UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

BEFORE THE

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED )

SAFETY-NET COST RECOVERY ) BPA DOCKET NO. ***SN-03***

ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE (SN CRAC) )

ADJUSTMENT TO 2002 )

WHOLESALE POWER RATES )

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

> **BRIEF ON EXCEPTIONS**
>
> **NW ENERGY COALITION**
>
> **SAVE OUR *WILD* SALMON COALITION**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**I. INTRODUCTION. 1**

**II. DEFICIENCIES OF LAW.**

**A. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO SOS/NWEC/s
ARGUMENTS..................................................................
1**

**B. FAILURE TO MEET THE COURT\'S REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE A REVIEWABLE
TEST OF WHETHER BPA MEETS ITS EQUITABLE TREATMENT MANDATE. 4**

**III. EXCEPTIONS TO SPECIFIC ISSUES INTRODUCED BY SA.
\...\...\...\...\...\... 6**

**2.1.3 Sound Business Principles
\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\.....
6**

2.7 Rate Design
\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...
7

**IV. CONCLUSION. 12**

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**CASES**

***. NW Environmental Defense Ctr v. BPA***, **117 F.3d 1520, 1534
(9^th^ Cir. 1997.)\...\...\..... 4**

**I. INTRODUCTION.**

In several significant ways, Bonneville\'s Draft ROD (\"DROD\") is an
improvement over its initial Proposal. The NW Energy Coalition and the
Save Our *Wild* Salmon Coalition (SOS/NWEC, or SA) are very supportive
of BPA\'s return to a TPP standard\--80-88%\--that is required by the
Fish and Wildlife Funding Principles and sound business principles.
Moreover, backing away from the extremely risky 50% TPP that was
originally proposed serves as a partial demonstration to those outside
the region that Bonneville can govern itself. We also support BPA\'s
decision to not put budget limits on fish and wildlife funding.

We use the words \"partial demonstration\" very deliberately, however.
For despite our belief that the DROD is superior to the initial
Proposal, it still has many flaws that will be discussed in detail
below. (1) Under the DROD, BPA will still be taking inordinate, but
wholly unnecessary risks, demonstrating that it has not learned the
lessons from its recent costly mistakes; (2) BPA has not complied with
its court-ordered requirement to demonstrate in a reviewable manner how
it is providing equitable treatment for fish; and, (3) Bonneville is
capping its planned expenditures for conservation on the eve of the
release of the Power Planning Council\'s new Power Plan, which violates
the Regional Act.

In addition, Bonneville has not provided a ToolKit run for parties to
review that would back up its claim of having a proposal that yields an
80% TPP. We suspect that the price caps and rebate mechanism described
in 2.7 have not been incorporated into the ToolKit. If they have not,
the real TPP may be much lower. We urge BPA to include those factors
into its final ToolKit calculation used to set the ultimate caps and
thresholds, while holding to the 80% TPP standard.

Finally, we must say that we were very disappointed in the quality and
integrity of the DROD\'s arguments. The document either fails to address
several significant issues raised by SA or distorts them so critically
that BPA\'s replies are irrelevant to the real issues SA presented. We
find this behavior professionally dishonest. By doing so, the agency
shows a lack of integrity and simply serves notice on the parties that
to influence this agency, one wastes time on reasoned testimony and
instead should focus on the political process that surrounds Bonneville.

**II. DEFICIENCIES OF LAW.** **II**

**A. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO SOS/NWEC/s ARGUMENTS.**

NWEC and SOS in its Testimony and Initial Brief proposed specific
changes to repair the flaws in Bonneville\'s initial proposal as regard
to risk, rate stability, adequacy of rates and equitable treatment to
fish, customers and the US Treasury. So as not to repeat those
arguments, we incorporate them here by reference. We do this not as a
*pro forma* \"throwaway\" line, but because BPA has failed to address in
the DROD many of our most important points. This failure puts SA at a
significant procedural disadvantage. By ignoring those arguments, BPA
does not have to put its response on the record for FERC or later 9^th^
Circuit review. Or, if BPA in its Final ROD *does* address these issues,
SA has been deprived of its only opportunity to correct the record.

In general BPA did not respond to our arguments. Instead, its tactic
seems to be to either ignore the important point, dwell on some trivial
side issue, or mischaracterize our point to create an easily vanquished
straw proposal.

For the record, (refer to our Brief and Testimony for detailed
arguments) the following arguments made by SA were simply ignored in the
DROD.

1.  [BPA\'s use of hydro-emergencies as a financial shock
    absorber]{.underline}. We provided an extensive discussion of how
    BPA\'s proposal violates BPA\'s equitable treatment mandate, because
    it relies upon the declaration of hydro-emergencies to provide a
    financial shock absorber for the rest of the system (SN-03-E-SA-01,
    pp.11-15), and an easy remedy. BPA did not address this issue or our
    remedy in the DROD.

2.  [The 1 year gap between BPA\'s proposed contingent SN CRAC mechanism
    and the 7(i) SN CRAC mechanism creates significant and unneeded risk
    for Bonneville]{.underline} (SN-03-E-SA-01, pp.9 and 14 and
    discussed extensively in oral argument). We also provide an easy
    remedy. The DROD repeatedly makes the claim\--in response to
    concerns by SA and CRITFC that BPA\'s rates or contingent CRAC are
    inadequate\--that it can always retrigger its 7(i) SN CRAC, but
    fails to discuss anywhere the issue of the year-long time gap
    created by its restrictions and the restrictions on the contingent
    CRAC. The DROD also fails to address SA\'s relatively simple
    remedies for this problem (e.g., triggering the contingent mechanism
    based on a forecast of \"bad news,\" instead of only accommodating
    \"good news.\")

**B. FAILURE TO MEET THE COURT\'S REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE A REVIEWABLE
TEST OF WHETHER BPA MEETS ITS EQUITABLE TREATMENT MANDATE.**

SA\'s Brief (SN-03-E-SA-01, pp 5-7) established that BPA has an
affirmative obligation to \"demonstrate, by means that allow for
meaningful review, that it has treated fish and wildlife equitably\" in
reaching its ratemaking decisions***. NW Environmental Defense Ctr v.
BPA***, 117 F.3d 1520, 1534 (9^th^ Cir. 1997.) Nowhere in BPA\'s
testimony or the DROD has that demonstration been made.

First, the DROD misinterprets BPA\'s responsibilities for equitable
treatment. The DROD states, \"BPA does wish to note that equitable
treatment applies to the regulation, management, and operation of the
hydrosystem, **not funding** per se. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i).\"
(DROD p.28-10, emphasis added.) However if one actually reads that
section of the Regional Act, it becomes clear that BPA\'s statement is
simply wrong. The phrase, \"managing, operating or regulating\" comes
from the previous subsection (839b(h)(11)(A) and is clearly used only to
[identify]{.underline} which agencies are covered by the equitable
treatment requirement, not to restrict their responsibilities: \"The
Administrator and other Federal agencies responsible for **managing,
operating, or regulating** Federal or non-Federal hydroelectric
facilities\...shall\--.\" (§ 839b(h)(11)(A) emphasis added.) §
839b(h)(11)(A)(i) then goes on to state that the agencies so identified
must \"exercise such responsibilities\...to adequately protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife\...in a manner that provides
equitable treatment for such fish and wildlife with the other purposes
for which such system and facilities are managed and operated.\" Clearly
the plain reading of the Regional Act does not exclude
[funding]{.underline} from BPA\'s responsibility to treat fish
equitably.

Moreover, if funding is excluded from the mix (i.e., if it only applies
to \"regulation, management, and operation of the hydrosystem\") then
the next step in that line of argument would be that BPA as an agency
has no equitable treatment responsibility. By law, BPA is not
responsible for \"regulation, management, and operation\" of the
hydrosystem. Their responsibility lies only in power marketing and
related decisions such as rate setting, and use of ratepayer dollars for
public purposes. Since the Administrator is specifically identified in
the language in question, however, it is very clear that BPA\'s fish and
wildlife funding decisions are very much subject to equitable treatment.

BPA then lays out its case for why it is meeting the equitable treatment
standard.

> By implementing the Council's program, the relevant NOAA Fisheries and
> FWS Biological Opinions, and the Basinwide Recovery Strategy, BPA is
> providing equitable treatment to fish and wildlife on a system‑wide
> basis as Congress intended. In response to litigation in 1994, NOAA
> Fisheries wrote a new 1995 FCRPS Biological Opinion and subsequently
> issued its 2000 Biological Opinion. Both Biological Opinions have
> resulted in significant and far‑reaching changes to hydrosystem
> operations. *See, e.g.,* Council, Second Annual Report to Northwest
> Governors at 21 (showing increased costs incurred subsequent to ESA
> listings and resulting changes in operations); SN‑03‑E‑CR‑01QQ. As for
> equitable treatment, the System Operations Review Environmental Impact
> Statement (SOR EIS) documented a comprehensive review of operating
> alternatives and their impacts on all operating purposes. The primary
> focus of the SOR EIS was fish and wildlife, and balancing the needs of
> fish and wildlife under the Northwest Power Act and ESA with energy
> production. In its SOR Record of Decision BPA resolved conflicts
> between power and fish in favor of fish by adopting the
> environmentally preferred alternative to implement the applicable NOAA
> Fisheries BiOp to insure hydrosystem operations will comply with these
> statutory responsibilities. *Id.*

This all may sound impressive, but it misses the mark. *NEDC* does not
direct BPA to list everything it is doing for fish. Instead it directs
BPA to \"demonstrate, by means that allow for meaningful review, that it
has treated fish and wildlife equitably.\" BPA must ask, and then answer
in a way that allows for meaningful review, the question, \"Do these
actions provide equitable treatment?\" BPA cannot just state that they
do. The question is inherently a [comparison]{.underline} between how
BPA treats fish and how it treats power and other uses of the system.
Explaining half the equation\--what it provides for fish\--doesn\'t
provide the needed comparison with what it does for power or other
purposes. For example, BPA must demonstrate that it provides an
equitable level of certainty that it will fund fish requirements and
provide spill and flow, to the same level it provides funding and
certainty for its power customers. BPA has not done this.

In particular, the DROD has the obligation to address our very
particular concern that BPA\'s proposed rate structure, especially the
1-year gap that is created by the peculiarly asymmetrical contingent
CRAC mechanism (which can go down but not up), combined with BPA\'s use
of hydro emergencies for financial reasons, is in itself inequitable
treatment. BPA has the obligation to show that a rate structure that
purposefully creates:(a) a one-year gap between when its contingent SN
CRAC and its 7(i) SN CRAC can provide funding; and, (b) emergency
criteria that can trigger before the 7(i) CRAC can act, treats power
equitably with fish.

**III.Number range level1 EXCEPTIONS TO SPECIFIC ISSUES INTRODUCED BY
SA.**

2.1.3 Sound Business Principles

Issue 1 Whether BPA's SN CRAC proposal is consistent with sound business
principles

Bonneville\'s response to this issue is to obfuscate a straightforward
concern brought by SA. Our concern was that Bonneville was deliberately
tying its hands by limiting its contingent SN CRAC\'s ability to react
to future events, especially during the one-year gap before the 7(i) SN
CRAC could start collecting money. BPA\'s long drawn-out answer simply
sidesteps this point, talking about balancing statutory objectives and
how budgets are set outside the 7i process. Instead of directly
addressing the issue raised by SA, BPA answers some other question it
seems to have dreamed up in its place.

Our issue is simple. No business following sound business practices
would deliberately tie its own hands to react to changes in its revenues
and costs that it could foresee. BPA can argue (and does in various
other places) that it doesn\'t think anything can go wrong\--that it\'s
very sure that the budget controls it has put into place will work, etc.
But, what if it doesn\'t rain very much one year and BPA has to start
the next year with low reservoirs? This happened in 2002 and caused BPA
to lose a lot of money compared to what it had forecast, even though the
total rainfall that year was about normal. Why not have the contingent
SN CRAC adjustment take that information into account when it sets rates
for the second year? This is what a business following sound business
practices would do. We wish BPA would simply answer the question and
justify why such a business would deliberately ignore such
information\--not argue that nothing can go wrong.

2.7 Rate Design

[Issue 2. Whether BPA should have a forward-looking trigger for the SN
CRAC, and]{.underline}

[Issue 7. Whether BPA should adopt a contingent recalculation of the SN
CRAC that modifies the Caps and Thresholds.]{.underline}

Again Bonneville twists and misinterprets the first question so as to
obfuscate the issue. But it is a straightforward issue brought up by SA
related to the previous one. If, as BPA proposes, its contingent SN CRAC
adjustment can adjust downward for foreseeable events that are likely to
occur, why not allow it to adjust upward for foreseeable events that
might raise its costs or lower its revenues? Instead, BPA first decides
in its rambling answer that SA is talking about the 7(i) SN CRAC rather
than the contingent SN CRAC. But BPA\'s own cite to our Brief makes it
clear that our concern was on the contingent SN CRAC, where we stated:
\"BPA\'s contingent SN CRAC adjustment proposal purposely ignores bad
forecasts.\" (SN-03-B-SA-01, p.14, line 16-7, emphasis added) BPA\'s
intellectual and professional laziness in making this kind of
\"mistake\" so as to sidestep the question is inexcusable.

Bonneville now continues its answer and mischaracterizes SA\'s position
again. BPA states, \"Allowing BPA to trigger the SN CRAC beyond the
current fiscal year for events that have not yet occurred and could be
mitigated through other actions would place unfair pressure on
ratepayers.\" (DROD 2.7-4 emphasis added) But our proposal was not to
trigger the SN CRAC if other actions could mitigate the need, only to
trigger it if necessary. BPA is putting words into our mouths. Of course
we would not advocate raising rates if other actions could mitigate the
need! It is unprofessional for BPA to use sophomoric debating tricks
when discussing these issues.

In the last few sentences of its answer, BPA gives another reason why it
does not support a forward-looking SN CRAC. BPA states,

> While a cost due to regulatory change may be foreseeable in the
> future, there are also a significant number of other unknown factors
> that could impact positively BPA's ability to make its treasury
> payment. Because market prices and hydro conditions are unknown until
> the actual fiscal year, triggering the SN CRAC based upon a predicted
> future cost event could result in BPA unnecessarily increasing rates.
> id.

While it is always true that unknown factors may counteract bad news,
they can also counter good news. Interestingly, Bonneville does not seem
to think that makes its own contingent SN CRAC\'s ability to adjust for
future good news a bad idea. BPA is also concerned here that it might
unnecessarily increase rates. But it shows no concern that it might
unnecessarily have rates that are too low to ensure paying Treasury or
to ensure that it will not have to trigger a hydro emergency for
financial reasons. (These are examples of Bonneville logic where if an
argument cuts both ways it does not seem to matter.) One should also
note the asymmetrical consequences of being wrong. If rates are too
high, BPA has proposed a mechanism to return that money to ratepayers
fairly quickly. On the other hand, if rates are too low, BPA may miss
its Treasury payment (unlikely), or feel it needs to declare a hydro
emergency and lean on fish (very likely, given BPA\'s refusal to even
mention the issue in the DROD, much less foreswear its use as a means to
provide a financial insurance policy.) Thus the negative consequences
from not having a forward looking contingent mechanism are much more
severe than the negative consequences\-- a temporary overcollection from
ratepayers\--of not having one.

Bonneville also argues that it is very sure that bad news will not
occur. The DROD states, \"While in theory it is possible that there
could be changes to the budgets between now and the time of the
contingent recalculation, it is a small risk.\" (DROD 2.7-19) That is
nice to hear, but given BPA and the region\'s track record of the past
few years, and given Judge Redden\'s decision, and other unknowable
events, and no demonstrable need to tie BPA\'s hands, if it turns out
that BPA\'s prediction of no future problems is correct, than no harm
has been done.

Finally, BPA repeats the argument that if something bad does happen, the
variable adjustment mechanism it is proposing will take care of it:
\"Even if these \[costs\] did increase, the variable nature of the rate
design will allow BPA to recover any increases in the comparisons
between ANR and the SN CRAC Thresholds shortly before the start of FY
2004 through FY 2006.\" id. This argument is also used in response to
the claim by CRITFC and SA that BPA has failed to account for the risk
that the recent court decision by Judge Redden invalidating the current
BiOp may result in more costs. BPA states, \"\...if BPA does experience
increased costs, the SN CRAC is designed to ensure BPA recovers its
total costs.\" (DROD 2.8-4) This argument is factually wrong. BPA\'s
variable mechanism is not designed to deal with unknown events outside
certain limited parameters, and is certainly not designed to ensure that
\"BPA recovers its total costs.\" Instead, it is designed with caps and
thresholds restricting it to deal only with the uncertainties modeled in
the ToolKit. These other risks were purposely not modeled or included in
BPA\'s TPP calculation. This is another reason that we conclude BPA\'s
claim that its TPP is 80%. Clearly that is overstated.

Issue 10. Whether BPA should limit the spending levels it can collect
from the SN CRAC and include a mechanism to reflect them in GRSPs.

We applaud BPA for not including fish and wildlife costs, both internal
and by the Corps and Bureau, in the proposed spending caps. As we and
CRITFC made clear in our testimony, there are many uncertainties related
to BPA\'s future fish obligations, so caps would be imprudent.

However, that said, SA does not believe that BPA has adequately
accounted for the risk to fish and other public purpose programs that
capping even some costs creates. Therefore, we recommend that BPA remove
the budget spending limits from its proposal. The problem with any
spending limits is that they effectively increase BPA\'s risk and lower
its TPP. Costs not recoverable via the contingent adjustment will lower
BPA\'s TPP and make it more likely that a Treasury payment will be
missed and/or the 7(i) SN CRAC retriggered. As we discussed extensively,
increased risk for BPA translates directly into increased risks that
fish operations will be curtailed or fish spending delayed or
eliminated, because retriggering the 7(i) process takes at least a year
before rates are increased. BPA has continually assured us that it has
its costs under control, and thus need not eliminate or raise the
recovery caps from its contingent SN CRAC mechanism or adjust its
proposal in any other manner so as to account for what BPA feels is the
tiny probability that it cannot control its costs. So we must ask, if
BPA is so sure that costs won\'t go up, why does it resist accommodating
our irrational fears? BPA has replied that it wishes to accommodate the
small irrational fears of its customers, and they, presumably, count
more than other constituencies.

This is not a trivial concern. BPA has stated that the reason it is
implementing budget limits is that it, \"\...will do much to
re-establish the trust between BPA and its customers.\" (DROD 2.7-29)
There can be no other reason, obviously, because Bonneville itself does
not need to have budget limits in the GRSPs in order to get it to manage
its costs. Pointedly, nowhere is there mention of a similar gesture to
re-establish the trust between BPA and the public interest community and
tribes. This policy tilt in the direction of lower rates at the expense
of the public interest is serious and objectionable. (It is also another
example of inequitable treatment that BPA has failed to justify. The
risk that uncontrollable costs may emerge puts a risk on both customers
and fish, but BPA\'s contingent proposal shifts that toward fish while
providing extra assurance for customers.) Bonneville should set its
policies based on the record and good public policy. There is no place
for favoritism that \"restores trust\" with some constituents while
destroying trust with others. This policy, and especially its rationale,
is offensive to those of us who have in good faith worked with
Bonneville for many years.

Another problem with BPA\'s proposal is that among the categories of
costs it proposes to limit is \"Conservation Initiatives.\" (DROD
2.7-30) This proposal is \"penny-wise, but pound-foolish.\" It also
violates the Regional Act §839b(d)(2) by restricting the
Administrator\'s ability to act consistent with the Power Council\'s
Power Plan. This is especially important given the fact that the Council
is on the verge of releasing its 5^th^ Plan, whose preliminary estimate
of cost-effective conservation available to the region has doubled since
the 4^th^ Plan. If, as expected, the 5^th^ Plan recommends that BPA
acquire more of its resources through conservation, BPA must be allowed
to increase funding levels in this budget category. IIINumber range
level1

**IV. CONCLUSION.**

SOS/NWEC is strongly supportive of BPA\'s intent in this DROD to use
some of the revenues produced by the positive events of the past few
months to increase its TPP. Maintaining the original proposed 50% TPP
after these events would have been extremely imprudent. That low of a
TPP represents a level of risk-taking that could only be justified by
extreme conditions and with unparalleled regional consensus. Those
conditions did not exist when BPA\'s Proposal was first aired, and they
certainly do not exist now.

However, despite that one very important improvement in BPA\'s Proposal,
the DROD still represents a failure to learn from the lessons of the
recent past. As we have detailed above, the DROD still takes
unacceptable risks for little gain or reason: tying BPA\'s ability to
react to future events (even when they can be reliably forecast long in
advance); putting unacceptable pressure on BPA to restrict hydro
operations and reduce and delay needed fish investments; and limiting
its ability to ramp up conservation as may be required when the Council
releases its 5^th^ Power Plan.

It is our firm opinion after reading the DROD that Bonneville still does
not take risk seriously, even after the events of the last few years
proved that no one can predict the future very well. It is interesting
that many people inside BPA seem to share our concern with risk. We
illustrate this with some excerpts from a May 6, 2003 internal
Bonneville survey entitled, [Learning from the Financial Crisis: BPA at
a Crossroads]{.underline}.

> Interviewees believe decision-makers need to more fully comprehend and
> apply risk concepts, \[avoiding\] trusting in uncertain events to
> cover very certain costs\.... p.5
>
> Interviewees sense that, if executives and managers better understood
> risk management concepts, they would put more value on capturing risk
> exposure in staff analyses. p.5
>
> Our decision processes should more adequately explore the costs and
> risks of alternatives as they relate to our business outcomes. p.7
>
> Interviewees discussed situations in which decision-makers thought
> they made reasonable decisions, but where unintended results now
> plague BPA. p.7
>
> Our decision processes should more adequately explore the costs and
> risks of alternatives as they relate to our business outcomes.
> Discussions noted that decision processes (1) include cost and risk
> analyses that are insufficient in scope, (2) don't reflect an
> enterprise wide risk management structure and process, and (3) often
> lack adequate time for informed decision-making. Several interviewees
> said that rate case analyses have never been accompanied by a risk
> analysis showing the probability of certain events and the potential
> cost/risk of those events. They said an improved rate case would
> include a complete risk and cost analysis associated with the
> different scenarios, ascertaining outcomes that lie in the risk tails
> and developing explicit contingency plans to deal with such outcomes.
> p.7-8

There are numerous similar comments. We do not present them as
\"evidence\" that BPA has problems dealing with issues of risk, but only
to show that our concerns are not uncommon nor unreasonable. We ask that
BPA take our concerns more seriously than they seem to have done and be
less self-confident that it knows what the future will bring. NWEC and
SOS have a very good track record when it comes to predicting the
problems Bonneville has gotten itself into in the past, and we hope that
the agency will rethink some of the risky practices it is advocating in
the DROD. Our remedies are not costly, but would provide BPA much-needed
protection against uncertainty.

For the reasons stated above, NWEC and SOS on behalf of its members urge
the Administrator to consider these exceptions.

1.  BPA should allow the contingent SN CRAC adjustment to be
    symmetrical: reacting to both good or bad news.

2.  BPA should foreswear the use of hydro emergencies for financial
    purposes.

3.  BPA should not adopt any proposed budget limits collectible via the
    contingent SN CRAC. If Bonneville decides to not follow this
    recommendation, it should at least not adopt a budget limit for its
    Conservation Initiatives.

+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Dated: June 18, 2003                 | Respectfully Submitted,       |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
|                                      | LINDA K. WILLIAMS             |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | OSB No. 78425                 |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | 10266 S.W. Lancaster Road     |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | Portland, OR 97219            |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | \(503\) 293-0399 fax 245-2772 |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | lawyer@teleport.com           |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | Attorney for NWEC and SOS     |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+