Department of Justice

**[Office of the Inspector General]{.underline}**

**[Estimates for FY 2008 Congressional Budget]{.underline}**

**[Table of Contents]{.underline}**

**[Page No.]{.underline}**

**I. Overview**
........................................................................
1

## 

**II. Summary of Program Changes**
............................................ 3

**III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language**
4

## IV. Decision Unit Justification .................................................. 5

A. OIG
................................................................................
5

Program Description
............................................................ 5

Performance Measurements
................................................\.... 6

Performance and Resources Table
............................................ 20

Performance, Resources, and Strategies
...................................... 28

Program Increases
............\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\...\.....
28

**V. Exhibits**

A. Organization Chart
............................................................. . 31

B. Summary of Requirements
................................................\...\... 32

C. Program Increases/Offsets by Decision Unit
................................ 34

D. Resources by DOJ Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective
............... 35

E. Justification for Base Adjustments
........................................... 36

F. Crosswalk of 2006 Availability
.............................................\... 38

G. Crosswalk of 2007 Availability
..........................................\...\... 39

H. Summary of Reimbursable Resources
....................................... 40

I. Detail of Permanent Positions by Category
.................................. 41

J. Financial Analysis of Program Changes
..................................... 42

K. Summary of Requirements by Grade
........................................ 43

L. Summary of Requirements by Object Class
..............................\... 44

M. Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and Evaluations
45

# I. Overview for Office of the Inspector General

#  FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request 

# 

**1. Introduction**

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was statutorily established in
the Department of Justice (Department) on April 14, 1989. The OIG
investigates allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct by
Department employees, contractors, and grantees and promotes economy and
efficiency in Department operations. The OIG is an independent entity
within the Department that reports to both the Attorney General and
Congress on issues that affect the Department's personnel or operations.

The OIG has jurisdiction over Department employees in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP);

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO); and other Offices,
Boards, and Divisions. The OIG investigates alleged violations of
criminal and civil law, regulations, and ethical standards arising from
the conduct of Department employees in their numerous and diverse
activities. The OIG also audits and inspects Department programs and
assists management in promoting integrity, economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness.

In fiscal year (FY) 2008, the Department's top priority will continue to
be detecting and preventing terrorism. The Department requested more
than \$3.4 billion towards that effort in

FY 2007. The Department also estimates that it will request \$2.2
billion for information technology (IT) annually. The OIG, through its
audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews, will help ensure that
the substantial funding provided to support these Attorney General
priorities are used efficiently, effectively, and for their intended
purposes.

The OIG is committed to assisting the Attorney General and Congress in
overseeing the use of counterterrorism resources, strengthening the
Department's internal financial systems, improving grant management and
accountability, ensuring the effectiveness and security of computer
systems, and promoting public confidence in the integrity of the
Department's programs and employees. The OIG's request for FY 2008
totals \$73,208,000, 439 full-time permanent positions, and 425 direct
workyears. This request represents an adjustment-to-base increase of
\$2,896,000, and program enhancements for 5 positions, 3 workyears and
\$460,000 for Counterterrorism Oversight.

The OIG helps the Department pursue its strategic goals and objectives
through its investigations, audits, inspections, and program reviews.
The OIG has two general goals that support the Department's strategic
goals: To "detect and deter misconduct in programs and operations within
or financed by the Department," and to "promote the efficiency and
effectiveness of Department programs and operations." To meet the first
goal, the OIG targets investigative resources on allegations of fraud,
bribery, civil rights violations, theft, sexual crimes, and official
misconduct against Department employees or others who conduct business
with the Department. To meet the second goal, the OIG targets resources
on reviews of Department programs to promote the economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness of those programs.

To be successful, the OIG must deal with a variety of internal and
external challenges that affect its work. These include the decisions
Department employees make while carrying out their numerous and diverse
duties that may increase or decrease the number of allegations the OIG
receives; Department support for the OIG's fulfillment of its duties and
responsibilities; and financial support from the Office of Management
and Budget and Congress.

The OIG's biggest internal challenge is in the area of human capital.
The OIG is working to ensure that it continues to hire employees who
have the appropriate skill sets for its complex mission.

> Finally, the OIG has not been selected for a Program Assessment Rating
> Tool (PART) review.
>
> **[Note:]{.underline}** Beginning in FY 2007, electronic copies of the
> Department of Justice's congressional budget justifications and
> Capital Asset Plan and Business Case exhibits can be viewed or
> downloaded from the Internet using the Internet address:
>
> **[http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008justification/]{.underline}**.
>
> **II. Summary of Program Changes**

+--------------+------------------------------+----+----+------+----+
| **Office of  |                              |    |    |      |    |
| the          |                              |    |    |      |    |
| Inspector    |                              |    |    |      |    |
| General**    |                              |    |    |      |    |
|              |                              |    |    |      |    |
| (\$ in       |                              |    |    |      |    |
| thousands)   |                              |    |    |      |    |
+--------------+------------------------------+----+----+------+----+
| **Item       | **Description**              | ** | *  | **D  | ** |
| Name**       |                              | Po | *F | olla | Pa |
|              |                              | s. | TE | rs** | ge |
|              |                              | ** | ** |      | ** |
+--------------+------------------------------+----+----+------+----+
| **Coun       | The OIG is requesting 3      | *  | *  | *    | ** |
| terterrorism | auditors,                    | *5 | *3 | *\$4 | 28 |
| Oversight**  |                              | ** | ** | 60** | ** |
|              | 1 program analyst and 1      |    |    |      |    |
|              | attorney for                 |    |    |      |    |
|              | Counterterrorism Oversight.  |    |    |      |    |
+--------------+------------------------------+----+----+------+----+
|              | **Total**                    | *  | *  | *    |    |
|              |                              | *5 | *3 | *\$4 |    |
|              |                              | ** | ** | 60** |    |
+--------------+------------------------------+----+----+------+----+

> **III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations
> Language**
>
> **Appropriations Language**
>
> **OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**
>
> **Salaries and Expenses**
>
> *[For necessary expenses of the Office of Inspector General,
> \$73,208,000, including not to exceed \$10,000 to meet unforeseen
> emergencies of a confidential character]{.underline}.*
>
> **Analysis of Appropriations Language**
>
> No substantive changes proposed.
>
> **Note:** The FY 2008 President's Budget uses the FY 2007 President's
> Budget language as a base so all language is presented as new.

# IV. Decision Unit Justification 

**A. OIG**

The OIG is one decision unit.

  --------------------------------------- --------- --------- ------------
  OIG                                     Perm.     FTE       Amount
                                          Pos.                

  2006 Enacted w/Rescissions and          449       449       67,922,000
  Supplementals                                               

  2007 Estimate                           449       459       69,852,000

  Adjustments to Base and Technical       -15       -14       2,896,000
  Adjustments                                                 

  2008 Current Services                   434       445       72,748,000

  2008 Program Increases                  5         3         460,000

  2008 Offsets                            ...       ...       ...

  2008 Request                            439       448       73,208,000

  Total Change 2007-2008                  5         3         3,356,000
  --------------------------------------- --------- --------- ------------

Note: The FTEs above include reimbursables.

1\. Program Description

The OIG operates as a single decision unit encompassing audits,
inspections, investigations, and reviews.

**PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS**

Because of the nature of its work, the OIG provides both qualitative
(narrative) and quantitative (indicators) performance information to
better enable the Department, Congress, and public to assess the value
of the work it performs. That information follows.

The OIG does not set targets for certain law enforcement activities
since those measures could be construed as "bounty hunting." For such
law enforcement measures, the OIG reports historical results.

In addition, consistent with previous budget submissions, the
performance indicators cover all of the OIG's programs, whether funded
from direct appropriations or reimbursements.

**[Examples of Recent OIG Reviews]{.underline}**

**The FBI's Sentinel Case Management System**

Since 2002, the OIG has reviewed and monitored the FBI's efforts to
upgrade its IT systems. The most recent effort is the FBI's Sentinel
program, a project to replace the FBI's antiquated Automated Case
Support system with a modern case management system.

In March 2006, the OIG released the first in a series of audits that
will monitor the FBI's development and implementation of the Sentinel
project. Sentinel is the successor to the

\$170 million Virtual Case File (VCF) project that the FBI ended
unsuccessfully after 3 years. Reviews by the OIG found that the VCF
project failed for a variety of reasons, including poorly defined and
slowly evolving design requirements, weak IT investment management
practices, weaknesses in the way contractors were retained and overseen,
the lack of management continuity at the FBI on IT projects, unrealistic
scheduling of tasks, and inadequate resolution of issues that warned of
problems in project development.

In light of these issues, the OIG's March 2006 audit evaluated the FBI's
progress on the Sentinel project. We assessed the FBI's pre-acquisition
planning for Sentinel, including the approach, design, cost, funding
sources, time frame, contracting vehicle, and oversight structure. The
OIG found that the FBI has taken important steps to help prevent the
types of problems encountered in the VCF project. In reviewing the
management processes and controls the FBI has applied to the
pre-acquisition phase of Sentinel, the OIG found that the FBI has
developed IT planning processes that, if implemented as designed, can
help the FBI successfully complete Sentinel.

In particular, the OIG found that the FBI has made improvements in its
ability to plan and manage a major IT project by establishing IT
Investment Management processes, developing a more mature Enterprise
Architecture, and establishing a Program Management Office (PMO)
dedicated to the Sentinel project.

However, the OIG identified several continuing concerns about the FBI's
management of the Sentinel project: (1) the incomplete staffing of the
Sentinel Program Management Office, (2) the FBI's ability to reprogram
funds to complete the second phase of the project without jeopardizing
its mission-critical operations, (3) Sentinel's ability to share
information with external intelligence and law enforcement agencies and
provide a common framework for other agencies' case management systems,
(4) the lack of an established Earned Value Management process, (5) the
FBI's ability to track and control Sentinel's costs, and (6) the lack of
complete documentation required by the FBI's IT Investment Management
processes.

In addition, while the FBI has considered its internal needs in
developing Sentinel's requirements, the OIG review expressed concerned
that the FBI had not yet adequately examined or discussed Sentinel's
ability to connect with external systems in other Department components,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other intelligence
community agencies. If such connectivity is not built into Sentinel's
design, other agencies could be forced into costly and time-consuming
modifications to their systems to allow information sharing with the
Sentinel system.

In December 2006, we issued the second Sentinel audit and found that the
FBI has made significant progress in addressing many of the concerns
highlighted in our first audit. However, some concerns still remain, and
we also identified several additional issues, such as an uncertainty
over total project costs and a lack of contingency planning for
identified project risks that warrant continued monitoring by the FBI.
This report contains 5 recommendations that focus on further reducing
risks to the Sentinel project, including updating the estimate of total
project costs as actual cost data becomes available, developing
contingency plans for significant project risks, and filling vacancies
in the Sentinel PMO.  The FBI concurred with all our recommendations. 

In early 2007, the OIG will open its third review of the Sentinel
project.

**The FBI's Efforts to Protect the Nation's Seaports**

In March 2006, the OIG released an audit report that examined the FBI's
efforts to protect

U.S. seaports from terrorism. The United States has more than 360
seaports, and 95 percent of overseas trade flows through these ports or
inland waterways, which often are located near major population centers.
The protection of U.S. seaports is a shared responsibility among the
DHS, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and FBI. The
Coast Guard protects and enforces laws at seaports while the Customs and
Border Protection enforces import and export laws and inspects cargo at
seaports. The FBI, as the lead federal agency for preventing and
investigating terrorism, has an overarching role in protecting the
nation's seaports, which includes gathering intelligence on maritime
threats and maintaining well-prepared tactical capabilities to prevent
or respond to maritime-based terrorism. Because of the number of
different agencies involved with the nation's seaport security efforts,
the issue of efficient and effective information sharing takes on vital
importance.

The OIG review of the FBI's efforts to protect the nation's seaports
found that since the September 11 attacks, the FBI has taken steps to
enhance its capability to identify, prevent, and respond to terrorist
attacks at seaports. For example, the FBI has created a centralized
maritime security program at FBI Headquarters and, in addition to its
counterterrorist tactical teams, has placed enhanced maritime SWAT teams
in the FBI field offices closest to 14 of the nation's strategic
seaports. Further, most of the FBI's 56 field offices have Maritime
Liaison Agents responsible for coordinating with other federal agencies
on maritime security.

However, we found that the FBI does not always assign these agents
according to the threat and risk of a terrorist attack on a given
seaport. For example, an FBI field office with six significant seaports
in its territory has only one maritime liaison agent while another FBI
field office with no strategic ports in its area has five maritime
liaison agents.

Furthermore, the OIG review found that the FBI and the Coast Guard have
not yet resolved issues regarding their overlapping responsibilities,
jurisdictions, and capabilities to handle a maritime terrorism incident.
We believe a lack of jurisdictional clarity could hinder the FBI's and
the Coast Guard's ability to coordinate an effective response to a
terrorist threat or incident in the maritime domain. Specifically, the
report expressed concern about how confusion over authorities will
affect the two agencies' ability to establish a clear and effective
incident command structure in response to a terrorist attack on a
seaport. In our judgment, unless such differences over roles and
authorities are resolved, the response to a maritime incident could be
confused and potentially disastrous.

The OIG report made 18 recommendations that focus on specific steps that
the FBI should take to improve its counterterrorism efforts regarding
seaport and maritime activities, including resolving overlapping
responsibilities with the Coast Guard before a terrorist incident
occurs; leading more interagency maritime-related exercises involving
likely terrorism scenarios; preparing and using after-action reports
after these exercises in order to identify lessons learned; and
assessing the threat and risk of maritime terrorism compared to other
threats and assigning resources accordingly.

**Review of the Terrorist Screening Center**

In December 2003, the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) began operating
as the nation's single point of contact for law enforcement authorities
requesting assistance in the identification of individuals with possible
ties to terrorism. The OIG's June 2005 audit report on TSC operations
found that TSC management successfully created a new organization and
consolidated vast amounts and types of terrorist information, which are
significant accomplishments. However, our review found several areas of
TSC operations needing improvement. The creation of the consolidated
database, a phased approach that continues to evolve, has weaknesses
that need to be addressed. Database controls and improved search
capabilities are necessary to ensure that watchlist data is safeguarded,
database history is retained, and call screeners are able to readily
identify individuals encountered. Procedures for verifying the
completeness and accuracy of records within the TSC database also need
to be enhanced to ensure that records are included in a timely manner,
all record information consolidated into the database is complete and
accurate, and measures taken to ensure any missing, conflicting, or
duplicate information is identified and resolved on a regular basis.
Further, a lack of sufficient training, oversight, and general
management of the call screeners has left the activities of the call
center vulnerable to procedural errors, poor data entry, and untimely
responses to callers.

The OIG report provided 40 recommendations to the TSC to address areas
such as database improvements, data accuracy and completeness, call
center management, operational planning, coordination between
participating agencies, and staffing. The TSC generally agreed with the
recommendations and said it was in the process of taking corrective
action.

In late 2006, we initiated a follow-up audit of the TSC.  Our objectives
are to determine if accurate and complete records are disseminated to
and from the watchlist database in a timely fashion; review the TSC's
efforts to ensure the quality of the information in the watchlist
database; and assess the TSC's ability to correct records where
individuals are incorrectly identified as watchlist subjects.

[The BOP's Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk
Inmates](http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/BOP/e0609/final.pdf)

In September 2006, the OIG issued a report that evaluated the BOP's
efforts to prevent terrorists and other high-risk inmates from using the
mail or the cover of a foreign language to commit criminal or terrorist
activities. The OIG review concluded that the BOP's monitoring of inmate
mail and other forms of communication was deficient in several
respects: 1) the BOP does not read all the mail for terrorists and other
high--risk inmates on its mail monitoring lists, 2) the BOP does not
have enough proficient translators to translate inmate mail written in
foreign languages, and 3) the BOP does not have sufficient staff trained
in intelligence techniques to analyze whether terrorists' communications
contain suspicious content. In addition to the deficiencies in its mail
monitoring efforts, the OIG also found that the BOP is unable to
effectively monitor high-risk inmates' verbal communications, which
include telephone calls, visits with family and friends, and cellblock
conversations.

According to BOP officials, BOP staff is expected to read 100 percent of
the mail for inmates placed on mail monitoring lists. However, staff
members at 7 of the 10 institutions that we visited told us they were
not reading 100 percent of the mail for these inmates, and the
percentage of mail read had decreased since FY 2005 due to staff
reallocations.

BOP staff also randomly read the mail of inmates not on monitoring lists
in order to gather intelligence. However, staff at seven institutions
told us that the high volume of mail, short processing deadlines, and
staff reallocations have resulted in a decrease in the amount of random
reading of inmate mail.

In addition, the OIG found that the BOP does not have adequate
agency-wide procedures for translating inmate mail written in a foreign
language. Instead, the BOP relies primarily on BOP staff volunteers to
translate mail as a collateral duty. We also found shortcomings in the
BOP's translation efforts, including the fact that: 1) the BOP does not
ensure that the staff used to translate inmate communications meet
language proficiency requirements, 2) the BOP does not have enough staff
members fluent in foreign languages to provide necessary translations,
and 3) BOP supervisors do not consistently support translating as a
collateral duty for their staff.

In general, we found that the BOP's intelligence capability to analyze
the contents of terrorist inmates' mail is not well developed. The BOP
offers only limited intelligence training to its staff to enable them to
identify suspicious content in the mail of terrorist inmates. The OIG
also found that the BOP was not meeting its own internal goals for
telephone monitoring of high-risk inmates, and thus, may be missing
opportunities to gather intelligence about terrorist or criminal
activity. In addition, we found that the Department does not have a
policy requiring that all inmates arrested for international
terrorism-related crimes be reviewed to determine whether they should be
placed under Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), the most
restrictive conditions that can be placed on an inmate's communications.
We concluded that unless such a review is required, there is no
guarantee that international terrorist inmates will receive the
heightened security and communications monitoring they require during
incarceration.

The OIG review also reported on the BOP's ongoing and proposed
initiatives that should help improve the monitoring of communications
for terrorists and other high-risk inmates. The BOP initiatives include
building stronger foreign language translation and intelligence analysis
capabilities through increased training of staff and use of electronic
tools such as translation software, enhancing information sharing
between its databases that contain information on inmate communications
to facilitate intelligence analyses, consolidating terrorist inmates in
a few institutions in order to concentrate the resources required to
monitor them, limiting the volume of mail and other types of
communication available to terrorists or other high-risk inmates, and
attempting to eliminate unsolicited "junk mail" for inmates.

The OIG made 13 recommendations designed to strengthen these initiatives
and provide additional improvements to the BOP's monitoring of mail and
verbal communications of terrorists and high-risk inmates. Two
additional recommendations were addressed to the FBI and the Criminal
Division. The BOP, Criminal Division, and FBI concurred with all 15
recommendations and have begun to develop plans to implement these
recommendations.

**September 2005 Shooting Incident Involving the FBI and Ojeda Rios**

In August 2006, the OIG issued a report examining the September 2005
shooting incident involving the FBI and long-time fugitive Filiberto
Ojeda Rios, leader of a Puerto Rican pro-independence organization that
claimed credit for various violent crimes during the late 1970s and
1980s. Journalists, elected officials, and activists in Puerto Rico
criticized the FBI for using excessive force to capture Ojeda and for
waiting 18 hours after Ojeda was shot before entering his residence,
thereby allowing Ojeda to bleed to death. The FBI Director requested
that the OIG conduct an investigation to determine the facts and
circumstances of the Ojeda shooting incident and to make recommendations
regarding what actions, if any, the FBI should take in connection with
it.

The OIG's objective in conducting this review was to investigate the
facts relating to the incident: (1) to determine whether the FBI agents
involved in the operation complied with the Department's Deadly Force
Policy, (2) to assess the FBI's decision to conduct an emergency
daylight assault of the Ojeda residence in light of other potential
options for apprehending Ojeda, (3) to assess the FBI's planning for and
conduct of negotiations with Ojeda during a standoff following an
initial exchange of gunfire, (4) to determine the reasons the FBI waited
18 hours after the shooting to enter the residence, and (5) to evaluate
communications between the FBI, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
public regarding the operation.

The OIG investigation was conducted by a team of OIG attorneys and
special agents. In the course of the investigation, the OIG interviewed
over 60 individuals, including the FBI agents involved in the attempted
arrest of Ojeda, FBI Headquarters officials, officials from the

USAO's Office in Puerto Rico, and officials from the Department of
Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Police of Puerto
Rico. The OIG also conducted lengthy interviews of the Executive
Director of the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences, and other
scientists involved in preparing the forensic reports. In addition, the
OIG reviewed thousands of pages of documents generated by the FBI and
the USAO relating to the Ojeda matter, and relevant forensic reports
prepared by the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences, including
the autopsy report, bullet and shell casing analyses, trajectory
analysis, shooting reconstruction, and blood pattern analysis. Finally,
the OIG consulted with three outside experts in tactical police
operations to provide expert input and guidance on the FBI's tactical
decisions in the Ojeda operation and application of the Department's
Deadly Force Policy.

The OIG investigation found that Ojeda opened fire on the federal agents
as they attempted to enter his residence in Puerto Rico. Three FBI
agents were shot and one was seriously wounded. The OIG concluded that
once Ojeda began firing he posed an imminent danger of death or serious
injury to the agents and that under the Department's Deadly Force Policy
the agents were justified in returning fire at Ojeda. The report also
examined the reasons that the agents did not enter the residence until
more than 18 hours after Ojeda was shot. The OIG concluded that the
FBI's cautious approach toward entering the residence after Ojeda was
shot was motivated by consideration of agent safety, not by any desire
to withhold medical treatment from Ojeda or to let him die.

However, the OIG report cited deficiencies in several aspects of the
planning and execution of the attempted arrest. For example, the
investigation determined that the decision to conduct an emergency
daylight assault to arrest Ojeda on September 23 was extremely dangerous
and was not the best option available. The OIG concluded that a strategy
of surrounding the residence and calling for Ojeda to surrender, with
the option of using chemical agents such as tear gas to force Ojeda
outside, would have been a safer and more effective strategy. The report
made 10 systemic recommendations intended to improve the planning and
conduct of future FBI arrest operations, including assuring the
reconsideration of all relevant tactical options when circumstances
change and ensuring that negotiations are integrated into tactical
planning for operations in which a standoff is a foreseeable
contingency.

**The FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Matter**

In January 2006, the OIG issued a report on the FBI's conduct in
connection with the identification of a fingerprint found on evidence
from the March 2004 terrorism attack on commuter trains in Madrid,
Spain, that killed almost 200 people and injured more than 1,400. FBI
fingerprint examiners erroneously concluded that the fingerprint found
on a bag of detonators belonged to Brandon Mayfield, an attorney in
Portland, Oregon. As a result of the misidentification, the FBI
initiated an investigation of Mayfield that resulted in his arrest as a
material witness. Mayfield was released 2 weeks later when the Spanish
National Police identified an Algerian national as the source of the
fingerprint on the bag. The FBI Laboratory subsequently withdrew its
fingerprint identification of Mayfield.

During its review, the OIG found several factors that caused the FBI's
fingerprint misidentification. The unusual similarity between Mayfield's
fingerprint and the fingerprint found on the bag (referred to as LFP 17)
confused three experienced FBI examiners and a court-appointed expert.
However, we also found that FBI examiners committed errors in the
examination procedure, and the misidentification could have been
prevented through a more rigorous application of several principles of
latent fingerprint identification. For example, the examiners placed
excessive reliance on extremely tiny details in the latent fingerprint
under circumstances that should have indicated that these features were
not a reliable support for the identification. The examiners also
overlooked or rationalized several important differences in appearance
between the latent print and Mayfield's known fingerprint that should
have precluded them from declaring an identification. In addition, we
determined that the FBI missed an opportunity to catch its error when
the Spanish National Police informed the FBI on April 13, 2004, that it
had reached a "negative" conclusion with respect to matching LFP 17 to
Mayfield's fingerprints.

Although the OIG determined that religion played no role in the FBI
examiners' initial conclusions, we found that by the time the Spanish
National Police issued its "negative" conclusion, Laboratory examiners
had become aware of information about Mayfield obtained in the course of
the Portland Division's investigation, including the fact that he had
acted as an attorney for a convicted terrorist, had contacts with
suspected terrorists, and was Muslim. We believe that these factors
likely contributed to the examiners' failure to sufficiently reconsider
the identification after the Spanish National Police raised legitimate
questions about it.

We also found that certain facts in affidavits the FBI submitted to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon to obtain a material
witness warrant and search warrants were misleading. The affidavits
contained several inaccuracies and provided an ambiguous description of
a meeting between the FBI and the Spanish National Police that led the
Court to incorrectly believe that the Spanish National Police agreed
with the FBI's identification of Mayfield.

The OIG did not find evidence that the FBI misused any of the provisions
of the *USA PATRIOT Act* (Patriot Act) in conducting its investigation
of Mayfield. However, the increased information sharing permitted by the
Patriot Act amplified the consequences of the FBI's fingerprint
misidentification.

We made a series of recommendations to help the FBI address the
Laboratory issues raised by the Mayfield case. The FBI said that its
Laboratory is planning to adopt new procedures that are consistent with
a majority of our recommendations.

**The FBI's Oversight of Counterintelligence Asset Katrina Leung**

In May 2006, the OIG issued a classified report examining the FBI's
handling and oversight of Katrina Leung, one of the FBI's most highly
paid counterintelligence assets. Leung and her FBI handler of 18 years,
Special Agent James J. Smith, were arrested in April 2003 after an FBI
investigation revealed that Leung had been actively spying for the
People's Republic of China against the United States. The FBI's
investigation also revealed that Leung and Smith had been involved in an
intimate relationship for nearly 20 years. Following the arrests of
Smith and Leung, the FBI Director asked the OIG to review the
performance and management issues relating to this case.

The OIG investigation was conducted by a team of OIG attorneys and
agents. In the course of the investigation, the OIG conducted over 120
interviews and reviewed more than 330,000 pages of documents. The OIG
report found that Smith operated Leung with little oversight based
primarily on his status as a top agent in Los Angeles and Leung's status
as a highly valued asset. The OIG determined that the FBI was aware of
serious counterintelligence concerns about Leung that began to surface
during the late 1980s and early 1990s but did little to follow up on the
warning signals it received.

The OIG report concluded that the FBI's inattention to the oversight of
Smith and Leung, its willingness to exempt Smith from complying with the
rules governing asset handling, and its failure to aggressively question
Smith or follow up when red flags arose allowed Leung to deceive the FBI
about the extent of her spying for the People's Republic of China and
permitted Smith to continue his affair with Leung until his retirement
in November 2000.

In May 2000, the FBI received credible information indicating that Leung
was a spy for the People's Republic of China and that she had a source
in the FBI's Los Angeles Division office. Yet, the FBI inappropriately
informed Smith about this information (which implicated him), and did
not begin an investigation of Smith and Leung until May 2001. The OIG
concluded that in light of the serious nature and specificity of the
allegation, there was no reasonable explanation for the FBI's year-long
delay in opening the investigation.

The OIG found that since the discovery of Smith's long-term relationship
with Leung, the FBI has taken steps to correct deficiencies in its China
Program and improve asset handling and vetting procedures. However, the
OIG report provided 11 recommendations to further address the systemic
issues that enabled Smith and Leung to escape detection and avoid
accountability for so long. The OIG recommendations included requiring
separate documentation for red flags and other counterintelligence
concerns involving assets, requiring alternate case agents to meet with
assets on a frequent basis, limiting the time a single agent can handle
an asset, and fully implementing the FBI's policy regarding
counterintelligence polygraph examinations.

**The FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to September 11**

In June 2006, the OIG released an unclassified version of the full
report it completed in 2004 entitled, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks." The OIG
provided the full report in 2004 to the FBI, Department, Congress,
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The OIG's 2004
report is classified at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented
Information level.

At the request of members of Congress, the OIG also created an
unclassified version of the report for public release. However, because
the unclassified version included information about the FBI's
investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, and because Moussaoui's trial was
pending at the time, the OIG could not release the portions of the
unclassified report relating to Moussaoui. The OIG therefore publicly
released the unclassified report in June 2005 without any of the
information relating to Moussaoui.

The Moussaoui case concluded in May 2006 when the U. S. Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia sentenced Moussaoui to life in prison. On
June 19, 2006, the OIG released an unclassified version of the full
report that includes both the Moussaoui chapter and the other references
to Moussaoui throughout the report that previously had not been released
publicly.

The OIG report found significant deficiencies in the FBI's intelligence
information related to September 11 and concluded that the FBI failed to
fully evaluate, investigate, exploit, and disseminate the information it
had received about efforts by Usama Bin Laden to send students to attend
United States civil aviation schools to conduct terrorist activities and
intelligence information regarding two of the September 11 hijackers. In
the final report, the OIG made 16 recommendations for improving the
FBI's intelligence and counterterrorism efforts, including
recommendations targeted towards the FBI's analytical program.

# FBI's Foreign Language Translation Program {#fbis-foreign-language-translation-program .BN-2005-Start-Header}

In July 2005, the OIG issued a follow-up audit of the FBI's Foreign
Language Translation Program. The follow-up review assessed the FBI's
progress in responding to recommendations contained in the OIG's July
2004 audit of the foreign language program and in addressing the volume
of unreviewed counterterrorism and counterintelligence audio material
(backlog) that it collects from its National Foreign Intelligence
Program. The follow-up review concluded that the FBI has taken important
steps to address the OIG's recommendations and has made progress to
improve the operations of the Foreign Language Program, but key
deficiencies remained.

For example, the FBI now sets specific target staffing levels for
linguists that account for attrition and, as of March 30, 2005, had
achieved 56 percent of current hiring goals. In addition, the FBI has
begun to identify counterterrorism cases with significant backlogs and
has addressed issues with storage limitations on its digital collection
system that can result in the deletion of unreviewed audio sessions.
Although the OIG found that the FBI continued to delete unreviewed
translation materials, no unreviewed counterterrorism or Al Qaeda
sessions had been deleted.

However, the OIG found that key deficiencies remain in the FBI's Foreign
Language Translation Program. These deficiencies include a continuing
backlog of unreviewed material, some instances where high-priority
material has not been reviewed within 24 hours in accord with FBI
policy, and continued challenges in meeting linguist hiring goals and
target staffing levels. In addition, implementation of the Quality
Control Program has been slow, although the FBI has made recent
improvements in this area.

The follow-up review found that the FBI's collection of audio material
continues to outpace its ability to review and translate that material,
with the amount of unreviewed FBI counterterrorism and
counterintelligence audio material increasing since our July 2004
report. While the FBI believes that most of the unreviewed material may
not need to be translated, it has no assurance that all such
counterterrorism and counterintelligence material should not be reviewed
or translated.

**Possible Intelligence Violations Reported to the Intelligence
Oversight Board**

Section 1001 of the Patriot Act directs the OIG to undertake a series of
actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations
allegedly committed by Department employees. In March 2006, the OIG
released its eighth semiannual report to Congress required by Section
1001. The report described the OIG's activities during the last 6 months
related to civil rights and civil liberties complaints and the status of
OIG and Department investigations of allegations of civil rights and
civil liberties abuses by Department employees.

In addition to summarizing investigations and reviews undertaken by the
OIG in furtherance of our Section 1001 responsibilities, the March
Section 1001 report described the results of an OIG review of the FBI's
reporting to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) of
possible intelligence violations. Our report detailed the types and
percentages of violations reported by

the FBI to the IOB in FYs 2004 and 2005 and the process used by the FBI
to report such violations. Under the FBI's process, FBI employees
self-report potential violations to the FBI's Office of the General
Counsel, which reviews the possible violations to determine whether
reporting to the IOB is required. Among the authorities the FBI used
during this period that prompted reports to the IOB were the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), including FISA authorities
that were expanded by the Patriot Act; the Attorney General's Guidelines
for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
Collection; and various statutory authorities used to issue National
Security Letters to obtain information from third parties.

Examples of the violations that the FBI reported to the IOB in FYs 2004
and 2005 include FBI agents intercepting communications outside the
scope of the order from the FISA Court; FBI agents continuing
investigative activities after the authority for the specific activity
expired; and third parties providing information that was not requested
by the National Security Letter. Not all possible violations were
attributable solely to FBI conduct. According to the data we reviewed,
third parties such as telephone companies were involved in or
responsible for the possible violations in approximately one-quarter of
the cases in both years we examined. The OIG's Section 1001 report also
provided detailed information that summarized the percentages of
possible violations reported to the IOB, broken down by specific
intelligence activity. We intend to report on potential IOB violations
in early 2007.

[Review of ATF's Violent Crime Impact Team
Initiative](http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0605/index.htm)

In May 2006, the OIG issued a review of ATF's Violent Crime Impact Team
(VCIT) initiative that seeks to decrease homicides and violent crimes
committed with firearms in targeted urban areas. VCITs currently operate
in 23 cities across the country, and the initiative is slated to expand
by 15 additional cities by FY 2008. The VCIT strategy includes targeting
specific geographic areas or "hot spots" with a high rate of firearms
violence, targeting the "worst-of-the-worst" violent offenders in those
areas, building effective working relationships with community leaders,
using ATF firearms investigative technology resources, and involving
representatives from other Department law enforcement components.

Our report found that ATF did not consistently implement the VCIT
strategy. For example, rather than target specific "hot spots," two
VCITs targeted entire cities and another targeted an entire county ---
with the population in the VCIT target areas ranging from 25,000 to 3
million. None of the five VCITs that we visited actively participated in
any community outreach, six VCITs did not compile a "worst-of-the worst"
list, and seven did not keep their lists up to date. In addition, VCITs
did not consistently use ATF's technology resources for their
investigations and frequently did not include representatives from other
Department law enforcement components.

We also concluded that ATF could not support its claim in its January
2006 report on best practices that the number of homicides committed
with firearms was lower in 13 of the 15 VCIT pilot cities' target areas
compared to the same 6-month period the preceding year.

The OIG made 5 recommendations to improve ATF's implementation of the
VCIT initiative, including establishing specific operational guidelines
for VCIT implementation and developing an adequate evaluation strategy
to assess the success of the VCIT program. ATF, while disagreeing with
some of the findings in the OIG report, concurred with all our
recommendations and is implementing the recommendations.

**DEA Drug Diversion Control Program**

In July 2006, the OIG issued a follow-up report that addressed the DEA's
actions to control pharmaceutical diversion since our previous review in
October 2002. We found that the DEA has taken important steps to improve
its ability to control the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals,
especially pharmaceutical diversion using the Internet. However, several
shortcomings that we identified and reported on in 2002 still exist.

On the positive side, in our current review, the OIG found that the DEA
has made diversion control a strategic goal, established performance
measures for diversion control, centralized its diversion criminal
investigations with other criminal investigations, and provided
additional intelligence resources to diversion investigators. The DEA
also increased the number of authorized domestic diversion investigator
positions by 75, from 512 in FY 2004 to 587 in FY 2005. The number of
criminal diversion investigations the DEA initiated rose from 770 in
FY 2002 to 950 in FY 2005 -- an increase of 23 percent.

Moreover, since 2002 the DEA has taken a series of actions to control
the increasing use of the Internet to divert pharmaceuticals. From FY
2002 to FY 2005, it increased the percentage of time that diversion
investigators spent investigating Internet diversion cases from
3 percent to 11 percent. The DEA also developed an operational strategy
for Internet diversion investigations. Among the elements of the
strategy that we examined we found that the Online Investigations
Project, under development since 2001, has become a valuable
investigative tool even though it cannot automatically identify websites
with the highest volume of suspect pharmaceutical sales as originally
intended.

Despite these positive actions, we identified several continuing
concerns. Although the need for special agent assistance in diversion
investigations had increased significantly since our previous review, we
found that the time spent by special agents assisting diversion
investigations still constitutes a small share of their total
investigative effort. While the DEA still has not resolved the
complicated issue of providing law enforcement authority for its
diversion investigators so that diversion investigators are able to
perform the law enforcement tasks that are critical to completing
criminal investigations, it is actively pursuing the matter. Further,
the support intelligence analysts provide to diversion groups in the
field has continued to be limited, and intelligence analysts and special
agents still receive minimal diversion control training.

We made six recommendations concerning special agent support for
diversion investigations, diversion training for special agents and
intelligence analysts, and implementation of the undercover credit card
program. The DEA concurred with five of the six recommendations and has
presented an action plan for addressing all the recommendations.

The Department's Terrorism Task Forces

In June 2005, the OIG reviewed the Department's terrorism task forces,
including the Deputy Attorney General's National Security Coordination
Council; the U.S. Attorneys' Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils; and the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), the National Joint Terrorism
Task Force and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. These task
forces and councils are responsible for coordinating and integrating
intelligence and law enforcement functions to eliminate terrorist
networks, preventing terrorist operations, and prosecuting perpetrators
of terrorist acts. The OIG examined whether these terrorism task forces
and councils were achieving their purposes; whether gaps, duplication,
and overlap existed in counterterrorism coverage; and how the
performance of the task forces and councils was measured.

The OIG found that the task forces and councils were achieving their
intended purpose. They provided distinct, yet complementary, forums for
investigating terrorist threats and for sharing counterterrorism
information, particularly among federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. However, the OIG review found key areas that
needed improvement. The review identified several management and
resource problems, including the need for more stable leadership among
the task forces and councils, more explicit direction, adequate
resources, better training for participants, and better coverage of
remote areas.

In addition, in some instances the groups were understaffed or lacked
personnel with particular types of expertise because certain agencies
had chosen to limit their participation or had provided staff without
the appropriate expertise. The OIG also found that for the JTTFs, no
national training plans or minimum training standards had been
developed, participants were notified of training opportunities on an ad
hoc basis, and many participants believed that FBI participants received
preferential treatment.

The OIG's report contained 28 recommendations to help the Department
improve the operations of the counterterrorism task forces and councils,
including to stabilize leadership of the groups; establish performance
measures and outcome-oriented goals; clarify responsibilities and
priorities; develop and implement national training plans and standard
orientation programs; address the need for adequate resources; and
coordinate strategies for working consistently with law enforcement and
first responders in remote areas of the country. As of December 2006,
all but two recommendations have been closed.

**Follow-up on the FBI's Progress Toward Biometric Interoperability
Between Fingerprint Systems**

In July 2006, the OIG issued the latest of six reports monitoring the
FBI's progress toward achieving biometric interoperability between the
FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and
the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). Fully
interoperable fingerprint systems would allow law enforcement and
immigration officers to more readily identify criminals and known or
suspected terrorists trying to enter the United States, as well as to
identify those already in the United States. The OIG found that the FBI
and the DHS are moving forward toward interoperability and developing
the first phase of a three-phase plan to make IDENT and IAFIS fully
interoperable by December 2009.

In the first phase, the agencies plan to deploy a joint automated system
for near real-time (updated within 24 hours) sharing of certain key
immigration and law enforcement data between the FBI and the DHS by
September 3, 2006. In the remaining two phases, the FBI and the DHS plan
to expand the data shared to include law enforcement and immigration
data in IAFIS and IDENT, and to allow access to that data by federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies, authorized non-criminal
justice agencies, and immigration authorities. By December 2009, users
of the two systems are expected to be able to submit a single request
that searches all fingerprint records maintained by the FBI and the DHS
to receive associated criminal history and immigration information about
the subject.

To support full interoperability, the FBI is upgrading IAFIS to process
more flat (in lieu of rolled) fingerprint submissions, and the DHS is
planning to modernize IDENT and convert its entry/exit and border
security system, US-VISIT, from a 2‑ to a 10‑fingerprint system. The FBI
and the DHS have identified technical, funding, and policy risks to
achieving full interoperability; have developed risk mitigation
strategies; and are working to estimate the costs for the second
interoperability phase.

Until a fully interoperable system is available, the FBI has taken
interim actions to lessen the risk that criminal aliens or terrorists
will enter the United States undetected. These include providing daily
transmissions of key terrorist records to the DHS, improving overall
IAFIS availability and capacity for DHS fingerprint searches, and
reducing the response time to DHS requests for checks of aliens'
fingerprints.

**[Examples of Recent Investigations Division Cases]{.underline}**

**False Statements**

An investigation by the OIG's Dallas Field Office determined that a
former FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) concealed material facts from
the FBI regarding his association with the Mexican national allegedly
involved in money laundering and drug trafficking and made false
statements in Office of Government Ethics Public Financial Disclosure
Reports submitted to the FBI for 2002 and 2003 regarding gifts totalling
over \$100,000 allegedly received from the Mexican national. The SAC was
employed by the FBI for 23 years and served as the SAC of the El Paso
Division from July 2001 to November 2003. He retired from the FBI on
November 7, 2003, 2 days after his OIG interview. In August 2006, the
former SAC was convicted in the Western District of Texas on two counts
of a five-count indictment charging him with making false statements. On
January 5, 2007, the former SAC was sentenced to 6 months' incarceration
and 3 years' supervised release.  He was also ordered to pay a \$10,000
fine and perform 200 hours of community service.

**Fraud**

An investigation by the OIG's Dallas Field Office led to the arrest,
plea, and sentencing of an FBI special agent on fraud charges. The
investigation determined that the special agent exceeded his authorized
access by querying the FBI's Automated Case Support system for
information regarding a counterfeit check cashing and identity theft
investigation targeting his brother-in-law and providing the information
to his brother-in-law. Additionally, the special agent did not disclose
his relationship with his brother-in-law to the FBI until after his
brother-in-law's arrest. The special agent was ordered to pay a \$5,000
fine and resign from his position pursuant to a plea agreement with the
USAO for the Southern District of Texas.

**Theft**

An investigation by the Fraud Detection Office led to the indictment of
several leaders of a

Las Vegas, Nevada, church on charges of conspiracy, mail fraud, wire
fraud, theft of government property, false statements, and obstruction
of justice. OIG investigators determined that the church leaders -- a
civilian pastor, his wife, and a civilian minister -- received a
\$423,000 Bureau of Justice Assistance grant through the Alliance
Collegiums Association of Nevada to fund the creation of a prisoner
re-entry program for southern Nevada. Rather than establish the program,
the individuals expended more than \$330,000 for personal use, and
thereafter created false documents to cover up their activities. The
pastor's wife also was charged with bank fraud, identity theft,
bankruptcy fraud, and misuse of a social security number.

**Bribery**

An investigation by the OIG's Philadelphia Area Office led to the arrest
and guilty plea of a

BOP senior correctional officer assigned to the Federal Detention Center
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to charges of bribery. The OIG
investigation determined that the officer procured cell phones,
supplies, drugs, and other contraband for several prisoners in exchange
for bribe payments in excess of \$12,000. The officer was sentenced to 1
year incarceration and 3 years' supervised release, and ordered to pay a
\$15,000 fine.

**Embezzlement** An investigation by the OIG's Miami Field Office led to
the arrest of a DEA special agent on charges of converting property of
another, embezzlement of public funds, and money laundering. An
indictment returned in the Northern District of Georgia alleged that the
special agent, who served as a team leader and evidence custodian at the
DEA's Atlanta Airport Task Force from early 2003 to January 2005,
embezzled cash seized from money couriers for drug organizations by
instructing local police officers to turn over seized money to him
without counting it. The special agent allegedly stole more than
\$200,000, and used a portion of the embezzled money to build a custom
home in Orlando, Florida.

**Bid Rigging**

An investigation by the OIG's New York Field Office led to the criminal
convictions of a DEA contractor and one of its employees on charges of
bid rigging. The investigation determined that the employee and his
employer submitted three bids -- the company's bid of \$18,500 and two
forged bids in the amounts of \$25,800 and \$24,000 -- to perform
electrical work for the DEA. By offering the lowest bid, the company was
awarded the contract. With the assistance of the OIG's Fraud Detection
Office, the contracting company was debarred from all government
contracts until August 2006, while the employee was debarred until
August 2008.

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3\. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

a\. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

For the Department's programs and activities to be effective, Department
personnel, contractors, and grantees must conduct themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of integrity, accountability, and
efficiency. The OIG was established to detect and prevent misconduct and
mismanagement on the part of the Department's personnel and in its
programs. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil
laws, regulations, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of the
Department's employees in their numerous and diverse activities. In
addition, the OIG assists management in promoting integrity, economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department and in its
financial, contractual, and grant relationships with others using the
coordinated efforts of the OIG's investigative, audit, inspection, and
special review resources.

The OIG continues to review its performance measures and targets,
especially in light of the changing nature of its work. Today's work is
much more complex and expansive than it was only a few years ago. The
number of documents to be reviewed, the number of people to interview,
the amount of data to examine, and the analytical work involved in many
OIG reviews are significantly greater than in prior years. This is
especially true for reviews of sensitive Department programs, as well as
for cross-cutting work that covers multiple components, such as the
OIG's recent reviews of component's disciplinary programs or their
handling of shooting incidents. These multi-component reviews can be
particularly valuable in identifying "best practices" within the
Department and ensuring consistency across component programs.

b\. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

The OIG will investigate allegations of bribery, fraud, abuse, civil
rights violations, and violations of other laws and procedures that
govern Department employees, contractors, and grantees, and will develop
cases for criminal prosecution and civil and administrative action. The
OIG will use its audit, inspection, and attorney resources to review
Department programs or activities identified as high-priority areas in
the Department's strategic plan and devote resources to review the
Department's Top Management Challenges.

[Program Increases]{.underline}

**Item Name: [Counterterrorism Oversight]{.underline}**

Budget Decision Unit: [Audits, Inspections, Investigations, and
Reviews]{.underline}

Strategic Goal & Objective: [Supporting the Mission: Efficiency and
Integrity]{.underline}

[in the Department of Justice]{.underline}

Organizational Program: [OIG]{.underline}

Component Ranking of Item: **[1]{.underline}** of **[1]{.underline}**

Program Increase: Positions **[+5]{.underline}** Agt/Atty
**[+1]{.underline}...\...**FTE **[+3]{.underline}** Dollars
**[+\$460]{.underline}**

[Description of Item]{.underline}

The OIG is requesting 3 auditors, 1 program analyst, and 1 attorney for
Counterterrorism Oversight.

[Justification]{.underline}

Specifically, the requested positions would be deployed in the following
area:

**[Preventing and Combating Terrorism]{.underline}**

As funding for the Department's counterterrorism efforts continues to
increase, so does the need to monitor and evaluate Department programs
to identify possible vulnerabilities. This request will enable the OIG
to assist the Department in ensuring that its counterterrorism funds are
put to the most effective use.

The FBI has established as its highest priority the prevention of
terrorist attacks on the United States. The accomplishment of this
critical national security mission requires the FBI to collect, analyze,
and appropriately disseminate intelligence and other information needed
to disrupt or defeat terrorist activities. However, in the past
congressional investigations and OIG reports have found weaknesses in
the FBI's ability to effectively carry out these vital efforts. Given
the importance of the FBI's counterterrorism mission, the additional
requested positions will enable the OIG to expand its oversight program
in the FBI.

With these positions, the OIG will continue to examine key issues in the
FBI, including development of its Sentinel Case Management System, its
efforts to protect the nation's seaports, and its process for reporting
possible violations involving its intelligence activities to the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board. The OIG will continue to
conduct audits and reviews on topics such as the operations of the
Terrorist Screening Center, the Department's Internal Controls over
Terrorism Reporting, Intelligence Sharing, and the Bureau of Prisons'
efforts to improve the monitoring of communications for terrorists and
other high-risk inmates.

Additional resources would enable the OIG to undertake new reviews in
these and other critical areas.

[Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic
Goals)]{.underline}

All personnel requests are in direct support of the Department's
Strategic Goals and Objectives. The OIG is a key player in meeting the
Department's Strategic Goals and Objectives by providing leadership in
integrity, efficiency and effectiveness, and management excellence.

See the performance indicator charts for the description of the OIG's
general goals and the performance effect of the FY 2008 enhancements.

**Funding**

(Dollars in Thousands)

[Base Funding]{.underline}

<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 12%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 12%" />
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="4">FY 2006 Enacted</td>
<td colspan="4">FY 2007 Estimate</td>
<td colspan="4">FY 2008 President’s Budget Current Services</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Pos</td>
<td><p>Agt/</p>
<p>Atty</p></td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$(000)</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td><p>Agt/</p>
<p>Atty</p></td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$(000)</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td><p>Agt/</p>
<p>Atty</p></td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$(000)</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The OIG operates as a single decision unit encompassing audits,
inspections, investigations, and reviews. By the nature of its mission,
the OIG must be able to move its resources and funding freely across all
functions to address new priorities. Therefore, base funding for the OIG
is only meaningful at the single decision unit level.

[Personnel Increase Cost Summary]{.underline}

+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Type of                | Modular Cost   | Number of  | FY 2008      |
|                        |                |            |              |
| Position               | Per Position   | Positions  | Request      |
|                        | (\$000)        | Requested  |              |
|                        |                |            | (\$000)      |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Attorney (GS-15)       | 120            | 1          | 120          |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Program Analyst        | 90             | 1          | 90           |
| (GS-14)                |                |            |              |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Auditor (GS-14)        | 90             | 1          | 90           |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Auditor (GS-13)        | 80             | 2          | 160          |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Total Personnel        |                | 5          | \$460        |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+

[Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary]{.underline}

+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Non-Personnel          | Unit Cost      | Quantity   | FY 2008      |
|                        |                |            |              |
| Item                   |                |            | Request      |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Not Applicable         | 0              | 0          | \$0          |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+
| Total                  | 0              | 0          | \$0          |
|                        |                |            |              |
| Non-Personnel          |                |            |              |
+------------------------+----------------+------------+--------------+

[Total Request for This Item]{.underline}

  ---------------------- ----- ---------- ------ ----------- --------------- --------
                         Pos   Agt/Atty   FTE    Personnel   Non-Personnel   Total

  Current Services       \-    \-         \-     \-          \-              \-

  Increases              5     0/1        3      \$460       \$0             \$460

  Grand Total            5     0/1        3      \$460       \$0             \$460
  ---------------------- ----- ---------- ------ ----------- --------------- --------

[Program Offsets]{.underline}

(Not Applicable)

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