![](media/image1.jpeg){width="6.489583333333333in"
height="1.15625in"}**Legislative
Bulletin...................................................March 11,
2008**

> **Contents:**
>
> **H.R. 2082 Veto Override** ---Intelligence Authorization Act for
> Fiscal Year 2008

H.R. 2082 Veto Override---Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (*Reyes, D-TX*)

**[Order of Business]{.underline}**: The Democratic House Leadership has
indicated that the House will likely vote to override the President's
veto of H.R. 2082 today, March 11, 2008. The vote on H.R. 2082 is to
either sustain or override the President's veto. For additional
information on the process in the House regarding vetoed bills, please
see the "Process for a Vetoed Bill" section below.

**[Background]{.underline}**: On December 13, 2007, the House passed the
Conference Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 by a final vote of
[222---199](http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1160.xml). Two days
prior, the White House issued a Statement of Administration Policy
(SAP), stating that "If this bill were to pass the House and the Senate
and be presented to the President for signature, the President's senior
advisors would recommend that he veto the bill." On February 13, 2008,
the Senate passed the legislation by a vote of
[51---45](http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=2&vote=00022http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1159.xml)
and the bill was presented to the President on February 29, 2008. On
Saturday, March 8, 2008, the President vetoed H.R. 2082.

The SAP stated numerous reasons for the President's opposition to the
bill, including:

***Requirement that Executive Branch Agencies Use Only Interrogation
Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual***:

-   Section 327 of the bill prohibits any member of the U.S.
    Intelligence Community from using any interrogation technique not
    authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human
    Intelligence Collector Operations (Army Field Manual).

-   The provision would make our enemies aware of every interrogation
    tactic at our disposal and bar Intelligence Community professionals
    from utilizing many enhanced interrogation tactics regardless of the
    severity of the situation, the value of the detainee, or their
    geographic location.

-   Strict adherence to the Army Field Manual would bar Intelligence
    Community professionals from using such tactics as: threatening
    physical violence, using loud noise or yelling to intimidate a
    suspect, denial of hot food, using hot or cold conditions to make a
    suspect uncomfortable, or lying to a suspect about the identity of
    his interrogators. Intelligence specialists have stated that these
    tactics should be at the disposal of highly trained members of the
    Intelligence Community, especially when dealing with a high-value
    target like Osama Bin Laden or in a ticking clock scenario.

-   Many members of the Intelligence Community, Congress, and the
    Administration have expressed a deep concern that such limitations
    would effectively tie the hands of the CIA and other intelligence
    agencies operating in the field and may stop U.S. intelligence
    entities from preventing attacks against the U.S.

-   Concerns have also been raised that the use of the Army Field Manual
    will neutralize the abilities of our specially trained members of
    the Intelligence Community by limiting them to the use of techniques
    broadly designed for unspecialized forces.

-   Proponents of the bill argue the use of the Army Field Manual would
    prevent rampant use of interrogation techniques such as
    "waterboarding." In truth, the practice of waterboarding was used
    only three times on extremely hardened and high level targets (such
    as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad who planned 9/11 and beheaded Daniel
    Pearl) in emergency situations. According to CIA head Michael
    Hayden, the U.S. has not used waterboarding as an interrogation tool
    in over five years.

-   In light of this provision, the Republican conferees from the House
    refused to sign the final conference report.

-   The President's SAP stated, "Such interrogations have helped the
    United States disrupt multiple attacks against Americans at home and
    abroad, thus saving American lives. The Military Commissions Act of
    2006, enacted just over one year ago, struck the acceptable balance
    with respect to collection of intelligence from captured terrorists.
    Section 327 would prevent the President from taking the lawful
    actions necessary to protect Americans from attack in wartime."

***Inspector General for the Intelligence Community***

-   The bill creates the position of Inspector General of the entire
    Intelligence Community inside the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI). The new Inspector General would conduct
    oversight across the entire Intelligence Community, even though
    every part of the Intelligence Community is already under a specific
    Inspector General.

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-   The bill would also give more statutory power to inspectors general
    in other intelligence agencies. Additional and duplicative oversight
    within the Intelligence Community may slow intelligence activity,
    despite the fact that the 9/11 Commission concluded that
    intelligence officials need to assume and carryout their duties and
    responsibilities as quickly as possible.

-   According to the SAP, "The existing inspectors general of the
    departments with elements in the IC, and the Central Intelligence
    Agency, are best suited to perform the necessary investigative,
    inspection, and audit functions. There is no need to spend
    additional taxpayer resources to provide for two inspectors general
    with competing jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements."

***Reporting on Certain Sensitive Matters***

-   The Administration opposes provisions in the bill that require the
    President to disclose certain intelligence material.

-   The Administration also opposes a requirement that the Intelligence
    Community keep an inventory of Special Access Programs---highly
    classified programs and budgets developed by the Defense Department
    and the Intelligence Community.

-   The SAP states that certain provisions in the bill "purport to
    require the President to submit information that may be
    constitutionally protected from disclosure, including information
    the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national
    security, deliberative processes of the Executive, or performance of
    the Executive's constitutional duties. Questions concerning access
    to such information are best addressed through the customary
    practices and arrangements between the executive and legislative
    branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of
    legislation."

To read the complete SAP on H.R. 2082, including additional White House
concerns with the legislation, [click
here](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2082sap-r_2.pdf).
To read the statement released by the President when the bill was
vetoed, [click
here](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080308-1.html).

In addition to the complaints enumerated by the White House, the
[conference report for H.R.
2082](http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(hr478):)
includes a list of 26 separate congressional earmarks totaling
approximately \$96 million. In response to many Member's concerns,
Republicans offered a Motion to Recommit (MTR) H.R. 2082 with
instructions to remove all earmarks from the bill in order to fund human
intelligence at the highest level possible. The MTR was defeated by a
vote of [205---215](http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1159.xml).

On December 13, 2007, the House passed the Conference Report to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 by a final vote of
[222---199](http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1160.xml). On February
13, 2008, the Senate passed the legislation by a vote of
[51---45](http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=2&vote=00022http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1159.xml),
with the vast majority of Republicans voting against the bill. Among
those voting against H.R. 2082 was Senator John McCain, a noted opponent
of torture and abuse during interrogations. According to Sen. McCain,
"What we need is not to tie the CIA to the Army Field Manuel, but rather
to have a good faith interpretation of the statutes that guide what is
permissible in the CIA program."

[**Process for a Vetoed Bill**:]{.underline}

-   The House and Senate pass an identical bill.

-   The President vetoes the bill and sends a veto message to the House.

-   The Speaker "lays a veto message before the House on the day it is
    received\...When the message is laid before the House, the question
    on passage is considered as pending."  

-   Consideration of a vetoed bill (a privileged matter) generally takes
    precedence over other floor matters (it can interrupt other floor
    business), *except* in certain specific instances: a motion to
    adjourn, a question of privilege under the Constitution (such as a
    blue-slip resolution), and unfinished business with the previous
    question order (such as a bill with the previous question ordered to
    passage on the day before, but the House adjourned before voting on
    passage of the bill).

-   If the House does *not* wish to proceed immediately to reconsider
    the bill, three motions are in order:

    1.  motions to lay on the table (if passed, a motion to take it from
        the table is in order at any time);

    2.  motions to postpone consideration to a day certain (it becomes
        unfinished business on that day); or

    3.  motion to refer to committee (a motion to discharge is highly
        privileged and in order at any time).

-   If none of the above three motions are offered, the House proceeds
    to debate the override question under the hour rule and then votes
    on the question of overriding the veto.

-   If the veto is sustained, the bill is referred to committee. Since
    the bill has been rejected (when the veto was sustained), a motion
    to take the bill from committee is not privileged.

**[The Vote on H.R. 2082---Sustaining the Presidential
Veto]{.underline}**: When a vote is requested on a vetoed bill, the
question is: "Will the House, on reconsideration, pass the bill, the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus, it
is as if the bill is up for normal consideration again, [only the
threshold for passage is now 2/3 of those voting]{.underline}. **If a
member opposes the bill and voted NO when it was originally considered
and passed, then he would vote NO again (still opposing the bill,
thereby voting to sustain the President's veto).**

**[Summary of the Underlying Legislation]{.underline}**: The following
is a summary of the underlying legislation that was first distributed by
the RSC on December 12, 2007.

*Note*: This Legislative Bulletin addresses only the
**[un]{.underline}**classified portion of the conference report. The
language of H.R. 2082 provides for the passage of the classified annex,
which contains the **[vast]{.underline}** majority of the authorizations
in this legislation. The classified annex is available to the Committees
on Appropriations of the House and Senate, and to the President. The
President has to provide for the "suitable" distribution of appropriate
portions of the annex within the executive branch.

The unclassified portion of the conference report for H.R. 2082 would
authorize \$734 million in [discretionary FY2008
appropriations]{.underline} (\$260 million less than FY 2007 and \$3
million less than the House-passed bill), including \$263 million for
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS---previously mandatory spending in FY 2007). The specific
schedule of authorizations for intelligence activities of the federal
government (including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the CIA, the Defense Department, the National Security
Agency, the FBI, etc.) is classified.

*[Authorization of Appropriations]{.underline}*. Authorizes
appropriations for FY 2008 for intelligence-related activities of the
following U.S. government entities:

> 1\) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
>
> 2\) The Central Intelligence Agency
>
> 3\) The Department of Defense
>
> 4\) The Defense Intelligence Agency
>
> 5\) The National Security Agency
>
> 6\) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
> Department of the Air Force
>
> 7\) The Department of State
>
> 8\) The Department of the Treasury
>
> 9\) The Department of Energy
>
> 10\) The Department of Justice
>
> 11\) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
>
> 12\) The National Reconnaissance Office
>
> 13\) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
>
> 14\) The Coast Guard
>
> 15\) The Department of Homeland Security
>
> 16\) The Drug Enforcement Administration

**[Major Changes]{.underline}**: The conference report to H.R. 2082
included numerous changes from the original bill which passed the House
on May 11, 2007, by a vote of
[225-197](http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll341.xml). The following is
a list of major provisions added to, or removed from, the original
House-passed bill.

***Provisions Added**:*

*[Limitation on Interrogation Techniques]{.underline}*. Section 327 of
the conference report prohibits any member of the U.S. Intelligence
Community from using any interrogation treatment or technique not
authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence
Collector Operations (Army Field Manual) on any individual in the
custody or control of an element of the Intelligence Community.

The Army Field Manual prohibits interrogators from using acts of
violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or
exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of, or aid to, interrogation.
Tactics that would be specifically prohibited include, but are not
limited to, placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using
duct tape to cover the eyes of a detainee; beatings, or other forms of
physical pain; waterboarding; using trained military dogs; inducing
injury do to severely hot or cold conditions; mock executions;
deprivation of necessary food, water, sleep, or medical care. Members of
the Intelligence Community would be barred from using any of these
tactics regardless of the severity of the situation, the value of the
detainee, or their geographic location.

Many members of the Intelligence Community, Congress, and the
Administration have expressed a deep concern that such limitations would
effectively tie the hands of the CIA and other intelligence agencies
operating in the field and may stop U.S. intelligence entities from
preventing attacks against the U.S. **In light of this provision, none
of the Republican conferees from the House signed the final conference
report and the President has issued a veto threat against the bill.**

*[Report on Compliance with the Detainee Treatment and Military
Commissions Act]{.underline}*. Requires the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to submit a classified report to Congress detailing
all the measures taken by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) and the Intelligence Community to comply with the
interrogation provisions in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the
Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report must be submitted within 45
days of enactment.

*[Limitation of Funds]{.underline}*. Stipulates that no more than 30% of
funds may be expended for a specific, classified expenditure in the
Executive Branch Congressional Budget Justification until the full
membership of the House and Senate intelligence committees are fully
briefed on a facility in Syria that was the subject of reported Israeli
military action on September 6, 2007. Because the specific expenditure
is classified, the conference report may not disclose where the
specified funds would be allocated. This provision was added by
amendment during conference.

*[Inspector General of the Intelligence Community]{.underline}*. Creates
the position of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community within
the ODNI. The DNI, who was authorized to have an Inspector General in
the Intelligence Reform Act, has appointed an administrative Inspector
General and given him certain responsibilities. The Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community would be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. The Administration contends that intelligence
officials need to assume their duty as quickly as possible and opposes
the creation of an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

*[Confirmation of Appointment]{.underline}*. Requires that the heads of
the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency be
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The original
Senate bill included the head of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
in this section, but the DNI expressed concern with the increased number
of Senate-confirmed positions in the Intelligence Community.

*[Inspector General Matters]{.underline}*. Includes the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency as
"designated federal entities" for the purpose of appointing inspectors
general. This section would give the inspectors general of these
agencies statutory authority to access information relevant to their
audits or investigations, and to compel people to release information
via subpoena.

*[Pay Authority for Critical Positions]{.underline}*. Provides the DNI
new authority to grant enhanced pay for critical positions in the
Intelligence Community.

*[Enhanced Flexibility]{.underline}*. Expands the amount of time that
government personnel may be detailed to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), while being paid by another agency, from
one year to two.

***Provisions Removed***:

*[Intelligence Restrictions]{.underline}*. Emphasized that this
legislation should not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct
of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.

*[CIA Deputy Director]{.underline}*. Created a new position of Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to be appointed by the
President (and confirmed by the Senate), and stipulated that the
position has responsibility to assist the CIA Director, and exercise the
powers of the Director during the absence or disability of the Director.

*[Global Climate Change Estimate]{.underline}*. Required the DNI, within
270 days after enactment, to submit a report to Congress with a national
intelligence estimate on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global
climate change and the implications of these effects on the national
security of the U.S.

*[Reports Eliminated]{.underline}*. Required the DNI to submit a list of
reports to the congressional intelligence committees on recommendations
for the elimination of required reports that relate to foreign language
proficiency which the DNI considers outdated or no longer necessary.

*[CIA Audit]{.underline}*. Directed the Inspector General of the CIA to
conduct an audit of each covert action at least every three years and
report the findings to the congressional intelligence committees.

*[Intelligence Personnel Compensation Report]{.underline}*. Prohibited
the DNI or the head of any element of the Intelligence Community to
implement a plan to provide compensation to intelligence personnel based
on performance until 45 days after the date which the DNI submits a
report on performance-based compensation for the intelligence community.
The report would have included such components as an implementation time
line and certain target dates, an estimated budget, and a description of
the performance-based compensation system, among other items.

**[Other Provisions in the conference report]{.underline}**:

*[Personnel Ceilings]{.underline}*. Authorizes the DNI, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to
exceed the (classified) FY 2008 civilian personnel ceilings, when
necessary to perform "important intelligence functions," when reported
to Congress, and when the increase is no greater than two percent of the
authorized level.

*[Intelligence Community Management Account]{.underline}*. Authorizes FY
2008 appropriations of \$734.1 million to the Intelligence Community
Management Account (CMA) to fund 1,035 (unclassified) full-time
personnel and other administrative requirements. Allows the Account,
under certain circumstances, to reimburse other federal agencies for
detailing personnel to the staff of the Account.

*[Specific Authorization of Funds for which 2008 Appropriations Exceed
Amounts Authorized]{.underline}*. Stipulates that funds appropriated for
a specific purpose, in excess of the amount authorized for that purpose,
will still be available for use by the Intelligence Community, but can
be applied only to other intelligence activities within the National
Intelligence Program.

*[CIARDS]{.underline}*. Authorizes \$262.5 million to be appropriated
for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS), converting previously mandatory spending into discretionary.

[]{.mark}

*[Increase in Employee Compensation]{.underline}*. Authorizes such
additional or supplemental amounts as "may be necessary" for employee
compensation or benefits.

*[Security Clearances]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to establish a
multi-level security clearance system for the Intelligence Community in
order to enable them to make more efficient use of persons proficient in
foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter
expertise that is critical to national intelligence (this provision was
a Sense of Congress in the FY07 Intelligence Authorization).

*[Intelligence Personnel Travel on Common Carriers]{.underline}*.
Expands the DNI's ability to delegate his authority---to allow travel on
a common carrier---to any head of any other element of the intelligence
community. This provision also allows those agency heads granted
authority by the DNI to further grant this authority to other senior
officials "as specified in guidelines prescribed by the DNI."

*[Annual Personnel Level Assessments]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to
prepare an annual personnel and contractor assessment for each element
of the Intelligence Community. This section is similar to sections 411
and 414 of the House bill, which request reviews of Intelligence
Community personnel and contractors.

*[Comprehensive Report on Contractors]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to
conduct a one-time report detailing the activities performed by
contractors working for the Intelligence Community. The report would
have to be submitted by March 31, 2008. This section differs from the
House-passed version of the bill which would have required an annual
report on Intelligence Community contractors.

*[Report on Plan to Increase Diversity]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI
to submit a report to Congress on the plans of each element of the
Intelligence Community to increase diversity. The plans must be
submitted by March 31, 2008. The House version of the bill included this
requirement as well as a requirement that 80 percent of the amount
appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Fund be withheld
until the plan was submitted. The conference report omits the latter
requirement.

*[Report on Pay-for Performance Management System]{.underline}*.
Prohibits the implementation of pay-for-performance compensation within
[certain]{.underline} elements of the Intelligence Community until 45
days after the DNI submits a report to Congress detailing the
implementation plan. This differs from the House bill which required
that [every]{.underline} element of the Intelligence Community wait to
implement pay-for-performance plans. This section is meant to allow
elements of the Intelligence Community that are prepared to implement
such plans to do so.

*[Vulnerability Assessments]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to conduct a
vulnerability assessment of every major system and its significant items
of supply to the National Intelligence Program. This section would
require the DNI to conduct vulnerability assessments throughout the life
of a system. This provision was not contained in the House-passed
version of H.R. 2082.

*[Business enterprise and System Modernization]{.underline}*. Requires
the DNI to create a "business enterprise architecture" that would define
all Intelligence Community business systems. The architecture will be
used to guide the implementation of interoperable Intelligence Community
business system solutions and must be submitted to Congress by September
1, 2008. The DNI would also be required to report to Congress every five
years regarding the implantation of the architecture. This provision was
not contained in the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Reports on Acquisitions]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to submit
annual reports for each major system acquired by the Intelligence
Community. The report must including information about the cost of the
acquisition and the results of any tests or evaluations of the system.
This provision was not contained in the House-passed version of H.R.
2082.

*[Clarification of Definition of Intelligence Community]{.underline}*.
Permits an element of departments and agencies to be designated as an
element of the Intelligence Community whether or not they are among the
agencies listed in the National Security Act of 1947.

*[Reprogramming Funds]{.underline}*. Modifies the requirements for
reprogramming funds for intelligence activities to require that "the
activity to be funded supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency."

*[Extension of Authority to Delete Information]{.underline}*. Allows the
head of an intelligence agency to delete, when transmitting information
regarding receipt and disposition of foreign gifts, certain information
if the agency head certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that
the publication of this information could adversely affect U.S.
intelligence sources or methods.

*[Incorporation of Reporting Requirements]{.underline}*. Incorporates
each reporting requirement contained in the classified annex to the
conference report. This provision was not contained in the House-passed
version of H.R. 2082.

*[Office Locations]{.underline}*. Includes the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) and the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center in the list of officers within the Office of the
DNI and provides that the NCPC Director be appointed by the DNI.

*[Transportation Security Oversight Board Membership]{.underline}*.
Amends the members of the Transportation Security Oversight Board to
remove the CIA Director and add the DNI Director (or his designee).

*[Science and Technology]{.underline}*. Directs the DNI's Science and
Technology Committee to *prioritize* (as opposed to just coordinate)
research and development related to intelligence, including
identification of basic, applied, and advanced research programs to be
carried out by the intelligence community. The Director of Science and
Technology would also have to assist the DNI in establishing technology
goals for the elements of the intelligence community. The DNI would have
to report to Congress by June 30, 2008, on a strategy for the
development and use of technology in the Intelligence Community through
the year 2018.

*[Energy Efficiency Implementation]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to
develop a plan to implement the recommendations of a report submitted to
Congress (P.L. 109-431) entitled "An Act to study and promote the use of
energy efficient computer servers in the U.S."

*[List of Special Access Programs]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to
submit a classified and comprehensive list of special access programs to
Congress. This section is to enable the congressional intelligence
committees to determine whether the Intelligence Community is fully
fulfilling their obligation to keep the committees informed.

*[Iran and North Korea Intelligence Reports.]{.underline}* Requires the
DNI to submit reports to the congressional intelligence committees
(classified) on the current intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and North Korea regarding their nuclear programs (and
requires various information be contained within the report, such as an
assessment of nuclear weapons programs, etc.). The original House
version of the bill stipulated that the reports must be issued
quarterly; however, the conference report only requires that one report
is submitted in FY 2008 and two in FY 2009.

*[Accountability Reviews]{.underline}*. Stipulates that the DNI has the
authority to conduct accountability reviews of any element of the
Intelligence Community. This provision was not contained in the
House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Modification of Limitation on Delegation]{.underline}*. Provides that
the DNI may delegate the authority to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. This provision was not contained
in the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

[*Authorities for Intelligence Information Sharing*.]{.underline}
Provides the DNI the authority to use National Intelligence Program
funds to address deficiencies in information sharing. This provision was
not contained in the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Authorities for Interagency Funding]{.underline}*. Authorizes the DNI
to use "all available" Intelligence Community funds to quickly focus the
Intelligence Community on pressing intelligence issues. This provision
was not contained in the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Foreign Language Proficiency]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to submit
an annual report to the congressional intelligence committees on the
foreign language proficiency of each intelligence agency, and requires
the head of each element of the Intelligence Community to annually
submit a report to the DNI on the foreign language proficiency of the
personnel at such element.

[]{.mark}

*[Authorities of CIA Protective Personnel]{.underline}*. Authorizes
protective detail personnel of the CIA to make arrests without a warrant
if a felony or misdemeanor is committed in their presence while they are
functioning in an official capacity. This provision was not contained in
the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Enhancement of NSA Training Program]{.underline}*. Allows the director
of the NSA to protect intelligence and sources by removing a requirement
that the NSA identify students who are NSA employees or training program
participants to educational institutions. This provision was not
contained in the House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Security Clearances in the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency]{.underline}*. Requires that the Secretary of Defense grants the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency the same amount
of personnel security authority that is granted to the Director of the
National Security Agency through December 31, 2008. This section is
intended to clear a security backlog at the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This provision was not contained in the
House-passed version of H.R. 2082.

*[Coast Guard and DEA]{.underline}*. Adds the Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration to the list of Intelligence Community
agencies in the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

*[Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and
Development]{.underline}*. Renews authority for the National Commission
for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community, which was authorized in 2003 and allowed to
lapse on September 1, 2004.

*[Report on Intelligence Activities]{.underline}*. Requires the DNI to
report to the congressional intelligence committees any authorization
related to the overthrow of a democratically elected government in the
ten years prior to enactment.

*[Aerial Reconnaissance Platforms]{.underline}*. Prohibits the Secretary
of Defense from terminating the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary
certifies that there would be no loss of national or DoD intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in transitioning from the
U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle
platform.

**[Possible Conservative Concerns]{.underline}:** Some conservatives may
be concerned that this legislation prohibits the U.S. Intelligence
Community from using any interrogation technique not authorized by the
Army Field Manual on any individual in the custody or control of an
element of the Intelligence Community. Some conservatives may be
concerned that such limitations would effectively tie the hands of the
CIA and other intelligence agencies operating in the field and may stop
U.S. intelligence entities from preventing attacks against the U.S.

Some conservatives may also be concerned that the bill would create the
position of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and give
more statutory power to inspectors general in other intelligence
agencies despite the fact that the 9/11 Commission concluded that
intelligence officials need to assume and carryout their duties and
responsibilities as quickly as possible.

In addition, the [conference report for H.R.
2082](http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(hr478):)
includes a list of 26 separate congressional earmarks totaling
approximately \$96 million. Some members may be concerned with the
existence of earmarks in the Intelligence Authorization bill, a bill
meant to fund our Nation's Intelligence Community.

**[Committee Action]{.underline}**: H.R. 2082 was referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 1, 2007, and was
marked-up the next day. The Committee reported the bill, as amended, to
the full House by voice vote on May 7, 2007 (House Report
[110-131](http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(hr131):)).
On May 11, 2007, the bill passed the House by a vote of
[225-197](http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll341.xml). On October 3,
2007, the bill passed the Senate, with an amendment, by unanimous
consent. On December 5, 2007, conferees agree to report the bill and the
following day [Conference Report
110-478](http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(hr478):)
was filed.

**[Administration Policy]{.underline}:** The Administration opposes
passage of the conference report to H.R. 2082 and released a [Statement
of Administration
Policy](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2082sap-r_2.pdf)
(SAP) on December 11, 2007, citing numerous concerns with the bill.
According to the SAP, "the conference report to H.R. 2082 contains
provisions that are inconsistent with the effective conduct of
intelligence activities, the recommendations of the 9/11 commission, and
the desire for legislative-executive cooperation with respect to U.S.
intelligence activities."

**[Cost to Taxpayers]{.underline}**: A CBO score for the conference
report to H.R. 2082 is currently unavailable. However, the conference
report would authorize \$734 million in [discretionary FY2008
appropriations]{.underline} (\$260 million less than FY 2007 and \$3
million less than the House-passed bill), including \$263 million for
CIARDS (mandatory spending in FY 2007). The specific schedule of
authorizations for intelligence activities of the federal government
(including the Office of the DNI, the CIA, the Defense Department, the
National Security Agency, the FBI, etc.) is classified.

**[Earmark Compliance]{.underline}**: [Conference Report
110-478](http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/cpquery/R?cp110:FLD010:@1(hr478):)
lists 26 separate earmarks totaling \$96 million.

**[Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal
Government?]{.underline}:** No.

**[Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or
Private-Sector Mandates?]{.underline}:** No.

**[Constitutional Authority]{.underline}:** The conference report to
H.R. 2082 fails to cite constitutional authority.

**[RSC Staff Contact]{.underline}:** Andy Koenig;
<andy.koenig@mail.house.gov>; 202-226-9717

\###