This version includes the errata dated 20Mar02

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS**

[No]{.smallcaps}. 00-329

[Douglas B. Morgan, Appellant]{.smallcaps},

[v.]{.smallcaps}

[Anthony J. Principi,]{.smallcaps}

[Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee.]{.smallcaps}

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans\' Appeals

(Decided March 14, 2002 )

*William A. L\'Esperance*, of Albuquerque, New Mexico was on the briefs
for the appellant.

*John H. Thompson*, Acting General Counsel; *Ron Garvin*, Assistant
General Counsel; *Mary Ann Flynn*, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and
*Debra L. Leach*, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the
appellee.

Before IVERS, STEINBERG, and GREENE, *Judges*.

STEINBERG, *Judge*: The appellant, through counsel, seeks review of a
September 28, 1999, Board of Veterans\' Appeals (Board or BVA) decision
that determined (1) that a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional
office (RO) had properly denied a July 1993 request for an extension of
time to file a Substantive Appeal and (2) that a December 16, 1993,
Substantive Appeal was not timely filed. Record (R.) at 16. The
appellant has filed a brief, and the Secretary has filed a brief in
response, to which the appellant has filed a reply. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will affirm the Board\'s decision.

**I. Relevant Background**

The veteran, Douglas K. Hayes, served on active duty during World War II
in the U.S. Army Air Corps from August 1942 through September 1945
during World War II. R. at 19. He died in March 1979 due to
complications from diabetes mellitus; service connection was granted in
April 1979 (R. at 103) for the cause of his death, apparently on the
application of his last wife (*see* R. at 165, 208 (appellant and VA,
respectively, stating that decedent\'s last wife (the appellant\'s
stepmother) had received dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC)
benefits from 1979 until her death in 1984)). In November 1992, the
appellant, who is the veteran\'s son, filed a claim with a VARO for both
VA DIC and dependents\' educational assistance (DEA) under chapters 11
and 35, respectively, of title 38, U.S. Code. R. at 34-35. By letters
dated December 4, 1992, and December 17, 1992, the RO notified the
appellant that these claims were denied. R. at 106, 109. On January 12,
1993, he filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) as to those decisions. R.
at 117-18. In that NOD, he stated: \"I amend claim submitted for DIC .
. . 11/9/92 to include request for \[c\]hapter 35 . . . \[DEA\]
\[b\]enefits 11/9/92, as all one claim.\" R. at 117.

In a May 14, 1993, letter to the appellant, the RO acknowledged
receiving the January 1993 NOD and enclosed both a Statement of the Case
(SOC) and a blank VA Form 9, Substantive Appeal to the BVA. R. at
126-35. The RO made no statement in that letter or the SOC in response
to the appellant\'s attempt to amend his DIC claim to include his DEA
claim. *See ibid*. On July 8, 1993, he requested, through his veterans\'
service organization representative, a 30-day extension of time to reply
to the SOC; he cited the death \"recently\" of his mother (a prior wife
of the veteran) as the basis for that request. R. at 137. The RO
responded to that request in a July 26, 1993, letter, which stated as
follows:

> This letter is in a \[sic\] response to a memorandum dated July 8,
> 1993, received from Paralyzed Veterans of America, pretaining \[sic\]
> to your request for a 30\[-\]day extension to perfect your appeal. You
> have one year from the date of the letters notifying you of the denial
> of benefits in which to perfect your appeal. You must submit VA Form 9
> prior to November 24, 1993, for \[c\]hapter 35 \[e\]ducation benefits
> and December 17, 1993, for . . . DIC\[\] benefits.

R. at 140. Again, the RO made no ***explicit*** reference to the
purported \"one claim\" amendment. *See ibid*.

The appellant submitted a VA Form 9, dated December 16, 1993, as to the
denial of both claims. R. at 142-59. On that VA Form 9, he noted his
prior request, based on his mother\'s death, for an extension of time to
file the Substantive Appeal and stated: \"I am turning in my appeal
today\[,\] Dec 16, 1993\[,\] because it\'s been hard and on 1/12/93 I
amended my DIC & Educational claim together.\" R. at 159.

At the appellant\'s request (R. at 142), the RO conducted a hearing in
February 1994 (R. at 163-71). Based on the sworn testimony provided at
that hearing and on the evidence that was referenced in the May 1993
SOC, the VA hearing officer, in a December 1994 decision, determined
that the appellant\'s DIC claim was properly denied and that the
appellant\'s DEA claim was \"not within the jurisdiction of the
\[h\]earing \[o\]fficer\". R. at 177. As to the DEA claim, the hearing
officer explained:

> The claimant was notified on December 4, 1992, of the denial of his
> claim for educational benefits. He filed a\[n NOD\] on December 22,
> 1992, and was issued a\[n SOC\] on May 14, 1993. He did not submit his
> VA Form 9 . . . until December 16, 1993. As Mr. Morgan failed to
> perfect an appeal to the December 4, 1992, decision within one year of
> notification, that decision is final and is not within the
> jurisdiction of the \[h\]earing \[o\]fficer.

R. at 179.

After the RO issued a February 1995 Supplemental SOC (SSOC) (R. at
323-26), the appellant, on March 31, 1995, filed, through his
representative, a Substantive Appeal to the Board. R. at 333-58. In a
statement in support of his appeal, the appellant admitted that his
appeal of the DEA claim was filed \"some 12\[\]days late\" and
explained, as to his July 1993 request for a 30-day extension of time,
that \"\[w\]hen \[he\] lost \[his\] \[m\]other to cancer, it was all
\[he\] could do to try to finish \[his\] appeal on time\[;\] \[e\]ven
with 5\[\]months left to spare, \[he\] knew that \[he\] needed an
extension of time to finish \[his\] appeal\" and that his \"goal was to
try to add on 30\[\]more days to the 5\[\]months left to perfect \[his\]
appeal.\" R. at 334.

In a June 30, 1997, decision, the Board requested that the RO \"provide
the appellant with a\[n SOC\] on the issues of (1) whether the July 1993
request for an extension for filing a Substantive Appeal should have
been granted, and (2) whether the December 1993 Substantive Appeal was
timely filed\" as to the DEA claim. R. at 377. In the same June 1997
decision, the Board denied the appellant\'s DIC claim because it found
that he was over age 17 at the time of the veteran\'s death and thus
lacked the requisite status of \"child of the veteran\" for purposes of
that claim. R. at 380-81.

In response to the June 1997 BVA decision, the RO, on January 14, 1998,
issued an SOC deciding that the appellant\'s December 16, 1993,
Substantive Appeal as to the RO\'s December 4, 1992, denial of his DEA
claim was not timely filed. R. at 412. The RO found that such an
extension \"should not have been granted . . . \[and that b\]ecause the
appellant\'s request was only for an extension to respond to the
\[SOC\], and \[because\] this request was received well within the time
limits to submit a \[S\]ubstantive \[A\]ppeal, the VA letter dated
7-26-93 was merely notifying the veteran that he had more than thirty
days left on his appeal period in which to respond to the \[SOC\], and
submit a \[S\]ubstantive \[A\]ppeal\". *Ibid*. The RO explained that it
had \"in essence\" previously denied the appellant\'s July 1993 request
for an extension of time to reply to the May 1993 SOC and that the RO
letter sent to the appellant in July 1993 was meant to convey that
information. *Ibid*. Addressing the second issue specified in the
Board\'s June 1997 decision, the RO stated that the appellant\'s
submission of the Substantive Appeal as to the denial of his DEA claim
was untimely because it was filed on December 16, 1993, but was due to
be filed on or before November 24, 1993. *Ibid*.

In the September 1999 BVA decision on appeal, the Board made findings of
fact including, inter alia, the following: (1) In its December 4, 1992,
letter, the RO had notified the appellant that his DEA claim was denied;
(2) on May 14, 1993, the RO had issued an SOC to the appellant; (3) in a
July 1993 letter, the appellant had requested a 30-day extension of time
for filing a Substantive Appeal; (4) in July 1993, the RO, \"in
effect\", had denied the appellant\'s request for an extension of time;
and (5) the appellant\'s Substantive Appeal was not received within 60
days after the mailing of the May 14, 1993, SOC, or within one year
after the mailing of the December 4, 1992, notification letter. R. at 6.
Based on these facts, the Board concluded that the RO had acted properly
when it denied the appellant\'s July 1993 extension-of-time request and
that the appellant\'s Substantive Appeal as to the DEA claim was thus
not timely filed. R. at 7. In its analysis, the Board acknowledged that,
although the RO had denied the appellant\'s DEA claim in a November 24,
1992, decision, the appellant had not been notified of that decision
until a notice was mailed on December 4, 1992, and that the latter date
was the proper date to use in determining the timeliness of the
appellant\'s Substantive Appeal. R. at 11. The Board then reasoned that,
because the granting of an extension of time to file a Substantive
Appeal \"lies largely within the discretion of the body to which the
decision is committed\" and because the proffered basis for this request
for an extension of time (the death of the appellant\'s mother five
months before the expiration of time to file a Substantive Appeal) does
not demonstrate a need for granting the requested 30-day extension of
time, the RO had not acted erroneously in denying the requested
extension. R. at 13. Finally, the Board concluded that the appellant\'s
Substantive Appeal (date stamped by the RO on December 16, 1992) -- even
if statutorily presumed to have been postmarked and received on December
10, 1993, *see* 38 C.F.R. § 20.305 (a), (b) (2001) (computation of time
for filing) -- was still untimely because it was received after
December 4, 1993. R. at 14-15.

**II. Analysis**

***A. Statutory and Regulatory Authorities***

Section 7105(d)(3) of title 38, U.S. Code, provides in pertinent part:

> The claimant will be afforded a period of sixty days from the date the
> statement of the case is mailed to file the formal appeal. This may be
> extended for a reasonable period on request for good cause
> shown. . . . The agency of original jurisdiction may close the case
> for failure to respond after receipt of the statement of the case, but
> questions as to timeliness or adequacy of response shall be determined
> by the Board of Veterans\' Appeals.

38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3). Section 20.302(b) of title 38, Code of Federal
Regulations, provides:

> \(b\) *Substantive Appeal*. Except in the case of simultaneously
> contested claims, a Substantive Appeal must be filed within 60 days
> from the date that the agency of original jurisdiction mails the
> Statement of the Case to the appellant, or within the remainder of the
> 1-year period from the date of mailing of the notification of the
> determination being appealed, whichever period ends later. The date of
> mailing of the Statement of the Case will be presumed to be the same
> as the date of the Statement of the Case and the date of mailing the
> letter of notification of the determination will be presumed to be the
> same as the date of that letter for purposes of determining whether an
> appeal has been timely filed.

38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b) (2001). Regulatory § 19.34 provides:

> Whether a Notice of Disagreement or Substantive Appeal has been filed
> on time is an appealable issue. If the claimant or his or her
> representative protests an adverse determination made by the agency of
> original jurisdiction with respect to timely filing of the Notice of
> Disagreement or Substantive Appeal, the claimant will be furnished a
> Statement of the Case.

38 C.F.R. § 19.34 (2001). Regulatory § 20.303 provides in pertinent
part:

> An extension of the 60-day period for filing a Substantive
> Appeal . . . may be granted for good cause. A request for such an
> extension must be in writing and must be made prior to expiration of
> the time limit for filing the Substantive Appeal. . . . A denial of a
> request for extension may be appealed to the Board.

38 C.F.R. § 20.303 (2001).

Although there is no statutory or regulatory provision that specifically
applies to the extension of the one-year period (from the date of
mailing of the notification of the adverse RO determination being
appealed) for filing a Substantive Appeal (as opposed to the 60-day
period that runs from the date of the mailing of the SOC), there is a
general regulatory provision for granting extensions of time, which
provides, inter alia:

> \(b\) *Extension of time limit*. Time limits within which claimants or
> beneficiaries are required to act to perfect a claim or challenge an
> adverse VA decision may be extended for good cause shown. . . .
> Denials of time limit extensions are separately appealable issues.

38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) (2001).

2.  Substantive-Appeal Filing Period for DEA Claim

Absent an extension of time, there is no dispute that the appellant\'s
December 16, 1993, Substantive Appeal as to the RO\'s denial of his DEA
claim was untimely -- that is, it was filed more than one year after
December 4, 1992, the date of the RO\'s mailing to him of notification
of the adverse RO decision on that claim. *See* 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b).
Despite the RO\'s erroneous statement in its January 1998 SOC, after
remand by the Board, that the appellant\'s Substantive Appeal was due on
November 24, 1993 (R. at 412), *see* Secretary\'s Brief (Br.) at 3 n.1
(conceding RO\'s error), the appellant and the Secretary are in
agreement regarding the dates by which that Substantive Appeal was due
to be filed and when it was actually filed. In fact, in his initial
appeal to the BVA in March 1995, the appellant conceded that his appeal
as to the denial of his DEA claim was untimely filed. R. at 334 (appeal
filed \"some 12-days late\").

***C. Denial of Request for Extension of Filing Period***

The question whether the BVA erred in finding proper the RO\'s denial of
the appellant\'s July 1993 extension-of-time request (R. at 16) raises
two subissues. First is the Secretary\'s contention that \"there is no
provision in the law allowing for extension of the \[one\]-year period
after the notice of denial \[by an RO\] is mailed\" and that, therefore,
\"it was not an abuse of discretion for the RO to deny \[the
a\]ppellant\'s request\" for an extension that \"the applicable statutes
or regulations do not contemplate\". Br. at 11.

The Secretary is correct that statutory section 7105(d)(3) does
***expressly*** provide for the Secretary to extend the period for
filing a Substantive Appeal only as to the 60-day post-SOC period, and
his regulation at § 20.303 appears to impose a time limit for extension
motions only as to motions to extend the 60-day post-SOC period (the
phrase \"\[a\] request for such an extension\" in the second sentence of
§ 20.303 refers back specifically to the preceding sentence\'s reference
to \"\[a\]n extension of the 60-day period for filing a Substantive
Appeal\"). However, regulatory § 20.302(b) expands upon the 60-day
Substantive-Appeal filing period by providing the appellant with the
remainder of the one-year period, after the date of mailing of an
adverse RO determination, in which to file a Substantive Appeal if that
one-year period extends beyond the 60-day period. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b).
The 60-day post-SOC period is inapplicable here because the appellant\'s
deadline to file his Substantive Appeal as to the denial of his DEA
claim was December 4, 1993, the date one year after the date of the
RO\'s notice of its denial of that claim. His deadline was thus not July
13, 1993, the date 60 days after the issuance of the May 14, 1993, SOC.
Hence, whatever may be the merit or lack thereof of the appellant\'s
extension-of-time request in this case, that request was not untimely
filed.

The § 20.302(b) regulatory provision of an alternate Substantive-Appeal
filing period derives from the NOD one-year filing period provided in
38 U.S.C. § 7105(b). *See* *Rowell v. Principi*, 4 Vet.App. 9, 17
(1993); *see also* 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1) (providing Secretary with
authority to prescribe \"regulations which are necessary or appropriate
to carry out the laws administered by \[VA\] and are consistent with
those laws, including . . . regulations with respect to . . . the method
of taking and furnishing \[proof and evidence\]\"). As to that alternate
NOD filing period, section 7105(c) expressly authorizes the Secretary to
provide by regulation for exceptions, and, as discussed further below,
the Secretary has provided in § 3.109(b) for the granting of such an
exception to the one-year NOD filing period by way of a time extension
\"for good cause shown\". *See* 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c) (providing that
Secretary may provide for exceptions by regulations not inconsistent
with title 38, U.S. Code); *Rowell*, 4 Vet.App. at 14-15 (holding §
3.109(b) applicable to NOD filing period).

In light of this analysis, it is troublesome that in this case the
Secretary, when addressing the question of a request to extend the
period of time for filing a Substantive Appeal, makes no reference to
§ 3.109(b)\'s provision for \"good cause\" extensions of \"\[t\]ime
limits . . . for challeng\[ing\] an adverse VA decision\", particularly
given that § 3.109(b) is facially applicable to a request for an
extension of time to challenge an adverse RO decision by filing a
Substantive Appeal. *See* 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 (2001) (providing that
\"\[p\]roper completion and filing of a Substantive Appeal are the last
actions the appellant needs to take to perfect an appeal\"); *see
generally* *Roy* *v. Brown*, 5 Vet.App. 554, 559 (Steinberg, J.,
dissenting). As noted above, assuming that the Secretary\'s regulatory
establishment of the alternate one-year Substantive-Appeal filing period
is within his regulation-writing authority (and no challenge to that
regulation is presented here), *see* 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1), and to the
extent that the Secretary has allowed, through § 3.109(b), for the
extension of the one-year period for filing a Substantive Appeal, such
an extension may be granted only for \"good cause shown\". 38 C.F.R. §
3.109(b).

Thus, the second subissue concerns the applicable standard of review for
determining \"good cause\" under § 3.109(b). Before we address that
issue, however, there are two preliminary matters to consider.

***1. Argument Regarding Consolidation of DEA Claim with DIC Claim***

The appellant has argued that he had obtained an extension of time to
file a Substantive Appeal to the denial of his DEA claim when he filed
his January 12, 1993, NOD that sought to consolidate his DEA and DIC
claims to make them \"all one claim\". R. at 117. However, in the
appellant\'s July 8, 1993, request for a 30-day extension to reply to
the SOC, he made no mention of this idea of claim consolidation. *See*
R. at 137. When the RO denied his request for a 30-day extension to
reply to the SOC, it again did not refer to or acknowledge his purported
consolidation of his claims. *See* R. at 140. The only other mention of
consolidating the claims was made in his December 16, 1993, Substantive
Appeal: \"I am turning in my appeal today Dec\[.\] 16, 1993\[,\] because
it\'s been hard and on 1/12/93 I amended my DIC & Educational claim
together.\" R. at 159. It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the
RO never advised him that the claims were consolidated or made any
statement that reasonably could have been construed that way. Moreover,
in its July 26, 1993, letter, the RO stated that it was responding to
his 30-day extension request and it did, without doubt, deny that
request by treating the two claims as separate and distinct and giving
separate deadlines for filing Substantive Appeals in response to the
SOCs that had denied each claim separately. R. at 140.

***2. Fair-Process Considerations***

Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, however, the RO\'s denial of
an extension of time to file the appellant\'s Substantive Appeal was an
appealable issue under law and regulation. *See* 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3)
(providing that \"questions as to timeliness . . . of response \[to
SOC\] shall be determined by \[BVA\]\"); 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.34 (providing
that whether Substantive Appeal has been filed on time is an appealable
issue), 20.101(c) (providing that \"\[a\]ll claimants have the right to
appeal \[to BVA\] a determination . . . by \[RO\] . . . that the Board
does not have jurisdictional authority\[,\] . . . includ\[ing\]
questions relating to the timely filing of . . . the Substantive
Appeal\"), *amended by* 66 Fed. Reg. 53,339-40 (Oct. 22, 2001), 20.303
(providing that \"denial of a request for extension may be appealed to
the Board\") (2001). Therefore, the appellant was entitled to notice of
his appellate rights accompanying the notice of that adverse decision,
*see* 38 U.S.C. § 5104(a) (providing that notice of decision \"affecting
the provision of \[VA\] benefits . . . shall include an explanation of
the procedure for obtaining review of the decision\"); 38 C.F.R.
§ 19.30(b) (2001). The Board in its June 30, 1997, decision regarding
the DIC claim clearly recognized the inadequacy of the process that the
RO had afforded to the appellant; the Board stated the following:

> In July 1993, the appellant, through his representative, submitted a
> request for a 30\[-\]day extension to reply to the \[SOC\]. The RO
> replied in July 1993 with a letter stating that \[it\] had received
> the appellant\'s request for a 30\[-\]day extension. Without allowing
> or denying the request, the RO informed the appellant of the original
> time limit for filing his appeals, about four-and-one-half months
> later. The appellant\'s Substantive Appeal was received at the RO on
> December 16, 1993, twelve days after the one\[-\]year anniversary of
> the notice of denial of the claim regarding \[c\]hapter 35 benefits.
> In February 1994, the appellant presented testimony at a personal
> hearing before RO personnel. One of the issues on which the appellant
> presented argument was entitlement to education benefits pursuant to
> \[c\]hapter 35, United States Code. In a December 1994 decision, the
> Hearing Officer determined that he did not have jurisdiction over the
> claim for entitlement to \[c\]hapter 35 education benefits as the
> appellant had not submitted a timely Substantive Appeal on the issue.
> The appellant was notified of that decision in a\[n SSOC\], dated
> February 1995. The \[SSOC\] provided no laws and regulations regarding
> timeliness of appeals, nor did it reflect consideration of the fact
> that no action had been taken on the appellant\'s request for an
> extension for filing his Substantive Appeal. In a letter accompanying
> the \[SSOC\], the RO informed the appellant that if he wanted the
> issue of timeliness of the Substantive Appeal to be adjudicated by the
> Board, all he had to do was write a letter stating that he disagreed
> with the determination. It was stated that the issue would then be
> before the Board. The appellant responded in March 1995, arguing that
> he had requested a 30\[-\]day extension for filing his Substantive
> Appeal, assuming that he would be given a total of one year and thirty
> days if the extension was granted. As the \[SSOC\] merely informed the
> appellant that his appeal on the \[c\]hapter 35 issues had not been
> timely perfected, without providing pertinent laws and regulations,
> and without discussing the intertwined issue of whether an extension
> should have been granted for Filing the Substantive Appeal, the Board
> construes it to be a notice of denial. Thus, the appellant\'s March
> 1995 statement was a\[n NOD\] with that finding. The RO is requested
> therefore to provide the appellant with a\[n SOC\] on the issues of
> (1) whether the July 1993 request for an extension for filing a
> Substantive Appeal should have been granted, and (2) whether the
> December 1993 Substantive Appeal was timely filed as to the claim for
> entitlement to benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. \[c\]hapter 35.

R. at 376-77.

Thereafter, the RO, by its January 14, 1998, letter, complied fully with
the Board\'s request. By providing the appellant with the four-page SOC
on the denial of the 30-day extension of time to file his Substantive
Appeal and a full statement of his right to appeal that determination to
the Board (R. at 407), which he thereafter did in a timely fashion (R.
at 423 (April 7, 1998, Substantive Appeal)), the Board cured the
procedural defect in the case by presenting the appellant with a full
opportunity to contest the RO\'s denial of an extension of time and in
finding that his Substantive Appeal as to the denial of his DEA claim
was not timely. Because we are satisfied that there is no procedural
defect associated with this matter any longer, we proceed to a review of
the merits of the BVA decision on appeal

***3. BVA\'s Exercise of Discretion as to Request for Extension of
Time***

We now address whether the Board abused its discretion in concluding
that the RO\'s denial of an extension of time beyond December 4, 1993,
was proper. The Court has held that there is no \"legal entitlement\" to
a \"good cause\" extension under § 3.109(b) and that a \"good cause\"
determination is a \"decision committed to the sole discretion of the
Secretary\". *Corry v. Derwinski*, 3 Vet.App. 231, 235 (1992). This
standard is highly deferential and has been equated to the
abuse-of-discretion standard. *See Tulingan v. Brown*, 9 Vet.App. 484,
489 (1996) (Farley, J., concurring) (stating that 38 U.S.C. §
7261(a)(3)(A) authorizes Court to overturn decisions committed to the
Secretary\'s discretion that are found to be an abuse of discretion). In
this case, the basis for the appellant\'s request in July 1993 for a
30-day extension of time to file a Substantive Appeal -- that is, the
death of his mother five months before the expiration of the time
available to him to file his Substantive Appeal -- does not, on its
face, logically justify or support the request. Moreover, the appellant
did not provide, in conjunction with the proffered basis at the time
that he requested an extension, an explanation or specific reasons
supporting a basis for the requested extension; all he said was that his
\"mother \[had\] died recently\". R. at 137. Five months later, on
December 16, 1993, he described that loss and stated that \"it was all I
could do to try to finish my appeal on time.\" R. at 334. Accordingly,
given the highly deferential standard of review for good-cause
determinations, *see Corry* and *Tulingan,* both *supra*, the Court
cannot conclude that the Board erred in finding that the RO acted
properly in denying the appellant\'s request for an extension of time to
file his Substantive Appeal.

**III. Conclusion**

Upon consideration of the foregoing analysis, the record on appeal, and
the parties\' pleadings, the Court holds that the appellant has not
demonstrated that the BVA committed error -- in its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, compliance with procedural requirements,
articulation of reasons or bases, or consideration of the
benefit-of-the-doubt rule -- that would warrant reversal or remand under
38 U.S.C. §§ 1310, 5107(b), 7104(a) or (d)(1), 7105(c) or (d)(3), or
7261, or 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.109(b), 19.34, 20.302(b), or 20.303. Therefore,
the Court affirms the September 28, 1999,

BVA decision.

AFFIRMED.