**Social Investment in Culturally and Ecologically Fragile Areas.**

Modern Venezuela owes its development to the country's natural
resources, petroleum. From 1924 to 1989, Venezuelan's economic and
social growth was driven by the state owned petroleum activities. Unlike
other Latin American countries where the population itself contributed
to the country's growth through tax payments or other non-financial
payments to society, Venezuelans were dependent on the state for its
economic wellbeing. In this context, however, not all Venezuelans
benefited equally from the State's petroleum initiatives. In particular
indigenous populations were at a significant disadvantage vís a vís
reaping the benefits of Venezuela's petroleum riches. Either the vast
distances separating these groups from urban areas or the meager budgets
allocated to agencies responsible for advocating for them, led these
groups to be excluded from the health and education benefits that the
State provided to other Venezuelans.

In this context of unmet needs in contrast with petroleum gains, the
private, public and civil sectors have come together to try to improve
the quality of life for indigenous groups in Venezuela. An example of
such a partnership is that among the Inter-American Foundation (IAF),
the Amoco petroleum company (now B.P.Amoco), and the La Salle Foundation
of Natural Science (FLASA). In 1998 the three partners initiated a
program to improve the quality of life of three Warao communities on the
Orinoco River Delta in the State of Delta Amacuro.

**The Problems and the Project.**

The program, *"Education, health, and generation of their own income:
actions to improve the quality of life of the residents of the Orinoco
Delta\'s Warao communities"* was inaugurated in mid-1998. Its objective
was to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of Kokuina,
Makareo, and Mariusa on the Orinoco Delta in Venezuela. This basic
program was essential for the communities, given the poverty and the
fragile natural environment in which they live. The Warao' situation was
made more vulnerable by the temporal infrastructure built by the state
for oil extraction purposes. As a result of these constructions, much of
the vast Orinoco River Delta water system was closed resulting in
serious environmental damage. With the closing of some of this river\'s
branches, the channels and land became salinized; consequently, a major
famine broke out and significant out migration to large cities. This
type of immigration has serious social and cultural problems associated
with it.

With this context in mind, the partners considered how to address the
most pressing issues facing the Warao ethnic group: lack of basic health
care, lack of formal and bilingual education, and under-optimized
fishing production. The program encompassed these basic needs and was
based on profound respect for the ethnic group\'s identity, always
keeping in mind that processes must be participatory not forced, and
must be executed according to the local perception of time, rationale,
and motivation. This type of strategy was critical in order allow the
communities to assume co-responsibility for improving their own quality
of life.

Today, the program results are real. In the area of health, three
comprehensive health centers were built and started up, and a mobile
river medical care service is available. Some 770 residents received
health training through bilingual lectures, and six people were trained
in non-traditional medicine. With regards to education, two schools were
built, and six Warao teachers were trained to deliver bilingual literacy
classes and courses for adults. Finally, an array of educational
materials was developed in the Warao language. With regard to micro
entrepreneurs, a rotating fund was established. To date, 72 loans have
been made to purchase nets and motors. Marketing channels for the
Waraos\' fishing industry products are currently being investigated.

As a result of the project, the Warao have measurably improved their
quality of life and income levels. Moreover, there is an ongoing effort
to recapture the Warao cultural identity thanks to implementation of the
bilingual intercultural system in the schools. Despite these project
results, the one thing that remains questionable is the project's
*sustainability*. As each partner has finalized its funding commitment,
the question is how will the community continue to benefit from the
project. Like other geographically and culturally remote communities
that participate in development projects, the Warao face a significant
problem ... the lack of an exit strategy developed in conjunction with
the partners to ensure the project management is transitioned over time
to the beneficiary population. To understand this problem, we must first
understand the parameters of the partnership and, more specifically,
each partner's reason for participating in it.

**The Partnership.**

BP Amoco, IAF, and FLASA each had individual interest in establishing
this partnership. While the collective motive was consistent - improving
the living conditions of the Warao -- the partner's individual, or
self-interest, did not necessarily tie into the specific of the project.

***BP Amoco.*** The Amoco Petroleum Company initiated exploration in the
State of Delta Amacuro and, thanks to the merger with British Petroleum
(B.P.), was working in Punta Pescador, the location of the project. BP
Amoco's CSR motivations fell squarely into the corporation's global
social investment plans. For B.P. Amoco, the project should reflect the
commitment of all partners time and money to generate sustainable human
progress among the Warao which could be quantifiable at the end of the
project.

While the company was extremely interested in minimizing any potentially
negative environmental impact and at the same time proactively improving
the lives of the local communities, like most companies, it was
motivated to do these things in order to maintain a stellar corporate
image. In the opinion of Rosi Álvarez, B.P.\'s current Manager for
Corporate Affairs, and María Eugenia Fuenmayor, Amoco\'s former Manager
for Corporate Affairs, this strategy was fundamental to a company that
was developing, and continues to develop, a business niche with the
potential downside environmental risks in a particularly fragile area
such as the Orinoco River Delta. That motivation does not detract from
the corporation\'s contributions to the program, which came to more than
a million dollars.

***IAF.*** For the IAF, the project was an opportunity to continue to
partner with the private sector in Venezuela in an effort to promote
self-help, grassroots development amongst the poorest of the poor.
Taking into consideration a successful eight-year partnership with
PDVSA, the IAF made a grant to this project. The grant presented more
logistical difficulties than most. As the IAF traditionally makes
several montoring visits a year to meet with the grantees, the Delta
project with its physical distances and communication problems, made it
more difficult to have a very close relationship between donor and
grantee. Development of a social program in such an isolated area with a
population that had such a unique worldview would generally require more
of a physical presence by IAF and BP-Amoco in addition to the follow-up
monitoring by both.

***FLASA.*** FLASA, from an institutional standpoint, had and continues
to have in-depth knowledge of the Orinoco Delta region and its people.
Since 1939, it has been working to classify the local flora and fauna
and work with the local indigenous populations. The organization has a
special knowledge of the geographic and ethnographic characteristics of
the Orinoco Delta region. At the same time, however, this project
presented a learning curve for FLASA as it was the first time the
organization would mange a micro credit program with an indigenous
community.

In summary, BP-Amoco sought to improve living conditions in the Warao
communities that live near its center of operations and to optimize its
institutional image. For IAF, it was important to establish new
alliances with private organizations and serve disadvantaged
populations, being true to its commitment "to reach populations that
other donors do not reach." Finally, FLASA, a Venezuelan NGO with a long
history in the region, was interested in further promoting the
development of the Delta and the research it has been carrying out for
more than 60 years. These motivations came together in the alliance that
funded and implemented a three-year program, which effectively achieved
its goals, but did not optimize the alliances. In short, the motivations
of each partner shared a common interest in participating in a project
to improve the standard of living of the Warao. However, they were not
clear on their long-term vision for the project beyond the three-years.

**Lessons Learned:**

-   Partnering for the sake of partnering is not enough. Partnerships
    should be made on the basis of a solid foundation so that not just
    economic resources come together in the project, but also the
    knowledge and expertise that each partner can contribute;

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Each partner should take time to understand its individual and
    collective motivations in order to ensure that the two are not
    mutually exclusive;

-   Working in geographically and culturally remote communities requires
    more human, financial and time commitments in order to ensure that
    the program is successful within the local context.

***Marlene Das Faias**. BA in Education, specialization in Social
Sciences, Andrés Bello Catholic University, 1997. Masters in Latin
American Social and Policy Studies, specialization in Social
Development, DIAL, Chile, 1999-2000. Program Coordinator for the civil
corporation PROactiva, local IAF Liaison and Support Service in
Venezuela.*