![](media/image1.jpeg){width="1.051388888888889in"
height="1.0652777777777778in"}

Statement of

Casey Judd, Business Manager on behalf of the

Federal Wildland Fire Service Association

Before the

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Concerning

Federal Land Management Agency Wildfire Preparedness

**[INTRODUCTION]{.underline}**

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege
to appear before you today on behalf of the brave men and women across
this country who serve as wildland firefighters and wildland fire
program managers. These brave men and women make up our Nation's federal
wildland firefighting forces, and I intend to offer you their voice and
their perspectives on the current preparedness of the federal land
management agency fire programs, as we face yet another potentially
catastrophic wildfire season. I also intend to offer their
recommendations on a corrective course of action needed to improve the
overall efficiency, cost effectiveness, accountability, and safety
needed to provide wildland fire management in the 21^st^ Century.

The Federal Wildland Fire Service Association (FWFSA) is an employee
association whose membership is primarily made up of federal wildland
firefighters from all five federal land management agencies. As an
association, our diverse membership includes those occupying all fire
positions from entry-level firefighter to fire chief, along with
dispatch, prevention, and support personnel. It is that diversity that
continues to provide the FWFSA with a wealth of reliable data and
information from the field. The FWFSA in turn provides "real world"
information to Congress to illustrate and define the serious issues
facing the fire programs of the land management agencies, and how these
issues directly affect community and firefighter safety, as well as
wrongly increase the financial burden being placed upon the American
taxpayer to fund an often misguided program.

**[FIRE PREPAREDNESS]{.underline}**

During this hearing, the committee will no doubt hear two significantly
different perspectives on the readiness and preparedness of the land
management agency fire programs to meet the current wildfire season. The
committee will hear from Agency representatives who, for at least the
past two years have suggested to this and other committees that they
(the agencies) are adequately prepared for the season. They (the
agencies) undoubtedly will use terms such as "increased management
efficiencies" and "the ability to move resources to areas of need" to
describe their version of preparedness, and how they feel it is possible
to do more with less. These terms, as well as their implementation, need
great attention and oversight by this committee.

The committee will also hear testimony representing the voice of the
Nation's federal wildland firefighters. The FWFSA will suggest that the
federal land management agencies and their fire programs are **not as
prepared** for the wildfire season as the agencies would like us to
blindly believe. As an employee association, the FWFSA will present
several significant issues that must be addressed if proper fire
preparedness is to be realized.

Preparedness levels can be somewhat subjective depending on what
criterion is being used. The FWFSA believes it is prudent to utilize the
guidance and expectations of Congress, and who through thorough
consultation with the land management agencies and their constituents,
approved the National Fire Plan (NFP) as the baseline for measuring
current levels of preparedness. As I understand it, it was the intent of
Congress to fund the "Most Efficient Level" (MEL) of resources at
90-100% to provide improvements to community and resource protection, as
well as reduce large fire costs. Today, regardless of data being
provided by the agencies, the current MEL level has dropped below 2000
levels in most areas.

As the NFP suggests and common sense would dictate, having sufficient
preparedness resources in place prior to the wildfire season would lead
to reduced fire suppression costs. Fire preparedness dollars are
designed to pay for a variety of resources including temporary
firefighters, which in any given season can make up nearly 46% of the
fire season staffing.

To compliment having adequate preparedness resources in place, it is
imperative that, as a result of the wildfire season being year round in
many parts of the country, hazardous fuels reduction must be
accomplished. These two elements: proper preparedness resources and
hazardous fuels reduction, are key to reducing wildfire suppression
costs.

**[SO WHY ARE SUPPRESSION COSTS CONTINUING TO SKYROCKET?]{.underline}**

This and other committees have been consistently told by the Agencies
and "experts" that suppression costs are continuing to rise because
of 1) climate/drought and 2) the increasing costs of protecting the
Wildland Urban Interface. We, the FWFSA, take serious note with these
assumptions. While these two elements are indeed factors, proper
preparedness mitigates to a great degree the influence these two
elements have on the overall costs of suppression. The question has been
posed by both Congress and OMB: *If it stands to reason that proper
preparedness lead to reduced suppression costs, why after increased
preparedness funding under the National Fire Plan, have suppression
costs continued to rise?* A simple answer -- Smoke and Mirrors.

As previously mentioned, the answer from the Agency(s) is that while
they cling to their (unrepeatable data) suggestion that initial attack
(IA) success is still 96-98%, climate & Wildland Urban Interface have
caused the other 2-4% of fires to cost record sums. With all due
respect, the Nation's federal wildland firefighters adamantly disagree
with this assessment.

**[FIREFIGHTER POSITION]{.underline}**

In 2003 the FWFSA warned the Forest Service leadership that changes to
the retirement package enjoyed by employees of the California Department
of Forestry & Fire Protection (now called CAL FIRE) would result in a
mass-exodus of CAL FIRE firefighters taking advantage of the more
gratuitous 3% @ 50 benefits by the year 2007 & 2008. The FWFSA further
warned the Forest Service that as a result of the vacancies at CAL FIRE,
it (CAL FIRE) would naturally look to federal land management agency
wildland firefighters to fill their ranks. It was at that time that the
FWFSA made every conceivable effort to reach out to the agencies,
primarily the Forest Service, to work with it to find ways to address
long standing pay & benefit issues so that when 2007 & 2008 came, the
losses would be minimal. The FWFSA was summarily ignored by the
leadership of the agencies.

Throughout this decade, hundreds of millions of dollars in fire
preparedness and fuels reduction dollars have been systematically
diverted by non-fire "line officers" of the agencies (again primarily
the Forest Service) to pay for a variety of non-fire programs, positions
& projects. These line officers include leadership of the Washington
Office (WO), Regional Foresters, Forest Supervisors, and to a lesser
extent, District Rangers.

The impact of this diversion was not felt until 2006 as up to that time
forests were able to "deficit spend" in order to secure the needed
preparedness resources despite these huge sums of money being diverted
away from fire. However in 2006 the word came down that there would be
no further deficit spending. Incredibly fire management officers were
expected to maintain the same IA rate without the ability to pay for
adequate preparedness resources. Several years ago, Congress directed
the executive branch agencies to cut the costs associated with "cost
pools", and show actual costs and where the Congressionally intended and
appropriated dollars were actually being spent. As a result, the Forest
Service for example, changed terminology and began using "Indirect
Shared Costs" to rename where dollars were being redirected and spent.
The decision above to no longer allow "deficit spending" (Antideficiency
Act, 31 U.S.C. sect. 1517) must be addressed as both fire preparedness
and fire suppression funding is being misused, and directly contribute
to "the increasing costs of fire suppression" as agency officials say
"we are prepared" (Reference: GAO, Comptroller General Decision,
B-310108).

In February 2006, Agency (USDA) representatives appeared before this
committee and once again assured the Committee that adequate
preparedness resources would be in place. Firefighters knew this wasn't
going to be the case. The continuation of diverting preparedness dollars
resulted in less preparedness resources in the field. The diversion of
fuels reduction dollars reduced the number of treated acres. The result
was what firefighters expected: reduced preparedness resources allowed
many small fires to grow in size, intensity and ultimately cost as
either Incident Commanders waited for federal resources that had to now
come from much greater distances or, in the typical alternative, the
Agency reverted to its over-reliance on significantly higher-priced
non-federal resources to fill in the gaps of the missing federal
resources. Either way suppression costs increased needlessly. The result
was a record year for suppression costs.

Rather than admitting the diversion of funds played a role in less
resources being in place and thus ultimately increasing the costs of
fires needlessly, the Agency simply reverted to its theory of climate
and wildland urban interface as the causes of increased suppression
costs.

In 2007 we suggested to Congress that a repeat of 2006 was inevitable.
We further predicted as we correctly did in 2006 that the Agency would
return to Congress in the fall, complain that it had been a terrible
season and seek a supplemental appropriation of another half billion
dollars. That is exactly what happened. The problem was exacerbated by
the expected exodus of CAL FIRE firefighters retiring and by the
vacancies they left to be filled by federal firefighters. In 2007, the
migration of federal wildland firefighters began to CAL FIRE and other
fire agencies offering better pay, benefits, and working conditions The
Agency, as it did in 2003 when first warned of the issue, did nothing to
retain their employees despite having a number of authorities to do so
under the Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004. To compound the problem for
the federal sector, the Governor of California opened up hiring to the
outside for mid-level positions at CAL FIRE. This generated an entirely
new round of hiring and federal losses. These losses, and the Agency's
inability to retain highly tenured and quality firefighters, are
currently being investigated by Senator Feinstein of California.

As we enter the 2008 season, the Forest Service fire program, primarily
focused in the western United States, and especially in California is
imploding. Despite assurances from the Agency that all funded positions
would be staffed by the start of the season, as of June 6, 2008, **32%
of California's Forest Service Engines are unavailable.** That doesn't
include hotshot crews that are being disbanded because of staffing and
other resources not being staffed. Despite the USDA suggesting on May
6^th^ in a letter to Senator Feinstein that California had 363
vacancies, the fact was that there were, and still are, more than
**500** vacancies.

Further, while the Agency referenced a round of hiring in July,
firefighters know very well that with the continuing HR problems and
training requirements, anyone who does get a job offer likely won't
actually come on board until later in the season, or after they meet
minimal qualifications. Thus the July hiring idea will have little
impact on this season's staffing. Furthermore, the problem hasn't been
recruiting firefighters, it has been keeping them once they are trained
at taxpayer expense.

The staffing problems are not exclusive to California. Across the
country Forest Service engines and other crews are not staffed and left
uncovered. More importantly, while Congress and the American taxpayers
expect these engines to be available 24/7, because of the losses of
firefighters and the failure of the Agency to get fire preparedness
dollars to the field where they belong, many engines are running only 5
days a week or even 3 days a week allowing firefighters to wonder if the
Agency leadership has found a way to "schedule" wildfires.

**[PROGNOSIS FOR 2008 & BEYOND]{.underline}**

Unless Congress takes immediate action to break the vicious cycle
described herein, the infrastructure of our Nation's federal wildland
firefighting forces will continue to be less than adequate to meet the
complexities of wildfires in the 21^st^ century. Allowing the land
management agencies to continue to manage their fire programs as they do
today will continue to needlessly result in skyrocketing suppression
costs borne by the American taxpayer. Throwing more money at the
problem, i.e. emergency supplemental appropriations without demanding
proper fiscal management of the funds already appropriated to the
Agencies for suppression, preparedness and hazardous fuels reduction
will not result in a stronger, more effective and fiscally efficient
fire program.

**[SIMPLE BASIC SOLUTIONS TO LONG STANDING PROBLEMS]{.underline}**

If Congress intends for the federal land management agencies to field
and manage fire programs, it (Congress) must insist that the
organizational structure of said programs be changed so that they are
managed in a manner that will meet head on the challenges and
complexities of wildfires in the 21^st^ century. The fire programs can
no longer be managed as they were 30-40 years ago. While recognizing
that any such fire program is a part of a land management agency, the
fire programs must be managed like a fire department. This means, above
all, that the program must be managed by those with fire experience and
expertise. This includes those who are responsible for developing and
implementing fire policy along with the responsibility for handling and
managing fire funds.

A common analogy of the current organizational structure of the land
management agency fire programs is that it is tantamount to a major
metropolitan city fire department being managed by that city's Parks &
Recreation Department. As ridiculous as that sounds, that is the reality
of land management agency fire programs today.

Turning fire program management over to those with fire experience and
expertise will eliminate the diversion of preparedness & fuels reduction
funds ensuring adequate resources are in place. This will lead to
reduced suppression costs as envisioned by the National Fire Plan.
Further, policies more in line with current fire department protocol
would be realized which is essential given the frequency that federal
wildland firefighters interact with those from other non-federal fire
agencies.

Secondly, solutions must be implemented immediately to stem the tide of
losses of federal wildland firefighters to other agencies. The issues
facing our firefighters with respect to pay & benefits are not new. They
have been well documented for decades and all reports point to the
removal of firefighters from beneath archaic pay & personnel policies as
***[the]{.underline}*** solution to this problem. Unfortunately the
Agencies have done nothing to correct these problems.

As a result, our Nation's federal wildland firefighters have turned to
Congress for help in strengthening the land management agency fire
programs; making those programs ***[the]{.underline}*** place to make a
wildland firefighting career while saving the American taxpayer
staggering sums of money.

The FWFSA has repeatedly suggested to the Agency leadership that two
actions would have immediate positive benefits in stemming the tide of
losses. The first is to properly recognize these brave men and women as
wildland firefighters through proper job classification.

Nearly every member of Congress, the President of the United States and
even the Forest Service Chief and USDA Undersecretary refer to these
employees as "wildland firefighters." Yet the agencies have turned a
deaf ear towards the firefighters in removing them from outdated
classifications such as "Forestry Technicians" and Range Technicians."

The Congressional Budget Office has determined that there would be no
financial impact to the federal budget if the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) were to create a new wildland firefighter series
(reference HR 5697, 109^th^ Congress). In fact creating such a series
would eliminate the current debacle associated with the 401
classification as it affects our firefighters.

There simply is no compelling reason not to classify these men and women
as wildland firefighters. The Forest Service Fire & Aviation Management
Director recently acknowledged what our firefighters have known for
years...wildland firefighting is a year round job in the 21^st^ century.
The job descriptions and classifications of these employees should more
accurately reflect the variety of fire related duties these employees
now perform. Properly recognizing these brave men & women for who they
are and what they do would be a tremendously cost effective morale boost
and give them the sense that someone actually does care about them.

Finally, the compensation concept of "portal to portal" pay has been a
subject of contention between federal wildland firefighters and their
employers for decades. Despite the fact that the vast majority of paid
professional firefighters in the United States, inclusive of Department
of Defense federal firefighters are compensated in this way, the land
management agencies have steadfastly refused to do so. It is likely a
result of the fact that the fire program is managed by those with no
fire background and thus ill-equipped to understand what is needed to
field a top notch firefighting force.

Ironically the payment of "portal to portal" to non-federal firefighters
(primarily those in the West from municipal fire agencies) is also a
major factor in skyrocketing fire suppression costs. One only needs to
look at major costly fires in the West and see that the majority of
suppression costs are for non-federal resources.

However the refusal of land management agencies to compensate their own
wildland firefighters with portal to portal pay is perhaps the most
egregious issue when one conducts exit polls of those federal
firefighters leaving the federal system.

It is unconscionable for the Federal Government to criticize the rising
costs of wildfire suppression while continuing to pay non-federal
firefighters portal to portal pay while taking their own, inherently
less expensive firefighters "off the clock" on the same incident.

Currently, federal wildland firefighters who are on assignments that
exceed 24 hrs are taken off the clock for anywhere from 8-14 hours of
that 24 hour period while their municipal counterparts are paid their
already higher salary for a full 24 hours. These assignments can be up
to two weeks or longer and result in federal wildland firefighters being
away from home and family yet they are not compensated even though they
cannot utilize their time as they would normally do.

The concept of portal to portal as it relates to federal wildland
firefighters would be to simply compensate said firefighters for all
hours on an assignment exceeding 24 hours in duration.

While the Agencies have suggested that such compensation is "cost
prohibitive" such an argument defies logic given that those same
agencies compensate cooperators with portal to portal pay at much higher
rates. In fact, it is our assumption that compensating federal wildland
firefighters with portal to portal pay would not only cost a fraction of
what is currently funded for wildfire suppression but it would lead to
better retention and thus reduce the need to over rely on the
higher-priced non-federal resources thereby saving taxpayers significant
sums. It should be interesting to note that despite their opposition to
portal to portal pay, the Forest Service approved the use of "24 hour
pay plans" on several Southern California forests this past fall. These
plans paid firefighters 8 hours of base pay and 16 hours of overtime
less 3-half hour meal periods. Furthermore these plans were utilized for
crews who were simply pre-positioned and not on an active assignment.
Thus we believe the precedent has been set for portal to portal pay.

Furthermore, the greatest irony involving portal to portal pay is that
if preparedness funds were not diverted as previously referenced and
sufficient federal fire preparedness resources were actually in the
field, the number of incidents (24 hrs+) in which portal to portal would
be compensable would be significantly reduced. There mere knowledge that
they would be eligible to be paid in a similar manner as their
non-federal counterparts on any given emergency incident would lead to
better retention.

These changes, along with providing temporary wildland firefighters
basic health benefits and eligibility to the Federal Employee Group Life
Insurance (FEGLI) would eliminate any retention problem; ensure adequate
preparedness resources are in place each season; reduce the costs of
suppression; eliminate the annual request for emergency supplemental
appropriations; strengthen the infrastructure of our Nation's federal
wildland firefighting forces and ultimately save the American taxpayer
hundreds of millions of dollars.

The federal land management agencies have steadfastly refused to support
or implement any plans/policies that would serve to solve the myriad
problems facing their fire programs. If the agencies are unwilling to
make the necessary changes, we urge Congress to make them for them or,
in the alternative, take fire away from the land management agencies and
create a stand-alone federal wildland fire service managed by
firefighters for firefighters.

Until these changes are made, our Nation's federal land management
agencies will be ill-prepared to face this and subsequent fire seasons
and will remain unable to provide the American public with the
strongest, yet most cost-efficient and effective wildland firefighting
force in the world.

Respectfully Submitted:

Federal Wildland Fire Service Association\
P.O. Box 517\
Inkom, ID 83245\
208-775-4577