Chapter XIII

The Defenses of San Juan

It is appropriate at this stage to examine in detail the defenses which
faced the invading English force, as it was these defenses which played
the major part in rendering the attack unsuccessful.

From the earliest days of her conquest and colonization of the New
World, Spain had been required to undertake defensive construction in
order to defend and retain her new territories and after the attack on
Puerto Rico in 1625 by the Dutch under Captain Boudewijn Hendricksz, an
ongoing program was begun to improve the fortifications of San Juan and
the surrounding area. This initiative was eventually to show significant
results, including the completion of the city walls and a connecting
wall between the forts of El Morro and San Cristobal on the north coast
of the island.

The first half of the eighteenth century was for Puerto Rico one of
relative tranquility, partly as a result of the peace between the mother
country and her rival, France, and a reluctance by the other Great
Powers to take an interest in the island. It is probably for this reason
that between the period 1701 to 1740, Spain seems to have largely
forgotten the island and very little defensive maintenance or
improvement took place. As a result, by mid century, the defenses had
fallen into a poor state of repair and were much in need of maintenance
and revision.

By 1759, it had become apparent to Spain that unless she took action to
defend her Caribbean territories, she was in danger of losing them to
the British, as was to prove the case when Havana fell in 1762. By the
end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Charles III of Spain had initiated a
series of reforms which would eventually culminate in the impressive
defensive array which was to prove insurmountable to the British at the
close of the century.

By 1764, it was Puerto Rico\'s turn to benefit from the new initiative,
following repeated petitions from the Island\'s Governor regarding the
unsatisfactory state of affairs. In response to a Royal Decree of
September 26, Field Marshall Alejandro O\'Reilly was commissioned to
make his way to the island to compile a comprehensive report on the
defenses and conditions prevailing at San Juan and the area in general.
He eventually arrived at the island on April 8, 1765 aboard the frigate
\"El Aguila\".(1)

It was the visit of O\'Reilly which gave the impetus for the eventual
defensive improvements. He complied diligently with his orders to
provide a comprehensive report to Spain, spending a full two months
inspecting the area in the company of the Governor and considering the
opinions and questions of the local officials.

Once the investigation was completed, O'Reilly compiled a detailed
General Program of Military Reform which included the state of the El
Morro castle and that of San Cristobal with it's adjacent coastal
defenses, together with the northern and western ramparts of the walled
city. He also enclosed "a Plan and a project of Fortifications for the
better understanding of this study\..."(2) These he forwarded to the
Minister for the Indies, stating "I feel it necessary to inform Your
Excellency of the state in which I found the citadel and of that which I
find necessary to ensure its protection". He continued "Honored Sir, For
many reasons I wish to give you the results of my investigations, and it
appears to me that it will be of infinite service to the King to have an
exact and detailed report of the state of our colonies in America."(3)

The worth of this valuable information was quickly appreciated, and
Charles III declared San Juan a "Defense of the First Order" on
September 25, 1765. The Royal Decree stated that "San Juan in Puerto
Rico shall be a city of the first order of support for the island,
bulwark of the Antilles, safeguard of the Gulf of Mexico, depository,
point of acclimatization, port of call and naval station of the
navigating fleets, favorable to foster and secure the commerce that will
improve industry, agriculture and art, the foundation of true
wealth."(4)

The Minister for the Indies gave his approval and it was decided that
Lieut. Col. Thomas O'Daly, Chief Engineer and Second in Command should
be nominated to supervise the works. He was to be assisted by three
engineers, Don Pablo Castello, Lt. Col. Don Pedro Carrasco and Juan
Francisco Mestre, together with two architects, Diego Ramos and Antonio
Sein.(5)

What appeared to O'Reilly and O'Daly as a major requirement was the
necessity to extend considerably the exterior works to delay the advance
of an enemy. O'Reilly's main observation was that the fortifications
were "passive", and to make them "active" it was necessary to design
certain types of defense which would keep the enemy at a distance.

Finally, on January 1, 1766, the work began on the citadel of San Juan,
under the direction of Chief Military Engineer O'Daly. Employed on the
construction works were officers and soldiers of the Toledo Regiment,(6)
workers, outcasts, prisoners and slaves. (See Appendix XIX)

A description of the city plan stated that "On the western side of the
City of San Juan was the Castle of San Felipe del Morro, situated on a
promontory at the entrance of the bay for the purpose of preventing the
entrance of enemy ships into the harbor. At the other side of the bay,
the Fort of El Cañuelo (San Juan de la Cruz) was placed to provide
crossfire in case of attack and at the same time to protect the passage
between Palo Seco and the Isla de Cabras.

On the eastern side of the city lay the Castle of San Cristobal with its
exterior works, fulfilling the objective of defending the city from
enemy attacks launched from the shore line, and also from naval attacks.
A sophisticated system of exterior emplacements completed the design of
this defensive masterpiece, which consisted of the Ravelin of San Carlos
with its defensive ditch, the battery of Santa Teresa, and the small
fort of the Abanico, all these works encompassing three lines of
retreat. The works were interdependent and incorporated the tactical
concepts of active defense which prevailed at the time, with deep
defensive positions and good distribution of fire."(7) The Trinidad
battery, the ravelin del Principe, the bastion of Santiago and the
provisional battery of San Francisco de Paula extended from the Castle
of San Cristobal to the south of the bay.

These exterior works were complemented by those built along the
shoreline, extending towards the eastern coastal inlet. In that
direction were also situated the battery of Escambrón, and the small
fort of San Gerónimo. The purpose of these emplacements was to impede
the entrance from the sea to the inlet of Boquerón which connected the
Condado lagoon and the San Antonio Channel with the eastern side of the
Bay of San Juan.

The other strongpoint on the eastern shoreline was the San Antonio
bridge, which provided the only access from the small island on which
San Juan was situated to the remainder of the of the country.

The city of San Juan itself was surrounded by a sophisticated system of
walls. On the southern side which faced the bay and the Puntilla area,
joining the walls of the bastions of Santiago and San Pedro, there were
the fortified moles of San Jose, Concepción and the San Justo gate. On
the western side, there were the bulwarks of Santa Catalina and San
Agustin, (between which was the Gate of San Juan), Santa Elena and San
Fernando.

Along the length of the north coast between the Castle of San Felipe del
Morro and San Cristobal extended the bastions of San Antonio, Santa
Rosa, Santa Domingo, Las Animas, Santo Tomas and San Sebastián, with the
two gates of Santa Rosa, next to the cemetery and La Perla, in the
vicinity of the old outer fort and the slaughter house.

O'Reilly's plans and projects had been designed specifically in
preparation for the war with England which seemed inevitable at the
time. His recommendations and plans would be the basis for all the
successive studies and works which would be undertaken in San Juan under
the supervision of the military engineers Thomas O\'Daly, Juan Francisco
Mestre and Felipe Ramirez. Their accomplishments would be relied upon to
defend the city if necessary by Governors and CaptainsGeneral Don Jose
Dufresne and Don Miguel Antonio de Ustariz between the years 1765 and
1791.

According to the scholar Dr. Juan Manuel Zapatero, in his monumental
work, \"The war in the caribbean in the xviii century\", a plan was
presented of the general fortifications drawn up by Field Marshall
O\'Reilly, from which we quote: \"Northwest Sector, principal entrance
to the San Juan Bay. Castle of San Felipe del Morro: Reinforce the works
with two batteries, one on the shoreline and the other to the sea.
Improvement and addition to the Castle of San Juan de la Cruz or to the
Cañuelo, which is constructed on the islet which blocks the passage to
the West, opposite the Morro. A new battery of nine cannon would be
placed on the Isla de Cabras to the back of the Cañuelo, their fire
directed toward the left flank of the Morro. These would provide a
crossfire to prevent any enemy incursions into the bay.

Northern Sector, extending between the Morro Castle in the West and San
Cristobal in the east: A sheltered route would be extended from the
Castle of San Cristobal via the heights of San Sebastián, Santa Barbara
and Santa Domingo, connecting with the battery at la Perla. Reinforcing
batteries would be installed at the heights of San Sebastián and Santa
Barbara.

Western Sector, between the Morro Castle and the Royal Fort: The old
ramparts would be reinforced by new refuges.

Southern Sector, between the Royal Fort and the Santiago bastion:
O\'Reilly considered this portion very adequate because it comprised a
system of ramparts well placed and preserved; these were San José, San
Justo, Concepción and the Mole of San Pedro.

Eastern Section, shoreline between the Santiago bastion and the Castle
of San Cristobal: Two raveling were to be erected to protect the eastern
walls and the Santiago Gate.

Castle of San Felipe del Morro: Decommission the Carmen or lower
battery. Widen the Santa Barbara or middle battery with parapets of 18
feet on the Northern front and Bay. The powder store, the Granados
battery and the artillerymens\' barracks would disappear, providing a
protected space for the well.

Raise a wall in such a manner that it would be level with the natural
terrain and the embankment, so as to provide a secure vault, leaving the
ruined barracks, the house of Castellano and the chapel to be
demolished. The wall would extend to a height of 30 feet, excluding
it\'s parapet.

The internal sides of the two principal bulwarks, Austria and Ochoa,
easily discernible in O\'Reilly\'s plan of 1765 and in another anonymous
plan of 1742, would be occupied by two vaults, leaving the flanks in the
form that O\'Reilly had envisaged and which had been drawn up by
O\'Daly.

By 1775, the works along the shoreline presented an imposing picture.
Miyares González described them as follows in his memoirs of the same
year: \"The shoreline of this citadel is totally completed, of which the
northern part ascends about one hundred feet above sea level and
descends to form a beach at the bay. It\'s fortification consists of a
semibastion called the Northern, a level work, and another by the name
of Santiago. In front of the ramparts formed by these three bastions
have been constructed two ravelins. The one between the Northern and the
level is called San Carlos and the other, el Príncipe. Between these two
revelins one finds an arsenal called la Trinidad, because it includes
three batteries which follow the irregularity of the terrain. All of
these works are protected by a covered way with it\'s accompanying
crossbeams and fences. In the rampart between the level bastion and
Santiago is the gate of the same name, solely for leaving the city by
carriage. All of the principal walls on this shoreline were built above
the old foundations, but the ravelins and the other exterior works have
been constructed from the ground. In the level bastion there are some
works which together with the northern balustrade are called the Castle
of San Cristobal, behind which there is a big parade ground with three
vaults which could accomodate a batallion.\"(8)

These observations are confirmed by the chronicles of Abbad y Lasierra
who in the year 1776 wrote in the History of Puerto Rico: \"the most
impressive and grandiose thing in this city, are the fortification works
which defend it\".(9) In that year, the principal defenses of the city
were the castles of el Morro and San Cristobal and according to the
description, \"These fortifications enclose the City on the eastern
side, occupying the width of the islet, from the bay to the sea,
directing its fire everywhere, although its principal objective is to
protect the land area..\"(10)

\"\...Its construction follows the terrain which is uneven, forming a
downward slope from the northern shoreline to the bay. At the top of the
hill is the ramp through which one enters the castle courtyard, in which
a batallion can be assembled. It has two large bombproof barracks with
other offices and auxiliary rooms, on top of which there is the
Caballero, which can hold from 22 to 24 cannon whose fire can dominate
the City and the surrounding land and sea. Below the Caballero there is
the parade ground. Its batteries point towards the open sea, the land
and the drawbridge of the interior moat. After this there are three
large ravelins; that of San Carlos occuping the top of the hill, the
Principe on the slope, and the main one in which the drawbrige of the
second moat is located and exits onto an open field and the countryside.
All these works are surmounted by heavy artillery. These fortifications
and their moats have openings in the rock in various parts and are
bombproof, as are the barracks and wells. If the ramparts are viewed
from the \"mined\" fields, three emplacements of batteries may been
seen, one above the other, that direct their fire in all directions\".
\...Abbad y Lasierra.(11) The term \"mined\" here refers to the practice
of digging tunnels and filling them with explosives beneath strategic
approaches. These explosives could then be detonated beneath an
advancing enemy.

The observations continue: \"From this castle to San Felipe del Morro,
which is located in the extreme western side of the City, there is no
wall on the northern side, only six batteries placed near the seashore
at regular intervals, this defense being considered sufficient owing to
the inaccessibility of the coast due to the dangerous reefs which run
alongside it.(12)

The Morro Castle forms an obtuse angle with three lines of batteries
towards the sea, one above the other, which can direct their crossfire
to defend the entrance to the port. On the city side it has a wall
flanked by two guarded emplacements of heavy artillery, which dominate
all the intermediate ground towards the City. That part which faces the
northern shore can cross it\'s fire with that of the Caballero of San
Cristobal. Its barracks, wells, stores, chapel, and auxiliary rooms are
all bombproof. A tunnel goes down to a battery that is just above the
waterline at the center of the entrance to the port, through which it is
possible to send out troops, receive provisions and communicate with the
Cañuelo Castle.

\"The Cañuelo castle is situated on an outcrop in the middle of the port
channel. It is square and well fortified, and it\'s location prevents
ships from forcing entry into the port since it can create a crossfire
with the guns of El Morro. However, if the enemy could take the Isla de
Cabras, which is low lying, of short extension and without defense, they
could bombard the Castle of El Cañuelo from Palo Seco point.

From the City to the bridge in which the islet ends there is a powder
store with it\'s guard house. At the end of the islet, where the open
sea connects with the bay, is the Castle of San Jeronimo, which is a
little fort for defending the passage of small boats, these being the
only ones which may pass through the shallows of the Boqueron, a passage
between the bay and the open sea. Nearby is a bridge of two carriageways
which crosses the inlet. It\'s supports are of cut stone faced with
lime, over which there are wooden cross beams which give safe passage
and may be easily cut when necessary. At the entrance of the bridge
there is a strongpoint for defense, and at the opposite side is a stone
water fountain, the only one which may be found in the island (of San
Juan).(13)

A further description reads \"\...The island is long and narrow.
Entrenchments cut entirely across it rather more than half way up the
hill and the town, which is situated on the summit, is fortified
apparently by the strongest forts, presenting embrazures for at least
two hundred pieces of artillery. The system of fortification is chiefly
perpendicular as there is no situation where the works can be flanked
except from a neck of land to the Eastward, but on which the nearest
spot to the town that could be fired upon is at least 1,500 yards
distant\... The entrance into the harbour is defended by the Morro
Castle and a strong insulated work (El Cañuelo) to the southward of the
channel, independent of the other 12 guns of the place, so that it would
be extremely dangerous to attempt anything with shipping, as the wind
blowing constantly from the northeast makes it a lee shore, and in case
of damage the ship must immediately run aground\...\"(14)

According to the historian Pedro Tomás de Córdova: \"\...in the year
1795 the military expenditures reached the sums of 356,813 ps. 20mrs. In
fortification works 64.145ps. 1 real, 30mrs. were spent, and in the
artillery 13,879 ps. 14 mrs. The citadel had 253 cannon, 20 mortars, 3
pedreros and 4 howitzers\...\"(15)

\"Prior to the attack, on the fort of San Antonio and in front of the
Rodeo, a battery of six pieces was constructed. To the left of the
waterway, another battery of four pieces was built in order to defend
the point of the Condado. A parapet was also constructed along this line
and at its end was placed a battery of five pieces which defend the
waterway between San Gerónimo and San Antonio. In case San Antonio
should be taken along with the heights of Condado and Rodeo, this
battery connected by another road to San Gerónimo. The castle of San
Gerónimo was repaired and two embrasures were added facing the sea, with
a further two at San Antonio. Also, another battery of three pieces was
constructed which communicates with that at Escambrón. A straight
channel was cut through Miraflores to enable it to face fire from the
bay and in its center a battery of six pieces were placed, with another
of four cannon nearby whose fire would be directed towards the
Rodeo\....\"(16)

In 1796, 65,760 ps. 5 rs. 7mrs. were spent on fortifications and on the
artillery, 14, 836 ps. 1 real 5 mrs. The review of the militia gave the
numbers of 1871 infantry men and 300 horses.(17)

Brigadier Don Ramón de Castro had assumed the position of Governor of
the island on March 21, 1795 and would remain in office until November
12, 1804. De Castro\'s military experience and the preventive measures
he took in advance of the invasion may have been decisive factors in his
eventual victory.

Tomas de Cordova has left us with a detailed account of these
precautions, which are interesting as they give an example of the type
of defensive activity which must have taken place on most of the
Caribbean islands during the many wars of the century. He states:

\"\...The news that Brigadier Castro had received of the hostilities
taking place between the British and the Spanish in the autumn of 1796)
and the intentions of the former to attack Spanish possessions in
America, had made him assume an attitude of vigilance and a
determination to complete military preparations for the city.\"(18)

These measures were as follows:

\- As the battery of San Francisco de Paula was considered to be one of
the most important defensive works, he hastened it\'s completion by
allocating the largest possible workforce that could be spared without
delaying the the work on the San Gerónimo fort. He also made great
efforts to ensure that these two strongpoints were equipped with their
respective artillery. He also:

> \- Ordered all batteries, the land front, the outerworks, gates and
> stockades of the San Cristobal Fortress checked and repaired, to
> ensure their full readiness.
>
> \- Advised all towns on the island that they should have their cattle
> rounded up at the first warning.
>
> \- Held cannon, mortar and howitzer drills, which included giving
> instruction to officers and men from the militias.
>
> \- Ordered increased vigilance from San Cristobal and all along the
> coast, to forwarn of any threat from the sea.
>
> \- Recalled all men on temporary leave.
>
> \- Ordered the regular garrison increased by three companies of
> militia.
>
> \- Inspected the points most vulnerable to attack between the city and
> the mouth of the Cangejos River.
>
> \- Prohibited ships from sailing from any port on the island.(l9)
>
> When Governor de Castro heard in March of the fall of Trinidad the
> previous month, he correctly surmised that Puerto Rico would be next
> on Britain\'s agenda and he immediately:
>
> \- sent lieutenants to train all able-bodied men in areas where there
> was no militia.
>
> \- ordered a precise account of provisions to be stockpiled, and
> prepared warehouses.
>
> \- Had all cattle taken to enclosures in the interior of the island,
> with a view to supplying the city.
>
> \- Had the Cañuelo Fortress inspected and repaired.
>
> \- Commissioned two city councillors or \"Regidores\" to requisition
> sufficient rice for the Royal Storehouses.
>
> \- Cancelled the discharge papers of soldiers who had completed their
> tour of duty.
>
> \- Gave orders to the Urban Militias.
>
> \- Ordered the E1 Morro fortress to repel any suspicious ship.
>
> \- Sent an Engineer to prepare the town of Aguadilla\'s defenses.
>
> \- Transferred most of the powder from the magazines at Miraflores and
> San Gerónimo into the main fortress.
>
> \- Began the outfitting of two pontoons and four Barges with two 16
> pounder cannon each, and twelve launches with 3,4 and 6 caliber
> cannon, for defending the port and it\'s channels. Frigate Captain
> D.Francisco de Paula Castro was instructed to oversee this.
>
> \- Prepared the battery at the end of the moat.
>
> \- Sent word to Caracas, Santa Domingo and Havana warning of the real
> danger of attack and requesting help.
>
> \- Had stone-throwing mortars outfitted and set up workshops for
> preparing explosives and war rockets.
>
> \- Ordered 440 militia who were being drilled in various districts to
> be incorporated into the \"fixed\" militia.
>
> \- Expedited the outfitting of patrol boats.
>
> \- Commissioned local leaders, \"jueces territoriales\" to have the
> citizens plant all the produce that would be necessary in case of an
> attack.
>
> \- Requested loans from corporations and private citizens pending the
> arrival of the \"situado\", the funds from Spain.
>
> The response from the local citizenry is exemplified as in de
> Cordoba\'s report. \"\...Doña Juana de Lara had constructed at her own
> expense two batteries of four pieces each on the islet of Punta Las
> Marias..\"(20)

In April, as the threat of attack became more imminent, de Castro
further reinforced his preparations and:

> \- Ordered Batallion cannon ready for use as necessary.
>
> \- Accepted the offer of the leader of the French community on the
> island, a Monsieur Paris, to join the defensive effort along with his
> countrymen.
>
> \- Ordered eight companies of militia to active duty to join the eight
> companies already in the citadel. Also to add 200 men from the
> militias into artillery service.
>
> \- All citizens of San Juan were enlisted into the urban militias.
>
> \- As enemy privateers were constantly engaging in forays along the
> coast, he was appointed General Commander of the Northern Militia and
> Colonel of the \"Fixed\" Militia regiment to enable him to limit as
> far as possible the threat to the people posed by these
> privateers.(21)
>
> The Governor, along with his Chief Engineers, also spent several days
> personally inspecting the bay area, the entrance to the port, the
> Boca-Vieja channel, the accesses and outlets of the Martin Peña San
> Antonio channels, the possible landing sites on the three Cangrejos
> beaches, Punta Salinas, and the entrance to the Martin Peña lagoon,
> where an embankment was constructed. He also inspected the posts,
> fortresses and castles of the city, the outerworks and those locations
> most vulnerable to attack.(22)

These most comprehensive preparations were a sound tribute to the
knowledge and military experience of Governor De Castro and as the
chronicler de Cordoba puts it, \"It may be stated categorically that
this Commander proceeded with the utmost prudence, not neglecting the
slightest detail and preparing things as well as he could to save the
country and ensure the triumph of Your Majesty's arms\".(23)

These, then, were the defenses and preparations which faced the British
invaders and according to the historian Salvador Brau,\"\...for the
English fleet, the major obstacle was without any doubt the recently
finished fortifications and the artillery emplacements with 415 guns and
10,000 quintals of powder\", together with \"the resistance offered by
the garrison and those newly recruited.\"(24)

In the next chapter we will follow the course of the attack and see how
these defenses stood up to the test of fire.

1 Ricardo Torres Reyes. El Mariscal O'Reilly y Las Defensas de San Juan,
1765-1777. Historia, Vol. IV. Centro de Investigaciones Históricas,
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954.

2 Ibid.

3 AlejandroTapia y Rivera. Memoria de D. Alexandro O'Reilly Sobre la
Isla de Puerto Rico, año 1765. Biblioteca Histórica de Puerto Rico, Ed.
Instituto de Literatura, San Juan, 1945.

4 Torres Reyes, op cit. 4

5 Ibid.

6 From 1765 onwards the "veterans" Battallion had been transformed into
the "fixed regiment of Puerto Rico" and was later even further reformed.
In 1787, spanish soldiers were incorporated into the naples regiment but
during the following year, this practice ceased. María Cadilla Martínez.
Rememorando el Pasado Heróico, Puerto Rico 1946.

7 Edward Hoyt. A History of the Harbor Defenses of San Juan, P.R. Under
Spain, 1509-1898. Puerto Rico Coast Artillery Command, 1943.

8 Fernando Miyares González. Noticias particulares de la Isla y Plaza de
San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954.

9 Fray Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra. Historia Geográfica, Civil y
Natural de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico. Editorial
Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, 1979.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Charles Stewart. Report of British Spy at San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Enclosed with a Letter from Governor Burt of Antigua to Lord Germain.

15 Pedro Tomás de Córdoba. Memorias Geográficas, Históricas, Económicas
y Estadísticas de la Isla de Puerto Rico, Tomo III, Instituto de Cultura
Puertorriqueña, San Juan de Puerto Rico, 1968.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Salvador Brau. Historia de Puerto Rico. Nueva York, 1914.

Chapter XIV

Abercromby's Siege

In this chapter we shall follow the course of the attack itself on a day
by day basis. The main source is the chronicle of the event left by
Governor De Castro, \"Journal of the commands and orders given by
Brigadier Don Ramon De Castro, Governor, Quartermaster General and
Captain General of the Post and Island of Puerto Rico beginning 17 April
1797, when enemy ships came into sight, and the main operations and
movements of the two armies and the Squadron until today\'s date.\"(1)
(May 4). For this reason, any reference to \"our\" in the narrative
refers to the Puerto Rican defenders, \"the enemy\", of course, being
the British.

This valuable record is supplemented by other sources of the time which
are no less important, including letters written by Felipe Ramirez(2)
and Bishop Zengotita,(3) the accounts of the French naturalist Pierre
Ledru and of Padre Miguel Rodriguez Feliciano.(4) Also referred to have
been such valuable works as \"The Three British Attacks\" by
E.T.Blanco,(5) the Boletin Historico de Puerto Rico by the famous
historian Coll y Toste(6) and the Biblioteca Historica Puertorriquena by
Alejandro Tapia y Rivera,(7) among others.

We shall also refer to the main English records, the log of Admiral
Henry Harvey (8) and the account by General Abercromby in his letter of
May 2, (9) making comparisons as appropriate.\*

> Monday, April 17
>
> At six in the morning, more or less, a convoy was sighted, consisting
> of warships and what appeared to be transports whose number, kind and
> nationality could not be made out, but in view of the current war, and
> the earlier warning of an attack against this Post and island, it was
> suspected to be an enemy squadron. This was confirmed shortly because
> of the movements of the squadron even though none of the ships had
> shown it\'s colors.

The Chiefs of Staff were called immediately to the Morro Castle where
they and the Governor implemented the defense plans. The call to arms
was sounded and the troops of the garrison were deployed amongst the
castles, fortresses, batteries and inner and outerworks of the Post
(Citadel). All these positions were supplied with the arms and
provisions necessary to defend them. The trained citizens were issued
with arms. Two armed pontoons and twelve gunboats were placed along with
four armed barges under the command of Frigate Captain Don Francisco de
Paula Castro. A platoon with four field cannon under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Don Isidoro Linares of the Regimiento Fijo (permanent
or \"fixed\" regiment) were sent to prevent the landing. Orders were
sent to the urban mounted militia and able bodied men of all the towns
to take up arms and report immediately to the capital. Those not under
arms were to bring supplies to the city to sustain the garrison. Written
instructions were sent to all districts of the island.

The Ordnance Chiefs and their assistants were sent to their posts and
the Storekeeper of the artillery was ordered to stay at the main
artillery park day and night to supply equipment as necessary.

A Proclamation was issued ordering all women, children and elders to
leave the Post, leaving only able-bodied men under arms. Powder stored
in outlying magazines was hurriedly collected and stored in magazine
ships in the bay.

By 10 o\'clock in the morning, after observing it\'s manoeuvres, it was
confirmed beyond any doubt that the squadron was British and that it was
heading towards the shores of Cangrejos, with the transport ships
anchoring at the far end of the inlet of La Torrecilla. In view of this,
the outpost of Escambron and the outerworks of the post were made ready.

Engineer Don Ignacio Mascaro y Homar was sent with a team to prepare a
battery at the Seboruco de Barrios(10) to defend the entrance to the
Martin Pea channel and the bridge, where they were to raise a defensive
embankment. They were to retreat if unable to carry out the work.

Two pontoons were to defend the entrance to the port, and two barges
each were ordered to the Martin Peña and San Antonio bridges. These
floating batteries each had two 15 pounder cannon. Some of the gunboats
were to support the pontoons and barges and others were held in reserve.

His Excellency the Bishop and the Clergy pledged their services and some
were appointed chaplains and deployed throughout the post. Surgeons
equipped and manned the hospitals in readiness to care for the wounded.
Arrangements were made for the Carmelite Calced nuns to leave the city
with dignity, their convent and monastery being used as hospitals and
quarters, as were several houses in the town.

No other movement of the enemy squadron was observed that day except
that two frigates and a tender were sent out with the apparent objective
of blocking the entrance to the port. The remainder of the squadron
stayed by the inlet with the smaller transport ships nearer the shore. A
ship was seen setting out to sea, apparently unarmed.

The British account is mainly in agreement although it stresses the
problem of the offshore reef which runs all along the northern coast and
the difficulty of finding a passage through. Even when the passage was
found it was so narrow that only the frigates and smaller transports
could get through, denying the British the use of their capital ships
for close inshore support and increasing the problems of disembarking
men and equipment.

The main dubiety arises regarding the number of British ships in the
squadron. One Puerto Rican account lists them as follows:

1 ship with three decks.

2 with 70 cannon.

2 with 50 cannon.

2 frigates, one of 40 and one of 36 cannon.

2 brigantines of 16 - 18 cannon.

4 corvettes of about 16 cannon.

18 schooners, with a bearing of privateers, 6-12 cannon.

1 large merchantman.

28 smaller ships.

Total = 60 sail.

Don Felipe Ramirez, Chief Engineer of Royal Works in San Juan, also
states in a letter of May 4 , 1797 that there were 60 ships(11) but
Father Miguel Rodriguez Feliciano, a prebendary of the Catholic Church
of Puerto Rico(12) and who E.T Blanco mentions in a letter of May 22 ,
1797 as being \"one of the illustrious defenders of the post, being an
eyewitness of the events being narrated", describes \"the enemy squadron
as being 64 ships\".(13)

The British accounts do not give a precise number of ships, and this and
other discrepancies in figures will be looked at again in the next
chapter.

> Tuesday, April 18.
>
> The men of the cavalry company who lived in Bayamón and Guaynabo
> arrived on the night of 17/18, and 40 of them were deployed as
> reinforcements.

At dawn there was heavy firing from the anchored ships to protect the
landings which were taking place. The frigates were still blockading the
port.

A platoon set out under the command of Lt. Cal. Don Isidoro Linares,
together with Don Jose Vizcarrondo, Captain of the Infantry Regiment of
Valencia and Don Teodomiro del Toro, adjutant of the disciplined
militias.

Each had 100 men, Don Isidoro taking position at \"La Plaza\", by one of
the Cangrejos beaches, Vizcarrondo with his cannon at San Mateo beach
and del Toro with further cannon at La Torrecilla, deployed so as to
give maximum effect and mutual protection.

Most of the enemy\'s fire was directed against Toro\'s position, it
being the closest. Four large and heavily armed boats, one showing the
British colors, approached the beach. Toro opened fire against them,
causing considerable damage to the extent that only one man survived in
the boat carrying the colors and few were left in the other boats, which
were forced to retreat. They soon returned with a greater number of
boats and managed to land about 3,000 armed troops.

The British record contradicts Toro\'s account of heavy fire and
significant casualties. Admiral Harvey\'s log states that the British
\"\...Landed in the bay without any other opposition than the firing of
musketry from a small party at the edge of the woods, who soon made off,
having wounded three men in the boats.\"(14)

Also, there are discrepancies in numbers of troops landed, Ramón de
Castro mentioning seven to eight thousand, (15) Felipe Ramírez quoting
eleven thousand(l6) and Father Rodríguez Feliciano from twelve to
thirteen thousand. (17) (See Chapter XV. )

On seeing the size of the enemy force, the defending officers decided to
retreat, Linares and Toro towards the Martin Peña bridge and Vizcarrondo
towards the San Antonio bridge, in accordance with their orders.
Vizcarrondo dug in with his cannon at his new position to cover the
retreat of his two fellow officers but they, on seeing that the enemy
were advancing towards him, decided to Join him. However, the strength
of the enemy again proved too great and the defenders retreated over the
San Antonio bridge into the Citadel, leaving some of their number to
help defend the bridge and the San Gerónimo fortress. They had no time
to retrieve their cannon, so they disabled and buried them.

The British account for this incident reads \"A party of the enemy were
soon along the shore, but as our advance guard went on they moved
towards the town, leaving three brass cannon and some military stores at
one of their posts and pickets\".(18)

De Castro\'s Journal continues: \...The British, no doubt on seeing the
firepower ranged against them from the main defenses of the Citadel,
halted their advance and sent out scouting parties. That same morning,
Vizcarrondo and a party of French Republicans, 50 militia and 30 cavalry
were sent out to rendezvous and harass the enemy. They marched towards
Cangrejos, splitting into three groups with orders to rendezvous later
with a Captain of Cavalry and 25 infantrymen.

As they were advancing towards San Mateo, an exchange of fire took place
with enemy advance parties. The British quickly brought up
reinforcements, again causing Vizcarrondo to retreat over San Antonio
bridge, taking with him a cannon he found en route. Fire from the San
Gerónimo fortress covered the retreat, after which the order was given
to destroy the bridge.

As a precaution, the order was then given that all thatched roofs of the
\"bohios\" (huts) in the city be removed to avoid the risk of fire.

That same morning a ship flying diplomatic colors approached the
entrance to the port and was stopped by the Morro fortress. It was met
by an aide-de camp and the officer in charge delivered a message to the
city\'s Commanding Officer from the British Naval and Military
Commanders, essentially demanding that the city be surrendered to the
forces which were besieging it. (See Appendices XXIII and XIV) However,
the British ship did not wait for a reply, so an attempt was later made
to send it to one of the enemy frigates blockading the port.
Unfortunately, possibly because of the darkness, the frigate did not see
the flag of truce and opened fire, forcing the local ship to retreat.

Meanwhile, at three o\'clock that afternoon, three gunboats were sent to
reinforce the two barges defending the Martin Peña Bridge with the
object of containing the enemy and covering the retreat of the engineers
who had been sent to Seboruco de Barrios, who were in danger of being
cut off. The British, however, attacked the gunboats from the land with
a party of about 200 men. Fire was exchanged and the gunboats retreated.
The floating batteries on the barges maintained their fire throughout
the day and into the night to prevent the attackers from advancing or
digging in.

Scout boats and reconnaissance parties were again sent out and they
reported that the British were advancing towards the San Antonio and San
Gerónimo fortresses, which sustained a continuous fire to prevent
further progress. The Regimiento Fijo reported two dead and one wounded.

> Wednesday, April 19.
>
> A courier ship was made ready to leave the port under cover of
> darkness carrying word of the attack to the Commanders at Havana and
> repeating the Governor\'s request for aid in the form of warships,
> troops, arms and money, and confirming the intention of using all
> resources in an attempt to hold out until help arrived.

It was confirmed that the previous evening\'s heavy fire from the 8 and
12 pounder cannon at San Gerónimo and San Antonio, together with that
from the barges, had severely restricted the enemy\'s operations,
reportedly causing one fatality and several wounded. One of the mortally
wounded was captured and on being questioned by the Commander at San
Antonio, Don Ignacio Mascaro y Homar,(19) (the engineer rescued the
previous day) it could only be ascertained that he was a German, a
grenadier from one of his country\'s regiments in the service of
England. He was one of a party of troops which had landed, more or less
3,000 men but there could be as many as 6,000. He was too ill to
continue his statement, and died on the way to the Citadel.

The frigates blockading the entrance to the bay came further inshore
than usual, although still out of cannon range. They were seen to send a
boat to reconnoitre the point of the Isla de Cabras and the Cañuelo
Fortress and to take depth soundings. Although they were out of range, a
few shots were fired from the Morro Castle to discourage them, and in
fact they hastily withdrew. With the same object in mind, cannon were
fired from San Cristóbal Castle and the batteries of the Northern Line,
but without effect on account of the distance.

To contain any attempted landing at Punta Salinas by the enemy following
their reconnaissance, Lt. Col. Linares set out with 50 armed men to join
others arriving from nearby districts to form a platoon to defend the
post at Palo Seco.

On realizing how effective had been the fire from the barges in the
Martin Peña channel in harassing the enemy, it was decided to reinforce
that position with one of the pontoons from the port entrance, to
increase it\'s potential. Also, San Gerónimo was reinforced with a
howitzer.

News was received from Río Piedras that 400 troops had arrived from the
surrounding districts, 200 of which remained to counter any enemy attack
and the remainder going to the city. Further men arrived from Toa Baja,
making the city\'s reinforcements for the day 251.

Word was received that an enemy party of between 20 and 30 men had
encamped near Bañacaballos(20) and had sacked the nearby sugar
refineries of Don Jose Giral and Don Jayme O\'Daly in Puerto Nuevo and
San Patricia

A party of negroes from the Loisa district apprehended two German
soldiers from the enemy force and sent them to the city. Efforts were
made to obtain from them useful information about the enemy but their
statements provided little of value, except that one had in his knapsack
a paper on which was written the name of one of the city\'s residents.
This was passed to the Judge Advocate for appropriate action.

This episode raised the spectre of enemy sympathizers and traitors in
the city and arrangements were made to watch the movements of certain
residents, particularly transients and those of British and Irish
nationality. Investigations followed and some were even arrested.

The British account for the day mainly coincides, adding that they
landed their heavy artillery by boat \"as far to the westward as the
navigation would allow\".(21) They comment that the transportation of
the guns was difficult due to the roads being of sand.

> Thursday, April 20.
>
> The frigates blocking the port remained on station and were
> accompanied by a brigantine and what appeared to be gunboats. The fire
> from San Antonio, San Gerónimo and the barges continued to match enemy
> movements.

It was observed that the enemy was trying to establish a battery on the
Cerro del Condado overlooking our positions to the east and at a
distance of about 400 \"varas\" (\"rods\"- an old unit of measurement,
about two feet eight inches). We fired grenades, which seemed to have a
favorable effect.

Militia Second Lieutenant Don Vicente Andino and his brother Don
Emigdio, adjutant to the post, were ordered to take 60 volunteers to
contain an enemy attack which was being attempted at the rear. Don José
Díaz, Master Sargeant of the Toa Alta district, set out with 50 men for
the same purpose.

Standing Orders were given to the Commanders of the companies of
civilians forming at the camp from elsewhere in the island to defend
themselves as best they could from enemy attack, and to counterattack
when the opportunity arose.

The Naval Commander ordered an inventory of all the pirogues (small
boats) in the many moorings around the bay in order to use them for
transporting food, cattle, troops and munitions, and for communication
purposes.

During the afternoon another frigate joined the blockade and at around
nine o\'clock, enemy frigates and a brigantine were seen approaching the
area of Punta Salinas. The Morro and Cañuelo forts opened fire, although
it was known that the ships were out of range. It was decided that the
Captain of the Port, Frigate Lieutenant Don Juan Hurtado would set out
with gunboats for Palo Seco to observe the movements of the frigates and
repel any attempts at a landing. Despite the darkness, it was possible
to observe the movements of the brigantine, which eventually anchored
near Isla de Cabras. The Cañuelo fortress opened fire, as did San
Fernando\'s 36 pounder battery. At daybreak it was seen that the fire
had been effective, as the ship set sail swiftly, leaving behind her
anchor.

Three hundred and twenty-five men from the urban companies of Guaynabo
and Caguas entered the Post on this day.

A total of 25 prisoners and deserters were taken during the day. From
their statements the most significant information was that in the enemy
camp there were German and English regiments, that the landing troops
numbered six to seven thousand men, and that some heavy artillery,
howitzers, mortars and a large amount of munitions and ordnance had been
landed. They also stated that there were between 400 and 500 Frenchmen
who were prisoners of the British and who were virtually forced to take
up arms for the expedition by reason of their miserable circumstances.
They were said to be unhappy about such service and that many had been
killed and wounded on the day of the landings.

Strangely, the British records make no mention of these Frenchmen
amongst their numbers. The fact that they were allegedly prisoners
implies that they were French Republicans and as such, enemies, and it
would seem most unlikely that a Commander would arm a large number of
enemy prisoners and let them loose amongst his own troops. At best, if
Frenchmen were present at all it would seem more reasonable to assume
that they were Royalist sympathizers from the French territories who
were volunteers in exchange for British protection of their islands. The
record of British forces makes no mention of such a contingent, although
it may have been incorporated into the regimental totals.

Harvey\'s log for the day states..\"A.M. the enemy fired occasionally
from their different batteries and gunboats but without any effect. All
the heavy artillery and mortars were in great part landed within four
miles of the enemy\'s works. The Requin sailed to join the Tamar and
Arethusa off the port and the latter sent in a Spanish schooner taken by
her from St. Jago de Cuba, having aboard 1700 dollars and a quantity of
beeswax.\"(22)

> Friday, April 21.
>
> The blockade and enemy fleet remained on station except for one
> warship, which set out to sea in the company of a brigantine.

At daybreak, several platoons were sent out under the command of Second
Lieutenant of Grenadiers Don Luis de Lara and the brothers Andino. They
were ambushed by about 150 men near the Martin Peña bridge but in spite
of being outnumbered they were able to make an orderly retreat to El
Roble, where they joined a larger party with 48 cavalry who were able to
put the enemy to flight. The few enemy left behind were forced to take
refuge at the Martin Peña bridge, where three enemy cannon were sited.

In this action the enemy suffered a fair number of dead and wounded, and
a Second Lieutenant and 32 soldiers were taken prisoner and sent into
the city. On our side there were 5 dead, 20 wounded, 2 severely, and two
men missing in action.

The San Gerónimo fortress was reinforced with two 24 pound cannon to
harass the enemy, who were constructing two batteries directed mainly at
the San Antonio fortress, one to the south about 250 rods distant at a
place called El Rodeo and another by the bridge to the east, in El
Condado, about 400 rods distant.

The Commander of the San Antonio fortress, realizing the danger posed by
the enemy works and being hampered by lack of space for artillery,
arranged for two 8 pounder cannon to be installed.

Today, the fire fron San Antonio, San Gerónimo and the barges was
intermittent, as appropriate to the enemy\'s movements.

Orders were given to destroy the breastwork of the San Antonio bridge to
prevent the enemy from taking cover from our fire\...

The fort of San Gerónimo was reinforced with two mortars, one of 9 and
the other of 12 inches.

During the evening a force of 15 men and two sergeants left the San
Antonio Bridge in order to discover the enemy\'s works and their
numbers. After advancing 100 feet from the bridge they were attacked by
very strong enemy fire but they responded in kind even though they had
inferior numbers and were able to retreat to the bridge under covering
fire from San Gerónimo and the barges. After our Commandant was certain
of the safety of his men, with only one wounded soldier, a general
bombardment ensued against the enemy.

Thirty-five prisoners and deserters were taken to the Post, including
those captured by Don Vicente Andino. The information given by these
prisoners was useful as it was learned that the British were still
disembarking artillery and munitions and that General Abercromby had
established his headquarters in San Mateo Square, taking for his
lodgings the house of the Bishop. Also, it was learned that the British
were working feverishly in order to advance their batteries against our
lines and that they were trying to construct some mortar batteries.

The urban militias entered the city with 530 men from the towns of Toa
Alta, Vega Baja and Manaty\...

Harvey states \"The enemy\'s batteries of San Gerónimo and the gunboats
continued to fire occasionally, but with no effect, on the works that
were advanced.\"(23)

> Saturday, April 22
>
> Last night we fired bullets, bombs and grenades intermittently,
> causing damage to the enemy works. On seeing them dragging cannon
> towards their batteries, we intensified our fire in that direction.

It was rumored that the enemy General planned to advance on the Post and
we feared a surprise night attack, as we could see large columns of
veteran regiments flying their colors beyond the range of our cannon. We
knew that the enemy had landed horses and we believed that they planned
to use them to wade through the shallow waters to attack the bridge,
supported by columns of musketeers and artillery, while another platoon
forced a bridgehead.

To repel this action, \"chevaux de frise\", or barbed sawhorses, were
placed at the points where it was easiest for the cavalry to cross, and
boards spiked with nails were placed on the banks to injure the horses.
Cylindrcal fuses, \"salchichas cargadas\", were laid out together with
incendiaries and hundredweight barrels of gunpowder. A trench was dug to
give cover for 400 musketeers to face the cavalry, and an 8 pounder and
two 12 pounders were added to San Gerónimo. At the sound of vespers the
400 men took up their positions and some field cannon were sited in the
Great Moat of San Cristóbal fortress. 1500 infantrymen and cavalry were
deployed to reinforce the San Antonio fortress and the trench, partly to
cover retreat if necessary. Hand grenades were prepared and barriers
with spiked planks were placed at the entrance to the bridge. Embrasures
were prepared for musketry. The garrisons at the bridge and San Gerónimo
fortress were reinforced and explosive mines and packed mortar shells
were placed to be blown when needed. The barges and gunboats were
relocated as appropriate.

It was suspected that the enemy might first attack the bridge to draw
our attention while attempting under cover of darkness to make landings
at the Escambron or San Jorge channels to the North. Accordingly,
cavalry patrols were sent out and an infantry platoon with two field
cannon were emplaced to give opposition.

Today, 22 prisoners and deserters were taken, but their statements added
nothing to our information.

Also, 323 men fron the urban militias of Juncos, Arecibo and Cayey
arrived at the city.

The British account adds little for the day, other than that the landing
of the heavy artillery, the mortars and their stores was completed, and
that 300 seamen had been landed to assist with the artillery.(24)

> Sunday, April 23.
>
> The main part of the squadron were anchored further out.

The Commander of a platoon behind the enemy lines was ordered to break
through and attack the enemy forward positions. Some foreigners in the
town were imprisoned as a precaution, and they had information that the
British intended to attack the citadel itself, a fact confirmed by some
of the deserters.

The blockading frigates were coming closer inshore near Punta Salinas
with some launches and it was suspected that information from spies had
suggested the possibility of a mail ship leaving for Havana.

A 12 inch mortar was added to one of the pontoons at the San Antonio
bridge, and fire from the batteries was kept up as necessary during the
day to delay the enemy in their efforts. Two of our soldiers in the
frontline were wounded.

Twenty nine prisoners and deserters were captured and taken to the Post,
their statements adding no new information other than the damage which
our fire was inflicting.

The British account for this day stated that the defenders\' fire \"did
no mischief nor occasion any impediments to the advancing party at the
batteries. The seamen in the night moved some guns to the newly
constructed works.\"(25)

> Monday, April 24.
>
> From intelligence received of the enemy\'s positions, it was
> determined to launch a raid Militia Sargeant Francisco Diaz was chosen
> as leader with 70 volunteers, 20 from the Disciplined Militias and 50
> from men being sent to prison. At daybreak they set out in pirogues,
> supported by two gunboats, passing down the San Antonio Channel to
> land nearest the enemy trenches and batteries. All floating and line
> batteries had previously laid down a heavy covering barrage and when
> they saw that our troops were landed, they were to maintain fire
> without cannon, also being prepared to cover a retreat if necessary.

Diaz landed his troops and advanced towards the enemy lines, shooting at
the men working on the trenches. The British returned fire but Diaz
continued to advance until, sabre in hand, he reached the trench, our
men killing or wounding any enemy who stood in the way. Those who
escaped our fire took flight quite shamelessly, even though we estimated
their number at about 300. On taking the trench, Diaz discovered a
cannon battery aimed towards San Antonio Bridge and San Gerónimo
fortress, capable of accommodating seven cannon and having two 24
pounders and one 12 pounder already emplaced, along with two howitzers
and three mortars. Not having the time or the means to retrieve this
artillery, they decided to retreat, bringing in a Captain and 13 live
prisoners. They became aware of a strong contingent leaving the enemy
camp in pursuit but by the time these arrived, Díaz had re-embarked with
his men and the prisoners, and was making an honorable withdrawal. The
General of our Army had witnessed the action from San Gerónimo with some
satisfaction, and ordered heavy fire from all our lines to cover the
retreat and to force the enemy back to their line and batteries. In this
action we had only one dead and three badly injured, two from the
Regimiento Fijo and one from the militias.

Harvey\'s log refers to obtaining fresh water supplies from a spring
near the landing ground and continues \"The enemy fired much during the
night, and we opened fire from the battery on the left. The fire
continued very smart during the day.\"

> Tuesday, April 25.
>
> The blockading ships remained on station. Fire from both sides
> continued intermittently, ours being the heavier and with desirable
> results.

The San Antonio bridge structure was suffering badly from close cannon
fire and more workmen were sent to repair it. The greatest problem was
the lack of space, with nowhere to store ammunition or allow the troops
to rest, or to build further protective barricades. The fire from the
enemy\'s 24 pounder battery in the Condado caused falling masonry to
disable our cannon on the left side of the bridge. Commander Mascaro was
forced to retreat to the small interior plaza and set up a provisional
battery aimed at the Condado emplacement. It\'s fire did considerable
damage to the enemy, thanks mainly to the fine aim of Artilleryman
Cristóbal Ortega of the Disciplined Militias, who at sunset took out one
of the enemy cannon which was doing most of the damage.

A trench was begun to provide a line of retreat from the bridge and also
a communicating road for the troops and workers from the Great Moat to
the outposts.

The San Gerónimo fortress was sustaining considerable damage from the
enemy\'s E1 Rodeo battery. It\'s Commander, Lt. Col. Don Teodomiro del
Toro, tried to make repairs with sandbags and barrels and ordered the
guardhouse and lower quarters covered with sand, as a shell had
penetrated the guardhouse roof and burst, killing and maiming several
men.

San Gerónimo then put up a heavy fire and Artilleryman Domingo Gonzalez
of the Disciplined Militias, on seeing the enemy ammunition dump,
managed to land a shell on it. The dump was blown up and a raging fire
broke out, at which we all aimed our guns. The Captain General
immediately ordered that Gonzalez be rewarded with 10 pesos.

This afternoon the enemy was observed moving towards the Miraflores Port
and the magazine located there, which had been emptied in accordance
with Standing Orders. We had first considered blowing up the magazine
after emptying it but as it was not shellproof, we decided that we could
destroy it later if necessary, possibly with more damage to the enemy.

This afternoon, the blockading frigates approached San Gerónimo and
fired on it with their cannon as they sailed along the coast, probably
to see if it could be attacked by sea. We replied with our 24 pounders
and they retreated. Nevertheless, both here and at El Morro and San
Cristóbal, mobile furnaces for hot shot ("bala-roja")were prepared,
should the need arise. (It was the practice when aiming against wooden
ships to heat the shot in a furnace in order to start fires.)

Seven prisoners and deserters were taken, but no new information was
obtained.

We suffered four dead from the militias and nine wounded, four from the
militias, 2 from the Regimiento Fijo, two Frenchmen and a Navy man from
the floating batteries. Don Ignacio Mascaro y Homar and Don José
Quiñones were both hurt.

Today, 204 men from the Coamo Urban Militia and the Aguada Cavalry
arrived at the Post.

Harvey\'s log adds nothing of note.

> Wednesday, April 26.
>
> One of the blockading frigates had anchored during the night near
> Punta Salinas. Gunboats were sent to investigate and at dawn almost
> captured one of the enemy\'s boats, but shellfire from the frigate
> intervened.

Artilleryman Ortega, who had the previous day taken out an enemy cannon
at the Condado battery, observed that this cannon had been re-emplaced
and was again damaging the bridge. He tried to re-establish his aim and
despite being wounded, maintained his fire with great effect. The
General awarded him 10 pesos for his efforts.

As the enemy had been observed the previous day taking up positions at
Miraflores, Don Pedro Córdova and Militia Sargeant Rafael García, along
with 60 armed negroes, set out for the area in pirogues, supported by
gunboats. They disembarked and meeting no opposition,they advanced
towards the enemy trenches, hoping to mount a surprise attack with
artillery. They were seen, however, and the British opened fire with
muskets. The negroes returned their fire but \"as that kind of people
are not able to act with the necessary discipline and order,\" Córdova
retreated as best he could to the Miraflores magazine. On regrouping and
finding that they had not been pursued, they returned and found an enemy
force of about 300 infantry, 30 horses and 2 field artillery pieces. The
enemy opened fire, causing our men to withdraw and killing 10 negroes
and wounding a further five. The gunboats protected our re-embarkation,
leaving 4 enemy dead, 10 wounded and some damage to the boats.

Knowing that if the enemy were able to site a battery at Miraflores they
would be able to enfilade the advance troops at the San Antonio
outerworks, it was ordered that a protective barricade be constructed
there. A mortar was placed on the Caballero of San Cristóbal and another
on it\'s parade ground. All the 24 pounder cannon between that fortress
and the Pedro Martin battery were also aimed towards Miraflores. Also,
one cannon barge was sent into the bay to enfilade the enemy battery and
a further one into the Martin Peña channel to attack it from the rear.

Today we maintained a heavy fire from San Gerónimo, San Antonio and the
floating batteries. The enemy replied and their 24 and 36 pounders,
again severely damaged the bridge, which required continual repairs.
Also, the south battery at San Gerónimo was damaged and needed repair.

One of the frigates again approached San Gerónimo but retreated under
fire without achieving anything. (Harvey\'s log confirms this.)

A battery was designated for La Puntilla, to deal with any enemy
gunboats which may enter the bay.

Our troops and workmen suffered 4 dead, 18 wounded and 2 injured,
including 4 Frenchmen.

Fiftheen prisoners and deserters were captured, including an artillery
sergeant who crossed over to our front line and gave us details of the
enemy batteries and mortars.

Today, the cavalry from Añasco arrived at the Post.

> Thursday, April 27.
>
> A platoon emplaced behind enemy lines observed that a party had gone
> inland to take cattle and fowl for their camp. Our men under Militia
> Sargeant Felipe Cleimpaux attempted to cut off their retreat and
> opened fire. They captured a Captain, a Lieutenant and 16 men, leaving
> 2 dead, whereas we suffered two wounded.

The San Antonio Bridge and San Gerónimo fort continued to sustain damage
and require repair.

Our 12 inch mortars were aimed at Miraflores and we experimented with
the propellant charges, to try to judge if the enemy would be able to
reach the city with their own mortars, relying on information that they
had none of larger caliber. We also found that our own 24 pounder cannon
could be used effectively against Miraflores.

It was ordered that the following night, all gunboats should be brought
to the San Antonio bridge to help ward off any surprise attack.

This afternoon, a warship and two frigates from the blockade again
approached San Gerónimo and San Cristóbal and opened fire but our
shooting kept them at a distance and they inflicted little damage. Our
batteries were at the ready and hot shot was prepared but they retreated
before we could use them.

Don Francisco Andino, commanding a platoon near the Martin Peña bridge,
sighted an enemy advance post at his rear. He was able to ambush and
take a lookout post, but when the enemy advanced on him he was forced to
retreat due to being outnumbered. The enemy lost one dead and we had one
man taken prisoner.

Some Urban Militia arriving from within the island at the Irregulars\'
Headquarters in Río Piedras were ordered to remain there to defend it,
as were two cavalry companies from San Germán and Arecibo.

The historian Luis R. Arana in his publication \"Estudio Histórico sobre
el ataque Inglés\"(26) explains that the Spanish troops deployed to the
south of the Martin Peña lagoon in the Río Piedras area had as its
specific objective the obstruction of any British attempt to enter the
island\'s countryside further than the Martin Peña lagoon. Arana quotes:
\"from April 23, this officer had the specific order to upset the
British attacks whenever the opportunity arose.\"(27)

100 men of the First Company, Ponce Urban Militia arrived at the Post,
as did the prisoners taken by Cleimpaux earlier in the day.

In all, we suffered three dead and nine wounded.

Admiral Harvey\'s log for the day again confirms that attempts to
bombard the defenses from the sea proved ineffective and that
cannonading from the batteries continued, with some shells being thrown
from the highest part of St. Christopher\'s castle (San Cristóbal).(28)

> Friday, April 28.
>
> Between 3 and 4 o\'clock this morning the enemy opened fire from their
> battery at Miraflores with four 36 pounders, two mortars and a
> howitzer. Some shells and incendiaries fell on the post but most burst
> in the air or fell short. They continued this until about eight thirty
> or nine, until we returned fire with our batteries, mobile mortars,
> gunboats and a 9 inch mortar from one of the pontoons in the bay.
> Under such a bombardment the enemy were forced to cease fire and we
> suffered only a fire in a mess storehouse caused by an incendiary,
> which we quickly extinguished.

San Gerónimo, the bridgehead and the two gunboats continued their fire
throughout and enemy batteries responded, although not as heavily.

Repairs continued on San Gerónimo and San Antonio and work continued on
the redoubt, the covered way and the enfilade barricade at the Great
Moat. Gabions were placed on the drill ground to protect the magazines
from grenades or incendiaries. Two cannon were sited at the lower part
of the San Gerónimo fortress to obstruct the entrance to the El Boquerón
channel, should any gunboat try to enter. The most decisive action was
to gather brushwood from nearby areas and take it to easily accessible
points.

Today we took only one deserter, who stated that the enemy was about to
attempt another surprise attack. We suffered 18 wounded.

Two hundred and fifty-two men of the Toa Alta Urban Militia arrived at
the Post.

Admiral Harvey reports that \"the batteries were constantly employed and
although the enemy\'s works both at the bridge and at St Gerónimo
battery were much damaged, they continued a brisk fire from other works
they had erected near them, and they appeared by large working parties
to be throwing up additional works in different parts of the island.(29)

> Saturday, April 29.
>
> In the extreme event that our first line had to withdraw from San
> Antonio and San Gerónimo, it was felt necessary to obstruct the
> passage of enemy gunboats through the Boqueron channel. To this end,
> naval courier Don Miguel Asaldegui had set out the night before with
> 100 men in pirogues to drop large stones in the shallow water. They
> were forced to retreat when seen by the enemy but Asaldegui gave
> assurance that the passage had been well obstructed as his own
> pirogues had had a difficult time when returning.

Our gunboat in the bay opened fire on the Miraflores battery, making
every shot count. The enemy returned fire, but the gunboat was
undamaged.

Three frigates and three smaller warships were seen approaching Punta
Salinas that evening and our local commander was told to be prepared to
repel a possible landing. Gunboats were sent to assist him.

Today we had four dead and five wounded. Four prisoners and deserters
were taken, adding nothing to our information.

Reinforcements of 298 men from the Peñuelas, Aguada and Tuna Urban
Militias arrived at the Post.

Militia Lieutenant Don Miguel Canales was ordered to site two field
cannon aimed at the Bishop\'s house, where General Abercromby had his
Headquarters. This position could not be attacked easily as it was
protected by the Martin Peña channel and could only be reached by a
circuitous route. It was also well defended. Second Lieutenant Don Luis
de Lara of the Regimiento Fijo, Commander of General Headquarters at Río
Piedras, was to assemble his troops and two cavalry companies facing the
Martin Peña bridge and await the opportunity to attack.

The Sargeant of the Disciplined Militias, plus some irregulars, were to
pass through San Antonio to take up position to cut off the retreat of
the enemy who were advancing from the beach. At daybreak of the 30th.
Canales was to sound the alarm with his cannon and signal the army to
advance. At the same time, Lara was to attack from the rear and
Cleimpaux should attack from his own position. The outpost line was then
to open fire to distract the enemy. Orders were given to co-ordinate the
efforts of the respective commanders in the hope of a successful
outcome.

Harvey records \"A howitzer battery was opened on the town and the other
batteries continued their fire, which the enemy likewise kept up very
briskly. Three seamen of the Prince of Wales were slightly wounded at
the battery. Shells were thrown from St, Christopher\'s castle without
doing any material injury.(30)

> Sunday, April 30.
>
> Cannon and mortar fire against the enemy position at Miraflores
> continued during the night and in the morning it was seen to have had
> good effect, as the majority of the battery had been destroyed, some
> cannon taken out and few men remained at the post. The barge and the
> pontoon continued their bombardment.

Despite having received clear orders, however, Don Luis de Lara
misunderstood the instructions he had been given by the General the
previous day. He assembled 800 men and two cavalry companies with the
field cannon in the front line and marched towards the Martin Peña
Bridge, his troops forming several columns with others on the flanks in
the mangroves to cut off enemy retreats. They were within pistol shot
when the enemy opened fire with cannon, and de Lara replied with his own
battery. He directed his cavalry to the flanks and opened up with musket
fire. However, the lie of the land did not favor his further advance and
as he was making no impression, he withdrew. He suffered three dead,
including Sargeant Major Don José Díaz of Toa Alta, who was struck by a
shell at the bridge. There were also eight wounded, none seriously.

Thirty-five prisoners and deserters arrived at the Post, from whom it
was learned that following the morning action at Martin Peña, a general
Call to Arms had been sounded in the enemy camp and that the army had
formed into two corps. One was moving towards Martin Peña and the other
towards the Post, intending to open a large space and attack from both
sides.

Today 102 men of the Second Urban Militia of Ponce arrived at the Post.

Harvey\'s log states \"It having been determined by the General to
relinquish the attack and embark the troops and artillery, the latter of
brass were accordingly moved during the night from the park, and boats
from the ships of war and transports were sent at daylight to put them
on board the ordnance ship. The seamen were likewise embarked and sent
to their different ships. One seaman of the Prince of Wales was killed
at the battery.\"(31)

> Monday, May 1.
>
> From midnight of the day before, the enemy firing ceased and ours was
> very light. The previous evening, a very large fire had been observed
> in the mangroves near the enemy territory along the northern shore,
> and it was thought that this was to discourage an attack from our
> side.

At daybreak today, when the enemy normally opened fire, it was observed
that their camp was quite silent. The pilots of the forts and the
lookouts later reported that the British were embarking in great haste,
a fact earlier stated by some deserters to our lines. On hearing this,
the General and his three cavalry companies marched to attack the enemy
from the rear and immediately sighted the abandoned batteries with their
artillery in place. Other parties followed the enemy trail and found
that they had embarked leaving behind all their land artillery with a
large quantity of ordnance, munitions, rations and other items.

At seven o\'clock in the morning the last troops had embarked and at ten
o\'clock when the breeze came in, the transport ships began to sail from
the inlets. At four o\'clock in the afternoon the last one left in full
sail, leaving the warships, except for the blockading frigates, at
anchor when night fell.

Historian González Vales, of the Gazeta de Guatemala. quotes Padre
Rodríguez Feliciano, \"Finally, the enemy found such preparedness,
bravery, resistance and opposition in the men of war and civilians at
the Post, that they were unable to occupy even a small territory in a
fortnight, having lost about 211 men, not counting the wounded, who were
taken on board, leaving behind everything they had on land, cannon,
mortars, powder, provisions, horses, even beds, as well as cookware and
many other furnishings of the General, they were forced to weigh anchor
and withdraw hastily on 2 May\...\"(32)

Harvey states \"Every preparation was making for embarking the troops,
stores, etc. that could be carried off. At 5 A.M. all the boats from the
ships of war and transports attended on the beach and the troops were
all brought off by 8 A.M. and divided in the different transports".(33)

> Tuesday, May 2
>
> The warships began to set sail, and all of them were at sea by eleven
> thirty in the morning.

Work was continued to bring back to the Post the artillery, munitions
and other items left behind by the enemy, and the San Antonio Bridge was
repaired to facilitate this.

With regard to the amount of abandoned equipment, General Abercromby\'s
letter of May 2 states \"All our artillery and stores were brought off,
except seven iron guns, four iron mortars and two brass howitzers, which
were rendered unservicable, it being impossible to remove them. Not a
sick or wounded soldier was left behind, and nothing of any value fell
into the hands of the enemy." (34)

Harvey states "The troops that had been put on the small vessels were
removed to the transports. At 9 A.M. made the signal and made with the
squadron and the transports and stood to the northward. Our ship the
"Fury" parted company with dispatches for England". (35)

> Wednesday, May 3.
>
> At daybreak today the enemy squadron was already out of sight, and
> only one frigate remained to block the port. Four British soldiers
> were taken, apparently left behind.

The Gazeta de Guatemala quoted Padre Rodríguez Feliciano as saying that
"\... a Te Deum was sung at the Holy Cathedral and Governor De Castro
led his troops riding the Britrish General's horse\..." (36)

His Excellency the Bishop indeed sang a solemn Te Deum with High Mass,
preaching a Sermon of Thanksgiving for the succor offered under such
critical circumstances by the defenders of the Post and the inhabitants
of the island who aided them.

> May 6.
>
> \"\...For the duration of the siege we have counted 43 dead, 154
> wounded, 2 injured, 1 taken prisoner and 2 missing in action. The
> enemy, 286 between prisoners, deserters and missing in action\...\"

So ended the final British attack on Puerto Rico. In his report to
England dated May 2, General Abercromby stressed both the natural and
manmade defenses of the city of San Juan and the difficulties they posed
in mounting an effective attack.(37)

The siege is perhaps best summed up in Abercromby\'s own words. \"After
every effort on our part we never could sufficiently silence the fire of
the enemy, who had likewise entrenched themselves in the rear of these
redoubts. As to hazard forcing a passage into the island with so small a
force, this would have been in vain, as the enemy could support a fire
ten times more powerful than we could have brought against them. The
only thing left was to endeavor to bombard the town from a point to the
southward of it, near to a large magazine abandoned by the enemy. This
was tried for several days, without any great effect on account of the
distance. It appearing therefore that no act of vigour on our part, nor
that any combined operation between the land and sea service could in
any manner avail, I determined to withdraw and re-embark the troops,
which was done on the night of April 30 with the greatest order and
regularity.\"(38)

In the next chapter we will consider the reactions of the various
parties to the failed attack and look further at certain discrepancies
in the accounts. These differences in the figures and narratives give
rise to interesting questions. Did the Spanish inflate the numbers and
losses of the invaders to further glorify their triumph? Did Abercromby
diminish the losses of his men and equipment to minimize the extent of
his failure? Was it merely a genuine attempt to assess each other\'s
strengths in the heat of battle? Have you ever tried to assess the crowd
at a ball game In view of the time which has elapsed we can only
evaluate the information quoted in the primary sources of both sides and
speculate accordingly.

1 Ramón de Castro. "Diario de las disposiciones y ordenes dadas por el
Brigadier Don Ramón de Castro, Gobernador, Intendente y Capitán General
de la plaza e Isla de Puerto-Rico, desde el día 17 de abril de 1797 en
que se presentaron buques enemigos a su vista y de las operaciones y
movimientos mas principales de los dos ejércitos y escuadra hasta el día
de la fecha. Tapia y Rivera, Alejandro. Biblioteca Histórica de
Puertorriqueña, San Juan, 1945.

2 Felipe D. Ramírez. Escrito del ingeniero en jefe de las reales obras
de San Juan, D. Felipe Ramírez, a D. Francisco Sabatini, Puerto Rico, 4
de mayo de 1797. Servicio Histórico Militar, Signaturas: 4-1-7-9.
Zapatero, Juan Manuel. La Guerra del Caribe en el Siglo XVIII. Instituto
de Cultura Puertorriqueña, San Juan de Puerto Rico, 1964.

3 Andre Pierre Ledru. Viaje a la Isla de Puerto Rico en el año 1797\...,
Ediciones del Instituto de Literatura Puertorriqueña, Universidad de
Puerto Rico, 1957.

4 Fray Juan Bautista Zengotita. Carta del Sr. Obispo Zengotita al Rey.
Puerto Rico 4 de mayo de 1797. Coll y Toste, Cayetano. Boletín Histórico
de Puerto Rico, Vol. VII, Correspondencia del Obispo Fray Juan Bautista
Zengotita con motivo del Asedio puesto por los Ingleses a la Capital, en
1797. San Juan, 1920.

5 Rodríguez Feliciano, Miguel (Padre). Extracto de una carta de Don
Miguel Rodríguez Feliciano, prebendado de la Santa Iglesia de Puerto
Rico, a un religioso de esta ciudad. Puerto Rico, 22 de mayo de 1797,
Gaceta de Guatemala, Tomo I, Núm. 31, folios 246-247: lunes 4 de
septiembre de 1797. González Vales, Luis. Alejandro Ramírez y su Tiempo.
Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1978.

6 Enrique T. Blanco. Los Tres Ataque Británicos a la ciudad de San Juan
Bautista de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puero Rico, 1947.

7 Alejandro Tapia y Rivera. Biblioteca Histórica de Puerto Rico, San
Juan, 1945.

8 See: Appendix XVIII.

9 See: Appendix XIV.

\* Maps are provided in Appendices XIX and XX for the purpose of
orientation.

10 "Seboruco de Barrios" (también llamado Seboruco de Barriga), según
Coll y Toste, Boletín Histórico de Puerto Rico, Vol. XIII, pág. 203, (2)
lugar por donde se ha levantado después el Cementerio de Santurce.

11 See: Appendix XVIII

12 Miguel Rodríguez Feliciano. Op cit.

13 Enrique T. Blanco. Op cit. pág. 117.

14 See: Appendix XIII.

15 Ramón de Castro. Op cit.

16 Felipe D. Ramírez. Op cit.

17 Rodríguez Feliciano. Op cit.

18 See: Appendix XIII

19 He was born is Arenys del Mar. Cataluña in 1760. For his services, he
was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and awarded the cross of Charles III.
He died in San Juan in 1815. María Cadilla Martínez. Rememorando el
Pasado Histórico, Puerto Rico, 1946, pag. 241.

20 See: Appendices XIX and XX

21 See: Appendix XIII

22 Ibid

23 Ibid

24 Ibid

25 Ibid

26 Luis R. Arana. Apuntes Para un Estudio Histórico-Militar sobre el
Ataque Británico a la Isla de Puerto Rico en 1797. Monumentos Históricos
Nacionales de San Juan, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1952. Pag. 68.

27 Ibid, pag. 69.

28 See: Appendix XIII.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Op Cit., 5.

33 See: Appendix XIII

34 See: Appendix XIV

35 See: Appendix XIII

36 Op Cit., 5.

37 See: Appendix XIV

38 Ibid