> ![](media/image1.jpeg){width="6.770833333333333in"
> height="1.5145833333333334in"}
>
> Release No. 0199.03
>
> **of**
>
> **Technical briefing on BSE with Dr. Brian Evans, Chief Veterinary
> Officer, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Dr. Claude Lavigne,
> Associate Executive Director Animal Products, CFIA, Dr. Ron DeHaven,
> Deputy Administrator of Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health
> Inspection Service and Dr. Ulrich Kihm, Director Safe Food Solutions,
> former Chief Veterinary Officer Switzerland, member of the Office of
> International des Epizooties Expert Committee on BSE**

# Monday, June 9, 2003

> MODERATOR: We have with us today Dr. Brian Evans, Chief Veterinary
> Officer, Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Dr. Claude Lavigne,
> Associate Executive Director, Animal Products; Dr. Ulrich Kihm,
> Director of Safe Food Solutions; Dr. Paul Meyer \[ph\], Associate
> Director General, Health Canada; Dr. Ron DeHaven, Deputy Administrator
> of Veterinary Services. \[French spoken.\]
>
> We\'ll start with a brief education from Dr. Evans.
>
> DR. EVANS: Thank you for joining us. I would like to bring you up to
> date once again on our ongoing BSE investigation, and following
> remarks in francais by Dr. Lavigne, we will open the floor to
> questions.
>
> We have undertaken a thorough and systematic analysis on three lines
> of investigation. We are looking at where a positive cow had been in
> its life and where its offspring went. We are looking where the
> rendered products of the cow may have been consumed and what feed
> sources the cow may have been exposed to over the course of its life.
> We have been rigorous and thorough. We have moved swiftly, while
> protecting the integrity of our investigation. We transported the
> animals humanely and applied scientific methodology to our sampling
> and testing process.
>
> So far, other than the original cow, all test results have come back
> negative for BSE. Negative results means that currently the incidence
> of BSE in Canada confirmed remains confined to one cow. Canadians can
> remain confident that the systems in place in this country have worked
> to detect the presence of BSE and to prevent its spread or
> amplification. We continue to take all necessary steps to ensure that
> we have one of the best systems possible.
>
> We began with 18 quarantines and approximately 2,000 cattle in two
> lines of inquiry, trace-forwards and the feed investigation. We did
> depopulate cattle from the 18 quarantined farms in the two lines of
> inquiry, and from them submitted over 1,500 samples to the laboratory.
> All rapid diagnostic tests received from these premises are negative,
> and 9 of the quarantines have been lifted. I want to confirm that the
> quarantines on the two Saskatchewan farms and one Alberta farm in our
> primary line of investigation were lifted on Saturday, June the 7th.
>
> I am also very pleased to announce that all tests have been completed
> on the three premises in British Columbia and they have also come back
> negative. We have lifted the quarantines on two of the premises, and
> the remaining one will be lifted following confirmations that the
> premise has been properly cleaned.
>
> Over the weekend we completed the rapid diagnostic testing on all
> remaining animal samples from both our primary and secondary line of
> investigation, and again, all results have come back negative. As you
> are aware, 25 farms which had been identified in the trace-out from
> the primary line of investigation, 19 in Saskatchewan and 6 from
> Alberta, were also targeted for individual animal or group of animals.
> With the exception of one farm, these farms have not been quarantined
> as they involved small numbers of animals as I\'ve indicated.
>
> In total we have depopulated approximately 1,000 additional animals
> from these nonquarantined farms in the primary line trace-outs. All
> samples for testing have come back negative. These are animals which,
> by their connection to the trace-out herds, were deemed to have
> consumed the same feed and to be roughly the same age demographic as
> the infected cow between 1996 and 1997.
>
> I stated at the last technical briefing that we were conducting 200
> targeted and random feed processing inspections. These were conducted
> as a cautionary measure to verify overall compliance. We have now
> completed most of those inspections, and the results are showing a
> very good level of compliance with feed processing guidelines at the
> farm level.
>
> Twenty days have now passed since a single case of BSE was reported in
> Alberta. Since that time, through our thorough comprehensive
> investigation, we have examined all of the herds that were the most
> likely to have the highest risk of exposure to BSE. We have been very
> encouraged that we have not found a single additional case. We have
> accomplished a tremendous amount of work swiftly, while as I said,
> protecting the integrity of the investigation.
>
> I want to state clearly that the decisions made in this investigation
> continue to be based on the lessons learned from the experiences of
> other countries, and to ensure that where appropriate, all applicable
> international standards have been complied with. We remain aware of
> the impacts on the farmers and the ranchers personally touched by this
> unfortunate circumstance, and our hearts and prayers continue to be
> with them. However, we must ensure that any public and animal health
> and food safety concerns are addressed through this comprehensive
> investigation.
>
> As you are aware, we invited an international review team to review
> our work. Over the weekend this team of international experts began
> its work to examine the thinking and approaches we have used in our
> investigation. They have been rigorous in their inquiries with our
> epidemiological team, and they have validated our findings and
> concurred that the active investigation stage has achieved its maximum
> potential.
>
> The recommendation from their preliminary report will allow us to
> focus our efforts now on finalizing amended policy approaches to
> further strengthen our inspection system in Canada. Canada is indeed
> fortunate to have obtained the input and advice of such recognized
> experts from the international public and animal health community.
>
> We will be sharing their findings with other international communities
> in the very near future once the report is completed. We will also be
> holding technical consultations with the U.S. in the near future.
>
> Our active investigation is drawing to a close. Some additional test
> results and information gathering will continue to arrive in the next
> two days, and we will be reviewing this information in its entirety.
> However, as I stated, we will also move forward to review the complete
> findings and recommendations of the international experts and fully
> consider those in our policy options.
>
> We still remain committed to keeping you informed as meaningful
> information becomes available. Following my colleague\'s remarks, we
> will be pleased to take your questions.
>
> Thank you.
>
> DR. LAVIGNE: \[French spoken.\]
>
> QUESTION: Hi. \[inaudible\] National News. My question is for Dr.
> Kihm. If you could give us an idea, as a conclusion of your report on
> the Canadian investigation, how would you describe their
> investigation?
>
> DR. KIHM: Just brief. We had two Mondays. On Monday, it was going into
> the investigation, and what we have seen there is that they did a
> very, very good job by investigating all the details, collecting the
> data, taking conclusions from them, and according to our experience,
> worldwide, we have to say and to make a positive assessment to say
> that was\--I have never seen such comprehensive investigation done in
> a short time, and I have to say this was only possible since Canada
> has probably a base level of such a team, a capable team to perform
> it. So it\'s very, very positive.
>
> That was the first thing. Now coming, then, to the conclusion, that\'s
> the second part of our short, brief summary\--what has to be done in
> the future?\--and we were considering, we were discussing different
> measures. There is of course two main objectives. One objective is to
> do everything to prevent any infection going into humans. So, say,
> food must be safe. That\'s one thing; one objective. The other one is
> stop recycling. Whatever you apply measures to amplify the BSE agent
> in the animal herds, in the animal population. I think this is the
> main focus and we were talking and then applying measures like the SRM
> ban \[?\], and which way it has to be done, so weighing \[?\] system,
> how to survey \[?\] the populations. So this is\--to be short\--this
> was the main issue.
>
> QUESTION: I have another supplementary question. In your view, the
> Americans have said over and over again, until we have the scientific
> proof that there will be no more cases of mad cow \[inaudible\] do you
> believe there\'s enough science to prove to the Americans that there
> will be no more cases of mad cow in Canada and the border
> \[inaudible\]?
>
> DR. KIHM: I think that we have to be very, very clear. This stuff, I
> mean the BSE infectious agents, came in six, eight year ago; maybe
> earlier. We don\'t know. But it came in into Canada, and at this time
> you have in fact no measures to prevent the amplification. So there is
> no question on that, that this sort of, this agent was amplifying...
> You see that only five, six, seven years later, you see the first
> case. But in the meanwhile, you have in your system, stable system,
> the possibility that you can prevent to go further via feed ban, was
> installed \'97 \[?\]. But if you haven\'t done all the barriers which
> are necessary to prevent the further spread, it goes on.
>
> QUESTION: But even enough to prove to Americans\--
>
> DR. KIHM: No; you can\'t prove that. But you have to assume, and you
> make a risk assessment, where you are, and the risk assessment is
> probably telling you the agent is circulating.
>
> MODERATOR: Sir, with the green shirt on. Unfortunately, I don\'t have
> your name.
>
> QUESTION: Barry Wilson at the Western Producer. Dr. Evans, are you
> able to now\--I mean, I\'ve been listening, all of the tests are
> negative, all the farms have been looked at. Are you able to now say
> that essentially the scientific work on this case is more or less\--is
> done, and you can now go to the Americans and say let\'s start to talk
> about opening the border, and to regulators, and say let\'s start to
> talk about how to change the regulations?
>
> But for all intents and purposes, your scientific investigation has
> proved that it\'s a singleton?
>
> DR. EVANS: Again, I come back to the point that Dr. Kihm has made.
> We\'re quite comfortable, and as the team has indicated, that the
> active investigation component, as you\'ve indicated, as achieved
> everything it could possibly achieve in terms of dealing with that one
> circumstance, and to help us pinpoint, as he\'s indicated, what were
> the risk factors that may have contributed to the expression of that
> case in Canada. Again, this is, as he\'s indicated, recognized in the
> North American context, going back to the mid \'80s, that this has
> been a global issue, not unique to anyone\'s understanding, and as a
> consequence of that, we feel that we\'ve addressed the immediate
> circumstance, and we think we have a fairly sound basis to explain the
> expression of the case as it was determined in Alberta, and on that
> basis, as I say, we will be making, as Uli has also indicated, we will
> be making policy recommendations in terms of how we further stabilize
> the system, how we provide the highest public health protection
> possible through various additional measures.
>
> We expect on that basis, as Uli has said, that the U.S. will fully
> consider that within the scope of their risk assessment and then
> consider the application of the interim measures that they put in
> place, as to whether they are warranted, whether they can be modified,
> whether they can be lifted. But, again, not being able to predict the
> future, we will make our case and we will await their determination.
>
> QUESTION: A supplementary to Dr. Kihm. Are you recommending that
> Canada remove specified risk materials (SRMs) from its animal feed
> system?
>
> DR. KIHM: Of course; there\'s no doubt\--
>
> QUESTION: Not just ruminant feed but animal feed.
>
> DR. KIHM: There\'s no doubt. You have to remove the SRMs from the
> system. The human food chain as from the animal feed chain. There\'s
> no doubt.
>
> MODERATOR: \[inaudible\] Toronto Star.
>
> QUESTION: I wonder, Dr. Kihm, if you could talk a little bit more
> about other recommendations that you\'re making in terms of policy
> changes and expand a little bit from one \[inaudible\].
>
> DR. KIHM: First, the most important measure I think is really the SRM
> ban, because this is contributing, what you raise right now, to food
> safety and feed safety. So you reduce the risk having these SRMs,
> infective SRMs in the feed chain. So that\'s absolutely a must, and
> you have to enforce it, and you have to look at the implementation at
> all levels. I think that\'s our experience in Europe. It\'s hard to do
> a good job where you achieve almost a 100 percent.
>
> So that is a very strong recommendation to the Canadian government to
> look at this, right from the beginning so you can learn what we
> didn\'t\--what we missed, what we didn\'t do properly at all times,
> and we can learn on that, and we are happy to show you where the gaps
> and the bottlenecks are. So that\'s probably one thing.
>
> Another thing is important under surveillance(?) system, you have to
> measure the magnitude of the disease occurrence, and I think they did
> already, very good start. They were going into measuring and checking.
> Of course you have to target the population. You cannot check all
> everything, all animals, so you have to go to those animals, the
> highest risk animals. As you know, this is the targeted surveillance
> system, and this is very important to see where you are on one side,
> and also to measure later on the consequences after implemented
> measures.
>
> So if you see \[inaudible\], then you should come down and you can
> measure in a surveillance system. If you don\'t have a proper
> surveillance system, you cannot measure it. So that\'s a very
> important recommendation as well.
>
> The feed ban, the application of the feed ban is another
> recommendation which should be as strong as possible, but there are
> certain alternatives. You can do it this way or the other way. I
> won\'t go more into details, but I believe these are the main points
> you should respect coming from our side. Of course, as you probably
> realize, BSE is an extremely difficult disease to control, so it\'s
> many times depending on little details which are not completely
> complied with, and that\'s why you have to learn from the lessons
> abroad and you have to learn also with your own systems in place, to
> handle it, it was your system, in order to make progress.
>
> QUESTION: Your call to ban animals, like cattle remains from all
> animal feed, is that something that a country that doesn\'t have a BSE
> case, a confirmed case, that that country should also do?
>
> DR. KIHM: I would say in this way, that\'s hard to say in a gentle
> way. We always recommend go for risk assessment. According to your
> risk assessment, you have to take the measures with management, and
> that\'s very important. You cannot\--
>
> QUESTION: The FAO\--
>
> DR. KIHM: Right, FAO was recommending that you should\--countries
> should go into risk assessment because it depends heavily how your
> system is running, how much importation you had and so on.
>
> OPERATOR: Marianne McClinton \[ph\], Farm Media.
>
> QUESTION: Dr. Kihm, I was wondering, at this point, based on what you
> know of Canada\'s surveillance system, how would you evaluate it? What
> would you say about how good it works and what more needs to be done?
>
> DR. KIHM: You mean in terms as it was right now? I would say that\'s a
> fairly good system, what you have in place on the surveillance side.
> You are fully aware, if you have a good \[inaudible\] program to
> detect clinical cases, that\'s one thing. What we always claim right
> at the beginning, that\'s important. Because if you have not the
> declaration and you have made clear to the people, they have to
> declare it. Otherwise, you will fail to find it. Good example, in
> European country\--you know which country I mean\--those, they were
> saying, \"We don\'t have it,\" so we don\'t look at it. So you started
> the surveillance program and you failed to find something.
>
> And then you have of course now in the modern time you have test
> systems and you go for those animals that are coming down. We call
> this fallen stock. We test all the fallen stock with this modern test
> system. And then you get the good picture of the \[inaudible\], and so
> this, as far as we have seen, you have \[inaudible\] in place, but you
> can of course improve it, and you have to improve it. There\'s no
> question.
>
> QUESTION: Just as a follow up, how long do you think it will be before
> you\'ve completed your entire \[inaudible\]?
>
> DR. KIHM: In the short time we had available right now, we searched
> the main lines, where they are going, and I think we have to
> completely review it, and we are in constant contact with the people
> here, just to make comment on it, and I think there are\--people, they
> know which job they have to do, so we continue. It\'s hard to say. It
> will take time.
>
> QUESTION: Are we talking weeks or\--
>
> DR. KIHM: To finish the report, two weeks.
>
> DR. EVANS: Marie, again, just to be very clear, you know, what we had
> asked the team to do in the initial phase of this again was to
> critique our epidemiological thinking, our investigation and terms,
> and to help us confirm that we had gone as far as we possibly could
> through that phase of the investigation, and to help us transition
> into, as Dr. Kihm has indicated, what are the measures now that we
> would like to put in place? So as I say, we have proposed to them
> several options that we think are warranted and they have provided
> comments on each of those options as to how they would be relevant to
> our circumstances, or how those would integrate into a stronger
> system.
>
> And so as Ulrich indicated, the expectation is we will receive the
> final written report on the first phase and their consideration of our
> options, but I\'ve left the door open to ask the team, in a period
> down the road, 3 or 4 months down the road, to reassess then the
> measures that we have brought into place and to further counsel us as
> to whether the measures that we had adopted in fact will provide the
> possible superior system that we think that we\'re able to achieve.
>
> MODERATOR: \[Inaudible\].
>
> QUESTION: Dr. Kihm, we\'re you looking at the gap between when the
> diseased cow was said to have been slaughtered and the 4 months later
> when the announcement came that this cow had mad cow disease, did you
> examine why there was that gap of time?
>
> DR. KIHM: It may look for you this is big failure. I can tell you we
> were in the same situation in 1990. In \'89 we decided in Switzerland
> to go for investigation, disease of \[inaudible\], and we got I think
> samples submitted in mid 1990 and we declared the first case in
> December 10th because we had a lot of investigation to go for to be
> sure this was BSE. So it\'s understood under the \[inaudible\]. We
> have seen why it happened, and what happened, but you have to compare
> this time gap also between the time when the infection took place.
>
> Infection took place in \'96 or \'97. So everything happened in
> between in quiet. Everybody was thinking BSE\'s not circulating, and
> then the last 4 months, of course, it would be nicer to have it done
> immediately and you get the result immediately, of course it\'s true.
> But it\'s not so devastating I would say that you had that time gap in
> between. That\'s \[inaudible\].
>
> QUESTION: I appreciate that. Dr. DeHaven, sir, you\'ve heard the
> praise for the Canadian system and the thoroughness of the review.
> I\'d like to know your reaction and your thoughts on whether this will
> mean a quick opening of the border.
>
> DR. DeHAVEN: Well, once again, I want to thank my Canadian colleagues
> for allowing us to participate in these media calls, and I think it\'s
> just an example of the good communication that has continued with
> regard to the investigation involving this situation.
>
> Certainly we are encouraged by Dr. Kihm\'s comments on the thorough
> and comprehensive investigation that the Canadian officials have
> carried out. But as I said before, we will wait until all of the
> relevant information from the investigation is presented, before we
> would officially consider lifting any of the restrictions, and, again,
> we\'re encouraged by Dr. Kihm\'s comments. I think that sheds a
> favorable light on that whole process. But I would just emphasize,
> again, that any lifting of restrictions would be based on sound
> science and solid risk assessment, and at the appropriate time, and
> that time is when we have all of the relevant information at hand, to
> include, perhaps, a formal report from Dr. Kihm\'s group.
>
> QUESTION: So does that mean two weeks at least?
>
> DR. EVANS: I don\'t know that we would necessarily have to have their
> finished report in our hands. I\'m sure there\'s other ways to convey
> that information, so again, it would be based on at that point in time
> when we have what we consider to be all of the relevant information at
> hand.
>
> MODERATOR: \[In French.\]
>
> QUESTION: \[In French.\]
>
> DR. LAVIGNE: \[In French.\]?
>
> QUESTION: \[In French.\]
>
> DR. LAVIGNE : \[In French.\]
>
> QUESTION: I just \[inaudible\] where we go from here, Dr. Evans. If
> you\'re saying your scientific investigation has basically reached the
> end of its rope, it\'s been maxed out, there\'s nothing more to do
> there, and the American gentleman, whose name I forget, is saying that
> more solid science has yet to come before a decision can be made, what
> more can you do to \[inaudible\] state, scientifically, that BSE is
> not a problem in Canada?
>
> DR. EVANS: Again, just pointing out the fact that, as Dr. DeHaven has
> mentioned, that we have been communicating with our U.S. colleagues
> and we\'ve had U.S. representatives in Canada over the last three
> weeks, that have been providing some oversight and review of our
> efforts as well.
>
> Certainly we have a commitment to our colleagues in the U.S., having
> reached this point in terms of bringing our active investigation to a
> close, we are assembling all of the data, all of the information,
> packaging it in a way that, again, gives them a very compelling story
> relative to the circumstances and we\'re working hard now with the
> advice of the international team that supports our drawing this active
> investigation to a close, to take that step. That information, as I
> say, we will be sharing with our U.S. colleagues imminently, and then
> we will await their assessment and any further questions, and I
> believe Dr. DeHaven has also indicated they will take on board
> information that the international team has compiled as part of that
> process as well.
>
> QUESTION: Perhaps I could ask Dr. DeHaven, as Joe did earlier: Is
> there a timeframe here, Dr. DeHaven? If you\'re getting this
> information imminently, how long will it take to digest before you
> come up with a decision?
>
> DR. DeHAVEN: Well, you know, as Dr. Evans indicated, and I\'ve said,
> there\'s been good flow of communication back and forth, and we\'ve
> been kept well-informed of the investigation as it\'s been ongoing.
>
> But getting that information as it\'s generated by the investigation
> and having it in a clear concise package as something that we can then
> use to evaluate and conduct risk assessments are two different things.
> So the investigation or the preponderance of the investigation is just
> being wrapped up as we speak. I think the report and the comments by
> Dr. Kihm, suggesting that they\'ve done a comprehensive job, is all
> helpful, but until we have that package that Dr. Evans described and
> have something that we can sink our teeth into in terms of evaluation,
> we can\'t take any, initiate any formal action.
>
> In terms of once we have that packet and how long it will take us, I
> hesitate to be painted into a corner. Typically, that amount of
> information generates some questions and some needs for clarification
> and additional information, and so while I would promise that we will
> consider that information expeditiously, I would hesitate to speculate
> on how long that might take because I just don\'t know how much
> follow-up and additional information might be generated when we take
> our first look at it.
>
> MODERATOR: The gentleman at the back.
>
> QUESTION: \[inaudible\]. Just for clarity, since day one, how many
> farms have been quarantined, in total, how many are still in
> quarantine, and how many head of cattle have been slaughtered?
>
> DR EVANS: A total of 18 farms were quarantined over the course of the
> investigation, nine remain in quarantine. Again, as we\'ve indicated,
> we have all the rapid \[?\] tests back and they are negative, and
> there\'s a small number of immunohistochemistry, the secondary tests
> that we\'ve been running, which will be forthcoming as well.
>
> We\'re in the process, again, of once those results are in, we will be
> moving as expeditiously as possible to deal with the other
> quarantines, and of course we have the one circumstance with the farm
> in which the positive case was found, which, again, we will be
> reviewing its status.
>
> Beyond that, as I say, that we did indicate some, from the, from those
> farms that were in the primary line of inquiry which had quarantines
> imposed, we had done further traceouts from those lines that, again,
> looked at animals that were born in the same year or within a year of
> the birth of the positive cow, and would potentially have been exposed
> to the same feed, and then taking that investigation out, it took us
> to an additional 25 farms.
>
> Again, we did not quarantine these farms because we were only
> interested in the singleton or small number of animals that have been
> physically on the premises with the index cow at that same age time
> and exposure point.
>
> So the other animals on those farms were not of direct interest to us
> and not implicated in the investigation.
>
> So based on those numbers plus the animals that were in the lines of
> inquiry, which we ended up taking out, the total number of animals is
> in the neighborhood currently\--would have been in the final
> neighborhood of around 2700 animals, total.
>
> MODERATOR: \[In French.\]
>
> QUESTION: \[In French.\]
>
> MR. : \[In French.\]
>
> QUESTION: You said, Dr. Kihm, en francais, earlier, that in other
> countries you did find not just one but there were three\--two and
> three, and four and five and six. How long did it take? Is there any
> way to know how long it may take with this kind of investigation, to
> find the next, and then the next?
>
> DR. KIHM: It\'s difficult to say but if you go immediately into a
> proper targeted surveying \[?\] system and you try to collect all
> fallen stock\--that\'s what we recommend\--all fallen stock, all
> emergencies, lots should be checked, and the difficulty is to get all
> this material out. But as many as you have and you prove negative, as
> much assured you are that you are in a comfortable situation. Or the
> other way around, as many as you get in a short time\--because we know
> about the percentage, they are coming down, of adult, always adult
> cattle\--don\'t go for young stock\--adult cattle, over 30 months, and
> you check them, so you have a higher probability to find another one.
>
> So you see both sides, depending how strong your surveillance, your
> targeted surveillance system is in place, and how good is your
> infrastructure to get them to collect all these samples, and those
> who, that the people are sensitized to submit those samples. If you
> have not the people already sensitized and they are pre\--they have an
> awareness of the disease, you probably don\'t find it. That happened
> in Europe, many, many times. The animals die.
>
> You take a big machine and they make a hole behind your premises and
> you bury it. That\'s it. You will never get \[inaudible\] because
> it\'s always a single\--or most of the time it\'s a single case in a
> farm that you get out a positive animal.
>
> So it\'s hard to say. But what you can say, if you have a big, a large
> epidemic, you find quickly a second one. That\'s for sure. Even if you
> don\'t look carefully for it. So that\'s \[inaudible\] estimation.
>
> MODERATOR: \[inaudible\].
>
> QUESTION: I want to clarify which countries are represented on the
> international \[inaudible\] how many scientists, officials have been
> involved in\--
>
> DR. EVANS: The international team involves four individuals. Dr.
> Stuart McDermitt \[ph\] from New Zealand. Dr. Will Houston \[ph\] from
> the United States. Dr. Dagmar Heim \[ph\] from Switzerland,
> representing the European position, and the team leader. Dr. Ulrich
> Kihm.
>
> MODERATOR: \[In French.\]
>
> MODERATOR: The first question comes from the line of Rick Baguski
> \[ph\], CBC Television. Please proceed with your question.
>
> QUESTION: This question is for Dr. Kihm. Dr. Kihm, I\'d like to
> clarify with you. Are you suggesting that perhaps a low level of BSE
> may still exist in the Canadian system?
>
> And also as a follow to that, if it does, if the answer is yes, do you
> feel that with sort of the checks and balances that are in place now,
> that there\'s enough there to detect it?
>
> DR. KIHM: I wonder why you say \"still existing\" because you had only
> one case, and I think I made it quite clear that the risk is there,
> that you, we\'ll find a second or third case, or even more. So the
> answer is clearly yes. I\'m estimating that there will be other cases
> in this part of the world.
>
> And the second one is you have to implement a proper surveillance
> system in order to detect them.
>
> QUESTION: What I\'m trying to find out is based on the information or
> based on the policies that we have in place today, is there enough to
> detect any further cases of BSE in your opinion, without going out and
> strengthening whatever, you know, has to be done?
>
> DR. KIHM: I think with our recommendation and with our discussion we
> had, until today, with the improvement of the targeted surveillance
> system, I would say yes, you have to make the system so much
> acceptable worldwide, to the world society, and also to the U.S., I
> think, that they accept this is a good targeted surveillance system in
> order to detect a case. Then you can define a case, one case in one
> million, one case in 100,000. So you have to do this and this and
> this.
>
> So we know from the epi\...\[?\] point of view how much you have to
> do.
>
> QUESTION: And based on everything you\'ve seen so far, would you
> consider Canadian beef safe for export?
>
> DR. KIHM: Yes. Beef, we always were claiming in Europe, beef has no
> risk. It was never detected, infection in beef. Beef from BSE cows was
> injected into the brain of cattle and they were not coming down. So
> beef has to be regarded as safe.
>
> QUESTION: And what about the cattle then?
>
> DR. KIHM: Cattle is different because you know you have a long
> incubation time. So cattle incubating the disease, it goes for four,
> six, seven, or even longer, years, until it may come down or it may be
> slaughtered. So cattle, you have to make other assessments for opening
> borders. I accept that.
>
> QUESTION: And how long in your opinion would one have to wait before
> Canada should be or could be exporting its cattle?
>
> DR. KIHM: I can give you our example in Switzerland. We are still
> banned to certain countries in Europe after having the first case,
> 1990.
>
> MODERATOR: \[In French.\] Tom Cohen, Associated Press. Please proceed
> with your question.
>
> QUESTION: Yes, thank you very much.
>
> Dr. Kihm, if I can just follow up a little bit on what you were just
> talking about there. You seem to be saying that there has to be an
> improvement in some of the surveillance from what exists now in order
> to bring down that risk assessment, and specifically in terms of
> cattle, that it may take some time for those improvements to be
> instituted and for the risk assessment to come down, it takes a longer
> period of time for that.
>
> Can you just expand on that a little bit, what has to happen.
>
> DR. KIHM: I think as I outlined a little bit, what should go on is
> really that you check the highest-risk population on a continuous way.
> That has to be installed properly, that you get the submission of all
> those samples of those animals to the laboratory for testing.
>
> So we know about, you have between 1 and 2 percent of fallen stock,
> emergency slaughter in \[inaudible\] and those should be per year and
> those you have to submit. So you see already the timeframe. You need
> time. It\'s an ongoing process which has to be checked.
>
> Only then, if you then still are negative, and you prove negative,
> then you could say, and I would be very optimistic, if you find during
> one year no cases in this high-risk population, you would come up and
> say this could, slowly proving you had only a single case, and that\'s
> what other countries like Austria, Finland and Israel, they are doing
> that. That\'s the approach you have to perform. Those are the
> countries that have only one case, something, now, so they do this
> chore.
>
> QUESTION: Right. You mentioned in Switzerland, there\'s still bans by
> certain countries, now, I think if I heard you right, 13 years after
> the first case was determined. Is Canada facing that type of
> situation, that it\'s going to have a lengthy time period, stretching
> over years, before its cattle would be accepted?
>
> DR. KIHM: I don\'t hope so\--
>
> QUESTION: But is that likely?
>
> DR. KIHM: \--to a certain extent is not justified. To a certain extent
> yes, but we could limit exporting cattle to a certain age, to a
> certain category, certain measures to be in place in the exporting
> country, or the importing country, and then it would make it safe. But
> this is up to the importing country as you know and they decide what
> they want, and sometimes you have no chance.
>
> MODERATOR: \[In French.\]
>
> Ladies and gentlemen, that does conclude the conference call for
> today, we thank you for your participation and ask you to please
> disconnect your lines.
>
> \[END OF TAPED RECORDING.\]
>
> \- - -