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**DENIC's Response to the NTIA's Inquiry**

**on "The Continued Transition of the Technical Coordination and
Management of the Internet Domain Name and Addressing System"**

It is with pleasure that DENIC, the registry for the German Top Level
Domain .de, responds to the NTIA's inquiry on "The Continued Transition
of the Technical Coordination and Management of the Internet Domain Name
and Addressing System".

*1. The DNS White Paper articulated principles (i.e., stability;
competition; private, bottom-up coordination; and representation)
necessary for guiding the transition to private sector management of the
Internet DNS.  Are these principles still relevant?  Should additional
principles be considered in light of:  the advance in Internet
technology; the expanded global reach of the Internet; the experience
gained over the eight years since the Department of Commerce issued the
DNS White Paper; and the international dialogue, including the
discussions related to Internet governance at the United Nations World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)?*

Not only are the White Paper principles still relevant but they have
gained additional relevance in the very light of the Internet's
development since issuance of the White Paper.

Most notably, this concerns the technical stability of the DNS, given
that the DNS (as well as the Internet as a whole) is, after all, a
technical infrastructure, regardless of all political and legal
implications that it might indeed carry or that might be attributed to
it by interested parties. The farther the global reach of the Internet
expands, and the more the world relies on the Internet, the more
important the smooth functioning of the Internet in general and the DNS
in particular becomes. Therefore, technical stability has to remain
paramount in all considerations regarding DNS management and, for that
matter, Internet governance.

The successful development of the Internet and the DNS to date has
mostly been made possible not by top-down (governmental) regulation but
by bottom-up, initially academic and later on private coordination. As
also the Working Group on Internet Governance asserted, with respect to
the Internet's practical management, "there is no specific weakness in
the system", as is, in fact, not surprising for perhaps the most
significant advantage of private coordination is its ability to swiftly
adapt to the new technical developments and challenges (and even the
policy requirements) generated by the Internet. In view of this, it
would be detrimental to the functioning of the DNS if attempts were made
to fundamentally change the current system and shift responsibilities
away from the private sector.

*2.  The DNS White Paper articulated a number of actions that should be
taken in order for the U.S. Government to transition its Internet DNS
technical coordination and management responsibilities to the private
sector.  These actions appear in the MOU as a series of core tasks and
milestones.  Has ICANN achieved sufficient progress in its tasks, as
agreed in the MOU, for the transition to take place by September 30,
2006?*

With respect to ccTLDs (different from gTLDs), ICANN's function is
purely technical in that ICANN performs the IANA function, whereas
policy decisions, in line with the nature of ccTLDs, have to be and are
in fact being made locally, not globally.

As a ccTLD registry, DENIC therefore is mostly interested in how ICANN
performs the IANA function whose smooth operation is of utmost
importance for the stability, reliability, and efficiency of the DNS. In
this instance, significant improvements have been achieved, yet further
improvements, in particular with regard to automation of DNS root
updates, are needed in order to ensure timely implementation of
authenticated root updates. DENIC notes with pleasure that such further
improvements are underway as demonstrated by ICANN's intention to adopt
the e-IANA initiative (cf. http://www.icann.org/announcements/
announcement-05jul06.htm).

*3. Are these core tasks and milestones still relevant to facilitate
this transition and meet the goals outlined in the DNS White Paper and
the U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing
System?  Should new or revised tasks/methods be considered in order for
the transition to occur?  And on what time frame and by what method
should a transition occur?*

It cannot be emphasized enough that the technical stability of the DNS
has to be paramount, and, consequently, more important than observance
of a certain time frame is the certainty that, after full transition of
DNS management, the IANA function will be performed reliably,
responsibly, and with a view to being accountable to the stakeholders
that immediately rely on it (such as TLD and IP address registries
(RIRs)).

In this instance, DENIC is pleased to have exchanged letters with ICANN
as the organization performing the IANA function, describing DENIC's and
ICANN's respective functions and responsibilities (cf.
http://www.icann.org/cctlds/de/ denic-icann-letters-31may06.pdf). On
this occasion, ICANN, in its letter to DENIC, has pledged to "implement
on notification by DENIC changes to the domain name or IP address(es) of
the name servers for .de as recorded in the Authoritative Root data for
.de in the Authoritative Root database". DENIC feels that this
accurately describes the way how the IANA function should be run as a
purely technical task.

*4.  The DNS White Paper listed several key stakeholder groups whose
meaningful participation is necessary for effective technical
coordination and management of the Internet DNS.  Are all of these
groups involved effectively in the ICANN process?  If not, how could
their involvement be improved?  Are there key stakeholder groups not
listed in the DNS White Paper, such as those with expertise in the area
of Internet security or infrastructure technologies, that could provide
valuable input into the technical coordination and management of the
Internet DNS?  If so, how could their involvement be facilitated?*

The management of the DNS primarily requires participation of those
stakeholders that are part of the DNS as a technical infrastructure,
such as root server operators, RIRs, or TLD registries, and
participation of these stakeholders is, in principle, provided for
within the ICANN framework.

Besides, due to the ever increasing importance of the Internet for
people's every day lives all over the world, many other stakeholder
groups take an interest in matters relating to the Internet. On the
global level, this is particularly the case with regard to gTLD issues
as gTLDs, different from ccTLDs, do not relate to a certain country or
territory but are truly global by nature. In this instance, ICANN
provides a framework for broad participation in the creation of gTLD
policies.

With respect to ccTLDs, on the other hand, as they are rooted in their
respective local communities, participation of interested stakeholder
groups should and does indeed take place foremost locally. Consequently,
for ccTLDs, there is no need to centralize stakeholder participation at
the global DNS root level, even less so as for cultural and language
reasons, meaningful participation will often be much more efficient on
the local level anyway.

*5. The DNS White Paper listed principles and mechanisms for technical
coordination and management of the Internet DNS to encourage meaningful
participation and representation of key stakeholders.  ICANN, in
conjunction with many of these key stakeholders, has created various
supporting organizations and committees to facilitate stakeholder
participation in ICANN  processes.  Is participation in these
organizations meeting the needs of key stakeholders and the Internet
community?  Are there ways to improve or expand participation in these
organizations and committees?*

In the course of ICANN's institutional reform three years ago, for the
enhanced participation of ccTLDs, the ccNSO was created. While this
undoubtedly was an encouraging step forward, the ccNSO has not yet
attracted a sufficient number of members.

It appears that the main reason for ccTLD registries not to join the
ccNSO lies in the fact that membership in the ccNSO comes with being
subject to policy decisions of ICANN (prepared by the ccNSO) even though
policy for ccTLDs must be and is being created locally. Even though the
recent amendments to the ICANN bylaws have remedied some of the concerns
that in particular many European ccTLD registries (including DENIC) had
with respect to the ccNSO, there are still quite a few issues remaining
of which the most important one probably is the not yet clearly enough
defined ccNSO scope (for a more detailed assessment, cf.
http://forum.icann.org/lists/ccnso-bylaws-changes/ msg00000.html).

Regardless of this, it is important that ICANN, with regard to the IANA
function, remains accountable and responsive to all ccTLD registries,
irrespective of whether they are members of the ccNSO or not.

*6. What methods and/or processes should be considered to encourage
greater efficiency and responsiveness to governments and ccTLD managers
in processing root management requests to address public policy and
sovereignty concerns?  Please keep in mind the need to preserve the
security and stability of the Internet DNS and the goal of
decision-making at the local level.  Are there new technology tools
available that could improve this process, such as automation of request
processing?*

The day-to-day management of the DNS root is a purely technical task
that neither requires nor merits responsiveness to "public policy and
sovereignty concerns". Managing the DNS root means nothing more than
implementing changes of the addresses of nameservers or contact details
for TLDs (not including, of course, replacement of the registry itself)
on request by the concerned TLD registry, and it is hardly imaginable
how such changes would raise or pertain to "public policy and
sovereignty concerns".

In light of this, it is important that neither ICANN nor any other party
(including any government) is being given the opportunity to delay or
prevent such technical changes for non-technical reasons.

The whole concept of ccTLDs is to provide places in the DNS for local
communities and with that cater to local cultural, political, and legal
needs. This is the reason why the ccTLDs can be and are so diverse in
any possible instance, including their government relationships.
Different types and grades of governmental involvement have been
developed locally according to the needs and necessities of the
respective ccTLD. Also, governments follow different public policies and
have different understandings of how national sovereignty might or might
not be affected by the management of their respective country's ccTLD.
Therefore, it would not be possible to apply a "one size fits all" model
of addressing "public policy and sovereignty concerns" at the DNS root
level. Instead, such concerns have to be addressed locally, within the
legal framework of the respective country. In Germany, for example, the
administration of domain names is, by a deliberate decision of the
German federal government, unregulated, and it would be inappropriate to
thwart this decision by implementing means of governmental involvement
at the root level.

Incidentally, even with regard to the "delegation" of new ccTLDs or the
replacement of the registries for existing ones (other than in the case
of gTLDs), a global policy is neither needed nor would it be
appropriate. Since any current and future ccTLD is per se linked to a
certain country or territory, the decision by whom the registry should
be run can and should be made locally (with the IANA then merely
implementing such local decision).

*7. Many public and private organizations have various roles and
responsibilities related to the Internet DNS, and more broadly, to
Internet governance.  How can information exchange, collaboration and
enhanced cooperation among these organizations be achieved as called for
by the WSIS?*

The history of the Internet and the DNS clearly demonstrates that
information exchange, collaboration, and enhanced cooperation
automatically develop between those stakeholders that need to
collaborate and cooperate to make the Internet work. Given that the
Internet is a technical medium, this particularly applies to the
technical community, as clearly demonstrated by the fact that the
technical functioning of the Internet is based not on the enforcement of
(legal) rules but on voluntary compliance with what makes sense
technically. Therefore, in particular with respect to the DNS, it would
be fallacious to assume that currently there was a lack of information
exchange, collaboration and cooperation.

Nevertheless, there is no reason imaginable not to foster further
improvement in this instance, and particularly increased information
exchange will certainly be useful to ensure that all stakeholders better
understand their respective needs and approaches as well as their
limitations. However, any endeavors to enhanced cooperation must not
obliterate the responsibilities and roles of each stakeholder or
stakeholder group nor impair, by making it cumbersome or unwieldy, the
stable management of the DNS as a technical task. Already in view of
this, enhanced cooperation neither requires nor would it benefit from
the creation of additional organizations.

Frankfurt, July 7, 2006

Stephan Welzel

General Counsel

DENIC eG