![](media/image1.jpeg){width="1.28125in" height="1.28125in"}National
Transportation Safety Board

Runway Incursion Accidents, Serious Incidents, Recommendations, and
Statistics

Deadliest Runway Accidents

● **Tenerife, Canary Islands, March 27, 1977 (583 fatalities).** The
world's deadliest runway accident occurred on March 27, 1977, when Pan
Am (PAA) flight 1736, a Boeing 747, and KLM4805, a Boeing 747, collided
on runway 12 at Tenerife, Canary Islands, killing 583 passengers and
crew. KLM4805 departed runway 12 without a takeoff clearance colliding
with PAA1736 that was taxiing on the same runway during instrument
meteorological conditions.

The Spanish government determined the cause was: "The KLM aircraft had
taken off without take-off clearance, in the absolute conviction that
this clearance had been obtained, which was the result of a
misunderstanding between the tower and the KLM aircraft. This
misunderstanding had arisen from the mutual use of usual terminology
which, however, gave rise to misinterpretation. In combination with a
number of other coinciding circumstances, the premature take-off of the
KLM aircraft resulted in a collision with the Pan Am aircraft, because
the latter was still on the runway since it had missed the correct
intersection."

● **Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 (49 fatalities).** The
deadliest runway accident in the United States occurred on August 27,
2006, at about 0606 eastern daylight time when Comair flight 5191, a
Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA, crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass
Airport, Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take off
from runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began
the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and
impacted the airport perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The captain,
flight attendant, and 47 passengers were killed, and the first officer
received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces
and postcrash fire. The flight was en route to Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia.  Night visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident was the flight
crewmembers' failure to use available cues and aids to identify the
airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure
to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway
before takeoff.  Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's
nonpertinent conversations during taxi, which resulted in a loss of
positional awareness and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure
to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air
traffic control clearances. (DCA06MA064) Note: The NTSB on July 27, 2007
classified the accident as a runway incursion.

#### 

#### Fatal Runway Accidents in the United States since 1990

● **Los Angeles, California, February 1, 1991 (34 fatalities).** On
February 1, 1991, at 1801 pacific standard time, when USAir (USA) flight
1493, a B737, and Skywest (SKW) flight 5569, an SW4, collided on runway
24L at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California,
killing 34. USA1493 was landing on runway 24L and collided with SKW5569
that was holding on the same runway, at intersection 45, waiting for a
takeoff clearance. (DCA91MA018AB)

#### The NTSB determined the probable cause was "the failure of the Los Angeles air traffic facility management to implement procedures that provided redundancy comparable to the requirements contained in the National Operational Position Standards and the failure of the FAA Air Traffic Service to provide adequate policy direction and oversight to its air traffic control facility managers. These failures created an environment in the Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Tower that ultimately led to the failure of the Local Controller 2 to maintain an awareness of the traffic situation, culminating in the inappropriate clearances and the subsequent collision of the USAir and Skywest aircraft. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of the FAA to provide effective quality assurance of the ATC system."

#### 

#### ● Atlanta, Georgia, January 18, 1990 (1 fatality). On January 18, 1990, at 1904 eastern standard time, Eastern Airlines (EAL) flight 111, a B727, collided with N44UE, an Epps Air Service Beechcraft King Air A100, on runway 26R at the William B. Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. N44UE was on landing roll, preparing to turn off runway 26R when it was struck from behind by EAL111 that had also been cleared to land on the same runway. The pilot of N44UE sustained fatal injuries. The accident occurred in night visual flight rule conditions, with reported visibility 3 miles with fog. (DCA90MA017AB)

The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was: "1) the
failure of the FAA to provide air traffic control procedures that
adequately take into consideration human performance factors such as
those which resulted in the failure of the north local controller to
detect the developing conflict between N44UE and EAL111, and 2) the
failure of the north local controller to ensure the separation of
arriving aircraft which were using the same runway. Contributing to the
accident was the failure of the north local controller to follow the
prescribed procedure of issuing appropriate traffic information to
EAL111, and failure of the north final controller and the radar monitor
controller to issue timely speed reductions to maintain adequate
separation between aircraft on final approach."

#### ● Detroit, Michigan, December 3, 1990 (8 fatalities). On December 3, 1990, at 1345 eastern standard time, Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 1482, a DC-9, and NWA299, a Boeing 727, collided near the intersection of runways 9/27 and 3C/21C at Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne Country Airport, Romulus, Michigan, that killed 8 people. NWA299 was on its takeoff roll on runway 3C and collided with NWA1482 after it taxied onto the runway. The accident occurred in day instrument meteorological conditions. (DCA91MA010-AB)

The NTSB determined the probable cause was the "lack of proper crew
coordination, including virtual reversal of roles by the DC-9 pilots,
which led to their failure to stop taxiing and alert ground controller
of their position uncertainty in a timely manner before and after
intruding onto the active runway. Contributing to the cause of the
accident were (1) deficiencies in ATC services provided by Detroit
Tower, including failure of the ground controller to take timely action
to alert local controller to possible runway incursion, inadequate
visibility observations, failure to use progressive taxi instructions in
low-visibility conditions, and issuance of inappropriate and confusing
taxi instructions compounded by inadequate backup supervision for level
of experience of staff on duty; (2) deficiencies in surface markings,
signage and lighting at airport and failure of FAA surveillance to
detect or correct any of these deficiencies; (3) failure of Northwest
Airlines to provide adequate cockpit resource management training to
line aircrews...."

● **St. Louis, Missouri, November 22, 1994 (2 fatalities).** On November
22, 1994, at 2203 central standard time, Trans World Airlines (TWA)
flight 427, a MD-82, collided with N441KM, a Cessna 441, at the
intersection of runway 30R and taxiway R, at the Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport (STL) in Bridgeton, Missouri. The STL ground
controller cleared N441KM to taxi to runway 31 but the crew
inadvertently taxied onto runway 30R. The STL local controller cleared
TWA427 for takeoff on runway 30R and collided with N441KM. The two
occupants of N441KM were killed. The accident occurred in night visual
meteorological conditions. (CHI95MA044AB)

The NTSB determined the probable cause was "the Cessna 441 pilot's
mistaken belief that his assigned departure runway was runway 30R, which
resulted in his undetected entrance onto runway 30R, which was being
used by the MD-82 for its departure. Contributing to the accident was
the lack of Automatic Terminal Information Service and other air traffic
control information regarding the occasional use of runway 31 for
departure. The installation and utilization of Airport Surface Detection
Equipment (ASDE-3), and particularly ASDE-3 enhanced with the Airport
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS), could have prevented this
accident."

● **Quincy, Illinois, November 19, 1996 (14 fatalities).** On November
19, 1996, at 1703 central standard time, United Express flight 5925, a
Beechcraft 1900C, and N1127D, a Beechcraft King Air A90, collided at the
intersection of runways 13/31 and 4/22 at the uncontrolled airport in
Quincy, Illinois, killing all 14 people in both planes. Flight 5925 was
completing its landing roll on runway 13 and the N1127D was on its
takeoff roll on runway 4 when they collided. The accident occurred in
day visual meteorological conditions. (DCA97MA009AB)

The probable cause determined by the NTSB stated in part: "the failure
of the pilots in the King Air A90 to effectively monitor the common
traffic advisory frequency or to properly scan for traffic, resulting in
their commencing a takeoff roll when the Beech 1900C (United Express
flight 5925) was landing on an intersecting runway. Contributing to the
cause of the accident was the Cherokee pilot\'s interrupted radio
transmission, which led to the Beech 1900C pilot\'s misunderstanding of
the transmission as an indication from the King Air that it would not
take off until after flight 5925 had cleared the runway...."

● **Sarasota, Florida, March 9, 2000 (4 fatalities).** On March 9, 2000,
at 1035 eastern standard time, N89827, a C152, and N79960, a C172,
collided during takeoff on runway 14 at the Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport, Sarasota, Florida, that killed 4 people. The
tower controller cleared N89827 for takeoff from the approach end and
6.5 seconds later instructed N79960 to "taxi into position and hold".
N89827 collided with N79960 when the airplane entered the runway at
taxiway F. The accident occurred in day visual meteorological
conditions. (MIA00FA103AB)

The NTSB determined the probable cause was "the failure of the
supervisor/ground controller and the local controller to provide
effective separation between the accident airplanes on the runway,
resulting in a collision during takeoff. Contributing to the accident
was the failure of the pilot and pilot-rated passenger on board N79960
to ensure that the runway was clear of traffic before taxiing onto the
runway. Also contributing to the accident was the failure of air traffic
control guidance and procedures to incorporate redundant methods of
verifying aircraft position for both controllers and pilots."

###### Serious Incidents in the United States

● **Providence, Rhode Island, December 6, 1999.** On December 6, 1999,
at 2035 eastern standard time, United Airlines flight 1448 (UAL1448), a
Boeing 757, and Federal Express flight 1662 (FDX1662), a Boeing 727,
were involved in a runway incursion on runway 5R at the Theodore Francis
Green State Airport, Providence, Rhode Island. No injuries were
reported, and neither aircraft was damaged. The crew of UAL1448 landed
on runway 5R and, during taxi to the terminal, became disoriented and
inadvertently turned on taxiway B and stopped on the edge of runway 5R.
FDX1662 departed runway 5R, passing very near UAL1448. The incident
occurred during night instrument meteorological conditions. Reported
visibility was ¼ mile and the runway visibility range was 1,400 feet.
(DCA00SA012AB)

● **Chicago, Illinois, April 1, 1999.** On April 1, 1999, at 0220
central standard time, Air China flight 9018 (CCA9018), Boeing 747, and
Korean Air flight 36 (KAL36), a Boeing 747, were involved in a near
collision on runway 14R at the Chicago O\'Hare International Airport,
Chicago, Illinois.  No injuries were reported, and neither aircraft was
damaged. CCA9018 landed on runway 14R and was instructed by the tower
controller to exit the runway via a right turn on taxiway T-10, left
turn on taxiway K, and to cross runway 27L to the cargo ramp.  The same
controller cleared KAL36 for takeoff as the CCA9018 was exiting runway
14R.  CCA9018 turned right turn onto taxiway T-10 then turned left onto
taxiway M instead of taxiway K.  CCA9018 entered onto runway 14R as
KAL36 was taking off.  KAL36 flew over 25 to 50 feet over the top of
CCA9018. The incident occurred during night visual meteorological
conditions. (DCA99SA054AB)

● **Dallas, Texas, August 16, 2001.** On August 16, 2001, at 1024
central daylight time, Delta Airlines (DAL) flight 1521, a 737, nearly
collided with Continental (COA) flight 1487, a 737, on runway 18L at
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Dallas, Texas. The tower local
controller cleared COA1487 to land on runway 18R, and then cleared
DAL1521 for take off on runway 18L. About 24 seconds later, the local
controller cleared COA1487 to cross runway 18L. The pilots of both
airplanes saw a possible impending collision and took evasive action.
COA1487 continued to the gate and deplaned the passengers. The pilot of
DAL1521 reported that the tail of the airplane scraped the runway.
Examination revealed that there was damage to the skin of the underside
of the tail. Radar data indicates that DAL1521 flew over COA1487 by
approximately 100 feet. The incident occurred in day visual
meteorological conditions. (FTW01IA183AB)

The NTSB determined the probable cause was "the local controller
clearing the taxiing aircraft to cross the runway in front of the
aircraft on takeoff roll. Contributing factors were the local
controller\'s failure to follow FAA procedures and directives to
visually scan the runway prior to issuing the crossing clearance, the
local controller's excessive workload, and the tower supervisor\'s
inadequate supervision."

● **Los Angeles, California, August 19, 2004.** On August 19, 2004, at
1455 pacific daylight time, Asiana Airlines flight 204 (AAR204), a
Boeing 747-400, and Southwest Airlines flight 440 (SWA440), a Boeing
737, were involved in a near collision on runway 24L at the Los Angeles
International Airport, Los Angeles, California. No injuries were
reported, and neither aircraft was damaged. The same tower controller
cleared AAR204 to land on runway 24L and cleared SWA440 onto the same
runway to depart. AAR204 initiated a go-around and flew over SWA440 by
about 200 feet. The incident occurred during daylight visual
meteorological conditions. (LAX04IA302)

The NTSB determined the probable cause of this incident was "a loss of
separation between Southwest flight 440 and Asiana flight 204 due to the
LC2 relief controller\'s failure to appropriately monitor the operation
and recognize a developing traffic conflict. Contributing factors
included the FAA\'s position relief briefing procedures, the formatting
of the DBRITE radar displays in the LAX tower, controller fatigue, and
the tower supervisor\'s staffing decisions on the day of the incident."

● **Boston, Massachusetts, June 9, 2005.** On June 9, 2005, at
approximately 1940 central daylight time, Aer Lingus flight 132
(EIN132), an Airbus 333, and US Airways flight 1170 (USA1170), a Boeing
737, were involved in a runway incursion at the General Edward Lawrence
Logan International Airport (BOS), in Boston, Massachusetts. No injuries
were reported, and neither aircraft was damaged. Both aircraft were
under control of the Boston Air Traffic Control Tower; the Local Control
West (LCW) controller was responsible for EIN132 and Local Control East
(LCE) was responsible for USA1170. At 2339:10, the LCW cleared EIN132
for takeoff from runway 15R. Five seconds later, forgetting that he
released the runway to allow EIN 132 to depart, the LCE cleared USA1170
for departure from runway 9. The first officer on USA1170 saw EIN102 and
pushed the control column forward to prevent the captain from taking
off. Once EIN132 had passed through the intersection, USA1170 became
airborne. AMASS did not activate because in its current configuration it
was not designed to operate on intersecting runways due to the amount of
nuisance alerts. The incident occurred during daylight visual
meteorological conditions. (NYC05IA095A)

● **Chicago, Illinois, July 23, 2006.** On July 23, 2006, about 2200
central daylight time, Atlas Air flight 6972, (GTI6972), a Boeing
747-400, and United Airlines flight 1015 (UAL1015), a Boeing 737-300
were involved in a runway incursion at the Chicago O'Hare International
Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. No injuries were reported, and neither
aircraft was damaged. The local controller cleared GTI6972 to land on
runway 14R and approximately two minutes later, cleared UAL1015 for
takeoff from runway 27L. UAL1015 almost collided with GTI6972 as it
crossed runway 27L while on landing roll. The captain of UAL1015 noticed
GTI6972 and rotated 10 knots prior to Vr, flew over GTI6972, and missed
it by approximately 120 feet. At the time of the incident, the Airport
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) was in limited mode and did not
alert. The incident occurred during night visual meteorological
conditions. (OPS06IA008A)

● **Denver, Colorado, January 5, 2007.** On January 5, 2007, at 0728
mountain standard time, Key Lime Air flight 4216 (LYM4216), an SW4, and
Frontier flight 297 (FFT297), an A319, were involved in a near collision
at Denver International Airport, Denver, Colorado. No injuries were
reported, and neither aircraft was damaged. The pilot of LYM4216
inadvertently entered runway 35L as FFT297 was on approach to the same
runway. As FFT297 descended out of the clouds, the pilot noticed LYM4216
on the runway and executed a missed approach. The airplanes missed
colliding by about 50 feet. The incident occurred in day instrument
meteorological conditions. Weather was reported as 600 overcast, 1100
broken, visibility 1/2 mile, light snow, mist, and the runway visual
range was 5,500 feet. (OPS07IA001AB)

● **San Francisco, California, May 26, 2007.** On May 26, 2007, at 1330
a tower air traffic controller at San Francisco International Airport
cleared SkyWest Airlines flight 5741, an Embraer 120 arriving from
Modesto, California, to land on runway 28R. Forgetting about the arrival
airplane, the same controller then cleared Republic Airlines flight
4912, an Embraer 170 departing for Los Angeles, to take off from runway
1L, which intersects runway 28R. After the SkyWest airliner touched
down, the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) alerted and the
air traffic controller transmitted \"Hold, Hold, Hold\" to the SkyWest
flight crew in an attempt to stop the aircraft short of runway 1L. The
SkyWest crew applied maximum braking that resulted in the airplane
stopping in the middle of runway 1L. As this was occurring, the captain
of Republic Airlines flight 4912 took control of the aircraft from the
first officer, realized the aircraft was traveling too fast to stop, and
initiated an immediate takeoff. According to the crew of SkyWest 5741,
the Republic Airlines aircraft overflew theirs by 30 to 50 feet.
(OPS07IA004)

● **New York City, New York, July 5, 2007.** On July 5, 2007, at about
0915 Eastern daylight time, there was a runway incursion at LaGuardia
Airport, New York, New York involving Delta (DAL) flight 1238, a 737,
and Comair (COM) flight 196, a CRJ1.  There was a developmental training
on ground control (GC) at the time of this incident.  GC requested to
cross runway 22 with an aircraft at taxiway F. The local controller
approved the request advising he should cross behind COM flight 425, an
E135, which was landing on runway 22. DAL1238 was inbound, landing
behind COM425. The aircraft following DAL1238 inbound was issued go
around instructions but GC thought that DAL1238 had been sent around. GC
then crossed COM196, on runway 22 at taxiway F, without coordination, as
DAL1238 crossed the landing threshold. The FAA originally reported that
the lateral separation of the aircraft was 3,200 feet. The Airport
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) radar data indicated that the
closest proximity of the aircraft was about 650 feet. The incident
occurred during day visual flight rules conditions.  The FAA classified
this incursion as a Category D.  (OPS07IA007AB)

● **Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, July 11, 2007.** On July 11, 2007, at 1437
eastern daylight time a runway incursion occurred at the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida between United
flight 1544, an A-320 and Delta Airlines flight 1489, a Boeing 757. The
incident occurred in day visual flight rules conditions, visibility 10
miles, scattered clouds at 4,800 feet. The ground controller instructed
United 1544 to taxi to runway 9L via taxiway T7. As the flight was
taxiing on taxiway D near runway 9L, the tower local controller noticed
the airplane was going too fast to hold short of the runway. The local
controller told the ground controller to tell United to stop. The ground
controller said, \"UAL 1544 stop, stop, stop\". The crew stopped on
runway 9L. Delta1489 was inbound for landing on runway 9L when the local
controller determined that United1544 was not going to hold short of the
runway and instructed Delta1489 to go around. When the crew received the
instruction, the main landing gear was on the ground. According to the
crew statement, they noted the urgency in the controller\'s voice so
they knew they had to get the aircraft airborne. FAA reported Delta1489
flew over United1544 by less than 100 feet. According to the FAA, the
United crew stated they missed the turn onto taxiway B. The air traffic
control tower is not equipped with either AMASS or ASDE-X. All airport
lighting was functioning normally. (OPS07IA006)

● **Los Angeles, California, August 16, 2007.** On August 16, 2007, at
approximately 1257 Pacific daylight time, a runway incursion occurred
involving West Jet (WJA) 900, B737 and Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight
180, an A320, at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles,
California.WJA900 landed on runway 24R and exited at taxiway Y then
changed to ground control frequency without authorization while the
airplane was holding between the parallel runways. The tower controller
cleared NWA180 for takeoff from runway 24L. Meanwhile, the pilot of
WJA900 contracted ground control and said, \"Ground, WJA900 with you on
reverse \[taxiway\] yankee for gate 35.\" The ground controller assumed
that the tower controller had instructed the flight to cross runway 24L
and responded, \"WJA900, Los Angeles tower, taxi \[via taxiway\] echo to
the gate.\" Ten seconds later, the pilot of WJA900 confirmed that the
flight was cleared to cross runway 24L. The ground controller asked who
called and the pilot again asked whether or not they were cleared to
cross the runway. The ground controller then realized that WJA900 had
not been instructed to cross runway 24L and told WJA900 to stop.
According to the FAA and WJA, the airplane crossed the hold short line
but did not enter the runway. According to the FAA, the two aircraft
missed colliding by 37 feet (wingtip of A320 to the nose of the B737) as
NWA180 departed runway 24L. The tower received an AMASS warning when the
pilot was confirming to cross and before the controller told WJA900 to
stop. (OPS07IA009A)

**● Chantilly, Virginia, September 12, 2007.** On September 12, 2007,
about 0313 Eastern daylight time, a runway incursion occurred at
Washington Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC involving N66NJ,
a Learjet 35, during night visual meteorological conditions. Runway 19R,
which is 11,501 feet long and 150 feet wide, was closed for surveying
and the runway lights had been turned off. The closure was advertised on
the automatic terminal information service and the tower controller
placed an X on the tower\'s ground radar display as a reminder of the
closure. The closure was also annotated on the tower status display. At
the time of the incident, there was one tower controller in the cab, the
second controller assigned to the shift was on break. The tower
controller instructed N66NJ to taxi into position and hold, then cleared
it for takeoff on the closed unlit runway. The departure controller at
Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control noticed the radar target depart
runway 19R and asked the tower controller if the runway was open, and
was told no. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
(OPS07IA010)

####### *Most Wanted Transportation Improvements List*

Runway incursion prevention has been on the NTSB's "Most Wanted List" of
safety improvements since the list was inaugurated in 1990. In November
2006, Board Members voted to keep the topic on the list and keep its
"red" color code denoting that actions by the FAA were "unacceptable"
because of the length of time the recommendation has been open.

The current runway incursion recommendation on the list is *(A-00-66)*:
Require, at all airports with scheduled passenger service, a ground
movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions. The system
should provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. In addition,
demonstrate through computer simulations or other means that the system
will prevent incursions*. **Current classification: open --
unacceptable.***

The NTSB is scheduled to discuss runway incursions and other issues on
the Most Wanted list at a public meeting on November 8, 2007.

######### 

######### Recommendation History

Since 1973, the NTSB has issued about 100 safety recommendations
regarding runway incursions to the FAA and various other agencies. These
recommendations addressed the need for improvements in air traffic
control operations, training, procedures, and hardware; pilot training;
airport signage, lighting and markings; airplane conspicuity; and
incident reporting.

Currently there are 13 open safety recommendations dealing with runway
incursions:

● Amend FAA Order 7110.65, "AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL," to require that
controllers provide traffic advisories to the flight crew of each
aircraft operating on intersecting runways where flightpaths converge.
***Current classification: open-acceptable. (A-00-34)***

● Amend the Aeronautical Information Manual to inform pilots that
controllers will issue traffic information about aircraft operating on
intersecting runways where flightpaths converge and explain the
rationale for the procedure. ***Current classification: open-acceptable.
(A-00-35)***

● Require, at all airports with scheduled passenger service, a ground
movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions. The system
should provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. In addition,
demonstrate through computer simulations or other means that the system
will prevent incursions*. **Current classification: open --
unacceptable. (A-00-66)*** (Recommendation A-00-66 replaced A-91-29
after numerous runway incursion investigations determined that a direct
warning to the cockpit was necessary.)

● Require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air
traffic control clearance, and ensure that all U.S. pilots, foreign
pilots flying into the U.S., and ground personnel responsible for the
movement of aircraft, receive adequate notification of the change.
***Current classification: open -- unacceptable. (A-00-67)***

● Require that, when aircraft need to cross multiple runways, air
traffic controllers issue an explicit crossing instruction for each
runway after the previous runway has been crossed. ***Current
classification: open -- unacceptable. (A-00-68)***

● Discontinue the practice of allowing departing aircraft to hold on
active runways at nighttime or at any time when ceiling and visibility
conditions preclude arriving aircraft from seeing traffic on the runway
in time to initiate a safe go-around maneuver. ***Current
classification: open -- unacceptable. (A-00-69)***

● Adopt the landing clearance procedure recommended by International
Civil Aviation Organization. ***Current classification: open --
unacceptable. (A-00-70)***

● Require the use of standard International Civil Aviation Organization
phraseology for airport surface operations, and periodically emphasize
to controllers the need to use this phraseology and to speak at
reasonable rates when communicating with all flight crews, especially
those whose primary language is not English. ***Current classification:
open -- unacceptable. (A-00-71)***

● Require that all 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91K, 121, and
135 operators establish procedures requiring all crewmembers on the
flight deck to positively confirm and cross-check the airplane's
location at the assigned departure runway before crossing the hold short
line for takeoff. This required guidance should be consistent with the
guidance in Advisory Circular 120‑74A and Safety Alert for Operators
06013 and 07003. ***Current classification: open -- await response.
(A-07-44)***

● Require that all 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91K, 121, and
135 operators install on their aircraft cockpit moving map displays or
an automatic system that alerts pilots when a takeoff is attempted on a
taxiway or a runway other than the one intended. ***Current
classification: open -- await response. (A-07-45)***

● Require that all airports certificated under 14 *Code of Federal
Regulations* Part 139 implement enhanced taxiway centerline markings and
surface painted holding position signs at all runway entrances.
***Current classification: open -- await response. (A-07-46)***

● Prohibit the issuance of a takeoff clearance during an airplane's taxi
to its departure runway until after the airplane has crossed all
intersecting runways. ***Current classification: open -- await response.
(A-07-47)***

● Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic
Control," to indicate that controllers should refrain from performing
administrative tasks, such as the traffic count, when moving aircraft
are in the controller's area of responsibility. ***Current
classification: open -- await response. (A-07-48)***

***FAA Runway Incursion Statistics***

On October 1, 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted
the ***International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) definition of a
runway incursion as*** "any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the
incorrect presence of an aircraft vehicle or person on the protected
area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft."

***The ICAO definition is broader than the previous FAA definition which
said a runway incursion was \"any occurrence in the airport runway
environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the
ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required
separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing,
or intending to land.\"***

##### Calendar Year Total Incursions Rate per 1 million ops {#calendar-year-total-incursions-rate-per-1-million-ops .unnumbered}

##### (FAA definition) (FAA definition) {#faa-definition-faa-definition .unnumbered}

1999 321 4.7

2000 431 6.4

2001 383 5.9

2002 336 5.2

In 2000, Congress mandated FAA begin reporting runway incursion data by
fiscal year instead of calendar year.

##### Fiscal Year Total Incursions Rate per 1 million ops Total Incursions {#fiscal-year-total-incursions-rate-per-1-million-ops-total-incursions .unnumbered}

**(FAA definition) (FAA definition) (ICAO definition\*)**

2000 405 5.9

2001 407 6.2

2002 339 5.2

2003 323 5.2 583

2004 326 5.2 504

2005 327 5.2 530

2006 330 5.4 806

2007 370 6.1 (estimate) 887 (preliminary)

2008 **\***

***\* FAA changed its definition of a runway incursion to the ICAO
definition on October 1, 2007, which is the beginning of the 2008 fiscal
year.***

###### Resources

National Transportation Safety Board: <http://www.ntsb.gov/>

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association's (AOPA) Air Safety Foundation
offer an online interactive runway safety course to all pilots:
<http://www.aopa.org/asf/runway_safety>

FAA's runway safety information, programs and data:
<http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety>

ICAO *Manual: Prevention of Runway Incursions:*
<http://www.icao.int/fsix/res_ans.cfm>

October 16, 2007