Fernando Morales

2231 Wakerobin Ln.

Reston Va 20191

703-476-9878

[**fermorales3@comcast.net**](mailto:fermorales3@comcast.net)

March 25, 2005

Memo to: Election Assistance Commission (EAC),

EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TDGC)

From: Fernando Morales, Inventor of a new electoral process paradigm

Re: False Statements, minuscule progress ... what next?

On March 9, 2005 Dr. Hratch Semerjian (NIST, Acting Director) said in
his opening statement: "*comments and position statements should be sent
to, if you want to send an e-mail, to voting@nist.gov where they will be
posted on the NIST voting website. [The comments we've received to date
have been posted and reviewed by NIST staff and TGDC committee
members]{.underline}*", which would undoubtedly include David Cypher, a
NIST specialist. (Refer to TGDC's March 9^th^ meeting Webcast at 11:05
AM Marker-21:00 on the broadband with text version).

In David Cypher's words "*again, back to the question of having
everything encrypted, that is not a possible statement either because,
again, back to the handicap situation. The [wireless technology cannot
be encrypted]{.underline}. It is -- it is at the voice level and,
therefore, if you encrypted it, I can't hear it. So, having encryption
required on every wireless link doesn't work either. I guess, yes I'm at
the point where I don't know where to go either*", he hinted that he is
in bind. But, is he or is he only pretending he didn't read my papers on
the use of Personal Voting Codes (PVC).

Mr. Cypher's misuse of the term encryption proves that he didn't review
the voting website, making Dr. Semerjian a liar or that he intentionally
omitted the concept. Of course, if audible voice signals are "scrambled"
they would be unintelligible to humans, white noise at best. But, on the
other hand, if they were encrypted (or coded) so that only those who
know the code could decipher them, then it would be totally beneficial
to have audible encryption.

Mr. Cypher needs to understand that beside from hearing "You voted for
... Mr. Buchanan", we can offer the voters another way to confirm the
vote: "You voted ... Mr. Bush, 3; Mr. Edwards, 4; Mr. Buchanan, 5 ..."
and so on. If bystanders were around, they would [NOT]{.underline} know
who s/he voted for, but the voter would; by observing that the candidate
of their choice is identified by their PVC. As an example, he may have
entered 5 to select his candidate, in this example, Mr. Buchanan. Hence
encryption of the voter's "decision-making mark" (a.k.a. Personal Voting
Code) is essential in protecting the voter's privacy.

The codes, beside from improving the privacy in a precinct environment
during normal voting, they offer, for first time on history, a method
that provides true privacy and confidentiality when applied to absentee
ballots.

As an additional defense for my case in favor of using Personal Voting
Codes, allow me to quote Dr. Schutzer's words: *"Emissions coming out
from the screen which [I can pick up and replicate copies of every
screen shots]{.underline}, and I can demonstrate equipment that can do
that, relatively inexpensive".* (Refer to TGDC's March 9^th^ meeting
Webcast at 11:05 AM Marker-35:00 on the broadband with text version.)
This tells us that voter's privacy is more at risk now than ever before.
Besides, the current electoral divide indicates that only a few votes
are required to change the outcome of an election. Hence the use of the
voter's decision-making mark becomes an essential element in protecting
the voter's privacy, in securing the committed votes, in safely enabling
after-election verification, as well as offering full transparency in
the electoral process without risking any of the above enhancements.

For an in-depth analysis of the proposed solution, please read "[Part
2](http://vote.nist.gov/PublicHearings/ElectoralProcess Issue 1.doc)"
and "[Part
3](http://vote.nist.gov/PublicHearings/Command Set Table Issue 1.xls)"
of Fernando Morales' Public Testimony, located in the TGDC's Public
Testimony section of September 20^th^ 2004 hearings published in the
NIST website.

What clearly stands out is that Mr. Cypher pretends that my proposal for
the use of personal voting codes doesn't exist and that Dr. Semerjian
inexcusably refuses to bring it up for discussion, which brings us to
another major flaw in our electoral system. In so disregarding my
comments, they provide a clear example that **government representatives
are NOT perfect;** hence my recommendation for active participation of
the political parties throughout the electoral process ... as the only
way to guaranty transparency and impartiality.

Supposing that my comments have been reviewed by NIST and staff as Dr.
Semerjian affirmed; then why doesn't anyone (especially Dr. Rivest who
understands it well) speak on behalf of, or at least discuss the
possibility of, using Personal Voting Codes? And what roll is Dr.
Semerjian playing in all of this? If he read my solution as he claimed,
who or what is holding everybody back? Is something else brewing?

Does NIST really believe that their "don't rock the boat" strategy is
going to fly? "*In order to affect the 2006 election cycle, guidance and
requirements need to be available by April 2005. Consequently, highest
priority is given to augmenting and correcting the current 2002 Voting
Systems Standard (2002 VSS), [rather than developing a new
standard]{.underline}.*" HAVA allocated billions of dollars and rounded
up the elite of our nation for this ... to replace old punch-card
machines and to work in a proofreading project ([editing]{.underline} an
obsolete VSS-2002)? Honestly, if no new voting paradigm was presented
and technology only improved enough to replace punch-card machines, then
it might have been acceptable; but that is not the case.

If so, let's take a look at their deliverables: thirty-two resolutions
that instruct NIST to do research, of which ten will be addressed by
April 2005 (the deadline mandated by HAVA). You would think that those
ten resolutions would provide the backbone for all future work, but no
... these resolutions do not address the main objections, such as
limited voter's privacy, uncontrolled software distribution, and
wireless technology that allow officials and/or vendors to communicate
with voting machines without being detected. Non of the resolutions
address making the software code public, or prohibiting the use of
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software, or enabling post-election
verification. To say the least, I am disappointed ... after 8 months, a
minuscule progress. All that effort to improve the accessibility (which
I agree with, by the way), but at the end of Election Day the doubt
still remains: did my vote count?. But this is not all ... if any of the
new resolutions do not pass on the next meeting, scheduled for April,
2005; the 2002-VSS resolutions kick in and it won't be until after the
2006 elections that we'll see another "effort". In conclusion, the NIST
has made suckers out of the TGDC and us. Dr. Semerjian clearly emerges
as the mastermind behind these manipulations.

Was it coincidental or on purpose that NIST priorities allowed the use
of COTS software and that the vendors are allowed to keep their
software-code concealed from code specialists (those that can find
malicious software). These two issues alone will allow government
officials and/or vendors (because only they have access to the code) to
hide Trojan horse in the voting software to manipulate the election
results without being caught. The records show that NIST and the TGDC
members are not working to govern credibly. As Mr. Craig Burkhard on his
9-20-04 testimonies said when talking about elected officers: "*And in
order to govern credibly, the public needs to have the understanding and
confidence that the mandate was given at an election*". The slightest
possibility of software corruption is enough to ruin the voters'
credibility, especially when there is a better, more secure, and less
expensive solution at hand (the one TGDC did not bring up for
discussion).

Are NIST and the TGDC daring enough to continue in their attempt to fool
all of us by trying to submit the 2002-VSS, essentially untouched, on
April 2005 as an "initial recommendation" to the EAC? If they succeed,
the equipment vendors (the only winners in all this show) would fleece
billions of dollars out of America's coffers by replacing "obsolete
equipment" for minimal improvement, if any.

Voting equipment vendors have used every ploy in the book to keep a
blindfold over our eyes and they have used every "friend" in key
positions to tie us down and not look towards the light and see the
truth: [a right change in the electoral process delivers a greater
impact]{.underline}, and at a lower cost, [than billions of dollars of
brute force]{.underline} (changing equipment). We may never have this
chance again in our lifetime since it will take another hundred years
before the federal government finances and opens up this topic again.
Please read my statements that have been posted on the NIST web site to
understand my position in this matter. We are talking about taking a
giant step for democracy. If you can speak up please do.

cc: EAC Commissioners

EAC Juliet Thompson, General Counsel

EAC Carol Paquette, Executive Director

David M. Thomas & Christopher A. Lopez of Representative Tom Davis'
office

Ursula Wojciechowski of Representative Adam H. Putnam's office

Matthew Petersen of Representative Robert Ney's office

Paul Vinovich Staff Director Committee on House Administration