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Chairman Susan Collins (R-ME) and Ranking Member Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)

## **Collins-Lieberman Intelligence Reform Legislation**

I. [National Intelligence Director]{.underline}

The legislation will create a National Intelligence Director (NID) with
strong budget, personnel, and other authorities to break-down stovepipes
and knit intelligence agencies into an agile network. The NID will be a
Senate-confirmed official separate from the CIA Director. The NID will
manage the National Intelligence Program, which is composed of the parts
of the Intelligence Community serving "national" customers like the
President. The NID heads the National Intelligence Authority, which will
contain entities such as the Office of the NID, the National
Intelligence Centers, and the National Counterterrorism Center. A NID is
necessary to counter 21^st^ Century national security threats --
epitomized by transnational and suicidal terrorists who target the
American homeland -- that require a quantum leap in U.S. intelligence
agencies' ability to integrate their efforts and share information.

A. [Budget Authority]{.underline}

The NID will be responsible for managing the "National Intelligence
Program," a budget category composed of parts of the Intelligence
Community that serve "national" customers -- meaning more than one
department. The National Intelligence Program will include at least the
CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, the FBI's Office of Intelligence, and the Department
of Homeland Security's IA&IP Directorate, plus other elements of the
Intelligence Community that are "national" unless the NID and the head
of a department agree otherwise. The National Intelligence Program will
*not* include tactical military intelligence assets, which will remain
under DoD.

The most critical authority for the NID is controlling these agencies'
funding. The NID will develop and present to the President the annual
budget request for the National Intelligence Program. In addition, the
NID will receive the appropriation for the National Intelligence
Program. As a result, the NID will have not only the "power of the
purse" to force integration among these agencies but also "execution"
authority to monitor how these agencies spend their funds. The NID will
have the authority to transfer funds within the National Intelligence
Program to respond to urgent needs and new threats, subject to the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and
appropriate notification to Congress.

B. [Personnel, Security, and Information Technology
Authorities]{.underline}

The NID will play an active role in selecting the heads of the key
entities in the National Intelligence Program: (1) the NID and the
Secretary of Defense will jointly forward recommendations to the
President for the NSA, NGA, and NRO directors; (2) the NID will have the
right of concurrence in the FBI Director's selection of the head of the
FBI Office of Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security's
recommendation to the President for the Undersecretary for IA&IP; and
(3) the NID will forward a recommendation to the President for the CIA
Director.

The NID will have authority to set security, personnel, and information
technology standards across the Intelligence Community in order both to
tie together the intelligence agencies into a network with robust
information-sharing and to strengthen the Community's ability to recruit
and retain the workforce it needs to address today's and tomorrow's
challenges. The NID will also have the authority to transfer personnel
within the National Intelligence Program, including to staff the
National Counterterrorism Center and the National Intelligence Centers.

We note that neither the 9/11 Commission nor we support achieving
integration by severing NSA, NGA, and NRO from DoD. These agencies
should remain within DoD.

C. [National Intelligence Centers]{.underline}

The NID will have authority to create National Intelligence Centers.
These centers will integrate capabilities from across the Intelligence
Community in order to accomplish intelligence missions. The topics of
the centers -- for example, weapons of mass destruction and the Middle
East -- will reflect National Security Council priorities for
intelligence collection and analysis. Each center will have primary
responsibility for providing all-source analysis of intelligence on its
topic and proposing collection requirements to the NID. The centers will
be staffed by personnel from the intelligence agencies as well as by
direct hires.

D. [Officials to Assist the NID]{.underline}

The NID will have an office composed of key officials necessary for
managing the National Intelligence Program: a general counsel,
comptroller, CIO, civil liberties officer, and privacy officer. The
National Intelligence Council, which oversees the production of national
intelligence estimates, will be moved to the Office of the NID. An OIG
also will be created. The Office of the NID, the other entities
referenced in this paragraph, the National Intelligence Centers, and the
National Counterterrorism Center will be housed in the National
Intelligence Authority -- not in the Executive Office of the President.

The Commission recommended that there be three Deputy NIDs as a middle
layer of management between the NID and the agencies, with the Deputy
NIDs being dual-hatted as officials in other departments or agencies.
For example, the Commission recommended that the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence be dual-hatted as the Deputy NID for Defense
Intelligence and supervise NSA, NGA, and NRO. Testimony before our
Committee raised many concerns about how dual-hatting would work in
practice. We adopt an approach that achieves the objectives of
dual-hatting -- namely, ensuring that the needs of critical intelligence
customers are met and that the intelligence agencies are following the
NID's program -- without creating a layer of bureaucracy between the
agencies and the NID. The NID will have up to five Deputies. One will be
a Principal Deputy NID. The NID will have discretion to assign roles and
authorities to the Deputies.

> E. [Declassification of the National Intelligence Program's Top-Line
> Appropriation]{.underline}

Per the Commission's recommendation, the National Intelligence Program's
top-line appropriation figure will be declassified in order to promote
public accountability. The NID will submit a report to Congress as to
whether declassifying the appropriations figures for each agency in the
National Intelligence Program would harm national security.

> F. [Open Source Intelligence]{.underline}

The legislation will strengthen the Intelligence Community's ability to
exploit open sources by improving the open source capability in the
Intelligence Community.

G.  [Other]{.underline}

The NID will chair a cabinet-level Joint Intelligence Community Council.
The purpose of the Council is to advise the NID on setting requirements,
financial management, and establishing policies across the Intelligence
Community. The Council will help ensure the implementation of a joint,
unified national intelligence effort to protect national security. In
addition, the NID will be required to submit a report to the President
and Congress within one year in order to assist Congress in judging the
efficacy of the legislation.

II. [National Counterterrorism Center]{.underline}

The Commission's recommendation for a National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) arises from two main findings. First, intelligence agencies are
not integrated in their efforts against terrorism. Thus the NCTC will
have a Directorate of Intelligence -- in essence, a National
Intelligence Center to integrate intelligence capabilities against
terrorism. Second, the Commission found that counterterrorism requires
an Executive Branch-wide effort to mount joint operations to counter
terrorism. Thus, the NCTC will have a Directorate of Operations to
conduct this joint operational planning.

A. [Joint Operational Planning]{.underline}

The NCTC's Directorate of Operations will concentrate on planning
activities that are "joint," meaning that they involve *more than one
agency*. Such planning will be at both the strategic level, such as
"winning hearts and minds" in the Muslim world, and at a more tactical
level, such as hunting for Bin Ladin. For example, the NCTC will craft
plans for dealing with an al Qaeda cell -- whether to destroy it with
military force or infiltrate it to acquire leads on Bin Ladin. The NCTC
could assign operational responsibilities as outlined in its plans.

To be clear, however, the NCTC will not have any operational authority
to direct operations by agencies in the Executive Branch and will not be
in the military chain of command. Agency heads could object to the
NCTC's plans, at which point the NCTC director could either accede or
raise the issue to the NSC. The NCTC will not resolve policy issues but
instead will elevate policy disputes to the NSC for resolution.

An analogy for understanding the NCTC's "joint operational planning" is
lanes in a highway, with each lane symbolizing an agency's expertise
(e.g., diplomacy, special operations, espionage, and law enforcement).
The NCTC will not tell each agency how to drive in its lane. But
effective counterterrorism requires choosing which lane to use in a
particular situation -- meaning which type of activity, and thus which
agency, should have the lead in a particular situation. The NCTC will
select the lane and propose a travel plan but will have no authority to
order an agency actually to drive. If an agency head objected to the
NCTC's plan and assignment of responsibility, then the issue could be
elevated to the NSC.

B.  [The NCTC Director]{.underline}

The NCTC Director will be Senate-confirmed and the equivalent of a
Deputy Secretary. The NCTC Director will report to the NID on
intelligence matters and to the NSC regarding joint operational
planning.

III\. [Civil Liberties Board]{.underline}

The legislation will establish a civil liberties board, as recommended
by the Commission. This Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed board
will (1) advise the President and executive agencies as they propose and
implement policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against
terrorism, and (2) conduct investigations and oversight of the
government's implementation of those policies. The legislation will also
direct specific agencies involved in the war on terror to have privacy
and civil liberties officers both to advise the agency on the civil
liberties and privacy ramifications of relevant policies and to review
the implementation of those policies to ensure privacy and civil
liberties concerns are being adequately respected and protected.

IV\. [Information-Sharing and Other Matters]{.underline}

The legislation will include provisions requiring the establishment of
an information sharing network to break down the stovepipes that
currently impede the flow of information. The network is to consist of
policies and information technology designed to facilitate and promote
the sharing of terrorism information throughout the federal government,
with state and local agencies and, where appropriate, with the private
sector.

In addition, we will include provisions to strengthen the FBI's
capability to conduct intelligence collection and analysis, including
the creation of a national security workforce and ensuring that each FBI
field office has a senior official responsible for intelligence matters.
The legislation will also contain provisions concerning reform of the
CIA's capabilities.