###### *The President's Conference on*

**FIRE**

**PREVENTION**

![](media/image1.png){width="1.7020833333333334in"
height="1.6736111111111112in"}

***Report of the Committee on***

#### Laws and Law Enforcement

#### 

Departmental Auditorium

Washington, D.C.

##### May 6,7, and 8, 1947

> *"The serious losses in life and property resulting*
>
> *annually from fires cause me deep concern. I am*
>
> *sure that such unnecessary waste can be reduced.*
>
> *The substantial progress made in the science of fire*

####### prevention and fire protection in this country during

> *the past forty years convinces me that the means are*
>
> *available for limiting this unnecessary destruction."*

######## Harry S. Truman

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**Page**

1.  **Introductory Statement 1**

2.  **Model Building Codes and Standards 1**

3.  **Use of Model Codes and Standards 3**

4.  **Methods of Adoption of Model Codes and Standards 3**

5.  **Application of New Fire Prevention Regulations to Existing
    Buildings 6**

6.  **Statewide Building Codes 7**

7.  **Other Fire Prevention Legislation 10**

8.  **Enforcement of Fire Prevention Regulations 10**

9.  **Findings and Conclusions 11**

> **Appendix A: Validity of Municipal Ordinances which Incorporate 13**

**Various Technical Codes By Reference**

**Appendix B: Applying New Fire Prevention Regulations to Existing 23**

**Buildings**

**Appendix C: State Fire Legislation 29**

1.  **INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT**

It is generally recognized that one of the most serious problems in the
field of fire prevention is the lag of laws and ordinances behind the
technical knowledge in this field. It is basic that before a State or
city can carry out a proper fire prevention program, adequate laws and
ordinances must be adopted.

It is often said that ours is a "government of laws rather than men";
and there is no field in which a more apt illustration of that statement
exists than in the field of fire prevention. With many building codes
10, 20, and more than 30 years old,[^1] it can readily be appreciated
that State and local officials charged with fire prevention work cannot
find, in these antiquated and obsolete laws and ordinances, an adequate
legal basis for proper administrative action for utilization of present
engineering and safety knowledge in the field of fire prevention.

It comes as rather a shock to many people to learn of the 16,220
municipalities in the United States,[^2] less than 2,000 have a building
code. There were 2,033 cities of over 5,000 population according to the
1940 census, and many of the codes that are in effect have been adopted
by cities of a smaller population, so that the field for adoption of new
building codes is large. In the field of State fire prevention laws,
most States have confined themselves to statutes authorizing cities to
adopt building codes, with a few States having laws of Statewide
application that apply to places of public assembly, storage of
inflammable liquids, and safety standards for construction work. In some
States, there is a fire marshal charged with the administration and
enforcement of such legislation. In other States, persons charged with
administration of State labor, health, and insurance laws are given this
responsibility, because the State has concerned itself chiefly with
particular safety standards. The States, with few noteworthy exceptions,
have not been too active in the field of fire prevention, but have left
this matter to municipalities.

This committee has surveyed the legal problems that exist with respect
to laws and ordinances in the field of fire prevention, and this report
contains the information it has accumulated and its recommendations
based thereon. It is so generally conceded that the enactment and
enforcement of fire prevention regulations is valid under the police
power of States and cities that this committee does not deem it
necessary to refer to the hundreds of court decisions on this point.[^3]

2.  **MODEL BUILDING CODES AND STANDARDS**

There are several so-called "model" building codes, such as those
prepared by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the Pacific Coast
Building Officials Conference, and the Southern Building Code Congress.
Other so-called "model" codes cover specific subjects, such as the
National Electric Code prepared by the National Fire Protection
Association, the National Elevator Code prepared by the National
Elevator Manufacturing Industry, Inc., and the more than 100 American
standards concerned with industrial safety that have been prepared and
approved by the American Standards Association. The last-named standards
cover steel, reinforced concrete, foundries and other subjects, and give
what is considered by members of the American Standards Association as
good engineering practice in each field. The American Standards
Association will soon release a proposed revision of "American
Administrative Requirements for Building Codes.' An American Standard
Plumbing Code is being prepared, and there is a boiler code that has
already been approved. The National Housing Agency shortly will publish
a proposed building code covering requirements for dwellings, which will
be a revision of "Recommended Building Code Requirements for New
Dwelling Construction" prepared by the Central Housing Committee in[^4]
1942. Recently the Association of Washington Cities issued "A Suggested
Basic Code for Washington Cities" that has the merit of briefness as
well as the approval of many experts in the field. Many small cities do
not have any building codes because the voluminous recommended model
codes are too long and involved for these cities. A real progressive
step was made by the League of Oregon Cities recently, when it published
"A Proposed Building Code for Small Cities." In the opinion of the
committee, such codes for small cities fill a real need.

The Building Officials Conference of America is drafting a new building
code that warrants special attention because of some new ideas that
Conference is following. Rather than attempting to state in detail the
specific technical rules and requirements for all construction, this
proposed code (which is in the drafting stage) is to be merely a
statement of basic requirements, such as the necessary fire resistance,
the necessary strength, and the maximum volume of buildings. The code is
to be divided into three parts. The first part will be the basic code
proper, containing a statement of fundamental functional requirements
based upon the use of the building itself and those principles that can
be commonly accepted as standard and that will remain fixed rather than
become antiquated or obsolete in a short time. The idea is that this
part will not be subject to constant revision and amendment. Parts 2 and
3 of the proposed code will be the rules and specifications relating to
construction and maintenance of buildings. It is expected that these
rules and specifications will be subject to constant revision as new
developments, new principles, and new methods of construction arise.

The American Society for Testing Materials has developed standards to
make performance, rather than specific materials, the basis for
standards in codes. This is an improvement over earlier ideas of
requiring certain thicknesses of materials, rather than performance, as
a standard.

While the so-called "model" codes and standards referred to in the
foregoing are in constant use as the chief source of technical
information on what should be contained in such codes, there is in fact
little uniformity in local building codes, because of the variations
made to fit local conditions.

3.  **USE OF MODEL CODES AND STANDARDS**

The many excellent codes and standards that have been developed from an
engineering viewpoint cannot become effective, however, until they are
actually taken over into the law of local communities by ordinances
legally adopted. It is the function of the Laws and Law Enforcement
Committee of the President's Conference on Fire Prevention to inquire
into the best way to bridge the gap between the good engineering and
safety standards that have been developed and the codes and standards
actually in existence. A great many of the building codes in effect are
antiquated and obsolete in their provisions; and one of the big
difficulties in the building field today is the lag of laws and
ordinances behind the engineering knowledge that has been developed as
to new methods and new materials for building construction in the light
of new fire hazards. For example, very few codes today allow the use of
prefabricated housing, and very few codes allow the use of
material-saving construction methods that have developed during the war
period. Too many codes have been hastily adopted after great disasters,
such as the Coconut Grove Night Club fire in Boston or the recent hotel
fires in Chicago, Atlanta, and other cities. Some impetus other than
such disasters is essential to keep building codes up to date.

Before proceeding with an inquiry into the legal ways whereby proper
engineering standards may be taken over into local laws, it might be
well to point out that many of the codes developed by private interests
and private organizations are "suspect", because they contain provisions
for the "protection" of the industry that developed the code. Anyone who
has had much connection with the field of local government knows that
certain codes are so designed that only a particular type of material
legally can be used. Such codes are designed to foster a monopoly on
behalf of the particular industry developing the code. Nothing said
below is to be taken as a suggestion that such codes be adopted by any
city. It is also true that many cities do not have the technically
qualified officials to ferret out particularly vicious provisions of
codes promoted by special interests, as those codes are necessarily
written in technical engineering language. Perhaps the development of a
code, or codes, that are above suspicion would help to eliminate, or at
least soften, many of the legal technicalities often raised to prevent
the full use of some of these so-called "model" codes. The excellent and
unbiased work of the National Bureau of Standards, the American
Standards Association, and the American Society for Testing Materials
has been of great value in eliminating suspicion as to engineering
standards contained in various codes and in promoting the development of
proper fire prevention methods.

4.  **METHODS OF ADOPTION OF MODEL CODES**

**AND STANDARDS**

Assuming, therefore, that there are codes and standards above suspicion
which should be adopted by State and local governments, the duty of this
Committee would seem to be to inquire into the legally approved methods
whereby such adoption can take place. The following methods of adoption
have been considered in the past:

1.  Adoption and publication in full of a so-called "model" code after
    it has been adapted to local conditions and requirements.

2.  Incorporation by reference of a so-called "model" code through the
    simple expedient of a short ordinance referring to a named code as
    of a certain date.

3.  Adoption of an ordinance containing legally sufficient standards
    requiring "reasonably safe" construction or "good engineering
    practices" in all building construction, and then reference in such
    an ordinance to certain named "model" codes as being "prima facie"
    evidence as of a fixed date of what is "reasonably safe"
    construction or "good engineering practices" in construction.

Where a so-called "model" code is adopted as an ordinance and properly
published in full in local newspapers under the publication requirements
for all ordinances, no legal question can arise as to the validity of
the adoption of the code. The only problem is that of the extremely high
cost. Because building codes are extremely lengthy, few cities can
afford to spend the thousands of dollars required by this costly
publication procedure. The result is that the city goes along for years
with an antiquated and obsolete building code, or in fact without any
code whatever.

There is set forth as Appendix A a survey of the law on incorporation of
model codes and standards into municipal ordinances by reference, which
collects the statutes and legal authorities on this subject. This
appendix also covers the adoption of ordinances containing adequate
legal standards with reference to model codes and standards as "prima
facie" evidence of compliance under No. (3) above. This survey of
statutes and court decisions has enabled the Committee to reach the
following conclusions:

1.  In the few States that have adopted enabling acts authorizing cities
    to incorporate codes by reference, such action results in the
    removal of the initial bar to incorporation by reference. However,
    the danger of incorporating future changes in the codes by reference
    should be guarded against.

2.  In the States that have not adopted any of the above mentioned
    statutes, the validity of incorporation by reference can be
    seriously questioned. The chief objection is that codes are not
    published in accordance with the charter, statutory, or
    constitutional provisions requiring the publication of all local
    ordinances, and the further objection is that adoption by reference
    delegates unlawfully the power of a municipal corporation to a
    private organization.

3.  In the States that have no statute authorizing adoption by
    reference, one answer would appear to be the adoption of an
    ordinance containing general safety and engineering standards
    complete within themselves, but which refer to the standards
    established by a named national code as of a fixed date as "prima
    facie" evidence of detailed compliance with the ordinance. The same
    procedure must be followed in adopting future amendments to the
    national code referred to, so as to avoid the delegation problem
    above.[^5]

4.  In any State, whether or not incorporation of codes by reference has
    been authorized, the dangers and difficulties inherent in such
    incorporation may be avoided by the creation of a State Board of
    Standards, as provided in Massachusetts (referred to hereafter),
    which, upon application, may furnish to any municipality fully
    drafted codes of almost any required nature, which codes will become
    effective upon official acceptance by the municipality. Under such
    legislation and procedure, the question of delegation of legislative
    powers does not arise; such codes are developed by a board of
    experts at State expense; and, since publication is not required,
    the tremendous expense of publication is eliminated.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that any model code or standard
that is referred to as "prima facie" evidence of "reasonably safe"
construction or "good engineering practices" in building construction
should be referred to by date, so as to avoid all questions of
delegation of the legislative power of the municipality to the private
organization or group, or the governmental group, that has developed the
particular code or standard. This is essential because most codes and
standards are constantly being changed to bring them up to date. Care
should also be exercised to have an adequate number of copies of any
code or standard, which is adopted by reference or referred to as such
"prima facie" evidence of compliance with general standards, officially
on file with the city clerk so as to be readily available as a public
record.

In Massachusetts, as a result of the Coconut Grove Night Club fire, the
powers of the State Department of Public Safety were expanded greatly to
meet the situation revealed by a Statewide investigation conducted by a
Legislative Commission on Safety of Persons in Buildings. This
Commission discovered that there were 257 towns in Massachusetts that
make no provisions for the inspection of buildings in their respective
areas and concluded that "it is next to impossible for many small towns
to draft their own building codes, partly because of the expense
involved and partly because persons qualified to draft such codes are
not generally available to such towns." The Commission further stated
that its study had revealed that something must be done to "make it
easier and less expensive for those cities and towns having building
codes to keep them up to date."

The Commission recommended the adoption of new statutes and amendments
to existing statutes in Massachusetts, whereby any city, by vote of the
city council, or any town, by a vote of a town meeting, may petition the
Board of Standards in the State Department of Public Safety to prepare
and furnish to any such city or town a building code, electrical code,
or other code to be used in connection with the construction of
buildings, such code to be drafted to meet the particular conditions of
the specific city or town. Upon the delivery of such a code to the
petitioning city or town, the question of its acceptance is subject to a
vote of the city council or the town meeting. Upon acceptance by such a
vote, the code becomes a part of the ordinances of the city or a part of
the bylaws of the town. A copy is to be filed in the office of the State
Secretary within 10 days of such acceptance. To encourage the cities and
towns to keep such a code up to date, any such city or town can, by a
similar vote, petition the Board of Standards for revisions to the code;
and, in the event that the city or town fails to petition for the
revisions within a reasonable time of the need for them, the Board of
Standards may draft such revisions, send them to the city or town clerk
of the city or town by registered mail, return receipt requested, and
file a copy with the State Secretary with the revisions thereupon to
become a part of the ordinances or bylaws, as the case may be.

It can be seen that the above method removes one of the chief practical
objections to incorporation by reference that have existed in the past;
i.e., that such codes were drafted by private "interests" rather than
public officials or public agencies. The Massachusetts law really
furnishes cities and towns, at State expense, a board of experts to
prepare codes for any municipality requesting such assistance. The city
or town then adopts the full code prepared by the Board of Standards of
the Department of Public Safety, and no question of incorporation by
reference arises. The Massachusetts law also eliminates the requirement
of publication in these circumstances, so that both the expense of
preparation of the model code and the publication cost are eliminated.
It is to be noted that the adoption by municipalities of State statutes
or State regulations by reference is not condemned by the authorities
collected in Appendix A of this report.

The Committee is impressed with the tremendous amount of work that the
Recess Commission on Safety of Persons in Buildings has done in
Massachusetts since the Coconut Grove disaster. The States interested in
setting up a Board of Standards similar to the Massachusetts Board can
profit greatly by a study of the experience of that State.

5.  **APPLICATION OF NEW FIRE PREVENETION REGULATIONS TO EXISTING
    BUILDINGS**

Many lives have been lost in recent years through the failure of
legislative bodies to make new fire prevention regulations applicable to
existing buildings. The primary reason for their failure to do so is the
economic burden involved. In many instances, the cost of making
antiquated buildings reasonably safe, under current knowledge of
adequate fire prevention methods, may seem rather high. But when one
weighs the value of human life against such economic reasons, the
economic reasons fade into insignificance. Because much of the
litigation concerning building codes has involved the reasonableness of
applying new fire prevention regulations to existing buildings, this
committee has inquired into the legality of such application.

The application of new fire prevention regulations to existing buildings
is sometimes referred to as giving a "retroactive effect" to such
regulations, in that the new regulations require buildings that were
constructed in strict conformity with the regulations in effect at the
time of their construction to be changed to meet new ideas as to safety
developed over a period of 10, 20, or 30 years since the original
construction of the building. The many decisions of the courts cited in
Appendix B herein on validity of statutes or ordinance "Applying New
Fire Prevention Regulations to Existing Buildings" amply demonstrate
that so long as they are reasonable, new fire prevention regulations can
apply to existing buildings.

The so-called "vested rights" arguments, contending that a building
owner, by erecting his structure in compliance with the existing
building code regulations, is not subject to the application of new fire
prevention regulations, and the argument that application of new fire
prevention regulations to such buildings is retroactive in effect, have
not met with favor in the courts.

> "The public safety and welfare is the highest consideration of all
> legislation, and to this consideration private rights must yield. No
> man has a right to so use a dangerous species of property as to put
> the safety of others in peril. Liberty does not imply the right of one
> to so use property as to put the safety of others in peril, nor does
> ownership imply any such right. This is rudimental. It must,
> therefore, be true that the owner of property of such a dangerous
> nature as to require regulations to prevent injury to others can have
> no right paramount to the police power. This is not too much to say
> that, as against the police power, there is no such thing as a vested
> right. " (***Jamiesen v. Indiana Natural Gas and Oil Company***, 128
> Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76, 12 L.R.A. 652.)

The argument of economic burden has not generally been regarded as of
great weight when courts have before them regulations reasonably
necessary for proper fire prevention.

> "The imposition of the cost of the required alterations as a condition
> of the continued use of antiquated buildings for multiple dwellings
> may cause hardship to the plaintiff and other owners of the 'old-law
> tenements'; but, in a proper case, the legislature has the power to
> enact provisions reasonably calculated to promote the common good even
> though the result be hardship to the individual." (***Adamec v.
> Post***, 273 N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. \[2d\] 120, 109 A. L. R. 1110
> \[1937\].)

This Committee therefore concludes that any new fire prevention
regulations that is reasonably necessary for the protection of human
life or safety can be applied to existing buildings as well as new
construction without doubt as to its validity.

6.  **STATEWIDE BUILDING CODES**

It has been suggested that the Committee should inquire into the
adoption of Statewide building codes. This matter has been given very
serious consideration in a number of States in recent years. In New
York, a special legislative committee has spent a year in studying the
subject and has filed a preliminary report surveying the arguments for
and against such codes.[^6] While this New York committee in fact
announced no final conclusions, it pointed out that such a code has much
merit. The report states that out of 602 cities of New York State
responding to a questionnaire from the committee, only 175 have building
codes. The committee also developed the fact that of the 175 building
codes, 15 are over 30 years old, 53 are over 20 years old, 54 are over
15 years old, and 16 have been in effect for more than 10 years. In
reviewing the existing codes, the committee pointed out that "there is
no standardization of requirements for particular situations which are
common to all and peculiar to none." Since this report reveals that much
of the construction in New York State is being erected and maintained
without any control whatever, the report states that the committee is
convinced "upon the basis of existing evidence of the need for minimum
standards throughout the entire State, although it recognizes the
difficulties involved in the imposition of such minimum standards."

George N. Thompson, Chief of the Division of Codes and Specifications of
the National Bureau of Standards, in his splendid article entitled "*The
Problem of Building Code Improvements," 12 Law and Contemporary
Problems* *95* (1947), points out that in Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and
a few other States "actual State codes exist." (P. 104.) He notes that
in Wisconsin the State code does not apply to one- and two-family
houses, and research indicates that the codes in Ohio and Indiana apply
only to public buildings, places of public assembly such as theaters,
other limited subjects and safety requirements relating to protection of
laborers. The New York report refers to the same type of State
legislation as being in existence in that State and as being a part of
the labor law statute. The National Fire Protection Association has
prepared a chart, set forth herein as Appendix C, indicating the type of
State legislation which that association's study has revealed in the
State field. The chart in Appendix C reveals that few States have
attempted to do more than enact legislation on specific subjects, such
as hotels, places of public assembly, and storage of inflammable
liquids. In view of the rather limited application of the State laws in
existence, it is doubtful that they are of much assistance in studying
the possibilities of a Statewide building code.

Those who have studied the subject of Statewide building codes so far
have generally concluded that one of two types could be followed: (1) a
mandatory building code applicable to all building construction within
the State, or (2) a so-called "recommended" code, which would apply in
any instance where there was not a local building code of more stringent
character in effect. For example, in the draft of a proposed model State
statute entitled "The Model Hotel Safety Law," drafted by the National
Fire Protection Association's Fire Marshal Section, and now being
circulated for comment and criticism, it is provided in section 2:
"Nothing in this act shall affect any ordinance or code relating to the
matters contained herein legally adopted by any county, city, town or
district, in so far as such ordinance or code specifies requirements
equal to or additional or more stringent than the requirements of this
act or the regulations issued under the authority thereof." This quoted
section is similar to the suggested provisions of the so-called
"recommended" State building code. The greatest danger in such a
provision would seem to be divided responsibility between State and
local officials for enforcement of fire prevention regulations. We
believe there would be too great a tendency for the city to rely upon
the State to perform the necessary inspection and enforcement, or too
much reliance by the State upon the city. If an ordinance on hotel
safety did exist, there would appear to be no person having the
responsibility of determining whether or not in contained "requirements
equal to or additional to or more stringent than the requirements of
this act or the regulations issued under the authority thereof." Divided
responsibility usually results in no enforcement, a situation that must
be avoided in a field where adequate enforcement is essential.

Adoption of a Statewide building code poses many problems of
interference with local home rule, administration, and enforcement,
which require extensive study before a conclusion can be announced on
this subject. For example, it is essential that some board be set up
with power to vary the requirements of the State code to meet particular
situations, so as to avoid hardship, practical difficulties, and other
problems. Buildings simply do not fit into a common mold, and some kind
of controlled discretion is essential so as to cover the acceptance of
new materials and new methods of construction. Having to apply the State
Capitol for a permit covering every little change in construction of
every building in the State presents untold financial and practical
difficulties. Enforcement of a Statewide code in cities that have the
administrative machinery for such work might well be carried out by
taking over municipal building departments; but even this would be a
rather large extension of State controls into the commonly accepted
sphere of local government.

It has been pointed out how difficult it is to secure amendments to
existing Statewide statutes. For example, in Ohio the statute relating
to construction of buildings used for public assembly was adopted in
1910; and because conflicting interests fail to agree on amendments made
necessary by technical advancements, no major amendments has been
possible since that time. The statute is thus out-of-date, and there
seems to be little prospect of securing agreement among the various
conflicting interests to permit revision of this statute. In most
instances, State legislatures meet only every 2 years, and the
possibility of securing changes in a field so controversial as building
regulations is not considered too good by those familiar with State
legislative processes. There is also the matter of control of many State
legislatures by the rural elements, a fact that makes it extremely
doubtful whether a Statewide building code could be adopted that would
apply in an impartial manner to all construction.

It is conceded that the great problem in building code enforcement today
is that which exists on the "fringe" area of cities; and it is as a
proposed solution of this problem that the Statewide building code is
receiving its most serious study. Walter J. Mattison, city attorney of
Milwaukee, in his paper entitled "Building Codes Kill Low-Cost Housing"
(*Municipalities and the Law in Action* \[1939\], pp. 151-158), pointed
out that stringent requirements of building codes have forced low-cost
construction outside the corporate limits of many cities. When cities
seek at annex this adjacent territory, the cost of bringing it up to the
standard required by city building codes is so great in many instances
as to make annexation impractical. Whether a Statewide building code
would answer this problem or not is a matter requiring much study. That
some answer to the problem should be arrived at is conceded. In many
instances cities are trying to achieve a solution by securing an
extension of their police powers for 5 to 10 miles outside of their
corporate limits. In this way they can apply their building codes to
this fringe area and prevent the development of slum districts. Perhaps
this extension idea will prove the most feasible, as it may not conflict
so greatly with the interests that might oppose any Statewide code
applicable to all buildings in the whole State.

7.  **OTHER FIRE PREVENTION LEGISLATION**

The Committee has not overlooked other legislation so essential to a
well-rounded fire prevention program, as, for example, arson laws, fire
marshal laws, and Statewide inspection laws of various kinds. These laws
are listed in Appendix C of this report. Building codes are the most
important legislation in this field, but the Committee does not mean to
imply by its emphasis on these that this other essential legislation
should be neglected. The Committee believes that the desirability and
essential character of the laws listed in Appendix C are so apparent
from their titles that detailed analysis is unnecessary in this report.
The Committee believes that every State should examine its statutes to
determine whether it has adopted this essential legislation in an
up-to-date form.

8.  **ENFORCEMENT OF FIRE PREVENTION REGULATIONS**

The first and paramount conclusion of the Committee on this subject is
that the field of enforcement of fire prevention regulations is one that
has received too little attention. Lack of properly qualified officials
to enforce State statutes and local building codes has prevented the
achievement of the maximum fire prevention possible under existing
statutes and ordinances. Political influence has too often allowed
continued existence of buildings that were known to be unsafe and known
to violate existing statutes and ordinances. Lack of aggressive
enforcement, through a proper understanding of fire prevention
regulations, often results in interpretations of existing statutes and
ordinances that classify buildings as complying with applicable
regulations. Division of responsibility among various municipal
officials, such as building, health, labor, and fire department
officials, often results in confusion as to responsibility and lack of
proper enforcement of fire prevention regulations.

It has been brought to the attention of this Committee that some of the
recent fires resulting in a large loss of life were caused by a lack of
proper inspection, rather than a lack of adequate statutes or
ordinances. In too many instances, insurance companies, rather than
public officials, have, as a matter of political necessity, taken the
lead in inspection work. Perhaps one cause of inadequate enforcement of
fire prevention regulations has been lack of a properly controlled
discretion in local building officials to pass upon questions of
compliance with building codes. It is certainly true that few buildings
fit into a common pattern, so that every building presents some
questions as to compliance with requirements of the building code. Too
few codes contain an adequate statement of the authority of building
officials to meet this situation. The drafting of a proper provision
which grants adequate discretion to building officials, but which also
sets up adequate controls to prevent arbitrary action, is essential. As
an example of a discretionary clause that the courts have upheld,
attention is directed to the New York City law, which provides that in
addition to the requirements set forth in that city's code, the owners
and proprietors of buildings shall provide such other means of fire
extinguishment and means of controlling the spread of fire as the fire
commissioner may deem necessary in the interest of public safety.

The best statutes and the best ordinances that expert engineering and
other technical knowledge can develop are worthless without proper
enforcement. States and cities must give more attention to this
important field, or even worse disasters than those of recent months are
bound to occur. Every State and every city should immediately make a
study of the administrative and enforcement staff and the procedures
which it now has, to determine whether or not this staff and those
procedures can perform the necessary work in the enforcement field. From
available information, it appears that few States and cities will find
that they meet the minimum requirements for proper enforcement of fire
prevention.

9.  **FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

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1.  Most of the existing statutes, codes, and ordinances in the field of
    fire prevention are antiquated and obsolete. This unfortunate lag of
    law behind technical achievements in the field allows dangerous
    buildings to escape the regulation that is essential to the safety
    of human life.

2.  Each State and each municipality should initiate immediately a study
    to determine whether its present fire prevention regulations are so
    antiquated and obsolete as to create perils to human life.

3.  Recognizing that engineering and other technical research is
    discovering constantly new materials and new methods for building
    construction which render existing fire prevention regulations
    inadequate, each State and municipality should create a continuing
    advisory board of experts, including representatives of industry,
    charged with the duty of making recommendations that will keep the
    respective State or city fire prevention regulations up-to-date.

4.  Fully realizing the dangers inherent in so-called "model building
    codes" and standards designed by certain industries for their own
    protection, cities should be given adequate legal authority to adopt
    properly prepared and approved "model" codes and standards by
    reference, or by some other simplified method, to avoid the
    prohibitive cost of publishing lengthy codes in local newspapers.
    The cost of compliance with the usual requirement that all
    ordinances be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
    city that enacts them is so great in the case of voluminous building
    codes that many cities are unable to adopt a building code or to
    revise their existing codes. The incorporation by reference should
    be to a named code as of certain fixed date, to avoid delegation of
    legislative powers to the preparers of the "model" code or standard,
    and adequate provisions should be made to insure that copies of the
    "model" code or standard which is adopted by reference are readily
    available.

5.  Adoption of a general ordinance containing legally sufficient
    standards governing building maintenance and construction, with
    reference in such a general ordinance to certain properly prepared
    and approved "model" codes and standards as "prima facie" evidence
    of compliance with such standards, is another method of avoiding the
    prohibitive cost of publishing lengthy building codes that should
    receive the most careful study.

6.  Adoption of Statewide fire prevention laws and building codes is a
    subject that needs further study by all interested in adequate fire
    prevention. Division of enforcement responsibility and
    administrative problems, which appears to be rather difficult in
    connection with a Statewide building code, does not appear to be an
    impediment where the State legislation covers specific subjects,
    such as places of public assembly, hotels, and other structures
    designed primarily for public use or subject to a particular hazard.
    Where such State laws are desirable, division of enforcement
    responsibility should be avoided.

7.  In the entire field of fire prevention there is no subject that
    needs attention more than that of statute and ordinance enforcement.
    Steps should be taken by all States and cities to insure that they
    are not among the States and cities where future disasters will be
    caused by lack of adequate enforcement of existing laws.

8.  Creation by the Council of State Governments, the National
    Association of Attorneys General, the United States Conference of
    Mayors, and the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, of
    standing committees with a militant program on building codes and
    fire prevention ordinances is highly desirable. The drafting, by
    representatives of these organizations, of a model statute
    permitting adoption of codes and ordinances by reference is
    recommended.

9.  The Committee earnestly supports the statement of the President that
    these problems are of first importance to the highest officials of
    the States and municipalities, and it is from them that the
    leadership necessary to the prompt advancement of remedial measures
    must come.

**APPENDIX A**

**VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES WHICH INCORPORATE VARIOUS TECHNICAL
CODES BY REFERENCE**

As a prerequisite to effectiveness and validity, ordinances of a
municipality are generally required to be published. These are statutory
or charter requirements which have been held to be mandatory and not
merely directory provisions (19 R. C. L. Mun. Corps., § 201). Their
purpose is to insure that the citizens of the city are fully informed as
to the passage or the proposal of ordinances for the city in which they
abide and to which they will be expected to conform. The soundness of
these publication requirements need not be questioned.

Because of this requirement, however, the question arises as to the
validity of ordinances which adopt, by reference, various technical
codes prepared by national trade or other associations. These codes are
generally exhaustive and lengthy treatments of the subject, prepared by
recognized experts and published in pamphlet or booklet form by national
trade associations or organizations. They set forth the standards which
that particular organization considers to be minimum standards in the
field of endeavor covered by their code. The codes are many and cover
variety of subjects: building construction, plumbing installation codes,
electrical wiring codes, inflammable liquids codes, sanitary codes, and
fire prevention codes, to mention a few.

Adoption of these codes by reference has the advantage of circumventing
the usual publication requirements and thereby avoiding the enormous
expense for the publication of the code which would be necessary if set
forth in full in the ordinance. That would appear to be the primary
justification for adoption or incorporation by reference.

As opposed to the above advantage, however, there are several serious
objections to incorporation by reference, the chief of which is the fact
that, by such incorporation, the city council or governing body of the
city is unlawfully delegating its legislative functions to a private
organization. The second objection has been suggested above, and that is
the inability of citizens to know exactly what legislation is being
passed to which they will have to conform.

The reconciliation of the advantages and disadvantages of incorporation
by reference, in accordance with the pertinent State constitutional and
statutory provisions, may not be a simple task. The problem is arising
with more frequency with the development of many new technical codes by
organizations. That cities will need the benefit of the studies and
recommendations of these private organizations is not doubted, but they
should be made aware of the limitations under which their city operates,
so as to avoid the inherent objections to such action of incorporation
by reference.

I.  **Some States Have Granted Authority to Cities to Incorporate Codes
    by Reference**

State statutes are generally silent on the question of the adoption by
reference of the codes of private organizations, so as to avoid the
necessity of setting forth in full in the ordinance the code being
adopted. There are, however, 10 States (California, Colorado, Illinois,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Washington) which have explicit enabling legislation authorizing
cities to incorporate certain codes by reference. This is indeed a far
step toward the solution of the problem, because in the absence of such
a statute, the act of incorporating by reference would be of extremely
doubtful validity.

Typical of these statutes is that of Colorado, which provides as
follows:

> *Adoption of Codes by Reference.* -- Notwithstanding the provisions of
> any general or special law, any municipality shall have the power, and
> it is hereby authorized, to enact ordinances adopting or amending any
> previously published code or specified part or parts thereof by
> reference. After the first reading of such a code, the city council or
> board of trustees shall schedule a hearing thereon. Notice of the
> hearing shall be printed once weekly in a newspaper of general
> circulation in the municipality for three consecutive weeks preceding
> the hearing. If there is no such newspaper, the notice shall be posted
> in the same manner as provided for the posting of an ordinance under
> the same circumstance. The notice shall state that the code is being
> considered for adoption by the city council or board of trustees, that
> copies of the text are available for inspection at the office of the
> city clerk or town clerk and shall stipulate the time and place of the
> hearing. All official references in notices and ordinances to the code
> shall contain as a minimum description the title of the publication,
> the author, the date of publication, and the address from which the
> citizens may secure additional copies. After the hearing, the city
> council or board of trustees may amend, adopt, or reject the ordinance
> which adopts the code by reference in the same manner as any other
> ordinances.
>
> Three copies of the code certified to be true copies by the mayor and
> clerk shall be filed in the office of the city clerk or town clerk,
> and one copy of the code so certified shall be filed in the office of
> the chief enforcement officer. Any subsequent amendments or change in
> the code shall either be enacted in the same manner as is provided for
> ordinances or shall be adopted by reference through the same procedure
> as required for the adoption of the original code. If the amendment or
> change is to be adopted by reference, published copies of the
> amendment or change must be available to the public. It shall be the
> duty of the city clerk or the town clerk to correct all certified
> copies of the code when amendments or changes are made.

The California statute (Act 5692, Stats. 1927) applies to codes for the
construction of buildings, the installation of plumbing, the
installation of electric wiring or other similar work; the Nebraska
statute (ch. 18, § 102, Rev. stat., 1943) allows incorporation of future
amendments to an adopted code by the original adopting ordinance; the
Illinois statute (Illinois Annotated Statutes, § 10-3) applies to "rules
and regulations for the construction of buildings"; the Minnesota
statute (approved March 31, 1945) applies to "any code" which is defined
as "any code or part thereof prepared by any governmental agency or any
trade or professional association for general distribution in printed
form as a standard or model on the subject of building construction,
plumbing, electric wiring, inflammable liquids, sanitary provisions,
public health, safety or welfare"; the New Hampshire statute (laws of
1945, ch. 105, amending ch. 66 of the revised laws) applies to codes
"for the construction of buildings, relating to the installation of
plumbing, the use of concrete, masonry, metal, iron and wood, and other
building material, the installation of electric wiring, and fire
protection incident thereto"; the New Mexico statute (Statutes, 1941
Annotated, § 14-2501) applies to building codes; the Oregon statute
applies to "rules and regulations for the construction of buildings, the
installation of plumbing, the installation of electric wiring or other
similar work"; the Pennsylvania statute (Purdon's P.S.A., Title 53)
applies to "any standard building code"; the Washington statute
(Pierce's Code, 1943, § 412.1) applies to codes pertaining to "the
construction of buildings, the installation of plumbing, the
installation of electric wiring, health and sanitation, the
slaughtering, processing, and selling of meats and meat products for
human consumption, the production, pasteurizing, and sale of milk and
milk products, or subjects."

The variance in the subject matter of the above statutes is not without
significance. What may be legally adoptable by reference in one State
may not be authorized in another. For example, the Illinois, New Mexico,
and Pennsylvania statues are limited to building codes. Consequently
other codes could not be legally incorporated by reference in those
States unless the term "building codes" is construed to include all fire
prevention and other codes. This variance should be borne in mind.

These statutes have, in general, the effect of removing the initial
barriers to incorporation by reference of the particular codes to which
they refer, although, as hereinafter pointed out, other objections may
exist to the statutes themselves.

The State of North Dakota has an interesting statutory provision which
may enable cities to avoid the necessity for publishing a complete
electrical, building, or other code, and which reads as follows:

1106. *Publication of ordinances.* - The title and penalty clause of
      every ordinance imposing any fine, imprisonment, or forfeiture for
      a violation of its provisions, after the final adoption of such
      ordinance, shall be published in one issue of the official paper
      of the municipality.

Such a statute would work no particular hardship is so far as the
publication of an ordinance which adopts a code is concerned, for the
title and penalty clause of a building or fire prevention code would be
little, if any, longer than an ordinary ordinance passed by the city.

Despite these enabling acts of the States, the objection that
legislative authority is being delegated to a private organization may
still exist. This would be particularly true if the statute authorized
the adoption of any amendments to the code being incorporated by
reference *in futuro*. Such, clearly, would seem to be a complete
abdication of legislative power and would, of course, be held invalid
under the theory that a municipal ordinance could not be amended by any
except the governing body of the city. See the cases of ***Santee Mills
v. Query***, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922); ***State ex rel. Davis
v. Fowler***, 94 Fla. 752, 114 So. 435 (1927); ***Scottish Union and
National Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co.***, 28 Ariz. 22, 235 Pac.
137 (1925); ***Machinery Co. v. Browne***, 206 Pa. 543, 56 Atl. 43
(1903); ***In re Opinion of Justices***, 239 Mass. 606, 612, 133 N. E.
453, 455 (1921); Note (1935) 3 George Wash. Law Rev. 482 entitled
"Incorporation by Reference of Federal Recovery Laws and Administrative
Regulations in State Acts."

In the New Hampshire statute referred to above, an interesting provision
with respect to this matter appears. It provides as follows:

> *Amendment.* - Any such ordinance may be amended or supplemented in
> like manner, provided, that three copies of such ordinance, as amended
> or supplemented, shall be filed, as provided in section 1, in the
> office of the building inspector and three copies filed in the office
> of the city clerk for use and examination by the public.

This statutory provision recognizes the difficulties that might be
encountered from future amendments to the code being incorporated by
reference. It may prove to be the solution, although the provision has
not been judicially tested.

Another objection that has been raised in the past has been that the
constitutional limitations of over two-thirds of the States, which
provide that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its
title only, would be a bar to incorporation by reference. This
constitutional limitation should not, of itself, be sufficient to bar
incorporation by reference in a municipal ordinance of a technical code.
As a matter of fact, this constitutional limitation in the State of
Louisiana has been held inapplicable to municipal corporations. ***State
v. Cozzens***, 42 La. Ann. 1069, 8 So. 268. There are many court
decisions interpreting these limitations, and it is evident that they
were designated for the purpose of insuring that State legislators knew
exactly what they were amending or reviving. The purpose of these
constitutional provisions is clear, and the reason behind such purpose
sound. These provisions will be found in approximately 30 of the State
constitutions, but it is not believed that they are applicable to this
review.

I.  **Other States Have Not Granted Authority to Incorporate by
    Reference**

From a practical viewpoint, the publication of lengthy technical codes
would serve no particularly useful purpose, and would hardly fulfill the
legislative intent of requiring publication of enactments so that the
people of a city may be made aware of what their governing bodies have
done. In all instances, the codes are of nationwide reputation, and are
well known to the professions that apply them in their work.
Nonavailability would be no bar, for they are readily obtainable, and
are widely circulated. Furthermore, any codes adopted by reference are
required to be, or should be required to be, filed in some public office
for inspection by the public at all times. The code is not something
that is far removed from those who will have to comply with it.

Despite the practicability of dispensing with the publication of a code
in full, the aforementioned objections will have to be first removed or
satisfied in some manner. With the exception of those States mentioned
in the foregoing section, there is no enabling legislation permitting
cities to adopt these codes by reference. It is in the States with no
enabling legislation that the greatest difficulty might lie, and where a
special effort to solve the problem will have to be made.

One solution, and it appears to be the only one, is for the ordinance of
a city which establishes a building, plumbing, electrical or other code,
to be complete within itself, and not to incorporate any other code by
reference. This, it may be argued, does not avoid the problem of
publishing a lengthy document. However, it does permit the adoption of a
shorter enactment in this fashion. The ordinance can set up the
standards of compliance with the particular subject matter, and refer,
as "prima facie" evidence of such compliance, to the various national
trade codes. This would avoid the attack that the ordinance is not
complete within itself, and that legislative power is being delegated.
The next section on court decisions, however, will point out how this
theory was rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court in a case that arose
several years ago.

II. **Court Decisions**

While there are a number of court decisions involving the right of a
city to adopt, by reference, a State statute, or a Federal regulation,
or a former municipal ordinance, there is a dearth of decisions directly
in point with the subject matter of this paper, i.e., the validity of a
municipal ordinance incorporating the provisions of technical codes by
reference. As a matter of fact, all of the reported decisions studied
may only be used inferentially to sustain the conclusions herein
reached.

Probably the most pertinent case is that of ***City of Tucson v.
Stewart***, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. (2d) 72, 96 A. L. R. 1492 (1935),
involving the validity of a municipal ordinance that incorporated, by
reference, an electrical code adopted by the city. The ordinance
referred to the regulations of the National Electrical Code, and
provided:

> "No certificate of approval shall be issued unless the wiring,
> devices, apparatus or equipment installations conform with the
> provisions of this Ordinance, the Electrical Code of the city of
> Tucson, as adopted by the mayor and council by Resolution No. 1309
> and, as the same may be amended, the statutes of the State of Arizona,
> and with approved methods of construction for safety to life and
> property. The regulations contained in the present National Electrical
> Code, and subsequent editions thereof, and in the present National
> Electrical Safety Code, and subsequent editions thereof, shall be
> prima facie evidence of such approved methods, provided that the
> Electrical Code of the city of Tucson shall govern in all cases where
> there are conflicting provisions."

Here, the court held that since the electrical code of the city was a
public record, as it has been adopted by the city, the ordinance was not
required to set the code forth in full, and therefore the code did not
have to be published. The court cited numerous authorities for the
proposition of adopting prior ordinances and statutes by reference.
***Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Smith***, 175 Ala. 260, 57 So.
29; ***Napa v. Easterby***, 76 Cal. 222, 18 Pac. 253; ***Southern
Operating Co. v. Chattooga***, 128 Tenn. 196, 159 S. W. 1091, Ann. Cas.
1914D, 720; ***City of Milwaukee v. Krupnik***, 201 Wis. 1, 229 N. W.
43. See also ***City of Litchfield v. Thorworth***, 337 Ill. 469, 169 N.
E. 265; ***Croker v. Board of Excise Comrs. of City of Camden***, 73 N.
J. L. 461, 63 Atl. 901; ***Baumgartner v. Hasty***, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am.
Rep. 830; ***Greene v. Town of Lakeport***, 74 Cal. App. 1, 239 Pac.
702. On this same question, McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations* (2d Ed)
says:

> "An ordinance may, by reference, adopt the provisions of statutes or
> prior ordinances, and in such case the statute need not be set out in
> totidem verbis, and entered upon the minutes of the corporation."

A law review article appearing in 5 Geo. Was. Law Rev. 198 states that
"it is obvious that a legislature is not delegating power, legislative
or otherwise, if it refers to a law, to an ordinance, or to any other
document or writing in its existing form." (1934) 8 Cin. L. Rev. 310;
***State v. Armstrong***, 31 N. M. 220, 243 Pac. 333 (1924); ***Santee
Mills v. Query***, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922).

In the *Tucson* case, however, the theory of prima facie evidence of
compliance with the terms of the ordinance by reference to the
provisions of a national electrical code was stricken down, the court
stating:

> "The fact that the ordinance provides that in determining the approved
> methods the regulations of the present National Electrical Code and
> the present National Electrical Safety Code and subsequent editions
> thereof may be taken as prima facie evidence of such methods, but that
> in case of conflict the electrical code of the city of Tucson shall
> govern, does not lend clarity, certainty, or definiteness to the
> regulations, but rather suggests conflicts for an administrative
> officer of the city to reconcile.
>
> "The electrical code was adopted by reference 'as is', and not as it
> may be changed or altered. Likewise the rules of evidence to be
> applied in determining whether construction is in conformity with the
> ordinance and electrical code, if such a rule may be adopted, is the
> one subsisting at the time of its adoption and not one later
> promulgated by the national societies mentioned."

This decision would point to the need for care in setting up the
provisions of a national code as evidence of compliance. The question of
adopting *in futuro* measures is too dangerous. In this connection,
reference is made to the provision of the New Hampshire statute, quoted
above.

On October 11, 1921, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
rendered its decision in ***Cawley v. Northern Waste Company***, 239
Mass. 540, 132 N. E. 365. In that case a State statute, authorizing
cities to "designate or provide for the appointment of an officer who
shall supervise \*\*\* every wire within a building when such wire is
designed to carry an electric light or power current \*\*\*" and
requiring a written permit from the inspector of wires to connect a
current of electricity, was involved. The court held that an ordinance
forbidding an officer to issue a permit under this statute, unless "the
established rules and regulations of the National Board of Fire
Underwriters" shall have been complied with, was unauthorized. The Court
said:

> "There is nothing in that statute \*\*\* which empowers a city council
> to adopt by mere reference the rules and regulations of another and
> foreign body as the basis for determining the suitableness or safety
> of the installation, attachments, supports or appliances for wiring
> designed to carry electric currents."

Reference is here made to section 4 of the report of the committee,
where there is a discussion of the method evolved by Massachusetts to
escape the adoption by reference that is condemned in this decision.

Another case was that of ***L. A. Thompson Scenic Ry. Co. v. McCabe***,
211 Mich. 133, 178 N. W. 662 (1920), involving the adoption by reference
of a city building code in the city of Detroit. There, the court reached
an opposite conclusion from the *Tucson* case, chiefly on the ground
that that which was being adopted by reference was not a public record,
and had no character as such. This distinction was carefully drawn by
the Arizona Supreme Court in the *Tucson* case above. In the *McCabe*
case, the building code incorporated by reference had not, itself, been
adopted by the city and for that reason can be distinguished from the
Arizona decision. The Michigan Supreme Court said:

> "It, therefore, was entirely lacking in those characteristics
> necessary to entitle it to be filed as a 'public record.'"

See cases cited above involving the adoption of public records or
statutes.

In ***Ex parte Hollyfield***, 88 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Cr. App., Nov. 20,
1935), the court upheld an ordinance governing the operation of steam
boilers and providing that reference should be had to the rules of the
"A. S. M. E." Code in computing heating surface boilers. In so holding,
the Court said:

> "\*\*\* the computation of 'heating surface,' as that expression is
> used in this ordinance, is a mere matter of the use of a standard rule
> or tape measure aided by the ordinary rules of arithmetic, and \*\*\*
> the reference to the A. S. M. E. Code is but a matter of universal
> definition; the expression having but one meaning, and being so
> understood by all text writers and boiler engineers."

In ***Blitch v. City of Ocala***, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940), an
ordinance of the city of Ocala, designating the city manager as the
person to issue building permits in accordance with the provisions that
all buildings except enumerated exceptions should have roof which "would
rank as class A or class B under the test specifications of the National
Board of Fire Underwriters," was not invalid on the ground that it
unlawfully delegated enforcement of the city's legislative powers, since
the test specifications, while not set forth in full, could be readily
ascertained and would be deemed to be those in effect at the time the
ordinance was enacted and not the specifications subsequently adopted.
The Court said in part:

> "So construed, the meaning of the ordinance could be made certain, and
> its validity upheld. If it should be held to mean not only present,
> but also future specifications, or any changes therein that might be
> adopted by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, section 31 of the
> ordinance would be invalid as being a delegation of authority to an
> outside board to alter a municipal ordinance."

In ***Natural Milk Producers Association of California v. City and
County of San Francisco***, 112 Pac. (2d) 930 (Cal. App., 1941), a
subdivision of an ordinance of the city of San Francisco providing as
follows was involved:

> "*Certified milk*.- Certified milk is market milk which conforms to
> the rules, regulations, methods and standards for the production and
> distribution of certified milk adopted by the American Association of
> Medical Milk Commissions and must bear the certification of the milk
> commission of the San Francisco County Medical Society.\*\*\*"

The contention was made that the rules and regulations may be so amended
by the association as to impose additional burdens on the vendors of
certified milk. The court held that it would strike out the words
"rules, regulations" and uphold the remainder of the ordinance. The
California Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court (124
Pac. (2d) 25) and the United States Supreme Court held that it could not
pass on the validity of the ordinance, since a moot question had been
raised by an amendment to the regulations governing the distribution of
milk subsequent to the California decision.

The case of ***Kansas v. Crawford***, 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360, 2 A.
L. R. 880 (1919), presented the question as to the validity of a State
statute providing that "all electric wiring shall be in accordance with
the National Electric Code." The court held the statute unconstitutional
as a delegation of legislative authority to private individuals and
associations, and void for uncertainty.

The following quotation clearly shows how that court felt about the
matter of incorporation by reference:

> "But none of the cases cited has ventured so far afield as to intimate
> that the legislature might delegate to some unofficial organization of
> private persons, like the National Fire Protective Association, the
> power to promulgate rules for the government of the people of this
> State, or for the management of their property, or that the
> legislature might prescribe punishment for breaches of these rules. We
> feel certain that no such judicial doctrine has ever been announced.
> If assent to such a doctrine could be given, a situation would arise
> where owners of property with considerable persistence might learn
> what these code rules were, and incur the expense of making their
> property confirm thereto, only to find that the National Fire
> Protective Association had reconvened in Chicago, New York, or New
> Orleans, and had revised the code, and that the work and expense has
> to be undertaken anew. And there would be no end to such a state of
> affairs. Furthermore, there is no official way for the average
> property owner to know what these code rules are. The laws of this
> State to which our people owe obedience must be officially published.
> The people may learn what these laws are, and they are privileged to
> meet legislative committees and petition the legislature for
> amendments, improvements, and amelioration of the laws. Shall it be
> intimated that if these fire prevention regulations, these 'national
> electrical code' rules, are oppressive, or otherwise objectionable,
> the property owners of this State must be referred to some voluntary
> and unofficial conference of underwriters and electricians, which
> occasionally meets here, there, or anywhere in North America, for
> redress of grievances? But the fallacy of such legislation in a free,
> enlightened, and constitutionally governed State is so obvious that
> elaborate illustration or discussion of its infirmities is
> unnecessary. If the legislature desires to adopt a rule of the
> national electrical code as law of this State, it should copy that
> rule, and give it a title and an enacting clause, and pass it through
> the senate and house of representatives by a constitutional majority,
> and give the Governor a chance to approve or veto it, and then hand it
> over to the Secretary of State for publication."

The most recent cases on the adoption of Federal regulations by cities
may be briefly referred to. These are, ***People v. Sell***, 310 Mich.
305, 17 N. W. (2d) 193 (1945) and ***City of Cleveland v. Piskura***, 60
N. E. (2d) 919 (Ohio, 1943). In the former case, an ordinance of the
city of Detroit, which made it unlawful to violate OPA price and
rationing regulations, was upheld as a valid exercise of that city's
police power. On the other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an
ordinance of the city of Cleveland, which made it a misdemeanor to sell
commodity that is subject to a ceiling price fixed by or under the
authority of the United States at a price in excess of such ceiling
price, was invalid because it unlawfully delegated legislative power to
a Federal agency. These cases are not too informative in the present
study, however, and merely outline the different attitudes of the
respective courts toward the general question.

**CONCLUSIONS**

From the foregoing summary of the statutory, constitutional, and
judicial provisions on the subject, the following conclusions might be
listed:

1.  In the few States that have adopted enabling acts authorizing cities
    to incorporate codes by reference, such action results in the
    removal of the initial bar to incorporation by reference. The danger
    against incorporating future changes in the codes by reference
    should be guarded against, however.

2.  In the States that have not adopted any of the above statutes, the
    validity of incorporation by reference can be seriously questioned.
    The chief objection is that codes are not published in accordance
    with the charter, statutory, or constitutional provisions requiring
    the publication, and the further objection is that adoption by
    reference delegates unlawfully the power of a municipal corporation
    to a private organization.

3.  In the States that have no statute authorizing adoption by
    reference, one answer would appear to be the adoption of an
    ordinance containing general safety and engineering standards which
    are complete within themselves, but which refer to the standards
    established by a named national code as of a fixed date as "prima
    facie" evidence of detailed compliance with the ordinance. The same
    procedures must be followed in adopting future amendments to the
    national code referred to, so as to avoid the delegation problem
    mentioned above.

**APPENDIX B**

**APPLYING NEW FIRE PREVENTION REGULATIONS**

**TO EXISTING BUILDINGS**

"The authority to enact and enforce building regulations can be
sustained only on the ground that it is a part of the police power." 4
R. C. L. p. 395, 109 A. L. R. 1118.

What, then, is police power? Mr. Justice Miller in the *Slaughter House
Cases*, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (1872), says that police
"power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact
definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of social order,
the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a
thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life,
and the beneficial use of property."

The question is whether the police power is broad enough to validate
statutes and ordinances which affect, and require changes in, buildings
erected before passage of the legislation, and which met all
requirements of the law when erected. It might even be asked whether
legislation could adversely affect vested rights. The Indiana Supreme
Court, in the case of ***Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas and Oil Co.***,
128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76, 12 L. R. A. 652 (1891), at p.655, answers
this question very clearly, saying: "The public safety and welfare is
the highest consideration of all legislation, and to this consideration
private rights must yield. No man has a right to so use a dangerous
species of property as to put the safety of others in peril. Liberty
does not imply the right of one man to so use property as to put the
safety of others in peril, nor does ownership imply any such right. This
is rudimental. It must, therefore, be true that the owner of property of
such a dangerous nature as to require regulations to prevent injury to
others can have no right paramount to the police power. This is not too
much to say that, as against the police power, there is no such thing as
a vested right."

There have been comparatively few decisions bearing directly on this
subject, but in those that have arisen, the courts have generally upheld
legislation passed under the police power which requires reasonable
changes in already existing structures to meet the new standards, where
those standards have a reasonable basis for the protection of health and
safety.

One of the leading cases is that of ***Health Department v. Trinity
Church***, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 27 L. R. A. 710 (1895). The
statute involved in this case required that water be furnished on each
floor of every tenement house in New York City. There was no arrangement
in the houses involved whereby this could be done, and it was shown that
alterations would have to be made and money expended in order to comply
with the provisions of the law; and it was contended that to so require
would be the taking of property for public use without compensation and
would be a denial of due process. The court upheld the law as a valid
exercise of the police power with respect to the public health and also
with respect to the public safety regarding fires and their
extinguishment, and said : "\*\*\* we do not think it (the statute) can
be regarded as invalid because it will cost money to comply with the
order of the board, for which the owner is to receive no
compensation\*\*\*. We may own our property absolutely, and yet it is
subject to the proper exercise of police power. We have surrendered, to
that extent, our right to its unrestricted use. It must be so used as
not improperly to cause harm to our neighbor, including in that
description the public generally." The court called attention to the
fact that the statute must be reasonable in its application, saying:
"\*\*\* no one would contend that the amount of the expenditure which an
act of this kind may cause, whether with or without a hearing, is within
the absolute discretion of the legislature. It cannot be claimed that it
would have the right, even under the exercise of the police power, to
command the doing of some act by the owner of property, and for the
purpose of carrying out some provision of law, which act could only be
performed by the expenditure of a large and unreasonable amount of money
on the part of the owner. If such excessive demand were made, the act
would, without doubt, violate the constitutional rights of the
individual. The exaction must not alone be reasonable when compared with
the amount of work or the character of the improvement demanded. The
improvement or work must, in itself, be a reasonable, proper, and fair
exaction, when considered with reference to the object to be attained."

***Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. State of Nebraska ex rel
City of Omaha***, 170 U. S. at p. 76, 42 L. ed. at p. 955 (1898), does
not concern building, but quotes *Health Dept. v. Trinity Church,
supra*, with approval as follows: "Laws and regulations of a police
nature, though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are
not unconstitutional, though no provision is made for compensation for
such disturbances. They do not appropriate private property for public
use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner. If he
suffer injury, it is either *damnum absque injuria*, or, in the theory
of the law, he is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits
which the regulations are intended and calculated to secure."

In a Massachusetts case, ***Commonwealth v. Roberts***, 155 Mass. 281,
29 N. E. 522, 16 L.R. A. 400 (1892), the statute applied to every
building in Boston used as a dwelling, tenement, or lodging house and
required that: "Every such building situated on a public or private
street, court, or passageway, in which there is a public sewer, and
every building connected with such sewer, shall have sufficient water
closets connected with the sewer and shall not have a cesspool or privy,
except where, in the opinion of the Board of Health, it can be allowed
to remain temporarily, and then only as said board shall approve." The
court upheld this statute in its application to buildings already in
existence which were lawful when built.

In a later case, ***Tenement House Department v. Moeschen***, 179 N. Y.
325, 72 N. E. 231, 70 L. R. A. 704, 103 Am. St. Rep. 910, 1 Ann. Cas.
439 (1904), affirmed, 203 U. S. 588, 27 S. Ct. 781, 51 L. ed. 328
(1906), in a decision based principally on *the Health Department v.
Trinity Church* and *Commonwealth v. Roberts* cases, *supra*, a statute
was upheld which required the removal of all school sinks, privy vaults,
or other similar receptacles used to receive fecal matter, urine, or
sewage and their replacement by individual water closets, properly sewer
connected, with individual traps, and properly connected flush tanks.
The court said: "It is a well recognized principle in the decisions of
the State and Federal courts that the citizens holds his property
subject, not only to the exercise of the right of eminent domain by the
State, but also subject to the lawful exercise of the police power by
the legislature. In the one case, property is taken by condemnation and
due compensation; in the other, the necessary and reasonable expenses
and loss of property in making reasonable changes in existing
structures, or in erecting additions thereto, are *damnum absque
injuria*."

In ***St. Louis v. Nash***, 260 S. W. 985 (1924) and ***St. Louis v.
Howel Real Estate and Building Co.***, 59 S. W. (2d.) 617 (1933), the
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld an ordinance similar to that in
*Tenement House v. Moeschen, supra*.

Another much cited case, that of ***Seattle v. Hinckley***, 40 Wash.
468, 82 P. 747, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398 (1905), held to be constitutional
and applicable to buildings previously erected an ordinance requiring a
certain type of fire escape on "all hotels, office buildings, factories,
tenements, and lodging houses more than three stories in height." In
overruling the contention of the owner of a building that he had an
inherent or vested right, because he had complied with the law at the
time the building was erected, the court said: "There is no such thing
as an inherent or vested right to imperil the health or impair the
safety of the community. But to be protected against such impairment or
imperilment is the universally recognized right of the community in all
civilized governments; a protection which the government not only has a
right to vouchsafe to the citizens, but which it is its duty to extend
in the exercise of its police power."

Likewise, in ***Fire Department v. Chapman***, 10 Daly (N. Y.) 377
(1882), the court upheld the order of the Superintendent of Buildings,
requiring additional fire escapes in accordance with a statute which
provided that any dwelling house more than two stories in height, then
erected, or to be erected, be provided with fire escapes as directed by
the Superintendent of Buildings and that owners of buildings on which
fire escapes were then, or might thereafter be erected, should keep them
in good repair.

In ***Clarke v. Chicago***, 159 Ill. App. 20 (1910), a case based
principally on the *Hinckley* case, *supra*, and *Commonwealth v.
Roberts, supra*, the Court upheld the authority of the municipality to
adopt certain ordinances regulating theater buildings (admittedly valid
with respect to theaters thereafter to be built), as applied to theaters
already built, which complied with regulations in effect at the time of
their erection, as a proper exercise of police power.

In the case of ***Daniels v. City of Portland***, 124 Or. 677, 625 Pac.
790, 59 A. L. R. 512 (1928), the court held that a municipal ordinance
requiring every room occupied for living purposes to have a window of a
certain size opening directly to the outer air for lighting and
ventilation does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, or the Bill of Rights of the Oregon
Constitution, guaranteeing equity of rights, and forbidding the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation or the
enactment of *ex post facto* laws, as applied to a hotel erected prior
to the passage of the ordinance and which was lawful when built. The
case arose out of an order made by the Chief Health Inspector of the
city of Portland, requiring, under threat of immediate arrest, the
removal of a skylight over the opening or court in the plaintiff's hotel
building, or immediately to cease using or renting for sleeping purposes
the rooms having windows opening on the court. In answer to plaintiff's
contention that the ordinance was retrospective, the court said: "The
act in question cannot be properly classed as retrospective. It affects
no act or fact or right accruing before its enactment. It neither
destroys or impairs any vested right acquired under existing law. A
careful reading of the ordinance discloses that it is solely
prospective. The building permit granted by the city of Portland for the
construction of the Harrison Hotel does not affect the right of the
police power of the city of Portland to adopt and apply to it regulative
measures looking to the public health."

***Doran v. Boston Store of Chicago***, 307 Ill. App. 456, 30 N. E. 778
(1941), was a personal injury action arising out of a fall on the
stairway of defendant's store. The basis of the claim was the failure of
the defendant to construct and maintain a handrail as required by an
ordinance of the city of Chicago. Judgment was for the plaintiff, and
the court held that the ordinance, which allegedly became effective in
1931, was applicable to require the defendant to maintain a handrail on
each side of the store stairway, which was 6 feet ¾-inch wide, not
withstanding the building was constructed in 1906-7.

The case of ***Adamec v. Post***, 273 N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. (2d) 120, 109
A. L. R. 1110 (1937) (see annotation beginning at 109 A. L. R. 1117), in
an action challenging the New York Multiple Dwelling Law, holds that due
process is not denied by a statute that prescribes higher standards of
fire protection and sanitation for multiple dwelling buildings erected
prior to 1901, which conformed to the standards in effect at the time of
their erection, as applied to a tenement house of 40 rooms erected
before that date, the cost of necessary changes being upwards of
\$5,000, although the property is assessed only in the total sum of
\$13,500, \$8,500 of which is represented by the building. The court
said: " The imposition of the cost of the required alterations as a
consideration of the continued use of antiquated buildings for multiple
dwellings may cause hardship to the plaintiff and other owners of the
'old-law tenements'; but, in a proper case, the legislature has the
power to enact provisions reasonably calculated to promote the common
good, even though the results be hardship to the individual."

However, we cannot forget, or even overlook, the well-established rule
that the police power, broad as it is, is not all-inclusive. It must be
exercised with discretion and in a reasonable manner. The regulation
must not be confiscatory and the benefits to the public must bear at
least a reasonable relation to the cost of achieving those benefits. As
the court pointed out in *Health Department v. Trinity Church, supra*,
the discretion of the legislative body is not absolute. "The improvement
or work must in itself be a reasonable, proper, and fair exaction when
considered with reference to the object to be attained. If the expense
to the individual under such circumstances would amount to a very large
and unreasonable sum, that fact would be a most material one in deciding
whether the method or means adopted for the attainment of the main
objective were or were not an unreasonable demand upon the individual
for the benefit of the public." In the same case, the court quoted with
approval from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in ***Rideout v. Knox***, 148 Mass. 368,
19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560: " It may be said that
the difference is only one of degree; most differences are when nicely
analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is one of the distinctions
by which the right of the legislature to exercise the police power is
determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights
incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing a
manifest evil; larger ones could not be except by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain." ***Sawyer v. Davis***, 136 Mass. 239, 243.

Thus, in ***Masonic Fraternity Temple Association v. Chicago***, 131
Ill. App. 1 (1907), although the court said that it could easily
conceive of circumstances with respect to physical, social, or municipal
conditions in which a municipality, in the exercise of property granted
police power, might require, to a reasonable degree, alterations in
buildings previously erected in accordance with regulations in effect at
the time of such erection, the proposed required alterations to the
plaintiff's building, a Masonic Temple (which would cost at least
\$200,000, cause a yearly loss of \$50,000 to the plaintiff, in addition
to a loss of \$18,000 worth of personalty, and result in a defaced but
no safer building), were held to be unreasonable. 109 A. L. R. 1123.

***Central Savings Bank in City of New York et al. v. City of New York
et al.***, 279 N. Y. 266, 18 N. E. (2d) 151, Court of Appeals of N. Y.
(1939), discussed with approval the case of *Adamec v. Post, supra*, but
held the amendment of the Multiple Dwelling Law authorizing the city of
New York to make certain repairs on old-law tenements and assess the
cost as a lien prior to existing mortgages, without affording the
mortgagor an opportunity to be heard as to the reasonableness of the
proceeding or expenses, to be unconstitutional as an impairment of the
obligation of the mortgagees's contract with the mortgagor. The court
said: "We, therefore, reverse the judgment below and direct judgment for
the plaintiffs, declaring that any liens imposed upon the respective
premises for the expenses of making alterations or repairs in accordance
with the orders of the Department of Housing and Buildings shall at all
times be subject and subordinate to the plaintiff's respective mortgage
liens."

In ***Realty Revenue Corp. v. Wilson***, 182 Misc. 552, 50 N. Y. S. (2d)
941, (Supreme Court, Special Term, New York Co., May 21, 1944), the
court ruled that the owner of a multiple dwelling was entitled to a
permanent injunction restraining enforcement of an order directing the
plaintiff's property to be vacated for failure to make repairs deemed
necessary for the safety and health of the inhabitants, where the owner
attempted to comply with the order, but the materials needed were not
available because of Federal regulations, and plaintiff would suffer
substantial damage from enforcement of the order, and where evidence did
not establish that the hazard to life and health of occupants was so
great or imminent as to force evacuation because of plaintiff's
inability to comply with the multiple dwelling law. The court ruled that
the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction until Federal regulations
were lifted so as to enable him to obtain the necessary material.

The court in the case of ***Bonnet v. Vallier***, 116 N. W. 885 (Wis.
1908), ruled unconstitutional as an abuse of police power a multiple
dwelling law governing the entire State. The court said: "It must be
conceded that the degree of regulation of the construction, maintenance,
and manner of occupancy of tenement houses and lodging houses which is
reasonable must vary greatly according to density of population and
other circumstances. What would be reasonable in a very large city might
be highly unreasonable in the country or in small cities and villages of
the State. Requirements as to large structures to be occupied by many
persons might be very unreasonable as to the smaller class of the same
general class of structure to be occupied by very few persons. Again,
requirements as to water service and fire hazard, not difficult to
comply with by moderate expense in cities where there is a water and
sewer system which are essential to the equipment of such buildings in
those respects, might be plainly reasonable, while such requirements in
the country districts and the smaller cities and villages where there
are no such facilities, might be just as plainly absurd. The character
of the structure and its equipment, as regards the expense required to
comply with the law in a large city, where the added cost is warranted,
not only by the degree of danger to be guarded against but by the
returns a proprietor could reasonably expect to derive from his
investment, might be within the bounds of reason, while the same
requirement as to the sparsely settled districts and in small cities and
villages, where the conditions as to such dangers and the expense that
could prudently be incurred in erecting the structures are entirely
different, might be plainly outside the boundaries of reason."

From the foregoing it is clear that the States, and the municipalities
under authority granted by the States, can, under their police power,
establish new regulations relating to buildings and fire control, such
regulations to have full effect on buildings already in existence at the
time of passage of the regulations, even though the buildings compiled
with all legal requirements at the time of their erection, so long as
the regulations are reasonable in the burden they place on building
owners and bear a reasonable relation to the end to be attained; namely,
the health and safety of the community.

Many of the legal authorities on this general field are also referred to
in NIMLO Report No. 111 "Demolition, Vacation, or Repair of Substandard
Buildings," and in NIMLO Report No. 98 "Firemen and the Law." In the
latter report, see page 34.

**APPENDIX C**

**(Furnished by National Fire Protection Association)**

**STATE FIRE LEGISLATION**

(Number after State Fire Marshal indicates (**1**) Independent State
Office, (**2**) Insurance Department, (**3**) State Police, (**4**)
Public Safety Department, (**5**) State Auditor, (**6**) Director of
Commerce.)

**Key to Principal Types of Legislation**

> ***a.*** State Fire Marshal Law.
>
> ***b.*** Arson Law.
>
> ***c.*** State Building Code.
>
> ***d.*** Regulations on construction or protection of buildings.
>
> ***e.*** Fire protection of public buildings.
>
> ***f.*** Fire protection of places of public assembly.
>
> ***g.*** Removal of dilapidated buildings.
>
> ***h.*** Flammable liquid regulations.
>
> ***j.*** Dry-cleaning plant regulations.
>
> ***k.*** Fire drills in schools.
>
> ***m.*** Fire prevention education in schools.
>
> ***n.*** Fireworks regulations.
>
> ***o.*** Fire escape regulations.
>
> ***p.*** Theater or motion picture regulations.
>
> ***q.*** Hotel regulations.
>
> ***r.*** Liquefied petroleum gas regulations.
>
> ***s.*** State electrical Law.

***[State]{.underline} [Principal Enforcement Agency]{.underline}
[Principal types of legislation in force]{.underline}***

**Alabama** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-d-e-f-h-j-k-n-o-r***.

**Arizona** Local police ***b-n***.

**Arkansas** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-e-f-h-k-m-p-q***.

Labor Department ***r***.

**California** State Fire Marshal (**1**) ***a-b-d-e-f-h-j-n-p***.

State Division of Housing ***q***.

State Board of Education ***k-m***.

State Division of Industrial Safety ***r-s***.

***[State]{.underline} [Principal Enforcement Agency]{.underline}
[Principal types of legislation in force]{.underline}***

**Colorado** Labor Commissioner ***o***.

Industrial Commission ***s***.

**Connecticut** State Fire Marshal (**3**) ***a-b-e-f-h-j-p***.

Department of Education ***d***.

**Delaware** Local police ***b-n***.

**Florida** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-n***.

State Superintendent of Public ***k***.

Instruction

Hotel Commissioner ***q***.

**Georgia** State Fire Inspector (**2**) ***b***.

**Idaho** Local police ***b-o-q***.

**Illinois** State Fire Marshal (**4**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-o-p-q***.

**Indiana** State Fire Marshal (**1**)
***a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-p-r-s***.

**Iowa** State Fire Marshal (**4**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-k-m-n-o-p-q-r***.

**Kansas** State Fire Marshal (**1**) ***a-b-d-e-f-h-j-k-m-n-o-p-r***.

**Kentucky** State Fire Marshal (**2**)
***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-o-p-q-r-s***.

**Louisiana** State Fire Marshal (**1**) ***a-b-o***.

Public Utility Commissioner ***r***.

**Maine** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-d-e-f-g-h-m-p-q-r***.

**Maryland** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-e-f-g-n***.

**Massachusetts** State Fire Marshal (**4**) ***a-b-e-f-h-j-k-m-n***.

Commissioner of Public ***d-o-p***.

Safety (**4**)

Chief of Inspections (**4**) ***e-f-g-o-p-q***.

State Examiners of **s**.

Electricians

**Michigan** State Fire Marshal (**3**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-o-p***.

***[State]{.underline} [Principal Enforcement Agency]{.underline}
[Principal types of legislation in force]{.underline}***

**Minnesota** State Fire Marshal (**2**)
***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-o-p-q***.

Local building officials ***c***.

State Board of Electricity ***s***.

**Mississippi** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-d-e-f-q***.

Motor Vehicle Commissioner ***r***.

**Missouri** Local police ***b-e-f-o-p-q***.

Inspector of Oils ***h***.

**Montana** State Fire Marshal (**5**) ***a-b-e-f-g-k-n-o-p-q***.

Railway Commission ***r***.

**Nebraska** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-e-f-g-h-j-k-m-n-o-p-q***.

Department of Labor ***s***.

**Nevada** Local police ***b***.

State Controller ***e***.

Fire chiefs ***k***.

**New Hampshire** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b***.

Fire chiefs ***e-g-h-n-o***.

**New Jersey** State Department of Labor ***d-f-h-j-n-o-p-s***.

State Board of Education ***k-m***.

Motor Vehicle Department. ***h***.

**New Mexico** Local police ***b***.

Local city officials ***d-g-h***.

Health Department ***r***.

State Electrical Engineer ***s***.

**New York** Labor Department ***d-f-j-p-o***.[^7]

Commissioner of Education ***m***.

Local police ***n***.

**North Carolina** State Fire Marshal (**2**)
***a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-m-o-p-q-s***.

**North Dakota** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-d-e-g-k-n-o-s***.

Hotel inspectors ***q***.

***[State]{.underline} [Principal Enforcement Agency]{.underline}
[Principal types of legislation in force]{.underline}***

**Ohio** State Fire Marshal (**6**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-q***.

Department of Industrial Relations ***c-n-o-p***.

**Oklahoma** State Fire Marshal (**1**) ***a-b-e-f-g-h-o-q-r***.

**Oregon** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-d-e-f-h-j-k-n-o-p***.

State police ***b***.

Labor Bureau ***s***.

**Pennsylvania** State Fire Marshal (**3**) ***a-b-g-h-m-n***.

Department of Labor and Industry ***d-e-f-j-o-p-q-r***.

Department of Public Instruction ***k-m***.

**Rhode Island** State Fire Marshal (**3**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-n-o-p-q***.

Commissioner of Education ***k-m***.

**South Carolina** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-c-d-e-g-h-n-o-p***.

Board of Education ***m***.

**South Dakota** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-o-p-r***.

**Tennessee** State Fire Marshal (**2**)
***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-n-o-p-q-r-s***.

**Texas** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-h-j-k-m-n-o-p***.

Railroad Commission ***r***.

**Utah** State Board of Health ***q***.

Local police ***b-n***.

**Vermont** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***a-b-g-h-j-n-o***.

**Virginia** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-e-f***.

Commissioner of Labor ***d***.

**Washington** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b-e-f-g-n***.

Hotel inspectors ***q***.

Labor Department ***s***.

**West Virginia** State Fire Marshal (**5**) ***a-b-d-e-f-g-n***.

**Wisconsin** State Fire Marshal (**2**) ***b***.

Industrial Commission ***c-d-e-f-h-j-m-n-o-p-s***.

**Wyoming** Local police ***b***.

###### COMMITTEE ON LAWS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

**CHAIRMAN**

JOHN C. KNOX, *United States District Judge, Southern District of New
York*

**VICE CHAIRMAN**

LOUIS A. JOHNSON, *Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.*

**SECRETARY**

CHALES S. RHHYNE, *National Institute of Municipal Law Officers,
Washington, D.C.*

Anne X. Alpern, *City Solicitor, Pittsburgh, Pa.*

J. Raymond Berry, *National Board of Fire Underwriters, New York 7,
N.Y.*

William D. Buck, *International Association of Firefighters, St. Louis
9, Mo.*

Thomas A. Burke, *Mayor, Cleveland, Ohio.*

Ralph V. Clampit, *State Senator, Massachusetts State Senate, Boston,
Mass.*

Roger T. Clapp, *Grinnell Corporation, Providence 1, R.I.*

John R. Cooney, *President, Firemen's Insurance Co., Newark 1, N.J.*

Joseph H. Crowley, *City Hall, Cleveland, Ohio.*

Arthur M. Curtis, *Landers Building, Springfield, Mo.*

William E. Dowling, *Corporation Counsel, Detroit 26, Mich.*

Horace H. Edwards, *Mayor, Richmond, Va.*

B. T. Fitzpatrick, *National Housing Agency, Washington, D.C.*

Edward Freeman, *New York Joint Legislative Committee on Statewide
Building Code, White Plains, N.Y.*

T. J. Gentry, *City Attorney, Little Rock, Ark.*

Hall Hammond, *Attorney General, Baltimore, Md.*

Barnet Hodes, *Corporation Counsel, Chicago, Ill.*

William S. Hogsett, *Attorney at Law, Kansas City, Mo.*

Nathan C. Horwitz, *Third Deputy Commissioner, Fire Department, New
York, N.Y.*

Walter R. Johnson, *Attorney General, Lincoln, Nebr.*

Alan Johnstone, *Chief Counsel, Federal Works Agency, Washington, D.C.*

William E. Kemp, *Mayor, Kansas City, Mo.*

M. L. Landis, *Central Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., Van Wert,
Ohio.*

J. Edwin Larson, *Commissioner of Insurance, Tallahassee, Fla.*

Charles E. Murphy, *Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y.*

Ray Murphy, *Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, New York 7,
N.Y.*

E. F. Mynatt, *Associate Solicitor, Department of Agriculture,
Washington 25, D.C.*

Hale Powers, *Office of the Solicitor, Department of Interior,
Washington, D.C.*

George F. Prussing, W*estern Oil and Gas Association, Los Angeles 14,
Calif.*

Arnold C. Renner, *State Fire Marshal, East Lansing, Mich.*

Eugene Sanders, *Austin, Tex.*

J. C. Savage, *City Attorney, Atlanta, Ga.*

Abram P. Staples, *Attorney General, Richmond 19, Va.*

J. E. Taylor, *Attorney General, Jefferson City, Mo.*

Frank F. Truscott, *Solicitor, Philadelphia, Pa.*

John Warden, *President, Auto Call Co., Shelby, Ohio.*

Thomas Watters, Jr., *Attorney at Law, New York 7, N.Y.*

Lyle D. Webber, *Chief Building Inspector, City Hall, Denver, Colo.*

James C. Wilkes, *Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.*

Herman C. Wilson, *City Attorney, Greensboro, N.C.*

**CONFERENCE ORGANIZTION**

**GENERAL CHAIRMAN**

Maj. Gen. PHILIP B. FLEMING, *Administrator, Federal Works Agency*

**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

A.  BRUCE BIELASKI, *Assistant General Manager, National Board of Fire
    Underwriters*

> **COORDINATING COMMITTEE**
>
> **CHAIRMAN**
>
> W. E. REYNOLDS, *Commissioner of Public Buildings*

O. J. Arnold, *President, Northwestern National Life Insurance Co.*

Frank Bane, *Executive Director, Council of State Governments.*

Paul Betters, *Executive Secretary, United States Conference of Mayors.*

Ernest B. Brown, *President, Ernest W. Brown, Inc.*

Frank A. Christensen, *President, National Board of Fire Underwriters.*

J. H. Craig, *Chairman, Fire Marshals' Section, National Fire Protection
Association.*

Dr. Ned H. Dearborn, *President, National Safety Council.*

Charles A. Delaney, *President, International Association of Fire
Chiefs.*

Robert E. Dineen, *President, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners.*

Jas. R. Edmunds, Jr., *President, American Institute of Architects.*

Wallace J. Falvey, *Chairman, Advisory Committee, National Conservation
Bureau.*

Hovey T. Freeman, *President, Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co.*

A. V. Gruhn, *General Manager, American Mutual Alliance.*

W. K. Jackson, *President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States.*

Leroy A. Lincoln, *President, Metropolitan life Insurance Co.*

W. E. Mallalieu, *General Manager, National Board of Fire Underwriters.*

Earl D. Mallery, *Executive Director, The American Municipal
Association.*

James H. Mooney, *President, Building Officials' Conference of America.*

James H. Park, *President, Pacific Coast Building Officials Conference.*

Curtis W. Pierce, *President, National Fire Protection Association.*

George J. Richardson, *Secretary and Treasure, International Association
of Fire Fighters.*

Mrs. Pearl Wanamaker, *President, National Education Association.*

Guy T. Warfield, Jr., *President, National Association of Insurance
Agents.*

Frank M. Whiston, *President, National Association of Building Owners
and Managers.*

**TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP**

H. R. Bassford, *Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.*

Robert B. Beach, *National Association of Building Owners and Managers.*

James V. Bennett, *Federal Interdepartment Safety Council.*

George W. Booth, *National Board of Fire Underwriters.*

A. L. Brown, *Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Cos.*

Percy Bugbee, *National Fire Protection Association.*

W. C. Clark, *Federal Fire Council.*

Theodore I. Coe, *American Institute of Architects.*

John P. Coyne, *International Association of Fire Fighters.*

Dr. Robert W. Eaves, *National Education Association.*

Hubert R. Gallagher, *Council of State Governments.*

Donoh W. Hanks, Jr., *The American Municipal Association.*

Julien H. Harvey, *National Conservation Bureau.*

A. L. Kirkpatrick, *Chamber of Commerce of the United States.*

West Shell, *National Association of Insurance Agents.*

Fred Shepperd, *International Association of Fire Chiefs.*

J. C. Stennett, *American Mutual Alliance.*

**CONFERENCE STAFF**

A. BRUCE BIELASKI, *Executive Director.*

LEWIS A. VINCENT, *Assistant Executive Director.*

William J. Chattin, *Technical Assistant.*

John L. Werheim, *Technical Assistant.*

Douglas H. Timmerman, *Conference Arrangements.*

John B. West *Technical Assistant.*

Russell R. McGuire, *Publicity.*

Hester M. Bell, *Secretary.*

**STAFF CONSULTANTS**

A. C. Hutson, F. C. McAuliffe, R. E. Truman, R. E. Verner, R. E. Wilson

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office,

Washington 25, D.C. -- Price 15 cents

[^1]: A report released February 19, 1947, by the New York Legislature's
    Joint Legislative Committee on Statewide Building Codes states that
    of the 175 building codes in effect in that State (602 New York
    cities were surveyed by the committee), 15 are over 30 years old, 53
    are over 20 years old, 54 are over 15 years old, and 16 are over 10
    years old.

[^2]: Municipal Year Book (1945), p. 17.

[^3]: The decisions referred to in appendix A and B herein offer an
    ample starting point for any research in this general field.

[^4]: The Central Housing Committee, created by the President in 1941,
    was composed of the representatives of all of the housing agencies
    of the National Government.

[^5]: See New Hampshire Statute -- New Hampshire Laws of 1945, ch. 105.

[^6]: See footnote 1.

[^7]: ^1^ The Multiple Dwelling Law in New York City is concerned
    entirely with safety and fire prevention. See the discussion of this
    law in Appendix B of this report in the paragraph devoted to the
    case of ***Adamec v. Post*** which upholds the validity of the law.