W

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Administrative

> Investigations, and Assessments

SUBJECT: Enhancing Compatibility for Long-Duration Space Flight Crews

The ongoing Office of Inspector General evaluation of the United States
participation in the Phase I Shuttle-Mir Program and the programs
related to the International Space Station (ISS) examined the issue of
crew compatibility. Our inquiry included a review of astronaut
psychological evaluation and training.[^1] The ISS crews will be
multi-national, larger in number, and will remain on station longer than
the Phase I Mir crews. This situation poses greater challenges to
achieving crew compatibility.

**Introduction**

In its 1987 report on "A Strategy for Space Biology and Medical
Science," the Space Science Board of the National Research Council
indicated that:

> ...\[I\]t seems likely that behavioral and social problems have
> already occurred during long-term missions and that such problems will
> be exacerbated as missions becomes (sic) more complex, as mission
> duration is increased, and as the composition of crews become more
> heterogeneous. An understanding of the problems and their amelioration
> is essential if man desires to occupy space for extended periods of
> time.

The report further indicates that there had been a significant amount of
research completed on the screening and selection of individuals for
situations resembling space flight that require both high technical
competence and the ability to work well in small, interactive groups.

The report concluded that more research is needed to identify other
factors that may be important to group performance and to determine the
validity of such criteria to long-duration space flight.

Other research has also identified the need to consider the
psychological aspects of long- duration flight in selecting crews for
future missions. Dr. Nick A. Kanas co-authored a 1971 study for NASA
entitled "Behavior, Psychiatric, and Sociological Problems of
Long-Duration Space Missions." At the time of the study, Dr. Kanas was
with the University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine.
This study advocated the importance of selecting compatible crew members
to minimize stressors during long-duration missions.[^2] Dr. Kanas
indicated that there are four types of stressors: physical,
physiological, psychological, and social. He con-cluded that NASA
largely concerned itself with the physical and the physiological
stressors. However, he believed that the advent of long-duration
missions requires that the psychological and social stressors be
considered.

Using travel to Mars as an example, Dr. Kanas' report stated that:

> ...\[T\]he long duration of a Mars mission, the great distance the
> crew will be from the vicinity of earth, the vastness and hostility of
> outer space, and man's lack of knowledge about outer space are factors
> which make it unwise to extrapolate from our current experiences and
> predict that psychological and social stressors will not seriously
> affect the probability of mission success.

Among the psychological and social stressors, Dr. Kanas listed low
sensory input, lack of motivation, confinement, isolation, monotony,
free time, unconscious conflicts, dangers and emergencies, interpersonal
relationships, crew size, and crew structure. He concluded that the
selection of crew members who are compatible will minimize many stressor
effects.

**Background**

NASA formed an In-House Working Group on Psychiatric and Psychological
Selection of Astronauts (Working Group) in 1988 to discuss NASA's
psychiatric procedure for selecting astronauts and to recommend
psychiatric standards for making future selections.[^3] The Working
Group published a paper in July 1988, that defined "...the 'best'
psychological make-up for the job of astronaut; and the 'best' crew
psychological mix, particularly for extended-duration space flights."
The Working Group defined three attributes---aptitude, motivation, and
sensitivity---as being of equal importance in the selection of
astronauts.[^4] These attributes were referred to as the select-in
criteria.[^5] The Working Group asserted, however, that attri-butes
accurately reflecting characteristics that predict astronaut or crew
member success on a long-duration mission were unknown. Therefore,
validation through ongoing performance and behavioral measures would be
essential.

NASA used the attributes developed by the Working Group and continually
recorded select-in information on astronaut candidates beginning with
the astronaut class of 1991. However, since the Agency disbanded the
Working Group in 1990, NASA has not further refined the criteria based
on the experiences of long-duration missions on the Mir.

In 1996, NASA selected one of Dr. Kanas' science experiments to fly to
Mir on NASA 3 through 7.[^6] The experiment was designed to study crew
member tension, cohesion, and leadership roles both with the Mir
on-board crew and the ground support crew.

During the time between Dr. Kanas' initial study in 1971 and the
selection of his current experiment, little study has been done of
psychological issues as they relate to the U.S. space program and its
astronauts. To quote Dr. Santy from her 1994 book, *Choosing the Right
Stuff: The Psychological Selection of Astronauts and Cosmonauts*:

> Thirty years of space flight experience in this country have yielded a
> gold mine of data and knowledge about the human body and its response
> to the space environment, but no objective data on the human psyche in
> that same environment has been produced---and many scientists consider
> psychological issues to be a limiting factor in the human exploration
> of the universe.

**A. Psychological Testing For Optimal Crew Compatibility Should be
Implemented**

NASA has moved from the early days of the space program where missions
were comprised of a single astronaut, to short-duration flights of
several astronauts, to the current long-duration flights with
multi-national crews (with even longer duration flights scheduled for
ISS). With this progression, the need to consider the psychological
impact of long-duration space travel, particularly its effect on crew
compatibility, has increased dramatically. However, while some work has
been done on determining the psychological fitness of astronaut
candidates, little has been done to use psychological testing as the
basis for crew selections beyond the initial evaluations.

There have been numerous studies that indicate as space missions become
longer and broader in scope and as crews become more heterogeneous,
psychological and interpersonal factors take on increasing importance.
The Working Group recognized that embarking on missions to other planets
and living and working in the space environment for long periods of time
requires a certain set of characteristics. Both the individual astronaut
and the crew may need charac-teristics that are different from those
needed when astronauts flew alone or for short periods of time. The
Working Group's studies were a promising start in this area but its work
stopped in the early 1990's without further validation of its identified
selection attributes.

Recently, NASA initiated a study to provide further validation of the
selection attributes identified by the Working Group. This study was
approved by the astronaut office, funded, and staffed by a working group
of outside specialists. The study, however, is undergoing a
Headquarters' peer review and may be canceled.

NASA has not placed enough emphasis on identifying necessary and
desirable characteristics for success during long-duration space flight.
Without developing a composite of those characteristics, there is no
standard against which the Agency can evaluate astronauts at initial
selection, throughout their training programs, and at the point of crew
selection. In contrast, the Russian space program has historically
emphasized the assembling of compatible space flight crews. According to
Russian space psychologists:

> The absence of total compatibility (among crewmembers) can lead to
> disruption of interpersonal relations, the development of conflicts,
> neurotic states, and undesirable psychosomatic symptoms. On the other
> hand, when the system of group relationships in the crew undergoes
> progressive development, conducive to the stabilization of
> interactions, the growth of mutual understanding, cohesiveness, and
> solidarity ensues. Prolonged joint training of the crewmembers through
> which they develop the capacity to work together very well is
> particularly important here. The factor of psychological compatibility
> has a determining significance in the development of this capacity.
> [^7]

When forming the space flight crews, the Russian psychologists take into
account a wide variety of psychological and social attributes in
evaluating prospective crew members. While tests of this nature are not
fool-proof, the Russians believe the tests provide some additional
predictive capability regarding crew compatibility.

In 1996, NASA and the Russian Academy of Sciences published a joint work
devoted to *Space Biology and Medicine*. Volume III (Humans in
Spaceflight), Book 2, provides

insights into psychological factors for long-duration crew as well as
group interactions.[^8] Chapter 19 indicates:

> ...\[S\]electing compatible crews should begin from the principles of
> complementarity and congruence. In other words, the strengths of
> different crew members either should complement and compensate for
> each other, or character, personality, psychosocial traits and
> qualities, values, motivations, knowledge, and experience should
> correspond or be similar among crew members.

The chapter goes on to state:

> ...\[W\]e have found that as duration of flight increases, the
> congruence or similarity of crew members' personality traits is more
> important than complementarity of these traits. Similarity in
> personality traits that reflect psychosocial maturity, moral and
> ethical qualities, and capacity for long-term group interactions and
> group living in crowded conditions are particularly critical. The
> credibility of the crew commander, reinforced by age and professional
> experience, also plays a significant role.

Recently, Shannon Lucid, in a *Scientific American* article, stated,
"For long-duration manned spaceflight, the most important consideration
is not the technology of the spacecraft but the composition of the
crew." Astronaut Lucid also added, "Even if the space station has the
latest in futuristic technology, if the crew members do not enjoy
working together, the flight will be a miserable experience." [^9] In
addition, another long-duration astronaut emphasized the need to put
more into the process of selecting space station commanders. The
astronaut also indicated this was one way of lowering stress levels and
improving the operation of the space station.

**[Recommendation 1]{.underline}:** NASA should move forward with the
proposed study or propose another study to further validate the
select-in criteria for astronauts. The study should be expanded to
develop a data base of attributes necessary for use in crew selection
for long- duration flights.

**B. Need for Periodic and Post Flight Psychological Evaluations**

While NASA conducts psychological evaluations as part of its astronaut
selection process, there are no further evaluations done. Periodic
evaluations would be beneficial in ascertaining continued psychological
health and as a basis for determining long-duration crew composition.

Every astronaut candidate is interviewed by a psychiatrist. The
selection criteria for a NASA astronaut states that anyone with a
diagnosed personality disorder is automatically disqualified from
consideration.[^10] However, once a candidate is selected, astronauts
are required to have annual physical examinations, but not annual
psychological evaluations. Furthermore, when an astronaut is selected to
fly a long-duration mission, there is no required preflight or
post-flight psychological evaluation. As a result, NASA may be unaware
that a long-duration astronaut has developed a disqualifying personality
disorder either prior to or following the flight. Also, by failing to
provide preflight evaluations, NASA fails to identify those areas where
the astro-naut may need to strengthen the coping skills dictated by a
long-duration flight. Post-flight evaluations could reassure the
well-being and normalcy of a returning astronaut. Post-flight
evaluations can also provide valuable information to share with other
astronauts about what to expect as they embark on their own missions and
to study the psychological impacts of long-duration space flight.[^11]

The NASA Task Force on Countermeasures suggested that NASA study Russian
data in the area of behavior and performance. The Task Force
specifically recommended areas such as pre-flight selection processes,
preflight psychological evaluation, in-flight evaluations, and
post-flight monitoring and interventions.[^12] Other organizations such
as the Air Force provide periodic psychological evaluations of their
pilots. NASA can gain knowledge from these other experiences on how best
to implement a periodic psychological evaluation program for its
astronauts.

**[Recommendation 2]{.underline}:** NASA management should develop and
implement a psychological evaluation process as an integral part of an
astronaut's annual physical examination. In developing the process, NASA
should study mission data in the area of performance and behavior. A
preflight and post-flight evaluation should be conducted each time an
astronaut flies a long-duration mission.

**C. Need for Improved Crew and Ground Training in Recognizing and
Coping With Psychological Stressors Preflight and During Flight**

In conjunction with the gathering of valuable information from the
psychological evaluations of astronauts, NASA needs to improve the way
it approaches the training of flight and ground crews in recognizing and
coping with psychological stressors. A myriad of stressors may affect
astronauts. Weightlessness, radiation, and atmospheric contaminants can
lower an astronaut's tolerance to psychological and sociological
stressors. Vibration, lighting, temperature, noise, food, waste removal,
and lack of sleep are other stressors affecting performance, behavior,
and mental alertness.[^13] For example, an exhausted Alexander Lazutkin,
a Russian crew member on Mir 23, mistakenly pulled a vital cable that
shut down the Mir's main computer, causing the station to lose
power.[^14] As previously reported in our August 29, 1997 letter to the
Chairman, House Committee on Science, an American engineer familiar with
events aboard the Mir believes fatigue to be the probable cause of the
crew's inadvertently closing a valve that interrupted coolant flow to
the Elektron thereby causing it to overheat.

Astronaut John Blaha, in a Washington Post article, stated, "Personally,
I would not want to repeat a long-duration space flight---and I didn't
have emergencies...Long-duration orbital duty is much more taxing than
the intense, but brief, and heady bursts of five (sic) to 14 days
orbiting in the U.S. Space Shuttle.[^15]

Cosmonaut Valery Polyakov and astronaut Michael Foale, who have flown
long-duration space missions, have experience with the various stessors
associated with these flights. For example, as indicated in an article
in *Florida Today* Space Online, Michael Foale, "..knew his productivity
was slipping by the end of his 4 ½ month Mir mission in early October.
Part of that was 'get-home-itis.' And part was accumulated stress from a
cargo ship collision and frequent computer breakdowns and power
outages." [^16]

In the same article, Valery Polyakov indicated, "That's a real effort to
be away from everything. I mean, you are really isolated. They talk
about the French Foreign Legion. Man, this is really...you're in the
Sahara Desert and there's just no way around it." [^17]

Dr. Ronald Merrell, Chairman of the Department of Surgery at Yale
University and member of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous
and Docking Missions, traveled to Moscow in September 1997, to
participate in joint meetings with Academician Utkin's Expert Advisory
Council. Their purpose was to discuss the Mir environment, the health of
the astronauts, and human performance. In a letter to General Stafford
dated September 23, 1997, Dr. Merrell reported on the results of the
meeting. His report included a discussion of the importance and
variability of human interaction in the confines of space. He and his
Russian colleagues noted that the:

> ...\[M\]ajority of the untoward events of the last year have followed
> non-mechanical or human events rather than purely mechanical failure.
> However, the age of the station with as much as 50% crew time spent on
> maintenance has resulted in fatigue, stress and the curtailment of
> countermeasures.

Dr. Merrell further indicated that the fire (which took place on
February 24, 1997) was "associated with profound crew stress..." In his
letter to General Stafford, Dr. Merrell made several recommendations for
the future. One relating to the reduction of stress indicates:

> Human factors are the major focus for risk mitigation. Better
> communication, better group and individual selection, training in
> group dynamics, programs for stress reduction and fatigue control.
> In-flight exercise, consistent schedules and active psychodynamic
> intervention were...discussed for the formulation of future plans in
> the space medicine program to improve the lives and performance of
> individuals in long duration flight.

Appendix A is a chronological list of mishaps experienced by the Mir
crews from February 1997 to February 1998. These types of unpredictable
mishaps can cause, or be caused by, emotional stress that could impact
an astronaut's ability to perform effectively.

John Blaha, Flight Engineer on Mir 22, indicated that during the
organization and conduct of training, it is necessary to take into
account the psychological preparation of the American astronaut for
long-duration flight. Among the methods he suggested were consultations
with psychologists and experts, psychological support during flight, and
a sharing of psychological aspects of long-duration flight between those
who have completed a Mir flight and those who are preparing to go.[^18]

In its May 1997 final report, the NASA Task Force on Countermeasures
made several recommendations regarding psychological and behavioral
training. Among the recommendations were that NASA:

-   use professional psychologists to observe, record, feed back, and
    lead discussions on group interactions (crew, crew and ground, crew
    and family, and family and ground);

-   strengthen relationships between the mission crew and the ground
    crew through training, including sections on conflict resolution,
    communication skills, etc.;

-   employ psychologists to help individuals define and maximize
    performance for personal/professional mental and physical health
    goals; and

-   employ psychologists with special training or experience in
    cross-cultural work to help mission planners and teams define and
    maximize performance.

The Task Force indicated that research needs to be conducted regarding
the best methods for training individuals and whole crews prior to
flights. Topics should include conflict manage-ment and resolution,
communication skill enhancement, cross-cultural training, team
mainte-nance, and stress management. Research announcements were
recently issued in several of these areas, including the relationships
between mission crew and ground crew.

Long-duration astronauts have indicated that during their Mir missions
they experienced extreme difficulty with getting communications through
to their families, a significant time demand for ground communications
that impacted other assignments, interruptions in sleep patterns due to
the timing of space walks, personality changes in flight, and cultural
differences among the crew. These factors and others of that nature
should be considered as part of the training for long-duration flights.

Dr. Santy, in her article on "Behavior and Performance in the Space
Environment,"[^19] points

out that psychological training has been used successfully in the German
space program. She indicates that:

> The biomedical training of science astronauts in the German space
> program included a psychological training program. The goals of that
> program were: "(1) improving the individual social-competence of
> astronauts, (2) evoking and supporting a team-building process within
> the astronauts' team, and (3) increasing the general efficiency of
> astronauts by developing general performance skills."

Dr. Santy stated that four elements were emphasized in the training
program: communication and cooperation, stress management, coping with
operational demands, and group problem-solving.

NASA has an intense training program to prepare astronauts for the
physical and operational demands of long-duration flight. We believe
that more attention to the psychological demands, not only of the
individual, but also of the flight and ground crews, would better
prepare all participants for the rigors of long-duration travel and
contribute to overall mission success. NASA should make maximum use of
data collected during psychological evaluations of crew compatibility
and post-flight astronauts as a basis for its psychological training
program.

**[Recommendation 3]{.underline}:** As part of its formal training
program, NASA should include training on the stressors that individuals
and crews will experience on long-duration flights. NASA should factor
into this training the results of the research recommended by the Task
Force on Countermeasures.

**Summary of NASA Management's Response**

NASA management partially concurred to the three recommendations made in
this report. In his response, the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight indicated that the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is developing an
integrated program to manage flight crew psychological interactions. The
Associate Administrator also provided comments from JSC that
specifically addressed each of the recommendations. Overall, the JSC
response indicated that the OIG recommendations were helpful and
synergistic. JSC management indicated that the Mir Phase I Program did
anticipate the psychological demands of long-duration crew members prior
to the first Shuttle-Mir mission. The response indicates that NASA
created the Psychological Service Group to provide support for
long-duration mission astronauts. JSC management stated that it is
currently reviewing the implementation of a Behavioral Health and
Performance Program, which will be an expansion of the Psychological
Services Group. This new program would provide an integrated effort to
reach many of the Inspector General's identified goals in this area.

The JSC management response indicated that they will move forward with a
study to validate psychological tests and techniques that will be used
as aids during the astronaut selection process. In 1996, the
Psychological Services Group formally began a Selection Upgrade Project,
which resulted in an expansion of the attributes thought to be
predictive for use in crew selection.

Regarding our second recommendation that NASA should develop and
implement a psychological evaluation process, JSC management indicated
that they are reviewing the implementation of regular preflight and
postflight meetings with the NASA psychiatrist. These meetings would
culminate not only in flight certification, but also in an individual
adaptation and potential treatment plan for each crew member. JSC
management also stated that they are considering the collection of crew
members' in-flight data to advise them of their health and well being.
In addition, JSC management is considering the implementation of a
behavioral medicine examination that would be conducted during the
annual astronaut physical examination, as well as a method to support
the health of the mission ground support team.

In its response to our third recommendation that NASA include training
on the stressors that individuals and crews will experience on
long-duration flights, JSC management concurred that psychological
training, preparation, and support should be provided to the entire
mission team. JSC management indicated that they already provide
information and training on coping and adaptive strategies that have
been used effectively by previous long-duration astronauts. They agreed,
however, that additional preflight training is needed. JSC management
indicated that they are reviewing, as part of the Behavioral Health and
Performance Program, the interface between the crew member and the
environment, including habitability, work schedules, and retraining
issues during long-duration flight.

NASA management's response is included in its entirety as Appendix B.

**Evaluation of Management Response**

NASA management's comments are responsive to the intent of the
recommendations. We will monitor and periodically evaluate NASA's
progress in developing an integrated program to manage flight crew
psychological interactions, in validating the initial selection criteria
for astronauts, in developing and implementing a psychological
evaluation process, and in adapting its training program to include
training on stressors unique to long-duration flight.

Both the Associate Administrator and JSC management indicated that
psychological testing and crew compatibility are not the only factors in
the crew selection process. We have never taken the position that
psychological factors are the only consideration. However, we do believe
that psychological factors have not been adequately addressed and that
they are vitally important in ensuring the overall success of
long-duration missions. This is particularly true as NASA moves toward
putting together crews for the International Space Station. With these
crews, which will be truly international in character, the issue of crew
compatibility as well as adequate training becomes significantly
important. When successfully implemented, NASA's planned actions should
help in these areas.

**Conclusion**

Crew compatibility and emotional stability are vital factors in space
flight. As NASA moves toward missions of longer duration conducted by
larger, multi-national crews, the selection of compatible crews and
their proper training becomes even more crucial. Therefore, we believe
NASA should develop a data base of attributes to use in crew selection
for long-duration flights. For optimum safety and mission success of
long-duration flights, the Agency should increase its efforts to: (1)
identify those astronauts best suited for long-duration travel, (2)
select crews based on compatibility factors, (3) implement a
psychological evaluation process as an integral part of the astronauts'
annual physical exams, and (4) provide psychological training and
subsequent support to the entire mission team.

***Original Signed/Dated 6/19/98***

David M. Cushing

Enclosure

cc:

Distribution

**Distribution**

**[National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Officials-In-Charge]{.underline}**

A/Administrator

AD/Acting Deputy Administrator

AT/Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical)

F/Associate Administrator for Human Resources and Education

I/Associate Administrator for External Relations

L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs

P/Associate Administrator for Public Affairs

Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance

U/Associate Administrator for Life & Microgravity Sciences &
Applications

**[NASA Advisory Officials]{.underline}**

Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Chairman, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station

Chairman, Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and ISS
Operational Readiness

Task Force

Chairman, Life & Microgravity Sciences and Applications Advisory
Committee

**[Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of each of the following
Congressional]{.underline}**

**[Committees and Subcommittees:]{.underline}**

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space

Senate Committee on Government Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice

House Committee on Science

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

**[Appendix A]{.smallcaps}**

**(Chronology of Mir Mishaps)**

**Chronology of Mir Mishaps**

***(February 1997 - February 1998)***

[February 26, 1998]{.underline} Increased presence of carbon monoxide
following an emission of smoke into the cabin

[January 2, 1998]{.underline} Main computer failed. Solar panels stopped
tracking the sun and the station lost power

[December 17, 1997]{.underline} Inspektr satellite malfunctioned and was
abandoned.

[October 6, 1997]{.underline} Progress M-35 supply ship did not undock
properly due to a clamp left in place.

[September 22, 1997]{.underline} Main computer failed.

[September 16, 1997]{.underline} Near miss with American science
satellite. Crew retreated to the Soyuz.

[September 8, 1997]{.underline} Main computer failed. All systems except
life-support equipment were turned off.

[August 25, 1997]{.underline} Primary and backup oxygen generators
failed.

[August 18, 1997]{.underline} Main computer failed. Central systems were
shut down.

[August 18, 1997]{.underline} Progress redocking failed due to
computerized automatic pilot system failure. Crew used manual controls
to redock Progress.

[August 5, 1997]{.underline} Two oxygen generators broke down. Crew used
special oxygen canisters.

[July 17, 1997]{.underline} Crew member accidentally disconnected a
computer cable. MIR lost power and went into free drift.

[July 14, 1997]{.underline} Russian Commander Vasily Tsibliyev has
irregular heart beat and was declared unfit for EVA.

[July 5, 1997]{.underline} Cosmonauts report a substance leaking from
Spektr. Substance later identified as urine from the Progress vehicle.

[July 3, 1997]{.underline} Stabilizing gyroscopes shut down.

[June 27, 1997]{.underline} Computer disconnected from control system.

[June 25, 1997]{.underline} Progress collided with Mir and damaged a
solar panel and the Spektr.

[April 11, 1997]{.underline} Cooling system leaked ethylene glycol
fumes.

[April 4, 1997]{.underline} Cooling system leak forced crew to shut down
primary carbon dioxide removal system.

[March 7, 1997]{.underline} Oxygen generator failed.

[March 6, 1997]{.underline} Progress failed a manual redock and almost
hit Mir.

[February 24, 1997]{.underline} Oxygen generating canister erupted in
flames causing the crew to wear oxygen masks. Crew fought the fire until
it burned out.

**Appendix B**

**(NASA Management Response)**

[^1]: Related to the issue of psychological evaluation and training is
    the ability of the astronauts to deal with the stress of
    long-duration space flight. Our August 29, 1997, letter to the
    Chairman, House Committee on Science, highlights several factors
    contributing to fatigue and stress, and provides several examples of
    problems that may have occurred because of stress.

[^2]: Kanas' study defined stress as being any change in an organism
    produced by a stressor and a stressor being some condition(s)
    affecting an organism.

[^3]: Dr. Patricia A. Santy chaired the Working Group, a diverse group
    which included astronauts, professors, consultants, university
    department heads, National Space Development Agency of Japan
    employees, and others. Dr. Santy worked at the Johnson Space Center
    from 1984 to 1991 as a flight surgeon to the astronauts. She was the
    first full-time civil service psychiatrist to fill this position.

[^4]: Aptitude evaluates an astronaut's ability to function effectively
    in an extended-duration mission environment. Motivation defines the
    degree of interest and enthusiasm for the job with a high degree of
    mission-oriented motivation. Sensitivity to self and others is
    believed to demonstrate emotional maturity.

[^5]: Dr. Santy defined select-in as a process frequently used in
    personnel selection that does not have specific medical or
    psychiatric implications. The goal of this process is to identify
    the best person for the job.

    Dr. Santy defined selecting-out as primarily a medical/psychiatric
    decision. The candidate cannot previously have had or currently have
    any of the specified psychiatric conditions listed in the standards,
    or he or she will be disqualified.

[^6]: Kanas' experiment began with NASA 3, John Blaha's flight to Mir in
    September 1996, and will conclude with the completion of Andrew
    Thomas' flight, NASA 7, in May 1998.

[^7]: G.T. Beregovoy, V.N.Grigorenko, and R. B. Bogdashevskiy. In:
    *Pochkayev: Kosmicheskaya Akademiya \[Space Academy\]*.
    Mashinostroyeniye, Moscow. Pp. 1-7, 1987.

[^8]: *Space Biology and Medicine*, Joint U.S./Russian Publication in
    Five Volumes, Volume III, Humans in Spaceflight, Book 2, Chapter 19,
    "Psychological States and Group Interactions of Crew Members in
    Flight."

[^9]: "Six Months on Mir," *Scientific American*, May 1998.

[^10]: Some personality disorders that would eliminate a candidate from
    consideration include bi-polar tendencies and major depressions.

[^11]: One long-duration astronaut recommended that astronauts who had
    already completed flights on the Mir be involved in the training of
    those preparing to go to Mir. The astronaut also stressed the
    importance of the briefing between the astronaut completing a space
    flight and the newly arrived astronaut. One of the topics to be
    covered was psychological support of the newly arrived astronaut as
    it relates to a long-duration mission.

[^12]: "Final Report of NASA Task Force on Countermeasures," May 1997.

[^13]: Dr. Kanas, "Behavior, Psychiatric, and Sociological Problems of
    Long-Duration Space Missions," 1971.

[^14]: MSNBC, "Interview with Alexander Lazutkin, Mir 23 Flight
    Engineer."

[^15]: *The Washington Post*, July 20, 1997, p.A25.

[^16]: *Florida Today*, Space Online, December 7, 1997.

[^17]: Ibid.

[^18]: "Operational Report of Flight Engineer-2, NASA Astronaut John
    Blaha on the Preparations for and Completion of a Space Flight
    Aboard the MIR Orbital Scientific Research Complex."

[^19]: Patricia A. Santy, "Behavior and Performance in the Space
    Environment," *Fundamentals of Space Life Sciences*, Vol. 2.