![](media/image1.png){width="0.7833333333333333in"
height="0.9048611111111111in"}
![](media/image2.jpeg){width="1.2118055555555556in"
height="0.9208333333333333in"}

Summary Report on Wilton Park/National Intelligence Council Workshop
WPS04/22

**NIC 2020 PROJECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST**

# Friday 12^th^ -- Sunday 14th March 2004

The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project are those of individual participants. They are posted for
discussion purposes only and do not represent the views of the US
Government.

![](media/image1.png){width="0.7833333333333333in"
height="0.9048611111111111in"}
![](media/image2.jpeg){width="1.2118055555555556in"
height="0.9208333333333333in"}

Summary Report on Wilton Park/National Intelligence Council Workshop
WPS04/22

**NIC 2020 PROJECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST**

# Friday 12^th^ -- Sunday 14th March 2004

#### Introduction

1\. In a fast-changing, globalised world government policymakers can no
longer afford to base their decision-making on purely short-term
prognoses. They must now extend their horizons and make strategic plans
over a much longer 15-20 year time frame. A difficult task at any time,
it is now even more so as many of the political and economic
"certainties" that have traditionally underpinned strategic planning in
the US and Western Europe have, in recent years, been severely shaken.

2\. In response to this challenge, the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) 2020 project, a consultative and participatory exercise, aims to
uncover the most important influences that will, or could, shape the
global community over the years to 2020. The NIC uses estimative
intelligence to elaborate possible responses based on plausible
scenarios, which do not discount major shocks or 'wild cards'. 9/11 was
arguably the most dramatic 'wild card' the world has ever seen. The NIC
encourages creative thinkers from around the world in the fields of
academia, business and civil society to produce innovative and
provocative ideas about the major forces likely to drive global
developments in the next 15 or so years.

3\. As part of the process, a variety of regional scenarios are being
developed that represent alternative futures for different areas, and
explore how they impact on wider global issues. This workshop, held
under Wilton Park auspices, focused on the Middle East. The participants
were a broad mix of experts, primarily but not exclusively from the
region, who collectively had immense insight into this fast-changing,
socially complex, economically powerful and politically turbulent part
of the world.

Methodology

4\. The workshop sought firstly to identify the principal 'drivers' -
the main themes or issues that will be the major influencing factors in
determining the political, economic and social profile of the region in
the years to come. Some drivers are global -- globalisation itself being
the most obvious. Other drivers are specific to the region, although
with global significance. In the Middle East context, oil, the
Israel-Palestine conflict and the uncertain future development path of
Iraq following the coalition invasion and overthrow of the Saddam regime
may all be considered global drivers.

5\. The workshop was invited to propose scenarios for how the Middle
East could possibly develop rather than concentrate solely on informed
predictions based on what we know today. The way in which different
drivers might interact and impinge on each other was of especial
importance. An important objective of the conference was for experts
from the region to identify drivers which had not previously been
identified by outsiders, thus giving regional ownership of the process.

Key Issues

6\. Discussion initially focussed on four key Middle East drivers that
had been identified in advance of the workshop. These were:

-   Natural resources -- how would changing supplies of oil and gas
    affect relations between states in the region and with outside
    powers?

-   Population demographics -- who wins and who loses influence over
    time?

-   Governance -- will the region be more democratic in 2020?

-   Social identity -- will Islam be as politically important for social
    identity by 2020?

7\. One crucial factor identified at an early stage is that in the
Middle East context that all drivers are heavily politicised -- every
decision taken on any issue invariably has a political dimension or
sub-text.

8\. Other drivers identified in the course of the workshop were:
information technology; culture; and poverty.

Oil

9\. Energy security is an overwhelming interest of the industrialised
world. The West's heavy reliance on oil, particularly from the Middle
East, has significantly affected the way the West has conducted its
relations with the countries of the region. It was pointed out that
estimated reserves are based on current technology -- what can actually
be accessed now -- and they do not reflect the amount of oil that is in
the ground. Optimists argue that globally there is more than sufficient
oil to meet world demand for the foreseeable future, even allowing for
what some consider profligate US consumption.

10\. Some argue that the Middle East could possibly double its
production of oil by 2025, especially when one considers that the
capacity of the principal Gulf producers has not increased since the
1970s. The question of where the incentives and finance would come from
to do so remains unanswered. A key factor is that most Gulf oil
production is through state-owned enterprises -- directed by governments
using public money, rather than market-driven private resources which
would probably react more dynamically and proactively.

11\. Ironically, the US policy objective to reduce its reliance on
Middle East oil is undermined by the fact that the US is very
inefficient in its use of that oil. US administrations have seemingly
been unwilling to get tough with American 'gas guzzlers', both domestic
and industrial, and to impose taxes at European or Japanese levels. The
EU is much more advanced in looking for alternative sources of energy,
though it was suggested that the point where renewable forms of energy
will overtake oil is probably 50 years or so away.

12\. Most considered that oil shortages per se would not be a major
driver in the future, but that oil flow problems, or fears of shortages
as a result of conflicts, could be significant. However the
interdependent relationship of the Middle East and the West over the
production and consumption of oil is in itself seen as a stabilising
influence.

13\. It was generally agreed that oil revenues have contributed little
to economic development in many Middle East countries, though Kuwait and
Abu Dhabi were cited as exceptions. Instead, income from oil has been
squandered on prestige projects or creamed off for the benefit of a
small elite. Governments have usually provided just enough in terms of
health and education provision to keep their people passive -- the
general standard of life has neither significantly improved nor
deteriorated enough to provoke widespread unrest. Many Middle East
states are complacently dependent on their oil revenues for financing
all areas of government expenditure and so far have had little incentive
to diversify into other industries.

14\. It is possible that, in the future, competition between the major
producers could intensify leading to a breakdown of the OPEC consensus
and a greater volatility in the market. It was suggested that Iraq, for
example, could try to increase its market share by reducing its price
and increasing production to the benefit of the US. The majority thought
it more likely that a new regime in Iraq would not wish to break OPEC
ranks and therefore would stick to agreed quotas. If the political
situation deteriorates in Iraq to the extent of civil war, the oil
infrastructure would undoubtedly be targeted. Some believe this would
have little effect on the rest of the world. The international market
has been very flexible in the face of the Iraq crisis and even if Iraqi
oil were to go semi-permanently off-line, the world would readjust
fairly easily. In short, oil security is well assured at a global level
but there will always be a massive economic impact on the producers when
there are big swings in oil prices. The challenge for the Middle East
will be to try to ensure that major shocks are avoided.

Demographics

15\. The workshop tended to view Middle East demographics as an
influencing factor rather than as a major driver in its own right. It is
a truism to say that the people factor and the dynamic between
population, resources and technology are key in any form of strategic
planning. Population factors may exacerbate any conflict particularly
when there are severe pressures on land and other natural resources such
as water. Migration or the influx of refugees may also create heightened
tensions. How individual governments respond to the health, education,
and employment needs of increasing populations is a major influence on
stability.

16\. There is considerable variation in population estimates for the
region. The more optimistic view is that there will be no long-term
population explosion in the Middle East but, as in Europe, the problem
of ageing populations will become an increasingly important issue.
Advances in recent years in the percentage of girls receiving secondary
education are cited as a factor influencing family size. Areas of
conflict such as Gaza and the West Bank have witnessed very high
fertility rates as a mechanism for coping with conflict - the notion of
security in numbers -- but these are now levelling off. Countries like
Saudi Arabia have in the past followed policies to promote birth rates.
It is arguable that advances in technology will reduce the demand for
labour and that smaller families will become the norm.

17\. Despite these developments, many still see the number of young
people, including increasing numbers of young women, entering the labour
market in the next five to 10 years to be problematic, especially since
most economies of the region are largely stagnant. Participants
recognised the importance of the European Union (EU) as an area that
could continue to absorb a significant amount of surplus labour from
North Africa and other parts of the Middle East. However, with the
enlargement of the EU and a reaction to perceived security threats,
certain European governments are under strong pressure from their
electorates to tighten up their policies on immigration. A hardening of
the EU's borders would undoubtedly cause problems, although some
considered this European 'safety valve' to be relatively insignificant
in relation to the actual increase in the population. Others also
identified less welcome aspects of this labour movement. The EU (and
indeed the US) is generally highly selective -- it wants to skim off the
best professional people but not take the unqualified. This is creating
a brain drain in some countries.

18\. Another factor making accurate population forecasts difficult is
the massive percentage of migrant workers from Asia residing in certain
countries in the Gulf, in some cases outnumbering the indigenous
population. There was some discussion of the extent to which migrant
workers might influence domestic politics should they be allowed to
become citizens and participate in the political life of the country.
This could greatly change the political landscape but many thought such
a scenario was unrealistic, as it would never gain the support of the
ruling elites.

19\. Do population pressures and lack of employment opportunities for
young men drive people towards extremist political movements (and not
just Islamic ones)? It was recognised that when people are faced with
stress in their daily lives they are likely to look to anyone holding
out a promise of better things. In some areas Islamic institutions have
a dual role: providing basic social services as well as pursuing
religious and political agendas. Although population pressures in
themselves do not lead directly to extremism, a combination of high
population growth with economic stagnation can produce thwarted economic
and social aspirations. The frustration born out of this is ripe for
exploitation by organised groups of whatever religious or political
persuasion.

Democracy and Governance

20\. Democracy has not made the same advances in the Arab region as it
has in some other Muslim majority states. There is a unanimous view in
the region that the move to pluralist societies can only be achieved
incrementally and cannot be imposed as a blueprint from outside. The
workshop tended to feel that the West placed too much emphasis on the
holding of elections, which, while important, is only one element of the
process towards democratisation. Additionally, some felt greater
emphasis needs to be given to building the institutions for the rule of
law. It was felt that the more the United States and Europe engage with
and encourage reformers, rather than confront and hector, the sooner
genuine democracy will be achieved.

21\. As mentioned above, most of the Middle East suffers from an
excessive politicisation of every sphere of life. Economic decisions,
for example, are more likely to be made on the basis of political
expediency than economic common sense. In most states independent civil
society organisations are barely allowed to exist since such groups are
seen as a threat to the political system. Trade unions and women's
organisations, for example, are more often than not quasi state bodies
run by arms of the central government. In academic life, appointments
are often subject to political vetting to ensure that 'subversive
elements' are kept out. This over-politicisation inhibits initiative and
results in a poor utilisation of human resources. The best people for
particular jobs often get overlooked because their views do not fit with
the ruling orthodoxy. In some cases this is a deliberate attempt to
resist change and reform as, like elsewhere, many vested interests do
well out of the status quo and have no desire to cede their privileged
positions to others. Some say that outside political influences, notably
from the United States, have been complicit in helping to maintain this
situation since they have preferred to deal with personalities they know
and understand rather than with new and unknown quantities.

22\. There is hope that governance in the region can be improved in
incremental steps, but the workshop was adamant that the push for change
must be internally driven. Externally imposed blueprints of democracy
will not be acceptable or sustainable, although the Middle East should
look to other examples such as Eastern Europe where democratisation has
been successfully introduced in a number of countries. It was agreed,
though, that if the Iraqi democratisation experiment succeeds, this may
well influence change in other countries of the region. One important
caveat is that the process of democratisation does not automatically
have to lead to a western style liberal democracy. Middle Eastern
democracy and development is more likely to be achieved through a
gradual depoliticisation of the economy, the spread of education and
expansion of a real civil society. The establishment of the rule of law,
including an independent judicial system and independent media, were
identified as the foundation on which to build.

23\. Some argue that democratic experiments in the Middle East have
often failed because they have allowed extremist elements to win power.
Conversely, others see this as fundamentally healthy since it brings
their philosophies and policies out into the open and gives people a
chance to reject them electorally. In an authoritarian state, extremist
elements have to work in the shadows but by doing so they often
penetrate more deeply into a society than otherwise would be the case.

Islam and social identity

24\. The workshop considered it important to underline that in Islam, as
in other religions, people demonstrate a wide spectrum of religious
behaviour from believers but non-practitioners to extreme
fundamentalists. It must also be acknowledged that while Islamic leaders
can and do play a political role, a person's Islamic identity bears
little relation to his or her practical political and voting behaviour.
It is therefore possible to distinguish between cultural Islam,
traditional Islam and, finally, political Islam which is indeed
controversial even in Islamic countries. Many people reject the notion
of the inseparability of Islam and the state, and the degree of their
Islamic religiosity has little correlation with their preference for a
democratic or an authoritarian style of government.

25\. Recent research has shown, however, that younger people are
increasingly identifying themselves in terms of their religious identity
rather than their national one. The historical division of the Middle
East into nominally independent 'nation states' in the aftermath of the
colonial period is seen by many as artificial. Instead, a trans-national
Islamic basis of identity is strong. This is likely to become
politically significant as the current young generation matures over the
next 15-20 years and becomes the new generation of political leaders and
policy makers. An interesting thesis is that at a time of rapid
globalisation many societies are feeling a strong need to assert their
individual identity. This may explain why there is a resurgence in the
Middle East of support for Islam and the Arab language, and why, for
example, many young Muslim women living in the West are taking up
wearing the veil as a highly visible symbol of cultural and religious
identity. An interesting phenomenon is that Muslims returning home after
living in the West are often more radical in their views and more
willing to espouse extremist politics than those who have never been
away.

Possible scenarios for developments in the Middle East to 2020

26\. Having discussed the principal drivers as relatively discrete
elements, the workshop sought to elaborate scenarios that could develop
as a result of their interaction. Although there was variation in views
on potential outcomes for the Middle East to 2020, the scenarios
regarded as the most plausible are described below.

\(a\) Stagnation

27\. This case rests on the supposition that there will be little change
over the next 10-15 years in the current status quo. Governments will
muddle through without major conflicts taking place, or serious shocks.
Yet there will be little political advancement either, particularly on
the Israel-Palestine conflict. Regimes would have just enough income and
growth to keep the situation stable in their countries; the electorate
would not be particularly happy but neither would they be in open
revolt. It was agreed that this situation could change dramatically if
there was a major fall in oil revenues although this was considered to
be highly unlikely; there may be small changes taking place rather than
a major readjustment.

28\. The most worrying effect of stagnation is that it is the scenario
most likely to encourage the continuance of terrorism. Poor economic
performance and lack of progress in the development of democratic
institutions fuels unemployment, lowers living standards and leads to
frustration that can be exploited by groups that espouse violence as a
means to promote change.

29\. By contrast, an ideal scenario would see Arab-Israeli peace,
leading to an extension of democracy, increased economic growth and
employment, greater regional integration and a move towards
secularisation in which moderate forms of Islam would be the predominant
culture. In reality, the prevailing opinion is that there is likely to
be a mix of good and bad along the way. The Middle East is not one
homogeneous region and each country is likely to develop differently.
Some leaders may try to avoid significant change, but social and
economic pressures will force many of them to embrace change. The role
of US foreign policy in the region will continue to be crucial. The
perceived propping up of defunct regimes by the US in exchange for
secure oil sources has in itself helped to promote continued stagnation.
Disengagement is highly unlikely but would in itself have an
incalculable effect.

\(b\) Democratisation and political reform

30\. A more optimistic scenario envisages gradual democratisation and
political reform. The process will be different in individual countries
and the end result will be a group of states that share common
democratic values but which are organised and behave in different ways.
The challenges of democratisation must not be underestimated. Most
Middle East regimes are authoritarian and oligarchic by nature and it
will require a major change in mindsets to achieve the desired result.
As democratisation progresses there will be an opening up of political
systems, greater public participation in political life, the development
of a genuine and strong civil society, greater freedom of information,
helped especially through increased access to internet sources of
information, and the development of independent media. Autocratic
regimes which were previously tolerated if they provided a reasonable
standard of living to the majority of their citizens, will be thrown out
of power if they fail to deliver. Once the process has started, a
broader cross-section of political opinion will develop and new
political parties emerge. Traditional Islamist parties will need to
regroup and organise themselves to meet the challenge of political
competition. The result will be that even if they continue with a
socially conservative agenda they will have to adopt politically
democratic principles in order to gain support and election.

31\. Liberal democracies will allow freedom of worship within a secular
system and radical Islamists may well gain positions of power. It should
not be taken for granted, however, that radical regimes would
automatically be anti-western provided there was not undue interference
in their affairs. In this sense they can be extremist in their internal
governance, but not in their dealings with the wider world.

32\. The prospects for change vary from country to country. Iraq is seen
as the best hope as it is evolving from a completely new situation. The
old regime has been dismantled and there is a good chance that it will
develop its own new democratic constitution. Saudi Arabia presents a
different challenge. As an executive monarchy its rulers have no roots
in democratic traditions. Although there may be modest reforms, it is
unlikely that there will be a sudden willingness to cede power to a
democratically elected body.

33\. In summary there is no single road map towards democracy. Each
country is likely to take its own course. There will inevitably be
tensions as new political forces develop within countries, but once the
new democratic culture becomes firmly embedded extremist, elements are
likely to be gradually neutralised. Individual leaders will need to
provide a model and be willing to give up their position if they are
voted out of power, for example.

\(c\) Arab-Israeli conflict

34\. Despite the current stalemate, some participants were of the
opinion that a settlement of the Palestine issue, leading to new and
peaceful relations between Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the wider Middle
East was a viable scenario. It was argued that the conflict has so
preoccupied the politics of the region for so long that it has allowed
regimes an excuse for not making more progress on economic and social
reform. Although peace would not in itself help to promote democracy
elsewhere in the region, it would have a strong positive regional effect
and force governments to address other pressing problems.

35\. The converse of this scenario -- the creation of an unstable
Palestinian state and prolonged conflict with Israel, was also regarded
as a distinct possibility. In this case it is likely that the area would
be 'compartmentalised' by the rest of the region because of their fear
that the consequences of a major conflagration would spill over into
their territories. On balance, the workshop felt that, whatever the
outcome, the Israel--Palestine conflict would not be the dominant driver
in the region over the next 15-20 years that it is currently, although
it would indeed colour all other political developments. The lesson
would be for the region to learn how to compromise and accommodate.

\(d\) Fragmentation of Middle Eastern states

36\. A doomsday scenario would see the intensification of inter/intra
state conflict in the region, fragmentation and an increase in the
number of failed or failing states. This scenario rests upon the highly
debatable thesis that Middle East states are not solid enough to
withstand severe economic and social pressures. If it were to come
about, new states could emerge from the remnants of fragmented states,
such as a separate Kurdish state. Others raised the possibility of Saudi
Arabia fragmenting into a series of mini states as a result of a final
showdown between modernists and traditionalists.

37\. Fragmentation of the region would result from failures of the
international community rather than from purely internal and regional
dynamics. If the US-led war on terror and the military intervention in
the region failed to secure a lasting peace this could add fuel to
internal divisions and conflicts providing a real catalyst for disaster.
The consensus was that this is unlikely to happen; but it would be wrong
to discount the possibility of a catastrophic situation too complex for
countries to manage in the traditional political manner, such as the
future emergence of a new and hostile nuclear power. Rather than
complete fragmentation of states, it was thought more probable that
there would be pressure for regional devolution and semi-autonomous
regions within states. Some saw this as a potentially dangerous
development as such areas could be exploited by extremists not wishing
to work within the normal mainstream political institutions of the
country.

38\. Once again, the workshop also juxtaposed the opposite scenario -- a
major coming-together of states and factions in the region as a united
and peaceful entity. This scenario would require the emergence of a new
Arab statesman accepted by all, including Israel, who would have a
unifying effect on the whole region. It was agreed that, while not
impossible, no one of such stature has yet emerged to fill such a role.

\(e\) Weapons proliferation intensifies

39\. Another gravely pessimistic scenario sees an increase in armaments
in the region, fuelled by current tensions, leading to an arms race and
Iran's open declaration of military nuclear capacity. This would be
watershed for the region. Would Egypt, for example, be prepared to see
Iran develop such a capacity without responding itself? It was pointed
out that nuclear technology can nowadays be 'bought in' rather than
developed 'in-house'\... Others, like Saudi Arabia, could conceivably
decide that they too needed to develop this capability. The conclusion
was that an intensive arms race in the Middle East is in fact unlikely
to happen unless one nation has the temerity to promote actual friction
through conducting missile tests or similar unfriendly actions.

Global scenarios for 2020

40\. The conference concluded by looking at how the Middle East may
contribute towards or be influenced by possible global scenarios for
2020. Firstly, it was suggested that continuing globalisation, though
with more variety in economic systems than was originally envisaged,
would produce a dominant trend to open markets, open borders and
increasingly interdependent partnerships between producers and consumers
in global markets. Successful World Trade Organisation (WTO) and EU
negotiations will have led to better access to developed country markets
for agricultural products. A second scenario, if there is no progress
made in global trade, will lead to a regionalisation of trade and
payments, and a more multipolar order. A third scenario underscores a
rampant increase in global insecurity. In the face of this security
dilemma, cooperation atrophies and self-help is the order of the day. A
fourth scenario envisages deepening economic and strategic competition
between the US and China.

41\. Although the Middle East has a lot to gain economically from
globalisation, it was agreed that Arabs/Muslims are nervous that certain
aspects of globalisation, especially the pervasive influence of western,
particularly American, values and morality are a threat to traditional
cultural and religious values. A modest increase in inter-Arab
integration was felt to have occurred in recent years, although whether
there is the psychological shift to Arab cooperation is an open
question. The rise of another superpower, China, will provide an
interesting juxtaposition. The latter is likely to become a major oil
importer as its huge economy continues to grow and it may well wish to
make major investments in the Middle East.

42 No firm conclusions can be drawn about what the Middle East of 2020
will look like. But it can be said with certainty that developments in
the region will continue to play a very important role in shaping the
political and economic scene far beyond its own borders.