DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2400

DAAR-ZA 29 April 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, (OCAR) and
Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) Staff Action Officers

SUBJECT: "Life Among the Indians"

1\. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve is a General Staff agency of
the Army Staff (ARSTAF) in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).
The OCAR provides direction for Army Reserve planning, programming,
budgeting and execution to accomplish the CAR's Title 10 mission of
providing trained units and soldiers to the United States Army.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command is the command and control
headquarters through which the Commanding General (CG), USARC exercises
command of U.S. Army Reserve units. For the CAR/CG to accomplish his
missions he relies on the work of the OCAR staff and USARC General
Staff. The General Staff is a corporate tribe with few chiefs and many
Indians. The latter do the work and expend the sweat -- all in the
interests of the United States Army.

2\. The General Staff is no place for glamour boys and girls,
self-seekers, and glory-hunters. It requires officers, NCOs and civilian
employees, who are thorough, painstaking and sound. General Staff work
is mostly hard digging to establish the facts. My biggest concern is to
be sure we know what we are talking about. That is the hardest thing in
the world, to know what you are talking about. First and last we must
have facts; real, verified facts. To dig out these facts, compile and
analyze them, sort them, and from the facts provide studied conclusions
and straight-forward recommendations, we rely on you, the Staff Action
Officer.

3\. An Army exists for only one purpose: action. The staff exists only
to produce action. We call you an "action officer" because we want
action. All you are here for is to get something done. Any paper, any
word you write, is wasted effort unless it directly contributes to
getting something done. You may have a long hard task, a lot of
research, a lot of conferences, a lot of concurrences; but all the time
your mission is to find that solution and get something done. Now the
first thing is to gather all the pertinent facts, but the hardest part
of that is to be sure that they are in truth factual. I cannot warn you
too solemnly that this is very hard, this being sure you have right and
true facts. The most awe-inspiring people sometimes make important
assertions that are not facts at all. What do good Staff Action Officers
need to possess to accomplish their mission of getting facts -- here are
a few of the attributes of an outstanding performing Staff Action
Officer.

a\. What we look for first is common sense, just plain horse sense.
Second, patience. And most important of all, good temper. You also need
the ability, which you must develop, to show one or two essential facts
on a piece of paper no bigger than one page -- boiler plate, Badge 714
style "Just the Facts"!

b\. Ownership by Action Officers. Work programs or issues within your
area of responsibility from beginning to end. Even though an action has
reached the front office, it will still require future monitoring and
work. Keep it on your radar screen. You own the action from beginning
until it reaches execution in the field, and then you must monitor and
assist in its execution. The action may be in another office for
coordination or the front office for approval, but you still own it.
Check on its progress and if necessary prod executive officers and
fellow action officers to move it if required to meet a suspense. When
you are assigned an action you own it in its entirety -- you schedule
the meetings, set the agenda, disseminate the read-ahead, coordinate
specialized support -- you are responsible to produce the action!

c\. The doctrine of "Completed Staff Work" is a doctrine of this office.
"Completed Staff Work" is the study of a problem and presentation of a
solution, by a staff member, in such form that all that remains to be
done on the part of the head of the staff unit, section, chief of Staff,
or Commander, is to indicate his or her approval or disapproval of the
completed action. The words "completed action" are emphasized because
the more difficult the problem is, the more the tendency is to present
the problem to the section head in piece-meal fashion. It is your duty
as a staff member to work out the details. You should not consult your
section head in the determination of those details, no matter how
perplexing they may be. You may and should consult other staff members.
The product, whether it involves the pronouncement of a new policy or
affects an established one, should, when presented to the section head
for approval or disapproval, be worked out in finished form. When you
have finished your "Completed Staff Work" the final test is this: If you
were the section head, would you be willing to sign the paper you have
prepared, and stake your professional reputation on its being right?
(This requires some careful thought on the part of the staff member
since it is usually extremely tempting to think "Yes, I would sign this"
without really thinking through the implications of what one is
proposing). If the answer is in the negative, take it back and work it
over, because it is not yet "Completed Staff Work".

4\. The responsibilities of commanders and staffs and their
relationships and intricacies are often a source of confusion and
misunderstanding. Such confusion causes friction and unnecessary waste;
during combat it could lead to disaster. In 1937 the forerunner of
"Infantry Magazine", then called "The Infantry School Mailing List",
published an article titled "The Functioning of the Infantry Staff". It
is one of the most accurate, complete descriptions of the functions of a
staff and how the staff should operate to serve the command that I am
familiar with. I have included a copy of that article at enclosure 1. I
strongly encourage you to read it closely, apply its teachings and use
it in training your staffs. I cannot emphasize too strongly the
importance of our use of these doctrines and teachings.

5\. Using these tools and the guidance provided herein we can improve
the quality of our staff work -- a must for us to serve and support our
great Army Reserve soldiers, employees and family members. You are the
unsung heroes of OCAR and USARC, the Staff Action Officer; you produce
the action -- HOOAH!

*(Original PDF version signed)*

Encl JAMES R. HELMLY

Major General, USA

Chief, Army Reserve Designee

The Infantry School

MAILING LIST

A compilation of instructional matter

Prepared at The Infantry School

And issued from time to time

Containing the Latest Thought

on Infantry

VOLUME XIV\-\--JULY 1937

*Prepared by the*

*Academic Department of the Infantry School*

*Under the supervision of the*

*Assistant Commandant*

DISTRUBUTED BY THE BOOK SHOP

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

PREFACE

This volume of The Infantry School Mailing List contains material
contributed by the following infantry officers:

Major Claud E. Stadtman

Major Eugene M. Landrum

Major John T. Murray

Major Frederick Irving

Major Raymond G. Lehman

Captain W llam A. Marsh

Captain William H. Schildroth

Captain Wendell G. Johnson

Major John H. Burns, assisted by Major Elliot D. Cooke and Captain
Wendell G. Johnson, edited this volume.

The drawings, map reproductions, printing, and binding are the work of
the enlisted personnel of The Infantry School Reproduction Plant,
supervised by Captain George C. Mergens.

C.F. Thompson

Colonel, Infantry

Assistant Commandant,

The Infantry School

CHAPTER 5

The Functioning of the Infantry Staff

(An Infantry School Teaching)

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Staff officers are assistants to the commander. Therefore, if we are to
understand the underlying principles governing staff organization and
function, a clear conception of command responsibility and the command
function is absolutely necessary. The controlling head of a military
organization is the commander. He alone is responsible to his proper
superior for everything his command does---or fails to do. He alone is
responsible for all basic decisions, plans, and policies that emanate
from his headquarters. This responsibility cannot be shared and it
cannot be delegated. In this the staff has no part. It is one man's
responsibility, and in order to meet this responsibility the commander
must be able to make his authority felt and his will obeyed by each and
every member of his command.

Yet it is obvious that personal contact between a commander and the
individuals that make up his command becomes more and more difficult as
the size of the unit increases. In addition, experience has proven that
the number of individuals which a commander can personally supervise and
control is extremely limited. How then can the commander---this single
controlling and responsible head---effectively direct each of the many
individuals composing his command and make his authority felt and his
will obeyed by each individual? Manifestly, he cannot do this by
personal supervision and direct orders to each individual, as can a
corporal. The commander must have some framework of organization by
means of which he may impose his will on a few subordinates, each
responsible directly and only to him, so that through them he may be
able to make his authority felt down to the last private.

This framework is provided by organizing into successive subordinate
groups, each under its own commander, and making each subordinate
commander responsible to his immediate superior for all that his
subdivision does or fails to do. This succession of subordinate
commanders, through whom the commander of the whole exercises his
authority and control, is known as the *chain of command*. This is the
vital artery of the command system. All authority and all responsibility
flows through this artery, and through it alone. Cut it anywhere
throughout its course only at the peril of seriously interrupting or
diverting the normal flow of command authority---the only thing that
insures the effective execution of the will of the commander.

As we ascend the steps of the military hierarchy of command, we
eventually reach a point where the number of units grouped under a
single responsible commander imposes upon him numerous and exacting
details. These he cannot possibly have the time and physical endurance
to attend to in person if, at the same time, he is to give his attention
to the broader phases of his duties. Therefore, at this point in the
chain of command, the commander must be provided with staff assistants
to relieve him of the burden of details connected with the issuance and
distribution of orders, the evaluation if information, and the supply
and movement of his troops.

We believe that this point is first reached in the battalion. Here,
then, is the lowest echelon in which the commander must have staff
assistants. Staffs are not a recent introduction into the military
system, nor does the role of the staff plays alter in any way the basic
principle of command responsibility. *Staffs are no part of the chain of
command*. The commander retains as full responsibility and exacts as
complete responsibility from his subordinate commanders as though these
assistants---the staff---never existed.

From the above, it can be seen that command, responsibility, and
organization are interdependent. Not only must this be clearly
understood by prospective commanders, but it must be understood by
prospective staff officers. The latter are assistants to the commander,
performing in his name such of the details pertaining to the commander's
functions as he may delegate to them. In the performance of these
details they must keep in mind the responsibility of their commander and
the means by which their commander holds his subordinate commanders to
their responsibilities. The line of authority and responsibility passes
direct from superior commander to subordinate commander. It does not
pass through the staff nor can the staff with impunity assume any of the
authority or responsibility pertaining to the chain of command.

Staffs, in some form or other, are as old as command and may be said to
go back to the period when armed hordes were first grouped into definite
military organizations. Commanders have always employed assistants:
first as couriers to deliver oral orders; later as military secretaries,
with the primary duty of reducing the commander's orders to writing; and
still later as assistants in the performance of administrative and
tactical duties.

There is nothing to be gained by attempting to trace the historical
origin and development of the staff as an institution in military
organization. It is sufficient to say that when armies were small,
commanders with a few assistants could work out the details of plans and
orders. Fighting formations, and questions of supply were comparatively
simple. Battlefields were restricted and troops usually fought under the
eye of the commander. As armies became larger and more complex, a
commander was compelled to shift more and more of the burden of
administrative detail on the shoulders of assistants in order to
conserve his own time and energy for the maneuvering of fighting units.
Thus was developed what may be termed the *special staff*, \--such as
adjutants, quartermasters, and so forth. As weapons improved and
fighting formations became more dependent upon specific tactical
situations and less on fixed geometric tactical formations, commanders
found the need of a new type of assistant---one who could take over some
of the burden of tactical detail. Thus was developed the staff group
that may be called the *tactical staff* or in large units the *general
staff*. The *unit staff* of our modern battalion, regiment, or brigade
is an outgrowth of this evolution. In it are combined some of the
functions of both the tactical and the administrative staff.

It has been previously stated that after a command reaches a certain
size it is impossible for the commander to perform, personally, all the
duties which devolve upon him, and that it is necessary to delegate or
assign certain of these duties to his assistants. In considering what
duties will be delegated to these assistants we must divide the
functions of the commander into two general classes. The first class
embraces those duties which are inherent in that person of the commander
and which either cannot, or should not, be delegated. Let us call such
duties *command duties*. The second class of duties are those which the
commander finds it possible to delegate to his assistants. These may be
referred to as *staff duties*. In general, they consist in handling
details in conformity with the plan or policy of the commander which has
previously been announced. These so-called *staff duties* may be
functionally classified into: (1) personnel, (2) military intelligence,
(3) operations and training, and (4) supply. This functional
classification of staff duties has come to be recognized as the
underlying principle of all staff organization, from the battalion to
the general headquarters.

This grouping must not be construed as implying that staff details can
be neatly classified as pertaining exclusively to one, and only one
group. It is not as easy as that. Seldom, if ever, will a question come
up that will not in some vital way affect all staff groups. Battles are
fought with personnel and, therefore, personnel affects tactics.
Tactical plans affect supply and supply, in its turn, affects tactics.
Moreover, both have a marked effect on personnel matters. Enemy
information is vital to proper tactical plans. As a consequence it is
common for one item to need the consideration of several staff sections
before a sound decision can be reached. Thus all things interlock to
make a battle pattern. From all this it is easy to see that there can be
*no water-tight staff compartments* into which we may dump these various
details of operations. Furthermore, since staff sections interlock and
overlap, it is apparent that a coordinating head must be provided to
effectively insure that the many related questions that are delegated to
the staff are properly handled. This coordination could, of course, be
effected by the commander. But that would, in itself, defeat the very
purpose of a staff---that of freeing the commander of the burden of
detail, in order that he may have the time and opportunity of
discharging his broader functions of command. The commander, therefore,
obviously needs one principal assistant, to act as his chief advisor. A
person who can represent him when he is absent, and who, while
coordinating the overlapping staff functions referred to above, also
insures that staff and subordinate commanders function in accordance
with the orders of the commander.

From the foregoing we see that the command functions that are ordinarily
delegated to assistants and known as staff duties may be classified into
four functional groups and one coordinating group. This functional
classification of staff duties and the necessity for a coordinating head
is recognized in the organization of the unit staff of our battalions,
regiments, and brigades.\*

\[\*The physical organization and functioning of the infantry staff may
readily be obtained in Chapter 1, Part One, Staff Officers' Field
Manual.\]

It is not enough to learn the written principles of staff
procedure---anyone who reads can do that. The staff is not a machine,
neither is the commander nor the troops, both of whom the staff must
serve. All are human beings---commander, staff and troops. Only by
recognizing this fact can staff officers acquire sufficient background
for the application of the principles and practice of staff operation.
Only with this knowledge, ever present in the background, can the staff
be a help to the commander and the troops. Without it they become an
instrument of discord and meddlesome interference, causing
disorganization, distrust, and lowered morale.

It may be asked, "Just what are the relations of the staff to the
commander?" The cardinal principle that governs all activity of the
staff officer is: The staff neither commands nor executes, for it has no
element subordinate to its authority. It only assists the commander in
preparing, transmitting and following up *his* orders and in so doing
*recognizes no authority save that of the commander*.

Good commanders usually resent any usurpation of their authority,
especially by staff officers. The staff officer who attempts it will
quickly find that he has forfeited the confidence of his commander and
that his usefulness as a staff officer is at an end. Even the appearance
of usurpation must be studiously avoided. The phrases: "I desire---", "I
direct---"or even "we wish" must never be used. It should be: "The
colonel directs---", "The general desires---"or the like.

No two commanders follow the same methods of command. If you would
assist the commander you must know his methods. If you would know his
methods you must know the man. Therefore, the staff officer must
endeavor to learn the commander's personal characteristics, so that he
can adjust himself and his actions to them. This will require a close
study of the commander's way of doing business, to ascertain his
peculiarities and his idiosyncrasies---if any. This is done, not with
the idea of *reforming* the commander, but with the idea of *doing
business his way*. For instance, some commanders require a mass of
detailed data concerning problems presented them for decision, while
others require only the essential facts. The rule is to find out what
the commander wants, and the way he wants it; then give it to him
exactly that way. This subordination to the commander's method of
working in no way implies that the staff officer is to become a "yes
man". Quite the contrary, the staff officer must have well defined ideas
and thoughts and the personal courage and integrity to present them,
when requested, irrespective of the known opinion of the questioner. The
lack of this quality is a serious defect in any staff officer.

The staff must keep the commander informed on all important matters
affecting the command. Nothing embarrasses a commander more than to
discover from an outside source that something has been going on in his
organization for some time and his staff has failed to inform him of it.
Questions of this nature are a real test of the judgment and common
sense of the staff officer.

Yet where shall he draw the line? Is the subject one the commander must
be informed of at once, even though the staff officer is unprepared to
present him with the essential facts bearing on it? Is the subject one
which he may withhold from the commander until such time as he is able
to gather the essential facts and is prepared to make a definite
recommendation? Is it a matter that may be classified as an unimportant
detail that need not be presented to the commander? The answer cannot be
found by the use of any rule or formula. Good judgment and common sense
will usually lead to the right answer. If there is any rule that is
applicable, it is this: resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of
informing the commander.

This brings us to the question of how matters should be offered to a
commander for decision. This, of course, will depend on the staff
officer knowing the manner in which the commander wants his problems
presented. Usually a commander wants facts. Whenever possible, the staff
officer must marshal all the facts bearing on the subject. He should
analyze these facts and their bearing on the problem at hand. He must
either arrange all these facts in a logical manner in writing or be
prepared to present them orally. The arrangement and consideration of
these facts should enable him to arrive at a conclusion. This he should
give to the commander in the form of a definite recommendation. If time
permits, the papers required to put this recommendation into effect---if
approved by the commander---should be prepared and submitted with the
recommendation. This saves time, for as soon as the commander indicates
his approval the matter is ready for signature and quick dispatch.

Should the commander fail to approve the recommendation, or modify it in
any way, then the staff officer must cheerfully accept the change and
proceed to carry out the commander's wisher with the same energy as
though his original recommendation had been approved in full.

Before we leave the relations of the staff to the commander, it is
desired to refer to two personal matters that are very important.
*First*: In his position as advisor to the commander the staff officer
must remember that his opinion as to the ability of other officers may
carry considerable weight; therefore petty personal differences must be
put aside. *Second*: The staff should beware of gossip and avoid
gossipers as it would a pestilence. The staff officer who indulges in or
even listens to gossip is a menace to the harmony of a command, for
inevitably such practices lead to discord and distrust. The staff
officer who permits gossip to color his reports to his commander or who
gossips about his commander immediately impairs his value to that
officer.

There is no place on a staff for the officer who by nature or habit is
temperamentally antagonistic toward those about him, or who gives this
impression. Staff duties frequently overlap. Conflicts arise which must
be adjusted in the interest of the command as a whole. This calls for
the exercise of tact, forbearance, and unselfish self-effacement by all,
if the staff is to be an effective, helpful team. Friendship and loyalty
within the staff play an important part in team work and should be
fostered. The physically close and mentally intimate association
resulting from personal conference greatly facilitates coordination. For
this reason staff coordination is best effected by direct relations
between officers of the different sections. In this way ideas are
crystallized and plans adjusted in a minimum time before commencing the
solution of a given problem, or the drawing up of an order. This system
gives free scope to the staff officer's initiative. Written memoranda
and so-called "buck slips" delay action.

Memoranda between staff officers should be needed only to supplement
personal contact methods. This applies particularly to infantry staffs
which are relatively small. Too great a use of this system between staff
sections indicates either indolence or a lack of confidence in
associates, shown by the desire to get an associate committed in
writing. An example of the results produced by written memoranda may be
quoted, since it is rather typical of what may be expected from the
system.

A civic body of a certain city were one of our Regular Army regiments is
stationed called on the commanding officer and requested a military
parade for the delegates to a convention then in session. The commanding
officer agreed and set a date of three days later. He sent for S-3 and
directed him to make the necessary arrangements for a parade of the
entire regiment, including the trains.

This headquarters was well organized. It had its own Message Center.
Although S-3 could confer with S-4 by walking across the hall, he sent
him a note, written on an office form, called a "buck slip". The
efficient Message Center functioned well enough to deliver the buck slip
to S-4 the next afternoon at 2:00 o'clock. Unfortunately, that very
morning, S-4, acting on the authority given him by the commanding
officer---prior to the conference with the committee of civilians---had
stripped the wagons of his train for painting. In fact, painting had
already begun. We can picture the commander's state of mind when he
found out that his plan could not be carried out in full because of a
failure in staff cooperation?

Another case: S-3, as everyone knows, is charged with planning troop
movements. When this involves marching, S-3's plan also includes the
time and place of the bivouacs. S-1 is charged with the supervision of
quartering and sheltering arrangements. A simple requirement in
elementary coordination, surely, but let us see how it worked out in one
case. The situation is not uncommon.

A regiment was on a practice march several years ago. When the troops
arrived at the bivouac area they were halted with packs on, and kept
waiting while S-3 lined up stakes that marked the areas of the units.
The companies then started to pitch their tents. S-3 ran up and down the
line, moving this tent and then that. S-1, who thought he had a function
to perform, had some different ideas. He stepped in and proceeded to
make changes. Both ignored the battalion and company commanders. Several
hours elapsed before the companies could settle down and rest. The
result was growling and grumbling that lasted well into the night and
seriously affected the comfort of the troops. Fortunately, the regiment
got another S-3 before taking the field the next year.

This new S-3 not only knew his business, but he knew what was not his
business. He prepared the plan for the march, the location of the halts
and bivouacs. He turned the S-3 bivouac plan over to S-1, the billeting
officer. S-1 went ahead, reconnoitered the bivouac area, and had guides
meet the units as they arrived. These guides led the units to their
assigned areas. Camp was made under the supervision of the company and
battalion commanders and in a few minutes the tired troops were under
tents and at rest. It is significant to note that this regiment was
rated *unsatisfactory* at its tactical inspection for the first year
mentioned, but for the second year it was rated *satisfactory*.

It has been stated previously that the line of authority and
responsibility passes direct from the commander to the subordinate
commanders. Not only must the staff officer remember that he is not in
this line of authority or responsibility, but he must also remember that
the subordinate commanders are usually his senior in rank. He must,
therefore, be careful to accord all officers the courtesy and
consideration due them, even while disagreeing with their ideas. Above
all, he must remember it is a command principle that all orders and
instructions from a higher unit to a subordinate unit are given to the
commander thereof. As a consequence, each subordinate commander is
accustomed to look to his immediate superior for orders and
instructions. Staff officers acting or speaking in the name of the
commander must be sure that the commander has authorized such action.

In those urgent circumstances---which fortunately are not common---where
it may be necessary to indicate action without specific authority of the
commander, the staff officer must be sure that the orders he gives in
the name of the commander are the orders that the commander would give
if he were present and acquainted with the facts. To be able to do this
the staff officer, as indicated before must be thoroughly familiar with
the policies of his commander and his method of operation. When a staff
officer acts without specific authority he must, at the first
opportunity, advise the commander of the action he has taken. For
nothing will bring about strained relations between the staff and
subordinate commanders quicker than staff usurpation of authority, or
the bare suspicion of such a condition.

Cordial, cooperative relations between the staff and subordinate
commanders will go far toward securing efficiency in the execution of
the commander's will. Therefore, it is a staff responsibility to
cultivate this relationship. Such a relationship will bear fruit during
the anticipation and preparation phase of a plan when information or
suggestions from subordinates may be illuminating. This one thing the
staff officer must constantly bear in mind---no man has so firm a grasp
on his business as to warrant deafness to the opinions of others,
particularly when these others are closer to fundamental items that
cannot be ignored.

For instance: the subordinate commanders usually have a better
understanding of the powers and limitations of their units than has the
staff. Therefore, they should be consulted freely and frankly.
Commanders' plans have failed many times, because some subordinate
commander, not with sinister intent but because of a feeling that
information was unwelcome, has held back data which should have been
communicated. Even after the commander's orders have been issued the
staff will find that, if a frank, helpful relationship with subordinate
commanders exists, there are many difficulties of execution that can be
ironed out, and many misunderstandings avoided. To sum all this up we
can say: the staff officer must get along with subordinate commanders,
and it is up to the staff officer to do most of the *getting*!

The organ of execution is the troops. If the staff officer is to be a
helpful assistant to his commander he must know the troops. If he is to
further the execution of his commander's orders he must be helpful to
the troops. He can do neither unless he is familiar with the
capabilities, limitations, and the conditions actually confronting the
troops. First-hand knowledge of such factors is gained by personal
visits to the troops and not by sitting at a desk shuffling papers. The
staff officer must organize his office so that it can function during
his absence. He must not hesitate to leave the office to obtain the
intimate knowledge of actual conditions which confront the troops. This
is a duty that he owes to the commander and to the troops. He must bear
in mind that efficient execution by the troops is, in the final summing
up, the thing that will make his commander a success or a failure. The
motto for staff officers should be: *He serves his commander best who
helps the troops most*.

It appears obvious, then, that the staff officer must have first-hand
knowledge of the needs, the conditions, and the situation of the lower
echelons; but at the same time he must remember that this knowledge
should be obtained without meddling with the responsibilities of the
hierarchy of command. To be sure, a commander cannot be everywhere and
his staff must be his eyes, but these staff eyes must function wisely
and according to a careful system. The visiting staff officer must bear
in mind that the needs of the troops are those approved by the
successive echelons of command, the respect for which lies at the base
of all military efficiency. Therefore, he must be punctilious in his
observance of proper military customs and courtesy. For example: he must
never visit troops without reporting to intervening commanders---first,
in arriving, the object of his visit; second, on leaving, what he has
seen and intends to report.

This method, while respecting the basic laws of courtesy, gives the
staff officer an opportunity to adjust his personal observation to the
viewpoints of the successive commanders. Also they will frequently give
the staff officer information unknown or unavailable in the lower
echelons. Thus his report to his commander will be well rounded and of
real value. If he keeps in mind that the purpose of his visit is to find
out how he can help the troops and if his subsequent report, or
subsequent action, has been directed toward furthering the needs of the
troops, his visits always will be welcome and fruitful.

If, in his preceding visits, he has ascertained the needs of the troops
and carried this information to the commander or to the agency that can
supply these needs, and afterwards has followed up to ascertain whether
the needs are being supplied; then, and only then, will he be doing a
real staff job. Moreover, in all his future visits, he will be received
with frankness by the troops, be looked upon as a friend, and finally
will come to be regarded as the troop representative with the commander.
That should be his goal.

Even a staff officer of mediocre professional ability can become a
pillar of strength to a command if he is able to establish such a
relationship. If, on the other hand, a staff officer, no matter how
brilliant, fails to interest himself in the needs of the troops or if,
with the mantle of the commander on his shoulders, he play the role of
critic only, the troops will heartily dislike him and resent his visits.
He will be a depressing influence. He will be a source of more harm that
good. He will be a failure, personally and to his commander.

Two contrasting examples will serve to illuminate this matter in a hard,
white light. During the war a two-company battalion in Siberia was
stationed about 150 miles from its regiment. The troops had been engaged
in rather trying operations for over six months. The equipment of the
men---for which no replacement had been available---was worn and frayed.

Early one morning the regimental supply officer arrived and reported to
the battalion commander that he had been directed by the regimental
commander to make an inspection of the command. He said his principal
interest was to see the condition of equipment and to find out if there
was any way the regimental supply office could be of assistance to the
troops. He did not desire the troops turned out, he declared, but would
accompany the battalion commander about and observe the troops as they
were.

In his tour he noticed the worn, frayed state of the men's equipment and
told the battalion commander that he would replace it at once as he had
just received a shipment of new equipment. He said that his office would
prepare the necessary papers for the transaction and forward them with
the new equipment, since he knew the company commanders had no
facilities to do this work. He listened to the battalion commander's
story about the difficulties of getting fresh beef and told him he would
find some way of getting it to the troops regularly. *And he did*.

The battalion commander unburdened himself, and the staff officer
returned to regimental headquarters. Then he followed up every request
to the entire satisfaction of the troop commander. The result obtained
from his visit was a better equipped a better fed, and a happier outfit.
That was real staff work.

Two days after he left another staff officer from the same headquarters
arrived. He informed the battalion commander that he had arrived to make
an inspection. He desired the troops turned out. He was critical of the
equipment that had been worn threadbare by actual field service. He did
not offer one helpful suggestion, nor even ask if there was anything
that regimental headquarters could do to help the situation or in any
way further the interest of the command. The immediate result of his
inspection was a bad taste in everyone's mouth. Later came a
"skin-letter" from regimental headquarters about the worn equipment
which left a worse taste. This "skin-letter" was signed by a staff
officer and not by the commander. This is staff work at its worst. Such
staff officers are of no use to a commander and are a menace to a
command.

The second staff officer never came again. Perhaps, he is still waiting
for a cordial invitation from the battalion commander.

In conclusion all that has been said might be put into six commandments
for the potential---even technically trained---staff officer. There may
be more commandments but the officer who follows these will achieve his
own official salvation and enhance his commander's reputation.

**THE STAFF OFFICER'S COMMANDMENTS**

I. The staff must recognize no authority save that of the commander. His
wishes and his interests must be paramount.

II\. The staff serves the commander best when it assists the troops
most.

III\. The staff must jealously guard against any violation of the chain
of command.

IV\. The staff officer must not be tied to the command post. He must
arrange his office so that it can function during his absence.

V. The staff must know the troops. They are the commander's engine of
execution where execution is most difficult. The staff officer should
get out and see them, help them all he can, but avoid meddling with
responsibilities of subordinate commanders, and never assume the role of
a critic.

VI\. Lastly, all good staff work is characterized by respect for the
duties and responsibilities of others, respect for the basic laws of
courtesy, and a realization that assistance to commander and to troops
is the real mission of the staff.