**Social Problems Perspectives, Disaster Research and**

**Emergency Management: Intellectual Contexts,**

**Theoretical Extensions, and Policy Implications**

**Thomas E. Drabek**

**John Evans Professor, Emeritus**

**Department of Sociology and Criminology**

**University of Denver**

**Denver, Colorado 80208-2948**

[**zted@dd-do.com**](mailto:zted@dd-do.com)

\*Revision and expansion of the 2006 E.L. Quarantelli Theory Award
Lecture presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, New York City, New York, August, 2007. (International
Research Committee on Disasters, Research Committee 39, International
Sociological Association). I wish to thank Ruth Ann Drabek for her work
on this paper. I also want to thank Gary Kreps for his critical review
of an early draft. Partial support was provided by the International
Research Committee on Disasters (IRCD) and the University of Denver
through the John Evans Professorship Program. Any opinions, findings,
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRCD, the
University of Denver, or any of the individuals acknowledged herein.

**Abstract**

This essay explores the intellectual contexts wherein disasters are
defined as non-routine social problems. The argument is advanced that
this theoretical orientation can both open new doors for researchers and
assist emergency management professionals in critically reviewing
existing policy and future proposals. The essay is comprised of five
sections: 1) [introduction]{.underline} (how I came to this topic); 2)
[social problems perspectives]{.underline} (key insights from past and
recent analyses); 3) [disaster research]{.underline} (sampling of
theoretical issues and conclusions relevant to a social problems
orientation); 4) [emergency management]{.underline} (selected policy
areas and implications) and 5) [conclusions]{.underline} (payoffs for
future theory and application).

**Social Problem Perspectives, Disaster Research, and Emergency
Management: Intellectual Contexts, Theoretical Extensions and Policy
Implications**

**[Introduction]{.underline}**

I am honored to have been selected as a recipient of the E.L.
Quarantelli Theory Award and proudly accept. I want to thank Dr. Robert
A. Stallings, former International Research Committee on Disasters
President (2002-2006) for his role in making this happen as well as Dr.
Ronald W. Perry, our current President (2006-2010).

This award only has been made twice before and I am humbled to join the
prior recipients---Drs. Russell R. Dynes (University of Delaware) and
Allen H. Barton (Columbia University). I have the greatest respect for
both of these scholars. Russ was one of my doctoral professors. I
assisted him during the founding days of the Disaster Research Center
(DRC) at The Ohio State University. His classic text (Dynes 1970)
reflected some of the early literature reviews I completed. Even though
it was published nearly four decades ago, it remains a useful reference
book for me and many others. While I never worked directly with Allen
Barton, his theoretical syntheses, e.g., 1963, 1969, stimulated my
curiosity and worked like light bulbs in my formative years. I continue
to admire the theory building skill he brought to the disaster case
studies of his day. His work helps all of us understand better how
things fit together---how differing events have parallels, how key
analytic qualities of social structure and collective stress reflected
patterns that might reemerge in future disasters (e.g., see Barton
2005).

I am equally humbled to receive this award named after my other DRC
mentor---Henry Quarantelli. His intellectual imprint was significant
initially and has grown over the years as I try to keep up with his
latest contributions. Through his work my thinking has been both
redirected and greatly deepened. Thanks Henry---I "talk" to you more
than you ever could know.

Before turning to substance, I would be remiss if I didn't also thank
the Theory Award Selection Committee, chaired by Dr. Dennis E. Wenger
(Texas A & M University, U.S.A.). In addition to Wenger, the committee
members were: Drs. Linda B. Bourque (University of California, School of
Public Health, U.S.A.), Wolf Dombrowsky (Christian-Albrechts-Universität
zu Kiel, Germany), J. Kenneth Mitchell (Rutgers University, U.S.A.),
Betty H. Morrow (Florida International University, U.S.A.), and Tricia
Wachtendorf (University of Delaware, U.S.A.). To each, I say, "Thanks."

Additionally, I want to thank Drs. William A. Anderson and B. Wayne
Blanchard. As many of you know, both have years of experience as program
directors, Anderson at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
Blanchard at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Each
provided intellectual and administrative guidance that permitted the
successful completion of numerous funded projects that facilitated many
of my publications over the years. These broadened and enriched my
understanding of both the human side of disaster and the evolving
profession of emergency management.

Finally, I want to publicly thank my wife, Ruth Ann Drabek who has
edited and word processed all of my work for decades. More importantly,
however, she has enhanced the work by being both a "friendly" critic and
an unwavering source of emotional support. You see, she always let me
know, that she, had faith in me.

After Bob Stallings explained to me that the E.L. Quarantelli Theory
Award required that the recipient present a public lecture, I began
exploring a series of possible topics. I had just finished reading the
chapter by Kreps and Bosworth (2006) in the *Handbook of Disaster
Research* (Rodríguez, Quarantelli and Dynes, 2006) and was pleased to
see their long-term efforts pushed to new heights (e.g., 1993; 1994). I
also was pleased to see some of my old data (e.g., Drabek et al. 1981)
being used in their analysis (Kreps and Bosworth 2006, p. 304) and the
basic consistencies in their logic with my assessment of strategies used
by local emergency managers to guide post-disaster response networks
(e.g., Drabek 2003b). Hence, I seriously considered pushing my
preliminary "theoretical model of disaster response effectiveness"
(Drabek 2003b, p. 149; 2005b) another step or two through this lecture
opportunity.

Days later I decided that I might develop further, document better, and
expand on a lecture I presented at the National Academies Natural
Disaster Round Table (Drabek 2003a). There I had used the old human
ecology POET model (i.e., population, organization, environment, and
technology), to examine a series of national and international trends. I
also specified some of the challenges and opportunities these trends
present to emergency managers. There are important new linkages that
need to be integrated with those observations. For example, Clarke
(2006) urges us to go beyond the confines of disaster events as
"abnormal" (e.g., see p. 129). Like Perrow did previously (1984), he
suggests that disaster is "normal", at least in the sense that it should
not be viewed ". . . as separate from the ebb and flow of normal life."
(Clarke 2006, p. 128). That was the underlying point of my NAS social
trends lecture. But while I described a variety of technological
developments that were providing opportunities (e.g., implementation of
computers into disaster response agencies) and challenges (e.g., network
failures during responses and privacy invasions through misuse of data
bases), I really had not thought through the intricacies of the ways in
which heavily networked systems---one of my trends---create new levels
of vulnerability. Conversely, as Perrow (2006) points out so well,
decentralized systems, like some terrorists groups, can function with
high reliability, remarkable efficiency, and much less vulnerability.
Hence, ". . . the loosely organized Al Qaeda network has survived at
least three decades of dedicated international efforts to eradicate it."
(p. 532).

So what are the implications of these observations for some emergency
management officials who argue that disaster response policy should
promote greater centralization and standardization among response
agencies? Might not there be something to the argument advanced by
Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson (2003) that: "System complexity in and of
itself could very well be modern society's principal vulnerability to
terrorism." (p. 26). Hence, recent policy changes might best be
redirected. Or as they put it: " . . . future development should
progress from the paradigm of business and resource consolidation and
centralization of power to a paradigm of decentralized power and
dispersed resource allocation . . ." (Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson, 2003, p.
26).

This insight parallels Perrow's (2007) conclusions following his
in-depth analysis of our vulnerabilities resulting from natural
disasters, advanced technologies, and future terrorist attacks. Despite
his realistic pessimism given a variety of serious structural flaws,
including Congressional failures in meaningful campaign finance reforms,
increased corporate concentrations and radical policy changes
implemented by the Bush administration, Perrow concluded that ". . . we
have hardly began to do the most effective thing: reducing the size of
the targets that inevitably will be attacked." (Perrow 2007, p. 325).

As I thought about these ideas for a few days, I became more and more
troubled. The failed response to Hurricane Katrina kept popping up.
Punctuated by images I recalled seeing in television coverage,
discussions with emergency management faculty (e.g., see Drabek 2007),
and scanning policy reports wherein many were proposing increased roles
for the military in future disaster responses and reduced emphasis on
state and local governments, I kept wondering, "How did things go so
wrong?" "How did FEMA once again become the favorite target of late
night comics? I thought that ended after Hurricane Andrew."

As I reflected on conversations I had over many years with the late Lacy
Suiter (former Director of Emergency Management for the State of
Tennessee) who worked so hard with James Lee Witt to push the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) toward levels of excellence many
thought could never happen, I began to realize that my emotions
paralleled those expressed by the Dixie Chicks. Maybe you know their
album entitled "Taking the Long Way". One of the songs on this album
(i.e., "Not Ready To Make Nice") (2006) contains these lines:

"I'm not ready to make nice

I'm not ready to back down

I'm still mad as hell and

I don't have time to go round and round and round."

Of course, they were dealing with a specific event that later was
documented in "Shut Up And Sing." Like thousands of others, Ruth and I
were most pleased with their recognition in the 2007 Grammy Awards
(*Rocky Mountain News*, February 12, 2007, pp. 10-11). But the anger
expressed in their song paralleled what had been building up in me for
several months. And when I tried talking with some emergency management
faculty, really homeland security types, about my essay on Katrina
entitled "Don't Blame the Victims" (Drabek, 2005a), I realized that
reorganizations of FEMA and the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), were only the tip of the iceberg. You see, I was
becoming aware of new faculty who were viewing disasters, and disaster
victims from a very different perspective than mine (see Drabek 2006c).
When I had a few explain to me at a conference that "we are at war" and
"your kind of policy criticism really hurts the morale of our troops and
encourages the terrorists", I decided I needed to go back to some
basics. I firmly believe---and always have---that social values,
institutional arrangements, political structures, and such, always must
be examined critically. And, those who express criticism of agency
doctrine, regardless of "the agency," must be both encouraged and
protected. Yet, I was encountering some homeland security and emergency
faculty who were expressing the view, "If you're not with us, you are
against us." Period!

My last book for the FEMA Higher Education Project was a revision of an
instructor guide I had prepared for college or university faculty
entitled *Social Dimensions of Disaster* (Drabek 2004; see also Drabek
2006d). This resource required an enormous amount of time and energy
from Ruth and I---it totaled 1,315 pages! But I believed that it could
facilitate faculty literature reviews and the preparation of program and
course materials. In this book, in a chapter entitled "History of
Sociological Research on Disasters," I included a brief section with
this learning objective: "Summarize the key ideas that define disasters
as social problems." (Drabek 2004, pp. 3-11 to 3-13). This section
included a recommended classroom workshop built around Kreps's (2001)
article in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral
Sciences* which was the recommended student reading. Workshop discussion
questions included these: "According to Kreps (2001), how do disasters
differ from other social problems?" and "What are disaster
'claims-making' activities?"

Students of emergency management, like their elder practitioners, need
to be encouraged to examine disaster events within a social problems
context. Why? Because if they are, disasters could not be approached as
simply "incidents to be managed" or incidents wherein community members
would be encouraged to remain uninvolved. To quote one of the
"unenlightened" emergency managers I interviewed in a prior project
(Drabek 2003b), "We can handle the crisis without public interference."
Disasters could not be approached as if they had no historical context.
Disasters could not be approached as if there were no other social
problems within the community. And the costs of disaster mitigation, in
its varied forms, could be juxtaposed against both other community
needs---health insurance for the non-covered, shelter for the homeless,
and so forth---and basic protections of privacy and freedom. How much
erosion in civil liberties do we accept just to stay safe from future
floods, hurricanes, or terrorist attacks?

In short, I am very concerned about many of the policy directions and
initiatives that have occurred since President Clinton left the White
House in January, 2001. So I rejected the other topics I had considered
for this lecture. Instead, I decided to use this occasion to elaborate
and integrate a series of theoretical connections that may help future
researchers frame their agenda differently. I also hope it may assist
emergency managers in developing a broader perspective on their
profession.

I'll begin by explaining why it is essential to incorporate the analysis
of disasters within mainstream social problems perspectives in
sociology. Such perspectives highlight both objective conditions and
social definitions of human harm and social disruption. Capturing how
these interrelate requires attention to mainstream social problems
constructs like class, status, power, ethnicity and gender. And it
requires attention to both social context and change and historical and
comparative research. Second, having established the relevance of social
problems perspectives, I will show that disasters are a particular form
of social problems. That is, by labeling disasters as "nonroutine," we
are challenged to address the implications for both theory and public
policy. When such issues are raised, basic questions of generalization
of findings and taxonomy are highlighted. Finally, I will demonstrate
that fundamental social science research has been largely ignored by
emergency management policy makers since the attacks on September 11,
2001. Consequently, many policy shifts are being implemented that are
pushing the profession of emergency management in directions that have
been and will continue to be both ineffective and inefficient. **To put
it bluntly: our nation has been going in the wrong direction since the
attacks on 9-11.**

**[Social Problems Perspectives: Past and Present]{.underline}**

Following his work at the University of Chicago, National Opinion
Research Center (NORC), the late Charles Fritz made many contributions
to the disaster studies area through his long-term stay at the National
Academy of Sciences. Quarantelli's summaries of these and other efforts
are important aspects of our historical legacy (e.g., see Quarantelli
1987a). Over the years, Fritz helped organize numerous committees which
brought together some of the best scholars in the country to assess a
wide range of research and policy issues (e.g., Committee on
Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Predictions 1978 \[chaired by Ralph
Turner\] and Committee on International Disaster Assistance 1979
\[chaired by Russell Dynes\]).

Of much help to many, however, has been his summary chapter (Fritz 1961)
entitled "Disasters" which appeared in the first edition of the widely
used social problems text edited by Robert K. Merton and Robert A.
Nisbet (1961). This text was revised and updated three times. The second
edition, published five years after the first, did not contain Fritz's
chapter, nor did any subsequent versions, e.g., 1976 (4^th^ edition).
Did this mean that Merton and Nisbet had decided that disasters were not
social problems? The rationale given at the time is informative.

> "Three new chapters have been introduced---on alcohol, poverty, and
> war and disarmament---to deal with vital problems of contemporary
> society not included in the first edition. These additions have been
> at a price: to avoid lengthening an already long book, it was
> necessary to drop the chapters on problems of military life, of
> disaster and catastrophe, and of transportation in the metropolis,
> which proved to be more appropriate for graduate students than for
> undergraduates. Advanced students will want to consult those chapters
> in the first edition to learn how the sociological orientation helps
> to clarify problems once assumed to be the exclusive province of other
> specialists." (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. ix).

That is the message of this lecture. That is, " . . . how the
sociological orientation helps to clarify problems once assumed to be
the exclusive province of other specialists." (Merton and Nisbet 1966,
ix). As the profession of emergency management continues to evolve and
accommodate the constraints of any varying political ideologies and
horrifying events like the attacks on 9-11, a sociological perspective
has as much or more to offer today as it did in 1961. And it is the
collective responsibility of at least some of us to bring our theory,
including those unique insights found within our analysis of social
problems, and our research, to issues confronting emergency managers.

Let me illustrate this rich social problems legacy by highlighting seven
themes which I emphasize in my own courses. These enhance student
capacity for critical analysis, and in the tradition of a basic liberal
arts curriculum, their capacity for freedom. Those implementing new
university programs in both emergency management and homeland security
are advised that failure to incorporate insights like these will lessen
the analytical capacity of their graduates in their future roles.

**1. There is a relationship between the *[private
troubles]{.underline}* experienced by individuals and the *[public
issues]{.underline}* of their day.**

For many of us, this insight is one of the cornerstones of "the
sociological imagination" so well articulated by C. Wright Mills (1959)
in his book by that title. Back in the 1960s, Merton and Nisbet did not
use the language, but proposed similar ideas which they ascribed to such
theorists as Weber (1946) and Mannheim (1936). For example, in their
discussion of fatalist versus activist value systems, they wrestled with
the issue of why certain social problems remain latent, off the public
radar so to speak. Of course, such latency varies over time within all
societies as does the degree to which fatalism reflects their major
value orientation. But after referencing Weber and Mannheim, both of
whom pointed this out previously, they wrote that ". . . the ethic of
fatalism has often been replaced by the ethic of responsibility, in
which knowledge of the sources of social problems and efforts to control
them become defined as a moral obligation." (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p.
797). And they elaborated as follows.

> "To the extent that the ethic of responsibility spreads in a society,
> social problems tend to become manifest rather than remaining latent.
> But even within such a society, largely oriented toward directed
> social change, countervailing processes make for the continued latency
> for a time of certain social problems." (Merton and Nisbet, 1966, p.
> 797).

And so today we might ask about the "countervailing processes" that were
operative in the Gulf states especially Louisiana, that prevented
officials and citizens from better anticipating and preparing for a
storm like Katrina (2005). Some would wash their hands knowing that they
had been successful with the exercise known as Hurricane Pam (e.g., see
Brinkley 2006, pp. 18-19; Bourne 2004). Others would point to their work
that documented the continued loss of wetlands that had heretofore
provided greater protection (for elaboration see Bourne 2004). But the
outcome remains---over 1,300 people died. Why did the changing
distributions of risk---a process that had been going on for
years---remain off the public agenda? Why didn't the preparedness plans
that had been designed get implemented in a manner that could have saved
more lives and reduced the trauma of rescue for many survivors?

Perhaps part of the answer reflects the logic in the revision of the
Merton-Nisbet text. Remember Fritz and disasters, while referenced once
in the second edition, (p. 784) was replaced by Etzioni's (1966)
analysis of "War and Disarmament." It is noteworthy that this reference
came within the context of discussion of the "social origin of social
problems." This discussion explicitly raises a fundamental theoretical
question for disaster researchers that I'll explore later, that is, are
social problems analysis frameworks applicable to both the phenomena of
war and "natural" disasters? The only place Fritz and his earlier
chapter were referenced was in answer to this question.

> "For whether the forces disrupting patterns of social life are
> nature-made or manmade, they will, in the end, confront members of the
> society with the task of responding to them, and the nature of that
> response is, in sociological principle, greatly affected by the
> structure of the society, by its institutions, and its values."
> (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. 784).

To understand the failed Katrina response, like that of any other
disaster event, we always must place emergency management within the
community, state and federal context of the time. It was this historical
context that led Hartman and Squires (2006) to title their Katrina
analysis as *There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster*. And their
sub-title *Race, Class and Hurricane Katrina* points us toward
institutional patterns of racism, sexism, and ageism that molded and
shaped this flawed response. There was much more to it than, for
example, the priority shift toward terrorism among emergency officials.
The private troubles of the Katrina victims reflected a whole range of
public issues. This capacity to shuttle between micro and macro levels
is the promise of the sociological imagination.

2\. **All societies are in a constant degree of change reflecting
patterns of consensus and dissensus among and within institutional
areas.**

This theme reflects my early training with Russ Dynes when I served as a
graduate teaching assistant in a social problems course directed by Si
Dinitz. Later I used their text (Dynes et al. 1964) in my own courses at
the University of Denver wherein we examined the processes of
integration that make for stability within societies and other social
systems such as communities and families. It is worth noting that
neither Fritz's 1961 chapter, nor the concept "disaster," is referenced
or indexed in this text. However, we always emphasized that the social
fabric is both *fragile*, because it always is subject to change, and
*powerful*, because it is taken for granted. Conflicts, however, are
ever present and can boil over whenever patterns of strain become
redistributed and highly polarized. Dynes and his colleagues put it this
way.

> "The possibility always exists that dissensus will become extreme and
> result in conflict among groups, threatening the stability of the
> society---the Civil War is an example of dissensus become group
> (regional) conflict." (Dynes et al. 1964, p. 375).

I suspect that this social problems perspective greatly facilitated
Dynes' later analysis of the disaster literature (1970) that has helped
many of us better understand various "mechanisms of integration."
Focusing on the community level, he carefully wove case study data into
a comprehensive whole. So following a disaster event, various types of
organizational units---reflected in the four cells of the DRC
Typology---respond to disaster demands. At times local officials, both
within and among agencies, must define areas of "emergency consensus" so
that the "mass assault", to use Barton's (1969) term, can be
coordinated. Such processes, when viewed within the social problems
perspective, become much clearer to any trying to understand the reality
of disaster, be they researcher or practitioner.

**3. Because social problems are socially constructed, so too must be
their solutions.**

Many of us use the phrase, "society as patient." By this, of course, we
can illustrate the role of social structure as a constraint in both how
social problems are defined and the search for solutions. Unlike what we
hear from some politicians today, Merton and Nisbet (1966), of course,
rejected the doctrine that "evil is the cause of evil". Instead they
proposed ". . . that, to a substantial extent, social problems are the
unwilled, largely indirect, and often unanticipated consequences of
institutionalized patterns of social behavior." (p. vii).

Today many of us would point to intercommunity crime rates and reference
documentation of how these co-vary with various measures of social
disorganization (e.g., Oh 2005). Or we might describe recent research
from the Netherlands that validated and extended Durkheim's (1951)
classic work on suicide (van Tubergen and Ultee 2006). Following World
War II, suicide rates in the U.S. did not drop as Durkheim would have
predicted whereas they did in European countries that remained neutral.
The researchers concluded ". . . that Durkheim's political integration
theory could explain these empirical problems if it takes into account
people's *expectations* for the future and if it considers the *social*
integration of groups." (van Tubergen and Ultee 2006, p. 233).

Certainly, the near daily reports of suicide bombers in Iraq and
elsewhere leads us to be curious about possible linkages among religious
ideologies, different socialization processes, and resulting motivations
related to such behavior. Merton and Nisbet (1966) devoted an entire
chapter to the topic of suicide (e.g., Gibbs 1966). While data from
middle-eastern countries is absent, Durkheim's analysis of "altruistic"
suicides is summarized and illustrated as a reflection of ". . .
excessive social integration." (p. 313). More recently, Bergesen (2006)
has emphasized that despite our limited data bases, several recent
empirical studies such as Papes (2005), clearly document that: "In
general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically
insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often
educated, socially integrated and highly capable people who could be
expected to have a good future." (Papes 2005, p. 200 as quoted by
Bergesen 2006, p. 459). So today, social problems analysts, like Neubeck
et al. (2007), trace out these linkages in their analyses of
"martyrdom", i.e., ". . . to sacrifice one's life in the name of the
cause . . ." (p. 605). Hence, ". . . a strong connection to one's faith
or to political organizations devoted to resisting what they see as
oppression actually enhances the chances of suicide rather than acting,
as Durkheim predicted, as a deterrent . . ." (p. 605).

Remembering the acute and chronic poverty that defined New Orleans long
before Katrina, we might instead focus here. And if poverty is to be
reduced, like any other social problem, our focus must be on elements of
structure. It is these elements that are bringing more and more American
citizens to their breaking points every day. While the rates vary a bit
from study to study, we currently have nearly 20 percent of our
population---55 million people---living in a state of poverty (Block et
al. 2006). Why? One research team summarized the situation very well and
in so doing, they illustrate my third theme.

> "Looking abroad also shows that government policies can dramatically
> reduce poverty levels. The probability of living in poverty is more
> than twice as high for a child born in the United States than for
> children in Belgium, Germany, or the Netherlands. Children in
> single-mother households are four times more likely to be poor in the
> United States than in Norway. The fact that single-parent households
> are more common in the United States than in many of these countries
> where the poor receive greater assistance undermines the claim that
> more generous policies will encourage more single women to have
> children out of wedlock. These other countries all take a more
> comprehensive government approach to combating poverty, and they
> assume that it is caused by economic and structural factors rather
> than bad behavior." (Block et al. 2006, p. 17).

**4. As with wealth and other forms of privilege, the socially powerful
also have greater influence in defining what is and is not a social
problem.**

This theoretical principle was reflected in the Merton-Nisbet text in
several chapters. In Merton's (1966) "Epilogue" which he subtitled
"Social Problems and Sociological Theory," he emphasized that there is
marked inequality in the judging process regarding this matter.

> "Social definitions of social problems have this in common with other
> processes in society: those occupying strategic positions of authority
> and power of course carry more weight than others in deciding social
> policy and therefore, among other things, in identifying for the rest
> what are to be taken as significant departures from social standards."
> (Merton 1966, p. 765).

Domhoff's (2006) look back at C. Wright Mill's (1956) classic statement
on the concentration of power within the United States is a good
illustration of this theme. While acknowledging the depth and breadth of
Mills' analysis, he suggests that it had weaknesses. For example, the
military "chieftains" do comprise part of the power elite, but Mills was
". . . wrong to give them equal standing with the corporate rich and
appointees to the executive branch of the policy-planning network." (p.
548). Domhoff's examples inform out analysis of social problems,
including disasters and approaches to solution.

> "This point is demonstrated most directly by the fact that military
> leaders are immediately dismissed if they disagree with their civilian
> bosses, as seen numerous times since the early 1960s, and most
> recently in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, when a top general was
> pushed into retirement for daring to say there was a need for more
> troops than former corporate CEO and current Secretary of Defense
> Donald Rumsfeld and his think-tank advisors thought necessary."
> (Domhoff 2006, p. 548).

So while more recent research, including his own (e.g., Domhoff 2005)
has confirmed most of the conclusions presented in *The Power Elite*, it
is Domhoff's judgment that both " . . . historical and sociological
research leads me to place far more emphasis than Mills did on corporate
capitalism and class conflict as the dominant factors in the power
equation." (Domhoff 2006, p. 550). This is not to deny that an
independent power base is represented by the military, but only to
acknowledge that it is less influential than the corporate cluster.
Indeed, as we have seen since Mills's death, additional power bases have
emerged, although they are more transitory and less potent. As Domhoff
(2006) noted, ". . . power also can be generated from a religious
organizational base, as seen in the civil rights movement, the rise of
the Christian Right, and the Iranian Revolution." (p. 550).

**5. There is an interdependence among social problems, including their
origins, analysis, and solutions.**

Many of us have emphasized this element of the social problems
perspective. Hence, aspects of crime and poverty may be linked directly
to issues of race and educational failure. Merton and Nisbet (1966) put
it this way: "Owing to the systematic interdependence among the parts of
a social structure, efforts to do away with one social problem will
often introduce other (either more or less damaging) problems." (p.
viii).

Perhaps no where has this principle been explored better than in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. For example, in the analyses compiled by
Hartman and Squires (2006), these interdependencies were highlighted
through powerful prose.

> " . . . some noted the sickeningly high poverty rate among the city's
> black residents, but said nothing about how radicalized poverty
> contributed to the crisis. Neither the concentration of subsidized
> housing, nor the lack of car ownership among poor blacks---which made
> it impossible for many African Americans to flee New Orleans because
> the city's middle-class-oriented evacuation plan was predicated on
> people leaving in their own vehicles---were mentioned. Racialized
> disinvestment in schools, public health, and other critical
> institutions in the core city, which impacts the suburbs as well, has
> existed for decades, but unlike the wind and the water, it garnered
> little attention. We do not believe that anyone intended to strand
> poor blacks in New Orleans. But it was predictable . . ." (powell et
> al. 2006, pp. 64-65).

While interdependent with race and poverty, Gullette (2006) focused on
the elderly, especially females who represent an important pocket of
vulnerability. Such areas of vulnerability are not sought out by
hurricanes or earthquakes, but the impacts really are worsened. While
many of us have emphasized the growing vulnerabilities reflected in the
changing age distribution of the U.S. population, few have analyzed
emergent perceptions of "age anxiety". Daily doses of media coverage
that portray "old geezers" living within the opulence of manicured
retirement villages create a fiction that denies the poverty experienced
by most elderly.

> "Age anxiety is being cleverly manipulated into a political tactic on
> behalf of a conservative agenda. The image of expensive codgers
> distracts attention from class warfare coming from the top---the Bush
> tax cuts for the rich, the budget surplus turned into a Frankenstein
> deficit, the cuts in social programs, the deadly quagmire in Iraq. All
> these costs much, much more than the modest changes Social Security
> needs to thrive beyond 2042, or than national health care. Once the
> alarms have been sounded, then come the 'remedies'---weakening the
> very programs that are our nation's slender warrant of being a humane
> democracy." (Gullette 2006, p. 113).

**6. Sociological analyses of social problems preclude blaming the
victims.**

Living in poverty means much more than dollar levels communicate. Yet,
during the past six years the number of poverty stricken Americans not
only has increased, but their income has dropped below previous levels.
In short, the poor within our nation have become even poorer (e.g., see
Jones-DeWeever and Hartman 2006, p. 86). While all humans make choices,
even the poor, sociological analyses unveil the webs of social
constraint that narrow visions of option and cloud the last vestiges of
hope. Degrees of freedom are socially constructed by all of us, but
among those at the bottom of the economic pile, the perceived
constraints become so narrow that the very word "choice" becomes
offensive. Yet, many, if not most who outside the poverty pit, continue
to ask, "why don't they just get a job?" Unfortunately, even among the
compassionate, the reality of "the society as patient" remains poorly
understood. Why? Rubington and Weinberg (2003) put it succinctly in
their introduction to Wagner's (2003) insightful "critical analysis".
"It is in the interest of a capitalist society to endorse solutions to
social problems that treat individual persons, thereby creating a market
for treatment industries while discouraging solutions that call for a
radical change in the social structure." (p. 251).

This was the social problems context within which I viewed the failed
Katrina evacuation. Years ago, this general theme was well articulated
by Ryan (1971). But for me, it caused back flashes to an earlier
disaster---the Big Thompson Canyon Flood of 1976---when other officials
chastised victims. "We warned them, but they didn't leave." Rather than
accepting the outcome of 139 deaths as "unavoidable", my social problems
perspective caused me to ask these officials a different kind of
question, one rooted in the assumption base that blaming the victims
results in poor public policy. "But Sheriff, isn't it your job to devise
an evacuation plan that works?" My application of this logic to the
failed Katrina response resulted in an essay entitled "Don't Blame the
Victims" (Drabek 2005a). Reactions among emergency managers have been
telling---some see the big picture, others don't.

In his reflective essay regarding what is and what is not a "disaster",
Barton (2005) offered a view that parallels mine. In so doing, he added
important insight as to why a social problems perspective helps us view
disaster victims differently.

> "The role of a dominant ideology which blames the victim or
> stereotypes them as less than human is to reduce communication by and
> with them, to weaken their ability to organize themselves, and to make
> the rest of society unwilling to listen to them or talk about them."
> (Barton 2005, p. 142).

Years ago, Henry Quarantelli and I (1967), explored post-disaster
blaming processes and emphasized parallels documented for other social
problems. That is, by a focus on personal "guilt", required structural
changes---root causes, rather than symptoms---may never be considered,
much less implemented. Our case example was the 1963 explosion at the
coliseum in Indianapolis where the search for "the guilty" deflected
attention away from a basic structural element---an inadequate
inspection procedure. "We believe that putting other persons into the
same position could have made little difference." (Drabek and
Quarantelli 1967, p. 16). But the consequences of such wrong-headed
blame assignment processes are even more insidious. "Not only does
individual blame draw attention from more fundamental causes, but it
might actually give the illusion that corrective action of some sort is
being taken." (Drabek and Quarantelli 1967, p. 16). This is not to say
that personal blame assignation never precipitates structural change, as
we acknowledged. But it is to say that too often, especially in American
society, this perspective detracts from analyses focused on structure;
analyses wherein a society, or other social unit, is viewed as "the
patient."

**7. Like war in earlier analyses, terrorism is now commonly accepted as
a social problem.**

Following the attacks on 9-11, the threat of terrorism quickly became
identified and widely accepted as a social problem. While informative
analyses of terrorism have been completed, linkages to the research
literature on other disasters are lacking, however. I did not try to
review every current text on social problems, but I did read five. Of
course, neither Merton and Nisbet (1966) nor Dynes et al. (1964)
included any references to terrorism. Nor did any of the authors
selected by Rubington and Weinberg (2003) for their sixth edition. The
insights from various "social constructionists" contained in this
volume, however, are most relevant to the process of "acceptance."
Best's (2003) analysis, for example, not only reviews some of the
criticisms that have been made over the years, but also differentiates
between "strict" and "contextual" constructionism. Hence, when we
analyze terrorism as a social problem we should remember Best's
suggestions. For example, ". . . any analysis of the social construction
of child abuse or any other social problem---requires locating
claimsmaking within at least part of its context." (Best 2003, p. 344).

John Palen has written several urban sociology texts (e.g., 1997), but
decided to assess the general social problems area in 2001. The last
chapter of his book is entitled "The Environment: War and Terrorism." He
assessed these topics through the lenses of the same three theoretical
approaches used throughout, i.e., functionalist, conflict, and
interactionist. He introduced students to such topics as population
change, environmental racism, and both air and water pollution, before
brief discussion of "eco-terrorism". This brief section served as the
bridge to his final section on war and terrorism. "Revolutionary"
terrorism was illustrated with such examples as the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center, 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma,
and the 1995 nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway (p. 477). Although
military targets have been selected in some attacks, e.g., Muslim
radicals bombing U.S. airbases in Saudi Arabia, "soft" targets are more
popular because they better advance civilian disruption and fear. Being
weak militarily, isolated politically, most terrorists perceive their
actions as legitimate religious or racial struggles. Hence, ". . .
whether you label someone a terrorist or a freedom fighter depends on
your position." (Palen 2001, p. 477). Despite the chapter context of
"the environment" and discussion of certain unintended consequences of
environmental policies, e.g., widespread use of insecticides, no link
was made to other forms of disaster or our rich research legacy.

McVeigh and Wolfer (2004) devoted much more space to revolts by numerous
groups of varied political persuasion ranging from the Ku Klux Klan as
"an instrument of terror" (p. 133) to Bacon's Rebellion (1676). In an
effort to expose the "root causes" of such acts of violence, they
emphasized the later as ". . . a desperate move on the part of the poor
to share in or equalize the wealth . . ." (p. 298). Hence, actions like
these are put into historical context with others that indicate the
"normalcy" of such events when perceptions of injustice prevail, e.g.,
the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), the Flour Riot (1837), and so on. All of
these occurred long before the "Kerner Report" pinpointed the linkages
among racism, poverty, and urban riots (i.e., U.S. National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders which was chaired by Governor Otto Kerner,
Summary Report, 1968). Hence, crises or disasters such as these were
placed into the broader contexts of structural inequality and the
conflicts that result when activists goad the poor into saying: "Enough
is enough, we're not putting up with this anymore."

But by 2004, the reality of globalization was apparent and social
problems---all of them---were best viewed as having ". . . some kind of
international connection . . " (McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 365). Hence,
a jump from Giddens's (2000) view of a "runaway world" to corporate
concentrations of power through multi-nationals was a logical way to
lead into the root causes of terrorism. "Most sociologists argue that
multi-nationals are harmful as they exercise power over the governments,
societies and environments of underdeveloped countries in such a way
that they actually function as colonial machines of exploitation."
(McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 371). Within this context, war emerges as
the most important social problem confronting American society. And in
order to begin to understand it, we must recognize the economic
interdependencies between economic growth and war related products. Just
weapons production alone is a staggering reality. "The United States is
the world's leading arms supplier to other nations, \$842 billion worth
in 1997 . . ." (McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 386). Thus, despite the
adoption of various social policies to reduce the number of wars and
frequency of terrorist attacks, they argued that the U.S. ". . . still
ignores the basic value conflicts, ideas and ideals between Western and
Eastern cultures" (p. 394). And here at home, the largest government
reorganization in our history was implemented through the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002. This bureau has
responsibility for all disasters regardless of agent or origin. McVeigh
and Wolfer (2004) briefly discussed a range of issues pertaining to the
then newly created DHS, including the controversial conflict regarding
workers represented by unions and "managerial flexibility" requirements.
Even more controversial were DHS policies regarding citizen surveillance
and border protection. Value conflicts regarding "the limits" of civil
liberties and roles of illegal immigrants in the work force are but two
of the interdependencies that must be illuminated if we are to begin to
understand these social problems.

Robert and Jeanette Lauer (2006) also ended their recent text with
chapters entitled "War and Terrorism" and "The Environment." Starting
with Mills's "personal troubles---public issues" framework, they
reviewed the familiar litany of three broad study areas (i.e., 1:
behavioral variance, e.g., crime and delinquency; 2: inequality, e.g.,
poverty and 3: social institutions, e.g., family problems) which can
best be understood by using three overlapping theoretical perspectives
(i.e., structural functionalism, conflict theory and symbolic
interactionism). Neither the term "disaster" nor "natural disaster"
appear in the index, but both the Bhopal (1984) plant tragedy (p. 437)
and the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion (p. 448) are presented as
examples of the types of threats industrialized societies must recognize
and try to prevent. Growing public fears of future terrorism attacks (p.
416) are juxtaposed against rising military expenditures (p. 418) and
their value question is stated baldly. "What if the United States
invested the billions spent on military preparations in electronics,
education, health, and other sectors that benefit human beings?" (p.
419). Loss of civil liberties, perhaps willingly given up because of
fears of terrorist attacks (p. 420), is integrated with detailed
cross-national data on military expenditures (p. 421), weapons sales (p.
424) and the manipulation of public threat perceptions.

> "Many Americans accepted the notion that Iraq was involved in the
> September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that Iraq had developed and was
> prepared to use weapons of mass destruction, and that a good part, if
> not most, of world opinion favored the American position. The news
> media, particularly Fox News, helped shape these misperceptions."
> (Lauer and Lauer 2006, p. 427).

Finally, Neubeck, et al. 2007, published the fifth edition of their
popular text, *Social Problems: A Critical Approach*. As they
reorganized and updated prior work, they introduced materials on
terrorism and expanded their discussion on war (now Chapter 3).
Extensive data on military arms sales and expenditures were used to
introduce the topics of terrorism and "the effects of militarism" (e.g.,
see pp. 76-86). And assessments then follow.

> "Militarism affects the quality of life in more than just economic
> ways. It also interferes with our democratic rights and civil
> liberties." (p. 87).
>
> "If human survival is the goal, then disarmament will play an
> important role in meeting it. But the first step is to reduce the
> ready access to weaponry. The United States, now the number one arms
> exporter, must stop making the world into an unstable armed camp
> through its sale of arms and military-related technology to other
> nations." (p. 90).
>
> "It is up to people in the United States and elsewhere, starting at
> the grass roots through their political associations, community
> groups, religious institutions, or student organizations, the name a
> few, to begin to communicate loud and clear to society's elites.
> 'Enough is enough.'" (p. 91).

These seven themes provide important context for why I believe it will
be useful to pursue a definition of disaster as a special type of social
problem. For social problems are both manifest and latent conditions of
communities, regions, societies, and the entire world. The processes by
which social problems are socially constructed, redressed, or
unaddressed call attention to the actions of individuals, groups, and
organizations at all of these levels. Historically, sociology has and
must continue to play a key role in unraveling these processes.

But let me be clear before proceeding. I am not proposing a consensus on
values, nor am I proposing that this definition and approach are the
only ones researchers should use. They are one among many that I believe
will help us sort things out so that basic and badly needed theoretical
work can continue. Also, I believe that this perspective opens new doors
through which we should go to insure broader dissemination
[and]{.underline} use of the findings and conclusions of our work.

**[Disaster Research: Integrative Approaches and Conceptual
Issues]{.underline}**

When we put disaster research into the types of social problems
perspectives I summarized above, what theoretical issues are recast and
illuminated? I will explore this question by briefly developing six
themes: 1) contributions being ignored; 2) some basic distinctions; 3)
studies of claims makers; 4) emergence of a complementary perspective;
5) disasters are a non-routine social problem; and 6) payoffs.

**1. Disaster researchers have constructed a scientifically based core
of knowledge which too frequently has been ignored by high level policy
makers, especially during the past six years.**

This is not the place to review the core knowledge base that dates back
to Prince's (1920) classic study, the NORC field team reports summarized
by Fritz (1961) and others (e.g., Fritz and Marks 1954), or the several
reports published in the early National Academy of Sciences series
(e.g., Moore et al. 1963) in which Barton's (1963) theoretical framework
first appeared (see also Barton 1969). Additional study syntheses have
continued to appear over the years, including the excellent work of
Dynes (1970), and those in which I have participated, e.g., Mileti,
Drabek and Haas 1975, Drabek 1986, and Drabek 2004. Of course, the
recently released *Handbook of Disaster Research* (Rodríguez et al.
2006) sets a new standard for such summaries.

When asked by my former student David McEntire (in press) to identify
the key contributions sociologists had made to the study of disasters, I
(Drabek in press) selected these four as being most significant: 1)
debunking disaster myths, e.g., Quarantelli and Dynes 1972; Fischer
1998; 2) innovations in research methods, e.g., Stallings 2002; Homan
2003; 3) extensions of sociological theory, e.g., Kreps et al. 1994;
Dynes 2002, 2005 and 4) social criticism, e.g., Dynes 1994; Aguirre
2004. Others, of course, would highlight different aspects of this rich
legacy. I might too on a different day or week, but these four areas
clearly constitute significant contributions reflecting our larger and
complex research legacy.

Upon carefully reading the final report of the 9/11 Commission (NCTAUS
2004), I was impressed with the level of detail with which they
effectively reconstructed the planning and process of the attacks and
the challenges responders confronted. As I pointed out elsewhere,
(Drabek 2006b, pp. 224-226), however, many of the intra and inter-agency
communication and coordination difficulties paralleled those that had
been documented in numerous places following other disasters (e.g.,
Drabek 1968, 1986). Despite pages of footnotes, the report made no
mention of this prior research as Tierney (2005) underscored in her
review. And while I agree with Perrow (2005) that the failure to even
mention the lack of leadership at the federal level was a major
shortcoming, ignoring past disaster research may have paved the way for
wrong headed policy recommendations like the emphasis on implementation
of the incident command system (ICS) as if this would fix everything.
I'll return to this specific issue later, but it illustrates my overall
point.

I also carefully reviewed three of the major policy reports completed
after Hurricane Katrina by the White House staff (2006), the Select
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives (SBCIPRHK 2006), and the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate
(CHSGA 2006). The Senate report noted "a failure to act on the lessons
of past catastrophes, both man-made and natural . . ." (p. I-16), but
did not specify the sources of such lessons, nor even what they were in
specific terms. In fairness, however, I should note that the Committee
did consult with and cite testimony and publications produced by several
scientists focused on physical aspects of the storm, levee failure, and
storm surge modeling, e.g., Ivor van Heerdeen (Deputy Director of the
LSU Hurricane Center) (see pp. 4-14 through 4-16) and work by John C.
Pine (Director, Disaster Science and Management, LSU) and Hassa
Mashrique (Assistant Professor Research, LSU Hurricane Center) (see p.
6-23). They also reviewed in detail the simulated disaster
exercise---known as "Hurricane Pam"---and highlighted some of the
conclusions reported in local media outlets the year prior to Katrina,
e.g., Nolan 2005 (see Chapter 8 of the Senate Report). They also noted
FEMA's failings after Hurricane Andrew and the proposals and reforms
implemented thereafter (e.g., National Academy of Public Administration,
1993 and 1994) including testimony and e-mail messages from such policy
oriented researchers as John Harrold (Director, Institute for Crisis,
Disaster and Risk Management, George Washington University) and Herman
Leonard (John F. Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business
School) (see pp. 14-17 and 14-24). Finally, they noted that, "Neither
the Hurricane Pam exercise nor the resultant Southeast Louisiana
Catastrophic Hurricane Plan contemplated the shelter and transportation
of pets." (p. 16-36, footnote #193) despite prior behavioral research
which had documented the need for such, e.g., Health et al. 2001. These
notations were the only exceptions I could find.

The House Committee recognized, however, that there should be further
exploration of ". . . how socioeconomic factors contributed to the
experiences of those directly affected by the storm." (p. 20) And they
cited survey results published in the *Natural Hazards Observer* by John
Barnshaw (2005). Yet, they too sometimes fell into the trap of blaming
the victims. "Those individuals in all states who had the means to
evacuate, but did not do so, must also share the blame for the
incomplete evacuation and the difficulties that followed." (p. 103).
Without referencing the disaster literature on looting, at least they
recognized the differences among so-called "looters." "In some cases,
people looted stores for their survival and to diminish suffering,
taking items such as food, water, clothing, flashlights, batteries, and
camping supplies." (p. 241).

Fortunately, additional sociological studies will continue to illuminate
these matters, e.g., Barsky et al. 2006. But will they too be ignored?
You may remember that some in Congress, (e.g., Rep. Charlie Melancon and
Rep. William J. Jefferson), like some academics (e.g., *Natural Hazards
Observer* 2006, and Pastor et al. 2006, p. 40) pressed for the
appointment of an Independent Katrina Commission (see "Additional Views"
of the House Committee report, p. 54). Ruth and I wrote to our
congressional representatives on this matter, did you? Unfortunately, to
date this recommendation has fallen on deaf ears!

The White House Report (2006) which emphasized "lessons learned" also
ignored most of the social science literature on disasters. Yet,
seventeen ". . . most critical challenges that were problematic . . ."
(p. 2) were identified to serve as a backdrop for a new vision. That is,
a "National Preparedness System" is to be implemented along with a
"culture of preparedness." I'll return to these matters in the fourth
section of this paper, and here only note that the 689 endnotes cited
throughout the six chapters of the White House report include very few
references to what most of us would consider the "standard" sociological
disaster research literature, although a few historical (e.g., Vale and
Campanella 2005), policy oriented (e.g., Platt 1999) and popularized
works (e.g., Larson 1999) were included. The single exception was
reference to the text Jerry Hoetmer and I (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991)
edited for the International City Management Association regarding the
evolution of emergency management within the U.S.A. (e.g., see footnotes
8 and 11 in Chapter Two, p. 15).

While lots of different types of other evidence could be cited, my first
theme reflects two basic conclusions: 1) a significant scientifically
based core of knowledge has been created by disaster and hazards
researchers, and 2) during the last six years especially, this knowledge
has too frequently been ignored by high level policy makers.

**2. Some basic distinctions can be helpful in exploring the theoretical
issues and implications inherent in a social problems perspective. Let
me illustrate this point by proposing definitions for four key
concepts: 1) social problem; 2) disaster; 3) hazard; and 4) terrorism.**

a\. *Social problem*. Reviews of past and current texts reveal
differences in how a "social problem" is defined. Most typical, however,
are definitions like that proposed by Rubington and Weinberg (2003, p.
4), i.e., ". . . an alleged situation that is incompatible with the
values of a significant number of people who agree that action is needed
to alter the situation." This view is implicit in the more complex
definitions offered by many others such as Lauer and Lauer (2006, p. 4).
Further discussion, however, usually follows regarding the subjectivity
inherent in such a position. How many people must define a situation as
being "incompatible"? Who "selects" the values that are to be used in
making such an assessment?

These questions have led some writers, like Palen (2001) to highlight an
alternative position.

> "Some sociologists say that public recognition is not crucial for an
> issue to be a social problem. They say that social problems are the
> issues identified by social scientists as those about which people
> should be concerned." (p. 7).

This matter was introduced years ago by Merton (1961) in the "Epilogue"
of the first edition of the Merton-Nisbet (1961) social problems text.
Without digressing, I must note, however, that many others made similar
analyses over the years (e.g., see Mills 1943). But to stay on point,
I'll simply note the appropriateness of Merton's chapter sub-title which
was "Social Problems and Sociological Theory." After acknowledging the
difficulties deciding who might be the "judges," Merton emphasized that
"It is with the social definition of social problems as it is with other
processes in society: those occupying strategic positions of authority
and power of course carry more weight . . ." (p. 206). Here, as in
subsequent editions (e.g., see Merton 1966, pp. 788-792), he followed
with an elaboration wherein "manifest" versus "latent" social problems
were differentiated. In this way he tried to provide an out from
potential charges of values imposition.

> "Apart from manifest social problems, those objective social
> conditions identified by problem definers in the society as at odds
> with their values are latent social problems, conditions that are also
> at odds with values of the group but are not recognized as being so.
> The sociologist does not impose his values upon others when he
> undertakes to supply knowledge about latent social problems." Merton
> 1961, p. 709).

More current writers, having benefited from analyses of this issue since
the 1960s, usually come down on the side of offering at least three
complementary theoretical frameworks, i.e., functional, conflict,
interaction (e.g., Palen 2001, pp. 13-18) which help in our
understanding the public issues and private troubles of our time. But
the fundamental issue of value choices remains with the individual
analyst or reader. Palen (2001) summarized his view as follows.

> "This text takes the position that it is impossible to eliminate
> personal values and experiences and we invariably make value judgments
> about which social problems are most important and what should be done
> about them. Both professionals and nonprofessionals alike make
> subjective judgments on how social problems should be solved. Everyone
> has biases, but sociologists make a conscious effort to try to take
> their own biases into consideration." (Palen 2001, pp. 7-8).

These considerations provide the context for the next three concepts.

b\. *Disaster*. I'll return to this concept in a subsequent section, but
for now let me propose this definition from Gary Kreps (1989b).
Disasters are:

> ". . . nonrountine events in societies or their larger subsystems
> (e.g., regions, communities) that involve **conjunctions** of
> historical conditions and social definitions of physical harm and
> social disruption. Among the key defining properties of such events
> are length of forewarning, magnitude of impact, scope of impact, and
> duration of impact (Kreps 1989b, p. 219).

From this theoretical position, which somewhat parallels Fritz's
definition (1961, p. 655), disasters are events of a certain type. While
they may differ in terms of such key analytic criteria as length of
forewarning, the operative term in the definition is "among". There are
other dimensions beyond these four listed that may, *for certain
research purposes*, be far more significant. I'll return to this issue
later because it is extremely important (see section 6, sub-section
entitled "technological disasters"). Also, these events are to be
understood as conjunctions of both historical conditions and social
definitions of physical harm and social disruption. Finally, there is a
"nonroutine" quality about disasters that also differentiates them from
other social experiences.

This definition is consistent with that used by the Committee on
Disaster Research in the Social Sciences (2006) which was chaired by
Kreps. By using it as their guidepost, they were able to skillfully
integrate the key conclusions of past research and identify a complex
future research agenda reflecting questions like these.

> ". . . in what ways are terrorist threats similar to and different
> from risks posed by natural and technological disasters? How has the
> increased salience of willful disasters shaped the emergency
> management system in the United States? Also how prepared are local
> communities and the nation as a whole for possible future attacks?"
> (p. 70).

c\. *Hazard*. Hazards are conditions that have the *potential* to harm
to a community or environment (see Drabek 2004, pp. 2-5 through 2-9).
Commonly, like Mileti's (1999) excellent follow-up to the bench-setting
"assessment" by White and Haas (1975), we differentiate among "classes"
of these using various weather and earth science terminologies. So, we
refer to "the earthquake hazard" or "the flood hazard" for a given
community, region, or sometimes a nation. Thus, a hazard represents a
potential, whereas a disaster references a specific event that has
actually occurred. Hurricane Katrina was a disaster that reflects the
overall hazard or threat defined by the potential for hurricanes in the
community of New Orleans, the Gulf Coast region, and the U.S.A. While it
is possible to broaden the reference, most sociologists have focused on
so-called "natural" hazards ranging from floods, tornadoes, earthquakes,
to frost, drought, and heat (e.g., Mileti 1999). Of growing importance,
however, are the hazards reflecting various technologies ranging from
nuclear power plants (e.g., Perrow 1984) to other toxic substances
(e.g., Erikson 1994). As illustrated by the recent bridge collapse in
Minneapolis, however, much of the nation's entire infrastructure has not
been maintained properly. Hence, our failure to invest in our rich
technological applications has left many dams, bridges, sewer and water
systems, and the like in a dismal state. Just like our cars or our
homes, all of these applications require continued reinvestments if the
probabilities of disaster are to be reduced.

As I will elaborate in subsequent sections, for years Quarantelli (e.g.,
1987b) has pushed us to confront "the fundamental question," i.e., "what
is a disaster?" Many have addressed this question by examining various
analytic criteria that differentiate among disaster events such as those
noted above and others like frequency, time of day, and so on (see Dynes
1970, pp. 52-55 and Drabek 1986, pp. 22-23, 45-46). More recently,
researchers like Simpson and Katirai (2006) have sorted through the
literature to identify various discussions and proposals for measures
and indicators of risk, hazards, and disasters. Others have noted
different discussions of "taxonomic" approaches (e.g., Green and
McGinnis 2002). Proposals for "structuring paradigms" vary from
Quarantelli who urges that the concept of disaster be limited to
"consensus" based events to Green and McGinnis (2002) who ". . . believe
that three classes describe the highest order range of disaster events .
. . natural disasters, human systems failures, and conflict based
disasters." (p. 4). In contrast, Erikson (1994) has proposed that events
reflecting exposure, threatened or actual, to toxic substances clearly
reflect "a new species of troubles." I'll extend this discussion
momentarily to document more of the historical context of my position
and its relationship to public policy, but for now the point is to
underscore the diversity in viewpoints and lack of closure among
disaster researchers.

d\. *Terrorism*. Terrorism is a strategy to gain political objectives by
attacking civilian populations with the intent of spreading fear and
intimidation. Others have used slightly different language, but this
definition includes the basic themes emphasized by many (e.g., see
Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, p.
26; Neubeck et al. 2007, p. 81; McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 388; Palen
2001, p. 476). Until the attacks on 9/11, most Americans did not
perceive "terrorism" as a social problem. Specific attacks, like those
of 9/11, or earlier *events* (e.g., bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, 1988; 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York City; 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in
Oklahoma City; see Drabek 2004, Student Handout 5-3 or Waugh 2000, for
listings of numerous terrorist attacks), are subsumed within the above
definition of disaster. Thus, as with the disaster vs. hazard
distinction, it is important to differentiate between specific events
and a general strategy of conflict that historically has been used by
"the weak." While "state-sponsored" terrorist acts clearly occur, it is
more often a strategy adopted by those with minimal levels of political
power. As Palen (2001) put it, "Terrorism is also used by aggrieved
religious, ethnic, and political groups who can not see, or refuse to
see, any other alternative to influencing change." (pp. 475-476). By
focusing on "soft" targets like hotels, office buildings, and other
places of high population density, those using this strategy of
randomized killing, expose vulnerabilities that in earlier times clearly
had remained "latent" in Merton's use of the term. Today, however,
things are very different. ". . . a national survey in 2003 reported
that 8 percent of Americans said they were 'very worried' and another 30
percent that they were 'somewhat worried' that they or a family member
might become a victim of terrorism . . ." (Lauer and Lauer 2006, p.
416). As with other hazards, risk perceptions change and are subject to
manipulation by those seeking to instill different rankings among "the
social problems" confronting a society (e.g., see Jenkins 2003).

But there are complexities and subtleties that a social problems
perspective highlights. "Just who is it that defines what constitutes a
criminal act?" "How have such definitions changed over time?" Standard
stuff in any social problems course. So it is with terrorism as even a
Bush White House committee report emphasized, (i.e., Subcommittee on
Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences and the Social, Behavioral and
Economic Sciences Working group, both of which report to the National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) (2005) which in turn operates
within the Executive Office of the President).

Among their definitional observations were these.

-   "Consensus as to what actions define terrorism has been difficult to
    attain." (p. 7)

-   ". . . the use of the term 'terrorism' may over-simplify different
    types of actors, warfare and motivations, encapsulating them in a
    single group or act so that critical variables are overlooked." (p.
    7)

-   "The use of the term 'terrorist' denies the perpetrator all claim to
    legitimacy within Western Culture . . ." (p. 7)

-   "The root causes of one terrorist action may have little in common
    with those of another." (p. 7).

**3. Studies of "claims-makers" help illuminate the processes whereby
certain conditions, including hazards and disasters, become defined as
social problems.**

The social construction of social problems has evolved through a series
of penetrating analyses that I simply will note here. These include the
pioneering work of Spector and Kitsuse (1973; 1977) who argued that
fifty years of textbooks had still not generated a theory of social
problems because the wrong questions were being asked. In an effort to
go beyond the subjective vs. objective value debate, they proposed that
sociologists should focus primarily on questions that could be addressed
empirically. That is, "what do people say is a social problem?" And,
"how do such perceptions evolve over time?"

To date, this social constructionist perspective has been applied to
disaster research most effectively by Bob Stallings (1995) in his now
classic study of the "earthquake risk." He documented that many of the
claims-making activities described by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), seemed
to illuminate what was happening within the "earthquake establishment"
(see pp. 54-60). Clearly ". . . the existence of claims-making activity
justifies placing the earthquake threat in the category of phenomena
labeled social problems." (p. 196). Yet, the natural-history model of
social problems only partially fit the earthquake case.

A "partial" fit? Why only "partial?" According to Stallings the most
important thing missing was controversy. "Currently, most of what
earthquake safety advocates do on a daily basis is not at all
controversial." (p. 197). And so Stallings was forced to ask a key
question: ". . . can something be a social problem without being
controversial?" (p. 197). He did find, of course, some areas of conflict
and controversy. But these seemed to be different somehow than those
commonly associated with other social problems.

> "The chief difference between these and the conflicts usually
> associated with social problems is that they occur 'backstage,' out of
> public view. Perhaps the earthquake threat is different not because
> controversy is absent but because somehow it is the 'wrong kind' of
> controversy." (Stallings 1995, p. 198).

Finally, Stallings (1995) resolved these matters by proposing that the
earthquake threat in the U.S.A., up to 1980 at least, was best labeled
as a "partially constructed social problem." "Like organized crime in
the 1960s and white collar crime in the 1980s, it remains visible to
insiders but nearly invisible to those outside the earthquake
establishment." (pp. 203-204). And he identified three changes that
could occur that might move the construction process along: 1)
personalization (i.e., name those responsible for minimizing or
distributing the risk such as "greedy developers" or "current
politicians"); 2) politicization (i.e., identification of certain
candidates who would support certain legislation, ballot initiatives,
etc.); and 3) "presentization" (i.e., emphasis on how everyday
decisions, not future ones, affect risk distribution) (see pp. 206-208).
Do you see any parallels to the processes that have been operative the
past few years regarding the manufacturing of the fear of terrorism?

**4. A complementary perspective on disasters and hazards has emerged
that incorporates insights from social problems theorists despite the
misgivings and cautions of some.**

In the late 1960s I was invited to write a short essay on methodological
issues in disaster research (Drabek 1970). This exercise caused me to
question the procedures whereby units of analysis could be specified
more explicitly. I saw this as necessary to establish some basis for
generalization across study findings and guidance in future sample
selection and study design. The issues of both internal and external
validity seemed critical to me. These matters had real salience to me
since many questioned the relevance of our laboratory simulation
research to organizational responses to "real world" disasters (e.g.,
see Drabek and Haas 1969, 1967). So I proposed a simple typology to
illustrate my concerns about how ". . . to integrate disaster studies
into other substantive areas ranging from family and organizational
studies to civil disturbances and revolutions Quarantelli and Dynes
1969". (Drabek 1970, p. 335). The typology also illustrated three types
of comparative research that I believed was necessary for the knowledge
accumulation process: 1) across events; 2) across societies; and 3)
across groups and organizations. I envisioned a series of emergent
taxonomies for both the structural units of analysis and the disaster
events being selected for study so as to construct " . . . empirically
tested relationships with the universe to which they apply specified."
(Drabek 1970, p. 334).

A decade later I revisited some of these issues upon receiving an
invitation from Gary Kreps to prepare a paper on taxonomy for a
conference designed to review his team's analysis of "organized
responses" they identified within post-disaster interviews conducted by
Disaster Research Center (DRC) staff during the 1960s (see Kreps 1989d).
Their data base included such disasters as the 1964 Alaska earthquake
and Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969). In my conference paper I
raised a lot of questions and proposed some future directions. Among
these questions was ". . . when should a crisis event be classified as a
disaster?" (Drabek 1989b, p. 319). This matter had been made more
salient in my thinking by Quarantelli's IRCD Presidential address in
1986 (Quarantelli 1987b) and a series of studies conducted by Peter
Rossi and his associates (e.g., Rossi et al. 1978; Rossi et al. 1982;
Wright et al. 1979; Wright and Rossi 1981). The Rossi group was highly
critical of the White-Haas (1975) assessment project and a lot of other
disaster-hazard research. So they had attempted to increase the rigor of
their research study designs by increasing their survey sample sizes. By
doing so they concluded that disasters really had little or no effect on
communities. And since there was negligible impact, it was bad public
policy to succumb to the lobby efforts being made by those within a
"growing disaster industry." In short, a "no-effect" conclusion clearly
justified a "no funds" position for either research or amelioration, be
it mitigation, preparedness, or whatever. I'm over stating their
position just a bit, but I clearly recall hearing such views being
expressed at their conference.

I was invited as a disaster researcher, but also had registered
criticisms of many past studies. And I refused to be drawn into false
choices by an agenda structured around "the worth" of past work be it
that flowing from the "old" NORC studies, the DRC or the University of
Colorado (e.g., White and Haas). So in my critique of their work (Drabek
1981), I endorsed their effort at design rigor but remained suspicious
of their study sample which was comprised of too many "small scale"
events. In my judgment, this is what had led them to the conclusion that
disasters had "no effect." As I put my criticism then: "Simply put, were
they studying disasters?" (Drabek 1989b, p. 320).

A second theme I introduced pertained to social problems. ". . . I have
believed that one form of integration we should seek would be within
theories of social problems (Drabek 1981)." (Drabek 1989b, p. 337). I
pushed this idea very briefly by proposing that we should try to build
better bridges with emergency managers and one way of doing this was to
define disaster as ". . . *a low-priority, nonroutine social problem*.
As emerging professionals, emergency managers can be helped to develop a
sense of perspective and basis for interpretation by expanding upon a
social problems framework." (Drabek 1989b, p. 341).

Following this conference, Kreps asked me to expand on this idea through
an essay that might be included in a special issue he was editing for
the *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*. In his
introduction to this special issue Kreps (1989c) noted that this
publication reflected " . . . a resolution passed at the 1986 ISA
meeting of the Research Committee on Disasters" (p. 213) which " . . .
called for a special issue devoted to the general question of the
boundaries of the field." (p. 213). As a very practical matter, as
co-editor (1985-1990) of our journal (i.e., *International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters*), I was wanting some guidance. For
example, should we accept articles focused on war or other types of
conflict situations? If a civil disturbance like the riots in Watts (Los
Angeles area of California) was relevant to our readership, what about a
riot within a prison?

In the opening essay Kreps (1989c), explained that he would elaborate on
". . . my thoughts on the boundaries question and what I see as the
essential role of taxonomy in disaster research." (p. 213). In his
article, Kreps (1989b) addressed the question "What is a disaster?" and
proceeded to lay out a rigorous approach whereby future taxonomic work
could lead to a series of schema whereby *multiple taxonomies* could be
used to aggregate past findings and guide the design of new comparative
studies (see pp. 230-231). He then referenced my earlier work (e.g.,
Drabek 1981) and explicitly claimed ". . . disasters are nonroutine
social problems" (p. 233). He then elaborated briefly on these ideas and
concluded with a statement with which I was and remain in full
agreement.

> "I am certain that a cooperative dialogue based on mutual respect for
> competing epistemologies is the path to scientific progress in
> disaster research. I hope this exchange serves an example of what is
> needed." (Kreps 1989a, p. 280).

In that same issue, Quarantelli (1989) began his essay with this
statement. "The question of a taxonomy of disaster research cannot be
addressed meaningfully until some sort of answer is given to the more
fundamental issue: What is a disaster?" He then elaborated by suggesting
that Kreps's argument was inadequate because " . . . Kreps is operating
with common sense notions of social problems---namely, something happens
that disrupts people." (p. 249). Furthermore, ". . . except for a few
disaster researchers, other sociologists apparently do not see disasters
as social problems." (p. 249). Finally, toward the end of his essay
Quarantelli (1989) proposed: "Disasters are better seen as part of
social change dynamics than as nonroutine social problems." (p. 249).

Why? Why would a "social change dynamics" perspective be better?
Quarantelli proposed several reasons including the basic and very
important idea that this would insure that disasters would ". . . be
seen as an integral part of what usually goes on in the social
structure, rather than as an external intrusion from the outside . . ."
(p. 250). I, however, would propose that this is one of the very reasons
why I believe a social problems perspective is so useful. He also
registered another concern which I addressed above, that is, the issue
of bias.

> "A social change emphasis also avoids the extreme relativism and the
> ideological bias inherent in any social problem approach, along with
> accepting elite views of what constitutes problems (that researchers
> sometime act as surrogates for political and economic elites may
> partly disguise but does not circumvent the issue)." (Quarantelli
> 1989, p. 250).

Quarantelli (1998) continued to push all of us to address this
fundamental question through a compilation of essays that revealed
varied answers, perspectives, and orientations. As he first did in his
"Presidential Address", back in 1986, he forced us to think hard about
the assumptions we were making when we casually tossed around terms like
"natural disasters" and started to generalize to other social situations
like civil disturbances or war (Quarantelli 1987b). Most recently, he
teamed with Ron Perry (2005) to edit another round of essays and
reactions and reactions to the reactions, in and effort to press us even
harder. As I read these, I found myself in agreement with Perry that too
often ". . . disaster researchers are spending more time talking past
one another than talking to one another." (Perry 2005, p. 315). And
while I might prefer a more complex system, hence the term taxonomy
rather than typology, I am in full agreement with Ron's conclusion that
empirically documented instances of inconsistency, e.g., absence or
presence of looting behavior, requires " . . . a system of classifying
occasions that enables understanding and meaningful interpretation of
such disparities." (Perry 2005, p. 315).

I also noted the definition Bob Stallings recommended that incorporated
a portion of that proposed by Kreps and I, i.e., nonroutine. Hence, "A
disaster is *a social situation characterized by nonroutine,
life-threatening physical destruction attributed to the forces of
nature, regardless of what other causal factors may seem to be involved*
(italics in original) (Stallings 2005, p. 263). Where we disagree,
however, is the boundary implied by "forces of nature" and no reference
to social problems. I was, however, glad to see that others, especially
Smith (2005), underscored the importance of highlighting the nonroutine
nature of disasters (p. 288).

In contrast, Barton (2005) identified direct parallels to the
integrative power of his concept of "collective stress" and the
frameworks used by social problems analysts.

> "Using the concept of 'collective stress' to examine a wide range of
> situations of large-scale deprivation varying on several dimensions,
> with 'local physical disaster' as one subtype, raises important
> theoretical questions and points to a wide range of empirical cases
> from which to learn answers. The wider concept relates the problems of
> preventing, mitigating, and coping with physical disasters to the
> general field of social problems and the means by which societies deal
> or fail to deal with them." (Barton 2005, p. 151).

Quarantelli's (2005) concluding essay covered a lot of ground that
provided much food for thought. Regarding the need for classification
system, or maybe systems in my view, he referred back to a distinction
he made in his 1987 article, i.e., genotype versus phenotype.

> "Essentially making this distinction argues that less obvious or
> visible characteristics are far more important than surface features.
> Our prediction is that our eventual new paradigm will involve far more
> genotypical rather than phenotypical features we now almost
> exclusively use." (Quarantelli 2005, p. 341).

This parallels a view he expressed previously regarding the whether or
not reactions to military attack involving nuclear bombs would parallel
those following natural disasters.

> ". . . if people are asked to evacuate from a certain area, whether
> the impetus for the evacuation is radiation fallout or a hurricane
> doesn't matter. However, people are only going to accept certain
> warnings as legitimate. But fundamentally, we thought that a nuclear
> attack was qualitatively different from any other situation.
> Therefore, we could not say to what degree the response to a nuclear
> attack or a hurricane would be similar." (Quarantelli 2004b, p. 325).

See why the issue of generalizability is so important for both disaster
theory and policy? Stallings (2006b) has elaborated on both the
importance and complexity of this issue for both cross-event and within
event comparisons. Analyses like his reflect the type of hard work
required to push the field further (see especially pp. 62-65 and 67-71).

Finally, Quarantelli (2005) again noted his preference for a "social
change approach" which ". . . would force us to consider the more
positive aspects of disasters (all but impossible to consider in a
social problem context that focuses on the negative)." (p. 353).

As this issue has begun to sensitize researchers, more comparative work
will help us better identify similarities and differences in a wide
variety of non-intentional versus intentional disaster agents like war
situations. As noted by the Committee on Disaster Research in the Social
Sciences (2006, pp. 10-19), comparative historical research on the
policy developments that follow major events provides an empirical
pathway toward understanding how social definitions emerge and public
policy evolves (e.g., see also Rubin 2007 and Birkland 2006, 1997).
Another good example of the level of specificity required to pursue this
task is Kirschenbaum's (2006) analysis of family preparedness
activities. It turns out that while there are certain similarities,
within his Israeli data base at least, conditions of intentional
conflict like war, may require explanatory models that differ
significantly from those documented for earthquakes and other natural
hazards.

But there is more to this issue than just intentionality or conflict as
differentiating concepts. Clarke's (2006) insights are most informative
and should be considered carefully by all disaster researchers. For
example, in contrast to our emphasis on the post-event emergence of an
altruistic community, which does have a clear empirical basis, he
appropriately questions the limits of this conclusion. Sure it does fit
hundreds of cases studied thus far, but what if London, for example,
were hit by surprise? What might be the relevance of the altruistic
community conclusion from the macro level view of the world system?

> "What, after all could Zimbabwe really do to help England recover? . .
> . the response wouldn't be uniform even within the United States. The
> religious right would probably say Londoners brought it on themselves;
> it was divine retribution for sinful behavior. Russia could do
> little." (Clarke 2006, p. 176).
>
> "I don't mean to sound coldhearted, but if we're really going to think
> smartly and imagine well about worst cases we have to be honest about
> political realities. The happy conclusion of disaster
> researchers---that altruistic communities form after calamity---has
> limits." (Clarke 2006, p. 177).

Of course, Quarantelli may well be right in his objections to efforts to
link disaster studies to those of other social problems. But I believe
there is room for multiple approaches at this point in the development
of the field. So let's examine an alternative.

**5. Disasters are a nonroutine social problem.**

In 1992 Russ Dynes sent a draft paper to me which was the basis for
remarks he made at a conference in Spain on the uses of sociological
research (see Dynes 1992). He asked for reactions and additional
examples that might be incorporated into a future article for
publication. I found his basic argument interesting, of course, and
after several exchanges we decided to co-author a new draft wherein we
summarized a few key sociological findings and their policy impacts
(Dynes and Drabek 1994).

> "The consequences of the research tradition has been to transform
> policy approaches to disaster. That transformation has been most
> complete in the United States, but, in general, those policy changes
> have also had other national and international implications. In the
> United States, responsibility for disaster was 'demilitarized'. At the
> national level, this has meant pulling together diffuse functions to
> create a Federal Emergency Management Agency with responsibility for
> 'comprehensive' emergency management. An all hazards approach is
> emphasized conceptually which can be implemented through the
> development of integrated emergency management systems within local
> communities." (Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 15).

We then looked toward the future and began by summarizing an insightful
paper by Quarantelli (1991) regarding various social trends that in his
judgment would ". . . produce more and worst disasters." (p. 18). The
nine trends we selected from his paper emphasized technological and
population changes that jointly increased vulnerability. For example, we
summarized Quarantelli's conclusion that "more vulnerable kinds of
populations will be impacted, e.g., in many areas such as Florida in the
U.S., new retirement communities and large concentrations of tourists
are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes." (p. 19).

After listing these trends, we quoted his conclusion because we were in
complete agreement.

> "'It is that solutions are not to be found primarily in new
> technologies or better use of existing ones. The difficulties note
> stem from social factors. Social problems can only be dealt with
> socially; technological improvements can only address technological
> problems.'" (p. 27, in Quarantelli 1991)) (as quoted in Dynes and
> Drabek 1994, p. 19).

Quarantelli's use of the concept of social problems in this context
reminded me of his earlier objections to the position I had advanced
previously. But that was not the specific point Dynes and I were trying
to develop. Rather, beyond Quarantelli's analysis, we saw the need to
place disaster research within a much broader theoretical perspective.
We illustrated this by noting Smelser's (1991) analysis of three large
scale "master trends" from which additional types of changes could be
identified. Among the eight we specified was that ". . . social problems
will become increasingly internationalized" and that not only would
there be ". . . a continuation of widespread problems of chronic
instability" but also a ". . . continuing erosion of traditional forms
of social stability." (Dynes and Drabek 1994, pp. 19-20).

Among the several points made in our brief conclusion that are most
relevant to my analysis here are these.

> "As the profession of emergency management matures and disaster
> researchers are pressed to specify the limits of generalizability of
> increased numbers of localized data bases, higher priority will be
> given to more fundamental questions: How and why do societies differ
> in their coping responses to risk? What social constraints pattern the
> differential distribution of risk, both temporally and globally, as
> new policy initiatives are implemented that are intended to mitigate
> disaster impacts and improve disaster preparedness, response and
> recovery?" (Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 21).

While not very extensive, we believed that the empirical base and
theoretical orientations flowing from disaster and hazard researchers ".
. . had a rather profound effect on public policy." (Dynes and Drabek
1994, p. 21). But the types of issues emerging on the horizon would
require that disaster researchers and emergency managers ". . . look
toward the discipline of sociology for relevant theoretical paradigms."
(Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 21). So we ended on a note of caution
regarding the future of sociology and its potential contribution to the
emerging profession of emergency management."

> "A new partnership may emerge that could prove to be mutually
> beneficial. To the extent that the discipline fragments substantively,
> stagnates intellectually and withers politically, it will fail to
> provide the insights needed." (Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 21).

About a year after this piece was published, Gary Kreps asked me to
co-author an elaboration of my 1989a article which we entitled
"Disasters Are Nonroutine Social Problems." (Kreps and Drabek 1996).
Therein we advanced our case by pointing out that the ". . . phase
'nonroutine events' distinguishes disasters as unusual and dramatic
social happenings from the reservoir of everyday routines and concerns .
. ." (p. 133). Furthermore we emphasized how our ". . . reference to
'historical conditions' and 'social definitions' underscores the need to
understand how social definitions of disaster emerge and the mix of
competing definitions that may be involved." (p. 134). Finally, we
illustrated how the threshold of social disruption and physical harm
must be linked to the complexity of the system selected for study, e.g.,
family versus community, and be socially defined. (p. 134). On this last
point we were underscoring the wisdom implicit within Barton's (1969)
collective stress perspective.

From our vantage point, however, the work of social constructionists,
like the Stallings (1995) study, *complemented* the approach we
proposed. Using the controversy noted above regarding the conference
organized by Wright and Rossi (1981), we argued that ". . . the false
dualism advocated by some functionalists and many social
constructionists . . ." (p. 139) was a pitfall that should be avoided.
Rather, both the objective aspects of disaster highlighted by
functionalists **and** the claims-making activities studied by social
constructionist types should be included in the future research agenda.

Kreps (2001) elaborated on these themes in his entry entitled
"Disasters, Sociology of" for the *International Encyclopedia of the
Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Unlike poverty, he proposed, disaster
events can be demarcated in social time and space. Generally speaking,
however, disasters remain a low priority for local officials and the
public because the probability of impact is low. When certain triggering
events occur, however, the perception of risk distribution may be
redefined by key interest groups thereby permitting *temporary*
acceptance of selected preparedness and/or mitigative actions like the
airport security changes after the 9/11 attacks. In short, ". . .
disasters are nonroutine problems because social processes related to
them change dramatically, depending on what stage of their life
histories is being considered." (Kreps 2001, p. 3719). In my opinion he
has it exactly right.

**6. There are many payoffs to approaching disasters as nonroutine
social problems.**

Careful reading of the works cited above could produce a longer listing,
but here I will highlight six of the most important.

a\. *Historical context*. Social problems require that the subject
matter, including disasters, be placed within their historical context.
In his review of five recent books on disaster, Stallings (2006a)
illustrated this by starting his essay with a summary of Dynes's (2000)
analysis of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake wherein the local government, for
the first time, ". . . wrested power from the church and assumed primary
responsibility for response, recovery, and rebuilding." (Stallings
2006a, p. 223). Thus, when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August
2005, ". . . the cultural repertoire of causal explanations for
disasters had grown considerably." (p. 223).

b\. *Root causes*. Social problems perspectives push analysts to dig
deeper so as to identify root causes. Thus, the responses during
Katrina, for example, surprised some. But the underlying patterns of
racism, sexism, ageism, and classism that I noted above, reflected
pre-event patterns of vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability offers
much to the study of social problems, including disasters, e.g.,
McEntire 2004; Enarson et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2003; Bolin 2006;
Enarson et al. 2006. Rodríguez and Barnshaw (2006) illustrated this
nicely in their review essay which included *At Risk* (Wisner et al.
2003).

> "The authors argue that a number of variables, including 'class . . .
> occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, health status, age,
> immigration status' and the 'nature and extent of social networks' (p.
> 11) impact disaster vulnerability. . . . The authors also discuss how
> factors such as wars, national debts, famines, droughts, illness, and
> urbanization place people at risk, increase their vulnerability, and
> makes the disaster recovery process extremely difficult." (Rodríguez
> and Barnshaw 2006, p. 220).

Similarly, Quarantelli (2005) has proposed that disasters ". . . are
overt manifestations of latent social vulnerabilities, basically of
weaknesses in social structures or social systems." (p. 345). In this
sense, like other social problems then, disasters can be seen as
'normal' (e.g., Perrow 1984). As Quarantelli (2005) elaborated in
comparing disasters to Perrow's concept of 'normal' accidents, ". . .
disasters are similar in that they latently exist in the larger social
systems, and are the result of a convergence of a variety of social
factors none of whom might be very important in themselves." (p. 346).
These insights bring us close to themes highlighted in chaos theory; a
complex set of epistemological and mathematical developments that I
believe may provide a great deal of help to future disaster researchers
(e.g., see Koehler 1996; Piotrowski 2006).

c\. *Terrorism*. As noted above, terrorism has become constructed as a
social problem. Of course, there are those who confuse the issues by
referring to a "war on terrorism". Hard to wage war on a strategy! But
that point aside, many sociologists and other social scientists who had
been studying disasters with other qualities tried to bring their
methods and theory to various attacks by groups using this strategy,
e.g., Aguirre, et al. 1998; Waugh 2006.

In short, by adopting a social problems perspective, the analysis of
disasters in general can be incorporated. Aside from mentioning a few
specific events, however, the social problems texts I reviewed did not
make this connection.

This is not to say that terrorist attacks are exactly like other
disasters. Some have proposed certain differences beyond the dimension
of intentionality or conflict. For example, Waugh (2006, p. 392) has
highlighted that such events are crime scenes which in turn places
unique constraints on responders. The major difference is that the roles
shift, i.e., " . . . the lead roles of agencies and officials
responsible for capturing or killing the perpetrators rather than
performing lifesaving roles and helping reduce the impact of the
disaster on people and property." (pp. 392-393) (see also McEntire et
al. 2001).

Once again, the question of generalization raises its head. And unlike
Quarantelli (1998, p. 3) who would exclude conflict situations from his
definition of disaster, my preference is to include them as part of the
study area and empirically explore which research conclusions fit and
which don't. By making such comparisons we can better inform our efforts
to construct a theoretical structure that can guide us in determining
the appropriateness and limits of generalization of our findings. As
Quarantelli (2005) has noted, however, this matter is very complex and
requires much further exploration (e.g., see especially pp. 336-338).

d\. *Technological disasters*. Events like the 1979 incident at the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (e.g., Perrow 1984) and the deadly
explosion at the Union Carbide facility in Bopal India (e.g.,
Shrivastava 1987), introduced response patterns and policy issues that
most disaster researchers had not considered. Such risks, how they might
be measured, and the social factors that might constrain both their
distribution and perception evolved into a discipline which only a few
tried to bridge (e.g., Slovic et al. 1974; Kunreuther and Ley 1982).
Similarly, controversies regarding potential toxicity impacts, like the
school children exposed at Love Canal (e.g., Levine 1982) or the long
smoldering underground coal fires in rural Pennsylvania (e.g.,
Kroff-Smith and Couch 1990), suggested to some analysts like Erikson
(1994) that a "new species" of troubles had emerged. Hence, Picou and
his colleagues (1997) placed their case study of the *Exxon Valdez* oil
spill into Erikson's framework since the patterns of anger, hostility,
rage, and other responses differed significantly from those typically
reported by disaster researchers. Indeed, they concluded that: ". . .
technological disasters differ from natural disasters in their
characteristics and consequences for human communities." (Picou et al.
1997, p. 13). But they also concluded ". . . that technological
disasters can be conceptualized, understood and recognized as a modern
social problem." (p. 314). Both of these themes were introduced in the
opening essay of their edited collection of reports on this event which
broadly assessed the social, economic, ecological, psychological and
legal consequences. As integrating conceptual tools, these two themes
put their case study of this single event into a much broader
theoretical context. And from the native peoples they met during this
process they learned the reality of cultural differences in interpreting
events like this especially as they pondered the significance of phrases
like "the day the water died". The emergence of bewilderment, then
distrust, followed by uncertainty were parallels to what Erikson (1994)
also had observed at his previous study locations. And as he emphasized
in his "Foreword" to the Picou et al. (1997) text, one consequence of
such emergence may be damage to the social fabric of the community
(Erikson 1997, p. xiii).

I am in total agreement with Picou and his associates regarding the
desirability of placing events like the *Exxon Valdez* spill into a
social problems framework. I disagree with them and Erikson, however,
regarding the utility and desirability of using either "agent toxicity"
or "technological" as a sole differentiating event characteristic for
the future theory development of a *sociological theory* of disaster.
Rather, I find Quarantelli's position far more inviting. That is, our
differentiating criteria must be both *social in nature and abstract*
(see Quarantelli 2005, pp. 339-341).

So what might such criteria be? While the agent characteristics that
Kreps and I (1996) proposed were useful for evacuation studies and
others---qualities like event scope, duration of impact, and length of
forewarning---other dimensions of a different quality are required for a
more comprehensive theory. If I were writing the paper today, which I
obviously am not, I would explore the utility of these five: 1)
*perceived scope of impact* (i.e., is the impact perceived to be local,
national or global in scope of impact); 2) *perceived degree of
routiness* (i.e., to what degree are the relevant social and physical
structures perceived to be understood and subject to manipulation; see
Perrow 1967); 3) *perceived degree of intentionality* (i.e., to what
degree is the event perceived to be a consequence of human intent,
error, accident or failure); 4) *perceived degree of social worth of
impacted objects* (i.e., given the cultural values of the impacted
system, including people, physical structures, and their social
significance); and 5) *perceived degree of collective stress* (i.e., to
what degree do the disaster demands exceed the system capacity including
various forms of system vulnerability, e.g., see McEntire 2004). This is
a complex puzzle that others will have to address, but having given the
matter some thought, I am convinced that future classification systems
of disaster will reflect such matters as these.

e\. *Parallel processes*. Once disasters are placed into a social
problems perspective, we begin to ask, as noted above, how do they
differ from other matters of public concern and policy? But we also can
be informed by analyses of other social problems. Parallels in the
processes of blame assignation, for example, and the search for root
causes that reflect strains within social structure are obvious
examples. The late Lou Zurcher (1989) did not want to abandon "social
change theory", but did not view this as a requirement to using a social
problems perspective as a way to enrich and expand disaster research.
Indeed, at the 1989 Kreps conference he identified ". . . six major
characteristics that seemed to correspond with the typologies of
disaster response." (p. 362). Among these were such themes as "The
social problem is defined and morally evaluated by human beings" (p.
363) and "the social problem has a significant element of social
causation" (p. 362). His conclusion underscored my theme here of
"parallel processes."

> "Perhaps, depending upon the particular orientation of social problems
> theory, Drabek is right that there can be an effective merging with
> disaster theory. The parallels seem obvious." (p. 363).

Stimulation of thinking in both of these directions and others will
benefit the quality of future disaster research.

f\. *Policy guidance*. I noted above the efforts Russ Dynes and I (1994)
made to illustrate how past disaster research had influenced some policy
development. Since that essay was published, a great deal of impact
occurred within the Higher Education Project sponsored by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (e.g., see Drabek 2006d). Many faculty now
teaching within the over 100 formal emergency management degree programs
have been influenced and assisted by the materials flowing from that
project. As their students become acquainted with the research
literature from sociology and other social science disciplines, future
policy will be impacted at all levels of government. Unfortunately, the
past six years has not reflected a continuation of the pattern Dynes and
I saw emerging in 1994. But I remain convinced that the introduction of
a social problems perspective into the curricula experience of future
emergency managers would be a good thing. Without it, I fear the
profession will drift into a series of policy failures that will hinder
their capacity to be effective. Such constraint will reduce the ability
of the entire nation to cope with the diverse and horrific challenges we
surely will confront.

**[Emergency Management Policy Implications]{.underline}**

A social problems perspective on disasters has many policy implications
for emergency managers. The *most important* of these is that it
provides a more *strategic perspective on their profession*. More
comprehensive, complex, and internationally based views of history,
social structure, and alternative value positions, can help inform
alternative policy approaches and choices. **Far too often, especially
during the past six years, emergency management has been drifting in
directions that are inconsistent with many fundamental values and
constitutional protections that reflect the very ethos of this nation.
And these directions are inconsistent with much of the disaster research
legacy.** I'll elaborate on this conclusion by briefly examining nine
interrelated issues: 1) coordination; 2) managerial models; 3)
intergovernmental partnerships; 4) catastrophic planning; 5) military
roles; 6) professional training; 7) homeland security interface; 8)
civil liberties; and 9) a necessary shift in priorities.

**1. The primary task of emergency managers is to facilitate the
coordination of agency and organizational activities related to the
preparedness for, response to, recovery from and mitigation of
disasters.**

Although this has not always been the case, since the late 1970s an
all-hazard approach to emergency management has evolved and become
widely accepted as legitimate (e.g., see Dynes, Quarantelli and Kreps
1972; Drabek and Hoetmer 1991;McEntire et al. 2002; Haddow and Bullock
2003; Perry and Lindell 2007; McEntire 2007; Lindell and Perry 2007;
Rubin 2007). This coordination function extends horizontally across all
sectors of a community, whatever the jurisdictional authority happens to
be from village or town to city and county boundary. It also extends
vertically from a local area to a region, to state and federal levels.

Since all disasters are local in their initial and immediate impact,
coordination processes are most effective when the lowest level of
government is the principle planning unit and the central point of
authority and control. Thus, as with most other social problems, the
primary locus of decision-making ideally should reside at the lowest
level of government, with resources becoming available for specialized
purposes and on a temporary basis when nonroutine situations demand such
action.

In short, the emergency management function must be revisited and
greatly enhanced. Such enhancements must occur within local, state and
federal agencies. At the federal level this must occur by making
significant changes within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so
that *emergency management becomes whole once again* as many have
recommended (e.g., see Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 2006,
pp. 135-136), or through the recreation of an independent Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as many advocated in the wake of the
failed response to Hurricane Katrina (e.g., Mikulski 2006). Recent
reorganizations are steps in the right direction, but much more is
required (e.g., "Post-Katrina Management Reform Act," April 1, 2007).
Indeed, a UPI/Zogby national poll (Waterman 2007) indicated that over
seven in ten (71%) Americans ". . . believed that FEMA should be
restored to the status of an independent agency." (p. 1).

**2. The most effective managerial model for emergency managers is one
rooted in community problem solving and change that emphasizes
cooperation, communication, and coordination.**

In recent years, older notions of "command and control" have been
reintroduced as "the appropriate" model (Tierney 2006). Despite numerous
critiques (e.g., Buck et al. 2006; Quarantelli 2004a; Dynes 1994; Kuban
1993; Neal and Phillips 1995; Wenger et al. 1990; Drabek 1987, p. 289;
2006b, p. 232), various versions of command and control philosophy have
been proposed and/or mandated (e.g., see DHS 2006). For example, upon
documenting the flawed interagency coordination that characterized much
of the initial response to the World Trade Center attacks on September
11, 2001, (e.g., see pp. 285-303), the 9/11 Commission (NCOTAUTUS 2004)
recommended nationwide adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) (p.
297). Some policy reviews, like that of Bea (2004) cautioned against
such mandates for several reasons.

> "Some might contend that the imposition of the ICS system, as set out
> in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), signals federal
> involvement in an arena traditionally administered by state or local
> governments. Such individuals might argue that such an approach could
> lead to practices and decisions that may result in inefficiencies,
> more bureaucracy, or an erosion of state authority guaranteed under
> the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." (Bea 2004, p. 14).

Equally important, as with any standardized federal policy, the ICS may
not be equally applicable to emergency management programs in
communities with different histories, sub-cultures, demographic
characteristics, and varying modes and degrees of involvements by
voluntary groups and associations. Citing such works as Kendra and
Wachtendorf (2003), Lowe and Fothergill (2003) and the ICMA Greenbook
that Hoetmer and I edited (1991), Bea stated that "the ICS framework may
help as well as hinder spontaneous and creative responses by
volunteers." (p. 15). Regarding community variability, he raised red
flags.

> "The system may not be appropriate for local governments with small or
> mid-sized fire departments and may require considerable refitting for
> nonfire emergency activities. Regardless of the size of the community,
> the ICS application should be flexible enough to allow for local
> differences in organization, politics, and needs. ICS should therefore
> be reviewed for applicability before it is adopted." (Bea 2004, p.
> 15).

While appropriate as a tactical strategy for many first responders,
especially law enforcement and fire agencies in large Metropolitan
areas, the ICS is not a panacea (Wenger et al. 1990; McEntire 2006).
Even community level emergency management, and especially that relevant
to most state and federal agencies, requires a much more complex model,
one rooted in multiple strategies that facilitate cooperation and
coordination (e.g., see Drabek 1987, 1990, 2003b; Moynihan 2006).
Unfortunately, as I noted above, policy doctrine flowing from the White
House after Hurricane Katrina reflects a very different vision, one
reflective of approaches that failed in the past.

> "One model for the command and control structure for the Federal
> response in the new National Preparedness System is our successful
> defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework,
> there is a clear line of authority that stretches from the President,
> through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combat and Commander in the
> field. . . . Although the Combatant Commander might not 'own' or
> control forces on a day-to-day basis, during a military operation he
> controls all military forces in his theater; he exercises the command
> authority and has access to resources needed to affect outcomes on the
> ground." (White House 2006, p. 71).

**3. Like the horizontal community level networks that function to
prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against, vertical
inter-governmental networks addressing emergency management functions
can best be coordinated through multiple strategies that emphasize
partnership of team building, and trust, rather than bureaucratic
orientations and actions reflecting intimidation, direct orders, or
secrecy.**

As reflected in our constitution, there are clear separations of powers
both among the three co-equal branches of government, i.e., executive,
legislative and judicial, and across the intergovernmental system. This
decentralized structure provides the highest levels of protection and
security against all hazards, although specialized federal units, with
narrowly defined tasks such as the National Hurricane Center or U.S.
Geological Survey, are required so that timely information can be
provided to policy makers across the intergovernmental system.

In part, the numerous failures during the response to Hurricane Katrina
reflected the wrongheaded policy shifts promoted by DHS such as NIMS and
the ICS. Moynihan's (2006) detailed analysis of the House and Senate
reports on Katrina documents this in detail.

> "There is weak empirical evidence on the validity of these claims, but
> the DHS has promoted the ICS approach as applicable to all types of
> crises. This is a contestable proposition, and even a cursory
> examination of different types of crises suggests contingencies that
> will affect the efficacy of hierarchical networks." (p. 3).

So despite mandates from DHS in 2004 wherein NIMS, including ICS, and
the National Response Plan (NRP) became national policy, the response to
Katrina had many failings. Moynihan's (2006) summary is on target.

> "The network response was diminished by capacity problems of key
> members, whose resource problems led to inadequate numbers of
> personnel who were poorly prepared for their tasks. These capacity
> problems also weakened coordination, as did a lack of understanding
> about new crisis management policies that provided the rules by which
> networks response were to be guided. These policies called for
> hierarchical controls over the network of crisis responders, but were
> unfamiliar to many responders, and never properly implemented during
> Katrina. As different network members struggled to complete their
> tasks, trust between network members also declined, weakening another
> key network coordination mechanism." (p. 1).

As many of us have emphasized (e.g., Perrow 2007, pp. 117-119; Drabek
2006b; Dynes 1994), management models rooted in the principles of
bureaucracy have limited applicability to the emergent multiagency
networks that characterize post-disaster responses. As Moynihan (2005)
put it in his analysis of the responses to the Exotic Newcastle Disease
in the state of California in 2003, "Networks are a nonhierarchical
approach to the management, reliant on horizontal relationships,
information, expertise, and trust to direct a self-organizing process .
. ." (p. 7). Furthermore, by the time Katrina hit in August of 2005,
staff morale within FEMA had plummeted. And as Perrow noted, this had
far reaching consequences. ". . . the low morale of upper managers who
were not political appointments would spread to lower management, and
then to employees in general. In an organization with low morale,
sticking to the rules to protect your career may be better than breaking
them even if the rules are inappropriate." (Perrow 2007, pp. 117-118).

Brinkley's (2006) magnificently detailed description of "the great
deluge", i.e., Katrina, provides careful documentation of the
coordination and communication failures that so terribly wounded the
intergovernmental system. His conclusions are on point and provide
another specific illustration of why I disfavor the current policy
drift. Certainly, the flawed Katrina response reflected many factors,
and depending on where one sits, alternative explanations are more or
less appealing.

> "The one that rings truest, though, is that cronyism riddled FEMA and
> its contractors in the Bush administration, making incompetence and
> not racism the key to the response. As Lieutenant Commander Duckworth,
> noted, the bureaucracy 'was to blame.'" (Brinkley 2006, p. 618).

While I personally believe that both racism, like sexism and ageism,
*and* bureaucratic incompetence were operative, the strained
intergovernmental system also was a key factor as Brinkley noted.

> "At the end of the first week after Katrina, Bush tried in every way
> possible to pressure Governor Blanco into ceding control of troops in
> her state, along with, effectively, responsibility for the course of
> the response. It was the sort of political fight that Bush was used to
> winning, but Blanco, for her part, stood up to the President. . . . It
> was a battle largely hidden from the public, but in winning a battle
> royale with the President, Blanco changed the second term of George
> Bush, leaving him open to other attempts to curtail the sweeping power
> he assumed for himself. . . . The country could always bounce back
> from a natural disaster, and the hurricane was a natural disaster. But
> the Great Deluge was a disaster that the country brought on itself."
> (Brinkley 2006, p. 619).

**4. As with all other disasters, responses across the full life cycle
of future catastrophic events, including those resulting from actions
taken by terrorists, enhancement of the capacities of local and state
governments should be given priority.**

If one accepts the premise that catastrophic events are qualitatively
different from other disasters, as Quarantelli, (2003, p. 3) for example
has proposed, it may seem to follow that the primary enhancement
required is at the federal level. Reflecting a false image of local
chaos and inability to respond, some have proposed policies that reflect
high levels of centralization of authority, especially regarding certain
hazards. Clearly, the risks of future pandemics like the influenza
outbreak of 1918 (Barry 2005), and terrorist attacks from domestic or
internationally based groups are real. And the range of actions that
might be required is substantial.

Fortunately, some actions **(**e**.**g., "Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act" \[S.3678\]; signed on December 19, 2006) have been
taken to address preparedness issues in recognition of the ". . .
uncertain but urgent threat . . ." (National Governors Association 2006,
p. 1) represented by a pandemic influenza outbreak with far more lethal
potential than the 1918 killer event. "Once a pandemic happens, we will
divide forever the progress of our nation as pre-pandemic and
post-pandemic." (NGA 2006, p. 1).

Despite such efforts, however, a lack of trust and increased conflict
has emerged within the intergovernmental system. I am indebted to my
brother-in-law for alerting me to a recent *Washington Post* article
that illustrates this point all too well.

"A decision by the Bush administration to rewrite in secret the nation's
emergency response blueprint has angered state and local emergency
officials, who worry that Washington is repeating a series of mistakes
that contributed to its bungled response to Hurricane Katrina nearly two
years ago.

State and local officials in charge of responding to disasters say that
their input in shaping the National Response Plan was ignored in recent
months by senior White House and Department of Homeland Security
officials, despite calls by congressional investigators for a shared
overhaul of disaster planning in the United States.

'In my 19 years in emergency management, I have never experienced a more
polarized environment between state and federal government,' said Albert
Ashwood, Oklahoma's emergency management chief and president of a
national association of state emergency managers." (Hsu 2007, p. 1).

As with hurricanes or tornadoes, specialized federal agencies must be
tasked with the functions of monitoring and warning. But coordination
and control of other activities, including response and recovery, should
rest primarily within the local and state government layers. Certainly,
specialized planning for highly improbable events, as Clarke (2006) has
discussed, should be completed especially within the federal level where
horizontal coordination is most difficult given the size and complexity
of the agencies involved. Neither the scope nor the complexity of such
challenges, however, should be accepted as rationale for greater
centralization of authority at the federal level in the name of
effectiveness, efficiency, or security. But as Harrald noted, Bush
appointees appear ". . . to be guided by a desire to ensure centralized
control of what is an inherently decentralized process. . . . Response
to catastrophic events requires collaboration and trust in a broad
network of organizations." (Hsu 2007, p. 1).

**5. While the federal military has had an increased presence in many
aspects of disaster life cycles during the past six years, this role
should not be expanded further.**

Several scholars (e.g., Anderson 1969, 1970; Drabek et al. 1981) have
documented the many roles the federal military have played in disasters
of various types. Recently, especially after Katrina, some have called
for increased shifting of resources and responsibility to various
sectors of the military (Tierney 2006, p. 410). In part, this reflected
certain conflicts and coordination difficulties as the Select Committee
of the U.S. House report documented in detail. For example, ". . .
Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response
capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to
a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response"
(p. 221). Such matters appear to reflect tensions that go far beyond
this single event, however. As the House Committee noted, citing an
article in the *Wall Street Journal*, the state controlled National
Guard leadership has seen this matter to be of great concern.

> "Admiral Keating who heads U.S. NORTHCOM, a newly created military
> body overseeing homeland defense, has told lawmakers that active-duty
> forces should be given complete authority for responding to
> catastrophic disasters. . . . The head of the Washington State
> National Guard, General Timothy Lowenberg, suggested in e-mails to
> colleagues that Admiral Keating's suggestion amounted to a 'policy of
> domestic regime change. *Wall Street Journal*, December 8, 2005."
> (SBCIPRHK 2006, p. 221).

Less politicized was the conclusion reached by Clayton (2006) who
examined policy shifts and needs related to "Incidents of National
Significance." His conclusion is an example of the type of analysis
required.

> "Despite recent calls for the contrary in the aftermath of Hurricane
> Katrina, it would be antithetical to the U.S. system of governance and
> its philosophical underpinnings for local responsibilities and
> response to be 'federalized' too early and for the DoD to assume the
> lead agency for responding to Incidents of national Significance.
> Legislating change and establishing specific requirements in law for
> cooperative DHS, DoD and state training and exercises would establish
> minimum requirements for regional planning and preparedness and,
> ultimately, better response. It is time to better shape the efforts
> and responsibilities of the federal agencies with reality and codify,
> train, and exercise them so that the national response capability
> reflects the professionalism of state and local agencies." (Clayton
> 2006, Abstract).

Upon completing a detailed assessment of the military response during
Hurricane Katrina, the staff of the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) (2006) concluded that ". . . disaster plans and training exercises
involving the military did not sufficiently incorporate lessons learned
from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that
could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster." (p. 3)
Reflecting this conclusion, they titled their report as *Hurricane
Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's
Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*.

Recognizing that Department of Defense (DoD) was aware of various
problems and was ". . . beginning to take actions to address the lessons
learned . . . (p. 31), the team, never the less, concluded that the
issues ". . . . are often complex, cross agency boundaries, and are, in
some cases, long standing." (p. 31). Hence, four recommendations were
offered calling for clarification in roles, especially with National
Guard units designation of milestones, and " . . . the development of
detailed plans and exercises to fully account for the unique
capabilities and support that the military is likely to provide to civil
authorities in response to the full range of domestic disasters,
including catastrophes." (p. 35).

The response to the "draft" report by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Paul McHale, dated May 5, 2006, Appendix III of the GAO report, pp.
48-49) is informative. Among the key points of most relevance to my
observation above (#5) are these.

> "We request you make several changes in the draft report. In general,
> our comments fall under two broad categories. First, the report calls
> for greater DoD role during domestic disaster response. While we agree
> with the general thrust of your recommendation, striking the
> appropriate balance between the military's primary warfighting role
> overseas and the need to support civil authorities at home is a
> difficult, but fundamental issue. . . . The goal is to enhance the
> capacity of other agencies and state and local governments to perform
> their assigned responsibilities during domestic disaster response,
> with the continued ability to call on U.S. military support when
> required by the circumstances.
>
> . . .
>
> In addition, as Lieutenant General Honoré points out in his May 1,
> 2006, letter to you (attached), the title of the draft GAO report is
> misleading in that it does not recognize DoD's extensive planning and
> exercise schedule prior to August 29, 2005." (p. 48).

Twenty days after the McHale letter, the GAO contact person, Ms. Sharon
Pickup (2006) (Director, Defense Capabilities and Management) released a
"Statement for the Record" to the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives. Her statement referenced the above report,
outlined the key findings, and emphasized two ideas of most relevance
here. That is: 1) "Many of the challenges faced in the response point to
the need for better plans and more robust exercises . . ." (p. 3), and
2) ". . . substantial improvement will require sustained attention from
the highest management levels in DoD and from leaders across
government." (p. 5).

Reflecting on the six year anniversary of their final report (2001, U.S.
Commission on National Security) calling for a greater priority on
homeland security, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman emphasized their views
that the National Guard should be primary in this responsibility. In
testimony before the House Appropriations subcommittee (1/30/07), both
expressed regrets that the detailed and "lower-profile recommendations"
they had made six years ago were ignored including ". . . a key
recommendation that the National Guard be used as the backbone of
homeland security." (Sprengelmeyer 2007, p. 8). Hart commented, ". . .
we all know where the National Guard is today." "It's not securing the
homeland." (p. 8).

Lawrence J. Korb, a former assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
administration, expanded on his testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee (April 17, 2007) in a co-authored paper (Korb and
Duggan 2007) to document Hart's observation in much more detail. For
example, regarding troop and equipment shortages during the Katrina
response, they put it this way.

> "Contrary to official statements by the Bush administration, a dearth
> of ready troops was also to blame. Had a substantial number of
> essential Guard units been readily available, logistical gaps that
> occurred during Katrina operations would have been mitigated." (p. 5).

But as they note, subsequent responses reflect continuations of such
shortages due to the failed policies in Iraq. For example, after the
2007 tornado in Greensburg, Kansas, Governor Kathleen Sebelius pointed
out that ". . . the state's National Guard has only about 40 percent of
the equipment it is allotted because much of it has been sent to Iraq."
(p. 5). And other states reflect the same deficiencies.

> "Sadly the problems plaguing the Kansas Guard are not unique. The
> Guards of California, Florida, Arizona, New Jersey, Idaho, Louisiana,
> South Carolina, Oklahoma, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon and Arkansas
> also have less than half the equipment they need to deal with natural
> disasters." (Korb and Kuggan 2007, p. 5).

**6. The profession of emergency management will be enhanced through
university and college level degree programs that must grow both in
number and quality.**

As noted above, there are now over 100 emergency management degree
programs with another 100 in development. (Blanchard 2006). Like all
other professions, however, the intellectual tools required for the art
of practicing emergency management is not confined to a single academic
discipline. Hence, these programs are nested and administratively within
a variety of departments and colleges at the present time. Regardless of
their administrative home, the theories, methods, and findings from all
the social sciences are most relevant. And this *includes* the *social
problems perspective* on disaster research, I outlined in the first
section of this paper. For it is within this perspective that basic
issues of inequality, vulnerability, corporate power and concentration,
and the like, can effectively be brought into these classrooms. Failure
to examine "root causes" of disaster at these levels of analysis, will
limit the depth of emergency management education. Such limitations in
quality can allow these courses to drift into becoming training grounds
for future bureaucrats rather than enlightened professionals.

Increased drift toward more bureaucratic, militaristic, or engineering
and other physical science emphases within emergency management
programs, is a potential direction with which I disagree. A footnote
(#6) in Merton's (1961) "Epilogue" makes the fundamental point and
further illustrates why a social problems perspective is most relevant.

> "Although they occasionally waver in their judgments of 'physical
> problems' -- i.e. the usual array of nature-made catastrophes---as
> constituting social problems, Fuller and Myers conclude their
> excellent contribution to a sociological theory of social problems by
> setting forth much the same position adopted here. For example: 'While
> the earthquake itself may involve no value-judgments, its consequences
> inevitably will call for moral judgments and decisions of policy.
> People will not agree on how much should be spent in reconstruction,
> how it should be spent, or how the funds should be raised.' Richard C.
> Fuller and Richard R. Myers, 'Some Aspects of a Theory of Social
> Problems,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 6 (February, 1941), p.
> 27." (Merton 1961, p. 705).

Currently two important challenges must be confronted by faculty
responsible for such programs. First, the *capacity for social
criticism* must be strengthened and protected. A social problems
perspective may help this, but the matter should be addressed
explicitly. Students and faculty should be encouraged to critically
examine past, current and proposed emergency management policy changes.

As I have emphasized elsewhere (e.g., Drabek 2006a,c, 2007), inadequate
development of a capacity to critically review emergency management
policy, both existent and proposed, is the *greatest weakness* in
current college and university programs. We would be wise to remember
the observations of many theorists who have made this general point over
the years (e.g., Gardner 1965). Indeed, such requirement, as Tom Paine
stated so succinctly shortly after our nation's birth, is the *duty of
every citizen*. **"The defects of every Government and Constitution,
both as to principle and form, must on a parity of reasoning, be as open
to discussion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man
owes to society to point them out."** (Paine 2003, p. 263; original
publication 1792). And a few pages later, as he explained to La Fayette
why he added "part the second" to his initial essay, i.e., "Rights of
Man" he offered this sentence which has an eerie relevance to today's
political climate. "Freedom had been hunted round the globe; reason was
considered rebellion; and the slavery of fear had made men afraid to
think." (p. 266).

Second, the interface with homeland security courses, emphases, and
programs should be examined critically. As I have elaborated elsewhere
(Drabek 2007), different perceptions of "the problem," assumptions about
it, and focal tasks, reveal *important cultural differences* that
preclude simple integration of emerging programs. What is most clear is
that integration can not be accomplished by administrative fiat or
simply adding one or the other name to a program area. Careful and
thoughtful analyses will be required. In many cases, program integration
efforts will reflect culture conflict and in some, simply may not occur.
Such future outcomes will reflect governmental policy changes, disaster
events, pressures from professional associations and other such external
forces. As Barry's (2005) informative history of the medical profession,
like others (e.g., Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel 2002; Moore 1970; Hall
1975), clearly document, such pressures, conflicts and adjustments
reflect common processes documented for numerous professions.

Sustained funding to encourage and nurture emergency management courses
and programs, however, must be increased. Similarly, there must be
parallel enrichment of disciplinary, multidisciplinary, and
interdisciplinary disaster and hazard research activity so as to provide
a continuing array of study findings and theoretical analyses that form
the core intellectual foundation for these programs (e.g., see Mileti
1999, pp. 255-265; Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences
2006, pp. 282-285).

**7. The assumptions, tasks, and policies that define "homeland
security" must be examined critically from a broad social problems
perspective.**

As revealed by the organizational charts that were created initially,
and continue to evolve, there are many tasks that comprise "homeland
security". Reflecting the public outrage that followed the 9/11 attacks
and the earlier proposals, e.g., Hart-Rudman 2001 (U.S. Commission on
National Security/21^st^ Century), Congress initiated the largest
government reform in our history by establishing the Department of
Homeland Security. One of the early statements issued by the White House
in June, 2002, indicated that the new cabinet level secretary, would be
responsible for five core units (Office of Homeland Security 2002): 1)
Border and Transportation Security; 2) Emergency Preparedness and
Response; 3) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures; 4) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
and 5) Management. Each of these areas involved transfers of personnel
from existing agencies like the FEMA into core area 2 and the Coast
Guard into area 1.

**Of course, activities by other agencies were to be coordinated better
even though they were outside this agency.** Most important among these
was the matter of mitigation as it pertained to the terrorist threat. As
later documented by the 9/11 Commission (NCOTAUTUS 2004) important
cultural barriers among the several intelligence agencies resulted in
structural stovepipes that severely reduced interagency information
sharing. Flawed intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
used to justify the preemptive attack on Iraq, precipitated another
structural adjustment designed to insure better coordination among the
various agencies. Thus, the creation of the Director of National
Intelligence presumably has improved the effectiveness of the
multiagency network responsible for this critical task.

What do social problems perspectives add to an analysis of the homeland
security dimension of emergency management? Consider the parallel to
crime. Social problems texts emphasize historical patterns in criminal
activity, changing legal definitions of what constitutes a criminal act,
and the ebb and flow of policy designed to mitigate. These and the
analysis of related issues provide a basis for recasting criminal
activity from the actions of evil people to larger social issues of
structural patterns of inequality, failing schools, job exportation, and
other matters reflecting the "society as patient" orientation. While
adding more locks to apartment doors, like purchasing guns for classroom
teachers, may seem logical to many, especially within the context of a
particular traumatic event, such actions do not address the *root
causes* of crime.

Similarly, recall my earlier comments regarding social problems
perspectives on suicide. While most Americans will never benefit from
these assessments and their linkages to "root causes", by the spring of
2007, some popular media publications were introducing these ideas. For
example, in a discussion of increased threat perceptions regarding
future terror attacks, *Newsweek* reporters (Hirsh and Yousafai 2007)
quoted Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri regarding
White House criticism of their failure to reign in terror training
facilities. Kasuri's response may have been totally political, but at
least it pointed to directions beyond military solutions. "Let's be
honest. There are a lot of people all over the Muslim world, from
Indonesia to Somalia, who are hostile to what they regard as American
foreign policy. You need to tackle the root causes." (p. 37).

Racism is deeply embedded in American society. It, like the matter of
immigration, has a long history and reflects the evolution of complex
policy changes that too often have been adopted to treat specific
symptoms. As bandaids on an infected cut, they cover over the obvious,
but fail to address the infection that places the patient at risk. So
too, proposals to build higher and longer walls along our southern
border with Mexico, do not reflect the complexity of the history or the
economic and social dynamics that comprise "the immigration problem." As
McCorkel (2006) pointed out in her review of Maril's (2004) case study
of the U.S. Border Patrol, there is a ". . . profound disconnect between
official policy and the complex environmental, political, and
interpersonal realities of the border." (p. 177). Somewhat like many
emergency managers trying to implement or justify certain homeland
security terrorism initiatives, these agents try to do their jobs in a
professional manner. But ". . . a lack of resources and inadequate
training meant that agents frequently worked their shifts alone, many
with limited ability to communicate with the Spanish-speaking immigrants
they apprehended." (p. 177). Consequently, both the ". . . agents and
the immigrants they encountered \[were put\] in positions of great
vulnerability" which in turn ". . . exacerbated problems of mutual
distrust." (p. 177).

My point is this. The homeland security dimension of emergency
management must be placed within a much *broader strategic framework*.
One of the few who have addressed this need is Gary Hart (2006). He
clearly acknowledges that there are terrorist groups that must be
identified and destroyed before they can hurt people. Parallel to local,
state, or federal law enforcement personnel, our anti-terror "forces,"
in the broadest sense of that term, must have the resources required to
get the job done. But creating "a spear" or "a shield" to use Hart's
language, are only two aspects of what is required. And so, building on
Hart's critique, I have recommended that university faculty encourage
students to adopt my social problems perspective. With it they can step
back and ask more fundamental questions. "What are the sources of
insecurity?" For as Hart reminds us, "Freedom requires security. An
insecure individual or an insecure nation cannot be said to be truly
free." (p. 173). And because terrorism is a strategy designed to
increase fear, those who would use this strategy must be stopped. But
there are additional sources of fear and insecurity that also threaten
the nation. For some it is the fear of losing a job, others being caught
in the cross-fire of gang violence. And for millions of elderly it is
fear of abandonment, payment of drug bills, and even enough food to
maintain a body weakened by parts that simply are wearing out.

> "It is the source of considerable wonder that those most eager to
> sacrifice some freedoms to create a shield, or spear, against
> terrorism are unwilling to demonstrate equal zeal in attacking other
> sources of insecurity to create a cloak of security." (Hart 2006, p.
> 175).

Hence, we would do well, as Hart (2006) recommends (p. 175) to ponder
the wisdom of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his 1941 State of the
Union speech he specified four freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from
want, freedom of speech, and freedom of worship. And so instead of
defining homeland "security" in an overly narrow way, emphasizing our
military and law enforcement shields and multiple blankets of protection
resulting from initiatives in airline passenger scrutiny, port container
surveillance, or higher walls in Arizona or California, we need to focus
more strategically on today's parallel to Roosevelt's insight.

> "Our new four freedoms should be freedom of the commons, freedom of
> livelihood, freedom of a sound environment, and freedom from fear."
> (Hart 2006, p. 176).

**8. Recently adopted policies, like the USA Patriot Act and others
pertaining to electronic eavesdropping, "data mining," warrantless
physical searches, and the like, permit unacceptable assaults on
fundamental civil liberties and for the most part must be rejected.**

Since the 9/11 attacks, risk perceptions of Americans have been changed.
Substantial numbers, as noted above, now fear death or injury from
future terrorist attacks. So it is more important than ever that we keep
the most fundamental question of a social problems perspective clearly
in front of us. This is, "what qualities identify a good society?"

**In my own social problems courses years ago, and in my disaster
classes especially since the 9/11 attacks, I emphasize this question and
the value issues, choices and trade-offs that each of us as individuals
must decide.** "It is not the objective of this course to select a set
of values for you. Rather the objective is to get you to think about the
values you believe in today, examine them critically and understand
better how they are linked to the private troubles being experienced by
members of our society and a range of interdependent public issues. And
as you ponder these, look for linkages to the Constitution of the United
States and the civil liberties protected through the Bill of Rights."

In such discussions, we should seek wisdom from a wide variety of
thinkers of various political persuasions. I will cite only two examples
here to make the point. First, listen to Dostoevsky (1960) as his "Grand
Inquisitor" explains why ". . . man prefers peace, and even death, to
freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil." (p. 129).

> "I tell you that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find
> someone to whom he can hand over quickly that gift of freedom with
> which the unhappy creature is born." (pp. 128-129).
>
> ". . . they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them
> from the great anxiety and terrible agony they now endure supplying a
> free, individual answer. And everyone will be happy, all the millions
> of creatures except the hundred thousand who rule them. For only we,
> we who guard the mystery, will be unhappy." (p. 135).

Our nation's founders, of course, had very different visions of both
human nature and the role of government in an ideal society. We should
think hard on the policy implications and wisdom reflected in their
writings, especially those who thought hard about the basic principles
of democracy. Consider these words that Thomas Paine sent to George
Washington in 1791.

> "When I contemplate the natural dignity of man, when I feel (for
> Nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the
> honour and happiness of its character, I become irritated at the
> attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were Knaves
> and fools, and can scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus
> imposed upon." ("Rights of Man", p. 172).
>
> "That there are men in all countries who get their living by war, and
> by keeping up the quarrels of nations, is shocking as it is true; but
> when those who are concerned in the government of a country make it
> their study to sow discord and cultivate prejudices between nations,
> it becomes more unpardonable." ("Preface to the English Edition," p.
> 134).

Of course, Paine was defending the French Revolution and rejecting
Burke's interpretation of it, the French Constitution, and their
potential impact on future relationships between England and France. So
after seeing ". . . old prejudices wearing away" Paine proposed that
Burke ". . . immediately began sowing the seeds of a new inveteracy, as
if he were afraid that England and France would cease to be enemies."
("Preface to the English Edition," p. 134). I suspect I know what
Paine's view of the USA Patriot Act would be!

It is somewhat ironic that the chapter in the second edition of the
Merton-Nisbet social problems text (1966) that replaced Fritz's (1961)
disaster summary was authored by one of our former (1995) ASA
presidents, Amitai Etzioni. As I noted above it was titled: "War and
Disarmament" (Etzioni 1996). After exploring many other topics over the
years, including complex organizations (e.g., Etzioni 1964) and
community integration processes (e.g., Etzioni 1996, 1999, 2003),
Etzioni (2004) focused his analytic powers on the USA Patriot Act. He
highlighted the tensions between government actions designed to increase
citizen protection and the cost of a decrease in civil liberties
(Etzioni 2004). As he assessed these issues and tried to walk the
"tightrope of balance," you can trace his movement toward acceptance and
trust of "the authorities". Far better to have a few e-mails or phone
calls reviewed that are not supposed to be available, than allow a group
of terrorists to be successful in their evil deeds. Schehr's (2005)
review of his work is very critical and points out Etzioni's failure to
highlight the influential roles played by a variety of politically
conservative organizations and individuals in the creation of this
legislation, e.g., Family Research Council, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul
Wolfowitz. Even more disparaging are Etzioni's statements reflecting a
view that the best federal oversight should reside with "the public".

> "This must be consistent with his previously articulated belief that
> democracies are constituted by a 'free press', otherwise, how can 'the
> public' truly know what is happening? Unfortunately, here too Etzioni
> is stronger on rhetoric than truth. With six corporations owning and
> controlling virtually all major media, the embedded nature of media
> journalists with government officials, and the near blackout of all
> media critical of state activities, it is hard to see how 'the public'
> will be able to deduce precisely the machinations of state actors."
> (Schehr 2005, pp. 614-615).

In their *Introduction to Homeland Security*, Bullock and her colleagues
(2005, pp. 403-412) provided a helpful summary of this complex and
lengthy piece of legislation. Commonly referred to as "The Patriot Act"
it contains numerous sections and sub-sections like these six: 1) "Title
II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures"; 2) "Subtitle B: Enhanced
Immigration Provisions" (includes "Section 41" which provides a detailed
legal definition of "terrorist activity" that includes planning or
discussions about possible planning of such future actions); 3) "Title
VIII: Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism" (includes
"Section 803" which ". . . prohibits harboring any person knowing or
having reasonable grounds to believe that such person has committed or
to be about to commit a terrorist offense" and "Section 804" which
"established Federal jurisdiction over crimes committed at U.S.
facilities abroad"; 4) "Section 1011" which amends the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Protection Act"; "Section 1012" which amends
the Federal Transportation Code: and 6) "Section 1014" which directs the
Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support of the Office
of Justice Programs to ". . . make grants to enhance state and local
capability to prepare for and to respond to terrorist acts" (p. 412) and
authorizes appropriations for FY 2002 through FY 2007. These few items
illustrate the scope and complexity of this legislation.

While favoring the last item, i.e., enhancement of state and local
capability, it is my opinion, like that of many others, that sections of
this legislation go much too far in extending the authority of federal
agencies in their efforts to prevent future attacks by terrorists. As
with other forms of violence, the boundary between protecting citizens
from harm and protecting their basic civil liberties is a matter about
which reasonable people can disagree. My point is that such issues
should be more of a focus within the emergency management and disaster
research communities.

Obviously, these matters are very complex legally and far beyond the
scope of this paper. So I'll simply note two current examples of this
controversial social problem area. As context, by the way, I found it
helpful to return to the textbook used in the social problems course in
which I enrolled as an undergraduate (1959), i.e., Horton and Leslie
(1955). The chapter entitled "Civil Liberties" has much relevance to
today even if we never have a "modern day Joe McCarthy" appear on scene.

But we do have "warrantless physical searches" taking place despite the
concerns expressed by high level officials like FBI Director Robert
Mueller (e.g., see Ragavan 2006). And President Bush did sign the "John
W. Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2006" (October 17, 2006; PL
109-364) which, according to one analyst "takes the cuffs off." (Stein
2006, p. 2). "Specifically, the new language adds 'natural disaster,
epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or
incident' to the list of conditions permitting the President to take
over local authority . . ." (Stein 2006, p. 2). Apparently in response
to the flawed Katrina response, some policy makers slipped this language
into the defense bill as a rider. "One of the few to complain, Sen,.
Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., warned that the measure virtually invites the
White House to declare federal martial law." (Stein 2006, p. 2).
According to Stein, Leahy included the following remarks in the
Congressional Record on Sept. 29, 2006.

This rider "subverts solid, longstanding *posse comitatus* statutes that
limit the military's involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it
easier for the President to declare martial law . . ." furthermore "The
changes to the Insurrection Act will allow the President to use the
military, including the National Guard, to carry out law enforcement
activities without the consent of a governor. . ." (Stein 2006, pp.
2-3).

A variety of other actions have taken place since the 9/11 attacks that
cumulatively have helped to alter risk perceptions producing heightened
levels of fear (e.g., see Altheide 2006 and Furedi 2006). The social
construction of such perceptions, like any other aspects of risk
perception change, should also be studied by disaster researchers so
that emergency managers and others can better understand what is
happening in their communities and thereby make more informed judgments
about their own actions. Let me illustrate this "fear generation"
process by noting only four topics that merit much further attention.

First, there are the issues related to the Homeland Security Advisory
System (HSAS) with its color coded scale. Among the issues are the
vagueness of warnings, lack of specificity regarding protective actions,
problems of dissemination across the intergovernmental system, etc. (see
Reese 2005). Indeed, as Aguirre (2004) has argued, the HSAS is more of a
public relations device than a true warning system. But, television
viewers are reminded daily, and on some networks like "Fox noise" even
more frequently, that future terrorist attacks may be coming. And they
probably are. The real question, however, is the generation of higher
fear levels the best strategy to produce support for a balanced, threat
based, emergency management program? As noted in the excellent summary
report from the Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences
(2006), the HSAS initiative is not reflective of years of solid studies
by disaster researchers.

> "While most disaster researchers would agree that the scale is not a
> warning system, much of what has been learned by disaster researchers
> on effective risk communication practices is largely ignored in the
> development of the system . . ." (Committee on Disaster Research in
> the Social Sciences 2006, p. 310).

Second, what are the impacts on risk perceptions of the continued
violence in Iraq, the Israel-Palestine areas, and elsewhere? The daily
reporting of these activities may be key in the construction of
inappropriate fear levels. While these may engender support for certain
political agenda, the overall impacts need better study and
understanding. This process may have important parallels to shifts in
risk perception documented for other social problems, e.g., predatory
public school teachers and disturbed kids shooting up schools. A rash of
highly publicized incidents can alter fear levels which in turn can be
used to promote a variety of agenda, e.g., more funds for school
security devices like metal detectors and witch hunts triggered by
unfounded allegations of "inappropriate behavior." Obviously, incidents
like the Virginia Tech (2007) and Columbine school massacres do happen
and may trigger copy-cats just as some teachers---both male and
female---cross the line of trust expected of them. But failure to keep
such incidents in perspective, as with terrorism, can produce very poor
public policy decisions.

Third, is the very complex matter of multi-national firms and corporate
concentrations within the U.S.A. For example, increased corporate
concentration of media ownership and control, as noted during the
congressional hearings in which the Dixie Chicks were invited to testify
after their music was targeted because of a critical comment about Iraq
war policy, the impacts of content and viewer habits should lead to more
informed policy making. With limited air space, the public agenda is
manipulated both by intent and default. Over reporting of terrorist
activities and increased numbers of popular dramatic television series
focused on terrorist plots, may reflect intent. And excessive coverage
of the latest starlet who happens not to be wearing underwear, or who is
now in rehab, illustrate the "narcotic potential" of the mass media. As
Merton (1957) put it years ago: "Propaganda is no substitute for social
policy and social action, but it can serve to root policy and action in
the understanding of the people." (p. 528).

Fourth, and finally, we must explicitly recognize how a broad range of
interest groups have bought into the terrorism bandwagon as a way to
promote their own agenda and resource bases. As Lustick (2007) has
pointed out so clearly, anti-gun groups press for legislation using
potential terror attacks in their presentations as does the National
Rifle Association and others who propose increased citizen arms
purchases. Far more important, however, has been the rush to the money
pots by those who have recast their mission and agenda. This includes
most sectors of the society ranging from universities, to pediatricians,
pharmacists, and others, who have alter their agenda to participate in
the so-called "War on Terror". By so doing, they further legitimate and
enhance the public perception of a heightened threat. The overall
consequence is that the entire nation has played directly into the aims
of small groups of Muslim fanatics. ". . . they hijack Madisonian
democracy itself, to create a vortex of aggrandizing exploitation of the
War on Terror for self-interested agendas that spin our country out of
control." (Lustick 2007, p. 9). Thus, the consequences of these altered
risk perceptions are most profound. As Al Gore (2007) put it: " . . .
when fear and anxiety play a larger role in our society, logic and
reason play a diminished role in our collective decision making." (p.
48). In short, the key processes that define our form of government are
put at risk.

Enhanced understanding of such policy controversies, and related sectors
of institutional change, including the propaganda potentials of the
media, can assist emergency managers to think more strategically about
risk communication, both dangers and possibilities for the public good.
It is within this type of larger social context that most of the
sections of the U.S. Patriot Act, and other policies that may infringe
on our civil liberties, should be examined. This position is consistent
with that of Gary Marx (2007) who is one among dozens creating a new
sociological subfield of surveillance studies. As he put it recently:

> "Using criteria such as the nature of the goals, the procedure for
> creating a surveillance practice, minimization, consideration of
> alternatives, reciprocity, data protection, and security and
> implications for democratic values, I suggest twenty questions to be
> asked about any surveillance activity (Marx 2005). The more these can
> be answered in a way affirming the underlying values, the more
> legitimate the surveillance is likely to be." (Marx 2007, p. 129).

**9. Emergency managers should increase their priority on matters
related to global warning, both mitigation efforts and strategic
adaptations, and place all future hazards policy reviews for natural,
technological, and conflict based threats, including terrorism, into a
social problems perspective.**

Let me be clear here. I am *not* recommending that efforts to mitigate
(i.e., counter intelligence, law enforcement, special forces attacks,
etc.) and better prepare for response and recovery from future terrorist
attacks simply be put aside. The threat is real and as a nation we must
do much better in a wide variety of ways, especially by recognizing the
types of alternative strategies that flow from the questioning by
analysts like Hart (2006). Rather what I am proposing for consideration
and debate is *greater emphasis* on policies that are proactive
regarding future climate changes. These policies should be mitigative
both in programs aimed at reducing global warning, reduction of carbon
emissions, and in adaptations to it. Extreme worst case scenarios in
future sea level rises, for example, need not be used rigidly in
planning and development decisions. But local and state level approaches
to such mitigative actions should be encouraged through new initiatives.
As with other matters of public policy, these future initiatives must be
put into the context of all other social problems confronting
communities including matters of racism, sexism, and ageism.

I am in full agreement with Lustick's (2007) conclusion regarding the
War on Terror. That is, **"We have been, and are being, suckered,
suckered big-time."** (p. 9). So a shift in priorities is in order.
Furthermore, my position parallels that outlined by Pastor et al. (2006)
in their discussion of "environmental justice." As they documented, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPS), had begun to incorporate the
concept of "environmental equity" into its structure in 1992. And under
the Clinton administration the momentum resulted in the Executive Order
No. 12898 which mandated ". . . environmental justice as part of the
federal government's mission." (p. 11). While they use somewhat
different terms, the logic of their analysis parallels my social
problems perspective. Indeed, it is no accident that some of the same
critics, e.g., Peter Rossi, who attacked the White-Haas assessment
project (1975) and other disaster research that caused me to initially
propose this view, also were instrumental in attacking the research
studies that had been used to justify this policy shift. Hence, their
criticisms, e.g., Anderton et al. 1994, fueled the supporters of the
Bush administration who quickly pushed for new directions (Pastor et al.
2006, pp. 10-11). "In a society seemingly hooked on putting hazards in
the backyards of those already burdened by poverty and racial
discrimination, owning up to the reality would make a good starting
place for policy making." (Pastor et al. 2006, p. 15).

Pastor et al. (2006) correctly identify the gaps between most disaster
researchers and those studying other aspects of environmental issues. As
I noted above, most current social problems texts make this link
*except* they have yet to integrate disaster studies and instead focus
solely on terrorism. As Pastor et al. (2006) noted: "Environmental
sociology books, for example, rarely discuss disaster research, and
disaster studies rarely draw on environmental justice literature." (p.
27). I believe that my social problems perspective provides an
additional and complementary bridge toward these frameworks, especially
many key principles and concepts. For example, "community empowerment is
central to the precepts of environment justice." (p. 35). Similarly, ".
. . an overemphasis on technocratic and scientific expertise for
decision making can lead to a process that inappropriately frames
fundamentally political and moral questions (that is, 'transcientific'
issues) in scientific terms . . ." (p. 35).

My call for a priority shift, one wherein the terrorism preparedness
challenge is *retained within the overall emergency management
portfolio*, is consistent with the recommendations of many others. For
example, the staff within the Office of Inspections and Special Reviews
(2006) within the Office of Inspector General of the DHS documented the
changes in FEMA's budget and personnel that occurred following its move
into DHS (see pp. 110-122). Among these included ". . . a number of
changes to the administration of grants for natural hazards preparedness
\[that\] diminished FEMA's involvement in how states conduct emergency
training, planning, exercises, and other functions." (p. 112).
Furthermore, other changes ". . . diverted attention from natural hazard
preparedness to terrorism preparedness. In 2005, FEMA no longer
administered natural hazards preparedness grants . . ." (p. 113).
Shifting this function to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
meant that "FEMA lost its direct preparedness relationship with the
state emergency management agencies." (p. 116). Additionally,". . .
FEMA's understaffing include decreased morale and inadequate succession
planning." (p. 119). Thus, in contrast to the imagery of professionalism
and excellence during the Witt era, by 2003, ". . . FEMA was ranked the
worst place to work in Federal government by its own employees in the
Office of Personnel Management surveys analyzed by the Partnership for
Public Service." (p. 119).

These matters are relevant side issues that are contextual to the key
point, i.e., the current over emphasis on terrorism preparedness at the
expense of everything else. The IG staff honed in on this point toward
the end of their assessment.

> "The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that DHS' efforts to
> protect and prepare the nation for terrorist events and natural
> disasters have not yet translated into preparedness for all hazards.
> State emergency management staff we interviewed said the majority of
> DHS preparedness grants are spent on terrorism preparedness, which has
> not afforded sufficient support or funding for natural hazard
> preparedness." (Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 2006, p.
> 135).

And despite policy documents that could be interpreted as recognition of
a natural hazard preparedness priority, the IG staff concluded
otherwise. "Through the documents in the National Preparedness System
address all hazards, the prevalence of terrorism-related items in these
fosters a perception that the preparedness for and response to a
terrorist event is different from that of a naturally occurring event."
(p. 136). Hence, the DHS must explicitly embark upon a cultural change
so as to carry out its emergency management within an all-hazard
perspective (see pp. 135-143). *As part of this shift in priorities, I
recommend new preparedness and mitigation initiatives focused on global
warming and its potential socioeconomic impacts.* Such initiatives will
be most effective if they are developed and implemented primarily within
state and local levels although both national and international projects
are urgently required as well.

These nine complexes of policy areas, while only briefly reviewed here,
illustrate some of the ways that emergency managers can be encouraged to
*think more strategically* about their profession. We best accomplish
this by introducing them to the notion that for *some* research
purposes, certainly not all, it is helpful to conceptualize disasters as
non-routine social problems. Failure to adopt a more *strategic view of
their profession*, one enriched by the future studies completed by
disaster and hazard researchers from a wide variety of social science
disciplines, will constrain the growth of this profession. Such
constraint will weaken a critical capacity necessary for the continued
resiliency of the U.S.A.

**[Conclusions]{.underline}**

I have: 1) proposed a linkage to social problems perspectives; 2)
summarized the intellectual context for and rationale for further
exploration of the key epistemological issue that constrains the
generalization of our research findings; and 3) illustrated the
significant policy implications of these two matters. I will now offer
five conclusions. Hopefully, these will stimulate others, because of
either agreement or disagreement, to push this analysis much further.
Such is the nature of academic work.

**1. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems provides a
powerful framework for interpretation, context, and future research.**

Disasters, from this perspective, are *interpreted as normal events*
largely originating within identifiable historical and structural
conditions. Like other social problems, understanding the private
troubles experienced requires the capacity to shift abstraction levels
and examine relevant public issues. And sometimes the analysis must
transcend the public concerns of any given era and identify latent
juxtapositions of social trends and structural conditions that will
ignite in future areas of conflict, instability, and human hurt.

This orientation provides a *context* for drawing upon the insights seen
by others who have selected different areas of human travail for study
ranging from crime to race relations to poverty and so on. As with
analyses of these areas, however, there is no inherent bias toward the
negative. Disasters do at times, and for some much of the time, *have
positive consequences* (e.g., see Drabek and Key 1984).

What this perspective forces the analyst to specify, however, is a
definition of the value judgments that are being made to declare any
given behavior as "positive" or "negative." Hence, the cultural context
of the definer is made explicit and may be contrasted with that of
others whose circumstance and value position may differ. So-called "good
business practices" that some would define as "unethical" illustrate a
type of analysis that similarly permits enhanced understanding of the
historical contexts and ideologies that foster classrooms of children
who will become suicide bombers within the next few years. The same can
be said for the thousands of American citizens who will be injured or
killed because of domestically birthed gang violence. The same can be
said for the billions of young girls from centuries past, like millions
today, whose personal security requires unquestioning obedience and
*loyalty* to unjust systems rooted in patterns of inequality, abuse, and
intolerance.

Clearly, this orientation presses analysts to ask *new research
questions* not just about "routineness" but also many other important
matters. In what ways, and with what consequences, are disasters
"nonroutine"? What additional differences, and of course similarities,
can be identified when disasters are compared to other social problems?
In what ways are these processes similar, and different, across the
range of societies existent today and over centuries past? If the
society is the patient, as a social problems perspective assumes, what
is being said to disaster researchers as they pursue their craft?

**2. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems does not preclude
or invalidate other definitions that may be required for other
theoretical frameworks and research agenda at this point in the history
of the field.**

At the time Kreps and I (1998) reviewed and extended the social problems
application, my focus was on community evacuations. I documented that
several key event characteristics were helpful in understanding certain
aspects of evacuation behavior (e.g., Drabek 1994, 1996). This work,
along with that of the Kreps team (e.g., Kreps and Bosworth 1994), led
us to identify the four properties I noted in the definition above,
e.g., scope of impact. While helpful for some limited and specific
purposes like these, I am in full agreement with Quarantelli (2005) that
these are *not a final answer* to the complex issue of taxonomy.

Indeed, I totally agree with Quarantelli that we must go beyond the
obvious as did the biological community when they created the category
of "mammal" that placed whales, humans, and bats into the same taxonomic
niche. That is exactly the type of reasoning that led Kreps and I to
propose further analysis of the concept of "routineness" along the lines
that Perrow (1967) had done in his development of a typology of
organizations. Rather than traditional sortings done commonly on
mission, often mistakenly labeled "goal", for example, fire departments
vs. schools vs. voluntary disaster agencies, this approach offers an
alternative pathway. Through it, we can go beyond the traditional
weather category groupings or assuming that all aspects of technological
crises are qualitatively different from those originating from so-called
"acts of nature" or human caused conflict. We must continue to struggle
creatively with this fundamental issue so as to specify the *limits of
generalizability* of our study findings. But let's never forget the
error in the logic that led some to assume that "better research"
required, or was characterized, by simply having a larger number of
"cases."

**3. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems highlights the
multidirectional pathways that can enhance the flows of research
findings and theoretical frameworks among other sociologists, those
oriented in other social science disciplines, and members of related
professions be they practicing emergency managers, fire and law
enforcement, public health, law, planning, and the like.**

When I began my reviews of several recently published social problems
texts, my initial vision of this conclusion was totally inadequate.
Being blinded by the past, I envisioned future social problems texts
wherein the disaster research legacy would be displayed. Whether the
insights were sprinkled throughout standard chapters on family, poverty,
crime, etc., or be highlighted in a separated chapter like Fritz's
(1961) did not matter to me as I pondered the challenge with excitement.
Then I recall thinking, as I often do, "A does not preclude B." So I saw
a lot of work ahead for many.

It didn't take long, however, as my pen pushed my thinking as it
commonly does, to realize the severity of my impaired vision. The
challenge goes far beyond future social problems textbooks. And the
information flow must be multi-directional. As we reach out more
frequently to bring our "goods" to others working within different
academic and professional settings, we too will grow in unanticipated
ways. Sometimes it will be because of questions or criticism. But other
times it will be because someone else has had a creative insight about a
statistical method or conceptual framework that helped them understand
some aspect of crime, or how certain elementary school classrooms
traumatized students trapped therein. If we are open to such ideas, new
ways to thinking about disasters and hazards will stimulate growth. To
the degree that we encourage isolation and separateness, our growth will
be constrained. Thinking through the numerous linkages afforded within
social problems perspectives will stimulate such growth among disaster
researchers.

**4. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems highlights a focus
on root causes, both domestic and international.**

Recent writings by Wismer et al. 2003, Enarson et al. 2003 and many
others have pressed all of us to think harder about the meaning of
"social vulnerability" (e.g., McEntire 2004). Patterns of risk are
shaped by social processes that usually reflect the contours of power
and privilege. Does the risk of living in a flood prone area parallel
the pathway that results in the death of a hate crime victim whose
sexual orientation is despised by his killers? And do either of these
risks merit the amount of public expenditures currently being allocated
daily to ensure that all airline passengers remove their shoes before
boarding? We often hear rhetoric about funding decisions for disaster
mitigation and preparedness programs being based on threat assessments.
But what range of threats are really being assessed by those holding and
directing the flow of dollars? And when we return to the orientation
proposed by Hart (2006), and ask about the real sources of insecurity
confronting *all* American citizens, not just the well off, the linkage
to social problems perspectives becomes much clearer. For it has been
within these frameworks, enriched by basic sociological studies of
crime, poverty, sexism, racism, ageism and the like, that our
understanding of *root causes of social problems* has been most
enhanced.

Increasingly, we must frame our research agendas within cross-national
and historical contexts. The pollutants of Love Canal fame (e.g., Levine
1982) did not arrive there like the 1999 tornado that hit Moore,
Oklahoma (Drabek 2003b). And the woman who was beaten badly by a spouse,
whose sense of frustration with flood relief run- arounds and cleanup
fatigue boiled over, is every much a victim as those temporarily living
in a Red Cross shelter (e.g., Fothergill 2004). But we must dig deeper
and ultimately confront the realities of "the power elite" and their
roles in the changing distributions of risk and patterns of
victimization. While most may prefer to stay within the confines of
flood studies, for example, even if they accept the challenge of
cross-societal analysis, even they must confront the human caused nature
of flooding be it reflections of timber harvesting, failed levee and dam
construction or maintenance, unregulated upstream development, or just
stupidity. Others must venture into the less charted waters of conflict
disasters and their root causes. Record levels of arms production and
sales, expanded military training facilities, and the like, are linked
directly to the economic security of many, not just those at the top.
How such economic interdependencies fuel policy decisions within both
the public and private sector require scrutiny. For it is within such
structural arrangements that the root causes of the most violent
disasters are to be found. One need not accept the strategy or the value
set of the "environmental justice movement" (e.g., Pastor, et al. 2006),
for example, but it might very well be a good place to start.

And so too is further reflection on the implications of the conclusions
reached by Thomas Paine in his initial essay on the "Rights of Man"
(original publication, 1791). For example, ponder the relevance of these
words to an analysis of "root causes" of disaster.

> "Every war terminates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with
> an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they
> are now commenced and concluded, the power and interest of Governments
> are increased. War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily
> furnishes the pretence of necessity for taxes and appointments to
> places and offices, becomes a principal part of the system of old
> Governments; and to establish any mode to abolish war, however
> advantageous it might be to Nations, would be to take from such
> Government the most lucrative of its branches." (Paine 2003, p. 254).

**5. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems can provide
emergency managers with a theoretical foundation that will enhance their
capacity to more effectively practice their profession.**

Since the creation of FEMA in 1979, the profession of emergency
management has experienced acceleration in its long-term evolution
(e.g., Petak 1984; Drabek 1991; Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel 2000). From two
university degree programs in 1996, by a decade later over 100 were
operating. Additionally, over 50 programs were introducing students to
aspects of homeland and defense security (Blanchard 2006). I noted these
earlier and my concern about the current capacity and interest of
faculty in critical examination of emergency management policy. I
believe firmly that the social problems perspective on disaster that I
have herein proposed would assist these faculty, and subsequently, those
practicing within this profession to develop a *more strategic
perspective* on their profession. By explicitly recognizing and better
understanding the mix of social trends and structures within which their
agencies are embedded, ranging from the local community to the
international context, they will better be able to provide the
leadership and technical expertise reflected in the vision statements of
their professional associations (e.g., International Association of
Emergency Managers, IAEM).

And they will better be able to grasp the policy implications of broad
historical analyses like Barry's (2005) analysis of military troop
movements and emergent quarantine efforts that resulted in both the
rapid spread of the 1918 influenza virus and poorly implemented
mitigation policies. Furthermore, an understanding of how social
processes and structures, interact with environmental realities like
those described by Jared Diamond (2005) in his theoretical framework of
societal collapse, can provide emergency managers with the breadth of
knowledge essential for more informed policy review and creation.

> "When people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, they
> blame their governments, which they see as responsible for or unable
> to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They fight
> each other over land. They kill each other. They start civil wars.
> They figure that they have nothing to loose, so they become
> terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism." (Diamond 2005, p.
> 516).

Disasters are nonroutine social problems. At least that is one way of
viewing conjunctions of historical conditions and social definitions of
physical harm and social disruption. It is not the only way, nor does it
preclude other definitions and perspectives. But it is a perspective
that offers some unique insights, integrative mechanisms, and linkages
to both substantive areas of study and the future practice of emergency
management. Thank you for your attention during my effort to explore
this option.

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