DAO 207-12, Attachment 1

**Espionage Indicators Guide Briefing**

Espionage indicators are signs that an individual, either a DOC employee
or a Foreign National Visitor or Guest may be involved in illegal
collection of information on behalf of a foreign intelligence
organization. The purpose of this guide is to provide you with common
indicators of questionable behavior that may place sensitive U.S.
Government information at risk. If you become aware of any attempts by
Foreign National Visitors or Guests or Departmental employees to exploit
their working relationship within the Department with the intent to
commit espionage, you must report this information to your servicing
security office. Continuing studies of past espionage cases show that
employees often overlooked or failed to report espionage indicators
which, had they been reported, would have permitted earlier detection of
espionage.

If your reporting helps stop a case of espionage, you may be eligible
for a reward of up to \$500,000. The reward is authorized by an
amendment to Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3071, which authorizes the
Attorney General to make payment for information on espionage activity
in any country, which leads to the arrest and conviction of any
person(s):

• For commission of an act of espionage against the United States; or

• For conspiring or attempting to commit an act of espionage against the
United States.

Also, you may be eligible for a reward for information which leads to
the prevention or hindrance of an act of espionage against the United
States. Some of the following indicators are clear evidence of improper
behavior. Others probably have an innocent explanation but are
sufficiently noteworthy that your servicing security office should be
informed so the activity can be assessed and evaluated.

Potential Indicators of Espionage

> • Disgruntlement with the U.S. Government strong enough to cause an
> individual to seek or wish for revenge.
>
> • Any statement that suggests conflicting loyalties may affect the
> proper handling and protection of sensitive information.
>
> • Active attempts to encourage others to violate laws or disobey
> security policies and procedures.
>
> • Membership in, or attempt to conceal membership in, any group
> which: 1) advocates the use of force or violence to cause political
> change within the United States, 2) has been identified as a front
> group for foreign interests, or 3) advocates loyalty to a foreign
> interest.
>
> • Repeated statements or actions indicating an abnormal fascination
> with and strong desire to engage in \"spy\" work.

Potential Indicators of Information Collection

> • Asking others to obtain or facilitate access to classified material
> or unclassified but sensitive information to which one does not have
> authorized access.
>
> • Obtaining or attempting to obtain a witness signature on a
> classified document destruction record when the witness did not
> observe the destruction.
>
> • Offering money to a person with a sensitive job in what appears to
> be an attempt to entice that person into some unspecified illegal
> activity.
>
> DAO 207-12, Attachment 1
>
> • Undue curiosity or requests for information about matters not within
> the scope of the individual's job or need-to-know.
>
> • Unauthorized removal or attempts to remove unclassified, classified,
> export-controlled, proprietary or other protected material from the
> work area.
>
> • Retention of classified, export-controlled, proprietary, or other
> sensitive information obtained through previous employment without the
> authorization or the knowledge of that employer.
>
> • Extensive, unexplained use of copier, facsimile, or computer
> equipment to reproduce or transmit unclassified, sensitive,
> classified, proprietary or export-controlled material.
>
> • Taking classified or sensitive materials home purportedly for work
> reasons, without proper authorization.
>
> • Working odd hours when others are not in the office or visiting
> other work areas after normal hours for no logical reason.
>
> • Bringing cameras or recording devices, without approval, into areas
> storing classified, sensitive or export-controlled material.

Potential Indicators of Unauthorized Information Transmittal

> • Storing classified material at home or any other unauthorized place.
>
> • Short trips that are inconsistent with one's apparent interests and
> financial means, to foreign countries or to U.S. cities (e.g., New
> York City.) with foreign diplomatic facilities.
>
> • Excessive use of email or fax.
>
> • Failure to comply with regulations for reporting foreign contacts or
> foreign travel.
>
> • Attempts to conceal foreign travel or close and continuing contact
> with a foreign national.
>
> • Foreign travel not reflected in the individual's passport to
> countries where entries would normally be stamped.
>
> • Maintaining ongoing personal contact with diplomatic or other
> representatives from countries with which one has ethnic, religious,
> cultural or other emotional ties or obligations, or with employees of
> competing companies in those countries.

Potential Indicators of Illegal Income

> • Unexplained affluence, or life-style inconsistent with known income.
> Notably, sudden purchase of high-value items or unusually frequent
> personal travel, which appears to be beyond known income. Sudden
> repayment of large debts or loans, indicating sudden reversal of
> financial difficulties.
>
> • Joking or bragging about working for a foreign intelligence service,
> or having a mysterious source of income.

Other Potential Indicators of Concern

> • Behavior indicating concern that one is being investigated or
> watched, such as actions to detect physical surveillance, searching
> for listening devices or cameras, and leaving \"traps\" to detect
> search of the individual's work area or home.
>
> • Any part-time employment or other outside activity that may create a
> conflict of interest with one\'s obligation to protect classified or
> sensitive but unclassified information.
>
> It is important to emphasize that the existence of one or two of the
> aforementioned factors does not necessarily mean that a person is
> engaged in espionage activity. However, the risk that someone may be
> involved in espionage against the DOC increases when these elements

are present. When in doubt report it!

> If you believe that someone may be contemplating espionage or other
> criminal activity, or has taken steps to initiate it, you are
> obligated to immediately report this information to the Office of
> Security Headquarters through your servicing security office.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Signature Date