The Future of Force in the Region

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

# The Future of Force in the Region

May 4, 2004

With the growing interdependence of economies in East Asia, security
relations among nations in this area have been improved to some extent.
As nations are focusing on non-traditional source of threats, e.g.,
trans-border terrorism, Washington's relations with Beijing have been
improved (though the US is not geographically a state in the region).
Currently, South Korea's trade volume with China has surpassed that with
the US. This has also strengthened Seoul's tie with Beijing, and will
serve the stability of the Korean Peninsula positively. Another positive
case is that both China and the US will participate in late May in an
18-country naval exercise initiated by Singapore and Indonesia, for
disposing explosives on the high sea.

Despite the demise of the Cold War and the expanding economic
interactions among the economies in East Asia, however, security
relations in the region have not been improved dramatically. The
tensions of the Korean peninsula remain high and North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, as so reported, have concerned all actors in the
region. China's rapid economic growth, planned to be re-quadrupled in
the coming two decades, and hence the national strength this will
translate into, are inevitably to be viewed as a force that will
challenge the regional and possibly global balance of power. Coupled
with growing push for independence of Taiwan, security relations across
the Straits are increasingly intensified. Other factors in the region,
such as Japan's revamping of its constitution to allow rights of armed
forces and waging a war, and Russia's possibility to build up a
brand-new armed force by 2020, are all possible to contribute to the
security pattern of East Asia gradually.

As security drivers in East Asia toward 2020, the most prominent of them
are likely to include:

-   nuclear weapons development in the region;

-   China's growing power and its implication;

-   Japan's normalcy and ramification.

First and most pressing is the nuclear weapons development in the
region. East Asia has already encompassed major nuclear weapons states:
US, Russia and China. The region has also witnessed nuclear weapons
development of South Korea and Taiwan. Also, it is well known that Japan
has the capability to acquire nuclear weapons quickly given a political
decision.

But most pressing is the nuclear weapons development in North Korea. It
is understood that the North may have reprocessed all fuel rods of its
Yongbyon-based nuclear reactor, providing it some 35 kg of plutonium,
equivalent to at least 4 (or 8) atomic bombs assuming each Hiroshima
/Nagasaki-level bomb would require 8 (or 4) kg of plutonium. It is also
speculated that North Korea may have acquired some uranium enrichment
capability.

Currently, a multilateral effort is being made to negotiate with North
Korea to trade its abandonment of its weapons program for a number of
benefits. Two rounds of "six-party" talks have been held already in
Beijing and the third round is to follow likely next month. However,
such negotiation is by no means to guarantee the success of the effort.
North Korea could relinquish its nuclear weapons program as a result of
the talk, or move on to a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of
Pakistan.

Thus, North Korea's nuclear weapons program plays a driver of security
situation in East Asia. Depending who is in the White House and how
Washington-Pyongyang plays the game of action-reaction, such weapons
development could lead to various possibilities:

-   North Korea gives up nuclear weapons program;

-   The North keeps its weapons program, stimulating proliferation in
    the area;

-   The US eventually accepts it, and restrains its allies to follow
    suit;

-   The US could not tolerate this and launches an attack.

Though North Korea's nuclear weapons program could drive regional
security to various destinations, none of the outcomes would be ideal if
the North would not abandon its program: it could be a war between the
US and the North, possibly involving US allies and other players in East
Asia, or could be a pure proliferation under the most "peaceful"
circumstance.

As a security driver in East Asia, basically the regional situation will
be clear in about five years: either North Korea commits nuclear
disarmament that is inducive to regional stability, or refuses to do so,
forcing the US to accept the *fait accompli*, or to launch a
counterproliferation offensive. Therefore, the picture in 2020 due to
this driver shall be relative clear by the end of this decade.

Even so, there is reason to extrapolate a future of 2020 when North
Korea, if it continues to exist, will have removed its nuclear weapons
for a number of reasons: all regional actors don't welcome its going
nuclear; its security relations with China provide it with assurance;
the US government may have met North's demand in *quid pro quo* of its
nuclear abandonment; grim economic opportunity with external world given
a nuclear arsenal.

The second driver of military development in the region out to 2020 is
China's growth. Since 1978, China has dramatically grown economically,
with GDP growth *per annum* at over 8% in average. Though it is GDP *per
capita* is still way behind, China's overall economic strength has
reached the level of some G7 members. In terms of purchasing power
parity (PPP), China is one of the leading economies in the world
already.

Plus its economic target of further quadrupling of output by 2020,
China's growth pace will allow it to have an economic share in the world
from current 3% to possibly 8-9% in the next twenty years. This will
place China in the top leading economies in the world, even without the
PPP consideration.

This also indicates that China's defense expenditure will rise from
current \$25 billion to \$100, assuming defense budget grows in
commensurate with China's economic growth. Such a budget by 2020 is just
a quarter of that of the US at this time, but two times as big as that
of current Japan.

Such drastic re-shaping of world economic and military landscape
indicates a shift of balance of power in China's favor. Other states
will subsequently meet the quandary: how to welcome China bidding
farewell to poverty while sustaining *status quo* of the world?

Leadership in Beijing has noticed this consequence, and has recently
advocating a theory of "peaceful rise". It is argued that China's rise
is of its legitimate rights, and is for peaceful purpose. It is
explained that both the process and outcome of China's rise shall be
peaceful. Such explanations are helpful as they help reduce the
apprehensions of other nations, and remind Beijing that even the
exercise of legitimate rights may not be always productive.

As many have noted, China is indeed moving toward a revisionist country:
a country that preserves *status quo*. On Korean peninsula, China is now
the most prominent actor that works on the peaceful resolution of North
Korea's nuclear weapons program. And, for the across Taiwan Straits
relationship, China has noted anti-independence has been a more imminent
priority than national unification. Therefore, tactically China and the
US have converged their interests in maintaining the *status quo* there.

China's rise and Taiwan's inclination to independence will be entangled
in the years to come. Under no circumstances one would expect mainland
China relinquish its claim of demand of unification with Taiwan, while
popular support to this is getting thin on the island. A contrast of
both advantage, in terms of hard power, and disadvantage, in terms of
Taiwan's heart, is growing high on both ends. This complicates the
regional security equation.

As the US has *Taiwan Relations Act* that obliges America to certain
defense responsibility of Taiwan, so far the across Straits balance of
power has been maintained. But as Taiwan is transforming further
drifting away from the mainland, the chance of war-fighting in this area
is increasing. Therefore, China's rise and Taiwan's move toward
independence constitute another driver of military development in East
Asia.

This driver will play its role of across-Straits arms race, and the
unsymmetrical arms race, with sole focus on the Taiwan question, between
China and the US. If the Taiwan independence will be controlled at
official level, there may be no war occurring before 2020, but the race
of military capability and interoperation development will be tense
throughout 2020, with Taiwan gradually losing the edge. But should
Taiwan declare independence in the next few years, this driver will lose
its validity as by that time, the status of Taiwan may take shape as a
consequence of its declaration.

One more security driver is Japan's normalcy. From this January Japan's
Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) started debate in the party as to revise
Japan's Constitution, primarily to revise Article 9 that stipulated that
Japan abandons military means for international disputes and possesses
no armed forces. This issue was submitted to the Diet in February,
officially starting the legal process of the revision. It is noted that
currently 72% of Japan's Diet Members support the Constitution's
revision.

At the same time, Japan's has sent armed forces to Iraq. From 2004,
Japan will build up missile defense system and revise its *Defense Plan
Outline* that will replace its defense-orientated posture with a more
aggressive overseas-mission emphasizing stance.

Japan's adjustment reflects its strategic view of strengthening security
relations with America, and hedge against China as a rising power. Its
new emphasis of developing long-range delivery means as well as
strategic-striking weaponry indicated Japan's changing security
perception in the region. As Japan is co-developing missile defense
platform with the US, Japan inevitably will share with the US its
military R&D products, breaking Japan's long-held policy of export of
weapons.

Undoubtedly, Japan's shift of military doctrine and defense posture will
affect China's security perception. China has taken note of Japan's
revised security guideline that allows Tokyo to assist the US when the
latter is engaged militarily in Japan's "surrounding" waters. China
would not assume that Japan would sit idle when the US intervenes
militarily in the Taiwan question.

This cross negative security perception between China and Japan plays no
constructive role in mending Beijing-Tokyo's political trust. One would
expect that the two countries would continue to expand their economic
and trade relations, but remain cool in dealing with each other on
political and military matters, for many years to come. Such a
relationship looks unhealthy and is likely to be the reality, for the
coming two decades. At least for this reason, the two Asian giants will
compete in security quarter with distrust toward 2020.

In sum, security equation of East Asia by 2020 will be largely driven by
three factors: North Korea's nuclear weapons development, China's rise
and Taiwan's independence, and Japan's military "normalcy". They are
interacting and intertwined. Nuclear path of Pyongyang would affect
choices of Tokyo, and if Japan goes officially nuclear, its alliance
with Washington, and relations with other actors in the region, will be
complicated. China's rise will strategically shift the center of world
power, and this course could be interrupted by Taiwan's quest for
independence. A war between Beijing and Washington for Taipei's sake, at
any time by 2020, will be hard to measure and shall be avoided.
Eventually, China and Japan need to seek strategic reconciliation for
their own benefits and those of the region.

By 2020, the US will be plausibly playing a balancer role in East Asia,
though with more factors to complicate the assuredness of its success.