####### SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICAN ENTERPRISES ABROAD

######## Overseas Security Advisory Council

######### U.S. Department of State

[Security Guidelines for American Enterprises Abroad Introduction
1](#security-guidelines-for-american-enterprises-abroad-introduction)

[Chapter I. Introduction 2](#chapter-i.-introduction)

[Chapter II. Site Selection Guidelines
3](#chapter-ii.-site-selection-guidelines)

[Need for Security Criteria 3](#need-for-security-criteria)

[New Office Building 3](#new-office-building)

[Existing Office Building 4](#existing-office-building)

[Common Requirements 5](#common-requirements)

[Standards of Design for Site and Building Security
5](#standards-of-design-for-site-and-building-security)

[Security Design Objectives 5](#security-design-objectives)

[Chapter III. Exterior Protection 7](#chapter-iii.-exterior-protection)

[Perimeter Security 7](#perimeter-security)

[Building Exterior 8](#building-exterior)

[Vehicular Entrance and Controls 9](#vehicular-entrance-and-controls)

[Exterior Lighting 12](#exterior-lighting)

[Building Access 12](#building-access)

[Construction Activities 13](#construction-activities)

[Chapter IV. Interior Protection 14](#chapter-iv.-interior-protection)

[Building Layout 14](#building-layout)

[Walls and Partitions 14](#walls-and-partitions)

[Doors 14](#doors)

[Other Public Areas 15](#other-public-areas)

[Special Storage Requirements 15](#special-storage-requirements)

[Elevators 15](#elevators)

[Cable Runs 15](#cable-runs)

[Security Monitoring 15](#security-monitoring)

[Controlled Access System 16](#controlled-access-system)

[Alarm Systems 16](#alarm-systems)

[Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV) 16](#closed-circuit-tv-cctv)

[Hardware 16](#hardware)

[Stairwell Door Reentry System 17](#stairwell-door-reentry-system)

[Special Functional Requirements 17](#special-functional-requirements)

[Chapter V. Public Access Controls (PAC)
18](#chapter-v.-public-access-controls-pac)

[Security Officers and Watchmen 18](#security-officers-and-watchmen)

[Security Hardline 18](#security-hardline)

[Chapter VI. Emergency Exit 21](#chapter-vi.-emergency-exit)

[Chapter VII. Communications 22](#chapter-vii.-communications)

[Communications Facilities 22](#communications-facilities)

[Communications 22](#communications)

[Systems Integration 22](#systems-integration)

[Chapter VIII. Office Security Guidelines
23](#chapter-viii.-office-security-guidelines)

[General Procedures 23](#general-procedures)

[Security in the Office 23](#security-in-the-office)

[Advice for Secretaries 24](#advice-for-secretaries)

[Precautions for All 25](#precautions-for-all)

[Chapter IX. Vehicular and Travel Security
26](#chapter-ix.-vehicular-and-travel-security)

[Vehicle and Travel Security 26](#vehicle-and-travel-security)

[Normal Travel Procedures Checklist
26](#normal-travel-procedures-checklist)

[Vehicle Equipment Checklist 27](#vehicle-equipment-checklist)

[Vehicle Defense Strategy Checklist
28](#vehicle-defense-strategy-checklist)

[Travel Security Suggestions 28](#travel-security-suggestions)

[Chapter X. Visiting Personnel Protection
30](#chapter-x.-visiting-personnel-protection)

[General Principles 30](#general-principles)

[Minimal Threat-Factors and Guidelines
30](#minimal-threat-factors-and-guidelines)

[Moderate Threat-Factors and Guidelines
33](#moderate-threat-factors-and-guidelines)

[High Threat-Factors and Guidelines
33](#high-threat-factors-and-guidelines)

[Group Activities Guidelines 35](#group-activities-guidelines)

[Appendix I. Security Survey Checklist
37](#appendix-i.-security-survey-checklist)

[Appendix II. Facility Questionnaire
43](#appendix-ii.-facility-questionnaire)

[Appendix III. Threatening Phone Call Checklist
45](#appendix-iii.-threatening-phone-call-checklist)

[Appendix IV. Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition Points
48](#appendix-iv.-letter-and-parcel-bomb-recognition-points)

#  

## Security Guidelines for American Enterprises Abroad Introduction

Effective security precautions require a continuous and conscious
awareness of your environment. This is especially true when living in a
foreign country where it will be necessary to adapt to new cultures,
customs, and laws, which, in most instances, are very different from
those to which Americans are accustomed in the United States.

The implementation of security guidelines contained in this publication
could reduce the vulnerability of American private sector enterprises
abroad to criminal or terrorist acts. It is recognized that some of the
recommended guidelines cannot easily be implemented at existing
facilities.

## Chapter I. Introduction

This booklet is a compilation of security guidelines for American
private sector executives operating outside the United States. This
guidance is the product of many years of experience by a cross section
of American security practitioners from both the public and private
sectors. Obviously, the implementation should be consistent with the
level of risk in the country where you conduct business. For the most
part the guidelines are for protection in high threat areas. It is
recognized that the level of risk varies from country to country and
time to time so that you may need to choose among the suggested options
or apply the concepts in a manner modified to meet your needs. Since
levels of risk can change very rapidly, it is advisable to continuously
monitor factors that may impact the risk level. Security precautions
must be flexible and dynamic to respond effectively to changing risks. A
static, inflexible security posture will almost certainly result in a
lack of preparedness or unnecessary expense.

The Department of State has three threat assessment designators: High,
Medium, and Low. One of these three threat designators is applied to
each country where the United States has diplomatic representation.
Threat assessment information is available to the American business
community in countries where the United States has diplomatic
representation through the Regional Security Officer or Post Security
Officer at the nearest U.S. diplomatic post, i.e. Embassy or Consulate.
The level assigned to a particular country is determined by an analysis
of the political, terrorist, and criminal environment of that country.
It is reviewed quarterly by the Department of State and changed when
appropriate.

A High Threat country is one where the threat is serious and forced
entries and assaults on residents are common, or where an active
terrorist threat exists. A Medium Threat country is one where the threat
is moderate, with some forced entries and assaults on residents
occurring, or where the area has the potential for terrorist activity. A
Low Threat country is one where the threat is minimal and forced entry
of residences and assault of occupants is not common, and there is no
known terrorist threat.

For emphasis again, the guidelines set forth in this publication are
generally most appropriate for High Threat areas. One will probably want
to moderate them for applications where the risk is lower; or where
other considerations preclude their implementation at the level
discussed here. In many situations, professional technical security
assistance will be required.

These guidelines emphasize site selection and operational security.
Appendices I and II are checklists which will help you determine your
security needs.

## Chapter II. Site Selection Guidelines

### Need for Security Criteria

From a security point of view, proper site selection is the most
important initial step to provide adequate protection. It is the intent
of this booklet to bring to the attention of all responsible personnel
the wide range of security matters that should be addressed and
integrated into the site selection process for new office buildings and
existing buildings.

Because of car bombings there are new criteria for site selection on a
worldwide basis. Regardless of the geographic process, thereby preparing
for what might happen during the life of the building or its occupancy.
We have all seen how quickly a benign security situation can evolve into
a significant threat to facilities. It is only prudent to incorporate
adequate security measures based on an evaluation of the existing threat
and the potential for a higher future threat level to protect your
employees and visitors for the long term. It will be evident from the
factors highlighted that security considerations will impact on
operational matters. The implication of this fact may be greater in some
geographic regions than in others and will certainly affect some more
seriously than others. Where this is the case, it is incumbent on all
interested parties to evaluate potential damage while engaged in the
site selection process and balance it against security requirements. If,
in high threat areas, many of the suggested key criteria cannot be met
the firm should consider choosing another, more secure location.

Everyone involved in site selections should be aware of the following
suggested criteria for facilities.

### New Office Building

#### Topography

Site ideally should be situated at the high point, if any, of a land
tract, which makes it less vulnerable to weapons fire, makes
egress/ingress more difficult and easier to detect or observe any
intrusions.

#### Siting

Site should be located away from main thoroughfares and provide for the
following:

-   100 feet minimum setback from the building to perimeter walls and
    vehicular entrances to the building.

-   Sufficient parking space for personnel outside the compound in a
    secure area within sight of the building, preferably, immediately
    adjacent to the compound.

-   Sufficient parking space for visitors near the site but not on the
    site itself.

-   Sufficient space to allow for the construction of a vehicular
    security control checkpoint (lock-type system), which would allow
    vehicles to be searched, if deemed necessary, and cleared without
    providing direct access to the site.

-   Sufficient space to allow for the construction of a pedestrian
    security control checkpoint (gatehouse/booth) to check
    identification, conduct a package check or parcel inspection or
    carry out visitor processing before the pedestrian is allowed
    further access to the site. If a need for a thorough check of purses
    and briefcases, as well as items carried on a person may be
    required, sufficient space for a Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD)
    should be considered. Walking through a WTMD is less intrusive than
    a personal search or even one conducted with a hand-held detector.

-   Sufficient space for construction of a 9-foot outer perimeter
    barrier or wall.

#### Environmental Considerations

Site should be located in a semi-residential, semi-commercial area where
local vehicular traffic flow patterns do not impede access to or from
the site.

### Existing Office Building

The following security considerations for high-rise buildings are listed
in order of preference as the availability of local facilities dictate:

-   A detached (free-standing) building and site entirely occupied and
    controlled by you.

-   A semidetached office building that is entirely occupied by you.

-   A nondetached office building that is entirely occupied and
    controlled by you.

-   A detached (free-standing) office building in which the uppermost
    floors are entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A semidetached office building in which the uppermost floors are
    entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A nondetached office building in which the uppermost floors are
    entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A detached (free-standing) office building in which the central
    floors are entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A semidetached office building in which the central floors are
    entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A nondetached office building in which the central floors are
    entirely occupied and controlled by you.

-   A detached (free-standing) office building in which some floors are
    occupied and controlled by you.

-   A semidetached office building in which some floors are occupied and
    controlled by you.

-   A nondetached office building in which some floors are occupied and
    controlled by you.

### Common Requirements

Both new and existing office buildings should be capable of
accommodating these security items:

-   Floor load capacity must be able to maintain the additional weight
    of public access control (PAC) equipment (ballistic doors, walls,
    windows), security containers, and disintegrators and shredders, if
    needed.

-   Exterior walls must be smooth shell, sturdy, and protected to a
    height of 16 feet to prevent forced entry.

-   Building must be conducive to grilling or eliminating all windows
    below 16 feet.

The previously listed criteria should be adopted to provide satisfactory
protection for employees and visitors. If the site is found to be
deficient in some areas, attempt to resolve those deficiencies by
instituting security measures that will negate the deficiencies.
Professional security and/or engineering assistance should be considered
to address unique situations.

At a minimum, the following general security measures should be
incorporated into planning designs: perimeter controls, grillwork, and
shatter-resistant film for windows, public access controls, package
search and check, secured area, provisions for emergency egress, and
emergency alarms and emergency power.

### Standards of Design for Site and Building Security

This section establishes the minimum physical security standards to be
incorporated in the design of facilities.

The intent is to provide protection for assets, personnel, property, and
customers; ensure that consistent security measures are used at various
locations; and ensure design integrity and compatibility of all elements
of security with the architecture of the site.

Labor-saving and state-of-the-art security system components and
assemblies should be used in all U.S. activities operating overseas,
provided they can be maintained locally and there are spare parts
available locally.

For manufacturing plant and laboratory facilities, security equipment
such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and monitors,
intercoms, card readers, and special glass protection, should be
considered. Special care should be taken to verify the vendor\'s
references, especially as they pertain to the quality of alarms, a visit
should be made to the central station to observe the professionalism of
the operation. Design, purchase, and installation should be coordinated
through your architect. Bear in mind, and make provisions for, the cost
of maintenance on your security equipment. In some locations overseas,
security equipment may be less expensive and more reliable than guards
who receive relatively low pay and little training.

### Security Design Objectives

In designing business or activity sites, roadways, buildings, and
interior space, the following functional security objectives should be
achieved:

-   Physical and psychological boundaries (signs, closed doors, etc.)
    should establish four areas with increasing security controls
    beginning at the property boundaries. The areas are defined as:

    -   perimeter - property boundaries;

    -   exterior - lobbies/docks;

    -   interior - employee space; and

    -   restricted - laboratories, computer rooms, etc.

-   Vehicular traffic signs should clearly designate the separate
    entrances for trucks/deliveries and visitors and employee vehicles.
    Where feasible control points should be provided near the site
    boundaries. Sidewalks should channel pedestrians toward controlled
    lobbies and entrances.

-   Avoid having unsecured areas where there is no one nearby with
    responsibility for the function of the areas.

## Chapter III. Exterior Protection

### Perimeter Security

#### Walls, Fences, Berms, etc.

The overall design for perimeter security should consider using natural
barriers, fencing, landscaping, or other physical or psychological
boundaries to demonstrate a security presence to all site visitors.

If the threat is considered to be high at free-standing facilities,
there should be a smooth faced perimeter wall or combination wall/fence,
a minimum of 9 feet tall and extending 3 feet below grade. The wall or
fence may be constructed of stone, masonry, concrete, chain link, or
steel grillwork. However, if space limitations and local conditions
dictate the need, any newly constructed wall should be designed to
prevent vehicle penetration, and should use a reinforced concrete
foundation wall, 18 inches thick with an additional 1-1/2 inches of
concrete covering on each side of the steel reinforcement, and extending
36 inches above the grade. This type of wall is designed to support
three wall toppings: masonry, concrete, or steel picket fencing. The
toppings should be securely anchored into the foundation wall. If a
picket fence is used instead of a wall, the upright supports should be
spaced at least 9 feet apart so that the fence, if knocked down, can not
be used as a ladder. In addition, intrusion alert systems can be used to
enhance perimeter security.

In cases where the above standards of construction are neither feasible,
fiscally prudent, nor required by the threat, alternative methods
offering comparable protection can be used. These alternatives should
maximize the use of locally available materials and conditions to take
advantage of existing terrain features or by the creative use of earth
berms and landscaping techniques such as concrete planters.

Inside the perimeter barrier, the building should be set back on the
property to provide maximum distance from that portion of the perimeter
barrier which is accessible by vehicle. The desirable distance of the
setback is at least 100 feet depending on the bomb resistance provided
by the barrier.

At facilities with less than optimum barriers, or at locations where the
terrorist threat or building location increases the vulnerability to
vehicular attack, bollards\*[^1] or cement planters can be used to
strengthen the perimeter boundary. At walled or fenced facilities with
insufficient setback, bollards or planters can be installed outside the
perimeter to increase the setback of the buildings.

(In any event, whether at a walled facility or a nonwalled one as
discussed below, the design and placement of bollards or other
antivehicular devices should be considered in the early planning stages.
It would prevent having impenetrable gates connected by easily
penetrated walls, or necessitate relocating because local authorities
forbid the construction of required barriers.)

#### Nonwalled Facilities Barriers

In locations without perimeter wall protection, buildings should be
protected with bollards, cement planters, or any other perimeter
protection device. Such devices should be placed in a manner as to allow
the maximum distance between the building and the roadway and/or vehicle
access area. They should be positioned to impede vehicular access to
lobbies and other glassed areas that could be penetrated by a vehicle
(i.e., low or no curb, glass wall or door structure between lobby and
driveway). Driveways should be designed and constructed to minimize or
preclude high-speed vehicular approaches to lobbies and glassed areas.
(There may be local ordinances that make placement of these devices
illegal or ineffective.)

A positive and concerted effort should be made to contact local host
country law enforcement or governmental authorities and request that
they prohibit, restrict, or impede motor vehicles from parking,
stopping, or loading in front of the facility.

In high threat locations, if local conditions or government officials
prohibit antivehicular perimeter security measures and your business is
either the sole occupant of the building or located on the first or
second floor, you should consider relocating to more secure facilities.

### Building Exterior

#### Facade

The building exterior should be a sheer/smooth shell, devoid of
footholds, decorative lattice work, ledges, or balconies. The building
facade should be protected to a height of 16 feet to prevent access by
intruders using basic handtools. The use of glass on the building facade
should be kept to an absolute minimum, only being used for standard size
or smaller windows and, possibly, main entrance doors. All glass should
be protected by plastic film. Consider the use of lexan or other
polycarbonate as alternatives to glass where practical.

#### External Doors

Local fire codes may impact on the guidance presented here. As decisions
are made on these issues, local fire codes will have to be considered.

Main entrance doors may be either transparent or opaque and constructed
of wood, metal, or glass. The main entrance door should be equipped with
a double-cylinder dead bolt and additionally secured with crossbar or
sliding dead bolts attached vertically to the top and bottom of each
leaf. All doors, including interior doors, should be installed to take
advantage of the doorframe strength by having the doors open toward the
attack side.

All other external doors should be opaque hollow metal fire doors with
no external hardware. These external doors should be single doors unless
used for delivery and loading purposes.

Should double doors be required, they should be equipped with two
sliding dead bolts on the active leaf and two sliding dead bolts on the
inactive leaf vertically installed on the top and bottom of the doors. A
local alarmed panic bar and a 180-degree peephole viewing device should
be installed on the active leaf.

All external doors leading to crawl spaces or basements must be securely
padlocked and regularly inspected for tampering.

#### Windows

The interior side of all glass surfaces should be covered with a
protective plastic film that meets or exceeds the manufacturer\'s
specifications for shatter-resistant protective film. A good standard is
4-millimeter thickness for all protective film applications. This film
will keep glass shards to a minimum in the event of an explosion or if
objects are thrown through the window.

Grillwork should be installed on all exterior windows and
air-conditioning units that are within 16 feet of grade or are
accessible from roofs, balconies, etc. The rule of thumb here is to
cover all openings in excess of 100 square inches if the smallest
dimension is 6 inches or larger.

Grillwork should be constructed of 1/2 inch diameter or greater steel
rebar, anchored or imbedded (not bolted) into the window frame or
surrounding masonry to a depth of 3 inches. Grillwork should be
installed horizontally and vertically on center at no more than 8 inch
intervals. However, grillwork installed in exterior window frames within
the secure area should be spaced 5 inches on center, horizontally and
vertically, and anchored in the manner described previously. Decorative
grillwork patterns can be used for aesthetic purposes.

Grillwork that is covering windows designated as necessary for emergency
escape should be hinged for easy egress. All hinged grillwork should be
secured with a key operated security padlock. The key should be
maintained on a cup hook in close proximity of the hinged grille, but
out of reach of an intruder. These emergency escape windows should not
be used in planning for fire evacuations.

#### Roof

The roof should be constructed of fire-resistant material. All hatches
and doors leading to the roof should be securely locked with dead-bolt
locks. Security measures such as barbed, concertina or tape security
wire, broken glass, and walls or fences may be used to prevent access
from nearby trees and/or adjoining roofs.

### Vehicular Entrance and Controls 

#### Vehicular Entrance

Vehicular entry-exit points should be kept to a minimum. Ideally, to
maximize traffic flow and security, only two regularly used vehicular
entry-exit points are necessary. Both should be similarly constructed
and monitored. The use of one would be limited to employees\' cars,
while the other would be used by visitors and delivery vehicles.
Depending on the size and nature of the facility, a gate for emergency
vehicular and pedestrian egress should be installed at a location that
is easily and safely accessible by employees. Emergency gates should be
securely locked and periodically checked. All entry-exit points should
be secured with a heavy duty sliding steel, iron, or heavily braced
chain link gate equipped with a heavy locking device.

The primary gate should be electrically operated (with a manual back-up
by a security officer situated in an adjacent booth). The gate at the
vehicle entrance should be positioned to avoid a long straight approach
to force approaching vehicles to slow down before reaching the gate. The
general technique employed is to require a sharp turn immediately in
front of the gate.

In addition to the gate, and whenever justifiable, a vehicular arrest
system can be installed. An appropriate vehicle arrest system, whether
active, a piece of equipment designed to stop vehicles in their tracks,
or passive, a dense mass, will be able to stop or instantly disable a
vehicle with a minimum gross weight of 15,000 pounds traveling 50 miles
per hour.

#### Vehicular Control

##### General

All facilities should have some method of vehicle access control.
Primary road entrances to all major plant, laboratory, and office
locations should have a vehicle control facility capable of remote
operation by security personnel with automated systems.

-   At smaller facilities, vehicle access control may be provided by
    badge-activated gates, manual swing gates, etc.

-   Site security should be able to close all secondary road entrances
    thereby limiting access to the primary entrance. Lighting and turn
    space should be provided as appropriate.

##### Control Features

Primary perimeter entrances to a facility should have a booth for
security personnel during peak traffic periods and automated systems for
remote operations during other periods.

Capabilities are:

-   Electrically-operated gates to be activated by security personnel at
    either the booth or security control center or by a badge reader
    located in a convenient location for a driver;

-   CCTV with the capability of displaying full-facial features of a
    driver and vehicle characteristics on the monitor at security
    control center;

-   An intercom system located in a convenient location for a driver to
    communicate with the gatehouse and security control center;

-   Bollards or other elements to protect the security booth and gates
    against car crash;

-   Sensors to activate the gate, detect vehicles approaching and
    departing the gate, activate a CCTV monitor displaying the gate,
    sound an audio alert in the security control center;

-   Lighting to illuminate the gate area and approaches to a higher
    level than surrounding areas;

-   Signs to instruct visitors and to post property as required;

-   Road surfaces to enable queuing, turnaround, and parking;

-   Vehicle bypass control (i.e., gate extensions), low and dense
    shrubbery, fences, and walls.

#### Booth Construction and Operation

As noted previously, at the perimeter vehicular entry-exit a security
officer booth should be constructed to control access. (At facilities
not having perimeter walls, the security officer booth should be
installed immediately inside the facility foyer.)

If justified by the threat level the security officer booth should be
completely protected with reinforced concrete, walls, ballistic doors,
and windows. The booth should be equipped with a security officer duress
alarm and intercom system, both annunciating at the facility
receptionist and security officer\'s office. This security officer would
also be responsible for complete operation of the vehicle gate. If
necessary, package inspection and visitor screening may be conducted
just outside of the booth by an unarmed security officer equipped with
walk-through and hand-held metal detectors. Provisions for the
environmental comfort should be considered when designing the booth.

#### Parking

##### General

Security should be considered in the location and arrangement of parking
lots. Pedestrians leaving parking lots should be channeled toward a
limited number of building entrances.

All parking facilities should have an emergency communication system
(intercom, telephones, etc.) installed at strategic locations to provide
emergency communications directly to Security.

Parking lots should be provided with CCTV cameras capable of displaying
and videotaping lot activity on a monitor in the security control
center. Lighting must be of adequate level and direction to support
cameras while, at the same time, giving consideration to energy
efficiency and local environmental concerns.

If possible, parking on streets directly adjacent to the building should
be forbidden. Wherever justifiable given the threat profile of your
company, there should be no underground parking areas in the neither
building basement nor ground-level parking under building overhangs.

##### Within Perimeter Walls/Fences

All parking within perimeter walls or fences should be restricted to
employees, with spaces limited to an area as far from the building as
possible. Parking for patrons and visitors, except for predesignated VIP
visitors, should be restricted to outside of the perimeter wall/fences.

##### Garages

For those buildings having an integral parking garage or structure, a
complete system for vehicle control should be provided. CCTV
surveillance should be provided for employee safety and building
security. If the threat of car bombing is extant, consideration must be
given to prohibiting parking in the building.

Access from the garage or parking structure into the building should be
limited, secure, well lighted, and have no places of concealment.
Elevators, stairs, and connecting bridges serving the garage or parking
structure should discharge into a staffed or fully monitored area.
Convex mirrors should be mounted outside the garage elevators to reflect
the area adjacent to the door openings.

### Exterior Lighting

Exterior lighting should illuminate all facility entrances and exits in
addition to parking areas, perimeter walls, gates, courtyards, garden
areas, and shrubbery rows.

Lighting of building exterior and walkways should be provided where
required for employee safety and security. Regarding building facades,
there should be a capability to illuminate them 100% to a height of at
least 6 feet.

Although sodium vapor lights are considered optimum for security
purposes, the use of incandescent and florescent light fixtures is
adequate. Exterior fixtures should be protected with grillwork when
theft or vandalism have been identified as a problem.

For leased buildings, landlord approval of exterior lighting design
requirements should be included in lease agreements.

### Building Access

#### Building Entrances

The number of building entrances should be minimized, relative to the
site, building layout, and functional requirements. A single off-hours
entrance near the security control center is desirable. At large sites,
additional secured entrances should be considered with provisions for
monitoring and control.

##### Door Security Requirements

-   All employee entrance doors should permit installation of controlled
    access system hardware. The doors, jambs, hinges and locks must be
    designed to resist forced entry (e.g., spreading of door frames,
    accessing panic hardware, shimming bolts and/or latches, fixed hinge
    pins). Don\'t forget handicap requirements when applicable.

-   Minimum requirement for lock cylinders are \"6-pin\"
    pin-tumbler-type. Locks with removable core cylinders to permit
    periodic changing of the locking mechanism should be used.

-   All exterior doors should have alarm sensors to detect unauthorized
    openings.

-   Doors designed specifically for emergency exits need to have an
    alarm that is audible at the door with an additional annunciation at
    the security control center. These doors should have no exterior
    hardware on them.

##### Window Precautions

-   For protection, large showroom type plate glass and small operable
    windows on the ground floor should be avoided. If, however, these
    types of windows are used and the building is located in a high-risk
    area, special consideration should be given to the use of locking
    and alarm devices, laminated glass, wire glass, film, or
    polycarbonate glazing.

-   For personnel protection, all windows should have shatter-resistant
    film.

-   (For a more extensive discussion of windows and how to secure them,
    as well as guidance for securing windows which may be used for
    emergency exit, see \"Windows\" on page 9).

##### Lobby

Main entrances to buildings should have space for a receptionist during
the day and a security officer at night. The security control center
should be located adjacent to the main entrance lobby and should be
surrounded by professionally designed protective materials.

The lobby-reception area should be a single, self-sufficient building
entrance. Telephones and rest rooms to meet the needs of the public
should be provided in this area without requiring entry into interior
space. Rest rooms should be kept locked in high-threat environments and
access controlled by the receptionist.

Consistent with existing risk level, the receptionist should not be
allowed to accept small parcel or courier deliveries routinely unless
they are expected by addressee.

#### Other Building Access Points

Other less obvious points of building entry, such as grilles, grating,
manhole covers, areaways, utility tunnels, mechanical wall, and roof
penetrations should be protected to impede and/or prevent entry into the
building.

Permanent exterior stairs or ladders from the ground floor to the roof
should not be used, nor should the building facade allow a person to
climb up unaided. Exterior fire escapes should be retractable and
secured in the up position.

### Construction Activities

Landscaping and other outside architectural and/or aesthetic features
should minimize creating any area that could conceal a person in close
proximity to walkways, connecting links, buildings, and recreational
spaces.

Landscaping design should include CCTV surveillance of building
approaches and parking areas.

Landscape plantings around building perimeters need to be located at a
minimum of 4 feet from the building wall to prevent concealing of people
or objects.

## Chapter IV. Interior Protection

### Building Layout

Building space can be divided into three categories: public areas,
interior areas, and security or restricted areas requiring special
security measures. These areas should be separated from one another
within the building with a limited number of controlled passage points
between the areas. \"Controlled\" in this context can allow or deny
passage by any means deemed necessary (i.e., locks, security officers,
etc.).

Corridors, stairwells, and other accessible areas should be arranged to
avoid places for concealment.

Generally, restricted space should be located above the ground-floor
level, away from exterior walls, and away from hazardous operations.
Access to restricted space should be allowed only from interior space
and not from exterior or public areas. Exit routes for normal or
emergency egress should not transit restricted or security space.

### Walls and Partitions

Public space should be separated from interior space and restricted
space by slab-to-slab partitions. When the area above a hung ceiling is
used as a common air return, provide appropriate modifications to walls
or install alarm sensors. In shared occupancy buildings, space should be
separated by slab-to-slab construction or as described previously.

### Doors

Normally, interior doors do not require special features or provisions
for locking.

In shared occupancy buildings, every door leading to interior space
should be considered an exterior door and designed with an appropriate
degree of security.

Stairway doors located in multitenant buildings must be secured from the
stairwell side (local fire regulations permitting) and always operable
from the office side. In the event that code prevents these doors from
being secured, the floor plan should be altered to provide security to
your space.

Emergency exit doors that are designed specifically for that purpose
should be equipped with a local audible alarm at the door and a signal
at the monitoring location.

Doors to restricted access areas should be designed to resist intrusion
and accommodate controlled-access hardware and alarms.

Doors on building equipment and utility rooms, electric closets, and
telephone rooms should be provided with locks having a removable core,
as is provided on exterior doors. As a minimum requirement, provide
6-pin tumbler locks.

For safety reasons, door hardware on secured interior doors should
permit exit by means of a single knob or panic bar.

### Other Public Areas

The design of public areas should prevent concealment of unauthorized
personnel and/or objects.

Ceilings in lobbies, rest rooms, and similar public areas should be made
inaccessible with securely fastened or locked access panels installed
where necessary to service equipment.

Public rest rooms and elevator lobbies in shared occupancy buildings
should have ceilings that satisfy your security requirements.

### Special Storage Requirements

Building vaults or metal safes may be required to protect cash or
negotiable documents, precious metals, classified materials, etc. Vault
construction should be made of reinforced concrete or masonry and be
resistant to fire damage. Steel vault doors are available with various
fire-related and security penetration classifications.

### Elevators

All elevators should have emergency communications and emergency
lighting. In shared occupancy buildings, elevators traveling to your
interior space should be equipped with badge readers or other controls
to prohibit unauthorized persons from direct entry into your interior
space. If this is not feasible, a guard, receptionist or other means of
access control may be necessary at each entry point.

### Cable Runs

All cable termination points, terminal blocks, and/or junction boxes
should be within your space. Where practical, enclose cable runs in
steel conduit.

Cables passing through space that you do not control should be
continuous and installed in conduit. You might even want to install an
alarm in the conduit. Junction boxes should be minimized and fittings
spot welded when warranted.

### Security Monitoring

#### Security Control Center

If you have a security control center, it should have adequate space for
security personnel and their equipment. Additional office space for
technicians and managers should be available adjacent to the control
center.

Your security control center should provide a fully integrated console
designed to optimize the operator\'s ability to receive and evaluate
security information and initiate appropriate response actions for (1)
access control, (2) CCTV, (3) life safety, (4) intrusion and panic
alarm, (5) communications, and (6) fully zoned public address system
control.

The control center should have emergency power and convenient toilet
facilities. Lighting should avoid glare on TV monitors and computer
terminals. Sound-absorbing materials should be used on floors, walls,
and ceilings. All security power should be backed up by an emergency
electrical system.

The control center should be protected to the same degree as the most
secure area it monitors.

### Controlled Access System

This type of system, if used, should include the computer hardware,
monitoring station terminals, sensors, badge readers, door control
devices, and the necessary communication links (leased line, digital
dialer, or radio transmission) to the computer.

In addition to the normal designated access control system\'s doors
and/or gates, remote access control points should interface to the
following systems: (1) CCTV, (2) intercom, and (3) door and/or gate
release.

### Alarm Systems

Sensors should be resistant to surreptitious bypass. Door contact
monitor switches should be recessed wherever possible. Surface-mounted
contact switches should have protective covers.

Intrusion and fire alarms for restricted areas should incorporate a
backup battery power supply and be on circuits energized by normal and
emergency generator power.

Control boxes, external bells, and junction boxes for all alarm systems
should be secured with high-quality locks and electrically wired to
cause an alarm if opened.

Alarm systems should be fully multiplexed in large installations. Alarm
systems should interface with the computer-based security system and
CCTV system.

Security sensors should individually register an audio-visual alarm
(annunciator or computer, if provided) located at the security central
monitoring location and alert the security officer. A single-CRT display
should have a redundant printer or indicator light. A hard-wired audible
alarm that meets common fire code standards should be activated with
distinguishing characteristics for fire, intrusion, emergency exit, etc.
All alarms ought to be locked in until reset manually.

### Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV)

CCTV systems should permit the observation of multiple camera
transmission images from one or more remote locations.

Switching equipment should be installed to permit the display of any
camera on any designated monitor.

### Hardware

To ensure total system reliability, only high quality security hardware
should be integrated into the security system.

### Stairwell Door Reentry System

In multitenant high-rise facilities, stairwell doors present a potential
security problem. These doors must be continuously operable from the
office side into the stairwells. Reentry should be controlled to permit
only authorized access and prevent entrapment in the stairwell.

Reentry problems can be fixed if you provide locks on all stairwell
doors except the doors leading to the first floor (lobby level) and
approximately every fourth or fifth floor, or as required by local fire
code requirements. Doors without these locks should be fitted with
sensors to transmit alarms to the central security monitoring location
and provide an audible alarm at the door location. Appropriate signs
should be placed within the stairwells. Doors leading to roofs should be
secured to the extent permitted by local fire code.

### Special Functional Requirements

Facilities with unique functions may have special security requirements
in addition to those stated in this booklet. These special requirements
should be discussed with Corporate Security personnel or a security
consultant. Typical areas with special requirements are product centers,
parts distribution centers; sensitive parts storage facilities, customer
centers, service exchange centers, etc.

## Chapter V. Public Access Controls (PAC)

### Security Officers and Watchmen

All facilities of any size in threatened locations should have manned 24
hour internal protection. Security Officers should be uniformed
personnel and, if possible, placed under contract. They should be
thoroughly trained, bilingual and have complete instructions in their
native language clearly outlining their duties and responsibilities.
These instructions should also be printed in English for the benefit of
American supervisory personnel. If permitted by local law/customs,
investigations or checks into the backgrounds of security officers
should be conducted.

At facilities with a perimeter wall, there should be one 24 hour
perimeter security officer post. If the facility maintains a separate
vehicular entrance security officer post, such a post should be manned
from 1 hour before to 1 hour after normal business hours and during
special events. Security officers should be responsible for conducting
package inspections, package check-in, and, if used, should operate the
walk-through and hand-held metal detectors. Security officers should
also be responsible for inspecting local and international mail
delivered to the facility, both visually and with a hand-held metal
detector before it is distributed. X-ray equipment for package
inspection should be employed if the level of risk dictates.

At facilities with a perimeter guardhouse, the walk-through metal
detector could be maintained and operated in an unsecured pass-through
portion of the guardhouse. In addition, this security officer could also
be responsible for conducting package inspections. When there is
sufficient room to store packages at the guardhouse, checked packages
should be stored here\--new guardhouses should provide for such storage.
If package storage at the guardhouse is not feasible, then it should be
in shelves in the foyer under the direction of the foyer security
officer or receptionist. Generally, security screening and package
storage is carried out in the foyer.

### Security Hardline

Office areas should be equipped with a \"hardline\" to provide physical
protection from unregulated public access. Protection should be provided
by a forced-entry-resistant hardline that meets ballistic protection
standards. These standards can be obtained from your corporate personnel
or a security consultant. When a security hardline for Public Access
Control (PAC) is constructed, the following criteria should apply:

#### Walls

Walls comprising a PAC should be constructed of no less than 6 inches of
reinforced concrete from slab to slab. The reinforcement should be of at
least Number 5 rebar spaced 5 inches on center, horizontally and
vertically, and anchored in both slabs. In existing buildings, the
following are acceptable substitutions for 5-inch reinforced concrete
hardlines:

-   Solid masonry, 6 inches thick or greater, with reinforcing bars
    horizontally and vertically installed;

-   Solid unreinforced masonry or brick, 8 inches thick or greater;

-   Hollow masonry block, 4 to 8 inches thick with 1/4 inch steel
    backing;

-   Solid masonry, at least 6 inches thick, with 1/4 inch steel backing;

-   Fabricated ballistic steel wall, using two 1/4 inch layers of sheet
    steel separated by tubular steel studs;

-   Reinforced concrete, less than 6 inches thick with 1/8 inch steel
    backing.

#### Security Doors

Either opaque or transparent security doors can be used for PAC doors.
All doors should provide a 15 minute forced entry penetration delay. In
addition, doors should be ballistic resistant.

The PAC door should be a local access control door, meaning a
receptionist or security officer can remotely open the door.

#### Security Windows

Whenever a security window or teller-window is installed in the
hardline, it should meet the 15 minute forced entry and standard
ballistic resistance requirements.

#### PAC Entry Requirements

No visitor should be allowed to enter through the hardline without being
visually identified by a security officer, receptionist, or other
employee stationed behind the hardline. If the identity of the visitor
cannot be established, the visitor must be escorted at all times while
in the facility.

#### Alarms and Intercoms

A telephone intercom between the secure office area, the foyer security
officer, and guardhouse should be installed. In facilities where deemed
necessary, a central alarm and public address system should be installed
to alert staff and patrons of an emergency situation. Where such a
system is required, the primary control console should be located in the
security control center. Keep in mind that alarms without emergency
response plans may be wasted alarms. Design, implement, and practice
emergency plans.

#### Secure Area

Every facility should be equipped with a secure area for immediate use
in an emergency situation. This area is not intended to be used for
prolonged periods of time. In the event of emergency, employees will
vacate the premises as soon as possible. The secure area, therefore, is
provided for the immediate congregation of employees at which time
emergency exit plans would be implemented.

The secure area should be contained within the staff office area, behind
the established hardline segregating offices from public access. An
individual office will usually be designated as the secure area.
Entrance into the secure area should be protected by a solid core wood
or hollow metal door equipped with two sliding dead bolts.

Emergency egress from the secure area will be through an opaque 15
minute forced-entry-resistant door equipped with an alarmed panic bar or
through a grilled window, hinged for emergency egress. The exit
preferably will not be visible from the facility\'s front entrance.

## Chapter VI. Emergency Exit

All facilities should have a means of emergency escape aside from the
secure area exit. Positioned appropriately throughout the building
should be sufficient emergency exit points to accommodate normal
facility occupancy.

All emergency doors should be hollow metal doors (fire doors where
appropriate) equipped with alarmed emergency exit panic bars.

Emergency factors regarding windows are described in Chapter III.

## Chapter VII. Communications

### Communications Facilities

Satellite ground stations, microwave parabolic reflectors, and
communications towers and supports should be located on rooftops, with
limited access to the public. Where this is not possible, the equipment
should be installed with fences and alarms. Closed circuit television
(CCTV) with video recording capability should be considered and included
where justified.

### Communications

Telephone systems should incorporate an external direct line telephone
link for security and life safety independent of the internal telephone
network dedicated to the location. This line should feed into the secure
area.

Communications considerations should provide radio transmission
equipment for communications between security personnel.

Intercom systems should have the capacity to accommodate all remote
access control points.

### Systems Integration

Security systems in new buildings or buildings undergoing renovation
should be installed with distributed wiring schemes that use local
telecommunication closets as distribution points. This will provide
expansion capability, future networking capability, ease of maintenance,
and full function implementation of the security system. At a minimum,
the communications link and interface between the sensor, output
devices, and computers should include conduit, multiconductor twisted
shielded cable and terminal cabinets. However, recent technology such as
fiber-optic cables should be considered in planning the wiring
distribution scheme. Data distribution and gathering closets used for
security wiring must be secure. Where possible, integrate security
wiring with other systems such as telephone, paging, energy management,
etc. In every case, the design of the communications link should permit
ready installation and interconnection of cameras, sensors, and other
input-output devices. All life safety equipment and accessories should
be Underwriters Laboratory (UL) approved.

Outlying facilities should link security systems to the nearest security
control center. All new systems should be compatible with existing
systems or the existing system should be replaced with the new system.

## Chapter VIII. Office Security Guidelines

### General Procedures 

Any employee, but especially the executive, can be a target of terrorist
or criminal tactics and forced entry, building occupation, kidnapping,
sabotage, and even assassination. Executive offices can be protected
against attacks.

The executive office should have a physical barrier such as
electromagnetically operated doors, a silent trouble alarm button, with
a signal terminating in the Plant Protection Department or at the
secretary\'s desk, and close screening of visitors at the reception and
security officer desks in the lobbies and again at the executive\'s
office itself. Secretaries should not admit visitors unless positively
screened in advance or known from previous visits. If the visitor is not
known and/or not expected, he or she should not be admitted until
satisfactory identification and a valid reason to be on site is
established. In such instances, Security should be called and an officer
asked to come to the scene until the visitor establishes a legitimate
reason for being in the office. If the visitor cannot do so, the officer
should be asked to escort the visitor out of the building.

Unusual telephone calls, particularly those in which the caller does not
identify himself/herself or those in which it appears that the caller
may be misrepresenting himself/herself, should not be put through to the
executive. Note should be made of the circumstances involved (i.e.,
incoming line number, date and time, nature of call, name of caller).
This information should then be provided to the Security Department for
follow-up investigation.

Under no circumstances should an executive\'s secretary reveal to
unknown callers the whereabouts of the executive, his/her home address,
or telephone number.

The executive, when working alone in the evening, on weekends, or
holidays, should advise Security how long he/she will be in the office
and check out with Security when leaving.

### Security in the Office

American enterprises, particularly those in foreign countries, have been
and will continue to be the subject of controversial political and
economic issues that can turn their executives and offices into targets
for terrorists and criminal actions. Countermeasures against these acts
can and should be implemented in the office environment. The following
list describes some of the measures that may be useful in improving
personal security and safety at the office.

-   Avoid working alone late at night and on days when the remainder of
    the staff is absent.

-   The office door should be locked when you vacate your office for any
    lengthy period, at night and on weekends. Do not permit the
    secretary to leave keys to the office or desk.

-   There should be limited access to the executive office area.

-   Arrange office interiors so that strange or foreign objects left in
    the room will be immediately recognized.

-   Unescorted visitors should not be allowed admittance nor should
    workmen without proper identification and authorization.

-   Implement a clean desk policy. Do not leave papers nor travel plans
    on desk tops unattended.

-   Control publicity in high-risk areas. Avoid identification by
    photographs for news release. Maintain a low profile.

-   Janitorial or maintenance activity in key offices and factory areas
    should be supervised by competent company employees.

-   A fire extinguisher, first-aid kit, and oxygen bottle should be
    stored in the office area.

-   The most effective physical security configuration is to have doors
    locked (from within) with one visitor access door to the office
    area.

-   Where large numbers of employees are involved, use the
    identification badge system containing a photograph.

### Advice for Secretaries

A secretary has close knowledge of schedules and company business.
He/she should be instructed to maximize security, and the following
precautionary measures should be reviewed with him/her:

-   Be alert to strangers visiting the executive without an appointment
    and who are unknown to him/her.

-   Be alert to strangers who loiter near the office.

-   Do not reveal the executive\'s whereabouts to unknown callers. Even
    if the caller is known, the information should be on a need-to-know
    basis. As a standard policy, take a number where the caller can be
    contacted. Do not give out home telephone numbers or addresses.

-   When receiving a threatening call, including a bomb threat,
    extortion threat, or from a mentally disturbed individual, remain
    calm and listen carefully. Each secretary and/or receptionist should
    have a threatening telephone call checklist which should be
    completed as soon as possible. A boiler-plate checklist is attached
    as [Appendix III](#appendix-iii.-threatening-phone-call-checklist).

-   Keep executive travel and managers\' travel itineraries
    confidential. Strictly limit distribution to those with a need to
    know.

-   Incinerate, disintegrate or shred notes, drafts, correspondence and
    any and all material which reveal an executive\'s travel plans,
    itineraries, home address and telephone number, invitations and
    responses thereto or any other data about his/her whereabouts,
    including information about past trips which could indicate habitual
    contacts and travel patterns. Do not place such material in trash
    cans.

-   Observe caution when opening mail. A list of things to look for is
    included in [Appendix
    IV](#appendix-iv.-letter-and-parcel-bomb-recognition-points). You
    should post this list in your mail handling facility. (All persons
    handling mail should be made aware of the aforementioned basic signs
    found in [Appendix
    IV](#appendix-iv.-letter-and-parcel-bomb-recognition-points). The
    mail handlers should have available an established procedure in the
    event that any of the above signs are found. It is also important
    not to accept packages from strangers until satisfied with the
    individual\'s identity and the nature of the parcel.)

### Precautions for All

Money, valuables, and important papers such as passports should not be
kept in a your desk. Thefts will occur in all offices, even during
working hours. Some will be solved, most could have been prevented. The
following suggestions will decrease the chance of further thefts:

-   Do not tempt thieves by leaving valuables or money unsecured.

-   If sharing an office or suite of offices, stagger lunch hours and
    coffee breaks so that the office is occupied at all times.

-   If the office must be left vacant, lock the door.

-   Locate desks in a way that persons entering the office or suite can
    be observed.

-   Follow a clean desk policy before leaving at night. Keep valuables
    and company documents in locked containers.

-   Confirm work to be done or property to be removed by Maintenance,
    outside service personnel, or vendors.

-   Do not \"hide\" keys to office furniture under flower pots,
    calendars, etc. Thieves know all the hiding places. Do not label
    keys except by code.

## Chapter IX. Vehicular and Travel Security

### Vehicle and Travel Security

Threats of terrorism and kidnapping are serious problems involving all
aspects of security management; effective management dictates that
available resources be used wisely and concentrated on security weak
points. Terrorists are very quick to identify the security
vulnerabilities of business, family, and pleasure travel. At their best,
protection strategies dealing with vehicles and travel are perhaps the
hardest to formulate, and the advantage tends to be with the terrorist.
Current statistics indicate that the greatest danger from acts of
terrorism occurs while the executive is traveling to or from the office
and just before reaching his/her destination.

The inherent security problems of passenger vehicle travel are many.
Vehicles are easily recognized by year, make, and model, and the trained
terrorist can accurately assess any protection modifications and
security devices. Using adequate resources, vehicles can be discreetly
followed; therefore, making possible repeated dry runs of potential
attacks with very low risk of detection. Under these conditions,
different methods of attack can be formulated and tested until success
is ensured. While traveling in a passenger vehicle, the executive has
limited protection resources upon which to rely and often is dependent
on fixed security manpower. This makes it easier for terrorist groups,
which are geared to mobility, to ensure numerical superiority.

The attack potential against the executive in travel rests heavily on
psychological instability and human weakness. The shock of surprise
attack is greatest at points of changing surroundings, crossroads, and
when entering or exiting vehicles. These are situations of constant
change and points of activity where the executive has a tendency to be
mentally off balance. Vehicles are often left in driveways, on streets,
at service centers, and other isolated areas with no form of control or
protection, allowing easy access to terrorists. Through illegal entry to
the vehicle, the terrorist can gain a number of attack points; sabotage
with the intent to maim and injure, sabotage with the intent of
execution, and sabotage to ensure the success of future attacks. These
psychological factors make the vehicle the ideal place to apply scare
tactics, warnings, and gain initial control of the executive.

Even though travel problems provide the greatest number of security and
psychological variables, there are actions and policies that can be
developed to minimize the executive\'s risk and complicate the
terrorist\'s plans. The basic travel policy can be divided into three
areas: (1) Normal Travel Procedures, (2) Vehicle Equipment, and (3)
Vehicle Defense Strategy. The following checklists will aid in
formulating and evaluating an effective travel security policy.

### Normal Travel Procedures Checklist

-   The avoidance of routine times and patterns of travel by executives
    is the least expensive security strategy that can be utilized. The
    selection of the route should be at the discretion of the executive,
    not of the chauffeur. Always restrict travel plans to a need-to-know
    basis.

-   Avoid driving in remote areas after dark and keep to established,
    well-traveled roads.

-   In high-risk areas or when individuals are considered attractive
    targets, consideration should be given to executives and drivers
    being trained in antiterrorism strategy and defensive driving.
    Establish responsibilities and develop contingency plans.

-   There should be a simple duress procedure established between the
    executive and drivers. Any oral or visual signal will suffice (i.e.,
    something that the executive or driver says or does only if
    something is amiss).

-   Never overload a vehicle, and all persons should wear seat belts.

-   Always park vehicles in parking areas that are either locked or
    watched and never park overnight on the street. Before entering
    vehicles, check for signs of tampering.

-   When using a taxi service, vary the company. Ensure that the
    identification photo on the license matches the driver. If uneasy
    for any reason, simply take another taxi.

-   When attending social functions, go with others, if possible.

-   Avoid driving close behind other vehicles, especially service
    trucks, and be aware of activities and road conditions two to three
    blocks ahead.

-   Keep the ignition key separate and never leave the trunk key with
    parking or service attendants.

-   Before each trip, the vehicle should be inspected to see that (1)
    the hood latch is secure, (2) the fender wells are empty, (3) the
    exhaust pipe is not blocked, (4) no one is in the back seat or on
    the floor, and (5) the gas tank is at least three quarters full.

-   Establish a firm policy regarding the carrying and use of firearms.
    Local laws may prohibit firearms.

### Vehicle Equipment Checklist

-   The executive vehicle designed to meet the terrorist or criminal
    threat in a high threat area should be a hardtop model with the
    following special equipment: (1) inside hood latch, (2) locked gas
    caps, (3) inner escape latch on trunk, (4) steel-belted radial tires
    with inner tire devices that permit movement even with a flat
    tire, (5) radiator protection, (6) disk brakes, and (7) an anti-bomb
    bolt through the end of the exhaust pipe.

-   Positive communications can be ensured with a two-way radio or a car
    telephone.

-   It is recommended that the executive vehicle designed to meet the
    terrorist or criminal threat carry the following safety
    equipment: (1) fire extinguisher, (2) first-aid kit, (3)
    flashlight, (4) two spare tires, (5) large outside mirrors, and (6)
    a portable high-intensity spotlight.

-   For additional protection, the vehicle should have an alarm system
    with an independent power source (an additional battery).

### Vehicle Defense Strategy Checklist

-   Always be alert to possible surveillance; if followed, drive to the
    nearest safe location, such as police stations, fire stations, or
    shopping center and ask for help. Carry a mini-cassette recorder in
    the car to dictate details of a suspect surveillance car such as
    color, make, model, license plate, description of occupants, etc. It
    is difficult to make such detailed notes while driving.

-   Where feasible, drive in the inner lanes to keep from being forced
    to the curb.

-   Beware of minor accidents that could block traffic in suspect areas;
    especially crossroads because they are preferred areas for terrorist
    or criminal activities as crossroads offer escape advantages.

-   If a roadblock is encountered, use shoulder or curb (hit at 30-45
    degree angle) to go around, or ram the terrorist or
    criminal-blocking vehicle. In all cases, do not stop and never allow
    the executive\'s vehicle to be boxed in with a loss of
    maneuverability.

-   Blocking vehicles should be rammed in a nonengine area, at 45
    degree, in low gear, and at a constant moderate speed. KNOCK THE
    BLOCKING VEHICLE OUT OF THE WAY.

-   Whenever a target vehicle veers away from the terrorist vehicle, it
    gives adverse maneuvering room and presents a better target to
    gunfire.

### Travel Security Suggestions

The following are general traveling security suggestions:

-   Discuss travel plans on a need-to-know basis only. Telephone
    operators and secretaries should not advise callers and visitors
    when an executive is out of town on a trip.

-   Remove company logos from luggage. Luggage identification tags
    should be of a type that allows the information on the tag to be
    covered. Use the business address on the tag.

-   Do not leave valuables and/or sensitive documents in the hotel room.

-   When sightseeing, observe basic security precautions and refrain
    from walking alone in known high-crime areas.

-   Always have telephone change available and know how to use the
    phones. Learn key emergency phrases of the country to be able to ask
    for police, medical, etc.

-   Joggers should carry identification.

-   Men should carry wallets either in an inside jacket pocket or a
    front pants pocket, never in a hip pocket. The less money carried
    the better. Credit cards can be used for most purchases.

-   The telephone numbers of the U.S. Embassy or U.S. Consulate, and
    company employee contact numbers should be carried with employees at
    all times.

-   Always carry the appropriate documentation for the country being
    visited.

-   When traveling, ask for a hotel room between the second and seventh
    floors. Most fire department equipment does not reach higher to
    effect rescue and ground floor rooms are more vulnerable to
    terrorist or criminal activity.

-   American-type hotels usually offer a higher level of safety and
    security inasmuch as they offer smoke alarms, fire extinguishers,
    safety locks, hotel security, 24 hour operators, English-speaking
    personnel, safety deposit boxes, and normally will not divulge a
    guest\'s room number.

-   Choose taxis carefully and at random. Be sure it is a licensed taxi.
    Do not use independent non-licensed operators.

-   Be as inconspicuous as possible in dress, social activities, and
    amount of money spent on food, souvenirs, gifts, etc.

-   Stay in or use VIP rooms or security zones when waiting in
    commercial airports abroad. Minimize the amount of time spent in
    airports.

-   Confirm arrivals at destinations with office and/or family. Use an
    itinerary when traveling.

-   When traveling internationally, keep all medicine in original
    containers and take a copy of the prescription.

## Chapter X. Visiting Personnel Protection

### General Principles

This chapter provides guidelines regarding security procedures to be
implemented during visits of company executives. Guidelines for three
levels of threat (minimal threat, moderate threat and high threat) are
set forth below along with the factors which determine the level of
threat that may exist.

These guidelines should be viewed as tools to assist in organizing and
planning visits by company executives or other key personnel. Their
implementation will reduce the executive\'s exposure to terrorist acts,
criminal activity, and potential embarrassment.

### Minimal Threat-Factors and Guidelines

#### Minimal Threat Factors

Factors which should be used by management in determining whether in
view of the local security environment a minimal threat potential exists
include the following:

-   A stable local government;

-   Effective law enforcement;

-   No significant history of terrorist acts against multinational
    companies or their executives;

-   No previous history of criminal or terrorist acts directed against
    company executives;

-   No significant level of criminal activity (particularly violent
    crimes such as robbery, kidnapping, murder, and rape);

-   No current adverse publicity against the company and no local group
    activity protesting company policies;

-   Other risk factors applicable to the local environment.

#### Minimal Threat Guidelines

##### Security Coordination

A management-level employee should be assigned as security coordinator.
The coordinator\'s responsibilities consist of implementing the
established security guidelines, coordinating all other security aspects
of the visit, and serving as the visitor\'s main contact.

The coordinator should be present at the airport, hotel, and events
during arrivals and departures. He/she should ensure adequate security
precautions are taken and be present at large public functions.

##### Air Travel

-   Travel in corporate aircraft is preferable because contact with the
    general public is limited, but use of commercial airlines is an
    acceptable alternative provided the airline involved is not
    considered a likely terrorist target.

-   When booking reservations, you should make no reference to the
    visitor\'s position.

-   Personnel should be available at the airport to handle baggage and
    expedite customs clearances and local airport formalities, both on
    arrival and departure. A VIP room should be reserved at the airport
    for possible use in the event of a delayed departure by the
    aircraft.

-   Time spent at the airport should be kept to a minimum. Public areas
    should be avoided, if at all possible.

-   Use of public transportation to and from airports is not
    recommended.

-   Distribution of travel itineraries should be restricted.

##### Aircraft Security

This section applies in the event that corporate aircraft are used.

-   The hiring of contract security officers at major international
    airports to secure the corporate aircraft during stopovers is not
    necessary provided that the airport has a viable security system.

-   The use of contract security officers on a 24 hour basis is
    necessary in the event that the corporate aircraft uses a remote
    airfield with limited operations and minimal security or is parked
    in a remote area of a major airport.

##### Local Transportation

-   The use of public transportation such as taxis, buses, and subways
    is not recommended.

-   A four-door sedan should be available for use throughout the visit.
    Care should be taken to ensure that the vehicle is unobtrusive, so
    as not to bring undue attention to the visitor. The chauffeur or
    driver, if used, should be bilingual and knowledgeable of the local
    area and routes to be traveled.

##### Accommodations

-   Hotel reservations should be booked at a first class hotel located
    in a low-crime area. Hotel management need not be contacted to
    provide unusual security or other arrangements for the visitor. A
    low-key approach is essential to ensure anonymity. Reference to the
    company or the visitor\'s position should be avoided.

-   Visitors should be preregistered to avoid being required to check in
    at the reception desk. The room key should be provided to the
    visitor immediately upon his or her arrival at the hotel or airport
    by personnel responsible for coordinating the visit.

-   The guest room or suite should be located between the second and
    seventh floor of the hotel, preferably on a floor with a separate
    concierge. The room should be away from the public elevator lobby
    but near an emergency exit.

-   Valuables should be stored in accordance with hotel safekeeping
    provisions.

-   Use of a guesthouse or private residence is acceptable as long as it
    is not located in an isolated area.

##### Official Functions and Activities

-   Coordinate all activities and visit sites before the visitor\'s
    attendance. The coordinator should obtain guest lists and detailed
    itineraries, determine emergency evacuation routes, and ascertain
    the purpose of the function.

-   The coordinator should ensure that the function or activity does not
    subject the visitor to undue risk.

-   Official company functions should be on an invitational basis and
    guests should be required to present their invitations at a
    reception desk staffed by company personnel before being granted
    access to the function. The receptionist should match the invitation
    to the guest list.

##### Liaison With Local Authorities

Prior to a visit by a VIP, you should make contact with the appropriate
local authorities to advise them of the upcoming visit and to ascertain
whether the current local security environment necessitates an upgraded
security posture for the visit.

##### Background Data

An information packet should be prepared before the visit and presented
to the executive upon his/her arrival. Information provided should
include:

-   Emergency telephone contact list, including company personnel (home
    and office numbers), hospital, police, fire, emergency services, and
    company doctor;

-   Maps of the area;

-   Detailed itinerary;

-   Availability of company transportation;

-   Brief review of current security situation including curfews,
    government-imposed restrictions, description of high-crime areas to
    be avoided, and other relevant factors; and

-   Explanation of local currency (exchange rates and currency control
    laws or regulations).

##### Other

-   Details of visits by VIPs should be considered company confidential
    and distribution limited on a need-to-know basis.

-   Media coverage, unless requested by the visitor, is unwarranted.

### Moderate Threat-Factors and Guidelines

#### Moderate Threat Factors

Factors which should be used by management in determining whether in
view of the local security environment a moderate threat potential
exists include the following:

-   Stable local government;

-   Effective law enforcement;

-   Some history of terrorist attacks against multinational companies
    and/or their executives;

-   No previous history of criminal or terrorist acts directed against
    company executives;

-   Upswing in criminal activity, particularly violent crimes with some
    history of criminal kidnappings for financial gain;

-   Some current adverse publicity against the company and potential for
    nonviolent groups to protest against company policies during the
    executive\'s visit.

#### Moderate Threat Guidelines

##### Unarmed Security Escort

In addition to the guidance set forth in \"Minimal Threat Guidelines,\"
an unarmed security escort should be used when a determination is made
by management that a moderate threat exists.

### High Threat-Factors and Guidelines

#### High Threat Factors

Factors which should be used by management in determining whether in
view of the local security environment a high threat potential exists
include the following:

-   Unstable or unpopular local government, with terrorist groups
    actively attempting to bring about its overthrow;

-   Ineffective or corrupt law enforcement agencies unable to reduce
    criminal activity and bring the terrorist problem under control;

-   Significant history of terrorist attacks against multinational
    companies and/or their executives, including bombings,
    assassinations, and kidnappings;

-   Recent history of criminal or terrorist acts or threats against
    company facilities and/or their executives;

-   Widespread criminal activity reaching all elements of local society
    with emphasis on violent crimes;

-   Considerable adverse publicity against company policies and
    organized local groups that have been leaning toward violence and
    are planning to protest company policies during the executive\'s
    visit;

-   Other factors appropriate to the local environment. Asking the
    consulate regional security officer at the embassy is a good idea.

#### High Threat Guidelines

##### Recommendation Against Visit

High-threat potential means a significant risk to the well being of the
executive. You should strongly recommend against a visit by the
executive if a high risk exists. By definition, this category will apply
to a limited number of locations, but might vary based on the local
situation at a particular point in time. For example, a potential visit
might be deemed a moderate risk one month and high risk another because
of changes in the local environment.

##### Armed Protective Security Detail

If the executive cannot be dissuaded from visiting the high threat area,
an armed protective security detail should be used.

Specific guidelines for high risk protective details are beyond the
scope of this document because of the multiple and various
considerations in organizing each individual protective detail. However,
the use of trained security professionals is essential.

The items covered in \"Minimal Threat Guidelines\", will still have to
be addressed when an armed protective detail is required. However, the
manner in which relevant tasks are performed may be modified by
guidelines issued in regard to the armed details. Some general
guidelines are as follows:

-   Professional bodyguards dressed in plainclothes and equipped with
    weapons and two-way radios should accompany the executive at all
    times. At least one bodyguard should remain in the direct vicinity
    of the executive whenever potential public contact is envisioned.

-   Security personnel should conduct advance surveys of all sites to be
    visited and be on the scene throughout the executive\'s visit to the
    location.

-   Security personnel should be assigned to the hotel or residence on a
    24 hour basis to ensure that unauthorized individuals do not enter
    the room or suite. Cleaning staff should be escorted whenever they
    enter the accommodations. The room or suite should be periodically
    checked to ensure that contraband (such as a bomb) has not been
    introduced into the area.

-   An escort car or cars should be used on all vehicular movements by
    the executive to provide a response capacity in the event of an
    attack or vehicular mishap or breakdown. The escort car or cars
    should be staffed by at least two security professionals.

-   The executive\'s vehicle should be driven by a security professional
    trained in evasive or defensive maneuvers. The vehicle should be
    inspected before use to ensure that explosive devices have not been
    installed on the vehicle or that the vehicle has not been otherwise
    tampered with by unauthorized individuals. Use of an armored car, if
    available, is recommended.

-   Public exposure should be limited to the minimum necessary for the
    executive to complete his or her assignment.

### Group Activities Guidelines

The exposure created by a number of executives gathering at a single
location necessitates some degree of increased security. The following
is a list of some general guidelines for use in such group activities:

-   The suites should be inspected before occupancy to ensure that no
    contraband or unauthorized individuals are located in the rooms.

-   Security should be provided for corporate aircraft overnighting at
    the local airport. Such security may be provided by off-duty
    uniformed and armed police officers or contract security guards.

-   The hotel activity boards should make no reference to the company.
    Publicity and press coverage should be minimized. A low profile is
    strongly recommended. Anonymity is a powerful ally of a traveling
    executive.

-   If possible, hotel guest rooms occupied by company personnel should
    be located in one section of the hotel. Consideration should be
    given to hiring a security officer to patrol the hallway in the
    vicinity of the guest rooms and function rooms during hours of
    darkness or even on a 24-hour basis.

-   Access to functions should be controlled to prevent an unauthorized
    individual from gaining access to the meetings or functions. This
    can be handled by assigning a member of the meeting staff to serve
    as a receptionist outside the door. Access can be granted either by
    personal recognition or by checking identity cards.

-   Information packets provided to participants should include the name
    and telephone number of the staff person responsible for security.
    Staff personnel should be provided with an emergency contact list,
    including the telephone numbers of the nearest hospital with an
    emergency room, ambulance service, police department, and fire
    department.

-   Consideration should be given to leasing pagers to ensure that staff
    personnel can be rapidly contacted in the event of an emergency.

-   Upon the conclusion of the meeting, staff personnel should inspect
    all guest rooms and function rooms to ensure that no documents,
    personal effects, or equipment have been left behind by
    participants.

## Appendix I. Security Survey Checklist

### General, Preparatory Data

1.  Site name, address, telephone number:

Please fill in the name of the people holding the following positions:

Manager

Assistant Manager

Human Resources Manager

Person responsible for site security

Number of Employees

Area Covered/Office Size

Operating Hours

Function

2.  Survey should include review of theft reports prepared by this site
    for an appropriate prior period. Where appropriate, has corrective
    action been taken?\
    Do theft reports reflect patterns, trends, or particular problems at
    this location?

3.  What does site management regard as the most prevalent or serious
    security problem?

4.  Does the site maintain items of value, such as works of art,
    paintings, wall hangings, etc.?

5.  What are the site\'s most valuable physical assets?

6.  Does the location have an employees\' handbook or manual or other
    means of enumerating rules of conduct?\
    Have employees been notified that violation of these rules are
    grounds for disciplinary action up to and including discharge?\
    Do these rules of conduct include theft of company, customer, and
    employee property, including information?

7.  Identify off-site locations that should be included in survey, to
    include warehouses, offices, storage facilities, etc.\
    Are these locations protected against vandalism and theft?

8.  What is the police agency having jurisdiction over the site?\
    Does the plant have a dedicated telephone line to this agency?\
    Have they been called for assistance in the recent past?\
    What has been their response?\
    Do they normally include any of our perimeter in their patrols?\
    If requested, would they?

9.  Are police emergency numbers readily available to personnel who
    should have this information?

10. Is information readily available on how to reach the proper agency
    for assistance with illegal narcotics, bomb threats, obscene calls,
    etc.?\
    Do you have a policy of reporting identifiable items of stolen
    property to the local police for addition to their files, indexes?

11. Some police agencies have a Crime Prevention Unit that responds to
    invitations to speak on various topics (drugs, rape, etc.) or that
    may conduct limited security surveys.\
    Is this service available?\
    If so, have you taken advantage of it?

### Perimeter Security

#### Lighting Evaluation

12. Is the perimeter adequately lighted?

13. Does lighting aid or inhibit guards in the performance of their
    duties?

14. Is lighting compatible with closed-circuit television (CCTV)?\
    Does it cause monitor to \"bloom\"?

15. Is the power supply adequately protected?

16. Is lighting properly maintained and cleaned?

17. Are sensitive areas (parking lots, computer areas, stores, storage
    rooms, shipping/receiving areas) adequately lighted?

18. If an emergency occurred, is the site adequately lighted?\
    Is the fenceline adequately lighted?\
    In appropriate areas, is glare projection lighting used?

#### Security Force

19. Proprietary?\
    Contract?\
    If contract, name of agency and telephone number If proprietary,
    what is method and source of selection of personnel?

20. Are perimeter patrols conducted? Frequency?

21. Is an incident log, including alarms/responses maintained? Reviewed
    daily?\
    By Whom?

22. Are security personnel used for nonsecurity related duties?\
    If yes, what duties?

23. Does site use photo ID cards?\
    Compatible with access control system?\
    Who administers it?

24. Are all employees required to show photo ID card upon entry? Is
    duplicate copy kept on file?

25. Are parking decals or other methods of registering employee vehicles
    used? Are privately owned vehicles permitted to park on site? If so,
    can an individual reach a vehicle without passing a guard?

26. Does the site have a receptionist in place at all times? Are
    visitors required to register? Are they provided with an identifying
    badge, and are non-company employees escorted while on the site? Is
    visitor identification verified (e.g., vending company ID, etc.)?

#### Perimeter Protection

27. If outside building walls form part of the perimeter, are all doors
    and windows secured against surreptitious entry? Can entry be
    achieved via the roof? Can hinge pins be removed from doors? Are all
    entry/egress points controlled when opened?

### Internal Security

#### Lock/Key Control

28. With whom does physical and administrative key control rest?

29. Is a master key system in use?\
    How many grandmaster/master keys have been issued?\
    Is adequate control exercised over these keys?

30. Is a cross-control system (name versus key number) in use?\
    What type of numbering system is in use?\
    Is the entire system, including blanks, inventoried on a regular
    basis?\
    Are they stamped \"Do Not Duplicate\"?

31. What level of management authorization (written?) is required for
    issuance of keys?

32. Identify personnel who are permitted to have keys to perimeter
    fence, doors.

33. Are office/facility keys, particularly masters, permitted to be
    taken home?\
    Are keys signed in/out in a daily log?

34. Are locks rotated?

35. How long has the present lock/key system been in use?\
    Have keys been reported lost?\
    What level key?\
    What is the policy when this happens?

36. Is a record of locations of safes and their combinations
    maintained?\
    Are combinations routinely changed annually and when an individual
    who knows one no longer has that need to know? (separation,
    transfer, retirement)\
    Are safe combinations, if written, maintained in a secure place?

#### Alarms and Electronics

37. What type, if any, electronic security system is in use here?\
    Do alarms terminate at the site or at an outside central station?\
    Has service/response been satisfactory?

38. List alarms such as burglar (doors, windows, space (motion)), duress
    (receptionist, cashier, nurse), other (card access, CCTV, etc.)

#### Theft Control Procedures

39. Does the site have a policy of marking items susceptible to theft
    (calculators, office equipment, hand tools, microwave ovens, TV
    monitors, VCRs, etc.) so they can be identified as company
    property?\
    Describe the extent of the program.\
    Does it include die stamping or etching and painting?

40. Are serial numbers of all items bearing them recorded?\
    In the event of theft, is this information related to the police for
    inclusion in stolen property indexes, and for identification and
    return in case of subsequent recovery?

41. Are trash receptacles periodically inspected to determine whether
    items of value may be removed from the site via them?

42. Are all store/office supplies, etc., attended when open?\
    What is the procedure for drawing supplies when no attendant is
    present?

43. Are telephone records properly safeguarded to prevent unauthorized
    destruction?\
    Is access to telephone switching equipment (the \"frame room\")
    restricted?

44. Who performs custodial services - proprietary or contract janitorial
    people?\
    Is access limited to the office area only?\
    Are they bonded?\
    Are they required to wear ID badges?\
    Are they checked during the performance of their duties?\
    Are they inspected by guards as they leave?\
    Are the janitors\' vehicles inspected on the way off the property?\
    How is trash removed from the site?\
    Are the vehicles used to remove trash inspected on the way off the
    property?\
    Do the janitors have access to restricted or sensitive areas?\
    Are they given office keys (masters?)?\
    Are they permitted to take these keys off the site with them?

45. How much cash is kept on site? Is it handled at more than one
    location?\
    How is cash supply replenished?\
    Where is it kept during working hours?\
    Where is it kept after hours?\
    Where are blank payroll checks kept?\
    Where are blank disbursement checks kept?\
    Considering the neighborhood the site is located in, and the amount
    of cash on site, how do you assess your vulnerability to armed
    robbery or burglary?

#### Proprietary/Limited Information

46. Is there Proprietary and/or Limited data on site?\
    If so, in what form?\
    Is it properly marked?\
    Is it stored in a secure location?\
    Are the following locked at the end of the day:

    a.  Offices?

    b.  Filing Cabinets?

    c.  Desks?

47. What are office destruction procedures and file purging for
    Proprietary data?

48. Does the site have a clean desk policy?

#### Personnel Security

49. Are any background checks conducted prior to employment? Are
    previous employment dates verified? Are personnel medical records
    properly safeguarded? Is security included in the new hire
    orientation? Is company property (credit cards, ID keys) retrieved
    during exit interviews?

#### Emergency Procedures

50. Do you have a current bomb threat procedure?\
    Who implements it? (searches areas)\
    Does the procedure include a checklist for the switchboard operator?

51. Is there a contingency plan for acts of violence?\
    A disaster plan?

52. If personnel are required to work alone, are they periodically
    checked by someone to ascertain their well-being?\
    What means do they have of calling for help in an emergency?

#### Computer Security

53. Are terminated employees immediately separated from the EDP
    function?

54. Is access to the data center controlled physically, electronically?\
    Locked when not in use?

55. Is output distributed via user controlled lock boxes? Is tape
    library maintained physically separate from machine room?

#### Threat Information

56. Has liaison been established by your office with the American
    Embassy Regional Security Officer (RSO)?\
    Is the RSO able to notify you of security threats concerning known
    terrorist groups active in the area?\
    Any groups that harbor hatred for U.S. corporations, your company,
    its manager, and employees?\
    Anniversary dates that local population or terrorist groups
    celebrate?\
    What tactics and activities are practiced or adopted by local
    terrorist groups that might affect your company, its managers and
    employees?

57. Do you have sources that will inform you of any political
    controversy or labor disputes that might impact your operations?

58. Will you provide Security with copies of information, that may be
    detrimental to the company, received as a result of your contacts
    with the RSO, as well as other sources, including newspaper
    articles?

## Appendix II. Facility Questionnaire

1.  Are there any known groups that harbor hatred for U.S. businesses,
    managers and employees?\
    Identify:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
2.  What terrorist groups are known to be active in the area?\
    What tactics have these groups been known to use?\
    What is the possibility of a change in these tactics?

3.  Are there known groups that vocally oppose foreign capitalism or
    imperialism in the area?\
    Identify:

4.  Are there any known groups that vocally or actively oppose the local
    government that the United States supports?\
    Identify:

5.  Is there any current political controversy or labor dispute that we
    should be aware of?

6.  Are there any upcoming anniversary dates that the local population
    or terrorist groups celebrate? Identify:

7.  Have there been any previous hostage taking or kidnapping incidents,
    bombings, assassinations, strikes against U.S. businesses or the
    government, demonstrations, assaults, sabotage against corporate
    facilities or products, or occupation of corporate facilities in the
    area?\
    Identify:

8.  If there have been previous hostage taking or kidnapping incidents,

    a.  How were the victims seized?

    b.  What was the fate of the hostages?

    c.  How much ransom was demanded?

    d.  Was it paid?

    e.  How were the negotiations handled?

9.  Does the host country prohibit negotiating with hostage takers or
    prohibit the payment of ransom?

10. Do you consider the local police and intelligence services
    effective?

11. What are the aims of the local criminals or terrorist groups?\
    What tactics or type of activity by these groups would best further
    those aims?

12. What is the identified groups\' capability of carrying out planned
    activities such as ambush, hostage taking, kidnapping, execution,
    bombing, etc.?

13. In the event of terrorist activity, which organizations, businesses,
    groups, or individuals would be the most likely targets?

## Appendix III. Threatening Phone Call Checklist

PLACE THIS UNDER YOUR TELEPHONE - BOMB THREAT!

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1.  When is bomb going to explode?

2.  Where is it right now?

3.  What does it look like?

4.  What kind of bomb is it?

5.  What will cause it to explode?

6.  Did you place the bomb?

7.  Why?

8.  What is your address?

9.  What is your name?

EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT:

Sex of caller:

Race:

Age:

Length of Call:

Number at which call is received:

Time: Date: / /

CALLER\'S VOICE:

Calm Nasal

Angry Stutter

Excited Lisp

Slow Raspy

Rapid Deep

Soft Ragged

Loud Clearing throat

Laughter Deep breathing

Crying Cracking voice

Normal Disguised

District Accent

Slurred Familiar

If voice is familiar, who did it sound like?

BACKGROUND SOUNDS:

Voices Street noises

Crockery Animal noises

Clear PA System

Static Music

Local House noises

Booth Long distance

Motor Other

Factory machinery

Office machinery

THREAT LANGUAGE:

Well spoken Incoherent

(educated) Taped

Foul Irrational

Message read by threat maker

REMARKS:

Report call immediately to:

Phone number

Date / /

Name

Position

Phone number

HOSTAGE!

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

2.  Who is this?

3.  Where are you calling from?

4.  Is this a prank?

5.  How do I know this is not a prank?

6.  May I talk to the hostage?

7.  Is the hostage all right?

8.  What do you want?

VERY IMPORTANT:

9.  Will you call back in 15 minutes?

10. How can I contact you if I have trouble meeting your demands?

EXACT WORDING OF DEMAND:

Sex of Caller: Race:

Age: Length of call:

Number at which call is received:

Time: Date: / /

## Appendix IV. Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition Points

WARNING!

LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB RECOGNITION POINTS

-   Foreign Mail, Air Mail, and Special Delivery

-   Restrictive Markings, such as Confidential, Personal, Etc.

-   Excessive Postage

-   Hand Written or Poorly Typed Addresses

-   Incorrect Titles

-   Titles but No Names

-   Misspellings of Common Words

-   Oily Stains or Discolorations

-   No Return Address

-   Excessive Weight

-   Rigid Envelope

-   Lopsided or Uneven Envelope

-   Protruding Wires or Tinfoil

-   Excessive Securing Material, such as Masking Tape, String, etc.

-   Visual Distractions

[^1]: A device constructed to protect against a ramming vehicle attack.
    They are deployed in lines around a perimeter for anti-ram
    protection, or to provide supplemental control of vehicle traffic
    through permanent checkpoints when other means are not practical or
    effective.