**Before the**

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of )

)

Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al., )

)

Complainants, )

) File No. E-98-48

v\. )

)

Frontier Communications Services, Inc., )

et al., )

)

Defendants, )

)

and )

)

)

Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al., ) File No. E-98-49

)

Complainants, )

)

v\. )

)

MCI Telecommunications Corporation, )

)

Defendant. )

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

Adopted: September 23, 1999; Released: September 24, 1999

By the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau:

**I. INTRODUCTION**

In this order, we resolve two formal complaints filed by Bell
Atlantic-Delaware, *et al.* (Bell Atlantic or Complainant),[^1] one
against Frontier Communications Services, Inc., *et al.* (Frontier)[^2]
and one against MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI)[^3]
(collectively Defendants),[^4] pursuant to section 208 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act).[^5] Bell Atlantic contends
that Defendants violated section 276 of the Act and section 64.1300 of
the Commission\'s rules by refusing to pay payphone compensation for
compensable calls that originated on Bell Atlantic payphones. Under
section 276 of the Act, and the Commission\'s implementing rules and
orders, interexchange carriers (IXCs) are required to compensate
payphone service providers, including local exchange carrier (LEC)
payphone service providers, for certain completed intrastate and
interstate calls originated from the payphone service providers\'
payphones.[^6] Bell Atlantic seeks an order requiring Defendants to pay
payphone compensation to Bell Atlantic for all calls originated on its
payphones and carried by Defendants, during the fourth quarter of 1997
and the first quarter of 1998. Bell Atlantic also seeks an order
directing Defendants to make future payments for such calls.

Defendants each filed an answer arguing that Bell Atlantic is not
entitled to payphone compensation for the calls at issue because Bell
Atlantic did not adequately certify that it had complied with the
compensation eligibility prerequisites set forth in the *Payphone
Orders*.[^7] In Defendants\' view, certification requires that Bell
Atlantic prove to Defendants\' satisfaction that Bell Atlantic has met
all of the compensation eligibility prerequisites, including the removal
of intrastate subsidies from Bell Atlantic\'s rates.[^8]

We find Defendants\' arguments without merit. The term certification, as
set forth in the *Order on Reconsideration*, does not mandate that a LEC
payphone service provider prove to the IXC payor that it has satisfied
each compensation eligibility prerequisite. Under the Commission\'s
rules and orders, for purposes of triggering the IXCs\' payment
obligation, a LEC payphone service provider sufficiently \"certifies\"
its compliance with the prerequisites by attesting authoritatively to an
IXC payor that such LEC payphone service provider has satisfied each
prerequisite to the receipt of payphone compensation. Moreover, we find
this approach to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term
\"to certify.\" We therefore conclude that Bell Atlantic adequately
certified to Defendants that it satisfied the compensation eligibility
prerequisites. Accordingly, we order Defendants to pay payphone
compensation to Bell Atlantic for all compensable calls routed to them
that originated from Bell Atlantic payphones during the fourth quarter
of 1997, the first quarter of 1998, and all subsequent calls, as
required by the Act and the Commission\'s rules.

**II. BACKGROUND**

**A. Statutory Authority**

In the *Payphone Orders*,[^9] the Commission adopted new rules and
policies governing the payphone industry to implement section 276 of the
Act. Those rules and policies: (1) establish a plan to ensure fair
compensation for \"each and every completed intrastate and interstate
call using \[a\] payphone\[;\]\" (2) establish a plan to discontinue
intrastate and interstate carrier access charge service elements and
payments in effect on such date of enactment, and all intrastate and
interstate payphone subsidies from basic exchange services; (3)
prescribe nonstructural safeguards for Bell Operating Company (BOC)
payphones; (4) permit the BOCs to negotiate with location providers
regarding the interLATA carrier presubscribed to their payphones; (5)
permit all \[payphone service providers\] to negotiate with location
providers about the intraLATA carriers that are presubscribed to their
payphones; and (6) adopt guidelines for use by the states in
establishing public interest payphones to be located \"where there would
otherwise not be a payphone\[.\]\"[^10]

In the *Payphone Orders*, consistent with section 276 of the Act, the
Commission concluded that all payphone service providers, including LEC
payphone service providers, must be compensated for \"each and every
completed intrastate and interstate call\" originated from their
payphones.[^11] Prior to the *Payphone Orders*, payphone service
providers received no revenue for originating certain calls (e.g.,
subscriber 800 and other toll-free number calls) and were prohibited
from blocking callers from making some of those calls (e.g., access code
calls).[^12] The Commission concluded in the *Payphone Orders* that
payphone service providers must be compensated for access code,
subscriber 800, and other toll-free number calls, whether they are
jurisdictionally intrastate or interstate.[^13] The Commission further
concluded that IXCs, the primary economic beneficiary of such calls,
would be responsible for compensating the payphone service
providers.[^14]

The Commission concluded that LEC payphone service providers would be
eligible to receive compensation for completed calls originated from
their payphones once they had satisfied certain requirements.
Specifically, to receive compensation, the Commission required that each
LEC \"must be able to certify\" that it had complied with those
prerequisites.[^15] In the *Payphone Orders*, the Commission did not set
forth any requirements for the form of such a certification. The
Commission subsequently stated in the *Second Report and Order*,
however, that LEC payphone service providers are not required to file
such a certification with any state or federal regulatory agency or to
obtain a formal certification of compliance from either the Commission
or the states to be eligible to receive per-call compensation pursuant
to the *Payphone Orders*.[^16] Addressing certification in the *Bureau
Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, the Common Carrier Bureau (Bureau)
stated that, although the Commission does not require a LEC payphone
service provider to file a certification with it, nothing in the
*Payphone Orders* prohibits an IXC payor from requesting such a
certification from the LECs.[^17] In the *Bureau Coding Digit Waiver
Order*, the Bureau further stated that \"LECs that have certified to the
IXC that they comply with the requirements of the *Payphone Orders* must
receive per-call compensation.\"[^18]

**B. The Bell Atlantic Complaints.**

Bell Atlantic provides local exchange and payphone services in the
northeast and mid-Atlantic states.[^19] Defendants Frontier and MCI are
IXCs that provide both interstate and intrastate telephone toll
service.[^20] Since October 7, 1997, the beginning of per-call
compensation, Bell Atlantic has delivered calls from its payphones to
Defendants.[^21]

To obtain compensation for calls that originated from its payphones,
beginning in June 1997, Complainant Bell Atlantic---including
then-NYNEX[^22]---sent letters to Frontier and MCI stating that the
letters \"certified\" that each of its companies had satisfied the
compensation eligibility prerequisites, as set forth in the *Payphone
Orders*.[^23] Therefore, Complainant stated, each of its companies was
entitled to receive payphone compensation as set forth in the
Commission\'s rules and orders. To supplement its letters, NYNEX
provided several compliance matrices listing how it satisfied certain
prerequisites including: intrastate subsidy removal; intrastate tariff
filings for payphone services; unbundled functions and features; and
state-specific tariff information.[^24] Similarly, Bell Atlantic
provided information in its letters indicating how it satisfied each
prerequisite; for example, in responding to each requirement, Bell
Atlantic noted the effective date of the tariff, approved date for the
tariff or order, and tariff number, where applicable.[^25]

Defendants Frontier and MCI responded similarly to Complainant\'s June
1997 letters,[^26] each stating that it would not pay compensation until
Bell Atlantic proved that the compensation eligibility prerequisites had
been satisfied. Specifically, Frontier refused to pay compensation for
any calls originated in Bell Atlantic\'s territory (including former
NYNEX territory) until it was provided with specific materials that it
contended would demonstrate Bell Atlantic\'s compliance with the
Commission\'s payphone compensation prerequisites.[^27] Similarly, MCI
stated that it was not required to pay per-call compensation to Bell
Atlantic, because Bell Atlantic had not provided evidence to
substantiate the claim that payphone subsidies had been removed from all
of Bell Atlantic\'s intrastate rates.[^28] MCI, however, paid
compensation in some Bell Atlantic states.[^29] Subsequent to the filing
of this complaint, Frontier also paid compensation in some Bell Atlantic
states.[^30]

Bell Atlantic issued two subsequent letters in November/December 1997
and again in March 1998 each to Frontier[^31] and MCI,[^32] again
seeking compensation for calls originated from Bell Atlantic\'s
payphones (including those in the former NYNEX territory), and
reiterating that it had satisfied all of the Commission\'s compensation
eligibility prerequisites.[^33] Additionally, in June 1998,
representatives from Bell Atlantic met with representatives from MCI and
Frontier (on separate occasions), along with certain Commission staff
members, to discuss Defendants\' obligations to pay payphone
compensation.[^34] During these meetings, Commission staff expressed the
position that the *Payphone Orders* clearly mandated that IXCs must
compensate a LEC payphone service provider upon receipt of the LEC\'s
certification of eligibility without further inquiry or requirements.
Nonetheless, each Defendant stated that it would not compensate Bell
Atlantic until Bell Atlantic *had proven* to each Defendant\'s
satisfaction that it had removed intrastate subsidies from its
rates.[^35]

In July 1998, Bell Atlantic initiated the present action alleging that
Defendants\' refusal to pay payphone compensation violated section 276
of the Act and the Commission\'s implementing rules and orders. To
facilitate resolution of the issues addressed in the complaint, the
Enforcement Division of the Common Carrier Bureau (Division) held a
status conference for all parties on August 25, 1998. At that
conference, the Division directed the parties to brief two specific
issues: (1) what constitutes a \"certification\" as required by the
Commission\'s *Payphone Orders*, and has Bell Atlantic complied with
this certification requirement; and (2) are there any circumstances
under which an interexchange carrier may refuse to pay payphone
compensation after receiving a certification from a payphone service
provider.[^36]

**III. DISCUSSION**

**A. Introduction.**

In the *Payphone Orders*, the Commission set forth prerequisites that
LEC payphone service providers must satisfy to be eligible to receive
payphone compensation.[^37] In doing so, the Commission delineated
explicit guidelines that LECs must follow to satisfy each prerequisite,
including, in some cases, filing tariffs satisfying the
prerequisite.[^38] In the *Order on Reconsideration*, the Commission
stated that once these prerequisites had been met, \"\[t\]o receive
compensation, a LEC must be able to certify the following\"

\(1\) it has an effective cost accounting manual (CAM) filing; (2) it
has an effective interstate CCL tariff reflecting a reduction for
deregulated payphone costs and reflecting additional multiline
subscriber line charge (SLC) revenue; (3) it has effective intrastate
tariffs reflecting the removal of charges that recover the costs of
payphones and any intrastate \[payphone\] subsidies; (4) it has
deregulated and reclassified or transferred the value of payphone
customer premises equipment (CPE) and related costs as required in the
*Report and Order*; (5) it has in effect intrastate tariffs for basic
payphone services (for \"dumb\" and \"smart\" payphones); and (6) it has
in effect intrastate and interstate tariffs for unbundled
functionalities associated with those lines.[^39]

The Commission also required these LECs that are BOCs to \"have approved
\[comparably efficient interconnection (CEI)\] plans for basic payphone
services and unbundled functionalities prior to receiving
compensation.\"[^40]

Bell Atlantic contends that it is entitled to receive payphone
compensation from Defendants because it \"certified\" to each defendant
that it complied with the Commission\'s compensation eligibility
prerequisites.[^41] All parties agree that, in these letters, Bell
Atlantic does not attempt to demonstrate to the IXC payor that it
complied with each prerequisite.[^42] Instead, the letters purport to
confirm to the IXC that Bell Atlantic has complied with the compensation
eligibility prerequisites set forth by the Commission in the *Payphone
Orders*.[^43] Defendants argue that Bell Atlantic\'s statements that it
\"certifies\" that it has complied with the Commission\'s prerequisites
do not constitute a \"certification\" as required by the Commission\'s
orders. Instead, Defendants contend that Bell Atlantic must demonstrate
to the IXCs that it actually has met the Commission\'s compensation
eligibility prerequisites to constitute a valid certification.[^44]
Defendants thus contend that Bell Atlantic is not entitled to payphone
compensation, because it has not provided the IXCs proof positive that
it satisfied the compensation eligibility prerequisites, including the
requirement that the LEC remove intrastate payphone subsidies from its
intrastate rates.[^45]

To resolve the complaints before us, we must determine whether Bell
Atlantic\'s letters to Defendants, which state that the LEC has complied
with each compensation eligibility prerequisite, constitute a valid
certification triggering a payment obligation by Defendants.
Specifically, we must determine whether the term \"certification,\" as
set forth in the *Order on Reconsideration*, requires a LEC to
demonstrate to the IXC payor that the LEC has complied with each
payphone compensation prerequisite. The Commission has not specifically
defined the term \"certification\" in the context of payphone
compensation. The courts repeatedly have recognized the authority of
agencies to interpret the agency\'s own rules.[^46] For the reasons
discussed below, we find that the term \"certification\" as set forth in
the *Order on Reconsideration* does not require a LEC to demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the IXC payor that such LEC has satisfied each
compensation eligibility prerequisite. Rather, we find that the term
\"certification\" as set forth in the *Order on Reconsideration*
requires that a LEC be able to attest authoritatively that such LEC
indeed has complied with each prerequisite. Therefore, we conclude that
Bell Atlantic\'s letters to Defendants, which attested that Bell
Atlantic had complied with each prerequisite, constitute a valid
certification such that Defendants were obligated to pay Bell Atlantic
payphone compensation.

**B.A valid certification as set forth in the *Order on Reconsideration*
requires an attestation of compliance not a demonstration of
compliance.**

In the *Order on Reconsideration*, the Commission stated that to be
eligible to receive payphone compensation, a LEC \"must be able to
certify\" that it had satisfied the prerequisites set forth in the
*Payphone Orders.*[^47] In requiring that a LEC \"must be able to
certify,\" the Commission declined to require LECs to provide a
certification to a state or federal regulatory agency, or any other
entity. Instead, the Commission simply required that the LEC *be able
to* certify its compliance.[^48] The Commission also specifically
declined to require LECs to obtain a formal certification from either a
state or federal regulatory agency to be eligible for compensation.[^49]
The *Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, however, permits an IXC
payor to request such a certification from the LECs.[^50]

We conclude that \"certification\" as set forth in the *Order on
Reconsideration* requires a LEC to attest that it has complied with each
compensation eligibility prerequisite.[^51] In the *Order on
Reconsideration*, the Commission required a LEC to \"be able to
certify\" that it had satisfied the compensation eligibility
prerequisites.[^52] The Commission did not set forth any specific
requirements for such a certification.[^53] Therefore, we find it
appropriate to examine the use of the ordinary meaning of the term \"to
certify\" to determine a basis for a certification. Black\'s Law
Dictionary defines \"certification\" as \"the formal assertion in
writing of some fact . . . ,[^54] and to \"certify\" as \"\[t\]o
authenticate or vouch for a thing in writing.\"[^55] Similarly,
Webster\'s Dictionary defines \"certify\" as \"to attest
authoritatively\" and \"to attest as being true or as represented or as
meeting a standard.\"[^56]

The Commission also has used this common meaning of the term \"to
certify\" in other contexts where it has not identified specific
criteria to constitute \"certification.\" For example, the Commission\'s
definition of \"certify\" in the context of a formal complaint
proceeding requires that \"\[t\]he signature of an attorney or party
shall be a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, . . .
it is well grounded in fact . . . .\"[^57] Thus, we find that, in this
context, the ordinary meaning of the certification signifies an
assertion or representation by the certifying party, not, as Defendants
assert, a demonstration of proof of the facts being asserted.

We also find that there is nothing in the *Payphone Orders* to suggest
other than the ordinary meaning of the term \"to certify.\" We find
Defendants\' arguments supporting a broader meaning of the term
\"certify\" to be unpersuasive. As previously emphasized, the
Commission, in the *Order on Reconsideration*, stated only that a LEC
must be able to certify that it had satisfied each compensation
eligibility prerequisite. The Commission did not institute a separate
additional requirement that LECs prove in advance to the Commission,
IXC, or any other entity that the prerequisites had been met. Nor did
the Bureau in subsequent orders require LECs to prove to IXC payors that
it had satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite to
constitute \"certification.\" In the *Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver
Order*, the Bureau specifically refused AT&T\'s request to clarify that
\"a LEC is not eligible for payphone compensation \'until it has
provided proof of state action verifying the LEC\'s compliance with
section 276 . . . .\'\"[^58] In response, the Bureau reiterated that the
Commission\'s previous orders required only that a LEC \"be able to
certify\" compliance with the payphone compensation prerequisites.[^59]
The Bureau stated that the IXCs could request a certification from the
LECs.[^60] Nothing in this Order, however, suggests that the Commission
was creating a new requirement that the IXCs could mandate that LECs
provide a factual demonstration of compliance to the IXCs\' individual
standards before that IXC was obligated to pay compensation directed by
the statute and by the Commission\'s rules.

Thus, with regard to Defendants\' specific allegation that Bell Atlantic
must prove that it has removed intrastate payphone subsidies from its
rates prior to being eligible to receive payphone compensation, we find
that there is no such requirement, and indeed, directly conflicts with
prior Commission and Bureau orders. In the *Payphone Orders*, when
setting forth the specific guidelines for the removal of intrastate
subsidies, the Commission did not institute a \"proof\" requirement.
Instead, the Commission stated that, \"pursuant to the mandate in
Section 276(b)(1)(B), incumbent LECs must remove from their intrastate
rates any charges that recover the cost of payphones.\"[^61] The
Commission delegated the removal of intrastate payphone subsidies to the
states, noting that \"states must determine the intrastate rates
elements that must be removed to eliminate any intrastate \[payphone\]
subsidies.\"[^62] The Commission thus required LECs to follow procedures
outlined by the state and to be able to certify that they have taken the
necessary steps to satisfy the procedures.[^63]

Indeed, the interpretation Defendants ask us to adopt---that LECs
demonstrate compliance to the IXCs\' satisfaction to constitute a
certification---would place in the hands of the IXC payor the ability to
determine when, or even if, it should become obligated to pay
compensation mandated by the Act. This interpretation not only would
constitute an abdication of the Commission\'s statutory obligation under
section 276 \"to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly
compensated for each and every . . . call,\"[^64] but also would
conflict with the authority specifically delegated to the Common Carrier
Bureau to determine whether a LEC had complied with each prerequisite.
Accordingly, we agree with Bell Atlantic that the term \"certification\"
as used in the *Payphone Orders*, does not, and cannot, require it to
prove to each IXC\'s satisfaction that the LEC has met the Commission\'s
payphone compensation prerequisites.

We also find MCI\'s reliance on *Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche v.
Federal Election Commission*[^65] to be misplaced. In *Committee to
Elect LaRouche*, the court reviewed a decision of the Federal Election
Commission to withhold from Lyndon LaRouche, a 1976 candidate for the
Presidential nomination of the United States Labor Party, certification
to receive primary matching funds under the Presidential Primary
Matching Payment Account Act. The court found that there is a statutory
obligation in the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act that
the candidate certify his eligibility to the FEC. The court also noted
that, *pursuant to statute*, the FEC must review the submission,
determine whether the candidate has satisfied the FEC\'s eligibility
requirements such that the candidate should receive funding, and certify
its findings to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment, if
appropriate. Therefore, the court held that Petitioner\'s submission of
a notarized statement was insufficient to satisfy his eligibility
threshold and stated that the petitioner must provide additional
documentation demonstrating that he had met the threshold.[^66] This
case is simply inapposite to the current dispute.

Unlike the statute at issue in *Committee to Elect LaRouche*, section
276 does not contain any certification requirements. In contrast, in
this instance, we are only required to interpret the meaning of
Commission orders stating that LECs \"must be able to certify\"
compliance and that IXCs may request such a certification. Absent
explicit requirements in the Act or these orders, it is firmly within
our discretion to interpret these orders using the common meaning of the
term \"to certify\" as previously described.[^67] Nothing in section 276
requires a LEC to certify to any entity that it has satisfied the
prerequisites to receiving per-call compensation. Nothing in section 276
requires the state or the Commission to certify to the IXC that such
prerequisites have been met. Finally, neither section 276 nor the
Commission\'s orders requires the Commission or any other entity to
review a LEC\'s certification to determine if a LEC is eligible to
receive per-call compensation, and if so, how much compensation that LEC
should receive. We therefore conclude that neither section 276 nor the
Commission\'s rules and orders authorize the IXC to review a LEC\'s
submission and determine, based on its analysis of whether the
prerequisites have been met, whether a LEC should receive per-call
compensation.[^68]

We conclude that Bell Atlantic\'s certification letters satisfy the
Commission\'s requirement that a LEC \"must be able to certify\" as set
forth in the *Order on Reconsideration*. In the instant case, Bell
Atlantic provided signed letters from its representatives attesting that
it satisfied the Commission\'s prerequisites to certification. For
example, in its initial letter seeking compensation, dated June 27,
1997, NYNEX stated that\"\[t\]he NYNEX telephone companies hereby
certify that they have met the requirements established by the
\[Commission\] to receive compensation from carriers.\"[^69] NYNEX
listed each of its companies and stated that the letter was a
certification that each company satisfied the prerequisites. NYNEX
further stated that \"\[a\]ccordingly, NYNEX is in full compliance with
the applicable requirements as set forth in the *Payphone
Orders.*\"[^70] Similarly, Bell Atlantic, on behalf of its companies,
stated \"\[e\]nclosed are Certifications confirming that each of the
Bell Atlantic local exchange companies has met all requirements
established by the Federal Communications Commission for eligibility to
receive payphone compensation . . . .\"[^71] Bell Atlantic provided a
separate certification for each company.[^72]

As detailed above, to constitute a certification the LEC must assert
that it has complied with the compensation eligibility prerequisites.
The *Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order* stated that an IXC could
request \"a certification for each prerequisite.\" Accordingly, we find
that a satisfactory certification would attest that the LEC had
satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite.[^73] We find that
Bell Atlantic\'s letters of certification clearly meet this standard.

In addition to stating that it had complied with each prerequisite, Bell
Atlantic\'s letters listed each requirement separately and stated how it
satisfied each prerequisite.[^74] For example, Bell Atlantic provided
compliance matrices indicating the tariff approval date reflecting
intrastate subsidy removal and the approval date of a CEI plan where
appropriate. We found above that certification requires an attestation
that the LEC has complied with each compensation eligibility
prerequisite. Thus, Bell Atlantic not only satisfied its obligation to
attest to its compliance, but also provided specific information to the
IXC concerning compliance. In light of such thorough filings, Defendants
had no basis for refusing to pay compensation.

**C. Eligibility Disputes**

Frontier contends that a dispute as to a carrier\'s eligibility to
receive payphone compensation after certification negates an IXC\'s
obligation to pay payphone compensation.[^75] In support of its
position, Frontier compares its present dispute regarding payphone
compensation eligibility to how disputed ANIs are resolved. According to
Frontier, a carrier is not required to pay compensation on disputed ANIs
until \"\'a LEC makes a positive identification of an installed
payphone.\'\"[^76]

We reject Frontier\'s contention. The Commission established specific
procedures to resolve disputed ANIs.[^77] In contrast, although the
*Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order* permits IXC payors to request
a certification from the LECs,[^78] we have specifically stated that
IXCs *must* pay compensation upon receipt of the LEC\'s
certification.[^79] There is no exception to this absolute obligation to
pay upon receipt of certification. As noted above, the *Payphone Orders*
delegated to the Bureau the authority to determine whether a LEC had
complied with the prerequisites to payphone compensation.[^80] IXCs
questioning the veracity of a LEC\'s certification are obligated to
challenge the LEC\'s compliance may initiate a proceeding at the
Commission.

In the instant matter, neither Frontier nor MCI have availed themselves
of this remedy, but instead have undertaken the remedy of self-help by
refusing to pay compensation mandated by our rules. As we have stated in
other contexts, such self-help remedies are strongly disfavored by the
Commission.[^81] We emphasize that a LEC\'s certification letter does
not substitute for the LEC\'s obligation to comply with the requirements
as set forth in the *Payphone Orders.* The Commission consistently has
stated that LECs must satisfy the requirements set forth in the
*Payphone Orders*, subject to waivers subsequently granted, to be
eligible to receive compensation. Determination of the LEC\'s
compliance, however, is a function solely within the Commission\'s and
state\'s jurisdiction. As stated above, the Commission specifically
delegated to the Common Carrier Bureau the authority to determine
whether a LEC has complied with the compensation eligibility
prerequisites.[^82]

**D. Damages.**

We conclude above that Bell Atlantic\'s letters constitute an adequate
certification, such that these letters triggered Defendants\' obligation
to pay payphone compensation. The Commission bifurcated this proceeding
into liability and damages phases. Thus, in accordance with section
1.722(b) of the Commission\'s rules, the complainant may file a
supplemental complaint for damages within sixty days of the release of
this order.[^83]

**IV. BELL ATLANTIC\'S MOTION TO STRIKE**

On September 17, 1998, Bell Atlantic filed a motion to strike
Frontier\'s opening brief. Bell Atlantic argues that the Commission
Should strike Frontier\'s brief because the brief ignored the issues
that the Commission directed the parties to brief and instead addressed
questions that the Commission rejected as issues for briefing.[^84] On
September 24, 1998, Frontier filed a reply to Bell Atlantic\'s motion to
strike and argued that it directly \"addressed the issues identified by
Commission staff for briefing.[^85] We deny Bell Atlantic\'s motion to
strike. Frontier\'s brief did address issues set forth by the
Commission. To the extent Frontier addressed matters beyond the scope of
the issues set forth for this briefing, we did not consider those
arguments.

**V. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING CLAUSES**

In conclusion, we find that Bell Atlantic\'s letters to Defendants
satisfy the Commission\'s certification requirement. We also find that
Defendant\'s arguments that Bell Atlantic was required to demonstrate
compliance to their satisfaction are without merit for the reasons
stated above. Under Defendants\' theory, the IXC would be the ultimate
judge of whether the LEC payphone service provider had complied with the
Commission\'s rules and orders. This outcome is unacceptable. First,
such a construct would allow the IXC to delay paying compensation
indefinitely. Second, the statute requires that the Commission \"ensure
all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each . . .
call\" made from a payphone.[^86] The Commission has not---and
cannot---delegate this statutory requirement to IXCs. Therefore, we
conclude that Bell Atlantic is entitled to receive per-call compensation
from Frontier and MCI.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208, and
276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276, that the instant complaint filed on July
15, 1998, by Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc.,
Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell
Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc., Bell
Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company and New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company against Frontier Communications Services
Inc., Frontier Communications International Inc., Frontier
Communications of the West Inc., Frontier Communications-North Central
Region Inc., Frontier Communications of New England Inc., and Frontier
Communications of the Mid Atlantic Inc. IS GRANTED TO THE EXTENT
INDICATED HEREIN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208, and 276
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i),
154(j), 208, and 276, that the instant complaint filed on July 15, 1998,
by Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., Bell
Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell
Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc., Bell
Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company and New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company against MCI Communications Corporation
IS GRANTED TO THE EXTENT INDICATED HEREIN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell Atlantic MAY FILE a supplemental
complaint for damages within sixty (60) days pursuant to Section
1.722(b)(2) of the Commission\'s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.722(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell Atlantic\'s motion to strike is DENIED.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Lawrence E. Strickling

Chief, Common Carrier Bureau

[^1]: ^?^ Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc.,
    Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.,
    Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc.,
    Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company and
    New England Telephone and Telegraph Company (collectively Bell
    Atlantic).

[^2]: ^?^ Frontier Communications Services Inc., Frontier Communications
    International Inc., Frontier Communications of the West Inc.,
    Frontier Communications-North Central Region Inc., Frontier
    Communications of New England Inc., and Frontier Communications of
    the Mid Atlantic Inc. (collectively Frontier).

[^3]: ^?^ Subsequent to the filing of this complaint, Defendant MCI
    merged with WorldCom. This order is binding on all named parties and
    their successors-in-interest.

[^4]: ^?^ *Bell Atlantic v. Frontier*, File No. E-98-48 (filed July 15,
    1998) (Complaint (Frontier)). *Bell Atlantic v. MCI*, File No.
    E-98-49 (filed July 15, 1998) (Complaint (MCI)). The allegations and
    legal analysis are virtually identical in the two Bell Atlantic
    complaints. Bell Atlantic initially filed its complaint against
    Frontier Corporation, which is a holding company that owns common
    carriers subject to the Commission\'s rules. The parties agreed that
    Bell Atlantic could amend its complaint to substitute the Frontier
    Long Distance Companies for Frontier Corporation as the defendants.
    *See* Bell Atlantic/Frontier Joint Statement at 2. Accordingly, Bell
    Atlantic filed a revised complaint substituting the Frontier Long
    Distance Companies as the defendants on September 4, 1998.

[^5]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. § 208. Section 208 gives a party the right to file a
    complaint with the Commission if it believes that a common carrier
    acted or failed to act in contravention of the Act or a Commission
    rule or order.

[^6]: ^?^ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 276; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300; *see also
    Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and
    Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 20,541 (1997) (*Report and Order*);
    *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd 21,233 (1997) (*Order on
    Reconsideration*) (collectively the *Payphone Orders*). The
    *Payphone Orders* were affirmed in part and vacated in part. *See
    Illinois Public Telecomm. v. FCC*, 117 F.3d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
    The Commission addressed the issues remanded by *Illinois Public
    Telecomm.* in the *Second Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 1778 (1997)
    (*Second Report and Order*). The *Second Report and Order* was also
    appealed. On appeal, the Court remanded certain issues to the
    Commission. *See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC*, 143 F.3d 606 (D.C.
    Cir. 1998). The Commission addressed those issues in the *Third
    Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 2545 (1999). The portions of the
    *Payphone Orders* addressed in this order were neither vacated nor
    remanded by the Court.

[^7]: ^?^ *See Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd 21,233 (1997).

[^8]: ^?^ *See* Frontier Answer at para. 40; MCI Answer at para. 12.

[^9]: ^?^ *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 20,541; *Order on
    Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,233. There have been many orders
    in CC Docket No. 96-128, including the *Payphone Orders*, which
    address a variety of payphone-related issues. We will refer to this
    docket as the payphone proceeding.

[^10]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. § 276(b). Section 276(b)(1)(B) directed the
    Commission to discontinue the above-mentioned carrier access charge
    service elements and payments in effect on such date of enactment
    and intrastate and interstate payphone subsidies in favor of a
    compensation plan that would ensure fair compensation for each and
    every completed call as set forth in section 276(b)(1)(A). Only
    certain types of payphone owners were entitled to subsidies.

[^11]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A) (directing the Commission to
    establish a plan \"to ensure that all payphone service providers are
    fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and
    interstate call using their payphone\"); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(a)
    (requiring \"every carrier to whom a completed call from a payphone
    is routed \[to\] compensate the payphone service provider for the
    call . . . .\"). *See also Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,566,
    para. 48.

[^12]: ^?^ *See* Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act
    (TOCSIA), Pub. L. No. 101-435, 104 Stat. 986 (1990) (codified at 47
    U.S.C. § 226) (prohibiting payphone service providers from blocking
    certain calls); *see also* *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,568,
    para. 52. An \"access code call\" is a call made using a sequence of
    numbers that, when dialed, connect the caller to the operator
    service provider (OSP) associated with that sequence, rather than
    the OSP presubscribed to the originating line. Access code calls
    include toll-free calls (e.g., 1-800-CALL-ATT), 101XXXX calls in
    equal access areas, and \"950\" Feature Group B dialing (950-0XXX or
    950-1XXX) anywhere, where the three-digit XXX denotes a particular
    interexchange carrier. *See* *Policies and Rules Concerning Operator
    Service Access and Pay Telephone Compensation*, 7 FCC Rcd 3251, 3251
    n.1 (1992). \"Subscriber 800 calls\" consist of calls to an 800
    number assigned to a particular subscriber. *See* *Implementation of
    the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
    11 FCC Rcd 6716 (1996). In this order, the term subscriber 800 call
    encompasses toll-free subscriber calls, including 888 and 877
    numbers. *See* *Toll Free Service Access Codes*, 11 FCC Rcd 2496
    (1996); *see also* *Third Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 2568
    n.88.

[^13]: ^?^*See Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,568, para. 52.

[^14]: ^?^ For purposes of paying compensation for compensable calls and
    other associated obligations, such as tracking calls, the term
    \"IXC\" includes a LEC when it provides interstate, intraLATA toll
    service. *See Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,584, para. 83
    n.293; *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,270, paras.
    74-75 & 21,278, para. 92. Under the *Third Report and Order*, the
    default per-call compensation amount is \$0.24 absent negotiation to
    receive a different amount. *See Third Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd
    at 2552, paras. 14, 196 (setting forth the history of Commission
    payphone compensation plans and establishing the compensation amount
    retroactive to October 7, 1997).

[^15]: ^?^ *See Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293-94,
    paras. 131-32; *see infra* para. 12 (listing specific requirements).

[^16]: ^?^ *See Second Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 1780, para. 1
    n.9; *see also* *Implementation of the Pay Telephone
    Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
    FCC Rcd 4998, 5001-02, para. 4 (1998) (*Bureau Coding Digit Waiver
    Order*) (emphasizing that there are no state or federal
    certification requirements).

[^17]: ^?^ *See Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    21,380, para. 22.

[^18]: ^?^ *Bureau Coding Digit Waiver Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 5001-02,
    para. 4 (emphasis added); *see also infra* para. 30 (discussing the
    rights of a payor to challenge a certification).

[^19]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (Frontier) at para. 2; Complaint (MCI) at
    para. 2.

[^20]: ^?^ *See* Bell Atlantic/Frontier Joint Statement at 2; MCI Answer
    at para. 3.

[^21]: ^?^ *See* Bell Atlantic/Frontier Joint Statement at 2; Complaint
    (MCI) at para. 6.

[^22]: ^?^ Bell Atlantic and NYNEX merged prior to filing the instant
    complaints. We note, however, that in June 1997---when Bell Atlantic
    initially sought compensation from the IXCs---Bell Atlantic and
    NYNEX had not yet merged. Therefore, each company initially
    attempted to obtain compensation independently of the other. For the
    purpose of this complaint, references to the Complainant Bell
    Atlantic refer to the merged entity, which includes former NYNEX
    territory, unless otherwise noted.

[^23]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (Frontier) at paras. 12-13 & Exhibit A.
    Exhibit A to the complaint against Frontier is the following: Letter
    to FCNC-Frontier Comm. No. O.R., \"NYNEX Certification of Compliance
    with Requirements for Payphone Compensation in Payphone
    Reclassification Proceeding, CC Docket 96-128,\" from Diane F.
    Giacalone, VP-General Manager, NYNEX Public Communications & Peter
    Shepherd, Director, NYNEX Regulatory Planning (June 27, 1997)
    \[hereinafter Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit A\]. *See also*
    Complaint (MCI) at paras. 12-13 & Exhibit A. Exhibit A to the
    complaint against MCI is an identical letter to that in Exhibit A in
    the complaint against Frontier, with the recipient being Denny
    Reuss, Cincinnati\-- for MCI. Since the substance of the letters is
    identical, we will refer to these two letters as \"Exhibit A\"
    unless it is necessary to distinguish between the recipients of the
    letter.

[^24]: ^?^ *See* *id.* at Attachment A at 3-14. NYNEX also provided
    compliance matrices for state and federal filing requirements, a
    billing and collection outline, and a sample invoice. The matrices
    included information such as the date NYNEX filed a tariff to
    satisfy a particular requirement, effective date of tariff, and
    tariff transmittal number, or Commission order approving certain
    action.

[^25]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit B. Exhibit B to the
    complaint against Frontier is the following: Letter to Michael
    Nighan, Manager-Regulatory, Allnet/Frontier from Paul V.
    Francischetti, Vice President - Legislative Planning &
    Re-Engineering, Bell Atlantic (June 30, 1997) \[hereinafter
    Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit B\]; *see also* Complaint (MCI) at
    Exhibit B. Exhibit B to the complaint against MCI is identical to
    that in the complaint against Frontier with the recipient being
    Laura Pickeral, MCI. We will refer to these two letters as Exhibit B
    since they are identical, unless it is necessary to distinguish
    between the recipients. Bell Atlantic certified that each of its
    following companies complied with the Commission\'s requirements:
    Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., Bell
    Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell
    Atlantic-Virginia, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc., and
    Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc.

[^26]: ^?^ Unless otherwise specified, the entity \"Bell Atlantic\"
    includes former NYNEX territory. Thus, Defendants responses to
    \"Bell Atlantic\" encompass those responses to NYNEX.

[^27]: ^?^ *See* Frontier Answer at Exhibit A (stating that Frontier
    would pay only those LECs that followed the procedures that Frontier
    itself outlined); *see also* Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit C
    (Letter to Paul V. Francischetti, Vice President - Bell Atlantic
    Network Services, Inc. from Michael J. Nighan, Director - Regulatory
    Affairs, Frontier (July 10, 1997)); Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit
    D (Letter to Diane F. Giacalone, Vice President, NYNEX from Michael
    J. Nighan, Director - Regulatory Affairs, Frontier (July 11, 1997)).

[^28]: ^?^ *See* MCI Answer at para. 12; *see also* Complaint (MCI) at
    Exhibit C. The removal of payphone subsidies is one of the
    prerequisites to eligibility to obtain payphone compensation. *See
    infra* para. 15.

[^29]: ^?^ Bell Atlantic seeks compensation from MCI for the fourth
    quarter 1997 for the following states: Delaware, Maryland, New
    Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Maine, Massachusetts
    and Rhode Island, and for the District of Columbia. Bell Atlantic
    seeks compensation from MCI for the first quarter 1998 for the
    following states: Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
    Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and for all states on a going
    forward basis. *See* Complaint (MCI) at paras. 16-17.

[^30]: ^?^ *See* Letter to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC from
    Steven A. Augustino, Counsel to Frontier (Nov. 4, 1998) (noting that
    subsequent to the filing of this complaint, Frontier agreed to pay
    compensation to Bell Atlantic for payphones in the following
    jurisdictions: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
    Vermont, and West Virginia.) At the time of the filing of the
    complaint, Frontier had not made any payphone compensation payments
    to Bell Atlantic for the fourth quarter 1997 or the first quarter
    1998.

[^31]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibits E-F. Exhibit E to the
    Complaint against Frontier is the following: Letter to Michael J.
    Nighan, Director - Regulatory Affairs, Frontier Communications from
    Diane Giacalone, Vice President, Marketing and Planning (Dec. 10,
    1997) \[hereinafter Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit E\]. Exhibit F
    to the Complaint against Frontier is the following: Letter from Paul
    V. Francischetti, Vice President - Marketing and Planning, Bell
    Atlantic (Mar. 13, 1998) \[hereinafter Complaint (Frontier) at
    Exhibit F\].

[^32]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (MCI) at Exhibits D-E. Exhibit D to the
    Complaint against MCI is the following: Letter to Laura Pickeral,
    MCI Communications from Diane Giacalone, Vice President, Marketing
    and Planning, Bell Atlantic (Nov. 12, 1997) \[hereinafter Complaint
    (MCI) at Exhibit D\]. Exhibit E to the Complaint against MCI is the
    following: Letter from Paul V. Francischetti, Vice President -
    Marketing and Planning, Bell Atlantic (Mar. 13, 1998) \[hereinafter
    Complaint (MCI) at Exhibit E\]. We note that Exhibit E to the
    complaint against MCI is identical to Exhibit F to the complaint
    against Frontier.

[^33]: ^?^ *See* Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit E; Complaint (MCI) at
    Exhibit D (stating that \"Bell Atlantic has satisfied all the FCC\'s
    requirements for deregulating payphones\").

[^34]: ^?^ Frontier Answer at para. 22 (stating that Frontier attended
    the meeting and indicated at that time that Bell Atlantic \"had not
    proven that it is entitled to payphone compensation\"). *See also*
    Complaint (MCI) at para. 20.

[^35]: ^?^ *See* Frontier Answer at para. 22. *See also* Complaint (MCI)
    at Attachment I (Letter to Michael Kellogg, Counsel for RBOC
    Coalition from Leonard S. Sawicki, MCI (June 24, 1998)) (stating
    that MCI is not compensating certain companies, including Bell
    Atlantic, because they \"have not met the requirement that LECs
    remove intrastate payphone subsidies from intrastate access rates
    and certify this to the interexchange carriers.\").

[^36]: ^?^ *See* Letter to Jennifer Myers, Federal Communications
    Commission from Parties (Aug. 26, 1998).

[^37]: ^?^ *See Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,604-34, paras.
    127-87 (establishing eligibility requirements to receive per-call
    compensation); *see also Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    21,299-21,329, paras. 142-220 (further discussing such
    requirements). These orders listed the steps LECs must take to
    satisfy the prerequisites including what tariffs, if any, were
    required to be filed with either the states or the Commission.

[^38]: ^?^ *See Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,604-34, paras.
    127-87 (establishing eligibility requirements to receive per-call
    compensation); *see also Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    21,299-21,329, paras. 142-220 (further discussing such
    requirements).

[^39]: ^?^ *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293, para. 131.
    *See also* *Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and
    Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    Order, 12 FCC Rcd 21,370, 21,374, para. 10 (Com. Car. Bur. Apr. 15,
    1997) (*Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*) (stating that the
    requirements for intrastate tariffs are as follows:

    \(1\) that payphone service intrastate tariffs be cost-based,
    consistent with Section 276, nondiscriminatory and consistent with
    *Computer III* tariffing guidelines; and (2) that the states ensure
    that payphone costs for unregulated equipment and subsidies be
    removed from the intrastate local exchange service and exchange
    access service rates) (citations omitted).

[^40]: ^?^ *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,294, para. 132.
    The Commission also required payphone service providers to transmit
    payphone-specific coding digits to IXCs before payphone service
    providers would be eligible to receive compensation. Due to
    difficulties implementing coding digits, the Bureau granted limited
    waivers of the payphone service providers\' obligation to provide
    coding digits, but reiterated that these waivers did not negate an
    IXC\'s obligation to pay payphone compensation. *Bureau Coding Digit
    Waiver Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 4998. The provision of coding digits is
    not part of the Commission\'s certification \"requirement\" and is
    not at issue in this order.

[^41]: ^?^ *See* Bell Atlantic Reply Brief at 1.

[^42]: ^?^ *See* Bell Atlantic/Frontier Joint Statement at 2; MCI Answer
    at para. 12.

[^43]: ^?^ *See, e.g.,* Complaint at Exhibit B (stating, \"\[e\]nclosed
    are certifications confirming that each of the Bell Atlantic local
    exchange companies has met all requirements established by the
    \[Commission\] for eligibility to receive payphone compensation.\").

[^44]: ^?^ *See* Frontier Answer at para. 40; MCI Answer at para. 7.

[^45]: ^?^ *See* Bell Atlantic/Frontier Joint Statement at 2 (stating
    that one of the disputed facts is that \"Bell Atlantic has failed to
    demonstrate that it removed payphone subsidies from its intrastate
    rates for telephone exchange or exchange access service\"); *see
    also* MCI Answer at paras. 8, 12. Although Defendants contend that
    Bell Atlantic must demonstrate that it has satisfied each
    prerequisite to payphone compensation, Defendants\' main challenge
    to Bell Atlantic\'s certification letters is Bell Atlantic\'s
    failure to prove one particular prerequisite - the removal of
    intrastate subsidies.

[^46]: ^?^ *See Udall v. Tallman*, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); *see also
    National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC*,
    746 F.2d 1492, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the Commission\'s
    interpretation of its own policies and regulations is entitled to
    \"great deference\" and that \"the administrative interpretation is
    of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
    with the regulation.\") (citations omitted).

[^47]: ^?^ *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293-94, para.
    131.

[^48]: ^?^ As discussed above, the Commission established requirements
    that LEC payphone service providers must satisfy prior to being
    eligible to receive per-call compensation. To satisfy some of these
    requirements, LECs may have to file tariffs or other documents with
    either a state or federal Commission. The certification requirement,
    however, is distinct from the individual prerequisites, and does not
    require a LEC payphone service provider to file any formal
    certification with a state or federal agency in order to satisfy
    such a certification. As discussed *infra*, in the *Bureau
    Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, the Bureau permitted the IXCs to
    request a certification from the LECs. Thus, we must determine what
    satisfies the LECs obligation to provide such a certification to the
    IXCs.

[^49]: ^?^ *See Second Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 1780, para. 1
    n.9; *see also Bureau Coding Digit Waiver Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    5001-02, para. 4 (emphasizing that there are no state or federal
    certification requirements).

[^50]: ^?^ *See Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    21,380, para. 22.

[^51]: ^?^ As stated above, the *Order on Reconsideration* does not
    require a LEC to provide any form of a certification to the IXC
    payor (or to any other entity). Instead, the *Order on
    Reconsideration* merely requires that a LEC \"must be able to
    certify.\" The requirement that a LEC \"be able to certify\" is
    triggered by an IXC payor\'s request, as permitted in the *Bureau
    Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, to see such a certification.

[^52]: ^?^ *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293, para. 131.

[^53]: ^?^ We conclude that where the Commission seeks particular
    criteria to constitute certification, it states so explicitly. *See*
    Bell Atlantic Reply Brief at 4 (arguing that if the Commission had
    intended for LECs to prove their eligibility, it would have stated
    so explicitly). For example, the Commission set forth specific
    guidelines for the payphone industry regarding the resolution of
    disputed ANIs. *See Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    21,281-82, paras. 102-104. Likewise, with regard to tariff review
    plans, in the *Material to be Filed in Support of 1998 Annual Access
    Tariff Filings,* the Commission (as the title indicates) explicitly
    set forth filing requirements and stated, \"\[w\]e set forth herein
    the summary material that incumbent \[LECs\] should file to support
    the annual revisions to the rates in their intrastate service
    tariffs.\" 13 FCC Rcd 6702 (1998). It is thus significant here that
    the Commission did not establish a similarly specific criteria to
    satisfy certification in the context of payphone compensation.

[^54]: ^?^ [Black\'s Law Dictionary]{.smallcaps} at 227 (6th ed. 1990).

[^55]: ^?^ *Id*. at 228.

[^56]: ^?^ [Webster\'s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary]{.smallcaps} at
    223 (1989).

[^57]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.734(c). section 1.734(c) states in full:

    The original of all pleadings and other submissions filed by any
    party shall be signed by that party, or by the party\'s attorney.
    The signing party shall include in the document his or her address,
    telephone number, facsimile number and the date on which the
    document was signed. Copies should be conformed to the original.
    Unless specifically required by rule or statute, pleadings need not
    be verified. The signature of an attorney or party shall be a
    certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading,
    motion, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge,
    information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
    grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
    argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
    law; and that it is not interposed for the purposes of delay or for
    any other improper purpose.

[^58]: ^?^ *Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    21,377, para. 16.

[^59]: ^?^ *Id.* at 21,380, para. 22.

[^60]: ^?^ As stated above, the *Order on Reconsideration* did not
    require LECs to certify compliance to either a state or federal
    regulatory agency or to the IXC payors. In the *Bureau Intrastate
    Tariffing Waiver Order*, the Bureau allowed the IXC to request a
    certification from the LECs. The Bureau did not expand upon the
    *Order on Reconsideration\'s* requirement that the LEC \"must be
    able to certify\" nor did it require the LEC to prove compliance to
    constitute certification.

[^61]: ^?^ *Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,319, para. 193;
    *see also Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,634, para. 186; 47
    U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(B) (stating in pertinent part that the Commission
    shall enact regulations that \"discontinue the intrastate and
    interstate carrier access charge payphone service elements and
    payments in effect on such date of enactment, and all intrastate and
    interstate payphone subsidies from basic exchange and exchange
    access revenues . . . \").

[^62]: ^?^ *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,634, para. 186.

[^63]: ^?^ *See id.; see also Order on Reconsideration*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    21,293, para. 131.

[^64]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A).

[^65]: ^?^ 613 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

[^66]: ^?^ *See id.* at 842.

[^67]: ^?^ *See Udall v. Tallman*, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); *see also
    National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC*,
    746 F.2d 1492, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the Commission\'s
    interpretation of its own policies and regulations is entitled to
    \"great deference\" and that \"the administrative interpretation is
    of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
    with the regulation.\") (citations omitted).

[^68]: ^?^ To the contrary, the Bureau specifically has stated that
    \"LECs that have certified to the IXC that they comply with the
    requirements of the *Payphone Orders* must receive per-call
    compensation.\" *Bureau Coding Digit Waiver Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    5001-02, para. 4.

[^69]: ^?^ Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit A; Complaint (MCI) at Exhibit
    B.

[^70]: ^?^ Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit A; Complaint (MCI) at Exhibit
    B. Specifically, the letters state that \"\[t\]he NYNEX telephone
    companies hereby certify that they have met the requirements
    established by the \[Commission\] to receive compensation from
    carriers . . . \[as\] were initially set forth by the Commission in
    paragraphs 131 and 132 of the \[*Order on Reconsideration*\] in the
    *Payphone Reclassification Proceeding*, and \[ . . . \] clarified
    and modified by subsequent Orders.\" NYNEX certified the following:

    1.) NYNEX has an effective cost accounting manual (CAM) filing.

    2.) NYNEX has an effective interstate CCL tariff reflecting a
    reduction for

    deregulated payphone costs and reflecting additional multi-line
    subscriber line

    charge (SCL) revenue.

    3.) NYNEX has effective intrastate tariff filings reflecting the
    removal of charges that

    recover the costs of payphones and any intrastate subsidies.

    4.) NYNEX has deregulated and reclassified the value of payphone
    customer premises

    equipment (CPE) and related costs as required in the *Report and
    Order*.

    5.) NYNEX has in effect intrastate tariffs for basic payphone
    service (for \"dumb\" and

    \"smart\" payphones).

    6.) NYNEX has in effect intrastate and interstate tariffs for
    unbundled functionalities

    associated with those lines.

    7.) NYNEX has an approved Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI)
    plan for basic

    payphone services and unbundled functionalities prior to receiving
    compensation.

    NYNEX also provided the following: (1) a statement that NYNEX had
    informed the states that it had complied with the \"new services
    test\" set forth by the Bureau; and (2) a statement that it had
    filed rate changes required in the existing intrastate tariffs so as
    to satisfy the \"\'new services test\' on any unbundled
    functionalities that were not then in compliance.\" *Id.*

[^71]: ^?^ Complaint (Frontier) at Exhibit B.

[^72]: ^?^ *See id.*

[^73]: ^?^ *See Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    21,380, para. 22.

[^74]: ^?^ Letter to Michael Nighan, Manager-Regulatory, Allnet/Frontier
    from Paul V. Francischetti, Vice President-Legislative Planning &
    Re-Engineering, Bell Atlantic (June 30, 1997).

[^75]: ^?^ *See* Frontier Brief at 8.

[^76]: ^?^ *Id.* (citing *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,597-98,
    para. 113).

[^77]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 64.1310(e)(1), (2); *see also Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 20,598, paras. 113-14.

[^78]: ^?^ *See Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    21,380, para. 22.

[^79]: ^?^ *See id.*

[^80]: ^?^ *See supra* para. 19; *see also Order on Reconsideration*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 21,294, para. 132.

[^81]: ^?^ *See MCI Telecommunications Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
    Order*, 62 FCC 2d 703, 705-06 (1976) (stating that a customer may
    not withhold payment of properly billed tariffed charges for
    voluntarily ordered services).

[^82]: ^?^ *See supra* para. 19.

[^83]: ^?^ 47 C.F.R. § 1.722(b).

[^84]: ^?^ Motion to Strike at 1.

[^85]: ^?^ Reply to Motion to Strike at 1.

[^86]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. § 276.