##### **TRIAD 2025: THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE**

***John Cappello***

***Gwendolyn M. Hall***

***Stephen P. Lambert***

> *"It is always possible that as a consequence of focusing upon the
> shape of distant woods one may walk into a tree or two in the
> foreground."*[^1]

**Introduction: An Appeal for a New Logic**

The US nuclear force structure remains the product of a set of
circumstances that no longer exists. There is little disagreement
amongst government officials, scholars, and historians that the Cold War
is indeed over. The strategic confrontation between the US and the
former Soviet Union has been replaced by a relationship with Russia that
has emphasized strategic threat reduction and the desire to
concomitantly draw down strategic nuclear forces. What remains, however,
is in the words of former CIA director James Woolsey, "a jungle filled
with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes." The strategic landscape
between the US and the Russian Federation, while not openly adversarial,
seems mired in a position that neither side views as permanently
constructive to either country's national security aims. In addition,
the US is still struggling with the challenge of how to adapt its
nuclear postures to the "new" threats, not the least of which includes
an emerging Chinese nuclear challenge.

Some observers have suggested that it may be helpful to view the
landscape of the new millennium on two separate tiers. The first tier of
threats would include those countries capable of posing threats to the
very existence and sovereignty of the US, chiefly the Russian Federation
and China. While current strategic nuclear forces should be able to
deter these first-tier states, a second-tier response must be tailored
for smaller and more regional powers that have access to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).

As such, our previous work has concluded that while the concept of
deterrence is not in danger, it will not require the same number of
weapons or even the same weapons mix that was deemed necessary during
the Cold War. In fact, deterrence must continue to evolve, as
traditional deterrence by punishment may not be credible nor militarily
effective against the many second-tier threats armed with chemical or
biological weapons capabilities. In order to address these second-tier
threats, defenses will need to become an integral part of a new approach
to deterrence and its required force posture. Defenses can indeed be
vitally synergistic within a comprehensive deterrence and
counter-proliferation strategy. These conclusions from prior research
lead us toward this new effort, an attempt to produce an intellectual
framework for and create a new mix of offensive nuclear and defensive
forces that effectively suppress the capabilities of second-tier states
with smaller NBC forces, while preserving robust deterrence vis-à-vis
the primary tier-one states, the Russian Federation and China.

We seek to articulate a new deterrence and force posture vision for the
future within the context of a changing political climate. With the new
presidential administration, the political environment is primed for new
opportunities and rejuvenated leadership within the spheres of national
security and arms control. Presidential leadership is absolutely
necessary to move beyond the present paradigm. A new executive with a
broad vision for the future could initiate and supervise such an
undertaking and prevent the internal bureaucratic strangling of fresh
incentives in this area. A new intellectual framework on deterrence and
force posture must look to the future. It must include credible and
adaptive offensive nuclear forces, as well as robust and effective
defenses. In addition, there should be the flexibility and openness to
new arms reduction---with the underlying motive of preserving deterrence
and national security. In other words, not arms control for arms
control's sake, but arms control for national security's sake.
Undoubtedly, reductions will be the new reality in the long term---the
US must be able to meet these reductions and simultaneously provide
credible, robust deterrence.

In addition, a new strategic approach must consider the requirements for
extended deterrence. Traditionally, US leadership in this area has been
seen as a given, and as such has often been taken for granted. Future US
administrations must consider the long-term viability of US security
guarantees to key allies and states throughout the world. Changes to US
deterrence strategies and force mixes are likely to have significant
effects on both the actual nuclear forces stationed overseas, as well as
allied perceptions of the nature of US long-term intentions. *Extended*
*defenses* could play a significant role in allaying allied fears of US
withdrawal or future isolationism. A new strategy and force mix will not
be satisfactorily complete without a review of US extended deterrence
commitments and a look toward potential US extended *defenses*.

This research develops a framework that encompasses the intellectual
foundation, as well as the associated force structure for a deterrence
strategy that will meet first- and second-tier threats throughout the
new millennium. It begins by briefly examining the current strategic
logic that guides US deterrence strategy, to include the rationale for
the existing strategic force posture. It should be noted that this
strategy and force structure are the same that formed and supported US
policy throughout the Cold War period. Though it did so in order to
engage one primary threat, the Soviet Union, the US now faces a variety
of actors in the new threat environment. Thus, this research then looks
at the current, short- and long-term first- and second-tier threats to
US national security. One thing that will be obvious to the reader is
the absence of consensus on what these threats are and when they will
become critical threats requiring US attention politically and/or
militarily. Nonetheless, the new diversity of threats challenges the
current strategic logic to the point that a new strategic logic is
necessary for the new millennium.

This project then presents the new logic and suggests a force posture to
support that logic. Though some might consider this posture
revolutionary because it reconfigures the US Triad, in many ways it is
simply a required evolution given the evolving threat environment.
Because many will see the new offense/defense mix as a radical departure
from Cold War and post-Cold War logic, the project considers the likely
strategic and political realities that will need to be addressed. There
will be positive and negative reactions from various communities within
the US as well as from US allies, friends, and adversaries. The
immediate negative reaction will likely be based on arguments framed in
the very Cold War logic that we believe is out-dated at best, and
dangerous at its worst. Finally, in presenting this set of
recommendations about what the US should adopt as its strategic force
posture this paper discusses how to make the transition, recognizing
that dramatic movement from one strategic posture to another can be
dangerous. Our proposal suggests a series of unilateral initiatives and
multilateral measures (i.e., arms control and other cooperative
ventures) in order to make the transition from our current Cold War
posture to one more suitable for the new millennium.

######### The Old Logic

The current US strategic logic has not changed in the decade following
the end of the Cold War. Though the US and Russia are in the process of
significantly reducing their strategic arsenals, both sides are still
guided by Cold War conceptual thinking, which in turn, motivates their
current behavior in terms of declaratory policy, arms control
strategies, and weapons systems allocations. Generally speaking, this
logic holds that mutual vulnerability and mutually assured destruction
are required for stable deterrence. Additionally, an arms control treaty
that prevents the widespread development of strategic defensive systems
guarantees this state of affairs. Supporters of the ABM treaty, then and
now, believe that deterrence is best maintained in a world in which the
fear of nuclear devastation keeps a nuclear war from starting.
Therefore, ABM treaty supporters believe the likely response to defenses
is to increase one's offensive arsenal in an attempt to overwhelm the
defenses. This, they claim, would then inevitably lead to an arms race
(i.e., arms race instability), thus ultimately providing less security
with defenses than could be obtained previously without defenses.

The notion of holding each other hostage to nuclear holocaust---mutually
assured destruction---was maintained by deploying systems that were
large in number, technologically sophisticated, and widely deployed in
order to be lethal, versatile, flexible, and survivable. This was an
environment of *offense dominance,* and it required that both sides
maintain a perceived parity in weapons systems and capabilities in order
to preserve crisis and deterrence stability. Mutual vulnerability and
mutually assured destruction directly addressed the costs/benefits
calculation a state would need to engage in while contemplating the use
of nuclear force. The old logic is that you only need offensive systems
and the threat of nuclear retaliation to convince the opponent that
starting a nuclear war will result in sufficient devastation to make the
effort fruitless. This is deterrence by punishment. There were many
debates during the Cold War about the efficacy of deterrence by denial
(e.g., deploying defenses) and whether or not such a logic might produce
a similar outcome. However, due to different political and bureaucratic
constituencies, the lack of enabling technologies, and the prevalent
nuclear theology, defenses were never seriously considered nor pursued.

Much of the old logic about defenses was ensnared in a world dominated
by significant offensive numbers and the anticipated increase in those
numbers by one side as a likely response to deploying defenses by the
other side. There was much discussion about how many nuclear weapons
would be necessary to assure destruction, and though there were several
arms control initiatives to cap their numbers, the Cold War logic
required tens of thousands of warheads. As previously discussed, the ABM
treaty limited defenses particularly given a world of high numbers of
nuclear weapons and the fear that they would go higher still if defenses
were permitted.

The end of the Cold War inevitably produced a debate within the US
defense community about the roles of nuclear weapons as well as possible
drastic reductions in their numbers. While the debate at times seemed
lively and even eccentric, the Cold War nuclear theology prevailed. The
1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the Cold War logic as well
as its required nuclear force posture. The NPR essentially preserved the
US Triad and allowed for incremental reductions within the context of
the START agreements. In the years following the NPR, most US security
policy seemed focused on cooperative engagement efforts with erstwhile
Eastern Block opponents. These were the years of Nunn-Lugar, Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and NATO
Enlargement. Nuclear strategy, to a large extent, was relegated to a
back seat within US security policy. However, the emerging proliferation
threats and the spread of ballistic missile technology broke a lengthy
malaise in strategic thought and eventually forced a discussion about
national and theater missile defenses. What is noteworthy about both the
Cold War period and the current time is the lack of a debate about the
combination of defenses *plus* dramatically reduced numbers of nuclear
warheads. Neither debate---the debate about the consequences of low
numbers of nuclear warheads, or the debate about the consequences of
deploying national or theater defenses---addresses the consequences of a
strategic posture that has both reduced numbers of offensive warheads
*and* defensive systems.

To summarize, the Cold War logic embraces an environment of
vulnerability and punishment codified through arms control mechanisms
between two adversaries at strategic parity. This logic has not changed
since 1989, even though many elements of the strategic landscape have
dramatically changed. The present threat environment and the one likely
to emerge in the short- and long-term are very different. This requires
a new strategic logic. There are numerous nuclear states in a
competitive global engagement, and there are at least two nuclear states
capable of challenging US interests in terms of security at home and
abroad. Thus, there is no such thing as *mutual* vulnerability because
there is no longer a dominant, bipolar relationship in which each state
is simply vulnerable to the actions of the other. There are many
different potential relationships---the US and Russia, the US and China,
the US and North Korea, the US and Iraq, the US and India, the US and
Pakistan, etc, and mutual vulnerability and the old logic are no longer
sufficient. Yet the current Cold War logic and its associated nuclear
force posture and nuclear Triad leave the US with little flexibility to
respond to many of these diverse threat environments. Deterrence by
punishment alone clearly loses credibility not just in terms of
proportionality in some potential relationships, but also in terms of
crisis stability in others.

####### **The World as We See It**

Analysts and commentators concerned about existing and emerging threats
to US national security appear to be fairly consistent about what the US
should focus on in terms of strategic posture. Though there is some
disagreement about how "hot" the threats are and when some of them will
materialize, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and other "states of concern"
(also called "rogue" states, though the State Department prefers that we
now use the new term) join the more traditional Russian and Chinese
concerns.

Even traditional adversaries present some non-traditional concerns.
Though START-induced reductions for the US and Russia are lowering the
high numbers of nuclear weapons, the threat comes from the operational,
stockpile stewardship, and funding instabilities involving thousands of
operational and "dormant" warheads remaining in Russia. Moreover, though
not historically nor presently directly threatened by China's strategic
arsenal vis-à-vis the US mainland, the US is concerned about how China
might use its still limited nuclear forces to create a powerful sphere
of influence and coercion in the Far East. Additionally, no prudent
observer would disregard the long-term growth potential of the Chinese
arsenal should the Chinese government decide to buildup to higher
strategic thresholds.

The difficulties of threat assessment are further burdened by the
extremely diverse nature of the new global arrangement. One debate
indicative of the bureaucratic wrangling within the US government
involves the distinction between "possible" threats and "probable"
threats. This, of course, is the classic argument about responding to
simple capability versus responding to motivation plus capability.
Speculating about a country's intentions, Senator John Kerry argues that
the threat depends on the ability to build weapons and an "analysis of
the nature of the relationships with a country, the rationale for an
attack, the possibilities of an attack \[and\] the levels of
deterrence."[^2] Several intelligence officials have stated that in the
1999 National Intelligence Estimate "the rules of classic intelligence
analysis were altered from measuring what countries are *likely* to
threaten the US to whether they *could* threaten the US" which,
according to those who argue against evaluating pure threat
capabilities, led to the most alarming assessment possible.[^3]
Ironically, General Leonid Ivashov, head of a small Russian defense
ministry department, criticized the US for giving priority to
"technological ability of this state or another to build missiles ...
meanwhile, there is a complete absence of evaluation of the motivation"
for those states to use such missiles.[^4] Yet it was traditionally the
Russians who, as recently as the NATO Enlargement debates, scoffed at
NATO's "good intentions," and instead consistently pointed the finger at
NATO's military infrastructure and nuclear weapons capabilities. In
summary, we believe that this debate serves to highlight the present
conundrum in threat classification.

**Russia**

Though Russia is currently saber rattling in response to US missile
defense initiatives, it is likely to draw down its strategic nuclear
arsenal beyond the START II levels and it could do so unilaterally.[^5]
According to Alexi Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Russian Parliament's
Defense Committee, maintaining the Russian nuclear arsenal at START I
levels costs \$33B over 10 years, at START II levels \$26B over 10
years, and at START III levels the cost would be \$14B over 10
years.[^6] Even with lower numbers there is concern about Russia's
decaying network of early warning radars, satellites and computers that
might make it susceptible to false alerts.[^7] Of course there remain
innumerable issues involving Russian stockpile stewardship efforts.[^8]
The US is spending about \$2B on programs to "halt Russia's production
of plutonium, help dismantle Russia's older strategic weapons, and
improve security around Russia's disassembled pits."[^9]

**China**

There is legitimate concern about how China might respond to a US
strategic posture that includes defenses, but China's current arsenal is
still small and unsophisticated enough to not pose an immediate,
credible threat. Added to this is China's apparent priority of economic
modernization over military modernization. China's current long-range
strike force can be classified as a minimal deterrent force of aging
liquid-fueled missiles on a low state of alert with its fuel, warheads,
and missiles stored separately. As noted in a recent State Department
report, "the only Chinese missile system capable of targeting the
continental US is the CSS-4 ICBM\...\[though it is\] designing a new
generation of solid-fuel, road-mobile ICBMs that will greatly enhance
ICBM survivability."[^10] In addition, it tested the new long-range
DF-31 missile in August 1999, and a longer-range DF-41 is being
developed.[^11] The House of Representatives Cox Committee report notes
that China is capable of developing up to 1,000 ICBM warheads by 2015,
though a recent National Intelligence Estimate predicts a significantly
smaller number in the tens.[^12]

**Emerging Threats**

While there is some discussion about which emerging threats are more
immediate, thus deserving quicker attention, the US can ill afford to
wait until credible threats materialize before it thinks about what
deterrence requires in these cases. Some analysts cite theater ballistic
missile threats that have proliferated in the Middle East and South Asia
as being more significant than any direct threats to US territory. As
such, theater missile defense proponents feel these systems need higher
priority than national missile defense.[^13] Some cite the period from
2005-2010 as particularly vulnerable and troubling because it is in the
near-term. There is also concern about the threats to US forces abroad
and US allies situated in volatile regions of the world, though
Secretary of Defense William Cohen cited the year 2000 as the beginning
of the threat period.[^14] George Tenet, as DCI, told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that North Korea has the capability to test its
Taepo Dong-2 missile with little warning and that it might be capable of
delivering a nuclear payload to the US. He warned that North Korea is
not out of the nuclear business just because the Agreed Framework froze
its ability to produce additional plutonium. In his testimony, he added
that Iran could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to
the US in the next few years.[^15] Iran test fired its Shabab-3 missile
on July 15, 2000. It is a medium-range missile thought to be capable of
reaching Israel or US troops in Saudi Arabia. Given this range of
possibilities it is clear that a variety of US responses, and more
creative approaches, may be necessary in order to deter the use of force
against the US and its interests.

The US cannot afford to wait to see which of these threats emerge sooner
rather than later. It seems reasonable to the authors to acknowledge
that the emerging threat environment differs significantly enough from
the Cold War period that the Cold War logic no longer adequately
fulfills US national security objectives. Furthermore, this old logic
does not lead to strategic stability for other actors, and it is neither
sufficiently credible nor flexible. Whether the result of internal
bureaucratic debates, dubious intelligence assessments, or the
confounding complexities of the new global order, there is one clear
bottom line: The threat environment is very dynamic---sometimes
evolutionary yet other times revolutionary---and therefore requires a
new logic to corral its threats and challenges. A new threat-based logic
that takes advantage of new innovations and technologies will enhance
strategic stability for the US and its allies, and may also ensure clear
signaling and enhanced crisis stability for potential adversaries.

######### The New Logic: Moving from Vulnerability to Assurance

Thus far we have sought not to discredit deterrence, but perhaps to cast
it in a different light. Deterrence today remains a vitally necessary
strategy that contributes to the security and sovereignty of the United
States. However, while deterrence has always been a fundamental element
of US foreign and defense policy, nuclear weapons *do not* equal
deterrence. It is unfortunate that often times, nuclear weapons and
deterrence are terms that are used interchangeably. As one astute
observer has remarked, "children of the Cold War tend to view deterrence
synonymously with nuclear weapons. Whether described in terms of massive
retaliation, mutual assured destruction, or selective strike, nuclear
weapons hung like the sword of Damocles of the heads of friends and foes
alike."[^16] Rather, nuclear weapons play an essential role *within* a
credible deterrence strategy.

To be sure, as one DoD official recently remarked, "there is a continued
need for nuclear weapons in deterrence---they offer the threat of
unacceptable retaliation, the ultimate 'grand tour' counter-value
role."[^17] However, at the same time, the traditional rules of
bilateral conduct, the so-called carefully crafted mutual deterrent
relationships are being eclipsed by new strategic realities. As
previously discussed in this paper, the threat environment is
dramatically evolving. Today we live in a 360-degree arc of
vulnerability. Within this arc, the psychological abhorrence of nuclear
use may even be weakening. Indeed, as Dr. Rhinne, a senior scientist at
Sandia National Laboratories, has written, "a nation could undermine the
credibility of its nuclear deterrence by threatening punishment that
clearly is far in excess of the interests involved. How far can you
broaden the roles for nuclear weapons before the threat of their use
loses its utility and deterrence is devalued?"[^18]

The new strategic environment and its associated complexities should be
*prima facie* evidence that a new approach to deterrence is required.
Simply wielding the nuclear sword in a multi-polar world is not likely
to be seen as convincing or productive in the future. At the same time,
continued incrementalism in strategic nuclear force reductions is likely
to obfuscate the real security challenges at hand. Unfortunately, the
post-Cold War discussion regarding offensive nuclear forces is sparse
and burdened by old logic, while the debate about defenses---whether NMD
or TMD---is heavily laden with political agendas. Both areas are largely
considered in a vacuum, with no comprehensive strategy emerging from any
part of the US government.

**The Old Logic: Offense Dominant**

The old logic functioned in a bipolar, competitive environment. It was
based on holding populations hostage to nuclear holocaust; indeed, it
sought to achieve mutual vulnerability---Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD)---in order to discourage first-strike incentives and build
strategic stability. It was heavily offense dominated, with high numbers
of offensive nuclear forces, virtually no defenses, and through arms
control initiatives was supposed to ensure offensive parity, and
therefore, stability. It was based on year upon year of cautious and
highly scrutinized public statements that served as communiqués between
two sides that lived in constant mutual distrust. It was, as one retired
senior military officer described it, "two superpowers groping fearfully
in a fog of mutual misperception."[^19]

**The New Logic: Defense Included**

The new logic presented here is a departure from past norms and attempts
a fresh approach toward deterrence. Mutual vulnerability and assured
destruction have been eclipsed by new international strategic realities.
It is simply not credible nor practicable to threaten nuclear
retaliation against some of the lesser second-tier chemical or
biological, or even nuclear, threats. This is where defenses come into
play. The shift toward defenses in the new logic represents a pragmatic
change in both the proposed Triad force structure as well as overall
deterrence strategy. Where Cold-War deterrence strategy demanded a
massively punitive retaliatory capability, defenses permit a shift away
from punishment toward denial strategies. Defenses reduce the
challenger's ability to coerce, while also reducing the need for
pre-emptive action and increasing decision-making time during a crisis.
As Paul Nitze has written, "defenses are consistent with deterrence....
Deterrence requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the
risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to
achieve. Defenses can do this. Using defenses allows you to shift the
deterrence balance from the threat of nuclear retaliation to one that
focuses on defense."[^20]

We recognize that a move toward defenses is likely to be challenging
both domestically and in the international arena. *However, defenses
provide the US the leverage to move ahead with large, and previously
unconceivable, reductions in nuclear offensive forces.* As defenses come
online, increasing US assurances and first strike survivability, the US
can afford to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal. [Gradually, the new
logic shifts deterrence strategy away from mutual vulnerability and high
numbers of offensive nuclear weapons toward a strategy based on
protection and assurance, and much lower numbers of nuclear
weapons]{.underline}.

+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ##### [Old Logic]{.underline}    | ##### [New Logic]{.underline}     |
|                                  |                                   |
| #### **Mutual Vulnerability**    | ###### Protection & Assurance     |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ### Bi-Polar                     | # **Co                            |
|  Competitive Deterrence Strategy | mprehensive Deterrence Strategy** |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ### Mutual Vulnerability / MAD   | ### Protection and Assurance      |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ## **Deterrence by Punishment**  | ## **                             |
|                                  | Deterrence by Denial/Punishment** |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ## **Offense Dominant**          | ## **Offense/Defense Mix**        |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ## **Offensive Parity**          | ## **Strategic Assurance**        |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ## **                            | ##                                |
| High Number of Nuclear Weapons** | **Low Number of Nuclear Weapons** |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| ## **No Defenses**               | ## **Defenses**                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **Strategic Stability**          | ### Enhanced Strategic Stability  |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

Table 1: The Old Logic vs. the New Logic

**The New Logic: Protection & Assurance**

As depicted in Table 1, under the new logic, mutual vulnerability and
MAD evolve toward a strategy focused on *protection* and *assurance*.
Triad 2025 affords *protection* for US territory, population, and
forces, and potentially and incrementally over time, protection of US
allies abroad. It also offers *assurance* to other states in that (1)
the US will not need to broaden or stretch its nuclear declaratory
policy to the point that it is no longer credible vis-à-vis lower
second-tier type threats---thereby preserving overall deterrence
credibility; and (2) the US will not be forced to preempt in a potential
conflict with tier-one level threats because its remaining nuclear
forces are more secure from an enemy first strike---thereby enhancing
crisis stability. Deterrence moves away from a purely punitive
philosophy toward both denial and punishment strategies---denial in a
conflict with second tier threats and punishment in a challenge from a
tier-one level threat. Instead of an offense dominated force posture,
the new logic moves toward an offense/defense mix, with potential for a
defense-dominant posture in the future. Instead of maneuvering for
strategic parity, the US can set an international example and move
toward strategic assurance, signaling to other states that it feels
sufficiently secure to reduce its overall nuclear arsenal, thereby
setting a trend away from nuclear escalation. Overall, the authors argue
that this new shift in deterrence strategy will serve to enhance
strategic stability. The evolution of deterrence strategy away *from
mutual vulnerability* toward *protection and assurance* may, over time,
begin to de-escalate the historical search for stability based on higher
numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead of discussing nuclear strategy in
terms of vulnerabilities and strategic parity, the debate can move
toward confidence building and strategic assurances.

####### 

**The New Triad: Triad 2025**

The authors argue that with defenses, the United States can afford to
retire the oldest and most de-stabilizing leg of the US Triad, the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Traditionally seen as a target
sponge, and ham-strung with a "use-or-lose" mentality, the US will be
able to credibly posture the other offensive elements of its deterrent
posture without ICBMs. As depicted in Figure 1, instead of a Triad with
three offensive nuclear legs, the Triad 2025 becomes a
"defense-included" posture, with defenses, SSBNs, and bombers. Defenses
therefore take the place of offensive nuclear weapons, specifically the
ICBM leg of the old Triad. This allows the United States to seize the
international high ground and eliminate an entire class of nuclear
weapons. The restructuring of the traditional US Triad will be seen as
radical by some observers. However, we believe that a shift away from a
purely offense dominant posture will likely lead to increased stability
and security for the United States in the long run.

**SLBM Leg**

Triad 2025 will retain the nation's premier offensive nuclear leg, the
SSBN force. Most DoD officials agree that SSBNs provide unmatched
survivability, concealability, destructive power, and solid C3
links.[^21] Not only do SLBMs have a hard-target kill capability, are
survivable, and very responsive, but they are also programmed through at
least 2040 with the D-5 going through a planned life-cycle
extension.[^22] Triad 2025 envisions a fleet of 12 Ohio-class submarines
with 24 missile tubes a piece with each D-5 carrying four MIRVs, for a
grand total of 1152 warheads on SSBNs. This mixture should allow the US
Navy enough flexibility to commit eight submarines to sea at any point
while leaving one third of the fleet available for refurbishment or
maintenance operations. The remaining Ohio submarines could be converted
to conventional roles or dismantled all together. In a conventional
role, the converted Tridents would, according to Ronald O'Rourke, a
specialist in national defense for the nonpartisan Congressional
Research Service, "be able to provide a large volume (greater than 100)
of precision land attack missiles and sustained support for large groups
of special operations forces."[^23]

**Bomber Leg**

The most controversial change to the present Triad involves eliminating
ICBMs and replacing them with a defense-oriented leg. To many seasoned
observers, the elimination of the ICBM leg of the present Triad will
seem extreme. Few knowledgeable observers would disagree with the
assertion that the ICBMs are the most vulnerable leg of the present
Triad. Traditionally seen as a target sponge, the ICBMs stand today as
aging giants, the relics of the Cold War nuclear confrontation between
the United States and the USSR. In the event of an actual nuclear
exchange, they will be the first to be targeted because they are fixed,
land-based weapons. Nevertheless, some suggest that eliminating bombers
might be more appropriate. This, of course, would result in two
ballistic missile legs, and fails to address the tangible strategic
options that a bomber leg can preserve. In terms of crisis stability,
bombers serve as a valuable signaling device that can powerfully
communicate a nation's intent in response to severe challenges to the
highest national interest. Others add that a bomber leg can provide
decision makers with a tool that adds to crisis stability---i.e. the
ability to be mobilized and deployed in a crisis (signaling) but having
characteristics that permit the weapon system to be recalled should the
crisis be defused. Both ballistic missile platforms lack this advantage.

Officials throughout the US national security infrastructure interviewed
by the authors, from the Department of Defense to the State Department
and the National Security Council, seem to agree that as long as
international trend lines continue, it is quite conceivable to opt out
of the ICBM leg of the Triad. *In fact, if the number of warheads is
reduced to the 1,000-1,500 threshold, most officials agree that this
will by necessity drive the US to eliminate one offensive leg of the
current Triad*. [The authors of this paper maintain that a shift toward
a new defense-included logic, in conjunction with the elimination of the
ICBM-leg of the Triad, and a concomitant reduction in numbers to the
1,000-1,500 level, will initiate a shift away from mutual vulnerability
and move security strategies toward an emphasis on protection and
assurance]{.underline}. The elimination of the ICBM leg of the Triad
would be a powerful signal to the rest of the world, showing US
intentions to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and to move away from
the residual Cold War nuclear theology that still is prevalent here and
abroad. It would represent a fundamental opportunity to begin to shift
toward a defense-included and someday, defense dominant deterrence
strategy.

Therefore, the second offensive nuclear leg of Triad 2025 is the bomber
fleet. Under the terms of this recommendation, the United States would
retain 20 B-52s and 20 B-2s with an eight-weapon loadout per bomber, for
a grand total of 320 warheads. The B-52 is presently configured to carry
12 external and eight internal Air Launched Cruise Missiles. Triad 2025
would cap all external weapons stores on the 20 nuclear B-52s and
confine them to eight internal hard points for the ALCMs. The B-52 fleet
would be split, allowing the USAF to declare all remaining 55 B-52s as
conventional carriers only, similar to the current configuration of the
B-1 fleet. This would, in effect, free up the majority of the B-52s for
badly needed conventional missions, as tasked in the Air Force 1999
bomber roadmap.[^24] The B-2 fleet would retain its dual role
capability, with each B-2 restricted to an eight nuclear weapon loadout.

**Defenses**

The third leg of Triad 2025 is a multi-layered set of defenses. Defenses
have been discussed and argued over within US defense policy ever since
President Ronald Reagan made his now famous "Star Wars" proposals.
Defenses since then have been bogged down by political agendas and held
hostage by scientific pessimism. The quest to build missile defenses,
dating back to the late 1960s, "seemed beyond the limits of existing
technology. Today, new technologies hold out the promise of providing
effective defenses, especially against limited attacks. Technological
improvements have vastly enhanced strategic defensive
capabilities."[^25] Triad 2025 is unique in that it is the first
proposal to attempt to combine the current, but isolated, discussions
involving arms reductions and defenses of all kind. Neither nuclear
strategy/arms control and defenses should be considered in a vacuum---in
fact, further strategic arms reductions can pave the way for defenses
within the Triad. The defensive leg of Triad 2025 will not exclusively
consist of national or theater systems. It should immediately
incorporate a robust TMD component and, over time, involve elements of a
limited NMD system as it becomes technologically sound and fiscally
feasible. The defensive leg of Triad 2025 should also include a role for
civil defense, an area that the United States has historically
neglected. A formal civil defense response force to deal with limited
NBC strikes against US soil needs to be developed.

Recent scholarship regarding a potential US deployment of defenses, to
include a limited NMD system, points out that such a deployment appears
unlikely to produce a shock capable of upsetting the tenor of
international relations or leading to renewed arms racing.[^26] Bruce
Blair, traditionally a skeptic with regard to defenses, offers a way to
evolve toward a defense-included Triad when he writes that, "A promising
formula for striking a stable balance between offense and defense is to
cut deeply the size of the US and Russian missile arsenals and to take
silo-busting US strategic weapons off high alert. By de-alerting most or
all of the current 2,500 US weapons on high alert, a US national missile
defense would appear far less threatening to a Russian planner."[^27]
The authors of this paper advocate moving beyond de-alerting land-based
ICBMs to eliminating them all together. There remain those skeptics who
question whether or not a force posture without ICBMs and with
1,000-1,500 weapons will actually be sufficient to preserve the
deterrence equation. It should be noted that most of the warhead number
requirements are driven not by Pentagon planners, but by executive-level
Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that dictate US nuclear
targeting requirements. If the PDDs are adjusted, then Pentagon planners
can also develop their targeting strategies with fewer warheads. Indeed,
"there is no serious argument for nuclear strikes involving thousands of
warheads." Planners who continue to hold forth these theories of mutual
vulnerability have allowed themselves to subscribe to a nuclear theology
that gains its support from bureaucratic momentum rather than sound
political-military analysis."[^28]

We argue that a nuclear weapons inventory of 1000-1500 operational
warheads, combined with the elimination of the ICBMs, and the inclusion
of defenses, will not only preserve deterrence, but also (1) initiate a
major shift away from mutual vulnerability toward *protection and
assurance*, (2) include a vitally necessary and synergistic defensive
leg of the Triad, and (3) "represent a truly major initiative instead of
the increasingly atavistic incrementalism currently contemplated for a
START III accord." [^29] In the event that deterrence fails, the US
will, above and beyond the effect of defenses, "maintain the
capabilities for precision delivery, hard target destruction, and
sufficient numbers of weapons in survivable deployments to 'ride-out' a
first strike and retaliate against a major nuclear weapon state."[^30]
In addition, the US should finally be able to stop a limited NBC strike
from a tier-two threat with Triad 2025 due to the new defensive leg.

####### **Triad 2025: Likely Challenges and Responses**

In responding to existing and emerging threats to US national security
and interests abroad, Triad 2025 presents a specific proposal applying
new logic to the new national security environment in which we now
operate. The Triad 2025 concept as previously discussed is presented in
military and strategic terms. But there are some very important
political considerations and implications associated with eliminating
ICBMs, drastically lowering numbers of offensive nuclear weapons, and
incorporating defenses into the traditional Triad concept. Most of the
concerns about eliminating ICBMs and reducing offensive numbers will
come from within the US, specifically from the military and the
Congress. On the other hand, most of the concerns about adding defenses
as the third leg of the Triad are likely to come from outside the US,
and more specifically from NATO allies, Russia and China. The final
segment of this paper will look at four primary challenges vis-à-vis
Triad 2025: (1) the concept of eliminating ICBMs; (2) deep reductions in
nuclear warheads; (3) the inclusion of defenses in the Triad; and (4)
how to get to Triad 2025.

**Eliminating ICBMs**

Opposition to removing one leg of the Triad stems, in large part, from
the classic arguments concerning redundancy. Losing certain
characteristics of the ICBM, particularly its lethality and accuracy,
will cause legitimate concern among many. In previous writings, the
authors acknowledge that the excellent CEP and 24-hour alert status of
the ICBM provide for an impressive accuracy and timeliness.[^31]
Supporters will also likely cite the relative inexpensive cost of this
leg of the Triad. "Silo-based systems are unequivocally the most
reliable and least expensive strategic systems to operate and
maintain."[^32] However, the improved accuracy of the SLBM along with
its mobility and survivability more then make up for the loss of the
ICBM, particularly in the context of the new Triad. Indeed, even during
the Cold War, Mr. Donald Hicks, the former Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering in the mid 1980s, suggested that "the
survivability of our bombers and submarine forces is sufficient to cause
any Soviet planner pause."[^33] There seems to be little doubt
throughout the prevailing scholarship that the ICBM leg of the Triad is
the most vulnerable. We argue that its elimination arguably would
increase crisis stability. "Most of all, the high accuracy of MIRVs
highlights the vulnerability of land-based missiles. This problem has
probably been studied more intensely over a longer period than any other
issue\.... \[S\]uccessive administrations since that of President Nixon
have grappled with the problem of fixed-site missile
vulnerability."[^34] Finally, there may be residual concern over giving
up a capability that the Russians, Chinese and other emerging threats
maintain. But these emerging threats will have a limited capability with
only one leg, while the Russian capabilities continue to degrade and the
Chinese heretofore have extremely limited options at their disposal.

## **Deep Reductions in Nuclear Warheads**

## In a *Washington Times* article of 24 March 1997, General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor under President George Bush, and Arnold Kanter, former Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy and Arms Control in the Bush Administration, state that as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits. They suggest it is important to continue to focus on arms control measures, which directly and demonstrably enhance stability and reduce the risks of war. Most importantly, Scowcroft states that the burden to show how reductions would serve to enhance US security falls on those who advocate such reductions.[^35] This is the charge to which the authors now turn.

According to a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"The chiefs are
concerned about arms reductions that reduce the flexibility in strategic
deterrence and put at risk maintaining all three legs of the
Triad.\"[^36] It is argued that reducing the levels of strategic weapons
below 2,500 will do just that, seriously calling into question the
viability of the current Triad. The bottom line, according to most
experts, is that "it will require difficult decisions. Once you get
below 2,500, the decisions start to become very painful.\"[^37] As
another official put it, \"as you get to 2,000, it really starts to
squeeze the Triad.\"[^38] The prevailing opinion seems to lean toward
not changing \"the comfort level we have come to enjoy\" at present
levels. The idea of \"putting all our eggs in one basket\" is of great
concern as well. This suggests, of course, that reductions below 2,000
weapons may result in a DIAD, if the cuts are not spread evenly across
all three legs of the Triad. As some officials recently put it,
\"Unknowns call for balance.... \[W\]e can not allow catastrophic
failure in one leg of Triad to limit our response capability.\"[^39]

These concerns are certainly legitimate in the context of the old
thinking and the present Triad structure. They are particularly relevant
when talking only in terms of offensive systems. As previously noted in
this paper, the prevailing debates regarding nuclear strategy and
defenses have been conducted in a vacuum, driven primarily by Cold War
logic. As General Goodpastor puts it, "when we look at 1,500 weapons we
are forced to rethink many of our commonly held beliefs concerning
nuclear weapons. Targeting, force structure and the nuclear complex all
need to be adjusted as the numbers of nuclear weapons decline."[^40]
Triad 2025 goes beyond the old discussion of reduced numbers in
isolation from defensive systems. The authors do not advocate reducing
numbers in isolation, but rather reducing numbers while at the same time
supplementing them with defenses.

But what of the argument that the present target sets cannot be covered
at levels below 2,500 strategic weapons? Again, using the old logic
perhaps this argument holds some weight. The strategic war plan, known
as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), \"consists of a very
long and redundant list of targets in Russia and a shorter list of
targets in China that the Pentagon planners say the US needs to be able
to destroy in order to meet the latest presidential guidance on nuclear
war planning (PDD 60, issued in November 1997).\"[^41] The Joint Chiefs
are looking at 2,500 weapons in terms of the present START framework. In
light of what China has and will realistically have, and the Russian
economic situation, the leading opposition to numbers below 2,500 seems
to be the argument that they are insufficient to meet the target set
guidance directed by PDD 60. However, as previously stated, with a
change in the PDDs, Pentagon planners can make realistic adjustments to
their target strategies. There seems little doubt that 1,000-1,500
nuclear weapons allow both the United States and Russia to securely hold
at risk any potential adversary. The prospect of over a thousand nuclear
detonations---indeed even hundreds or tens---on a nation's territory
presents visions of horrendous damage and loss of life far beyond
anything imaginable today.

A final argument in support of deep reductions of nuclear weapons
involves the calculus of the historical "numbers games." Though using
the Cold War logic that drove previous arms control requirements would
suggest the need for parity in terms of offensive forces remaining,
Triad 2025's offense/defense mix suggests that parity, at least in the
traditional sense, is *not* necessary. One thousand to fifteen hundred
offensive strategic weapons, along with an array of defensive systems,
would equal some higher number of the adversary's potential nuclear
forces. For example, 1,500 warheads plus defenses may very well be equal
to 2,500-3,000 for the other side. This would suggest the need for a
philosophy that looks at the package of offensive and defensive forces
on one side and compares it to what the adversary is holding (be it all
offense or an offense/defense mix).[^42]

**A Defensive Leg in Triad 2025**

Bob Drogin and Tyler Marshall present an excellent summary of the
typical and numerous international concerns with US efforts aimed at
developing missile defenses in their *LA Times* article of 19 May 2000,
entitled "Missile Shield Warns of Arms Buildup." These include, but are
not limited to (1) strained relations with allies concerned with the US
lack of consultation; (2) a potential arms race between China, India and
Pakistan, should China buildup or install MIRVs in response to US
missile defenses; (3) the potential to undermine arms control and
nonproliferation regimes; and (4) the proliferation of missile
technology, primarily to the Middle East, as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
North Korea all seek countermeasures to defeat missile defense. These
concerns tend to form the foundation of foreign opposition to US missile
defense. European Ministers and diplomats continue to voice opposition
to the US agenda to build a ballistic missile defense system. From the
Belgian Foreign Minister's concern that NMD would weigh heavily on
alliance and trans-Atlantic solidarity and potentially have a decoupling
effect, to the French concern of NMD undermining nuclear deterrence and
unraveling arms control, NATO allies have been vocal in opposition to US
unilateral action in this arena.[^43] "Suddenly, Europe recognizes that
America by protecting itself, has perhaps unwittingly made its allies
more vulnerable\.... \[N\]ow they are being faced with a situation in
which America might be reluctant to utilize its ultimate weapons because
of its own reduced vulnerability." [^44]

Notwithstanding, there are signs that the response to US defenses may be
less dramatic than previously thought. French Defense Minister Alain
Richard suggested some subtle movement on missile defense when he
stated, "We don't want to be absolutist or dogmatic. We want a pragmatic
discussion. It may be right to go further with test and development, but
we need much more information and consultation within NATO before any
realistic decision about deployment can be made\.... We don't know yet
how to evaluate the side effects of missile defenses."[^45] The Russians
suggest even further movement when President Putin stated that "our
cooperation could take the form of building a non-strategic missile
defense system, reliably covering all of Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals."[^46] Overall, most Europeans tend to view major technical
developments in political rather than military or strategic terms.[^47]
Triad 2025 allows the US to address both NATO's and Russia's concerns in
a politically acceptable manner. Triad 2025's defensive leg begins with
TMD and progresses toward NMD in concert with the elimination of an
entire class of offensive nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the
defensive elements of Triad 2025 are concentrated primarily against
limited strikes from tier-two level threats, and are not postured at
protecting the US from an overwhelming tier-one threat. The structure of
Triad 2025 preserves first-tier (i.e., Russia/China) deterrence with the
two remaining offensive legs. Both the NATO allies and Russia will also
be assuaged, as deeper consultation and a focus toward *assurance and
protection* are integral to Triad 2025 implementation.

On the other hand, Chinese concerns seem far more complicated. Chinese
suggestions abound that US deployments of missile defense systems will
lead to an arms race. Sha Sukang, China's chief arms negotiator, stated
that it is hard to believe US claims that NMD is intended to counter
threats from rogue states as it would destroy China's ability to deter
nuclear attack by neutralizing its relatively small force of nuclear
weapons.[^48] Triad 2025 deals with the China concern in a
straightforward manner. It allows for potential US requirements to
deploy defenses (TMD) to global locations to protect and ensure US
interests in light of clearly emerging threats. It allows for flexible
TMD deployment to address these threats. Any potential TMD deployment
poses little threat to Chinese ballistic missile capabilities. Likewise,
any future deployment of a limited NMD system will not necessarily be
designed to prevent an all-out Chinese strike. The two offensive nuclear
legs of Triad 2025 will bolster the traditional deterrent relationship
vis-à-vis any tier-one threat (like Russia, and potentially China in the
future).

Finally, the ABM Treaty may also be a stumbling block to Triad 2025
implementation. However, this potential problem can be addressed by
starting with TMD in cooperation or concert with Russia (and possibly
even China at some point). As previously mentioned, there are
indications that Russia could be amenable to this type of approach.
After initial cooperative ventures in the TMD field, it may be possible
to move towards NMD in a way that is more acceptable to the Russians.
But even if NMD (or TMD for that matter) proves to be unacceptable to
the Russians, the US still needs to proceed with
implementation---national security interests demand that the US address
the evolving threat environment. This would undoubtedly require serious
and ongoing diplomatic and political initiatives, and these types of
measures would also be required in managing the transition period from
US offense dominance to a US offense/defense mix.

## **Conclusion: A Plan for Implementation**

The importance of presidential leadership and vision in light of the
malaise and stagnation in nuclear strategy and arms control since the
end of the Cold War cannot be overstated.[^49] The first step must be to
make a commitment to thoughtfully re-examine nuclear weapons strategy.
Executive leadership and vision are essential if such an effort is to
succeed. Since the end of the Cold War no fewer than four reviews have
been accomplished on US nuclear strategy.[^50] Senior leaders have been
reluctant to engage the issues directly or to provide leadership to
guide the outcome of these deliberations.[^51] The currently proposed
START III limits of between 2,000-2,500 weapons should be re-examined.
It is time to move beyond the incrementalism of the START accords. The
1,000-1,500 number advocated by Triad 2025 can be reached in one of two
ways. The Russians may seek to achieve a codified arms control agreement
with the end result of a 1,000-1,500 warhead limit, given their apparent
inability to maintain their strategic stockpile at START II levels. One
proposal has recently circulated in Moscow that would forgo START III
and the ABM treaties \"in favor of a newly negotiated agreement that
would place all strategic offensive and defensive forces under a low,
single aggregate ceiling. Under such an agreement, each side would have
the freedom to mix its preferred number of offensive and defensive
systems.\"[^52] However, the United States should not be constrained by
Russian stockpile requirements. *The authors prefer a bold, unilateral
approach by the US President. In the context of previous Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), the president should move forward
unilaterally to remove ICBMs from the US arsenal while concurrently
establishing a defensive leg in the new Triad. In this manner, the US
can not only seize the international momentum, but can also set into
motion a new strategic vision moving away from mutual vulnerability and
high numbers of offensive weapons, toward a philosophy based on
protection and assurance, defense inclusion, and much lower numbers of
warheads.*

Both the United States and Russia need a far more comprehensive vision
to articulate common objectives than is currently possible with a
fixation on negotiated force reductions.[^53] This vision is
incorporated in Triad 2025 and moves away from the Cold War nuclear
theology toward a new approach to security.

To conclude, the essence of our proposal---the shift away from a
strategic vision driven by vulnerability toward a fresh approach
grounded in protection and assurance---yields three core suggestions:
(1) incorporate defenses into the Triad; (2) eliminate the ICBM force;
and (3) reduce offensive strategic nuclear weapon numbers to
the1,000-1,500 level. After laying out, in detail, a comprehensive
vision for moving beyond the Cold War paradigm, we would like to offer
some thoughts on implementing this shift.

**[Incorporate defenses into the Triad]{.underline}.** The authors
suggest a two-phase implementation plan. During phase one, introduce a
robust TMD capability. This proposal recommends the immediate
development of comprehensive TMD systems, at which time ICBMs can be
eliminated. It is essential to note that deployment of TMD systems will
be based on emerging threats to US national security and interests, and
threats to those interests. While Chinese and other countries' concerns
are recognized and addressed, the primary focus of missile defense is to
further US national security. Phase two would involve the deployment of
a limited NMD system, designed primarily to counter tier-two type
threats. Thus, as an entire class of nuclear weapons is eliminated,
defenses are brought online to replace those weapons and to shift the
strategic focus toward a defense-included, and perhaps someday,
defense-dominated posture.

**[Eliminate ICBMs]{.underline}.** The difficulty of an arms control
agreement to achieve this is obvious; Triad 2025 does not advocate
symmetrical reductions in numbers or types of weapon systems. A
unilateral decision by the United States to pursue the Triad 2025 force
structure will make it easier to implement and will provide the much
needed leadership and vision missing in United States strategic nuclear
and arms control policy today. Who could continue to argue that the
United States is not serious about arms reductions and
non-proliferation?

**[Reduce offensive strategic nuclear weapon numbers to
1,000-1,500]{.underline}.** This can be accomplished primarily in two
ways---bilaterally through arms control with the Russians, or
unilaterally. Again the complexity of accomplishing this through arms
control is obvious, particularly under potential START III counting
rules. Updated and revised counting rules need to be negotiated if START
III is to play a role in Triad 2025. A unilateral PNI would be
sufficient to drive the strategy that would allow reductions to the
1,000-1,500 range.

Finally, the authors acknowledge that to some this proposal will seem
dramatic and revolutionary, while some may more readily agree with the
evolutionary and security-centered thrust of our ideas. As previously
discussed, there have been numerous attempts to re-invigorate a
grand-scale national security discussion regarding the efficacy, and
indeed perceived necessity, of nuclear weapons and their associated
strategic and doctrinal landscape. In fact, as recently as October 1998,
the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence
sought to outline and capture the key ideas and arguments involving the
purpose, size, configuration, and sustainment of the US nuclear arsenal.
Specifically in regard to the ICBM force, the panel found that
single-warhead missiles retain increasing value with overall declining
nuclear stockpile numbers. The task force concluded that the value of
the ICBM leg of the current Triad "increases the most with declining
\[nuclear\] forces. As the total numbers on both sides moves the
situation from warhead rich to target rich, the single warhead
silo-based ICBM becomes more stabilizing. It requires more than a 1:1
ratio for the attacker to attrit this force and that changes the
correlation of forces against the attacker without commensurate impact
on the broader target set. Further, the significant numbers of ICBMs
denies any adversary the benefit of a limited attack."[^54]

While this may be true within the context of the Old Logic and in an
environment without defenses, the authors contend that the new strategic
vision advocated in this proposal answers the targeting, force ratio,
and correlation of forces concerns expressed in the Defense Science
Board document, as well as other post-Cold War strategy reviews. It does
so principally by combining force reductions with the inclusion of
defensive systems. We stand today at the threshold of a new strategic
landscape. While some pessimists hold that the "window of opportunity"
has closed, we believe that with executive vision and leadership, the
United States can indeed begin to create a world environment that
de-emphasizes 50 years of nuclear vulnerability and instead articulates
a strategy of protection and assurance---for the United States, its
allies, and even its potential first-tier challengers. Deterrence by
punishment, strategic signaling, and the ability to inflict unacceptable
damage will be robustly preserved by the offensive nuclear legs of Triad
2025. However, under Triad 2025, defenses and deterrence by
denial---specifically, the ability to prevent tier-two threats from
pressuring the United States with force assymmetries---will contribute
real and tangible security benefits to the nation.

In the end, this proposal has attempted to produce an intellectual
framework for, and create a new mix of offensive nuclear and defensive
forces that effectively suppress the capabilities of second-tier states
with smaller NBC forces, while preserving robust deterrence vis-à-vis
the primary tier-one states, the Russian Federation and China. It calls
for an evolution of deterrence strategy away from mutual vulnerability
toward protection and assurance. The authors contend that, over time, it
will begin to de-escalate the historical search for security based on
higher numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead of discussing nuclear
strategy in terms of vulnerabilities and strategic parity, the debate
can embrace confidence building and strategic assurances.

[^1]: Colin S. Gray, "A Case for Strategic Defense," in P. Edward Haley
    and Jack Merritt, Eds. *Strategic Defense Initiative, Folly or
    Future*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

[^2]: Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, "US Study Reopens Division
    Over Nuclear Missile Threat," *New York Times*, 5 July 2000, 1.

[^3]: Sciolino and Myers, ibid.

[^4]: David Hoffman, "Russian Generals Diverge from Putin-Clinton Stance
    on Missile Threat," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*,
    30 June 2000, 27.

[^5]: Walter Pincus, "Pardon our Nuclear Dust," *Washington Post
    Weekly*, 3 April 2000, 31.

[^6]: Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Feels Pressure to Cut Out More Warheads,"
    *New York Times,* 11 May 2000,
    ebird.dtic.mil/May2000/e20000511pentagon.htm.

[^7]: William J. Broad, "US-Russian Talks Revive Old Debates on Nuclear
    Warnings," *New York Times*, 1 May 2000, A8.

[^8]: Gwendolyn M. Hall, Stephen P. Lambert, and John T. Cappello, *A
    Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model*, (USAFA, CO: INSS, 1999), 41.

[^9]: Walter Pincus, "Arsenal Cuts Don't Cover US's 12,000 Nuclear
    Triggers," *Washington Post*, 16 Apr 2000, 6.

[^10]: Annual Report on Military Power of People's Republic of China,
    Report to Congress, 2000, US Department of State, 17.

[^11]: Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto,
    "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No
    4 (July/August 2000): 56.

[^12]: Ibid., 10.

[^13]: John Deutch, Harold Brown, John P. White, "National Missile
    Defense: Is There Another Way?" *Foreign Policy* (Summer 2000): 91.

[^14]: Sciolino and Myers, ibid.

[^15]: Statement by George J. Tenet, DCI, before the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee, 21 March 2000.

[^16]: Robert Rhinne, "Deterrence and the Nuclear Weapons Complex,"
    Draft for Comment, Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA,
    April 18, 2000, 1.

[^17]: Jonathan D. Fox, esq, interview with the author, Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency, Dulles, VA, April 26, 2000.

[^18]: Rinne, op. cit., 3.

[^19]: Gen. Lee Butler, cited in "Nuclear Arms Deterrence may be Dying
    Idea," by David Wood*, New Orleans Times-Picaqune*, August 6, 2000.

[^20]: Paul H. Hitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace," in P Edward
    Haley and Jack Merritt, eds. *The Strategic Defense Initiative,
    Folly or Future?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 39.

[^21]: Col. Kurt Klingenberger, interview with the authors, Washington
    D. C., 1 May 2000.

[^22]: Mr. Frank Dellerman, et al, interview with the authors,
    Washington D. C., 26 April 2000.

[^23]: Ronald O'Rourke, cited in "United States Faces Tough Choices On
    Road to Start III Force Levels*," Inside the Air Force*, July 7,
    2000, 2.

[^24]: Ibid, 2. Note: The previous discussion was formulated, in part,
    based on data provided in this article.

[^25]: Dennis Ward, "The Changing Political-Military Environment," in
    James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Eds. *National Missile Defense
    and Strategic Stability: Consequences for the ABM Treaty*,"
    Executive Summary, 2000.

[^26]: Richard Harknett, "The Changing Political-Military Environment,"
    in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Eds. *National Missile
    Defense and Strategic Stability: Consequences for the ABM Treaty*,"
    Executive Summary, 2000.

[^27]: Bruce Blair, "Some Sensible Options for US Missile Defense,"
    *Moscow Times*, 3 June 2000, 5.

[^28]: Janne Nolan and Michael O'Hanlon, "Reducing Nuclear Arms in the
    Next Administration*," National Security Studies Quarterly* (Summer
    2000): 94.

[^29]: Ibid, 100.

[^30]: Rinne, 7.

[^31]: Hall, Cappello, and Lambert, op. cit., 12.

[^32]: General (Ret.) Russell Dougherty (former CINCSAC), "The Value of
    ICBM Modernization." *International* *Security*, Vol. 12, No. 2
    (Fall 1987): 165.

[^33]: Donald Hicks, "ICBM Modernization," *International Security,*
    Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987): 175.

[^34]: Michael Nacht, *The Age of Vulnerability* (Washington DC: The
    Brookings Institution, 1985), 68.

[^35]: Point reiterated by General Scowcroft in interview with author,
    \"If you keep reducing numbers, at some point you reach a level of
    great instability. Why search for that level.\" Interview conducted
    25 August 2000.

[^36]: Eric Schmitt, \"Pentagon Feels Pressure to Cut Out More
    Warheads,\" *New York Times,* 11 May 2000,
    ebird.dtic.mil/May2000/e20000511pentagon.htm.

[^37]: Adam J. Hebert, \"United States Faces Tough Choices on Road to
    START III Force Levels,\" *Inside the Air Force*, 7 July 2000, 1.

[^38]: Ibid.

[^39]: Interviews conducted by author at Air Staff, Pentagon, during
    August 2000.

[^40]: Interview conducted by author with General Andrew J. Goodpastor,
    22 August 2000.

[^41]: Dr. Bruce Blair, \"START III, Nuclear War Plans and the Cold War
    Mindset,\" Center for Defense Information, 5 June 2000,
    <http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue5/Start.html>.

[^42]: Some have previously suggested a possible "freedom to mix"
    arrangement where a total number of systems would be permitted and
    each side could accumulate any combination of offensive warheads and
    interceptors to match the total number of systems allowed.

[^43]: Luke Hill, "Europeans Cite Pressure on Allied Unity," *Defense
    News*, 5 June 00, 12.

[^44]: Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman, "Divisive Missile Defense,"
    *Defense News*, 31 January 00, 15.

[^45]: Jim Hoagland, "Missile Defense Uncorked," *Washington Post
    Weekly*, 6 March 00, 5.

[^46]: Reuters News Agency, "Envoys Meet Over Missile Defense,"
    *Washington Times*, 19 June 00, 6.

[^47]: See Christoph Bertram's discussion in *Strategic Defense and the
    Western Alliance*, Haley and Merritt, op. cit., 166.

[^48]: Erik Eckholm, "China Says US Missile Shield Could Force an Arms
    Buildup," *New York Times*, 11 May 00, 1.

[^49]: In numerous interviews in Washington DC by far the strongest
    consensus was the fact that a new strategic plan was essential and
    long overdue.

[^50]: 1993-Bottom Up Review; 1994-Nuclear Posture Review;
    1995-Committee to Analyze Roles and Missions of US Military;
    1997-Quadrennial Defense Review.

[^51]: Janne Nolan, interview with author August 1999, see also Nolan's,
    *An Elusive Consensus* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press,
    1999), 86.

[^52]: Yuri Chkanikov, Keith Payne and Andrei Shoumikhin, \"Can Russia
    Thwart NMD,\" *Defense News*, 15 May 00, 16.

[^53]: See Nolan, *An Elusive Consensus* (Washington DC: Brookings
    Institute Press, 1999), 94.

[^54]: *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear
    Deterrence*. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D.C., 20301-3140, October
    1998.