**NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYEE RELATIONS**

*THE YEAR (AND A THIRD) IN REVIEW*

**February 1999 - May 2000**

***THREATS***

***Groeber v. USPS***, 84 M.S.P.R. 646 (2000). Board sustained the
agency charge and removal action for conduct of swinging tire chairs and
brandishing a open knife at a supervisor and for informing a agency
nurse that he would go after his supervisor, her, and the rest of the
medical staff. Consideration of adverse factors not included in the
notice of proposed action is error. However, when the improper factors
were considered only in connection with penalty determination, the Board
will independently assess the penalty without consideration of the
improper factors. Also - disability discrimination statutes do not
immunize disabled employees from being disciplined for misconduct in the
workplace and an employee who is perceived as disabled may still be
disciplined if the agency would discipline any other employee for the
same misconduct. See also ***Laniewicz v. Veterans Affairs*** (below).

***Mancini v. Veterans Affairs***, 84 M.S.P.R. 70 (2000). In determining
whether statements made by employees in the workplace constitute
threats, the Board must apply a reasonable person criterion, considering
the listeners= reactions and apprehensions, the nature or working of the
statements, the speaker=s intent, and the attendant circumstances.

***FALSIFICATION AND FRAUD***

***Tackett v. Air Force***, 80 M.S.P.R. 624 (1999). A charge of lying or
falsification, requires the agency to prove that the employee knowingly
supplied incorrect information with the intention of defrauding the
agency.

***Blake v. Justice***, 81 M.S.P.R. 394 (1999). The Board held that
while intent is necessary to sustain a charge of falsification and that
that intent can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence,
that fact that the employee supplied incorrect information cannot by
itself control the question of intent, and plausible explanations are to
be considered in determining whether the incorrect information was
supplied intentionally.

***Bryant v. Army***, 84 M.S.P.R., 202 (1999). To sustain a charge of
misrepresentation, the agency is required to prove that the employee in
question supplied incorrect information and that he did so knowingly,
and with an intent to deceive or mislead the agency.

***THEFT***

***Fouquet v. Agriculture***, 82 M.S.P.R. (1999). Where a charge has
been identified as a criminal offense, the elements of that offense must
be identified and enumerated so that an evidentiary framework is
established for proof of the charges. If the elements of the criminal
offense are not set out the administrative judge will look to the most
closely analogous case precedent, or criminal law, rule of regulation as
guidance and then examine the evidence to determine where the agency has
met its burden of proof. In this case, the Board found the testimony of
an undisputed sociopath and convicted felon credible as to the criminal
behavior of his best friend.

***Jaramillo v. Army,*** 81 M.S.P.R. 469 (1999). The agency charge of
stealing government property and aiding and abetting other in he
stealing government property was not sustained in light of failure to
show that the property taken was indeed government property.

***Els v. Army***, 82 M.S.P.R. 27 (1999). The Board found that the
administrative judge erred in characterizing misuse of government
vehicle charge as a violation of the statutory provision regarding the
misuse of a government vehicle when the proposal and decisions notices
were not based on the statutory provision.

***INSUBORDINATION AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW ORDERS***

***Haebe v. Justice***, 81 M.S.P.R. 167 (1999). Agency not required to
prove intent in order to establish that an employee failed to follow a
lawful instruction. There is no de minimis exception to an otherwise
proven charge of failure to follow instructions. In a second important
holding the Board states that where an agency assigns an employee to
different duties during a period of interim relief, but does not
explicitly state an undue disruption determination, it satisfies its
burden to make such a determination by showing that it had a strong
overriding interest or compelling reason to assign the alternative
duties. On May 24, 1999, the Board modified its regulations to reflect
this second holding (see below under Jurisdiction section).

***Bennett v. Air Force***, 84 M.S.P.R. 132 (1999). The agency
established charge of insubordinate defiance of authority based on
employees refusal to obey commanding officers order to summon her
subordinates to a meeting, and publicly arguing with her commanding
officer about whether she needed to obey his order before taking steps
to get her workers. Agency employees are expected to respect authority
and follow the order of supervisory officials. Employees do not have
unfettered discretion to disobey or ignore agency orders.

***MITIGATION - PAST RECORD***

***Gregory v. USPS***, Fed. Cir. No. 00-3123, May 15, 2000. The court
held that consideration may not be given to prior disciplinary actions
that are the subject of ongoing proceedings challenging their merits.
Because the appellant=s past record was a primary factor in determining
the reasonableness of the penalty and that past record was the subject
of an ongoing grievance, the Board abused its discretion in relying on
the past record. The court noted to conclude otherwise would risk
harming the legitimacy of the reasonable penalty analysis, by allowing
the use of unreliable evidence (the ongoing prior actions) to support an
agency action.

***DISCOURTEOUS CONDUCT***

***Daigle v. Veterans Affairs***, 84 M.S.P.R. 625 (1999). Disrespectful
conduct charge could not be sustained on basis of disrespectful remark
which employee made about supervisor during the course of an EEO
counseling session because such sessions are a semi-confidential means
through which employees complain about the conduct of other agency
personnel, and the fact that employees are likely to be emotionally
distraught when they are reporting perceived discrimination to an EEG
counselor. In a second and equally important holding, the Board changed
its policy on requiring evidence of OPM approval of agencies performance
appraisal systems. Instead of OPM approval being a part of the agency=s
burden of proof, the Board will only require proof of OPM approval if an
appellant alleges that there is reason to believe that an agency is not
in compliance with the law.

***JURISDICTION, DUE PROCESS, AND PROCEDURE***

***Devingo, et al v.* GSA**, 82 M.S.P.R. 138 (1999) and ***Perrine v.
GSA**,* 81 M.S.P.R. 155 (1999). The agency refused to allow several
employees to revoke, prior to the effective date, separation agreements
in which they agreed to retire and receive buyouts. The employees
claimed that the agency improperly refused to allow them to withdraw
their retirements and that their subsequent retirements were
involuntary. On review, the Board found that the agency established that
it had a valid reason (administrative disruption) for denying requests
to withdraw buyout commitments unless an employee could establish
extreme hardship or extraordinary circumstances.

***Stone v. FDIC**,* 179 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.), June 11, 1999. Federal
Circuit finds that ex parte communications to a deciding official of new
and material evidence constitutes violations of constitutional due
process. While noting that not every ex parte communication to a
deciding official would violate the constitutional right to notice, the
Court instructed the Board to consider the individual facts of each case
to determine whether any alleged improper communication rose to the
level of new and material information.

***Bodus v. Air Force**,* 82 M.S.P.R. 508 (1999). USERRA does not
authorize the Board to adjudicate claims outside a USERRA complaint or
order remedial action on any basis other than a USERRA violation. Thus,
in USERRA cases involving personnel actions that are not otherwise
appealable, the Board may not consider non‑USERRA discrimination claims.

***Preyor v USPS*,** 83 M.S.P.R. 571 (1999). The one year of current
continuous service in the same or similar positions required for a
preference eligible claiming adverse action due process coverage must be
in the year preceding the action.

***Van Wersch v**. **HHS**,* 197 F.3d 1144 (Fed.Cir. 1999). The Court
holds that employees appointed under a Schedule A excepted service
appointment \[5 CFR 213.3102(u)\] which permits but does not require
conversion to the competitive service after two years, are covered by
the adverse action procedures of Chapter 75 after they have completed
two years of current continuous service, although the agency has chosen
not to convert them to the competitive service. The Court=s decision,
specifically its interpretation of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C), raises a
number of issues regarding the longstanding application of Chapter 75
coverage provisions.

***Special Counsel v. Merrick Malone, Margie Utley,*** 84 M.S.P.R. 342
(1999). The Board denied OPM=s petition for reconsideration and restated
its prior holding in *Special Counsel v, DeMeo* that the Hatch Act does
not authorize the debarment of Federal employees removed for violating
the Act.

***Hylick v. Air Force**,* 85 M.S.P.R. 145 (2000). Absent an explicit
agency rule to the contrary, an employee who is subject to a
non‑custodial interrogation in connection with allegations of misconduct
has no right to counsel. The appellant=s:; counsel argues unsuccessfully
that: The appellant would not have lied to Wade during the interview if
an attorney had been present during the interview.

***Stabile v. DOD,*** 85 M.S.P.R. 253 (2000). When the Board orders an
agency to demote a managerial employee to a lower‑graded nonmanagerial
position, without specifying that the demotion should be accomplished
with the least reduction in pay, the agency must set the employee=s pay
at the step of the lower‑graded position that results in the least
reduction in pay unless the agency has pay‑setting regulations
concerning demotions for cause which require a different result.

***Mattern v. Treasury***, DC0752980264-A-1, March 28, 2000. While a
criminal investigation of the employee=s conduct was pending, the agency
reassigned him to restricted duties without any overtime or night duty.
The agency subsequently removed the employee and that action was
reversed on appeal to the Board which ordered backpay. In a subsequent
enforcement decision, the Board granted additional back pay to the
employee for the period of time prior to his removal

to compensate him for lost wages during the period of restricted duty.
OPM has sought reconsideration of this decision, arguing that: (1) the
Board exceeded its jurisdiction to review a nonappealable action (the
reassignment) and (2) back pay may not be awarded where there is no
finding that the reassignment was unwarranted.

***Von Zemensky v. Veterans Affairs and OPM***, PH0351980078-I-1, April
18, 2000. The Board rejects OPM=s arguments and fails to overturn an
earlier decision that held that health care professionals hired under
Title 38 who are separated due to reductions in staff levels and/or
resources, are entitled to 5 CFR Part 351 reduction in forces
procedures. OPM argued that there is no reference within the reduction
in force statute or the implementing regulations that would provide
coverage for title 38 employees and that Congress excluded these
employees from coverage.

**5 CFR 1208** ‑ February 4, 2000 (65 FR 5410) ‑ MSPB issued a new Part
1208 dealing with the processing of appeals filed under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) and the
Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA).

**5 CFR 1201** - May 3, 2000 (65 FR 25623) - MSPB amends its rules to
require agencies, when taking an appealable action against an employee
who has both a right to file an appeal to the MSPB and a right to file a
grievance under a negotiated grievance procedure, to provide notice of
their right to pursue either (or in the case of USPS employees) both
avenues.

**5 CFR 1201** ‑ May 24, 1999 (64 FR 27900) ‑ MSPB amended its
regulations on interim relief, providing, among other things, that an
agency filing a petition for review must submit a certification it has
complied with the interim relief ordered or that it has made a
determination that it would be unduly disruptive for the appellant to
return to his or her job. The regulations also provide that the Board
will afford an agency the opportunity to provide evidence of compliance
with interim relief when challenged by the appellant. The regulations
note that Aif there is no harm to the appellant, dismissal of the
agency=s petition for review should not be required.@

***SEXUAL HARASSMENT***

***Lachance v Devall***, Federal Circuit No. 98-3213, May 20, 1999. The
Court addressed the Board=s authority to mitigate agency penalty
determinations when not all agency charges are sustained. The Board had
held that when not all agency charges are sustained, it will
independently determine a reasonable penalty. OPM argued that the Board
must give due weight to the agency=s primary discretion in matters of
employee discipline and that the Board=s function is not to displace
management responsibility but to assure that managerial judgement has
been exercised within tolerable limits of reasonableness. The Court
agreed with OPM, holding that the Board may not independently determine
penalties but must mitigate to the Amaximum reasonable penalty@ (the
penalty relative to the agency=s that brings the agency=s penalty within
tolerable limits of reasonableness). The only exception is where the
agency indicates that it desires a lesser penalty to be imposed if fewer
than all charges are sustained. On remand, *Devall v. Navy*, 83 M.S.P.R.
434 (1999), the Board holds that removal for sexual harassment was
appropriate penalty where contact involved physical contact and employee
was previously counseled on similar past complaints and his work
involved constant contact with women.

***Cisneros v. Defense***, 83 M.S.P.R. 390 (1999). Board found that it
was inappropriate for the AJ to mitigate the penalty in view of serious
nature of employee=s sexual misconduct, particularly its continual,
unrelenting nature, its pervasiveness, its perpetration on several
female employees. The Board also noted that the appellant occupied a
supervisory position. The removal action was sustained.

***WHISTLEBLOWING***

***Special Counsel v. Veterans Affairs**,* 81 M.S.P.R. 601 (1999). The
Board found that the agency had reprised against the employee for making
a disclosure protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act. The nature
of the reprisal was a geographic reassignment. After the reassignment,
the employee asked for and received approval to be carried in a sick
leave status and later workers compensation status prior to voluntarily
retiring. As corrective action for the whistleblower reprisal, the Board
ordered that the employee be provided back pay for the period of time he
was on workers compensation and that his sick leave used after his
reassignment be restored to him.

***Lachance v. White and MSPB**,* Federal Circuit No. 96‑3249, May 14,
1999. The Court ruled that Board failed to apply the proper test in
assessing whether an individual had a reasonable belief that his
disclosures evidenced gross mismanagement by his agency. Such a
reasonable belief is a key element in the determination of whether such
disclosures are protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act. The Board
had relied on the subjective perspective of the employee, particularly
if such perspective was shared by other employees. The Court held that
the proper test is Could a *disinterested* observer with knowledge of
the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee
reasonably conclude that the actions of the government evidence gross
mismanagement.

***Roach v. Army**,* 82 M.S.P.R. 464 (1999). In October, 1998, MSPB
invited amicus briefs on its authority to adjudicate whistleblower
retaliation claims that involve revocation of security clearances. The
issue was whether the 1994 amendments to the Whistleblower Protection
Act which included Any other change in duties, responsibilities, or
working conditions under the definition of a Apersonnel action,@ had the
effect of overturning the 1988 Supreme Court decision in *Navy v. Egan*
which held that the Board lacks the authority to review the substance of
security clearance determinations. OPM, DOD, CIA, and the Justice
Department all filed briefs arguing that the Board continues to lack
authority over security clearance determinations, while the Office of
Special Counsel argued that the 1994 amendments granted it such
authority. In this final Board decision, it carefully examined the
legislative history of the 1994 amendments and concluded that security
clearance determinations, including the denial, revocation, or
suspension of such clearances, are not Apersonnel actions@ under the
Whistleblower Protection Act.

***Keefer, et al. v. Agriculture**,* 82 M.S.P.R. 687 (1999). The Board
holds that neither

statute nor caselaw contain a requirement that a whistleblower
disclosure be made with such specificity as to enable the recipient of
the disclosure to conduct an investigation without having to return to
the employee for additional information.

***Yunus v. DVA***, 84 M.S.P.R. 78 (1999). In determining whether an
agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
an action in the absence of protected disclosures, the Board states it
will consider the weight of the evidence before the agency at the time
it took the action, rather than any subsequently developed information.

***Ganski v. Interior***, PH1221980111M-1, May 4, 2000. The Board
overrules *Thomas v. Treasury*, 77 M.S. P.R. 13, holding that a
violation of personnel rules is unprotected if it does not involve the
type of waste, fraud, or abuse intended to be covered by the WPA. Under,
5 U.S.C.\'2302(b)(A), the inquiry into whether a disclosure is protected
under subsection (I) ends upon the determination that the appellant
disclosed a violation of law, rule or regulation.

***LEAVE RELATED CASES***

***Burge v. Air Force***, 82 M.S.P.R. 75 (1999). Only the USPS and the
private sector are subject to FMLA=s notice-posting requirement, but
when a Federal employee requests leave under the law, the agency is
required to provide Aguidance concerning the employee=s right and
obligations.@ It may request administratively acceptable evidence but
may not apply a more restrictive leave policy than does the law. Of
particular significance, the Board adopted the same standard that
applied to the private sector and the Postal Service in determining
whether a federal employee=s untimely medical certification should be
considered under the FMLA. Pursuant to that rule, untimely submission of
medical documentation is allowed where a timely submission Ais not
practicable under the particular circumstances\...despite the employee=s
diligent, good faith efforts.@

***Fairley v. USPS***, 82 M.S.P.R. 584 (1999). The Board held that where
an appellant raises a nonfrivolous factual allegation reasonably
relating to a FMLA claim, or the agency=s evidence or allegations
otherwise show that FMLA qualifying leave was involved, the
administrative judge has the responsibility to develop the record
evidence as necessary and appropriate. The employee is not specifically
required to invoke the FMLA in requesting covered leave.

***Landahl v. Commerce***, 83 M.S.P.R. 40 (1999). The Board set forth
the entitlement outlined in 5 U.S.C. \' 6382(a)(1). Under the law, an
eligible employee of a covered employer is entitled to Aunpaid leave, or
paid leave, if earned, for a period of 12 weeks in any 12-month period
because of, inter alia, a serious health condition that renders the
employee unable to perform his job. A Aserious health condition@ is
defined as Aillness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition
that involves \... continuing treatment by a health care provider.@

***RETIREMENT***

***Bracey and Wilson v. OPM***, 83 M.S.P.R. 400 (1999). MSPB agrees with
OPM that an employee assigned to light duty is not eligible for
disability retirement so long as the employee retains the grade and pay
previously held. Employees whose positions prevent them from performing
in their positions of record would have to demonstrate that a light duty
assignment would not continue in order to be eligible for disability
retirement.

***Hall v. OPM***, 85 M.S.P.R. 371 (2000). Building on prior caselaw,
*Carrillo v. Army*, 82 M.S.P.R. 61 (1999), the Board continues to expand
the agency duty to file for disability retirement on behalf of
incompetent employees. In *Carrillo*, the Board held that an agency has
a duty to file for disability retirement on behalf of an employee prior
to issuing a decision to remove for cause when the agency concludes that
the employee is incapable of deciding to file. In this more recent case,
the Board modified *Carrillo* to provide that such a duty to file
applies only after a decision to remove is issued and remanded the new
case for a determination as to whether the agency was obligated to file
for disability retirement on behalf of the employee.

***DISCRIMINATION***

***Veterans Affairs v. Gibson,*** U.S. Supreme Court No. 98‑238, June
14, 1999. Resolving a conflict among several Circuit Courts, in a 5 to 4
decision, the Supreme Court holds that EEOC (and by implication, other
administrative bodies such as the MSPB) have authority under the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act, to award compensatory damages when
Federal agencies are found to have discriminated in violation of Title
VII of that statute.

***Sutton v. United Air Lines, Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, Inc., and
Murphy v. USPS***, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2162, and 2133, all on June 22, 1999.
The Supreme Court finds: 1.A determination under the ADA whether an
individual is disabled should take into account mitigating measures
(such as medication or eyeglasses) that overcome or lessen the
individual=s impairment 2.A physical disqualification decision for a job
does not, without more, establish that the individual is regarded as
disabled for purposes of ADA coverage. 3. To prove limitation in the
life activity of working, one must be precluded from more than one type
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.

***Laniewicz v. Veterans Affairs,*** 83 M.S.P.R. (1999). Even if an
employee=s misconduct is a manifestation of a disability, neither the
Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA immunize the employee from being
disciplined for the misconduct, provided the agency would impose the
same discipline on an employee without a disability.

***Browder v. Navy***, 81 M.S.P.R. 71 (1999). Because a Asexual behavior
disorder@ is specifically excluded from the definition of Aindividual
with a disability@ by 29 C.F.R.(8)(F)(I), as amended by the American
with Disabilities Act, an appellant who asserts such a condition fails
to allege prohibited discrimination.

***Vyas v. Army***, 83 M.S.P.R. 452 (1999). Inability to work for a
particular supervisor or in a particular position does not constitute a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act because it is not a barrier to
employment and does not foreclose an employee generally from his line of
work.

**EEOC Guidance ‑ On March 1, 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission published** comprehensive policy guidance entitled,
*Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).* The guidance applies to Federal agencies as
well as private sector employers and contains extensive information on
reasonable accommodation issues such as medical documentation, the
impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on requests for leave
as a form of reasonable accommodation, and undue hardship.

**Amendments to Executive Order 11478** - *Equal Employment Opportunity
in Federal Government*, May 2, 2000 - prohibiting discrimination based
an individual=s status as a parent.

**29 CFR 1614.102(b)(2)** - July 12, 1999 (64 FR 37644) New EEOC
Regulations regarding processing of EEO complaints.

**29 CFR I614** ‑ March 1, 2000 (65 FR 11019) New EEOC Regulations
regarding reassignment under reasonable accommodation.

***ATTORNEY FEES***

***Joyce v. Air Force and OPM**,* 83 M.S.P.R. 666 (1999). In a case in
which OPM sought reconsideration, the Board agreed with OPM that a
substantive jurisdictional finding is required in order to award
attorney fees. Contrary to OPM=s arguments, the Board continued to hold
that where an agency unilaterally rescinds an action and returns an
employee to *status quo ante,* there is a refutable presumption that
attorney fees are warranted so long as the appellant has set forth a
*prima facie* case of jurisdiction and incurs attorney fees.

**5 CFR 1201**, April 26, 2000 (65 FR 24381) - MSPB issues new
regulations with regard to attorney fee reimbursement to permit
reimbursement to a prevailing appellant=s attorney at his customary
billing rate if that rate is consistent with the prevailing community
rate where the attorney ordinarily practices.

***SETTLEMENT***

***Pagan v. Veterans Affairs**,* Federal Circuit No. 97‑3395, March 16,
1999. The Court held that the agency breached a settlement agreement in
which it had promised to provide the appellant with a Aclean record@ and
to remove all charges and actions from his personnel file, when an
agency official crossed out a portion of a questionnaire from another
agency which asked that the appellant be ranked according to his
attendance, performance, behavior, and attitude. The Court went on to
express its concern with agency settlement agreements that Aallow an
unsatisfactory employee to resign in exchange for a personnel record
clear of all charges.@ It stated that such agreements force the employer
to either lie or attempt some artful evasion which in fact fools no one.

***Anderson v. EPA***, 81 M.S.P.R. 618 (1999). Where an appellant
breaches a provision of a settlement agreement in which she agreed to
resign, the agency is entitled to treat the agreement as her resignation
and place appropriate papers in her personnel folder. In the course of
an MSPB hearing, the agency agreed to reinstate the employee, place her
in a leave without pay status for 90 days, and remove all references to
the removal action from her personnel file. The employee agreed to
withdraw her appeal, file for disability retirement, and submit her
resignation for medical reasons. She subsequently refused to submit her
resignation, but was unable to successfully challenge the validity of
the settlement agreement. Board ordered the employee to submit her
resignation and stated that it would authorize the agency to treat the
settlement agreement as her resignation if she failed to comply.

***Russell v. Navy,*** 85 M.S.P.R. 230 (2000). (1) A purported agreement
with an agency is not binding unless the other party can show that the
official with whom the agreement was made had the authority to bind the
Government to the agreement; and (2) where the agency makes a
nonfrivolous claim that its agent lacked authority to enter into a
settlement agreement, the employee bears the burden of proving that
agent had authority to bind the agency.

***ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION***

**29 CFR I614.102(b)(2)** - July 12, 1999 (64 FR 37644) New EEOC
regulations mandate alternative dispute resolution in the processing of
EEO complaints.

**5 CFR 1201** ‑ May 24, 1999 (64 FR 27899) ‑ MSPB amended its rules to
provide an automatic extension of up to 30 days of the time limit for
filing an appeal with MSPB where an appellant and agency mutually agree,
prior to the timely filing of an appeal, to attempt to resolve their
dispute through an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process.

**Director=s Award for Outstanding ADR Programs** ‑ Winners of the first
annual OPM Director=s Award for Outstanding ADR Programs were recognized
at a ceremony on July 27, 1999 in Washington, D.C.. The featured speaker
was Attorney General Janice Reno. The award, recognizing outstanding
programs for the resolution of workplace disputes, is an initiative by
OPM to help carry out President Clinton=s May 1998 memorandum
encouraging agencies to use ADR. There were 49 award nominations from
agencies across the country. Winners of the 2000 Award will be
recognized at a ceremony scheduled for the fall of 2000.

***Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Resource Guide*** ‑ this 1994
OPM issuance was substantially revised and updated and was reisussed on
July 27, 1999 at the above ADR awards event. Among other things, the
Guide contains one‑page descriptions of more than 80 working Federal ADR
programs set up to resolve workplace disputes. The updated *Guide*
contains new information about some of the shared neutrals programs that
are operating as well as descriptions of what the administrative appeals
agencies such as the Merit Systems Protection Board are doing to use
ADR. Another new feature this year is a listing of selected Internet
websites. The *Guide* is available on OPM=s website at www.opm.gov/er.