070227AMEDafternoon

Michael Dunn:

Well, let me welcome you once again to the second panel today. I'm
Michael Dunn, the editor of the "Middle East Journal" \[the "Journal"\],
as most of you have figured out by now, I think. Our second panel is a
little different from the first one. Instead of a retrospective, we're
looking at the field today. And we're not going to be looking at the
Journal itself, so much as we are at the general field of Middle East
studies, and some of the problems facing us in the future.

Our third panelist, Trita Parsi, is not here yet, but I'm going to go
ahead and introduce the panelists and hopefully he will arrive shortly.
On my left, Geneive Abdo is senior analyst at the Gallup Organization
Center for Muslim Studies. Her newest book is "Mecca and Main Street::
Muslim Life in America After 9/11." Her commentaries and essays have
appeared in the "New York Times," the "Washington Post," "Washington
Quarterly," the "International Herald Tribune," the "New Republic," the
"Nation," the "Christian Science Monitor" and I might add, the "Middle
East Journal." She did a fax interview with Ayatollah Montazeri, which
we published a few years ago. It's rather groundbreaking, I think. She
is the author of "No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam," and
the co-author of "Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in 21^st^
Century Iran."

Michele Dunne, on my right, is not a relative. She spells Dunne with an
e on the end \-- she misspells Dunn in other words \--

\[laughter\]

We get each other's phone calls sometimes, though. She's senior
associate and editor of the "Arab Reform Bulletin" at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, and so she is one of the specialists
in town on issues relating to democracy and political reform in the Arab
world. She was visiting assistant professor of Arabic at Georgetown
University from 2003 to 2006, and she was formerly a specialist at the
State Department and the White House on Middle East affairs. Her
research interests include political and other public discourse in the
Arab world, trends regarding political, economic and social reform in
the region, and U.S. policy in public diplomacy toward the Middle East
and the Muslim world.

Trita Parsi, who has not yet arrived, is adjunct professor at Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and he's
the author of the forthcoming "Treacherous Triangles: Secret Dealings of
Iran, Israel and the United States." We ran one of the chapters of that
as an article in the "Journal" a few months ago. His articles on Middle
East affairs have been published in the "Financial Times," "Jane's
Intelligence Review," the "Globalist," "Jerusalem Post," the "Forward,"
and the "Daily Star." He's also co-founder and current president of the
National Iranian American Council; a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
promoting Iranian American participation in American civic life.

I also want to just add one thing I forgot to mention earlier; that in
the program for today you will find a reprint of the editor's note from
our 60^th^ anniversary issue, which provides a short history of the
"Middle East Journal." So if you want a quick overview of our last 60
years, you will find that in the program. And once again, as Mary Jane
did earlier, I want to thank Aramco Services Company for providing the
funding to permit this event. We're going to do this alphabetically, so
Geneive will go first.

Geneive Abdo:

Thank you, Michael, for inviting me here. It's a pleasure to be at this
particular anniversary. And just in listening to the history of the
"Middle East Journal," which I actually was not that familiar with, I
realized from the stories that were told that it seemed appropriate for
me to be here in particular because the article in which Michael
referred, the interview I conducted with Ayatollah Montazeri, actually
led to my threatened expulsion from Iran. And so it seems a rite of
passage for people who write in the Journal that they be either expelled
or threatened with expulsion, so I guess it is appropriate that I am
here today.

Given that the second panel, the goal is to try to discuss the topics of
the future in the field of Islamic studies and Middle East politics and
history, I thought that it would be appropriate to discuss Muslims in
the West, a book that I just published on Muslims in America. To some
degree also looks at Muslims here, in the context of Europe. And I think
that very much so this is definitely a topic of scholarship, and a
subject that we are seeing now more in the press. And there's a great
attempt now to understand, as Muslims live in Western societies both
here and in Europe, what is their interpretation of Islam? How does this
interpretation differ from what it is in their countries of origin? And
how do general populations, the non-Muslim populations interact with
Muslims now that they are living in their midst, as opposed to living
afar?

In researching my book on Muslims in America, one thing that became very
clear to me that I think is also applicable to Europe is that
non-Muslims, because of global events and because of the globalized
world that we live in, a Muslim is not just an American Muslim or a
British Muslim or a French Muslim. Muslims are now increasingly
identified with the perception of Islam that has been created by events
in Iraq, by events in Lebanon. So as I interviewed a lot of Muslims in
this country, the point that they kept emphasizing to me was that part,
of their increasing feeling of alienation in this country. And again, I
think it's true of Europe, that people do not consider them American
Muslims; they consider them somehow equivalent to the more radical or
extremist fringe of movements in the Middle East, and so when they watch
television and they see their Muslim neighbor next door, there really is
no difference in the American mind between these two individuals.

So I think that very much so global events is, are contributing to not
only the formation of Islamic identities in the West, but also how
non-Muslim societies now interact with Muslims and Islam. One of the,
there have been several reactions among Muslims to this interaction in
the West, and one, I think, very significant response has been an
increase in religiosity. And we are seeing this not only in the United
States, but certainly in European countries. And even though, of course,
it's very difficult, and one shouldn't generalize the Islamic formation
of an Islamic identity in France versus Germany or Great Britain, sort
of for our purposes today I will generalize at least on those trends
that I think there's some sort of commonality, because, as you probably
know, Muslim populations in Europe differ greatly. I mean, in Germany,
for example, the majority of Muslims are Turks\--Turkish, whereas in
France they're North African and in Great Britain the largest population
is from South Asia. But there are trends that are common, that are
shared among American Muslims.

And I think that one, one \-- on this issue of religiosity, Muslims are
feeling \-- both in the United States and Europe \-- that they want to
embrace their Islamic identity for the same reasons that there is an
Islamic revival globally in Egypt and in the Arab world, as well as in
South Asia. And I think that this is not so much \-- people always tend
to believe that this growing religiosity is a response to the failure of
either the secular states, or the Muslim response to failed ideologies.
And I think that the West is a perfect example of how we can determine
that this theory is no longer true, or at least that this theory has
been discredited, because you have Muslim populations now living in the
West with every advantage, every access to higher education to all of
the things that the West has to offer including secularism, yet more and
more Muslims, particularly the younger generation, are identifying more
with Islam than they are particularly with, I guess, the values of their
adopted countries.

I don't want to say necessarily that these two things are mutually
exclusive. You know that there is a choice between an American identity
and a British identity versus an Islamic identity. I don't think that
these two things are mutually exclusive, because Muslims in America and
in Europe have explained to me that they can be both at the same time.
They can be loyal American citizens, loyal British citizens, but also
devout Muslims. However, I think that despite this reality, we are
seeing that Islam is playing much more of a prominent role in the lives
of Muslims in the West for the second generation of Muslims than the
first. And what I think is particularly interesting about this
phenomenon is that in the United States especially, it's a bit
counterintuitive to what we associate with immigrant and religious and
ethnic minorities. My own family background is Lebanese Maronite; I am
the third generation to come to the United States.

By the time I grew up, no one in my family spoke Arabic, so I had to
learn Arabic the hard way. I learned Fushah in graduate school and at
Middlebury, and my Arabic is still very pathetic. But Muslims in this
country \-- in fact, if you just take language skills as an example, the
younger generation is much more interested in learning Arabic. They're
going to Arabic lessons that are provided in the mosques, there's a lot
more involvement in their mosque communities, for example, than their
parents ever really experienced. And so in many ways Muslims here and in
Europe are becoming much more attached to their culture, their tradition
and their religion than their parents.

In the United States I tried to document in some way, in a much more
concrete way, how this process was unfolding. And I did a bit of
research at a place in California called the Zaytuna Institute, which
\-- you might have heard of one of the fairly now renowned imams who
runs this institute; his name is Shaykh Hamza Yusuf. He's been profiled
in the "New York Times," and he's often on television. He has a wide
following of thousands of Muslims, not only here but in Europe and even
in the Arab world.

And one important idea behind the Zaytuna Institute is that Shaykh Hamza
and some of his colleagues there are trying to "intellectualize the
faith," as they put it. And they characterize themselves as
neotraditionalists. So what they're trying to do \-- much like a lot of
intellectuals in Europe, Islamic intellectuals in Europe, is they're not
only trying to reconcile the temptations and the contradictions that
Muslims face, young Muslims living in Western societies. But they're
trying to return to the Islamic sources \-- to try to look at the Koran
and the Hadice to determine what was written at the time, what is the
more classical interpretation of women's rights, of some of the social
issues that young Muslims face living in Western societies.

And one of the messages that they try to convey through their teachings
of the sources to young Muslims is that whatever you may hear now,
whatever you may read on the Internet by more radical, from more radical
clerics or people who, I guess, are self-appointed clerics, you have to
step back from that, and let's examine what the sources say. So is it
really appropriate, for example, for women to marry at the age of 18, as
you might read on the Internet? Is it really appropriate for women to be
segregated in mosques, as is common now in both Europe and the United
States, whereas in a lot of countries in the Middle East, for example,
this isn't necessarily the case. So I think that this is a very
important movement, and as I mentioned it's also expanded to Europe
because it is encouraging young Muslims to try to interpret Islam from
within the tradition, not outside the tradition. So in other words,
don't go to Western sources as your points of reference. Let's analyze
and reinterpret the religion from inside the tradition, but let's do it
in a responsible and intellectual way.

The other important, I think, trend among Muslims now living in the West
is that they are trying in some way to resolve this whole issue of
gender equality. And I think that this is a very important subject in
understanding Islam for non-Muslims, because women, Muslim women in
particular in the Western mind, are often placed in two absolutist
categories; they're either traditionalists and they wear headscarves, or
they're secularists/modernists and they don't wear headscarves, and they
are in favor of wholesale adoption of Western values. And I think that
this subject is particularly relevant, has been relevant even in recent
years as a form of justification for policies under the Bush
administration. I'm sure that you recall in the early days of the
invasion of Afghanistan, where President Bush as well as First Lady
Laura Bush actually went on television and radio, trying to claim that
the United States was invading Afghanistan to save all those women from
their burkas.

So you can see that this whole stereotypical image of oppression in
Islam, as people sort of associate with women, has reached the point
that it has become a justification for foreign policy. What is happening
in reality \-- and I think that this is particularly obvious in the West
\-- is that the Muslim woman, the modern Muslim woman, is somewhere in
the middle. She is not the traditionalist; the woman who, you know,
people associate with not ever leaving the house, not holding a job, nor
is she the staunt secularist that you might hear about in the sort of
ideas articulated by people like Irshad Manji and even Hirsi Ali, who is
the former Dutch parliamentarian whose recent book has received a lot of
exposure in recent weeks. These are the two sort of absolutist ideas.
The reality is somewhere in between. And I think that we're seeing this
not only among Muslims in the West, but certainly in the broader Islamic
world, whereby women now \-- the typical Muslim woman is educated, she
has a family, she is active in politics in some cases, and she considers
her religion an extremely important part of her life, but it doesn't
define her totally.

And in my new position as an analyst at the Gallup Organization, this is
actually \-- this whole I think concept has actually been proven by
polling data. Gallup, in 2005 and 2006 began polling Muslims in the
Islamic world, and now the polling has reached 22 countries. And in
every country surveyed, in fact, the data shows that the women who were
interviewed believed that there should be some form of Sharia law in
their countries; in other words, it should be either a source of
legislation or the source of legislation. But they also want gender
equality. And they believe that they should be able to work outside the
home, they believe that they should be able to vote without influence,
and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, believe that they should drive cars.
So you can see that these two worlds that sort of the Western
imagination has created about Muslim women is not really all that
applicable when you consider what the reality is on the ground.

In the United States, this whole complexity surrounding gender issues is
also very much part of the debate among Muslim women in the United
States. And this past year, in fact, a woman who is a professor at
Hartford Seminary, who is a professor of Islamic Studies \-- her name is
Dr. Ingrid Mattson \-- she became the president of the Islamic Society
of North America, which is the largest Islamic organization in North
America. And what she has done through her work as an activist both here
and abroad is try to advance this whole idea of what is now the modern
Muslim woman. She wears a headscarf, she's a Muslim convert \-- she also
holds a Ph.D., she's a professor of Islamic studies, and she has two
children. And what she has done in some of her advocacy work, which I
think is very important, is in the United States she's gone around and
educated both mosque governing boards and the clerics in the mosque to
try to, I guess, enlighten them about gender issues, and about how these
two ideas of a woman whose religious and modern are not mutually
exclusive. And I'll just share a short anecdote with you, as I followed
her around the country.

I decided to write about one particular incident in which she was
lecturing clerics at just a seminar in the Midwest, as she often does,
and she asked them \-- they were discussing beforehand the whole idea of
the separation in mosques of women and men, and some of these clerics
were discussing with her the need for women to be in a completely
separate, isolated room of the mosque. And they said that even though,
you know, in their own countries they hadn't experienced this because,
for example, in Pakistan most women don't even go to a mosque, and that
this to some extent was their reaction to the fact that women in America
and in Europe actually go to mosque. So they felt that the most
appropriate response would be to actually segregate women. So this was
part of the discussion. So, at the end of this short discussion she
said, "Well, I'm going to begin this exercise by asking all of you men"
\-- and there were about 12 clerics in the room; two were women, the
rest were men \-- "to take your chairs and leave where I'm speaking, and
take your chairs to an adjoining room."

And so they didn't really know what was going on, but they picked up
their folding chairs and they left to an adjoining room. And then she
closed the door and went back to the first room and began lecturing, and
completely ignored them. And so, after a short time they began shouting,
"Well, we can't hear you!" And so when she brought them back into the
first room she said, "You see, this is what Muslim women experience
every Friday in your mosque. They can't really engage in any sort of
spiritual experience, they can't see you, and most of the time can't
even hear you because of the scratchy speaker systems that generally
exist in mosques." So I think that this kind of movement is extremely
important, both here and in Europe, in trying to bring awareness to the
non-Muslim world, and even bring awareness to the policy debate about
gender issues in Islam, which are often misunderstood.

The last topic that I wanted to just talk about in terms of this whole
new subject area of Muslims in the West is that for a lot of Muslims
living in Western societies, there are two parallel trends happening at
once. As they're becoming more religious and identifying more with
Islam, the general populations in the countries where they live are
becoming more anti-Islamic, and their attitudes towards Muslims are
growing more negative. And that is certainly the case here in the United
States, as it is in Europe. So we're reaching a point, I think, that's
almost at a critical stage, because with the connection between how
people perceive their Muslim neighbor and what's happening globally
between that particular phenomenon, and also the growing religiosity of
Muslims living in the West, we are now creating a very polarized Western
society. And this can only be very dangerous; not only in terms of
foreign policy considerations, but certainly in terms of any potential
for radicalization.

Of course, there have been now, at least since 9/11, Muslims who have
become radicalized in the West. But in order to deal with this
radicalization and the complete failure of integration and policies in
Europe, it's very important for this whole issue of how these two
societies are being polarized to be addressed. In Europe, in particular,
some of the policies and the laws that have been passed in Great
Britain, in France, in Germany have actually been extremely
counterproductive to integrating Muslims. That certainly is true in the
United States with the USA Patriot Act, even though that is not the only
legislation which has in fact contributed to the growing sense of
alienation among Muslims in America. So in terms of any sort of policy
debate, it is very important now, particularly at this critical moment,
to try to figure out in the United States and in Europe how Muslims can
become part of the political process; how more Muslims can be elected to
Congress, to parliaments, how more Muslims in Europe, for example, can
become educated. The dropout rate, for example, of Muslims in secondary
school in Germany is 40 percent; so 40 percent of Muslims in Germany
drop out in secondary school. That is certainly not the case in the
United States.

In fact, if you study the demographics and the statistics, these two
populations are very different. Muslims in the United States make on
average about \$8,000 \-- the average Muslim income is about \$8,000
higher than the average American income. Muslims in America are far more
educated than the average American. Most Muslims in this country, for
example, according to the Zogby poll and a poll which was done jointly
by Georgetown University in 2004, in fact most Muslims in the country
have professional jobs. Only five percent hold jobs that we would
classify as blue collar jobs. This is certainly not the case in Europe.
So even though I'm making this point of the sort of risk of the
potential for radicalization, the caveat is that these two populations
are very different. But I think what is quite startling and shocking \--
and it was for me when I conducted this research \-- that you would
think that in America, sort of the last place where, you know, we've
grown up with this tradition of being a melting pot, with the complete
integration of ethnic and religious minorities, we are now seeing a
Muslim population that, to some degree, is going its own way as a
response to 9/11, as a response to U.S. foreign policy, but also as
their own response to global events.

So in conclusion, I would just like to leave you with this thought \--
that it's not this kind of more black and white image that is painted of
Muslims in the West \-- that the good Muslims live in America because
they're completely integrated, whereas the problematic Muslims who live
in Europe are not; that the picture is much more complicated, and the
reality is actually somewhere in between. Thank you.

\[applause\]

Michael Dunn:

Thank you. Since I last spoke we have been in touch with Trita Parsi,
and he is down with a fever and has had to send his regrets. As a
result, our panelists can spend a little bit more time, if they wish,
and we'll have a bit more time for questions afterwards. Thank you.
Michele Dunne.

Michele Dunne:

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to be with you. I certainly am
someone who's benefited a great deal from the Middle East Institute over
the years. At an earlier part of my career it helped me to sustain my
Arabic in between undergraduate and graduate school, and I always would
advise my students at Georgetown to do that; to participate in courses
and programs there. And now in my position at Carnegie I added an online
journal called "The Arab Reform Bulletin," and we always cover the
publications in the "Middle East Journal," though I wish you would go
online, Michael, \[laughs\] because we link to articles in other
journals, so we'd love to be able to link to "Middle East Journal"
articles as well.

Now, Michael, you scared me a little bit before on the other panel when
you said that we weren't going to talk about politics here, because I
was supposed to talk about the future of democracy in the Middle East.
And it's really hard for me to do that without talking about politics.
Do I have dispensation to \--

Michael Dunn:

You have dispensation. I don't think we're going to talk about American
politics, because this is a branch of the United States Congress that is
hosting us, but \--

Michele Dunne:

Oh, okay. I'm definitely not going to talk about American politics. I
will say a little bit about American policy \-- same word in Arabic,
right, it's always confusing, *siyaasa*, but in English we can
differentiate between politics and policy.

So let me say a few words, then, about this issue of democracy in the
Middle East. I'd like to share with you my observations on the situation
in the Middle East, and then I will say a word about what I think are
some fruitful areas for study in terms of the field of Middle East
studies here. So, now after Secretary of State Rice's recent trip to the
Middle East in January, Jackson Diehl had a column in the "Washington
Post" entitled "Rice's Rhetoric in Full Retreat," and his article was
about what Secretary of State Rice said, or rather did not say about
democracy during her recent trip to the region, and particularly during
her stay in Egypt.

Diehl and other observers have contrasted sort of the recent statements
by senior U.S. officials about moderates and radicals in the Middle
East, which are monikers really based on the Arab government's foreign
policy behavior, and they've contrasted this with the sort of
prodemocracy rhetoric of earlier years \-- 2005, for example \-- when
Secretary of State Rice made a very strong prodemocracy speech in Cairo,
in the very same place.

So, what has happened? Was democracy a flash in the pan in the Middle
East, and in U.S. policy toward the region that appeared sometime around
2002, 2003, and was all over by 2006? So that's what I would like to
discuss, and I'm going to focus, I'd like to say, primarily on the Arab
states. That's my own field, so I won't be saying quite as much about
other states in the region. So, clearly the Middle East has taught the
United States, I think, some painful lessons about democracy promotion
in the last few years. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution in the spring of 2005
succeeded in generating pressure for the departure of Syrian forces, but
by the time of parliamentary elections held just a few months later it
was clear that confessionalism remained as large an issue as ever in
Lebanon, and one that would continue to invite foreign involvement.
Iraq, obviously Iraq's elections in 2005 were reasonably successful by
many measures, and even inspiring in some ways, yet clearly the
political leadership that was elected has not been able to stop or even
contain sectarian violence as well as the insurgency. And then, of
course, the Palestinian election of January 2006 brought to power Hamas;
a movement with principles entirely incompatible with what the United
States and Israel were looking for from a Palestinian leadership.

So, all of these episodes, plus of course the Lebanon war of this summer
and the spiraling violence among Palestinians have made it clear that
democracy alone was by no means the answer to all of the issues and the
problems in the Middle East. The rhetoric of senior U.S. officials
between 2002 and 2005 I think had implied, even though maybe it didn't
state so explicitly, but it had implied that an infusion of democracy
would somehow allow the Middle East to leap over the problems of the
past, over problems that were decades or centuries old; problems such as
the Arab-Israeli conflict, sectarian ethnic divisions within society, et
cetera. I think that looking back at U.S. policy, one could say that in
the 1990s the United States made the mistake of focusing solely on
trying to resolve some of these old conflicts, notably the Arab-Israeli
conflict, without promoting internal political and economic reform in a
serious way, and that from 2000 until at least recently the United
States went in the opposite direction, focusing on promoting internal
reforms while neglecting other older problems that would undermine such
reforms.

So this is not a very pretty picture, but actually my subject today is
not so much U.S. policy, but the future of democracy in the Middle East.
And the good news here, I think, is that the future of democracy in the
Middle East, and what will or will not happen is not all about the
United States and its policy in the region, although I think the United
States can play a role in encouraging or discouraging democratization
and so forth. The real question to me is to what extent change is afoot
\-- political change \-- in the Middle East itself.

Now, when we look at the Middle East and consider this question, one
thing I suggest is we start by separating a little bit the areas that
are in immediate crisis right now \-- Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon \-- from
the rest of the Middle East. You know, as all of us as observers and
students of the Middle East, as we look at the region we often try to
identify trends; we're forced to speak in simplifications and so forth.
And so, clearly now we can see trends; the U.S. bogged down in Iraq,
growing Iranian influence in the region, Sunni-Shia tensions, seemingly
unbridgeable differences between Israelis and Palestinians and indeed
even among Palestinians themselves. These are \--they are important
trends, they are relevant, and they're discussed everywhere.

They're an issue of concern everywhere in the region, but I would
suggest in terms of domestic politics these issues are much more
relevant in some places than in others. And I don't think we can
generalize to say that domestic political change and so forth has been
arrested throughout the Middle East because of these issues. In fact, I
think there are other trends going on in the region which make headlines
less often, but I think are at least as important, perhaps even more
important, in determining whether there will be movement toward
political liberalization, and perhaps eventually toward democratization
in the Middle East. So the three trends that I want to mention are, I
think, a general increase in freedom of expression, the rise of a new
generation of leaders in the Middle East and the increasingly broad
acceptance of democratic forms of governments across political trends,
including among Islamists.

So let me \-- I think it's always best, really, to look at individual
countries and so forth, but I don't have enough time to do that here. So
what I'm going to do is I'm going to mention these three trends and just
some examples, I think, from countries. So, regarding freedom of
expression, I think if we look back a little bit over time, the general
climate of the availability of information and the freeness of political
discourse has changed markedly over the last decade. This is not true in
every single country in the region, but it's true in many of them. And I
see Edmund Ghareeb is the real expert on this. But we have the
proliferation of media and information outlets clearly enough, whether
we are speaking of Internet, satellite, television, regional press, and
also even independent, local media springing up in a lot of countries.
So this has meant that even though the government controlled media still
exists, they've largely lost their monopoly on information.

And this is one of the factors that I think has contributed to the
lifting of taboos, a discussion of many issues in Arab countries, and
the greater frankness with which domestic issues \-- and also just a
greater space for discussion of domestic issues. Regional politics and
so forth used to occupy so much of the airtime of political discourse in
Arab countries, and they still do, and certainly there's been plenty to
talk about in the last few years. But alongside that, I think we see a
much more serious discussion of domestic, political and economic issues
and so forth in many Arab countries. And that continues to go on despite
the other crises in the region, and the fact that people are, you know,
are angry about developments in the region. But still side-by-side, in
many places we see a much more serious and frank discussion of domestic
issues going on publicly, and via various, various different venues and
various different media.

Now, in many countries this has also led to greater tensions between the
government and journalists. Just to mention a few examples of that \-- I
mean, there have been physical attacks on journalists in Yemen, for
example, in recent years. Recently there have been record libel damages
levied on publications \-- one recently was the "Le Journal
Hebdomadaire" in Morocco in 2006, and just last week the four-year
prison sentence given to the Egyptian blogger, Abdul Karim Suleiman, for
defaming Islam and for defaming President Mubarak. But as negative as
those kind of developments are \-- and those kind of reactions, I
actually think they show the extent to which journalists and others in
Arab countries have begun pushing against the limits. You know, these
reactions take place, but I don't think anyone at this point expects
those kinds of reactions, as harsh as they are, to mean that journalists
and others are going to stop talking about domestic issues and so forth.
I think there has been a change, and it's going to continue. People are
going to continue pushing against the limits here.

Okay. Another one of the changes in the region, the developments in the
region, is this rise of a new generation of leaders. And clearly, the
generation that has been in power since the 1980s or earlier is
gradually passing from the scenes, and this extends well below the level
of heads of states. I mean, this is clear enough in terms of succession
at that level, but it goes well beyond that. It's taking place clearly
within political parties and movements, whether they are ruling parties
or whether they are opposition parties, among the editors of major
newspapers, university presidents, in the military, et cetera. There is
a changing of the guard that's, that's going on, and I think this is a
regionwide phenomenon. But I'll mention it's particularly apparent, I
think, in Egypt, where we see people in their 30s and their 40s now
challenging those in their 60s and 70s for control; not only of the
National Democratic Party in Egypt, the ruling party, but also the
Muslim brotherhood. And it's evident in all the political movements in
Egypt, very evident that in some cases we see a younger generation
trying to change political organizations from within, and in others this
breaking away and forming alternative organizations.

Now, I think it is a very fruitful area of study. There's a lot to
discuss here in terms of who are these people, this younger generation?
In what ways are they similar, different, et cetera from the generation
that came before them? But one of the things that I find interesting
about them is I think there is greater common ground in some ways among
the members of this younger generation across the political spectrum
than there was among the members of their parents' generation. I don't
want to overplay this. I mean, we're not talking about political
unanimity and homogeneity, you know, coming out, but \-- and so, I mean,
in a country like Egypt for example, there are still significant
differences about how the younger generation in the ruling party and the
younger generation in the Muslim Brotherhood see the future of their
country, but they're not as far apart, I think, as their parents were.

And I'll be happy to discuss this more if you're interested in it. But I
think there's some promise here of greater convergence, in terms of how
people in the younger generation see the futures of their countries. And
that's partly because of this third trend that I mentioned, which I
think is increasing acceptance of democratic forms of governments and
broader political participation. And this includes, as I mentioned,
among Islamists and other oppositionists. The debates of 10 or 20 years
ago, about whether democracy was compatible with Islam, for example, or
with Arab culture or so forth \-- these debates are largely dying out. I
won't say they don't go on at all anymore, but they've really been left
behind by a lot of people; particularly a lot of people in this younger
generation.

Even this question of whether Islamists can be enfranchised within a
democratic political system has already been resolved, or is on its way
to being resolved in a lot of countries, with a few notable laggards. I
mean, certainly there are a number of countries where certainly this is
a very live question. But I mean, if for example we look at the
participation of the Shia political society, Al Wefaq, in the recent
Bahraini elections, the alignment between Islaah in Yemen and secular
political forces there, the growing maturity of the Party of Justice and
Development in Morocco and so forth, we see in many countries Islamists
becoming more certainly, you know, accepting of the idea of democratic
systems and the limits of democratic systems and so forth, and we see a
very interesting dialogue going on between Islamists and secularists in
many countries.

All right? So, I mean it remains to be worked out within all of these
countries in the region; what they would mean by democracy within their
country, what it would look like, what the shape and form of it and so
forth would be, and certainly what the road from the current political
system to a democratic system would look like. But this is very much a
subject of lively debate, and lively debate across the political
spectrum in many countries. And I think one of the more difficult things
to work out is that democratic systems entail clear winners and losers.
And in a real democratic system, of course, the losers always have the
hope that they will be the winners in the future. But in transitions, of
course, this is an extremely difficult issue because there are losers
and there are people who stand to lose a tremendous amount economically,
as well as politically, from change.

So I mentioned these trends partly because I think they're fruitful
areas of study. It's fruitful to look at areas of change and, you know,
to have an open mind about them; that there is change in the Middle
East. It's not necessarily going to be what we expect it to be; I think
you have to approach all of these things with an open mind about what
they're going to be about. But I do believe that because of that the
idea of democracy in the Middle East was a flash in the pan, and that it
will persist in the region, and that I think it will persist in some
ways in U.S. policy as well. I think in order to analyze the prospects
for this kind of political change in the Middle East, it's really
important to manage our expectations of what will happen and when. We
need to try our best to sort of look at change, and understand it on its
own terms to measure new conditions and new developments against
previous conditions and so forth, rather than against our own
expectations as outsiders of what may happen, which may be detached from
reality.

So I'll end there. Thank you.

\[applause\]

Michael Dunn:

And I think on that note, perhaps it's time to conclude. I want to thank
the Library of Congress and Mary Jane Deeb \-- and if Mary Jane has
something to say, she's welcome to -- for hosting this conference \--
for proposing and hosting this conference. I want to thank again the
Ramco Services Company for providing the financial support for the
conference, and I want to thank all of our panelists, Michele and
Geneive, and the panelists in the morning panel for their contributions.
I can't say where the "Middle East Journa"l will be 60 years from now,
but I think \-- in some way I hope that we are able to continue in the
course that we have set. And we'll look a lot different; I think print
publications are going to change into something quite different in the
coming years.

And we are struggling, as all print publications are, to try to keep up
with it, with limited resources. We're a membership organization, and of
course we depend on our members. So, those of you who \-- that's a plug.
And I also want to thank all of you for coming here today and spending
your morning with us, and celebrating our 60^th^ anniversary. You should
have found copies of the anniversary issue and a program on your seats.
If you didn't, I think we've got some sitting around outside. I want to
thank you very much.

\[applause\]

And I also want to thank, because it's so easy to do so, my own staff
\-- the "Journal" staff and interns, the communications department and
the programs department \-- for the support they've provided to us here.
These things don't just happen; a lot of people have contributed to
them, and I want to thank them all. Thank you.

\[applause\]

\[end of transcript\]