BTeV Hazard Analysis Document

07-23-2004

DOCUMENT BTeV-DOC-2829-v4

FERMI NATIONAL ACCELERATOR LABORATORY

Hazard Analysis Document Approval
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Project Leader/Date:
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Fermilab PPD Senior Laboratory Safety Officer/Date:
[\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_]{.underline}

BTeV Hazard Analysis Document

**I. Introduction**

At Fermilab, safety is important.  It is the policy of this laboratory
to protect the environment and all persons, be they employees or
visitors, from accident or injury while they are on site.   Nothing
shall have a higher priority. The Fermilab Environmental, Safety and
Health Manual (FESHM) specifies a set of physical and administrative
conditions that define the bounding conditions for safe operation of
accelerator facilities or portions thereof.  Chapters 2010 Planning and
Review of Accelerator Facilities and their Operations and 2060 Hazard
Analysis for Fermilab Employees, call for identification of hazards and
assessment and mitigation of risks at accelerator facilities, including
experimental facilities such as BTeV. The goal is to demonstrate that
there is reasonable assurance that operations can be conducted in a
manner that will limit risks to the health and safety of employees and
the public and will adequately protect the environment. Three reports
are mandated; a Hazard /Risk Analysis Document, Preliminary Safety
Assessment Document (PSAD) and a Safety Assessment Document (SAD).
Operationally, the Hazard/Risk Analysis shall be performed and
documented first, and the more detailed PSAD and SAD are developed
subsequently. **Because of the fact that BTeV is a new facility still
under construction, neither of these documents exists. However,
conditions in BTeV are expected to approximate those of CDF, for which a
full SAD (1) was developed to demonstrate the low risks associated with
operations prior to the start of the last accelerator colliding beams
operation period. This Hazard Analysis Document is based on the CDF
Hazard Assessment Document published in 1994 and 2001. It is intended to
achieve full compliance with the Requirements and formalize the hazard
classification for BTeV.**

It is important to note that the Hazard Analysis required by the above
Chapters is not an evaluation of the actual risk from BTeV operations,
but is an evaluation of the potential hazards at BTeV in the absence of
the engineered mitigations. Only passive mitigations are to be taken
into account in evaluating the different hazards identified; it is to be
assumed that engineered mitigations such as alarms, detectors,
interlocks, ventilation, and operational procedures are all inoperative
or compromised.

In Sections II and III, the hazard identification and assessment
methodology used is described, and the results of applying the process
to BTeV are detailed. Only local consequences in and adjacent to the
BTeV facilities were considered; the off-site impact from operations at
BTeV has already been reviewed and assessed as negligible. Section IV
presents the conclusion that operations at BTeV are characterized as low
hazard.

**II. Methodology**

The methodology used was selected to provide a uniform and thorough
process for identifying and assessing the hazards present to personnel
and the environment. The process consisted of three steps:

1\) Development of a list of potential significant hazards

2\) Surveying the BTeV facilities, existing and planned, for the
presence of these

potential hazards

3\) Assessing the probability for a possible mishap or equipment failure
and

the severity of the consequences.

Each of the three steps is described further below.

A detailed list of potential hazards that may be encountered at a
high-energy accelerator facility was obtained from the Work Smart
Standards List. These standards are the result of Fermilab\'s analyses
of the hazards present on the site and identified the statutory
requirements, and external and internal standards to be followed in
order to mitigate these hazards. A list of potentially significant
hazards was then prepared from this master list for use in surveying
BTeV. Hazards that are only of a magnitude and type routinely
encountered and/or accepted by the general public were not included nor
were hazards that are mitigated by code compliance (National Electrical
Code, Uniform Building Code, etc.) or by OSHA compliance. The resulting
potential hazard list is included here as Attachment A; it contains
primarily risks that follow from the unusual technical aspects of high
energy physics operations.

To facilitate the field survey of BTeV facilities and organize the
findings, the area was divided into seven physically distinct zones
using the natural features present. The zones are shown pictorially in
the top half of Figure 1 and the principal occupancies are described
below that. Office and laboratory occupancies were not included in the
survey. In carrying out the hazard identification survey, assistance was
provided by BTeV members and experienced Fermilab staff in identifying
and then listing each of the hazards located in the seven zones.

**Figure 1.**

# BTeV Area Zones

+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **ZONE   | ##### PRINCIPAL OCCUPANCIES                               |
| NO.**    |                                                           |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **1**    | ## Shipping receiving, Storage and Upper Staging Area     |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **2**    | Assembly Hall Deep Pit Service Area For Detector, Lower   |
|          | Staging Area and Alcoves                                  |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **3**    | Technician Work Area and Computer rooms                   |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **4**    | Collision Hall                                            |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **5**    | Mechanical Equipment Room                                 |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **6**    | Gas Shed                                                  |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| **7**    | Dewar Area                                                |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+

**III. Results and Assessment**

The results of the second step in the Hazard Analysis methodology,
hazard identification, are presented in Table 1 using a matrix of hazard
type versus BTeV geographical zone. As anticipated by the process of
constructing the preliminary hazard list (Attachment A), potential
hazards were identified in all areas of the facility. Within BTeV there
are radioactive sources for calibration, residual activation of
components, beryllium components, argon/ethane gas mixtures,
0.5-megawatt power supply, non-commercial electrical systems, cryogenic
systems, crane equipment, many different gases, cryogens, and a high
field magnet. Once identified, these hazards were subsequently ranked
according to the ranking process listed in Appendix-A assessing various
risk related to environment or safety and health activities.

# Table 1.

# BTeV Preliminary Hazard Identification

<table style="width:100%;">
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 36%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Zone No.</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><strong>Zone Description</strong></td>
<td><p id="radiation-hazards" class="heading">Radiation Hazards
</p></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Toxic Material Hazards</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Flammable Materials</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Electrical Energy</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Thermal Energy</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Kinetic Energy</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Potential Energy</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Flammable Gas Hazards</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Oxygen Deficiency Hazards</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Laser Hazards</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
<td><blockquote>
<p><strong>Magnetic Field</strong></p>
</blockquote></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><h2
id="shipping-receiving-storage-and-upper-staging-area-1">Shipping
receiving, Storage and Upper Staging Area</h2></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>Assembly Hall Deep Pit Service Area For Detector, Lower Staging Area
and Alcoves</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>Technician Work Area and Computer rooms</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>Collision Hall</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td>Mechanical Equipment Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td>Gas Shed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td>Dewar Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification of the identified hazards was documented through the use
of a preliminary Hazard Analysis worksheet. Each identified hazard was
characterized according to hazard type, mishap consequences, initiating
event, and finally a risk ranking corresponding to the Risk-Based
Priority Model given in Appendix A. Also included are descriptions of
the installed hazard mitigation measures, both passive and active
(engineered). Although no credit was taken in the assessment for the
active mitigating techniques employed, these mitigating techniques are
also listed for completeness. Credit was taken in the assessment for all
passive mitigation features. The set of Hazard Analysis worksheets is
included as Attachment B.

Upon examination of the results of the potential accident significance
evaluations documented on the preliminary Hazard Analysis worksheets,
the conclusion is clear that an unbreathable atmosphere incident
(asphyxiation) or a flammable gas release (fire/deflagration) mishap are
the most severe possible occurrences. Each of these potentialities,
however remote the possibility in the actual BTeV configuration with
engineered mitigations, could result in severe injury or death to
employees or experimenters. No potential for significant environmentally
damaging accidents was found in the full spectrum of BTeV operations.
The potential for off-site impact from potential accidents at BTeV has
already been investigated and assessed as negligible.

**IV. Worst Case Unmitigated Accident Scenarios**

On the basis of the results of the hazard identification and assessment
investigation, two worst case accident scenarios are postulated. Each of
these only presents risk to personnel in the immediate area of the
affected zone. The first accident scenario involves exposure of
personnel to an oxygen deficiency hazard (asphyxiation) condition in one
of the zones identified as high risk without mitigation. The second
accident scenario involves two potential flammable gas accidents in Zone
6 the remote gas shed area where inventories of ethane exist.

**Accident Scenario 1: Oxygen Deficient Atmosphere**

The worst case oxygen deficiency accident that could occur in BTeV might
result in the asphyxiation of one or more persons. If an undetected leak
of 50/50 argon/ ethane,

liquid or gaseous nitrogen, or liquid or gaseous helium was allowed to
persist for a sufficiently long period of time with no ventilation
available, then an oxygen deficient atmosphere could be created. Upon
entry into such an area, the person or persons entering would lose
consciousness almost immediately and, if not discovered by unexposed
personnel soon enough, would perish from lack of oxygen. Data on
possible oxygen deficiency areas in each BTeV zone is given in Table 2
below. The time for the oxygen concentration to decrease to O2 \< 12%
was found in each case by calculating the required volume of air to be
displaced by the asphyxiant gas to achieve a 12% O2 concentration and
dividing that value by the maximum asphyxiant gas flow rate into the
volume. In each case, the maximum gas flow rate is limited by passive
mitigating devices only, flow restricting orifices and fail-safe
pressure relief's; no credit is taken for active devices.

**Table 2.**

###### Possible Oxygen Deficiency Areas In Each BTeV Zone

+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| ** | **     | **Area | **     | **M    | **   | **Comments**     |
| Zo | Area** | V      | Normal | aximum | Time |                  |
| ne |        | olume, | Venti  | Gas    | to** |                  |
| N  | ##     | Cubic  | lation | Flow   |      |                  |
| o. | ###### | Feet** | Rate,  | Rate,  | **O2 |                  |
| ** |  Descr |        | CFM**  | SCFM** | \<1  |                  |
|    | iption |        |        |        | 2%** |                  |
|    |        |        |        |        |      |                  |
|    |        |        |        |        | **H  |                  |
|    |        |        |        |        | ours |                  |
|    |        |        |        |        | \*** |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | *      | 2      | 700    | 560    | 4.2  | Gas is not       |
| *1 | *Upper | 51,789 | -5,000 |        |      | normally used in |
| ** | S      |        |        |        |      | this area        |
|    | taging |        |        |        |      |                  |
|    | Area   |        |        |        |      |                  |
|    | Room** |        |        |        |      |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | **Asse | 2      | 700 -  | 560    | 4.2  | Gas is not       |
| *2 | mbly** | 51,789 | 5,000  |        |      | normally used in |
| ** |        |        |        |        |      | this area        |
|    | **Hall |        |        |        |      |                  |
|    | Pit**  |        |        |        |      |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | **Co   | 2      | 700 -- | \<560  | \    | Gas is not       |
| *3 | mputer | 51,789 | 5,000  |        | >4.2 | normally used in |
| ** | Room** |        |        |        |      | this area        |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | *      | 55,616 | 700 -- | 560    | .93  | Worst case is    |
| *4 | *Colli |        | 5,000  |        |      | failure of a LN2 |
| ** | sion** |        |        |        |      | or LHe line in   |
|    |        |        |        |        |      | the hall         |
|    | **     |        |        |        |      |                  |
|    | Hall** |        |        |        |      |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | **Mech | 10,752 | Air    | 0.217  | 462  | Gas is not used  |
| *5 | anical |        | infilt |        |      | in this area     |
| ** | Equ    |        | ration |        |      |                  |
|    | ipment |        | only   |        |      |                  |
|    | Room** |        |        |        |      |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+
| *  | **Gas  | \~1800 | Air    | 43     | .39  | Possibly open    |
| *6 | Shed** |        | infilt |        |      | air gas shed.    |
| ** |        |        | ration |        |      |                  |
|    |        |        | only   |        |      |                  |
+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+------------------+

\* With no ventilation

As can be seen from the information in Table 2, the areas that can
become oxygen deficient most quickly are Zones 4 and 6; Zone 4 due to
the potentially large influx rate of asphyxiant, and Zone 6 due to the
small volume of the Gas Shed and the moderately high influx rate of
asphyxiant. Each of these risks is addressed in the ensuing paragraphs.

In Zone 4, the BTeV Collision Hall the potential for a large release of
asphyxiant into the area from cryogenic lines entering and exiting the
area. An analysis, including the probability of such failures, has been
done elsewhere (Attachment C.) and concludes that the maximum asphyxiant
release rate into the BTeV Collision Hall would be the 560 SCFM as
listed in Table 2. At this rate with no mitigating actions taken and
with no ventilation available, the time to reach and oxygen
concentration of less than 12% would be .93 hours. The unmitigated
hazard classification for this zone with these conditions is class 1C:
likely to occur sometime during the lifetime of the project and having
possibly fatal consequences. Clearly, mitigating actions must be
undertaken to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

Note "Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (P-SAD) Issues"
significantly reduces the potential for Oxygen Deficiency Hazards (ODH)
and electrical bus hazards associated with the Tevatron tunnel from
adversely impacting the C0 experimental hall (Attachment D.).

The Zone 4 [passive mitigating measures]{.underline} are:

1)  All gas lines in this area are of metal construction, designed,
    constructed, and installed in accordance with ANSI B31.3.

2)  All pressure vessels were designed and constructed in accordance
    with the ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1, and

3)  A non-removable flow restricting orifice is installed in the supply
    line, limiting the maximum flow to

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```
a)  43 SCFM for the 50/50 argon/ethane gas supply line.

b)  560 SCFM for the liquid or gaseous nitrogen supply line.

The Zone 4 [active mitigating measures]{.underline} are:

1)  A situation awareness real-time display of the hazard status of the
    area is located at all of the entrances to the Collision Hall and in
    the BTeV main control room to alert personnel of any unsafe
    condition that may exist,

2)  There are multiple flammable gas and oxygen sensors installed which
    alarm with visual and audible signals if flammable gas or oxygen
    deficiency conditions are detected,

3)  Only trained personnel are permitted to conduct operations in this
    area,

4)  Administrative procedures and check lists are in effect for the use
    of gas and cryogens in the area

5)  The Collision Hall ventilation system supplies fresh air at a
    minimum rate of 700 SCFM and up to a maximum rate of 5,000 SCFM on
    demand or automatically from the oxygen sensor safety system. The
    rate of ventilation is monitored, and, upon loss of adequate
    ventilation, an evacuation alarm sounds to alert affected personnel,
    and

6)  The BTeV Flammable Gas System and the BTeV Cryogenic System will
    have been independently reviewed and subsequently recommended for
    permits to operate by permanent Laboratory-appointed safety review
    subcommittees.

With consideration of the above mitigation measures, the hazard
classification for Zone 4 would be reduced to one of very low risk as
gas release has been made a very unlikely occurrence and the
consequences of a leak alleviated by multiply redundant
detection/annunciation safety systems and by the high volume fresh air
capability of the ventilation system.

In the gas shed in Zone 6, an undetected leak of argon, ethane,
nitrogen, or 50/50 argon/ethane that persisted at the rate shown in
Table 2 would result in the creation of an oxygen deficiency condition
of O2 \< 12% in .39 hours. Anyone entering the building after that time
would loose consciousness almost immediately and, if not quickly removed
from the building would perish from lack of oxygen. The unmitigated risk
classification for this zone would be 1C: likely to occur sometime
during the lifetime of the project and having possibly fatal
consequences. Again, mitigating measures must be incorporated to reduce
the risk to personnel.

The same mitigating measures as listed in the Zone 4 accident scenario
apply with the following changes:

[Passive mitigating measures]{.underline};

3)  Non-removable flow restricting orifices are installed in each supply
    line, limiting the maximum flow into the mixing building to

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a.  43 SCF/hr argon

b.  43 SCF/hr ethane

c.  68 SCF/hr nitrogen.

> [Active mitigating measures]{.underline}:

1)  A situation awareness real-time display of the hazard status of the
    mixing building is located at the normally used (west) entrance to
    alert personnel of any unsafe condition that may be present in the
    building,

2)  This zone has one ODH and one flammable gas sensor that will trigger
    an alarm with a visual and an audible signal if an oxygen deficiency
    or a flammable gas situation is present,

3)  Normal ventilation to the mixing building is through outside air
    infiltration. In the event of a flammable gas or oxygen deficiency
    alarm, fresh air is automatically supplied at the rate of 1239 CFM,
    and

4)  The entry to the mixing building is kept locked at all times.

**Accident Scenario 2: Flammable Gas in Zone 6**

Two possible accident scenarios involving flammable gas could occur in
Zone 6, the Gas Mixing Area. Both accidents involve the quantity of
ethane gas contained in a full tube trailer (approximately 5,000
gallons) and the delivery vehicle, a semi truck. In each case, only the
driver of the truck and the gas technician on duty would be at risk.
Severe burns and/or death could result from either mishap.

The first scenario would be if the truck driver attempted to move a full
tube trailer that was still connected to the gas system. The most likely
result would be the separation of the flexible connecting hose from the
remainder of the system piping and the resultant escape of the tube
trailer contents to atmosphere through the torn hose. Since the truck
presents a convenient ignition source, it is likely that the escaping
ethane would be ignited and continue to burn until the trailer contents
were consumed. It is doubtful that an explosion would occur in this
scenario, since it is not likely that a stochiometrically correct
mixture of fuel and air would be achieved before the ethane ignited. As
stated before, personnel injuries would be limited to the driver and the
gas technician on duty. Equipment damage would be limited to loss of a
portion of the system to which the trailer was connected, and possible
loss of the truck and tube trailer from fire.

The second scenario would be similar in scope to the first scenario,
involving the same personnel and equipment. The initiating event would
be the loss of one or more high-pressure tube trailer rupture disks.
Each tube of a tube trailer is protected from over-pressure by a single
rupture disk installed at the front end (the truck end) of the trailer.
If one or more of these rupture disks spontaneously failed at the exact
time that a running truck was attached to the trailer, a fire could
result with the same consequences as the first scenario.

Although the severity of consequences associated with either of the
above scenarios is high, the probability of mishap is extremely remote;
thus the combination results in a low hazard classification for either
scenario.

**[V. Conclusion]{.underline}**

A systematic process of hazard identification and assessment has been
carried out for the BTeV experimental facility for hazards that are not
routinely accepted. This process resulted in the determination of the
worst-case potential accidents under the condition that engineered
mitigation measures and operational safety procedures are disregarded.
Accident scenarios were then developed for the two potential mishaps
judged as the most severe in terms of both probability of occurrence and
severity of consequences, a gas leak leading to an oxygen deficiency
condition and an ethane spill leading to a fire.

This assessment concludes that BTeV is a low hazard facility based on a
systematic analysis of worst-case accident scenarios involving risks
that would exist if there were no engineered mitigation actions taken
and no operational procedures in place.

**References:**

\(1\) Safety Assessment Document for the Collider Detector at Fermilab

Revision D, release date December 1, 1994

\(2\) FERMILAB Hazard Assessment Document

September 30, 1994

**Attachments:**

\(A\) Preliminary Hazard List

\(B\) Preliminary Hazard Analysis Worksheets

\(C\) C0 Oxygen Deficiency Hazard Ventilation Requirements

January 6, 2004

\(D\) Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (P-SAD) Issues

January 4, 2004

**Appendix:**

\(A\) Risk-Based Priority Model

The following list is a synopsis of potential hazards that are not
usually encountered and are associated with operation of a high energy
physics experimental facility. This list was assembled by consulting
Work Smart Standards document and by using generic potential hazard
groupings available in the common literature. The intent is to provide a
check list that ensures potential hazards that might be encountered in
high tech facilities and high energy physics in particular are certain
to be identified. The list is in no way intended to substitute for a
thorough on-site facility inspection; it serves as a catalogue of
watchful experience and \"mind jogging\" alerts.

**Radiation**

calibration source exposure

creation of mixed waste

**Toxic Materials**

beryllium components

chemical agents

lead and other heavy metals

**Flammable Materials**

flammable gases

flammable liquids

wire and cable insulation and

jackets

**Electrical Energy**

stored energy exposure

high voltage exposure

low voltage, high current exposure

electrical faults

**Thermal Energy**

cryogens

high temperature equipment

vacuum pumps

**Kinetic Energy**

power tools and equipment

movement of large objects

overhead structures and equipment

motor generator equipment and

flywheels

**Potential Energy**

crane operations

compressed gases

capacitor banks

vacuum/pressure vessels

**Asphyxiant**

cryogenic spill

cryogen/gas/liquid leak

ventilation failure

sensor failure

confined space

**Magnetic Field**

quench effects

fringe fields

battery bank and UPS equipment

This attachment presents the results of the Hazard Analysis process in
the form of spreadsheet summaries, pages 14 through 24 following. The
data is organized according to hazard type and BTeV Zone number.
Presented are the initiating event, the consequences, and the risk
classification. Comments and a listing of the hazard mitigation measures
in place are provided for each entry.

+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | *   | **C  | **   | **RPM | *    | **Comments and Hazard        |
| * | *Ha | onse | Init | Mat   | *RPM | Mitigation Measures**        |
| Z | zar | quen | iati | rix** | Sco  |                              |
| o | d** | ce** | ng** |       | re** |                              |
| n |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| e | **  |      | *    |       | **W  |                              |
| * | Typ |      | *Eve |       | itho |                              |
| * | e** |      | nt** |       | ut** |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * |     |      |      |       | **   |                              |
| * |     |      |      |       | miti |                              |
| N |     |      |      |       | gati |                              |
| o |     |      |      |       | on** |                              |
| . |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
+===+=====+======+======+=======+======+==============================+
| * | Rad | Ac   | Un   | 7D-0  | **   | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
| * | iat | cide | safe | .0010 | 0.00 | Non-detector located sources |
| 1 | ion | ntal |      |       | 85** | are                          |
| * |     |      | p    | 9D-0  |      |                              |
| * |     | expo | ract | .0075 |      | Kept Locked in an identified |
|   |     | sure | ices |       |      | storage cabinet when not in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | use. Detector-located        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sources are installed in a   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | manner                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | to limit personnel exposure. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Sources are only utilized by |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel. Administrative    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures are in effect to  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | restrict access to and limit |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel exposure to        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | calibration                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sources.                     |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | To  | Lim  | Dete | 7C    | **3. | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | xic | ited | ctor | -0.10 | 11** | passivated beryllium         |
| 1 |     |      | or   |       |      | detector                     |
| * | Mat | expo |      | 10    |      |                              |
| * | eri | sure | beam | C-0.2 |      | Components occurs only       |
|   | als |      | pipe |       |      | during construction and      |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | inst | -0.01 |      | installation/servicing of    |
|   |     |      | alla |       |      | the RICH Detector and        |
|   |     |      | tion | 12    |      | Forward                      |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | or   |       |      | Tracking Beam pipe. The      |
|   |     |      | rem  | 13C   |      | total amount of beryllium    |
|   |     |      | oval | -0.75 |      | (beam                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 14    |      | pipe) is \<2-4 pounds. Some  |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.4 |      | beryllium Oxide hybrid       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | printed                      |
|   |     |      |      | 15C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.15 |      | circuits. Very small         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | quantities of beryllium      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | substrate                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | attachments \<2-4 oz.        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | beryllium surfaces are       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | passivated.                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > The beam pipe is totally   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > covered with kapton. Beam  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > pipe                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | >                            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > shall have protective      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > sleeve and barriers to     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > prevent damage.            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Handle beryllium components. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | No machining, grinding, or   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | welding of beryllium is      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | permitted at Fermilab.       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments**: This zone is   |
| * | mma | erso | safe | .0010 | 0.00 | classified as an industrial  |
| 1 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** | area.                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 13    |      |                              |
| * | Mat | in   | ract | D-0.0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   | eri | jury | ices | .0075 |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   | als |      | or   |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     | Prop |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | erty | e    |       |      | for all welding and burning. |
|   |     | Loss | quip |       |      | The majority of materials    |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | stored in metal cabinets.    |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      | The area has sprinkler       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | protection to                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | control the spread of fire.  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **2  | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 2.47 | commercially available and   |
| 1 | tri | nnel | with |       | 15** | some                         |
| * | cal |      |      | 5D    |      |                              |
| * |     | in   | e    | -0.02 |      | BTeV specific electrical     |
|   | Ene | jury | nerg |       |      | equipment is located or      |
|   | rgy |      | ized | 6B-10 |      | utilized in                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    | 7A-10 |      | this area.                   |
|   |     |      | quip |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | 12    |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tag out rules are in |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements. System designs |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by an independent   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Electrical Safety Review     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | her | erso | tact | .0010 | 0.00 | soldering irons and heat     |
| 1 | mal | nnel | with |       | 10** | guns, as                     |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | hot  |       |      | well as Use of small amounts |
|   | rgy | jury | or   |       |      | of liquid nitrogen for leak  |
|   |     | due  | cold |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector operations may      |
|   |     | to   | surf |       |      | occur in this area.          |
|   |     | b    | aces |       |      |                              |
|   |     | urns |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing the      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Impr | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | oper | D-0.2 | *0.2 | hand held power tools and    |
| 1 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | manual                       |
| * |     |      | o    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | In   | pera | -0.02 |      | tools as well as rotating    |
|   | rgy | jury | tion |       |      | machinery operations         |
|   |     |      | of   | 6D    |      | associated with              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | small vacuum pumps may occur |
|   |     |      | achi | 7D-   |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | nery | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment.               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** A 30-ton crane |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | is available for use in this |
| 1 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | zone.                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | Improper use of the crane or |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | improper rigging practices   |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      | could                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | result in damage to property |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      | or injury to personnel.      |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      | None.                        |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | **Active Mitigation:** Crane |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operation is restricted to   |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Personnel only. The crane    |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | circuit breaker is off and   |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | locked                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      | out when the crane           |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is not in use. Lifting       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | fixtures are load tested and |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | their design                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is reviewed by a Mechanical  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety Review Committee. All |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | rigging equipment is         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | periodically inspected for   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signs of wear                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and/or abuse. The crane is   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | also periodically inspected. |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** When the       |
| * | mma | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 0.23 | central detector is located  |
| 1 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** | in the                       |
| * |     |      | p    | 5     |      |                              |
| * | Gas | in   | ract | D0.02 |      | adjoining Collision Hall,    |
|   |     | jury | ices |       |      | operational detector flow    |
|   |     |      | or   | 6D    |      | rates of                     |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | 50/50 argon/ethane,          |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      | argon/C02 and or nitrogen    |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      | are permitted                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  | 13D-0 |      | if standard operating        |
|   |     |      | lure | .0075 |      | requirements for the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector has been satisfied. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas and vent lines entering  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exiting each room are of     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | metal construction,          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | designed,                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | constructed, and installed   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | in accordance with ANSI      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | B31.3.                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Non-removable flow           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | restricting orifices are     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed in each            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas supply line, limiting    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the maximum flow into each   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | room to                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 43 SCFH. All over-pressure   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | venting devices are piped to |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | an                           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exhaust point outside the    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Assembly Hall.               |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** All   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas lines in each room have  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | locking                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | devices on the supply        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | valving to prevent           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | unauthorized use of          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the gas. In the highly       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | unlikely event of a line     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | break upstream               |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | of the flow restricting      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | orifices, each supply line   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | also has a                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | mechanically actuated excess |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flow valve that closes if    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flow exceeds 53 SCFH. All    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas system components and    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | subsystems are protected     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | from over-pressurization by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | relief                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | valves, which exhaust        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | outside the building. A real |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | time                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | display board of the hazard  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | status of the rooms is       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | displayed at                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the normally used entrance   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | to alert personnel of any    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | unsafe                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | condition that may be        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | present. Each room has an    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | ODH                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector and a flammable gas |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector installed which     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | will alarm at 7%LEL with a   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | visual and audible signal in |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | presence of a hazardous      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | condition. Power is removed  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | by                           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | shunt trip activation at 25% |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | LEL. Administrative          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures and check lists   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | For the use of gas the       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | collision hall. Ventilation  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is supplied to               |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | each of the test rooms at    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | rates shown in Table 2 of    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | BTeV                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Hazard Analysis Document.    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | System designs are reviewed  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | by an independent Flammable  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Gas Safety Review            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Due to the     |
| * | gen | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | volume of the zone and the   |
| 1 |     | nnel |      |       | 31** | limited                      |
| * | D   |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | efi | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | amount of cryogens available |
|   | cie | jury | ices |       |      | in the zone, an ODH          |
|   | ncy |      | or   | 6D    |      | condition                    |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | is highly unlikely.          |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      | **Passive and Active         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Mitigation:** Same           |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | mitigation items as          |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Listed in Accident Scenario  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 1 of BTeV Hazard Analysis    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Document for Zone 4.         |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Rad | Ac   | Un   | 7D-   | **   | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | iat | cide | safe | 0.001 | 0.00 | low level Fe-55 calibration  |
| 2 | ion | ntal |      |       | 86** |                              |
| * |     |      | p    | 11D-0 |      | sources are possible if      |
| * |     | expo | ract | .0001 |      | administrative procedures    |
|   |     | sure | ices |       |      | are not                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | followed.                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Non-detector located sources |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are kept                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Locked in an identified      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | storage cabinet when not in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | use.                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Detector-located sources are |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed in a manner to     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | limit                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel exposure.          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Sources are only utilized by |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel. Administrative    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures are in effect to  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | restrict                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | access to and limit          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel exposure to        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | calibration sources.         |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | To  | Lim  | Dete | 7C    | **3. | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | xic | ited | ctor | -0.10 | 11** | passivated beryllium         |
| 2 |     |      | or   |       |      | detector                     |
| * | Mat | expo |      | 10    |      |                              |
| * | eri | sure | beam | C-0.2 |      | Components occurs only       |
|   | als |      | pipe |       |      | during construction and      |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | inst | -0.01 |      | installation/servicing of    |
|   |     |      | alla |       |      | the RICH Detector and        |
|   |     |      | tion | 12    |      | Forward                      |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | or   |       |      | Tracking Beam pipe. The      |
|   |     |      | rem  | 13C   |      | total amount of beryllium    |
|   |     |      | oval | -0.75 |      | (beam                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 14    |      | pipe) is \<2-4 pounds. Some  |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.4 |      | beryllium Oxide hybrid       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | printed                      |
|   |     |      |      | 15C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.15 |      | circuits. Very small         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | quantities of beryllium      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | substrate                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | attachments \<2-4 oz.        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | beryllium surfaces are       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | passivated.                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > The beam pipe is totally   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > covered with kapton. Beam  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > pipe                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | >                            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > shall have protective      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > sleeve and barriers to     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | > prevent damage.            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Handle beryllium components. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | No machining, grinding, or   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | welding of beryllium is      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | permitted at Fermilab.       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 6D    | **0. | **Comments:** When the       |
| * | mma | erso | safe | -0.01 | 02** | central detector is located  |
| 2 | ble | nnel |      |       |      | in the Zone                  |
| * |     |      | p    | 7D-   |      |                              |
| * | Mat | in   | ract | 0.001 |      | quantities of carbon fiber,  |
|   | eri | jury | ices |       |      | rohacell, fiber-optic cables |
|   | als |      | or   | 13D-0 |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | large quantities of          |
|   |     |      | quip | 15D-0 |      | insulated cables are         |
|   |     |      | ment | .0015 |      | present.                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all welding and burning. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Active incipient fire        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detection                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | incorporating high           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sensitivity smoke detection  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and gas                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signature monitoring to      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | parts per million. A         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | multi-tiered                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | alarm system, which will     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | turn off power to the area.  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **2  | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 2.47 | commercially available and   |
| 2 | tri | nnel | with |       | 15** | some                         |
| * | cal |      |      | 5D    |      |                              |
| * |     | in   | e    | -0.02 |      | BTeV specific electrical     |
|   | Ene | jury | nerg |       |      | equipment is located or      |
|   | rgy |      | ized | 6B-10 |      | utilized in                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    | 7A-10 |      | this zone. The central       |
|   |     |      | quip |       |      | detector may be located in   |
|   |     |      | ment | 12    |      | this zone for                |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | service and upgrades.        |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tagout rules are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements. System designs |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by an independent   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Electrical Safety Review     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | her | erso | tact | .0010 | 0.00 | soldering irons and heat     |
| 2 | mal | nnel | with |       | 10** | guns, as                     |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | hot  |       |      | well as use of small amounts |
|   | rgy | jury | or   |       |      | of liquid nitrogen for leak  |
|   |     | due  | cold |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector operations may      |
|   |     | to   | surf |       |      | occur in this area.          |
|   |     | b    | aces |       |      |                              |
|   |     | urns |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Personnel utilizing the      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Impr | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | oper | D-0.2 | *0.2 | hand held power tools and    |
| 2 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | manual                       |
| * |     |      | o    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | pera | -0.02 |      | tools as well as rotating    |
|   | rgy | jury | tion |       |      | machinery operations         |
|   |     |      | of   | 6D    |      | associated with              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | small vacuum pumps may occur |
|   |     |      | achi | 7D-   |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | nery | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment.               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** A 30-ton crane |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | is available for use in this |
| 2 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | zone.                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | Improper use of the crane or |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | improper rigging practices   |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      | could                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | result in damage to property |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      | or injury to personnel.      |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      | None.                        |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | **Active Mitigation:** Crane |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operation is restricted to   |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Personnel only. The crane    |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | circuit breaker is off and   |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | locked                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      | out when the crane is not in |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | use. Lifting fixtures are    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | load                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | tested and their design is   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by a Mechanical     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Review Committee. All        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | rigging equipment is         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | periodically                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | inspected for signs of wear  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and/or abuse. The crane is   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | also                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | periodically inspected.      |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** When the       |
| * | mma | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 0.23 | central detector is located  |
| 2 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** | in the                       |
| * |     |      | p    | 5     |      |                              |
| * | Gas | in   | ract | D0.02 |      | adjoining Collision Hall,    |
|   |     | jury | ices |       |      | operational detector flow    |
|   |     |      | or   | 6D    |      | rates of                     |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | 50/50 argon/ethane gas are   |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      | permitted if standard        |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      | operating                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  | 13D-0 |      | requirements for the         |
|   |     |      | lure | .0075 |      | detector have been           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | satisfied.                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive and Active         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Mitigation:** Same hazard    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | mitigation                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Measures as stated in Zone   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 1, \"Flammable Materials\"   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | hazard                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | of this assessment, with the |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exception of the excess flow |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | valve and the total system   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flow. No excess flow valve   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is                           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed in this system.    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | The flow restricting orifice |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | in this system limits the    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | total flow to 43 SCFH.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Ventilation rates to this    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | zone are listed in Table 2   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | of BTeV                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Hazard Analysis Document.    |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** See Accident   |
| * | gen | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | Scenario 1 in BTeV Hazard    |
| 2 |     | nnel |      |       | 31** |                              |
| * | D   |      | p    | 5D    |      | Assessment Document          |
| * | efi | in   | ract | -0.02 |      |                              |
|   | cie | jury | ices |       |      |                              |
|   | ncy |      | or   | 6D    |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | La  | P    | Impr | 7     | **0. | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ser | erso | oper | C-0.1 | 85** | optical links, calibration   |
| 2 |     | nnel |      |       |      | and                          |
| * | Haz |      | o    | 9C    |      |                              |
| * | ard | in   | pera | -0.75 |      | Monitoring lasers may occur  |
|   |     | jury | tion |       |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | of   |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      | achi |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      | nery |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment. (i.e. FESHM   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 5062)                        |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Ma  | P    | No   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | gne | erso | rmal | D-0.2 | *10. | fringe field (\<10 gauss)    |
| 2 | tic | nnel |      |       | 99** | during                       |
| * |     |      | dete | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Fi  | In   | ctor | -0.02 |      | Vertex Magnet operation in   |
|   | eld | jury |      |       |      | the Assembly Hall is         |
|   |     |      | o    | 6B-10 |      | possible.                    |
|   |     |      | pera |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | tion | 9C    |      | The majority of the magnetic |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | field is contained within    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      | 12D-  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 0.015 |      | iron of the Vertex Magnet .  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | None.                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | to limit personnel exposure  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | during magnet operations in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Assembly Hall.               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | To  | Lim  | Dete | 6D    | *    | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | xic | ited | ctor | -0.01 | *0.0 | Some beryllium Oxide hybrid  |
| 3 |     |      | or   |       | 11** |                              |
| * | Mat | expo |      | 7D-   |      | printed circuits occurs only |
| * | eri | sure | beam | 0.001 |      | during construction and      |
|   | als |      | pipe |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation/servicing of    |
|   |     |      | inst |       |      | the some circuit boards      |
|   |     |      | alla |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | tion |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | beryllium surfaces are       |
|   |     |      | or   |       |      | passivated.                  |
|   |     |      | rem  |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | oval |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | handle beryllium components. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | No machining, grinding, or   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | welding of beryllium is      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | permitted at Fermilab.       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** **Q**uantities |
| * | mma | erso | safe | .0010 | 0.00 | of fiber-optic cables and    |
| 3 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** |                              |
| * |     |      | p    | 13    |      | large quantities of          |
| * | Mat | in   | ract | D-0.0 |      | insulated cables are         |
|   | eri | jury | ices | .0075 |      | present.                     |
|   | als |      | or   |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      | quip |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all welding and burning. |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | Active incipient fire        |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      | detection                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | incorporating high           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sensitivity smoke detection  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and gas                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signature monitoring to      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | parts per million. A         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | multi-tiered                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | alarm system, which will     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | turn off power to the area.  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **   | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 3.57 | commercially available and   |
| 3 | tri | nnel | with |       | 15** | some                         |
| * | cal |      |      | 5D    |      |                              |
| * |     | in   | e    | -0.02 |      | BTeV specific electrical     |
|   | Ene | jury | nerg |       |      | equipment is located or      |
|   | rgy |      | ized | 6C-1  |      | utilized in                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    | 7     |      | this zone.                   |
|   |     |      | quip | C-0.1 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | 12    |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tagout rules are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | System designs are reviewed  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | by an independent Electrical |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety Review Committee.     |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | her | erso | tact | .0010 | 0.00 | soldering irons and heat     |
| 3 | mal | nnel | with |       | 10** | guns, as                     |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | hot  |       |      | well as use of small amounts |
|   | rgy | jury | or   |       |      | of liquid nitrogen for leak  |
|   |     | due  | cold |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector operations may      |
|   |     | to   | surf |       |      | occur in this area.          |
|   |     | b    | aces |       |      |                              |
|   |     | urns |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing the      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Impr | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | oper | D-0.2 | *0.2 | hand held power tools and    |
| 3 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | manual                       |
| * |     |      | o    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | pera | -0.02 |      | tools as well as rotating    |
|   | rgy | jury | tion |       |      | machinery operations         |
|   |     |      | of   | 6D    |      | associated with              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | small vacuum pumps may occur |
|   |     |      | achi | 7D-   |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | nery | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment.               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | associated with compressed   |
| 3 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | gases                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Due to the     |
| * | gen | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | volume of the zone and the   |
| 3 |     | nnel |      |       | 31** | limited                      |
| * | D   |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | efi | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | amount of cryogens available |
|   | cie | jury | ices |       |      | in the zone, an ODH          |
|   | ncy |      | or   | 6D    |      | condition                    |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | is highly unlikely.          |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      | **Passive and Active         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Mitigation:** Same           |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | mitigation items as          |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Listed in Accident Scenario  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 1 of BTeV Hazard Analysis    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Document for Zone 2.         |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | La  | P    | Impr | 7     | **0. | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ser | erso | oper | C-0.1 | 85** | optical links, calibration   |
| 3 |     | nnel |      |       |      | and                          |
| * | Haz |      | o    | 9C    |      |                              |
| * | ard | in   | pera | -0.75 |      | Monitoring lasers may occur  |
|   |     | jury | tion |       |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | of   |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      | achi |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      | nery |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment. (i.e. FESHM   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 5062)                        |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Rad | Ac   | Un   | 4C-20 | *    | **Comments:** The potential  |
| * | iat | cide | safe |       | *26. | for residual activation of   |
| 4 | ion | ntal |      | 5C-2  | 86** | some                         |
| * |     |      | p    |       |      |                              |
| * |     | expo | ract | 6C-1  |      | detector components during   |
|   |     | sure | ices |       |      | routine accelerator          |
|   |     |      |      | 7     |      | operation                    |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.1 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exist. Anyone entering the   |
|   |     |      |      | 8     |      | collision hall during        |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | accelerator operations would |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | be subject to sever          |
|   |     |      |      | 9C    |      | radiation exposure.          |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | Non-detector located sources |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | are kept                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 12    |      | locked in an identified      |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | storage cabinet when not in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | use.                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector-located sources are |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed in a manner to     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | limit                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel exposure.          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Sources are only utilized by |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel. Potentially       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | activated components are     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | with-in                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | interlocked area.            |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect to             |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | restrict access to and limit |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel exposure to        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | calibration                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sources and potentially      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | activated components .       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | To  | Lim  | Dete | 6D    | *    | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | xic | ited | ctor | -0.01 | *0.0 | passivated beryllium         |
| 4 |     |      | or   |       | 11** | detector                     |
| * | Mat | expo |      | 7D-   |      |                              |
| * | eri | sure | beam | 0.001 |      | components occurs only       |
|   | als |      | pipe |       |      | during construction and      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | inst |       |      | installation/servicing of    |
|   |     |      | alla |       |      | the RICH Detector and        |
|   |     |      | tion |       |      | Forward                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | or   |       |      | Tracking Beam pipe. The      |
|   |     |      | rem  |       |      | total amount of beryllium    |
|   |     |      | oval |       |      | (beam                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | pipe) is \<2-4 pounds. Some  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | beryllium Oxide hybrid       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | printed                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | circuits. Very small         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | quantities of beryllium      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | substrate                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | attachments \<2-4 oz.        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | beryllium surfaces are       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | passivated.                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | The beryllium beam pipe is   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | totally covered with kapton. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | handle beryllium components. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | No machining, grinding, or   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | welding of beryllium is      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | permitted at Fermilab.       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** When the       |
| * | mma | erso | safe | .0010 | 0.00 | central detector is located  |
| 4 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** | in the Zone                  |
| * |     |      | p    | 13    |      |                              |
| * | Mat | in   | ract | D-0.0 |      | quantities of carbon fiber,  |
|   | eri | jury | ices | .0075 |      | rohacell, fiber-optic cables |
|   | als |      | or   |       |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | large quantities of          |
|   |     |      | quip |       |      | insulated cables are         |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      | present.                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all welding and burning. |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Active incipient fire        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detection                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | incorporating high           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | sensitivity smoke detection  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and gas                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signature monitoring to      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | parts per million. A         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | multi-tiered alarm           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | system, which will turn off  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | power to the area.           |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **2  | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 2.47 | commercially available and   |
| 4 | tri | nnel | with |       | 15** | some                         |
| * | cal |      |      | 5D    |      |                              |
| * |     | in   | e    | -0.02 |      | BTeV specific electrical     |
|   | Ene | jury | nerg |       |      | equipment is located or      |
|   | rgy |      | ized | 6B-10 |      | utilized in                  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    | 7A-10 |      | this zone.                   |
|   |     |      | quip |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | 12    |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tagout rules are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements. System designs |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by an independent   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Electrical Safety Review     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** Cold lines     |
| * | her | erso | tact | .0010 | 0.00 | associated with argon and    |
| 4 | mal | nnel | with |       | 10** | ethane                       |
| * | Ene | in   | hot  |       |      |                              |
| * | rgy | jury | or   |       |      | supplies to the mixing       |
|   |     | due  | cold |       |      | system may be encountered.   |
|   |     | to   | surf |       |      | Operation                    |
|   |     | b    | aces |       |      |                              |
|   |     | urns |      |       |      | of soldering irons and heat  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | guns, as well as use of      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | small                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | amounts of liquid nitrogen   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for leak detector operations |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | may                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | occur in this area.          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Insulation on cold lines and |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | surfaces.                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operating procedures are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all               |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment in the area.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent safety review    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | committee. Technical and     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | safety training of personnel |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | utilizing                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the equipment.               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | hand held power tools and    |
| 4 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | manual                       |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | tools as well as rotating    |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | machinery operations         |
|   |     |      |      | 6D    |      | associated with              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | small vacuum pumps and leak  |
|   |     |      |      | 7D-   |      | detectors. Also possible     |
|   |     |      |      | 0.001 |      | injury                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | to personnel if proper       |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | procedures are not followed  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | during                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | large detector component     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | moving operations.           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Equipment safety guards.     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Participate in detector      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | moving operations.           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative are           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | utilized to govern           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector-moving operations.  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | associated with compressed   |
| 4 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | gases                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** During routine |
| * | mma | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 0.23 | detector operations,         |
| 4 | ble | nnel |      |       | 85** |                              |
| * |     |      | p    | 5     |      | approximately \>50 SCF of    |
| * | Gas | in   | ract | D0.02 |      | 50/50 argon/ethane is        |
|   |     | jury | ices |       |      | contained in                 |
|   |     | or   |      | 6D    |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | the detector system in the   |
|   |     | e    |      |       |      | Collision Hall. Best         |
|   |     | quip |      | 7D-   |      | practices have               |
|   |     | ment |      | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | been utilized during the     |
|   |     | da   |      | 13D-0 |      | construction of the detector |
|   |     | mage |      | .0075 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | components to minimize       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | leakage.                     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas and vent lines entering  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exiting Zone 4 are of metal  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | construction, designed,      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | constructed and installed in |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | accordance with ANSI B31.3.  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | The maximum flow to the      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Collision Hall is limited to |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 43 SCFM by a non-removable   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flow restricting orifice.    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** A     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | real time display board of   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the hazard                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | status of the zone is        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | displayed at the entrance to |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the Collision                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Hall to alert personnel of   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | any unsafe condition that    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | may be                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | present. ODH detectors and   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flammable gas detectors are  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed which will alarm   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | with a visual and audible    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signal in                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the presence of a hazardous  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | condition. Administrative    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures and check lists   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect for the use of |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas in the                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | zone. Ventilation is         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | supplied to the zone and is  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | monitored and                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | alarmed in the event it is   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | lost. The gas system is      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | subject to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review by an outside safety  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review panel. The collision  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Hall                         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | has flammable gas detectors  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed which will alarm   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | at                           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 7%LEL with a visual and      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | audible signal in the        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | presence of a                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | hazardous condition. Power   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is removed by shunt trip     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | activation at 25% LEL.       |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4C-20 | *    | Same comments and hazard     |
| * | gen | erso | safe |       | *23. | mitigation measures as       |
| 4 |     | nnel | p    | 5C-2  | 85** | stated in                    |
| * | Dep |      | rac- |       |      |                              |
| * | let | in   |      | 6C-1  |      | Zone 4, \"Flammable Gas\"    |
|   | ion | jury | t    |       |      | hazard on the preceding page |
|   |     |      | ices | 7     |      | of                           |
|   |     |      | or   | C-0.1 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | eq   |       |      | this assessment.             |
|   |     |      | uip- | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | La  | P    | Impr | 7     | **0. | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ser | erso | oper | C-0.1 | 85** | optical links, calibration   |
| 4 |     | nnel |      |       |      | and                          |
| * | Haz |      | o    | 9C    |      |                              |
| * | ard | in   | pera | -0.75 |      | Monitoring lasers may occur  |
|   |     | jury | tion |       |      | in this zone.                |
|   |     |      | of   |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | Technical and safety         |
|   |     |      | achi |       |      | training of                  |
|   |     |      | nery |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel utilizing tools    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and equipment. (i.e. FESHM   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | 5062)                        |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Ma  | P    | No   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Exposure to    |
| * | gne | erso | rmal | D-0.2 | *10. | fringe field (\<10 gauss)    |
| 4 | tic | nnel |      |       | 24** | during                       |
| * |     |      | dete | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Fi  | expo | ctor | -0.02 |      | Vertex Magnet operation in   |
|   | eld | sure |      |       |      | the Collision Hall is        |
|   |     |      | o    | 6B-10 |      | possible.                    |
|   |     |      | pera |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | tion | 12D-  |      | The majority of the magnetic |
|   |     |      |      | 0.015 |      | field is contained within    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | iron of the Vertex Magnet .  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | None.                        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | to limit personnel exposure  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | during magnet operations in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Collision Hall               |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **   | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 3.57 | commercially available       |
| 5 | tri | nnel | with |       | 15** |                              |
| * | cal |      |      | 5D    |      | electrical equipment is      |
| * |     | in   | e    | -0.02 |      | located or utilized in this  |
|   | Ene | jury | nerg |       |      | zone.                        |
|   | rgy |      | ized | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      | e    | 7     |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      | quip | C-0.1 |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 12    |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tagout rules are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements. System designs |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by an independent   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Electrical Safety Review     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | hand held power tools and    |
| 5 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | manual                       |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | tools as well as rotating    |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | machinery operations         |
|   |     |      |      | 6D    |      | associated with              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | small vacuum pumps and leak  |
|   |     |      |      | 7D-   |      | detectors. Also possible     |
|   |     |      |      | 0.001 |      | injury                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | to personnel if proper       |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | procedures are not followed  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | during                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | large detector component     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | moving operations.           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Equipment safety guards.     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** Only  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained personnel are        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | allowed to                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Participate in detector      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | moving operations.           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative are           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | utilized to govern           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | detector-moving operations.  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | associated with compressed   |
| 5 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | gases                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | administrative procedures    |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | Same comments and hazard     |
| * | gen | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | mitigation measures as       |
| 5 |     | nnel | p    |       | 31** | stated in                    |
| * | Dep |      | rac- | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | let | in   |      | -0.02 |      | Zone 4, \"Flammable Gas\"    |
|   | ion | jury | t    |       |      | hazard on the preceding page |
|   |     |      | ices | 6D    |      | of                           |
|   |     |      | or   | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | eq   |       |      | this assessment.             |
|   |     |      | uip- | 7D-   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | E   | P    | Con  | 4     | **   | **Comments:** A variety of   |
| * | lec | erso | tact | D-0.2 | 1.80 | commercially available and   |
| 6 | tri | nnel | with |       | 75** | some                         |
| * | cal | in   | e    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | jury | nerg | -0.02 |      | BTeV specific electrical     |
|   | rgy |      | ized |       |      | equipment is located or      |
|   |     |      | e    | 6D    |      | utilized in                  |
|   |     |      | quip | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment |       |      | this zone.                   |
|   |     |      |      | 7D-   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 0.001 |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment meets applicable   |
|   |     |      |      | 12    |      | NEC                          |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and NEMA codes and FNAL      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      | Safety requirements.         |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | are in effect                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | for all work on electrical   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment and systems.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Lockout/Tagout rules are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all work on this  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment per OSHA           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | requirements. System designs |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | reviewed by an independent   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Electrical Safety Review     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Committee.                   |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 7D-0  | **   | **Comments:** Cold lines     |
| * | her | erso | tact | .0010 | 0.00 | associated with argon and    |
| 6 | mal | nnel | with |       | 10** | ethane                       |
| * | Ene | in   | hot  |       |      |                              |
| * | rgy | jury | or   |       |      | supplies to the mixing       |
|   |     | due  | cold |       |      | system may be encountered.   |
|   |     | to   | surf |       |      |                              |
|   |     | b    | aces |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     | urns |      |       |      | Insulation on cold lines and |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | surfaces.                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operating procedures are in  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | effect for all               |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment in the area.       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent safety review    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | committee                    |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Impr | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | oper | D-0.2 | *0.2 | rotating machinery           |
| 6 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | associated the               |
| * |     |      | o    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | pera | -0.02 |      | gas compressors or portable  |
|   | rgy | jury | tion |       |      | vacuum pumps used in the     |
|   |     |      | of   | 6D    |      | area.                        |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      | achi | 7D-   |      | Installed guards to limit    |
|   |     |      | nery | 0.001 |      | personnel                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | exposure to rotating parts.  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures.                  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | associated with compressed   |
| 6 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | gases                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     | or   |      | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Fla | P    | Un   | 4C-20 | *    | **Comments:** The gas        |
| * | mma | erso | safe |       | *23. | storage area contains the    |
| 6 | ble | nnel |      | 5C-2  | 85** | compressors                  |
| * |     |      | p    |       |      |                              |
| * | Gas | in   | ract | 6C-1  |      | used to pressurize the       |
|   |     | jury | ices |       |      | storage tanks with the 50/50 |
|   |     | or   |      | 7     |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.1 |      | argon/ethane gas mixture     |
|   |     | e    |      |       |      | from the mixing area. The    |
|   |     | quip |      | 13C   |      | storage                      |
|   |     | ment |      | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | area contains two 2500       |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      | gallon ASME coded storage    |
|   |     | mage |      |       |      | tanks,                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | one of which contain gas at  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | medium pressure (\<300 psig) |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the second is a low pressure |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | (\<24 psig) buffer tank.     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas and vent lines entering  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | and                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | exiting Zone 6 are of metal  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | construction, designed,      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | constructed and installed in |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | accordance with ANSI B31.3.  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:** A     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | real time display board of   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the hazard                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | status of the zone is        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | displayed at the entrance to |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the mixing                   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | shed to alert personnel of   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | any unsafe condition that    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | may be                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | present. ODH detectors and   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | flammable gas detectors are  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installed which will alarm   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | with a visual and audible    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | signal in                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the presence of a hazardous  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | condition. Administrative    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures and check lists   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are in effect for the use of |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | gas in                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the zone. All gas system     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | components, vessels, and     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | are protected from           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | over-pressurization by       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | relief valves                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | which exhaust to safe        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | outside locations. The gas   |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | system is                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | subject to review by an      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | outside safety review panel. |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4C-20 | *    | Same comments and hazard     |
| * | gen | erso | safe |       | *23. | mitigation measures as       |
| 6 |     | nnel |      | 5C-2  | 85** | stated in                    |
| * | D   |      | p    |       |      |                              |
| * | efi | in   | ract | 6C-1  |      | Zone 6, \"Flammable Gas\"    |
|   | cie | jury | ices |       |      | hazard on the preceding page |
|   | ncy |      | or   | 7     |      | of                           |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.1 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | this assessment.             |
|   |     |      | quip | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      | ment | -0.75 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      |                              |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | T   | P    | Con  | 4C-20 | *    | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | her | erso | tact |       | *23. | associated with compressed   |
| 7 | mal | nnel | with | 5C-2  | 85** | gases                        |
| * |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | cold | 6C-1  |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | surf |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     | due  | aces | 7     |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | C-0.1 |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     | to   |      |       |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | b    |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     | urns |      | -0.75 |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | K   | P    | Impr | 4     | *    | **Comments:** Operation of   |
| * | ine | erso | oper | D-0.2 | *0.2 | rotating machinery           |
| 7 | tic | nnel |      |       | 41** | associated the               |
| * |     |      | o    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | pera | -0.02 |      | gas compressors or portable  |
|   | rgy | jury | tion |       |      | vacuum pumps used in the     |
|   |     |      | of   | 6D    |      | area.                        |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      | m    |       |      | **Passive Mitigation:**      |
|   |     |      | achi | 7D-   |      | Installed guards to limit    |
|   |     |      | nery | 0.001 |      | personnel                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 11C   |      | exposure to rotating parts.  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | procedures.                  |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Pot | P    | Un   | 4     | **   | **Comments:** Stored energy  |
| * | ent | erso | safe | D-0.2 | 13.4 | associated with compressed   |
| 7 | ial | nnel |      |       | 89** | gases                        |
| * |     |      | p    | 5D    |      |                              |
| * | Ene | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | And pressurized liquid could |
|   | rgy | jury | ices |       |      | cause injury or damage if    |
|   |     |      |      | 6C-1  |      |                              |
|   |     | or   |      |       |      | Administrative procedures    |
|   |     | e    |      | 7A-10 |      | are not followed.            |
|   |     | quip |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | ment |      | 11C   |      | **Passive Mitigation:** All  |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | equipment is designed to all |
|   |     | da   |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     | mage |      | 12    |      | applicable codes and         |
|   |     |      |      | C-1.5 |      | standards governing this     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | type of                      |
|   |     |      |      | 13C   |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.75 |      | installation.                |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | 13D-0 |      | **Active Mitigation:**       |
|   |     |      |      | .0075 |      | Operator training and        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | adherence to                 |
|   |     |      |      | 15D-0 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | .0015 |      | Established procedures.      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Operations are conducted by  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | trained                      |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | personnel only. The          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | installation and the         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | operating procedures         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | have been reviewed by an     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | independent cryogenic safety |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | review committee.            |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+
| * | Oxy | P    | Un   | 4     | *    | **Comments:** The dewar area |
| * | gen | erso | safe | D-0.2 | *0.2 | is not an enclosed area. It  |
| 7 |     | nnel |      |       | 31** |                              |
| * | Dep |      | p    | 5D    |      | is in an outside location    |
| * | let | in   | ract | -0.02 |      | backed by the south wall of  |
|   | ion | jury | ices |       |      | the C0                       |
|   |     |      | or   | 6D    |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      | -0.01 |      | Assembly Hall and has a shed |
|   |     |      | e    |       |      | style roof. The proposal is  |
|   |     |      | quip | 7D-   |      | for                          |
|   |     |      | ment | 0.001 |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | it to be open on the other   |
|   |     |      | fai  |       |      | three sides. In the event of |
|   |     |      | lure |       |      | a very                       |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | large leak in this area on a |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | day with no air currents, it |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | is                           |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | conceivable that a localized |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | ODH condition might exist in |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | the                          |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | vicinity of the leak.        |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | **Passive and Active         |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Mitigation:** Same as those  |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | listed in                    |
|   |     |      |      |       |      |                              |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | Zone 6 \"Flammable Gas\"     |
|   |     |      |      |       |      | section.                     |
+---+-----+------+------+-------+------+------------------------------+

# 

Robert Sanders

01/06/04

This document looks at sizing a ventilation system for C0 that would be
adequate for an ODH emergency. The conclusion reached is that for ODH
reasons C0 should have a ventilation system capable of delivering 5000
CFM of fresh air into the building. If an exhaust fan in a pit is
required, it should be capable of drawing out 6000 CFM. These numbers
are based upon conservative calculations that already have had a 50%
safety factor added to them.

CALCULATIONS:

The worse emergency ODH situation would be a complete break in the
liquid nitrogen transferline inside of the C0 building main hall or the
collision hall. In both the main hall and the collision hall, the
maximum sustained leak rate of nitrogen is for practical purposes, the
same. There will be relatively small amounts of liquid nitrogen indoors.
The source of nitrogen would be the outside dewar. The maximum nitrogen
flow rate is determined by dewar pressure and the flow restriction of
the transfer line between the dewar and the C0 building.

The operating pressure of the dewar is not known. It will most likely
have to be about 5 psi above the suction pressure of the liquid nitrogen
recirculating pump. If the pressure were much higher some of the liquid
nitrogen would flash to vapor at the lower pump pressure and would have
to be vented to atmosphere as waste. For the sake of simplicity and
convenience assume a dewar operating pressure of :

p = 100 psia = 85.7 psig.

Therefore if there were a break in the transferline, discharging liquid
to atmosphere, the pressure drop driving the flow would be 85.7 psi.
Most likely, the dewar pressure will be lower.

Estimate the normal mass flow rate of liquid nitrogen. The heat load for
the pixel cooling system (plus 10%) is

Qdot = 4000 W

The normal boil-off rate Wn of the liquid nitrogen at 100 psia will be
in the pixel system\"

Wn = 193.103 lb / hr

Next estimate the normal pressure drop. The transferline will be
designed to keep the pressure drop at normal flow rates below 1psi.
Assume, for the sake of illustration, the transfer line has the
following components:

100 ft of 1/2\"X0.35\" tubing.

Cryolab 1/2\" globe cryogenic valve, CV8 series, Cv:=6.6

ten 90 degree elbows

The normal pressure drop through the transfer line would be about:

dpn = 0.519064939 psi

This is a reasonable pressure drop to design the transfer line for
during normal operating conditions.

However, during a hypothetical emergency condition, with the transfer
line severed just after it enters the C0 building, the pressure driving
the flow would be the gage pressure of the dewar dpe = 85.7 psi. Assume
the flow in the flow in the pipe is completely liquid. This is a very
conservative assumption. In reality, the pressure change would cause
about 10% to 20% or so of the liquid to vaporize. The lower density
vapor would significantly decrease the maximum flow rate, but the
calculations would be difficult and inaccurate. The flow rate varies
directly approximately with the square root of the pressure drop. So:

We/Wn = (pe/pn)\^(1/2)

Where We is the emergency flow rate and:

We = 2481.2471179085 lb/hr

We may not use 100\' of 1/2 tubing in the transfer line, however, if
need be, a restriction such as an orifice may be placed in the transfer
line that is big enough to permit normal flow at acceptable pressure
drops but to restrict the maximum flow in emergency conditions.

Next consider the required ventilation rates. At standard conditions 60F
and 1 atm the maximum liquid flow rate would be a nitrogen release of :

R = 33621 ft\^3 / hr = 560 scfm

If we use fresh air blowing into the building Solve equation (2) of
FESHM 5064TA-7 with time at infinity:

Q = -(Cr\*R)/(Cr-0.21)

Where R is the release of cryogens into the building, and Q is the
ventilation rate. Set the oxygen concentration Cr:= 0.18 to find the
required ventilation rate.:

Q= 3362.12 cfm

For exhausting air from the building solve equation (4) of FESHM
5064TA-7 with time at infinity:

Q = -0.21\*R/(Cr-0.21)

In which case, the required exhaust ventilation rate Is:

Q = 3922.49 cfm

Since there are many unknowns, and much of the BTEV system is not
designed, it would be reasonable to put a significant safety factor of
at least 50% to the required ventilation rates. Therefore C0 should have
a ventilation system capable of delivering 5000 cfm of fresh air into
the building. If an exhaust fan in a pit is required, it should be
capable of drawing out 6000 cfm.

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**[Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (P-SAD) Issues]{.mark}**

**From: Peter Garbincius**

The installation of the straight section and the low-β\* insertion do
not present any new or unique ES&H challenges beyond standard Tevatron
installation and operating issues. However, the following items are
noted as likely requiring consideration in the Preliminary Safety
Assessment Document (P-SAD).

The straight section and low-β\* insertion configurations allow for the
isolation of the C0 experimental hall from the Oxygen Deficiency Hazard
(ODH) and electrical power bus hazards of the Tevatron tunnel. The HVAC
system for the experimental hall will have to provide adequate fresh air
and monitor and alarm on any reduction of oxygen concentration in the
experimental hall. The hardware and procedures must be sufficiently
flexible to provide for all open/closed configurations of the 400-ton
shielding door and the tunnel isolation doors for equipment and
alignment accessibility.

As at CDF and D0, the radiation access interlock system must be
configured to provide controlled access to the C0 experimental hall, but
not to the Tevatron tunnel, except for emergency egress.

When the SM3 analysis magnets, compensating dipoles, and muon toroid(s)
are installed, lock-out/tag-out (LOTO) and interlocks on the magnet
power systems will likely be required for access to the experimental
hall.

For the low-β\* insertion, the regular Fermilab cryogenic and pressure
vessel standards will apply to the new LHC quads, corrector/trim
packages, and other specialty cryogenic components.

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**RISK-BASED PRIORITY MODEL**

The ES&H scoring and ranking process involves the assessment of various
risks related to environmental or safety and health activities. Because
risk consists of the product of impact severity (consequence) and
likelihood, the process requires consideration and evaluation of all
these factors in deriving a risk value. The ES&H Risk-based Priority
Model (RPM), shown in Table 1, provides the framework for deriving
activity priorities. This document describes the elements of the RPM and
provides explanations and examples of use and interpretation of the
model in the ranking process. The document is divided into the following
sections:

1.  Descriptions of each RPM matrix impact level (1 through 18) with
    examples to

> Illustrate situations to which different impacts apply.

2.  Descriptions of each RPM matrix likelihood level (A through D).

3.  Methodology for revising either RPM impacts or likelihood's to
    accommodate facility data.

+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| ##### TABLE 1                         |      |      |       |      |
|                                       |      |      |       |      |
| **ES&H RISK-BASED PRIORITY MODEL      |      |      |       |      |
| (RPM)**                               |      |      |       |      |
+=======================================+======+======+=======+======+
|                                       | ##   |      |       |      |
|                                       | ###  |      |       |      |
|                                       | LIKE |      |       |      |
|                                       | LIHO |      |       |      |
|                                       | OD O |      |       |      |
|                                       | F OC |      |       |      |
|                                       | CURR |      |       |      |
|                                       | ENCE |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| IMPACTS                               | A    | B    | C     | D    |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
|                                       | VERY | HIGH | M     | LOW  |
|                                       |      |      | EDIUM |      |
|                                       | HIGH |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| **CATEGORY: PUBLIC SAFETY AND         | 3000 | 300  | 30    | .03  |
| HEALTH**                              |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 1.  Immediate or eventual loss of     |      |      |       |      |
|     life/permanent disability         |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 2.  Excessive exposure and/or injury  | 300  | 30   | 3     | .003 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 3.  Moderate to low-level exposure    | 30   | 3    | 0.3   | 0    |
|                                       |      |      |       | .003 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| **CATEGORY: SITE PERSONNEL SAFETY AND | 2000 | 200  | 20    | 0.2  |
| HEALTH**                              |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 4.  Catastrophic - Injuries/illnesses |      |      |       |      |
|     involving permanent total         |      |      |       |      |
|     Disability, chronic or            |      |      |       |      |
|     irreversible illnesses, extreme   |      |      |       |      |
|     Overexposure, or death            |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 5.  Critical - Injuries/illnesses     | 200  | 20   | 0.2   | 0.02 |
|     resulting in permanent partial    |      |      |       |      |
|     Disability or temporary total     |      |      |       |      |
|     disability \> 3 months, or        |      |      |       |      |
|     serious Overexposure              |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 6.  Marginal - Injuries/illnesses     | 100  | 10   | 1     | 0.01 |
|     resulting in hospitalization,     |      |      |       |      |
|     temporary, reversible illnesses   |      |      |       |      |
|     with a variable but limited       |      |      |       |      |
|     period of disability of \< 3      |      |      |       |      |
|     months, slight overexposure       |      |      |       |      |
|     (e.g., 5-10 rem), or exposure     |      |      |       |      |
|     near limits)                      |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 7.  Negligible - Injuries/illnesses   | 10   | 1    | 0.1   | 0.   |
|     not resulting in hospitalization, |      |      |       | 0001 |
|     temporary reversible illnesses    |      |      |       |      |
|     requiring minor supportive        |      |      |       |      |
|     treatment, or exposures below 20% |      |      |       |      |
|     of limits                         |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| ## CATEGORY: COMPLIANCE               | 150  | 15   | 1.5   | 0    |
|                                       |      |      |       | .015 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 8.  Major noncompliance with Federal, |      |      |       |      |
|     State, or Local Laws; Enforcement |      |      |       |      |
|     Actions; or Compliance Agreements |      |      |       |      |
|     significant to ES&H and involving |      |      |       |      |
|     significant potential fines or    |      |      |       |      |
|     penalties                         |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 9.  Major noncompliance with          | 75   | 7.5  | 0.75  | 0.   |
|     Executive Orders; DOE Orders;     |      |      |       | 0075 |
|     Necessary and Sufficient          |      |      |       |      |
|     Standards; or Secretary of Energy |      |      |       |      |
|     Directives (Notices or Guidance   |      |      |       |      |
|     Memoranda) significant to ES&H    |      |      |       |      |
|     but not involving significant     |      |      |       |      |
|     potential fines and penalties     |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 10. Marginal noncompliance with       | 20   | 2    | 0.2   | 0    |
|     Federal, State, Local Laws;       |      |      |       | .002 |
|     Enforcement Actions; Compliance   |      |      |       |      |
|     Agreements; Executive Orders; DOE |      |      |       |      |
|     Orders; Necessary and Sufficient  |      |      |       |      |
|     Standards; or Secretary of Energy |      |      |       |      |
|     Directives significant to ES&H    |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 11. Significant deviation from good   | 1    | 0.1  | 0.01  | 0.   |
|     management practices              |      |      |       | 0001 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| ## CATEGORY: MISSION IMPACT           | 150  | 15   | 1.5   | 0    |
|                                       |      |      |       | .015 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 12. Serious negative impact on        |      |      |       |      |
|     ability to accomplish major       |      |      |       |      |
|     program mission                   |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 13. Moderate negative impact on       | 75   | 7.5  | 0.75  | 0.   |
|     ability to accomplish major       |      |      |       | 0075 |
|     150program mission                |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| **CATEGORY: COST-EFFECTIVE RISK       | 40   | 4    | 0.4   | 0    |
| MANAGEMENT**                          |      |      |       | .004 |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 14. Significant avoidable costs due   |      |      |       |      |
|     to degrading infrastructure,      |      |      |       |      |
|     inefficient management systems or |      |      |       |      |
|     program implementation, or        |      |      |       |      |
|     accident-related capital loss     |      |      |       |      |
|     (annual costs \> \$5M, or         |      |      |       |      |
|     one-time costs \> \$25M)          |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 15. Moderate avoidable costs due to   | 15   | 1.5  | 0.15  | 0.   |
|     degrading infrastructure,         |      |      |       | 0015 |
|     inefficient management systems or |      |      |       |      |
|     program implementation, or        |      |      |       |      |
|     accident-related capital loss     |      |      |       |      |
|     (annual cost \$1M-5M/year, or     |      |      |       |      |
|     one-time costs \< \$25M)          |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| **CATEGORY: ENVIRONMENTAL             |      |      |       |      |
| PROTECTION**                          |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 16. Catastrophic damage to the        | 2000 | 200  | 20    | 0.2  |
|     environment (widespread and       |      |      |       |      |
|     long-term or irreversible         |      |      |       |      |
|     effects)                          |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 17. Significant damage to the         | 200  | 20   | 2     | 0.02 |
|     environment (widespread and       |      |      |       |      |
|     short-term effects, or localized  |      |      |       |      |
|     and long-term or irreversible     |      |      |       |      |
|     effects)                          |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+
| 18. Minor to moderate damage to the   | 20   | 2    | 0.2   | 0    |
|     environment (localized and        |      |      |       | .002 |
|     short-term effects)               |      |      |       |      |
+---------------------------------------+------+------+-------+------+

## Section 1 RPM Matrix Impacts

The rows of the RPM matrix constitute the impacts used to score the risk
benefits of activities. The matrix impacts are organized in six
categories, representing the major types of risks important to ES&H
activities:

1\. [Public Safety and Health]{.underline} includes potential adverse
impacts on the health

> and safety of the *off-site* population surrounding a facility.

2\. [Site Personnel Safety and Health]{.underline} includes potential
adverse impacts on

> the safety and health of individuals *inside the facility boundary.*
> This
>
> includes site workers and visitors.
>
> 3\. [Compliance]{.underline} includes failures to comply with laws,
> regulations, compliance
>
> agreements, Executive Orders, necessary and sufficient standards, and
>
> DOE Orders related to Environment, Safety and Health. Such failures
>
> may adversely affect the confidence of DOE or other agencies in the
>
> ability of the facility to operate while protecting the public,
> workers, and
>
> the environment.

4\. [Mission Impact]{.underline} includes potential adverse impacts on
the ability to

> perform the research or production mission of the facility or the
> ability to
>
> carry out important parts of the mission.

5\. [Cost-Effective Risk Management]{.underline} includes potential
accidental losses to a

> facility\'s capital investment (buildings, equipment) or an existing
>
> opportunity for cost savings, such as infrastructure upgrades,
>
> management systems upgrades, or improved program development.

6\. [Environmental Protection]{.underline} includes potential adverse
harmful impact on

> natural resources (air, water, land, wildlife).

Each of the six categories includes two or more impacts representing
different levels of severity within the category. For example the Site
Personnel Safety category includes four impacts of decreasing severity:
catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible. The following sections
define the RPM impacts.

1.  **[Public Safety and Health]{.underline}**

*Impact 1 Immediate or eventual loss of life/permanent disability*

This impact should be chosen when a potential result of a condition
being

evaluated could lead to permanent disability (loss of limb, sight,
hearing.) or loss of life by one or more members of the off-site
population. This impact includes immediate deaths and disabling
injuries, as well as future cancer deaths or genetic damage and effects
that might result from releases of hazardous or radioactive materials
that breach the site boundaries. Such releases could be the result of
accidents that release hazardous materials within a building combined
with failures in building confinement or containment, accidents during
off-site transportation, or catastrophic events resulting in direct
release of materials (*e.g.*, fire,

explosion).

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a set of seismic safety improvement projects
to*

*correct structural and equipment deficiencies that could contribute to*

*building failures in case of an earthquake. Under current conditions,
there*

*is a high likelihood of building structural failure in a strong
earthquake.*

*Structural failure may result in a chemical release or fire that could
spread*

*off-site. Because a number of public facilities and private residences
are*

*in close proximity to the site boundary, public safety could be
threatened*

*and fatalities are possible.*

*Impact 2 Excessive exposure and/or injury*

This impact indicates the potential for excessive exposure or injury to
the

off-site population, but without the potential for death or permanent

disabling injury (*i.e.*, recovery from potential injuries is expected).

Excessive exposures to radioactive or hazardous materials are those that

exceed published acceptable limits.

***Example***

*The example given for Impact 1, above, could apply to this impact if
the*

*volume of chemicals that could potentially be released was reduced
such*

*that death or permanent injury was not expected. However, public*

*exposures to hazardous substances that exceed limits would still be*

*expected.*

*Impact 3 Moderate- to low-level exposure*

This impact indicates the potential for exposure of the off-site
population

to hazardous or radioactive materials, but these exposures are no
greater

than published acceptable limits. Immediate deaths or injuries are not

expected. Rates of cancer incidence in the population would not

detectably increase.

***Example***

*A facility must purchase modern radiation survey equipment to comply*

*with DOE Orders 5400.5 and 5480.11 and ANSI N323. Existing survey*

*equipment does not meet requirements for lower limits of detection for*

*release of equipment or materials from radioactive materials
management*

*areas at the facility. Because of this inadequacy in detection*

*instrumentation, there is a chance that contaminated materials may be*

*inadvertently released to uncontrolled areas and subsequently travel
offsite.*

*Because of the nature and volume of the potential released*

*contaminated materials, however, the potential releases would not*

*constitute a threat to public health, but could result in a minimal
exposure*

*of members of the public to radioactive material.*

Impacts 1, 2, and 3 differ in the extent of potential off-site
consequences. In considering the potential consequences of a condition
at a facility, the following factors should be considered:

1)  The nature of possible accidents that could occur at the facility;

2)  The potential for off-site release of hazardous or radioactive
    material in

> case of an accident;

3)  The amount and type of hazardous or radioactive material present;
    and

4)  The potential for deaths, injuries, or exposures of the off-site
    population.

Impacts 1, 2, and 3 do not include deaths or disabling injuries that may
be experienced by site visitors. Impacts on visitors are treated as
equivalent to effects on site workers, as visitors to the site are
considered to have accepted on-site risks when they entered the site
boundary.

1.  **[Site Personnel Safety and Health]{.underline}**

*Impact 4 Catastrophic: Injuries/illnesses involving permanent total
disability, chronic*

> *or irreversible illnesses, extreme overexposure, or death*

This impact encompasses potential permanent effects among the site

worker population. Such effects may result from industrial accidents or

excessive exposures to hazardous or radioactive materials. This impact

includes immediate deaths and disabling injuries as well as future
deaths

from latent effects such as cancer.

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a Line Item Project to bring site buildings
into*

*compliance with fire and life safety codes and to correct deficiencies
found*

*in a facility-wide fire protection engineering survey. Deficiencies
include*

*inadequate sprinklers, fire barriers, alarms, exit corridors, and exit
doors.*

*In case of fire in a site building with these deficiencies, fire and
smoke can*

*spread quickly through the building. Fire alarms cannot be heard in
some*

*parts of the buildings and some exit corridors are too long, poorly*

*protected, or poorly marked. Under these conditions, a fire may lead to
a*

*fatality of a site worker in the affected building.*

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a set of seismic safety improvement projects
to*

*correct structural and equipment deficiencies that could contribute to*

*building failures in case of an earthquake. Under current conditions,
there*

*is a high likelihood of building structural failure in a strong
earthquake.*

*Persons inside the deficient buildings would be at risk and fatalities
are*

*Possible.*

*Impact 5 Critical: Injuries/illnesses resulting in permanent partial
disability,*

> *temporary total disability (\> 3 months), or serious overexposure*

This impact involves injuries, illnesses, or exposures that result in
lengthy

hospitalization and significant recuperation time, but are not expected
to

result in death or permanent total disability. This impact includes

exposures to radioactive or hazardous materials that may exceed

published acceptable limits.

*Impact 6 Marginal: Injuries/illnesses resulting in hospitalization,
temporary*

> *reversible illnesses with a variable but limited period of disability
> (\<3*
>
> *months), slight overexposure, or exposure near limits (20-100%)*

This impact involves worker injuries, illnesses, or exposures that
result in emergency room treatment, limited hospitalization, and lost
work time. Time required for recuperation from these effects, however,
is not

extensive.

***Example***

*A facility proposes a Line Item Project to improve pedestrian and
vehicular*

*safety through roadway modifications. This project will improve sight
lines*

*at turns and intersections and widen narrow portions of site roadways.*

*Under current conditions, the facility experiences about two road
accidents*

*per year. These accidents are typically minor, but do occasionally
result*

*in injuries requiring limited hospitalization.*

*Impact 7 Negligible: Injuries/illnesses not resulting in
hospitalization, temporary*

> *reversible illnesses requiring minor supportive treatment, or
> exposures*
>
> *below 20% of limits*

This impact involves worker injuries, illnesses, and exposures that
would be expected to result in no lost work time (unless the exposure
resulted in a cumulative dose exceeding limits). Standard first aid is
expected to be

adequate treatment.

1.  **[Compliance]{.underline}**

*Impact 8 Major noncompliance with Federal, state, or local laws;
enforcement*

> *activities; or compliance agreements significant to environment,
> safety, or*
>
> *health and involving significant potential fines or penalties*

This impact includes major violations of laws, regulations, codes,
enforcement actions, compliance agreements, or standards. These
noncompliances have the following characteristics.

1\. Violation of the law, regulation, code, enforcement action,

> compliance agreement, or standard could result in the
>
> imposition of fines on DOE or the operating organization,
>
> imprisonment of DOE or operating organization personnel,
>
> liability for the payment of significant damages, or other
>
> legal penalties.

2\. The existing situation must represent a *major, substantive* non-

> compliance with the law, regulation, code, or standard. If existing
>
> conditions are substantially in compliance with only minor
>
> exceptions, then this impact does not pertain (see definition of
>
> Impact 10 below)

3\. The violated law, regulation, code, or standard must be

> significant to environment, safety, or health.

If an activity addresses a major non-compliance with an environmental
law or regulation (such as the CAA, RCRA, or CERCLA), the compliance
impact should be 8. If an activity addresses a major non-compliance with

a rule subject to penalties under the Price-Anderson amendments act,
then impact 8 also applies.

In general, non-compliance with a DOE Order or necessary and sufficient
standard should be scored using Impact 9 or 10 below because fines or
criminal penalties do not typically result from DOE Order
non-compliance. Likewise, non-compliance with an OSHA requirement or a
DOE OSH Order should be scored using Impact 9 or 10 below, unless OSHA
has the force of law at a facility (which is not currently the case at
most DOE facilities). If an activity addresses a major non-compliance
with an environmental law and a DOE Order simultaneously, the applicable
compliance impact with the highest potential risk reduction score should

be chosen (in this case Impact 8).

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a project to expand its hazardous waste
storage*

*and disposal capability. Currently, hazardous waste handling capability
is*

*inadequate, so that waste remains in temporary storage locations for*

*longer than 90 days. This is a violation of RCRA and the facility may
be*

*fined by the EPA. Because this example involves non-compliance with an*

*environmental law, it would be scored with Compliance Impact 8.*

***Example***

*A contractor radiation protection program requires several changes in*

*order to comply with 10CFR-835 provisions. A large number of further*

*changes are required in order to implement the DOE Radiological
Control*

*Manual. Impact 8 applies to those activities needed to achieve 10CFR-*

*835 compliance, because non-compliance is subject to legal action
under*

*Price-Anderson. Impact 8 does not apply, however, to additional
activities*

*(beyond 10CFR-835 provisions) needed to implement the Rad Con*

*manual.*

*The RPM compliance impacts that apply to Rad Con manual implementation
depend on whether the activities needed for implementation have some
other compliance driver. If the activities have a compliance driver,
such as a DOE Order, then impacts 9 or 10 apply (see impact descriptions
below). Otherwise, if the activities are best management practices or
recommendations without a formal compliance driver, then impact 11
applies.*

*Impact 9 Major noncompliance with Executive Orders; DOE Orders;
necessary and*

> *sufficient standards; or Secretary of Energy Directives (Notices or*
>
> *Guidance Memoranda) that are significant to environment, safety, or*
>
> *health but not involving significant potential fines and penalties.*

This impact includes significant non-compliances with any DOE Order,
necessary and sufficient standard, or Secretary of Energy Directive that
is significant to ES&H. To distinguish Impact 9 from Impact 8,
noncompliances included under Impact 9 cannot result in fines,
imprisonment, or other legal penalties. Impact 9 also includes facility
non-compliance with laws, regulations, codes, and standards (*e.g.*,
OSHA, NFPA, ANSI,

NEC, MSHA) that are referenced in DOE Orders, but do not have the force
of law at the facility . As with non-compliance covered under Impact 1-8
above, conditions of non-compliance included in this impact must be

*major, substantive* non-compliances and must relate to requirements
that are significant to environment, safety, and health. The impact does
not include marginal non-compliances, such as minor administrative

discrepancies (see definition of Impact 10 below).

***Example***

*A recent audit finding identified that the Hazards Communication
Program at*

*a Facility is not in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order
5480.10.*

*All aspects of the program are lacking, including surveillance,*

*communications, and record-keeping. A facility proposes to add 5 FTEs
to*

*upgrade the Hazards Communication Program.*

***Example***

*A facility proposes to increase staff in its industrial safety section
to*

*support efforts for achieving full compliance with DOE-required OSHA*

*standards (such as DOE Order 5483.01). Without this additional
staffing,*

*the facility will remain substantively out of compliance.*

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a GPP project to upgrade electrical cable that
does*

*not comply with NEC requirements. Compliance with NEC requirements*

*is needed for conformance with DOE Order 6430.1A.*

*Impact 10 Marginal noncompliance with Federal, state, and local laws;
enforcement*

> *actions; compliance agreements; Executive Orders; DOE Orders;
> necessary*
>
> *and sufficient standard; or Secretary of Energy Directives that are
> significant*
>
> *to ES&H*

This impact includes *minor* discrepancies in compliance with laws,
regulations, codes, standards, Orders, or directives that are
significant to ES&H (the same group of laws and orders, that are
included in Impacts 8

and 9). It is differentiated from Impacts 8 and 9, which cover major
noncompliance conditions. This impact pertains to conditions in which
current ES&H programs largely conform to the requirements of applicable
laws and Orders., but do not fulfill certain marginal or administrative
aspects of the requirements.

For example, if a facility has fulfilled the actual substantive physical
requirements of a law or Order, but has not completed all administrative
requirements or paper work, then Impact 10 applies.

***Example***

*A facility proposes to add 1 additional clerical employee to assist the
IS*

*Manager in support of the Hazards Communication Program which was*

*recently upgraded as required by DOE Order 5480.10. The*

*responsibilities of this new employee will be record keeping and
clerical*

*support for visiting assessment teams. Recent audits have indicated
that*

*the program is adequate, but to be in full compliance the Facility
must*

*keep better records of communication activities and provide better
clerical*

*support for visiting assessment teams to allow them to obtain a more*

*comprehensive picture of the state of the Facility\'s compliance.*

***Example***

*DOE Order 5480.07 requires that facilities have adequate fire
protection*

*systems in buildings, that these systems be tested and inspected*

*routinely, and that the facility maintain records of the fire system
testing*

*and surveillance. If a facility has adequate fire protection systems in
each*

*building and has routinely performed the required testing and
surveillance*

*on these systems, but has failed to keep timely records of the testing
and*

*surveillance, then the appropriate impact in this case would be Impact
10.*

*Impact 11 Significant deviation from good management practices*

This impact indicates a significant deviation from accepted industry or
DOE standards for the performance of activities in a given area. Such
directives or good practices do not have the weight of a law or DOE

Order, nor do they have the importance of a directive or instruction
issued by the Secretary of Energy.

1.  **[Mission Impact]{.underline}**

*Impact 12 Serious negative impact on ability to accomplish major
program mission*

> This impact includes conditions that seriously curtail or prevent
>
> accomplishment of the mission of a major program at a site. The

condition need not shut down the entire site, but must threaten the

> continuation of at least one of the facility\'s major research or
> production
>
> missions. Under this impact, the interruption of the affected program
>
> mission must be of sufficient duration to pose serious doubts about
> the
>
> feasibility of accomplishing yearly goals or objectives set for the
> program.

The program mission impact may be due to regulatory or administrative
shutdown of part of a facility, a catastrophic accident preventing
continued activities, or the unavailability of equipment, staff, or
other

resources required by the program.

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a Line Item Project to bring site buildings
into*

*compliance with fire and life safety codes, and to correct
deficiencies*

*found in a facility-wide fire protection engineering survey.
Deficiencies*

*include inadequate sprinklers, fire barriers, alarms, exit corridors,
and exit*

*doors. In case of fire in a site building with these deficiencies, fire
and*

*smoke can spread quickly through the building and significant portions
of*

*the building may be damaged or destroyed. If so, research programs*

*under way in this building will be severely disrupted and unable to*

*continue before the replacement of necessary facilities. This
disruption*

*will impede progress in the research and may make it impossible to*

*achieve goals set for the program.*

***Example***

*Radiological surveys of chemistry laboratories at a site have
discovered*

*previously unknown contamination outside of posted radiological areas.*

*In order to fully comply with DOE Order 5480.11 and DOE ALARA*

*guidelines, the facility is proposing to fund systematic, detailed
surveys of*

*the laboratories and management of any contamination that is
discovered.*

*If this work is not performed, then all chemistry division laboratories
could*

*be zoned as radiation areas. This would result in loss of effective use
of*

*the laboratory facilities and prevent progress in major programs that
rely*

*on the facilities.*

*Impact 13 Moderate negative impact on ability to accomplish major
program mission*

> This impact includes conditions preventing accomplishment of major
>
> program missions at a site. However, the interruptions of programs
>
> considered under this impact are shorter than those included under
>
> Impact 12 above. The interruptions included under Impact 13 may pose
>
> risks to the achievement of set program goals or objectives, but still
> allow
>
> the possibility that such goals or objectives may be met.

***Example***

*A facility must institute a site roadway safety and stabilization
program to*

*meet Federal and State safety standards. This project will stabilize*

*landslides adjacent to roads at the site. Without this work, the
landslides*

*threaten to displace roadways and underground utilities. If this
occurred,*

*access and utility supplies to some site buildings could be disrupted,*

*interrupting programs in these locations. However, repairs to
re-establish*

*access and utilities are not expected to cause an excessive disruption
of*

*progress on these programs, however.*

1.  **[Cost-Effective Risk Management]{.underline}**

*Impact 14 Significant avoidable cost such as degraded infrastructure,
inefficient*

> *management systems or program implementation, or accident-related*
>
> *capital loss (total cost \> \$25M or annual cost \> \$5M)*
>
> Impacts 14 and 15 involve either the loss of DOE capital investment
> due
>
> to accidents or an existing opportunity for cost savings (such as
>
> infrastructure upgrades, management systems upgrades, or improved
>
> program development). The difference between Impacts 14 and 15 is the
>
> dollar value shown to be at risk or the dollar value of the cost
> savings
>
> opportunity.

For Impact 14, the loss of investment could include loss of buildings,
equipment, materials, finished products, or supplies, in which DOE had
invested greater than \$25 million. Such loss could be incurred by
events such as fire, explosion, human errors, or natural occurrences. In
addition to situations involving financial loss due to accidents, Impact
14 also includes opportunities for cost savings that would have a
positive financial impact. Prominent among such opportunities are
situations in which an immediate preventive investment can help avoid a
potentially greater cost impact in the future. Examples include
neglected facility infrastructure for which short-term expenditures on
physical upgrades or increased maintenance or surveillance can help
avoid increased long-term costs due to continued neglect or degradation
or potential catastrophic damage. For Impact 14 to apply, the total cost
savings must exceed \$25 million. Impact 14 also includes annual cost
impacts greater than \$5 million incurred as a result of a condition
causing losses to a facility\'s capital stock. Similarly, Impact 14
includes opportunities for recurring annual preventive or other positive
financial impacts exceeding \$5 million.

Examples include opportunities to develop improved ES&H management
systems that increase the efficiency of managing ES&H issues, thereby
promoting the early identification of problems, the setting of
appropriate

priorities for addressing issues, and definition of cost-effective
activities for addressing issues.

***Example***

*A facility has proposed a Line Item Project to bring site buildings
into*

*compliance with fire and life safety codes and to correct deficiencies
found*

*in a facility-wide fire protection engineering survey. Deficiencies
include*

*inadequate sprinklers, fire barriers, alarms, exit corridors, and exit
doors.*

*In case of fire in a site building with these deficiencies, fire and
smoke can*

*spread quickly through the building and significant portions of the
building*

*may be damaged or destroyed. If so, the cost of repair or replacement
of*

*the building and its contents could exceed \$25M.*

***Example***

*A site contractor has proposed launching a behavior-based safety
process*

*to improve worker safety and decrease the frequency of on-the-job*

*injuries. The process includes workplace observation and feedback to*

*workers to improve the safety of workplace behaviors. In addition to*

*substantial expected safety improvements, the process is expected to*

*yield substantial annual cost savings through reduction of workman\'s*

*compensation expenses. The avoided costs could exceed \$5M per year.*

***Example***

*A national laboratory has identified several site buildings that have
not*

*been maintained adequately for many years and are in need of immediate*

*physical upgrades and/or enhanced maintenance and surveillance.*

*Without short-term commitment of resources, these buildings are
subject*

*to continued deterioration and potential catastrophic damage that
would*

*require large expenditures to remediate. The remediation costs could
top*

*\$25M if such damage occurs.*

*Impact 15 Moderate avoidable cost due to degraded infrastructure,
inefficient*

*management systems or program implementation, or accident-related*

*capital loss (total cost \<\$25M or annual cost \$1M-5M).*

This impact is similar to Impact 14, with the exception of the dollar

amounts of the loss of investment. This impact includes lower investment

losses or cost savings opportunities.

***Example***

*A facility proposes a Line Item Project for a site roadway safety and*

*stabilization program to meet Federal and State safety standards. This*

*project will stabilize landslides adjacent to roads at the site.
Without this*

*work, the landslides threaten to displace roadways and underground*

*utilities. The damaged roadways and utilities would have to be repaired
or*

*replaced, but the cost of such work would be lower than \$25M.*

***Example***

*A national laboratory and DOE Operations Office ES&H division propose*

*coordinated development of an integrated issue management and*

*commitment tracking system to improve the efficiency of ES&H*

*management at the lab, increase accountability, and allow the
Operations*

*Office to perform its oversight role more productively. It is expected
that*

*implementation of such a system will improve the cost-effectiveness of*

*risk management activities. The savings that are expected to result
are*

*expected to be around \$1.5M per year.*

***Example***

*A production facility plans to perform a pollution prevention/ waste*

*minimization opportunity assessment on one segment of the plant\'s*

*process and to implement waste minimization activities based on the*

*findings of the assessment. Preliminary evaluations have indicated
that*

*the resulting waste reduction would substantially reduce disposal
costs. It*

*is estimated that costs could be reduced by around \$3M per year.*

1.  **[Environmental Protection]{.underline}**

Environmental impacts are defined as damage to a significant public
resource such as: air, water, land or wildlife. These impacts would
primarily result from accidents involving the release or spill of
radioactive

or hazardous materials to the environment.

*Impact 16 Catastrophic damage to the environment (widespread and
long-term or*

> *irreversible effects)*

This impact includes the most severe environmental effects, those with
both of the following characteristics.

1\. The effects are spread or may be spread over a wide area

> and are not easily containable in a limited area.

2\. The effects are either irreversible or may only be reversed

> over a period of several years.

***Example***

*A process at a facility involves the use of industrial solvents. The
facility*

*has proposed a project for better monitoring of the releases from the*

*process. Under current conditions, solvents may be released, travel
offsite,*

*and contaminate ground water that serves as the drinking water*

*supply for a nearby community. The water supply would be unusable and*

*an alternative supply would be needed. Cleanup of the ground water is*

*thought to require 30 years.*

*Impact 17 Significant damage to the environment (widespread and
short-term*

> *effects, or localized and long-term or irreversible effects)*

This impact includes serious environmental effects that are less severe
than those considered under Impact 16 above. These impacts must have one
of the following characteristics:

1\. The effects are spread or may be spread over a wide area

> but may be reversed in no more than a year\'s time.
>
> *or*

2\. The effects are confined to a limited area but are either

> irreversible or require several years to reverse.

*Impact 18 Minor to moderate damage to the environment (localized and
short-term*

> *effects)*

This impact includes less severe effects on the environment than those
covered in Impacts 16 and 17. These effects include both of the
following characteristics:

1.  The effects are confined to a limited area.

> *and*

2.  The effects may be reversed within a year\'s time.

***Example***

*A facility proposes a project to construct double containment of feed
lines*

*into a diesel fuel tank to help prevent leaks. Currently, the tank is*

*vulnerable to leaks, which could spill fuel and contaminate the soil in
the*

*area surrounding the tank. Because of the volume and location of the*

*tank, however, the contamination will not spread off-site and will not*

*contaminate any water sources. Clean-up should require only a few*

*weeks.*

**Section 2 RPM Matrix Likelihood**

The RPM matrix columns (see Table 1) constitute the levels of likelihood
used in assessing the risk reduction benefit of activities. The matrix
uses four levels of likelihood, as given in Table 2. Each likelihood
level has an associated numerical value, which is multiplied by the
impact weights to derive the risk value for each matrix

cell in the matrix column corresponding to the likelihood level.

**TABLE 2**

**RPM MATRIX LIKELIHOOD LEVELS**

+---------------+----------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
|               | A        | B           | C           | D            |
+---------------+----------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Likelihood    | Very     | High        | Medium      | Low          |
|               | High     |             |             |              |
+---------------+----------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Numerical     | 1.0      | 0.1         | 0.01        | 0.0001       |
| Value         |          |             |             |              |
+---------------+----------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Expectation   | 1 in 1   | \< 1 in 1   | \<1 in 10   | \<1 in 100   |
|               | Year     | Year        | Years       | Years,       |
|               |          |             |             |              |
|               |          | \~1 in 10   | \~1 in 100  | \~1 in       |
|               |          | Years       | Years       | 10,000 Years |
+---------------+----------+-------------+-------------+--------------+

The likelihood levels are defined as:

A. **[Very High]{.underline}** likelihood indicates an impact already
exists with certainty or is

expected to occur at least once per year. For example, if a facility is

known to be out of compliance with a DOE ES&H Order, then the

likelihood of this impact falls into the *very high* category. If a
condition at

a facility has historically resulted in one or more lost-time worker
injuries

per year and the condition has not been corrected, then the likelihood
of

this impact also fits this category.

B. **[High]{.underline}** likelihood indicates that an impact is
expected less frequently than

once per year, but more frequently than once every 10 years. Such

impacts are expected to occur within the operating history of the
facility,

but have not occurred regularly every year.

C. **[Medium]{.underline}** likelihood indicates that an impact is
expected less frequently

than once every 10 years but more frequently than once every 100 years.

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Impacts with this likelihood are not expected frequently within the

operating life of a facility, but may occur once in the facility\'s
life.

D. **[Low]{.underline}** likelihood impacts are unlikely to occur within
the operating life of a

facility, but are not completely precluded from occurring. For example,

impacts in this category may occur once in the operating life of one
facility

out of a population of 100 similar facilities. Impacts with this
likelihood

are expected to occur less frequently than once per 100 years, but more

frequently than once per 10,000 years.

The RPM columns represent four specific likelihood values that may be
used in

assessment of risks for activity scoring. In addition, the ES&H
Management Plan

Information System allows other likelihood values to be entered
directly. Such values

may be entered if information exists that supports other specific
likelihood values for

impacts in the risk scoring of an activity.

***Example***

*A portion of a non-reactor nuclear facility Safety Analysis Report
analyzes a scenario in*

*which an extreme over-exposure of workers could occur. The likelihood
of this scenario*

*is estimated to be 10 per year. A fix has been defined to remove the
possibility of this -3*

*scenario. In deriving the RPM score for an activity representing
implementation of the*

*fix, impact 4 (extreme over-exposure of workers) applies. Because the
estimated*

*likelihood of the scenario falls between the representative likelihoods
for RPM columns*

*C and D (10 and 10 ), this likelihood value may be entered directly in
the Information -2 -4*

*System; the risk score for the impact-likelihood combination
representing this scenario*

*is 2 (=10 times 2000). Note that a likelihood value other than one of
the RPM matrix -3*

*column likelihoods was used in this case because specific information
was available*

*(i.e., part of a facility SAR) to support a different value.*

## Section 3 Allowance for More Precise Values for Impacts and Likelihoods

The RPM matrix includes discrete values for severity of impact (the rows
of the matrix) and the likelihood of experiencing these impacts (the
columns of the matrix). These discrete values should be adequate to
support prioritization of activities in most instances. However, if the
facility has more precise risk assessment information available, the RPM
can be modified to accommodate such information. More precise
information can be incorporated in two ways:

-   Instead of using the discrete likelihood levels discussed in Section
    2, the

RPM can accept any likelihood between 0.0001 and 1.0;

-   A consequence multiplier can be applied to each impact to
    interpolate

between or extrapolate beyond the discrete impacts levels of the RPM.

For example, the consequence multiplier can be applied to the Public
Safety and Health or Site Personnel Safety and Health categories account
for the size of the population impacted. The RPM weights in each RPM
matrix cell in these categories have been assigned based on an
assumption that each impact affects 10 persons. If a

significantly higher or lower number of persons are affected by an
impact, however, then different weights are appropriate. Specifically,
the weight should vary proportionally to the number of affected persons.

The RPM cell weights may be used exactly as given in the matrix, without
adjustment, if the activity scorers determine that the implicit
assumption of ten persons being affected by the impact is sufficient to
score an activity appropriately. If the number of persons expected to be
affected by an impact diverges significantly (either higher or lower)
from this assumption, so that the risk benefits of the activity are not
represented

appropriately by the RPM cell weights, the process allows for an
additional factor to be specified to multiply by the RPM cell weights.
The appropriate adjustment factor equals the number of persons expected
to be affected divided by ten. For example, if 100 persons are expected
to be affected by an impact, then the multiplier equals 10 (= 100
persons affected divided by 10 persons implicit in RPM weights). If no
more than one person is expected to be affected, then the multiplier
equals 0.1 (= 1 person affected divided by 10 persons implicit in RPM
weights). The consequence multiplier can be applied for those impact
categories with continuous

impact scales (e.g. number of injuries, risk management investment
dollars) and where additional quantitative risk assessment information
is available to establish a basis for the more precise values. The
multiplier should not be used to interpolate between levels of
compliance. The ES&H Budget Plan Information System and ADS form
includes fields in which the consequence multiplier may be entered when
an activity is scored. These fields have default values of one,
indicating no adjustment to the RPM weights.

***Example***

*A national laboratory plans a program to reduce lost time injuries to
lab workers.*

*Currently, such injuries occur at a rate of 100 per year. The proposed
program intends*

*to reduce this rate significantly. An ADS is prepared to represent this
program. In*

*scoring this activity, Impact 6 (lost-time worker injuries) applies
with a RPM likelihood*

*category of A (greater than once per year). In addition, the number of
persons affected*

*by the impact significantly exceeds the 10 per year assumption implicit
in the RPM*

*weight for Impact 6. The appropriate multiplier for 100 injury victims
per year is 10*

*(=100/10). This results in a scaled weight for the Site Personnel
impact equal to 1000*

*(Impact 6, Likelihood A RPM weight equals 100, multiplied by a scaling
factor of 10).*

***Example***

*A site proposes to upgrade safety analysis reports for a nuclear
facility at the site. It is*

*anticipated that the additional analysis of facility hazards will
result in discovery of*

*previously un-analyzed scenarios that could lead to release of
radioactivity beyond the*

*site boundary and exposure of the surrounding general population to
potentially lethal*

*doses. The likelihood of any of these scenarios occurring is very low
(a total of around*

*0.0001 per year), but the site is adjacent to a town with a population
of 10,000. If the*

*postulated scenarios and releases occur, it is expected that 10% of
this population*

*could receive lethal doses. Thus in RPM scoring of these risks, Impact
1 (fatality to*

*members of the public) and likelihood level D (1 in 10,000 years)
apply. To account for*

*the high number of potential victims, a scaling factor of 100 should be
specified (=10%*

*of 10,000 total population divided by 10). The adjusted RPM impact
weight equals 30*

*(RPM Impact 1, Likelihood D, multiplier of 100).*

[]{.mark}