**Disaster Response:**

**Principles of Preparation & Coordination**

**Erik Auf der Heide, M.D., FACEP**

**Chapter 1: THE PROBLEM**

The Topeka, Kansas tornado June 8, 1966.\
(Courtesy of *Topeka Capital-Journal*, Topeka, Kansas.)

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  Disasters are the ultimate test of emergency response capability. The
  ability to effectively deal with disasters is becoming more relevant
  because of factors that tend to increase risk. Unfortunately, there are
  recurring difficulties with disaster response. Lessons learned in
  previous disasters are not always being applied in other communities.
  Sometimes this is because accurate information regarding the basic
  underlying causes of the difficulties is not readily available to
  emergency and disaster responders. The purpose of this text is to
  summarize what the research on disasters has revealed about these
  underlying causes.

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**DISASTER: THE ULTIMATE EMERGENCY**\
\
\"When I got out of the ambulance there were people lying everywhere.
Police officers were carrying people out of the front door of the hotel,
bystanders were helping others out; and many people were just running
into each other trying to get out of the hotel. It was absolute
pandemonium. I could see about 200 people outside. Half of them were
lying in the grass and the parking lot driveway\.... When I walked into
the hotel, people began pulling at me wanting me to help their wives,
husbands or friends\.... There were people chopped in half, just torsos
lying about; people with limbs sheared off, people crushed flat, ones
that were still trapped screaming for help. There is no way I can
explain the helplessness that overwhelmed me when I saw this. There must
have been more than a 100 people still in that hotel dead and in major
trauma-and there I stood not knowing what to do next.\"\
Jim Taylor, Paramedic\
Hyatt Hotel Disaster\
Kansas City\
July 17, 1981 (Stout, 1981)\
\
Paramedic Taylor was about to make decisions that could have had life or
death consequences for a large number of people.\
\
Many people have pondered how they would cope with a disaster of such
magnitude. This has been, in fact, a topic of intrigue throughout the
ages. Fascination with disasters is reflected in the number of news
accounts, movies, and books that deal with the subject. Even before mass
communication, and in preliterate times, ballads sprang up after every
catastrophe. People want to know what it is like when a town is
obliterated by a wall of water or when high-rise hotel guests are
trapped by a fire on the 35th floor.

**Figure 1-1.** Rescue operations at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel
skywalk collapse. (Courtesy of the Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas
City, Missouri.)

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  \"They want to know how others act under such extreme situations, using
  disaster as a test for bringing out what is normally hidden-the best
  and the worst in people, the abilities normal life does not tap, and
  the dark motives we all repress. As we read about disaster, in safety
  and comfort, we vicariously test ourselves and our society-How would I
  have behaved, how would my community have behaved?\" (Barton,
  1969:xliii)

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For the emergency or public safety professional, this question has much
more relevance than that of curiosity. These persons are the ones to
whom the community will look for leadership and guidance in the event of
a disaster. For them, more than anyone else, it is a test of all their
training, experience, and ability; for them disaster is the ultimate
emergency.\
\
\
**THE RISK OF DISASTER**\
\
Concern about disasters is becoming increasingly relevant as increases
in population density, population shifts, and increasing technology make
it likely that we will encounter disasters more frequently and that they
will be more severe (Drabek, 1986:60, 70). Conservative estimates
suggest, for example, that the dollar losses from disasters in the year
2000 will be double that experienced in 1980 (Petak, 1985). There are
several reasons for this:\
\
**Increasing Population Density**\
For one thing, as areas become more densely populated, there are more
potential victims when a disaster strikes. Because of this, future
hurricanes or earthquakes of the same magnitude as in the past will tend
to result in greater losses Quarantelli, 1981a).\
\
**Increased Settlement in High-Risk Areas**\
Another reason for increasing disaster losses is that part of this
increase in population density is occurring in disaster-prone areas.
There is greater settlement in high-risk areas such as flood plains,
earthquake faults, coastal hurricane areas, unstable hillsides, areas
subject to wildland fires, and areas adjacent to hazardous waste
landfills, airports, and nuclear power plants (Petak, 1985; Cigler,
1986; Drabek, 1986:341, 374; Lantis, 1984:2).\
\
For example, between 1960 and 1970 the population along the Texas gulf
coast increased 24.8% (as compared to a national population increase of
only 14.2%) (Davenport, 1978:1). According to one report, these changes
in coastal population density are reflected in the increased time
required to evacuate hurricane-threatened areas (17 hrs. for Tampa Bay,
Florida; 26 hrs. for Galveston, Texas; and 24 hrs. for Beaumont-Port
Arthur-Orange, Texas). This is in the face of estimated maximal warning
times of 10 to 12 hours (Ruch, 1984:390).\
\
This pattern of settlement in high-risk areas is reflected in the death
rate from flash floods, which tripled from the 1940s to the 1970s
(Quarantelh, 1979b). In fact, floods are the most serious natural
disaster in the U.S. in terms of lives lost, personal suffering,
property damage, and frequency of occurrence. Yet, de-spite the fact
that flood losses are increasing each year, people almost invariably
move back into the same area after a flood, and sometimes in even
greater numbers (Cigler, 1986; Comm. on Disasters, 1980:20).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Flood, Pearl River, Mississippi, April 11-18,1979.*
Property loss in the City of Jackson and its surroundings was estimated
at \$0.5 billion. Yet the most damage occurred to buildings erected in
the very same area previously inundated by the flood of 1961 (Drabek,
1985b:32).

**Figure 1-2.** Burgeoning population along the Gulf Coast with-out a
corresponding increase in transportation routes for evacuation increases
the potential for greater loss of life from future hurricanes. Hurricane
Betsy struck the southern tip of Florida in 1965 before entering the
Gulf of Mexico where it ravaged the Louisiana Coast. (Courtesy of Flip
Schulke, Miami, Florida.)\
\
\
Sometimes, in the process of settling high-risk areas, natural
protection against environmental threats is removed. For example, along
seashores vulnerable to hurricanes, protective sand dunes are removed to
make way for houses (Drabek, 1986:374). Paving of large areas in or near
settled flood plains prevents water from being absorbed by soil and
vegetation. This type of situation in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, led to
extensive flooding during Hurricane Agnes. The property damage that
resulted was among the largest in any U.S. disaster (FEMA, 1983d:88).\
\
Finally, the vulnerability of people living in high-risk areas is
increasing because the inhabitants are often unaware of the potential
risks and how to deal with them (Drabek, 1986:341). People are living in
structures that are not designed to resist the forces of local natural
hazards. For example, persons moving to the Gulf Coast are increasingly
likely to live in mobile homes which are more vulnerable to wind damage,
as evidenced by a 700% increase of mobile home sales in these areas in a
recent 10-year period (Drabek, 1986:375). Another example is the number
of homes built in areas at risk for wildland fires that have extremely
flammable, wood-shake roofs.

**Figure 1-3.** The recent proliferation of high-rise hotels has
increased the risk of disastrous hotel fires. The fire at the MGM Grand
Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada on November 21,1980 is a good example.
(Courtesy of Clark County Fire Department, Las Vegas, Nevada.)\
\
**Increased Technological Risks**\
New technology is adding to the list of disaster agents at an
ever-increasing rate. One of these is the 4 billion tons of hazardous
chemicals that are shipped annually in this country. Approximately 10%
of all trucks (Quarantelh, 1981a) and 35% of all freight trains carry
dangerous cargos (Kasperson, 1985). There is a proliferation of
high-rise office buildings and hotels that subject their inhabitants to
fire threats not experienced before. Our society is also becoming more
dependent on technology and specialization, making us more vulnerable to
disasters like the mass power outage in the northeastern United States
in 1965 Quarantelli, 1979b; Quarantelli, 1985; Drabek, 1986:375). Our
dependence on computers is introducing a new form of disaster
vulnerability. A major earth-quake in California could disable the
computers on which banking and financial institutions depend and which
interconnect with the rest of the United States. This could result in a
nationwide, or perhaps worldwide, monetary crisis (Quarantelli, 1985).\
\
\
**RECURRING RESPONSE DIFFICULTIES**\
\
In the face of ever-increasing risk of disaster losses, there is good
reason to be concerned about our ability to deal with these
catastrophes. Review of past disasters shows a number of recurring
difficulties with disaster response though their causes may be
considerably more complex than is superficially apparent. One community
will experience a disaster and critique its response. Suggestions are
made, and an article may be written about the \"lessons learned\" so
that others may benefit from the experience. But, as other communities
experience similar catastrophes, the same mistakes are sometimes made
all over again. Not only do people sometimes fail to learn from the
mistakes of others, but they may even neglect to correct their own,
previously noted deficiencies.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Air Florida Crash, Washington, DC, January 13,* 1982.
In a 1980 letter to the Federal Aviation Administration, the Airline
Pilots Association stated, \"Even though the vast majority of takeoffs
and landings at DCA (National) are over water, the marine
crash-fire-rescue resources are severely limited. \" In spite of this
warning, the same problems were present when Air Florida Flight 90
crashed into the 14th Street bridge and then into the Potomac river in
1982 (Adams, 1982:54).

**Figure 1-4.** Unique problems were faced by responders to the Air
Florida Crash. U.S. Park Police helicopter rescued survivors clinging to
the aircraft wreckage in the Potomac River in Washing-ton, D.C. on
January 13, 1982. (United States Park Police Photo-Mr. Charles
Pereira.)\
\
\
**ACCESS TO ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT DISASTERS**\
One of the reasons that lessons about disasters are not learned is
because it is difficult for emergency responders and planners to get
*accurate* information about what happens in disasters, so that they may
profit from the lessons learned by others.\
\
**Attributes of Published Disaster Accounts**\
Many disaster reports lack documentation, objectivity, and perspective.
This statement refers, in particular, to those reports in publications
most often read by emergency responders.\
\
***Documentation***\
Many articles make recommendations for disaster planning without
providing adequate documentation of their validity or effectiveness.
Others merely de-scribe a locale\'s disaster plans or drills, or tell
what *\"should happen\"* rather than what actually *\"does happen.\"* Of
the few that describe actual disasters, many of these merely recount
what happened rather than analyzing the effectiveness of the plan or the
response (Reynolds, 1976:4,9).\
\
***Objectivity***\
Many published articles are narratives of a single disaster written from
the perspective of one individual. Frequently, the author is one who was
actually involved in the incident or was in charge of some aspect of the
disaster planning or response. It is never easy for one to impartially
evaluate the actions of his own organization. Too often, post-disaster
critiques turn out to be defenses or justifications of what was done,
rather than objective assessments of problems and mistakes. Valuable
lessons may be missed because of the bias held for one\'s own community
or organization (Quarantelli, 1982b:15). In addition, published accounts
may delete material that may cause political embarrassment or in-crease
the liability of the response participants. Finally, many disaster
critiques are assembled solely for \"in-house\" use aimed at correcting
internal shortcomings and are not meant for others\' benefit.\
\
***Perspective***\
The recounting and evaluation of a disaster by a person involved in the
response has another inherent limitation, that is, the narrow
perspective avail-able to any single participant (especially if his
attention is focused on action rather than observation). Each
participant can have only a limited view of the total picture (Rosow,
1977:204; Yutzy, 1969:vi). This factor is illustrated by the following
quote from an account of the Kansas City Hyatt Hotel skywalk collapse:

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  \"Nothing we write in this report can describe what happened. The
  personal accounts provided by EMT Gary Frank and Paramedic Jim Taylor
  may help the reader gain a better feel for what went on. We were there,
  and except for occasional flashes of comprehension, we can\'t get a
  handle on it ourselves.\" (Stout, 1981:34)

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The task of developing the overall picture of what happens in a disaster
is like piecing together the history of a battle. Ernie Pyle, the famous
World War II correspondent, observed that:

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  \"War to the individual is hardly ever bigger than a hundred yards on
  each side of him.\" (Pyle, 1946:98)

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Of the disaster articles most likely to be read by emergency responders
and planners, few are the result of interviews with large numbers of
participants in a disaster. Also rare are any articles examining the
interrelation among the various responding organizations (Reynolds,
1976:8). This is unfortunate, since coordination among the various
agencies involved in the disaster is almost always a problem.\
\
Another limitation of these disaster articles is that they may describe
some feature of a disaster, but fail to observe how characteristic it
is. Attention may be focused on something because it is particularly
dramatic or unusual, even though its frequency of occurrence is small.
This may lead to a distorted picture of what is common in disasters and
what is not (Barton, 1969:xlvii; Quarantelli, 1982b:15; Quarantelli,
1985:21). The point here is that disciplined study of disasters requires
that you make *quantitative* observations. You need to find out such
things as: How *often* does panic occur? Or, *how many* casualties have
serious (versus trivial) injuries? Or, *how frequently* are there
shortages of blood, doctors, or hospital beds? Yet, such quantitative
observations are not common in these disaster articles (Barton,
1969:54).\
\
In addition to quantitative observations, *comparative* ones are
important. It is essential to determine what disaster characteristics
and problems are predict-able and recurrent (regardless of the location,
type, size, rapidity of onset, and duration of the disaster), rather
than just a fluke occurrence in a particular event. However, articles
comparing different disasters to see what they had in common-are not
common (Reynolds, 1976:2,3,16).\
\
**Disaster Research Reports**\
Because very few emergency responders are likely to be involved in
enough disasters to gain adequate personal experience, and because of
the narrow perspective offered by personal disaster experience, it is
important to be able to collect information on disasters in some
organized and disciplined fashion. Only in this way can we hope to gain
a more objective idea of what happens in disasters and assemble a
reasonable overall perspective of such events. Because this is difficult
and expensive, the data have only begun to be accumulated. Nonetheless,
a significant body of knowledge has been collected, and it paints a
picture about disasters that is sometimes different from what we might
expect.\
\
In contrast to many reports in publications read by disaster responders,
there are disaster research reports that result from the careful
analysis of information collected from a multitude of participants,
sometimes even from a number of disasters (Reynolds, 1976; Rosow,
1977:ii; Quarantelli, 1983:15). Unfortunately, despite the fact that a
significant body of such information has been collected, much of it is
not easily accessible to emergency responders and disaster planners
Quarantelli, 1979b:14,15), because:\
\
1) Much of the research is located in unpublished reports, out-of-print
books, and technical journals that are not circulated among emergency
responders.\
\
2) Many reports are written using technical terminology that, while
appropriate for the academic audience for which they were writ-ten, may
be difficult for others to understand (e.g., disaster responders and
members of emergency response organizations).\
\
For this text, an attempt has been made to survey existing research
literature on disasters and to summarize some of the important and
relevant concepts and observations. Sources of information include
fairly early works, such as the series of studies carried out in the
1950s by the Committee on Disasters of the National Research Council;
the University of Chicago, National Opinion Re-search Center studies
(Marks, 1954) and classic works by Fritz (Fritz, 1956; Fritz, 1961),
Barton (Barton, 1963; Barton, 1969), Baker (Baker, 1962), Form and Nosow
(Form, 1958), Raker (Raker, 1956), and Williams (Williams, 1956).\
\
Much of the more recent research referred to in this text comes from the
University of Colorado\'s Natural Hazards Research Center in Boulder.
The largest amount of data, however, are from the Disaster Research
Center. The Disaster Research Center was established in 1963 at The Ohio
State University, and 21 years later it was relocated at the University
of Delaware. It was the first center of its kind in the world and has
the largest collection of books, periodicals and reports related to the
socio-behavioral aspects of disasters.\
\
Probably the most interesting and far-reaching study referred to in this
text is one carried out by the Disaster Research Center in the 1970s. In
this study, E.L. Quarantelh examined emergency medical services in 29
major disasters in various communities throughout the United States and
its territories and compared them to identify the common patterns
(Quarantelli, 1983). Rather than focusing on the activities of an
individual hospital or ambulance service, Quarantelli carried out his
observations on a *systems* level, noting how the various organizations
affected each other. Quarantelli\'s works are cited frequently in this
text because he has carried out a large part of the existing published
research on disasters.\
\
This material is supplemented by a number of technical reports and
non-research papers. In most cases, these are used to provide specific
examples and anecdotes to illustrate points made in the more academic
research studies. Sometimes this was necessary because researchers felt
that the subjects they interviewed would be more candid if their names,
and the names of their community and organization, remained
confidential.\
\
\
**LAG BETWEEN RESEARCH AND PROGRESS**\
\
Quality research on disasters takes time, and funding is often difficult
to obtain. There is, accordingly, a lag before recent improvements are
reflected in the research studies. For example, there are those who may
believe that triage has improved since the time of the Disaster Research
Center studies (see Chapter 8) of the 1970s. However, another
comparative, multi-disaster study of triage has not been carried out to
verify that belief. Although there may well have been improvements, some
evidence suggests that many of the disaster response problems that were
present in the \'50s, \'60s, and \'70s, are still seen in some form in
the \'80s.\
\
The long list of problems associated with disaster response does not
mean to suggest that it is typically carried out by persons or
organizations that are incompetent, bungling, or lacking in care and
concern. This is *not at all the case.* The history of disasters is rife
with unsung heroes, sacrifice, and remarkable improvisation under
conditions of *extreme* duress and uncertainty. In many cases, the
difficulties are \"system problems,\" not problems with individual
behavior or effectiveness. They reflect the fact that organizations
evolve to take care of *common* community problems. Disasters, however,
pose unique problems often different even from the more routine
emergencies that police, fire, medical, and other emergency
organizations face on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, the everyday
emergency systems are not always well adapted to tackle disaster
problems.

**Chapter 2: THE APATHY FACTOR**

An informal party held amidst the rubble of a tornado that struck
Topeka, Kansas on June 8, 1966. (Courtesy of the *Topeka
Capital-journal,* Topeka, Kansas.)

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  Disasters are \"low-probability events.\" As such, they compete for
  attention with the priorities of daily living. Often, getting the
  public, elected officials, and organizational leaders to sup-port
  disaster preparedness is just as difficult as developing the disaster
  counter-measures themselves. This chapter addresses the causes of
  apathy toward disaster preparedness, its implications, and some methods
  for reducing it or planning around it.

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**WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND APATHY**\
**TOWARD DISASTER PREPAREDNESS**\
\
One of the social realities to be faced in disaster planning is that the
general attitude toward disaster preparedness is characterized by apathy
(Drabek, 1987:176). It is important to understand this phenomenon for
three reasons:

-   to see how it can be influenced,

-   to see how it can be circumvented, and

-   to develop a realistic appreciation for the limitations it imposes.

**REASONS FOR APATHY**\
\
Apathy toward disaster preparedness pervades governmental bodies as well
as the public at large. Although they will be discussed separately,
there is some overlap because governmental priorities are influenced by
those of their constituencies.\
\
**Public Apathy**\
***Lack of Awareness***\
Public awareness of disaster risks is generally poor. Even in
communities where disasters have occurred relatively frequently, the
public has often failed to demand the most rudimentary protection.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, White County, Arkansas, March 21, 1952.* Even
though White County is located in an area known as \"Tornado Alley,\"
only about 7% of the people in the impact area had storm cellars, and
less than 40% had any knowledge of the appropriate precautionary or
protective actions to take in the event of a tornado (Fritz, 1961:661).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, San Angelo, Texas, May 11, 1953.* Al-though this
city is also located in an area frequently visited by tornadoes, less
than 10% of its houses had storm cellars (Fritz, 1961:661).

**Figure 2-1.** San Fernando Valley, California, viewed through a breech
in the Van Norman Dam after the 1971 earthquake. (Courtesy of the Los
Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)\
\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Grand Island, Nebraska, June 3, 1980. No* trailer
parks had group storm cellars, and the residents had to seek shelter
elsewhere Quarantelli, 1982c:65).\
\
Similar observations can be made in parts of California notorious for
earth-quakes, where residents fail to anchor tall, heavy items of
furniture to the wall and neglect to consider earthquake risk factors
when buying property (Drabek, 1986:322; Ritz, 1961:661).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, San Fernando Valley, California, February 2,
1971.* An analysis of data collected throughout Los Angeles County after
the 1971 quake revealed that few persons had made prior disaster
preparations (Bourque, 1973:ii). But, even in the high-impact zone
*after* the disaster, less than half the population subsequently made
preparations of any type (Drabek, 1986:24).\
\
The motivation for choosing where to live is usually dictated by
economic opportunities (a better job) or aesthetic reasons (the risk of
wildfire is overridden by the breathtaking view) rather than concern
about natural or technological hazards (Drabek, 1986:322,358).\
\
***Underestimation of Risk***\
There is a tendency to underestimate the risk of disaster. It is a
striking observation that public *perception* of risk shows no
correlation to *actual* risk, and that the risks are usually
downplayed.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** Residents of San Francisco, who are very attached to their
city, downplay the risk of earthquake damage. The longer they live
there, the less seriously they take the seismic threat. Likewise, 61% of
the residents in the flood plain in Tucson, Arizona, do not perceive
that they live in a hazardous area. Those who are aware that flooding
can occur, underestimate the danger (Drabek, 1985b:4-5; Drabek, 1986:
320).\
\
Sometimes even local legends can contribute to a perception of
invincibility:\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Waco, Texas, May 15, 1953.* An Indian legend held
that the area was immune to tornadoes. This was even printed in a
pamphlet by the Chamber of Commerce (Moore, 1958:3).\
\
Even direct experience with disasters can inadvertently lead to
inaccurate perceptions of risk:\
\
**EXAMPLE:** Because of their past experience with hurricanes, many
persons overestimate their ability to survive future storms by taking
minimal emergency measures. Careful scrutiny, however, reveals that many
had experienced only the peripheral effects of hurricanes or storms that
were not hurricanes at all (Drabek, 1986:324; Davenport, 1978:17).\
\
***Reliance on Technology***\
A false sense of security provided by manmade protective devices
contributes to the underestimation of risk. Flood control projects are
renowned for this effect. Levees and dams reduce the frequency of
flooding and often remove inhibitions against living in a flood plain.
Eventually, however, a flood will come that will exceed the capacity of
almost any levee or dam. Sometimes, greater settlement in and upriver
from the flood plain results in decrease vegetation and more pavement.
Eventually, the increase in water runoff will exceed the capacity of the
flood control system, leading to catastrophic flooding in a now densely
populated area (FENL4,,1983d:88,91; Burton, 1968:13; Drabek, 1986:375).\
\
This problem of a \"technological security blanket\" is illustrated by
the Galveston, Texas, sea wall, constructed in the early 1900s. To most
citizens of the city, the sea wall is the \"end-all\" in hurricane
protection. However, even though Hurricane Carla came ashore 70 miles
west of Galveston, its tides came within, 2 feet of the highest
elevation on the island, and the 2 roads to the mainland were under 9
feet of water (Davenport, 1978:3,4,6,17,18).\
\
***Fatalism/Denial***\
The public\'s attitude toward disasters is often a mixture of \"What
will happen will happen\" and \"It can\'t happen here.\" People living
in high-risk areas accept the threat philosophically (\"earthquakes come
with the territory\") (Drabek, 1986:320, 340).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *San Francisco, California, prior to the 1906 earth-quake.*
\"The earthquake back in 1868 had been a ripper\.... There had been fair
shakes in 1892 and 1898, too. \'Nothing to worry about, because there\'s
nothing that can be done about it,\' was the attitude. \'Besides, a good
shake is not half so bad as a twister or a hurricane bearing down on
you\' \" (Bronson, 1959:19).\
\
***Social Pressures***\
In some high-risk areas, flouting disaster threats is considered a sign
of bravery and strong character. This is exemplified by persons going to
the beach to party and to surf as a hurricane approaches (Drabek,
1986:340).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Hurricane Carla, Galveston Island, Texas, September 11,
1961.* The attitude of many Galveston Islanders, especially the
long-term residents, is one of defiance toward hurricanes. This is
typified by the statement of a professional man after Hurricane Carla
who said that he was \"very proud of not having evacuated. His parents
had never fled before a storm \... and neither had he.\" \"About 40,000
people (70-80%) stayed on the Island during Carla even though most knew
that they would eventually be cut off from the main-land.\" (Moore,
1964:199; Davenport, 1978:19)\
\
**Governmental Apathy**\
Public apathy, as well as economic restraints, are reflected in a lack
of political support for disaster preparedness. Programs have been
difficult to initiate or maintain unless they have been demanded by the
citizens or mandated by law and paid for by the state or federal
government (Tierney, 1985b:73; Davenport, 1978:12). Without federal
funding, many government officials have felt that they could only
justify the most basic preparedness programs. Sometimes this has been
limited to the drawing up of a written disaster plan and assigning the
position of disaster coordinator (Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:42;
Stevenson, 1981:80). Even when governmental bodies have adopted goals
for disaster preparedness, the resources necessary to accomplish the
goals have not always been made available (Drabek, 1986:386).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake and Fire, San Francisco, California, April*
18-19, 1906. In October of 1905, just a bare 7 months before the quake,
the National Board of Fire Underwriters had declared San Francisco\'s 36
million gallons per day water system inadequate. \"San Francisco has
violated all underwriting traditions and precedents by not burning up;
that it has not done so is largely due to the vigilance of the fire
department, which cannot be relied upon indefinitely to stave off the
inevitable.\" Fire Chief Dennis Sullivan had battled the supervisors for
years to no avail trying to get the money needed to build a
supplementary salt-water system and to reactivate dozens of huge,
long-neglected cisterns in the city. When the Great Quake finally
struck, it was the fire, not the shaking, that dealt the City its
greatest blow (Bronson, 1959:21,92).\
\
**EXAMPLE**: In a study by Wyner and Mann published in 1983, the
implementation of earthquake safety measures of thirteen California
cities and counties were evaluated. (Seven of these had recent
earthquake experiences.) Only a few jurisdictions had attained even
their most modest planning goals, which included such elementary
accomplishments as collecting more information on the nature of seismic
hazards. Most jurisdictions had not even allocated resources in a manner
that would permit fulfillment of the adopted goals (Drabek, 1986: 386).\
\
Even when *federal policy* and regulations promote disaster
preparedness, these policies are not self-implementing. The enforcement
and application of these policies are often dependent on local
government cooperation, which is not always forthcoming (Berke, 1987;
Clary, 1985:23). At a time when state and local responsibility for
disaster countermeasures has increased, they have been confronted by a
number of factors that have limited their ability to raise and spend
revenues (Mushkatel, 1985:51).\
\
***Opposing Special Interest Groups***\
Vested interest groups can have a negative influence on disaster
counter-measures. For example, the most effective way to prevent flood
losses is to avoid building structures in the flood plain (Drabek,
1986:353). However, competition for land due to increasing population
and the prevailing American attitude that property owners have the right
to develop their land without governmental interference, often inhibit
restrictions on land use in flood prone areas (Cigler, 1986:10).\
\
***Lack of an Organized Constituency Advocating Disaster
Preparedness***\
While special interest groups such as developers, builders, and
realtors, are well organized lobbying factions, coalitions promoting
disaster prevention and management are not (Cigler, 1986:10, 12, 14;
Petak, 1985:5; Clary, 1985:22; Mushkatel, 1985:51, 53; Kasperson,
1985:11; FEMA, 1984a:17).\
\
***Defeatism***\
An attitude of defeatism sometimes contributes to apathy toward disaster
preparedness. Some persons believe that every disaster is so unique that
effective planning is not possible Quarantelli, 1979b:2; Quarantelli,
1982b:17; Quarantelli, 1983:104; Quarantelli, 1985:22; Drabek, 1986:58).
Others conjure up hypothetical catastrophes of such magnitude as to
boggle the mind and paralyze any preparedness effort (Dynes, 1981:iv).
Such an attitude may occur when faced with the enormity of preparing for
a cataclysmic earthquake or a nuclear holocaust (Seismic Safety Comm,
1979:10; Gratz, 1972:48; Drabek, 1987:55; Blanchard, 1985:3).\
\
***Priorities Competing with \"Low-Probability\" Events***\
Contributing to governmental apathy is the fact that, in spite of the
increasing threat of disasters, they are still improbable events. When
crises occur repeatedly at frequent intervals (such as the World War II
aerial bombings of London), the target population develops sophisticated
mechanisms for dealing with the threat (e.g., air raid wardens and bomb
shelters). Peacetime disasters occur so rarely, however, that there is
not usually the impetus to make elaborate, time-consuming, and expensive
preparations (Barton, 1969:40; Dynes, 1981:72). Those areas that have
the most extensive disaster preparedness are the ones exposed to
recurrent seasonal threats from floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes
(Drabek, 1986:55,178; Barton, 1969:40).\
\
This improbability of occurrence is especially true with respect to
*large-scale* disasters in the United States. In fact, only six
disasters in U.S. history have resulted in more than 1,000 fatalities
(see Table 2-1) Quarantelli, 1987; Lane, 1984; Houghton, 1986; Grolier,
1985), and only about 10 or 15 disasters per year have resulted in more
than 40 injuries (Wright, 1977:193).\
\
\
**Table 2-1.** U.S. Disasters with Deaths Exceeding 1,000

  ----- -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1\.   April 27, 1865. Steamship Sultana explosion on the Mississippi
        River near Memphis, Tennessee. 1,547 killed.

  2\.   October 8, 1871. Forest fire, Peshtigo, Wisconsin. 1,182 deaths.

  3\.   May 31, 1889. Flood, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. More than 2,200
        deaths.

  4\.   August 27, 1900. Hurricane, Galveston, Texas. About 5,000 deaths.

  5\.   June 15, 1904. Fire on the steamship General Slocum, on the East
        River, New York. 1,021 fatalities.

  6\.   September 13, 1928. Hurricane, Lake Okeechobee, Florida. 2,000
        deaths.
  ----- -------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated by one renowned disaster researcher, the statistical
probability is that when a disaster strikes, it will strike
elsewhere-primarily because there is so much \"elsewhere\" (Drabek,
1985b:4). From 1900 to 1967 there were only 16,619 deaths from natural
disasters in the United States (Roth, 1970:442). These figures pale when
compared to more routine causes of violent death. For example, in 1967
alone, the number of persons dying in motor vehicle accidents was 52,924
(Nat Safety Council, 1973:12). The infrequency of disaster is reflected
in the figures shown in Table 2-2.\
\
Because of the improbability of disaster impact, the expense and effort
put out to prepare for it is perceived as an investment with little
certainty of return (Barton, 1969:159). In the face of the doubtful
benefits of preparing for a catastrophe that may never occur, are
competing everyday concerns such as employment, crime, pornography,
attaining status among one\'s peers, or even partaking of leisure
activities (Fritz, 1961:661; Drabek, 1985b:4; Drabek, 1986:320). In
other words, people are unlikely to give priority of attention to an
unlikely future disaster when there are fifteen tasks that have to be
accomplished by Friday (Tierney, 1985a:77). This factor is particularly
salient in contemporary government where there are so many programs
competing for scarce resources (Drabek, 1985b:i; Seismic Safety Comm,
1979:42; Blanchard, 1985:4).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** When state and local decision-makers were asked to rate the
importance of 18 problems that might require governmental attention, the
highest ratings were given to inflation, welfare, unemployment, and
crime. The lowest ratings were given to floods, hurricanes, tornadoes,
and earthquakes (Drabek, 1986:385).\
\
The mention of these factors should not be taken to imply that, because
disasters are improbable, effective countermeasures are not practical.
Rather, it is to point out that motivational issues need to be
considered during disaster planning.

**Figure 2-2. (A)** Galeston, Texas, prior to the hurricane of 1900 and
after **(B)** the hurricane. No domestic peacetime disaster has caused
more fatalities than this storm. (Courtesy of the Rosenberg Public
Library, Galveston, Texas.)\
\
\
**Table 2-2**.

  -------------------------- --------------------------------------------
  **Risk**                   **Fatalities per person-hour of exposure**

  Natural disaster           1 in 100 billion

  Smoking                    5 in 10 billion

  Motor vehicle transport    1 in 1 million

  Adapted from Foster and    
  Starr (Foster, 1980:19;    
  Starr, 1969)               
  -------------------------- --------------------------------------------

***Difficulty Substantiating Benefits of Preparedness***\
Assessing risks from potential disaster hazards is difficult at best, as
is deter-mining the benefits of disaster management and preparedness
efforts. This is complicated by the expenditures required to make the
necessary studies and the uncertainty, even then, that the answers are
forthcoming. Ironically, the very apathy that inhibits disaster
preparedness is just as likely to thwart the funding of studies to
assess the cost-benefit ratio of disaster preparedness (Petak, 1985:5,6;
FEMA, 1984a:47,125; Cigler, 1986; Kasperson, 1985:9,10; Zimmerman,
1985:33). Often, the benefits of preparedness are not visible in the
short run, but only after a disaster has occurred. In times of economic
restraints, programs whose benefits cannot clearly be demonstrated get
short shrift on the fist of budgetary priorities.\
\
***Overestimation of Capability***\
Another reason for complacency toward disaster preparedness is the
mistaken belief that the disaster problems can be managed merely by an
extension of routine emergency measures. In studying disaster emergency
medical services, the Disaster Research Center found this attitude in
over half the communities in their sample (Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:9;
Quarantelli, 1981a:10; Quarantelli, 1983:101; Sorensen, 1981:27; Barton,
1969:159). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, disasters often pose
unique problems for which routine emergency procedures are not well
adapted.\
\
***The Inter-governmental Paradox***\
As you move to lower levels of government, the disaster damages
experienced from that level\'s perspective are less frequent. For
example, the federal government experiences most all of the disasters
that occur in the nation. State government experiences fewer of them,
and city governments even fewer. Because any given local government
experiences the fewest exposures to disaster loss, it is least apt to
perceive it as an important issue (Cigler, 1986:8,13; Drabek, 1985b:4).\
\
The inter-governmental paradox refers to the fact that the local
government, which is least likely to see disaster management as a key
priority, is most likely to be faced with the responsibility for
carrying out the disaster response. There are several reasons for this.
For one thing, the trend in the United States has been to place most of
the responsibility for disaster response on local government (Cigler,
1986:8, 10; Clary, 1985:23,24). For another, local governments bear a
large part of the responsibility because they are the closest to the
event and are apt to be on the scene before substantial state or federal
resources are available (Kasperson, 1985:13).\
\
***Ambiguity of Responsibility***\
Responsibility for disaster tasks in the United States is spread out
among many public and private organizations (Drabek, 1987:105). In
addition, disasters tend to cross jurisdictional and functional
boundaries involving city, county, state, federal, and special district
(e.g., flood control or fire districts) governments as well as private
spheres of responsibility. This often results in a situation where no
*single* institution, person, or level of government is perceived as
responsible for disaster preparedness. Accordingly, disaster
preparedness goals and policies of various jurisdictions and agencies
are often contradictory, and motivation to get things done is hampered
by a lack of accountability (Cigler, 1986:6).\
\
\
**TAKING APATHY INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PLANNING**\
\
Apathy results in limited resources for disaster preparedness. It is
important to apply the limited interest and resources in such a manner
that they will do the most good. In effect, *there is a form of
\"triage,\" or priority-setting, that has to be applied to disaster
preparedness measures,* and the cost-effectiveness of these measures has
to be taken into consideration.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Because of the limited resources available, disaster
  preparedness proposals need to take cost-effectiveness into
  consideration.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**Prepare for What *Is Likely Moderate-Sized Disasters***\
Some disaster planners believe the best planning philosophy is to
prepare for the worst-case disaster scenario. They anticipate disasters
involving tens of thousands of casualties (Drabek, 1985b:i; Dynes,
1981:75). A variation on this theme is disaster planning aimed primarily
at nuclear attack (Gratz, 1972:48). At present, preparedness for nuclear
attack, rather than the more common types of natural and technological
disasters, is the top planning priority of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (Thomas, 1988:14). There are, however, several
problems associated with planning for disasters of this magnitude:

-   They may conjure up hypothetical possibilities of such immensity as
    to make most despair at ever being able to cope with them (Dynes,
    1981:iv,75; Blanchard, 1985:3). In other words, such scenarios
    amplify apathy.

-   Most of the research on disasters in the United States has focused
    on relatively moderate events involving tens to hundreds of
    casualties. The applicability of this knowledge to cataclysmic
    disasters involving tens and hundreds of thousands of casualties is
    questionable. Although such \"cataclysmic\" disasters have occurred
    in foreign countries, the sociopolitical context is so different
    from the United States that it is unclear whether we can apply
    lessons learned from them to our own culture and form of government.
    In other words, while we now know a fair amount about how to plan
    for smaller disasters, we know little about how to plan for the
    cataclysmic ones (Drabek, 1985b:3; Drabek, 1986:6). *Therefore, when
    it comes to applying limited resources to planning, it makes sense
    to plan for those events for which we have the knowledge to plan.*

-   Applying limited resources to prepare for the most improbable type
    of disaster-the cataclysmic one-is not cost effective. It is also
    not the best approach when we have not first become proficient at
    handling small disasters, which are reasonably likely to occur. It
    is like signing up for very expensive dance lessons before learning
    to walk.

For these reasons, preparedness for moderately sized disasters may be
more realistic and achieve greater acceptance by those who must pay for
and carry out the preparations (Lewis, 1980:865; Dynes, 1981:75). This
*is not to say that planning for large disasters isn\'t valuable.*
Clearly, California will experience a large earthquake in the near
future. However, planning is sometimes carried out for cataclysmic
disasters *to the exclusion* of the more moderate and more likely ones.
The advantage of a focus on moderate disasters is that the procedures
involved are more likely to be *used* and, therefore, learned. They are
also more likely to get funded. Furthermore, the skills, training,
procedures, and supplies developed for moderate disasters are a logical
step toward preparedness for larger events.\
\
On the other hand, a number of the preparedness efforts for cataclysmic
disasters have never been used and have little applicability in the
types of disasters more likely to occur. An example is the packaged
disaster hospitals. These have laid dormant for so long that you may
have to question if the equipment and supplies are still usable, or if
those who would need them know that they exist, where they exist, how to
get them, what they contain, or how to set them up.\
\
Just what is a moderately sized disaster? That answer is less clear.
Limited evidence suggests that a disaster large enough to consistently
cause inter-organizational coordination problems is one resulting in
about 120 casualties (Wright, 1977:190). Since interorganizational
coordination is one of the major disaster response problems, this figure
seems to be a reasonable yardstick.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Planning should be for disasters of moderate size (about
  120 casualties); disasters of this size will present the typical
  inter-organizational coordination problems also applicable to larger
  events.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

***More Common Types of Disasters***\
Disaster preparedness applicable to the more common disaster events is
more likely to receive support. It is easier to sell planning for
multiple vehicle accidents than for an earthquake. Serious earthquakes
occur in the same locality once in several decades; complex traffic
accidents occur several times a year. Likewise, tornadoes, floods, and
hurricanes are a more relevant threat than a nuclear holocaust. Apathy
is most likely to be overcome by emphasizing those threats that are seen
as relevant by the public and elected officials (Drabek, 1987:203;
Stevenson, 1981:40).\
\
***Predictable Disaster Tasks***\
Although it is not possible to prepare for every disaster contingency\~
there are some problems that occur with such regularity as to be quite
predictable. It is these which are the most amenable to planning. For
example, almost every major disaster requires procedures for the
centralized gathering and sharing of information about the overall
disaster situation and the responding and available resources.
Procedures are needed for overall coordination (deciding what
organizations are going to carry out what tasks and how they are going
to interact) and for logistics such as supplies, transportation,
feeding, shelter, and communication networks to support the disaster
response. Other examples include procedures for integrating and managing
unsolicited volunteers, warning threatened populations, handling
evacuations, carrying out triage, coordinating search and rescue,
keeping unauthorized persons out of the impact area, distributing
casualties rationally among the available hospitals, decontaminating
equipment and casualties exposed to hazardous materials, dealing with
the press, and responding to voluminous inquiries from anxious loved
ones and relatives of those thought to be potential disaster victims.
This idea of focusing on \"generic\" disaster tasks most likely to be
faced in all types of disasters has been embodied in the concept of
\"comprehensive emergency management\" which the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has used in its \"Integrated Emergency
Management System\" (FEMA, 1984c:I-9; FEMA, 1983a; FEMA, 1985d:1-2).\
\
Some of the tasks likely to be needed can be identified if a formal
hazards analysis is carried out. Available methods for doing this are
well described in several publications available from FEMA (FEMA,
1983b:9; FEMA, 1984c:11-10; FEMA, 1983a:3-2; FEMA, 1983c:11; FEMA,
1985c; FEMA, 1985b; FEMA, 1985a). However, it must be realized that
present methods of risk analysis are crude at best and can be used as
only a rough guide for disaster planning (FEMA, 1984a:47,125). (Appendix
A illustrates a method of hazards analysis.)\
\
**Make Preparedness Adaptable to a Wide Variety of Circumstances**\
***Adapt to Routine Emergencies***\
Whenever possible, it is advantageous to adapt disaster procedures for
use in daily, routine emergencies (Div Med Sci, 1966; Morris, 1982;
Jenkins, 1975). This has several benefits: 1) it may reduce training
costs by decreasing the number of procedures that are used only in
disasters; 2) it allows those who will need to use the procedures to
become familiar with them; and 3) it may improve routine emergency
responses (Stevenson, 1981:4,42,44; Quarantelli, 1983:149).\
\
One example is the emergency medical services system in Sacramento
County, California. The standard practice there is for emergency medical
technicians on the ambulances to assign a triage category to every
emergency patient transported on a daily basis. This becomes a part of
the radio report to the hospital. The result is that both the emergency
medical technician and hospital personnel become familiar with the
triage system. In essence, they have a daily triage drill (Lowry,
1983).\
\
***Modular Expansion***\
The flexibility of a disaster plan is enhanced if the disaster
management structure is designed to be expanded in stages as the
incident (and the number of resources that need to be coordinated) grows
in size. If managed well, this can help to minimize the presence of
excessive numbers of personnel and organizations and, therefore,
simplify coordination (Tierney, 1980: 100). (See Chapter 7.)\
\
**Cost-Sharing**\
Joint training, combined dispatch centers, standardized resource and
management procedures, and joint purchasing of standardized equipment
can all be promoted as cost-reduction measures applicable to routine
emergency responses. They also have been shown to facilitate
multi-agency coordination and communication in disaster operations,
discussed further in Chapter 5.\
\
**REDUCING APATHY**\
\
Although apathy is difficult to overcome, it is possible to motivate
disaster preparedness.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** As the result of a research project on earth-quake-related
fires, it was projected that San Francisco would be swept by firestorms
in the event of another 1906-like earth-quake. With the encouragement of
researcher Charles Scawthorn, and buttressed by their own estimations,
the San Francisco Fire Department declared that there was a pressing
need to increase the city\'s preparedness. With the support of the
mayor, the fire department conducted an information campaign to explain
the fire risk and the necessary counter-measures to the public. The
media were involved, and a citizens\' committee was formed to initiate a
bond issue. In November of 1986, they were successful in obtaining a 90%
approval of the voters for a \$46.2 million bond issue to finance
improvements in the city water system, firefighting capability, and an
emergency operations center (NHRAIC, 1987a:13).\
\
There are a number of motivating factors that can be used to counteract
apathy. Some illustrative examples follow.\
\
\
**Liability**\
Changing liability related to disasters may help to counter apathy.
Recent court decisions indicate that local governments and officials may
be financially liable for certain consequences of a disaster if the
community was not prepared or did not respond properly (Tierney,
1985b:58; Stevenson, 1981:83; Drabek, 1986:342; Perkins, 1984). With
such a change, emergency managers can rightly argue for increased
resources to meet these increased legal responsibilities (Adams,
1981b:51).\
\
The trend suggests that governments will increasingly face the threat of
successful litigation if someone suffers damage from a disaster. A loss
due to disaster can be recovered in court if the victim can show: 1) the
governmental body owed a duty to the victim to avoid, prevent, or lessen
such a loss; 2) that the body failed to carry out this duty; and 3) that
the loss occurred as a result of this failure (Kusler, 1985:119).\
There are several factors that may increase governmental liability in
this context (Kusler, 1985:120):

-   The courts have recognized broadened concepts of the duties and
    responsibilities of local governments.

-   The \"act of God\" defense for disaster losses is less frequently
    accepted by the courts.

-   The ability of governments to claim \"sovereign immunity\" (\"The
    \'king\' can do no wrong.\") has been substantially reduced.

-   The duty of governments to develop disaster countermeasures is
    becoming more frequently stipulated in legislation.

**Recent Disasters**\
One factor, more than any other, appears effective in reducing
apathy-the occurrence of a disaster. This theme surfaces repeatedly in
the research literature on disasters. Unfortunately, the interest so
generated also decays rapidly, often before it has had time to stimulate
significant changes (Drabek, 1985b:5; Drabek, 1986:366; Quarantelli,
1983:138; Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:45; Stevenson, 1981:81).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Interest in disaster preparedness is proportional to the
  recency and magnitude of the last disaster.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

If there is a preparedness program lacking support, one should be ready
to take advantage of a disaster to reintroduce it-even if the disaster
has occurred elsewhere (Stevenson, 1981:82). While broad-based appeals
for support can be based on such tactics, they are most effective if
tied to specific needs, with this illustrative disaster exemplifying
that need (Drabek, 1987:176).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** One preparedness director in South Dakota used a movie of a
disaster that struck another community. He showed his county
commissioners the film, \"The Day of the Killer Tornadoes,\" in an
attempt to obtain funding for an emergency generator. The film
graphically depicted a blackout in the stricken community\'s Emergency
Operations Center. As a result, the commissioners voted unanimously to
budget for the generator (Drabek, 1987:175).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Wittier, California, October 1, 1987.*
\"Perhaps one of the reasons we have accomplished so much in earthquake
mitigation in California is that whenever concern over seismic threat
ebbs for too long, the earth rumbles and shakes and warns us that we had
better take this threat seriously. As much as we in the mitigation
business try to be proactive, to foresee problems, threats, and dangers,
and to mitigate their effects, we are not entirely successful when we
are working in an atmosphere of near apathy. We try to combat the apathy
in the \'off years\' by producing some excitement, holding pretend
earthquakes in the back lot of Universal Studios, with the tremendous
visual and sound effects only the studio can re-create (sic). These
events attract media and citizen attention, and they exercise and
practice our own response operations. Needless to say, however, their
impact pales in comparison to a real trembler .\
\
\"Immediately following the earthquake, the usual apathy and inertia
were overcome, if only for a brief time. Both the public and government
officials were receptive to mitigation messages. Everyone wanted to be
briefed, educated, and trained \...\...\
\
\"The day after the quake, councilman Hal Bernson introduced a motion to
create within the fire department a division to supervise training the
community to prepare for earth-quakes\.... Remarkably, this very costly
program, originally proposed more than 2 years before, was unanimously
approved a few weeks after the quake. In addition several other council
motions were taken, and council action sparked renewed interest in
improving the safety and security of the Emergency Operations Center
(Mattingly, 1988).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**The best time to submit disaster preparedness programs for
  funding is, right after a disaster (even if it has occurred elsewhere).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**Public Education**\
Public education about the nature of disaster hazards and the practical
counter-measures available can help to offset apathy. Education is most
effective at times when people are motivated to learn about disasters.
For example, the public is more anxious to learn about disasters at the
beginning of seasonal threats (e.g., tornado or hurricane season), or
after disasters, even nonlocal ones, that have received attention in the
news (e.g., the Mexico City earthquake). At these times, they may be
more interested than usual in how vulnerable their own community is to
disaster threats, how well their emergency services are able to respond,
and what practical measures citizens can take to protect themselves. A
listing of sources for public education and awareness material is given
in Appendix E.\
\
***The Media***\
One of the most effective methods of public education is the mass
communications media, particularly commercial television and radio
stations (Holton, 1985:17; Wenger, 1985b:17). News accounts emphasizing
the lack of and need for improved emergency preparedness increases
support for larger operating budgets and helps to make preparedness a
higher local government priority (Stevenson, 1981:36). Tornado,
blizzard, hurricane, and earthquake media awareness releases have been
used effectively to improve public awareness of disasters (Drabek,
1987:198; FEMA: A-70).\
\
***School Programs***\
School programs teaching about disaster hazards increase awareness, not
only in the students, but in their parents as well. Evaluation of a
junior high school program on hurricane awareness in North Carolina
found that approximately 80% of the students obtained parental help in
the program\'s homework assignments (FEMA: A-26). An article in the
*Journal of Civil Defense* (12(2):10-13, 1979) gives an illustration of
how adults can be influenced indirectly by disaster education directed
at children:\
\
**EXAMPLE:** In 1974, as a school bus was transporting children home, a
tornado approached. Although the driver did not know what to do, a
seventh-grade student on the bus did. His teacher had reviewed tornado
precautions in class that day. The student convinced the driver to stop
the bus and get everyone into a ditch. Although the tornado destroyed
the bus, none of the pupils was injured (Foster, 1980:187).\
\
A National Weather Service study found that the subject of disaster
preparedness is most appropriate for the fifth, sixth, and junior high
school grades. It also recommended that the curriculum should not be
costly and should contain material addressing local types of hazards as
well as those of a more general nature. The material for school programs
was more likely to be accepted by schools if it was introduced within
existing school curriculum such as social studies or science courses
(FEMA:A-74).\
\
**SUMMARY**\
Disasters are \"low-probability\" events. As such, they are associated
with a high degree of apathy. It is important to understand the
limitations posed by this fact. The existence of apathy should not be
taken as an excuse to neglect or discount the need for preparedness,
but, especially in this time of shrinking resources and expanding
responsibilities, we must be selective in deciding which aspects of
disaster preparedness to emphasize. Programs that are practical,
inexpensive, realistic, and applicable, not only to a wide variety of
disasters, but also to routine emergency problems, are the most likely
to gain support. Even then, however, motivation for disaster planning is
one of the most difficult aspects of the planning and preparedness
process.\
\
**PLANNING CHECKPOINTS**

-   Does your disaster plan focus on events of moderate size? Ones which
    are likely to occur in your area?

-   Does your disaster training program emphasize common disaster tasks,
    such as overall coordination, determining what the overall disaster
    problems are, determining all of the resources present and
    available, decontamination, search and rescue, patient distribution,
    management of volunteers handling inquiries about disaster victims,
    and relations with the press?

-   Have you adapted disaster procedures for application in routine
    emergencies, so personnel can become familiar with them?

-   Can your disaster response plan be expanded in stages as the
    incident magnitude increases?

-   Does your community disaster planning include provisions for
    cost-sharing of resources and training?

-   Are your elected officials and organizational leaders aware of the
    potential liability of failing to develop disaster countermeasures?

-   Do you have public education material prepared for dissemination:

> \- at the beginning of seasonal disaster threats?\
> - after the occurrence of major disasters?

-   Do you have arrangements with the media for broadcast of disaster
    educational material?

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**Chapter 3: THE \"PAPER\" PLAN SYNDROME**

Disaster plans are an illusion of preparation unless accompanied by
training. (Courtesy of Vern Paule, Public Information Officer, FEMA
Region IX, San Francisco, California.)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  Written disaster plans are important, but they are not enough by
  themselves to assure preparedness. In fact, they can be an illusion of
  preparedness if they are not tied to training programs, not acceptable
  to the intended users, not tied to the necessary resources, or not
  based on valid assumptions. This illusion is called the \"paper\" plan
  syndrome. This chapter discusses the important steps in avoiding
  impotent written disaster plans.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**WHAT IS THE \"PAPER\" PLAN SYNDROME?**\
\
One of the greatest impediments to disaster preparedness is the tendency
to believe that it can be accomplished merely by the completion of a
*written* plan Quarantelli, 1982b:16; Quarantelli, 1985:21). Written
plans indeed are very important, but they are *only one* of the
requirements necessary for preparedness (Gratz, 1972:12; Quarantelli,
1981a: 12; Bush, 1981: 1). A written plan can be an illusion of
preparedness if the other requirements are neglected Quarantelli,
1982b:16,17; Rosow,1977:104; Barton,1963:43; Barton,1969:96; Moore,
1958:10). This illusion will be referred to as the \"paper\" plan
syndrome.\
\
**\"PAPER\" PLANS VERSUS DISASTER RESPONSE**\
\
The preponderance of \"paper\" plans is reflected in the frequency with
which disaster responses differ from what is in the written plan (Neff,
1977:181; Golec, 1977:175; Worth, 1977:160,162; Rosow, 1977:104,105;
Quarantelli, 1983:87,121; Moore, 1958:21; Tierney, 1985b:62; Arnett,
1983:31; Dynes, 1981:71).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** Many hospital administrators concede that while disaster
plans are necessary for hospital accreditation, they are relatively
unworkable in practice (Worth, 1977:166). As stated by one administrator
involved in a disaster: \"I opened up our plan immediately after we were
notified, and it said that wards 4A and B would be the shock and
resuscitation areas for all victims. That\'s four floors up. I\'ve got
two old elevators that take forever to move up, and I said we\'re
forgetting the disaster plan completely, this is the way we are going to
run it, and we ran it from that point on our own \...\... (Worth,
1977:166)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Mt. St. Helens Volcano Eruption, May 18,1980.* A
Washington State University study revealed that a majority of 26
communities did not use an emergency preparedness plan when the eruption
occurred. In many cases, city officials discovered that the plan was not
applicable to their needs (FEMA, 1983d:8).\
\
A Disaster Research Center study of 29 mass casualty disasters found
that in most cases the disaster plan was not followed to any great
extent. One reason for this was that key personnel did not fully
understand the plan or know their role in it. In addition, common
disaster problems were not anticipated. In only 21 % of the disasters
was a predesignated communications plan followed, and In less than 50%
of the cases was transportation of disaster casualties carried out
according to the written plan (Quarantelli, 1983:71,89,121).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Disaster planning is an illusion unless: it is based on
  valid assumptions about human behavior, incorporates an
  inter-organizational perspective, is tied to resources, and is known
  and accepted by the participants.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**PLANNING BASED ON VALID ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HUMAN BEHAVIOR**\
\
Disaster planning and response must be based on valid assumptions.
Unfortunately, many of the assumptions people make about disasters are
incorrect Quarantelli, 1982b:15; Quarantelli, 1985:3,19,21; Drabek,
1985b:i,9).\
\
**The Myth of Maladaptive Behavior**\
One of these assumptions is that citizens in a disaster-impacted area
tend to respond in a maladaptive manner. One common belief is that panic
is a common occurrence and that warnings and evacuation orders must be
given most cautiously to prevent it. Another belief is that many persons
are stunned by the impact and suffer from a condition of immobility and
inability to act rationally (the so-called \"disaster syndrome\"). These
persons are thought to be incapable of acting on their own and to need
strong leadership and direction by authorities. Another belief is that
the chaos and confusion following disasters provides the conditions for
antisocial behavior such as crime, looting, and exploitation (Dynes,
1974:71; Quarantelli, 1960:68; Quarantelli, 1965:107; Quarantelli,
1972:67).\
\
The prevalence of belief that disasters are typified by maladaptive
behavior is suggested by the results of a study by Wenger and his
associates (Wenger, 1975). They surveyed a random sample consisting of
354 residents of New Castle County, Delaware. Of those surveyed, 84%
believed that panic is a major problem in disasters, 74% felt that
disaster victims cannot care for themselves because they suffer from the
\"disaster syndrome\"\' 62% felt that looting was usually a significant
problem in disasters, and 51% believed that crime rates usually increase
immediately following disasters.\
\
A later study by Wenger, James, and Faupel confirmed these results. This
study included the previous data from New Castle County (a community
with little actual disaster exposure) and added random sample surveys of
the general population from three communities that had suffered from
multiple major disasters (300 interviews from each community). A total
of 51 additional interviews were carried out with informants from
emergency response organizations in these communities (including the
mayor\'s office, civil defense, police, fire, sheriff, Red Cross,
Salvation Army, military, and hospital). This study revealed that most
emergency responders also held these beliefs, though not as large a
percentage as the general population (Wenger, 1985a:103,105).\
\
Although seemingly less prevalent in more recent publications, the
belief in maladaptive behavior is still expressed in articles and books
on disaster management (FEMA, 1983a:5-16; Buerk, 1982:644; 1981f:40;
Arnett, 1981:76,87).\
\
Careful and systematic studies of disasters, however, have yielded an
entirely different picture. Although an occasional episode of human
behavior may conform to this stereotype, it does not represent the ways
in which people typically respond to disasters (Mileti, 1975:57;
Quarantelli, 1960:68; Quarantelli, 1965:107; Wenger, 1975:33;
Quarantelli, 1972:67). The morals, loyalties, respect for laws, customs,
and tenets of acceptable behavior, ingrained by years of upbringing, are
not dissolved in an instant by disaster (Drabek, 1968:143). Courage,
altruism, and selflessness are characteristics far more representative
of disaster behavior (Drabek, 1986:143). (The prevalence of helping
behavior in disasters is discussed in Chapter 6.) As stated by Professor
E.L. Quarantelli of the University of Delaware\'s Disaster Research
Center:\
\
\"Most human beings act in quite controlled and adaptive ways in the
face of the new and extreme stresses which they face during large scale
disasters.\" (Quarantelli, 1965:108)\
\
Panic is not a typical response to disaster. On the contrary, it is
often quite difficult to get persons in a disaster-threatened area to
evacuate. (More discussion about panic is found in Chapter 9.)
Furthermore, disasters generally do not render people stunned and unable
to act. They will take what they perceive to be appropriate actions even
without direction or leadership from the authorities. In fact, official
directives that are not considered relevant or appropriate may be
ignored altogether (Quarantelli, 1960:76; Dynes, 1974:30; Fritz,
1956:41; Fritz, 1961:672).\
\
Except in civil disorders, it has been difficult to verify that
significant looting or an increase in criminal activity occurs in
peacetime disasters. The investigations that have been carried out
conclude that looting is quite rare, and that criminal activity does not
increase (Quarantelli, 1972:69; Drabek, 1986:145, 180; Dynes, 1968:10;
Fritz, 1957:53). In a study of 100 disasters, researchers found many
stories of looting, but extremely few verified cases (Dynes, 1981:26;
Quarantelli, 1972:69).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *PSA Air Crash, San Diego, California, September* 25, 1978.
After the airliner collided with a private plane and crashed into a
residential area, a report of looting at the crash site was circulated.
The San Diego police chief was so concerned by this unverifiable rumor,
that he wrote a letter to a national news magazine, stating, \"There is
absolutely no evidence that any looting occurred at the crash site or in
the immediate vicinity.\" (Drabek, 1986:146)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, White County, Arkansas, March* 21, 1952. Of those
questioned by a University of Chicago team of investigators, 58% stated
that they had heard of *others\' property being* stolen, but only 6%
felt convinced that *their own* property had been taken. Furthermore,
most of the missing items were of inconsequential value. The study team
could actually verify the theft of only two items-a cash register and a
piano Quarantelli, 1972:69; Dynes, 1968:10).\
\
Unfortunately, police sometimes invest so much effort in preventing
looting that traffic control suffers. Serious crowd and traffic problems
interfere with access, and movement of ambulances and rescue equipment
are not managed optimally (Kennedy, 1970:358). However, because the
public *expects* looting and other anti-social behavior, they need to
feel the presence of security forces in the area. It is not usually
necessary in natural disasters to deploy *massive* forces for this
purpose. Rather the need can often be met by placing a few armed guards
at strategic and conspicuous locations, and by mass media announcements
that all necessary precautions are being taken (Dynes, 1981:33).
Furthermore, the deployment of security and law enforcement personnel
for traffic and perimeter control also contributes to their visible
presence to the public.\
\
**\"Likely\" Behavior Versus \"\'Correct\" Behavior**\
Disaster plans are often written in the belief that people ought to
behave according to the plan. The plans state what people *\"should do.
\" A* more successful approach is to design the plan according to what
people are \"likely *to do.\"* Plans are much easier to change than
human behavior (Drabek, 1985b:9; Quarantelli, 1985:21; Dynes, 1981:iv).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Base disaster plans on what people are \"likely\" to do,
  rather than what they \"should\" do.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Some planners believe that persons in the impact area are often stunned
and rendered helpless by a disaster and that what they need and will
respond to is a strong leader who can tell them what to do. For this
reason, it is assumed that disaster behavior can be controlled to a high
degree. Some disaster plans specify in quite some detail the manner in
which people are to behave or respond.\
\
However, even totalitarian governments; using coercive measures during
wartime have not always found it possible to dictate behavior that was
not considered legitimate by the public. When this has been tried,
orders have sometimes had to be rescinded in the face of widespread and
sometimes violent protests.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Germany, World War II.* The government had to abandon
attempts to prevent families from bringing their children back to the
cities which were targets of allied bombing attacks (Quarantelli,
1960:76).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Britain, World Wars I & IL* The British government in both
world wars tried to ban the use of subway stations as overnight bomb
shelters. Both times, however, people continued to sleep in the subway
stations, and regulations against this activity had to be canceled
(Quarantelli, 1960:76).\
\
Some persons seem at times resistant to evidence that contradicts their
presumption that control of disaster behavior can be achieved. The
failure of citizens to follow their directives may be interpreted to
reflect a weakness in the means of control used, rather than in the
basic assumption that such control can be achieved. Occasionally,
disaster officials gain a false sense of success when they misinterpret
public actions as being a result of their directives (Quarantelli,
1960:77).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** Warning was received in a California city that it might be
the target of a tidal wave. City officials issued an order to evacuate
the downtown area. The evacuation order was called a success because the
area was cleared rather promptly. However, many of those who left then
went to the beach to watch for the wave! (Quarantelli, 1960:76)\
\
\
**INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE**\
\
**EXAMPLE:** \"The key to NASA\'s success in reaching the moon was that
all the participants were impressed not only with their role in getting
the rocket off the ground but more importantly with how their role
interfaced or interacted with other roles. They were briefed not only on
their duties but also informed about the total, overall project. The
problem of getting to the moon was solved by many experts performing in
their own separate fields of expertise but all with the same goal in
mind. Although each participant had only a small role in the outcome,
each was very much aware of his own part in achieving it.\" (Coleman,
1978:8)\
\
This quote was taken, not from a book on space exploration, but from a
fire management text. The author used it to describe the importance of
an overall *systems* perspective in fire service operations. A systems
perspective in disaster preparedness requires *inter-organizational*
planning. Some of the most critical difficulties in disaster response
are due to the lack of inter-organizational coordination. Yet, many
organizations plan for disaster as if they were to function in
isolation. Their disaster plans are conceived -with a focus on trees
rather than forests.\
\
For example, while nearly all hospitals have disaster plans, they may
have ignored coordinating them with other hospitals, public safety
agencies, and ambulance services (Quarantelli, 1983:103; Worth,
1977:166). The Disaster Research Center found that only 44% of the
communities they studied had any inter-organizational disaster plan
whatsoever for emergency medical services. Even then, some plans called
for the coordination of only two or three emergency agencies. Plans
called for police to coordinate with fire departments, or for ambulances
to coordinate with hospitals, but other organizations were ignored.\
\
Furthermore, most of the plans only took into consideration those
emergency organizations that normally respond to medical emergencies
within the political boundaries of the community. Even fewer plans
existed for overall coordination of disaster emergency medical services
at the county or state level Quarantelli, 1983:86,120; Neff, 1977:179;
Tierney, 1985a). In only about 25% of the localities did the Disaster
Research Center find any type of regional disaster planning
(Quarantelli, 1983:106).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Air Florida Crash, Potomac River and Subway
Derailment, Washington, D.C., January 13, 1982.* The National
Transportation Safety Board investigation revealed that there was no
area-wide disaster plan that provided for joint response by emergency
units of the District of Columbia and adjoining suburban areas of
Virginia and Maryland. The D.C. Fire Department and the Transit
Authority had jointly conducted three disaster drills prior to the
derailment. One of the drills was an evacuation of 292 passengers from
the subway. However, the simulations did not include participation by
suburban fire and rescue units, D.C. Police, or the metropolitan area
hospitals (NTSB, 1982:46).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. All*
agencies involved in the response to Coalinga did have disaster plans.
However, most of the plans were not coordinated with those of other
agencies and jurisdictions, and when the quake struck, the various
organizations seemed to act independently. Poor coordination among the
responders resulted in misunderstandings, delays, and duplication of
effort (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:74; Kallsen, 1983:29; Tierney,
1985b:33).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**For disaster planning to be effective, it must be
  inter-organizational.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

There are two types of organizations in particular that are frequently
overlooked in community disaster responses. The first of these is the
military. The second is the private sector, especially private hospitals
(Stallings, 1971:28,30; Hildebrand, 1980:12).\
\
\
**REALISTIC SUPPORT FOR DISASTER PLANNING**\
\
**Resources Necessary to Carry Out the Plan**\
One of the reasons that disaster plans may not be put into effect when
disaster strikes is because of the failure to provide the resources
(personnel, time, money, equipment, supplies, or facilities) necessary
to make the plan work (Barton, 1969:96).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Hyatt Hotel Skywalk Collapse, Kansas City,* Missouri, July
17, 1981. Although the use of a medical emergency triage tag (METTAG)
was designated by the Kansas City disaster plan, the necessary materials
were not available the night of the disaster. Therefore, triage tags
were not used. Similarly, identification arm bands prescribed in the
disaster plan were not available (Orr, 1983:602,603).\
\
Plans may be developed, but funding not made available for equipment and
supplies. Time and money may not be budgeted for the development of
disaster training programs. Many emergency organizations operate on a
24-hour-a-day basis. This means that ongoing training sessions must be
repeated for each shift, or personnel must come in on their day off (but
overtime pay for this may not be budgeted). Persons may be assigned
disaster planning tasks, but not given the paid time to carry them out
effectively and still meet their routine work obligations. Rather, they
may have to donate their free time. Few rewards and little recognition
are provided to induce knowledgeable and experienced persons to become
involved in disaster preparedness activities. It is little wonder that
communities that allow planning to occur in this context-get \"what they
pay for.\" If disaster planning is to result in more than \"paper\"
plans, the planning process must be tied to the resources necessary to
carry out the mandate (Drabek, 1986:386; Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:42;
Kilijanek, 1981:41; Dynes, 1981:74; May, 1985:45; Mushkatel, 1985:51).\
\
**Status of the Disaster Planning Office**\
In order to gain the attention, respect, and cooperation of other
governmental offices, disaster planning must be given a place in the
governmental hierarchy that provides the necessary status, authority,
and support (Stevenson, 1981:42). Unfortunately, disaster planning is
often relegated to a position of low status in the administrative
hierarchy of organizations-isolated from any existing sources of
political power and from the priority-setting, budgeting, and
decision-making processes (Drabek, 1986:53; Tierney, 1985b:74).\
\
There is a theoretical advantage when the disaster preparedness office
functions as a staff position to the governmental chief executive
officer, independent of other governmental subdivisions. When community
disaster planning is relegated: to a single agency such as the fire or
sheriff s department, its priorities sometimes take second place to
those of the agency. Also, cooperation with other agencies can be
dampened because the disaster office is not seen as a neutral body.\
\
However, such an \"independent\" position is not always the most
advantageous. Sometimes an individual sheriff or fire chief can offer
support, legitimacy, and authority to disaster planning which more than
offsets the theoretical advantages of an \"independent\" disaster
planning office. A wise preparedness director will seek a niche for his
agency that provides the strongest base of support. The exact location
of this niche will vary from one community to another (Tierney,
1985b:74; Drabek, 1987:194,233).\
\
\
**INVOLVEMENT OF DISASTER PLAN USERS**\
\
**Knowledge of the Plan**\
Disaster preparedness cannot be accomplished unless the plan is known by
the participants (Quarantelli, 1981a:17; Adams, 1981a:25). History has
shown us the consequences of this fact.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire, April* 18-19,
1906. The third floor of the fire station on Bush Street was the
official residence of Chief Dennis Sullivan. When the quake struck, it
toppled a set of brick smokestacks which plummeted through the roof,
critically injuring the Chief. He was taken unconscious to the Southern
Pacific Hospital and died 3 days later. San Francisco will never know
what might have happened if the Chief had not been injured. He, more
than any man in the city, had been aware of the frightful fire potential
presented by the miles of crowded wooden buildings. Apparently
unbeknownst to anyone else, he had long before laid plans to stop the
kind of conflagration that could result if the city\'s water supply were
disrupted. There was water in the bay, and there were ways to pump it
into the city (Bronson, 1959:29, 40).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Evacuation of Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, November
10,* 1979. After the derailment of a Canadian Pacific Railway train in
1979, chlorine leaking from one of the tank cars made it necessary to
evacuate 220,000 residents of Mississauga, including three hospitals and
several nursing homes. The evacuation was successful because of the
preplanning, training, and experience of the Peel Regional Police Force.
The Peel Police plan was not only a good plan, but it was known to the
members of the force. This was because of the requirement that all
officers know the plan in order to pass promotional examinations
(Drabek, 1986:120; Quarantelli, 1982a:H-36).\
\
***Training Programs***\
Disaster plans, in order to be functional, must be tied to training
programs (Casper, 1983; Quarantelli, 1985a:21; Dynes, 1981:75). It is
during training sessions and drills that various operational problems
can be encountered and resolved (Adams, 1981a:25). Unfortunately,
although 83% of local governments have disaster plans, only 52% actually
test these plans (Mushkatel, 1985:51), and only 42.2% of counties and
27.7% of cities test them annually (Drabek, 1985a:86).\
\
Agencies are often more easily motivated to participate in practical
simulations and training programs than to expend valuable resources
developing rigid and complex written plans whose value they question.
Practical courses such as those put on by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency\'s Emergency Training Center or the California
Specialized Training Institute are but a couple of examples (Seismic
Safety Comm, 1979:26).\
\
***Designation of Positions Rather Than Persons***\
It is important that participants in the disaster response know how to
carry out the plan even in the absence of certain key individuals.
Therefore, plans should be written in terms of positions (for example,
the on-call administrative supervisor, or the acting chief, rather than
in terms of particular persons. Succession of authority should be
covered by the plan (for example, who is in charge if the mayor is out
of town) (Worth, 1977:166; Quarantelli, 1983:121).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May* 2,1983. Bob Semple
was Coalinga\'s public information director and a volunteer emergency
medical technician. When he got back to his office, he had to dig
through the rubble for his copy of the county disaster plan. The first
thing it said to do was to find the incident commander, who was supposed
to be the Coalinga Fire Chief. Unfortunately, the Fire Chief was out of
town. Using his car CB radio, Semple did manage to contact the captain
in charge of the fire department, and they began to try and get things
organized. (It was a Fresno County Sheriff\'s lieutenant who
subsequently assumed the position of incident commander.) (Arnett,
198361)\
\
**Acceptance of the Plan**\
According to a 1979 report, city managers and county executives feel
that state and federal disaster agencies require the writing of very
complicated and lengthy disaster plans. City managers said they had read
the plan once, did not know where it was now, and wouldn\'t use it in a
disaster anyway (Seisndc Safety Comm, 1979:19). As stated by one city
official:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"Once you get your plan approved by the Office of Emergency Services,
  go bury it and write a plan which meets your needs.\" (Seismic Safety
  Comm, 1979:19)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

And an emergency services coordinator put it this way:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  She pointed to a 3-inch volume on the shelf and said that it was the
  official city disaster plan. She called it a \"compliance plan-a term
  that was used by emergency services directors around the state to
  describe the plan that had been submitted to the Office of Emergency
  Services. From the desk drawer she withdrew a thin handbook, stating
  that this was the city\'s real plan. This consisted of a list of
  agencies, contacts in the agencies, telephone numbers, a list of where
  to get various kinds of equipment and supplies, and a checklist of
  actions to take in various types of disasters (Seismic Safety Comm,
  1979:19).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

The point to be made is that disaster plans must be acceptable to the
elected officials, the departments that will implement them, and even to
those the plan is intended to benefit \[the public\]. The consequence of
ignoring this principle is that the resulting plans may also be ignored
(Gratz, 1972:39,50).\
\
**Importance of the Planning Process**\
One aspect of disaster planning often overlooked is the importance of
the process (Drabek, 1986:53; Wenger, 1986:72). Often it is more
important than the written document that results. One reason for this is
that those who participate in developing the plan are more likely to
accept it. This is preferred over adopting a plan written by someone
else who may not understand local circumstances. But, there is another
aspect of equal importance-the personal contacts that develop. A number
of researchers have observed that pre-disaster contacts among
representatives of emergency organizations result in smoother operations
in subsequent disasters. Organizations are more likely to interface if
the contact is not with total strangers. Furthermore, in the process of
planning, the participants become familiar with the roles of other
individuals and organizations involved in the disaster response (Dynes,
1978; Drabek, 1986:125; Quarantelli, 1983:120,130). (See Chapter 5)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**The process of planning is more important than the written
  document that results.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**Planning *by the Users***\
One of the reasons disaster plans become \"paper\" plans is because they
are often composed by civil defense officials or disaster planning
offices rather than by the emergency agencies that have to carry out the
response (Gratz, 1972:48). This pattern has its roots in the historical
wartime focus of civil defense in the United States (Blanchard, 1985).
Planning for wartime civil defense was based on the assumption that
local emergency response agencies would not be acting as independent and
autonomous bodies, but would act as part of a \"military-like,\" line
organizational structure under the direction of the federal government.
With an emphasis on an enemy attack scenario, civil defense planning was
based on military experience, and civil defense officials were often
appointed who had a military background (Irwin, 1984).\
\
Even after the \"dual use\" concept (preparedness applicable both to
enemy attack and peacetime disasters) was introduced in the early 1970s,
civil defense planning was seen as an effort to get local governments to
comply with federal policy. In order to receive federal civil defense
money, local government had to comply with complex paperwork
requirements and create written disaster plans according to specific
rules. Since the federal perspective was based on a military
orientation, little of the required planning dealt with issues critical
to the realities of emergency response in the civilian context.\
\
It is within this historical context that planning is still often seen
as something that is done *by* a civil defense office (or what is now
often called an emergency management agency) *for* the community\'s
emergency response organizations (e.g., fire, law enforcement,
ambulances, hospitals, Red Cross). This type of planning effort is
sometimes enhanced when a disaster advisory committee composed of
representatives of local emergency response organizations is formed.
Unfortunately, it is still often seen as a plan imposed from the
outside. For this reason, its legitimacy and effectiveness may be
questioned by those for whom it is intended (Wenger, 1986:13,60; Drabek,
1987:60,62,106,178; Dynes, 1978:52; Gratz, 1972:48).\
\
Recently, a different organizational structure for disaster planning has
gained in popularity. This model is represented by a congressionally
funded project called FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern
California Organized for Potential Emergencies) which was made up of
federal, state, and local firefighting agencies in Southern California.
FIRESCOPE was chartered in 1972 after a series of devastating wildland
fires. Its purpose was to develop coordination processes for
multi-agency fire operations. The important feature of the FIRESCOPE
process is planning *by the users* (the responders). This process has
been adopted by the National Interagency Incident Management System
(NIIMS) for use by federal wildland firefighting agencies on a national
basis (ICS, 1983b; ICS, 1986; FEMA, 1987:5).\
\
Planning group membership in this model is open to representatives of
all those organizations likely to be participating in local emergency
operations. The planning process actually describes a four-tiered
decision-making and planning body (see Table 3-1):

-   **The Board of Directors** is made up of agency directors and sets
    goals and policy.

-   **The Operations Team** is composed of the agency operations chiefs
    (deputy, assistant, or division chiefs, those who are directly in
    charge of each agency\'s emergency operations). They implement Board
    decisions and recommend new proposals for consideration or review.

-   **The Task Force** is composed of supervisory operations-level
    officers (for example, fire battalion chiefs, police sergeants).
    They provide most of the general staff work and basic analysis.

-   **Specialist Groups** are composed of agency specialists (for
    example, experts in training, communications, public information).
    They perform technical staff work in their areas of expertise.

**Table 3-1.** The FIRESCOPE structure for emergency and disaster
planning.

  ------------------------------ ----------------------------------------
  BOARD OF DIRECTORS             
  \-\-\-\-\-\-\-- COORDINATOR    

  \|\                            
  OPERATIONS TEAM\               
  \|\                            
  TASK FORCE\                    
  \|\                            
  SPECIALIST GROUPS              
  ------------------------------ ----------------------------------------

(Adapted from \"Exemplary Practices in Emergency Management: The
California. FIRESCOPE Program,\" Monograph series No. 1, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 5.)\
\
Administrative management of the planning and implementation process is
through a **Coordinator** who is responsible to the Board of Directors.
The coordinator selected should be as free as possible from the
influence of any single agency or jurisdiction. If he is unduly
influenced by a particular agency, his credibility and effectiveness
will be compromised (ICS, 1983b; Wenger, 1986:68).\
\
The FIRESCOPE planning process is designed so that the jurisdictional
authority and responsibilities of the participating agencies are not
compromised. The planning group attempts to clarify each member
agency\'s roles and how they will interact with other member agencies
(Irwin, 1988). Among the other advantages of this approach, this
\"planning by the users\" assures that the resulting plan will be known
and accepted by those who are supposed to put it into action.\
\
Because FIRESCOPE was mandated by Congress to address the response
problems of *fire agencies,* this model was designed primarily for fire
service planning. Although it was not specifically designed for the
participation of representatives of multiple disciplines such as fire,
law enforcement, hospitals, and military organizations, nor of elected
chief executives such as mayors, city managers, county supervisors
(Irwin, 1988), the model is easily adapted to include representation by
these participants. One format for elected officials might be a joint
powers body (FEMA, 1983d:159) made up of a chief elected executive or
his representative, from each participating political jurisdiction
(e.g., city mayors, county supervisors, special district supervisors,
state, and federal representatives). The board of directors would then
answer to that joint powers body. This body would set overall political
policy and establish inter-governmental agreements regarding budgetary
support.\
\
**SUMMARY**\
\
Disaster plans are not effective unless several requirements are first
met. They must be based on valid assumptions about what happens in
disasters and how people tend to behave when faced with such crises.
Disaster plans must also take a \"systems\" perspective. They must take
into account all of the organizations and persons involved in the
response, even the unexpected ones. Finally, disaster plans must be
familiar to those that will use them, and accepted by them as legitimate
and appropriate. Plans that do not fit these criteria may only succeed
in creating a false sense of security in the community for which they
are written. In contrast to the traditional approach to disaster
planning, where the civil defense authorities establish planning
requirements for the responders, there is a new and more effective
model. This new approach is for the directors of the agencies themselves
to determine their needs and to establish multi-agency coordination
arrangements. The coordinator for this planning effort is selected by
the agency directors and acts on their behalf. This approach tends to
assure that planning corresponds to local needs and that the resulting
plan is accepted and understood by those who will need to use it.\
\
\
**PLANNING CHECKPOINTS**

-   Does your disaster plan cover the tasks and responsibilities of all
    the organizations and individuals likely to be involved in the
    response?

-   Does it avoid trying to change how people normally behave in
    disasters?

-   Does your planning body or coordinator have the respect, support,
    and authority to carry out his mandates? Is he chosen by the
    agencies that will be using the plan?

-   Are those who are expected to implement and use the plan familiar
    with it?

-   Do the involved organizations have ongoing, mandatory disaster
    training programs?

-   Do those for whom the plan is designed accept it as legitimate and
    worthwhile? Did they *develop* the plan?

-   Are disaster tasks assigned in terms of positions rather than
    individuals?

-   Does your disaster planning office have a position within the
    governmental hierarchy where its input is likely to be heard by
    those who set operational and budgetary priorities?

**ADDITIONAL READING**\
\
Public official attitudes toward disaster preparedness in California,
Publication No. SSC 79-05, 1979. Available from: Seismic Safety
Commission, 1900 K St, Suite 100, Sacramento, Calif 95814 (free).

**Chapter 4: DISASTERS ARE DIFFERENT**

Disasters can damage emergency response resources. This photograph shows
the collapsed ambulance bays at Olive View Hospital, a result of the San
Fernando Valley earthquake of February 9,1971. (Courtesy of the Los
Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  One of the reasons disaster response is difficult to coordinate is
  because *disasters are different from routine, daily emergencies.* The
  difference is more than just one of magnitude. Disasters generally
  cannot be adequately managed merely by mobilizing more personnel and
  material. Disasters may cross jurisdictional boundaries, create the
  need to undertake unfamiliar tasks, change the structure of responding
  organizations, result in the creation of new organizations, trigger the
  mobilization of participants that do not ordinarily respond to local
  emergency incidents, and disable the routine equipment and facilities
  for emergency response. As a consequence of these changes, the normal
  procedures for coordinating community emergency response may not be
  adapted well to the situation.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**WHAT IS A DISASTER?**\
\
What is a disaster? The term often suggests images such as earthquakes,
tidal waves, floods, hurricanes, and explosions, and yet it is difficult
to define a disaster by physical characteristics alone. Is the flooding
of an uninhabited, uncultivated plain a disaster? What about a landslide
in a deserted canyon? In general, to be considered a disaster, these
events have to affect an area of human development.\
\
Often, even this is not enough. An earthquake might cause little damage
in California, because the target area has relatively
earthquake-resistant buildings. The same amount of seismic activity in a
foreign community, whose buildings have unreinforced stone walls, might
result in disastrous loss of life. Thus, definition of a disaster must
include consideration of a hazardous event\'s effect on the target
population.\
\
The impact of a hazardous event on a community is partially determined
by the mechanisms and adaptations that the population has developed to
deal with the effects of potentially damaging events. In some
communities, natural hazards occur with such regularity that effective
methods have been developed to cope with them. In such cases, the event
might trigger emergency activity, but would not result in a disaster.\
\
Imagine the impact of a typical Vermont winter on Southern Florida, or a
monsoon season in Phoenix, Arizona. Vermont does not declare a disaster
every winter, because the residents have adapted to the weather there.
Cincinnati, Ohio, is an example of a city which has adapted to frequent
flooding. Located in the flood plain of the Ohio River Valley,
Cincinnati is subject to flooding about every 14 months. As a result,
local organizations have developed a sophisticated set of procedures for
responding to floods. These are so effective that flooding emergencies
do not inordinately disrupt the community\'s coping mechanisms
(Anderson, 1965).\
\
The amount of property destruction and numbers of deaths and injuries
are often used as a criteria for defining a disaster, but this may be
somewhat misleading. A ten-victim, multiple vehicle collision might
overwhelm a rural community hospital, whereas the same event may not
cause undue problems at a large urban trauma center. Research does
suggest that non-routine procedures and inter-organizational
coordination are almost always required when a civilian disaster
produces more than 120 casualties (Wright, 1977:190). In contrast, much
more death, injury, and loss of material are managed in wartime without
exceeding the ability of the system to respond effectively and smoothly.
Bomb shelters, fire control, management of debris clearance, and systems
for handling the dead and wounded become routine (Yutzy, 1969:36).\
\
Some disaster plans identify three levels of disaster. A typical version
is described in *The Student Manual for Disaster Management and Planning
for Emergency Physician\'s Course* (ACEP:1-2):\
\
*Level I:* A localized multiple casualty emergency wherein local medical
resources are available and adequate to provide for field medical
treatment and stabilization, including triage. The patients will be
transported to the appropriate local medical facility for further
diagnosis and treatment.\
\
*Level II:* A multiple casualty emergency where the large number of
casualties and/or lack of local medical care facilities are such as to
require multi-jurisdiction (regional) medical mutual aid.\
\
*Level III:* A mass casualty emergency wherein local and regional
medical resource\'s capabilities are exceeded and/or over-whelmed.
Deficiencies in medical supplies and personnel are such as to require
assistance from state or federal agencies.\
\
These definitions of disaster levels can be useful for planning
different levels of disaster response, but one caution is in order. It
must be recognized that *even in local (Level I) disasters,* federal and
state agencies are often involved, and need to be considered when
coordination procedures are planned.\
The Federal Emergency Management Agency defines disaster as:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"An occurrence of a severity and magnitude that normally results in
  deaths, injuries, and property damage and that *cannot be managed
  through the routine procedures* and resources of government. \[Emphasis
  is author\'s.\] It usually develops suddenly and unexpectedly and
  requires immediate, coordinated, and effective response by multiple
  government and private sector organizations to meet human needs and
  speed recovery.\" (FEMA, 1984c:1-3)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Holloway, a physician who has written a number of articles on disaster
management, defines a disaster as:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"Many people trying to do quickly what they do not ordinarily do, in
  an environment with which they are not familiar.\" (Tierney, 1985a:77)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

*This requirement, to do things in non-routine ways, often under
conditions of extreme urgency, is one of the keys to understanding
disaster response problems.* Often, to a significant degree,
disaster-stricken communities end up *improvising* their responses.\
\
A common disaster planning assumption is, \"Good disaster response is
merely an extension of good, routine, daily emergency procedures.\"
(Quarantelli, 1981a:10; Quarantelli, 1983:87; Tierney, 1977:153; Orr,
1983:603; Gratz, 1972:48; ACEP:9-2; Sorensen, 1981:27) In contrast to
this assumption, this chapter will discuss the ways in which disasters
differ from more routine, daily emergencies, and why *the normal ways in
which communities cope with routine emergencies may not always work well
in disasters.* These differences are not limited to questions of
magnitude. While it is true that the destruction posed by a disaster is
often greater than that from routine emergencies, there are also
differences in the types of problems that must be handled, the types of
tasks that must be carried out, and the types of help available. Thus,
responding to a disaster involves more than merely mobilizing greater
numbers of emergency personnel and greater quantities of supplies.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Good disaster management *is not* merely an extension of
  good everyday emergency procedures. It is more than just the
  mobilization of additional personnel, facilities, and supplies.
  Disasters often pose unique problems rarely faced in daily emergencies.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**ROUTINE PATTERNS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**\
\
The management of routine, daily emergencies in the United States is
influenced by a national preference for local control and private
enterprise. The result is a complex, decentralized structure where the
various tasks are divided up among a myriad of independent public and
private organizations and individuals (Drabek, 1985a:85; Drabek,
1987:105; Quarantelli, 1981c:68). Which organization does what at the
scene of an emergency is usually determined by tradition and is
formalized in laws, contracts, and charters. The geographical areas to
which each emergency agency responds and the roles and responsibilities
of each are often mutually understood. Occasional jurisdictional
disputes do occur, but these are usually settled by legislative or
judicial procedures, or by informal negotiations over a period of time.\
\
Since local emergencies usually involve the same set of emergency
organizations, each is eventually able to carry out its tasks at the
scene independently and with *relatively* little conflict or confusion.
Because these tasks often do not tend to change, there is frequently not
a great need for on-the-spot decisions about the responsibilities of
each organization at the scene. In short, routine emergencies create
little demand for ongoing, moment-to-moment coordination among the
involved organizations (Quarantelli, 1985:5; Dynes, 1978:59; Dynes,
1981:12,39; Wenger, 1978:27).\
\
As in the assignment of tasks, the assignment of resources for routine
emergencies is often standardized. Each organization is budgeted a
quantity of resources, and this may be done far in advance of their
use-often on an annual basis. Members of each organization may be
familiar with the needed re-sources, where they are located, and the
standardized procedures for obtaining them. In such cases, much of the
information regarding the availability of resources is known in advance
of an emergency response and does not need to be communicated.\
\
\
**IN DISASTERS, THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND RESOURCES CHANGES**\
\
In disasters there are often conditions that may make the traditional
division of labor and resources, characteristic of routine emergency
management, unsuitable for disaster response:

-   Disasters may put demands on organizations, requiring them to make
    internal changes in structure and delegation of responsibilities.

-   Disasters may create demands that exceed the capacities of single
    organizations, requiring them to share tasks and resources with
    other organizations that use unfamiliar procedures.

-   Disasters may attract the participation of organizations and
    individual volunteers who usually do not respond to emergencies.

-   Disasters may cross jurisdictional boundaries, resulting in multiple
    organizations being faced with overlapping responsibilities.

-   Disasters may create new tasks for which no organization has
    traditional responsibility.

-   Disasters may render unusable the normal tools and facilities used
    in emergency response.

-   Disasters may result in the spontaneous formation of new
    organizations that did not exist before.

**Table 4-1**. Differences in Disasters

  --------------------------------- -------------------------------------
  **Routine Emergencies**           **Disasters**

  Interaction with familiar faces   Interaction with unfamiliar faces

  Familiar tasks and procedures     Unfamiliar tasks and procedures

  Intra-organizational coordination Intra- and inter-organizational
  needed                            coordination needed

  Roads, telephones, and facilities Roads may be blocked or jammed,
  intact                            telephones jammed or non- functional,
                                    facilities may be damaged

  Communications frequencies        Radio frequencies often overloaded
  adequate for radio traffic        

  Communications primarily intra-   Need for inter-organizational
  organizational                    information sharing

  Use of familiar terminology in    Communication with persons who use
  communicating                     different terminology

  Need to deal mainly with local    Hordes of national and international
  press                             reporters (see Chapter 10)

  Management structure adequate to  Resources often exceed management
  coordinate the number of          capacity
  resources involved                
  --------------------------------- -------------------------------------

**Organizations Change Internally**\
Emergency response organizations may adapt to the increased demands of a
disaster in a number of ways which can result in their members carrying
out unfamiliar tasks with unfamiliar equipment and interacting with
unfamiliar faces (Dynes, 1974:81; Dynes, 1978:50; Quarantelli, 1978:4;
FEMA, 1983d:14).\
\
***Off-Duty Personnel Called In***\
Emergency organizations such as hospitals, ambulance companies, fire
departments, and law enforcement agencies typically operate 24 hours a
day. Also, some emergency organizations such as police departments may
have a cadre of reserve or auxiliary officers that can be summoned for
duty (Quarantelli, 1972:69). By calling in off-duty personnel, the
available manpower may be quickly doubled or tripled. Unfortunately,
this may also deplete the reserve of well-rested personnel if the
disaster lasts longer than one work shift (Quarantelli, 1983).\
\
***Personnel Re-assigned to New Duties***\
Organizations may curtail nonessential activities and re-assign
personnel to disaster-relevant duties (Dynes, 1981:44,62). Fire
departments may re-assign fire prevention officers to fire suppression
duties. Police departments may re- assign detectives, training officers,
crime prevention officers, and records personnel. In addition, routine
patrol activities may be reduced. Hospitals may discontinue routine
services like: elective surgery, clinic services, patient education,
physical therapy, medical library services, and gift shop hours (Dynes,
1981:44,62).\
\
***Everyday Procedures and Priorities Altered***\
In disasters, emergency organizations are often required to use
different procedures and to establish different priorities for action.
One example is the hospital, where medical treatment may be carried out
in different areas of the facility and by different personnel than
usual. Nurses sometimes end up making medical decisions, such as which
patients to discharge to make room for disaster victims. Suspected
fractures may be splinted without being X-rayed. Arriving patients may
have been exposed to dangerous chemical or radioactive material and
require decontamination. Physicians, nurses, medical students, and
student nurses who do not usually work in emergency treatment areas may
be pressed into service there. Registration of incoming patients may be
abandoned in favor of using disaster tags. In many cases, record-keeping
and billing are abandoned in favor of more rapid treatment and
disposition. Hospital switchboard operators are often inundated with
unusual offers of assistance or requests for information. The phone
lines may quickly become so jammed that it becomes impossible to use
them to get information into or out of the facility. This introduces the
novel task of using alternative means to carry out communications. A
system of runners may have to be set up to carry messages. Hospital
security is faced with new tasks related to traffic and crowd control
(Quarantelli, 1983:82,83; Worth, 1977:164; Tierney, 1985b:33,80;
Williams, 1956:658; Stallings, 1971:18).\
\
Persons manning communication and decision-making positions may be- come
so overwhelmed with the volume of traffic that they are forced to
perform a sort of **\"communications triage.\"** That is, they must
filter out all but the most essential information to transmit. A problem
can occur when the person filtering the information does not understand
its significance to the overall disaster effort (Stallings, 1971:18;
Kilijanek, 1979:5; Dynes, 1977:10,12; Brunacini, 1985:47). This may be
because the information is important to another organization whose goals
and tasks are unfamiliar (Ringhofer). Confusion can also occur when
other persons (those, for example, from a subdivision of the
organization that has ceased to have a priority function during the
disaster) are pressed into manning radios or answering phones.\
\
Overload of communications channels and filtering of information in
disasters can have widespread effects on decision-making. Getting
information to higher echelon authorities in organizational
bureaucracies can become too time consuming and unreliable for the
situation at hand. Decisions have to be made urgently or fives and
property are lost. The result is that the decision-making in disasters
may tend to occur at lower levels in the organization than in routine
emergencies (Drabek, 1986:121,162,171; Dynes, 1977:6; Dynes, 1978:60;
Drabek, 1985a; Drabek, 1985b:20; Tierney, 1985b:32, Stallings, 1971:32;
Worth, 1977:163; Rosow, 1977:74).\
\
**Organizations Share Tasks and Resources**\
Even with the various adaptations available to them, *single
organizations* often do not have the resources to manage the disaster
tasks at hand. It may not be possible for all the traffic to be
controlled by one police department, an of the rescue and extrication to
be carried out by one fire department, all the injured to be transported
by one ambulance company, and all the patients to receive timely medical
care at one hospital. One of the fundamental differences in disasters is
that various urgent tasks may have to be divided up among multiple
organizations. In contrast to the more common, large emergencies in
which mutual aid is requested from familiar neighboring jurisdictions,
organizations sharing tasks in disasters may be from distant locales and
may have not worked together before. Preexisting mutual aid agreements
or familiar procedures for working together and sharing resources may be
lacking (Drabek, 1981:21; Quarantelli, 1985:5; Dynes, 1974:79; FEMA,
1983d:14; Quarantelli, 1983:64; Kilijanek, 1981:126; Quarantelli,
1981a:10; Dynes, 1981:41).\
\
**Involvement of Non-emergency Responders**\
Many organizations and individuals that normally do not do so on a
routine basis may become involved in emergency tasks. Some organizations
have traditional mandates to switch to emergency-related activities in
the event of a disaster. Examples are the Red Cross, the Salvation Army,
public works departments, television stations, and private utility
companies. Non-emergency governmental organizations such as parks
departments, purchasing departments, and building inspectors may also be
pressed into disaster activities. There are others with no such mandate,
but they become involved because of the perceived need and a spirit of
altruism. In addition to all the individual volunteers that become
involved, there are many organizations that donate their services.
Examples include labor unions, church groups, scouts, civic and
fraternal organizations, private helicopter operators, and heavy
construction companies (Dynes, 1974:136).\
\
**Crossing of Jurisdictional Boundaries**\
Disasters often involve the response of many independent organizations
from the private sector as well as from multiple levels of government,
including federal, state, county, and city agencies, as well as special
districts (such as fire districts, regional parks, and water districts).
The diversity of responders is illustrated in Table 4-2 adapted from a
study of search and rescue operations in disasters (Drabek, 1981).\
\
Government in the United States is very decentralized. According to the
1982 Census of Governments, there are over 82,000 separate governments
in this country. Such decentralization allows for, and in some cases
even promotes, a lack of standardization. This is illustrated by the
variations in the way authority is vested to activate local disaster
plans, to request state disaster assistance, and to order a major
evacuation. Even the organizational structures of local disaster
agencies are characterized by diversity (Drabek, 1985a:85; Drabek, 1987:
107, 233; Wenger, 1986:59). This lack of standardization among the
myriad of agencies representing various levels of government complicates
coordination of disaster response.\
\
Unfortunately, many organizations continue to act independently in
disasters, focusing on their own organizational tasks, and sometimes
failing to see or find out how their role fits into the overall response
effort. This has been called by some the **\"Robinson Crusoe
syndrome\"** (\"We\'re the only ones on the island.\"). This narrow
focus on one\'s own organizational goals has been observed not only in
disaster response, but in planning as well. In a number of communities,
the various organizations that have a role in disaster response have
carried out their planning individually with little attempt to meld
their plans together into a coherent overall strategy. This problem has
been noted even more frequently with planning on a county- or state-wide
basis. Different levels of government (city, county, state, federal,
special district) may not have plans which are coordinated with each
other (Quarantelli, 1983:87,103,120; Tierney, 1985a:73; Tierney,
1985b:33; NTSB, 1982:46; De Atley, 1982:33; Adams, 1982:54; Kallsen,
1983:29; Kilijanek, 1981:44; Neff, 1977:179; Seismic Safety Comm,
1979:56; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:71).\
\
**Table 4-2**. Organizations Involved in Search and Rescue

  --------------------- ------------- ---------- ------------ ----------- -------------
  **Disaster**          **Private**   **City**   **County**   **State**   **Federal**

  Tornado\              5             4          5            4           2
  Lake Pomona, KS\                                                        
  6/17/78                                                                 

  Flood\                3             2          13           6           1
  Texas Hill Country\                                                     
  8/1-4/78                                                                

  Tornado\              4             5          5            4           2
  Wichita Falls, TX\                                                      
  4/10/79                                                                 

  Tornado\              4             3          4            3           1
  Cheyenne, WY\                                                           
  7/16/79                                                                 

  Hurricane Frederic\   3             8          6            3           1
  Jackson County, MS\                                                     
  9/12/79                                                                 

  Volcano Eruption\     2             1          7            5           10
  Mt. St. Helens, WA\                                                     
  5/18/80                                                                 

  (Adapted from: Drabek                                                   
  T.E., Tamminga H.L.,                                                    
  Kilijanek, et al.,                                                      
  \"Managing                                                              
  multiorganizational                                                     
  Emergency Responses:                                                    
  Emergent Search and                                                     
  Rescue Net-works in                                                     
  Natural Disaster and                                                    
  Remote Area                                                             
  Settings,\" Natural                                                     
  Hazards Information                                                     
  Center, University of                                                   
  Colorado, Boulder,                                                      
  1981.)                                                                  
  --------------------- ------------- ---------- ------------ ----------- -------------

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **OBSERVATION**The typical response to a disaster includes multiple
  independent organizations from the private sector as well as from
  agencies of city, county, state, federal, and special district
  governments. Often, they have planned independently and end up
  responding that way, with little grasp of how each fits into the
  overall response.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

When planning has been done on an inter-organizational basis, it is more
likely to result in a coordinated response.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 10, 1979.* The city,
county, and state had well rehearsed and detailed disaster plans. They
were designed to fit with one another and to be complementary. The
general roles and authority structure were understood by most. Following
impact, the response network formed very rapidly according to the
previously practiced plans (Adams, 1981b:30,40).\
\
***Political Boundaries***\
Earthquakes, wildfires, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and toxic spills
may cause destruction over large geographical areas, simultaneously
involving city, county, regional, state, and federal jurisdictions.
Under such circumstances, customary divisions of responsibility may be
inapplicable Quarantelli, 1985:16; Quarantelli, 1983:106; Neff,
1977:179; Tierney, 1977:154).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** A railroad tank car containing a toxic volatile substance
exploded at a chemical plant within the limits of a northeastern city.
However, the gas cloud that resulted spread into the county area
Quarantelli, 1983:58).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Volcano eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May 18,
1980.* This disaster involved a large federal jurisdiction (U.S. Forest
Service) and that of three counties. Further jurisdictional overlap
resulted when the Governor of Washington declared the event a state
disaster (Drabek, 1981).\
\
Examples of the governmental agencies that might be involved at various
levels are shown in Table 4-3.\
\
Disasters do not need to cover large geographical areas in order to
cross multiple levels of governmental responsibility. Even localized
disasters can include federal jurisdiction if a navigable waterway or
airport is involved. jurisdictional boundaries may be crossed even when
geographical boundaries are not. For example, the federal government may
have jurisdictional involvement in a local accident involving a nuclear
reactor or the crash of a military aircraft. Laws determining who has
overall coordinating responsibility and authority when jurisdictions are
crossed are often unfamiliar to the participants, or are vague,
confusing, or nonexistent (Sorensen, 1981:46).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Lake Pomona, Kansas, June 17,1978.* This tornado
struck and capsized a showboat on a federal reservoir in a state park in
an unincorporated area of the county. Unfortunately, there was no
existing state law which defined who should be in charge of such a
situation. (Even if one existed, it would not apply to federal
authorities.) The matter was only resolved after the county attorney was
consulted and declared that the sheriff was the responsible authority
(Drabek, 1981:35; Kilijanek, 1980:28,32).\
\
**Table 4-3**. Governmental Agencies Involved in Disaster Response

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  **Law Enforcement and Investigatory 
  Agencies**                          

  *City*\                             *Federal*\
  Police\                             National Guard\
  \                                   Secret Service\
  \                                   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
  \                                   Firearms\
  \                                   National forest special agents\
  *County*\                           Park Police\
  Sheriff\                            Fish and Wildlife Service\
  Coroner\                            Coast Guard\
  Park ranger\                        Bureau of Indian Affairs\
  \                                   Environmental Protection Agency\
  \                                   Nuclear Regulatory Commission\
  \                                   Department of Transportation\
  \                                   Aviation Administration\
  *State*\                            Highway Traffic Safety
  Police, highway patrol\             Administration\
  Fish and game wardens\              Railroad Administration\
  State forest/park ranger\           Maritime Administration\
  University police                   FBI\
                                      \
                                      *Other*\
                                      Fire department arson investigation
                                      bureaus

  **Fire Protection Agencies**        

  *Local*\                            *Federal*\
  City fire departments\              Forest Service\
  Local fire protection districts\    Department of the Interior\
  County fire departments\            National Park Service\
  \                                   Bureau of Indian Affairs\
  *State*\                            Bureau of Land Management
  State forestry                      

  **Medical Organizations**           

  V.A. hospitals\                     Military air-sea rescue\
  County hospitals\                   State and county health offices\
  Public Health Service hospitals\    State emergency medical services
  Military hospitals\                 offices\
  Public ambulance and rescue teams\  U.S. Park Service mountain rescue\
  Lifeguards\                         County sheriffs search and rescue
  Military land ambulances            teams\
                                      Civil Air Patrol

  **Miscellaneous**                   

  *Local*\                            *Federal*\
  Public works departments\           Bureau of Mines\
  Welfare departments\                Geological Survey\
  Flood control districts\            Army Corps of Engineers\
  Cemetery district\                  Department of Agriculture\
  Civil defense\                      Weather Bureau\
  \                                   Small Business Administration\
  *State*\                            Federal Emergency Management Agency
  Mines or geology departments\       
  Seismic safety offices\             
  Civil defense\                      
  Highway departments                 
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

**EXAMPLE:** *Coliseum Explosion, Indianapolis, Indiana, October* 31,
1963. Initially, this disaster was characterized by a general lack of
coordination. Contributing to this state of affairs was ambiguity about
who should be in charge. The Indianapolis Civil Defense plan specified
that the County Civil Defense Director would assume command of all
emergency organizations in the event of a major disaster. But in this
case, there was some reluctance to call the incident a \"major\"
disaster. City Fire Department officials would normally be in command of
a fire within the city limits, but local statute also specified that the
County Coroner was the absolute authority in a disaster where a death
was involved.\
\
**Table 4-4**. Private Sector Organizations Involved in Disaster
Response

  ----------------------------------- ----------------------------------- --
  Private hospitals\                  Private hazardous spill cleanup     
  Physicians, nurses, and allied      companies\                          
  health professionals\               Manufacturing plant fire brigades\  
  Private ambulance companies\        Poison control centers\             
  Volunteer search and rescue teams\  Explorer Search and Rescue\         
  National Ski Patrol\                Private utility companies\          
  Rescue Dog Association\             Amateur radio organizations\        
  Red Cross\                          Veterinarians\                      
  Salvation Army\                     Funeral services\                   
  Religious disaster assistance and   Commercial radio and T.V. stations  
  social organizations                                                    

  Chemical Manufacturers                                                  
  Association - CHEMTREC (hazardous                                       
  materials telephone hotline)\                                           
  Railroad, airline, maritime,                                            
  trucking, pipeline, petroleum,                                          
  mining, and chemical firms whose                                        
  equipment or products are involved                                      
  in a mishap                                                             
  ----------------------------------- ----------------------------------- --

The first control was actually assumed by the City Police Chief, until 3
hours into the event. At that time, the Superintendent of the State
Police raised the point that the Coliseum was located on the State
Fairgrounds, and therefore, was under the jurisdiction of the State
Police. Responsibility for direction of the disaster operations was
transferred accordingly (Drabek, 1968:20,166).\
\
***The Private Sector***\
Responsibility for public welfare and safety in the United States is not
limited to governmental bodies, but is also relegated to private sector
organizations, businesses, and professionals (FEMA, 1983d:27). Disasters
not only cross political boundaries, but also the traditional areas of
private sector responsibility. Examples of the types of private
organizations and institutions that may be-come involved are given in
Table 4-4.\
\
**Non-routine Tasks**\
Another way in which disasters differ from routine emergencies is that
they frequently create non-routine tasks. They also create tasks for
which no organization has clear-cut responsibility. Often these tasks
have no counterpart in routine emergency operations, and there are no
precedents to help decide who is responsible for them (FEMA, 1983d;
Quarantelli, 1965:111; Quarantelli, 1982b:159; Bush, 1981; Dynes,
1981:29; Parr, 1970:426; Dynes, 1978:51; Drabek, 1986:29). Examples
include:\
\
***Situation Analysis***\
Disasters are characterized by great uncertainty. Often the character
and extent of damage and the secondary threats (leaking chemicals,
downed power lines, weakened dams) are not immediately apparent and
therefore the necessary countermeasures not undertaken. Initial actions
are undertaken based on vague and inaccurate information. Disasters are
also very \"fluid\" in nature with needs changing minute-to-minute.\
\
This fluidity necessitates a procedure for determining and updating what
the overall disaster situation is and what problems need to be tackled.
Typically, it is unclear to the responders who has the responsibility
for this task, and in many disasters the process is neglected. When
assessment of the disaster situation is carried out, it is generally
done independently by a number of individual organizations. Often each
agency limits its assessment to those observations of direct consequence
to that particular organization. In many cases, the information obtained
by these individual organizations is not shared or pooled. Accordingly,
an overall picture of the scope, severity, and types of disruption and
damage does not emerge early in the crisis (Parr, 1970:425; Golec,
1977:169,174; Quarantelli, 1983:67,91; Quarantelli, 1981a:23; Yutzy,
1969:118,152; Rosow, 1977:72,136,167,193; Drabek, 1986:170,186; Tierney,
1977:154). This failure may result from lack of planning or lack of
familiarity with established plans.\
\
***Multi-organizational Resource Management***\
Disasters often create the need for different organizations to share
resources (personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and facilities).
They also create the need for unusual resources not commonly used in
daily emergencies (e.g., search dogs, satellite communications, cranes).
Resources in disasters arrive from many atypical sources and often in
large numbers. In addition, they are often not dispatched or requested
in the routine manner. Units often respond without being asked after
hearing of the disaster on their scanners, or on commercial newscasts
(Quarantelli, 1983:61; Lewis, 1980:863; 1981f:39; Gordon, 1986:27; Neff,
1977:184; Stallings, 1971:12; Kallsen, 1983:26; Rosow, 1977:105). The
atypical mode in which resources respond makes it difficult to tell what
resources are present, where they are, what they are doing. Accordingly,
it is difficult to determine what resources need to be requested or
discouraged from responding. Disasters therefore create the need for
procedures aimed at managing and keeping track of resources on a
multi-organizational basis. (Further discussion of resource management
may be found in Chapter 6.)\
\
***Inter-agency Communications***\
Coordination of multi-organizational task accomplishment, situation
analysis, and resource management requires inter-agency communication.
The requirement is not only for communications hardware (e.g., radios
with compatible frequencies) but also for communications *procedures.*
Persons having information need to know who needs it and how to get it
there. Persons exchanging information need to use mutually understood
terminology. (Inter-agency communications are discussed further in
Chapter 5.)\
\
***Logistical Support***\
When organizations respond to a disaster, especially if they come from
some distance away and need to stay in the disaster area for an extended
period of time, they may require logistical support that cannot be
provided in the routine manner (Kallsen, 1983:28; 1983). These needs may
include:

-   Fuel and maintenance for vehicles

-   Sanitary facilities (latrines, showers)

-   Food - Shelter and sleeping facilities

-   Relief and replacement personnel

-   Emergency message contact arrangements

**Figure 4-1**. Disasters often require the establishment of logistical
support arrangements such as feeding facilities. (Courtesy of California
Department of Forestry, Sacramento, California.)\
\
***Search and Rescue***\
In the typical medical emergency, an ambulance is dispatched to a known
location with a definite number of victims. In disasters, however, the
situation often requires looking for casualties whose exact number,
location, and condition are unknown. This entails the need for
widespread organized search and rescue efforts.\
\
Federal guidelines stress the importance of specifying responsibility
for search and rescue in disaster planning and operations (FEMA,
1984c:111-2; FEMA, 1985d:3-4; FEMA, 1983e:485). Nevertheless, search and
rescue in many disasters has not been perceived as the primary
responsibility of any of the participating local government agencies.
State statutes have not helped to clarify the responsibilities. A survey
published in 1979 was able to find only four states with laws specifying
what agency was to be in charge of post-disaster search and rescue
(FEMA, 1983b:203). Accordingly, initial disaster search and rescue has
often occurred in a haphazard manner with little structure or control
Quarantelli, 1983:63; Wenger, 1986:32; Dynes, 1970:432).

**Figure 4-2**. In contrast to daily emergencies, disasters often call
for large-scale search and rescue operations as in this photo of the San
Fernando Valley, California, earthquake on February 9, 1971. (Courtesy
of Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)\
\
***Triage and Casualty Distribution***\
Ambulances responding to a routine emergency usually treat one or two
casualties and transport them to a single hospital. In disasters,
however, there are usually more patients than one ambulance crew or
hospital can handle. Therefore, the need often exists for triage (that
is, determining priorities for treatment and transport) and initiating a
procedure to distribute casualties equitably among the various hospitals
(Gibson, 1977:196; Tierney, 1985a:80; Quarantelli, 1983:63; Barton,
1969:69). (Triage is discussed further in Chapter 8.)\
\
***Casualty Lists***\
Casualty lists are important for two reasons:

-   They are needed to address the inquiries of concerned loved ones.
    After many major disasters there is an inexorable flood of inquiries
    from concerned loved ones seeking information about the missing
    (Ross, 1982:64; Worth, 1977:164; Quarantelli, 1983:82).

-   They are necessary to determine the number of missing victims for
    which search and rescue operations must be carried out. This task
    can be difficult if the missing have no relatives, were out of town
    when the disaster struck, or were visitors from out of town (Yutzy,
    1969:122; Kilijanek, 1981:127).

In many disasters though, a single organization does not have clear-cut
responsibility for maintaining casualty lists. Often the task will be
attempted by the Red Cross and/or Salvation Army, but other
organizations will also become involved (Kilijanek, 1981:78,128; Yutzy,
1969:122). In some disasters the Red Cross attempted to put together
casualty lists, but their efforts were stymied by those who were
unfamiliar with their function in this regard. Hospitals would not
release the information to them for fear of breaching patient
confidentiality (KC Health Dept, 1981:24B; Drabek, 1968:76).\
\
***Issuance of Passes***\
An important security task in disasters is keeping unauthorized persons
out of the disaster area. This is often done to prevent looting, to
decrease congestion hampering rescue efforts, and to prevent persons
from being injured in the wreckage. Often this implies the need for
passes to let in persons who have legitimate reasons to be there (for
example, homeowners and businessmen retrieving salvageable goods and
belongings). The lack of precedence may lead to disputes regarding who
has the authority to issue passes. In some cases, several organizations
may assume the task, resulting in arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement
of area restrictions and protests by irate citizens (Rosow, 1977:32;
Tierney, 1985b:34; Sorensen, 1981:46; Moore, 1958:17; Quarantelli,
1982b:12; Yutzy, 1969:114).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964.* The
damaged downtown area was cordoned off, and property owners and
businessmen clamored for access to their residences and stores. A
\"disaster control group\" had been organized and began to issue passes
to individuals with legitimate reason to enter the area. Anchorage Civil
Defense also issued passes to virtually everyone who requested them. To
further complicate matters, passes were also being issued by the State
Civil Defense, the city building inspector, the police, and by other
officials. Some persons with passes were not permitted entry because
some of the guards had not been instructed which passes to accept as
legitimate (Yutzy, 1969:116).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** A hospital was flooded after a hurricane when a
rain-swollen river overflowed its banks. For security reasons, access to
the neighborhood was controlled by roadblocks manned by guards. The
recovery operations of the hospital were hampered, because these guards
would not honor the identity cards of hospital employees, who were
trying to obtain supplies and equipment to clean up and repair the
facility. Finally, the workers had to resort to wearing hospital lab
coats so the guards would think they were doctors and let them pass
(Blanshan, 1978:194).\
\
***Hazardous Material Problems***\
As communities gain more experience with hazardous materials incidents,
which are increasing in frequency, the required coordination and
technical procedures have become more familiar. In some communities,
however, handling of a hazardous spill disaster still fits in the realm
of a new task for which smoothly functioning procedures have yet to be
developed.\
\
There are cases where a great deal of ambiguity exists as to who has
responsibility to plan for and respond to hazardous chemical accidents.
For example, accidents in private chemical plants have occurred that
were not considered the responsibility of public safety agencies until
the hazard extended beyond the plant\'s boundaries.\
\
There has also been disagreement regarding who was thought to be
responsible for handling hazardous material transportation accidents. In
one study, a variety of organizational respondents were questioned who
should be responsible. Depending on who was asked, the answer was the
manufacturer, the transporter, the state environmental protection
agency, the state police, the local fire department, the military, or
some other organization.\
\
This ambiguity has sometimes been compounded by a tendency for hazardous
materials transportation accidents to occur at the entrance from a
highway onto private property, or where a public road crosses a private
railroad line. The situation has been further complicated when laws
designate certain types of local incidents as federal responsibility.
For example, hazardous spills involving a navigable waterway have come
under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard, which has superseded all
state and local authority in such cases Quarantelli, 1981c:33,72,94).\
\
***Handling of the Dead***\
Mass handling of the dead creates problems that may not have been faced
in routine emergencies. For example, in hazardous materials accidents,
contamination of the body and personal effects sometimes makes routine
handling impossible (Dorn, 1986:120). Media attention and the lack of
accurate information as to who all the victims are generates inquiries
about the dead that can be national in scope (Fritz, 1956:36).
Collecting information for such inquiries can be different than in
routine fatalities when the disaster crosses jurisdictional boundaries.
In a disaster, special materials may be needed for the recovery,
identification, and care of fatalities. For example, special markers may
be needed to indicate where the bodies were found; special body pouches
or other containers may be required; and special provisions (for
example, refrigerator trucks) may need to be acquired for the storage of
large numbers of bodies (Raether, 1986:178).

**Figure 4-3.** Handling the dead poses different problems in disasters.
This photo demonstrates the management of dead bodies after the
AeroMexico crash that occurred in Cerritos, California, August 31, 1986.
(Courtesy of Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles,
California.)\
\
***Other Tasks***\
Other examples of tasks that may be unique to disasters include:

-   Warning and communicating with the public (see Chapter 9)

-   Shelter and feeding of displaced persons

-   Evacuating neighborhoods

-   Evacuating hospitals, prisons, nursing homes, and psychiatric
    facilities

-   Coordinating volunteers (see Chapter 6)

-   Acquiring and allocating unusual resources (see Chapter 6)

-   Dealing with mass animal carcasses

-   Dealing with livestock or family pets that had to be left behind or
    sheltered (Drabek, 1986:116)

-   Procedures for condemning damaged buildings (Moore, 1958:84)

-   Disposing of unclaimed valuables and merchandise found in the rubble
    at the scene (Moore, 1958:85)

-   Control of air traffic (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15,45,70,75;
    Drabek, 1981:179)

-   Disposing of large amounts of donations (Fritz, 1956) (see Chapter
    6)

-   Controlling emergency vehicle traffic, so access routes are not
    blocked by emergency vehicles whose drivers have parked and left
    them (Hamilton, 1955:50; Drabek, 1968:7,11,19; Cohen, 1982a:102;
    Morris, 1982)

-   Checking on hospitals, nursing homes, and day care centers that may
    need assistance, but are without communications to call for it
    (1971:28; Dektar, 1971; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:91)

-   Deciding when and in which areas utilities should be cut off
    (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:122)

::: Definition-Term
**Figure 4-4**. Management of Livestock from evacuated or affected areas
creates unique problems in disasters as in this photo of the
\"Fourty-Niner Fires\" of Nevada County, California in September, 1988.
(Courtesy of *The Union,* Grass Valley, California.)
:::

**Figure 4-5**. Control of air traffic, especially helicopters, is an
increasing concern in disasters as seen at the MGM Grand Hotel fire,
November 21, 1980, in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Courtesy of Clark County Fire
Department, Las Vegas, Nevada.)

**Figure 4-6**. Management of emergency vehicles may be a problem in
disasters. This is illustrated by the congestion at the MGM Hotel fire.
(Courtesy of Clark County Fire Department, Las Vegas, Nevada.)\
\
**Inability to Use Normal Response Tools and Facilities**\
In addition to being faced with unfamiliar tasks, organizations are
sometimes faced with the loss of familiar response tools and facilities.
Although damage to hospitals and interruption of their water and power
supplies are rare in U.S. disasters (Quarantelli, 1983:81), they are a
particular threat in areas of high seismic risk. More commonly,
telephones, which are the routine means of communication (especially
inter-organizational communication), are unusable. Even when lines have
not been damaged, jammed phone circuits prevent normal outgoing
communications except from telephones designated as \"essential
services\" (those given special priority by the phone company when trunk
lines are overloaded). Another \"response tool\" which may be, to some
extent unusable, is the road and highway system needed to transport
disaster response equipment and personnel.\
\
**Formation of New Organizations**\
When the demands of the disaster cannot be met by existing
organizations, new organizations may evolve spontaneously to fill the
gap. Often, they are very informal in nature and may quickly disband
when the immediate crisis is over. Search and rescue, for example, is
often carried out by a mixture of citizens, volunteers, and members of
emergency agencies who have never worked together before. Not
uncommonly, as they proceed, a transient informal network of
coordination will develop. In essence, a temporary, new organization is
formed (Dynes, 1974:146; Dynes, 1981:53; Drabek, 1986:218).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Hyatt Hotel Skywalk Collapse, Kansas City, Mis*souri, July
17, 1981. \"A smoothly functioning, high-performance organization was
developed on the spot. Leaders emerged, and were recognized and allowed
to lead because they were capable, willing, and because it was
necessary\.... People \... formed an organization, almost
departmentalized, with managers, assistant managers, and a work force
(sic) \.... These \'department heads\' worked together almost as though
the organization had evolved formally and over a period of years.\"
(Stout, 1981:45)

**Figure 4-7.** During rescue operations at the Kansas City Hyatt
Regency Hotel skywalk collapse \"a smoothly functioning,
high-performance organization was developed on the spot. (Courtesy of
Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas City, Missouri.)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Flint, Michigan, June 8,1953.* One of the largest
contractors in Flint undertook to organize the resources of several big
private companies who were donating heavy construction equipment and
crews for road clearance and search and rescue. His office functioned as
an informal rear headquarters. The contractor\'s own equipment had
two-way radios, and he placed a radio-equipped car in the field to act
as a sort of command post. Thus, he set up a working organization and
made its services available to the local authorities (Rosow, 1977:143).\
\
One new type of organization that eventually evolves rather typically in
disasters is some form of coordinating \"committee\" or group. The
various organizations involved in the disaster response may become aware
that their individual and independent activities are inadequate. It
becomes clear that a system for inter-organizational information sharing
and coordination is necessary. A meeting finally occurs where
representatives of the various organizations are invited, and which
results in the establishment of some form of multi- organizational
coordinating group (Bronson, 1959:42; Dynes, 1978:61; Dynes, 1981:30,42;
Drabek, 1986:161,182,186; Kilijanek, 1981:71; Rosow, 1977:20, 122, 124;
Yutzy, 1969:59,60,77,121). Unfortunately, the formation of such a group
may not be accomplished in time to benefit many of the victims (Moore, 6
1958:15; Mhjanek, 1981:71; Stallings, 1971:25; Rosow, 1977:20, 122, 124;
Yutzy, 1969:59,60,77,121; Drabek, 1986:182; Faupel, 1985:35).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Jonesboro, Arkansas, May 15,1968.* Local
organizations worked separately for the first 5 hours. As initial search
and rescue activities drew to a close, several public safety agencies,
along with city and county officials had developed something of an
emergency coordination group. Organizations represented at this center
included the National Guard, sheriff\'s office, the state highway
patrol, the city police, the mayor, and the county judge. Each group set
up its own radio-equipped vehicles outside the police station, which
became the emergency operations center. And although direct radio
contact among the organizations was not possible, they were close enough
to each other for runners to pass information, requests, and
instructions among them (Stallings, 1971:25).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Waco, Texas, May 11,* 1953. The tornado struck at
4:40 p.m. Uaworski, 1954:129), but coordination did not even begin to
emerge until a meeting at state police headquarters at 11:30 p.m. \"We
finally organized a disaster committee with the power to make the
decisions and \... pass final judgment on any particular question
(Moore, 1958:14)\
\
\
**NEW DIVISIONS OF LABOR AND RESOURCES REQUIRE COORDINATION**\
\
In disasters, the alterations of traditional divisions of labor and
resources increase the need for multi-organizational and
multi-disciplinary coordination of the various responding participants.
Without this coordination, resources may not be shared or distributed
according to need. Disaster-related activities, such as search and
rescue, traffic control, medical care, and transportation of casualties,
may be carried out in a loosely structured, spontaneous manner, with
insufficient communication and control. The result can be duplication of
effort, omission of essential tasks, and even counterproductive activity
(Parr, 1970:425; Wenger, 1986:24,26,32,33; Kilijanek, 1981:126).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** \"During a large-scale fire emergency the water department
issued a call to the citizens to hold the use of water to an absolute
minimum so that water pressure could be kept up for the fire
departments. At the same time, however, fire officials were on T.V.
instructing citizens to wet down their roofs with garden hoses.\" (FEMA,
1981:3)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Volcano Eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May* 18,
1980. Response to this disaster was a large and complex undertaking. At
least four emergency operations centers and five different base camps
were a part of the 14-day operation. Search and rescue covered 600
square miles, eight to nine times over, and involved 2,000 personnel
from a multitude of organizations. At least 100 people were saved and 34
bodies recovered. It was one of the largest search and rescue missions
in United States history. Unfortunately, the operations of the various
organizations were not coordinated. Finally, on the third day,
representatives from the three county sheriff\'s departments and the
U.S. Forest Service met and decided to pull their operations under a
joint decision-making team composed of a representative from each of the
four agencies. The National Guard, however, continued to act
independently of this group. Lack of inter-agency coordination resulted
in several near mid-air collisions among the numerous aircraft at the
site. It was not until the fifth day that the National Guard became
integrated into the cooperative effort (Kilijanek, 1981:iii,68,71,74;
Drabek, 1981:169).

**Figure 4-8.** From the 14,000 foot summit of nearby Mt. Adams, climber
Vincent Larson captured this photograph of erupting Mt. St. Helens.
Fortunately, in spite of being enveloped in ash and fallout within 15
minutes, the climbing party was able to get off the mountain alive.
(Courtesy of Vincent R. Larson.)\
\
Evaluations of a number of U. S. disasters illustrating difficulties in
coordinating response are summarized in Table 4-5.\
\
The term \"mass assault\" was used by early researchers to describe the
manner in which they observed tasks being carried out at the scene of a
disaster. Shortly after impact, there was a massive influx of public
safety agencies, equipment, and volunteers. Together with civilians who
happened to be in the area, these responders spontaneously came together
as informal teams. Under the pressure of great urgency, responders
plunged into the first obvious problem they met, wrestled with it until
it was overcome by sheer force of numbers, and then moved on to tackle
the next problem that confronted them. Little attention was paid to
anything except the particular task immediately at hand (Rosow,
1977:16).\
\
**Table 4-5.** Coordination Problems in Disasters

  ----------------------- -----------------------------------------------
  **Disaster**            **Observations**

  Tornado\                The loose control was evident in an uneven
  Flint-Beecher, MI\      distribution of resources in the field (Rosow,
  1953                    1977:131).

  Tornado\                It was not until the day after the tornado that
  Waco, TX\               a coordinating organization materialized
  1953                    (Moore, 1958:50).

  Tornado\                The work of independent agencies was largely
  Worcester, MA\          uncoordinated (Rosow, 1977:66).
  1953                    

  Earthquake\             Search and rescue was uncoordinated; systematic
  Anchorage, AK\          search of the rubble was not organized until
  1964                    the second day (Yutzy, 1969:149).

  Train wreck\            Central control did not exist; a coordinating
  Chicago, IL\            communications center was not functioning
  1972                    (Cihlar, 1972:17).

  Volcano eruption\       Real multi-organizational coordination did not
  Mt. St. Helens, WA\     begin to take shape until the fifth day
  1980                    (Kilijanek,1981:79).

  Hyatt Skywalk collapse\ There was lack of coordination in obtaining
  Kansas City, MO\        equipment at the scene (Gray,1981:70;
  1981                    Stout,1981:42).

  Air Florida crash\      There was no single, on-scene commander.
  Washington, DC\         Traffic control at the scene was hampered by
  1982                    divided command and lack of central control
                          (Adams, 1982:54).

  Metrorail crash\        There was very little coordination and control
  Washington, DC\         (Edelstein, 1982:161).
  1982                    

  Earthquake\             Poor coordination among responders resulted in
  Coalinga, CA\           misunderstandings, delays, and duplication of
  1983                    effort (Tierney, 1985b:33).
  ----------------------- -----------------------------------------------

**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Flint, Michigan, June 8,1953.* One of the worst
disasters in Michigan history was the tornado that struck the
Flint-Beecher area at 8:29 p.m. on June 8, 1953. It destroyed 340 homes
and caused major damage to 107 more. It left in its wake 115 dead and
800 injured. The rescue response was fragmented and disorganized.
Several emergency response organizations were involved, but they did not
coordinate their activities. A member of a Flint Fire Department rescue
team described their activity:\
\
\"We would be working our way down this block from one house to the
next. But there was some other gang ahead of us and another following
right behind, maybe 30 feet away, looking through the place that we just
finished. We would shove around a pile of timbers and junk to search
through underneath and when we\'d finish, the team coming afterwards
would push it back to check where we had dumped it.\"\
\
When asked if this was the same pile of junk that the team ahead of him
had shoved around, the firefighter admitted that indeed it was. Nobody
checked on his team\'s work, nor did the team report to anyone the
results of their work. There was a multitude of search teams at work,
but none knew what the other was doing, and no one was trying to keep
track (Rosow, 1977:130).\
\
In spite of improvements in disaster coordination since this classical
example from the Flint tornado, one still can observe multiple
organizations operating independently without knowledge about what other
organizations involved in the disaster response are doing. For example,
in a 1986 Disaster Research Center study of six disasters, major
problems with coordination occurred in four of them (Wenger,
1986:23,44).\
\
The management of many emergency response and public safety agencies is
patterned on the military model. This reflects the belief that the most
effective emergency operations are carried out under rigid control
exercised from a single commander. Indeed, such a centralized
intra-organizational authority structure may be entirely appropriate and
effective in the independent, daily, routine operations of these
organizations.\
\
In the United States, however, no single organization can legitimately
control what all other public and private organizations do and don\'t do
in a peacetime disaster (Drabek, 1980:23; Drabek, 1981:xx; Drabek,
1985b:9; Drabek, 1987:106; Dynes, 1981:29). It has been argued,
therefore, that realistic disaster management in a country with a
decentralized government such as the United States, with its traditional
preferences for local control and private enterprise, probably cannot be
accomplished using a military model. Rather, coordination among the
various independent responding organizations needs to be based on
negotiation and cooperation (Drabek, 1980:23; Drabek, 1981:122; Drabek,
1987: 92,239; Kilijanek, 1981:126; Adams, 1981b:2,52,61; Dynes,
1981:29).\
\
Although it may not be obvious initially, the need for joint
decision-making eventually becomes apparent in most large disasters.\
\
The need for joint, inter-organizational direction and decision-making
is reflected in three processes which are being used with increasing
frequency in disaster responses. These are multi-agency pre-disaster
planning (see Chapter 3), emergency operations centers (see Chapter 6),
and the unified command structure of the Incident Command System (see
Chapter 7).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**In contrast to most routine emergencies, disasters
  introduce the need for multi-organizational and multi-disciplinary
  coordination.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**SUMMARY**\
\
Disasters may generate a whole host of problems that are not found in
routine emergencies. Organizations change structure, with various
positions being filled by different persons. Multiple organizations are
faced with overlapping areas of responsibility. Many activities are
taken on by unsolicited volunteers. New tasks, sometimes requiring
unusual resources, present themselves for which no one has clear-cut
responsibility. New organizations even come into being. Multiple
organizations are faced with the need to coordinate activities with each
other on a moment-by-moment basis, without familiar procedures for
carrying this out. Furthermore, all of this may take place under
conditions of extreme urgency, which virtually precludes the time
required to develop the necessary coordination.\
\
\
**PLANNING CHECKPOINTS**

-   Does your disaster plan include procedures for determining
    responsibility for disaster tasks that are not the traditional
    responsibility of any single organization (for example, overall
    situation assessment, search and rescue, casualty distribution)? For
    tasks for which multiple organizations may claim responsibility?

-   Does the plan include provisions and procedures for a
    multi-organizational coordination body?

-   Does the plan make provisions to incorporate responding public and
    private organizations that do not usually play a part in routine
    emergencies?

**Chapter 5: INTER-AGENCY COMMUNICATIONS**

Adequate communication is a recurring challenge in disaster response.
(Courtesy of California Office of Emergency Services, Sacramento,
California.)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  In disasters, communication difficulties are often hard to separate
  from coordination difficulties, and the greatest coordination
  difficulties are inter-organizational. Therefore, many of the
  communications, problems are those related to inter-agency information
  sharing. Frequently, the means for communication exists, but for a
  number of reasons, persons are hesitant to communicate with others
  outside their own organization.\
  \
  Inter-organizational communication is fostered by those factors which
  promote trust in other organizations and familiarity with how they
  function. These include: informal contacts, joint planning and
  training, preplanned agreements for the division of disaster
  responsibilities, and the use of similar terminology, procedures, and
  performance criteria. Inter-organizational radio networks, common
  mapping systems, and computer networks also contribute to effective
  communications.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS IN DISASTERS**\
\
In disasters, communication difficulties are often hard to separate from
coordination difficulties, and the greatest coordination difficulties
are inter-organizational. Therefore, many of the communications,
problems are those related to inter-agency information sharing.
Frequently, the means for communication exists, but for a number of
reasons, persons are hesitant to communicate with others outside their
own organization.\
\
Inter-organizational communication is fostered by those factors which
promote trust in other organizations and familiarity with how they
function. These include: informal contacts, joint planning and training,
preplanned agreements for the division of disaster responsibilities, and
the use of similar terminology, procedures, and performance criteria.
Inter-organizational radio networks, common mapping systems, and
computer networks also contribute to effective communications.\
One of the most consistent observations about disasters is that
communication is inadequate. An in-depth 1986 study suggests that this
is a continuing problem. Major communications problems were found in
half of the six disasters evaluated (Wenger, 1986:11,14,44,76). Less
clear is what constitutes adequate communication, and why it is so
difficult to achieve.\
\
In this chapter, the discussion of inter-organizational communication
will focus on two main topics: 1) \"pre-incident\" communication; and 2)
technical aspects of communication. Inter-organizational communication
as it relates to resource management is discussed in Chapter 6.\
\
\
**RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNICATION TO COORDINATION**\
\
**Types of Information Needed for Coordination**\
The importance of communication is its ability to get people to work
together on a common task or toward a common goal-to coordinate. It is
the process by which each person understands how his individual efforts
intermesh with those of others. Frequently, what are perceived as
communications problems are actually coordination problems in disguise
(Brunacini, 1985b:54). Disasters pose unusual demands for
*inter-organizational* coordination. For this reason, a substantial
portion of disaster communications problems are related to the exchange
of information among organizations. The most crucial types of
information that need to be shared are those related to:

-   an ongoing assessment of what the disaster situation is and what
    disaster countermeasures need to be undertaken

-   an ongoing determination of what resources are needed to undertake
    the countermeasures, what resources are present, as-signed,
    out-of-service, what resources are available, how they can be
    obtained, what is their capacity, and how long will it take for them
    to arrive

-   a determination of the priority of needed disaster countermeasures
    (and, therefore, resource allocation)

-   a determination of what persons and organizations win be responsible
    for the various tasks necessary to accomplish the countermeasures
    (Sorensen, 1985:32).

**\"\'People\" Problems in Communication**\
Research on disasters suggests that many communications problems are
*\"people problems,\"* rather than *\"equipment problems\"* (Kilijanek,
1979:7; Quarantelli, 1965:109; Quarantelli, 1985:12; Worth, 1977:160).
Communication equipment may be in short supply, but more often than not
a physical means of communication is available (Quarantelli, 1985:12).
Examples of \"people\" problems in communication include the following
(Kilijanek, 1979:5; Rosow, 1977:139; Drabek, 1986:54; Quarantelli,
1983:106):

-   The \"Robinson Crusoe syndrome,\" or \"we\'re the only ones on this
    island.\" Organizations are accustomed to operating autonomously and
    fail to change this approach in disasters where multiple
    organizations are involved and are dependent on one another. Each
    person gives priority to the information needs of his own
    organization rather than that of the overall response effort.

-   Terminology and procedures used to exchange information vary among
    different organizations. There is a hesitancy to depend on other
    organizations, often due to lack of trust or familiarity, or due to
    political, jurisdictional, and personal disputes.

-   There is no mutual agreement as to who has the responsibility for
    the collection and dissemination of various types of information, or
    to whom it should be distributed.

-   Persons possessing information do not realize that another person
    who needs it, doesn\'t have it.

-   The information needs of other organizations are not understood.

These are crucial aspects of communication that no amount of radio
equipment is likely to correct (Rosow, 1977:173).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**In disasters, what are thought to be \"communications
  problems\" are often coordination problems in disguise.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**THE IMPORTANCE OF \"PRE-INCIDENT\" COMMUNICATIONS**\
\
One key to understanding disaster communication problems is the concept
of pre-incident communications. In efficient *routine* emergency
operations, the vast majority of communications have occurred *prior to
the incident.* The goals and tasks are often determined by tradition.
They are formalized in statutes, contracts, and charters. Within various
organizations, they are addressed in rules, regulations, performance
standards, and standard operating procedures. The important point here
is that many of these tasks are *known beforehand* and do not have to be
communicated for each event to which an organization responds (Dynes,
1978:59; Dynes, 1981:39).\
\
Yet, a number of observations in *disasters* have revealed a lack of
pre-impact communications among key local disaster response
organizations such as law enforcement agencies, fire departments, local
emergency management agencies, and organizations in the health and
welfare sectors (Wenger, 1986:76; Quarantelli, 1978:4). This may be
compounded by the fact that organizations responding to disasters often
include many who have had minimal previous contact, because they do not
respond to local emergencies on a routine basis Quarantelli, 1983:64;
Kilijanek, 1981:50).\
\
When organizations have interacted and coordinated with each other
*before-hand,* they have had fewer problems doing so in a disaster
(Kilijanek, 1981:50,126; Dynes, 1978:58; Adams, 1981b:40,53; Tierney,
1977:155; Dynes, 1977:12; Drabek, 1986:125; Sorensen, 1985:32).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Hyatt Hotel Skywalk Collapse, Kansas City, Missouri,* July
17, 1981. Although Kansas City\'s ambulance crews all work for a private
ambulance company, they are quartered at city fire stations. It was felt
that because the ambulance and fire personnel work together daily and
share the same facilities, this contributed to the ease with which they
worked together during the disaster (Stout, 1981:36).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April* 10, 1979. Because of
frequent pre-disaster contacts, various agency heads knew each other
quite well. This formed a basis for mutual expectations and
understanding which facilitated the multi-organizational response
(Adams, 1981b:40).\
\
The importance of pre-disaster contact helps to explain a seemingly
paradoxical observation made in a number of disasters, that smaller
communities with fewer resources tended to coordinate their disaster
responses better than larger, more urban areas. The explanation was
that, because the emergency response agencies of the smaller communities
had fewer resources, they had to coordinate and cooperate with each
other to handle even the more routine emergencies. Therefore, when they
had to work together in a disaster, it was not the first time they had
done so Quarantelli, 1983:105).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Those who work together well on a daily basis tend to work
  together well in disasters.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**Development of Trust**\
Even under the pressure of a disaster, certain preliminary information
has to be exchanged before meaningful communication and coordination can
take place with a member of an unfamiliar organization. Examples of the
types of critical information needed include:

-   what the organization\'s legitimate role is in the disaster
    response;

-   whether that person has a legitimate position in that organization;
    and

-   the competence and reliability of that person.

Emergency organizations with disaster operations responsibility
frequently hesitate to coordinate with others unless these questions
have been addressed. *This hesitancy may exist even though there are
formal plans or arrangements for the different organizations to
coordinate.* Unfortunately, the urgency of the disaster situation often
precludes the time necessary to determine the answers to these questions
on-the-spot. The result is that, unless they have been addressed *before
the disaster,* there is a reluctance to depend on the activities of
other organizations and a failure to coordinate and communicate with
them (Dynes, 1978:58; Rosow, 1977:63,74,76).\
\
When one is dependent on other team members, particularly in
life-threatening situations, he needs to feel confident in their
competence and reliability. Developing this level of trust often
requires \"pre-incident\" contact over a period of time.\
\
**Resolution of Political, Personal, and Jurisdictional Disputes**\
Cooperation is adversely affected by preexisting personal, political,
and jurisdictional disputes. Quarantelli found, for example, that
conflicts within the emergency medical services (EMS) system and between
it and other community sectors was a major factor hindering disaster
planning. Such differences those between city and county, or public and
private interests had a pervasive negative influence on cooperation. The
consequences of such disputes may range from the exclusion of
organizations from planning meetings to charges that an organization is
transgressing another\'s jurisdiction or responsibility. Unfortunately,
jurisdictional disputes unresolved on an everyday basis, do not tend to
get resolved in disasters Quarantelli, 1983:105).\
\
**Knowledge of How Other Organizations Function**\
Inter-organizational teamwork requires information sharing. Persons need
to know when they possess critical information required by someone in
another organization, how to get it to the other person, and how to use
terminology the other person will understand (Wenger, 1986:15,46). For
these reasons, knowledge about how other organizations function tends to
promote inter-organizational communication and coordination (Dynes,
1978:55,58).\
\
That is why the most effective and cooperative relations seem to develop
between similar organizations where each has knowledge of the internal
operations of the other. With such familiarity, each organization is
more likely to feel it can coordinate and exchange information with the
confidence that the other is reliable and competent. Thus, police
agencies tend to interact best with other law enforcement groups and
fire departments to cooperate best with other fire fighting agencies
(Mileti, 1975:80; Dynes, 1978:58; Rosow, 1977:185,187). Knowledge about
how dissimilar organizations function is more apt to be lacking (Seismic
Safety Comm, 1979:36; Quarantelli, 1983:103). Important knowledge about
other organizations includes that about roles, resources, needs,
terminology, and competence (Wenger, 1986:33).\
\
***Knowledge About Routine Function***\
In some cases, at least to a degree, knowledge of how other
organizations *routinely* function is useful in disaster situations. For
example, familiarity with another organization\'s terminology or
competence, engendered by previous contact during routine emergencies,
is likely to facilitate interaction during a disaster.\
\
***Knowledge About Preplanned Disaster Functions***\
In contrast, knowledge about other organizations\' disaster response
needs and roles are not always reliably based on familiarity with their
routine functions. The responsibility for a number of important disaster
roles (especially those that have little counterpart in routine
emergency responses) may be ambiguous unless there is a functioning,
pre-disaster, mutual agreement that clarifies the issue. In that case,
knowledge about the agreement can convey knowledge about how other
organizations will function. For the purpose of formulating such
agreements, federal disaster planning guidelines suggest bringing
together representatives of the various organizations likely to be
involved in a disaster response. These agreements may be summarized in
the form of disaster role matrices. A number of role matrices may have
to be developed depending on the type of disaster and the jurisdictions
it involves. An example of such a role matrix for a county-level
disaster is shown in Fig. 5-1.\
\
Certain organizations in disasters have needs that they must rely on
other organizations to fulfill. For example, in order to muster their
resources, hospitals need to have advance warning that they will be
receiving patients and timely estimates of the types, numbers, and
severities of casualties to be expected. This information must come from
those at the disaster scene. In addition, hospitals are at the mercy of
those at the scene to see that casualties are equitably distributed, so
that no one hospital receives an inordinate number. As discussed later
in Chapter 8, the failure to recognize these needs has been the cause
for problems in many disasters.\
\
Knowledge about the special disaster resources to which another
organization has access can also be helpful. For example, local branches
of state organizations (e.g., state police, state forestry) may be able
to obtain state resources without the necessity of a state-wide disaster
declaration. Certain organizations may have access to unusual resources
valuable for disaster operations (e.g., satellite communications
equipment, search dogs, devices for chemical analysis).\
\
***Standardization***\
Standardization can also create familiarity with other organizations. To
the extent that organizations agree to use the same procedures,
resources, terminology, and performance criteria, they will share a
common knowledge of each other\'s function.\
\
The effectiveness of disaster response may depend on the ability of
organizations to share resources. However, when requesting resources
from another organization, the lack of standardized terminology may make
it difficult to know what one will receive. The ability of a requested
fire truck to carry out the mission for which it is requested may depend
on the equipment it carries, its water capacity, and the number and
training of its crew. All of these factors may vary among different fire
departments. This problem is now being addressed in areas where the
Incident Command System is in use, because it stipulates standardized
terminology to describe common emergency response resources (see Chapter
7).

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/852DEEC109E50C8E0A25691A00664FAD/$file/p-86.jpg)

[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/852DEEC109E50C8E0A25691A00664FAD/\$file/p-86.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/852DEEC109E50C8E0A25691A00664FAD/\$file/p-86.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/852DEEC109E50C8E0A25691A00664FAD/$file/p-86.jpg)

**Figure 5-1.** Role matrix - Assignment of Responsibilities. (From
Emergency planning: student manual, SM-61, Washington, D.C., 1983,
Federal Emergency Management Agency.)

Many police departments, fire departments, rescue units, and ambulance
services use radio codes for communication. These codes may vary from
agency to agency, a situation which interferes with inter-organizational
communication.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** The California Highway Patrol uses the code \"11-79\" to
dispatch a patrol car to an accident and to advise that unit that an
ambulance is en route. One of the local sheriff\'s departments uses the
code \"901T\" to mean the same thing.\
\
For this reason an increasing number of agencies are abandoning the use
of radio codes in favor of simple English (\"Clear Text\" or \"Clear
Speech\") (Public Safety Dept, 1975:2; ICS, 1982:26).\
\
The likelihood that one organization will interact with and depend on
an-other organization is enhanced when it is perceived that its members
are competent. This is facilitated when members of such groups pass a
standardized test of their knowledge, skills, and competence. Some
departments require a rigorous qualifications exam as a condition of
employment, which may include a test of basic knowledge as well as a
test of physical agility and endurance. More advanced examinations may
be required at the completion of a rookie\'s training and further tests
become necessary for promotion. In some locales, certain public safety
occupations require passing standard state exams (e.g., state standards
for peace officer, firefighter, or paramedic training). In some cases,
national qualification standards exist. Examples include the National
Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians, the certifying examination
given by the American Board of Emergency Medicine, and the
qualifications for Incident Command System training under the National
Interagency Incident Management System.\
\
**Joint Planning and Training**\
One of the most important ways in which disaster response organization
members can get to know and trust each other and become familiar with
the function of other organizations is during joint planning and
training activities (Dynes, 1978:58; FEMA, 1983d:14; Grollmes, 1985:8;
Hildebrand, 1980:4; Stevenson, 1981:57; Adams, 1981b:47).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Rocky Mountain Fire Academy, Denver, Colo*rado. The
Aurora and Denver Fire Departments began sharing training resources in
1985 to combat the effects of severe bud-get restrictions and decreased
tax revenues. This agreement has catalyzed dialogue not only between the
two fire departments, but among other agencies and municipalities as
well. For example, the personnel and administrators from the two fire
departments have found themselves comparing standard operating
procedures and managerial techniques and adopting the best ones from
each agency. As a result of this experience, the feasibility of mutual
hazardous materials response and firefighting operations are being
investigated as well as the purchase of a new 800 mHz fire dispatching
system (Schumacher, 1988:16).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *MGM Grand Hotel fire, Las Vegas, Nevada, November* 21,
1980. The county fire department had conducted training sessions to test
its plans, as well as annual drills involving civil defense, police,
city and county fire departments, the airport, and the local medical
community. When the disaster occurred, the years of planning and
rehearsal paid off . The fire, despite its magnitude, did not overwhelm
local resources (Buerk, 1982:641; Parrish, 1981:12).\
\
**Importance of Informal Contacts**\
Even informal contacts are an important part of \"pre-incident\"
communications (Drabek, 1986:44,125; Quarantelli, 1983:120,130; Dynes,
1977; FENIA, 1983d:205; Sorensen, 1985; Grollmes, 1985:8; Wenger,
1986:33). The value of such contacts is not only the knowledge they
generate about how other organizations function, but also in the trust
that may develop (Drabek, 1980:10). Even in the absence of
well-developed plans, personal familiarity can facilitate coordination
(Dynes, 1978:54).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado and Showboat Capsizing, Lake Pomona, Kansas, June*
17, 1978. The responding organizations did not have a well-developed,
written plan for responding to a disaster of this type. However, many of
them had functioned jointly before in routine emergencies, and what they
lacked in formal plans, they made up for because of close personal
acquaintances among those in charge of each organization.\
\
\"They knew each other well and they knew the local area. They were able
to obtain needed resources quickly. Although they did not have a plan
specifying who should do what, they put their heads together, considered
options, and made decisions which respective units could act on quickly.
To no small degree, the success of this operation reflected the sheriff
s knowledge of the various organizations and their managers, rather than
planning or prior experience. Too often this type of re-source is not
recognized in emergency management, nor are those responsible encouraged
to nurture it. Piles of paper plans stored away neatly on office shelves
are poor substitutes for strong interpersonal relationships rooted in
trust and weekly contacts.\" (Drabek, 1981:52,54)\
\
Sometimes communications and resource-sharing between organizations is
facilitated when a person has membership in multiple organizations. An
example is the police chief who is also a member of the local Red Cross
disaster committee, a civil defense group, and a municipal
administrative council (Dynes, 1978:55; Sorensen, 1985:32).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Las Vegas, Nevada, November* 21,
1980. Bob Forbuss, the Mercy Ambulance triage officer at the scene, was
also a school district trustee. He contacted the school district and
arranged the dispatch of 50 school buses to the scene for the transport
of survivors to a county evacuation center (Munninger, 1981:38).\
\
There is another type of informal contact which may facilitate
communication and coordination among organizations in disasters. This
occurs when someone has extensive, long-term friendships with members of
other important community organizations. These contacts, and the trust
and loyalties which they have fostered, can expedite cooperation among
the organizations to which these contacts belong Quarantelli, 1982c:69;
Bush, 1981:4; OM 1982:10).\
\
**Preplanned Procedures for Developing a Strategy at the Incident**\
Although certain aspects of disaster response can be anticipated and
planned in advance, each disaster is to some extent unique. Therefore, a
specific strategy, or \"action plan\" has to be created at the time the
individual incident occurs. By this is meant an overall,
multi-organizational plan. The failure to do this is one of the reasons
that different organizations responding to the disaster often do not
carry out a unified, concerted effort. This post-impact creation of an
incident \"action plan\" is facilitated if there is a *prearranged,*
mutually agreeable procedure for the process.\
\
One example of such a procedure which has achieved national acceptance
is that used by the Incident Command System (ICS) (see Chapter 7). A
simplified description is given of the procedure as it would be used in
a multi-jurisdictional disaster incident:

-   A survey is made of the disaster to assess what problems need to be
    tackled (what objectives, or \"goals,\" need to be accomplished) and
    what resources are present.

-   Each agency indicates the problems (objectives) for which it is
    responsible, that is, \"This is what my organization needs to
    accomplish.\" (The pre-agreement as to who has what responsibilities
    may have been formalized in a role matrix like that in Fig. 5-1.)
    Each agency also indicates the constraints (e.g., fiscal, legal,
    political) that limit what it can do. The various objectives might
    be quite diverse as in the following hypothetical example:

> Agency A: \"I need to evacuate the people from area X.\"\
> Agency B: \"I must control traffic and prevent the entry of
> unauthorized persons.\"\
> Agency C: \"I must provide information to the area hospitals and make
> triage, field medical care, and casualty transportation
> arrangements.\"\
> Agency D: \"I must locate and put out any fires.\"

-   A mutually agreeable multi-organizational strategy is developed for
    the incident that best meets the objectives and priorities of the
    various agencies and the overall situation.

-   The incident is subdivided into geographic areas and/or general
    functional areas, and organizational groups assigned to these areas
    are given specific work assignments which will contribute toward
    attainment of the incident objectives. Each group indicates the
    resources it needs to accomplish its work assignment.

-   The resources needed to accomplish the work assignments are compared
    with the resources present at the incident. By this means it is
    possible to determine what additional resources must be requested.

This ICS incident action planning procedure is not a \"committee
process\" that must somehow resolve all differences in agency objectives
before any action begins. It is, however, a \"team process,\" which by
means of a sharing of objectives and priorities, formulates a set of
collective directions to address the needs of the entire incident and
which reduces duplication and omission of crucial tasks. Experience with
the system has shown that this collective sharing of information and
objectives has led to a voluntary sharing of resources and modification
of individual agency objectives to meet the overall requirements of the
incident (Irwin:5; ICS, 1985b).\
\
\
**TECHNICAL ASPECTS**\
\
Although \"people problems\" appear to be among the greatest obstacles
to effective disaster communications, there are a number of technical
problems that can also inhibit information exchange.\
\
**Loss of Function**\
Flooding, tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes are all capable of
toppling antennas and interrupting normal electrical power. Commercial
broadcast stations and public safety radio networks may be rendered
inoperable (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** A recent study in California revealed that a number of the
commercial broadcast stations, which were to be used in disasters for
state officials to communicate with the public, had no provision for
back-up power (JCFEDS, 1983:31,ii-48).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983.* During the
shaking, the police department\'s radio console fell on the floor and
broke, disabling the system. The earthquake also cut off power to the
hospital\'s radio, and the emergency back-up power system failed
(Tierney, 1985b:33; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15,16,32).\
\
Effective disaster preparedness requires that essential communications
equipment have sources of back-up power. The equipment and reserve power
source need to be protected against the forces of the impact. In areas
of seismic risk, this equipment needs to be anchored. In flood-prone
regions, it needs to be placed in elevated areas. In tornado and
hurricane areas, the antennas must be able to withstand the winds,
and/or back-up provisions made.\
\
**Inter-agency Radio Networks**\
***The Problem of Frequency Incompatibility***\
Besides loss of function, there are other technical problems in
inter-organizational disaster communications. Because of the
unreliability of telephone communications in disasters,
inter-organizational communications are best carried out by two-way
radio. Unfortunately, public safety radio frequencies have been assigned
in such a manner as to make this very difficult. Part of the problem is
that radio traffic occurs on a number of different \"bands.\" A \"band\"
is a collection of neighboring frequencies, and it is technically
possible to have a single radio that can switch to different radio
frequencies on the same \"band.\" However, the difference in frequencies
on separate bands is so great that completely different radio-electronic
circuits and antennas are needed. *In effect, for each band a completely
different radio is needed.* If several organizations are on different
radio frequencies in the same band, it is possible for them to
communicate with each other if they all switch their radios to the same
frequency. This is not possible if the frequencies used by the
organizations are on different bands GCFEDS, 1983:18). Unfortunately,
this is the way radio frequencies have been assigned. The bands involved
are: low band (37-42 mHz); high band (150-155 mHz); UHT (450-470 mHz);
UHF-TV (450-470 mHz); and the 800 mHz band (806-902 mHz). In addition
there are different bands for use by the military and ham operators.
Even units of similar organizations in adjacent jurisdictions cannot
talk to each other using their assigned frequencies. Table 5-1
illustrates the prevalence of the problem.\
\
This problem was discussed in a 1983 report by the California State
Legislative Joint Committee on Fire, Police, Emergency and Disaster
Services entitled *California\'s Emergency Communications Crisis*
UCFEDS, 1983). The report states that units of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff cannot communicate directly with Los Angeles City Police units
because they are on different bands. Even the designated law enforcement
and fire service \"mutual aid\" frequencies in California cannot always
be used to solve the problem because many of the agencies have been
assigned primary frequencies on a different band than the mutual aid
frequency. In order to take advantage of the mutual aid frequency, they
would have to buy a whole second set of radios, an expense that few
jurisdictions are capable of bearing. At the time of the report, only
30% of the law enforcement agencies in the state had vehicles equipped
to use the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System (CLEMARS)
frequencies UCFEDS, 1983:14,ii-3). The problem is illustrated by the
following:\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Norco Bank Robbery and Lytle Creek Shootout, Riverside
County, California, May 9, 1980.* Riverside law officers (whose radios
communicate on 450 mHz) were chasing bank robbers into San Bernardino
County (which uses 150 mHz), and called for help from Los Angeles County
(39 mHz). There were 200 fatigue-dressed (SWAT team) law enforcement
officers in the hills above San Bernardino, carrying AR-16 rifles,
looking for six robbers with fatigues and AR-16 rifles. Because their
frequencies were incompatible, officers from the different counties
could not communicate by radio, and they had to resort to hand signals
and shouting. A sheriffs deputy from Riverside County was killed when
the San Bernardino County Sheriff s helicopter saw him driving into an
ambush, but could not warn him UCFEDS, 1983:ii-98; Irwin, 1987).\
\
**Table 5-1.** Lack of Inter-organizational Radio Networks

  ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------
  **Disaster**           **Observation**

  Wildland fire\         Mutual aid fire companies from 23 nearby cities
  Bel Air, CA\           could not be effectively controlled, because
  1961                   they were all operating on different radio
                         frequencies (Bahme, 1978:70).

  Hurricane Camille\     Lack of a common radio frequency complicated
  1969                   National Guard activities; various mobile
                         equipment operated on different radio pieces of
                         frequencies (Stallings, 1971:13).

  Earthquake\            One conspicuous weakness of the hospital radio
  San Fernando Valley,   network was its lack of tie-in to police and
  CA\                    fire radio systems (1971:28).
  1971                   

  Tornado\               Lessons: communications can be a problem if
  Xenia, OH\             there are no common radio frequencies;
  1974                   coordination is difficult if you cannot talk
                         with all field units (Troeger, 1976).

  Ammonia spill\         A hard look should be given to communications
  Houston, TX\           from the hospital to other governmental units
  1976                   (Swint, 1976:45).

  Flash flood\           Inter-agency communications was mentioned as a
  Bandera, Kendall, &    leading cause of coordination difficulties
  Keff Co.\'s, TX\       (Drabek, 1981:89).
  1978                   

  Nuclear accident\      Hospital communications must be linked to
  Three Mile Island, PA\ emergency operations centers (Maxwell,
  1979                   1982:299).

  High-rise fire\        Police, ambulances, public works, fire
  MGM Hotel\             department, and helicopters were unable to
  Las Vegas, NV\         communicate through a central command center at
  1980                   the scene, so many efforts were delayed and
                         coordination difficulties were magnified (White,
                         1981:31).

  Skywalk collapse\      A coordinated, interfacing communications
  Hyatt Hotel\           network should be available to all responding
  Kansas City, KS\       emergency service units (Grollmes, 1985:10; KC
  1981                   Health Dept, 1981:24b).

  Aircrash\              Police, fire, and ambulance agencies could not
  Kenner, LA\            communicate directly with one another by radio
  1982                   (Morris, 1982:63).

  Earthquake\            Major problems included the lack of common radio
  Coalinga, CA\          frequencies for fire, law enforcement, and
  1983                   public utility crews (Seismic Safety Comm,
                         1983:96).

  Tornado\               Overtaxed radio communications were made worse
  Lenoir Co., NC\        by the lack of a common frequency (Deats,
  1984                   1985:52).

  Aircrash\              Because departments at the scene did not have a
  Dallas, TX\            common radio frequency, messages had to be
  1985                   conveyed by runners or shouting (Gallagher,
                         1985:44).

  Flood/levee break\     A common radio frequency is needed for
  Yuba County, CA\       responders who must coordinate with one another
  1986                   (Sac Fire Com, 1986).
  ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------

**EXAMPLE:** *Flash Floods, Bandera, Kendall, and Kerr Counties, Texas,
August 1-4, 1978.* \"One county sheriff recounted the intense
frustration he felt while standing aside his cruiser that was parked at
a ravaging riverbank. He had no way to communicate with a pilot in a
helicopter that was hovering over a victim hidden from \[the pilot\'s\]
view by tree branches. A communication chain linked him to a dispatcher,
who, in turn, could reach a state agency that could relay messages to
the federal military base that had radio contact with the pilot. The
chain was activated minimally, however. When used episodically, these
chains reflected the consequences of distortion typically found in such
multiperson relays.\" (Drabek, 1985a:88)\
\
As stated by one emergency services coordinator in California, \"Law
enforcement agencies cannot communicate with the fire services; the fire
service cannot communicate with the California Highway Patrol; the CHP
is unable to communicate with units of the Sheriff\'s Department; cities
are unable to communicate with the county and the list goes on and on.\"
(JCFEDS, 1983:16)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Chlorine Gas Leak, Santa Rosa, California, July,* 1982.
This incident required the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people and
the response of over 20 different agencies, including four law
enforcement agencies, four fire departments, seven county agencies, five
state agencies, and three volunteer agencies. During the response, the
two cities involved Santa Rosa and Sebastopol could only communicate
with each other by phone, and the on-scene incident commander could not
communicate directly with all of the responding agencies to coordinate
their activities. Command, control, and coordination could not be
properly exercised, nor could vital information be readily exchanged
between two local governments (JCFEDS, 1983:16).\
\
The situation was described as even worse for emergency medical
services. As in the case of law enforcement, different neighboring
ambulances and EMS units have been assigned radio frequencies on
different bands. But, unlike law enforcement and fire services, not even
one of these bands had a frequency set aside for mutual aid
communications. Because of this, ambulances were re-ported to lack any
effective contact with hospitals or others when transporting over any
significant distances. In addition, ambulances had to share the same
frequency with non-emergency users such as veterinarians, tow trucks,
washing machine repairmen, concrete companies, trucking companies, and
boat repairmen. The report criticized the lack of a dedicated radio link
between the medical community, the county emergency operations centers,
the State Office of Emergency Services, and the State Department of
Health Services UCFEDS, 1983:15,26,98,ii-138).\
\
Lack of radio frequency compatibility likewise was said to prevent
communications with other agencies likely to be involved in disaster
responses, such as the California Department of Transportation, the
county health agencies, and the National Guard UCFEDS, 1983:ii-19).\
\
Clearly, these emergency communications problems are not unique to
California. Since the time of the report, California has taken several
steps to correct their problem. The California State Office of Emergency
Services has developed an emergency, multi-organizational VHF mobile
coordination frequency, CALCORD. This will allow mobile units of fire,
law enforcement, medical, and other disaster responding agencies to
communicate with each other. In addition, the California State EMS
Authority is trying to negotiate a statewide emergency medical services
coordination frequency. The EMS Authority has also developed several
other sophisticated communications networks (including the use of
amateur radio, cellular telephone, computer links) and has state
ad-ministration approval for satellite communications capability
(Koehler, 1987).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Disasters create the need for coordination among fire
  departments, law enforcement agencies, hospitals, ambulances, military
  units, utility crews, and other organizations. This requires
  inter-agency communication networks utilizing compatible radio
  frequencies.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the mere development
of a mutual, multi-disciplinary, multi-agency communications frequency
will solve inter-organizational disaster communications problems. In
fact, the undisciplined use of such a frequency could quickly jam it
with excessive traffic, rendering it useless.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Air Florida Crash, Potomac River, Washington, DC, January
13, 1982.* A U.S. Park Police helicopter was the only means by which any
of the plane crash victims could be rescued. Even though the aircraft
had radio capability to communicate with ground rescue units, it was not
able to do so. This was because the frequency was too jammed with
emergency and non-emergency radio traffic (Grollmes, 1985:12).\
\
Communication has to be organized on a series of networks in order to
accommodate the volume of traffic and direct it in a manner consistent
with the inter-organizational management structure. In addition,
procedures are necessary to determine channels and priorities for
information flow.\
\
***Frequency Sharing Agreements***\
One approach to the problem of inter-agency communications is the
development of frequency sharing agreements and radio caches (FEMA,
1987:38,40; ICS, 1980). A frequency sharing agreement is a mutual pact
allowing multiple organizations involved in joint emergency operations
to share radio frequencies licensed under single organizations.\
\
Technical advances in radio equipment have made frequency sharing
easier. Synthesized and programmable radios, some of which are capable
of using hundreds of different frequencies, are now widely available.
Unfortunately, commercial public safety radios are still capable of
transmitting and receiving on only one *band.*\
\
***Radio Caches***\
To some extent, the difficulty of communications among organizations
whose radios are on different bands can be overcome by the development
of \"radio caches.\" Each radio cache has a collection of multichannel
portable radios each with the same frequencies, extra batteries, battery
chargers, and, perhaps, portable repeaters. These caches are stored
where they can be obtained and mobilized to provide linking
communications nets in multi-agency emergency operations and disasters.\
\
***\"Two-way\" Use of Scanners***\
One method of communication among agencies on different bands involves
the use of modem, programmable scanning *receivers* (receivers that scan
a number of frequencies, pausing to listen on each frequency only when
it is carrying radio traffic). Although these devices cannot transmit,
they can receive on multiple radio *bands.* With this technique, one
person transmits on his two-way radio. The message is received on the
second person\'s scanner. The second person then transmits his response
on his two-way radio, and it is received on the scanner of the first
person (see Fig. 5-2).\
\
This technique can even be used if one person is transmitting on one
band (e.g., UHF) and the other person is transmitting on another (e.g.,
VHF-Low). Coordination frequencies can be determined for each band. Each
agency sets up its radios so they can transmit on the coordination
frequency in the band in which their radios operate. Each radio operator
also has a multi-band scanning receiver set up to receive the
coordination frequencies *on each band.* For interorganizational
contact, one transmits on the coordination frequency on one band, and
can hear the response on any of the coordination frequencies in any of
the other bands. Various other communications nets (e.g., command nets,
ground-to-air nets, hospital-to-scene nets, tactical nets) can also use
shared frequencies with this method to effect inter-agency communication
for various purposes.\
\
This type of communication does have its limitations. It should be used
only for emergency traffic and preceded by mutual communications
agreements among the organizations using it. There also may be
difficulty when a person\'s scanner is paused on another frequency when
someone is trying to contact him. Nevertheless, \"two-way\" use of
scanners is one inexpensive means to carry out critical emergency
communications among agencies whose radios do not operate on the same
band.

**Figure 5-2.** Using scanners for \"two-way\" inter-agency
communications.\
\
***Tone-activated Receivers***\
Specified frequencies can also be used to assure notification of various
emergency or disaster-relevant agencies. In this case, each
organization\'s dispatcher or radio operator has a tone-activated
receiver (similar to a pager, or tone-activated weather frequency
monitor). The area\'s communications center (or other prearranged
organization) has a transmitter capable of emitting the tone alert,
which activates the receivers. Different groups of organizations (e.g.,
all local fire departments, all local law enforcement agencies, all
local hospitals), or all organizations having the receivers can be
\"toned,\" depending on the in-tended audience for the notification
alert, update, or cancellation. One advantage of tone-activated
receivers is that they are only activated when critical transmission of
information is needed. They are, therefore, less likely to cause
constant noise, resulting in people turning the volume down or off.\
\
***\"Calling\" Frequencies***\
In Southern California, fire agencies have designated a prearranged
\"calling-frequency.\" This frequency is used solely for initial radio
contact and instructions. Subsequent to initial contact, other
frequencies are assigned to incoming responders, depending on their
function, assigned task, and operations area (ICS, 1980).\
\
There are advantages to this technique that are applicable to
inter-organizational disaster communications. One of the values of a
prearranged regional or state-wide \"calling\" frequency is that it can
even facilitate the initiation of coordination with *unexpected* or
*unrequested* responders. Not only does a \"calling\" frequency allow
resources to report their presence to those coordinating incident
operations, but it can also be used to obtain essential initial
information, such as:

-   Are they, in fact, needed? (If not, they can be instructed to abort
    their response.)

-   Where are they to report?

-   How do they get to the check-in area?

-   Are there any hazards that might be encountered en route?

-   Are they to switch to another radio frequency for further
    communication?

One of the difficulties that has been experienced in a number of
disasters is the initiation of communication between the incident site
and responding helicopters. Large, bright cloth *ground-to-air signal
panels* can be used for this purpose. Laid out on the ground at the
disaster site, they are lettered with a message indicating the
air-to-ground \"caning\" frequency, on which the aircraft can initiate
contact with incident operations.\
\
Appropriate employment of regional or state-wide calling frequencies
re-quires the establishment of procedures for their use and pre-signed
agreements prior to approval for operation on them. Also required is the
availability of directories of the various calling frequencies.\
\
***Satellite Communication***\
The availability of sophisticated satellite capability can help
alleviate communications problems, especially over wide geographic
areas, in remote settings, or from the site to distant state or federal
disaster assistance points (Kilijanek, 1981:67; Vines, 1986:10).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 10, 1979.* At the
request of local officials, the State Division of Disaster Emergency
Services contacted the Air Force for help with communications. Two
communications jeeps were flown in which allowed a satellite
communications link to be established between Wichita Falls and the
state capital and simplified the state\'s ability to respond to local
requests (Adams, 1981b:31).\
\
This type of arrangement can be valuable in earthquakes too, since
telephone transmission lines and microwave dish alignment are vulnerable
to seismic forces (Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:7). Very small and
lightweight portable satellite two-way radios make this type of
communication an attractive tool (Cowley, 1985:223).\
\
**Common Mapping Systems**\
Multi-agency sharing of information about the present and predicted
extent and location of disaster damage, secondary threats, vulnerable
populations and structures, activities, transportation routes, and
response activities generates the need for standardized maps and mapping
grid systems. Yet, in some disasters as many as five or six different
map types and map scales have been used by different agencies. This
dissimilarity has caused considerable difficulty in communicating
essential, geographically related information. The provision of
standardized maps and familiarity with a standardized way (coordinate
system) of describing locations on the maps are essential components to
disaster communication.\
\
**Computers for Communication**\
Computers are not only useful for storing and analyzing disaster
information, but also for sharing it. The graphic capabilities of modem
personal computers have adapted themselves well to handling and
transferring map data, the usefulness of which has already been
described. The following are but a few examples of the uses of computers
in disaster communications (Wohlwerth, 1987; Carroll, 1983; Carroll,
1985; Wallace, 1985; FEMA, 1987:27):

-   Sharing and collating information about what agencies have responded
    and what resources they have dispatched.

-   Locating and specifying procedures for obtaining \"special\"
    disaster resources (e.g., cranes, search dogs).

-   Sharing information about the location, scope, and character of the
    disaster and damage that has resulted.

-   Sharing information about the status of transportation routes,
    facilities (How many more victims can each shelter or hospital
    accept?), docking and landing sites.

-   Generating and sharing predictions about weather and other expected
    conditions (areas subject to flooding, fire spread, movement of
    leaking chemicals, avalanche risk).

-   Obtaining information on how to deal with a specific hazardous
    chemical.

-   General \"electronic mail.\"

**SUMMARY**\
\
The communications equipment and procedures used by most emergency
agencies are established primarily to deal with information flow
*within* the organization. Disasters, on the other hand, pose heavy
demands for *inter-agency* communication. To some extent, this can be
facilitated by the availability of inter-agency radio networks, but some
of the most difficult problems are \"people\" rather than \"equipment\"
issues. The natural hesitancy to depend on and communicate with other
organizations can be diminished in several ways. The critical
information requirements of the various organizations involved in the
disaster response need to be mutually understood, and the responsibility
for gathering and disseminating it needs to be made clear.\
\
\
**PLANNING CHECKPOINTS**

-   Does your disaster training program familiarize the members of
    various organizations with the tasks, methods, and responsibilities
    of other organizations likely to be involved in the response?

-   Do the organizations in your area have joint training sessions that
    deal with the common aspects of disaster response?

-   Have the emergency organizations in your area adopted standard
    terminology and procedures?

-   Has your area established inter-agency communications networks?

-   Does your area promote informal contacts among members of agencies
    likely to be involved in disaster responses?

-   Has your area developed a mutually acceptable division of
    responsibility for tasks likely to be necessary in a disaster?

-   Are your agencies\' radio systems protected against disruption from
    common disaster agents? Are radio consoles and other components
    anchored to protect them from earthquake hazards? Are they protected
    from flooding? High winds? Is there a protected source of back-up
    power? An auxiliary antenna? Are protective and back-up precautions
    provided for the communications equipment of local commercial
    broadcast stations?

-   Is the responsibility for common disaster tasks predetermined on a
    mutually agreeable basis?

**ADDITIONAL READING**\
\
Dynes RR, Quarantelli EL: Organizational communications and decision
making in crises, Disaster Research Center Report Series No 17, 1977.
Available from: Disaster Research Center, Newark, Del 19716.\
\
Dynes, RR: Interorganizational relations in communities under stress.
In: Quarantelli EL, Disasters: theory and research, 1978. Available
from: Sage Publications, Ltd, 275 South Beverly Dr, Beverly Hills, Calif
90212.\
\
Federal Communications Commission: Report on Future Public Safety
Telecommunications Requirements, PR Docket No. 84-232: Phase 2, Private
Radio Bureau, FCC, Washington, DC, 1985. Available from: International
Transcription Services, 2100 M St, NW, Washington, DC 20036.\
\
Joint Committee on Fire, Police, Emergency, and Disaster Services:
California\'s Emergency Communications Crisis, California State Senate
and Assembly, Sacramento, 1983. Obtained from the office of Senator
William Campbell, California State Senate, Sacramento, Calif 95814.\
\
Stallings RA: Communications in natural disasters, Disaster Research
Center Report Series No. 10, 1971. Available from: Disaster Research
Center, Newark, Del 19716.

**Chapter 6: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

Coordination of responding resources is a major problem in disasters.
This photo shows emergency personnel and equipment outside the Kansas
City Hyatt Hotel after the skywalk collapse of July 17, 1981. (Courtesy
of the Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas City, Missouri.)\
\
Disasters pose problems for resource management that are different from
those in daily emergencies. Disaster tasks may require the use of
resources (personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment) from multiple
organizations and jurisdictions and may also require the use of unusual
resources. Much of the emphasis of disaster planning in many communities
has traditionally been on the mobilization and reinforcement of
resources. And, indeed, procedures for this purpose are important. More
recently, however, it has been recognized that uncontrolled mobilization
and over-response are common problems in disasters. When they occur,
coordination of response can be significantly complicated. This chapter
discusses several problems that disasters pose for resource management
and some approaches for handling them.\
\
**THE PROBLEM OF OVER-RESPONSE**\
\
One of the assumptions that often guides disaster planning is that the
primary problem is one of mobilizing enough resources Quarantelli,
1983:104). In fact, some persons have defined disasters as,
\"emergencies that exceed the available resources.\" (Orr, 1983:601;
ACEP, 1976:901; ACEP:2-1, 5-15; Cohen, 1982b:24; Comm on EMS, 1971;
Holloway, 1978:60) However, this is not always the case. The problem of
too many resources is coming to be recognized as a pattern which is
found, at some time or another, in many disasters. When resources are
present in greater amounts than needed, they can greatly complicate the
already difficult problems of coordination and communication (Wenger,
1986:v; Quarantelli, 1970a:384; Quarantelli, 1972:69; Quarantelli,
1983:78,80; Golec, 1977; Stout, 1981:42; Williams, 1956:660). In the
more extreme cases, excessive influx of resources has even been observed
to physically impede activity at the scene.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** Nine minutes after a tornado hit, an ambulance was
dispatched to the scene. The EMT on board was asked to make an
assessment and report back. After asking a couple of questions of people
at the scene, the EMT estimated there were 150 injuries and radioed
back, saying, \"Send everything avail-able; it\'s a big one.\" This
assessment was made in 2 minutes, and ambulances arrived from all over
the state. However, the estimate was totally wrong, and outside
ambulances were not needed at all. Three times the ambulances necessary
arrived, many of which got flat tires and blocked the roadways
Quarantelli, 1983:68).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Coliseum explosion, Indianapolis, Indiana, October* 31,
1963. \"Literally hundreds of nurses, doctors, first aid volunteers,
wreckers, cranes, station wagons \... outside the fairgrounds made it
difficult to get inside the Coliseum. A mass of humanity and equipment
had converged and filled almost all the space within and just outside
the building \...\... Finally, the Chief of Police gave the order to bar
any further traffic, including ambulances and first aid personnel, from
entering the fairgrounds.\" (Drabek, 1968:19)\
\
There are five main reasons why resource excesses may occur in
disasters:

-   The resources surviving in the disaster-stricken community are
    greater than expected.

-   People react to disasters with a spirit of concern and generosity.
    Assuming that resources are deficient and the community is
    incapacitated, outsiders send resources into the disaster area in
    large amounts\-\--even if they have not been specifically requested.

-   The determination of responsibility and establishment of procedures
    for assessing and requesting the overall resources needed are often
    neglected.

-   Because of the lack of clearly defined contact points, absence of
    compatible radio frequencies, non-functional or overloaded telephone
    circuits, and communications overload, it is often difficult for
    those offering help to contact someone who can tell them whether or
    not they are needed. Assuming it is almost certain that help is
    needed and that too many resources are better than too few, they
    choose in favor of responding.

-   It is often difficult for the recipients of unsolicited assistance
    to refuse it.

**Surviving Resources**\
\
After disaster impact, the basic resources still available in the
community may be underestimated (Mileti, 1975:85; Faupel, 1985:58).\
\
***Manpower of Emergency Organizations***\
Police departments, fire departments, ambulance companies, and hospitals
routinely operate 24 hours a day. By calling in off-duty personnel,
these organizations may be able to actually double or triple their
manpower. Furthermore, these organizations may be able to increase their
capacity by shifting people from their regular tasks to more
disaster-relevant duties. The police personnel assigned to records,
crime prevention, and vice, for example, may be shifted to patrol or
traffic control duties (Dynes, 1981:44,62; Quarantelli, 1972:69;
Kennedy, 1970:354).\
\
***Food and Clothing***\
Historically, food shortages have not been a characteristic of disasters
in the United States. Food supplies in households, retail groceries, and
in wholesale warehouses has been sufficient to maintain a community for
as long as several weeks. Paradoxically, disaster victims sometimes have
eaten *better* than in normal times. Power failures thawed frozen food
which then had to be eaten (Mileti, 1975:115).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964.* After the
Alaska earthquake of 1964, food was not a serious problem for anyone.
This was in spite of the fact that some households lost a considerable
amount of food from broken containers and thawed freezers. Only one
family had to obtain meals from a kitchen set up in the neighborhood by
the Army. Many wives pooled foods with their friends or relatives and
cooked for the group on whatever stove was available. People needing
food could go to the supermarkets where guards were patrolling or the
clerks were cleaning up and ask for an item that was needed. If it could
be found undamaged, it was freely given to the asker. Sometimes food
came from unexpected sources within the community. One farmer who did
not have enough feed for his chickens, killed 40, dressed and froze
them. He gave several to needy families in one hard-hit neighborhood.
Another family had about 35 dozen eggs which they were going to prepare
for an Easter celebration by a local men\'s service club. Many of the
eggs survived the quake and were given to the Salvation Army to
distribute (Lanfis,1984:24).\
\
***Medical Facilities, Supplies, and Personnel***\
Medical supplies are often available at nearby hospitals or wholesale
warehouses (Quarantelli, 1972:69). Loss of hospital capability is not
common in disasters. Historically, it is quite rare for American
hospitals to be damaged or destroyed by the impact, or for them to be
incapacitated by loss of water or power (Quarantelli, 1983:81). In a
study of 29 major disasters, the Disaster Research Center found that
supply shortages were experienced by only 6% of the hospitals, and
personnel shortages occurred in only 2%. Many hospitals reported that
they had more regular staff and volunteers than they could effectively
use (Quarantelli, 1983:82,109). As stated by one researcher:\
\
\"Unlike less-developed countries, the United States, except perhaps in
very poor, rural communities, has enough skilled personnel and adequate
medical facilities to respond to most disasters-short of truly
catastrophic events. The main barrier that impedes effective EMS
delivery in disasters is, rather, the insufficient level of awareness,
education, and organization.\" (Tierney, 1985a:83)\
\
As long ago as 1956, Raker observed that most hospitals taking care of
disaster victims did not have to carry out a large number of surgical
procedures (Raker, 1956:35). This pattern can still be seen in recent
domestic disasters of some magnitude.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Hyatt Hotel Skywalk Collapse, Kansas City, Missouri,* July
17, 1981. When two elevated walkways crowded with people collapsed and
fell on patrons dancing below, 113 died, and 200 were injured (90 of
whom were admitted to the hospital). Yet only 29 surgical procedures
were carried out in the following 3 days, and the busiest hospital
carried out only 6 of these during the evening of the disaster
(Patterson, 1981:414; KC Health Dept, 1981:13; Orr, 1983:601).\
\
There are two main reasons why the hospital operating room load is often
not heavier:

-   In general, most disaster casualties have minor injuries.

-   Most disasters in the United States have not been very large.

In the disasters studied by the Disaster Research Center an average of
only 2 10-15% of the casualties were serious enough to require even
overnight admission to the hospital (Quarantelli, 1983:81; Golec,
1977:176). In most disasters, casualties pose more problems in their
numbers than in their severity.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **OBSERVATION**In a study of 29 major disasters, only 10-15% of the
  casualties were injured seriously enough to require overnight admission
  to the hospital; only 6% of the hospitals suffered supply shortages,
  and only 2% had personnel shortages.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**Outside and Volunteered Assistance**\
When calamity strikes, people want to help. This desire to assist is
manifested in a number of ways. Civilians in and near the disaster area
become involved in search and rescue, giving first aid, providing food,
shelter, and comfort. Sometimes the aid is given in spite of
considerable risk to the provider. Those living farther away send food,
clothing, medical supplies, and money. Surrounding governmental and
public safety agencies send in personnel, ambulances, fire apparatus,
helicopters, and other resources. These offers of assistance may come
from distant locations in other parts of the country or even from
foreign countries (Fritz, 1956:25; Bronson, 1959:102).\
\
This flood of generosity may have some unforeseen consequences. Often
this inundation of assistance is unsolicited and greatly exceeds the
needs of the stricken community. When this happens, the inpouring of
resources, however generously motivated, complicates the coordination of
disaster response efforts.\
\
In spite of the *perception* that disaster stricken communities are in
need of resources, it may be very difficult for outsiders to get
accurate information on *actual* needs. In part, this is due to the
inherent uncertainty of the disaster situation. Additionally, it is
because many communities have no generally accepted set of procedures
for the multi-organizational collection and analysis of information
about the disaster-so that resource needs can be accurately determined
and resource requests coordinated. One factor that probably contributes
to the quantity of *\"unsolicited\"* outside assistance *is* the
difficulty the providers experience in determining who is in charge of
the overall disaster response and who has accurate knowledge about
resource needs.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **OBSERVATION**The lack of a mechanism for outsiders to find out
  whether or not their assistance is needed may contribute to
  over-response in disasters.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

***Donations***\
One of the ways that generosity is manifested in disasters is in the
flood of donations that frequently pours into the impacted area (Fritz,
1956:22; Williams, 1956:660; Moore, 1958:169).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake and Fire, San Francisco, April 18-19, 1906.*
Outside aid began to enter the earthquake and fire-ravaged city before
the ashes were cold. Food, medicines, cots, and blankets were the
vanguard of hundreds of tons of relief supplies that would pour into the
city. Within a few days, \$8 million \[\$103,728,000 in 1983 dollars\]
had been raised to help San Francisco, and in the months to follow,
another million would be added to that. Railroad cars arrived first from
the coastal cities of Los Angeles, Seattle, Stockton, Vancouver, and San
Diego. Within a week, trains arrived from all over. A steamer and a
bargeload of provisions arrived from Sacramento along with the message:\
\
\"San Francisco can count on Sacramento for the last bit of bread and
meat in the house, can draw on us for every dollar we have, and then you
can have our blood if you need it.\"\
\
Ogden, Utah, had no bread for days, because it all went to San
Francisco. Boys of the Chemewa, Oregon, Indian School bought flour with
their savings and baked 830 loaves of bread for San Francisco which was
sent by Wells Fargo Express. The New York City Merchants Association
ordered 14 freight cars of foodstuffs by phone to be sent from Omaha. In
one month 1,800 freight-carloads of supplies came into the city. Even
the entertainment world joined in to help. Barnum & Bailey contributed a
day\'s receipts of \$20,000 \[approx. \$260,000 in 1983 dollars\]. Sarah
Bernhardt held two benefit performances, and George M. Cohan sold papers
on Wall Street, some of them going for as high as \$1,000. In Los
Angeles, men on the streets with megaphones begged for money for San
Francisco. Within 3 days of the quake, Los Angeles had sent or was ready
to send 75 freight cars of donations to the stricken city (Bronson,
1959:99).\
\
In some cases, donations may pour into disaster-stricken communities far
in excess of local needs, and the recipient communities may be
unprepared to handle the deluge:\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, White County, Arkansas, March 21, 1952.* In 1952,
a series of tornadoes struck six states. White County, Arkansas, was
severely hit; forty-nine people were killed and 675 injured. The
following day, large amounts of food and clothing donations began to
flow into Searcy, the hardest hit area. A warehouse had to be found and
opened to accommodate the donations that arrived in carloads, moving
vans, railroad express trucks, planes and freight cars. A large American
Legion auditorium was secured for storage, but it was filled to the
ceiling within 2 hours. An auto parts building with a capacity of about
84,000 cubic feet was filled within the next 12 hours. Another building,
covering half a city block, was fined by noon the next day. After that,
tent warehouses were opened up, then a gymnasium and an additional
warehouse. All of these storage areas were promptly and completely
filled. The sorting and processing of this material took the efforts of
over 500 volunteers working for 2 weeks (Fritz, 1956:23).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Waco, Texas, May 11, 1953.* The unexpected volume
of clothing donations (an estimated 31/2 boxcars full) created a problem
because no provision had been made to receive it. A warehouse was
opened, but the amount of arriving material almost crowded the workers
out of the building. Clothing continued to arrive for a month, over 3
tons of it remaining in the Salvation Army warehouse after the disaster
period had passed (Fritz, 1956:25; Moore, 1958:169).\
\
Sometimes persons in one organization assume another organization is in
need and make resource requests for it without confirming that the need
exists.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Flint, Michigan, June 9, 1953.* Hurley Hospital
(where 750 \[approx. 80%\] of the casualties were treated) had an
adequate supply of blood on hand for the disaster. Nevertheless, a Red
Cross volunteer, and independently, Flint\'s mayor called all the local
radio stations to have an appeal made for blood donors. As a result, the
hospital was suddenly deluged with 2,000 people eager to donate blood.
This proved to be extremely disruptive to the hospital\'s disaster
operations. At about the same time, the Red Cross was disrupted by a
flood of donors bringing unneeded cots and bedding as a result of public
appeals made by Hurley Hospital, the Mayor, and the Salvation Army
(Rosow, 1977:167,169).\
\
***Large Numbers of Responding Organization***\
Another factor contributing to resource-convergence is the large numbers
of organizations that often respond (Mileti, 1975:121). There are
several reasons why this may occur:

-   Initially, the extent of the disaster is overestimated, resulting in
    requests from the scene to \"send everything you\'ve got.\"

-   Local branches of national disaster relief agencies call in help
    from their regional headquarters.

-   Local divisions of state and federal agencies have responsibilities
    in the disaster area.

-   Federal and state agencies dispatch teams to study the disaster
    agent or the disaster response.

-   When organizations outside of the disaster area hear of the event,
    they send reinforcements (even when not requested to do so).

Unsolicited aid may come from organized ambulance, rescue, and other
emergency services Quarantelli, 1983:71). Unsolicited aid is often
offered to hospitals by off-duty medical and hospital personnel (Drabek,
1968:21). Physicians and nurses who are *not* members of the hospital
staff also may show up and offer assistance (Quarantelli, 1970a:388).\
\
In a number of disasters it has been observed that the response exceeded
the manpower needs created by the disaster. In Quarantelli\'s study of
29 disasters, there was an average of only one patient transported per
organization at the scene. (That is, one patient per *organization,* not
per vehicle.) Furthermore, vehicles almost never made multiple runs
Quarantelli, 1983:22,71).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Airliner Crash, Kenner, Louisiana, July 9, 1982.*
Unsolicited ambulance and rescue units came from as far as 70 miles
away, but the disaster left only four seriously injured survivors.
\"More doctors and nurses than planned or expected arrived at the scene.
Command personnel were unaware that they were even coming (and therefore
could not cancel their response). While well intentioned, the flood of
personnel and equipment overwhelmed site authorities . . . \" making
management and control difficult (Morris, 1982:65).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983.* \"The
initial emergency response by area public safety agencies and volunteers
was commendable; however, the response came close to bordering on
over-reaction. Within hours, the city had 30 ambulances and five medivac
helicopters at their disposal, none of which were requested.\"
Ambulances came over 100 miles from the San Francisco Bay Area without
having received an official request by the Coalinga authorities (Seismic
Safety Comm, 1983:81,86).\
\
***Volunteers***\
\
\"Whatever planning is undertaken, it can rarely prepare for the
quantity and quality of volunteers that appear.\" (E. L. Quarantelli
Disaster Research Center University of Delaware Quarantelli, 1965:111)\
\
Another cause of resources convergence is the large numbers of
volunteers who often respond (Bush, 1981:1; Fritz, 1956:40). The United
States has a long and vigorous tradition of volunteerism. Almost half of
this country\'s ambulance services are volunteer (Dick,1982:67).
Volunteerism is a tradition in the fire service, support of the Olympic
Games, and numerous social and philanthropic causes. This altruism does
not vanish in the face of disaster. If anything, it becomes stronger
Quarantelli, 1970b:625; Dynes, 1970a:436).\
\
Not everyone anticipates the extent to which unofficial voluntary and
unsolicited help is offered when a disaster strikes. In fact, within the
stricken area, *more* potential volunteers become available, because
schools and non-essential businesses close down (Quarantelli, 1972:69).
In some disasters, more rescue and relief has been provided by
unofficial civilian volunteers than by formal emergency or disaster
agencies. In contrast to volunteers who participate in the response to
routine emergencies, disaster volunteers are often unsolicited, and
volunteer activity is unexpected (Raker, 1956:20; Williams, 1956:657;
Barton, 1969:132,144,147,161; Dynes, 1974:30; Dynes, 1981:xviii;
Quarantelli, 1983:36).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, White County, Arkansas, March 21, 1952.* After
impact, 1,000 residents of a nearby town (representing 26% of the adult
population) volunteered their services in the four medical centers
during the first night (Fritz, 1956:43).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Cheyenne, Wyoming, July 16,1979.* During the
first 2 hours after impact, an estimated 29% of the total search and
rescue effort was completed by individuals who were not affiliated with
any emergency organization (Drabek, 1981:119).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Floods, Texas Hill Country, August 1-4, 1978.* When three
Texas counties suffered extensive flooding in 1978, two-thirds of those
needing rescue or help received it from persons unaffiliated with any
emergency organization (Drabek, 1981:68).

Figure 6-1. The Cheyenne, Wyoming tornado of July 16,1979 is a good
example of individuals not affiliated with any emergency organization
helping out in an emergency. (Courtesy of Peter Willing.)\
\
\
**Difficulties with the volunteer response.**\
Organizations frequently have difficulty coordinating the efforts of
volunteer workers with their own efforts. This is especially true when
these people have never worked together before. Volunteers may have
varying skill levels and lack familiarity with organizational routines
or operating procedures. Organizations making use of volunteers cannot
always count on the required task being completed, or if completed, it
is uncertain with what efficiency, speed, or quality the task will be
carried out. Furthermore, volunteers are not always familiar with the
standard terms or routes used in communications. They don\'t know who to
ask for what, or under what conditions (and to whom) to report
difficulties Quarantelli, 1970a-388; Quarantelli, 1983:21; Dynes,
1981:33; Killian, 1953:6,16; Faupel, 1985:52).\
\
**Benefits of the volunteer response.**\
In contrast to the picture painted above is the significant role
volunteers play in decreasing the toll of death and destruction caused
by disasters (Barton, 1969:132).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Lake Pomona, Kansas, July 17,1978.* On June 17,
1978, the showboat Whippoorwill, carrying 60 passengers and crew on Lake
Pomona, Kansas, was struck by a tornado and capsized. At least a dozen
nearby boaters rushed to the overturned vessel. One rescuer brought 15
to 18 people to shore who had been pulled from the water. He then
returned to the Whippoorwill\--and diving repeatedly into the
water-located and helped to the surface several persons trapped below.
Spontaneous action by civilian volunteers was responsible for all of the
lives saved in this incident. Even if there had been an elaborate rescue
system in the area, it is unlikely that it would have reached the
victims sooner than did the volunteers (Drabek, 1981:53; Kilijanek,
1980:68).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983.* A report
stated: \"Local untrained citizens did most of initial search and rescue
work, including control of utilities on a block-by-block basis.\" \"The
*immediate* community response of untrained citizen volunteer disaster
service workers was vital to the fire suppression, search and rescue
function and utility control to alleviate fire hazards. Without this
responsiveness a much larger disaster would have resulted...\" (Seismic
Safety Comm, 1983:97,98)

Figure 6-2. After the showboat Whippoorwill was capsized by a tornado,
June 17, 1978, the spontaneous search and rescue effort of nearby
recreational boaters was responsible for all of the lives saved.
(Courtesy *Topeka Capital-journal,* Topeka, Kansas.)\
\
**INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**\
\
It is important for response coordinators and planners to appreciate the
tendency toward over-response in disasters. Although it is unlikely that
ti pattern can be completely controlled, effective measures can be taken
to reduce it and channel it. In part, this can be accomplished by the
development of procedures for the multi-organizational management of
resources, so that needs can be accurately determined and requests
coordinated. This helps to decrease exaggerated estimates of damages.
and injuries and the resultant appeals for mass assistance which may not
be needed.\
\
**Overall Needs Assessment**\
A prerequisite to effective and efficient resource management is an
accurate *overall* analysis of the disaster situation and the available
resources. The data for this analysis must be collected from multiple
organizations in order to get an idea of the \"big picture. \" The
failure to carry out this task has been a frequently observed problem in
disasters (Parr, 1970:425; Mileti, 1975:80; Dynes, 1978:58; Quarantelli,
1983:65,114; Scanlon, 1985:123; Kilijanek, 1979:5; Rosow, 1977:136;
Yutzy, 1969:118,156; Stallings, 1971:30). Often this is because it is
unclear whose responsibility this is (Drabek, 1986:54). It is important
to anticipate the fact that initial information about the disaster
situation is often inaccurate (Dynes, 1974:77; Quarantelli, 1983:68).
For this reason, *needs assessment has to be an ongoing procedure* that
continues throughout the duration of the incident.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **PRINCIPLE**Procedures for ongoing needs assessment are a prerequisite
  to efficient resource management in disasters.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Needs assessment involves two major processes: 1) situation analysis;
and 2) resource analysis. Situation analysis is the collection of
information about the extent and character of the disaster itself and
the problems that have to be tackled. Resource analysis involves the
collection of information about the resources needed to tackle the
problems.\
\
***Overall Situation Analysis***\
**Situation analysis difficulties in disasters.** The responsibility for
overall situation analysis in disasters often is not clearly delineated
Even when situation analysis is carried out in disasters, it is usually
done by individual organizations who seek out primarily that information
of importance to their own organization\'s activities. Often, critical
information possessed by one organization and needed by another is not
shared (see Chapter 4).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Flint-Beecher, Michigan, June 8, 1953.*
Initially, the local post of the Michigan State Police got a report that
the center of impact was at a drive-in theater. They were also under the
impression that the direct road to the drive-in was blocked by debris
and, therefore, impassible. Shortly thereafter, a fire truck from a
nearby town worked its way past the drive-in, found that the road was in
fact open and that there had not been a severe impact there after all.
But what the firefighters knew was not communicated to the State Police.
The State Police, assuming heavy casualties at the drive-in and that the
direct route was blocked, sent badly needed ambulances there on a 2-hour
drive on a roundabout detour. Furthermore, when the State Police
discovered the correct situation, they did not inform the Red Cross,
which sent a field radio unit to the drive-in (Barton, 1963:102; Rosow,
1977:136).\
\
The prompt receipt of information about a disaster situation allows
hospitals to start mustering and organizing their resources (Raker,
1956:16,33). However, transmission of this information from the disaster
site to community hospitals is a recurring problem. In 29 disasters, the
Disaster Research Center found fewer than 12% of the cases where
hospitals received useful information from the scene about the number of
casualties to expect, or the type and severity of injuries (Quarantelli,
1983:67,91; Golec, 1977:174).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *The Air Florida Crash, Washington,* D.C., *January* 13,
1982. At Washington Hospital Center\'s Medstar adult trauma unit,
confusion reigned. Park Police officials instructed Medstar personnel
that 4 or 5 victims would be arriving in two helicopters. When the
patients failed to arrive, Medstar officials manned both radios and
telephones in their effort to find out what was going on. \"When an Army
helicopter landed with a female patient suffering from hypothermia, a
collapsed lung, multiple compound fractures, and internal bums from
inhalation of jet fuel, she was taken to the hospital\'s 4th floor
operating room-in order to reserve Medstar\'s single surgical bed for
more critically injured victims. None ever arrived.\" (Goodwin,
1982:14)\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May* 2, 1983. Hospitals
in nearby Fresno received little information from the county emergency
operations center. Apparently, the designated hospital radio
notification (HEAR) system was not used (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:86).\
\
In a number of cases, the hospital\'s initial information was from the
first arriving casualties or ambulances (Neff, 1977:186; Golec,
1977:173).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Metrorail Crash, Washington,* D.C., *January 13,* 1982.
None of the major hospitals in the city were notified of the accident.
The first notification that George Washington University Hospital
received was from a paramedic who arrived with a victim of the Air
Florida crash (which occurred 30 minutes before the Metrorail crash).
The hospital never received any information regarding the number of
casualties, type of injuries, or estimated arrival time. Most of what
D.C. area hospitals learned of the disaster came from incoming EMS
personnel or the news media. Furthermore, the hospitals were not
successful in reaching the appropriate officials to obtain additional
information. This made it very difficult to determine the level of
preparedness necessary for incoming victims (Edelstein, 1982:159).\
\
**Sources of information.**\
Disaster situation analysis may be accomplished by the use of
multi-disciplinary damage assessment teams.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964.* Damage
assessment teams were organized at the Safety Building and dispatched to
make a block-by-block reconnaissance. These teams were composed of 6 to
10 persons (e.g., a mechanic, an electrician, a plumber, a medical
person). They were asked to assess damage, shut off utilities, search
for survivors, and return with a report of their findings (Yutzy,
1969:120).\
\
Alternatively, radio reports of situation data from each agency can be
collected at a central point where it is collated and analyzed. The
overall situation analysis is then composed into a report, including
appropriate maps, which is made available to all responders.\
\
Additional sources of information may include:

-   Computer programs for forecasting fire spread, flood involvement, or
    spread of leaking hazardous materials.

-   Weather predictions and satellite data from the National Weather
    Bureau.

-   Air reconnaissance information including infrared detectors carried
    by aircraft to analyze fire hot spots.

-   Computer data-bases with information on geographic features such as
    topography, access routes, helicopter landing sites, vulnerable
    structures, special features at risk (hospitals, nursing homes), and
    special hazards such as oil storage tanks, dams, and chemical
    storage sites.

**Types of information needed for situation analysis.**\
***Present conditions**.* Important information includes that related
to\
location and severity of damage; existing threats (fires, explosions,
chemical spills, downed electrical wires, weakened structures in danger
of collapse); numbers, locations, types, and severities of injuries; and
numbers and locations of trapped victims.\
\
***Expected conditions**.* Examples of factors that might influence
expected conditions include: rate of fire spread; rate of river rise;
seismic aftershocks; tsunami (tidal wave) or *seiche*
(earthquake-generated wave in a lake or other closed body of water);
hazardous spills due to earthquake; duration of the incident; weather
influences; and downed power lines after storms.\
\
***Impact of expected conditions**.* Examples of impacts of expected
conditions include: evacuation areas; public shelter and feeding; need
for sandbagging; possibility of further casualties; need for replacement
personnel and reinforcements; need for feeding, sleeping, and sanitation
facilities; need for fuel; and vehicle and equipment maintenance or
replacement.\
\
***Overall Resource Analysis***\
**Resource analysis difficulties in disasters**. Ascertaining what
resources are present at the disaster is often quite difficult. This is
because:

-   Persons and organizations arrive at the scene without having been
    requested.

-   Multiple organizations may independently request resources without
    informing the other organizations.

-   It\'s not always clear whose responsibility it is to keep track of
    all resources involved in the disaster (Golec, 1977:169; Parr,
    1970:426).

-   It may not be clear to arriving resources who is responsible for
    overall disaster site coordination and to whom the resources should
    report.

**Types of information needed for resource analysis.**\
\
Information needed for resource analysis includes data on what
objectives need to be accomplished, what resources are needed to
accomplish them, what resources are present and/or assigned, and what
resources are available. When the situation analysis is complete, the
results should identify those general problems that have to be tackled
(incident objectives). These are broken down into specific tasks that
are delegated to the various organizations present and their
subdivisions. For each delegated task, the group responsible for
accomplishing it must then indicate the resources it needs to do so. The
indicated resource needs are then compared with resources present to
assess the resources that need to be requested or reassigned.\
\
**Check-in areas.** One technique for obtaining and providing
information on what resources are present is the use of check-in areas
(Drabek,1981:112).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Waco, Texas, May 11, 1953. \"As* organization
proceeded, three location points were set up at which personnel were to
report\.... These check points greatly facilitated the use of
volunteers. When a particular type of skill was needed, it was often
found that a person with that skiff was actually present at one of the
points. Furthermore, this prevented a situation that had occurred
several times: a person would volunteer for a particular type of work
and be told he was not needed; later, when he was needed; those in
charge of personnel were unable to locate him.\" (Moore, 1958:16)\
\
*A* useful arrangement is to have law enforcement agencies set up a
security perimeter around the disaster site. At roadblocks, they can
then divert incoming responders to a nearby check-in area located
outside the perimeter. Such an off-incident reporting area has also been
called a staging area or mobilization center (Brunacini, 1978; ICS,
1983b; 1983). The person in charge of the check-in area has the
responsibility for keeping track of those who arrive and conveying that
information to the incident command post. *As* the responders are needed
at the disaster site, they are requested from the check-in area by the
command post. They are then assigned a communications frequency and told
where and to whom to report as seen in Figure 6-3.\
\
This type of arrangement has several advantages:

-   It decreases radio traffic by allowing responders to check in and to
    receive a briefing and assignment in person.

-   It allows a means to inventory and integrate into the system
    volunteers and unexpected responders.

-   It keeps unneeded resources from congesting the disaster site.

-   It allows responders to be integrated into the system even if they
    have different radio communications frequencies, or if they do not
    know on arrival who is in charge or where to report.

-   It prevents needed personnel from being excluded because they have
    not arrived with the usual \"symbols of authority\" which tend to
    grant passage through road blocks (red fights, official vehicles,
    uniforms, surgical scrub suits).

**Figure 6-3.** The disaster check-in area.\
\
The technique, to be maximally effective, does require the prompt
establishment of a security perimeter, and that those manning it know
that the check-in area is functioning, where it is, and that incoming
responders should be directed to it.

**Figure 6-4.** Search dogs are an example of \"special\" resources
needed in disasters. This photo shows Marcia Koenig and her dog, Bear,
combing the rubble from the Wichita Fall, Texas, tornado of April 10,
1979. (Courtesy National Association for Search & Rescue. Photographer:
Bob Koenig.)\
\
**Disaster resource-acquisition directory.** Disaster tasks may require
\"special\" resources\--cranes, search dogs, satellite communications
equipment, devices for listening for signs of life in the rubble, and
equipment or skilled personnel for cleaning up hazardous chemical
spills.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Volcano Eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May* 18,
1980. A basic problem was establishing a communication network among
multiple base camps, over 30 helicopters in the air, and the emergency
operations centers in Vancouver and Olympia. The solution was
accomplished by tapping a unique and recently developed resource. A
C-130 aircraft carrying a specially designed communications jeep was
requested through the State Department of Emergency Services via the Air
Force Rescue Coordination Center in Illinois and dispatched from March
Air Force Base in California. The jeep was equipped to provide
communications on most radio frequencies as well as by a NASA ATS-3
communications satellite. The C-130, which was also equipped with
sophisticated communications gear that allowed it to monitor up to 65
aircraft at one time, was used as an airborne command post (Kilijanek,
1981:67).

**Figure 6-5.** \"\'Special\" disaster resources include heavy
earth-moving equipment such as that in this photo of search and rescue
operations following the San Fernando Valley earthquake of February 9,
1971. (Courtesy Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles,
California.)\
\
Some of these \"special\" resources. may not be part of the routine
emergency inventory, and their access may not be covered by routine
procedures (Drabek, 1981:xx; Drabek, 1986:185; Lantis, 1984:7; Gray,
1981:70; Ross, 1982:64; Scholl, 1984:287).

**Figure 6-6.** Heavy mobile cranes are a \"special\" resource that may
be needed in disasters. This illustration shows the search and rescue
operations at the Hyatt Hotel skywalk collapse in Kansas City, Missouri
on July 17, 1981. (Courtesy Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas City,
Missouri.)\
\
\
Locating \"special\" resources is facilitated by the existence of a
current and complete inventory of available material and human disaster
resources (Wenger, 1986:16). The resource-acquisition directory is a
list of such resources, where they can be located, and the proper
procedures for requesting them. The directory may take the form of a
written resource manual, index cards, or a computer data base. The
latter has the advantage that it can be easily updated, and it can be
shared by telephone fine or radio interconnect. However, computers are
also vulnerable to electrical surge or outage, and to earthquake
shaking, and this should be taken into consideration. Examples of what
might be included in a directory are illustrated in Appendix B.\
\
**Resource Allocation**\
***Priorities and Sequential Interdependence***\
The allocation of disaster resources depends on the task priorities
established for the incident. This may be affected by the fact that some
tasks are \"sequentially interdependent.\" That is, the ability of one
organization to complete its assigned task is dependent on another
organization\'s accomplishment of a prior task (Drabek, 1986:178; Dynes,
1981:42).\
\
For example, surgery cannot be initiated on a disaster victim unless
that victim first reaches the hospital alive, and this depends on the
skills applied by private ambulance paramedics in the field. But the
paramedics cannot gain access to the victim until he is located in the
rubble of a neighborhood of collapsed buildings. This requires the
services of search dogs from private, volunteer organizations contacted
through the sheriff s department. A crane to remove the entrapping
rubble is then required, which the fire department obtains from a
private construction firm listed in the local civil defense agency\'s
disaster resource inventory.\
\
Another example of sequential interdependence is the effect of disaster
site activities on patient flow to hospitals. Typically, the
distribution of casualties among the area hospitals is the result of
decisions made at the scene, and hospitals are at the mercy of these
decisions. The destination of casualties is often the result of
independent decisions made by the various persons who come into contact
with the victims, including police, firefighters, relatives, and
civilian bystanders participating in search and rescue activities. Not
rarely, this results in the bulk of casualties ending up at the closest
hospital, while other facilities remain under-utilized (see Chapter 8).\
\
***Monitoring Task Progress and Resource Re-allocation***\
Allocation of resources based on the situation analysis can be
complicated when, as so often occurs, the initial information obtained
is inaccurate (Dynes, 1974:77; Quarantelli, 1983:68). Furthermore,
attempts to accomplish disaster tasks are often plagued by unforeseen
problems. Therefore, one cannot be certain that the various important
disaster tasks will be completed as expected. This is particularly
significant if the task is one upon which the accomplishment of a series
of other crucial tasks is dependent. The appropriate countermeasure for
this problem is the establishment of procedures to monitor the progress
of the various tasks and to reassign resources to meet the conditions as
they change.\
\
**Managing Volunteers**\
Management of disaster volunteers should take the following into
consideration:

-   Volunteers will respond-often in large numbers and on an unsolicited
    basis.

-   With the presence of large numbers of volunteers makes coordination
    difficult, they play a significant-sometimes underestimated-role in
    saving lives and relieving the suffering that results from
    disasters. Volunteers may be able to provide needed services that
    are unavailable at the time from formal emergency organizations
    (Drabek, 1986:184).

-   A large amount of the disaster aid from spontaneous volunteers
    occurs in the early period after impact when organized emergency and
    disaster agencies have not yet arrived in sufficient strength to
    provide the needed assistance. In many cases, these volunteers will
    turn over disaster work to formal, organized agencies when the
    latter can better supply the needed aid (Fritz, 1956:41).

-   Difficulties with volunteers may be lessened if procedures are
    developed for integrating them into the formal organizational
    response.

For these reasons, effective coordination of disaster response must
recognize and integrate volunteers, and someone must be vested with the
responsibility for managing them.\
\
One approach is to assign the responsibility for a check-in area where
volunteers can report and an inventory made of their skills, abilities,
and the equipment to which they have access. This may be at the same
location as the check-in area for professional emergency responders or
at a separate location. It is important that security personnel manning
the road blocks and disaster site perimeter be aware of the check-in
areas for volunteers and direct volunteers to these locations.\
\
The effectiveness of volunteers can be enhanced by placing groups of
them under the supervision of a trained member of a formal emergency
organization (deputy sheriff, police officer, firefighter, National
Guardsman) and assigning the group to carry out a specific task. The
coordination of volunteer search and rescue efforts following disasters
have been improved by this means.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Waco, Texas, May* 11, 1953. Military personnel
brought organization to the search and rescue efforts by incorporating
civilian volunteers into their teams. These teams were composed of about
15 men under a leader and an assistant leader. In addition, there was
one member with a walkie\--talkie keeping track with the command post
and with other teams (Moore, 1958:14).\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 10,* 1979. By the
time both the city emergency operations center and major field command
post were in operation, many people in the area went to the command post
to offer their assistance. The police captain in charge assigned members
of emergency response organizations to direct search parties, each
composed of 5 to 12of these unofficial helpers (Adams, 1981b:24).\
\
Members of emergency organizations who are assigned to lead teams of
volunteers may find themselves acting as \"instant teachers,\"
explaining procedures as they go.\
\
**EXAMPLE:** *Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2,* 1983. \"It was
often necessary for me to stop and explain basic fireman-ship activities
to the civilian on the fireground. When I asked for lines to be moved, I
had to explain how to hold them, how to move them and how to put them
together and operate them.\" (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:116)\
\
The coordination of volunteering organizations can be enhanced if each
task assigned to volunteers is assigned to a group made up of members of
a single existing organization. This preserves the existing coordination
and communication procedures of intact groups and the advantages of
working with familiar persons. Even if the organizations (for example,
church groups, fraternal and sororal groups, clubs, unions, professional
associations, private commercial firms) do not have specific emergency
or disaster skills, their contribution to coordinated disaster activity
is improved if their organizational structures are kept intact (Dynes,
1974:160).\
\
In certain cases, volunteer organizations have special expertise
applicable to the disaster situation. For example, organizations that
provide special services to the disabled are well-adapted to handle the
needs of the disabled in a disaster (Stevenson, 1981:45). The same might
be said of organizations representing certain ethnic and language
groups.\
\
It is beneficial to have a process for registering volunteers as civil
defense workers, so they will be covered by workers\' compensation
(Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:98).\
\
**Command Post**\
A command post is a facility located *at the scene* of an emergency or
disaster where management of site activities is carried out. In
multi-organizational operations, coordination and resource management is
facilitated when the leaders of the various responding organizations are
located together in the same command post (Esch, 1982:167; Adams,
1980:13; Rosow, 1977:197; Moore, 1958:11). Frequently, however,
different agencies involved in a disaster will each set up their own
independent command posts (Best, 1980:22,25; Adams, 1982:54; Seismic
Safety Comm, 1983:117). This is a situation that tends to isolate rather
than unify response efforts.\
\
Another problem at command posts is the absence of those with
decision-making authority. Some organizational commanders neglect their
overall command responsibilities and attempt to become involved in
operations. Command refers to taking charge and making *general policy
decisions* for the organization\'s overall response effort. Operations
refers to the activities directly related to attacking the fire,
rescuing the victims, giving emergency medical care, or arresting
protesters. The effective commander does not allow himself to get bogged
down in operations to the exclusion of other responsibilities, such as
logistics (support) or planning. Rather, he delegates responsibility for
the detailed management of these areas, while he provides *overall*
direction (Brunacini, 1985:730,33,40; Wenger, 1986:31; 1983:16,67).\
\
**Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)**\
In addition to command posts, disasters with multiple impact sites and
large,complex disasters (e.g., those with significant state and federal
involvement)often call for an emergency operations center (EOC). The EOC
is usually established away from the disaster scene, often near
governmental offices (e. g., city hall). In contrast to the command
post, which is concerned with activities at the scene, the EOC
establishes priorities for the distribution of resources among the
various sites, and handles off-incident concerns (e.g., interaction with
off-site facilities such as shelters; ordering of resources from distant
jurisdictions or through state or federal disaster agencies) (FENLA,
1984b:i,A-1; Quarantelli,1979a:23,35).\
\
The idea of using an EOC to direct disaster response was initially a
civil defense concept developed primarily with wartime use in mind. In
more recent times, it has come to be used rather extensively in
peacetime rises (Quarantelli, 1979a:9,11).\
\
Based on the study of 180 local disasters, the Disaster Research Center
concluded that in most cases when EOCs have been used, they have
functioned fairly well (Quarantelli, 1979a:9; Wenger, 1986:iii). In
fact, even when an EOC is not part of the disaster plan, one will often
develop spontaneously anyway. The need for inter-organizational
coordination and communication simply requires it (Drabek, 1986:186).
Preplanning for an EOC, however, does seem to make it function a lot
more smoothly, especially early in the disaster Quarantelli,
1979a:15,16,18). Although EOCs generally work well, the following
discussion will identify the areas where problems are most likely to
develop if they occur.\
\
***The Number of EOCs***\
In some disasters, a number of separate EOCs appear, each involving a
limited number of the participants in the total disaster response, and
each dealing with a limited range of disaster problems. In such cases,
there may be delays or deficiencies in needed information exchange among
key officials located at different EOCs. In addition, persons having
business with the EOC may be confused as to which one to contact. It is
probably best in most cases to encourage the development of a single
EOC, if maximal inter-organizational coordination is to result
(Quarantelli, 1979a:12; Wenger, 1986:24,25,30). An exception to this
rule might be the case where - a disaster strikes in a number of
counties within a state. Then it may be appropriate to have one EOC for
each county interacting with a state-level EOC. A similar model might be
used with several impacted states interacting with federal authorities.\
\
***Alternative EOC Sites***\
The Disaster Research Center found very few communities with plans for
an alternative EOC location in case the original facility could not be
used or had to be abandoned. Yet, the Center estimated that in as many
as one fifth of the disasters, the necessity of moving the EOC became an
issue. In three cases, this was due to flooding. The probability of this
hazard could have been predicted by the examination of flood plain maps
available from the Army Corps of Engineers or other sources Quarantelli,
1979a:15).\
\
***Knowledge about EOC Location***\
In a number of cases studied, key persons and organizations were not
aware that an EOC existed in the community and that it was part of the
planned disaster response. Even if they knew that the plan called for an
EOC to be activated, they could not indicate where it was supposed to be
located. In some cases, this was because the EOC location was not
clearly stated in disaster plans. In other cases, because it was not
activated during disaster drills, officials were not familiar with it
(Quarantelli, 1979a:14).\
\
***EOC Management Responsibility***\
Planning for an EOC needs to specify who is responsible for managing the
facility. When this is neglected, questions arise regarding what space
or communications equipment is to be allocated to what officials or
organizations. Difficulties may be experienced when additional equipment
or supplies are needed, or when decisions need to be made regarding who
is allowed access to the facility-VIPs, non-governmental organizations,
or the press, for example (Quarantelli, 1979a:22,25).\
\
***Presence of Those with Decision-making Authority***\
Coordination is hampered when representatives at an EOC lack the full
authority, knowledge, and experience to make command and coordination
decisions (Wenger, 1986:v,15; ICS, 1985a:62). Unfortunately, those
assigned to the EOC often represent middle management levels of their
respective organizations. This creates problems when urgent, high-level
policy decisions are called for. The tendency of these managers is to
follow the rules and regulations of their organizations rather strictly.
On the other hand, flexibility, imagination, and initiative are needed
to make the decisions required. Under these circumstances, top
management representation is needed at the EOC. They have the authority
and experience necessary to facilitate the type of innovative decision-\
making required (Quarantelli, 1979a:22).\
\
***Organizations Represented at an EOC***\
Even when most local key organizations are properly represented at an
EOC, there are some that are often neglected. Private sector
organizations like the Red Cross and private utility companies are among
those that tend to be excluded. The hospital is also one organization
that is frequently in this category. Non-local organizations are not
always represented at EOCs. Sometimes this is because they do not get
involved early in the response, and by the time they do, the local EOC
is already manned with most of the available space already taken. In
some cases, local planning neglects coordination with non-local groups,
and they are not notified that an EOC was being activated. In others
these groups prefer to operate within their own familiar and routine
channels of communication and authority Quarantelli, 1979a:18,21;
Wenger, 1986:30,31).\
\
Attention needs to be given to anticipating the change in EOC
representation during different phases of the disaster. For example,
prior to disaster impact, organizations responsible for restoration and
rehabilitation activities do not usually need to be present at the EOC.
On the other hand, representatives of organizations involved in warning,
protective, and preventive activities win be important. The scope of
operations for many organizations will vary during the pre-impact,
impact, and post-impact time periods. Accordingly, so will their need to
be represented at the EOC Quarantelli, 1979a:18).\
\
***The FIRESCOPE Multi-Agency Coordination System (AMCS)***\
One system that holds promise as a model for multi-organizational
emergency operation centers is the Multi-Agency Coordination System
(MACS). FIRE-SCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern California
Organized for Potential Emergencies) was funded by Congress after a
series of devastating fires ravaged Southern California in 1970. Its
mandate was to create a coordinated emergency response system for
wildland fires. Two significant outcomes of this effort were the
Incident Command System (see Chapter 7) and the Multi- Agency
Coordination System. Whereas the Incident Command System was\
designed primarily for on-scene coordination, MACS carries out a number
of region-wide functions (Chase, 1980; FEMA, 1987a:17). These include:

-   information management,

-   situation assessment, and

-   resource allocation.

MACS is administered primarily through an off-incident emergency
operations center called the Operations Coordination Center (OCC), which
is the central information and resource coordination point for the
system. The OCC maintains communications ties with numerous fire agency
dispatch centers, local fire coordination centers, the National Weather
Service, and, at times, the incident command post itself (Scherr, 1988).
It also houses a set of computer data bases and programs to store,
process, and exchange information (FEMA,1987:27; ICS, 1987:1).\
\
**Information management.**\
MACS includes arrangements for sharing inter-agency communications
equipment and inter-agency coordination frequencies on a non-interfering
basis during major, multi-agency incidents (Chase, 1980:11; ICS, 1980a;
Scherr, 1988). Computer programs connected with local terminals provide
for region-wide dissemination of up-to-date information (Chase, 1980:13;
FEMA, 1987:17). Communications between the OCC, incident sites, and
agency dispatch centers is carried out primarily via telephone fine. As
the situation requires, this is supplemented by various radio
communications linkages (Chase, 1980:12,13; Scherr, 1988).\
\
**Situation assessment.** Several different types of information\
necessary for situation assessment may be obtained by the OCC:

-   Geographic information, including topography, fire risk, and
    man-made structures

-   Current usage and availability of firefighting resources from the
    various agencies (Chase, 1980:4; FEMA, 1987:17)

-   Current and predicted weather conditions (Chase, 1980:4; FEMA,
    1987:17)

-   Current and computer-predicted wildland fire involvement, including
    damages sustained; values of property threatened; and involved
    access, terrain, and vegetation (Chase, 1980:4,8)

-   Current and predicted effectiveness of fire suppression activities
    (Chase, 1980:4; FEMA, 1987:17)

**Resource allocation.**\
Local, state, and federal resources can be requested for an incident and
coordinated via the OCC. In major, multi-agency incidents, top command
personnel from the participating agencies congregate at the OCC to
coordinate operations (FEMA, 1987:18). Based on analysis of conditions
at various incident sites, and the availability and location of
re-sources, priorities are established for the allocation of resources.
In addition, future resource needs for the incident(s) are anticipated
and provisions made for their acquisition.\
\
**MACS administration and decision-making.**\
MACS is designed so that it does not usurp the authority of any of the
organizations using it. In fact, the participating (FIRESCOPE) agencies
run the system. MACS does not impose decisions on the participants.
Cooperation with MACS is voluntary, and policy decisions are by
consensus. Decision-making is carried by a Board of Directors,
Operations Team, Task Force, Specialist Groups, and an Executive
Coordinator. See Chapter 3 for more detail. (ICS, 1986; FEMA, 1987:17).\
\
\
**SUMMARY**\
\
In disasters, it is necessary to have established procedures for
obtaining additional resources when they are needed. However,
indiscriminate requests for resources can be detrimental. Many disasters
are complicated by the over-response of resources, and this can greatly
complicate the already difficult problems of coordination and
communication. Procedures for pinpointing the specific types and numbers
of resources needed are helpful in making the disaster response more
manageable. Selected examples have been described in this chapter. The
topic of the next chapter is the Incident Command System. One of the
advantages of this system is the procedures it uses for
inter-organizational resource management.\
\
\
**PLANNING CHECKPOINTS**

-   Does your disaster plan and training program provide procedures for
    assessing the overall disaster situation and response needs? For
    disseminating this information among all the responding
    organizations?

-   Does your disaster plan and training program provide procedures for
    ascertaining all the resources at the disaster site? All the
    resources responding? All the needed resources available? The
    procedures for obtaining them? The time it will take for them to
    arrive?

-   Does your disaster plan and training program provide procedures for
    limiting the congestion caused by excessive responders at the scene?

-   Are there centralized procedures for requesting resources so that
    duplication of requests are avoided?

-   Are check-in areas a part of the disaster plan and training?

-   Whose responsibility is it to develop and maintain a disaster
    resource-acquisition directory? Does everyone know how to access
    this information?

-   Does your plan and training include procedures for incorporating and
    managing volunteers and unexpected responders?

-   Does your community have an emergency operations center (EOC)?

-   Are all the appropriate disaster organizations represented at the
    EOC?

-   Is the existence and function of the EOC well understood by all
    those who are expected to participate in it?

-   Do top level managers of disaster response organizations understand
    and accept the importance of their being present at the EOC?

-   How many EOCs will there be in a disaster?

-   Is the EOC vulnerable to disaster threats such as flooding?

-   Who has been designated as responsible for managing the EOC?

-   Are private sector organizations (Red Cross, Salvation Army,
    hospitals, private ambulance companies) represented at the EOC?

-   Who decides when the EOC is to be activated? What criteria are used?

-   How are all the EOC representatives notified that it is being
    activated?

-   Does representation at the EOC vary according to the phase of the
    disaster (e.g., warning phase vs. post-impact vs. recovery)?

-   Is there provision for the EOC to incorporate non-local or
    unexpected responders (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency)?

**ADDITIONAL READING**\
\
Drabek TE: The professional emergency manager: structures and strategies
for success, 1987. Available from: Institute of Behavioral Science #6,
Campus Box 482, University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado 80309.\
\
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Emergency Operating Center (EOC).
In: Job Aid Manual, SM-61.1, 1983. Available from: FEMA, PO Box 8181,
Washington, DC 20024.\
\
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Emergency Operating Centers
Handbook, CPG1-20, 1984. Available from: FEMA, PO Box 8181, Washington,
DC 20024\
\
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Exemplary Practices in Emergency
Management: The California FIRESCOPE Program, Monograph Series No. 1,
1987. Available from: National Emergency Training Center, Emergency
Management Institute, PO Box 70742, Washington DC 20023. Further
information on FIRESCOPE can be obtained from: FIRESCOPE, Operations
Coordination Center, PO Box 55157, Riverside Calif 92517.\
\
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Using the Emergency operations
center. In: Emergency program manager: An orientation to the position,
SS-1, 1983. Available from: FEMA, PO Box 8181, Washington, DC.\
\
Quarantelli, EL: Studies in disaster response and planning, Final
Project Report 24, 1979. Available from: Disaster Research Center,
Newark, Delaware 19716, (302)451-6618\
\
State of California, Governor\'s Office of Emergency Services,
Telecommunications Division: California On-Scene Emergency Coordination
Radio Plan (CALCORD), 1986. Available from:O.E.S., Telecommunications
Div., 2800 Meadowview Rd, Sacramento, Calif 95832.\
\
Wenger D, Quarantelli EL, Dynes RR: Disaster Analysis: Emergency
Management Offices and Arrangements, Final Project Report 34, 1986.
Available from: Disaster Research Center, Newark, Del 19716, (302)
451-6618.

**Chapter 7: THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)**

by\
Robert L. Irwin\
\
\
[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-133.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-133.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-133.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-133.jpg)The
Incident Command System (ICS). (Courtesy of Fire protection
Publications.)\
\
The Incident Command System (ICS) discussed in this chapter was
developed after a series of wildland fires caused death, damage, and
destruction in southern California in 1970. Federal, state, and local
fire services involved in the fire siege recognized hundreds of problems
with their response and coordination during the fires. Most of the
problems were quite similar to those described throughout this book. The
fire services joined together in the FIRESCOPE Program to resolve those
problems. The ICS was a major product of their joint effort. ICS is a
management system, developed around specific design criteria and modern
management concepts. There are five functions in the System, designed
with a clarity that improves effectiveness, accountability and
communications. ICS uses an incident action planning process that is
systematic and comprehensive; multiple agencies and emergency response
disciplines can be integrated into a common organization using the
process. The unified command concept used in ICS provides the most
effective means of coordinating and directing multiple disciplines on
major civilian emergencies.\
\
**DEFINING THE SYSTEM**\
\
The term \"Incident Command System\" has become popular across the
United States in recent years. Hundreds of local jurisdictions and
emergency response agencies have applied the term to a nearly equal
number of organizational configurations. In many cases, the term has
simply been applied to existing, traditional emergency procedures as a
cosmetic approach to update or modernize an old way of doing things.
Other terms, such as \"incident management system\" or \"scene command\"
also abound. It is thus difficult to understand what they mean or to
determine the exact configuration of any of these \"systems\" without
some sort of definition. It is also dangerous to assume that one
\"incident command system\" is as complete, or as effective, as any
other.\
\
In this chapter, the Incident Command System (ICS) under discussion is
the version originally published by the FIRESCOPE Program (see Chapter
3) in 1982, and subsequently adopted by the National Wildfire
Coordinating Group, the National Association of State Foresters, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. A law enforcement version (LEICS)
has been adopted and certified by the California Governor\'s Commission
on Peace Officers Standards and Training (San Bernardino County, 1985).\
\
The ICS described here is \"a set of personnel, policies, procedures,
facilities, and equipment, integrated into a common organizational
structure designed to improve emergency response operations of all types
and complexities.\"\
\
**ICS ORIGIN**\
\
In the fall of 1970, a series of devastating wildfires roared across
southern California, burning over 600,000 acres and 772 structures in 13
days. Sixteen lives were lost during the period as a direct result of
the fires. Thirteen of the largest fires were burning on federal,
county, and city jurisdictions simultaneously.\
\
California fire services had never faced such an immense challenge, and
while many good works were accomplished during the disaster, it was
clear to all involved that serious problems existed. Those problems were
analyzed and documented in 1971 in an effort funded by Congress, led by
the United States Forest Service, and supported by the state, county,
and city fire departments that were involved.\
\
The analysis identified hundreds of individual and specific examples of
organizational weaknesses that were symptomatic of six major problem
areas. It is informative to recognize that these problem areas were
almost the same as those described throughout this book. They were:

-   *Lack of a common organization.* More than 100 federal, state, and
    local agencies took part in the suppression efforts. There were at
    least a dozen different organizational structures in use, and these
    were frequently modified to meet contingencies. Terminologies (for
    position titles, equipment, facilities, and actions) were different
    for urban and wildland organizations, and at the local level even
    urban fire departments used different terms for the same items.

-   *Poor on-scene and inter-agency communications.* Most of the 1970
    radios were of single-frequency capability; scanners were rare; and
    federal, state, and local forces were operating in different
    frequency bands. On-scene supervisors could not contact subordinate
    units and frequently could not talk to those in command. Suppression
    units were essentially \"on their own\" and had to take independent
    actions that were not necessarily coordinated or effective. There
    were several cases where messages intended for units on one fire
    were received by units on a different fire, creating mass confusion.
    Agency dispatch centers could not communicate with each other, and
    major strategical events were not reported from agency to agency.

-   *Inadequate joint planning.* Each involved agency did its own
    planning at is own chosen location. Forces were assigned on a
    unilateral basis, logistical support needs were ordered without
    knowledge of what other agencies already had available, and
    communications (as noted) were completely independent. On many of
    the fires there were separate and distinctly different strategic
    objectives created by different jurisdictions, at different times,
    and in different places. This resulted in diffusion of effort,
    safety problems, and failure to efficiently manage the incidents.

-   *Lack of valid and timely intelligence.* None of the various
    organizational structures included elements charged with the
    specific duties of data and intelligence gathering. Information
    about incident character, size, and intensity were provided to
    decision-makers on a random and haphazard basis. No one had the
    defined responsibility to compile a comprehensive status report for
    any single incident, and obviously there was no means of analyzing
    the situations on the multiple fires. Much of the information upon
    which plans were made was 12- to 24-hours old, and forces were often
    dispatched to areas that needed no action. Other forces were not
    dispatched to critically important sectors.

-   *Inadequate resource management. As* the combined consequence of all
    of the preceding weaknesses, resources were poorly managed. There
    were numerous examples of federal fire equipment heading one way
    \"Code 3\" (red lights and siren), passing state or local equipment
    going Code 3 the other way on the same road. Crews, engines,
    bulldozers, and other resources were lost, sometimes for days; no
    one knew where they were, and their potential effective-ness was
    lost. Some fires were overstaffed while others had no resources at
    all.

-   *Limited prediction capability.* Since these fires occurred under
    extreme fire weather conditions and with the compounding challenges
    of both wildland and urban structural suppression, the expertise to
    predict future conditions (even 1 hour in advance) was lacking. No
    one knew where the fires were going, how many homes might be
    threatened, how many people should be evacuated, or where they might
    go if they were ordered to leave.

Examination of the analysis made it clear that there was need for
inter-agency standardization and commonality, supported by modem
technologies, if fire service performance was to improve. This led to
the \"design criteria\" statement for a new system.\
\
**ICS DESIGN CRITERIA**\
\
The design criteria were developed before significant work began on
developing the new system. This was done to assure that whatever the
exact configuration of this new organization would be, it would be
compatible with all of the requirements of a major emergency management
system. The design criteria addressed a set of guidelines that included
standard multi-agency organization, terminology, operating procedures,
and communications integration. There were seven requirements placed on
the design of the system:

-   It must provide for effective operations at three levels of incident
    character: 1) single jurisdiction and/or single agency; 2) single
    jurisdiction with multiple agency support; and 3)
    multi-jurisdictional. and/or multi-agency support.

-   The organizational structure must be adaptable to a wide variety of
    emergencies (i.e., fire, flood, earthquake, rescue).

-   It must be readily adaptable to new technologies that may become
    available to support emergency response and management.

-   It must be able to expand from the organizational requirements of
    simple, daily incidents up to the needs of a major emergency.

-   It must have basic common elements in organization, terminology, and
    procedures.

-   Implementation of the system should have the least possible
    disruption to existing agency procedures.

-   It must be simple enough to assure rapid proficiency of new users
    and to ensure low operational maintenance costs.

**MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS AND SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS**\
\
The fire services participating in the developmental effort (United
States Forest Service; California Department of Forestry; California
Office of Emergency Services; Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and Ventura
County Fire Departments; and Los Angeles City Fire Department) provided
representatives who, collectively, had hundreds of years of emergency
management experience. These people were practical, and familiar With
all of the problems inherent in disaster response. They were all aware
of \"Murphy\'s Law\" (\"If anything can go wrong, it will go wrong.\"),
and they wanted to keep Murphy away from the Incident Command System.\
\
The fire services wanted to be sure the ICS was designed so that each
agency would retain control over its own legal and fiscal
responsibilities, agency roles, and organizational procedures. They
wanted a system that would work well even with the participation of
inherently different agencies and agencies from different levels of
government (city, county, regional, state, and federal). Also desirable
was a method for providing the best information management and
maintaining order and effectiveness under crisis conditions. These needs
led to yet another set of concepts and characteristics.\
\
**Concepts**\
***Agency Autonomy***\
Throughout ICS, procedures are designed to protect agency (or
jurisdictional) autonomy. The Unified Command concept was designed to
encourage the close working relationship of diverse agencies while at
the same time preventing \"power plays\" or \"take overs\" by larger or
more assertive members. The system recognizes the legal and fiscal
authorities of both primary and supporting organizations.\
\
***Management by Objectives (MBO)***\
The classic interpretation of MBO (Kast, 1974:171) is incorporated in
the ICS planning process. The objectives set by Command must be \"real\"
in the sense that subordinate positions agree that the objectives can be
met. Command is required to adjust any objectives that subordinates
state they cannot accomplish. This assures that plans are realistic and
that Command is clearly aware of organizational limitations. It also
increases the commitment of subordinate positions because those who help
to design their own assignments have a greater motivation to reach
objectives.\
\
***Unit Integrity***\
The organization is designed to keep people from the same agencies and
emergency management disciplines together (i.e., police are not
organizationally mixed with fire personnel; fire people are not assigned
to public works). This concept improves the safety of the responders,
makes it easier to keep accurate time records, and simplifies
communication throughout the organization.\
\
***Functional Clarity***\
Each part of the organization is designed so that its members can
concentrate on a primary assignment and not be unnecessarily distracted
by other responsibilities. For example, the Operations Section does not
have to be concerned with feeding, fixing flat tires, or obtaining
special clothing. Units in the Logistics Section are activated to serve
these and other needs so that Operations can put full energy into the
basic assignment.\
\
\
**Characteristics**\
***Effective Span-of-Control***\
Organizational supervisory positions are designed to provide
supervisor-sub-ordinate ratios that meet modern management practice. The
general rule is five subordinate units per supervisory position,
although allowance is made to vary this ratio under special
circumstances. If tasks are relatively simple or routine, taking place
in a small area, communications are good, and the incident character is
reasonably stable, then one supervisor may oversee up to eight
subordinate units. Conversely, if the tasks are demanding, taking place
over a large area, and incident character is changing, then the span of
control might be reduced to one supervisor per two or three
subordinates. ICS is designed to provide the most efficient leadership
possible under crisis conditions.\
\
***\"Modular\" Organization***\
The organization can be increased as an incident escalates in
complexity, and it can be decreased as the incident comes under control.
Following span-of-control guidance, an Incident Commander may respond
initially with only a few units. As the incident grows, Command can add
specific positions with specific assignments. Sections, Branches,
Divisions, Groups, and Units (de-fined below) can be added. The complete
(and rarely activated) organization will provide direction and control
over 5,200 personnel. As the incident de-escalates, the organization can
be reduced in a systematic manner, relieving those elements that are no
longer needed. If appropriate, a demobilization unit can be staffed to
assure prompt release of unneeded resources. Thus, ICS provides a means
of adding and subtracting resources in the most cost-effective and
leadership-efficient manner.\
\
***Common Terminology***\
There are several categories of \"common\" terminology:\
\
**Organizational positions.**\
Each position has a specific title (Incident Commander, Planning Section
Chief, Branch Director, Division Supervisor). Although there are some
necessary differences between the \"fire\" (ICS) and the \"law
enforcement\" (LEICS) versions, the basic organizational structure is
the same, For instance, the fire version has Section Chiefs while LEICS
titles those positions Section Officer-in-Charge, or OIC. LEICS has
\"Armorers,\" \"K-9 Units,\" and \"SWAT Teams,\"while ICS has \"Strike
Teams,\" and \"Air Attack\" positions not in LEICS. The medical
applications of ICS have introduced \"Medical Supervisor,\" \"Triage
Leader,\" and \"EMS Staging Manager. Each of these differences is
justified by the requirements of the particular discipline (fire, law,
or medical). The differences, however, still follow a standard hierarchy
(see Table 7-1). Adherence to the hierarchical terminology, even though
some special terms are needed, is what enables personnel from separate
agencies or disciplines to understand and utilize ICS on multi-agency
incidents.\
\
**Resource elements.**\
Both ICS and LEICS define specific resources. ICS defines 16 \"primary\"
resources (engines, bulldozers, helicopters) and 13 \"support\" or
secondary resources (breathing apparatus, mobile mechanic, utility
transport). LEICS defines 39 kinds of resources (SWAT team, light rescue
team, coroner, patrol vehicle).\
\
Defining the title and capability of specific resources, and having
those definitions used throughout any particular discipline, has several
advantages. First, resources can be ordered and managed to meet specific
tasks; second, both the ordering and the sending parties know exactly
what is needed; and third, the grouping of some resources into \"teams\"
or \"task forces\" allows simplified resource accounting (see
\"Comprehensive Resource Management,\" below).\
\
Defining resource elements and using those definitions throughout a
jurisdiction or emergency response discipline is one important way to
overcome the recurrent problem of incident managers ordering
\"everything you\'ve got.\"\
\
**Facilities.**\
Common terms are used to identify the facilities used at an incident,
and each facility has a defined function. For instance, the Incident
Command Post (ICP) is the location where Command functions are carried
out.\
\
**Table 7-1**. Standard Organizational Positions\
\
LEVEL TITLE\
\
Command Commander\
Command Staff Officer\
Section Chief/OIC\
Branch Director\
Division/Group Supervisor\
Unit Leader/Manager\
\
\
The Incident Base is where personnel eat, sleep, and receive other care.
The two facilities are not interchangeable in terms of function. Having
common facility definitions and functions is another means of
communicating and avoiding confusion; when personnel understand these
functions and terms, they know where to go and what they will find at a
given facility.\
\
***Integrated communications.***\
\
ICS/LEICS have a systematic process for making the best possible
integration of available communications. Two standard forms, the \"Radio
Requirements Worksheet\" and the \"Radio Frequency Assignment Sheet\"
(see Appendix C) provide means to identify all available radio resources
on the incident (mobiles, relays, base stations, and portables). These
radio resources are then assigned to Command, Tactical, Support,
Air-to-Air, and Air-to-Ground functions. These assignments abide by the
unit integrity, agency autonomy, and functional clarity concepts of ICS,
so no agency\'s radios are assigned to others without Command approval.
The radio resources data are noted in Division Assignment Sheets and
included in the Incident Action Plan (see Appendix C), so that all
personnel on the incident have instructions on the available nets.\
\
***Comprehensive resource management.***\
\
ICS resource management procedures are designed to overcome the typical
problems of too few, too many, lost, or mismanaged response forces. As
with all other parts of the system, the resource management procedures
are interrelated and compatible with the design criteria and management
concepts.\
\
Specific responsibility for resource status-keeping is assigned to the
Resource Status Unit (\"Restat\") in the Planning Section. Restat is
responsible for staffing \"check-in\" locations where all incoming
resources fill out a check-in form (Appendix C). Data on resource status
are continually updated, reported to Command, and used throughout the
planning process.\
\
Resources are managed either as single resources, task forces, or teams.
The process simplifies status keeping and reduces span-of-control
problems. Resources are monitored by three different status
conditions: 1) \"Assigned\"-performing an active assignment; 2)
\"Available\"-ready for immediate assignment; or 3)
\"Out-of-Service\"-not ready for assignment. Status changes, major
changes in location, and other data are recorded by a standard process
that provides both Command and Planning with nearly real-time management
information.\
\
Two other extremely important components of ICS, the Unified Command
concept and the Incident Action Planning Process, are discussed in
detail later in this chapter.\
\
\
\
**OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM**\
\
There are 36 basic positions in the complete ICS organization (Fig.
7-1). The Command, Branch Director, Division Supervisor, Task Force
Leader, Team Leader, and some other positions may be duplicated
(following span-of-control guidelines) if necessary to expand the
organization. With all positions filled,

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-133.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-133.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-133.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-133.jpg)**Figure
7-1.** Incident organization chart.\
\
\
\
ICS can manage up to 5,200 people. It is rare that they all win be
activated; only a major and very complex incident would require the full
organization.\
\
A basic rule of the organization is that the duties of any position not
filled will be assumed by the next higher position. Thus, for moderately
complex incidents where only perhaps one-third of the positions are
activated, the complete range of duties and responsibilities would still
be assigned to a specific person. For instance, if Command decides not
to activate the Finance or Logistics sections, then Command must still
be responsible for these functions. Or, if the Logistics Section Chief
(or OIC) has only a moderate workload, a decision not to activate the
Service and Support Branch Director positions may be made. In such case,
the Logistics Section Chief/OIC would assume the duties of the positions
not filled. This basic rule of delegation increases accountability and
tends to encourage a stronger managerial perspective from Command and an
Section Chiefs. The 36 positions are arranged to perform five functions:
Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance.\
\
**Command**\
Command responsibilities are **executive** in nature (see Fig. 7-2).
They are designed to develop, direct, and maintain a viable organization
and to keep that organization coordinated with other agencies, elected
officials, and the public. Command responsibilities include:

-   organizing to meet the needs of the incident,

-   establishing incident control objectives,

-   setting priorities for work accomplishment,

-   assuring development of Command-approved Action Plans,

-   approval of resource orders and releases,

-   approval of public information outputs, and

-   coordination with public officials and other agencies.

A key point about the command function is that the executive
responsibilities cannot be ignored. Even though there may be only five
or six responders on an incident and the Incident Commander may be quite
involved in the actual \"doing\" work, the command function requires
attention to organizing and managing.\
\
The Incident Commander is supported by a Public Information Officer\',\`
Safety Officer, and a Liaison Officer as needed. These positions report
directly to Command and assist in fulfilling the duties of coordination
with others and the overall safety of the organization\'s members.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-144.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-144.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-144.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-144.jpg)**Figure
7-2.** Command section.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-145.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-145.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-145.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-145.jpg)**Figure
7-3.** Operations section\
\
**Operations**\
The Operations Section responsibilities are of line nature (see Fig.
7-3). Operations is the \"doer\" in the organization, where the real
work of incident control is accomplished. Operations is charged with
carrying out Command direction. Responsibilities include:

-   achieving command objectives,

-   directing tactical operations,

-   participating in the planning process,

-   modifying Action Plans to meet contingencies

-   providing intelligence to Planning and Command,

-   maintaining discipline and accountability

The most important observation that can be made about the disaster
management failures documented in this book is that most disaster
response organizations start and stop with the \"doing\" work. Earlier
examples cite numerous instances where overall management has not been
maintained, and only massive \"doing\" chores constitute the emergency
actions. In ICS, the Operations Section activities-while certainly
important-are integrated into a total managed System, and not a means
unto themselves to the exclusion of all other chores that must be done.\
\
**Planning**\
Planning Section responsibilities are of **staff** nature (see Fig.
7-4). They are support of Command and Operations, and designed to
provide past, present, and future information about the incident. This
information includes both resource and situation status on a real-time
basis. Responsibilities include:

-   maintaining accurate resource status,

-   gathering and analyzing situation data,

-   providing displays of situation status,

-   estimating future probabilities,

-   preparing alternative strategies,

-   conducting planning meetings, and

-   compiling and distributing approved Action Plans.

The Planning Section includes a position for \"Technical Specialists.\"
The position(s) may be filled by any qualified advisor(s) to provide
Planning with technical data that are critical to incident management.
In a flood situation, for instance, it may be necessary to consider
public health and sanitation issues. A public health officer could be
assigned as a Technical Specialist to provide professional advice. In
the case of a building collapse, a construction engineer or the local
building permit inspector might be used to advise Planning. The purpose
of the position is to assure that plans are complete and realistic,
regardless of the nature of the problem.\
\
**Logistics**\
Logistics Section responsibilities are also of **staff** nature (see
Fig. 7-5). Logistics provides all of the personnel, equipment, and
services required to manage the incident. Following the \"functional
clarity\" concept of ICS, Logistics is responsible for two subfunctions:
Service and Support.

-   *The Service Branch is* responsible for those tasks that \"keep the
    organization going,\" such as communications, food services, and
    medical care for the incident (not public) personnel.

-   *The Support Branch* assures that all parts of the organization can
    function; they provide adequate facilities, obtain supplies and
    resources, and service equipment.

It is important to note that once human, technical, and mechanical
resources are obtained by Logistics, the management of those resources
is turned over to Planning and Operations.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-147.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-147.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-147.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-147.jpg)**Figure
7-4.** Planning section.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-148.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-148.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-148.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-148.jpg)**Figure
7-5.** Logistics section.\
\
\
**Finance**\
Finance is also a **staff** function (see Fig. 7-6). The Section is
responsible for financial management and accountability on the incident.
In keeping with the functional clarity concept, Finance authorizes
expenditures in accordance with agency policies, but does not actually
order or purchase anything. The Logistics Section obtains all needs
after approval by Finance.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-149.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-149.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/\$file/p-149.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/3B82E5382F2E69CD0A25691A0067FCC7/$file/p-149.jpg)**Figure
7-6.** Finance section.\
\
Finance uses the Incident Action Planning process, the resource-status
tracking, and the Logistics acquisition records to accomplish its
accounting tasks. In addition to incident record keeping, the Section
performs four other critical functions:

-   *Disaster Relief Records* are used to coordinate with state and
    federal (FEMA) representatives and to assure that cost and damage
    re-cords are prepared in proper format to assure reimbursement of
    private and public costs.

-   *Contracting is* arranged with vendors for all services not
    available through involved agencies. This function assures legal
    preparation of contracts, sets cost rates, inspects equipment both
    before and after use, keeps use time on equipment and other
    contracted services (e.g., food caterers, portable toilets) and
    assures that services are delivered appropriately.

-   *Agreements with other Agencies* are necessary during complex,
    multi-agency incidents when it is frequently quite cost-effective to
    share, or trade, resources. The classic example of this is in
    wildland fire suppression where one involved agency may have
    aircraft but lacks some kind of other resource, and one or more
    other agencies have specialized ground resources, but not aircraft.
    In these cases (and they happen frequently) the agencies\' Finance
    Section Chiefs will agree that the aircraft use during the entire
    incident will be paid by the \"owning\" agency, and the specialized
    resources will also be used without regard to jurisdictional
    boundaries, and paid by the other agencies. Such agreements are also
    applicable to flood, hazardous materials, earthquake, and other
    types of incidents.

-   *Injury and Damage Documentation is* prepared by the Compensation or
    Claims Unit, responsible for prompt recording of all injuries to
    incident personnel. This duty may be expanded to include civilian
    victims of the incident if the Incident Commander so directs. The
    unit is also charged with preliminary documentation and
    investigation of events that may lead to claims against any of the
    responding agencies. Such events might include damage to private
    property, personal injury, or any other kind of loss that could be
    construed to be a result of incident management activity.
    Documenting events when they occur, instead of weeks or months
    later, is a major task of the Finance Section.

In both ICS and LEICS, there are two checklists for the supervisory and
subordinate positions of each of the five functional areas. There are
general checklists showing the tasks all positions are accountable for
on all incidents, and a specific checklist for detailing performance of
each individual position. The checklists and other information about the
system are included in pocket-sized \"Field Operations Guides\" (State
of California, 1982) that can be provided to emergency response
personnel as training tools and as reminders or references during actual
incidents.\
\
**THE INCIDENT ACTION PLANNING PROCESS**\
\
Every emergency incident, no matter how small, requires some form of
planning to control the problem. Better planning results in more
effective and efficient response activities. ICS (and LEICS) use a
planning process that meets the design criteria of \"expansibility\"
from simple, daily activities up to the demands of a major emergency. It
has been carefully designed to accomplish rapid, yet complete, planning
for even the most complex of incidents.\
\
For simple, routine incidents the process will be accomplished
intuitively by the Incident Commander (the first arriving officer or
supervisor). Even for the massive emergency where written Incident
Action Plans should be prepared for every shift, the initial Incident
Commander will probably start with an intuitive plan. However, ICS
emphasizes that the mental and verbal procedures used in the early
crisis should be rapidly replaced by the more formal and systematic
planning process. Learning the formal process sets a mental pattern that
allows for more complete application of the principles when intuitive
planning is necessary.\
\
**Management-by-Objectives Framework**\
The Incident Action Planning process is derived from classic Management
by Objectives (MBO) concepts below (Kast, 1974:171).

-   Policy, objectives, and priorities are set by Command (the executive
    function).

-   The organization required to meet the objectives is designed by
    Operations and Planning (the line and staff functions).

-   Support and service needs, including communications requirements,
    are identified by Logistics (also a staff function).

-   Financial abilities and constraints are considered. (This may be
    done by an activated Finance position, or reserved by Command.)

-   A \"reality-checking\" review of the initial work is carried out. AD
    participants in the process examine the tentative plan for
    completeness, feasibility, and capability to meet objectives.
    Results of the review are used to revise or strengthen the plan.

**Forms Aid the Process**\
The experienced emergency responders who developed ICS spent over a year
designing the forms that are used in the planning process. Their work
was focused on preparing documents that would: 1) follow the MBO
concept; 2) answer the questions, \"What do we need to know?\" and
\"What do we need to do?\" on complex incidents; 3) be relatively easy
to complete; and 4) be of real assistance, not just an exercise in
paperwork, for incident personnel working under crisis conditions. All
of those requirements were met.\
\
There are two types or categories of forms used in the planning process.
\"Action\" forms are those necessary to set objectives, assign the
organization, and outline the tasks to be done. These are combined into
the written Action Plan and provided to the personnel who will do the
work. \"Support and recording\" forms are the remainder. They assist
incident management by providing worksheets for systematic plan
development, assuring that data and records are available and that
resources are accounted for, integrating communications capabilities,
and documenting decisions.\
\
Many view the following list of forms and their applications as a
formidable challenge, and \"not quite worth the effort.\" That is not
really the case. Trained incident managers can complete these forms in a
very short time, even for complex incidents. The time required is
materially shortened by the \"fill in the blanks\" nature of the forms
and is materially offset many times over by the completeness of final
planning and the effectiveness the process brings to emergency
management. NOTE: All ICS forms are included in Appendix C. ICS and
LEICS use the same form numbers throughout. There are some format
differences between the two sets to accommodate the differences in
disciplinary terminology. However, actual practice has shown that either
ICS or LEICS forms may be used interchangeably because of their
essential similarity.\
\
***Action Forms***\
**Incident map (on form 201).** Page 1 of Form 201 is used for a sketch
map of the incident if no better document is available. This is
particularly valuable during the early stages of an incident to record
situations, clarify thinking and communications about locations (for
actions or problems), and to focus attention on overall objectives. This
form can also be used to describe travel routes for resources (a
\"traffic plan\") and locations of special facilities such as casualty
collection points or evacuation centers. More sophisticated maps should
be used for detailed planning if they are available. Pages 2, 3, and 4
of Form 201 are used to provide documentation on simple incidents and as
a briefing format for succeeding Incident Commanders and other overhead
personnel if the incident escalates.\
\
Incident objectives (form 202). Form 202 is the key to effective action.
It is the initiator of the planning and control process and the place
where Command begins to form and direct the organization. The form
allows Command to describe all desired objectives and priorities.\
\
**Organization assignment list (form 203 or 207).** Form 203 (or Form
207) shows who has been assigned on the incident. It shows who\'s in
charge and details reporting relationships. It also serves as a
sequential record of the resources available by time period.\
\
**Division assignment list (form 204).** Form 204 provides detailed
instructions for incident personnel. Information on the form specifies
resources assigned, their configuration, and who does what. It is the
place where actual tasks necessary to meet Command objectives are
described, and may be used to further define priorities. Completed forms
assist the \"reality checking\" phase of MBO by making span-of-control
and communications decisions visible. They also assist in this regard by
forcing another examination of available capabilities compared to
objectives.\
\
Completed forms are distributed as part of the Action Plan. All
Sections, all Branch Directors, and all Division Supervisors have forms
showing the re-sources under their direction, and the tasks assigned to
those resources.\
\
**Communications plan (form 205)**. Form 205 is one of the major tools
that can bring order out of chaos on complex incidents. Its preparation
and use improves multi-agency communications regardless of the types or
capabilities of the involved radio systems. Preparation of the 205 is
facilitated by completion of Form 216, described below.\
\
**Medical plan (form 206)**. Form 206 is primarily intended to serve
incident personnel. However, on incidents where medical assistance to
the public is required, the form can serve \"double duty\" as an
attachment to Medical Division Assignment Sheets. Conversely, in the
case of a major multi-casualty incident, one of the Medical Divisions
could be assigned the additional duty of caring for incident personnel,
using the information from a Form 206 prepared for that purpose.\
\
**Organizational chart (form 207).** Form 207 provides a more visually
detailed picture of the organization. It can be used in place of Form
203 (the organizational assignment list).\
\
***Support and Recording Forms***\
\
**Incident status summary (form 209).** Form 209 provides a summary of
current status. The form serves Command as an overview of the incident
and may be used to forward details to local, state, and federal agencies
interested in incident details and control progress. It may also be
used(along with the entire Action Plan) as a briefing document for the
media and elected officials.\
\
**Check-in list (form 211).** Form 211 is a basic tool for Planning,
Finance, and Logistics Sections. It provides data on all authorized
resources on the incident and can be used very effectively to weed out
those forces or persons who have simply gravitated to the incident
because of its magnitude or notoriety. Item 5 on the form
(\"Order/Request Number\") serves as an indicator of legitimacy: if the
resource has been requested by Command there will be some kind of record
of that request; if the resource is a voluntary response, this form will
define it as such.\
\
**Unit log (form 214).** Form 214 is prepared by all assigned Units,
Division Supervisors, and Branch directors. It provides a record of
actions, problems, and intelligence for future planning and a record of
past events. It also assists in maintaining accountability.\
\
**Operational planning worksheet (form 215).** Form 215 is a valuable
tool for Action Plan preparation and overall management response to any
incident. Command objectives are listed, and the resources \"required,\"
\"have,\" and \"need-to-order\" are shown. From this worksheet, and the
process of its preparation, Command, Planning, Operations, and Logistics
gain valuable management information. The reality of objectives (shown
in the \"Work Assignments\" column) may be checked against resource
availability, the total workload estimated, assignments further
clarified, and the resource deficits, if any, recognized and corrected,
if possible.\
\
\
**Radio requirements and frequency assignment worksheets (forms 216 and
21M.** Forms 216 and 217 are the initiators of Form 205 (The
Communications Plan). Block 5 of Form 217 (\"Radio Data\") may be
modified to show the radio availability from any group of agency
disciplines. Any qualified communications technician will be able to
prepare this form quickly, given a general familiarity with agencies
involved in even the most complex incidents. This information is then
adapted into form 205 by the Logistics Section for use in the Action
Plan.\
\
\
**Support vehicle inventory (form 218).** Form 218 is prepared by the
Logistics Section to provide records and maintain availability
information on support and service vehicles. It is a tool for Finance
and serves Command, Planning, and Operations by showing the authorized
vehicles on the incident.\
\
**Air operations summary (form 220).** Form 220 records air operations
details. The Operations Section uses this form to manage aircraft in a
manner that provides the best possible coordination between air and
ground forces. Finance also uses the form in cost accounting.\
\
**UNIFIED COMMAND**\
**Why Unify Command?**\
More than 90% of emergencies that occur daily in the United States are
readily managed by local agencies using only their own resources. On a
small percent-age of emergencies, the responsible agency may exhaust its
own resources and call on neighboring jurisdictions for assistance. Many
agencies are experienced with these \"automatic aid\" responses and
assist each other on a routine and problem-free basis. These incidents
do not call for Unified Command and are best handled under a single
command structure.\
\
However, about 5% of all emergencies become serious enough to require
the response of several agencies, each with its own legal obligation to
perform some type of action, not just assist their neighbor. It is in
these critical, multiple\--involvement emergencies that Unified Command
is called for. Some examples:

-   *Incidents that affect more than one geographical jurisdiction.* The
    classic example is of a wildland fire starting in one Jurisdiction
    and burning into one or more others. Floods and hazardous-materials
    incidents could be similar. The incident is essentially the same
    challenge in each jurisdiction, but the political and geographic
    boundaries mandate multi-agency involvement.

-   *Incidents that affect more than one functional jurisdiction.* Major
    commercial airplane crashes are an example. The crash occurs in one
    geographical jurisdiction, but will involve fire suppression, law
    enforcement, medical response, Federal Aviation Administration,
    National Transportation Safety Board, and perhaps other agency
    response. All of these entities have different missions to perform,
    all at the same time, and all in the same place. The different
    functional roles, or statutory obligations, bring about multiple
    involvement.

-   *Incidents affecting geographical and functional jurisdictions.*
    These are typified by the Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption and the
    Three Mile Island nuclear accident. In these types of incidents,
    large numbers of federal, state, and local agencies become involved.
    The emergencies cross geographical boundaries and overlay multiple
    functional authorities.

In today\'s world, the public, private, and political values at risk in
major emergencies demand the most efficient methods of response and
management. Meeting this demand when multiple and diverse agencies are
involved becomes a very difficult task. The Unified Command concept of
ICS offers a process that all participating agencies can use to improve
overall management, whether their jurisdiction is of geographical or
functional nature (Irwin, 1980).\
\
**What is Unified Command?**\
Unified Command is the first consistent, systematic means of organizing
a variety of autonomous civilian agencies into one concerted emergency
response effort. The concept offers uniform procedures that enable all
involved agencies to perform their roles effectively. Unified Command
overcomes many inefficiencies and duplications of effort that occur when
functional and geographic jurisdictions, or agencies from different
governmental levels, have to work together without a common system.
Unified Command is deeply rooted in ICS concepts and characteristics. It
follows the same MBO planning processes, respects agency autonomy,
maintains functional clarity, and provides a common management framework
for action. The goals of the Unified Command concept are to:

-   Improve the information flow between the agencies involved.

-   Develop a single collective approach to the management of the
    incident.

-   Reduce or eliminate functional and geographical complexities.

-   Optimize the efforts of all agencies.

-   Reduce or eliminate duplications of effort.

These are practical goals. They have been achieved with relative ease on
actual incidents involving multiple fire agencies, incidents requiring
fire and law enforcement coordination, and emergencies that included
fire, law, and medical disciplines. As the ICS becomes more completely
implemented by agencies across the country, the goals will be met with
greater regularity and greater effectiveness. When that happens, many of
the consistent disaster management failures documented in this book will
begin to disappear.\
\
**ICS Characteristics Pertinent to Unified Command**\
The Incident Command System is based on commonality. The commonality is
a major departure from the traditional ways agencies have operated, and
it creates significant opportunities for improvement over old methods.
When agencies involved in a major emergency use ICS (the same
organizational structure, the same terminology, and the same management
procedures), there are few, if any, differences in operations. In
essence, they are \"one\" organization, and can be managed as such.
Instead of several command posts operating independently, the total
operation can be directed from only one location. Instead of preparing
several sets of plans (with no guarantee of coordination among them),
only one set need be prepared to inform all participants. In place of
several logistical and communications processes, only one system of
collective and integrated procedures is used.\
\
These five ICS characteristics (one organizational structure, one
Incident Command Post, one planning process, one logistics center, and
one communications framework) create a strong synergy. By meeting and
working together at one location, preparing a single plan of action, and
using other common procedures, the senior officers (Unified Commanders)
from many agencies bring their collective powers to bear on the
incident. They are able to share information, coordinate actions,
improve resource utilization, greatly improve communications, and
rapidly cope with changing incident conditions. This unified effort is
supported and reinforced by the ICS Planning Process.\
\
**The Planning Process for Unified Command**\
The planning process for Unified Command is the same as for single
Command, except that more people are involved. The process follows the
MBO sequence, uses the same worksheets and forms, and allows for both
functional and geographic response authorities to combine objectives and
actions.\
\
The process starts with documentation of each Commanders\' objectives
just as though it were a single-agency incident. These objectives may be
widely different depending on incident character, agency roles, and
other factors. It is extremely important to understand that these
separate, and perhaps diverse, objectives do not have to be forced into
a consensus package. Unified planning is not a \"committee\" process
that must somehow resolve all differences in agency objectives before
any action can take place. It is, however, a \"team\" process, and that
promotes open sharing of objectives and priorities. Through the process,
the team formulates collective (which is significantly different than
common\") directions to address the needs of the entire incident.\
\
Once collective objectives and priorities are documented, the process
continues as it would for single-agency involvement, except that all
agencies are included:

-   The organization is designed to utilize multi-agency resources
    according to all span-of-control, unit integrity, and functional
    clarity guidelines.

-   Support, services, and communications requirements are obtained and
    assigned.

-   Branch, division, and unit assignments are detailed.

-   Financial considerations are defined and agreements are documented.

-   \"Reality checking\" is accomplished by staff of all agencies.

The developed multi-agency plan is returned to the Unified Commanders
for approval. Again, it is important to understand that the individual
Commanders in the group only approve those portions of the plan that
affect their, agencies.\
\
**Unified Command Configuration**\
In addition to all of its other attributes, ICS is a common-sense
system. It is designed with a great deal of inherent flexibility. This
allows modification of the on-scene organization to meet specific
conditions, complexities, and workloads for different incidents. There
are also various ways that a Unified Command group may be formed. The
guidelines for deciding who should be in command are simple and apply at
any level of incident complexity:\
\
***Agency Role***\
Responding agencies will be filling one of two roles. They will be
either jurisdictional, with direct statutory responsibility and
authority, or they will be sup-porting agencies who have been called for
help.\
\
Only jurisdictional agencies with statutory responsibility on some part
of the incident can assign one of the Unified Commanders.\
\
***Agency Authority***\
The agencies who assign Commanders must have the authority to order,
transport, and maintain the resources necessary to meet Command
objectives. This authority is not dependent on size or budget level
since even very small agencies may participate in a Unified Command. It
is dependent upon legitimate capability to pay the bills. (In the case
of small agencies, this capability may come from state and federal
assistance, but is nevertheless the required capability.) Only agencies
with fiscal authority may assign one of the Unified Commanders.\
\
***Applicability***\
These guidelines apply equally to multi-geographical, multi-functional,
and multi-geographical-functional incidents. The guidelines can and
should be modified to meet exceptional conditions. An incident of
disaster proportions will involve state and/or federal agencies, and
officials from those government levels may be appropriate members of the
Unified Command Group.\
\
**Alternatives to Command Participation**\
There is a practical limitation on Unified Command participation. Once a
group exceeds about eight persons, the effectiveness of that group
begins to deteriorate. ICS concepts recognize this and recommend that no
more than eight people fill the Unified Command Group. During incidents
where more than eight agencies have legitimate legal and fiscal
authority, there are alternative ways to encourage total participation
without having all in command. These and other alternatives have been
used successfully on multi-agency and multi-disciplinary incidents. It
requires training and experience to make the process work effectively.
Pre-incident meetings, planning, and agreements facilitate the process.
Two of the most popular alternatives to participation in the Unified
Command Group are:\
\
***Deputy Incident Commanders***\
Agencies with limited involvement may choose to fill their commitment to
the incident with a Deputy, rather than a \"full\" Commander. This will
enable adequate input from that agency into the planning process,
protect the agency\'s autonomy, and provide significant support to the
unified effort.\
\
***Subordinate Positions***\
For smaller jurisdictions involved in a major emergency, it may be
appropriate to designate that agency\'s area or function as a Branch,
Division, or Group, and place a senior officer of the agency in charge.
The officer (now a Director or Supervisor in the organization) will be
an integral part of the unified effort and take part in the planning
process. At the same time, he is fulfilling \"at home\"
responsibilities, probably with his own forces, and serving his
jurisdiction.\
\
\
**MANAGING MEDICAL RESOURCES**\
\
The function of the Medical Unit (see Fig. 7-5) is frequently
misunderstood by persons not familiar with ICS. Medical professionals,
in particular, express concern that such an important function seems to
be placed in a subordinate role. It is important to understand that
these concerns are unfounded. The Medical Unit\'s role is to take care
of incident personnel, only. Very early in ICS development this was
called the First Aid unit, but the title and the functions required were
changed quickly to assure that incident personnel with more serious
injuries could and would have adequate medical care. The intent and
purpose of the Unit is to provide medical attention to responders that
are part of the incident organization.\
\
If an incident involves casualties that are victims of the emergency
itself, then various forms of a medical response organization can be
assigned. Medical entities will fit in any (or all) parts of the system,
depending on the character of the incident. A public health officer or
other M.D. could be the Incident Commander under some circumstances, or
might be a member of a Unified Command Group. On major multi-casualty
events, one medical representative could be the Operations Section
Chief, others could be Branch Directors or Division Supervisors. Still
other representatives could be in the Planning, Logistics, and Finance
Sections. Groups of ambulance and paramedic personnel can be designated
as Teams or Task Forces for just about any incident involving injuries.\
\
At any level of severity the ICS concepts of modular development,
functional clarity, and unit integrity will hold true for medical
applications, as they do for other types of incidents. The organization
can be increased to meet the needs of the event (see also Chapter 8, and
Fig. 8-1). Some examples include:

-   *Medical Emergency* (5 to 15 casualties): This level of severity
    could be managed by assigning a Medical Division Supervisor with a
    Triage Team, Treatment Team, and Transportation Team.

-   *Major Medical Emergency (16* to 50 casualties): In this case, the
    organization would be expanded by adding Officer and Unit Leader
    positions to assure that all required functions receive appropriate
    attention. Note that a Medical Communications Leader position is
    assigned to coordinate scene-to-hospital(s) communications.

-   *Medical Disaster* (more than 50 casualties): The organization is
    expanded further by adding additional Medical Divisions. A Medical
    Branch could be added if more than two Divisions were required. If
    there were need for more than five Divisions, a second (or third)
    Medical Branch could be established to further increase the response
    and still stay within the span-of-control guides. In such cases the
    Medical Communications Leader position could be assigned to the
    Branch Director, and reduce the number of those positions at the
    Division level.

Medical applications of ICS can bring increased effectiveness to the
discipline. As the ICS becomes more established with fire and law
enforcement agencies across the nation, the medical discipline will find
more opportunities to adopt the system.\
\
**INTEGRATING VOLUNTEER EFFORTS**\
\
It has been well established that volunteer efforts can both help and
hinder emergency response agencies. The help comes in the form of
immediate energies and work accomplishment. The hindrance comes from
unmanageable (or unknown) numbers of volunteers, poorly directed work,
and a general lack of control. All of the helping aspects of volunteer
involvement can be accentuated, and all of the hindering dynamics can be
reduced or eliminated by appropriate use of ICS.\
\
For example, the modular flexibility of ICS can incorporate volunteer
Units, Teams, Task Forces, and perhaps even Divisions. A qualified
agency Division Supervisor can easily manage up to 30 individual
volunteers, or up to a 100 if they are arranged in 20-person crews. A
Branch Director could oversee the effective work of about 500 people
under good conditions. The possibilities for integrating volunteers is
essentially unlimited, provided the agency supervision is available. A
few of those possibilities are search and rescue, sandbagging,
evacuation alerting, road construction, and firefighting. The key
element is supervision and fitting the resources into the organization.
That requires Command attention to managing the organization, and brings
us back almost full-circle to the responsibilities of the five functions
in ICS.\
\
In cases where volunteer efforts need to be managed, Command must
recognize the situation and set reasonable objectives for those efforts.
Command and Planning must develop the organization to provide
supervision and clear direction to the volunteers. Planning must also
inventory the volunteer resources through a retroactive check-in
procedure and include them in the Incident Action Plans. Logistics must
be able to service and support the re-sources and set up communications
through existing agency, or perhaps\"ham\" (radio amateur) capabilities.
The Finance Section should assure that volunteers are physically capable
of doing the assigned tasks, are paid if so directed, and are properly
compensated for any incident-related disabilities. If volunteers are
managed in this way, then the public agencies\' response efforts will be
more effective. If volunteers are not managed, then the typical problems
and inefficiencies associated with their involvement will continue.\
\
**SUMMARY**\
\
After the 1970 fires, southern California fire services recognized that
their experience included the same theme of weaknesses that are
described after most disasters. They recognized that those weaknesses
could be corrected if a systematic process for managing multiple and
diverse resources were developed. The fire services described criteria
and adopted modern management concepts that would reduce or eliminate
the problems. The resulting system, ICS, was designed to cope with the
basic causes of disaster problems. ICS provides ways to quickly perform
situation analysis and to use the analysis as a basis for realistic
planning and actions. The organization integrates multiple resources
into definitive functional efforts. It provides for direction and
management of multiple disciplines and different government levels under
crisis conditions; it improves communications; and it increases the
effectiveness of all involved. The planning process brings order out of
chaos, and the step- by-step use of helpful forms makes the process
systematic and thorough. Unified Command procedures protect agency
autonomy. Major law enforcement and medical agencies in various parts of
the nation are adopting the system without changing its basic
configuration. This testifies to the fact that ICS is no longer viewed
as a \"fire\" system and is now seen as it was intended to be-a
management system.\
\
\
**ADDITIONAL READING**\
\
Exemplary Practices in Emergency Management The California FIRESCOPE
Program\
Monograph Series No. 1, FEMA 117, 1987. Available from: Federal
Emergency Management Agency, National Emergency Training Center,
Emergency Management Institute, PO Box 70742, Washington, DC 20023.
Free.\
\
FIRESCOPE Program: System Description, Incident Command System
Operational System Description, ICS-120-1, 1981. Available from:
Operations Coordination Center, PO Box 55157, Riverside, Calif 92517. An
extensive list of FIRESCOPE and ICS publications is available from this
address.\
\
Incident Command System, 1983, Available from: Fire Protection
Publications, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078-0118,
(800) 654-4055, \$13.00.\
\
Incident Command System Operational: Basic Orientation Course Training
Package, 1982. Available from: California State Board of Fire Services,
California Fire Service Training and Educational System, 7171 Bowling
Dr, Suite 500, Sacramento, Calif 95823.\
\
Law Enforcement Incident Command System (LEICS), 1985. Available from:
Jerome Ringhofer,\
Deputy Chief, Desert and Mountain Command, San Bernardino County
Sheriffs\
Department, PO Box 569, San Bernardino, Calif 92402.\
\
Multi-Casualty Incident Operational Procedures Manual, 1986. Available
from: California Fire Chiefs Association, 825 M St, Rio Linda, Calif
95673, \$5.00.\
\
National Interagency Incident Management System: Information and Guides,
1983. Avail- able from: National Wildfire Coordinating Group,
Publications Management System, Boise Interagency Fire Center, 3905
Vista Ave, Boise, Ida 83705, Free. An extensive NIIMS publications and
forms list and prices are also available at this address.\
\
\
**WHERE TO GET INFORMATION ON ICS TRAINING**\
\
For information on ICS training, contact your local office of the U.S.
Forest Service, your state forestry agency, or:\
\
FIRESCOPE\
Operations Coordination Center\
P.O. Box 55157\
Riverside, CA 92517\
\
Director, Fire and Aviation Management\
USDA Forest Service\
PO Box 96090, Room 1001 RP-E\
Washington, DC 20090-6090\
\
U.S. Bureau of Land Management\
Director, Boise Interagency Fire Center\
Attention: Public Affairs Officer\
3905 Vista Drive\
Boise, ID 83705

Chapter 8: TRIAGE

In contrast to most routine emergencies, efficient response in disasters
requires procedures for triage and casualty distribution. (Courtesy of
California Office of Emergency Services, Sacramento, California.)\
\
One aspect of resource management that deserves special attention is the
distribution of resources for medical care. This chapter will address
the concepts of triage and how they can be applied to affect medical
resource management. The more common difficulties in disaster triage and
some suggested solutions are discussed.\
\
\
WHAT IS TRIAGE?\
\
Traditionally, triage has been called the keystone to mass casualty
management (Bowers, 1960:59). Triage comes from the French verb, trier,
which means \"to sort.\" It evolved, perhaps as early as Napoleon\'s
time, as a technique for assigning priorities for treatment of the
injured when resources were limited. The basic concept was to do the
greatest good for the greatest number of casualties. Generally,
attention is given first to those with the most urgent conditions and to
those who are the most salvageable (Rund, 19813; Silverstein, 1984:8).
The technique is considered by many to be essential for good disaster
medical care (Spirgi, 1979:25; FEMA, 1983e:108; Cowley\~ 1982; Burkle,
1984:45).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEA basic concept of triage is to do the greatest good for the
  greatest number of casualties.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Doing the greatest good for the greatest number of disaster casualties
does, however, involve more than just deciding who gets treated first.
It also requires that use of all of the available treatment resources is
maximized. That is, that the casualties are distributed rationally among
the various hospitals and other medical treatment facilities
(Silverstein, 1984:8, 44). Therefore, the definition of triage to be
used in this text includes the organized evaluation of all disaster
casualties to establish treatment and transport priorities. In addition,
it involves the process by which casualties are rationally distributed
among the available treatment facilities. Typically, management of
triage is a systems problem requiring inter-organizational coordination
and flow of information.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLETriage implies making the most efficient use of available
  resources.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

There are three major reasons why triage is beneficial in the disaster
response:

> 1\. Triage separates out those who need rapid medical care to save
> life or limb.\
> 2. By separating out the minor injuries, triage reduces the urgent
> burden on medical facilities and organizations. On average, only
> 10-15% of disaster casualties are serious enough to require over-night
> hospitalization.\
> 3. By providing for the equitable and rational distribution of
> casualties among the available hospitals, triage reduces the burden on
> each to a manageable level, often even to \"non-disaster\" levels.

TRIAGE PROBLEMS IN DISASTERS\
\
Observations in disasters have revealed problems with triage. The most
comprehensive data collected to date are those from the Disaster
Research Center obtained as part of a study of emergency medical
services (EMS) in 29 major U.S. disasters occurring in the 1970\'s
(Quarantelli, 1983; Golec, 1977). Because no similar studies have been
carried out since then, it is difficult to determine to what extent
these problems have been ameliorated by modem improvements in EMS
systems and disaster planning. However, there is evidence to suggest
that at least some of these problems continue to occur.\
\
When Disaster Research Center investigators carried out these studies,
they found an interesting discrepancy. In 55% of the cases studied,
responders claimed that triage was carried out. However, the researchers
found that the word \"triage\" was used in a loose fashion to describe
almost any handling of the victims by emergency personnel. Sometimes the
presence of uniformed medical personnel seemed to suggest to onlookers
or other responders that triage was being carried out even when it was
not. But if the term was used to describe appropriate assessment and
sorting of all casualties according to the seriousness of their
injuries, then little triage actually occurred (Quarantelli, 1983:69;
Tierney, 1977:154).\
\
Furthermore, in quite a number of disasters, casualties were not
distributed among the available hospitals in a rational or efficient
manner. Instead, the vast bulk of them ended up at the closest hospital,
while other hospitals received no casualties at all. A variant of this
pattern was where one hospital in the community was thought to give
superior emergency care to critical casualties, or where it was more
familiar to those providing the transportation. Such might be the case
if one facility was renowned as the local \"trauma center.\" In that
event, the majority of victims sometimes ended up there (a pattern also
observed in a number of previous disaster case studies) Quarantelli,
1983:73; Golec, 1977; Rosow, 1977:166; Cohen, 1982a:19; Mileti, 1975:84;
Williams, 1956:659; Neff, 1977:183).\
\
In 75% of cases studied, a majority of the casualties were sent to the
closest hospital. In 46% of the cases, more than three-fourths of the
casualties were sent to the nearest hospital. Only in about half of the
disasters did a simple majority of the hospitals in the area receive
even one casualty. The pattern is illustrated by the figures in Table
8-1.\
\
\
Table 8-1. Hospital Distribution of Disaster Casualties

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-168.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-168.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-168.jpg(Adapted
from: Quarantelli EL: Delivery of emergency medical services in
disasters: Assumptions and realities, Irvington, New York, 1983, p.
88.)\
\
Another perspective on the situation is given by Table 8-2 (Golec,
1977:171). (Note the percentage treated in one hospital). The hospitals
not receiving patients had an average of 20% of their beds vacant
Quarantelli, 1983:79).\
\
Not only did one hospital receive the largest number of casualties, but
also those most seriously injured. In one disaster, for example, 40 out
of 51 casu alties were sent to one hospital which admitted 30 of them
(28 in serious condition). The remaining 11 victims were taken to four
other area hospitals. Not one of these 11 had injuries considered
serious enough to require staying in the hospital. The pattern was
sin-War for the casualties that were dead on arrival ( Quarantelli,
1983:81). Even in those communities with only one hospital, a large
community with a number of hospitals was usually located within 15 to 30
miles (Golec, 1977:172).\
\
In considering the distribution patterns of disaster casualties, it
should be noted that the optimal pattern does not necessarily mean that
every hospital rives an equal number. In addition to hospital size and
emergency department capacity, a facility\'s ability to take care of
specialized cases (e.g., trauma) may affect the number of cases it can
effectively handle. It could be argued that a trauma victim may be able
to receive better care in a crowded trauma center than a less burdened
but also less experienced facility. However, there is a lack of data on
casualty severity versus receiving hospital capability in disasters, the
level of case rendered, or the resulting mortality or morbidity.
Therefore, the degree that overcrowding versus experience affects
patient outcome is yet to be determined.\
\
In some disasters, it has been claimed that adequate care was given,
even though hospitals received a disproportionate share of casualties
(KC Health Dept, 1981:13, 16, 19; Ross, 1982:65; Moore, 1958:28; Lewis,
1980:863). Nevertheless, reasonable balanced distribution of disaster
casualties and especially the use of all hospitals to the levels of
their capabilities, seems to be a reasonable measure of optimal medical
resource use.\
\
Despite the fact that the incidence and quality of triage has not been
subjected to rigorous study since Quarantelli\'s research in the
1970\'s, anecdotal reports from recent disasters have revealed that
under the right circumstances rather good patterns of casualty
distribution to hospitals are possible. In some cases, use has been made
of non-hospital treatment facilities for minor injuries, and casualties
have been reasonably distributed among area hospitals.\
\
Table 8-2. Distribution of Disaster
Casualties](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-168.jpg)

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-169.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-169.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-169.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-169.jpg)\[Deleted
from this table are 3 communities with only 1 hospital\]\
(Adapted from Golec JA, Gurney PJ: The problem of needs assessment in
the delivery of EMS, Mass Emergencies, 2:169-77, 1977.)\
\
\
EXAMPLE: High-rise Fire, MGM Grand Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada November 21,
1980. The disaster plan called for the use of the Convention Center as a
secondary triage and refuge center. This facility, remaining from
earlier civil defense planning, was equipped as an acute care hospital
and contained 200 beds and 100 additional cots. It was staffed primarily
by Red Cross and other volunteer staff Although it was not used as a
hospital in this disaster, 1,700 minimally injured and displaced
per-sons out of the 6,000 hotel guests were triaged to the center, many
of these by bus. Of 769 injured survivors, 150 received treatment by
medical teams at that location. Others were transported for treatment to
the following facilities:

-   Southern Nevada Hospital-104

-   Desert Springs Hospital-161

-   Sunrise Hospital-211

-   Valley Hospital-143 (Buerk, 1982:641; Morris, 1981:20).

EXAMPLE: DC-9 Airline Crash, Stapleton International Air-port, Denver,
Colorado, November 16, 1987. Nine of the area hospitals usually accept
emergency ambulance patients on a daily basis. In this disaster, 10
hospitals received the following numbers of the 56 injured survivors and
5 injured rescuers:

-   Denver General Hospital (a level I trauma center)-3 immediate, 24
    minor;

-   University Hospital (a level I trauma center)-6 immediate, 2 minor;

-   St. Anthony, Central (a level I trauma center)-3 critical, 1
    delayed, 2 minor;

-   Swedish Hospital (a level II trauma center)-l immediate, 1 delayed,
    1 minor;

-   Presbyterian Aurora Hospital-2 delayed;

-   St. Joseph Hospital-1 immediate, 1 delayed, 3 minor;

-   St. Luke Hospital-2 delayed;

-   Porter Memorial Hospital-1 delayed, 2 minor;

-   Fitzimons Army Hospital-1 delayed, 1 minor;

-   Rose Medical Center-2 delayed, 1 minor (Dinerman, 1988).

It should be noted, however, that in each one of these cases, the
disaster covered a rather small geographic area. Adequate triage and
casualty distribution is more difficult to achieve in disasters such as
tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, that cause injury and
destruction over a wide area.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEGood casualty distribution is particularly difficult to
  achieve in \"diffuse\" disasters, such as earthquakes and tornadoes,
  that cover large geographic areas.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

As shown in Table 8-3, observations in a number of cases reveal that
communities did not take full advantage of all their available hospital
resources in disasters.\
\
Table 8-3. Distribution of Casualties

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-171.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-171.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-171.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-171.jpg)\
[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-172.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-172.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-172.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-172.jpg)\
CAUSES OF TRIAGE PROBLEMS\
\
Responders from Outside the Local EMS System\
Non-ambulance Transport of Casualties\
One of the difficulties that faces emergency medical services (EMS)
systems trying to carry out triage is that many injured casualties reach
the hospital outside the EMS system Quarantelli, 1983:63,70; Tierney,
1977:155; Mileti, 1975:84; Golec, 1977:175; Seismic Safety Comm,
1983:83; Scanlon, 1988:6). Table 8-4 indicates the means of arrival of
the first casualties at 75 hospitals where the method of transport could
be determined.\
\
Table 8-4. Means of Initial Disaster Casualty Arrival at the Hospital

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-173.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-173.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-173.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-173.jpg)(Adapted
from: Quarantelli EL: Delivery of emergency medical service disasters:
Assumptions and realities, Irvington, New York, 1983, p. 70\'.)\
\
While these figures indicate the mode of arrival of the initial
casualties, overall, less than half arrived by properly equipped
ambulance or rescue vehicle. The researchers noted a strong tendency for
police officers to load victims into whatever vehicles were handy and
send them off to the hospital. In one disaster, for example, police
loaded 26 injured persons into three non-ambulance vehicles, and these
were the first to arrive at the hospital (Quaran-telli, 1983:70).\
\
Some disaster plans call for a delay in evacuation of victims from the
scene. This is so they can be triaged for orderly and rational field
stabilization and transport. Other plans call for the use of field
first-aid stations to alleviate the burden on hospitals. However, these
plans do not always take into consideration the perceptions and
motivations of the victims or the public, which may be different from
those of the planners. Failure to do so results in plans which may look
good on paper, but which do not correspond to reality.\
\
Often the public\'s perception of good emergency medical care is
transportation to the hospital as quickly as possible (Drabek, 1968:148;
Quarantelli, 1983:72, 110; Quarantelli, 1970a:383; Wright, 1976:27). If
medical care and transportation are not furnished promptly by official
emergency organizations, victims do not usually sit idly by and await
its arrival. Instead, they get themselves to the hospital by the most
expedient means available. Often, they will go to the nearest hospital,
the one with which they are most familiar, or the one in which they have
the greatest trust. Field disaster first-aid stations are often
bypassed, either because their location is unknown, or because for many
people \"first aid\" is seen as an inferior level of medical care. This
pattern has been noted most particularly in diffuse, widespread
disasters such as tornadoes and earthquakes (Wright, 1976:27;
Quarantelli, 1970a:384; Dynes, 1974:30; Quarantelli, 1983:21,64; Raker,
1956:23; Drabek, 1986:139,170; Adams, 1981b:17,30,57; Worth, 1977:161).\
\
\
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. Only 7 of the 38
casualties arriving at the Coalinga District Hospital in the first hour
came by ambulance. The rest came by private car or on foot. The most
seriously injured victim arrived in the vehicle of a local physician.
Another local doctor, who was responsible for the city\'s disaster
medical response, established triage site in the devastated downtown
area. All patients from the downtown area, however, went directly to the
hospital, bypassing the triage site (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:83;
Kallsen, 1983:25).\
\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, July 31, 1987. Out of more
than 300 injured victims, 30% were transported to the hospital by a
family member, 20% were taken by a stranger, 18% arrived by bus, and 16%
were conveyed by ambulance (Scanlon, 1988).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  OBSERVATIONThe distribution of disaster casualties is complicated by
  the tendency for the victims to get themselves to the nearest hospital
  or the one with which they are most familiar and in which they have the
  most trust.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

This rapid transport to nearby hospitals by non-ambulance vehicles
contributes to two problems seen frequently in disaster situations: 1)
Casualties with relatively minor injuries arrive (often unannounced)
before those with serious conditions. The result is that when the more
serious victims arrive, the hospital emergency department is already
inundated and its beds occupied. 2) Casualties arrive at the hospital
without having been triaged or having received stabilizing first aid
Quarantelli, 1983:73).\
\
Involvement of Non-local Responders\
Another factor that has contributed to the lack of organized triage and
casualty distribution has been the number of responders from non-local
organizations and those not under control of the local EMS system. This
has been true especially in larger disasters and those occurring in
urban areas (Quarantelli \' 1983:68,71; Morris, 1982a:65; Seismic Safety
Comm, 1983:81,86. The increased use of helicopters for medical transport
seems to contributed to this trend (seismic safety comm, 1983:81,86;
Quarantelli, 1983:70).\
\
EXAMPLE: Kansas City Hyatt Hotel Skywalk collapse. The City Health
Department post-disaster review noted that coordination was never
established over patients transported by a helicopter operated by one of
the local hospitals. The crew reportedly failed to coordinate with those
directing scene activities, including the ambulance dispatcher, the
triage officer, or the site communications officer (KC Health Dept,
1981:7).\
\
Effects of Search and Rescue Activities\
The manner in which search and rescue activities are carried out has an
important influence on triage. Search and rescue often becomes the
initial contact point with the disaster victims. Therefore, those
carrying out this activity generally influence how the disaster
casualties enter the EMS system. When search and rescue operations are
confused and uncoordinated, the flow of casualties into the EMS system
tends to develop the same characteristics (Quarantelli, 1983:63,67).\
\
Search and rescue is not always coordinated or carried out with
significant input by those having emergency medical expertise
(Quarantelli, 1983:66). In part, this is due to the large amount of
search and rescue that is carried out by unofficial civilian volunteers,
often family members and neighbors (Drabek,
1981:xviii,38,53,68,87,97,111,119). It is also due to the ambiguity
regarding who has the overall responsibility to coordinate search and
rescue operations (Quarantelli, 1983:67; Drabek, 1981:xx,35,240; Wenger,
1986:32).\
\
Lack of Inter-organizational Planning\
In many disasters, the flow of disaster casualties into the EMS system
has not occurred according to any formal, predesignated plan. In the
1970\'s, the Disaster Research Center found casualty flow occurring
according to plan in only about half the cases they studied. In part,
this occurred because many communities did not have a realistic
inter-organizational plan for disaster EMS. This was the case in over
66% of the localities studied. Furthermore, even when plans existed,
they were often limited in scope, dealing with only a single
jurisdiction, or calling for the coordination of only 2 or 3 of the
community\'s emergency agencies. In only about 25% of the cases studied
was there anything resembling a region-wide plan (Quarantelli,
1983:71,86,101,103,106). Although there have been improvements in
disaster planning since the 1970\'s, difficulties continue to be seen
(Wenger, 1986:ii).\
\
Even when plans for triage exist, they may be \"paper plans.\" That is,
they are either unrehearsed, devoid of associated training, based on
invalid assumptions, or encompass only a limited number of those who
actually participate in the disaster response (Dynes, 1981:75;
Quarantelli, 1985:7).\
\
Lack of Needs Assessment\
Efficient use of available medical resources (including hospital
facilities) re-quires an overall needs assessment to determine the
numbers, types, and severities of injuries. It is also crucial to
ascertain the availability and status (available versus in-use) of
medical resources such as field medical personnel (EMTs, paramedics,
nurses, physicians); equipment; ambulances and rescue and/or first-aid
vehicles; and hospital facilities. However, disaster response has often
evolved without consideration of the overall situation. Rather, many
individuals did what seemed rational from their own isolated
perspective. That is, they endeavored to move each disaster victim to
the closest hospital as quickly as possible. Even when triage did occur,
most often it included only an assessment of specific individual
casualties, rather than an evaluation of the. disaster as a whole
Quarantelli, 1983:111; Golec, 1977:169).\
\
When the medical aspects of situation analysis have been neglected, two
factors in particular seem to have contributed to this oversight.\
\
Lack of Medical Direction at the Scene\
In some cases, those with emergency medical training have not played a
major role in the overall direction of activities at the disaster scene.
Others likely to be directing disaster site operations may lack
familiarity with the function of emergency medical systems (EMS)
Quarantelli, 1983:66; U.S. Fire Admin, 1980:3,18,21,28,41,43).\
\
Lack of Scene-to-Hospital Communications\
Communications between the scene and area hospitals is essential for
situation analysis and casualty distribution, yet meaningful and
informative scene-to-hospital information flow (see Chapter 5) is often
neglected (Golec, 1977:174; Neff, 1977:186; Edelstein, 1982:159;
Goodwin, 1982:14). The Disaster Research Center found less than 22% of
the cases where meaningful information ex change occurred between the
disaster site and any area hospital Quarantelli, 1983:67). Even the
absence of elaborate, preplanned procedures for scene-to\--hospital
communications related to triage activities, was no guarantee that the
procedures would actually be used.\
\
EXAMPLE: in one community, the disaster plan included procedures to
prevent the overloading of any single hospital. The central
communications center had access to information on each hospital\'s bed
census and emergency department capability. The communications center
was to notify the hospitals in the event of a disaster and was to direct
patients away from overloaded hospitals. In spite of the plan, 90% of
the 140 casualties were taken to one hospital out of 17 in the
community. The remaining 15 were distributed among three other
hospitals. Furthermore, the communications center never even notified
the hospital that the disaster had occurred (Golec, 1977:172).\
\
\
IMPROVING TRIAGE\
\
Many of the general principles applicable to disaster management in
general may improve triage. Use of common terminology and the existence
of joint planning, training, and testing all contribute to effective
activity. Procedures for cooperative communications, situation
assessment, resource management, and integration of unexpected or
unfamiliar responders are all applicable to organized triage efforts.\
\
Coordination with Non-Medical Organizations\
Successful triage is dependent not only on the actions of medical (EMS)
personnel at the site, but on non-medical responders as well. Often, the
majority of casualties in disasters are initially encountered during
search and rescue efforts. Although the very first search and rescue is
usually carried out by civilians who happen to be in the impact area,
when the activity is taken over by formal emergency responders, they are
most likely to be firefighters or peace officers (Quarantelli, 1983:66).
Triage is more successful if injured casualties located by search and
rescue efforts are fed into the triage system. This requires a concerted
effort by those overseeing these two essential activities.\
\
Coordination is also important with other organizations whose activity
might affect triage. Examples are those responsible for adequate crowd
and traffic control, decontamination of those exposed to hazardous
substances, and provision of light and shelter for triage areas.\
\
Coordination with Hospitals\
Notification of Hospitals\
Functional procedures are required to designate a person whose
responsibility it is: 1) to see that all area hospitals are notified
that a disaster exists and provided with information regarding its
location, character, magnitude, and the numbers, types, and severities
of casualties to expect; 2) to continually and regularly update this
information; 3) to respond to requests from the hospitals for further
information; and 4) to indicate when the hospitals may deactivate their
disaster status.\
\
Hospital Capacity Assessment\
In order to distribute casualties rationally among area hospitals,
someone at the scene needs to be responsible for acquiring information
from the hospitals regarding their capacities and capabilities. This
information needs to be up-dated continually, because hospitals are also
likely to be receiving casualties who have gotten there by their own
means. In addition, as off-duty staff come in, the hospital may be able
to care for more patients than when the facility was initially notified.
In some communities, one of the local hospitals is designated as a
\"disaster coordination hospital,\" responsible for collecting capacity
information from the hospitals and casualty information from the scene.
This facility is then responsible for directing ambulance destinations
based on this information.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEEffective triage requires coordination among medical and
  non-medical organizations at the disaster site and between the site and
  local hospitals.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Coordination of Scene Medical Activities\
One model for the coordination of scene medical activities is that
described in the 1986 version of the California Fire Chief\'s
Association, Multi-Casualty Operational procedures (MCOP) Manual (CFCA,
1986). What follows is a brief description of the system. For more
detailed information, a copy of the manual is available from the
Association at 825 M Street, Rio Linda, CA 95673, \$6.50. The system is
designed as a medical component of the Incident Command System (ICS)
(see Chapter 7), and uses procedures and terminology consistent with
ICS. The organizational structure is diagrammed in Fig. 8-1. This
structure may be expanded to encompass multiple triage areas as
illustrated by the diagram in Fig. 8-2. Each position is provided with a
checklist of responsibilities similar to that type of checklist used for
the ICS. An example is given in Fig. 8-3. Similar checklists are
provided for all positions in the Multi-Casualty Incident Procedures
Manual.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-179a.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-179a.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-179a.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-179a.jpg)Figure
8-1. Organizational structure of triage. (Adapted from Multi-casualty
incident operations procedures manual, Rio Linda, 1986, California. Fire
Chiefs Association.)

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-179b.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-179b.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-179b.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-179b.jpg)Figure
8-2. Expanded organizational structure for multiple triage sites.

  --------------------------- -------------------------------------------
  MEDICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR    

  Definition:                 Qualified officer.

  Commanded by:               Division Supervisor, or Branch Director, or
                              Operations Chief, or Incident Commander
                              \[whichever is the lowest position that is
                              activated\].

  Subordinates:               Triage Unit Leader, Treatment Unit Leader,
                              Medical Transportation Unit Leader, Medical
                              Supply Manager, Morgue Manager.

  Function:                   Establish, command, and control the
                              activities within a Medical Group\
                              in order to assure the best possible
                              emergency medical care to patients during a
                              multi-casualty incident.

  Duties:                     1\. Establish and supervise a Medical Group
                              at a level of personnel and other resources
                              sufficient to handle the magnitude of the
                              incident.\
                              2. Delineate officers and designate patient
                              control area locations as appropriate.
                              Isolate minor treatment and morgue areas.\
                              3. Ensure law enforcement/coroner
                              involvement as necessary.\
                              4. Ensure activation of hospital alert
                              system.\
                              5. Request Hospital Emergency Response
                              Teams through the hospital alert system as
                              necessary to provide medical assistance.\
                              6. Determine amount and types of additional
                              medical resources and supplies, e.g.,
                              Medical Strike Teams, Medical Task Forces,
                              medical caches, ambulances, helicopters,
                              and other methods of patient
                              transportation.\
                              7. Establish coordination of air ambulance
                              (helicopter) operation between Medical
                              Transportation Unit Leader and the Air
                              Operations Director.\
                              8. Establish liaisons with on-scene
                              agencies, e.g., Coroner\'s Office, Red
                              Cross, law enforcement, ambulance
                              companies, county health agencies, etc.\
                              9. Ensure that proper security, traffic
                              control and access have been established.\
                              10. Direct other medically trained
                              personnel to appropriate unit leaders.
  --------------------------- -------------------------------------------

Figure 8-3. Medical group supervisor duty checklist. (Adapted from
Multi-casualty incident operations procedures manual, Rio Linda, 1986,
California Fire Chiefs Association.)\
\
The flow of casualties and layout of triage, treatment, and
transportation areas are illustrated in Figs. 8-4 and 8-5.\
\
\
TRIAGE PROCEDURES\
\
Examples of Triage Classification Systems\
There is no single, standard, or universal method of triage. The number
of categories used may vary from 2 to 5 or more, depending on the
particular system in use. Various color codes, numbers, and symbols have
been used to identify these categories. The triage category is often
identified by the use of a triage tag, the design of which is also
variable. In the absence of a triage tag, a triage symbol is sometimes
written on the patient. The selection of how many categories or what
colors or symbols to use for triage is somewhat arbitrary, and each
system has its particular advantages and disadvantages. If the number of
categories is limited to two, for example, the system is simple to
remember. On the other hand, the use of more categories has the
advantage of greater precision (Rund, 1981; Savage, 1977; Gazzaniga,
1979; Baker, 1979; Moore, 1967; Grant, 1982; Silverstein, 1984:12,63;
Cohen, 1982a).\
\
In order to illustrate how triage categories can be used, examples of
two classification schemes will be given. The idea is not to endorse any
particular system, but to illustrate a small sample of the various
methods which demonstrate the basic concepts of triage.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-181.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-181.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-181.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-181.jpg)Figure
8-4. Multi-casualty scene. (Adapted from Multi-casualty incident
operations manual, Rio Linda, 1986, California Fire Chiefs Association.)

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-182.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-182.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-182.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-182.jpg)Figure
8-5. Patient Flow Chart. (Adapted from Multi-casualty incident
operations manual, Rio Linda, 1986, California Fire Chiefs
Association.)\
\
\
The S.T.A.R.T. System\
START is a mnemonic for Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment. This program
was developed in southern California by a group of emergency physicians,
firefighters, and an emergency nurse (Super, 1984).\
The basic process for determining categories is represented by Fig. 8-6.
Information and training materials for the START system may be obtained
from:

S.T.A.R.T.\
Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian\
301 Newport Blvd., Box Y\
Newport Beach, CA 92663\
(714) 760-5689\
A Proposed 5-Category Triage System\
An alternative proposed triage system is described below. This system
was designed to address some problems associated with the triage and
management of \"unsalvageable\" disaster casualties. It was also
constructed to be adapted not only to disasters, but also daily EMS
care. The daily use of routine triage for EMS helps to assure that it
will be a familiar system when disaster strikes. This system uses five
color-coded priority categories. These are felt to be a representative
sample of what is in common use (Savage, 1977; Baker, 1979). However,
other effective systems use three or four categories. A summary of the
system is given in Table 8-5, and its special features are then
discussed.\
\
Used in this context, \"simple care\" is that which does not require
unusual expenditures of time, equipment, or personnel. \"Simple\" field
care might include inserting an airway, sealing a penetrating chest
wound, applying a MAST unit, or giving intravenous fluids for shock.
\"Complicated\" care would include artificial ventilation or CPR.
\"Simple\" hospital care might include giving intravenous drugs,
applying splints, surgical cleansing of flesh wounds, performing a
cricothyrotomy or inserting a chest tube. In some cases, it might also
include surgical exploration of the abdomen. It would not include repair
of a transected aorta or ruptured aortic aneurysm, nor would it include
surgery for a fractured neck. The \"catastrophic\" category deserves
special discussion. In some triage systems this has been called the
Expectant category. It was reserved for those who were moribund or who
were in such poor condition that they could only be saved if extensive
resources were diverted from more salvageable cases. Immediate care was
to be withheld from these cases so that limited resources could be used
to do the most good for the most casualties. These casualties were
grouped with the dead and minor casualties and given last priority
(Tintinalh, 1978). This assignment of last priority was probably a
holdover from the days when much of the military casualty sorting was
carried out at the battalion aid stations where resources were extremely
limited (Rund, 1981). It had to be assumed under these conditions that
these casualties would not survive. In the Vietnam War, however,
helicopters evacuating casualties often bypassed the battalion aid
stations and delivered the casualties directly to the hospital. At the
hospital, all living casualties were initially considered potentially
salvageable (US Dept Defense,1975; Rund,1981). This may be a more
appropriate procedure for triage in the civilian setting.

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-184.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-184.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-184.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-184.jpg)Figure
8-6. The START classification protocol. (Adapted from Super, G.: START
instructor\'s manual, Newport Beach, Presbyterian Hoag Memorial
Hospital.)

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-185.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-185.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-185.jpg\
Table 8-5. 5-Category Triage
System](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-185.jpg)

  -------------- ------------- ------------- -----------------------------
  PRIORITY       COLOR         SYMBOL        CASUALTY CONDITION

  FIRST          RED           R             CRITICAL: likely to survive
                                             if simple\* care given within
                                             minutes.

  SECOND         BLUE          B             CATASTROPHIC: Unlikely to
                                             survive and/or extensive or
                                             complicated care needed
                                             within minutes.

  THIRD          YELLOW        Y             URGENT: Likely to survive if
                                             simple\*\* care given within
                                             hours.

  FOURTH         GREEN         G             MINOR: likely to survive even
                                             if care delayed hours to
                                             days. May be walking OR
                                             stretcher cases.

  NONE           BLACK         X\*\*\*       DEAD

  \*Simple: Care                             
  that doesn\'t                              
  require                                    
  unusual                                    
  equipment, or                              
  excessive use                              
  of time or                                 
  personnel.\                                
  \                                          
  \*\*Assigned                               
  THIRD priority                             
  (after                                     
  YELLOWS) when                              
  there are so                               
  many                                       
  casualties                                 
  that if                                    
  resources are                              
  used in vain                               
  to try to save                             
  BLUE cases,                                
  the YELLOWS                                
  will                                       
  needlessly                                 
  die.\                                      
  \                                          
  \*\*\*The                                  
  circling of                                
  this symbol                                
  prevents its                               
  being confused                             
  with a                                     
  sloppily                                   
  written Y.                                 
  -------------- ------------- ------------- -----------------------------

Assigning last priority to Catastrophic cases and reserving that
category for those with inevitably fatal conditions presents several
problems:

-   It is generally well adapted only for use in situations where there
    are truly massive numbers of casualties and access to extremely
    limited resources. These conditions are not at all typical of
    civilian disasters in the United States.

-   Psychologically, it is untenable to \"condemn\" living casualties to
    such a category, especially under conditions of maximum duress, and
    by persons not experienced in making such decisions (Gann, 1979;
    Gazzaniga, 1979; Grant, 1982; Moore, 1967; Tintinalli, 1978).
    Fortunately, it is unlikely for any one person to encounter civilian
    mass-casualty situations frequently enough to become
    \"experienced.\"

-   Treating these patients last means that minor injuries (which may
    survive for days without treatment) are given priority over
    casualties that may still be salvageable once the resources needed
    to care for them are finally mustered.

::: Definition-Term
Assigning last priority to catastrophic casualties, therefore, is
probably not a realistic approach in the civilian setting. In addition,
it does not work well if the triage system is to be used on a daily
basis for routine emergency patients.\
\
The approach described here, therefore, is to first treat the Critical
(RED) casualties. After this, the Catastrophic (BLUE) casualties, which
it may stiff be possible to salvage, are usually treated. When there are
large numbers of casualties, it is conceivable that those initially
categorized as Urgent (YELLOW) will eventually reach a point where they
will need care within minutes. If it appears that this will occur before
the Catastrophic (BLUE) casualties have all been treated, then attention
is diverted from the BLUEs to first treat the YELLOWs. Minor (GREEN)
casualties are not treated until attention has first been given to REDs,
YELLOWs, and BLUEs.\
\
Detailed examples of the patient problems in each category are given in
Appendix D.\
\
Triage Tags\
It is commonly suggested that disaster casualties have their priority
indicated by the attachment of a triage tag. There is no universal
agreement regarding the design of such tags. Several useful variations
are in use (Cohen, 1983; 1977; Cohen, 1986).\
\
The S.T.A.R.T. System uses a commercial triage tag (METTAG) with four
categories, indicated by four tear-off, colored strips at the bottom of
the METTAG (see Table 8-6).\
\
\
Table 8-6. The Triage Classification System Used by METTAG\
GREEN: (Bottom strip)\
Symbol: ambulance\--crossed-out\
Meaning: No hospital treatment needed; first aid only\
\
YELLOW: (Second strip from bottom)\
Symbol: Turtle\
Meaning: Non-urgent; hospital care\
\
RED: (Third strip from bottom)\
Symbol: Rabbit\
Meaning: Urgent; hospital care\
\
BLACK: (Fourth strip from bottom)\
Symbol: Cross/dagger\
Meaning: Dead or unsalvageable; no CPR\
\
(Adapted from: METTAG literature, Starke, FL)\
\
\
There are several practical features of this tag. It is designed so that
if casualty\'s condition deteriorates, the next strip can be torn off to
indicate the fact. Each tag has an identification number on it and on
each of the color strips. In addition, two upper corners of the tag have
the number on it, and they can be removed by tearing along perforations,
and used for keeping track of the casualties. The upper part of the tag
has spaces for patient information. Two disadvantages have been noted
with the METTAG: 1) some responders have complained that the colored
strips on the METTAG are hard to see at a distance; and, 2) whereas a
patient\'s deteriorating condition can be indicated on the METTAG by
tearing off an additional strip, an improving condition cannot be so
easily indicated.\
\
The amount and type of casualty information to be placed on the triage
tag is also by no means standardized. The tag may provide for notations
regarding such things as locations and types of injuries (sometimes
indicated with a diagram of the human body), pulse, respiration, blood
pressure, treatment given, a serial number, and the patient\'s name,
address, age, gender, and next of kin.\
\
Another approach is used by the Alpine, Mother Lode, and San Joaquin
Emergency Medical Services Agency in California. They use a tag for
patient information, and a separate, colored cloth tag to indicate the
triage category. Thus, when the casualty\'s condition improves or
deteriorates, the cloth tag is changed and the information tag remains
with the patient. These cloth tags are inexpensive, durable, and visible
from a distance.\
\
One problem that has been observed in disasters is that, while the
disaster plan called for the use of triage tags, there was a lack of
tags at the incident site (KC Health Dept, 1981:5; Buerk, 1982:643;
Quarantelli, 1983:77; Worth, 1977:163). The best solution to this
problem is to keep a set of triage tags aboard every emergency rescue
and ambulance vehicle. Each batch of tags should also include a summary
of triage plan and categorization scheme, as well as charts for keeping
track of casualty conditions, hospital capabilities, and hospital
destinations.\
\
\
Casualty Distribution Procedures\
\
Variations Depending on Local Conditions\
There are a number of different approaches to disaster casualty
distribution. Which approach is most practical may depend on the size of
the community, the number of area hospitals, and the difference in
capabilities of these institutions.\
\
In the simplest case, only one local hospital is available. However, it
may be necessary for this hospital to act as a triaging facility,
stabilizing patients then distributing them to more distant facilities
(Butman, 1982:140). If there are but a few hospitals in the community,
all with similar capabilities, it might suffice to send one ambulance
load to each facility on a rotating basis. In large urban centers, a
rather sophisticated set of distribution procedures may be necessary.\
\
Hospital Polling\
In some communities, the disaster plan may include procedures for
polling each hospital to obtain information about its present staffing,
number of empty beds, operating room availability, and other resources.
Such plans need to recognize the time it takes to collect this
information and to consider the fact that casualties typically begin to
arrive at the hospital within 30 minutes of disaster impact
(Quarantelli, 1983:74; Golec, 1977:173). In order to be of maxi-mum use,
the polling information has to be made available to field medical units
before the casualties leave the scene.\
\
The \"First Wave\" Protocol\
In communities that use hospital polling, it may be advantageous to
predetermine a method for equitably distributing the initial disaster
casualties, pending the collection of hospital information. By its very
nature, such a procedure is likely to be imprecise. Nonetheless, even a
fairly crude distribution of casualties is better than what is often
achieved if no procedure is in effect.\
\
An example of such a procedure is the first-wave protocol. This involves
the predetermination of disaster treatment capabilities of the area
hospitals as a guideline for casualty distribution. These are based on
the \"worst-case\" types and numbers of casualties each facility can
treat (i.e., 2 a.m. on a Saturday). These categories are established to
match those used in the local triage categorization system. Using the
above five-tiered triage system as an illustration, the hospital capable
of treating a minimum of three urgent (\"yellow\") casualties would be
designated as a \"yellow-3- first-wave facility. Another hospital,
capable of treating only minor casualties, but which could manage 20 of
them, would be designated a \"green-20\" first-wave facility and so on.
Although priorities are different for \"red\" (critical) and \"blue\"
(catastrophic) casualties, the facilities needed for treatment are the
same. Therefore, red and blue casualties would be sent to facilities
with a \"red\" designation. Communities may consider the use of
guidelines established by the Committee on Trauma of the American
College of Surgeons in the selection of facilities for critically
injured casualties (ACS, 1986:4).\
\
Using this protocol, a community distributes casualties according to the
type and number in the first-wave designation of each facility. When,
for example, a \"red-Y\' facility has received three critical
casualties, any further critical victims are sent to other \"red\"
facilities until all such hospitals have received their quota. A
modification of this system (applied only to critical casualties) has
been initiated in Sacramento County, California (Lowry\~ 1983).\
\
When all hospitals of any particular color designation have received
their share of casualties, subsequent distribution is according to a
calculated first-wave ratio. This is determined by adding up all the
hospital capacities for a triage category and dividing by the number
indicating the capacity of each. For example, if the community has a
total of 10 \"red\" casualties, and Hospital A has a first-wave
designation of 4, then 4/10 or 40% of the \"red\" casualties from the
disaster are sent to this facility. First-wave designations for a
hypothetical community are illustrated in Table 8-7. The application of
this First-Wave protocol is illustrated in Fig. 8-7.\
\
Unfortunately, the existence of a disaster does not necessarily diminish
the occurrence of routine emergencies. People continue to have babies,
get sick, get drunk, and crash their cars into each other. The
first-wave protocol can be used to take into consideration all the
accidents and illnesses occurring in the community, including those
created by the disaster. In this case, the sum of all the critical
casualties at the disaster site and occurring in other areas of the
community are used to determine the total load of critical casualties to
be distributed to \"red\" hospitals. In a similar manner, distribution
is determined for other categories of patients both on and off the
disaster scene.\
\
As in the case of triage categories, distribution techniques can be
adapted for use in routine emergencies. When any hospital in the
community, as the result of one or several emergencies, receives
simultaneously a total number of emergency patients exceeding its
first-wave score, this can be used as a guide-line for considering
temporarily redirecting ambulance traffic to other facilities. I
Likewise, when all \"red\" facilities have patient loads exceeding their
first-wave scores, then the first-wave ratios can be used as a guide to
divvy up the patient load. The adaptation of such types of disaster
procedures for more routine emergency situations, tends to assure that
the users keep familiar with them.\
\
\
SUMMARY\
\
Triage, a wartime invention, involves the concept of \"doing the most
good for the most casualties.\" As such, it is well adapted for use in
civilian disasters Triage is often thought of in narrow terms as merely
the designation of priorities for patient care., However, in disasters,
doing the most good for the most casualties also means maximizing the
use of the available hospital facilities. This is often a difficult task
to accomplish, especially in diffuse disasters covering a large
geographic area. This chapter has examined some of the more common
problems interfering with effective triage and casualty distribution in
disasters. The reasons for these problems and some examples of how to
counter them have been discussed.\
\
Table 8-7. Calculating the First-Wave Score and Ratio
:::

  ------------------ -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
  A                  B              C              D              E

  Designation        Hospital       First-Wave\    Total          First-Wave\
                                    Score          First-Wave     Ratio
                                                   Score of All   
                                                   Area           
                                                   Hospitals\*    

  Red                Hospital A     4              10             4/10=40%

  Red                Hospital B     2              10             2/10=20%

  Red                Hospital C     2              10             2/10=20%

  Red                Hospital D     2              10             2/10=20%

  Yellow             Hospital E     8              20             8/20=40%

  Yellow             Hospital F     12             20             12/20=60%

  Green              Hospital G     5              20             5/20=25%

  Green              Hospital H     15             20             15/20=75%

  \*with the same                                                 
  \"designation\"\                                                
  \                                                               
  Determine the                                                   
  highest triage                                                  
  category that the                                               
  hospital can                                                    
  manage at any time                                              
  of day or week,                                                 
  giving good                                                     
  disaster care for                                               
  the initial 2                                                   
  hours, without                                                  
  calling in                                                      
  disaster back-up                                                
  resources. Place                                                
  this designation                                                
  in column A.\                                                   
  \                                                               
  Determine the                                                   
  maximum number of                                               
  casualties that                                                 
  can be managed at                                               
  one time - under                                                
  such conditions.                                                
  Place this number                                               
  in column C.\                                                   
  \                                                               
  Determine the                                                   
  total number of                                                 
  casualties of this                                              
  triage category                                                 
  that can be                                                     
  managed by all                                                  
  hospitals in the                                                
  area. Place this                                                
  number in column                                                
  D.\                                                             
  \                                                               
  Divide the number                                               
  in C by that in D                                               
  (multiply the                                                   
  product by 100 to                                               
  convert it a                                                    
  percentage). Place                                              
  this ratio in                                                   
  column E.                                                       
  ------------------ -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-192.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-192.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/\$file/p-192.jpg](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/409583F8918DD44A0A25692A007C87F5/$file/p-192.jpg)Figure
8-7. Distribution using the \"First Wave\" protocol\
\
\
PLANNING CHECKPOINTS

-   Do persons with expertise in emergency medical services have primary
    authority over patient care and transport at the scene of a
    disaster?

-   Do your fire and police personnel understand that they may be
    involved in disaster search and rescue operations?

-   Do they understand how they should coordinate their activities with
    those involved in triage at the site?

-   Does the disaster plan and training provide for close contact
    between those directing search and rescue and those providing EMS?

-   Does your community have a plan and associated training for disaster
    casualty distribution among area hospitals?

-   Are your disaster triage and distribution procedures adapted so they
    can be used in more common emergencies?

-   Does your community have procedures and training for assessing the
    types, numbers, and severities of casualties at the scene? For
    sharing this information with all the involved responding
    organizations including all area hospitals?

-   Is this information collected and disseminated on an ongoing basis?

-   Does your community have functioning procedures and training for
    assessing the capacity and capability of local hospitals?

-   Does every ambulance and rescue vehicle have a supply of triage
    tags?

-   Does your plan anticipate that \"trauma centers\" and hospitals near
    the disaster tend to get a disproportionate share of casualties?

-   Are all public safety and EMS personnel required to have ongoing
    training familiarizing them with the local disaster triage and EMS
    system?

-   Does your plan and training indicate who is responsible for each of
    the following field disaster medical care/triage responsibilities:

-   Overall coordination?

-   Liaison with other agencies? Dispatch?

-   Provision of disaster information to hospitals?

-   Assessment of up-to-date hospital capabilities? Casualty
    distribution?

-   Triage?

-   Patient care at the scene? Logistics?

-   Air transport?

-   Public information?

ADDITIONAL READING\
\
Burkle FM Jr, Sanner PH, and Wolcott BW: Disaster medicine: application
for the immediate management and triage of civilian and military
disaster victims, 1984. Available from: Medical Examination Publishing
Co, Inc, 3003 New Hyde Park Rd, New Hyde Park, NY.\
\
Butman AM: Responding to the mass casualty incident: a guide for EMS
personnel, 1982. Available from: Emergency Training, 181 Post Road West,
Westport, Conn 06880.\
\
Cohen E: A better mousetrap: what makes up the \"perfect\"triage tag?, J
Emerg Med Serv, pp. 30-36, July 1983.\
\
Cohen E: Patient identification: a look at triage tags, Emerg Med Serv,
15(9):45-49, Oct 1986.\
\
Eisman B: Combat casualty management in Vietnam, J Trauma, 7(l):53-63,
1967.\
\
Emergency War Surgery: First United States revision of the emergency war
surgery NATO handbook,United States Department of Defense, 1975.
Available from: Superintendent of Documents,US Government Printing
Office, Washington,DC 20402.\
\
Golec JA and Gurney PJ: The problem of needs assessment in the delivery
of EMS, Mass Emergencies, 2:169-177, 1977.\
\
Multi-Casualty Incident Operational Procedures Manual, 1986. Available
from: California. Fire Chief\'s Association, 825 M Street, Rio Linda,
Calif 65673.-.\'\
\
Quarantelli EL, Delivery of emergency medical services in disasters:
assumptions and realities, 1983. Available from Irvington Publishers,
551 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017.\
\
Rund DA and Rausch TS: Triage, The C V Mosby Co, St Louis, 1981.\
\
Super G, editor: S.T.A.R.T. instructor\'s manual, 1984. hospital
Presbyterian, 301 Newport Blvd, Box Y,Available from: Hoag Memorial
Hospital- Newport Beach, Calif 92663.\
\
Trends in Triaging: A Random Survey of Thavs Tags Used in the United
States, Emerg I\'rod News 88-91, Oct 1977.

Chapter 9: COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC

Convincing the public to evacuate areas threatened by impending disaster
is often difficult. Ben Buerger is shown standing in the ruins of his
store on Dauphine Island, Alabama, where he rode out Hurricane Frederic.
(Courtesy of Robert Madden, (@) 1980, National Geographic Society.)\
\
In disasters, communication with the public assumes new dimensions not
present in routine emergencies. This chapter will address some of the
more important points of two aspects: issuing warnings to the public and
handling inquiries from the public.\
\
When warning is possible, it may have the greatest potential for saving
lives and property, because it allows people to take protective action
before impact. The effectiveness of warning requires not only that the
message is received, but that it is based on accurate assumptions about
human behavior in disasters.\
\
Large numbers of inquiries from the public to emergency and governmental
agencies are an almost inevitable consequence of disasters. Often the
volume of such information requests can place substantial demands on the
recipients. Organized efforts to deal with these inquiries can lessen
their disruption.\
\
\
WARNING\
\
The Value of Warning\
Warning can be one of the most important types of disaster
communication, allowing the recipients to avoid the threat altogether or
to significantly lessen its effects (Mcluckie, 1970:2). A number of
disaster countermeasures can be taken as a result of effective
forewarning. Probably the most effective is to leave the threatened area
before the disaster hits. Other adaptive responses include sandbagging
to prevent flooding, boarding up windows to prevent wind damage,
mobilizing teams in anticipation of search and rescue activities, or
stocking up on food, fuel, water, flashlight batteries, and medical
supplies. In a number of disasters, many fives have been saved, even in
the face of tremendous property losses, because the affected population
received advanced warning (Adams, 1981b:53; Drabek, 1981:87;
Quarantelli, 1982c:57).\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 10, 1979. This tornado
ranked at 4 on the Fujita scale, placing it in the top 3% of tornado
severity. It was one of the widest tornados ever observed and stayed in
contact with the ground for a distance of 47 miles, cutting an
11-square-mile path of destruction through the city. It was felt that
the injuries and deaths (171 hospitalized and 47 dead) resulting from
the storm would have been much greater had there not been an effective
warning prior to impact Quarantelli, 1982a:G54; Adams, 1981b:53; Fox,
1981:7; Glass, 1980:737).\
\
Planning Assumptions\
Effective procedures for warning must be based on accurate assumptions
about how the public reacts to warning messages. Unfortunately,
officials have put out warning bulletins most cautiously, or withheld
warnings until the last minute, because they felt that the inevitable
panic would be almost as dangerous as the disaster itself (Dynes,
1981:16; Quarantelli, 1965:107; Quarantelli, 1972:67; Fritz, 1961:664;
Drabek, 1986:120).

Figure 9-1. About to be engulfed by a tsunami, a man faces his last
moment alone. This wall of water, which reached a height of 55 feet, was
generated by an earthquake in the Aleutian Islands. It struck Hilo,
Hawaii on April 1, 1946, killing 159 persons. Tsunami warning systems
are the most effective means of preventing loss of life in this type of
disaster. This photo from the ship S. S. Brigham Victory. (Courtesy of
Water Resources Center, University of California at Berkeley,
California.)\
\
EXAMPLE: City officials and state police refused to order the evacuation
of an eastern resort threatened by an approaching hurricane. They
preferred to chance the danger of inaction, because they feared the
warnings would result in a panic flight. This was despite urgent
recommendations by the Weather Bureau and Coast Guard that the warnings
should be issued. It was also despite knowledge that the two routes of
escape from the low-lying city would be impassable if the magnitude of
the storm was as great as predicted (Quarantelli, 1960:68).\
\
EXAMPLES: Because of similar beliefs about the risk of panic, warnings
were played down during the Rio Grandeflood, and the Worcester tornado.
Fear of panic is also why alarm bells were not rung on the
collision-doomed ship, Andrea Doria Quarantelli, 1960:68).\
\
The Absence of Panic\
However, contrary to popular belief, research has shown that panic is
not a common reaction to disasters (Dynes, 1974:71; Dynes, 1981:16,18;
Quarantelli, 1960:68; Quarantelli, 1965:107; Quarantelli, 1972:67;
Mileti, 1975:57; Drabek, 1986:136; Wenger, 1975:33; Wenger, 1985a:30).
This is not to say that panic never occurs, but that it is rare.
Furthermore, if it does occur, three conditions appear to be required
(Mileti, 1975:58):

-   a perception of immediate danger,

-   apparently blocked escape routes, and

-   a feeling by the victim that he is isolated.

Finally, if panic occurs, it is not widespread or contagious. It is most
always highly localized, with few participants, and of short duration
Quarantelli,1960:72). The lack of panic in disasters is documented in
Table 9-1.\
\
One of the reasons for the belief that panic is common is failure to
draw the distinction between evacuation and wild panic. Fleeing a threat
is not the same as panic. Sometimes withdrawal is the most intelligent
response to a hazard. A panic-stricken individual, however, flees
without consideration for others. In contrast, persons who leave an area
in an orderly evacuation often assist others to get away (Quarantelli,
1972:68).\
\
\
EXAMPLE: Flood, Denver, Colorado, June 16, 1965. When residents of
Denver were threatened by the rapidly rising flood waters, 92% of the
families who evacuated left together. This is in contrast to the pattern
one would expect from a panic-stricken population Quarantelli,
1972:68).\
\
Reluctance to Evacuate\
Not only is panic flight an uncommon response to disasters, but it is
often difficult to get people to leave when disaster threatens
(Quarantelli, 1972:67; Quarantelli, 1960:69; Quarantelli, 1965:107;
Fritz, 1961:665; Wenger, 1985a:34; Perry, 1985:54) (see Table 9-2).\
\
A similar hesitancy to flee in the face of impending disaster has been
documented in dozens of disasters of all sorts. In some of these cases,
even the threat of force and coercive measures was not enough to assure
evacuation (Quarantelli, 1960:67,69)\
\
Table 9-1. Absence of Panic in Disasters

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  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEPanic is not a common problem in disasters; getting people to
  evacuate is.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Premature Return of Evacuees\
Even if they have been convinced to evacuate, inhabitants may return
while the threat is still present.\
\
EXAMPLE: Four months after the initial war-time evacuation of British
cities, over 60% of the population had returned. This was in spite of
official warnings that these areas were prime targets for air raids and
rocket attacks. Although the cities were being bombed nightly, even
children were being brought back to London in large numbers. A similar
pattern occurred in Germany in spite of governmental efforts to
discourage it by withholding ration cards and schooling (Quarantelli,
1960:70).\
\
Table 9-2. Reluctance to Evacuate in Disasters

  --------------- -------------------------------------------------------
  Disaster        Observation

  Bombing of      Only 37% of the mothers and children evacuated London
  Britan WWII     during the raids. The town of Bootle was bombed every
                  night for a week, and 60% of its houses were hit at
                  least twice each, and only 10% escaped serious damage.
                  Nonetheless, 25% of the town\'s inhabitants remained to
                  sleep in their homes during the raids (Quarantelli,
                  1960:69).

  Hurricane       Despite intensive warnings, 66% of the residents in a
  Florence\       town in the hurricane\'s path refused to leave their
  Florida 1953    homes (Quarantelli, 1960:70).

  Hurricane\      About 70 to 80% of Galveston residents stayed on the
  Carla\          island even though most knew that they would eventually
  Texas 1961      be cut off from the mainland (Davenport, 1978:19).

  Hurricane       As the winds intensified, in spite of a massive
  Frederic\       evacuation effort, nearly half the residents refused to
  Mississippi     leave their homes (Drabek, 1981:141).
  1979            
  --------------- -------------------------------------------------------

EXAMPLE: The Mt. St. Helens, Washington, Volcano Eruption, May 18, 1980.
Risking a \$500 fine and 6 months in jail, many residents circumvented
the barricades around the threatening volcano. Taking to the back roads,
they went to check on their property and retrieve belongings (Kilijanek,
1981:57).\
\
Reasons for Hesitancy to Evacuate\
There are a number of reasons why persons hesitate to evacuate in the
face of threatening disaster. They may not be convinced that they are
actually at risk; they may wish to stay and protect their property; or
they may want to assure the safety of other family members before
leaving.\
\
Perception of risk. The most common reason people do not evacuate is
that they do not believe they are in immediate danger (Perry, 1985:53).
People tend to interpret observations in light of what they expect to
happen. Since disasters are such a rare experience for most people, the
natural reaction to warning is disbelief. This effect is magnified when
the warning is related to a type or severity of threat that is unlikely
to occur in the recipient\'s area. Thus, residents of Kansas are likely
to heed a springtime tornado warning. On the other hand, a flash flood
warning to those living near a quiet stream which has never flooded
before is less likely to be taken serious (Drabek,\
1985b:12).\
\
In addition, the thought of impending disaster is one that most people
would prefer to avoid, and thus they may tend to deny it. This is not to
say will necessarily ignore warnings, but if there is any ambiguity or
in the warning information, it is often interpreted as evidence that the
best rather than the worst situation exists. For example, an air raid
siren may be taken for another test, or a mistake. Often, only after
these possibilities are shown to be untenable are other less pleasant
interpretations considered (Mcluckie, 1970:40; Drabek, 1986:73,82).\
\
In most cases, the first reaction to a warning, if it has not been
expected, is to try and confirm its validity. One way this is carried
out is by observing the behavior of others. The failure to see them
behaving in an alarmed manner may lead to a discounting of the warning
as a mistake, misunderstanding, or overreaction. Attempts to validate
the information may take the form of phone calls to relatives, friends,
or public safety agencies. Another common response is to turn on the
radio or TV for further information. Validation can also take the form
of assessing the warning in the context of environmental cues (Mcluckie,
1970:41; Drabek, 1985b:12; Drabek, 1986:83,113,123; Perry, 19850,79).\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Grand Island, Nebraska, June 3,1980. The warning
sirens were heard frequently from April through late summer, but the
last actual tornado was in 1857. Nevertheless, on the evening of June 3,
they were not heard with the usual complacency, because the skies began
to look uniquely ominous. Many people were acutely aware of the weather,
turning -on the radio to get further information, even before the sirens
-sounded. When they did go off, furthermore, they were heeded. Thus, in
spite of bearing the full brunt of six twisters that flattened one fifth
of the town, the town lost only five of its- 40,000 residents to the
storm (Quarantelli, 1982c:57).\
\
Even when persons hear a warning and accept the fact that a disaster is
threatening, they may still fail to evacuate because they don\'t believe
they are in personal danger (Perry, 1985:70). This may be because the
warning does not carefully specify the severity of the forces involved,
or because previous disasters have failed to materialize after warnings
or have been of less magnitude than predicted.\
\
EXAMPLE: Hurricane Audrey, Lmmr Cameron Parish, Louisi-ana, June 27,
1957. A large number of the 400 deaths from this storm were from an area
where the residents thought the rising waters would not reach the ridges
on which they lived. The warning messages issued failed to make it clear
that they would (Mcluckie, 1970:7; Bates, 1963:13).\
\
Protection of property. Another common reason persons hesitate to
evacuate is because they want to protect their property. In some cases,
this has been because of the fear of looting, but many times, it has
been due to the desire to protect property against the environmental
threat (Perry, 1985:53, 153).

::: Definition-Term
Figure 9-2. As in this wildland fire, residents are often hesitant to
evacuate in disasters, preferring to remain and protect their property.
In such situations, the absence of effective and convincing warning
procedures can lead to loss of lives. This photograph of \"The
Forty-Niner Fire,\" of Nevada County, California in September, 1988, is
a good example of need for warning procedures. (Courtesy of The Union,
Grass Valley, California.)\
\
\
Safety of family members. Persons in disaster-threatened areas often
hesitate to evacuate until they have assured the safety of other family
members. Often, this means that the family will evacuate as a unit, but
only after all family members are located or accounted for. Sometimes
this definition of \"family\" even applies to household pets,
particularly dogs (Perry, 1985:60,72; Drabek, 1986:84,114,116).\
\
Improving the Response to Warning\
In contrast to the belief that people will flee in panic when warned of
a disaster threat, the chief difficulty is in getting people to
evacuate. There are several factors which can enhance warning
effectiveness.\
\
Context of the Warning Message\
The credibility of warning is enhanced it if is issued in a context
consistent with a condition of urgency. For example, if a TV station
issues a tornado warning and then suspends regular broadcasting to
follow the storm\'s progress, the viewer\'s perception of urgency is
enhanced. If, however, the warning is followed by a return to normal
programming, the threat is not taken so seriously. In some cases,
information given out with the warning can have a neutralizing effect on
it (Mcluckie, 1970:33; Drabek, 1985b:13; Perry, 1985:44,58).\
\
EXAMPLE: Rio Grande Flood, Piedras Negras, Mexico, June 27-30, 1954. Two
loudspeaker cars were \"drafted\" from a local theater to assist in
warning the public. Reportedly, one of them issued the following alert,
\"An all-time record flood is going to inundate the city. You must
evacuate immediately. (Pause) The\_\_\_\_\_ theater is presenting two
exciting features tonight. Be sure to see these pictures at the\_\_\_\_
theater tonight.\" (Mcluckie, 1970:33)\
\
The validity of past warning messages can also influence believability.
Per-sons living in areas frequently warned about approaching threats,
but which rarely sustain a severe impact, tend to discount the
seriousness of subsequent warning messages (Mcluckie, 1970:23,26,33,37;
Drabek, 1986:77,93).\
\
Consistency and Repetition\
Hearing repeated warnings increases the likelihood of taking protective
action (Drabek, 1986:61,76; Drabek, 1985b:13; Adams, 1981b:15,53).
Consistency of the warning information from different sources enhances
its effect. When different sources of information convey similar
information about the threat, persons trying to confirm the warning are
more likely to heed it (Drabek, 1981:76,95,113). The greater the number
of different warning sources, the larger the number of people contacted
(Moore, 1958:212; Adams, 1981b:15,53,57; Fox, 1981:8; Glass, 1980:737;
Perry, 1985:41).\
\
Legitimacy of the Source\
Warning messages are more likely to be believed if they are issued by
official governmental authorities, such as the police, civil defense,
fire department, the governor, or the mayor\'s office (Drabek,
1986:75,104).\
\
Specificity\
The specificity of warning influences its effectiveness. Recipients of
warning information need to know more than just the fact that there is a
disaster threat. They need information that indicates how the threat
will affect them personally. Although sirens can alert a large number of
people, they carry the least specific type of information. They do,
however, get people to turn to potentially more specific sources of
information, such as the mass media, especially if sirens go off in
inclement weather (Mcluckie, 1970:31; Drabek, 1986:92; Quarantelli,
1982c:57,61). Helpful information is that which states in terms clear to
the recipient, the urgency of the situation, the likelihood of impact,
and the specific localities at risk. \"Terms clear to the recipient\"
implies the need for foreign languages in certain ethnic communities. It
also infers that the terminology used is meaningful to its audience. For
example, saying that flood waters will crest 5 feet above flood stage
may convey less meaning than saying that the waters will cover the
courthouse stairs. Even in parts of the country where tornadoes are
common, terms like \"tornado watch\" and \"tornado warning\" are
misunderstood by over a third of the public (Drabek, 1986:74,106,335;
Perry, 1985:67,71; FEMA, A-50; Kreimer, 1980:21).\
\
Information on Courses of Action\
For a warning to be effective, it has to do more than just alert the
public of a disaster threat. Information has to be given regarding
appropriate protective actions that should be taken. Protective actions
may be obvious to some living in disaster prone areas, but to many,
especially in technological accidents, the proper courses of action may
be less obvious (Perry, 1985:66,79).\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979. Of those living within 15 miles of the reactor, 39%
(144,000) evacuated. Of those that failed to evacuate, 62% indicated it
was because they were not instructed to do so (Perry, 1985:53).\
\
Invitations from Relatives\
Those living in disaster-threatened areas are more likely to evacuate if
they are encouraged by invitations from relatives and friends outside
the impact area (Drabek, 1985b: 17). This is because people prefer to
seek shelter with friends or relatives rather than at public shelters.
It also reflects the effects such invitations have in confirming the
danger. Encouraging this activity can enhance compliance with evacuation
advisories (Drabek, 1986:81,86,118).\
\
TelePatrol International\
One of the most potentially effective technological approaches to
warning is the use of computers to contact selected populations by phone
and give recorded warning information. This technology is now widely
available through \"Tele-Patrol International.\" TelePatrol
International is a non-profit organization formed for the purpose of
bringing this alerting system into widespread use.\
\
Using TelePatrol, local communities can list all residential and
business phone numbers by category in a computer data bank. The system
can then be programmed to rapidly dial every number and announce a
recorded message or warning. If the number is busy, the system will
redial until it gets a response. This allows large numbers of people to
be warned of a hazard, even if they have their radio or TV turned off,
or if they are asleep.\
\
The system allows listing the phone numbers according to geographic
location. Thus, if a tanker truck carrying hazardous material is
involved in an accident, all those living in the immediate vicinity can
be warned to evacuate. Phone numbers can be categorized by features
other than location. For example, non-English speaking households can be
identified and the message given in the appropriate language. Households
with deaf residents or those without phone can also be indicated.
Furthermore, the system will identify those addresses that have failed
to respond. The system can be used to recall public safety or hospital
personnel. It can also be used to call sources of special supplies or
equipment needed for a disaster. In addition to its ability to carry
messages to the public, TelePatrol can also receive and collate
information. For example, it can ask those who are disabled and need
transportation assistance to indicate that need.\
\
In addition to uses in disaster warning, TelePatrol has a number of uses
in daily emergencies and law enforcement. For example, it can quickly
give a neighborhood the description of a child who is lost in that area.
It can also expand the distribution of the message as time passes and
the area of search increases. If a report is received that a food or
pharmaceutical product has been tampered with, every grocery store and
drug store in the area can be rapidly notified. The possibilities are
endless. A participating community has to pay a \$1 fee and agree to
assist in establishing a local TelePatrol Board of Directors from its
business and community leaders which would be one of the outreach
mechanisms for raising funds for the local program. The community is
also required to appoint one liaison from existing government personnel
to coordinate the public relations and political aspects of the program
and another to coordinate operations and technical aspects. TelePatrol
International is responsible for fund raising with the assistance of the
liaisons and the support of the local government chief executives. All
of this funding stays in the local community\'s TelePatrol program. For
more information, see Additional Reading at the end of the chapter.\
\
Coordination of the Warning Process\
The process of warning is complicated by the fact that it requires the
accomplishment of a number of tasks, and because these may have to be
carried out by different organizations, coordination is required among
them. For example, the determination that adverse weather will lead to
unusually heavy rainfall is usually made by the Weather Bureau. This
might alert the local flood control authorities to the possibility of
flooding and the subsequent detection of impending dam or levee failure.
The decision to issue an evacuation directive might then come from the
sheriffs department or the office of the county executive. But the
conveyance of the message to the public is often carried out by local
commercial radio or TV stations (Stallings, 1971:34; Dynes, 1981:9).\
\
\
INQUIRIES FROM THE PUBLIC\
\
Many inquiries from the public are an almost inevitable consequence of
disasters. Often the volume of such information requests can place
substantial demands on mayor\'s offices, police and fire departments,
hospitals, news agencies, and other sources of disaster information. The
bulk of these inquiries are of three types: inquiries to confirm the
validity of warnings; inquiries about the welfare and location of
missing loved ones; and instruction on what to do (Scholl, 1984:289;
Quarantelli, 1965:110; Fritz, 1956:14, 38; Lands, 1984:52; Ross,
1982:64; Drabek, 1986:85).\
\
These inquiries can be disruptive for several reasons. Their sheer
numbers can jam local telephone circuits; essential public safety
activities are interrupted as agency personnel attempt to answer the
inquiries; and it may be very difficult to collect and collate the
information necessary to respond (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:16,33;
Drabek, 1986:85; Worth, 1977:160; Moore, 1958:8).\
\
Efforts to Locate Loved Ones\
Because the United States is a very mobile country, family members and
loved ones are often separated from one another. Nearly every family in
the country has blood relatives living in other parts of the nation or
in foreign countries. Families living together are usually temporarily
separated at different times of the day (Fritz, 1956:36). This fact is
of special importance when disaster strikes, because there is an
immediate and frantic effort of loved ones to locate those thought to be
disaster victims.\
\
The mass communications media not only quickly notifies the world of
these events, but many times their versions are greatly dramatized, if
not distorted. In addition, news reports usually do not give specific
information about the exact location of a disaster, or details to
indicate who has or has not been involved. Even in disasters with only a
few hundred homeless, injured, or killed, the total number of personal
welfare inquiries may be in the tens and hundreds of thousands (Fxitz,
1956:22,36,37,63). Few public safety agencies, hospitals, emergency
organizations, or governmental bodies are prepared for the deluge of
inquiries after a disaster, and the results can be literally
paralyzing.\
\
Jammed Telephone Circuits\
When people hear of a disaster that might involve loved ones, the first
response is to telephone them. If loved ones cannot be located where
expected, information is sought by phoning hospitals, police
departments, fire departments, relief agencies, newspaper offices, or
the city hall. Since it only takes a small percentage of the population
using the phone simultaneously to overload the system, phone lines in
the disaster area quickly become jammed (Drabek, 1985b:13; Stallings,
1971:34).\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Waco, Texas, March 21, 1952. After the tornado struck,
incoming calls were so numerous that outgoing calls were delayed for as
much as 6 hours. Similarly, the communications resources of the
telegraph office, the post office, \"ham\" radio operators, and the
NIARS (Military File-ate Radio System) were inundated (Fritz, 1956:19).\
\
EXAMPLE: Flash Flood, Big Thompson Canyon, Colorado, July 31, 1976. As
word of the disaster spread across the country, concerned relatives
deluged the Denver office of Associated Press, often blocking incoming
reports from reporters at the scene (Ritz, 1980:195).\
\
Community organizations considered sources of disaster information
(police departments, hospitals, municipal offices) have their
switchboards so flooded with calls that all communication in or out of
the organization is prevented. Therefore, emergency procedures dependent
on telephone communication cannot be carried out.\
\
Traffic Congestion in the Disaster Area\
When loved ones cannot find the information they seek by phone, those
within traveling distance try to seek it out in person.\
\
EXAMPLE: Gas Main Explosions, Brighton, New York, September 21, 1951.
When a city gas main pressure reducing valve failed, pilot lights of
some gas appliances were extinguished by the gas pressure surge. The
houses then filled up with gas which then exploded when it reached the
pilot light of another appliance or when someone turned on an electrical
switch. Forty-one houses were damaged or destroyed and twenty-seven
casualties resulted-three of them fatal. Getting in con-tact with all
immediate family members was one of the first responses. At the time of
the disaster, most of the men were away working in Rochester. When they
heard of the explosions, they tried to call home. Most of them, unable
to get through the jammed phone exchange, tried to drive back to
Brighton. They soon found themselves tied up in the traffic jam, that
developed. In many cases, even when the men eventually reached the edge
of Brighton, they were stopped by road blocks. Despite all this, a
number of them took to the back roads and were able to work their way
into the disaster area (Fritz, 1956:11,13,15,16; Marks, 1954:Appendix
B-2:36).\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 9, 1953. Twenty minutes
after a tornado swept through the city, the traffic jam on the roads
leading to the area was formidable. It interfered with the passage of
fire, police, ambulance, and other emergency vehicles. Complicating the
traffic problems were \"the hundreds of fathers, mothers, sons, and
daughters of the disaster area residents.\" They were abandoning their
cars and running into the impact area to find and help their families
(Wallace, 1956:74).\
\
EXAMPLE: Atomic bomb explosion, Hiroshima, Japan, August 6, 1945. The
city was evacuated after the explosion. But, less than 24 hours after
the evacuation, \"thousands of refugees came streaming back into the
city \... road blocks had to be set up along all routes into the city
because there were so many people who wanted to search for missing
relatives or inspect the damage(Fritz, 1956:12).\
\
Similar examples can be documented from many other disasters. Hospitals,
police departments, and other places of disaster activity are also
swamped with people who go there trying to locate loved ones (Fritz,
1956:37).\
\
Advice\
Adding to the disruptive effects of those seeking information about
loved ones, are those seeking advice about disaster-related problems.
Questions may be asked about such things as whether or not the callers\'
homes are in an area threatened by flooding; whether or not food exposed
to the chemical cloud can be eaten safely; and where the caller should
go to donate blood. They often present organizations with requests for
information which the organizations may not be prepared to provide and
which require the diversion of resources to obtain (Quarantelli,
1965:110; Fritz, 1956:15; Raker, 1956:44; Drabek, 1968:49).\
\
\
Management of Inquiries: Disaster Public Information Centers\
\
Answering these questions is often impossible unless there exists a
system for the various organizations to share information (see Fig.
9-3). For example, inquiries about missing loved ones may require the
collection of information from the coroner, law enforcement agencies,
public shelters, and local hospitals (Quarantelli, 1965:110;
Quarantelli, 1983:83; Scholl, 1984:289; Yutzy, 1969:121; Lands,
1984:52). This requires the establishment of a central,
multi-organizational public information office for the disaster. The
responsibilities of this office are three-fold: 1) information for the
disaster community (warning and instructions); 2) information for the
press and dignitaries (discussed in Chapter 10); and 3) information for
outsiders inquiring about loved ones.\
\
Establishing a regional system of disaster public information centers
can help in dealing with outside requests about loved ones. This system,
composed of local information centers connected with regional centers,
channels as many outside welfare inquiries as possible away from the
centers of emergency activity.\
\
Information on dead, relocated, and injured casualties is collected from
designated officials at local hospitals, police departments, morgues,
coroners offices, Red Cross, Salvation Army, and community shelters. It
is then transmitted to regional centers in other parts of the state or
country. Pre-arranged agreements with the media provide the public with
toll-free numbers to these regional information centers where they might
learn if their relatives are fisted as known fatalities, or if relocated
or injured, where they are now.
:::

[(click to
enlarge)](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/236F5159AD9E09530A25691A006E5DC0/$file/p-211.jpg)\
[/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/236F5159AD9E09530A25691A006E5DC0/\$file/p-211.jpg/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/236F5159AD9E09530A25691A006E5DC0/\$file/p-211.jpgFigure
9-3. The use of regional disaster information centers to divert public
inquiries from emergency and public safety agencies.\
\
The local information center in the disaster-stricken community also
collects information that would allow others to learn if their loved
ones were victims of the event. For example, information on the scope
and severity of the event allows callers to determine if a loved one\'s
residence was in the seriously impacted area. If the event is an airline
crash, the information includes the points and times of departure and
arrival, the airline company and flight number, the passenger list, and
the streets and block numbers in the crash impact site. This information
is also provided to the regional centers and to the press. The provision
of this detailed information in news accounts of the event helps to
decrease the number of viewers who feel they may have a loved one in the
disaster
area.](../../../../../../../../dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/236F5159AD9E09530A25691A006E5DC0/$file/p-211.jpg)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEInquires about loved ones thought to be in the impact zone are
  not likely to be discouraged, but can be reduced or channeled in less
  disruptive ways, if the needed information is provided at a location
  away from the disaster area.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY\
\
Disaster-stricken communities often have difficulties communicating with
the public. Issuing warnings is one of the most important methods of
averting the destructive consequences of disasters. In some cases, an
effective warning process may depend on the cooperative interactions of
multiple organizations: those who detect the disaster threat, those who
decide that a warning should be issued, and those who convey the warning
to the public. The public\'s response to warning is not a simple
stimulus-response reaction. Rather, members of the public often have to
be convinced that they are in immediate, personal danger. The source,
context, and repetition of the message can influence the warning\'s
influence on public behavior.\
\
In disasters, news reports generate worldwide concern in those who think
they may have loved ones in the impact area. The usual result is that
organizations in the disaster area are inundated with inquiries about
these persons. Although these welfare inquiries cannot be stopped,
effective planning can reduce them or channel them so they are less
disruptive.\
\
\
PLANNING CHECKPOINTS

-   Do those responsible for issuing warnings to the public understand
    that widespread panic is not a common problem in disasters, but that
    convincing people to evacuate is?

-   Does your community\'s disaster planning and training address which
    organizations and persons are responsible for the various aspects of
    warning: detection of the threat, decision to warn, and
    dissemination of warning?

-   Does your warning process take into consideration the importance of
    the warning context? The legitimacy of the warning source? The
    importance of warning repetition and consistent, multiple warnings
    from different sources?

-   Does your planning include provisions to disseminate information
    that will help members of the public determine that they don\'t have
    loved ones impacted by the disaster (such as information accurately
    describing the geographical boundaries of the disaster, the involved
    aircraft destination, flight number, and list of uninjured
    passengers)?

-   Do you have a regional system for collecting disaster victim
    information and providing it to the public at a site away from the
    disaster response activity?

ADDITIONAL READING\
\
Mcluckie B, The warning system in disaster situations: A selective
analysis, Report Series 9, 1970. Available from: Disaster Research
Center, University of Delaware, Newark, Del 19716.\
\
Perry RW, Comprehensive Emergency Management: Evacuating Threatened
Populations, 1985. Available from: JAI Press, Inc, 36 Sherwood Place,
Greenwich, Conn 06830.\
\
Quarantelli EL, Evacuation Behavior and Problems: Findings and
Implications from the Re-search Literature, Book and Monograph Series
16, 1984. Available from: Disaster Research Center, University of
Delaware, Newark, Del19716.\
\
TelePatrol International, TelePatroI Management, Inc, P 0 Box D, Sunny
Lane, Beach Lake, Penn. 18405, (800) 2554583.

Chapter 10: THE MEDIA: FRIEND AND FOE

The magnitude of media response to future disasters it likely to be much
greater than that shown in this photograph of the 1971 San Fernando
Valley, California earthquake. (Courtesy of Los Angeles County Fire
Department, Los Angeles, California)\
\
Many emergency managers have been frustrated when they have had to
divert much needed time and resources to address the demands of the
media, while at the same time trying to mount a multi-organizational
disaster response under conditions of extreme urgency and uncertainty.
Well-planned inter-actions with the media, though, can be of critical
importance in decreasing the loss of life and property. In those types
of disasters where warning is possible, accurate, timely, and consistent
information conveyed by the media can be one of the greatest factors
preventing death and injury. It has been suggested that difficulties
with the media occur because emergency agencies do not understand how
the media operate in disasters and how to deal with them in an effective
way. This chapter identifies some of the important patterns of media
behavior in disasters and suggests ways of optimizing the interaction
between the media, the public, and disaster response agencies.\
\
\
DISASTERS ARE A MEDIA EVENT\
\
Disasters are a significant source of news. In fact, one study by Gans
estimated that 25% of all news stories involve natural disasters,
technological hazards, or civil disturbances. Why is this the case? One
reason that has been suggested is that mass media news reporting is an
entertainment business. Often, news reports are called \"stories,\" and
reporters are encouraged to find events that have the same attributes as
that of good fiction: drama, conflict, problems, solutions, and rising
and falling action. Disasters offer all of these characteristics, and
for television they present the additional advantage of great
attention-grabbing, Asuals (Wenger, 1985b:2; Larson, 1980:79,119).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"From the journalistic point of view, a natural disaster has all the
  ingredients for the perfect media event\' (especially for the
  electronic media). It\'s brief, spectacular, often mysterious,
  action-oriented, and portrays human suffering and courage.\" (Bolduc,
  1987)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Another reason that has been given to explain why disasters attract so
much media attention is that they are generally so easy to cover.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"Television likes to cover disasters. All it takes is a film crew or
  two, a public shelter where victims can be photographed, a few shots of
  rising water, destroyed homes or trailers, some high turf, and an
  authority figure to interview and you have one minute and thirty
  seconds of dynamite, visual coverage.\" (Wenger, 1985b:3)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Evening news broadcasts are highly profitable programs for most local
stations. They are also valuable for local network affiliates because
they attract an audience that also tends to watch the network\'s
national news broadcasts. Therefore, in all major markets there is
intense competition for local news audiences, and a considerable amount
of \"show business\" and entertainment has been injected into
programming to help attract these audiences (Lar-son,1980:79).\
\
THE MEDIA AS \"FRIEND\"\
\
Public officials sometimes decry the mass media. Many feel that they
would be able to carry out their disaster duties in a calmer atmosphere
if the media were not there to play \"sideline quarterback,\"
criticizing actions and questioning decisions. However, in spite of this
feeling, the absence of the media in disasters can create enormous
difficulties (Scanlon, 1985:123).\
\
The mass media, and the electronic media (TV and commercial radio) in
particular, are the most important source from which the public obtains
information on disasters (Wenger, 1980:241; Wenger, 1985a:62). The
importance of the private sector news media as a communications system
in the United States is reflected in the following quotes:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"The entire governmental structure of the United States-Department of
  Defense, FEMA, NASA, all of the state and local governments-together
  have sophisticated communications systems costing dozens of billions of
  dollars; they are the envy of the rest of the world. But in our society
  that marvel of electronic wizardry is incapable of crossing the
  threshold of the American home, or entering the confines of the
  American automobile to communicate directly to the citizen. For that
  link to the public the emergency management community is totally
  dependent on the private sector, the news media.\"\
  \
  \"The development of a reasonable, effective and constructive working
  relationship between the emergency manager and the media in disasters
  should be a high priority goal of the emergency management community.
  The fundamental responsibility of all governments is assuring the
  safety and well-being of its citizens. That mission cannot be carried
  out in an information vacuum. The citizen must know if and when he is
  in danger, and if and when the danger has passed. And he has a right to
  know about the fate of his neighbors.\" (Holton, 1985:6)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

The mass media can play a number of important roles that help to lessen
the effects of disaster (Comm on Disasters, 1980:vii). They transmit
warnings of impending tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tidal waves, and
volcano eruptions.\
\
Commercial radio and television are the most frequent sources from which
the public receives initial warning about an impending disaster. Even
when initial warning is from another source such as sirens, people turn
to the media for further information (Drabek, 1986:91,113; Quarantelli,
1982c:61; Moore, 1958:212; Kreps, 1980:61). Indeed, people often react
to warning sirens with disbelief until such confirmation is obtained
(Kreps, 1980:61). When media warning messages are clearly worded,
authoritative, and consistent, they can be very effective in stimulating
appropriate protective activity (Wenger, 1985b:18).\
\
On occasion, the media have even been known to initiate such warnings
without awaiting official requests:\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Topeka, Kansas, June 8, 1966. A local radio station
had its own alert plan for severe weather situa tions. This involved the
dispersal of mobile radio units that would make on-the-spot reports if a
funnel cloud was sighted. The radio station\'s own warning broadcast was
not only heard before the sounding of the public alert system, but also
30 minutes before the Weather Bureau\'s official teletype warning
(Kreps, 1980:60).\
\
Often, it is not only the public that receives useful warning and
information from the media. When, as often occurs, there is inadequate
communication among emergency response organizations, their best source
of information may be from the mass media (Wenger, 1985b:18).\
\
EXAMPLE: Flash Floods, Terrace, British Columbia, October 30, 1978.
CFTK, the local radio and TV station was often the first source of
information for the public about disaster-related problems.
\"Individuals in trouble called the \... station rather than an official
agency. The station then quite quickly passed that information on to the
various authorities. The station also was the first place to define the
extent of the emergency situation. A number of local officials said that
they had not viewed the situation as being close to a disaster until
they heard the reports of the media. The various disaster response
agencies intended to work on their own and not share information. Thus
they learned the overall situation only by listening to radio and/or
watching television (Scanlon, 1980:260).\
\
EXAMPLE: Metro Subway Crash, Washington, DC, January 13, 1982. Little
useful information was received from the accident site, and information
from official governmental sources was conflicting. Most of the
hospitals learned of the crash either from incoming emergency medical
services personnel or from the news media (Edelstein, 1982:161).\
\
In a number of disasters, it has been observed that the media has
conveyed important information about the disaster useful to government
officials and relief agencies (Moore, 1958:189; Wenger, 1985b:18;
Edelstein, 1982:161; Killian, 1953:S-2).\
\
EXAMPLE: in a forest fire disaster one radio station \"be-came an
emergency appendage for a number of disaster-related organizations,
including the Civil Defense, the police and fire departments, the county
sheriffs office, and the Salvation Army. The station not only served as
an interagency communications link, but it also collected information
about the fire for emergency organizations and sent that information to
them through its mobile unit \'live coverage\' of the disaster.\"
(Kreps, 1980:63)\
\
The mass media may perform a number of other useful functions to aid
disaster-relevant organizations and the public:

-   They may convey instructions to the public as to how they can lessen
    or deal with the effects of the disaster. They may help to educate
    the public about how to prepare for disasters (Kreps, 1980:59;
    Wenger, 1985b:17).

-   They may stimulate donations from other parts of the country which
    (if handled properly so as not to overwhelm the stricken areas with
    unneeded supplies) can help speed recovery (Kreimer, 1980:18; Comm
    on Disasters, 1980:4).

-   They may draw attention to natural and technological hazards and
    stimulate public support for actions to prevent or mitigate
    disasters. They may help to overcome public and governmental apathy
    by drawing attention to disaster risks and inadequate prepared-ness
    (Stevenson, 1981:36; Drabek, 1986:62).

-   They can help to minimize the number of inquiries from anxious loved
    ones by providing accurate information about the severity and scope
    of the disaster and by publicizing lists of survivors (Kreimer,
    1980:18; Kreps, 1980:46).

-   When other means are not available they can be used for
    point-to-point and person-to-person communications if necessary to
    expedite rescue and recovery (Yutzy, 1969:103,122).

-   They will often withhold news if they consider it to be dangerous to
    release to the public (Scanlon, 1982:18).

-   Good publicity from media coverage is a factor that may facilitate
    future funding, donations, or re-election for those involved in
    disaster response or management (Larson, 1980:89).

THE MEDIA AS \"\'FOE\"\
\
Emergency managers have often expressed frustration and consternation
with media operations in disasters (Wenger, 1985b:5; 1982). They feel
that the media complicate the tasks at hand and that paying attention to
media demands diverts their attention from urgent matters like casualty
care, search and rescue, and evacuation. As those responding to the Mt.
St. Helens eruption discovered, trying to organize all of their forces
into a unified, multi-organizational effort is a monumental task. This
is even more painful when it has to be carried out under the
scrutinizing eyes of the international press (Kili-janek,1981:72).\
\
Demands on Resources, Facilities, and Officials\
The media will make demands on communications, transportation, and other
local resources. In situations where the disaster has reduced the
available functioning communication and transportation systems, these
demands are even more noticeable. In extreme cases, their demands may
completely tie up any surviving transportation and communication
facilities, and local Officials may find themselves responding more to
the needs of the media than to the disaster situation. The media have
other needs too, and expect local emergency personnel to fulfill them.
These needs include adequate lighting, electrical power, work space, and
the provision of officials to give them information or take them on
tours of the disaster area (Wenger, 1985b:7, Scanlon, 1982:17, Scanlon,
1985:124; Rosow, 1977:87).\
\
Reporters have been described as descending on disaster officials like
\"Wolf packs\" and overwhelming them with demands for specific
information the type of which is seldom available in the early phases of
the incident. They win often pressure officials for \"exact figures\" on
the number of deaths and injuries, the amount of property damage, and
the quality of aid expected. In technological disasters they will ask
why and how such an accident could happen. If officials say they don\'t
know the answers, questions may be raised as to their competence. In
many cases, officials are pressured to offer estimates. Unfortunately,
estimates obtained from various sources may prove to be conflicting or
inconsistent, which also paints a picture of organizational incompetence
(Wenger, 1985b:6; Scanlon, 1985:124; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:70;
Rosow, 1977:86).\
\
\
Distortion of Facts\
The entertainment aspect of news broadcasts focuses on the dramatic and
unique aspects of disasters, favoring the reporting of the unusual
versus the typical or representative events Quarantelli, 1981b:63;
Larson, 1980:93). It has been argued that this perspective perpetuates
common myths about disasters. It also leads to an exaggerated picture of
the disaster\'s magnitude, a factor which tends to magnify the problems
of overresponse and convergence.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"Media reports frequently failed to include qualifiers about uncertain
  information \... (they) do not seem to want to accept the reality that
  disasters are full of ambiguity about precisely what happened. The
  media persist in trying to be precise, and in the process, blunder into
  inaccuracy.\" (Kreps, 1980:66)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Perpetuation of Disaster Myths\
Decades of research have revealed that a number of popular beliefs about
what happens in disasters are incorrect. It has been argued that the
persistence of these \"disaster myths\" is at least partly attributable
to the images portrayed by news reports (Bolduc, 1987).\
\
For example, documented cases of panic flight in disasters are extremely
rare. In fact, a much more significant problem is getting people to
leave their homes, even in the face of certain danger. Nevertheless, the
news media seem so preoccupied with panic that the term is loosely
applied to describe even orderly evacuations.\
\
Another example is looting. Although documented cases of looting are
rare in domestic disasters not involving civil unrest, rumors of looting
are commonly reported by the press. Even when it has been correctly
observed by the press that looting did not ensue, this has often been
couched -in terms to suggest that this was the exception rather than the
rule. What is reported is that the National Guard or police have
instituted measures to prevent looting. However, what is not reported is
that no looting, in fact, occurred (Wenger, 1985b:10; Tierney, 1985b:31;
Drabek, 1985b:18,21).\
\
Sometimes \"what should happen\" in disasters has been so well
ingrained, that if the story did not conform to the expectation, the
reporter shaped it so it did.\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979. Media crews advised people to get off the streets
because they felt deserted streets were appropriate for such a situation
(Scanlon, 1985:124).\
\
Exaggeration of Disaster Impact\
Another contention of some disaster researchers is that the media\'s
preoccupation with the dramatic accentuates and exaggerates the
destructive magnitude of disasters. This has been labeled the \"Dresden
syndrome\" (the media make every tornado-stricken community look like
Dresden after it was bombed in World War II). News films and photographs
focus on scenes of destruction, but not upon the surrounding undamaged
areas. The audience is often lead to believe that the whole community
lies in ruins on the basis of intense coverage of damage which may, in
reality, be limited to a few buildings or blocks.\
\
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964. One of the
widely circulated news photographs of the earth-quake showed a wrecked
department store. The damage that was the focal point of the picture was
impressive, but the buildings across the street were undamaged, with
even their large plate-glass windows still intact (Quarantefli,1972;
Walker, 1982:24).\
\
The impression of widespread destruction is also left by the human
interest story of the family that has suffered great loss from the
disaster. When these news stories are told, it is not always reported to
what extent they represent the disaster\'s impact. The viewer is often
left with the impression that the family\'s plight is the typical
situation of the residents in the disaster area, even when this is not
the case (Wenger, 1985b:13; Quarantelli, 1972).\
\
It should be said at this point, however, that the inaccuracy of news
reports cannot be attributed to the media alone. There are questions
about the extent to which the media introduce distortion and to what
extent they are merely passive disseminators of inaccurate information
provided by official sources (Kreps, 1980:44; Hartsough, 1985:282).\
\
\
Interference with Disaster Operations\
\
Effects on Over-response and Inquiries\
Exaggerated media coverage has been suggested as contributing to the
inundation of inquiries by anxious loved ones. It has also been blamed
for the over-response of resources that typify disasters, complicating
their management (Wenger, 1985b:13; Quarantelli, 1983:68; FEMA,
1984a:85; Scanlon, 1985:124).\
\
Decision-making\
The media have been called a source of interference in local
decision-making, pressuring officials to indicate what action will be
taken before the officials are ready to decide what to do. Sometimes the
media even report greater precision about the intended actions than
actually exist. This factor leads to credibility problems for the
officials involved (Kreps, 1980:68).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \"The analysis process itself requires breaking issues down into
  components, studying them, and manipulating the possible alternatives.
  That takes time. When an emergency is imminent or in progress, there is
  little or no time. Adding to that are the demands of media
  representatives who are trying to meet their own deadlines. Radio and
  television demand immediate response; the greater the emergency, the
  greater the urgency in putting something on the air. The possibilities
  of error are magnified\.... While leaders are attempting to gather
  facts and make assessments, the press is pushing. To news people
  pursuing a disaster, there is not time; information is demanded
  immediately and, if officials cannot provide it, then it win be
  gathered from unofficial sources. Another element of traditional policy
  analysis is muted or removed entirely. Therefore, the structure of the
  analytical process is changed. Steps are omitted. Decisions are made
  with partial facts and without fun appreciation of the ramifications.
  Further, because of the media-imposed time factors, a decision once
  made and announced is very difficult to reverse.\" (FEMA, 1984a:85)

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Mass media activities may even subvert the adherence to disaster plans
and alter the disaster response decision-making process.\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979. \"The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had a proposed
emergency response system for an accident at fixed-site nuclear
facilities prior to the accident at Three Mile Island. Basically, the
plan centered around the major coordinating role that was to be
performed by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. However, by
the later stages of the disaster, the plan had been abandoned\.... The
entire system had evolved into that of \'emergency management by press
conference.\' Under the stress of monumental media attention and
demands, state and federal authorities centralized all decisions and
information-distribution within the Governor\'s office. This alteration
effectively isolated the state\'s emergency management system not only
from active involvement in decision-making, but also from the receipt of
information. Local and state emergency management officials, who had
planned to be centrally involved in the response, often found it
necessary to listen to radio and television press conferences in order
to find out what was happening.\" (Wenger, 1985b:8)\
\
The presence of the media can limit the alternatives available for
response and make alternative contingency planning difficult. For
example, the local mayor, considering the possibility of violence during
a labor dispute, might hesitate to ask the governor to put the National
Guard on standby. If word leaks out to the press, the situation could
worsen. In a toxic spin disaster, if the media learns that mortuaries
are being put on alert, this might conflict with the officials\'
simultaneous desire to calm the public (FEMA, 1984a:82).\
\
Rescue and Recovery\
The convergence of media personnel at the disaster site has been
reported to physically interfere with response and recovery operations.\
\
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. The California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) was called in to help clear
earthquake rubble from the streets. Media personnel reportedly
contributed to the crowd problems which made it impossible to safely
remove the debris. As a result, Caltrans threatened to remove its
equipment altogether unless the traffic could be cleared (Scholl,
1984:288; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:70). \"The news media was an
extremely disruptive influence. They frequently hindered response
ac-tions in their efforts to obtain camera coverage or to interview
rescue workers, city officials, or other response officials.\" (Seismic
Safety Comm, 1983:70)\
\
Problems with media air traffic have been reported in a number of
disasters (Tierney, 1985b:34; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15; Lewis,
1980:863).\
\
EXAMPLE: Volcano Eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May 18, 1980.
Private aircraft carrying news media personnel be-came a threat to the
air search efforts, contributing to the risk of mid-air collisions
(Drabek, 1981:179; Kilijanek, 1981:63,67).\
\
As a result of repeated problems with air traffic at disasters, the
Federal Aviation Administration was finally forced, in June of 1985, to
issue a new regulation prohibiting helicopters from flying in disaster
areas unless they were carrying out emergency or rescue assignments
(Holton, 1985:13).\
\
\
HOW THE MEDIA OPERATE IN DISASTERS\
\
If disaster planners and managers are going to effectively deal with the
media, they first need to understand what makes the media \"tick\" in
disasters. Media behavior is fairly predictable. \"Win-win\" situations
can be accomplished with the news media if disaster planners and
emergency managers know what they need and are able to provide it for
them (Bernstein, 1986:46).\
\
The Media Will be There\
They Will Hear of the Disaster\
Emergency managers are rarely able to carry out a disaster response
without the media hearing about it (Scanlon, 1985:124). When a major
incident occurs, some citizens will call the media. Others will tell
friends and neighbors, and that news reaches the media. The media also
monitor the activities and radio transmissions of key emergency agencies
on a continuous basis. Major response activity is difficult to conceal
(Scanlon, 1982:14; Scanlon, 1985:128).\
\
Convergence of Media at the Disaster Site\
In a newsworthy disaster, the media may descend on the scene en masse.
Even a fairly localized disaster can become a world media event within
minutes. Literally hundreds of journalists and their crews will show up
at the scene (Kilijanek, 1981:77, Wenger, 1985b:7; Scanlon, 1982:14;
Scanlon, 1985:124).\
\
EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Coalinga, California, May 2, 1983. A swarm of media
people arrived-between 150 and 200 . coming \"literally from all over
the world, taking photographs, interviewing emergency responders and
residents, and hiring aircraft to fly over the damaged area. The
presence of so many media workers added to the burden of emergency
response agencies . (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:32,34; Tierney,
1985b:34)\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979. \"The size of the press corps, and especially the
electronic legions that descended on the Harrisburg area in the first
few days of the crisis were reminiscent in numbers and baggage of the
armies of reporters, photographers, feature writers, correspondents,
camera crews and editing and production units that flock every four
years to the national political conventions. Only in this case there had
been no planning time to establish procedures, or to set up facilities
to deal with this overpowering demand for complex information. Three
commercial TV networks \... established full scale field operations in
various motels in the area\.... Each brought in between 75 and 100
reporters, editors, managers and technicians. In addition, camera and
reporter teams were quickly on hand from individual TV stations in
nearby Harrisburg, Lancaster, Baltimore and Philadelphia.\" (Holton,
1985:1)\
\
\
Effects of Technology on Media Convergence\
If a Three Mile Island-type disaster were to occur today, it is
estimated that the numbers of media personnel responding in the first 24
hours would be in-creased three-fold. Recent technological advances have
reduced the size, weight, and cost of portable video equipment. They
have also improved the ability to transmit audiovisual material over
long distances by microwave and satellite. Because of this, it has
become physically possible and financially feasible for local TV
stations to cover news stories in distant locations.\
\
Local TV reporters, complete with their own camera crews, are ranging as
far away as Beirut, Jerusalem, Rome, Ethiopia, Peking, India, and Japan
to collect lively and graphic material for their broadcasts. This,
combined with the intense competition for local news audiences, has led
to a multi-fold increase in the number of media personnel who will
quickly descend upon a disaster-stricken community (Holton, 1985:3,11).
The proliferation of local media at distant events is illustrated by the
following:\
\
EXAMPLE: In 1980, the two national political conventions in New York
City and Detroit attracted crews from approximately 25 local stations
which felt they could afford to send them. In 1984, the New York Times
reported that nearly 400 local TV stations were sending news teams to
the convention in San Francisco-an 8-fold increase (Holton, 1985:3)!\
\
Information-seeking Behavior\
\
General Types of Information Sought\
\
Members of the press have been trained to report the unique and
sensational. In determining the newsworthiness of a disaster, two main
criteria are applied to an event. The most important is its impact in
terms of deaths and injuries; the second is the extent of property
damage (Larson, 1980:94,119). Reporters will want to interview
participants in the response, officials in charge of disaster
operations, witnesses, and victims. Those disseminating information to
the media should anticipate requests for the following information
(Bernstein, 1986:41; Brunacini, 1978:206.01; Scanlon, 1982:15):

Figure 10-1. Advances in communications technology have contributed to
media convergence at disasters. This media satellite dish was located at
\"The Forty-Niner Fire,\" Nevada County, California, during September,
1988. (Courtesy of The Union, Grass Valley, California.)\
\
\
Casualty information.\
How many were killed or injured? Of those injured, how serious is their
condition? How many escaped? How was escape hindered? Were any of the
victims prominent persons? How were the injured managed? Where were they
taken? What was the disposition of the dead?\
\
Property damage\
What is the estimated value of property loss? What kind of structures
are involved? Did the damage include any particularly important property
(e.g., historical buildings, art treasures, homes of prominent figures)?
Is other property threatened? What measures have been under-taken or are
being undertaken to protect property? Is the damage covered by
insurance? Has this area been damaged by disasters before?\
\
Response and relief activities.\
Who discovered the emergency? Who summoned the alarm? How quickly were
response units on the scene? What agencies responded? How many are
engaged in the response? What acts of heroism occurred? How was the
emergency kept from spreading? How are the displaced and homeless being
cared for?\
\
Other characteristics of the crisis.\
Were there any blasts or explosions? Collapse of structures? Crimes or
violence? Attempts at escape or self rescue? What was the extent of the
disaster? The duration? Number of spectators? Crowd problems? Were there
other unusual happenings? What accompanying accidents have occurred?
What were the resulting effects (e.g., anxiety, stress) on the families
and survivors?\
\
Causes of the disaster.\
Were there any previous indications of danger? Could the disaster have
been prevented? How? \[Questions about blame are more likely to surface
in technological disasters such as hazardous materials accidents\]
(Wenger, 1985b:22; Holton, 1985:20). Will there be a coroner\'s inquest?
Lawsuits? Insurance company actions? Criminal investigation?

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEMany of the questions that will be asked by reporters are
  predictable, and procedures can be established in advance for
  collecting the desired information.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Types of Media and Their Different Information Needs\
In carrying out the public information, function, it is important to
realize that different types of media have different informational and
logistical needs (Scanlon, 1982:17; Scanlon, 1985:127; Holton, 1985:19;
Larson, 1980:86; Bemstein, 1986:46; FEMA, 1984a:83,197).\
\
Local versus non-local.\
Local news covers all phases of the disaster, ranging from the warning
phase, through impact and response, and on into recovery and
rehabilitation. The local media have long-range, home-town concerns.
They attempt to provide specific information to area residents to help
them face the crisis: warning information, evacuation advice, where help
is available, and how long utilities are expected to be out of service.\
\
In contrast, the national media are less interested in details of the
disaster, such as names of people (unless they are nationally prominent)
or specific locations, than in the unique aspects of a particular
disaster or in the human interest stories in the event. They are more
concerned with the overall picture, focusing on such things as the scope
of the impact, the number of dead and injured, and the activities of
federal response agencies and national relief organizations. Their
interest in the local incident is generally maintained only as long as
there is an active state of disaster. Concern with long-term recovery
activity is less likely. Questions posed by the national media may be
less sensitive, sometimes trespassing into areas that local reporters
consider off limits. (Local reporters must cultivate long-term
relationships with local officials who may be important contacts for
future stories.) A disaster is more likely to attract national media
attention if there is visually exciting footage to film. Events
occurring early in the day may get priority for coverage because of the
time it takes to edit the video material.\
\
The international press may take on an even different focus. For
example, during a flood in Florence, Italy, the British press focused
more on the threat to Renaissance art treasures than on the local
concerns with the human suffering and loss.\
\
Television.\
Television media have concerns with shipping film or transmitting video
material via satellite. TV combines the qualities of sight, sound,
immediacy, and motion. The impact of television is affected by the
editing of the stories, the hour of broadcast, and the number of times
the broadcast is repeated. The TV media want visuals; a telephone
conversation is not an adequate substitute. Television is predisposed to
a headline approach that emphasizes succinct, catchy 20- to 30-second
statements. The haste required in assembling a major television news
report is illustrated in a passage by ABC News vice president, A.V.
Westin, in his book, News-Watch, as de-scribed in the Federal Emergency
Management Agency\'s Monograph on the electronic news media:\
\
\"In its live and continuous coverage of a breaking story of \...
significant proportions TV news compresses that \[traditional editing\]
process. The coverage takes on a life of its own, developing momentum
and drive, which forces correspondents to race rather than walk from one
story element to another. The anchors become, in effect, editors and
reporters. Reporters on the scene of the breaking story may add
important details; still it is the anchor who summarizes, repeats,
amplifies, and ultimately evaluates the material coming in from the
field. All those judgments are taking place under time pressures and in
the midst of near chaos. Dozens of facts, rumors, conjectures, and ideas
are surging about every minute. The system does not provide for a
detailed review of material. Much of what pours in are raw data, edited
in the head of the correspondent as he or she reads from notes hastily
scribbled at the scene. Interviews are done with eyewitnesses whose own
credibility is unchallenged and unchecked. The system provides for only
two alternatives: accept the material or reject it.\" (Holton, 1985:13)\
\
Actually, to fully appreciate the impact of dealing with a major
disaster story, what is described in the above passage would have to be
mentally multiplied fifty-fold (Holton, 1985:12).\
\
Commercial radio.\
Radio wants to be there first and to have rapid access to information.
After all, it is able to reach audiences almost anywhere. It tends to
broadcast the information almost as soon as it\'s received, but
generally limits its reports, which are short in duration (often less
than a minute) and selective in detail.\
\
Print (newspapers, magazines).\
Radio and print media are concerned with availability of telephone
communications to transmit information. to their offices. Because print
news does not have the time constraints experienced by radio and TV, it
tends to search for more background and off-beat material. Often reports
include analysis and commentary, and stories may build day-after-day as
the disaster progresses. They want depth and graphics and are not
constrained by the same time limitations as radio and TV. Print
photographers may be very aggressive, because to compete with the
emotional impact of TV, their pictures have to be exclusive.\
\
Information-sharing\
One of the important maxims of the media is that while it is desirable
to get an exclusive story (a \"scoop\"), it is even more important not
to get scooped. It has been observed that the tendency in a truly major
incident is for almost all the reporters present from the various media
to share with each other the information they obtain. The various media
also monitor each other to pick up information they may have missed
(Scanlon, 1982:15; Scanlon, 1985:131; Wenger, 1985b:20; Holton,
1985:21).\
\
EXAMPLE: The Canadian public broadcasting organization (CBQ receives
information from Canadian Press (CP), the main Canadian news agency. CP
is linked to the United States, British, and French news wire services,
with which it shares information. CBC is also linked to U.S. television
networks ABC and NBC. In addition, CBC monitors its main rival, CTV, and
the Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail (Scanlon, 1982:15).\
\
This information-sharing tendency has important implications for the
establishment of a centralized source of public information in disasters
(discussed later in this chapter).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLENewsworthy information will rapidly spread among news
  organizations and from one type of media to another.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

The Media are Different in Disasters\
\
Diminished Information Verification\
In disasters, the media become voracious consumers of information.
Television and radio stations may abandon regular programming in favor
of non-stop disaster coverage. News shortages develop when official
sources of information are not sufficient to fill the expanded news
coverage. Sometimes the pressure to keep airtime filled with disaster
news creates demands on media personnel at the scene that can only be
described as desperation. When this occurs, the usual pattern of
checking sources is often relinquished in favor of a new norm: that all
news should be disseminated from all sources (official and non-official)
as soon as it is obtained. Even contradictory information may be
broadcast. This is justified on the assumption that instant feedback
from the public win straighten things out in the end (Larson, 1980:62;
Holton, 1985:20; Scanlon, 1982:15; Scanlon, 1985:128).\
\
Diminished Adversarial Role\
The traditional role of the press as a watchdog over the government goes
back to the very founding of our nation. However, in disasters, the
media will often moderate their adversarial posture towards government.
Quite often, the media will arrive at the scene willing to temporarily
set aside animosities that might have developed during routine news
coverage (Holton, 1985:22). Al-though this norm has been applied to
technical disasters as well as natural ones, this is less likely. In
particular, nuclear accidents tend to arouse a skeptical stance and
blame seeking. Whether justified or not, some journalists feel the
nuclear proponents have created a credibility gap when it comes to the
safety of power plant reactors. In addition, a significant anti-nuclear
movement generates a hostile and untrusting stance towards emergencies
involving radioactive material (Rubin, 1987:14).\
\
The media will often cooperate with requests by officials to hold back
information that might have an adverse effect on the public during the
disaster. Even if there is no such request, information has been
withheld on the media\'s own initiative when it was felt to be harmful.\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Penn-\
Slvania, March 28, 1979. The Harrisburg Patriot-News, acting Y solely on
its own judgment, deleted a reporter\'s account of what would happen to
bank records in the event of a disaster because it was concerned about
provoking a run on the banks (Scanlon, 1985:124).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEThe media will often withhold newsworthy disaster stories it
  feels would be detrimental to the public.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Domination by the National versus Local Media\
In routine emergencies, response and government officials may deal with
familiar persons representing the local media. To some extent, local
reporters have a stake in cultivating and maintaining good contacts with
local officials who are often a reliable source of daily news. In
addition, local reporters have some sensitivity about the needs of the
community. These factors may allow a good working relationship to
develop between local media and response organizations.\
\
Some officials may come to believe that this relationship will form the
basis of their interactions with the media in a major disaster.
Unfortunately, the usual ground rules of interaction are often brushed
aside by the outside media whose numbers quickly overwhelm the locals.
In particular, network television news tends to quickly dominate at the
scene of a major disaster. There are several reasons for this (Holton,
1985:21):

-   The networks assign large, multi-specialty staffs to disasters,
    often led by producers and other personnel experienced in this kind
    Of event. These crews are often quite adept at acquiring lodging,
    office space, telephone lines, and such.

-   The major networks are pragmatically aware of the advantages of
    cooperating with each other and have developed arrangements for
    doing so effectively. The effectiveness of such agreements is the
    basis of an efficient news-gathering operation.

-   Usually each network assigns several \"star\" correspondents to an
    event of such proportions. The possibility of an appearance on
    \"Good Morning America\" or \"Dan Rather\'s Evening News\" tends to
    sweep aside the local media competition for interviews.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLELocal officials will have to deal with different news media in
  times of\
  disaster than those with which they interface on a routine basis.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

The \"Command Post\" Perspective of the Media\
For all types of media, the most important sources of news are official
government agencies, and much of the news about disasters tends to be
reported from the perspective of these agencies. This is known as the
\"command post\" perspective (Larson, 1980:89; Quarantelli, 1981b). In
fact, the media can be depended on to demand news conferences at which
authoritative official statements can be recorded (Scanlon, 1982:16).
This, like the tendency for reporters to share information, can
facilitate response agency efforts to develop a central ized source for
public information.\
\
Media Difficulties with Technical Information\
Most news agencies have not developed a cadre of reporters and
consultants with technical expertise on disaster-related topics.
Accordingly, they have a great deal of difficulty evaluating the
technical aspects of disasters and assess-mg the competence of various
(sometimes conflicting) sources of information (Drabek, 1986:167;
Scanlon, 1982:16; Scanlon, 1985:124; Wenger, 1985b:22; Holton,
1985:24).\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accident, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979. \"A seemingly simple question of whether the core of the
reactor had been \... damaged elicited responses couched in terms of
\'ruptured fuel pins/ \'pinholes in the cladding/ \'fuel.damage\' \"
(Scanlon, 1985:124) Once a reporter had figured out what they were
saying he might discover another source that was saying something
different. Media representatives felt as if they needed a degree in
nuclear physics just to ask the right questions (Scanlon, 1982:17).\
\
This factor makes it very important for public information officers to
find those to speak to the media who are adept at translating technical
subjects into plain English.\
\
\
IMPROVING MEDIA DISASTER OPERATIONS\
\
The Need for Media Planning\
\
Considering the impact the media can have on the public and disaster
response agencies, both positive and negative, the need for planning in
this area is of paramount importance.\
\
EXAMPLE: Train Derailment and Chlorine Gas Leak, Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada, November 10, 1979. The evacuation of 220,000 residents, 3
hospitals, and several nursing homes was widely praised. The success of
the response was attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the area
police put the importance of media operations second only to on-site
command and control (Scanlon, 1985:124,127; Quarantelli, 1982a:H-36).\
\
However, those who have studied this topic have reported few communities
that have treated this facet of preparedness as more than an
afterthought. Often this has consisted merely of assigning someone the
duty of writing and distributing press releases and assuming this would
adequately deal with the issue. It has been claimed that a number of the
problems disaster managers face in dealing with the media result from a
failure to fully understand and plan for the media. Even those who
understand what information the media needs and the importance of
providing it are not always provided the resources (e.g., staff, time,
equipment) to accomplish the task (Wenger, 1985b:8,25; Holton,
1985:iii).\
\
Ability of the Media to Survive and Function\
If the local media are to be able to carry out their designated
functions in a disaster, they must first be able to survive the impact.
Consideration must be given to the importance of locating broadcast
stations and transmitters in areas not vulnerable to natural hazards and
to providing back-up electrical generators.\
\
EXAMPLE: Flood, Rochester, Minnesota, 1978. When flood waters crested
the Zumbro River and inundated the city, television station KTTC was in
the water\'s path. Local news coverage ended when the station crew was
forced to evacuate. Because the transmitter was located upstairs, the
crew was able to leave the microwave link operating so that at least
network broadcasting could continue. However, even this was terminated
when the local power station flooded, cutting off the station\'s
electricity. Not only was the station unable to function as it should
during the disaster, but the waters also\
destroyed most of the film and video tapes in the basement on which were
stored 20 years of Rochester history (NAB:1).\
\
It is also important that communication links to sources of official
information not depend on telephone lines. Additional considerations
include provisions for sleeping and eating, for calling in staff after
hours, and for rotating staff on a 24-hour basis (Scanlon, 1985:124).\
\
Educating the Media about Disasters\
As in the case of disaster response organizations, media function is
best carried out when the participants have an adequate disaster
knowledge base. Education can help to reduce inaccurate news reporting.
For example, newscasters should be encouraged not to withhold news
information, warnings, and instructions to the public for fear of
causing panic. The evidence indicates that the public is quite capable
of handling the facts. The media should be aware that a disaster warning
is less likely to be taken seriously if it is followed by resumption of
normal programming. Newscasters should also be taught the importance of
announcing the areas not hit by the disaster and the effect this
information will have on reducing the number of calls by persons who
believe they have loved ones in the impact zone. Finally, reporters
should be sensitized to the fact that precise information and accurate
figures on deaths, injuries, damage, and cause, in the early aftermath
of a disaster, is an unrealistic expectation. Trying to pin down
officials to \"exact\" information can be self-defeating
(Scanlon,1985:129).\
\
Media organizations often keep files to which they refer for background
information when a large news story breaks (Scanlon, 1982:14). This
provides an opportunity for astute disaster planners to make useful and
accurate information available on a pre-impact basis. Glossaries of
technical terms, schematic drawings, models, and diagrams are also
valuable tools for assuring that the media, and ultimately the public,
understand disaster phenomena (Bernstein,1986:86).\
\
Involvement of the Media in Planning\
Probably one of the best ways to educate the media about disasters is to
have them involved in the disaster planning process. Effective planning
for public information in disasters cannot be done for them. It has to
be done with them (Wenger, 1985b:25). Without their active involvement,
one suffers the risk of falling into the \"paper\" plan syndrome.\
\
Representation on Planning Bodies\
One of the most important requirements for effective media disaster
operations is to plug the media into all stages of the disaster planning
process (Scanlon, 1985:126). The media should be represented on
disaster-planning bodies. Some may oppose this idea believing that it
may lead to a hesitancy to discuss preparedness weak points in the
presence of the press. In that case, it may be necessary to be selective
about the meetings the media should attend. On the other hand, the media
can be a powerful ally when it comes to obtaining public funding and
support if they understand the weak points and see a need for financial
bolstering.\
\
Local Media Participation in Media Relations\
One clever strategy for handling media relations is to delegate the
responsibility to the local media itself. This technique has reportedly
been used effectively in a number of Canadian communities. The media has
been plugged right into the disaster response and served as a liaison
between the Emergency Operations Center and the outside media (Scanlon,
1985:127).\
\
Initiating Planning with the Media\
When initiating contact with the media, it is probably best to start at
the top. Contact the commercial radio or television station owner or
manager, the newspaper or news magazine publisher or editor. They will
be able to assign someone in their organization to act as liaison with
the local disaster planning effort. An alternative is to directly
approach those responsible for day-to-day news coverage. For the print
media this would be the managing or city editor, for the electronic
media, the news director (Scanlon, 1985:126).

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEAdequate disaster preparedness requires planning with the
  rather than for the media.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

::: Definition-Term
Reaching the Public\
\
Knowledge about Audience Composition\
Merely seeing to it that there is a local radio or TV station
broadcasting disaster information does not assure it will be received by
all who need it. For example, some communities have significant
populations of special language or ethnic groups that may not be reached
by English-language broadcasting. Those with hearing or visual
disabilities have to be considered as wen.\
\
A helpful technique in public information planning is the use of viewing
and listening audience surveys carried out by agencies such as A.C.
Nielson and Arbitron. These surveys can be used to provide information
about the audiences for various media at different times. By inference,
this information can also be used to get an idea of who is not being
reached (Scanlon, 1985:125). One consideration may be to use volunteers,
or \"TelePatrol\" (see Chapter 9) to canvass neighborhoods to ascertain
who cannot be reached by the normal warning and advisory methods, and to
develop alternative means of conveying this information when needed.\
\
The Emergency Broadcast System\
The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) evolved from the CONELRAD (Control
of Electromagnetic Radiation) system created in 1951. Its purpose was to
provide a means by which the President, utilizing existing commercial
broad-casting stations, would communicate directly with the public in
times of national emergency. While the system was originally to be used
in the event of enemy attack, it has been expanded to civil disaster use
so that it can be activated by certain state and local government
officials as wen (NAB:20).\
\
State-wide activation of the Emergency Broadcast System allows the
governor to address the entire state citizenry at the same time.
However, the system has an inherent technical weakness. It depends on
\"chain-broadcasting.\" What this means is that the governor broadcasts
a message via a commercial (usually an FM) station in the Capital. This
broadcast is picked up by a more distant station and relayed on. This
process is repeated until the message is conveyed across the state. If,
however, one station in the chain is disabled, or can\'t operate because
it doesn\'t have an emergency generator, then the \"chain\" is broken.\
\
Attempts to use the EBS can fail, as in after the earthquake in
Coalinga, California, when officials didn\'t know how to activate it
(Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:165). Unless government officials and
commercial broadcasters are motivated enough to educate the users and
test the system frequently, those who need to utilize the system in a
disaster may be unfamiliar with it (another variation of the \"paper\"
plan syndrome) (Harter, 1985).\
\
Exceptions to FCC Regulations\
In emergency conditions and disasters, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) allows public and commercial broadcast stations,
without prior approval, to ignore certain regulations governing their
transmissions. For example, certain stations have to go off the air or
limit their transmission power at certain times of the day or night.
During an emergency, stations may use their full power regardless of the
time of day. Furthermore, at the request of government officials,
stations may broadcast point-to-point and even person-to-person messages
for the purpose of requesting or dispatching aid and assisting rescue
operations (NAB:13; Wenger, 1985b:18).\
\
Use of Non-local Stations\
When local stations are non-functional as a result of a disaster, it is
often possible for local media or local government officials to convey
information to stations outside the impacted area for broadcast back
into the stricken locale. In this way, the flow of essential information
to the disaster victims can be maintained.\
\
TIS Radio: Be Your Own Media\
Using a little-known provision under Part 90 of the FCC regulations,
agencies of city, county, and state government are able to set up their
own \"mini\" radio stations. These \"Travelers Information System\"
(TIS) radio stations, can transmit information to the public on the AM
radio band. You may have encounter ed such a radio station while
visiting a national park, a major airport, or while crossing an
international border. Typically, you will see a sign at the roadside
instructing you to tune to either 530 or 1610 Kilohertz on the AM band
for local traveler\'s information.\
\
TIS radio stations can be licensed for use in national parks, adjacent
to major transportation centers, and adjacent to federal and state
highways. It is this latter provision (being adjacent to a highway) that
allows almost any city to qualify for a TIS radio station license. While
most TIS stations are used to provide traffic directions and
information, they can also be used for other non-commercial purposes,
including the issuance of public safety information during emergencies
and disasters.\
\
The Coronado, California, Police Department established a TIS radio
station in January, 1985, and has found it to be a worthwhile and
cost-effective addition to their public information system in routine
and emergency conditions (Boyd, 91985). Motorists entering the city,
will see large road signs reading, \"Traffic/ Emergency Info-Tune 530
AM,- and can get up-to-the-minute information on traffic problems and
delays. They may be directed to alternative routes to avoid traffic
congestion, relieving traffic officers for other purposes. During local
emergencies or disasters, the radio can broadcast official information
on the event, lessening the volume of telephone inquiries that typically
\"light up\" police telephone switchboards in such events, and allowing
personnel to direct their attention to emergency response-related
communications.\
\
The equipment for a TIS radio station is relatively inexpensive (\$1,500
to \$2,500), small in size (the transmitter occupies a space of about a
cubic foot), and simple to operate (estimated training time is less than
5 minutes). Endless-loop audio tape cassettes are available in various
lengths (20 seconds to 10 minutes and more) for about \$5 each.\
\
Total installation time for the system is about 4 hours. Technical
assistance can be obtained from local government radio maintenance
personnel, or donated time from local AM commercial radio stations. In
Coronado, assistance was given by local amateur radio operators who were
already involved in local disaster preparedness activities. Coverage
area is dependent on the type of antenna, its placement, the local
terrain, and the maximum allowable transmitter power, which is limited
to 10 watts. Even with these limitations, however, the broadcasts can be
received within a radius of 7 to 8 miles.\
The steps needed to establish a TIS radio station are as follows:
:::

-   Obtain a TIS radio station license application and a copy of Part 90
    of the FCC rules. Request information regarding commercial radio
    stations in your area that broadcast between 520 to 540 kHz and 1630
    to 1640 kHz. You must operate on a non-interference basis with other
    local stations.

-   Using available or volunteer technical assistance, prepare the FCC
    license application. You can expect the license to arrive in 60 to
    90 days.

-   Locate a radio equipment supplier. Several manufacturers pro-duce
    TIS radios. Advertisements can be found in communications journals
    (e.g., The Associated Public Communications Officers \[APCO\]
    journal, P.O. Box 669, New Smyrna Beach, FL 32069). Delivery time
    will be 4 to 8 weeks. Two manufacturers are:

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  Radio Systems, Inc\                 Information Station\
  5113 W. Chester Pike\               P.O. Box 51\
  Edgemont, PA 19028\                 Zeeland, MI 49464\
  Attn. Dan Braverman\                Attn. William Baker\
  (800) 523-2133\                     (616) 772-2300
  or (215) 356-4700                   

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

-   Using available technical expertise, identify a location for the
    equipment. You will need a 115 volt AC circuit which is on emergency
    backup power. A suitable location for the antenna must be located,
    consistent with FCC regulations which limit the height of the
    antenna above the average local terrain. The bulk of the
    installation time will be installing the antenna, wiring it to the
    transmitter, and tuning the antenna to match the radio.

Centralization of Public Information\
Having a central source from which the media can receive official
information about the disaster can help to assure that what the public
receives is timely, consistent, and accurate. The Incident Command
System has seen this as an important enough issue to designate a
specific command staff position for it and to develop specific
procedures for the process (ICS, 1981). Indeed, the design of the ICS
and the forms used to keep track of the incident and resource status,
contribute to the effective and efficient collection of information for
the media.\
\
Acceptance by the Media

-   Several characteristics of the media make them receptive to a
    central source of public information:

-   The media tend to share information anyway.

-   The media often prefer to attribute the news to official sources
    (the \"command post\" perspective).

-   Due to news deadlines, the media will congregate where it is easiest
    to get the greatest amount of news quickly.

-   The media will not only be receptive to press conferences in a
    central location where \"packaged\" news releases are handed
    out-they will often, in fact, demand them (Scanlon, 1985:124).

Where the concept has been promoted, the media, especially television,
have given it support and even offered to help preplan the details of
such an arrangement (Holton, 1985:27).\
\
The need for a public information center, as seen from the perspective
of the media, is captured in the following quote:\
\
EXAMPLE: Tornado, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 9, 1953. \"Whom do you
believe when you are broadcasting? Who is the real authority? There is a
confused picture from confused lines of authority. They are superseding,
overlapping, and parallel to each other, all at the same time\.... But
who knows the facts and can speak with authority about them? That is the
dilemma of the broadcaster\.... That is why a central clearing house of
information is important\.... When there is just confused authority, the
broadcaster has to do the best he can. He has to make private decisions
about what he will regard as authoritative sources.\" (Rosow, 1977:86)\
\
Sources of Information\
The success of a centralized information office depends on its access to
accurate and timely intelligence (situation analysis) (Rubin, 1987:12).
This requires functioning procedures for inter-organizational
information flow, a problem cussed in detail in Chapter 5. The adoption
of the Incident Command S one way of facilitating this process.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRINCIPLEThe propensity for the media to share information and to
  assume \"command post\" perspective facilitates the establishment of a
  central source of disaster information.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Limitations of Centralized Information\
The fact that the media will embrace the establishment of a central
soikwi;, of disaster information does not mean that any emergency
management or government official is going to be able to control the
news. Reporters do not rely on only one source for news information.
They usually have a variety of Reno and sources, and this is not likely
to change in a disaster.\
\
Although it is advantageous to establish a single media center for
disaster information and to staff it with trained public information
officers, the amount of information that is centralized is relative,
rather than complete. To some extent, rumors will still occur, the
public will still get information from friends, family members, and
other sources, and the credibility of government officials will not be
guaranteed (Wenger, 1985b:21).\
\
Reducing Media Convergence\
Media Pools\
The problem of media convergence\--crowding the emergency operations
center, tying up communications facilities, and making demands for tours
of the disaster site-can be lessened by the use of media pools. A media
pool is where only one or a few reporters collect information about an
event and then share it\
with their colleagues and competitors. The media are often not only
receptive to pools, but (especially network television) will even form
pools on their own initiative (Holton, 1985:21).\
\
One tactic that might be useful is to assign local media representatives
as pool coordinators. \" The selection of these coordinators would
depend on their taking a disaster public information training course set
up by the local preparedness agency. This \"disaster education\" can
help avoid the dissemination of disaster myths, can help the media to
understand and sympathize with the difficulties faced by public
officials, and can help the media to be aware of the types of public
information that best assist the disaster response efforts. Because of
the differences in media needs, it is best to compose the media pool of
representatives from each of the following: print media, television
commercial radio, and the national wire services. In addition, the pool
should include representatives from local, regional, national, and if
applicable, inter-national media (Bernstein, 1986:88).\
\
Media Outreach andlor Use of Computer Communication\
Another way to reduce the media\'s disruptive activities is to channel
their information-seeking behavior. This can be done by contacting the
various media and informing them where centralized information can be
reached.\
\
Don\'t wait for the media to show up-get the information to them where
they are, and use automated or computerized devices to give regular news
updates. The mere existence or designation of a centralized information
office does not guarantee that it will be used. The media must be aware
that it has been set up\
and where it is located. If media pools have been established, then
media outside of the pool need to know how to obtain information from
it. Printed press releases or pre-recorded (audio and/or visual) press
releases can lessen the burden on public information officials. Releases
can even be made available by recorded telephone messages. In fact,
TelePatrol (see Chapter 9) could be well adapted for this use.
Specifically tailored recorded messages can be assembled for the
different types of media and telephoned to them by a computer dialing
process using a pre-programmed fist of phone numbers. Centralized
sources for visual material can also be conveyed in the messages.\
\
Channeling the news media\'s information search is best accomplished, if
possible, by contacting them before they show up at the scene. Once
again, if telephone lines are available, this may be accomplished by
TelePatrol. Another arrangement is to plan a tone-encoded, two-way radio
net with local news media and local or regional wire service offices.\
\
One program that illustrates the usefulness of the \"media outreach\"
idea is the Media Computer Netu7ork (MCN), in use in Sacramento,
California (Dickson, 1987). The county sheriff was the motivating force
behind the idea. The net-work uses computer terminals in the public
information offices of a number of public safety and other agencies
which are tied by dedicated lines directly into area news agencies. At
present, the network includes local TV and radio stations, newspapers,
the local and Associated Press wire services, area police and fire
agencies, the County District Attorney\'s office, the California Highway
Patrol, California Office of Emergency Services, Folsom Prison, the
local offices of the FBI and U.S. Attorney, and local utilities
including the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant.\
\
Each terminal can send, receive, and store messages. High-quality
graphics printers allow maps, photos, and other visual material to be
transmitted. Portable, briefcase-sized, inexpensive computers are
available for agencies to use in the field, and cellular phones and
phone booths can be used to send information from them. When a local
agency, such as the police department, types a news bulletin into the
system, it is immediately and automatically conveyed to every other
terminal in the system. In addition, individual terminals can
communicate with each other privately.\
\
Experience with the network has revealed several benefits. First, local
agencies find that use of the system decreases the number of inquiries
by the press. Since the network conveys information instantly and
simultaneously to 22 separate news agencies, including two wire
services, this lessens the need for each of these agencies to make a
separate inquiry. Prior to initiation of the network it was not unusual
for the law enforcement agency to receive 20 to 25 calls on a routine
developing crime story. In other words, there reportedly is a noticeable
decrease in media convergence. Second, the system is in use on a daily,
routine basis. For this reason, in contrast to the Emergency Broadcast
System, it is more likely to be a familiar tool and more likely to be
functioning and to be used in a disaster. Third, since every agency
receives a printed copy of the news releases, information is less likely
to be misunderstood, and incorrect information is more likely to be
noticed and corrected by somebody on the network.\
\
Although MCN is a proprietary program, and the author does not wish to
endorse specific commercial products, the idea appears to have merit.
Readers wishing to investigate the idea further may contact: The Media
Computer Network, P.O. Box 60919, Sacramento, CA 95860, (916) 488-8624.\
\
Regional Public Information Teams and Equipment\
Another novel approach that has been suggested for managing the media
assault in disasters is to import specialized outside public information
management equipment and/or teams of public relations specialists. Media
coverage in disasters is dominated by the national television media.
Perhaps it would be good to make available to local governments teams of
professionals who are experienced in handling the media (Scanlon,
1985:131).\
\
Surviving a Press Conference or Interview\
To the harried official trying to manage the pressing contingencies of a
major disaster, the idea of facing a national news audience can be an
intimidating prospect. In fact, the absence of skill in carrying out
this task can convert an otherwise adequately handled incident into a
public relations disaster. What follows, while certainly not
scientifically validated, is a collation of suggestions from public
information professionals which may be of help in surviving the
experience (FEMA, 1984a:88,198; Bernstein, 1986:45,86; Lavalla,
1983:279; Scanlon 1985:127; Johnson, 1986:106; CSTI, 1987).\
\
Be Prepared\
There are certain questions (discussed above) that you can virtually
predict the press will ask. Do your homework and be ready with answers.
Background material, graphs, charts, and illustrations can sometimes be
assembled in advance to help convey what you will want to say.\
\
Be Wary of \"\'Off-the-record\" Comments\
The reporter assumes that everything you say and everything he sees is
\"on- the-record\" and fair game unless specifically agreed to the
contrary in advance. It is wise, therefore, when talking to the press,
either in person or on the phone, to assume that anything you say might
be published. If you feel the information you provide should be
anonymous, you might be better off not giving the interview at all.\
\
Be Honest\
Trying to cover up mistakes, mislead the press, or withhold critical
information about a disaster can backfire.\
\
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Reactor Accidents, Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,
March 28, 1979 and Chernobyl, USSR, April 28, 1986. \"Once officials in
charge did begin to talk, they were quick to put the best face on
developments and reluctant to confirm bad news. This diminished their
credibility and severely reduced the number of trustworthy sources with
firsthand knowledge of the accident. Similarly, they provided certain
kinds of information-particularly about radiation release-too late to
help a worried public. This compounded their credibility problem.\"
(Rubin, 1987)\
\
When reporters find officials reticent to give accurate and timely
information, they may impute the worst motives for the apparent
evasiveness and seek alternative (possibly less reliable and
authoritative) sources to get the \"facts.\" Sometimes this also prompts
them to consider the worst-case scenario in describing the disaster and
the response effectiveness. This is particularly the case in
controversial or politically charged issues such as nuclear accidents.
Reporters have had to deal with public relations and government
spokesmen who are experts at verbal misdirection. The misrepresentation
and deceit attributed to government statements about events like
Watergate and Vietnam have led reporters to develop a healthy skepticism
when they encounter evasiveness and \"no comment\" responses. As a
result, such statements are generally interpreted to indicate that the
interviewee either doesn\'t know the answer or that he has something to
hide (Rubin, 1987; Johnson, 1986:111).\
\
There are, of course, times when it is legitimate to hold back specific
types of information. When this is the case, it is best to state in a
matter-of-fact way why the information is being withheld and when it
might be made available, if that is possible. If the media have obtained
information that could be dangerous to release, do not hesitate to ask
them to withhold it. Be sure to give them the reasons why it should not
be reported and promise to tell them when it is safe to release the
information.\
\
Admit problems and mistakes if they exist. Significant errors that are
concealed will leak out and cause much more difficulty than if they had
been immediately disclosed. On the other hand, this does not mean that
officials are obligated to cast everything in its worst possible light.
If problems have developed or mistakes have been made, point out your
positive efforts to correct them and then turn the conversation toward
what has been done to effectively manage the emergency.\
\
Stick to the facts. Don\'t describe the situation as any better or worse
than it actually is. Avoid making statements that could be construed as
trying to exaggerate or to grab undue credit or manipulate the story to
create a favorable impression of your office or agency.\
\
Manage Ambiguity\
Disasters are characterized by uncertainty. Often, accurate
information-about the extent of the destruction, dangers to public
safety, cause of the incident, and other matters of interest to the
media-is simply not available early on. The interviewee should be able
to admit what he doesn\'t know, and avoid speculating on the answers.
Instead, he should state that he will try to determine the facts as soon
as practical and make this information available.\
\
Relate to the Audience\
Remember that you are not talking to an audience of fellow experts.
Avoid using technical terminology and jargon. This only confuses the
public or makes them think you are trying to hide something. On the
other hand, avoid \"talking down\" to the audience too. Be human; strive
for an informal, conversational tone, while still maintaining a
professional demeanor.\
\
Take the Initiative\
Often, the interviewee is chosen because he is the expert. As such, he,
and not the reporter, is in the best position to judge what the
important issues are. The interviewee should take the lead in pointing
these out and directing the course of discussion. This can be
accomplished even in the worst possible press confrontation, the
\"ambush interview.\" When the reporter suddenly pushes the microphone
into your face and asks a difficult question, you can use what is called
\"transition technique\" to redirect the direction of the interview.
This is done by briefly answering the question (e.g., \"yes, this is
true, but \... 11 or, \"No, that is not the case, and . then proceeding
to address what you consider the important facts. The interviewee should
say what he needs to say, not just answer the questions posed by the
reporter.\
\
The interviewee should ask the reporter to rephrase the question if what
is being asked is not clear. (\"Did you mean \... ?\") Do not allow
misleading or inaccurate comments or statements to go unchallenged.
Correct any bad information built into the questions. The longer
misinformation lingers before being corrected, the more it gains
credibility. Refute it politely, offering a brief explanation, and move
on to the topics you want to cover.\
\
The Team Approach\
Sometimes fear of the media can be the interviewee\'s worst enemy. One
way of tackling this problem is to avoid facing the interview alone.
Instead, assemble a group of experts and spokespersons and face the
media as a team.\
\
Preparation for a Television Appearance\
While preparation for any interface with the media is important,
television requires special attention. Public relations professionals
describe television as an emotional medium, rather than an intellectual
one. They say that, while viewers will often forget the content of your
message, they will remember your style: how you looked, your manner, and
the quality of your voice. First impressions are important, and there is
an advantage to having your most important and most positive statements
up front. Conventional clothing should be worn (as well as accessories,
jewelry, makeup, and hairstyle) with subdued colors and with a design
that reflects your professional image. If it is possible to choose in
advance, clothing colors that blend into the set back-ground should be
avoided.\
\
As noted before, television relies on a \"headline approach\" with
succinct, catchy, 20- to 30-second statements. The interviewee can
almost certainly assure which part of the pretaped material will be used
by prefacing it with,\
\
\"The most important thing about this is\...\" Most newscasters work
under tight deadlines and appreciate when the experts flag what is
important for them. While maintaining accuracy, try to keep answers
short and to the point. The best way to lose what you are trying to get
across is to \"overload the\
system\" by giving too much information.\
\
Telephone Interviews\
Find out to whom you are speaking, so your answers can best meet the
needs of the interviewer. Also get a phone number so you can back with
additional important information or corrections. Find out when and how
the material is going to be used and who the target audience is. Be sure
you have a clear telephone connection. Unfortunate misquotes can result
because a statement was not clearly heard. Have your interview
statements read back to you. Start off by stating your main point in
clear, simple language and repeat it in a concluding summary statement.
Subtle or wry statements may be translated badly-avoid them. Also avoid
making absolute statements. If you are in doubt about an important
point, or wish to give it further thought before answering, tell the
interviewer you will call back shortly-and be sure to do so. Also be
sure to call back if new information develops which causes you to want
to change the statements you made or the opinions you gave. Offer any
photographs, charts, or illustrations that might contribute to the story
if the report is to appear in the print media. Try to have some good
background reference material available for reporters who are not
familiar with your subject.\
\
If the telephone interview is being taped for radio, you may have to do
a few trial runs before getting an adequate product for broadcast. Be
sure to find out what the time limits of the broadcasted interview are
so you can avoid giving too much information. It is best that you, as
the expert, determine what is most important, rather than having the
reporter edit a few seconds of material out of a 20-minute interview.
Turn off any noisy air conditioners or other equipment in your office
that might interfere with the sound quality of your statements. Have
other phone calls held. Ask whether you should use the interviewer\'s
name in your responses. If you pause to think, avoid \"ah\'s\" and
\"uh\'s;\" it is better to have a silent pause. Avoid the use of
numbers; if they are essential, however, round them off and use as few
as possible. Talk in a normal tone past the telephone mouthpiece rather
than directly into it. Don\'t hold the mouthpiece too close. This will
help prevent popping and hissing sounds when pronouncing \"p,\" s,\" and
\"t\" sounds.\
\
The Interviewee\'s \"Bill of Rights\"\
Although providing the media with accurate, consistent, and timely
information can often help an organization carry out its function,
maintain a good public image, and help the public, the potential
interviewee does not always have to place himself completely at the beck
and call and at the mercy of the\
media.\
\
Organizations do have the right to remain silent, to stick to a prepared
text, or to say, \"I don\'t know. I\'ll find out and get back to you
later.\' They also have the right to tape the interview, to keep records
of the information given, to have others present, and to use their best
spokesperson to face the press. If faced\
with a notorious, cut-throat interviewer, one tactic that might be
useful is to consent to an interview, but only if it will be reported
verbatim and in full (except for editing that is reviewed by and
mutually agreeable to interviewer and interviewee).\
\
\
SUMMARY\
\
The need for a free press is an important part of our heritage.
Nonetheless, disaster managers often feel that they could do their job
better if they didn\'t have to divert valuable time, resources, and
effort to deal with the press. In many communities, the establishment of
procedures for effective media relations in disasters is not given high
priority. Preparation may consist merely of assigning someone the
responsibility for handing out press releases and talking to reporters
that show up.\
\
Media behavior in disasters is, to a significant extent, predictable.
Because of this, proper public information procedures are likely to
reduce the disruption caused by media demands. In this chapter we have
examined the types of behavior that can be expected of the media in
disasters and discussed several techniques for dealing with them.\
\
\
PLANNING CHECKPOINTS

-   Is the mass media represented on your area\'s disaster planning
    body?

-   Do your local media organizations have emergency backup electrical
    power and other provisions allowing them to function in a disaster?

-   Are the facilities of your local media located in areas vulnerable
    to disaster threats (e.g., in the flood plain)?

-   Do your local TV and radio stations have pre-established procedures
    and agreements for conveying information to non-local stations for
    broadcast back into the area in the event that local stations are
    knocked off the air by a disaster?

-   Do your local broadcast stations know what FCC regulations do not
    apply in disasters?

-   Do you have a program to educate the local media about disasters?

-   Do you have provisions to provide background and public educational
    and instructional information to the media for use in the event of a
    disaster?

-   Does your area test the Emergency Broadcast System, including the
    inter-face between local government and local EBS stations, on a
    monthly basis? Do local officials know how to activate and use the
    system?

-   Do your local emergency response organizations have a mutually
    agree-able procedure for centralized disaster information
    dissemination? For collecting information from the various response
    organizations for the information center (e.g., the procedures
    outlined in the Incident Command System)?

-   Does your public information plan include the use of media pools?

-   Do your emergency managers have procedures and guidelines to follow
    in anticipation of information the media will request?

-   Have provisions been made to provide it to them in a way that is
    minimally disruptive to emergency operations? Do they initiate
    contact with the media to provide this information? Are automated
    devices used to provide information to an local media (e.g., a
    computer electronic mail system)?

-   Has your area considered the establishment of a TIS radio station?

::: Definition-Term
ADDITIONAL READING\
\
Bernstein AB: The emergency public relations manual, revised edition,
1986.\
Available from:\
PASE, Inc, PO Box 1299, Highland Park, NJ, 08904, \$125.00.\
\
Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media, Commission on Sociotechnical
Systems, National Research Council: Disasters and the mass media, 1980.\
Available from:\
National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution AveWashington, DC 20418,
\$9.75.\
\
Friedman B, Lockwood D, Snowden L, et al: Mass media and disasters: an
annotated bibliography, Miscellaneous Report 36, 1986.\
Available from:\
Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark, Del, 19716.\
\
Hartsough DM and Mileti DS: The Media in Disaster, In: Laube J and
Murphy SA, Perspective on disaster recovery, p. 282,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Norwalk, Conn, 1985.\
\
Holton JL: The electronic media and disasters in the high-tech age,
publication 109, 1985. Available from: Federal Emergency Management
Agency, PO Box 70274, Washington, DC, 20024, free.\
\
Johnson B: Dealing with Mass Media in Time of Emergency. In: Multiple
death disaster response workshop, p 104, Publication SM/IG 193, 1986.
Available from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, PO Box 70274,
Washington, DC, 20024, free.\
\
Lavalla R and Stoffel S: Managing External Influences. In: Blueprint for
community emergency management: a text for managing emergency
operations, p 273, 1983, Available from: Emergency Response Institute,
1819 Mark St, NE, Olympia, Wash 98506, \$25. 00.\
\
Policy Development and the Media. In: Formulating public policy in
emergency management Course Book and Resource Manual, Student Manual 51,
p 82, 1984. Available from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, PO
Box70274, Washington, DC, 20024, free.\
\
Scanlon J and Alldred S: Media coverage of disasters: the same old
story, Emergency Planning Digest (Canada), 7(4):13, Oct.-Dec. 1982.
Available from: Emergency Preparedness- Canada, 141 Laurier Avenue West,
2nd floor, Ottowa, Canada, KlA OW6.\
\
Scanlon J, Alldred S, Farrell A, et a\]: Coping with the media in
disasters: some predictable problems, Public Administration Review,
45(Special Issue on: Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public
Administration):123, (Jan.) 1985, Available from: the American Society
for Public Administration, 1120 G St, NW, Washington, DC 20005\
\
Wenger D: Mass Media and Disasters, Preliminary Paper 98, 1985.
Available from: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware,
Newark, Del 19716.
:::