# Session No. 6

## Course Title: Homeland Security and Emergency Management

# Session Title: Recovery 

# Prepared by William L. Waugh, Jr., Ph.D.

**Time: 3 Hours**

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Session**

**Objectives:** At the conclusion of the session the students should be
able to:

1.  Describe the primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts of major
    terrorist attacks

2.  Describe the major challenges for economic and business recovery
    following a major terrorist attack

3.  Describe the process of social recovery following a major terrorist
    attack, including the issue of victim compensation

4.  Describe the nongovernmental resources available to aid in recovery
    following a major terrorist attack

5.  Describe the process of psychological recovery following a major
    terrorist attack

6.  Describe how local services are restored and maintained following a
    major terrorist attack

7.  Describe how communities can deal with "dirty" sites that may be
    left by a major terrorist attack, including determining how "clean"
    they need to be before residents can return

**Scope**

This session will provide an overview of the recovery issues that may be
raised following a major terrorist attack utilizing WMD (i.e., chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive materials). The foci are
on economic, social, and psychological recovery. Attention will also be
paid to the process of recovery as communities transition to normal
operations and deal with the long-term effects of the attack,
particularly if it involves chemical or radiological material.

**Required Session Readings:**

Lowe, S., & Fothergill, A. (2003). A Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer
Behavior after September 11^th^. In J. L. Monday (Ed.), *Beyond
September 11^th^: An Account of Post-Disaster Research* (pp. 293-314).
Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science,
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Special
Publication No. 39.

McEntire, D. Robinson, R.J., & Weber, R.T. (2003). Business Responses to
the World Trade Center Disaster: A Study of Corporate Roles, Functions,
and Interaction with the Public Sector. In J.L. Monday (Ed.), *Beyond
September 11^th^: An Account of Post-Disaster Research,* (pp. 431-457).
Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science,
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Special
Publication No. 39.

Sutton, J. (2003). A Complex Organizational Adaptation to the World
Trade Center Disaster: An Analysis of Faith-Based Organizations. In J.L.
Monday (Ed.), *Beyond September 11^th^: An Account of Post-Disaster
Research,* (pp. 405-428). Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of
Behavioral Science, Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center, Special Publication No. 39.

U.S. General Accounting Office (2003). *September 11: Overview of
Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York City Area*. Washington, DC:
USGAO, GAO-04-72, October.

Waugh, William L., Jr. (2006a). "The Political Costs of Failure in the
Katrina and Rita Disasters." *Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science,* Special Issue on "Shelter from the Storm:
Repairing the Nation's Emergency Management System," edited by W.L.
Waugh (March).

Waugh, William L., Jr. (2006b). "Terrorism as Disaster," *Handbook of
Disaster Research*, eds. Havidán Rodríguez, E.L. Quarantelli, and
Russell R. Dynes (Springer-Verlag).

Waugh, William L., Jr., and Smith, R. Brian (2006). "Economic
Development and Reconstruction on the Gulf After Katrina," *Economic
Development Quarterly*, August.

**Note**

Recovery from a catastrophic terrorist attack is very much like recovery
from a catastrophic natural or technological disaster. The recovery
processes following the 9-11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina have shown
that recovery is a much more complex process following catastrophic
disasters. The number of casualties, the extent of damage to
infrastructure, and the long-term effects on people, communities, and
economies tends to extend the process well beyond the traditional
restoration of lifelines. State and federal disaster assistance may be
required well beyond the initial recovery and local governments may be
managing the reconstruction and redevelopment of the disaster zone for
years. As the 9-11 disaster has proven, the psychological, health,
economic, social, and political effects can last a decade or more. The
long-term effects of the Katrina and South Asian tsunami disasters are
only slowly being realized. Recovery along the Gulf coast may take a
decade or more, as well.

The Russell Sage Foundation has published three books on the recovery of
New York City following the World Trade Center attacks. The chapters
offer considerable detail beyond what is described in this instructor
guide and would be excellent supplementary readings for this course or a
course focusing on the impact of 9/11. See:

John Mollenkopf, ed., *Contentious City: The Politics of Recovery in New
York City* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

Howard Chernick, ed., *Resilient City: The Economic Impact of 9/11* (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

Nancy Foner, ed., *Wounded City: The Social Impact of 9/11* (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

**Objective 6.1**

**Describe the primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts of major
terrorist attacks**

As indicated in Session 1, the primary purpose of terrorism is to
influence the behavior of a target group through the creation of fear or
terror. Terrorist acts may or may not involve acts of violence. If the
threat of violence is sufficiently credible, actual violence may not be
necessary in order to create fear.

Terrorist acts can have direct impacts in terms of lives lost and
property destroyed. However, the primary reason for terrorists to use or
threaten violence is to accomplish political (or criminal or religious)
goals and destruction may not be useful in achieving those goals.

Campaigns of violence can have secondary and tertiary impacts in terms
of influencing audiences other than the target group and in terms of
causing losses of lives or property or having political repercussions
beyond the intended impact.

> For example, terrorist attacks on Westerners in Egypt had a strong
> negative impact on tourism in Egypt and surrounding nations in the
> 1990s. Reductions in tourism cost the Egyptian government needed
> revenue and cost the communities around the major historical sites
> jobs.

Recovery from terrorist attacks can be identical to recovery from other
kinds of disasters. For example, the World Trade Center attacks in 2001
involved air crashes, structural fires, structural collapses, and
hazardous materials spills, as well as crimes.

> Terrorist attacks might involve dams or levees, water supplies,
> bridges, electrical power lines or facilities, food production, or any
> number of other critical resources or assets and the recovery process
> will be very similar to the process that follows a natural or
> technological disaster (Waugh, 2006b).

Planning to recover from major terrorist attacks in the U.S. has been
shaped largely by the experiences following the first bombing of the
World Trade Center towers in 1993, the bombing of the Murrah Federal
Office Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the attacks on the World Trade
Center towers and Pentagon in 2001, and the anthrax attacks that
affected postal facilities and government offices in 2001.

Americans have suffered mass casualty terrorist attacks outside of the
U.S. and there have been programs to provide medical, including
psychological, assistance to the victims and to rebuild facilities. But,
the host nations have been responsible for the more long-term effects of
those attacks.

The Homeland Security Council in the Executive Office of the President
has also recommended preparation to deal with fifteen disaster
scenarios, most involving terrorist attacks (see Table 1).

The terrorism scenarios with the longest estimated recovery times are
the explosion of a nuclear device and the dispersal of radiological
material. It should also be noted that major natural disasters, i.e.,
hurricanes and earthquakes, are also expected to take months to years
for recovery.

> The estimated economic costs are highest for the explosion of a
> nuclear device and an attack utilizing a biological (disease) agent,
> with the costs running into the hundreds of billions of dollars for
> the nuclear device and \$70 to \$160 billion for the disease agent.
>
> The estimated damage to infrastructure from a 10-kiloton nuclear
> device is essentially complete within 0.5 to 1.0 miles of the blast.
>
> The worst case scenarios are the explosion of a nuclear device and the
> use of chemical, biological, and radiological agents, i.e., "weapons
> of mass destruction."

The recovery processes for major terrorist attacks begin with
Presidential disaster declarations and the Stafford Act's provisions for
public and individual assistance and other (see Mary Jordan, *Federal
Disaster Recovery Programs*, Congressional Research Service, 2005).

**TABLE 1**

**Homeland Security Council's Fifteen Planning Scenarios**

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**Scenario Casualties Infrastructure Economic Recovery**

**Damage Impact Timeline**

Nuclear Detonation Can vary widely Total within Hundreds of Years

10-Kiloton Improvised radius of 0.5 billions of

Nuclear Device to 1.0 mile dollars

Biological Attack 13,000 fatalities and Minimal Billions of Months

Aerosol Anthrax injuries dollars

Biological Disease 87,000 fatalities, None \$70 to \$160 Several

Outbreak - 300,000 hospitalized billion months

Pandemic Influenza

Biological Attack 2500 fatalities, None Millions Weeks

Plague 7000 injuries of dollars

Chemical Attack 150 fatalities, Minimal \$500 Weeks, but

Blistering Agent 70,000 hospitalized million long-term effects

Chemical Attack 350 fatalities, 50% of Billions Months

Toxic Industrial 1,000 hospitalized structures of dollars

Chemicals in area

Chemical Attack 6,000 fatalities, Minimal, but \$300 3-4 months

Nerve Agent 350 injuries contamination million

(in a building)

Chemical Attack 17,500 fatalities, In immediate Millions Weeks

Chlorine Tank 10,000 severe area and of dollars

Explosion injuries, 100,000 metal

Hospitalized corrosion

Natural Disaster 1400 fatalities, 150,000 Hundreds of Months to

Major Earthquake 100,000 hospitalized buildings billions Years

destroyed, of dollars

1 million

damaged

Natural Disaster 1000 fatalities, Buildings Millions of Months

Major Hurricane 5000 hospitalized destroyed, dollars

100,000

buildings

seriously

damaged

Radiological Attack 180 fatalities, Near Up to Months to

Radiological 270 injuries, explosion billions of years

Dispersal Devices 20,000 detectable dollars

contaminations

Explosives Attack 100 fatalities, Near Local Weeks to

Improvised 450 hospitalizations explosion months

Explosive Device

Biological Attack 300 fatalities, None Millions of Weeks

Food 400 hospitalizations dollars

Contamination

Biological Attack None None Hundreds of Months

Foreign Animal millions of

Disease (Foot & dollars

Mouth Disease)

Cyber Attack None directly None Millions of Weeks

dollars

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Source: Homeland Security Council, *Planning Scenarios: Executive
Summaries*, July 2004.

The psychological impact of terrorist attacks may also be different than
that of natural disasters (an "act of God") or technological disasters
(human error or mechanical failure). But, research indicates that people
will behave in much the same way as they do for other kinds of
disasters. The response to the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway
system was remarkably calm, for example (Waugh, 2006b).

The collapse of the World Trade Center towers had been the most costly
disaster for FEMA, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development,
and the US Department of Transportation (US GAO, 2003: 19). \[NOTE: The
costs of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have not yet been fully assessed
and they are already higher than the costs of the World Trade Center
disaster.\].

> To provide a context for the disaster recovery effort, Table 2
> indicates the funds authorized and disbursed for the initial disaster
> response in New York City area. \[NOTE: The distinction between
> authorized and dispersed funds is because not all funds authorized by
> Congress are necessarily spent and, even when spent, can be stretched
> out over many years.\]
>
> Search and rescue operations cost \$22 million and debris removal cost
> \$695 million. The total federal expenditures for the World Trade
> Center response were \$1.17 billion.

**TABLE 2**

**The 9-11 Disaster: Initial Response Assistance (as of June 30, 2003)**

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Total Committed Total Disbursed**

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

Search and rescue operations \$22,000,000 \$22,000,000

Debris removal 1,689,000,000 695,000,000

Emergency transportation 299,000,000 298,000,000

Temporary utility repairs 250,000,000 0

Testing and cleaning 53,000,000 42,000,000

Other response services 232,000,000 114,000,000

Total \$2,554,000,000 \$1,170,000,000

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Source: USGAO, Federal Disaster Assistance, October 2003

**TABLE 3**

**Compensation for Disaster-Related Costs and Losses (as of June 30,
2003)**

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**Total Committed Total Disbursed**

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

Assistance for state, city, and other

organizations \$3,319,000,000 \$1,593,000,000

Assistance to individuals and families 807,000,000 546,000,000

Assistance for businesses 683,000,000 510,000,000

Total \$4,809,000,000 \$2.649,000,000

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_Source:
USGAO, Federal Disaster Assistance, October 2003

As Table 3 shows, \$2.649 billion was provided as assistance to state,
city, and other organizations, to individuals and families, and to
businesses.

> Assistance to governments includes funds to repair damaged
> infrastructure, facilities, and other public assets.
>
> Assistance to individuals and families includes funds for property
> (e.g., housing) losses and assistance to businesses includes funds for
> property and inventory losses.
>
> The disbursements in Table 3 are the same kinds of disbursements as
> would be made after a major natural or technological disaster and
> eligibility requirements were essentially the same.

The data in Table 4 indicate that over \$5.5 billion was committed to
rebuild the transportation system in lower Manhattan, repair utilities,
and support short-term capital projects.

> Only \$54 million of the committed \$5 billion was disbursed as of
> June 2003 for the rebuilding of the transit system.
>
> The delays in spending funds to rebuild the transit system have
> largely been due to the need to evaluate transit needs.

**TABLE 4**

**Infrastructure Restoration and Improvement (as of June 30, 2003)**

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**Total Committed Total Disbursed**

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Rebuilding and improving lower

Manhattan transportation system \$5,006,000,000 \$54,000,000

Permanent utility infrastructure repairs 500,000,000 0

Short-term capital projects 68,000,000 0

Total \$5,574,000,000 \$54,000,000

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Source: USGAO, Federal Disaster Assistance, October 2003

Table 5 indicates the authorization of \$5.5 billion in funds and tax
benefits for economic revitalization. By June 2003, \$173 million in
funds had been disbursed.

> The impact of the tax benefits is more difficult to measure in part
> because the impact is more long-term. Tax benefits are expenditures in
> the sense that the government loses revenue.
>
> Uninsured and insured losses from the World Trade Center disaster were
> also in the billions of dollars.
>
> Debris removal lasted nine months and approximately 18,000 businesses
> were directly affected. Many businesses in lower Manhattan failed.
>
> The total amount of money committed to the World Trade Center disaster
> recovery through FEMA, the US Department of Housing and Urban
> Development, and the US Department of Transportation was over \$18
> billion.
>
> The total does not include loans and grants provided by the Small
> Business Administration and disaster assistance programs (USGAO, 2003:
> 24) nor does it include funds provided by nongovernmental
> organizations and private firms.

**TABLE 5**

**Economic Revitalization Efforts (as of June 30, 2003)**

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Total Committed Total Disbursed**

Tax benefits -- Liberty Zone \$5,029,000,000 a

Job creation and retention grants 320,000,000 130,000,000

Small firm attraction and

Retention grants 155,000,000 31,000,000

Other planning efforts 40,000,000 12,000,000

Total \$5,544,000,000 \$173,000,000

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Source: USGAO, Federal Disaster Assistance, October 2003. "a" = tax
benefits not disbursed as grants.

Table 5 lists programs designed to redevelop the area in and around
"Ground Zero" in lower Manhattan. The recovery process has evolved into
a development process as new businesses are recruited, jobs are created,
and new infrastructure is added.

Memorializing the victims, including the emergency responders, killed in
the attacks has become a central theme in the redevelopment and the
families of the victims have been very vocal about the need to make the
memorial a prominent feature of the new development.

Large scale disasters, including terrorism caused disasters, encourage
communities to redevelop disaster areas rather than simply assist in the
rebuilding of the areas. Recovery becomes economic development or
redevelopment.

The Hurricane Katrina disaster is forcing a reexamination of policies
and programs to deal with large scale terrorist attacks because the
disaster demonstrated the difficulty in dealing with major displacements
of residents, loss of housing, damage to infrastructure, interruption of
economic activity, and the social-psychological impact on victims (Waugh
and Smith, 2006).

As a result of the Katrina experience, officials in West Virginia have
purchased sites to use for evacuees in the event of a major disaster in
that state and officials in Arizona are identifying locations that may
be used to relocate evacuees from other states, e.g., California, in the
event of a major earthquake or another kind of catastrophic disaster.

Redevelopment of areas damaged by disasters like the 9-11 attacks and
Katrina have become controversial because of the displacement of
residents, as well as by the memorialization of victims.

Disasters provide opportunity to relocate homes and businesses from
hazardous areas to less vulnerable areas but also an opportunity to
develop new businesses and new public facilities. Redevelopment has been
a contentious political issue around the World Trade Center site and
(Mollenkopf, 2005).

> In Mississippi, the state recovery plan includes moving homes and
> businesses from areas along the coastline and replacing them with golf
> courses, resorts, boat harbors, and other tourist attractions (Waugh
> and Smith, 2006).

The recovery/redevelopment process may be more politically contentious
than the disaster response itself.

Redevelopment decisions following natural disasters have lead to
electoral defeats by those responsible, particularly when residents do
not feel that they have been able to participate fully in decision
making (see, e.g., Kweit and Kweit, 2002).

Disaster recovery is a social, political, and economic process. With
large disasters, whether they be terrorist attacks or natural disasters
or technological disasters, recovery can become a very long process. It
has taken years to determine how to redevelop the World Trade Center
site and the process will continue for some time.

**Questions to ask students:**

> **1. In what ways might natural and unnatural (terrorism-related)
> disasters be similar?**
>
> The level of damage and the loss of life, the response, the recovery
> process, and the cost of recovery may be very similar for both kinds
> of events.
>
> **2. In what ways might natural and unnatural (terrorism-related)
> disasters be different?**
>
> The psychological impact of the disasters may differ in that those
> affected may find it easier to deal with "acts of God" than "acts of
> men." The fact that someone has purposefully caused loss of life,
> particularly the loss of many lives, it far more difficult to
> understand than accidents, mechanical failures, and geophysical or
> meteorological processes.

## Objective 6.2 

## Describe the major challenges for economic business recovery following a major terrorist attack

The research on long-term economic recovery following a major disaster
is mixed. 

Some studies indicate that there can be positive economic consequences,
meaning that communities will be better off after a disaster (Skidmore
and Toya, 2002; and Chang, 2001) and other studies indicate there are
few effects beyond the immediate post-impact and short-term recovery
periods (Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer, 2002).  

In terms of terrorist attacks, cities are resilient and do recover. The
factors that encourage the development of cities also make them
economically resilient (Harrigan and Martin, 2002).

> Terrorism has costs, including inhibiting transportation due to
> disruption and delays, increasing spending on security, increasing
> insurance premiums, and causing emotional trauma (Harrigan and Martin,
> 2002).
>
> However, people remain in cities because of the economic attraction --
> jobs, markets, etc. (Harrigan and Martin, 2002).

The impact of the 9-11 attacks on business in New York City was
profound. Seventy-eight percent of the people killed in the World Trade
Center, excluding the emergency responders, were employed in finance,
insurance, and real estate (Dolfman and Wasser, 2004).

> The "export sector" was hardest hit with job losses.

Clearly, many small businesses and not-for-profit organizations do not
recover from major disasters. Some reopen and struggle for months before
they fail. Some cannot compete with new businesses and thus fail
(Alesch, Holly, Mittler, and Nagy, 2001).

> Insurance coverage is an important factor in recovery. Businesses tend
> to be undervalued to reduce tax burdens and tend to be underinsured to
> reduce costs.
>
> Older owners may simply retire rather than try to rebuild their
> businesses.
>
> Retail businesses tend to fare poorly in the aftermath of disaster
> because they often lose their market share and cannot adapt to new
> markets.

A recent study of businesses in Santa Cruz County, California, eight
years after the Loma Prieta earthquake, and businesses located in South
Dade County, Florida, six years after Hurricane Andrew found that
"whether measured in terms of number of employees, clients, business
profits, or overall financial condition, most businesses did not
experience long-term declines" (Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer, 2002). 

> The longer that businesses are closed the less likely they are to
> survive.
>
> Businesses with a broader market, such as a regional or international
> market, tend to have a better long-term recovery outcome.  Regional or
> national chain stores are more likely to survive than smaller "mom and
> pop" stores.

In terms of long-term business recovery, the survival of smaller
businesses depends upon how long they are closed following a disaster,
whether they have adequate insurance coverage to replace facilities and
equipment and inventory, the nature of the business, and how well they
adapt to changing circumstances.

In New York City following the World Trade Center attacks, hundreds of
businesses in and around "Ground Zero" were destroyed or severely
damaged.

Many businesses were closed for months as the clean up progressed. With
residents evacuated and no pedestrian traffic, business would have been
very poor in any case.

Large businesses tended to reevaluate their need to be located in New
York City and some chose to move outside the city to New Jersey or
Connecticut or to other parts of the country, or simply to work in
temporary offices until they could return to their offices in lower
Manhattan (see Chernick, 2005).

> Across the U.S. Company officials discussed the vulnerabilities and
> exposure of offices in downtown high-rise buildings. Suburban
> locations and less conspicuous facilities were thought to be less
> likely to attract terrorist attacks.

Job loss among low-income, low-skill workers lead to increases in
transfer payments, from Medicaid to TANF to Food Stamps (see Chernick,
2005).

> Low-income workers had fewer resources with which to survive months of
> unemployment or underemployment. Many had to leave the city or move
> into less expensive housing.

New York City was plunged into a "deep fiscal crisis" by the attacks.
City tax revenues were greatly reduced and expenditures were greatly
increased while individual tax burdens increased. Cuts had to be made in
basic services to compensate (Chernick, 2005: 315-316).

The physical damage from the 9-11 attacks was localized in New York City
and Fairfax County, VA, where the Pentagon is located. There are
fundamental questions concerning economic recovery from a more
widespread terrorist disaster. If whole cities were destroyed and
millions of residents were displaced for extended periods of time,
recovery would take on new dimensions.

Disaster also provides opportunity for economic redevelopment, because
large tracts of land are cleared, residents are displaced, property is
available for sale because of foreclosures, and governments may wish to
use buyouts to move homes and businesses out of hazardous areas.

For example, the Katrina disaster has cleared large tracts of land in
New Orleans that can be used for other purposes if destroyed
neighborhoods are not rebuilt.

Some of the redevelopment recommendations for the City of New Orleans
include building:

-   an elevated light rail system to connect the city and the airport
    and to connect business and education centers and neighborhoods,

-   new parks and undeveloped marshlands,

-   new community centers in renovated school buildings,

-   elevated residences in low-lying areas,

-   more residential housing above businesses,

-   a new medical research park to replace the damaged hospitals (Carr
    and Meitrodt, 2005), and

-   new "education villages," linking public schools and community
    colleges with their neighborhoods.

A new transit system could also be used for evacuation when the next
major hurricane hits the city.

A smaller city will also need fewer police, firefighters, and other
personnel.

Plans have been proposed to facilitate the cleaning and clearing of
damaged neighborhoods so that they can be sold to developers. Whole
towns might be moved to higher ground (Nossiter, 2006a).

FEMA has also hired scientists and other experts to help preserve
cemeteries and other historic sites in New Orleans that were damaged by
the storm and flood or might be damaged by the redevelopment to assure
that the character of the city is preserved (Schwartz, 2005).

Assuring that the city's music, food, and diversity are preserved, as
well as its famous Mardi Gras celebration, is essential to
redevelopment. Evacuees are more likely to return if the city's unique
culture is intact.

The plans for recovery and redevelopment raise a number of questions
concerning the rights of property owners, the need to move residents out
of hazardous areas, and the need to address short- and long-term
recovery issues as well as equity issues because of the impact of
decisions on the poor and the elderly.

The New Orleans recovery plan has great appeal for those wary of state
and federal intentions and may offer a middle ground between those who
wish to see neighborhoods and communities rebuilt and their character
preserved and those who wish to mitigate the hazard of flooding and, at
the same time, redevelop devastated areas. The fear of residents is that
the unique culture of the city will be lost.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

> **Questions to ask students:**

1.  **How do disasters provide opportunities as well as challenges for
    communities?**

> Disasters destroy property, require action to reduce future losses,
> and encourage public and private investments. Once the social,
> economic, and political inertia is broken, change follows and altering
> patterns of land-use, economic activity and community design are
> easier than they would be without the disaster.

2.  **How might your (the students') community change if all or most of
    the downtown area was destroyed? Would businesses rebuild? Would
    residents return? Would the community implement changes like those
    proposed in New York City (e.g., the rail line to the airport) and
    New Orleans (e.g., a new transit system, educational parks, etc.)?**

> The discussion could be far-reaching in terms of possible topics, just
> as the discussions in communities devastated by Hurricanes Katrina,
> Rita, and Wilma are now. This question may be turned into an exercise
> if the students are advanced undergraduates or graduate students who
> are very familiar with the community.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

## Objective 6.3

## Describe the process of social recovery following a major terrorist attack, including the issue of victim compensation

The 9-11 attacks had an international impact in the sense that people in
many nations felt vulnerable and the events certainly had a broad
national impact in the U.S. However, there were serious and direct
impacts on the residents of New York City and the surrounding
metropolitan area.

Since 2001, it is increasingly being recognized that there has been a
long-term impact upon the health of those who lived and worked near the
World Trade Center Towers and those who responded to the disaster.

Ground Zero was a very dangerous worksite, according to Occupational
Health and Safety Officials (Lyman, 2003). Dust, debris, fire,
structural collapses, and other hazards caused serious injuries among
the responders.

> The presence of "trade center cough" among the residents and
> responders was noted within days of the attacks. Dust, including toxic
> materials and gases, permeated everything at and near Ground Zero. It
> was breathed by all who worked in the area, including the rescue dogs
> used to search for survivors in the rubble and damaged buildings.
>
> Respirators were provided to many of the responders, but many did not
> wear them despite warnings to do so. Because of the heat, many chose
> to remove their respirators.
>
> A decade after the attacks, increasing numbers of cases of respiratory
> ailments, from emphysema to black lung disease, are encouraging some
> people to urge the appointment of an official to assess the long-term
> effects of 9-11 on residents and responders.
>
> New York City's Department of Health and Mental Hygiene is tracking
> 71,000 people directly affected by the World Trade Center collapses,
> but cannot yet draw a direct connection between respiratory problems
> and the collapses (Associated Press, 2006a and b).

Social recovery was especially slow in those communities adjacent to the
World Trade Center site, in those communities in which many of the first
responders lived, and among those who worked in and around lower
Manhattan.

In *Wounded City* (2005), the authors describe the impact of the World
Trade Center attacks on the close in neighborhoods of Battery Park City
and Tribeca, the community of Belle Harbor where many first responders
lived, and the Islamic community in Jersey City across the river from
Manhattan.

> Battery Park City and much of Tribeca were evacuated when the towers
> collapsed. Access to the neighborhoods was cut off after the
> evacuations and then restricted as residents slowly returned.
>
> Security and cleanup at Ground Zero blocked streets in lower
> Manhattan. Subway and bus access was reduced.
>
> Businesses, particularly restaurants, close to the disaster area no
> longer had the foot traffic that they had depended upon prior to the
> attacks. Many businesses were closed during the months of search and
> rescue and debris removal. Many never reopened.
>
> Belle Harbor and other communities on the Rockaway Peninsula where
> many NYC emergency responders lived, the losses in the World Trade
> Center towers had a traumatic impact. Many lost family members and
> close friends.
>
> In the Moslem community in Jersey City, residents stayed home because
> of the hostility toward anyone who even appeared to be of the Islamic
> faith or from the Middle East.
>
> Airline employees had suffered through layoffs prior to 9-11 and
> thousands more lost their jobs following the attacks. As many as
> 140,000 airline employees lost their jobs nationally and airline
> workers in New York were particularly vulnerable because of the
> reductions in passenger and cargo traffic through the city's airports.
>
> Employment in Chinatown was also greatly reduced as restaurants
> closed. Job loss within the garment industry had already made it
> difficult for ethnic Chinese families to live in the area and the loss
> of restaurant jobs exacerbated the problem.
>
> Taxi drivers, many of whom are Moslem, were insulted and harassed.
> Leased vehicles became liabilities as streets were closed and city
> life slowed down.
>
> Artists, too, found galleries closed and businesses unwilling to
> commission art. Many were forced to leave the city because they could
> no longer afford housing.
>
> Tens of thousands sought psychological counseling to help with stress.
> Almost a half million people were expected to experience
> post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 3 million more would were
> expected to suffer depression, anxiety, and other effects.
>
> The New York State of Office of Mental Health created Project Liberty
> to address the needs of residents.
>
> Traders in the financial firms close to the World Trade Center found
> their businesses closed by the disaster. Firms had to locate their
> employees and find alternative means of operating. Some traders worked
> in makeshift facilities in New Jersey, some worked via Internet, and
> others stayed connected by telephone.

For the firms within the World Trade Center towers that lost employees,
recovery involved strategies for leadership succession, business
continuity, and decentralization. Whole staffs had to be replaced,
facilities found and equipped, and data retrieved.

For the communities that lost large numbers of residents, churches,
synagogues, and mosques provided spiritual and social support.
Charitable organizations provided financial support.

For some of the occupational groups that suffered in the aftermath of
the attacks, economic assistance was provided by government agencies,
unions, trade organizations, and charitable organizations. But, some
industries, like the airline industry, have not recovered over four
years after the attacks.

## Victim Compensation

## Over \$38.1 billion has been paid to the victims and families of victims killed or injured on 9-11 (Rand, 2005). \[Note: The victims include those in the World Trade Center towers and surrounding areas, the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania where the fourth airliner crashed.\]

> Ninety percent of the victim compensation has been paid by insurance
> companies and the federal government.
>
> The payments from insurance companies are expected to be \$19.6
> billion or higher, roughly one-half of the total victim compensation.
>
> The payments from government sources are expected to be almost \$15.8
> billion -- 42 percent of the total victim compensation.
>
> The payments from charitable sources are expected to be around 7
> percent of the total victim compensation.
>
> The federal government limited the liability of the airlines,
> airports, and some governmental organizations.
>
> The Victim Compensation Fund was created to compensate families of
> victims (see Figure 1 below).

The average compensation paid to the first families that applied was
\$1.36 million (Time, 2002).

The estimated value of a 25-year old man with one child, who made
\$50,000 a year, was \$2,235,997 -- minus insurance payments and other
benefits (Time.com, 2002).

Businesses near the World Trade Center have received \$23.3 billion in
compensation for disrupted operations, property damage, and incentives.
Approximately 75 percent of the compensation has come from insurance
companies (Rand, 2005).

Victims (or their families) killed or seriously injured in the attacks
have received approximately \$1.3 million each. Most of the compensation
has come from the Victim Compensation Fund and the rest from insurance
companies, charitable organizations, and employers. Payments from the
Victim Compensation Fund were based on estimated future earnings.
Civilian deaths totaled 2551 and serious injuries totaled 215 (Rand,
2005).

Displaced residents, those left unemployed by the disaster, and those
who suffered emotional trauma or were exposed to hazards such as
asbestos dust have been paid approximately \$3.5 billion (Rand, 2005).

Emergency responders killed or seriously injured in the attacks have
received \$1.9 billion in compensation. 460 emergency responders were
killed or seriously injured (Rand, 2005).

In order to receive compensation from the Victims Compensation Fund,
recipients had to agree not to sue those who might be responsible for
the deaths or injuries.

FIGURE 1

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Victim Compensation Fund of 2001                                      |
|                                                                       |
| +-                                                                    |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------+---+ |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | **     |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | Victim |                                                  |   | - | |
| |                                                                     |
| | Compen |                                                  |   | - | |
| |                                                                     |
| | sation |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | Fund   |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | of     |                                                  |   | - | |
| |                                                                     |
| | 2001** |                                                  |   | - | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | **El   | -   Anyone that was present (and suffered        |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | igibil |     physical harm or death) at the World Trade   |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | ity:** |     Center, the Pentagon, or the site of the     |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     aircraft crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     at the time, or in the immediate aftermath,  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     September 11, 2001.                          |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | -   Any personal representatives of the victims  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     who were members of the flight crew or       |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     passengers on American Airlines flight 11 or |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     77 or United Airlines flight 93 or 175 on    |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     September 11, 2001 (except anyone identified |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     by the Attorney General to have been a       |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     participant or conspirator in the attacks,   |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     or a representative of the perpetrator.)     |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | *      | -   **COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR        |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | *Benef |     DEATH**, but does not provide compensation   |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | its:** |     for losses to physical property.             |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | -   There is no limit on the amount of           |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     compensation available to each claimant and  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     there is no limit to the financial resources |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     available to the fund.                       |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | **Li   | -   **The amount of compensation will be reduced |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | mitati |     by any duplication of benefits that the      |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | ons:** |     claimant has received or is entitled to      |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     receive as a result of the September 11th    |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     terrorist attacks.**                         |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | -   No more than one claim may be submitted to   |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     the Fund by an individual or on behalf of a  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     deceased individual.                         |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | -   Fund claimants give up their rights to file  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     a lawsuit (or to be a party to an action) in |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     any Federal or State court against those     |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        |     responsible for victim's injury or death.    |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | *      | December 31, 2003                                |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | *Deadl |                                                  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| | ine:** | **A determination of each applicant\'s           |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | eligibility and compensation will be made within |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | 120 days. Compensation will be paid within 20    |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | days of the determination.**                     |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | Source: FEMA Region I website                    |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | \<http:/                                         |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| |        | /www.fema.gov/regions/i/resources/victim.shtm\>  |   |   | |
| |                                                                     |
| +--------+--------------------------------------------------+   |   | |
| +-                                                                    |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------+---+ |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Questions to ask students:

1.  **The Victim Compensation Fund based payments on estimated future
    earnings, but capped the payments at \$231,000. Are there problems
    valuing some lives more than others?**

> The placing of values on human life is a very controversial issue for
> which there is no set answer. Students may be comfortable with the
> differences in compensation or they may not be comfortable assigning a
> higher value to the life of an executive or manager than to a clerk or
> janitor. As a policy question, however, it is one that may have to be
> answered again if there are more terrorist attacks.

2.  **How should the government respond to job losses, including
    business closings, caused by terrorist attacks? Should they respond
    by offering tax breaks, loans, and other financial assistance to
    firms to keep them in business (as they did for the airlines after
    9/11)?**

> Again, this is a policy question that may have to be answered again if
> there are more terrorist attacks. Relating the question to the
> recovery in New Orleans and the other Gulf coast communities
> devastated by the hurricanes in 2005 or to the Homeland Security
> Council's fifteen disaster scenarios would help frame the issues for
> students in terms of levels of destruction and estimated recovery
> periods.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Objective 6.4

Describe the nongovernmental resources available to aid in recovery
following a major terrorist attack

Disaster responses following terrorist attacks have included a mix of
responders very similar to that for a natural disaster, but generally
have involved law enforcement and military personnel in lead, rather
than support, roles.

The recovery efforts, too, have necessarily involved large numbers of
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, as well as organized and
spontaneous volunteers (Waugh, 2003b).

Although authorities dealing with terrorist incidences may be reluctant
to use nongovernmental resources, particularly volunteers, they may be
essential in very large events.

The response to the Oklahoma City bombing involved dozens of
organizations, from the American Red Cross to the Oklahoma Restaurant
Association, and hundreds of individual volunteers (City of Oklahoma
City, 1996).

The response to the World Trade Center attack drew hundreds of
organizations and many thousands of volunteers (see, e.g., Lowe and
Fothergill, 2003; Sutton, 2003; and McEntire, Robinson, and Weber,
2003).

Catering firms and disaster relief organizations fed emergency response
and law enforcement personnel, including the thousands of volunteers who
supported them.

Private firms provided material support ranging from equipment for
search and rescue to clean socks and underwear for emergency responders.

Representatives from the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, Pet Rescue, and other animal rescue organizations located
and evacuated pets left in apartments by owners who had evacuated.

Relief organizations cleaned apartments and businesses covered with dust
and debris from the collapsed towers.

Volunteer counselors provided psychological counseling for emergency
responders, law enforcement personnel, and victims.

Effective utilization of nongovernmental resources is a problem
following terrorist attacks because of the lead roles of agencies
unfamiliar with the networks that respond to large natural disasters and
unused to communicating and collaborating closely with nongovernmental
actors (Waugh, 2004a).

In response to dislocations due to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA awarded
grants to the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) and the
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) to provide
long-term recovery assistance to victims (FEMA, 2005).

The funds included monies donated by foreign governments to the Katrina
relief effort.

The funding created a national network of case managers to address unmet
victim needs, including long-term housing and social services.

Voluntary and nonprofit organizations traditionally are involved in
long-term recovery and address the needs of victims that are not
addressed by government programs. Victims with unmet needs are referred
by government offices and other nongovernmental organizations.

> **Questions to ask students:**
>
> **1. Why should local resources be used for the disaster response and
> recovery operations?**
>
> Using local resource supports local businesses and reduces the cost of
> bringing in outside resources. Large metropolitan areas, in
> particular, have a broad range of resources to provide food (e.g.,
> restaurants, catering firms, and nongovernmental food programs),
> shelter (e.g., hotels and motels, large public facilities like
> convention halls and schools), and other services and materials.
>
> **2. Can we rely upon nongovernmental and private resources in major
> disasters like 9/11 and Katrina?**
>
> Nongovernmental and private organizations can often handle smaller
> disasters and, indeed, often do. They can also provide substantial
> help in major disasters. But, the government, particularly the federal
> government, has more resources and more logistical capacity to deliver
> those resources and, thus, is an essential participant in major
> disaster response and recovery efforts.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 6.5**

**Describe the process of psychological recovery following a major
terrorist attack**

Since 9-11, assumptions about the psychological impact of disasters and
how to respond to the needs of victims have changed radically.

Mental health officials have had to develop guidelines for addressing
the needs of the victims of large-scale disasters, including those who
experience the disasters from afar.

There is increasing evidence that Critical Incident Stress Management
(CISD) is ineffective in many cases.

There is strong evidence that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is more
common than previously assumed and should be addressed.

The symptoms of PTSD include reliving the events with flashbacks,
nightmares, and physical reactions; (2) avoidance behavior such as
feeling detached and removing oneself from activities, particularly if
they are related to the traumatic experience; (3) increased arousal such
as difficulty sleeping, extreme alertness, and inability to concentrate;
and (4) other maladies such as panic attacks, drug abuse, and feelings
of isolation (CDC, 2006).

The National Mental Health Information Center provides guidelines for
PTSD and related problems (see
[www.mentalhealth.smhsa.gov/](http://www.mentalhealth.smhsa.gov/)) and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides guidelines for
mental health for disaster responders and a list of disaster mental
health resources
([www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/](http://www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/))
(SMHSA, 2006; CDC, 2006).

Thousands of volunteer counselors, as well as city, state, and federal
counselors, provided mental health services to victims, emergency
responders, law enforcement personnel, and other residents of the city
following the World Trade Center attacks.

One of the controversies following the 9-11 attacks was the decision not
to implement the provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance
Act of 1996.

The explosion and crash of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island in 1996 that
killed all onboard the aircraft was initially assumed to be the result
of a terrorist bomb.

Normally, the National Transportation Safety Board would have
investigated the crash and dealt with the victims families. But, because
the FBI is the lead agency for terrorist incidences, they took
responsibility for the crash site and for dealing with the victims.

> The FBI acted to preserve evidence, including evidence associated with
> the victims' remains, and showed little sensitivity to the grieving
> families.
>
> The very slow process of identifying and releasing remains and poor
> communication with families, airline officials, and local public
> officials caused a public outcry and action by the US Congress.
>
> As a result, the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act was passed to
> assure that the needs of victims and their families were met in
> aviation disasters.

The Act specifies roles for the airlines, the American Red Cross, and
other agencies and the airline industry has developed procedures to deal
with such disasters. The American Red Cross, for example, is responsible
for providing counseling services.

The procedures mandated in the act were not followed after the 9-11
attacks and the victims on the four aircraft were treated much the same
as the victims in and around the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The
airlines, however, did provide assistance to the families of those
killed on the aircraft.

The poor support for the victims' families has angered some families and
complicated the usual practice of memorializing the victims.

Some psychologists say that encouraging people to seek counseling after
a traumatic event, such as a disaster, may make them view themselves as
victims even it they are not affected. If individuals seek counseling
because they are experiencing problems, such as those common to PTSD,
assistance should be provided. But, they recommend that large programs
not be created if there is little "demand."

**Questions to ask students:**

> **1. Should the federal government be responsible for providing or
> funding psychological counseling to victims, victims families,
> emergency responders, and those less directly affected by disasters
> like 9/11?**
>
> The federal government did fund programs to deal with the
> psychological trauma caused by 9/11 and does fund similar programs for
> other disasters. The policy question is whether everyone affected by a
> disaster needs federal assistance. Should the federal government
> provide long-term funding for those indirectly affected, such as those
> living near the World Trade Center towers?
>
> **2. Should the victims on the four aircraft involved in the 9/11
> attacks be memorialized separately and should their families have been
> assisted by the**
>
> This, too, is a policy question. Why should the families of those
> killed on the aircraft expect to be treated as a separate group? Air
> crash survivors and victims' families usually create memorials, but
> should government officials facilitate a separate memorial or set of
> memorials for those killed in aircraft on 9/11. \[A separate memorial
> is being created for those killed in the crash in Pennsylvania.\]

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 6.6**

**Describe how local services are restored and maintained following a
major terrorist attack**

When a major terrorist attack occurs, such as the World Trade Center
attacks, critical infrastructure may be seriously damaged, essential
services may be disrupted and emergency services personnel and
organizations may be dealing with the emergency and unable to maintain
normal services.

During the World Trade Center response, fire and emergency medical
services companies from surrounding jurisdictions moved into New York
City to provide regular service to parts of the city not directly
affected by the attack. They responded to 911 calls to free up FDNY
personnel to work at "Ground Zero."

Just as a plan is necessary to activate and mobilize emergency
responders and support personnel during an emergency, a plan is
necessary to restore essential services. Police, fire, and emergency
medical services, including 911 call services, should be the first to be
restored to assure public health and safety. The restoration of power
and water is essential to public health.

The maintenance of medical and other essential life-saving services in a
major terrorism-related disaster is a major question.

> For example, there are questions concerning whether emergency
> responders, including medical personnel, will report for duty in a
> major disaster, such as a terrorist attack or pandemic.
>
> Some New Orleans police and firefighters did not report for duty
> during the Katrina disaster because their families and, in some cases,
> they themselves were victims.
>
> In a bioterrorist attack, medical personnel may fear that they will
> expose their own families to the biological agent (virus or bacteria)
> and, as a consequence, not report for duty when a disaster occurs.
>
> Emergency personnel who are single-parents or who have spouses who are
> unavailable, perhaps responding to the disaster themselves, may have
> to take care of their own families rather than report for duty.

Medical facilities, fire stations, police stations, 9-1-1 call centers,
and other essential facilities may be destroyed, contaminated, or
otherwise unavailable during and after a major terrorism-related
disaster. Restoration of those facilities or the creation of alternative
facilities may take weeks or months, as the Katrina disaster has shown.

Mobile command centers, medical facilities, and other essential
facilities may have to be brought in when the destruction is widespread
and assistance cannot be obtained from neighboring communities.

More simply, it is common for communities to offer their EOCs and other
facilities to support operations in neighboring communities. Just as
firefighters and equipment were dispatched to New York City by officials
in surrounding cities during the 9/11 response, personnel and equipment
can be shared.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact facilitates the sharing of
emergency personnel and equipment between and among states. Emergency
management personnel, firefighters, police officers, and others were
deployed to Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Florida during
the 2005 hurricane disasters.

> **EMAC Background:**
>
> Following Hurricane Andrew, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles proposed
> the creation of a mutual aid compact.
>
> The 19 members of the Southern Governors' Association (SGA) had their
> state legislatures approve the Southern Regional Emergency Management
> Assistance Compact (SREMAC).
>
> The compact was signed by the SGA governors in August 1993.
>
> The National Governors' Association and the Federal Emergency
> Management Agency supported a national compact and the U.S. Congress
> enacted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as Public
> Law 104-321 in 1996.
>
> The compact facilitates mutual assistance by addressing the problem of
> liability and by providing procedures for reimbursement to for those
> providing assistance (www.emacweb.org).

The transition from disaster operations to normal operations presents
several problems:

> Personnel in the affected community may well have been working long
> shifts with little rest and, therefore, may need rest before resuming
> normal operations.
>
> Even with outside assistance in manning EOCs and conducting search and
> rescue and other disaster operations, the personnel usually have been
> working far longer than eight hour work shifts and will need to sleep,
> wash clothes, repair their own homes, and take care of their own
> families.
>
> A transition period should include ample time to rest and to adjust
> psychologically from the stress of disaster operations to less
> stressful normal operations.
>
> Equipment may need to be replaced or repaired before it can be used in
> normal operations, as well. Equipment may have been brought in by
> emergency responders from other jurisdictions and will be unavailable
> when they leave.
>
> "Normal" operations may be different after the disaster. For example,
> there may be greater vulnerability to structural fires when buildings
> and power lines are damaged. There may also be greater demand for
> emergency medical services as people clean up their homes and
> businesses. Stress levels may rise as residents come to realize the
> tasks ahead and stress related illnesses may increase.

**Questions to ask students:**

> **1. In what cases may mutual assistance agreements with neighboring
> jurisdictions not be activated?**
>
> In major disasters, jurisdictions may have to deal with loss of life
> and property among their own residents and be unable to dispatch
> emergency or other personnel to jurisdictions with which they have
> agreements. The agreements normally are not activated if the affected
> jurisdiction can manage without assistance. Long term events may
> require considerable outside assistance so that local emergency
> personnel can rest after the initial disaster operations. Search and
> rescue, for example, may be a 24-hour operation and additional shifts
> may be necessary so that personnel can rest.
>
> **2. Why might emergency management and other emergency personnel not
> report for duty in a major disaster?**
>
> In a pandemic or bioterrorism event, emergency personnel may fear
> being exposed to viruses or bacteria and infect their own families.
> They might also have to save their own families or even themselves
> from the disaster, as firefighters and police had to in the
> communities devastated by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
>
> **3. What issues arise when communities transition from disaster
> operations to normal, day to day, operations?**
>
> Personnel have to have time to rest, bathe, get clean clothes, and
> check on their families and property before they may be ready to
> return to "normal" work. After long days of physically and
> psychologically stressful work, the transition may take several days.

**Objective 6.7**

## Describe how communities can deal with "dirty" sites that may be left by a major terrorist attack, including determining how "clean" they need to be before residents can return 

Attacks involving radiological, biological, or chemical material or a
nuclear device may contaminate large areas. Such attacks might
contaminate whole towns, large sections of cities, large areas of
agricultural land, historic or cultural sites, or any number of other
physical assets.

Cleaning up after a nuclear explosion or an attack involving
radiological material, biological agents, or toxic chemicals might take
months or even years.

One of the worst case scenarios is for terrorists to detonate a "dirty
bomb" or radiological dispersion device (RDD) -- a conventional bomb
used to disperse radiological or chemical material.

Dispersed in an urban environment, toxic material would be difficult to
remove. While some of the material would be carried out of the area by
wind and rain and some may be transported by people, on purpose or not,
a considerable amount of material might have to be cleaned up before the
area would be habitable again.

The amount of contamination would be related to the size of the
explosive, the type of material, weather conditions (wind, rain, etc.),
and topography (buildings, hills, etc.).

People in the immediate area of the explosion should move away from the
blast area and find shelter. People should take shelter in buildings
with windows shut, doors closed, and air-conditioning shut down. It is
also suggested that they shower, discard clothing in plastic bags, and
listen for information concerning testing for exposure and, if
necessary, treatment (NRC, 2006).

There are practical issues related to warning systems that typically
signal the need to evacuate and seldom signal the need to
shelter-in-place. Clearly, sheltering-in-place is critical in incidents
involving "dirty bombs" and evacuation may result in severe exposure to
radiation.

Community warning systems, building warning systems, training programs,
and other preparedness efforts need to assure that alert and warning
systems include sheltering-in-place and that people understand what to
do when they hear that warning.

There is less consensus concerning what to do in the aftermath of a
"dirty bomb" explosion and the Department of Homeland Security has been
developing guidelines for resettlement of contaminated areas.

As with other kinds of disaster, the speedy restoration of services,
economic activity, and social interaction can reduce the impact of the
disaster and be beneficial to public health and safety.

**Just how much contamination would be safe for those returning to the
area is being debated?**

Some officials think that applying EPA standards for radiation exposure
would be too restrictive, too difficult to achieve quickly. They would
use benchmarks used by other nations that are much higher (Wald, 2006).

> For example, the International Commission on Radiation Protection says
> that radiation doses may be as high as 10 rem per year before
> evacuation or decontamination should be required (Wald, 2006).
>
> This dose is about 30 times the amount that the average American
> receives from natural and manmade sources, five times the amount that
> workers in power plants receive per year, and twice the maximum dose
> that workers in power plants can legally receive (Wald, 2006).
>
> The dose that the EPA permits when power plants are dismantled is
> 0.025 rem per year (Wald, 2006).

Department of Homeland Security officials have suggested choosing a
maximum exposure based upon the circumstances, including the need for
restoration of the contaminated area and the cost. **This suggestion
constitutes the advice given to state and local governments by the
Department of Homeland Security for resettlement of areas contaminated
by a "dirty bomb" (Wald, 2006).**

Opponents argue that the exposure over time would like to cancer or
leukemia in one in four people exposed to 10 rem of radiation for 30
years (Wald, 2006).

The question that those who may be exposed to radiological contamination
may ask is: Do you trust the guidance provided by authorities, such as
the DHS guidance for exposure, enough to return to the contaminated area
to live or work?

> There is substantial disagreement concerning the long-term effects of
> radiological exposure from the Chernobyl disaster, chemical exposure
> from the Bhopal disaster, and chemical exposure from the sarin gas
> attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995.
>
> There is substantial disagreement concerning the long-term effects of
> exposure to dust created by the collapse of the World Trade Center
> towers.
>
> But, in each of these cases, there is a general consensus among
> medical and other experts that there are long-term health effects and
> even fatalities associated with exposure.
>
> Ultimately, the question is how much risk are you willing to accept
> and who do you trust to provide guidance concerning that risk.
>
> **Questions to ask students:**
>
> **1. What should people do if they are near an explosion that might be
> a "dirty bomb" or radiological dispersion device (RDD)?**
>
> People in the immediate area of the explosion should move away from
> the blast area and find shelter. People should take shelter in
> buildings with windows shut, doors closed, and air-conditioning shut
> down. They should shower, discard clothing in plastic bags, and listen
> for information concerning testing for exposure and, if necessary,
> treatment (NRC, 2006).
>
> **2. Would you recommend that residents in a community live and/or
> work in an area where they might be exposed to 10 rem per year, twice
> the maximum amount that workers in power plants can legally receive?
> Would you expect that residents will return to areas with that level
> of contamination?**
>
> This, too, is a policy question. Logical extensions of the questions
> are whether you would remain in an area with that amount of radiation
> and whether you would permit your family to remain in such an area.
> The EPA guidelines were formulated to minimize risk to workers. People
> have different views of risk and, undoubtedly, some and perhaps many
> would choose not to return to areas that are more than minimally
> contaminated. This is a good place to talk about "acceptable risk" and
> whether radiological and biological hazards elicit more concern than
> other kinds of hazards.

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