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**Table of Contents**

[I. Introduction 1](#__RefHeading___Toc7674742)

[II. Context for Homeland Security 4](#__RefHeading___Toc7674747)

[III. Customer Issues 8](#__RefHeading___Toc7674755)

[IV. Institutional/Organizational Issues 10](#__RefHeading___Toc7674757)

[V. System Performance Issues 12](#__RefHeading___Toc7674761)

[VI. Conclusions 15](#__RefHeading___Toc7674763)

[VII. Acknowledgements 17](#__RefHeading___Toc7674766)

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674742 .anchor}

# Introduction

### Purpose of White Paper {#purpose-of-white-paper .unnumbered}

Prior to September 11, the U.S. homeland had been mostly spared from
terrorist attacks. Today, transportation agencies are beginning to
address the need for threat and vulnerability assessments, and
re-examine how existing emergency management plans will be implemented
during a homeland security emergency or alert. Travel information is an
important component of emergency management, and the telephone is one of
many delivery mechanisms. As 511 systems become more widely deployed, it
is reasonable to ask---what role should 511 systems play during homeland
security emergencies and alerts, and what are the organizational,
technical, cost, and other impacts of doing so?

This White Paper discusses the challenges and opportunities for 511
systems, their designers, and their operators, arising from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. Neither location had a 511 system, but relevant lessons were
learned. While it does not provide the solutions, this White Paper
highlights the issues and suggests related guidelines, for consideration
by the 511 Deployment Coalition Policy Group at its meeting on February
26, 2002.

The 511 Deployment Coalition Working Group established the 511 and
Homeland Security Task Force at its December 2001 meeting, with the
purpose of developing a White Paper to examine both the role 511 can
play in assisting in homeland security efforts and the impact that
homeland security preparedness could have on 511 services. This White
Paper is the result of that initiative. The volunteer Task Force members
are listed in section 7.

**Linkage between 511 and Homeland Security**

It is important to acknowledge the existing relationships between the
transportation and emergency management communities with regard to major
incident response. These relationships formed the basis for the
responses to the September 11 attacks. Among the many stories of human
tragedy and heroism on September 11, transportation agency staff guided
hundreds of thousands of travelers to safety in the minutes and hours
following the attacks. Given the disruption caused by the attacks, this
effort continued for days and weeks. Providing accurate, timely
information to travelers was critical to safety and mobility, not just
in the New York and Washington D.C. regions but also throughout the
eastern seaboard.

### How can 511 support emergency management? {#how-can-511-support-emergency-management .unnumbered}

Under 'normal' conditions there are multiple media for dissemination of
information to travelers. However, on September 11, the need for a rapid
exodus on foot from the affected areas precluded the options to use the
Internet, television, or even radio. For many, cell phones became the
primary means of communication in the hours following the attacks. Just
as transportation agencies responded to that need, it is apparent that
had a 511 system been available it too would have contributed to support
emergency management and evacuation.

Today there are a handful of 511 systems across the nation. As the
number of systems multiplies in the years ahead, familiarity with 511 as
the telephone number for travel information may become as commonplace as
911 is today for emergencies. People from a city, region, or state with
511 systems may not hesitate to dial 511 for travel information when
traveling on business or visiting unfamiliar locations, including for
homeland security emergencies.

### Are there homeland security considerations for 511 systems? {#are-there-homeland-security-considerations-for-511-systems .unnumbered}

While a homeland security emergency has many parallels to a major
incident in terms of detection, response, and recovery, there are
differences as well. Perhaps the most troubling is the combination of:

-   The potential for large numbers of people to be the target of an
    attack, or to be impacted by its immediate aftermath, creating a
    spike in demand for travel information, or related news;

-   Transportation infrastructure may be the target of an attack, e.g.
    bridges or railway stations, or be indirectly impacted, e.g. closure
    of surface streets due to exclusion zones around sensitive buildings
    or facilities, highlighting the need for accurate travel information
    in a dynamically changing environment;

-   Communications infrastructure may be the target of an attack, e.g.
    communications hubs, or be indirectly impacted, e.g. collateral
    damage to fiber optic cables, highlighting the need for
    communications network redundancy;

-   An attack could occur at any time, with or without warning, when
    available response resources are insufficient;

-   The nature of an attack could be outside the envelope of knowledge
    and experience of transportation operations staff, e.g. weapons of
    mass destruction, delaying an accurate assessment of need and
    appropriate response; and,

-   An attack could comprise multiple primary and secondary events over
    a short period of time, designed to create confusion and lure
    emergency responders and civilians into a 'trap', and again
    highlighting the need for accurate travel information in a
    dynamically changing environment.

This combination of circumstances leads to challenges for a broad
spectrum of emergency responders, law enforcement, and transportation
agencies. This in turn will impact how travel information is gathered
and disseminated. Where 511 systems exist or are planned, it appears
prudent that their designers and operators take account of such
challenges.

A recurring theme throughout the White Paper is that many issues apply
to traveler information systems in general, of which 511 systems are but
one delivery medium.

### Overview of White Paper content {#overview-of-white-paper-content .unnumbered}

This White Paper continues with a more detailed description of the
context for homeland security, and how agencies and organizations are
responding. Issues are identified and addressed in three
sections---customers, institutional/organizational, and system
performance. The White Paper discusses each issue and proposes
guidelines and actions.

-   A proposed guideline represents specific advice to 511 system
    designers and operators, to be incorporated into the next version of
    the 511 Implementation Guidelines.

-   A proposed action represents an area for further discussion or
    research by the 511 community at large that needs to be undertaken
    prior to the development of proposed guidelines for 511 system
    designers and operators.

The White Paper concludes with a summary of the challenges and
opportunities, and recommendations for moving forward.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674747 .anchor}Context for Homeland Security

### Trends in Terrorism {#trends-in-terrorism .unnumbered}

The U.S. Department of State reports nearly 140 significant terrorist
attacks worldwide since 1961. While many of these attacks have been
against U.S. interests, prior to September 11 just three of these
attacks were on the homeland: World Trade Center (1993), Oklahoma City
(1995), and Empire State Building sniper attack (1997). Research by the
Mineta Transportation Institute on terrorist attacks and serious crime
involving public surface transportation systems indicates that worldwide
there have been an average of 5 significant attacks per month during the
1990s. None of these were on the U.S. homeland. Research by the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) indicates that 58% of international
terrorist attacks in 1998 were on transportation targets, and of these
92% were on surface transportation.

While there are many lessons that transportation agencies may learn from
these attacks, the relatively small number of attacks on the U.S.
homeland leaves 511 system designers and operators with a dilemma. On
the one hand, there is a heightened sense of awareness of threats and
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, there is little in the way of hard
data to influence 511 system design and operation. This is perhaps
understandable, given the relatively short period of time since
September 11, 2001 and the immediate concern for critical infrastructure
protection and emergency preparedness. Nonetheless, it is appropriate
for the 511 Deployment Coalition to provide some initial guidance to
designers and operators, and to continue to review the emerging homeland
security situation.

It is not the intent of this White Paper to conduct a detailed review of
the events of September 11 or to address the potential for, or nature
of, any future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Of relevance to
this paper, and the subject of the remainder of this section, are how
transportation system operators responded on September 11, initiatives
and actions of various national organizations, and the missions and
actions of new federal players.

### Overview of transportation system operators' responses {#overview-of-transportation-system-operators-responses .unnumbered}

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has commissioned case studies
to document the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Two
additional case studies will document the actions taken by
transportation agencies in response to a rail tunnel fire on July 18,
2001 in Baltimore, and the Northridge earthquake on January 17, 1994.
These case studies were not available at the time of publication of this
report. In addition to FHWA's case studies, AASHTO has commissioned its
own case studies for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon.

While none of the above case studies explicitly addressed traveler
information, all touched on it to varying extents given their general
focus on transportation agency response. To the extent possible, draft
products have been reviewed, and relevant findings have been
incorporated into this White Paper.

FHWA, in conjunction with AASHTO, is currently undertaking a series of
emergency transportation operations preparedness and response workshops.
FTA, in conjunction with the Federal Railroad Administration and
American of Public Transportation Association, is developing a series of
emergency preparedness and security forums.

**Initiatives and activities of national organizations**

Transportation system security is not a new issue, although there is no
doubt it has come into sharper focus since September 11. In 1998 TRB
established a Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Protection in
Transportation, with a mission to raise awareness among all TRB
committees of the importance of critical infrastructure protection and
to promote the inclusion of critical infrastructure protection in the
mission of TRB committees. At TRB's 81^st^ Annual Meeting in Washington
D.C. in January 2002, there were more than 30 sessions that addressed
critical infrastructure protection or transportation security.

Several national organizations have developed a focus on homeland
security. AASHTO has established a transportation security task force,
which has initiated the case studies referred to above, as well as
vulnerability assessment guidelines and an emergency response handbook.
AASHTO has undertaken a joint survey (with TRB) to assess the
transportation security concerns of state DOTs, and their research needs
in the field of emergency preparedness and transportation security.

In addition, both ITS America and the Institute of Transportation
Engineers have taken homeland security initiatives.

### New Federal players {#new-federal-players .unnumbered}

President Bush\'s budget for fiscal year 2003 proposes substantial
increases in areas that require immediate attention to secure the U.S.
homeland: enhancing first responder programs, securing America\'s
borders, combating bio-terrorism, strengthening intelligence sharing,
improving transportation security and supporting other national defense
related initiatives. While it is too early to determine whether this
budget will result in any new funding for travel information
initiatives, it is likely that the roles of two new federal 'players'
will impact the linkage between 511 and homeland security.

### Office of Homeland Security {#office-of-homeland-security .unnumbered}

The mission of the Office of Homeland Security will be to develop and
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office
will coordinate the executive branch\'s efforts to detect, prepare for,
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks
within the United States. The Office is expected to play a role in
developing a National Threat Alert System, which will provide a
consistent process with which federal, state, and local agencies, and
private sector entities will be able to prepare for and respond to the
threat of terrorist attacks. When in place, such a system may be of
potential importance to 511 systems.

### Transportation Security Administration {#transportation-security-administration .unnumbered}

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA). The TSA is charged with security for all
the modes of transportation. Currently, the TSA has a focus on aviation
mandates but recognizes the security needs of other transportation
modes. Across every mode, the TSA will develop measures to increase the
protection of critical transportation assets, addressing freight as well
as passenger transportation. The TSA plans to maintain a commitment to
relentlessly measure performance, building a security regime that
provides both world-class security, and world-class customer service, to
the American people.

### United States Secret Service {#united-states-secret-service .unnumbered}

While not a new agency, the United States Secret Service, under the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, is the lead agency for designing, planning
and implementing security for National Special Security Events (NSSE).
The Secret Service has had that role since August 1999, when the 2002
Salt Lake City Winter Olympics were named a NSSE, the first Olympics so
designated. Previously, the U.S. Secret Service performed the lead
security role at the 2000 U.N. Millennium Summit in New York City, the
2001 Presidential Inaugural in Washington, D.C., and the 2002 Superbowl.
Given the importance of transportation to security, and the potential
impact of security measures on transportation, the Secret Service can be
considered not just as a new player in the transportation community, but
one with formidable authority.

### Potential demand patterns for travel information during emergencies {#potential-demand-patterns-for-travel-information-during-emergencies .unnumbered}

Any spike in demand for travel information will likely be a function of
many factors, including the type of homeland security emergency or
alert, location, time of day and day of week, maturity of local traveler
information systems (including 511 systems), and maturity of traveler
information systems in general (including 511 systems). Perhaps one of
the most immediate lessons that can be learned from September 11 is how
the demand for travel information changed during the attacks and in the
following days and weeks. As 511 systems do not currently exist in
either the New York or Washington D.C. regions, existing telephone and
web site usage provide the best proxy.

New Jersey Transit's transit information center, which normally receives
approximately 8,400 calls per day, received over 16,000 calls on
September 12. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority's website, which
normally gets 200,000 hits per day, received 10 million hits per day in
the week following the attacks.

The SmarTraveler service in the Washington D.C. region publishes calls
taken and website hits on a monthly basis, making meaningful comparisons
difficult at this time. However, calls taken for the month of September
are considered to be somewhat low, possibly indicative of overload
issues. Website hits were up by approximately 100,000 to slightly in
excess of 500,000. As a general observation, SmarTraveler operated with
high levels of demand on its system, requiring staff to work longer
hours and additional staff to be added on September 11.

TRANSCOM, which collects and disseminates real time incident information
to over 100 member agencies and affiliates in the NY, NJ, and CT region,
does not provide travel information to the public. However, on September
11 staff took calls requesting travel information, an indication both of
the heightened need for travel information and the difficulty obtaining
such information.

Clearly, evidence is mixed as to the true pattern of demand for travel
information on September 11. An alternate proxy that has been explored
is the demand for travel information related to extreme weather events
in North Carolina. In September 1999, Hurricane Floyd closed over 1500
roads in the eastern third of the state. This generated 160,000 phone
calls to the toll free DOT Customer Service line over a 2 week period.
Normal call volume is 1,500 calls per week. Call volume dropped
significantly when the DOT posted this information on its website. In
January 2002, 94 of the state's 100 counties received significant snow
(more than 12 inches in the Raleigh area). This generated nearly 400,000
website hits in 2 days where normal volume is 2,000 hits per day.

Understanding the likely demand for travel information during a homeland
security emergency is a fundamental input to system design and
operation.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674755 .anchor}Customer Issues

### Message content {#message-content .unnumbered}

**Issue:** Travel conditions may be so disrupted by the emergency that
other menu options will lead to information that is not accurate,
timely, nor reliable. In addition, the 511 system may be experiencing
huge spikes in demand.

**Proposed Guideline:** The Implementation Guidelines (version 1.1)
suggest that during major emergencies, an emergency interrupt message
may be provided prior to, or in place of, the normal initial greeting.
Under these circumstances, callers will be provided with immediate
information related to the emergency without having to navigate any
menus. In order to meet unusual levels of demand, this may be the only
message that callers hear before the call is automatically terminated.
Depending on the details of the proposed National Threat Alert System,
it may be appropriate, e.g. at intermediate levels of threat alert, to
implement a combination of an emergency interrupt message with limited
navigation of menus.

**Accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of travel information**

**Issue:** Travel conditions during the early stages of a homeland
security emergency may be very dynamic, and it may be difficult to
continuously collect data that will result in accurate, timely, and
reliable travel information. Following the attack on the Pentagon, there
were numerous instances of media dissemination of false information
regarding threats, impending attacks, or actual attacks on sites across
the Washington D.C. region. It is not known whether these were malicious
hoaxes or misunderstandings, but they highlighted the challenge of
collecting accurate, timely, and reliable information. The likely
involvement of law enforcement and security services may lead to
actions, e.g. exclusion zones, with no warning or advice, that may
blindside 511 system operators.

**Proposed Guideline:** 511 system operators must consider what
additional sources of information they may need to access, how they will
validate the information they receive, and the frequency of posting
updates.

**Issue:** While there was no evidence of this on September 11, there
have been numerous examples of "hacked" computer systems and web sites.
"Cyber-terrorism" may be an emerging form of homeland security
emergency, either as a primary attack, or as part of a secondary attack
designed to compromise response. In either case, this may lead to the
collection and/or dissemination of inaccurate travel information.

**Proposed Guideline:** 511 system designers and operators should take
all possible precautions to protect data and telephony systems from
cyber-terrorism, and develop recovery plans in the event that data is
corrupted.

**Focus of travel information**

**Issue:** Travel conditions during the early stages of a homeland
security emergency may be very dynamic, and it may be necessary to
provide travel information with content that is more regional or
multi-modal in nature than is normally the case. During the emergency,
normal travel options may be unavailable, meaning people may need very
basic and specific information on alternative travel options.

**Proposed Guideline:** 511 system operators must consider the broader
impacts of the emergency on travel options. This may require wider
coordination with other agencies to determine "safe" escape routes to
locations where travel options are less disrupted, and a thorough
interpretation of available options including alternative means, e.g.
ferry, walking. This, in turn, may require 511 system operators to have
a regional and multi-modal knowledge of transportation systems in their
area.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674757 .anchor}Institutional/Organizational
Issues

### Public and private sector roles and responsibilities {#public-and-private-sector-roles-and-responsibilities .unnumbered}

**Issue:** While many traveler information systems are entirely public
service operations, some are partnerships between the public and private
sectors, and others are purely private sector enterprises. While public
agencies may provide some data, the private sector partners generally
undertake the processing and dissemination functions. If the private
sector partners are responsible for operating a system, they may become
the primary source of travel information during a homeland security
emergency. However the private sector partners may not be best
positioned to provide accurate, timely, and reliable travel information
if they do not have immediate access to data specific to the emergency
that is collected by the public sector. Conversely, private sector
partners normally have some capability to gather their own data. If the
public sector is responsible for operating 511 systems in their areas,
they may not have access to data specific to the emergency that is
collected by the private sector.

**Proposed Guideline:** Public and private sectors should develop
coordinated responses to homeland security emergencies, with regard to
collection, processing, and dissemination of travel information. For
example, this may include standard operating procedures for sharing what
might normally be considered proprietary or privileged data.

### Additional resources required {#additional-resources-required .unnumbered}

**Issue:** As homeland security emergencies will typically occur without
specific warning, it is likely that operations staff will become
intensely busy "working the issue" for as long as it takes. Traveler
information, while important, may be regarded as a low-level concern
during the initial phases of emergency response. This situation may be
compounded by the evacuation of non-essential staff, and/or
self-dismissal of staff concerned for family members. Insufficient
qualified staff may be available to operate 511 systems; particularly
posting and updating of emergency interrupt messages.

**Proposed Guideline:** Agencies responsible for providing content to
511 systems should designate as essential those staff qualified to
operate such systems. Those staff individuals would be dedicated to the
function of operating the 511 systems, and would likely be in addition
to operators responsible for ensuring the other transportation functions
of the agency. Appropriate management processes, such as preparation of
emergency rosters, training, supervision, and overall coordination of
staff functions and responsibilities may need to be addressed as
appropriate to individual agency circumstances. Most importantly,
standard operating procedures would be needed to ensure that 511 system
operators would have immediate access to travel information and the
means to update their 511 systems.

### Inter-Agency Coordination {#inter-agency-coordination .unnumbered}

**Issue:** While most, if not all, transportation agencies have
developed and refined emergency plans tailored to local circumstances,
many of these may be predicated on past emergencies, such as natural
disasters, extreme weather events, hazardous material spills, street
riots, major events, and attractions. A few states or large
jurisdictions may have developed specific terrorism plans, including
bio-terrorism. For the most part, these may be less developed and
rehearsed than traditional emergency plans. Primary responders for such
emergencies include FBI, FEMA, DOD, Secret Service, National Guard, as
well as law enforcement. With the exception of FEMA and law enforcement,
transportation agencies may have limited experience working with
security and military authorities, and vice versa. In an emergency, the
transportation function may be subject to the direction of the
appropriate Office of Emergency Management, or other designated
authority. The non-transportation community may not understand what
types of information, and information granularity, are helpful to
transportation system operators. The non-transportation community may
not appreciate the role of traveler information in general, and 511
systems in particular, for emergency response.

**Proposed Action:** Transportation agencies must develop new
relationships, including operational planning and rehearsals, with
security and military authorities to ensure that the importance of 511
systems are understood and factored into emergency response processes.
In addition, transportation agencies should recognize the likelihood
that some information will need to be regarded as "secure", and factor
this and the possible need for staff with security clearances into their
emergency planning activities, to ensure that the integrity of secure
information is preserved and not posted onto 511 systems.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674761 .anchor}System Performance Issues

**511 System capacity considerations, including cost**

**Issue:** What assumptions about demand during a homeland security
emergency should 511 system designers make when determining system
capacity, i.e. what volume of calls should the 511 system be designed to
accommodate? Providing adequate capacity is somewhat analogous to
traditional design conventions, such as designing a facility for a
pre-determined life or for a 100-year event. As with any design that
enhances capacity or functionality, 511 system designers will have to
make trade-offs between the benefits of such features and the cost of
providing them. Designers are faced with four primary approaches:

-   Design to a locally determined spike demand, such that the 511
    system can be expected to maintain normal or near normal service
    during the emergency;

-   Design to normal levels of demand, but with the feature to activate
    additional capacity when needed. This was the case for Salt Lake
    City during the 2002 Winter Olympics, where the regular capacity had
    been increased from 96 to 360 lines for the duration of the games,
    with a guaranteed overflow protection of 110% in the event that the
    511 system detects a spike in demand;

-   Design to normal levels of demand, and plan to address any spike in
    demand on an as-needed basis, e.g. by replacing the normal menus
    with an automatically terminated emergency interrupt message to
    constrain call length, adding more call takers, and adding more
    phone lines on an as-needed, as-available basis; and,

-   Design to normal levels of demand and not attempt to address any
    spike in demand related to a homeland security emergency, on the
    basis that the 511 service is locally determined to be an
    inappropriate means to address such situations relative to other
    options, e.g. local media or law enforcement.

**Proposed Action:** Undertake further research into the
functionality/cost trade-offs represented by the preceding design
principles, and use this as a basis for proposed guidelines to 511
system designers and operators. One important avenue to explore in the
coming months is the linkage between 511 system design and the proposed
National Threat Alert System, in particular whether the declaration of
certain levels of threat alert may trigger specific travel information
responses that are eligible for federal funding.

**Issue:** Some estimates of spikes in demand are provided earlier in
this report. Their significance and relevance to other locations or
circumstances in determining adequate and appropriate capacity are
matters of interpretation and judgment, and should be considered
alongside other factors, such as local evidence of demand spikes for
non-homeland security emergencies.

**Proposed Action:** Undertake further research into spike demand for
travel information during emergencies, including non-homeland security
emergencies, and use this as a basis for enhanced guidelines to 511
system designers and operators.

**Issue:** The foregoing discussion assumes sufficient capacity exists
on the telephone providers' networks to handle calls from users to the
511 service. While this may be a reasonable assumption for landline
service, it may not apply for cellular service.

**Proposed Action**: Work with landline and cellular providers, and
their industry associations, to ensure adequate capacity exists to meet
the locally determined needs of potential callers to 511 systems during
a homeland security emergency.

### Response times/quality of service {#response-timesquality-of-service .unnumbered}

**Issue:** The Implementation Guidelines (version 1.1) suggest that 511
systems should be sized to accept all calls for the 90th percentile peak
hour load. If live operators are utilized or connected to as part of a
511 service, 90th percentile wait time should not exceed 90 seconds, and
callers should receive indications that they are on hold.  511 services
should have availability to callers of 99.8% (out of service less than
18 hours a year).  System performance against these parameters should be
measured and monitored. During a homeland security emergency it is
likely that the quality of the 511 service may deteriorate, depending on
which design principle (of the four listed above) is adopted.

**Proposed Guideline:** Experience from New York and Washington D.C.
indicates that callers experienced delays and dropped calls on September
11. Unless a 511 system has been designed to maintain normal or near
normal service during the emergency or with a feature to activate
additional capacity when needed, relax or suspend the quality guideline
for wait time and availability.

**System redundancy**

**Issue:** Immediately following the September 11 attacks, landline and
cellular telephone services became unreliable, apparently as a result of
overload. In Lower Manhattan, the situation on September 11 with regard
to using telephone service was compounded by damage to a Verizon central
hub, resulting in the loss of 200,000 phone lines, cellular sites
knocked out, local telephone switching office damaged, fiber optic
transport equipment crushed, and high-speed internet service down for
many companies because of power failures. Not only did this make it
difficult for callers to get access to travel information, it also
impacted the ability of agencies to communicate between office and field
staff, and to share information with other agencies.

**Proposed Action:** Work with landline and cellular service providers,
their industry associations, emergency management agencies, and others
to address the need for communication network and system redundancy.

**Critical Systems Assessment**

**Issue:** Communications capacity and redundancy are not the only
systems of concern during a homeland security emergency. Power supply
and the 511 systems themselves may be the target of an attack, or be
impacted by an attack.

**Proposed Action:** Undertake vulnerability assessments of critical
systems to assess the risk of primary or backup system failures, and as
a basis for the development (and costing) of mitigation plans.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674763 .anchor}Conclusions

### Summary {#summary .unnumbered}

511 systems offer the potential to become a valuable medium through
which to provide travel information in support of homeland security
emergency management. This potential is likely to increase in the coming
years as more systems are deployed and familiarity with such systems
continues to grow across the nation. Put simply, 511 has the potential
to be a national asset in the event of homeland security emergencies.

It is therefore appropriate for 511 system designers to take homeland
security considerations into account at this time. While the September
11 attacks were tragic, it is perhaps fortunate that most 511 systems
are at a formative stage of development and are thus able to embrace
homeland security needs. Perhaps, it is possible that they will even
offer higher levels of public service than was ever envisioned.

This White Paper draws attention to a number of issues related to
customers, institutions / organizations, and system performance that
must be addressed. It is fair to say that a number of the issues apply
to traveler information systems in general, of which 511 systems are but
one medium. Closely related to this is the recognition that there are
new federal players, with their respective missions, who will likely
influence the future role of 511 systems in ways that have yet to be
determined. These players signify that there is a "new order" in terms
of authority, control, and lines of responsibility. Transportation
agencies will likely find that their detailed knowledge of
transportation networks, human resources, geographical dispersion, and
technology systems bring a utility to the security community that has
been previously under-valued or even recognized. What is less clear is
the extent to which transportation agencies retain the same level of
control over their resources (including travel information systems such
as 511) during a homeland security emergency, compared to a
pre-September 11 situation.

### Recommendations {#recommendations .unnumbered}

This White Paper has addressed the challenges and opportunities for 511
systems, their designers, and their operators, arising from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. However, the homeland security environment is evolving,
meaning this White Paper cannot be the last statement on the subject
from a 511 perspective. Recognizing that there needs to be wider debate
as to what role, if any, 511 systems will play during homeland security
emergencies, we recommend that the 511 Deployment Coalition take the
following actions:

-   Recognize that while 511 system design will be primarily driven by
    local considerations, the potential for diverse approaches to
    homeland security may result in a loss of the desired national
    consistency, e.g. 511 could be a pillar of one region's response to
    an event, while it could be non-existent in another region's
    response to a similar event.

-   Incorporate the proposed guidelines in this White Paper into the 511
    Implementation Guidelines.

-   Undertake the proposed actions in this White Paper.

-   Open a dialogue with representatives from the homeland security
    environment, especially the new federal players (Office of Homeland
    Security, Transportation Security Administration, and the United
    States Secret Service) to better understand their perspectives
    towards homeland security emergency management, including the
    proposed National Threat Alert System, and to apprise them of the
    challenges and opportunities for 511 systems.

-   Work closely with FHWA, FTA, and the emergency management community,
    and with national associations (TRB, AASHTO, APTA, ITS America, and
    ITE) to pool knowledge and resources regarding challenges and
    opportunities for 511 systems related to homeland security.

-   Conduct a post-games case study of the operation of the Salt Lake
    City 511 system during the 2002 Winter Olympics, to document any
    additional homeland security related lessons learned.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc7674766 .anchor}Acknowledgements

### Task Force Members {#task-force-members .unnumbered}

The task force was comprised of the following members:

-   Kelly Hutchinson, NCDOT, lead

-   Ron Boenau, Federal Transit Administration

-   Pete Costello, ITS America

-   Sandra Check, New Jersey Transit

-   Les Jacobson, PB Farradyne

-   Keith Jasper, PBS&J

-   Mac Lister, Federal Highway Administration

-   Steven McDonald, Missouri DOT

-   Bob Rupert, Federal Highway Administration

-   Mike Sobolewski, Minnesota DOT

-   Alice Wiggins, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

-   Jim Wright, Minnesota DOT

### Additional Insights {#additional-insights .unnumbered}

The task force acknowledges the assistance and insights of the
following:

-   Malaika Abernathy, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

-   Karen Cavallo Miller, Battelle

-   Judy Chen, California DOT

-   Allan DeBlasio, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

-   Dave Ekern, AASHTO

-   Arthur Hamilton, Federal Highway Administration

-   Tom Hicks, Maryland State Highway Administration

-   Chris Hill, NET

-   Tony Kane, AASHTO

-   David Lively, California DOT

-   Steve Mondul, Virginia DOT

-   Vince Pearce, Federal Highway Administration

-   Joe Peters, Federal Highway Administration

-   Frank Quon, California DOT

-   Ray Ruggieri, TRANSCOM

-   Rick Schuman, PBS&J