Before the

Federal Communications Commission

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | * | CC Docket No. 00-65          |
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| Application by SBC               | ) |                              |
| Communications Inc.,             | * |                              |
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| Southwestern Bell Telephone      |   |                              |
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| And Southwestern Bell            | ) |                              |
| Communications                   | * |                              |
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| Services, Inc. d/b/a             |   |                              |
| Southwestern Bell Long Distance  | * |                              |
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| Pursuant to Section 271 of the   | ) |                              |
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| Telecommunications Act of 1996   | * |                              |
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| To Provide In-Region, InterLATA  | * |                              |
| Services                         | * |                              |
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**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

**Adopted:** June 30, 2000 **Released:** June 30, 2000

By the Commission: Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring and issuing a
statement.

Paragraph

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II\. BACKGROUND 8

A. Statutory Framework 8

B. History of this Application 12

C. Texas Commission and Department of Justice Evaluations 17

III\. Analytical Framework 21

A. Overview 21

B. Compliance With Unbundling Rules 28

C. Scope of Evidence in the Record 34

1\. Procedural Framework 34

2\. Ex Parte Submissions 41

D. Framework for Analyzing Compliance with Statutory Requirements 43

1\. Legal Standard 44

2\. Evidentiary Case 47

IV\. COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(A) 59

A. Background 59

B. Discussion 60

V. CHECKLIST COMPLIANCE 61

A. Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection 61

1\. Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection 61

2\. Pricing of Interconnection 79

B. Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements 91

1\. Operations Support Systems 92

2\. UNE Combinations and Other Issues 213

3\. Pricing of Network Elements 231

C. Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way 243

1\. Background 243

2\. Discussion 245

D. Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops 246

1\. Background 246

2\. Discussion 251

E. Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport 331

1\. Background 331

2\. Discussion 332

F. Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching 336

1\. Background 336

2\. Discussion 337

G. Checklist Item 7 343

1\. 911 and E911 Access 343

2\. Directory Assistance/Operator Services 345

H. Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings 352

1\. Background 352

2\. Discussion 355

I. Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration 359

1\. Background 359

2\. Discussion 361

J. Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling 362

1\. Background 362

2\. Discussion 364

K. Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability 369

1\. Background 369

2\. Discussion 371

L. Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity 373

1\. Background 373

2\. Discussion 375

M. Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation 378

1\. Background 378

2\. Discussion 379

N. Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 387

1\. Background 387

2\. Discussion 388

VI\. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 394

A. Background 394

B. Discussion 395

1\. Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section
272 397

VII\. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 416

A. Overview 416

B. Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets 419

C. Assurance of Future Compliance 420

1\. Performance Remedy Plan 422

2\. Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan 423

D. Other Arguments 431

VIII\. SECTION 271(D)(6) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 434

IX\. CONCLUSION 437

X. ORDERING CLAUSES 438

**APPENDIX A: LIST OF COMMENTERS**

# APPENDIX B: SWBT OSS OVERVIEW {#appendix-b-swbt-oss-overview .Appendix-Heading}

# INTRODUCTION

1.  On April 5, 2000, SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance (collectively, SWBT)
    filed its second application for authorization under section 271 of
    the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,[^1] to provide interLATA
    services in the State of Texas.[^2] Although SWBT initially filed
    for in-region, interLATA authority for the State of Texas on January
    10, 2000,[^3] that application was withdrawn at SWBT's request.[^4]
    We therefore take no action with respect to SWBT's first
    application. In this Order, we grant SWBT's second application to
    enter the in-region, interLATA market in Texas based on evidence
    that SWBT has taken the statutorily required steps to open its local
    exchange and exchange access markets to competition.

2.  This approval marks, for the first time, an application that is
    supported by both the Department of Justice and relevant state
    commission, in this case the Texas Public Utility Commission (Texas
    Commission). The success of this application is due, in large part,
    to the extensive review conducted by both the Department of Justice
    and the Texas Commission.

3.  We applaud the efforts of the Texas Commission, which has expended
    significant time and effort overseeing SWBT's implementation of the
    requirements of section 271. For more than two years, the Texas
    Commission has worked with SWBT and competing carriers to identify
    and resolve a number of key issues related to SWBT's compliance with
    the Act. As a result of the Texas Commission's efforts, competition
    has taken root, and is expanding in local telecommunications
    markets, which ultimately benefits consumers. The Texas Commission
    utilized a number of effective methods to ensure that the local
    markets in Texas are open to competition today, and will remain so
    in the future. Of particular note, the Texas Commission ensured that
    its section 271 review process was open to participation by all
    interested parties, and supplemented its review of the operational
    readiness of SWBT's OSS with an independent third party test. As
    part of its section 271 review, the Texas Commission also developed
    clearly defined performance measurements and standards, and adopted
    a performance remedy plan to discourage backsliding. In a continuing
    effort to refine and monitor performance measurements, the Texas
    Commission has a six month review process in place. The Texas
    Commission is currently considering modifying existing measurements
    and adding new measurements based on input from SWBT and competing
    carriers.

4.  In addition to overseeing SWBT's implementation of the requirements
    to section 271 approval, the Texas Commission has actively
    implemented our rules issued under section 251, including the
    Commission's pricing standards and the rules relating to advanced
    services. Moreover, to address the concerns raised by the Department
    of Justice and commenters with respect to SWBT's initial
    application, the Texas Commission conducted a further review with
    respect to a number of key section 271 issues. Because of those
    efforts, this second application by SWBT is an improvement over its
    first one, especially in those areas identified as deficient by the
    Department of Justice in its evaluation of SWBT's first application.
    Furthermore, we accord the Texas Commission's verification of SWBT's
    compliance substantial weight based on the totality of its efforts
    and the extent of expertise it has developed on section 271 issues.

5.  The fact that SWBT has implemented the competitive checklist in
    Texas can be seen in the degree of entry into the local exchange
    market. According to SWBT, it has unbundled more than 302,000 loops
    (including nearly 244,000 loops as part of an unbundled network
    element platform or "UNE-P").[^5] SWBT also reported resale of
    approximately 349,000 access lines to competitors (including 191,000
    residential lines).[^6] The Department of Justice estimates that
    competitors have captured approximately eight percent of access
    lines in SWBT's territory in Texas.[^7]

6.  In addition to competition for voice services, SWBT provisioned
    nearly 7,000 unbundled loops to broadband competitors for provision
    of xDSL services.[^8] Although this is only a fraction of SWBT's
    ADSL customer base in Texas,[^9] recent implementation of our line
    sharing requirements will give xDSL providers additional
    opportunities to compete for residential and small business
    customers on an equal footing with SWBT's separate affiliate for
    advanced services.[^10] Monthly order volumes for unbundled
    xDSL-capable loops are steadily increasing,[^11] as are UNE-P
    volumes.[^12] Additionally, another branded player for voice
    services---WorldCom---joined AT&T in the Texas market in April with
    a focus on residential customers.[^13]

7.  As we noted in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* the grant of this
    application merely closes a chapter. It does not end the story. SWBT
    must continue to comply with the checklist obligations set forth in
    section 271, and the separate affiliate requirements of section 272.
    As noted throughout this Order, should the evidence demonstrate that
    SWBT ceases to comply with the requirements of the Act, enforcement
    action may be appropriate.[^14] Most notably, section 271(d)(6)
    authorizes the Commission to suspend or revoke the authorization
    granted herein.[^15]

# BACKGROUND

## Statutory Framework

8.  In the 1996 Act, Congress conditioned BOC provision of in-region,
    interLATA service on compliance with certain provisions of section
    271.[^16] Pursuant to section 271, BOCs must apply to this
    Commission for authorization to provide interLATA services
    originating in any in-region state.[^17] Congress has directed the
    Commission to issue a written determination on each application no
    later than 90 days after the application is filed.[^18]

9.  To obtain authorization to provide in-region, interLATA services
    under section 271, the BOC must show that: (1) it satisfies the
    requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A), known as "Track A" or
    271(c)(1)(B), known as "Track B"; (2) it has "fully implemented the
    competitive checklist" or that the statements approved by the state
    under section 252 satisfy the competitive checklist contained in
    section 271(c)(2)(B);[^19] (3) the requested authorization will be
    carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272;[^20]
    and (4) the BOC's entry into in-region, interLATA market is
    "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
    necessity."[^21] The statute specifies that, unless the Commission
    finds that these four criteria have been satisfied, the Commission
    "shall not approve" the requested authorization.[^22]

10. Section 271(d)(2)(A) requires the Commission to consult with the
    Attorney General before making any determination approving or
    denying a section 271 application. The Attorney General is entitled
    to evaluate the application "using any standard the Attorney General
    considers appropriate," and the Commission is required to "give
    substantial weight to the Attorney General's evaluation."[^23]

11. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state
    commission to verify that the BOC has one or more state approved
    interconnection agreements with a facilities-based competitor, or a
    Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT), and
    that either the agreement(s) or general statement satisfy the
    "competitive checklist."[^24] Because the Act does not prescribe any
    standard for Commission consideration of a state commission's
    verification under section 271(d)(2)(B), the Commission has
    discretion in each section 271 proceeding to determine the amount of
    weight to accord the state commission's verification.[^25] The
    Commission has held that, although it will consider carefully state
    determinations of fact that are supported by a detailed and
    extensive record, it is the Commission's role to determine whether
    the factual record supports the conclusion that particular
    requirements of section 271 have been met.[^26] As noted in the
    Introduction, we accord the Texas Commission's verification of
    SWBT's compliance substantial weight based on the totality of its
    efforts and the extent of its expertise on section 271 issues. Like
    the New York Commission, whose section 271 verification we also
    accorded substantial weight, the Texas Commission directed a
    lengthy, rigorous and open collaborative process with active
    participation by Commission staff and competitive LECs.[^27] The
    Texas Commission also developed a comprehensive performance
    measurement and remedy plan, which it continues to monitor and
    refine.[^28] In addition, the Texas Commission has taken the lead on
    a number of emerging technical and legal issues related to
    provisioning of xDSL-capable loops. We thus place substantial weight
    on the Texas Commission's comments in this matter, as they reflect
    its role not only as a driving force behind these proceedings, but
    also as an active participant in bringing competition for local
    telecommunications services to Texas.

## History of this Application

12. In March 1998, SWBT filed with the Texas Commission a draft
    application to provide in-region, interLATA authority in the State
    of Texas.[^29] On April 7, 1998, after a number of technical
    conferences and collaborative meetings, the Texas Commission
    concluded that SWBT had not demonstrated compliance with the
    requirements of section 271(c).[^30] Shortly thereafter, on June 1,
    1998, the Texas Commission issued Order Number 25 in which it listed
    129 key issues that needed to be resolved before it could recommend
    approval of SWBT's application.[^31]

13. To facilitate the resolution of the issues identified in Order
    Number 25, the Texas Commission invited SWBT and interested
    competing carriers to participate in a series of collaborative
    meetings and workshops and technical conferences, known as the
    "Texas 271 Collaborative Process."[^32] During this process, staff
    of the Texas Commission, SWBT, and competing carriers worked
    collaboratively to identify and resolve a number of key issues
    related to SWBT's compliance with section 271, including the
    operational readiness of SWBT's OSS, and the development of a
    performance monitoring and enforcement mechanism.[^33] Another key
    component of the Texas Commission's section 271 proceeding was the
    development and adoption of a model interconnection agreement, which
    is referred to as the "Texas 271 Agreement" or "T2A."[^34] The Texas
    Commission ensured that its collaborative process was open to
    participation by all interested parties and, as a result, received
    and reviewed a massive record of public comments.

14. In connection with its review of the operational readiness of SWBT's
    OSS, the Texas Commission retained Telcordia (formerly Bellcore) to
    conduct an independent third party evaluation of SWBT's OSS.[^35]
    The Telcordia test was intended to address a multitude of issues,
    including the ability of SWBT's OSS to handle commercial volumes of
    orders, and SWBT's implementation of the performance measurements
    that had been approved by the Texas Commission during its
    collaborative process.[^36] Following the completion of initial and
    follow-up testing,[^37] Telcordia issued a final report, in which it
    concluded that SWBT's OSS were "operationally ready to handle
    commercial volumes of transactions."[^38]

15. Upon concluding that all outstanding issues relating to SWBT's
    compliance with section 271 had been resolved, the Texas Commission
    voted at its December 16, 1999 open meeting to unanimously support
    SWBT's section 271 application.[^39]

16. As noted above, on January 10, 2000, SWBT filed an application with
    this Commission to provide in-region, interLATA service in the State
    of Texas. On April 5, 2000, SWBT filed an extensive supplement to
    its January 10 Application.[^40] Recognizing that such new evidence
    was filed shortly before the expiration of the 90-day statutory
    deadline, in its April 5 filing, SWBT requested that the Commission
    "restart the clock" on its January 10 Application.[^41]
    Alternatively, SWBT asked the Commission to treat its supplemental
    filing as: (1) a withdrawal of the January 10 Application; and (2) a
    resubmission of a new application, which incorporates both the
    January 10 and April 5 filings.[^42] On April 6, 2000, the
    Commission granted SWBT's alternative request to withdraw its
    January 10 Application and to initiate a new application pursuant to
    section 271 based on the record generated in response to the January
    10 and April 5 filings.[^43] Throughout this Order, the January 10
    filing will be referred to as the "Texas I Application," and the
    April 5 filing will be referred to as the "Texas II Application."

## Texas Commission and Department of Justice Evaluations

17. The Texas Commission submitted its evaluation of SWBT's Texas I and
    Texas II Applications to this Commission on January 31, 2000[^44]
    and April 26, 2000, [^45] respectively. The Texas Commission advises
    the Commission that SWBT has taken the statutorily required steps to
    open its local markets to competition.[^46] Specifically, the Texas
    Commission states that SWBT has met its obligation under section
    271(c)(1)(A) by entering into interconnection agreements with at
    least 17 competing carriers that are serving residential and
    business customers either exclusively or predominantly over their
    own facilities.[^47] In addition, the Texas Commission states that
    the record developed in the Texas proceeding establishes that SWBT
    has a legal obligation, under its interconnection agreements and
    state-approved tariffs, to provide the 14 items required under
    section 271's checklist, and that SWBT is meeting its legal
    obligation to provide these 14 items.[^48]

18. In its evaluation of SWBT's Texas II Application, the Texas
    Commission acknowledges the Department of Justice's finding that
    SWBT's initial application was deficient in certain critical areas.
    [^49] To address these concerns, the Texas Commission states that it
    conducted a further review. Specifically, the Texas Commission
    states that it reexamined the evidence with respect to: (1) the
    integration of SWBT's pre-ordering and ordering interfaces; (2) the
    coordination, timing and quality of SWBT "hot cut" process; and (3)
    SWBT's provisioning of loops used by competing carriers to provide
    advanced services.[^50] Based on the evidence presented in SWBT's
    Texas I Application, and its further review, the Texas Commission
    concludes that SWBT has taken the statutorily required steps to open
    its local markets to competition.[^51]

19. The Department of Justice filed its evaluation of SWBT's Texas I
    Application on February 14, 2000. [^52] In this evaluation, the
    Department of Justice recommended that SWBT's application be
    denied.[^53] The Department of Justice submitted evaluations of
    SWBT's Texas II Application on May 12[^54] and June 13, 2000.[^55]
    In its May 12 evaluation, the Department of Justice concluded that
    SWBT's performance with respect to interconnection trunking had
    sufficiently improved to alleviate its concerns with respect to this
    issue.[^56] It stated, however, that it would provide the Commission
    with its analysis of SWBT's performance in providing DSL-capable
    loops, hot cuts for analog loops, and UNE-platform after it had
    reviewed SWBT's April performance data. In its June 13, 2000
    evaluation, the Department of Justice recommends approval of SWBT's
    application to provide long distance service in Texas, subject to
    certain qualifications.[^57]

20. In recommending approval of SWBT's Texas II Application, the
    Department of Justice notes that SWBT has addressed many of the
    deficiencies associated with its first application. More
    specifically, the Department of Justice concludes that SWBT has
    significantly improved the process by which it measures and reports
    its performance in providing unbundled loops for DSL services, and
    has demonstrated improvement in its ability to provision DSL-capable
    loops in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^58] Indeed, the Department of
    Justice concludes that recent data indicate that SWBT "is now
    providing parity under virtually all measures relating to the
    provisioning of DSL loops."[^59] The Department of Justice further
    finds that SWBT has demonstrated improvement in cutting over a loop
    to a competing carrier through both the coordinated hot cut (CHC)
    and frame due time (FDT) processes.[^60] Finally, the Department of
    Justice states that commercial data with respect to competing
    carriers' ability to compete via the UNE-platform are encouraging.
    Indeed, the Department of Justice notes that entry by competing
    carriers using the UNE-platform has increased steadily over the last
    few months.

# Analytical Framework

## Overview

21. As part of our determination that SWBT has satisfied the
    requirements of section 271, we consider whether SWBT has fully
    implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)(2)(B).[^61]
    In demonstrating compliance with each item on the competitive
    checklist, a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and
    specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant
    to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices
    and other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it
    is currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist item
    in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an
    acceptable level of quality.[^62]

22. Section 271 conditions authorization to enter the long-distance
    market on a BOC's compliance with the terms of the competitive
    checklist, and those terms generally incorporate by reference the
    core local competition obligations that sections 251 and 252 impose
    on all incumbent LECs. In a variety of proceedings since 1996, this
    Commission has discharged its statutory authority to issue
    comprehensive rules and orders giving specific content to those
    obligations, often in considerable detail. In determining whether a
    BOC applicant has met the local competition prerequisites for entry
    into the long-distance market, therefore, we evaluate its compliance
    with our rules and orders in effect at the time the application was
    filed.

23. Despite the comprehensiveness of our local competition rules, there
    will inevitably be, at any given point in time, a variety of new and
    unresolved interpretive disputes about the precise content of an
    incumbent LEC's obligations to its competitors, disputes that our
    rules have not yet addressed and that do not involve per se
    violations of self-executing requirements of the Act. Several
    commenters seek to use this section 271 proceeding as a forum for
    the mandatory resolution of many such local competition disputes,
    including disputes on issues of general application that are more
    appropriately the subjects of industry-wide notice-and-comment
    rulemaking. Indeed, those commenters would apparently compel this
    Commission to resolve those disputes in this proceeding, and to
    resolve each one in favor of SWBT, as a precondition to determining
    that SWBT has met the statutory obligations of section 271.

24. The position of those commenters is irreconcilable with this
    statutory scheme. There may be other kinds of statutory proceedings,
    such as certain complaint proceedings, in which we may bear an
    obligation to resolve particular interpretive disputes raised by a
    carrier as the basis for its complaint.[^63] But the section 271
    process simply could not function as Congress intended if we were
    generally required to resolve all such disputes as a precondition to
    granting a section 271 application.

25. First, Congress designed section 271 proceedings as highly
    specialized, 90-day proceedings for examining the performance of a
    particular carrier in a particular State at a particular time. Such
    fast-track, narrowly focused adjudications \-- generally dominated
    by extremely fact-intensive disputes about an individual BOC's
    empirical performance \-- are often inappropriate forums for the
    considered resolution of industry-wide local competition questions
    of general applicability. If Congress had intended to compel us to
    use section 271 proceedings for that purpose, it would not have
    confined our already intensive review to an extraordinarily
    compressed 90-day timetable.

26. Second, Congress designed section 271 to give the BOCs an important
    incentive to open their local markets to competition, and that
    incentive presupposes a realistic hope of attaining section 271
    authorization. That hope would largely vanish if a BOC's opponents
    could effectively doom any section 271 application by freighting
    their comments with novel interpretive disputes and demand that
    authorization be denied unless each one of those disputes is
    resolved in the BOC's favor. Indeed, if that were the required
    approach, the BOCs would face enormous uncertainty about the steps
    they need to take to win section 271 authorization, and they would
    therefore lose much of their incentive to cooperate in opening their
    local markets to competition in the first place. That result would
    disserve the public interest in greater competition in both local
    and long-distance markets, and it would defeat the congressional
    intent underlying this statutory scheme.

27. Finally, simply as a matter of statutory construction, few of the
    substantive obligations contained in the local competition
    provisions of sections 251 and 252 are altogether self-executing;
    they rely for their content on the Commission's rules. That is most
    obviously true in the case of our legislative rules under section
    251(d)(2) identifying "what network elements should be made
    available,"[^64] but it is also true of our many other rules and
    orders giving content to the broadly-worded provisions of the 1996
    Act. Our rules vary with time, redefining the statutory obligations
    that govern the market. Just as our long-standing approach to the
    procedural framework for section 271 applications focuses our
    factual inquiry on a BOC's performance at the time of its
    application, so too may we fix at that same point the local
    competition obligations against which the BOC's performance is
    generally measured for purposes of deciding whether to grant the
    application. Nothing in section 271 or any other provision of the
    Act compels us to require a BOC applicant to demonstrate compliance
    with new local competition obligations that were unrecognized at the
    time the application was filed.

## Compliance With Unbundling Rules

28. One element of the required showing, as explained in more detail
    below, is that the applicant satisfies the Commission's rules
    governing unbundled network elements. It is necessary to clarify the
    aspects of the new rules governing incumbent LECs' unbundling and
    line sharing obligations with which we expect SWBT to demonstrate
    compliance in this proceeding. We note that both the *UNE Remand
    Order* and the *Line Sharing Order* introduced new rules which did
    not become binding until after SWBT filed its second section 271
    application for Texas, on April 5, 2000.[^65] We conclude that, for
    the purpose of evaluating compliance with checklist item 2, we
    require SWBT to demonstrate that it is currently in compliance with
    the

    rules in effect on the date of filing, but do not require SWBT to
    demonstrate that it complies with rules that become effective during
    the pendency of its application.

29. We emphasize that, on an ongoing basis, SWBT must comply with all of
    the Commission's rules implementing the requirements of sections 251
    and 252 upon the dates specified by those rules. This includes such
    rules that have taken effect since the date SWBT filed its
    application, such as the new unbundling rules that became effective
    on May 18, 2000.

30. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
    established a list of seven unbundled network elements (UNEs) which
    incumbent LECs were obliged to provide.[^66] This obligation was
    codified in section 51.319 of the Commission's rules (rule
    319).[^67] In January 1999, the Supreme Court vacated rule 319 and
    instructed the Commission to revise the standards under which the
    unbundling obligation is determined and to reevaluate the network
    elements subject to the unbundling requirement.[^68] On November 5,
    1999, we released the *UNE Remand Order*, in which we reevaluated
    the unbundling obligations of incumbent LECs and promulgated a new
    rule 319, pursuant to the Supreme Court's direction and sections
    251(c)(3) and 251(d)(2) of the Act. With certain exceptions, the new
    rule 319 and other requirements set forth in the *UNE Remand Order*
    took effect on February 17, 2000, 30 days after publication in the
    Federal Register.[^69] The remaining aspects of the new rule 319 did
    not take effect until 120 days after the publication date, or May
    18, 2000.[^70] Therefore, on April 5, 2000, when SWBT filed its
    re-application for section 271 authorization in Texas, certain
    aspects of the new rule 319 were not yet in effect.

31. In order to demonstrate compliance with checklist item 2, SWBT must
    demonstrate that it complies fully with those portions of the new
    rule 319 that took effect in February 2000, and thus were binding on
    the date SWBT filed this second application. Indeed, in the Texas I
    proceeding, SWBT had already committed to demonstrate compliance
    with the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order* that took effect in
    February 2000.[^71] No commenter has objected to SWBT's position.

32. For the purpose of evaluating whether its application satisfies
    section 271, we do not require SWBT to demonstrate that it complies
    with those portions of the new rule 319 that took effect in
    May 2000. Although SWBT, like all other incumbent LECs, was required
    to comply with rule 319 in May 2000, we believe it would be unfair
    to require SWBT to demonstrate compliance with rules that become
    effective after it submits an application for section 271
    authorization, in advance of the effective date for other incumbent
    LECs. In addition, were we to require SWBT to supplement the record
    with additional evidence demonstrating its compliance with the new
    *UNE Remand* rules once they became effective on May 18, 2000, such
    a re-opening of the record would be administratively complicated and
    inconsistent with our well-established procedural framework for
    section 271 applications.[^72] A similar procedural situation was
    presented in the *Bell Atlantic New York* proceeding. Bell Atlantic
    filed its application for section 271 authorization in New York
    after the *UNE Remand Order* had been adopted but before it had
    taken effect and, thus, at a time when no binding section 319 rule
    was in effect.[^73] Bell Atlantic suggested, and we agreed, that it
    would be reasonable for the Commission to use the original seven
    network elements identified in former rule 319 in evaluating
    compliance with checklist item 2 of its application.[^74] We
    declined to require Bell Atlantic to demonstrate compliance with the
    new rule 319 because we recognized that the new rule would not take
    effect until after the release of the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, and because we believed it would be unfair to require Bell
    Atlantic to demonstrate compliance with new rules weeks or months
    before the rule became binding on other incumbent LECs. We thus find
    SWBT's approach to rule 319 to be reasonable, and consistent with
    our analysis in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order.*

33. For similar reasons, as discussed below, we do not require SWBT to
    prove that it has implemented the OSS and other loop facility
    modifications necessary to accommodate requests for line sharing as
    required in the Line Sharing Order.[^75]

## Scope of Evidence in the Record

### Procedural Framework

34. Section 271 proceedings are, at their core, adjudications that the
    Act requires the Commission to complete within ninety days of the
    application filing. The statute also requires us to consult with the
    Department of Justice and the relevant state commission in reviewing
    the application. In the context of this statutory framework, the
    Commission has established procedural rules governing BOC section
    271 applications.[^76] Among other things, these rules provide an
    opportunity for parties other than the Department of Justice and the
    relevant state commission to comment on section 271 applications.

35. Under our procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications,
    we expect that a section 271 application, as originally filed, will
    include all of the factual evidence on which the applicant would
    have the Commission rely in making its findings.[^77] An applicant
    may not, at any time during the pendency of its application,
    supplement its application by submitting new factual evidence that
    is not directly responsive to arguments raised by parties commenting
    on its application.[^78] This includes the submission, on reply, of
    factual evidence gathered after the initial filing. In an effort to
    meet its burden of proof, however, a BOC may submit new factual
    information after the application is filed, if the sole purpose of
    that evidence is to rebut arguments or facts submitted by other
    commenters.[^79] The new evidence, however, must cover only the
    period placed in dispute by commenters and may, in no event,
    post-date the filing of the comments (*i.e.*, day 20).[^80] In the
    event that the applicant submits new or post-dated evidence in
    replies or *ex parte* filings and the evidence is not directly
    responsive to commenting parties, we retain the discretion to start
    the 90-day review process anew or to accord such evidence no
    weight.[^81]

36. This precedent has served the Commission well by deterring
    incomplete filings from the BOCs. In particular, the rule is
    designed to prevent applicants from presenting part of their initial
    *prima facie* showing for the first time in reply comments.[^82] The
    rule has enabled us properly to manage our own internal
    consideration of the application and ensures that commenters are not
    faced with a "moving target" in the BOC's section 271 application.
    We continue to believe, as a general matter, that it is highly
    disruptive to our processes to have a record that is constantly
    evolving. We emphasize, however, that our precedent makes clear that
    this rule is a discretionary one.[^83]

37. We do not expect that a BOC, in its initial application, will
    anticipate and address every foreseeable argument its opponents
    might make in their subsequent reply comments, but we have
    previously stated that a BOC must address in its initial application
    all facts that the BOC can reasonably anticipate will be at issue.
    Through state proceedings, BOCs should be able reasonably to
    identify and anticipate certain arguments and allegations that
    parties will make in their filings before the Commission.[^84]

38. In addition, the Commission has found that a BOC's promises of
    *future* performance to address particular concerns raised by
    commenters have no probative value in demonstrating its *present*
    compliance with the requirements of section 271.[^85] In order to
    gain in-region, interLATA entry, a BOC must support its application
    with actual evidence demonstrating its present compliance with the
    statutory conditions for entry, instead of prospective evidence that
    is contingent on future behavior. Thus, we must be able to make a
    determination based on the evidence in the record that a BOC has
    actually demonstrated compliance with the requirements of
    section 271. Changes or upgrades (*e.g.,* development of new
    processes for providing access to checklist items) that post-date
    the application will not be relied upon for checklist compliance,
    but may provide us with further assurances that the applicant will
    continue to satisfy the conditions of market entry in the future.

39. With this procedural framework in mind, we find it appropriate to
    consider in connection with this application SWBT's Texas
    performance data for the month of April 2000, even though the month
    contains a few days that extend beyond the comment filing date,
    April 26, 2000. We believe that it would be administratively
    burdensome and would not result in any material change to the
    submitted data if we were to formalistically require SWBT to omit
    the last four days of April from its reports for the purposes of
    this proceeding. SWBT's state-approved procedures are geared toward
    generating performance reports on a monthly basis, and competitive
    LECs have become accustomed to receiving them in the same form.

40. Moreover, generation of a special report, *e.g.*, covering only the
    dates from April 1 to April 26, 2000, would pose a greater risk of
    manipulation or miscalculation and would presumably make it more
    difficult for competitive LECs to compare the reported data with
    their own records, which they have become accustomed to receiving in
    monthly reports. We find the monthly performance reports created in
    the ordinary course of business and according to established
    procedures to be inherently more reliable than any abbreviated
    report. In addition, submission of a second set of April performance
    data (consisting of hundreds of pages of nearly duplicative
    material) would make an already voluminous and complex docket even
    more difficult for interested parties to follow. Additionally, a
    partial month of data arguably would be less valuable for examining
    trends from previous full months. For these reasons we do not
    believe that any party to this proceeding is prejudiced by our
    decision to include consideration of the last four days of SWBT's
    April performance reports.

### *Ex Parte* Submissions

41. Under the procedural rules governing section 271 applications, we
    strongly encourage parties to set forth their views comprehensively
    in their formal submissions (i.e*.,* Brief in Support, oppositions,
    supporting comments, etc.), and not to rely on subsequent *ex parte*
    presentations. At the same time, the Commission expressly provided
    that parties may file *ex partes.* Our procedural Public Notice thus
    clearly contemplates that parties may file written *ex partes*, when
    appropriate, to clarify the record.[^86] We take this opportunity to
    clarify that like reply comments, *ex partes* must be directly
    responsive to arguments raised by parties commenting on the
    application. Such *ex partes* may, however, elaborate on, or provide
    additional explanation or detail in response to requests from
    Commission staff or in direct response to post-reply *ex parte*
    filings.

42. Nothing in our procedural rules or past precedent precludes the
    Commission and the staff from requesting clarification or an
    explanation about information or data contained in the filings
    specified above. Indeed, our procedural Public Notice expressly
    recognizes that the Commission may request additional information
    from the applicant, as the page limit for *ex partes* does not apply
    to written material filed in response to direct requests from
    Commission staff.[^87] It is critical to the agency's deliberative
    process that the Commission and staff fully understand the evidence
    and arguments presented in the BOC's section 271 application,
    arguments raised in opposition, and responses made by parties on
    reply. Accordingly, the Commission retains the discretion to request
    additional information from the applicant or other parties that
    elaborates on positions set forth in the original application,
    comments, or reply comments.[^88] We emphasize that we are not
    departing from our view that the applicant should set forth its
    position in a clear and concise manner in its formal filings.
    However, it is imperative that, as part of the Commission's
    deliberative process, we have the ability to engage in an ongoing
    dialogue with parties to ensure that we have a clear and accurate
    understanding of the information contained in all formal
    submissions.

## Framework for Analyzing Compliance with Statutory Requirements

43. In this section, we discuss two aspects of the framework for
    analyzing compliance with the statutory requirements of section 271.
    First, we discuss the legal standards we have enunciated in past
    orders for determining whether a BOC is meeting the statutory
    nondiscrimination requirements. Second, we discuss the evidentiary
    requirements of a BOC's section 271 application and, in particular,
    the types of showings we will find probative in deciding whether a
    BOC has met the statutory standards.

### Legal Standard

44. In order to comply with the requirements of section 271's
    competitive checklist, a BOC must demonstrate that it has "fully
    implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)(2)(B)."[^89]
    In particular, the BOC must demonstrate that it is offering
    interconnection and access to network elements on a
    nondiscriminatory basis.[^90] Previous Commission orders addressing
    section 271 applications have elaborated on this statutory standard.
    First, for those functions the BOC provides to competing carriers
    that are analogous to the functions a BOC provides to itself in
    connection with its own retail service offerings, the BOC must
    provide access to competing carriers in "substantially the same time
    and manner" as it provides to itself. Thus, where a retail analogue
    exists, a BOC must provide access that is equal to (*i.e.,*
    substantially the same as) the level of access that the BOC provides
    itself, its customers, or its affiliates, in terms of quality,
    accuracy, and timeliness.[^91] For those functions that have no
    retail analogue, the BOC must demonstrate that the access it
    provides to competing carriers would offer an efficient carrier a
    "meaningful opportunity to compete."[^92]

45. We do not view the "meaningful opportunity to compete" standard to
    be a weaker test than the "substantially the same time and manner"
    standard. Where the BOC provides functions to its competitors that
    it also provides for itself in connection with its retail service,
    its actual performance can be measured to determine whether it is
    providing access to its competitors in "substantially the same time
    and manner" as it does to itself. Where the BOC, however, does not
    provide a retail service that is similar to its wholesale service,
    its actual performance with respect to competitors cannot be
    measured against how it performs for itself because the BOC does not
    perform analogous activities for itself. In those situations, our
    examination of whether the quality of access provided to competitors
    offers "a meaningful opportunity to compete" is intended to be a
    proxy for whether access is being provided in substantially the same
    time and manner and, thus, is nondiscriminatory.

46. Finally, we note that a determination of whether the statutory
    standard is met is ultimately a judgment we must make based on our
    expertise in promoting competition in local markets and in
    telecommunications regulation generally. We have not established,
    nor do we believe it appropriate to establish, specific objective
    criteria for what constitutes "substantially the same time and
    manner" or a "meaningful opportunity to compete." We look at each
    application on a case-by-case basis and consider the totality of the
    circumstances, including the origin and quality of the information
    before us, to determine whether the nondiscrimination requirements
    of the Act are met. Whether this legal standard is met can only be
    decided based on an analysis of specific facts and circumstances.

### Evidentiary Case

47. We have set forth above the analytical framework that we use in
    assessing whether a BOC has demonstrated compliance with the
    statutory requirements of section 271. At the outset, we reemphasize
    that the BOC applicant retains at all times the ultimate burden of
    proof that its application satisfies all of the requirements of
    section 271, even if no party files comments challenging its
    compliance with a particular requirement.[^93]

48. The evidentiary standards governing our review of section 271
    applications are intended to balance our need for reliable evidence
    against our recognition that, in such a complex endeavor as a
    section 271 proceeding, no finder of fact can expect proof to an
    absolute certainty. While we expect the BOC to demonstrate as
    thoroughly as possible that it satisfies each checklist item, the
    public interest standard, and the other statutory requirements, we
    reiterate that the BOC needs only to prove each element by "a
    preponderance of the evidence," which generally means "the greater
    weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing that the
    evidence which is offered in opposition to it."[^94]

49. As we held in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, we first
    determine whether the BOC has made a *prima facie* case that it
    meets the requirements of a particular checklist item. The BOC must
    plead, with appropriate supporting evidence, facts which, if true,
    are sufficient to establish that the requirements of section 271
    have been met. Once the BOC has made such a showing, opponents must
    produce evidence and arguments to show that the application does not
    satisfy the requirements of section 271, or risk a ruling in the
    BOC's favor.[^95]

50. When considering commenters' filings in opposition to the BOC's
    application, we look for evidence that the BOC's policies,
    procedures, or capabilities preclude it from satisfying the
    requirements of the checklist item. Mere unsupported evidence in
    opposition will not suffice.[^96] Although anecdotal evidence may be
    indicative of systemic failures, isolated incidents may not be
    sufficient for a commenter to overcome the BOC's *prima facie* case.
    Moreover, a BOC may overcome such anecdotal evidence by, for
    example, providing objective performance data that demonstrate that
    it satisfies the statutory nondiscrimination requirement.

51. We will look to the state to resolve factual disputes wherever
    possible. Indeed, we view the state's and the Department of
    Justice's roles to be similar to that of an "expert witness." Given
    the 90-day statutory deadline to reach a decision on a section 271
    application, the Commission does not have the time or the resources
    to resolve the enormous number of factual disputes that inevitably
    arise from the technical details and data involved in such a complex
    endeavor. Accordingly, as discussed above, where the state has
    conducted an exhaustive and rigorous investigation into the BOC's
    compliance with the checklist, we may give evidence submitted by the
    state substantial weight in making our decision.

52. To make a *prima facie* case that the BOC is meeting the
    requirements of a particular checklist item under section
    271(c)(1)(A), the BOC must demonstrate that it is providing access
    or interconnection pursuant to the terms of that checklist item. In
    particular, a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and
    specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant
    to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices
    and other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it
    is currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist item
    in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an
    acceptable level of quality.[^97]

53. The particular showing required to demonstrate compliance will vary
    depending on the individual checklist item and the circumstances of
    the application. We have given BOCs substantial leeway with respect
    to the evidence they present to satisfy the checklist. Although our
    orders have provided guidance on which types of evidence we find
    more persuasive, "we reiterate that we remain open to approving an
    application based on other types of evidence if a BOC can persuade
    us that such evidence demonstrates nondiscriminatory treatment and
    other aspects of the statutory requirements."[^98] In past orders we
    have encouraged BOCs to provide performance data in their section
    271 applications to demonstrate that they are providing
    nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements to requesting
    carriers.[^99] We have concluded that the most probative evidence
    that a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access is evidence of
    actual commercial usage.[^100] Performance measurements are an
    especially effective means of providing us with evidence of the
    quality and timeliness of the access provided by a BOC to requesting
    carriers.

54. A number of state commissions, including Texas, have established a
    collaborative process through which they have developed, in
    conjunction with the incumbent and competing carriers, a set of
    measures, or metrics, for reporting of performance in various
    areas.[^101] Through such collaborative processes, Texas has also
    adopted performance standards for certain functions, typically where
    there can be no comparable measure based on the incumbent LEC's
    retail performance. We strongly encourage this type of process,
    because it allows the technical details that determine how the
    metrics are defined and measured to be worked out with the
    participation of all concerned parties. We also strongly support the
    efforts of state commissions to build and oversee a process that
    ensures the development of local competition that Congress intended.
    An extensive and rigorous evaluation of the BOC's performance by the
    states provides greater certainty that barriers to competition have
    been eliminated and the local markets in a state are open to
    competition.

55. We caution, however, that adoption by a state of a particular
    performance standard pursuant to its state regulatory authority is
    not determinative of what is necessary to establish checklist
    compliance under section 271. We recognize that metric definitions
    and incumbent LEC operating systems will likely vary among states,
    and that individual states may set standards at a particular level
    that would not apply in other states and that may constitute more or
    less than the checklist requires. Therefore, in evaluating checklist
    compliance in each application, we consider the BOC's performance
    within the context of each respective state. For example, where a
    state develops a performance benchmark with input from affected
    competitors and the BOC, such a standard may well reflect what
    competitors in the marketplace feel they need in order to have a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^102]

56. We emphasize that, because the Commission is statutorily required to
    determine checklist compliance, we must independently evaluate
    whether a BOC is fulfilling the nondiscrimination requirements of
    section 271. Nevertheless, in making our evaluation we will examine
    whether the state commission has adopted a retail analogue or a
    benchmark to measure BOC performance and then review the particular
    level of performance the state has required. If the state commission
    has made these determinations in the type of rigorous collaborative
    proceeding described above, we are much more likely to find that
    they are reasonable and appropriate measures of parity. Accordingly,
    we are inclined to rely on such standards and measurements in our
    own analysis but may reach a different conclusion where justified.

57. In determining that SWBT has satisfied each element of the
    competitive checklist, we rely, among other factors, on performance
    data collected and submitted by SWBT. Several commenters challenge
    the validity of certain data submitted by SWBT, however, including
    performance data collected and reported pursuant to the performance
    measurements developed under the auspices of the Texas
    Commission.[^103] We reject the contention that SWBT's data are
    generally invalid because they have not been audited, and thus
    cannot be relied upon to support its application. We note that the
    data submitted by SWBT in this proceeding have been subject to
    scrutiny and review by interested parties. To a large extent,
    moreover, the accuracy of the specific performance data relied upon
    by SWBT is not contested. Where particular SWBT data are disputed by
    commenters, we discuss these challenges in our checklist analysis,
    below. In such instances, we first look to the results of data
    reconciliations between SWBT and competing carriers. In other
    instances, we examine data collected and submitted by commenters in
    addition to SWBT's data.

58. The determination of whether a BOC's performance meets the statutory
    requirements necessarily is a contextual decision based on the
    totality of the circumstances and information before us. There may
    be multiple performance measures associated with a particular
    checklist item, and an apparent disparity in performance for one
    measure, by itself, may not provide a basis for finding
    noncompliance with the checklist. Other measures may tell a
    different story, and provide us with a more complete picture of the
    quality of service being provided. Whether we are applying the
    "substantially same time and manner" standard or the "meaningful
    opportunity to compete" standard, we will examine whether any
    differences in the measured performance are large enough to be
    deemed discriminatory under the statute. For this reason, and
    because standards established by the Texas Commission are not
    necessarily determinative of checklist compliance, we note that
    SWBT's failure of individual performance measurements does not, in
    itself, warrant denial of this application.[^104]

# COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(A)

## Background

59. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate
    that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A)
    (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^105] To qualify for Track A, a
    BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing
    providers of "telephone exchange service . . . to residential and
    business subscribers."[^106] The Act states that "such telephone
    service may be offered . . . either exclusively over \[the
    competitor's\] own telephone exchange service facilities or
    predominantly over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange
    facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications
    services of another carrier."[^107] The Commission concluded in the
    *Ameritech Michigan Order* that, when a BOC relies upon more than
    one competing provider to satisfy section 271(c)(1)(A), each carrier
    need not provide service to both residential and business
    customers.[^108]

## Discussion

60. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it satisfies the
    requirements of Track A based on the interconnection agreements it
    has implemented with competing carriers in Texas. Specifically, we
    find that AT&T, Birch, CoServ, ETS, Optel, Sage, and KMC all provide
    telephone exchange service either exclusively or predominantly over
    their own facilities to residential subscribers and to business
    subscribers. [^109] The Texas Commission also concludes that SWBT
    has met the requirements of section 271(c)(1)(A).[^110] None of the
    commenting parties, including the competitors cited by SWBT in
    support of its showing, challenge SWBT's assertion in this regard.

# CHECKLIST COMPLIANCE

## Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection

### Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection

#### Background

61. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act requires a section 271 applicant
    to provide "\[i\]nterconnection in accordance with the requirements
    of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)."[^111] Section 251(c)(2)
    imposes a duty on incumbent LECs "to provide, for the facilities and
    equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier,
    interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network . . . for
    the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and
    exchange access."[^112] In the *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, the Commission concluded that interconnection referred "only
    to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of
    traffic."[^113] Section 251 contains three requirements for the
    provision of interconnection. First, an incumbent LEC must provide
    interconnection "at any technically feasible point within the
    carrier's network."[^114] Second, an incumbent LEC must provide
    interconnection that is "at least equal in quality to that provided
    by the local exchange carrier to itself."[^115] Finally, the
    incumbent LEC must provide interconnection "on rates, terms, and
    conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in
    accordance with the terms of the agreement and the requirements of
    \[section 251\] and section 252."[^116]

62. To implement the equal-in-quality requirement in section 251, the
    Commission's rules require an incumbent LEC to design and operate
    its interconnection facilities to meet "the same technical criteria
    and service standards" that are used for the interoffice trunks
    within the incumbent LEC's network.[^117] In the *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, the Commission identified trunk group
    blockage and transmission standards as indicators of an incumbent
    LEC's technical criteria and service standards.[^118] In prior
    section 271 applications, the Commission concluded that disparities
    in trunk group blockage indicated a failure to provide
    interconnection to competing carriers equal-in-quality to the
    interconnection the BOC provided to its own retail operations.[^119]

63. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
    concluded that the requirement to provide interconnection on terms
    and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"
    means that an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection to a
    competitor in a manner no less efficient than the way in which the
    incumbent LEC provides the comparable function to its own retail
    operations.[^120] The Commission's rules interpret this obligation
    to include, among other things, the incumbent LEC's installation
    time for interconnection service[^121] and its provisioning of
    two-way trunking arrangements.[^122] Similarly, repair time for
    troubles affecting interconnection trunks is useful for determining
    whether a BOC provides interconnection service under "terms and
    conditions that are no less favorable than the terms and conditions"
    the BOC provides to its own retail operations.[^123]

64. Competing carriers may choose any method of technically feasible
    interconnection at a particular point on the incumbent LEC's
    network.[^124] Incumbent LEC provision of interconnection trunking
    is one common means of interconnection. Technically feasible methods
    also include, but are not limited to, physical and virtual
    collocation and meet point arrangements.[^125] The provision of
    collocation is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating compliance
    with item 1 of the competitive checklist.[^126] In the *Advanced
    Services First Report and Order*, the Commission revised its
    collocation rules to require incumbent LECs to include shared cage
    and cageless collocation arrangements as part of their physical
    collocation offerings.[^127] To show compliance with its collocation
    obligations, a BOC must have processes and procedures in place to
    ensure that all applicable collocation arrangements are available on
    terms and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory" in accordance with section 251(c)(6) and our
    implementing rules.[^128] Data showing the quality of procedures for
    processing applications for collocation space, as well as the
    timeliness and efficiency of provisioning collocation space, helps
    the Commission evaluate a BOC's compliance with its collocation
    obligations.[^129]

#### Discussion

65. We conclude, as described below, that SWBT demonstrates it provides
    equal-in-quality interconnection on terms and conditions that are
    just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the
    requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and as specified in section 271.
    We further find that SWBT meets its burden of proof that it designs
    its interconnection facilities to meet "the same technical criteria
    and service standards" that are used for the interoffice trunks
    within its own network. We also find that SWBT makes interconnection
    available at any technically feasible point, and that it is
    providing collocation in Texas in accordance with the Commission's
    rules. We note that the Texas Commission finds that SWBT has
    satisfied all aspects of this checklist item.[^130]

##### Interconnection Trunking 

66. Based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that SWBT
    provides competing carriers with interconnection trunking that is
    equal-in-quality to the interconnection SWBT provides to its own
    retail operations, and on terms and conditions that are just,
    reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.[^131] SWBT makes interconnection
    available in Texas through interconnection agreements, including its
    state-approved T2A agreement.[^132] SWBT receives orders for
    interconnection trunks through the Access Service Request (ASR)
    process, and accepts ASRs through an electronic
    application-to-application interface, through a proprietary OSS
    system, and through manual orders.[^133] SWBT provides performance
    data to measure the quality of interconnection service provided to
    competing carriers.[^134]

67. *Trunk Blockage*. In prior section 271 applications, we relied on
    trunk blockage data to evaluate a BOC's interconnection
    quality.[^135] SWBT's performance data demonstrates that in the
    months leading up to its Texas II application, SWBT provided
    interconnection that is equal-in-quality to the interconnection it
    provides in its own network. Specifically, SWBT's statewide
    performance data measuring the percentage of calls blocked on
    outgoing traffic (trunk blockage from SWBT end office and tandem to
    competitive LEC end office) demonstrates that in the three months
    immediately preceding its Texas II section 271 application, SWBT was
    in compliance with the relevant benchmark established in Texas
    (*i.e.,* blockage not to exceed one percent on these trunks).[^136]

68. We find that allegations of some competitive LECs, that they have
    been unable to obtain the number of interconnection trunks they
    requested in a timely manner appear to be the exception rather than
    the rule. Indeed, as we discuss throughout this section, we find
    that SWBT's performance data indicate that it is providing
    nondiscriminatory interconnection trunking. To the extent there may
    have been some problems with trunk provisioning,[^137] we agree with
    the Department of Justice that such issues have been adequately
    resolved.[^138]

69. Competitive LECs allege that they have encountered problems ordering
    trunks from SWBT which has resulted in blockage on competitive LEC
    networks, in some cases leading to customer complaints and lost or
    forgone sales.[^139] TWTC, which provided the most extensive history
    of its blockage problems, stated that its most severe blockage
    occurred in Houston during the conversion of the SWBT and TWTC
    interconnection facilities from one-way to two-way trunks during the
    second half of 1999.[^140] TWTC acknowledges that the blocking ended
    in mid-October, 1999.[^141] Furthermore, we note that SWBT
    implemented improvements approved by the Texas Commission during
    supplemental proceedings in November and December 1999 to respond to
    competitive LEC concerns. As stated above, SWBT meets the state
    benchmark for PM 70 for January, February, March and April.[^142] We
    also note that, as of October, over 75% of the trunks provisioned in
    Texas were two-way trunks.[^143] In the future, if competitive LECs
    allege that blocking is occurring on outgoing calls from the
    competitive LEC network to the BOC network, and that such blockage
    is not being captured by the state-approved performance measure,
    then competitive LECs should provide evidence, such as reliable
    performance data, along with a showing of why the BOC is responsible
    for the blockage. Should such evidence develop in the future in
    Texas, we will consider whether enforcement action pursuant to
    section 271(d)(6) is warranted.

70. *Missed Due Dates*. We find that other aspects of SWBT's performance
    data further indicate it is providing nondiscriminatory
    interconnection trunking in Texas. SWBT's performance data
    concerning the percentage of missed due dates for provisioning of
    interconnection trunks show that in the months preceding its Texas
    II application, SWBT provided parity or better performance to
    competitors.[^144] Recently implemented modifications in reporting
    give us added assurance that SWBT will continue to provide timely
    installation of interconnection trunks. In response to competitive
    LEC concerns that the performance measurement does not capture "held
    orders,"[^145] the Texas Commission implemented a new measure, PM
    73.1, to capture the percentage of held interconnection trunk orders
    greater than 90 calendar days.[^146] SWBT asserts that there were no
    held orders greater than 90 days between January and March.[^147] We
    find that SWBT has satisfied the benchmark. Further, commenters have
    not raised any new allegations of inadequate or overlong trunk
    provisioning. We note that the Department of Justice agrees that
    SWBT's performance is satisfactory with respect to this
    measurement.[^148]

71. *Average Installation Intervals*. SWBT's performance data that
    measure the average time for installation of interconnection trunks
    demonstrate that SWBT meets the state benchmark in February, March
    and April.[^149] We have considered the concerns of the
    Telecommunications Resellers Association and others in addition to
    the Department of Justice, and find that the extensive review by the
    Texas Commission of SWBT's operational processes and empirical
    performance data satisfactorily addresses their concerns.[^150] We
    therefore reject the concerns raised in the record regarding SWBT's
    average installation interval performance as those concerns relate
    largely to last year's performance. The data submitted as part of
    the instant application indicate SWBT meets the state benchmark.

72. In conclusion, our decision that SWBT satisfies the requirements of
    this checklist item is based on the following: its trunk group
    blockage rates for competitors pass the state benchmark, its rate of
    missed due dates for trunk installations is lower for service to
    competitors than for service to itself, and its average time to
    install interconnection trunks passes the state benchmark.

##### Collocation

73. SWBT has demonstrated that its collocation offering in Texas
    satisfies the requirements of sections 271 and 251 of the Act. SWBT
    provides physical and virtual collocation through a state-approved
    tariff.[^151] In its application, SWBT indicates that shared,
    cageless, and adjacent collocation options are available in Texas,
    and that it has taken other steps to implement the collocation
    requirements contained in the *Advanced Services First Report and
    Order*.[^152] SWBT provides terms for physical collocation in its
    physical collocation tariff, as well as in a physical collocation
    handbook that it incorporates into the tariff by reference.[^153]
    SWBT's collocation performance data indicate that SWBT processed
    requests for collocation within time frames established by the Texas
    Commission. SWBT stated that it has provided 655 physical
    collocation arrangements in 166 different SWBT central offices in
    Texas. Except where a competitive LEC places a large number of
    collocation orders in the same 5-business day period, SWBT responds
    to each request within 10 days.[^154] SWBT provides three
    measurements (disaggregated into various submeasures) for
    collocation: Percentage of Missed Collocation Due Dates (PM 107),
    Average Delay Days for SWBT Missed Due Dates (PM 108), and Percent
    of Requests Processed within the Tariffed Timelines (PM 109). Where
    data points are available, SWBT's data indicates it meets the
    measures for the months of January, February, and March.[^155]

74. SWBT makes virtual collocation available through its virtual
    collocation tariff, with notification and installation intervals for
    all tariffed equipment established in SWBT's Interconnector's
    Collocation Services Handbook for Virtual Collocation.[^156] In
    addition, SWBT states that competitive LECs may negotiate
    custom-tailored interconnection arrangements on request.[^157] The
    Texas Commission agrees that SWBT's revised physical collocation
    offerings comply with the *Advanced Services Order*.[^158] Further,
    SWBT's collocation offering underwent an active and thorough review
    at the state level. The Texas Commission addressed the provisioning
    of collocation space and established standard provisioning intervals
    for caged, cageless, and virtual collocation.[^159]

75. We disagree with ALTS and the CLEC Coalition that SWBT's practice of
    walling in its own equipment as a "reasonable security measure"
    violates our collocation rules. [^160] Our rules as they existed at
    the time of filing did not explicitly prohibit this practice.[^161]
    Therefore, we find that these allegations do not rise to the level
    of non-compliance for this checklist item.[^162] In addition, we
    believe that Metromedia Fiber Network Services' (MFNS) alleged
    difficulties negotiating collocation arrangements with SWBT are best
    resolved through the section 252 negotiation and arbitration process
    or through the section 208 complaint process.[^163]

##### Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection

76. We conclude that SWBT provides interconnection at all technically
    feasible points, and therefore demonstrates compliance with the
    checklist item. SWBT asserts that it makes each of its standard
    methods of interconnection available at the line side or trunk side
    of the local switch, the trunk connection points of a tandem switch,
    central office cross-connect points, out-of-band signaling transfer
    points, and points of access to UNEs.[^164] SWBT demonstrates that
    it has an approved state interconnection agreement that spells out
    readily available points of interconnection, and provides a process
    for requesting interconnection at additional, technically feasible
    points.[^165]

77. We disagree with AT&T that SWBT has violated its obligation to
    permit competing carriers to select interconnection points.[^166]
    The existing language in the interconnection agreement between SWBT
    and AT&T states that "in each SWBT exchange area in which AT&T
    offers local exchange services, the parties will interconnect their
    network facilities at a minimum of one mutually agreeable point of
    interconnection."[^167] This portion of the interconnection
    agreement between SWBT and AT&T, however, was negotiated and,
    therefore, does not have to comply with section 251.[^168]
    Consequently, AT&T's experience does not constitute evidence of a
    failure by SWBT to provide interconnection at all technically
    feasible points for purposes of section 271 review. [^169]

78. Section 251, and our implementing rules, require an incumbent LEC to
    allow a competitive LEC to interconnect at any technically feasible
    point. This means that a competitive LEC has the option to
    interconnect at only one technically feasible point in each
    LATA.[^170] The incumbent LEC is relieved of its obligation to
    provide interconnection at a particular point in its network only if
    it proves to the state public utility commission that
    interconnection at that point is technically infeasible.[^171] Thus,
    new entrants may select the "most efficient points at which to
    exchange traffic with incumbent LECs, thereby lowering the competing
    carriers' costs of, among other things, transport and
    termination."[^172] Indeed, "section 251(c)(2) gives competing
    carriers the right to deliver traffic terminating on an incumbent
    LEC's network at any technically feasible point in the network,
    rather than obligating such carriers to transport traffic to less
    convenient or efficient interconnection points."[^173] We note that
    in SWBT's interconnection agreement with MCI (WorldCom), WorldCom
    may designate "a single interconnection point within a LATA."[^174]
    Thus, SWBT provides WorldCom interconnection at any technically
    feasible point, and section 252(i) entitles AT&T, or any requesting
    carrier, to seek the same terms and conditions as those contained in
    WorldCom's agreement, a matter any carrier is free to take up with
    the Texas Commission.[^175]

### Pricing of Interconnection

#### Background 

79. As discussed above, checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide
    "interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections
    251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)."[^176] Section 251(c)(2) requires incumbent
    LECs to provide interconnection "at any technically feasible point
    within the carrier's network ... on rates, terms, and conditions
    that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^177] Section
    252(d)(1) requires state determinations regarding the rates, terms,
    and conditions of interconnection to be based on cost and to be
    nondiscriminatory, and allows the rates to include a reasonable
    profit.[^178]

80. Interconnection trunking, physical and virtual collocation, and
    meet-point arrangements are among the technically feasible methods
    of interconnection.[^179] Shared cage and cageless collocation
    arrangements must be part of an incumbent LEC's physical collocation
    offerings.[^180] To comply with its collocation obligations, an
    incumbent LEC must make collocation arrangements available on
    "rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory."[^181] The Commission's pricing rules require,
    among other things, that incumbent LECs provide collocation based on
    the total element, long-run, incremental cost (TELRIC).[^182]

81. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the
    Commission's pricing rules in 1996,[^183] the Supreme Court restored
    the Commission's pricing authority on January 25, 1999.[^184] In
    reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that section 201(b)
    "explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing
    matters to which the 1996 Act applies."[^185] Furthermore, the Court
    determined that section 251(d) also provides evidence of an express
    jurisdictional grant by requiring that "the Commission \[shall\]
    complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement
    the requirements of this section."[^186] The Court also held that
    the pricing provisions implemented under the Commission's rulemaking
    authority do not inhibit the establishment of rates by the
    states.[^187] The Court concluded that the Commission has
    jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local
    competition under the 1996 Act, including pricing for
    interconnection and unbundled access, as "it is the States that will
    apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining
    the concrete result."[^188]

#### Discussion

82. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT offers
    interconnection in Texas to other telecommunications carriers at
    just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, in compliance with
    checklist item 1.[^189] SWBT states that it provides interconnection
    at TELRIC-based rates that are just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory.[^190] SWBT provides terms for physical
    collocation in its physical collocation tariff, as well as in a
    physical collocation handbook that it incorporates into the tariff
    by reference.[^191] SWBT makes virtual collocation available through
    its virtual collocation tariff.[^192] SWBT says it will also
    negotiate custom-tailored interconnection arrangements on
    request.[^193] According to SWBT, TELRIC-based charges apply to
    custom work even if no rate has been established previously.[^194]
    SWBT states that it pro-rates its site preparation charges and
    allocates them based on the percentage of the total space each
    competitive LEC uses.[^195] SWBT also says that it pro-rates its
    collocation charges so that the first competitive LEC to enter the
    premises is not responsible for all the site preparation
    costs.[^196]

83. The Texas Commission states in its evaluation that SWBT has
    satisfied the requirements of checklist item 1.[^197] According to
    the Texas Commission, SWBT provides interconnection trunking at
    just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.[^198]
    The state commission says that SWBT makes interconnection available
    through the Texas Commission-approved 271 agreement, and that the
    Texas-approved physical and virtual collocation tariffs comply with
    sections 251 and 271 of the Act.[^199]

84. We stress that we place great weight on the Texas Commission's
    active review of SWBT's pricing elements in its 271 application. The
    Texas Commission has encouraged active and open participation by all
    carriers in setting rates through numerous proceedings, reviewed
    costs studies and conflicting testimonies, arbitrated pricing issues
    and incorporated its findings into interconnection agreements, and
    has demonstrated its commitment to applying the pricing standards of
    sections 251 and 252 of the Act as implemented by our rules.[^200]

85. As the Texas Commission explains, "\[t\]he collocation tariffs
    contain interim rates, subject to true-up, for all aspects and
    methods of available collocation."[^201] AT&T argues that the
    interim nature of these rates proves fatal to SWBT's application in
    light of our discussion of interim rates in the *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*.[^202] We disagree. In that order, we stated that:

> a BOC's application for in-region interLATA authority should not be
> rejected solely because permanent rates may not yet have been
> established for each and every element or nonrecurring cost of
> provisioning an element. We believe that this question should be
> addressed on a case-by-case basis. If the uncertainty caused by the
> use of interim rates can be minimized, then it may be appropriate, at
> least for the time being, to approve an application based on the
> interim rates contained in the relevant tariff.[^203]

86. We concluded that the interim nature of Bell Atlantic's xDSL rates
    posed no obstacle to the approval of its application. We reasoned
    that the xDSL rate dispute was relatively new, that the New York
    Commission has a track record of setting other prices at TELRIC
    rates, and that the interim rates would be subject to a refund or
    true-up once final rates were set.[^204] Although we noted that
    competitive "\[u\]ncertainty will be minimized if the interim rates
    are for a few isolated ancillary items," we did not say that the
    disputed items must be ancillary in character to ensure compliance
    with the checklist.[^205]

87. This case again presents the question of the significance of interim
    rates for purposes of adjudicating a section 271 application. We
    again conclude that the section 271 process could not function as
    Congress intended if we adopted a general policy of denying any
    section 271 application accompanied by unresolved pricing and other
    intercarrier disputes. Our experience has demonstrated that, at any
    given point in time at which a section 271 application might be
    filed, the rapidly evolving telecommunications market will have
    produced a variety of unresolved, fact-specific disputes concerning
    the BOC's obligations under sections 251 and 252. BOCs and their
    competitors can be expected to take opposite positions in those
    disputes, and the adjudicated resolution ultimately will often fall
    somewhere in between the positions of the opposing parties. If
    uncertainty about the proper outcome of such disputes were
    sufficient to undermine a section 271 application, such applications
    could rarely be granted. Congress did not intend such an outcome.

88. The 1996 Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve specific
    carrier-to-carrier disputes arising under the local competition
    provisions, and it authorizes the federal district courts to ensure
    that the results of the state arbitration process are consistent
    with federal law.[^206] Although we have an independent obligation
    to ensure compliance with the checklist, section 271 does not compel
    us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by
    the state commissions, particularly now that the Supreme Court has
    restored our pricing jurisdiction and has thereby directed the state
    commissions (and the federal courts on review) to follow our pricing
    rules in their disposition of those disputes. For those reasons, the
    mere presence of interim rates will not generally threaten a section
    271 application so long as an interim solution to a particular rate
    dispute is reasonable under the circumstances, the state commission
    has demonstrated its commitment to our pricing rules, and provision
    is made for refunds or true-ups once permanent rates are set.[^207]
    As discussed below, the interim rates in dispute here meet that
    standard.

89. AT&T argues that the interim nature of SWBT's collocation rates
    demands that we deny the section 271 application.[^208] We disagree.
    As we explained in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, we examine
    interim rates under section 271 on a case-by-case basis.[^209] We
    conclude that the state has made reasonable efforts to set interim
    collocation rates in accordance with the Act and the FCC's rules.
    The Texas Commission set the interim rates pursuant to TELRIC
    standards so that competitive LECs could obtain collocation while
    the state incorporated the Commission's findings in the March 31,
    1999, *Advanced Services Order*.[^210] AT&T argues that the interim
    caged collocation rates are not TELRIC-based, and stem instead from
    outdated tariffs that include costs for things such as asbestos
    removal and separate entryways that the FCC has since deemed
    improper.[^211] AT&T admits, however, that the Texas Commission
    reduced one of the elements of the caged collocation rates by 30
    percent to accommodate that fact.[^212] AT&T argues that the
    reduction is insufficient to conform the caged collocation rates to
    TELRIC standards,[^213] but we view it as a reasonable attempt by
    the state commission to set an interim TELRIC-based rate pending its
    final determination. Moreover, the Texas Commission based the
    majority of the interim rates, at least with regard to physical
    collocation, from a TELRIC model developed by AT&T and MCI, albeit
    with some modifications.[^214]

90. The Texas Commission has set up a schedule to set permanent rates,
    and has indicated to the parties that the interim rates are subject
    to a refund or true-up, an approach apparently urged by AT&T.[^215]
    AT&T acknowledges that the Texas Commission has directed use of the
    AT&T/MCI model in setting permanent physical and virtual collocation
    rates.[^216] Further cost studies were due April 12, 2000, and a
    hearing was scheduled for June 15-16, 2000.[^217] Based on the
    record, we believe that the Texas Commission has taken a reasonable
    approach. We conclude that the uncertainty surrounding the interim
    rates has been minimized, and we have

    confidence that the Texas Commission will set permanent rates that
    are in compliance with the Act and our rules. Consequently, we find
    that SWBT has met its obligations under this checklist item.[^218]

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

91. Our analysis under checklist item 2 addresses whether SWBT satisfies
    its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled
    network elements pursuant to section 251(c), at prices that meet the
    requirements of section 252(d). As discussed above, the Commission
    has identified a number of UNEs, including operations support
    systems (OSS), that incumbent LECs must make available under section
    251(c)(3) as of the filing date of this application.[^219] In this
    section, we address whether SWBT provides access to OSS and to
    combinations of UNEs in accordance with section 251(c)(3) and our
    rules.[^220] We recognize, as we have in prior section 271 orders,
    that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions
    is embodied in other terms of the competitive checklist as
    well.[^221] Aside from OSS, the other UNEs that SWBT must make
    available under section 251(c)(3) are also listed as separate items
    on the competitive checklist, and are addressed below in separate
    sections for each checklist item.[^222]

### Operations Support Systems

#### Background

92. Incumbent LECs use a variety of systems, databases, and personnel
    (collectively referred to as OSS) to provide service to their
    customers.[^223] The Commission consistently has found that
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development
    of meaningful local competition.[^224] For example, new entrants
    must have access to the functions performed by the incumbent's OSS
    in order to formulate and place orders for network elements or
    resale services, to install service to their customers, to maintain
    and repair network facilities, and to bill customers.[^225] The
    Commission has determined that without nondiscriminatory access to
    the BOC's OSS, a competing carrier "will be severely disadvantaged,
    if not precluded altogether, from fairly competing" in the local
    exchange market.[^226]

93. Section 271 requires the Commission to determine whether a BOC
    offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Section
    271(c)(2)(B)(ii) requires a BOC to provide "nondiscriminatory access
    to network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections
    251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)."[^227] The Commission has determined that
    access to OSS functions falls squarely within an incumbent LEC's
    duty under section 251(c)(3) to provide unbundled network elements
    under terms and conditions that are nondiscriminatory and just and
    reasonable, and its duty under section 251(c)(4) to offer resale
    services without imposing any limitations or conditions that are
    discriminatory or unreasonable.[^228] The Commission must therefore
    examine a BOC's OSS performance to evaluate compliance with section
    271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and (xiv).[^229] In addition, the Commission has
    also concluded that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
    OSS functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive
    checklist as well.[^230] Consistent with prior orders, we examine
    SWBT\'s OSS performance directly under checklist items 2 and 14, as
    well as other checklist terms.[^231]

94. As part of its statutory obligation to provide nondiscriminatory
    access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide access that sufficiently
    supports each of the three modes of competitive entry envisioned by
    the 1996 Act -- competitor-owned facilities, unbundled network
    elements, and resale.[^232] For OSS functions that are analogous to
    those that a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its
    affiliates, the nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer
    requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality,
    accuracy, and timeliness.[^233] The BOC must provide access that
    permits competing carriers to perform these functions in
    "substantially the same time and manner" as the BOC.[^234] The
    Commission has recognized in prior orders that there may be
    situations in which a BOC contends that, although equivalent access
    has not been achieved for an analogous function, the access that it
    provides is nonetheless nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the
    statute.[^235]

95. For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must offer
    access "sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
    opportunity to compete."[^236] In assessing whether the quality of
    access affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
    compete, we will examine, in the first instance, whether specific
    performance standards exist for those functions.[^237] In
    particular, we will consider whether appropriate standards for
    measuring OSS performance have been adopted by the relevant state
    commission or agreed upon by the BOC in an interconnection agreement
    or during the implementation of such an agreement.[^238] If such
    performance standards exist, we will evaluate whether the BOC's
    performance is sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^239]

96. We analyze whether SWBT has met the nondiscrimination standard for
    each OSS function using the two-step approach outlined in prior
    orders. First, we determine "whether the BOC has deployed the
    necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each
    of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately
    assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use
    all of the OSS functions available to them."[^240] We next

97. assess "whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed are
    operationally ready, as a practical matter."[^241]

98. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has
    developed sufficient electronic (for functions that the BOC accesses
    electronically) and manual interfaces to allow competing carriers
    equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS functions.[^242] For
    example, a BOC must provide competing carriers with the
    specifications necessary for carriers to design or modify their
    systems in a manner that will enable them to communicate with the
    BOC's systems and any relevant interfaces.[^243] In addition, a BOC
    must disclose to competing carriers any internal business
    rules[^244] and other formatting information necessary to ensure
    that a carrier's requests and orders are processed
    efficiently.[^245] Finally, a BOC must demonstrate that its OSS is
    designed to accommodate both current demand and projected demand for
    competing carriers' access to OSS functions.[^246] Although not a
    prerequisite, the Commission continues to encourage the use of
    industry standards as an appropriate means of meeting the needs of a
    competitive local exchange market.[^247]

99. Under the second inquiry, we examine performance measurements and
    other evidence of commercial readiness to ascertain whether the
    BOC's OSS is handling current demand and will be able to handle
    reasonably foreseeable future volumes.[^248] The most probative
    evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready is actual
    commercial usage.[^249] Absent sufficient and reliable data on
    commercial usage, the Commission will consider the results of
    carrier-to-carrier testing, independent third-party testing, and
    internal testing in assessing the commercial readiness of a BOC's
    OSS.[^250] Although we do not require OSS testing, a persuasive test
    will provide us with an objective means by which to evaluate a BOC's
    OSS readiness where there is little to no evidence of commercial
    usage, or may otherwise strengthen an application where the BOC's
    evidence of actual commercial usage is weak or is otherwise
    challenged by competitors, The persuasiveness of a third-party
    review, however, is dependent upon the qualifications, experience
    and independence of the third party and the conditions and scope of
    the review itself.[^251] If the review is limited in scope or depth
    or is not independent and blind, we will give it minimal weight.

#### Discussion

100. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we conclude that SWBT
     has demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     OSS. The Commission consistently has found that nondiscriminatory
     access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful
     local competition, as well as providing access to other checklist
     items.[^252] For example, new entrants must have access to the
     functions performed by the incumbent's OSS in order to formulate
     and place orders for network elements or resale services, to
     install service to their customers, to maintain and repair network
     facilities, and to bill customers. The evidence presented in this
     record shows that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering, ordering, maintenance and repair, and billing
     functions. We base these findings primarily on evidence in the
     record of SWBT's actual commercial performance, including SWBT's
     performance measurements developed under the auspices of the Texas
     Commission. In addition, we find that the Telcordia third-party
     test provides some additional evidence of the functionality and
     capability of SWBT's OSS. We also find that SWBT has instituted a
     change management process that will help to ensure that changes to
     SWBT's OSS interfaces do not impede a carrier's ability to access
     critical OSS functions.

101. Although the Department of Justice identified several areas of
     concern regarding the performance and readiness of SWBT's OSS in
     the *Texas 1* proceeding,[^253] it recommends approval of SWBT's
     second application and states that it is "encourag\[ed\]" by recent
     developments with respect to OSS. The Department of Justice
     nonetheless expresses "lingering concerns" about several
     allegations raised by competitive LECs.[^254] We address each of
     these concerns below. Based on evidence submitted in this second
     proceeding, including evidence demonstrating that SWBT's
     performance has improved in several critical areas, we find that
     the areas of concern identified by the Department of Justice do not
     merit denial of SWBT's application, and conclude that SWBT has
     demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.

#### Independent Third Party Testing

102. The Texas Commission retained Telcordia (formerly Bellcore) as an
     independent third party to oversee a carrier-to-carrier test of the
     operational readiness of SWBT's OSS and to evaluate the efficacy of
     the documentation and other processes SWBT makes available to
     competing carriers in Texas.[^255] With the help of the Technical
     Advisory Group (TAG), a group composed of the Texas Commission,
     several competitive LECs, and SWBT, Telcordia developed a Master
     Test Plan that outlined the general structure of the testing, and
     framed the specific requirements necessary for testing certain SWBT
     systems.[^256] The test consisted of a "functionality" test
     designed to evaluate and validate the ability of SWBT's OSS systems
     to process different types of orders, and a "capacity" test
     designed to evaluate the ability of SWBT's systems to handle
     reasonably foreseeable volumes of orders.[^257] The actual tests of
     SWBT's OSS were conducted using electronic interfaces certain
     carriers had already developed for interconnecting with SWBT's
     systems.[^258] Telcordia's role was to validate the test design,
     monitor the test execution, validate the test results, and report
     the results of the testing.[^259] We applaud the Texas Commission
     for its significant role in developing a third-party test in Texas,
     for its oversight of Telcordia's review of SWBT's OSS readiness,
     and for its continuing role in ensuring that SWBT provides access
     to its OSS in a non-discriminatory manner.[^260] We continue to
     encourage strong state participation in ensuring that the BOCs' OSS
     can support competitive entry into the local markets.

103. We view independent third party testing as a useful tool in
     determining whether a BOC's deployment of OSS is nondiscriminatory.
     While there may be several ways to design and conduct a meaningful
     third party test, we have recognized that the persuasiveness of
     such a test is dependent on the conditions and scope of the review,
     and we thus encourage BOCs to pursue comprehensive OSS testing. The
     findings of a third party tester may be necessary to assess whether
     a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS,
     particularly if other evidence, such as data reflecting actual
     commercial usage, is not presented by the applicant. As we have
     stated previously, however, we consider actual commercial usage to
     be the most probative evidence that a BOC is providing
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.[^261] We thus first examine
     actual commercial usage in making our determination in this matter.

104. We find that the third party test conducted by Telcordia provides
     evidence of the functionality and capacity of SWBT's OSS in several
     important areas.[^262] At the same time, however, we agree with
     several commenters and the Department of Justice that the Telcordia
     test was limited in scope and depth.[^263] This is not to say, as
     some commenters contend, that SWBT's application is inadequate.
     Rather, this finding simply means that, in those substantive areas
     not covered by the Telcordia test, we will rely instead on other
     evidence, such as actual commercial usage, to assess whether SWBT
     provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Throughout the
     following analysis, we describe various aspects of the Telcordia
     test, and identify the specific portions of the test upon which we
     rely. We also explain where we are unable to rely on Telcordia's
     findings, such as when we find that a particular issue was not
     covered by the test.

105. Several commenters also challenge the blindness of the test process
     and Telcordia's independence, and argue that Telcordia's findings
     thus should be given little weight.[^264] We note, however, that
     the Texas Commission played an active role throughout the testing
     process and acted as "test manager."[^265] The Texas Commission
     also describes specific efforts that were taken to maintain testing
     blindness.[^266] Based on our review of the evidence in the record
     describing the test process, and on the assurances provided by the
     Texas Commission, we find that the results of Telcordia's test, in
     certain areas, provide meaningful evidence that is relevant to our
     analysis of SWBT's OSS.

#### Change Management Process

106. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides the
     documentation and support necessary to provide competing carriers
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. SWBT makes this demonstration
     by showing that it has an adequate change management process in
     place in Texas. The record also reflects that SWBT has adhered to
     its change management process over time. As a result, we find that
     SWBT provides access to its OSS in a manner that allows an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.

##### Background

107. Competing carriers need information about, and specifications for,
     an incumbent's systems and interfaces to develop and modify their
     systems and procedures to access the incumbent's OSS
     functions.[^267] Thus, in order to demonstrate that it is providing
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate
     that it "has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to
     provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions
     and . . . is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand
     how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to
     them."[^268] By showing that it adequately assists competing
     carriers to use available OSS functions, a BOC provides evidence
     that it offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^269] As part of this demonstration, the Commission will
     give substantial consideration to the existence of an adequate
     change management process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to
     this process over time.[^270]

108. The change management process refers to the methods and procedures
     that the BOC employs to communicate with competing carriers
     regarding the performance of, and changes in, the BOC's OSS
     system.[^271] Such changes may include updates to existing
     functions that impact competing carrier interface(s) upon a BOC's
     release of new interface software; technology changes that require
     competing carriers to meet new technical requirements upon a BOC's
     software release date; additional functionality changes that may be
     used at the competing carrier's option, on or after a BOC's release
     date for new interface software; and changes that may be mandated
     by regulatory authorities.[^272] Without a change management
     process in place, a BOC can impose substantial costs on competing
     carriers simply by making changes to its systems and interfaces
     without providing adequate testing opportunities and accurate and
     timely notice and documentation of the changes.[^273] Change
     management problems can impair a competing carrier's ability to
     obtain nondiscriminatory access to UNEs, and hence a BOC's
     compliance with section 271(2)(B)(ii).[^274]

###### Discussion

109. In evaluating whether a BOC's change management plan affords an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, we first
     assess whether the plan is adequate. In making this determination,
     we assess whether the evidence demonstrates: (1) that information
     relating to the change management process is clearly organized and
     readily accessible to competing carriers;[^275] (2) that competing
     carriers had substantial input in the design and continued
     operation of the change management process;[^276] (3) that the
     change management plan defines a procedure for the timely
     resolution of change management disputes;[^277] (4) the
     availability of a stable testing environment that mirrors
     production;[^278] and (5) the efficacy of the documentation the BOC
     makes available for the purpose of building an electronic
     gateway.[^279] After determining whether the BOC's change
     management plan is adequate, we evaluate whether the BOC has
     demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan.[^280]

110. We disagree with commenters that argue that SWBT's failure to
     implement a change management plan that is identical to the one
     adopted by Bell Atlantic in New York is a basis for concluding that
     SWBT's change management plan is inadequate.[^281] Indeed, because
     an effective change management plan is based on collaboration
     between a BOC and the carriers operating in its territory, we do
     not expect such plans to be identical in every state. The fact that
     SWBT's and Bell Atlantic's change management plans are different,
     yet equally allow the smooth and effective transition from one EDI
     release to another, is persuasive evidence that more than one type
     of change management plan is adequate for the purpose of
     demonstrating compliance with the requirements of section
     271.[^282]

####### Adequacy of Change Management Plan

111. SWBT's current change management process became effective in
     September 1999.[^283] We find that this process, which is the
     result of collaborative efforts between SWBT and competing
     carriers, provides an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity
     to compete.[^284] As an initial matter, we note that SWBT's change
     management documentation is clearly organized and readily
     accessible to competing carriers. The basic change management
     process is memorialized in a single document entitled "SWBT
     Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) Interface Change
     Management Process" (Change Agreement).[^285] This document sets
     forth the process and procedures that govern the introduction,
     modification, and retirement of OSS interfaces.[^286] The change
     management plan is designed to accommodate five different types of
     changes: emergency changes; regulatory changes; changes in industry
     standards; changes initiated by SWBT; and changes requested by
     competing carriers. The dates and timelines associated with each
     type of change are clearly reflected in the change management
     documentation.[^287] The basic change management agreement, and any
     modifications thereto, are made available to competing carriers
     through SWBT's website.[^288]

112. We further note that SWBT's change management process provides for
     substantial input from competing carriers. For example, the
     document provides for regularly scheduled change management
     meetings between SWBT and competing carriers.[^289] The Agreement
     further requires SWBT to provide competing carriers with a
     "12-Month Development Plan," which reflects SWBT's plans for future
     OSS modifications. Moreover, the plan provides for feedback from
     competing carriers on proposed changes, and indicates that change
     releases will be based on consensus among the parties.[^290] We
     further note that the Change Agreement includes a schedule for the
     distribution of draft specifications or business rules, receipt of
     competing carrier comments on the documentation, and distribution
     of final documentation that is based on the consensus of the
     parties.[^291]

113. We also find that SWBT's change management process includes many
     elements that provide assurances that changes to existing OSS
     interfaces will not disrupt competing carriers' use of SWBT's OSS.
     Specifically, the plan includes a process whereby competing
     carriers can decide whether or not to implement a new release
     (*i.e.*, "go/no go" vote), and a process for identifying and
     resolving issues related to the change management process in a
     timely manner.[^292] Unresolved change management disputes could
     impede a carrier's ability to access the BOC's OSS, which, in turn,
     hampers that carrier's ability to serve its customers.[^293] It,
     therefore, is critically important that change management disputes
     are handled expeditiously. We would be hesitant to find that a BOC
     has an adequate change management process in place if the change
     management plan does not define a mechanism for change management
     disputes to be handled in a timely manner. Finally, we note that
     the change management plan includes a requirement that SWBT support
     the current and most recent versions of software for its EDI
     Ordering and EDI/CORBA pre-ordering interfaces (*i.e.*,
     "versioning").[^294] Although versioning has not yet been
     implemented in Texas, the record indicates that versioning will be
     implemented in connection with the next EDI release, which is
     expected to occur in August 2000.[^295]

114. Some commenters argue that SWBT cannot rely on the change
     management plan described above to demonstrate compliance with
     section 271 because it has not been used in connection with a
     "major" EDI release, [^296] and has not been fully
     implemented.[^297] These commenters argue that section 271
     compliance must be based on the two different change management
     plans SWBT actually has used over the past year. As noted above,
     the current plan became effective in September 1999. Any EDI
     releases that were implemented prior to this time were governed by
     a process that initially became effective in June 1998.[^298]
     According to some carriers, SWBT's former change management plan
     was inadequate because it failed to include several elements that
     competing carriers regard as critical to their ability to modify
     and test changes on its side of the interface.[^299] WorldCom
     further maintains that SWBT should be

115. required to implement performance measurements to ensure that SWBT
     will comply with the Change Agreement in the future.[^300]

116. We reject each of the foregoing claims. First, contrary to these
     carriers' assertions, the record indicates that SWBT has followed
     the procedures outlined in its current change management plan since
     September 1999. In fact, this process was successfully used in
     connection with the EDI releases that were implemented on October
     23, 1999, January 15, 2000 releases.[^301] Although the evidence
     indicates that these releases were not substantial, we note that
     the timelines, processes, and procedures set forth in the Change
     Agreement must be followed regardless of the scope of the release.
     We thus find that SWBT's successful use of the current change
     management plan in connection with any EDI release is instructive
     in determining whether the change management plan in place in Texas
     affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. We
     recognize that there may be circumstances in which it is necessary
     to assess a BOC's ability to implement at least one significant
     software release.[^302] Indeed, given the nature and scope of the
     change management issues that could arise in connection with major
     software releases, we find that such a demonstration may be
     critical to another section 271 applicant's demonstration that the
     change management plan it has in place is adequate. The evidence
     presented in this proceeding, including that SWBT's change
     management plan was used successfully for at least two EDI
     releases, and Telcordia's findings that SWBT's change management
     process is effective, provides a sufficient basis upon which to
     determine whether the methods and procedures SWBT employs to
     communicate with competing carriers regarding OSS system
     performance and changes is adequate.

117. We recognize, as some commenters point out that, contrary to the
     documented change management plan, SWBT has not yet implemented
     versioning. As we previously have recognized, versioning is one of
     the most effective means of ensuring that system changes and
     enhancements do not adversely affect a carrier's ability to access
     the BOC's OSS.[^303] Given its importance, we find that versioning
     is integral to a section 271 applicant's demonstration that the
     change management plan it has in place affords competing carriers a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. We do not find, however, that
     the lack of versioning has deprived carriers of a meaningful
     opportunity to compete in Texas, or otherwise demonstrates that the
     SWBT's change management process is inadequate. We reach this
     conclusion on the basis of evidence demonstrating that SWBT has
     employed a number of other mechanisms to ensure the timely and
     effective transition from one EDI release to another. Should future
     evidence demonstrate that the resources SWBT makes available to
     assist carriers in EDI implementation and release testing become
     less effective before versioning is implemented, this may serve as
     a basis for concluding that its change management plan is
     inadequate, thus leading to a conclusion that the requirements of
     section 271 are not satisfied.

118. As noted above, SWBT has in place a number of mechanisms to ensure
     that releases are implemented in a timely and effective manner.
     Indeed, as we explain more fully below, SWBT notifies competing
     carriers of all system changes and enhancements well in advance of
     the target implementation date.[^304] In addition, SWBT provides
     numerous other information and human resources to competing
     carriers to ensure successful EDI implementation.[^305] We further
     note that the go/no-go vote procedure that has been in effect in
     Texas since July 1999.[^306] We find that this procedure, which
     permits any carrier that will be adversely affected by the
     implementation of a release to request that it be delayed,
     minimizes any adverse consequences associated with the lack of
     versioning.[^307] Given the effectiveness of these tools in
     ensuring the orderly implementation of EDI releases in the past, we
     reject AT&T's contention that the lack of versioning in Texas
     exposes competing carriers and their customers to an "unreasonable
     risk."[^308] Should the facts reveal at a later time that carriers
     are forced to transition to a new release prematurely, thereby
     impeding their ability to access SWBT OSS, enforcement action may
     be appropriate. Indeed, we find that scrutiny of SWBT's change
     management procedures is particularly important until versioning is
     fully implemented.[^309]

119. Second, while we agree with competing carriers that the change
     management plan that was in place prior to September 1999 was
     deficient in a number of respects,[^310] this plan is not relevant
     to our determination of whether SWBT presently satisfies the
     requirements of section 271. Indeed, in determining section 271
     compliance, we review the adequacy of the change management plan
     that is in place at the time the section 271 application is filed.
     We further review whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of
     compliance with this plan. As noted above, SWBT has adhered to an
     adequate change management plan in connection with the past three
     EDI releases. We do not expect any change management process to
     remain static. Rather, a key component of an effective change
     management process is the existence of a forum in which both
     competing carriers and the BOC can work collaboratively to improve
     the method by which changes to the BOC's OSS are implemented. This
     certainly is the case in Texas where, as a result of concerns
     raised by competing carriers and to accommodate process
     improvements recommended by Telcordia, SWBT's change management
     process has evolved over time. We believe it would be unreasonable
     to evaluate SWBT's section 271 compliance based on a change
     management process that it no longer follows.

120. Finally, we disagree that the existence of performance measurements
     is the only basis upon which to ensure that a BOC will comply with
     the requirements of section 271, including the requirement that it
     adhere to its documented change management plan. Indeed, we note
     that, the Texas Commission has been extensively involved in the
     development of the Texas change management plan, and continues to
     handle disputes related to the change management process
     effectively and expeditiously.[^311] Moreover, pursuant to section
     271(d)(6), the Commission retains the authority to enforce the
     requirements of section 271, even after such authority has been
     granted. Given the extensive oversight of the Texas Commission, and
     this Commission's continuing enforcement authority under section
     271(d)(6), we have no reason to believe that SWBT will disregard
     its obligation to maintain in Texas a change management plan that
     affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.
     Evidence that SWBT fails to adhere to the agreed-upon change
     management process, thereby depriving competing carriers of a
     meaningful opportunity to compete, may result in an enforcement
     action under section 271(d)(6).

####### Documentation Adequacy

121. We conclude that SWBT makes available sufficiently detailed
     interface design specifications to enable competing carriers to
     modify or design their systems in a manner that will enable them to
     communicate with the SWBT's systems and any relevant
     interfaces.[^312] We, therefore, conclude that the EDI
     implementation and design specifications that SWBT makes available
     afford an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.
     Competing carriers raise various arguments with respect to the
     adequacy of SWBT's EDI interface development documentation.[^313]
     We believe that many of the issues cited by commenters (such as
     SWBT's failure to provide a comprehensive, customized set of
     SWBT-specific EDI documentation) are important, and under a
     different set of circumstances, could seriously undermine a section
     271 applicant's assertion that it provides nondiscriminatory access
     to its OSS.

122. Under the facts of this proceeding, however, we find that SWBT's
     documentation is adequate for the purpose of building an EDI
     gateway, and therefore affords an efficient competing carrier of a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^314] As an initial matter, we
     agree with SWBT and the Texas Commission that the adequacy of
     SWBT's documentation is demonstrated by the fact that several
     competing carriers have constructed and are using EDI interfaces in
     a commercial environment.[^315] As SWBT explains, sixteen carriers
     are in production using SWBT's EDI interface gateway, and
     additional carriers are in the process of testing EDI
     requirements.[^316] The fact that many of these carriers are
     placing high volumes of orders via EDI with relatively few rejects
     significantly undermines the assertion that these carriers' EDI
     implementation efforts have been unsuccessful. Indeed, these
     carriers' actual commercial experiences indicate that SWBT's EDI
     documentation is sufficient.

123. We further note that SWBT makes available to competing carriers a
     vast number of resources for the purpose of EDI
     implementation.[^317] For example, each competing carrier operating
     in Texas is assigned an SWBT Account Manager, who is responsible
     for managing and assisting with all activities pertaining to the
     carrier's working relationship with SWBT for local service.[^318]
     In addition, through its Information Services (IS) Call Center and
     OSS CLEC Support Team, SWBT is able to offer personalized
     assistance to carriers that experience OSS-related problems.[^319]
     Other resources provided by SWBT include interactional, OSS-related
     websites.[^320] Although not decisional in this case, we note that
     SWBT recently engaged the services of General Electric Global
     Exchange Services (GXS) to provide to competing carriers several
     hours of OSS-related technical assistance at no charge to the
     competing carrier.[^321]

124. Telcordia's findings provide additional support for our conclusion
     that the documentation and resources provided by SWBT enable
     competing carriers to implement successfully EDI. As part of the
     Texas Commission's third-party test, Telcordia performed an
     assessment of the usefulness of the documentation and related
     materials SWBT makes available to competing carriers for the
     purpose of implementing EDI.[^322] In its Documentation Analysis
     Report, Telcordia concluded that the resources made available by
     SWBT for the purpose of EDI implementation are "clear and
     comprehensive, and conform to applicable OBF pre-order and ordering
     guidelines."[^323] Telcordia further found that the resources SWBT
     provides to competing carriers are easy to use and readily
     available to competing carriers.[^324] According to Telcordia,
     these findings were confirmed by the competing carriers it
     interviewed in connection with its documentation review.[^325]
     Indeed, in its Documentation Report, Telcordia noted that competing
     carriers consistently commented upon the responsiveness of SWBT
     employees to their concerns and issues raised during EDI
     implementation.[^326]

125. Moreover, many of the issues related to EDI implementation,
     including the adequacy of SWBT's EDI documentation, are discussed
     fully and openly during regularly scheduled meetings between SWBT
     and competing carriers. The record indicates that, when a competing
     carrier expresses a concern about SWBT's EDI documentation, SWBT
     responds to their concerns in an effective and timely manner.[^327]
     Given these findings, we are convinced that any problems associated
     with SWBT's EDI documentation are minimal, and can be easily
     overcome.

126. We further note that, other than AT&T, no carrier claims that its
     EDI implementation efforts were unreasonably complicated, or
     accompanied by unreasonable expense and delay. With respect to
     AT&T, we are persuaded by SWBT's claim that many of the problems
     associated with AT&T's development efforts are unique to AT&T.
     Indeed, although AT&T claims that it took several years for it to
     construct an EDI gateway, other competing carriers were able to
     establish connectivity with SWBT's EDI ordering gateway within a
     few months after receiving the EDI implementation documentation. In
     fact, SWBT explains that Allegiance Telecom implemented electronic
     bonding within 90 days of commencing the EDI implementation
     process. [^328] Moreover, there is some evidence in the record that
     suggests that AT&T itself is at least partially responsible for
     some of the problems it experienced during the early stages of its
     EDI implementation.[^329]

127. Finally, SWBT has convincingly explained that many of the problems
     associated with the EDI documentation utilized by AT&T have been
     resolved,[^330] and therefore should not similarly limit another
     carrier's gateway development efforts. Indeed, we note that,
     through functionality testing, Telcordia indirectly tested the OSS
     documentation SWBT supplies to competing carriers.[^331] When
     testing activities revealed the need for improvements to the
     documentation, Telcordia verified SWBT's implementation of those
     changes.[^332] Telcordia's functionality review, therefore,
     provides additional indirect evidence that most of the problems
     related to SWBT's EDI documentation have been resolved. We further
     note that, on April 11, 2000, SWBT initiated a documentation
     meeting with competing carriers.[^333] As a result of the concerns
     expressed by competing carriers during this meeting, SWBT
     implemented various improvements to assist carriers in accessing
     and utilizing its system documentation.[^334] Under our procedural
     framework, the process improvements that resulted from this meeting
     are not relevant to our determination of whether SWBT satisfies the
     requirements of section 271. We do note, however, that we are
     supportive of these and other steps taken by SWBT to facilitate
     entry into its local markets by competing carriers.

####### Notification Adequacy and Timeliness

128. It is critical that a BOC provide timely, complete, and accurate
     notice of alterations to its systems and processes. Indeed, without
     timely notification and documentation, competing carriers are
     unable to modify their existing systems and procedures or develop
     new systems to maintain access to a BOC's OSS, which, in turn,
     impedes a carrier's ability to serve its customers.[^335]
     Previously, in reviewing a BOC's change management process, we
     examined whether the BOC "established a pattern of compliance with
     the relevant notification and documentation intervals in its Change
     Agreement."[^336] In making this determination, we relied, in part,
     on the performance measurements associated with the BOC's
     compliance with the dates and timelines set forth in its Change
     Agreement. In this application, however, there are no performance
     measurements associated with SWBT's compliance with its documented
     change management process. We thus limit our analysis of SWBT's
     compliance with the change management process to competing
     carriers' actual commercial experiences. As noted above, we do not
     rely on the processes and procedures set forth in SWBT's former
     change management plan in evaluating SWBT's compliance with the
     requirements of section 271 because we find that this plan is
     inadequate. We further note, however, that the notification
     intervals set forth in the former and current change management
     plans are essentially the same.[^337] Thus, in evaluating whether
     SWBT provides change management notification and documentation in a
     reasonable and timely manner, we assess whether SWBT has
     demonstrated a pattern of compliance with the intervals associated
     with both the current and former change management plans.

129. Based on the evidence presented in the record, we conclude that
     SWBT has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with its documented
     change management processes and procedures. As a preliminary
     matter, we find that the change management notification and
     documentation intervals set forth in SWBT's change management plan
     are reasonable because they provide competing carriers with
     sufficient time to prepare for changes to SWBT's interfaces and
     systems.[^338] Given our finding, as explained more fully below,
     that SWBT has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with these
     reasonable intervals, we conclude that SWBT provides competing
     carriers with change management notification and documentation in a
     manner sufficiently timely to allow an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

130. Our conclusion that SWBT generally has adhered to the reasonable
     timeframes set forth in its change management plan is based on the
     evidence in the record and Telcordia's findings. As part of the
     Texas Commission's third-party test, Telcordia assessed whether
     SWBT adhered to the notification intervals set forth in the change
     management plan in connection with the August and October 1999 EDI
     releases.[^339] With respect to these releases, Telcordia found
     that SWBT generally followed the documented change management
     process.[^340] More specifically, Telcordia found that SWBT
     distributed change management notification and documentation in a
     manner consistent with the intervals set forth in the Change
     Agreement,[^341] and that other activities outlined in the Change
     Agreement were carried out by SWBT in a reasonable and timely
     manner.[^342]

131. We disagree with AT&T and WorldCom that SWBT's failure to follow
     strictly the intervals set forth in the Change Agreement has
     deprived competing carriers of a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^343] As an initial matter, we note that, whenever SWBT
     has introduced changes outside the intervals set forth in the
     change management plan, it has followed the "exceptions process,"
     which is specifically defined and provided for in the *agreed-upon*
     change management plan.[^344] Pursuant to the exceptions process,
     each change SWBT has sought to introduce under an expedited
     timeframe was discussed fully and openly at change management and
     other meetings held between SWBT and competing carriers. In
     addition, competing carriers were notified of the proposed changes
     via Accessible Letter.[^345] Thus, competing carriers were provided
     with timely notice of each exceptions change, and were given
     reasonable opportunity to comment and object.[^346] The record
     indicates that, when competing carriers express concerns about
     particular changes, SWBT has shown a willingness to accommodate
     their concerns.[^347]

132. Moreover, any carrier that would be affected by the change could
     have delayed the implementation of the release by invoking the
     "go/no-go vote" policy. Given that no carrier objected to SWBT's
     implementation of the exceptions changes, we give little weight to
     the assertion that SWBT's implementation of such changes impeded
     competing carriers' ability to compete. Finally, we note that, in
     many instances, the changes implemented by SWBT pursuant to the
     exceptions process were for the purpose of accommodating system
     changes or enhancements specifically requested by competing
     carriers, or mandated by regulatory authorities.[^348] Accordingly,
     we find that, despite its use of the exceptions process, SWBT is
     implementing its change management plan in a way that provides
     adequate and timely notice to competing carriers. The evidence
     further demonstrates that SWBT sufficiently accommodates competing
     carriers' change management concerns. At the same time, we expect
     SWBT's use of the exceptions process should decrease as the changes
     requested by competing carriers and mandated by regulatory
     authorities are successfully implemented.

133. We caution BOCs against the use of any process that would
     effectively nullify the standard procedures outlined in the formal
     change management documentation. Indeed, as several commenters
     point out, part of the problem with deviating from the standard
     timelines set forth in the Change Agreement is that it requires
     competing carriers to make substantial changes to their systems
     within a significantly abbreviated timeframe, which could increase
     the risk of error.[^349] There is no evidence in this proceeding,
     however, that SWBT's use of the exceptions process has adversely
     affected competing carriers' ability to access SWBT's OSS after new
     releases were implemented. Indeed, in view of the number of
     competing carrier-requested and regulatory-mandated changes SWBT
     has had to implement over the past year, we find that SWBT's use of
     the exceptions process was limited to instances in which it was
     both necessary and unavoidable. We further find that SWBT's
     exceptions process is reasonable given that that competing carriers
     are afforded an adequate opportunity to comment upon and object to
     each exceptions change.

####### Testing Environment

134. As part of a sufficient change management process, a BOC must
     provide competing carriers with access to a stable testing
     environment to certify that their OSS will be capable of
     interacting smoothly and effectively with the BOC's OSS.[^350] In
     addition, prior to issuing a new software release or upgrade, the
     BOC must provide a testing environment that mirrors the production
     environment in order for competing carriers to test the new
     release.[^351] If competing carriers are not given the opportunity
     to test new releases in a stable environment prior to
     implementation, they may be unable to process orders accurately and
     provision new customer services without delays.[^352] Moreover, the
     failure to provide a testing environment that mirrors production
     can result in competing carriers' transactions succeeding in the
     testing environment but failing in production.[^353]

135. SWBT's current test environment was made available to competing
     carriers on November 1, 1999.[^354] SWBT represents that that its
     current testing environment is sufficiently stable because it
     dedicated solely to testing by competing carriers.[^355] More
     specifically, SWBT explains that, in contrast to the testing
     environment that existed prior to November 1999, where the testing
     environment was shared between SWBT developers and testers and
     competing carriers, the current testing environment is physically
     separate from the production environment and is made available for
     the exclusive use of competing carriers.[^356] SWBT asserts that
     the stability of its testing environment is further demonstrated by
     the fact that internal testing of the release is completed before
     it is made available to competing carriers.[^357] According to
     SWBT, its testing environment adequately mirrors the production
     environment because "the functionality of the test environment is
     the same as the production environment and returns data in the
     identical fields and format."[^358] In further support of its
     assertion that its testing environment is adequate, SWBT points out
     that its test plan defines a process whereby SWBT and competing
     carriers jointly develop testing scenarios and timeframes.

136. We conclude that SWBT's test environment affords competing carriers
     an adequate opportunity to test SWBT OSS changes prior to
     implementation. We, therefore, find that the testing environment
     SWBT makes available provides competing carriers with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. Specifically, we find that the record
     demonstrates that SWBT's testing environment is stable, adequately
     mirrors the production environment, affords competing carriers an
     opportunity to develop test decks of representative pre-ordering
     and ordering transactions, and offers the extended testing periods
     that competing carriers need for EDI implementation and new release
     testing. We base this conclusion on the experience of the competing
     carriers that used the current testing environment to implement EDI
     and to test the January 15, 2000 release. The record indicates that
     three carriers that used the new test environment for EDI
     implementation achieved production status,[^359] and that two
     carriers used the new testing environment without substantial
     difficulty to test the requirements associated with the January 15,
     2000 release.[^360] Thus, we find that the recent evidence from
     commercial usage suggests that SWBT's testing environment works in
     the manner represented in its application.

137. In concluding that SWBT's testing environment is adequate, we
     recognize that SWBT's testing environment was not tested by a third
     party. Although such a test would have provided us with useful
     evidence concerning the adequacy of the testing environment SWBT
     makes available to competing carriers, we reject AT&T's assertion
     that the absence of third party test is basis for concluding that
     SWBT's section 271 application is deficient. Indeed, we find that
     the commercial evidence, as described above, is sufficient for the
     purpose of evaluating the adequacy of the testing environment SWBT
     makes available to competing carriers.

138. AT&T is the only commenter that raises several specific concerns
     with respect to the adequacy of SWBT's EDI testing environment. One
     of its primary arguments is that SWBT's EDI testing environment is
     deficient because it does not mirror the production environment. In
     support of this assertion, AT&T maintains that, in SWBT's EDI
     testing environment, test orders do not flow-through as they would
     during production, but instead are manually monitored by SWBT as
     they progress through the testing process.[^361] AT&T claims that
     this approach is problematic because it denies competing carriers
     an opportunity to assess how the release will affect new or
     existing flow-through capability, and deprives competing carriers
     of an opportunity to assess how the relevant systems will actually
     respond in a production environment.[^362] AT&T further states
     that, because SWBT's test environment does not take orders through
     the posting cycle in billing, but only through service order
     creation, it fails to predict adequately problems that could occur
     in production. In support of this claim, AT&T points to evidence
     suggesting that certain problems are discovered only after
     competing carriers have moved into production.[^363]

139. We agree with AT&T that a BOC's failure to provide a testing
     environment that adequately mirrors production may deny competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. Such a failure is of
     particular concern in this case in view of the fact that SWBT has
     not yet implemented versioning. As AT&T explains, an inadequate
     test environment coupled with the lack of versioning is
     particularly problematic because it forces competing carriers to
     use a new EDI release in the production environment without any
     assurance that they can submit orders successfully, and without the
     ability to continue using the previous release.[^364]

140. The record demonstrates that there are two notable differences
     between SWBT's testing and production environments. First, SWBT's
     test environment does not test flow through or response times, but
     only evaluates application functionality.[^365] Second, the record
     indicates that SWBT's test environment does not evaluate the
     ability of an order to post to billing.[^366] With respect to the
     first issue, AT&T appears to argue that, for purposes of
     demonstrating compliance with the requirements of section 271, a
     BOC must provide a testing environment that is identical to its
     production environment. The record indicates, however, that
     competing carriers are able to test adequately OSS changes prior to
     their implementation as long as the testing and production
     environments perform the same key functions. In this regard, we
     note that, although SWBT's testing and production environments are
     not identical, the vast majority of carriers are able to achieve
     production status and test new releases without substantial
     difficulty. Thus, despite any differences between the testing and
     production environments, the totality of the evidence indicates
     that SWBT's testing environment is adequate. We further agree with
     SWBT that this approach to managing its testing environment does
     not harm, but ultimately benefits competing carriers because it
     allows SWBT to quickly identify and resolve errors found during
     testing.[^367]

141. As noted above, we find that another notable difference between
     SWBT's testing and production environments is that the testing
     environment does not evaluate the ability of an order to post to
     billing. The record further indicates, however, that this practice
     has not significantly impeded any carrier's ability to submit
     orders, or otherwise access SWBT's OSS after the new release has
     been implemented. The record indicates that there were some
     problems associated with the January 15, 2000 release.[^368]
     Specifically, the record indicates that after the January 15
     release was implemented, orders that were pending at the time the
     release was implemented failed to post.[^369] In addition, LVAS, a
     downstream system, did not properly populate product tables.[^370]
     AT&T argues that these problems could have been discovered if SWBT
     conducted end-to-end testing (*i.e*., testing from order creation
     to posting to billing).

142. SWBT explains, however, that these problems were not due to its
     failure to conduct end-to-end testing environment, but instead
     occurred because the production system did not update certain
     tables in a timely manner.[^371] The record indicates that
     corrective measures were implemented within four days of the
     release being implemented.[^372] On the basis of these findings, we
     conclude that the problems that occurred in connection with the
     January 15, 2000 release do not represent a systemic failure in
     SWBT's ability to provide access to its OSS. Rather, we find that
     SWBT has convincingly demonstrated that the problems associated
     with the January 15, 2000 release were isolated, did not
     significantly impede any carrier's ability to serve its customers,
     and should not recur in connection with future releases.

143. We are further encouraged by the fact that SWBT has expressed a
     willingness to run a test through to the billing cycle.[^373]
     Although not decisional to our analysis, we note that end-to-end
     testing should provide further assurance that SWBT's testing
     environment affords competing carriers an adequate opportunity to
     assess whether the new release will function as intended. We
     emphasize that the adequacy of a BOC's testing environment is a
     critically important area for demonstrating compliance with the
     requirements of section 271. Thus, if the evidence demonstrates
     that SWBT's testing environment is inadequate for the purpose of
     EDI implementation and release testing, thereby depriving competing
     carriers of a meaningful opportunity to compete, enforcement action
     under section 271(d)(6) may be appropriate.

144. In arguing that SWBT's test environment is deficient, AT&T further
     claims that SWBT fails to provide a standard validation test deck,
     and that, as a result, competing carriers must compile new test
     accounts each time a new release is implemented.[^374] We find,
     however, that the evidence in the record simply does not support
     this claim. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that SWBT
     provides competing carriers a reasonable opportunity to develop
     test transactions that will enable them to determine whether the
     new release produces expected results. SWBT points out, for
     example, that the test plan permits competing carriers to develop
     their own test scenarios based upon their own business
     requirements.[^375] SWBT further states that, upon request, it will
     provide a competing carrier with test scripts that are specific to
     the new functionalities it wishes to implement.[^376] Although SWBT
     requests that competing carriers provide information on their test
     scenarios before new release testing begins, this appears to be a
     reasonable method of managing test transactions because it affords
     SWBT an opportunity to access whether the appropriate types of
     accounts are available before testing begins.[^377] SWBT further
     explains that this practice is beneficial because it helps to
     minimize the delay that may be caused when a carrier submits a test
     order that does not have the required characteristics.[^378] Given
     these findings, which indicate that these practices ultimately
     benefit competing carriers, we reject AT&T's contention that the
     test deck SWBT offers for the purpose of testing is deficient.

145. Other than AT&T, the only comments in the record concerning the
     adequacy of SWBT's test environment were raised by the Department
     of Justice. In its evaluation of the Texas I Application, the
     Department of Justice noted that competing carriers had complained
     about the lack of a stable testing environment.[^379] Although the
     Department of Justice opined that SWBT's performance may have been
     flawed in this area, it stated that it lacked sufficient evidence
     to determine the extent to which this, and other issues, may impede
     competition in the future.[^380] It, therefore, recommended that
     the Commission reserve judgment on this issue.[^381] Unlike the
     circumstances that existed with respect to the Texas I Application,
     we find that there is sufficient evidence in the instant record to
     determine whether SWBT's testing environment is sufficiently
     stable. Indeed, as noted above, SWBT implemented a new testing
     environment in November 1999, which, according to SWBT, is much
     more stable than the testing environment it used prior to this
     time.[^382]

####### Training, Technical Assistance, and Help Desk Support 

146. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides the technical
     assistance and help desk support necessary to give competing
     carriers nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. SWBT has created a
     Local Service Center (LSC) that provides competing LECs with a
     single point of contact for issues regarding ordering, billing, and
     collections related to interconnection facilities, resold services
     and UNEs.[^383] The LSC assigns a work group to each competitive
     LEC customer to provide competing LECs with access to service
     representatives and managers to handle service requests and any
     associated issues for pre-order, order and billing.[^384] Service
     representatives in these groups undergo several months of
     training.[^385]

147. In addition, SWBT's Local Operations Center (LOC) supports the
     provisioning of UNEs, interconnection with SWBT's local network,
     and resold services as well as any maintenance and repair functions
     requested by competing carriers.[^386] Within the LOC there is a
     Customer Action Support Team, (CAST) that provides competing LECs
     with additional technical support and assists in the resolution of
     operational issues pertaining to pre-ordering, ordering,
     provisioning, maintenance and OSS.[^387] SWBT states that it tracks
     incoming trouble volumes on an hourly basis that allow it to ensure
     that the LOC is always adequately staffed.[^388] In addition, the
     evidence demonstrates that SWBT trains its carrier-customers on the
     LSC/s procedures, and engages in ongoing consultation with
     competing carriers regarding operational practices and service
     issues.[^389] SWBT has also established an Information Services
     (IS) Call Center that serves as the "Help Desk," answering
     questions regarding access to SWBT systems and applications and
     helping to resolve information technology problems.[^390] SWBT also
     SWBT provides extensive training for competitive LEC
     employees,[^391] and provides on-line assistant through its
     Internet site.[^392]

148. In view of the foregoing evidence, which demonstrates that SWBT
     provides efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete
     by enabling them to understand how to implement and use all of the
     OSS functions available to them, we reject claims that SWBT's
     training, technical assistance and helpdesk support is
     inadequate.[^393] We agree with commenters that a third-party test
     that includes an evaluation of BOC support organizations and
     personnel would provide us with additional assurance that these
     resources are available and commercially ready to support competing
     carriers seeking access to the BOC's network. In this proceeding,
     however, there is sufficient evidence to evaluate SWBT's support
     organizations without the need for a third party test. Moreover,
     there is no evidence of poor performance by SWBT's support
     personnel. Nor does the record indicate that SWBT support
     organizations provide discriminatory treatment to competing
     carriers. For these reasons, we disagree with those commenters who
     claim that the lack of a third party evaluation of SWBT's technical
     assistance and help functions indicate that SWBT's section 271
     application is deficient.

#### Pre-Ordering

149. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering functions. Specifically, we find that SWBT
     demonstrates that: (i) competing carriers successfully have built
     and are using application-to-application interfaces to perform
     pre-ordering functions; (ii) competing carriers are able to
     integrate pre-ordering and ordering interfaces; (iii) its
     pre-ordering systems provide reasonably prompt response times; (iv)
     these interfaces are consistently available in a manner that
     affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete; and (v)
     SWBT offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions
     associated with determining whether a loop is capable of supporting
     xDSL advanced technologies.[^394]

##### Discussion

150. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities
     that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information
     necessary to place an order.[^395] Given that pre-ordering
     represents the first exposure that a prospective customer has to a
     competing carrier, it is critical that a competing carrier is able
     to accomplish pre-ordering activities in a manner no less efficient
     and responsive than the incumbent.[^396] Most of the pre-ordering
     activities that must be undertaken by a competing carrier to order
     resale services and UNEs from the incumbent are analogous to the
     activities a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own
     customers. For these pre-ordering functions, SWBT must demonstrate
     that it provides requesting carriers access that enables them to
     perform pre-ordering functions in substantially the same time and
     manner as its retail operations.[^397] For those pre-ordering
     functions that lack a retail analogue, SWBT must provide access
     that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^398] In prior orders, we have emphasized that providing
     pre-ordering functionality through an application-to-application
     interface is essential in enabling carriers to conduct real-time

151. processing and to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions in
     the same manner as the BOC.[^399]

152. *Pre-Ordering Functionality*. We find that SWBT offers requesting
     carriers access to an application-to-application interface,
     DataGate, for the pre-ordering functions that SWBT provides to
     itself. The DataGate interface is based on SWBT's proprietary
     pre-ordering functionality, and allows competing carriers to
     acquire pre-ordering information using their own software programs
     or applications. SWBT states that it provides competing carriers
     with access to all of the necessary technical specifications and
     documentation for its DataGate interface.[^400] The DataGate
     interface allows competing carriers to perform a wide range of
     pre-ordering functions for both resale services and UNEs.
     Specifically, carriers are able to use DataGate to: (1) retrieve
     CSRs; (2) validate addresses; (3) select and reserve telephone
     numbers; (4) determine services and features available to a
     customer; (5) obtain due date availability; (6) access loop
     qualification information; (7) view a customer's directory
     listing; (8) determine dispatch requirements; (9) retrieve local
     primary intraLATA carrier (LPIC) and primary interexchange carrier
     (PIC) list; (10) access the Common Language Location Identifier
     (CLLI) for the serving central office; and (11) verify channel
     facility assignment.[^401]

153. SWBT also offers access to pre-ordering functions through EDI and
     CORBA interfaces, which are based on industry standards.[^402] The
     availability of these interfaces is beneficial to competing
     carriers in Texas and we encourage SWBT to continue to develop them
     and promote their use. These interfaces do not form the basis of
     our decision that SWBT meets the nondiscrimination requirements for
     OSS pre-ordering functions, however, because SWBT's evidentiary
     showing in this proceeding is insufficient to allow such a
     determination. Although SWBT offers evidence on the functionality
     available through EDI and CORBA,[^403] there is insufficient
     evidence to find that, in Texas, these interfaces: (i) can be used
     in a commercial setting; (ii) are stable and reliable; and (iii)
     provide nondiscriminatory response times.[^404]

154. With respect to actual commercial usage, SWBT demonstrates that
     competing carriers successfully have built their systems to connect
     with SWBT's DataGate interface. SWBT states that at least five
     carriers are in production in Texas using DataGate for
     pre-ordering.[^405] A review of performance data submitted by SWBT
     confirms that carriers currently are using DataGate to perform six
     of the pre-ordering transactions listed above.[^406] While
     Telcordia did not test the functionality of SWBT's pre-ordering
     interfaces,[^407] we note that the evidence of actual commercial
     usage supports SWBT's claim that these functions are made available
     to competing LECs. Moreover, we reject commenters' claims that
     SWBT's pre-ordering interfaces are functionally deficient. First,
     AT&T complains that a particular pre-ordering function -- SWBT's
     telephone number assignment system -- has the potential to
     discriminate against competing LECs.[^408] AT&T does not claim,
     however, and the record does not suggest, that such discrimination
     actually takes place, and thus we do not conclude competing LECs
     are denied nondiscriminatory access to this pre-ordering function.
     Should we receive evidence of such discrimination in the future, we
     shall take appropriate enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).
     We address commenters' claims relating to integration and loop
     qualification information in the following subsections.

155. *Integration.* SWBT has demonstrated that its
     application-to-application interfaces allow competing carriers to
     integrate successfully pre-ordering information obtained from the
     DataGate interface into the ordering process and the carriers' back
     office systems.[^409] The Commission has explained previously that
     a BOC with integrated pre-ordering and ordering functions for its
     retail operations must provide competing carriers with access to
     the same capability. Indeed, we have noted that the inability to
     integrate may place competitors at a disadvantage and significantly
     impact a carrier's ability to serve its customers in a timely and
     efficient manner.[^410] Thus, in order to demonstrate compliance
     with checklist item 2, the BOC must enable competing carriers to
     transfer pre-ordering information (such as a customer's address or
     existing features) electronically into the carrier's own back
     office systems and back into the BOC's ordering interface. We do
     not simply inquire whether it is possible to transfer information
     from pre-ordering to ordering interfaces -- we assess whether the
     BOC enables *successful* integration.[^411] We clarify that a BOC
     has enabled "successful integration" if competing carriers may, or
     have been able to, automatically populate information supplied by
     the BOC's pre-ordering systems onto an order form (the "local
     service request" or "LSR") that will not be rejected by the BOC's
     OSS systems.

156. As an initial matter, we note that our analysis of integration is
     complicated in this instance by the fact that SWBT has chosen not
     to provide "parsed" address information at the preordering stage,
     but instead returns this information to competing LECs in an
     undifferentiated (or "concatenated") string of alphanumeric
     characters.[^412] In order to transfer seamlessly the unparsed
     address information onto an order, competing LECs must first write
     a program which "parses" the undifferentiated string of numbers and
     words into the specific fields required on the order form. Because
     successful parsing is thus a necessary component of successful
     integration, we must determine whether SWBT enables carriers to
     implement a parsing program that allows the seamless transfer of
     information from pre-ordering to the ordering stage.[^413] Of
     course, a BOC

157. that provides address information in a parsed format would not need
     to make this complicated showing.[^414]

158. We conclude, based on the totality of evidence in the record, that
     SWBT's DataGate pre-ordering interface can be successfully
     integrated with SWBT's EDI ordering functions. In reaching this
     conclusion, we rely primarily on evidence, submitted both by
     competing LECs active in Texas and by SWBT, that carriers have been
     able to successfully integrate certain pre-ordering and ordering
     functions in a commercial setting. Specifically, while several
     carriers in this proceeding claim to have encountered substantial
     difficulties in achieving full, successful integration, the record
     contains statements from at least two carriers indicating that they
     have been able to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions. We
     also rely on the results of a customized third party review
     conducted in April 2000, in which Telcordia found that
     documentation and other information provided by SWBT enabled it to
     mechanically integrate address information received in a
     pre-ordering inquiry into the ordering process. Finally, we
     recognize that SWBT has hired GE Global eXchange Services to
     provide additional technical assistance relating to integration,
     free of charge, to any competing LEC that requests this additional
     help.[^415]

159. In terms of commercial usage, SWBT submits that at least two
     competing LECs, Sage Telecom and Navigator Telecommunications, have
     successfully integrated pre-ordering functions.[^416] Both of these
     competing LECs have confirmed on the record in this proceeding
     that, by interfacing with SWBT's DataGate system, they are able to
     transfer information received electronically from SWBT directly
     into their internal systems and into the ordering process.
     Specifically, Sage reports that, using documentation and technical
     support from SWBT, it has designed its systems to electronically
     transfer information contained in the CSR, including address
     information, directly onto an order.[^417] Similarly, Navigator
     reports that it has developed systems to electronically transfer
     information from the CSR to the ordering process, including service
     and feature codes, but not address information.[^418] Because
     service address information is not required for orders that migrate
     customers from SWBT retail to resale service, this level of
     integration apparently allows Navigator to complete orders for
     resale service with "minimal human intervention."[^419] AT&T
     apparently also has developed a program that parses address
     information drawn from DataGate, and integrates pre-ordering
     information directly into its ordering process.[^420] Unlike Sage
     and Navigator, however, AT&T does not characterize its integration
     efforts as a "success."

160. An analysis of these carriers' order rejections indicates that they
     have achieved substantial success in their parsing and integration
     efforts. We note that a high reject rate may indicate that a
     carrier has not successfully integrated its pre-ordering and
     ordering functions, particularly where rejects are attributable to
     integration or parsing difficulties.[^421] In this instance,
     however, we note that Sage and AT&T have been able to achieve low
     reject rates -- 50 percent lower than any other carrier using EDI
     for ordering in Texas.[^422] Most significantly, data submitted by
     SWBT indicates that, for the past three months, a relatively low
     percentage of orders submitted by both Sage and AT&T are rejected
     for address-related reasons.[^423] These data indicate that both
     Sage's and AT&T's parsing and integration efforts have enabled them
     to submit orders that generally survive address edits.

161. We disagree with AT&T that the problems it has encountered in a
     commercial setting indicate that SWBT's systems cannot be
     integrated. AT&T explains that, due to deficiencies in the
     documentation SWBT makes available to assist carriers in
     integrating their systems, it has had to devote substantial
     resources to correcting parsing problems on its orders.[^424]
     Specifically, AT&T states that it must take the unnecessary step of
     carefully pre-screening orders before they are transmitted to SWBT,
     and that it must spend an inordinate amount of time and resources
     processing and resolving address-related rejects.[^425]
     Nevertheless, we reject AT&T's assertion that SWBT is substantially
     responsible for its integration difficulties.[^426] As an initial
     matter, Sage's commercial experience indicates that successful
     integration is possible. There also is evidence in the record that
     AT&T's address-related rejects are relatively low, and that some of
     AT&T's address-related rejects may be unrelated to parsing
     problems.[^427] This suggests that, contrary to AT&T's assertions,
     its integration efforts have in fact been successful.

162. In addition to the evidence pointing towards successful integration
     in a commercial setting, we also rely on the customized integration
     test performed by Telcordia. The Texas Commission explains that
     Telcordia was retained in April 2000 to review the documentation
     and other information available to competing LECs and determine
     whether this information enables a competing LEC to parse and
     integrate information obtained from SWBT's pre-ordering systems
     into the ordering process.[^428] Telcordia reports that it used
     documentation and other information obtained from SWBT to develop a
     program that automatically parsed and transferred information,
     including address information, obtained through the pre-ordering
     process directly onto an LSR.[^429] We conclude that this
     supplemental functionality test, performed at the specific request
     of the Texas Commission in order to augment the record in this
     proceeding, provides us with additional assurance that competing
     LECs should be able to write a parsing program which enables
     integration efficiencies.

163. We disagree with AT&T and WorldCom, who argue that Telcordia's
     conclusions merit little weight in this analysis. AT&T and WorldCom
     suggest that Telcordia's test is unreliable because it did not
     involve the actual submission of orders, and did not appear to test
     a broad range of address scenarios.[^430] While this type of
     additional testing would certainly have bolstered Telcordia's
     conclusion, and in fact may be critical to another BOC's section
     271 application, we note that Telcordia's test does not stand alone
     in this instance and supplements evidence of integration in a
     commercial setting.[^431] AT&T and WorldCom also note that
     Telcordia tested whether it could integrate address information
     received via the *EDI pre-ordering interface*, rather than the
     DataGate interface upon which SWBT relies to demonstrate
     nondiscriminatory access to pre-ordering functions.[^432] Telcordia
     subsequently explained, in a submission in this proceeding, that
     the task of parsing and integrating address information obtained
     via EDI is functionally the same as parsing address information
     received directly from DataGate.[^433] We thus find that
     Telcordia's evaluation is useful to demonstrate that effective
     parsing can occur with respect to information provided by SWBT
     through its pre-ordering interfaces.

164. As noted above, we base our conclusion that SWBT's systems can be
     integrated on carriers' actual commercial experiences and
     Telcordia's findings. As further evidence that successful
     integration can continue to occur in the future, we are encouraged
     by the recent steps SWBT has taken in this area. Specifically, we
     note that SWBT has recently implemented a programming change which
     will virtually eliminate address-related rejects received by
     competing LECs on most types of orders.[^434] As of May 2000, SWBT
     no longer requires carriers to populate the service address fields
     on orders that convert a retail or resale customer to UNE-P
     service. Even the relatively low levels of address-related rejects
     received by AT&T and Sage should thus be reduced even further.
     Although this enhancement occurred after it filed this application,
     and therefore is not decisional, it provides assurances that
     carriers that have yet to attempt integration should be able to
     avoid the burden of receiving and processing a large number of
     address-related rejects.[^435] To the extent that competing
     carriers, in the future, present evidence that undermines our
     finding that SWBT's pre-ordering and ordering systems may be
     integrated -- such as evidence that they are unable to avoid
     rejects attributable to inadequacies in SWBT's documentation or
     systems -- then we may consider an enforcement action under section
     271(d)(6).[^436]

165. Finally, we recognize that SWBT has engaged GE Global eXchange
     Services (GXS) as a third party expert to provide high-level
     consulting advice to competing carriers that seek to integrate
     pre-ordering and ordering functions.[^437] We believe that GXS may
     provide valuable assistance to competing LECs seeking to design or
     improve their ordering systems to maximize the functionality
     offered by SWBT.

166. *Interface Response Times and Availability.* We find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides requesting carriers access to
     pre-ordering functionality in a manner that allows an efficient
     competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. Specifically, we
     have held previously that an interface that provides responses in a
     prompt timeframe, and is stable and reliable, is necessary for
     competing carriers to market their services and serve their
     customers as efficiently and at the same level of quality that SWBT
     provides to itself.[^438] With respect to the timeliness of
     pre-ordering responses using DataGate, we note that the Texas
     Commission established benchmark standards rather than identifying
     a retail analogue.[^439] We accept the Texas Commission's
     determination regarding these time intervals, which were
     established with input from competing carriers, and conclude that
     performance satisfying these benchmarks would provide competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

167. Performance data from January 2000 to April 2000 demonstrate that
     SWBT consistently satisfies the Texas Commission's benchmark
     standards for timeliness of various

168. pre-order inquiries.[^440] Correspondingly, commenters have not
     argued that SWBT fails to provide timely responses to pre-ordering
     inquiries.

169. We further conclude that SWBT's interfaces are available in a
     stable and consistent manner, which affords an efficient competitor
     a meaningful opportunity to compete. SWBT reports the percentage of
     time its DataGate interface is available based on its "scheduled
     available hours."[^441] SWBT has satisfied the Texas Commission's
     benchmark of 99.5% availability for five of the last six
     months.[^442] The one exception was March 2000, where the DataGate
     interface was available 98.5% of the time. While interface outages
     may substantially inconvenience competing carriers and harm
     competition, we conclude that the March performance appears to be
     an isolated incident, when viewed against the backdrop of
     performance that consistently satisfies the Texas Commission's
     benchmark. Moreover, we note that commenters generally do not
     assert that SWBT's DataGate interface is unreliable.[^443]

170. *Access to Loop Qualification Information.* We find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop
     is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies.[^444] As
     discussed above, for the purposes of this proceeding, we evaluate
     whether SWBT is in compliance with the regulatory requirements in
     place on the date of its section 271 filing, and do not consider
     whether SWBT complies with the new loop qualification requirements
     that took effect on May 18, 2000.[^445] In this regard, as in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*,[^446] we will consider whether SWBT
     provides requesting carriers equivalent access to the loop
     qualification functionality that it provides to itself.

171. SWBT provides three avenues for competing carriers to obtain loop
     make-up information. First, SWBT provides carriers real-time
     electronic access, through the Verigate and DataGate interfaces, to
     its database containing "theoretical" loop make-up information that
     is based upon the standard loop design for the longest loop in the
     end user's distribution area.[^447] Second, for actual loop make-up
     information stored in SWBT's electronic systems, SWBT enables
     carriers to submit requests via fax or email. SWBT explains that
     its retail representatives request loop qualification information
     from SWBT operations via email as well.[^448] Third, to access loop
     make-up information that is not stored by SWBT in an electronic
     format, competing LECs may request a manual search of engineering
     records.[^449] Requests for a manual look-up are submitted via
     Verigate or DataGate directly to SWBT's engineering operations, and
     no longer involve SWBT's local service center ("LSC") as an
     intermediary. Once the manual search has been completed, the
     information will be updated in the mechanized loop qualification
     system, and the competing LEC will have the option of receiving the
     loop qualification results via email at this point, or may instead
     query the mechanized loop qualification system using Verigate or
     DataGate.[^450]

172. We find that these mechanized and manual processes provide
     competing carriers access to loop qualification functionality in
     substantially the same time an manner as SWBT's retail operations.
     Specifically, where loop make-up information resides in an
     electronic format within SWBT's systems and is accessible by SWBT's
     retail operations, SWBT enables competing LECs to request access to
     this information via the same channels as SWBT's retail
     operations.[^451] Where this information resides in engineering
     records, and is accessible by SWBT's retail operations only via a
     manual look-up, competing LECs also may request a manual look-up.
     Moreover, SWBT's performance data reflect that it provides
     responses to competing LEC requests for loop information in
     substantially the same time as for itself. In three of the last
     four months, SWBT has returned competing LEC loop qualification
     requests, on average, in less time than it takes to respond to
     requests from its retail operations.[^452]

173. We applaud the Texas Commission's ongoing efforts in resolving
     issues emerging from the Covad/Rhythms DSL arbitration in Texas,
     including issues relating to access to information used by carriers
     at the pre-ordering stage. Specifically, we note that the Texas
     Commission is overseeing implementation of the internal "firewall"
     that SWBT was required to establish under the Covad/Rhythms
     Arbitration Award as a means to ensure nondiscriminatory access to
     competitively significant information.[^453] SWBT has submitted
     several versions of its "firewall" plan and the Texas Commission
     has twice instructed SWBT to modify these plans.[^454] Most
     recently, on June 23, 2000, the Texas Commission required SWBT to
     make two minor adjustments to its latest "firewall" plan, which the
     Commission had previously approved on May 8, 2000.[^455] We
     disagree with Covad's suggestion that full compliance with this
     aspect of the Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award is a prerequisite of
     satisfying the competitive checklist.[^456] Indeed, in requiring
     SWBT to make modifications in its June 23, 2000 Order, the Texas
     Commission did not indicate that SWBT fails to provide competing
     carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification functionality
     it provides to itself. Rather, this modification indicates that the
     Texas Commission is still in the process of ensuring that SWBT
     "fully satisf\[ies\] the concerns" identified in the Covad/Rhythms
     Arbitration Award.[^457] As stated above, the evidence before us in
     the instant proceeding demonstrates that SWBT provides
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, in compliance with the statute
     and our rules.

#### Ordering

174. In this section we address SWBTs' ability to provide access to its
     OSS ordering functions to competing carriers. We conclude that,
     based on all the evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it
     provides nondiscriminatory access to its ordering systems in
     accordance with the requirements of section 271.

##### Discussion

175. We find that SWBT demonstrates, with performance data and other
     evidence, that it provides nondiscriminatory access to the key
     aspects of a BOC's ordering systems, as identified in our prior
     section 271 orders.[^458] Specifically, SWBT has shown that: (i) it
     is able to return timely order confirmation and rejection
     notices; (ii) its systems flow-through a high percentage of orders
     without manual handling, at a rate that is comparable overall to
     the flow-through rate for its retail services; (iii) the mechanized
     orders that do not flow-through are handled in a reasonably prompt
     and accurate manner; (iv) the mechanized and manual components of
     its ordering systems are scalable to accommodate increasing
     demand; (v) it provides jeopardy notices in a nondiscriminatory
     manner; and (vi) it provides timely order confirmation
     notices.[^459] Because most of these ordering functions lack a
     direct retail analogue, our standard of review is to determine
     whether SWBT's systems and performance allow an efficient carrier a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. For those functions of the
     ordering systems for which the Texas Commission has identified a
     retail analogue, we shall assess whether SWBT provides competing
     carriers with access to its OSS systems in substantially the same
     time and manner as it provides to its retail operations.

###### Order Confirmation Notices

176. We conclude that SWBT is providing timely order confirmation to
     competing LECs in Texas. The Commission, in prior section 271
     orders, has held that the functionality encompassed by order
     confirmation notices is a very important element of the ordering
     process, and that data demonstrating that they are provided in a
     timely manner is a key consideration for assessing whether
     competitors are allowed a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^460]
     We find that SWBT is providing timely order confirmation notices to
     competing LECs in Texas that use EDI and LEX for resale and UNE-P
     ordering. For both types of orders, SWBT has consistently met the
     Texas Commission's standard of returning 95% of confirmation
     notices within five hours of submission of the order (and within 24
     hours for complex business orders).[^461] These data indicate that,
     in only one month, April 2000, did SWBT's performance for EDI
     orders drop below the benchmark to 94.1 percent.[^462] Because this
     performance is barely below the benchmark, and because SWBT had
     satisfied the standard for the preceding seven straight months, we
     conclude that SWBT's performance in this area satisfies the
     nondiscrimination standard and provides competitors with a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^463]

177. We also conclude that SWBT's performance with respect to order
     confirmation notice timeliness for unbundled loop orders submitted
     electronically meets the nondiscrimination requirement. SWBT is
     required to report its performance in this area separately for
     orders submitted via EDI and those submitted via LEX, and also is
     required to divide loops into those ordered with a ported number,
     and those without, and a separate category for xDSL-capable loops.
     SWBT's performance with respect to stand-alone loops has been
     consistently above the 95 percent benchmark for the last five
     months, for both the EDI and LEX interfaces.[^464] Moreover, the
     average time to return confirmation notices for stand-alone loop
     orders generally has been under two hours for these months.[^465]
     The percentage of confirmation notices returned within five hours
     for orders of loops with a ported number also has been generally
     satisfactory, and has consistently been near or above the 95
     percent benchmark during the last three months.[^466] Finally, as
     discussed in more detail below in part V.D, we conclude that SWBT
     provides satisfactory performance for xDSL capable loop orders,
     returning 96 percent of order confirmation notices within 24 hours
     for orders submitted via EDI, and 94 percent within 24 hours for
     LEX orders.[^467]

178. Furthermore, we do not find that SWBT's order confirmation process
     itself is flawed, as urged by several commenters. ALTS/CLEC
     Coalition, for example, argues that SWBT sends an unacceptably high
     volume of jeopardies after sending an order confirmation notice,
     and that this is evidence that SWBT's systems send order
     confirmation notices prematurely, before fully checking on the
     availability of facilities and due dates.[^468] We conclude that
     there is insufficient evidence in the record to indicate that
     SWBT's process is discriminatory. Moreover, SWBT explains that it
     uses the same systems to check facilities availability for retail
     orders as it does for competing carriers' orders.[^469]
     Accordingly, we conclude that SWBT's system for returning order
     confirmation notices allows competing carriers a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

###### Reject Notices

179. We conclude that SWBT provides competing carriers with timely order
     rejection notices in a manner that allows competing LECs a
     reasonable opportunity to compete. SWBT provides carriers with two
     types of rejects: mechanically-generated reject notices, which are
     returned over the same interface used to submit the order, and
     manually-generated rejects, which are returned via a separate
     graphical user interface.[^470] SWBT's performance data
     demonstrates that it consistently has satisfied the Texas
     Commission's one-hour standard for timely return of
     mechanically-generated reject notices.[^471] Prompt return of these
     reject notices by SWBT minimizes delays associated with order
     rejections, and enables competing carriers to correct and resubmit
     these orders in a timely manner.

180. We also conclude that SWBT's performance with respect to
     manually-generated rejects satisfies the nondiscrimination
     standard. SWBT has returned manually-generated rejects, on average,
     in under eight hours for February, March, and April 2000, and its
     performance has shown improvement during this period even as
     overall order volumes have increased. [^472] We recognize that SWBT
     has satisfied the Texas Commission's strict five hour standard in
     this area only once in the last three months. We nonetheless
     conclude that SWBT's ability to return manually-generated rejects
     in an average of five to eight hours provides efficient competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete, particularly in light
     of the fact that most rejects are mechanically-generated and are
     returned in under an hour.[^473] Finally, we agree with SWBT that
     the long average processing time reported in December 1999 and
     January 2000 do not accurately

181. reflect average performance for live orders submitted in those
     months, and had little or no competitive impact.[^474]

182. We disagree with several commenters who suggest that SWBT's reject
     rate indicates that it fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     its ordering systems.[^475] We note that the Texas Commission did
     not establish a reject rate standard, and neither has this
     Commission previously engaged in a parity or direct benchmark
     analysis of a carrier's overall reject rate. We have, however,
     indicated that we will not hold a BOC accountable for rejects that
     occur for reasons within a competing LEC's control.[^476] As in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, we note that order rejections in
     this instance vary widely by individual carrier, from 10.8 percent
     to higher than 60 percent.[^477] We find that such a wide variation
     in the individual reject rates strongly implies that the care a
     competing carrier takes in submitting its orders makes a
     significant difference in the rate at which its orders are
     rejected. In light of this variation, we conclude that the overall
     reject rates faced by competing carriers in this instance on orders
     submitting via the EDI interface do not appear to indicate flaws in
     SWBT's OSS systems or processes.[^478]

183. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we note that some commenters
     argue that address-related rejects delay orders and impose
     additional costs on competing carriers, and are largely
     attributable to SWBT. Specifically, competing carriers argue that
     these unavoidable address-related rejects can be attributed to two
     causes: parsing/integration difficulties, and mismatches between
     SWBT's two primary address databases -- PREMIS and CRIS.[^479] As
     noted above, SWBT denies that any address-related rejects are
     related to parsing/integration difficulties. SWBT does not dispute,
     however, that some address-related rejects may be due to
     discrepancies between PREMIS and CRIS.[^480] Even assuming that
     some of the responsibility for address-related rejects may be
     attributed to SWBT, we do not find that competing carriers have
     been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to compete. Indeed,
     evidence in the record indicates that fewer than five percent of
     carriers' orders are rejected for address-related reasons, which
     suggests that, despite any address-related rejects, carriers have
     been largely successful in submitting their orders. In view of our
     finding that reject rates correlate to the care a carrier takes in
     submitting its orders, and given that the low level of
     address-related rejects in Texas does not deprive an efficient
     competitor of a meaningful opportunity to compete, we decline to
     further address carriers' numerous and specific claims regarding
     the nature and scope of address-related rejects in SWBT's systems.

184. We recognize that SWBT and several commenters agree that an order
     process enhancement implemented by SWBT in May 2000 -- the "TN
     Ordering" change -- will reduce the number of rejects.[^481]
     Specifically, this change obviates the need for carriers to list an
     end user's address on orders involving the migration of an end-user
     from retail or resale to UNE-P service. This provides us with
     additional assurances that competing LECs will be able to further
     reduce their reject rates and avoid the potentially time-consuming
     task of resolving address-related rejects. We note that this
     enhancement should be particularly beneficial to carriers such as
     WorldCom who plan to increase volumes considerably in offering
     service to the mass market.[^482] Although several carriers have
     expressed concern that the "TN Ordering" change will shift the
     burden of manually resolving database mismatches from competing
     LECs to SWBT (thus creating the potential for delays, if SWBT is
     unable to handle the workload), the evidence in the record does not
     indicate that the increased burden on SWBT will be
     substantial.[^483]

###### Flow-through Rate

185. In prior section 271 orders, the Commission used order
     "flow-through"[^484] as a potential indicator of a wide range of
     problems that we consider in determining whether a BOC provides
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.[^485] We have not considered
     flow-though rates as the sole indicia of parity, however, and thus
     have not limited our analysis of a BOC's ordering processes to a
     review of its flow-through performance data. Instead, we have held
     that factors such as a BOC's overall ability to return timely order
     confirmation and rejection notices, accurately process manually
     handled orders, and scale its systems are relevant and probative
     for analyzing a BOC's ability to provide access to its ordering
     functions in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^486] Moreover, we have
     consistently stated that a BOC is not accountable for orders that
     are rejected or fail to flow through due to competing carriers'
     mistakes.[^487]

186. We conclude that the flow-through rate reported by SWBT indicates
     that SWBT's systems are capable of achieving high overall levels of
     order flow-through.[^488] Specifically, SWBT reports a higher than
     96 percent flow-through rate for orders submitted via EDI.[^489] In
     other words, over 96 percent of EDI orders that are designed to
     flow through, and that are not rejected, are processed through the
     ordering systems without manual intervention. Even when considering
     all orders (and not just orders designed to flow-through), SWBT
     demonstrates that a high percentage of its orders are processed
     without manual intervention.[^490]

187. We disagree with commenters who argue that SWBT's performance with
     respect to flowing through UNE loop orders is inadequate.[^491] We
     recognize that additional data submitted by SWBT confirms that UNE
     loop orders flow through at a considerably lower rate than UNE-P or
     resale orders submitted via EDI. As noted above, however, the Texas
     Commission established a method of comparing retail and competing
     LEC flow-through rates in the aggregate (combining all resale and
     UNE orders), and SWBT has satisfied this level of performance.
     While we may conclude that failure to provide parity or benchmark
     performance for a single sub-category of service constitutes a
     failure to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS, we do not find
     this to be the case here with respect to flow-through. As we have
     stated in prior section 271 orders, a BOC's ability to return
     timely order confirmation and rejection notices, accurately process
     manually handled orders, and scale its systems is more relevant and
     probative for analyzing the BOC's ability to provide access to its
     ordering functions than a simple flow-through analysis. Indeed, as
     explained in this section, the record before us supports a finding
     that SWBT is able to perform these key ordering functions in a
     timely and accurate manner. We thus find that the relatively low
     flow-through rate for UNE-loop orders is not, in itself, an
     indication that competing carriers are denied nondiscriminatory
     access to SWBT's ordering systems and processes.

188. Several competing LECs assert that manual order processing by SWBT,
     including the manual creation of service orders, can inject errors
     into the process which causes delays and may lead to provisioning
     errors.[^492] Although SWBT does not provide performance data
     regarding the accuracy of orders created and handled manually by
     SWBT,[^493] evidence in the record indicates that SWBT has
     procedures in place to ensure the accuracy of these manual
     processes.[^494] In addition, Telcordia concluded that SWBT employs
     a "comprehensive approach for the detection and analysis of manual
     data entry errors, with a goal of reducing manual data entry
     errors."[^495] We also note that the performance data concerning
     trouble reports within 10 or 30 days of installation suggests that
     SWBT is provisioning orders accurately.[^496] Thus, while some
     commenters allege generally that orders are provisioned
     inaccurately, the evidence does not support a conclusion that such
     inaccuracies are attributable to processing errors by SWBT
     personnel. Moreover, we recognize that SWBT demonstrates a high
     overall flow-through rate, which necessarily means that relatively
     few mechanically-submitted orders will fall out for manual
     processing. Where an applicant is unable to demonstrate a high
     flow-through rate, and thus manual processing of mechanized orders
     is more common, we may require more extensive data with respect to
     this issue.

189. Finally, we disagree with commenters' contentions that,
     notwithstanding the relatively high flow-through rates and low
     overall level of manual processing, SWBT's OSS will be unable to
     accommodate reasonably foreseeable increases in commercial order
     volumes. We note that Telcordia tested the capacity of SWBT's OSS
     systems in July 1999 and determined that SWBT could handle
     projected first quarter 2000 volumes.[^497] This conclusion is
     generally supported by SWBT's performance data, which indicates
     that SWBT has maintained on-time performance for key functions
     notwithstanding steadily-increasing daily order volumes.[^498] We
     recognize, as AT&T points out, that SWBT employed a policy in
     January and February 2000 of manually processing only 500 of AT&T's
     orders per hour.[^499] We reject AT&T's assertion, however, that
     this policy indicates that SWBT is unable to handle reasonably
     foreseeable commercial order volumes. Indeed, SWBT explains that it
     instituted this policy in direct response to actions taken by AT&T.
     Specifically, for several days in January and February 2000, AT&T
     altered its normal practice of submitting orders on a real time
     basis, and instead saved its orders and submitted them all at once
     -- thus sending more than ten times its order volume in a single
     hour. [^500] SWBT states that, although AT&T's practice did not
     cause its systems to fail, its ability to process orders
     "efficient\[ly\]" was impeded.[^501] There is no evidence in the
     record indicating that SWBT's policy has impeded any carrier's
     ability to compete. Moreover, we note that AT&T no longer uses the
     ordering practice that triggered SWBT's policy.[^502] We thus find
     that SWBT's policy for processing AT&T's orders, under these
     circumstances and in light of these findings, was a reasonable
     method of ensuring that its ability to provide nondiscriminatory
     access to all competing carriers is not impaired, and is not a
     basis for finding that SWBT's OSS is not scalable.

###### Jeopardy Notices

190. We conclude that SWBT provides "jeopardy" notices (*i.e.,* notice
     that a service installation due date will be missed) to competing
     carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner. SWBT provides two types of
     jeopardy notifications to competing carriers. First, SWBT provides
     mechanized jeopardy notifications to competing carriers via LEX or
     EDI if it determines, after a service appointment is scheduled,
     that the necessary facilities are unavailable.[^503] SWBT explains
     that this "no facilities available" jeopardy notice is the only
     type of jeopardy notification it provides within its retail
     operations. SWBT provides a second type of electronic jeopardy
     notification in certain instances other than "no facilities
     available," and sends these notices over a web-based GUI. SWBT
     explains that these GUI jeopardies include, for example, instances
     where a dispatch technician is unable to access an end user's
     property or discovers that additional driving instructions are
     needed.[^504] SWBT states that there is no retail equivalent for
     this second type of jeopardy notice.

191. We conclude that SWBT provides "no facilities" jeopardy notices to
     competing carriers and to its own operations in the same time and
     manner. SWBT demonstrates that it utilizes the same databases and
     returns the notices real-time using the electronic ordering
     interface used to submit the order.[^505] Commenters do not provide
     any indication that these "no facilities" electronic jeopardy
     notices are not created and returned promptly after SWBT determines
     that facilities are unavailable. We also conclude that SWBT's
     process for returning other jeopardy notifications via GUI provides
     efficient carriers with a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^506]
     We disagree with carriers who suggest that flaws in SWBT's jeopardy
     process -- specifically, that too many orders receive jeopardies
     and that jeopardies are sent too late in the ordering process --
     deny carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^507] First, the
     record does not support carriers' claims that SWBT returns an
     unreasonably high number of jeopardy notifications. SWBT has
     submitted data indicating that less than five percent of all
     carriers' orders result in the issuance of jeopardy notices.[^508]
     While we recognize that jeopardies may lead to delays in the
     ordering process, the record does not indicate that competing
     carriers' customers feel the impact of such delays in Texas.
     Moreover, SWBT is held accountable, through its performance
     measurements, for instances where SWBT-caused jeopardy situations
     result in missed due dates. As discussed below in section V, SWBT
     misses fewer due dates for competing LECs than it does for its own
     retail operations, across almost all categories of service.

192. Carriers also contend that SWBT's "GUI" jeopardies include errors
     that should have been identified earlier in the ordering process,
     before an order confirmation notice is returned and before a due
     date is established.[^509] We note, however, that many of the "GUI"
     jeopardies reflect circumstances that could only be detected at the
     provisioning stage -- such as a situation where a technician is
     unable to access the end user's premises, or requires additional
     driving directions. Moreover, we agree with SWBT that carriers may
     seek process changes to implement additional up-front edits, where
     possible, to reduce the number of jeopardies received by competing
     LECs.[^510]

###### Completion Notices

193. We conclude that SWBT provides order completion notification in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^511] In this case, SWBT has not
     indicated whether it provides completion notification information
     to its retail operations. The Texas Commission did not identify a
     retail analogue, but instead established a benchmark against which
     SWBT's performance in this area is to be compared.[^512] We accept
     the Texas Commission's approach and will assess whether SWBT
     provides completion notification sufficient to allow an efficient
     competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^513] We have
     recognized that such a notice can play the crucial role of
     informing the carrier that it can begin billing the customer for
     service and addressing any maintenance problems experienced by the
     customer.[^514] The timely provision of

194. such notices thus can directly impact a competing carrier's ability
     to serve its customers at the same level of quality that SWBT
     provides to its retail customers.

195. We base our finding that SWBT provides sufficient order completion
     notification on SWBT's provision on "Service Order Completion"
     notices to competing carriers. The Texas Commission established a
     performance standard requiring SWBT to return 97 percent of
     completion notices within one day of work completion.[^515] SWBT
     has satisfied this standard for each of the last three months for
     orders submitted via EDI.[^516] SWBT's performance for LEX orders
     has not met the Texas Commission's standard for these months, but
     has been improving and was only 0.2 percent below the benchmark in
     April 2000.[^517] Moreover, considering EDI and LEX orders
     together, SWBT's performance exceeded 97 percent in April 2000.
     Based on the level of overall performance, and the steady
     improvement in LEX performance, we agree with the Texas Commission
     that SWBT's provision of completion notices allows competing LECs a
     reasonable opportunity to compete.[^518] Finally, although AT&T
     argues that SWBT's performance with respect to AT&T's UNE loop
     orders is lower than these aggregate figures, we do not find that
     this demonstrates a systemic problem with SWBT's OSS or that
     competing carriers are denied a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^519]

###### Other Issues

196. *LIDB.* We conclude that SWBT enables carriers to update customer
     information contained in SWBT's Line Information Database ("LIDB")
     in substantially the same time and manner as its retail operations.
     LIDB contains end user information that is used to enable calling
     card and collect calls, information used for branding operator and
     directory assistance calls, and also customers' interLATA and
     intraLATA PIC.[^520] SWBT provides carriers two ways to update LIDB
     records: first, a carrier may use the initial LSR requesting
     service to trigger a LIDB update; and second, where a carrier must
     update LIDB records for an existing customer, updates may be
     batched and submitted to SWBT via one of two electronic
     interfaces.[^521]

197. WorldCom asserts that SWBT's "LSR" process for updating carriers'
     LIDB records is flawed. Specifically, based on its initial
     experience in sending live orders, WorldCom reports that SWBT
     consistently fails to complete the LIDB updates in a prompt and
     accurate manner.[^522] While we share the concern expressed by the
     Department of Justice on this issue,[^523] we conclude that the
     record does not support a finding that SWBT fails to provide a
     mechanism for updating LIDB records in a nondiscriminatory manner.
     As an initial matter, we note that there is no indication that
     these particular LIDB updating errors actually harmed WorldCom's
     customers in any way.[^524] Furthermore, SWBT explains that the
     delays and incorrect updates identified by WorldCom were caused by
     a particular type of manual error committed by SWBT
     personnel.[^525] SWBT states that it has resolved this problem,
     having retrained its LSC representatives and implemented other
     safeguards to protect against a recurrence of these mistakes.[^526]
     We rely on SWBT's assertion that it has correctly identified the
     root cause of this problem, and thus expect that the changes SWBT
     has implemented remedy the problem and essentially eliminate errors
     in processing LIDB updates. If a carrier were to demonstrate, in
     the future, that SWBT continues to cause LIDB records to be updated
     incorrectly or late, and that

198. these problems are competitively harmful, SWBT may be subject to
     enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).[^527]

199. *Posting Process.* We also conclude that SWBT "posts" competing
     LECs' orders to its billing systems in a manner that gives
     efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. This
     "posting" process involves establishing the end user's new billing
     relationship and, for orders involving the transfer of an existing
     customer from SWBT to a competing carrier, it also involves
     terminating the existing billing relationship. The Texas Commission
     has established a performance metric to measure the percentage of
     competing carriers' orders posted to SWBT's billing systems prior
     to the competing carrier's next bill period, and compares SWBT's
     performance in this area for competing carriers to its performance
     in posting orders on the retail side.[^528] According to the
     performance data, SWBT has consistently posted over 98 percent of
     carriers' orders to its billing systems in time for the next
     billing cycle.[^529] While commenters note that SWBT's performance
     was slightly out-of-parity in the first two months of this year,
     they do not establish that the slight difference reflected in the
     performance data is competitively significant or reflects a
     systemic problem in SWBT's OSS.[^530] We thus conclude that SWBT
     provides nondiscriminatory performance in this area.

200. Several carriers nonetheless complain that double billing has
     occurred in isolated instances, and that they are harmed by such
     billing mistakes.[^531] The Commission previously has found that
     double billing, which results from failure to terminate promptly
     the BOC's existing billing relationship, is compelling evidence
     that a BOC's OSS for ordering and provisioning of wholesale
     services is not operationally ready.[^532] SWBT has established
     procedures for automatically updating its billing systems -- and
     manual processes to attend to orders that do not update
     properly.[^533] The Texas Commission concluded that SWBT has
     adequate billing processes in place which minimize the likelihood
     of double billing.[^534] While we do not discount the potential
     harm of double-billing on affected customers, there is insufficient
     evidence of double billing in this instance to indicate that SWBT's
     systems process for updating its billing records is discriminatory.

201. *Loss Notification Reports.* AT&T also reports that it recently has
     discovered instances in which SWBT fails to provide timely "loss
     notification reports," which signal competing carriers that a
     customer has migrated to another LEC.[^535] AT&T explains that this
     failure caused it improperly to continue billing 99 customers in
     April 2000 who apparently had switched to back to SWBT or to
     another LEC. We note that AT&T is entitled to receive these loss
     notification reports pursuant to its interconnection agreement with
     SWBT, which sets out in detail the procedure by which AT&T is able
     to request these reports.[^536] While we recognize that failure to
     provide loss notification reports may impact customers and impede a
     competitive carriers' ability to compete, we also recognize that
     AT&T does not indicate whether it has registered to receive these
     reports as necessary under the interconnection agreement. There is
     thus no basis for finding that SWBT has failed to follow the loss
     notification procedures contained in its interconnection agreement,
     or is otherwise at fault for these missing loss notification
     reports. Also, because no other carrier suggests that SWBT fails to
     provide these notices, there is nothing to suggest that this is a
     systemic problem. We reject AT&T's claim, then, that these
     circumstances warrant a finding that SWBT has failed to provide
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.

#### Provisioning

202. In this section we conclude that, overall, SWBT provisions
     competing LEC customers' orders for resale and UNE-P services in
     substantially the same time and manner as it provisions orders for
     its own retail customers.[^537] Consistent with our approach in
     prior section 271 orders, we examine SWBT's provisioning processes,
     as well as its performance with respect to provisioning timeliness
     (*i.e.,* missed due dates and average installation intervals) and
     provisioning quality (*i.e.,* service problems experienced at the
     provisioning stage).[^538] We note, however, that SWBT's electronic
     processes for provisioning UNE-P orders may falter when handling
     orders that contain address-related discrepancies that are not
     resolved by SWBT's front-end edits. SWBT concedes that mismatched
     addresses can disrupt the normal order process flow, but indicates
     that its process for manually catching and correcting such errors
     are adequate to minimize the occurrence of service outage. We note
     that customer-affecting problems arising from these address
     discrepancies appear to be rare, and conclude that these process
     failures, standing alone, do not warrant a finding that SWBT fails
     to provide nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning functions.

203. *Provisioning Processes.* Based on the evidence in the record, we
     conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory
     access to its provisioning processes. Specifically, we find that
     SWBT provides competitive LECs and its retail operations with
     equivalent access to information on available service installation
     dates.[^539] For orders that do not require a dispatch technician
     to complete, SWBT asserts that it makes available the same set of
     standard provisioning intervals for competing carriers and its
     retail representatives.[^540] "Dispatch" orders, on the other hand,
     are routed to SWBT's provisioning systems and assigned a technician
     in the same manner as SWBT retail orders requiring a
     technician.[^541] We also find that SWBT's processes provide
     requesting carriers with the same level of confidence as its own
     retail operations that the due date promised to customers will be
     the actual due date that the BOC assigns to the order when it is
     processed.[^542]

204. We conclude that SWBT provisions orders for resale "POTS" and
     "specials" to competitors in substantially the same time and manner
     that it provisions equivalent orders to itself. Specifically, SWBT
     provides performance data showing that it provisions resale service
     at parity with its own retail operations. First, SWBT demonstrates
     that it misses fewer competitive LEC customer appointments for
     installing resale POTS and special services, and provisions such
     service within equivalent average intervals, compared to
     appointments and service for its own retail customers.[^543]
     Second, SWBT demonstrates that the quality of installations
     provided to competitors' customers is very close to parity, or
     above parity, compared to similar work performed for its own retail
     customers.[^544] We further note that the Texas Commission
     concludes, based on this performance data, that SWBT provisions
     resale services in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^545]

205. Based on a review of corresponding performance measurements for
     UNE-P service, we conclude that SWBT also provisions competing LEC
     orders for these network combinations in the same time and manner
     as it provisions equivalent retail services. Specifically, the
     record evidence demonstrates that SWBT is meeting the service
     installation dates for competitive LEC customers at higher rates
     than for its own retail customers, and completes these competing
     LECs' orders, on average, in less time than it completes analogous
     retail orders.[^546] SWBT's performance data also indicates that it
     provisions UNE-P orders at generally the same level of quality
     (*i.e.,* with a comparably low level of troubles reported within
     the first ten days after installation) as it provisions analogous
     retail service.[^547] Specifically, while SWBT reported slightly
     more installation-related troubles associated with UNE-P orders
     requiring no field work than for analogous retail orders in
     February 2000, it reported better than parity performance for March
     and April 2000.[^548] We also note that SWBT's performance with
     respect to UNE-P orders requiring field work reflects an
     installation-related trouble rate than is very slightly higher than
     the analogous retail rate.[^549] We conclude that this level of
     disparity is minimal, however, and does not indicate that SWBT
     fails to provision competing LEC orders in the same time and manner
     as its own.

206. *Address Discrepancies and Service Outages.* Evidence submitted by
     SWBT and various commenters indicates that the normal order flow
     may be disrupted if a UNE-P order contains an address discrepancy
     that is not detected during the initial editing process.[^550]
     Specifically, SWBT uses a "three order process" under which it
     splits a carrier's LSR into three separate sub-orders, each of
     which performs different tasks -- such as provisioning and billing
     functions -- in SWBT's back office systems. SWBT explains that it
     populates one of the orders with the address submitted by the
     competing LEC, and takes the address for the remaining two orders
     from one of its internal address databases. If these addresses are
     not exactly consistent (and SWBT has explained scenarios where they
     may not be consistent),[^551] SWBT's process for automatically
     relating these three service orders fails and the three orders
     become "disassociated."[^552] SWBT explains that one of these
     disassociated orders will act as a "disconnect" order and cut off
     the customer's dial tone unless SWBT promptly intervenes and
     manually reunites the three orders.[^553] SWBT does not dispute
     that the potential exists for order disassociation leading to
     service outage, but explains that it has implemented a manual
     process to monitor for disassociated orders, which enables it to
     manually re-associate orders and prevent outages.[^554]

207. We conclude, based on evidence submitted by SWBT and commenting
     parties, that service outages attributable to problems with the
     "three order process" are very rare, and thus do not warrant a
     finding that SWBT fails to provision UNE-P orders in substantially
     the same time and manner as it provisions equivalent retail
     services. We recognize that the Texas Commission has reviewed
     allegations and evidence of UNE-P outages and concluded that the
     occurrence of such outages is "minimal."[^555] We agree with the
     Texas Commission in this matter: evidence submitted by carriers in
     this proceeding indicates that, at present, service outages
     associated with UNE-P conversions are relatively infrequent, and
     thus does not lead us to a different conclusion. We recognize that
     one commenter alleges that 5.6 percent of UNE-P orders experience a
     loss of service at installation, and another claims a 2.8 percent
     outage rate.[^556] SWBT disputes these figures, however, and offers
     evidence indicating that, for these two carriers, the occurrence of
     outages resulting from errors in its OSS was actually less than one
     percent.[^557] While it is difficult to resolve conclusively these
     disputed claims, we find that SWBT's evidence, along with the prior
     determination of the Texas Commission, sufficiently refutes these
     claims. If, however, such outages rise to a level that impedes a
     carrier's opportunity to compete, we will take appropriate
     enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).

208. In addition, we note that several commenters raise other complaints
     about problems which they attribute to the three-order process. The
     CLEC Coalition, for example, blames imperfections in SWBT's
     three-order process for other service-affecting problems such as
     "loss of long distance service, loss of vertical features, loss of
     outbound calling, double billing and inability to call certain
     local numbers."[^558] While we do not discount the impact such
     problems would have on customers, we find that commenters did not
     document some of these problems, while others appear to be
     infrequent. We thus conclude that these problems do not warrant a
     finding that SWBT fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to its
     provisioning systems and processes. Finally, several commenters,
     including CompTel, argue that the "three order process" is
     inherently discriminatory, as it unlawfully splits already-combined
     elements apart and puts them back together.[^559] We disagree with
     this characterization of SWBT's three-order process -- SWBT does
     not require carriers to order or pay for the network elements
     separately, nor does SWBT physically separate and reassemble the
     network elements. SWBT has explained that the three orders simply
     correspond to different functions that must be completed in its
     back office systems.

#### Maintenance & Repair

209. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to maintenance and repair OSS functions.
     First, we find that SWBT has deployed the necessary interfaces,
     systems, and personnel to enable requesting carriers to access the
     same maintenance and repair functions that SWBT provides to itself.
     We then conclude that SWBT's systems allow carriers to access those
     functions in substantially the same time and manner as SWBT's
     retail operations. We further find that SWBT restores service to
     customers of competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner as it restores service to its own customers. Finally, we
     conclude that SWBT performs maintenance and repair work for
     customers of competing carriers at substantially the same level of
     quality that it provides to its own customers.

##### Background

210. As part of its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS functions, SWBT must provide requesting carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair
     systems.[^560] A competing carrier that provides service through
     resale or unbundled network elements remains dependent upon the
     incumbent LEC for maintenance and repair. Because SWBT performs
     analogous maintenance and repair functions for its retail
     operations, it must provide competing carriers access that enables
     them to perform maintenance and repair functions "in substantially
     the same time and manner" as SWBT provides its retail
     customers.[^561] Equivalent access ensures that competing carriers
     can assist customers experiencing service disruptions using the
     same network information and diagnostic tools that are available to
     SWBT personnel.[^562] Without equivalent access, a competing
     carrier would be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage,
     as its customer would perceive a problem with SWBT's network as a
     problem with the competing carrier's own network.[^563]

##### Discussion

211. *Functionality.* We conclude that SWBT offers maintenance and
     repair interfaces and systems that enable a requesting carrier to
     access all the same functions that are available to SWBT's retail
     representatives. SWBT provides competing carriers with several
     options for requesting maintenance and reporting troubles.
     Competing carriers may electronically access SWBT's maintenance and
     repair functions for UNE-Loop, UNE-Platform, and resale through the
     Graphical User Interface Toolbar Trouble Administration interface
     (Toolbar) or the application-to-application Electronic Bonding
     Trouble Administration interface (EBTA).[^564] Both the EBTA and
     Toolbar interfaces flow directly into SWBT's back-end OSS systems
     and enable competing carriers to perform the same functions, in the
     same manner, that SWBT's retail operations perform.[^565] SWBT also
     offers requesting carriers non-electronic access to its maintenance
     and repair functions through the SWBT Local Operations Center
     (LOC).[^566] The LOC handles all competing carrier repair and
     maintenance requests for UNEs, resale, and interconnection.[^567]

212. WorldCom complains that it is precluded from accessing SWBT's EBTA
     interface for a new customer until that customer's order has posted
     to SWBT's wholesale billing systems.[^568] Without this ability,
     WorldCom notes that it cannot use EBTA to submit trouble tickets or
     perform loop tests on the day service is provisioned, and possibly
     for several days thereafter. WorldCom has the option of using the
     Toolbar interface for these installation-related trouble
     situations, or may call SWBT's Local Operations Center ("LOC") to
     report troubles in such circumstances.[^569] While reliance on
     these alternative means of accessing SWBT's maintenance and repair
     OSS undermines the efficiency and convenience of using EBTA, we
     conclude that these alternative processes are adequate and enable
     carriers that rely on EBTA to access SWBT's OSS in substantially
     the same time and manner as SWBT retail.[^570] In addition, SWBT
     reports that, as of June 20, 2000, it has lifted this restriction
     on access to EBTA, thereby enabling WorldCom to submit trouble
     tickets on the completion date prior to posting of the order.[^571]
     We expect that SWBT will implement this change for other carriers
     using EBTA as well.

213. *Interface Response Times.* We further conclude that SWBT's
     maintenance and repair interfaces and systems process trouble
     inquiries from competing carriers in substantially the same time
     and manner as SWBT processes inquiries concerning its own retail
     customers.[^572] To compete effectively in the local exchange
     market, competing carriers must be able to diagnose and process
     customer trouble complaints with substantially the same speed and
     accuracy that SWBT diagnoses and processes complaints from its
     retail customers. A slower process can lead to customer perception
     that the competing carrier is a less efficient service provider
     than the BOC. SWBT has provided evidence of the transaction times
     for its Toolbar interfaces that indicates it responds to competing
     carrier requests for maintenance and repair inquiries in
     substantially the same time as it does for itself. [^573] Moreover,
     we note that no commenter has asserted otherwise.

214. *Time to Restore*. We conclude that SWBT repairs reported troubles
     competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner that
     it repairs troubles reported by its own customers. The Commission
     has stressed that a BOC is obligated to repair troubles for a
     customer of a requesting carrier in substantially the same time
     that it takes to repair problems experienced by its own
     customers.[^574] For example, because a reliable telephone line may
     be crucial for a business customer to conduct its business, the
     Commission has emphasized the importance of timely resolution of
     trouble reports from a competing carrier's business
     customers.[^575]

215. We base our finding of nondiscriminatory restoration time on SWBT's
     performance data. SWBT's performance data for December 1999 through
     April 2000 indicates that, for both resale and unbundled network
     elements, SWBT repaired troubles reported by customers of competing
     carriers, on average, in substantially the same time that it
     repaired troubles reported by its own retail customers.[^576] In
     addition to SWBT's performance with respect to average restoration
     intervals, we note that SWBT is able to meet a comparable number of
     repair commitments for competing carriers (in the "resale POTS" and
     "UNE-P" service categories) as for its own customers.[^577] This
     level of performance is substantial evidence that SWBT responds to
     trouble reports and restores service in substantially the same time
     and manner for competing carriers as for itself. Accordingly, we
     find that the performance measurements provide compelling evidence
     that SWBT responds to competitors' trouble complaints in
     substantially the same time and manner that it responds to its own
     customers' complaints.

216. The one service category for which SWBT has not consistently
     performed repair functions for competing LECs and its retail
     operations in substantially the same time and manner is resale
     specials -- particularly SWBT's resold Voice Grade Private Line
     service and ISDN products.[^578] SWBT's performance data indicates
     that, for these two services, SWBT generally has taken two or three
     hours longer to perform repairs for competing LEC customers than
     for its own customers.[^579] In this instance, however, we conclude
     that this difference in repair time is not competitively
     significant because it is so slight. In addition, we view these two
     performance measurements in the context of SWBT's strong overall
     maintenance and repair performance for resale services (described
     above). We thus conclude that SWBT's performance with respect to
     these two service offerings does not indicate that SWBT fails to
     repair troubles in substantially the same time and manner for
     retail and wholesale customers.

217. *Quality of Work Performed.* We also find that SWBT demonstrates
     that it performs maintenance and repair work for customers of
     competing carriers at the same level of quality as it performs for
     its retail customers. A competing carrier's customer may become
     dissatisfied if the customer experiences frequent service problems,
     especially repeated troubles. In determining the quality of
     maintenance and repair work performed by SWBT for competing
     carriers, we examine the rate of trouble reported by customers of
     competing carriers as compared with SWBT's own retail customers, as
     well as the rate of repeat reports of trouble. SWBT's performance
     data reveals that competing carriers' customers generally reported
     the same or lower rate of troubles, for both resold services and
     UNE-P, as SWBT's retail customers.[^580] Similarly, performance
     data on the rate of *repeat* trouble reports submitted by competing
     carriers are generally lower than for SWBT's retail
     customers.[^581] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that SWBT
     provides nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair
     functions.

#### Billing

218. We conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     billing functions, based on an assessment of its billing processes
     and its Texas performance data. Competing carriers need access to
     billing information to provide accurate and timely bills to their
     customers.[^582] SWBT is obligated to provide competing carriers
     with complete and accurate reports on the service usage of
     competing carriers' customers in substantially the same time and
     manner that SWBT provides such information to itself. To do so,
     SWBT provides competing carriers with billing information through
     the Usage Extract process and carrier bills.[^583] The Usage
     Extract itemizes usage records for competing carrier customers,
     while carrier bills serve as a monthly invoice that incorporates
     charges for all of the products and services provided to a
     competing carrier by SWBT. Similar mechanisms are used to provide
     billing information to SWBT's retail operations.[^584]

219. We find that the performance standards and measurements established
     by the Texas Commission and developed in conjunction with SWBT and
     competing carriers are appropriate measures of SWBT's ability to
     provide competing carriers with usage data in substantially the
     same time and manner that SWBT provides such information to
     itself.[^585] SWBT's performance data indicate that, during the
     period from December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT's actual commercial
     performance consistently satisfied these standards for usage data
     timeliness and accuracy.[^586] The one exception occurred in
     February 2000, when SWBT returned only 91.3 percent of daily usage
     feed records within six days, falling short of the 95 percent
     standard.[^587] SWBT explains that its performance in this month
     was affected by the one-time recovery and return of "missing
     records" from September, October and November 1999.[^588] We
     recognize that lost records, and even late records, can cause
     direct financial harm to competing carriers. In this instance,
     however, we note that SWBT claims to have fixed the underlying
     problem,[^589] and further note that carriers do not dispute that
     the problem has been fixed. Based on these factors, and because
     SWBT's performance was satisfactory for the two preceding and two
     subsequent months, we conclude that SWBT does not discriminate in
     the provision of usage feeds to competing carriers.

220. Although several commenters complain that SWBT's performance with
     respect to wholesale bills is inadequate, the record does not
     indicate that SWBT's performance in this area deprives carriers a
     reasonable opportunity to compete. As noted by the National ALEC
     Association and other commenters, we recognize that SWBT has failed
     to satisfy the standard for timeliness of wholesale bills sent to
     resellers for three of the last five months.[^590] SWBT offers a
     separate explanations for each failure, suggesting that unique
     one-time occurrences caused the disparate results, and that the
     incident in March also delayed SWBT's own retail bills.[^591]
     Commenters have not disputed SWBT's explanations, and we recognize
     that SWBT reported 100 percent on-time performance for February and
     April 2000. AT&T further complains that SWBT does not report
     whether it provides timely "wholesale bills" for its UNE-P
     orders.[^592] Neither AT&T, nor any other competing LEC (other than
     the resellers discussed above) suggests that it actually receives
     such bills late or has been harmed by late bills. While we do not
     minimize the importance to carriers of receiving wholesale bills in
     a timely manner, the record does not reflect that carriers,
     overall, are not receiving wholesale bills in a timely manner. We
     thus conclude that SWBT does not discriminate against competing
     carriers in the provision of wholesale bills.

### UNE Combinations and Other Issues

221. In this section, we conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory
     access to combinations of unbundled network elements. We also
     reject allegations that SWBT imposes unreasonable and
     discriminatory restrictions on certain types of combinations.
     Finally, we reject allegations that SWBT places restrictions on
     intellectual property associated with UNEs that contravene its
     obligations under the Act.

#### Background

222. In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a BOC
     must show that it is offering "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to
     network elements in accordance with the requirements of section
     251(c)(3) . . . ."[^593] Section 251(c)(3) requires an incumbent
     LEC to "provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . .
     nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
     at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory . . . ."[^594]
     Section 251(c)(3) of the Act also requires incumbent LECs to
     provide unbundled network elements in a manner that allows
     requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide a
     telecommunications service.[^595]

223. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission emphasized that
     the ability of requesting carriers to use unbundled network
     elements, as well as combinations of unbundled network elements, is
     integral to achieving Congress' objective of promoting competition
     in local telecommunications markets.[^596] Using combinations of
     unbundled network elements provides a competitor with the incentive
     and ability to package and market services in ways that differ from
     the BOCs' existing service offerings in order to compete in the
     local telecommunications market.[^597] Moreover, combining the
     incumbent's unbundled network elements with their own facilities
     encourages facilities-based competition and allows competing
     providers to provide a wide array of competitive choices.[^598]
     Because the use of combinations of unbundled network elements is an
     important strategy for entry into the local telecommunications
     market, as well as an obligation under the requirements of section
     271, we examine section 271 applications to determine whether
     competitive carriers are able to combine network elements as
     required by the Act and the Commission's regulations.[^599]

#### Discussion

##### Combinations of Unbundled Network Elements

224. Based on the evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it
     provides requesting telecommunications carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements (UNEs) at
     any technically feasible point. We also conclude that SWBT provides
     access to UNEs in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
     combine those elements, and that SWBT provides access to
     preexisting combinations of network elements. We base our
     conclusion on evidence of actual commercial usage, and also on
     SWBT's legal obligation to provide such access as established in
     the T2A.

225. The record indicates that SWBT, as required by the Texas
     Commission, provides a variety of methods that allow competitive
     carriers to combine unbundled network elements. For example, in
     addition to the standard physical and virtual collocation
     arrangements, SWBT provides alternative collocation arrangements
     such as shared collocation cages, common cage, and cageless
     collocation arrangements.[^600] Where space for physical
     collocation is not available, SWBT also permits competing LECs to
     collocate their equipment in adjacent controlled environmental
     vaults or huts. Moreover, competitive LECs may request other
     technically feasible methods of combining UNEs that are consistent
     with the provisions of the 1996 Act and other governing statutes
     and decisions. [^601] For example, SWBT will provide interested
     competitive LECs access to a secured frame room (or cabinet, where
     space constraints require) that is set aside for accomplishing the
     necessary connections.[^602]

226. The record also indicates that SWBT provides access to combinations
     of network elements in compliance with our UNE rules. [^603] SWBT
     has a legal obligation, under certain existing interconnection
     agreements and the T2A to provide access to preassembled
     combinations of network elements, including the loop-switch port
     platform combination (known as the UNE platform or UNE-P) and the
     Enhanced Extended Loop (EEL), a combination of loop and transport
     facilities.[^604]

227. We disagree with arguments of several competing carriers that
     SWBT's ordering process for UNE-P is *per se* discriminatory and
     violates rule 315(b)'s prohibition against separating individual
     network elements that are already combined.[^605] These parties
     assert that rather than migrating pre-existing combinations of
     elements "as is," SWBT's ordering process functionally disconnects
     the existing service configuration in the switch and replaces it
     with a new configuration established by the competitive LEC's local
     service request. According to these parties, SWBT's "three-order"
     process results in service outages and disruptions for their
     customers, negatively impacting the competitive carriers' ability
     to compete in the local market.[^606]

228. Rule 315(b) forbids an incumbent LEC from separating network
     elements that are already combined to provide a service.[^607] SWBT
     is not separating network elements in this context. Instead, SWBT
     engages in a billing software change in order to establish service
     on behalf of a competitive LEC. In particular, for SWBT to migrate
     a customer to a requesting carrier using the UNE platform, it must
     enter a software change that instructs its systems that the
     customer no longer belongs to SWBT, identifies the new provider for
     that customer, and changes billing instructions accordingly. We
     find that SWBT's ordering process that converts its retail customer
     to a requesting carrier's UNE platform customer through a software
     change does not involve separation of combined network elements,
     and therefore is not prohibited by rule 315(b).

229. For the same reason, we find that SWBT's ordering process is not
     *per se* discriminatory. The record shows that SWBT's ordering
     system is designed to link orders to flow through its systems
     together. Thus, if SWBT's ordering process operates as SWBT claims
     it is intended to operate, the three orders would be processed
     simultaneously and the change would be imperceptible to the
     end-user customer. As described in the OSS section *supra,* SWBT is
     providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS ordering functions as
     evidenced by its performance data. Therefore, we conclude that SWBT
     is meeting its statutory obligation of providing nondiscriminatory
     access regardless of the specific type of ordering process it has
     chosen to implement.

230. Finally, we note that the Department of Justice expressed concern
     about two recent "disturbing allegations" by competing LECs
     regarding limitations on the availability of UNE-P.[^608] Based on
     our review of these allegations and evidence in the record, we
     conclude that SWBT satisfies its statutory obligation to provide
     access to UNE-P on a nondiscriminatory basis. First, AT&T alleges
     that SWBT refuses to provide "fiber-to-the-curb" lines originating
     from a central office in Richardson, Texas to competitive LECs on a
     UNE-P basis, making them available only on a resale basis.[^609]
     While SWBT concedes that some orders for UNE-P over
     "fiber-to-the-curb" architecture were improperly rejected, it
     states that it completed other orders and that the improper
     rejections have not recurred since February 2000.[^610] Moreover,
     SWBT explains that these rejections resulted from mistakes made by
     individual personnel and do not reflect its official policy. SWBT
     also submitted copies of internal procedures for completing such
     orders.[^611]

231. Second, Global Crossing alleges that SWBT has "stonewalled" Global
     Crossing's request to convert its resale customers in Texas to
     UNE-P service.[^612] We have previously stated that we will not
     withhold section 271 authorization on the basis of isolated
     instances of alleged unfair dealing or discrimination under the
     Act.[^613] In this instance, we do not find that the incident cited
     by Global Crossing constitutes a pattern of discriminatory conduct
     or undermines our overall conclusion that SWBT provides
     nondiscriminatory access to combinations of network elements.[^614]
     Moreover, we note that SWBT now acknowledges that "resale-to-UNE-P
     conversions" are covered by Global Crossing/Frontier's current
     interconnection agreement in Texas, and SWBT suggests that it is
     willing to resolve this issue promptly.[^615]

##### Access to the Enhanced Extended Link

232. Section 251(c)(3) of the Act imposes on incumbent LECs such as SWBT
     the obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled
     network elements.[^616] AT&T and other commenters assert that SWBT
     places unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions on a
     combination of the loop and transport network elements (also known
     as an enhanced extended link or "EEL") in violation of this
     statutory requirement.[^617] We disagree.

233. In a further notice of proposed rulemaking that accompanied the
     *UNE Remand Order,* we requested comment on the legal and policy
     implications of allowing interexchange carriers to gain access to
     the EEL solely for the purpose of providing special access to their
     customers at UNE-based rates, thereby avoiding an incumbent LEC's
     tariffed special access service.[^618] We were specifically
     concerned that such access would imperil the universal service
     subsidies implicit in the access services provided by incumbent
     LECs.[^619] In our *Supplemental Order* in the same proceeding, we
     exercised our authority to protect universal service during periods
     of regulatory transition by issuing a substantive rule temporarily
     conditioning an interexchange carrier's access to the EEL on the
     interexchange carrier's provision of a significant amount of local
     exchange service, in addition to exchange access service, to given
     customers.[^620]

234. On June 2, 2000, we clarified and extended that interim measure in
     a *Supplemental Order Clarification,* establishing safe harbor
     guidelines for what constitutes a "significant amount of local
     exchange service." [^621] In that order, we explained that, in
     addition to the universal service concerns underlying the
     *Supplemental Order* itself, we had not conducted an "impairment"
     analysis under section 251(d)(2) specifically addressing a
     carrier's access to the EEL for purposes of competing in the
     exchange access market.[^622] The need for such an analysis, we
     observed, was particularly important in light of the Supreme
     Court's recent invalidation of our previous implementation of the
     "impairment" standard as insufficiently rigorous.[^623] We found
     that we needed additional time to complete that empirical inquiry,
     and we explained that incumbent LECs have no statutory obligation
     to provide the EEL solely or primarily for use in the exchange
     access market unless and until we exercise our legislative
     rulemaking authority under section 251(d)(2) to impose that
     obligation.[^624] We specifically rejected, on the basis of our
     long-standing experience in this area, the contention that this
     temporary constraint on access to the EEL would enable incumbent
     LECs to engage in "price squeezes" or other anticompetitive conduct
     once they enter the long-distance market.[^625]

235. We disagree with WorldCom's claim that SWBT has imposed
     discriminatory and unreasonable restrictions on access to
     EELs.[^626] WorldCom points to three requirements that SWBT places
     on access to EELs: (1) collocation; (2) refusal to permit
     "commingled" traffic; and (3) certification by the competitive LEC
     that the leased UNEs will carry only certain patterns of
     traffic.[^627] First, as we indicated in the *UNE Remand Order* and
     in the *Supplemental Order Clarification,* collocation is a
     reasonable requirement for access to EELs.[^628] Secondly, under
     the three safe harbor circumstances described in the *Supplemental
     Order Clarification,* incumbent LECs are allowed to prohibit
     commingling. As we stated in that order, we are not persuaded that
     removing the prohibition in those local usage options would not
     lead to the use of unbundled network elements by interexchange
     carriers solely or primarily to bypass special access
     services.[^629] Finally, certification is not an unreasonable
     requirement for implementing the *Supplemental Order,* where we
     expressly stated that competing carriers using EELs must provide a
     significant amount of local exchange service.[^630] In fact, all
     three of the safe harbor circumstances described in the
     *Supplemental Order Clarification* for determining whether a
     requesting carrier is providing a "significant" amount of local
     exchange service call for certification by the requesting
     carrier.[^631]

236. There is no indication in the record that SWBT has imposed any
     restriction on access to EELs that conflicts with our specific
     guidance in the *Supplemental Order*. Because the substantive
     interim rules we have adopted in our orders on this subject define
     the nature of SWBT's statutory obligations, SWBT's adherence to
     them cannot constitute a basis for finding noncompliance with the
     checklist. It would be quite unfair to a BOC applicant to deny it
     approval to compete in the long-distance market on the basis of
     conduct that, in other proceedings, we have explicitly authorized.
     For the section 271 process to work, potential BOC applicants must
     have a reasonable degree of certainty about what they need to do to
     bring themselves in compliance with the statutory requirements, and
     they therefore need to be able to rely on our rules for appropriate
     guidance.

##### Intellectual Property Rights for UNEs

237. We reject AT&T's assertion that SWBT places restrictions on
     intellectual property associated with UNEs in violation of sections
     251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) of the Act.[^632] Furthermore, AT&T appears
     to believe that SWBT has an obligation to protect competitive LECs
     that lease network elements from intellectual property
     liability.[^633] AT&T notes that SWBT could "eliminate the problem"
     by agreeing to indemnify competitive LECs using UNEs in a manner
     equivalent to SWBT against any intellectual property liabilities
     that competitive LECs may incur from that use.[^634]

238. We recently addressed the intellectual property rights surrounding
     UNEs in our *Intellectual Property Order* released April 27,
     2000.[^635] In that order, we declared that section 251(c)(3)
     requires an incumbent LEC such as SWBT to use its best efforts to
     obtain coextensive intellectual property rights associated with
     UNEs from a vendor on terms and conditions that are equal in
     quality to the terms and conditions under which the incumbent LEC
     has obtained its rights.[^636] SWBT has stated that it will fully
     comply with the *Intellectual Property Order's* requirement to use
     best efforts to obtain coextensive third-party intellectual
     property rights for competitive LECs using UNEs.[^637]
     Additionally, the T2A provides that the terms of the *Intellectual
     Property Order* control over language in the T2A that AT&T asserts
     is discriminatory.[^638] We therefore find that SWBT does not
     insist on language in its interconnection agreements that violates
     its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to UNEs under
     section 251(c)(3) or 252(d)(1) of the Act, as AT&T argues.
     Moreover, the *Intellectual Property Order* did not require that
     incumbent LECs indemnify competitive LECs for any intellectual
     property liability associated with their use of UNEs, and we do not
     find that unwillingness to provide such indemnification would
     necessarily constitute a violation of the Act. All that the
     nondiscrimination principle requires in this context is that the
     incumbent LEC utilize its best efforts to obtain coextensive third
     party intellectual property rights for competitive LECs in the use
     of unbundled network elements.

### Pricing of Network Elements

#### Background

239. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with
     sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)" of the Act.[^639] Section
     251(c)(3) requires local incumbent LECs to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
     at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^640] Section
     252(d)(1) requires that a state commission's determination of the
     just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be based on
     the cost of providing the network elements, shall be
     nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable profit.[^641]
     Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission has determined
     that prices for UNEs must be based on the total element long run
     incremental cost of providing those elements.[^642] The Commission
     also promulgated rule 51.315(b), which prohibits incumbent LECs
     from separating already combined elements before providing them to
     competing carriers, except on request.[^643] Starting in September
     1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed and
     then vacated the Commission's pricing rules, and in 1997 it vacated
     Rule 51.315(b)[^644] The Supreme Court restored these rules,
     however, on January 25, 1999.[^645]

240. SWBT's initial application noted that it assessed a number of
     nonrecurring charges on UNE orders. SWBT assesses a \$2.56
     nonrecurring service order charge for each UNE order.[^646] SWBT
     also assesses a separate, nonrecurring charge for each stand-alone
     element ordered.[^647] When a requesting carrier orders UNEs that
     are already combined in SWBT's network, SWBT assesses the sum of
     the nonrecurring charges for the applicable UNEs. Thus, in an order
     for a pre-combined residential platform containing a two-wire
     analog loop, the applicable charges were: 1) a \$2.56 nonrecurring
     service order charge, 2) a \$15.03 nonrecurring two-wire analog
     loop charge, 3) a \$1.27 nonrecurring port charge, and 4) a \$4.17
     nonrecurring cross-connect charge, for a total of \$23.03 in
     nonrecurring charges.[^648] In an order for a combination of
     elements not already assembled in SWBT's network, SWBT assessed an
     additional \$16.35 nonrecurring central office access charge
     (COAC).[^649]

241. While the Eighth Circuit decision invalidating our rule 315(b) was
     in effect, the Texas Commission approved these charges.[^650] AT&T
     and WorldCom appealed to a federal district court in Texas the
     state commission's decision on the nonrecurring charges, including
     the COAC, contending that they constituted non-cost based "glue
     charges."[^651] The district court affirmed the Texas Commission's
     decision, also while the Eighth Circuit's decision was in
     effect.[^652] AT&T and WorldCom then appealed to the Fifth
     Circuit.[^653] On February 24, 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
     the Fifth Circuit remanded AT&T and WorldCom's appeal to the Texas
     Commission for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's
     decision in *Iowa Utilities Board*.[^654] The Eighth Circuit and
     the Texas Commission are currently considering whether the Supreme
     Court's decision in *Iowa Utilities Board* and our rules obligate
     SWBT to combine UNEs in new combinations as ordered by
     competitors.[^655] The Texas Commission is also considering whether
     SWBT is entitled to impose the nonrecurring charges on competitive
     LEC orders for existing UNE combinations and whether SWBT's current
     nonrecurring charges are adequately supported by cost documentation
     as required by the Telecommunications Act and our rules.[^656]

#### Discussion

242. *COAC.* SWBT states that the COAC is assessed on UNE combinations
     and enhanced extended loops (EELs) that do not already exist in
     combined form in SWBT's network, and thus require work by
     SWBT.[^657] SWBT argues that the COAC is not subject to sections
     251 and 252 of the Act,[^658] and opposed the remand to the Texas
     Commission on this issue.[^659] According to SWBT, the COAC is not
     subject to the Commission's forward-looking methodology because the
     Supreme Court held only that incumbent LECs cannot separate already
     combined elements before providing them, not that they must combine
     separate UNEs.[^660] AT&T and WorldCom challenge the COAC as a
     non-cost-based glue charge.[^661] They state that the COAC is not
     based on the cost of combining UNEs, but has its basis in a retail
     tariff that SWBT charges to cover central office activity to its
     retail customers.[^662] AT&T and WorldCom contend that the COAC
     double-recovers costs recouped through the nonrecurring charges
     assessed on the individual elements,[^663] as well as the retail
     fees for central office.[^664]

243. In its 1997 ruling, the Eighth Circuit invalidated rules 315(c)
     through (f), which required incumbent LECs to provide network
     elements in new combinations requested by a competing carrier. The
     Supreme Court did not specifically review that aspect of the Eighth
     Circuit\'s holding, which is, therefore, binding on us unless and
     until it is vacated. We are also precluded by the Eighth Circuit's
     holding from denying this application on the ground that SWBT has
     somehow violated the Act by setting particular pricing conditions
     on the provision of UNE combinations that, under the Eighth
     Circuit's decision, it need not provide at all. For this reason, we
     have not examined the prices associated with the UNE combinations
     that SWBT is not required to provide. The Eighth Circuit is
     currently considering whether to revive rules 315(c) through (f) on
     remand from *Iowa Utilities Board*, and the Texas Commission has
     been asked to consider the underlying "new combinations" issue on
     remand from the Fifth Circuit.

244. Given the current state of the law, those proceedings are the
     appropriate forums for resolving disputes such as the one at issue
     here.[^665]

245. *Nonrecurring charges other than the COAC.* As previously
     discussed, we are reluctant to deny a section 271 application
     because a BOC is engaged in an unresolved rate dispute with its
     competitors and the relevant state commission, which has primary
     jurisdiction over the matter, is currently considering the
     matter.[^666] Instead, as we have explained, interim rate solutions
     are a sufficient basis for granting a 271 application when an
     interim solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under
     the circumstances, the state commission has demonstrated its
     commitment to our pricing rules, and provision is made for refunds
     or true-ups once permanent rates are set. SWBT's 271 application
     easily meets that standard.

246. The dispute over the nonrecurring charges other than the COAC has
     evolved significantly since SWBT filed its initial application.
     [^667] The practice that AT&T now challenges is a policy under
     which SWBT withholds collection of the relevant charges,
     effectively imposing an interim charge of zero on the nonrecurring
     items that form the basis of AT&T's complaints, if the competing
     carrier agrees to be bound by any true-up the Texas Commission
     might order on remand from the Fifth Circuit. [^668] That interim
     solution, which AT&T chose to reject, is reasonable given the legal
     uncertainty that has surrounded these charges since the Supreme
     Court's 1999 decision in *Iowa Utilities Board*. SWBT has agreed to
     an interim solution that gives its competitors the current benefit
     of the doubt on these rates, subject only to the possibility that
     the Texas Commission, and ultimately the federal courts, might
     someday find that a charge greater than zero is required by the Act
     or our rules. AT&T is poorly positioned to complain about that
     solution. Because the Texas Commission and the federal courts must
     be presumed to apply the law correctly, those carriers face
     uncertainty about the imposition of a true-up only to the extent
     that they reasonably believe that they may in fact have a legal
     obligation to pay something greater than a charge of zero. No
     carrier is immune from the effect of future

247. resolutions of disputed issues, and, under the circumstances, the
     objection of AT&T on this point is entirely insufficient to warrant
     a denial of SWBT's application.

248. In light of the Fifth Circuit remand and SWBT's offer to impose an
     effective interim rate of zero for the nonrecurring charges in
     dispute, therefore, we need not preempt the Texas Commission's
     ongoing inquiry into whether those charges comply with section 251
     of the Act or our pricing rules. The Texas Commission has
     established a schedule to set permanent rates for all nonrecurring
     charges, and has indicated to the parties that the interim rates
     are subject to a true-up[^669] The Texas Commission is currently
     reviewing whether SWBT is entitled to impose nonrecurring charges
     for existing UNE combinations and whether there is adequate cost
     support for SWBT's proposed nonrecurring charges as required by the
     Telecommunications Act of 1996 and our rules.[^670] Interested
     parties will have an opportunity to challenge the cost-based nature
     of the rates proposed by SWBT in the proceeding before the Texas
     Commission.[^671]

249. The situation we confront here is similar to the situation we
     confronted in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* on the issue of
     interim rates.[^672] As in that proceeding, the rate dispute here
     is fairly new, the relevant state commission has demonstrated a
     commitment to TELRIC, and provision will be made for retrospective
     rate adjustments once permanent rates are set. Moreover, SWBT has
     agreed to set an effective interim rate of zero, subject to
     true-up, pending resolution of this dispute. Because we are
     confident that the Texas Commission will reach an appropriate
     result consistent with our rules, we conclude that SWBT has met its
     obligations under this checklist item. We also observe that in any
     context in which prices are not set in accordance with our rules
     and the Act, we retain the ability to take a variety of enforcement
     actions and will not hesitate to do so.[^673]

250. *xDSL Rates.* Covad argues that SWBT has not met the requirements
     of checklist item (ii) because it does not have final, TELRIC-based
     rates for charges relating to the installation and conditioning of
     xDSL-capable loops.[^674] The Texas Commission, in the
     Mega-Arbitration, set permanent charges for xDSL-capable
     loops.[^675] After reviewing the permanent rates set in the
     Mega-Arbitration, the arbitrator for the Covad/Rhythms' arbitration
     agreement set interim charges, subject to true-up, that are the
     exact xDSL rates that Covad proposed.[^676] The Texas Commission is
     now conducting a proceeding to set permanent xDSL rates based on
     cost studies that SWBT submitted at the direction of the Texas
     Commission arbitrator.[^677]

251. As discussed previously, interim rate solutions are a sufficient
     basis for granting a section 271 application when an interim
     solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under the
     circumstances, where the state commission has demonstrated its
     commitment to our pricing rules, and provision is made for refunds
     or true-ups once permanent rates are set. It is evident from a
     review of the Covad/Rhythms arbitration proceeding that the interim
     xDSL rates are a reasonable interim solution to this fairly recent
     dispute, the Texas Commission has established a track record of
     setting interim xDSL rates that are cost-based, and the rates are
     subject to a retroactive rate adjustment.[^678] We are confident
     that the Texas Commission will ultimately set permanent, cost-based
     xDSL rates that comply with our rules. Under these circumstances,
     we find that SWBT has met the requirements of checklist item 2 with
     respect to its xDSL rates.

252. *Promotional Discounts.* AT&T also asserts that promotional
     discounts on unbundled loop and platform orders for
     telecommunications carriers serving residential customers that SWBT
     offers are discriminatory and in violation of the Act.[^679] These
     promotions arise out of SBC's merger with Ameritech.[^680] We found
     in the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* that these promotions will
     bring more competitive offerings to residential customers.[^681] We
     also found that these promotional offerings are offered to all
     telecommunications carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis.[^682] Our
     findings in that order answer AT&T's concerns here, and in any
     event, it would be quite unfair to penalize SWBT in this proceeding
     for acting in accordance with those findings.[^683]

## Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way

### Background

253. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way owned or controlled by the \[BOC\] at just and
     reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section
     224."[^684] In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the
     Commission interpreted section 251(b)(4) as requiring
     nondiscriminatory access to LEC poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way for competing providers of telecommunications
     services in accordance with the requirements of section 224.[^685]
     In addition, we interpreted the revised requirements of section 224
     governing rates, terms, and conditions for telecommunications
     carriers' attachments to utility poles in the *Pole Attachment
     Telecommunications Rate Order.*[^686] Section 224(f)(1) states that
     "\[a\] utility shall provide a cable television system or any
     telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any
     pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by
     it."[^687] Notwithstanding this requirement, section 224(f)(2)
     permits a utility providing electric service to deny access to its
     poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory
     basis, "where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of
     safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering
     purposes."[^688]

254. 

255. Section 224 also contains two separate provisions governing the
     maximum rates that a utility may charge for "pole
     attachments."[^689] Section 224(b)(1) states that the Commission
     shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions governing pole
     attachments to ensure that they are "just and reasonable."[^690]
     Notwithstanding this general grant of authority, section 224(c)(1)
     states that "\[n\]othing in \[section 224\] shall be construed to
     apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to
     the rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts,
     conduits and rights-of-way as provided in \[section 224(f)\], for
     pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a
     State." [^691] As of 1992, nineteen states had certified to the
     Commission that they regulated the rates, terms, and conditions for
     pole attachments.[^692] However, none of the five states in which
     SWBT is a LEC, including Texas, has elected to regulate poles,
     ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way.[^693]

### Discussion 

256. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT provides
     nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way at just and reasonable rates in compliance with
     section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii), and thus satisfies the requirements of
     checklist item 3.[^694] The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT
     provides nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way at just and reasonable rates that comply with the Act
     and Commission rules.[^695] No commenter raised allegations
     challenging SWBT's compliance with this checklist item.

## Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops 

### Background

257. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive
     checklist, requires that a BOC provide "\[l\]ocal loop transmission
     from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from
     local switching or other services."[^696] The Commission has
     defined the loop as a transmission facility between a distribution
     frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and
     the demarcation point at the customer premises.[^697] This
     definition includes different types of loops, including "two-wire
     and four-wire analog voice-grade loops, and two-wire and four-wire
     loops that are conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed
     to provide service such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1-level
     signals."[^698]

258. In order to establish that it is "providing" unbundled local loops
     in compliance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv), a BOC must demonstrate
     that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish
     loops and that it is currently doing so in the quantities that
     competitors demand and at an acceptable level of quality.[^699]

259. A BOC must also demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory
     access to unbundled loops.[^700] Specifically, the BOC must provide
     access to any functionality of the loop requested by a competing
     carrier unless it is not technically feasible to condition the loop
     facility to support the particular functionality requested.[^701]
     In order to provide the requested loop functionality, such as the
     ability to deliver ISDN or xDSL services, the BOC may be required
     to take affirmative steps to condition existing loop facilities to
     enable competing carriers to provide services not currently
     provided over the facilities, with the competing carrier bearing
     the cost of such conditioning.[^702] The BOC must provide
     competitors with access to unbundled loops regardless of whether
     the BOC uses integrated digital loop carrier (IDLC)
     technology[^703] or similar remote concentration devices for the
     particular loops sought by the competitor. Again, the costs
     associated with providing access to such facilities may be
     recovered from competing carriers.[^704]

260. SWBT states that through February 2000, it provisioned to competing
     carriers more than 54,000 loops on a stand-alone basis and over
     203,000 loops as part of pre-assembled loop/port
     combinations.[^705] In order to demonstrate that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to these loops, SWBT submitted performance
     data relating to its loop provisioning and maintenance and repair
     functions for competing carriers. These data are disaggregated by
     loop type into several categories for both voice grade loops and
     loops capable of transmitting the digital signals necessary to
     support high-speed data services. In light of the variety of SWBT
     performance data, our analysis of checklist item 4 does not focus
     on any single performance measurement or any single type of loop.
     Instead, we examine the data for all the various loop performance
     measurements, as well as the factors surrounding the development of
     these performance measurements, in order to evaluate in the
     aggregate whether SWBT provides local loops in accordance with the
     requirements of checklist item 4.

261. The focus of our analysis in this section is on the provisioning
     and maintenance and repair of stand-alone loops. In particular, we
     address voice grade loops provisioned both as hot cut loops and as
     new stand-alone loops. We also address xDSL-capable loops and high
     capacity loops (*e.g.*, DS1 loops). Because provisioning and
     maintenance and repair functions for pre-assembled loop/port
     combinations are more similar to processes used to provide resale
     than

262. those used to provide unbundled loops, we address loop/port
     combination issues in our discussion of checklist item 2.

### Discussion

263. Like the Department of Justice and Texas Commission,[^706] we
     conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled local
     loops in accordance with the requirements of section 271.[^707]
     Specifically, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides voice
     grade unbundled loops through "hot cut" conversions[^708] in a
     manner that offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity
     to compete. Similarly, we find that SWBT provides competing
     carriers with voice grade unbundled loops through new stand-alone
     loops in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its
     own retail service. We also conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it
     provides xDSL-capable loops and high capacity loops to competing
     carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner.

264. To reach these conclusions, we evaluate a variety of SWBT
     performance measurement data disaggregated by loop type. From these
     data,[^709] we calculate that in February, March, and April 2000,
     mass market voice grade loops, which may be provisioned by hot cuts
     or through new stand-alone loops,[^710] were 77, 74, and 71 percent
     of all unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by competing carriers.
     During the same period, xDSL-capable loops increased from 19
     percent of all unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by competing
     carriers in February 2000 to 23 and 27 percent of all unbundled
     stand-alone loops ordered by competing carriers in March and
     April 2000. At the same time, DS1 high capacity loops have remained
     between 1 and 4 percent of all unbundled loops ordered by competing
     carriers in Texas. Although we examine unbundled loops in this
     disaggregated way, we base our conclusion on SWBT's unbundled
     stand-alone loop provisioning overall. Thus, even if SWBT's
     performance appears lacking in a particular area, we examine the
     circumstances surrounding any shortfall, as well as SWBT's
     performance in aggregate, to reach our conclusion that checklist
     item 4 is met.

265. As described above, the Texas Commission developed SWBT's
     performance measurements and standards in a collaborative state
     proceeding with substantial input from competing carriers.[^711]
     When possible, the Texas Commission elected to compare SWBT's
     service to competing carriers using unbundled loops directly to the
     level of service provided to SWBT's retail operations.[^712] Thus,
     where the Texas Commission determined that a retail analogue is
     appropriate and uses this analogue in its evaluation, we examine
     SWBT's performance by determining whether it provides unbundled
     local loops to competing carriers in substantially the same time
     and manner as it does to its retail customers.[^713] Where,
     however, the Texas Commission determined that no comparable retail
     function exists, the level of SWBT service provided to competing
     carriers is tested against benchmarks developed in the
     collaborative state proceeding.[^714] In these instances, we
     examine SWBT's service to competing carriers in terms of whether
     its performance affords efficient competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^715]

266. 

267. In determining that SWBT satisfies checklist item 4, we rely, among
     other factors, on performance data collected and submitted by SWBT.
     Several commenters challenge the validity of SWBT's performance
     data generally, and loop performance data in particular.[^716] As
     described above,[^717] we reject this general contention because
     the data submitted by SWBT in this proceeding have been subject to
     substantial scrutiny and review by interested parties. Where
     commenters dispute specific data, we discuss these challenges in
     our analysis. In such instances, we look to the availability of
     data reconciled under the auspices of the Texas Commission,
     specific evidence presented by commenters, and the record as a
     whole, in order to determine the appropriate weight to accord the
     challenged data.

#### Voice Grade Stand-Alone Loops

268. SWBT provisions unbundled voice grade local loops to competing
     carriers in three distinct forms. First, SWBT provisions
     stand-alone loops to competing carriers through conversions of
     active loops to the carriers' collocation space. These loop
     cutovers, or hot cuts, make it possible to transfer an active SWBT
     customer's service to a competing carrier. Second, if SWBT does not
     presently service the customer on the lines in question, a
     competing carrier may obtain a "new" loop from SWBT. In this case,
     the customer receives service on a second loop from a competitive
     carrier and not from SWBT, while it may choose to retain SWBT on
     the original line. For both new loops and conversions of existing
     customers, when loops are provisioned on a stand-alone basis, the
     competing carrier obtains only the transmission facility between
     SWBT's central office and the customer's premises. Third, SWBT
     provisions loops as part of a platform of network elements. What
     follows below is a discussion of the provisioning and maintenance
     and repair of hot cut loops and new stand-alone loops. Because
     provisioning and maintenance and repair functions for loops
     provisioned as part of a platform are more similar to processes
     used to provide resale than those used to provide unbundled loops,
     we address them in checklist item 2.

##### Hot Cut Loop Provisioning

269. Like the Department of Justice, we find that SWBT demonstrates that
     it provides unbundled hot cut loops through the conversion of
     active customers from SWBT to competing carriers, in accordance
     with the requirements of checklist item 4.[^718] The ability of a
     BOC to provision working, trouble-free loops through hot cuts is
     critically important in light of the substantial risk that a
     defective hot cut will result in competing carrier customers
     experiencing service outages for more than a brief period.[^719]
     Moreover, the failure to provision hot cut loops effectively has a
     particularly significant adverse impact on mass market competition
     because they are a critical component of competing carriers'
     efforts to provide service to the small- and medium-sized business
     markets.[^720]

270. At the outset, we reject the argument made by some commenters that
     SWBT fails to meet the "standards" we developed in the *Bell
     Atlantic New York Order*.[^721] With each application we are
     presented with a different set of circumstances: new and
     differently defined performance measurements, state proceedings
     with different histories, new processes by which BOCs perform
     necessary functions for competing carriers, and new competing
     carrier concerns. Although the hot cut timeliness and quality
     issues we assess remain consistent, the evidence presented will
     vary from one application to the next. For instance, unlike Bell
     Atlantic, SWBT's hot cut processes are divided into two methods,
     and these two methods are reflected in separate performance
     measurements. As described in more detail below, some of SWBT's
     performance measurements are reported on a per loop basis, rather
     than the per order basis used by Bell Atlantic with some of its
     performance measurements. In many cases, such differences are the
     product of state proceedings where provisioning processes and
     performance measurements were developed and refined with input from
     both the BOC and competing carriers. These differences can make
     direct comparison with the performance discussed in prior orders
     difficult, if not impossible. As a result, although our hot cut
     inquiry here examines the same criteria as our inquiry in the *Bell
     Atlantic New York Order*, we necessarily base our conclusion on the
     evidence presented in this application. In particular, we evaluate
     SWBT's hot cut process, and the timeliness and quality of the hot
     cuts it provides to competing carriers.

271. The Texas Commission reasonably determined that there is no retail
     equivalent to a hot cut, and no commenter contends otherwise. Thus,
     as in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the appropriate standard
     is whether the BOC provides unbundled loops through hot cuts in a
     manner that offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity
     to compete.[^722] In a footnote in one of its comments, AT&T
     proposes an ostensibly different standard, under which a BOC would
     be required to demonstrate that it has provided "the fewest number
     of outages and best on-time performance that it is technically
     feasible and commercially reasonable for the BOC to achieve."[^723]
     Because AT&T does not explain how such a test would operate in
     practice or how, if at all, it would differ from our traditional
     standard for BOC activities that lack a retail analogue, we
     conclude that AT&T's passing reference to this issue provides no
     basis for departing from our traditional approach.[^724]

272. *Hot Cut Process*. SWBT makes available two hot cut processes: the
     fully coordinated hot cut (CHC) process and the frame due time
     (FDT) hot cut process. CHC orders are manually handled in SWBT's
     order processing center and require intensive coordination and
     communication between SWBT and the competing carrier during the
     actual cutover from SWBT to the competing carrier.[^725] FDT hot
     cuts require both SWBT and the competing carrier to perform
     necessary work at pre-arranged times, with no communication
     required at the time of the hot cut.[^726] Unlike CHC orders, FDT
     orders are capable of flowing through SWBT's order processing
     center without manual work by SWBT's representatives.[^727]
     Although in the past SWBT has represented that the CHC process is
     too resource-intensive to support commercial levels of demand for
     lower volume loop orders,[^728] SWBT now states that it has
     sufficient resources to process competing carriers' orders in a
     timely and efficient manner, regardless of which method they
     choose.[^729] Thus, competing carriers "have their choice of two
     alternative processes in every case, allowing them to pick the
     process that best fits their resources and priorities."[^730] At
     present, slightly more than half of all hot cuts are performed with
     the FDT process; the remainder are performed with the CHC
     process.[^731]

273. Upon review of SWBT's present representations regarding CHC
     availability and the lack of recent competing carrier evidence
     suggesting otherwise, we conclude that competing carriers may
     freely choose between the CHC and FDT hot cut processes.[^732]
     Although some commenters maintain that SWBT cannot handle high
     volumes of CHC orders, they offer little or no current evidence to
     demonstrate that this continues to be true.[^733] With respect to
     the more recent evidence that AT&T offers to support this
     conclusion, namely AT&T's experience with erroneous CHC order
     rejections for invalid due dates, we conclude that it is
     insufficient to warrant a determination that the CHC process is not
     capable of handling current demand. The only evidence AT&T provides
     is a statement by SWBT in an e-mail regarding CHC rejections that
     SWBT cannot provide a "limitless" number of CHC orders.[^734] In
     light of its stated commitment in the same e-mail to "make\[\]
     every effort to accommodate all requested dates and times for CHC
     orders," this is not, by itself, substantial evidence that SWBT's
     process cannot manage competing carrier demand for CHCs.[^735]
     Moreover, the e-mail indicates that SWBT actively is working with
     AT&T to resolve its CHC rejection problem. In any event, should
     future SWBT hot cut capacity constraints limit competing carrier
     access to unbundled voice grade loops, we shall take appropriate
     enforcement action at that time.

274. We emphasize that competing carriers can now choose freely between
     the CHC and FDT hot cut processes, because we conclude that the
     evidence in this proceeding indicates that it is only through the
     CHC process that SWBT is able to provision unbundled hot cut loops
     in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. In the
     discussion that follows, we find that SWBT demonstrates it
     provisions CHCs in a timely manner and at an acceptable level of
     quality, with a minimal service disruption and a minimum number of
     troubles following installation. We also find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provisions FDT hot cuts in a timely manner and
     with a minimum number of troubles following installation. Problems,
     however, remain with respect to FDT hot cut service disruptions,
     and therefore we do not find that SWBT provisions hot cut loops
     through the FDT process in accordance with the requirements of
     checklist item 4. Yet, because the FDT process is still chosen by
     competing carriers in significant numbers, we discuss the FDT
     process in conjunction with the CHC process below.

275. *Hot Cut Timeliness*. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it
     can complete a substantial percentage of CHCs and FDT hot cuts it
     provisions within a reasonable time interval.[^736] Under the
     performance measurement developed by the Texas Commission, and
     approved at its December 16, 1999 open meeting, SWBT hot cut
     performance is measured according to the percentage of hot cut
     loops in orders of less than 25 lines that SWBT completes within a
     specified time window.[^737] The Texas Commission adopted an
     interim benchmark, under which 100 percent of these cutovers must
     be completed within 2 hours of the scheduled start time.[^738] This
     standard applies to both CHC and FDT hot cuts.[^739] The
     performance data SWBT submitted with its application indicate that
     SWBT completed between 98 and 99 percent of all CHCs within 2 hours
     from February through April 2000.[^740] During the same time
     period, these data indicate that SWBT completed between 92 and 99
     percent of FDT hot cuts within 2 hours.[^741]

276. In response to criticism regarding the accuracy of SWBT's hot cut
     data, the Texas Commission issued orders requesting SWBT and
     competing carrier reconciliation of various SWBT self-reported hot
     cut performance measurement data.[^742] Because we believe data
     reconciled under the auspices of a state commission, with the
     participation of both competing carriers and the BOC, to be
     reliable evidence of a BOC's performance, we accord these data
     substantial weight.[^743] Moreover, the reconciled data include
     information on SWBT's ability to perform both CHCs and FDT hot cuts
     within a 1 hour interval.[^744] In addition to these reconciled
     data, SWBT presented data from competing carriers that were
     reconciled, combined with SWBT data from competing carriers that
     did not participate in the reconciliation. Because we find that
     this aggregated presentation is the most accurate overall picture
     of SWBT performance in Texas, we use it to evaluate SWBT's hot cut
     loop timeliness.

277. We find that the aggregated data demonstrate that SWBT can
     provision a substantial percentage of competing carrier CHC and FDT
     hot cut loops within a 1 hour interval. These aggregated data
     indicate that during December 1999, and January and February 2000,
     SWBT completed an average of 90 percent of all CHC loops from
     orders with less than 11 lines within 1 hour and an average of 94
     percent of all FDT hot cut loops from orders with less than 11
     lines within 1 hour.[^745] Moreover, in its reply comments, SWBT
     developed similar data for March and April 2000, that demonstrate
     that during these two months, SWBT completed an average of 93
     percent of all CHC loops from orders with less than 11 lines within
     1 hour and an average of 96 percent of all FDT hot cut loops from
     orders with less than 11 lines within 1 hour.[^746] We find this
     evidence sufficient to overcome the claims of competing carriers
     that SWBT's hot cut provisioning is not performed in a timely
     manner and therefore affects their ability to obtain and retain
     customers.[^747]

278. We acknowledge that some commenters raise concerns with respect to
     the way SWBT measures the interval for its completion of hot cut
     loops. First, some competing carriers criticize SWBT and the Texas
     Commission for using a measurement based on individual loops,
     rather than orders.[^748] Although these commenters insist that a
     loop-based measurement[^749] is a more charitable representation of
     SWBT's performance than a measurement based on orders, we do not
     find their arguments persuasive. A measurement based on loops and
     not orders is not systematically more generous to the BOC, because
     it is possible for the percentage of loops completed within an
     interval to be lower than the percentage of orders completed within
     the same interval. As SWBT points out, whether one approach is
     stricter than the other depends upon the extent to which delays
     occur on multiple lines in the same order.[^750] Moreover, we agree
     with the Texas Commission that performance measurements are not
     necessarily "one size fits all," and conclude that it is the more
     prudent course for this Commission to recognize reasonable
     measurements adopted by state commissions as a part of a state
     proceeding that included both BOC and competing carrier
     input.[^751]

279. Finally, some commenters criticize SWBT's interim hot cut
     timeliness performance measurement because the business rules
     indicate that the interval ends when the SWBT technician completes
     the hot cut, excluding the time it takes for the SWBT technician to
     call the competing carrier to indicate that SWBT completed work on
     the CHC cutover.[^752] At the outset, we note that this criticism
     does not apply to FDT hot cuts, because no such call is required
     when this process is used. With respect to CHCs, we find that this
     concern is misplaced, because communication between SWBT and the
     competing carrier is already required at the time of the CHC.[^753]
     Although beyond the scope of this order, we note that SWBT and
     competing carriers recently agreed to revise the business rules so
     that the conversion interval will end after the SWBT technician has
     notified the competing carrier that the cutover is complete.[^754]

280. *Hot Cut Quality*. We further conclude that SWBT demonstrates that
     it provisions CHCs at a level of quality that offers efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. Upon review of the
     evidence in the record regarding hot cut installation quality, and
     specifically the outage rate associated with failed SWBT CHCs, and
     the trouble rate following CHC installation, we find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provisions CHCs to competitors in a manner
     that meets the requirements of the checklist. Although we find that
     SWBT's performance with respect to troubles following FDT hot cut
     installation meets the requirements of the checklist, we find that
     the outage rate associated with failed SWBT FDT hot cuts does not.

281. [Outages]{.underline}. We conclude that the record demonstrates
     that the CHC process SWBT makes available to competing carriers
     minimizes service disruptions that may significantly affect
     competing carriers' end-user customers. As a result, we conclude
     that SWBT demonstrates that the level of outages competing carriers
     may experience as a result of failed SWBT CHCs is sufficiently
     small to provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

282. A comprehensive reconciliation of AT&T's hot cut outage data
     conducted under the auspices of the Texas Commission demonstrates
     that SWBT's CHC process minimizes service disruptions experienced
     by competing carrier customers who are provisioned service via hot
     cut loops. Because no performance measurement exists to capture all
     SWBT-caused hot cut outages, the Texas Commission developed the
     Provisioning Process Improvement Group (PPIG) to reconcile SWBT and
     competing carrier data relating to unexpected hot cut service
     outages.[^755] As a result of PPIG efforts, a joint affidavit was
     filed with the Texas Commission by SWBT and AT&T with reconciled
     outage data for December 1999, and January and February 2000.[^756]
     In addition, SWBT filed an affidavit with the Texas Commission
     reflecting the PPIG reconciliation for March 2000 that is
     consistent with AT&T's representation of the March 2000 PPIG data
     in its reply comments.[^757] Furthermore, the Texas Commission
     filed an *ex parte* letter with this Commission indicating the
     results of the April 2000 PPIG data reconciliation.[^758] As with
     our discussion of SWBT's hot cut timeliness data, we review these
     reconciled data on a per loop basis.[^759]

283. Because the PPIG data reveal that during the period from December
     1999 through April 2000, an average of less than 5 percent of all
     CHC loops that SWBT provisioned to AT&T resulted in end-user
     service outages caused by SWBT provisioning failures, we conclude
     that SWBT makes available a hot cut process that provides efficient
     competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^760] We find
     this outage rate low enough to reject competing carrier arguments
     that high CHC outage rates caused by SWBT provisioning failures
     make it difficult for them to obtain and retain customers.[^761] We
     acknowledge, however, that this average excludes outages directly
     related to a one-time Telcordia software problem (SOAC) that
     affected outage rates in February 2000. Although some commenters
     criticize this exclusion,[^762] we find that these outages were an
     unusual one-time problem based on a vendor's software defect.[^763]
     The Texas Commission concludes that "this problem has been
     rectified and will not affect SWBT's future performance."[^764]
     Furthermore, AT&T acknowledged the scope of the SOAC outage problem
     and its impact on the PPIG data in the joint affidavit.[^765]

284. We acknowledge that the reconciled PPIG data demonstrate a higher
     outage rate associated with the FDT hot cut process than the CHC
     process.[^766] Furthermore, we acknowledge that in the past SWBT
     has encouraged competing carriers to use the FDT process for all
     but large volume loop orders, or orders provisioned outside of
     normal business hours.[^767] At present, however, SWBT makes both
     the CHC and FDT hot cut processes equally available to competing
     carriers.[^768] Moreover, SWBT provides the FDT process to
     competing carriers free of charge, despite the fact that FDT
     conversions require most of the same SWBT labor as CHC
     conversions.[^769] In addition, the mechanized nature of the FDT
     process makes it a less labor-intensive option for competing
     carriers than the CHC process.[^770] If, despite these
     conveniences, any competing carrier finds FDT outage rates too
     high, they are free to use the alternative CHC process.

285. Because we find that the CHC process affords efficient competitors
     a meaningful opportunity to compete, and that this process is now
     widely available to all competing carriers, we do not find the fact
     that SWBT has developed an alternative, mechanized process with a
     higher incidence of competing carrier end-user customer outages to
     be fatal to this application. The record reflects that SWBT is
     working to further refine the FDT process so that it becomes a
     viable option for more competing carriers in the near future.[^771]
     We do not wish to discourage SWBT, or any other incumbent, from
     developing new processes to provision unbundled loops. As the Texas
     Commission points out, no one is benefited if this Commission
     discourages incumbents from developing potentially more efficient
     systems or processes, just before or during the pendency of their
     section 271 application.[^772]

286. Finally, we commend the Texas Commission for developing a new
     "outages on conversion" performance measurement in its April 2000
     work sessions with SWBT and competing carriers.[^773] This
     measurement will capture the percentage of CHC and FDT circuits for
     which competing carriers submit a provisioning trouble report on
     the day of the conversion, or by noon on the following day.[^774]
     The Texas Commission's action effectively provides an outage
     measure that AT&T and other competing carriers have indicated is
     important to them.[^775] This addition to the Texas performance
     measurements also will render it unnecessary to perform the sort of
     manual, time-consuming review and assessments that have been
     performed under the auspices of the PPIG and are described
     above.[^776] We believe this measurement will be a useful,
     standardized way for competing carriers to assess FDT and CHC
     outage rates in the future and will enable competing carriers to
     determine which method better suits their business plans.

287. [Installation Troubles]{.underline}. We conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that competing carrier end users experience only very
     low rates of installation troubles on lines provisioned by CHCs and
     FDT hot cuts. From December 1999 through March 2000, competing
     carriers experienced troubles within 7 days after installation on
     an average of only 1.5 percent of CHCs and 2.3 percent of FDT hot
     cuts.[^777] When the CHC and FDT processes are combined, competing
     carriers experienced troubles within 7 days following installation
     on an average of only 1.9 percent of all hot cut loops.[^778] As a
     result, we find that SWBT installs hot cuts of quality sufficient
     to provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^779]

288. *Other Hot Cut Issues*. We reject AT&T's allegation that SWBT fails
     checklist 4 because of problems with the pricing of the CHC hot cut
     process.[^780] The Department of Justice concludes that SWBT passes
     this checklist item.[^781] It states, however, that it has
     "continuing concern" regarding SWBT's CHC charges because they are
     "significant in amount" and notes that "the record does not contain
     any justification of them as appropriately cost-based."[^782] AT&T
     asserts that: (1) SWBT fails to identify relevant time and
     materials charges imposed during the CHC process; (2) fails to
     identify its cost studies to support these charges; (3) fails to
     prove that the Texas Commission considered or approved these
     charges; and (4) does not impose these charges for all hot cuts,
     which proves that the CHC charges are actually penalties.[^783]

289. SWBT disputes each of AT&T's allegations. First, SWBT asserts that
     it has adequately identified its time and material charges imposed
     during the CHC process, and that the terms of these charges are
     contained in both the UNE price schedule of AT&T's interconnection
     contract and in the T2A agreement.[^784] SWBT also responds that
     these rates are cost-based and were arbitrated by the Texas
     Commission as part of its Mega-Arbitration.[^785] Additionally,
     SWBT asserts that as part of its rate case, the Texas Commission
     considered SWBT's cost studies relating to the CHC process.[^786]
     SWBT also disputes AT&T's allegation that the CHC rates are imposed
     in a punitive manner. SWBT states that it has waived the Texas
     Commission-approved charges for its alternative hot cut method,
     FDT, in order to make that process "an attractive optional
     offering" for competitive LECs.[^787] SWBT contends, however, that
     offering one hot cut method free does not make the alternative
     method punitive, as both options are equally available.[^788]

290. Because of its demonstrated commitment to our pricing rules, the
     Texas Commission's determinations are entitled to a presumption of
     legitimacy.[^789] AT&T provides no basis for disputing SWBT's
     observation that the CHC charges were arbitrated by the Texas
     Commission as part of its Mega-Arbitration proceeding. Thus, AT&T's
     challenge to the cost basis of these charges (and there could be no
     other legally relevant type of challenge) is in reality a challenge
     to the pricing determinations of the Texas Commission. AT&T has
     altogether failed to establish a record for challenging the Texas
     Commission's rulings on this point or to explain with particularity
     how it believes the Texas Commission may have erred. In short, AT&T
     has not laid a proper foundation that would justify this Commission
     in second-guessing the Texas Commission's exercise of its pricing
     jurisdiction.

##### New Stand-Alone Loop Provisioning

291. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions new unbundled
     stand-alone voice grade loops in accordance with the requirements
     of checklist item 4. As described above, when SWBT does not
     presently service the customer on the line in question, a hot cut
     loop is not required. Instead, a competing carrier may obtain a new
     loop from SWBT, which requires that a technician be dispatched to
     the customer's premises in order to complete the installation.

292. First, we find that SWBT systems afford competing carriers access
     to appointment dates that is equivalent to the access provided to
     SWBT representatives serving retail customers. SWBT represents that
     SORD provides competing carriers with the same access to available
     due dates as that afforded to SWBT's retail operations.[^790] SWBT
     also represents that the same due date database is used for both
     competing carrier and SWBT retail orders.[^791] No commenters claim
     otherwise.

293. We also conclude that SWBT provisions new unbundled stand-alone
     loops to competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner as it does for its own retail service. From February through
     April 2000, SWBT missed a lower percentage of 8.0 dB loop
     installation due dates requiring field work for competing carriers
     than it did for its own retail service.[^792] With respect to loop
     quality, during the same period of time, the 8.0 dB loops that SWBT
     installed for competing carriers experienced a comparable
     percentage of trouble reports as SWBT's own 8.0 dB loops.[^793]
     Although these performance data do not exclusively address the
     provisioning of new stand-alone 8.0 dB loops, they do include the
     provisioning of such loops. Moreover, we note that no commenter has
     criticized this aspect of SWBT's performance. Therefore, we find
     that SWBT provisions new voice grade loops in accordance with the
     requirements of checklist item 4.

##### Maintenance and Repair of Voice Grade Loops

294. Like the Department of Justice, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates
     that it provides maintenance and repair functions for unbundled
     local loops provisioned to competing carriers in substantially the
     same time and manner as it does for its own retail customers.[^794]
     During the period from December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT met a
     greater percentage of unbundled loop repair due dates for customers
     of competing carriers than for its own retail customers.[^795] In
     addition, during the same period, the average time to repair
     unbundled loops for competing carriers was consistently and
     significantly lower than the time that SWBT took to repair such
     loops for its own customers.[^796] Furthermore, during the same
     period, competing carriers and SWBT experienced a comparable
     percentage of repeat trouble reports for unbundled loops.[^797]
     Thus, we find that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory maintenance and
     repair services for the unbundled loops that it provides to
     competing carriers.[^798]

#### xDSL-Capable Loops

295. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled local
     loops for the provision of xDSL services in a nondiscriminatory
     manner. At the outset, we note that xDSL-capable loops are a
     substantial and growing portion of all unbundled loops provisioned
     by SWBT to competing carriers.[^799] We also note that in our *Bell
     Atlantic New York Order*, we stated that we would "find it most
     persuasive if future applicants under section 271 . . . make a
     separate and comprehensive evidentiary showing with respect to the
     provision of xDSL-capable loops."[^800] In doing so, we set forth
     the evidence that an applicant may use to demonstrate that it
     provides xDSL-capable loops to competing carriers in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. First, the Commission stated that 271
     applicants could demonstrate that they are providing
     nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops through
     comprehensive and accurate reports of performance measures.[^801]
     As we noted in our *Bell Atlantic New York Order*:

     we emphasize our strong preference for a record that contains data
     measuring a BOC's performance pursuant to state-adopted standards
     that were developed with input from the relevant carriers and that
     include clearly-defined guidelines and methodology . . .
     Accordingly, we encourage state commissions to adopt specific xDSL
     loop performance standards measuring, for instance, the average
     completion interval, the percent of installation due dates missed
     as a result of the BOC's provisioning error, the timeliness of
     order processing, the installation quality of xDSL loops
     provisioned, and the timeliness and quality of the BOC's xDSL
     maintenance and repair functions.[^802]

     Second, the Commission indicated that the establishment of a "fully
     operational" separate affiliate for advanced services "may provide
     significant evidence" of nondiscrimination.[^803]

296. We commend the Texas Commission for its extensive consideration of
     xDSL-capable loop issues and development of specific xDSL-capable
     loop performance standards before SWBT filed its application. We
     also commend the Texas Commission for its efforts to include
     competing carriers in this process. As a result, we have for the
     first time in a section 271 application a complete record of a
     BOC's xDSL-capable loop performance from which to assess the
     provisioning of nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops.

##### xDSL-Capable Loop Performance 

297. Like the Department of Justice, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates
     that it provides nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops
     through its existing performance measurement data and other
     evidence it presents in its application.[^804] Consistent with our
     statements in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, we analyze
     competing carrier access to SWBT xDSL-capable loops on the basis of
     performance measurements and standards adopted by the Texas
     Commission in a state proceeding. Specifically, we review SWBT's
     xDSL-capable loop order processing timeliness, the timeliness of
     SWBT's xDSL capable loop installation and percentage of SWBT-caused
     missed due dates, the quality of the xDSL-capable loops SWBT
     installs, and the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and
     repair functions SWBT provides to competing carrier xDSL-capable
     loops. In nearly all areas, recent performance data indicate that
     SWBT offers competing carrier nondiscriminatory access to
     xDSL-capable loops. Viewed as a whole, the recent performance data
     confirm that SWBT, although it has not yet achieved perfection, has
     met its general obligation to provide competing carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops and has satisfied
     the requirements of the checklist. If in the future, however, SWBT
     performance deteriorates and restricts competing carrier access to
     unbundled xDSL-capable loops in a discriminatory manner, we note
     that we may take appropriate enforcement action pursuant to section
     271(d)(6).

298. As a preliminary matter, we note that competing carriers in Texas
     rely principally on two types of unbundled xDSL-capable loops: the
     xDSL loop and the BRI ISDN loop.[^805] The Texas Commission
     developed separate loop-type performance measurement categories for
     xDSL loops (including, but not limited to, loops provisioned for
     ADSL, HDSL, and SDSL services) and BRI ISDN loops, which are used
     by competing carriers to provide IDSL services. For the discussion
     of SWBT performance that follows, we refer to xDSL loops and BRI
     ISDN loops collectively as xDSL-capable loops. When discussing the
     separate categories of performance measurements, we refer to xDSL
     loops and BRI loops.

299. *Order Processing Timeliness*. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates
     that it provides order processing for xDSL-capable loops in a
     timely manner that provides an efficient competitor with a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. We reach this conclusion on the
     basis of the nondiscriminatory access to loop qualification
     information that SWBT provides competing carriers, SWBT's ability
     to process competing carrier FOCs in a timely manner, and SWBT's
     substantial implementation of xDSL-capable loop processing changes
     required by the Texas Commission.

300. First, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it offers
     nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions associated
     with determining whether a loop is capable of supporting xDSL
     technologies.[^806] As described in greater detail in our
     discussion of checklist item 2, we find that the mechanized and
     manual processes in place at the time SWBT filed its application
     enable requesting carriers to access loop qualification information
     in substantially the same time an manner as SWBT's retail
     operations. In fact, in the period from February through April
     2000, the average time for SWBT to return competing carrier loop
     qualification requests was consistently lower than the average time
     for SWBT to return such requests to its own retail
     operations.[^807]

301. Second, we find that performance data demonstrate that SWBT
     processes competing carrier LSRs for xDSL-capable loops in a timely
     manner that provides efficient competitors with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. For instance, in both March and April 2000,
     SWBT returned 94 percent of competing carrier FOCs within 24 hours
     for xDSL-capable loops ordered via LEX and 96 percent of competing
     carrier FOCs within 24 hours for xDSL-capable loops ordered via
     EDI.[^808]

302. In large part, our finding that SWBT processes competing carrier
     xDSL-capable loop orders in a timely fashion is the product of the
     Texas Commission's comprehensive review of SWBT's methods and
     procedures for offering xDSL-capable loops in the Covad/Rhythms
     arbitration.[^809] The Covad/Rhythms arbitration award culminated a
     year-long effort to resolve interconnection disputes related to
     SWBT's xDSL-capable loop ordering practices for competing carriers,
     consolidated by the Texas Commission under section 252(g) of the
     Act.[^810] In the course of this arbitration, the Texas Commission
     ordered SWBT to implement substantial changes to its xDSL-capable
     loop ordering process.[^811] In addition, at the Texas Commission's
     December 16, 1999 open meeting, SWBT made a series of related
     commitments to implement xDSL-capable

303. loop ordering process changes in order to secure the support of the
     Texas Commission for its section 271 application.[^812]

304. We conclude that SWBT performance data demonstrate that in recent
     months, with the substantial implementation of these changes,
     competing carriers can order xDSL-capable loops in a timely
     manner.[^813] Through numerous affidavits and supporting
     attachments, SWBT demonstrates step-by-step how it complied with
     the requirements of the arbitration and put in place the terms and
     conditions the Texas Commission found necessary to provide
     competing carriers with nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable
     loops.[^814] Notably, SWBT describes how it has dismantled the
     binder group management system it had developed to mechanically
     segregate ADSL-based services from other data services.[^815]
     Although some commenters contend that more work needs to be done by
     SWBT before the Commission can find that it has fully complied with
     its legal obligations, we find that these allegations are
     insufficient

305. to rebut the strong combination of performance data and affidavit
     evidence that SWBT presents to demonstrate its order processing
     timeliness.[^816]

306. *Average Installation Interval*. We find that SWBT installation
     interval data demonstrate that it provisions xDSL loop orders in
     substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own
     retail service. We also find that SWBT installation interval data
     demonstrate that it provisions BRI loop orders in a sufficiently
     timely manner for an efficient competitor to have a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

307. [xDSL Loops]{.underline}. In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT
     generally provisioned competing carrier orders for xDSL loops in
     less time than it did for its own retail customers, regardless of
     whether or not loop conditioning was required.[^817] Covad,
     however, questions the accuracy of these performance data, claiming
     that many of its loop orders are missing from this performance
     measurement.[^818] Yet, Covad fails to acknowledge that the
     business rules associated with this measurement expressly permit
     the exclusion of competing carrier loop orders requesting an
     installation interval longer than the standard offered
     interval.[^819] In addition, earlier problems with the accuracy of
     the data in this performance measurement were corrected after SWBT
     discovered a "minor processing error" resulting in accidental
     exclusions.[^820] Finally, we find further confirmation of the
     timeliness of SWBT xDSL loop provisioning in other performance data
     demonstrating a low rate of missed installation due dates for
     competing carrier xDSL loops.[^821]

308. [BRI Loops]{.underline}. With respect to BRI loops, the Texas
     Commission did not establish a retail analogue, but instead
     established a 3 day target interval for order installation.[^822]
     Accordingly, we assess SWBT's performance on the basis of whether
     or not it offers efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. As the Department of Justice notes, in recent months, SWBT
     has provisioned competing carrier BRI loop orders in progressively
     fewer and fewer days.[^823] In fact, in April 2000, when volumes of
     BRI loop orders were more than twice as high than in any previous
     month, SWBT was able to provision such orders in an average of 2.8
     days, within the 3 day target established by the Texas
     Commission.[^824] This represents substantial improvement from
     January 2000, when the average was 6.7 days.[^825] Furthermore, we
     note that the shortest installation interval offered to SWBT's
     retail for BRI loops is 5 days and may be as long as 10 days if
     loop conditioning is required.[^826] This is substantially longer
     than the 3 day interval that applies for competing carriers. Thus,
     we conclude that recent performance indicates that efficient
     competitors have a meaningful opportunity to compete.

309. Covad, however, urges the Commission to recognize that it has a
     contractual right to a 3 day installation period and that
     historically SWBT has not met this interval.[^827] Our inquiry, for
     purposes of this application, is whether SWBT provides competing
     carriers with a meaningful opportunity to compete. SWBT's failure
     to meet this 3 day interval with Covad does not preclude a finding
     of overall compliance with item 4 of the checklist, in light of
     SWBT's improving performance in this area and the longer
     installation interval SWBT provides for its own retail service.

310. *Percentage of Installation Due Dates Missed Due to BOC
     Provisioning Error*. We find that SWBT demonstrates with its missed
     due date performance data that it installs xDSL-capable loops for
     competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner that
     it installs xDSL-capable loops for its own retail service. This
     finding further buttresses our conclusion regarding SWBT
     installation intervals that is described above.

311. [xDSL Loops]{.underline}. As a preliminary matter, although the
     Texas Commission originally established SWBT DS1 loops as the
     appropriate retail analogue for competing carrier xDSL loops in
     this performance measurement, neither the Texas Commission, nor any
     carriers participating in this proceeding encourage us to use the
     DS1 analogue.[^828] Accordingly, we confine our review to the
     standard presented in SWBT's performance data: a straightforward
     comparison between xDSL loops provisioned to competing carriers and
     xDSL loops provisioned to SWBT's own retail service. We note that
     this is the comparison used in the Texas Commission's evaluation,
     and addressed by the commenters.

312. Although in the past SWBT had some difficulty meeting competing
     carrier xDSL loop due dates,[^829] more recent data indicate that
     SWBT has since remedied this problem. In March 2000, SWBT missed a
     comparable percentage of xDSL loop due dates for competing carriers
     as it did for its own retail services, and in April 2000, SWBT
     missed less than 3 percent of competing carrier due dates, and 11
     percent of the due dates for its own retail service.[^830] Thus, we
     find that SWBT now meets installation due dates for competing
     carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner.

313. [BRI Loops]{.underline}. Although in the past SWBT had some
     difficulty meeting competing carrier BRI loop due dates,[^831] more
     recent data indicate that SWBT has since remedied this problem. In
     both March and April 2000, SWBT missed fewer competing carrier BRI
     loop due dates for competing carriers than for its own retail
     service.[^832] Notably, in April 2000, SWBT missed 20 percent of
     its own retail service BRI loop due dates and only 9 percent of
     such due dates for competing carrier BRI loops.[^833]

314. *Loop Quality*. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions
     xDSL-capable loops to competing in a manner sufficient to meet the
     requirements of checklist item 4. As the Commission has noted in
     the past, trouble reports within 30 days are "indicative of the
     quality of network components supplied by the incumbent LEC."[^834]
     Moreover, advanced services customers that experience substantial
     troubles in the period following installation of a xDSL-capable
     loop are unlikely to remain with a competing carrier.

315. [xDSL Loops]{.underline}. For reasons described above with respect
     to missed installation due dates, we confine our review of xDSL
     loop quality to the standard presented in SWBT's performance data:
     a straightforward comparison between xDSL loops provisioned to
     competing carriers and xDSL loops provisioned to SWBT's own retail
     service.[^835] Although in the past SWBT has had some difficulty
     provisioning xDSL loops without more troubles following
     installation that their own retail xDSL loops,[^836] more recent
     data indicate that SWBT has since remedied this problem. In both
     March and April 2000, SWBT provisioned xDSL loops to competing
     carriers with comparable trouble rates in the 30 days following
     installation.[^837] For instance, in April 2000, just over 4
     percent of both SWBT and competing carrier xDSL loops experienced
     troubles in the 30 day period after installation.[^838]

316. [BRI Loops]{.underline}. Like the Department of Justice, we
     acknowledge that some performance issues remain with respect to
     troubles following the installation of competing carrier BRI
     loops.[^839] We find that these issues arise from the fact that
     competing carriers use BRI loops for IDSL service,[^840] which
     makes provisioning work more difficult than that required for the
     ISDN service that SWBT provisions using BRI loops.[^841] SWBT
     maintains that these technical difficulties associated with
     supporting IDSL, combined with the short 3 day installation
     interval, are responsible for trouble rates greater than those SWBT
     experiences with its retail ISDN service.[^842] We also find that
     SWBT is working with competing carriers and equipment vendors to

317. solve this problem.[^843] As suggested by Rhythms, SWBT is testing
     a new card for its digital loop carriers that will support IDSL
     service.[^844]

318. Under these circumstances, we find that the differences reported in
     SWBT performance data between the way BRI loops are provisioned for
     SWBT's ISDN service and competing carrier IDSL service do not
     demonstrate discriminatory treatment. We note that the Department
     of Justice reaches the same conclusion.[^845] In light of SWBT's
     efforts to remedy this problem, reasonable questions regarding the
     appropriateness of a straightforward comparison between troubles
     following installation for IDSL and ISDN service, and SWBT's
     competing carrier xDSL-capable loop record overall, we conclude
     that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions BRI loops of a quality
     sufficient to meet the requirements of checklist item 4.

319. *Maintenance and Repair*. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that
     it provides maintenance and repair functions for competing carrier
     xDSL-capable loops in a manner sufficient to meet the requirements
     of checklist item 4.

320. [xDSL Loops]{.underline}. SWBT demonstrates that it provides
     maintenance and repair for competing carrier xDSL loops in
     substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own
     retail customers. With respect to timeliness of maintenance and
     repair, in both February and April 2000, the average time to repair
     competing carrier xDSL loops was substantially less than the
     average time SWBT took to repair its own retail xDSL loops.[^846]
     SWBT also demonstrates that it provides the same quality of xDSL
     loop repair service to competing carriers as it does for its own
     retail service. In the period from February through April, 2000,
     SWBT and competing carrier xDSL loops have experienced a comparable
     repeat trouble rate.[^847]

321. [BRI Loops]{.underline}. Like the Department of Justice, we
     acknowledge that some performance issues remain with respect to the
     timelines of BRI loop maintenance and repair. As discussed above
     with respect to BRI loop trouble rates, SWBT maintains that
     technical difficulties associated with supporting IDSL are
     responsible for the longer average repair times for competing
     carrier BRI loops.[^848] If SWBT discovers that a competing carrier
     intends to use a particular BRI loop to deliver IDSL services, the
     loop may need to be redesigned or reassigned to avoid using
     equipment and facilities that support ISDN services but are not
     compatible with IDSL technology.[^849] This can adversely impact
     the repair time for competing carrier BRI loops used for IDSL
     service, and it draws into question the reasonableness of comparing
     average IDSL repair time with the average time in which SWBT
     repairs its own retail BRI loops.[^850] At the same time, SWBT is
     working with competing carriers to improve its BRI loop
     performance.[^851] Under these circumstances, we find that the
     differences reported in SWBT performance data between the average
     time to repair competing carrier BRI loops and SWBT retail BRI
     loops do not demonstrate discriminatory treatment.

322. At the same time, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it now
     provides the same quality of BRI loop repair service to competing
     carriers as it does for its own retail service. Although in the
     past SWBT has had some difficulty provisioning BRI loops without
     more repeat troubles than SWBT retail BRI loops, more recent data
     indicate that SWBT has since remedied this problem. In both March
     and April 2000, competing carrier BRI loops had fewer repeat
     troubles than did SWBT's own retail BRI loops.[^852] In light of
     these performance data and SWBT's ongoing efforts to improve its
     BRI loop performance, as well as reasonable questions regarding the
     appropriateness of a straightforward comparison between time to
     repair IDSL and ISDN service, and SWBT's competing carrier
     xDSL-capable loop performance overall, we conclude that SWBT
     provides maintenance and repair for BRI loops provisioned to
     competing carriers in a manner sufficient to meet the requirements
     of checklist item 4.

##### Separate Subsidiary

323. SWBT's implementation of a separate subsidiary for advanced
     services in Texas is not a decisional factor regarding compliance
     with section 271 because, for reasons described in the xDSL section
     *supra,* SWBT has carried its burden of demonstrating
     nondiscrimination with an evidentiary showing of performance to its
     wholesale xDSL customers. In this section, however, we address
     commenters' allegations that SWBT's relationship with its separate
     subsidiary for advanced services violates its nondiscrimination
     obligations under the Act. We disagree that these allegations
     constitute grounds either for finding noncompliance with checklist
     item 4 or for denying SWBT's section 271 application.

###### Background

324. SWBT's parent company, SBC, is required as a result of the
     *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* to set up a separate affiliate for
     advanced services throughout its 13-state region.[^853] The purpose
     of the separate affiliate structure is to ensure nondiscriminatory
     provisioning of key inputs for advanced services.[^854] In order to
     comply with the merger conditions, SBC has established SBC Advanced
     Solutions Inc. (ASI) to provide retail and wholesale advanced
     services in Texas and other SBC states (Arkansas, California,
     Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada and Oklahoma).[^855]

325. In order to minimize any disruption to the efficient and timely
     delivery of advanced services to customers, SWBT was permitted a
     reasonable period to transition to "steady state" provisioning of
     advanced services through ASI.[^856] ASI's interconnection
     agreement with SWBT in Texas, which is modeled after the T2A,
     became effective January 7, 2000. On March 13, 2000, ASI began
     processing all new requests for frame relay and cell relay services
     in Texas.[^857] Approximately 10 percent of these new requests
     require a UNE loop (4-wire digital or DS-1 loop) to connect the
     customer premises to the frame relay/cell relay switch port.[^858]
     ASI has been processing LSRs in Texas to order these loops from
     SWBT using the same EDI interface that is available to competitive
     LECs to order unbundled loops.[^859] ASI submits an Access Service
     Request (ASR) for special access for the other 90 percent of orders
     where the 4-wire digital loop or DS-1 is used to connect the
     customer premises to a frame/cell switch port outside the wire
     center for the customer's local exchange service.[^860] ASI submits
     the ASR to SWBT utilizing the same processes, procedures, and
     interfaces as unaffiliated frame relay and ATM service
     providers.[^861]

326. As for ASI's ADSL services, ASI stated that it would continue to
     engage in "interim line sharing" until May 29, 2000, at which time
     SWBT would make line sharing generally available.[^862] In order to
     address criticism in the Texas I record that ASI was not ordering
     xDSL-capable loops as its competitors were doing, ASI pledges in
     SWBT's Texas II application to order 280 unbundled loops per month
     that are capable of providing ADSL service.[^863] ASI stated that
     it would begin to order xDSL-capable loops on April 6, 2000 and
     would continue to do so until line sharing was made generally
     available, submitting LSRs to SWBT for processing in the same
     manner that SWBT provisions unbundled loops to competitive
     LECs.[^864] Furthermore, ASI asserts that when line sharing became
     available, ASI began ordering the "HFPL UNE" (high frequency
     portion of the loop) from SWBT utilizing the same interfaces and
     paying an equivalent price as competitive LECs.[^865]

###### Discussion

327. AT&T and other commenters assert that SWBT has engaged in
     discrimination favoring its advanced services separate affiliate in
     a number of ways. These assertions fall into two broad
     categories: (1) those attacking the separate affiliate structure
     permitted under the merger conditions;[^866] and (2) those alleging
     that SWBT has improperly implemented the merger conditions,
     resulting in preferential treatment for ASI.[^867]

328. As an initial matter, we reject AT&T and TRA's assertions that ASI
     must be deemed a "successor or assign" of SWBT.[^868] In the
     *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order,* we established a rebuttable
     presumption that SWBT's separate subsidiary for advanced services
     would not be considered a successor or assign of the incumbent LEC
     provided that the incumbent and its separate affiliate do not
     deviate from the requirements of section 272(b), (c), (e), and (g)
     other than in the manner explicitly provided for in the merger
     conditions.[^869] We incorporate by reference our legal reasoning
     in reaching this conclusion.[^870] As discussed below, there is no
     evidence in the record that SWBT is operating outside the
     strictures of the merger conditions. Accordingly, no commenters
     have rebutted the presumption we set forth in the *SBC/Ameritech
     Merger Order*. Moreover, we find it would be unfair to fault SWBT
     in the context of the instant proceeding for its adherence to the
     conditions with which it is obligated to comply under the terms of
     the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*.

329. Because we find that ASI is not subject to the obligations of
     section 251(c), we reject TRA's argument that SWBT violates its
     statutory obligation to make xDSL services available at wholesale
     rates to resellers by providing the service through ASI, its
     wholly-owned subsidiary.[^871] As an incumbent LEC, SWBT only has
     an obligation to offer for resale at wholesale rates those services
     that it provides to subscribers at retail.[^872] SWBT does not
     provide xDSL services at retail, so it is not obligated to provide
     these services at wholesale rates.

330. We also reject allegations that the structure of the separate
     affiliate permits SWBT to discriminate on behalf of ASI. For
     example, AT&T asserts that SWBT's provision of network planning and
     engineering functions, including use of SWBT employees to arrange
     for requested collocation space for ASI, allows SWBT to unlawfully
     favor its affiliate over competitors. [^873] SWBT is permitted,
     pursuant to the merger conditions, to engage in certain activities
     for a limited transition period. The Commission found in the
     *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* that "because SBC/Ameritech had
     previously been performing these activities on an integrated basis,
     it \[would\] take some time, both logistically and technically, to
     remove these functions from the incumbent."[^874] Specifically, we
     concluded that a short transition period would "minimize any
     disruption to the efficient and timely delivery of \[a\]dvanced
     \[s\]ervices to customers."[^875] We also note that any differences
     in treatment between ASI and competitors that may occur during this
     transition period would be inherent in the integrated provision of
     advanced services. Moreover, at the end of the transition period,
     competitors will have greater protection against discrimination
     than they otherwise would be entitled to if SWBT had continued to
     provide advanced services on an integrated basis. We find no basis,
     therefore, for altering our conclusion that SWBT complies with the
     collocation requirements of checklist item 1.

331. Similarly, we also reject commenters' objections to ASI's access to
     non-transitional services such as OI&M, joint marketing and
     customer care services, exclusive access to line sharing for a
     limited period, and to our decision to permit the terms of an
     interconnection agreement to suffice for certain transaction
     disclosure requirements.[^876] These activities, like the
     transitional network planning activities described above, were
     explicitly permitted under the merger conditions.

332. We concluded in the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* that the advanced
     services separate affiliate will not derive unfair advantages from
     any of the activities that it is permitted to engage in with the
     incumbent LEC.[^877] We disagree, therefore, that SWBT's engaging
     in these activities with ASI constitutes a violation of
     section 271. In any event, even if these commenters had presented a
     plausible claim of discrimination, which they have not, they have
     alleged no form of discrimination substantial enough to draw into
     question SWBT's overall compliance with the relevant checklist
     items.

333. Finally, we also reject allegations that SWBT, in implementing the
     merger conditions, has conducted activities outside the strictures
     of these conditions, resulting in preferential treatment of
     ASI.[^878] These claims generally appear to describe activity that
     is, in fact, contemplated by the merger conditions. For example,
     AT&T is troubled by a SWBT statement that it provides "certain
     customer care functions after the sale" of ASI's services.[^879] As
     stated above, however, we explicitly found that the sharing of
     customer care services on an exclusive basis is a permitted
     activity pursuant to the SBC/Ameritech merger conditions. [^880]
     Similary, IP Communications alleges that SWBT has only recently
     made its Premis database available to competitive LECs because ASI
     needs access to it. Under the nondiscrimination requirement of
     section 272(c)(1), SWBT's obligation is to give all unaffiliated
     entities the same "goods, services, facilities, and information"
     that it gives to its affiliate.[^881] Instead of showing potential
     discrimination, these facts indicate that SWBT is abiding by the
     relevant nondiscrimination obligations.

334. In addition, we note that even if this allegedly "discriminatory"
     activity were outside the strictures of the merger conditions,
     commenters do not describe how such activity violates any provision
     of the competitive checklist. It seems that, at best, such
     allegations could be relevant, if at all, only to the Commission's
     predictive judgment whether SWBT will comply with the section 272
     requirements with respect to its long distance separate
     affiliate.[^882] Because we find no evidence on this record that
     SWBT is acting outside the confines of the merger conditions,
     however, there is no need to evaluate these claims in the context
     of our section 272 analysis below.

335. 

#### High Capacity Loop Performance

336. We find, based on the evidence in the record, that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides high capacity loops to competing
     carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner. With respect to average
     installation interval, the Texas Commission did not establish a
     retail analogue, but instead established a 3 day target for average
     order installation. Accordingly, we assess SWBT's performance on
     the basis of whether or not it offers efficient competitors a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. Although SWBT has had difficulty
     with meeting this target in the past, during March and April 2000,
     SWBT installed competing carrier DS1 loops in about 3 days, on
     average.[^883] Furthermore, with respect to missed installation due
     dates, in the period from February through April 2000, SWBT missed
     only slightly more due dates for competing carrier DS1 loops than
     it did for its own retail DS1 service.[^884] In addition, during
     the same period, the average time to repair competing carrier DS1
     loops was only slightly higher for competing carriers than it was
     for SWBT.[^885] In light of the lack of commenting parties on these
     slight performance disparities, we do not find these differences
     competitively significant. Finally, during the period from February
     through April 2000, competing carriers DS1 loops experienced
     comparable or lesser repeat trouble report rates than did SWBT's
     own retail DS1 loops.[^886] Thus, we find that SWBT provides
     nondiscriminatory maintenance and repair services for the high
     capacity loops it provides to competing carriers.

337. WorldCom alleges that SWBT will not provide unbundled access to
     high capacity loops, such as OC-3 or OC-12 level facilities.[^887]
     SWBT, however, offers an optional amendment to the T2A that
     redefines the loop network element to include "DS1, DS3, fiber, and
     other high capacity loops to the extent required by applicable
     law."[^888] Because this language indicates that SWBT has a
     concrete and specific legal obligation to make available as broad a
     variety of high capacity loops as the law requires, and we reject
     WorldCom's arguments.

#### Line Sharing and Other Loop Related Issues

338. *Line Sharing*. For the purpose of evaluating whether this
     application satisfies section 271, we do not require SWBT to prove
     that it has implemented the loop facility and OSS modifications
     necessary to accommodate requests for access to the line sharing
     unbundled network element as required by our December 9, 1999 *Line
     Sharing Order*.[^889] Although that order became technically
     effective on February 9, 2000, we acknowledged that it could take
     as long as 180 days from release of our order for incumbent LECs to
     develop and deploy the modifications necessary to implement the new
     obligations.[^890] This 180 day period concluded on June 6, 2000,
     well after SWBT filed its application.[^891] As with the aspects of
     the *UNE Remand Order's* revised rule 319 that were not yet in
     effect at the time SWBT filed its application, we conclude that it
     would be unfair to require SWBT to demonstrate full compliance with
     the requirements of the *Line Sharing Order* in its initial
     application, at a time well in advance of the implementation
     deadline established in the Order. Finally, requiring SWBT to
     supplement the record with new evidence demonstrating its
     compliance with its line sharing obligations on or after June 6,
     2000, would necessitate an 11th hour review of fresh evidence and
     dispose of our well-established procedural framework.[^892]

339. Although we set June 6, 2000 as an outside deadline for
     accommodating requests for access to this new line sharing network
     element, we also established that an incumbent LEC had clear
     obligations to work towards satisfying the line sharing
     requirements in the weeks leading up to this deadline.[^893] We
     find that SWBT demonstrates significant development and operational
     resources devoted to planning for competing carrier access to the
     high frequency portion of the loop.[^894] We find the depth and
     scope of this evidence sufficient to overcome the speculative
     concerns of some competing carriers regarding SWBT's line sharing
     readiness,[^895] and reject competing carrier arguments that the
     Commission should deny SWBT's section 271

340. application on the basis of its alleged failure to comply with the
     requirements of the *Line Sharing Order*.[^896]

341. *Line Splitting*. Some commenters contend that SWBT has unlawfully
     hindered the ability of competing carriers to use the UNE-P to
     provide both xDSL and voice services.[^897] For instance, AT&T
     argues that SWBT has unlawfully denied AT&T access to SWBT's
     splitter and has thereby made it more difficult for AT&T to use the
     UNE-P to provide advanced services.[^898] The Department of Justice
     also noted this issue in passing, but it did not suggest that the
     issue casts doubt on the merits of this application.[^899]

342. As a preliminary matter, we note that under the *Line Sharing
     Order*, the obligation of an incumbent LEC to make the high
     frequency portion of the loop separately available is limited to
     those instances in which the incumbent LEC is providing, and
     continues to provide, voice service on the particular loop to which
     the requesting carrier seeks access.[^900] Thus, the situation that
     these commenters describe is not technically line sharing, because
     both the voice and data service will be provided by competing
     carrier(s) over a single loop, rather than SWBT. To avoid
     confusion, we characterize this type of request as "line
     splitting," rather than line sharing.

343. The Commission's rules require incumbent LECs to provide requesting
     carriers with access to unbundled loops in a manner that allows the
     requesting carrier "to provide any telecommunications service that
     can be offered by means of that network element."[^901] As a
     result, incumbent LECs have an obligation to permit competing
     carriers to engage in line splitting over the UNE-P where the
     competing carrier purchases the entire loop and provides its own
     splitter.[^902] The record reflects that SWBT allows competing
     carriers to provide both voice and data services over the
     UNE-P.[^903] For instance, if a competing carrier is providing
     voice service over the UNE-P, it can order an unbundled
     xDSL-capable loop terminated to a collocated splitter and DSLAM
     equipment and unbundled switching combined with shared transport to
     replace its UNE-P with a configuration that allows provisioning of
     both data and voice service.[^904] SWBT provides the loop that was
     part of the existing UNE-P as the unbundled xDSL-capable loop,
     unless the loop that was used for the UNE-P is not capable of
     providing xDSL service.[^905]

344. AT&T also argues that it has a right to line splitting capability
     over the UNE-P with SWBT furnishing the line splitter.[^906] AT&T
     alleges that this is "the only way to allow the addition of xDSL
     service onto UNE-P loops in a manner that is efficient, timely, and
     minimally disruptive."[^907] Furthermore, AT&T contends that
     competing carriers have an obligation to provide access to all the
     functionalities and capabilities of the loop, including electronics
     attached to the loop.[^908] AT&T contends that the splitter is an
     example of such electronics and that it is included within the loop
     element.[^909]

345. We reject AT&T's argument that SWBT has a present obligation to
     furnish the splitter when AT&T engages in line splitting over the
     UNE-P. The Commission has never exercised its legislative
     rulemaking authority under section 251(d)(2) to require incumbent
     LECs to provide access to the splitter, and incumbent LECs
     therefore have no current obligation to make the splitter
     available.[^910] As we stated in the *UNE Remand Order*, "with the
     exception of Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAMs),
     the loop includes attached electronics, including multiplexing
     equipment used to derive the loop transmission capacity."[^911] We
     separately determined that the DSLAM is a component of the packet
     switching unbundled network element.[^912] We observed that "DSLAM
     equipment sometimes includes a splitter" and that, "\[i\]f not, a
     separate splitter device separates voice and data traffic."[^913]
     We did not identify any circumstances in which the splitter would
     be treated as part of the loop, as distinguished from being part of
     the packet switching element. That distinction is critical, because
     we declined to exercise our rulemaking authority under section
     251(d)(2) to require incumbent LECs to provide access to the packet
     switching element, and our decision on that point is not disputed
     in this proceeding.

346. The *UNE Remand Order* cannot fairly be read to impose on incumbent
     LECs an obligation to provide access to their splitters. Indeed,
     the only discussion of the splitter appeared in a discussion of a
     network element (the packet switching element) that we decided not
     to unbundle, and that discussion at least suggested that the
     splitter, because it is often part of the DSLAM, might properly be
     considered part of that element as a general matter. In response to
     petitions for reconsideration of the *UNE Remand Order*, we have
     been asked to consider whether to impose on incumbent LECs a new
     obligation to provide access to the splitter, just as we are often
     asked to adjust our unbundling rules in light of industry
     developments. In this regard, we believe AT&T's arguments merit
     prompt and thorough consideration by the Commission, and we commit
     to resolving them expeditiously in our reconsideration of the *UNE
     Remand* *Order*. The fact remains, however, that SWBT had no such
     obligation during the period covered by this application and
     therefore, any SWBT failure to provide access to the splitter can
     provide no basis for denying this application.

347. Finally, AT&T suggests in passing that SWBT "voluntarily" provides
     the line splitter functionality to competing carriers engaging in
     line sharing with SWBT voice services and that it has for that
     reason incurred an obligation to provide all UNE-P carriers with
     the same option.[^914] Even if AT&T had fully developed this issue,
     this argument would lack merit and would in any event be unripe for
     our review here. What AT&T requests is not line sharing, but access
     to the entire loop and the splitter in order to provide both voice
     and advanced services. Line sharing and line splitting present two
     different scenarios under our rules. With respect to line sharing,
     we stated in the *Line Sharing Order* that incumbent LECs have
     discretion to maintain control over the splitter.[^915] With
     respect to line splitting, as described above, we have not imposed
     any obligation on incumbent LECs to provide access to their
     splitters. AT&T presents no evidentiary or conceptual basis for
     concluding that SWBT's practices in these two different contexts
     somehow amount to "discrimination" against AT&T. In any event, the
     parties' entire dispute on the question of line splitting is a
     recent development and is subject to further negotiation and, if
     necessary, arbitration before the Texas Commission.[^916] In light
     of SWBT's overall compliance with the relevant checklist items,
     this newly arising dispute provides no basis for rejecting SWBT's
     application here.

348. *Other Issues*. We reject AT&T's argument that we should deny this
     application on the basis of SWBT's decision to deny its xDSL
     service to customers who choose to obtain their voice service from
     a competitor that is using the UNE-P.[^917] Under our rules, the
     incumbent LEC has no obligation to provide xDSL service over this
     UNE-P carrier loop. In the *Line Sharing Order*, the Commission
     unbundled the high frequency portion of the loop when the incumbent
     LEC provides voice service, but did not unbundle the low frequency
     portion of the loop and did not obligate incumbent LECs to provide
     xDSL service under the circumstances AT&T describes. Furthermore,
     as described above, the UNE-P carrier has the right to engage in
     line splitting on its loop. As a result, a UNE-P carrier can
     compete with SWBT's combined voice and data offering on the same
     loop by providing a customer with line splitting voice and data
     service over the UNE-P in the same manner. In sum, we do not find
     this conduct discriminatory.

## Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport

### Background

349. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC
     to provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
     local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
     services."[^918] The Commission has required that BOCs provide both
     dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers.[^919]
     Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities
     dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide
     telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting
     telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or
     requesting telecommunications carriers. [^920] Shared transport
     consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one
     carrier, including the BOC, between end office

350. switches, between end office switches and tandem switches, and
     between tandem switches, in the BOC's network.[^921]

### Discussion

351. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT provides
     both shared and dedicated transport in compliance with the
     requirements of this checklist item.[^922] The Texas Commission
     also finds that SWBT is in compliance with this checklist
     item.[^923]

352. We are persuaded that SWBT's data concerning missed due dates for
     interoffice facilities shows that its provisioning of transport to
     competitive LECs is nondiscriminatory.[^924] We note that no
     commenters challenge SWBT's showing concerning the provision of
     dedicated or shared transport, except insofar as the commenters
     address OSS issues and matters concerning the provisioning of the
     UNE platform, which we address elsewhere.[^925]

353. We disagree with Global Crossing's assertion that SWBT fails to
     provide unbundled local transport.[^926] Global Crossing states
     that in Houston it has an Optical Carrier Level-3 (OC-3)[^927] from
     SWBT that it uses to carry access traffic to its point of presence.
     Global Crossing alleges that SWBT refused to process orders to
     carry local exchange traffic over the OC-3, but required Global
     Crossing instead to acquire a separate transport facility to carry
     purely local traffic. Global Crossing claims that this was an
     illegal use restriction that constituted a refusal by SWBT to
     provide unbundled local transport.

354. As we found in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* we do not
     consider the provision of special access services pursuant to a
     tariff for purposes of determining checklist compliance.[^928] We
     do not believe that checklist compliance is intended to encompass
     the provision of tariffed interstate access services simply because
     these services use some form of the same physical facilities as a
     checklist item.[^929] The fact that the competitive LECs can use
     interstate special access service in lieu of the EEL, a combination
     of unbundled loops and transport, and can convert special access
     service to EELs, does not persuade us that we should alter our
     approach and consider the provision of special access for purposes
     of checklist compliance.[^930] Nevertheless, to the extent that
     parties are experiencing problems in the provisioning of special
     access services ordered from SWBT's federal tariffs, we note that
     these issues are appropriately addressed in the Commission's
     section 208 complaint process.[^931]

## Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching

### Background

355. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[l\]ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop
     transmission, or other services."[^932] In the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order,* the Commission required BellSouth to provide
     unbundled local switching that included line-side and trunk-side
     facilities, plus the features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch.[^933] The features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch include the basic switching function as well as the same
     basic capabilities that are available to the incumbent LEC's
     customers.[^934] Additionally, local switching includes all
     vertical features that the switch is capable of providing, as well
     as any technically feasible customized routing functions.[^935]

356. Moreover, in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission
     required BellSouth to permit competing carriers to purchase
     unbundled network elements, including unbundled switching, in a
     manner that permits a competing carrier to offer, and bill for,
     exchange access and the termination of local traffic.[^936] The
     Commission also stated that measuring daily customer usage for
     billing purposes requires essentially the same OSS functions for
     both competing carriers and incumbent LECs, and that a BOC must
     demonstrate that it is providing equivalent access to billing
     information.[^937] Therefore, the ability of a BOC to provide
     billing information necessary for a competitive LEC to bill for
     exchange access and termination of local traffic is an aspect of
     unbundled local switching.[^938] Thus, there is an overlap between
     the provision of unbundled local switching and the provision of the
     OSS billing function.[^939]

357. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission stated
     that to comply with the requirements of unbundled local switching,
     a BOC must also make available trunk ports on a shared basis and
     routing tables resident in the BOC's switch, as necessary to
     provide access to shared transport functionality.[^940] The
     Commission also stated that a BOC may not limit the ability of
     competitors to use unbundled local switching to provide exchange
     access by requiring competing carriers to purchase a dedicated
     trunk from an interexchange carrier's point of presence to a
     dedicated trunk port on the local switch.[^941]

358. 

### Discussion

359. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it complies with checklist item 6.[^942]
     Specifically, SWBT demonstrates that it provides: (1) line-side and
     trunk side facilities; [^943] (2) basic switching
     functions;[^944] (3) vertical features;[^945] (4) customized
     routing; [^946] (5) shared trunk ports; [^947] (6) unbundled tandem
     switching;[^948] (7) usage information for billing exchange access,
     [^949] and (8) usage information for billing for reciprocal

360. compensation.[^950] The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT is in
     compliance with checklist item 6.[^951]

361. We reject Z-Tel's argument that SWBT has failed to meet this
     checklist requirement. Z-Tel stated that it is effectively
     foreclosed from Line Class Code customized routing (LCC) because,
     as stipulated in the T2A interconnection agreement, if a competing
     carrier requests LCC in any local switch where Advanced Intelligent
     Network custom routing (AIN) is implemented, SWBT may establish a
     rate for the requested LCC, and only if the rate is disputed will
     the Texas Commission set a TELRIC rate.[^952] Z-Tel argued that,
     given this pricing uncertainty, SWBT cannot show that it is
     providing LCC in accordance with the 271 standard, and therefore
     fails to meet checklist item 6.[^953] To support this conclusion,
     Z-Tel pointed to the *Ameritech Michigan Order* in which the
     Commission stated that "\[t\]o be 'providing' a checklist item, a
     BOC must have a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish
     the item upon request pursuant to a state-approved interconnection
     agreement that sets forth prices and other terms and conditions for
     each checklist item."[^954] Z-Tel also cited the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order*, in which the Commission stated that the features,
     functions, and capabilities of the switch include any technically
     feasible customized routing functions.[^955]

362. Z-Tel appeared to conflate two standards -- the "sets forth prices,
     terms, and conditions for each checklist item" standard from the
     *Ameritech Michigan Order*, and the "any technically feasible"
     standard from the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* -- to place an
     unreasonable burden on SWBT. Carried to its logical conclusion,
     Z-Tel's argument would require BOCs to stand ready with fixed
     prices and terms for any and all technically feasible methods of
     providing a function of a network element. We find that SWBT meets
     its obligation to provide the customized routing function, because
     SWBT provides, at fixed prices, terms, and conditions, the routing
     system SWBT itself uses, and makes LCC available, upon request, as
     well.[^956]

363. Z-Tel may consider LCC essential to its business plan. Taking into
     consideration the availability of alternative elements outside the
     incumbent's network, including self-provisioning by Z-Tel or
     acquiring an alternative from a third-party supplier, Z-Tel may
     decide that SWBT's customized switching offering materially
     diminishes Z-Tel's ability to provide the services it seeks to
     offer.[^957] If Z-Tel believes we should include LCC among the
     specific attributes of the switching element, we note that there
     are venues better suited to airing the issue.[^958]

## Checklist Item 7

### 911 and E911 Access

#### Background

364. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to -- (I) 911 and E911
     services."[^959] In the *Ameritech Michigan Order,* the Commission
     found that "section 271 requires a BOC to provide competitors
     access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that a BOC
     obtains such access, *i.e.,* at parity."[^960] Specifically, the
     Commission found that a BOC "must maintain the 911 database entries
     for competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it
     maintains the database entries for its own customers."[^961] For
     facilities-based carriers, the BOC must provide "unbundled access
     to \[its\] 911 database and 911 interconnection, including the
     provision of dedicated trunks from the requesting carrier's
     switching facilities to the 911 control office at parity with what
     \[the BOC\] provides to itself."[^962]

#### Discussion

365. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to
     911/E911 services, and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist
     item 7.[^963] We note that no commenter disputes SWBT's compliance
     with this portion

366. of checklist item 7, and that the Texas Commission concludes that
     SWBT is providing nondiscriminatory access to 911/E911.[^964]

### Directory Assistance/Operator Services

#### Background

367. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III)
     require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to "directory
     assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to
     obtain telephone numbers" and "operator call completion services,"
     respectively.[^965] Section 251(b)(3) of the Act imposes on each
     LEC "the duty to permit all \[competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service\] to have
     nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory
     assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^966] The Commission implemented section 251(b)(3) in the
     *Local Competition Second Report and Order*.[^967]

368. We concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* that a BOC
     must be in compliance with the regulations implementing section
     251(b)(3) to satisfy the requirements of sections
     271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).[^968] In the
     *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, the Commission held
     that the phrase "nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance
     and directory listings" means that "the customers of all
     telecommunications service providers should be able to access each
     LEC's directory assistance service and obtain a directory listing
     on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding: (1) the identity of
     a requesting customer's local telephone service provider; or (2)
     the identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose
     directory listing is requested."[^969] The Commission concluded
     that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and
     5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory assistance were technically
     feasible, and would continue.[^970] The Commission specifically
     held that the phrase \"nondiscriminatory access to operator
     services\" means that ". . . a telephone service customer,
     regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service
     provider, must be able to connect to a local operator by dialing
     '0,' or '0 plus' the desired telephone number."[^971]

369. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory
     assistance by either reselling the BOC's services or by using their
     own personnel and facilities to provide these services. Our rules
     require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOC's
     operator services and directory assistance to request the BOC to
     brand their calls.[^972] Competing carriers wishing to provide
     operator services or directory assistance using their own
     facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory listings
     either by obtaining directory information on a "read only" or "per
     dip" basis from the BOC's directory assistance database, or by
     creating their

370. own directory assistance database by obtaining the subscriber
     listing information in the BOC's database.[^973]

371. Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide
     directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis
     pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the Commission removed directory
     assistance and operator services from the list of required
     unbundled network elements in the *Local Competition Third Report
     and Order*.[^974] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's obligations to provide unbundled network elements
     are not subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252,
     including the requirement that rates be based on forward-looking
     economic costs.[^975] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's UNE obligations, however, still must be provided in
     accordance with sections 201(b) and 202(a), which require that
     rates and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unreasonably
     discriminatory.[^976]

#### Discussion

372. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides directory assistance services in
     accordance with the requirements of checklist item 7.[^977] The
     Texas Commission concludes that SWBT has satisfied the requirements
     of this checklist item.[^978]

373. SWBT's showing withstands the arguments of its opponents regarding
     this checklist item. With regard to directory assistance, WorldCom
     asserts that SWBT violates the checklist by charging competitive
     LECs non-cost-based rates for access to directory assistance
     listings of customers that reside within its region, but outside of
     Texas (*i.e.* Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma).[^979] SWBT
     denies that it violates this checklist item, because the Commission
     and some state commissions have determined that directory
     assistance is a competitive service subject to market-based
     pricing, not cost-based pricing.[^980]

374. We find WorldCom's assertions unpersuasive. WorldCom's argument
     that SWBT's *out-of-state* directory assistance services are priced
     at an anticompetitive level is not relevant to a determination of
     whether SWBT meets checklist item 7 in Texas. For purposes of the
     instant application, we consider only whether SWBT meets the
     requirements of section 271 in the State of Texas.[^981] No
     commenter has challenged SWBT's rate for directory assistance in
     Texas, and the Texas Commission conclude that SWBT meets this
     checklist item.[^982] We therefore conclude that SWBT meets this
     checklist item.

## Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings

### Background

375. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to
     provide "\[w\]hite pages directory listings for customers of the
     other carrier's telephone exchange service."[^983] Section
     251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive
     providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service
     to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listings.[^984]

376. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission concluded
     that, "consistent with the Commission's interpretation of
     'directory listing' as used in section 251(b)(3), the term 'white
     pages' in section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local
     alphabetical directory that includes the residential and business
     listings of the customers of the local exchange

377. provider."[^985] We further concluded, "the term 'directory
     listing,' as used in this section, includes, at a minimum, the
     subscriber's name, address, telephone number, or any combination
     thereof."[^986]

378. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission found
     that a BOC satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by
     demonstrating that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance
     and integration of white page directory listings to competitive
     LECs' customers; and (2) provided white page listings for
     competitors' customers with the same accuracy and reliability that
     it provides its own customers.[^987]

### Discussion

379. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies
     the requirements of checklist item 8.[^988] The Texas Commission
     concludes that SWBT complies with this checklist item.[^989]

380. We reject allegations that SWBT does not meet this checklist item.
     ALTS and the CLEC Coalition state that competitive LECs in Texas
     have experienced problems with SWBT's processes for altering
     customer listings and incorporating changes into the white pages
     directory.[^990] ALTS and the CLEC Coalition also state that some
     listings are "falling out" or failing to appear for no apparent
     reason. In addition, both parties express concern that SWBT's
     performance measurements fail to capture the problems that their
     members report.[^991] The

381. Association of Directory Publishers (ADP) support ALTS and the CLEC
     Coalition, and note that inaccurate or incomplete listings in the
     incumbent's database harmed its members as well.

382. SWBT explains that, at the direction of the Texas Commission, SWBT
     leaves listings unchanged during the resale or UNE provisioning
     process. Unless the competitive LEC submits a Directory Service
     Request form stating otherwise, SWBT assumes the white pages
     listing is to remain unchanged.[^992] ALTS, the CLEC Coalition, and
     ADP did not rebut SWBT's explanation in their reply comments.[^993]

383. We conclude there is no evidence to support that the difficulties
     some competing carriers may have encountered with SWBT's processes
     for altering white pages listings reflect systemic defects within
     SWBT's white pages directory listings procedures. It appears likely
     that competing carriers' perception that listings are "falling out"
     may reflect misunderstanding or miscommunication between carriers
     rather than actual failure to list customers in SWBT's white pages
     directory. We agree with the CLEC Coalition and ADP, however, that
     irregularities involving the white pages are a very serious matter
     because customers may tend to blame the new competitor, rather than
     the familiar incumbent, for mistakes.[^994] Although we do not hold
     SWBT to a standard of perfection, we note that, if there were a
     systemic problem involving a significant number of listings, it
     would warrant a finding of noncompliance.[^995]

## Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration

### Background

384. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to
     the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers," until
     "the date by which telecommunications numbering administration,
     guidelines, plan, or rules are established."[^996] The checklist
     mandates compliance with "such guidelines, plan, or rules" after
     they have been established.[^997]

385. SWBT does not assign telephone numbers to itself or competitive
     LECs. The Commission has designated NeuStar, Inc. (NeuStar) as the
     North American Numbering Plan Administrator.[^998] NeuStar is
     responsible for assigning blocks of 10,000 telephone numbers (NXX
     Codes) to carriers within each area code, and for coordinating area
     code relief planning efforts with state commissions.[^999] SWBT
     must demonstrate that it adheres to industry numbering
     administration guidelines and Commission rules, including
     provisions requiring the accurate reporting of data to the code
     administrator.[^1000]

### Discussion

386. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies
     the requirements of checklist item 9.[^1001] The Texas Commission
     concluded that SWBT meets the requirements of checklist item 9, and
     no commenter alleges that SWBT has failed to meet such
     requirements.[^1002]

## Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling

### Background

387. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling
     necessary for call routing and completion."[^1003] In the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana Order,* we required BellSouth to demonstrate
     that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access
     to: "(1) signaling networks, including signaling links and
     signaling transfer points; (2) certain call-related databases
     necessary for call routing and completion, or in the alternative, a
     means of physical access to the signaling transfer point linked to
     the unbundled database; and (3) Service Management Systems (SMS)."
     [^1004] We also required BellSouth to design, create, test, and
     deploy Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) based services at the SMS
     through a Service Creation Environment (SCE).[^1005]

388. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
     defined call-related databases as databases, other than operations
     support systems, that are used in signaling networks for billing
     and collection or the transmission, routing, or other provision of
     telecommunications service.[^1006] At that time the Commission
     required incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to their
     call-related databases, including but not limited to: the Line
     Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling database, the
     Local Number Portability database, and Advanced Intelligent Network
     databases.[^1007] In the *UNE Remand Order*, we clarified that the
     definition of call-related databases "includes, but is not limited
     to, the calling name (CNAM) database, as well as the 911 and E911
     databases."[^1008]

### Discussion

389. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies
     the requirements of checklist item 10.[^1009] The Texas Commission
     also concludes that SWBT meets this checklist item.[^1010]

390. We reject Pilgrim's assertions that SWBT refuses to provide
     competitors with real-time access to information regarding 900/976
     blocking, billing name and address (BNA), and credit history, and
     therefore, SWBT does not fulfill the call-related database
     requirement of item 10.[^1011] Pilgrim argues that, because it
     provides "casual calling services"[^1012] it must make snap
     decisions whether or not a call should be accepted and
     transmitted.[^1013] Therefore, Pilgrim maintains, the nature of its
     business requires real-time access to call blocking, billing name
     and address (BNA), and credit information in order to validate and
     bill the call. [^1014]

391. SWBT states that, regarding 900/976 blocking information, Pilgrim
     is incorrect, and that in fact SWBT's LIDB does provide real-time
     access to call-blocking information.[^1015] SWBT describes in
     detail the capabilities of the LIDB system.[^1016] Therefore we
     conclude that, contrary to Pilgrim's assertion, SWBT makes
     call-blocking information available on a nondiscriminatory
     basis.[^1017]

392. SWBT further states that it has no obligation to release end-users'
     BNA or credit history to Pilgrim.[^1018] We agree with SWBT that
     checklist item 10 does not require SWBT to share with other
     carriers the customer-credit information that SWBT has accumulated
     in the course of its business dealings with its customers. Such
     information would be considered customer proprietary network
     information (CPNI).[^1019] Pilgrim has not established that SWBT is
     under any obligation to share such CPNI with Pilgrim, or that such
     information is necessary for Pilgrim to "initiate, render, bill,
     and collect for telecommunications services."[^1020]

393. Pilgrim appears to assert, correctly, that BNA is a call-related
     database which must be unbundled pursuant to section 251(c)(3) of
     the Act. As stated above, the Commission has defined call-related
     databases as databases, other than operations support systems, that
     are used in signaling networks for billing and collection or the
     transmission, routing, or other provision of telecommunications
     service.[^1021] Because the BNA database contains the billing name
     and address to validate and bill a telephone call, it clearly meets
     this definition.[^1022] Unlike customer-credit information, BNA
     information is available to competitive LECs that participate in
     the T2A interconnection agreement.[^1023] SWBT provides real-time
     access through a pre-order electronic gateway to SWBT's BNA to
     these competitive LECs.[^1024] Pilgrim, therefore, could opt into
     the T2A and gain access to BNA, pursuant to section 252(i) of the
     Act.[^1025] Consequently, we find that Pilgrim's allegations do not
     warrant a finding of noncompliance with this checklist item.

## Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability

### Background

394. Section 271(c)(2)(B) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to comply with
     the number portability regulations adopted by the Commission
     pursuant to section 251.[^1026] Section 251(b)(2) requires all LECs
     "to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability
     in accordance with requirements prescribed by the
     Commission."[^1027] The 1996 Act defines number portability as "the
     ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at the
     same location, existing telecommunications numbers without
     impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching
     from one telecommunications carrier to another."[^1028] In order to
     prevent the cost of number portability from thwarting local
     competition, Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which requires
     that "\[t\]he cost of establishing telecommunications numbering
     administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne
     by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis
     as determined by the Commission."[^1029]

395. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the Commission requires
     LECs to offer interim number portability "to the extent technically
     feasible."[^1030] The Commission also requires LECs to gradually
     replace interim number portability with permanent number
     portability.[^1031] The Commission has established guidelines for
     states to follow in mandating a competitively neutral cost-recovery
     mechanism for interim number portability,[^1032] and created a
     competitively neural cost-recovery mechanism for long-term number
     portability.[^1033]

### Discussion

396. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT complies
     with the requirements of checklist item 11. SWBT provides permanent
     number portability in conformance with Commission regulations and
     provides interim number portability to competing carriers through
     remote call forwarding, direct inward dialing, and directory number
     routing indexing.[^1034] SWBT is presently converting all interim
     number portability lines to permanent number portability and
     expects that this conversion will be complete by year-end.[^1035]
     The Texas Commission also concludes that SWBT satisfies this
     checklist item.[^1036]

397. We reject Global Crossing and the CLEC Coalition's assertions that
     SWBT fails to provide local number portability in a reliable
     manner.[^1037] Global Crossing describes occasions where it
     believes SWBT failed to update its switch translations properly so
     that calls to Global Crossing customers with a ported number were
     unable to be completed.[^1038] Similarly, the CLEC Coalition claims
     that a SWBT local number portability database outage delayed its
     members orders.[^1039] Because Global Crossing and the CLEC
     Coalition's claim appear to be anecdotal and unsupported by any
     persuasive evidence, we conclude that they do not warrant a finding
     of noncompliance of this checklist item.

## Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity 

### Background

398. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to such services or information as
     are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local
     dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section
     251(b)(3)."[^1040] Section 251(b)(3) imposes upon all LECs "\[t\]he
     duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service with no unreasonable
     dialing delays."[^1041] Section 153(15) of the Act defines "dialing
     parity" as follows:

. . . a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of
any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications
services provider of the customer's designation . . .[^1042]

399. Our rules implementing section 251(b)(3) provide that customers of
     competing carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits
     the BOC's customers dial to complete a local telephone call.[^1043]
     Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer

400. inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays,
     compared to the BOC's customers.[^1044]

### Discussion

401. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT demonstrates
     that it provides local dialing parity in accordance with the
     requirements of section 251(b)(3) and thus satisfies the
     requirements of checklist item 12.[^1045] The Texas Commission
     concluded that SWBT meets the requirements of this checklist
     obligation.[^1046]

402. We reject Pilgrim's argument that because SWBT allegedly denies
     Pilgrim real-time access to call‑blocking databases, Pilgrim cannot
     offer its customers the call-blocking feature that is available to
     SWBT's customers, and SWBT thus fails to provide dialing parity as
     required by section 271 of the Act.[^1047] Because a customer may
     place a call through Pilgrim, rather than directly through SWBT's
     switch, it is possible for that customer (or anyone with access to
     the customer's telephone) to circumvent the blocking intelligence
     in SWBT's switch, and thereby reach the type of pay-per-call
     services the customer has asked SWBT to block.[^1048] Thus, Pilgrim
     argues, the customer suffers inferior quality service by using
     Pilgrim.[^1049]

403. The Commission's dialing parity rules and orders have concerned the
     ease with which a customer may dial an outgoing call, rather than
     the ease with which customers may block the ability to dial
     calls.[^1050] Pilgrim would have us find an ease-of-blocking
     requirement in the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*'s
     phrase "must not otherwise suffer inferior quality service."[^1051]
     We are not persuaded that Commission precedent requires such an
     interpretation. Accordingly, we reject Pilgrim's assertion that
     SWBT fails to meet this checklist requirement.

## Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation

### Background

404. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter
     into \"\[r\]eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with
     the requirements of section 252(d)(2)."[^1052] In turn, pursuant to
     section 252(d)(2)(A), \"a state commission shall not consider the
     terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and
     reasonable unless (i) such terms and conditions provide for the
     mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated
     with the transport and termination on each carrier\'s network
     facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the
     other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such
     costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional
     costs of terminating such calls."[^1053] . The Commission has held
     that "ISP-bound traffic is non-local interstate traffic" and that
     "the reciprocal compensation requirements of section 251(b)(5) of
     the Act . . . do not govern inter-carrier compensation for this
     traffic."[^1054] The Commission specified that state commissions
     may impose reciprocal compensation obligations for ISP-bound
     traffic, or may decline to require the payment of reciprocal
     compensation and may adopt another compensation mechanism while the
     Commission developed final rules in an ongoing proceeding.[^1055]
     On March 24, 2000, the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated this ruling
     and remanded it for a fuller explanation of why ISP-bound traffic
     is not subject to section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation
     requirements.[^1056]

### Discussion

405. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it has entered into reciprocal compensation
     arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section
     252(d)(2), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist
     item 13. SWBT demonstrates that it (1) has in place reciprocal
     compensation arrangements in accordance with section
     252(d)(2),[^1057] and (2) is making all required payments in a
     timely fashion.[^1058] In its brief, SWBT states that the Texas
     Commission established rates for transport and termination in the
     Mega-Arbitration,[^1059] using a forward-looking TELRIC methodology
     that complies with Commission rules.[^1060] SWBT states that
     pursuant to the T2A, its agreements contain clearly defined
     arrangements for each party to compensate the other for traffic
     exchanged between their networks.[^1061] SWBT's interconnection
     agreements include each party's obligation to account for local
     traffic, as well as any applicable charges.[^1062]

406. In the T2A, SWBT offers competitive LECs three opportunities for
     establishing the terms and conditions for reciprocal
     compensation.[^1063] First, a competitive LEC may obtain the
     arbitrated terms in the then-effective SWBT/AT&T interconnection
     agreement.[^1064] That agreement expired January 2, 2000.[^1065] If
     a competitive LEC chose this option prior to that date, the
     provisions of the SWBT/AT&T agreement continue to apply until the
     competitive LEC agreement expires.[^1066] After the competitive LEC
     agreement expires, the compensation arrangements become
     bill-and-keep while SWBT and the competitive LEC negotiate and/or
     arbitrate new terms.[^1067] SWBT states that the Texas Commission
     established transport and termination rates using a TELRIC
     methodology.[^1068] Under the second alternative, competitive LECs
     and SWBT may mutually exchange local traffic on a bill-and-keep
     basis pursuant to terms approved by the Texas Commission.[^1069]
     Finally, the competitive LEC may choose to negotiate and, if
     needed, arbitrate the terms for reciprocal compensation while
     operating under the other terms of the T2A.[^1070] SWBT says that
     while it is negotiating or arbitrating a reciprocal compensation
     agreement with a competitive LEC, the parties exchange local and
     internet traffic under an interim bill-and-keep arrangement,
     subject to true-up, as approved by the Texas Commission.[^1071] The
     Texas Commission concludes that SWBT meets this checklist
     item.[^1072] The Texas Commission states that rates for both
     tandem- and end-office transport and termination are based on a
     TELRIC methodology.[^1073]

407. SWBT's showing withstands the arguments raised by its opponents. We
     find unpersuasive the claims of the CLEC Coalition and e.spire that
     SWBT's reported usage data for traffic passed between SWBT's and
     their respective networks is unreliable and incorrect.[^1074] SWBT
     says it provides competitive LECs that use unbundled local
     switching with detailed records needed to obtain reciprocal
     compensation for calls originating from SWBT and other unbundled
     switch-based competitive LECs.[^1075] SWBT notes that the Texas
     Commission has concluded that SWBT's usage record method is
     adequate.[^1076] The Texas Commission notes that if competitive
     LECs do not wish to use SWBT's particular type of record exchange,
     they are free to choose one of the other two reciprocal
     compensation options.[^1077]

408. SWBT notes that due to technological limitations, it currently
     cannot track calls originating from a third-party facilities-based
     carrier and terminating to a customer served by a competitive LEC
     using SWBT's unbundled local switches.[^1078] In response to the
     Texas Commission\'s concerns regarding this problem, SWBT and other
     carriers have implemented an interim traffic reporting and
     compensation mechanism. [^1079] SWBT notes that this interim
     compensation mechanism was agreed to by AT&T, WorldCom, and Sage
     Telecom, approved by the Texas Commission, and is included in the
     T2A.[^1080] This interim mechanism will remain in effect until a
     permanent industry solution is found.[^1081] SWBT also notes that
     the carriers' interconnection agreements provide procedures for
     addressing billing disputes, and that neither commenter has
     presented its claims to the Texas Commission.[^1082]

409. The 1996 Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve specific
     carrier-to-carrier disputes arising under the local competition
     provisions, and it authorizes the federal district courts to ensure
     that the results of the state arbitration process are consistent
     with federal law.[^1083] Although we have an independent obligation
     to ensure compliance with the checklist, section 271 does not
     compel us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier
     disputes by the state commissions. We believe that e.spire and the
     CLEC Coalition should bring this fact-specific dispute before the
     Texas Commission. Additionally, we believe that SWBT has made a
     concerted effort to resolve this traffic reporting dispute, has
     continued to exchange traffic records with e.spire during the
     course of this dispute, and has implemented a reasonable interim
     traffic reporting mechanism while industry groups work toward a
     permanent industry-wide solution.[^1084] We find that e.spire's and
     the CLEC Coalition's allegations are insufficient to rebut SWBT's
     case.

410. Nor are we persuaded by WorldCom's allegations that SWBT's Extended
     Area Service (EAS) additive charge is a non-cost-based fee intended
     to compensate SWBT for lost revenues, in violation of our
     rules.[^1085] EAS enables residential and business customers to
     extend the coverage of their flat-rate local calling area for a set
     monthly fee.[^1086] A customer subscribing to EAS pays a higher
     monthly flat rate in order to have a larger non-toll calling
     area.[^1087] Under one-way EAS, a SWBT customer would be able to
     call another SWBT customer within its extended area without paying
     a toll. Under two-way EAS, the SWBT subscriber pays a higher fee to
     allow other SWBT customers within the extended calling area to call
     in without paying toll charges.

411. When either the originating or terminating end user is not a SWBT
     customer, however, EAS will not work. If a SWBT EAS customer calls
     a competitive LEC customer in the extended area, the competitive
     LEC ordinarily would charge SWBT terminating access, which SWBT
     would pass on to its SWBT customer. Similarly, when a competitive
     LEC customer in the extended area calls a SWBT customer, SWBT would
     charge the competitive LEC terminating access, which the
     competitive LEC would pass on to its customer. Carriers, however,
     may agree to waive toll charges that would otherwise be assessed.
     In the alternative, carriers may agree to bill each other a
     per-minute charge. WorldCom asserts that the additive charge of
     between 2 and 4 cents per minute is a non-cost-based charge
     intended to compensate SWBT for revenues it once received from EAS
     customers that have moved to a new entrant.[^1088] As the Texas
     Commission explains, however, the additive charges are designed to
     compensate the carriers in exchange for their agreement to waive
     the terminating access they otherwise would have received.[^1089]
     The Texas Commission notes that such EAS additives are reciprocal
     in nature and entirely optional.[^1090] Therefore, we conclude that
     WorldCom has not demonstrated that the EAS additive violates the
     section 271 provisions applicable to reciprocal
     compensation.[^1091]

412. Allegiance requests that the Commission determine the appropriate
     compensation arrangement for local and ISP-bound traffic.[^1092]
     Allegiance asserts that the Commission should set compensation
     rates for inter-carrier traffic in accordance with TELRIC.[^1093]
     The Texas Commission has determined that Internet-bound traffic
     from an end user is to be treated under the applicable
     interconnection agreements as if it were local traffic for purposes
     of reciprocal compensation.[^1094] SWBT has appealed this
     determination but states that it will continue to apply this method
     of compensation while required to do so.[^1095] We note that
     Allegiance does not allege that SWBT fails this checklist item, but
     merely requests that the Commission reconsider its previous
     decision to allow states to make determinations regarding
     reciprocal compensation. As noted above, the D.C. Court of Appeals
     remanded the Commission's ruling that ISP-bound traffic is not
     subject to section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation
     requirements.[^1096] Because Allegiance does not allege that SWBT
     fails this checklist item, and also because this issue if before us
     again due to the court's remand, we do not address it in the
     context of a 271 application.

## Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 

### Background

413. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make
     \"telecommunications services . . . available for resale in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and
     252(d)(3).\"[^1097] Section 251(c)(4)(A) requires incumbent LECs
     \"to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications
     service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are
     not telecommunications carriers.\"[^1098] Section 252(d)(3)
     requires state commissions to "determine wholesale rates on the
     basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the
     telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof
     attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs
     that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier."[^1099] Section
     251(c)(4)(B) prohibits \"unreasonable or discriminatory conditions
     or limitations\" on service resold under section
     251(c)(4)(A).[^1100] Consequently, the Commission concluded in the
     *Local Competition First Report and Order* that resale restrictions
     are presumed to be unreasonable unless the LEC proves to the state
     commission that the restriction is reasonable and
     non-discriminatory.[^1101] If an incumbent LEC makes a service
     available only to a specific category of retail subscribers,
     however, a state commission may prohibit a carrier that obtains the
     service pursuant to section 251(c)(4)(A) from offering the service
     to a different category of subscribers.[^1102] If a state creates
     such a limitation, it must do so consistent with requirements
     established by the Federal Communications Commission.[^1103] In
     accordance with sections 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv), a
     BOC must also demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access
     to operations support systems for the resale of its retail
     telecommunications services.[^1104]

### Discussion

414. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it makes telecommunications services available
     for resale in accordance with sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3), and
     thus satisfies the requirements of checklist item 14. SWBT states
     that it is in compliance with the requirements of this checklist
     item,[^1105] and the Texas Commission agrees.[^1106] SWBT says that
     it commits in its interconnection agreements and the T2A to making
     its retail services available to competing carriers at wholesale
     rates.[^1107] In 1995, the Texas Commission established a resale
     tariff to make retail local exchange telecommunications services
     available to resellers at a 5 percent discount.[^1108] In its
     Mega-Arbitration proceeding, conducted after the 1996 Act was
     implemented, the Texas Commission used an avoided-cost calculation
     method consistent with the Commission's pricing rules to establish
     a generally-available discount of 21.6 percent off SWBT's retail
     rates.[^1109] Competing carriers may thus obtain services from
     SWBT's tariff at a 5 percent discount, or from the T2A or through
     interconnection agreements at a 21.6 percent discount.[^1110]
     Competing carriers may purchase SWBT's promotional offerings of 90
     days or less at the promotional rate, and its promotional offerings
     of greater than 90 days at the 21.6 percent discount.[^1111]
     Competing carriers may purchase existing customer specific
     arrangements (CSAs) at either a 5.62 percent or 8.04 percent
     discount, depending on the type of contract.[^1112] Additionally,
     competing carriers may purchase at the 21.6 percent discount CSAs
     to resell to new customers.[^1113] Pursuant to the terms of the
     SBC/Ameritech merger, SWBT also offers a discount of 32 percent off
     its retail rate for resold service to residential customers.[^1114]

415. SWBT also states that it makes its retail telecommunications
     services available for resale without unreasonable or
     discriminatory conditions or limitations.[^1115] The Texas
     Commission agrees.[^1116] According to SWBT, the telecommunications
     services it offers competing carriers for resale are identical to
     the services it furnishes its own retail customers, and competing
     carriers are able to sell these services to the same customer
     groups, in the same manner.[^1117] Competing carriers may also take
     over existing contracts by purchasing CSAs without triggering
     termination liability charges or contract transfer fees to the end
     user.[^1118] SWBT permits competing carriers that resell CSAs to
     meet minimum volume requirements by aggregating the traffic of
     multiple end-user customers, provided that those customers are
     similarly situated to the customer(s) of SWBT's original
     contract.[^1119]

416. SWBT's case withstands the arguments of its opponents. We are not
     persuaded by the National ALEC Association/Prepaid Communications
     Association (NALA)'s unsubstantiated contention that SWBT's resale
     contracts contain onerous contract terms.[^1120] Specifically, NALA
     asserts that SWBT's resale contracts: indemnify SWBT against
     resellers' customer claims, limiting that liability to a credit or
     refund if SWBT negligently performs its resale services; lack
     meaningful penalties if SWBT fails to perform its contract
     obligations; make resellers responsible for all sales and related
     taxes; compel arbitration rather than litigation in cases of
     dispute; fail to guarantee that SWBT's third-party vendor
     arrangements will not result in higher reseller fees; permit SWBT
     to terminate reseller agreements on an annual basis; and require
     large deposits from resellers.[^1121] The Texas Commission provides
     multiple procedural vehicles to address such concerns, and NALA
     should have first raised these concerns there, preferably when it
     was contemplating entering into the contracts.[^1122] For example,
     if NALA does not care for one of SWBT's contract provisions, it may
     negotiate or arbitrate such provision, or otherwise work with the
     Texas Commission to find an interim solution until a final
     resolution is reached.[^1123] Additionally, NALA has not produced
     evidence to substantiate its claim. We therefore find that SWBT's
     application withstands this allegation.

417. Nor are we persuaded by NALA's argument that SWBT's resale-related
     OSS charges are discriminatory. NALA resells SWBT's local service
     to residential customers with poor credit histories in the form of
     prepaid, flat-rate local telephone service.[^1124] SWBT offers a
     virtually identical prepaid package.[^1125] NALA alleges that SWBT
     offers its prepaid home service "at a price below what NALA . . .
     members charge," and that "it appears that this rate does not
     impute all the charges that SBC's competitors must pay."[^1126]
     Specifically, NALA contends that SWBT charges Texas resellers OSS
     costs, and that "it is far from clear whether these OSS charges are
     included in SBC's rates for its Prepaid Home Service." [^1127] SWBT
     responds that the charge NALA refers to is not OSS.[^1128] Rather,
     it is a "conversion order charge" that SWBT assesses when a
     competing carrier converts existing SWBT retail POTS service into a
     resold service.[^1129] Alternately, SWBT assesses a "service
     connection charge" when a competing carrier establishes a new
     service using resold SWBT service.[^1130] The service connection
     charge, SWBT asserts, is the same charge it assesses its retail
     customers, but resellers receive a 21.6 per cent discount.[^1131]
     SWBT asserts that these charges recover the cost of customer
     service labor associated with processing service orders.[^1132] The
     Texas Commission has authorized both of these charges.[^1133] SWBT
     also disputes NALA's assertion that it cannot compete with SWBT for
     prepaid home telephone service because SWBT is able to underprice
     the service.[^1134] SWBT notes that resellers may purchase its
     prepaid home telephone service for resale at a discount of either
     21.6 per cent or 32 per cent.[^1135] Alternatively, resellers may
     purchase SWBT's POTS, along with those options that constitute a
     prepaid home service option identical to SWBT's, at a
     discount.[^1136] We find that NALA provides insufficient
     information to show that SWBT's service offering is
     discriminatory.[^1137]

418. We find unpersuasive the claims of Adelphia,[^1138]
     Allegiance,[^1139] e. spire,[^1140] and KMC[^1141] that the
     Commission should allow customers in long-term contracts to switch
     to competing telecommunications carriers without termination
     penalties under a "fresh look" argument. These commenters assert
     that their customers are reluctant to change carriers if they are
     required to pay termination penalties.[^1142] SWBT responds that
     competitive LECs may resell its CSAs without triggering termination
     liability to the end user.[^1143] Additionally, the Commission has
     previously held that although termination liabilities could, in
     certain circumstances, be unreasonable or anticompetitive, they do
     not on their face cause a carrier to fail checklist item 14.[^1144]
     The Commission further found that the absence of a "fresh look"
     requirement is not a basis for rejecting a section 271
     application.[^1145] KMC contends that the Commission should impose
     a "fresh look" requirement on public interest grounds, that is, as
     part of our analysis under section 271(d)(3)(C).[^1146] We note
     that KMC raised an identical issue in a Petition for Declaratory
     Ruling, which is currently pending.[^1147] We find, as we did in
     the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, that this issue is best
     addressed in the context of that pending petition, and we decline
     to resolve the issue here.[^1148] In any event, our resolution of
     this issue would not cast doubt on SWBT's overall compliance with
     checklist item 14 because SWBT meets our existing resale
     requirements.

419. *Provisioning.* Based on evidence in the record, we find that SWBT
     satisfies the provisioning requirements of checklist item 14. As
     discussed above, SWBT is provisioning competitive LECs' orders for
     resale in substantially the same time and manner as for its retail
     customers.[^1149]

# SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 

## Background

420. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^1150] The
     Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the
     *Accounting Safeguards Order* and the *Non-Accounting Safeguards
     Order*.[^1151] Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate
     the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization
     between the BOC and

421. its section 272 affiliate.[^1152] In addition, these safeguards
     ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of their section 272
     affiliates.[^1153]

422. As we stated in the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, compliance with
     section 272 is "of crucial importance" because the structural,
     transactional, and nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272 seek
     to ensure that BOCs compete on a level playing field.[^1154] The
     Commission's findings regarding section 272 compliance constitute
     independent grounds for denying an application.[^1155] Past and
     present behavior of the BOC applicant provides "the best indicator
     of whether \[the applicant\] will carry out the requested
     authorization in compliance with section 272."[^1156]

## Discussion

423. Based on the record, we conclude that SWBT has demonstrated that it
     will comply with the requirements of section 272. We address each
     section 272 requirement below.

### Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section 272

424. *Section 272(a) -- Separate Affiliate*. Section 272(a) requires
     BOCs and their local exchange carrier affiliates that are subject
     to section 251(c) to provide certain competitive services through
     structurally separate affiliates.[^1157] For the reasons described
     in the subsequent section below, we conclude that SBC demonstrates
     that it will operate in accordance with section 272(a).

425. The parent company, SBC Communications, Inc., has established one
     primary section 272 affiliate to provide in-region interLATA
     services in Texas upon gaining section 271 approval: Southwestern
     Bell Communications Services, Inc. ("SBCS"), which does business as
     Southwestern Bell Long Distance. [^1158] At this time, SBCS
     conducts no business aside from the company's calling card
     operations. Once earning section 271 approval, SBCS plans to
     provide in-region interLATA services in Texas by reselling
     wholesale network services of one or more unaffiliated
     providers.[^1159] In its application, SWBT demonstrates that it has
     implemented internal control mechanisms reasonably designed to
     prevent, as well as detect and correct, any noncompliance with
     section 272.[^1160]

426. *Section 272(b)(1) -- Operate Independently*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate
     will comply with section 272(b)(1), which requires a section 272
     affiliate to "operate independently from the Bell operating
     company."[^1161] The Commission has interpreted the "operate
     independently" requirement to impose four important restrictions on
     the ownership and operations of a BOC and its section 272
     affiliate: (1) no joint ownership of switching and transmission
     facilities; (2) no joint ownership of the land and buildings on
     which switching and transmission facilities are located; (3) no
     provision by the BOC (or other non-section 272 affiliate) of
     operation, installation, and maintenance services (OI&M) with
     respect to the section 272 affiliate's facilities; and (4) no
     provision of OI&M by the section 272 affiliate with respect to the
     BOC's facilities. We note that our review of SBCS's Internet
     postings, as well as SWBT's cost allocation manual (CAM) and
     independent auditor's reports, support our finding.

427. *Section 272(b)(2) -- Books, Records, and Accounts*. Based on the
     evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that section 272
     affiliate will comply with the its requirement to "maintain books,
     records, and accounts in a manner prescribed by the Commission
     which shall be separate from the books, records, and accounts
     maintained by the \[BOCs\]."[^1162] Although initially unclear
     whether the section 272 affiliate maintained its books, records,
     and accounts in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
     Principles (GAAP), SWBT submitted

428. additional evidence to demonstrate consistency with GAAP and
     compliance with the Commission's rules.[^1163] In addition, we note
     that no party challenges SWBT's showing.

429. *Section 272(b)(3) -- Separate Officers, Directors, and Employees*.
     Based on the evidence in the record, SWBT has demonstrated that its
     section 272 affiliate will comply with the "separate officers,
     directors, and employees" requirement of section 272(b)(3).[^1164]
     We note that no party challenges SWBT's showing.

430. *Section 272(b)(4) -- Credit Arrangements*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate
     will comply with section 272(b)(4), which prevents a section 272
     affiliate from obtaining "credit under any arrangement that would
     permit a creditor, upon default, to have recourse to the assets of
     \[any SBC BOC\]."[^1165] We note that no party challenges SWBT's
     showing.

431. *Section 272(b)(5) -- Affiliate Transactions.* Based on our review
     of its application, we conclude that SBC demonstrates that it will
     comply with the arm's length and public disclosure requirements of
     section 272(b)(5) for transactions between its BOCs and its section
     272 affiliate.[^1166] Section 272(b)(5) requires that a section 272
     affiliate conduct all transactions with its affiliated BOCs on an
     arm's length basis, with all such transactions reduced to writing
     and made publicly-available.[^1167] Consistent with the
     Commission's *Accounting Safeguards Order*, all transactions
     between SWBT's section 272 affiliates and any affiliated BOC are
     posted on the company's Internet homepage within 10 days of the
     transaction.[^1168] To ensure that all transactions occur at arm's
     length, SWBT must abide by the Commission's affiliate transactions
     rules.[^1169] As noted in previous Orders addressing section 271
     applications, the Commission evaluates the sufficiency of a BOC's
     Internet disclosures by referring to its ARMIS filings, its cost
     allocation manuals (CAMs), and its CAM audit workpapers.[^1170]

432. SWBT persuades us that its section 272 affiliate will comply with
     the section 272(b)(5) public disclosure requirements, including the
     obligation to post all transactions between the BOC and its section
     272 affiliate within 10 days of the transaction.[^1171] Although
     our preliminary analysis revealed a potentially significant
     discrepancy between the relevant Internet disclosures and SWBT's
     accounting data, SWBT adequately demonstrated that the
     discrepancies did not adversely impact the timely posting of
     information on the Internet.[^1172] We further note that, for
     certain transactions, SWBT provided additional assurances to show
     that it met its obligations under section 272(b)(5).[^1173]
     Finally, SWBT demonstrates that its section 272 affiliate

433. meets the Commission's 10-day posting requirement and maintains an
     audit trail of past Internet postings.[^1174]

434. Although we are concerned about the specific examples cited by
     AT&T, we conclude that the Internet disclosures of SWBT's section
     272 affiliate are, on the whole, sufficiently detailed to evaluate
     compliance with the Commission's rules and to facilitate the
     detection of potential anticompetitive conduct.[^1175] As AT&T
     points out, however, the Internet posting for "Temporary Projects"
     services provided by SBC to its section 272 affiliate fails to
     provide a comprehensible description of the services at
     issue,[^1176] and several other Internet postings contain a similar
     lack of detail.[^1177] Despite these flaws, our in-depth review of
     the relevant Internet disclosures shows that the majority contain
     sufficient detail, as specified in the *Accounting Safeguards
     Order*, the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, and the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order*.[^1178] Finally, we note that SWBT's Internet
     postings will undergo a thorough and systematic review in the
     section 272(d) biennial audit, which will ensure that any failure
     to post sufficient detail are identified in time for appropriate
     remedial action.

435. Based on the record evidence, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates
     that it will comply with the affiliate transactions rules, which is
     necessary to ensure that all transactions between a BOC and its
     section 272 affiliate comply with the statutory "arm's length"
     requirement.[^1179] Our review of SWBT's ARMIS data, its CAM, its
     independent auditor's workpapers, and the Internet disclosures
     supports SWBT's showing of compliance with the affiliate
     transactions rules. Neither the Commission's review of SWBT's
     accounting information nor the audits conducted by independent
     auditors have revealed discrepancies with SWBT's corporate
     accounting procedures for affiliate transactions in the past three
     years. We note that the section 272(d) joint Federal-State audit
     will provide an appropriate mechanism for detecting potential
     anticompetitive or otherwise improper conduct.

436. As a final matter, we are concerned about the confidentiality
     agreement raised by AT&T, but we are persuaded that the agreement
     does not preclude a showing of compliance for SWBT.[^1180] AT&T
     argues that SWBT's nondisclosure agreement[^1181] restricts the
     ability of unaffiliated third parties to obtain information about
     affiliate transactions and to report potential noncompliance to the
     appropriate authorities.[^1182] We agree with AT&T that restricting
     third party access to regulatory authorities is improper and that
     SWBT's nondisclosure agreement might deter unaffiliated third
     parties from notifying the Commission about potential violations of
     our rules. SWBT persuades us, however, that its current
     nondisclosure agreement has not adversely affected its ability to
     comply with section 272(b)(5) to date because all transactions were
     properly posted on the Internet.[^1183] Competing carriers and
     others are always entitled to raise potential problem areas and
     seek redress with the appropriate authorities, and that a BOC
     should not attempt to restrict such rights through nondisclosure
     agreements or other means.

437. *Section 272(c)(2) -- Accounting Principles*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it accounts for all
     transactions with its section 272 affiliates in accordance with the
     accounting principles designated or approved by the
     Commission.[^1184] In the *Accounting Safeguards Order*, the
     Commission concluded that complying with the Part 32 affiliate
     transactions rules satisfies the accounting requirements of section
     272(c), which pertain to the BOC's "dealings" with its separate
     affiliate. We agree with SBC that its section 272 affiliates may
     share services (except OI&M) provided to its affiliated BOCs by a
     "shared services affiliate," but we emphasize that such services
     are subject to the appropriate non-structural safeguards.[^1185]

438. *Section 272(d) -- Biennial Audit*. Based on the evidence in the
     record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with
     section 272(d), which requires an independent audit of a BOC's
     compliance with section 272 after receiving interLATA
     authorization.[^1186] The section 272(d) biennial audit involves a
     thorough and systematic evaluation of a BOC's compliance with
     section 272 and its affiliate relationships performed by an
     independent auditor working under the direction of the Commission
     and state commissions.[^1187] As noted in the *Accounting
     Safeguards Order*, once a BOC obtains section 271 approval, the
     Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau will form a joint Federal/State
     audit team to review the conduct of the audit and oversee the
     activities of the independent auditor.[^1188] We view the active
     participation of the state commissions as critical to the success
     of the biennial audit at ensuring a BOC's compliance with
     section 272. As noted in previous orders, the section 272(d)
     biennial audit entails an examination into a BOC's affiliate
     relationships to ensure the company does not use its corporate
     affiliates as improper tools for circumventing statutory
     obligations.[^1189] We stress that a BOC cannot circumvent legal
     and regulatory requirements through its affiliate structure.[^1190]

#### Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272

439. *Section 272(c)(1) -- Nondiscrimination Safeguards*. Based on the
     evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it
     will comply with section 272(c)(1), which prohibits a BOC from
     discriminating in favor of its section 272 affiliates in the
     "provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and
     information, or in the establishment of standards."[^1191] The
     Commission's nondiscrimination safeguards require a BOC to, among
     other things, "provide to unaffiliated entities the same goods,
     services, facilities, and information that it provides to its
     section 272 affiliate at the same rates, terms, and
     conditions."[^1192] Our review of SWBT's internal controls and
     standard operating procedures shows that SWBT requires its section
     272 affiliate to adhere to the same procedures for obtaining
     collocation space required of unaffiliated third parties, and that
     SWBT has procedures to ensure that unaffiliated entities have
     access to information for, among other things, the development of
     company-internal standards and processes.[^1193] In addition, we
     note SWBT's OSS showing demonstrates that it meets the requirements
     of section 272(c)(1) regarding nondiscriminatory provision of
     information.[^1194]

440. Although we agree with AT&T that section 272(c)(1) establishes an
     "unqualified prohibition" against discrimination, we find that its
     arguments regarding SWBT's proposed intrastate switched access
     tariffs are moot.[^1195] In its comments, AT&T contends that SWBT's
     pricing plan for swtiched access service discriminates against
     larger interexchange carriers.[^1196] The Texas Commission,
     however, rejected SWBT's proposed intrastate switched access tariff
     as unlawful for the reasons presented by AT&T.[^1197] Because
     SWBT's proposed tariff is not (and will not) be effective, we
     conclude that AT&T's argument regarding a violation of the section
     272(c)(1) nondiscrimination safeguards is moot.

441. *Section 272(e) -- Fulfillment of Certain Requests.* Based on the
     evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with
     section 272(e), which requires SWBT to fulfill requests for, among
     other things, telephone exchange and exchange access services from
     unaffiliated entities within the same time period SWBT fulfills
     such requests for its own retail operations.[^1198] In addition,
     section 272(e) also provides that a BOC "shall not provide any
     facilities, services, or information concerning its provision of
     exchange access to the \[section 272 affiliate\] unless such
     facilities, services or information are made available to other
     providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms
     and conditions."[^1199] Finally, section 272(e) places certain
     accounting and nondiscrimination requirements on BOCs with respect
     to exchange access and facilities or services provided to their
     section 272 affiliates.[^1200] Except for one issue, we note that
     no party challenges SWBT's showing.

442. As discussed above in the context of the section 272(c)(1)
     nondiscrimination safeguards, AT&T alleges that a SWBT-proposed
     intrastate switched access tariff violates the nondiscrimination
     safeguards of section 272(e)(3) because it provides volume
     discounts to a limited number of interexchange carriers.[^1201]
     Although AT&T correctly points out that the Commission's section
     272(e)(3) rules require a BOC to "make volume and term discounts
     available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all unaffiliated
     interexchange carriers," its argument is moot because the Texas
     Commission rejected SWBT's proposed intrastate switched access
     tariffs as unlawful for the reasons presented by AT&T.[^1202]
     Because SWBT's proposed tariff is not (and will not) be effective,
     we conclude that AT&T's argument regarding a violation of the
     section 272(e)(3) nondiscrimination safeguards is moot.

#### Joint Marketing Provisions of Section 272

443. *Section 272(g)(1) -- Affiliate Sales of Telephone Exchange Access
     Services*. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that
     SWBT has demonstrated that it will comply with the joint marketing
     provisions of section 272(g)(1).[^1203] We note that no party
     challenges SWBT's showing.

444. *Section 272(g)(2) --* Bell Operating Company Sales of Affiliate
     Services. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply
     with section 272(g)(2), which prevents a BOC from marketing or
     selling within its region any interLATA service provided by a
     section 272 affiliate absent authorization obtained pursuant to
     section 271(d).[^1204] We note that no party challenges SWBT's
     showing.

# PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS

## Overview

445. In addition to determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^1205] We conclude that approval of this application is
     consistent with the public interest. In reaching this
     determination, we find that compliance with the competitive
     checklist is itself a strong indicator that long distance entry is
     consistent with the public interest. This approach reflects the

446. Commission's many years of experience with the consumer benefits
     that flow from competition in telecommunications markets.

447. Nonetheless, the public interest analysis is an independent element
     of the statutory checklist and, under normal canons of statutory
     construction, requires an independent determination.[^1206] Thus,
     we view the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review
     the circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no
     other relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional
     intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive
     checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest
     as Congress expected. Among other things, we may review the local
     and long distance markets to ensure that there are not unusual
     circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest
     under the particular circumstances of this application.[^1207]
     Another factor that could be relevant to our analysis is whether we
     have sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant
     of the application. While no one factor is dispositive in this
     analysis, our overriding goal is to ensure that nothing undermines
     our conclusion, based on our analysis of checklist compliance, that
     markets are open to competition. As discussed below, we conclude
     that the public interest would be met by grant of this application.

448. Finally, we note that a strong public interest showing cannot
     overcome a failure to demonstrate compliance with one or more
     checklist items. The Commission is specifically barred from
     "limit\[ing\] . . . the terms used in the competitive
     checklist,"[^1208] or forbearing from requiring compliance with all
     statutory conditions under section 271.[^1209]

## Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets

449. As set forth below, we conclude that approval of this application
     is consistent with promoting competition in the local and long
     distance telecommunications markets. Consistent with our extensive
     review of the competitive checklist, which embodies the critical
     elements of market entry under the Act, we find that barriers to
     competitive entry in the local market have been removed and the
     local exchange market today is open to competition. We disagree
     with commenters' arguments that the public interest would be
     disserved by granting SWBT's application because the local market
     in Texas has not yet truly been opened to competition.[^1210]
     Commenters cite an array of evidence which, they argue,
     demonstrates that the local telecommunications market is not open
     and that competition has not sufficiently taken hold in Texas. For
     example, commenters allege that the local market in Texas is
     characterized by: the low percentage of total access lines served
     by competitive LECs;[^1211] the concentration of competition in
     Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston and other urban areas;[^1212] minimal
     competition for residential services;[^1213] modest
     facilities-based investment;[^1214] and prices for local exchange
     service at the maximum permissible levels under the price
     caps.[^1215] We note that Congress specifically declined to adopt a
     market share or other similar test for BOC entry into long
     distance, and we have no intention of establishing one here.[^1216]
     We further find that the record confirms our view, as noted in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, that BOC entry into the long
     distance market will benefit consumers and competition if the
     relevant local exchange market is open to competition consistent
     with the competitive checklist.[^1217]

## Assurance of Future Compliance

450. As set forth below, we find that SWBT's performance remedy plan
     provides additional assurance that the local market will remain
     open after SWBT receives section 271 authorization. The Commission
     previously has explained that one factor it may consider as part of
     its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would continue to
     satisfy the requirements of section 271 after entering the long
     distance market.[^1218] Although the Commission strongly encourages
     state performance monitoring and post-entry enforcement, we have
     never required BOC applicants to demonstrate that they are subject
     to such mechanisms as a condition of section 271 approval.[^1219]
     The Commission has stated that the fact that a BOC will be subject
     to performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms would
     constitute probative evidence that the BOC will continue to meet
     its section 271 obligations and that its entry would be consistent
     with the public interest.[^1220]

451. We believe that it is not necessary that a state monitoring and
     enforcement mechanism alone provide full protection against
     potential anti-competitive behavior by the incumbent. Most
     significantly, we recognize that the Commission's enforcement
     authority under section 271(d)(6) already provides incentives for
     SWBT to ensure continuing compliance with its section 271
     obligations. We also recognize that SWBT may be subject to payment
     of liquidated damages through many of its individual
     interconnection agreements with competitive carriers.[^1221]
     Furthermore, SWBT risks liability through antitrust and other
     private causes of action if it performs in an unlawfully
     discriminatory manner.[^1222]

### Performance Remedy Plan

452. SWBT's Performance Remedy Plan is part of the T2A standard
     interconnection contract and is available through that
     agreement.[^1223] Under the Plan, SWBT monitors 131 performance
     measurements according to set definitions and business
     rules.[^1224] The Performance Remedy Plan provides for two classes
     or "tiers" of performance penalties. Tier-1 penalties apply to
     customer-affecting measurements, such as how long it takes to
     install or restore service. Penalties for failure to comply with
     standards corresponding to these performance measurements are paid
     to competitive LECs receiving the substandard performance and that
     sign the T2A.[^1225] Tier-2 penalties apply to
     competition-affecting measurements such as OSS availability, and
     are paid to the Texas State Treasury.[^1226] For both tiers the
     penalties accrue "per-occurrence," which means that SWBT's damages
     or fines are calculated according to the number of incidents that
     SWBT delivers non-compliant performance for a particular
     measurement.[^1227] Each measurement also is ranked low, medium or
     high, with the size of the per-occurrence payment tailored
     accordingly. Tier-1 damages are assessed if a performance measure
     is out of compliance for a

453. single month, but Tier-2 fines apply only if a measurement is
     missed for three consecutive months.[^1228]

### Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan

454. Although the details of mechanisms developed at the state level may
     vary widely, we have examined certain key aspects of these plans to
     determine whether they fall within a zone of reasonableness, and
     are likely to provide incentives that are sufficient to foster
     post-entry checklist compliance.[^1229] In our *Bell Atlantic New
     York Order*, for example, we predicted that the enforcement
     mechanisms developed in New York would be effective in
     practice.[^1230] Plans may vary in their strengths and weaknesses,
     and there is no one way to demonstrate assurance.[^1231] Through a
     lengthy collaborative process, the Texas Commission, SWBT and
     involved competitive LECs have arrived at workable measures to
     sufficiently capture SWBT's wholesale performance.[^1232] The
     measures, coupled with a self-executing performance remedy plan
     (Plan), are designed to prevent backsliding. The Texas Commission
     was aware of the need to fashion a remedy plan that produced
     sufficient incentives for SWBT to maintain a high level of
     wholesale service, and sufficient disincentives for SWBT to engage
     in anti-competitive behavior after section 271 relief is
     granted.[^1233] As explained below, we conclude the Texas
     Commission established a performance remedy plan that would
     discourage anti-competitive behavior by setting the damages and
     penalties at a level above the simple cost of doing
     business.[^1234]

455. *Total Liability At Risk.* We conclude that the total of \$289
     million in potential penalties placed at risk, on an annual basis,
     under the performance plans represents a meaningful incentive for
     SWBT to maintain a high level of performance.[^1235] We thus
     disagree with commenters that suggest that this amount is
     insufficient and fails to provide adequate assurance of SWBT's
     compliance in the future.[^1236] Most fundamentally, we disagree
     with a basic assumption made by several commenters: that liability
     under the Plan must be sufficient, *standing alone*, to completely
     counterbalance SWBT's incentive to discriminate.[^1237] The
     performance plans adopted by the Texas Commission do not represent
     the only means of ensuring that SWBT continues to provide
     nondiscriminatory service to competing carriers. In addition to the
     \$289 million at stake under this Plan, as noted above, SWBT faces
     other consequences if it fails to sustain a high level of service
     to competing carriers, including: federal enforcement action
     pursuant to section 271(d)(6); liquidated damages under dozens of
     interconnection agreements; and remedies associated with antitrust
     and other legal actions.

456. *Performance Measurements and Standards.* Performance measurements
     are intended to ensure that the reporting mechanism provides a
     "benchmark against which new entrants and regulators can measure
     performance over time to detect and correct any degradation of
     service rendered to new entrants."[^1238] Several commenters
     contend that the performance measurements fail to capture certain
     problems competitive LECs experience in their relations with
     SWBT.[^1239] In reply, SWBT defends the scope and meaningfulness of
     its measurements.[^1240] Through a collaborative process SWBT has
     increased the number of performance measurements from 66 at the
     time of its initial filing before the Texas Commission to the 131
     measurements in place at the time of filing this section 271
     application.[^1241] Moreover, the plan is not static, and we
     recognize that the Texas Commission presently is considering
     modifying existing measurements, and adding new measurements based
     on input from both SWBT and competitive LECs. For example, SWBT and
     competitive LECs are developing additional performance measurements
     for provision of DSL-related services.[^1242] In addition, in
     response to competitive LEC concerns that aspects of
     interconnection trunking measurements give an incomplete portrayal
     of SWBT's actual performance, the Texas Commission has implemented
     a new measurement, PM 73.1 (concerning missed due dates), and is
     considering modifications to PM 78 (concerning average installation
     intervals) during its April 2000 performance review.[^1243] This
     continuing ability of the measurements to evolve is an important
     feature because it allows the Plan to reflect changes in the
     telecommunications industry and in the Texas market.[^1244]

457. *Structural Elements of the Plan.* The structural elements of the
     Plan appear reasonably designed to detect and sanction poor
     performance when it occurs. Commenters have raised specific
     criticisms, arguing, for example, that the Plan fails to deter
     targeted discrimination directed against individual competing
     carriers,[^1245] and does not include penalties that escalate with
     the magnitude or duration of the performance shortfall.[^1246]
     These criticisms do not undermine our overall conclusion that the
     Plan provides a meaningful incentive to provide nondiscriminatory
     performance in the future. We find it significant that the Texas
     Commission considered and rejected most of these arguments.[^1247]

458. *Self-Executing Mechanism.* The performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms appear to be reasonably self-executing, and
     are generally comparable to the mechanisms we found satisfactory in
     the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*.[^1248] Specifically, we note
     that SWBT is required to provide performance data by the 20th day
     of the month following the reporting month, and is required to make
     payments, if necessary, by the 30th day following the due date of
     the performance measurement report for the month in which the
     obligation arose.[^1249] We further note that the Plan provides for
     expedited dispute resolution in certain carefully designated
     circumstances.[^1250] AT&T argues that because the Texas Commission
     has not provided guidance regarding waiver terms comparable to that
     set forth by the New York Commission, the Plan invites litigation
     by SWBT.[^1251] We have said that a waiver process, if not narrowly
     limited to a discrete set of circumstances and subject to time
     constraints, could have such an impact.[^1252] Should the Texas
     Commission suspect any party of abusing the dispute-resolution
     procedures provided in the Plan, we are confident the Texas
     Commission will take appropriate action.

459. *Data Validation and Audit Procedures.* The Department of Justice
     states, and we agree, that the reliability of reported data is
     critical, and that properly validated metrics must be meaningful,
     accurate, and reproducible.[^1253] In particular, the raw data
     underlying a performance measurement must be stored in a secure,
     stable, and auditable file if we are to accord a remedy plan
     significant weight.[^1254]

460. Several commenters allege that SWBT's performance data is generally
     unreliable.[^1255] SWBT states that its performance data
     collection, storage, and reporting practices are verifiable, and
     are conducted according to contemporaneously published business
     rules. Further, SWBT replies that its data collection methods and
     procedures were verified by Telcordia, and that Telcordia confirmed
     that SWBT collects and reports data in a manner consistent with the
     state-approved business rules.[^1256] While Telcordia did make
     several recommendations regarding SWBT's data control mechanisms,
     we note that SWBT has agreed to implement each of these
     measures.[^1257] We also note that the Texas Commission, in
     collaboration with competitive LECs and SWBT, is currently
     reviewing a document concerning SWBT's internal data collection
     procedures.[^1258] Because the Performance Remedy Plan rests
     entirely on SWBT's performance as captured by the measurements, the
     credibility of the performance data should be above
     suspicion.[^1259]

461. *Accounting Requirements*. Consistent with our accounting rules,
     antitrust damages[^1260] and certain other penalties paid by
     carriers,[^1261] SWBT should not reflect any portion of penalties
     paid out under the Plan as expenses in the revenue requirement for
     interstate services. As we noted in the *Bell Atlantic New York
     Order*, such accounting treatment ensures that ratepayers do not
     bear, in the form of increased rates, the costs of penalties paid
     out under the Plan in the event that SWBT fails to provide adequate
     service quality to competitive LECs.[^1262]

## Other Arguments

462. We recognize that commenters raise several other concerns which,
     they contend, support a finding that grant of this application is
     not in the public interest. These arguments do not convince us that
     grant of this application would be inconsistent with the public
     interest. Several commenters offer specific allegations that SWBT
     has engaged in anti-competitive behavior.[^1263] We have previously
     stated that we will not withhold section 271 authorization on the
     basis of isolated instances of allegedly unfair dealing or
     discrimination under the Act.[^1264] In this instance, we do not
     find that the various incidents cited by commenters constitute a
     pattern of discriminatory conduct that undermines our confidence
     that SWBT's local market is open to competition and will remain so
     after SWBT receives interLATA authority.[^1265]

463. Several commenters urge the Commission to deny SWBT's application
     on the grounds that SBC's investment in a network architecture
     commonly known as "Project Pronto" is discriminatory because it
     favors the business plans of ASI.[^1266] For example, competing
     carriers claim that SWBT's Project Pronto architecture will deploy
     digital loop carrier systems in remote terminals fed by fiber optic
     cables and will not permit competing carriers to line share the
     loops served by those remote terminals.[^1267] At the same time,
     SWBT contends that the investments of its parent company will bring
     broadband services to the vast majority of residential and small
     business customers in its operating area and that the benefits of
     these infrastructure changes will be available to all xDSL service
     providers on equal terms.[^1268] We acknowledge the importance of
     competing carrier concerns regarding Project Pronto and the impact
     that Project Pronto may ultimately have on a number of the section
     271 checklist items (e.g*.*, interconnection, unbundled local
     loops). The record before us, however, does not demonstrate that
     Project Pronto has resulted in a showing of noncompliance with any
     checklist item.[^1269] To the extent that SWBT utilizes Project
     Pronto in such a way that it results in non-compliance in the
     future, however, we may take appropriate enforcement action
     pursuant to section 271(d)(6).

464. We disagree, as stated above, with commenters that believe that a
     section 271 application is an appropriate forum to consider
     instituting a "fresh look" policy (to provide an opportunity for
     retail and wholesale customers to exit without penalty long term
     contracts that the carriers have voluntarily entered into with
     SWBT).[^1270] Moreover, we also reject concerns that the Texas
     Commission has limited regulatory authority over SWBT because of
     legislation enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1999.[^1271] The
     Texas Commission notes that the legislation

465. does not limit the Texas Commission's authority or any competitor's
     ability to challenge rate changes or service offerings by
     SWBT.[^1272]

# SECTION 271(D)(6) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

466. Section 271 approval is not the end of the road for SWBT in Texas.
     The statutory regime makes clear that SWBT must continue to satisfy
     the "conditions required for ... approval" [^1273] after it begins
     competing for long distance business in Texas. To this end,
     Congress gave the Commission additional post-approval enforcement
     powers to address possible "backsliding" by SWBT and other BOCs.
     This authority is critical to the statutory design that local
     market are -- and remain -- open to competition, and evidences
     Congress's recognition that a BOC's incentives to cooperate with
     its local service competitors may diminish in a given state once
     the BOC obtains section 271 approval in that state.[^1274] As we
     stated in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, "\[s\]wift and
     effective post-approval enforcement of section 271's requirements
     ... is essential to achieve Congress's goal of maintaining
     conditions conducive to achieving durable competition in local
     markets."[^1275]

467. We described the post-approval enforcement framework, as well as
     our various section 271(d)(6) enforcement powers, in detail in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*.[^1276] Among other things, section
     271(d)(6) provides for Commission receipt and review of complaints
     filed by persons concerning alleged failure by a BOC to meet
     conditions required for long distance approval. It also specifies
     several enforcement actions that the Commission can take on its own
     motion to address BOC backsliding. These include monetary
     forfeitures, as well as suspension or revocation of authority to
     provide long distance service. We envision exercising our section
     271(d)(6) suspension power, when appropriate, through a
     "standstill" order that could prohibit a non-compliant BOC from
     enrolling additional subscribers and from marketing and promoting
     interLATA service -- in essence, freezing the BOC's subscriber base
     as of the date of the order.[^1277]

468. Working in concert with the Texas Commission, we intend to monitor
     closely SWBT's post-approval compliance. We require that SWBT
     provide us with the monthly Texas Aggregated Performance
     Measurement Reports that it provides to the Texas Commission for at
     least one year from the date of the release of this order, so that
     we can review SWBT\'s performance to ensure continued compliance
     with the statutory requirements. We stand ready to exercise our
     various statutory enforcement powers quickly and decisively in
     appropriate circumstances to ensure that the local market remains
     open in Texas. We are confident that cooperative state and federal
     oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that may
     arise with respect to SWBT's entry into the Texas long distance
     market**.**[^1278]

# CONCLUSION

469. For the reasons discussed above, we grant SWBT's application for
     authorization under section 271 of the Act to provide in-region,
     interLATA services in the state of Texas.

# ORDERING CLAUSES

470. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
     and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
     154(i), 154(j) and 271, SWBT's application to provide in-region
     interLATA service in the State of Texas filed on April 5, 2000, IS
     GRANTED.

471. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE July
     10, 2000.

     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

     Magalie Roman Salas

     Secretary

APPENDIX A

**SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company**

**Southwestern Bell Communications Services**

**271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas**

**CC Docket No. 00-65**

**Comments**

Allegiance Telecom, Inc (Allegiance)

Association for Local Telecommunications Services

(ALTS) & CLEC Coalition (CLEC) Joint Comments

Alliance for Public Technology

AT&T Corp.

CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a "Connect"

Competition Policy Institute

Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 33 Participating Companies

COVAD Communications Company

Competitive Telecommunications Association

Department of Justice

IP Communications

Joint Comments of: Bluestar Network Services, DSLNET, Inc.

MGC Communications d/b/a MPOWERCommunications, Waller Creek
Communications d/b/a Pontio Communications Corp

Level 3 Communications L.L.C.

MCI

NorthPoint

Public Utilities Commission of Texas

RCN Telecom Services Inc.

Rhythms Net Connections

Southwestern Tel-Com

Sprint Communications Co.

Telecommunications Resellers Associations

Z-TEL Communications

**SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company**

**Southwestern Bell Communications Services**

**271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas**

**CC Docket No. 00-65**

**Reply Comments**

Allegience

Association of Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

AT&T

COVAD Communications Company

Department of Justice

Global Crossing Local Services, Inc.

Joint Comments of: Bluestar Network Services, LINK Network, Inc.

DSLNET, Inc MGC Communications d/b/a MPOWERCommunications

Waller Creek Communications d/b/a Pontio Communications Corp

MCI/WorldCom

Pilgrim Telephone, Inc.

Public Utilities Commission of Texas

RCN Telecom Services, Inc.

Southwestern Bell Corporation

Telecommunication Resellers Association

**SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company**

**Southwestern Bell Communications Services**

**271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas**

**CC Docket No. 00-4**

**Comments**

Adelphia Business Solutions (Adelphia)

Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (Allegiance)

Alliance for Public Technology

Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

AT&T Corp. (AT&T)

Bluestar Communications (Bluestar)

Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 33 Participating Companies

CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a "Connect"

CLEC Coalition

Communications Workers of America

Competitive Telecommunications Association

COVAD Communications Company

Department of Justice

DSL, Inc.

E.spire Communications, Inc.

Global Crossing

IP Communications

KMC Telecom Inc.

MCI WorldCom, Inc.

Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc.

National ALEC Association/Prepaid Communications Association

NorthPoint Communications, Inc.

Pilgrim Telephone, Inc.

Public Utilities Commission of Texas

Rhythms Net

Sprint Communications Co.

Telecommunications Resellers Association

Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel (Texas OPC)

Z-Tel Communications Inc.

###  {#section .unnumbered}

**SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company**

**Southwestern Bell Communications Services**

**271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas**

**CC Docket No. 00-4**

**Reply Comments**

Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (Allegiance)

Association of Directory Publishers

Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

AT&T Corp. (AT&T)

BellSouth

Bluestar Communications (Bluestar)

Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 57 Participating Companies

CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a "Connect" and Focal Communications

CLEC Coalition

Communications Workers of America

Competition Policy Institution

Competitive Telecommunications Association

Consumer Federation of America

COVAD Communications Company

Department of Justice

Global Crossing

IP Communications

MCI WorldCom, Inc.

Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc.

North Point Communications

Public Utilities Commissions of Texas

Rhythms Net Connections Inc.

SBC

Sprint Communications Co.

Texas Internet Service Providers Association

#### APPENDIX B {#appendix-b .unnumbered}

#### Overview of SWBT's OSS Operations. {#overview-of-swbts-oss-operations. .unnumbered}

1.  The process of obtaining resold local services or unbundled network
    elements from SWBT begins with the submissions of a Local Service
    Request (LSR) by a competing carrier. Upon the submission of an LSR,
    there are a series of transaction that must take place between SWBT
    and the competing carrier to ensure that the order is completed on
    time and in the manner contemplated by the competing carrier. For
    example, SWBT must inform a competing carrier of the status of the
    order as it progresses through its system, and a new entrant must
    have a means of notifying SWBT if the service or network element is
    not properly installed. Competing carriers may submit LSRs and
    conduct the various other transactions associated with obtaining
    service or network elements from SWBT through either manual or
    electronic access to SWBT's OSS. Manual access means that the
    competing carrier may place an order via facsimile and monitor the
    status of an order by placing a phone call to SWBT. Electronic
    access, in contrast, means that information is exchanged, and
    transactions are conducted, between SWBT and the competing carrier
    through the use of electronic interfaces.

```{=html}
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472. SWBT provides competing carriers with access to six primary
     electronic interfaces to access its pre-ordering, ordering and
     provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing functions.[^1279]
     These interfaces are either application-to-application interfaces
     or graphical user interfaces (GUIs).[^1280]
     Application-to-application interfaces are based on industry
     guidelines and require software development by both SWBT and the
     competing carrier. An application-to-application interface may be
     integrated with the competing carrier's own ordering systems,
     thereby allowing it to control how the application appears to its
     own sales representatives. A GUI interface, in contract, is a
     proprietary interface that may not be integrated with the competing
     carrier's own systems. Thus, when a competing carrier obtains
     information from SWBT's GUI-based interfaces, it must retype that
     information into its own systems.

473. [Pre-Ordering]{.underline}. Before placing an actual order for
     service, a competing carrier can obtain pre-ordering information
     from SWBT that assists the competing carrier's negotiations with
     its end-user customer.[^1281] Such preordering information, which
     is often accessed while the customer is on the line, typically
     includes a customer's address and service history, services and
     features available to that customer, telephone numbers, and dates
     that various services and facilities required by the competing
     carrier will be available.[^1282] Competitive carriers can exchange
     preordering information with SWBT by sending a request manually, or
     by using one or more of SWBT's four electronic interfaces that
     provide access to SWBT's pre-ordering capabilities:[^1283] Easy
     Access Sales Environment (EASE) for resale services,[^1284]
     DataGate,[^1285] Verigate,[^1286] and Electronic Data Interchange
     (EDI)/CORBA interface.[^1287]

474. [Ordering and Provisioning]{.underline}. Using the information
     obtained in the pre-ordering process, the competing carrier submits
     a Local Service Request (LSR) using any of four electronic
     interfaces for access to SWBT's OSS ordering/provisioning
     capabilities: EASE, Southwestern Order Retrieval and Distribution
     (SORD);[^1288] Local service request EXchange (LEX);[^1289] or
     SWBT's EDI Gateway.[^1290] SWBT reports that, as of the filing date
     of this application, seven carriers were using EDI for ordering and
     another 15 have tentatively scheduled production in the first
     quarter of 2000.[^1291] For those competing LECs that do not choose
     to utilize an electronic interface for ordering, SWBT also accepts
     service requests by facsimile, courier, U.S. Mail, or telephone.
     Such manually-submitted LSRs would be processed by a SWBT Local
     Service Center (LSC) service representative.[^1292]

475. Before an actual service order is created in SWBT\'s systems, the
     LSR submitted by a competing carrier through LEX or EDI must pass a
     set of edits that check for valid data entries and formats, as well
     as for agreement between various data fields.[^1293] An LSR
     requesting unbundled network elements enters through SWBT's EDI
     Gateway to Local Access Service Request (LASR), which edits the LSR
     for the validity of data and conditions.[^1294] If the LSR fails
     the LASR edits, LASR electronically returns an error message to the
     competing LEC via LEX or the EDI Gateway, and the competing LEC
     must correct the error and resubmit the LSR.[^1295] Once a service
     request passes the LASR edits, LASR sends the LSR to
     FOLDERS,[^1296] SLR/Decision Support System (DSS),[^1297] and to
     the "Mechanized Order Generator" (MOG) if the order is
     MOG-eligible.

476. An LSR is MOG-eligible if SWBT's systems are supposed to generate a
     service order automatically, without manual intervention.[^1298]
     Upon receiving a MOG-eligible order, MOG performs another series of
     edits and attempts to create a service order.[^1299] If MOG cannot
     create a mechanical service order because of a fatal error, the
     LASR electronically returns an error message to the requesting
     LEC.[^1300] As with a LASR fatal error, the requesting LEC must
     correct the error and resend the LSR. If MOG cannot create a
     service order because of a non-fatal error, LASR sends the LSR to
     the MOG error report in FOLDERS and LSR/DSS, and the LSR falls out
     for manual processing by an LSC service representative for creation
     of a manually-generated reject notice.[^1301]

477. If the LSR fails LASR or MOG fatal edits, SWBT returns a reject
     notification on LSRs submitted via LEX or EDI. When an LSR falls
     out because of a SORD error or non-fatal MOG error, a SWBT local
     service representative manually inputs a reject notification into
     LASR GUI to produce an electronic notification via LEX or
     EDI.[^1302] SWBT sends jeopardy notices to the requesting carrier
     in the same manner.[^1303]

478. If the LSR passes all LASR and MOG edits, MOG creates a service
     order which is sent to Service Order Retrieval and Distribution
     (SORD) for processing.[^1304] SORD performs additional edits which
     may also cause an order to drop out for manual processing.[^1305]
     Once an order successfully flows through SORD, SORD distributes the
     orders to the appropriate back-office system.[^1306] Once an order
     reaches SWBT's back office systems, it is mixed in and processed
     along with SWBT retail orders.[^1307] When all orders for a request
     are created and distributed through SORD, SWBT returns a Firm Order
     Confirmation (FOC) to the competing LEC.[^1308]

479. The FOC contains critical information such as the assigned
     telephone number and the date on which the service will be
     installed. If SWBT is unable to fulfill the order by the date
     confirmed on the FOC, it will send either an electronic or manual
     jeopardy notice to the competing carrier.[^1309] Electronic
     jeopardy notification via LEX or EDI is limited to jeopardy
     situations relating to "no facilities available."[^1310] In all
     other jeopardy situations, SWBT will manually input the jeopardy
     code into LASR GUI, which then sends an electronic notification to
     the competing carrier via LEX or EDI.[^1311] A manual jeopardy
     notice is sent for reasons such as additional information is needed
     with respect tot he service address or a SWBT technician attempting
     to install the service cannot obtain access to the premises (i.e.,
     no access).[^1312]

480. After an order is successfully entered into SORD, SWBT begins the
     process of provisioning the order, or activating the requested
     service or feature, which may involve assigning facilities,
     updating translations in a switch, and dispatching technicians. An
     order flows from SORD to the Service Order Analysis and Control
     (SOAC) system which controls the progress of service orders through
     the provisioning process by distributing the service order to other
     necessary provisioning systems and updating SORD. From the SOAC,
     most orders flow automatically through the assignment systems,
     including the Loop Facility Assignment and Control System (LFACS),
     where the appropriate facilities are assigned or reserved for the
     order. Technicians at the central office receive the order and
     perform any wiring work associated with the order. Orders that
     require work performed outside are sent via Trunk Integrated Record
     Keeping System (TIRKS) to the Work Force Administration (WFA)
     systems for dispatch of a field technician. Once the work for the
     service order is physically completed, a Service Order Completion
     (SOC) notification is sent to the competing carrier.[^1313]

481. A competing carrier can monitor the status of an order using SWBT's
     Provisioning Order Status (POS), which provides a read-only view of
     the current provisioning status for pending service orders.[^1314]
     In addition, SWBT 's Order Status, a graphical user interface
     application available to competing carriers from the SWBT's
     Toolbar. [^1315] Order Status displays the status of orders
     relative to the SORD distribution process and enables competing
     carriers to check the status of service orders, view a service
     order, verify that a service order has been completed, or verify
     that a pending service order has been posted.[^1316] The Order
     remains in Originating (O) status until the date the order is
     physically completed.[^1317] Once the work is physically completed,
     the order is sent over SORD distribution, which puts the order into
     Completion (C) status.[^1318]

482. SWBT sends a Service Order Completion notice ("SOC") when SWBT has
     completed the provisioning work associated with an order.[^1319]
     The SOC is sent to the carrier over the EDI interface if the order
     was submitted via EDI, and over the LEX interface if the order was
     submitted via LEX. Carriers using EASE for ordering resale services
     do not receive order completion notices. While the SOC represents
     notification that *provisioning* has been completed, it is not a
     notice that the billing systems, or the maintenance and repair
     systems, have actually been updated. Indeed, the SOC actually is
     issued *before* the order is posted to SWBT's billing systems, and
     *before* the maintenance and repair systems are updated to allow
     the competing LEC full access.

483. [UNE-P Three-Order Process]{.underline}. As explained above, at a
     certain point in the ordering process, SWBT transforms a competing
     carrier's order (either automatically or manually) into one or more
     "service orders" which perform different functions in SWBT's
     down-stream provisioning and billing systems. For most resale
     services and unbundled network elements (*e.g.,* an order for a new
     loop), a single service order is created. SWBT uses a three-order
     process, however, for UNE-P migrations: a "D" order, to disconnect
     and remove the customer from the retail billing systems; a "C"
     order, to initiate service and add the customer to a different
     billing system; and an "N" order, to migrate the directory and E911
     listings to the competing LEC.[^1320] The provisioning function for
     UNE-P migration orders is performed by the "D" and "C" orders. SWBT
     explains that, for its UNE-P provisioning process to perform as
     designed, these two orders must proceed in tandem. A "related
     order" field on each of these orders is used to keep these orders
     together. This field is populated automatically on service orders
     created mechanically but, for service orders that are typed
     manually by SWBT personnel (*i.e.,* that do not flow through), SWBT
     personnel must remember to type this field manually.

484. SWBT explains that orders nonetheless become disassociated under
     two circumstances. First, SWBT may simply fail to populate the
     "related order" field on service orders that are typed manually,
     causing the "D" and "C" orders to be processed as stand-alone
     orders.[^1321] Because the vast majority of UNE-P orders "flow
     through" SWBT's systems without such manual handling,[^1322]
     however, we note that few orders run the risk of this mistake.
     Second, SWBT's system is designed to *override* the related order
     field (and thus to disassociate the orders) if the address on the
     "C" order is not identical to the address on the "D" order.[^1323]
     The address on the "C" order is the address provided by the carrier
     and has passed through edits to ensure that it is consistent with
     the PREMIS address databese. The address on the "D" order is taken
     from the CRIS address database.

485. There appear to be two different reasons why the "C" and "D" orders
     would contain different addresses -- neither of which would be
     detected until the provisioning stage. First, the discrepancy may
     stem from a mismatch between the addresses contained in the PREMIS
     database and the CRIS database. Competing LECs explain that, for
     certain orders, they have found that the address verified by the
     PREMIS database is not consistent with the address contained in
     CRIS.[^1324] SWBT does not dispute that mismatches exist between
     its PREMIS and CRIS databases.[^1325] That SWBT's internal
     databases contain inconsistencies is not fatal to its application:
     we note that database inconsistencies may affect SWBT's retail
     operations as well. It is the fact that these inconsistencies
     result in rejections, delays and service outages, however, that
     causes us concern.

486. A second reason for an address mismatch between "D" and "C" orders
     is that a carrier may enter the wrong address on its order (*e.g.,*
     4 Elm Street, rather than 44 Elm Street). This type of mistake will
     not be detected until the provisioning stage because the mechanized
     PREMIS edits only check the address listed on the order, and do not
     verify that the address matches the customer's name and telephone
     number.[^1326] While this mistake necessarily would derive from a
     competing LEC's typographical error, we believe that the failure of
     SWBT's OSS edits to detect such a mistake places a heavy burden on
     competing LECs to "pre-edit" their orders to ensure that they are
     accurate. Indeed, we note that this type of name/address mismatch
     would not be likely to occur on SWBT's retail side. The system used
     by SWBT for the bulk of its retail orders, EASE, contains detailed
     up-front address edits that would detect these name/address
     mismatches. We thus disagree with SWBT that competing carriers are
     to blame for these order disassociations and resultant service
     outages.

487. [Maintenance and Repair]{.underline}. SWBT provides competing
     carriers with several options for requesting maintenance and
     reporting trouble for resold local services sand unbundled network
     elements. If a competing carrier's customer experiences service
     disruptions, the carrier can call the LOC where a customer service
     representative enters a trouble report into SWBT's Enhanced
     Customer Report System (ECRS), which interfaces with SWBT's
     back-office systems involved in maintenance and repair.[^1327] The
     customer service representative then performs a mechanized line
     test (MLT) and provides the results to the competing LEC, along
     with a due date for service repair.[^1328]

488. A competing carrier can also create and monitor trouble tickets,
     access trouble history for a line, and request/initiate a test of
     the customer's circuit by submitting electronic inquiries through
     SWBT's proprietary graphic user interface, Toolbar Trouble
     Administration (TBTA),[^1329] or through SWBT's Electronic Bonding
     Trouble Administration Interface (EBTA), an
     application-to-application interface.[^1330] The TBTA electronic
     interface offers the competing carrier the same capabilities as
     SWBT's retail ECRS, the system SWBT retail representatives utilize
     for maintenance and repair activity. TBTA provides competing
     carriers with the ability to issue trouble reports, request and
     receive MLTs for POTS services and POTS-like UNE combinations
     without initiating a trouble report,[^1331] check status on an
     opened trouble report, obtain trouble histories, view a list of
     open trouble reports, and view a list of closed trouble reports
     within the last 120 days.[^1332] Using the TBTA, a competing
     carrier can issue a trouble report without manual
     intervention.[^1333] EBTA offers the same capabilities as ECRS and
     TBTA, with the exception of checking trouble history and viewing
     the lists of open and closed trouble reports.[^1334] Both of these
     electronic interfaces flow into SWBT's back end systems.[^1335]

489. [Billing]{.underline}. In order for competing carriers to bill
     their customers, SWBT provides carriers with usage billing
     information and a process for adjusting or correcting invalid or
     incorrect data.[^1336] SWBT provides competing carriers with a
     choice of five options for obtaining electronic access to billing
     information: Bill Plus™;[^1337] EDI for billing;[^1338] Carrier
     Access Billing System (CABS); Bill Data Tape (BDT) for UNEs;[^1339]
     Bill Information;[^1340] and Usage Extract feed.[^1341] These
     interfaces can be used to view SWBT's bill to competitive LECs and
     specific information available from these interfaces can also be
     used by a competing carrier to bill its end user customers.[^1342]
     In addition, SWBT makes available to competing carriers that are
     reselling SWBT products or services, its Customer Record
     Information System (CRIS), the system SWBT uses to bill its own
     retail products to residential and business customers and create
     bills for competitive LECs.[^1343] Competing carriers can also
     utilize CRIS to bill a few UNE-related services such as Interim
     Number Portability and operator-handled calls.

CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HAROLD W.

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH

*In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
Inc.*

*d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance*

*Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*

*To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*, CC Docket No. 00-65

I concur in the decision to grant this application by Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company (SWBT) to provide in-region, inter-LATA services in
the State of Texas. I write separately, however, in order to apply my
understanding of the statute.

## Application of Sections 251, 252, and 271 {#application-of-sections-251-252-and-271 .unnumbered}

As I explained in the decision on Bell Atlantic's application to offer
long distance service in New York, the relationship between the
regulatory approval process under section 271 and the procedures
regarding private interconnection agreements established by sections 251
and 252 is a critical one. Unfortunately, the Commission has not paid
close attention to this relationship, and its failure to do so has
caused the section 271 review process to morph into something quite
different from the original statutory plan. The process has turned into
a general federal regulatory scheme, instead of tracking the
contract-based, State-centric model of sections 251, 252, and 271. *See
generally* Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W.
Furchtgott-Roth, *In the Matter of Application by Bell Atlantic New York
for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York*, CC Docket No.
99-295 (rel. Dec. 22, 1999) ("*New York Statement*").

I will briefly reiterate those points that pertain to my analysis here.
*First*, the text of section 271 makes clear that the relevant universe
of BOC conduct to be tested in a "Track A" application is not its
commercial performance generally, as the Order supposes, but its
fulfillment of specific interconnection agreements:

With respect to a BOC that \"is providing access and interconnection
pursuant to one or more agreements described in paragraph (1)(A),\" as
here, it is \"*such* access and interconnection \[that must\] meet\[\]
the requirements of\" the competitive

checklist. *Id.* section 271(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
statute defines the Commission's administrative task under Track A as
determining whether the petitioning BOC \"with respect to access and
interconnection provided pursuant to

subsection c(1)(A) has fully implemented the checklist.\" *Id.* section
271(d)(3)(A)(i).

*New York Statement* at para. 6.

*Second*, in analyzing the RBOC's fulfillment of the checklist under its
approved interconnection agreements, one should consider the existence
of complaints to enforce those agreements filed by interconnecting
parties with the State Commission. If CLECs are receiving seriously
inadequate service under those agreements, one would expect to see them
invoke the rights and remedies guaranteed to them by sections 251 and
252, including the right to arbitration and federal court review.
Accordingly, it has seemed to me that

the most probative evidence of compliance with the checklist -- perhaps
even prima facie proof \-- is the absence of disputes arising under
section 252 contracts. Conversely, the best evidence of noncompliance is
the presence of such disputes. Record documentation of these disputes,
such as complaints filed with State Commissions pursuant to section 252,
would only strengthen that showing.

*Id.* at para. 23.

In sum, the best case for noncompliance with section 271 under Track A
is to be made by parties: (1) with approved interconnection agreements
described in section 271(c)(1)(A); (2) who legitimately allege that the
RBOC is not providing them service pursuant to the actual terms and
conditions of those agreements; and (3) who have pursued those alleged
violations with State Commissions pursuant to section 252.

On this record, we have evidence that approaches, but does not meet,
this standard. Covad Communications, which opposes the instant
application, receives interconnection and access from SWBT pursuant to a
final, "Track A" interconnection agreement that was arbitrated and
approved under section 252. And that agreement appears to provide for
the non-discriminatory provisioning of x-DSL capable loops to Covad.
*See* Ex Parte Submission of Covad Communications (June 27, 2000)
(attaching interconnection agreement on DSL). So far, so good.

That interconnection agreement, however, was not finalized and operative
until February of this year. Although Covad points to findings by Texas
arbitrators related to discriminatory provisioning of loops by SWBT,
those findings were *not* made in the context of a controversy arising
under a section 252 contract -- that is, in a dispute over the adequacy
of SWBT's service under the terms of an existing interconnection
agreement. Rather, they were made in the context of a petition for
arbitration to establish an interconnection agreement and terms
thereunder with SWBT.[^1344] Covad never alleged a breach of performance
under a Track A agreement, at the State Commission or anywhere else, and
the arbitrators' findings do not go to SWBT's actual performance of an
agreement but to the proper drafting of a future agreement. Such
findings, then, are not probative of a failure to provide access and
interconnection pursuant to a Track A agreement.

AT&T, which also takes service from SWBT under an approved
interconnection agreement, also opposes the grant of this application.
It argues in this proceeding that SWBT is, in various ways, violating
the terms and conditions of its interconnection agreement. *See* Ex
Parte Submission of AT&T (June 23, 2000). For example, AT&T says that
SWBT is discriminating against it in the provision of unbundled,
DSL-capable loops obtained as part of the UNE-platform, and that this
conduct violates the non-discrimination and other provisions of their
agreement and section 251. *See id.* at page 2 (citing section 55.1 of
agreement, providing that "\[a\]t the request of AT&T and pursuant to
the requirements of the Act, SWBT will offer . . . Network Elements to
AT&T on an unbundled basis on rates, terms, and conditions set forth in
this Agreement that are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory").
Thus, AT&T well demonstrated that the conduct that it alleges as a
problem under section 271 is conduct to which its interconnection
agreement directly speaks. Again, so far so good.

What AT&T has not done, however, is adduce evidence that it has sought
enforcement of its contractual right to nondiscrimination with the State
Commission. Like Covad, it has participated in hearings regarding the
content of new, not-yet-entered-into interconnection agreements. *See*
AT&T Ex Parte Submission (June 27, 2000). But the record does not
reflect that AT&T has ever asserted that SWBT's provision of access and
interconnection under an operative agreement was in breach. As with
respect to Covad, there is no showing here that AT&T has ever attempted
to enforce its contractual rights.

As noted above, CLEC action to enforce an alleged breach of an
interconnection agreement is evidence of significantly inadequate
provisioning of access and interconnection under section 252 contracts,
which, as I read section 271, is the relevant universe of access and
interconnection Accordingly, while both Covad and AT&T make legitimate
points here, I still "view with skepticism assertions of inadequate BOC
performance lodged for the first time in the section 271 approval
process." Concurring Statement, *New York Order*. That is what we have
with respect to both Covad and AT&T, and I thus find no record evidence
of failure by SWBT to perform as required under the terms of section 252
contracts.

## SBC/Ameritech Merger Conditions {#sbcameritech-merger-conditions .unnumbered}

As I stated at the time of the Commission's approval of SBC and
Ameritech's application to transfer licenses and authorizations under
sections 309 and 214 of the Communications Act, I believe that some of
the conditions applied to the license transfer conflict with specific
sections of the Act. In particular, I believe that

of especial legal concern are those related to carrier-to-carrier
promotions. These conditions limit the number of services and facilities
that may be offered to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) on a
promotional basis. Once the caps are reached, some CLECs will be unable
to obtain the same promotional deals as other CLECs. Quite simply,
carrier-to-carrier promotions will not be available on an equal basis to
all requesting carriers. In this way, then, the conditions violate the
\"nondiscriminatory access\" requirement of section 251(c)(3), as well
as the resale non-discrimination requirement of 251(c)(4)(B).

> Moreover, the caps directly conflict with the \"pick-and-choose\"
> provision of section 252. Section 252(i) requires incumbent LECs to
> \"make available \[to a CLEC\] any . . . service, or network element\"
> provided to any other CLEC \"upon the same terms and conditions,\"
> regardless of the level of offering to others. For the reasons given
> above, the guarantee of that section will be unfulfilled as a result
> of the caps.
>
> Apart from the caps themselves, the underlying discounts on loop rates
> also offend sections 252(i) and 251(c)(3). These discounts
> discriminate among CLECs \-- in terms of prices and offerings \-- by
> creating a situation in which a CLEC that uses an ILEC\'s unbundled
> switch gets one rate for the loop, but a CLEC that uses its own switch
> gets a discount on the very same loop.

Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Concurring
in Part and Dissenting in Part, *In re Applications of Ameritech Corp.,
Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee*, CC Docket No.
98-141 (rel. Oct. 8, 1999).

I personally solicited further comment on the effect of these merger
conditions on SWBT's section 271 application. *See* Separate Statement
of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, *In the Matter of Application
by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and
Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell
Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the*

*Telecommunications Act of 1996 To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services
In Texas*, CC Docket No. 00-4 (rel. April 6, 2000).

Some parties addressed this issue. *See* Comments of AT&T at 62-64. As I
review the record, no party submitted information revelatory of the
actual effects of the loop discounts required in the Commission's merger
Order. Specifically, the record is ambiguous as to whether the cap has
been reached or not; and if the cap has not been reached, then price
discrimination is, at this point in time, just a theoretical
possibility. If, in future long distance applications, a party can show
that the cap has been reached and differential prices are actually being
charged, this issue would be live and I would be most willing to pursue
it further. At this point, however, the record does not support it.

> \* \* \*

Because I believe that SBWT is providing access and interconnection
pursuant to Track A agreements as required by those contracts, which in
turn incorporate rights available to CLECs under sections 251 and 252, I
concur in the grant of its application to offer long distance service in
Texas.

[^1]: 47 U.S.C. § 271. Section 271 was added by the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104‑104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), *codified* at
    47 U.S.C. § 151 *et seq*. We refer to the Communications Act of
    1934, as amended, as "the Communications Act" or "the Act." We refer
    to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as "the 1996 Act."

[^2]: *Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas,* CC Docket No. 00-65 (filed
    Apr. 5, 2000) (SWBT Texas I Application); *see Comments Requested on
    Application by SBC Communications Inc. for Authorization Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In‑Region,
    InterLATA Service in the State of Texas (CC Docket No. 00-65)*,
    Public Notice, DA No. 00‑750 (rel. Apr. 6, 2000). Unless an
    affidavit or appendix reference is included, all citations to the
    "SWBT Application" refer to SWBT's "Brief in Support of Application
    by Southwestern Bell for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services
    in Texas." References to all affidavits or other sources contained
    in the appendices submitted by SWBT are initially cited to the
    Appendix, Volume, and Tab number indicating the location of the
    source in the record. Subsequent citations to affidavits are cited
    by the affiant\'s name, *e.g*., "SWBT Dysart Aff." Comments on the
    current application are cited by party name, *e.g.*, "ALTS
    Comments." Documents, such as affidavits and declarations, submitted
    by commenters are cited by the affiant\'s name and the party
    submitting the affidavit, *e.g.,* "AT&T Rhinehart Aff.," "Covad
    Goodpastor Decl." A list of parties that submitted comments or
    replies is set forth in Appendix A.

[^3]: *See Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed
    Jan. 10, 2000) (SWBT Texas II Application); *see* *Comments
    Requested on Application by SBC Communications Inc. for
    Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In‑Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Texas (CC Docket No.
    00-4)*, Public Notice, DA No. 00‑37 (rel. Jan. 10, 2000).

[^4]: *See* Letter from James D. Ellis, Paul K. Mancini, Martin E.
    Grambow, Counsel for SBC Communications Inc., to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated Apr. 5, 2000) (*SBC Apr. 5, 2000 Ex
    Parte Letter*) at 2; *see also Application by SBC Communications
    Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell
    Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance
    for Provision of In-Region InterLATA Services in Texas*, CC Docket
    No. 00-4, FCC 00-124, Order (rel. Apr. 6. 2000) (*SWBT Texas I
    Withdrawal Order*) (granting SWBT's request to withdraw its January
    10 Application and to initiate a new application pursuant to section
    271 based on the existing record in CC Docket 00-4 and the new
    information provided by SBC in its April 5 filing).

[^5]: SWBT Texas II Reply, App. A-4, Vol. 1, Tab 3, Reply Affidavit of
    John S. Habeeb (SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff.), Attach. A
    (reporting 58,704 "stand-alone" unbundled loops and 243, 922 UNE
    loop/port combinations through March 2000).

[^6]: *Id.* (reporting resale of 157,700 business lines and 191,040
    residential lines through March 2000). Parties to this proceeding
    dispute SWBT's methodology for estimating the number of
    "facilities-based" lines that are served by competitors (through
    means other than resale or unbundled loops). Most, however seem to
    agree that, at a minimum, several hundred thousand access lines are
    served this way, primarily for business customers in urban areas.

[^7]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 9 (estimating 840,000
    -- 890,000 competitive LEC lines compared with 9.6 million SWBT
    retail lines).

[^8]: SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A (reporting 6,978
    unbundled loops to xDSL service providers through March 2000).

[^9]: Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd &
    Evans, P.L.L.C., to Magalie Roman Salas, Esq., Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 at Tab 5 (filed Apr.
    21, 2000) (SWBT Apr. 21 *Ex Parte* Letter) (reporting deployment of
    36,000 ADSL lines in Texas during the six-month period from October
    1999 through March 2000); *see also* SWBT Texas II Brown Reply Aff.
    (anticipating *monthly* volume of 9,000 ADSL orders for SWBT's
    advanced services affiliate in Texas by June 2000).

[^10]: *See* *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,* Third
    Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147, Fourth Report and Order in
    CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 99-355, paras. 4-5 (rel. Dec. 9, 1999)
    (*Line Sharing Order*).

[^11]: SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A; SWBT Texas II
    Application, App., Vol. A, Tab 1, Affidavit of John S. Habeeb (SWBT
    Texas II Habeeb Aff.), Attach. A (reflecting monthly order totals of
    1160 loops in January, 1489 loops in February, and 2166 loops in
    March).

[^12]: SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A; SWBT Texas II Habeeb
    Aff. Attach. A (reflecting monthly order totals of 23,338 lines in
    January, 32,997 lines in February, and 40,750 lines in March).

[^13]: WorldCom, Inc. Texas II Reply at 1. WorldCom, Inc. changed its
    corporate name from MCI WorldCom, Inc. effective May 1, 2000. *Id.*
    at n.1. AT&T reported capturing 130,000 local phone customers in
    Texas over UNE-P through March 2000, which represents greater than
    half of the UNE-P lines served by competitive carriers in Texas.
    "AT&T Reports Flat Earnings, Lowers Growth Estimates,"
    Communications Daily (May 3, 2000).

[^14]: *See, e.g., Bell Atlantic-New York Authorization Under Section
    271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA
    Service in the State of New York,* File No. EB-00-IH-0085, Order, 15
    FCC Rcd 5413, 5414 (2000) (adopting consent decree after
    investigation into potential violations of section 271 after grant
    of in-region, interLATA authority).

[^15]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A)(iii).

[^16]: We note here that, for the provision of international services, a
    U.S. carrier must separately receive section 214 authorization from
    the Commission. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 214; *see also* *Streamlining the
    International Section 214 Authorization Process and Tariff
    Requirements, Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 12884 (1996); *Rules and
    Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
    Market, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd
    23891 (1997), *recon. pending*. This requirement applies
    notwithstanding a BOC's approval under section 271 for the provision
    of in-region, interLATA service originating in a particular state.

[^17]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271.

[^18]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3).

[^19]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3)(A). The critical, market-opening provisions of
    section 251 are incorporated into the competitive checklist found in
    section 271. *See* *id.* § 251; *see also Implementation of the
    Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    CC Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (*Local Competition
    First Report and Order*), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom,
    *Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC*, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th
    Cir. 1997) and *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
    1997), *aff'd in part and remanded*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525
    U.S. 366 (1999).

[^20]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^21]: *Id.* § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^22]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3); *see SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 138
    F.3d 410, 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^23]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A).

[^24]: *Id*. § 271(d)(2)(B).

[^25]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20;
    *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended,* CC Docket No. 97-137, 12
    FCC Rcd 20543, 20559-60 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan Order*). As the
    D.C. Circuit has held, "\[A\]lthough the Commission must consult
    with the state commissions, the statute does not require the
    Commission to give State Commissions' views any particular weight."
    *SBC Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416.

[^26]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; *SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416-17.

[^27]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20.

[^28]: *Id.*

[^29]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.

[^30]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.

[^31]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.

[^32]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.

[^33]: During the collaborative process, the staff of the Texas
    Commission worked with SWBT and competing carriers to develop a
    comprehensive set of performance measures and business rules that
    are intended to capture whether SWBT is providing nondiscriminatory
    service to competing carriers. The Texas Commission also approved a
    performance remedy plan that is intended to provide financial
    incentives for SWBT to maintain an open market and prevent
    "backsliding." Pursuant to the Plan, SWBT must compensate either
    competing carriers or the Texas Treasury for noncompliance
    performance in connection with particular performance measurements.
    Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 3-4.

[^34]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 3.

[^35]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 5-6.

[^36]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 5.

[^37]: Telcordia issued two reports on the operational readiness of
    SWBT's OSS. In its initial report, Telcordia presented the results
    of its functionality and capacity testing and identified issues that
    warranted further review. Texas Commission Comments at 30-31. The
    issues identified by Telcordia in its initial report formed the
    basis of a re-test plan. *Id.* Following the completion of a retest,
    Telcordia issued a final report. Telcordia Technologies, *The Public
    Utility Commission of Texas Southwestern Bell OSS Readiness Report*
    (Sept. 1999) (Telcordia Final Report), SWBT Ham Texas I Aff.,
    Attach. A. Although in its final report, Telcordia concluded that
    SWBT's OSS were operationally ready, it highlighted seven areas in
    which the Texas Commission should focus to remove "service-affecting
    issues." *Id.* at ES-1, 7. Specifically, Telcordia recommended: (1)
    the revision of certain procedures for scalability forecasting; (2)
    the implementation of eleven new performance measures; (3) that the
    Texas Commission expeditiously resolve thirty issues that were
    identified during the retest; (4) increased automation of the
    performance measure reporting process; (5) increased data security
    and auditability; (6) confirmation of the effectiveness of SWBT's
    procedures for ordering xDSL-capable loops; and (7) further training
    for SWBT and competing carriers to improve the understanding and use
    of SWBT's standard methods and procedures. *Id.* After Telcordia's
    final report was issued, the Texas Commission worked further with
    SWBT and competing carriers to resolve the seven issues identified
    in Telcordia's final report. Texas Commission Texas I Comments at
    31-32.

[^38]: Telcordia Final Report at 7.

[^39]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 7.

[^40]: The supplemental filing included a brief and eight affidavits.
    According to SWBT, this new evidence is intended to respond to
    issues and arguments that emerged during the course of the January
    10 proceeding subsequent to the submission of reply comments on
    February 22. SWBT Texas II Application at 1.

[^41]: Letter from James D. Ellis, Paul K. Mancini, Martin E. Grambow,
    Counsel for SBC Communications Inc., to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, FCC (dated Apr. 5, 2000) (*SBC Apr. 5, 2000 Ex Parte
    Letter*) at 2.

[^42]: *Id.*

[^43]: *See SWBT Texas I Withdrawal Order*.

[^44]: The Evaluation of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC
    Docket No. 00-4 (filed Jan. 31, 2000) (Texas Commission Texas I
    Comments).

[^45]: The Evaluation of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC
    Docket No. 00-65 (filed Apr. 26, 2000) (Texas Commission Texas II
    Comments).

[^46]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 1.

[^47]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 95.

[^48]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10-90.

[^49]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 11, 34, 36; *see also
    infra* note Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text.

[^50]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 1.

[^51]: *Id.*

[^52]: Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket
    No. 00-4 (filed Feb. 14, 2000) (Department of Justice Texas I
    Evaluation).

[^53]: In its evaluation, the Department of Justice concluded that,
    although SWBT had shown substantial progress in opening its local
    markets to competition, it failed to satisfy the requirements of
    section 271 in the critical area of providing unbundled loops.
    Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 2. Specifically, the
    Department of Justice found that SWBT's performance was deficient
    with respect to providing unbundled loops for advanced services and
    coordinated conversions, or "hot cuts." *Id.* at 2-3. In addition to
    its findings with respect to xDSL and hot cuts, the Department of
    Justice expressed concern about some of the evidence presented by
    SWBT to demonstrate compliance with other section 271 requirements.
    For example, the Department of Justice noted that there was
    insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether SWBT could
    provide interconnection trunks in a timely manner, and whether
    carriers could compete effectively using the UNE-platform. *Id.* at
    44-49 (interconnection), 49-53 (UNE-platform). The Department of
    Justice recommended that the Commission defer judgment on these
    issues until additional commercial data is available. *Id.* at
    52-53. Moreover, the Department of Justice stated that the OSS test
    performed by Telcordia had significant limitations. In particular,
    the Department of Justice noted that, due to its limited scope and
    depth, "the Telcordia test does not provide evidence that SBC
    provides adequate wholesale services overall to CLECs in Texas."
    *Id.* at 5.

[^54]: Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket
    No. 00-65 (filed May, 12, 2000) (Department of Justice Texas II May
    12 Evaluation).

[^55]: Letter from Donald J. Russell, Chief, Telecommunications Task
    Force, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated June 13, 2000) (Department of Justice
    Texas II Evaluation).

[^56]: *Id.* at 5.

[^57]: *Id.* at 1. For example, the Department of Justice recommends
    that the Commission ensure that adequate mechanisms exist to resolve
    emerging issues that will affect competition, such as DSL line
    sharing and SBC's Project Pronto. *Id.* at 20. As the Department of
    Justice notes, "Project Pronto is an SBC network upgrade that will
    employ fiber optic cable and remote terminals to provide DSL
    services to customers that are out of reach to central office
    digital subscriber line access multiplexers ('DSLAMS')." *Id.* at 7.

[^58]: *Id.* at 2-8.

[^59]: *Id.* at 4.

[^60]: *Id.* at 8-9.

[^61]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3). As set forth below, we conclude that
    SWBT has satisfied the requirements of subsection (c)(1)(A) ("Track
    A") and thus merits analysis under section 271(d)(3)(A)(i) of our
    rules.

[^62]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973-74, para. 52
    (*Ameritech Michigan Order*).

[^63]: *American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

[^64]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).

[^65]: *See* *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Third Report and Order and Fourth
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd at 3696 (1999)
    (*UNE Remand Order*); *see also Deployment of Wireline Services
    Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation
    of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
    1996,* Third Report and Order, and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC
    Rcd 20912 (1999) (*Line Sharing Order*).

[^66]: The seven network elements set forth in the *Local Competition
    Order* were: (1) local loops; (2) network interface devices; (3)
    local and tandem switching; (4) interoffice transmission facilities;
    (5) signaling networks and call-related databases; (6) operations
    support systems; and (7) operator services and directory assistance.
    *See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report
    and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (*Local Competition First Report
    and Order*), *aff\'d in part and vacated in part sub nom.
    Competitive Telecommunications Ass\'n v. FCC*, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th
    Cir. 1997) and *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753* (8th Cir.
    1997), *aff\'d in part and remanded*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd*., 525
    U.S. 366 (1999); *on remand*, Third Report and Order and Fourth
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999).

[^67]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.319.

[^68]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). In reaching
    this conclusion, the Court held that the Commission had not
    adequately considered the "necessary" and "impair" standards of
    section 251(d)(2) in establishing the list of seven network
    elements. *Id.* at 387-92.

[^69]: *UNE Remand Order* at para. 526. The order was published in the
    Federal Register on January 18, 2000. *See Revision of the
    Commission's Rules Specifying the Portions of the Nation's Local
    Telephone Networks That Incumbent Local Telephone Companies Must
    Make Available to Competitors*, 65 Fed. Reg. 2542 (2000).

[^70]: *See UNE Remand Order* at para 526. The requirements that were
    not contained in § 51.319 prior to the rule being vacated by the
    Supreme Court in *Iowa Utils. Bd*. became effective 120 days after
    publication in the Federal Register. These are: the requirement to
    provide access on an unbundled basis to dark fiber as set forth in §
    51.319(a)(1); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled
    basis to subloops and inside wire as set forth in § 51.319(a)(2);
    the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to packet
    switching in the limited circumstances set forth in §
    51.319(c)(3)(B); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled
    basis to dark fiber transport as set forth in § 51.319(d)(1)(B); the
    requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to the Calling
    Name Database, 911 Database, and E911 Database as set forth in
    §51.319(e)(2)(A); and the requirement to provide access on an
    unbundled basis to loop qualification information as set forth in §
    51.319(g). *Id*. n.1040. We note that the T2A already contains
    provisions addressing many of these items. SWBT Texas 1 Auinbauh
    Aff. at para. 86.

[^71]: SWBT Texas I Application at 36-37; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    paras. 85-86. SWBT offers access through the T2A to the UNEs defined
    in the original rule 319. In addition, SWBT has complied with the
    *UNE Remand Order's* revised rule 319 by developing revised
    definitions of the loop, network interface device (NID), and
    interoffice transport network elements, and making these new
    definitions available to competitive LECs through an amendment to
    the T2A. *Id.*

[^72]: *See* section III.C.1, *infra.*

[^73]: Bell Atlantic filed an application for section 271 authority in
    New York on September 29, 1999. *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 3953, para. 1.

[^74]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3966-67, paras.
    30-31.

[^75]: *See* section V.D*, infra.* The *Line Sharing Order* amends the
    Commission's rules to require incumbent LECs to provide, as a
    network element, access to the high-frequency portion of the local
    loop to a requesting competitive LEC on loops that carry the
    incumbent LEC's basic telephone service. *See* *Line Sharing Order,*
    14 FCC Rcd at 20926, para. 25.

[^76]: *See, e.g., Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications
    Under New Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 11
    FCC Rcd 19708, 19711 (Dec. 6, 1996) (Dec. 6, 1996 Public Notice);
    *Revised Comment Schedule for Ameritech Michigan Application, as
    amended, for Authorization under Section 271 of the Communications
    Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of
    Michigan*, Public Notice, DA 97-127 (Jan. 17, 1997) (Jan. 17, 1997
    Public Notice); *Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public
    Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 17457 (Sept. 19, 1997) (Sept. 19, 1997 Public
    Notice); *Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public
    Notice, DA-99-1994 (Sept. 28, 1999) (Sept. 28, 1999 Public Notice).

[^77]: Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B.

[^78]: *Id.; Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968, para.
    34; *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20570-71, para. 50.

[^79]: *Id.*

[^80]: Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B; *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20570-71, para. 50.

[^81]: *Id.* (citing Jan. 17, 1997 Public Notice). The Commission
    subsequently released a procedural public notice incorporating this
    policy for future section 271 applications, *see* Sept. 19 Public
    Notice at Section B.

[^82]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20573, para. 54.

[^83]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20571, para. 51 ("\[I\]f a
    BOC chooses to submit such evidence . . . we reserve the discretion
    . . . to accord the new evidence no weight in making our
    determination."); *id.*at para. 54 ("\[W\]e find that using our
    discretion to accord BOC submissions of new factual evidence no
    weight will ensure that our proceedings are conducted in 'such
    manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and
    to the ends of justice.'"); *id.*at para. 57 ("By retaining the
    discretion to accord new evidence no weight . . . . "); *id.* at
    para. 59 ("Because we will exercise our discretion in determining
    whether to accord new factual evidence any weight, we deny \[the
    motion to strike\]"); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 20674 ("Given the complexity of this data and the fact that
    interested parties have not had an opportunity to address it, we
    exercise our discretion to accord the information minimal weight.");
    Dec. 10 Public Notice at 1 ("\[I\]f parties choose to submit new
    evidence, \[the Commission\] retains the discretion to accord new
    evidence no weight.").

[^84]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20575.

[^85]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 37;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20573-74.

[^86]: Sept. 19 Public Notice at Section H (establishing page
    limitations for *ex partes*, subject to certain exceptions).

[^87]: *Id.*

[^88]: Consistent with section 1.1204(a)(b) of our rules, responses to
    Commission inquiries will generally be placed in the record. 47
    C.F.R § 1.204(a)(b).

[^89]: *Bell Atlantic New York* *Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20599.

[^90]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)(i), (ii).

[^91]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^92]: *Id.*

[^93]: *Bell Atlantic New York*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 47;
    *Application of BellSouth Corporation for Provision of In-Region,
    Inter-LATA Services in Louisiana*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
    FCC Rcd 20599 at 20635-36, para. 57 (*Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*); *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20567-68, para.
    43.

[^94]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972-73, para. 48;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39, para.
    59; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20568-69, para. 45.

[^95]: *Bell Atlantic New York* *Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973, para. 49;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39, para.
    59.

[^96]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20569, para. 45
    (concluding that greater weight will be attached to comments and
    pleadings supported by an affidavit or sworn statement than to an
    unsupported contrary pleading); *see also Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 47.

[^97]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973, para. 52;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20601-02, para. 110.

[^98]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39, para.
    59.

[^99]: *See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order* at 3974, para. 53;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20658-59, para.
    92; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20627-52; *Application
    by BellSouth Corp. et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket No. 97-231, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 6245,
    6258-81, paras. 21-58 (1998) (*First BellSouth Louisiana Order*);
    *Application by BellSouth et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide InterLATA
    Services in South Carolina*, CC Docket No. 97-208, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order,13 FCC Rcd 539, 597-634 (*BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*).

[^100]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655, para. 86;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 138;

[^101]: In our *Performance Measurements NPRM* we proposed a model set
    of reporting requirements that states could adopt to measure whether
    an incumbent LEC is providing interconnection, resale, and unbundled
    network elements on nondiscriminatory terms. *Performance
    Measurements and Reporting Requirements for Operations Support
    Systems, Interconnection, and Operator Services and Directory
    Assistance,* CC Docket No. 98-56, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
    FCC Rcd 12817 (rel. Apr. 17, 1998) (*Performance Measurements
    NPRM*). This Commission has not, however, adopted, as a federal
    requirement, a particular set of metrics or performance standards.

[^102]: We also recognize that states may choose to set their
    performance benchmarks at levels higher than what is necessary to
    meet the statutory nondiscrimination standard. *Bell Atlantic New
    York* *Order* at para. 55, n.107.

[^103]: *See* AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 36 (arguing that SWBT
    should be required to prove the accuracy and reliability of its data
    collection and reporting processes); AT&T Texas I Pfau/DeYoung Decl.
    at paras. 15, 25, 56-58; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 34 (arguing
    that SWBT's data have not been sufficiently audited and thus are
    unreliable).

[^104]: We thus reject AT&T's contention that the application should be
    denied on the ground that SWBT failed to satisfy the Texas
    Commission's parity or benchmark standards for certain Texas
    performance measurements. *See* AT&T Texas II Comments at 64.

[^105]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^106]: *Id.*

[^107]: *Id.*

[^108]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85. *See
    also BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 20633-35 at paras.
    46-48.

[^109]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 96.

[^110]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 95-96. Although the
    Department of Justice does not address business and residential
    subscribers separately, it states that competitive LECs have a total
    of approximately 840,000 -- 890,000 access lines, representing
    approximately eight percent of SWBT's Texas market. Department of
    Justice Texas I Evaluation at 9.

[^111]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i); *see Bell Atlantic New York Order,*
    15 FCC Rcd at 3977-78, para. 63; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20640, para. 61; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20662-63, para. 222.

[^112]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(A).

[^113]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15590,
    para. 176. Transport and termination of traffic are therefore
    excluded from the Commission's definition of interconnection. *See
    Id.*

[^114]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order*, the Commission identified a minimum set of technically
    feasible points of interconnection. *See Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15607-09, paras. 204-211.

[^115]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(C).

[^116]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D).

[^117]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15613-15, paras. 221-225; *see* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20641-42, paras. 63-64.

[^118]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15614-15, paras. 224-25.

[^119]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3978*,* para.
    64*; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20648-50,
    paras. 74-77; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20671-74,
    paras. 240-45. The Commission has relied on trunk blockage data to
    evaluate a BOC's interconnection performance. Trunk group blockage
    indicates that end users are experiencing difficulty completing or
    receiving calls, which may have a direct impact on the customer's
    perception of a competitive LEC's service quality.

[^120]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612,
    para. 218; *see also Bell Atlantic New York* Order, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3978*,* para. 65*; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20642, para. 65.

[^121]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^122]: Our rules require an incumbent LEC to provide two-way trunking
    upon request, wherever two-way trunking arrangements are technically
    feasible. 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(f); *see also Bell Atlantic New York*
    Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978-79, para. 65*; Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65; *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 15612-13, paras. 219-220.

[^123]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^124]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779,
    paras. 549-50*; see Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    3979, para. 66*; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20640-41, para. 61.

[^125]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.321(b); *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-82, paras. 549-50; *see also Bell
    Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3979*,* para. 66*; Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, para. 62.

[^126]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (requiring incumbent LECs to provide
    physical collocation); *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3979, para. 66; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20640-41, paras. 61-62.

[^127]: *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket No. 98-147, First Report
    and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761
    (1999) *vacated in part*, *GTE Services Corp. V. FCC*, Nos. 99-1176
    *et al.* (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2000) (*Advanced Services First Report
    and Order or Advanced Services First Report and Order and FNPRM*).

[^128]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, paras.
    183-84 ; *BellSouth Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 649-51, para. 62.

[^129]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66;
    s*ee Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41,
    paras. 61-62.

[^130]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10-22.

[^131]: For certain interconnection performance metrics, the Texas
    Commission established a benchmark standard for evaluating SWBT's
    performance (*e.g*., percent of trunk blockage and average
    interconnection trunk installation intervals). For other
    interconnection measurements, such as percent missed due dates for
    installation, a parity standard is applied.

[^132]: SWBT Texas I Application App. B (providing interconnection
    agreements between SWBT and competing carriers); SWBT Texas I
    Application at 74, 77, 80; Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10.
    Several competitive LECs raised complaints regarding receipt from
    SWBT of notices of termination of the T2A. *See* ALTS and CLEC
    Coalition Texas II Comments at 14-16; Allegiance Texas II Comments
    at 3; Z-Tel Texas II Comments at 5-6; Allegiance Texas II Reply
    Comments at 2. SWBT states that by the terms of the T2A it was
    required to send such notices six months prior to expiration of the
    T2A (which would expire after one year if SWBT's application for
    section 271 authority were not granted). Because SWBT's application
    is herein granted, the T2A will remain in effect for an additional
    three years. *See* SWBT Texas II Reply at 47-48.

[^133]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10.

[^134]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 548 and Attach. A,
    Measurements 70-78, (Performance Measurement Business Rules)
    (Version 1.6). SWBT has implemented nine Texas Commission-approved
    performance measures relating to this checklist item, including
    measures that compare trunk blockage between SWBT and competitive
    LECs (PM 70), measures that capture missed due dates for trunk
    installations (PM 73), and measures that provide data on average
    installation intervals (PM 78). *Id*.; *see also* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Measurement Data No. 70-78 at 271-No. 70-71-78 (showing
    performance measurement data for January 2000 through March 2000).

[^135]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3981-83, paras.
    69-72; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20649-50,
    para. 76; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20669-74, paras.
    236-245.

[^136]: For SWBT end office to competitive LEC end office, SWBT's
    statewide data indicate zero (0.0%) trunk blockage for the months of
    January through March. For SWBT tandem to competitive LEC end
    office, SWBT's data indicate blockage well below the benchmark, 0.1
    % for January and February, 0.0% blockage for March. *See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, No. 70-01, 70-02 at 271-No. 70-71
    (showing performance measurement data for January 2000 through March
    2000). The Texas Commission applied blockage criteria of one percent
    as a benchmark to ensure that the competitive LEC's network traffic
    does not experience the same blockage as SWBT's network (citing the
    disproportionate impact of blocked trunks on new entrants). Texas
    Commission Texas I Comments at 14; *see also* SWBT Texas I Dysart
    Aff. at paras. 543-547.

[^137]: The Department of Justice initially raised concerns in the Texas
    I application, which were also raised by the competitive LECs
    themselves, that some competitive LECs had been unable to obtain the
    number of interconnection trunks they needed and that these
    competitive LECs had difficulty ordering trunks. *See* Department of
    Justice Texas I Evaluation at 44-49; s*ee* *also* Department of
    Justice Texas I March 20, 2000 *ex parte* at 1, n.2.

[^138]: In its Evaluation of SWBT's Texas II application, the Department
    of Justice stated that "the efforts of SBC, competitive local
    exchange carriers and the Texas PUC appear to have led to
    improvements in SBC's interconnection trunking performance and to a
    better understanding of trunk provisioning by the various parties to
    the process." Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5. The
    Texas Commission reviewed SWBT's trunk utilization, forecasting,
    ordering and provisioning processes, as well as plans to relieve
    blockage through proper cooperative planning between SWBT and
    competitive LECs. As a result of this review, SWBT agreed to
    implement improvements relating to trunk forecasts, data collection,
    application of exclusions, and the process for ordering trunks. SWBT
    was also permitted to apply certain exclusions in calculating the
    performance measurements (*e.g*., customer not ready exclusion).
    Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 14; SWBT Deere Texas I Reply
    Aff. at para. 11; SWBT Laurie Leathers Texas I Aff. (filed Dec. 14,
    1999 in Docket 16251); SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 19;
    SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 56, Attach. K Dysart Aff. (filed
    Dec. 14 in Docket 16251), *see also* Texas Commission Dec. 16 Open
    Meeting Transcript at 26-27; 32.

[^139]: CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 7-12, TWTC Nick Summit Texas
    I Aff. as Attach. 4 to CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments; TWTC Kelsi
    Reeves Texas I Aff. as Attach. 5 to CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments;
    ALTS Texas I Comments at 17-23, e.spire Texas I Comments at 3,
    George Wong Texas I Aff. at 2-4 as Attach. to e.spire Texas I
    Comments; CompTel Texas I Comments at 10-12, CapRock Jere Thompson
    Texas I Aff. as Exhibit B to CompTel Texas I Comments; NTS Mitch
    Elliott Texas I Aff. as Exhibit C to CompTel Texas I Comments;
    Sprint Texas I Comments at 62-64.

[^140]: TWTC Reeves Texas I Aff. at paras. 17-24; TWTC Summit Texas I
    Aff. at paras. 12-14.

[^141]: TWTC Summit Texas I Aff. at para. 11. SWBT Texas I Application
    at 79; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 549-559. *See also* Texas
    Commission Texas I Comments at 10-22. SWBT modified its trunk
    ordering guidelines in December 1999. SWBT agreed to accept orders
    of 12 DS1s per competitive LEC per day (an increase from eight DS1s
    per day) in each of the four market areas in Texas. This
    modification was approved by the Texas Commission at its December
    16, 1999 Open Meeting. SWBT Deere Reply Aff. at paras. 7-9. SWBT's
    Deere Attach. A to Reply Aff. (confidential) reflects all occasions
    on which SWBT has provisioned eight or more DS1s per day, per
    competitive LEC, per market area from January 1 to February 11,
    2000. It shows SWBT has provided 12 or more DS1s per day on at least
    18 different occasions. SWBT has also agreed to accept quarterly
    forecasts from competitive LECs (instead of only semi-annual
    forecasts accepted previously). According to the business rule for
    PM 70 (Version 1.6), if a competitive LEC exceeds 25% of its most
    recent forecast (which must have been provided within the last six
    months), an exclusion applies. SWBT has agreed to measure the 25%
    exclusion against forecasts provided by competitive LECs on a
    quarterly basis. SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 12; SWBT
    Dysart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 64; Texas Commission Texas I
    Reply Comments at 15-16. *See also* March 8, 2000 *ex parte* letter
    from SWBT to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission.

[^142]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data No. 70-01, 70-2 at
    271-No. 70-71 (showing performance measurement data for January 1999
    through December 1999). e.spire makes general allegations concerning
    blockage caused by SWBT and SWBT's lack of assistance to e.spire.
    e.spire Wong Texas I Aff. paras. 8-12. e.spire's allegations,
    however, do not disprove the submitted data showing that SWBT met
    the benchmark on the trunk blocking performance measure (PM 70), as
    detailed above.

[^143]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 11. We also note that TWTC
    acknowledged that the conversion from one-way to two-way trunks in
    Austin "was a huge success for both companies." TWTC Reeves Texas I
    Aff. at para. 17. This is significant because where a competitive
    LEC does not carry a sufficient amount of traffic to justify
    separate one-way trunks, an incumbent LEC must accommodate two-way
    trunking upon request wherever technically feasible. Refusing to
    provide two-way trunking would raise costs for new entrants and
    create a barrier to entry. The provisioning of two-way trunking
    arrangements is among the obligations that the Commission concluded
    in the *Local Competition Order* demonstrated an incumbent LEC was
    providing interconnection to a competitor in a manner no less
    efficient than the way in which the incumbent LEC provides the
    comparable function to its own retail operations. *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612-613, paras. 217-220;
    *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(f).

[^144]: SWBT\'s percentage of missed due dates:

    **PM 73: Missed Due
    DatesJanFebMar**CLEC10.4%4.4%4.1%SWBT60.3%27.6%22.5%*See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Measurement Data PM 73 at 271-No.73-76
    (showing performance measurement data for January 2000 through March
    2000). SWBT continues to meet the benchmark in April.

[^145]: "Held orders" are orders that SWBT does not process due to lack
    of interconnection facilities. A lack of interconnection facilities,
    in turn, could mean that SWBT could not satisfy its interconnection
    obligation.

[^146]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 15. The interim measure
    will be finalized as part of the Texas Commission's six-month review
    of performance measurements which began in April 2000. *See* Texas
    Commission Dec. 16, 1999 Open Meeting Transcript at 29-31. CapRock
    and NTS alleged that the pre-planning process that occurs before
    SWBT officially counts a competitive LEC's request as an order
    (*e.g*. scheduling of initial planning meeting and preparation by
    SWBT of a Service Planning Document summarizing the requirements
    specified by a competitive LEC), further delays their ability to
    obtain interconnection trunks (and is not tracked by performance
    measurements). CompTel Texas I Comments at 10-11, Exhibit C, NTS
    Mitch Elliot Aff., Exhibit B, Caprock Jere Thompson Aff. SWBT
    responds that this supposed delay is no more than timely contract
    preparation. SWBT Texas I Reply Comments at 49. The Texas Commission
    stated that NTS and Caprock had never brought their complaints to
    the attention of the Texas Commission, and it did not believe that
    based on the evidence developed in the Section 271 proceeding that
    the complaints of NTS and CapRock indicate systemic problems.
    Inasmuch as the Texas Commission had little opportunity to
    investigate those complaints and develop a factual record, we accord
    them little weight. Texas Commission Texas I Reply Comments at
    13-14.

[^147]: *See* SWBT Texas I March 17 *ex parte* Attach. 3; SWBT Texas I
    February 18 *ex parte* at 5-6; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. K at
    11. NTS' allegation that the orders it submitted in December in
    Amarillo were held for lack of facilities does not constitute
    evidence demonstrating that SWBT fails to meet the checklist item.
    Specifically, NTS alleged that when it submitted properly forecasted
    orders on December 23, 1999, SWBT claimed it did not have enough
    multiplexing equipment available to fulfill NTS's order and that as
    of its Texas I filing, the trunks were still not installed. SWBT
    responded that on December 23, 1999, NTS ordered a single DS-3
    facility to support its interconnection trunks in Amarillo. SWBT
    stated that it responded to NTS the same day explaining that SWBT
    lacked facilities to provision the DS-3, but offered to fill the
    order using DS-1s to provide the same capacity. SWBT Texas I *ex
    parte* letter of March 22, 2000*.* SWBT stated that NTS ordered the
    DS-1s on January 4, 2000, but twice delayed provisioning of these
    trunks on the basis that NTS was not ready to receive them. SWBT
    stated that most recently, the trunks were scheduled for delivery
    between March 14 and March 16, but that NTS indicated on each of
    these dates that it was not ready to accept the trunks. SWBT Texas I
    *ex parte* letter of March 22,2000. The Texas Commission noted on
    Reply that it will work with SWBT, NTS \[and CapRock\] in Docket
    20400 to ascertain if there are problems. However, based on the
    evidence developed in the section 271 proceeding, the Texas
    Commission did not believe that the complaints of NTS \[and
    CapRock\] indicate systemic problems." Texas Commission Texas I
    Reply. We agree.

[^148]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5, stating that PM
    73.1 reports very few orders held for lack of facilities for March
    2000.

[^149]: In February, March, and April, SWBT met the 20 business day
    benchmark with an average installation interval of 16.5, 17.4, and
    17.3 business days respectively for competitive LECs. The Texas
    Commission established a benchmark instead of a parity measure
    because SWBT installs more trunks for competitive LECs than for its
    retail side. Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16.

[^150]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 47;
    Telecommunications Resellers Association Texas I at 9-10, 13; Sprint
    Texas I at 62-64; Sprint Texas II Comments at 46; CompTel Texas II
    Comments at 2. We also note that the performance measures will be
    reviewed by SWBT, competitive LECs and the Texas Commission every
    six months, beginning in April 2000, "to determine whether they are
    properly reflecting the behaviors and results needed for a
    sustainable competitive market." Texas Commission Texas I Comments
    at 4. We disagree with the allegation of Pontio that its
    interconnection dispute with SWBT disqualifies SWBT from receiving
    section 271 authority. Specifically, Pontio alleges that SWBT will
    not provide requested interconnection trunks unless Pontio agrees to
    an amended interconnection agreement that would impose per minute
    local switching charges. *See* Texas II Comments of \@Link,
    BlueStar, DSLnet et. al. at 23. SWBT states that the trunks at issue
    were provisioned on May 11, 2000 and the terms to recover the
    appropriate costs for the use of those facilities are subject to
    ongoing negotiations with Pontio. *See* SWBT Texas II Reply at 50.
    We believe Pontio's alleged difficulties are best resolved through
    the section 252 negotiation and arbitration process.

[^151]: SWBT's physical and virtual collocation tariffs were revised in
    connection with the Texas Commission's collaborative process and
    workshops designed to address competitive LEC concerns. The revised
    physical and virtual collocation tariffs became effective upon state
    approval October 29, 1999. *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments
    at 16. SWBT's physical collocation tariff contained a 50 square foot
    minimum space requirement for shared cage collocation. However, our
    rules provide that an ILEC must make shared collocation space
    available in single-bay increments or their equivalent, *i.e*., a
    competing carrier can purchase space in increments small enough to
    collocate a single rack, or bay, of equipment. 47 CFR § 51.323
    (k)(1). We note that SWBT eliminated the minimum space requirement
    and notified competitive LECs through an Accessible Letter of
    February 29, 2000 that it had removed the minimum space requirement.
    *See* SWBT Accessible Letter of February 29, 2000 "Clarification of
    minimum cage size for Caged and Shared Cage collocation Kansas,
    Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas ," No. CLEC00-050.

[^152]: SWBT Texas I Application at 73-78; *see also* Texas Commission
    Texas I Comments at 16-22.

[^153]: SWBT Texas I Application at 74.

[^154]: SWBT Texas I Application at 75, SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at
    para. 629, SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at paras. 44-45.

[^155]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data PMs 107-109
    at 271-No. 107a --109b (showing performance measurement data for
    January 2000 through March 2000).

[^156]: SWBT Texas I Application at 77. SWBT states that it has
    completed 40 virtual collocation arrangements in Texas.

[^157]: SWBT Texas I Application at 78.

[^158]: "SWBT's physical and virtual collocation tariffs have been
    revised in conformance with the Texas Commission recommendations,
    and address the myriad competitive LEC concerns discussed at length
    in the Texas Commission's collaborative process and workshops."
    Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16.

[^159]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 17-18.

[^160]: ALTS and the CLEC Coalition objected to SWBT's practice of
    walling in its own equipment as a "reasonable security measure"
    associated with cageless collocation and then charging competitive
    LECs for the construction. The competitive LECs contended this
    practice is not contemplated by the Commission's *Advanced Services
    First Report and Order*. ALTS Texas I Comments at 24; CLEC Coalition
    Texas I Comments at 12; *see also* AT&T's DeYoung Texas I Aff. at
    para. 327 n.240. Pending completion of the Texas Commission's rate
    proceedings, the interim rate for security for cageless collocation
    is zero, subject to true-up. SWBT argues therefore that as a
    practical matter there is no genuine issue. *See* pricing discussion
    *infra* at section V.A.2; SWBT's Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at
    para. 32; *see also Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    3987-88, para. 79.

[^161]: *See* Petition for Partial Reconsideration or Clarification
    filed June 1, 1999, Sprint Corporation requests that we clarify and
    further strengthen the collocation rules adopted in the *Advanced
    Services First Report and Order.*

[^162]: On March 17, 1999, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded certain
    aspects of the *Advanced Services First Report and Order*, including
    the relevant sections at issue here. *See GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,*
    Nos. 99-1176 *et al.* (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2000).

[^163]: *See* MFNS Texas I Comments and Reply Comments. *See also*
    Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 25-26. MFNS filed a section
    208 complaint with the Commission's Enforcement Bureau on February
    15, 2000 requesting that SWBT be directed to provide its Competitive
    Alternate Transport Terminal "CATT" interconnection. That complaint
    was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with the
    Commission's complaint requirements. *See* February 28, 2000 Letter
    from Radhika V. Karmarkar, Enforcement Bureau, to Karen Nations
    (MFNS), Jonathan E. Canis and David A. Konuch (Kelley Drye & Warren)
    and Christine Jines (SBC).

[^164]: SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 14; 20-21. SWBT will provide
    other technically feasible alternatives using the Special Request
    Procedure set forth in the T2A. *Id*. at 14.

[^165]: SWBT Texas I Application at 73-78. SWBT's state approved T2A
    requires SWBT to provide other collocation arrangements that have
    been demonstrated to be technically feasible and in compliance with
    the *Advanced Services Order*. The T2A provides a rebuttable
    presumption of technical feasibility when a collocation arrangement
    has been deployed by any incumbent LEC. *Id*. at 17.

[^166]: Specifically, AT&T objects to SWBT's requirement that AT&T
    establish direct trunks to each central office in the Dallas
    exchange area, which is not served by a local tandem, instead of
    allowing AT&T to interconnect at the access tandem serving the
    central offices in the Dallas exchange area. AT&T alleged that
    SWBT's requirement led to a three-month delay in AT&T's final
    testing of its telephony-over-cable service in the Dallas area.
    *See* AT&T Texas I Comments at 59-60; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at
    paras. 20-26; AT&T *ex parte* of March 8, 2000; AT&T Texas II Reply
    Comments at 49; *but see* SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at 24-25;
    SWBT Texas II *ex parte* of April 26; SWBT Texas II Reply Comments
    at 50-54. *See also* AT&T Texas II *ex parte* letter of June 13,
    2000.

[^167]: *See* SWBT Deere Texas II Reply Aff., App. A-4 at 5-7; AT&T
    Texas II Reply Comments, DeYoung/Fettig Decl., at 5 n.7.

[^168]: SWBT Texas II Reply Comments at 53. SWBT notes that the issues
    raised by AT&T will be debated before the Texas Commission in a
    pending arbitration between SWBT and AT&T. SWBT Deere Texas II Reply
    Aff. App. A-4 at 7. We believe that AT&T's issue is appropriately
    resolved through the Texas Commission's arbitration process. *See
    AT&T Communications of Texas, L.P., TCG Dallas and Teleport
    Communications, Inc's Response to Southwestern Bell Telephone
    Company's Petition for Arbitration*, Tex. PUC Docket 22315 at 13-17
    (filed April 17, 2000).

[^169]: In addition, we find that SWBT satisfactorily addresses AT&T's
    concern that SWBT does not allow virtual collocation if space for
    physical collocation is available. AT&T's DeYoung Texas I Aff. at
    para. 332; *see also* AT&T's March 8, 2000 *ex parte* at 2-3. SWBT
    confirms that sections 25 and 26 of SWBT's Virtual Collocation
    Tariff make virtual collocation available to competitive LECs
    regardless of the availability of physical collocation; the
    restriction to which AT&T refers involves a maintenance and repair
    option for virtually collocated equipment, and such language does
    not deny virtual collocation as alleged by AT&T. SWBT Texas I Reply
    Comments at 51; Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 34-35.

[^170]: *See* 47 U.S.C § 251(c)(2),(3); *see also* 47 C.F.R.
    §51.305(a)(2); s*ee,* *e.g.,* *Memorandum of the Federal
    Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae, US West Communications,
    Inc., vs. AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. et.
    al*, No. CV 97-1575 JE.

[^171]: 47 C.F.R Section 51.305(e); *see also Local Competition First
    Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 15602, 15605-06, paras. 198, 203,
    205.

[^172]: *See Local Competition First Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at
    15588*,* para. 172.

[^173]: *Local Competition First Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at
    15608*,* para. 209.

[^174]: *See* SWBT Texas II Application , App. 5, Tab 45, MCI(WorldCom)
    Agreement Attach. 4, § 1.2.2. Section 1.2.2 of the WorldCom
    Agreement states: "MCI(WorldCom) and SWBT agree that MCI(WorldCom)
    may designate, at its option, a minimum of one point of
    interconnection within a single SWBT exchange where SWBT facilities
    are available, or multiple points of interconnection within the
    exchange, for the exchange of all traffic within that exchange. If
    WorldCom desires a single point for interconnection within a LATA,
    SWBT agrees to provide dedicated or common transport to any other
    exchange within a LATA requested by WorldCom, or WorldCom may
    self-provision, or use a third party\'s facilities." SWBT Texas II
    Application , App. 5, Tab 45, WorldCom Agreement Attach. 4, § 1.2.2

[^175]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 252(i). Section 252(i) makes these terms and
    conditions available to all requesting carriers despite SWBT's
    statement that it requires competitive LECs to interconnect in every
    local exchange area. *See* SWBT Texas II Reply at 50.

[^176]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i).

[^177]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2).

[^178]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^179]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.321(b); *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-81, paras. 549-53. In a physical
    collocation arrangement, an interconnecting carrier has physical
    access to space in the LEC central office to connect to the
    incumbent LEC network. *Id.* at 15784, para. 559, and n.1361. In a
    virtual collocation arrangement, interconnectors designate central
    office transmission equipment dedicated to their use, but have no
    right to enter the central office and do not pay for incumbent LEC
    floor space. *Id.* In a meet-point arrangement, the parties
    negotiate a point at which one carrier\'s responsibility for service
    ends and the other carrier's begins. *See id.* at 15778, n.1332.

[^180]: *Advanced Services First Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at
    4783-85, paras. 40-42.

[^181]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6); 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.305(a)(5),
    51.321(a)-(b); *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3979*,*
    para 66.

[^182]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-07, 51.509(g); *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812-16, 15844-61, 15874-76,
    15912, paras. 618-29, 674-712, 743-51, 826.

[^183]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (1997).

[^184]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,* 525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^185]: *Id.* at 380.

[^186]: *Id.* at 382.

[^187]: *Id*. at 384.

[^188]: *Id*.

[^189]: We note that other unbundled network elements are required
    pursuant to the checklist, but we discuss them in the context of
    other checklist items. Additionally, we discuss UNE pricing,
    including both recurring and non-recurring charges, in checklist
    item 2; rates for access to poles, ducts, and conduits in checklist
    item 3; the pricing of directory assistance and operator services in
    checklist item 7; reciprocal compensation rates in checklist item
    13; and resale rates in checklist item 14.

[^190]: SWBT Texas I Application at 72, 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff at
    para. 148.

[^191]: *See* SWBT Texas I Application at 74, 80.

[^192]: *Id*. at 77*.*

[^193]: *Id.* at 78.

[^194]: *Id.* at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 149.

[^195]: SWBT Texas I Application at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    paras. 59-60, 63.

[^196]: SWBT Texas I Application at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    para. 59-60, 63.

[^197]: Texas I Commission Comments at 10.

[^198]: *Id.*

[^199]: *Id.* at 10, 16, 21.

[^200]: *See* Texas I Commission Comments at 80; Texas II Commission
    Comments at 55-58; Letter from Donna Nelson,
    Director-Telecommunications, Legal Division, Texas Public Utility
    Commission to Magalie Roman Salas, CC Docket No. 00-65, Attach. 5,
    Interim Award at 17 (filed June 19, 2000) (Texas Commission June 19
    *Ex Parte*).

[^201]: Texas I Commission Comments at 21.

[^202]: AT&T Texas I Comments at 41; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras.
    317-18, 328.

[^203]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090, para. 258.

[^204]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 259.

[^205]: *Compare Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090-91,
    para. 258 with *id*. at 4091, para. 259.

[^206]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c), (e)(6); *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.,
    525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^207]: *See* para. 84, *supra* (discussion of Texas Commission's
    commitment to apply pricing standards of sections 251 and 252 of the
    Act).

[^208]: AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras. 320, 328.

[^209]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090-91, para.
    258.

[^210]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 6, 40, 149; SWBT Texas I
    Shelley Aff. at paras. 44-46; SWBT Texas I Reply at 50; SWBT Texas I
    Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 12, 27-28. *See Advanced Services
    Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 4771-94, paras. 19-60.

[^211]: AT&T Texas I Comments at 41-42; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at
    paras. 320-21, 328 & nn.230, 233.

[^212]: AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 321.

[^213]: AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 322. According to AT&T, a
    competitive LEC acquiring a 100-square-foot caged space would pay
    \$4,166 in interim non-recurring charges and \$64 per month in
    interim recurring charges, compared to no non-recurring charges and
    a maximum of \$42.01 per month in recurring charges under the
    AT&T/MCI cost model. *Id*. AT&T says that SWBT's own rate comparison
    indicates that the interim rates, prior to the 30 percent reduction,
    are approximately twice those produced by the AT&T/MCI model,
    representing a difference of about \$14,000 in non-recurring charges
    for a 100 square-foot cage. *Id*. at 323 & nn.235-236.

[^214]: AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para 320 & n.231.

[^215]: *See* SWBT Texas I Reply at 50; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff.
    at paras. 27-29.

[^216]: AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 325.

[^217]: Texas I Commission Comments at 21.

[^218]: We also observe that in any context in which prices are not set
    in accordance with our rules and the Act, we retain the ability to
    take a variety of enforcement actions and will not hesitate to do
    so. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^219]: *See* section III.B.1, *supra; UNE Remand Order* at para. 15.

[^220]: 47 U.S.C. § 51.315(b).

[^221]: *See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990,
    para. 84.

[^222]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (for example, unbundled loops,
    transport and switching are listed separately as checklist items iv,
    v and vi).

[^223]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-90, para.
    83; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 585.

[^224]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585.

[^225]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83.

[^226]: *Id.*

[^227]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^228]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 84.

[^229]: *Id.*

[^230]: *Id.* As part of a BOC's demonstration that it is "providing" a
    checklist item (*e.g.*, unbundled loops, unbundled local switching,
    resale services), it must demonstrate that it is providing
    nondiscriminatory access to the systems, information, and personnel
    that support that element or service. An examination of a BOC's OSS
    performance is therefore integral to our determination of whether a
    BOC is offering all of the items contained in the competitive
    checklist. *Id*.

[^231]: *Id.* at 3990-91, para. 84.

[^232]: *Id.* at 3991, para. 85.

[^233]: *Id.*

[^234]: *Id.* For example, we would not deem an incumbent LEC to be
    providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS if limitations on the
    processing of information between the interface and the back office
    systems prevented a competitor from performing a specific function
    in substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent performs
    that function for itself.

[^235]: *See id.*

[^236]: *Id.* at para. 3991, para. 86.

[^237]: *Id.*

[^238]: *Id.* As a general proposition, specific performance standards
    adopted by a state commission in an arbitration decision would be
    more persuasive evidence of commercial reasonableness than a
    standard unilaterally adopted by the BOC outside of its
    interconnection agreement. *Id*. at 20619-20.

[^239]: *See id.* at 3991-92, para. 86.

[^240]: *Id.* at 3992, para. 87; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 20616; s*ee also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20654; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 592-93. In
    making this determination, we "consider all of the automated and
    manual processes a BOC has undertaken to provide access to OSS
    functions," including the interface (or gateway) that connects the
    competing carrier's own operations support systems to the BOC; any
    electronic or manual processing link between that interface and the
    BOC's OSS (including all necessary back office systems and
    personnel); and all of the OSS that a BOC uses in providing network
    elements and resale services to a competing carrier. *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20615; s*ee also Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654 n.241.

[^241]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para.
    88.

[^242]: *Id.*

[^243]: *Id.*

[^244]: Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure
    uniformity in the format of orders and include information
    concerning ordering codes such as universal service ordering codes
    (USOCs) and field identifiers (FIDs). *Id.; see also Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n.335.

[^245]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88.

[^246]: *Id.*

[^247]: *See id.*

[^248]: *Id.* at 3993, para. 89.

[^249]: *Id.*

[^250]: *Id.*

[^251]: *See id.; Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659
    (emphasizing that a third-party review should encompass the entire
    obligation of the incumbent LEC to provide nondiscriminatory access,
    and, where applicable, should consider the ability of actual
    competing carriers in the market to operate using the incumbent's
    OSS access).

[^252]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-3990,
    para. 83.

[^253]: *See* Department of Justice Texas 1 Evaluation at 36 to 52.

[^254]: *See* Department of Justice June 13 *ex parte* submission at
    17-19. Specifically, the Department of Justice expressed concern
    about: (i) the "apparent difficulty CLECs have had integrating SBC's
    pre-order interfaces with SBC's ordering interface" (*see* section
    V.B.1.e, *infra*); (ii) allegations regarding SBC's inability to
    provide nondiscriminatory access to updating the LIDB database in a
    timely and accurate manner (*see* section V.B.1.f.i.f, *infra*); and
    (iii) "disturbing allegations" raised by two competing LECs
    regarding specific recent SWBT conduct in Texas (*see* section
    V.B.2.b.i, *infra*).

[^255]: Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5-6, 28-32; SWBT Texas 1
    Ham Aff. at para. 251; Telcordia Final Report at §1.1.1.

[^256]: Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5 n.7; Telcordia Final
    Report at § 1.1.1.

[^257]: Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5.

[^258]: SWBT Texas 1 Application at 28; Texas Commission Texas 1
    Comments at 5; SWBT Texas 1 Ham Aff. at para. 256-258. Seven
    competitive LECs were test participants in the test. Only AT&T and
    WorldCom actively participated in testing their EDI interface. *See*
    Telcordia Final Report at §§ 1.1.1.1-1.1.1.2; Transcript of OSS
    Testing Workshop, SBC Application App. D, Vol. 3, Tab 50.

[^259]: Telcordia Final Report at 3.2.4.

[^260]: As we stated in the New York order, rigorous state proceedings
    can contribute to the success of a section 271 application. *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3958, para. 8.

[^261]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para.
    53; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655, para.
    86; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 138.

[^262]: *See, e.g.,* sections V.B.1.e and V.B.1.f, *infra*. *See also*
    Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 4 (suggesting that
    Telcordia's test has "significant limitations," but also
    "provid\[es\] some evidence of the functionality and capacity of
    SBC's \[OSS\]").

[^263]: *See* Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 4-7; AT&T
    Texas I Comments at 74-75, 79-80; WorldCom Texas I McMillon & Sivori
    Decl. at 110; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 9. 17. In sum, the
    Department of Justice and commenters suggested that Telcordia: (i)
    tested an inadequate number of transaction scenarios, excluding, for
    example, the provisioning of xDSL capable loops; (ii) did not test
    SWBT's manual processes or back-end systems; (iii) did not
    adequately test SWBT's change management processes or competitive
    LEC support organizations such as the Help Desk and Customer Service
    Center; and (iv) did not evaluate the accuracy of the raw data used
    by SWBT to calculate its performance measurements. *Id.* Several
    parties also argued that the third party test in Texas was less
    comprehensive than the test executed by KPMG in New York, with
    respect to the Bell Atlantic section 271 process. In Bell Atlantic's
    New York application, we treated the conclusions in the KPMG Final
    Report as persuasive evidence of Bell Atlantic's OSS readiness
    based, in part, on the scope and depth of KPMG's review. *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, at paras. 96-100.

[^264]: *See, e.g.,* WorldCom Texas I Comments at 40; CLEC Coalition
    Texas I Comments at 5 (arguing that SWBT had advanced notice of test
    scenarios and competitive LECs test participants and used special
    codes that earmarked their test orders); AT&T Texas I Comments at 9
    and 73-74 (asserting that SWBT provided much of the content of the
    process review report); AT&T Texas I Dalton/Connolly Decl. at paras.
    39-49; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 9 (stating that Telcordia
    shared its findings with SWBT before reporting them to the Texas
    Commission and the competing carriers).

[^265]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 28-32. The Texas
    Commission explains that its "role in the OSS readiness test
    included: overseeing the development of the functionality and
    capacity tests, overseeing the test process, assisting in the
    defining of the test scope, ensuring a collaborative process,
    providing final approval of 'baselined' documents with input from
    the TAG and Telcordia, approving data retention policy for
    participants \[and\] acting as the test manager." *Id.* at 29-30.

[^266]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 30, 38 (describing
    efforts to maintain testing blindness).

[^267]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at para. 102; *First BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6279 n.197; *BellSouth South
    Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd. at 625 n.467; *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20617 n.334; *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd. at 19742.

[^268]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 3999, para. 102.

[^269]: *Id.* at 3999-4000, para. 102

[^270]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 102.

[^271]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 103.

[^272]: *Id.*

[^273]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 103.

[^274]: *Id.*

[^275]: *Id.* at 4002, para. 107.

[^276]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 104.

[^277]: *Id.* at 4002, para. 108.

[^278]: *Id.* at 4002-03, paras. 109-10.

[^279]: *Id.* at 4003-04, para. 110. In the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, we used these factors in determining whether Bell Atlantic
    had an adequate change management process in place. *See id.* at
    4004, para. 111. We left open the possibility, however, that a
    change management plan different from the one implemented by Bell
    Atlantic may be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the
    requirements of section 271. *Id.*

[^280]: *Id.* at 3999, para. 101, 4004-05, para. 112.

[^281]: As explained more fully in part V.d.(i) *infra*, some commenters
    criticize SWBT's change management plan because, in contrast to Bell
    Atlantic's change management plan, it has not been used in
    connection with a major release, was not subjected to rigorous third
    party testing, and fails to include performance measurements to
    capture whether SWBT is complying with the change management
    notification intervals.

[^282]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 4003, para.
    111 (recognizing that various change management plans may be
    adequate to meet the needs of competing carriers).

[^283]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 307, 314.

[^284]: We note that, as far back as March 1998, SWBT expressed an
    interest in working jointly with competing carriers to establish an
    effective change control process for EDI. *See* SWBT Texas I
    Application, App. C, Tab 169, Affidavit of Liz Ham on Behalf of SWBT
    at para. 64 (filed Mar. 2, 1998 in Texas Commission Project No.
    16251). Indeed, at that time, SWBT developed a change control
    process plan and provided it to AT&T for its review in input.
    According to SWBT, the purpose of this initial plan was to serve as
    a starting point to establish a change control process between the
    two companies. *Id.* Beginning in October 1998, at the direction of
    the Texas Commission, SWBT committed to: (1) hold change management
    meetings on a monthly basis; (2) provide competing carriers with the
    ability to establish the agenda for the meetings; (3) submit the
    minutes of the meetings to competing carriers and allow competing
    carriers five business days to comment; (4) file minutes of such
    meetings with the Texas Commission; and (5) file a competing
    carrier's comments along with such minutes if such competing
    carrier's requested changes were not incorporated by SWBT into the
    meeting minutes. Texas Commission Comments at 47; *see also* SWBT
    Texas I Application, App. C, Vol. 75, Tab 1233, Texas Commission
    Final Staff Report on Collaborative Process at 168 (filed Nov. 18,
    1998 in Texas Commission Project No. 16251).

[^285]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff., App. A-4, Vol. 6, Attach. NN, SWBT
    Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) Interface Change
    Management Process (dated Sept. 23, 1999) (Change Agreement).

[^286]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 308.

[^287]: *See* Change Agreement §§ 3.3.1-3.3.16 (setting forth timeline
    associated with changes to application-to-application interfaces);
    *id.* §§3.5.1 (defining timeline for changes to graphical-user
    interfaces).

[^288]: Pursuant to the Change Agreement, SWBT must maintain information
    relating to the change management process on a webpage that is made
    available to competing carriers (hereinafter referred to as
    "competing carrier webpage"). The Change Agreement provides that the
    competing carrier webpage will contain, at a minimum, the following:
    (1) current version of the Change Agreement; (2) LSR-EDI Joint
    Release Test Plan Template; (3) log of competing carrier change
    requests; (4) references and/or links to requirements for upcoming
    releases; and (5) SWBT's exceptions to the EDI LSOG Mechanization
    Specifications. Change Agreement § 8.0. ALTS and the CLEC Coalition
    argue that modifications to the competing carrier website are
    necessary. ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas II Comments at 17. We are
    confident that issues such as these will be adequately resolved
    through the normal change management process.

[^289]: Currently, these meetings are held on a monthly basis. This
    interval, however, may change in the future. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff.
    at para. 330. The record indicates that competing carriers have an
    active role in the development of the agenda for the change
    management meetings. As a result of Telcordia's findings, SWBT
    includes an "Action Item Register" in the minutes to the change
    management meetings. According to SWBT, this log facilitates the
    tracking of change management issues and notifies all participants
    of the status of outstanding issues. *Id.* at para. 334.

[^290]: For example, SWBT's Change Agreement defines the procedure by
    which a competing carrier can submit an interface change request to
    SWBT. SWBT explains that, in deciding whether to include a competing
    carrier's change request in its requirements, it will consider such
    factors as feasibility, cost, and cost reduction, and user benefits.
    SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 318.

[^291]: *See infra* note Error: Reference source not found and
    accompanying text. We further note that the Change Agreement
    specifies that the change management plan is dynamic in nature, and
    will be managed through regularly scheduled meetings based on group
    consensus. Change Agreement § 1.0.

[^292]: Change Agreement §§ 7.0-7.5 (defining outstanding issue
    resolution process).

[^293]: Birch Tidwell/Kettler Texas I Aff. at para. 160.

[^294]: Change Agreement § 3.4. These rules provide that the most recent
    prior release will be maintained in service after a new release,
    allowing competitive LECs to transition to the newest release at
    their own pace (or alternatively, wait to transition to the
    subsequent release). SWBT Texas I Application at 34; SWBT Ham Texas
    I Aff. at paras. 352-354. SWBT adopted this versioning policy in
    response to competitive LEC requests during change management
    meetings. *Id.* SWBT will make available one version of a GUI at any
    given time. *Id.* § 3.5.

[^295]: *See* SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-084 (dated June 5,
    2000), Attach. 1 to AT&T June 14, 2000 OSS *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^296]: A release is considered "major" if a change in the Local Service
    Ordering Guidelines (LSOG) version occurs, or substantial new
    functionality is introduced. *See* WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I
    Decl. at para. 221.

[^297]: AT&T and WorldCom point out, for example, that contrary to the
    documented change management plan, SWBT has not implemented
    versioning. AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at paras. 37-44;
    WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 224.

[^298]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 307 (noting that its former
    change management plan was made available to competing carriers from
    June 1998 to August 1999).

[^299]: *See* AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 56 & n.26;
    WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 218.

[^300]: WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Decl. at para. 219, 223.

[^301]: We further note that the current change management process was
    used in connection with the May 27, 2000 release. SWBT Ham Texas II
    Aff. at para. 55 (noting that the current agreed-upon change
    management plan was used for all releases implemented in 2000); *see
    also* Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at 2, 6-8 9
    (concluding that SWBT generally followed the current change
    management process for the October 23, 1999 release). According to
    SWBT, except for the dates and timeframes that had already passed
    when it became effective, the current change management plan was
    effective for the October 23, 1999 release. Specifically, SWBT
    states that joint testing was carried out in a manner consistent
    with the current change management plan, and the go/no-go vote
    policy was in effect for the October 23, 1999 release. SWBT Ham
    Texas I Aff. at para. 314.

[^302]: Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Chief, Common Carrier
    Bureau, to Nancy E. Lubamersky, Executive Director, Regulatory
    Planning, U S WEST, at 2-3 (Sept. 27, 1999) (*U S WEST Sept. 27,
    Letter*).

[^303]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at 4002-03, para. 110; U S WEST
    Sept. 27 Letter at 2.

[^304]: *See infra* part V.d.(iii).

[^305]: In its Documentation Analysis report, Telcordia noted that
    competing carriers cited SWBT's human resources as the most
    significant resources for EDI implementation, and that competing
    carriers were particularly impressed by the assignment of numerous,
    knowledgeable SWBT subject matter experts with wide-ranging areas of
    expertise during the implementation process. Other resources cited
    by competing carriers as being helpful for EDI implementation
    included a daily conference call routine, SWBT's "Mapping Matrix"
    and LSOR, and the competing carrier website. *Id.* at 11.

[^306]: SWBT Texas I Application, App. G, Vol. 9, Tab 631 (Modification
    to the Southwestern Bell EDI/LSR Change Control Process-Arkansas,
    Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, Accessible Letter CLEC 99-097
    (July 21, 1999)).

[^307]: While we continue to believe that the existence of a go/no-go
    vote policy minimizes the need for versioning, we agree with AT&T
    that such a policy does not obviate the need for versioning
    altogether because, as AT&T explains, "new releases impact different
    CLECs differently." AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 38. For
    example, as AT&T points out, "\[a\] defect in a release that will
    cripple one CLEC's ability to convert and support customers may have
    little impact on another CLEC, thus creating the possibility that a
    'go/no go" vote will not delay the release." *Id.*

[^308]: AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 43.

[^309]: We note that the issue of the availability of versioning was
    specifically raised before the Texas Commission. The Texas
    Commission ordered SWBT to implement versioning by January 15, 2000,
    *see* Texas Commission Order No. 5-Re: EDI Version Control (filed
    July 23, 1998, in Texas Commission Project No. 19000, Attach. 2 to
    AT&T Dalton/De Young Decl.). Due to subsequent discussions with the
    Texas Commission, however, SWBT currently will not implement
    versioning until August 2000. *See* Letter from Mark A. Haddad,
    Counsel for AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated June
    14, 2000 (AT&T June 14, 2000 OSS *Ex Parte Letter*), Attach. 1, SWBT
    Accessible Letter, CLECSS00-84 (dated June 5, 2000) (requesting
    input from competing carriers on its proposal to implement the
    versioning release in August 2000). We reiterate that, until
    versioning is fully implemented in Texas, the efficacy of SWBT's
    change management will be carefully scrutinized.

[^310]: For example, the evidence demonstrates that this change
    management process was developed with minimal input from competing
    carriers and failed to include certain key safeguards that competing
    carriers believe are essential to their ability to modify and test
    changes on their side of the interface. In particular, the former
    change management plan did not require SWBT to complete internal
    testing of the release prior to the commencement of the competing
    carrier testing period, did not permit competing carriers to request
    that the implementation of the release be delayed if problems were
    encountered during testing (*i.e*., go/no go vote), failed to
    include documentation with respect to the entrance, exit, and
    success criteria associated with testing, did not require SWBT to
    extend the testing period to fix errors found during testing, and
    did not provide for versioning. *See* AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Aff. at
    para. 56 n.26 & Attach. 6.

[^311]: The Texas Commission has been actively involved in handling
    various change management issues through Project Numbers 16251
    (proceeding addressing SWBT compliance with 271), 19000 (proceeding
    addressing the implementation of the AT&T/SWBT and WorldCom/SWBT
    interconnection agreements) and 20400 (proceeding established to
    handle change management issues).

[^312]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20616-17, para. 137.

[^313]: Some commenters point out that SWBT does not provide a set of
    SWBT-specific EDI interface documentation. Instead, SWBT relies on
    industry standard documents such as the Telecommunications Industry
    Forum (TCIF) EDI Guidelines to notify competing carriers of the
    requirements necessary to build to its OSS. SWBT notifies competing
    carriers of the differences between its EDI interface requirements
    and industry standards through documents entitled "Accessible
    Letters." Several carriers argue that Accessible Letters are an
    ineffective method of communicating to competing carriers the
    requirements necessary to build to SWBT's systems. For example,
    these commenters claim that these Accessible Letters do not offer a
    comprehensive view of all of the differences between industry
    standards and SWBT-specific EDI interface requirements. *See* AT&T
    Dalton/ DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 83 (arguing that Accessible
    Letters "do not provide a comprehensive view of all differences
    between industry standards interface guidelines and those consistent
    with SWBT's EDI interface"); *see also* AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas
    II Decl. at paras. 39-42 (describing deficiencies with respect to
    SWBT's EDI documentation). Other commenters contend that that these
    letters often fail to include critical change management
    information, are not easily accessible, and often are not made
    available to competing carriers in a timely fashion. *See* Birch
    Tidwell/Kettler Texas I Aff. at paras. 163-66.

[^314]: Several commenters suggest ways in which SWBT could improve the
    quality of its EDI documentation. *See* AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas
    II Decl. at para. 42. We are confident that any issues concerning
    the adequacy of SWBT's EDI documentation will be resolved
    expeditiously and effectively by SWBT through the normal change
    management process.

[^315]: As the Texas Commission explains, in carrier-to-carrier testing,
    the ability of a competing carrier to build an EDI interface capable
    of pass orders to the BOC is one indicator of the sufficiency of the
    BOC's documentation. Texas Commission Comments at 46. In this
    regard, the Texas Commission notes that, "any deficiencies in
    documentation appear through the identification of errors." *Id.*

[^316]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 16, 131.

[^317]: SWBT Brainard Texas I Aff. at para. 6.

[^318]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 19.

[^319]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 20-21. The IS Call Center
    answers questions regarding access to SWBT's systems and
    applications, and assists in the resolution of information
    technology problems experienced by competing carriers. SWBT Ham
    Texas I Aff. at para. 20. SWBT's OSS CLEC Support team is available
    to discuss with competing carriers such issues as hardware and
    software requirements, training needs, and implementation
    strategies. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 30.

[^320]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 36. The competing carrier website
    address is \<https://clec.sbc.com\>. *Id.* Examples of OSS-relates
    sites that can be accessed by competing carriers include: (1)
    Customer Education Website, which presents an overview of OSS
    classes available for competing carriers; (2) IS Call Center
    Website, which assists carriers in the resolution of problems that
    may arise while accessing SWBT's OSS; (3) Performance Measurements
    Website, from which carriers may view performance reports; and (4)
    FOC/SOC Online Application, which provides carriers currently
    receiving FOCs and SOCs manually an alternative means for accessing
    these notices.

[^321]: SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 15; SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff.
    at para. 30. According to SWBT, GXS will assess each individual
    competing carrier's situation, make recommendations relating to
    inter interface architecture and strategy, offer high level
    requirements, and issue a report detailing the above information to
    the competing carrier. SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 15.

[^322]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas I Aff.., App. A-4, Attach. T, Telcordia
    Technologies, Southwestern Bell EDI/LSR Documentation Analysis
    (filed Dec. 13, 1999 in Texas Commission Project No. 20000)
    (Telcordia Documentation Report). Telcordia's analysis consisted of
    three parts. First, Telcordia compared documentation made available
    by SWBT to general industry resources (*e.g.*, OBF Guidelines with
    respect to pre-order and order procedures, Telecommunications
    Industry Forum (TCIF) EDI Guidelines with respect to EDI mapping).
    *Id.* at ES-1. Second, Telcordia utilized documentation and
    resources provided by SWBT to create LSRs and their associated EDI
    records. Telcordia then utilized SWBT's "How Am I Doing" service to
    assess and analyze the accuracy of the data created. *Id.* at 3.
    Finally, Telcordia interviewed four competing carriers to validate
    its own findings and identify any strengths and weaknesses perceived
    by those carriers. *Id.* at ES-1. The competing carriers that were
    interviewed by Telcordia were selected by the Texas Commission.
    *Id.* at 1.

[^323]: Telcordia Documentation Report at 8.

[^324]: Telcordia Documentation Report at ES-1, 1.

[^325]: Telcordia Documentation Report at 1.

[^326]: Telcorida Documentation Report at 11(outlining some of the
    strengths noted by competing carriers). Although some of the
    competing carriers identified areas in which the EDI implementation
    process could be improved, Telcordia concluded no competing carrier
    had identified a persistent problem. Telcordia Documentation Report
    at 12. Indeed, Telcordia noted that all of the carriers errors were
    corrected after an initial communication to SWBT. *Id.*

[^327]: In its Documentation Report, for example, Telcordia noted that
    "CLEC representatives consistently commented on the responsiveness
    of SWBT employees to their concerns and issues raised during EDI
    implementation." Telcordia Documentation Report at 11. In fact,
    Telcordia stated that its analysis revealed that all of the
    competing carriers' errors were corrected after initial email or
    voice conversation with SWBT representative. Telcordia Documentation
    Report at 12.

[^328]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 111 & Attach. U (announcing
    that SWBT and Allegiance Telecom were able to establish electronic
    bonding between their two companies within 90 days).

[^329]: *See* SWBT Ham Mar. 2, 1998 Aff. in Texas Commission Project No.
    16251 at para. 62 (noting that "AT&T has experienced considerable
    system and training problems within its own operations which have
    impaired its ability to send correct service orders."); *id.* at
    para. 63 (noting that "AT&T has demonstrated an inability to correct
    known order entry problems which have unduly extended the \[service
    readiness testing\] time-frames"); *see also* SWBT Application, App.
    C, Tab. 613, SWBT Ham Apr. 17, 1998 Aff. in Texas Commission Project
    No. 16251 at paras. 40-42 (arguing that one reason that AT&T's EDI
    implementation plans were delayed is that AT&T initially planned to
    develop a national interface, but then abandoned those plans to
    develop a regional system).

[^330]: Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 9-16 & Attach. A.

[^331]: SWBT Ham Aff., Attach. A, Telcordia Technologies, SWBT OSS
    Readiness Report at 24 (filed Oct. 7, 1999 in Texas Commission
    Project No. 20000). As Telcordia explained:

    > This test provides an indirect test of the documentation and may
    > not catch all the ambiguous situations. However, the documentation
    > will be much improved since several CLECs used it to implement
    > their interfaces. Thus, the implementation improvements provide
    > for enhancements for the CLEC community.

[^332]: Telcordia Final Report at 24; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras.
    284-87 (noting that every instance of inadequate or unclear
    documentation reported by Telcordia during the course of the
    third-party test has been addressed by SWBT); *see also* SWBT Ham
    Texas I Aff. Attach. KK (listing each documentation change made by
    SWBT during the course the Telcordia test).

[^333]: SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 9.

[^334]: *Id.* at paras. 9-10; *see also* SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff.,
    Attach. A (providing a summary of the items discussed at the
    documentation meeting and SWBT's responses to these items).

[^335]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at 4005, para. 113.

[^336]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at 4005, para. 114.

[^337]: *Compare* SWBT Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC)
    Interface Change Management Process (dated Sept. 1, 1999) *with*
    SWBT Change Agreement (dated Sept. 23, 1999).

[^338]: SWBT's Change Agreement sets forth a timeline for changes to
    existing interfaces and the introduction of new interfaces. *See*
    Change Agreement §§ 3.3.1-3.3.16 (timeline for changes to existing
    application-to-application interfaces); *id.* §§ 3.5.1-3.5.10
    (timeline for changes to graphical-user interfaces); *id.* §§
    4.2.1-4.2.18 (timeline for the introduction of new
    application-to-application interfaces); *id.* §§ 4.3.1-4.3.12
    (timeline for the introduction of new graphical-user interfaces).
    Changes are divided into two different categories: "Category One,"
    which refers to changes to application-to-application interfaces;
    and "Category Two," which refers to changes to graphical-user or
    proprietary interfaces. The Change Agreement specifies the timelines
    associated with each type of change. In general, SWBT shares its
    plans for changes to its interfaces at change management meetings
    approximately 9 to 12 months prior to the target implementation
    date. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 310; Change Agreement § 3.3.2.
    SWBT also provides a high-level view of upcoming Category One
    changes in a "Release Announcement," which is delivered to competing
    carriers via an Accessible Letter approximately 180 days prior to
    the implementation of the change. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para.
    310; Change Agreement § 3.3.3. SWBT must distribute the initial
    requirements associated with Category One changes within 152 to 172
    days prior to the scheduled implementation, and 21 days prior to the
    implementation of a Category Two change. Change Agreement § 3.3.8,
    3.3.9. Final release requirements must be issued approximately 110
    to 130 prior to the implementation of Category One changes, and 14
    days prior to the implementation of a Category Two change. Release
    testing, which is conducted in connection with Category One changes,
    typically occurs at least 30 days prior to the implementation of the
    release. Change Agreement §§ 3.3.14., 4.2.16. SWBT explains that the
    process for Category Two changes is different from the process
    followed for Category One changes because the latter requires
    programming by both SWBT and competing carriers and the former does
    not. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 317.

[^339]: Telcordia issued two reports relative to SWBT's adherence to its
    change management plan. SWBT Ham Texas I Aff., App. A-4, Vol. 6,
    Attach. LL, Telcordia Technologies, SWBT Change Control Process
    Validation Report (dated Sept. 1999) (Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change
    Management Report); *id.*, Attach. MM, Telcordia Technologies, SWBT
    Change Control Process Validation Report (dated Dec. 1999)
    (Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report). The first report,
    which was issued in September 1999, assessed whether SWBT followed
    its documented change management process in connection with the
    August 1999 release. *See* Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management
    Report at 6. The second report, which was issued in December 1999,
    assessed whether SWBT followed its documented change management
    process in connection with the October 1999 release, and whether
    SWBT had implemented the corrective measures Telcordia recommended
    in its September 1999 change management report. Telcordia Dec. 1999
    Change Management Report at ES-1, 2.

[^340]: Telcordia September 1999 Change Management Report at 5;
    Telcordia December 1999 Change Management Report at ES-1.
    Specifically, in its September 1999 Change Management Report,
    Telcordia noted that the initial requirements associated with the
    August 14, 1999 release were available on February 19, 1999, which
    was 178 days before the actual release. Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change
    Management Report at 11. The final requirements were issued to
    competing carriers on March 31, 1999, which was 136 days prior to
    the actual release date. *Id.* Telcordia noted that minor changes to
    the final requirements were proposed by SWBT via Accessible Letter
    on June 17, 1999, which was approximately 60 days prior to the
    implementation of the release. Telcordia stated, however, that,
    given the scope of this release, it appeared that competing carriers
    "had adequate time to review, comment and prepare testing for the
    changes." Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 12. In
    its Dec. 1999 Change Management Report, Telcordia again found that
    SWBT generally adhered to the timelines set forth in its formal
    change management plan. *See* Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management
    Report at ES-1. In particular, Telcordia found that SWBT issued an
    Accessible Letter on March 5, 1999, announcing its plans implement a
    release in October 1999. *Id.* at 6. The initial requirements
    associated with the October 23, 1999 release were made available to
    competing carriers on April 26, 1999, approximately 166 days prior
    to the date of implementation. *Id.* Final requirements relative to
    the October 23, 1999 release were issued by SWBT on June 23, 1999,
    which was 122 days prior to the implementation date. *Id.* The
    testing environment relative to this release was made available by
    SWBT from September 20, 1999 through October 18, 1999. *Id.* at 7.

[^341]: Telcordia Sept. 1999 CMP Report at 11-12.

[^342]: In its reports relative to the August 1999 and October 1999
    releases, Telcordia noted that SWBT deviated from certain aspects of
    the formal change management plan. For example, in its September
    1999 Change Management Report, Telcordia noted: (1) SWBT's failure
    to comply with the timeframes set forth in the Change Agreement with
    respect to competing carriers' responses to change management
    notices; (2) SWBT's failure to provide a test plan in connection
    with the Final Requirements associated with the August 1999 release;
    (3) a lack of evidence demonstrating that competing carriers had
    input into the development of test cases and a testing schedule; (4)
    a lack of documentation with respect to the entrance and exit
    criteria associated with release testing; and (5) a lack of
    documentation concerning SWBT's identification and resolution of
    issues encountered during testing. Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change
    Management Report at 5, A-28, A-29. In its December 1999 Change
    Management Report, Telcordia noted that, contrary to the documented
    change management plan, SWBT did not support versioning. Telcordia
    Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at 6 n.2. Telcordia noted,
    however, that such deviations did undermine the achievement of the
    general objectives set forth in the documented change management
    plan. Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 5; Telcordia
    Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at ES-1.

[^343]: AT&T maintains that SWBT has failed to demonstrate a pattern of
    compliance with its documented change management procedures, and has
    introduced numerous changes outside the change management process.
    *See* AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at paras. 54-73 (providing
    examples of SWBT's failure to follow documented change management
    plan); *id.* at paras. 45-53 (outlining instances in which SWBT
    implemented coding changes outside of the documented change
    management process). AT&T and WorldCom further maintain that SWBT
    improperly introduces a substantial number of changes pursuant to
    the "exceptions process" outlined in the Change Agreement in order
    to evade the standard 120-day notification interval set forth in the
    change management plan. *See* AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Reply
    Decl. at para. 47; WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl. at para.
    221.

[^344]: The Change Agreement, under the heading "Exceptions," provides
    that:

    > \[A\]ny agreement to deviate from the normal \[change management
    > plan\] shall be agreed to unanimously by qualified CLECs and SWBT.
    > If SWBT wishes to propose that a specified change, introduction of
    > a new interface or retirement of an interface be handled on an
    > exception basis, it will issue a Release (or Retirement)
    > Requirements Exception Accessible Letter, which indicated that it
    > seeks an exception following the conclusion of a reply and comment
    > cycle.

    Change Agreement § 6.2.

[^345]: Since December 20, 1999, SWBT has issued thirteen Exception
    Accessible Letters. *See* SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 57.
    WorldCom admits that SWBT is permitted to make these change pursuant
    to the exceptions process, but states that it is concerned that
    "SWBT will make the exception into the rule." WorldCom
    McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 221.

[^346]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 311. For example, SWBT discussed
    these changes at change management meetings, and/or issued
    Accessible Letters seeking comment on such proposed changes. SWBT
    Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 316. No competing carrier objected to the
    implementation of the changes either in the change management
    meetings or in response to the associated Accessible Letter. SWBT
    Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 314.

[^347]: For example, the record indicates that a particular edit was
    removed from the May 27, 2000 release due to competing carriers
    objections. SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 58.

[^348]: SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at paras. 55, 57. Specifically, SWBT
    states that:

    > \[C\]ompliance with the numerous regulatory mandates issued at the
    > end of 1999 and in January 2000 (e.g., LIDB programming, ling
    > sharing, and UNE Remand) have involved massive and complex
    > programming efforts on SWBT's part. In order to meet the timing
    > requirements of these orders, SWBT has had no choice but to
    > schedule its releases according to the exception process spelled
    > out in the CMP.

    *Id.* at para. 55.

[^349]: WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 221.

[^350]: A stable testing environment means that no changes by the BOC
    are permitted after the testing period commences. *See Bell Atlantic
    New York Order* at 4002-03, para. 109 & n.301.

[^351]: *Id.* at para. 109.

[^352]: *Id.*

[^353]: *Id.*

[^354]: SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 338. SWBT explains that competing
    carriers were notified of the new test environment via Accessible
    Letter CLECSS99-150. *See* *id.* Attach. SS.

[^355]: SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 170. Specifically, in
    contrast to the test environment that existed prior to November 1999
    where the testing environment was shared between SWBT developers and
    testers and competing carriers, the current testing environment is
    physically separate from the production environment and is made
    available for the exclusive use of competing carriers for the
    purposes of testing.

[^356]: *Id.*

[^357]: *Id.*

[^358]: *Id.* at para. 168.

[^359]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 171.

[^360]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 131. As discussed
    more fully in paragraphs 141-142, *infra*, although some problems
    arose in connection with the January 15, 2000 release, the record
    demonstrates that these problems were isolated, were resolved by
    SWBT in a timely fashion, and did not significantly impede any
    carrier's ability to test adequately the release prior to its
    implementation.

[^361]: AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 43.

[^362]: AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 77.

[^363]: AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 44; *see also*
    Letter from John A. Redmon & David F. Werthheimer, Counsel, AT&T, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 00-4, at 9-10 (filed Mar. 8, 2000) (AT&T Mar. 8 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^364]: Letter from Mark E. Haddad, Counsel, AT&T, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    00-65, at 2-3 (filed June 14, 2000) (AT&T June 14 OSS *Ex Parte*
    Letter).

[^365]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para 127. More specifically,
    SWBT acknowledges that it manually monitors orders as they enter and
    exit the testing environment, and that its testing environment does
    not emulate production response times. SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff.
    at para. 168.

[^366]: *See* AT&T Mar. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. D, Final Minutes
    for February 8, 2000 Change Management Meeting Process
    Meeting---Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, at 5-6 (Final
    Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting). During
    this meeting, SWBT acknowledged that competing carrier joint testing
    goes through service order creation, but not through to billing and
    provisioning. Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management
    Process Meeting at 6.

[^367]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 165-69.

[^368]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 130. For example, in the
    first change management meeting subsequent to the implementation of
    the January 15, 2000 release, Birch noted that it lost a week's
    worth of revenue due to problems with the release. Final Minutes for
    Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting at 6.

[^369]: Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting
    at 6.

[^370]: *Id*.

[^371]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 130.

[^372]: *See* Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process
    Meeting at 6.

[^373]: In response to concerns raised by competing carriers with
    respect to the testing environment, SWBT stated that it would "check
    into the possibility of running a test through to the billing
    cycle." *Id*.

[^374]: AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 45.

[^375]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 132 & Attach. RR (Pacific
    Bell, Nevada Bell, Southwestern Bell and Competitive Local Exchange
    Carrier (CLEC) Joint Release Test Plan Template for Local Service
    Request (LSR) Electronic Date Interchange (EDI), Version 3.0, § 2.2
    (SWBT/CLEC Joint Release Test Plan)).

[^376]: SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 132.

[^377]: *Id*.

[^378]: *Id*.

[^379]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 49-50.

[^380]: *Id*. at 51-52.

[^381]: *Id*. at 52-53.

[^382]: SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 170.

[^383]: SWBT Texas I Application at 25; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at 19;
    SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras 5, 12. SWBT states that the LSC
    executes complex transactions that are performed manually for both
    SWBT retail customers and competing carriers, as well as other
    transactions for competing carriers that prefer to use manual
    processes. SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at
    paras. 5, 34, 38.

[^384]: SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at para. 18.

[^385]: SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 6,
    25. The LSC has a staff of approximately 600 employees. *Id.*

[^386]: SWBT Application at 26; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras 7, 15.
    The LOC has 148 employees and is available to competing carriers 24
    hours a day, 7 days a week. SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras.
    15-17.

[^387]: Competing carriers can contact the CAST through a "hotline" that
    is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. SWBT Conway Texas I
    Aff. at 10.

[^388]: SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at para 107.

[^389]: SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 6,
    114-117.

[^390]: SWBT Application at 24; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 20-28.
    The IS call center is open 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. *Id.*

[^391]: SWBT offers classes on using its electronic OSS interfaces as
    well as a free workshop that covers both manual and electronic
    ordering processes. SWBT Ham. Texas I Aff. at paras. 370-74; SWBT
    Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at paras. 154-170.

[^392]: SWBT Texas I Application at 24-25; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at
    para. 18; *see also* SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at paras. 171-173.

[^393]: Several parties assert that SWBT's LSC is inadequately staffed
    and that the personnel is inadequately trained. CLEC Coalition
    Comments at 35-36. Some commenters further argue that the Telcordia
    test did not adequately address support organizations such as the
    Help Desk, and Information Services Call Center. CLEC Coalition
    Comments at 5; *But see* Texas Commission Evaluation at 46-47
    (describing training and documentation.)

[^394]: As explained below, this does not include an evaluation of new
    loop qualification obligations under rule 319 that became effective
    in May, 2000. *See* section III.D, *infra*.

[^395]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para.
    129; *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd. at
    20660, para. 94 (referring to "pre-ordering and ordering"
    collectively as "the exchange of information between
    telecommunications carriers about current or proposed customer
    products and services or unbundled network elements or some
    combination thereof"). In prior orders, the Commission has
    identified the following five pre-order functions: (1) customer
    service record (CSR) information; (2) address validation; (3)
    telephone number information; (4) due date information; (5) services
    and feature information. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4015, para. 132; Second *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd. at 20660, para. 94; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd. at 619, para. 147.

[^396]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129.

[^397]: *Id.; see also*; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd.
    at 623-29 (concluding that failure to deploy an
    application-to-application interface denies competing carriers
    equivalent access to pre-ordering OSS functions).

[^398]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129.

[^399]: *See* *id.* at 4014, para. 130; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67, para. 105.

[^400]: *See* SWBT Texas I Application at 82; SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at
    para. 53.

[^401]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 52 and 54. These 11
    functions go beyond the seven pre-ordering functions previously
    identified by the Commission. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 4015, para. 132 (discussing the first seven functions
    listed above).

[^402]: *See* SWBT Texas I Application at 82; SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at
    para. 68 (explaining that, in addition to allowing direct access to
    DataGate, it is "front-ending" DataGate, thereby providing an
    interface that can be used by competing carriers that conforms to
    existing national standards for EDI and CORBA). According to SBC,
    this allows competing carriers to build their interfaces to national
    standards, while preserving the background application
    functionality, data content, and performance standards that SWBT has
    established for DataGate. *Id.*

[^403]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 69-70; *but see* AT&T
    Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at 16 (explaining that, unlike
    DataGate, EDI and CORBA do not return certain pre-ordering
    information -- CLLI codes and NC/NCI information -- that is
    necessary for completing a UNE-P order).

[^404]: SWBT's performance metrics measure the timeliness and
    availability only of the DataGate and VeriGate pre-ordering
    interfaces. *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at paras. 95-114.

[^405]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 66 and 70.

[^406]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1
    ("Average Response Time for OSS Pre-Order Interfaces") at 271-1a.
    Specifically, the data reflect a significant volume of the following
    types of pre-order transactions: retrieve CSRs; validate addresses;
    select and reserve telephone numbers; determine services and
    features available to a customer; obtain due date availability; and
    retrieve local primary intraLATA carrier (LPIC) and primary
    interexchange carrier (PIC) list. The ability to access loop
    qualification information at the pre-ordering stage is discussed
    separately, below.

[^407]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 268 (recognizing that,
    rather than test the application-to-application DataGate
    pre-ordering interface as part of its UNE-P functionality test,
    Telcordia only looked at the VeriGate GUI). We note, however, that
    Telcordia did assess the ability of the DataGate system to handle a
    high volume of transactions as part of its capacity test. *See*
    *id.* at para. 290.

[^408]: *See* AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 104-105
    (suggesting that SWBT has the ability to label some numbers as
    "available for ILEC" and "available for non-ILEC" and thus would
    have the ability, if it chose, to favor its own operations).

[^409]: SWBT also asserts that three carriers, using software developed
    by third party vendors, have successfully integrated two other
    pre-ordering interfaces, EDI and CORBA, with EDI for ordering. *See*
    SWBT Texas II Comments at 38; SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras.
    27-29, and Att. F and G. There is no corroborating evidence in the
    record (such as commercial usage or statements from these carriers)
    that these integration efforts have been successful. Moreover, as
    noted above, SWBT does not demonstrate that its EDI and CORBA
    interfaces satisfy all necessary aspects of our pre-ordering
    analysis. We do not need to rely on SWBT's assertions regarding EDI
    and CORBA, however, because we find that SWBT's DataGate interface
    may be integrated.

[^410]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4019, para.
    137 ("\[w\]ithout an integrated system, a competing carrier would be
    forced to re-enter pre-ordering information manually into an
    ordering interface, which leads to additional costs and delays, as
    well as a greater risk of error.").

[^411]: *See* *id.* at para. 138 (discussing Bell Atlantic's evidence
    that carriers were able to "successfully" integrate in a commercial
    setting); *see also* WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg
    Reply Decl. at para. 14 (conceding that "CLECs can build some form
    of 'integrated' pre-order and order interface," but indicating that
    parsing and integration difficulties lead to a high reject rate
    which negates the benefits of integration).

[^412]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 21; *see also* AT&T
    Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 14. Specifically, SWBT
    explains that, in response to a competing LEC's request for a
    customer's information via the DataGate pre-ordering interface, it
    returns address information (including street number, apartment
    number, street name, thoroughfare type and community name) as a
    string of numbers and words. Each of these pieces of information
    must be populated in separate fields on the LSR, in accordance with
    the incumbent LEC's pre-ordering and ordering business rules. Other
    information, including the customer name, telephone number and zip
    code are returned in a "parsed" format -- that is, each separate
    piece of information is identified by a particular code that can be
    matched to a field on the LSR.

[^413]: Contrary to AT&T's interpretation of the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, *see* AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 95, we have
    not previously stated that a BOC must perform parsing on its side of
    the interface. Rather, we consider whether integration has been
    shown to be possible (or has actually been achieved).

[^414]: Indeed, we note that the level of detailed analysis required in
    this instance was not necessary in the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order* because Bell Atlantic returned address information in a
    parsed format. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4020, para. 138.

[^415]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 15.

[^416]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham. Aff. at para. 3; Sage March 29 *Ex
    Parte* Letter; Navigator March 30 *Ex Parte* Letter. The Texas
    Commission observed that other competing LECs may have undertaken
    steps to integrate these functions, but have not come forward. *See*
    Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 6.

[^417]: *See* Sage March 29 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1. Sage has been
    submitting orders via EDI for at least ten months.

[^418]: *See* Navigator March 30 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1; Navigator June
    14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1.

[^419]: *See* Navigator March 30 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1. While WorldCom
    has not provided a clear explanation of its integration efforts in
    this proceeding, the Texas Commission noted that WorldCom has
    previously stated that it has integrated several fields, including
    the account telephone number. *See* Texas Commission Texas II
    Comments at 6.

[^420]: Although AT&T does not provide a detailed description of the
    process by which it takes address information obtained through
    pre-ordering and completes an order, AT&T does not suggest that it
    re-types such information, but instead it has "endeavored to
    integrate DataGate with its EDI ordering system." *See* AT&T Texas I
    Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 92-94. Also, WorldCom confirms that
    it has integrated certain pre-order fields (including "account
    telephone number"), but apparently has not attempted to integrate
    the address fields and instead manually re-types them. *See*
    WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para.
    8.

[^421]: We understand that, if a competing carrier places an
    incorrectly-parsed address on an order (*i.e.,* a segment of the
    address is placed into an inappropriate field) it will result in a
    reject with an address-related reject code. There are many other
    reasons for rejects which have nothing to do with parsing addresses,
    as evidenced by the hundreds of reject codes that correspond to the
    hudreds of mechanized and manual edits in SWBT's ordering systems.
    *See* SWBT Ham Texas II Aff., Att. H.

[^422]: SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 61 and Att. D-1 (listing
    carrier-specific reject rates for April 2000).

[^423]: SWBT Texas II Ham Aff., Att. H (listing the percentage of orders
    that receive each type of reject code, for certain carriers and for
    all carriers in the aggregate).

[^424]: *See* AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 11,
    18-23.

[^425]: *See* *id.*

[^426]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 48 and 55.

[^427]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Decl. at paras. 21 and 45
    (suggesting that address-related rejects also may result from
    mismatches between SWBT's two internal address databases, PREMIS and
    CRIS).

[^428]: *See* Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 7 and Att. 5
    ("Telcordia Pre-order/Order Integration Analysis").

[^429]: We note that Telcordia required oral clarification from SWBT on
    several points in order to complete its work. *See* Telcordia
    Pre-Order/Order Integration Analysis at 7. Telcordia
    "recommend\[ed\] several improvements to the documentation so that
    others will similarly receive such clarification." *Id.* SWBT
    reports that it has already implemented these documentation changes.
    *See* SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 36.

[^430]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 23.
    Telcordia explains that, while it did not actually send test orders
    through the editing process, it *visually* "confirmed that each
    \[address\] element was in fact populated in its correct field."
    *See* Telcordia June 13, 2000 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2. Telcordia
    further explained that it formulated 20 testing scenarios, and also
    used different combinations of the elements of an address, to ensure
    that the concatenated address information could be parsed correctly.
    *Id.*

[^431]: A comprehensive third party test of integration functions that
    includes an assessment of the various steps a competitive LECs would
    take in order to accomplish integration of pre-ordering and ordering
    functions would provide compelling evidence that a BOC's interfaces
    can be integrated. In this regard, substantial weight may be given
    to a test where the tester (i) submits a pre-order query; (ii)
    receives data from the BOC; (iii) auto-populates the data into an
    LSR; and (iv) submits the LSR to the BOC. SWBT itself identified
    these four key elements of "integration testing." *See* SWBT Texas
    II Ham Aff. at para. 14 (outlining steps that typically would be
    taken by a competitive LEC to accomplish integration of pre-ordering
    and ordering functions).

[^432]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 23.

[^433]: Telcordia explained that "Datagate . . . concatenated address
    information is similar to the EDI concatenated values. In both
    situations, the methodology is the same. The only difference is in
    the different coding language used. Telcordia concludes that the
    programming concept used for the script in parsing EDI files, both
    non-concatenated and concatenated values, can also be applied to
    Datagate . . . files." *See* Telcordia June 13, 2000 *Ex Parte*
    letter at 2-3; *see also* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 33.
    We accept Telcordia's explanation and find that, in this limited
    instance, its findings relating to EDI have relevance in assessing
    whether information obtained directly from DataGate can be
    integrated into the ordering process.

[^434]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras. 24 --32 and Att. I (SWBT
    Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-051, March 29, 2000). For these
    orders, SWBT will suppress the address edits and itself will
    populate the service address contained in the CSR onto competing
    LECs' orders. SWBT suggests that this change would have eliminated
    99.8% of AT&T's address-related rejects in January 2000. *See* SWBT
    Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 27. Several commenters have agreed that
    this change would likely reduce rejects, particularly those
    associated with address-related errors. *See* AT&T Texas II Reply at
    paras. 73-74; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at
    para. 40 (but suggesting that this change may have negative
    consequences as well); *see also* Sage March 29 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    2.

[^435]: We note that the "TN Ordering" change will not altogether
    eliminate the need for carriers to parse address information. *See*
    WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 35-38;
    *but see* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 81-83 (explaining
    that WorldCom overstates the instances in which carriers will have
    to use addresses). Nonetheless, as noted above, SWBT enables
    carriers to perform this parsing.

[^436]: The Department of Justice described this system enhancement as
    one of several "significant steps" taken recently by SWBT to
    alleviate concerns related to pre-ordering and ordering integration.
    *See* Department of Justice June 13 *Ex Parte* Letter at 18.

[^437]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 15; SWBT Texas II Ham
    Reply Aff. at para. 30. SWBT explains that GXS "is familiar with
    SWBT's systems and ordering rules because they have developed an
    integrated solution for a CLEC in SWBT's region . . . . GXS has the
    experience and know-how to evaluate a CLEC's technological platform
    and strategy and provide the CLEC with recommendations to insure
    sucessful integration." SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 30.

[^438]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025 and 4029,
    paras. 145 and 154.

[^439]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 34. For example, the
    benchmark for responding to DataGate address verification queries is
    4.7 seconds; for requests for telephone numbers, 4.5 seconds; for
    requests for CSRs, 6.6 seconds; and for PIC information, 28 seconds.
    *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at 8-9. We note that
    commenters do not argue that these standards are improperly lenient,
    although AT&T does suggest that a "parity" comparison would be
    preferable. *See* AT&T Texas I Pfau/DeYoung Decl. at n.102.

[^440]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1
    ("Average Response Time for OSS Pre-Order"), and Measurement No. 2
    ("Response Received Within 'X' Seconds") at 271-No. 1a to 2d. SWBT
    has satisfied the benchmarks for average response time, as well as
    percent within "X" seconds, for each of seven DataGate pre-order
    functions for each of the last six months.

[^441]: *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at para. 111. We note, however,
    that SWBT does not specify what the hours of availability for its
    DataGate interface.

[^442]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 4 ("OSS
    Interface Availability -- DataGate") at 271-No. 4a (100%, 99.7%,
    100%, 100%, 98.5% and 99.7% for November 1999 to April 2000,
    respectively).

[^443]: AT&T notes that SWBT's performance data would not reflect
    outages or unavailability of an *underlying database*, from which
    DataGate must obtain data. AT&T indicates that such an event
    occurred in November 1999, and effectively made it impossible for it
    to perform pre-ordering functions during the period of outage. *See*
    AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 106-108. We do not find
    that there is evidence to suggest that the problem of subtending
    database outage is systemic, however, and conclude that SWBT's
    evidence adequately demonstrates the reliability of its DataGate
    interface.

[^444]: As we have explained in the prior proceedings, because
    characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the presence of
    various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain
    advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to "pre-qualify"
    a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that will assist
    carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with or without
    the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced
    service. *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021,
    para. 140.

[^445]: *See* section III.B, *supra*; *see also UNE Remand Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 3926, para. 527.

[^446]: *See Bell Atlantic New York*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021-22, paras.
    140-141.

[^447]: *See* SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 18 and Att. D (SWBT
    Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-043); *see also* SWBT Texas II Cruz
    Aff. at para. 33 and Att. E at 1 (SWBT Accessible Letter No.
    CLEC00-062).

[^448]: *See* SWBT Texas I Chapman Aff. at para. 26. We recognize that,
    as of April 29, 2000, SWBT also began providing *real-time* access
    via Verigate and DataGate/EDI to this actual loop make-up
    information. *See* SWBT Texas II Reply at 17; SWBT Texas II Cruz
    Aff. at para. 38.

[^449]: *See* *id.* at para. 37.

[^450]: *See* *id.*

[^451]: *See* SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at para. 33; SWBT Texas I Chapman
    Aff. at para. 26.

[^452]: SWBT reports that it returned competitive LEC requests for loop
    make-up information, on average, in 4.34, 2.63 and 1.72 days in
    February, March and April, 2000, compared to 3.99, 5.39 and 2.15
    days for the same requests submitted by its retail operations. *See*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 57 ("Average
    Response Time for Loop Make-Up Information") at 271-No. 57.

[^453]: *See* SWBT Texas II Reply at 18; Arbitration Award, Petitions of
    Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad
    Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection Rates,
    Terms, Conditions and Related Arrangements with Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, Docket Nos. 20226 and 20272 (Nov. 30, 1999)
    ("Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award"); Texas Commission January 27,
    2000 Open Meeting Transcript at 63-67 (Jan. 27 Open Meeting Tr.)
    (affirming November 30, 1999 decision of Texas Commission
    arbitrator).

[^454]: *See* SWBT May 11 *Ex Parte* Letter at Att. 2; Covad June 23 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 2-4.

[^455]: *See* Covad June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at Att. A (*Implementation
    of Docket Numbers 20226 and 20272,* Order No. 13, Docket No. 22165
    (Texas PUC, June 23, 2000) ("*June 23 Arbitration Order*")). In
    granting reconsideration of its May 8, 2000 order approving SWBT's
    firewall plan, the Texas Commission arbitrators explained that the
    existing firewall plan "help\[s\] to ensure competitive neutrality
    within SBC," but nonetheless ordered SWBT to make two minor
    adjustments: (i) to "explicitly state the restriction of assigning
    employees to both wholesale and retail responsibilities"; and (ii)
    to "explicitly state that the term 'Competitor Information' . . .
    includes any information received from a CLEC, including CLEC
    customer information, that if provided to SWBT's retail operatiors
    or affiliates, would place SWBT's retail operations or affiliates at
    a competitive advantage." *Id*. at 3-4.

[^456]: *See* Covad June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^457]: *See* *June 23 Arbitration Order* at 2; *see also* Covad/Rhythms
    Arbitration Award at 70 (explaining that the firewall plan would
    provide "further assurance that competitively beneficial information
    is not being passed from SWBT's network provisioning operations to
    its retail service operations.").

[^458]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035, para.
    163; *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20677, para. 117.

[^459]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035-4039,
    paras. 163-166.

[^460]: *See id.* at paras. 163-164 (discussing order confirmation
    notices); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20680,
    para. 120. In this instance, as in the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, we are not presented with a retail analogue for order
    confirmation notices, and thus assess whether the process and
    performance offered by the applicant enables an efficient competitor
    a meaningful opportunity to compete.

[^461]: SWBT is required to return 95% of order confirmations (both
    manually- and mechanically-processed) within 5 hours of order
    submission. *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at A-13. For the
    past five months (December 1999 to April 2000), SWBT has returned
    over 95% of order confirmation notices within five hours for
    "Residence and Simple Business" orders submitted via both LEX and
    EDI, with only one exception. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 5 ("Percent FOCs Received Within 'X' Hours --
    Mechanized") (Residence and Simple Business) at 271-No. 5a and 5c.
    While "Residence and Simple Business" orders include both UNE-P and
    resale POTS orders, SWBT has shown that the vast majority of these
    orders submitted via EDI are for UNE-P. *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff.,
    Att. X-2; *see also* SWBT Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter, Att. 2 (showing
    that, from September to December 1999, order confirmation timeliness
    for UNE-P orders ranged from 96.48 to 99.13 percent). As in New
    York, complex business orders and loop orders over a certain size
    (10 lines in New York and 50 lines in Texas) are given a longer
    processing standard; these orders are relatively low in volume and
    are not addressed separately here.

[^462]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5, at 271-No.
    5c.

[^463]: The Texas Commission also concluded that SWBT provides timely
    order confirmation notices. *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments
    at 39-40. Although the Department of Justice expressed concern in
    the Texas I proceeding that SWBT's late-1999 performance on order
    completion notices appeared to be deteriorating as volumes
    increased, *see* Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 38-39,
    we note that SWBT's performance has been satisfactory in this
    calendar year, notwithstanding considerably heightened order
    volumes.

[^464]: For December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT returned 85.8, 96.2, 98.4,
    98.1 and 98.8 percent of confirmation notices on orders for
    stand-alone loops sumbitted via EDI within 5 hours, with
    corresponding LEX performance at 97.5, 97.5, 92.9, 98.1 and 97.6
    hours. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5
    ("Percent FOCs Received Within 'X' Hours -- Mechanized") (UNE Loop
    1-49) at 271-No. 5b and 5d. Although SWBT's performance in this area
    was slightly below the benchmark for EDI in December 1999 and for
    LEX in February 2000, we note that it surpassed the benchmark for
    four of the other five months for both interfaces, and thus conclude
    that the single shortfalls do not appear to reflect a systemic
    problem.

[^465]: For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT returned
    order confirmation notices for unbundled loop orders in an average
    of 0.9, 1.2, 2.0, 1.4 and 1.4 hours for LEX, and 2.3, 1.6, 1.1, 1.2
    and 1.3 hours for orders submitted via EDI. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 6 ("Average Time to Return FOC
    (Hours) -- Mechanized") (UNE Loop 1-50) (LEX) at 271-No. 6b, and
    (EDI) at 271-No. 6d. SWBT's performance for these months with
    respect to order confirmation notices for UNE-P and resale orders
    averaged 1.2, 1.0, 1.0, 0.6 and 0.6 hours for LEX orders, and 0.7,
    0.7, 0.8, 5.6 and 1.4 hours for EDI orders. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 6 ("Average Time to Return FOC
    (Hours) -- Mechanized") (Residence and Simple Business) (LEX) at
    271-No. 6a, and (EDI) at 271-No. 6c. We note that, considering the
    loop and UNE-P orders together, this performance is several hours
    faster than the average performance reported by Bell Atlantic (8.48,
    8.84, 6.16 and 6.46 hours for loops and UNE-P combined in June to
    September, 1999). *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4037, para. 164, n.506. In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, we
    concluded that "Bell Atlantic's ability to process nearly all
    competing carrier UNE orders in under 24 hours, and a majority of
    such orders within two hours of submission, provides an efficient
    competing carrier with a meaningful opportunity to compete." *Id.*
    at para. 164. We caution that the comparison of performance data
    between BOCs can be misleading, because the measurement
    methodologies, statistical approaches, definitions, and exclusions
    may vary in significant ways. In this instance, however, we
    determine that the comparison is a meaningful one.

[^466]: For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT satisfied
    the five-hour standard for 77.7, 92.9, 95.0, 95.0 and 94.1 percent
    of loop with ported number orders submitted via LEX, and 93.2, 98.2,
    97.1, 96.4 and 96.1 percent for EDI orders. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 94 ("Percent FOCs Received Within
    'X' Hours) (Residence and Simple Business With Loop 1-19) at 271-No.
    94a and 94c. In the *Texas I Proceeding*, SWBT explained that its
    sub-standard performance at the end of 1999, for loops with a ported
    number, was attributable to inadequate training and staffing, and
    would be cured by retraining and reallocating its workforce. *See*
    SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at paras. 595, 598.

[^467]: *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1
    ("Percent Firm Order Confirmations Relating to xDSL-capable Loops
    Returned within 'X' Hours") at 271-No. 5.1a.

[^468]: ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas I Reply at 17.

[^469]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.

[^470]: *See* SWBT Ham Texas I Decl. at para. 147. Errors detected by
    mechanized edits automatically result in rejects that are returned
    electronically via LEX or EDI, while errors detected during manual
    processing result in manually-generated rejects returned
    electronically via the "LASR GUI" interface. *Id.*

[^471]: For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT reports that
    the average duration between receiving an order and returning a
    mechanically-generated reject notice ranged from 20 to 28 minutes
    (0.34 to 0.47 hours) for orders submitted via EDI -- with one
    exception, March 2000, where the mean time to return was 6.03 hours.
    *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data , Measurement No. 11 ("Mean
    Time to Return Mechanized Rejects") at 271-No. 10-11. SWBT explains
    that the aberrant performance in March 2000 related only to AT&T's
    orders and suggests that the ultimate root cause of the delays was a
    programming change on AT&T's side of the interface. *See* SWBT Texas
    II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 104. AT&T has not contested SWBT's
    explanation, and thus we have no reason to conclude that this
    anomalous performance in March 2000 reflects discrimination against
    AT&T or a systemic problem with SWBT's reject notification process.

[^472]: For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT reports that
    it returned manually-generated rejects in an average of 35.65,
    28.47, 7.55, 6.41 and 4.93 hours, respectively. *See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 10.1 ("Mean Time to
    Return Manual Rejects Received Electronically Via LEX/EDI"); *see
    also* SWBT Ham 2 Reply Aff. at para. 36.

[^473]: We thus disagree with AT&T's contention that SWBT's failure to
    satisfy the Texas Commission's strict five-hour standard proves that
    SWBT's performance is unsatisfactory. *See* AT&T Texas II
    Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 101-102. We further note that,
    while the Texas Commission did not comment on SWBT's improved reject
    processing times in this proceeding, it concluded that SWBT's reject
    processing performance was satisfactory in its *Texas 1* Comments.
    *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 25.

[^474]: SWBT provided a detailed analysis of reject notices provided
    during these months, demonstrating that the long processing times
    were largely attributable to a handful of extremely tardy reject
    notices which related to "duplicate" orders that had already been
    filled months earlier. *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 36;
    SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at paras. 27-28; SWBT March 31 *Ex Parte*
    Letter; *see also* AT&T Texas II Chambers DeYoung Decl. at para.
    104.

[^475]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 85 and 98
    (arguing that the combined rejection rate of 30% for LEX and EDI
    orders in February 2000 is "unreasonable by any standard," and that
    even "a rejection rate of approximately 20 percent is . . .
    excessive").

[^476]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para.
    175; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20673-74,
    paras. 111-112.

[^477]: *See* SWBT June 12 *Ex Parte* Letter, Att. 1; *see also* Texas
    II Ham Reply Aff. at Att. D (listing carrier-specific reject rates).

[^478]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 9
    ("Percent Rejects") at 271-No. 9a. We recognize that a small portion
    of the recent decline in overall and carrier-specific reject rates
    may be attributable to SWBT's conversion, in mid-January, of certain
    "rejects" into "jeopardies." *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung
    Decl. at para. 93. We agree with the Texas Commission, however, that
    the effect of this change on overall reject rates appears to be
    minimal. *See* Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 9; SWBT Texas
    II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 73-76.

[^479]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 48 and 58;
    WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 17 and
    41-48.

[^480]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 45 (referring to the
    "PREMIS/CRIS mismatch problem" and indicating that this "problem"
    may be responsible for certain address-related rejects).

[^481]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras. 24-32; AT&T Texas II
    Reply at paras. 73-74; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg
    Decl. at para. 40.

[^482]: We thus believe that WorldCom's concerns about processing a high
    level of address-related rejects will not likely be realized. *See*
    WorldCom Texas II Comments at 3; WorldCom Texas II
    McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 7.

[^483]: SWBT's data indicate that fewer than five percent of all
    carriers' orders submitted via EDI are rejected for address-related
    reasons, which would include orders rejected due to database
    mismatches. *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at Att. H.

[^484]: A competing carrier's orders "flow-through" if they are
    submitted electronically and pass through SWBT's ordering OSS into
    its back office systems without manual intervention. *See* SWBT
    Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 125; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 4033, n. 488.

[^485]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034, para.
    162 ("Flow-through rates . . . are not so much an end in themselves,
    but rather are a tool used to indicate a wide range of possible
    deficiencies in a BOC's OSS.").

[^486]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034-4035,
    paras. 161-163.

[^487]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para.
    175; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20673-76,
    paras. 111-115.

[^488]: We note that SWBT's flow-through rate reflects only those orders
    that are not rejected, and thus does not alter our findings
    regarding reject rates.

[^489]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13
    ("Order Process % Flow Through") at 271-No. 13. We place greater
    weight on the flow-through capability of SWBT's EDI interface than
    we do on the less-sophisticated LEX graphical user interface because
    EDI is an industry-standard application-to-application interface,
    and thus disagree with AT&T's suggestion that SWBT should not be
    allowed to rely primarily on EDI to demonstrate that it provides
    nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions. *See* AT&T
    Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 108-109. In any case, we
    note that SWBT's flow through rate for orders submitted via the LEX
    interface has ranged from 87.3 to 92.5 percent for December 1999 to
    April 2000, and achieved a better-than-parity rate for the past two
    months. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13 ("Order
    Process % Flow Through") at 271-No.13.

[^490]: Several commenters suggest that SWBT's Measurement 13 overstates
    its actual flow-through rate and that the measurement should be
    viewed with respect to *all orders* and not just *orders designed to
    flow through*. *See* AT&T Texas 1 Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras.
    154-155. Even under such a "total" flow-through approach, however,
    we note that SWBT's OSS flow through a high percentage of orders
    submitted via EDI: for the months of August to December 1999, for
    example, an average of 84 to 97 percent of all service orders
    submitted via EDI were able to flow through the ordering systems
    without manual intervention. SWBT Texas I Ham Aff., Att. X; SWBT
    Texas I Ham Reply Aff., Att. F.

[^491]: *See* AT&T Texas I Comments at 67.

[^492]: *See* CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler Aff. at para. 22.

[^493]: SWBT's PM 12 ("Mechanized Provisioning Accuracy") *excludes*
    mechanized orders that were entered manually into SWBT's ordering
    systems, and no other measurement picks up these orders that did not
    flow through. *See* SWBT Texas I Application, Appendix C, Tab 1815
    at 54. In any case, we note that SWBT's performance regarding
    fully-mechanized orders has generally been better than parity. *See*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 12 ("Mechanized
    Provisioning Accuracy") at 271-No. 12. While SWBT's performance
    slipped noticeably in February and March 2000, SWBT has provided
    better than parity performance on this metric for all other months
    since August 1999, and achieved 99 percent accuracy in April 2000.
    *Id.*

[^494]: *See* SWBT Texas I Conway Reply Aff. at paras. 18-19 (explaining
    internal processes that monitor individual employees' processing
    errors).

[^495]: Telcordia Final Report, Sec. 4.5.4.5.

[^496]: *See* section V.B.1.g., *infra*.

[^497]: Telcordia concluded that SWBT's major OSS systems had the
    capacity at the time of the test to process projected first quarter
    2000 volumes, or 220,000 orders per month. Telcordia Final Report at
    105-131. As part of this test, Telcordia also concluded that SWBT's
    systems could handle a "peak" volume of 2,000 orders per hour.
    Telcordia Final Report at 130.

[^498]: *See generally,* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement
    No. 13 ("Flow Through") at 271-No. 13 (indicating that competing LEC
    orders submitted via EDI and LEX more than doubled between January
    and April 2000); *see also, e.g., id.* at 271-No. 5c and 5d (timely
    order confirmation notices), 271-No. 10.1, 11.1 (improving
    performance for returning manual reject notices).

[^499]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 146-151;
    AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 52-53. SWBT
    explains that it no longer applies this limitation to AT&T's orders.
    *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 94.

[^500]: According to AT&T, it decided to submit all of its orders in
    once- or twice-daily batches to allow for a final internal due date
    "check point" that "ensure\[s\] that its outbound EDI files
    contained valid due dates." AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply
    Decl*.* at para. 53 and Att. 25; *see also* SWBT Texas I Ham Reply
    Aff. at para. 121.

[^501]: *Id.* at paras. 117-118.

[^502]: SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 93-94.

[^503]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.

[^504]: *See* *id.* at para. 152; SWBT Texas I Conway Reply Aff. at
    para. 22 and Att. B.

[^505]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.

[^506]: SWBT explains that its process for returning these "GUI"
    jeopardies was introduced last year, and has been amended through
    the change management process. *See* *id.* at para. 152; SWBT Texas
    I Conway Reply Aff. at para. 22. As noted above, there is no
    analogous retail process for returning these "GUI" jeopardy notices.

[^507]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 112;
    WorldCom Texas II Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 58-65.

[^508]: *See* SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 74 and
    Att. N (showing that the number of jeopardies as a percentage of
    orders (LSRs) ranged from 3.2 to 5.2 percent in January to March
    2000).

[^509]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 112;
    WorldCom McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 60.

[^510]: *See* SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 76-78.

[^511]: An order completion notice informs a competing carrier that SWBT
    has completed the installation of the service requested by the
    particular order. *See* OSS Appendix for additional details of the
    SOC process.

[^512]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 40 (benchmark for PM
    7); SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at A-16 (benchmark for PM 7.1).

[^513]: In the Bell Atlantic New York Section 271 proceeding, Bell
    Atlantic represented that it did not provide completion notification
    to its own retail representatives, and the New York Commission
    concluded that order completion notification lacks a retail
    analogue. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4052,
    para. 187, n.591. Accordingly, rather than assess whether Bell
    Atlantic provided order completion notification in "substantially
    the same time and manner" as it provides such information to its
    retail operations, we assessed whether Bell Atlantic provided
    completion notification sufficient to allow an efficient competitor
    a meaningful opportunity to compete. *See* *id.* To avoid
    uncertainty on this issue in future applications, we strongly urge
    applicants to indicate whether they provide completion information
    to their retail operations.

[^514]: *See id.* at 4052, para. 187 ("Until the competing carrier
    receives a completion notice, the carrier does not know that the
    customer is in service, and cannot begin billing the customer for
    service or addressing any maintenance problems experienced by the
    customer.").

[^515]: *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. 2 at 16.

[^516]: For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT
    returned 97.1, 98.2, 98.6, 97.2 and 98.7 percent of SOCs within one
    day of work completion for orders submitted via EDI. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 7.1 ("Percent Mechanized
    Completions Returned Within 1 Day of Work Completion") at 271-No.
    7.1.

[^517]: For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT
    returned 87.5, 91.1, 92.9, 95.5 and 96.8 percent of SOCs within one
    day of work completion for orders submitted via LEX. *Id.*

[^518]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Reply at 25-26.

[^519]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 118
    (indicating that SWBT returned completion notices within one day of
    completing its UNE loop orders only 80 percent of the time in
    January and February 2000).

[^520]: *See* SWBT Texas I Rogers Aff. at para. 59.

[^521]: *See* SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 20. SWBT
    implemented the process allowing competing carriers to update an end
    user's LIDB records through the initial order establishing service
    on January 15, 2000. *Id.* We conclude that this new process
    adequately addresses carriers' assertions that SWBT's system used to
    be discriminatory, because carriers may now update new customers'
    records promptly at the time of the order, and no longer need to
    submit the same customer information twice (once on the LSR and
    again to update LIDB). *See* WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl.
    at para. 83; CLEC Coalition Texas 1 Tidwell/Kettler Decl. at paras.
    86-89.

[^522]: *See* WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at
    paras. 66-73 (reporting that it had found LIDB processing errors for
    19 orders, out of a sample of 60); WorldCom Texas II
    McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 26-40 (reporting
    that it had found LIDB processing errors for 157 orders, out of an
    additional sample of 360). Most of the "errors" identified by
    WorldCom were instances where the customers' LIDB records contained
    the wrong intraLATA and/or long distance carrier ("PIC"). In some
    cases, WorldCom was denied access to its customers' LIDB records,
    indicating that SWBT had failed to promptly transfer "ownership" of
    the records. *Id.*

[^523]: *See* Department of Justice June 13 *Ex Parte* at 18-19.

[^524]: SWBT indicates that end users are not affected by this
    particular LIDB problem -- delays in updating "PIC" information,
    which lists the customer's long distance carrier. Specifically, SWBT
    explains that the "PIC" listed in LIDB has no impact on an end
    user's service, and WorldCom has not disputed this contention or
    otherwise alleged that their customers have been impacted by
    incorrect "PIC" updates. *See* SWBT Texas II Rogers Reply Aff. at
    paras. 7-8; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply
    Decl. at paras. 35-38. WorldCom has also suggested that errors in
    updating another LIDB field (the "Account Owner" field) *could*
    cause their customers to receive incorrect branding on directory
    assistance and operator calls, but alleges only three instances in
    which this actually has occurred. *See* WorldCom Texas II Comments
    at para. 72. We agree that incorrect branding can harm competing
    carriers, but the record does not reflect that this problem actually
    has affected competition in Texas.

[^525]: Specifically, SWBT explains that certain service representatives
    "contrary to \[SWBT's\] processes failed to type the Toll File Guide
    portion (referred to as the "N" order) of the competitive LEC's
    request in a timely manner. As a result, the portions of the LIDB
    record which are updated based on the Toll File Guide order also
    were not updated in a timely manner." *See* SWBT Texas II
    Noland/Dysart Aff. at para. 88.

[^526]: *See* *id.* at paras. 87-92.

[^527]: Finally, we disagree with WorldCom's contention that the process
    for updating existing customers' LIDB records is discriminatory.
    *See* WorldCom Texas I Comments at 4, 14-17; WorldCom Texas I
    McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 30-32; *see also*
    AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at n.6. WorldCom has not
    demonstrated that the GUI process offered by SWBT is unreasonably
    burdensome or *per se* discriminatory, and we conclude that this
    process provides carriers with access to LIDB in substantially the
    same time and manner as SWBT provides for itself.

[^528]: *See* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at 521 and Att. A at A-28. While
    this performance data provides some indication that SWBT's systems
    post completed orders to the billing systems in a timely manner, it
    does not reflect how long (*i.e.,* how many days) it takes most
    orders to post. We note with approval that SWBT has committed to
    implement a performance measurement that tracks the average time it
    takes to post all orders. Such a measure was implemented recently by
    Bell Atlantic in New York. *See* *Bell Atlantic-New York
    Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York*, File No.
    EB-00-IH-0085, Acct. No. X32080004, Order and Consent Decree.

[^529]: SWBT's data for the last five months indicate that it posts an
    average of 98.15 percent of competing carriers' orders within the
    correct billing period, compared to 98.95 percent of its own orders.
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 17 ("Billing
    Completeness") at 271-No. 15, 16, 17.

[^530]: *See, e.g.,* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at para.
    74-77.

[^531]: AT&T explains that it reviewed a sample of six orders that had
    posted late in August 1999 and found that, for all six, the customer
    received a SWBT bill after the order completion date. *See* AT&T
    Texas I DeYoung Decl. at paras. 193-196. It is unclear whether such
    situations were examples of "double billing" for the same time
    period or, as suggested by SWBT, were simply cases involving a final
    SWBT bill covering a prior period before the end user switched
    carriers. *See* SWBT Texas I Locus Reply Aff. at paras. 10-13. In
    the end, the evidence presented in the record does not indicate that
    SWBT's process of updating its billing systems, or its overall
    performance in this area, deprives an efficient competitor a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.

[^532]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 203.

[^533]: *See* SWBT Texas I Locus Reply Aff.. at paras. 10-13; SWBT Texas
    I Conway Aff. at para. 55 (describing the specialized "Error
    Response Team" which focuses solely on clearing errors on orders
    that have been completed but fail to post to billing. SWBT explains
    that this team prioritizes its work by age of the error and bill
    dates.).

[^534]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 43.

[^535]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras.
    78-82.

[^536]: *See* SWBT Texas I Application, App. B, Tab 60 (SWBT/AT&T
    Interconnection Agreement) at Att. 5, sec. 7 (loss notification
    reports associated with resale services) and Att. 10, sec. 7 (loss
    notification reports associated with UNEs).

[^537]: We discuss loop provisioning below. *See* section V.D., *infra.*

[^538]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196.

[^539]: *See* SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 187.

[^540]: *See id.*

[^541]: *See* *id.*

[^542]: *See* *id.* at para. 189 (noting that SWBT changed the "Customer
    Desired Due Date" field on the FOC on only 3.67% of orders in
    October 1999).

[^543]: For timely provisioning of "Resale POTS" orders, we consider the
    following measurements: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure
    Nos. 27-01 to 27-04 ("Mean Installation Interval") (POTS -- Resale)
    at 271-No. 27a; *id.,* Measure Nos. 29-01 to 29-04 ("Percent SWBT
    Caused Missed Due Dates") (POTS -- Resale) at 271-No. 29-a. For
    timely provisioning of "Resale Specials" orders, we considered
    primarily the following measurements: SWBT Aggregate Performance
    Data, Measure Nos. 43-01 to 43-08 ("Average Installation Interval")
    (Specials -- Resale) at 271-No. 43a-b; *id.,* Measure Nos. 45-01 to
    45-08 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") (Specials -- Resale)
    at 271-No. 45a-b. These data indicate that SWBT satisfied the parity
    standards in the several sub-categories (residential and business
    orders, POTS and specials orders, orders requiring field work and
    those requiring no field work) for each of the past five months
    (December 1999 -- April 2000), with only isolated exceptions. We
    thus conclude that SWBT provisions competing carriers' orders for
    reseale services, overall, in substantially the same time as its
    provisions equivalent retail services.

[^544]: For provisioning quality of "Resale POTS" orders, we look to
    SWBT performance data reflecting the number of trouble tickets
    submitted within the first ten days after service is provisioned.
    *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 35-01 to 35-08
    ("Percent Trouble Reports on N and T Orders within 10 Days" and
    "Percent Trouble Reports on C Orders within 10 Days") (POTS --
    Resale) at 271-No. 35a-b. SWBT's performance on these measurements
    was generally better than parity. For provisioning quality of
    "Retail Specials" orders, we focus on the following performance
    measurements: SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 46-01 to
    46-08 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days")
    (Specials -- Resale) at 271-No. 46a-b. SWBT's performance was above
    parity for each type of resale specials service, with only isolated
    exceptions.

[^545]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 93-94.

[^546]: SWBT's "Percent Missed Due Dates" performance metric
    demonstrates that, for the last five months, SWBT has consistently
    met a higher percentage of installation appointments for competing
    carriers' resale and UNE-P orders than it has for analagous retail
    orders. *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 29-05
    and 29-06 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") at 271-No. 29b.
    SWBT's performance data also indicates that it provisions competing
    LECs' UNE-P orders, on average, in the same or shorter period of
    time than it does for its own analogous services. *See* SWBT
    Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 27-05 and 27-06 ("Mean
    Installation Interval") at 271-No. 27b. We recognize that these
    "average completed interval" metrics reflect only a portion of
    competing LEC orders, as they exclude orders for which competing
    carriers request longer-than-standard completion intervals. Combined
    with the missed due dates metric described above, however, this
    measurement provides an additional indication that SWBT is
    provisioning UNE-P and resale service in a timely manner, when
    compared to its retail operations.

[^547]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure Nos. 35-09 to
    35-12 ("Percent Trouble Reports Within 10 Days") at 271-No. 35c.

[^548]: *See id.* at 271-No. 35c.

[^549]: Specifically, for March and April 2000, 4.01 and 5.02 percent of
    UNE-P orders experienced a trouble report within 10 days of
    installation, compared to 3.13 and 3.68 percent for analogous retail
    orders. *See id.*

[^550]: *See* Appendix B ("OSS Appendix") for a more detailed
    description of SWBT's provisioning process.

[^551]: An address mismatch could occur for two reasons. First, there
    could be a problem with the address submitted by the competing LEC
    that was not picked up by SWBT's up-front edits. Second, a mismatch
    could result from an inconsistency between SWBT's two address
    databases. *See* Appendix B.

[^552]: *See id.*; SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 73.

[^553]: *See* *id.* (if the C and D orders have different addresses,
    "the two service orders will flow through all provisioning systems
    as independent service orders . . . . The D order will flow on Due
    Date and disconnect the \[customer's\] service.").

[^554]: *See* *id.*; SWBT March 10 *Ex Parte* Letter at Att. 4
    (explaining that orders that become disassociated due to an address
    mismatch are routed to the local service center (LSC) for
    resolution). SWBT's minutes from a December 21, 1999 "CLEC User's
    Forum" suggest that SWBT planned to implement a new process to
    address address mismatches on January 14, 2000, under which it would
    create a mechanized report listing UNE-P orders that had become
    disassociated and check the report three times daily. *See* AT&T
    Texas 1 Dalton/DeYoung Reply Aff., Att. 21 (SWBT Accessible Letter
    No. CLEC00-002) at 3. SWBT placed a copy of this mechanized report
    ("an internal report currently used by SWBT to detect orders that
    are at risk of an outage") on the record on March 13, 2000. SWBT
    March 13 *Ex Parte* Letter, Att. 1.

[^555]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 18; *see also* CLEC
    Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch Telecom.) Aff. at 63-70 and
    Att. AA at 3 (explaining to the Texas Commission in November 1999
    that the "volume of loss of dial tone is fairly small").

[^556]: *See* CompTel May 11 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1-2 (reporting service
    disruptions for January to April, 2000); AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung
    Reply Decl. at para. 41 (reporting lost dial tone for August to
    November 1999). Birch Telecommunications filed an informal complaint
    with the Texas Commission in September 1999, arguing that service
    outages during the UNE-P conversion process were adversely affecting
    its ability to compete -- but did not quantify the frequency of
    these outages. *See* CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 27-28.

[^557]: SWBT claims that AT&T's figure is too high, instead suggesting
    that fewer than one percent of AT&T's UNE-P conversions in December
    1999 and January 2000 resulted in lost dial tone. *See* SWBT Texas
    II Ham Aff. at para. 31; SWBT March 24 *ex parte* Letter. SWBT
    further claims that, based on its own review of trouble tickets
    submitted by Network Intelligence, that none of the service problems
    identified by Network Intelligence were attributable to the
    three-order process: SWBT either found no problem to exist, or
    determined that the problem was attributable to the customer's
    wiring, or SWBT's central office or cable facilities. *See* SWBT
    Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 78-83.

[^558]: *See* CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch) Aff. at
    paras. 81-90. Birch Telecom complained of other problems relating to
    the UNE-P three-order process which are addressed elsewhere in this
    Order. *See* CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch) Aff. at
    paras. 76-91; *see* section V.B.1.d.1.f, *supra* (addressing delays
    in posting to billing, double-billing and LIDB update issues).

[^559]: *See* CompTel Texas II Comments at 3-4; Global Crossing Texas II
    Reply Comments at 2.

[^560]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 212;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613, 20660-61.

[^561]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at 4067, para. 212; *see also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692-93.

[^562]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 212.

[^563]: *See id*.

[^564]: SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 217; *see* SWBT Texas I Conway
    Aff. at paras. 66-68.

[^565]: SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at 218, 222 and 229. The Toolbar interface
    enables carriers to perform the the same functions that SWBT's
    retail operations perform, including: (1) issue trouble reports; (2)
    conduct a mechanized loop test; (3) determine that status of an
    opened trouble report; (4) check history; (5) view a list of open
    trouble reports; (6) view a list of trouble reports closed within
    the last 120 days. *Id.* at para. 219. Although the EBTA interface
    provides only functions 1 to 4, this does not reflect a deficiency
    in SWBT's OSS. The Commission previously has determined that a BOC
    is not required, for the purpose of satisfying checklist item 2, to
    implement an application-to-application interface for maintenance
    and repair functions -- provided it demonstrates that it provides
    equivalent access to its maintenance and repair functions in another
    manner. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4068,
    para. 215.

[^566]: SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 65; *see* SWBT Texas I Ham
    Aff. at 217. The LOC is staffed by 165 employees and is available
    through a hotline number 24 hours a day, seven days a week. SWBT
    Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 15, 28, 31.

[^567]: *See* SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 65-66. Since 1996, the
    LOC has processed over 195,600 POTS maintenance reports in Texas and
    an additional 66,900 reports in the remainder of SWBT's region.
    *Id.* at para. 65.

[^568]: *See* WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl.
    at paras. 53-56. We note that carriers raised a similar concern in
    the *Texas I* proceeding, explaining that SWBT's Toolbar system had
    the same limitation. *See, e.g.,* AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl.
    at para. 200; WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl. at paras.
    191-92. SWBT implemented a change on March 18, 2000, however, which
    removed this restriction on the use of Toolbar and enabled carriers
    to use the interface's normal functions for telephone number
    formatted resale and UNE-P services on or after the provisioning due
    date. SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 111 & Attach. K (SWBT
    Feb. 18, 2000 Accessible Letter, No. CLECSS00-018).

[^569]: *Id.* at para. 224-226; SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para.
    112.

[^570]: Indeed, SWBT's performance data indicates that carriers have
    been confronted with a very low number of trouble reports within ten
    days of provisioning, and we would expect the number of troubles
    occurring before an order posts to billing and triggers EBTA
    availability (which certainly should occur in under ten days) to be
    even lower. *See, e.g.,* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 35 ("Percent Trouble Reports on C Orders Within 10
    Days") (UNE-P) at 271-No.35b (indicating that competing LECs
    received "installation related" trouble reports on less than one
    percent of UNE-P orders in March and April 2000).

[^571]: *See* SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 9.

[^572]: *See* SWBT January 21 *Ex Parte* Letter (maintenance & repair
    interface response times), Tab 1.

[^573]: *See* *id.*

[^574]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20693, para.
    147.

[^575]: *Id*.

[^576]: For resale POTS, SWBT took less time to repair end user troubles
    reported by its competitors than those involving its own retail
    customers for virtually all disaggregated sub-categories---for
    business and residential customers, for "dispatch" and "nondispatch"
    repair jobs, and for troubles "affecting service" and those taking a
    customer "out of service." SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 39 ("Receipt to Clear Duration") at 271-No. 39a-39b.
    The only exceptions were SWBT's performance in February and April,
    in which it reported slightly longer-than-parity intervals to
    resolve business customers' "affecting service" troubles that did
    not require dispatch. *Id.* at 271-No. 39a. We conclude that these
    exceptions, particularly when viewed in the context of the related
    metrics that reflect parity performance, do not reflect a systemic
    problem with SWBT's OSS. Similarly, for UNE-P, SWBT reports shorter
    repair intervals for its competitors' customers than for its own
    retail customers in every sub-category during this same time period.
    *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 39 ("Receipt
    to Clear Duration") at 271-No. 39c.

[^577]: For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT met
    substantially the same percentage of repair commitments for troubles
    on competing LECs' resold and UNE-P lines as it did for comparable
    retail repair commitments. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 38 ("% Missed Repair Commitments) at 271-No. 38a-b.
    The only exceptions occurred in April 2000, with respect to business
    POTS troubles (no dispatch) and UNE-P troubles (no dispatch).
    Because SWBT has reported satisfactory performance for the preceding
    four months in these two areas, however, we do not conclude that
    this April performance represents a systemic problem.

[^578]: SWBT has achieved parity with respect to VGPL troubles for only
    one of the last five months and reported that, in March 2000, it
    took an average of 12 hours longer to repair or restore competing
    LECs' VGPL troubles than for its own customers. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 52 ("Mean Time to Restore") at
    271-No. 52a. Similarly, SWBT achieved parity with respect to ISDN
    (BRI) troubles for only one of the last five months and reported
    that, in March 2000, it took an average of almost 14 hours longer to
    repair or restore competing LECs' ISDN troubles than for its own
    customers. *Id.* at 271-No. 52b.

[^579]: Calculations using SWBT's reported performance data indicates
    that, for the last five months other than March 2000, the parity gap
    averaged 2.5 hours for Measurement 52-01, and 3.0 hours for
    Measurement 52-06.

[^580]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 37
    ("Trouble Report Rate") (Resale POTS and UNE-P) at 271-No.37, and
    Measurement No. 54 ("Failure Frequency") (Resale Specials) at
    271-No. 54a-b. In only a handful on instances did SWBT report a
    higher trouble rate for competitors than for its retail operations:
    Residence POTS (February 2000), UNE-P (December 1999), resold DSL
    (December 1999) and UNE-P ISDN (April 2000). *Id*. We do not find
    these scattered discrepancies to be competitively significant for
    this metric in this instance.

[^581]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 41
    ("Percent Repeat Reports") (Resale POTS and UNE-P) at 271-No. 41,
    and Measurement No. 53 ("Repeat Reports") (Resale Specials) at
    271-No. 53a-b. These performance data reveal a
    statistically-significant disparity in only two instances: a higher
    number of repeat reports for competitive LECs than for its retail
    operations for UNE-P in December 1999, and for resold DS1 service in
    January 2000. We do not find that these results, particularly when
    viewed against the above-parity performance for the other months,
    indicate a competitively-significant disparity.

[^582]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para. 226;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20698, paras.
    158-160.

[^583]: *See* SWBT Texas I Locus Aff. at paras. 10-11.

[^584]: *See* *id.* at paras. 6 and 9.

[^585]: Specifically, the standard adopted by the Texas Commission
    requires that SWBT transmit 95 percent of its Daily Usage Feeds for
    resale and UNEs to competing carriers within six business days after
    creation, and 95 percent of its wholesale bills within six work days
    of the bill date. SWBT Texas I Dysart Decl. at para. 510 and Att. A
    at A-30 and A-31. The Texas Commission also established standards
    regarding the percent of usage records transmitted correctly (95%
    correct).

[^586]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 14
    ("Billing Accuracy"), Measurement No. 16 ("Percent of Usage Records
    Transmitted Correctly") and Measurement No. 19 ("Daily Usage Feed
    Timeliness") at 271-No. 14, 271-No. 15/16/17, and 271-No. 18/19/20.

[^587]: *See id.*, Measurement No. 19 at 271-No. 18/19/20; *see also*
    AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Aff. at para. 133.

[^588]: *See* SWBT Texas II McLaughlin Reply Aff. at paras. 5-7.

[^589]: *See* *id.*

[^590]: *See* National ALEC Association / Prepaid Communications
    Association Texas I Comments at 6; AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung
    Reply Decl. at paras. 134-135. For the months of December 1999 to
    April 2000, SWBT returned 76.3, 92.2, 100, 65.7 and 100 percent of
    mechanized carrier bills (resale carriers only) within six days of
    the end of the bill cycle. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 18 ("Billing Timeliness") at 271-No. 15/18.

[^591]: *See* SWBT March 15 *Ex Parte* Letter (explaining December 1999
    and January 2000 performance); SWBT Texas II McLaughlin Reply Aff.
    at para. 9.

[^592]: SWBT's Measure 18 -- "Billing Timeliness (Wholesale Bill)" --
    covers only resale carriers receiving bills electronically (*i.e.,*
    it covers only those wholesale bills processed through the CRIS
    system and supplied to competing carriers via EDI). SWBT
    Application, App. C, Tab 1815 at 59. Although this document suggests
    that "\[a\] separate measure is produced" for carriers ordering UNEs
    and UNE-P, *see id.*, the record does not reflect that such a
    measure exists. The Texas Commission did not address the issue of
    whether carriers are receiving timely wholesale bills in its
    Comments in this proceeding. *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments
    at 42-45 (discussing other aspects of SWBT's billing functions and
    performance). We note that Telcordia's conclusion that the
    "majority" of paper and mechanized bills were timely is too vague to
    merit any waight. Telcordia Final Report at 8; *see also id.* at 112
    ("mechanized and paper bills were generally sent/transmitted in a
    timely manner").

[^593]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^594]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^595]: *Id.*

[^596]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20718-19; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646.

[^597]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646. *See also
    Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15666-68.

[^598]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at para. 230.

[^599]: *Id.*

[^600]: SWBT Texas I Application at 38; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at para.
    164; SBC Texas I Application App. A-3, Vol. 1, Tab 1, Affidavit of
    Michael C. Auinbauh at paras. 40, 95-97 (SWBT Texas I Auinbauh
    Aff.); Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6. The terms and conditions for
    access to unbundled network elements through physical collocation
    arrangements are set forth in the T2A, which was approved by the
    Texas Commission. SWBT Texas I Application at 39; SWBT Texas I Deere
    Aff. at paras, 151-163. SWBT has provided 655 physical and 40
    virtual collocation arrangements to requesting carriers. It has 683
    physical and 158 virtual arrangements still pending. SWBT Texas I
    Deere Aff. Attach. E. Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6, § 2.4.
    Competing carriers can obtain tariffed collocation pursuant to FCC
    Tariff No. 73, through SWBT's Texas Collocation Tariffs, or by
    negotiating the terms and conditions for collocation in their
    interconnection agreements. SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras.
    40-79; 95-97 and Attachments C, D, E.

[^601]: SWBT Texas I Application at 39; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at
    80-84; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 66; Texas 271 Agreement
    Attach. 6, § 2.22.

[^602]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 40, 64, 95-97. Collocation
    is not required in order to use this option for combining network
    elements. Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 24. Furthermore,
    when competitors order UNEs for combining at the secured frame or
    cabinet, SWBT is required to cross-connect those elements to the
    frame or cabinet at no additional charge. *Id.* at 24-25.

[^603]: *See* SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 86.

[^604]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 87-93; Texas 271 Agreement
    Attach. 6, §§ 14.2 - 14.4,14.7. In addition, under the terms of the
    Texas 271 Agreement, SWBT will unbundle local loops with unbundled
    local switch ports for competitive LECs to provide service to
    business customers until at least October 13, 2001 using elements
    that are not currently combined. SWBT Texas I Application at 35
    ("Texas 271 Agreement obligates SWBT to assemble previously
    uncombined network elements for \[competitive LECs\] . . . ."); SWBT
    Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 88, 91-94; Texas 271 Agreement
    Attach. 6, §§ 2.4, 14.7; SWBT/AT&T Agreement Attach. 6, § 2.4. After
    October 13, 2001, in those SWBT central offices where there are four
    or more competitive LECs collocated and where SWBT has provided
    unbundled network elements, SWBT may elect not to combine unbundled
    network elements for a competitive LEC's business customers when the
    same UNEs are not already combined in that central office. If SWBT
    makes such an election, it will provide the requesting carrier with
    access to a secured frame where the competitive LEC can perform its
    own combining of those elements. SWBT will provide new combinations
    of unbundled local loop and switching not currently interconnected
    and functional in SWBT's network for the competitive LEC to provide
    service to residential customers through the full term of the Texas
    271 Agreement.

[^605]: *See, e.g.,* CompTel Texas I Comments at 5-6; CompTel Texas I
    Comments, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Burk (CompTel Texas I Burk Aff.)
    at paras. 1-24; CompTel Texas I Comments, Exhibit B, Affidavit of
    Thompson (CompTel Texas I Thompson Aff.) at para. 26; AT&T Texas I
    Comments at 57-58; AT&T Texas I Comments, App. Vol. IIIA, Tab D,
    Declaration of DeYoung (AT&T DeYoung Decl.) at paras. 301-302. *See
    also* CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 26-27.

[^606]: *See* discussion *supra* in OSS section. SWBT's ordering system
    separates the requesting carrier's local service request into three
    separate orders: (1) a disconnect or "D" order instructs SWBT's
    systems to disconnect the service presently installed at the
    customer location; (2) a new or "N" order is created that instructs
    SWBT's systems to install new service at the customer location; and
    (3) a change or "C" order is created, instructing SWBT's system to
    modify billing for the line.

[^607]: Rule 51.315(b) reads: "Except upon request, an incumbent LEC
    shall not separate requested network elements that the incumbent LEC
    currently combines." 47 C.F.R. § 51.315. This rule was challenged
    but upheld by the Supreme Court. *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,*
    525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^608]: *See* Department of Justice June 13 *Ex Parte* Letter at n.54.

[^609]: *See* AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras.
    55-62.

[^610]: *See* SWBT July 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4.

[^611]: *See* SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4 and Att. 13
    (confidential). Although we recognize that earlier remarks made by
    SWBT personnel in a workshop convened by the Texas Commission appear
    inconsistent with this policy, (*see* AT&T Texas 2 Chambers/DeYoung
    Reply Aff. at para. 59 and Att. 9), we rely on SWBT's clarification
    provided in its June 23 *ex parte* letter.

[^612]: *See* Global Crossing Texas II Reply Comments at 2-3 (accusing
    SWBT of refusing to allow Global Crossing to provide UNE-P service
    in Texas even though "existing agreements expressly provide for the
    availability of unbundled network elements").

[^613]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at para. 444; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20749.

[^614]: SWBT concedes that one of its account representatives caused
    this delay by initially insisting that Global Crossing/Frontier
    could not convert its Texas resale customers to UNE-P. *See* SWBT
    June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4. We further note that Global Crossing
    may choose to address disputes, such as this one, arising out of its
    interconnection agreement with the Texas Commission. *See* Texas
    Commission June 19 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4 ("welcom\[ing\] the
    opportunity to work with \[Global Crossing\] to resolve any
    potential issues").

[^615]: *See* SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4.

[^616]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^617]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 59-60; Level 3 Texas II Comments at
    7-8; WorldCom Texas II Comments at 37.

[^618]: *UNE Remand Order,* 15 RCC Rcd at 3914-15, paras. 494-496.
    Special access service typically consists of: (1) "entrance
    facilities," which are dedicated transport links from an
    interexchange carrier's point of presence to an incumbent LEC's
    switch or serving wire center (SWC); (2) a dedicated transport link
    from the serving wire center to an end office (i.e., interoffice
    transport); and (3) a channel termination facility from the end
    office to the end user (i.e., the local loop). *Id.* at 3912-13,
    paras. 485, 489.

[^619]: *Id.* at 3912-13, 3915, paras. 485-489, 496; *see also* *id.* at
    3915, para. 496 (seeking comment on the policy implications for our
    universal service program of a significant reduction in special
    access revenues).

[^620]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Supplemental
    Order, FCC 99-370 at paras. 4-5 (rel. Nov. 24, 1999) (*Supplemental
    Order*); *see Competitive Telecommunications Association v. FCC,*
    117 F.3d 1068, 1073-75 (8^th^ Cir. 1997) and *MCI Telecommunications
    Corp. v. FCC,* 750 F.2d 135, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The
    *Supplemental Order* extended the terms of the temporary constraint
    imposed in the *UNE Remand Order* beyond merely the "entrance
    facility" portion of special access because we had originally
    underestimated the extent of the policy implications associated with
    temporarily constraining interexchange carriers only from
    substituting entrance facilities for incumbent LECs' special access
    service. *Supplemental Order* at para. 4 & n.5 (extending temporary
    constraint to include combinations of unbundled loops and dedicated
    interoffice transport network elements). *See* WorldCom Texas II
    Comments at 38 (noting that our provisional use restriction on UNEs
    as a substitute for access services was "carefully tailored" in an
    effort to preserve requesting carriers' rights to use UNE
    combinations for all other telecommunications purposes).

[^621]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Supplemental
    Order Clarification, FCC 00-183 at paras. 1, 21-23 (rel. June 2,
    2000) (*Supplemental Order Clarification*).

[^622]: *See Supplemental Order Clarification* at paras. 13-17.

[^623]: *Id.*

[^624]: *Id.* at paras. 15-16 & n.50.

[^625]: *Id.* at paras. 19-20. The Eighth Circuit upheld a similar
    determination by this Commission in *Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
    FCC,* 153 F.3d 523, 548 (8^th^ Cir. 1998).

[^626]: WorldCom Texas II Comments at 37.

[^627]: *Id.* at 39-41.

[^628]: *See UNE Remand Order* at para. 486; *Supplemental Order
    Clarification* at paras. 22-24.

[^629]: *See Supplemental Order Clarification* at para. 28.

[^630]: *Supplemental Order* at para. 5 & n.9 (noting that allowing
    requesting carriers to "self-certify" that they are providing a
    significant amount of local exchange service would not delay their
    ability to convert facilities to unbundled network element pricing).

[^631]: *Id.* at paras. 22-23.

[^632]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 57.

[^633]: *See id.*; Letter from Mark E. Haddad, Counsel for AT&T Corp.,
    to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65 at 1-2 (filed June 27, 2000).

[^634]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 58.

[^635]: *Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling that New Entrants Need
    Not Obtain Separate License or Right-to-use Agreements Before
    Purchasing Unbundled Elements,* CCBPol. 97-4 & CC Docket No. 96-98,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 00-139 (rel. Apr. 27, 2000)
    (*Intellectual Property Order*).

[^636]: *Id.* at para. 2. The Commission reasoned that the
    "nondiscriminatory access" obligation in section 251(c)(3) requires
    incumbent LECs to use their best efforts to provide all features and
    functionalities of each unbundled network element they provide,
    which includes any associated intellectual property rights that are
    necessary for the requesting carrier to use the network element in
    the same manner as the incumbent LEC. *Id.* at para. 9.

[^637]: SWBT Texas II Reply at 64.

[^638]: *Id.*; AT&T Texas I Comments, Vol. 4, Tab F, Declaration of Mark
    Witcher and Daniel P. Rhinehart at para. 16 (objecting to sections
    7.3.2 through 7.3.4 of the T2A). Section 7.3.5 of the T2A provides
    that the provisions of the *Intellectual Property Order* "shall
    control over" the terms of sections 7.3.2 through 7.3.4. *Id.*
    Furthermore, any disputes between SWBT and the other party to the
    T2A regarding implementation of the *Intellectual Property Order*
    are subject to expedited dispute resolution procedures before the
    Texas Commission. *Id.*

[^639]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(B)(ii).

[^640]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^641]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^642]: *Local Competition Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 15844-46; 47 C.F.R. §§
    51.501. *See also* *Line Sharing Order* (Commission concluded that
    states should set the prices for line sharing, as a new network
    element, in the same manner as the state sets prices for other
    UNEs).

[^643]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b).

[^644]: *Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC*, 96 F. 3d 1116 (8th Cir. 1996)
    (per curiam) (temporarily staying the *Local Competition* Order
    until the filing of the court's order resolving the petitioners'
    motion for stay); *Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC*, 109 F.3d 418 (8th
    Cir.) (dissolving temporary stay and granting petitioners' motion
    for stay, pending a final decision on the merits of the appeal),
    *motion to vacate stay denied*, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996); *Iowa
    Utilities Board v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (vacating the
    Commission's pricing and combination rules).

[^645]: AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^646]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of Prices.

[^647]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 140; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Reply Aff. at para. 141.

[^648]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff., App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of
    Prices. We note that SWBT's nonrecurring charges are substantially
    higher than those charged by incumbent LECs in other states, as the
    following table indicates:

    **STATERESIDENTIAL LOOP-TO-PORT COMBINATION RATES**Florida \$1.46New
    York\$3.73Connecticut\$1.78Texas\$23.03

[^649]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff., App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of
    Prices.

[^650]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 26; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Aff. at para. 142. Rule 315(b) provides that an incumbent LEC shall
    not separate network elements that the incumbent LEC currently
    combines except upon request. 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b). Although the
    Supreme Court's review of the Commission's rules in *Iowa Utilities
    Board* revived rule 315(b), the Court did not review the Eighth
    Circuit's decision regarding rules 315(c) through (f). *See Iowa
    Utilities Board*, 525 U.S. 366.

[^651]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 26; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Aff. at para. 142; AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Aff. at para. 11; WorldCom
    Price Texas I Aff. at para. 4. Glue charges are charges competitors
    pay to compensate the incumbent LEC for combining network elements.
    We have expressed skepticism regarding the lawfulness of such
    charges in certain circumstances. *See, e.g.,* *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4092, para. 262.

[^652]: AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 29; SWBT Auinbauh
    Texas I Aff. at para. 142.

[^653]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142.

[^654]: Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. AT&T Communications, No.
    99-50073, (5^th^ Cir. Feb. 24, 2000).

[^655]: *See* *Iowa Utilities Board*, 525 U.S. 366; Texas Commission,
    Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket No. 22290, Order No. 5,
    Consolidating Two Dockets Setting Forth the List of Issues and
    Schedule for Phase I of the Proceeding (April 4, 2000).

[^656]: *See* Texas Commission, Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket
    No. 22290, Order No. 5, Consolidating Two Dockets Setting Forth the
    List of Issues and Schedule for Phase I of the Proceeding (April 4,
    2000).

[^657]: SWBT Texas I Comments at 37-38; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at
    para. 141; SWBT Texas I Reply at 56-57; Texas Commission Texas I
    Comments at 25; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 43.

[^658]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Reply Aff. at para. 43.

[^659]: SWBT Smith Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 9; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Aff. at para. 142.

[^660]: SWBT Texas I Comments, App. A-3, Tab 1; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Aff. at para. 142; SWBT Texas I Reply at 56-57. *See also* AT&T
    Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 27.

[^661]: WorldCom Texas II Comments at 35.

[^662]: AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Aff. at paras. 57-58, 60; AT&T Rhinehart
    Texas I Reply Aff., Att. 2 at paras. 25, 27; WorldCom Price Texas I
    Aff. at para. 16.

[^663]: AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Aff. at para. 60; WorldCom Price Texas I
    Aff. at paras. 17-18; WorldCom Texas II Comments at 35.

[^664]: AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 25.

[^665]: WorldCom contends that competitive LECs do not have access to
    SWBT's network to combine elements and it is apparently on that
    premise that WorldCom infers a requirement that the COAC must be
    cost-based. That premise is belied by the provision in SWBT's T2A
    that allows competitive LECs to combine individually ordered network
    elements. WorldCom Texas II Comments at 35-36; *see* SWBT Auinbauh
    Texas I Aff., Att. A, Attachment UNE-TX at 2. Because SWBT's
    interconnection agreement includes such a provision, competitors
    have a method, other than the COAC, of combining elements that are
    not previously combined in SWBT's network.

[^666]: *See also* part V.A.2 *infra*, Pricing of Interconnection.

[^667]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 39-42; WorldCom Texas II Comments at
    33-34. AT&T and WorldCom have challenged the nonrecurring charges
    that apply to the pre-existing two-wire analog, loop-to-switch port
    combination. The application of nonrecurring charges to other
    combinations of UNEs was not raised by the parties as an issue in
    this proceeding.

[^668]: AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 37; AT&T June 14, 2000 *Ex
    Parte* Letter to Magalie Roman Salas, FCC Secretary, from Mark E.
    Haddad, Counsel for AT&T. *See* SWBT June 27, 2000 *Ex Parte* Letter
    to Magalie Roman Salas, FCC Secretary, from Edwardo Rodriguez, Jr.,
    SBC Federal Regulatory Executive Director; SWBT Auinbauh Texas II
    Reply Aff. at paras. 41-42.

[^669]: ^?^ *See* SWBT Texas I Reply at 50; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply
    Aff. at paras. 27-29.

[^670]: *See* Texas Commission, Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket
    No. 22290, Order No. 5, Consolidating Two Dockets Setting Forth the
    List of Issues and Schedule for Phase I of the Proceeding (April 4,
    2000).

[^671]: AT&T Texas II Comments, Exh. G, at 3 (SWBT's April 5, 2000 brief
    before the Texas Commission).

[^672]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 259;
    *see also* Section V.A.2, Pricing of Interconnection.

[^673]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^674]: Covad Texas I Comments at 15.

[^675]: SWBT Texas I Application at 96; SWBT Auinbauh Aff. at para. 144.

[^676]: Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket
    Nos. 20226, 20272, at 87-88. *See* SWBT Auinbauh Aff. at para. 144;
    SWBT April 5 *Ex Parte* Letter at 14.

[^677]: Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket
    Nos. 20226, 20272 at 86-87. The xDSL cost study for loop
    conditioning was due on March 31, 2000 and for loop make-up
    information was due on May 30, 2000.

[^678]: Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket
    Nos. 20226, 20272, at 86-88.

[^679]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 64, n. 62.

[^680]: *Applications of Ameritech Corp. and SBC Communications Inc. for
    Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission
    Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the
    Communications Act*, CC Docket No. 98-141, Memorandum Opinion and
    Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14874 at paras. 390-391 (1999)
    (*SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*).

[^681]: *Id.* at 14915-15, para. 494.

[^682]: *Id.* at 14916 at para. 497.

[^683]: At the time SWBT filed its application, SWBT offered competing
    carriers a second voice grade loop for the provision of advanced
    services at 50 percent of its lowest rate for a voice grade loop.
    Because the Commission found that this was a reasonable approach
    until the line sharing requirements took effect, we reject AT&T's
    arguments otherwise. *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at
    14987-92, App. C., paras. 8, 14; SWBT Texas II Auinbauh Aff. at
    para. 5; AT&T Texas II Comments at 21; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers
    Decl. at para. 13.

[^684]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). As originally enacted, section
    224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators
    encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended
    section 224 in several important respects to ensure that
    telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access
    to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by
    utility companies, including LECs. *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n.574.

[^685]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16073,
    para. 1156.

[^686]: *Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act
    of 1996, Amendment of the Commission's Rules and Policies Governing
    Pole Attachments,* CS Docket No. 97-151, 13 FCC Rcd 6777 (1998)
    (*Pole Attachment Telecommunications Rate Order*), *vacated in
    part*, *Gulf Power Company v. FCC*, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).

[^687]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). Section 224(a)(1) defines "utility" to
    include any entity, including a LEC, that controls "poles, ducts,
    conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire
    communications." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1).

[^688]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order,* the Commission concluded that, although the statutory
    exception enunciated in section 224(f)(2) appears to be limited to
    utilities providing electrical service, LECs should also be
    permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way because of insufficient capacity and for reasons of
    safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes,
    provided the assessment of such factors is done in a
    nondiscriminatory manner. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 16080-81, paras. 1175-77.

[^689]: Section 224(a)(4) defines "pole attachment" as "any attachment
    by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
    service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
    controlled by a utility." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4).

[^690]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).

[^691]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1). Texas does not regulate the rates, terms,
    and conditions for pole attachments. *See In re Marcus Cable
    Associates, L.P. v. Texas Utilities Electric Company,* P.A. No.
    96-002, 12 FCC Rcd 10362, 10365, para. 10 (1997); *see also States
    That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole Attachments*, Public
    Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992). The 1996 Act extended the
    Commission's authority to include not just rates, terms, and
    conditions, but also the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory
    access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. *Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para.
    1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Absent state regulation of terms and
    conditions of nondiscriminatory attachment access, the Commission
    retains jurisdiction. *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1); *see also Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264*.*

[^692]: *See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole
    Attachments,* Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); 47 U.S.C. §
    224(f).

[^693]: SWBT Hearst Texas I Aff. at para. 32.

[^694]: SWBT states that, pursuant to section 224 of the Act, it has
    negotiated agreements with cable providers for access to poles,
    ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. SWBT Texas I Application at 92.
    The product of these negotiations is contained in SWBT's Master
    Agreement, which has been incorporated in interconnection agreements
    approved by the Texas Commission. *Id*. at 92. SWBT states that the
    Master Agreement is available to any competitive LEC, and that it
    will negotiate modifications to the Master Agreement upon request.
    *Id*. at 92-93. SWBT states that its Master Agreement and its
    state-approved interconnection agreements incorporate rates that
    were negotiated with cable operators and comply with the methodology
    set out in section 224(d)(1) of the Act, as well as the cost formula
    and methodology specified by the Commission. *Id*. at 93; *see also*
    SWBT Hearst Texas I Aff. at para. 32; SWBT Texas I Application App.
    C, Tab 1233 at 57 (Final Staff Status Report on Collaborative
    Process, Investigation of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's
    Entry into the Texas InterLATA Telecommunications Market, TX PUC
    Nov. 18, 1998).

[^695]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 48-50.

[^696]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv).

[^697]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691,
    para. 380; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras.
    166-167, n.301 (retaining definition of the local loop from the
    *Local Competition First Report and Order*, but replacing the phrase
    "network interconnection device" with "demarcation point," and
    making explicit that dark fiber and loop conditioning are among the
    features, functions and capabilities of the loop).

[^698]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691,
    para. 380; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras.
    166-167.

[^699]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20637, para. 54.

[^700]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20712-13, para.
    185.

[^701]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095-96, para.
    271; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20713, para.
    187.

[^702]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095-96, para.
    271.

[^703]: IDLC technology permits a carrier to multiplex and demultiplex
    loop traffic at a remote concentration point and to deliver that
    combined traffic directly to the switch without first separating the
    individual loops. *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 15692, para. 383; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3793,
    para. 217.

[^704]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15692-93, para. 384.

[^705]: *See* SWBT Texas II Habeeb Aff. at para. 5, Attach. A; *but see*
    Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 8-9 (alleging that SWBT
    overstates its facilities-based estimates); Allegiance Texas I
    Comments at 2; Allegiance Texas I Howland Decl. at paras. 1-2
    (alleging SWBT overstates competing carrier volumes); SWBT Texas I
    Habeeb Reply at paras. 3-10 (refuting Department of Justice and
    competing carrier allegations regarding SWBT's estimations of the
    volume of competition in Texas).

[^706]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1; Texas Commission
    Texas II Comments at 11-36.

[^707]: As a preliminary matter, we note that SWBT also demonstrates
    that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to provide
    unbundled local loops to competing carriers. Through various
    interconnection agreements, SWBT provisions a full range of
    unbundled loops, including 2-wire analog loops with 8.0 dB or 5.0 dB
    loss, 4-wire analog loops, 2-wire ISDN digital-grade lines, 4-wire
    DS1 digital grade lines, and various 2- and 4-wire loops capable of
    offering xDSL services. In addition, competing carriers may request
    loops capable of carrying DS3 signals. SWBT provides access to
    stand-alone loops through cross-connects that run from the SWBT
    distribution frame to competing carriers' collocation space. *See*
    SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at paras. 86-88, 151-165; *see also* Interim
    Award, petitions of IP Communications Corp. to Establish Expedited
    Public Utility Commission of Texas Oversight Concerning Line Sharing
    Issues, and Covad Communications Co., and Rhythms Links, Inc.
    against SWBT and GTE for Post-Interconnection Dispute Resolution and
    Arbitration Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Regarding
    Rates, Terms, Conditions, and Related Arrangements for Line Sharing,
    Docket Nos. 22168, 22469 (Texas PUC June 6, 2000) (setting forth
    interim interconnection terms and conditions for the high frequency
    portion of the loop).

[^708]: A hot cut entails manually disconnecting the customer's loop in
    the SWBT central office and reconnecting the same loop at the
    competing carrier's collocation space. It also involves coordinated
    switch software changes at both SWBT's switch and the competing
    carrier's switch and the implementation of local number portability.
    The customer is taken out of service while the hot cut is in
    progress, thereby making the cut "hot," although if the cut is
    successful, the service disruption will last no more than a few
    minutes. Thus, ensuring that a hot cut is provisioned correctly with
    coordination between SWBT and the competing carrier is critical
    because problems with the cutover could result in extended service
    disruption for the customer. *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4104-05, para. 291 n.925.

[^709]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59
    ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 days") (8.0 dB
    Loop, 5.0 dB Loop, BRI Loop, DS1 Loop, DSL) at 271-No. 59a-c
    (calculated from total volumes listed on a per loop basis, combining
    8.0 dB and 5.0 dB loop performance data to calculate mass market
    voice grade loops which may be provisioned by hot cuts or through
    new stand-alone loops, and BRI and DSL loop performance data to
    calculate xDSL-capable loops); Letter from Frank S. Simone,
    Government Affairs Director, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-04
    (filed Mar. 27, 2000) (AT&T Mar. 27 *Ex Parte* Letter) (indicating
    that Performance Measurement No. 59 is reported on a per loop basis
    for all loop types, including 8.0 dB loops).

[^710]: Well over 50 percent of the stand-alone loops competing carriers
    purchase from SWBT are hot cut loops. Department of Justice Texas II
    Evaluation at 9. *Compare* volumes in SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders
    within 30 Days") (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0 dB Loop (combined)) at 271-No.
    59a-c *with* Measurement No. 114.1 ("Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect
    Interval") (Local Number Portability with Loop-CHC, Local Number
    Portability with Loop-FDT) at 271-No. 114.1a-b.

[^711]: *See supra* Part III.D.2; *see also* Texas Commission Texas I
    Comments at 1-2.

[^712]: SWBT Texas I Application at 15.

[^713]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655, para.
    87; *see also Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4098,
    para. 279.

[^714]: SWBT Texas I Application at 15. *See generally Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4098, para. 279.

[^715]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para.
    269; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619, para. 141.

[^716]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 37-39; AT&T Texas II Reply at 15,
    23-36; AT&T Texas I Pfau/De Young Decl. at paras. 15, 25, 56-58;
    WorldCom Texas I Comments at 34.

[^717]: *See supra* III.D.2.

[^718]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1, 11.

[^719]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4109, para. 299.

[^720]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 9; Connect! Texas
    II Comments at 6; AT&T Texas II Depkiewicz Reply Decl. at paras.
    16-21, Attach. 1-3; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 27;
    Allegiance Texas I Comments at 5; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl. Vol.
    IIIA at paras. 11, 99-102, Attach. 14-16; Letter from Mark E.
    Haddad, Counsel, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65 at 10 (filed June 8,
    2000) (AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^721]: \@Link Texas II Comments at 3-4, 6; AT&T Texas II Comments at
    26-27, 29; Connect! Texas II Comments at 4-5; RCN Texas II Comments
    at 5, 7; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at paras. 13-25;
    51; ALTS Texas II Reply at 10-11; AT&T Texas II Reply at 19, 33, 35;
    AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at para. 9;
    Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 33.

[^722]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 4104, para. 291.

[^723]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 28 n.34.

[^724]: Indeed, AT&T appears to overlook the significance of the lack of
    a retail analogue in this context. It appears to rely, for example,
    on the language of section 51.311(b) of the Commission's rules,
    which requires an incumbent LEC, "to the extent technically
    feasible," to afford new entrants with a "quality of access" to
    network elements that is "at least equal in quality to that which
    the incumbent LEC provides to itself." 47 C.F.R. § 51.311(b). But
    the "equality" standard of this rule, which varies in application
    from incumbent to incumbent, applies in contexts where (unlike here)
    there is some retail analogue. The rule does not impose a general
    standard of performance.

[^725]: SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 134; SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at
    paras. 78-79.

[^726]: SWBT Texas I Conway at para. 76.

[^727]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 27.

[^728]: SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 79; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl.
    IIIA at paras. 44-47 (citing SWBT letters, e-mails, and statements
    presented to the Texas Commission and Nov. 2, 1999 Texas Commission
    Hearing Tr. at 267 (Gwen Rowling of ICG Communications testified
    before the Texas Commission that "Frame due time, we have been asked
    by Southwestern Bell to start using it. We didn't come to Bell to do
    it. They asked us to start doing it . . . .")). *See also* AT&T
    Texas II Reply at 23; \@Link et al. Texas II Reply at 5; AT&T June 8
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 6-7.

[^729]: SWBT Texas II Application at 10; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart
    Reply Aff. at para. 54; SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^730]: SWBT Texas II Application at 8; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart
    Reply Aff. at para. 54.

[^731]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT performed 1890, 1998,
    and 1500 CHCs and 2296, 2119, and 1637 FDT hot cuts. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 ("Loop Disconnect/Cross
    Connect Interval") (Local Number Portability with Loop---CHC, Local
    Number Portability with Loop---FDT) at 271-No. 114.1a-b.

[^732]: We note that the Department of Justice requested that the
    Commission make this determination. *See* Department of Justice
    Texas II Evaluation at 14. *See also* Texas Commission June 19 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 3 n.7; SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3..

[^733]: \@Link Texas II Comments at 5; Connect! Texas II Comments at 7;
    RCN Texas II Comments at 8; AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 24; AT&T
    June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 6 (citing SWBT statements from September
    and November 1999 regarding the availability of the FDT hot cut
    process and/or the limits of the CHC process).

[^734]: *See generally* AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 7, Attach. 8
    (e-mail from Bob Bannecker, SWBT, to Sarah DeYoung, AT&T (sent May
    26, 2000)).

[^735]: AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 8 (e-mail from Bob
    Bannecker, SWBT, to Sarah DeYoung, AT&T (sent May 26, 2000)).

[^736]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4114-15, para. 309 (finding that Bell Atlantic was able to complete
    at least 90 percent of competing carrier hot cut orders of fewer
    than 10 lines within a one-hour interval).

[^737]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 13.

[^738]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 13.

[^739]: *See, e.g.*, SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No.
    114.1 ("Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval") (Local Number
    Portability with Loop-CHC, Local Number Portability with Loop-FDT)
    at 271-No. 114.1a-b.

[^740]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 ("Loop
    Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval") (Local Number Portability with
    Loop-CHC) at 271-No. 114.1a.

[^741]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 ("Loop
    Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval") (Local Number Portability with
    Loop-FDT) at 271-No. 114.1b.

[^742]: Order No. 4, *Section 271 Compliance Monitoring of Southwestern
    Bell Tel. Co. of Texas*, Project No. 20400 (Texas PUC Mar. 28, 2000)
    (Texas Commission Mar. 28 Order); Order No. 9, *Section 271
    Compliance Monitoring of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. of Texas*,
    Project No. 20400 (Texas PUC May 5, 2000) (Texas Commission May 5
    Order).

[^743]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4106-07,
    paras. 294-95. *See also* SWBT Texas II Application at 31; SWBT
    Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 19. *But see* AT&T Texas
    II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at para. 15; AT&T June 8 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 15 (alleging that SWBT overstates the Texas
    Commission's involvement in fact finding).

[^744]: AT&T has criticized the 2 hour interval as overly generous. AT&T
    Texas II Comments at 35-36; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water at
    paras. 60, 105-109. The Texas Commission is revising its hot cut
    interval measurement. Loops in orders with less than 11 lines will
    be assessed using a 1 hour interval and loops in larger orders will
    be tracked against a longer time. SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply
    Aff. at para. 45.

[^745]: SWBT Apr. 25 *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 2 ("PM 114.1
    Reconciled/Reported Results Summary").

[^746]: These data were developed pursuant to a May 5, 2000 Texas
    Commission order requesting reconciliation of certain SWBT March and
    April 2000 hot cut data. We acknowledge, however, they do not
    reflect the final reconciliation. *See* SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart
    Reply Aff. at para. 15, Attach. B ("PM 114.1 Reconciled/Reported
    Results Summary") (averaging together March and April 2000 data).
    *See also* Texas Commission May 5 Order; AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 1-2 (criticizing SWBT's unilateral presentation of hot cut
    timeliness data for March and April 2000).

[^747]: CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 41-42; RCN Texas II Comments
    at 11; ALTS Texas I Comments at 33; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Vol. IIIA
    Decl. at paras. 75-81, 128-130.

[^748]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 34; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water
    Decl. at paras. 22, 31, 52; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply
    Decl. at paras. 72-81; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at
    32 n.85; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 5-7; ALTS Texas I Comments
    at 33; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Vol. IIIA Decl. at paras. 14, 55,
    131-159.

[^749]: By loop-based measurement, we mean data reported on an
    individual line basis.

[^750]: SWBT Texas II Reply at 34; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply
    Aff. at para. 47 (demonstrating that changing from reporting a
    measurement in loops to reporting a measurement in orders has no
    consistent impact), Attach. K (comparing SWBT hot cut timeliness
    data for December 1999 through March 2000, finding that of the eight
    reported results (CHC and FDT for the four months), two showed no
    change when recalculated on a per order basis, three showed
    improvement, and three showed deterioration in SWBT performance).

[^751]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 3.

[^752]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 39; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water
    Decl. at paras. 54, 102; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply
    Decl. at para. 92; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 31-32
    n.84; Department of Justice Mar. 9 *Ex Parte* Letter at 9; AT&T June
    8 *Ex Parte* at 11-13.

[^753]: SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 84.

[^754]: SWBT Texas II Reply at 33; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply
    Aff. at paras. 11-13; Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at
    10 n.26; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 31-32 n.84.
    AT&T also contends that SWBT's interim performance measurement fails
    to capture certain delays in switch activation. AT&T, however,
    presents no data to indicate that this is a recurrent problem. AT&T
    June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 13.

[^755]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 16; SWBT Texas II
    Conway/Dysart Aff. at para. 25; SWBT Apr. 25 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    Attach. 3 (Joint Affidavit of Mark Van de Water and Robert Royer,
    Investigation of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.'s Entry Into the
    Texas InterLATA Telecommunications Market, Section 271 Compliance
    Monitoring of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Project Nos. 16251,
    20400 at 2 (filed with Texas PUC Apr. 21, 2000) (PPIG Van de
    Water/Royer Aff.)).

[^756]: PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT December
    1999, and January and February 2000 outage data charts).

[^757]: Affidavit of Terry R. Hoeven, Section 271 Compliance Monitoring
    of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Project No. 20400 (filed with
    Texas PUC May 18, 2000) (PPIG Hoeven Aff.) (SWBT filing listing PPIG
    data from March 2000 reconciliation); SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart
    Reply Aff. at Attach. C; AT&T Texas II De Young/Van de Water Reply
    Decl. at Attach. 1 (March 2000 PPIG data summary).

[^758]: We note that the Department of Justice requested that the
    Commission confirm the accuracy of the April 2000 CHC outage data.
    Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 14. We find the Texas
    Commission's endorsement of these data, as described in its June 9,
    2000 *ex parte* letter, and as filed by SWBT with the Texas
    Commission in a June 15, 2000 affidavit, is substantial evidence of
    its accuracy. Texas Commission June 19 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^759]: As described above with respect to hot cut timeliness data, we
    reject the argument of commenters who contend that a measurement
    based on loops rather than orders is systematically more generous to
    the incumbent than a measurement based on orders. *See supra* para.
    266.

[^760]: PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT December
    1999, and January and February 2000 PPIG outage charts); PPIG Hoeven
    Aff. (CHC and FDT March 2000 outage charts); AT&T Texas II
    DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at Attach. 1 (outages summary,
    March 2000 data); Texas Commission June 19 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3
    (CHC outages from PPIG April 2000 data).

[^761]: *See* SWBT Texas II Conway/Dysart Aff. at paras. 10-11; AT&T
    Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at paras. 23, 55-59 n.11. *See
    generally Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4110-11,
    paras. 302-03.

[^762]: *See, e.g.,* AT&T Texas II Comments at 31 n.38; AT&T Texas II
    Reply at 28-29.

[^763]: SWBT Texas II Conway/Dysart at paras. 10-11 (SWBT performance
    results for February irreversibly affected by Telcordia software
    defect); SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 23-24
    (describing SWBT testing procedures to ensure this sort of software
    problem does not happen in the future).

[^764]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 18; SWBT Texas II Conway
    Aff. at para. 34.

[^765]: PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT February
    2000 outage charts).

[^766]: PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (FDT December 1999, and
    January and February 2000 outage charts).

[^767]: *See* SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at paras. 79, 86. AT&T Texas II
    Reply at 23; \@Link et al. Texas II Reply at 5; *See also* AT&T
    Texas I DeYoung Decl. Vol. IIIA at paras. 44-47; AT&T June 8 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 6-7.

[^768]: SWBT Texas II Application at 8-10; SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 3.

[^769]: SWBT Texas II Reply at 36-37.

[^770]: SWBT Texas II Reply at 36-37.

[^771]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 26 (describing
    "considerable effort" SWBT has devoted to improving its FDT hot cut
    performance).

[^772]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 14; AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 2 (acknowledging that FDT hot cuts require "less
    coordination" than CHCs, with "fewer steps and fewer time consuming
    hand-offs").

[^773]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 45, Attach. J.

[^774]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 45, Attach. J.

[^775]: *See* ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas II Comments at 3-5; AT&T Texas
    II Comments at 32-33; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at
    para. 26; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at paras.
    86-90; *see also* AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 8-9 (expressing
    concern about the exclusion of outages captured as trouble reports
    following installation); AT&T Texas II Reply at 20; AT&T Texas II
    DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 96 (expressing concern that
    defective cuts are not captured in existing performance
    measurements).

[^776]: *See* AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 77
    (characterizing the manual reconciliation process as
    "extraordinarily resource-intensive").

[^777]: We note that SWBT presents these data only for December 1999
    through March 2000, and as in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*,
    they are loop-based data (rather than order-based data). SWBT Texas
    II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at Attach. I. The Texas Commission
    established a performance measurement to assess the quality of a
    variety of loops provisioned by SWBT to competing carriers that
    captures the percentage of troubles within 30 days after
    installation. Because this is a much longer period than the 7 day
    period we used to evaluate hot cut quality in our *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order* and because the data for this performance measurement
    also includes new loops that are not provisioned by hot cuts, SWBT
    reviewed the underlying data for these measurements and submitted
    data specifically for hot cut loops within 10 days after
    installation. In response to AT&T criticism questioning SWBT's
    decision to use a 10 day measurement period, SWBT submitted trouble
    data for the 7 day period following installation identical to the
    standard discussed in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*. *See* SWBT
    Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 41-44, Attach. I; AT&T
    Texas II Comments at 37; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at
    para. 70.

[^778]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at Attach. I.

[^779]: *See generally Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4109, para. 301.

[^780]: AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 24-25; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van
    de Water Reply Aff. at paras. 27-28; AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter
    at 4-6.

[^781]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 14-15.

[^782]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 15 n.42.

[^783]: AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Aff. at paras. 27-28;
    AT&T June 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^784]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50; SWBT June 23
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^785]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50; SWBT June 23
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^786]: SWBT June 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^787]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50.

[^788]: SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 51; SWBT June 23
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^789]: *See* section V.A.2.

[^790]: SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 186.

[^791]: SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 187.

[^792]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT missed 3.4, 5.8, and
    9.9 percent of competing carrier 8.0 dB loop installation due dates
    involving field work. During the same time period, SWBT missed 11.3,
    11.4, and 12.0 of the same installation due dates for its retail
    service. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58
    ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") (8.0 dB Loop-Field Work) at
    271-No. 58a.

[^793]: In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers
    experienced troubles within 30 days following installation on 5.6,
    5.3, and 4.9 of their 8.0 dB loops. During the same period SWBT
    retail customers experienced troubles within 30 days following
    installation on 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 percent of their 8.0 dB loops. We
    acknowledge that while the trouble rates are comparable, the
    competing carrier rate is marginally higher. In light of SWBT's
    unbundled voice grade loop provisioning overall, and the fact that
    no commenter criticizes this aspect of SWBT's performance, we do not
    find this small difference competitively significant. SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent Trouble
    Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (8.0 dB Loop) at 271-No.
    59a.

[^794]: In this section, we discuss maintenance and repair functions for
    unbundled hot cut and new stand-alone loops, but not xDSL-capable
    loops and high capacity loops, which are separately addressed in
    discussions specific to those loop types. *See infra* at paras.
    303-06, 319-20.

[^795]: In December 1999 and January and February 2000, SWBT missed only
    2.6, 0.8, and 1.7 percent of competing carrier repair due dates, but
    8.3, 7.3, and 6.8 percent of such appointments for its own retail
    customers. Although in March 2000, SWBT missed 11.1 percent of
    repair due dates for competing carriers, and only 7.7 percent of
    such appointments for its own retail customers, this proved to be an
    aberration, because in April 2000, SWBT missed only 3.3 percent of
    competing carrier repair due dates and 7.1 percent of such due dates
    for its own retail customers. SWBT Aggregate Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 66 ("Missed Repair Commitments") (2 Wire Analog-8.0
    dB Loop) at 271-No. 65d-66. SWBT does not measure missed repair due
    dates for 5.0 dB loops, which are used much less frequently than 8.0
    dB loops. For instance, in April 2000, competing carriers were
    provisioned 5783 8.0 dB loops and only 228 5.0 dB loops. SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent Trouble
    Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0 dB
    Loop) at 271-No. 59a (reporting total volumes on a per loop basis).

[^796]: In February, March, and April 2000, the average time to repair
    competing carrier unbundled 8.0 dB loops requiring dispatch was
    5.95, 14.02, and 5.47 hours, respectively. During the same period,
    the average time to repair SWBT retail 8.0 dB loops requiring
    dispatch was 24.03, 27.26, and 30.48 hours, respectively. SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 67 ("Mean Time to
    Restore (Hours)-Dispatch") (8.0 dB Loop with Test Access) at 271-No.
    67a. During the same period, SWBT took a nearly comparable amount of
    time to repair the less frequently used 5.0 dB loops requiring
    dispatch for competing carriers as it did to repair 5.0 dB loops
    requiring dispatch for its own retail customers. For instance, in
    February, March, and April 2000, SWBT repaired competing carrier 5.0
    dB loops in 5.72, 9.39, and 4.08 hours, respectively. During the
    same period, SWBT repaired its own retail 5.0 dB loops in 4.68,
    5.34, and 6.14 hours, respectively. SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 67 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch")
    (5.0 dB loops with Test Access) at 271-No. 67a.

[^797]: In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers
    experienced repeat troubles on 13.3, 10.3, and 7.9 percent of their
    8.0 dB loops, while SWBT experienced repeat troubles during the same
    period on 12.0, 12.2, and 12.9 percent of its own retail 8.0 dB
    loops. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 ("Repeat
    Reports (%)") (8.0 dB Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 68-69a. In
    February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers experienced
    repeat troubles on 16.1, 9.3, and 5.9 percent of their 5.0 dB loops,
    while SWBT experienced repeat troubles during the same period on
    13.2, 13.3, and 13.0 percent of their retail 5.0 dB loops. SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 ("Repeat Reports
    (%)") (5.0 dB Loops with Test Access) at 271-No. 68-69a. We note
    that for both 8.0 dB and 5.0 dB loops, in the last two months
    competing carriers have experienced fewer repeat troubles on their
    loops than SWBT has experienced on its own retail loops.

[^798]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 50, 54 (reviewing
    missed repair appointments).

[^799]: In February 2000, xDSL-capable loops were only 19 percent of all
    unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by competing carriers. By April
    2000, xDSL capable loops were 27 percent of all such loops. *See*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent
    Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0
    dB Loop, BRI Loop, DS1 Loop, DSL) at 27-No. 59a-c (calculated from
    total volumes listed on a per loop basis and combining BRI and DSL
    loop performance data to calculate xDSL-capable loops).

[^800]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4122, para. 330.
    We did not require such a showing in New York because of the "unique
    circumstances" associated with the Bell Atlantic New York
    application, including the fact that the Commission's previous
    section 271 orders did not address the ordering or provisioning of
    xDSL-capable loops. SWBT has not argued that such "unique
    circumstances" exist in Texas. *See also* Department of Justice
    Texas I Evaluation at 10 n.19.

[^801]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4123-24, paras.
    333-35.

[^802]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4123-24, para.
    334.

[^803]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4122, para. 331.

[^804]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1.

[^805]: An xDSL loop is a continuous copper line from the collocation
    site in SWBT's central office to the end user, which is not equipped
    with "repeaters," the equipment used to increase the transmitted
    signal. The ISDN BRI loop may include a section of fiber optic cable
    and should include ISDN repeaters for long loops. BRI loops are
    sometimes used by competing carriers to provide a slower speed IDSL
    service where xDSL loops are not available. Covad Texas II
    Rosenstein Decl. at para. 30. In April 2000, SWBT installed 1445
    xDSL loops and 923 BRI loops. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") (DSL,
    BRI Loop) at 271-No. 58b-c.

[^806]: Because characteristics of a loop, such as it length and the
    presence of various impediments to digital transmission can hinder
    certain advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to
    access basic loop make-up information that will assist carriers in
    ascertaining whether the loop, without the removal of impediments,
    can support a particular advanced service. *See Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140; *UNE Remand Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 3884-85, paras. 426-27.

[^807]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT, on average, SWBT
    returned competing carrier loop makeup requests in 4.34, 2.63, and
    1.72 days, while returning similar requests for its own retail
    operations in 3.99, 5.39, and 2.15 days. SWBT Aggregate Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 57 ("Average Time for Loop Make-Up
    Information") at 271-No. 57. We also note that in January 2000, the
    performance measurement was redefined in response to Department of
    Justice criticism, to include the entire time between SWBT's receipt
    from the competing carrier of a request for information relating to
    loop qualification and the time that such information is returned to
    the competing carrier. SWBT Texas II Application at 12; SWBT Texas
    II Chapman/Dysart Aff. at para. 28.

[^808]: SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1 ("Percent
    Firm Order Confirmations (FOCs) Relating to xDSL-capable Loops
    Returned within "X" Hours) (Mechanized LSRs-LEX (1-20 Loops),
    Mechanized LSRs-EDI (1-20 Loops) at 271-No. 5.1a. This performance
    measurement is relatively new, and not yet approved by the Texas
    Commission, so only March and April 2000 data are available. *See*
    SWBT Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. at Attach. A; Covad Goodpastor
    Texas II Decl. at para. 30. The Department of Justice characterizes
    SWBT's present measuring and reporting of competing carrier FOCs as
    a "significant improvement" over SWBT's first Texas application.
    Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 2.

[^809]: Arbitration Award, petitions of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca
    Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad Communications Company for
    Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, Conditions and Related
    Arrangements with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Docket Nos.
    20226 and 20272 (Texas PUC Nov. 30, 1999) (Covad/Rhythms Arbitration
    Award); Texas Commission January 27, 2000 Open Meeting Transcript at
    63-67 (Jan. 27 Open Meeting Tr.) (affirming November 30, 1999
    decision of Texas Commission arbitrator).

[^810]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(g); Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award at 1. The
    Texas Commission affirmed its decision on January 27, 2000 and on
    February 4, 2000, approved both Covad and Rhythms' interconnection
    agreements with SWBT based on the principles established in the
    arbitration. Order Approving Interconnection Agreements, petitions
    of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad
    Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection Rates,
    Terms, Conditions and Related Arrangements with Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, Docket No. 20272 (Texas PUC Feb. 4, 2000); Jan.
    27 Open Meeting Tr. at 63-67.

[^811]: Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award 11-17, 34-36, 40, 42-52, 56-65,
    78-80 (ordered changes include requiring SWBT to provide
    xDSL-capable loops on demand for xDSL services of the competing
    carrier's own choosing; drop arbitrary length and transmission speed
    restrictions on competing carriers' xDSL-capable loops; provide
    competing carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification
    information available to SWBT retail personnel; and eliminate its
    efforts to segregate and reserve the best loops for SWBT retail
    customers with its Selective Feeder System binder group management).

[^812]: Dec. 16 Open Meeting Tr. at 12-14, 16-17 (changes committed to
    include eliminating rejection of competing carrier xDSL-capable loop
    orders lacking information categorizing the request in one of seven
    SWBT Power Spectral Density masks; taking requests for loop
    qualification information via e-mail or fax; developing streamlined
    two-step ordering process for xDSL-capable loops; making available
    acceptance testing after provisioning; offering xDSL-capable loops
    "as is" to competing carriers who do not wish to have performed the
    conditioning SWBT recommends; offering loops of less than 12,000
    feet without requiring competing carriers to go through the loop
    qualification process; and reaffirming commitment to eliminate the
    Selective Feeder System).

[^813]: We acknowledge that a recent Texas Commission order required a
    limited modification to the "firewall" plan developed to ensure
    competing carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification
    information available to SWBT retail personnel. Order No. 13, Order
    Granting Covad's Motion to Reconsider Order No. 10; requiring
    Further Modification to SWBT's Modified Plan to Ensure Competitive
    Neutrality; Requesting Comment; Requesting Additional Information
    Regarding TP 76869 Tx; and Notice of Workshop, Docket Nos. 20226,
    20272 ( Texas PUC June 21, 2000); Letter from Thomas M. Koutsky,
    Vice President---Regulatory Affairs, Covad, to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (filed June 23, 2000).
    Because these modifications involve further safeguards to ensure the
    competitive neutrality required by the Covad/Rhythms Arbitration
    Award, and do not reflect a determination by the Texas Commission
    that SWBT is presently discriminating against competing carriers by
    restricting access to loop qualification information, we conclude
    that the Texas Commission's recent action does not in any way
    undermine our conclusions in this section.

[^814]: *See generally* SWBT Meierhoff Texas II Aff. at paras. 8-30
    (describing dismantling of selective feeder system binder group
    management designed to reserve binder groups for ADSL); SWBT
    Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. at paras. 71-91, SWBT Chapman Texas I
    Aff. at Attach. F (Jan. 4, 2000 Accessible Letter) (describing
    modifications to ordering process, including, no longer requiring
    manual loop qualification for xDSL-capable loops under 12,000 feet,
    allowing competing carriers to request loop make-up information
    prior to the submission of an LSR, allowing competing carriers to
    order a loop before the loop qualification process is complete,
    allowing competing carriers to provision xDSL services that do not
    comply with industry standards, removing xDSL transmission speed
    limitations for competing carriers, and removing requirement that
    competing carriers provide a PSD number when requesting loop
    qualification).

[^815]: SWBT Meierhoff Texas II Aff. at paras. 8-30.

[^816]: Covad Texas II Comments at 3, 10-18; NorthPoint Texas II
    Comments at 6, 9-12; Rhythms Texas II Comments at 14; Sprint Texas
    II Comments at 23-25; Covad Texas II Goodpastor Decl. at paras.
    21-63; Covad Texas II Reply Comments at 6-10.

[^817]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT provisioned competing
    carrier orders for xDSL loops that did not require conditioning in
    an average of 6.65, 6.02, and 4.98 days, respectively. During the
    same period, SWBT provisioned orders for xDSL loops that did not
    require conditioning for its own retail service in an average of
    7.63, 7.78, and 11.36 days, respectively. In February, March, and
    April 2000, SWBT provisioned competing carrier orders for xDSL loops
    that required conditioning in an average of 16.34, 10.19, and 10.27
    days. During the same period, SWBT provisioned orders for xDSL loops
    that required conditioning for its own retail service in an average
    of 14.40, 10.67, and 31.50 days. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 55.1 ("Average Installation Interval-DSL") (Requires
    No Conditioning, Requires Conditioning) at 271-No. 55.1.

[^818]: Covad Texas II Comments at 20.

[^819]: *See* SWBT Performance Measurement Business Rules, Measurement
    No. 55.1 ("Average Installation Interval-DSL"). *See also* SWBT
    Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 25-26 (refuting Covad's claims
    of measurement inaccuracy); Covad Texas I Comments at 31 (alleging
    that SWBT systems force Covad to adjust installation dates on its
    xDSL-capable loop order to extend beyond the average interval in
    order to avoid automatic rejections on orders requiring
    supplements); SWBT Texas I Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 24-25
    (denying Covad allegations).

[^820]: SWBT Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at 18, 22-35 (correction of
    exclusion of NorthPoint and Covad data); Department of Justice Texas
    II Evaluation at 3.

[^821]: *See generally* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement
    No. 58 ("SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") (DSL) at 271-No. 58c.

[^822]: SWBT Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. at para. 44. *See generally*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 ("Average
    Installation Interval (Days)") (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 55a.

[^823]: *See generally* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement
    No. 55 ("Average Installation Interval (Days)") (BRI Loop) at
    271-No. 55a; Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5-6
    (characterizing recent SWBT BRI loop performance as demonstrating
    "impressive progress").

[^824]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 ("Average
    Installation Interval (Days)") (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 55a.

[^825]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 ("Average
    Installation Interval (Days)") (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 55a.

[^826]: SWBT Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 47.

[^827]: Covad Texas II Comments at 25.

[^828]: We note also that in a recent workshop before the Texas
    Commission carriers agreed the DS1 analogue was not appropriate.
    Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 29; SWBT Performance
    Measurement Business Rules, Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused
    Missed Due Dates") (listing retail analogues).

[^829]: Covad Texas II Comments at 21 (describing problems with xDSL
    loop missed installation due dates).

[^830]: In March 2000, SWBT missed 7.7 percent of xDSL loop installation
    due dates for competing carriers and 6.5 percent of xDSL loop
    installation due dates for its own retail service. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed
    Due Dates") (DSL) at 271-No. 58c.

[^831]: Covad Texas II Comments at 23 (describing problems with BRI loop
    missed installation due dates).

[^832]: In March 2000, SWBT missed 15.9 percent of competing carrier BRI
    loop installation due dates and 16.7 percent of BRI loop
    installation due dates for its own retail service. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed
    Due Dates") (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 58b.

[^833]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 ("Percent
    SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates") (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 58b.

[^834]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4073-74, para. 222
    n.711.

[^835]: Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 29; SWBT Performance
    Measurement Business Rules, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent Troubles on
    N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (citing to list of retail analogues
    in Measurement No. 58).

[^836]: Covad Texas II Comments at 21 (describing problems with xDSL
    loop troubles within 30 days after installation).

[^837]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent
    Troubles on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (DSL) at 271-No. 59c.

[^838]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 ("Percent
    Troubles on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days") (DSL) at 271-No. 59c.

[^839]: *See generally* Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at
    4-6.

[^840]: IDSL modems combine the three ISDN circuits into a single 144
    kbs data stream, and in order to support this use of BRI loops, SWBT
    central office technicians must avoid using some incompatible slots
    with certain digital loop carriers. SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff.
    at para. 31.

[^841]: SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 59-60.

[^842]: SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 59.

[^843]: SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 31-32; Letter from
    Austin C. Schlick, Counsel, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65 at 3 (filed
    June 6, 2000) (SWBT June 6 *Ex Parte* Letter) (describing
    xDSL-capable loop workshops addressing BRI loop performance issues,
    attended by SWBT, Covad, Rhythms, NorthPoint, and IP
    Communications).

[^844]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 6; Rhythms Texas II
    Comments at 14; Rhythms Texas II Lopez Aff. at para 6; SWBT Texas II
    Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 31, 33.

[^845]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 6.

[^846]: In February and April 2000, competing carrier xDSL loops were
    repaired in an average of 10.51 and 3.22 hours, while during the
    same months SWBT repaired its own retail loops in an average of
    28.65 and 24.08 hours. In March 2000, competing carrier xDSL loops
    were repaired in an average of 14.37 hours, only marginally higher
    than the 11.17 hours it took SWBT, on average, to repair its own
    retail xDSL loops. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No.
    67 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch") (DSL) at 271-No. 67c.

[^847]: In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers
    experienced repeat troubles on 11.7, 9.2, and 10.0 percent of their
    xDSL loops, while during the same period, SWBT retail experienced
    repeat troubles on 13.8, 11.1 and 8.9 percent of their xDSL loops.
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 ("Repeat
    Reports (%)") (DSL) at 271-No. 69c.

[^848]: SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 57, 59-60.

[^849]: SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 60.

[^850]: SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 60.

[^851]: SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 31-32; SWBT June 6 *Ex
    Parte* Letter (describing xDSL-capable loop workshops addressing BRI
    loop performance issues, attended by SWBT, Covad, Rhythms,
    NorthPoint, and IP Communications).

[^852]: In March and April 2000, competing carriers experienced repeat
    troubles on 13.5 and 15.7 percent of their BRI loops, while SWBT
    experienced troubles on 15.6 and 16.9 percent of their own retail
    BRI loops. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69
    ("Repeat Reports (%)") (BRI Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 69b.

[^853]: *See Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC
    Communications Inc., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of
    Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to
    Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22,
    24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and 101 of the Commission's Rules,* CC Docket No.
    98-141, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14859-67,
    14969-99 (1999) (*SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*), *appeal docketed,*
    No. 99-1441 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).

[^854]: The merger conditions define advanced services as wireline
    services (e.g., ADSL, IDSL, xDSL, Frame Relay) that rely on
    packetized technology and have the capability of supporting
    transmission speeds of at least 56 kilobits per second in both
    directions. *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order,* App. C at para. 2.
    Circuit-switched services are not included, regardless of the
    technology, protocols or speed used for the transmission of such
    services. *Id.* ISDN also is not included because it is "not
    primarily based on packetized technology." *Id.*

[^855]: SWBT Texas I Application App. A-3, Vol. 5, Tab 2, Affidavit of
    Lincoln Brown (SWBT Texas I Brown Aff.) at paras. 1, 3. SBC has in
    place another affiliate, Ameritech Advanced Data Services (AADS), to
    offer advanced services in Ameritech's service areas in Illinois,
    Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. *Id.* at para. 6.

[^856]: Steady state provisioning refers to provisioning in accordance
    with the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* conditions and after the
    expiration of an applicable transition period. *See SBC/Ameritech
    Merger Order,* App. C at para. 4. During this transition period, SBC
    may perform certain activities such as line sharing and network
    planning, engineering, design & assignment services on an exclusive
    basis with ASI. *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order,* App. C at paras. 3(c),
    4(n)(1), 4(n)(4).

[^857]: SWBT Texas II Application App. Vol. D, Tab 2, Affidavit of
    Lincoln Brown (SWBT Texas II Brown Aff.) at para. 21. ASI provides
    the following advanced services (in addition to ADSL): "Frame Relay,
    Cell Relay, Virtual Point of Presence Dial Access Service (VPOP/DAS)
    and Native LAN Plus." SWBT Texas I Brown Aff., Attach. A at 1, 3;
    SWBT Texas I Reply App. A, Vol. A-3, Tab 5, Reply Affidavit of
    Lincoln E. Brown (SWBT Texas I Brown Reply Aff.) at para. 5.

[^858]: SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 21.

[^859]: SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 19. As of April 5, 2000, ASI
    had received more than 200 requests for new frame relay and cell
    relay services, and had processed approximately 20 LSRs to order UNE
    loops from SWBT. *Id.* at para. 21. ASI noted in reply comments
    dated May 19, 2000, that none of these orders had yet been
    provisioned, and that the circumstances under which such a service
    arrangement would be applicable are "very limited." SWBT Texas II
    Reply App. A, Vol. A-1, Tab 3, Reply Affidavit of Lincoln E. Brown
    (SWBT Texas II Brown Reply Aff.) at n.6. While ASI uses EDI, an
    application-to-application interface, to order 4-wire digital and
    DS-1 loops, xDSL providers generally use LEX, a graphical user
    interface, to order xDSL-capable and BRI loops.

[^860]: SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 20.

[^861]: *Id.*

[^862]: SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 23. The term "interim line
    sharing" refers to the fact that under the *SBC/Ameritech Merger
    Order,* ASI is permitted to engage in line sharing with SWBT on an
    exclusive basis until line sharing is provided to unaffiliated
    providers of advanced services within the same geographic area.
    *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order,* App. C at para. 3(d). Where SWBT
    engages in interim line sharing, it is required to provide
    unaffiliated providers of advanced services within the same area
    discounted Line Sharing Surrogate Charges equal to 50 percent of the
    cost of a second loop. *See id.* at para. 8(b).

[^863]: SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 22.

[^864]: *Id.* In reply comments, ASI noted that it had ordered 282
    unbundled loops in April for the purpose of providing ADSL services
    in Texas, and that as of May 19, 2000, ASI had ordered an additional
    187 unbundled loops. SWBT Texas II Brown Reply Aff. at para. 7. ASI
    stated that ASI ordered the loops from SWBT utilizing the same
    interfaces and processes as are available to and used by
    unaffiliated providers. *Id.* at para. 8. For instance, ASI
    performed the pre-order function of obtaining loop qualification
    information for the 282 loops in April from the Complex Products
    Service Order System (CPSOS), which was made available to
    competitive LECs beginning April 5, 2000, and ASI performed the
    ordering function of submitting manual LSRs to SWBT's Local Service
    Center. *Id.*

[^865]: *Id.* at para. 9. ASI anticipated that its initial ordering
    volume would be approximately 450 HFPL UNEs per day in Texas (or
    9,000 per month based on 20 working days). *Id.*

[^866]: *See* AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 17 ("\[t\]he merger
    conditions pursuant to which ASI was created include numerous
    provisions that allow SBC to discriminate in favor of its
    affiliate."); AT&T Texas II Comments at 64-70; IP Communications
    Texas II Minter Decl. at paras. 8-11; Sprint Texas II Comments at
    19-22; \@Link Texas II Comments at 10.

[^867]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84; AT&T Texas II
    Reply Comments at 17; IP Communications Texas II Minter Decl. at
    para. 9.

[^868]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 64-70; TRA Texas I Comments at 24-30.
    We note that TRA filed an appeal of the Commission's SBC/Ameritech
    Merger Order in the D.C. Circuit (Docket No. 99-1441) challenging
    the determination that the separate advanced services affiliate
    required by merger conditions is not a successor or assign of the
    incumbent LEC for purposes of applying the resale obligation of
    section 251(c)(4). AT&T has intervened in the pending suit.

[^869]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 272(b), (c), (e), and (g); *see also
    SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* at para. 460, App. C. at para. 3.

[^870]: *See SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* at paras. 446-76. Moreover, we
    note that AT&T has not explained how failure to treat ASI as an
    incumbent LEC has disadvantaged AT&T. *See* AT&T Texas II Comments
    at 65.

[^871]: TRA Texas I Comments at 24-30. *See also* AT&T Texas II Comments
    at 64-70.

[^872]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A).

[^873]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84.

[^874]: *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* at para. 475.

[^875]: SBC*/Ameritech Merger Order*, App. C at para. 4(n). Recognizing
    SWBT\'s section 251 nondiscrimination obligations regarding
    unbundled network elements and collocation, the merger conditions
    provide that even during the transition period, SWBT and ASI were
    required to operate in a manner that was the \"functional
    equivalent\" of provisioning advanced services through a fully
    operational separate affiliate*. SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, App. C
    at para. 6(g). For example, ASI was required to order from SWBT
    \"facilities and/or services needed to provide \[advanced
    services\]\" rather than having SWBT continue to operate on an
    integrated basis. *Id*. at para 6(g)(3).

[^876]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 69-70; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers
    Decl. at paras. 83-89; AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 17-18; \@Link
    Texas II Comments at 10; IP Communications Texas II Minter Decl. at
    para. 10; Sprint Texas II Comments at 20.

[^877]: *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* at paras. 467-76.

[^878]: *See, e.g.,* AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84; AT&T
    Texas II Reply Comments at 17; IP Communications Texas II Minter
    Decl. at para. 9.

[^879]: S*ee* AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84 (citing SWBT
    Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 14).

[^880]: *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* at para. 469, App. C. at para.
    3(a).

[^881]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1).

[^882]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C); *see* section 272 section below.

[^883]: In March and April 2000, SWBT installed competing carrier DS1
    loops in an average of 3.0 and 3.5 days. SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 55 ("Average Installation Interval (Days)")
    (DS1 Loop) at 271-No. 55a.

[^884]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT missed 5.8, 13.8, and
    12.8 percent of competing carrier DS1 installation due dates. During
    the same period, SWBT missed 4.9, 9.0, and 7.7 of the installation
    due dates for its own retail DS1 service. SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed
    Due Dates") (DS1 Loop) at 271-No. 58b.

[^885]: In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT repaired competing
    carrier DS1 loops in an average of 5.24, 7.01, and 3.96 hours.
    During the same period, SWBT repaired its own retail DS1 loops in an
    average of 3.01, 2.96, and 3.45 hours. SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 67 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch")
    (DS1 Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 67b.

[^886]: In February, March, and April 2000, competing carrier DS1 loops
    experienced repeat trouble rates of 12.9, 22.2, and 8.5 percent,
    while SWBT's own retail DS1 loops experienced repeat trouble rates
    of 19.4, 17.9, and 21.8 percent. SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 69 ("Repeat Reports (%)") (DS1 Loop with Test
    Access) at 271-No. 69b.

[^887]: WorldCom Texas II Comments at 41-43.

[^888]: SWBT Auinbauh Texas II Aff. at Attach. C (Amendment 6 to T2A at
    para. 4.1).

[^889]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 20912.

[^890]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-83, para. 161.

[^891]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-83, 21016, paras. 161,
    230; 65 Fed. Reg. 1331 (Jan. 10, 2000).

[^892]: *See* section III.C.1, *supra.*

[^893]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-85, paras. 161-170.

[^894]: SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at paras. 5-55; SWBT Texas II Auinbauh
    Aff. at paras. 3-9; SWBT Texas II Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 4-6;
    SWBT Texas II Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 41-43.

[^895]: NorthPoint Texas II Comments at 7-12; Rhythms Texas II Comments
    at 3-10; Covad Goodpastor Texas II Decl. at paras. 14-20; NorthPoint
    Lewandowski Texas II Aff. at paras. 23-29; Rhythms Lopez Texas II
    Aff. at paras. 2-25.

[^896]: Covad Texas II Comments at 2-3, 7-8; Covad Texas II Goodpastor
    Decl. at paras. 14-20; IP Texas II Comments at 2-4; NorthPoint Texas
    II Comments at 7-12; NorthPoint Texas II Lewandowski Aff. at paras.
    23-29; Rhythms Texas II Lopez Aff. at paras. 4-15.

[^897]: AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 8-9; IP Communications Texas II
    Comments at 14; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42;
    IP Communications Texas I Comments at 5.

[^898]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 29-42.

[^899]: Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 7 n.17.

[^900]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20941, para. 13; 47 C.F.R. §
    51.319(h)(3).

[^901]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.307(c).

[^902]: We note, however, that nothing in our rules prohibits an
    incumbent LEC from voluntarily providing the splitter in this line
    splitting situation.

[^903]: SWBT June 6 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^904]: SWBT June 6 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^905]: For instance, when the UNE platform is part of a DLC or exceeds
    distance limitations for xDSL service, such loops would not be
    xDSL-capable and could not be provisioned as an xDSL-capable
    unbundled loop. In these circumstances, modifications to the
    existing loop or other alternatives would need to provided. SWBT
    June 6 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2. In light of SWBT's representations,
    we find moot concerns expressed by commenters regarding an earlier
    SWBT proposal to require competing carriers using the UNE-P to order
    a new loop in addition to the existing UNE-P loop in order to
    ultimately engage in line splitting over the UNE-P. AT&T
    Pfau/Chambers Texas II Decl. at paras. 29-36; IP Communications
    Texas I Comments at 5.

[^906]: *See* AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42; *see
    also* IP Communications at 12, 14.

[^907]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 41.

[^908]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42.

[^909]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 40.

[^910]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2); *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*,
    119 S. Ct. 721, 736 (1999).

[^911]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3776, para. 175.

[^912]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3833, paras. 302-303.

[^913]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3833, para. 303.

[^914]: AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 42.

[^915]: *Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20940, para. 76.

[^916]: SWBT recently affirmed that it is "interested in exploring the
    use of SWBT's splitters" in line splitting arrangements and that it
    views this "as a potential business opportunity." SWBT June 6 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 2.

[^917]: AT&T Texas II Comments at 17-18; AT&T Texas I Comments at 12-13;
    AT&T Texas I Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 27-46. AT&T specifically
    points out that when a SWBT customer who had been using SWBT's local
    voice service and xDSL service combined over a single copper loop
    chose to switch voice service to AT&T, SWBT informed the customer
    that its xDSL service would be disconnected unless the customer
    switched voice service back to SWBT. AT&T Texas I Comments at 12;
    AT&T Texas I Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 29.

[^918]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v).

[^919]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719, para.
    201.

[^920]: *Id.* A BOC has the following obligations with respect to
    dedicated transport: (a) provide unbundled access to dedicated
    transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such
    offices and serving wire centers (SWCs); between SWCs and
    interexchange carriers points of presence (POPs); between tandem
    switches and SWCs, end offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire
    centers of BOCs and requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically
    feasible transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical
    Carrier levels (*e.g.,* OC-3/12/48/96) that the competing carrier
    could use to provide telecommunications; (c) not limit the
    facilities to which dedicated interoffice transport facilities are
    connected, provided such interconnections are technically feasible,
    or restrict the use of unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to
    the extent technically feasible, provide requesting carriers with
    access to digital cross-connect system functionality in the same
    manner that the BOC offers such capabilities to interexchange
    carriers that purchase transport services. *Id.* at 20719*.*

[^921]: *Id.* at 20719 n. 650. The Commission also found that a BOC has
    the following obligations with respect to shared transport: (a)
    provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of
    requesting carriers to be carried on the same transport facilities
    that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport
    transmission facilities between end office switches, between its end
    office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its
    network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled
    shared transport and unbundled switching to use the same routing
    table that is resident in the BOC's switch; and (d) permit
    requesting carriers to use shared (or dedicated) transport as an
    unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and
    terminating traffic to, customers to whom the requesting carrier is
    also providing local exchange service. *Id.* at 20720, n. 652*.*

[^922]: SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 111-128; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I
    Aff. at paras. 98-104.

[^923]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 65-69.

[^924]: The relevant state performance measures (disaggregated into
    various submeasures) indicate very few months and regions where more
    than 10 data points were recorded. SWBT Texas I Application at 102,
    SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 336, 345, 356, 359-360.
    Performance data for January through April generally indicate fewer
    than 10 data points. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data January
    through April Measurement No. 58 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due
    Dates") at 271-No. 58a. Under the performance remedy plan, SWBT is
    required to pay damages and assessments under Tier 2 for any
    substandard performance of this measure even if there are fewer than
    ten data points. Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 68. For PM 58
    (percentage of missed due dates) a parity measure, the results for
    submeasure 58-07(DS1 dedicated transport) indicate a greater
    percentage of misses for competitive LECs than for SWBT for the
    months of January, February and March. For submeasure 58-14 (analog
    line ports) the data indicate a greater percentage of misses for
    competitive LECs than for SWBT for the months of February and April.
    SWBT states that competitive LECs may request dedicated transport
    with levels of capacity higher than OC-48 through the Special
    Request Process. SWBT Application at 100. As we noted in *Bell
    Atlantic New York* incumbent LECs must provide all technically
    feasible transmission capabilities, such as Optical Carrier levels
    (e.g. OC-3/12/48/96) that the competing provider could use to
    provide telecommunications service. *Bell Atlantic New York Order*
    at para. 337 n.1041. *See also* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at
    16.

[^925]: *See* part V.B.1, *infra.* MFNS asserts that SWBT failed to
    unbundle loops and interoffice transport with the provision of MFNS'
    dark fiber product. MFNS Comments at 12-15. *See* part V.A.1,
    *infra*, where we address MFNS comments. Z-Tel and Connect raised
    issues regarding SWBT's policies for adopting interconnection
    agreements pursuant to section 252(i) of the Act. SWBT disallowed
    both parties from opting into interconnection agreements on the
    basis that the relevant agreements were no longer available for
    adoption because they had expired or were in the notice period for
    renegotiation. Connect Texas I Comments at 2-6; Connect Texas II
    Comments at 2; Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 2-9; Z-Tel Texas II
    Comments at 5-6; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 16-18.
    Z-Tel alleged that the policies affect Z-Tel's ability to purchase
    shared transport. While Z-Tel's allegation is not directly
    applicable to this checklist item, we caution SWBT that if it fails
    to recognize the rights of a carrier seeking to opt-in, that
    carrier, in addition to available state remedies, may seek expedited
    relief from this Commission pursuant to section 208*. Local
    Competition Order*, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16141, para.1321; 47 U.S.C. §
    208.

[^926]: Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 6-7, Global Crossing Laurie
    Larson Texas I Aff. at para. 12.

[^927]: An Optical Carrier level is a SONET optical signal. OC-1 is
    51.840 million bits per second. OC-3 equals three times OC-1.
    NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 534 (14^th^ ed. 1998).

[^928]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para.
    340.

[^929]: *Id*. at para. 340. To the extent that Global Crossing is
    seeking to use combinations of unbundled network elements in lieu of
    tariffed special access services, we have addressed the requirements
    associated with such use in several orders. *See* part V.B.2,
    *infra*, for discussion of Access to the Enhanced Extended Link.

[^930]: *See Bell Atlantic Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para. 340.

[^931]: *Id*. at para. 341.

[^932]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi); *see also Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20722.

[^933]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722, para.
    207.

[^934]: *Id*.

[^935]: *Id.* at 20722-23, para. 207.

[^936]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 208.

[^937]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 208 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan
    Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20619, para. 140).

[^938]: *Id.*

[^939]: *Id.*

[^940]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 209 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20705, para. 306).

[^941]: *Id.* (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20714-15, paras. 324-25).

[^942]: SWBT Texas I Application at 103 (SWBT furnishes more than
    125,000 unbundled switch ports in Texas, mostly in combination with
    unbundled loops.); SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 140; SWBT
    Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 105.

[^943]: Line-side facilities include, but are not limited to, the
    connection between a loop termination at a main distribution frame,
    and a switch line card. Trunk-side facilities include, but are not
    limited to, the connection between trunk termination at a trunk-side
    cross-connect panel and a switch trunk card. *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20724 nn.679-680. *See* SWBT Deere
    Texas I Aff. at paras. 130-131.

[^944]: The basic switching function includes, but is not limited to:
    connecting lines to lines, lines to trunks, trunks to lines, trunks
    to trunks, as well as the same basic capabilities that are available
    to the BOC's customers, such as a telephone number, directory
    listing, dial tone, signaling, and access to 911, operator services,
    and directory assistance. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20726 n.690. *See* SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 132.

[^945]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20726.
    Vertical features provide end-users with various services such as
    custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and
    Centrex. *Id.* *See* SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 132, 139.

[^946]: An incumbent LEC must provide customized routing as part of the
    local switching element, unless it can prove to the state commission
    that customized routing in a particular switch is not technically
    feasible. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20728
    n.705. Customized routing permits requesting carriers to designate
    the particular outgoing trunks associated with unbundled switching
    provided by the incumbent, which will carry certain classes of
    traffic originating from requesting carriers' customers. *See Id.*
    at 20728-29, para. 221. Customized routing is also referred to as
    selective routing. *Id.* at 20728 n.704. *See* SWBT Deere Texas I
    Aff. at paras. 134-137.

[^947]: *Local Competition Third Reconsideration Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    12475-79; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20716-17; *see
    also* *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20732, para.
    228. *See* SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 135.

[^948]: The requirement to provide unbundled tandem switching includes:
    (i) trunk-connect facilities, including but not limited to the
    connection between trunk termination at a cross-connect panel and a
    switch trunk card; (ii) the base switching function of connecting
    trunks to trunks; and, (iii) the functions that are centralized in
    tandem switches (as distinguished from separate end-office
    switches), including but not limited to call recording, the routing
    of calls to operator services, and signaling conversion features.
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20733 n. 732.
    *See* SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 142-146.

[^949]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20733-35,
    paras. 230-31. *See* SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 107.

[^950]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20735-37,
    paras. 232-34. *See* SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 107.

[^951]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 69-72. *See* Final Staff
    Report at 71-75.

[^952]: Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 10-11; T2A Attach. 6 § 5.2.3.4.

[^953]: Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 11. *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*,
    12 FCC Rcd at 20601, para. 110.

[^954]: Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 11. *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*,
    12 FCC Rcd at 20601, para., 110.

[^955]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20722-24,
    paras. 207-209 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20705).

[^956]: T2A Attach. 6 §§ 5.2.4.2 and 5.2.3.4.

[^957]: *See UNE Remand Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 3725, para. 51 (47 U.S.C. §
    251(d)(2) impairment standard); *Id*. at para. 253 *et seq*.
    (Applying impairment standard to switching element).

[^958]: Z-Tel may file a petition for rulemaking, or may seek to include
    its argument in our pending *UNE Remand Order* reconsideration
    proceeding. *See* Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, *Public
    Notice*, rel. Feb. 28, 2000, 65 FR 12004 (Mar. 7, 2000).

[^959]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^960]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256.

[^961]: *Id.*

[^962]: *Id.*

[^963]: SWBT Texas I Application at 105-108; SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at
    paras. 166-72, 178-81, 184-85, 606-618 and Attach. A at 124-126 (PM
    102-104).

[^964]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72-76. *See also* SWBT
    Texas I Application, App. C, Tab 1233 (Texas Commission Final Staff
    Report at 76-84).

[^965]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).

[^966]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^967]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217; *In re Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
    19392 (1996) (*Local Competition Second Report and Order*) *vacated
    in part, People of the State of California v. FCC,* 124 F.3d 934
    (8th Cir. 1997), *overruled in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,*
    119 S.Ct. 721 (1999)*; see also, Implementation of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings
    Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934*, Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 99-273 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999)
    (*Directory Listings Information NPRM*).

[^968]: While both sections 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to
    nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance," section
    251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to "operator services,"
    while section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory
    access to "operator call completion services." 47 U.S.C. §§
    251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III). The term "operator call
    completion services" is not defined in the Act, nor has the
    Commission previously defined the term. However, for section
    251(b)(3) purposes, the term "operator services" was defined as
    meaning "any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange
    for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call." *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para.
    110. In the same order the Commission concluded that busy line
    verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory
    assistance are forms of "operator services," because they assist
    customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a
    telephone call. *Id.* at 19449, para. 111. All of these services may
    be needed or used to place a call. For example, if a customer tries
    to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy
    signal, the customer may contact the operator to attempt to complete
    the call. Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and
    busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted
    directory assistance can all be used when an operator completes a
    call, we concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* that
    for checklist compliance purposes, "operator call completion
    services" is a subset of or equivalent to "operator service."
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd 20740 at n.763. As a
    result, we use the nondiscriminatory standards established for
    operator services to determine whether nondiscriminatory access is
    provided.

[^969]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19456-58, paras. 130-35. The *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order's* interpretation of section
    251(b)(3) is limited "to access to each LEC's directory assistance
    service." *Id.* at 19456, para. 135. However, section
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited to the LEC's systems but requires
    "nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the
    other carrier's customers to obtain telephone numbers." 47 U.S.C. §
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii). Combined with the Commission's conclusion that
    "incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities
    providing operator services and directory assistance from resold
    services and other unbundled network elements to the extent
    technically feasible," *Local Competition First Report and Order,*
    11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, paras. 535-37, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)'s
    requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance service
    provider selected by the customer's local service provider,
    regardless of whether the competitor; provides such services itself;
    selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party
    to provide such services. *Directory Listings Information NPRM*.

[^970]: *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19464, para. 151.

[^971]: *Id*. at para. 112.

[^972]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148. For example, when customers
    call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically
    hear a message, such as "thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company."
    Competing carriers may use the BOC's brand, request the BOC to brand
    the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC
    not brand the call at all. 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d).

[^973]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(C)(3)(ii); *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61, paras. 141-44.

[^974]: *In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunciations Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report
    and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Reulmaking (rel.
    Nov. 5, 1999) (*Local Competition Third Report and Order)* at paras.
    441-442.

[^975]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at para. 470. *See
    generally* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52. *See also* 47 U.S.C. §
    252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring UNE rates to be "based on the cost
    (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other
    rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element").

[^976]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at paras. 470-73.
    *See also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).

[^977]: SWBT Texas I Application at 108-110. SWBT Rogers Texas I Aff. at
    paras. 3-39; *see also* SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 525-542
    and Attach. A at 101-108 (measurements 79-86).

[^978]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72. The Texas Commission
    notes that SWBT has obligated itself to provide access to directory
    assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis at UNE prices
    to business customers for two years and to residential customers for
    three years, even though the Commission removed these items from the
    required UNE list. *Id*. at 74-74.

[^979]: WorldCom Texas I Comments at 56, 57 n.31 (stating that SWBT's
    rate for in-region, out-of-state directory listings is \$.0583).
    However, in an *ex parte* letter, WorldCom informs the Commission
    that it made a factual error and should have reported this rate as
    \$.0585. *See* Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel for
    Competitive Strategies, MCI (WorldCom) Communications Corporation,
    to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed Mar. 14, 2000).

[^980]: SWBT Rogers Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 11-12.

[^981]: For the same reason, we find that the National ALEC's argument
    that SWBT's directory assistance services in California are priced
    at an anticompetitive level is not relevant to a determination of
    whether SWBT meets checklist item 7 in Texas. *See* National ALEC
    Texas I Comments at 10-11. *See also Bell Atlantic New York Order*
    15 FCC Rcd at 4151, paras. 398-399 (claim that Bell Atlantic
    violated Commission rules in other states is not relevant to
    determination of whether Bell Atlantic meets its section 271
    obligations in New York).

[^982]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72-73.

[^983]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^984]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^985]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20748, para.
    255.

[^986]: *Id*. We note that in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* we
    stated that the definition of "directory listing" was synonymous
    with the definition of "subscriber list information." *Id.* at 20747
    (citing the *Local Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd
    at 19458-59). However, the Commission's decision in a recent
    proceeding obviates this comparison, and supports the definition of
    directory listing delineated above. *See Implementation of the
    Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network
    Information and Other Customer Information,* CC Docket No. 96-115,
    Third Report and Order; *Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No.
    96-98, Second Order on Reconsideration; *Provision of Directory
    Listing Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, As
    Amended,* CC Docket No. 99-273, FCC 99-227, Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, para. 160 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999).

[^987]: *Id.*

[^988]: SWBT Texas I Application at 110-111; SWBT Rogers Texas I Aff. at
    paras. 40-44, 51-52; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 640-641,
    646-648 and Attach. A at 133-136 (PM 110-113). SWBT demonstrates
    that it is providing white pages directory listings for customers of
    competitive LECs that are nondiscriminatory in appearance and
    integration, and have the same accuracy and reliability that SWBT
    provides for its own customers. SWBT Rogers Texas I Aff. at paras.
    40-44 (nondiscriminatory appearance, e.g., same size, font, and
    typeface), and paras. 51-52; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras.
    640-641, 646-648 and Attach. A at 133-136 (PM 110-113) (comparable
    accuracy and reliability).

[^989]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 76-78; *see* Final Staff
    Report at 85-89.

[^990]: ALTS Texas I Comments at 46; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at
    42-44.

[^991]: ALTS Texas I Comments at 46; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at
    42-43.

[^992]: *See* Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber et al.,
    Counsel for Applicants, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 at 2 (Feb. 4, 2000)
    (Austin C. Schlick Feb. 4 *Ex Parte* Letter). SWBT further explains
    that "the Dysart Affidavit's characterization of the UNE disconnect
    (D) order as 'drop\[ping\]' listing information out of the database
    is . . . incorrect. *See* Dysart Texas I Aff. ¶ 640. For clarity of
    the record, all after the first sentence of paragraph 640 of Mr.
    Dysart's affidavit should be stricken." *Id*. Accordingly, we take
    no notice of that portion of the Dysart Texas I Affidavit.

[^993]: *But see* ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas II Joint Comments at 14.
    NEXTLINK states that customers' listings are being dropped out of
    the database. NEXTLINK states that the problems appear to be related
    to orders falling out of the automated systems and not being
    completed by SWBT's back end office systems. SWBT states that it is
    working with NEXTLINK to investigate any errors in directory
    listings that may have occurred in connection with NEXTLINK's orders
    but has yet to receive details from NEXTLINK that would allow SWBT
    to investigate the particular orders affected. SWBT Texas II Reply
    Comments at 71. We note that NEXTLINK withdrew its opposition to
    SWBT's application on May 23, 2000. *See* Letter To Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, FCC, from NEXTLINK Communications, Inc., dated May
    23, 2000.

[^994]: CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 43; ADP Texas 1 Reply at 5.

[^995]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York* *Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4045,
    para. 176.

[^996]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^997]: *Id.*

[^998]: *In the Matter of Request of Lockheed Martin Corporation and
    Warburg, Pincus & Co. for Review of the Transfer of the Lockheed
    Martin Communications Industry Services Business*, CC Docket No.
    92-237, Order, FCC 99-346 (rel. Nov. 17, 1999). *See generally* 47
    C.F.R. §§ 52.7-52.19.

[^999]: *Administration of the North American Numbering Plan,* Report
    and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 2588, 2615; *NANP Third Report and Order,* 12
    FCC Rcd at 23042-46; *see* SWBT Adair Texas I Aff. at paras. 15-18.

[^1000]: *See Second Bell South Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20752.
    *See also, e.g.,* Central Office Code (NXX) Assignment Guidelines
    (INC 95-0407-008) (revised August 1999).

[^1001]: SWBT Texas I Application at paras. 111-112; SWBT Adair Texas I
    Aff. at paras. 15-18.

[^1002]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 80 and at n.445 (agreeing
    with SWBT Adair Texas I Aff., para. 18, that SWBT supports and
    adheres to all relevant rules, regulations, and guidelines
    established by regulatory agencies and industry groups). *See* Final
    Staff Report at 90.

[^1003]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^1004]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para.
    267.

[^1005]: *Id.* at 20755-56, para. 272.

[^1006]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15741, n.1126; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^1007]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15741-42, para. 484.

[^1008]: *UNE Remand Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^1009]: SWBT Texas I Application at 112-115; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at
    paras. 186-226 (describing SS7 interconnection at paras. 190-194;
    toll free "800" service database at paras. 198-208; AIN network
    architecture and call-related databases at paras. 209-218); SWBT
    Texas I Rogers Aff. at paras. 58-71 (describing SWBT's Line
    Information Database (LIDB), Calling Name delivery (CNAM), and Line
    Validation Administrative System (LVAS)). Competitive LECs access
    databases through SWBT's signal transfer points in the same manner
    and by the same signaling links that SWBT uses. SWBT Texas I Deere
    Aff. at para. 218.

[^1010]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 80. *See also* Final Staff
    Report at 91.

[^1011]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 19. *See also* Pilgrim Texas II
    Reply Comments. Pilgrim is an interstate, interexchange carrier that
    offers, among other services, pay-per-call services. Pilgrim Texas I
    Comments at 2.

[^1012]: By "casual calling services" Pilgrim means that the consumer
    does not establish a business relationship and subscriber account
    with the service provider. Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 3-4.

[^1013]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 7-8.

[^1014]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 2-4, 10, 18-19. *See also* Pilgrim
    Texas II Reply Comments.

[^1015]: SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14 ("All records in
    SWBT's LIDB are designated so that they will indicate non-acceptance
    of alternately billed 900/976 charges"). *See* SWBT Texas I Auinbauh
    Aff. Attach. A at Attach 7 (T2A Ordering and Provisioning), 4.2
    (Parties to the T2A agreement have access to a pre-order electronic
    gateway "that provides Real Time access to SWBT's information
    systems."). *See also* discussion of access to LIDB under checklist
    item II.

[^1016]: SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14; SWBT Texas I
    Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A at Attach. 6 (T2A Unbundled Network
    Elements) 9.4 *et seq.* (describing LIDB).

[^1017]: *Id.*

[^1018]: SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14; SWBT Texas I
    Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A at Attach. 7 (T2A Ordering and
    Provisioning), 4.2. (Parties to the T2A have "Real Time" access to
    SWBT's BNA through a pre-order electronic gateway).

[^1019]: 47 U.S.C. § 222(f)(1)(B).

[^1020]: 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(1).

[^1021]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15741, n. 1126; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^1022]: Section 51.319(e)(2)(ii) of the Commission's rules list certain
    databases that meet this definition, such as "Line Information
    Database" and "Toll Free Calling database," but also states that the
    list "is not limited to" these examples. 47 C.F.R. §
    51.319(e)(2)(ii).

[^1023]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A.7, 4.2 & 4.2.1.

[^1024]: SWBT also makes BNA generally available under Tariff No. 73,
    Section 13 and Texas Access Service Tariff, Section 8. If a customer
    chooses to receive SWBT's response to the customer's request via
    data tape, the tape is mailed on the next business day. If a
    customer chooses electronic data transmission (Network Data Mover
    (NDM)), SWBT processes requests up to six times daily. The data are
    made available for electronic recovery within 24 hours of SWBT's
    receipt of a customer's request. Letter from Austin C. Schlick,
    Kellogg, Huber et al., Counsel for Applicants, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    00-4 at 2 (filed March 10, 2000) (Austin C. Schlick March 10 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^1025]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(i).

[^1026]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^1027]: *Id.* at § 251(b)(2).

[^1028]: *Id.* at § 153(30).

[^1029]: *Id.* at § 251(e)(2); *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; *In the Matter of Telephone
    Number Portability*, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701,
    11702-04 (1998) (*Third Number Portability Order*); *In the Matter
    of Telephone Number Portability*, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and
    Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 95-116, at paras. 1, 6-9
    (Jun. 23, 1999) (*Fourth Number Portability Order*).

[^1030]: *Fourth Number Portability Order* at para. 10; *In re Telephone
    Number Portability*, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12, paras. 110-116 (1996)
    (*First Number Portability Order*); *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    251(b)(2).

[^1031]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.3(b)-(f); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355 and 8399-8404, paras. 3 and 91; *Third
    Number Portability Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11708-12, paras. 12-16.

[^1032]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.29; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 8417-24, paras. 127-140.

[^1033]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.32, 52.33; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *Third Number Portability
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706-07, para. 8; *Fourth Number Portability
    Order* at para. 9.

[^1034]: SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 220-226; Texas Commission
    Texas I Comments at 84.

[^1035]: SWBT Flemming Texas I Aff. at para. 30.; Texas Commission Texas
    I Comments at 84.

[^1036]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 82-86. We also note that
    the Texas Commission established performance measures to capture
    SWBT provision of both permanent and interim number portability. In
    nearly all months, SWBT meets the benchmarks established by the
    Texas Commission for both these measurements. *See* Texas Commission
    Comments at 85; SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data,
    Measurement No. 100 ("Average Time Out of Service for LNP
    Conversions") at 271-No. 99-101, Measurement No. 101 ("Percent Out
    of Service Less than 60 Minutes") at 271-No. 99-101; SWBT Texas 1
    Dysart Aff., Att. A at 122-123 (listing Texas Commission benchmarks
    for Measurements 100 and 101).

[^1037]: Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 8; CLEC Coalition Texas I
    Comments at 44-46.

[^1038]: Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 8.

[^1039]: CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 44.

[^1040]: Based on the Commission's view that section 251(b)(3) does not
    limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of
    dialing parity (i.e., international, interstate, intrastate, or
    local), the Commission adopted rules in August 1996 to implement
    broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing
    parity. *Local Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at
    19407; *Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
    Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers*, CC Docket No. 95-185,
    Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).

[^1041]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^1042]: *Id.* at § 153(15).

[^1043]: 47 C.F.R §§ 51.205, 51.207.

[^1044]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be
    dialed); *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection Between Local
    Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers,
    Area Code Relief Plan for Dallas and Houston Ordered by the Public
    Utilities Commission of Texas, and Administration of the North
    American Numbering Plan*, Second Report and Order and Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 at 19400, 19403 (1996) (*Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*), *vacated in part sub nom.
    People of the State of Cal. v. Federal Communications Commission*,
    124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1997), *rev\'d, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
    Bd*., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^1045]: SWBT Texas I Application at 118; SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at
    paras. 227-230.

[^1046]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 85-86; Final Staff Report
    at 97-98.

[^1047]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 19-20; Pilgrim Texas II Reply
    Comments; 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^1048]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 20 ("\[i\]f a consumer who has
    requested blocking decides to use one of Pilgrim's casual calling
    services, the consumer may unwittingly make calls that could not
    have been dialed over SWBT's network because Pilgrim would not know
    that the customer wanted those calls blocked.").

[^1049]: *Id*.

[^1050]: *See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection Between Local
    Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers,
    Area Code Relief Plan for Dallas and Houston Ordered by the Public
    Utilities Commission of Texas, and Administration of the North
    American Numbering Plan*, Third Order on Reconsideration and
    Memorandum Report and Order, CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 99-243, para.
    37 (1999) (recognizing that "'dialing parity' is a defined term in
    the Act that requires that a customer be able to access the carrier
    of his or her choice without having to use any access codes"); *see
    also* 47 U.S.C. § 153(15).

[^1051]: Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 20; *Local Competition Second
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19400, 19403, para. 15.

[^1052]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^1053]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A).

[^1054]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for
    ISP-Bound Traffic*; *Declaratory Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 at 3706, n.87
    (1999) (*Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic Order*).

[^1055]: *Id.*

[^1056]: *Bell Atlantic v. FCC*, No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2000).

[^1057]: SWBT provides reciprocal compensation to competing carriers for
    the termination of local calls from SWBT customers under approved
    interconnection agreements and tariffs. *See* SWBT Texas I
    Application at 118-119.

[^1058]: With regard to the second requirement, we note that section
    271(c)(2)(A)(i) requires a showing that a BOC \"is providing access
    and interconnection pursuant to one or more agreements . . . or . .
    . is generally offering access and interconnection pursuant to \[an
    SGAT\].\" 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(A)(i).

[^1059]: In its application, SWBT explains that the Texas Commission
    consolidated arbitration's involving several of the largest
    competitive LECs into a single "Mega-Arbitration" proceeding, which
    addressed pricing, interconnection, unbundling, and resale issues.
    The Mega-Arbitration also served as a forum for SWBT to negotiate
    with competitive LECS and the Texas Commission, and subsequently the
    Department of Justice, the framework for SWBT's performance
    monitoring program. SWBT Texas I Application at 3-4.

[^1060]: SWBT Texas I Application at 119.

[^1061]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 111.

[^1062]: SWBT Texas I Application at 119; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    para. 111.

[^1063]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 19.

[^1064]: *Id*. at para. 113.

[^1065]: *Id*.

[^1066]: *Id*.; *see also* SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. T2A Attach. 12,
    Compensation-TX at 2, § 1.2.1.

[^1067]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. T2A Attach. 12, Compensation-TX at
    2-3. "Bill-and-keep" arrangements are those in which neither of two
    interconnecting carriers charges the other to terminate traffic that
    originated on the other carrier's network. Rather, each carrier
    recovers from its own end users the cost of both originating traffic
    delivered to the other network and terminating traffic received from
    the other network. *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 16,045, para. 1096.

[^1068]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 19, 113-122.

[^1069]: *Id*.

[^1070]: *Id*. at para. 120.

[^1071]: *Id*. Pursuant to this option, interexchange traffic, including
    traffic to a third party, is compensated based on applicable access
    charges. Internet-bound traffic is specifically recognized as
    traffic that is bound for a third party, and is to be handled as
    meet-point billed interexchange traffic. Each party would bill the
    third party any applicable access charges for its portion of the
    call. However, internet service providers are exempt from meet-point
    billing under the Commission's Enhanced Service Provider access
    charge exemption. *Id*. at paras. 111, 118-19.

[^1072]: Texas I Commission Comments at 86-87.

[^1073]: *Id*. at 87.

[^1074]: CLEC Coalition Texas 1 Rowling Decl. at para. 46; e.spire Texas
    I Comments at 6; e.spire Texas 1 Falvey Aff. at para. 5.

[^1075]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 122.

[^1076]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 45-46.

[^1077]: Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 28.

[^1078]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 122.

[^1079]: Texas I Commission Comments at 88.

[^1080]: *Id*.

[^1081]: Texas I Commission Comments at 88.

[^1082]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 46.

[^1083]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c), (e)(6); *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.,
    525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^1084]: *Id*.

[^1085]: WorldCom Texas I Comments at 49-50; WorldCom Texas I Price
    Decl. at paras. 19-25.

[^1086]: *See, e.g., In re Public Utility Commission of Texas*, CC
    Docket No. 96-13, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 3460,
    3536, n.384 (1997) (*Texas Memorandum Opinion and Order*) *citing*
    Newton's Telecom Dictionary at 221 (1991); *see also United States
    v. Western Electric*, 569 F.Supp. 990, 1002 n.54 (D.D.C. 1983).

[^1087]: *See, e.g., Texas Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    3536, n.384.

[^1088]: WorldCom Texas I Comments at 49-50; WorldCom Texas I Price
    Decl. at paras. 22-25.

[^1089]: Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 29; *see also* SWBT Texas
    I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 48.

[^1090]: Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 29.

[^1091]: We note that SWBT contends that the EAS additive is not a form
    of reciprocal compensation and is therefore not subject to the
    requirements of section 252(d)(2), but rather is a tool to
    facilitate retail arrangement options between terminating carriers
    and their end users. SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 48.
    For the purpose of this analysis, we assume, but do not decide, that
    these EAS charges constitute a reciprocal compensation arrangement.

[^1092]: Allegiance Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1, Petition of
    Allegiance Telecom of Texas, Inc. for Arbitration at 4 (Allegiance
    Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1).

[^1093]: Allegiance Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1 at 4.

[^1094]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 111.

[^1095]: *Id*.

[^1096]: *Bell Atlantic v. FCC*, No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2000).

[^1097]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).

[^1098]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A).

[^1099]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3).

[^1100]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B).

[^1101]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15966, para. 939; 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(b). The Eighth Circuit
    acknowledged the Commission's authority to promulgate such rules,
    and specifically upheld the sections of the Commission's rules
    concerning resale of promotions and discounts in *Iowa Utilities
    Board*. *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d at 818-19, *aff'd in part
    and remanded on other grounds*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S.
    366 (1999). *See* *also* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.613-51.617.

[^1102]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B).

[^1103]: *Id.*

[^1104]: *See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4046-48, paras. 178-81 (Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory
    access to its OSS ordering functions for resale services and
    therefore provides efficient competitors a meaningful oppportunity
    to compete).

[^1105]: SWBT Texas I Application at 120-122; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff.
    at paras. 126-134, 152.

[^1106]: Texas I Commission Comments at 90.

[^1107]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 20.

[^1108]: *Id*. at para. 128.

[^1109]: *Id*. at para. 152.

[^1110]: *Id*. at paras. 128, 152.

[^1111]: *Id*. at para. 130. Pursuant to Commission rules, incumbent
    LECs do not need to offer for resale short-term promotions of 90
    days or less, as long as such short-term promotions are not used to
    evade the wholesale rate obligation. 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a)(2)(ii).

[^1112]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 134.

[^1113]: *Id*.

[^1114]: SWBT Texas I Application at 120; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh at Aff.
    para. 132. *See also* *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, 14 FCC Rcd
    14712, App. C, Conditions at 15,018-19, paras. 47-49. These
    carrier-to-carrier promotions were created as a result of the
    SBC/Ameritech merger. We concluded in the *SBC/Ameritech Merger
    Order* that such promotions are beneficial because they encourage
    the "rapid development of local competition in residential and less
    dense areas." *Id*. at 14874, para. 390. Additionally, we found that
    the promotions are not discriminatory because they are offered to
    competitors in a nondiscriminatory fashion, allowing all competitive
    LECs in SBC/Ameritech's region to participate. *Id*. at 14916, para.
    497.

[^1115]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 20.

[^1116]: Texas I Commission Comments at 91-92.

[^1117]: SWBT Texas I Application at 120; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    paras. 133-34.

[^1118]: SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 133.

[^1119]: SWBT Texas I Application at 121; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    paras. 133-34.

[^1120]: NALA Texas I Comments at 7-10.

[^1121]: *Id*.

[^1122]: *See, e.g*., SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff., Attach. A, T2A,
    General Terms and Conditions at § 9.0 (Dispute Resolution).

[^1123]: *Id.*

[^1124]: NALA Texas I Comments at 5.

[^1125]: *Id.*

[^1126]: *Id.*

[^1127]: *Id.*

[^1128]: Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd &
    Evans, P.L.L.C., Counsel to SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed March
    17, 2000) (*Schlick March 17 Ex Parte Letter*), Attach. 2 at 1.

[^1129]: *Id.*

[^1130]: *Id.*

[^1131]: *Id.*

[^1132]: *Id.*

[^1133]: *Id.*

[^1134]: *Id.* at 1-2.

[^1135]: *Id.*

[^1136]: *Id.* NALA states that its members purchase SWBT's POTS for
    resale. NALA Texas I Comments at 2-3.

[^1137]: *See* section V.D.2 for a discussion of TRA's assertion that
    SWBT does not make xDSL services available to resellers at wholesale
    rates.

[^1138]: Adelphia Texas I Comments at 1-2.

[^1139]: Allegiance Texas I Comments at 20-23; Allegiance Texas II
    Comments at 2.

[^1140]: e.spire Texas I Comments at 7-10.

[^1141]: KMC Texas I Comments at 2-4.

[^1142]: *See, e.g*., KMC Texas I Comments at 2.

[^1143]: SWBT Texas I Application at 121; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at
    para. 133; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 49-50.

[^1144]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4147-48, paras.
    389-390.

[^1145]: *Id.*

[^1146]: KMC Texas I Comments at 3-4.

[^1147]: *See In re* *Establishment of Rules to Prohibit the Imposition
    of Unjust, Onerous Termination Penalties on Customers Choosing to
    Partake of the Benefits of Local Exchange Telecommunications
    Competition*, Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CC Docket No. 99-142
    (filed Apr. 26, 1999) (requesting that the Commission declare
    unlawful termination penalties imposed by incumbent LECs, to
    prohibit enforcement of incumbent LEC termination penalties, and to
    require the removal of incumbent LEC termination penalties from
    state tariffs until more competition develops).

[^1148]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4148*,* para.
    391.

[^1149]: *See* sections V.B.1 and 2, *supra*.

[^1150]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^1151]: *See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-150, Report and
    Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (*Accounting Safeguards Order*),
    Second Order On Reconsideration, FCC 00-9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000);
    *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and
    272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No.
    96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*), petition for review pending sub nom. SBC Communications v.
    FCC, No. 97-1118 (filed D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (held in abeyance
    May 7, 1997), First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997)
    (*First Order on Reconsideration*), Second Order on Reconsideration,
    12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (*Second Order on Reconsideration*), *aff'd
    sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC*, 131 F.3d 1044
    (D.C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel.
    Oct. 4, 1999) (*Third Order on Reconsideration*).

[^1152]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^1153]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914, paras.
    15-16; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para. 346.

[^1154]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.

[^1155]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20785-20786
    at para. 322; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153,
    para. 402.

[^1156]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.

[^1157]: Section 272(a) states that a BOC may not provide certain
    services except through one or more affiliates that meet the
    requirements of section 272(b). *See* 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(1)(B).

[^1158]: For the purposes of its application to provide in-region
    interLATA services in Texas, we only address SWBT's section 272
    showing with respect to one affiliate, SBCS. We note that SWBT has
    several other section 272 affiliates as a result of its mergers:
    Southern New England Telephone Enhanced Services, Inc. (SNET
    Enhanced Services); Ameritech Communications, Inc. (ACI); Ameritech
    Communications, Inc. of Illinois (ACoI); and Ameritech
    Communications, Inc. of Wisconsin (ACoW). Our findings do not apply
    to Advanced Services, Inc. (ASI) because ASI is not a section 272
    affiliate. *See* Rhythms Comments at 62-63. For a complete
    description of SWBT's corporate affiliates and an organizational
    chart, *see* SBC Communications, Inc.[, Cost Allocation
    Manual]{.smallcaps}, § IV (Dec. 16, 1999).

[^1159]: SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 20.

[^1160]: SWBT Application at 69-70; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 51-57
    (describing SWBT's section 272 compliance efforts, such as a
    centralized Oversight Team, corporate policies, and training
    programs), Attach. E (submitting corporate memoranda outlining
    section 272 compliance requirements), F (submitting corporate
    memoranda describing compliance oversight team), and G (submitting
    section 272 training video), and H (submitting corporate section 272
    compliance program); SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 70, Attach. U
    (submitting compliance policy of SBCS). In addition, SWBT states
    that it will provide refresher training on section 272 compliance
    upon earning section 271 approval. SWBT Application at 69-70.

[^1161]: SWBT Application at 63-64 (citing SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras.
    9-19; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 17-21).

[^1162]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(2); 47 C.F.R. 53.203(b); *Accounting
    Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17617-18, para. 167; *Second
    BellSouth Lousiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20786-89, paras. 323-29;
    *see* SWBT Application at 64.

[^1163]: SWBT Ex parte (Jan. 19, 2000). In its ex parte filing, SWBT
    stated that it section 272 affiliate shares its chart of accounts
    with other non-BOC SBC affiliates. In addition, SWBT describes the
    security measures and other internal controls to show restricted
    access to the books, records, and accounts of its section 272
    affiliate. *See* SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 9-12.

[^1164]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(c); *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20730-31, para. 360; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20789-90, paras. 329-30;
    SWBT Application at 64; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at para. 19, Attach. B
    (submitting names of corporate officers and directors); SWBT Weckel
    Aff. at paras. 31-41, Attach. D-Q (listing names of relevant
    officers and directors), Attach. R (submitting corporate policy
    prohibiting loans of employees).

[^1165]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(d); *Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 21995, paras. 189-90; *see* SWBT
    Application at 65; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 42-44; SWBT Rehmer
    Aff. at paras. at 20-21.

[^1166]: Because SBC Communications owns and controls eight BOCs (i.e.,
    SWBT, Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and the five Ameritech Operating
    Companies) and a total of five section 272 affiliates, we clarify
    that our analysis in this order is limited only to SWBT, which is
    the BOC operating in Texas, and SBCS, which is the section 272
    affiliate through which SBC Communications plans to provide
    in-region interLATA services in Texas. We note, however, that SBC
    must comply with all section 272 safeguards with respect to any
    transactions between any SBC-owned or controlled BOC and any section
    272 affiliate. This would require, for example, SBCS to ensure that
    any transactions with Pacific Bell or the Ameritech operating
    companies are reduced to writing and made available for public
    inspection in accordance with the Commission's rules. *See* ARMIS
    43-02 USOA Report, Table I-2 (demonstrating that Pacific Bell
    provided SBCS with approximately \$5.27 million worth of services in
    1999).

[^1167]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(e).

[^1168]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94, para.
    122; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20734-37, paras.
    366-73; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95,
    paras. 331-40.

[^1169]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 32.27; *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 17616-17, para. 166; *see Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95, paras. 331-39.

[^1170]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20791-92,
    para. 335; *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at paras. 411-12. In their
    Automated Reporting Management Information System (ARMIS) reports,
    the BOCs provide summary information about their transactions with
    nonregulated affiliates. *See* ARMIS 43-02 USOA Report, Table I-2,
    B-4. In their CAMs, the BOCs disclose the nature, terms, and
    frequency of their anticipated affiliate transactions. *See* 47
    C.F.R. § 64.903; *see also* SBC Communications, Inc., [Cost
    Allocation Manual]{.smallcaps}, § V (Dec. 16, 1999). Pursuant to the
    Commission's Part 64 accounting safeguards, all the BOCs receive
    annual audits of their ARMIS data performed by an independent
    auditor. 47 C.F.R. § 64.904. In addition, the Commission regularly
    reviews the CAMs and the audit materials related to the independent
    audits, which show the actual dollar amount of affiliate
    transactions that occurred during the audited period.

[^1171]: SWBT Application at 65; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 15-24; SWBT
    Weckel Aff. at paras. 45-70; *see* ARMIS 43-02 USOA Report, Table
    I-2 (demonstrating that SWBT provided SBCS with approximately \$
    3.44 million worth of services in 1999).

[^1172]: SWBT Ex parte (Mar. 3, 2000). To review an applicant's showing
    for section 272(b)(5), the Commission examines publicly-available
    accounting and financial data, as well as confidential material
    obtained through the course of routine audits of a BOC's Part 64
    CAM. Our preliminary review of these materials revealed a potential
    discrepancy between the dollar amounts of certain services posted on
    the Internet and disclosed through the audit materials. In response
    to Commission inquiry, SWBT explained that there is a lag time in
    the true-up process it uses to reconcile its accounting records,
    more detailed billing records, and its Internet postings. More
    importantly, SWBT demonstrated that the transactions at issue were
    properly posted, and that the discrepancy applied only to the total
    dollar value of the services. We therefore conclude that the
    discrepancy did not affect the fundamental showing of compliance
    with the section 272(b)(5) disclosure requirements.

[^1173]: SWBT Ex parte (Mar. 7, 2000) (submitting additional information
    to show that SBCS posted the transfer of \$25 million worth of
    switching equipment to the BOC).

[^1174]: *Id.*

[^1175]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 17-23.

[^1176]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 21 (citing SWBT Temporary Projects
    at
    \<http://www.sbc.com/PublicAffairs/PublicPolicy/Regulatory/affdocs/1619-2.doc\>).

[^1177]: *See id.* at paras. 18-20 (addressing the lack of detail
    contained in Official Communications Services and General Agreement
    for Support Services).

[^1178]: Almost all of SBCS's Internet postings contain the detail
    required by the Commission's rules, including the rates, terms,
    conditions, frequency, the number and type of personnel, and the
    level of expertise of the personnel performing the services. *See
    Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94, para. 122;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20734-37, paras. 366-73;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95, paras.
    331-39; *see also* SWBT Reply at 71.

[^1179]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794-95,
    paras. 338-40; *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17592,
    para. 119; 47 C.F.R. § 32.27.

[^1180]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 32-37.

[^1181]: *See* SWBT Larkin Reply Aff. at para. 8.

[^1182]: AT&T Kargoll Decl. at paras. 32, 36-37 (citing SWBT Larkin Aff.
    at Attachment C, para. 5). Specifically, SWBT requires third parties
    to sign a nondisclosure agreement in order to review SWBT's detailed
    billing information. *See* AT&T Kargoll Decl. at para. 32. SWBT's
    nondisclosure agreement, however, prohibits any party that
    identifies potential discrimination from disclosing the evidence to
    a regulatory agency until SWBT has had 30 days to explain "and/or
    make any changes." *Id.* at para. 36.

[^1183]: SWBT Larkin Reply Aff. at para. 8 (stating that the
    nondisclosure agreement has addressed two third party reviews of the
    Internet postings, and that neither such review has resulted in
    complaints to regulatory agencies).

[^1184]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(2).

[^1185]: SWBT has a "shared services affiliate" that provides services
    to members of the corporate family. SWBT Rehmer Aff. at para. 29,
    Attach. C (describing services provided by SWBT's shared services
    affiliate to the SWBT section 272 affiliate). The Commission's
    accounting safeguards allow certain accounting treatment for
    services provided by a shared services affiliate to members of the
    corporate family, so long as the shared services affiliate only
    conducts business with members of the corporate family. *See
    Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17607-608, para. 148.

[^1186]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(d); 47 C.F.R. § 53.209-213; *see* SWBT
    Application at 67-68; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 38-44; SWBT Weckel
    Aff. at paras. 71-73.

[^1187]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(d)(1).

[^1188]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17629, para. 198.

[^1189]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17631, para. 203;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794, para. 338;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order* at para. 416.

[^1190]: *See* Covad Reply at 19 (raising concerns about the
    relationship between SWBT's affiliates).

[^1191]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 21997-17, para. 195; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd 20796-800, paras. 341-50. The Commission found that the
    nondiscrimination safeguards extend to any good, service, facility,
    or information that a BOC provides to its section 272 affiliate,
    including administrative services and other non-telecommunications
    goods and services. *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    22003-04, para. 210. The Commission interprets the section 272(c)
    nondiscrimination safeguards broadly. *See id*. at 22003, 22007,
    22012, 22015-016.

[^1192]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22000-01,
    para. 202.

[^1193]: SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 17 (noting that SBCS may negotiate
    at arm's length to obtain collocation space), 31 (describing
    procedures for the establishment of company-specific standards),
    Attach. G (addressing, in training video, procedures for collocation
    and establishing interal standards for products and services).

[^1194]: *See* discussion *supra* Sections IV.B.1.c, e-f; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 20799, para. 346.

[^1195]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 39 (citing *Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21998, para. 197).

[^1196]: AT&T Comments at 87; AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 38, n.33. AT&T
    contends that SWBT's proposed intrastate switched access tariff
    violated the nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272(c)(1) by
    allowing a series of discounts targetted to small volume
    interexchange carriers. AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 338-48.

[^1197]: SWBT Reply at 74.

[^1198]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 22018-22, paras. 239-45*; Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20800-01, paras. 348-50; *see* SWBT
    Application at 68-69. SWBT demonstrates that it will provide
    accurate data regarding actual service intervals so that
    unaffiliated parties can evaluate the performance SWBT provides
    itself and its affiliates and compare such performance to the
    service quality SWBT provides to competing carriers. SWBT Rehmer
    Aff. at 33-39, Attach. D (submitting report format for section
    272(e)(1) reporting requirements).

[^1199]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(2).

[^1200]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(3), (e)(4); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20802-03, paras. 353-55; *see* SWBT
    Application at 68-69; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 40-47; SWBT Larkin
    Aff. at paras. 15-24.

[^1201]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 40.

[^1202]: SWBT Reply at 74.

[^1203]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(g)(1); *see* SWBT Application at 69; SWBT
    Rehmer Aff. at para. 50; SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 80.

[^1204]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(g)(2); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20804, para. 357; *see* SWBT Application at 69; SWBT
    Rehmer Aff. at para. 50; SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 80.

[^1205]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^1206]: In addition, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that
    would have stipulated that full implementation of the checklist
    necessarily satisfies the public interest criterion. *See Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747 at para. 360-366; *see also*
    141 Cong. Rec. S7971, S8043 (June. 8, 1995).

[^1207]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06,
    para. 360 (the public interest analysis may include consideration of
    "whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant
    telecommunications markets").

[^1208]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).

[^1209]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(d).

[^1210]: *See, e.g.*, AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; WorldCom Texas I
    Comments at 57-61; Sprint Texas I Comments at 74-78; Sprint Texas II
    Comments at 48.

[^1211]: *See* Sprint Texas I Comments at 74-78; Allegiance Texas I
    Comments at 13; AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; WorldCom Texas I
    Comments at 57-61.

[^1212]: *See* AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; *but see* SWBT Texas II
    Reply at 76.

[^1213]: *See* AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; WorldCom Texas I Comments at
    60; Sprint Texas I Comments at 75-76; Sprint Texas II Comments at
    48-49.

[^1214]: *See* WorldCom Texas I Comments at 58-59.

[^1215]: *Id.* at 61.

[^1216]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4163, para.
    427. This is consistent with the Commission's approach in prior
    section 271 orders. *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20585, para. 77.

[^1217]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4164, para.
    428.

[^1218]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806;
    *see Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747.

[^1219]: These mechanisms are generally administered by state
    commissions and derive from authority the states have under state
    law or under the federal Act. As such, these mechanisms can serve as
    critical complements to the Commission's authority to preserve
    checklist compliance pursuant to section 271(d)(6). Moreover, in
    this instance, we find that the extensive collaborative process by
    which these mechanisms were developed and modified in Texas has
    itself helped to bring SWBT into checklist compliance.

[^1220]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806.

[^1221]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para.
    430. The Commission's enforcement powers include, among other
    penalties, suspension or revocation of section 271 approval. 47
    U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^1222]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para.
    430; SWBT Texas I Application at 45-47.

[^1223]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 25.

[^1224]: Since the Texas I Application was filed more measurements have
    been added, notably in measuring performance relating to DSL-capable
    loops and interconnection. *See* Texas Commission Texas II *ex
    parte* letter of June 19, 2000 at 1-5; Texas Commission Texas II
    Reply Comments at 1-3.

[^1225]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 46.

[^1226]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 46. The performance
    measurements in the two tiers overlap substantially, with 41 of the
    47 Tier-2 measurements also counted as Tier-1 measurements. SWBT
    Texas I Reply Comments at 86.

[^1227]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 9.

[^1228]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 15.

[^1229]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para.
    433.

[^1230]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para.
    433. This prediction was based on five characteristics: potential
    liability that provides a meaningful and significant incentive to
    comply with the designated performance standards;
    clearly-articulated, pre-determined measures and standards, which
    encompass a comprehensive range of carrier-to-carrier performance; a
    reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction poor
    performance when it occurs; a self-executing mechanism that does not
    leave the door open unreasonably to litigation and appeal; and
    reasonable assurances that the reported data is accurate. *Id*. at
    433.

[^1231]: *See Ameritech Michigan* Order, 12 FCC 20741-51, para. 393.

[^1232]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 98-111.

[^1233]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 106.

[^1234]: *Id.* at 106.

[^1235]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para 52. SWBT set the cap at \$289
    million annually in response to concerns that SWBT's earlier cap was
    too low. The cap is based on 36% of SWBT's net return, and will be
    recalculated annually, but will never exceed \$289 million or go
    below \$225 million. The cap is comparable to the cap we deemed
    adequate for Bell Atlantic in New York. *See Bell Atlantic New York*
    *Order* at para. 436 n.1332.

[^1236]: *See* ALTS Texas I Comments at 49-50, 57; AT&T Texas I Comments
    at 96; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 66-67, 74-75 (Overall cap is
    meaningless gesture because it can't be reached short of SWBT
    shutting down or disconnecting every actual or potential competitive
    LEC customer.) *See also Bell Atlantic* *New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd
    at 4168-69, para. 437 ("\[A\]n overall liability amount would be
    meaningless if there is no likelihood that payments would approach
    this amount, even in instances of widespread performance failure.").
    We note that SWBT may commence a show-cause proceeding if SWBT's
    Tier 1 payments to an individual competitive LEC exceed \$3 million
    in a month, or payments exceed \$10 million to all competitive LECs
    in a given month. Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 108. *See
    also* ALTS Texas II Reply Comments at 18-19.

[^1237]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4167, para.
    435.

[^1238]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4169*,* para. 438;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806, para. 363.

[^1239]: *See, e.g.,* ALTS Texas I Comments at 56; AT&T Texas I Comments
    at 97; AT&T Pfau/DeYoung Decl. at 167-68; CLEC Coalition Texas I
    Comments at 42-44; Covad Texas I Comments at 63; WorldCom Texas I
    Comments at 73-74; NorthPoint Texas I Comments at 2, 9.

[^1240]: SWBT Texas I Reply at 19-27; SWBT Dysart Texas I Reply Aff. at
    paras. 11, 18, 21, 22; Austin C. Schlick Feb. 4 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^1241]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 111. As of January 10,
    2000 SWBT tracked data in 1,874 submeasures. SWBT Texas I Brief
    Attach. 2 at 5.

[^1242]: Covad Goodpastor Texas I Reply Decl. at 4. *See also* Texas
    Commission Texas II Comments at 1-4; Texas Commission Texas II Reply
    Comments

[^1243]: *See* discussion under checklist item 1. The Texas Commission
    provides a forum for ongoing modification and improvement of the
    performance metrics. The Texas Commission reports that "a six month
    review process is in place to assure that the plan is not static in
    nature. The Texas Commission, in conjunction with SWBT and the
    competitive LECs, will engage in comprehensive review of the
    performance measures to determine if commercial experience indicates
    that changes are necessary." Texas Commission Texas I Comments at
    105. The six-month review process began in April 2000. *See* Texas
    Commission Texas II Comments at 1-4; Texas Commission Texas II Reply
    Comments at 1-3. *Cf. Bell Atlantic New York Order* at para. 438 and
    nn.1338-1339 (New York Commission's steps to ensure that metrics
    will continue to be developed and refined).

[^1244]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4169, para.
    438.

[^1245]: *See, e.g.,* WorldCom Texas I Comments at 69.

[^1246]: *Id.* at 69-70.

[^1247]: *See* Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 106-111*; see also
    Bell Atlantic* *New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4170-71, para. 440.

[^1248]: *See* SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 53; *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para. 441.

[^1249]: *See* SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 12-13.

[^1250]: Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 108. If SWBT delivers
    non-compliant performance for three consecutive months on at least
    20% of the measures reported, but SWBT has not incurred more than
    \$1 million in damages payable to the competitive LEC, the
    competitive LEC may commence an expedited dispute resolution
    proceeding to demonstrate why additional damages are appropriate. If
    SWBT's Tier 1 payments to an individual competitive LEC exceed \$3
    million in a month, or payments exceed \$10 million to all
    competitive LECs in a given month, upon timely completion of a
    show-cause proceeding, SWBT must pay the balance of damages owed.
    *Id.; see also* SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. Attach. H at 8.

[^1251]: AT&T Texas I Comments at 96; *see also* CompTel Texas I
    Comments at 19-20.

[^1252]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para. 441.

[^1253]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 5.

[^1254]: Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 5; AT&T Texas I
    Comments at 78.

[^1255]: *See* Allegiance Texas I Comments at 13; AT&T Pfau & DeYoung
    Aff. at para. 15, 25, 56-58; BlueStar Texas I at 5-6; WorldCom Texas
    I Comments at 33-34; Sprint Texas I Comments at 74-76.

[^1256]: SWBT Texas I Reply Comments at 81.

[^1257]: SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 76.

[^1258]: Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 105, n.607. We applaud
    the Texas Commission's ongoing commitment to strengthening the Plan,
    and do not interpret such efforts to call into question the Texas
    Commission's endorsement of the Plan as filed.

[^1259]: *See* SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 1.0 (providing for
    SWBT to collect, analyze, and report performance data).

[^1260]: *See Accounting for Judgments and Other Costs Associated with
    Litigation*, 12 FCC Rcd 5112 (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 7370(d). As a
    general matter, a carrier's operating expenses recovered through its
    rates must be legitimate costs of providing adequate service to
    ratepayers. *See, e.g.,* *West Ohio Gas Co. v. PUC*, 294 U.S. 63, 74
    (1935); *Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 939 F.2d 1035,
    1044 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

[^1261]: In the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, the Commission held that
    bill credits provided under the performance assurance plan arising
    from that order "shall not be reflected in the revenue requirement
    of an SBC/Ameritech incumbent LEC." *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*
    App. C at para. 34.

[^1262]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order* 15 FCC Rcd at 4172-73, para.
    443.

[^1263]: For example, several commenters suggest that misconduct of
    SWBT, such as intransigence, delaying tactics, perpetual litigation
    (and sanctionable tactics during litigation, such as destruction of
    or withholding documents), and the refusal to pay reciprocal
    compensation, undermines confidence in SWBT's post-grant conduct.
    *See* Sprint Texas I Comments at 78; BlueStar Texas I Comments at 6;
    Allegiance Texas I Comments at 14-16; Connect Texas I Comments at
    6-8; e.spire Texas I Comments at 6; CompTel Texas I Comments at 9;
    AT&T Texas I Comments at 89-95; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 62-63;
    Covad Texas I Comments at 49-50, 58, 60-62; NALA/PCA Texas I
    Comments at 3.

[^1264]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20749, para.
    396.

[^1265]: We emphasize that grant of this application *does not* reflect
    any conclusion that SWBT's conduct in the individual instances cited
    by commenters is nondiscriminatory and complies with the company's
    obligations under the Communications Act.

[^1266]: "Project Pronto" is a SBC network upgrade that will employ
    fiber optic cable and remote terminals to provide xDSL-capable
    services to customers that are out of reach of a central office
    digital subscriber line access multiplexers (DSLAMs). SWBT
    represents that it will offer competitors nondiscriminatory access
    to the xDSL facilities being deployed in remote terminals. SWBT
    Texas II Reply Brief at 26-27; CompTel Texas II Comments at 5-8;
    AT&T Texas II Comments at 23-24; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl.
    at paras. 54-69; AT&T Reply Comments at 15-18; Rhythms Texas II
    Comments at 9-10.

[^1267]: Rhythms Comments at 9.

[^1268]: SWBT Auinbauh and Lube Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 6-8,
    22-35.

[^1269]: A number of parties have raised issues concerning Project
    Pronto in a number of proceedings before us. *See, e.g., Line
    Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (recons. pending); *UNE Remand
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 3696 (recons. pending); Letter from Paul K.
    Mancini, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, SBC
    Communications, Inc., to Lawrence E. Strickling, Chief, Common
    Carrier Bureau (Feb. 15, 2000) (\"SBC Waiver Request\"); Common
    Carrier Bureau Seeks Comment on SBC\'s Request for Interpretation,
    Waiver, or Modification of the SBC/Ameritech Merger Conditions, CC
    Docket No. 98-141, ASD File No. 99-49, Public Notice, DA 00-335
    (rel. Feb. 18, 2000).

[^1270]: *See* ALTS Texas I Comments at 62-65; e.spire Texas I Comments
    at 8-10; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 20-23 urging "fresh look"
    for retail customers only. *See also* part V.N, *infra*, for
    discussion of "fresh look" argument.

[^1271]: *See* Allegiance Texas I Comments at 17-18; ALTS Texas I
    Comments at 50-55; DSL.net Texas I Comments at 9; ALTS Texas II
    Reply Comments at 20-22.

[^1272]: Texas Commission Texas I Reply Comments at 27. The Texas
    Commission states that the legislation adopts a more aggressive
    timeframe, allowing an offering to go into the market after a 10 day
    notice to the Texas Commission and to all companies that have an
    effective interconnection agreement with SWBT. The Texas Commission
    believes that this procedural change is consistent with a more
    competitive marketplace and has accelerated its review of such
    offerings in order to reflect this change. *Id.* at 27.

[^1273]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^1274]: *See generally U S WEST Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 177 F.3d
    1057, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that a central purpose of
    section 271 is to create incentives for BOCs to open local markets
    to competition), *cert. denied*, 120 S.Ct. 1240 (2000).

[^1275]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174, para. 446.

[^1276]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174-77,
    paras. 446-453.

[^1277]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A)(iii); *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4175-76, paras. 448-451.

[^1278]: In New York, for example, the New York Public Service
    Commission and the Commission responded quickly with a coordinated,
    two-pronged enforcement response when Bell Atlantic developed
    performance problems associated with lost or mishandled orders for
    unbundled network elements submitted electronically by its local
    service competitors. *See Order Directing Market Adjustments and
    Amending Performance Assurance,* Case OO-C-0008/9 and Case 99-C-0949
    (New York PSC, Mar. 23, 2000); *Bell Atlantic-New York,
    Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York*, File No.
    EB-00-IH-0085, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413 (2000) (adopting consent
    decree between Commission and Bell Atlantic that included provisions
    for Bell Atlantic to make a voluntary payment of \$3,000,000 to the
    United States Treasury, additional payments if Bell Atlantic failed
    to meet specified performance standards, and weekly reporting
    requirements to gauge Bell Atlantic's performance in correcting the
    problems associated with its electronic ordering systems); Letter
    from David H. Solomon, Chief, FCC Enforcement Bureau to Edward D.
    Young, III, Senior Vice President -- Regulatory, Bell Atlantic,
    dated June 20, 2000 (advising Bell Atlantic that it appears to the
    Commission to have met the requisite performance standards and that,
    in the absence of new information indicating that Bell Atlantic's
    performance reports are materially inaccurate, Bell Atlantic's
    obligations under the Consent Decree have terminated).

[^1279]: SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 10-17, 51-247; Texas Commission OSS
    Evaluation Master Test Plan § 2.2.

[^1280]: SWBT provides competitive LECs with several
    application-to-application interfaces based on an SWBT proprietary
    protocol or on the Electronic Data Interchange/Common Object Request
    Broker Architecture (EDI/CORBA) protocol, as well as graphical user
    interfaces (GUIs), available from SWBT's Toolbar Platform (Toolbar).
    SWBT Ham. Aff. at paras. 46-48. SWBT's Toolbar Platform provides
    access to multiple GUI applications using a single standard User ID
    and password. *Id.* Specifically, SWBT's Toolbar provides access to
    Verigate (for preordering), LEX (for ordering), Order Status (for
    checking status of orders), Provisioning Order Status (for checking
    provisioning status of pending orders), Trouble Administration (for
    repair and maintenance) and Bill Information (for billing). The
    Toolbar provides for automated software updates over the user's
    network connection. *Id.*

[^1281]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 52; Master Test Plan at § 4.3.5.1.
    Pre-ordering functions that SWBT makes available to competitive LECs
    include: address verification; access to customer service records,
    customer service inquiries, directory listings and Directory
    Assistance; service and feature availability, access to telephone
    number assignment, due date availability, dispatch requirements,
    Primary Interexchange Carrier (PIC) and Local Primary IntraLATA
    Carrier (LPIC) list, Access to Common Language Location Identifier
    for the serving central office; Channel facility assignment
    verification for UNEs. *Id.*

[^1282]: SWBT Ham Aff. at 51-53

[^1283]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 53. SWBT provides a table listing which
    preordering functions and the capabilities that are available in
    each system. *Id.*

[^1284]: EASE is SWBT's proprietary interface that competing LECs can
    use for preordering and ordering of resale services for residential
    customers with up to five lines and for business customers with up
    to thirty lines. It is the same system used by SWBT's own retail
    service representatives. SWBT Application at 82; SWBT Ham Aff. at
    paras. 5, 31-32. According to SWBT, EASE integrates ordering and
    pre-ordering functions into a single application and provides
    competitive LEC resellers the same access to ordering capabilities
    for resale services that are available to SWBT's retail service
    representatives. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 55.

[^1285]: DataGate is an application-to-application electronic interface
    that provides competing carriers with pre-ordering functionality for
    resale services and UNEs. SWBT designed DataGate to be used by
    competing LECs that have their own software programs or
    applications. It allows competing LECs to connect their mechanized
    OSS directly to SWBT's systems, thereby minimizing the need for
    manual entry of data. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 60. SWBT states that
    the competing LECs can integrate DataGate with SWBT's EDI Gateway to
    provide an integrated pre-ordering and ordering system. *Id*. For a
    discussion of the integratability of these interfaces, *see*
    discussion *infra* at Section V.B.1.

[^1286]: Verigate is a graphical user interface (GUI) operating on
    Windows.™ Verigate provides competitive LECs access to pre-ordering
    functions available from SWBT's "back office" systems (those systems
    not directly accessed by service SWBT's or competitive LEC
    representatives, but are accessed only through the systems used by
    those representatives). SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 57. SWBT states that
    Verigate was designed for competing carriers that want to use the
    EDI or LEX ordering interfaces, but do not want to develop their own
    software programs required for use of DataGate or EDI/CORBA.

[^1287]: Like DataGate, SWBT's EDI/CORBA is an
    application-to-application interface that supports both resale
    services and UNEs.^?^ According to SWBT, EDI/CORBA for pre-ordering
    can be integrated with SWBT's EDI Ordering Gateway. SWBT Application
    at 82l. *See* SWBT Texas Model Interconnection Agreement Attach. 2 §
    2, Attach 7 §§ 2,4; SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 51-70.

[^1288]: SORD is the same electronic interface that SWBT's retail
    service representatives use to create, edit distribute, and control
    requests for changes to customer's services and account records.
    SORD enables competing carriers to perform all ordering functions
    for resold services and unbundled network elements. SWBT Ham Aff. at
    paras. 85-88. These functions include certain complex ordering
    functions for those resold services and unbundled network elements
    that EASE, EDI, and LEX cannot handle. *Id.* SORD, however, is a
    more complex system because it is not English language-based. *Id.*
    at para. 87.

[^1289]: LEX is a graphical user interface (GUI) that is based upon
    national Ordering and Billing Forum (OBF)/LSR guidelines. It allows
    competing LECs to electronically submit requests to SWBT for both
    local resale service and UNEs. LEX supports UNE combinations LEX
    also enables competitive LECs to receive acknowledgments and
    notification of error details from SWBT, and to track the status of
    their orders. *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 74-99. SWBT provides a
    list of ordering/provisioning functions and the capabilities
    available in each system. *Id.* at para. 75.

[^1290]: SWBT's EDI Gateway provides an electronic interface that
    conform to the Ordering and Billing Forum/Telecommunications
    Interface Forum (OBF/TCIF) national guidelines. It supports the
    ordering and provisioning of both resale and UNEs and can be
    integrated with either DataGate or EDI/CORBA to provide an
    integrated preordering and ordering system. Both EDI and LEX support
    the same types of orders for resale services and UNEs. For resale
    services, LEX and EDI enables the competitive LECs to perform
    conversions, new connects, changes of service, disconnects, and
    suspend order requests. For unbundled network elements, LEX and
    SWBT's EDI Gateway allows competing carriers to submit conversions,
    new connects, changes of service, disconnects, outside moves, and
    record changes orders for unbundled local loops, interim number
    portability, number portability and switch ports. SWBT Ham. Aff. at
    paras. 90, 96. SWBT states that additional electronic interfaces are
    available to order local interconnection trunks, unbundled dedicated
    transport, and to check the status of service orders. SWBT Ham Aff.
    at para. 74.

[^1291]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 98.

[^1292]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 74. SWBT provides a list of
    ordering/provisioning functions and the capabilities available in
    each system. *Id*. at para 75.

[^1293]: SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 48.

[^1294]: SWBT Ham. Aff. at paras. 138, 166-167. SWBT Conway Aff. at
    para. 48. LASR edits are based on LSR field entries as required by
    OBF and SWBT's internal business rules. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 138.

[^1295]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 138. If the LSR contains a "Super Fatal"
    error such as a missing "Company Code" or "Purchase Order Number,"
    the competing LEC is required to send a new request with
    corrections. *Id.* If the LSR contains a "Fatal Error" the competing
    LEC can correct the error via a supplemental request. *Id.* An LSR
    containing errors is sent back to the competitive LEC across the
    same mechanism it was received. MASTER TEST PLAN at § 2.2.2.3.

[^1296]: FOLDERS stores the LSR and displays a MOG indicator if the LSR
    was also sent to the MOG. FOLDERS is used by LSC service
    representatives to view LSRs and reports generated during the
    processing of competing carriers' requests. SWBT Ham. Aff. at para.
    168.

[^1297]: LSR/DSS is a workload distribution tool utilized by the LSC for
    handling manual processes. SWBT Ham. Aff. at para. 169.

[^1298]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 169. *See* SWBT Ham Aff., Attachment X-1
    for a list of MOG-eligible service.

[^1299]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 140. SWBT states that for LSRs that
    cannot be mechanically generated, competing carriers can use SORD,
    the same system that the LSC service representatives would use on
    behalf of the competitor to manually create those orders that are
    not currently MOG-eligible. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 143.

[^1300]: SWBT Ham. Aff. at para 170. A list of MOG fatal errors are
    listed in the LSOR.

[^1301]: SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 48. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 170. If
    the non-fatal error was caused by the competing LEC, the LSC service
    representative manually inputs a reject notification via the LASR
    GUI. If the non-fatal error was caused by SWBT's internal processes
    that do not impact competing LEC entries on the LSR, the LSC service
    representative will create the service order in EASE (if resale) or
    in SORD. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 170.

[^1302]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 148. SWBT states that it developed a
    graphical user interface to allow LSC to electronically return
    manual rejects as an interim measure until it can move LSR
    resolvable error detection capability to LASR. *Id.*

[^1303]: *Id.* at para. 152.

[^1304]: Master Test Plan at § 2.2.2.4 SORD provides the service order
    distribution and assignment processing and associated information.
    SORD also provides the FOC and SOC notification to the competing
    carrier via LASR or EDI or LEX, whichever mechanism in which it was
    received. *Id.* at § 2.2.2.6

[^1305]: When a SORD error prevents SORD from distributing the order,
    the LSC representative electronically sends a reject notification to
    the requesting carrier. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 147.

[^1306]: SWBT Ham Aff. at 140-142. SORD has a separate editing process
    for service orders. Those edits that are translated and programmed
    in LASR and MOG as fatal edits can also be programmed by the
    competing carrier into its own side of the EDI Gateway.

[^1307]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para 121.

[^1308]: SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 141, 144, 154. A typical LSR creates
    multiple orders. For example, the process to convert a retail/resale
    end user to UNE-P requires the creation of three separate orders
    from the LSR: The "D" order is issued to disconnect the CRIS billing
    for either the SWBT end user or the competitive LEC resale customer;
    the "C" order is issued to provision the UNE element(s) as the
    competing carrier specifies on the LSR; and establishes CABS billing
    for the UNE element. A CRIS "N" order is issued to keep Directory
    Listings and E911 in sync and to migrate those listings to competing
    LECs.^?^ All firm order confirmation (FOC) criteria must be met
    before a FOC is returned to the competing carrier. This would
    include matches on the following fields: the LSR number, telephone
    numbers, circuit IDs, or ported numbers. *Id.*

[^1309]: Conway Aff. at para. 42; Ham Aff. at para. 151.

[^1310]: Ham. Aff. at para. 151; *see also* Southwestern Bell Accessible
    Letter---Jeopardy Notification Mapping Update, No. CLESS00=035
    (dated Mar. 12, 1999) (SWBT Mar. 12, 1999 Accessible Letter). SWBT
    implemented this electronic jeopardy notification process in May
    1999.

[^1311]: SWBT implemented this manual jeopardy notification process on
    January 15, 2000. Prior to this time, if a jeopardy condition
    occurred after a FOC had been sent back to the competing LEC, SWBT
    would send a post-FOC reject to the competing carrier via LASR GUI.

[^1312]: Ham Aff. at paras. 151-152; Southwestern Bell Accessible
    Letter---Final Requirements Exception Request for January 15, 2000
    Release at 1 & Attach. 2 (dated Dec. 20, 1999) (SWBT Dec. 20, 1999
    (Accessible Letter); *see also* Southwestern Bell Accessible
    Letter---Final Requirements for June 26^th^ Release (dated Mar. 31,
    1999) (SWBT Mar. 31, 1999 Accessible Letter). Other manual jeopardy
    codes include: (1) verify address or provide nearby TN; (2) account
    already converted---send cancel; (3) invalid CFA; (4) invalid
    feature detail; (5) invalid TN; (6) invalid due date; (7) duplicate
    LSR; (8) account not eligible for conversion; (9) invalid feature;
    (10) EU name and TN do not match; (11) provide driving instructions;
    (12) duplicate circuit ID; (13) busy cable ID and channel pair.

[^1313]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 159. The completion phase is
    accomplished mechanically by SORD when all orders for a request are
    completed and the SOC criteria are met, including matches for LSR
    number, telephone numbers, circuit IDs, or ported numbers. *Id.*

[^1314]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 122. POS is a graphical user interface
    application that is launched from SWBT's toolbar. *Id.* POS displays
    the status of an order as it relates to the provisioning/dispatching
    process. *Id.* at para. 123.

[^1315]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 122. SWBT provides competing carriers
    access to its OSS systems through its Toolbar that serves as a
    single launching point for access to multiple application using a
    single standard User ID and password. *Id.* at para 47. The Toolbar
    provides for automated software updates over the user's network
    connection. *Id.*

[^1316]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 115.

[^1317]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 144.

[^1318]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 145.

[^1319]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 145 and 159 (the SOC is sent
    "once the work for the service order is physically completed").

[^1320]: *See* SWBT Ham Decl. at para. 197; *see also* SWBT Ham Reply
    Aff. at para. 73 (the "D" order "will disconnect the old service.").

[^1321]: SWBT identified this as the cause for 8 end users losing dial
    tone while being converted to AT&T UNE-P service in August and
    September 1999. *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 71 (for these
    UNE-P orders, "the \[related field identifiers\] were not properly
    placed on the service order by SWBT's Local Service Center . . .
    representatives after the orders fell out for manual handling.").

[^1322]: SWBT reports that over 95% of UNE-P orders submitted
    electronically via EDI "flow throuh" its ordering systems without
    manual handling. *See* \[discussion in Ordering section\].

[^1323]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Decl. at para. 73 (point7, bullet 3); *see
    also* SWBT Ham Decl. at para. 198 ("If the end user address on the
    LSR \[which is placed on the "C" order\] does not match the address
    on the existing records in the CRIS database, the orders become
    disassociated.")

[^1324]: For example, AT&T notes that the two databases may simply have
    addresses that are formatted differently (*e.g.,* PREMIS lists a
    street name as "Jackson-Keller Road" and CRIS lists the street
    without the hyphen as "Jackson Keller Road").

[^1325]: *See* Ham Reply Decl. at para. 73 ("If the service address
    provided by the competing LEC on the LSR is a valid address
    \[*i.e.,* is consistent with the PREMIS database\], but is different
    from the service address contained on the SWBT CSR for the end-user
    \[*i.e.,* the address obtained from the CRIS database\], the C and D
    orders will have different addresses.").

[^1326]: *See* WorldCom McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para.
    26.

[^1327]: SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 69.

[^1328]: SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 69.

[^1329]: TBTA is a GUI used by SWBT's retail business customers and IXCs
    for maintenance and repair administration that offers competing
    carriers access to SWBT's back office systems. SWBT Ham Aff. at
    paras. 218-220.

[^1330]: EBTA is an application-to-application interface that the
    competing carrier can integrate into its own back office systems.
    SWBT Ham Aff. at para 218. SWBT states that due to the complexity
    and the information technology resource requirements of developing
    an EBTA, larger competitors are the most likely candidates to
    utilize the SWBT EBTA. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 229.

[^1331]: SWBT states that the MLT capability is not available for other
    forms of unbundled network elements combinations because MLT is
    capable of testing only POTS and POTS-like combinations. SWBT Ham
    Aff. at para. 220.

[^1332]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 219-220. A user of Trouble
    Administration can test or report trouble on a line on the same day
    that the order posts to the Customer Access Billing System (CABS).
    If a service order has been created but errors out prior to posting
    to CABs a competing carrier attempting to test the line using TBTA
    will receive an "Unauthorized to Access" error message. In this
    situation, the "CLEC Handbook" instructs the carriers to manually
    report trouble to the LOC. *Id.* at paras. 223-225.

[^1333]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 222.

[^1334]: *Id.* at para. 219. Currently, EBTA is used by AT&T, WorldCom,
    and Sprint for interexchange access service and by WorldCom and
    Sprint for local service. SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 230.

[^1335]: *Id.* Thus, when a competing carrier issues a trouble report or
    requests the current status of an existing report, the trouble
    ticket or status request will be sent to SWBT's back office system
    with no manual intervention by SWBT. SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 222,
    229.

[^1336]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 234.

[^1337]: Bill Plus™ is an electronic telephone bill that provides a
    competing carrier with the same information contained on its paper
    bill. Bill Plus's™ various reporting options allow carriers with the
    capability to analyze its billing data. In addition, a carrier can
    extract the billing data to their internal systems. *See* SWBT Ham
    Aff. at para. 236.

[^1338]: EDI for billing is an interface that enables competing carriers
    to receive their resale services billing data in an industry
    standard electronic format. The billing data consists of the same
    information that appears on the competing carrier\'s paper bill for
    resale service. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 238.

[^1339]: Bill Data Tape provides to competing carriers, in an electronic
    format from SWBT's CABs database, the same information that would
    appear on the competing carrier's paper bill for unbundled net work
    elements. The data is offered electronically via direct connection,
    on tape, on floppy disks, or on microfiche. SWBT Ham Aff. at para.
    242.

[^1340]: Bill Information is a graphical user interface available from
    SWBT's Toolbar platform that allows competing carriers to view
    billing data and other information regarding a competing carrier's
    resale services or unbundled network elements. SWBT Ham Aff. at para
    243.

[^1341]: Usage Extract is a process by which a competing carrier can
    receive its usage sensitive messages on a daily basis for resale
    services or unbundled network elements.

[^1342]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para 234.

[^1343]: *See* Aff. of John A. Locus, App. A-4, Tab 4.

[^1344]: Indeed, the arbitration award relied upon so heavily by Covad
    as evidence of actual discrimination in violation of section 251 and
    271 is captioned "Petition of Rhythms Links, Inc. for Arbitration to
    Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company and Petition of Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a
    Covad Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection
    Rates, Terms, Conditions, and Related Arrangements with Southwestern
    Bell Telephone Company."