March 20, 2007\
\
                         CBCA 471-TRAV\
\
                In the Matter of ROBERT O. JACOB\
\
\
    Robert O. Jacob, Lusby, MD, Claimant.\
\
    Judy A. Hughes, Travel Management and Procedures Office, Defense
Finance and\
Accounting Service, Columbus Center, Columbus, OH, appearing for
Department of\
Defense.\
\
HYATT, Board Judge.\
\
    Claimant, Robert O. Jacob, is a civilian employee of the Naval Air
Systems\
Command, Atlantic Test Range in Patuxent River, Maryland.  He was
scheduled to perform\
official travel to Cordova, Alaska, to support missile tracking tests
sponsored by the Missile Defense Agency.  His travel was approved in
advance of the scheduled dates for the tests and his orders were issued
on January 12, 2006.  He was scheduled to fly to Anchorage, Alaska,on
Sunday, January 22, 2006, out of Baltimore Washington International
Airport (BWI), and continuing on to Cordova that day.  Mr. Jacob, as the
senior representative of the three government attendees at the tests at
this remote site, was a key member of the team and was essential to the
mission.\
\
    Late on Sunday, January 15, 2006, Mr. Jacob learned that his
mother-in-law, who had\
resided in Jacksonville, Florida, had passed away.  Her funeral was
scheduled to take place in Florida later that week.  Mr. Jacob and his
family began driving to Florida the next day to attend the funeral.  On
that morning, Mr. Jacob also contacted his supervisors, the Head of the
Atlantic Range Operations Division and her deputy, Mr. Havens, to inform
them of the situation and to request a week of leave as a result of the
bereavement.  His request for leave was granted.  Mr. Jacob raised the
matter of his upcoming travel assignment and expressed concern that he
would be unable to return to Patuxent River in sufficient time to make
the scheduled departure from BWI on January 22.  He inquired whether it
would be allowable to change his flight departure from BWI to
Jacksonville, which would accommodate his need to attend the funeral and
still arrive in Cordova in sufficient time to support the tests.  Mr.
Havens told Mr. Jacob that he would look into whether this was feasible
and call him back.\
\
    Mr. Havens contacted the administrative assistant responsible for
processing travel\
arrangements and travel claims for the office.  He asked her to
determine whether Mr. Jacob could be authorized to depart from
Jacksonville, rather than from BWI, and to make the appropriate
arrangements if he could.  The assistant contacted the Travel Help Desk
and SATO (the contract travel office) for guidance.  She was told that
the airfare that could be reimbursed  by the Government would be limited
to what the cost to the Government would be to issue an airline ticket
from Jacksonville to Cordova.  The SATO representative also stated that
Mr. Jacob would have to purchase his own ticket using his own personal
credit card.  After obtaining Mr. Jacob\'s credit card information, the
assistant purchased his airline ticket.  Both Mr. Jacob and his
supervisors understood that Mr. Jacob could be reimbursed by the
Government so long as he did not purchase a ticket that was more
expensive than the Government fare from Jacksonville to Cordova.  \
\
    Although the record provided does not include a written amendment to
claimant\'s\
travel orders, Mr. Havens submitted a statement confirming that he
authorized  the alteration of Mr. Jacob\'s travel plans, at government
expense, in advance of his departure from Jacksonville.  Mr. Havens
stated that his approval was predicated upon two factors:  (1) his
understanding that the change would constitute an allowable expense, and
(2) the pressing need for Mr. Jacob to attend the time-critical tests in
Alaska.  Mr. Havens approved the claim for airfare when Mr. Jacob
returned from the trip to Alaska.\
\
     When the claim was submitted to the travel settlement office in
Patuxent River, Mr. Jacob\'s reimbursement was limited to what it would
have cost for round trip travel between BWI and Alaska.  The departure
from Jacksonville cost an additional \$597.20, which was disallowed,
even though it had been authorized and approved by the command.  \
\
    An appeal was forwarded to the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS).\
DFAS, after carefully reviewing the relevant provisions of the Joint
Travel Regulations\
(JTR), concluded that, despite the extenuating circumstances, there was
no basis for allowing payment to Mr. Jacob of the additional airfare
expense occasioned by departing from Jacksonville rather than from BWI.
 This determination was based on JTR C2000-C, which states that an
employee on a temporary duty (TDY) travel authorization is authorized
travel/transportation allowances not to exceed the actual transportation
authorized and used up to the constructed transportation cost between
the employee\'s permanent duty station (PDS) and TDY location.  The only
exception to this rule is when the employee is notified of the need to
perform official business travel after departing on authorized leave.
 DFAS determined that this provision does not apply in this case because
Mr. Jacob\'s TDY had been scheduled prior to his departure  for leave.
 \
\
    Although DFAS could not find a basis under the JTR for paying the
claim, the\
officials who reviewed this matter all agreed that under the
circumstances the claim has merit and should be forwarded to the Board
for review.\
\
                           Discussion\
\
    By statute, the Government is required to reimburse employees for
the actual and\
necessary costs incurred to travel on official business.  5 U.S.C. 5702
(2000).  Under the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) agencies are to limit
payment of travel costs to those which are necessary to accomplish the
mission in the most economical and efficient manner and in accordance
with the rules stated throughout the FTR.  41 CFR 301-2.2, -70.1 (2005).
 In keeping with this policy, the FTR specifies that an employee
performing a TDY assignment must \"travel to \[his or her\] destination
by the usually traveled route unless \[the\] agency authorizes or
approves a different route as officially necessary.\"  41 CFR 301-10.7.
 If an employee travels by an indirect route, or interrupts travel for
his or her personal convenience, the employee\'s reimbursement \"will be
limited to the cost of travel by a direct route or on an uninterrupted
basis.\"  If there are any additional costs occasioned by a change in
route or interruption in travel, the employee is responsible for those
costs.  In another provision of the\
FTR, the employee is advised that he or she is responsible for excess
costs resulting from circuitous routes and the like that are
\"unnecessary or unjustified in the performance of official business.\"
 41 CFR 301-2.4.  \
\
    The provision of the JTR relied upon by the agency is worded
somewhat differently\
than is the FTR, but essentially echoes the reasoning that added expense
caused by indirect routes and interrupted travel for the convenience of
the employee may not be reimbursed.  With respect to TDY travel
involving departure from or return to a non-PDS location it says that:\
\
         An employee on a TDY travel authorization is authorized
travel/\
         transportation allowances NTE \[not to exceed\] the actual\
         transportation cost for the transportation mode authorized and\
         used up to the constructed transportation cost between the\
         employee\'s PDS and TDY location.  When TDY travel is\
         to/from a non-PDS location:\
\
         1. The traveler must pay excess travel/transportation costs;
and\
\
         2. Constructed costs for each leg of the trip must be based on\
         Government . . . city-pair contract airfares, if available.\
\
JTR C2000-C.\
\
    It is well-settled that these provisions require an employee to pay
any added costs\
attributable to a deviation from the usually-traveled, uninterrupted
route.  See, e.g., Lisa Schwartz, GSBCA 16669-TRAV, 05-2 BCA µ 33,040;
Deborah H. Murray, GSBCA 15838-\
RELO, 03-1 BCA µ 32,184; Peter J. Van Deusen, GSBCA 15366-TRAV, 01-1
BCA\
µ 31,371.  This rule has been recognized both by the Board and by the
Comptroller General, who decided claims of this nature prior to
mid-1996.\
\
    A Comptroller General decision,  Lawrence O. Hatch, B-211701 (Nov.
29, 1983),\
provides helpful guidance in understanding this bright line rule. This
decision explained that the relevant provisions of the FTR and JTR
strictly limited reimbursement for TDY travel to the constructive cost
of a round trip originating and ending at the PDS even if the travel
orders authorized departure from and/or return to another location to
accommodate the personal circumstances of the traveler.  In Hatch, the
employee had requested that  his TDY orders depart from and return to
his vacation location and his orders had been issued accordingly.  His
vacation plans had been made prior to the occurrence of a need for TDY
travel, but the need for TDY travel had arisen, and orders had been
issued, prior to his departure from the PDS for annual leave.  In
addressing the arguments raised by Mr. Hatch, who asserted that his
annual leave dates could not be altered and that he would not have
returned prematurely to his permanent duty station to begin travel, the
Comptroller General stated:\
\
         \[T\]he scheduling of annual leave and temporary duty\
         assignments and recall to headquarters are matters that are\
         subject to the discretion and control of the employing agency.\
         The employee may travel on leave to the location of his choice\
         and he ordinarily bears the expense of returning to his\
         permanent duty station.  .  .  .  Concerning  the assurance to
Mr.\
         Hatch that the travel orders authorized reimbursable expenses\
         . . . , we have repeatedly held that the Government is not
liable\
         if an official exceeds his authority by granting a benefit in\
         excess of that authorized by law.  \
\
Further, the Comptroller General squarely rejected the notion that the
travel approving\
official might, after considering both the Government\'s needs and the
employee\'s personal desires, give prior authorization to begin travel
from a leave point from which reimbursable costs in excess of
constructive travel between permanent and temporary duty stations would
be generated.  Thus, while an employee might travel to perform TDY
travel from a location other than the PDS, the Government is not
authorized to pay for any extra cost that might be incurred as a
result.\
\
    Looking at the present provisions of the FTR, which are consistent
with the provisions in effect when Hatch was decided, and the language
of the JTR, we must conclude that DFAS has correctly interpreted the
applicable law.  Travel approving officials do not possess the authority
to authorize reimbursement of travel that is not the direct, usually
traveled route from the employee\'s PDS to the TDY location and back,
regardless of how compelling the personal circumstances of the employee
may be.\
\
    In considering whether the Navy might be able to reimburse Mr. Jacob
the additional\
expense occasioned by his departure from Jacksonville, we have reviewed
two decisions of\
the General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA), our immediate
predecessor in\
reviewing these cases, which were decided solely with reference to the
FTR.\
\
    The board considered the FTR\'s guidance as it applies to departures
for TDY from\
a location other than the PDS in K. Wesley Davis, GSBCA 15623-TRAV, 02-1
BCA µ 31,680 (2001).  This decision addressed a claim brought by an
employee of the Social Security Administration whose official duty
station was located in Dallas, Texas.  Mr. Davis\
maintained a residence in Dallas for the purpose of commuting to work on
a regular basis, but his family lived in Shreveport, Louisiana.  Mr.
Davis routinely spent weekends in Louisiana with his family.  He was
scheduled to travel to Columbia, South Carolina, for training.  To
attend the training he needed to depart on a Sunday, and would be
returning on Friday of that week.  Because he intended to be in
Shreveport for the first weekend, and wished to return to Shreveport for
the following weekend, he asked the agency to authorize his departure
and return from Shreveport, rather than from Dallas.  His travel orders
reflected this request.  After he returned and submitted a request for
reimbursement, the agency advised him that he could only be reimbursed
the cost of the round trip fare from Dallas to Columbia, which was
significantly less than the fare from Shreveport to Columbia and back.\
\
    The board in Davis noted that the departure and return to Shreveport
had been\
authorized in advance of the travel.  The board reasoned that while an
agency is under no obligation to authorize an employee to depart and/or
return to a location other than the PDS, at the same time there is
nothing in the FTR to suggest that an agency cannot, \"in its discretion
and for reasonable cause, authorize an employee to start and/or complete
TDY travel at a point outside the employee\'s PDS area.\"  The board
 further explained that such circumstances should not be viewed as
involving indirect routing of travel.  Finally, the board pointed out
that if an agency has the discretion to make a specific authorization
and does so, it cannot withdraw that authorization once the employee has
incurred expenses in reliance on it.  Davis, 02-1 BCA at 156,550-51
(citing Linda M. Conaway, GSBCA 15342-TRAV,00-2 BCA µ 31,133).  Thus,
the board held that Mr. Davis was entitled to be reimbursed for the full
cost of his trip.\
\
    In a subsequent case involving a litigating attorney employed by the
Equal\
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the board extended the
rationale of Davis.\
The EEOC attorney had planned a trip from her PDS in New York City to
her parents\' home\
in Memphis, Tennessee, to leave her infant daughter in their care while
she worked on a\
litigation matter requiring an extensive commitment of time.  She had
purchased a round trip ticket from New York City to Memphis and back at
a restricted rate.  Shortly before she left for Tennessee, the attorney
learned that her presence was required at a court hearing in Syracuse,
New York, on the day that she was scheduled to return from Tennessee.
 The cost of changing her tickets for the Tennessee trip to return to
New York earlier would have been prohibitively expensive.  Her
supervisor approved a change in travel plans to allow her to fly from
Tennessee to Syracuse and then return to her PDS in New York.
 Thereafter, the agency disallowed the additional expense resulting from
this arrangement and limited her reimbursement to the amount it would
have cost to fly round trip between New York City and Syracuse.\
\
    The board disagreed with the agency\'s position, relying on its
prior decision in Davis,which established that \"there is no reason why
an agency cannot, at its discretion and for reasonable cause, authorize
an employee to start and/or complete temporary duty (TDY)travel at a
point outside the employee\'s PDS area.\" Delner Franklin-Thomas, GSBCA\
15905-TRAV, 03-1 BCA µ 32,126, at 158,812 (2002).  Central to the
board\'s reasoning was\
the fact that this did not involve the typical case where an employee
was rerouting official travel solely for personal convenience.  The need
to travel arose after she had planned her trip to Memphis, and her
supervisor authorized her to fly directly from Memphis to Syracuse and
back to New York City at Government expense to accommodate the
Government\'s need to have her appear in court.  Ms. Franklin-Thomas,
relying on this authorization, undertook the travel with the expectation
that she would be reimbursed.\
\
    The primary factual distinction between the two cases interpreting
the FTR discussed above and Mr. Jacob\'s claim is that Mr. Jacob, unlike
Mr. Davis, whose travel from Shreveport was approved from outset, and
Ms. Franklin-Thomas, whose travel from\
Memphis to Syracuse was approved at the time the need for travel to
Syracuse arose, had\
already been given travel orders routing him from BWI to Alaska and
back.  In the earlier cases, there were no travel orders initially
issued from the PDS that were changed to accommodate the traveler.  \
\
    The Navy and DFAS, relying on the JTR provisions, reasoned that
since Mr. Jacob\'s\
travel was scheduled and authorized before the occasion arose for his
travel to Jacksonville, the regulations expressly precluded his
departure from Jacksonville, even though his immediate supervisor
approved and authorized the travel, and Mr. Jacob, relying on that
approval, undertook the travel so as to be able to perform this critical
TDY assignment. Thus, in the case of civilian employees of the Defense
Department, a strict construction of the pertinent JTR provision would
dictate that any discretion provided within the FTR to approve departure
from a non-PDS at Government expense is removed from the command level
and precluded across the board within the Defense Department.  Although
neither the Navy nor DFAS believe the result is fair to the employee in
these circumstances, they cannot perceive a basis to approve the added
expense.  \
\
    The conclusion arrived at by DFAS and the Navy is the right one.
 Upon reviewing\
the Davis and Franklin-Thomas cases, which were decided solely under the
FTR provisions,\
without reference to the JTR\'s expression of the rule, we now conclude
that the rationale underlying these cases is partly, but not entirely,
correct.  That is, we agree that a travel approving official may always
permit departure from or return to a location other than the PDS to
accommodate an employee.  We disagree, however, that this includes the
discretion to bind the Government to pay the added costs, as the board
held in those two cases.  As currently written, the pertinent
regulations dictate a contrary conclusion.  Both of these regulations
define the direct, or non-circuitous, route to start and end from the
PDS. When travel orders authorize a departure from (or return to) a
non-PDS location simply because that is where the employee will be when
TDY travel must commence, the proper analysis must recognize that this
is, in fact, an indirect route.  At some point the employee left the PDS
or will return to the PDS.  To use the instant case as an example, the
employee left his PDS to arrive at the non-PDS departure point,
Jacksonville, prior to undertaking official travel.  It begs the
question to ignore this leg of the trip solely because the supervisor
was willing to authorize travel to commence from Jacksonville.  By
definition, this was a circuitous, or\
indirect, route.\
\
    Thus, to the extent that the Davis and Franklin-Thomas cases hold
that the\
Government can be bound to pay for indirect or circuitous travel
originating or ending at a non-PDS location, if the approving official
authorizes it in advance of the travel, we will no longer follow that
reasoning.  \
   \
    Accordingly, with respect to this claim, we find that DFAS and the
Navy properly\
concluded that, while the approving official could authorize departure
from a non-PDS\
location to accommodate an employee\'s personal circumstances, the
Government has no\
authority to incur the added cost associated with this revised route.  
It is unfortunate that Mr. Jacob traveled with the expectation that his
costs would be fully reimbursed.  Nonetheless, erroneous authorizations
or incorrect advice provided by Government officials cannot create or
enlarge entitlements that are not provided by statute or regulation.
 See, e.g., Joseph E. Copple, GSBCA 16849-RELO, 06-2 BCA µ 33,332, at
165,290 (citing Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 322 U.S. 380,
384-85 (1947)).  \
   \
                                 
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
                                  CATHERINE B. HYATT\
                                  Board Judge