**\[DOE LETTERHEAD\]**

**\[DNFSB LETTERHEAD\]**

July 19, 2007

To the Congress of the United States:

On September 29, 2006, House Conference Report 109-702 on the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (H.R.
5122) was released and approved by both houses of Congress. The
Conference Report, Section 3201, requested the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (Board) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to
report jointly to the congressional defense committees on their efforts
to improve the timeliness of issue resolution, including
recommendations, if any, for legislation that would strengthen and
improve technical oversight of DOE's nuclear design and operational
activities.

This report, prepared jointly by the Board and DOE, describes actions
that will provide for more timely identification and resolution of
technical issues raised by the Board; some of these actions have already
been completed. A summary listing of these actions is provided in
Enclosure 1, while the complete report is provided in Enclosure 2.
Broadly, the actions described are intended to promote (1) the early
identification of safety requirements and strategies at the conceptual
and preliminary design phases of a project to avoid cost increases and
schedule delays, and (2) more effective processes or protocols for the
communication to DOE of issues identified by the Board and for the
tracking and management of these issues.

The Board and DOE believe that the actions described will improve the
timeliness of the resolution of safety issues resulting from the Board's
review of DOE's design and construction projects. Nonetheless, DOE and
the Board are mindful of the effort required to complete the actions
identified, and of the amount of work that must be accomplished early in
the design phase of projects to produce a more complete conceptual
design and safety strategy. The Board intends to conduct a fourth public
hearing on this topic during 2008, to assess progress towards
implementing the actions described.

Sincerely,

***Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary A. J. Eggenberger, Chairman***

***Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board***

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE 1

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE TIMELINESS OF ISSUE RESOLUTION

+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Action   | Respo     | Object               | Status   | Completion |
|          | nsibility |                      |          |            |
|          |           |                      |          | Date       |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Project  | Board     | Summarize unresolved | Being    | Immediate  |
| Letters  |           | safety issues and    | imp      |            |
|          |           | Board view of safety | lemented |            |
|          |           | status of projects   |          |            |
|          |           | at appropriate       |          |            |
|          |           | critical decisions.  |          |            |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Q        | Board     | Summarize to the     | Being    | Immediate  |
| uarterly |           | Congress unresolved  | imp      |            |
| Reports  |           | safety issues on a   | lemented |            |
| to       |           | project by project   |          |            |
| Congress |           | basis.               |          |            |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Periodic | Board/DOE | Track and status     | Being    | Immediate  |
| Joint    |           | safety issues raised | imp      |            |
| Reviews  |           | as a result of the   | lemented |            |
| of Open  |           | Board's reviews of   |          |            |
| Safety   |           | projects.            |          |            |
| Issues   |           |                      |          |            |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| I        | DOE       | Implement changes to | Phased   | Re         |
| mplement |           | the Order related to | implem   | quirements |
| Recently |           | early integration of | entation | become     |
| Issued   |           | safety into design.  | underway | effective  |
| Order    |           |                      |          | 6 months   |
| 413.3A   |           |                      |          | from       |
|          |           |                      |          | issuance   |
|          |           |                      |          | of         |
|          |           |                      |          | Standard   |
|          |           |                      |          | 1189       |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| I        | DOE       | Implement specific   | Phased   | Standard   |
| mplement |           | actions during the   | implem   | 1189 to be |
| Newly    |           | project design phase | entation | issued     |
| D        |           | to achieve the       | underway | late 2007. |
| eveloped |           | safety-in-design     |          | Immediate  |
| Standard |           | objectives           |          | impl       |
| 1189     |           | incorporated into    |          | ementation |
|          |           | DOE Order 413.3A.    |          | for new    |
|          |           |                      |          | projects;  |
|          |           |                      |          | phased     |
|          |           |                      |          | impl       |
|          |           |                      |          | ementation |
|          |           |                      |          | for        |
|          |           |                      |          | existing   |
|          |           |                      |          | projects   |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Dem      | Board/DOE | Demonstrate the      | Being    | Immediate  |
| onstrate |           | safety-in-design     | imp      |            |
| requ     |           | requirements of      | lemented |            |
| irements |           | Order 413.3A and     |          |            |
| inco     |           | Standard 1189 on two |          |            |
| rporated |           | major projects       |          |            |
| into     |           | (Uranium Processing  |          |            |
| Order    |           | Facility and         |          |            |
| 413.3A   |           | Integrated Waste     |          |            |
| and      |           | Treatment Unit).     |          |            |
| Standard |           |                      |          |            |
| 1189     |           |                      |          |            |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+
| Guides   | DOE       | Eighteen guides to   | Being    | All guides |
| to       |           | be developed to      | imp      | expected   |
| Support  |           | provide additional   | lemented | to be      |
| Order    |           | guidance on          |          | completed  |
| 413.3A   |           | implementation of    |          | by 2008    |
|          |           | DOE Order 413.3A.    |          |            |
+----------+-----------+----------------------+----------+------------+

**ENCLOSURE 2**

**IMPROVING THE IDENTIFICATION AND**

**RESOLUTION OF SAFETY ISSUES**

**DURING THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF**

**DOE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES**

**A Report Prepared Jointly by the**

**Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and**

**the Department of Energy**

**July 2007**

**PREFACE**

This report was prepared jointly by the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board and the Department of Energy, as requested in the
Conference Report of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007. The applicable portion of the Conference Report is
as follows:

The conferees note their concern regarding the untimely resolution by
the Department of Energy of technical issues raised by the Board. The
conferees believe that the Board and the Department would benefit from a
more structured process for issue resolution that would allow issues to
be raised, evaluated, and adjudicated at logical points in the design
and construction process. The conferees urge the Board to evaluate
whether more frequent use of the Board's formal recommendation process
would drive both parties towards this more structured process. The
conferees also encourage the Board to take a constructive role in the
problem-solving process by quickly evaluating corrective actions
proposed by the Department and its contractors.

The conferees are encouraged by efforts between the Department and the
Board to develop a process to provide for more timely identification and
resolution of technical differences over design standards arid other
issues at the Department's nuclear facilities. Specifically, conferees
support the pending revision of the Department's Order 413.3 to require
critical safety determinations be made prior to Critical Decision 1 in
the Department's project management system. The conferees direct the
Board and the Department to continue these discussions and to report
jointly to the congressional defense committees on their efforts to
improve the timeliness of issue resolution, including recommendations,
if any, for legislation that would strengthen and improve technical
oversight of the Department's nuclear design and operational activities.
Until such time as this report is submitted, the conferees further
direct the Board to provide to the congressional defense committees
quarterly reports to identify and report the status of significant
unresolved issues.

H.R. Rep. No. 109-702, at 976 (2006) (Conf. Rep.).

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the design and
construction of defense nuclear facilities required to carry out it5
mission. These defense nuclear facilities are often large, complex
projects involving new technology and one-of-a-kind processes. The
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is responsible for
providing external safety oversight of DOE'S defense nuclear activities.
As directed by its enabling legislation, the Board "shall review the
design of a new Department of Energy defense nuclear facility before
construction of such facility begins and shall recommend to the
Secretary \[of Energy\], within a reasonable time, such modifications of
the design as the Board considers necessary to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety."

In the Conference Report of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the conferees noted "their
concern regarding the untimely resolution by the Department of Energy of
technical issues raised by the Board." This concern arose primarily as a
result of significant cost increases and schedule delays due to the
untimely resolution of technical safety issues during the design of the
Waste Treatment Plant at the Hanford Site. The conferees requested the
Board and DOE to report jointly on their efforts to improve the
timeliness of issue resolution, including recommendations, if any, for
legislation that would strengthen and improve technical oversight of
DOE's nuclear design and operational activities.

This report, prepared jointly by the Board and DOE, describes actions
identified to provide for more timely identification and resolution of
technical issues raised by the Board; some of these actions have already
been completed. The significant actions include the following:

-   DOE Order 413.3, *Program and Project Management for the Acquisition
    of Capital Assets*, was revised to incorporate elements that should
    help ensure the early integration of safety into the design process.
    The following are examples of significant changes:

    -   Safety requirements for each critical decision have been
        identified.

    -   Safety design reports are required at the conceptual and
        preliminary design stages.

    -   A Technical Independent Project Review, which focuses on safety
        documentation, is required as part of the Critical Decision-1
        review for high-risk, high-hazard, and Hazard Category 1, 2, and
        3 nuclear facilities.

    -   The Integrated Project Team membership now includes technical
        safety experts.

    -   Safety responsibilities during the design process are now
        defined for DOE's Central Technical Authorities, Chief of
        Defense Nuclear Safety, and Chief of Nuclear Safety.

-   DOE Manual 413.3-1, *Project Management for the Acquisition of
    Capital Assets*, is being revised and converted to a series of
    guides to clarify the requirements of the associated DOE Order and
    to make clearer reference to safety standards and requirements.

-   A new standard, DOE-STD-1189, *Integration of Safety into the Design
    Process*, is being developed to provide a detailed description of
    the safety-related design information required to meet the
    requirements of DOE Order 413.3A for integrating safety early into
    the design. Significant elements of this new standard include the
    following:

    -   The development of a Safety Design Strategy that provides a
        roadmap for addressing important safety issues as the project
        progresses.

    -   The development, in the conceptual design stage, of
        facility-level design basis accidents to provide the necessary
        input for the classification of important safety functions and
        systems.

    -   The guidance for the preparation of a Conceptual Safety Design
        Report, a Preliminary Safety Design Report, and the Preliminary
        Documented Safety Analysis.

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-   DOE and the Board are jointly evaluating the effectiveness of DOE
    Order 413.3A and DOE-STD-1189 by demonstrating their application to
    two ongoing defense nuclear facility design efforts: the Integrated
    Waste Treatment Unit at the Idaho National Laboratory Site and the
    Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Nuclear Security
    Complex. These demonstration efforts are providing feedback on the
    effectiveness of actions taken to improve the early integration of
    safety into design.

-   DOE and the Board have reaffirmed the importance of the Boards ready
    access to information as described in the Board's legislation: "The
    Secretary of Energy shall fully cooperate with the Board and provide
    the Board with ready access to such facilities, personnel, and
    information as the Board considers necessary to carry out its
    responsibilities\...."

-   Pending the submittal of this report, the Board is providing
    Congress with quarterly reports to identify and report on the status
    of significant unresolved safety issues at defense nuclear
    facilities.

-   The Board has begun issuing "project letters" early in the design
    process to apprise DOE of the status of safety issues raised by the
    Board. These project letters will be updated by the Board as the
    project situation requires.

-   DOE and the Board are conducting joint periodic discussions to
    review the status of significant unresolved safety issues and to
    allow the Board to evaluate actions being taken to resolve these
    issues. DOE and the Board will use joint periodic reviews as a
    mechanism to maintain senior management awareness of the status of
    these unresolved issues.

The Board and DOE believe that the above actions will improve the
timeliness of the resolution of safety issues resulting from the Board's
review of DOE's design and construction projects. The Board and DOE also
believe that current law provides adequate mechanisms and authorities to
achieve the timely identification and resolution of issues and that
additional legislation is not required at this time.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  Section                             Page

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

**1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1-1**

**2. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN IMPROVE EARLY INTEGRATION OF**

**SAFETY INTO DESIGN 2-1**

2.1 Evolution of the Safety-in-Design Initiative 2-1

2.3 Creation of Guides to Support DOE Order 413.3A 2-5

2.2 Revision of DOE Order 413.3 2-3

2.4 Development of DOE Standard 1189 2-5

2.5 New Design Demonstration Efforts 2-7

**3. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOE**

**AND THE BOARD 3-1**

3.1 Issue Identification 3-1

3.2 Issue Communication and Management 3-4

3.3 Issue Resolution and Closure 3-9

**4. OTHER ACTIONS BEING CONSIDERED TO STRENGTHEN AND**

**IMPROVE TECHNICAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT 4-1**

4.1 Additional Changes to DOE'S Project Management Directive 4-1

4.2 Changes to DOE Draft Order 140 (DOE/Board Interface Order) 4-1

4.3 Need for Legislative Changes 4-1

4.4 Use of the Board's Formal Recommendations 4-2

**1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

In executing its mission, the Department of Energy (DOE) needs to
design, construct, or procure new facilities. Most DOE facilities and
activities that fall within the purview of the Board's oversight
authority are managed by DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM)
and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Within these
two offices there are currently 25 major defense nuclear facility design
and construction projects that are subject to review by the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The extent of the Board's
review of these projects varies depending on the level of hazard,
magnitude, complexity, and risk to public health and safety.

DOE Order 413.3A defines the critical decisions that need to be made
during the life cycle of a project, as summarized in Figure 1. These
critical decisions are as follows:

-   Approve mission need (Critical Decision-0).

-   Approve alternative selection and cost range (Critical Decision-1).

-   Approve the performance baseline (Critical Decision-2).

-   Approve start of construction (Critical Decision-3).

-   Approve start of operations or project completion (Critical
    Decision-4).

![](media/image1.wmf)

Note: CD = critical decision; PARS = Project Assessment and Reporting
System; PED = Project

Engineering and Design

**Figure 1 -- Project Life Cycle**

The Board's enabling legislation requires that it review the design of
new DOE defense nuclear facilities before construction begins and
recommend to the Secretary of Energy, within a reasonable time, any
modifications of the design the Board considers necessary to ensure
adequate protection of the public health and safety. The Board has
worked with DOE to carry out this legislative mandate since 1989, and in
so doing has reviewed a large number of DOE design and construction
projects.

The Board's review of ongoing design and construction projects---in
particular the Waste Treatment Plant at the Hanford Site---gave rise to
concern about the process for ensuring the expeditious resolution of
safety issues. Consequently, the Board and DOE began evaluating elements
of DOE's design and construction process to identify actions that could
be taken to resolve safety issues in a timely manner. The Board and DOE
concluded that the most important actions were related to the early
incorporation of appropriate safety features into the design. The goal
would be to shift the identification of major hazards and corresponding
safety attributes---such as the performance category of the facility and
the cost-dominant safety classification of structures, systems, and
components---to earlier in the design process.

The joint efforts of the Board and DOE in the safety-in-design area
started substantively when the Board held its December 7, 2005, public
meeting to explore DOE's policy direction related to the early
integration of safety into design. The Board subsequently held two
additional public meetings on this topic.

Actions resulting from the preparations for and conduct of these public
meetings included the revision of DOE Order 413.3, *Program and Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets*. That Order, now DOE
Order 413.3A, is the DOE directive that provides overarching project
management requirements for new design and construction projects. The
revision of DOE Order 413.3 is being augmented by related efforts to
revise the associated DOE Manual 413.3-1, *Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets*, and to develop a new DOE standard,
DOE-STD-1189, *Integration of Safety into the Design Process*. The Board
and DOE also selected two ongoing design and construction
projects---NNSA's Uranium Processing Facility project and EM's
Integrated Waste Treatment Unit project (also called the Sodium Bearing
Waste Treatment Project)---to demonstrate the application of the
concepts being established in the revised Order 413.3A and the new
standard DOE-STD-1189.

The Conference Report of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, requested the Board and DOE to report jointly
to the congressional defense committees on efforts to improve the
timeliness of issue resolution and to strengthen and improve technical
oversight of DOE's nuclear design and operational activities. These
efforts by the Board and DOE are organized in this report into two
categories: (1) efforts aimed at improving the early integration of
safety into design and (2) efforts aimed at improving interaction and
communication between DOE and the Board.

Section 2 of this report describes efforts currently under way or
completed that have been undertaken by the Board and DOE to improve the
early integration of safety into design. These actions will contribute
substantially to preventing the recurrence of the untimely issue
resolution

that has occurred in the past. The early integration of safety into
design provides an opportunity to identify and resolve safety issues
before significant project design or construction activities proceed.

Section 3 of this report details efforts directed toward improving the
interaction between DOE and the Board with respect to the identification
and resolution of safety issues resulting from the Board's review of
DOE's design and construction projects. These efforts are aimed
primarily at improving the interaction involved in identification of
safety issues by the Board, recognition of these safety issues by DOE,
management and tracking of the issues, and early issue resolution.

Section 4 of this report reviews other potential actions being discussed
by the Board and DOE that would further strengthen and improve the
timely identification and resolution of safety issues related to DOE's
design and construction projects.

**2. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE EARLY INTEGRATION OF SAFETY INTO
DESIGN**

A number of problems have resulted from the untimely identification and
resolution of safety issues during the design and construction of new
defense nuclear facilities. Both the Board and DOE recognize that
untimely identification and resolution of safety issues has resulted in
large part from the failure to adequately identify and incorporate
safety requirements into the design at the earliest stages of a project.
The Board and DOE have pursued several initiatives, discussed below, to
improve the effective incorporation of safety earlier in the design
process.

**2.1 EVOLUTION OF THE SAFETY-IN-DESIGN INITIATIVE**

As noted in Section 1, the Board has conducted three public meetings to
explore the need to integrate safety early into the design process. The
Board's initial public meeting on this topic, held on December 7, 2005,
had three objectives: (1) to raise awareness of the problem among senior
DOE management; (2) to discuss the problems being encountered with DOE's
design and construction projects for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear
facilities; and (3) to establish expectations regarding potential
corrective actions.

On December 5, 2005, prior to this initial public meeting, the Deputy
Secretary of Energy distributed a memorandum titled *Integrating Safety
into Design and Construction,* which outlined his expectations regarding
the effective integration of safety into the design process. These
expectations were summarized in the Deputy Secretary's opening statement
to the Board at the December 7, 2005, public meeting, and included the
following:

-   Acknowledging that DOE can improve on its safety-in-design
    performance.

-   Committing to safety as a core value.

-   Identifying and resolving safety issues as early in the design
    process as is practicable.

-   Revising DOE Order 413.3 to better address safety during design.

-   Improving project staffing and training of Federal Project
    Directors.

-   Involving the Chiefs of Nuclear Safety in the design development
    process in an oversight role.

-   Improving the Energy System Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB)
    process to ensure proper tailoring and appropriate management
    attention to safety issues.

-   Increasing the effectiveness of lessons learned.

During his testimony, the Deputy Secretary committed to making the
improvements noted above to enhance incorporation of safety into design
and construction activities.

Following the December 7, 2005, meeting, DOE's Offices of Environment,
Safety and Health (\[EH\] now the Office of Health, Safety, and Security
\[HSS\]), Engineering and Construction Management (OECM), Environmental
Management (EM), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
developed action plans for responding to the Deputy Secretary's December
5, 2005, memorandum and for implementing commitments included in his
December 7, 2005, testimony. On February 24, 2006, DOE's integrated plan
"for improving the incorporation of safety considerations into design
and construction for both new construction projects and major
modifications to existing facilities" was forwarded to the Deputy
Secretary.

DOE's integrated plan included a summary-level plan description; a
detailed schedule; and the detailed organization action plans of HSS,
OECM, EM, and NNSA. The integrated plan addressed revising DOE Order
413.3, increasing expectations for independent project review teams and
Federal Project Directors, improving the ESAAB process, evaluating
lessons learned from previous projects, and reviewing additional DOE
directives for needed improvements. Progress against the schedule is
monitored and reported to the Deputy Secretary monthly.

The Board's second public meeting was held July 19, 2006. At this
meeting, the Board received information regarding DOE's progress on the
initiatives committed to during the first public meeting. The objectives
of this second meeting included determining the degree of progress being
made toward implementing corrective actions, and identifying the
strategy for implementing the revised DOE Order 413.3A and, when
developed, the new technical standard DOE-STD-1189.

At the time of the second meeting, DOE's draft revised order generally
addressed the commitments made during the first public meeting. For
example, the Central Technical Authorities (CTAs) and the Chief of
Defense Nuclear Safety were formally involved in the design process, and
progress had been made toward qualifying Federal Project Directors. The
Board viewed these changes as a positive first step. However, the Board
noted that, despite the progress made to this point, there was a need
for a long-term commitment to continued senior management leadership,
adequate staffing and resources supporting the Integrated Project Teams,
and continued cooperation among DOE's major program offices.

During testimony at this second meeting, NNSA addressed how it intended
to institutionalize the early incorporation of safety into design and
construction. The NNSA actions included organizational changes designed
to ensure that uniform practices are applied in the execution of line
item projects, more effective involvement by senior line management,
support for the proposed technical standard DOE-STD-1189, and a
reiteration of NNSA's commitment to executing projects safely.

Testimony presented by EM identified a need for interim guidance to
further early safety-in-design objectives while DOE-STD-1189 was being
developed. This interim guidance provided

an increased emphasis on safety at the conceptual design stage and a
more prescriptive

approach for the selection and design of safety systems for Hazard
Category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. In its remarks, the Board expressed
its belief that this interim guidance was a strong statement of intent
by EM management supporting the objective of integrating safety early in
the design process.

Overall, the first two public meetings held by the Board established the
need to address safety earlier in the design, outlined actions and
commitments by DOE necessary to resolve recognized problems, and
provided a vehicle for tracking the progress being made.

The Board's third public meeting, held on March 22, 2007, addressed the
Board's early identification of safety issues, communication of these
issues to DOE, issue management, and timely issue closure or resolution.
During this meeting, DOE outlined process and procedural improvements
being pursued or in the early stages of implementation as a result of
its safety-in-design initiatives. DOE noted that resolving safety issues
early in the design process is central to mitigating cost and schedule
risks, and identified the need for strong and persistent federal
oversight of new design and construction projects. During the meeting,
DOE committed to completing the development of DOE-STD-1189 and the
planned revisions to DOE Manual 413.3-1. DOE also committed to
developing a strategy for the implementation of DOE-STD-1189; this
strategy is described in Section 2.4.

2.  **REVISION OF DOE ORDER 413.3**

Prior to the Board's first public meeting, the Secretary of Energy's
August 10, 2005, memorandum, *Improving Project Management*,
acknowledged the need for DOE to revise its directives on project
management and for programs and projects to assume accountability for
successful project management. The goal was to develop a culture within
DOE that would promote the integration of safety into design and
construction; disciplined up-front planning; realistic estimates of
cost, schedule, and performance; and straightforward communication
between Federal Project Directors and senior DOE management.

In January 2006, DOE began updating DOE Order 413.3 to clarify and
strengthen project management, specifically, to integrate safety more
clearly into design and construction. The goals of the revised directive
included the following:

-   Describing more completely safety requirements for design and
    construction.

-   Identifying references to the required safety directives and
    standards.

-   Clarifying the use of tailoring as applied to safety requirements.

-   Improving roles, responsibilities, and oversight related to safety.

DOE's approach to integrating safety into design and construction has
been a corporate effort. While OECM had the specific responsibility for
updating the Order, that Office collaborated with others---including
HSS; the Office of Science; EM; NNSA; and the Energy, Science and
Environment Field Management Council---in the revision of the Order to
ensure that safety would be incorporated in all phases of project
management.

DOE affirmed that safety cannot be incorporated into projects through
inspection only---it must be part of DOE's project management culture.
Consequently, changes related to integrating safety into design and
construction were made to the Order. These changes included the
following:

-   Clarifying and strengthening the means by which safety is integrated
    into design and construction (particularly for Hazard Category 1, 2,
    and 3 nuclear facilities).

-   Requiring Safety Design Reports at the conceptual and preliminary
    stages of design.

-   Identifying safety requirements at each Critical Decision phase.

-   Adding a Technical Independent Project Review, which focuses on
    safety documentation, as part of the Critical Decision-1 Design
    Review for high-risk, high-hazard, and Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3
    nuclear facilities.

-   Requiring technical safety expertise on the Integrated Project Team
    during each design phase.

-   Defining the safety roles of DOE's Central Technical Authorities,
    Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety, and Chief of Nuclear Safety in the
    design process.

-   Adding explanatory language with respect to "tailoring" and
    "design-build" projects to emphasize the importance of safety.
    Aggressive risk mitigation strategies are now required to address
    the unique characteristics of close-coupled or fast-track
    design-build projects. Risk management strategies must now be
    outlined in the risk management plan and at a minimum must
    address (1) all technical uncertainties, (2) the establishment of
    design margins to address the unique nature of the design, and (3)
    increased technical oversight requirements.

    OECM has worked closely with HSS to incorporate these safety
    requirements into the revised Order. The revised Order 413.3A now
    identifies the safety requirements for each critical decision point.
    HSS is developing DOE-STD-1189, *Integration of Safety into the
    Design Process*, which will provide implementation direction for the
    safety requirements for nuclear facilities mandated in the Order.
    Implementation of the new requirements identified in DOE Order
    413.3A are not required until 6 months after issuance of
    DOE-STD-1189.

**2.3 CREATION OF GUIDES TO SUPPORT DOE ORDER 413.3A**

DOE has begun the process of replacing DOE Manual 413.3-1, *Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets*. DOE plans to replace
the manual with a series of 18 guides, to be issued according to DOE's
priorities among the various topics to be addressed. DOE's goal is to
develop and publish all the guides by the end of fiscal year 2008.

A number of these guides will address safety-in-design topics. In
particular, DOE Guide 413.3-1, *Managing Design and Construction: A
Systems Approach*, will provide Federal Project Directors with guidance
on employing a systems engineering approach to the management of DOE
projects. The early integration of safety into design and construction
is one of the tenets of the systems engineering approach, and this topic
will be emphasized within the context of DOE's Integrated Safety
Management System. This guide, along with other guides that address
safety-in-design topics, will be consistent with DOE-STD-1189.

**2.4 DEVELOPMENT OF DOE STANDARD 1189**

DOE-STD-1189 is a fundamental element in the integration of safety
throughout DOE's acquisition management system and is key to the timely
identification, evaluation, and adjudication of safety-related design
issues early in a project's life. This new standard will provide
expectations for incorporating safety into design for DOE's Hazard
Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities whose intended functions involve
the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical. The
standard will ensure that hazards are identified early in a project and
that an integrated team approach is used to design safety into a
facility from the earliest conceptual phases of facility design. Some of
the key concepts included in the draft standard are as follows:

-   The importance of the Integrated Project Team (IPT), supported by
    the design contractor, including a Safety Design Integration Team.
    The latter team comprises safety and design subject matter experts
    and is the heart of the safety and design integration effort.

-   The development of a Safety Design Strategy for addressing important
    safety issues as a project progresses and developing key safety
    documentation. This strategy will be initiated during the
    preconceptual design stage and updated and refined through the
    conceptual design stage. It may become part of the Project Execution
    Plan.

-   The development, early in the process, of facility-level Design
    Basis Accidents that provide the necessary input to the application
    of guidance for the classification of important safety functions.
    These classifications (safety-class, safety-significant, seismic
    design classifications) provide design expectations for safety
    structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

-   The development of objective radiological dose and chemical exposure
    guidelines for both the public and collocated workers to hazardous
    materials for the safety and design classification of SSCs. These
    criteria relate to both the public and collocated worker safety
    design considerations.

-   The development of guidance for the preparation of a Conceptual
    Safety Design Report for inclusion in the Critical Decision-1
    package, a Preliminary Safety Design Report for inclusion in the
    Critical Decision-2 package, and the Preliminary Documented Safety
    Analysis at the final design (Critical Decision-3) approval stage.
    These reports are required by DOE Order 413.3A for new or major
    modifications of DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities.
    They must be approved by DOE as part of the formal project
    authorization process. The intent of these reports and their
    approvals is to ensure that decisions regarding project safety are
    identified and dealt with in the early stages of design and
    maintained during construction and startup testing. The objective is
    to reduce the likelihood of costly late reversals of design
    decisions involving safety.

-   The identification of technical risks involving safety-in-design
    issues early in a project, along with potential alternatives, should
    the desired path not prove successful. This includes any impact on
    the safety strategy resulting from a technology failure.

    These concepts and processes will help ensure that project
    management integrates safety into design and construction activities
    early in the design process, resulting in improved accuracy of
    project cost estimates. These activities will also provide the Board
    a better opportunity to engage with DOE and to bring its expertise
    to bear earlier in the safety design.

    The draft standard was issued for comment into DOE's RevCom System
    in March 2007, and the comment period ended on May 31, 2007. A large
    number of comments were received, and the comment resolution process
    is ongoing. The final standard is expected to be issued by late
    calendar year 2007.

    Once DOE-STD-1189 is issued, DOE plans to implement it into ongoing
    projects in a phased manner consistent with the design stage of the
    project. DOE line organizations will identify affected projects and
    the current design stage, evaluate the current status of each
    project, its projected hazard category, and the associated safety
    issues currently identified, and establish the necessary actions to
    implement DOE-STD-1189. At a minimum, each line organization will
    take the following implementation actions based on the design stage
    of ongoing projects:

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-   For projects in the mission need stage, DOE-STD-1189 will be
    implemented.

-   For projects in the conceptual design stage, DOE-STD-1189 will be
    implemented based on a specific evaluation of each project. As these
    projects advance into the preliminary design stage, the applicable
    portions of DOE-STD-1189 will be implemented.

-   For projects in the preliminary design stage, the applicable content
    and format specified in DOE-STD-1189 will be used in the preparation
    of the Preliminary Safety Design Report.

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-   For projects in the final design stage, the applicable content and
    format specified in DOE-STD-1189 will be used in the preparation of
    the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis.

    **2.5 NEW DESIGN DEMONSTRATION EFFORTS**

    DOE and the Board are being proactive in promoting the early
    integration of safety into design and the timeliness of issue
    resolution. The Board, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management, and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs agreed
    to select two projects to demonstrate the early integration of
    safety into design, as well as better communication and more timely
    issue resolution. The goal is to develop a common understanding of a
    process that will serve as a template for future defense nuclear
    projects and to evaluate DOE's revised directives on project
    management through application to specific projects. The two
    projects selected for this demonstration effort are:

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-   The Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex. This project is in the conceptual design stage and awaits
    Critical Decision-1 approval by DOE's Deputy Secretary.

-   The Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (also called the Sodium Bearing
    Waste Treatment Project) at Idaho National Laboratory. DOE-EM
    approved Critical Decision-2/3B for this project in late December
    2006.

    The Board, DOE headquarters personnel, federal project personnel,
    and contractor personnel are meeting periodically to discuss the
    Uranium Processing Facility and the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit.
    These meetings focus on developing a mutual understanding of the
    safety requirements for these new facilities and establishing, in
    detail, common expectations for early design maturity and early
    identification of safety issues and their resolution.

The Uranium Processing Facility is an ideal candidate since it is a
large, complex nuclear project for which the conceptual design was being
completed. The project is currently awaiting authorization to proceed to
preliminary design. The demonstration process included both a formal
component at the executive level between the organizations and a
complementary informal element operating between the staffs. As a result
of this process, lines of communication were opened at multiple levels,
and issues raised by the Board relating to the

project were identified early. DOE has committed to considering all of
these formal and informal discussions before authorizing the project to
move forward into its preliminary design phase. The process has enabled
the Board's staff to provide its observations on seismic criteria,
structural details, accident modeling and dispersion algorithms,
confinement, quality assurance, and fire protection. The discussions
have also resulted in the project team incorporating rigorous analysis
and detail into the Conceptual Safety Design Report in preparation for
approval of the conceptual design. As a result of these interactions and
progress made in the past several months, the Board has been able to
conclude that the safety basis controls now identified for the facility
provide an adequate basis for continuing the design process from the
conceptual design phase into the preliminary design phase.

The design for the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit was at a level of
maturity that allowed the Board to review in sufficient detail and agree
with its safety posture. At the time the demonstration effort was
initiated, the project was working toward completion of the preliminary
design (Critical Decision-2) and accordingly had a more complete design
than is typical at the end of conceptual design. The Board and DOE
believe that this project's success, up through completion of
preliminary design, is due to the following:

-   A strong, experienced DOE and contractor Integrated Project Team.

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-   Conservative assumptions made early in the project resulting in a
    conservative safety design strategy.

-   Involvement in the project and in decisions that could affect safety
    by DOE headquarters personnel.

-   A pilot scale plant, constructed and operated to address technical
    unknowns with the treatment process.

-   A DOE commissioned independent peer review by a team of experts to
    validate the basis of the seismic and structural design.

-   Early completion of the facility safety basis to support the
    facility's preliminary design.

-   Timely access by the Board to design documents that allowed early
    identification of issues.

-   Good communication among DOE, the contractor, and the Board that
    allowed early and frequent discussion of the safety basis, safety
    controls and analyses as they were being developed.

Among the lessons learned from these demonstration efforts, it is clear
that to ensure safety is embedded fully into the design process, the
following must be accomplished as early as practicable: (1) definition
of safety requirements, (2) identification of safety systems, and (3)
management's review and acceptance of the planned facility's safety
posture. These are in fact the principles that have been or are being
institutionalized in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE-STD-1189. Further lessons
learned include the following:

-   The Safety Design Strategy offers an approach such that informed
    decisions can be made by DOE and independently evaluated by the
    Board as early as possible in the design process.

-   More resources may need to be expended during conceptual design to
    achieve this more complete design and safety strategy earlier in a
    project's life.

-   Appropriately conservative design assumptions need to be made in the
    early stages of a project to provide an effective safety control
    strategy and help accommodate project unknowns that are inevitable
    at this point in the design process.

-   DOE should consider further use of detailed technical reviews by
    independent experts and, as needed, laboratory testing and the
    development of a pilot plant to address uncertainties and identify
    possible adverse conditions. DOE should also consider more use of
    sufficiently developed contingency plans that provide a viable
    alternative in case the desired outcome is not achieved.

-   The Board should be involved as early as possible in the design
    review process to facilitate early identification of issues.

-   DOE, the contractor, and the Board must communicate early and
    frequently while the safety controls and analyses are being
    developed.

These demonstration efforts also reinforced some of the fundamental
principles of good project management embodied in the revision of DOE
Order 413.3, such as the following:

-   DOE and the contractor need to have technically strong, experienced
    project team members who are assigned early in the design process.

-   DOE headquarters personnel need to be involved early in the project,
    including involvement in decisions that could affect safety.

-   In addition to cost and schedule risks, project risk management
    plans need to identify the technical risks due to design assumptions
    and uncertainties.

**3. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOE AND THE
BOARD**

This section briefly describes interactions between DOE and the Board
involved in the identification and resolution of safety issues resulting
from the Board's review of DOE's defense nuclear facility designs. The
discussion is presented in three parts: (1) the identification of safety
issues by the Board, (2) the communication of these issues to DOE, and
(3) the subsequent resolution and closure of the issues.

**3.1 ISSUE IDENTIFICATION**

**3.1.1. Safety Reviews of Defense Nuclear Facility Designs**

The requirement to design and construct defense nuclear facilities in a
manner that will support safe and efficient operations for 20 to 50
years demands an exacting design process, guided by Integrated Safety
Management principles that will ensure the identification of appropriate
safety controls.

DOE's design process is an iterative process from identification of a
mission need through design, construction, and startup of a facility.
Several defined key milestones (critical decisions) throughout the
process are intended to provide for formal DOE decisions that involve
assessing the need for a design, the progress of the design, the
schedule for completion, the likelihood of success, and the cost. The
project phases represent a logical maturation of the project design.
Each critical decision point marks an increased DOE commitment to the
next phase of the project.

For each critical decision, certain requirements must be satisfied
before the project can proceed. As discussed earlier, DOE Order 413.3A
was recently revised as a result of efforts by the Board and DOE to
clarify the specific information that must be available at each critical
decision. The revised Order will help improve the timely identification
of safety issues during the design of defense nuclear facilities by
clearly specifying the specific safety and design documents that must be
available for each critical decision.

Both DOE and the Board have as a goal resolving outstanding safety
issues related to defense nuclear projects as early in the design phase
as practicable. The recent changes made to DOE Order 413.3A require
earlier development of important safety attributes that are formally
approved by DOE. The Order now requires preparation of a Conceptual
Safety Design Report and a Preliminary Safety Validation Report to
support Critical Decision-1. The Order also identifies formal DOE
acceptance of the safety basis of the facility. When final, and in full
force, the implementation of DOE-STD-1189 will ensure the timely
identification, evaluation, and adjudication of design issues early in a
project's life.

DOE and the Board understand and agree that identifying and resolving
potential safety issues early in the design process is preferable to
identifying and resolving them later. Accordingly, both organizations
are committed to being vigilant in reviewing defense nuclear projects
early in the design process. Furthermore, as delineated in DOE Policy
450.4, *Safety Management System Policy*, DOE understands that it is
better to eliminate hazards through design from the beginning than to
mitigate them later in the design. As a result of efforts by the Board
and DOE, DOE has placed increased emphasis on establishing a
well-qualified, technically competent Integrated Project Team, which
specifically includes safety professionals, as early as possible.

Notwithstanding these efforts, potential safety issues can arise during
the evolution of a project. As described below, these issues are
identified by DOE contractors, DOE line management, and the Board as the
project design proceeds.

**3.1.2 Factors that can affect the timeliness of issue identification**

During discussions between DOE and the Board, several factors were
identified that help ensure the timely identification of safety issues.
These factors include (1) a clear understanding of what and when certain
design information will be available, (2) clear and adequate DOE safety
requirements, and (3) early and ready access to information.

A clear understanding of what and when certain design information is to
be available is necessary to ensure timely safety reviews. DOE prepared
DOE Order 413.3A envisioning that the details for implementing the
safety-in-design principles of that order would be incorporated into
DOE-STD-1189. Specifically, DOE-STD-1189 includes detailed instructions
regarding the purpose and content of the safety and design documents
that are required to be issued for each critical decision. Together, DOE
Order 413.3A and DOE-STD-1189 will identify the safety and design
analyses and documents that are required and when they are required to
support approval of specific critical decisions. These requirements will
then be translated into real-time deliverables in a project's schedule.

The determination of whether a safety issue exists can also be
significantly delayed if there are problems with the clarity or adequacy
of safety requirements or uncertainties in their applicability or
interpretation. DOE requirements defining the nuclear safety design for
a project include, at the top level, the Nuclear Safety Rule (Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations \[CFR\], Part 830); DOE Order 420.1B,
*Facility Safety*; and the documents referenced therein. Also at the
top-level tier for nuclear projects are DOE Order 413.3A and
DOE-STD-1189, which specify technical documents used by DOE to approve a
project's safety approach. This set of DOE rules, directives, and
standards establishes the safety design requirements that, when met,
result in an appropriately conservative safety basis. Below these
top-level requirements are other directives, guides, and standards,
including DOE and industry technical standards.

At the project level, site office contracting officers, supported by the
requirements described below, are responsible for identifying the set of
applicable DOE directives and standards that establish clear contract
expectations for safety in design and construction. To ensure that the
appropriate contract requirements are invoked, DOE has now established
CTAs in each of the major line offices. The CTAs are responsible for
concurring on decisions regarding applicability, inclusion, and
exceptions to DOE directives and standards related to nuclear safety
requirements invoked through Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation
(DEAR) clause (Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations \[CFR\],
970.5204-2), "Laws, regulations and DOE directives." DOE is developing
DOE Order 410.1, *CTA Responsibilities Regarding Nuclear Safety
Requirements*, to institutionalize its procedures for implementing these
responsibilities and ensuring that contracting officers, supported by
the CTAs, incorporate all applicable nuclear safety requirements into
contracts for DOE facilities.

Concerning uncertainties in the interpretation of safety requirements,
the Board is required by its enabling statute to review and evaluate the
content and implementation of health and safety standards, including
DOE's orders, rules, and other safety requirements, practices, and
events relating to system design, construction, operation, and
decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. In response to the
Board's public meetings concerning integration of safety into the design
of defense nuclear facilities, DOE acknowledged that safety was not
being integrated consistently into its new defense nuclear facilities.
Upon issuance of DOE-STD-1189, DOE will make conforming changes to
impacted directives and technical standards to provide a coordinated
process for the integration of safety early in the design of defense
nuclear facilities.

Early identification of safety issues associated with a design requires
that information related to the design be available for review. The
Board carries out its duties by gathering the kinds of information
needed to apply its scientific and engineering expertise. While the
Board's enabling legislation provides the broad authority to obtain
ready access to information the Board deems appropriate in carrying out
its work and the traditional legal instruments that ensure timely access
to that information, the legislation emphasizes that a cooperative
relationship between the Board and DOE is expected.

DOE and the Board share a common goal of ensuring adequate protection
the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment at DOE
defense nuclear facilities. To this end, frequent dialogue between the
Board and DOE during the design of defense nuclear projects serves both
organizations well. Accordingly:

-   The Board's staff routinely attends project engineering, safety, and
    status meetings during the design process. For example, the staff
    participated in the technical project review for the Uranium
    Processing Facility in March 2007---the first of its sort in NNSA
    after the issuance of DOE Order 413.3A in July 2006.

-   The Board's staff and the Board members convene periodic meetings on
    project design issues during the design process.

-   Starting with the preparation of the second quarterly project review
    report forwarded to Congress by the Board, senior members of the
    Board's staff and senior DOE staff began sharing status information
    on active projects that are reported. These quarterly status
    meetings will continue after the issuance of this joint report to
    Congress.

-   DOE project teams, such as that for the Uranium Processing Facility,
    and the Board's staff meet regularly to keep one another apprised of
    the status of safety issues.

-   DOE project teams and their headquarters program officials
    facilitate visits by the Board members and the Board's staff to DOE
    sites or design firm offices to review the status of design
    activities. The Board uses these visits and other activities as the
    basis for "project letters" transmitted periodically to DOE prior to
    a request for a critical decision to provide an assessment of the
    Board's position on the project, including the identification of any
    significant safety issues (these communications are discussed
    further in the next section).

**3.2 ISSUE COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT**

An important element of any issue management system is the communication
and tracking of issues. The Board identifies issues through a number of
different mechanisms, and the management and eventual closure of the
issues is a process that requires attention by both DOE and the Board.
This section discusses the Board's communication of issues to DOE and
mechanisms for tracking these issues.

**3.2.1 The Board's Communication of Issues to DOE**

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides the Board with a
number of tools for communicating issues, concerns, and information to
the Secretary of Energy. These tools include recommendations, public
hearings, reporting requirements, letters, and staff-to-staff
interaction. In accordance with the letter and intent of the act and
other controlling law, the Board's choice of how to communicate issues
and information to the Secretary is driven by their significance and
immediacy.

The Board's action-forcing authority is most formal in the
recommendation process. The act prescribes when and how the Board is to
provide to the Secretary of Energy, and ultimately to the President,
issues it has identified that have or may adversely affect the health
and safety of the public and workers. The act prescribes how and when
the public and others are to be informed and given the opportunity for
meaningful comment.

The recommendation process is invoked when the Board determines that it
has identified an issue or concern that requires action by the Secretary
to provide adequate protection of the health and safety of the public
and workers. Recommendations typically address issues that are

broad and comprehensive as they affect the DOE's defense nuclear
complex. As prescribed by the act, the Board's recommendation is
provided to the Secretary, then to the public for comment. Public
comments are forwarded to the Secretary. The Secretary then must respond
to the Board and, if in agreement with the Board, proceed to develop an
implementation plan for the recommendation. This is an iterative
process.

The Board has also developed a series of technical reports addressing
various aspects of DOE's operation of the defense nuclear complex that
impact public health and safety. These reports provide in-depth
discussion of current health and safety problems affecting one or more
defense nuclear facilities or generic topics such as fundamentals for
understanding standards-based safety management at defense nuclear
facilities.

Incidental to the Board's work, the Board receives information on health
or safety issues from individuals. Many of these issues are raised by
workers at the sites or within DOE or contractor organizations. The
Board respects all requests for confidentiality. Nevertheless, upon the
Board's determination that the concern is valid the concern is
communicated to DOE in a way that facilitates timely remediation and
protects the identity of the reporting individual.

Besides written communications, the Board and its staff routinely
communicate with DOE and its contractors at both the headquarters and
field levels. These exchanges provide an effective means for the Board
and its staff to gather information on emerging health and safety
issues, as well as to provide additional information to DOE staff and
contractors concerning health and safety issues and related questions.

As a result of the current effort to improve the timeliness of issue
identification and resolution, the Board has begun issuing the project
letters mentioned above to apprise DOE, where appropriate, of the status
of safety issues raised by the Board. The purpose of these project
letters is to ensure that DOE is aware of any unresolved safety issues
and to assist DOE at critical decision points in evaluating the
readiness of a project to move forward. The project letters can then be
updated as design, construction, testing, and startup proceed. The Board
has recently issued initial project letters prior to Critical Decision-2
for the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability project at the
Savannah River Site, the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit project at the
Idaho Closure Project Site, and the Salt Waste Processing Facility
project at the Savannah River Site.

The Board continues to be sensitive to the need for public involvement
in and awareness of defense nuclear safety issues. The Board's written
communications to DOE, as well as weekly reports from the Board's site
representatives, are made available to the public via the Board's
website. The Board has also used open meetings, described earlier, as a
forum for communication on its activities. In addition, the Board has
continued its practice of meeting with state and local officials, labor
leaders, DOE facility workers, public interest groups, and area
residents to exchange information and to inform interested parties about
its work.

**3.2.2 Mechanisms for Tracking Issues**

DOE established its commitment management tool, the Safety Issues
Management System (SIMS), in August 1995. The Departmental
Representative conducts reviews of DOE's implementation plans and
outgoing letters to the Board to identify and capture DOE's commitments
to the Board. Incoming letters from the Board are also evaluated to
identify those requiring a written response. Commitments and other
actions identified from these documents are entered into the SIMS
database, along with the required completion date, the party responsible
for action, and other pertinent information. Monthly reports on the
status of the implementation and completion of commitments are
distributed to responsible DOE managers, Secretarial Officers, and other
designated personnel. Quarterly SIMS reports are also prepared to focus
DOE management attention where needed. DOE and Board personnel can
access detailed SIMS information and use various view, sort, and report
formats via an online, Internet-based user interface.

DOE Order 226.1, *Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight
Policy,* requires DOE site contractors to ensure that a comprehensive,
structured issues management system is in place. This system provides
for the timely and effective resolution of deficiencies and is an
integral part of the contractor assurance system. Program and
performance deficiencies, including those identified by the Board, must
be captured in a system that provides for effective analysis,
resolution, and tracking. Site issues management systems include
structured processes for the following:

-   Determining the risk, significance, and priority of deficiencies.

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-   Evaluating the scope and extent of a condition or deficiency.

-   Identifying root causes of a deficiency.

-   Identifying suitable actions to correct and prevent the recurrence
    of a deficiency.

-   Identifying individuals/organizations responsible for implementing
    those actions.

-   Establishing milestone and completion dates for the correction of
    deficiencies.

-   Tracking progress on the correction of deficiencies.

-   Verifying that corrective actions have been completed.

    Issues management systems provide a process for determining the
    impact of identified deficiencies and taking timely action to
    address conditions of immediate concern, such as stopping work,
    shutting down activities, or revising a procedure. The systems
    include processes for communicating issues to senior managers with
    sufficient information to allow them to make informed decisions.

    The heads of DOE's field offices review and concur on descriptions
    of contractor assurance programs, including issues management
    programs. Depending on how authority has been delegated, senior DOE
    and NNSA headquarters personnel or site managers:

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-   Initially approve and thereafter annually review and approve
    descriptions of contractor assurance programs.

-   Conduct periodic adequacy reviews of contractor assurance programs
    and processes for consistency across the complex, and ensure that
    they reflect industry best practices.

Most DOE projects maintain their own issues management systems that
include the attributes discussed above. These project-specific systems
are typically established by the Federal Project Director and structured
to support specific projects needs. For example, some of the projects
capture and track to conclusion requests for information made by the
Board's site representatives and issues/questions raised by the Board's
staff during reviews of design documents. Periodically, project
personnel review the open issues within their purview. The frequency of
such reviews is determined by current project conditions.

DOE Facility Representatives also identify and track nuclear safety
issues. The DOE Facility Representatives are assigned to oversee, but
not manage, day-to-day contractor operations at DOE's hazardous nuclear
(and non-nuclear) facilities. In addition, DOE's CTAs, through their
Chiefs of Nuclear Safety, maintain operational awareness and provide
technical support to line managers in the identification and resolution
of nuclear safety issues at their respective facilities.

The Board also tracks DOE's progress toward meeting commitments. The
Board tracks DOE's actions to implement recommendations, its progress in
responding to reporting requirements, and its responses to less formal
written communications in a similar manner:

-   Each commitment described in DOE's implementation plan for a
    recommendation, a reporting requirement, or any other written
    communication is entered into a database.

-   For each commitment, the source document is cited, and a staff lead
    and commitment due date are identified. As data are gathered,
    date-stamped notes can be entered into the database and associated
    with a specific commitment.

-   The staff lead updates the database as events dictate, but at a
    minimum on a bimonthly basis.

-   When the Board and its staff are satisfied that the
    actions/deliverables provided in relation to a specific commitment
    are adequate, the commitment is annotated as "closed" in the
    database.

-   The Board's Technical Director and Group Leads review the status of
    all open commitments on a regular basis.

    The Board rarely issues letters for which no action by DOE is
    expected in response. Therefore, most of the Board's letters to DOE
    result in an entry in the tracking database.

**3.2.3 Factors That Affect Issue Communication and Tracking**

Figure 2 illustrates multiple levels of communication on safety issues
within and between DOE and the Board. These communications take place at
three primary levels, discussed below.

> ![](media/image2.wmf){width="5.583333333333333in"
> height="4.041666666666667in"}

**Figure 2: Levels of Communication on Safety Issues within and between
DOE and the Board**

**Presidential Appointee Level (or Institutional Level).** This is the
highest level of communication on safety issues between DOE and the
Board. DOE's presidential appointees include the Secretary of Energy,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, Under Secretary of Energy, Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security, and Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management. The Board's presidential appointees are the Board members.
Only a small portion of safety issues must be communicated at the
institutional level because they cannot be adequately resolved at lower
levels. The main communication mechanisms at this level are formal
letters between senior agency officials (such as from the Chairman of
the Board to the Secretary of Energy). In addition, the Board may
request briefings by DOE on specific topics, during which issues or
concerns may be communicated. As previously described, DOE tracks
commitments made in formal letters using the SIMS database.

**Senior Staff Level.** This is the middle level of communication on
safety issues between DOE and the Board. DOE's senior staff includes
responsible managers in the agency's line organizations between the
cognizant Federal Project Director and the Chief Operating Officer or

Principal Program Deputy. For example, within DOE's Office of
Environmental Management, personnel at the senior staff level include
Deputy Assistant Secretaries, such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Safety Management and Operations. The Board's senior staff members
include the Technical Director and the Group Leads for the different
topical areas, such as Nuclear Facility Design and Infrastructure and
Nuclear Weapons Programs.

At this senior staff level, DOE and the Board are taking additional
actions to identify unresolved technical issues more completely,
including establishing a formal framework for regular staff-to-staff
interaction on the status of such issues, using the Board's initial
quarterly report to Congress as a starting point. This process will
incorporate appropriate procedures for issue tracking and resolution and
include the development of a database tool for design safety issues that
will capture additional information for effective management of the
resolution of unresolved issues. This database tool will be modeled on
SIMS and use technology already proven in this application.

**Local, Working Level.** This is the lowest level of communication on
safety issues between DOE and the Board. DOE and contractor
representatives at this level include all personnel directly involved
with the design and construction of projects up to the Federal Project
Director, who is typically part of DOE's site office organization. The
Board's representatives at this level include the local site
representatives, as well as various technical experts on the Board's
staff. The vast majority of identified safety issues relative to design
and construction are communicated and resolved at the local working
level between the Board's staff and DOE/contractor staff through a
variety of mechanisms, including face-to-face discussions. Issues
identified at this level may be entered into local tracking systems
specific to the project or site-wide systems established under DOE Order
226.1.

**3.3 ISSUE RESOLUTION AND CLOSURE**

Once a safety issue has been identified, communicated, and captured in a
tracking system, what remains is its resolution and ultimate closure.
Discussions between the Board and DOE have explored actions that could
improve the mutual understanding of what activities remain to achieve
issue resolution and closure.

Based on a review of past practices in issue resolution and closure, DOE
and the Board are taking action to improve the timeliness of issue
resolution through periodic joint reviews of open issues. These joint
reviews should help prevent outstanding issues from languishing, and
should provide several additional benefits, such as the following:

-   Identifying more completely and accurately those unresolved
    technical issues related to the incorporation of safety into design
    and construction projects.

-   Promoting open communication and information sharing to characterize
    and resolve issues more effectively.

-   Resolving issues at the lowest possible level while maintaining
    effective communication and awareness.

To facilitate these joint Board/DOE reviews, a list of significant
unresolved issues, derived from the appendix to the Board's quarterly
report to Congress, "Summary of Significant Unresolved Issues," will be
routinely updated to support periodic discussions between the Board and
DOE. During these periodic discussions, the status of unresolved issues
will be reviewed. These discussions will include federal project
directors or their representatives.

**4. OTHER ACTIONS BEING CONSIDERED TO STRENGTHEN AND IMPROVE TECHNICAL
SAFETY OVERSIGHT**

**4.1 4.1 ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO DOE'S PROJECT MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE**

During the last two years, the efforts by the Board and DOE to improve
the timeliness of identification and resolution of safety issues have
resulted in the establishment of several new expectations and
requirements, as delineated in DOE O 413.3A and the drafted
DOE-STD-1189. The Board and DOE are committed to the continuous
improvement of DOE's project management directives. As experience is
gained in implementing the requirements of DOE Order 413.3A and
DOE-STD-1189, and as the DOE 413.3 Guides are developed, DOE and the
Board will continue to identify improvements to the project management
directives.

DOE recognizes that a conceptual design and associated early safety
strategy needs to be adequately developed so that cost-dominant safety
systems are identified and included in the project cost range.
DOE-STD-1189 is designed to accomplish this. To this end, DOE and the
Board are mindful of the amount of work that must be accomplished early
in the design process. DOE and the Board will monitor the implementation
of DOE O 413.3A and DOE-STD-1189 to ensure that safety in design issues
are adequately addressed.

**4.2 4.2 CHANGES TO DOE DRAFT ORDER 140 (DOE/BOARD INTERFACE ORDER)**

To clarify the interface between DOE and the Board relating to the
incorporation of safety into project design and to promote timely issue
resolution without having to elevate an issue to the senior management
level, DOE draft Order 140 will be revised to describe specific
activities DOE will take to improve communication and cooperation with
the Board, as outlined in this report. The order will promote more open
communication and information sharing, with the objective of promoting
effective characterization and the early identification of unresolved
issues. Open communication reduces the time required to identify safety
issues and facilitates rapid escalation to the necessary level for issue
resolution. This will provide a mechanism for resolving issues at the
lowest possible level while maintaining effective vertical communication
within the organization.

**4.3 4.3 NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGES**

The Conference Report on the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 asked DOE and the Board to consider whether
either or both organizations might benefit from legislative changes to
existing law designed to improve the organizational protocols between
the two agencies or to improve their respective abilities to embed
safety considerations more completely into the designs of defense
nuclear facilities. The agencies have also considered whether different
organizational structures and authorities than are currently

authorized under law might be useful for managing nuclear safety. The
Board and DOE have concluded that rigorous adherence to the existing
responsibilities and powers set forth in existing law will foster the
early identification and resolution of safety issues without the need
for legislative changes. Additionally, both agencies have concluded that
rigorous implementation of DOE Order 413.3A, as supported by the
issuance of DOE-STD-1189, as well as strengthening of the issue
management process as described in this report (i.e., project letters,
status reports, periodic status meetings), will enhance the early
incorporation of safety into design.

**4.4 USE OF THE BOARD'S FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Conference Report on the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, urged the Board to evaluate whether more
frequent use of the Board's formal recommendation process would drive
both DOE and the Board to a more structured process for issue
resolution. The recommendation process is central to the Board's
oversight of public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities. As
an initial step in the recommendation process, the Board's enabling
legislation requires the Board to determine that a recommendation is
necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.
In most cases, health and safety issues affecting design and
construction projects have been raised by the Board and resolved by DOE
in a timely manner without the need to resort to formal recommendations.
Furthermore, DOE has generally been cooperative with and responsive to
the Board's findings. Many important safety issues have been identified
and resolved, resulting in important improvements in the safety of
defense nuclear facilities and thereby providing for adequate protection
of the public health and safety.

The Board and DOE believe that the congressional concerns related to the
timeliness of safety issue resolution will be addressed with the process
improvements identified in this report. Because these improvements are
also expected to facilitate transparency, allowing public and
congressional review, the Board and DOE agree that public involvement
will also be satisfied. Both the Board and DOE are committed to the
timely resolution of safety issues at defense nuclear facilities. Should
situations occur in which issues identified by the Board are not being
resolved expeditiously or in such a manner as to ensure adequate
protection of the public health and safety, the Board will continue to
carry out its statutory obligation and issue formal recommendations as
are necessary.