*Strategic Discussion Points*

## *for the*

## *Cart Creek Fire Staff Ride* 

**[Strategic Discussion at Stand #1]{.underline}**

-   There are significant surface features in this general area such as
    large areas of exposed red rock juxtaposed with stands of dense
    forest, deep narrow canyons and an adjacent large body of cold
    water. Other than a cumulus downdraft (which may or may not have
    been present on the afternoon of July 16^th^ 1977) what factors
    could lead to a rapid increase in wind speed and change in wind
    direction?

**[Strategic Discussion at Stand #2]{.underline}**

-   The fuel conditions on this site today are very similar to the
    conditions that existed immediately prior to the Cart Creek Fire.
    You can imagine that under a light west wind, temperature of 78˚,
    relative humidity of 33% and mostly sunny skies, the intensity of
    the fire would allow for direct attack. Was the strategy of direct
    attack along one flank and an indirect attack along the ridge using
    natural barriers reasonable based on the expected fire behavior?

**[Strategic Discussion at Stand #3]{.underline}**

-   From the moment the helicopter dropped the firefighters off at this
    location they were defenseless against a sudden wind change. There
    was nothing between them and the fire except a bed of flashy fuels.
    Their only real safety zone was inside of the fire itself. How could
    this safety concern have been mitigated?

-   Thousands of times every year firefighters hike through unburned
    flashy fuels to reach the edge of a wildland fire. This is a routine
    event. What lessons from the Cart Creek Fire can be shared with
    firefighters to give them an appreciation of the high potential
    hazards associated with walking through flashy fuels into fire area?

**[Strategic Discussion at Stand #4]{.underline}**

-   Gene Campbell and Dave Noel both had considerable fire experience;
    Dave was carded as a Sector Boss. They likely both had experiences
    working many fires under very similar fuel and weather conditions.
    How could this base of experience influenced their decisions on the
    Cart Creek Fire?

-   In 1997, a remote automated weather station was installed
    approximately one mile south of this location. July observations
    from this station show that there are frequently early afternoon
    wind increases and significant wind shifts in this area. How might
    this information have changed the suppression strategy on the Cart
    Creek Fire?

**[Strategic Discussion at Stand #5]{.underline}**

-   In 1979, the recently established National Wildfire Coordinating
    Group chartered a task force to examine a rash of wildland fire
    accidents that occurred during the late 1970s. The Cart Creek Fire
    was one of those fires along with several other notable fires
    including the 1976 Battlement Creek Fire in Colorado, the 1977 Bass
    River Fire in New Jersey, the 1977 Honda Canyon Fire in California,
    the 1979 Spanish Ranch Fire in California, and the 1979 Shipp Island
    Fire in Idaho. Their *Report of the Task Force on study of
    Fatal/Near Fatal Wildland Fire Accidents* gave 22 specific
    recommendations. How do you think these recommendations might
    compare to recommendations in other similar reports such as the 1957
    Report of the Fire Task Force to Reduce the Chances of Men Being
    Burned While Fighting Forest Fires; the 1967 Report of the Fire
    Safety Review Team; or the 1995 Interagency Management Review Team
    Report?