![](media/image1.png){width="0.8486111111111111in"
height="0.7201388888888889in"}

**NASA Exploration Systems Enterprise**

**Request for Information**

**RFI04212004**

##### 

This page intentionally left blank

##### A Breakthrough Acquisition Strategy

##### Using Independent Space Transportation Operators

##### Making Affordable and Sustainable Space Transportation Possible

**\* \* \* S I N G L E S H E E T S UMMA R Y \* \* \***

<Carey.M.McCleskey@nasa.gov> , Code YA-D4, Systems Engineering Office,
Technical Mgr.

NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, U.S.A.

Phone: (321) 867-6370

**[Request For Information (RFI) Focus Area]{.underline}: Program
Management, Acquisition, and Interfaces**

**[RESPONSE SUMMARY]{.underline}**---Progress in achieving affordable
space transportation (i.e., cost-per-flight *[and]{.underline}*
cost-per-pound) for space exploration, commercialization and defense has
been stalled. While many promising technical strategies must be pursued,
this Request for Information (RFI) response suggests that a new business
strategy using *independent operators* could be the breakthrough means
that allows innovative technical approaches to be embraced that focus on
operability, supportability and dependability. Explored are the near-
and long-term programmatic benefits of establishing independent
operators for space transportation; i.e., business organizations that
operate and maintain space transportation system assets independently
from flight system manufacturers. These independent operators do not
profit from production of flight hardware but rather profit from
producing flights for paying customers (either on government contract or
in the marketplace).

More importantly, the enclosed paper indicates that a unique (but
rapidly fading) opportunity exists for independent operators to
influence design requirements for the space exploration systems that
NASA's Office of Exploration Systems (Code T) intends to acquire,
operate, and sustain. *[Code T must initiate action within weeks if it
is to impact currently planned proposal activities. If acted upon too
late, Code T loses a significant opportunity to instill discipline in
space transportation design activity for deriving operationally
effective solutions.]{.underline}* This would be due to the perpetuation
of the current space launch system acquisition status quo, where
entrenched manufacturing interests continually trumps operability and
supportability.

New business models, with profit motives driven less by hardware
consumption and more by space system utilization, can unleash
free-market economic forces to help NASA achieve its ambitious program
cost, schedule and risk goals, while staying tightly focused on the
needs of the operator. The paper discusses the pros and cons of using
independent operators as a breakthrough means for NASA's Exploration
Enterprise to achieve these objectives. This concept promotes
interdependent contracting arrangements between suppliers and operators
with natural economic incentives to pursue innovative technology
development, establish affordable and sustainable space architectures,
and promote internationally competitive space commerce growth by
providing greater investment choices and opportunities. To achieve this
Code T should recognize and encourage on-going
government-industry-academia partnerships for spaceport and range
technical development and seriously consider the benefits of pursuing
the Future Interagency Range and Spaceport Technology (FIRST) program
currently being formulated. Finally, the paper points to changes in
technology needs, as well as needed changes in system design strategies.

**[PROPOSAL]{.underline}---NASA's upcoming Office of Exploration Systems
proposal activity---particularly with regard to space transportation
systems RFPs, BAAs, and so forth---should partition a) flight element
concept definition activity from b) concept of operations development
and ground/surface support element concept definition activity. No
bidder of part (a) should be allowed to bid or earn profits from the
efforts of part (b) during the concept definition period. Further, NASA
should follow through with this separation of the means of space
transportation flight element production from the means of space
transportation operation during each phase of acquisition in order to
ensure that inherently operable, supportable, and dependable system
solutions emerge from NASA investments.**

## Information CONTENT

-   Introduction

-   Historical Examples

-   Potential Programmatic Improvements

-   Enabling Needed Technical Improvements

-   Need for Variation from Past Attempts

-   Recommended Influence on RFPs and BAAs

-   Conclusions

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

##### 

This page intentionally left blank

##### A Breakthrough Acquisition Strategy

##### Using Independent Space Transportation Operators

#####  Making Affordable and Sustainable Space Transportation Possible

C. M. McCleskey, Technical Manager

Systems Engineering Office

Spaceport Engineering and Technology Directorate

NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, U.S.A.

## Introduction

[Situation for Space Transportation Operators]{.underline}---Why are
inherently operable, dependable, and supportable systems not emerging in
anything other than marketing bullets for space transportation? Huge
programmatic investments are made. Billion dollar sales of hardware and
software products are made. Yet no system has proven to be inherently
operable and logistically sustainable enough for anything more than
monthly utilization at best of the resulting space assets (flight
elements and their support assets).[^1]

[A Vertical Space Transportation Industry]{.underline}---Today's space
launch providers (large and small the world over) currently design,
manufacture, and operate launch vehicle flight hardware. They also
design, manufacture, operate and maintain unique ground support
equipment (GSE). They even design, construct, activate, as well as
operate and maintain unique launch infrastructure, such as dedicated
launch platforms, custom launch pads, dedicated control rooms, vehicle
assembly facilities and so forth.

*[The Manufacturer's Business Motivation]{.underline}*---Separating the
manufacturing function from within this vertical business model, we can
see that the motivation is ultimately focused on production sales of
flight hardware and associated software products.[^2] Sales and profits,
from the manufacturer's point of view, is maximized by tying the sale of
a flight directly to the sale of flight hardware---preferably expended
after each flight. Manufacturing profits are compounded even more when
multiple flight elements are assembled at the launch site for each
flight (such as multiple rocket engines, solid strap-ons or multiple
common elements such as seen in EELV and Falcon concepts) and thus
consume even more hardware per flight. This then creates, from a
near-term perspective only, even greater hardware demand and thus more
hardware sales within a given market condition.

Past experience has also shown that ground support equipment (GSE)
creep---a process by which servicing and support equipment accumulates
during the design phase---represents an excellent opportunity for
cost-plus profit on government contracts for not only unplanned
equipment acquisition, but also for recurring upkeep and associated
services, as well.

On balance, the manufacturer's incentives are to make money by holding
down their manufacturing costs regardless of operations and support
impacts that occur well after the business commitment. This may also
partially explain the lack of Operational Readiness Demonstration (ORD)
requirements (which are demanded by the customer in most military
aircraft acquisitions and commercial airliner enterprises). This is due
to the fact that manufacturing interests dominate space launch business
decisions. There is little incentive for the manufacturer to be held
accountable downstream with regard to perceived "lesser priority"
operational outcomes, such as the total system responsiveness, total
accumulated infrastructure and logistics support systems. As long as the
customer gets a capability to deliver the "mission" hardware
successfully to space, all else can be compromised from the
manufacturing point of view.

*[The Operator's Business Motivation]{.underline}*---The space
transportation system operator, if we can envision that business
function in isolation for a moment, is concerned with owning and
operating space transportation system equipment (both flight and ground
support) and producing profit from sales of space flights for a
customer. Repeatedly purchasing equipment, and the cost to operate and
support that equipment, is to be minimized. The number of paid flights
by a customer base is to be maximized. Labor and equipment-intensive
assembly of flight elements and launch vehicles are to be minimized,
simplified, and preferably eliminated---i.e., "no assembly required."
Complex flight systems, such as liquid propulsion and power management
systems need to be simple to service and operate; even though it may be
perceived by the vehicle manufacturer (and their traditional parts
supply chain) as having less profit potential for flight and ground
hardware production.

In other words, the business motives of the space flight system
manufacturer are very different from the prime motives of the system
operators within the same industry. Can these differences be reconciled?

[A Compromise Solution or a Win-Win Solution?]{.underline}---The natural
tendency in the current vertical business arrangement, since both the
manufacturing elements and the operating elements are embodied under one
industrial house, is to strike a balance and compromise. The compromise
process, however, has not proven to be win-win. Today's business
equation tends to favor increased profits for higher-margin
manufacturing at the expense of higher downstream operating costs.
Separating these functions into independent enterprises would bring
economic forces to bear on both sides of the equation, allowing
optimization of both classes of the enterprise. This would likely
encourage business growth and, perhaps, international leadership.

*Compromise in Requirements*---In today's environment, the process of
compromise usually begins with the conceptual requirements for new space
transportation system architectures, with experience teaching us that
the business needs of the manufacturer continually dominate and delay
specification of operations and support requirements to the "next
phase," since the particulars of a flight system solution are the
center-of-attention.

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="1.7694444444444444in"
height="3.5in"}*Discipline and Accountability in Aircraft
Acquisitions*---This degree of flight system design and manufacturing
dominance is not true, however, for aircraft. For commercial aircraft
sales, for example, independent airlines must be brought into the
conceptual design process and sold on the proposed product before major
commitment to detailed design and production. The airline's requirements
(that is, the independent operator's requirements) must be met, or there
is no deal. Additionally, airworthiness requirements must be
demonstrated before the system is fielded, offering further evidence to
prospective purchasers of the operational compatibility of the product
with business operations.

The same is largely true for military aircraft equipment buys, even for
relatively new concepts like the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor vertical/short
takeoff or landing (V/STOL) vehicle. In the V-22 case the DoD was not
satisfied with the fielded reliability and maintainability of the
product and has since been sent back to pass more rigorously enforced
Operational Readiness Demonstration requirements.[^3]

[Possible Win-Win Solution: Independent Operators]{.underline}---In
order to deploy and grow an affordable and sustained capability in
space, we must find a "win-win" business construct or our nation's space
business is certain to wander in a desert of stagnation and decline
while our international space launch competitors continue to make
ground.

Whatever the detailed nature of the solution looks like, an enduring and
successful solution is not likely to be as dependent on hardware
consumption and will naturally manage and control key performance
parameters that influence the operational effectiveness for the
operator---one way or another.

## Historical ExampleS

[Air Mail Act of 1934]{.underline}---Aerospace history can provide us
some inspiration on this subject. The air transportation world in the
early 1930s ran into the ethical problems that can often occur in
completely vertical business arrangements with a narrow set of players.
The issue was finally resolved through anti-trust legislation in the
Airmail Act of 1934.

By way of background, air transportation "holding companies," like
United Airlines (formed from Boeing Air Transport and other airmail
airlines, such as National Air Transport), were formed in the late 1920s
and early 1930s on a vertical business model that was shaped around U.
S. Air Mail contracts passed out to industry by the U. S. Postmaster
General. These holding companies owned the means of aircraft production,
the airlines that operated its aircraft, and even its own network of
airports.

Contention grew when a nascent passenger air travel market was stifled
because smaller operators couldn't get the manufacturers motivated to
build inherently safer aircraft they needed to convince the public that
it was safe to fly. This erupted into scandal when the Postmaster
General consolidated airline routes to only three selected companies at
what later became known as the "Spoils Conference" in May of 1930. Their
smaller competitors were forced out. This became a presidential campaign
issue in the election of 1932. After a change of administrations, and
with the backdrop of the Great Depression, a Senate investigation called
the process of giving contracts "spoils" and that the contracts had been
issued to the friends of the previous administration. After a short
period of time the existing airmail contracts were canceled and new
contracts were let forbidding simultaneous ownership of both airlines
companies and aircraft manufacturing companies.[^4] After the Air Mail
Act of 1934, United Airlines for example, was separated from its parent
holding company.[^5]

As a result of the Air Mail Act of 1934, the new United Airlines was
free to purchase, own, and operate whatever aircraft it wished to
purchase---not just Boeing products any longer. More significantly, it
was free to move into whatever markets made sense to their operation and
not what made sense to Boeing aircraft manufacturers. They drove
technology needs for safer aircraft designs and features, so that
technologists in general (and the National Advisory Council for
Aeronautics, or NACA, in particular) emerged as important national
economic assets in the late 1930s and beyond.

[Telecommunications Revolution]{.underline}---Additional examples, some
more recent, also offer historical insight. The technology revolution in
the telecommunications industry that occurred in the latter decades of
the twentieth century can arguably be traced to the end of the vertical
industry structure that existed in that industry prior to legal
actions.[^6]

[Satellite Industry Trends]{.underline}---It is also interesting to note
that in the satellite operations arena we see a recent headline in
*Space News* (April 26th, p. 16) that read "Separate Procurements
Fueling Ground Systems Competition."[^7] It's starting to happen where
flight hardware procurements are intentionally separated from ground
system procurements.

## Potential Programmatic Improvements

[Acquisition Cost & Schedule]{.underline}---A major programmatic benefit
that emerges from the separation of the means of space vehicle
production from the means of space flight production is the purchasing
power of the independent operator as it builds a portfolio of flight and
ground equipment assets. The operator is now free to purchase flight and
ground equipment from a supplier base focused on their particular needs
(e.g., frequent heavy cargo for space infrastructure sustainment, or
frequent-dependable passenger service, or infrequent-high value science
expeditions---we will need them all!). A key issue NASA's Code T must
eventually confront: who is to be the transportation system operator? Is
it the same contractor that also sells the flight and ground hardware
and various support services---as was traditionally done with the Cold
War era industrial infrastructure?

The manufacturing community will benefit from independent operators by
shedding a significant burden involved in designing, costing, building,
and pricing non-flight element services, such as specialized, unique
ground support equipment and infrastructure. The flight system
manufacturer will no longer be required to envision the details of the
"operations concept," and operational logistics plans and so forth
(which are usually remote, secondary functions at best for a launch
vehicle supplier). The independent operator would bear this burden.

The independent operators are free to go to a base of flight and ground
system suppliers that match and economically optimize their envisioned
portfolio of affordable, sustainable support assets (i.e., GSE, launch
platforms, support services, logistics tail, etc.). This is not to say
that new sister maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) businesses,
perhaps owned or affiliated with reusable flight system suppliers could
not emerge for all types of space vehicles, not just earth to orbit
(ETO). This is the long-range vision: growing new markets for space
vehicle manufacturing and manufacturing services.

*[The bottom line for space launch industry manufacturers]{.underline}*:
Infrequent, all-or-nothing large batch orders for launch vehicles turns
into a steadily growing stream of smaller orders---from yearly orders to
monthly orders, and eventually, to weekly orders from a widening market
base of independent "space lines."

*[The bottom line for NASA's Space Exploration Enterprise]{.underline}*:
Large, drawn-out batch-order contracts turn into smaller, less-risky,
pay-for-service contracts as needed and budgeted for independent
operator contractors. Thus, independently contracting the operations
(from conception of the operations) allows greater purchasing power for
the U. S. Government throughout the acquisition cycle. At the same time,
the approach promotes unleashing of free-market forces, in coordination
with NASA's technology infrastructure, for advancing space
commercialization and utilization.

[Annual Operating Costs]{.underline}---Space systems operating costs
have several major elements to consider. First, there are the direct
operations costs. These are the highly visible costs associated with
performing assembly, servicing, functional verification, and serving of
the space flight elements. The associated labor and materials associated
with these direct costs are often the only ones considered.
Unfortunately, in the space transportation industry, these are not well
tracked and made available to Government technologists by industry, even
for the important function of operations modeling and technology
prioritization.

Another set of costs that tend to overwhelm the direct operating costs
is the fixed infrastructure support costs. These costs include the
servicing, repair and upkeep of support equipment, facilities and other
indirect logistical services. These support costs are required for safe,
dependable and effective operation. For all other viable transportation
market segments, the independent operator (whose economic existence
depends on management and control of annual operations costs and
infrastructure liabilities) is the means to achieve affordability and
political sustainability.

![](media/image3.png){width="3.3097222222222222in"
height="2.61875in"}[Space Flight Demand and
Growth]{.underline}---regardless of the business model followed,
vertical or horizontal, healthy growth in the demand for space flights
must exist alongside a capability to affordably meet demand for space
flight growth.

Most current launch providers tie the payload with the sale of the
vehicle, which for space exploration tends to favor heavy lift
launchers, rather than highly operable, highly utilized reusable assets.
Thus, the idea of "space freight" to [build]{.underline} and sustain new
outposts and infrastructure in space is considered to be outside the
realm of business viability and is disfavored---usually through the
claim that such approaches are inherently too expensive. One of the
reasons this is the case is that the production or throughput capability
of large-scale expendable launch vehicles (more than a couple metric
tons per launch) has been limited to around no more than a dozen flights
per year.

The Soviet Union's Soyuz launches did meet a high launch rate in the
1970s and 1980s, but only through the use of an expensive array of
launch sites---about twelve simultaneously in operation, or about six to
ten launches per year per string of ground processing facilities. Since
the fall of the Soviet Union, very few, if any, new Soyuz launch sites
have been constructed. The notable exception is the one currently under
construction on American soil at the European Space Agency's (ESA's)
Kourou Space Center in Kourou, French Guiana in South America.

The emergence of independent operators focused on producing flights (and
not just flight hardware) would be a move in the right direction for
increased flight demand. Consider how compatible this would be with
NASA's current Space Flight Enterprise Strategy for development of
innovative modular lunar bases.[^8] Such approaches use simple,
standardized families of dependable building blocks to construct the
infrastructure needed to occupy the space frontier (see Figure 2). Such
approaches move the space transportation industry from "all-up" mission
payloads towards the concept of a growing "space freight" industry.

## Enabling NEEDED TECHNICAL Improvements

![](media/image4.png){width="3.3097222222222222in"
height="2.1194444444444445in"}[Fundamentally Changing the Nature of
Ground Ops]{.underline}---Motivated to produce flights affordably,
independent operators would search in earnest for inherently
*[operable]{.underline}* space flight systems and technologies. *[The
operator is looking for a fundamental remake of space transportation
systems from the inside out.]{.underline}*

Recent studies have begun identifying key functions and design needs
associated with space transportation ground operations. How independent
operators could impact the major high-level functions are addressed
below.

[Unplanned Troubleshooting & Repair
Operations]{.underline}---Independent operators would strive to acquire
dependable flight and ground hardware solutions. That in turn could
initiate a sea-change in how space flight systems are certified and
qualified for space flight, since there would be a high emphasis on
removing sources of costly unplanned hardware change-outs. Inherently
reliable parts and systems, demanded by the operator, would also
influence the overall safety of the system. This would happen because
operators would be continually searching for less complex systems with
lower part counts, and focus on demonstrated reliability rather than
relying on redundant parts with lesser reliability. Today, vehicle
system and subsystem designs give rise to high part counts and this has
not been adequately addressed to the operator's satisfaction.

With today's demonstrated reliability and dependability, engineering
confidence in vehicle type certifications is inconceivable. Instead,
each flight, with its numerous part change-outs (hundreds on the Shuttle
Orbiter and an un-totaled number on domestic expendables per flight) and
intrusive repair activities goes through a rigorous review. These flight
readiness reviews (FRRs) conduct nationwide engineering examinations of
the entire supply chain for material and process (M&P) variations and of
the assembly, servicing and checkout activities, often requiring
battalions of "sustaining engineers" at the design agencies and design
centers, legions of "configuration managers," and regiments of safety,
quality and reliability engineers, to name a few.

Independent operators would have no vested interest in hardware/part
re-supply and manufacture. They would be motivated to invest in highly
dependable parts and inherently reliable technologies. Over time, the
operators would be motivated to move the industry to the point of
demonstrating flights that had no part removals at the departure point.
If this could be repeatedly demonstrated, then vehicle-type
certification could become a reality and fundamentally change space
transportation.

*[Specific Technology Opportunities Associated with Highly Dependable
Systems]{.underline}*---Several opportunities exist for the space
technology community to help bring about vehicle type-certifications and
help move the industry away from the burdensome flight-by-flight
certification process.

First, independent operators would be shopping for basic improvements in
vehicle functions (propulsion, airframes and mechanisms, power,
communications, and so forth). Any areas of foot-dragging in addressing
recurring hardware design problems would likely end very quickly, with
the more technically challenging issues also surfacing quickly. Very
specific technology needs would rapidly emerge.

[Launch Vehicle Assembly and Integration
Operations]{.underline}---Assembly of flight elements upon arrival at
the launch area is a major work contributor. This includes more than
just the lift and mate operations of major flight elements, such as
mating the Orbiter onto its Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)/External Tank
(ET) assembly; or the mating of a strap-on solid to a core expendable
vehicle element. Flight element assembly operations have consistently
required launch site assembly of ordnance devices and routing of
electrical cables in systems tunnels that go across elements. Other
assembly operations include application of thermal protection,
(spray-on, curtain installation, etc.) range safety equipment among many
other time-consuming and labor-intensive activities.

*[Specific Technology Opportunities Associated with Highly Integrated,
Fully Assembled Transportation Systems]{.underline}*---Much attention
has been focused on automatic mechanisms for the mating of the elements,
which may well be needed for designs with many flight elements to
integrate into a launch vehicle. Mating operations and functional
verification of the mate should be designed to be routinely performed in
a matter of minutes. Today, however, such operations (including
functional verification for cryogenic propellant flow, leak-free flow of
other fluids, and electrical integrity) take hours and shifts, if not
days, depending on the complexity of the vehicle design.

What needs more attention is a design focused on reducing the number of
flight elements per launch. This will be highly desired by independent
operators, bringing about a "no assembly required" policy at the
spaceport.

The operators also need designs for reliable, dependable separation
systems that eliminate archaic use of ordnance devices can greatly aid
the independent operator by eliminating the need for area and facility
clears involved with the installation and checks of such hazardous
devices.

Research into alternative thermal protection devices, rather than
complex, process-variant and time-consuming spray-on foam application
techniques are also needed.

[Servicing Operations]{.underline}---One of the greatest needs for
independent operators is the reduction in ground servicing operations.
These include simplified propellant loading operations with far fewer,
simpler thermal conditioning tasks; far fewer dedicated power management
fluid energy loading tasks, such as filling, draining, system
pressurizations and purges. Numerous ground service ports require
pre-flight hook-up operations. The Space Shuttle Orbiter, for example
has 402 ground interfaces to its Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), most
of which relate to fluid and gas system servicing. While the expendable
vehicles are less intensive than the decades-old Shuttle Orbiter, the
number of hoses, ducts, and service arms for expendables can be improved
upon. Independent operators, if given the opportunity, would search for
elimination of liabilities, such as ground interfaces and dedicated
umbilicals.

*[Specific Technology Opportunities Associated with Simple, Integrated
Systems]{.underline}*---Significant reductions in servicing operations
would require wholesale elimination of dedicated subsystems, with their
functions incorporated into other subsystems. The objective is to
eliminate dedicated working fluids and dedicated systems of parts when a
more robust and flexible set of parts in a similar system could perform
the function.

Some of the solutions may be the result of simple design solutions while
others may prove to be technologically challenging. For example, the
general layout of a propulsive vehicle stage often elevates the liquid
oxygen tank forward. When this is done dedicated anti-geyser hardware,
ground support equipment and operations complicate the system
architecture. Careful up-front systems location and vehicle
![](media/image5.jpeg){width="3.2015748031496063in"
height="2.545275590551181in"}![](media/image6.wmf){width="1.5110236220472442in"
height="0.85in"}balancing can eliminate entire subsystems on the vehicle
and on the ground when operability is of the highest priority.

Other potential solutions require more technology development and
demonstration. For example, the elimination of hydraulic and pneumatic
equipment in favor of more-electric solutions offers tremendous
potential to simplify the overall power management architecture of space
transportation systems.

[Functional Verification Operations]{.underline}---Checkout and
inspection operations, two of the more highly visible functions of the
ground crew, are directly dependent not only on the flight criticality
of a system or function, but also on the engineering confidence of the
overall design.

If the degree of unplanned troubleshooting and repair is high enough
(and it only takes a total of one or two items routinely per flight),
then the overall system cannot be depended upon to function without
conducting detailed system checks. To overcome this, engineering
practice over the years has instilled a significant amount of
confidence-building test, checkout, and inspection operations, as the
vehicle is built-up and serviced for flight.

If a system typically leaks, then routine, time-consuming and
labor-intensive leak checks are required. If high-traffic internal
compartment servicing is designed into the architecture, and many nicked
wires, dented ducts and other collateral damage typically results, then
pre-closeout "confidence runs" that power up the systems are often used
as good practice to prevent major interruptions during the launch
countdown.

*[Specific Technology Opportunities Associated with Smart, Autonomous
Systems]{.underline}*---The overall strategy likely to emerge from the
use of independent operators is to: 1) strive to demonstrate vehicle
processing without destroying the configuration of the flight vehicle
that could occur from unplanned troubleshooting, replacement of
limited-life items by design, or servicing by design; 2) inclusion of
embedded component health monitoring and system-level health management
technologies. The focus of the independent operator will be on
validation of health management systems that provide confidence that the
system is healthy and therefore does not need to destroy the structural
or functional integrity of the vehicle to verify proper operation. On
the other hand, premature deployment of "VHM" technologies can put the
operator in a worse position by having to continually troubleshoot
undependable instrumentation (i.e., the red light comes on often enough
to lose engineering confidence in the total system design and
technology).

[Setting Up a Technology Pipeline]{.underline}---The technology focus
for operationally effective systems needed by independent operators is
going to be most challenging for NASA at the mid- to high-levels of
readiness. While NASA has a wealth of capability in deriving new
technology components and materials, its infrastructure for carrying out
subsystem and system level technology integration, testing, and
evaluation has deteriorated severely over recent decades.

Independent space transportation operators are likely to succeed today
under one of two conditions:

1.  Manufacturers have all the technology they need to succeed on the
    shelf, and therefore, independent operators are free to purchase
    highly operable, dependable, and supportable vehicles and ground
    equipment *(Considered unlikely).*

2.  The technology integration gap is somehow closed for major subsystem
    and system design disciplines, such as structures and mechanisms,
    propulsion, power management, thermal management, communications,
    safety management and control systems, and so forth. *(Likely only
    with the proper forcing function).*

## Need for Variation from Past Attempts

[The Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC) and the Space Flight Operations
Contract (SFOC)]{.underline}---The proposal for
*[independent]{.underline}* operators with purchasing power over
manufacturers should be distinguished from past attempts to "privatize"
the Space Shuttle. The United Space Alliance (USA) Space Flight
Operations Contract (or SFOC) and its predecessor, the Lockheed Shuttle
Processing Contract (SPC) were attempts to establish separate operators.
In both cases, the "operations contractor" was not involved (or even in
existence) during design requirements development. The SPC contract was
not in existence during the acquisition phase of Shuttle, and, as with
today's USA/SFOC contract, had no significant independent purchasing
power to search, select and acquire its own vehicle or ground assets.
The opportunity exists now to "do it right" for NASA's Space Exploration
Enterprise (and perhaps for the Air Force's next generation
Operationally Responsive Spacelift, or ORS, as well).

## Recommended Influence on RFPs and BAAs

(1) Separate the means of transportation system production from the
    means of transportation system operation from the beginning, with
    this separation of function driving operability into the whole
    acquisition process.

(2) Immediately establish linkages between the H&RT themes and their
    technology break-outs and the infrastructure needed to mature these
    technologies at the mid-TRLs. This must be done in order to assure
    achievement of a proposed portfolio's operability, supportability
    and dependability; i.e., identify how these technology areas,
    particularly space transportation, are going to be demonstrated for
    ease of operation, simple and affordable support requirements, and
    reliability---not just flight reliability, but ground operations
    dependability, as well.

(3) Code T should work with and task the Advanced Range Technology
    Working Group (ARTWG) and its sister organization, the Advanced
    Spaceport Technology Working Group (ASTWG) to propose specific
    language for consideration in future proposals for space
    transportation acquisition and exploration vehicle operations. These
    government/industry/academia groups were formed several years ago
    under White House direction and have made significant progress in
    forming an alliance of technologists and managers to move the
    state-of-the-art in spaceports and ranges forward. However, a
    sponsor with meaningful resources is required to act on specific
    strategies that are emerging.

(4) Additionally, a collaborative program, such as the Future
    Interagency Range and Spaceport Technology (FIRST), with partnership
    of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Air Force Space Command should
    be pursued to bring forth the supporting ground system technologies
    needed to enable the whole industry to thrive. Government seed
    dollars are urgently needed due to the lack of current commercial
    interest and the stagnant state of the launch market. Further, a
    program such as FIRST allows for shared costs among several federal
    agencies, thus significantly reducing NASA's burden.

## CONCLUSIONS

So important are the annual support costs, particularly for the
accumulation of space systems as we move out beyond earth orbit, that
Code T must find natural economic means to manage and control these
costs. The non-existence of independent operators (whose economic
survivability depends on management and control of annual operations
costs and infrastructure liabilities) is the one key industrial
distinction between space transportation and all other viable
transportation market segments. For NASA to politically sustain a fresh
new enterprise through old Cold War era, vertical business structures
for space transportation would not be wise.

It is understood that what is being suggested represents a major sea
change in space system acquisition culture. We need not fear the concept
of independent operators, however, and become paralyzed by the
suggestion. Unlike the downsizing of the 1990s, all hands need to be on
deck in the manufacturing and operations arena if we are to unleash the
nation's creative skills as it extends economic opportunity into the
space frontier.

END NOTES

##### 

[^1]: Isakowitz, AIAA International Reference Guide to Space Launch
    Systems, 3^rd^ ed., 1999 \[Isakowitz\].

[^2]: EADS Space Transportation Press Release, "EADS to Win
    3.0-billion-euro Contract for 30 Ariane-5 Rockets, Paris, France;
    May 10, 2004

[^3]: "Presentation to the V-22 Blue Ribbon Panel," Government
    Accounting Office, January 12, 2001;
    <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/gao_blue_rib_brf.pdf>

[^4]: U. S. Centennial of Flight Commission, "Role of Government:
    Airmail and the Growth of the Airlines,"
    <http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Government_Role/1930-airmail/POL6.htm>

[^5]: United Airlines web site, "Soaring Through History---The History
    of United Airlines,"
    <http://www.united.com/page/article/0,6722,2311,00.html>

[^6]: "AT&T A Brief History," <http://www.att.com/history/history4.html>

[^7]: Bates, J.; "Separate Procurements Fueling Ground Systems
    Competition," [Space News]{.underline}, vol. 15, No. 17, April 26,
    2004. Space Holdings, Springfield, VA.

[^8]: [National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space Flight
    Enterprise Strategy]{.underline}, NP-2003-10-319-HQ, p. 68, Nov.,
    2003; Washington, DC.