# **RADIATION SAFETY**[^1]

## Introduction

Chapter 4 of this Handbook presented technical designs for each of the
subsystems required to produce the neutrino beam for the NuMI physics
program. Inherent in the designs is the fact that radiation protection
is of the greatest importance in both primary and secondary beam areas.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the various radiation-related
matters, to explain the methodology that has guided the designs of the
radiation protection systems in the project and to show the results.

The design of the Fermilab Main Injector (MI) permits the acceleration
of numbers of protons not previously encountered in the energy regime
above 100 GeV. The NuMI Facility design assumes that Main Injector
protons will be transported to the target at a maximum intensity of
4×10^13^ protons every 1.87 seconds. This is called the Safety Envelope.
Normal running will be allowed up to 10% less than this safety envelope.
Physics goals of the MINOS experiment assume a value for beam on target
of 3.7×10^20^ protons per year. For the purposes of designing radiation
protection for the NuMI Facility, the above intensities translate to a
maximum instantaneous proton rate of 2.1×10^13^ protons per second and
an annual \"dc\" average (assuming 55% efficiency for beam) of
\~1×10^13^ protons per second.

As discussed in Chapter 4, an important consideration in the design of
the NuMI Facility has been the desire to maintain the flexibility to
accommodate a variety of neutrino beam configurations. This flexibility
includes designing a Target Hall in which the location of the beam line
components such as the target and the focusing horns may vary depending
on the desired range of neutrino energy. Maintaining this flexibility
has an impact on the design of the radiation shielding because of the
desire to minimize the need to reconfigure the Target Hall shielding
after the facility has begun operation.

There are four types of radiation that are of concern in the design of a
facility such as NuMI. These are 1) the prompt radiation field, 2) the
residual radiation field, 3) airborne activation and 4) soil/rock and
groundwater activation. All these will be discussed. We have also
included a section on Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D).

The program MARS[^2] has been adopted as the Fermilab standard shielding
code. Thus the design of the NuMI shielding is based on the use of the
MARS simulation code. The \"output\" of the MARS program can be
converted to activation level or, dose equivalents, used to determine
the probability of radionuclide production in the air, soil or rock in
which the nuclear interactions occur. These doses can then be compared
to the various regulatory limits for each type of radiation exposure.

Evaluation of the radiation protection requirements for the NuMI
facility has shown that various radiation safety factors drive the
design of the facility. The design of the shielding for the
target/focusing region (except the top), decay region, and two sides of
the Hadron Absorber are driven by groundwater activation. Residual
activation levels drive the shielding on top of the target/focusing
region, and two sides of the Hadron Absorber. The level of primary
beamline losses allowed are driven by groundwater or residual dose rate
concerns, depending on the region of the primary beam. The air within
the target chase is highly activated and thus must be contained in the
target chase to the extent possible. This drives some design issues with
the target chase shielding. Similarly the air in the region of the
Hadron Absorber is highly activated and must be minimized and allowed to
decay in transit to the vent.

**Figure 5‑1** shows a conceptual drawing of the NuMI Project. Radiation
safety items are shown such as interlocked gates and doors, air
monitoring locations, and labyrinths and penetrations. Refer to this
picture when locating items described in the text.

![](media/image1.wmf){width="5.625in"
height="7.548611111111111in"}**Figure 5-1** Conceptual Drawing of the
NuMI Project, showing Radiation Safety Items

## Access Requirements and Interlocks

The personnel safety interlock system is fail safe and redundant. The
primary critical device for NuMI will be the Lambertson string (LAM601,
LAM6023) located in MI-60. The secondary critical device will be the set
of bend magnets HV102. (**Need MARS runs of this.)**

The personnel safety interlock system will \"request\" the abort signal
required to stop NuMI extraction, in those situations when a radiation
or critical equipment protection limit has been exceeded. The interlocks
for the portions of the NuMI facility in the MI enclosure, NuMI Stub
Enclosure, and lined section of the carrier tunnel will be an integral
part of the MI interlocks system.

The NuMI safety interlock system will prevent personnel access, when the
beam is enabled, to the Carrier Tunnel unlined section, Pretarget and
Target Hall area, decay pipe tunnel, Hadron Absorber area and muon
alcoves. There will also be interlocked detectors that will disable the
beam if the radiation levels become too high in the power supply room,
upstream shaft area and bypass tunnel.

##  Groundwater

Groundwater activation and contamination can occur when radionuclides
produced in the soil or rock surrounding an accelerator or beam line
enclosure have a finite probability of getting into water passing
through the soil or rock. Groundwater activation also can occur when the
beam produces radionuclides, namely tritium, directly in the water
contained in the soil or rock. This activated water can then migrate to
a potential source of potable water.

The NuMI primary proton beam, and the secondary hadron beam, must be
directed toward the MINOS far detector in Soudan, implying a 58 mradian
downward slope. As a consequence the Target Hall and much of the hadron
decay region pass through the local aquifer. This has led to careful
consideration and analysis of the processes that might lead to potential
contamination of the groundwater resources. The key issue for NuMI is
that radionuclides produced in the rock and water surrounding part of
the beam line are produced in the groundwater resource. Thus we cannot
take credit for decay in transit to the groundwater resource, as other
facilities not constructed so deeply have. Several analyses and
designs[^3]^,^[^4]^,^[^5] laid the groundwork for the present model,
which has resulted in the understanding of the problem. A Fermilab TM
describing this methodology has been completed and is being circulated
for approval. It takes into consideration the flow rate of water within
the aquifer. Previous methodologies assumed static water conditions,
which is extremely unrealistic within the aquifer. In the unlined
sections of the NuMI tunnel, all the water nearby is captured by the
tunnel and thus cannot make it to a well for consumption.

### Specifications

**Table 5‑1** gives the limits on the concentrations of ^22^Na and ^3^H
allowed.

  ----------------------- ------------------------ -----------------------
                          ^22^Na (pCi/ml)          ^3^H (pCi/ml)

  Groundwater             0.4                      20

  Surface Water           10                       2000
  ----------------------- ------------------------ -----------------------

Table 5‑1 Regulatory limits on allowed radionuclide concentrations in
groundwater and surface water.

$\sum_{i}^{}\frac{C_{i}}{C_{\text{reg}i}} \leq 1$The sum of the
fractions of radionuclide contamination (relative to the regulatory
limits) must be less than one for all radionuclides;

where the sum is over radionuclides, i, C*~i~* is the concentration of
radionuclide *i* in the water and C~reg~ ~*i*~ is the regulatory limit
concentration.

Fermilab ES&H policy requires that a facility design must demonstrate
that beamline operation will *not* result in activation levels above the
regulatory limits, including all uncertainties in the methodology and
input parameters. Verification that such limits are not violated is
accomplished during the facility operation through the Lab-wide
monitoring program (FESHM).

### Primary Beam Region

The primary beam region is separated into seven different sections based
on the geology and geometry of the sections. Both geometry and geology
affect the water flow rates. **Figure 5-2** shows the seven sections.
The sections of main concern are the lined sections 1 and 2.

![](media/image2.wmf){width="5.995138888888889in"
height="4.096527777777778in"}**Figure 5-2**: Seven Groundwater Sections
of the NuMI Primary Beam

Section 1, the glacial till region, is not in the aquifer and the water
travels slowly (cm/yr) through the soil to the aquifer. Thus much of the
radioactivity has decayed by the time the water reaches the aquifer.
Section 2, where the tunnel is lined, in the aquifer and in the mixed
rock glacial till, is the area of the utmost concern. Here predicting
the water velocity is difficult due to the variable nature of the
geology in this region. We conservatively assume the water flows with
the regional gradient towards the Fox River. This velocity (4 to 50 feet
per year) is slow enough to allow activation of the water near the
tunnel. The remaining sections (3 through 7) are unlined and have high
water inflow velocities (several hundred feet per year), thus not
allowing the water to get very activated and not allowing the water to
get to a well. In all cases the inflow rates assumed in the calculations
is below that measured in May 2002.

One should also note that the unlined tunnel downstream collects a large
amount of water from the critical section 2. This is because two
drainpipes were installed under the lined carrier tunnel. These two
pipes extend \~50 feet and 6 feet respectively from the unlined section
upstream into the lined section. They collect water in this region at a
rate of **\~5 gpm** (update value) as of March 2002. The groundwater
activation calculation conservatively assumes the tunnel collects none
of the water in section 2.

**Table 5-2** shows the calculated residency time of the water in each
of the 7 sections, based on conservative (slow) flow rates. The last two
columns show the number of accident pulses allowed in each section, and
the accident condition that can cause such an accident pulse. These
results are all based on comparison to the groundwater limit. This table
is being updated for the new beam optics. It is envisioned that the
results will not change significantly. The region of most concern, as
expected, is region 2. The final column in the table shows that power
supply regulation is very important. (See Section 4.3.1). In order to
have stable, controllable beam, the power supplies will be regulated at
least an order of magnitude below that which is shown to create these
accident conditions.

The radiation safety system will have interlocked detectors to watch
losses in the primary beam. If excessive losses are seen, it will trip
the critical devices and remove the beam permit. Also the beam permit
system will check the power supply current at flattop before each pulse,
losses on the last pulse and many other status items. The permit system
will not allow extraction if anything is not within tolerance (See
Section 4.1). All of this will make the occurrence of more than one
accident pulse very unlikely.

![](media/image4.wmf)**Table 5-2** Primary Beam Accident Conditions and
Lost Pulses Allowed

Due to all the mitigating factors for accident pulses, the DC or normal
operational losses are of the biggest concern. These are the continually
occurring losses that one can run with while still meeting all the
regulatory requirements and not overly irradiating the components that
personnel need to access. These are estimated using MARS, to be at a
level of 10^-4^ of 4E13ppp (at 1.87 sec per pulse) for all regions, but
region 2 where it is 10^-6^. MARS simulations show that with the
required power supply regulation no beam normal beam losses should
occur, assuming 500π beam at 1x10^-3^∆p/p. As described in Section
4.1,the NuMI beam optics is designed to accept the largest beam the MI
can provide.

### Secondary Beam Region

Similar to the primary beam, the secondary beam is broken down into 5
different regions. Table 5‑3 shows the estimated star densities from
MARS simulations of the secondary beam components and shielding, and the
resulting estimates of activation of the water flowing into the tunnel
relative to the groundwater regulatory limit. **Figure 5-3** shows the
activation levels of the inflow waters relative to the groundwater
regulatory limits, including uncertainties. In all areas we are below
the groundwater regulatory limit, including uncertainties.

+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| Region           | Star        | Star Density | Average Value      |
|                  | Density     | Limit        | Relative to Limit  |
|                  | (stars per  | (            |                    |
|                  | cm3/p)      | stars/cm3/p) | (% Uncertainty)    |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| Target Hall      | 1.33E-11    | 4.10E-11     | 0.185 (75%)        |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| DK Middle        | 4.58E-11    | 6.80E-11     | 0.402 (66%)        |
| Silurian         |             |              |                    |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| DK Lower         | 2.02E-11    | 4.80E-11     | 0.258 (64%)        |
| Silurian         |             |              |                    |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| DK Upper         | 1.23E-11    | 5.40E-11     | 0.142 (61%)        |
| Ordovician       |             |              |                    |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+
| Hadron Absorber  | 7.8e-12     | 4.7e-11      | 0.101 (64%)        |
+------------------+-------------+--------------+--------------------+

**Table 5‑3**: Secondary Beam Star Densities and Estimated Activation
Levels

![](media/image5.wmf){width="4.222222222222222in"
height="4.361111111111111in"}**Figure 5-3**: Secondary Beam Groundwater
Inflow Activation Levels Relative to Regularity Limits

###  Monitoring

Operation of the NuMI Facility will be included in the comprehensive
laboratory-monitoring program. Wells are an integral part of the
Fermilab environmental monitoring strategy. Samples of well water would
initially be examined every month, with the sampling rate eventually
being reduced once NuMI has reached steady-state operation. NuMI, in
collaboration with the ES&H Section, is in the process of determining
the number and locations of NuMI monitoring wells.

In addition, regular sampling will be done on the water that is pumped
from the NuMI downstream shaft region to the surface waters. Regular
sampling will also be done for radionuclide levels in cooling water
systems, including both the closed loop RAW system serving components
experiencing higher activation levels, and the **LCW cooling system**
serving conventional beam transport elements. RAW spills are controlled
by a combination of continuous water level sensing, secondary
containment vessel collection and tightly controlled sump discharge.

## Airborne Activation

Airborne activation results from the interaction of primary and
secondary particles directly with target nuclei of the air (or other
gaseous medium) in its path. A secondary source of airborne activity is
dust, formed by natural erosion or wear or by work on radioactive
accelerator components. The third source of airborne radioactivity
results from the emission of gaseous radioactivity from liquids
irradiated in the accelerator produced radiation environment. For NuMI,
the main concern is radioactive air. Activities in radioactive air
consist primarily of ^11^C and ^13^N with smaller concentrations of
^15^O and ^41^Ar; all with relatively short half-lives. ^11^C, having a
20 minutes half-life, tends to be the dominant concern.

### Specifications

Federal regulations, which are further implemented by the State of
Illinois, govern the releases of airborne radionuclides, excluding radon
and radon progeny, by U. S. Department of Energy Facilities (CFR89)[^6].
These regulations place an annual limit of 10 mrem/year on the dose
equivalent that can be delivered to a member of the public due to the
release of airborne radionuclides from DOE facilities. The methodology
for determining the dose equivalent is also specified. The regulations
further require the application of continuous monitoring in accordance
with U. S. Environmental Protection Agency specifications if the dose
equivalent should exceed 0.1 mrem/year. Requirements for monitoring
systems that meet these specifications are quite stringent and could
tightly constrain Fermilab operations. These limits apply to the total
release from the Laboratory.

Consistent with these requirements, in March 1999, Fermilab submitted an
application renewal to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency for
its lifetime air pollution-operating permit[^7]. This application
addressed the radionuclide emissions from NuMI and other Fermilab
facilities. It specified that the doses to the public will be kept well
below 0.1 mrem/year for all Fermilab operations. The average annual
activity release is to be kept less than 100 Ci. In consideration of the
overall program of operations at Fermilab, the NuMI project management
in consultation with the staff of the Fermilab ES&H Section established
an administrative goal for the NuMI project of a maximum annual release
of 45 Ci. The corresponding maximum anticipated dose equivalent due to
NuMI operations that might be received by an individual hypothetically
present full-time at the Fermilab site boundary is estimated to be 0.025
mrem.

###  Air Activation Results for NuMI

Delayed ventilation is used at NuMI to control radioactive air
emissions. It is the simplest method and the one historically used at
Fermilab. Since the vast majority of the radioactive atoms produced are
short lived (20.5 minutes for ^11^C), a delay time of one hour from
production to exhaust will reduce the radioactivity by roughly one order
of magnitude at the stack. Since the sealed chase inside the Target Hall
is the main source of air activation, the largest delay is from the
Target Hall to the vent part way down the Decay Tunnel. The area between
the Hadron Absorber and the decay pipe also has high air activation
levels. We are in the process of more accurately estimating these levels
and determining the best ways to mitigate them. Most likely we will
significantly reduce the airflow rate from the Hadron Absorber to the
vent and build an aluminum box to contain the air just downstream of the
decay pipe. Details of the air activation methodology and its
application to NuMI are covered in TM-2089, and draft documents on the
updated air activation methodology.

  ------------------ ----------------------- ------------- ---------------
                     Ventilation Rate (cfm)  Yearly        Yearly Release
                                             Release 1%    2.5% ^41^Ar
                                             ^41^Ar        (Ci/yr)
                                             (Ci/yr)       

  Carrier Tunnel     1000                    To be         1
                                             determined    

  Pre-Target Hall    900                     To be         1
                                             determined    

  Target Hall        800 (700 leakage rate   To be         40
                     from chase)             determined    

  Upstream 1/2 Decay 800                     To be         0.01
  Region                                     determined    

  Downstream 1/2     3500                    To be         0.01
  Decay Region                               determined    

  Hadron Absorber    2250 (200 leakage rate  To be         Being
                     from core/aluminum box) determined    calculated
  ------------------ ----------------------- ------------- ---------------

Table 5-4 Summary of air emission calculations at NuMI stacks. Note that
the ventilation rate in the pre-target area can be reduced if necessary.

## Prompt Radiation

The prompt radiation field at particle accelerators and beam lines
exists only while they are in operation. Depending on the configuration
of the facility and its components, the prompt radiation fields may
include thermal neutrons, fast neutrons, photons and/or muons.

The prompt radiation field must be predicted and mitigated for both
normal operations and accident conditions. There are two areas of
concern; the radiation field outside of enclosures, which are normally
embedded and/or covered by bulk shielding comprised of rock and/or soil,
and the "leakage" of radiation through labyrinths and penetrations. For
the former it is appropriate to use the results, which have been well
established by the simulations done for a relevant set of case studies.
These results are documented[^8]^,^[^9] and accepted for use in the
design of bulk shielding at Fermilab.

Since most of the NuMI Facility lies deep underground, there are only a
few areas where the issue of prompt radiation from NuMI operations must
be considered. These areas are the MI/NuMI Stub, power supply
room/upstream shaft area and bypass tunnel (see **Figure 5‑1**).
Interlocks and interlocked detectors will be used in some of these
areas. There is also the issue of prompt radiation from the MI in areas
where NuMI wishes to have access when NuMI is not operating, but the MI
is operating. This includes the unlined section of the Carrier Tunnel
and downstream.

###  Primary Beam

*MI/NuMI Stub*: In particular, this includes the regions of the Main
Injector where the NuMI extraction devices are located, also the NuMI
Extraction Stub (Figure A). The design goal is to have the surface areas
above all Main Injector related beams be classified as Unlimited
Occupancy. The applicable criterion applied to the MI indicates the need
for 24.5 feet of soil equivalent over most of the enclosure and 25 feet
over extraction regions, with stairways, cable penetrations etc. being
treated separately. The as-built drawing which includes the MI-60
extraction region and the NuMI Stub[^10] shows that the stated shielding
criteria (24.5 and 25 feet) have been satisfied.

**Table 5-5** shows the various penetrations and labyrinths in the
primary beam region, their dose rates at the exit under normal and
accident conditions and the mitigation that will be used. Accident
pulses will normally be limited to one pulse due to the beam permit
system or radiation safety system detecting the accident condition. Thus
the column to look at for the accident condition is the dose rate/pulse.
All of these areas have sufficiently low dose rates for their locations.

  -------------------- ------------- ------------- ---------------- ----------------
  **Access**           **Normal      **Accident    **Accident       **Mitigation**
                       (mrem/hr)**   (mrem/hr)**   (mrem/pulse)**   

  Survey Riser SR-1    1.48          14765.41      7.79             plug
  (498)                                                             

  Exhaust Air Vent     0.29          2852.87       1.51             fence
  EAV-1 (935)                                                       

  Survey Riser SR-2    0.29          2852.87       1.51             plug
  (954)                                                             

  Target Hall          2.44E-03      24.37         0.013            OK
  Labyrinth                                                         

  Target Hall          0.25          2476.83       1.31             OK
  Equipment Door                                                    
  -------------------- ------------- ------------- ---------------- ----------------

**Table 5-5**: Primary Beam Labyrinth and Penetration Calculations

### Secondary Beam

In the secondary beam, two areas will have beam on access. These areas
are the power supply room and upstream shaft area adjacent to the Target
Hall. The design goal is to have these areas be Controlled Areas.
**Table 5-6** shows anticipated levels in these areas due to the
transmission line penetration, labyrinth and the equipment door. Two
interlocked detectors will be located in this region, one in the Power
Supply Room and one in the shaft area.

  -------------------- ------------- ------------- ---------------- --------------
  **Access**           **Normal      **Accident    **Accident       **Mitigation
                       (mrem/hr)**   (mrem/hr)**   (mrem/pulse)**   (possible)**

  Survey Riser SR-1    0.15          14765.41      7.79             plug
  (498)                                                             

  Exhaust Air Vent     0.03          2852.87       1.51             (fence)
  EAV-1 (935)                                                       

  Survey Riser SR-2    0.03          2852.87       1.51             plug
  (954)                                                             

  Target Hall          1.36E-03      \-            \-               OK
  Labyrinth                                                         

  Target Hall          0.74          \-            \-               OK
  Equipment Door                                                    

  Stripline            2.77          \-            \-               (shield)
  Penetration (PS                                                   
  Room)                                                             

  Raw Penetration      60.80         \-            \-               plug

  Survey Riser SR-3    0.002         \-            \-               plug
  (1321)                                                            
  -------------------- ------------- ------------- ---------------- --------------

**Table 5-6**: Secondary Beam Labyrinth and Penetration Dose Rates

Dose rates at the exit of the Hadron Absorber labyrinth are estimated at
7 mrem/hr beam on. Dose rates in the bypass tunnel are estimated at less
than 0.05 mrem/hr. When beam is first commissioned at lower intensities,
these values will be checked with radiation monitors.

## Residual Dose Rates

The residual radiation field is that which remains after the beam has
been shut down. In most situations at Fermilab, the residual radiation
field is almost exclusively gamma rays, with the occasional presence of
beta rays near a contaminated surface.

![](media/image1.wmf)

**Table 5-7**: Estimated Residual Dose Rates for Various Beamline
Elements

**Table 5-7** shows the estimated residual dose rates for various
beamline elements. Blank cells are in the process of being estimated.
Underlined numbers are being updated.

## RAW Water Systems

Here we describe the results of the calculation of the induced activity
in the NuMI Radioactive Water (RAW) Systems. The interaction between the
ionizing radiation and water leads to the formation of short-lived
radical species (OH, H and electrons mainly) and stable molecular
species (O~2~, H~2~O~2~ and H~2~). While most of the ions recombine to
form water, hydrogen gas and other species are also produced. The amount
of hydrogen gas produced is calculated to assess the level of safety
precautions required.

The most significant radioisotopes, from a contaminant aspect are ^3^H,
and to a lesser extent ^7^Be, because of their rather long half lives.
However, from a dose rate from a RAW system point of view, tritium dose
not contribute, because of its very low energy decay beta particle. Only
10% of beryllium decays are via gamma emissions, while 11C, 13N and 15O
are positron emitters producing 0.511MeV gamma rays. Therefore, allowing
cooling time before getting near a RAW system is very effective way of
reducing the dose rates.

Fermilab Radiological Control Manual (FRCM) suggests keeping the tritium
concentrations in the cooling system below 0.67 microCuries/cc. However,
some of the NuMI RAW systems may exceed this limit due to high particle
fluxes or it may not be feasible to replace the cooling water frequent
enough to keep the concentrations below the FRCM value. For these cases,
multi-tier containment methods are used, with the proper operational
precautions during the handling of the RAW systems. When possible the
high tritium concentration water is disposed of as solidified low-level
radioactive waste.

**Table 5-8** and **Table 5-9** summarize the results for five NuMI RAW
systems. One can see that the horn 1 system has the highest levels.
These results, are conservatively calculated (reference RAW Note), and
thus an overestimate. The table also shows the estimated shielding
needed for the RAW systems and DI bottles and tanks. A 1.5' thick
concrete wall is planned for the RAW room which houses the horn 1, horn
2, target and decay pipe RAW systems. With this wall, dose rates are
estimated at less than 5 mrem/hr outside the room's door.

The flux densities used in calculating activities and dose rates are
shown in **Table 5-8** for the decay pipe and Hadron Absorber Systems.
For the target system, a flux density of 0.12 hadrons/cm^2^/proton was
used. This corresponds to 10 times the flux density at the horn 1 neck.
This is a conservatively high estimate. For horn 1, the flux density
used for the water between the conductors was 0.019 hadrons/cm^2^/proton
and 0.0053 hadrons/cm^2^/proton for the water in the tank under the
horn. For horn 2 the flux density used for the water between the
conductors is 0.0025 hadrons/cm^2^/proton and 0.0019
hadrons/cm^2^/proton for the tank under the horn. The target cooling
tubes have an inner diameter of 5.4 mm, and thus the amount of water
present is extremely small.

![](media/image2.wmf){width="6.061111111111111in"
height="3.279861111111111in"}

**Table 5-8**: RAW System Activity

![](media/image3.wmf){width="6.404166666666667in"
height="2.8041666666666667in"}

**Table 5-9** RAW System Dose Rates and Hydrogen Gas Production

Since 4% hydrogen gas in air is considered explosive, a helium purging
system will be added to the horn RAW systems. The Hadron Absorber RAW
system needs to be vented to the exhaust stack and the Decay Pipe RAW
system might need daily purging/venting with small amounts of Helium
gas.

## Hot Component Handling

See Section 4.2.

## Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D)

The guidelines of the FESHM 8070 will be used for the D&D of the NuMI
Beamline. No hazardous materials have been used in the construction of
the beamline. Items put in the NuMI tunnel during construction are being
chemically analyzed for D&D. Therefore, no mixed waste or potential
contaminant of the ground water will be produced. The major radioactive
isotopes produced will have 2.6 and 5.3 year half-lives. There are sump
pumps that remove the water that flows into the NuMI tunnel. This will
continue after the conclusion of the experiment. Accidental flooding of
the tunnel in the future will not have any detrimental effects on the
ground water. All the materials used in the construction of the beamline
are naturally occurring in the surrounding soil.

[^1]: The approved NuMI/MINOS SA can be found on the
    [web](http://www-numi.fnal.gov/internal/safety_docs/SAD/NuMI_SAD_v10.doc);
    it contains the most up to date information on radiation safety.
    Contact Nancy Grossman for access to this password protected
    document.

[^2]: N. V. Mokhov, "The MARS Code System User's Guide",Fermilab-FN-628
    (1995); Update Version 13(98), February, 1998

[^3]: A.Wehman, S. Childress, "Tritium Production in the Dolomitic Rock
    Adjacent to NuMI Beam Tunnels", Draft (1998) NuMI-B-495A(1999)

[^4]: B. Freeman, "A NUMI Wide-Band Beam Shield Design That Meets the
    Concentration Model Groundwater Criteria, NuMI-B-155, June 13, 1995.

[^5]: A. Wehmann,et.al.,"Groundwater Protection for the NuMI Project,
    FERMILAB-TM-2009, October 10, 1997.

[^6]: Dagenais (Da84) has provided estimates of the buildup of radon in
    tunnels made of the rock found at the level of the NuMI facilities
    on the Fermilab site. These results, including worst-case estimates,
    indicate occupational exposure to radon and radon progeny under the
    ventilation conditions present in the NuMI facility to be
    unimportant compared to the applicable regulatory limits of (CFR93).

[^7]: In response to this application, Illinois Environmental Protection
    Agency permit was issued on June 16, 1999.

[^8]: A. Van Ginneken and M. Awschalom, "High Energy Particle
    Interactions in Large targets", Fermilab, 1975, (available from the
    Publication's Office).

[^9]: J. D. Cossairt, "A Collection of Casim Calculations", TM-1140,
    October 22, 1982.

[^10]: Radiation Safety 9667-C7