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# 

####### *CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY*

**The Best Protection for both Colombian and American Workers: Stronger,
Market-Based Democratic Institutions in Colombia**

**Testimony before the**

**Committee on Education and Labor**

**United States House of Representatives**

**February 12, 2009**

**James M. Roberts**

**Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth**

**Center for International Trade and Economics**

**The Heritage Foundation**

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My name is Jim Roberts. I am the Research Fellow for Economic Freedom
and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The
Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage in 2007, I served for 25
years as a Foreign Service Officer with the State Department and worked
on a variety of economic and political issues in a number of Latin
American countries. The views I express in this testimony are my own,
and should not be construed as representing any official position of The
Heritage Foundation.

Colombia is one of America's best friends in the Caribbean--Andean
region. The Colombian government -- the oldest democracy in South
America \-- is solidly committed to its partnership with the United
States and is following a similar path toward market-based democracy and
strong rule of law that has made the United States the most prosperous
nation in world history.

A decade ago Colombia was a nation wracked by violence and seized with
fear, where drug kingpins, narco-funded leftist terrorists and
guerillas, far-right paramilitaries, and an assortment of other
gangsters operated with impunity, while government, military, and law
enforcement officials cowered in their offices and barracks.

Today, by comparison, Colombia is again bustling with people who are
excited to see their homeland growing more prosperous and, at last, more
peaceful. The vast majority of Colombians are focused on enhancing their
peace and prosperity by accelerating Colombia's incorporation into the
globalized economy. Interestingly, many of these pro-globalization
Colombians are unionized workers enjoying the prosperity created in
recent years by the hundreds of thousands of jobs in Colombian export
industries (e.g., cut flowers, mining, petroleum products, coffee,
textiles, sugar, and bananas).

In the intervening years, many things changed, but they can be
summarized in a few words: Plan Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe, and a
new spirit among the Colombian people. Plan Colombia is a bold,
multi-year program begun in 1999 by former President Bill Clinton and
President Andres Pastrana, Uribe's predecessor. Through this plan, which
was continued and strengthened under former President George W. Bush,
the two countries began rebuilding the Colombian state. Plan Colombia
has helped the Colombian government regain control of territory and
extend security to the towns and the countryside. Progress has been
especially dramatic since 2002 when President Uribe took office and
Congress significantly increased U.S. funding for Plan Colombia.

**A History of Violence**

Colombia's tragic history of violence in the modern era goes back to at
least 1948, when revolutionaries began rioting to protest the
assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a lawyer and somewhat populist
leftist politician who was running for president against the
conservative oligarchy then in power.[^1]

Thousands perished in the *Bogotazo*, as the riots came to be known,
including Colombian soldiers, revolutionaries, and innocent bystanders.
Colombia's major political parties were unable to put a stop to the
extreme levels of violence (*La Violencia*) triggered by the *Bogotazo*
until a decade later in 1958, after more than 200,000 Colombians had
been killed. The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of violent leftist
guerilla warfare groups such as the Marxist-oriented Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian Liberation Army (ELN) and M-19
movement. During this insurgency by the FARC and ELN, drug cartels in
Cali and Medellin dramatically increased cocaine production and
smuggling. Drug traffickers enlisted guerrillas to make direct assaults
on the government as occurred in October 1985. By the late 1980s, Pablo
Escobar, the notorious leader of the Medellin Cartel, had become the
seventh richest man and the most feared terrorist in the world. His
power was such that he threatened "to usurp the Colombian state."[^2]

Colombians' penchant for resolving disputes through violence has many
root causes, including the longstanding existence of criminal and
violent narco-terror/trafficking gangs; the Colombian government's lack
of effective control in the past over much of its vast territory (the
combined size of California and Texas); the fiercely independent and
stubborn nature of the average hard scrapple Colombian, who must carve
out a living from often rough and inhospitable terrain; and the long
history of class warfare that has been stoked, organized, and funded by
Marxist revolutionary groups over the past 60 years. Other countries in
the region have also been disproportionately affected by violence, for
many of the same reasons.

**Colombia's Ongoing Struggle for Modernity and Prosperity**

The FARC is a long-time enemy of Colombian democracy. Long isolated in
the Colombian jungles, FARC leaders are out of touch with the 21st
century. They reject market-based democracy, individual freedoms, urban
life, and modernity in general. Their visions of Colombia's future would
follow in the footsteps of the apostles of revolutionary violence from
Mao Zedong to Che Guevara. Colombia government officials say that
negotiations with the FARC are very difficult, since there is little the
government can offer to them.

FARC continued to pursue the overthrow of the government of Colombia
during the 1990s, but more worldly FARC members also turned to the
lucrative and fast-growing businesses of drug trafficking, kidnapping,
and extortion. The resulting violence led some far-right landowners in
Colombia to form paramilitaries to protect their property in the absence
of effective governmental authority. The government's negotiations with
the FARC ended in 2002 after the FARC turned a safe haven twice the size
of El Salvador into a laboratory for violence, misrule, drug
trafficking, and kidnapping.[^3]

The best known of the paramilitary groups was the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC), [^4] which waged war against the left and the
government in the general chaos generated by the armed left and the drug
trade. AUC members engaged in a vicious guerrilla campaign against the
FARC and the ELN, drug traffickers, and the Colombian army. Some AUC
members were also corrupted by the temptation of easy money from
narco-trafficking, and a significant number of large landowners in
Colombia who sponsored paramilitaries were the drug lords themselves.
The combination of FARC, drug traffickers, and paramilitaries nearly
destroyed the Colombian state.

**Defending Market-based Democracy in Colombia**

The restoration of order and civilian authority has allowed President
Uribe's free market policies to bear fruit, and economic growth in
Colombia has taken off. The gross domestic product (GDP) has been
growing at an increasing rate since Uribe took office, reaching an
estimated 7 percent in 2007[^5] before falling back slightly last year
in the wake of the worldwide economic slowdown. Colombia's economic
growth has been spurred by the duty-free access it has enjoyed under the
Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), \[which\]
gives Colombia access to the U.S. market as a way to reduce poverty and
fight the drug trade."[^6]

The *2009 Index of Economic Freedom*, which was recently published by
The Heritage Foundation and *The Wall Street Journal* and scored 179
countries worldwide, ranked Colombia's economy at 62.3 out of a possible
100 (with 0 equaling "repressed" and 100 indicating "free"), making it
the world's 72^nd^ freest economy. Colombia is ranked 15th out of 29
countries in the Latin America/Caribbean region.[^7] By comparison,
neighboring Venezuela's score fell all the way to the bottom of the
*2009 Index*, to 174th place (just ahead of Cuba)[^8], while Ecuador was
not much higher ranked at 137^th^ out of 179 countries.[^9]

For the first time in memory people are enjoying the freedom of safely
walking Colombia's once mean streets. Uribe's popularity has soared
along with the economy, while the favorable rating of the FARC has
plummeted to almost zero.[^10]

**The U.S. - Colombia Free Trade Agreement**

To stabilize market-based democracy, President Uribe and former
President George W. Bush negotiated the U.S.--Colombia Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), which the two governments signed in February 2006. It
is much more than just a simple trade agreement. The Colombia FTA would
help the United States complete a contiguous free trade zone along the
Pacific Rim from Canada to Chile and further stabilize many Latin
nations from Mexico through Central America and into the Andean region
in their struggles against both the extreme poverty in segments of their
populations and the malignant effects of narco-terror on their
societies. Importantly, the FTA would also increase U.S. exports to
Colombia and would seal a deeper partnership between two nations that
are long-time friends and great defenders of market-based democracy. The
FTA would fortify a bulwark against the rising tide of Chávism that
nearly surrounds Columbia and threatens to undermine U.S. hemispheric
interests.

Regrettably, Congress has delayed approval of the U.S.--Colombia FTA.
Protectionist U.S. labor unions and anti-globalization leftist groups
have joined with far-left allies in the region to try to block
Congressional approval of the FTA.

On the surface at least, their main argument against the FTA is that a
history of violence against leaders of Colombian trade unions and
allegations that the Colombian government has tolerated or even
sanctioned that violence should disqualify Colombia from further
consideration for a FTA with the United States. However, these opponents
conspicuously ignore the historical context of the violence (both within
Colombia as well as in the region) as well as the considerable progress
the Uribe government has made in reducing it.

**Stronger Democratic Institutions in Colombia Will Reduce Violence**

FTA opponents place heavy emphasis on the tragic history of violence
against Colombian labor leaders and the alleged impunity for their
government assailants. All of Colombian society, including union
members, has clearly suffered from the horrifically high murder rate of
the past few decades. However, more than half of all union members are
in the Colombian public sector, with teachers comprising the largest
union in the public sector. Given the nature of their work and the lack
of any direct connection to paramilitaries sponsored by large
landowners, most killings of teachers were likely the result of
apolitical, "normal" motives (e.g., robbery and crimes of passion).

Over the years certain labor union members and leaders were undeniably
targeted for assassination by paramilitaries and others in Colombia. Yet
while the AFL-CIO reports the overall toll of violence against teachers
and other union members, it fails note that the vast majority of the
"2,500 murders of trade unionists since 1986"[^11] occurred prior to
2001. According to statistics from the Embassy of Colombia, the number
of murders of union members in Colombia has dropped drastically since
2001, one year before Colombian President Álvaro Uribe was sworn into
office. In 2001 and 2007, union killings totaled roughly 200 killings
annually. The number fell by half in 2003 and has declined since
then.[^12]

By the time President Uribe took office in 2002, almost 29,000
Colombians were being murdered annually. Many politicians from Uribe's
own political party were among the dead. While a few teachers were
certainly killed because of their leftist ideology, a large number of
the killings should not be included in the AFL-CIO's "union killings"
figures. Many of the murders involved persons in union members'
households, not the union members themselves. A high percentage of them
occurred for reasons unrelated to union affiliation. As The Washington
Post recently noted: "There were 17,198 murders in 2007. Of the dead,
only 39 (0.226 percent) were even members of trade unions, let alone
leaders or activists, according to the Colombian labor movement. (Union
members make up just under 2 percent of the Colombian population.)"[^13]

**Strengthened Colombian Government Institutions Have Reduced Violence**

Plan Colombia and a strong, market based economy have helped President
Uribe's government to achieve many successes to reduce violence in
Colombia.

**Demobilization:** The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative reports
that more than 30,000 AUC and other paramilitaries have been demobilized
since 2005, when the Colombian government implemented the Justice and
Peace Law, which set the rules for the demobilization process.[^14]

**Truth and Reconciliation:** Under the Justice and Peace Law of 2005,
over 1600 bodies of some of the victims of the FARC and the AUC have
been recovered and their families have been partially compensated with
assets seized for a reparation fund. There are more people now in jail
in Colombia for human rights violations that at any other similar
(post-conflict) period in the history of any Latin American
country.[^15]

**Violence Down:** As the Center for Strategic and International Studies
recently noted, the FARC and other drug-traffickers are on the run, and
violence is down significantly. The government has "a legitimate state
presence in all of Colombia's 1,099 municipalities" and "\[t\]he
guerrillas have been driven out of many areas that they previously
dominated and their military capability sapped by the resurgence of
state security force."[^16]

**Extraditions up:** Another indicator of the success of Plan Colombia,
and a development also very helpful to U.S. law enforcement efforts in
the war against drugs, is the dramatic increase in the number of
significant narcotics traffickers extradited to face prosecution in the
United States since President Uribe took office.

**Dropping Murder Rate:** When President Uribe assumed power, violence
was ripping the very fabric of the Colombian nation. However, the
overall murder rate has dropped by 40 percent, kidnappings are down 83
percent, and terror attacks are down 76 percent.[^17] Plan Colombia has
helped to cut cocaine production and smuggling significantly.[^18] The
streets of Medellin, once ruled by Pablo Escobar, are now safe enough
for visits by senior Bush Administration and congressional
officials.[^19] The number of murders of trade unionists has dropped by
75 percent.[^20] Although the number of trade unionist murders increased
very slightly in 2008, to 32, the Uribe government has maintained and
accelerated its efforts to reduce the level to zero.[^21]

One pro-FTA Colombian union leader's courageous advocacy of the
U.S.--Colombia trade agreement apparently cost him his life. Jairo
Giraldo Rey was murdered in his hometown of Cali in November 2007, just
before he was to travel to Washington with other pro-FTA Colombian union
leaders to lobby Congress to pass the agreement. As reporter Monica
Showalter noted, "Giraldo's murder not only silenced an unexpected voice
for free trade, it also jacked up union killings data to stoke the case
in the U.S. against Colombia's pact."[^22]

**Dramatic Drop in Extrajudicial Killings:** A constant refrain heard
from U.S. and Colombian leftist NGOs and unions is that the
paramilitaries can still act with impunity and are protected by the
Colombian government. This allegation is false.

While extrajudicial killings are still occurring, they have been greatly
reduced. President Uribe made it clear from the day he took office that
his government would not tolerate paramilitary activity and would
prosecute criminals in the AUC and other far-right groups. In fact,
nearly all of the paramilitaries have been demobilized and disbanded
under the Uribe administration.

Furthermore, "\[t\]he Colombian government has tripled spending on
protection for unionists, human rights activists, and other at-risk
individuals and established a special unit to prosecute crimes against
trade unionists."[^23] In 2008, the Colombian government spent US\$42
million on this security program to protect at-risk individuals.[^24] Of
the 9,400 individuals benefiting from individual protection
schemes---which range from bodyguards and armored vehicles to cell phone
networks---1,959 are unionists, which is an increase from 2006, when
unionists accounted for 1,504 of the 6,097 individuals being
protected.[^25]

The Prosecutor General's office has led the charge in dealing with past
killings, resolving 73 cases of union member murder and convicting 156
individuals since 2001. In November 2006, a special labor Sub-unit was
created in the Office of the Prosecutor General to focus on labor union
killings and has since resolved 40 cases and convicted 67 people.[^26]
The unit has three specialized judges, 19 prosecutors, 22 additional
lawyers, and almost 100 judicial police investigators.[^27]

**Adoption of U.S. Legal System Model:** With technical assistance from
the U.S. government, beginning in 2004 Colombia switched from the
Napoleonic inquisitorial legal system to the accusatory, open-court
criminal trial procedures based upon U.S. and English common law. These
reforms will strengthen Colombia's judicial system and make it more
efficient with a speedier trial process. The transition to the new
system will take time, however, and the first new law school students
rained in the new procedures only graduated recently.[^28]

**Improved Labor Standards:** The AFL-CIO alleges that the Colombian
government is "not in compliance with International Labor Organization
(ILO) core labor standards."[^29] Yet a November 2007 ILO report
concluded, based on a visit to Colombia, that the labor situation in
Colombia is positive and that the government has made significant
progress. The ILO report praised the "the cooperation of the Government
of Colombia with the ILO officials in their work to conclude the
Tripartite Agreement on Freedom of Association and Democracy."[^30]

Opponents are also willfully blind to the many successes stemming from a
wide variety of substantial USAID programs that are jointly funded with
the Colombian government. These programs target development assistance
to address the problems that festered during the "lost years" of rampant
violence. These programs train all employers---small, medium, and
large---in proactively ensuring compliance with all Colombian labor laws
on occupational safety, child labor, working hours, and other issues of
concern to Colombian workers.

These programs are also intended to bring more workers into formal
economy, where they can receive benefits and contribute to the tax base.
USAID and the Colombian government are working cooperatively with
business owners, but are also establishing protocols to enforce laws
with a system of fines and incentives. The Colombian Labor Ministry is
also funding programs to increase availability of vocational training
programs.[^31]

**Improved Human Rights Record**. Human rights activists opposed to the
FTA have faulted the Colombian government's treatment of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). [^32] However, some of those persons labeled
as IDPs by the left are actually economic migrants who have gravitated
to large cities in search of work and a better life, as is common in
many developing countries. Furthermore, numerous neutral observers have
noted tremendous progress on human rights in recent years. Retired
General Barry McCaffrey, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command
and Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy,
visited Colombia in October 2007 and reported that "\[t\]he human rights
situation has improved immeasurably during the President Uribe
tenure."[^33]

According to a report from the Colombian government:

> Impressive progress has been made in poverty reduction, education and
> health since 1999. Increased stability has allowed the government to
> provide more and better services to the country's poor.

-   Social spending represents 40 percent of the national budget

-   Poverty levels have decreased since 1999 from 55 percent to 45
    percent

-   Programs have been developed to improve infant nutrition and health,
    encourage school enrollment, empower women, and provide food for
    millions of children

-   More than 20 million of the country's poor receive full or partial
    health coverage

-   Infant and child mortality have decreased

-   Child immunizations have steadily increased

-   Student completion of elementary school has increased to almost 100
    percent, while the number of completing secondary school has also
    significantly risen.[^34]

**The U.S. - Colombia FTA Will Lock-in Gains for Both Countries**

My colleague at Heritage, Dr. Ray Walser, has noted that former Bolivian
president Jorge Quiroga recently observed the irony that two key
"commodity exports" (oil and cocaine) are entering the U.S. duty free
from several countries in Latin America, while the U.S. Congress debates
the duty-free entry of legal products from pro-American Colombia (which
already has duty-free access to the U.S. market for most of its products
through ATPDEA).[^35]

The FTA will spur additional economic development in Colombia and, just
as importantly, push the Colombian government to build up and strengthen
government institutions and judicial and economic regulation to ensure
that continued economic progress will not depend on any particular
political personalities.

As Dr. Walser has already reported to Congress, a full spectrum of the
wisest voices---U.S. and Latin American presidents, former senior
officials, both Democratic and Republican--- and the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Brookings Institute, the American Enterprise Institute,
The Heritage Foundation, to name a few, as well as mainstream-media
editorials are unanimous in urging swift passage of pending agreements
with Colombia and Panama.[^36] Colombia will certainly be willing to
work with the Obama Administration and Congress to accommodate
additional reasonable measures aimed at protecting labor and
environmental standards.

If the Congress votes down the Colombia FTA, it will deliver a major
psychological victory to the FARC, the narco-traffickers that the U.S.
has battled for decades in Colombia, and other enemies of market-based
democracy in the region. It will seriously risk the progress and
momentum made by the Plan Colombia war on drugs on which the U.S. has
spent hundreds of millions of dollars during the Clinton and Bush
Administrations.

Iinflicting economic punishment on a U.S. ally in the Andean region by
defeating the FTA is not in the U.S. interests. Left-wing populism is
fueled by poverty and lack of opportunities, as seen in Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Bolivia. To counter this possibility in Colombia, the
development of strong democratic institutions must be accompanied by
continued economic development and growth.[^37]

A defeated FTA might also force Colombia reluctantly into closer ties
with a very eager and suddenly conciliatory Venezuela, which is already
Colombia's second largest export market after the U.S., and Colombia
cannot afford to ignore it. Chávez's dangling of petroleum carrots will
not be ignored by the Colombians. If Colombia is spurned by the U.S., it
will continue to seek trade agreements with many other countries (e.g.,
Canada and Mexico) and trading blocs, such as the EU, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), and MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). This
would only further isolate the U.S.

A failed FTA will lead Colombia and other Latin American countries to
conclude that the U.S. is not a reliable partner. It will also fuel a
return to narco-trafficking and other illicit activity by the urban and
rural poor, who would not benefit from the many jobs that would be
created by the legitimate alternative economic development that will be
created by the Colombia FTA.

Congress should quickly approve the pending trade agreements with
Colombia and Panama. These actions will send a strong signal that the
new Congress and the Obama Administration will be adopting a
forward-looking trade policy agenda that emphasizes the creation of new
U.S. jobs through expanded export opportunities.

[^1]: Brian Latell, *After Fidel: Raul Castro and the Future of Cuba's
    Revolution: The Inside Story of Castro\'s Regime and Cuba\'s Next
    Leader* (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 101--106*.*

[^2]: Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest
    Outlaw* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 15.

[^3]: Author's notes from visit to Bogota, Columbia, December 2007.

[^4]: Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Tanya Primiani, *Back from the
    Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1997-2007* (Washington,
    D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007),
    p. 6, at
    *www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071112-backfromthebrink-web.pdf*.

[^5]: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
    April 2008, at
    *www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx* (April
    9, 2008).

[^6]: Christopher A. Padilla, Under Secretary for International Trade,
    U.S. Department of Commerce "Outlook on the Americas 2008," remarks
    at Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America,
    Coral Gables, Florida, January 24, 2008, at
    *www.ita.doc.gov/press/speeches/padilla_012408.asp* (April 14,
    2008).

[^7]: Terry Miller and Kim R. Holmes, *2009 Index of Economic Freedom*
    (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company,
    Inc., 2009), pp. 135-136, at
    *www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm*.

[^8]: Ibid., pp 423-424

[^9]: Ibid., pp. 163-164

[^10]: Author's notes from visit to Bogota, Colombia, December 2007.

[^11]: James Parks, "Act Now to Stop Colombia Free Trade Deal," AFL-CIO
    Weblog, March 24, 2008, at
    *http://blog.aflcio.org/2008/03/24/act-now-to-stop-colombia-free-trade-deal*
    (April 5, 2008).

[^12]: Embassy of Colombia, "Progress Report: Strengthening the Rights,
    Benefits and Security of Unions," October 2007, and the Colombia
    Ministry of Social Protection, cited in Daniel Griswold and Juan
    Carlos Hidalgo, "A U.S.--Colombia Free Trade Agreement:
    Strengthening Democracy and Progress in Latin America," Cato
    Institute *Free Trade Bulletin* No. 32, February 7, 2008, Figure 1,
    at *www.freetrade.org/node/839* (March 17, 2008).

[^13]: Editorial, "Columbia's Case," *The Washington Post*, April 18,
    2008, p. A14, at
    *www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR2008041802900.html*
    (April 21, 2008).

[^14]: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Columbia FTA Facts,"
    March 2008, at
    *www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/asset_upload_file144_13716.pdf*
    (April 11, 2008).

[^15]: Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice
    and Labor Rights," Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at
    [www.colombiaemb.org](http://www.colombiaemb.org/)).

[^16]: DeShazo *et al.*, *Back from the Brink*, p. viii.

[^17]: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Columbia FTA Facts."

[^18]: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
    Law Enforcement Affairs, "International Narcotics Control Strategy
    Report, 2008," March 2008, at
    *www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100776.htm* (April
    21, 2008).

[^19]: Press release, "Secretary Gutierrez to Lead Fourth Congressional
    Delegation to Colombia," U.S. Department of Commerce, February 28,
    2007, at
    *www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_005275*
    (April 5, 2008).

[^20]: Hugh Bronstein, "Colombia Trade Deal Dead This Year, U.S. Unions
    Say," *The Washington Post*, February 12, 2008.

[^21]: Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice
    and Labor Rights," Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at
    [www.colombiaemb.org](http://www.colombiaemb.org/)). *See also* José
    de Córdoba, "Colombia's Uribe Says Passage of Free-Trade Pact Is
    Critical," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 4, 2008.

[^22]: Monica Showalter, "U.S.--Colombia Deal Faces Labor Deceit,"
    *Investor's Business Daily*, April 7, 2008, at
    *www.investors.com/editorial/IBDArticles.asp?artsec=16&issue=20080407*
    (April 11, 2008).

[^23]: Doug Palmer, "Labor Leaders to Visit Colombia As Bush Presses for
    Vote," Reuters, February 7, 2008, at
    *www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0739641220080207*
    (February 19, 2008).

[^24]: Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice
    and Labor Rights," Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at
    [www.colombiaemb.org](http://www.colombiaemb.org/)).

[^25]: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Columbia FTA Facts,"
    and author's notes, meeting with U.S. Embassy officials in Bogota,
    Columbia, December 2007.

[^26]: *Ibid.*

[^27]: Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice
    and Labor Rights," Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at
    [www.colombiaemb.org](http://www.colombiaemb.org/)). .

[^28]: Ibid.

[^29]: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
    Organizations, "Worker's Rights, Violence, and Impunity in
    Colombia," January 9, 2008, p. 8, at
    *www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/colombia_briefing.pdf*
    (April 5, 2008).

[^30]: U.N. International Labour Office, "Fourth Supplementary Report:
    Implementation Process of the Tripartite Agreement on Freedom of
    Association and Democracy in Colombia*,*" GB.300/20/4, November 1,
    2007, para. 8, at
    *www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/\-\--ed_norm/\-\--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_087328.pdf*
    (April 5, 2008).

[^31]: U.S. Agency for International Development, "FY 2006 Budget
    Justification to the U.S. Congress," s.v. "Colombia Program:
    Alternative Development," June 14, 2005, at
    *www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/pdf/co514-008.pdf*
    (December 13, 2007), and author's notes, meeting with USAID
    officials, U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, December 5, 2007.

[^32]: News release, "Colombia: Death Threats Drive Thousands from Their
    Homes Every Year," International Committee of the Red Cross,
    February 4, 2008, at
    *www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/colombia-news-020408!OpenDocument*
    (April 5, 2008), and Human Rights Watch, *Displaced and
    Discarded---The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá and
    Cartagena*, October 2005, at
    *http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia1005* (April 5, 2008).

[^33]: General Barry McCaffrey, quoted in Embassy of Colombia
    (Washington, D.C.), *Colombia: Perspectives on Progress*, January
    2008, p. 5, at
    *www.colombiaemb.org/docs/2008perspectivesonprogressreport.pdf*
    (April 5, 2008).

[^34]: *Ibid,* p. 11 (original bullet points).

[^35]: Ray Walser, Ph. D., "U.S Policy toward Latin America in 2009 and
    Beyond," Testimony before The Subcommittee on the Western
    Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of
    Representatives, February 4, 2009

[^36]: (From Walser Testimony) Some examples recommending approval
    include: Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General, Organization of
    American States (OAS), "Recognize and Build on Our Progress,"
    *Americas Quarterly*, Fall 2008, pp 103--105, at
    *http://as.americas-society.org/article.php?id=1332* (January 28,
    2009); Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.--Latin America Relations:
    A New Direction For A New Reality," Independent Task Force Report
    No. 60. pp. 17--19; "Rethinking U.S.--Latin Relations: A Hemispheric
    Partnership for A Turbulent World," Report of the Partnership for
    the Americas Commission, November 2008, p. 22; and "Democrats
    Support Colombia FTA," *Latin Business Chronicle*, April 21, 2008,
    at *http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=2314*
    (January 28, 2009).

[^37]: Griswold and Hidalgo, "A U.S.--Colombia Free Trade Agreement,"
    Cato Institute, Center for Trade Policy Studies, February 7, 2008,
    at <http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-032.pdf> (February 11,
    2009)