**National Intelligence Council**

**NIC 2020 Project**

**NIC-sponsored Seminar on Asian Reponses to the United States**

24 November 2003

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project are those of individual participants. They are posted for
discussion purposes only and do not represent the views of the US
Government.**

*January 2004*

**National Intelligence Council**

**NIC 2020 Project**

**NIC-sponsored Seminar on Asian Reponses to the United States**

24 November 2003

### **Introduction**

For the past year and a half, the NIC has engaged a group of leading
international relations theorists in a series of discussions about
"power politics in the age of unipolarity." At the end of the
discussions, the group's chair, Professor John Ikenberry of Georgetown
University, has drafted papers summarizing the discussions. An earlier
one---***Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power
Politics in the Age of Unipolarity***---describes possible future
challenges from our allies and partners, including Europe, Japan,
Russia, China, India and Brazil.

This paper---summarizing the group's discussion last
November---addresses four questions:

-   How might a stronger China behave and what are the implications of
    that behavior for Asia and the wider world?

-   How will other Asian states and the United States respond to a
    rising China?

-   How are other regional powers, such as Japan, Indonesia, and India,
    likely to develop and behave between now and 2020.

-   How might Asia, particularly with respect to the US-Chinese
    relationship, develop strategically between now and 2020.

**Discussion**

# How Might a Stronger China Behave?

The most commonly cited characteristic of Asian politics is the
seemingly inexorable rise of China. Three questions in particular
occupied the group as it tried to come to terms with this development.
First, will a stronger China seek to increase its influence globally or
regionally? In other words, will it seek to directly challenge the
United States on a global scale? Second, how will China seek to increase
its influence? Third, what could throw China off balance and prompt a
change in strategy, perhaps in a more aggressive direction?

**Does China have regional or global revisionist intentions?**

The group was not united on this but generally tended to support the
thesis that China would not seek to emulate the Soviet Union by
attempting to construct its own global order. Four reasons were advanced
in support of his position. First, China lacks the capacity to challenge
unipolarity on a global scale. Crucially, China is without a blue water
navy. It has intentions to construct one but no conceivable plan would
be sufficient to challenge American maritime power. Second, regional
ambitions are within reach but unaided global ambitions are not.
Attempts toward the latter may prove to be self-defeating. Third, a true
global challenge may prompt a unified American balancing response. A
regional challenge, particularly if it is perceived to be legitimately
executed, may divide American opinion, both elite and public, and thus
weaken the likely American balancing response. Fourth, China lacks a
unifying ideology that could form the basis of the soft power necessary
to project power globally.

A dissenting viewpoint does not rule out the possibility of Chinese
collaboration with other powers such as a united Europe or Russia in an
effort to create a rule-based international order that would stand in
contrast to a hegemonic United States. However, the most likely outcome,
for the reasons stated above, is that the ambitions of a rising China
are highly likely to be regionally focused.

In terms of its relations with the United States, Chinese military
intentions are likely to be about raising the costs of entry to the
United States to deter American intervention in a Asian conflict or
crisis. Thus, it is important to look beyond the raw comparative numbers
of Chinese and American military strength and ask whether or not China
has sufficient power to achieve these limited goals of regional power
projection and deterrence of American intervention.

**What form will Chinese regional revisionism take?**

There is no one future for Asia given a rising China. How China behaves
will help shape how its neighbors and the United States respond, and
thus the outcomes may vary depending upon the strategic choices of the
parties involved. The group identified three ways in which China may
attempt to increase its influence over the next twenty years.

***China remains an authoritarian state, increasingly articulates
revisionist objectives, and seeks to use its newfound power to achieve
them.*** In some ways, this scenario pictures China behaving like
emerging great powers of the past, e.g. Wilheim's Germany, the Soviet
Union, etc. This scenario is at once the clearest threat to American
interests and presents the United States and the region with
straightforward choices. It is the scenario that is most likely to
prompt an American-supported regional alliance against China.

***China remains an authoritarian state with revisionist intentions but
respects the rules of the order, works within the existing framework,
and seeks to change it by peaceful and legitimate means.*** In this
scenario, China may seek to construct a regional security framework that
excludes the United States, it may bind itself in agreements to make its
power more acceptable, it may speak softly; all of this it would do with
a view to legitimizing its own power and to convince its neighbors that
China represents the future, a future in which they have a part. This
China will still threaten America's role in the region but it will be
more difficult for the United States to convince Asian states of the
dangers inherent in this development. Similarly, it will also be much
more difficult to secure European backing for a containment policy
(including restrictions on technology transfers); why would Europe
resist a well-behaved China just to cement and preserve unipolarity? It
may also complicate any attempt to rally American public opinion behind
a containment regime.

For China this is a counter-avoidance strategy. It is designed to
prevent the emergence of a counterbalancing coalition regionally and by
playing nice it endeavors to avoid a direct confrontation with the
United States. There was a general sense in the group that this strategy
would be China's preference.

A related theme is the possibility that the next ten years may see
China's message and soft power gaining resonance regionally at the
expense of the United States. As the United States becomes increasingly
occupied with dangers, such as terrorism, that are perceived as
peripheral at best, middle-ranking Asian states will be courted by an
apparently benign power that wishes to talk about the things that matter
to them (SARS, economic instability, AIDS, and, crucially, a means of
containing its own rising power).

***China becomes democratic.*** A democratic China deprives the United
States of a powerful argument against Chinese regional hegemony and may
weaken American resolve to confront a rising China. The reason for this
is simple. American policy towards trouble spots such as Taiwan is
largely premised on a strong preference for peaceful and democratic
solutions to political problems.

A democratic China may be a China that plays by, and respects, the rules
but that need not necessarily be the case. Strong nationalistic
pressures, particularly in the case of a prolonged economic recession,
may prompt an aggressive foreign policy to legitimize the sitting
government, although that could just as easily occur in an authoritarian
China.

**What developments could throw China off balance and prompt a change in
strategy?**

Some in the group expressed the view that as long as China is rising it
is unlikely to cause trouble. Why would it? Time only makes it stronger.
The sensible strategy is to wait because future conflict will likely be
on more favorable terms.

However, China is rising now but it may not always be so. If it
continues to grow but then faces a certain leveling off or decline it
may be tempted to act to turn its momentary advantage into durable facts
on the ground. This may be particularly dangerous and destabilizing if
it sees the United States as likely to grow stronger during its
predicted period of malaise. Similarly, economic decline may mean that
an authoritarian government may be unable to justify itself to its
people on the basis of prosperity; it may have to turn to alternative
sources of legitimacy, including nationalism. In a classic diversionary
tactic this may lead to a more assertive foreign policy.

Finally, traditionally contentious questions such as a Taiwanese move
towards independence could threaten the legitimacy of the Chinese regime
and cause it to resort to military force even if that entails a risk of
American involvement against China.

**How Will Other States Respond to a Rising China?**

The group considered a number of questions about how regional and
American responses to the emergence of an increasingly powerful China,
including whether or not that reaction would be shaped by the way in
which China seeks to increase its influence.

**Are China's neighbors likely to balance or bandwagon?**

There are three factors which will encourage regional bandwagoning
towards China. The first is the small size of many of the countries
involved, which makes the creation of a counterbalancing coalition very
difficult. The second is the giant sucking sound of the Chinese economy
which may deter states from directly confronting Beijing for fear of
jeopardizing their economic well-being. Finally, the large Chinese
communities in other states may exert political influence for a
pro-China foreign policy. However, balancing will become more likely if
a larger state is involved in spearheading a balancing effort and if
China seeks to achieve its goals by force, aggression, and coercion.

A related theme concerns the interaction between economic and political
links with China. If China's neighbors increasingly integrate with China
economically can they continue to keep security ties to the United
States or are these two dynamics mutually exclusive? Can the United
States offer a vision of regional order that makes this separation
practicable?

**How will America's policy toward Asia affect the calculations of
China's neighbors?**

American disengagement from what matters to the United States' Asian
allies will increase the likelihood that they will bandwagon and allow
China to create its own regional security order that excludes the United
States. As a global hegemon primarily concerned with combating
international terrorism, the United States presently offers Asian
governments a message of security that is of little relevance to the
challenges that those states face. This creates a vacuum which China can
attempt to fill. If it does so successfully, and in a way that is
non-threatening, it may be able to create a China-dominated regional
order that excludes the United States. The key question that the United
States needs to ask itself is whether it can offer Asian states an
appealing vision of regional security and order that will rival and
perhaps exceed that offered by China? Failure to do so will increase
Chinese incentives to play a long game, by the rulebook, with the
ultimate goal of either excluding the United States from the region or
excessively diminishing its power there.

**Does the United States have a problem with a rising China per se or
just with a rising China that is not democratic?**

At present, American concern about rising Chinese power is largely based
upon normative rhetoric. That is to say that the United States is
concerned about the rise of an authoritarian state, a state that may use
its power to coerce favorable outcomes at the expense of its democratic
neighbors. The United States also objects to the manner in which China
organizes itself internally by denying full political and human rights
to its people.

Is this America's problem with China or does it transcend normative
judgments? Should America be concerned with a stronger China regardless
of its internal makeup? The group pondered this question on a number of
occasions. Some suggested that if the United States were to be excluded
from Asia it would have important and detrimental implications for
America's capacity to project power globally. The sustenance of an
American-led international order may depend upon its continuing status
as the only global power. Others argued that any Chinese threats is a
direct result of its authoritarian characteristics and if this changed
so too would the entire strategic question that the United States is
grappling with. However, this question needs to be explored in greater
depth, something that may become urgent if China undergoes normatively
positive change.

Can the American-led international order accommodate rising non-western
powers such as China or India?

As a rising power China will be desirous of increased influence in
international affairs. This need not necessarily be incompatible with
the American-led international order. To use a business analogy, do
China and India want a place on the board or to set up a company of
their own? The critical question is whether or not the order is flexible
and fungible enough to adjust to a changing distribution of power on a
global level. If the order is inflexible the likelihood of political
conflict between emerging powers and the United States will increase; if
it is flexible it may be possible to forge an accommodation with rising
powers and strengthen the order in the process.

**How Might Other Asian Powers Develop Between Now and 2020?**

The group also discussed how developments in Japan, Indonesia, and India
will affect the Asian security order.

## Japan

There are two important points to be made about Japan. First, for Japan,
the US-Japan security treaty trumps all, even the constitution. The
Japanese place a great value upon this alliance and it is the bedrock of
their policy; they do not want to imagine a world without it. This
largely explains why relations with the United States have been so good
since September the 11^th^ and throughout the Iraq crisis. However, if
Japan begins to pay a price in casualties for supporting the United
States, the commitment to the alliance could clash with the public's
traditional pacifism, possibly leading to political controversy and
problems for the governing elite.

Second, modern day Japan is unique and does not easily fit into the
realist definition of state and statehood. It does not seek prestige and
lacks a traditional nationalistic element in its foreign policy, an
element which may be present in other states. Japan in many ways is an
example of what can go right, of what can be done. The question is
whether or not American leadership and enlightened policy on the part of
political elites can export this experience to the rest of Asia in an
attempt to replicate the developments in Europe. The glue that would
allow anything like this to happen is the continuance of global
capitalism which creates porous and open borders leading to the decline
of mistrust between states.

**Indonesia**

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Indonesia may be a potential
troublemaker in Asia. Four reasons were advanced to support this
contention. First, Indonesia may not remain a single entity for long; it
is a country with severe national identity problems which may greatly
complicate maintaining national unity. Second, Indonesia may not be a
reliable American ally. There are strong domestic and ideological
incentives in Indonesian politics to oppose American grand strategy and
these may become increasingly potent over time. Third, democratization
in Indonesia is not necessarily irreversible. Here some of the problems
resemble those it encountered in the 1950s. A return to authoritarianism
should not be considered out of the question. Finally, Indonesia
considers itself to be a great Asian power and may seek ways of
extending its influence regionally.

**India**

US-Indian relations may turn out to be a less stable and less
predictable version of American relations with France. Ironically,
India's democratic character may make it difficult for the United States
to deal with in the future, partially because of the individuals that
may be involved and partially because of structure. There are a number
of questions that need to be answered in order to understand India's
emerging place in the world. First, what is India's commitment to
multipolarism? Second, what does India want, tangible gains or prestige?
Third, is India obsessed with being autonomous and, if so, what are the
implications of that?

There are a number of crisis points that could throw India off balance.
One obvious one is a conflict, either deliberate or accidental, with
Pakistan. A second is the prospect of internal terrorism within India.
India has 150 million Muslims who have not mobilized yet; a small but
significant minority might do so at some point.

**Alternative Scenarios: How Might Asia Develop Strategically?**

The central focus of the group's discussion was China and the
implications of its rise. From the ensuing discussion, four possible
futures for US-China relations and an Asian security order can be
discerned.

China increases its influence peacefully and gradually excludes the
United States from Asia.

This is most likely if the United States ceases to effectively
communicate with its Asian allies, thus creating a vacuum which would be
filled by China. Chinese political liberalization, culminating in
democratization, may accelerate this development although it could occur
without it. The United States then faces a dilemma. Should China's
newfound influence be accepted, resisted, or should a deal be reached by
which Chinese influence manifests itself as part of the existing
international order?

The United States remains at the center of Asian politics; China
gradually increases its economic and political influence but its
neighbors opt for security ties to the United States.

This is most likely if Chinese actions are non-threatening, Chinese
intentions remain ambiguous, and America offers a vision of regional
order that resonates with its Asian allies. This is effectively a
continuation of the status quo as china's neighbors both work with, and
hedge against, it.

A regional bipolar cold war in which an American-led Coalition resists a
rising China.

This is most likely if Chinese intentions are perceived as threatening
by its neighbors, if China remains authoritarian, and if, as above, the
United States offers it Asian allies a vision of regional order that is
relevant to their policy goals. China then faces a dilemma. How should
it deal with this counterbalancing coalition? Should it utilize its
economic power and diaspora communities to coerce favorable outcomes?

A crisis throws the existing order off balance and its outcome
determines whether or not a China or an American-dominated regional
order emerges.

There are a number of crisis points, both known and unknown, that may
lead to a crisis between China and the United States, including Taiwan,
a crisis of legitimacy in China following economic collapse, or oil
competition in the Caspian Sea. These crisis points should be thought of
as an ever-present danger that is largely extraneous to long-term trends
in the region but will nevertheless largely shape those trends if they
ever spiral out of control and lead to a severe crisis or conflict.