**Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan:**

**Change And Continuity**

**Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Strategic Studies Institute**

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

**Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan:**

**Change And Continuity**

**Steven Metz and Raymond Millen,**[^1] **Strategic Studies Institute**

**Introduction**

Insurgency has existed as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak
to the point of violence. It is simply a strategy of desperation in
which those with no other options turn to protracted, asymmetric
violence, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. In some
modes, insurgents seek to attain their objectives directly by wearing
down the dominant power. In other forms, particularly the one developed
by Mao Zedong and refined by his disciples, asymmetric methods are used
to rectify an adverse conventional military balance, with ultimate
victory coming through conventional means once parity or something like
it is attained. Ultimately, though, the result is the same: the weak
avoid defeat and, over time, the power balance changes and they become
stronger.

Throughout history insurgency has ebbed and flowed in strategic
significance. While always existing somewhere, at times it was strategic
\"background noise.\" At other times, it was a central component of the
global security system. This strategic significance was determined by
contextual factors. The less the chances of direct armed conflict
between great powers and the greater the tendency of major powers to
sponsor insurgency as a form of surrogate conflict, the greater the
strategic significance of insurgency for regional and global power
balances and stability. Today, the combination of the massive
conventional military preeminence of the United States, nuclear
deterrence between great powers, and multiple sources of global
discontent arising from globalization, the collapse of traditional
political, economic, and social orders, environmental decay, population
pressure, and other factors, insurgency is again surging in strategic
significance. In fact, the world has entered another \"age of
insurgency\" analogous to the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. This
is likely to continue for at least several decades.

Every insurgency era differs from its predecessors in some significant
ways. The key for those who must confront the threat is discerning the
salient changes. It is clear that insurgency has metastasized into a
networked global phenomenon motivated by a violent form of radical
Islam. But what does that mean? Will old counterinsurgency concepts and
strategies still apply? These same questions must be asked when dealing
with specific national insurgencies as well. Since the previous
insurgency era is only a decade or so in the past, the U.S. defense
community has a deep reservoir of residual knowledge. This is both a
blessing and a curse. It can provide insights into today\'s insurgencies
but it can also prevent strategists and senior leaders from seeing what
is new and different.

To understand the insurgencies the United States now faces, whether
those in Iraq and Afghanistan or the global one against violent radical
Islam, and to develop coherent strategies to counter them, American
planners and leaders must ask two questions: *Do these insurgencies
exhibit the characteristics that have traditionally led to insurgent
success or victory*? and *Do these insurgencies have any characteristics
that break with traditional patterns and may allow them to attain
success or victory even though they are missing some of the traditional
determinants of success?*

**Conceptual Framework: Determinants of Success and Discontinuities**

During the past century some insurgencies attained victory or success.
Many more have failed. Those which did succeed invariably exhibited one
characteristic: they were able to prevent the counterinsurgents, whether
the regime or outside occupiers, from driving the conflict to the point
of decision in the military realm while the counterinsurgents still had
an overwhelming military superiority. In other words, the insurgents
were either able to make the political and psychological theater of
operations decisive (since it was much easier for them to attain parity
with the counterinsurgents in this sphere), or to postpone decisive
military struggles until they remedied their military disadvantage
through guerrilla, political, and psychological operations. At a
somewhat finer level of resolution, successful insurgencies had four
characteristics in common:

*Effective strategy* Insurgent strategies have two interlinked
dimensions: they must avoid a decisive engagement until the adverse
power balance is adjusted, and they must take direct steps to adjust the
power balance by weakening the counterinsurgents and strengthening the
insurgents themselves. Often insurgents have been able to build
strategies in which they seize and hold the initiative due to their
inherently greater flexibility and absence of ethical or legal
constraints.

*Effective ideology* There are many variants of effective insurgent
ideologies, but are unifying and mobilizing. In the 20th century, the
combination of Marxism and nationalism was particularly powerful. The
nationalistic angle made the ideology broad and unifying; the Marxist
angle focused anger and resentment on the regime and provided a
rationale for why the insurgents could expect ultimate success even when
the odds against them appeared long.

*Effective leadership* Leading an insurgency is extremely difficult.
Insurgent leaders must convince people to undertake extraordinary danger
and hardship for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a
positive outcome. Those who succeed tend to be those who can unify
diverse groups and organizations and mobilize segments of the polity not
previously engaged in politics. Psychologically, effective insurgent
leaders tend to be so dedicated to their cause that they will persevere
even though the odds are greatly stacked against them. In a similar
vein, they tend to believe so strongly in their cause that they become
utterly ruthless, and are willing to take whatever steps are necessary
to weaken the counterinsurgents. Insurgent leadership, in other words,
is not a business for the faint of heart, but for the utterly committed.

*A method of obtaining resources* In the broadest terms, insurgents need
five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies;
4) sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence. These can be *provided*, *seized,*
or *created*. Provided resources can come from outside sponsors,
domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of the counterinsurgents
(e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the
presence of the insurgents). Funding, equipment, and supplies are the
resources most often seized, but in some insurgencies, particularly
those in Africa, manpower is seized through violence as insurgents
undertake forcible recruitment. Just as in nature an organism seeks to
obtain food with the minimum energy expenditure, most insurgencies would
prefer to be provided resources, but will seize or create them if none
are provided or, in some cases, if provided resources come with too many
strings attached.

*Discontinuities*. The basic determinants of success remain the same
from the previous insurgent era to the new one. In addition, the core
characteristics of insurgency\--its complexity, and grinding, dirty,
violent nature\--persist. From a strategic standpoint, though, there are
some key changes or discontinuities with effects that have not yet been
fully understood:

The remainder of this paper will examine the ongoing insurgencies in
Iraq and Afghanistan through the lens of these characteristics of
successful insurgencies and emerging discontinuities.

**Iraq**

The United States did not expect to bear the brunt of the responsibility
for stabilizing Iraq after the collapse of the Hussein regime. The
expectation was that the existing Iraqi security forces would remain
intact and play the major role, and that international peacekeepers
would lend vital support. Very quickly though, it became clear that
armed opposition to the American-led occupation was emerging, and that
neither the security forces of the old regime nor international forces
could substitute for U.S. and, to a lesser degree, British forces.

In late May 2003---just a few weeks after Coalition forces took control
of Baghdad---the first U.S. soldier was killed at a checkpoint in what
would become the vortex of the insurgency, Fallujah. By June the first
U.S. helicopter had been shot down, sporadic ambush-style assaults on
American troops took place, and the U.S. military launched a series of
large scale sweep operations to pacify areas of opposition in what had
become known as the \"Sunni Triangle\" north and west of Baghdad.
Implored by tapes recorded by Saddam Hussein, insurgents also began
attacking Iraqis who supported the Coalition. On July 5, seven Iraqi
police recruits were killed and 40 wounded by an explosion at a training
center in Ramadi. As Americans developed more effective force protection
procedures, the insurgents focused more and more on such \"soft\"
targets. As Mowaffak Rubaie, a member of the U.S.---appointed Governing
Council, noted, \"They are targeting the new leadership of Iraq because
they can\'t get to the Americans, because the Americans are very well
protected.\"[^2] Judges, city officials, translators, and journalists
were also assaulted.[^3] In August, the United Nations also became a
target as a truck bomb at the U.N. mission killed Serbio Viera de Mello,
its head, and 23 other people. Later that month bombs killed 95,
including a key cleric, at a Shi\'ite mosque in Najaf.

Throughout the summer and into the autumn, the insurgents in the Sunni
Triangle developed increasingly sophisticated methods for attacking U.S.
forces, particularly using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). By the
autumn attacks increased to 20-35 a day from 10-15 a day during the
summer.[^4] In October, the parallel campaign of suicide bombing
escalated with several in Baghdad inside of a week. In early November,
insurgents shot down two American helicopters, killing 22. The
insurgents were learning and adapting. Early in the conflict they
attacked U.S. forces from close range and were often killed or captured.
By the autumn, they relied on standoff weapons such as IEDs and
mortars.[^5] And, the insurgency spread geographically: by November, the
U.S. was confronting a \"sustained period of resistance\" in the key
northern city of Mosul.[^6] Attacks on infrastructure like oil pipelines
and electrical pipelines thwarted the restarting of the Iraqi economy.
Even though the insurgents were responsible, this often worked exactly
as they planned since it stoked anger and resentment toward the
Coalition.

Following an extensive American offensive in November, the insurgents
shifted attacks on U.S. forces to Coalition allies including Spain,
Japan, and South Korea.[^7] By this time there was a noticeable increase
in the coordination and resolve of the insurgents.[^8] The capture of
Saddam Hussein in December led to a temporary dip in the number of
attacks, but by January levels had reached new highs, with the deadly
combination of direct attacks on U.S. forces, attacks on Iraqis
supporting the Coalition, and attacks on other soft targets such as
reconstruction workers, and infrastructure. A parallel but interlinked
war developed against Iraqi\'s Shi\'ite community. On March 2, 2004, a
series of car bombs near Shi\'ite religious ceremonies in Baghdad and
Karbala kill at least 270 people.

By March, U.S. fatalities began surging again, ending hopes that the
capture of Hussein had taken the life out of the insurgency.[^9] In
April the insurgency reached a new peak of violence as U.S. forces
entered Fallujah to attempt a clearing and stabilization operation
while, at nearly the same time, the radical Shi\'ite cleric Moktada
al-Sadr led an insurrection across southern Iraq. Both represented
significant changes. Fallujah reflected a shift from \"shoot and scoot\"
attacks to set-piece small unit actions---what one military officer
called \"a stand-up fight between two military forces.\"[^10] For the
first time, the insurgents attempts to create and hold \"liberated
areas.\"[^11] Simultaneously, the sophistication, coordination, and
aggressiveness of attacks on other American forces and supply routes
increased sharply, to include the destruction of key bridges on planned
advanced routes.[^12] Analysts had long warned that if the insurgency
spread from Iraq\'s Sunni to its majority Shi\'ite community, the
Coalition would be in an untenable position.[^13] Al-Sadr\'s uprising,
while not supported by most Shi\'ites or the more respected clergy,
raised fears of this happening as the formerly secure southern region of
the country became a battleground.[^14] Particularly troubling was the
apparent coordination, even alliance, between the two.[^15]

*Strategy* The strategy of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to discern.
This is not unusual. It often takes insurgencies an extended period of
time to become coherent as various factions and leaders vie for control.
While American ideas about insurgency tend to be shaped by \"mature\"
ones like Vietnam in the 1960s, it is easy to forget that this period of
confusion and incoherence is natural, perhaps even inevitable. While
insurgent operations appear to have been planned by the Hussein regime
while it was still in power, that regime demonstrated its strategic
ineptitude over and over, so it is not surprising that there is no
overarching strategy for the insurgency.[^16] The fact that the United
States kept recognized and responded to the insurgency with a quickness
that is without historical precedence kept the gestation period short.
This further stymied any attempts to formalize the insurgency and
develop a more coherent strategy.

The inchoate strategy of the Iraqi insurgency reflects the looseness,
even incoherence of the movement. It is also a survival technique. The
more the insurgency solidifies and develops coherent organizations,
procedures, and strategy, the more vulnerable it is to political and
military actions by the Coalition. At this point, the insurgents are too
weak to allow that to happen. Even if they would prefer a more coherent
organization and strategy, they must recognize that---as in
nature\--only insurgencies with powerful survival instincts have a
chance of success. And, the vagueness of the strategy makes it easier to
mobilize strength by building a wide coalition among the various groups
opposed to American involvement in Iraq.

The strategy which has emerged, however inchoate, is a fairly standard
one for insurgents opposing outside occupiers. It has three parallel and
interlinked tracks: 1) show the weakness of the occupier by making the
country ungovernable---i.e. follow the old Russian revolutionary slogan
\"the worse, the better\" by taking any action that creates instability,
chaos, conflict, and fear; 2) increase support by showing boldness and
provoking the counterinsurgents into steps that alienate or anger the
population; and, 3) directly erode the will of the counterinsurgents by
causing casualties.[^17] This is done through a sustained level of
action punctuated by periodic offensives or spurts of activity to retain
the psychological initiative. In other words, the counterinsurgents must
never be able to create the impression that things are definitely
getting better.

The ultimate determinant of the outcome in an insurgency is the
*perception* of the eventual outcome held by the parties involved---the
insurgents, the counterinsurgents, the population, and, to a lesser
extent, other actors. If the counterinsurgents are able to create and
sustain the impression that no matter how long it takes, they will
ultimately persevere, they will. If the insurgents are able to prevent
this, they have the potential to win. The way insurgents do this is by
launching some sort of military or psychological offensive whenever the
counterinsurgents appear to be on a trajectory for success, and by
creating the impression that the insurgency is growing in strength. As
U.S. Brigadier General Martin Dempsey complained, \"Every time we do
something positive, the bad guys try to reverse the psychology with
their own negative act.\"[^18]

An important step in creating the impression that the insurgency was on
the ascent was the attempt to unify the Shi\'ite uprising in the spring
of 2004 and the ongoing Sunni based insurgency. This is potentially very
problematic for the United States. The components of the
insurgency---the foreign terrorists that rely heavily on car bombs, the
main insurgency in the Sunni triangle, and the Shi\'ite uprising---have
radically different methods of operation and thus require different
responses. One thing that made Vietnam so difficult for the United
States was its multidimensionality. That was not either a classic
insurgency or a semi-conventional war, it was both simultaneously. To
the extent the conflict in Iraq becomes and remains a complex,
multidimensional one, the more difficult counterinsurgency will be.

By the spring of 2004, there were signs that the insurgents were winning
the decisive battle for future expectations. The April battle for
Fallujah, even though it was ultimately a military defeat, had begun to
take on a \"mythic\" air since it appeared to illustrate that the
insurgency was on the ascent.[^19] In May public opinion polls began to
indicate that a majority of Iraqis said they would feel safer with U.S.
troops gone and favored immediate withdrawal.[^20] The guarded optimism
of a few months earlier had been replaced by a deep sense of
pessimism.[^21] It was not clear that the Coalition could reverse this
trend by persisting with its existing strategy.

Yet what is missing from the strategy of the Iraqi insurgents is a
\"positive\" dimension. Most victorious insurgents have been able to
create the impression both that the government or occupier cannot create
a stable or just society, and that they can. So far, the Iraqi
insurgents have not projected a vision of the type of nation they would
create if they expel the Coalition. Again, this is not unusual: this is
very young and immature insurgency. If it is sustained, such a positive
dimension to the insurgent strategy is likely to emerge.

*Ideology* The ideology of the Iraqi insurgency follows the pattern of
the strategy---it has remained inchoate, whether to be as inclusive as
possible or simply because the Coalition response has prevented the
emergence of any clear leadership. The normal pattern in insurgencies
(at least successful ones) is to begin with general grievances, refine
this into a very inclusive ideology that can build a broad based
coalition, and then at some point to undergo further ideological
refinement as one faction comes to dominate the others. The primary
foundation of the ideology of the Iraqi insurgency is opposition to
foreign rule. This is based both on nationalism and religion. They
believe, as Daniel Pipes phrases it, that \"rule by non-Muslims is a an
abomination, a blasphemous inversion of God\'s dispensation.\"[^22] But
the Iraqi insurgents have not yet crafted any kind of overarching
ideological framework *other than anti-Americanism* than can incorporate
the largely secular Ba\'athist from the old regime, the Sunni tribes,
the Shia groups, and the outside jihadists. What they have is a
proto-ideology. It capitalizes on intense and growing dislike of the
United States and taps into wider anger in the Islamic world, but has no
positive dimension that promises a better world once the Americans are
expelled.

The crucial point will come when the counterinsurgency begins to assume
more of an Iraqi face. History suggests that insurgencies that do not
develop a coherent and complete counter-ideology may be able to sustain
their struggle for an extended time and may even be able to seize power
(e.g. Sierra Leone), but they cannot consolidate control. If the Iraqi
insurgents cannot develop a coherent and complete ideology they will
find it difficult to sustain their movement at a level adequate for any
kind of decisive outcome.

*Resources* The potential manpower base for the Iraqi insurgency is
immense. Unlike the Viet Cong or many of the African insurgencies that
were forced to provide the most rudimentary military training to their
recruits, Iraq is awash with men who have had military, police, or
intelligence training. And cultural and linguistic factors make it
relatively easy to integrate foreign recruits. But the insurgents were
able to draw on only a small segment of this pool since they were seen
as linked to the unpopular Hussein regime, and a large segment of the
Iraqi population at least temporarily tolerated the Coalition.

A series of factors began to change this, though, and helped mobilize
participants at the different levels always found in insurgencies:
leaders or cadres, full time fighters, occasional or part time
insurgents, active supporters among the population, and passive
supporters. These factors included the Coalition Provisional
Authority\'s \"de-Baathification\" policy and decision to disband the
Iraqi military which left hundreds of thousands of men with no means of
support; aggressive, sometimes culturally insensitive techniques on the
part of American military forces; slowness restoring the economy; and
more effective psychological campaigns by the insurgents than by the
Coalition. Most importantly, the Sunni minority, which had held a
privileged position under Hussein, saw this dominance slipping.[^23]
Sunni tribesmen thus become the principal source of support for the
insurgency.[^24] The Shi\'ite uprising, while still limited, could
greatly expand the potential recruit base. The Sadr militia, which is
based on the very poorest segment of the Shi\'ite community, is
estimated to have between 300 and 400 hard core fighters, but can
mobilize between 3,000 and 6,000 when challenged.[^25]

Equipment and supplies have been less of an issue for the Iraq
insurgency than for many of its counterparts elsewhere due to the huge
caches of arms and munitions scattered about the country, many of which
remained unguarded after the collapse of the Hussein regime.[^26] As a
result, the insurgents probably have enough basic arms and ammunition to
last for several years. Funding is more of a problem. It appears that
the first few months of the insurgency were fueled by money stashed away
during the Hussein regime. In addition, some money is coming in from
outside supporters. Whether this is adequate or no is hard to say.
Reportedly al-Jazeera broadcast a statement from one group offering a
bounty of \$15 million for anyone who kills a top American
commander.[^27] If this is true, the insurgents must have an extensive
war chest.

Given the nature of the Iraqi insurgency with its emphasis on guerrilla
attacks and terrorism, and its lack of \"liberated zones,\" it is likely
that it is a relatively inexpensive insurgency to operate in comparative
terms. Similarly, the Iraqi insurgents have no access to sanctuary other
than through dispersal and subterfuge within the country. This is a
serious organizational constraint.

The information age has provided the insurgents a wealth of strategic
intelligence. Through personal visits, telephone, and email, the global
jihadist and terrorist network has provided advice on tactics learned in
places as diverse as Afghanistan and Chechnya.[^28] The insurgents have
access to an unlimited amount of information about the political
situation within the United States and other Coalition nations. There
has also been concern by the U.S. military that efforts quickly share
tactical and operational \"lessons learned\" could provide intelligence
to the insurgents. At the local level, the insurgents probably rely on
networks of informers and sources linked by phones and other methods
much like 20th century insurgencies. While they may have attempted to or
even succeeded in infiltrating the new Iraqi security forces or other
Iraqis working for the Coalition, the fact that the Coalition itself
controls counterinsurgency planning limits the chances of intelligence
leaks.

*Leadership* Because of the vigor of the Coalition counterinsurgency
efforts, no clear leadership has emerged among the insurgents. The
capture of Saddam Hussein in December removed a symbolic rallying point
(albeit one that was probably an impediment to the growth of the
insurgency outside the Sunni Triangle). At the local level, the
insurgents are led by a diverse group of military and security officials
from the former regime and others inspired to rebellion but, as Edward
Wong of the *New York Times* puts it, the insurgent has not presented a
\"public face to the world at large.\"[^29] There is no question that
they have many of the characteristics typical of successful
insurgencies, specifically the dedication and ruthlessness. The question
remains whether a culture where no charismatic leaders other than Saddam
Hussein were tolerated can now produce them remains to be seen.
Ultimately, the pathologies of Hussein\'s system of rule may prove to be
the downfall of the insurgency he unleashed, at least in terms of
leadership.

*Assessment* The Iraq insurgency does not yet have the characteristics
that were evident in past insurgencies that attained victory, but it is
a very young and immature movement. If the Iraq insurgency were compared
to the Viet Cong one year after its founding, the prognosis would likely
to be grim. On the other hand, the Viet Cong were working with a blank
canvas of political unmobilized peasantry, so they could create a
political consciousness and therefore mold a unified ideology and
movement. The problem for the Iraqi insurgents is that they are
operating in a politically conscious and highly factionalized
environment. This suggests they can never become a truly effective
movement and thus can only succeed if their opponent---the American
allied new Iraqi government---proves particularly inept.

The only characteristic of the Iraqi insurgency that may allow it to
break with previous patterns and attain success if those it is missing
key components is the linkage to the global anti-American movement. If,
somehow, the insurgency can develop a political front that establishes
legitimacy outside of the jihadist movement by becoming part of
anti-Americanism rather than part of global terrorism, this could
represent part of a true new wave in insurgency---the strategic
globalization of the phenomenon with Iraq at the cutting edge.

**Afghanistan**

The ongoing insurgency is a mixture of that nation\'s traditional,
persistent low level conflict between various groups and powerful
figures, and the global insurgency centered on radical Islam. In a
sense, Afghanistan represents a continuation of lawlessness, more than
open conflict, with various militant groups vying for power. Sometimes
acting in concert but often in isolation, these insurgent groups exert a
presence that is growing in light of the upcoming national elections in
September. At the same time, the jihadists, led by Osama bin Laden\'s al
Qaeda, remain determined to see that Afghanistan is a battlefield in
their global struggle with the United States. To the extent there is a
coherence to the strategy and the ideology of the Afghan insurgency, it
is derived from this linkage to the global insurgency.

*Strategy*. The goal of bin Laden and the radical Islamicist is to
create Islam's historical caliphate and expunge it of outside influence.
Because the United States represents the greatest obstacle to achieving
this objective, bin Laden has sought to challenge, humiliate, and
psychologically dominate the United States, at least in the eyes of the
Islamic world. His belief is that radical Muslims brought down one
superpower through asymmetric warfare and can do it again. The decade of
attacks culminating with September 11, 2001 was designed to lure the
United States into Afghanistan in an attempt to replicate the
Soviet-Afghan conflict. Complete success in this provocation led to a
temporary setback for al Qaeda resulting in the loss of Afghanistan as a
base of operations. Nevertheless, bin Laden likely views Iraq as an
excellent opportunity to accomplish what he failed to do in Afghanistan.
The funneling of militants and other resources to Iraq seems to support
this shift in strategy. Iraq presents an opportunity to seize and hold
the initiative and perhaps shift the balance of power not only in the
Middle East but also in Afghanistan. The relatively quiet battlefront in
Afghanistan will resume once bin Laden feels the time is ripe for a
counter offensive. Such an opportunity will arise if one or more
warlords take up arms against the central government.

*Ideology*. The natural xenophobia and dislike of outsiders that has
characterized Afghanistan for centuries provides a foundation for the
insurgency. Bin Laden has incorporated this into this Islamic ideology
which appeals to a large following among Muslims. His pious demeanor,
self-sacrifice, stoicism, and charity towards others have solidified the
devotion of his followers. Except with the Taliban, bin Laden's appeal
to Afghans is limited. Intrinsically suspicious and somewhat xenophobic,
the Afghans, which made up the Northern Alliance bitterly, contested the
al Qaeda and Taliban alliance for years. Bin Laden and al Qaeda have a
more devote following among the Pakistanis, and given Pakistan's past
support of the Taliban, Pakistan will remain an ideological bastion for
al Qaeda and the Taliban, despite the official stance of the Pakistani
government.

*Resources*. The various insurgent groups, with al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and HiG[^30] being the most prominent, have varying degrees of available
resources. Even though not contesting the authority of the central
government outright, Afghan warlords represent a latent threat that can
erupt into civil war if threatened. The manner in which President Hamid
Karzai manages the warlords will determine whether they are marginalized
as a threat or simply insurgents-in-waiting.[^31] Still, in Afghanistan,
the forms of resources---manpower, funding, equipment/supplies,
sanctuary, and intelligence---still favor the Afghan central government
and coalition forces.

As an international insurgent organization, al Qaeda potentially has the
greatest access to manpower. Having set up a loose system of recruitment
in the Middle East, Chechnya, Europe, the United States, and the
Philippines to name just a few, al Qaeda potentially can mobilize
experienced fighters for the fight in Afghanistan. Getting these
soldiers into country is another matter entirely though. With a more
vigilant world, al Qaeda operatives must run the gauntlet of airline
screening and various country passport controls. Even with fake
credentials and bribes, this vehicle may not be worth the effort. It is
more likely that an Underground Railroad system is used to bring in
recruits. Such a system is slow and intermittent to rely on if al Qaeda
decides to launch a concerted offensive. Moreover, al Qaeda must support
its global activities at the same time. Even with a robust global
recruitment program, al Qaeda will likely suffer from manpower shortages
continually. In view of these difficulties, the Taliban likely fills the
majority of manpower requirements. With access to followers in southern
Afghanistan, the Taliban can tap new recruits as long as the Afghan
central government struggles to exert control over the southern
provinces. The HiG as well as the various warlords have access to
recruits from the provincial areas they control. Currently the HiG is in
open conflict with the central government and the coalition forces;
however the various warlords also represent a latent threat as their
militias have an aggregate strength of 100,000.[^32] Still, many
warlords and their militias currently assist the coalition in locating
al Qaeda and Taliban elements.[^33]

Al Qaeda is the wealthiest of the lot but also has global commitments it
must finance. Osama bin Laden\'s business sense has generated enormous
financial assets for its global insurgency. Given the extensive and
diverse financial network, al Qaeda is not likely to be strangled
financially.[^34] The question that al Qaeda must answer is how much
funding it wants to devote to the struggle in Afghanistan. An indicator
of offensive intent therefore will be the amount of funding al Qaeda
devotes to its effort in Afghanistan. The Taliban, HiG, and warlord
militias rely on the lucrative opium trade[^35], taxation and extortion
of the local inhabitants, and various legal and illegal market
activities. Shutting down these sources of funding is largely dependent
on the central government\'s ability to extend its control over the
country. Heretofore, progress in this regard is slow.

As a result of 23 years of near constant warfare, equipment and supplies
for the insurgents are abundant. In fact, the nascent Afghan National
Army is poorly equipped in comparison to the warlord militias. Al Qaeda
and the Taliban in contrast are light infantry since they were driven
into the mountainous regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of
Operation Enduring Freedom. The warlords are not likely to contest the
central government in the near term and an alliance of convenience
between al Qaeda/Taliban and any warlords is highly unlikely given the
inimical past relations. Even cooperation between the HiG and al
Qaeda/Taliban is pretty limited despite an open goal of resisting the
central government. As such, until al Qaeda/Taliban can capture
sufficient equipment and weapons as well as control territory in
Afghanistan, it will remain a light infantry force.

Gone are the days in which al Qaeda and the Taliban enjoyed unreserved
sanctuary and succor in Pakistan. Other than local hospitability and a
modicum of security, both are tolerated but must be vigilant to
Pakistani army raids and sweeps. Taliban control of the Afghan southern
provinces along the Pakistan border is also tenuous. Certainly, it
enjoys the loyalty of local Afghans, but does not control any territory
to classify it as a sanctuary. Of course, warlords fully control their
provinces with few instances of central government interference. Real
central government challenges to their authority have yet to
materialize, so even though they are not insurgents, the central
government must remain vigilant of their loyalty.

The militants enjoy enough of an intelligence edge to protect them from
counter insurgency operations. The combination of human intelligence and
media reports are extensive enough to alert even the most obtuse
insurgent whenever something is afoot. Historical analogy suggests that
insurgents will penetrate the central government, the military, police
forces, and local governments. A certain degree of penetration of the
coalition headquarters and forces must also be assumed. It would be
extremely foolish to assume differently. Coalition and Afghan National
Army forces can achieve tactical and sometimes operational surprise, but
as al Qaeda, Taliban, and HiG forces are veterans of the Soviet-Afghan
War, they can easily use the mountainous terrain to escape even the most
well laid trap. Regarding the central government's ability to gather
intelligence on the warlords, it is hampered by a nascent intelligence
service, limited budgets for agents, technical means, and to a degree,
legal restrictions. To date, the central government is likely as
ignorant of warlord activities as it is of the active insurgents.

The decades of peaks and troughs regarding the fortunes of the militant
forces have made them more resilient to the psychological impact of
setbacks. Although the past two years represent a low point, recent
activities indicate they are attempting to reverse the course of events.
The sources available to the militants are dependent on their current
state of affairs.

Because of the limited authority of the central government beyond Kabul
and the limited number of coalition forces in Afghanistan, the warlord
militia have virtually uncontested control of their provinces.
Fortunately, the warlords are pretty compliant with the central
government and the coalition forces. Furthermore, the militias protect
their provinces from Taliban and al Qaeda influence. The HiG does
contest part of Konar and Nurestan in eastern Afghanistan and the
Taliban exerts a certain degree of control in southern Afghanistan, but
these are not secured positions. Frequent patrols, ambushes and raids by
U.S. forces in both areas keep such sanctuaries tenuous for the
militants.

Warlord militias are well armed and despite the UN Disarm, Demobilize,
and Reintegrate initiative, few weapons and militia have been
processed.[^36] The reality is that the warlords give only token
compliance and retain the best weapons and equipment for their forces.
Their militias dwarf the Afghan National Army in terms of manpower, 100k
to 6k and modern weaponry.[^37] Hence there is no need to acquire more
weapons or equipment.

Al Qaeda and Taliban however do lack sufficient weapons to mount a
large-scale offensive. Fortunately, neither has captured many weapons as
a result of raids or ambushes. Except with the occasional brush with the
U.S. forces, most Taliban and al Qaeda attacks have been made on police
and civilian organizations, netting little or no weapons. Because of the
increasing pressure brought to bear on the Taliban and al Qaeda in
Pakistan, it is unlikely that they have assured access to weapons as
well as the ability to train their forces to any marked degree.

*Leadership*. Perhaps the most important factor for achieving success,
leadership serves to organize, motivate, formulate a winning strategy,
and instill resolve.

Without a doubt, bin Laden is the most talented leader of all the
insurgent leaders. He has used his money, business savvy, cultivated
relationships, and charisma to command a global following. Nevertheless,
even these qualities failed by large to create cohesion among the
Afghans during the Soviet-Afghan War and the civil war which followed.
He was likely and often quite beside himself with frustration. His past
attests to his ruthlessness, but he has failed to use this to good
effect in Afghanistan, especially against the United States. Other than
occasional suicide bomb attacks, ambushes, and assassinations of local
government officials, bin Laden's al Qaeda and the Taliban have been
remarkably quiet. Nevertheless, bin Laden is unyielding in his
determination to continue the struggle until the bitter end. He has
likely created a succession of leaders to carry on the struggle after he
has gone as well.

Each warlord's leadership position in his province is uncontested. Other
than pro forma acknowledgment that the central government is the sole
authority in Afghanistan, there is no question they remain in charge of
their provinces. Since they fought against the Soviets and then the
Taliban for twenty-three years, the warlords are capable of ruthlessness
and are determined as well. Sooner or later, the central government will
need to challenge the warlords or at least marginalize them. Until then,
President Karzai must continually play a balancing act.

*Assessment.* Although the Afghan insurgents exhibit the characteristics
that have lead to traditional insurgency success, a number of factors
prevent them from achieving final victory. First is their inability to
craft an ideology that promises more than return to the post. The
Taliban was a government in power before its ouster by the U.S.
supported Northern Alliance. Its harsh and tyrannical rule was reviled
by most Afghans, who do not wish to see a return of the regime. Afghans
view the al Qaeda as \"Arabs,\" meaning they are regarded as outsiders
and not particularly admired. Following the decade-long Soviet-Afghan
War, the 1990s only resulted in more devastation, slaughter, and
oppression. So, the Taliban and al Qaeda have hardly endeared themselves
to the Afghans by large. The Taliban/al Qaeda message of \"bring us back
into power, and we will stop the killing\" that characterizes this
insurgency is hardly convincing to the Afghans. In short, the Taliban/al
Qaeda alliance will not by itself conquer the coalition and central
government. It will no doubt attempt to exploit and create a power base
in Afghanistan if one or more warlords wage open conflict with the
central government.

**Conclusions**

At the tactical level, there is only minimal difference between this
insurgency era and the previous one. For counterinsurgents, that is good
news. While the U.S. military has allowed its ability at
counterinsurgency to atrophy, it can easily rebuild it. The basic
soldier skills and professionalism that exist throughout the military
provide a solid foundation. Developing counterinsurgency capabilities in
the other components of the U.S. government, which is as vital to
success as augmenting the military\'s ability, will be more difficult,
but not impossible. In general, the Department of Defense is aware of
what need to be done at the tactical level and is making improvements.
The real challenges are at the strategic level, in understanding where
insurgency fits into American strategy and how the strategy of
insurgency has evolved. Ultimately, insurgency is a strategy, not a
tactic.

The most basic rule of strategy is that the resources expended and risks
borne in pursuit of an objective should be in proportion to the expected
benefit of attaining that objective or of defeating a threat. In the
most basic sense, insurgents succeed either by a *direct* strategy in
which they erode the strength of the government until they can confront
it on equal terms, or an *indirect* strategy in which they skew the
cost/benefit ratio for the counterinsurgents, making persistence not
worth the cost. The direct strategy works best when insurgents are
fighting a relatively weak and isolated local regime; the indirect is
most effective against a local regime with outside patrons, or a
powerful outside occupier.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the insurgents have not been able to
develop the features and capabilities that have characterized
insurgencies able to attain decisive victory in the past. But, at the
same time, they have been able to coalesce to the point that their
supporters have a reasonable expectation of long term success and thus
their survival is likely. The greatest probably, then, is that both
insurgencies will neither attain decisive victory (so long as the United
States remains engaged in supporting its local ally) nor will they be
defeated, at least for many years.

One of the greatest vulnerabilities of contemporary insurgencies is
their need to generate their own funds. Both the Iraq and Afghan
insurgencies appear to be cheap enough to operate and to have enough of
a funding stream that this does not create a decisive vulnerability. Two
other wild cards could alter the course of this protracted, bloody
stalemate, particularly in the case of Iraq (which is the more complex
and mature insurgency). One would be the development of a political
front and some degree of international legitimacy on the part of the
insurgents. Given the growing anti-Americanism around the world, this is
not inconceivable. Second would be the use of \"power projection\" by
the insurgents, specifically a terrorism campaign against American
targets designed specifically to undercut support for involvement in
Iraq. It is hard to predict whether this would increase or decrease
public support in the United States, so it would clearly be a high-risk
venture by the insurgents.

Ironically, even though the world has entered a new era of strategic
significance for insurgency, no model or strategy of insurgency that is
as effective as Maoist People\'s War has emerged. Neither Iraq nor
Afghanistan is likely to produce one. The jury is still out on the
global insurgency against radical Islam. Ultimately, then, today\'s
insurgency is basically an attempt to add a few new twists to old
methods. This is hard to kill, but it is unlikely to generate a new wave
of insurgent victories.

[^1]: *Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen are
    analysts at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
    They performed field research in Iraq during April and May of 2003.
    LTC Millen also served as an adviser to the Afghan National Army
    from July to November of 2003. The opinions expressed here are
    solely those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of
    the U.S. Army War College or Department of Defense*.

[^2]: Quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, \"\'What Did We Do to Deserve
    This?\',\" *Washington Post*, October 13, 2003, p. A1.

[^3]: Yochi J. Dreazen, \"Insurgents Turn Guns On Iraqis Backing
    Democracy,\" *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2003, p. 1.

[^4]: \"Insurgency in Iraq,\" International Institute for Strategic
    Studies, *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 9, Issue 8, October 2003, p. 1.

[^5]: General John Abizaid, quoted in Brian Bennet, \"Who Are the
    Insurgents?\" *Time*, November 24, 2003.

[^6]: Todd Zeranksi, \"U.S. General Sees \'Sustained\' Resistance in
    Northern Iraqi City,\" Bloomberg.com, November 19,2003.

[^7]: Nicholas Blanford, \"Attacks Turning To US Allies in Iraq,\"
    *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 2003, p. 1.

[^8]: Anthony Shadid, \"Battle Reveals New Iraqi Tactics,\" *Washington
    Post*, December 2, 2003, p. 1; Sabah Jerges, \"Guerrillas Now
    \'Stand and Fight\',\" *Washington Times*, December 2, 2003, p. 13.

[^9]: John Daniszewski, \"U.S. Combat Fatalities In Iraq Surge
    Suddenly,\" *Los Angeles Times*, March 15, 2004; Thom Shanker and
    Eric Schmitt, \"G.I. Toll Is Rising As Insurgents Try Wilier Bombs
    and Tactics,\" *New York Times*, March 15, 2004, p. 1.

[^10]: Quoted in Thom Shanker, \"U.S. Prepares a Prolonged Drive to
    Suppress the Uprisings in Iraq,\" *New York Times*, April 11, 2004.
    Also, Ann Scott Tyson, \"Insurgents In Iraq Show Signs of Acting As
    a Network,\" *Christian Science Monitor*, April 28, 2004.

[^11]: \"The Iraq War\'s New Phase,\" Stratfor.com, April 11, 2004.

[^12]: Thomas E. Ricks, \"Insurgents Display New Sophistication,\"
    *Washington Post*, April 14, 2004, p. A1.

[^13]: For instance, Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq: Too Uncertain To
    Call*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
    Studies, November 14, 2003, p. 9.

[^14]: Michael R. Gordon, \"Iraq Insurgency Spreads, U.S. Finds More
    Foes and Fewer Friends,\" *New York Times*, April 9, 2004.

[^15]: Karl Vick, \"Muslim Rivals Unite In Baghdad Uprising,\"
    *Washington Post*, April 7, 2004, p. 1; Jeffrey Gettleman, \"Signs
    That Shiites and Sunnis Are Joining To Fight Americans,\" *New York
    Times*, April 9, 2004, p. 1; Annia Ciezadlo, \"Nationalism Grows In
    Iraq,\" *Christian Science Monitor*, April 15, 2004; Annia Ciezadlo,
    \"Shi\'ites Ally With Sunnis In Iraq,\" *Washington Times*, April
    20, 2004, p. 12; and, Karl Vick, \"Shiites Rally To Sunni
    \'Brothers\',\" *Washington Post*, April 9, 2004, p. 1.

[^16]: On Pentagon report concern the planning of the insurgency by
    Hussein\'s intelligence services, Thom Shanker, \"Hussein\'s Agents
    Are Behind Attacks in Iraq, Pentagon Finds,\" *New York Times*,
    April 29, 2004, p.1; Douglas Jehl, \"Plan For Guerrilla Action May
    Have Predated War,\" *New York Times*, November 15, 2003; Scott
    Ritter, \"Defining the Resistance In Iraq---It\'s Not Foreign and
    It\'s Well Prepared,\" *Christian Science Monitor*, November 10,
    2003; Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, \"Is This Hussein\'s
    Counterattack?\" *Washington Post*, November 13, 2003, p. A1.

[^17]: For a complete list of the components of the insurgent strategy,
    see Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare: The US vs.
    FRL/Islamist Duel*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
    International Studies, December 6, 2003, pp. 8-11.

[^18]: Quoted in James Kitfield, \"Ramadan Offensive,\" *National
    Journal*, November 1, 2003.

[^19]: Karl Vick and Anthony Shadid, \"Fallujah Gains Mythic Air,\"
    *Washington Post*, April 13, 2003, p. 1.

[^20]: Hannah Allam, \"Outlook Is Bleak For Success In Iraq,\"
    *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 9, 2004, p. 1.

[^21]: Daniel Williams, \"As Violence Deepens, So Does Pessimism,\"
    *Washington Post*, May 18, 2004, p. 1.

[^22]: Daniel Pipes, \"Why Iraq Rebels,\" *Jerusalem Post*, April 14,
    2004.

[^23]: Anthony Shadid, \"In New Iraq, Sunnis Fear a Grim Future,
    *Washington Post*, December 22, 2003, p. 1; and, Daniel Williams,
    \"In Sunni Triangle, Loss of Privilege Breeds Bitterness,\"
    *Washington Post*, January 13, 2004, p. 1.

[^24]: Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institute, quoted in Tyson,
    \"Insurgents In Iraq Show Signs of Acting As a Network.\"

[^25]: Shanker, \"U.S. Prepares a Prolonged Drive To Suppress the
    Uprisings in Iraq.\"

[^26]: Lowell Bergman and Eric Schmitt, "Vast, Unsecure Iraqi Arms
    Depots Could Take Years to Dispose," *New York Times*, September 30,
    2003, p. 1; "Deadly Munitions Still Litter Much of Iraq," *Baltimore
    Sun*, October 26, 2003; Dan Murphy, "Iraq Awash in Military
    Weapons," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 20, 2003, p. 1.

[^27]: \"Still a Cauldron, Not a Quagmire,\" *The Economist*, May 1-7,
    2004.

[^28]: Jim Krane, \"Iraqi Insurgents Use Tactics They Learned from
    Chechens, Taliban, Al-Qaida,\" *ArmyTimes.com*, January 5, 2004.

[^29]: Edward Wong, \"Rebels Without a Cause Or a Web Site,\" *New York
    Times*, December 7, 2003.

[^30]: "Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a
    faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the
    major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has
    long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar
    ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a
    pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts.
    Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan
    in 1996." HiG operates in "Eastern Afghanistan (particularly Konar
    and Nurestan Provinces) and adjacent areas of Pakistan\'s tribal
    areas." Intelligence Research Program, "Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin
    (HIG)," Federation of American Scientists,
    *http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hig.htm.*

[^31]: The conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban is not a central issue
    with the Afghan central government. The primary concern remains the
    tension between the central government and the warlords regarding
    the extent of central authority. To date, none of the warlords has
    contested the central government's legitimacy. Barnett R. Rubin*, In
    Kabul, The Government Owns the Peace*, International Herald Tribune,
    May 6, 2004.

[^32]: *New Afghan Army Hit By 3,000 Deserters*, London Daily Telegram,
    January 12, 2004.

[^33]: This has become a double-edged sword since coalition cooperation
    with warlord militias hinders the central government's extension of
    its authority and perhaps opium crop eradication. Judy Dempsey, *US
    Planning For Stopgap Afghan National Guard*, London Financial Times,
    February 12, 2004.

[^34]: Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies\' Eyes*, Washington D.C.:
    Brassey\'s, INC, 2002, pp. 29-44.

[^35]: Afghanistan supplies three quarters of the world's illicit opium
    trade. That 28 out of 32 Afghan provinces have opium fields
    illustrates the pervasive and lucrative opium market by warlords. F.
    Andy Messing Jr. and Sarah J. Lippitt, *Perilous Afghan
    Undercurrents*, Washington Times, April 28, 2004.

[^36]: The original DDR goal was to process 40 percent of the militia by
    June 2004. Thus far, only about 5,500 have been disarmed, far below
    the 33,000 goal. Carlotta Gall, *Already Stretched, Afghan Leaders
    Face New Threat*, New York Times, April 12, 2004. James Astill,
    *Disarming Militiamen Vexes U.N. Force*, Washington Times, April 12,
    2004.

[^37]: To date, much of the equipment and weapons turned is old and in
    disrepair. The militia retains all the modern equipment. Hamida
    Ghafour, *Afghan Warlords Hand Over Heavy (And Old) Weapons*, Los
    Angeles Times, January 16, 2004.

    As a member of the OMC-A, ANA Plans and Design Team from July
    through November 2003, LTC Millen had the opportunity to examine
    some of the weapons handed over to the ANA. The vast majority of
    weapons were pre 1970s technology and were rusty and in need of
    repair and extensive parts. The ANA is able to maintain these
    weapons only through the dedication of volunteer mechanics and the
    cannibalization of equipment form the vast bone yard outside of
    Kabul.