**Before the**

**United States Department of Commerce**

**National Telecommunications and Information Administration**

**Washington, D.C. 20230**

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **In Re:**                        | **Docket No. 040127027­4027­01**    |
|                                   |                                   |
| **United States Spectrum          |                                   |
| Management Policy For the 21st    |                                   |
| Century**                         |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

**Comments of Wayne Longman**

The Administration (NTIA) is to be congratulated for this timely and
critical initiative on spectrum policy reform. The recent FCC activity
to promote unlicensed and unregulated use of the spectrum can only
satisfy ad hoc spectrum uses and users where the presence of destructive
interference is of short term impact and concern. This is a very limited
slice of the needs of the vast majority of spectrum applications that
require near-absolute certainty for interference-free, economical,
reliable, and predictable provision of service. Although the
"traditional" spectrum management system provides these certainties, it
is also clearly guilty of failing to respond in a rational and timely
manner to new and emerging demands on the spectrum. It is argued here
that these shortcomings are largely institutional in nature and can be
readily organized out of existence by the creation of a central and
independent Spectrum Policy Agency (SPA), for lack of a better name, and
other attendant changes such as a centralized and accurate database of
U.S. frequency assignments.

My views arise from my direct participation as an electrical engineer,
analyst and manager in the spectrum management process from 1975 to
2001. In the early part of that period I was Superintendent, Frequency
Management for the Canadian Department of Transport, which had duties
similar to its FAA equivalent. I supervised the design of software with
the capability to automatically re-frequency the whole Canadian VHF air
traffic control system. This was a challenge since the most difficult
areas are contiguous, and part of, the US North-Eastern ATC system. I
was also a Canadian delegate and spokesperson to the 1977 (aeronautical
HF planning) and the 1979 (General) ITU WARC's, and head of delegation
to the ICAO preparatory meetings for those conferences. In 1982 I joined
the Canadian Department of Communications as Chief, Spectrum Policy,
responsible primarily for spectrum utilization and allocation policy
matters for the Fixed and Fixed-Satellite Services, and related
services. I was primary author for a major spectrum policy review of the
1-10 GHz band, and participated in numerous ITU conferences and
international preparatory meetings and bilaterals. From 1996 to 2001 I
worked in Washington DC for Teledesic, LLC as Director, Regulatory
Affairs. This experience has given me a long and direct association with
national and international spectrum management, the U.S. processes,
institutions and personnel, and allowed me to view first hand the issues
and how they are dealt with in different environments. I have since
moved on to a different field which does not give me the luxury of much
time to spend on this topic.

Some believe there is a shortage of spectrum, while others maintain
there is plenty. This not a cup half-full or half-empty argument, it is
more like a blindfolded committee describing an elephant; that is,
members are only capable of relating their part of the whole reality. In
the case of the U.S. spectrum "shortage" perspective, no one can make a
definitive statement because the radio spectrum has fragmented
management, which is unevenly distributed and controlled within the
Federal government system, within the FCC structures, and between all of
them. The resulting lack of single oversight and knowledge of the
precise existing uses and projected future needs of all users cannot
help but yield a different answer to each participant. The integration
of knowledge is the greatest challenge facing the development of
coherent spectrum management policies.

***First Objective: Facilitate Modernized and Improved Spectrum
Management System***

The bifurcated management system, inadvertently or otherwise, creates
two separate and competing camps for spectrum use, i.e. government
departments and agencies vs. individuals and private enterprise.
Managers of both systems listen to their constituents and defend them
against demands of the other. This inhibits a full and unbiased hearing
of the relative needs of spectrum users, preventing an unimpaired
judgment of relative merit of each, and thus equitable access. Indeed,
many have the feeling that the private sector gets what is left after
the Federal government agencies are satisfied.

U.S. spectrum management successes thus far are more likely attributable
to the skill and dedication of government employees than the processes
within which they are required to operate. The substance of this Inquiry
verifies these are serious issues that need to be resolved.

Should the Federal government consider establishing a centralized
organization to perform these functions? First, it is necessary to
define the components of spectrum management.. Spectrum management has
three separable components:

1\) Spectrum allocation (sometimes called spectrum policy)

These are policy decisions - what spectrum for what service, how much,
when and how -- and must take into account the entire spectrum, to
enable a full consideration of alternatives and of all competing demands
of different users. The policy constituency must consist of all users of
the spectrum and thus requires a single, central agency.

2\) Frequency assignment (coordination)

Frequency assignment is a highly technical function -- that determines
what precise frequency should be used at a given location, considering
the technical, radio propagation and operational characteristics of that
system and other systems sharing the band. This degree of detail means
it is best performed when it is placed closest to the users. There may
be many frequency assignment organizations, even ones for different
cities for a single band.

3\) Authorization

Authorization entails application of statutory, equipment and operating
standards to determine the use is "legal". It is tailored to specific
classes of users, so it can be organized by type of user constituency.

These components are separable as long as lines of communication are
open in all directions, and as they carry out complementary functions
there is incentive for them to do so. All three are supported by another
function, sometimes called spectrum engineering.

Although the current U.S. system in part recognizes the organizational
needs of 2) and 3) above, it fails the spectrum policy process. No
single unit is responsible for and can take into all competing uses and
users of the spectrum.

This shortcoming results in unnecessarily denied uses, fragmented bands,
and it invites political intervention. It reduces spectrum policy from
the objective to the subjective, where it is often more important who is
making the decision, than why it is made. Process becomes paramount, and
can be used to create delay.

The primary risk that will be seen by NTIA and FCC of an independent
Spectrum Policy Agency will be the loss of control of their constituents
in allocation matters. The power to approve or deny the availability of
access to spectrum has been used as a general policy tool to achieve
other ends. However, if the objective is to improve spectrum access, it
warrants a separate and independent process. The SPA will take into
account these other needs as expressed by NTIA and FCC when granting
spectrum.

The most difficult challenge in the creation of the SPA is in the
appointment of its leadership. The leadership must be knowledgeable of
the widest range of spectrum issues, uses and users, but it must not be
partisan, either political or institutional. This likely means they must
be drawn from senior career staff in the existing agencies, or from
those with equivalent experience in the private sector, but not from
political appointees who generally have short term personal agendas.

One possibility is the creation of the SPA as an arms-length creature of
both FCC and NTIA.

The second most difficult issue is to maintain a public process while
dealing with classified government demands. This will require compromise
on all sides, with the goal of revealing as much information on
classified systems as is required to understand the issues and
decisions. Today, U.S. allocations accommodate highly classified systems
without exposing them, but now the NTIA process is not public.

As described earlier, both the assignment and authorization functions
are best performed in close contact with users, and should be retained
by those agencies, with the furthest delegation of the assignment
functions where possible. Both agencies should devise a "quality
assurance" programs for the frequency assignment delegations, to ensure
delegated assignment authority spectrum results in efficient spectrum
use and in conjunction with the Spectrum Policy Agency, a reliable
national frequency database is created and maintained. NTIA and FCC
input and feedback to the SPA on all matters are essential to its
success.

The allocation by "Who" (user) instead of "What" (use) means that two
different users with identical needs and equipment may be forced into
separate bands. Invariably, one of these bands will be congested in
time, denying entry, while the other might otherwise be available. This
division is endemic of the bifurcated allocation system and can largely
disappear under a single Spectrum Policy Agency. The only excuse for
exclusivity is to protect future growth which may not happen, or if it
does, it may exceed the available spectrum anyway. In any case, a larger
shared band is the best guarantee for future access.

The term "coordination" is popular because the term "assignment" is
mixed in with the concept of "authorization". The ITU definition of
"assignment" is the selection and designation of a frequency for a
specific radio station. It does not include the authorization to use
that frequency. This submission specifically proposes that the
assignment function be delegated as close to the user as competently
possible. Assignment normally includes frequency coordination with
existing assignments in a band and would be carried out by the
assignment entity.

Although the international coordination function could be maintained by
FCC and NTIA, it may be given to the Spectrum Policy Agency who must
also lead international allocation processes.

The coordination (assignment) of frequencies by a central agency for all
levels of government is now essential because the concept of
government/non-government and type of user instead of type of use has
fragmented the spectrum available to these users.

This coordination (assignment) of frequencies by a central agency is
essential because the concept of government/non-government and type of
user instead of type of use has fragmented the spectrum preventing
interoperability except by duplicating radio systems, and has made a
single local assignment body infeasible.

The first task of the Spectrum Policy Agency should be to identify
common interoperable bands, so the assignment function can be delegated
to a single local entity dealing with immediate demands. If this were
determined to be a national priority, it could be done in a short time.

State should continue to lead U.S. international activities, but
preferably only for the diplomatic aspects regarding spectrum policy.
Spectrum policy matters should be coordinated, determined and executed
domestically and internationally by the Spectrum Policy Agency.
International frequency coordination should be handled by either that
agency or the FCC or NTIA as discussed above. State would continue to be
responsible for the institutional aspects of the ITU, delegation
formation, and U.S. organization of participation in ITU-T, ITU-D and
non-spectrum aspects of ITU-R. The SPA would operate under State
guidelines on international spectrum matters. The third party role
played by State in the event of differences between the FCC and NTIA
will no longer be required in this area.

Forecasts of growth of existing systems can be based on past growth if
there is confidence in frequency assignment records. Studies should be
carried out on trend changes and new developments. This information can
be used by all parties to determine bands that should be candidates for
change. Long range planning activities, per se, may be of limited value
because the environment is quickly changing.

Considerable benefit will be gained by laying a strategic path toward
integrating the band fragmentation created by Type of User. This
consolidation of spectrum should open bands not available to some users,
and should make some re-allocations easier. There is also a view that
reducing the number of radiocommunication services is beneficial,
particularly at the national level.

A comprehensive spectrum policy process is impossible with inadequate
funding. Funding should not be discretionary, so as to avoid
Congressional interference in due process. The most likely source of
funding is an adjustable spectrum user fee paid by all spectrum users.
This would be used to fund the SPA, the national frequency database,
international activities, and directly related activities. Authorization
and assignment activities would be funded as now.

The ITU Frequency Allocation process is glacial in speed and thus per
force long-term,. The U.S. has had great successes in the ITU, but it
appears to be taking too many resources. Several efforts to streamline
the ITU process have failed, such as various panels of experts and, more
frequent conferences. A real stumbling block to U.S. interests is the
growing CEPT bloc, dominated by EC industrial policy, but still counting
as individual country votes in the ITU.. Strong support from CITEL helps
offset this, but the US is becoming more isolated because of its unique
use of the spectrum.

A significant step would be the closer alignment of the U.S. and
International Tables of Frequency Allocations. This will make future
changes the U.S. wants easier to support by foreign countries, and to
adopt changes wanted by others and won in the ITU, to be accommodated
with U.S. uses. The SPA would be in an ideal position to do this.

***Second Objective: Facilitate Policy Changes to Create Incentives for
Achieving More Efficient and Beneficial Use of the Spectrum, and Provide
a Higher Degree of Predictability and Certainty in the Spectrum
Management Process as It Applies to Incumbent Users***

Spectrum efficiency should be measured subjectively, i.e. if there are
unsatisfied demands, is it because existing users are using old
technology, or is there simply not enough spectrum? Efficient spectrum
is accessible spectrum, inaccessible spectrum is inefficient.

Efforts to determine "efficient" spectrum allocation by economic
criteria are misleading and impossible by definition. Allocation is the
division of spectrum between different and distinct services, separately
identifiable because of a host of technical, operational and economic
factors, making economic criteria as basis of choice, irrelevant. It is
possible to use economic means to choose between competitors for
frequency assignments within a single service, which do have common
aspects. Auctions for example, have been used to ease the bureaucratic
burden of choosing a licensee. Some parties, not understanding the basic
components of spectrum management wrongly claim it as an efficient means
of spectrum allocation.

Functional efficiency is an issue normally between the service provider
and the user. The users will select the level of functional efficiency
best meeting their needs. There are few cases requiring government
intervention.

Metrics are to be avoided to describe efficiency as they change for
every service, and even within a service (e.g. urban vs. rural), so are
generally inapplicable to allocation decisions. In general, efficient
spectrum use will mean the ability of a new user to gain use of a band.
If the entrant is denied because of inappropriate or obsolete equipment
of existing users, the existing user should be considered inefficient.
An exception to the none-use of metrics may be in benchmarking efficient
frequency assignment strategies (e.g. number of assignments per unit
area).

All users should pay enough for spectrum so they quickly release
spectrum they no longer need. An inefficient user (see above) should be
required on short notice to accommodate the new user at his own expense.
.

NTIA should establish a spectrum management quality assurance program,
to ensure Federal users follow a established criteria for the
assignment, recording and use of radio frequencies; collection of fees,
with a threat of loss of management delegation where it is found
sub-standard. The fee structure should not only fund allocation
processes, it should serve as a deterrent to wasteful use, such as
hoarding. Federal budget managers must accommodate new requirements and
price increases each year, so spectrum charges should be manageable.

Temporary authorizations make up a small part of spectrum use, and will
make no significant inroad on spectrum shortages where they exist. A
secondary lease program to be effective must convey a level of
permanence on the user that defeats the intent of the program.
Temporarily unused Federal spectrum should be frozen pending a
comprehensive spectrum review.

Receiver interference characteristics must first, not defeat that
system's operating needs. To the extent that, secondly, they do not
defeat the needs of another system, they require no regulation. If they
do block another qualified entrant, and an improvement does not block
their mission, a mandated change is justified.

These comments apply in part to the remaining Objectives stated in the
NOI. The terseness of this comment is not intended to slight this
process - it is a reflection of the limited time available to formulate
a response.

Respectfully submitted

Sunday, November 12, 2023

Wayne Longman

73648 Sun Lane

Palm Desert, CA 92260

\(760\) 413-4114

<wayne.longman@att.net>

[http://desert-estates.info](http://desert-estates.inf/)

Electronic submission