Session No. 19

# Course Title: Business and Industry Crisis Management, Disaster Recovery, and Organizational Continuity

**Session 19: Crisis Management and Crisis Decision Making**

## Time: 3 hr

**Objectives:**

1.  Discuss the thoughts and recommendations for coping with a crisis
    contained in Capt. M. E. Gilbert's 1982 article "Management of a
    Crisis," from the *Commandant's Bulletin*, and contrast these
    thoughts and recommendations with those expressed in Norman
    Augustine's 1995 *Harvard Business Review* article "Managing the
    Crisis you Tried to Prevent. "[^1]

2.  Explain the role of information and the characteristics of an
    information system that adequately support crisis management
    decision making within the crisis management team (CMT).

3.  Explain the tasks associated with effective crisis decision making
    and the characteristics of impaired crisis decision making.

4.  Discuss the impact of crisis-induced stress on crisis decision
    makers, individually and in a group context.

# Scope: 

# 

# Completion of this session should require three one-hour periods. The session starts with a discussion of Capt. M.E. Gilbert's article "Management of a Crisis" and a comparison with Norman Augustine's article "Managing the Crisis you Tried to Prevent," from session 18. Several questions are presented to stimulate discussion of these pragmatic articles reflecting hands-on crisis management experience. The emphasis then shifts to crisis decision making with objectives covering the role of information and information systems in supporting crisis decision making, the tasks associated with effective crisis decision making and the characteristics of impaired crisis decision making, and the impact of stress on crisis decision makers individually and in the group context. Different personality characteristics of individuals and the functioning of a group during stressful situations will be discussed. A prescription for effective team decision making, "teamthink," is presented for discussion. The modified experiential learning cycle for each objective should be completed at the end of the presentation, and discussion of that objective and of the entire session, at the end of the session. 

**Readings:**

*Student Reading:*

Gilbert, M.E. 1982. "Management of a Crisis." *U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant's Bulletin* \[on-line; now called *Coast Guard Magazine*\]*.*
November/December. U.S. Coast Guard. Four pages.

*Instructor Reading:*

Fink, Steven. 1986. *Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable.*
New York: Amacom. Chapter 16, pages 133--150.

Gilbert, M.E. 1982. "Management of a Crisis." *U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant's Bulletin* \[on-line; now called *Coast Guard Magazine*\]*.*
November/December. U.S. Coast Guard. Four pages.

Hale, Joanne. 1997. "A Layered Communication Architecture for the
Support of Crisis Response." *Journal of Management Information
Systems.* Fourteen pages in electronic version. Vol. 14, No. 1. Armonk,
NJ. Pages 235--255.

Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. "From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward
the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work
Teams." *Human Relations.* Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *Victims of
Groupthink*, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Start page
929. (Page 1 of 16).

Post, Jerrold M. 1993. "The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy
Makers." in *Avoiding Inadvertent War,* edited by A. George. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press. Pages 471--494.

**General Requirements:**

Complete the modified experiential learning cycle for each objective at
the end of that objective and for the entire session at the end of the
session.

**Objective 19.1 Discuss the thoughts and recommendations for coping
with a crisis contained in Capt. M.E. Gilbert's 1982 article "Management
of a Crisis," from the *Commandant's Bulletin*, and contrast these
thoughts and recommendations with those expressed in Norman Augustine's
1995 *Harvard Business Review* article "Managing the Crisis you Tried to
Prevent. "**

**Requirements:**

Present the material with lecture and discussion as necessary.

A series of questions are provided to stimulate discussion:

> II\. B.1.c. Do you agree with these two observations?
>
> II\. B.2.b. Can you think of any other examples where crisis managers
> actually made the situation worse?
>
> II\. B.16.d. Are these descriptions still accurate?
>
> II\. B.19.b. What do these two sentences mean to you? Why would
> someone in authority hesitate to do something if they knew it was not
> the right thing to do?
>
> III\. A. How are the articles similar?
>
> III\. B. How do these articles differ?

Complete the modified experiential learning cycle at the end of this
objective.

**Remarks:**

I.  Author and article **background.**

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A.  From 1978 to 1981, **Mike Gilbert** was a captain (0--6 equivalent
    to a full colonel in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) in the
    United States Coast Guard and commander of Coast Guard Group St.
    Petersburg, Florida, a collection of stations, rescue craft, and
    aircraft responsible for Coast Guard missions along the central west
    coast of Florida.

B.  The commander of Coast Guard Group St. Petersburg **reports directly
    to** the commander of the 7^th^ Coast Guard District, a rear admiral
    (0--8 equivalent to a major general in the Army, Air Force, and
    Marine Corps), with headquarters in Miami, Florida.

C.  Captain Gilbert and his immediate staff comprised the **crisis
    management team (CMT) for both crises.** Captain Gilbert, as the
    senior Coast Guard officer present, assumed leadership of the crisis
    management efforts (in business terms, he was the CEO).

D.  Based upon his **record of performance,** accentuated in the
    management of the United States Coast Guard cutter (USCGC)
    *Blackthorn* and motor vessel (M/V) *Summit Venture* disasters and
    crises, Captain Gilbert was promoted to rear admiral and was
    selected to lead two major studies in the mid 1980s on the Coast
    Guard's overall organization and resources. To this day, Rear
    Admiral Gilbert's studies still shape the strategic direction of the
    United States Coast Guard.

E.  USCGC ***Blackthorn*** disaster.

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1.  The USCG ***Blackthorn,*** a 180-foot cutter with a crew of
    approximately 75, collided with the tank ship *Capricorn* in the
    early evening hours of January 28, 1980.

2.  In total, 23 Coast Guardsmen drowned as the *Blackthorn* quickly
    capsized and sank. This was and remains the **largest peacetime
    disaster** in the history of the Coast Guard.

3.  The Blackthorn disaster **followed by 15 months** the October 1978
    collision of the USCGC *Cuyaho*ga with a large motor vessel in the
    Chesapeake Bay and its immediate sinking, which resulted in the loss
    of 11 Coast Guardsmen.

4.  The two cutter sinkings **called into question** the expertise and
    professionalism of the service and its international reputation as a
    premiere maritime organization. If perceived as incompetent by the
    public and Congress, the U.S. Coast Guard stood to lose missions and
    resources -- a major crisis for the U.S. Coast Guard.

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a.  Although Captain Gilbert does not specifically claim this in this
    article, his expert handling of the *Blackthorn* crisis **averted
    major problems from both within and without** to the Coast Guard.

b.  In the aftermath of the crisis, family members of the deceased
    *Blackthorn* crew openly **praised the efforts of the Coast Guard,
    and Captain Gilbert in particular,** for their responsiveness,
    concern, and open communications.

c.  This visible support **helped counter considerable criticism** and
    scrutiny of the Coast Guard's professionalism.

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F.  M/V ***Summit Venture*** collision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge
    disaster.

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1.  On May 6, 1980, the 609 foot M/V ***Summit Venture*,** an empty
    phosphate carrier, collided with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in
    Tampa, Florida, at 7:34 AM during the morning rush hour.

2.  A section of the bridge collapsed into the water, and before traffic
    could be stopped, a Greyhound bus, a pickup truck, and six
    automobiles had plunged into the water below. In total, **35
    people** in these vehicles perished.

3.  The resulting damage **blocked a major shipping channel for
    months.**

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II. **Captain Gilbert's article.**

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A.  The article lists **a series of pragmatic thoughts and
    recommendations** for coping and dealing with a crisis situation.

B.  **Specific thoughts and recommendations** applicable to all crisis
    situations include:

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1.  **Recognizing** that you are dealing with a crisis.

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a.  **Small problems** produce a plethora of ideas and suggestions for
    what you should be doing.

b.  When you have a **major problem,** no one tells you how to do your
    job -- the sure sign of a crisis situation.

c.  **Ask the students,** Do you agree with these two observations?

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2.  Don't make the crisis **worse.**

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a.  In some situations, not making the situation worse may be **the best
    you can do.**

b.  The article mentions several examples: Watergate, Viet Nam, and the
    ancient Pharaoh. **Ask the students,** Can you think of any other
    examples where crisis managers actually made the situation worse?

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3.  Capture **control** **of the information** flow.

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a.  **Information flowing into the CMT** must be filtered and sorted to
    be of use in crisis decision making. There will be more on this
    later in this session.

b.  A plan is necessary for passing information **to the outside
    world.**

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4.  **Save yourself** for the main events.

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a.  Successful managers are **good delegators.**

b.  In crisis situations, **successful delegation** includes definition
    of the scope of what is delegated and the need to keep the top
    leadership advised.

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5.  Refuse to be drawn into **trivia.**

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a.  Retain **focus** on the important aspects of the crisis.

b.  Avoid the temptation to deal with the **small but urgent problems**
    that may be satisfying to solve, but are better handled by others in
    the heat of a crisis.

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6.  **Silly people** will continue to be silly.

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a.  "Under stress, individuals become **more like themselves** -- that
    is their characteristic coping mechanisms become exaggerated" (Post
    1993 p. 490). There will be more on this later in the session during
    the discussion of crisis decision making.

b.  Crisis situations tend to bring out the **best and the worst** in
    all of us; so a leader must recognize the strengths and weaknesses
    of his team and employ them accordingly.

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7.  Insist helpers get **adequate rest.**

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a.  In any situation, but particularly in a stressful one characterized
    by a crisis, people need **adequate rest and nutrition** to function
    at peak capacity.

b.  The CMT leader should **set the example** by rotating personnel,
    including herself/himself to allow for adequate rest.

c.  Leaders who feel that **their continuous presence is essential** to
    the management of a crisis and neglect their own need for rest can
    be counterproductive to the work of the CMT. A quote from Jerrold
    Post's article "The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy
    Makers" provides a vivid example -- "Stories abound of senior
    officials during crises walking around like living zombies -- taking
    in information but being utterly unable to make decisions -- with a
    consequent paralysis of decision making, for their subordinates feel
    unable to make decisions on their own while the senior officials are
    present" (p. 488).

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8.  Make sure everyone **knows what is happening.**

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a.  Disseminate **information,** as appropriate both internally and
    externally.

b.  Insist on **clear and concise** communication.

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9.  Select a **good boss.**

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a.  Most people have no control over who their boss is, but they can
    **manage their relationship** with their boss by fostering mutual
    trust and respect.

b.  In Captain Gilbert's handling of both disasters, he made a point of
    keeping the 7^th^ District commander adequately, but not overly,
    **informed** through daily messages and phone calls.[^2]

c.  Due to the trust (established through over 20 years of exemplary
    performance as well as in these crises) placed in Captain Gilbert,
    he was **awarded the support and autonomy** necessary for leading
    the CMT.[^3]

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10. Return to **normal operations** as soon as possible (ASAP). In
    general, other routine operations should continue to the extent that
    the crisis allows, a point continually made in the context of
    business continuity.

11. **Maintain maneuvering room.**

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a.  Crisis decisions are often made in an environment of **incomplete
    information and time constraints.**

b.  Decisions may have to be **reversed** as the crisis progresses. It
    is not a sign of weakness to reverse one's decisions as additional
    information becomes available. There will be more on this later in
    the session.

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12. **Litigation** will follow.

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a.  In our **litigious society,** the potential for lawsuits is
    constantly growing.

b.  Taking the time and effort to maintain **a good audit trail** of
    reports, actions, conditions, and decisions is prudent.

c.  The **advice of a legal expert,** in preparation for, during, and
    after a crisis, is necessary. In general, a lawyer (chief counsel)
    should be included as a member of the CMT.

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13. Beware of abdicators. Hold **people and organizations accountable**
    for accomplishing their responsibilities.

14. Know your territory. **Establish and verify** policies, procedures,
    and relationships through precrisis event training and exercises.

15. Critically **reexamine assumptions.**

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a.  Contingency plans are based upon **explicitly stated assumptions.**

b.  Those **assumptions** should be compared to the actual crisis with
    plans modified as necessary.

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16. **Feed (don't fight)** the media.

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a.  Establish a **professional relationship** with the media.

b.  The media has **a legitimate job** to do.

c.  **Rules** to remember:

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(1) Establish **fair and uniform** rules.

(2) **Never be provoked into an** adversarial position.

(3) Establish **good access** to your media spokesperson.

(4) Don't let questioners put **words in your mouth.**

(5) Act as the **media's conscience** and maintain control.

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d.  The article provides a 1982 description of newspaper, radio, and TV
    coverage. **Ask the students,** Are these descriptions still
    accurate?

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17. Assign a **casualty assistance officer** (CAO).

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a.  The terminology and use of a CAO are somewhat military-specific, but
    this is **sound advice** for any organization experiencing
    casualties.

b.  Consideration and care for the **needs of families and friends**
    should be included in crisis planning and management.

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18. Provide for **survivors' needs.**

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a.  When there is loss of life and/or severe injuries, the **survivors**
    require care, compassion, and services during and following the
    crisis.

b.  **Professionals,** including medical personnel, counselors, and
    religious leaders should be included in the planning, exercising,
    and actual response and aftercare for crises.

c.  **Postcrisis let-down** takes many forms, including depression,
    physical ailments, absenteeism, and personal conflicts. They are
    natural results of a crisis and require adequate attention and
    resources.

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19. Most of all: **Do what you should do.**

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a.  A leader should posses the **courage** to do what he/she knows to be
    right.

b.  We can live comfortably with many things that go wrong, mistakes in
    judgement, lack of knowledge, bad breaks, etc. We cannot live
    comfortably with failure to do what we knew was right at the time.
    **Ask the students,** What do these two sentences mean to you? Why
    would someone in authority hesitate to do something if they knew it
    was not the right thing to do?

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III. **Comparing** Captain Gilbert's and Norman Augustine's thoughts and
     recommendations.

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A.  **Ask the students,** How are the articles similar? Some possible
    responses might include:

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1.  Although writing from entirely **different perspectives** (military
    and private sector), both authors lay out a series of pragmatic
    thoughts and recommendations **applicable to the management of any
    crisis.**

2.  Both emphasize the **importance of preparing for and recognizing a
    crisis**.

3.  Both emphasize the need for **controlling/containing** a crisis
    through effective **crisis communication.**

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B.  **Ask the students,** How do the articles differ? Some possible
    responses might include:

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1.  Augustine's article emphasizes **avoiding the crisis** while
    Gilbert's does not.

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a.  Interestingly, both the *Blackthorn* and Sunshine Skyway Bridge
    disasters **were preventable,** with triggering events attributable
    to human errors in judgement.

b.  **Basic and immediate causes** (session 10 -- causal chain) were
    rooted in inadequate training, policies, rules, and cultures
    emphasizing the need to get the cutter to sea or the commercial
    vessel to the pier as soon as possible.

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2.  Gilbert's article emphasizes **caring for the families and friends**
    of casualty victims and survivors while Augustine's does not. This
    emphasis is related to the nature of the disasters covered in each
    article.

3.  Gilbert's article does not address **organizational learning** as
    does Augustine's.

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a.  In writing this article, however, Gilbert was attempting to share
    his **"lessons learned"** with the entire U.S. Coast Guard.

b.  Primarily as a result of the *Cuyahoga* and *Blackthorn* disasters
    and crises, the U.S. Coast Guard implemented **major shipboard
    training and qualification programs** targeting basic causes for
    such maritime disasters.

**Supplemental Considerations:**

The value of this and Augustine's articles are the pragmatic thoughts
and recommendations based upon their personal observations and
experiences. Through completion of the class discussion and the modified
experiential learning cycle, the students should recognize that many of
the thoughts and recommendations of the authors are applicable to the
management of any crisis.

**Objective 19.2 Explain the role of information and the characteristics
of an information system that adequately supports crisis management
decision making within the crisis management team (CMT).**

**Requirements:**

Present the material by means of lecture and discussion as necessary.

Overheads/student handouts are provided for the instructor's use if
desired.

Complete the modified experiential learning cycle at the end of this
objective.

The question, What would happen if attention were not paid to any of the
layers? provides a lead-in to completing the modified experiential
learning cycle for this objective.

**Remarks:**

I.  **Information requirements** in crisis situations:

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A.  Crisis situations are generally characterized by (overhead 19-1)
    (see Post p. 472):

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1.  **Threats** to major values.

2.  Time **urgency.**

3.  **Ambiguity** or uncertainty.

4.  **Surprise** or uniqueness.

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B.  These **characteristics are expanded** upon in the 1993 article
    "Preparing for the Worst: the Process of Effective Crisis
    Management," by A.H. Reilly (overhead 19-2):[^4]

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1.  Crisis situations **are novel, unstructured, and outside** of an
    organization's or individual's typical operating framework.

2.  Crises require **nonprogrammed** decision responses.

3.  Crises are highly **uncertain and complex** situations.

4.  Crises are characterized by an **overload of incomplete, conflicting
    information.**

5.  The process of perceiving, selecting, and processing this
    information is **critical** to effective crisis management.

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C.  Overhead 19-3, also from Reilly's article, presents a **model** for
    the "Role of Information in Crisis Management. "[^5]

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1.  The attributes of a crisis will result in **particular outcomes** in
    the absence of crisis management decisions and actions (the top
    arrow).

2.  Crisis management requires **problem sensing (recognition)** based
    upon perception of the event generating the crisis, and a diagnosis
    of the problem/threat generated.

3.  The CMT **reaches decisions and initiates response actions** (lower
    arrow) based upon the **processing of information** from external
    sources and internal to the team (crisis management box). Without
    the necessary information and ability to process it, the CMT can not
    properly function.

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D.  Put in greatly simplified term, the demanding and dynamic **crisis
    decision-making environment** requires getting (overhead 19-4):

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1.  **The right information** (valid, relevant, complete, and concise)

2.  **To the right people** (those people responsible for providing
    input to and actually making crisis decisions)

3.  **At the right time** (in time to allow for reasoned decision making
    to the extent that the urgency of the situation permits).

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E.  Only with the right information, available to the right people, at
    the right time, will the **ability to make the best possible crisis
    decisions** be maximized. Joanne Hale's 1997 article, "A Layered
    Communication Architecture for the Support of Crisis Response," in
    the *Journal of Management Information Systems*, lays out a series
    of six layers necessary for establishing and supporting an
    information system connecting the CMT to the crisis response.

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II. The **six layers** are shown (overhead 19-5), with layers 1 through
    4 occurring sequentially and layers 5 and 6 occurring in parallel
    (see Hale's article). Each layer performs a cohesive grouping of
    functions and provides input to the next higher layer.

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A.  **Connectivity.**

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1.  The **fundamental crisis-information requirement** is open and
    operable channels between the various crisis-information sources
    (functional and operational teams, stakeholders, databases, etc.)
    and the CMT (referred to as the crisis-handling team in Hale's
    article).

2.  The connectivity layer ensures that individual messages are
    transmitted **completely and correctly** between the sender and
    receiver.

3.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 10):

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a.  As is mentioned in "group process" (F., below), a lack of
    connectivity between **Union Carbide headquarters and Bhopal**
    following the catastrophic gas leak did not allow the required flow
    of information.

b.  Even with the other layers in place and functioning, information
    connectivity is the **fundamental requirement for** effective crisis
    management.

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B.  **Data validation.**

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1.  The data validation layer attempts to **authenticate** the messages
    passed through the connectivity layer.

2.  **Multiple, independent sources** are consulted to validate an
    event, fact, or conclusion. The data-validation layer thus provides
    the filtering layer with the original message, annotated with
    supporting (or contradictory) material.

3.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 7):

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a.  Following a **toxic gas leak** at the Union Carbide Institute, West
    Virginia, plant, 135 local residents were sent to the hospital for
    treatment.

b.  For five days, Union Carbide officials **incorrectly believed** and
    reported that the leaked gas was a minor eye and lung irritant and
    their decisions and actions reflected this erroneous information.

c.  Finally, it was determined that among the 23 hazardous gases
    released, two thirds of the mixture was a toxin that attacks the
    nervous system. If this information had been **available
    immediately,** Union Carbide officials would probably have responded
    to the situation differently.

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C.  **Filtering.**

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1.  Numerous but **unorganized messages,** annotated with collaborating
    and/or contradictory information, are passed to the filtering layer
    by the data validation layer.

2.  The **filtering layer** performs the following:

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a.  **Screens** incoming messages and diverts those that can be handled
    outside the CMT (delegated responsibilities).

b.  **Organizes** related messages into cohesive and coherent sets.

c.  **Sorts** message sets according to level of importance.

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3.  Organized and prioritized message sets are essential to providing
    the CMT with a **clear picture** of ongoing events.

4.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 8):

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a.  During the first few minutes of the Three Mile Island emergency,
    over **100 different alarms** went off in the control room.

b.  There was **no filtering mechanism** to suppress the less important
    signals so that the operators could concentrate on the more
    important alarms.

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D.  **Values.**

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1.  The filtering layer passes **organized and prioritized** message
    sets to the value layer, where they are analyzed and annotated with
    interpretation and evaluation against pre-established crisis
    priorities.

2.  This layer requires the organization to **clearly state its values**
    so that these will help guide the decisions made by the CMT.

3.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 9):

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a.  Once again we refer to the **Johnson and Johnson Tylenol crisis**
    where crisis decision makers, equipped with minimal and often
    contradictory information, were forced to make decisions "in the
    dark. "

b.  In the absence of the right information at the right time, the CMT
    looked to the **Johnson and Johnson credo** (core value): "We
    believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses, and
    patients, to mothers and all others who use our products and
    services" (Hale p. 9).

c.  History has shown the **resulting decisions** aligned with this core
    value were the right ones for Johnson and Johnson and the public.

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E.  **Organizational memory.**

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1.  In the organizational memory layer (which occurs in parallel with
    group process), interpreted message sets are supplemented by
    **organizational memory** from such sources as personnel databases,
    inventory databases, maps of facilities and surrounding areas,
    historical records of past crisis response, and contingency plans
    with established policies and procedures, to assist the CMT in
    making decisions.

2.  Crisis management **planning efforts and documented lessons
    learned** from within and without the organization provide valuable
    sources of memories to support this layer.

3.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 9):

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a.  During Chemco's Colombian hostage crisis, three employees assumed
    the **central role** of crisis response.

b.  **No provisions** were made for rotating the personnel or
    documenting the lessons learned to preserve the organizational
    memory. Instead, the experience gained by the three responders made
    each indispensable to the crisis and hindered the development of
    organizational memory.

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4.  **Information technology** -- information storage and retrieval --
    has great application to the organizational memory layer.

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F.  **Group process.**

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1.  In the group process layer, members of the **CMT share** interpreted
    message sets from the values layer and organizational memories to
    support crisis decision making.

2.  **Multiple perspectives and constructive discussion and debate** are
    made possible through group processes. The study of group processes
    and dynamics can cover multiple semesters at the graduate level and
    is not covered in any depth at this point. Limited coverage will be
    provided in the next two objectives on crisis decision making.

3.  An **example** from Hale's article (p. 10):

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a.  Within 48 hours of the **Union Carbide Bhopal India gas leak**
    disaster, Warren Andersen, the chairman of the board and CEO,
    announced that he would make an immediate trip to India to lead the
    response efforts.

b.  In hindsight there are both **pros and cons** concerning Anderson's
    decision to leave for India; however two points can be made.

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(1) Information **connectivity was lacking** between Union Carbide
    Headquarters and Bhopal, which limited the CMT's ability to receive
    and send information.

(2) There was **insufficient critical debate** within the CMT that would
    have aired the many pros and cons that accompanied with Anderson's
    decision.

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III. **Discussion** of Hale's six-layer model.

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A.  The **first four layers** of Hale's model provide the necessary
    conditions for crisis decision making by ensuring that the CMT has
    access to valid, relevant messages appended with sufficient
    corroborating and evaluative information to obtain a clear picture
    of the crisis event. These layers provide the right information to
    the right people at the right time.

B.  The **two top parallel layers** provide organizational memory
    support and facilitate group communication and decision making by
    the CMT.

C.  Taken together, Hale's six-layer model **describes an architecture**
    for designing and implementing an information system to support the
    CMT. Information technology such as decision support systems and
    expert judgement systems can enhance each layer.

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1.  Reading this article may leave one with the impression that a
    **sophisticated information system** supported by elaborate
    information technology hardware and software is necessary to support
    crisis management.

2.  **Information technology will certainly assist** and make the
    information collection and dissemination processes more manageable,
    but is not an absolute requirement.

3.  Even without information technology support, **attention must be
    paid to each layer** by whatever means are available to ensure that
    necessary information is available, validated, filtered,
    prioritized, supplemented, and shared by the crisis decision makers.

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D.  The **measure of success** of the CMT is the quality of the
    decisions guiding crisis management and response.

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1.  Even with six layers in place, the **highest-quality** crisis
    decisions are not assured.

2.  Other factors, including **individual and group characteristics,**
    covered in the next two objectives, greatly influence the quality of
    crisis decisions.

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E.  To complete the **modified experiential learning cycle** for this
    objective, **ask the students,** What would happen if attention were
    not paid to any of the layers? Possible responses include:

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1.  **Connectivity:** Necessary information might not be communicated to
    the CMT, resulting in an incomplete or distorted picture of the
    crisis situation.

2.  **Data validation:** The CMT might receive incorrect information
    upon which decisions would be based.

3.  **Filtering:** The CMT can be overwhelmed with information, much of
    which should have been routed elsewhere, that inhibits it from
    determining what is really important.

4.  **Values:** By not explicitly stating what is valued, the CMT may
    make decisions that are in conflict with the organization's
    priorities.

5.  **Organizational memory:** An organization that does not tap
    possible sources of information and learn from its own or others'
    experiences may be doomed to make the same mistakes over again.

6.  **Group processes:** A group can degenerate into dysfunctional
    behavior without adequate facilitation and/or tools promoting
    constructive individual and group participation and behavior.

**Supplemental Considerations:**

Reilly's article is referred to but is not required reading for the
level of coverage provided in this session. *Industrial and
Environmental Crisis Quarterly* has very limited distribution and is not
easily accessed.

Without the adequate consideration and provisions for the six layers
discussed above, crisis decision-makers will not have the right
information at the right time to support their functions. Information
technology can greatly assist in establishing and maintaining each layer
but is not absolutely essential. The instructor might consider giving
those students with an interest in information technology an assignment
to research a topic such as decision support systems or expert systems
and provide a short presentation to the entire class.

**Objective 19.3 Explain the tasks associated with effective crisis
decision making and the characteristics of impaired crisis decision
making.**

**Requirements:**

Present the material by means of lecture and discussion as necessary.

Overheads/student handouts are provided for the instructor's use if
desired.

Complete the modified experiential learning cycle at the end of this
objective.

The question, Why do decision-makers make "impaired" decisions in the
face of crises even when they are aware of the steps (tasks, from below)
necessary for making the best decisions? provides a lead-in to
completing the modified experiential learning cycle for this objective.

**Remarks:**

I.  Tasks associated with **effective crisis decision making.**

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A.  The **who and how of crisis decision making** reflect the
    organization's culture and the personal characteristics of top-level
    management/CMT.

B.  Be they individuals or members of a group, crisis decision-makers
    are faced with **multiple tasks** in making the best possible
    decisions based upon the information available to them. Some of
    these tasks include (overhead 19-6):

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1.  Define the **main elements** of the situation.

2.  Maintain **receptivity** to new information.

3.  Identify and adequately consider the **major values, interests, and
    objectives** to be fulfilled.

4.  Search for and evaluate **alternative courses** of action.

5.  Estimate **probable costs and risks** of alternatives.

6.  Search for **new information** relevant to the assessment of
    options.

7.  Discriminate between **relevant and irrelevant** information.

8.  Consider problems that arise in **implementing** options.

9.  Assess the situation from the **perspective** of other parties.

10. Resist both **defensive procrastination and premature closure.**

11. Monitor **feedback** from the developing situation.

12. Make **adjustments** to meet real changes in the environment
    (remember Capt. Gilbert's recommendation no. 11: Maintain
    maneuvering room).

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II. Characteristics of **impaired** crisis decision-making.

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A.  Ideally, the decision maker(s) will accomplish these tasks and make
    the **best possible decisions** while maintaining room to maneuver.
    Such a decision-maker(s) is said to follow the pattern of "vigilant"
    decision making (terminology that will be explained later in this
    session). From some of the cases we have discussed so far (Pinto,
    Exxon *Valdez,* Bhopal, TWA 800) it is obvious that decision-makers
    do not always adequately complete these tasks and often make **less
    than optimal decisions** in crisis situations.

B.  Some of the characteristics of **impaired crisis decision making**
    are (overheads 19-7, 8) (see Post p. 475):

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1.  A **truncated time span,** with major attention being devoted to the
    immediate and diminished attention to long-range consequences of the
    action.

2.  A perceived requirement for **decisional closure,** which may in
    turn lead to premature action or, conversely,

3.  In searching for certainty, a tendency to **irrational
    procrastination.**

4.  **Cognitive rigidity,** a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set and
    not be open to new information.

5.  A tendency to **reduce cognitive complexity** and uncertainty.

6.  A reduction of the **range of options** considered.

7.  In considering options, a **tendency to "bolster,"** -- that is, to
    upgrade factors in favor of the favored action prescription and
    downgrade factors militating against it.

8.  A tendency to view the **present in terms of the past.**

9.  A tendency to seek **familiar patterns,** to relate the critical
    events to mental schemata or scripts.

10. **Diminished creativity.**

11. A tendency toward the fundamental **attribution bias** -- to see the
    other's actions as being precipitated by internal (psychological)
    causes rather than external circumstances (example: my adversary's
    actions show he is malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that
    he is protecting himself from external threats).

12. A corresponding tendency to fall into the **actor-observer
    discrepancy;** that is, to see the external situation as the cause
    of one's own behavior without attending to one's own internal
    psychological motivations.

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C.  These characteristics are reflected in **flawed patterns** of
    decision making such as "unconflicted adherence," "unconflicted
    change," defensive avoidance," and "hypervigilance" (further
    explanation of these terms later in the session).

D.  **Ask the students,** Why do decision makers make "impaired"
    decisions in the face of crises even when they are aware of the
    steps (tasks, from above) necessary for making the best decisions?

**Supplemental Considerations:**

The included overheads/handouts (19-6, 7, 8) can serve as a valuable
checklist and memory aid for the students when they complete their term
project.

**Objective 19.4 Discuss the impact of crisis-induced stress on crisis
decision makers, individually and in a group context.**

**Requirements:**

Present the material with lecture and discussion as necessary.

Overheads/student handouts are provided for the instructor's use if
desired.

A series of questions is provided to stimulate discussion:

> II\. B.3. , II. C.3. and II. D.3. What does this all mean to the CMT?

Complete the modified experiential learning cycle for this objective and
the entire session at the end of this objective.

The question, How might you go about establishing the antecedent
conditions necessary for "teamthink," while discouraging the antecedent
conditions for "groupthink"? provides a lead-in to completing the
modified experiential learning cycle for this objective.

**Remarks:**

I.  Jerrold Post's article provides considerable insight into the
    interaction and impact of crisis-induced stress on the **personality
    of individuals and groups** involved in decision making.

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A.  As was pointed out earlier in this session, "Under stress,
    **individuals become more like themselves** -- that is, their
    characteristic coping mechanisms become exaggerated" (emphasis
    added; post p. 490).

B.  Concerning the personalities of decision makers, Jerrold Post adds,
    "But to the extent that that individuals do have significant
    compulsive, narcissistic, or paranoid elements in their
    personalities (as many successful individuals do), **under stress
    these traits can be expected to magnify,** and they can approach the
    extreme descriptions portrayed" (emphasis added; post p. 477).

C.  A **model** of the effect of stress on leadership decision making is
    shown in overhead 19-9. Some of the words in the model require
    further explanation.[^6]

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1.  To start with, a **stimulus** (crisis) situation may result in a
    **perceived threat** to values which include not only organizational
    values, but the personal values of the decision maker. These values
    may at times conflict (more on this in the discussion of particular
    personality types).

2.  The resulting anxiety or fear leads to a **coping pattern,** that
    is, a pattern of defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms are a
    derivative of an individual's personality and intensify under
    stress.

3.  Thus, different individuals, with different personalities,
    experience a **different impact** on their information processing
    capabilities, which in turn influence their decision-making
    capability.

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D.  This is **not to say that all stress is bad** and adversely affects
    performance. Some levels of stress can actually improve performance,
    as shown in overhead 19-10. (post p. 474).

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1.  The level of stress **(threshold)** where performance is maximized
    is different for each individual. Not understanding how stress
    affects one's performance can be very detrimental to the
    decision-making process.

2.  **Training and exercises** can assist decision makers in
    understanding how stress affects them individually and in the team
    context.

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II. **Personality types** and their reaction to stress.

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A.  Jerrold Post's article discusses **three personality types,** two of
    which -- compulsive and narcissistic -- are frequently found in the
    ranks of leaders, be they from the public or the private sector. A
    third personality type -- paranoid -- though found less often, is
    included due to the potential catastrophic consequences of stress on
    such individuals.

B.  The **compulsive** personality (overhead 19-11).

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1.  "Compulsive personality characteristics are frequently encountered
    in **successful** government and business executives, scientists and
    engineers, academic scholars, and military leaders" (emphasis added;
    post p. 477).

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a.  The **core features** of a compulsive personality are organizational
    ability, attention to detail, and emphasis on rational processes.

b.  Compulsive individuals need to keep strong feelings such as anger
    and anxiety **under control.**

c.  Compulsive individuals approach decision making on the basis of
    **logical reasoning.** They attempt to consider all aspects of a
    problem or issue before reaching a conclusion.

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2.  Unfortunately, crises do not lend themselves to an orderly thought
    process, and compulsive personality characteristics, **intensified
    under crisis-induced stress,** can interfere with effective decision
    making, causing a preoccupation with detail, an inability to see
    "the big picture," and indecisiveness.

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a.  With only partial information at his/her disposal, a compulsive
    decision maker can become **paralyzed with doubt** ("folie du
    doute") and vacillate between alternatives when an immediate
    decision is necessary.

b.  A person with a compulsive personality generally suffers from an
    inordinate **fear of making mistakes** and accordingly may seek that
    one additional piece of information needed to ensure a correct
    decision. The resulting procrastination becomes, in effect, a
    decision not to act.

c.  During the final stages of decision making, the compulsive
    individual may experience **self-induced pressure** to reach a
    decision to relieve anxiety and has a tendency to isolate
    himself/herself. Although outwardly receptive to the input of
    advisers, he/she often ignores it, and once a final decision is
    reached it is closed to further input and discussion.

d.  When the compulsive decision maker does make a decision, after
    experiencing anxiety and doubt over conflicting alternatives, the
    decision itself may not reflect the deliberative process followed,
    but rather may be a consequence of a **frantic impulse** due to time
    pressures or the need for relief from the process. Again, this
    feeling of relief may shut the door to any further input and
    discussion.

e.  Compulsive individuals can avoid some of their decisional agony if
    there are **set procedures and policies** that appear to fit the
    situation at hand. However, this runs the danger of inappropriately
    force-fitting a past solution to a new and possibly unique
    situation.

f.  In the group context, people with compulsive personalities tend to
    place **great importance on the interpersonal hierarchy** and become
    preoccupied with their relative status in dominant-submissive
    relationships. Such behavior may result in blind submission to the
    ideas of those perceived as superiors (leading to "groupthink,"
    covered later in the session), competition with peers, and the need
    to dominate subordinates, all of which can be dysfunctional to
    crisis decision making.

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3.  **Ask the students,** What does this all mean to the CMT? Some
    possible responses include:

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a.  It is necessary to **recognize** compulsive personality traits in
    CMT members through training and exercises.

b.  If any CMT members, particularly the team leader, have compulsive
    tendencies, other team members need to understand that they should
    **provide their input early** in the decision-making process. Input
    and disagreement after a decision has been reached will probably
    fall on deaf ears and may be viewed as a personal attack by the
    leader.

c.  Compulsive team members who become **"yes women/men"** in deference
    to superiors and interact in a dysfunctional manner with peers and
    subordinates detract from the team. Such extreme behavior should
    result in attempts to correct the behavior or their removal for the
    team.

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C.  The **narcissistic** personality (overhead 19-12).

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1.  "If the ranks of leaders were stripped of individuals with
    narcissistic personality features, they would be seriously depleted,
    for the upper levels of government and industry are **filled with
    successful narcissists.** After all, at one level narcissism is
    nothing more than extreme self-confidence, and the wedding of
    self-confidence and ability is what creates success." (emphasis
    added; post p. 479.)

2.  Taken to an extreme level, as characterized by **self-centeredness,
    egocentricity, and self-absorption,** narcissism can be
    dysfunctional and hinder effective crisis decision making.

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a.  The extreme narcissist seeks **constant reassurance of self-worth**
    and accordingly has the need to be the center of attention and to be
    admired.

b.  The primary **loyalty** of a narcissist is to herself/himself,
    resulting in an insensitivity to others and even their exploitation
    for self gratification.

c.  What the narcissist says and does is designed to **enhance his/her
    position** and is primarily for effect and does not reflect core
    beliefs. This allows the narcissist to change his/her position as
    the environment changes without a qualm of conscience.

d.  **Self-interest** dominates the conscience of a narcissist; however,
    her/his self-image is of a principled and scrupulous person
    deserving admiration. The narcissist communicates in an aura of
    sincerity and believes that he/she is sincere.

e.  Some narcissistic leaders, craving adulation, will **surround
    themselves with individuals (sycophants)** who quickly learn that
    they must uncritically assure the leader of the excellence of
    his/her plans and protect the leader from any external criticism.

f.  Narcissists tend to be **very self confident** in their own
    judgements and, surrounded with uncritical supporters, may well fall
    into the trap of "groupthink" (to be covered later in this session).

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3.  **Ask the students,** What does this mean to the CMT? Some possible
    responses include:

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a.  The need to **recognize** narcissistic personality traits in CMT
    members through training and exercises.

b.  Particularly when the leader has strong narcissistic traits,
    advisers (CMT members) need to be skilled in finding ways to
    **assist the leader** in accurately assessing the situation,
    evaluating the completeness of her/his plans and decisions, and in
    making adjustments as new information is obtained. In short, even
    though the narcissistic leader my want "yes men/women" as advisers,
    the advisers must find a way of assisting the leader in a manner
    he/she is willing to accept.

c.  Extreme narcissistic behavior should be **corrected** or the person
    removed from the CMT.

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D.  The **paranoid** personality (overhead 19-13).

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1.  The central feature of a paranoid personality is a
    **suspiciousness** and mistrust of others in general. The paranoid
    sees her/himself standing alone, surrounded by enemies.

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a.  The paranoid generally has **fixed conclusions** and accepts
    information supporting those conclusions while rejecting information
    to the contrary.

b.  Advisers **attempting to reason** with a paranoid leader and provide
    information contrary to his/her conclusions will meet with anger and
    increased suspicion of their motives.

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2.  Fortunately, extreme paranoid behavior is **self-destructive,**
    limiting the ability of the paranoid to rise to leadership
    positions. There are exceptions, however.

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a.  The last days of the **Nixon presidency,** when his inner circle of
    advisers questioned his capability to serve as commander-in-chief
    and instituted actions to limit his ability to wage war.

b.  By no means to compare President Nixon to **Adolph Hitler,** under
    the stress of the Normandy invasion and the unraveling of the German
    political-military situation, Hitler firmly held to his construction
    of the world. Attempts to convince him to change his mind were met
    with anger, dismissal, and even execution. Thus, emphasis was placed
    on appeasing Hitler rather than providing the information and advice
    he needed.

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3.  **Ask the students,** What does this mean to the CMT? Some possible
    responses include:

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a.  Society is generally **self-correcting,** leaving the extreme
    paranoid with little opportunity to rise to positions of power and
    influence. As mentioned above, there are exceptions, however.
    Advisers have the responsibility to protect the public or
    organizations from the irrational actions of a paranoid leader if
    possible (for example, Nixon's situation).

b.  The **inclusion of paranoids on a CMT should be avoided.** Their
    presence can only stand in the way of effective crisis decision
    making.

c.  If the boss is a **strong paranoid,** maybe it's time to find a new
    job.

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III. **Patterns of decision making** under crisis-induced stress.

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A.  Information accessibility, personality traits, and levels of
    perceived and actual stress combine to shape **crisis
    decision-making patterns** followed by individuals and the
    collective CMT.

B.  Overhead 19-14 shows **five patterns** (from Fink chapter 16), the
    first four of which are maladaptive to a crisis situation.

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1.  **Unconflicted adherence.**

2.  **Unconflicted change.**

3.  **Defensive avoidance.**

4.  **Hypervigilance.**

5.  **Vigilance.**

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C.  **Vigilance** -- Completes the tasks associated with effective
    crisis decision making shown in overhead 19-6 (overhead 19-15).

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1.  In short, the vigilant decision maker follows a **methodical,
    high-quality process** to objectively collect available information,
    thoroughly consider it, search for other possible options, and make
    a well reasoned decision.

2.  The **compulsive personality** has the trait of logical reasoning
    that would support a vigilant process. But, as mentioned earlier,
    compulsive characteristics, intensified under crisis-induced stress,
    can shift the process away from vigilance to a maladaptive style.

3.  The key to vigilant decision making is to follow a process of
    **logical reasoning while adapting to the effects of crisis-induced
    stress** on individuals and the collective group.

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D.  **Unconflicted adherence** -- Continuing with the current situation
    (overhead 19-15).

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1.  The unconflicted adherence decision maker copes by **ignoring
    information** about associated risks and choosing to continue with
    what is currently happening--a laissez-faire approach.

2.  This may reflect extreme **compulsive** characteristics (paralyzed
    by indecision), **narcissism** (self-absorption), or **paranoia**
    (holding to a set conclusion).

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E.  **Unconflicted change** -- Following the last advice received
    (overhead 19-15).

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1.  The unconflicted change decision maker copes by following the **last
    advice provided.**

2.  This may reflect extreme **compulsive** characteristics (frantic
    impulse to reach a decision) or **narcissism** (ability to shift
    positions for self promotion).

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F.  **Defensive avoidance** -- Avoiding decision making (overhead
    19-15).

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1.  The defensive avoidance decision maker avoids decision making by
    **procrastinating and avoiding conflict.** Essentially, his or her
    mind is made up and he/she is not receptive to new information.

2.  This may reflect extreme **compulsive** characteristics (irrational
    procrastination), **narcissism** (self-absorption), or **paranoia**
    (holding to a set conclusion).

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G.  **Hypervigilant** -- Vacillating approach (overhead 19-15).

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1.  The hypervigilant decision maker is **overwhelmed by the stress** of
    the situation and looks to an alternative to ease the problem, only
    to quickly change to another alternative that appears more
    attractive. Hypervigalance can be characterized by a condition of
    panic, where diminished cognitive abilities limit the search for and
    appropriate consideration of information.

2.  This may reflect extreme **compulsive** characteristics (following
    frantic impulses to reach a decision) and **narcissism** (ability to
    shift positions for self promotion).

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IV. **Group decision making.**

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A.  Although the ultimate responsibility for decision making in a crisis
    situation rests with the CMT leader, **the individual and collective
    contributions of the CMT** members provide valuable input, review,
    and evaluation of the decisions.

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1.  The CMT can provide **various perspectives** and ideas and a venue
    for discussion to assist in reaching the best decision.

2.  As discussed previously, the presence and **interaction of
    personalities** can greatly influence the dynamics of the CMT's
    work.

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B.  For all the positives of a group approach to decision making, there
    are negatives, most notably the group tendency labeled as
    **"groupthink"** -- a defective decision-making process afflicting
    highly cohesive and conforming groups (Neck and Manz p. 1).

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1.  In his 1972 book, *The Victims of Groupthink,* Janis defined
    **"groupthink"** as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when
    they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group...members' striving
    for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
    alternate courses of action... a deterioration of mental efficiency,
    reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group
    pressures" (Neck and Manz p. 2[^7]) (overhead 19-16).

2.  In his 1983 book, *Groupthink*, Janis laid out the framework of
    "groupthink" in a moderately or highly cohesive group, in the
    presence of specific **antecedent conditions,** having an increased
    probability of exhibiting the **symptoms** representative of
    "groupthink." These symptoms will in turn lead to **defects in the
    group's decision-making process** and accompanying **poor-quality
    decisions** (Neck and Manz p. 3). The antecedent conditions and
    symptoms of "groupthink" and the defects in the decision making
    process are shown on overheads 19-17, 18, and 19.

3.  **Antecedent conditions** (overhead 19-17).

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a.  Primary condition: Moderately or highly **cohesive** group.

b.  Structural or administrative **faults in the organization** in which
    the group exists, including:

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(1) **Insulation** of the group.

(2) The **group leader's preference** for a certain decision.

(3) A **lack of norms** requiring methodical procedures for the group.

(4) **Homogeneity** of the group members' social background and
    ideology.

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c.  **High stress** from external threats with **low hope** of a better
    solution than the leader's.

d.  **Low group self-esteem** induced by the group's perception of
    recent failures, excessive difficulty on current decision-making
    tasks, and moral dilemmas (i.e., apparent lack of feasible
    alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards).

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4.  Eight symptoms of "groupthink" stimulated by the antecedent
    conditions (overhead 19-18):

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a.  Direct **social pressure** placed on a member who argues against the
    group's shared beliefs.

b.  Members' **self-censorship** of their own thoughts or concerns that
    deviate from the group consensus.

c.  An illusion of the group's **invulnerability** to failure.

d.  A shared illusion of **unanimity.**

e.  The emergence of self-appointed **mind guards** that screen out
    information from outside the group.

f.  Collective efforts to **rationalize.**

g.  **Stereotyped** views of potential adversaries outside the group.

h.  Unquestioned belief in the group's **inherent morality.**

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5.  Seven **decision-making defects** resulting from "groupthink"
    (overhead 19-19):

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a.  Incomplete survey of **alternatives.**

b.  Incomplete survey of **objectives.**

c.  Failure to examine the **risks** of the preferred choice.

d.  Failure to reappraise initially **rejected alternatives.**

e.  **Poor information** search.

f.  **Selective bias** in processing information at hand.

g.  Failure to work out **contingency plans.**

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6.  In summary, a group experiencing "groupthink" fails to effectively
    employ the cognitive abilities of its members and instead seeks
    **complacency and complete agreement.** As Janis argues in
    *Groupthink,* "the greater the number of groupthink symptoms that
    the group exhibits the more likely that the group will make
    decisions of a defective nature" (Neck and Manz p. 10).

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C.  **Examples** of "groupthink. "

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1.  In the months leading up to attack on **Pearl Harbor,** the
    military's self-perception of Pearl Harbor as an impregnable
    fortress that the Japanese would never consider attacking.[^8]

2.  The defective decisions leading to the failed invasion of the **Bay
    of Pigs** (Cuba) in 1961. President Kennedy's group of close
    advisers displayed the antecedent conditions and symptoms of
    "groupthink." Further discussion and expressions of dissent were not
    accepted once the President and his advisers had reached the
    decision to go ahead with the plan.

3.  In a more contemporary setting, the basic and immediate causes of
    the **space shuttle *Challenger* disaster** can be traced back to
    defective decision making reflective of the symptoms of "groupthink.
    "

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D.  The **"teamthink"** alternative.

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1.  Neck and Manz's article proposes "teamthink," an alternative to
    "groupthink" in which **collective thinking of a group** can serve
    as a catalyst of positive as opposed to negative outcomes (p. 7).

2.  The antecedent conditions to "teamthink" fall under the general
    umbrella of **constructive thinking** (overhead 19-20):

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a.  **Team beliefs and assumptions** emphasizing the positive. problems
    are viewed as opportunities rather than as obstacles.

b.  **Team self-talk.** Verbalization within the group, expressing the
    need for open and honest discussion.

c.  **Team mental imagery.** The interactive creation of a common vision
    regarding what the group wants to accomplish and an effective means
    for doing so.

d.  **Thought patterns.** Maintaining an optimistic (but not overly
    optimistic -- a symptom of "groupthink") pattern of thought.

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3.  Five symptoms of "teamthink" stimulated by the antecedent conditions
    (overhead 19-21):

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a.  **Encouragement** of divergent views.

b.  **Open expression** of concerns and ideas.

c.  **Awareness** of limitations and threats.

d.  **Recognition** of members' uniqueness.

e.  **Discussion** of collective doubts.

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4.  In summary, a group exercising "teamthink" seeks to **effectively
    employ the cognitive abilities of its members** to reach the best
    possible decisions by completing the tasks associated with effective
    decision making (overhead 19-6).

5.  **Ask the students,** How might you go about establishing the
    antecedent conditions necessary for "teamthink," while discouraging
    the antecedent conditions for "groupthink"?

**Supplemental Considerations:**

Following the completion of the modified experiential learning cycle for
objective 19.4, the modified experiential learning cycle for the entire
session should be accomplished. The topics of information systems,
crisis decision making, and individual and group performance under
stress can be related to Capt. Gilbert's article and the overall
function of crisis management, in preparation for, during, and after an
organizational crisis.

[^1]: Augestine, Norman R. 1995. "Managing the Crisis You Tried to
    Prevent." *Harvard Business Review*. Vol. 73, No. 6. Start page 147.

[^2]: Personal observations of the course author (Greg Shaw, Captain,
    U.S. Coast Guard (retired)), who was personally involved in the
    USCGC *Blackthorn* disaster response operations.

[^3]: See note 2.

[^4]: Reilly, A.H. 1993. "Preparing for the Worst: The Process of
    Effective Crisis Management." *Industrial and Environmental
    Quarterly.* Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 115.

[^5]: Reilly p. 115.

[^6]: Post p. 473. Post cites "The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on
    Decision Making," by A. George, in *The Medical Implications of
    nuclear War*, edited by F. Solomon and Q. Marston (Washington, DC:
    National Academy Press. Page 33).

[^7]: Derived by Neck and Manz from Janis p. 9. See reference to Neck
    and Manz in Instructor Reading.

[^8]: Allison, Robert E. 1993. *Global Disasters.* New York: Prentis
    hall. Page 91.