Potential Conflict in Latin America

David Spencer, PhD

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

Potential Conflict in Latin America

**David Spencer, PhD**

**The Most Peaceful Continent?**

In the 1980s there were at least 11 wars in Latin America---three
conventional wars and 8 major insurgencies. In the 1990s there were 5,
of which one was conventional. In the first decade of the 21^st^ Century
there remains only one major conflict, the internal war in Colombia. Is
this a trend? Can we expect an end to regional wars in the near future?
So far Latin America has been the least conflictive region of the world
in the new century. However, this honor may not last long. Northern
South America seems to be one step away from major conflagration.

**Black Clouds on the Horizon**

Conditions are ripe in most of the Andean Ridge and Amazon Basin
countries for a new round of political violence. Democratization, which
was largely responsible for the reduction of Latin American wars since
the 1980s, has fallen short of delivering the much anticipated social
and economic benefits that its proponents promised.

-   First, the establishment of democratic structures has not prevented
    the long-time practices of corruption and patronage politics from
    thriving. These practices have excluded significant minorities from
    their respective polities, bankrupted national treasuries, and
    gridlocked political decision-making and execution in many
    countries.

-   Second, the economic liberalization and globalization that
    accompanied democratization created its own set of unanticipated
    problems. For example, although economies did grow through
    globalization, the benefits have not favored the majority. The gap
    between rich and poor in most Latin American countries has grown
    wider, and quality of life for the poorest has decreased
    significantly. Furthermore, globalization has wreaked havoc on
    certain traditional industries that proved to be inefficient
    compared to other foreign competitors. Although the economies are
    adjusting, the impact on the life of the displaced has been
    difficult.

-   Third, globalization and the vast amounts of ungoverned or poorly
    governed space in Latin America has resulted in exponential growth
    of efficient illegal economies, particularly drug trafficking.
    Despite increasing numbers of drug busts, arrests and confiscations
    of funds for money laundering, and spraying operations, neither the
    purity, price or availability of drugs on U.S. or European streets
    has been significantly impacted. Price has even gone down slightly,
    indicating that supply is plentiful and illegal money continues to
    pour into the region at unprecedented rates. What's worse is that
    those that control these vast illicit funds are precisely the forces
    and elements that can produce the most chaos. This means that,
    unlike the past, would-be revolutionaries don't have to appeal to an
    outside source for money, resources and weapons. They can merely tap
    into the vast reservoir of profits available from drug trafficking
    and other illegal economies to push their agenda. These profits are
    increasingly accessible to agents of political violence because of
    the breakup of the large cartels and their replacement by the much
    smaller "boutique cartels."

-   Finally, ungoverned space and illegal economies create another
    problem, one that is more direct threatens the United States. This
    is the appeal to foreign, particularly Islamic, terrorist
    organizations to establish support (training, logistics and rest)
    facilities in the region, and/or possible forward operating bases
    from which to project attacks into the United States.

All of these factors are combining to create conditions ripe for
conflagration. Should they all combine at once, it would undoubtedly
cause a significant crisis for the United States, one that would drain
U.S. resources at a time when forces and resources are already stretched
thin because of commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The
good news is that with the commitment of relatively few additional
resources, much could be done to prevent such a Latin American
conflagration. The bad news is that the United States most likely won't
show such forethought, only reacting when the situation develops into a
significant crisis, one that will cost the United States far more in
blood, treasure and forces than if the right policies were adopted now.

**Survey of the Andean Ridge/Amazon Basin Countries**

The most volatile region in Latin America is the northern half of South
America, comprising the countries of the Andean Ridge and Amazon Basin.
In the interest of time and space this paper will concentrate on this
region. This paper will survey five countries: Colombia, Venezuela,
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. It will examine the current status
of conflict and political unrest in those countries and then discuss
potential trends for violent conflict. It will also discuss the issue of
foreign terrorist organizations and ungoverned space. Finally it will
offer some general conclusions about conflict trends in the region.

**Colombia**

Ironically, Colombia, despite its long war, is the country with the most
positive outlook in the region. The last half of the Pastrana government
(2000-2002) and the first half of the Uribe government (2002-2004) has
marked an apparent turning point in the internal conflict. During the
Pastrana government, efforts were made to build the forces necessary to
stop the strategic advance of the FARC insurgents. By the time Pastrana
turned over the reigns of power to the Uribe administration, this had
been successfully accomplished.

During the Uribe administration the government has gone on the
offensive. One of the first things the administration did was to write a
national security strategy, known as "Democratic Security." The stated
objective of the strategy was to establish security so that all
Colombians can exercise their political rights within a democratic
framework. It is important to note that this is one of the few times
that Colombia has written a strategy and followed it.

Militarily the strategy has sought to take away terrain from the illegal
armed groups, which include FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, and organized
crime. The first step has been to consolidate disputed terrain near the
centers of population. Subsequently the military has sought to go on the
offensive against the insurgents through an ambitious campaign known as
"Plan Patriota." This campaign is launching forces deep into the base
areas of the illegal armed groups, but principally those of FARC, since
FARC represents the greatest direct threat to the state. These areas are
deep within the traditionally ungoverned space where drug trafficking
and other activities of the illegal economy have thrived. The outcome of
this offensive will not be known until the end of the Uribe government,
but so far signs are hopeful.

Meanwhile, Democratic Security seems to be working back in the urban
areas as designed. Security has increased in the urban and suburban
areas across the country, common crime statistics are down, and
government human rights abuses have not increased as many of Uribe's
critics predicted. Uribe has adopted a policy of accountability. He has
particularly held the military accountable for human rights and
operational results, dismissing generals who fail. He has also held
ministers accountable for health, economic, and local development
results. For the first time in Colombian history, the common voter feels
like they can expect results from their government.

One of the great ironies of this success is that opposition politics,
particularly from the political left, have prospered under the Uribe
regime commonly labeled as "rigthist." In most countries this is usually
an indication that the president is in trouble. However, it is important
to note that Uribe does not have his own party. Also, although leftist
parties have won important elections in cities like Bogota and Cali,
Uribe remains one of Colombia's most popular president's ever with an
approval rating that fluctuates in the high 70 and low 80 percentiles.
This is an indication of success rather than failure because no matter
how people feel about local politics, the broad consensus is that Uribe
is doing a good job at the national level. Furthermore, the success of
the left under a rightist security regime debunks some long cherished
myths. The militant left has always asserted that they needed to make
armed revolution because the Colombian establishment would never let the
left compete fairly in the political arena. This may have been true in
the past. However, the prosperity of the left under a rightist national
security regime unravels the old pattern and indicates that Colombian
politics are entering a new era of maturity. As the government continues
to be successful against the insurgents, Colombia's political maturity
will grow.

FARC strategic level decisions have actually helped the government. FARC
realized that they could not confront the government directly and
survive. Therefore they instituted a strategic withdrawal in accordance
with the precepts of Mao's prolonged popular war. Their hope is to
conserve their basic strength and their cadre to fight another day. The
directive has been to avoid direct fighting and employ the tactics of
attrition. Attrition is to be enhanced by increasing the technical
skills of its combatants, particularly in the use of explosives and
mines, and to inflict cumulative high cost on the government while
preserving their own strength for a future counter-offensive.

To understand FARC's thinking it is important to understand that,
presidential terms last four years in Colombia and there is no
reelection. FARC believes that Uribe too shall pass. Colombian history
is on the FARC's side, for in the past a dove president has inevitably
followed a hawkish president. Uribe has increased military spending and
expanded the forces more than any previous Colombian president. These
forces have expanded government presence in previously ungoverned space
and have increased security, but FARC is banking on economic exhaustion
and mediocre results to put pressure on the next government to relent
and adopt policies that turn the war back in their favor. They may get
their wish. The government is in a bit of a dilemma. It must produce
significant results by the end of Uribe's term in 2006. Meanwhile, FARC
only needs to avoid government success. As the military presses deeper
into FARC base areas, the government must increase defense spending to
sustain the effort. Meanwhile FARC's task becomes easier as they operate
on shorter interior lines of communication.

At the same time the state must increasingly juggle a delicate economic
situation in which international loans are due, unemployment and
underemployment are high, and raising additional taxes is difficult.
FARC has bet that the Uribe government can't accomplish all of its
necessary tasks. That still remains to be seen. So far, Uribe has
surprised many of his detractors. In 2003, increased security helped the
economy grow by 3.4%. The government has also proved able negotiators
with the international banking community by meeting debt obligations,
raising investment ratings, and negotiating free trade and preferential
trading status. Finally, Uribe is pushing to amend the constitution to
allow reelection. Although there is resistance in the Colombian
congress, around 70% of the population support Uribe's initiative. FARC
has underestimated the Uribe government before. Time will tell if they
do again and made a strategic mistake.

In essence FARC created a large vacuum and ceded the strategic
initiative to the government. The Uribe government has rushed to fill
it. The test is whether the government can consolidate the space it has
filled, or whether FARC has guessed correctly and the government will
eventually cede the space back. This will depend on two factors:
continuity and consolidation.

In order for the government to consolidate the recovered space, Colombia
needs to continue the security policies established by Uribe. An Uribe
reelection would guarantee this, but in some ways in would be more
powerful if a new president came into office and continued the same
policies. If a dove came into office, letting up on the offensive
against FARC and the illegal armed groups would mean ceding the
strategic initiative back to them.

Peace is better served by maintaining a position of strength.
Consolidation is where the Colombian government is weak. It means
getting the rest of the state into the newly recovered areas. The
military and police have recovered large tracts of previously abandoned
territory. They are holding open the door. It is up to the non-military
entities of the state to walk through the door and consolidate the
military success. The military can physically prevent the guerrillas
from entering the towns, but they can't prevent people going over to the
insurgents. This will happen if the people don't receive any benefit
from increased state presence. Success will come when young people in
the recovered areas cease to see FARC as an attractive career
opportunity and find the legal alternatives are more attractive and
fulfilling.

To accomplish this there are significant challenges ahead. Although FARC
has been largely driven out of the urban and suburban areas and is being
increasingly driven from its rural base areas, drug trafficking gives it
resources far beyond those enjoyed by any other insurgency or terrorist
organization in history. So, although the government may be able to
significantly reduce the FARC threat, drug trafficking resources give it
the ability to carry out at least low level terrorism for years to come.
It is doubtful that FARC will be totally defeated by 2006. However, its
power may be significantly reduced. It is more likely that the war will
continue at some level for at least another two presidential terms, so
at least to 2014.

One complicating factor is that not only has FARC withdrawn into its
base areas, but it has had the forethought to begin to establish a
strategic rearguard. This is possible because of friendly groups outside
of Colombia. Venezuela is a key player in this and will be described
later in great depth. However, there is evidence that in addition to
Venezuela, FARC has sought to establish and consolidate ties in
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil.[^1] FARC presence
and money has been detected among anti-US and anti-establishment
movements in all of these countries.

-   This has included FARC infiltration of the Peruvian Upper Huallaga
    valley where FARC began to pay farmers to plant poppies and coca as
    well as revive both of Peru's nearly extinct insurgent groups,
    Shining Path and MRTA.[^2]

-   The U.S. government has similarly detected the presence of Colombian
    FARC and ELN in Bolivia linked to the cocaine trade. In 2003 a
    Colombian was detained in Cochabamba with ELN and FARC propaganda,
    military uniforms, cash, coca base, and possible bomb making
    materials.[^3] Peruvian intelligence claims that FARC operatives in
    Bolivia are closely linked to the cocalero leader, Evo Morales.[^4]

-   Brazil has long been a route for moving personnel and gun running
    for FARC.[^5] FARC has significant ties to the criminal
    organizations that rule the favelas (urban slums) in Rio de Janeiro.
    In 2003 a FARC explosives instructor was captured in a favela of Rio
    de Janeiro.[^6]

-   Colombian guerrillas have long been present in Ecuador. FARC camps
    are continually discovered just inside the border by Ecuadoran
    security personnel.[^7] There has also long been evidence that
    corrupt members of the Ecuadoran military and police have sold
    quantities of weapons and ammunition to illegal armed groups
    including FARC. In October 2003, a government commission
    investigating the disappearance of weapons from Ecuadoran arsenals
    admitted as much.[^8] Besides weapons, Ecuadoran merchants sell
    boots, uniforms, and other supplies to FARC. It's good business for
    them. However, FARC may be trying to do more in Ecuador than just
    use it as a logistics base. In 2002 a new group emerged calling
    itself FARE. It has set off a few bombs and claimed links to the
    FARC. However, little more has been heard from it.[^9] Either the
    claims were false or the effort foundered. More recently, the
    government of Ecuador helped Colombia capture Simon Trinidad, a
    member of the FARC high command, who was in Ecuador seeking medical
    treatment.

What is important is that, as the Colombian military are more successful
at fighting the FARC at home, there is a good possibility that FARC
could increasingly export instability to Colombia's increasingly
volatile neighbors. This could be a dangerous combination, both for
Colombia and its regional neighbors.

**Venezuela**

In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela on an
anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform. Instead he has installed
himself as a traditional Latin American caudillo and populist. Benefits
have been showered on the poor, and those in his party have put their
hand in the state till and become wealthy. Where this would have
destroyed other economies, in Venezuela oil money keeps the country
afloat.

Throughout the last six years Chavez has been maneuvering to consolidate
his personal power. He has proved an able political chess player and has
consistently outmaneuvered his enemies. Opponents in the military,
professional organizations, media and the state-run oil industry have
been slowly but systematically isolated and forced out. It has been a
low-intensity process, but the cumulative effect over six years has been
enormous. Chavez has also proved to be a survivor. He has weathered a
coup attempt and three general strikes. He is now trying to sidestep a
national referendum that would force him to step down according to the
Constitution, which Chavez himself helped to write.

According to the constitution, a national referendum on a president's
leadership could be held half-way through his term if 20% or 2.4 million
signatures of the registered voters could be obtained calling for such a
referendum. The opposition to Chavez made a mammoth effort and turned in
3.6 million signatures. Chavez alleged that the opposition had not even
obtained 2 million signatures.[^10] The Chavez-dominated electoral
council ruled that only 1.8 million of the signatures delivered were
valid. It has since ordered more than 1 million people to confirm that
they signed the petition by the end of May 2004.[^11] The opposition
needs 525,000 verified signatures to be validated, but the process set
up to verify the signatures is so complex that it will be easy for
Chavez to sidestep it. Opposition leaders warned Chavez that if he tried
to delay or block the referendum he would face a popular rebellion.[^12]
Chavez relented and the electoral council that he controlled will allow
the referendum to be held. However, it will not be without controversy.
How the votes will be counted is now at stake. While Chavez is trying to
maintain a façade of legality, he is also prepared for war.

Preparations for an eventual armed revolt or U.S. invasion have been
going on since the beginning of the regime. Chavez formed the Bolivarian
Circles, ostensibly for study and education. However, there have been
substantial allegations of Bolivarian Circles conducting military
training, both by Venezuelan military officers and foreigners,
particularly Colombian guerrillas (FARC and ELN[^13]), and also
Cubans.[^14] This was taken a step further more recently when Chavez
announced the official creation of the Bolivarian militias to defend the
revolution. The militias will be openly trained and armed by the
Venezuelan military. Chavez's pretext for the creation of the militias
was a purported plot to kill him by Colombian paramilitaries, over 100
of whom were arrested, in uniform, on a farm, deep in Venezuela.
However, the circumstances are so suspicious that it appears as if the
plot was a staged event by the Chavez regime itself.[^15] In addition
there have been significant indicators of increasingly close
relationships between the Colombian guerrillas (FARC and ELN) and the
Chavez government. In fact, the relationship seems to have been friendly
from the beginning of the regime. Over time, the closeness of the
relationship is slowly being revealed. FARC/ELN and Chavez share similar
political ideologies and a mutual enmity for the United States. Although
Chavez has not provided much, if any, direct aid to the Colombian
guerrillas in the form of weapons (they don't need the aid due to their
wealth), he has allowed the Colombians to use Venezuelan territory to
establish bases, traffic drugs, weapons, and move personnel. By
maintaining the conflict in Colombia, Chavez diverts U.S. attention from
Venezuela, a diversion he needs to consolidate the revolution.
Furthermore, U.S. involvement in Colombia serves as a whipping post to
stir up Venezuelan nationalism.

The real threat in Venezuela is the outbreak of civil war. Society is
deeply divided and although a majority of the people seem to be against
Chavez, there is a significant number that do support Chavez. When there
are large anti-Chavez rallies in Caracas, the pro-Chavez side is usually
able to muster a similar number of people to demonstrate in favor of the
President. Chavez retains a significant loyal following among the poor
and significant elements of the military. Meanwhile, Chavez has been
slowly but steadily purging the military of the anti-Chavez elements.
Finally, the United States has little interest in invading Venezuela or
providing covert aid to Venezuelan insurgents against Chavez. Therefore,
if there is a civil war in Venezuela, the descent into such a war will
probably have started out as massive civic unrest and have escalated
into guerrilla war as the regime becomes increasingly brutal and
intransigent. There will probably not be an open conventional war.

Chavez believes that he can outmaneuver and wear down his opponents
through a drawn-out process of street fights, false promises, arrests,
intimidation, and deportation. In other words, rather than an
earthquake, there will be a series of "low intensity" clashes or
tremors, and the shedding of some blood, but in the end Chavez will
emerge triumphant. If the opposition moves from civic opponents to
guerrillas, he feels that he can deal with them as well because they do
not have the foreign support, organization, or funding for a prolonged
campaign.

Chavez is probably not seeking an external conflict with Colombia. He is
too intent on consolidating national power. Colombia has no territorial
ambitions against Venezuela and is too embroiled in its own internal war
to be a threat. However, keeping tensions high along the border and
supporting the Colombian guerrillas (passively or actively) serves
several purposes.

-   First, the specter of conflict with Colombia helps detract from
    problems at home by evoking nationalism, particularly since the
    United States is so heavily committed in Colombia. This allows
    Chavez to use the "international threat" to increase militarization
    and national defense spending, ostensibly to defend against a
    foreign enemy while hiding its true purpose---internal control.

-   Second, by supporting FARC and ELN in Colombia, Chavez keeps the
    United States focused on other countries, not Venezuela. This allows
    him to consolidate his revolution.

-   Finally, although a remote possibility, were FARC and ELN to triumph
    in Colombia, they would establish a Chavez friendly regime. This can
    only benefit him. Chavez is playing high stakes poker with both the
    internal opposition and Colombia. His multiple tremor approach might
    backfire on him and produce the earthquake he thinks he can avoid.

**Brazil**

Brazil, like most of the region, has turned to the Left. A decade of
corruption, stagnant politics, and stagnant economy in the 1990s led to
Lula da Silva's election in 2002. Lula was a longtime member of the
Brazilian Communist Party, who founded a center-left party in 1980 known
as the Workers Party (PT). Unlike Chavez' radical approach in Venezuela,
Lula has moved cautiously, introducing social reforms only within a
tight fiscal policy. This cautious approach coupled with a faltering
economy and corruption at the highest levels of government has caused
widespread disillusionment with his government from both extremes of the
political spectrum. Lula's popularity ratings have reached a low of
25%.[^16] Lula's social base has criticized him for not moving toward
socialism fast enough, and his critics on the right are unhappy about
the faltering economy.[^17] Meanwhile, increasing violence is occurring
in the urban slums, the favelas. There is a virtual war in the favelas
of Rio de Janeiro between police and the drug gangs. There are
approximately 5,000 armed gang members.[^18] During early May of 2004,
fighting between police and the gangs left 14 dead. The gangs are
showing increased military and political sophistication. They enforce
crude justice and carry out social programs such as providing milk to
mothers, sweets to children, and presents to children at
Christmastime.[^19] However, increasingly they are using the language
and analysis of radical Marxism. For example, they call the war on drugs
in the favela a "class war."[^20] Militarily, in recent fighting, gang
members employed more advanced weapons, including mines and anti-tank
weapons.[^21]

Although not an insurgency, the mix of elements of society pushing for
increased radicalization, discontent with a leftist president and
existing gangs with territorial control and popular backing, drug
finances, and perhaps FARC advisers, could produce a more serious
conflict requiring increasing involvement of the military. This is
particularly likely if Brazil's economy continues to sputter.

**Ecuador**

Since 1990, Ecuador's indigenous people have increasingly gained
political power, organizing and marching against what they perceive to
be corrupt and inept politicians. The peak of their power was reached in
January of 2000, when an indigenous popular rebellion backed by the
military overthrew the unpopular and inept government of Jamil Mahaud.
The leader of the military rebellion, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, was
subsequently elected to the presidency in November 2002. Colonel
Gutierrez won the elections by winning the backing of leftist political
parties such as the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), the electoral
front of the Ecuadoran Communist Party, and Pachakutik, the political
arm of the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE). To
these backers Gutierrez promised an anti-corruption campaign, reduction
in poverty, increased health, education, a social security system, and
job creation. Simultaneously Gutierrez pacified those who accused him of
drifting too far to the left by committing his government to honor
Ecuador's World Bank and IMF commitments as well as allowing the US to
maintain basing rights at Manta. Gutierrez won the elections by
successfully trying to be everything to everyone.

In office Gutierrez has been a disappointment to his indigenous
supporters. Initially he appointed several members of Pachakutik to his
cabinet. However, Gutierrez, like Lula, moved cautiously on the social
agenda. Instead of pushing for broad social programs, he has opted for
reduced government spending, austerity, and adherence to IMF and World
Bank recommendations. Gutierrez has also firmly backed Washington in the
counter-drug war and reaffirmed U.S. basing rights at Manta. On August
6, 2003 the differences over economic programs led to an official break
between Gutierrez and Pachakutik.[^22] The problem was that Gutierrez
had his back against the wall economically. With a struggling economy
and a 15 billion dollar deficit, Gutierrez had to agree to austere
measures to secure additional loans from the international community.
The bottom line was that Ecuador did not have the money to institute
ambitious social programs. By leaving the government, Pachakutik lost a
historic opportunity for indigenous incorporation into the Ecuadoran
polity and reverted to its role of political spoiler. Pachakutik has
already played a significant role in overthrowing two presidents. It
would not be difficult for them to attempt to overthrow a third.

To make matters worse, Gutierrez's political party, the January 21^st^
Patriotic Society, has been rocked by scandal. In December 2003 ample
evidence was uncovered linking the top leadership of the party to
corruption and drug trafficking. A number of party leaders were jailed.
However, the scandal did not affect only the president's party, but all
of Ecuador's political elite. In February 2004, tens of thousands of
Indians blocked the highways for 48 hours demanding Gutierrez's
resignation.[^23] Although the government weathered the storm and the
situation returned to normal, the rage of the indigenous peoples is a
latent, potentially explosive force, if the right conditions present
themselves.

There is no current threat of conflict in Ecuador. The most likely
scenario for social conflict is an Indian insurrection in the form of
marches and road stoppages around Quito. Like Bolivia, a militant
indigenous government can keep the country in perpetual crisis
indefinitely. However, it is improbable that the Indians will become
armed insurgents anytime soon, although armed violence could become a
factor in the protests. Several efforts by Colombian groups to foster
sister insurgent groups in Ecuador have always fallen far short. Of
course, given the right catalyst, things could change. Historically,
however, although unstable, Ecuador has always been able to pull back
and avoid major violent social conflict. Therefore the prognosis for the
future is probably more of the same. Ecuador and Peru can always go to
war over the border, but this possibility is currently remote, given the
Ecuadoran victory in the 1995 conflict and the presence of international
observers on the border.

**Peru**

Although Peru led Latin America in economic growth in 2003, and the
trend seems to be continuing in 2004, the popularity of President
Alejandro Toledo continues to spiral downward.[^24] The most recent
polls indicate that it hovers around 6%. A significant number of
Peruvians want Toledo to resign.[^25] Besides personal public relations
ineptitude, Toledo's government has been consistently rocked by scandal
and resignations. After 30 months of governance, Toledo has dismissed
and reformed his cabinet five times.[^26] Although Peru seems to moving
in the right direction, politically and economically, some analysts have
dubbed it more akin to "stumbling in the right direction." The basic
problem is the president's unstable character and his lack of leadership
experience.[^27] Despite economic growth, Peru is emerging from a long
period of political violence and economic stagnation. There is
discontent at both extremes of the political spectrum that is still
powerful enough to cause significant disruption. Unemployment and
underemployment are rampant. Like neighboring Bolivia, indigenous coca
growers are becoming increasingly militant. Marches and protests of
Indian groups from the border regions with Bolivia have become
increasingly frequent. These protests have demanded that their crops
cease being eradicated, their leaders freed from jail, and the anti-drug
agency, DEVIDA, disbanded.[^28]

In addition to the coca growing Indians, the Aymara Indians in the Puno
region have begun to take the law into their own hands. In this case the
focus of anger has been corruption. Indians have assassinated or driven
out of office public officers accused of fraud and corruption. When the
government arrested those responsible for the murders, the Indians have
taken to the streets, launching mass protests demanding their release.
While these incidents have been episodic and localized, similar
grievances exist elsewhere and it is feared that similar unrest could
explode across the country.[^29]

Perhaps as an additional symptom of the larger problem, there are
indications that Sendero Luminoso is making a comeback. Sendero was
largely defeated after the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman in 1992.
It was reduced to several hundred fighters organized in small groups
operating in the Upper Huallaga valley and the jungle regions of
Ayacucho. In June of 2003 they made the headlines when elements of
Sendero Luminoso kidnapped 71 workers from Technint, a German company
exploiting natural gas resources. Eventually the hostages were released.
In July of 2003 a marine patrol was ambushed by Sendero resulting in 7
government dead.[^30] Even more disturbing reports indicate that Sendero
organized one of the peasant marches against the Toledo government in
Ayacucho, also in July of 2003.[^31] This indicates that despite their
weakening, Sendero maintains a base of public support within the
indigenous community. As anger grows with the government, support may
correspondingly increase for Sendero. With a sufficiently large mass
base, Sendero can begin full-scale operations again.

The combination of increasingly rebellious Indians, inept government,
and resurgent terrorism and drug trafficking fueled by the likes of FARC
could spell dark days ahead for Peru. This will be particularly true if
recent economic growth does not translate into more jobs and better
living conditions for Peru's poor. The likelihood of an external
conflict with Ecuador is remote because Peru's internal challenges are
more daunting.

**Bolivia**

Bolivia has a reputation for being one of the most unstable countries in
Latin America. Recent events confirm its reputation. To understand
recent events it is necessary to understand something of the history of
drug trafficking in Bolivia. In the 1980s and 1990s Bolivia's Chapare
region became a major cocaine producing region. In 1993 it was estimated
that drug trafficking produced an estimated \$600 million in annual
income, roughly equivalent to the combined value of all other Bolivian
exports. Furthermore, around twenty percent of the adult work force was
employed in the coca trade.[^32] The United States has given extensive
aid to Bolivia's military to eradicate coca crops and drug processing
labs in this region. Over the years the coca growers, known as
cocaleros, have increasingly resisted the eradication effort, becoming
better organized and more belligerent. A common tactic has been to build
road blocks with burning tires, stones, and tree trunks and then place a
mob behind the barricade. The army has been used to break up these
roadblocks. On occasion the cocaleros have turned violent, using
dynamite mines and Chaco War-era Mauser rifles distributed to popular
militias by the revolutionary government of the 1950s.[^33] Over the
years there have been several hundred deaths. This has created
bitterness on both sides.

However, the coca growers did not limit their activities to barricades.
They also became politically powerful. Over the years they were able to
elect a number of representatives to the Bolivian Congress. In 2002 the
most powerful cocalero party, Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and their
presidential candidate Evo Morales, was narrowly beaten in the polls by
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. This put the cocaleros in an extraordinarily
powerful political position. Meanwhile in the mid-1990s huge natural gas
reserves were discovered in the Tarija province. An international
consortium was formed to plan exploitation and exportation of this
natural resource, the profits of which would boost the sagging Bolivian
economy. Evo Morales and MAS disputed the wisdom of the proposed plans,
claiming that the natural gas should go first toward helping the
Bolivian poor. When the Bolivian government approved plans to build an
export pipeline through Chile, to whom Bolivia lost territory in the War
of the Pacific (1879-1884), Morales called for an uprising. On September
19, 30,000 people mobilized in Cochabamba and 50,000 in La Paz. The
protesters accused the government of selling out to U.S. interests in
the drug war and for natural resource exploitation. On September 26,
Bolivia's powerful Labor Union (COB) joined the cocaleros. Government
forces were driven out of a number of Indian communities and the country
paralyzed by road blocks. The military sent in forces to unblock the
roads. In some places it became violent. Around 60 people were killed by
mid October, the road blocks were still in place, and the country began
to suffer severe food and fuel shortages. Finally, President Sanchez de
Lozada and a number of his ministers were forced to resign. Sanchez was
replaced by his vice president, Carlos Mesa.[^34] The political
situation in Bolivia still hangs by a thread. Currently an uneasy peace
exists, and Mesa is trying to cooperate with Morales, who is a de facto
co-president. However, this cooperation can be shattered at any time by
the right catalyst. Society is polarizing and there are advocates of
extreme measures on both sides of the divide.

Conflict in Bolivia will probably continue to follow the same pattern it
has demonstrated recently. The mobilization of Indians to block roads,
backed by selective violence, has worked quite well. However, a number
of factors could propel Bolivia into a more volatile situation: drug
money, Colombian (FARC and ELN) influence, or a major political
provocation such as the murder of someone like Evo Morales.

A real possibility is an eventual Evo Morales presidency. Morales would
probably follow footsteps similar to those of Venezuela's Chavez. He
might end drug eradication, carry out a more hostile policy toward the
United States, and increase spending for social programs. Morales may
also tolerate the activities of terrorist groups like Sendero Luminoso,
FARC and ELN on Bolivian territory. Like Chavez, a Morales presidency
could incite significant social instability. Bolivia will remain a
significant challenge to regional stability for the next decade.

**International Terrorism**

A final factor that needs to be discussed is the presence of
International Islamic Terrorism in Latin America. Since the late 19^th^
Century, there have been significant Muslim emigrant communities that
have settled in Latin America. They have tended to congregate on Latin
America's coasts. Collectively they were nicknamed "Turks" because many
of them migrated to Latin America when the Ottoman Empire ruled much of
the Arab world and therefore they carried Turkish passports. However,
ethnically the emigrants were Arabs with strong representation from
Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. There are particularly large communities
in the Atlantic coastal region of Colombia and Venezuela, and in the
border region between Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, known as the
Tri-border Region. These Arab communities are active in commerce, and
some are inevitably active in Latin America's longtime smuggling and
contraband rings. Insurgent organizations have long taken advantage of
these organizations to move people, money and weapons. It is no surprise
that Arab terrorist organizations have tapped into the same networks.

Hizbullah and Hamas have raised money among the expatriate Arab
populations, and even conducted operations in South America. In 1992,
Hizbullah bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people.
On July 18, 1994, an organization calling itsel Ansar Allah bombed a
Jewish civic organization headquarters, killing nearly 100 people.[^35]
However, according to the U.S. government, the primary function of the
Muslims in the tri-border region has been for fund raising and training.
Activities range from counterfeiting U.S. currency to drug smuggling.
Because of similar physical traits, Arab terrorists can easily blend in
and remain undetected for extended periods of time.[^36] There is
evidence that Al Qaeda has also sent operatives to Latin America. Local
informants have long reported on training and planning activities of Al
Qaeda. The discovery of such things as wall hangings of Iguazu Falls in
Al Qaeda compounds in Afghanistan adds credence to these reports.[^37]
The Colombian press reported that 5 of the 19 suicide bombers that
carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks had passed through Colombia's
Arab enclave of Maicao at different times prior to the operation.[^38]
In addition Venezuela's opposition alleges that President Chavez donated
\$1 million dollars to Al Qaeda after the September 11^th^ attacks, and
has given Al Qaeda terrorists sanctuary on Margarita Island in the Gulf
of Venezuela.[^39] While the truth of this allegation is unclear, what
is clear is that radical Islamic groups, to include Al Qaeda, have taken
advantage of Latin America's Muslim population, long established
smuggling routes, and ungoverned space to carry out movement, some
training, fund-raising, and maybe planning. Should northern South
America descend into increased chaos, new opportunities could develop
that would allow Al Qaeda to use Latin America as a springboard for
operations against the United States homeland.

**Conclusion**

In summary, although there is only one major conflict in Latin America
today, conditions in northern South America are ripe for renewed
conflict. While the conflict in Colombia appears to be winding down,
FARC's drug money and regional ties may allow them to project violence
and chaos into Colombia's neighboring states. Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia are all vulnerable due to already existing precarious political
conditions. In Brazil, militant drug traffickers are becoming more and
more politically organized. Should they consolidate and merge with
disgruntled popular sectors they may present a significant challenge to
the Brazilian state. In Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, militant Indian
groups are proving the deciding factor in national politics. However,
the Indians are much better at protesting and overthrowing governments
than they are at ruling. As far as the United States is concerned, the
rise of militant indigenous movements presents a significant challenge
to U.S. counterdrug and economic policies in the region. Any of the
situations in these countries could suddenly turn into a bloody civil
war given the right catalyst, although Bolivia and Peru are probably
more volatile than Ecuador. Venezuela is the region's wild card. The
money fueling the conflict here is not drugs, but oil. President Hugo
Chavez seems determined to consolidate his personal rule and is taking
increasingly risky steps towards that end. With a significant opposition
he is playing high stakes poker and taking the country to the brink of
civil war. His gamble is that the opposition doesn't have the appetite
to take that step, or that he will triumph if and when they do.
Depending on how things go this could result in a major head-on-head
civil war, an opposition guerrilla war against Chavez, or, if Chavez is
deposed by coup, a pro-Chavez guerrilla war against the new government.
If the latter scenario developed it is likely that the insurgents would
use drug trafficking to finance the insurgency, converting Venezuela
into a drug-producing country. The terrain is very similar to Colombia.
Into this chaos throw Al Qaeda. While not a major player in Latin
American politics, Islamic extremism may take advantage of any
developing chaos in Latin America to attempt to project power against
the U.S. homeland. The insurgents might welcome some aid from Al Qaeda
to acquire new technology and access to arms markets.

In the worst case scenario, the U.S. is facing the calm before the storm
in Latin America. In the best case scenario, Latin American instability
will play itself out in a series of low-grade controlled tremors but
will eventually emerge as stronger, with better governments and
economies. Somewhere in between is the most likely outcome. To ensure a
more positive outcome, it would behoove the United States to shake off
its traditional complacency and be more proactive in Latin America. Now
is the time to act when preventative measures are relatively benign,
simple and cheap. Waiting to act until the crisis erupts will be
politically difficult and costly in terms of blood and treasure.

[^1]: Jeremy McDermott, "Shining Path back as FARC exports terror,"
    *Daily Telegraph*, September 13, 2003

[^2]: Sharon Stevenson, "The FARC's Fifth Column," *Newsweek
    International*, January 21, 2002. Also see Monica Vargas, "Peru Says
    FARC Growing Coca in Peru, *Reuters*, February 20, 2004.

[^3]: http://www.wola.org/andes/Bolivia/bolivia_ain_updates.htm#may22

[^4]: "En Peru dicen que las FARC se vinculan con Evo Morales en
    Bolivia," *Diaro la Razon,* Enero 3, 2003.

[^5]: "The FARC, Venezuela and Brazil: Growing Security Concerns in
    South America, *Stratfor*, April 9, 2003.

[^6]: "Las FARC ayudan a narcos en Brasil," *El Pais*, Abril 7, 2003.

[^7]: "Descubren base de las FARC en Ecuador," *Noticeros Televisa*,
    Enero 21, 2001.

[^8]: "Militares de Ecuador negociaron armas con las FARC," *Associated
    Press*, October 24, 2003.

[^9]: "New Rebel Group in Ecuador Claims Ties to FARC, *Stratfor*,
    September 13, 2002.

[^10]: Pascal Fletcher with Magdalena Morales, "Chavez Foes Say They
    Secured Venezuela Referéndum," *Reuters,* December 3, 2003.

[^11]: "Venezuela Threatens to Expel Observers," *Associated Press*, May
    15, 2004.

[^12]: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1126572/posts

[^13]:

[^14]: http://www.insightmag.com/news/342429.html

[^15]: Patrick Markey, "Ill Hand Power to Another Revolutionary
    --Chavez," *Reuters*, May 18, 2004.

[^16]: http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aEzlrr_aC0pE&refer=latin_america

[^17]: Alex Bellos, "Lula throws Brazilians more promises as problems
    mount," *The Guardian*, April 28, 2004.

[^18]: http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s865716.htm

[^19]: Michael Astor, "Police Battle Violent Drug Gangs in Rio,"
    *Associated Press*, November 1, 2003.

[^20]: http://www.narconews.com/Issue30?artigo773.html

[^21]: Carmen Gentile, "Brazil: Crime-struck Rio getting troops," *UPI*,
    May 5, 2004.

[^22]: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *EcuadorPresident's Plight:
    Gutierrez's Future in Doubt after Break with Indigenous Ally*,
    Memorandum to the Press 03.54, August 14, 2003.

[^23]: http://www.oneworld.net/article/view/79493/1/

[^24]: Marcela Sanchez, "Good news won't stick to Peru's president,"
    *Washington Post*, August 29, 2003.

[^25]: Jude Webber, "Peru's Congress to Review Rules on Firing
    President," *Reuters*, May 19, 2004.

[^26]: "Peru's unpopular President Toledo unveils new Cabinet,"
    *International Herald Tribune*, February 16, 2004.

[^27]: http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2002/06/05_peru.html

[^28]: Tania Mellado, "Peru coca growers give Toledo ultimatum," May 12,
    2004.

[^29]: Drew Benson, "Unrest Challenges Peru's Central Government,"
    *Associated Press*, May 17, 2004.

[^30]: "Peru rebel ambush raises fears," *BBC News*, July 11, 2003.

[^31]: "Alertan sobre posibles atentados de Sendero Luminoso,"
    *Notimex*, July 24, 2003.

[^32]: Wesley A. Fryer, *U.S. Drug Control Policy in the Americas: Time
    for a Change*, unpublished paper, August 30, 1993.

[^33]: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v03/n409/a10.html

[^34]: http://www.bolivia.indymedia.org/es/2003/10/3394.shtml

[^35]: U.S Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994*,
    Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
    April 1995.

[^36]: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02042404.htm

[^37]: Interview with Walter Purdy, Terrorism Research Center, April
    2004.

[^38]: "5 de los 19 terroristas del 11 de Septiembre estuvieron en
    Maicao," *El Tiempo*, October 5, 2001.

[^39]: Johan Freitas, "Chavez \$1M support for Al Qaeda confirmed,"
    *Militares Democraticos*, January 9, 2003.