***Facilitators Field Reference***

***for the***

***1937 Blackwater Fire Staff Ride***

APRIL 2005

**STAFF RIDE DIFFICULTY RATING:**

[Physical]{.underline}

Arduous -- All walking segments are on a trail system in mountainous
terrain and an average slope of 40 percent. Average elevation for the
area is approximately 7,610 feet.

Bottom elevation: 6,200 feet.

Top elevation: 9,020 feet.

From the memorial site to the last stand is approximately 6 miles
one-way. From "Lower Camp" (accessed only by 4x4 standard type passenger
trucks or vehicles) it is approximately 4 miles.

[Logistics]{.underline}

Moderate / Difficult -- Adjacent to a major paved highway. The Highway
Memorial (Stand 1) is less than one-hour drive from Cody, Wyoming. Cody
has ample overnight accommodations. Access to the site is seasonal and
dependent upon snow load and spring break-up. In normal snow years the
trail up to the fire site may not clear until late June. Standard 4x4
passenger trucks/vehicles can access "Lower Camp." However, parking
space is very limited. Leave card in vehicle windshield with
date/time/itinerary/# in group/etc.

[Hazards]{.underline}

**[Bears:]{.underline}** This area is frequented by Grizzly bears and
there is a high population of Grizzly Bears. It is highly recommended
that participants' carry approved pepper spray and be trained in the use
of pepper spray and how to respond when confronted by Grizzly Bears.

**[Other users:]{.underline}** This trail is frequently used by local
lodges for trail rides with horses. If you meet horseback riders step
off on the downhill side of the trail and wait for the horses to pass.
Try not to spook them. There are occasionally mountain bike riders on
the trail. While not too much of a risk if they are going up the
trail...they tend to descend the trail at high speeds.

**[Weather:]{.underline}** Given the nature of the terrain, storms can
appear quickly. Lightning is very frequent with thunderstorms. Snow can
happen year round in the high country of the Shoshone National Forest.
Be prepared for all types of weather and check forecasts prior to your
trip.

**[Snags:]{.underline}** Both inside and outside the burn areas dead
trees abound in the area. Be aware of the potential for snags to come
down without notice. If significant winds are forecasted do not enter
the area. If you experience high winds consider returning to the
trailhead.

NOTE TO FACILITATORS: THIS IS A SUGGESTED FORMAT. DO NOT FEEL LIMITED BY
THE INDENTIFIED STANDS OR DISCUSSION ITEMS. IT IS PROVIDED AS A WORD
DOCUMENT SO THAT USERS MAY ADAPT AND REVISE IT TO FIT THEIR SPECIFIC
AUDIENCE AND TIME DEMANDS.

**Stand 1 -- Highway Memorial**

[Maps]{.underline}

Travel Map

Blackwater Map A - Topo map showing stand locations

[Access]{.underline}

**NAD 27 Conus GPS Coordinates: 44° 27' 30" x 109° 44' 49"**

From Cody, Wyoming take Highway 20 east toward Yellowstone National Park
-- East Entrance, go approximately 35 miles. Just after the Rex Hale
Campground, turn left into the Highway Memorial for Stand 1.

*\*\* Depending on the number of people in your party, the trailhead
parking area next to the Highway Memorial site can provide a place to
park extra vehicles if shuttling personnel to "Lower Camp" (44° 26' 26"
x 109° 44' 52") approximately 1.8 miles. \*\**

[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}

State Highway 20

North Fork of the Shoshone River

Blackwater Fire Memorial Monument

Blackwater Creek

Lower Camp

[Events to Describe]{.underline}

Overview of the Civilian Conservation Corps program

1930's Firefighting

1930's "Dust-bowl" era

The 1937 Fire Season

[Discussion Topics]{.underline}

-   The Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) crews of the 1930's were formed
    under Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the hopes of relieving
    unemployment by providing conservation work across the nation. The
    CCC was run by the War Department and fire suppression command,
    control and organization was modeled after the military.

-   Each camp had a camp commander, an assistant commander, a
    lieutenant, a doctor and an education advisor. All were Army
    personnel. Fire crews were trained and supervised by specific
    government agencies. Training for firefighting was "introductory" at
    best.

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-   Crews were generally consisted of 20-25 people. These crews were
    involved in firefighting around the country. Each camp was assigned
    a fleet of trucks, tractors and basic fire tools.

-   The Blackwater Fire was over 60 years ago. The knowledge and
    experience of how to fight wildland fires was very elementary at
    this time. Not only were communications done through hand written
    notes with runners, but logistical supplies were delivered via horse
    pack strings. Aerial delivered retardant, helicopter bucket drops,
    or sling loads were not invented yet. And finally, there was no
    LCES, 10 and 18's or PPE. Most of the men wore jeans, a full brim
    felt hat, and cowboy boots.

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-   The casual observer must wonder if the "dust bowl" conditions of the
    1930's are contributed to the drought and severe weather conditions.
    The temperature on August 20^th^ was 85 degrees with a relative
    humidity of 16 percent. Under these conditions the smoke was rising
    vertically. The day has often been described as extremely "hot and
    dry, with the sun boiling down and no discernible winds."

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-   Blackwater Fire background -- At approximately 1530 on Saturday,
    August 21, 1937 an unknown and unpredicted dry cold front hit the
    Blackwater fire area. Winds shifted from a general southwest flow to
    the northwest as wind speeds increased to 30 miles per hour. The
    resulting firestorm trapped groups of firefighters in separate
    locations (Clayton Gulch and Post Point) along the fireline. Fifteen
    firefighters gave their lives in service and over 32 were injured.

-   The fire started on August 18, 1937 as the result of lightning and
    was detected from the Pahaska Tepee at East Yellowstone Entrance at
    1535 hours on Friday, August 20, to District Ranger Charles Fifield
    at the Wapiti Ranger Station. Assistant Forest Supervisor Carl G.
    Krueger, who was currently conducting an aerial recon for a reported
    smoke in the Sunlight Basin, with Pilot Bill Monday spotted the fire
    at about the same time Pahaska made the report. At this time, the
    smoke was seen by Krueger, the column was moving straight up with
    little wind, and the fire appeared to have burned over only a couple
    of acres.

-   Ranger Fifield responded at 1600 with men from his CCC camp and
    arrived on scene at 1710 hours. The travel route consisted of 13
    miles of highway, an old logging road, and unused trail; this made
    Ranger Fifield's response time approximately 1-hour and 18 minutes,
    which is exceptionally good time. The point of origin was traced to
    a Sub-alpine Fir located on the west bank of Blackwater Creek
    approximately 3.8 miles from the Highway Memorial.

[Discussion Topics -- Cont...]{.underline}

-   Foreman Bryan Sullivan and his crew of seven CCC's were the first to
    arrive on the fire and begin work. By 2000, 58 CCC's were on the
    line, with seven men supervising and forming the overhead. The fire
    was estimated to be about 200 acres at this time.

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-   The fire was headed towards Coxcomb Peak in an almost pure stand of
    Douglas-fir. The objectives at this time:

1.  Keep the fire from getting into the heavily timbered basin (one of
    the main forks of Blackwater Creek;

2.  Strike hard and swiftly.

-   Forest Supervisor Sieker arrived at the fire, after an 86-mile trip
    from Sunlight, at about 2000, having learned from Krueger's airplane
    reconnaissance that the fire on the Blackwater promised to be far
    more serious than the one in the upper Sunlight Basin. Sieker and
    Fifield estimated the fire wouldn't spread much during the night and
    enough line could be constructed to hold the fire to its present
    boundaries.

-   Two things were needed: men and equipment. Supervisor Sieker left to
    order additional men so that 150 men would be on the fire by
    daybreak.

-   On the night of the 20^th^, about 65 men were divided and
    construction of line advanced around the flank of the fire from
    Blackwater Creek each way. The fire pump on the west sector during
    the night held a dangerous section of line and prevented spread up
    Blackwater Creek, embodying a basin of heavy timber.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #1 or Strategic Discussion Points #1
prior to leaving Stand 1**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 2.

NOTE TO FACILITATORS: THE TACTICAL DECISION GAMES ARE A GOOD METHOD TO
GENERATE GROUP INTERACTION IF PARTICIPANTS HAVE PREDOMINATELY FIRELINE
OPERATIONS BACKGROUNDS (FOR EXAMPLE FIREFIGHTER TYPE 1, SINGLE RESOURCE
BOSSES, STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE LEADERS, OR DIVISION SUPERVISORS). THE
STRATEGIC DISCUSSION POINTS ARE A GOOD METHOD TO USE FOR GENERATING
GROUP INTERACTION IF THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT OR
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BACKGROUNDS (FOR EXAMPLE FIRE MANAGEMENT OFFICERS,
IMT COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF, OR AGENCY ADMINISTRATORS).

**Stand 2 -- Trail Ridge**

[Maps]{.underline}

Blackwater Map B -- Topo map with fire progression (8/19-20/1937)

Blackwater Map C -- Orthophoto comparing fire perimeters of 1937 & 2003

[Access]{.underline}

**NAD 27 GPS Coordinates 44° 24' 43" x 109° 45' 03"**

From Stand 1 either drive or hike\*\* approximately 1.8 miles to the
south on Forest Road 435 to the upper trailhead. This location is where
the "Lower Camp" was established to support the fire and was also the
end of the road in 1937. Follow the trail south along Blackwater Creek
for approximately 2.5 miles to Stand 2 on Trail Ridge.

*\*\* Depending on the number of people in your party, the trailhead
parking area next to the Highway Memorial can provide a place to park
extra vehicles if shuttling personnel to "Lower Camp" (44° 26' 26" x
109° 44' 52") approximately 1.8 miles. \*\**

[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}

Blackwater Creek Drainage

Blind Creek

Clayton Gulch

Post Point

Double Mountain

Clayton Mountain

[Events to describe]{.underline}

Strategy and tactics

Location of resources

2003 Blackwater Fire comparison with the 1937 Blackwater Fire

[Discussion Topics]{.underline}

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #1 or Strategic Discussion Points #1**

-   Around midnight on the morning of August 21^st^, an unexpected wind,
    for short duration, cause Ranger Fifield to concentrate forces on
    the North side of the fire -- along Trail Ridge. By daylight,
    despite unfavorable weather, the line was still holding.

-   The shift change began along this ridge during the late morning of
    August 21^st^. Smoke was hanging in the drainage and the fire was
    backing down the north side of Trail Ridge. The Tensleep CCC
    relieved the Wapiti CCC Crew at around 1200. The Yellowstone CCC had
    arrived at 0230 that morning and continued to work. The BPR Crew had
    arrived at 1030 that morning and continued to work.

-   At noon, Assistant Forest Supervisor Krueger made an airplane
    reconnaissance of the fire, returned to the Cody office at 1330 and
    the proceeded to the fire with the intention of relieving Ranger
    Fifield. Ranger Alfred G. Clayton, of the South Fork District of the
    Shoshone National Forest, had arrived at the fire camp at about
    noon, when it was planned by the Forest Supervisor to turn the fire
    over to Clayton and Krueger to permit himself and Fifield to secure
    some rest.

-   At the time Krueger made his air reconnaissance the fire was quite
    hot on the steep, Douglas-fir covered slope above the line which was
    being constructed northeastward from the Trail Ridge and had spotted
    over into the headwaters of Blind Creek on the Elk Fork drainage.
    The fire was not, however, making much progress at the time and the
    wind was quiet.

-   The initial strategy was to anchor and flank the fire. Hose lays
    were used from the creek bottom up the southern edge (right flank).
    Trail Ridge was considered the northern edge (left flank) and is
    where most of the crews were constructing handline construction
    while picking up spot fires as they went.

-   The objective at this time was to extend the control line towards
    the timberline and hold the existing line. Ranger Clayton and Ranger
    Urban J. Post from the Big Horn National Forest were selected for
    the advance line work because of their long firefighting experience.
    Ranger Post was assisted by Junior Forester Paul E. Tyrrell and
    Foreman James T. Saban (a former Forest Ranger with much
    firefighting experience) who was in charge of the Tensleep CCC's.

-   Ranger Post and Tyrell took the lead and deployed his men with
    orders to push the fireline toward the rim rock above, while Saban
    brought up the rear with a group of enrollees carrying back pack
    hand pumps. Ranger Clayton followed to improve the line and catch
    any new spot fires. Ranger Post found nothing to cause him concern
    and expressed the fire would be well in hand in 3 or 4 hours. Post's
    men actually got to work on the line at about 1515 hours. As the day
    progresses the crews crossed Trail Ridge and dropped into the next
    gulch (now known as Clayton Gulch).

-   At this time, the men are unaware that the relative humidity is 6%
    with a temperature of 90° down at camp.

[2003 Blackwater Fire]{.underline}

-   From Trail Ridge, you can see the fire scar from the 2003 Blackwater
    fire which was started by lightning on August 16^th^. This fire was
    initially managed as a Type 3 incident with several hotshot crews,
    with logistics support by the Wapiti Ranger District.

-   On August 21^st^, the fire grows significantly so the Type 3
    organization pulled back heading to the 1937 memorial on the
    mountain. The fire is not engaged again until August 23^rd^.

-   The fire transitions to a Type 2 Incident Management Team.

-   On August 25^th^, as a dry air mass moves over the fire with a
    relative humidity of 14%, a Haines Index of 5 and the stand of 60%
    dead timber caused all resources to pull off the fire again. The
    fire remains un-staffed on August 26^th^ because of the continued
    critical fire weather.

-   The fire management objectives given to the Type 2 team by the
    Forest was to keep the fire confined in the Blackwater drainage and
    not all of the perimeter needed to be contained; only the northern
    edges.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #2 or Strategic Discussion Points #2
prior to leaving Stand 2**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 3.

**Stand 3 -- Clayton Gulch**

[Maps]{.underline}

Blackwater Map D -- Topo map with fire progression (8/20-21/1937)

[Access]{.underline}

**NAD 27 GPS Coordinates 44° 24' 43" x 109° 44' 27"**

From Stand 2 follow the trail up Trail Ridge and across Clayton Gulch
eastwards approximately 0.7 miles to the Clayton Gulch memorial. The
actual memorial site is just above the gulch on the east side.

*If time is not available for your group to hike the entire distance to
Stands 3 and 4 there is an excellent overlook point on Trail Ridge
approximately 1/4 mile above Stand 2. This is Stand 2A. From this
overlook one can see Clayton Gulch, Post Point, and the drainage where
the fire spread from below to overtake the firefighters working in those
locations. The discussions for Stand 3 and 4 can be effectively
conducted at this Stand 2A location (NAD 27 GPS Coordinates 44° 24' 44"
x 109° 44' 49").*

[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}

Trail Ridge

Clayton Gulch

Post Point

Clayton Mountain

[Events to Describe]{.underline}

Condition of the timber stand

Wind Pattern(s)

Communications

Safety Zone and Escape Routes

[Discussion Topics]{.underline}

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #2 or Strategic Discussion Points #2**

-   During the morning of August 21^st^ the fire had a slight southwest
    wind which is a typical airflow over Wyoming's Wind River and
    Absaroka Mountains.

-   The BPR and Tensleep CCC crews were cutting under slung line across
    the drainage. Ranger Clayton who had come up from behind the crew
    looking over the line was discussing the situation with Foreman
    Saban (Tensleep CCC) and Junior Assistant Hale (Wapiti CCC). Saban
    and Hale with 5-6 men of the Tensleep enrollees stopped and damned
    up the creek to fill backpack pumps.

-   As Ranger Post and his men gain the ridge to the north they notice
    the smoke below Ranger Clayton and his group. Clayton also notices
    the smoke and prepares to abandon line construction to attack the
    new smoke. Ranger Clayton and Ranger Post both noticed the spot
    fire, but had no way of communicating to one another.

-   The last word received from Ranger Alfred G. Clayton was a written
    note to Ranger Post:

> *"Post, We are on the ridge in back of you and I am going across to
> "spot" in the hole. It looks like it can carry on over ridge east and
> south of you. If you can send any men please do so since there are
> only 8 of us here." Clayton*

-   Sometime around 1530 the wind increased from the northeast blowing
    embers over the line and briefly subsided. When the wind began again
    it was associated with a frontal passage and it blew strongly out of
    the northwest. The spot fire rapidly runs up drainage trapping
    Ranger Clayton and his men at the dam in the drainage. Whether
    Clayton and his men actually started down to the spot or not was
    never determined.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #3 or Strategic Discussion Points #3
prior to leaving Stand 3**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 4.

**Stand #4 -- Post Point**

[Maps]{.underline}

Blackwater Map D -- Topo map with fire progression (8/20-21/1937)

[Access]{.underline}

**NAD 27 GPS Coordinates 44° 24' 50" x 109° 44' 00"**

From Stand 3 hike approximately 0.5 miles due east gaining elevation to
the rocky outcropping identified on the map as Post Point.

[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}

Post Point

Clayton Gulch

Spot Fire Location

Clayton Mountain

[Events to Describe]{.underline}

The spot fire

Ranger Post's escape actions

Management response

[Discussion Topics]{.underline}

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #3 or Strategic Discussion Points #3**

-   Shortly after Ranger Post received the note from Clayton, the wind
    began whipping back and forth fiercely driving the surface fires
    into the crowns. From Ranger Post's position, he quickly realized
    the seriousness of the situation, pulling all his men; he proceeded
    to what he considered a safe place, since he was unable to return
    along the fireline to Trail Ridge.

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-   BPR Foreman Bert Sullivan took the lead while Post and Tyrrell
    brought up the rear. The fire consumed the fuels above Post's crew
    cutting off their escape to timberline, thus making Post Point the
    men's best chance for survival. Five men panicked and ran downhill
    through the fire, of these five, only one survived. Post, Tyrrell
    and Sullivan made every attempt possible to keep the men in place,
    of the 37 who stayed at Post Point, only 3 would perish.

-   Paul Tyrrell knocked down some of the panicked men only to lie on
    top of them as a human shield to protect them from the "fiery
    blast". A few days later, Paul's severe burns took his life, he
    passed away at 1300 on August 26, 1937.

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-   The fire rushed uphill from the "spot" in two waves. The group on
    the ridge top tried to move around to avoid the flame fronts, but
    there was little room on the ridge.

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-   The final fire size was 1,700 acres and it took more than 400 CCC's
    and miscellaneous forest officers for a total of 520 men to bring
    the fire under control.

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-   David P. Godwin, Division of Fire Control, Washington -- concluded:

    -   The leadership on the fire was intelligent and protective of the
        men. It is evident that this fire was handled in a manner
        reflecting sound experience and knowledge...failure of the
        Tensleep crew to arrive earlier on Saturday probably contributed
        to the disaster.

    -   David Godwin established the Parachute Project in 1939 at
        Winthrop, WA a mere two years following the Blackwater tragedy.

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-   Fire behavior specialist A.A. Brown completed the fire behavior
    report for the Blackwater fire. Mr. Brown identifies the following
    factors as key to the "Blow Up":

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-   The ragged edge of the fire.

-   Under burning of surface fuels that pre-heated the canopy crown.

-   The heavy fuel model that the fire burned in -- today's fuel model
    10.

-   Spot Fires

[Discussion Topics -- Cont...]{.underline}

-   We can also add the following factors:

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-   Frontal Passage - The most obvious, but overlooked due to the
    limited understanding of fire weather at the time was the passage of
    a dry cold front. The winds shifted from southwest to northwest and
    increased to 30 mph. Local firefighters expect and plan for winds
    due to the frequency/consistency of winds.

-   Drought - In addition, the long-term drought of the 1930 "dust bowl"
    years would have intensified by 1937 contributing to the explosive
    conditions.

-   Terrain - Finally, the orientation of the fire within the North Fork
    of the Shoshone River drainage could help funnel and increase wind
    speed over the fire area with the passage of the northwest cold
    front.

-   Other Ignitions - While spots generated by the fire are a common
    concern of firefighter even today...how aware were firefighters in
    1937 or even today of the potential for another ignition source to
    influence strategies and tactics on the initial event. Are lookouts
    today so focused on the fire at hand that another situation like
    this could evolve??

**Handout and Conduct TDGS #4**

After conducting Tactical Decision Game #3 or Strategic Discussion
Points #3, allow time for participants to explore the area. Select an
appropriate location to conduct Tactical Decision Game #4 or Strategic
Discussion Points #4.

**Appendix A -- Fire Organization and Staffing**

###### August 20, 1937

**Management Oversight - Shoshone N.F. Forest Supervisor John Sieker**

**Initial Attack Fire Boss -Wapiti District Ranger Charles E. Fifield**

**Resources:**

-   **Wapiti Camp CCC (F24) -- 58 men**

> **(Crew Boss Glenn Hill with Foreman Bryan Sullivan)**

-   **Lake NPS CCC (YNP) -- 54 men**

**(Crew Boss Rogers with Forman Wolcott)**

###### August 21, 1937

Large Fire Fire Boss - Shoshone N.F. Assistant Forest Supervisor Carl G.
Krueger

Sector Boss - South Fork District Ranger Alfred G. Clayton

**Resources:**

-   **Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) - 9 Men**

**(Bert Sullivian -- Crewboss)**

-   **Tensleep CCC - 51 men**

**(Crew Boss Urban J. Post with Foremen James Saban and Paul Tyrrell)**

-   **Deaver CCC (BR7) - 50 men**

**(Crew Boss Sanzenbacher)**

-   **Lake NPS CCC (YNP) - 54 men split between flanks**

**(Crew Boss Rogers with Forman Wolcott**

-   **Locals - 15 men at unknown locations**