#### The One-of-Us Effect in Decision Evaluation

Raanan Lipshitz, Ziv Gilad, and Ramzi Suleiman

University of Haifa

December, 2000

Address Correspondence to

Raanan Lipshitz

Department of Psychology

University of Haifa

Haifa, Israel 31905

[**Raanan@psy.haifa.ac.il**](mailto:Raanan@psy.haifa.ac.il)

####  

#### Abstract

#### 

#### Judgment-by-outcomes denotes basing retrospective evaluation of decisions on the valence of their outcomes (success vs. failure). Although decisions are typically evaluated in social contexts, so far judgment-by-outcomes has been studied without regard to this context. This study examines the moderating effect of evaluator's identification with the decision maker (the one-of-us-effect) on the influence of outcome information on the evaluation of. Arab and Jewish subjects were presented with two cases recounting operations by either Arab or Jewish underground directed against the British authorities in Palestine. One case was a success (from the underground's point of view) and one ended in failure. Consistent with the one-of-us effect, identification with the decision maker variably canceled the influence of outcome information altogether, accentuated or weakened its influence, or determined which outcome constituted successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The one-of-us effect exercised a differential influence over different facets of decision evaluation, influencing most strongly the assignment of sanctions (in-group decision makers were mostly rewarded, out-group decision-makers were mostly punished regardless of outcomes). Next, in order of potency, the effect influenced the evaluation of decision justification, the evaluation of the decision maker, and the evaluation of the quality of decision process. 

#### The One-of-Us Effect in Decision Evaluation

1\. Introduction

Outcome information exerts powerful influence on the evaluation of
decisions and decision makers. An episode from Israel's 1996 national
elections provides a vivid impression of the overpowering effect of
outcome information in social life.

Some time before the elections, Benjamin Netanyahu, who emerged from
them as the prime minister of Israel, convinced his rival David Levy
(whom he had previously forced out from the main opposition Likud party)
to re-unite their two parties (Gesher and Likud, respectively). Under
the surface old enmities continued to smolder, owing to Netanyahu's
apparent disregard of Levy during the campaign:

> 'If Netanyahu wins,' said a high ranking official in Gesher last
> night, 'all complaints will be forgotten. Everybody will praise the
> efficiency of the campaign staff, glorify Finkelstein's \[Netanyahu's
> political advisor\] genius, and proclaim that Netanyahu is a
> mega-genius having closed a 30% gap between himself and \[prime
> minister\] Peres. If, however, Netanyahu loses, all hell will break
> loose. We \[at Gesher\] will remind him of the thousand snafus that
> occurred during the campaign. Thousands of pages can be written on all
> the errors that were made during the campaign. And, if he loses, we
> will punish Bibi (Netanyahu) and Finkelstein for every one of them'
> (Shkhory, 1996).

Basing the evaluation of decisions on outcome information is referred to
as "judgment by outcome." Several studies showed that information
regarding outcome valence ("success" vs. "failure") plays a principal
role in causal attribution (Kelley & Michela, 1980), the attribution of
responsibility (Mitchell, Green & Wood, 1981), the distribution of
rewards and punishments Lipshitz, 1989; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981) and the
evaluation of decision quality (Zakay, 1984). Outcome information
affects not only deliberate (or manipulative) evaluations, as in the
political anecdote above. Studies of hindsight bias show that people
cannot ignore outcome information even when they are specifically
instructed to do so (Fischhoff, 1975).

Judgment by outcome has received particular attention because of its
important normative implications:

> Judging single decisions on the basis of their outcomes is
> inappropriate for three reasons. The first reason is that the outcome
> of a decision, by itself, cannot be used to improve a decision unless
> the decision maker is clairvoyant (Baron & Hershey, 1988). A second,
> similar argument can be made from the standpoint of fairness: it is
> [unfair]{.underline} to use information not available to the decision
> maker to judge the quality of his decision... \[Finally\], under risk
> or uncertainty... judgment-by-outcomes is [logically
> unwarranted]{.underline} because it involves backward reasoning
> equivalent to affirming the consequent [(a → b, therefore b →
> a)]{.underline}, (Lipshitz, 1995, p. 123).

Lipshitz and Barak (1995) studied a wide range of variables affected by
judgment-by-outcomes. Officers in the Israel Defense Force were
evaluated six versions of two different cases of decision making in
military contexts crossing three levels of outcome information (success,
failure, no information); two levels of outcome valence (success vs.
failure) and two levels of norm conflict (norm conflict vs. no norm
conflict). Their results showed that compared to identical unsuccessful
decisions, successful decisions were perceived as (1) more justified;
(2) more congruent with normative expectations; (3) preceded by higher
quality decision process; and (4) induced a stronger tendency to
sanction the decision maker.

Hamilton (1978) criticized attribution theorists for emphasizing
cognitive explanations of causal ascription and attribution of
responsibility at the expense of social (i.e., normative) explanations.
The results of Lipshitz (1989) and Lipshitz and Barak (1995) indicate
that the two classes of variables are confounded in practice: successful
decisions are judged as normatively more acceptable than unsuccessful
decisions. Nevertheless, Hamilton's criticism is well taken. Since the
evaluation of decisions and decision makers typically takes place within
a particular social context (e.g., as in the anecdote concerning
Netanyahu and Levy above), it is reasonable to assume that the impact of
outcome information may vary between different contexts. One facet of
social contexts with particular relevance to decision evaluation are the
social identities of the decision maker and of the decision evaluator.
Specifically, we hypothesize that identical actions with identical
outcomes are evaluated differently when the decision maker is "one of
us" (e.g., a member of one's family, group, social class, or
nationality) and when he is a member of an external social group.

The one-of-us effect was demonstrated in a classical study by Hastorf
and Cantril (1954). Following a Dartmouth-Princeton football game, two
samples of students from the two colleges were shown the same film of
the game. Results from a questionnaire administered after the film
revealed basic disagreements between the two samples over what actually
took place during the game. In particular, each sample claimed that the
team representing its own school played in a more sportsmanlike fashion
than the opposing team. The hypothesis that judgment-by-outcomes is
moderated by the one-of-us effect is also supported by Tajfel and
Turner's (1985) social identity theory, Pettigrew's (1979) theory of the
ultimate attribution error, and findings from research on procedural
justice.

According to Tajfel and Turner, self identity is partly determined by
one's own group achieving a positive distinctiveness vis-á-vis other
social groups. In the context of decision evaluation, this may be
achieved by positive evaluation of decisions of in-group members
relative to those of out-group members. This tendency is the ultimate
attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979), which is essentially an extension
of the self-serving bias (Zuckerman, 1979). People are particularly
inclined to commit the ultimate attribution error when the relevant
in-group and out-group are in conflict, and when their national and
ethnic divisions are exacerbated by socioeconomic differences (Hewstone,
1990). Several studies obtained empirical support for this proposition.
Taylor and Jaggi (1974) found that Hindi and Moslem subjects made
internal attributions to positive actions and external attributions to
negative actions of members of their own ethnic groups, and the opposite
pattern of attributions to members of the other group. Duncan (1967)
found that black and white American subjects rated the same behavior
(pushing another person) as more aggressive when performed by members of
the other group. Lyyon (quoted in Hewstone et. al., 1990) found that
Arab and Jewish subjects rated behavior during conflict as more
aggressive when performed by members of the other group. Finally, Lind
and Tyler (1988) report that the most common finding in studies of
procedural justice show that procedural fairness is higher following a
positive outcome than following an unfavorable outcome (see also Daly,
Kirk, & Delaney, 1992).

A study by Crabb (1989) comes close to investigating the moderating
effect of the one-of-us effect on judgement-by outcomes. This researcher
asked Jewish-Israeli, Jewish-American, Arab, Arab-American, and other
American subjects to rate the justification of successful and
unsuccessful aggressive actions taken by Israelis against Palestinians
and by Palestinians against Israelis. As hypothesized, evaluations of
justification were related to the affiliation between evaluators and
perpetrators of aggression. Jewish students rated Israeli aggression as
more justified than Palestinian aggression and Arab students ranked
Palestinian aggression as more justified than Israeli aggression
irrespective of outcome. In addition, successful actions were rated as
more justified than unsuccessful actions.

Crabb results show that the one-of-us effect may moderate the pernicious
effect of outcome knowledge on decision evaluation. However, because
Crabb was not interested in juxtaposing these two effects, his results
are not conclusive owing to a subtle, but crucial, fault in his analysis
which grouped all "successful" and "unsuccessful" actions together,
irrespective of the identities of aggressors and perpetrators. However,
since the valences of harming N Israeli or N Arab soldiers are entirely
different from Israeli and Arab perspectives, Crabb's analysis confounds
judgment-by-outcomes and the one-of-us effects -- it is not clear
whether his results reflect subjects' sympathies or antipathies of Arab
and Jewish aggressors, or their differential evaluations of the
consequences of the latter's actions. In addition to avoiding this
confound, the present study was designed to examine the joint and
reciprocal influences of judgment-by-outcomes and the one-of-us effect
on decision evaluation with the wide range of dependent variables
employed by Lipshitz and Barak (1995).

2\. Method

To test the hypothesis that the one-of-us effect moderates the influence
of outcome information, we asked Arab and Jewish subjects to evaluate
different versions of two fictional cases of operations against the
British occupation in Palestine. In each case the versions were that the
operation was a success or a failure; and that it was carried out by an
Arab or a Jewish underground organization.

The Jewish versions supposedly occurred around 1947, and the Arab
versions supposedly occurred around 1936. Thus, the cases described
identical acts of terror (or of struggle for independence) with
identical outcomes, albeit under different historical circumstances.

##### 2.1. Subjects 

Participants in the study were 120 twelfth-grade Arab high-school
students and 120 twelfth-grade Jewish high-school students.

2.2. [Design]{.underline}

A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-group design was applied (Figure 1), crossing
two cases by two levels of outcome valence (success vs. failure) and two
levels of decision maker's and evaluator's social identities (Arab vs.
Jewish). Each subject was asked to evaluate two different cases, one
describing successful Jewish (or Arab) operation and one describing
unsuccessful Jewish (or Arab) operation. The social identity and outcome
valence in the two cases read by each subject were identical. Note that
not all comparisons between factors (and their high level interactions)
are relevant to the research question. Specifically, two cases and
Jewish and Arab evaluators were used for the sake of replicability. Only
analyses directly pertinent to the influence of the one-of-us- effect on
judgment by outcomes were performed.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Figure 1 here

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##### 2.3. Independent Variables

The identification of the evaluator with the decision maker was
manipulated by varying their social identities (i.e., Arab and Jewish).
Outcome valence was manipulated by inventing successful and unsuccessful
versions of the following two cases:

[The Ambush]{.underline}: This case was based on a little known actual
attack by a Jewish underground group against the British High
Commissioner of Palestine. In the Arab versions the decision maker plans
and executes an ambush against a British officer's car during the Arab
revolt in 1936. In the Jewish versions the ambush takes place in 1947,
shortly before Israel's War of Independence. Because of thick smoke it
is impossible to know if the targeted officer has been killed in the
first stage of the ambush. The decision maker decides, therefore, to
assault the car with machine-gun fire at great risk to himself and his
comrades. In the successful versions the officer is killed, innocent
bystanders are miraculously saved, and the operation achieves its
political objectives. In the unsuccessful versions the officer
miraculously escapes unharmed, a woman and a small child traveling with
him are killed, and the underground group suffers a severe political
setback.

[The Depot]{.underline}: In this imaginary case the decision maker, a
local volunteer in the British army, is a sentry at one of its depots.
Several compatriots ask him to assist them in robbing the depot to
obtain arms for the underground organization. The decision maker is torn
between his loyalty to his people in the underground on the one hand,
and his loyalty to his British colleagues at the depot on the other.
Finally he decides to cooperate with the underground. In the successful
versions the operation achieves its objectives, and some British
soldiers are lightly wounded. In the unsuccessful versions the attackers
are discovered and repelled at the cost of several British lives.

The two particular cases were selected because they are open to
different ethnocentric interpretations (terrorism vs. struggle for
independence), and because they offer a modest test of generalizability
owing to their differences in regard to the nature of the decision
maker's action (active and heroic vs. passive collaboration), the
severity of negative outcomes, and the presence or absence of norm
conflict.

2.4. [Dependent Variables]{.underline}

All variables were measured on 7-point response scales to which subjects
were requested to respond after reading each case.

[Manipulation checks]{.underline}: The strength of identification with
the decision maker was tested by the item "To what extent do you
identify with the decision maker in the case?" The effectiveness of the
outcome valence manipulation was tested by the item "To what extent was
the outcome of the case a success or a failure?"

The influence of the one-of-us-effect on decision evaluation was studied
in terms of four variables. The items measuring the normative dimensions
of the decision (first two dependent variables) and sanctioning (fourth
dependent variable) were selected on the basis of their relevance to the
evaluated cases and extensive pre-testing. Quality of the decision
process (third dependent variable) was measured identically to Lipshitz
and Barak (1995).

[Evaluation of the decision maker]{.underline}: "Norms are behaviors
that are expected of members of specific groups or cultures. To what
extent was the decision maker guided by each of the following norms: (1)
patriotism; (2) persevering; (3) obeying orders; (4) showing courage;
(5) preventing innocent casualties; (6) loyalty to one's comrades; (7)
promoting selfish interests; (8) religious fanaticism?"

[Evaluation of the decision]{.underline}: "To what extent was the
decision maker's action: (1) justified - unjustified; (2) an act of
freedom fighting -- an act of terrorism; (3) a criminal act -- a
manifestation of positive values; (4) an act of self-defense -- an act
of aggression; (5) an act of treason -- an act of loyalty; (6) moral --
amoral; (7) commendable -- condemnable?"

[Quality of the decision process]{.underline}: This variable was
measured by 7 items regarding the extent to which the decision maker (1)
considered all the information; (2) conducted an adequate information
search; (3) considered a wide arrange of alternatives; (4) thoroughly
evaluated his alternatives; (5) thoroughly evaluated the potential
consequences of his alternatives; (6) used all the time available to
him; (7) assessed the situation adequately.

[Assignment of Sanctions]{.underline}: This variable was measured by
asking subjects if they would have rewarded, punished, or taken no
action with respect to the decision maker. Subjects who selected the
first two options were asked to rank the magnitude of their reward or
severity of their punishment on a 1-10 scale.

2.5. [Procedure]{.underline}

Questionnaires containing the independent and dependent variables were
administered in group sessions after securing the cooperation of
teachers and students. Data collection took approximately 30 minutes.
Each group received the questionnaire in its own language. The
assignment of subjects to experimental conditions (success or failure)
and case order were randomized. Outcome information and social identity
were not varied within subjects, that is, each subject received either
two cases of success or two cases of failure of either an Arab or a
Jewish decision maker.

3\. Results

[Preliminary Analyses]{.underline}

To avoid measurement with single items we factor analyzed the item sets
pertaining to the evaluation of the decision maker, evaluation of
decision, and quality of the decision process using the entire sample of
subjects. Each of the three analyses produced a single factor with an
eigen value larger than 1.00. Screening out items with factor loadings
smaller than .5 produced slightly different scales evaluating the
decision makers and the decisions in the two cases (reflecting their
different contents), and an identical scale evaluating quality of the
decision process.

The scale evaluating the decision maker in the Ambush was labeled
[Heroism]{.underline} and consisted of courage (.8), perseverance (.7),
and patriotism (.5) (item loadings in parentheses). The corresponding
scale in the Depot consisted of loyalty to comrades (.8), avoiding
innocent victims (.7) and obeying orders (.5) and was labeled [Team
Playing]{.underline}.

The dimensions relevant to the evaluation of the decision in The Ambush
were justified-unjustified (.8), terrorism-freedom fighting (.7)
moral-amoral (.6) self defense-aggression (.5) and
commendable-condemnable (.5). These were collectively labeled
[Justifiability]{.underline}. The corresponding scale for The Depot was
also labeled [Justifiability]{.underline} although it had a slightly
different dimensionality: justified-unjustified (.9), terrorism-freedom
fighting (.6), treason-loyalty (.6), commendable-condemnable (.6), a
criminal act -- a manifestation of positive values (.5), moral-amoral
(.5).

The scale evaluating [quality of the decision process]{.underline}
consisted of all seven original items (factor loadings for The Ambush
presented first): (1) considered all the information (.6, .5); (2)
conducted an adequate information search (.7, .8); (3) considered a wide
arrange of alternatives (.7, .7); (4) thoroughly evaluated his
alternatives (.7, .8); (5) thoroughly evaluated the potential
consequences of his alternatives (.7, .7); (6) used all the time
available to him (.6, .5); (7) assessed the situation adequately (.7,
.7).

In conclusion, the one-of-us effect in decision evaluation was tested in
The Ambush and The Depot cases by four variables, two variable measuring
the normative aspects of the decision makers' actions (Justification and
Heroism and Team Playing for The Ambush and The Depot cases,
respectively), one measuring Quality of the Decision Process and one
measuring Assignment of Sanctions. On each variable the effect was
tested four times using two-way analyses of variance.

Available theory and research do not allow to derive specific hypotheses
regarding the moderating effect of the one-of-us effect on the
previously demonstrated influence of judgment-by-outcomes on these
variables. Our working hypothesis thus, was that the basic pattern of
results showing the one-of-us effect is a non-significant outcome
valence main effect coupled either with a significant decision maker's
identity effect or with a significant decision maker's identity x
outcome valence interaction. Although four elements are nominally
included in the design (decision makers, evaluators, outcomes, and
cases), not all comparisons among them are relevant to the research
question (e.g., differences between the two cases and perceived success
of Arab decision makers by Jewish vs. Arab evaluators).

For this reason and for the sake of clarity of presentation, the two
cases were analyzed separately using a series of 2X4 ANOVA analyses. We
begin the results of The Ambush.

3.2. [The Ambush]{.underline}

[Manipulation checks]{.underline}: Table 1-a presents mean Arab and
Jewish evaluators' identification with the decision makers in the Arab
and Jewish case versions. Only the identity main effect was significant,
indicating that Arab evaluators identified more strongly with Arab
decision makers than with Jewish decision makers, F (1, 100) = 4.33,
[p]{.underline} \< .04, and Jewish evaluators identified more strongly
with Jewish decision makers than with Arab decision makers, F (1, 95) =
12.22, [p]{.underline} \< .001,irrespective of outcome valence. It is
noteworthy that Arab evaluators identified more strongly with their
compatriot in case of the failure than in the case of success, while
Jewish decision evaluators identified more strongly with theirs in the
case of success than in the case of failure. Later we shall say more
about this interesting pattern, indicating that the case content has
different meanings in the two ethnic groups. Now we just note that only
the identity main effect is directly relevant to testing the one-of-us
effect. Table 1-b presents the perceived success or failure of the two
case versions. Confirming the hypothesized effect, case outcomes in
success conditions were rated as more successful by both Arab and Jewish
evaluators, F (1, 100) = 54.57, [p]{.underline} \< .0001 and F (1, 95) =
69.06, [p]{.underline} \< .0001, respectively.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 1-a here

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\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 1-b here

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The results for decision makers' heroism, decision justification and
quality of the decision process are presented in Table 2. The results
for assignment of sanctions are presented in Figure 3.

[Heroism]{.underline}: The results are presented in Table 2-a. The
one-of-us effect is manifested in the results of Arab evaluators by the
significant outcome x identity interaction, F (1, 99) = 10.19,
[p]{.underline} \< .002 coupled with two non-significant main effects:
Duncan post-hoc tests revealed that successful Jewish decision makers
and unsuccessful Arab decision makers were perceived to be equally
heroic, and both were evaluated more highly than the equally less heroic
successful Arab decision makers and unsuccessful Jewish decision makers.
Both successful and unsuccessful Jewish decision makers were regarded as
more heroic than their Arab counterparts by Jewish evaluators, F (1, 98)
= 3.73, [p]{.underline} \< .06. This marginally significant one-of-us
effect did not cancel the influence of outcome information on perceived
heroism -- successful Arab and successful Jewish decision makers were
perceived as more heroic than their corresponding compatriots who
failed, F (1, 98) = 9.65, [p]{.underline} \< .003. Thus, the one-of-us
effect is reflected in this variable by the different impact of outcome
information on perceptions of heroism. The very meaning of outcome
information is jointly determined by decision makers' and evaluators'
ethnic identities.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 2-a here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Justification]{.underline}: The results are presented in Table 2-b. The
one-of-us effect is manifested in the results of Arab evaluators by a
significant identity main effect, F (1, 99) = 3.79, [p]{.underline} \<
.05, which completely cancels the influence of outcome information: the
actions of successful and unsuccessful Arab decision makers were
regarded as equally justified and as more justified than the equally
less justified actions of their Jewish counterparts. The one-of-us
effect in the ratings of Jewish evaluators on this variable takes a
complex form: a significant tendency to perceive the actions of Jewish
decision makers as more justified, F (1, 98) = 22.32, [p]{.underline} \<
.0001, coupled with a marginally significant outcome effect, F (1, 98) =
3.23, [p]{.underline} \< .08 reflecting a tendency to perceive Arab
[failure]{.underline} as more justified than Arab success. Outcome
valence had no influence on the evaluation of Jewish decision makers by
Jewish evaluators.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 2-b here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Quality of the Decision Process]{.underline}: This variable proved to
be impervious to the one-of-us effect (Table 2-c). Replicating the
results of Lipshitz (1989) and Lipshitz and Barak (1995), both Arab and
Jewish evaluators gave higher ratings to the quality of decision making
process in cases of success than in cases of failure regardless of the
identity of the decision makers, F (1, 98) = 3.16, [p]{.underline} \<
.08, and F (1, 96) = 12.71, [p]{.underline} \< .001, respectively.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 2-c here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Assignment of Sanctions]{.underline}: This variable, which measures the
"bottom line" of the evaluation process, shows most clearly the impact
of the one-of-us effect on decision evaluation (Figure 2). The principal
response of Jewish evaluators to successful Jewish decision makers was
reward while their principal response to successful Arab decision makers
was punishment. In addition, the effects of success and failure are more
differentiated for Jewish decision makers in terms of reward (a ratio of
53:14 = 3.8 for Jewish decision makers vs. 24:8 = 3 for Arab decision
makers -- with Arab decision makers who fail more likely to receive
reward. The differentiation is even more pronounced in terms of
punishment (a ratio of 36:18 = 2 for Jewish decision makers vs. 59:50 =
1.2 for Arab decision makers \-- with successful Arab decision makers
more likely to receive punishment. Thus, the meaning of success and
failure was determined, again, by ethnic identity, and Arab decision
makers were likely to be punished virtually irrespective of their
outcomes [even though the attack was targeted at a third party (a
British officer), and the identity of the civilian casualty in the
failure case was unspecified]{.underline}. The results for Arab
evaluators also show the effect of ethnic identity on the determination
of success and failure. Arab decision makers were more likely to be
rewarded in the case of failure while Jewish decision makers were more
likely to be rewarded in the case of success. The latter were equally
likely to be punished regardless of outcome valence.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Figure 2 here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

3.3. [The Depot]{.underline}

[Manipulation checks]{.underline}: Table 3-a presents mean Arab and
Jewish evaluators' identification with the decision makers in the Arab
and Jewish case versions. As hypothesized, Arab evaluators identified
more strongly with Arab than with Jewish decision makers, F(1, 105) =
8.39, [P]{.underline} \< .01. In addition, the results of Arab
evaluators showed a significant outcome effect owing to a stronger
identification with the unsuccessful Arab decision maker (interaction
was not significant). The slightly stronger identification of Jewish
evaluators with Jewish decision makers was not significant, F(1, 94) =
1.98, [P]{.underline} \< .16, while their stronger identification with
successful decision makers irrespective of ethnic identity was
significant, F (1, 106) = 4.28; [p]{.underline} \< .05. Thus, while Arab
evaluators were consistently more partial to Arab decision makers and to
Arab decision makers that failed in both cases, the conflict between
national and social loyalties weakened the identification of Jewish
evaluators with Jewish decision makers and, in consequence, the
moderating effect of ethnic identity on outcome information. The results
regarding the effectiveness of the outcome valence manipulation are
presented in Table 3-b. In both cases outcome effects are significant in
the hypothesized direction (F (1, 107) = 56.54; [p]{.underline} \<
.0001, and F (1, 94) = 23.38; [p]{.underline} \< .001 for Arab and
Jewish evaluators, respectively).

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 3-a here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 3-b here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

The results for decision makers' team playing, decision justification,
and quality of the decision process are presented in Table 4. The
results for assignment of sanctions are presented in Figure 3.

[Team playing]{.underline}: The pattern of results for Arab evaluators
did not produce significant effects for outcome valence, decision
maker's identity, and their interaction. Showing the one-of-us effect,
Jewish evaluators gave higher ratings to Jewish decision makers with no,
and regardless of, significant outcome valence influence, F (1, 95) =
6.47; [p]{.underline} \< .01.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 4-a here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Justification]{.underline}: These results are presented in Table 4-b.
Consistent with the one-of-us effect, Arab evaluators were more partial
to Arab decision makers with no, and regardless of, significant outcome
valence influence, F (1, 109) = 10.41; [p]{.underline} \< .002. The
results of Jewish evaluators produced no significant main or interaction
effects.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 4-b here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Quality of the Decision Process]{.underline}: These results are
presented in Table 4-c. The results of Arab evaluators showed outcome F
(1, 110) = 9.233, [P]{.underline} \< .001 and F (1, 110) = 4.53,
[P]{.underline} \< .04, respectively, owing to the ratings of the
unsuccessful Arab decision makers which were uniformly lower than the
ratings of decision makers in the three other conditions. The results
fail to show the one-of-us effect, thus replicating the corresponding
results in The Ambush case.

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Insert Table 4-c here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

[Assignment of Sanction]{.underline}: The "bottom line" variable shows,
once again, the most pronounced one-of-us effect, essentially
eliminating out the influence of outcome information in conjunction with
a marked ethnic identity effect (Figure 3). Arab evaluators tended to
reward Arab decision makers more and punish them less regardless of
outcomes (reward/punishment ratios of 77:15 and 71:19 for successful and
unsuccessful Arab decision makers vs. 44: 36 and 5:43 for successful and
unsuccessful Jewish decision makers). The results of Jewish evaluators
are somewhat different. Both Jewish and Arab decision makers were not
treated differentially in terms of their outcomes, while Jewish decision
makers were rewarded more and punished less in both outcome conditions
(33:12 and 29:0 and 53:72 and 50:70, respectively).

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Insert Figure 3 here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Table 5 summarizes the study's results which may be somewhat difficult
to follow owing to the complexity of the design. It is fair to conclude
that except for quality of the decision process, all the variables under
investigation provide at least some -- and often strong -- support for
the proposition that judgment-by-outcomes is attenuated by the
identities of the decision maker and the decision evaluator.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

Insert Table 5 here

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

5\. Discussion

Extensive research shows that outcome information attenuates
retrospective estimates of the likelihood of decision outcomes (the
"I-knew-it-all-along" effect, Fischhoff, 1975), and attributions of
responsibility for these outcomes (the "either-a--medal-or-a-corporal"
effect, Lipshitz, 1989). This study tested the "one-of-us" effect,
namely the moderating effect of identification with the decision maker
on the influence of outcome information on retrospective evaluation of
decision makers and decision making. Confirming this proposition, the
results show that the one-of-us effect variably cancels the influence of
outcome information altogether, accentuates or weakens its influence, or
determines what constitutes successful and unsuccessful outcomes to
begin with. The effect exercised differential influence over different
facets of decision evaluation. The one-of-us-effect influenced most
strongly the assignment of sanctions (in-group decision makers were
mostly rewarded, out-group decision makers were mostly punished,
regardless of outcomes), followed, in order of potency, by its influence
on the evaluation of decision justification, the evaluation of the
decision maker, and the evaluation of the quality of the decision
process (which reflected the influence of outcome information in three
of the four experimental conditions of the study).

The influence of outcome information attracted the attention of
researchers partly owing to its normative implications. Its attenuating
effects reflect violations of Decision Theory (i.e., "outcome bias,"
Baron & Hershey, 1988), hinder drawing of valid lessons from experience
(Fischhoff, 1975), handicap just distribution of rewards and
punishments, and weaken the authority of valid professional doctrines
and standard operating procedures (Lipshitz & Barak, 1995).
Unfortunately, the moderating influence of the one-of-us effect on
outcome bias probably worsens rather than helps its dysfunctional
consequences.

The nationalistic content of the cases used in the study and the nature
of the subject populations raises a question as to the generalizability
of our findings to other domains in which the one-of-us effect may
influence decision evaluation, such as industrial disputes or situations
in which one has to pass judgment on his or her family members. Although
we were cognizant of this limitation of our design we chose to
"capitalize" on the (otherwise unfortunate) Arab-Jewish conflict
inasmuch as it allowed us to simulate in an experimental setting the
emotionally charged settings in which the one-of-us effect exerts its
influence. It is interesting to note that the original design included a
third "neutral" condition in which the cases took place in the
ex-British colony of Sarawak. However, pretests with Jewish subjects
revealed that their evaluations of the unfamiliar Sarawakian decision
makers were indistinguishable on all variables from their evaluations of
the Jewish decision makers, thus raising doubt whether culture
neutrality is feasible not only with intelligence tests.

The wider implications of the present study are thus relevant to the
study of decision making but not to its improvement. In particular they
are pertinent to the utility of context-free abstract syntactic, and
hence presumably "general" models of decision making.

[The socio-cultural context of decision making]{.underline}: Hamilton
(1978) criticized researchers working within the framework of social
cognition for studying the attribution of responsibility while ignoring
the social-normative aspects of this process. Confirming this criticism,
albeit with a certain twist, Lipshitz and Barak (1995) showed that
normative and non-normative decisions with identical outcomes are indeed
evaluated differently. However, the extent to which decisions are
considered to be normative is partly determined by outcome information
(e.g., successful decisions are perceived as more normative). Our
finding that identical outcomes have opposite effects depending on
decision makers' and evaluators' ethnic identities suggests an
additional twist to Hamilton's criticism. Hamilton claimed that Norm
Theory provides alternative plausible explanations of attribution
processes to the cognitive explanations offered by attribution
theorists. Our findings show that cognitive models cannot be applied
effectively in order to predict, for example, the effects of specific
outcome information on decision evaluation in concrete real-world
situations, without an understanding of the socio-cultural context to
which the models are applied. In our case no general (cognitive) model
could have predicted that Arab evaluators would treat unsuccessful Arab
decision makers in the same way as Jewish evaluators treated successful
Jewish decision makers. This result (which we did not anticipate) could
only have been predicted from a sophisticated theory of Palestinian
culture that specifies the implications of the cult of the "Shaheeds"
(martyrs) to attitudes towards success and failure in incidents of
"terror"/"freedom fighting."

[The semantic facet of decision making]{.underline}: This important
aspect of a contextual approach to decision making and decision
evaluation is essentially a corollary of the socio-cultural aspect of
decision making and decision evaluation. While decision research
traditionally focuses on the syntax (i.e., "deep structure") of decision
processes, the semantics of these processes are at least as important
for their understanding as their syntax. We stumbled on this aspect
serendipitously when we found that both Jewish and Arab evaluators
treated The Ambush and The Depot cases differently (we included two
cases in the design for purposes of generalizability). There is growing
awareness among students of decision making of the importance of
semantics. Goldstein and Weber (1995) and Lopes (1987) provide excellent
discussions of the poverty of describing decision making purely in terms
of its syntax; Wagenaar, Keren, and Lichtenstein (1988) and Dawes, van
de Kragt, and Orbell (1988) provide empirical evidence for the
importance of the semantic content of decision problems in a study in
which syntactically identical but semantically different decision
problems produced opposite attitudes toward risk: "Starting from ...83%
preference for the certain outcome \[Wagenaar et al.\] we have, after a
number of changes in the problem's surface structure, finally come to
92% preference for the uncertain outcome...\[illustrating\] that the
jump from surface structure to deep structure might be tricky" (pp.
185-187). Dawes et al. (1988) showed that a variable that is extraneous
to game theory, namely group identity (playing with total strangers vs.
playing with acknowledged same group members), radically affects
cooperation levels in prisoner dilemma situations. By extrapolation from
these studies on decision making to the study of decision evaluation, it
seems that the attempts to find purely cognitive explanations to various
manifestations of outcome knowledge such as judgment by outcomes,
hindsight bias (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) or the attribution of and
assignment of sanctions responsibility (Mitchel, Green, & Wood, 1981)
should be complemented by research that pays closer attention to
context-specific social, cultural, and semantic aspects of these
processes.

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Table 1

a.  Evaluator's identification with the decision maker \-- The Ambush,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.50       | 5.25        | 4.10         | 4.15        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.82       | 2.03        | 1.97         | 1.35        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(22\)     | \(24\)      | \(29\)       | \(27\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 2.70       | 3.06        | 4.23         | 4.23        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ##           | 2.10       | 1.47        | 2.09         | 1.72        |
| ##### Jewish |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(23\)     | \(18\)      | \(30\)       | \(26\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

b.  Perceived success of case outcome \-- The Ambush,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.68       | 2.96        | 5.72         | 2.61        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.64       | 1.68        | 1.69         | 1.59        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(22\)     | \(24\)      | \(29\)       | \(28\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 4.74       | 2.89        | 5.73         | 1.69        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 2.20       | 1.91        | 1.46         | 1.32        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(23\)     | \(18\)      | \(30\)       | \(26\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

Table 2

a.  Decision makers' heroism \-- The Ambush,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| ####### Arab | 5.44       | 6.22        | 6.03         | 5.49        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.43       | 1.03        | .82          | .89         |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(22\)     | \(23\)      | \(29\)       | \(28\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 6.03       | 4.98        | 6.16         | 5.75        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | .88        | 1.61        | .86          | 1.27        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(25\)     | \(20\)      | \(29\)       | \(27\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

b.  Decision justification \--The Ambush,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Arab         | 4.59       | 4.76        | 4.15         | 4.15        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.28       | 1.33        | 1.56         | 1.46        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(20\)     | \(24\)      | \(29\)       | \(28\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 2.44       | 3.66        | 4.42         | 4.12        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.47       | 1.41        | 1.16         | 1.09        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(25\)     | \(20\)      | \(29\)       | \(26\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

c\. Quality of the decision process \-- The Ambush,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Arab         | 4.74       | 4.13        | 4.69         | 4.42        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.48       | 1.24        | .97          | 1.26        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(20\)     | \(24\)      | \(29\)       | \(27\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 4.59       | 3.60        | 4.84         | 3.84        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.48       | 1.50        | 1.16         | 1.36        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(25\)     | \(20\)      | \(27\)       | \(26\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

Table 3

a.  Evaluator's identification with the decision maker \-- The Depot,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.79       | 5.79        | 4.08         | 4.50        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.89       | 1.70        | 2.02         | 1.45        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(28\)     | \(29\)      | \(26\)       | \(24\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 4.08       | 2.91        | 4.35         | 3.82        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 2.13       | 1.69        | 2.10         | 1.96        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(26\)     | \(22\)      | \(26\)       | \(22\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

b.  Perceived success of case outcome -- The Depot

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 5.00       | 2.34        | 5.50         | 3.32        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.65       | 1.23        | 1.77         | 1.97        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(29\)     | \(29\)      | \(26\)       | \(25\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 4.46       | 2.41        | 4.46         | 2.77        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.79       | 1.84        | 1.94         | 1.97        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(26\)     | \(22\)      | \(26\)       | \(22\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

Table 4

a.  Decision makers' team playing \-- The Depot,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.27       | 3.89        | 4.21         | 4.73        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.56       | 1.80        | \(28\)       | 1.15        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(28\)     | \(29\)      | 1.11         | \(28\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Jewish       | 3.36       | 2.62        | 3.72         | 3.90        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.58       | 1.39        | 1.54         | 1.79        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(27\)     | \(22\)      | \(23\)       | \(24\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

b.  Decision justification \-- The Depot,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.77       | 4.73        | 3.95         | 3.98        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.44       | 1.47        | 1.32         | .77         |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(28\)     | \(29\)      | \(26\)       | \(28\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| ##           | 3.60       | 2.98        | 3.67         | 3.54        |
| ##### Jewish |            |             |              |             |
|              | 1.60       | 1.06        | 1.53         | 1.34        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(27\)     | \(21\)      | \(23\)       | \(24\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

c\. Quality of the decision process \-- The Depot,

Means, SDs, and cell size n.

+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Case version | Ar         | A           | Je           | Jew         |
| →            | ab-Success | rab-Failure | wish-Success | ish-Failure |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| Evaluator ↓  |            |             |              |             |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 4.85       | 3.73        | 4.61         | 4.41        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ####### Arab | 1.32       | 1.04        | 1.29         | .90         |
|              |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(28\)     | \(29\)      | \(28\)       | \(27\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| #######      | 3.25       | 3.14        | 4.26         | 3.58        |
|              |            |             |              |             |
| ##           | 1.40       | 1.04        | 1.66         | 1.42        |
| ##### Jewish |            |             |              |             |
|              | \(27\)     | \(21\)      | \(22\)       | \(19\)      |
+--------------+------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+

Table 5

Different patterns of the one-of-us effect

1.  The Ambush

+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Variable    | Pattern                                                |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Heroism     | No outcome effect; successful Jewish and unsuccessful  |
|             | Arab decision makers considered more heroic by Jewish  |
|             | and Arab evaluators, respectively.                     |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Ju          | No outcome effect with Arab evaluators; Arab decision  |
| stification | makers evaluated as more justified regardless of       |
|             | outcome.                                               |
|             |                                                        |
|             | No or inverse outcome effects with Jewish evaluators;  |
|             | Jewish decision makers more justified regardless of    |
|             | outcome; successful Arab decision makers marginally    |
|             | less justified.                                        |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Quality of  | Outcome effect and no identity effect: Higher quality  |
| the         | decision process for successful decision makers        |
| decision    | regardless of identity.                                |
| process     |                                                        |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Assignment  | Complex patterns. Both the definition of success and   |
| of          | failure and the assignment of rewards and punishment   |
| sanctions   | reflect primarily the one-of-us effect.                |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+

2.  The Depot

  --------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
  Variable        Pattern

  Team playing    No outcome effects for both Arab and Jewish evaluators.
                  Jewish decision makers rated more highly by Jewish
                  evaluators.

  Justification   No outcome effects and no identity effects for Jewish
                  evaluators. Arab decision makers rated more highly by
                  Arab evaluators regardless of outcome.

  Quality of the  Outcome effect and no identity effect: Higher decision
  decision        process quality regardless of decision maker identity.
  process         

  Assignment of   Complex patterns. Both the definition of success and
  sanctions       failure and the assignment of rewards and punishment
                  reflect primarily the one-of-us effect.
  --------------- ---------------------------------------------------------

![](media/image1.wmf){width="5.34375in" height="7.135416666666667in"}

[Figure 2: Assignment of Sanctions \--The ambush]{.underline}

![](media/image2.wmf){width="7.3in"
height="3.9in"}![](media/image3.wmf){width="7.3in" height="3.9in"}

[Figure 3: Assignment of Sanctions \--The depot]{.underline}

![](media/image6.wmf){width="7.3in" height="3.9in"}