January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

 

 

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

 

 

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
\[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041\] RIN 0579-AC01

\[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)\]\
\[Proposed Rules\]\
\[Page 1101-1129\]\
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access \[wais.access.gpo.gov\]\
\[DOCID:fr09ja07-21\]\
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\[\[Page 1101\]\]\
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Part III\
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Department of Agriculture\
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Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service\
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9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96\
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of\
Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines; Proposed Rule\
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\[\[Page 1102\]\]\
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE\
\
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service\
\
9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96\
\
\[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041\]\
RIN 0579-AC01\
\
\
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions;\
Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines\
\
AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.\
\
ACTION: Proposed rule.\
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\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--\
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SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations regarding the\
importation of animals and animal products to establish conditions for\
the importation of the following commodities from regions that present\
a minimal risk of introducing bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)\
into the United States: Live bovines for any use born on or after a\
date determined by APHIS to be the date of effective enforcement of a\
ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in the region of export; blood and blood\
products derived from bovines; and casings and part of the small\
intestine derived from bovines. We are proposing these amendments after\
conducting a risk assessment and comprehensive evaluation of the issues\
that concluded that such bovines and bovine products can be safely\
imported under the conditions described in this proposed rule.\
\
DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before March\
12, 2007.\
\
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by either of the following methods:\
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
[http://www.regulations.gov](http://www.regulations.gov/)\
, select \`\`Animal and Plant Health Inspection\
\
Service\'\' from the agency drop-down menu, then click \`\`Submit.\'\'
In the\
Docket ID column, select APHIS-2006-0041 to submit or view public\
comments and to view supporting and related materials available\
electronically. Information on using Regulations.gov, including\
instructions for accessing documents, submitting comments, and viewing\
the docket after the close of the comment period, is available through\
the site\'s \`\`User Tips\'\' link.\
Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: Please send four copies\
of your comment (an original and three copies) to Docket No. APHIS\
2006-0041, Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 3A-\
03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-1238. Please state\
that your comment refers to Docket No. APHIS 2006-0041.\
Reading Room: You may read any comments that we receive on this\
docket in our reading room. The reading room is located in room 1141 of\
the USDA South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue, SW.,\
Washington, DC. Normal reading room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.,\
Monday through Friday, except holidays. To be sure someone is there to\
help you, please call (202) 690-2817 before coming.\
Other Information: Additional information about APHIS and its\
programs is available on the Internet at
[http://www.aphis.usda.gov](http://www.aphis.usda.gov/).\
\
\
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information regarding ruminant\
products, contact Dr. Karen James-Preston, Director, Technical Trade\
Services, Animal Products, National Center for Import and Export, VS,\
APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-\
4356.\
For information concerning live ruminants, contact Dr. Lee Ann\
Thomas, Director, Technical Trade Services, Animals, Organisms and\
Vectors, and Select Agents, National Center for Import and Export, VS,\
APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-\
4356.\
For other information concerning this proposed rule, contact Dr.\
Lisa Ferguson, Senior Staff Veterinarian, National Center for Animal\
Health Programs, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 43, Riverdale, MD\
20737-1231; (301) 734-6954.\
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\
\
I. Background \...\...\...\...\... snip \...\...\...\...\...\..... full
text ;\
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<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/07-17.htm>

 

 

 

 

MY COMMENTS are as follows ;

 

 

WITH the new BASE mad cow in the USA bovine, on top of the regular BSE
mad cow, I urgently stress that our borders be sealed and that no bovine
or ovine, or cervids be traded. THE BSE MRR policy should be repealed,
and the old BSE GBR risk assessments be adhered too, and strengthened to
include all TSE. \...TSS

 

 

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on
7\
December 2006 are now available.\
\
\
snip\...

ITEM 9 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS\
\
snip\...\
\
\
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was\
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be
more\
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived
BSE.\
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic
spongiform\
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in
the\
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE
TO A\
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that
in a\
mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of
prion\
disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after
infection.\
\
\
<http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf>

 

Docket No. 03-080-1 \-- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL\
IMPORTS FROM CANADA\
\
\
<https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed>

 

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of the United States of America (USA)\
\
\
Summary of the Scientific Report\
\
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working
Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission
(EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United
States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more
cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in
USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004
based on data covering the period 1980-2003.\
\
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached
domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in
the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and
therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is
possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached
domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early
nineties.\
\
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle
imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were
processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This
risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the
low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with
continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.\
\
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is
likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no
significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be
(pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently
increases.\
\
\
<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html>\
\
\
\
<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.Par.0004.File.dat/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of Canada\
\
\
Summary of the Scientific Report\
\
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working
Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the
presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically
as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the
GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period
1980-2003.\
\
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the
eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties.
These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in
the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the
early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into
Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the
early 90s.\
\
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada,
and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s
when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered.
This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's
when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years
with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.\
\
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is
confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system
remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if
no additional external challenges occur.\
\
\
\
\
<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.html>\
\
\
\
<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.Par.0001.File.dat/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_v2_en1.pdf>

 

 

 

 EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of Mexico

 

 

 

**Summary of the Scientific Report**

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working
Group on the Assessment of the **G**eographical **B**ovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) **R**isk **(GBR)** were asked by the European
Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in
Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being
infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This
scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based
on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached
domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and
therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is
possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached
domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993.

It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported
live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external
challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system
has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was
recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since
grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge
and lack of a stable system.

EFSA concludes that **the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is
III,** i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are
(clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is
likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge,
coupled with a very unstable system.

 

<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/565.Par.0003.File.dat/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_summary_en1.pdf>

 

<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/565.Par.0004.File.dat/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_v2_en1.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
\
THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED
;\
\
\
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006\
\
\
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public
earlier\
this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to\
them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this
latest\
case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for
at\
least a decade.\
\
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which
USDA\
officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.\
\
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a\
picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is\
thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed
they\
consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal,\
incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products
contaminated\
with the mad cow pathogen.\
\
\"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence
of\
other undetected cases,\" Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of
the\
National Institutes of Health\'s Laboratory for Central Nervous System\
Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press\
International. \"The question was, \'How many?\' and we still can\'t
answer\
that.\"\
\
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad
cow\
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in
the\
United States, said he has \"absolutely no confidence in USDA tests
before\
one year ago\" because of the agency\'s reluctance to retest the Texas
cow\
that initially tested positive.\
\
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected
seven\
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency\'s inspector
general.\
\
\"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before
2005\
suspect,\" Brown said. \...snip\...end\
\
\
<http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r>\
\
\
\
\
\
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt \...\
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of
Central\
Nervous System \... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36,
Room\
4A-05, \...\
\
\
<http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm>

 

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE\
\
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM\
\
\
\"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad
cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent
lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the
Canadian Food Agency.\"

O.I.E. \...\...\.... ??? GOD HELP US!  most every country that went by
the flawed OIE BSE guidelines, most all became BSE infected countries.
\...TSS

 

sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle,
if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went\
\
by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. \...TSS

<http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading
Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.\
\
AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it
appears they will buckle every time a country\
\
makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures.
IF they are not going to be science based, they\
\
should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. \...

Page 95 of 98\
\
8/3/2006\
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WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs, WITH RELATIONS TO
SRMs ???\
\
a.. BSE OIE\
\
see full text ;

<http://p079.ezboard.com/fwolftracksproductionsfrm2.showMessage?topicID=470.topic>

IT\'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have
been at the helm of the\
\
USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the
incompetence of these agencies are so inept,\
\
either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps.,
they then should be all done away with and a\
\
single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this
ongoing problem ?\
\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf>\
\
\
\
<http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=20678>\
\
\
\
<http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&I=-3&P=3381>\
\
\
\
\
\
Subject: \[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011\] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of
Bovine\
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)\
\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf>

BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL\
\
\
BMJ\
\
\
<http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2>\
\
\
BMJ\
\
\
<http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1>

\[Docket No. 03-025IFA\] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk\
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of\
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf>\
\
\
\[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011\] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine\
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)\
\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf>\
\
\
\
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT \*\*\*\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf>\
\
\
PAUL BROWN M.D.\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
9 December 2005\
Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)\
\
SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION\
James J. Kramer, Ph.D.\
Vice President, Corporate Operations\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf>\
\
\
\
Embassy of Japan\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm>\
\
\
\
Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005\
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of\
Platelets\
by Automated \... EC 203, McDonald\'s Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:,
34 \...\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm>\
\
\
03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler \[PDF\]\
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.\
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf>\
\
\
03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler \[PDF\]\
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.\
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf>\
\
\
Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 \[PDF\]\
\... 2005 6:17 PM To: <fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov> Subject:
\[Docket\
No. 03-025IFA\]\
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food
\...\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf>\
\
03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost \[PDF\]\
\... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al\
\[Docket No. 03-\
025IF\] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human
Food and\
\...\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf>\
\
\
In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC \... \[PDF\]\
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701
Phone:\
732-741-2290\
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US
\...\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf>

 

Volume 12, Number 12--December 2006\
\
\
PERSPECTIVE\
\
On the Question of Sporadic\
\
or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and\
\
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease\
\
Paul Brown,\* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§\
\
Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic\
\
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require\
\
systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries\
\
considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,\
\
or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in\
\
countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.\
\
To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence\
\
of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the\
\
annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease\
\
\[CJD\] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million\
\
randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and\
\
sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory\
\
studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.\
\
Such a link might yet be established by the discovery\
\
of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations\
\
of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various\
\
subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced\
\
by a continuation of current public health measures that\
\
exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and\
\
human food chains.\
\
\
SNIP\...\
\
\
<http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e>\
\
\
\
\
\
3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the
Exhibit\
Hall\
\
\
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse\
\
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case
Western Reserve\
University\
\
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE
strain\
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE
cases\
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes
of\
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with\
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we
have\
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain\
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about
half\
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation
time\
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear
to\
be infected after more than 2 years. \*\*\*These results indicate that
BASE is\
transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than\
classical BSE in humans.\
\
6:30 Close of Day One\
\
\
<http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp>\
\
\
\
\
\
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM\
1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype\
of \'UNKNOWN\' strain growing. \...\
\
\
<http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html>\
\
\
\
\
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented
last\
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance\
collection.\
\
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display
selectively\
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm>\
\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed
cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or
1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the
normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd.
Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable
spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if
those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of
incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress
indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low
as 0.01g and 0.001g. \...\...\...\
\
\
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose>\
\
\
and i think, with time, and testing becomes more and more sensitive, we
will all be surprised at just how much is too much, and just how young
one might be to spread the agent, even as sub-clinical.\
\
\
IF i remember correctly, the infamous PURINA FEED MILL incident in
Gonzales TEXAS,\
where at one feeding, those cows could not have consumed more
than\...\...or no more than 5.5 grams\...etc. so, how many feedings does
a feeder and or dairy calf have in there lifespan ? wouldn\'t you
multiply that by those figures by that ??? be a lot of potential mad cow
protein IN COMMERCE, and still is in 2006\...\...tss\
\
\
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce \-- of
prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html>\
\
\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm>\
\
\
\
\
\
Subject: DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs) AND
OTHER REGULATIONS FSIS NOTICE 01-07 1/8/07\
Date: January 8, 2007 at 9:28 am PST\
\
FSIS NOTICE 01-07 1/8/07\
\
DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs)\
AND OTHER REGULATIONS\
\
\
This notice clarifies how inspection program personnel are to document
regulatory noncompliance related to 9 CFR 310.22 for controlling
specified risk materials, as well as other regulations\
\
Inspection program personnel are to cite 9 CFR 310.22 in the Relevant
Regulation section of every noncompliance report (NR) for an
establishment that does not meet the regulatory requirements for
controlling SRMs. In addition to selecting 9 CFR 310.22, inspection
program personnel are to select all other regulations with which there
has been noncompliance.\
\
For example, while performing the 03C02 procedure, the
Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) sees spinal cord material on previously cut
T-bone steaks that had passed the Critical Control Point (CCP). The IIC
cites 9 CFR 417.2(c)(4) and 310.22(b) in the Relevant Regulations
section on the Procedure Results NR screen. The IIC notifies the
appropriate establishment official of the finding. The IIC also verifies
that the corrective actions implemented by the establishment meet the
requirements of 9 CFR 417.3(a) before issuing the NR.\
\
Inspection program personnel are to describe the noncompliances in the
Narrative Section, block 10, of the NR. The narrative should include a
complete description of the SRM noncompliance, including the type of SRM
and any other information relevant to the noncompliance. The narrative
should also address each of the other regulations that inspection
program personnel cite in the Relevant Regulations section on the NR
screen. The statements in block 10 of the NR are to support completely
and adequately the regulatory noncompliances cited.\
\
For every NR that inspection program personnel issue, it is important
that they cite all relevant regulations. These citations provide data
that are the basis for critical, risk-based decisions that the FSIS must
regularly make when working to ensure that meat and poultry products are
safe. Thus, it is not appropriate for inspection program personnel to
cite only one regulation if other regulations are also violated by the
noncompliance that is the subject of the NR.\
\
Inspection program personnel with technical questions related to the use
of PBIS, or who experience technical problems, should contact the FAIM
Help Desk at 1-800-473-9135. They should contact the Technical Service
Center at 1-800-233-3935 for policy-related questions.\
\
\
Philip S. Derfler /s/\
\
\
Assistant Administrator\
Office of Policy, Program, and Employee Development\
\
DISTRIBUTION: Inspection Offices; T/A Inspectors; Plant Mgt; TRA; ABB;
TSC; Import Offices NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/08 OPI: OPPED\
\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Notice_01-07/index.asp>\
\
\
\
\> This notice clarifies how inspection program personnel are to
document regulatory noncompliance\
\
\> related to 9 CFR 310.22 for controlling specified risk materials, as
well as other regulations\
\
\
\
\
SO, it\'s Monday Jan. 8, 2007, in 2006 ALONE, the FDA allowed literally
100s of 1,000s of TONS of ruminant protein to be fed to not only USA
cattle and livestock, but it also exported this poison to other parts of
the globe as well, and the FSIS is just NOW clarifying how it\'s
inspectors handle SRMs ??? and no SRMs are being fed to cattle in the
USA ???\
\
\
LIKE i said,\
\
\
IT\'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have
been at the helm of the\
USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the
incompetence\
of these agencies are so inept, either through ignorance and or just too
overweight with industry reps.,\
they then should be all done away with and a single agency brought
forth, and if not, how will you\
correct this ongoing problem ?\
\
\
<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
\
<http://www.prwatch.org/node/4624>\
\
\
\
\
====================================\
\
\
2006 (partial list of) highly potential mad cow protein in commerce USA\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE
AL,\
TN, AND WV\
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST\
\
PRODUCT\
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall \# V-130-6;\
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall \# V-131-6;\
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall \# V-132-6;\
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall \# V-133-6.\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by
telephone\
on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated
recall is\
complete.\
REASON\
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based\
protein.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
477.72 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
AL\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall \# V-134-6;\
b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall \# V-135-6.\
CODE\
None. Bulk product\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning
on\
June 28, 2006.\
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated\
recall is complete.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone\
meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
1,484 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
TN and WV\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html>\
\
\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY,
LA,\
MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS\
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST\
\
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall \# V-115-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or\
about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.\
REASON\
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain\
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
Approximately 2,223 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
KY\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall \# V-116-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14,
2006.\
FDA initiated recall is ongoing.\
REASON\
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain\
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
1,220 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
KY\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall \# V-117-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA
initiated\
recall is completed.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients\
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and
bone\
meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
40 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
LA and MS\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA\
initiated recall is complete.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients\
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and
bone\
meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
7,150 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
MS\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall \# V-119-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006.
Firm\
initiated recall is complete.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat
and\
bone meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
87 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
MS\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall \# V-120-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm\
initiated recall is complete.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat
and\
bone meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
350 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
AL and MS\
\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,\
50 lb. bags, Recall \# V-121-6;\
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,\
50 lb. bags, Recall \# V-122-6;\
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,\
50 lb. bags, Recall \# V-123-6;\
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD\
Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall \# V-124-6;\
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,\
Recall \# V-125-6;\
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,\
Recall \# V-126-6;\
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,\
50 lb bags, Recall \# V-127-6\
CODE\
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and
visit\
on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.\
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm
initiated\
recall is ongoing.\
REASON\
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based\
protein were not labeled as \"Do not feed to ruminants\".\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
7,541-50 lb bags\
DISTRIBUTION\
AL, GA, MS, and TN\
\
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006\
\
\###\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html>\
\
\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN\
COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs\
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall \#
V-113-6\
CODE\
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H.
J.\
Baker recalled feed products.\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006.
Firm\
initiated recall is complete.\
REASON\
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been
contaminated\
with mammalian protein.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
27,694,240 lbs\
DISTRIBUTION\
MI\
\
\
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006\
\
\###\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html>\
\
\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125\
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006\
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST\
PRODUCT\
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall \# V-100-6;\
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,\
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall \# V-101-6;\
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal \-- 50 lb, Recall \# V-102-6;\
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,\
Recall \# V-103-6;\
e) \"Big Jim\'s\" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,\
Recall \# V-104-6;\
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,\
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall \# V-105-6;\
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,\
Carbadox \-- 0.0055%, Recall \# V-106-6;\
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete\
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,\
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,\
Recall \# V-107-6;\
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying\
Chickens, Recall \# 108-6;\
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall \# V-109-6;\
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,\
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall \# V-110-6;\
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,\
Recall \# V-111-6;\
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,\
Recall \# V-112-6\
CODE\
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email
and\
visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.\
REASON\
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based\
protein not labeled as \"Do not feed to ruminants\".\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
125 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
AL and FL\
\
\
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006\
\
\###\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html>\
\
\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????\
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST\
PRODUCT\
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall \# V-114-6\
CODE\
None\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm
initiated\
recall is ongoing.\
REASON\
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain\
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
?????\
DISTRIBUTION\
KY\
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006\
\
\###\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html>\
\
\
\
\
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD\
TSS\
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE\
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22\
71.248.128.67\
\
\
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE \-- CLASS II\
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\
PRODUCT\
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy
Animals,\
Recall \# V-079-6;\
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6
kg),\
Recall \# V-080-6;\
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL\
FEED, Recall \# V-081-6;\
d) Feather Meal, Recall \# V-082-6\
CODE\
a) Bulk\
b) None\
c) Bulk\
d) Bulk\
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER\
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006
and\
by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.\
REASON\
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and
bone\
meal.\
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE\
10,878.06 tons\
DISTRIBUTION\
Nationwide\
\
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006\
\
\###\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html>\
\
\
\
\
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006\
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST\
Public Health Service\
Food and Drug Administration\
\
New Orleans District\
297 Plus Park Blvd.\
Nashville, TN 37217\
\
Telephone: 615-781-5380\
Fax: 615-781-5391\
\
\
May 17, 2006\
\
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06\
\
FEDERAL EXPRESS\
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY\
\
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner\
Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products\
2621 State Street\
Dallas, Texas 75204\
\
Dear Mr. Shirley:\
\
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration\
(FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509
Fortson\
Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant\
deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal\
Regulations, Part 589.2000 \[21 CFR 589.2000\], Animal Proteins
Prohibited in\
Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment
and\
amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to\
follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured
and\
distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of
Section\
403(a)(1) \[21 USC 343(a)(1)\] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act\
(the Act).\
\
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including
sufficient\
written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and
to\
maintain sufficient written procedures \[21 CFR 589.2000(e)\] because:\
\
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to
prevent\
carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein
or\
feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses
the\
same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you
use\
only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from
each\
species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts
after\
processing mammalian tissues.\
\
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out\
procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from\
mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.\
\
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein
derived\
from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR\
589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein
derived\
from mammalian tissues must be labeled, \"Do not feed to cattle or
other\
ruminants.\" Since you failed to label a product which may contain
protein\
derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement.
the\
poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) \[21 USC 343(a)(1)\]
of the\
Act.\
\
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at
your\
facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use,
you\
are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products
you\
manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should
take\
prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a
system\
whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these\
violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or\
injunction, without further notice.\
\
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of
receiving\
this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your
firm\
into compliance with the law. Your response should include an
explanation of\
each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence.
If\
corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the\
reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be\
completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating\
corrections have been made.\
\
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer,
U.S.\
Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410,
Metairie,\
Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this
letter,\
please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.\
\
Sincerely,\
\
/S\
\
Carol S. Sanchez\
Acting District Director\
New Orleans District\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm>\
\
\
\
\
look at the table and you\'ll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused\
7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;\
\
\
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in\
primates\
\
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian
Herzog,\
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie\
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown,
Jean-Philippe\
Deslys\
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform\
encephalopathy (BSE)\--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease\
(vCJD)\--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of
oral\
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier
to\
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to\
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain
homogenate\
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological\
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of
disease\
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other
studies, we\
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which\
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can\
prevent transmission of BSE to man.\
\
\
snip\...\
\
\
BSE bovine brain inoculum\
\
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg\
\
Primate (oral route)\* 1/2 (50%)\
\
Cattle (oral route)\* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15
(7%)\
1/15 (7%)\
\
RIII mice (ic ip route)\* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)\
\
PrPres biochemical detection\
\
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine
inoculum\
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a\
similar PrPres concentration that was\
\
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 \*Data are number of animals\
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of\
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of\
\
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic\
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.\
\
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle
infected\
orally with similar BSE brain inocula\
\
\
Published online January 27, 2005\
\
<http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa>\
\
\
\
\
Feb 06, 2004 Washington State Investigation---Final Epidemiology Report\
\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/WashingtonState_epi_final3-04.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
Secretary\'s Advisory Committee Recommendations\
\
\
Feb 13, 2004 Secretary's Advisory Committee Report\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/SAC-Report2-13-04.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
\
\
Feb 02, 2004 International Review Team (IRT) Report\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/US_BSE_Report2-2-04.pdf>\
\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/bse_disease_surv.shtml>\
\
\
\
Information on the Washington State Investigation of the BSE-positive
Cow\
\
This Office of Inspector General (OIG)\
\
\
<http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/TestimonyBlurb2.pdf>\
\
\
\
<http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/Testimony7-2004.pdf>\
\
\
\
<http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-9-final.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
OIG REPORT ON IMPORTS FROM CANADA\
\
<http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
Final Case Summeries\
\
\
May 02, 2006 Alabama BSE Investigation---Final Epidemiology Report\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf>\
\
<http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/feds_confirm_mad_cow_in_alabama_10204.html>\
\
<http://www.prwatch.org/node/4624>\
\
<http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?showtopic=306>\
\
\
\
\
\
Aug 30, 2005 USDA Texas BSE Investigation---Final Epidemiology Report\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf>\
\
\
\
\
TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the
one\
that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)\
\
\
\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- Original Message \-\-\-\-\-\-\--\
\
\
Subject: Re: BSE \'INCONCLUSIVE\' COW from\
TEXAS ???\
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600\
From: \"Terry S. Singeltary Sr.\"\
To: Carla Everett\
References: \<\[log in to unmask\]\>\
\<\[log in to unmask\] us\>\
\
\
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;\
\
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food
chain?\
\
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up
forsomething,\
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION
YET\...can you\
confirm???terry\
\
\
==============================\
==============================\
\
\
\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- Original Message \-\-\-\-\-\-\--\
\
\
Subject: Re: BSE \'INCONCLUSIVE\' COW from\
TEXAS ???\
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600\
From: Carla Everett\
To: \"Terry S. Singeltary Sr.\"\
References: \<\[log in to unmask\]\>\
\
\
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the
USDA\
web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas.
CarlaAt\
09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:\>Greetings Carla,\>\>i am getting\
unsubstantiated claims of this BSE \'inconclusive\' cow is from\>TEXAS.
can you\
comment on this either way please?\>\>thank you,\>Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.\>\>\
\
\
===================\
===================\
\
\
\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- Original Message \-\-\-\-\-\-\--\
\
\
Subject: Re: BSE \'INCONCLUSIVE\' COW from\
TEXAS ???\
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600\
From: Carla Everett\
To: \"Terry S. Singeltary Sr.\"\
References: \<\[log in to unmask\]\>\
\<\[log in to unmask\] us\>\
\<\[log in to unmask\]\> \<\[log in to unmask\]\
us\> \<\[log in to unmask\]\>\
\
\
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post
USDA\'s\
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced
tonight by\
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA\
announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you
wrote:\>why\
was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?\>\>Bovine Spongiform\
Encephalopathy:\>November 22: Press Release title here \>\>star image
More BSE\
information\>\>\>\>terry\>\>Carla Everett wrote:\>\>\>no confirmation on
the U.S.\'\
inconclusive test\...\>\>no confirmation on location of\
animal.\>\>\>\>\>\>\
\
\
==========================\
==========================\
\
\
THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now
\$\$\$\
\
\
NO, it\'s not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take
em\
or leave em, however, you cannot change them.\
\
with kindest regards,\
\
I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA
77518\
\
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.\
\
\
FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again\
\
\
<http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf>\
\
\
<http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=23557>\
\
\
\
Feb 06, 2004 Washington State Investigation---Final Epidemiology Report\
\
\
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/WashingtonState_epi_final3-04.pdf>

 

 

 

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System \[TSS SUBMISSION\]\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt>\
\
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in\
\
Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed\
\
Comment Number: EC -10\
\
Accepted - Volume 2\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html>\
\
\
\
PART 2\
\
\
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html>

 

ALSO, now with the 4th documented transmission of vCJD via transfusion,
from such a small donor pool, we must ban blood from feed for animal and
human consumption ;

 

 

Fourth case of transfusion-associated vCJD infection in the United
Kingdom\
\
Editorial team (<eurosurveillance.weekly@hpa.org.uk>), Eurosurveillance\
editorial office\
\
A suspected case of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) has
recently\
been diagnosed in a patient in the United Kingdom (UK), who received a
blood\
transfusion from a donor who later developed vCJD \[1\]. This is the
fourth\
case of probable transfusion transmission of vCJD infection in the UK.
Three\
of the four recipients developed symptoms of vCJD.\
The first symptomatic case of vCJD associated with blood transfusion
was\
identified in December 2003. This individual developed vCJD six and a
half\
years after transfusion of red cells donated by an individual who
developed\
symptoms of vCJD three and a half years after donation.\
\
A second case of vCJD \'infection\' was identified a few months later in
a\
person who had received red cells from a donor who developed symptoms
of\
vCJD 18 months after donation. This patient (the second case) died from\
causes unrelated to vCJD five years after transfusion. Post-mortem\
investigations found abnormal prion protein in the spleen and a
cervical\
lymph node., However, prion protein was not found in the brain, and no\
pathological features of vCJD were found.\
\
A third case developed symptoms of vCJD six years after receiving a\
transfusion of red blood cells, and died two years and eight months
later.\
The donor of the blood involved developed vCJD about 20 months after\
donating it.\
\
These three cases have been published as case reports and in the
findings of\
the ongoing collaborative study between the National Blood Services,
the\
National CJD Surveillance Unit, and the Office for National Statistics.
This\
study aims to collect evidence about transmission of CJD or vCJD via
the\
blood supply \[2,3,4,5\].\
\
The new, fourth case is in a patient who developed symptoms of vCJD
eight\
and a half years after receiving a transfusion of red blood cells from
a\
donor who developed vCJD about 17 months after this blood was donated
\[1\].\
The donor to this case also donated the vCJD-implicated blood transfused
to\
the third case. As for all other reported clinical vCJD cases that have
been\
tested for genotype, this patient is a methionine homozygote at codon
129 of\
the prion protein gene. The patient is currently alive.\
\
All four cases had received transfusions of non-leucodepleted red blood\
cells between 1996 and 1999. Since October 1999, leucocytes have been\
removed from all blood used for transfusion in the UK. The effect of\
leucodepletion on the reduction of the risk of transmission of vCJD from
an\
infective donation is uncertain.\
\
This fourth case of vCJD infection associated with blood transfusion
further\
increases the level of concern about the risk of vCJD transmission
between\
humans by blood transfusion, although much remains unknown. This
reinforces\
the importance of the existing precautions that have been introduced to\
reduce the risk of transmission of vCJD infection by blood and blood\
products \[6\]. No cases of vCJD have been associated with fractionated
plasma\
products. The small group of living recipients of vCJD-implicated blood\
transfusion in the UK have been informed of their potential exposure to
vCJD\
by blood transfusion, asked to take certain precautions to reduce the
risk\
of onward person-to-person transmission of vCJD during health care, and\
offered specialist neurological evaluation and advice.\
\
This article has been adapted from reference 1\
\
\
References:\
Health Protection Agency. Fourth case of variant CJD associated with
blood\
transfusion (press release). Press release, 18 January 2007.\
(<http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2007/070118_vCJD.htm>\
)\
Llewelyn CA, Hewitt PE, Knight RSG, Amar K, Cousens S, Mackenzie J, et
al.\
Possible transmission of variant CJD disease by blood transfusion.
Lancet\
2004; 363:417-21.\
Peden AH, Head MW, Ritchie DL, Bell JE, Ironside JW. Preclinical vCJD
after\
blood transfusion in a PRNP codon 129 heterozygous patient. Lancet 2004
;\
364: 527-9.\
Wroe SJ, Pal S, Siddique D, Hyare H, Macfarlane R, et al Clinical\
presentation and pre-mortem diagnosis of blood transfusion-associated\
variant CJD. Lancet 2006;368:2061-67.\
Hewitt PE, Llewelyn CA, Mackenzie J, Will RG. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
and\
blood transfusion: results of the UK Transfusion Medicine Epidemiology\
review study. Vox Sang. 2006;91(3):221-230.\
Department of Health \[London\]. Further precautions to protect blood
supply.\
Press release 2004/0104, 16 March 2004.\
(<http://www.dh.gov.uk/PublicationsAndStatistics/PressReleases/PressReleasesN>\
otices/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4076608&chk=MTwE%2Bl)\
\
<http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2007/070118.asp#4>\
\
\
\
\
THE last time a country decided it was o.k. to poison the rest of the
world, I thought we had learned something from it, I suppose we have
not. that is all in the world the BSE MRR policy is, a legal tool to
poison the globe, just for commodities and futures. THIS time however,
we are dealing with a more virulent strain of mad cow disease i.e. BASE,
and it\'s been here in the USA for some time if you go back and look at
the studies of Mission, Texas from the Scrapie transmission studies
there. So I failed to see the logic of this BSE MRR policy, there is
nothing science based about it. \...

 

 

 

 

CONFIDENTIAL BSE POLICY

 

<http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/05/20002001.pdf>

 

 

 

RESTRICTED

 

MINISTER\'S MEETING ON BSE (EXPORTS AND TRIPE) AND ANTHRAX, 14, JULY
1989

 

 

<http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/07/14006001.pdf>

 

 

 

 

England worried briefly about infecting other countries

 

 

27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by [Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.](mailto:flounder@wt.net)

 

BSE11/2 020;\
\
SC1337p\
\
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY\
Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS\
Telephone 01-210 3000\
From the Chief Medical Officer\
Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM\
\
Mr K C Meldrum\
Chief Veterinary Officer\
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food\
Government Buildings\
Hook Rise South\
Tolworth\
Surbiton\
Surrey\
KT6 7NG    3 January 1990\
\
Dear Mr Meldrum\
\
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY\
\
You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks
of\
BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export\
from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or\
possibly BSE.\
\
I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to\
contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone\
meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK\
products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be\
achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal,\
or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it\
absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants\
\[or [zoo animals](http://www.mad-cow.org/zoo_cites_annotated.html),
including [rare and endangered
primates](http://www.mad-cow.org/~tom/mar99_mid_sci.html) \--
webmaster\].\
Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced
with BSE\
may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal.\
Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as\
having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain\
in other countries.\
\
I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present\
precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be\
aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export\
of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.\
\
Yours Sincerely\
Donald Acheson\
\
Copy:\
Dr Metters\
Dr Pickles\
\
90/1.03/1.1\
============\
BSE13/3 0083\
\
Dr Pickles                  \
From: Dr J S Metters DCM0\
International, Prevention and Community Services\
7 June 1990\
Copies to: Dr McInnes  Miss Pease  Mr Otley\
\
BSE\
\
1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me\
that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and\
in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made\
compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC\
Directives \[total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting \--
webmaster\], and there is also concern about the level of detail that\
should be included in any foodstuff labels.\
\
2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a\
particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the\
principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these\
were going for export.\
\
3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope\
encourage further communication of MAFF\'s internal deliberations.\
\
\
J S METTERS\
Room 509\
Richmond House\
Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1

 

 

<http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff>

 

<http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/03001001.pdf>

 

 

 

 

 

\> Transmission Studies\
\>\
\> Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and\
\> compared with natural cases\
\>\
\> {the following was written but with a single line marked through it\
\'\'first\
\> passage (by this route)}\...TSS\
\>\
\> resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with
repeated\
\> episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became
affected,\
it\
\> is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD\
\> transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and\
squirrel\
\> monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the
shortest\
\> incubation period in the ferret.\
\>\
\> snip\...\
\>\
\> Appendix 3\
\>\
\> VISIT TO USA - DR A E WRATHALL - INFO OH BSE AND SCRAPIE\
\>\
\> 1. Dr Clark lately of the Scrapie Research Unit, Mission Texas has\
\> successfully transmitted ovine and caprine scrapie to cattle. The\
\> experimental results have not been published but there are plans to
do\
\> this. This work was initiated in 1978. A summary of it is:-\
\>\
\> Expt A\
\> 6 Her x Jer calves born in 1978 were inoculated as follows with\
\> a 2nd Suffolk scrapie passage:-\
\>\
\>\
\> i/c 1ml; i/m, 5ml; s/c 5ml; oral 30ml.\
\> 1/6 went down after 48 months with a scrapie/BSE-like disease.\
\>\
\> Expt B\
\> 6 Her or Jer or HxJ calves were inoculated with angora Goat\
\> virus 2/6 went down similarly after 36 months.\
\>\
\> Expt C\
\> Mice inoculated from brains of calves/cattle in expts A • B\
\> were resistant, only 1/20 going down with scrapie and this was the\
\> reason given for not publishing.\
\>\
\> Diagnosis in A, B, C was by histopath. No reports on SAT were given.\
\>\
\> 2. Dr Warren Foote indicated success so far in eliminating scrapie
in\
\> offspring from experimentally- (and naturally) infected sheep by ET.\
\> He had found difficulty in obtaining embryos from naturally infected\
\> sheep (cf SPA).\
\>\
\> 3. Prof. A Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was
to\
\> accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr A Thiermann showed the\
\> picture in the \"Independent\" with cattle being incinerated and
thought\
\> this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.\
\> BSE was not reported in USA.\
\>\
\>\
\> 4. Scrapie incidents (ie affected flocks) have shown a dramatic
increase\
\> since 1978. In 1953 when the National Control Scheme was started\
\> there were 10-14 incidents, in 1978 - 1 and in 1988 so far 60.\
\>\
\> 5. Scrapie agent was reported to have been isolated from a solitary\
\> fetus.\
\>\
\> 6. A western blotting diagnostic technique (? on PrP) shows some
promise.\
\>\
\> 7. Results of a questionnaire sent to 33 states on the subject of
the\
\> national sheep scrapie programme survey indicated\
\>\
\>\
\> 17/33 wished to drop it\
\>\
\> 6/33 wished to develop it\
\>\
\> 8/33 had few sheep and were neutral\
\>\
\>\
\> Information obtained from Dr Wrathall\'s notes of a meeting of the
U.S.\
\> Animal Health Association at Little Rock, Arkansas Nov. 1988.\
\>\
\>\
\>\
\> 33\
\>\
\> end\...TSS\
\>\
\>\
\> \>\> Differences in tissue distribution could require new
regulations\
\> \>\> regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.\
\>\
\>\
\> snip\...end\
\>\
\> full text 33 PAGES ;\
\>\
\>\
\> <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf>\
\>\
\> <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf>\
\>\
\>\
\> It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown
that\
cattle\
\> inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk
sheep at\
\> the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas,
developed a\
\> TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission,
though\
\> not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were
communicated in\
\> October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by
Dr\
\> Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of
the\
CVL,\
\> to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were
not\
\> published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice
from the\
\> experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the
clinical\
\> and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and
cattle\
were\
\> published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated\
\> intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of\
\> scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States,
were\
\> carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The
results,\
\> published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though\
\> pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of
brain\
\> lesions characteristic of BSE.\
\>\
\> <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/>\
\>\
\>\
\>\
\> 1: J Infect Dis. 1994 Apr;169(4):814-20.\
\>\
\>\
\> Intracerebral transmission of scrapie to cattle.\
\>\
\> Cutlip RC, Miller JM, Race RE, Jenny AL, Katz JB, Lehmkuhl HD, DeBey
BM,\
\> Robinson MM.\
\>\
\> USDA, Agriculture Research Service, National Animal Disease Center,
Ames,\
IA\
\> 50010.\
\>\
\> To determine if sheep scrapie agent(s) in the United States would
induce a\
\> disease in cattle resembling bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 18
newborn\
\> calves were inoculated intracerebrally with a pooled suspension of
brain\
\> from 9 sheep with scrapie. Half of the calves were euthanatized 1
year\
after\
\> inoculation. All calves kept longer than 1 year became severely
lethargic\
\> and demonstrated clinical signs of motor neuron dysfunction that
were\
\> manifest as progressive stiffness, posterior paresis, general
weakness,\
and\
\> permanent recumbency. The incubation period was 14-18 months, and
the\
\> clinical course was 1-5 months. The brain from each calf was examined
for\
\> lesions and for protease-resistant prion protein. Lesions were
subtle, but\
a\
\> disease-specific isoform of the prion protein was present in the
brain of\
\> all calves. Neither signs nor lesions were characteristic of those
for\
\> bovine spongiform encephalopathy.\
\>\
\> MeSH Terms:\
\> Animals\
\> Brain/microbiology\*\
\> Brain/pathology\
\> Cattle\
\> Cattle Diseases/etiology\*\
\> Cattle Diseases/pathology\
\> Encephalopathy, Bovine Spongiform/etiology\*\
\> Encephalopathy, Bovine Spongiform/pathology\
\> Immunoblotting/veterinary\
\> Immunohistochemistry\
\> Male\
\> Motor Neurons/physiology\
\> Prions/analysis\
\> Scrapie/pathology\
\> Scrapie/transmission\*\
\> Sheep\
\> Sleep Stages\
\> Time Factors\
\>\
\> Substances:\
\> Prions\
\>\
\>\
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8133096&dopt=Citation>\
\>\
\>\
\> Intracerebral transmission of scrapie to cattle FULL TEXT PDF;\
\>\
\> SNIP\...\
\>\
\>\
\> Discussion\
\>\
\>\
\> WE conclude that American sources of sheep scrapie are transmissible
to\
\> cattle by direct intracerebral inoculation but the disease induced is
NOT\
\> identical to BSE as seen in the United Kingdom. While there were\
\> similarities in clinical signs between this experimental disease and
BSE,\
\> there was no evidence of aggressiveness, hyperexcitability,
hyperesthesia\
\> (tactile or auditory), or hyperemetria of limbs as has been reported
for\
BSE\
\> (9). Neither were there extensive neurologic lesions, which are
primary\
for\
\> BSE, such as severe vacuolation of neurons and neuropil or neuronal\
necrosis\
\> and gliosis. Although some vacuolation of neuropil, chromotolysis in\
\> neurons, and gliosis were seen in the brains of some affected
calves,\
these\
\> were industinguishable from those of controls. Vacuolated neurons in
the\
red\
\> nucleus of both challenged and normal calves were considered normal
for\
the\
\> bovines as previously described (50).\
\>\
\>\
\> PrP-res was found in ALL CHALLENGED CALVES REGARDLESS OF CLINCIAL
SIGNS,\
and\
\> the amount of PrP-res positively related to the length of the
incubation.\
\> \...\
\>\
\>\
\> snip\...\
\>\
\>\
\> WE also conclude from these studies that scrapie in cattle MIGHT NOT
BE\
\> RECOGNIZED BY ROUTINE HISTOPATHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BRAIN AND\
SUGGEST\
\> THAT DETECTION OF PrP-res by immunohistochemistry or immunoblotting
is\
\> necessary to make a definitive diagnosis. THUS, undiagnosed scrapie\
\> infection could contribute to the \'\'DOWNER-COW\'\' syndrome and
could be\
\> responsible for some outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy\
proposed\
\> by Burger and Hartsough (8) and Marsh and harsough (52). \...\
\>\
\>\
\> snip\...\
\>\
\>\
\> Multiple sources of sheep affected with scrapie and two breeds of
cattle\
\> from several sources were used inthe current study in an effort to
avoid a\
\> single strain of either agent or host. Preliminary results from
mouse\
\> inoculations indicate multiple strains of the agent were present in
the\
\> pooled inoculum (unpublished data). \...\
\>\
\>\
\> Transmission of the sheep scrapie to cattle was attempted in 1979 by
using\
\> intracerebral, intramuscular, subcutaneous, and oral routes of
inoculation\
\> of 5, 8- to 11-month old cattlw with a homologous mixture of brain
from 1\
\> affected sheep (61, 62). ONE of the 5 cattle develped neurologic
signs 48\
\> months after inoculation. Signs were disorientation, incoordination,
a\
\> stiff-legged stilted gait, progressive difficulty in rising, and
finally\
in\
\> terminal recumbency. The clinical course was 2.5 months. TWO of the
5\
cattle\
\> similarly inoculated with brain tissue from a goat with scrapie
exhibited\
\> similar signs 27 and 36 months after incoluation. Clinical courses
were 43\
\> an 44 days. Brain lesions of mild gliosis and vacuolation and mouse\
\> inoculation data were insufficient to confirm a diagnosis of scrapie.
This\
\> work remained controversial until recent examination of the brains\
detected\
\> PrP-res in all 3 cattle with neurologic disease but in none of the\
\> unaffected cattle (62). Results of these studies are similar to ours
and\
\> underscore the necessity of methods other than histopathology to
diagnose\
\> scrapie infection in cattle. We believe that immunologic techniques
for\
\> detecting PrP-res currently provide the most sensitive and reliable
way to\
\> make a definitive diagnosis\...\
\>\
\>\
\> <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf>\
\>\
\>\
\> Visit to USA \... info on BSE and Scrapie\
\>\
\> <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf>\
\>\
\
snip\...

<http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf>

 

 

<http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0610&L=sanet-mg&D=0&T=0&P=19406>

 

 

 

 

2006-2007  USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

 

 

 

\*\*\*These results indicate that BASE is\
transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than\
classical BSE in humans.\
\
6:30 Close of Day One\
\
\
<http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp>

 

 

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on
7\
December 2006 are now available.\
\
\
snip\...\
\
\
\*\*\*\$\$\$\*\*\*\
\
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was\
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be
more\
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived
BSE.\
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic
spongiform\
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in
the\
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE
TO A\
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that
in a\
mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of
prion\
disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after
infection.\
\
\
<http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf>

 

 

 

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with
human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different
species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in
cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different
strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the
typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very
likely to have passed to sheep.  all of which have been\
rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a
frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human
life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the
USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration,
with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done,
cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through
daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97.\
I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to
believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only
this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the
globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to
humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many\
more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and
sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

 

 

 

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border,
but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter
than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated,
100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal
consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK
did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the
globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy
is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did,
thanks to the OIE and GW, it\'s legal now. and they executed Saddam for
poisoning ???\
\
go figure. \...

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.\
P.O. Box 42\
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518