*An Integrated Roadmap for the Programmatic Resolution of Gas Generation
Issues in Packages Containing Radioactive Waste/Materials*

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**Final Report**

**Prepared by:**

**National Transportation Integration and Planning Program**

**Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory**

**Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC**

**P.O. Box 1625**

**Idaho Falls, ID 83415-1625**

**April 2001**

#######  {#section .unnumbered}

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Gas generation, particularly hydrogen, is an area of significant concern
for the transport and storage of radioactive materials in the Department
of Energy (DOE). Because it appeared that this issue was being addressed
independently by various research and development (R&D) programs within
the DOE Complex, the Office of Integration and Disposition (EM-20) and
the Office of Science and Technology (EM-50) established a Task Group to
develop an integrated gas generation R&D plan.

This report contains the integrated gas generation R&D plan in a
"roadmap" form. Attachment A is the summarized graphical depiction of
the roadmap (hereafter called the 'roadmap summary'). This depiction is
the heart of the report and it contains concise, useful information
readable at a glance. The following figure from the roadmap summary is
an example of what useful information can be viewed. For example, Figure
1 shows the shipping function for plutonium oxides in jeopardy because
of untimely certification of a transportation package, as indicated by
the red coloration of the function coupled with red flags showing
activities/functions in jeopardy. Section 5 and Attachment A contain a
complete guide for reading the roadmap summary. To give supporting
detail to the roadmap summary, an R&D activities matrix is located in
Attachment B. The matrix gives a summary statement, owner, and projected
completion date for the R&D 'issue resolution activities' that are shown
in the roadmap summary.

![](media/image4.wmf){width="6.05625in" height="3.15in"}

Figure 1. Example of the Integrated Hydrogen Gas R&D Plan Diagram
showing the relation of R&D actions to functions over time. This view
shows a function and a milestone in jeopardy.

From this planning effort the Task Group found the following:

-   *Overlaps:* There are no significant overlaps in planned R&D
    activities, nor appreciable duplication of R&D already performed

-   *RFETS Closure:* The de-inventory of nuclear materials and closure
    of Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) may be in
    jeopardy because both the 9975 and SAFKEG shipping packages have
    encountered problems associated with certification due in part to
    gas generation issues

-   *Unclear NM disposition pathway:* Orphan nuclear materials (those
    materials that cannot be treated/stabilized according to
    DOE-STD-3013-2000, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
    Plutonium-Bearing Materials) need a clear disposition pathway.

The roadmap summary shows pathways that have significant risk, which may
indicate more emphasis, should be placed on contingency planning. If an
existing pathway proves unsuccessful, what is the backup plan? For
example, getter development and shipping of sealed containers of oxides
and some other nuclear materials are activities that may need some
contingency planning due their moderate to high probability of failure.
Continued use of roadmapping efforts will be useful in keeping focused
on the efforts necessary to mitigate the risk in the disposition
pathways and to respond to the specific needs of the sites.

The roadmapping effort further identified the following opportunities
for sharing of information and collaboration (1) use of periodic
symposium for sharing, (2) modeling of gas generation rates; (3) gas
measurement methods; (4) use of getters; (5) inert atmosphere; (6)
permeable membrane technology; and (7) drying/stabilization techniques.

Another aid to resolving gas generation issues is the establishment of
an independent peer review group to address challenges of gas generation
throughout the DOE Complex. This would assist in viewing the overall
picture and keep R&D efforts in line with existing and forecasted needs.

In conclusion, it became apparent to the Task Group that gas generation
issues can adversely affect DOE milestones in a number of programs and
at a number of sites. The Task Group believes that gas generation issues
may represent one of the greatest threats to timely accomplishment of
DOE's Environmental Management (EM) mission.

**Contents**

Acronyms iv

[1 INTRODUCTION 1](#introduction)

[2 PURPOSE 2](#purpose)

[3 ROADMAPPING APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
2](#roadmapping-approach-and-methodology)

[3.1 Regulatory Background 2](#regulatory-background)

[3.2 Process Background 5](#process-background)

[4 OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM APPROACHES 8](#overview-of-program-approaches)

[4.1 TRU Waste Program 8](#tru-waste-program)

[4.2 NM Programs 8](#nm-programs)

[4.3 SNF Program 10](#snf-program)

[4.4 Program Integration 10](#program-integration)

[5 USING THE ROADMAP SUMMARY AND MATRIX
10](#using-the-roadmap-summary-and-matrix)

[5.1 Roadmap Summary Explanation 11](#roadmap-summary-explanation)

[5.1.1 Overview 11](#overview)

[5.1.2 Colors 11](#colors)

[5.1.3 Legend 12](#legend)

[5.2 Detailed Matrix Explanation 12](#detailed-matrix-explanation)

[6 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PATH FORWARD
12](#findings-recommendations-and-path-forward)

[6.1 Findings 12](#findings)

[6.2 Recommendations 13](#recommendations)

[6.2.1 Sharing of Information 13](#sharing-of-information)

[6.2.2 Contingency Planning 15](#contingency-planning)

[6.2.3 Independent Peer Review Group 16](#independent-peer-review-group)

[6.3 Path Forward / Assignment of Responsibilities
17](#path-forward-assignment-of-responsibilities)

**Acronyms**

ANSI American National Standards Institute

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CH Contact-Handled (i.e. CH-TRU)

CoC Certificate of Compliance

DOE Department of Energy

DP Defense Programs

EM Environmental Management

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FRR Foreign Research Reactor

H~2~ Hydrogen Gas

ICV Inner Containment Vessel

IE Inspection and Enforcement

HLW High-Level Radioactive Waste

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LLW Low-Level Radioactive Waste

LWA Land Withdrawal Act

M/LLW Mixed/Low-Level Radioactive Waste

NM Nuclear Materials

NMFA Nuclear Materials Focus Area

NN Non-proliferation and National Security

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSNFP National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program

NTP National Transportation Program

NTWP National TRU Waste Program

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Pu Plutonium

R&D Research and Development

RH Remote-Handled

RFETS Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

SAR Safety Analysis Report

SARP Safety Analysis Report for Packagings

SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel

SRS Savannah River Site

SQS Small Quantity Sites

TFA Tanks Focus Area

TMFA TRU & Mixed Waste Focus Area

TRU Transuranic

U Uranium

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

# INTRODUCTION

Gas generation issues, particularly hydrogen, have been an area of
concern for the transport and storage of radioactive materials and waste
in the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Complex for a number of years.
Potentially combustible gases can be generated through a variety of
reactions, including chemical reactions between water or organic
compounds and the contained material and radiolytic decomposition of
hydrogen-containing materials. At the same time, chemical reactions can
remove hydrogen, and these reactions can be enhanced by the presence of
radiation. The balance between these competing reactions is not well
known at this time. This uncertainty in the potential for the generation
of combustible quantities of hydrogen in containers of radioactive
material is the essence of the problem in shipping or storage of those
materials. Transportation regulations prohibit shipment of explosives
and radioactive materials together. The regulator responsible for
certifying packages for the shipment of radioactive waste, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), has developed criteria to ensure packaging
effectiveness when there is the potential for generation of combustible
gas mixtures. The regulator responsible for certifying packages for the
shipment of non-defense nuclear materials (DOE/EM-5) may adopt the same
criteria, but has indicated a willingness to consider other criteria
that will provide equivalent assurance that radioactive materials are
not being shipped together with explosives, as required by the
transportation regulations.

The gas generation issue is unlikely to have a single, generic answer
suitable to all situations. That is because of the wide variety of
wastes, residues, and nuclear materials that exist within the DOE
Complex. To illustrate the problem, consider stabilized plutonium oxides
-- at this time we believe that the primary hydrogen generation
mechanism is a reaction between "tightly bound" adsorbed water and the
plutonium oxide. In unstabilized oxides, with higher water content,
hydrogen production may also be possible through radiolytic
decomposition of some of the less tightly bound water. Some residues
contain unreacted materials, such as calcium, that can produce hydrogen
through reactions with unbound water that may be present. Wastes may
contain organic materials, which, in the presence of a radiation field,
can decompose to produce hydrogen. In short, different materials produce
hydrogen through different reactions, and some materials may involve
several reactions. In the same manner, reactions that remove hydrogen
can vary from material to material.

To ensure that the various gas generation activities within the Office
of Environmental Management (EM) are properly integrated, Mr. David
Huizenga, DOE EM-20 and Mr. Gerald Boyd, DOE EM-50, established a Task
Group to develop an integrated gas generation research and development
(R&D) plan (i.e., a program level 'roadmap'). Members of the Task Group
included DOE and contractor representatives from: the Nuclear Materials
(NM) programs, which includes the Nuclear Material Focus Area (NMFA),
the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Program, and the 94-1 Program; the
National Transportation Program (NTP); the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)
program; the TRU Waste program, including the Transuranic and Mixed
Waste Focus Area (TMFA); and site personnel associated with these
programs.

Gas generation data provided by the NM, SNF, and TRU Waste programs give
focus to the activities needed to succeed in proper storage and
shipment. Also, site subject matter experts, Focus Area representatives,
and national program personnel provided additional information and
clarification about the site and R&D baselines. Future assessments will
integrate data from the high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and
mixed/low-level radioactive waste M/LLW programs to better determine if
those programs also have gas generation issues.

This report identifies the major gas generation programmatic issues
within the DOE Complex and the research that has been and is being
conducted to address gas generation concerns. This document is a report
on the work of the Task Group in developing the integrated R&D plan
(roadmap). The report also presents a "program level" roadmap that links
technology development to program needs and identifies the probability
of success in an effort to understand the programmatic risk associated
with the issue of gas generation.

# PURPOSE 

This "program level" roadmapping is meant to focus needed technical
support to the baselines (and to alternatives to the baselines) where
the probability of success is low (high uncertainty) and the
consequences of failure are relatively high (high programmatic risk).
Emphasis should be directed to areas where investments are large, the
return on investment is high, or the timing is crucial for
dispositioning the waste or material. A second purpose of this document
is to provide the basis for coordinating sharing of "lessons learned"
from R&D efforts across DOE programs to increase efficiency and
effectiveness in addressing gas generation issues.

# ROADMAPPING APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The approach is to use "roadmapping" methodology to link technology
development (and deployment) efforts to the programs' needs and
requirements for dispositioning the material/waste that generates gas
through radiolysis and chemical decomposition. Development of this
roadmap involved identifying the major steps needed for disposition (or
for storage pending disposition) and the associated R&D and
certification activities required to ensure the viability of each step.
In a generic disposition pathway, four major functions are needed: (1)
treatment, (2) packaging, (3) transportation, and (4) disposal/storage.
Issues or challenges arise because of uncertainty in completing a
function. In addition, there are regulatory activities that are required
to demonstrate to an independent third party that a function can be
completed adequately and safely. The independent third party then, in
part, uses the technical information provided by R&D activities as
referenceable material proving adequacy and safety in a disposition
pathway function.

The following subsections (3.1 and 3.2) describe the regulatory
background for each of the three-waste/material programs and the process
used in developing the roadmap.

## Regulatory Background

The potential for gas generation in packages containing nuclear material
or waste has been a growing regulatory concern. In part, the growth of
the gas generation issue is because the scope of work within the DOE
complex has changed. As sites change from production mode to
environmental remediation and facility closure, a wider variety of
materials are being shipped for testing, process, or final storage than
has been shipped in the past. This section discusses the current
regulatory requirements pertaining to gas generation for transportation
and storage of nuclear materials and waste.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the responsibility to issue
certificates of compliance for transport packages containing radioactive
materials. The Code of Federal Regulation, at 10 CFR 71, provides the
necessary regulations. DOE has been authorized (49 CFR 173.7) to issue
certificates for DOE transportation packagings, provided that DOE use
the same or comparable regulations. DOE exercises its authority as a
regulator only for shipments of nuclear materials. The NRC regulates
(certifies packages for) transportation of TRU, LLW, and SNF.

The NRC first established basic guidelines for hydrogen gas generation
in the Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Information Notice No. 84-72:
Clarification of Conditions for Waste Shipments Subject to Hydrogen Gas
Generation, published by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement in
1984. The memo required that in twice the expected shipping time,
hydrogen gas be limited to a molar quantity that is no more than 5% by
volume of the secondary container gas free volume at a standard
temperature and pressure. Failing that, the secondary container can be
inerted to ensure that oxygen is limited to 5% by volume in the portions
of the package that could have hydrogen greater than 5%. The Standard
Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Radioactive Material,
NUREG-1609 published in November 1999, has superceded the earlier
Information Notice for Type B packages. It requires that an applicant
for a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for a package demonstrate in a
Safety Analysis Report for Packaging that hydrogen and other flammable
gases comprise less than 5% by volume of the total gas inventory within
any confined volume. It also requires that the maximum normal operating
pressure within the vessel be appropriately evaluated. The DOE has not
restricted itself to the NRC criteria, and may adopt other equally
effective criteria, perhaps more similar to those in the earlier IE
Bulletin.

Storage of potentially gas-generating materials is another subset of the
gas generation issue. However, regulation of this function differs from
that of transportation in several ways. Perhaps foremost is the fact
that the regulatory interest is in the storage facility, and not just
the materials container. The container is just one element in a system
intended to isolate the radioactive materials from workers, the public,
and the environment. Similar to transportation, however, regulation is
accomplished through preparation, review, and approval of safety
analysis reports, control of operations processes and procedures, and
training of involved workers. These aspects prevail whether the facility
is a storage vault or a materials repository, and whether the regulator
is the NRC or is internal to DOE.

Guidance for the non-facility aspects of long-term storage of plutonium
metals and oxides is contained in DOE Standard 3013[^1], originally
published in 1994. The standard requires that oxides be stabilized by
heating for at least two hours at 950°C in an oxidizing atmosphere and
that the moisture content of the stabilized material be less than 0.5%
by weight. Metals must have no liquids present, contain no pyrophoric
compounds, and be in sufficiently large pieces to preclude spontaneous
combustion. The materials are doubly encapsulated in leak-tight, welded
metal cans that may contain a maximum 4.4 kilograms of plutonium (or 5.0
kg of plutonium-bearing material). The standard conservatively assumes
that all of the hydrogen in the water adsorbed on oxides is decomposed
to generate hydrogen gas. The mass-loading may be reduced to ensure that
internal pressure from hydrogen generation remains within the design
parameters of the container for a minimum of 50 years. The body of
analytical and theoretical work that supports this standard indicates
that stabilized oxides provide an oxygen "sink" that precludes a
combustible atmosphere within the container, even though it may be rich
in hydrogen. It should be noted that gas generation issues generally do
not affect current storage. That is because current practice is to not
contain the hydrogen source, thereby allowing the generated gases to be
diluted and swept out of the storage facility through the heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. Although there have
been some instances in which gas generation has contributed to
unexpected occurrences in storage vaults, it has generally not been a
problem for the vast majority of nuclear materials that have been or are
being stored - some of which have been in storage for decades. An
extensive review of storage \"events\" showed that all had involved
unstabilized materials, implying that stabilization effectively limited
pressurization.[^2]

In summary, different government bodies may regulate shipment and
storage of wastes and materials at different points in time or location.
DOE and EPA primarily regulate TRU waste, while activities to
disposition NM are governed by DOE. NRC sets forth the regulations and
procedures for SNF dispositioning.

## Process Background

![](media/image5.wmf)In January 2000, the National Transportation
Program (NTP) sponsored a Hydrogen Gas Generation Workshop in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. The goal of the workshop was to promote the
integration of DOE gas generation activities across DOE programs.

As a result of the workshop, it became apparent that gas generation
issues were being addressed independently by a number of different
organizations. Therefore, David Huizenga, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Office of Integration and Planning (EM-20) in coordination with Gerald
Boyd, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Science and Technology
(EM-50) decided to establish a Task Group responsible for development of
a report that would help integrate resolution of gas generation
programmatic issues. The Task Group was assigned to develop a strategic
approach for addressing gas generation issues, develop a roadmap to
solutions, and establish an integrated group within EM-20 that will
review progress on R&D activities. The National Transportation Program
(NTP) of EM-20 was asked to lead the planning effort in coordination
with the Science and Technology Integration Program at the INEEL. Other
members of the Task Group consisted of cross-program DOE representatives
and contractors from 1) the Nuclear Materials Programs, 2) the Spent
Fuel Program, 3) Waste Management, and 4) the TRU Waste Program. In
addition, the Task Group coordinated with both the TRU and Mixed Waste
and Nuclear Material Focus Areas under EM-50.

The roadmapping effort began with a kick-off meeting held in May 2000.
Representatives from the Task Group plus subject matter experts from DOE
sites that have potential gas generation problems were invited. The
purpose of the working session was to address the R&D activities, the
needs and requirements, and the programmatic and regulatory issues
associated with storage, packaging, and shipping waste/materials that
generate hydrogen gas (and possibly other gases) within the DOE complex.
Figure 2 shows the process used during the "roadmapping" effort. A
two-toned status bar indicates how far in the process this document
describes. The lighter tone indicates that a start has occurred but that
more effort and detail ought to be done in subsequent efforts. The
kick-off meeting was used as the first method to address the first two
functions indicated in the figure.

It was determined at the kick-off session that the programs that have,
or potentially have, gas generation issues include the NM programs, the
TRU waste program, the SNF program, the nuclear material programs in
NN-60 and DP, the high-level radioactive waste program, and potentially
the mixed and low-level radioactive waste program (for high activity
waste). The nuclear material programs in NN-60 and DP appear to have
mostly metallic or low alpha activity (e.g., uranium) materials; these
programs do not appear to have serious gas generation issues, primarily
because metals do not pose a gas generation problem, and there will be
very little shipment of oxides. The solutions for excess EM oxides are
directly applicable to the National Nuclear Security Administration
oxides. Table 1 shows the sites/programs having gas generation issues
and those entities that are seeking resolution to those issues.

Table 1. Sites with potential gas generation issues and programs seeking
resolution.

  ------------------------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ----------- ------------------------
  **Program with           **NM**   **TRU**   **SNF**   **HLW**   **M/LLW**   **Other**
  Waste/Material Stream**                                                     

  **[Sites with Gas                                                           
  Generation                                                                  
  Issues]{.underline}:**                                                      

  Hanford                  X        X         X         X                     

  INEEL                    X        X         X         X                     

  LANL                     X        X                                         

  ORNL                     X        X                                         

  RFETS                    X        X                                         

  SRS                      X        X         X         X                     

  SQS/Other Sites          X        X         X         X                     

  FRR                                         X                               

  Universities                                X                               

  Other Gov't Agencies                        X                               

  DP                       X                                                  

  NN-60                    X                                                  

  **[Programs Working on                                                      **[Point of
  Solutions to                                                                Contact]{.underline}**
  Issues]{.underline}:**                                                      

  TMFA                              X                                         Whitney St. Michel or
                                                                              Sheila Lott

  NTWP                              X                                         Phil Gregory

  NTP                      X        X         X                               Steven Hamp

  94-1 R&D                 X                                                  Richard Mason or Sharon
                                                                              Arp

  NMFA                     X                  X                               Gary Roberson

  NSNFP                                       X                               Gregg Wachs

  TFA                                                   X                     Tom Brouns
  ------------------------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ----------- ------------------------

Gas generation issues are found across the DOE Complex. The severity of
the impact, however, depends on the material in question. For example,
many of the issues associated with transportation of TRU waste have been
solved. Methods to predict gas generation have been expanded to include
most of the waste materials destined for WIPP. Further, the methods have
been refined to account for reduced gas generation in certain wastes,
thereby allowing a larger payload. Current issues deal mainly with a
small portion of the wastes that cannot yet be shipped and the desire to
improve efficiency and cost effectiveness.

With respect to nuclear materials, the situation is quite different.
Shipments of plutonium oxide and other related materials from Rocky
Flats are currently precluded because there is no certified
transportation package. One of the major impediments to certification is
the inability to realistically predict gas pressure and composition
within the sealed transportation container. Resolution of this matter is
on the critical path for de-inventory of nuclear materials from Rocky
Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). As the site attempts to
maintain its schedule, delays are creating a "bow wave" of shipments
that threatens to exceed the capacity of the transportation system. A
complicating factor at RFETS, Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford is
the requirement in the "3013 Standard"[^3] that oxides packaged
according to the standard must be represented by materials in a
surveillance program currently underway at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). The current inability to ship such materials
precludes their inclusion in the surveillance program, thereby delaying
their packaging for storage.

With respect to spent nuclear fuel, the problem is not so immediate.
However, the ability to predict gas generation to the satisfaction of
regulatory and safety officials is a critical factor in designing
systems to store and transport SNF. It is important that these matters
are resolved in the near future so that shipping and facility
deactivation schedules will not be adversely impacted.

The HLW program has gas generation issues ranging from gas generation in
liquid waste storage tanks to transport of the liquid waste in pipes
(pre-vitrification). The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) is doing some work on
defining mechanisms for gas generation due to gamma- and beta-ray
impinging on hydrogenous material (i.e., high-level waste). This work
may be useful to other DOE programs. It may also be useful to explore
other opportunities to share R&D activities with the HLW program in the
future.

The M/LLW program was identified as potentially having a gas generation
issue due to high activity waste. However, no information could be
obtained to determine if there are any issues or not. All people
contacted so far were not aware of any problems (or at least of any
actions being taken to determine if there is an issue).

The National Transportation Program (NTP) has been providing support to
the various programs in helping determine or develop the shipping
packages that could be used for transporting the waste and materials.
NTP also provides support by funding some R&D efforts and evaluation of
R&D efforts that could improve transportability of nuclear waste and
materials.

In summary, it is apparent that gas generation issues can adversely
affect DOE milestones in a number of programs at several sites. The Task
Group believes that gas generation issues may represent one of the
greatest threats to timely accomplishment of DOE's Environmental
Management (EM) mission.

# OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM APPROACHES

Each of the programs (NM, TRU, SNF) has different, yet related
approaches to solve gas generation issues. In terms of maturity of
shipment campaigns, the programs are at different levels; therefore each
program has a different focus. The TRU waste program currently focusing
on ways to speed up the process and to include a greater portion of the
TRU waste that can be disposed at WIPP; the NM program is at the
threshold of shipping, while the SNF is looking at a future time for
shipping to a national repository. The following is a summary of each
program's approach.

## TRU Waste Program

The TRU waste program addresses the shipment of defense-related TRU
waste throughout the DOE complex and the disposal of TRU waste at WIPP.
The TRU waste program focuses on the use of the TRUPACT-II, HalfPACT,
and 72-B cask packagings, each with an approved Certificate of
Compliance (CoC) from the NRC, based on a satisfactory review of the
applicable Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP). The SARP is
intended to demonstrate compliance with all applicable transportation
requirements. Of particular interest is the requirement that
concentrations of hydrogen gas may not exceed 5% (by volume) of the free
gas volume in any confined region of the package during the maximum
allowable transportation period. Many forms of TRU waste can generate
hydrogen gas and this requirement can often limit the amount of waste
that may be transported within a single package.

Payload expansion initiatives, intended to increase the envelope of
shippable waste in the three approved packagings, are submitted to the
NRC for review and approval. These expansion initiatives build on
analytical methods used to estimate flammable gas concentrations and use
the best available information about the waste and the waste packaging.
This information is used to provide an accurate model for flammable gas
generation and release. Through the payload expansion initiatives
included in 19 revisions of the TRUPACT-II SAR, approximately 97% of the
contact-handled waste inventory in approved payload containers (e.g.,
55-gallon drums) may be shipped to the WIPP site for disposal. Future
work in the TRU waste program will focus on making the remaining 3% of
the waste shippable, developing a packaging for the shipment of waste in
large payload containers, and increasing the envelope of shippable
remote-handled waste in the 72-B cask.

## NM Programs

It appears that the NM program currently has the most serious issues and
the most pressing drivers to solve the gas generation issue due
primarily to not having a certified shipping container. One of the major
impediments to certification is the inability to realistically predict
the extent of hydrogen generation within the sealed transportation
container. Resolution of this matter is on the critical path for
de-inventory of nuclear material from RFETS, and has already delayed
shipments. In fact, RFETS de-inventory is the critical driver for the
schedule information shown on the roadmap summary chart. Savannah River
Site (SRS) will be the likely recipient of the RFETS 3013-compliant
materials while most of the non-compliant materials are expected to go
to WIPP. Each of these sites has a vested interest in how the materials
will be packaged, shipped and stored (dispositioned).

Gas generation issues also impact other DOE sites that have nuclear
materials including Hanford, INEEL, LANL, LLNL and Oak Ridge. Other DOE
programs like NN-60 and DP are also impacted. Some of these sites (e.g.,
INEEL and Oak Ridge) have mostly uranium materials that do not typically
have a serious issue with gas generation.

The NM approach to solving the gas generation issue is to develop
empirical data in the 94-1 Program demonstrating overall gas generation
rates (including gas recombination rates). These empirical data are then
used in analytical models being developed by the NMFA that can predict
or bound gas pressure and composition in a sealed container. Two types
of models are under development: one would be used to predict or bound
gas pressure and composition for materials meeting certain
specifications, while the other would be used to extrapolate gas
generation measurements on less well characterized materials. The first
type of model allows safe storage or transport to be assured through
characterization of the materials, ensuring that they meet the required
specifications. The second type of model requires a gas generation
measurement on each container of material, although it may be possible
to use statistical methods to reduce the number of measurements made. In
either case, failure to meet the requirements, i.e., to be within the
material characterization criteria or to have an acceptable measured gas
generation rate, would require treatment (repackaging and/or
stabilization) of the materials to meet the shipping/storage
requirements.

In regards to the two shipping packagings slated for immediate use
pending certification (namely 9975 and SAFEKEG) the SARP for the 9975
has been submitted using current information. There is no assurance a
certificate will be granted based on that information. In fact, current,
on-going R&D is proving helpful in answering some of the regulator's
questions. The SARP for SAFEKEG is under review. It is likely, but not
certain, that information for the 9975 will be satisfactory for the
SAFEKEG. The SAFEKEG is needed a) because of its lesser weight more can
be included in the weight-limited DOE Transport Safeguard System which
will allow for quicker de-inventory of RFETS and b) as a backup to the
9975 should a design flaw or other systemic problem be identified. On
longer term schedule shipments, as the case for de-inventory of Hanford,
additional R&D could prove helpful depending on what restrictions are
placed on the 9975 and/or SAFEKEG. Further R&D could be useful for some
materials, those that are outside of the current 3013 scope (generally
\<30% Pu plus U) and currently appear to be orphans, to permit the 3013
scope to be expanded to accommodate these materials.

R&D performed for gas generation is also done for economic reasons. For
example, R&D on moisture measurements could result in a system that is
less expensive in terms of both cost and personnel exposure. However,
there is no clear "deadline" for those benefits so the urgency is much
less and no attempt has been made to show it on the roadmap summary
chart, but it is worthwhile R&D nevertheless.

A major unknown at this time is whether DOE/EM-5 will accept hydrogen
concentrations greater than 5%. Even if it can be shown that hydrogen
concentrations greater than 5% do not produce a flammable mixture in the
container, there may be a concern regarding behavior during an accident
involving some breach of the package. In such an event, the gas escaping
into the oxygen-containing ambient environment might reach flammable
concentrations and produce an unacceptable result. One possibility for
stabilized materials may be to rely on the robust design of the 3013
specified container inside the 9975 transportation package to survive an
accident and preclude release of any contained hydrogen. Another
possibility may be the development and incorporation of getter materials
within the package to mitigate or control the hydrogen concentration.
These concepts, coupled with additional empirical data and improved
predictive models, currently appear to be the most promising solution(s)
to the gas generation issue for the NM program.

## SNF Program

The SNF program's approach is much like that of the NM program. It plans
to use the modeling of gas generation rates for traceable proof for
certified packaging. Coupled with modeling, the strategy also includes
drying of spent fuel elements (treatment) to reduce a potential hydrogen
gas source. Additionally, work is being performed to look at a permeable
membrane technology to prevent excessive gas buildup during long-term
storage. The sites having SNF assume that their efforts to solve the
generation issue will be timely and successful. This is based in part on
the fact that the schedule to disposition the fuel is at least 5-10
years in the future. Driving this schedule is the future opening of a
geologic repository for SNF.

## Program Integration

Overall there do not appear to be many overlaps of ongoing or planned
R&D efforts related to gas generation issues among DOE EM programs.
There are many reasons for this. One reason is simply the differing
situations that exist for the different materials. For example, because
shipments of SNF are not contemplated for several years, currently SNF
only needs gas generation data to support design of storage and
transportation containers. However, shipments of nuclear materials are
already delayed and a transportation container has been designed and is
nearing certification. What is needed at this time is a predictive model
that is sufficiently robust in its theoretical and experimental basis to
satisfy a regulator. Such a model for TRU waste has been developed,
approved, and is currently in use. R&D on gas generation from TRU waste
is focused on increasing the amount of material that can be put into a
container. It should be noted that the approach taken in construction of
a TRU waste gas generation model and its justification to the regulator
is now being applied to certain nuclear materials. Similarly, approaches
being taken to measure and model gas generation in nuclear materials may
be applied to SNF. In this way, lessons learned are applied to later
endeavors.

Another reason for the apparent absence of overlaps is the differing
nature of the materials and the consequent differences in gas generation
mechanisms. For example, gas generation in a nuclear material,
"stabilized oxides", is dominated by its greatest source of hydrogen:
water, and a mechanism that includes potentially both surface catalysis
and radiation-induced reactions. Gas generation in another nuclear
material, unstabilized oxides, still considers only a single source of
hydrogen, but radiolysis appears to dominate over other types of
reactions. However, TRU waste has many sources of hydrogen. Also, TRU
waste has a significant, though finite, source of hydrogen and the rate
of gas generation is dependent in part on the radiation field. In
stabilized oxides, the situation is reversed, with only a limited source
of hydrogen. Thus, R&D on gas generation mechanisms for TRU waste is not
particularly applicable to stabilized oxides.

Programs have started to share and integrate information and expertise.
For example, the 94-1 R&D program, which has extensive experience
measuring gas evolution in dry oxides, and the NMFA are applying their
expertise to the measurement of gas evolution from "dried" SNF. Another
positive development is the integration of SNF into the NMFA R&D
activities.

# USING THE ROADMAP SUMMARY AND MATRIX

A simplifying visual depiction assists decision-makers to readily
identify how R&D and key programmatic efforts link to the gas generation
issues in the DOE Complex. This section contains two products: (1) the
summarized graphical depiction of the roadmap summary. (Attachment A),
and (2) a matrix (Attachment B) containing in depth information
including points of contacts and projected completion date for each of
the R&D issue resolution activities included on the roadmap summary.
Roadmap summary site milestones and agreements were taken from The DOE
Plan in Response to DNFSB Recommendation 2000-1 Revision 1, entitled *An
Implementation Plan for Stabilization and Storage of Nuclear Material*
dated January 2001.

## Roadmap Summary Explanation

The gas generation roadmap summary shows at a glance the functions
involved to disposition a waste/material type, the R&D and regulatory
activities associated with successfully completing a function, and the
current condition of the functions and activities. This roadmap summary
is designed to assist decision-makers by quickly showing how issue
resolution activities are logically related to disposition functions and
to direct decision-maker focus towards resolution of the issues.

### Overview

Starting left to right on the roadmap summary (Attachment A) are four
columns: (1) program name, (2) waste/material type, (3) issues and
resolution activities, and (4) a timeline of functions and activities.
To get a material/waste positioned for disposition/disposal, functions,
like those defined on the roadmap summary, are needed (namely, treat,
package, ship, and store). These functions are shown as bars and are
labeled on the far right of the roadmap summary. The roadmap summary is
designed to focus on how resolution activities enable a function to
begin or improve. The activities do this is by producing deliverables
(for example, regulator approval of a package type or gas generation
rate data that helps prove the safety of a container) that provide a
basis to begin performing or improving a function. The timeline column
then identifies four dimensions for an activity: (1) risk, (2) time, (3)
type of activity, and (4) possibility for sharing across programs. Risk
is depicted by the colors (section 5.1.2) and time is shown by the
location of an icon in relation to the timeline. The shape of the icon,
as defined in the legend (section 5.1.3), shows the activity type and
the possibility for sharing is defined by a purple diamond surrounding
an icon.

### Colors

It is essential the roadmap summary be colored. This added dimension
provides significant information by identifying where emphasis and
management involvement is needed. The colors indicate a level of risk as
described by the following color definitions:

-   *Red* indicates there is significant risk to achieving success. For
    example, the activity lacks funding, basic assumptions that provide
    the foundation for the activity or function are wrong, the regulator
    indicates that activity may be unacceptable, or the critical path
    appears to be unachievable unless heroic efforts are made.

-   *Yellow* designates moderate risk. For example, the activity is
    behind schedule, the success of the activity is suspect (funding,
    schedule, regulatory approval, politics), an aggressive assumption
    has not been proven, or some combination of factors.

-   *Green* indicates low risk. For example, an activity/function has
    funding, priority, and expects to meet its milestones and goals.

-   *Blue* describes where a process improvement happens. Examples are:
    an increase in process efficiency, reduction in cost, schedule
    improvements, and increased safety.

-   *Striping* shows that the function is 'at risk' unless, and until,
    the resolution activity is successfully completed. The color of the
    striping is indicative of the coloring of the resolution activity
    (indicating level of risk) feeding into the function.

### Legend

The Legend is located at the bottom of the roadmap summary. It shows
symbols for milestones, completion times for R&D activities, regulator
approval times, and "at risk" activity flags. The flags are meant to be
an added guide to direct decision-makers to focus on specific areas. The
first row continues by showing if an activity extends beyond the
timeline shown on the roadmap summary. An important symbol is the purple
diamond surrounding an R&D icon. It designates a possible opportunity
for programs to share information by virtue that they may be similar
enough or have lessons-learned that another program can use for
assistance. On the bottom row with the color definitions is a two-tier,
two colored icon showing a performance improvement area. When a function
has an increase in productivity or throughput because of an R&D
activity, this icon shows it.

## Detailed Matrix Explanation

The roadmap summary provides a broad overview of the issues within the
DOE Complex. Because of the brevity, Attachment B of the report contains
more detail of each of the resolution activities shown on the roadmap
summary. Only R&D resolution activities are enumerated along with detail
concerning activity objectives, responsible group and individual, and
the expected deliverable format and content. The activities are
cross-referenced to the roadmap summary by the material/waste letter
coupled with the number of the activity. For example, on the first page
of summaries labeled "TRU Gas Generation Roadmap Summary," the first
waste/material is called Non-Type IV and it is labeled with the letter
'A'. If activity 2 'Reduce layers of confinement R&D' is chosen then
further information about the activity can be found in the matrix
labeled TRU A-2.

# FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PATH FORWARD

The Task Group purposely kept this roadmapping effort and analysis at a
fairly high level rather than going into great detail. In doing so, some
of the findings and recommendations may be somewhat subjective based on
high level analysis and may have precluded inclusion of some important
lower level critical activities.

By reviewing the report, the roadmap summary (Attachment A), and the
matrix (Attachment B), the Task Group makes the following findings,
recommendations, and suggested path forward:

## Findings

-   *No duplication of efforts* - There are no significant overlaps in
    planned R&D activities, nor appreciable duplication of R&D already
    performed. The reason for this is that shipping program maturity
    levels are staggered. TRU waste shipping is the most mature with
    shipments currently taking place, whereas NM is at the threshold of
    shipping from RFETS. Shipping of SNF to a repository is scheduled to
    start a decade from now.

-   *NM shipping packages* - For the RFETS shipping schedule to be met,
    both the SAFKEG and 9975 packagings must be certified for
    transportation campaigns of nuclear material. Both the SAFKEG and
    the 9975 packages are needed to ensure the maximum amount of
    material can be shipped in the narrow window of opportunity. There
    is a moderate probability with high consequence of failure to give a
    moderate level of risk tending to high because problems are being
    encountered with certification of both packages. It is essential
    that the 94-1 R&D efforts to understand the gas generation and
    recombination mechanisms, plus NMFA efforts in modeling to predict
    gas pressure and composition continue in order to reduce this risk.

-   *Unclear NM disposition pathway* - A disposition pathway is
    identified for the portion of nuclear materials that are treated and
    sealed according to the current 3013 standard. However, other
    nuclear materials such as some impure oxides and residues do not
    have a clear disposition pathway. It appears that these orphan
    nuclear materials need priority attention to make sure shipping
    packages can be certified, shipments can be approved and expedited,
    and pathways for disposition can be quickly developed (or RFETS
    closure schedule needs to be revised).

-   *Unsure SNF cask funding* - The baseline schedule for shipping of
    SNF to a repository is very much in jeopardy due to anticipated lack
    of funding for continued development of a transportation packaging
    (cask).

-   *Contingency planning needed* - The roadmap shows pathways that have
    significant risk, which may indicate more emphasis should be placed
    on contingency planning. For example, getter development and
    shipping of sealed containers of nuclear materials are activities
    that may need some contingency planning due their moderate to high
    probability of failure.

-   *TRU waste program performance improvements* - The TRU program can
    currently perform all functions needed to disposition TRU waste. The
    R&D activities being performed are to enhance performance of
    existing functions e.g., to allow greater amounts of waste in the
    shipping package thus decreasing transportation costs and schedule.

-   *Opportunities for sharing* -- The Task Group found many
    opportunities for sharing information about gas generation issues
    and potential solutions (see 6.2 Recommendations). Areas of greatest
    potential cooperation appear to be in sharing methods, approaches,
    and strategies.

## Recommendations

In an effort to reconcile the findings, the Task Group offers the
following recommendations for consideration. With each recommendation
there are specific areas that need focus now and associated suggested
actions that will identify and/or facilitate the implementation
necessary to address the recommendation.

### Sharing of Information

The Task Group found that there are four areas that have the most
potential for sharing of information.

#### Areas of Focus 

-   Methods for measuring gas generation rates -- Methods for measuring
    gas generation rates, sampling methods, analysis methods,
    procedures, and even equipment for making these measurements are
    part of what can be shared among the programs in this area.

-   Mechanisms for gas generation -- Though gas generation mechanisms
    may differ due to the chemical and physical properties of the
    waste/materials in each program, the general mechanisms of
    radiolysis and some chemical interactions are the same or similar
    enough to warrant sharing of this information.

-   Modeling methodologies -- The approach used to develop a model for
    gas generation (or the structure of the model) may very well be
    applied to several different materials. A model would most likely
    require some modification as it is applied across different
    materials because gas generation mechanisms differ. Once developed,
    a model would require R&D data to demonstrate its applicability.

-   Approaches for elimination of gas generation or mitigation of
    impacts --

    -   Use of getters -- If regulatory approval can be obtained,
        getters will allow greater quantities of TRU waste to be
        transported in each shipment. Although getters for materials
        other than TRU waste will likely be different because of the
        dissimilar environments in which they must operate, the
        processes for obtaining regulatory acceptance and the technical
        bases will likely be very much alike.

    -   Permeable membranes -- If proven successful for "venting" of
        metal containers while maintaining their robustness, this
        technology is one that could potentially be shared by various
        programs within the DOE Complex.

    -   Drying/stabilization techniques -- Drying/stabilization
        techniques are currently part of the planned or current baseline
        for preparing nuclear materials for long-term storage and
        transportation. These techniques, developed by the NM programs,
        should have applicability to the SNF program.

    -   Use of inert atmospheres -- The NRC applies a simple 5%
        concentration limit to hydrogen in the container atmosphere. The
        DOE/EM regulator may be willing to consider instead a
        flammability limit for hydrogen content that considers limiting
        the oxygen concentration. The conditions that the regulator
        might impose, such as requiring the container to be opened in an
        inert atmosphere or requiring the package to survive more severe
        accidents would likely apply to different materials.

#### Methods to Implement

> The following are suggested ways of facilitating the sharing of gas
> generation information:

-   *Use of periodic symposium for sharing*: Gathering the DOE Complex
    subject matter experts to openly discuss progress and issues are of
    immense value. Group dialogue most always leads to productive
    conclusions. This Task Group could be the nucleus of such a forum.

-   *Reports 'clearinghouse' establishment*: Charter an existing
    organization to serve as a 'clearinghouse' to collect and
    disseminate information on R&D and other activities that relate to
    gas generation throughout the DOE Complex to all entities that could
    gain from the sharing of this information.

### Contingency Planning

There are pathways that are questionable single solution pathways.
Therefore, the group suggests that bottlenecks be defined and plans made
as to how to mitigate them. Should a single pathway prove impassible,
alternatives should be considered or put into place or the consequences
will most likely be "missed" or "slipped" milestones.

#### Areas of Focus

The following are items that should have contingency plans developed in
case the existing baseline fails to achieve the expectations:

-   RFETS shipping schedule -- The detailed schedules for shipment of
    nuclear materials from RFETS needs to be looked at in detail to
    determine if the baselines for shipping, development of the 9975 and
    SAFKEG shipping packagings, manufacture of the shipping packagings,
    and programmatic approvals, etc. are integrated and achievable.
    Other alternatives should be explored in case one of the links is
    delayed or unattainable.

-   Treatment, shipping, and disposition of nuclear materials -- Issue
    resolution activities are being worked, but their timely success to
    support baseline schedules (e.g., RFETS closure) is not very certain
    at this point for some impure Pu oxides and residues.

-   Uses of getters to enhance shipping capabilities -- Regulators do
    not currently accept getters in transportation packages. As a
    consequence, use of getters involves not only the R&D to identify,
    develop, demonstrate, and deploy them, but also involves convincing
    the regulator that they will perform as designed. Because of the
    real risk that the regulator may not approve the use of getters, the
    programs should plan for other contingencies.

-   Permeable membranes -- As with getters, the regulator acceptance of
    permeable membranes to vent hydrogen gas buildup in shipping and/or
    disposal containers is questionable since they do not currently
    allow any "vented" Type B packagings and may even question the
    applicability of "venting" to disposal. Contingency planning should
    be implemented to have alternatives in place if the regulators
    reject the concept or should the R&D prove to not work.

-   SNF Funding -- The Task Group recommends that DOE management
    evaluate funding adequacy and timing of the SNF packagings to assure
    meeting shipping schedules and impacts of not meeting them.

#### Methods to Implement

The following are some suggested methods to help in identifying areas
that are on critical pathways that need contingency planning.

-   Continue to use this roadmap as a planning tool- the tool for
    decision-makers has been developed. Continued use of this roadmap
    would constitute good project management practices.

-   Leverage the expertise and capability of the independent peer review
    group as mentioned in the following section.

-   EM-20/EM-50 should assign responsibility to perform contingency
    planning to fold into the roadmap.

### Independent Peer Review Group

Establish an independent peer review group to address challenges of gas
generation throughout the DOE Complex. The following areas of focus are
anticipated functions of this group.

#### Areas of Focus

-   Review proposed R&D and programmatic activities -- This review would
    look at the details of the activities, including the schedule for
    development, to assure that the activity fully resolves the issue(s)
    or does so if combined with other activities.

-   Perform quality checks on applications to regulators -- Using
    experts in writing applications for packaging certification would
    streamline the now lengthy process of submittal to a regulatory
    agency, waiting for comments (usually in regards to issues that
    could be caught before handing the application to the regulator),
    and then responding to the issues and resubmitting. The expert group
    would provide invaluable advice that would most likely shorten the
    certification process.

-   Act as facilitator -- Being independent from the programs, this
    group could have greater influence with the regulator(s) by
    facilitating submittals from the applicants to the regulators.

-   Assure life cycle planning -- In some instances, dispositioning a
    waste/material included only either long-term storage or
    transportation. When designing and developing packagings,
    decision-makers should thoroughly develop the disposition path that
    takes the material/waste from current to end state. Once the
    disposition pathway has defined functions, a decision-making process
    should be used to ensure DOE resources are prudently employed.

#### Methods to Implement

-   Establish the peer review group- DOE management enlists subject
    matter experts to participate in this group.

-   NTP independent review- Assign the NTP to independently review the
    baseline schedule for funding and development of the SNF packagings
    to determine immediacy of need for funding, etc.

-   Re-establish the ANSI 14.32 working group- The Standard for Gas
    Generation in Packages Used for the Storage or Transport of
    Radioactive Materials (ANSI 14.32) working group would assist others
    to plan for current to end state disposition of materials/wastes.
    This group would define standards that the peer review group could
    use in their analyses of the programs' activities.

## Path Forward / Assignment of Responsibilities

The following are activities / assignments that summarize the action
items in the preceding Recommendations section. The team members
recommend that David Huizenga and Gerald Boyd of DOE-HQ take the lead
role and initiate the activities located in the following table.

  --------------------------------------------- -------------------------
  **Activities**                                **Suggested Assignments**

  *Assign responsibility for 'clearinghouse'    NTP -- begin immediately
  function*                                     

  *Assign responsibility for report updates and NTP -- every 6 months
  timeframes for updates*                       

  *Determine date of next status meeting on     EM-20 -- Sept./Oct. 2001
  roadmap progress*                             

  *Set date of next symposium for sharing*      Rotate NTP, NM, TRU, SNF
                                                -- June 2001

  *Assign responsibilities for contingency      Each Program -- by July,
  planning*                                     2001

  *Assign responsibility for independent peer   IPT -- lead by NTP -- by
  review group (e.g., NTP or an Integrated      June 2001
  Product Team (IPT))*                          
  --------------------------------------------- -------------------------

**Attachment A- Roadmap Summary Graphic**

This attachment contains the Roadmap Summary graphic. This depiction is
the heart of the report and it contains concise, useful information
readable at a glance. The roadmap summary is grouped and color-coded by
waste/material type: (1) TRU, (2) NM, and (3) SNF. Following the set of
roadmap summaries is a description of how to interpret the layout and
symbols on page A-6. The roadmap summary shows the interrelation of R&D
activities to the functions necessary to disposition the waste/materials
over which DOE has stewardship.

![](media/image6.wmf){width="10.397222222222222in"
height="8.018055555555556in"}

![](media/image7.wmf){width="10.500694444444445in"
height="7.997222222222222in"}

![](media/image8.wmf){width="10.448611111111111in"
height="7.997222222222222in"}

![](media/image9.wmf){width="10.397222222222222in"
height="7.997222222222222in"}

**ROADMAP SUMMARY EXPLANATION**

The gas generation roadmap summary shows at a glance the functions
involved to disposition a waste/material type, the R&D and regulatory
activities associated with successfully completing a function, and the
current condition of the functions and activities. This roadmap summary
is designed to assist decision-makers by quickly showing how issue
resolution activities are logically related to disposition functions and
to direct decision-maker focus towards resolution of the issues.

**Overview**

Starting left to right on the roadmap summary (Attachment A) are four
columns: (1) program name, (2) waste/material type, (3) issues and
resolution activities, and (4) a timeline of functions and activities.
To get a material/waste positioned for disposition/disposal, functions,
like those defined on the roadmap summary, are needed (namely, treat,
package, ship, and store). These functions are shown as bars and are
labeled on the far right of the roadmap summary. The roadmap summary is
designed to focus on how resolution activities enable a function to
begin or improve. The activities do this is by producing deliverables
(for example, regulator approval of a package type or gas generation
rate data that helps prove the safety of a container) that provide a
basis to begin performing or improving a function. The timeline column
then identifies four dimensions for an activity: (1) risk, (2) time, (3)
type of activity, and (4) possibility for sharing across programs. Risk
is depicted by the colors (section 5.1.2) and time is shown by the
location of an icon in relation to the timeline. The shape of the icon,
as defined in the legend (section 5.1.3), shows the activity type and
the possibility for a purple diamond surrounding an icon defines
sharing.

*Colors*

It is essential the roadmap summary be colored. This added dimension
provides significant information by identifying where emphasis and
management involvement is needed. The colors indicate a level of risk as
described by the following color definitions:

-   *Red* indicates there is significant risk to achieving success. For
    example, the activity lacks funding, basic assumptions that provide
    the foundation for the activity or function are wrong, the regulator
    indicates that activity may be unacceptable, or the critical path
    appears to be unachievable unless heroic efforts are made.

-   *Yellow* designates moderate risk. For example, the activity is
    behind schedule, the success of the activity is suspect (funding,
    schedule, regulatory approval, politics), an aggressive assumption
    has not been proven, or some combination of factors.

-   *Green* indicates low risk. For example, an activity/function has
    funding, priority, and expects to meet its milestones and goals.

-   *Blue* describes where a process improvement happens. Examples are:
    an increase in process efficiency, reduction in cost, schedule
    improvements, and increased safety.

-   *Striping* shows that the function is 'at risk' unless, and until,
    the resolution activity is successfully completed. The color of the
    striping is indicative of the coloring of the resolution activity
    (indicating level of risk) feeding into the function.

*Legend*

The Legend is located at the bottom of the roadmap summary. It shows
symbols for milestones, completion times for R&D activities, regulator
approval times, and "at risk" activity flags. The flags are meant to be
an added guide to direct decision-makers to focus on specific areas. The
first row continues by showing if an activity extends beyond the
timeline shown on the roadmap summary. An important symbol is the purple
diamond surrounding an R&D icon. It designates a possible opportunity
for programs to share information by virtue that they may be similar
enough or have lessons-learned that another program can use for
assistance. On the bottom row with the color definitions is a two-tier,
two colored icon showing a performance improvement area. When a function
has an increase in productivity or throughput because of an R&D
activity, this icon shows it.

**ATTACHMENT B- DETAILED MATRIX**

The roadmap summary provides a broad overview of the issues within the
DOE Complex. Because of the brevity, this attachment of the report
contains more detail of each of the resolution activities shown on the
roadmap summary. Only R&D resolution activities are enumerated plus
detail concerning project objectives, responsible group and individual,
and the expected deliverable format and content. The activities are
cross-referenced to the roadmap summary by the material/waste letter
coupled with the number of the activity. For example, on the first page
of the roadmap summary, the first waste/material is called Non-Type IV
and it is labeled with the letter 'A'. If the activity '2' 'Reduce
layers of confinement R&D' is chosen then further information about the
activity can be found in the matrix labeled TRU A-2.

There are three parts to the matrices color-coded with the roadmap
summary: TRU waste program, NM programs, and the SNF program.

+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| * | **A     | **Task Description**  | **C  | ** | **Deliverable**  |
| * | ctivity |                       | onta | Da |                  |
| I | Title** |                       | ct** | te |                  |
| D |         |                       |      | Co |                  |
| * |         |                       |      | mp |                  |
| * |         |                       |      | le |                  |
|   |         |                       |      | te |                  |
|   |         |                       |      | ** |                  |
+===+=========+=======================+======+====+==================+
| T | Single  | Option for use of a   | Phil | Do | This activity    |
| R | He      | single headspace      | Gre  | ne | resulted in a    |
| U | adspace | measurement for CH    | gory |    | submittal to the |
| A | Meas    | TRU waste in place of | (N   |    | NRC to approve a |
| - | urement | gas generation        | TWP) |    | proposed         |
| 1 | for CH  | testing (test         |      |    | revision (#19)   |
|   | TRU     | duration reduced from |      |    | to the SAR for   |
|   |         | weeks to hours).      |      |    | the TRUPACT-II.  |
|   |         |                       |      |    | It was submitted |
|   |         |                       |      |    | in April 2000.   |
|   |         |                       |      |    | The NRC is       |
|   |         |                       |      |    | reviewing the    |
|   |         |                       |      |    | application.     |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| T | Reduce  | Hydrogen gas buildup  | Whi  | Se | Demonstrate      |
| R | Conf    | can occur from        | tney | p- | commercial       |
| U | inement | restricted hydrogen   | St.  | 01 | technology       |
| A | Layers  | gas release through   | Mi   |    | viability        |
| - | within  | the multiple layers   | chel |    |                  |
| 2 | Drums   | of packaging within   | /    |    |                  |
|   |         | CH TRU waste drums.   |      |    |                  |
|   |         | Removing the          | Sh   |    |                  |
|   |         | confinement layer may | eila |    |                  |
|   |         | allow the waste to    | Lott |    |                  |
|   |         | meet shipping         | (T   |    |                  |
|   |         | requirements.         | MFA) |    |                  |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| T | N       | This project is       | Whi  | Se | Report           |
| R | on-hydr | identified for FY-02  | tney | p- | presenting       |
| U | ogenous | to develop            | St.  | 02 | information      |
| A | ma      | non-hydrogenous waste | Mi   |    | learned.         |
| - | terials | packaging materials.  | chel |    |                  |
| 4 |         | Non-hydrogenous waste | /    |    |                  |
|   |         | packaging materials   |      |    |                  |
|   |         | can be used with      | Sh   |    |                  |
|   |         | those wastes that     | eila |    |                  |
|   |         | will be               | Lott |    |                  |
|   |         | generated/packaged    | (T   |    |                  |
|   |         | for disposal in the   | MFA) |    |                  |
|   |         | future, which         |      |    |                  |
|   |         | include: TRU waste    |      |    |                  |
|   |         | treatment operations, |      |    |                  |
|   |         | D&D activities, and   |      |    |                  |
|   |         | ER projects.          |      |    |                  |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| T | H       | Hydrogen Gas Getters  | Whi  | Se | Reports          |
| R | ydrogen | For TRU Waste - Upon  | tney | p- | evaluating       |
| U | Gas     | completion of the     | St.  | 01 | getter           |
| A | Getters | TMFA Hydrogen Gas     | Mi   |    | performance and  |
| - |         | Getters studies, NTWP | chel |    | ability to meet  |
| 5 |         | will be ready to      | /    |    | anticipated      |
|   |         | submit option to NRC  |      |    | regulatory       |
|   |         | for use of gas        | Sh   |    | concerns.        |
|   |         | getters (potentially  | eila |    |                  |
|   |         | reduces hydrogen      | Lott |    |                  |
|   |         | concentration in the  | (T   |    |                  |
|   |         | TRUPACT-II ICV to     | MFA) |    |                  |
|   |         | below 5%) (wattage    |      |    |                  |
|   |         | increase up to 50+    |      |    |                  |
|   |         | times).               |      |    |                  |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| T | Gas     | Perform gas           | Whi  | Oc | Report with      |
| R | Gen     | generation tests on   | tney | t- | data.            |
| U | eration | organic sludges.      | St.  | 01 |                  |
| B | Tests   |                       | Mi   |    |                  |
| - | for     |                       | chel |    |                  |
| 1 | Organic |                       | /    |    |                  |
|   | Sludges |                       |      |    |                  |
|   |         |                       | Sh   |    |                  |
|   |         |                       | eila |    |                  |
|   |         |                       | Lott |    |                  |
|   |         |                       | (T   |    |                  |
|   |         |                       | MFA) |    |                  |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+
| T | He      | By the end of FY-00,  | Whi  | No | Report generated |
| R | adspace | design, fabricate,    | tney | v- | at LANL          |
| U | Gas     | and utilize a gas     | St.  | 00 | entitled-        |
| C | S       | sampling system for   | Mi   |    | "Headspace Gas   |
| - | ampling | RH TRU canisters to   | chel |    | Sampling of      |
| 1 | of      | measure gas evolution | /    |    | RH-TRU           |
|   | RH-TRU  | rates and determine   |      |    | Containers at    |
|   | Waste   | \"effective           | Sh   |    | LANL, FY-00      |
|   | Con     | G-values\". This      | eila |    | Status Report,"  |
|   | tainers | information will be   | Lott |    | LA-VR-00-5213.   |
|   | -- LANL | used to determine     | (T   |    |                  |
|   |         | whether the waste     | MFA) |    |                  |
|   |         | meets transportation  |      |    |                  |
|   |         | requirements and WIPP |      |    |                  |
|   |         | acceptance criteria   |      |    |                  |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+----+------------------+

+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| * | **A     | **Task Description**  | **C  | **D | **Deliverable** |
| * | ctivity |                       | onta | ate |                 |
| I | Title** |                       | ct** | C   |                 |
| D |         |                       |      | omp |                 |
| * |         |                       |      | let |                 |
| * |         |                       |      | e** |                 |
+===+=========+=======================+======+=====+=================+
| N | Gas     | Perform gas           | Ric  | On  | These           |
| M | Gen     | generation            | hard | -go | measurements    |
| C | eration | measurements for      | M    | ing | provide a       |
| - | Measu   | residues at           | ason |     | technical basis |
| 2 | rements | conditions            | (LA  | [Co | for pressure    |
|   | of      | representative of the | NL)/ | mpl | and gas         |
|   | Residue | transportation        | Sh   | ete | composition of  |
|   | Ma      | environment.          | aron | ?   | nuclear         |
|   | terials |                       | Arp  | ?]{ | materials in    |
|   |         |                       | (DOE | .ma | cans for        |
|   |         |                       | -AL) | rk} | shipment and    |
|   |         |                       |      |     | storage.        |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | Gas     | Perform gas           | Ric  | On  | These           |
| M | Gen     | generation            | hard | -go | measurements    |
| A | eration | measurements for      | M    | ing | provide a       |
| - | and     | residues at           | ason |     | technical basis |
| 2 | Regen   | conditions            | (L   | Co  | for pressure    |
|   | eration | representative of the | ANL) | mpl | and gas         |
|   | measu   | transportation        |      | ete | composition of  |
|   | rements | environment.          |      | ??  | nuclear         |
|   | ma      | Headspace gases,      |      |     | materials in    |
|   | terials | radiolysis rates,     |      |     | cans for        |
|   | with    | chemical rates, etc.  |      |     | shipment and    |
|   | a       | of oxygen, hydrogen,  |      |     | storage.        |
|   | ctinide | water, and other      |      |     |                 |
|   | content | gases are being       |      |     |                 |
|   | greater | evaluated.            |      |     |                 |
|   | than 20 |                       |      |     |                 |
|   | wt.%    |                       |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | M       | Develop advanced      | Mark | Sep | Advanced        |
| M | odeling | computer models to    | Pa   | -03 | modeling        |
| A | of Gas  | defensibly predict    | ffet |     | predictions can |
| - | Gen     | gas pressure and      | (LA  |     | provide a real  |
| 3 | eration | composition in        | NL), |     | decision-making |
| , | During  | nuclear material      | Neal |     | tool for        |
| C | Storage | storage and           | A    |     | transport and   |
| - | &       | transportation        | skew |     | storage of      |
| 3 | S       | containers. Validate  |      |     | nuclear         |
|   | hipping | the predictive        | (    |     | materials,      |
|   | (Pure & | techniques to the     | SRS) |     | eliminating the |
|   | Impure  | satisfaction of       |      |     | need for future |
|   | Pu & U  | regulators for        |      |     | gas generation  |
|   | Mat     | nuclear materials     |      |     | measurements of |
|   | erials) | shipments such that   |      |     | individual      |
|   |         | gas generation        |      |     | material        |
|   |         | measurements of       |      |     | containers      |
|   |         | individual material   |      |     | prior to        |
|   |         | containers prior to   |      |     | shipment.       |
|   |         | shipment are no       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | longer required. Many |      |     |                 |
|   |         | of the key variables  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | necessary for the     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | modeling effort are   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | being derived from    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | gas generation        |      |     |                 |
|   |         | studies in the 94-1   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | lab program and       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | related studies at    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | SRS.                  |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | M       | Develop techniques to | Ric  | [Oc | These           |
| M | oisture | measure the moisture  | hard | t-0 | measurements    |
| A | Ana     | content of stabilized | M    | 0]{ | will provide a  |
| - | lytical | Pu materials. Both    | ason | .ma | basis for       |
| 4 | Methods | sample based and bulk | (L   | rk} | determining     |
|   | (Impure | measurement           | ANL) |     | that the        |
|   | Pu      | techniques are of     | /    |     | materials have  |
|   | Oxides  | interest. The         | Sh   |     | been adequately |
|   | &       | techniques must be    | aron |     | stabilized      |
|   | Re      | applicable to the     | Arp  |     | according to    |
|   | sidues) | entire range of       | (DOE |     | the 3013        |
|   |         | stabilized materials. | -AL) |     | criteria        |
|   |         |                       |      |     | (namely, \<0.5  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | weight percent  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | moisture).      |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | Pu      | Develop and deploy an | Kurt | Sep | Direct          |
| M | Co      | advanced, remote      | Silv | -01 | measurement of  |
| A | ntainer | sensor technology for | ers, |     | internal        |
| - | Mon     | the monitoring of     | (P   |     | pressure and    |
| 6 | itoring | pressures and other   | NNL) |     | temperature     |
| , | System  | information within    | /    |     | within 3013 NM  |
| C |         | sealed 3013 nuclear   |      |     | containers      |
| - |         | materials containers, | Gary |     | would provide   |
| 6 |         | at Hanford in FY      | Robe |     | the data needed |
|   |         | 2001.                 | rson |     | to identify     |
|   |         |                       | (N   |     | potential       |
|   |         |                       | MFA) |     | problem         |
|   |         |                       |      |     | containers well |
|   |         |                       |      |     | before reaching |
|   |         |                       |      |     | unsafe          |
|   |         |                       |      |     | conditions.     |
|   |         |                       |      |     | Monitoring of   |
|   |         |                       |      |     | these critical  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | parameters can  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | be realized by  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | integrating     |
|   |         |                       |      |     | smart sensors   |
|   |         |                       |      |     | with a          |
|   |         |                       |      |     | mechanical      |
|   |         |                       |      |     | pressure sensor |
|   |         |                       |      |     | and RF tagging  |
|   |         |                       |      |     | technology.     |
|   |         |                       |      |     | These systems   |
|   |         |                       |      |     | will be         |
|   |         |                       |      |     | demonstrated    |
|   |         |                       |      |     | and deployed in |
|   |         |                       |      |     | FY 2001.        |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | Lo      | Develop/implement     | Ric  | O   | The R&D will    |
| M | ng-term | program for long term | hard | ngo | provide a       |
| A | Gas     | surveillance of       | M    | ing | technical basis |
| - | Gen     | materials packaged    | ason | [Co | for continued   |
| 7 | eration | according to          | (L   | mpl | assurance of    |
| , | Surve   | STD-3013-99. Identify | ANL) | ete | containment     |
| C | illance | any sub-populations   | /    | ?   | integrity and   |
| - | for     | that have the         | Sh   | ?]{ | establishes the |
| 7 | Sta     | potential to cause    | aron | .ma | parameters for  |
|   | bilized | problems during       | Arp  | rk} | safe long-term  |
|   | NM &    | long-term storage.    | (DOE |     | storage of      |
|   | R       | All materials         | -AL) |     | Pu-bearing      |
|   | esidues | packaged into 3013    |      |     | materials in    |
|   |         | cans for long-term    |      |     | 3013            |
|   |         | storage must be       |      |     | containers.     |
|   |         | represented in this   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | program. The majority |      |     |                 |
|   |         | of the experimental   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | work is presently     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | being conducted       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | within the Materials  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | Identification and    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | Stabilization (MIS)   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | program in response   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | to 94-1 concerns.     |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| N | Gas     | During FY-01, -02,    | Alan | Dec | These           |
| M | Gen     | perform alpha         | Icen | -02 | measurements    |
| B | eration | radiolysis studies to | hour |     | will provide a  |
| - | in      | determine and model   |      |     | statistical     |
| 1 | U-233   | gas generation        | (O   |     | basis for       |
|   | Ma      | characteristics of    | RNL) |     | bounding limits |
|   | terials | U-233 materials.      |      |     | on U-233        |
|   |         | These studies will be |      |     | nuclear         |
|   |         | performed on uranium  |      |     | materials in    |
|   |         | oxide compounds that  |      |     | cans for        |
|   |         | contain known amounts |      |     | shipment and    |
|   |         | of fluoride           |      |     | help establish  |
|   |         | impurities or sorbed  |      |     | a technical     |
|   |         | water. The results    |      |     | basis for the   |
|   |         | for this work,        |      |     | safe storage of |
|   |         | combined with the     |      |     | these oxides.   |
|   |         | results already       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | obtained from the     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | gamma radiolysis      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | experiments on        |      |     |                 |
|   |         | uranium oxides, will  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | provide a clearer     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | picture of the        |      |     |                 |
|   |         | radiolytic behavior   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | of these systems,     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | demonstrating that    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | they do not exceed    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | container design      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | pressures or          |      |     |                 |
|   |         | compromise container  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | integrity.            |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+

+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| * | **A     | **Task Description**  | **C  | **D | **Deliverable** |
| * | ctivity |                       | onta | ate |                 |
| I | Title** |                       | ct** | C   |                 |
| D |         |                       |      | omp |                 |
| * |         |                       |      | let |                 |
| * |         |                       |      | e** |                 |
+===+=========+=======================+======+=====+=================+
| S | Dry     | Establish a technical | Greg | Sep | Report          |
| N | Phy     | basis for the drying  | W    | -01 | identifying a   |
| F | sically | techniques and final  | achs |     | technical basis |
| A | En      | dryness levels for    |      |     | for drying      |
| - | trained | dry storage of        | (N   |     | techniques.     |
| 1 | Water   | formerly wet spent    | MFA) |     |                 |
|   | in SNF  | fuels as a means of   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | limiting the gas      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | generation potential  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | of these materials in |      |     |                 |
|   |         | storage.              |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| S | Pe      | SNF-05 -- Development | Paul | Sep | Report          |
| N | rmeable | effort includes Pd-Cu | Les  | -01 | identifying     |
| F | M       | membrane              | sing |     | rates versus    |
| A | embrane | qualification tests   | /    |     | temperatures    |
| - |         | and ceramic membrane  | G    |     | and pressures   |
| 4 |         | development. Testing  | regg |     |                 |
|   |         | indicates that Pd-Cu  | W    |     |                 |
|   |         | membrane will remove  | achs |     |                 |
|   |         | hydrogen \~5 times    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | the rate of           | (NS  |     |                 |
|   |         | generation at 100 °C  | NFP) |     |                 |
|   |         | & 50 psig. Testing is |      |     |                 |
|   |         | needed at lower       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | temperatures and      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | pressures. (Work is   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | complete, but tests   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | are planned for lower |      |     |                 |
|   |         | temperatures and      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | pressures)            |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| S | H       | Task Description:     | G    | Sep | Report          |
| N | ydrogen | Refine gas generation | regg | -01 | detailing the   |
| F | Gen     | rates (corrosion,     | W    |     | sources of      |
| A | eration | radiolysis,           | achs |     | hydrogen in SNF |
| - | Mecha   | radiogenic). Sources  |      |     | packages.       |
| 5 | nism(s) | of hydrogen in SNF    | (NS  |     |                 |
|   |         | packages: (1)         | NFP) |     |                 |
|   |         | corrosion reactions   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | (inadequate drying;   |      |     |                 |
|   |         | sludge, crud, &       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | corrosion products    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | and pockets within    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | damaged cladding);    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | (2) radiolysis of     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | bound water (aluminum |      |     |                 |
|   |         | hydroxides & uranium  |      |     |                 |
|   |         | hydrates); (3)        |      |     |                 |
|   |         | radiolysis of         |      |     |                 |
|   |         | hydrocarbons (if      |      |     |                 |
|   |         | present); and (4)     |      |     |                 |
|   |         | ternary fission       |      |     |                 |
|   |         | product tritium.      |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| S | Detect  | Develop a technique   | Phil | Sep | Report          |
| N | M       | to remotely measure   | Win  | -01 | detailing the   |
| F | oisture | moisture content of   | ston |     | statistical     |
| A | Re      | spent fuel at high    |      |     | approach to be  |
| - | maining | accuracy to bind the  | Ron  |     | used.           |
| 6 | in a    | gas generation        | De   |     |                 |
|   | Dry     | potential of these    | nney |     |                 |
|   | Fuel    | materials in dry      |      |     |                 |
|   | Storage | storage canisters.    | (NS  |     |                 |
|   | System  |                       | NFP) |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+
| S | Testing | Hydrogen has a        | G    | D   | Report          |
| N | of      | deleterious effect on | regg | one | identifying the |
| F | h       | stainless steel. The  | W    |     | rates of        |
| A | ydrogen | hydrogen diffuses     | achs |     | deterioration   |
| - | effects | into the molecular    |      |     | and suggestions |
| 7 | on      | level of the steel    | (NS  |     | of how to       |
|   | st      | matrix. This causes   | NFP) |     | mitigate any    |
|   | ainless | embrittlement of the  |      |     | issues regard   |
|   | steel   | steel and would       |      |     | these findings. |
|   |         | eventually lead to    |      |     |                 |
|   |         | canister failure over |      |     |                 |
|   |         | time.                 |      |     |                 |
+---+---------+-----------------------+------+-----+-----------------+

[^1]: The latest version is DOE-STD-3013-2000, Stabilization, Packaging,
    and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials, September 2000

[^2]: Summary of Plutonium Storage Package Failures" by P. Gary Eller,
    Richard W. Szempruch, and James W. McClard, LA-UR-99-2896, June
    1999.

[^3]: DOE-STD-3013-2000, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
    Plutonium-Bearing Materials