**Comprehensive**

**Emergency**

**Management**

**A Governor's Guide**

National Governors' Association

Center for Policy Research

Washington, D.C.

*This publication printed for*

*Defense Civil Preparedness Agency*

*May 1979*

Hilary Whittaker is director, National Governors' Association Emergency
Preparedness Project.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is permitted for any
use of the U.S. government.

March 1979

© 1979 by the National Governors' Association, Washington, D.C.
Permission to quote from or reproduce materials in this publication is
granted when due acknowledgment is made.

*Printed in the United States of America.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office

Washinton, D.C. 20402

Stock Number 008-040-00079-6

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  CONTENTS

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Preface

**1. Current Emergency Management in the United States 1**

> Federal Emergency Programs 2
>
> State Emergency Management, 1978 3

2\. What Is Comprehensive Emergency Management? 11

> Types of Emergencies 12
>
> Emergency Management Phases 12
>
> Federal-State-Local Partnership 13
>
> Organizational Involvement in Varied Types of Emergencies 15

**3. Role of the Governor in Comprehensive Emergency Management 27**

> The Governor's Policy 28
>
> Establishing a CEM Program 31
>
> Appointing a Comprehensive Emergency Manager 33

4\. Monitoring Comprehensive Emergency Management 35

> The Governor's Report 36
>
> Annual CEM Evaluation 37

5\. Obtaining Federal Assistance in Emergencies 43

> Accuracy 43
>
> Timing 44
>
> Gauging 45
>
> Communications 46

6\. Summary 49

> **Appendix A:** NGA Comprehensive Emergency Management Policy **51**
>
> **Appendix B:** The Governor's Emergency Report **55**

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  PREFACE

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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor answered the phone at 3 a.m. It was his friend the    |
| > mayor of Wetcreek, excitedly reporting that twenty-seven people who |
| > were marooned in trees were in danger of drowning in rapidly rising |
| > flood waters. Urgent help was needed. The governor ordered Civil    |
| > Air Patrol search and rescue teams to the scene and requested a     |
| > prompt situation report. When he had not received a report by 7     |
| > a.m., the governor called the Civil Air Patrol and was informed     |
| > that the search and rescue squad had found some escaped cats from a |
| > boarding kennel that had been treed in the heavy rain. The kennel   |
| > attendant was new on the job and had frantically called a           |
| > schoolmate, the mayor's son, for assistance. The press ate it up    |
| > when they heard about it.*                                          |
|                                                                       |
| This example illustrated two important points: governors must have    |
| the facts, and they must know emergency management procedures before  |
| acting.                                                               |
|                                                                       |
| Had the governor called his emergency services office (SEO), it would |
| (or should) have checked with the highway patrol, the local emergency |
| services coordinator, and the weather service for the facts. A couple |
| of calls would have avoided an embarrassing situation.                |
|                                                                       |
| Governors have learned the hard way not to jump the gun when calls    |
| first come in. IMMEDIATE, CORRECT DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS ARE GOVERNORS'   |
| FIRST NEED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT.                          |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Emergencies can strike at any time, with either minor or monumental
human, economic, and political consequences. The technological, social,
and political developments of the twentieth century are compounding and
expanding the range of traditional natural hazards that states must
manage:

-   Billions of dollars are spent annually by states and municipalities
    on emergency response and recovery.

-   Five hundred million dollars is spent each year on federal disaster
    aid to states where about fifty presidentially declared disasters
    and emergencies occur.

-   Two, three, or more sizable hazardous materials accidents,
    explosions, and train derailments occur daily in the United States.

-   Ten to fifteen thousand people a year die from burns alone, largely
    in residential fires, but also in fires associated with natural
    disasters and industrial accidents.

-   Fire accounts for \$11 to \$12 billion in losses annually.

-   Thirty-five percent of the U.S. population and thirty-nine states
    are at major or minor earthquake risk.

-   Two to three billion dollars a year is spent on earthquake-resistant
    construction.

-   One hundred eleven acts of domestic terrorism occurred in 1977, of
    which fifty-eight were bombing threats.

Governors, who are responsible for the safety and welfare of the people
of their states, are in a unique position to coordinate state, local,
and federal resources in preventing avoidable hazards, mitigating and
preparing for unavoidable disasters, responding to them, and recovering
from emergencies of all kinds.

There are, however, an inordinate number of conceptual, organizational,
procedural, legislative, and leadership roadblocks that have hampered
states' ability to manage emergencies and disasters.

Governors of the United States, its commonwealths, and territories have
become increasingly concerned about the lack of a national policy for
managing natural, man-made, and attack emergencies. This lack of a
comprehensive national policy for emergency management, coupled with a
dispersion of emergency management responsibilities among numerous
federal agencies, has compounded states' problems.

This concern prompted the National Governors' Association to form a
Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance in 1977 to urge the president to
establish a new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and to
undertake a comprehensive one-year project to analyze and make
recommendations about the states' problems in managing all types of
emergencies.

This guide highlights the findings of the NGA Emergency Preparedness
Project study, recommends an approach to comprehensive state emergency
management, and offers pertinent management advice and tools based on
hard-won experience in a variety of states.

Case histories based on actual experience, as told by governors, their
aides, and state emergency office directors, appear as insets throughout
the text. These case histories both illustrate and augment the
surrounding text. The outcomes of cases describing comprehensive
emergency management are hypothetical, as this practice is not yet
implemented in most states.

Intended for governors and their staff aides, this guide is concerned
with emergency management. It is one of a series of five companion
publications of the NGA Center for Policy Research. The others are
listed, with capsule descriptions, inside the back cover.

We wish to acknowledge the spirit of cooperation and helpfulness
extended by governors, executive aides, state budget and planning
officers, state emergency services directors, and other staff in
twenty-five states across the nation. Appreciation and thanks are also
extended to national and local emergency-related organizations, local
elected and appointed officials, representatives of the research
community, and many public interest groups. The high degree of interest
and cooperation received reflects the concern of all in improving
emergency management.

Special thanks are due Nevada Governor Mike O'Callaghan, chairman of the
NGA Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance. His expert advice, not only
from a governor's viewpoint, but also as an experienced regional
director of the former Offices of Emergency Planning and Preparedness,
was invaluable. The advice of subcommittee members George Jones,
representing Virginia Governor John Dalton; Milton Mitnick, representing
Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen; Hayden Haynes, representing Oklahoma
Governor David L. Boren; and State Representative Bill Stewart,
representing Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp, was also extremely
helpful. George Jones wrote the declaration summary in this guide and
originally conceptualized the need for the NGA project.

NGA General Counsel John Lagomarcino, who acted as staff advisor to the
project, gave invaluable advice and support. Others whose work
contributed substantively to the concepts in this manual are: Vernon L.
Wingert, project associate director; Hugh Russell, evaluation
consultant; Jim Morentz, research consultant; and Edmond F. Rovner,
legal consultant.

Appreciation is extended to DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana, his special
assistant for liaison, Angela Novello, and Plans and Operations Director
John McConnell, who provided the funding and gave unstinting support to
the project staff.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1\. CURRENT EMERGENCY                                                 |
|                                                                       |
| MANAGEMENT IN THE                                                     |
|                                                                       |
| UNITED STATES                                                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor's office manager routed a new U.S. Geological Survey  |
| > map of seismic zones to the special assistant for natural           |
| > resources, who was uncertain about which communities would be most  |
| > vulnerable. So he sent the map to the state geologist, who added    |
| > possible fault lines and placed them on subdivision maps. These     |
| > were sent, in turn, to state legislators and local municipalities.  |
| > Several legislators from hazard zones proposed a statute requiring  |
| > real estate agents to disclose the fault lines to potential         |
| > property buyers. The real estate industry, however, discredited the |
| > map as theoretical and influenced key legislators to bottle up the  |
| > bill in committee. Local city councils, which also reviewed the     |
| > maps, could not decide on needed action. Eventually, the matter was |
| > dropped.*                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| Lack of decisive follow-up on federal research provided to states     |
| often happens when RESPONSIBILITIES ARE FRAGMENTED. The USGS sent the |
| material to the states, but did not have authority to make            |
| operational recommendations. The state geologist felt he had met his  |
| responsibility when he disseminated more detailed information. The    |
| Land Use Planning Office and other pertinent agencies were not        |
| consulted, and the complex set of technical, economic, and public     |
| policy concerns involved remained unaddressed.                        |
|                                                                       |
| A state comprehensive emergency manager with governor's clout could   |
| have established a mitigation management plan and monitoring system,  |
| coordinated consideration of the matter from all angles, and          |
| developed plans and follow-up for this and other potential hazards.   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Although most legislation enables a broader approach, both federal and
state government have managed disasters mainly in terms of
preparedness[^1] for and response^\*^ to expected disaster events. For
example, Pennsylvania emphasizes flood preparedness; Texas and Florida
have developed hurricane response plans and procedures.

At the federal level, preparedness for attack and preparedness for
natural disasters have usually been administered by separate agencies.
Currently, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) in the
Department of Defense and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
(FDAA) in the Department of Housing and Urban Development share lead
roles. Many fragmented services are provided by some thirty other
agencies. Efforts to coordinate the management of man-made disasters are
just beginning.

Although individual agencies, notably the U.S. Fire Administration
(formerly the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration), have
done much to develop prevention and mitigation^\*^ programs for certain
kinds of emergencies, little has been done until this year (1978) to
integrate mitigation and long-term recovery^\*^ activities into a
coordinated emergency management program. The same is true at the state
level.

Only recently has the combination of technological hazards and rising
personnel and equipment costs demanded that governments at federal,
state, and local levels coordinate their resources for emergency
mitigation and long-term recovery, in addition to preparedness and
response. These same forces require the broadest use of available
resources to meet needs without increasing costs.

Federal Emergency Programs

New Deal social programs in the 1930s initiated piecemeal federal
assistance to natural disaster victims. Since then a patchwork of
agencies, departments, and councils has been established by executive
orders, acts of Congress, administrative delegations, and reorganization
plans. They have been largely temporary in nature, responding to
specific disasters. In 1950, two separate federal civil defense and
disaster relief acts were passed. Attack response and natural disaster
response have been conceptually and legislatively separated ever since.

Federal financial assistance to state and local jurisdictions for civil
defense programs was begun in 1958. At that time, the Federal Civil
Defense Act was amended to provide federal matching (50/50) funds for
"personnel and administrative" expenditures for civil defense
preparedness. Attack preparedness was mandated as a joint
federal-state-local responsibility.

The Council of State Governments recommended model state civil defense
legislation in 1958. Most states have adopted it either wholly or in
part. On the basis of this legislation, local and state governments
implemented emergency programs for both attack and natural disaster
preparedness. A serious conflict emerged, however, between the different
orientations of the model state legislation on the one hand and
restrictive civil defense attack preparedness and funding provisions on
the other.

States, which must deal with all kinds of emergencies with limited
personnel, have found it very difficult to handle disasters effectively
when they have to coordinate with multiple federal agencies, each with
its own mandate and restrictions. Governors, therefore, have become
increasingly concerned about the lack of a comprehensive national policy
and organization for all types of emergencies. They began to voice their
concern through NGA in 1977.

On June 9, 1978, after strong resistance from some of the federal
agencies concerned, President Carter submitted Reorganization Plan
Number Three to Congress. He did so because of strong pressure for the
plan from civil defense and emergency services organizations, state and
local officials, and public interest groups, among which NGA played a
lead role.

A new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be created in
early 1979. Its director will report to the president and chair an
emergency management committee comprising the assistants to the
president for national security affairs, domestic affairs and policy,
and intergovernmental relations, and the director of the Office of
Management and Budget. FEMA will include the Federal Insurance
Administration (FIA) from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the U.S. Fire Administration from the Department of
Commerce, and the Federal Emergency Broadcast System's oversight
responsibility from the Office of the President.

Other agencies and programs to be consolidated into FEMA include the
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency from the Department of Defense, the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration from HUD, the Federal
Preparedness Agency from the General Services Administration, the
National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program from Commerce,
the Dam Safety Coordination Program and Earthquake Hazard Reduction
Office, both from the Executive Office of the President, and two
emergency functions not assigned to any agency: Federal Response to
Consequences of Terrorist Incidents and Coordination of Emergency
Warning. Federal emergency preparedness and response organizational
development is capsulized in Figure 1.

This is the first time that mitigation, response and preparedness
programs are being stressed in a coordinated manner at the federal
level, and it is hoped that FEMA may also develop strong long-term
recovery coordination programs. FEMA can provide the foundation for a
comprehensive national emergency management system wherein federal,
state, and local emergency management organizations become equal
partners.

State Emergency Management, 1978

At the same time governors were urging federal consolidation, they also
initiated a study of state emergency management by the NGA Center for
Policy Research. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency funded the
project and the NGA Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance provided
advisory guidance.

State emergency offices reported a total of 1,242 emergencies in the
first half of 1978, compared to 1,461 incidents in the past five years.
Their figures also indicate that man-made emergencies, such as hazardous
materials accidents, utilities failures, pollution, and terrorism, are
dramatically increasing. Man-made emergencies represent two-thirds (819)
of the cases this year alone, in contrast to one-fifth (291) of the
cases dealt with during the past five years.

The figures in Table 1 indicate events that have been reported to state
emergency services offices. We cannot be sure how well they represent
the number of emergencies that actually occurred throughout the United
States, its commonwealths, and territories during this period. But the
figures do reflect a changing trend in the type of emergencies reported.
This trend requires a parallel change in emergency management procedure.

*These figures strongly indicate that states should examine their
capacity to deal with man-made and civil hazards in addition to natural
disasters.* In fact, the 1977-78 chairman of the National Governors'
Association, Governor William G. Milliken of Michigan, and the
subcommittee chairman, Governor Mike O'Callaghan, have called for the
establishment of an office to coordinate hazardous materials accidents
management within FEMA.

**Figure 1**

FEDERAL EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

-   All states have emergency office (SEOs) which plan for, and
    coordinate responses to, natural disasters and possible attack. *Few
    SEOs, however, coordinate technological hazards, energy and
    materials shortages, or long-onset natural disasters such as
    droughts and internal disturbances.* Not one comprehensively
    coordinates mitigation and long-term recovery for all risks.
    Overall, SEOs coordinate response to only 40 percent of all
    emergencies that occur.

    The majority of governors (72 percent) and SEO directors (71
    percent) interviewed consider response to natrual disasters as the
    SEO's responsibility. All consider attack, whether nuclear or
    conventional, as adjutant-general and National Guard matters. If an
    attack occurred, however, many National Guard units and
    adjutants-general would be federalized, leaving the SEO to
    coordinate civilian protection. Federalization could pose a
    management continuity problem in some states with a high percentage
    of mililtary reservists on SEO staffs. Response to technological
    hazards and civil disorders is assigned to various offices most (80
    percent) of the time. State response operations are thus split by
    types of emergencies.

+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| **Table 1**                                |            |            |
|                                            |            |            |
| STATE EMERGENCY INCIDENCE TRENDS           |            |            |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
|                                            | *          | **1978**   |
|                                            | *1973-78** |            |
|                                            |            | (Jan       |
|                                            |            | uary-June) |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Natural Events                             | 1,082      | 339        |
|                                            |            |            |
| Wind, water, rural fire, snow and ice      | 69         | 78         |
|                                            |            |            |
| Drought and range infestion                | 19         | 6          |
|                                            |            |            |
| Land movement                              |            |            |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
|                                            | 1,170      | 423        |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Man-Made Events                            | 75         | 38         |
|                                            |            |            |
| Urban fire                                 | 70         | 65         |
|                                            |            |            |
| Utilities failures, explosions, air        | 37         | 51         |
| crashes, oil spills                        |            |            |
|                                            | 102        | 87         |
| Pollution, epidemics                       |            |            |
|                                            | 7          | 25         |
| Radiation                                  |            |            |
|                                            | \-\-\-\--  | 550        |
| Terrorism, civil disorder                  |            |            |
|                                            | \-\-\-\--  | 3          |
| Hazardous materials accidents              |            |            |
|                                            |            |            |
| Energy shortages                           |            |            |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
|                                            | 291        | 819        |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Total                                      | 1,461      | 1,242      |
+--------------------------------------------+------------+------------+

The governors and SEO directors interviewed see preparedness and
response as the responsibility of the SEO, rather than mitigation and
recovery. These latter two functions are viewed as federal
responsibilities to be carried out by block (not categorical, which are
too limiting) grants to states. Governors and SEO directors are not
sure, however, about what state office should administer such grants.
Thus *emergency operations appear to be fragmented at both the federal
and the state level by type of emergency, by phases of management, and
by organizational involvement.*

Nonetheless, the study found direct management links between types of
disasters and the four phases of emergency activity. Practical
mitigation activities should reduce the probability of some disasters
and ameliorate the effects of them all. Preparedness activities should
reduce the probability of deaths, injuries, and property damage caused
by emergencies. Immediate response and long-term recovery measures, if
managed in the context of overall state community development planning,
can speed return to normalcy and contribute materially to state
development.

Lessons learned from recovery activities are often not used in
mitigating consequences of future disasters because state legislators
and planners are seldom involved in any continuous way. *It is evident
that the close links between mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery are not adequately understood.*

The lack of understanding of the relationship between preparedness and
response on the one hand and recovery and mitigation on the other, and
the kinds of talents needed to manage all four phases, may be a key
factor behind differing viewpoints among emergency services operations
run by adjutants-general and civilian divisons. The NGA study showed
that a variety of skills are needed in a comprehensive emergency
management set-up:

-   *Preparedness and response* personnel need a fast-action,
    authoritative, operational, and decision-making approach to their
    work. They need systems-planning skills, training skills, and
    technical expertise.

-   *Mitigation and long-term recovery* personnel, by contrast, require
    analytic, evaluative, and policymaking skills. They also require
    political acumen and knowledge of the state development plan.

    It should not, then, be a question of whether military or civilian
    personnel or responders or planners should run emergency management.
    The question should be how any given operation can use both types of
    skills. The fortunate governor has a manager who has both sets of
    skills and infuses an appropriate balance into the emergency
    management program.

    *All of these issues lead to the major finding of the NGA study:
    many state emergency operations are fragmented.* There are two basic
    causes for this fragmentation: (1) uncoordinated federal programs
    encourage state fragmentation, and (2) the strong relationship
    between long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters and
    preparedness and response to more immediate disasters is not
    adequately understood. Little thought has been given to the
    relationship of all four phases to one another and to state
    development planning. Moreover, neither planning roles nor emergency
    policy have been delineated or articulated at federal, state, and
    local levels.

    **Figure 2**

    CURRENT STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

    (general patterns of fragmentation for all-risk management)

+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
| MITIGATION   |   | P           |   | RESPONSE    |    | RECOVERY    |
|              |   | REPAREDNESS |   |             |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
| Planning     |   | (Plans are  |   | (Varied     |    | Federal     |
|              |   | inadequate  |   | lead        |    | grants\     |
| (now ad hoc) |   | for         |   | agencies    |    | (ad hoc)    |
|              |   | man-made    |   | manage      |    |             |
|              |   | e           |   | man-made    |    |             |
|              |   | mergencies) |   | e           |    |             |
|              |   |             |   | mergencies) |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
|              |   |             |   |             |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
| Budget       |   |             |   |             |    | Legislated  |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | dollars\    |
| (now ad hoc) |   |             |   |             |    | (now ad hoc |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
|              |   |             |   |             |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
| Legislature  |   |             |   |             |    | Individual  |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | state       |
| (unaware)    |   |             |   |             |    | agency      |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | programs    |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | involving   |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | recovery    |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | (now ad     |
|              |   |             |   |             |    | hoc)        |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
|              |   |             |   |             |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+
| Implementing |   |             |   |             |    |             |
| authorities  |   |             |   |             |    |             |
|              |   |             |   |             |    |             |
| (incomplete  |   |             |   |             |    |             |
| and          |   |             |   |             |    |             |
| un           |   |             |   |             |    |             |
| coordinated) |   |             |   |             |    |             |
+--------------+---+-------------+---+-------------+----+-------------+

**Figure 3**

SUGGESTED LINKAGES FOR COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

(coordinating all risks, four phases, with state development plan)

\`

**Note:** This is a functions linkage diagram. It is not an
organizational chart or model.

To summarize, the NGA study found that many state emergency management
programs are fragmented and that mere preparedness and response
mechanisms are not enough. These must be coordinated with active
mitigation and long-term recovery programs which should be set in the
context of state development plans. The important emergency management
criteria which emerged from the study are: (1) planning, program, and
political, as well as response, skills are needed for successful
emergency management; (2) mitigation programs can save lives and
dollars; and (3) states should upgrade their capacity to deal with
man-made emergencies by using existing personnel and resources more
extensively.

Figure 2 illustrates general patterns of current state disorganization
in the context of comprehensive emergency management. Figure 3 suggests
links that could provide a comprehensive emergency management program.
These two diagrams do not describe a specific organizational chart;
rather, they illustrate important functional and management linkages
with which governors may wish to compare their own operations.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Because the governor had kept faith with a seven-state pact and    |
| > refused to accede to the demands of a terrorist group to release    |
| > twenty convicts, the terrorists dynamited a dam. The governor was   |
| > appalled at the human suffering and flood damage. He applied for,   |
| > and was granted, a presidential disaster declaration for the six    |
| > counties hit hardest by the flood. During several visits to the     |
| > disaster scene, the governor observed that federal individual and   |
| > family grants were delayed, pending Small Business Administration   |
| > turndowns, and the one-stop federal assistance centers were falling |
| > behind in processing victims' claims. He signed vouchers for        |
| > thousands of dollars for state aid and services to needy victims.   |
| > Four years later, many of the vouchers were still unfulfilled.*     |
|                                                                       |
| The governor's great concern is understandable; it was the only       |
| reason he was not held accountable for his unauthorized vouchers.     |
| Human suffering can be best alleviated by mobilizing and infusing     |
| support into already existing public and private assistance           |
| organizations at national, state, and local levels. EMERGENCY         |
| MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE A TEAM EFFORT BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF RESOURCES.   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2\. WHAT IS COMPREHENSIVE                                             |
|                                                                       |
| EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT?                                                 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Shortly after his inauguration, the governor called together his   |
| > cabinet, state legislative leaders, and regional and state          |
| > emergency officers to discuss all the major emergencies in the      |
| > state over the past five years, assess the state's vulnerability to |
| > future civil disorders, plan for natural, man-made, technological,  |
| > and energy hazards, and set up a coordinated management structure.  |
| > When the director of natural resources heard the public works       |
| > commissioner describe the coastal plain building codes, he          |
| > suggested similar codes might be useful in the tornado-prone        |
| > northern area. The director of transportation also suggested that   |
| > road safety codes be updated for transporting hazardous materials   |
| > cargoes across interstate highways. The speaker backed the          |
| > proposals as public safety issues and agreed to push new            |
| > legislation. The governor, pleased with these results, appointed a  |
| > comprehensive emergency manager for the state, with authority to    |
| > convene agency heads and other key officials to investigate, share, |
| > and develop other ideas and cooperative efforts to mitigate all     |
| > kinds of emergencies.*                                              |
|                                                                       |
| This example of gubernatorial initiative led to COMPREHENSIVE         |
| EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT in the state, with the potential for long-term   |
| benefits to public protection. It also resulted in recovery cost      |
| savings which were directed into long-delayed public development      |
| programs in the state community development plan.                     |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) is a new term. It refers to a
state's responsibility and capability for managing all types of
emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous
agencies. The "comprehensive" aspect of CEM includes all four phases of
disaster or emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery. It applies to all risks: attack, man-made, and natural, in a
federal-state-local partnership.

CEM should be distinguished from the term *comprehensive emergency
preparedness,* now generally in use, because the latter has come to
place too much emphasis, in practice if not legislative intent, on the
preparedness phase of emergency management. There are several reasons
for this misdirected emphasis: (1) a lack of federal funds to states to
mount mitigation and long-term recovery planning, (2) a lack of state
funds, staff, and time to coordinate these phases, and (3) a lack of
understanding of the relationships between the four phases. In addition,
public leaders have tended to emphasize preparedness and response at the
expense of coordinated mitigation and recovery, at both federal and
state levels.

A CEM program identifies agencies and individuals who have useful
resources to bring to bear on all aspects of emergencies. It motivates
them to apply their resources in the most productive manner, and it
coordinates their disaster activities. The coordination function should
not be confused with the concept of "directing," as in directing
emergency response operations.

The following discussion describes types of emergencies, phases of
disaster activities, and the partnership of organizations whose
emergency resources a state CEM program must coordinate. In short, it
delineates the components of a state CEM program and shows their
interrelationships.

Types of Emergencies

Emergencies take many forms. They can involve any combination of
consequences stemming from:

-   *Technological and man-made hazards:* nuclear waste disposal spills;
    radiological, toxic substance, or hazardous materials accidents;
    utilities failures; pollution; epidemics; crashes; explosions; urban
    fires.

-   *Natural disasters:* earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes,
    tsunami, sea surges, freezes, blizzards of snow and ice, extreme
    cold, forest fires, drought, and range infestation.

-   *Internal disturbances:* civil disorders such as riots,
    demonstrations run amok, large-scale prison breaks, strikes leading
    to violence, and acts of terrorism.

-   *Energy and material shortages:* from strikes, price wars, labor
    problems, and resource scarcity.

-   *Attack:* the ultimate emergency---nuclear, conventional, chemical,
    or biological warfare.

Emergency Management Phases

Emergency-related activities are clustered into four phases that are
related by time and function to all types of disasters. The phases are
also related to each other, and each involves different types of skills.

*Mitigation:* Mitigation includes any activities that actually eliminate
or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster (for example, arms
build-up to deter enemy attack or legislation that takes the unstable
double-bottom tanker off the highways). It includes long-term activities
designed to reduce the effects of unavoidable disaster (for example,
land-use management, establishing comprehensive emergency management
programs, or legislating building safety codes).

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *After a suburban gas line explosion tore up several roads, the     |
| > governor was called on to solve the problem of restrictions that    |
| > prohibited state vehicles from clearing county roads to utility     |
| > lines. After notifying the attorney general and the Highway         |
| > Department, the governor suspended the problem-causing statute and  |
| > notified the County Road Commission. The CEM director and the       |
| > attorney general were later asked to look into all laws and         |
| > regulations that might have emergency-related conflicts and to      |
| > recommend solutions. When the recommendations were compiled, the    |
| > governor addressed both the state legislature and the annual        |
| > convention of county commissioners about writing and revising       |
| > statutory and regulatory language to allow for responsible, wider   |
| > application of authorities in times of emergency.*                  |
|                                                                       |
| Experience, if acted upon, can reduce procedural frustration in times |
| of emergency when responsible, fast decisions and follow-up are       |
| needed and thus improve future PREPAREDNESS and response.             |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

*Preparedness:* Preparedness activities are necessary to the extent that
mitigation measures have not, or cannot, prevent disasters. In the
preparedness phase, governments, organizations, and individuals develop
plans to save lives and minimize disaster damage (for example, compiling
state resource inventories, mounting training exercises, or installing
warning systems). Preparedness measures also seek to enhance disaster
response operations (for example, by stockpiling vital food and medical
supplies, through training exercises, and by mobilizing emergency
personnel on a standby basis).

*Response:* Response activities follow an emergency or disaster.
Generally, they are designed to provide emergency assistance for
casualties (for example, search and rescue, emergency shelter, medical
care, mass feeding). They also seek to reduce the probability of
secondary damage (for example, shutting off contaminated water supply
sources, cordoning off and patrolling looting-prone areas) and to speed
recovery operations (for example, damage assessment).

*Recovery:* Recovery activities continue until all systems return to
normal or better. They include two sets of activities: Short-term
recovery activities return vital life-support systems to minimum
operating standards (for example, cleanup, temporary housing). Long-term
recovery activities may continue for a number of years after a disaster.
Their purpose is to return life to normal, or improved levels (for
example, redevelopment loans, legal assistance, and community planning).

Federal-State-Local Partnership

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The National Weather Service issued a forecast for a severe and    |
| > prolonged drought throughout the central United States. Governors   |
| > of eight affected states directed their CEM directors to set up a   |
| > task force coordinated by NGA, which in turn asked the Farmers Home |
| > Administration, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation     |
| > Service, and other offices in the U.S. Department of Agriculture to |
| > participate. The National Association of Counties, the National     |
| > League of Cities, and the National Weather Service were also        |
| > contacted and brought together. The task force analyzed irrigation  |
| > possibilities and the potential economic threat to affected         |
| > farmers, their markets and to the national economy. An effective    |
| > county-by-county public information program was mounted. In some    |
| > areas, farmers agreed to plant alternate crops requiring less       |
| > water; farmers from southeastern and southwestern states agreed to  |
| > increase their corn and wheat production. State legislatures passed |
| > temporary farm assistance programs, and state agriculture and       |
| > planning offices provided regular reports to the state CEM          |
| > directors and governors. When the drought lifted five years later,  |
| > no presidential disaster declaration had been issued, and no        |
| > farmers had lost appreciable income.*                               |
|                                                                       |
| This is an example of how COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND      |
| EFFECTIVE FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL PARTNERSHIP can mitigate an emergency.  |
| It is based on real events, although the coordinated outcome is       |
| hypothetical.                                                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Different levels of public and private organizations have special
resources they can apply to disaster management. For example, the
*federal government* provides authorities---legislation, executive
orders, and regulations---which influence disaster activities. It is
also an important source of fiscal aid that can be applied to emergency
management. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, for example,
provides preparedness planning grants to states; the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency provides operations planning and financial
assistance, including personnel and administrative support funds. In
other cases, federal agencies are sources of the specialized services,
research, technical information, and manpower needed in disaster work.

*Local governments* also have unique resources. First and foremost, they
bring *motivation* to manage disasters, all of which occur in single or
multiple localities. Second, localities provide *manpower* and
*knowledge of the area* affected by a disaster. Third, they can provide
*limited funds and locally available equipment and supplies.* Fourth,
they can pass ordinances and regulations to prevent or forestall some
emergencies, reduce the damage caused by others, improve response
efficiency, and enhance recovery.

*The private sector* can provide *specialized material,* such as heavy
construction equipment, and *volunteer workers* with varied expertise.
The private sector can also provide *specialized technical information.*
Chemical companies, for example, can provide data on the rate of
detoxification for certain accidentally released chemicals.

*State governments* have a very strong *public mandate* (and federal
encouragement) to coordinate all aspects of emergency management. This
mandate is translated into *legislated authorities* and *extraordinary
gubernatorial powers.* The state, like the federal government, is a
source of disaster-related *laws and regulations,* such as land use
codes, state fire regulations, and other protective covenants. State
government is also a source of the public administration skills and
equipment necessary to manage emergencies.

State government's unique resource is its capability to broker
relationships between those in need at the local level and those who can
help at the state and federal levels.

Although the variety of hazards and the costs of responding to them are
growing, personnel, equipment, and dollars are becoming more scarce.
This disparity has led some states to seek ways to use available
resources more efficiently at all levels of government and in the
private sectors. More should do so.

State government is in a unique position to ascertain local disaster
program needs, assess available state and federal government disaster
resources, and facilitate the acquisition, application, and coordination
of those resources.

These fiscal and management factors favor a program of comprehensive
emergency management, that is, the integration of all possible
organizations at all levels into all phases of emergency activity, for
all types of disasters. CEM is more appropriate for state governments
than emergency preparedness alone.

In summary, comprehensive emergency management marshals all the
resources available to meet all potential emergencies under coordinated
management. CEM enables a state to meet its responsibility in
emergencies and disasters by coordinating public and private programs,
not only toward *preparedness* and *response* to disasters, but for
*mitigation* of their consequences and augmenting *recovery* from them.
CEM fosters a *federal-state-local operating* *partnership.*

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *A series of tornadoes across the state inflicted severe damage on  |
| > two medium-sized cities. In visiting both, the governor noticed     |
| > that cleanup seemed to be further along in the more severely hit    |
| > city. He found that the local emergency services coordinator (EMC)  |
| > was well respected in town and had worked out and tested an         |
| > emergency response plan for early warnings from the National        |
| > Weather Service. He had initiated installation of new warning       |
| > sirens at the fire department and had coordinated health services,  |
| > evacuation procedures, search and rescue operations, debris         |
| > clearance, temporary shelter construction, feeding programs, and    |
| > other response services. He had made particularly good use of       |
| > trained volunteers. The other city had a part-time EMC, who was not |
| > on duty when the tornado hit. Warnings to the city, as well as      |
| > notification to city and state officials, were delayed. The second  |
| > city, although less severely struck, took longer to respond to and  |
| > recover from the emergency.*                                        |
|                                                                       |
| Both these situations occur frequently throughout the United States.  |
| CEM, EXTENDED TO THE LOCAL LEVEL, should involve meetings between     |
| governors and state-level CEM coordinators and the local officials    |
| who appoint emergency management coordinators to develop a mutual     |
| understanding of roles and responsibilities. An agreement under which |
| local officials nominate several EMC candidates to the governor for   |
| final choice and joint local-state funding of salaries of full-time   |
| EMCs might be useful.                                                 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Organizational Involvement in Varied Types of Emergencies

To further illustrate the various aspects of CEM, let us take a specific
look at organizational resources in each phase of five varied types of
emergencies.

The following diagrams illustrate that emergencies are handled by
combinations of organizations that vary according to type of emergency
and phases of emergency management. Comprehensive emergency management
coordinates the interactions of all organizations for all phases of all
risks. The diagrams on the following pages depict five generalizations:

-   Federal and state governments are the major sources of long-term
    recovery resources for all types of major emergencies. The private
    sector and local government can make special contributions which,
    together with outside assistance, require coordination at the state
    level.

-   Generally, federal organizations provide resources for all phases of
    activity only in conditions of attack or internal disturbance.

-   Federal resources are usually tapped for national, strategic,
    long-term recovery, and preparedness aspects of emergency
    management.

-   Generally, local and private resources are most appropriate for
    emergency preparedness operations, response mobilization, and
    short-term recovery.

-   In all types of disasters, state organizations not only provide
    disaster resources, but also coordinate the resources and assistance
    provided by other levels.

Hence, state government exercises a pivotal role in managing all kinds
of disasters.

Figures 4 through 8 illustrate the organizational levels that usually
have the most resources to bring to bear on five types of emergencies:
attack, internal disturbance, natural disaster, technological hazard,
and energy or materials shortage. In each figure, the center circle
labels the type of emergency; the second circle shows quadrants for the
four phases of emergency activity; and the screening, or shading, in the
outer circles shows emphases of organizational activity by emergency
phase.

The figures highlight primary resources in order to point up differing
organizational role emphases between types of emergencies as they appear
to be practiced currently. There are, of course, numerous specific
exceptions.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor of a coastal state learned from the press that        |
| > federal agents had captured a group of Asians who had recently      |
| > arrived by ship to blow up strategic facilities in Port City with a |
| > nuclear bomb. The terrorists were protesting the deportation of     |
| > fellow countrymen for subversive activities. The mayor of Port City |
| > had notified the FBI, which worked with local port officials to     |
| > screen all incoming vessels. The FBI had called in the Department   |
| > of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) which had analyzed |
| > threatening telephone voices for national origin and psychological  |
| > implications. Shipping arrival schedules were then consulted and    |
| > suspect vessels searched. NEST experts found and defused the bomb   |
| > while the FBI and local police arrested the terrorists. Because the |
| > governor had not been informed of this potential threat to the city |
| > and area citizens, he filed complaints at the White House and FBI,  |
| > and requested all mayors to notify him of any terrorist or attack   |
| > events in the future.*                                              |
|                                                                       |
| While it is true that terroristic emergencies instigated by foreign   |
| or domestic groups are classified as federal offenses and the FBI     |
| and/or the State Department have official jurisdiction, the governor  |
| should have been advised. In an effort to avert panic, the State      |
| Department did not want more offices than necessary to know of the    |
| threat. It did not occur to the FBI to alert the governor, although   |
| agents were working with local police authorities. Neither would have |
| refused to do so.                                                     |
|                                                                       |
| There have been over seventy nuclear threat incidents across the      |
| United States during the last eight years. In only a few instances    |
| have the governors concerned been informed. Federal-state agreements  |
| for COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF ALL TYPES OF ATTACK EVENTS  |
| should be updated to include notification of governor's offices.      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Figure 4**

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ATTACK

![](media/image1.png){width="6.492361111111111in"
height="6.094444444444444in"}

The impact of attack (nuclear, conventional, biological, or chemical)
would be widespread, if not nationwide. Life, property, and the economy
are at risk. Federal organizations have skills, resources, and personnel
for all four phases of attack activity. State government has
preparedness, response, and recovery capability. Local governments and
the private sector have limited preparedness and recovery options. They
must deal with initial response alone until outside help is mobilized,
and must plan for that initial response. By law, attack preparedness is
a joint federal, state, and local responsibility; however, each level's
resources are different in type and amount.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor was aware of growing citizen concern about potential  |
| > radiation problems in ten urban and rural areas where new nuclear   |
| > power plants were to be located. Local officials reported           |
| > demonstrations appeared likely. The governor decided to establish a |
| > strong emergency management policy, addressing all potential risks  |
| > in the state, both technological and natural. Civil demonstrations  |
| > were averted when she initiated a public information program that   |
| > explained the need for nuclear energy and stressed the potential    |
| > economic benefits to be derived from new jobs. She personally       |
| > inaugurated public protection exercises and information programs. A |
| > small leakage incident at an existing plant was quickly handled and |
| > well publicized, forestalling public skepticism.*                   |
|                                                                       |
| The governor built a reputation for strong, forward-looking           |
| leadership by coordinating state development planning with emergency  |
| response planning. She also encouraged good interagency relationships |
| through cooperative exercises.                                        |
|                                                                       |
| The development of new industries and other economic, social, and     |
| geological changes pose potential civilian hazards. The state should  |
| have a comprehensive emergency manager to coordinate analyses of      |
| current and changing vulnerabilities that result from social and      |
| economic development. The CEM should also analyze the relation of     |
| potential risks to the state community development plan and the       |
| legislative and regulatory implications and coordinate                |
| emergency-related programming with all the concerned state agencies   |
| and offices, not only for INTERNAL DISTURBANCES but for all kinds of  |
| emergencies.                                                          |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Figure 5**

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL DISTURBANCE

![](media/image2.png){width="6.495138888888889in"
height="6.122916666666667in"}

Internal disturbances, such as riots, prison breaks, disruptive
terrorism, and strikes, are usually matters for police management, with
state and federal support and assistance being provided only if needed.
The impact of internal disturbances is more localized, threatening
mainly life and property. Local and private-sector managers usually have
the tools to mitigate and prepare for them. Local and state police
usually have the necessary response resources, unless the disturbances
pose a widespread or sensational threat.

Internal disturbances require government regulation, planning, emergency
enforcement personnel, and recovery funds. The private sector is most
limited in the response phase.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Following hurricane Zelda, the governor visited heavily devastated |
| > areas in Mason County, to find the sheriff was running roughshod    |
| > over the county civil defense director. He was giving out           |
| > conflicting news information to area CB operators, arguing with     |
| > neighboring mayors over equipment and deployment for debris         |
| > removal, and had used the governor's name to call out the National  |
| > Guard without permission. The governor convinced the sheriff that   |
| > the sheriff's most important task was to enforce public safety,     |
| > allowing others to manage relief operations. The governor left an   |
| > inexperienced aide at the scene to monitor activities in his        |
| > behalf, but the sheriff soon overstepped his role again and         |
| > confusion returned. The governor's request for a presidential       |
| > disaster declaration was delayed when he was forced to return to    |
| > the scene.*                                                         |
|                                                                       |
| The case shows a lack of several important CEM factors: TRAINING,     |
| PLANNING, and DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES at both state and local |
| levels. These factors are important not only to natural disasters but |
| to all types of emergencies.                                          |
|                                                                       |
| The National Guard should have been called out only by the governor   |
| or his authorized representative (often the SEO director), not the    |
| sheriff. Had the county commissioners been briefed on the importance  |
| of coordinating all emergency response activities apart from the      |
| sheriff's public safety functions, they might have appointed a strong |
| county emergency management coordinator to develop practical plans    |
| and cooperative training exercises.                                   |
|                                                                       |
| The governor also needed a state CEM manager to serve as state        |
| coordinating officer (SCO), with adequate clout to solve and monitor  |
| the on-site problems. This person could have worked in close          |
| cooperation with the emergency services office and all the state and  |
| national agencies involved in response operations.                    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Figure 6**

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN NATURAL DISASTER

![](media/image3.png){width="6.492361111111111in"
height="5.978472222222222in"}

Natural hazards provide the greatest opportunity for coordinated
interaction of all levels. Impact may be limited to small areas, as in
the case of a tornado that hits one town. Or, impact may be dispersed,
as in the case of multistate winter storms. To date, natural disasters
have provided all organizational levels with the most experience in
hazard management. Federal agencies provide recovery assistance for
major disasters. State emergency offices prepare for and coordinate
response to large disasters. Local governments maintain warning systems
and respond to all disasters in their areas.

Major natural disasters require recovery resources from the federal
government. The state is in a good position to coordinate all phases of
activity.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *A seventeen-car freight train carrying both chlorine and propane   |
| > gas was derailed. On visiting the scene, the governor, his          |
| > emergency services director, and an aide found that residents for a |
| > five-mile radius had been quickly evacuated. Trained railroad       |
| > technicians, wearing protective clothing, had already sealed the    |
| > cars that had been leaking deadly chlorine gas and were about to    |
| > begin the delicate operation of righting two propane gas tank cars. |
| > The governor was told the tanks were secure and the operation would |
| > be completed that afternoon. On his departure, the governor held a  |
| > press conference at the road barricade five miles away, after which |
| > his aide told reporters that local residents would be able to       |
| > return to their homes that night. Later, returning homeowners found |
| > that they were not allowed to cross the barricade. Five people who  |
| > disregarded the order and walked home through the woods were found  |
| > dead the next day of chlorine gas inhalation. Chlorine had hovered  |
| > in the forest declivity where the five victims lived.*              |
|                                                                       |
| The aide should not have inferred that the area was safe because the  |
| propane tanks would be righted that day and the chlorine tanks had    |
| been sealed.                                                          |
|                                                                       |
| In dealing with MAN-MADE TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS, public officials    |
| and their representatives must leave technically related decisions,   |
| predictions, and announcements to the experts.                        |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Figure 7**

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARD

![](media/image4.png){width="6.5in" height="6.3in"}

Most technological hazards such as train derailments or toxic gas
escapes have very limited impact areas. For the most part, they threaten
life and property, and they frequently require a great deal of
private-sector technological input to overcome them. Local jurisdictions
can mitigate technological hazards by assessing public vulnerabilities
and passing appropriate regulatory ordinances. Local governments and
private industries can cooperate in mitigation, preparedness, and
response activities. State and federal governments regulate technology
to mitigate emergencies. The federal government is least able to issue
warnings or respond to or activate short-term recovery from emergencies,
although it can provide clearinghouse, research, and information
services.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The worst blizzard in the state's history knocked out power and    |
| > utilities and blocked incoming highways and railroads. Fuel, water, |
| > food, and medical supplies became scarce in three major             |
| > communities. The governor was informed that public panic was likely |
| > and that famine and epidemic conditions were developing. Adequate   |
| > help from outside the state could not be brought in for several     |
| > days until roads and airstrips could be cleared. Having recently    |
| > participated in crisis relocation planning exercises with two       |
| > adjacent states, the governor called for all available helicopters  |
| > to evacuate stranded people according to the relocation plan. The   |
| > media broadcast life protection information for areas which         |
| > couldn't be reached immediately, and the SEO mobilized volunteer    |
| > snowmobile deliveries* of *basic necessities to distribution points |
| > until help could be brought in. The disaster response operation     |
| > worked well and also provided an opportunity to test crisis         |
| > relocation plans in a real-life situation.*                         |
|                                                                       |
| This application of attack preparedness measures and the allocation   |
| of existing resources to ENERGY AND MATERIALS SHORTAGES caused by a   |
| natural disaster illustrate the importance of integrating attack and  |
| natural disaster authorities in CEM.                                  |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Figure 8**

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ENERGY AND MATERIALS SHORTAGES

![](media/image5.png){width="6.366666666666666in"
height="6.065277777777778in"}

Energy and materials shortages require a greater input from quasi-public
and private industrial organizations. They generally threaten the
economy more than property or life. Federal government activities are
usually limited to regulatory mitigation, conciliatory response, and
long-term recovery. States can influence mitigation and preparedness
through quasi-public commissions and multistate resource-sharing
agreements. Because the scope of these disasters is usually great, local
jurisdictions are much more dependent on state-level management.

Energy and materials shortages are best mitigated by all organizational
levels. Both federal and state government can regulate production and
distribution of vital commodities. After a shortage occurs, federal
response is largely ineffectual, but state governments may have response
options, such as sharing their diminishing stockpiles or imposing
rationing. Long-term recovery usually requires major fiscal support---a
task for the federal government.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 3\. ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN                                           |
|                                                                       |
| COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT                                    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor was faced with a drought affecting human water        |
| > supplies, agricultural irrigation, inland fisheries, recreational   |
| > use of reservoirs, industrial waste disposal, and hydroelectric     |
| > power. The situation threatened severe social and economic          |
| > consequences. The governor appointed a comprehensive emergency      |
| > manager with cabinet rank, instructing her to contact the state     |
| > planning office to obtain economic forecasts and to ask line        |
| > agencies for analyses of all potential federal and state assistance |
| > programs applicable to drought situations. He also asked her to     |
| > contact other affected states regarding their planning and to       |
| > develop contingency plans and action options. The CEM manager       |
| > developed a successful three-state effort to secure federal         |
| > assistance from USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation  |
| > Service (ASCS) for emergency conservation and irrigation measures   |
| > programs. The Rural Electrification Administration provided loans,  |
| > and the Soil Conservation Service assisted in resource conservation |
| > and emergency watershed protection. County public information       |
| > programs were developed with the help of the ASCS, the state        |
| > emergency office, media, and local municipalities. The CEM manager  |
| > also coordinated planning between the federal Bureau of Land        |
| > Management and the state Emergency Services Office to mitigate the  |
| > effects of torrential rain on abnormally dehydrated land the        |
| > following year.*                                                    |
|                                                                       |
| This coordinated planning and action program at every organizational  |
| level averted the destruction of many industries in the state and     |
| provided economic assistance until plentiful rains came the next      |
| year. This is an example of RESOURCE MANAGEMENT in COMPREHENSIVE      |
| EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.                                                 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Because the governor is responsible for the general welfare of the
citizens of the state, he or she has specially legislated powers and
resources that can be applied to emergency situations. At minimum, all
governors have the responsibility to exercise the following
emergency-related options:

-   issue state or area emergency declarations and invoke appropriate
    state response actions (see Chapter 5);

-   activate emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state
    agency budgets for emergency work; and

-   apply for and monitor any federal assistance in the wake of
    disasters.

For optimum protection of public lives and property, however, governors
should support a comprehensive emergency management program. This may be
done by taking the following steps:

-   publicly declaring a policy for state performance and standards of
    emergency management;

-   taking a personal interest in life and property protection programs;

-   reviewing the current state emergency program;

-   establishing a comprehensive emergency management program for
    mitigation and recovery activities as well as preparedness and
    response based on vulnerability analyses for all types of
    emergencies;

-   appointing a CEM manager to coordinate all pertinent
    emergency-related activities of the courts, legislature, and all
    state offices, as well as substate and federal agencies. The CEM
    manager should ensure comprehensive four-phase emergency management
    for all types of emergencies, institute awareness and training as
    needed for appropriate state personnel and the general public, and
    coordinate all available resources of year-round support; and

-   establishing a continuous CEM monitoring system.

The first four of the above steps are the cornerstones of developing
CEM; the fifth and sixth provide the foundation for maintaining and
improving it. We will briefly explore the first five points on the
following pages and the sixth in the next chapter.

The Governor's Policy

A state's CEM program is based on the governor's clearly stated policy,
from which program tasks can be developed, assigned, and monitored.

Systematic assessment of the state's recent history of emergencies and
future vulnerability can help formulate the governor's stated policy.
Five questions that can help the governor derive a policy stance are
outlined below. They also suggest a CEM program of work.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Eager to support his newly appointed state health director, the    |
| > new governor agreed to participate in a series of multi-county      |
| > emergency medical service (EMS) simulation exercises. The Health    |
| > Department was working out the exercises in great detail through    |
| > all levels of the department. The governor appeared on TV to urge   |
| > complete state and local support. He expected some confusion in the |
| > first exercises, but could not understand why the entire series     |
| > lacked coordination and focus. Local public health officials seemed |
| > confused at every control point he visited. Ambulances were delayed |
| > or lost; EMS coordinators had few backup volunteers; and in one     |
| > town no one could find the keys to the school gym where patients    |
| > were to be taken. The new health director was unaware of the state  |
| > emergency plan and never thought of involving either state or       |
| > county emergency coordinating services (civil defense) offices or   |
| > the fire service, which traditionally supports many aspects of      |
| > emergency medical services. The SEO did not see the governor's      |
| > telecast, and fire officials and local emergency management         |
| > coordinators who saw it thought they were excluded in the new       |
| > administration, since they were not contacted by the SEO or EMS.    |
| > Trained community volunteers and support services were ready to     |
| > participate, but were not called.*                                  |
|                                                                       |
| No state agency can "go it alone" when it comes to large-scale public |
| involvement. Successful training, just like actual response, works    |
| well only when fully planned with and supported by the full spectrum  |
| of appropriate public and private support resources.                  |
|                                                                       |
| GOVERNORS SHOULD HAVE AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POLICY WITH COORDINATED |
| PLANS, and they should ensure that all new agency officials are       |
| oriented to these plans early in their terms.                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

1\. What emergencies have occurred over the past ten years?

-   Types of incidents

-   Frequency of occurrence

-   Duration of emergency periods

-   Warning time

    2\. What were the impacts?

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-   Lives lost and persons injured

-   Geographic locale and dispersion

-   Extent of private and public property damage

-   Response and recovery costs

-   Economic losses

    3\. How were they managed?

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-   Which organizations (federal, state, and local governments and the
    private sector)

-   Did what (lifeline and property preservation actions)

-   To forestall them, prepare for them, respond to them and/or recover
    from them

4\. Are there climatic, social, or economic changes under way in the
state that could affect its vulnerability to attack, civil disturbance,
natural, man-made, or technological disasters, or energy or materials
shortages? For example:

-   industrial and business expansion or shifts;

-   technological build-up;

-   radiological, biological, and/or chemical plant expansions, product
    use, or transportation through populated areas;

-   climatic patterns; and

-   economic trends that affect population mobility.

5\. What resources will be needed by the state to manage emergencies of
all types, beyond those resources covered in the state emergency plan?
For example:

-   special mitigation needs;

-   high priority preparedness needs;

-   response coordination needs;

-   long-term recovery needs;

-   mitigation and recovery roles of line agencies;

-   state (community development) planning applications;

-   state budget; and

-   legislation.

    Answers to these questions may be obtained by contacting a wide
    range of state officials. For example, economic advisors and state
    planners track and anticipate social, industrial, and economic
    changes that may influence a state's vulnerability to certain
    hazards. Legislators, planners, and line agency heads are familiar
    with state community development needs and resources. The state
    emergency office can deal with emergency preparedness and response
    resources.

When answers are obtained, governors and their aides should not be
overwhelmed by the potential vulnerabilities discovered, but take steps
to make political and public information decisions concerning the
release and use of the information obtained. (These questions also
provide a basis for the review all governors agreed to undertake when
they passed NGA policy position A-19 in August 1978. See Appendix A.)

The governor may wish to appoint a special CEM review leader to obtain
answers to the above questions. The review leader might be a special
appointee, a special aide, the State Emergency Services Office director,
or a person knowledgeable in all four phases of emergency management.

The CEM review leader should interview the state agency personnel who
can provide answers. Others who can help are senior personnel on the
governor's staff or planning office, since policy will flow from this
activity.

The governor's stated policy should direct the formation and/or
maintenance of a state comprehensive emergency management program.
Further, it should specify the goal of such a program. For example, "The
State Comprehensive Emergency Management program will use all resources
at its disposal (federal, state, local, private) to reduce disaster
occurrence or damage, prepare and warn citizens of imminent danger from
disasters, aid in emergency response, and facilitate disaster recovery."

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Following a landslide election victory, the governor, a former     |
| > state emergency office director, announced that the lapsed federal  |
| > building program for emergency operations centers (EOCs) would be   |
| > reactivated with surplus state funds. He met obstacles at every     |
| > turn. The legislature balked at appropriating funds for what it     |
| > considered a federal program. The budget office advised state funds |
| > were inadequate because building estimates would be doubled due to  |
| > inflation. The state architect said that the EOC plans were         |
| > outmoded. The planning commission said that the EOCs were not       |
| > strategically located. The emergency services office said there     |
| > were not adequate personnel to staff area EOCs. The governor had to |
| > retract the announcement.*                                          |
|                                                                       |
| This illustrates how programs lacking complete coordination can       |
| backfire. While his wish to protect the people of his state through   |
| additional emergency operating centers was commendable, the governor  |
| needed an able CEM manager to carefully REVIEW ALL NEEDS, pitfalls,   |
| options, and priorities in light of the state budget and community    |
| development plan. If this new type of state expenditure proved        |
| feasible, the CEM could have developed an implementation plan and     |
| gained the concurrence of the state budget and planning offices, the  |
| state architect, the legislature, and others concerned. All of this   |
| should have been done before the governor made his announcement.      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

**Establishing a CEM Program**

The governor's policy statement provides numerous possibilities for CEM
program development. Following are five questions that may help the CEM
review director determine how best to proceed.

1\. What emergency-related state legislation and local ordinances are
already in effect? Consider *all* risks. *(Federal Emergency
Authorities: Abstracts,* prepared by the National Governors' Association
Emergency Preparedness Project, may be used as a guide to review state
legislation.) Do not overlook:

-   statute analyses;

-   executive orders;

-   regulations;

-   ordinances; and

-   their gaps, inconsistencies, and overlaps.

2\. What program, planning, dollar, materiel, and manpower resources are
available for all four phases of CEM? Consider:

-   high probability incidents;

-   high vulnerability geographic areas;

-   less probable risks in all areas;

-   preparedness and response at all levels;

-   prevention and mitigation activities;

-   long-term effects and recovery needs; and

-   all sources of potential assistance, including private organizations
    and individuals, local governments, substate groups, state agencies,
    multistate organizations, and federal agencies.

3\. What specific benefits might be obtained by coordinating state CEM
efforts and applying them to existing programs to reduce:

-   the probability of disaster occurrence;

-   the quantity of damage;

-   the response and recovery costs; and

-   duplicated efforts by varied state programs.

    4\. What can the state encourage others to do?

5\. What are the cost and level-of-effort options for the above?

Answers to these questions will begin to uncover program objectives that
can be assigned priorities. State planners, economic advisors, and
emergency personnel (SEO, enforcement, fire, health, et cetera) are
sources for pertinent interviews and documents. Resource surveys can be
conducted by interviews, mail, and telephone. Some of these questions
are best answered by reviewing and recombining the data already on hand
and by some limited new data collection. Several cost/benefit analyses
may be useful.

Development of CEM program objectives enables a structured approach to
coordinating emergency-related functions, resources, and relationships
with state line agencies and legislators, with substate, multistate and
federal groups, and with the private sector. CEM program tasks can also
be developed, specified in operational terms, and combined to meet the
stated program objectives.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor was concerned about warnings from the Department of   |
| > Agriculture of impending drought in the small, but important        |
| > northwest citrus belt in his state. Since his background was urban, |
| > he appointed a blue-ribbon advisory group of agriculture experts.   |
| > He did not realize that this action would insult his independently  |
| > elected agriculture commissioner. To complicate the matter, the     |
| > downstate business lobbies were promoting siphoning off northwest   |
| > river water for hydroelectric expansion, and the farmers did not    |
| > really believe the drought might become serious. Thus, the          |
| > agriculture commissioner would not listen to the advisory group's   |
| > recommendation to build a reservoir in the northwest. Organized     |
| > business lobbied against the advisory committee, and northwest      |
| > farmers "kept their heads in the sand," The governor was caught in  |
| > a three-way stalemate and was publicly blamed for disinterest when  |
| > drought in the northwest set in.*                                   |
|                                                                       |
| This problem might have been avoided if the governor had involved the |
| agriculture commissioner in appointing the advisory group, which      |
| might have offset the business lobbies' arguments and raised public   |
| awareness in the northwest.                                           |
|                                                                       |
| Asking the state planning office for development and economic         |
| forecasts, and the state budget office for welfare and recovery cost  |
| estimates, might have minimized the problem.                          |
|                                                                       |
| The governor could have used the help of a COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY    |
| MANAGER WITH POLITICAL SENSITIVITY AND STRONG NEGOTIATING ABILITIES   |
| to evaluate and deal with matters before they became acute.           |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Appointing a Comprehensive Emergency Manager

State agencies such as health, human services, energy, the National
Guard, transportation, natural resources, and the emergency services
office all have roles in preparing for and responding to emergencies.
There are also legislative, political, preventive, mitigational, and
community-development-oriented recovery activities involved in all types
of emergencies. The governor needs, therefore, a senior appointee who
coordinates all state emergency-related activities. The responsibilities
for these activities go far beyond the traditional approach of
preparedness to respond to expected disasters. Although some state
emergency offices bear greater responsibilities than others in
mitigation and long-term recovery activities, most governors currently
mandate that SEOs coordinate only preparedness and response activities,
mainly for natural hazards. This leaves the mitigation and long-term
recovery phases, as well as technological and other man-made disasters,
major civil disorders, and energy and materials shortage emergencies,
subject to ad hoc management. Both governors and SEOs report that SEOs
are used only 20 percent of the time in these latter instances, and not
at all for mitigation or long-term recovery coordination.

A CEM manager should have the confidence of the governor, the executive
staff, lawmakers, and line agencies to work effectively with all of
them. The comprehensive emergency manager must know state government,
its powers, processes, politics, and functional units. He or she must be
familiar with the state development plan, economic forecasting, and
public administration, and should be able to exert authority, negotiate
functional relationships between competing units of state government,
and communicate effectively with the public media. The CEM must
appreciate the importance of balancing mitigation and long-term recovery
concerns with emergency preparedness and response, and should also have
working experience with federal and local officials.

Depending on the governor's style and the traditions and needs of the
state, the CEM manager could be a top appointee, a line agency director,
an emergency services or other special office director, a special
assistant, or an appointed or elected commission. The main thing is that
this office must have clout and be backed by the governor's strong
policy. The governor's comprehensive emergency manager should be
familiar with *1978 Emergency Preparedness Project: Final Report,
Federal Emergency Authorities: Abstracts, Managing Domestic Terrorism,*
and *National Emergency Assistance Programs: A Governor's Guide,* all
prepared by the NGA Emergency Preparedness Project.

The following is taken from Governor O'Callaghan's report on CEM to the
nation's governors on August 28, 1978:

> I wish to emphasize that the subcommittee is not suggesting that
> states should necessarily create a new position to oversee
> comprehensive emergency management.
>
> The subcommittee is stressing only that there must be one individual
> who is currently responsible for emergency management---including not
> only preparedness and response for natural disasters, man-made
> emergencies, and attack, but the functional ability to coordinate
> mitigation and recovery activities as well.
>
> If some states choose to create a new department, then surely that is
> their prerogative. If others choose to merely designate an individual,
> whether in the governor's office or some other agency, then that, too,
> is their prerogative. We are talking about accountability and the need
> to streamline a process that currently is fragmented. How that is done
> is up to the individual governors.

The NGA Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance and all governors at the NGA
annual meeting in Boston in August 1978 endorsed the concept of CEM (see
Appendix A).

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4\. MONITORING COMPREHENSIVE                                          |
|                                                                       |
| EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT                                                  |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *After a major earthslide knocked out several miles of an*          |
| > *interstate highway, the governor arranged for reconstruction with  |
| > help from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. After three weeks of    |
| > intensive work, the road was repaired. The governor,* *in an        |
| > election year, delayed reopening the road for two days until he     |
| > could personally cut the ribbon and ride in the first vehicle down  |
| > the needed thoroughfare. Poor voter support from the area later     |
| > contributed to the governor's renomination loss.*                   |
|                                                                       |
| Public gratitude for the reconstruction arranged by the governor was  |
| overbalanced by his delay in reopening the road. Had the governor     |
| been fully informed of the number of people who used the closed road  |
| and the lack of a viable detour, he might have changed his schedule   |
| to reopen the highway as soon as it was repaired, or sent a           |
| representative to do so in his place.                                 |
|                                                                       |
| Fuller CASE REPORTING, including damage estimates and local           |
| implications, would have served the governor well. This situation     |
| might have been prevented if the governor had a CEM MANAGER TO ADVISE |
| ON THE PLANNING AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS of recovery management.    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

The state CEM program should address several objectives:

-   Reduce (if not eliminate) the incidence of disasters wherever
    possible (for example, man-made);

-   Reduce the damage (health, property, economic) caused by disasters
    that could not be prevented; and

-   Reduce the costs of emergency response and disaster recovery while
    increasing their effectiveness.

These are the governor's criteria for monitoring the state CEM program,

The governor should review CEM monitoring data annually and receive news
of each disaster. The governor's CEM manager, on the other hand, should
collect evaluation data continually and summarize results semiannually
and annually.

The Governor's Report

Each time a disaster occurs, the governor should require an immediate
report with reliable assessments of threat to life and property damage.

The specific data contained in the governor's report helps the governor
manage state resources and make informed decisions about providing state
assistance, declaring emergencies, and requesting outside assistance.
The report should contain as much specific information as possible and
should be updated regularly until the information is complete. The
governor needs the following information:

-   *Disaster:* type and/or cause; date and time of impact; onset and
    duration; location and counties; population affected; congressional
    districts and state legislative districts affected;

-   *Damage:* lives lost; injuries; number evacuated, sheltered, and
    fed; health problems; homes lost; businesses closed; preliminary
    economic loss estimates; families needing temporary housing;
    estimated unemployed; public facilities affected---roads, utilities,
    water and sewer, buildings;

-   *Preparedness and response:* warning time; response mobilization
    time; key organizations and resources used; sufficiency of local and
    state resources; needed resources;

-   *Recovery:* estimated short-term duration; estimated long- term
    duration; estimated costs---local, state, and federal;

-   *Mitigation:* what operations were in force; what should have been;
    and

-   *Special problems:* potential secondary effects; declaration and
    other assistance trade-offs; media concerns; special interests; and
    political considerations.

For a sample one-page report form, see Appendix B.

The report permits the governor and the CEM manager to monitor emergency
management without impeding operations and readily indicates when the
governor's direct involvement is warranted. The report should be
submitted in as complete form as possible within twenty-four hours of
emergency impact and updated frequently until complete.

These data are particularly useful as the number of reports increases.
The governor can observe management tasks over time and a range of
emergencies. The same data can also be combined periodically to indicate
costs of repair and restoration, unrestorable losses, and will provide
the governor an opportunity to observe trends in disaster
characteristics and state CEM performance.

The governor's report is actually excerpted from the CEM manager's
emergency case report. This is the full record on which specific
disaster case data are recorded. (A sample of the case report is
provided in *1978 Emergency Preparedness Project: Final Report,* Chapter
9.)

The emergency case report should be completed by a combination of the
following methods: (1) personal interview; (2) telephone interview;
and/or (3) direct mail. Health and property damage estimates should be
verified by the SEO through state agencies to expedite immediate
emergency damage information to the governor. The CEM manager should
work with the state planning and budget offices, line agencies, and
other sources such as insurance companies, local government officials,
tax personnel, associations, and business groups, universities, and
research organizations to obtain economic and other data needed.

Annual CEM Evaluation

The individual case reports and special reports to the governor go a
long way toward providing the data base for an annual evaluation of the
state's CEM program. But they are not entirely sufficient for this
purpose. Additional data are needed and can be obtained from answers to
the following questions:

*Mitigation*

1\. Have prevention and/or reductions of disasters occurred?

2\. Do fewer deaths and injuries occur between disasters of similar
types and intensity?

3\. Is there a good mix of organizational cooperation for mitigation of
each type of emergency in the state?

4\. Has disaster damage been reduced in similar kinds of events?

5\. Are all organizations identified in establishing the CEM program and
its objectives involved in mitigation activity?

*Preparedness*

1\. What are the increases in the length of disaster warning, by type of
emergency?

2\. How accurate are the predictions of disaster duration?

3\. Are planning, training, and exercises appropriate to the types of
disasters experienced?

4\. Are state emergency preparedness plans current? Do they cover all
risks, all three government levels, substate and multi-state groups, and
the private sector?

5\. In recent emergencies were preparedness plans followed? What caused
any divergences?

*Response*

1\. Have there been avoidable delays in obtaining damage assessments?

2\. Are damage and needs assessments after disasters correct?

-   Damage done to people, their property and public facilities

-   Assistance, equipment, and supplies needed (type and quantity at
    site and from elsewhere)

3\. What is the length of the emergency response period, by type of
disaster? Can response periods of similar intensity disasters be
compared? Are they becoming shorter?

4\. Are all organizations involved able to communicate effectively?

5\. Is there a search and rescue operation for air, land, and water?

*Recovery*

1\. Are assessments made of recovery needs?

-   Systems to be returned to pre-disaster norms

-   Systems to be modified to new norms more consistent with community
    development plans

    2\. What is the speed and effectiveness of short-term recovery?

    3\. What is the quality and sufficiency of long-term recovery?

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-   Legal assistance

-   Technical assistance

-   Financial assistance---state, local, federal

-   Public information

    4\. Is recovery management effective?

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-   Appropriate involvement of all organizational levels

-   Acquisition, disbursal and control of financial aid

-   Accuracy, efficiency, and use of records

-   Availability, efficiency, and use of information

-   Adequacy of staff

-   Quality of overall coordination

*Administration*

1\. Has the state applied for federal emergency assistance since 1974?

  ---------------- -- --------------- -- --------------- -- ---------------
                      No. of             No. Granted        No. Disallowed
                      Applications                          

  Presidential                                              
  Disaster                                                  

  Presidential                                              
  Emergency                                                 

  Small Business                                            
  Admin.                                                    

  FmHA                                                      

                                                            
  ---------------- -- --------------- -- --------------- -- ---------------

2\. Are federal regional offices supportive of all types of emergencies?

> Yes \_\_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_\_ (Explain):

3\. Do DCPA funds for personnel and administration and FDAA planning
grants provide the minimum necessary to augment state response
operations?

4\. Does the state take advantage of other federal assistance programs
for all four phases of CEM? *(National Emergency Assistance Programs: A
Governor's Guide* will be a useful reference here.)

5\. Does the SEO record and monitor emergencies of all kinds?

-   Attack

-   Internal disturbance

-   Natural

-   Technological

-   Energy and material shortages

    6\. How many emergency operations centers (EOCs) are there in the
    state? Enough? Construction delayed?

7\. Is media coverage supportive?

8\. Does the state have a CEM manager who:

-   Is known to have the governor's confidence?

-   Can speak readily for the governor?

-   Understands and participates in the formulation of the state
    development plans?

-   Has positive, active relations with state lawmakers?

-   Has credibility with state agencies?

-   Has credibility with local government?

-   Has good working relationships with the regional offices of
    pertinent federal agencies?

-   Oversees and coordinates all state emergency services for all types
    of emergencies?

Answers to the first seven questions are obtained by the CEM manager.
The answer to the eighth question is obtained by the governor personally
or by an executive assistant.

Whenever frequency and severity of similar types of disasters can be
reliably compared, answers to the above questions can be used to
describe change. The results of monitoring CEM effectiveness are
comparative. Therefore, the governor should direct that general raw data
be aggregated to permit visual, as well as statistical, comparisons.
Comparisons between specific disasters should, however, be approached
carefully. Any number of methods and formats for comparisons can be
designed. They should be developed and implemented by the state
officials responsible for maintaining the consistency and integrity of
all state fiscal, economic, and planning data. The governor should
review them annually, monitoring trends and special problems.

Obtaining the answers to these questions may require a full range of
approaches. Also, a decision will be needed about minimum quality and
quantity requirements to ensure lowest costs. Care and scientific rigor
must be used in making these annual evaluative observations. Such rigor
is more readily achieved if minimum data, like those recommended for the
monitoring system, are recorded as soon after the emergency as possible.
The monitoring system is the key to effective CEM program management,
including evaluation.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *While attending an out-of-state land use management conference,    |
| > the governor was contacted by a wire service for comment on the     |
| > legionnaires' disease epidemic which, according to the reporter,    |
| > had broken out in three communities in his state. The governor was  |
| > embarrassed not to know of the situation and tried to locate his    |
| > health director or deputy, but both were away for the weekend. The  |
| > state SEO, who usually alerted the governor to natural disaster     |
| > events, had no directive to track health matters. The health        |
| > director was aware of the situation, but never thought to alert the |
| > governor. The health director could have been reached through the   |
| > agency duty officer, but the governor did not have the duty roster  |
| > or telephone number.*                                               |
|                                                                       |
| A state CEM director would have had standing orders from the governor |
| to receive word about emergencies of all kinds from all sources and   |
| alert him wherever he was at any time.                                |
|                                                                       |
| With the growing incidence of complex emergencies, governors need     |
| COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT COORDINATION.                    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Answers to these questions should enable governors to improve CEM
management and organization continually. These questions can help answer
additional questions, such as: What is the smallest number of personnel
needed to staff the CEM program office? How will the program ensure
coordination between state planning, the legislature, budget and line
agencies, and the state emergency response office? How will the program
incorporate the governor's level of interest and commitment to CEM? How
can program quality control be managed?

Maintaining a CEM monitoring system enables the governor to direct a
productive state program. It also helps indicate when outside assistance
is needed and provides rationales with which to obtain it quickly. The
governor who has a good CEM program and monitoring system will acquire a
creditable reputation that directly affects federal willingness to
assist.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 5\. OBTAINING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE                                      |
|                                                                       |
| IN EMERGENCIES                                                        |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *The governor was notified that three grain elevators had exploded  |
| > and started a fire in a large downstate port city. Over 200 persons |
| > were killed and a densely populated twenty block area leveled. The  |
| > city power plants were knocked out and shipping was crippled. After |
| > verifying the situation by telephone, the governor called the       |
| > president and asked for a major disaster declaration. When it was   |
| > not immediately forthcoming, he thought the president had turned    |
| > him down, so he contacted his congressional delegation to pressure  |
| > the White House. Two days later, the regional Federal Disaster      |
| > Assistance Administration (FDAA) director called to ask where his   |
| > application was for the declaration.*                               |
|                                                                       |
| The governor thought his call to the White House should be sufficient |
| and did not look at his SEO director's draft for an application for   |
| federal assistance. He did not personally know his SEO, which was a   |
| small unit in the office of the adjutant-general. He was not aware    |
| that, while governors may telephone the White House to alert the      |
| president to emergency events, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE CANNOT BE INVOKED   |
| UNTIL AN APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED THROUGH THE REGIONAL FDAA office to |
| federal FDAA headquarters, which administers disaster assistance on   |
| behalf of the president. A trusted CEM advisor could have averted     |
| this situation.                                                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

One of the most important steps in disaster response is the governor's
declaration of a disaster or state of emergency. The declaration
authorizes a range of emergency actions including funding, manpower, and
materiel commitments in extraordinary amounts for unusual circumstances.
This use of emergency powers dictates appropriate caution, but also
appropriate responsiveness by the governor and state administration. The
subtleties of making each declaration change, but the main
characteristics rarely vary.

Accuracy

Accuracy is critical to disaster management. Fast, accurate reporting of
damage enables the governor to ensure appropriate types and levels of
assistance will be provided. *Governors report that this is their most
important need.* Disaster damage assessment is a very difficult task and
accuracy is always questioned. Reasonably accurate damage assessments
can be developed, however, by applying a phased verification process in
which local, state, and federal expertise is used. Of singular
importance to governors is that verification be done quickly before
recommendations for response actions are entertained.

**Timing**

Timing of a governor's declaration, the decision not to declare, or even
a deliberate delay of a declaration is a subtle but important matter.
Perhaps the most critical consideration is the emotional impact to the
victims and disaster workers. The initial aftermath of any disaster is a
period of shock, disappointment, and extreme fatigue. These are
compounded by deprivation of basic living commodities and, in many
cases, threats to health and welfare. It follows that a response to a
request for assistance can have important psychological effects on all
of those involved in a disaster. The governor should be aware that, with
an emergency declaration, there is an immediate rise in the level of
community expectation. Knowing that presidentially declared disasters
provide more benefits, local officials naturally tend to petition the
governor to request presidential assistance. Often, a local governing
body will petition as a shock reaction, rather than base a request on
actual damage or the amount of unmet need. Too often, in marginal cases,
the disaster turns out to be not as serious as it first appeared. Where
local and/or state resources are sufficient to respond to the situation,
federal assistance would be denied. Carefully controlled public
information programs and press releases stating the concerns and
intentions of the governor can bolster public attitudes. It is wise to
underestimate anticipated levels of assistance when making public
statements, however, so the public will not feel misled.

Unnecessary delay in making a declaration can have serious negative
effects. A timely declaration acknowledges the severity of the situation
and assures that assistance will be promptly offered. Undue hesitation
may mean that assistance is received too late to provide full benefit.
In requesting a presidential declaration, unnecessary delay may imply
that the situation is less urgent and that federal assistance is not
immediately needed.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Oakville and Elmton were severely affected when their joint water  |
| > supply was contaminated by waste from a nearby chemical plant.      |
| > Hospitals in four counties were filled to capacity. The chemical    |
| > plant was closed and economic hardship loomed for the two cities.   |
| > The governor requested, and was granted, a presidential emergency   |
| > declaration. A federal coordinating officer (FCO) and support staff |
| > from the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) and a    |
| > health team from the Atlanta Disease Control Center and the HEW     |
| > regional office flew to the scene. In Oakville, the emergency       |
| > management coordinator (EMC) was full-time, and the mayor respected |
| > and backed him. In Elmton, the EMC was part-time, had no            |
| > facilities, was often difficult to find, and local officials hardly |
| > knew him.*                                                          |
| >                                                                     |
| > *Conflict arose in Oakville between the EMC and FCO,* *who wanted   |
| > to establish a one-stop assistance center between the two towns.    |
| > Elmton welcomed the FDAA and endorsed its proposals. The two city   |
| > mayors disagreed about where the center should be located and a     |
| > stalemate ensued. The governor sent the lieutenant governor as      |
| > state coordinating officer to the site several times to settle      |
| > differences among* *federal and state officials and between the     |
| > mayors. The unclear jurisdictional prerogatives in this case led to |
| > differences between strong people, until someone with adequate      |
| > clout intervened to resolve them.*                                  |
|                                                                       |
| This case illustrates the necessity of a strong FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL   |
| PARTNERSHIP IN RECOVERY MANAGEMENT.                                   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Gauging

Gauging the magnitude of an event to determine if it is a disaster of
state or federally declarable proportions is a difficult task. A good
deal of effort at state and federal levels has been spent trying to
establish fixed thresholds beyond which a disaster is declared, but this
effort has proven impractical. There are, however, indicators which will
help the governor judge the recommendations made to him. Perhaps most
important of these is the individual policy of the governor on what
constitutes a disaster and how it has been communicated to his advisors.
The state disaster legislation and history are also very important.

It is best to rely on a systematic approach wherein the governor relies
on an organized emergency management division to conduct emergency
operations, assess damage, coordinate recovery, and apply lessons
learned to future mitigation. Such an organization should serve as the
operational linkage with local government and should recommend
gubernatorial actions.

A CEM director's comfortable relationship with the governor and his
staff is necessary in order to deal effectively with the critical
disaster policy and operational matters.

A great deal of attention has been given by the federal and state
governments and the National Governors' Association to the development
of a workable criteria system. It has not been possible, however, to
refine such a system, short of investigating each state's experience and
analyzing them separately and in the aggregate against demographic data,
and drawing conclusions therefrom.

The governor should be aware that federal reaction to a request is
partly influenced by experience. If a state has a reputation for
inflating disaster damage, delays can be expected while federal
reverification takes place. It is also advisable for the governor to
stay current on each administration's attitude toward federal
assistance, and what levels of state commitment are expected. A
telephone conversation between the governor and the regional
administrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration to
establish the governor's interest and general perspectives in this
somewhat confusing process can set the tone for the SEO's follow-through
in times of emergency.

The Federal Disaster Act specifies that a situation "must be clearly
beyond the ability of state and local government before federal
assistance can be approved." It goes on to conclude that federal
assistance is supplemental to, and does not substitute for, state and
local assistance.

At the state level, it is very difficult to determine what is beyond the
state's capabilities. The level of the state's assistance program
affects the determination, but it is not necessarily an exact
measurement. Rather, the clue seems to be a reasonable person's judgment
of the size of the disaster compared to the reasonable ability of the
state and local governments to cope with it. The complexity of this
process of determination is in inverse proportion to the severity and
magnitude of the disaster. In severe disasters, the decision that
additional resources are required is clear cut; it is in marginal events
that the decision is difficult. The magnitude of unmet needs after state
and local governments have exhausted their programs is a good benchmark
to use.

Also, current policy seems to favor federal assistance for human needs
rather than for restoration of government property. It is also clear
that because federal disaster assistance cannot be considered a
financial recovery program, reports of loss in dollar terms are not well
received by the federal government.

Communications

Communications are also a vital factor in achieving accuracy, good
timing, and correct gauging of an event's magnitude. There are several
important aspects of communications. One is the technical ability to
communicate quickly and efficiently, which means having designated
telephone, radio, telex, and other electronic mechanisms available, on
compatible frequencies, and with backup systems in case of failure of
the primary system. Ability to communicate over a wide area, even
nationally, is also important. Another important aspect of
communications is prompt, friendly relations with the media, all of
which can be of tremendous service in times of emergency. During
disasters, officials never have to worry about getting a story covered.
But the release of incorrect information can cause great hardship and
anguish, and even threaten citizens. Bad information returns to haunt
officials later. It is very important to issue correct information even
if that means delay.

Table 2 shows the general sequence of events for various disaster
declarations. It should be noted that there are, of course, many
exceptions to the general patterns described here.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Within hours after major river flooding around Metropolis, the     |
| > governor, his emergency services director, one of the state's U.S.  |
| > senators, and a station WRXZ pool reporter were surveying damage    |
| > from a helicopter. Highland rivers were still rising due to spring  |
| > thaw and heavy rains. Hovering upstream, the governor noticed that  |
| > the Dixon Dam to the north had a fissure. The helicopter's          |
| > occupants watched it widen, and the dam began to disintegrate. They |
| > discovered that although they had a clear patch into the local      |
| > radio station, they could not talk to the Metropolis mayor or to    |
| > the highway patrol below to warn them. The governor preempted WRXZ  |
| > regular programming to warn Metropolis citizens. The station        |
| > alerted the mayor, the local emergency services director, and       |
| > others, and many lives were saved.*                                 |
|                                                                       |
| While the governor's fast action in going on the air direct to area   |
| citizens was commendable, the radio station patch was a lucky         |
| happenstance.                                                         |
|                                                                       |
| State and local officials must be able to communicate at all times,   |
| wherever they may be. COMPATIBLE FREQUENCIES AND READY COMMUNICATIONS |
| are a first order of business for every governor's CEM director to    |
| assure.                                                               |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| **Table 2**     |                 |                 |                 |
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
| DECLARATION     |                 |                 |                 |
| PROCESS FOR     |                 |                 |                 |
| VARIED TYPES OF |                 |                 |                 |
| DAMAGES         |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| **Damage        | **Damage        | **Damage        | **Combination   |
| Primarily to    | Primarily to    | Primarily to    | of All          |
| Agricultural    | Homes and       | Government or   | Categories of   |
| Property**      | Businesses**    | Municipally     | Damage**        |
|                 |                 | Owned           |                 |
|                 |                 | Property**      |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Coordinate      | Coordinate      | Coordinate      | Coordinate      |
| emergency       | emergency       | emergency       | emergency       |
| operations to   | operations to   | operations to   | operations to   |
| perform         | perform         | perform         | perform         |
| essential life  | essential life  | essential life  | essential life  |
| saving &        | saving &        | saving &        | saving &        |
| property        | property        | property        | property        |
| protection      | protection      | protection      | protection      |
| measures &      | measures &      | measures &      | measures &      |
| response to     | response to     | response to     | response to     |
| immediate human | immediate human | immediate human | immediate human |
| needs.          | needs.          | needs.          | needs.          |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Local officials | City & county   | City & county   | City & county   |
| activate local  | officials       | officials       | officials       |
| USDA Emergency  | survey, declare | survey &        | survery &       |
| Board survey &  | local           | request         | request         |
| r               | emergency,      | assistance.     | assistance.     |
| ecommendations. | forward request | State agency    |                 |
|                 | for assistance. | survey & damage |                 |
|                 |                 | report.         |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| State USDA      | State emergency | State emergency | Governor would  |
| Emergency Board | organization    | organization    | likely declare  |
| r               | verification &  | verification &  | local or        |
| ecommendations. | recommendations | r               | statewide       |
|                 | including       | ecommendations. | emergency, if   |
|                 | coordination    |                 | requested.      |
|                 | with other      |                 |                 |
|                 | organizations.  |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| State emergency | Governor may or | Governor may or | Governor may    |
| organization    | may not declare | may not declare | issue           |
| verification &  | local           | a state of      | appropriate     |
| r               | emergency.      | emergency.      | emergency       |
| ecommendations. |                 |                 | orders for      |
|                 |                 |                 | emergency       |
|                 |                 |                 | measures and/or |
|                 |                 |                 | restoration of  |
|                 |                 |                 | public &        |
|                 |                 |                 | private         |
|                 |                 |                 | property        |
|                 |                 |                 | including       |
|                 |                 |                 | individual and  |
|                 |                 |                 | family          |
|                 |                 |                 | assistance.     |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Governor may or | Letter of       | Governor may    | Governor may    |
| may not declare | request to U.S. | issue           | request         |
| local           | Small Business  | appropriate     | consultation    |
| emergency.      | Admin. and/or   | emergency       | with FDAA for   |
|                 | U.S. Farmers    | orders to       | possible major  |
|                 | Home            | assist state    | disaster        |
|                 | Administration  | and/or locals   | declaration     |
|                 | for emergency   | for restoration | and/or          |
|                 | loan            | of essential    | particular form |
|                 | assistance.     | services and/or | of emergency    |
|                 |                 | restoration of  | assistance.     |
|                 |                 | property.       |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Governor may    | Governor may    | Governor can    |                 |
| authorize       | also activate   | appeal to       |                 |
| letter to U.S.  | state housing   | federal         |                 |
| Sec. of         | assistance      | regional        |                 |
| Agriculture     | programs and    | council for     |                 |
| requesting      | state           | priority        |                 |
| appropriate     | individual &    | assistance      |                 |
| assistance.     | state family    | through regular |                 |
|                 | grant programs  | programs.       |                 |
|                 | with            |                 |                 |
|                 | appropriate     |                 |                 |
|                 | emergency       |                 |                 |
|                 | orders.         |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|                 |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Governor may    |                 |                 |                 |
| also choose to  |                 |                 |                 |
| activte state   |                 |                 |                 |
| agricultural    |                 |                 |                 |
| assistance      |                 |                 |                 |
| programs with   |                 |                 |                 |
| appropriate     |                 |                 |                 |
| emergency       |                 |                 |                 |
| orders.         |                 |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  6\. SUMMARY

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > *Soon after her election the governor appointed a CEM manager who   |
| > was a former state senator and, more recently, chief land use       |
| > analyst in the state planning office. The governor directed the CEM |
| > manager to use all pertinent state resources to analyze current and |
| > future vulnerabilities for all risks, in conjunction with economic  |
| > forecasts, climatic changes, and shifting business and population   |
| > trends. She also directed the CEM manager to make recommendations   |
| > based on present and future vulnerability data, as well as on       |
| > long-term recovery and disaster mitigation needs, especially for    |
| > man-made hazards. The governor also directed that the               |
| > recommendations take the state community development plan, the      |
| > state emergency preparedness plan, and current state                |
| > emergency-related legislation into account.*                        |
| >                                                                     |
| > *When the CEM manager brought in his initial findings four months   |
| > later, the governor convened her cabinet, pertinent office heads,   |
| > the speaker of the house and president of the senate, federal       |
| > regional emergency officials, as well as business, labor, and       |
| > volunteer agency heads and the mayors of all cities over 30,000 in  |
| > population. The group was astounded to learn of the aggregated      |
| > probable and potential risks in the state. A priority task force    |
| > was established to examine all possible federal, state and local    |
| > public and private resources which could be applied to all four     |
| > phases and all types of risk. The task force was surprised to find  |
| > numerous public and private programs at all levels already under    |
| > way or available. Through their coordination, more mitigation       |
| > services were provided without additional cost in the state.*       |
|                                                                       |
| Thus, the state was able to develop a COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY         |
| MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.                                                   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Recent increases in technological hazards and rising equipment and
personnel costs demand the application of all federal, state, and local
resources to mitigate emergencies of all kinds. Coordination is needed
for preparation, response, and long-term recovery as well. These same
increases require the broadest possible coordination of available
resources to meet needs without increasing costs.

Although the variety of hazards and the costs of responding to them are
great and growing, personnel, equipment, and dollars are becoming
scarcer. This disparity has led some states to review how to use
available resources more efficiently at all levels of government and in
the private sector. This review process is encouraged so that these same
resources can be applied to all phases of emergency management.

State government can ascertain local disaster program needs, evaluate
the available state and federal government disaster resources, and
facilitate the acquisition, application, and coordination of those
resources.

For these reasons, the comprehensive emergency management concept was
developed. CEM refers to the responsibility and capability of a state to
manage all types of disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous
agencies. The "comprehensive" aspect of CEM includes all four phases of
disaster activity---mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It
applies to all risks---attack, man-made, and natural---in a
federal-state-local operating partnership.

CEM should be distinguished from *comprehensive emergency preparedness,*
a term now generally in use, which emphasizes, in practice if not
legislative intent, the preparedness and response phases of emergency
management almost exclusively.

The governor's role in comprehensive emergency management is to:

-   issue state or area emergency declarations and invoke appropriate
    state response actions;

-   activate emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state
    agency budgets for emergency work;

-   apply for and monitor any federal assistance in the wake of
    disasters;

-   take personal interest in life and property protection programs and
    publicly declare a policy for state emergency performance and
    standards;

-   review the current state emergency program;

-   establish a comprehensive emergency management program for
    mitigation and recovery activities as well as preparedness and
    response. This program should be based on vulnerability analyses for
    all types of emergencies, examining social, industrial, business,
    and economic trends in the state, in addition to climatic and
    geological factors;

-   establish a continuous CEM monitoring system; and

-   appoint a CEM manager to coordinate all pertinent emergency-related
    activities of the courts, legislature, all state and substate
    offices, and federal agencies. The CEM manager must ensure
    comprehensive four-phase emergency management for all types of
    emergencies. The CEM manager should also be responsible for
    awareness and training for appropriate state personnel and the
    general public. (See *National Emergency Assistance Programs: A
    Governor's Guide.)*

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Appendix A                                                            |
|                                                                       |
| NGA COMPREHENSIVE STATE                                               |
|                                                                       |
| EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT                                                  |
|                                                                       |
| POLICY                                                                |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

The National Governors' Association unanimously passed the following
policy position at its annual meeting in Boston, Massachusetts, on
August 29, 1978. This statement was the first passed by the National
Governors' Association dealing with comprehensive statewide management
policy. Most other NGA resolutions have recommended federal policy.

A premise for this new NGA policy is that an equal local-state-federal
partnership is the most effective approach to a comprehensive national
system of emergency management. NGA recommends that since the president
has followed the NGA recommendation and moved to establish an
independent emergency management office, governors should undertake
similar action at the state level. This will enhance the prognosis for a
viable national emergency management system. It is also to be hoped that
mayors will undertake a similar policy enunciation at the local level to
complete the system.

**A.−19**

**COMPREHENSIVE STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

Emergencies can have major or monumental human, economic, and political
consequences for all levels of government. The National Governors'
Association recognizes the importance of coordinating federal, state,
and local activities in the comprehensive management of emergencies
arising from attack or man-made or natural sources. This comprehensive
approach should include not only preparedness and response but long-term
recovery and mitigation.

We commend the President for proposing reorganization plan number 3 to
Congress. This plan calls for the establishment of a federal emergency
management agency, whose director shall report directly to the
President. Congressional approval of the plan will lay the groundwork
for the development of a strengthened federal-state-local partnership in
emergency management. We urge Congress to approve the plan.

The Governors also recognize the need to review the effectiveness of
state emergency operations. The findings of an in-depth NGA emergency
preparedness study, initiated last year, indicate the need to establish
comprehensive state management strategies that are compatible with the
proposed federal reorganization.

The National Governors' Association hereby adopts the following
guidelines for comprehensive state emergency management:

**Government Roles and Responsibilities**

States recognize that *local government* has the first line of official
public responsibility in the preparation for and response to most
emergencies. States encourage local governments to use local resources
and to exchange and share resources for emergency programs with other
local jurisdictions. Local governments also should share comprehensive
emergency mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery management
activities with the state. Local governments should recognize and
upgrade, where needed, the responsibilities of local civil defense
coordinators to emergency management coordinators for all hazards.

The *state's* role is to develop and maintain a comprehensive program of
emergency management activities that supplements, facilitates, and
provides leadership, when needed, to local efforts before, during, and
after emergencies. The state must be prepared to maintain or accelerate
current services and provide new services to local governments that may
be unable to manage all aspects of an emergency. The state also
cooperates at multistate levels when appropriate. Further, the state is
responsible for facilitating the acquisition of federal resources to
deal with emergencies.

When states have insufficient resources to manage all prevention,
mitigation, preparedness, response, or long-term recovery services
themselves, the *federal government* should provide services that are
responsible to all types of emergencies and disasters. Such services
include fiscal resources, research and dissemination of research
results, economic and other impact analyses, information and educational
materials, technical facilities, and assistance, equipment, and
materials.

State Emergency Management

Comprehensive state emergency management consists of the judicious
planning, assignment, and coordination of all available resources in an
integrated program of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery for emergencies of any kind, whether from attack or
man-made or natural sources.

While all emergency-related program activities are not the
responsibility of one single office, they should be integrated and
coordinated. Effective emergency management involves coordination
between the Office of the Governor, the state emergency management
office (if it is not located in the Office of the Governor), the state
planning office, the state budget office, the state legislature, the
emergency officers of a state's line agencies, the regional director of
the proposed federal emergency management agency, and representatives of
local government.

State emergency management includes intergovernmental linkages that
should: (1) ensure that any emergency is handled at the lowest
appropriate level of government, (2) provide direct support to local
emergency programs as requested and appropriate, (3) facilitate
acquisition of needed federal resources to support local emergency
programs, (4) encourage multistate resource sharing, and (5) stimulate
mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions.

Sound emergency management requires regular reviews of the performance
effectiveness and coordination of a state's emergency-related program in
light of public need and resources utilization.

Role of the Governor

The Governor has the mandated responsibility to promote the general
welfare and provide for the common good of the citizens of the state.
Because of this, the Governor has special powers and resources that can
be used in emergency situations.

The Governor establishes policy and performance standards for the
state's emergency organization. The Governor appoints leadership
personnel. Just as national emergency management must have the interest,
support, and confidence of the President, the entire state emergency
management program should have the direct interest, support, and
confidence of the Governor. The state emergency manager should have
direct access to the Governor.

The Governor, with the assistance of the emergency manager, should:
declare the policy on emergency management, establish or maintain a
comprehensive state emergency program, issue state or area emergency
declarations and invoke appropriate state response actions, activate
emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state agency budgets
for emergency work, and apply for and monitor the use of federal
assistance.

Emergency Management Actions

States should review all their current emergency management programs to
ensure that all appropriate ones are included in a coordinated program
of emergency mitigation and recovery, in addition to preparedness and
response, for all types of emergencies.

In keeping with the concept of a full federal-state-local partnership in
the consolidation of all-risk emergency management, state and local
governments should adopt consistent nomenclature, using the words
*emergency management*.

The National Governors' Association Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance
will review the specific findings of the emergency preparedness project
and take action on specific recommendations that are in keeping with
these guidelines.

Adopted August 1978.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Appendix B                                                            |
|                                                                       |
| THE GOVERNOR'S                                                        |
|                                                                       |
| EMERGENCY REPORT                                                      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Measurements should be taken at the time of each disaster and reported
to the governor. The same data for all emergencies, aggregated into
annual status reports, will provide the governor with the opportunity to
observe trends in both disaster characteristics and state CEM
performance.

Measurement of some of the more subjective dimensions, such as warning
time and duration, should be made by both state and local government
officials. All estimates should then be combined to derive an average
estimate. The CEM monitoring system should provide the governor with the
following single page of data after each emergency.

(Note that the report is numbered. The first four digits report the
fiscal year; the last two digits represent the series number. For
example, the number of the first report for fiscal year 1979 would read
"No. FY 1979-01." Numbers correspond to fiscal years to permit eventual
coordination with state planning and budgeting cycles and CEM
cost/benefit evaluations.)

**GOVERNOR'S EMERGENCY REPORT**

**(No. FY 19\_\_\_-\_\_\_)**

Name of State \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Cong'l
Dists: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Federal Region \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ State Sen.

Dists: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

State Rep.

Dists: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Date of Report: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_Time:
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Reporter: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Type of Incident:
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Date of Impact:
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Onset
duration: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Location: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \# of
Counties: \_\_\_\_\_ Population: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Impact on Individuals:** Deaths: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Injuries: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\# Evacuated: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \# Sheltered:
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \# Mass Fed: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\# Receiving Health Care: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \#
Hospitalized: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\# Evacuated homes: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \#
Businesses Closed: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

  -------------- ------------- ------------ -------- ------------------ -------
  Category of    Home/Apts.    Businesses & Farm     Equipment          Crops
  Damage         Mobile Homes  Industries   Bldgs.                      

  Destroyed                                                             

  Major Damage                                                          

  Minor Damage                                                          

  \% Insured                                                            

  \$ Damage                                                             
  -------------- ------------- ------------ -------- ------------------ -------

  ----------------- --------- -- -------- -- ------------- -- ---- --- -- -------- ------------ ---- ------------- -- ------------ ---- -- ------- ---- -- ------ --
  Est. families                                                                                      Estimated                                                    
  needing temp.                                                                                      unemployed:                                                  
  housing:                                                                                                                                                        

  **Impact on                                                                                                                                                     
  Public                                                                                                                                                          
  Facilities:**                                                                                                                                                   
  Debris:                                                                                                                                                         

  Roads:                                                                           Water &                                                                        
                                                                                   Sewer:                                                                         

  Utilities:                                                                       Buildings:                                                                     

  Other:                                                                                                                                                          

  **Preparedness &                                                                                                                                                
  Response:**                                                                                                                                                     
  Date/Time of                                                                                                                                                    
  1^st^ public                                                                                                                                                    
  warning:                                                                                                                                                        

  Response                                                                                                                                                        
  mobilization                                                                                                                                                    
  time:                                                                                                                                                           

  Local resources                                                                                                                                                 
  mobilized:                                                                                                                                                      

  State resources                                                                                                                                                 
  mobilized:                                                                                                                                                      

  Est. response                  Local:                                   State:                                                           Fed.:                  
  costs:                         \$                                       \$                                                               \$                     

  **Recovery:**                              Short-term:                                                              Long-term:                                  
  Est. duration:                                                                                                                                                  

  Est. costs:                    Local:                                   State:                                                           Fed.:                  
                                 \$                                       \$                                                               \$                     

  **Mitigation:**                                                                                                                                                 
  What operations                                                                                                                                                 
  were in force?                                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                                                                                                  

  What operations                                                                                                                                                 
  should have been                                                                                                                                                
  in force?                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                                                  

  **Special                                                                                                                                                       
  Problems:**                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                                  
  ----------------- --------- -- -------- -- ------------- -- ---- --- -- -------- ------------ ---- ------------- -- ------------ ---- -- ------- ---- -- ------ --

[^1]: For a discussion of these terms, see Chapter 2, pp. 12−13.