***COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN 1998-2006***

***USAID/Senegal***

*Original: February 1998*

##### Revised: June 1998 {#revised-june-1998 .unnumbered}

***There is a tide in the affairs of men***

***Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;***

***Omitted, all the voyage of their life***

***Is bound in shallows and in miseries.***

***On such a full sea are we now afloat,***

***And we must take the current when it serves,***

***Or lose our ventures.***

***from [Julius Caesar]{.underline}, Act 4, Scene 3***

***by William Shakespeare***

***USAID/SENEGAL COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN***

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Quotation i

Map of Senegal ii

Table of Contents iii

List of Acronyms v

Ambassador\'s Statement viii

Foreword ix

**PART I. ANALYSIS OF ASSISTANCE ENVIRONMENT AND RATIONALE**

**FOR STRATEGY 1**

A. U.S. Foreign Policy Interests 1

B. Country Overview 3

C. Crisis Prevention 6

D. Host Country and Other Donor Activities 7

E. How Customers and Partners Influenced the Strategic Plan 13

F. Summary of Rationale for the Strategy 16

**PART II. USAID/SENEGAL\'S PROPOSED STRATEGIC PLAN 18**

A. Introduction 18

B. Demand-Driven Strategy 21

C. Linkage to Agency Goals and Objectives 22

D. New Partnerships Initiative 26

E. Strategic Objectives 27

SO1: *Sustainable increase of private sector income-generating
activities in selected*

*sectors.* 27

SO2: *More effective, democratic, and accountable local management of
services*

*and resources in targeted areas.* 41

SO3: *Increased and sustainable use of reproductive health services
(child survival,*

*maternal health, family planning, and STI/AIDS) in the context of*

*decentralization in targeted areas.* 54

F. Monitoring and Evaluation Framework 70

G. Support for Global Objectives 71

**PART III. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 73**

A. Introduction 73

B. Staff Implications 73

C. Budget Scenarios 74

**PART IV. ANNEXES 78**

A. Bibliography of Key Background Studies 78

B. Customer Service Plan 83

C. Gender Considerations 93

D. USAID/Senegal Issues 97

E. Preliminary Plan for Monitoring and Evaluation 100

F. AID/W Review of CSP 110

G. Letter from the Minister of Economy, Finance and Planning 120

**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ACEP *Alliance de Crédit et d\'Epargne pour la Production (Alliance of
Savings and Loans for Production* )

ADS Automated Directive System

AFDB African Development Bank

AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

ARD Regional Development Agency

AVSC Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception

BRID *Bureaux Régionaux des Impôts et Domaines* (Regional Bureaus of
Taxes and Responsibilities)

CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resource Management

CCPP Consultative Committee for Participation and Partnership

CDIE USAID\'s Center for Documentation, Information, and Evaluation

CEL Country Experimental Lab

CFAF *Communauté Financière de l\'Afrique (Franc)*: local currency of
the member states of the West African Monetary Union

CFD *Caisse Française de Développement*

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CL *Collectivité Locale* (local government unit)

CNCR *Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux*

CONGAD *Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d\'Appui au
Développement* (national coordinating body for non-governmental
organizations)

CONSERE *Conseil Supérieur des Ressources Naturelles et de
l\'Environnement* (Senior Council for Natural Resources and the
Environment)

CR *Conseil Rural* (Rural Council, equivalent to the county-level
government structure in the United States)

CR *Communauté Rurale (Rural Community)*, equivalent to U.S. county

CRS Catholic Relief Services

CS Child Survival

CSE Ecological Monitoring Center

CSC Customer Service Committee

CSCP Customer Service Contact Person

CSP Country Strategic Plan

CSP Customer Service Plan

DAT *Direction de l\'Aménagement du Territoire*

DCL *Direction des Collectivités Locales*

DFCL *Division Financière des Collectivités Locales*

DFS Decentralized Financial System

D/G Democracy and Governance

DHS Demographic and Health Survey

EC European Community

EDF European Development Fund

EG Economic Growth funds of USAID

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EROS Earth Resources Observation Systems

ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility

EU European Union

FA Foreign Aid

FHA Family Health & AIDS Control

FP Family Planning

FPLM Family Planning Logistics Management

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

FSN Foreign Service National Employee

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FY Fiscal Year

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIE *Groupement d\'Intérêt Economique* (Economic Interest Group)

GNP Gross National Product

GOS Government of Senegal

GTZ German Development Agency

HRDA Human Resources Development Assistance

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IDA International Development Association

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IEC Information, Education and Communication

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFC International Finance Corporation (IBRD)

IFES International Foundation for Election Systems

IFIs International Financial Institutions

IMF International Monetary Fund

IRs Intermediate Results

ISRA *Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles* (government
agricultural research institute)

KAED Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development

KIR Key Intermediate Result

LTC Land Tenure Center

LUMP Land Use Management Plan

MCH Maternal and Child Health

M&E Monitoring & Evaluation

MEPN Ministry of the Environment and Protection of Nature

MHSA Ministry of Health & Social Action

MSI Management Systems International

NEAP National Environmental Action Plan

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NMS New Management System

NPA Non-Project Assistance

NPI New Partnerships Initiative

NR Natural Resource

NRBAR Natural Resource Based Agricultural Research

NRM Natural Resource Management

OE Operation Expense

OMVG *Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur de la Gambie*

ONEL National Observatory of Elections

ORB Operational Year Budget

PDIS Integrated Health Development Program

PHN Population, Health and Nutrition

PMP Performance Monitoring Plan

PNDSS National Social and Health Development Plan

PS Socialist Party

PVO Private Voluntary Organization

RH Reproductive Health

R4 Results Review and Resource Request

RPs Results Packages

TFR Total Fertility Rate

SASA Senegal Agricultural Sector Analysis

SDPs Service Delivery Points

SDRs Standard Drawing Rights

SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises

SENELEC Senegal\'s National Electric Company

STI Sexually-Transmitted Infection

SO Strategic Objective

USDH U.S. Direct Hire

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities

UNICEF United Nations Children\'s Fund

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

USGS United States Geological Survey

WADB West African Development Bank

WHO World Health Organization

**AMBASSADOR\'S STATEMENT**

Senegal has become in many ways America\'s most important francophone
partner in sub-Saharan Africa. A voice of moderation on peace in the
Middle East and conflict resolution in Africa, Senegal is a veteran
participant in international peacekeeping and a charter member of the
U.S.-proposed African Crisis Response Initiative. Senegal\'s 35 years of
political stability, its increasing political pluralism, and good record
on human rights buttress our partnership.

The major challenges of the coming decade are carefully targeted in
USAID\'s new strategy:

In the past Senegal\'s skill in overcoming political problems has not
been matched by a positive record of economic management and growth.
Over the past few years, however, Senegal has been carrying out
far-reaching economic reforms to liberalize the economy, to disengage
the state from direct economic activity, and to master inflation and the
budget deficit. USAID\'s new strategy is aimed at improving the business
climate and permitting the private sector to become the engine of
economic growth. A dynamic private sector is essential if Senegal is to
take advantage of economic globalization.

In 1996 Senegal took a further major step toward democratization by
creating regional and local elected bodies to decentralize political
decisions. Success in this ground-breaking experiment will depend on how
well the new political institutions can mobilize local revenues and
manage their natural resources in an environmentally-responsible manner.
The USAID strategy addresses this need very creatively.

Finally, under the new strategy USAID will maintain its role as the
preeminent donor in the family planning and health sectors. Declining
fertility rates and infant mortality suggest that there is good progress
to be made in the coming decade in bringing down Senegal\'s 2.7%
population growth rate and thus in eventually reducing the heavy burden
it imposes on educating and employing its young people. USAID\'s
continued involvement in this sector is thus important for the future
political stability of Senegal.

The USAID strategy is the product of an extraordinary year-long effort
of collaboration with Senegalese from a great variety of sectors and
walks of life. It is well-focused and realistic and therefore a good
investment in our continued partnership with this country, the gateway
to West Africa.

Dane F. Smith, Jr.

Ambassador

**FOREWORD**[^1]

Economically, politically, and socially, Senegal is at a critical
development crossroads. The choices that the Senegalese make over the
next few years will determine if the country moves forward and reaches
its potential, or stagnates and loses the opportunity to advance at the
pace it would like. USAID has been a partner in Senegal\'s development
over the past 35 years and recognizes the country\'s current juncture.
In response, this new Country Strategic Plan, which builds on experience
to date, represents a paradigm shift and outlines a more effective
approach to support Senegal in making and sustaining appropriate
development decisions. In doing so, it forges a new relationship with
the Senegalese and strengthens donor partnerships.

Senegal\'s macroeconomic performance has improved significantly, as
demonstrated by real GDP growth rates over the past four years since
devaluation. While policy reform steps have been in the right direction
and have begun to effect such changes as liberalizing the rice marketing
system and privatizing parastatals, Senegal needs to deepen and
strengthen the base for its market economy. By facilitating a stronger
private sector environment, Senegal can stimulate both internal and
external investment and improve its competitiveness in a globalized
economy. Without such steps, it will be unable to address the real needs
for increased employment and income generating opportunities among its
people.

Senegal\'s political development is at a critical point. Long-touted as
a stable democracy, the Senegalese have shown increasing signs of
disenchantment with the poor responsiveness of centralized government to
citizen concerns; however, two recent developments are encouraging. In
late 1996, the Government of Senegal took a major step to expand citizen
participation as it passed far-reaching legislation to decentralize many
key public authorities to regional levels. While decentralization should
enable local prioritization of issues, problems, and opportunities, as
well as the mobilization of resources and efforts to address them
locally, much will have to be done to ensure that this new system works
well. In 1997, an independent electoral observatory was established to
provide greater transparency to the electoral process. If fully
implemented, these measures can help increase people\'s confidence in
the functions and relevance of public institutions.

Social issues in Senegal affect its development. The continuing high
population growth rate threatens to diminish real development gains that
would otherwise be made. Appropriate health services need to improve and
become more accessible to have an impact on reducing both the rate of
population growth and child and infant mortality. Senegal can address
these concerns effectively if it builds on progress that has been made
and seizes the opportunities relevant to health issues presented by
decentralization and greater engagement of the private sector.

All three of these major crossroads issues involve critical choices that
the people must make if Senegal is to move into long term sustainable
development. This new Country Strategic Plan (CSP), covering the period
1998-2006, is founded on the key concept of empowerment as the most
effective way to support Senegal\'s goal. USAID\'s willingness to
promote this concept and make it real stems from a fundamental lesson
learned from its own experience and the experiences of other partners in
Senegal and worldwide over the last four decades. At one time, the
general tendency in the donor community, including USAID, was to spend
large amounts of resources on expressed survival needs. At best, these
resources helped sedate pain, but did not cure wounds. Their effects
often ceased with or shortly after the termination of assistance
programs. It is now evident that worthwhile, lasting results from
development assistance must instead *endow targeted communities with the
moral confidence, the social and institutional capital, and the
technical ability to identify and address their needs themselves*. To
this end, this new CSP focuses on a three-faceted objective of promoting
economic, political, and social empowerment. The overarching objective
is, for operational purposes, divided into the following three Strategic
Objectives (SOs):

**Strategic Objective 1.** *Sustainable increases in private sector
income generating activities in selected sectors.* This Strategic
Objective is about economic empowerment, enabling people to have
meaningful choices in the economic investments of their labor and
resources, to be achieved by promoting private initiatives in all
sectors at all levels, especially at the grassroots level.

**Strategic Objective 2.** *More effective, democratic, and accountable
local management of services and resources in targeted areas.* This
Strategic Objective is aimed at political empowerment by enabling people
to make choices about the definition of priority issues and the
mobilization of resources at local levels to address those issues. These
are political choices that decentralization encourages.

**Strategic Objective 3.** *Increased and sustainable use of
reproductive health services (child survival, maternal health, family
planning, and sexually-transmitted infections/AIDS), in the context of
decentralization in targeted areas.* Social empowerment, including
greater private sector choice in health care, is the primary purpose of
this Strategic Objective.

Empowerment is further imbued in the way USAID expects to implement this
CSP. Under a new demand-driven approach, communities will self-select
themselves to become associated with achieving the results implicit in
each of these Strategic Objectives. Together, this strategic framework
and its implementing principles, developed in true partnership with the
Senegalese, will achieve sustainable development results based on the
ownership that derives from empowered choices.

###### PART I: NANALYSIS OF ASSITANCE ENVIRONMENT AND RATIONAL FOR STRATEGY {#part-i-nanalysis-of-assitance-environment-and-rational-for-strategy .unnumbered}

### INTRODUCTION  {#introduction .unnumbered}

Senegal is a politically stable, largely Moslem (though administratively
secular), multi-party democracy

that acts as a moderating force in the Islamic and African worlds. But
local and global forces offer new

challenges and opportunities during the period covered by this CSP.

Senegal\'s unique and commendable stability is likely to be severely
tested through a combination of

political, economic, and social dynamics. Drought and degraded soils
threaten the agricultural sector,

which cannot absorb a rapidly growing population (expected to double in
25 years). The social system

will continue to cope with wide-spread illiteracy and rapid, unplanned
urbanization. While health care will

become even more accessible to rural and urban populations, mortality
rates for infants and children

remain high. In response to economic globalization, global information
technologies will quickly become

widespread, and Senegal will need to expand beyond its traditional trade
relationships.

While Senegal is committed to macroeconomic reform, democratic freedom,
and stability, the next few

years will be particularly challenging as the country seeks to balance
the forces of stability and

entrenched power centers (both secular and religious) with the forces of
change emanating from a

disenchanted and resource-poor majority (note that half of the
population were born subsequent to

President Diouf assuming the Presidency 18 years ago).

Over the next decade, the GOS will also be faced with a donor community
whose resources and

priorities are shifting. Senegal can expect a continued decline in
funding, including that from France, due

to shrinking budgets worldwide and competition for these scarce
resources from nations that are showing

results. Senegal will therefore increasingly need to finance its own
development using both domestic and

international investment capital. Donor assistance will remain a useful
tool for easing this transition from

dependency to greater autonomy. Likewise, a strong thrust towards
decentralization is evolving into new

balances of power in Senegal. The rise of civil society, including
women\'s groups and a younger

generation trained with an international influence, will likely induce
other changes both inside and outside

of government. Current concerns with corruption in Africa are equally
strong in Senegal, centering on

issues of transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in business
and government communities.

In spite of these challenges, the Senegalese and their development
partners can draw hope from their

accomplishments during the mid-1990s, and from the assets and great
opportunities mentioned in the

Forward.

# U.S. FOREIGN POLYCY INTERESTS

USAID is uniquely positioned to help Senegal seize its opportunities and
manage a transition from the

powerful constraints of poverty, illiteracy, and centralized government
to a more pluralistic society that

releases the power of latent creativity and self-interest. The United
States holds a position of great

importance to the Senegalese, who appreciate strong U.S. leadership on
transnational issues;

opportunities for education, culture, and information; and economic
partnership. USAID/Senegal, though

not among the top five donors in Senegal, has an influence beyond its
ranking. This influence is

strengthened by USAID\'s innovative, participatory, and creative
programming, which focuses on

achieving results that will be sustained long after assistance is
terminated.

Senegal, in turn, is uniquely important to U.S. foreign policy interests
in several ways:

Policy and History. Modern U.S./Senegal relations date to World War II.
The country\'s world view

and strategic perspectives remain largely congruent with those of the
United States, and its government

remains a positive example of political stability and moderation. In
addition, since Senegal was a major

staging ground for the slave trade, it is of particular cultural
significance to American history.

Economics. Congress\' Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the Clinton
Administration\'s Partnership

for Growth and Opportunity in Africa call for stronger U.S. trade and
investment in selected African

countries, including Senegal. Despite aggressive economic
liberalization, much room for progress

remains. Senegal\'s macroeconomic situation is improving (U.S. exports
to Senegal increased by 60%

from 1994 to 1996), and the country is capitalizing on its modern port
facility, stable political climate,

and burgeoning tourist industry. In response to globalization, Senegal
increasingly seeks greater trade and

investment with the United States. It has recently formed, at the level
of the Presidency, a group to study

how to take advantage of the recent developments discussed above.

Politics and Military: While chronically short of resources, Senegal
nevertheless continues to play a key

role in contributing to conflict resolution in Africa and beyond.
Senegal is a charter member of the

U.S.-proposed African Crisis Response Initiative and has demonstrated
commitment and

professionalism in peacekeeping operations in, among other places,
Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sinai,

and Lebanon. Senegal was the first sub-Saharan country to volunteer
forces for Operation Desert Storm

in Kuwait. Senegal also enjoys a high diplomatic profile and exercises
considerable influence among

other African and Islamic nations. Senegalese professionals hold a
disproportionately large number of

high positions in international organizations. Senegal is a stable,
multi-party democracy that is conscious

of the need to strengthen its democratic traditions. The disorderliness
of local and regional elections in

November 1996 cast a shadow over democratic procedures and has
heightened awareness of the need

to assure a more transparent process in the future. The recent
establishment of a National Observatory

of Elections is evidence of progress.

Environment. In Senegal, as in much of West Africa, environmental
degradation continues to threaten

physical resources and economic livelihoods. Senegal is a typical
Sahelian country, so environmental

efforts initiated here could be developed into solutions for the entire
region. Because the United States is

a recognized leader in environmental technology, U.S. investments in
this sector could benefit both

Senegal and the Sahel as a whole, as well as promote U.S. commercial
interests.

Population and Health. Senegal\'s high population growth rate (2.7%)
remains a major concern in terms

of health and sustainability. While much progress has been made in the
health sector through long-term

U.S. investments, efforts must continue to combat the constraints of
limited resources and low per capita

income.

AIDS. Thanks in part to U.S. investments, Senegalese researchers were
part of a team that discovered a

major strain of HIV. USAID\'s early assistance in late 1980s has helped
to stem transmission and has

contributed to high levels of population awareness of the disease and
its avoidance.

Senegal has a history of resiliency in the face of foreign domination,
economic hardship, drought, and

other natural disasters. Popular resourcefulness, government reforms,
creativity, and an entrepreneurial

spirit will provide a basis for further economic growth and social
development. Senegal\'s increased

openness to the United States has permitted USAID to develop excellent
relationships with ministers,

religious leaders, and the business community. Though USAID funding
levels are shrinking, the Mission\'s

proposed strategy has great potential to meet U.S. objectives and have a
far-reaching, sustainable

impact.

**B. COUNTRY OVERVIEW**

**1. Natural resources**

Senegal is a semi-arid country with a population of 8.8 million (1997)
occupying an area of 76,000

square miles (about the size of North Dakota). The country shares
borders with Mauritania, Mali,

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. Dakar, the capital city located on
the western-most portion of

Africa\'s Atlantic coast, is considered a gateway to the continent.

Senegal has a diversified natural resource base of uneven quality,
including a deep-water port at Dakar;

a sunny and pleasant climate; extensive beaches and other tourist
attractions; and one of the best marine

fisheries in Africa. However, Senegal\'s port and tourism potentials are
under-utilized, while its marine

fisheries are threatened by over-fishing. Other than phosphate, Senegal
has not yet found significant

mineral or energy resources for industrial development. Fuelwood and
charcoal furnish about 63% of

Senegal\'s energy needs, supplemented by heavily-taxed, imported
petroleum products (including gas).

Of Senegal\'s total land area, only 19% is suitable for agriculture, and
only 1.5% is currently irrigated.

Drought and population pressures have placed intense strains on
Senegal\'s present agriculture and natural

resource management (NRM). Much of Senegal\'s agricultural land has been
degraded and is further constrained by substantial variation and an
overall decline in rainfall. Improved conservation and more effective
use of limited agricultural resources thus remain key to sustaining
rural livelihoods. However, it is clear (at least to USAID) that
Senegal\'s economic future cannot be based primarily on agriculture.

**2. Population**

Senegal\'s current population is estimated at 8.8 million, with about
60% living in rural areas. With women

bearing, on average, 5.7 children each, the population continues to grow
quickly, at a rate of 2.7% per

year. Senegal\'s population is expected to pass 18 million before the
year 2025, imposing great challenges

to the country\'s social service systems.

Children under the age of 10 represent over one third of the population.
They continue to die at

unacceptable rates from preventable diseases such as malaria, chronic
diarrhea/dehydration, measles,

and respiratory infections. Overall life expectancy in Senegal rests at
approximately 50 years.

Only about 31% of the population is literate, a reflection of years of
poor management and lack of

resources in the educational sector. Women are particularly
marginalized, only 21% of whom are

educated compared with 41% of men. In general, women suffer from greater
poverty due to lack of

access to critical resources such as land, credit, extension services,
and technology.

**3. Political context**

Unlike many African countries, Senegal\'s independence was not
accompanied by violent revolution.

Instead, political, economic, and cultural relationships with France
have remained strong. Since

Independence, Senegal has been ruled by the same Socialist Party (PS),
initially under the leadership of

President Leopold Sedar Senghor (1960-80), and later under the
leadership of President Abdou Diouf

(1980-present). During his last few years in office, President Senghor
took steps to liberalize the regime

and to encourage development of a limited multiparty system. President
Abdou Diouf furthered the

democratic experiment, opening up the political system to more political
parties (of which there are now

21). Politics, to an important extent, tend to reflect personalities
rather than philosophies or programs.

Traditional religious interest groups remain strong, though a number of
new forces are beginning to

emerge. An armed movement seeking greater local autonomy in the
Casamance region periodically

challenges the otherwise stable government.

The 1996 Decentralization Law is a major initiative that has the
potential for empowering local entitites to provide social services that
the central government proved it could not deliver. The challenge is how
to train these local officials, and how to finance local programs.

Senegalese elections continue to be characterized by controversy and
conflict among parties and within

the ruling PS. Recent elections, for example, have been marred by
administrative irregularities and

allegations of registration and ballot fraud. In 1997, however, the GOS
created a National Observatory

of Elections (ONEL) to oversee the (May 1998) legislative elections that
are still run by the Ministry of

Interior. If implemented as planned, the ONEL will define the ground
rules as well for the Presidential

election in the year 2000, ensuring free, fair, open, and transparent
elections nationwide.

**4. Economic context**

As the former colonial capital of French West Africa, Senegal has long
been an economic and trading

hub. It was also one of the first countries in Africa to undertake a
structural adjustment program,

beginning in the early 1980s. Economic growth resulting from the program
was unsustainable, however,

due in part to an overvalued currency. In 1993 Senegal came close to
financial collapse when expected

public resource allocations did not materialize. Negotiations for
further budget assistance from the World

Bank and the IMF were cancelled. In addition, the lack of basic
macroeconomic reform agreements led

to the suspension of support from other major donors. Beginning in 1993,
however, the GOS

implemented stringent economic reforms, reinforced by the devaluation of
the CFA Franc in January

1994\. Macroeconomic performance indicators have since shown
improvement. The real GDP growth

rate has increased from -0.2% in 1993 to 5.6% in 1996, and the fiscal
deficit as a percent of GDP has

declined from -4% in 1993 to -1%. The service sector contributes to 50%
of the growth in GDP, while

that of the primary sector is limited to about 20% per year (see Table
1.A).

## TABLE 1.A. Macroeconomic Performance {#table-1.a.-macroeconomic-performance .unnumbered}

  ---------------------------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
  Indicator                          1993    1994    1995    1996    1997

  Real GDP Groiwth                   -2.1    2.0     4.8     5.6     4.7

  Inflation Rate                     -0.5                            2.5

  Gross Savings as % of GDP          7.1                             14.5

  Investment as % of GDP             13.2                            16.5

  Fiscal Surplus/Deficit as % of GDP -4.0                            -1.1

  External Current Accounts as % of  -10.3                           -6.3
  GDP (less official transfer)                                       

  External Public Debt as % of GDP   62.5                            68.2

  Debt Service as % of GDP           25.6                            19.2
  ---------------------------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------

source: IMF/GOS/IBRD, compiled by USAID/Senegal

Although much has been done to improve Senegal\'s environment for
sustainable development, economic

reforms have not resulted in significant domestic and foreign investment
increases. Senegal\'s economic

recovery is hardly complete. Several issues exist that constrain
Senegal\'s efforts to improve private

response to these positive developments. Some of these include:

> High cost of production. Labor, water, energy, and transport costs
> remain relatively high compared
>
> with regional competitors and other dynamic developing economies.
>
> Low investment/GDP ratio. Prudent macroeconomic management has
> resulted in low inflation and
>
> fiscal deficit. While current investment is 16.5% of GDP, experience
> suggests that Senegal needs to
>
> invest about 25% of its GDP each year in order to create jobs for its
> growing labor force. The country
>
> needs to promote an investor-friendly climate to attract both domestic
> and direct private foreign
>
> investment.
>
> Slow pace of privatization. Privatization of state-owned enterprises
> is a key tool for stimulating private
>
> sector growth. Despite GOS pledges, only a limited number of these
> enterprises have been privatized or
>
> liquidated.
>
> Weakness in the administration of justice. Administrative weaknesses
> hinder growth in investment and
>
> trade. Lack of transparency in the judicial system, lack of jurists
> trained in commercial law, and delays in
>
> resolving commercial claims are among the current pitfalls. Sustained
> growth in Senegal will require a
>
> more transparent legal environment.
>
> Heavy reliance on donor funding. Senegal is not eligible for the debt
> relief programs designed to
>
> benefit extremely poor countries, yet about 70% of its investment
> budget (1996) has been supported by
>
> foreign-based loans and grants.
>
> Centralized bureaucratic structures. Until recently, ministries and
> other national offices rarely
>
> delegated authority to their field services, and in the case of NRM,
> not even to the general population.
>
> This system has slowed the implementation of policy decisions and
> smothered local initiatives. With the
>
> new Decentralization Laws in place, the challenge lies in
> implementation.
>
> Lack of education about market economies. Misconceptions about the
> market structure are
>
> widespread among civil servants. GOS decision processes lack policy
> analysis with a solid basis in
>
> market economics. Misguided public policies, hesitation, and
> backsliding can be eliminated with a better
>
> public understanding of liberalization and market policies.
>
> Low level of basic education. Senegal\'s literacy rate is lower than
> the average for Africa. As the Asian
>
> experience has shown, increases in wage rates and employment
> possibilities depend heavily on a labor
>
> pool that is dependable and that either has skills or is easily
> trainable. Literacy is essential.

#### C. CRISIS PREVENTION {#c.-crisis-prevention .unnumbered}

Food Availability. Senegal\'s agriculture is characterized by extreme
variability in rainfall

levels. Domestic production of food grains now provides only 50% of the
food grains needed to

feed this rapidly growing population. Meanwhile, commercial imports and
food aid (relatively

small and declining somewhat) have been essential for maintaining
consumption levels. Thanks

to successful USAID/Senegal policy reform efforts, which have enabled
the private sector to

import rice and market it domestically, Senegal\'s rice marketing is
highly competitive and

efficient. The private sector now has the capacity to respond to food
grain shortages, aided by

climatic monitoring systems that have received CILSS/USAID/FAO
assistance. Poor farmers,

however, affected by production shortfalls, continue to rely on the GOS
as a safety net due to

the absence of private sector mechanisms such as crop insurance or
futures contracts.

Drug Use. While Senegal is not currently a major drug trafficking
center, drug use has increased enough

to become a social problem. To the extent that the new CSP addresses
poverty and unemployment

through empowering the Senegalese to take a greater role in political,
economic, and social decisions to

improve their lives, steps toward sustainable development can help
minimize the motivations behind drug

use.

Regional Violence. While the upsurge of violence in the southern
Casamance region is troubling, it is an

internal civil matter and USG intervention is not assumed in this CSP.
The United States continues to

support Senegal\'s territorial integrity and maintains that the conflict
can only be settled through peaceful,

political negotiations. The Embassy has restricted travel to affected
areas by U.S. citizens and employees

of USG agencies. Such local unrest and USG restrictions will limit the
areas in which USAID can safely

operate. This is unfortunate because areas with some of the greatest
need and potential are in the

Casamance. To the extent that the new CSP addresses political, economic,
and social empowerment

issues, it may help alleviate problems in other areas of Senegal before
they too lead to violence.

Corruption. Corruption is present in Senegalese public and private
sector life, and while it may not be as

serious as in some other African countries, it affects people\'s
confidence in fundamental social, political,

and economic institutions. SO2 (local management) addresses the local
empowerment and good

governance needed to instill transparency and restore confidence.
Moreover, a key intermediate result of

SO1 (private sector) deals with the enabling environment, recognizing
that transparency and the

establishment of \"rules of the game\" are equally essential in the
private sector.

**D. HOST COUNTRY AND DONOR ACTIVITIES**

**1. GOS goals and programs**

Senegal\'s Ninth Development Plan for 1996-2001 builds upon the solid
foundation of structural

adjustment. The Plan has the following strategic orientations:

1.  **Make the legal framework more appropriate for promoting
    competition and investment;**

2.  **Reinforce regional integration and international cooperation;**

3.  **Develop private initiatives;**

4.  **Adapt the financial environment to the needs of actors and favor
    savings;**

5.  Improve the quality of basic infrastructures and services;

6.  **Improve decentralization;**

7.  Reinforce the education system , particularly vocational and basic
    education;

8.  Reinforce and facilitate access to information and promote social
    communication;

9.  Continue the development of human resources and lessen negative
    demographic trends; and

10. **Ensure better NRM for a sustainable development.**

This Plan, like previous ones, is quite broad, reflecting the extent of
Senegal\'s continued poverty. Despite

a sophisticated veneer among the French-educated upper classes of
society, in Dakar particularly,

Senegal is overwhelmingly rural, impoverished and illiterate. Population
growth rates and deteriorating

environmental conditions in the countryside have moreover brought rapid
urbanization, and the ability of

the GOS to provide education, water, electricity, and health services
has not kept pace with current

demands.

Senegal\'s overall Development Plan is complemented by other more recent
sectoral plans mentioned in

the introduction to Part II. The interventions to be implemented through
USAID/Senegal\'s SOs have a

clear and needed role. USAID/Senegal\'s proposed strategy responds in
particular to those strategic

orientations marked in bold above.

**2. International donor activity in Senegal**

In 1996, approximately 16% of Senegal\'s GDP and about 70% of its
investment budget was supported

by foreign assistance in the form of loans and grants. Most donors,
including the United States, believe

that support for Senegal\'s moderate, stable democracy is well-placed
and well-deserved. Virtually every

sector in Senegal is supported by foreign assistance to some extent,
including agriculture and forestry;

regional development; macroeconomic management and budget support;
natural resources and the

environment; health; transportation; good governance; electoral reform;
legal reform; and education.

The United States is an influential donor in Senegal, but its efforts
alone are seldom sufficient to bring

about the major changes required for sustainable development. Donor
coordination remains essential for

using aid resources most efficiently, and for avoiding redundant
programs or competing approaches.

Donors coordinate in a number of venues. For macroeconomic matters, the
IBRD and the IMF take the

lead with periodic Consultative Group meetings. For all general matters,
the UNDP chairs a quarterly

meeting of major donors in Senegal to share information. In addition,
there are sectoral-specific donor

committees that cover areas such as health and decentralization.

USAID/Senegal has been at the forefront of efforts to coordinate donor
activities, and will continue to

work with the larger community of PHN, NRM and private sector actors to
develop a concerted

strategy. By emphasizing donor coordination, the Mission seeks to: (a)
leverage its increasingly scarce

resources; (b) minimize the chance that Senegalese counterparts might
take advantage of the multiplicity

of donors by playing one donor off another; and (c) promote a more
equitable distribution and efficient

use of donor resources. During the design of this CSP, strong linkages
have been formed in all areas of

proposed USAID intervention. Table I.D (page 9) shows potential
partnerships between

USAID/Senegal and other donors for each of the new SOs and Key
Intermediate Results (KIRs).

#### TABLE I.D: POSSIBLE SYNERGIES BETWEEN USAID/SENEGAL\'S CSP {#table-i.d-possible-synergies-between-usaidsenegals-csp .unnumbered}

#### AND OTHER MAJOR DONOR INTERVENTIONS {#and-other-major-donor-interventions .unnumbered}

+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| SO/ | F     | World | Eur   | Ge    | Japan | Saudi | C     | U.N.  |
| KIR | rance | Bank  | opean | rmany |       | A     | anada | S     |
|     |       |       | Union |       |       | rabia |       | ystem |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| ### |      |      |      |      |       |       |      |      |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| # S |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| O1  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| {#s |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| o1  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |      |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 1.1 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |      |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| 1.2 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |      |      |      |      |       |       |      |      |
| 1.3 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| ##  |      |      |      |      |      |       |       |      |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ##  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| SO  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 2 { |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| #so |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| -2  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |      |       |       |       |       |       |      |      |
| 2.1 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |       |      |       |       |       |       |      |      |
| 2.2 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |       |
| 2.3 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| #   |      |       |       |       |       |       |      |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|   { |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| #se |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| cti |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| on  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ##  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ##  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| KIR |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|  2. |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 4 { |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| #ki |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| r-2 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .4  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| #   |      |      |      |      |      |       |      |      |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| #   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| {#s |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ect |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ion |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| -1  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| #   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ### |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| # S |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| O3  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| {#s |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| o3  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| .un |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| num |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ber |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| ed} |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      |
| 3.1 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |       |       |      |      |       |       |       |      |
| 3.2 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| KIR |      |      |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| 3.3 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+

**2.1 Bilateral assistance: the major partners**

a\. France

France has been the largest bilateral donor in Senegal since
Independence, providing \$700 million in the

last three years (1994-1996). One third of this amount was dedicated to
budgetary support, while the

rest aided projects. In addition, \$380 million in bilateral debt and
adjustment grants were cancelled as

part of a special package of assistance to help offset the adverse
effects of the CFA Franc devaluation in

1994\.

Sectoral priorities for French activity in the last three years have
included:

Education, culture, youth development and health;

> Agriculture, forestry, water development, public enterprises,
> fisheries, urban management, tourism,
>
> handicraft industry, energy, and telecommunications; and
>
> Institutional development, including public security, civil service
> and judicial reform, economic reform,
>
> democratization, and decentralization.

For the next three years (1998-2000), these domains will remain
priorities, though technical assistance,

which has represented the bulk of French aid, will decrease dramatically
(from 722 cooperant positions

in 1992, to 267 in 1997).

b\. Japan

Assistance from Tokyo has increased markedly from very modest earlier
levels and will continue to

expand. For 1994-1996, Japanese aid was estimated at more than US \$195
million. The main areas of

intervention cover agriculture and fisheries, environment, education
(about half of total assistance),

community development micro-projects, and structural adjustment
programs. For the next three years,

the following sectors have been identified as additional priorities:
potable water, construction of primary

schools, primary health care, and the environment.

c\. Germany

Thanks to significant increases in recent years, the FRG now ranks as
Senegal\'s third largest bilateral

donor. German assistance is channeled through GTZ, the Frederich Ebert
Foundation, and the Konrad

Adenauer Foundation. Funding for 1994-1996 aid was estimated at US \$150
million, devoted mainly to

irrigation, water supply, NRM, education and health, the Manantali Dam,
decentralization (contributions

from GTZ of \$1.7 million), elections and civil society (through the
Frederich Ebert Foundation),

employment generation, and support to small and medium-sized enterprises
(through the financial

cooperation agency, KFW). These areas, in addition to natural resource
management, will remain

priorities for the next three years.

d\. Saudi Arabia

Through the Saudi Development Fund, Saudi Arabia provided \$19 million
in loans for 1996, covering

programs in agriculture, hydraulics, electricity and road building.
Other funding is rumored, but not

confirmed.

e\. United States

The United States Mission as a whole (Embassy, USAID, Peace Corps, and
the U.S. Information

Agency) is committed to encouraging economic reform and sustainable
growth in Senegal, based on

competitiveness and rational use of natural resources; and to
strengthening democracy through more

effective rule of law, respect for democratic institutions, human rights
and the development of human

capacities.

The Department of State\'s priorities for assistance to Senegal are
noted in the Ambassador\'s Statement

and generally focus on implementing the U.S. Africa Policy, including
the African Crisis Response

Initiative, the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in
Africa, and the Africa Growth and

Opportunity Act. The programs of USAID, Peace Corps and USIS will
mutually reinforce the

attainment of these and other agency-specific objectives. In FY 1997
USAID alone provided US\$ 23.1

million in bilateral grant aid to Senegal.

f\. Canada

Canada provided \$14 million in assistance to Senegal in 1996, evenly
divided between a fund to offset

the adverse social effects of devaluation and a program to develop
financial cooperatives. Canada\'s aid

focuses as well on education and training, rail transport, research in
the primary sector, combatting

desertification, developing energy substitutes for fuelwood,
decentralization (estimated at US \$6.9 million

for 1997/98), water resources, telecommunications development, aid to
small enterprises and village

associations, and women\'s training and basic education. Canada
currently coordinates donor activities in

support of decentralization.

g\. Taiwan

Taiwanese aid has targeted road building in the northern region of
Senegal, rehabilitation of a health

hospital in Ziguinchor, and technical assistance for rice cultivation in
Kolda. The country\'s assistance

began in 1996 and its value is not readily available.

h\. Italy

In 1994, Italy cancelled US \$11 million worth of debt, easing some of
Senegal\'s budgetary strain.

Approximately \$5 million in 1996 was invested in road infrastructure,
rice cultivation in the Casamance

region, and social development.

i\. The Netherlands

Aid from the Netherlands amounted to \$12.7 million in 1996, targeting
social development (women\'s

issues and primary health care for rural areas) and forestry.

**2.2 Multilateral donors**

a\. World Bank

The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group
supports numerous

projects in Senegal, most with a duration of four to six years and
currently falling under the following

areas: macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programs to
rationalize the economy and reduce

the budget deficit; agricultural sector restructuring and research;
decentralization (estimated at a total of

\$75 million to support both rural communities and municipalities);
infrastructure (road building and

sanitation); education and health; and industry, energy, and private
sector development. Road and urban

employment interventions in Dakar and other cities are funded through a
local organization,

AGETIP-Senegal. In 1997, World Bank assistance to Senegal amounted to
\$583.3 million.

The goal of the Bank\'s proposed new country assistance strategy
(1998-2000) is alleviation of

poverty, with two sub-goals: (1) more rapid and sustained growth, and
(2) social sustainability. This

strategy will involve strategic objectives in the following areas:
macrostability, private sector development

supporting infrastructure, environmental protection, health and
education, social protection (through a

community nutrition project), gender services, and rural development. It
is expected that the World

Bank\'s portfolio will consist of 23 projects by the end of 2000. Five
of these projects will be sector

investment operations in the health, education, agriculture, transport,
and water sectors. The level of

commitment over the strategy period will amount to \$631 million.

b\. International Monetary Fund

Senegal\'s three-year (1994-1997) Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) from the IMF was

structured to support Senegal\'s adjustment program after the CFA Franc
devaluation. Under the ESAF

Senegal was accorded access to total SDRs of US \$179 million. The key
objective of the IMF-funded

ESAF program was to foster economic growth led by the private sector as
well as to improve Senegal\'s

fiscal position so that the GOS could reduce its dependence on foreign
budgetary support for recurrent

expenditures. Currently, a new ESAF arrangement is under development for
1998-2000.

c\. European Union (EU)

Under its 8th European Development Fund (EDF) for 1997-2001, the EU
targets three major areas:

Promoting economic growth. In the agricultural sector, this includes
activities on the left bank of the

Senegal river, the Groundnut Basin, and horticulture. Assistance
includes setting up a rural credit

mechanism to support producer organizations and small rural enterprises;

Strengthening the capacity of the public sector in health service
delivery and road maintenance;

and

Supporting local development through NGOs and local government
decentralization, fighting

poverty, and promoting gender and environmental issues.

About \$500 million in grant assistance is available for the next five
years.

d\. African Development Bank (AFDB)

The African Development Bank (of which the United States is a major
shareholder) assists Senegal

through development grants and soft loans targeted at urban hydraulics
and sanitation (\$14.5 million for

1996/98).

e\. West African Development Bank (WADB)

While traditionally not a major donor in Senegal, the WADB approved a
\$10.7 million loan for 1996

covering agriculture, artisan activities, road and air transport, and
energy.

f\. The United Nations system

U.N. agency assistance to Senegal mainly covers public administration
and human resources

development in the form of technical assistance. Other sectors of
involvement include health and nutrition,

child survival issues (UNICEF), population, health and nutrition,
education and training (UNFPA), and

agriculture and forestry (IFAD). The Senegalese Triennial Public
Investment Program estimates that

U.N. involvement for the period 1998-2000 will total \$43 million.

**2.3 Islamic sources**

It is likely that Senegal will remain a privileged recipient of Islamic
aid, due to Senegal\'s support for Arab

causes. Aid from Arab-Islamic donors is substantial, though fluctuating.
In 1996 an agreement was

ratified for a \$26 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank for
agriculture, cattle farming, water

management, anti-salt dams, and other activities. The loans also
supported the construction of a 312 km

highway connecting Kita in Mali with Saraya in Senegal. In 1996 a \$19
million loan was approved by the

Saudi Development Fund to support agriculture, road infrastructure, and
energy. The Arab Bank for

Economic Development in Africa recently extended a \$2.2 million loan
for development of agricultural

and rural hydraulics, road infrastructure and sea transport.

#### E. HOW CUSTOMERS AND PARTNERS INFLUENCED THE STRATEGIC PLAN {#e.-how-customers-and-partners-influenced-the-strategic-plan .unnumbered}

From the very inception of development of this CSP, USAID/Senegal
decided that this strategy

would require new approaches to both design and implementation.
Thirty-five years of

experience in Senegal have clearly shown that the key to sustainable
development is

ownership by those concerned, and true ownership is fostered by having a
say from the

beginning.

USAID/Senegal wanted to tap the opinion and knowledge of all levels of
Senegalese society, in addition

to involving its usual partners and stakeholders. The many activities
undertaken to solicit such wide

participation are summarized below:

\- The Mission made use of contacts at the highest level of the GOS,
including an audience with the

President of the Republic and meetings with the Prime Minister and key
Ministers concerned with the

economic and social development of the country. The purpose of those
meetings was to exchange

preliminary ideas on the major development problems Senegal will have to
address over the next 25

years and the avenues U.S. development assistance could explore in
finding solutions to those problems.

\- Three one-day workshops entitled \"Your Vision of Senegal Ten Years
Hence\" were conducted with PVOs/NGOs and private sector
representatives, the U.S. Embassy community, and GOS officials.

\- Semi-structured interviews of over 7,000 Senegalese in all 10 regions
of Senegal (referred to as the Customer Survey) was conducted from
January 12-19, 1997, targeting rural, peri-urban, and urban

populations. The ten survey teams were comprised of personnel from
USAID/Senegal, the GOS,

donors, and the PVO/NGO community. This large-scale effort allowed the
Mission to elicit and record

the visions and perceptions of a representative sample of Senegalese
society on the future of their

country.

\- A \"Dream Team\" of prominent Senegalese thinkers was formed to
provide an independent reflection on the future of Senegal. The team\'s
expertise brought new perspectives to the strategy development process
and many of their insights were integrated in the political climate
study.

\- A three-day Strategic Objective Workshop (April 28-30, 1997) was
attended by over 200 customers, partners, and stakeholders. From the
synthesis of the working groups two draft strategic objectives (SOs)
were identified:

1.  Effective and sustainable decentralization in targeted regions; and

2.  Expanded employment opportunities via sustainable private
    initiatives in targeted areas.

The process and results of the workshop were widely disseminated in the
local media, which noted that

USAID was now setting a new benchmark for quality donor collaboration
and program design.

\- In May 1997 a four-person team from USAID/Senegal, led by the Mission
Director, traveled to

Washington to participate in a Parameters Setting meeting. The purpose
of this meeting was to initiate

dialogue and obtain concurrence from USAID/Washington for the
development of USAID/Senegal\'s

Strategic Plan. Certain issues were raised, and the Mission was given a
conditional go-ahead by

USAID/Washington to proceed with CSP development.

\- Following the Parameters Setting meeting, USAID/Senegal formed focus
groups for each of its

proposed strategic objectives. Each focus group was composed of USAID
staff, partners and

stakeholders from the GOS, PVOs/NGOs and private sector representatives,
and grassroots

organizations. The groups were charged with refining the SO analysis and
statements, developing the

Results Frameworks, defining some elements of Results Packages and
target/performance indicators,

and identifying critical assumptions.

\- A three-day SO Refinement Workshop, held August 4-6, 1997, was
attended by 150 participants,

including USAID staff, selected partners/customers, and USAID/Washington
visitors. The ensuing

interaction between the Mission and its partners, customers, and
stakeholders led to the identification of

a third SO for the health sector.

\- Three five-day Results Framework Development Workshops (one for each
SO), involving 60

participants, were held September 8-26, 1997 to refine and finalize work
on the strategy frameworks.

USAID/W and other experts in the development of Results Frameworks
assisted during and after this

workshop.

\- At the Validation Workshop held October 28-30, 1997, over two hundred
participants validated the three Results Frameworks. This final workshop
also provided the opportunity to formulate a number of strategy
implementation principles and criteria for selection of eventual
customers.

\- Customer Feedback sessions were conducted December 17-21, 1997 to:
(1) provide feedback to the same customers surveyed in January 1997; and
(2) explain to them the process that led to the three SOS and Results
Frameworks validated during the October workshop. The feedback teams,
composed of

USAID/Senegal staff and their partners, also solicited feedback from
customers on the three SOs and

Results Frameworks. As one elderly man eloquently stated, after walking
miles to attend the session,

\"No one has ever asked our opinions, nor come back to us as you
promised you would. We thank

you for truly capturing our concerns in your strategic objectives, and
encouraging us to articulate

and act upon our vision and convictions.\"

Some important lessons learned in the Mission\'s interaction with
customers include: (1) the Senegalese

are acutely aware of their own problems; (2) they are fed up with
waiting for others to deliver on

promises and are now ready to take charge of their own lives; (3) they
now lack confidence in all

development assistance intermediaries, including NGOs; and (4) they have
expressed concern that the

potential of decentralization might be usurped by existing central
elites unless donor assistance is made

available soon.

USAID/Senegal\'s participatory approach to strategy development has
important ramifications for the

success of the CSP. First, it represents a new vision in a global
context of overall reduced development

assistance, emphasizing the necessity of creating greater host-country
ownership of development

activities. Second, with the participatory approach the Mission\'s
priorities are more firmly rooted in the

political and social realities of Senegal. Efforts can be directed at
the most critical constraints to the

country\'s democratic, economic and social development, and can reflect
the best judgments of those

most concerned and familiar with the country\'s development needs.

This customer focus is more fully described in Annex B, the Customer
Service Plan. The

demand-driven approach governing the selection of customers and
geographic areas of interventions is

described in Part II.

#### F.SUMMARY OF RATIONALE FOR THE STRATEGY {#f.summary-of-rationale-for-the-strategy .unnumbered}

As noted in the Forward, Senegal is at a development crossroads. The old
paradigm of large donor

flows acting as a safety net, managed by a statist, centralized
bureaucracy, cannot be maintained. Issues

of dependency and sustainability must be addressed, as must issues of
Senegal\'s comparative advantage

in an increasingly competitive global economy. In examining how to best
respond to these central issues

in its new strategy, USAID/Senegal changed its paradigm. With heavy
emphasis on partnership and

Senegalese ownership, it combined the customer approach outlined above
with a series of analytical

studies. Noting where other donors were currently working, the Mission
capitalized on its prior

experience in Senegal and its comparative advantage in choosing areas of
intervention.

In the development of the above analysis and the strategy that flows
from it, the Mission benefited from

numerous studies (cited in the bibliography). Findings from these
studies shaped the strategy itself,

reinforcing (and in some cases, modifying) the needs expressed by
customers. Berg et al., for example,

assessed the economic and private sector situation and noted that the
United States has a special

contribution to make because of its particular entrepreneurial
orientation and its vast experience with

privatization of services. Gellar, Denoeux, and Kanté, in their separate
reports on democracy and

governance, noted the importance of giving assistance to Senegal in
implementing decentralization and

assisting with the electoral process. The Bucknell et al. report on the
agricultural sector, meanwhile,

pointed to the importance of natural resource management as well as the
limited possibilities for further

USAID direct assistance to agricultural production. The Rideout et al.
report on the education sector

demonstrated that USAID should focus on training and education only
within the context of other SOs.

Finally, numerous reports on the health and population sector suggested
that USAID continue the basic

thrust of its past activities, but do so within the specific context of
decentralization.

The specifics of USAID strategy mesh well with Senegal\'s formal
development plans and have been

tailored specifically in partnership with a broad segment of Senegalese
society. In achieving its three

SOs, USAID not only has a comparative advantage, but has focused on the
areas of highest importance

to the Senegalese for the expenditure of its finite resources. SO2,
dealing with democracy and

governance, responds to the greatest political opportunity in Senegal in
decades: the 1996

Decentralization Law. SO1, increasing income generating activities, is
the backbone of sustainable

development and the financing of social services. With Senegal\'s
macroeconomic outlook stabilized,

SO1 is both timely and essential. SO3, increased use of reproductive
health services, remains

essential to the Senegalese for improving individual quality of life.
Moreover, addressing population

issues (including rapid population growth) through SO3 will aid in
reducing the demographic pressures

undermining sustained economic growth.

To implement this strategy, the Mission will forge a new partnership
with the Senegalese to overcome the major weakness of past development
assistance: the lack of \"ownership\" of development

programs/activities. USAID/Senegal intends to build its program around
participation and partnership,

eventually dropping the phrase \"donor project\" from its collective
lexicon. Instead of having

\"beneficiaries\" of \"projects,\" jointly designed programs will be
developed with mutually agreed-upon

expected results and a clearly-defined exit strategy for Mission
involvement in these activities.

Senegal remains important to U.S. foreign policy interests for economic
as well as political and other

reasons. Senegal has been, and is expected to be, an effective user of
development assistance. While

there is always the potential for crisis (natural disasters or
otherwise), the Mission believes it unlikely that emergency assistance
will be required from USAID in the first few years of the strategy
period.

The general Mission context of \"Reengineering\" applies to the
development and implementation of this

CSP. In spite of initial resistance, USAID/Senegal began applying
reengineering concepts over two years

ago and has achieved success in streamlined management for results,
efficiency, and teamwork. Key

ministry officials, NGOs, and other donors have since begun to adopt
these techniques for themselves.

USAID/Senegal\'s new CSP is based on a radical shift in the development
paradigm, meant to free

Senegal from dependency while further increasing the effectiveness of
donor assistance.

***PART II: USAID/SENEGAL\'S PROPOSED***

***STRATEGIC PLAN***

**A. INTRODUCTION TO THE STRATEGY**

The definition of these goals and objectives is the result of not only
analysis and the participatory process described in Part I, but also
recent changes in Senegal\'s overall policy environment. Key elements of
the national reform agenda constitute an essential enabling environment
for attaining USAID/Senegal\'s objectives. Many are now in place,
including the National Environmental Action Plan, the National Health
Development Plan, the ONEL, the National Employment Policy, the Women in
Development Action Plan, the Petroleum Code, and the law privatizing
SENELEC. The most important laws, however, were those dealing with
decentralization, enacted by the GOS in late 1996, which have created an
environment for profound changes and socioeconomic growth in Senegalese
society. The new strategy seizes this opportunity to broaden ownership
of development resources and their use.

The focus of this strategy is on empowerment as a means of achieving
sustainable development. The GOS has put in place the structure for
decentralization and power-sharing, but donor assistance is needed to
strengthen the political will and to provide technical advice to fully
implement these changes:

• SO1 promotes *economic empowerment* through increasing economic
choices related to investing oneself and one\'s resources in private
sector income generating activities;

• SO2 promotes *political empowerment* because it increases political
choices related to defining local problems and priorities, and deciding
on the application of resources to address them; and

• SO3 promotes *social empowerment* by increasing and expanding access
to health services, both public and private.

**Cross-cutting themes**

The three SOs\--increased private sector income generating activities,
improved management of local services and resources, and increased use
of reproductive health services\--are mutually reinforcing and respond
to the major problems and opportunities cited in Part I. The synergies
among the SOs are explained in many empirical and theoretical social
science works over the past 200 years, throughout the past 30 years of
USAID development assistance, and within USAID/Senegal\'s analytical
rationales since the early 1980\'s. For example, in the Senegalese
context it is clear that rapid population growth is depressing per
capita economic development and putting greater pressure on the natural
resource base. More income generating activities will generate wealth
that can be used to purchase improved nutrition and health care, while
effective decentralization (management of local services and resources)
will lead to greater local ownership of both problems and solutions to
income generation, natural resource management, and better use of health
care services.

In addition to these synergies, there are several themes that provide a
common context for implementing the overall strategy. These links ensure
that results in one area will support, as well as depend on, results in
another area.

Effective *decentralization* is the most important linkage among the
three SOs. The implementation of decentralization legislation will
essentially change the basis of operation for all grassroots development
efforts. However, if the legislation is not implemented in a way that
fosters community-based democratic participation, then the goal of
improving the lives and economies of the Senegalese people will not
easily be attained. On the other hand, if local populations are
empowered and the effective exercise of (shared) power is engendered at
the local level, then Senegal will see significant progress in
increasing incomes, protecting the natural resource base, and improving
social and health services.

*Income generation*, the focus of SO1, is also a cross-cutting theme.
Increased income, the first priority mentioned by the Mission\'s
Senegalese customers, is a key factor for ensuring good nutrition and
access to effective health care. Under the health objective (SO3), the
Senegalese will be increasingly asked to pay for health services.
Activities that increase income would thus increase overall access to
and use of health services, just as the development of cost-recovery
mechanisms in the health care system will permit improvements in the
quality of care provided.

An important area of focus for all of the SOs is the better-managed
development of an enabling environment for achieving results. The new
strategy therefore emphasizes SO-specific *improvements in the policy
and regulatory environments.*

*Capacity building* is a critical cross-cutting theme expressed as a KIR
is all SOs. Human resource development is seen as key to achieving the
sustainability and empowerment that are central to this strategy.
Whether it is training in literacy, leadership or business management,
one of this strategy\'s key goals is to increase the capacity of the
Senegalese to manage their own affairs.

Other cross-cutting themes include *natural resource management* (see
below), the *empowerment of women;* participation of *customers and
partners;* development of *civil society* and the *private sector*; and
*support for NGOs*. Finally, the operational principles of the strategy
and criteria for ultimate selection of customers and activities are
discussed in detail in Annex B, the *Customer Service Plan*.

**NRM as a cross-cutting theme**

For communities to sustain their natural environment (a long term
effort), they need to satisfy their daily need for income. Giving
communities the ability to manage their resources at a local level and
gain income from them will increase the likelihood of sustained
protection of the environment.

NRM has figured prominently in past USAID strategies in Senegal, and
will continue to be emphasized. At issue is the best means for USAID to
address the problems and opportunities presented. In the past, focusing
on NRM as a sector has not been fully successful. The development and
transfer of technology packages has been useful, but not sustainable.
The Mission believes that its programming can best improve NRM not with
a sectoral focus, already the path of a number of donors, but by
addressing the larger context in which NRM operates: the enabling
conditions necessary for broad-based use of production practices that
increase yields and reduce degradation. For example, once local people
and elected representatives become aware of the economic importance of
NRM to their lives and livelihoods, then the adoption of NRM practices
will be facilitated. SO1 will work to improve the economic conditions
for sustainable use of NRM, while SO2 will focus on improving political
empowerment so local populations can take fuller charge of their local
resources.

The Mission will be best served by using NRM as a model for
decentralization (SO2) with links to SO1[^2] as a very useful way of
achieving the economic, political and social empowerment that the SOs
encompass. For example, rural people are reluctant to take time away
from their work to learn about decentralization, voting, building more
democratic civil societies, or improving the democratic process in their
villages if there are few tangible consequences. However, if D/G
messages are packaged around an issue that is important and central to
their economic livelihoods (such as access to land), then participation
is virtually guaranteed. The Mission has noted that voter participation
in higher in areas where NR assistance has been provided

Other examples of the spin-off effects of using NRM as a means of
accomplishing the objectives of this CSP include:

• Providing greater and more diverse economic opportunities that will
help relieve pressures to over-exploit and degrade the land;

• Promoting democratization in the rural population;

• Building confidence and advocacy in rural communities through
involvement in NRM issues and NR-based enterprises; and

• Slowing natural resource degradation.

The Mission already has a record of linking NRM with decentralization as
well as private sector development through the Community Based Natural
Resources Management (CBNRM) and the Kaolack Agricultural Enterprises
Development (KAED) activities currently implemented under the
terminating strategy. CBNRM and KAED have established enabling
conditions for local-level empowerment, including the devolution of
authority to local levels; support for greater participation,
particularly among women; and the strengthening of local organizational,
technical, literacy, managerial, and leadership skills. These skills are
critical for better governance and broad-based democratic processes, as
well as greater economic opportunities. The Mission intends to build on
these successes in its new strategy.

**B. DEMAND-DRIVEN STRATEGY**

USAID/Senegal\'s strategy for the years 1998-2006 is based upon the
concept of \"demand\": demand by customers determines what the Mission
does, when it does it, where it does it, and how it does it. Implicit
within this context of demand is working in partnership with customers
throughout all stages of the strategy. Explicit is the fact that the
Mission cannot meet every demand: limitations are necessitated by a
number of factors.

**Demand during strategy development**

As has been discussed elsewhere, this strategy was developed in strong
consultation with USAID/Senegal\'s partners. Using customer surveys,
studies, focus groups and a series of seminars, strategic choices were
made based on priorities established by these partners and customers.
USAID/Washington is among these partners.

The Mission will follow a similar process in the development of its
results packages prior to the signing of the strategic objective
agreements. Due to contracting constraints, participation at this level
will have to be more limited.

**Demand during implementation**

It is apparent that USAID/Senegal cannot cover all of Senegal during the
period of this strategy. However, to achieve the impact established by
the results framework, it must work in areas large enough to include a
significant number of people. In addition, certain activities will be
conducted at the national level. Consequently, the Mission will
implement its strategy at both the local and national levels, but will
*not* pre-select the local levels.

*National-level program*

The policy dialogue to be conducted at the national level under each
strategic objective will be determined in two ways. First, specific
areas for discussion will be developed in consultation with partners,
including other donors. Second, as important constraints are identified
throughout the local-level implementation period, they will be included
in the ongoing policy dialogues. In addition, it is evident that certain
global activities, such as provision of contraceptives, will continue to
support the rest of the strategy.

*Local-level program*

Local-level programs will be based on the submission of proposals from
local entities for the achievement of specified results. In order to
achieve the necessary impact, the local administrative entity for SOs 1
and 2 will be either the *Commun* (urban municipality) or the *Conseil
Rural* (CR, or county). For SO3 the applicable entity will be the health
district, which can include more than one *Commun* or CR.

USAID will develop the basic \"package\" of results\--probably including
elements of all three SOs\--in which the local entities must be willing
to invest. During an Outreach Campaign, this package will be publicized
throughout Senegal in local languages, along with the procedures for
selection and participation in the strategy program. Where needed,
technical assistance will be available to help communities develop
proposals for submission to USAID. Selection of proposals will be based
on an agreed-upon set of principles and selection criteria. Continuation
under the program will depend upon results achieved as well as adherence
to the principles. *(See Annex B for further discussion of preliminary
principles, criteria, and the proposed implementation plan.)*

**Limitation to the demand-driven approach**

The demand-driven approach as described above is limited by several
factors. For example, both Senegal and the United States have overall
strategic development plans as well as sector-specific plans that must
guide the implementation of any strategy. In addition, the need for
impact and results combined with management constraints will limit the
number and types of units to which one can respond. The availability of
funds and earmarks imposes other types of constraints. Finally,
absorptive capacity poses its own set of limitations. Taking into
account these and other limitations poses a challenge for USAID/Senegal
as it implements its demand driven strategy.

**Defining base-line data under a demand-driven approach**

The Mission\'s demand-driven approach continues its sharpened focus on
customers as a means of attaining sustainability. Essentially, demand
will determine both the customers and the geographic areas in which the
Mission can achieve specified results. In many ways, a demand-driven
approach has already been used in determining SOs and Key Intermediate
Results (KIRs). The difference is that this strategy will not identify
the location of the target populations and will not develop base-line
data until after the Results Packages (RPs) are completed and the
Outreach Campaign conducted.

The competitive process outlined here and in Annex B is intended to
identify those potential partners and customers who are most interested
in contributing to and achieving the results spelled out in this CSP.
The results will be theirs as well as USAID\'s.

**C. LINKAGE TO AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

USAID/Senegal\'s strategy responds to the constraints and opportunities
discussed in Part I, and reflects both the priorities of the Agency and
those of USAID\'s customers and development partners. The
collaboratively-selected strategic objectives are those that the Mission
believes are most appropriate, achievable, and sustainable. Importantly,
they are also within USG manageable interest and comparative advantage.

In late 1997, the Agency redefined its development objectives as:

\(1\) Broad-based economic growth and agricultural development
encouraged;

\(2\) Democracy and good governance strengthened;

\(3\) Human capacity built through education and training;

\(4\) World population stabilized and human health protected;

\(5\) World environment protected for long-term sustainability;

\(6\) Lives saved, reduced suffering, and re-established conditions for
political/economic development following natural or man-made disasters;
and

\(7\) USAID\'s position as a premier bilateral development agency
maintained.

USAID\'s proposed strategy in Senegal responds to all of the above
except for Goals 3 (education) and 6 (humanitarian and transitional
assistance). Table II.C *(next page)* describes the specific areas of
overlap between the Mission\'s strategy and Agency goal and objectives.

In line with current strategy guidance, the Mission\'s proposed SOs are
not intended to solve all the problems faced by Senegal, nor do they
represent the exclusive means for achieving broad-based sustainable
economic development. Both the SOs and the Key Intermediate Results
(KIRs) selected to meet them are intentionally and realistically limited
in scope. They conform with USAID resource limitations and build upon
USAID\'s comparative advantage. By working in four strategic assistance
areas\--economic growth, democracy, environment, and health\--the
Mission\'s strategy responds to the current Agency-wide strategic plan
as well as to GOS priorities. The three SOs complement each other in the
attainment of *sustainable economic development through broadened
social, political, and economic empowerment.*

This *goal* reflects thirty-six years of common understanding between
the United States and Senegal as well as the quality of USAID\'s
relationship established with Senegalese customers and partners.

**TABLE II.C: CSP LINKAGES TO AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**[^3]

+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **AGENCY GOAL**          | **AGENCY OBJECTIVES**                     |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **Broad-based economic   | • Critical markets expanded and           |
| growth and agricultural  | strengthened.                             |
| development              |                                           |
| encouraged.**            | • ~~More rapid and enhanced agricultural  |
|                          | development and food security             |
|                          | encouraged.~~                             |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • Access to economic opportunity for the  |
|                          | rural and urban poor expanded and made    |
|                          | more equitable.                           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **Democracy and good     | • Rule of law and respect for human       |
| governance               | rights of women as well as men            |
| strengthened.**          | strengthened.                             |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • Credible and competitive political      |
|                          | process encouraged.                       |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • The development of politically active   |
|                          | civil society promoted.                   |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • More transparent and accountable        |
|                          | government encouraged.                    |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **~~Human capacity built | • ~~Access to quality basic education,    |
| through education and    | especially for girls and women,           |
| training.~~**            | expanded.~~                               |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • ~~Contribution of institutions of       |
|                          | higher education to sustainable           |
|                          | development increased.~~                  |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **World population       | • Unintended and mistimed pregnancies     |
| stabilized and human     | reduced.                                  |
| health protected.**      |                                           |
|                          | • Infant and child health and nutrition   |
|                          | improved and infant and child mortality   |
|                          | reduced.                                  |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • Deaths, nutrition insecurity, and       |
|                          | adverse health outcomes to women as a     |
|                          | result of pregnancy and child birth       |
|                          | reduced.                                  |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • HIV transmission and the impact of the  |
|                          | HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing countries |
|                          | reduced.                                  |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • The threat of infectious diseases of    |
|                          | major public health importance reduced.   |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **World environment      | • ~~The threat of global climate change   |
| protected for long-term  | reduced.~~                                |
| sustainability.**        |                                           |
|                          | • ~~Biological diversity conserved.~~     |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • ~~Sustainable urbanization including    |
|                          | pollution management promoted.~~          |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • ~~Use of environmentally sound energy   |
|                          | services increased.~~                     |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • Sustainable management of natural       |
|                          | resources increased.                      |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **~~Lives saved,         | • ~~The potential impact of crises        |
| suffering reduced, and   | reduced.~~                                |
| conditions               |                                           |
| re-established for       | • ~~Urgent needs in times of crisis       |
| political and economic   | met.~~                                    |
| development following    |                                           |
| natural or man-made      | • ~~Personal security and basic           |
| disasters.~~**           | institutions to meet critical             |
|                          | intermediate needs and protect human      |
|                          | rights re-established.~~                  |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **USAID\'s position as a | • Responsive assistance mechanisms        |
| premier bi-lateral       | developed.                                |
| development agency       |                                           |
| maintained.**            | • Program effectiveness improved.         |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • U.S. commitment to sustainable          |
|                          | development assured.                      |
|                          |                                           |
|                          | • ~~Technical and managerial capacity of  |
|                          | USAID improved.~~                         |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+

**SO relevance to Agency goals and objectives**

*SO1* supports the Agency\'s objectives of *\"access to economic
opportunity for the rural and urban poor expanded and made more
equitable\"* and *\"critical markets expanded and strengthened.\"* It
directly addresses the policy and institutional constraints that have
inhibited private sector growth, employment, and income. To achieve
economic empowerment, foreign and domestic small businesses and
microenterprises require an improved policy and regulatory environment,
viable access to financial resources, and training in entrepreneurial
and business skills. Direct support provided to businesses, business
groups, and entrepreneurs is designed to provide opportunities for
income generating activities.

*SO2* addresses political empowerment in the context of
decentralization: an area of great opportunity for governance and
democratization linked to economic development. SO2 conforms to the
Agency\'s objectives of *\"more transparent and accountable government
institutions encouraged\"*; *\"the development of politically active
civil society promoted\"*; and *\"sustainable management of natural
resources increased.\"* SO2 emphasizes improved governance and
participation by strengthening NGOs, farmers\' organizations,
environmental action groups, and business associations. It further
supports decentralization in the priority area of NRM.

*SO3* addresses social empowerment in the context of decentralization
and supports the Agency\'s goal of *\"world population stabilized and
human health protected\"*. In a country where women are responsible for
a large proportion of informal income generating activities, efforts to
provide family planning and improve maternal and child health are all
the more critical. For years, USAID assistance has been the key to the
success of health and population activities in Senegal. The Mission has
a clear comparative advantage in supporting service delivery systems and
providing appropriate, high quality technical assistance. No other donor
in Senegal currently can provide the same level of expertise in social
marketing and health systems strengthening. Country and customer needs,
USAID\'s comparative advantage, and host country commitments argue
strongly for the Mission\'s proposed interventions in the health sector.

All three SOs, and the Mission\'s overall developmental approach,
support the Agency\'s goal of *\"remaining a premier bilateral
development agency\".* Among other donors in Senegal, USAID is generally
recognized as a leader in innovative, performance-based development
assistance. The Mission\'s proposed demand-driven approach is an example
of how USAID/Senegal *has identified better ways of doing business and
adopted \"best practices*\" in support of the Agency\'s objective of
*\"responsive assistance mechanisms developed.\"*

Strategic Objectives focused on agriculture or education have not been
included in the Mission\'s new strategy, *per se*. For the foreseeable
future, agricultural production will play a major role in the Senegalese
economy, but in the Mission opinion, it will not be a major engine of
new employment or incomes. The food grain sector, in particular, has
been deeply affected by several donor-inspired reforms (including those
of USAID), but the full impact of those reforms has not yet
materialized. Clearly, these reforms are necessary, but not sufficient.
Moreover, there is currently intense activity among other donors in this
sector. For these reasons, USAID will focus on the removal of other
constraints to agricultural intensification and the use of sustainable
production practices. Examples include building links between the rural
sector and commercial lenders, strengthening women\'s roles in the
marketplace, improving information flows, and fostering greater
efficiency in the marketing and processing of inputs and outputs.

While the troubled formal educational system remains a constraint to
sustainable development, the Mission has decided not to conduct
activities in this sector. Instead, France and the World Bank are
contributing much-needed educational planning assistance, joined by many
other donors who provide direct support to school operations. Because of
the magnitude of aid from these other sources, the Mission feels it has
somewhat less of a comparative advantage.

**D. NEW PARTNERSHIPS INITIATIVE (NPI)**

The Mission\'s three SOs fully incorporate the development philosophy of
NPI, which promotes NGO empowerment, small business partnership,
democratic local governance, and the synergies between them. SO1, by
targeting individuals, associations, and SMEs, including
microenterprises, will encourage small business partnerships. Vertical
and horizontal communication among suppliers, producers, and outlets
will also be encouraged. SO2 focuses on democracy/governance and
improved local management of resources. This includes development of
civil society as active partners in local governance. SO3 focuses on
utilization of decentralized health services. Once again, this will be
achieved by developing the public, private, and non-governmental sectors
and their interactions.

The Mission\'s approach is built upon lessons learned from a number of
activities, including the \$21 million PVO/NGO activity, which from 1994
to 1998 has strengthened the capacity of local groups and communities to
conceive and execute development activities. As of 1997, there were 391
PVO/NGOs operating in Senegal, reflecting substantial growth in the late
1980s. Some of the important lessons learned include:

• *Motivation.* Results are much more likely to be achieved among low
income people if income generating activities are integrated into the
assistance.

• *Collaboration between NGOs and GOS decentralized technical services.*
One of the typical problems of development assistance has been that
after donor funding for NGOs and contractors runs out, the activities
must be continued by the people themselves, with help from government
technical services. USAID/Senegal\'s PVO/NGO Support Program overcame
this problem by involving government officials throughout the process.

• *Customers\' contributions.* Required contributions in cash and/or
in-kind were an indication of customer commitment and helped create
ownership from the outset of the activities.

***Ndimabal nàcifek loxo borom.***

**Help yourself first before asking for assistance.**

Overview:SAID/Senegal\'s January 1997 nationwide customer survey
revealed that most Senegalese placed the highest priority on economic
empowerment because of its relevance to their daily needs and concerns.
Out of the eight groups in the April workshop that proposed a strategic
objective for future USAID consideration, five came up with economic
growth or private sector-related objectives, with a focus on employment
and income. USAID/Senegal agrees with these priorities, and therefore
proposes as its first SO, sustainable increases in private sector income
generating activities in selected sectors. The natural resource (NR)
sector will be one of the targeted areas, addressing both the need and
potential for improved natural resource management (NRM). SO1 is within
the Mission\'s manageable interest and comparative advantage, and
supports the GOS\' Economic and Social Development Plan, which focuses
on the same issues. In January 1998 the USG was selected to head the
donor coordinating group on assistance in support of private sector
development. This is an honor and an opportunity given that the IBRD,
the French, and the EU are larger players in this sector.

**1. Problem analysis**

Senegal is among the world\'s poorest countries, with a growing
population placing greater demands on an already deteriorating natural
resource base. Despite improvements in the macroeconomic climate
following the CFAF devaluation in 1994 and other structural and economic
reforms, most people have yet to experience tangible improvements in
their daily life.

In Senegal, economic growth has not yet \"taken off\" in a broad‑based
and sustainable way. While there have been clear advantages to political
stability, it has also protected the power and privilege of the
bureaucracy and the economic elite, inhibiting broad-based economic
growth. Currency devaluation and other economic reforms improved growth
in 1995 and 1996, but current projections show slowing of growth.

A recent study headed by Elliot Berg concluded that a slower economic
growth rate is not surprising. Recent improvements in Senegal\'s economy
are neither irreversible nor automatically sustainable. The challenge is
to build upon the sound macroeconomic climate, continue regulatory
reforms, and leverage current economic opportunities within the context
of decentralization. This will promote growth and employment
particularly in the entrepreneurial segments of the economy.

The Mission believes that Senegal is at a crossroads. Opportunities
exist to bolster economic growth from the grassroots level while
continuing iimprovements at the policy and macroeconomic level. Without
concentrated effort to reverse short‑sighted bureaucratic regulations
(which are being perpetuated and even re‑introduced), economic
empowerment will not reach the majority of Senegalese. Some of the
factors affecting the current economic climate in Senegal include:

• The currency devaluation of 1994 and ensuing economic liberalization;

• A growing acknowledgement that the highly centralized government is
incapable of creating economic growth, or even providing effective
social services to the majority of Senegalese, and that the private
sector must be encouraged to take the lead through improvements to the
business environment;

• Existence of opportunities, even in poor areas, for income generation
from small NR-based and other private sector businesses to provide goods
and services that improve the quality of life for the poor;

• A growing understanding of the critical role of improved NRM
technologies and practices to increasing economic opportunities; and

• Decentralization, which provides a new framework for partnership and
initiative within which private income‑generating activities can operate
for the benefit of the poor in rural and peri‑urban areas.

SO1 has been designed to provide the essential ingredients for greater
access to economic options and broader‑based economic growth by building
on the success of past USAID activities in policy reform, improved NRM,
and overall private sector development. This SO provides a comprehensive
and continuous approach to: strengthening local business associations;
identifying and documenting priority concerns; proposing solutions;
debating the issues in an open and participatory manner; and developing
and implementing strategies to improve the policy/regulatory environment
within the context of decentralization.

The linkage between SO1 and SO2 is critical. Development literature has
demonstrated a high correlation between economic growth and good
governance/democracy, and thus widespread comprehension of a more
participatory democratic process, including transparency in government
and private sector activities, must become the norm.

The sectors targeted by this SO will be shaped to a large extent by the
demand expressed by potential customers and partners. In addition to the
criteria for selection of customers/partners provided in the Customer
Service Plan, USAID will exclude assistance to those sectors that are
restricted by U.S. law (e.g. narcotics, crops that compete with those in
the United States, or activities that use child labor). In addition,
USAID will not work in sectors where other donors have a comparative
advantage (such as pelagic fishing and rice production/processing along
the Senegal River).

**2. Targeted customers**

SO1 will support promising income generating activities and will
specifically target those benefitting youth and women in rural, urban,
and peri-urban areas. The Mission will focus in particular on:

• Activities undertaken by individuals and community groups;

• NR-based enterprises, including family farm operations;

• Microenterprises (employing up to ten people with modest investment);
and

• Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) employing 5 to 100 employees with
under \$800,000 in equity.

**3. Critical assumptions**

The Mission, in consultation with its Senegalese customers and partners,
has identified several critical conditions that will have an impact on
the success of SO1:

• The GOS continues to emphasize the private sector as the engine for
economic growth;

• Transparent and sound macroeconomic management, as well as political
and social stability, prevail;

• Senegal\'s external partners continue their cooperation;

• Investments in basic infrastructure to support economic growth
increase; and

• Access and ownership of property, including land, is expanded and
secured.

Above all, the political will to address the numerous constraints to
broad‑based and sustainable economic growth in Senegal will be of
greatest importance to the success of this SO. The Mission is not
leaving the critical assumptions pertaining to political will to chance.
Through synergistic linkages between SO1 and SO2, including information
systems, focused analyses, and media development, the Mission will help
strengthen Senegal\'s civil society, facilitate effective advocacy,
bolster political will, and appeal to public opinion.

**4. Causal relationships within the Results Framework**

USAID/Senegal, in collaboration with its customers and partners, has
defined three interrelated and mutually reinforcing KIRs to achieve SO1.
These focus on the improvement of the legal, policy and regulatory
environment, access to financial services, and use of the best technical
and managerial practices.

As an example of the causal linkages among the KIRs, the Mission notes
that nearly all workers in Senegal complain about a lack of affordable
credit. Yet they may not fully understand that improvements in the
policy and regulatory climate could reduce defaults, reduce red tape,
and thus lower the rates of interest on borrowed capital. Also, a solid
enabling environment and affordable credit will not stimulate more
income generating activities unless the Senegalese have sound business
ideas that can make money.

USAID/Senegal\'s strategy incorporates an integrated and well-balanced
\"top-down/bottom-up\" approach to achieve not only SO1, but also
interrelated elements of SO2 and SO3. USAID/Senegal will develop
\"top-down\" programs aimed at improving the policy, legal, and
regulatory environment. \"Bottom-up\" programs will provide direct
support to small businesses, microenterprises, community or individual
activities, and associations of such enterprises.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #1: RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

**KIR 1.1 Improved legal, regulatory, and policy environment**

The legal, regulatory, and policy environment is perhaps the most
essential component for successful private sector income generation. For
example, an open, transparent, and accessible business investment
environment (a level playing field) provides the basis for individuals
to identify opportunities that will create income and/or employment.

With NR-based activities, for example, improved government and/or
community regulation, management and oversight will greatly help
minimize abuses of the environment.

Critical assumptions for this KIR include:

• Individuals and groups will be motivated to organize and invest in
economic activities if the enabling environment permits;

• Economic opportunities will in fact exist;

• Entrenched economic interests can be convinced to support reform; and

• Political, administrative, and social cultures accept and practice
greater transparency and accountability.

Two Intermediate Results (IRs) will support the achievement of this KIR.

*IR 1.1.1 Policy and regulatory framework improved*

Despite progress in improving the business climate, a series of studies
(including those by Berg, Bucknall, Gray, Gabbois, Oyinlola, Kelly) have
confirmed that private sector development remains stalled by numerous
constraints. This IR includes reduction of the high transaction costs,
for example, that are incurred by entrepreneurs when dealing with
regulations and bureaucratic procedures. Policies will be changed so
that they no longer favor (through taxes and tariff privileges) some
domestic industries over importers and new entrants. Disincentives to
employment creation, growth, and economies of scale will be reduced by
making sure that microenterprises and SMEs pay their fair share of
taxes. While the existing investment environment adversely affects the
private sector as a whole, it particularly affects small and
microenterprises. Therefore, the existence of a more supportive policy
and regulatory framework will significantly assist these groups.

*IR 1.1.2 Judicial process more adapted to business needs*

Business people frequently complain that their planning and
decision-making are impeded by time-consuming disputes with
unpredictable outcomes. This IR will reduce judicial constraints to
business activity, particularly those relating to labor disputes,
commercial disputes, and litigation between banks and customers. Key
areas of concern include the timeliness, predictability, and
implementation of judicial decisions.

**KIR 1.2 Improved access to financial services**

This KIR will improve financial resources, systems and services for
microenterprises and SMEs. While Senegal's financial sector has
relatively high liquidity, few small businesses are adequately serviced.
Banks generally consider small business loans to be too risky and costly
to administer. Credit union legislation issued in 1995 aims at
encouraging the development of a Decentralized Financial System (DFS) to
provide innovative ways to meet the savings and credit needs of small
businesses.

Critical assumptions for the success of this KIR include:

• The sustainability of the financial system will not be undermined by
subsidized credit that may come from non-USAID sources;

• Macroeconomic conditions remain favorable, thus reducing financial
risks; and

• The government does not forgive loans, providing a disincentive for
repayment.

This KIR will be achieved through four IRs:

*IR 1.2.1 Decentralized Financial System (DFS) expanded and sustained*

The DFS, which includes credit unions, credit cooperatives and
micro-lending programs, has gained importance over the last two years.
The number of savings and loan networks rose from 13 in 1993 to 30 in
1996 and the GOS reported that DFS clientele went from 45,000
individuals in 1994 to 100,000 individuals in 1996. However, only a
limited number of geographical areas are well-covered by the DFS. Rural
NR-based enterprises are notably under-represented in access to
financial services. In addition, only a few of the institutions are
receiving direct support through PVO/donor-funded projects, and even for
these, there is no guarantee of financial viability once the funding
terminates. This IR will therefore focus on increasing outreach and
achieving financial viability of the DFS.

*IR 1.2.2 Increased client awareness of financial instruments*

An important component of increased access is the client's knowledge of
service availability. Information about both the system and its
resources will be disseminated and understood.

*IR 1.2.3 Financial risks reduced*

Banks often argue that small business clientele are risky because of the
poor quality of applications and the lack of collateral and marketable
assets. A guarantee scheme, combined with training programs, will help
reduce the risk and increase the understanding about small businesses.

*IR 1.2.4 More savings mobilized*

The low level of savings mobilized by the DFS remains a key weakness.
The amount of savings collected in 1996, for example, totaled about \$11
million, 85% of which was collected by 5 out of the 30 existing
financial networks. Even for the highest-performing micro-lending
institutions in Senegal, savings mobilization is viewed as the greatest
challenge in their efforts to achieve sustainability. This IR will
attempt to rectify the problem by introducing new savings programs and
accounting systems.

**KIR 1.3 Increased use of best technical and managerial practices**

This KIR focuses on the essential human resource skills required to
generate successful enterprise activities. Building and supporting these
skills among potential and practicing entrepreneurs is a key element of
SO1 because even the most innovative financial services are not
sufficient without the application of appropriate technical and
managerial practices.

Critical assumptions include:

• Senegalese entrepreneurs wish to improve their technical and business
skills;

• Appropriate training mechanisms exist and will be used; and

• Family and other social demands will not decapitalize the business;

Three IRs support the achievement of the KIR:

*IR 1.3.1 Increased access to information*

Successful businesses require good information for decision making,
especially in the areas of identifying new business opportunities,
marketing, appropriate NRM practices and other technologies, product
development, and management. This IR will improve access to information
using trade-specific media and the internet. Public debate and consensus
building on policy reform will also be fostered by improving the
information content of the local media. Many activities under this IR
will be coordinated with those of the other two SOs.

*IR 1.3.2 Increased use of appropriate technology*

Appropriate technologies concentrate on those choices that are
cost-effective, generally favor labor over capital for economies like
Senegal\'s, and are easier to produce and maintain. The competitiveness
of Senegal\'s products is dependent upon using appropriate technologies.
The Mission\'s program will therefore provide information and access to
appropriate technologies for SME development. For example, USAID/Senegal
will intensify existing efforts to increase use of improved NRM
technologies and practices with some modifications to the on-going
Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) activity.

*IR 1.3.3 Private businesses, associations, and groups strengthened*

This IR will strengthen training and support for entrepreneurs. Services
will be provided by private consultants, NGOs, community programs, and
financial institutions. As part of this IR, business management and
technical skills such as literacy, numeracy, accounting, marketing,
agricultural processing, input supply and purchasing, and inventory
management will be enhanced.

**5. Commitment and capacity of customers/partners**

Since the devaluation of the CFAF, the GOS has formulated a
comprehensive package of policy reforms to support the development of
private initiatives. Policies already implemented include price and
trade liberalization, reform of the labor code, and the abolition or
renegotiation of special agreements under which the GOS conferred
special protection, subsidies, and tax exemptions to enterprises.

In the spirit of NPI, the GOS has promoted a climate of dialogue with
business associations and social actors. For example, the Focus Group
for Private Sector Competitiveness and Growth, consisting of
representatives of the GOS, the private sector, and trade unions, was
established to discuss proposed measures to improve the policy
environment. The GOS has also established a Private Sector Foundation to
serve as an intermediary between business service providers and
enterprises that need technical assistance. Finally, the GOS has set up
a Legal Reform Committee to improve the legal framework for business.

USAID/Senegal\'s customers and partners actively assisted in the design
of this SO. Participants in the various preparatory workshops included
PVO/NGOs, relevant ministry experts, private business service providers,
and others. The participatory nature of the strategy development has
encouraged not only commitment, but ownership in the formulation of
USAID/Senegal\'s new strategy.

**6. Donor activities in the SO**

The principal donor providing support to the private sector is the World
Bank, which sponsored a Private Sector Adjustment and Competitiveness
Program in 1994 as an accompanying package to the CFAF devaluation. The
Bank is also concluding an Energy Sector Adjustment Program with the
intent of liberalizing the sector and reducing energy costs, a major
obstacle to private sector growth. In 1997, the IFC opened an office in
Dakar to respond to the financial needs of SMEs. Two new activities will
likely be sponsored: an Investment Support Project and an Export
Promotion Project to support non-traditional exports.

After successfully completing its 1994/1997 Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the IMF is considering in early 1998 a new
program that centers on a \"new generation of reforms\" with a declared
objective of promoting the private sector, alleviating poverty, and
strengthening governance.

A number of other donors, as indicated in the following charts, are
providing support to the private sector either on a nationwide basis or
in selected geographic areas. Most have targeted microenterprises and
SMEs. Their support focuses mainly on lines of credit and/or technical
assistance. However, the implementation of donor lines of credit is
hindered by a lack of intermediate financial institutions.

A survey of savings and credit schemes cited in a recent World Bank
study found 30 active programs but only 3 that have any significant
capacity to extend a large volume of loans or that have prospects for
achieving financial sustainability: (i) the *Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal
(CMS)*, a French-funded credit union that has been selected by the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for the
implementation of the financial component of its Rural Microenterprises
Project; (ii) the Village Bank Project conducted by Catholic Relief
Services (CRS) under the USAID-funded PVO/NGO Activity; and (iii) the
*Alliance de Crédit et d\'Epargne pour la Production (ACEP)*, a former
USAID-supported (1985-1993) micro-lending program that is viewed by many
observers as the \"best practice\" in the field of micro-lending. ACEP
has demonstrated a capacity to mediate successfully credit relationships
between donor financiers and small and microenterprises.

Donor coordination of private sector activities and policy
recommendations has been particularly difficult. The status quo is
protected by vested interests and the inclinations of powerful
businesses and their benefactors to remain in control. However, forces
of change include globalization and increasing pressure from those who
are blocked by the regulatory environment and lack of knowledge about
economic options. The USG, while not the largest or most influential
player in Senegal\'s economy, is likely to take the lead in donor
coordination related to private sector income generation. As the
Ambassador\'s opening statement indicates, the State Department is
placing particular emphasis on seeing Senegal develop a more vibrant and
independent economy.

**Overview of Donor-funded Activities to Support the Private Sector**

**I. Multilateral donors**

+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+
| **Donor** | *        | **Nature  | **T      | **G       | **       |
|           | *Project | of        | argets** | eographic | Completi |
|           | Title**  | Act       |          | areas**   | onDate** |
|           |          | ivities** |          |           |          |
+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+
| AFDB      | FPE      | Line of   | All      | N         | 1998     |
|           |          | Credit    | types of | ationwide |          |
| EUROPEAN  | COPARE   |           | ent      |           | 2001     |
| UNION     |          | Line of   | erprises | St.Louis; |          |
|           | Private  | Credit    |          | Zi        | 2002     |
| IBRD      | Sector   |           | SMEs     | guinchor; |          |
|           | In       | I         |          | Dakar;    | 2002     |
| IFAD      | vestment | nvestment | All      | Kaolack;  |          |
|           | Project  | Promotion | types of | Kolda     | 2002     |
| UNDP      |          |           | ent      |           |          |
|           | Export   | Export    | erprises | N         | 2001     |
| WADB      | Dev      | Promotion |          | ationwide |          |
|           | elopment |           | Non-     |           | 2002     |
|           | Project  | Micr      | tra      | N         |          |
|           |          | o-lending | ditional | ationwide |          |
|           | Rural    |           | Exports  |           |          |
|           | Micro-en | Technical |          | Tambacou  |          |
|           | terprise | A         | Rural    | ndaKolda; |          |
|           | Project  | ssistance | Micro-   |           |          |
|           |          |           | ent      | Kaolack;  |          |
|           | SMEs     | Line of   | erprises |           |          |
|           | Support  | Credit    |          | Fatick    |          |
|           | Program  |           | SMEs     |           |          |
|           |          |           |          | Ta        |          |
|           | Credit   |           | Arts &   | mbacounda |          |
|           | A        |           | Crafts   |           |          |
|           | rtisanal |           |          | St-Louis  |          |
|           |          |           |          |           |          |
|           |          |           |          | N         |          |
|           |          |           |          | ationwide |          |
+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+

**II. Bilateral donors**

+------------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----------+
| **Donor**  | *        | **Nature  | **T      | **G       | **Com     |
|            | *Project | of        | argets** | eographic | pletion** |
|            | Title**  | Act       |          | areas**   |           |
|            |          | ivities** |          |           | **Date**  |
+------------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----------+
| CANADA     | Rural    | Promotion | Small    | Thies;    | 2002      |
|            | E        | of        | bu       | Louga;    |           |
| FRANCE     | ntrepre- | Entrepre  | sinesses | St.Louis  | 2002      |
|            | neurship | -neurship | in       |           |           |
| GERMANY    | in the   |           | hort     | Kolda     | 2002      |
|            | Niayes   | Promotion | iculture |           |           |
| ITALY      |          | of        | and NRM  | Dakar;    | 1998      |
|            | Rural    | Entrepre  |          | Thiès;    |           |
|            | E        | -neurship | Small    | Louga;    | 2001      |
|            | ntre-pre |           | bu       | St.Louis; |           |
|            | neurship | Micr      | sinesses | Kolda;    | 1998      |
|            | in Kolda | o-lending | in       | Ta        |           |
|            |          |           | forestry | mbacounda | 1999      |
|            | PAMECAS  | Line of   |          |           |           |
|            |          | Credit    | Micro-   | Dakar     | 1998      |
|            | PAME     |           |          |           |           |
|            |          | Technical | ent      | Thiès     |           |
|            | PAMEC    | A         | erprises | -St.Louis |           |
|            |          | ssistance |          |           |           |
|            | SME      |           | Micro &  | Thiès     |           |
|            | Project  | Line of   | small    |           |           |
|            |          | Credit    | bu       | N         |           |
|            | Em       |           | sinesses | ationwide |           |
|            | ployment | Support   |          |           |           |
|            | Ge       | to SMEs   | Arts &   | Dakar     |           |
|            | neration |           | Crafts   |           |           |
|            | Program  | Training  |          |           |           |
|            |          |           | SMEs     |           |           |
|            | Com      |           |          |           |           |
|            | modities |           | SMEs in  |           |           |
|            | Aid      |           | public   |           |           |
|            |          |           | works    |           |           |
|            | Program  |           |          |           |           |
|            |          |           | SMEs     |           |           |
+------------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----------+

**7. Illustrative approaches**

**KIR 1.1:** In close collaboration with other donors, USAID/Senegal
will continue its policy dialogue with the GOS to remove some of the
major constraints to private sector development. USAID/Senegal will
consider a Non-Project Assistance (NPA) with conditioned policy grants
aimed at encouraging the GOS to improve the business environment, if
funding permits *(See Part III)*. USAID/Senegal will complete an
Investment Barrier/Investment Road Map Survey in collaboration with
other donors to identify other key constraints. The Mission will finance
research and technical assistance to strengthen some key public
institutions (e.g. the Economic and Social Council, etc.) that help
assure a level and open playing field for the private sector. Technical
assistance programs will train judges in commercial law and support
private Arbitration Centers.

**KIR 1.2:** Building on the success of past activities to finance micro
and small businesses, USAID\'s suggested activities include: a)
replicating the ACEP experience, building on existing savings and credit
systems to expand village banks with a focus on financial services; b)
building upon KAED\'s credit program which demonstrates to commercial
banks that rural producers\-- both men and women\-- are reliable and
profitable partners; c) technical assistance to train DFS managers,
expand savings services, and enforce regulation; and d) implementing a
loan guarantee mechanism to increase access to formal bank services by
lowering their perceived risk in lending small amounts to new clients.

**KIR 1.3:** USAID/Senegal will finance assistance that focuses on
technical and entrepreneurship training. Activities might include
workshops to bring together established and aspiring entrepreneurs,
focusing on entrepreneurial spirit, management tools and techniques, and
business plan development. Support would also be provided to strengthen
the institutional capacities of professional associations. Further
assistance would be offered to support public education about how free
markets operate and the appropriate role for government. In the NRM
sector, activities proven to be successful under CBNRM and the KAED
Activity will continue to focus on the use of improved NR technologies
and the translation of NRM-based initiatives into viable profit-making
enterprises.

**8. Sustainability**

The GOS policy statement issued during the last Consultative Group
meeting (1995) clearly underscored the primacy of the private sector in
the economic growth process. The GOS is moving towards a limited role of
promoting a peaceful and stable political climate, maintaining and
developing public infrastructure, and ensuring a supportive environment.
SO1 will support the GOS in its continuing transformation from a
centralized, controlling economy to one that is more open, efficient,
and dynamic.

The emphasis on customer and partner involvement in all stages of the
strategy formulation process is the best insurance that SO1 will be
sustainable. Throughout the implementation period, it will be the
customers and partners who propose activities and support their
implementation through financial or in-kind contributions.

**9. Expected magnitude of impact**

USAID/Senegal\'s past and current experience under the ACEP, KAED, RSA,
and CBNRM activities, combined with expected trends in Senegal, provide
a fairly sound basis for anticipated magnitude of impact under this SO.

Under a low funding scenario *(see Part III)*, SO1 is expected to
benefit a total of 1,000 SMEs employing 10,000 people and some 30,000
individuals involved in income generating activities. In addition,
policy reforms to be put in place over the eight-year implementation
period should improve the business environment, enabling an increase in
the number of SMEs from 2,500 to a total of 5,000, while the clientele
of the DFS involved in income generating activities (microenterprises
and community groups) would increase from 100,000 to 175,000. In total,
SO1 would directly benefit at least 40,000 people (of whom 50% would be
women entrepreneurs) through financial services, training, and
technological support. A high funding scenario involving an NPA for
policy reforms (e.g., tariff reductions and harmonization with
neighboring countries, commercial law reforms, and more efficient land
titling) would increase the impact of SO1.

**10. Performance indicators**

***SO1 Sustainable increases in private sector income generating
activities in selected sectors***

• Incomes increased by \$80 million through supported activities;

• 1,250 SMEs and 3,200 microenterprises created;

• Ratio of private investment to GDP increased from 13% to 17%.

***Cost: \$70.4 million over 8 years***

*KIR 1.1 Improved legal, regulatory and policy environment*

• Proportion of surveyed economic agents that report improvement in the
business climate;

• Average time to resolve business litigations;

• Average time for new businesses to register;

• Average costs for new businesses to register;

• Number of public enterprises privatized;

• Value of public shares transferred to the private sector.

*IR 1.1.1 Policy and regulatory framework improved*

• Number of firms/products granted tariff preferences;

• Selected improvements in the tax code;

• Selected improvements in the customs code;

• Number of investment incentives rationalized.

*IR 1.1.2 Judicial process more adapted to business needs*

• Number of arbitration centers established;

• Number of cases submitted to arbitration centers;

• Number of distressed enterprises assisted.

*KIR 1.2 Improved access to financial services*

• Value of credit extended;

• Number of loans extended.

*IR 1.2.1 DFS expanded and sustained*

• Number of DFSs recovering at least 100% of costs;

• Number of people benefiting from loans;

• Number of financial intermediaries;

• Loan repayment rate.

*IR 1.2.2 Increased awareness of available instruments*

• Number of interviewees aware of two financial instruments.

*IR 1.2.3 Financial risks reduced*

• Number of loans made under financial guarantee programs;

• Value of loans extended under financial guarantee programs;

• Change in the collateral requirement;

• Number of trainees under financial guarantee programs.

*IR 1.2.4 More savings mobilized*

• Amount of savings mobilized;

• Number of savers.

*KIR 1.3 Increased use of best technical and managerial practices*

• Proportion of SMEs with business plans;

• Proportion of SMEs and individuals working in NR-related activities
that have adopted improved NRM technologies;

• Proportion of SMEs working in other areas that have adopted improved
technologies.

*IR 1.3.1 Improved access to information*

• Number of subscriptions to specialized journals/magazines;

• Number of SMEs/entrepreneurs who have memberships in organizations or
networks providing business or technical information.

*IR 1.3.2 Increased access to appropriate technology*

• Number of households visited by outreach/extension agents;

• Proportion of economic agents reporting that they abide by agreed-upon
standards.

*IR 1.3.3 Private businesses, associations, and groups strengthened*

• Number of position papers and studies by private sector organizations.

***Ndànk ndànk moy jàp golo ci ñaay.***

***\"It is little by little that one catches the monkey in the
bush.\"***

***(Patience is the way to progress.)***

**Overview:** In 1996, a major decentralization law in Senegal
transferred a wide range of responsibilities to local governments and
new regional councils[^4]. This law presents an important new
opportunity for local empowerment, sustainable development, and as a
result, tangible economic improvements.

In the absence of decentralization, local and private initiatives have
often been constrained by centralized management. For decentralization
to succeed, local governments and their partners must have in place the
technical capacity, efficiency, financial resources, and the political
authority to carry out their new responsibilities.

Through its second strategic objective, the Mission will build on the
political will and momentum created by the decentralization law. In
response to the needs articulated by USAID\'s customers and their
partners, this SO will:

• Provide necessary institutional support to elected bodies and their
local partners;

• Facilitate access at the local level to financial resources for
funding development programs;

• Strengthen civil society to assure good local governance and thwart
central attempts to control local debates; and

• Improve the implementation of decentralization policies and
regulations.

This SO primarily supports the Agency\'s Democracy and Governance (D/G)
SO. It emphasizes popular participation at the grassroots level, greater
accountability of local officials, and greater transparency in local
government practices. Of the nine authorities transferred to local and
regional entities, USAID will concentrate its assistance in the sectors
of health and natural resources. This builds upon USAID\'s comparative
advantage and will serve as a model for implementing the other
transferred authorities. In the area of NRM, the decentralization
legislation includes specific texts to stimulate the formation of local
civil society organizations, particularly those with a focus on the
environment.

**1. Problem analysis**

Since 1960, Senegal has gradually attempted to ensure greater and more
equitable development at the grassroots level. In 1974, 320 Rural
Councils (*Conseils Rurales,* or CRs) were created but never given clear
responsibilities or resources. In 1987 many of the regions were
redefined and in the early 1990s central ministry powers and
responsibilities were devolved to some extent to regional offices. In
1996, Senegal revised its electoral code and passed one of the most
progressive decentralization laws in francophone Africa. Later that
year, more than 28,000 local officials were elected to office, marking
an extraordinary post-Independence move towards popular democracy. Many
of these new officials, however, are new to public service and have only
rudimentary administrative skills. The legal framework and operational
procedures remain incomplete, even though full legislative authorities
have been transferred since January 1997. Moreover, in many cases human
and budget resources have not yet been transferred from the central
government. Not surprisingly, many local officials are unsure of their
roles and responsibilities under the new legislation. Essentially, the
decentralization process so far has transferred the responsibilities,
but not the resources.

In addition, the newly elected officials co-exist with
Presidentially-appointed governors, prefects and sub-prefects, who
retain important powers including budget-related matters. However,
decentralization offers an exciting glimmer of hope that empowered local
people will take charge of their own development, rather than wait
passively for central-level promises to go unfulfilled. The opportunity
presented by the decentralization law is real enough, but so too are the
risks if it is not implemented to the benefit of localities. Senegal has
already demonstrated that the central government is not fully capable of
delivering services in the nine transferred sectoral domains. If
decentralization fails, Senegal risks moving backwards. This is a major
reason that USAID, with other major donors, is focused on making
decentralization work.

Recent experience in the health and NRM sectors in Senegal has lead
USAID to a realization of just how important improved local management
is, and how health and NRM issues can be the \"hook\" to achieving
improved local D/G. Broadened participation in NRM‑based enterprises
produced by KAED and CBNRM is proving to be an effective means to
achieving decentralization, and may be more effective in some cases than
a stand-alone SO focusing exclusively on ballot‑box issues. For example,
in the rural communities where KAED and CBNRM operate, participation in
NRM‑based enterprises‑‑a result of training and new authorities‑‑have
had real and immediate consequences for people previously excluded from
much of the economic or political decision making in their communities.
An ever‑increasing number of people involved in NRM‑based activities in
these communities are, for the first time, taking leadership roles in
the economic life of the community. By contrast, there is an apparent
decrease in the number of people participating in national and local
elections (based on reports of lower voter turn-out). This comparison
reinforces the argument that the Mission is supporting democratization
by helping a broad segment of the rural community build necessary
skills, confidence and advocacy through involvement in community‑based
NRM issues and NRM‑based enterprises. Because Mission experience with
helping to strengthen local health districts has resulted in the same
kinds of D/G impacts, much of SO2 will be achieved by implementing NRM
and health sector activities as models for good local governance.

The Mission has also examined opportunities for assisting Senegal\'s
electoral process. Previously, USAID funded the International Foundation
for Election Systems (IFES) to provide technical assistance to the GOS
for civic and voter education during the November 1996 regional,
municipal, and local elections. Among the recommendations made by IFES
was the establishment of an independent body to oversee the elections.
Following the creation of this non-partisan entity\--the National
Observatory for Elections (ONEL)\--USAID and the U.S. Embassy expressed
keen interest in providing support for its objective of overseeing the
May 1998 legislative elections. In February of 1998, however, the GOS
made it clear to the donor community that direct assistance to the ONEL
would not be permitted.

At this time, therefore, USAID does not have a basis for developing a
special objective on elections. Through SO2\'s third KIR, however, the
Mission will assist the political process at the local level by
developing activities to strengthen democratic principles and further
promote civic and voter education. These activities are expected to
enable local populations to understand better the political process and
make informed choices about the candidates, as well as to increase local
government accountability to their constituencies. Furthermore, there
will be two important local elections during the life of this strategy
(2001 and 2006), at which time the Mission will again explore
possibilities of providing assistance.

**2. Targeted customers**

SO2 will work closely with the following customers:

• *Local government institutions* at the regional, municipal and rural
levels;

• *Locally elected (CR level) NRM committees* that provide wiser and
more participatory management of the natural resource base, including
land use management;

• *Youth associations*, which are excellent bases for shaping Senegal\'s
future leaders. Many have developed economic activities and perform
social and economic services for their communities;

• *Women\'s groups*, which are dynamic and very receptive to activities
that address problems and encourage greater participation at the local
level;

• *Hometown and \"émigré\" associations.* These groups are well
organized and capable of mobilizing considerable financial and human
resources, as well as introducing new ideas;

• *Journalists and the media.* The emergence of independent media has
become one of the most promising developments in Senegal\'s
democratization. The Mission will work with these entities to support
the development of local media to address local governance issues and
disseminate information;

• *Local and regional unions and federations* will be strengthened to
foster horizontal linkages and economies of scale among various
grassroots organizations; and

• *Groupements d\'Interet Economique (GIEs)*. These economic interest
groups are among the fastest growing structures in Senegal, in part
because their income is not taxed (income is allocated to individual
members and taxed accordingly). GIEs are dynamic providers of economic
and social services at the local level.

**3. Critical assumptions**

Critical assumptions at the SO level define the conditions for achieving
results. They include:

*• A continuing climate of social, political, and institutional
stability* to permit improved management of local services and
resources. As the insurgency in the Casamance region demonstrates,
physical security is the minimum prerequisite for program operation.

*• A continuing, shared political will to support decentralization.* The
central government must not obstruct or manipulate the process, either
deliberately or through neglect, carelessness or bureaucratic
obfuscation. Political will at all levels of government must be genuine.

*• Donor and development partner agreement to coordinate closely on
decentralization programs and to establish appropriate funding
mechanisms.* Donors have traditionally provided funding directly to
central government bodies, with the exception of funds allocated
directly to PVOs or other private entities. If decentralization is to
succeed, development programs supported by donors must be coordinated
and funding procedures adapted.

*• The people\'s belief and participation in local government.* This is
the countervailing force to political will. The entire decentralization
effort could falter if people mistrust the process and fail to invest
their time and effort in local government structures. Nurturing
confidence in popular participation depends on strong leadership from
local officials and civic leaders.

**4. Causal relationships within the Results Framework**

USAID/Senegal, in collaboration with its customers and partners, has
defined four interrelated and mutually reinforcing KIRs. Together they
will lead to the achievement of SO2, which is essentially enhanced
political empowerment at the local level through appropriate
implementation of the new decentralization law.

Given that the regional, municipal, and rural councils have new and
greater responsibilities as of 1997, the strategy will strengthen these
government institutions in targeted areas, helping them to carry out
decentralized mandates. In addition, USAID/Senegal will focus on
effective coordination among the different layers of government found at
the local level. Finally, since the decentralization law itself is new,
there are a number of regulations and implementation guidelines that
still need to be developed. These will affect how local governments
interact, raise revenues, and involve the local private sector and
various interest groups.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

![](media/image1.png){width="7.282638888888889in"
height="5.795138888888889in"}

**KIR 2.1 Increased capacity of local institutions**

If local government service delivery and resource management are to be
more effective, democratic, and accountable, then relatively strong
governmental, as well as non-governmental, institutions must be put in
place. Current levels of capacity are exceedingly weak or non-existent.
The knowledge, skills and attitudes of local leaders must be upgraded
both technically and managerially.

Critical assumptions for this KIR are that:

• Individuals and groups in the community and local government are
willing and able to take advantage of opportunities created by
decentralization;

• Small groups can organize themselves around tangible interests and
work together for mutual benefit;

• Relatively poorly educated local elected officials and civil society
leaders, working with local administrative officials, can acquire the
basic skills to guide and manage bureaucracies and to encourage
individual and community actions;

• Access to good information will provide adequate technical and
organizational guidance to support successful activities; and

• Systems for transfer of information and human resources exist and are
operational.

Three intermediate results support the achievement of this KIR.

*IR 2.1.1 Managerial, leadership, planning, and analysis skills
improved*

This IR focuses on building the capacity of local government structures
and local organizations, supporting their efforts in participatory
planning, analysis, and implementation. This IR will include
establishment of improved systems for record keeping, budgeting,
accounting, management, and report writing to show progress and
completion of activities. These systems will provide a framework for
ensuring that efficiency, transparency and accountability become part of
routine procedures.

*IR 2.1.2 Increased access to good information*

This IR is based on the premise that good information is a prerequisite
for strong, sustainable institutions. Two kinds of information seem to
be of the greatest importance. First, there is a need to know at the
local level the rules and regulations governing the decentralization
law. Secondly, there is a need to establish information systems about
\"best practices\" for good local governance as well as technical
information on such topics as best NRM practices. Local access to good
information will enhance the quality of development efforts and promote
their sustainability.

*IR 2.1.3 Improved systems for transfer of information and human
resources from national to local level*s

Improving these systems will facilitate information flow and provide the
necessary human means and resources needed by local governments to carry
out their new mandates. Sharing of \"best practices\" among local
communities across Senegal will also be promoted.

IR 2.1.4 Increased accountability and transparency of local institutions

For local institutions to be strong, there must be greater
accountability of local officials and greater transparency of local
government practices. This IR will support activities which will help
create an environment conducive to a public monitoring of the
performance of locally elected officials as well as the non-elected
civil servants. Activities will also include auditing of local finances
and other anti-corruption measures.

**KIR 2.2 Increased access to financial resources**

Local governments need a certain level of financial resources to carry
out their responsibilities. This in turn requires a timely transfer of
funds from the central government. Because the need for resources at the
local level far exceeds the amount that the central government could
ever transfer, local governments need clear authority and mechanisms to
generate additional financial resources locally, through non-government
channels, donors and other external entities, local taxes,
contributions, and fund-raising.

The critical assumptions for this KIR are that:

• Central governmental resource allocations will be forthcoming;

• Local governments are able to increase their tax revenues and attract
additional funds from donors, NGOs, and other partners;

• Individuals contribute their own resources, both financial and
in-kind; and

• The Senegalese begin building off of their culture of donations and
taking care of the extended family, to support philanthropic
organizations that provide social services such as public libraries and
neighborhood clean-up campaigns.

Three intermediate results support the achievement of this KIR:

*IR 2.2.1 Improved systems for the transfer of funds from national to
local levels*

This IR addresses the implementation of existing legislation provisions
with respect to funding. Because the transfer of funds from the national
to the local level has not been effective during the first year of
decentralization, this IR will work to improve efficiency and timeliness
of the transfer systems.

*IR 2.2.2 Improved management and enforcement of tax collection
procedures*

This IR addresses the improvement of existing tax collection techniques
and the generation of new fiscal resources to finance local development
activities.

*IR 2.2.3 Improved implementation of a policy and legal framework for
local government authority to raise revenues.*

This IR addresses non-central government sources of funding for local
governments to carry out their programs. Alternatives include donor and
NGO funding, local fiscal efforts, credit, and private fund-raising or
contributions, both financial and in-kind.

**KIR 2.3 Increased popular participation in the management and
oversight of local affairs**

Popular participation is demonstrated in several ways: elections;
decision making and feedback on the acceptability of plans;
participation in the implementation of services, development activities,
and village level decision making; financial contributions; the
promotion of local civic culture that reinforces democratic principles
and good governance; the development of regional and local media; and
oversight of and feedback on overall government actions.

Following are some critical assumptions for this KIR:

• People have the time and interest to participate at the levels defined
above;

• Local leaders (civic, elected officials, and administratively
appointed officials) act to inspire popular participation;

• Access and availability of pertinent information will prompt people to
action;

• Elections can be organized and conducted in a transparent and credible
fashion; and

• Local civic leaders are selected in a credible and transparent fashion
based on the confidence they inspire in responding to local issues.

Two intermediate results support the achievement of this KIR:

*IR 2.3.1 Multiple and regular channels of citizen access to information
established*

Establishing systems for citizen involvement begins with regular
meetings that encourage a sharing of views and information. Sharing
financial information is a key element of transparency, essential for
trust and openness. In a semi-literate society, meetings constitute
perhaps the most important forum for communication and participation.
Yet discussion must also be encouraged outside of meetings, in small
groups or subcommittees, to involve those who may not have attended or
spoken up at the meetings. Moreover, thorough, candid, and regular
reports on plans, budgets and activities constitute an indispensable
aspect of open systems.

*IR 2.3.2 Better informed and strengthened local development groups
concerned with good governance*

The more citizen groups are knowledgeable about good governance, the
more they will be able to provide oversight of local institutions and
meaningful participation in their deliberations. Information on team
building, information-sharing, fund-raising, problem solving, conflict
resolution, and other issues will be provided. USAID will use NRM and
health issues as a means of focusing on good governance.

*IR 2.3.3 D*emocratic process for electing local leaders improved

One of the most important components for popular participation is the
process of electing local leaders. If leaders are not representative and
effective in carrying out their roles, then popular participation
generally falters and people become indifferent. Elections should
increasingly focus on programs as opposed to discussions of
personalities and electoral tactics. The accomplishments of incumbents
should also become common knowledge. This IR will support activities
aimed at voter education and political participation and at
strengthening local advocacy groups engaged in voter education
campaigns.

**KIR 2.4 More effective implementation of policies and regulations
related to decentralization**

The regulatory framework for effective decentralization is not yet fully
in place, and serious gaps have already been identified. KIR 2.4 will
address this problem to permit a better coordination of the multiple
governmental structures currently existing at the local level.

The critical assumptions for this KIR are that:

• The political will exists among different levels of government to
rationalize their responsibilities and to implement fully the intent of
the decentralization legislation;

• Adequate skills can be transferred and developed to implement
decentralization and related legislation;

• Transparent regulations and codes are developed and implemented that
\"level the playing field\" and empower the private sector and NGOs; and

• Local officials, many of whom are illiterate, can understand and
effectively apply the intent of all relevant legislation, codes, and
regulations.

Two intermediate results will support the achievement of this KIR:

*IR 2.4.1 Better coordination systems among levels of local government*

Coordination is essential for information-sharing about successes as
well as constraints and concerns. For decentralization to succeed, it
will require horizontal as well as vertical coordination.

*IR 2.4.2 Increased knowledge of decentralization texts and related
legislation*

One of the key constraints to decentralization is a lack of knowledge of
decentralization texts and related legislation at the levels of both
general operations and specific sectoral authorities such as NRM and
health financing. Since local leaders are reluctant to act until they
understand their roles and responsibilities, it is essential that a
basic operational understanding of the decentralization legislation be
provided in a consistent and coherent manner across the country.

**5. Customer and partner commitment**

During the initial Customer Survey and the April workshop to define the
Strategic Objectives, USAID/Senegal\'s customers and partners
articulated this SO as being a high priority, second only to income and
employment creation. Initially, the SO was worded as, \"effective and
sustainable decentralization.\" During subsequent workshops, it was
rephrased to better articulate the actual intent of empowerment.
Partners from NGOs and the Ministry of Interior were particularly active
and supportive of the new wording. During the December 1997 Restitution
with Customers, the sampled customers also expressed satisfaction with
the final wording of the SO and KIRs. In addition, PVOs/NGOs are
particularly enthusiastic about this SO because they see themselves
featured prominently both as partners and as keeping customers of the
related SO activities.

**6. Other donor activities in the SO**

In 1997, decentralization was the most discussed development idea among
donors in Senegal. A donor coordination committee on decentralization
was established under the leadership of the Canadian International
Development Agency. This group has been crucial in keeping the GOS from
playing one donor off another, and in creating transparency in the
budget distribution process. Assistance is particularly aimed at
increasing the technical capacities of the national association of these
newly elected regional officials; increasing and disseminating knowledge
of decentralization policies and procedures, including studies on local
taxation; and the development and promotion of new forms of partnership
for the management of local affairs.

The EU is focusing on community support for decentralization;
information systems for locally elected officials; equipment for local
governments; and training government officials and newly appointed local
officials in communications systems, regional statistics, and
decentralization-related topics.

The French have activities to support GOS reforms adapted to
decentralization; to train GOS agents and newly elected officials in
land use planning, development planning, and budget control; and to
support local government with equipment and infrastructure.

UNDP supports decentralization efforts through Local Development Funds
focused on strengthening rural council capacities and developing income
generating activities in targeted towns.

Other donors and activities include the World Bank\'s Program of Support
to Regional, Communal, and Rural Community Levels; the Frederich Ebert
Foundation, which will provide focused training in budget implementation
and environment to the newly elected officials; and the GTZ, which will
provide literacy programs. The Netherlands also intend to provide
assistance to decentralization.

**7. Illustrative approaches**

**KIR 2.1:** Newly elected officials as well as local level
organizations and associations in the targeted areas will be provided
training in literacy, numeracy, bookkeeping, leadership skills, and good
governance practices, as well as management, proposal, and report
writing. Local governments will be provided with reliable, updated
information on new ideas and approaches. Workshops will also be
conducted to promote local development strategies and to discuss
local-level problems stemming from transferred authorities, such as
health, environment and natural resources. Activities will include the
continuation under CBNRM of technical assistance, equipment, and skills
training for NGOs and local populations to develop and implement land
use management plans.

**KIR 2.2:** USAID activities will focus on developing appropriate
techniques and organizations to mobilize financial resources needed by
local governments to carry out their planned programs. For example, this
KIR will explore increased generation of revenues from weekly village
markets. Under CBNRM, greater emphasis will be placed on networking for
access to savings and loan programs.

**KIR 2.3:** Popular participation requires interactions between
locally-elected officials and citizen groups, as well as the direct
involvement of those groups in local decision making processes. Programs
will be developed to help ensure greater accountability, transparency
and oversight in regional, municipal, and rural government operations.
Activities will also aim at strengthening good governance practices,
democratic principles, and accountability at the local level. These
activities are already underway in an initial 15 (of 50 planned) CRs
through CBNRM, where NRM committees continue to learn a participatory
approach to decision making. Other activities will promote civic and
voter education[^5] to increase knowledge about the political process
and to help community-based groups in local government operations.
Finally, to assist local governments in developing partnerships with
NGOs, improved organizational and participatory management techniques
will be introduced .

USAID will develop activities to strengthen service-oriented NGOs and
develop mechanisms for making them more accountable to the local
populace. The Mission further plans to promote the development of
regional media and the diffusion of information about local issues in
local languages. Activities will also support selected organizations
that specialize in the development of instruments to promote good
governance and local government oversight.

**KIR 2.4**: Under this policy dialogue KIR, USAID activities will
initially focus on improving the implementation of decentralization
policies by providing more information about decentralization texts and
related legislation. CBNRM has already been instrumental in building
greater understanding of the decentralization law and related forestry
code legislation in 15 CRs; these efforts will expand under the new
strategy. Assistance will also be provided to better coordinate and
differentiate roles among the different local government structures.

**8. How sustainability will be achieved**

For decades, development programs in Senegal have not been sustainable
because of lack of program ownership by the Senegalese themselves.
Senegal\'s new delegation of authority to local levels now promotes such
local autonomy and emphasizes popular participation. SO2 will target
those local governments, using the demand-driven approach, that have
demonstrated vision, energy, management acumen, and a willingness to
contribute to their own development. This approach will weed out those
partners that are not likely to be focused on the sustainability of
results after USAID assistance has ended.

**9. Expected magnitude of impact**

Under a low funding scenario *(see Part III)*, and in light of current
experience under the six year, \$25 million CBNRM Activity, the Mission
believes that with a similar level of funding and roughly the same
timeframe the new strategy would be able to provide assistance to
between 30 and 40 CRs and their constituencies (NGOs, GIEs, and other
associations) in addition to the assistance already aimed at 50 CRs
under CBNRM (which would continue under the new strategy). In total,
some 80 to 90 CRs out of the 320 in Senegal would be affected by the new
strategy. However, because assistance provided under the new strategy
goes beyond NRM and NRM-related activities, the impact of this SO will
be more diversified and much greater than that of CBNRM alone.

SO2 activities may also target two to three regional councils, selected
based on criteria developed by USAID and its partners. In so doing, SO2
would have an impact not only on the population of each CR (roughly
320,000 to 400,000 people), but on those of the selected regions.
Moreover, PVOs/NGOs and grassroots organizations within the selected CRs
would benefit from USAID support.

A high funding scenario would allow the Mission to provide more
intensive and extensive assistance, enhancing both the scope and quality
of its services. The Mission would also be able to develop NPAs to: (1)
negotiate policy reforms such as the approval and implementation of the
Land Tenure Plan, which would facilitate access to land rights for
youth, women and the landless; and (2) enable local governments to levy
local taxes. The impact of these envisioned policy reforms would be
nationwide.

**10. Performance Indicators**

A number of performance targets will be used to monitor progress and to
measure achievement of this SO. Sources of data and information to be
used in measuring performance indicators will include: reports from the
GOS Ministries of Interior, Decentralization, Finance, and Environment;
reports produced by other donors; customer and partner surveys; and any
other external evaluations deemed appropriate. Some of the following
indicators may be dropped if the costs of data are deemed too high. See
Annex E for more information about the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.

**SO-level performance indicators**

• Proportion of citizens in 50 CRs and 10 Communes who report
satisfaction with a threshold level of services and resources (as
determined by periodic surveys);

• 90% of targeted CRs implementing Land Use Management Plans (LUMPS);

• 60% of Communes and 65% of CRs implementing 90% of their budgets.

***Cost: \$48 million over 8 years***

*KIR 2.1 Increased capacity of local institutions*

• Proportion of CLs that implement their Environmental Action Plans;

• Proportion of CLs that design and implement a development plan;

• Proportion of CLs capable of self-reporting on management-related
financial data;

• Proportion of works under CL supervision contracted to local
organizations.

*KIR 2.2: Increased access to financial resources*

• Proportion of CLs that collect at least 80% of planned operating
revenues on their own;

• Rate of increase of government transfers (in real terms) to CLs;

• Rate of increase in the value (in real terms) of revenues from
external sources;

• Proportion of CLs that receive 100% of expected central government
transfers by March 31st.

*KIR 2.3: Increased popular participation in the management and
oversight of local affairs*

• Number of complaints registered against local governments and
deconcentrated state authorities.

*KIR 2.4: More effective implementation of policies and regulations
related to decentralization*

• Proportion of decentralization-related implementation decrees issued;

• Proportion of conflicts resolved at the CR level.

***Wergiyàram moy àlàl.***

**Health is wealth*.***

**Overview:** U.S. investments towards this objective will promote the
use and sustainability of selected primary health care services by
increasing access, demand, and local financing. Working in both public
and private sectors, efforts will be aimed at decreasing infant and
child mortality, reducing fertility, and stabilizing HIV/AIDS prevalence
rates. Funding levels will depend on local needs-based demands, program
performance, and participatory co-financing. Anticipated impacts include
doubling the levels of use for key infant/child preventive health
services and family planning in the selected areas as well as improving
other key indicators.

SO3 builds directly on the 1992-1997 strategy and on USAID experience in
Senegal over the past 35 years.[^6] It reinforces an emphasis in recent
years on stimulating private and voluntary sector initiatives and is
intended to enhance Senegal's political and administrative
decentralization. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of
strengthening local entities \-- a minor feature of U.S. health
assistance in Senegal since the early 1980s.

The services reflect priorities established by the GOS Ministry of
Health & Social Action (MHSA) in its 1998-2002 national plan, and are
fully consistent with priorities established in U.S. foreign assistance
legislation and Agency population and health sector policies. The
GOS/MHSA's new national strategy and its related Integrated Health
Development Program (PDIS) will allow donors to coordinate their
investments in integrated primary health services, especially for
reproductive health (RH). USAID interventions will focus on child
survival (CS), maternal health and family planning (FP), and sexually
transmitted infections (STI/AIDS) services.

**1. Problem analysis**

Since the late 1970s, mortality and fertility (and the related issues of
demography and rapid population growth), as well as ethical rights
issues surrounding human reproduction, have been identified by USAID as
among the major long-term development assistance challenges in Africa.
This is why the United States has invested over \$100 million in the
population and health domain in Senegal over the past 20 years. These
investments have contributed to some remarkable results: health policies
now strongly favor primary health care and community-level organization;
child mortality declined 50% (even more in rural areas); fertility in
urban areas declined more than 25%; and the country\'s early, concerted
action in the 1980s has so far successfully contained the HIV/AIDS
pandemic to comparatively low levels.

Senegal has benefited from\--and returned good results for\--high levels
of international donor financing. However, significant mortality and
fertility problems remain. Continued foreign exchange grant financing
and other assistance for health system services can help accelerate
Senegal's transition in the first half of the next century to a
low-mortality, low-fertility equilibrium that will enable more
investment in productive and social sectors, lessen demographic
pressures that contribute to political and social instabilities, and
enable alleviation of potentially severe environmental degradation.

Senegal's *infant and young child mortality* has declined steadily since
the 1960s (from over 325 to 139 per 1000 for children under 5 years old,
in 1997). It now is among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, due in large
part to deliberate public health measures and donor assistance taken
over the past 20 years in spite of largely stagnant or declining
economic growth. This mortality, however, remains high by international
standards and is amenable to further policy and program interventions as
planned by the GOS and as proposed in this strategy. Moreover, recent
studies show declines in rural mortality leveling off and actual
increases in urban age 0-5 mortality in 1995 and in 1996, likely due to
declines in vaccination rates earlier this decade, differential
vulnerabilities to poverty in urban areas after the 1994 CFAF
devaluation, and possible deterioration in water and sanitation
standards. With over 13% of children dying before age five, a major
prerequisite for reducing fertility is still lacking.

The *Total Fertility Rate* (TFR) recently has shown significant declines
in urban areas but remains high in the country overall, at about 5.7 per
woman. Rural areas show little change: marital fertility remains above 8
children per woman. With natural increase at about 2.7%, population
doubling time is 26 years. The total population will pass 18 million
before the year 2025, even assuming fairly rapid declines in birth
rates. High dependency ratios (number of children and aged to
economically active-aged adults) impose great burdens on social sectors
and major constraints on domestic savings and investments for economic
development. High fertility itself also contributes directly to high
maternal and infant mortality.

*Maternal mortality* is very difficult to measure with certainty, but
indications are that Senegalese women are at unusually high risk;
estimated at between 800 and 1200 per 100,000 live births\--higher than
all but a few countries (Somalia, Niger, and Guinea, for example).
Reasons are not well understood but surely include a distinctly Sahelian
pattern of continued high fertility through the later reproductive years
(e.g., 40\'s). Furthermore, access to and use of quality pre- and
postnatal referral services for mothers are much more limited than
standard child survival services. Only an estimated 20% of women use
these services. Female genital mutilation (excision), however, is not
comparatively pronounced in Senegal, affecting probably less than 20%
and largely confined to one major and one minor ethnic group.

Control of *sexually-transmitted infections* (STIs) is a central feature
of Senegal's new national health plan and of USAID's international
assistance program because HIV/AIDS is a major threat, not only for
economically active adults across the socioeconomic spectrum, but also
to infants and children. Though Senegal presently has one of the lowest
levels of prevalence (about 1.4%) and incidence of HIV infection in the
Africa region, this situation might change quickly without continued,
strong control efforts. The Mission believes that the comparatively low
levels are due to a combination of early, aggressive control efforts,
including active involvement of religious leaders, and to what can be
described as a "conservative culture" governing sexual behavior. These
led to what appear to be higher levels of sexual abstinence and greater
use of condoms among young adults during the 1990s. A possible related
effect or indicator of this tendency is the decline in urban fertility,
which the DHS-III shows is due mainly to delays in first births.
Senegalese health professionals often note that U.S. assistance since
the early 1980s has been a major contributing factor to the country's
comparative success and, though many donors are willing to contribute,
the Senegalese emphasize their concern that the U.S. should continue to
play a leading role in assistance to STI/AIDS control.

Institutional analyses show that Senegal has the capacity and means to
train sufficient numbers of personnel to meet requirements for basic
health service delivery.[^7] Medical personnel deployed, however, are
well below norms urged by WHO. GOS determination and the planned
external resources of other donors, however, should assure that overall
requirements for personnel will be met during this strategy period.
Correcting the serious maldistribution of health personnel (concentrated
in Dakar) is a main, intended benefit envisioned for decentralization in
the health sector, as municipalities and local health committees employ
more personnel directly and encourage growth of private health
facilities through private sector investment.

Senegal's prospects for sustainable development should improve markedly
with further efforts in health for more productive labor; lowered
fertility and population growth; and improvements in dependency ratios
over the next generation.[^8] Demographic and socioeconomic changes
similar to those in Asia are entirely possible and are envisioned in
Senegal over the next few decades, though the time span may be longer
than was the case in Asia due to comparatively higher mortality and
fertility at the onset of transitions in Africa.

**2. Targeted Customers**

At the level of the strategic objective, SO3\'s main "market" is
*couples and individuals of reproductive age*, especially mothers.
*Infants and children* up to age 5 are major customers of child survival
activities. *Groups at high risk* of contracting STIs, including
prostitutes, transporters, and older students, as well as the population
at large, are the focus for STI/AIDS control activities. Community
outreach and local participation have for many years been features of
Senegal's health strategy, but new laws and political mobilization now
permit and require greatly renewed emphasis. USAID's customer focus
requires consumers of health services be even more involved throughout
the process of planning, implementing, and financing activities. The
GOS, likewise, is committed to this principle.

From the customer and geographic viewpoint, some features of the
Mission\'s strategy will continue to be *national in scale,* including:
procurement and logistics of contraception; social marketing; certain
initiatives in information, education, and communication (IEC);
demographic and epidemiological studies; and training *(see Illustrative
Approaches)*. These usually "vertical", sharply defined, often
private-sector features may amount to 50% or more of total SO3
investment in some years, and often will involve U.S. technical
assistance via USAID/Global Bureau Cooperating Agencies. Comparatively
larger investments under SO3, however, will be in *demand-driven,
area-specific* program activities where USAID will support locally
planned and executed, integrated RH activities, largely with Senegalese
technical assistance. This differentiation of national and local area
\"markets" also leads to dual monitoring and reporting *(see SO
Indicators)*.

**3. Critical assumptions**

The political, economic, bilateral, and professional environments in
Senegal today broadly favor attainment of SO3. Some fundamental
assumptions and concerns, however, were repeatedly posed throughout SO3
preparations: [^9]

***SO-level assumptions:***

• Leadership *sustains sufficient political will* to effect general
compliance with the new decentralization laws and regulations as well as
the Bamako Initiative. Steady flows of internal resources will require
community involvement and cross-sectoral collaboration on scales
unprecedented in Senegal.

• Though Senegal's overall legal, regulatory, and policy environment
already favors achievement of SO3, there must be *no policy reversals*
that undermine progress achieved or underway towards, for example,
autonomy of national hospitals and liberalization of controls in the
pharmaceutical sector.

• The *GOS will relieve remaining constraints* to easier access to
contraception and oral rehydration packets through both private and
public sectors. Other barriers constrain increased acceptance of generic
drugs and dynamization of private sector services. Leaders must further
promote expansion of services beyond the public sector, including
encouraging sustainable health care financing, especially through cost
recovery systems, by local communities and private practitioners,
reinforcement of the essential drugs policy, and greater involvement of
PVOs/NGOs in providing preventive services.

• Development partners (the GOS, donors, the private sector, and local
governments) meet their commitments and execute their interventions in a
*timely manner.* Active coordination presently is good but must be
intensified in order to increase use of services.

***KIR-level assumptions:***

*KIR 1* focuses on strengthening existing service delivery mechanisms
and expanding the health resources available at the community level. It
incorporates standardized care and quality control mechanisms for both
public and private providers.

Critical assumptions include:

• The GOS continues expanding SDPs to meet norms set by WHO;

• The GOS deploys enough health personnel with adequate technical
competency to staff rural SDPs;

• The GOS fulfills its commitment to hire about 250 new health
professionals each year;

• Health providers in the public and private sectors establish
partnerships and coordinating mechanisms for delivering primary health
services.

*KIR 2* focuses on increasing demand for health services by improving
community-level knowledge, attitudes, and health practices. It
encourages increased participation by communities to achieve ownership
as well as increased use of heath services. A critical assumption for
this KIR is that there will be fewer competing demands for household
resources, so that routine health services can be an integral and
manageable part of household expenditures and that use of services will
further enhance demand.

*KIR 3* focuses on the availability of financial resources and local
abilities to manage funds. A critical assumption is that local
governments will make health services a priority and commit resources
accordingly.

**4. Results Framework and causal relationships**
![](media/image2.wmf){width="6.122222222222222in"
height="5.881944444444445in"}

Over the course of strategy formulation, KIRs and IRs were elaborated
with specialists and partners, as summarized below. This framework
illustrates types of results that will be sought in the cooperative
agreements to be established between USAID/Senegal, the GOS, and local
governments, as well as establishing the framework for the Senegal
Action Plans of USAID/W cooperating agencies who will be working on SO3.

At the SO level, program and epidemiologic research demonstrate that
increasing use of a variety of health services leads directly to
significantly higher infant/child survival rates and lower fertility.
Likewise, there is consensus among Senegalese, U.S., and other partners
that KIRs 1 and 2, *access* and *demand*, are critical for increasing
use of services. These were the key areas of program emphasis during the
Mission\'s preceding strategy, working within a similar Results
Framework, and have been key concepts in USAID/W's guidance and strategy
frameworks for many years. \"Access\" was chosen over \"availability\"
because it includes physical availability as well as cost and quality.

The third KIR, *increased internal financing for services*, is linked to
*sustainability* in the SO statement. While it is not easy to imagine
how use of services could increase without either or both access and
demand increasing, it is easily imaginable that service use could
increase without greater internal financing were there no concern for
long-term sustainability of the service system. KIR3 reflects a
conviction at USAID/Senegal and among many Senegalese that optimal
financing of preventive, public health requires a better balance
between: (a) external grant and loan sources (presently nearly 100%,
including both recurrent and development finances); (b) GOS central
sources; and (c) local-level tax and consumer cost-recovery. For
decentralization to be effective in a broader sense, the GOS and people
at local levels must have higher stakes in financing as well as
directing health services in their communities. Only with a better
balance of external and internal resources will greater access to
quality services lead to higher, *sustainable* levels of use of primary
services.

**5. Customer/partner commitment: SO3 is participatory and timely**

Health services are mainly technical, and their organization
hierarchical in nature; therefore, at the level of *occupations* and
Intermediate Results, SO3 partners begin with *health professionals and
paramedicals*, specialists certified by the state to provide defined
services. These are the front-line partners and intermediaries for
program training, equipment and supply, supervision, surveillance, and
reporting of services.

Program technical priorities and interventions are set within GOS
national and regional plans by Senegalese specialists in epidemiology,
demography, and quantitative and qualitative analysis, often with USAID
and other donor funding and consultation. These *subject area
specialists* are important clients and intermediaries.

Other essential partners include *national and local political and
public opinion leaders* in the realms of religion, civil society, and
entrepreneurship, who frame policies, make or interpret laws and
regulations, promote and guide programs, and typically determine success
or failure of initiatives.

USAID's key *institutional* partners under SO3 remain the MHSA, the
Ministry of Women and Children, other donors, and international and
national non-governmental organizations. The strategy for coming years,
however, brings together regional and local governments and community
organizations (especially health and/or development committees) as
principal partners for the first time.

SO3 is timely given that in the 1990s the GOS has steadily reversed the
past constant increase in spending on hospitals and wage outlays and
devoted greater expenditures to prevention and basic curative care,
logistics and support systems.[^10] MHSA priorities for the next ten
years are clearly established in the new national health program (the
Social and Health National Development Plan, or PNDSS). The first five
years of this program have been further specified and budgeted in the
PDIS. These two plans, and the MHSA's regular formal and informal
consultations with all donors throughout their development, have
permitted USAID/Senegal to identify interventions that meet joint
interests and fall within manageable interests.

The MHSA\'s health plans also permit more efficient coordination among
donors and local partners. The PDIS describes in detail modalities for
executing the plan; activities to be implemented during the period
1998-2002; estimates of contributions by the central government, local
governments, population and donors; and monitoring and evaluation of the
activities. Discussions are underway with donors to determine their
preferred areas of intervention, modalities of assistance, and the
resources each intends to make available under the PDIS.

*Local governments (Collectivités Locales, or CLs)* will be principal
partners in the new strategy. USAID/Senegal will work closely with the
newly empowered elected officials and entities to help them fulfill
their responsibilities under the new laws. Joint USAID-CL performance
reviews will be public and transparent, with clear and unambiguous
indicators and benchmarks for all program activities included in the
agreement. This approach will help hold local governments accountable,
and at the same time will help them develop credibility as they perform
well.

*Health Committees* are also key partners. Their role in financing and
overseeing local health services has grown steadily over the past ten
years and they now are among the most potent elements in the overall
health system in many rural areas. Their importance is expanding under
decentralization, as they now are much closer to decision-making by
local government officials. These committees, however, presently have no
real legal status nor any horizontal association among themselves.
USAID/Senegal will support a PDIS intention to promote more
participatory management to engage health committees in the
identification of local health priorities and increase their role in
preventive health, including health-related water, sanitation, and
nutrition activities. Health committees will bring resources generated
by cost recovery mechanisms.

Senegal has important and increasingly well-organized local *grassroots
associations* that will be engaged as intermediaries between health
facilities and households to promote behavior change and motivate
greater demand for services. USAID/Senegal local agreements will include
these for promotion of services and outreach activities.

Finally, *U.S. and Senegalese Private Sector Cooperating Agencies* will
play an important role through activities including: procurement and
distribution of contraceptives; operations research on family planning
and child survival; commercial retail sales of contraception; national
and area-specific demographic and epidemiological research; health
system policy and program analyses; training and surveillance of
clinical methods; and IEC and HIV/AIDS control programs.

USAID and Germany's GTZ are the only major donors to concentrate their
activities in technical assistance through external contracts and local
organizations, rather than channeling the majority of aid through
government structures.

**6. Other donors' activities in the SO**

At least 16 donor countries, multi-lateral agencies, and organizations
currently contribute to Senegal\'s health sector. Though data on total
health sector assistance are not complete, the following table
summarizes recent and probable future commitments from selected major
donors under the GOS's new Integrated Health Development Program (PDIS):
[^11]

**Table III.E. Other Donor Commitments**

  ------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------
  **Donor**    **Recent Commitments**        **Future Commitments
                                             (est.)**

  France (FAC)                               \$4.3 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years

  Canada       1995: \$2.5 million Canadian; to be determined
  (CIDA)       STI/AIDS                      

  Japan (JICA) 1994: \$229,000; '95:         to be determined (likely
               \$90,940; '97: \$390,000      large)

  Norway                                     \$5.9 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years

  EU                                         \$25 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years.

  World Bank   1992-1996: US\$400 million    \$55 million after 1997 for
               (approx)                      5 years.

  WHO                                        \$4.3 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years.

  UNICEF       1992-1994: US\$9 million      \$16 million after 1997 for
               (approx)                      5 years.

  UNDP                                       \$1.2 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years.

  UNFPA                                      \$8.5 million after 1997 for
                                             5 years.
  ------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------

Donor assistance to the health sector in 1990 amounted to US \$4.90 per
person, the fourth highest level in sub-Saharan Africa. Thirty percent
or more of total health budget and expenditures over recent years has
been funded through foreign assistance, mostly for preventive health,
for which nearly 100% of total expenditures are donor funded.

The PDIS systematically describes major health problems and each
intervention by activity type, objective, zone of intervention, timing,
and cost. It provides an assessment of needs, the duration of
interventions and results expected, and the location and cost of
interventions. The PDIS process provides a framework for donors to offer
assistance in areas where they have comparative advantages. A formal
government office, the *Cellule d\'appui et de Suivi du Programme
d\'Investissement Sectoriel*, is being developed to monitor and
coordinate assistance, serving as the liaison between the donors and the
MHSA on a daily basis.

Numerous NGOs assist the GOS with some of its obligations at the field
level, yet they require better GOS regulation and coordination. Although
not yet operational, the MHSA is establishing a process for certifying
and coordinating NGOs and their activities in the health sector. It
likely will build on two main features: (1) an existing private sector
coordinating organization (CONGAD) to enhance capacities of local NGOs;
and (2) a new Technical Review Commission for NGO activities.
Coordination at the central level, however, remains quite weak and there
is currently little collaboration between health sector donors and
CONGAD (with the exception of USAID and UNFPA). USAID/Senegal has in
fact been at the forefront of promoting rights and freedoms for
Senegalese NGOs.

Quasi-formal, regular meetings are held among and between donors and the
MHSA. Regular agendas address priority health and program planning
issues, studies, and key event schedules. Membership is open to all
donors working in the sector; leadership (currently held by the EU) is
elected. The quasi-formal system of meetings has been most successful;
formal coordination, though promising, so far is less effective.
Coordinating more aid through NGOs presents major opportunities, but
their capacity to manage larger, dispersed activities is not yet
adequate, and barriers to free and fair competition among NGOs are
formidable. While ideally the PDIS will serve as a supervisory,
coordinating, and monitoring unit, there is concern that it could
reinforce centralization within the GOS and MHSA and remain focused at
the national level.

**7. Illustrative approaches**

The services selected over the months of strategy formulation reflect
priorities established by the GOS/MHSA in its 1998-2002 national plan,
USAID assessments and studies, and the needs expressed by USAID\'s
partners and customers. Interventions will focus on the child survival,
maternal health, family planning, and STI/AIDS services summarized
below.

+------------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| **Child Survival :**   | **Maternal Health  | **STI/AIDS :**         |
|                        | :**                |                        |
| •Vaccination           |                    | •Treatment of STIs     |
|                        | •FP                |                        |
| •Control of Diarrhea   |                    | •Epidemiologic         |
| Diseases               | •Prenatal Visits   | Surveillance           |
|                        |                    |                        |
| •Nutrition             | •Assisted          | of HIV Infection and   |
|                        | Deliveries         | STIs                   |
| •Exclusive             |                    |                        |
| Breastfeeding          | •Postnatal Visits  | •IEC                   |
|                        |                    |                        |
| •Acute Respiratory     | •IEC               |                        |
| Infection              |                    |                        |
|                        |                    |                        |
| •Malaria               |                    |                        |
+------------------------+--------------------+------------------------+

USAID/Senegal intends to make full use of its comparative advantages
such as a strong in-country technical presence and ability to leverage
resources and policy change from host governments and other donors. As
in the past, assistance will be concentrated in selected zones of the
country, complementing similar regional emphases of other major donors
within the GOS national plan. However, SO3 will also provide critical
assistance to health systems at the national level through:

• *National-level commodity supply and logistics, including provision of
contraceptives; equipment, protocols, and training for clinical methods
of fertility regulation; and local production, national logistics, and
retail distribution of oral rehydration packets*. Interventions will
include technical assistance to the contraceptive logistics management
and tracking systems at the central, district, and community health
facilities.

• *Technical and clinical service quality (through KIR 1) to increase
access to quality, both because quality services eventually lead to
positive health outcomes, and because increasing people\'s perception of
value generally increases their willingness to pay for services.* The
need for a national system of service monitoring and technical oversight
to ensure quality is closely linked to the national supply of
commodities. The MHSA sets standards of practice and establishes service
guidelines for all providers in Senegal. As decentralized management
takes over, MHSA supervision will become increasingly important for
regulating service quality. SO3 will assist the MHSA in providing and
upgrading technical standards and supervision of health services. The
Mission will also work with the MHSA to strengthen pre-service training
programs for midwives, nurses, and physicians. In SO3 focus districts,
the Mission will ensure that MHSA standards are disseminated and applied
by both public and private health providers. Technical assistance will
also be provided to the national IEC plan, a critical element of
increasing use of STI services and condom use for HIV prevention.

• *Analyses and policy, including close collaboration with partners in
operations research and results dissemination; demographic and
epidemiological analyses; and policy advocacy on mortality, fertility,
and health systems.* The Mission will continue to pursue the
privatization of contraceptive sales through its social marketing
program: technical assistance will be provided to transform the current
social marketing unit into a private organization capable of entering
into contractual agreements with donors, the MHSA, and local
governments. USAID intends to discontinue grant-type funding to this
activitiy by the second year of the strategy.

SO3\'s research agenda will include operations research, demographic
surveys and special studies, introduction of new technologies, and
secondary analysis and integration of existing data sets for policy and
management decision making. In addition, the Mission will continue to
support HIV sentinel surveillance throughout Senegal, currently the only
means available to the GOS for tracking the spread of the HIV epidemic.
In response to recent data suggesting that HIV prevalence may be higher
than previously measured, the Mission will work with the MHSA to
strengthen surveillance capabilities and perhaps undertake separate
studies to check current estimates.

USAID has been a key actor in the technical design of the emerging MHSA
computerized data management system. Because the Mission expects to be
one of the principle users of data from this system once it becomes
operational, it will assume an advisory role to ensure quality and
efficiency in this new apparatus.

SO3 will begin the new strategy period with a reduced number of U.S. CAs
and comparatively greater support to the development of the Senegalese
private sector. U.S. CAs will be focused mainly on *highly specialized
technical assistance for technology transfer* (such as clinical methods
of family planning) as well as *measurement and assessment* (demography,
epidemiology, and policy work).

Achieving SO3 will involve the following cross-cutting themes: (1)
*decentralization,* which offers the opportunity for better
participation in health programs and use of services; (2) *partnership*
between the public and the private sector to increase the availability
and use of services; and (3) *integrated service delivery*, to conform
with the policy and protocols of MHSA.

Activities under this SO will be designed to mobilize community and
local government resources under Senegal\'s new decentralization laws,
as well as under the well-functioning Bamako Initiative cost recovery
system for essential drugs. Programs will be strongly anchored in the
new Senegalese legal framework for decentralized government planning,
budgeting and decision-making, and will further capitalize on the new
partnerships and modes of cooperation possible in this environment. The
Mission will also make use of close collaborative relationships with the
MHSA and various NGOs to more actively involve community outreach groups
and other mechanisms for social mobilization.

The SO will seek maximum participation by private health providers,
creating new partnerships with communities and local governments to
improve and provide alternatives to MHSA services. Activities will build
on cost recovery systems already in place and the population\'s
demonstrated willingness to pay for higher quality services. To this
end, a co-financing and performance requirement will be a central
element of any intervention. Local participation and full engagement
will be the trigger for USAID resources, and program \"success\" will be
performance-based, for contractors as well as Senegalese partners.
Interventions will be designed to enable performance-based evaluations.

The Mission will seek to leverage additional donor resources and
engagement through its continued technical leadership and presence in
the community, ensuring the maximum impact from inputs. Specific areas
of involvement under each KIR include:

• KIR 3.1: Improving the functionality of existing public Service
Delivery Points (SDPs) and reinforcing and/or creating private SDPs.
Synergistic activities under SO1 will be help to create an appropriate
environment for promoting the private health sector.

• KIR 3.2: Increasing the population\'s perception of the individual and
family-level benefits of the selected RH services. The Mission will
develop innovative IEC strategies to increase the participation of
opinion leaders, the private sector, NGOs and other community partners.

• KIR 3.3: Strengthening the financial and administrative management
capacities of local governments and NGOs, and improving the legal and
regulatory framework for health financing in the context of the
decentralization laws. Synergy with SO2 (strong and sound policy
dialogue) will be crucial for achieving this KIR. Activities will also
reinforce the Bamako Initiative and develop alternate forms of financing
for the health care system, such as mutual health insurance.

While USAID may have numerous Memoranda of Understanding with local
entities, management limitations and accountability requirements
mitigate against direct funding to partners and/or beneficiaries.
Therefore, an independent, preferably local contractor or grantee agency
working for USAID under a performance-based contract or Cooperative
Grant Agreement will have day-to-day contact with local governments and
other partners at the regional level, monitor activities, and handle
disbursements.

The types of mechanisms to be put in place will be based on some
parameters that can be controlled by USAID and others that are yet
uncertain because of the newness of the environment to USAID and its
partners. Key considerations are:

• Local governments now control financial resources, both those
transferred by central government and those levied locally. Funding for
health activities will mainly come from these two sources. The
cooperation mechanism must protect the Mission against the risk of
illegal actions taken by local governments.

• USAID requires that counterpart and local financing be a precondition
to any funding of activities. The cooperation mechanism will have to
include checkpoints and verifications to ascertain that funds are
actually made available by local counterparts, especially central
government funds whose amount may vary from year to year.

• USAID intends to support only those groups and operating units that
are able to produce results. Memoranda of Understanding signed with CLs
will be renewed annually, based on performance indicators with early
warning signals in case of poor performance.

**8. Sustainability**

SO3 undertakes not only to increase use of key public, preventive health
care services but to do so in ways that are oriented explicitly towards
long-term sustainability, even at the risk of decreases in near-term
results in public health. The GOS decentralization movement is itself
intended and designed to foster more durable development, less
dependence on remote central controls and expertise, and greater basis
on local vibrancy and empowerment.

The many features of sustainability in the SO3 approach have been
discussed throughout this section. However, the nuance of this strategy
concerns KIR3, promoting significant increases in domestic financing for
preventive health in the geographic areas to be served by USAID. Apart
from its application to the health sector, this new emphasis is intended
to be synergistic with the Mission's other two SOs, private sector and
decentralization, and is the most sensitive aspect of SO3 from the point
of view of the Senegalese.

**9. Magnitude of impact**

This program aims at: (1) strengthening RH activities in the existing
public SDPs; (2) expanding these services in the private sector
(including NGOs); (3) involving as many grassroots organizations as
possible in providing preventive care services; and (4) reinforcing the
coordination of donor interventions. Anticipated nationwide impacts
include doubling the levels of use for key infant/child preventive
services and maternal health services as well as improving other key
indicators discussed below.

The Mission\'s current health portfolio (including CS, MH, FP, and
STI/AIDS services) covers 33 of Senegal\'s 44 health districts. The
population in each district averages between 150,000 and 200,000. Based
on past and present experience, the Mission anticipates a similar
magnitude of impact for SO3, given similarities in annual levels of
funding. Expected results have have been developed for each of the
performance indicators, shown below in the Section 10 table,
*Performance Indicators (National/Target Areas),* for the years 2000 and
2006, based on available baseline data from 1996. Results for \"Target
Areas\" can be developed only after specific baselines are calculated
following selection of geographic areas for intervention. The Mission
does not presuppose the nationwide implications of proposed policy
dialogue and institutional development.

Under a high-funding scenario, KIR1 and KIR2 results could be increased
during the out-years of the strategy by an NPA program that would: (1)
accelerate national-level reforms for hospital autonomy, pre-service
medical and para-medical curricula and personnel deployment, and
devolution of responsibilities under decentralization; and (2) reduce
loan burdens acquired by the GOS.

**10. Performance Indicators**

***SO3: Increased, sustainable use of selected reproductive health
services (child survival, maternal health, family planning, and
STI/AIDS) in the context of decentralization in targeted areas.***

+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| [Performance Indicators (National/Target    | Base  | [2   | [20   |
| Areas)]{.underline}                         | line: | 000] | 06]{. |
|                                             |       | {.un | under |
|                                             | [19   | derl | line} |
|                                             | 96]{. | ine} |       |
|                                             | under |      |       |
|                                             | line} |      |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • Contraceptive prevalence rate increased   | 7.1%  | 8.   | 15%   |
|                                             |       | 9%/? |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • % condom use with non-regular sex         | 29%   | ?/?  | 50%   |
| partners increased                          |       |      |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • % of pregnancies receiving one or more    | 82%   | 8    | 98%   |
| prenatal visits increased                   |       | 5%/? |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • % of children fully vaccinated by age one | 39%   | 4    | 65%   |
| increased                                   |       | 5%/? |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • % of child diarrhea cases treated with    | 33%   | 3    | 60%   |
| oral rehydration therapy increased          |       | 5%/? |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+
| • % of infants exclusively breast-fed       | 14%   | 1    | 30%   |
| increased                                   |       | 5%/? |       |
+---------------------------------------------+-------+------+-------+

***Cost: \$68.8 million over 8 years***

*The contraception prevalence rate* (DHS definition), is a widely
accepted indicator of use of primary health care services. Family
planning is by far the least used of the complement of primary health
care services, so increases in this indicator will be highly correlated
with overall improvements in service delivery. In addition, the new
strategy builds on the preceding one, which focused on fertility and
family planning with prevalence of use of contraception as a key
indicator. The next indicator, *reported condom use with non-regular
partners,* measures a key aspect of behavior for STI/HIV prevention in
high risk situations. This indicator refers to condom use with
non-regular partners in the general population, rather than the more
standard denominator, \"high risk\" groups. This reflects a growing,
worldwide strategy of HIV/AIDS prevention programs aimed at general
populations and is appropriate in Senegal to stabilize the current low
level of sero-prevalence.

*Prenatal consultations among pregnant women* is a standard, crucial
measure of maternal health service use. In Senegal, GOS guidelines urge
a minimum of three prenatal visits for each pregnancy. This will be
monitored by the MHSA Health Information System currently in place. The
total number of pregnant women who benefit from one prenatal counseling
session in the target areas will be reported\--not just those with
physical access to a service delivery point.

Three indicators were decided upon at the SO level to measure
modification of behavior toward use of CS services. *Vaccination
coverage* is perhaps the most widely accepted measure, here intended to
indicate progress in complete vaccination (as recommended by WHO) of
children by age one, to be estimated among children 12-23 months and
based on review of vaccination cards. *Oral rehydration therapy use* is
widely accepted as a measure of the use of oral rehydration salts,
and/or recommended home fluids to treat diarrhea among children under
five. *The rate of exclusive breastfeeding* has been included to monitor
progress in the improvement of nutrition behaviors among women with
infants 0-4 months.

KIRs deemed critical to the attainment of SO3 and their principal
indicators are shown below. This structure of results and indicators
constitutes an analytically sound strategy framework based on intensive
and extensive consultation and a thoroughly participatory process that
should assure unusual consensus in Senegal on objectives, results, and
measures of progress. Further adaptations and improvements will be made
based on USAID/W CSP reviews and during preparation of the SOAG for SO3.

***KIR 3.1 Improved access to quality services***

• % of population living within 5 kilometers of a functioning SDP

• % of population living more than 5 kilometers from an SDP covered by
outreach

• % of women with 3 prenatal consultations during their most recent
pregnancy

• % of correct case management according to MOH protocols

• Couple Years of Protection (public sector; possible estimates for
private sector)

• % of FP clients who have used any modern FP method on a continuous
basis in the past year

The first two indicators estimate aspects of physical access of the
population in the target areas to fixed, functioning service delivery
points (SDPs), and to community-based outreach agents in areas with no
or very limited infrastructure. Quality is assessed through the
operational definition of "functional". The next indicator, three
prenatal consultations, gauges access through level of participation and
also indicates quality, as does the fourth indicator, case management, a
key indicator of health worker performance at SDPs. Couple Years of
Protection (CYP) estimates access, though it often is taken as a proxy
for prevalence of use of modern contraception during years when sample
survey data are not available. It is based on service and logistic data
regarding distribution. CYPs under the new strategy will be based more
on local-level distribution than previous national-level distribution
and therefore should be closer to client use. The final indicator also
addresses questions of quality, as longer-term use typically reflects
higher quality of services.

***KIR 3.2 Increased demand for services***

• average desired family size

• % of women of reproductive age who state intention to use RH Services

• % of population who know of at least two methods for prevention of
STI/AIDS;

• % of women of reproductive age who know of at least two preventive
measures, including proper case management, for acute respiratory
infections, diarrhea, malaria, and malnutrition

Demand is difficult to estimate, in part because it often is expressed
definitively only at the time of direct need or at the point of
consumption. Nevertheless, it is possible to measure levels of knowledge
of benefits of specific services and/or behaviors with the assumption
that if actual benefits are high and knowledge of these benefits is
high, then practice usually will follow. Desired family size has been
highly correlated with demand for and practice of family planning in
research across the globe. Though expressed desire for smaller families
is influenced by factors well beyond the scope of program interventions,
it also can be influenced by deliberate demand-generation activities, is
highly indicative of underlying demand, and is relevant to program
management and measurement of impact. The remaining three indicators
reflect prevailing knowledge and intentions with respect to key types of
reproductive and child health services. They have been successfully
measured in the past in Senegal and are based on MHSA program
priorities.

***KIR 3.3 Greater financing from internal sources***

• amount of annual real per capita health budget (target areas)
furnished by internal (Senegalese) resources (e.g., taxes or other
regional/local funds)

• annual real budget of service delivery points (target areas)

• % of service delivery points (target areas) that received (x)% of
expected local government transfers by (y) date

At present three indicators have been chosen to assess progress toward
greater internal financing of health in Senegal, reflecting the view
that real increases in local budgets, overall service provider budgets,
and timeliness and functioning of disbursement of funds from the local
government to service providers constitute the core requirements for
attaining the intended results. The first relates directly to the KIR in
estimating the trend in Senegalese resources. The second monitors
overall budgets of the SDPs to evaluate how funds are being mobilized by
the SDPs themselves. The third reveals the success and/or problems of
decentralization and the efficiency of the system in disbursing planned
resources.

**F. MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK**

**1. Conceptual overview**

The ADS Series 201.4.47 defines the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) as
a detailed plan for managing the collection of data for monitoring
performance. The PMP contains information for gathering data on the SOs,
KIRs, and IRs, as well as critical assumptions. To this end, it: (a)
defines the indicators to be tracked; (b) specifies the sources, methods
of collection, and schedule of collection for each type of data
required; and (c) assigns responsibility for collection to a specific
office, team, or individual. While a review of the Mission PMP by
central or regional bureaus is not required (ADS E203.5.5b),
USAID/Senegal has already begun to develop its plan, in accordance with
the reengineering core value of management for results. The Mission
expects to finalize its PMP in May/June 1998 after the initial Results
Packages are defined.

While items (b) and (c) of the PMP are not yet finished, the indicators
for USAID/Senegal\'s PMP were defined in workshops with partners and
customers during August and September 1997. In November 1997, two
consultants from Management Systems International (MSI) and CDIE helped
the Mission address issues relating to the PMP. This two-week technical
assistance improved the causal relationships within the Results
Framework and helped refine performance indicators.

Involving various stakeholders, partners, and customers in the PMP
development process not only ensures a more representative and
responsive design, but it also transfers the responsibility for routine
monitoring and information-gathering to partners and customers. They in
turn can develop their own monitoring and communication networks, which
must be compatible with those systems found in funding sources (like
USAID). This participatory approach lays the foundation for increased
effectiveness and ownership.

USAID/Senegal can benefit from monitoring and evaluation lessons learned
during the prior strategy period. Some of the problems identified in the
past included:

• Poor integration and networking with partners and customers;

• Absence of standard data collection methods;

• Lack of scheduling for data acquisition, analysis, and use;

• Lack of definition of responsibility and accountability for data
collection;

• Lack of systematic performance monitoring at the activity level;

• Inadequate baseline data; and

• Lack of staff trained in M&E at the SO and activity implementation
level.

The shift to performance-based contracting and results-oriented grants
may help to overcome these M&E issues at the field activity level. In
addition, efforts to address past problems have led to new M&E
strategies in the Mission. These should result in:

• Improved coordination of data collection and recording;

• A more systematic liaison with partners and customers; and

• Increased access for decision-makers to on-line capabilities and
databases.

As part of the M&E plan, USAID is considering assigning an M&E
specialist to each SO Team to serve as an interface between the Team,
its related partners and customers, and the larger Mission M&E unit. The
Mission will also recruit a full-time USDH to coach the M&E unit. The
M&E specialists for the SOs would be regarded as the \"satellite staff\"
of the M&E unit. The M&E unit would provide the specialists with
guidelines and technical support for formulating M&E analytical agendas,
which would then be shared with the SO staff, partners, and customers.

**2. Process overview**

At this juncture, the challenge remains to create an M&E plan that
responds to management needs. Currently, a lack of defined target areas
and/or selected sectors for the program does not easily allow for the
collection of baseline data and the identification of specific
performance targets. Only one of the three identified SOs (SO3, HPN) can
use data sources and methodologies from past interventions. The other
SOs are confronted with the following procedural development issues:

• How often, and at what points, to conduct performance reviews;

• What sources of information to draw upon for the reviews;

• Whom to involve in the reviews;

• What types of issues should be reviewed; and

• How to assess the need for evaluative activities.

Nevertheless, USAID/Senegal has identified several indicators at the SO
and KIR levels for each of the three SOs. Aside from the demands of
actual monitoring, several specific issues related to data collection
and calculation will be addressed and clarified. For example:

• Data collection challenges for SO1 are related to the entities
monitored: all SMEs compared with SMEs supported by USAID\'s program.

• SO2 indicators must address the multiple levels of local governments
as well as the coverage of local institutions.

• SO3 indicators must be comparable over time because of the possible
differences between periodic surveys and the interim data necessary to
meet annual reporting requirements.

*Annex E* describes the SO and KIR-level indicators in detail, providing
definitions, units of measure, data sources, and methods of data
collection/calculation for each. Once the Mission\'s scope of
intervention is determined, the availability of baselines and targets
will be addressed along with reporting requirements and comparability
over time.

**G. SUPPORT FOR USAID\'S GLOBAL OBJECTIVES**

As USAID/Senegal begins its new strategy, there are a number of on-going
global or regional Agency activities that the Mission continues to
support, even though they may be only tangentially linked to the new
SOs.

*The Sahel Regional Program (including the Club du Sahel)* has several
programs that foster West African coordination and exchange of lessons
learned. USAID/Senegal supports many of these efforts, and occasionally
provides supplemental funds for activities that have particular bearing
on the achievement of Mission objectives.

*USAID/REDSO/WCA's Family Health & AIDS Control* project provides,
generates and shares best practices across West Africa. Senegal in
particular benefits because Dakar is frequently the site of regional
conferences and workshops on health system reforms.

The *USAID/U.S. Energy Administration\'s Energy Partnership for Africa*
has created an exchange arrangement between Senegal\'s National Electric
Company (SENELEC) and GPU, Inc., a New Jersey-based power and utility
company. With this partnership, SENELEC gains knowledge about energy
efficiency, management systems, and financing, while a U.S. company
gains a base in West Africa. Senegal\'s business climate improves
through the jobs created by lowering the energy costs of production.
Furthermore, efficient electricity production benefits the environment.

In the area of NRM, a *Small Project Assistance Agreement* between Peace
Corps and USAID/Senegal will continue through FY 1999. This program
provides technical assistance and training to improve the design and
management of sustainable community development efforts.

The West Africa Bureau\'s *EAGER Project* seeks to increase
decision-makers\' use of economic and social research on key issues
related to economic growth. This meshes well with KIR 1 of SO1,
*improved legal, regulatory, and policy environment.* The Global
Bureau\'s *Loan Portfolio Guarantee Program* has been requested by a
private bank to finalize an agreement as soon as the Mission\'s new
strategy is approved. The program encourages banks to expand their
client base in keeping with SO1\'s KIR 2, *improved access to financial
services.*

Finally, the *Leland Initiative* can contribute to the USAID strategy in
three broad areas: (a) improving the policy and regulatory climate so
that access to internet is broadened; (b) expanding internet
connectivity to rural areas and to key institutions such as specialized
schools and training centers; and (c) fostering greater knowledge of the
information that can be found on the internet. Future Leland activities
are possible under each of the SOs:

• Under SO1, internet development has great potential as already
demonstrated by a web site that provides information about rice
marketing. Using Leland resources, the Mission will consider developing
similar web sites to promote commercial objectives.

• Under SO2, the Mission will explore designing an *Intranet* among
local governments in a region, with further access to the global
internet.

***PART III: RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS***

**A. INTRODUCTION**

During the Senegal Parameters Setting meeting, USAID/W requested the
Mission to develop both high (\$30,000,000) and low (\$20,000,000)
Operational Year Budget (OYB) scenarios. Table III.A *(see end of this
section)* summarizes the program and resource implications for each of
these scenarios. Both would result in achievements toward five of the
Agency\'s strategic goals, as compared with the FY 1992-97 strategy,
which delivered results toward four Agency strategic objectives with an
annual OYB of \$23 million. Essentially, in its new strategy the Mission
proposes to accomplish more, with the same or slightly less funding than
in years past.

USAID is not requesting higher amounts of money for two reasons. First,
while funding is important, USAID\'s influence in Senegal depends on
many other factors (including the flexibility to deploy staff and
resources as required in different situations). Second, the
demand-driven approach creates a question as to how much money the
Mission can judiciously deploy. Therefore, the Mission feels comfortable
with both the high and the low option, without prejudice for one over
the other. Both funding levels are within the recent historical range of
assistance to Senegal, and are commensurate with its expected
performance and importance to the USG.

**B. STAFF IMPLICATIONS**

As a Country Experimental Lab (CEL), USAID/Senegal has improved and
streamlined its personnel mix and operating procedures, and fully
expects to follow these new operating procedures as an important element
of the new strategy implementation. A realignment and redefinition of
staff responsibilities to meet the goals and objectives of the new CSP
will be needed. In the coming months, the Mission will consider
recommendations and options regarding a reconfiguration of USAID\'s
staff and management structures.[^12] USAID\'s goal will be to have a
staff with the appropriate skills to implement the new strategy, as well
as an organizational attitude based on customer service, flexibility,
imagination, and a focus on ex-ante planning and systematic monitoring.
Both funding levels would require the same number of staff, which will
remain at 12 USDH and 90 local hires.

The links between the adopted reorganization plan and the strategic plan
will continue to evolve. As of this writing, all ramifications of moving
from a donor supply-driven to a customer demand-driven approach,
especially with some of the key players still to be selected and
assigned, cannot be fully anticipated. What is clear, however, is the
necessity to at least maintain current staffing levels, especially for
the immediate two-year period. This approach will allow the Mission to:
(1) restructure itself in a graduated fashion; (2) bring prior program
activities to closure while also instituting the new program; (3) enable
the provision of \"new skills\" training to some employees without
necessarily closing down important work activities; and (4) develop
plans for, solicit, review, and select contractor/grantee implementation
instruments to carry out the new program. As part of this last priority,
the Mission must also forge ahead with the customer negotiation,
education and organization process. The burden of these activities falls
on USAID staff until performance-based contracts and grants are in
place, functional, and ready to take on the lion\'s share of development
activities. At that point, the Mission itself will concentrate on
analysis, monitoring, and evaluation. While this strategy should
ultimately be less staff and management-intensive, allowing a lowering
of OE costs, it is yet too early to promise such savings.

The new strategy demands that the Mission make some changes to manage
the increased emphasis on private sector (SO1) and
governance/decentralization-oriented (SO2) activities. Some Senegalese
staff can be retrained, but others will have to be replaced. Retirements
should help lessen the need to let long-term staff go. Concerning USDHs,
the Mission has already eliminated one Health USDH FTE and one
Agriculture/Natural Resource USDH FTE, to be replaced with Private
Enterprise and Program/Analysis USDH FTEs. The Mission will also fill
its only open USDH position with a Democracy/Governance USAID FTE.

Note: Neither scenario factors in the need for increases in the
Mission\'s operating budget to accommodate regional West African
responsibilities that are being transferred from USAID offices in
Abidjan to Dakar. Also, funding scenarios will need to be adjusted in
the event of devaluations or large swings in inflation.

**C. BUDGET SCENARIOS**

**1. Low budget scenario**

The essential differences between the results of the high and low
scenarios have to do with intensity, extensiveness, and the ability to
effect policy-level change. By working more intensively, the Mission
can, for example, hold follow-up training sessions to make sure that
concepts and techniques are not only understood, but are integrated into
daily work patterns. Extensively, the Mission can expect to interact
with or operate in a few additional sites. This will allow the program
to reach perhaps five percent more of Senegal\'s overall population
through achievement of the SOs. In the past, at a \$23 million level,
USAID/Senegal has generally reached 15% of the population with its
field-level programming. The effects of policy-level and
institution-building expand this impact, but the magnitude has not been
easy to measure. With the \$20 million budget scenario, all of the SOs
can be achieved, but Mission flexibility will be quite limited.

**2. High budget scenario**

The \$30 million level is on a par with the recent historical levels for
Senegal. Senegal\'s importance in West Africa remains as high as ever.
The fact that the country is at a crossroads (see the Foreword and the
Introduction to Part I) provides stong reasoning for consideration of
the high option. Senegal continues to be one of the most forward-looking
countries in the region in terms of privatization, decentralization, and
democratic governance, and the Mission sees it as critical to U.S.
objectives in West Africa that it retain its pre-eminent development
role in Senegal at a time when social and economic stresses threaten
this bold African experiment in democracy. The high funding scenario
will also permit:

• Implementation of Non-project Assistance (NPA) in one or all of the
SOs to achieve nation-wide impact on certain key policy/regulatory
issues (NPA was used very successfully in the 1992-1997 Strategy to
liberalize the marketing of rice);

• Creation of an endowed foundation to begin the transition away from a
USAID program in Senegal, creating a bridge to assure the long-term
sustainability of USAID contributions;

• Funding of all earmarks and directives (USAID/Senegal has often served
the Agency well in programming earmarked funds);

• Retention of USAID\'s current role as a \"premier bilateral
development funder\" in Senegal (an Agency goal), allowing the Mission a
full voice in the area of Senegalese policy dialogue; and

• Assurance that USAID is not only the coordinator within the donor
community for private sector issues, but is an even stronger player in
the area of policy dialogue (through NPA).

**3. Preferred budget scenario**

At the time of the drafting of this CSP, the Mission preferred the
funding levels shown in Table III.B. This funding level seemed to
represent the best match between the Mission\'s request and USAID\'s
resources.

**Table III.A BUDGET SCENARIOS**

+-------+--------+-----------------------------+-----------------------+
| **Le  | **Am   | **Program Implications**    | **Resources           |
| vel** | ount** |                             | Implications**        |
+-------+--------+-----------------------------+-----------------------+
| High  | \$30   | Implement proposed          | Go forward with       |
|       | m      | \"demand-driven\" strategy  | Mission               |
|       | illion | *in full*.                  | reconfiguration and   |
|       |        |                             | staffing plans in     |
|       |        | Possibility of developing   | accordance with USAID |
|       |        | NPAs for each of the SOs.   | numbers:              |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        | Fund a Senegal-American     | 1998 1999             |
|       |        | Development Fund in the     |                       |
|       |        | out-years of strategy.      | USDH 12 12            |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        | More geographic coverage.   | FSN(Program) 12 15    |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | FSN (OE) 78 78        |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | Straightline these    |
|       |        |                             | FTE and OE levels     |
|       |        |                             | over the remaining    |
|       |        |                             | strategy period       |
|       |        |                             | (2000-2006)           |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | Full staffing will be |
|       |        |                             | maintained unless     |
|       |        |                             | severe OE funding     |
|       |        |                             | cuts or Agency        |
|       |        |                             | ceiling changes       |
|       |        |                             | mandate a change in   |
|       |        |                             | this policy. At such  |
|       |        |                             | time cuts in program  |
|       |        |                             | will be examined.     |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | Plan and organize the |
|       |        |                             | Mission around a      |
|       |        |                             | demand-driven         |
|       |        |                             | approach for both     |
|       |        |                             | program and human     |
|       |        |                             | resources.            |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | Continue seeking more |
|       |        |                             | flexibility for more  |
|       |        |                             | program funded FSNs   |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        |                             | Resist forced         |
|       |        |                             | absorption of         |
|       |        |                             | directives and        |
|       |        |                             | earmarks.             |
+-------+--------+-----------------------------+-----------------------+
| Low   | \$20   | Implement proposed strategy |                       |
|       | m      | *in full*, however:         |                       |
|       | illion |                             |                       |
|       |        | \- Request more Global      |                       |
|       |        | Support funds and use USAID |                       |
|       |        | resources to leverage       |                       |
|       |        | higher donor resources.     |                       |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        | \- Less geographic          |                       |
|       |        | coverage.                   |                       |
|       |        |                             |                       |
|       |        | \- Less intensive           |                       |
|       |        | implementation.             |                       |
+-------+--------+-----------------------------+-----------------------+

**TABLE III.B ILLUSTRATIVE CSP BUDGET:**

**Average Annual OYB for 1998-2006**

*(US\$, in millions)*

  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------
  ***SO 1***             ***EG &     ***DG***   ***NRM***   ***AIDS***   ***PHN/CHS***   ***POP***
                         AGR***                                                          

  Bilateral              6.4                    1.6                                      

  G Field Support        0.8                                                             

  Sub-total              7.2         0.0        1.6         0.0          0.0             0.0

  ***SO 1 OYB: \$8.8                                                                     
  million***                                                                             
  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------

  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------
  ***SO 2***             ***EG &     ***DG***   ***NRM***   ***AIDS***   ***PHN/CHS***   ***POP***
                         AGR***                                                          

  Bilateral              1.0         3.0        2.0                                      

  G Field Support                                                                        

  Sub-total              1.0         3.0        2.0         0.0          0.0             0.0

  ***SO 2 OYB: \$6.0                                                                     
  million***                                                                             
  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------

  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------
  ***SO 3***             ***EG &     ***DG***   ***NRM***   ***AIDS***   ***PHN/CHS***   ***POP***
                         AGR***                                                          

  Bilateral                                                 0.9          1.9             0.9

  G Field Support                                           1.0          0.8             3.1

  Sub-total              0.0         0.0        0.0         1.9          2.7             4.0

  ***SO 3 OYB: \$8.6                                                                     
  million***                                                                             
  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------

  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------
                         ***EG &     ***DG***   ***NRM***   ***AIDS***   ***PHN/CHS***   ***POP***
                         AGR***                                                          

  ***Earmark             **8.2**     **3.0**    **3.6**     **1.9**      **2.7**         **4.0**
  Subtotals***                                                                           

  ***AVERAGE ANNUAL OYB:                                                                 
  \$23.4 MILLION***                                                                      
  ---------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ------------ --------------- -----------

***PART IV: ANNEXES***

**ANNEX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KEY BACKGROUND STUDIES**

Acedo, Andres, 1995. *History of USAID/Senegal, Volume I of II and
Volume II of II: Project Summaries*. USAID/Senegal.

Agence Canadienne de Développement International, 1995. *Cadre
Stratégique Régional pour l\'Afrique de l\'Ouest, Décember 1995*.
Ottawa: IDRC.

Armor, Thomas, 1997. *Organizational and Staffing Plans for
USAID/Senegal.* Management Systems International for USAID/Senegal.

Berg, Elliot; Tom Lenaghan; Daouda Diop; and Mamadou MBengue, 1997.
*L\'Aide au Développement du Secteur Privé au Sénégal, 11 Juin 1997*.
USAID/Sénégal.

Bucknall, James; Geoffrey Livingston; Robert Kagbo; and Douglas Brown,
1997. *Senegal Agricultural Sector Analysis: July 1997 Update*.
USAID/Senegal.

Buzzard, Shirley, 1997. *Development Assistance and Health Programs:
Issues of Sustainability.* USAID Program Evaluation Discussion Paper
No.23, PPC/CDIE.

Cabinet MGP-Afrique, 1997. *Elaboration de la Stratégie de l\'USAID:
1998‑2006.- Atelier d\' Elaboration des Cadres et Indicateurs des
Résultats. Synthèse des Propositions des Comités Restreints:
Décentralisation ‑Secteur Privé‑Santé du 8 au 26 Septembre 1997*.
USAID/Sénégal.

Cabinet MGP-Afrique, 1997. *Elaboration de la Stratégie de
l\'USAID/Sénégal 1998‑2006. Atelier des 28, 29, et 30 Octobre 1997.
Rapport final*. USAID/Sénégal.

Cabinet MGP-Afrique, 1997. *Elaboration de la Stratégie de
l\'USAID/Sénégal:1998‑2006. Atelier des 28, 29, et 30 Avril 1997*.
USAID/Sénégal.

Cabinet MGP-Afrique, 1997. *Elaboration de la Stratégie de
l\'USAID/Sénégal: 1998‑2006. Atelier des focus groupes. Synthèse des
Résultats: Secteur privé: 04‑06 Aout 1997 ‑ Décentralisation: 05‑07 Aout
1997* . USAID/Sénégal.

Club du Sahel, 1996. *Cooperation 2021. Aid to the Sahel from Colonial
Days to the 21st Century via the Drought of the 1970\'s: Change and
Continuity*.

Daane, Janelle and Dorothy Madison-Black, 1997. *USAID Water Supply and
Sanitation Activities in Senegal. A Retrospective Examination Covering
the Post-Independence Years to the Present*. Washington, D.C.: USAID and
the Environmental Health Project. (Prepared for USAID/Senegal under EHP
Activity No. 338-CC).

Diallo, Issakha, 1996. *Predicting the Quality of Primary Health Care at
the Health Post Level in Senegal. A Subjective Approach*. New Orleans:
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine,
Department of International Health and Development.

Denoeux, Guilain, 1997. *Democracy Assessment of Senegal.* Management
Systems International, USAID/Senegal.

Diop, Idrissa, 1997. *Coordinations des Bailleurs de Fonds*. HYGEA, Le
Cabinet d\'Etudes et de Recherche and the Ministry of Public Health and
Social Action.

Gabbois, Millie; Mamadou Daffe; and Abdourahmane Diallo, 1996. *Senegal
Agricultural Sector Retrospective Study*. USAID/Senegal.

Gellar, Sheldon, 1997. *The Political Climate and Will in Senegal for
the Political and Economic Reform. Final Report*. USAID/Senegal.

Gellar, Sheldon, 1996. *Rural Councils and Decentralized Natural
Resource Management in Senegal. The Challenge of Transforming Concepts
into Reality*. USAID/Senegal.

Gray, Clive, 1997. *Senegal Economic Growth Study.* USAID/Senegal.

Horkan, Kathleen M. and Patricia L. Jordan, 1996. *Endowments as a Tool
for Sustainable Development*. PPC/CDIE.

Kanté, Babacar, 1997. *Identifier et Surmonter les Obstacles à la Mise
en Oeuvre de*

*la Décentralisation*. USAID/Sénégal.

Kelly, Valerie; Bocar Diagana; Thomas Reardon; and Matar Gaye, 1996.
*Cash Crop and Food Grain Productivity in Senegal. Historical View, New
Survey Evidence and Policy Implications*. USAID/Senegal.

Lowenthal, Jim and Adel Mokhtari, 1997. *Leland Initiative Report:
Telecommunications Sector Assessment: Senegal.* USAID/Senegal.

Maynard-Tucker, Gisele, 1997. *Etude Rétrospective du Secteur Population
et Santé au Sénégal: Composante Qualitative*. USAID/Senegal and The
Futures Group International.

Mbengue, Mamadou, 1997. *Résumé de la Littérature sur le Secteur Privé
au Sénégal.* USAID/Sénégal.

Merritt, Gary; and Kate Chalkley Frederick, 1997. *Population and Health
in Senegal: USAID Retrospectives and Appraisals*. USAID/Senegal.

Ministère de la Décentralisation, Sénégal, 1996. *Textes de Loi de la
Décentralisation: Recueil des Textes destinés aux Parties Politiques
avec l\' Appui de la Commission des Communautés Européennes*.

Ministère de l\' Intérieur, Sénégal, 1995. *Projet de Loi portant Code
des Collectivités Locales*.

Ministère de l\' Economie, des Finances et du Plan, Sénégal, 1997.
*Enquête Démographique et Santé au Sénégal: EDS-III 1997 Rapport
Préliminaire*. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique, Division
des Statistiques Démographiques, and Macro International, Inc., 1997.

Ministère de l\'Economie des Finances et du Plan, 1996. *Etude des
Interrelations Population-Environment-Développement au Sénégal:
Bibliographie Exhaustive.* Le Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE) et Le
Centre d\'Etude et de Recherche sur la Population et le Développement
(CERPOD), Study No. .96/003. Direction de la Planification des
Ressources Humaines.

Ministère de l\'Economie des Finances et du Plan, Direction de la
Planification, 1995. *Plan d\'Orientation pour le Développement
Economique et Social 1996-2001 (IX eme plan). Compétitivité et
Développement Humain Durable*. Direction de la Planification.

Ministère de la Santé et de l\'Action Sociale, Senegal, 1997. *Programme
de Développement Intégré de la Santé et de l\'Action Sociale (PDIS)
1998-2002*.

Ministère de la Santé et de l\'Action Sociale, 1997. *Programme
d\'Investissement Sectoriel 1998-2002: Plan d\'Action*.

Ministère de la Santé et de l\'Action Sociale, 1997. *Programme de
Développement Intégré du Secteur de la Santé et de l\'Action Sociale:
Manuel de Procédures*.

Ndiaye, M.Salif; Francois Diop; and Ibrahima Sarr, 1997. *Etude
Rétrospective dans le Secteur Population et Santé au Sénégal: Composante
Quantitative*. Groupe SERDHA SAR.

Ndiaye, Salif; Papa Denibe Diouf; and Mohamed Ayad, 1994. *Enquête
Démographique et de Santé au Sénégal EDS-II, 1992-93*. Direction de la
Prévision et de la Statistique, Division des Statistiques Démographiques
and Demographic and Health Surveys, Macro International, USA.

Niasse, Madiodo, 1997. *Contribution to the Senegal D/G Assessment*.
USAID/Senegal.

Oyinlola, Adeyinka, 1996. *Technical Assistance to Senegal\'s 1996
Regional, Municipal and Local Elections*. International Foundation for
Elections Systems, Washington, D.C.

Pison, Gilles; Kenneth H. Hill; Barney Cohen; and Karen A. Foote, 1995.
*Population Dynamics of Senegal.* National Research Council, National
Academy Press.

République du Sénégal, 1997. *Lettre de Politique Sectorielle, Mars
1997*.

Réseau Migrations et Urbanisation en Afrique de L\'Ouest, 1997. *Enquête
Migrations et Urbanisation au Sénégal, Synthese (EMUS-1993)*.

Rideout, William; Alain Grandbois; Younousse Diallo; Alle Diop; and
Marilyn Merritt, 1997. *Senegal Education Sector Assessment Update.
Background Report for the Consideration of Future USAID/Senegal
Intervention*. USAID/Senegal.

Samann, Maurice and Yolande A. Takesian, 1993. Developing a Credit
Project for Small Scale Enterprises. ACEP.

Samb, Mamadou, 1997. *Analyse Documentaire Macroéconomique.- Deuxième
partie. Synthèse*. USAID/Sénégal.

Samb, Mamadou, 1997. *Analyse Documentaire Macroéconomique. Première
partie: Résumé des Documents, 18 Février 1997*. USAID/Sénégal.

Sante Magazine, 1997. *Objectif Stratégique en Santé de l\'USAID au
Sénégal (1998-2006): Utilisation Accrue des Services de Survie de
l\'Enfant, Santé de la Reproduction et de MST/SIDA dans le Cadre de la
Décentralisation,\" Santé Magazine, Série No. 3. (1997)*. USAID/Sénégal.

Sarr, Désire Y., 1997. *Elaboration de la stratégie de L\'USAID/Sénégal
pour 1998‑2006. Synthèse des Résultats de l\'Enquête des Clients. Mars
1997*. USAID/Sénégal.

Smith, Dane F., 1997. *Ambassador Dane F. Smith\'s Speeches on August 2
and October 31,* 1997. United States Embassy, Dakar.

Snrech, Serge, 1997. *Preparing for the Future: A Vision of West Africa
in the Year 2020: Summary Report. Cilss-Cinergie-Club du Sahel West
Africa Long Term Perspective Study. 1997*. OECD/ CILSS.

Stanton, Cynthia; Abderrahim Noureddine; and Kenneth Hill, 1997. *DHS
Maternal Mortality Indicators: An Assessment of Data Quality and
Implications for Data Use.* (Demographic and Health Surveys Analytical
Report No. 4). Calverton, MD: Macro International Inc.

The Mitchell Group, 1997. *Final report, USAID/Senegal Results
Framework.* USAID/Senegal.

UNFPA, *1995. Global Population Assistance Report*. New York: United
Nations Fund for Population Activities.

USAID/Senegal, 1994. *Coordination of Health Sector Aid in West and
Central Africa: Country Case Study of Senegal (draft).* Tulane
University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, commissioned
by USAID/Senegal HPN Office. USAID/Senegal.

USAID/PPC/CDIE, 1994. *Strategies for Sustainable Development*.
PPC/CDIE.

USAID/Senegal, 1998. *Assessment of Tropical Forests and Biodiversity
(as required by the Foreign Assistance Act).* USAID/Senegal.

USAID, 1997. *Working Document on Health and Family Planning Indicators:
A Tool for Results Frameworks.* Health and Human Resources Analysis for
Africa (HHRAA) Project, Office of Sustainable Development, Bureau for
Africa, USAID.

USAID, 1997. *Measuring Health System Performance: A Handbook of
Indicators.* Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform (Abt
Associates), for the Policy and Sector Reform Division, Office of Health
and Nutrition, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research.

World Bank, 1995. *Consultative Group for Senegal: Paris July 5-6,
1995*.

World Bank/IMF, 1997. *Le FMI conclut les Consultations au Titre de
l\'Article IV avec le Sénégal.*

World Bank, 1996. *Private Sector Adjustment and Competiveness Credit.-
December 1996*.

**ANNEX B: CUSTOMER SERVICE PLAN**

**INTRODUCTION**

The Customer Service Plan (CSP) was prepared within the general
framework of the reengineering process begun by USAID in general, and
USAID/Senegal in particular, in 1994. This process, which seeks efficacy
and efficiency in the delivery of development assistance, marks a
dramatic departure from past approaches. Five core values underlie the
reengineering philosophy:

• Results orientation

• Customer focus

• Teamwork

• Empowerment and accountability

• Partnership and participation

The objective of a Customer Service Plan is to make these values
tangible realities. It is a tool that USAID/Senegal will use for
improving the quality of its services in order to meet the needs and
expectations of its customers. It allows for identification and analysis
of the nature and quality of the various links in the chains leading to
end-users of USAID programs. At each implementa­tion phase, it helps to
reach customers, assess their satisfaction level, and elicit necessary
feed-back for integration into planned activities.

The CSP, as conceived by USAID/Senegal, is a participatory and itera­tive
document. Its demand-driven approach provides a framework for seeking
and ensuring full customer participation in the planning, execution,
monitoring, and evaluation of servi­ces or programs, not only on
technical grounds, but with respect to administrative and financial
methods and procedures. It defines agreed-upon norms for assessing the
quality of *delivered* services, as judged by clients and partners.
Customers are identified for each service provided, and their
satisfaction is analyzed based on gender, geographical area, living
conditions, and other factors.

The Customer Service Plan will serve as a guideline for identifying and
asssessing activities under the CSP as well as the potential for
continuous improvement. It will be adjusted as needed according to
changes in the development environment and lessons learned.

**1. MISSION VISION STATEMENT**

*USAID/Senegal is committed to contributing to the sustained prosperity
and empowerment of Senegal\'s people. It seeks to foster collegial,
participatory relationships with partners and customers. The Mission
will work together to produce high-quality results. Its members respect
one another, value individual creativity and diversity, and encourage
innovation and rigor.*

**2. RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

In support of the goal of *long term sustainable development,* the new
Country Strategic Plan, covering the period 1998-2006, is founded on the
key concept of *empowerment.* The Mission\'s willingness to promote this
concept and make it real stems from a fundamental lesson learned from
its own experience and the experiences of other partners in Senegal and
worldwide over the last four decades. At one time, the general tendency
in the donor community, including USAID, was to spend large amounts of
resources on immediate, rather than sustainable, development activities.
Effects ceased with or shortly after the termination of assistance. It
is now evident that worthwhile, lasting results from development
assistance must instead *endow targeted communities with the moral
confidence, the social and institutional capital, and the technical
ability to identify and address their needs themselves.* To this end,
USAID/Senegal\'s strategy focuses on a three-faceted objective of
promoting economic, political and social empowerment. This overarching
objective is, for operational purposes, divided into the following
Strategic Objectives (SOs) and Key Intermediate Results (KIRs):

**SO1:** *Sustainable increases in private sector income generating
activities in selected sectors*.

KIR 1: Improved legal, regulatory, and policy environment;

KIR 2: Improved access to finanancial services (for small and
microenterprises); and

KIR 3: Increased use of best technical and management practices.

**SO2:** *More effective, democratic, and accountable local management
of services and resources in targeted areas.*

KIR 1: Increased capacity of local institutions;

KIR 2: Increased access to financial resources;

KIR 3: Popular participation in the management and oversight of local
affairs; and

KIR 4: More effective implementation of policies and regulations related
to decentralization.

**SO3:** *Increased and sustainable use of reproductive health services
(child survival, maternal health, family planning, and STI-AIDS) in the
context of decentralization in targeted areas.*

KIR 1: Improved access to quality reproductive health services (CS, MH,
FP, STI/AIDS);

KIR 2: Increased demand for reproductive health services (CS, MH, FP,
STI/AIDS); and

KIR 3: Increased and effectively mobilized financing of health services
from internal sources.

To begin achieving these results, USAID will conduct a nation-wide
information campaign to explain these goals, describe our procedures,
and request submission of proposals from local Senegalese to join USAID
in a partnership. USAID will also bring to this partnership
contractors/grantees to help implement the development activities. These
activities will be given greater specificity in Results Packages which
will be completed after the first round of selection among Senegalese
proposals.

**3. PRINCIPLES**

*Ownership* and *participation* are the two basic concepts guiding the
implementation of the new country strategy. These concepts are
translated into a set of key principles for delivering USAID/Senegal\'s
development assistance. Because of the unique challenges imposed by a
demand‑driven strategy, these principles provide the Mission and its
partners with a reference for selecting activities, zones, partners and
types of interventions to achieve results as set forth in the Results
Framework.

The principles defined here broadly showcase the operating values
adopted by the Mission and its partners. Originally, eight principles
were proposed by USAID partners during the various meetings and seminars
leading to the definition of the CSP. Further discussion and analysis
reduced these to three over‑arching principles that should characterize
USAID/Senegal\'s approach to its new CSP: *Management for Results,
Partnership, and Good Governance*.

**3.1 Management for results**

This principle combines three ideas proposed during the CSP validation
workshop: (i) better relationship between resources levels and expected
results; (ii) performance-based contracts; and (iii) management for
*results* (not outputs).

**3.2 Partnership**

The development process of this CSP exemplifies what can be achieved
through partnership. For ownership to be secured, and sustainable
results achieved, partnership is clearly vital. USAID\'s partners share
this vision through four distinct elements of partnership:

*Sufficient information* is the condition that sets the foundation for
any profitable partnership.

*Considering the demand as a central part of the process* is the
mechanism that allows ownership to take place. Greater client commitment
can be expected if needs and activities are identified and satisfied
directly through the client.

*Partners and customers\' contributions* can be seen as the risk‑sharing
mechanism that is an important component of any partnership. It
reinforces the sense of ownership and greater involvement from
contributing partners.

Finally, *coordination with other donors\' programs and activities*
reflects the desire to avoid duplication of efforts and wasted energy,
thereby maximizing the impact of available resources.

**3.3 Good governance**

One of the most significant outcomes of the Mission\'s customer survey
was the strong feeling that to achieve any result, all aspects of bad
governance should be addressed and good governance promoted.
Furthermore, good governance is an element of participation since an
important aspect of participation is the definition of a common code of
conduct.

**4. RATIONALE FOR A DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH**

Development assistance traditionally has taken a supply-driven approach:
donors define their priorities and resource levels, and then accordingly
provide help to beneficiaries. This approach over the past 37 years in
Senegal has had many successes, but also the following weaknesses:

• Mistakes have occurred from the outset because decisions were made
without involving the customers in program/activity design.
Consequently, results have been mixed.

• Recurrent costs are seldom borne by the customers, resulting in a
collapse of development programs/activities once donor funding stops.
Customers refuse to finance development priorities defined by others,
and therefore do not take ownership or ensure sustainability of what is
proposed.

• The central government has been the donors\' primary decision-making
partner in setting development priorities and determining activities and
implementation mechanisms for the population. This has resulted in a
failure to take into account specific socio-cultural factors, and has
turned the population into passive consumers of the goods and services
provided under the proposed development programs or activities.

Because it emphasizes customer ownership of results as the key to
sustaining those results, the Mission\'s demand-driven approach to its
CSP should effectively remedy these weaknesses. Under former development
paradigms, the Mission would have already selected geographic areas for
its work, and then proceeded to hire contractors to select particular
customers to work with. Under this new paradigm, the Mission will allow
the most dynamic and interested customers to identify themselves
(self-selection) in response to an advertising/solicitation campaign
that presents what USAID has to offer (its Investment Proposal) and
seeks proposals for achieving specific results. In responding to these
proposals, USAID will select its areas of intervention and its targeted
customers and partners in accordance with the principles and criteria
outlined in this annex.

**5. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**

Outlined below are initial thoughts on how the Mission will finalize its
baseline, targets, and magnitude of impact expected.

**5.1 Outreach program**

An outreach campaign will be initiated nationwide using a local
contractor to work closely with a team including staff from USAID, the
GOS, NGOs and private sector organizations. The primary objective of the
campaign will be to inform the Senegalese people of the opportunities
under the new strategy and to encourage potential customers and partners
to submit proposals to USAID/Senegal describing how they would achieve
some of the results specified in the Mission\'s RF. Various
communication channels (i.e., national, local radios and TV) will be
used to reach the largest possible audience.

*• Content of the campaign.* The outreach campaign will furnish adequate
information about the proposed strategic objectives and planned results.
It will present the principles and criteria set for proposal selection,
and will include illustrative activities. It will also describe the
entities eligible for program assistance, as well as the format,
content, and submission schedules of program/activity proposals.

*• Eligible entities*. The customers and partners targeted for
developing and submitting program/activity proposals will include:
locally-elected councils in Senegal\'s 10 regions, 60 urban communes and
320 rural communities; 300+ PVOs/NGOs; grassroots associations
(primarily of youth or women); private business organizations and
associations; decentralized financial organizations; banks; chambers of
commerce; private sector support institutions; health committees; health
districts; the GOS partner Ministries; the National Assembly; and the
Social and Economic Council. It is preferable (and possibly a
requirement) that proposals be submitted by an urban, rural, or regional
governmental entity to demonstrate a coordination and synergy of efforts
within a certain geographic area.

These partners will be encouraged (without USAID financial assistance)
to further disseminate the campaign information and to even help with
the formulation of the proposals.

**5.2 Initial implementation actions**

• *Results Package development*. As soon as the Mission completes the
CSP, and during completion of the Results Review, Resource Request in
February, the Mission will begin to develop the Results Packages (RPs).
While RPs may not be finalized until after local customers have been
selected, the RP exercise will at least dentify certain activities that
can be initiated in the first year.

• *SOAG preparation and signing***.** The steps described above lay the
foundation for the Mission\'s preparation of the Strategic Objective
Agreements (SOAGs), at the latest in August 1998, and their approval by
the GOS before the end of September 1998.

• *Completion of contracting/granting scopes of work***.**

• *Launching of an outreach campaign*.

*• Establishment of a selection committee.* USAID/Senegal will establish
an internal selection committee, assisted by limited involvement of
partners (avoiding conflicts of interest or inappropriate involvement in
an inherently USG function).

• *Receipt, processing, and selection of proposals*. Prior to receiving
the first proposals, USAID/Senegal will use a contractor to assure that
the proposals/dossiers received are complete and organized for easy
review by USAID. This will require that the contractor have in place a
means of interacting with the proposal writers. After the Mission has
received solicitations from potential customers for
assistance/partnership, Mission personnel will screen the requests
against the criteria disseminated at the time of the solicitation.

*• Establishment of baselines and targets.*

**6. PARTNERS, CUSTOMERS AND THE CUSTOMER CHAIN**

For its interventions in Senegal, USAID/Senegal will use resources made
available by the U.S. Government through USAID/Washington. These
*stakeholders* (along with individuals and organizations whose
livelihood depend on the program financially) set the parameters for
interventions and require regular reports on progress toward each of the
Strategic Objectives defined. The continued support of the stakeholders
is contingent on the ability of USAID, implementing agencies, host
country partners, and customers to achieve specified performance
targets.

The Mission\'s *customers* are the people of Senegal, including those
groups that are politically marginalized, economically weak, and
socially disadvantaged. These special groups will be the primary
targets, or *ultimate customers.*

In designing its programs and selecting intervention zones,
USAID/Senegal will consult and coordinate with the major *donors* in its
target sectors. In the area of decentralization, the most active donors
include the EU, the French Development Agency *(Caisse Française de
Developpement)*, CIDA, GTZ, the World Bank, and UNDP. Key donors
supporting the private sector are the World Bank, the French Development
Agency, the KFW/GTZ, and UNDP. The lead donors in the health and
population sector are FNUAP, UNICEF, WHO, AGCD (the Belgian Development
Agency) and the World Bank.

To reach its ultimate customers, USAID/Senegal will rely on a chain of
*intermediaries.* The first link in the chain connects the Mission to
its *grantees and contractors.* Activities supporting results packages
developed under each strategic objective will be executed by a limited
number of contractors and grantees. Due to internal USAID procurement
integrity concerns, these prime contractors or grantees will mainly be
U.S. for-profit firms, voluntary organizations, and education or
research institutions. However, a heavy emphasis will be placed on their
utilization of Senegalese personnel and/or institutions wherever
possible.

Thus, in most cases, host country institutions (associations of private
entrepreneurs, local NGOs, universities, and research centers) will be
*sub-contractors or sub-grantees.* USAID/Senegal will make sure that the
rules and arrangements established by its prime contractors and grantees
for selecting and collaborating with host-country partners are open,
fair, and transparent.

The most crucial link in the customer chain is the connection between
the intermediate customers (prime contractors and grantees, and their
host-country partners) and the targeted end-users. These end-users (the
ultimate customers) cannot generally be reached directly, even at the
grassroots level. The interlocutors for the Mission\'s activities,
therefore, are typically *customer representatives:* individuals and/or
institutions who represent the ultimate customers. Customer
representatives include government field agents, elected officials, and
leaders of community-based organizations such as village development
associations, home-town welfare associations, women\'s groups, youth
organizations, small businesses, and professional associations.

USAID/Senegal is aware that grassroots views and interests often are not
reflected in local leadership and policies. The current strategy will
address this issue by improving local governance through the
establishment of transparent and democratic procedures for designating
leaders at all levels. The Mission intends to promote internal democracy
in all groups and institutions targeted by or using its development
assistance resources. While the emergence of a democratic culture will
take time, it should eventually lead to a dramatic improvement in true
representation at all decision-making levels.

In promoting its operational principles, USAID/Senegal will also be
particularly vigilant in ensuring that the grassroots perspective is not
distorted by local leaders or by intermediate customers. The staff,
Strategic Objective Team members, and members of the Customer Service
Committee (see below) will undertake frequent field visits to elicit
direct feed-back from end-users and to verify reports from implementing
partners against realities in the field.

**7. CUSTOMER CONSULTATION STRATEGY**

The primary purpose of customer consultations is to establish mechanisms
for collecting needed information on the quality of services provided by
the Mission\'s implementing partners and intermediate customers. More
generally, the consultations provide a means for establishing a
framework for two-way communication along the customer chain, from USAID
to end-users.

**7.1 Responsibilities of Strategic Objective Teams**

The Strategic Objective (SO) Teams are responsible for implementing the
Customer Service Plan. Each Team will designate a Customer Service
Contact Person (CSCP), whose primary role is to serve as an interface
between the SO Team and its customers and partners. The CSCP will ensure
that findings from the customer consultations are used by the SO Team to
improve the quality of its services.

**7.2 Coordination at the Mission level**

A Customer Service Committee (CSC) is responsible for coordinating the
customer service activities initiated by SO Teams. The Customer Service
Committee is chaired by the Mission Deputy Director and is composed of
SO Team CSCPs and SO partner representatives as appropriate. The
Sociologist of the Mission serves as the coordinator of the CSC.

**7.3 Periodic customer satisfaction reviews**

Semi-annual Activity Implementation Reviews provide an opportunity to
review aspects of customer service. Prior to each Activity
Implementation Review session, the CSC will prepare a customer service
issue paper.

**7.4 Reporting on customer satisfaction**

The Mission will report annually, as part of the R4 exercise, on
customer satisfaction indicators included among the impact indicators.
Possible indicators include:

• (SO1) The proportion of surveyed economic agents that report
improvement in the business climate;

• (SO2) The percentage of CRs (rural councils) whose populations are
satisfied with the exercise of defined authorities;

• (SO3) Customers\' rating of the quality of services provided in
targeted service delivery points.

The Mission will also explore the utility of having an annual Customer
Satisfaction Survey, in addition to the reporting done under each
contract and grant.

**7.5 Consultation and coordination with other donors**

SO Teams will be represented in relevant donor-coordination fora such as
the Donor Informal Consultation Committee on Decentralization, the Donor
Consultative Committee on Health and Population, and the Informal Donor
Coordination Group on Gender.

**7.6 Implementation schedule**

The Customer Service Plan developed for the current strategy (1992-1998)
will be implemented until September 1998. The current Consultative
Committee for Participation and Partnership (CCPP) will review and
validate the new Customer Service Plan. The Customer Service Committee
will meet quarterly to review and coordinate customer service activities
undertaken by the SO Teams, preparing a customer service issues paper
for each Activity Implementation Review session.

**8. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF PARTNERS, ACTIVITIES, AND ZONES FOR
INTERVENTION**

A set of criteria defined by USAID/Senegal and its partners will help
select among competing activities, zones, partners and types of
interventions, and will guide the successful implementation of the new
strategy:

**8.1 Criteria for impact**

The impact of proposed interventions will be determined by three major
elements: scope, gender considerations, and effects on the environment.
The following four criteria will help measure the magnitude of impact:

*• Potential for synergy between SOs and partners/other donors:* the
extent that activities undertaken or planned by partners during the same
period contribute to the achievement of the results that are greater
than the sum of the individual activities;

• *Size of the customer group:* the importance of the population
benefitting from the intervention;

• *Gender considerations:* the extent to which proposed interventions
will address existing gender issues; and

• *Development potential of the area:* the intervention\'s potential for
making best use of human, financial and natural resources, as well as
the creation of secondary development poles.

**8.2 Criteria for sustainability**

The sustainability of the proposed intervention will be assessed with
regard to the following seven criteria:

*• Consolidating/capitalizing on experiences with USAID and/or other
partners.* USAID and other partners have contributed to various
activities during their long presence in the country. This criterion
will permit the integration of successful experiences into proposed
programs;

• *Clients\' real contribution.* This criterion is one of the basic
steps towards sustainability. It provides a valid impression of
clients\' ownership of and commitment to the intervention. The Mission
and its partners have agreed that the level of client contributions will
be modulated according to program type, within a range of 25% to 50%;

• *Economic, financial and/or social profitability*. This criterion will
help measure the program potential for generating revenue and promoting
well-being. These will also contribute to ensuring sustainability;

• *Natural resource conservation.* Adequate management of natural
resources is key to environmental protection and an important element of
sustainable programs;

• *Organizational and managerial capacities.* This criterion refers to
the quality of the organizational structure and management practices;

• *Transparent operation of institutions.* Sustainability is closely
dependent on the adoption of proper rules, regulations, and guidelines
for internal *and* external program operations. These implementation
elements will be weighed through this criterion;

• *Security in the area.* This criterion will ensure the safety of
employees and institutional contractors in the field. A violence-free
climate is also a pre-condition for sustainable as well as short-term
development.

**8.3 Importance of \"need\" as a criteria**

To the extent that there is a trade-off between achieving sustainable
results and assisting the neediest communities and/or individuals, this
CSP emphasizes the former. There are several reasons for doing so:

• Other donors in Senegal, such as UNDP and the IBRD, have specific foci
on poverty alleviation;

• USAID/Senegal has conducted such programs in the past with very mixed
results;

• USAID/Senegal\'s demand-driven approach brings a sharper focus on
results as the best way to achieve sustainable long-term development for
Senegal; and

• This approach remains sensitive to the needs of the poorest
communities by responding to people and communities that both need
assistance and are willing to achieve results with that assistance.

Certain mechanisms inherent in this CSP will help to address the needs
of \"the very poor.\" First, the strategy clearly represents a departure
from assistance heavily to and through the central government, which has
often failed to reach the needy. This CSP instead continues a trend
toward greater assistance to and through PVOs/NGOs.

Second, by helping Senegal successfully implement the Decentralization
Law, USAID will indirectly reach the poor. Because the central
government has acknowledged its inability to effectively do so, a new
decentralized structure is expected to better allocate resources and
responsibilities to these neglected groups. *(Please refer to the
Foreword, the Introduction to Part II, and the \"Principles\" section of
this Annex for the rationale guiding this CSP\'s focus on making
Senegal\'s decentralization process more effective.)*

Finally, USAID\'s customers will be identified only after an Outreach
Campaign is conducted. Realizing that proposals will mainly come from
groups that are skilled in preparing them, and, conversely, that the
greatest results may come from working with groups who may not have
these skills, the Outreach Campaign will take extra measures to ensure
greater equality in the application process. These will include, for
example, the use of local languages, clear instructions for completing
the applications, and where necessary, technical assistance in the
preparation of the applicatons.

**9. STANDARDS OF USAID/SENEGAL PERFORMANCE**

Each year, as part of its Results Review and Resource Request (R4)
exercise, the Mission will review the performance of each of its
contractors and grantees. *The continuation of funding will be based on
satisfactory performance*. Low performance, if not justified by factors
outside the manageable interest of contractors and grantees, will be
sanctioned by termination of funding. The same principles should prevail
at all levels in the customer chain, from grantees and contractors to
intermediate customers, and from intermediate customers to end-users.

USAID/Senegal will strive to reduce routine administrative paperwork
within its offices, and to devote the majority of staff time to the
achievement of tangible development results. The Mission will further
improve relationships with clients by maintaining an open-door policy
for partners and customers, and by establishing a permanent forum for
dialogue.

Financial procedures will be simplified and reporting requirements
minimized for grantees and contractors. Even so, USAID/Senegal will
expect these groups to maintain high standards of reporting and sound
financial management and accounting principles.

**ANNEX C: GENDER CONSIDERATIONS**

Years of research have shown that women in Senegal require targeted
interventions to counteract gender inequalities. In the development of
its new strategy, USAID/Senegal has considered several gender issues
that will be addressed through its Strategic Objectives. In this annex,
each SO is examined from a gender-perspective for opportunities to
advance gender-equitable development. In some cases, programmatic
recommendations are provided for minimizing potential biases against
women.

***Strategic Objective 1.* Sustainable increases in private sector
income generating activities in selected sectors.**

While women represent only 15% to 26% of the civil service[^13]
workforce, they comprise 40% of the employees of the private
sector.[^14] The vast majority of this employment, however, is in the
informal sector. A survey conducted in 1990 for USAID/Senegal found that
less than 10% of the permanent employees of formal sector firms
operating in Senegal were women. The study also noted that most of these
women held lower-level, less skilled, and lower paying jobs.[^15] In
contrast, a concurrent study found that a greater proportion of women
held permanent jobs in the informal, small-business sector, and had
greater access to management functions.[^16] USAID/Senegal\'s experience
from the ACEP and KAED activities has confirmed the prominent role of
women in this sector. The 1995 Technical Evaluation of the Kaolack
Agricultural Enterprise Development activity, for instance, found that
more than 80% of the members of the agricultural enterprises working
with KAED were women.[^17] Moreover, another recent survey showed that
Senegalese women exercise a quasi-monopoly over the trade of fruits and
vegetables in market places. In the horticultural sector as a whole,
they represent more than 40% of retailers.[^18]

USAID/Senegal\'s first SO, which aims at increasing private sector
income generation in small and microenterprises and the informal sector,
is designed to have a positive impact on women. This SO will relieve
some of the constraints that prevent women from expanding their roles in
the private sector, including a high incidence of illiteracy; the burden
of multiple domestic chores; and limited access to land and credit.

Because the majority of the Senegalese population lives in rural areas,
most income generating activities are related to agriculture or natural
resource exploitation, and thus generally require access to farmland.
Even when women have access to land, such as for seasonal agriculture,
they are often confined to marginal areas and face precarious tenure
rights. When land is scarce, as with the case of irrigated agriculture,
women\'s access to any type of tenure right is even more limited. A
survey conducted in 1991-92 in the Senegal River Valley, for instance,
revealed that women represented only 6% of all tenants.[^19] In
addition, the proportion of households headed by women (currently 18%)
is increasing.

If implemented, the Land Tenure Action Plan (*Plan d\'Action Foncier*)
initiated by the GOS could have significant gender impacts.[^20] This
Plan recommends two options: to convert the National Domain (about 95%
of Senegal\'s total land area) into the private domains of decentralized
institutions, which would then be responsible for allocating private
ownership rights to their constituencies; or to register the National
Domain as a private asset of the State, which would then allocate
private ownership rights to individuals and organizations. Both options
advocate private ownership of the land. Further, there are strong
indications that the recognition of private ownership rights will likely
lead to the development of a land market with more open and democratic
access to land rights[^21].

Because many Senegalese women lack bankable assets to serve as
collateral, their access to formal credit is generally limited. This has
been documented by an assessment conducted in local banks of loans
exceeding CFAF 10 million as of November 30, 1991. In this assessment,
women received only 1.1% of the total amount loaned (*Femmes
Sénégalaises,* op. cit. 1993:67).

To address the foregoing identified constraints, this strategy will:

*Ease women\'s workload.* To the extent feasible, USAID/Senegal will
help to equip targeted communities with labor-saving devices such as
mills and fuel-saving stoves.

*Reduce illiteracy*. The new CSP will support literacy training for
female entrepreneurs as well as IEC programs for illiterate audiences.

*Help to expedite the adoption and implementation of the Land Tenure
Action Plan* and encourage decentralized institutions to open access to
land for marginalized groups (women, youths, and traditionally landless
groups), and

*Promote and facilitate women\'s access to credit through the
establishment of decentralized financial institutions*, and conduct
awareness campaigns on financial instruments and how to access them.

***Strategic Objective 2.* More effective, democratic and accountable
local management of services and resources in targeted areas.**

Women\'s representation in local government is an important influence on
decisions relating to gender equity. Substantial improvements have been
noted in the number of women elected to rural and municipal councils
over recent years. Statistics from the 1990 local elections (Ministry of
Interior) revealed that nearly 8% of rural and municipal councilors were
women. Between 1984 and 1990, representation increased from 5% to 15.7%
in municipal councils, and from less than 2% to 5.6% in rural councils.
This positive trend has been confirmed in the 1996 municipal and rural
elections.[^22] Even so, women\'s political weight and capacity to
influence decision-making processes in decentralized institutions varies
among local government units.

This SO will strive to increase women\'s participation in local affairs
by:

*Including women\'s representation as a key criterion for selection of
customers and partners;* and

*Promoting women\'s active participation in defining priorities for
local communities* by ensuring that within decentralized territories,
all viable grassroots organizations will be equally eligible for
USAID/Senegal\'s assistance, regardless of affiliations with local
decentralized authorities.

***Strategic Objective 3.* Increased use of reproductive health (child
survival, maternal health, family planning, and STI/AIDS) services in
the context of decentralization in targeted areas.**

In Senegal, women face greater health and social risks than men, due in
large part to their traditional roles in society. Maternal mortality
remains high, estimated at 800-1200 maternal deaths per 100,000 live
births. This is the result of both limited access to health services and
a high fertility rate. While it has declined over the years, the
fertility rate remains high enough to represent a major obstacle to the
social, political and economic empowerment of Senegalese women. Frequent
childbirth increases the duration and the frequency of women\'s exposure
to health risks, reducing the likelihood of active and effective
participation in income generating activities. In addition, female
genital mutilation continues among some of the minority ethnic groups.

The persistence of a social preference for large families is another
constraint to gender equity in Senegal. Recent Demographic and Health
Surveys, for example, have revealed that women desire, on average,
between five and seven children. Children prove women\'s fertility, and
that belief is strengthened by the rivalries in the widely adopted
polygamy system: in Senegal, 47% of married women were in polygamous
unions (1992-93 DHS). High rates of child mortality; the need for
numerous family members to diversity sources of income; and a cultural
emphasis placed on the reproductive roles of both men and women are
among the factors explaining these preferences. Initiatives to address
each of these factors will be undertaken in SO3.

Achieving sustainable and significant results in gender equitable
development will require strong campaigns in the health sector,
involving many segments of the society\--not just women. In particular,
USAID/Senegal must continue its efforts to educate and sensitize key
opinion leaders. Without an active role of opinion leaders and civil
society organizations, it is unlikely that fertility will continue to
decline, thus trapping many women in vulnerable, traditional
reproductive roles.

Under this strategy\'s third SO, USAID/Senegal will continue to:

*Stimulate, diversify and strengthen the participation of traditional,
religious and political leaders;* and

*Rely on PVOs/NGOs, grassroots organizations, civil societies, and
private sector entities as advocates.* The Mission will further promote
IEC activities and advocacy focusing on the social and cultural
constraints that women continue to encounter.

**ANNEX D: USAID/SENEGAL ISSUES**

USAID/Senegal plans to address a number of issues mentioned below during
the development of Results Packages (RPs) and the initial stages of
implementation.

**1. Caveats concerning decentralization**

After decades of centralization, the Decentralization Law is a
much-welcomed step to broaden participation and harness local energy.
However, decentralization must be well-implemented to be beneficial.
First, there is a question about the will and dedication of the GOS to
making decentralization work. Decentralization cannot merely be a
transfer of responsibilities without a transfer of skills, resources,
and ultimately, actual power. Nor can it be an opportunity for the
existing national political power structure to suppress the development
of grass-roots interest groups. Second, establishing additional units of
government is expensive, and Senegal can ill-afford a proliferation of
discrete administrative units that fail to perform better than the
former centralized system. Third, fundamental changes are still needed
at the central level to equitably and efficiently allocate resources
among the localities and to provide quality control for local
governance.

By being a part of the implementation of decentralization in Senegal,
donors (including USAID) can help create a balance between centralized
administrative efficiency and decentralized program effectiveness. Also,
they can act as a countervailing force to those that resist broad-based
development, by giving voice to local issues as intended in the
decentralization law.

**2. Caveats concerning the demand-driven approach**

USAID has proposed a demand-driven approach due to its long-run
benefits, but in the near-term there may well be some inconveniences.
Until partners, customers, and the exact zones of intervention are
selected, for example, the Mission will not be able to establish
baselines and specific performance targets. This will affect the
Mission\'s ability to report on results within the R4 format during the
first year of implementation.

In addition, to minimize the lag between the approval and implementation
of this CSP, the Mission will probably have an initial round of grants
and/or contracts that build an element of design work into the first
phase of implementation. While these implementing mechanisms will be
performance-based, they will not have the benefit of predetermined
baselines and performance targets.

Finally, USAID expects a slower than usual start-up of activities. The
selection process of customers/partners/zones of intervention will be
lengthy. Customers, too, may be slow to respond to USAID\'s offer of
assistance/partnership, due to the stiffened requirement that they show
serious intent to participate by sharing costs. Moreover, the
much-anticipated decentralization process could actually lead to poorer
results in the short run than were achieved previously under a
centralized government structure.

However, given the enthusiasm exhibited by all who helped develop this
CSP, and given its foundation in the vision, aspirations and priorities
of the Senegalese themselves, the Mission fully expects to enlist an
unprecedented participation of partners and customers, yielding greater
and more sustainable results by the end of the strategy period.

**3. Reengineering: opportunities and limits**

*Customer and Partnership Focus.* USAID/Senegal is in its third year of
reengineering. The paradigm shift from passive \"beneficiaries\" to
active partners is well underway. However, participation and partnership
are not without financial, organizational and labor costs. This raises a
difficult point as USAID down‑sizes and funds for operating expenses
decrease. In addition, the customer/partnership focus is not as smooth
or efficient with counterparts who have not been empowered to make
decisions because of their highly hierarchical chain of command.
Empowering USAID staff alone is not sufficient. Similarly, USAID staff
themselves, at times, are not as empowered as could be hoped. For
example, USAID earmarks mean that USAID/Senegal is not always able to
respond to some of the priorities articulated by Mission customers.

*Results Orientation.* With reengineering, the emphasis is no longer on
*how many*, but on the *impact of assistance on the lives of the
customers*. Reengineering has created opportunities for USAID staff to
emphasize that performance on the part of everyone is the only guarantee
for future funding. In other words, *No results, no money*. Yet
challenges persist. Few significant results (that are both sustainable
and within USAID\'s manageable interest) can be achieved and measured on
an annual basis. Also, strong incentives remain for development
assistance plans to be overly optimistic and open to earmarked funds
that a country may not be motivated to use very well. USAID/Senegal has
worked hard to avoid these pitfalls.

**4. Security issues in the Casamance region**

The Casamance (now the Kolda and Ziguinchor regions) would have been an
ideal location for the three SOs under this strategy. However, as of the
end of 1997, the security situation has precluded continuation of most
of USAID\'s activities there. The Mission will therefore alter its
geographic areas of intervention in accordance with conditions in this
and other regions of Senegal. Attainment of CSP results may be delayed
in or diverted from certain areas, but they will not be prevented by
isolated disturbances.

**5. The costs of regular monitoring and evaluation**

In the development of the Results Frameworks, the Mission and its M&E
consultants focused on defining performance indicators that are
quantifiable and significant. Little thought was given to the cost of
generating this information compared with the benefits of having it. The
Mission might well find, as the Results Packages and the M&E Plan are
developed, that the costs of monitoring certain targets far outweigh the
potential benefits of having such data. Efforts will also be made to
make sure that data collection and analysis are used to increase the
efficiency of Mission investments.

**6. Transitional issues**

This eight-year strategy represents a threshold for USAID\'s emergence
in new partnership with Senegal, based on greater sustainability of the
results this strategy is designed to achieve and the new operating
principles it builds on. Half-way through the design of the CSP, it was
decided that this should not be the final USAID exit strategy. The
Mission based its decision on the assumption that Senegal would remain
an excellent development partner, and that socio-economic indicators,
though improving, would still be very weak in 2006. The CSP design
therefore examined whether USAID should consider establishing a
foundation to take the place of a formal USAID Mission at the end of
this strategic planning period, with traditional assistance modalities
replaced by a new kind of relationship. This option only appears
feasible under a \$30 million OYB scenario (see *Part III, Resource
Requirements*).

**7. Issues outside of USAID/Senegal control**

It is important to note at least a few issues that profoundly shape not
only this strategy, but also its implementation. They may be topics for
the CSP review or other fora. These issues include:

• USAID-imposed restrictions on the use of OE funds;

• The difficulty of meshing a customer-focused, demand-driven strategy
with Congressional priorities;

• The trade-off between a drive towards pre-specified results and the
need for flexibility to respond to the changing needs, interests, and
capabilities of partners and customers;

• The need to report quantifiable people-level results on an annual
basis, when most of USAID\'s impacts involve behavioral and
institutional changes that rarely occur in the short term (what is the
balance between giving a women a fish, or teaching a woman to fish?) ;
and

• USAID\'s need to aggregate diverse worldwide results into a concise
document that responds to earmarks and special interest groups.

**ANNEX E: PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

**A. SO1 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

SO-level Indicators

**1. *Incomes increased by \$80 million through supported activities***

• *Definition*: \"Incomes\" include the salaries distributed and the
profits generated by the activities under review.

• *Unit of Measure*: The income distributed will be expressed in billion
CFAF.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, business and professional associations, the GOS, and other
donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**2. *Number of newly established businesses/SMEs increased (1,250 SMEs
and 3,200 microenterprises created)***

• *Definition*: The scope will include all the newly established
businesses/SMEs within a target area.

• *Unit of Measure*: Number of units

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, business and professional associations, the GOS, and other
donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**3. *Ratio of private investment to GDP increased from 13% to 17%***

• *Definition*: Private investment includes the acquisition of fixed
assets and changes in inventories by private businesses and households.

• *Unit of Measure*: The ratio will be expressed as a percentage. The
denominator comprises the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the
numerator focuses on private investment.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through the GOS Ministry of
Economy, Finance and Planning, and the IMF.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources.

KIR 1 Indicators

**4. *Proportion of surveyed economic agents that report improvement in
business climate***

*• Definition*: The business climate is a set of critical factors that
spur private business. The road map investment survey will help list the
critical factors.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all the economic agents sampled within a
target area while the numerator focuses on those surveyed who report
improvement in business climate.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: A well-focused survey will
ensure the availability of the data.

KIR 2 Indicators

**5. *Value of credit extended***

• *Definition*: The scope will include all the credit extended within a
target area.

• *Unit of Measure*: The value will be expressed in billion CFAF.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, financial intermediaries, the GOS, and other donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**6. *Number of loans extended ***

• *Definition*: The scope will include all the loans extended within a
target area.

• *Unit of Measure*: Number.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, financial intermediaries, the GOS, and other donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

KIR 3 Indicators

**7. *Proportion of SMEs with business plans***

• *Definition*: The business plan includes the following three
components: the provisional partial budget, the investment plan, and the
provisional financing plan.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all SMEs within a target area while the
numerator focuses on those SMEs that have a business plan.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, business and professional associations, the GOS, and other
donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**8. *Proportion of SMEs working in NRM-related activities that have
adopted improved technologies***

*• Definition*: An NRM-related activity is any NR-based activity that
generates income through market-based participation. \"Technologies\"
include all improved technical and managerial practices.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all NRM-based businesses/SMEs within a target
area while the numerator focuses on those businesses/SMEs that have
adopted improved technologies.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, business and professional associations, the GOS, and other
donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**9. *Proportion of SMEs working in other areas that have adopted
improved technologies***

• *Definition*: The areas under review include any (except NRM) that
USAID/Senegal may select.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all SMEs (except NRM-based ones) within a
target area while the numerator focuses on those SMEs that have adopted
improved technologies.

• *Data Sources*: Data will be available through USAID/Senegal\'s
contractors, business and professional associations, the GOS, and other
donors.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well-focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**B. SO2 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

SO-level Indicators

***1. Proportion of citizens in 50 CRs and 10 Communes who report
satisfaction with a threshold level of services provided by CLs.***

• *Definition:* Core services provided include health, natural resource
management, education, water supply, etc.

• *Unit of Measure:* The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all residents in a CL while the numerator
focuses on those citizens who are satisfied with the level of services.

• *Data Sources:* Customer Survey conducted every three years.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* Review of data collected,
cited above.

**2. *Proportion of \"Conseils Rurales\" (CRs) implementing Land Use
Management Plans (LUMP, target: 90%)***

*• Definition:* LUMPs are the product of local participation and
consensus building. They cover and define needed 10-15 year period
investments, changes in land use management practices, needed training
and technical assistance, and needed accompanying support.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all the CRs that have a LUMP while the
numerator focuses on those CRs implementing their LUMP.

• *Data Sources*: Data are available through the DCL, the CR, and the
\"Direction de l\'Aménagement du Territoire (DAT)\".

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of records of the
data sources cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure
the availability of the data.

**3. *Proportion of CLs that implement 90% of their planned budget
(target: 60% of Communes and 65% of CRs)***

• *Definition:* For this indicator, the budget implementation rate might
be distorted because estimations overlooked the actual financial
capacities. These can be assessed through calculating the average
ordinary revenues over a three year period; calculating the
implementation rate for the current fiscal year; and reviewing late
changes. Ordinary types of revenues include rural head taxes, income
taxes, licensing, land ownership, and construction fees; parts of
judiciary fees; animal slaughtering, fuel sale, and market taxes;
receipts from rental lands; solidarity funds; and other miscellaneous
funds.

• *Unit of Measure:* The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all CLs implementing their budget, no matter
the rate, while the numerator focuses on those CLs whose implementation
rate equals at least 90%.

• *Data Sources:* The data are available through the DCL and the DFCL.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of the records of
the data sources cited above coupled with a well focused survey will
ensure the availability of the data. Data calculation is performed in
two steps. First, information on all the CLs implementing their budget
is compiled. Once the implementation rate is determined, the number of
CLs whose implementation rate equals at least 90% is used in the
numerator.

KIR 1 Indicators

**4. *Proportion of CLs that develop and implement their Environmental
Action Plans (EARs)***

• *Definition*: An EAP is a reference framework that ensures that
environmental concerns are addressed in all economic and social
policies.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all CLs according to the type (10 regions, 60
\"communes de droit commun,\" 43 \"communes d\'arrondissement,\" and 320
CRs). The numerator comprises those CLs that develop and implement an
EAP.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the DCL, the CL, and
the \"Direction de l\' Environnement)\" of the Ministry of Environment.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**5. *Proportion of CLs that design and implement a development plan***

• *Definition*: \"Development plan\" includes the *Plan Regional de
Developpement (PRDI), Plan d\'Investissements Communaux (PIC),* and the
*Plan Local de Developpement (PLD)* at the regional, urban, or rural
levels.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all CLs, according to the type. The numerator
focuses on those CLs that design and implement a development plan
(\"Plan Régional de Développement Intégré (PRDI)\" at the regional
level, \"Plan d\'Investissements Communaux (PIC)\" at the level of the
\"communes\", and \"Plan Local de Développement (PLD)\" at the CR level.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the DCL, the CL, the
\"Agence Régionale de Développement (ARD)\", and the \"Direction de la
Planification\" of the MEFP.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**6. *Proportion of CLs capable of self-reporting management-related
financial data***

• *Definition:* \"Self-reporting\" means that CLs will handle requests
for financial data themselves, without referrals to the tax inspector or
collector.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all CLs, according to the type. The numerator
focuses on CLs that have the capacity to design and maintain their own
financial data base.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the CL.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: A well-focused survey will
ensure the availability of the data.

**7. *Proportion of activities under CL supervision contracted to local
organizations***

• *Definition*: Local organizations include NGOs/PVOs, local businesses,
and other local associations.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises the number of activities under CL supervision,
according to the type. The numerator focuses on those activities under
CL supervision that are contracted to local organizations.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the CL and the
Treasury.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

KIR 2 Indicators

**8. *Proportion of CLs that collect at least 80% of their planned
operating revenues on their own***

• *Definition*: The scope of CL includes only the \"commune\" and the CR
since the \"region\" does not have yet any revenue of its own. CL
revenues include local taxes, real estate taxes, and service fees.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed in percentage. The
denominator comprises all CLs, according to type (60 \"communes de droit
commun\", 43 \"communes d\'arrondissement\", and 320 CRs). The numerator
focuses on those collecting at least 80% of their revenues on their own.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the DCL, the CL and the
DFCL.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**9. *Increase rate of government transfers (in real terms) to CLs***

• *Definition*: Government transfers are made up of allowance,
assistance, and rebate funds. The nominal value of these transfers will
be divided by the inflation rate to get the amount in real terms.

• *Unit of Measure*: The rate will be expressed in percentage. The
denominator consists of transfers made the previous year while the
numerator counts transfers made during the year under review.

*• Data Sources*: The data are available through the DFCL and the
\"Direction du Budget\" of MEFP.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**10. *Increase rate of the value (in real terms) of revenues from
external sources***

• *Definition*: The nominal value of these revenues will be divided by
the inflation rate to get the amount in real terms. The external sources
should be understood as all the financial backers except for the
government and the CL itself.

• *Unit of Measure*: The rate will be expressed in percentage. The
denominator consist of the revenues from external sources last year
while the numerator is these revenues during the year under review.

• *Data Sources*: The data are available through the DFCL, the CL, the
Treasury, and the \"Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière
(DCEF)\" of MEFP.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**11. *Proportion of CLs that receive 100% of expected central
government transfers by March 31***

• *Definition*: Assuming that the various concepts included in the
indicator statement will be understood uniformly or have been already
explained, no further explanation is necessary.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all CLx (preferably by type of CL) while the
numerator focuses on those that receive the entire amount of transfer
from the government by the deadline of March 31.

• *Data Sources*: Data are available through the DFCL, the DGTCP, and
the CL.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focuses survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

KIR 3 Indicator

**12. *Number of appeals lodged against CLs and deconcentrated
authorities***

• *Definition*: The appeals might be administrative or judicial
depending on the stage at which the issue is resolved.

• *Unit of Measure*:

• *Data Sources*: Data are available through the DCL, the CL, the
deconcentrated authorities (\"gouverneur\", \"préfet\", and
\"sous-préfet\"), and the jurisdictions.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

KIR 4 Indicators

**13. *Proportion of decentralization-related implementation decrees
issued***

• *Definition*: No further explanation is necessary.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all decentralization-related implementation
decrees cited by the law while the numerator focuses on all decrees
issued.

• *Data Sources*: Data are available through the DCL.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of records of the
DCL will ensure the availability of the data.

**14. *Proportion of conflicts resolved at the CR level***

• *Definition*: The underlying assumption is that conflicts at the
regional or communal level, or those not resolved by the
\"sous-préfet,\" are likely submitted to the jurisdictions. Thus, the
focus is on the CR within an \"arrondissement\".

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all conflicts recorded at the CR level while
the numerator focuses on those resolved by the rural council either
alone or under the auspices of the \"sous-préfet\".

• *Data Sources*: Data are available through the CR, and the
\"sous-préfecture\".

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation:* The review of data sources
cited above coupled with a well focused survey will ensure the
availability of the data.

**C. SO3 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

SO-level Indicators

**1. *Contraceptive prevalence rate increased from 7.1% to 15%***

• *Definition*: \"Women of reproductive age\" include women between the
ages of 15 and 49. \"Modern methods\" include condoms, spermicides, the
Pill, injectables, Norplant, DIU/CU-T380, and sterilization.

• *Unit of Measure*: The rate will be expressed as a percentage. The
denominator is comprised of all currently-married women of reproductive
age, while the numerator counts only those currently-married women of
reproductive age who are using (or whose partner is using) a modern
method of contraception at a given point in time.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the \"Direction de la
Prévision et de la Statistique (DPS)\" of the MEFP.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) conducted every four years will ensure the availability of
data.

**2. *Condom use with non-regular sex partners increased from 29% to
50%***

*• Definition*: \"People\" includes men or women between 15 and 60 years
of age.

• Unit of Measure: The value will be expressed as a percentage. The
denominator comprises all surveyed people whose last sexual act was with
a non-regular partner, while the numerator includes only those who
report the use of a condom that act.

• Data Source: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP and Family
Health International (FHI)/Senegal.

• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation: The DHS conducted every four
years and the Behavior Surveillance Survey (BSS) conducted every two
years will ensure the availability of data.

**3. *Proportion of pregnancies receiving one or more prenatal visits
increased from 82% to 98%***

• *Definition*: No further explanation is necessary

• *Unit of Measure:* The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all pregnancies estimated within the target
area for one year while the numerator focuses on those pregnant women
attending one or more prenatal consultations.

• *Data Source:* Data are available through the monitoring system of the
MOHSA.

• *Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of the Service
Delivery Points (SDP) records will ensure the availability of the data.

**4. *Proportion of children fully vaccinated by age one increased from
39% to 65%***

*• Definition*: A child fully vaccinated has received the full series of
World Health Organization-recommended immunizations by age one.

• *Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all children 12 to 23 months while the
numerator focuses on those children who are fully vaccinated based on
their vaccination card.

• *Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP and
secondary data sources such as UNICEF.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS conducted every four
years and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) will ensure the
availability of data.

**5. *Proportion of child diarrhea cases treated with oral rehydration
therapy increased from 33% to 60% ***

*• Definition*: Oral rehydration therapy includes treatment with Oral
Rehydration Sachets (ORS) or recommended home fluids.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all cases of child diarrhea within the last
two weeks (as reported by mothers) while the numerator focuses on those
cases treated with ORS and/or an appropriate home-based solution.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP and
secondary data sources such as UNICEF.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS, conducted every
four years, and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) will
ensure the availability of data.

**6. *Proportion of infants from 0-4 months exclusively breast-fed
increased from 14% to 30%***

*• Definition*: Exclusive breastfeeding precludes supplementation with
water or any other type of food/liquid.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all children under four months of age while
the numerator focuses on those children who are exclusively breastfed.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS conducted every four
years will ensure the availability of data.

KIR 1 Indicators

**7. *Proportion of people living within 5 kilometers of a functioning
Service Delivery Point (SDP)***

• *Definition*: A functioning SDP has enough well-trained staff, the
proper equipment to deliver services, and an adequate supply of
appropriate drugs.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all inhabitants in the target area within 5 km
of an SDP for one year while the numerator focuses on those inhabitants
living within 5 kilometers of a functioning SDP.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP and the
monitoring system of the MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: Demographic data projections
and SDP records will ensure the availability of data.

**8. *Proportion of people living more than 5 kilometers from an SDP who
are covered by outreach***

*• Definition*: No further explanation is necessary .

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all people living outside of the 5km radius of
an SDP for one year while the numerator focuses on those inhabitants
covered by an outreach strategy.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of the MEFP and the
monitoring system of the MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: Demographic data projections
and SDP records will ensure the availability of data.

**9. *Proportion of women with 3 prenatal consultations during their
most recent pregnancy***

• *Definition*: No further explanation is necessary .

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all pregnancies estimated within the target
area for one year while the numerator focuses on those pregnant women
who have had 3 prenatal consultations during their most recent
pregnancy.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the monitoring system of the
MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: SDP records will ensure the
availability of data.

**10. *Proportion of correct case management according to Ministry Of
Health and Social Action (MOHSA) protocols***

*• Definition*: The scope of this indicator includes STIs, acute
respiratory infection, diarrhea, malnutrition, malaria, and prenatal
consultations. A correct case management means compliance with current
MOHSA protocols.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all cases observed during the survey while the
numerator focuses on those cases correctly managed.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the \"Programme National de
Planification Familiale (PNPF) of the MOHSA and The Population Council.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The \"Analyse
situationnelle\" surveys of health facilities every two years will
ensure the availability of data.

**11. *Couple Years of Protection (Public sector)***

• *Definition*: This indicator is a proxy for contraceptive prevalence.
It focuses on the total amount of contraceptives sold or distributed
free of charge during a year.

*• Unit of Measure*: Currently-married women of reproductive age.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the \"Programme National de
Planification Familiale (PNPF) of the MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: Review of contraceptive
logistics system reports. Multiplication coefficients for calculating
CYP vary depending on the type of contraceptive: the Pill (15 cycles per
CYP), DIU/CU-T380 and Norplant (3.5 CYP per unit), injectable (4 per
CYP), sterilization (8 CYP per unit), condom (120 per CYP), and
spermicide (120 per CYP).

**12. *Proportion of Family Planning (FP) clients who have used any
modern FP method on a continuous basis throughout the past year***

• *Definition*: Use on a continuous basis indicates the probability that
an acceptor will still be using some contraceptive method for at least
one year.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all FP acceptors drawn from a cohort of new FP
acceptors and monitored for 12 months while the numerator focuses on
those of the sample who have used any modern FP method on a continuous
basis throughout the year.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the \"Programme National de
Planification Familiale (PNPF) of the MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: A retrospective study based
on SDP records will ensure the availability of data.

**13. *Proportion of SDPs with mechanisms for coverage of health care
costs of indigents***

*• Definition:* Health care for indigents is defined as\...

*• Unit of Measure:* The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all SDPs within a target area while the
numerator focuses on those SDPs that have a mechanism for covering
health care costs for indigents.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the monitoring system of the
MOHSA.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: Review of the SDP records
will ensure the availability of data.

KIR 2 Indicators

**14. *Average desired family size***

• *Definition*: The average desired family size is the average number of
children that women of reproductive age would choose to have if they
could have exactly the number desired.

*• Unit of Measure*: Number of children.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of MFEP.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS conducted every four
years will ensure the availability of data.

**15. *Proportion of women of reproductive age who state intention to
use reproductive health services***

• *Definition*: No further explanation is necessary.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all women of reproductive age sampled within a
target area while the numerator focuses on those reproductive age women
who state their intention to use health services.

• *Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of MFEP and
Management Sciences for Health (MSH)/Senegal.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS and Knowledge,
Attitude, and Practice (KAP) surveys conducted every two years will
ensure the availability of data.

**16. *Proportion of people who know of at least two methods for
prevention of Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)/AIDS***

• *Definition*: Methods for prevention are those defined by the
\"Programme National MST/SIDA\".

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all people aged 15-60 sampled within a target
area while the numerator counts only those who can cite at least two
acceptable means of protection against HIV and STIs.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the DPS of MFEP and
FHI/Senegal.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The DHS and the BSS
conducted every two years will ensure the availability of data.

KIR 3 Indicators

**17. *Amount of real per capita annual SDP budget furnished by
Senegalese resources***

• *Definition*: The annual SDP budget derived from Senegalese resources
will be divided by the infation rate to get the amount in real terms.
This amount divided by the number of inhabitants gives the real per
capita budget. Within each target area, Senegalese resources include
Bamako Initiative funds and local government transfers to SDPs.

*• Unit of Measure*: This amount will be expressed in thousands of CFAF.

*• Data Source*: Demographic and inflation data are available through
the DPS of MEFP. Local governments, the monitoring system of the MOHSA,
and the SDP health committees provide nominal budget related figures.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above will ensure the availability of data.

**18. *Proportion of SDPs whose real per capita budget increases
annually***

*• Definition*: A real per capita budget is defined above. Budgets will
be monitored each year for trends.

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all SDPs that have a budget while the
numerator counts only those whose real per capita budget has shown an
increase from the previous year.

*• Data Source*: Demographic and inflation data are available through
the DPS of MEFP. Local governments, the monitoring system of the MOHSA
and the SDP health committees provide nominal budget related figures.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above will ensure the availability of data.

**19. *Proportion of SDPs that receive 100% of expected local government
transfers by May 31***

*• Unit of Measure*: The proportion will be expressed as a percentage.
The denominator comprises all SDPs within a target area while the
numerator counts those that receive the entire amount of transfer from
the local government by the deadline of May 31.

*• Data Source*: Data are available through the local government and the
SDP health committee.

*• Methods of Data Collection/Calculation*: The review of data sources
cited above will ensure the availability of data.

**ANNEX F: AID/W REVIEW OF CSP**

This document is specially formatted so that it may be electronically
sent to the AID cable room. To print this cable in regular format ALWAYS
use CTRL‑Y. DO NOT USE THE PRINT KEY !! APPR: CP ( )

DRAFT: GT ( )

CLEAR: GB ( )

UNCLASSIFIED SECSTATE 46969 CLEAR: HL ( )

CLEAR: ( )

AID/AFR/WA:GTHOMPSON:GT\\O\\SENEGAL\\CSP\\SEN_CSP5.CBL CLEAR: ( )

03/16/98 712-4028

AID/AA/AFR:CPEASLEY (ACTING) CLEAR: ( )

======LEFT SIDE CLEARANCES====== ======RIGHT SIDE
CLEARANCES======AFR/AA:GBOMBARDIER AFR/WA:HLIGHTFOOT

AFR/AMS:BRYNER(SUBST) AFR/DP:JGOVAN(DRAFT)

M:DHARRISON(DRAFT) AFR/SD:JWOLGIN(SUBST)

PPC:RBYESS(DRAFT) G:LDOBBINS(SUBST)+

=================MAXIMUM WIDTH OF ADDRESSEE
LINES==================PRIORITY SENEGAL

ROUTINE BAMAKO, ACCRA, ABIDJAN

AIDAC ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: USAID/SENEGAL COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN REVIEWS

1\. SUMMARY:

A. AT THE WRAP-UP SESSION OF THE SENEGAL PROGRAM WEEK ON FEBRUARY 20,
1998, A-AA/AFR CAROL PEASLEY APPROVED THE FY 1998-2006 COUNTRY STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR USAID/SENEGAL AS AMENDED CONTINGENT UPON PROVISIONS AND
MANDATES DESCRIBED BELOW. THIS CSP REPORTING CABLE, ALONG WITH THE
APPROVED CSP AND ADDENDUMS CONSTITUTE THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT WITH
USAID/SENEGAL TO ATTAIN THE RESULTS THE MISSION HAS IDENTIFIED FOR THE
AMOUNT OF FUNDS IT HAS REQUESTED, SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

B. THE FEBRUARY 17-20 SENEGAL PROGRAM WEEK MEETINGS WERE ATTENDED BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF GLOBAL, M, PPC, GC/AFR, AFR/SD, AFR/DP, AFR/AMS, AND
AFR/WA. THE MISSION WAS REPRESENTED BY MISSION DIRECTOR, ANNE WILLIAMS
AND SEVERAL STAFF. ALL INVOLVED ARE COMMENDED ON THE PROFESSIONAL AND
COLLABORATIVE TEAMWORK SHOWN IN THE WAY SOME VERY CRUCIAL AND NOVEL
ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. THE USAID/W/SENEGAL TEAM CAME A LONG WAY DURING
PROGRAM WEEK.

C. ON THE BUDGET PRESENTED, THE BUREAU MADE A GUARDED COMMITMENT OF
\$23.4 MILLION PER YEAR, SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, WITH THE
PROVISO THAT HPN AND TO AN EXTENT ENV FUNDING WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE
AVAILABLE THAN E/G OR ESPECIALLY D/G FUNDS. THE BUREAU APPROVED THE
MISSION\'S PROPOSED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS WITH SOME
MODIFICATION. THE APPROVED SOS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

\-- S.O. 1 SUSTAINABLE INCREASE OF PRIVATE SECTOR INCOME GENERATING
ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED SECTORS.

\-- S.O. 2: MORE EFFECTIVE, DEMOCRATIC, AND ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL MANAGEMENT
OF SERVICES AND RESOURCES IN TARGETED AREAS.

\-- S.O. 3: INCREASED AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (CHILD
SURVIVAL, MATERNAL HEALTH, FAMILY PLANNING, AND STI/AIDS) SERVICES IN
THE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALIZATION IN TARGETED AREAS.

END SUMMARY.

II\. BACKGROUND:

A. USAID SENEGAL PROGRAM WEEK WAS HELD TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, THROUGH
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1998. ISSUES MEETINGS WERE HELD THE PRECEDING
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11 AND FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, TO DETERMINE WHICH
ISSUES SHOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD TO PROGRAM WEEK AND TO DEAL UP FRONT
WITH THE OVERARCHING ISSUES.

B. THE MAJOR ISSUE RAISED DURING THE COURSE OF WASHINGTON REVIEW WAS
THAT THE STRATEGY SEEMED TO EQUATE THE DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH WITH AN
INABILITY TO PROVIDE A FIRM SENSE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF RESULTS TO BE
ACHIEVED AND THE COST OF EACH STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. ULTIMATELY, THE
MISSION TEAM WORKED UP ADDENDA PROVIDING BASELINES, TARGETS AND
ESTIMATED BUDGET COSTS. THIS ALLOWED THE PROGRAM WEEK MEETINGS TO
PROCEED AND TO RESOLVE THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGH DISCUSSIONS, SIDE
MEETINGS, ADJUSTMENTS, AND FURTHER ADDENDA. ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
WITHIN THE AGENCIES CONTROL WERE THUS RESOLVED, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL
MANDATES, CONDITIONS AND CONCERNS WHICH ARE NOTED BELOW.

III\. OVERARCHING ISSUES:

A. DECISIONS:

1\. THE PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND BASELINE INFORMATION ARE PROVIDED AT THE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE LEVEL IN ADDENDUM NO. 1 TO THE CSP. ALL AGREED THAT
THIS INFORMATION IS ADEQUATE FOR JUDGING THE LEVEL OF IMPACT FOR THE
PURPOSES OF THIS MANAGEMENT CONTRACT.

\- A). FOR PRIVATE SECTOR SO 1, A NEW INDICATOR WILL REPLACE INDICATOR
NO.3 (ON NUMBERS OF BUSINESS FAILURES). THE NEW INDICATOR IS: INCREASE
IN THE RATIO OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT TO GDP. THE BASELINE FOR THIS
INDICATOR IS 11.7 PERCENT. THE TARGET FOR FY2006 IS 17 PERCENT.

\- B) FOR THE DECENTRALIZATION SO 2, THE FIRST AND FOURTH INDICATORS (ON
CITIZENS BENEFITTING FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE AND VOTER TURNOUT) ARE
REMOVED. THEY ARE REPLACED WITH A NEW INDICATOR AT THE SO LEVEL:
PROPORTION (PERCENT) OF CITIZENS WHO REPORT SATISFACTION WITH A
THRESHOLD LEVEL OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AT LEAST 50
RURAL COMMUNITIES (CRS) AND 10 COMMUNES. THIS INDICATOR WILL INVOLVE THE
USE OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS. BASELINES AND TARGETS FOR THIS INDICATOR
WILL BE PROVIDED NLT THE END OF FEBRUARY, 1999.

2\. THE ADDITIONAL TARGETS AND BASELINES NEEDED TO JUDGE PROGRESS AT THE
KIR LEVEL AND WHICH MAKE UP THE CORE OF THE PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND
EVALUATION PLAN WILL BE PROVIDED NLT THE NEXT R4, THAT IS BY THE END OF
FEBRUARY 1999.

3\. ALL ATTENDEES AGREED THAT THE BUDGET HANDOUT, ADDENDUM NO. 2, WAS
REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CSP DID NOT
PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO ALLOW FOR PROPER BUDGETING OF DIRECTED
FUNDS. THE ADDENDUM WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO JUDGE THE REASONABLENESS
OF THE REQUESTS IN RELATION TO THE SO TARGETS.

4\. MOVING FROM THE OLD STRATEGY TO THE NEW WILL INEVITABLY BRING
PROBLEMS. WHICH PROJECTS SHOULD CONTINUE AS EXAMPLES, WHICH CAN BE TAKEN
OVER BY OTHER DONORS, WHICH SHOULD BE CLOSED DOWN ARE SENSITIVE
QUESTIONS. TO DEAL WITH THE CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE, THE MISSION WILL
PROVIDE THE TRANSITION PLAN, UNDER DEVELOPMENT SINCE NOVEMBER, TO USAID
WASHINGTON NLT MAY 15, 1998. THIS SUBMISSION WILL NOT BE FOR REVIEW, BUT
FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS.

5\. THE QUESTION OF EQUITY AND WHETHER WE ARE HELPING THE POOREST OF THE
POOR IS OFTEN RAISED IN STRATEGY REVIEWS. THE MISSION PRODUCED ADDENDUM
NO. 6 TO THE CSP REVIEWING HOW IT IS ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
NEED FOR ASSISTANCE IS NOT IGNORED IN THE DEMAND DRIVEN APPROACH. THE
MISSION WILL ALSO USE AN ASSISTANCE CAMPAIGN TO HELP NEEDY COMMUNITIES
WITH THEIR PROPOSALS AS A WAY TO GET AT THIS PROBLEM.

6\. THOUGH DISCUSSED UNDER SO 3 BELOW, ANOTHER RELATED OVERARCHING ISSUE
CONCERNED THE CAPACITY OF SUCH A STRATEGY TO AFFECT REQUIRED CHANGE AT
THE NATIONAL LEVEL WHEN THE MISSION WAS GIVING THE MAJOR EMPHASIS TO
GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT. THE STRATEGY WAS LESS EXPLICIT CONCERNING THE
LINKAGES BETWEEN THE LOCAL DEMAND DRIVEN APPROACH AND THE MISSION\'S
NATIONAL POLICY AND TECHNICAL AGENDA. THE MISSION AGREED THAT WHAT THEY
WERE PROPOSING ON THIS ISSUE COULD BE FURTHER CLARIFIED IN THE CSP AND
PREPARED ADDENDUM NO. 5 TO SHOW SEVERAL OF THE WAYS THEY WERE ADDRESSING
THESE LINKAGES FOR SO 3. OTHER DECISIONS UNDER SO 1 AND SO 2 ALSO HELPED
TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

B. DISCUSSION:

ON THE FIRST AND DECISIVE OVERARCHING ISSUE, WHETHER A DEMAND-DRIVEN
APPROACH WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH PROVIDING TARGETS AND BASELINES IN A
TIMELY FASHION AND WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEMIC STRATEGY FOR
DEVELOPMENT, THERE WAS LONG DISCUSSION ON THE TARGETS GIVEN, WHETHER
THEY WERE SOUNDLY DEVELOPED, AND WHETHER THE DEMAND DRIVEN APPROACH
WOULD REALLY ALLOW FOR CALCULATION OF SUCH TARGETS.

THE MISSION RESOLVED THE ISSUE BY PROVIDING ADDENDA WITH THE TARGETS AND
BUDGET BREAKDOWNS AND DEFENDED THOSE TARGETS AND BUDGETS. DISCUSSIONS
WALKED EVERYONE THROUGH THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND SHOWED HOW EVERYTHING
ADDED UP TO A SYSTEMIC PLAN UNDER EACH SO.

SO 1: USAID STAFF PRESENTED TARGETS AND INDICATORS AND WALKED ATTENDEES
THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE INDICATORS AND SHOWED THE BREAKDOWN OF
THE BUDGET IN RELATION TO THE DIFFERENT KIRS. AFTER DISCUSSION,
ATTENDEES AGREED THAT ALL THE INDICATORS WERE ADEQUATE EXCEPT FOR A
NATIONAL LEVEL INDICATOR OF ENTERPRISE SURVIVAL RATES WHICH WAS FELT NOT
TO BE THE BEST INDICATOR FOR THE WORK PLANNED IN POLICY REFORM. AFR/SD
AND THE MISSION LATER FRAMED A BETTER INDICATOR TO MEASURE THE KINDS OF
POLICY WORK USAID/SENEGAL WOULD LIKELY DO.

THE INDICATOR PROPOSED WAS \"INCREASED PRIVATE INVESTMENT PER GDP.\" ALL
THE ECONOMISTS AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD INDICATOR EVEN IF IT WAS NOT
WITHIN THE MISSION\'S MANAGEABLE INTEREST TO HAVE MORE THAN A MINOR
DIRECT IMPACT ON THE PERCENT OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT. DISCUSSION ENSUED ON
WHAT THE TARGET SHOULD BE, BUT ALL AGREED THAT SHOULD WAIT ON THE
COMPLETION OF THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOS AND THE
BRETON-WOODS INSTITUTIONS. USAID WOULD BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEM ON
POLICY REFORM. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW FAR ENOUGH ALONG FOR THE
MISSION TO COMMIT TO THE TARGET GIVEN ABOVE.

ALL AGREED THAT THE BUDGET LEVEL REFLECTED A REASONABLE LEVEL OF
INVESTMENT FOR THE RESULTS TARGETED.

SO 2: MISSION PRESENTED THE TARGETS AND INDICATORS AND EXPLAINED HOW THE
MISSION ARRIVED AT THESE INDICATORS. IT ALSO BROKE-OUT THE BUDGET BY
KIR.

THE D/G INDICATORS ARE IN GENERAL MORE DIFFICULT TO FORMULATE AS
QUANTIFIABLE MEASURES THAN IN OTHER SECTORS. MUCH DISCUSSION ENSUED ON
THE VALIDITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE INDICATORS. THOUGH THE OTHER
INDICATORS WERE ADEQUATELY DEFENDED, THE FIRST CONCERNING PERCENT OF
CITIZENS BENEFITING FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS DID NOT CLEARLY SAY
WHAT THE BASELINE WAS AND WHAT WE WERE GOING TO MEASURE. IN THE SIDE
MEETING INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES FROM G/DG, SD/DG, PPC/DG, PPC/CDIE,
DP, WA AND THE MISSION, DISCUSSIONS LED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FIRST
AND FOURTH INDICATORS SHOULD BE DISCARDED AND THAT A NEW INDICATOR WOULD
REPLACE THEM.

THE NEW INDICATOR WILL BE BASED ON A PERIODIC CUSTOMER SURVEY IN THE
AREAS USAID WILL BE WORKING, AND WOULD MEASURE SATISFACTION
WITH/CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE PROVISION.

SO 3: MISSION PRESENTED TARGETS AND INDICATORS AND WALKED US THROUGH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE INDICATORS AND SHOWED THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BUDGET
IN RELATION TO THE DIFFERENT KIRS. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ALL
ATTENDEES AGREED WITH THE TARGETS.

THE ISSUE OF TRANSITION FROM THE OLD PROGRAM TO THE NEW ENTAILED A LONG
DISCUSSION ON WHETHER WE WERE GOING TO LOSE SOMETHING IN THE TRANSITION.
THE MISSION REPLIED AND SHOWED EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS IN PROCESS OF DOING
A TRANSITION PLAN, BUT YES, WE MIGHT LOSE SOMETHING DUE TO LACK OF
SUFFICIENT RESOURCES THIS YEAR. WHETHER OR NOT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES ARE
CONTINUED IS NOT A STRATEGIC ISSUE EXCEPT THAT LETTING IMPORTANT
ACTIVITIES END TOO SOON MAY IMPACT ON RESULTS.

IN THE END THAT IS THE MISSION\'S CALL. USAID/W EXPECTS THAT THE VIRTUAL
TEAMS WILL BE CONSULTED DURING THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSITION PLAN.

THE FINAL OVERARCHING ISSUE CONCERNED WHETHER \"NEED\" FIGURED INTO THE
CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF PARTNERS, ACTIVITIES AND ZONES FOR
INTERVENTION. THE STRATEGY APPEARED TO INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST POORER COMMUNITIES. THIS WAS RESOLVED WHEN THE MISSION AGREED TO
WORK CLOSELY WITH \"NEEDY\" AREAS TO DEVELOP PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN
THE USAID PROGRAM.

IV\. SO 1 AND SO 2 COMMON ISSUES:

A. DECISIONS:

1\. ALL AGREED THAT SO 1 AND SO 2 MEET THE TESTS FROM THE ADS FOR
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SOS, I.E. THEY ARE A) IMPLEMENTED IN AN INTEGRATED
MANNER, B) ACHIEVABLE BY A COMMON SET OF INTERMEDIATE RESULTS AND CAUSAL
LINKAGES REPRESENTED IN THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK, AND C) THE COMPONENT
RESULTS ARE INSEPARABLE AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

2\. THE CRITICAL CONCERN FOR THESE TWO SOS, BUT ALSO FOR THE ENTIRE
STRATEGY WAS THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER RESULTS THROUGH SYNERGY,
THE SYNERGY MUST BE MANAGED. THE MISSION WILL USE A SYNERGY GROUP WITH
PARTICIPANTS FROM EACH SO AND A FULLY STAFFED MONITORING AND EVALUATION
UNIT TO ASSURE THAT THE HIGH LEVEL OF SYNERGY REQUIRED BY THESE TWO
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SOS AND THROUGHOUT THE STRATEGY IS ATTAINED.

3\. TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT ADEQUATE TRACKING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS MUST EXIST IN THE STRATEGY, THE MISSION HAS AGREED
TO TRACK RESULTS BY ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, WHICH EXIST FOR BOTH SO 1
(AT THE KIR LEVEL) AND SO 2 (AT THE SO LEVEL).

B. DISCUSSION:

MANY SIDE MEETINGS AS WELL AS THE FORMAL SESSIONS RAISED SEVERAL ISSUES
CONCERNING SO 1 AND SO 2. THE EXCELLENT COLLABORATION OF ALL CONCERNED
LED TO THE RESOLUTION OF ALL THE ISSUES WITH THE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON
DECISIONS ABOVE.

V. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: PRIVATE SECTOR.

A. DECISIONS:

1\. USAID/W ENDORSED USAID/SENEGAL\'S SO 1: \"SUSTAINABLE INCREASE OF
PRIVATE SECTOR INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED SECTORS.\"

2\. MISSION WILL NOT DIRECTLY SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, BUT THE
NRM ASPECTS OF SO 1 AND SO 2 WILL INDIRECTLY RESULT IN INCREASED
PRODUCTIVITY.

B. DISCUSSION

WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE OVERARCHING AND COMMON ISSUES WITH SO 2, ALL
AGREED THAT THIS SO WAS CRITICAL TO SENEGAL\'S DEVELOPMENT. THE EMPHASIS
ON GENDER AND SUSTAINABILITY WERE BOTH CITED AS CRUCIAL ASPECTS OF THE
SUCCESS OF THIS SO.

THE USE OF NPA WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY AND NOT RULED OUT AS A TOOL IN
ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE USING BUDGET RESOURCES WHICH ARE OR BECOME
AVAILABLE TO THE MISSION.

A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH
THE MISSION WAS PLANNING ON UNDERTAKING, MADE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT
DIRECTLY PROMOTING AG PRODUCTION EASIER TO ACCEPT BY TECHNICAL OFFICERS
DEALING WITH FOOD SECURITY.

VI\. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: DECENTRALIZATION

A. DECISION:

1\. USAID/W ENDORSED THIS SO: MORE EFFECTIVE, DEMOCRATIC, AND
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF SERVICES AND RESOURCES IN TARGETED
AREAS.

2\. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERNS RAISED THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST PLAY IN DECENTRALIZATION AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE
THE MISSION WILL HAVE IN INDUCING GOS TO FULFILL ITS ROLE. THE MISSION
AFFIRMED IT WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE REQUIRED POLITICAL
WILL AND TO ENSURE THAT THE GOS CENTRAL LEVEL WILL TAKE ALL ACTIONS
REQUIRED TO KEEP DECENTRALIZATION ON TRACK.

3\. MISSION EXPLAINED IN ADDENDUM NO.3 WHY IT DOES NOT ANTICIPATE
WORKING ON ELECTIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. THE MISSION WILL DEVELOP TWO
NEW INTERMEDIATE RESULTS THAT RELATE TO SUPPORT FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND
LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK DURING RESULTS PACKAGE
PREPARATION IN SENEGAL. G/DG AND AFR/SD/DG SUPPORT WILL BE USED IN
FRAMING THE NEW IRS.

B. DISCUSSION:

EFFORTS TO PUSH FOR DECENTRALIZATION AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL
ENGENDERED MUCH DISCUSSION AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF BOTH THE
COMPLEXITY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH DECENTRALIZATION IN
SENEGAL. ALL AGREED THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUCH EFFORT AND THAT THE
MISSION WAS WELL AWARE OF THE RISK IT WAS TAKING AND THE EFFORT
REQUIRED. IN THE END ATTENDEES REACHED CONSENSUS THAT THIS WAS AN
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE. HOWEVER, OWING TO THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUES
SURROUNDING DECENTRALIZATION, USAID/W ENCOURAGES THE MISSION TO SEEK OUT
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION. IN ANY
EVENT, MISSION SHOULD SEEK TO COORDINATE EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF
DECENTRALIZATION WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK.

HOW MUCH USAID COULD ACCOMPLISH IN THIS NEW SECTOR WAS ALSO QUESTIONED.
THOUGH THE MISSION HAD THE RIGHT TO BE AMBITIOUS, ALL AGREED THAT IT
WOULD BE BETTER TO BE A BIT CONSERVATIVE ON THE TARGETS AND EXCEED THEM
AS LONG AS THE RESULTS WERE WORTH THE INVESTMENT. THE NUMBER OF RURAL
COMMUNITIES (CRS) WHICH THE MISSION IS TARGETING FOR ASSISTANCE WAS
REDUCED FROM 80 TO 50 IN THE NEW SO 2 INDICATOR PRESENTED ABOVE (SEE
OVERARCHING ISSUES). THE D/G EXPERTS IN ATTENDANCE AGREED THAT SUCH A
TARGET WAS CERTAINLY WORTH THE FUNDING LEVELS REQUESTED.

SEVERAL SIDE MEETINGS WERE REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH THIS BRAND NEW SECTOR FOR USAID/SENEGAL. BUT ALL AGREED THAT USAID
MUST BE A PLAYER AND IN FACT A LEADER IN DECENTRALIZATION IN SENEGAL IF
IT IS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO SUCCEED.

VII\. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

A. DECISIONS:

1\. USAID/W ENDORSED USAID/SENEGAL\'S SO 3: INCREASED AND SUSTAINABLE
USE OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (CHILD SURVIVAL, MATERNAL HEALTH, FAMILY
PLANNING, AND STI/AIDS) SERVICES IN THE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALIZATION IN
TARGETED AREAS.

2\. THE MISSION PRODUCED ADDENDUM NO. 5 TO THE CSP WHICH IDENTIFIES THE
ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY AND TECHNICAL AGENDA, THE LINKAGES TO
THE LOCAL DISTRICT LEVEL APPROACHES AND HOW THESE ELEMENTS FIT TOGETHER
TO ACHIEVE THE TARGETS.

3\. THE MISSION REAFFIRMED THEIR DECISION TO HAVE FOUR TECHNICAL
PROFESSIONALS ON THE SO3 TEAM AND POSSIBLY A TAACS ADVISOR AS WELL.

B. DISCUSSION:

MANY ISSUES WERE RESOLVED SIMPLY THROUGH THE IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING
WHICH WAS ACHIEVED DURING THE PROGRAM WEEK. ONE QUESTION WHICH REQUIRED
FURTHER EXPLANATION CONCERNED THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE LOCAL DEMAND
DRIVEN APPROACH AND THE MISSION\'S NATIONAL POLICY AND TECHNICAL AGENDA.
ALL FINALLY AGREED THAT AS THE STRATEGY IS IMPLEMENTED AND
DECENTRALIZATION PROCEEDS, A MYRIAD OF ISSUES WILL ARISE. IT WOULD BE
UNFAIR TO ASK THE MISSION TO ADDRESS ALL ISSUES NOW WHICH MIGHT ARISE
DURING IMPLEMENTATION. HOWEVER, THE DECISION TO PRODUCE ADDENDUM NO. 5
RESOLVED THE ISSUE SATISFACTORILY.

SOME QUESTIONED WHETHER THE STRATEGY ENCOURAGED A LEARNING APPROACH. IF
LOCAL GRANT RECIPIENTS WILL BE ASSESSED AFTER ONLY ONE YEAR AND A
DECISION MADE WHETHER TO CONTINUE OR TO CUT OFF FUNDING, THE PERIOD OF
TIME SEEMED TOO SHORT. THE MISSION EXPLAINED THAT IT IS NOT GOING TO BE
UNREASONABLY DEMANDING REGARDING LOCAL LEVEL RESULTS, I.E. THE MISSION
WOULD NOT CUT PEOPLE OFF AFTER THE FIRST YEAR UNLESS IT WAS EVIDENT THAT
NOTHING COULD BE ACHIEVED. THIS RESOLVED THE ISSUE.

NOTE: THE MISSION WAS COMMENDED FOR DEVELOPING AN APPROACH TO MONITORING
DECENTRALIZATION\'S EFFECT ON DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES WHICH SHOULD
BE A MODEL FOR ALL OF AFRICA.

VIII\. BUDGET

A. DECISIONS.

1\. THE BUREAU APPROVED THE REQUESTED BUDGET OF APPROXIMATELY \$23.4
MILLION PER YEAR. THE MISSION WAS ADVISED TO EXPECT DIFFERENT LEVELS
DEPENDING ON DIRECTED FUNDS. ON THE GENERAL BUDGET, DP FOUND THAT EG/AGR
(\$8.2M) AND ESPECIALLY D/G (\$3.0M) AMOUNTS REQUESTED WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO GET, NRM (\$3.6) SEEMED REASONABLE, AND ADVISED THE MISSION
TO BE PREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDING ITS EFFORTS IN THE PHN
AREA (\$8.6 REQUESTED) OR POSSIBLY ADJUSTING TO A LOWER OVERALL RESOURCE
LEVEL. I.E. LESSER PHN RESOURCES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY TRANSLATE INTO
MORE EG OR DG FUNDS. THE MISSION ARGUED THAT MORE PHN FUNDING WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO ABSORB, BUT DID AGREE TO TRY TO FIND WAYS OF USING PHN
FUNDS FOR SOME OF THE HEALTH RELATED INTERVENTIONS IN SO1 AND SO2
ACTIVITIES, E.G. POLICY REFORM, PRIVATE LENDING FOR PRIVATE HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS, ETC.

2\. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ADDITIONAL FUNDING COULD BE OBTAINED FOR
AIDS IN FY1998 WAS DISCUSSED. SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES WERE MENTIONED
INCLUDING FALLOUT FUNDS, CANVASSING OTHER MISSIONS FOR SWAPS, AND/OR
BORROWING FROM WHAT WE HAVE AVAILABLE FOR THE UN THIS YEAR.
UNFORTUNATELY, NO FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM COULD BE FOUND. DP
PROMISED TO DO ITS BEST.

3\. THE MISSION RAISED THE ISSUE THAT O.E. LEVELS WOULD CAUSE REAL
PROBLEMS IN OVERSEEING THIS CSP IF THERE IS NO RELIEF BY 2002. DP SAID
IT SAW NO RELIEF IN SIGHT.

THE MISSION SAID IT WOULD LOOK INTO ADDITIONAL WAYS,

IN CONSULTATION WITH GC, OF STRUCTURING THEIR ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE OE
BY MAXIMIZING THE USE OF PROGRAM FUNDS FOR PROGRAM/PROJECT REQUIREMENTS.

IX\. STAFFING.

A. DECISION: USAID/W AGREED THAT USAID/SENEGAL WOULD STRAIGHT LINE STAFF
NOT COUNTING THE REGIONAL STAFF, WITH THE ONLY ISSUE BEING WHETHER A
STRAIGHT LINE OE BUDGET WOULD ALLOW THIS.

X. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS.

USAID/SENEGAL\'S COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACT FOR
1998-2006 IS APPROVED BY THE A-AA/AFR.

THE MISSION AGREED TO CONSOLIDATE THE CSP PART OF THE MANAGEMENT
CONTRACT BY INTEGRATING THE ADDENDUMS INTO IT AND MAKING ANY OTHER
CHANGES NEEDED SO THAT REFERENCES TO MODIFIED SECTIONS WERE CONSISTENT.
THE MISSION AGREED TO PROVIDE THE CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE PLAN NLT
JUNE 15, 1998.

SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING, REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL
NOTIFICATIONS, AND LEGAL CLEARANCE, STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AGREEMENTS FOR
ALL THREE SOS MAY BE ENTERED INTO BY USAID/SENEGAL WITH THE GOVERNMENT
OF SENEGAL. YY

GC/AFR:JPOWER(DRAFT)

Y

**ANNEX G: LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY, FINANCE AND PLANNING IN
SUPPORT OF USAID/SENEGAL\'S CSP**

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="6.080555555555556in"
height="8.997222222222222in"}

![](media/image4.jpeg){width="5.677777777777778in"
height="8.995138888888889in"}

[^1]:     ^?^ USAID/Senegal\'s Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for FY
    1998-2006 is submitted in response to Agency strategic planning
    requirements defined in ADS Section 201.5.10.

[^2]:     ^?^A 1998 USAID/Senegal paper, *Assessment of Tropical Forests
    and Biodiversity,* provides an in-depth discussion of NRM issues.

[^3]:     ^?^ Note: \"Strike-through\" text indicates Agency goals or
    objectives that are not included in USAID/Senegal\'s CSP.

[^4]:     ^?^Transferred authorities include: land tenure, environment
    and natural resources; health, population, and social affairs; youth
    and sports; culture; urban planning and housing; education; land
    development; and development planning.

[^5]:     ^?^ Oyinlola, Adeyinka, 1996. *Technical Assistance to
    Senegal\'s 1996 Regional, Municipal, and Local Elections.*
    International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C.
    (p.23).

[^6]: ^1^ Historical studies, contemporary analyses, and key information
    sources for this SO3 section are found in *Merritt et al. Population
    and Health in Senegal: USAID Retrospectives and Appraisals*,
    USAID/Senegal, 1997.

[^7]: ^2^ GOS, PDIS, 1997. World Bank Appraisal Mission, 1996.

[^8]: ^3^ See: Williamson & Higgins, *Population and Development
    Review*, June, 1997; and Mason, Lee, & Miller, *East-West Center
    Working Papers*, August, 1997. Rapid fertility declines during the
    1970\'s in Asia have been shown to be among the most important
    factors accounting for rapid economic growth since the 1980s. Shifts
    in age structure led by the 1980s to an unprecedented proportion of
    the population in the working-age group, facilitating much higher
    rates of household savings and investment. All these countries had
    very active, successful family planning and primary health programs,
    and all achieved transitions to low mortality and low fertility
    within the span of a single generation.

[^9]: ^4^ Other assumptions at more macro levels are discussed earlier
    in the CSP. SO3 implications include: (1) that household *purchasing
    power remains stable* or improves, enabling ability to pay for
    health services; (2) that the GOS, with donor assistance, will be
    able to *mitigate the effects of natural disasters* affecting the
    ability and willingness of populations to pay for health services;
    and (3) *Socio-political stability* must be maintained. Chronic
    social unrest related to domestic issues, such as strikes and
    demonstrations, as well as more international issues such as border
    closings, often reduce health service delivery. This also includes
    the powerful labor unions of health professionals who blocked
    reporting on performance during 6 months of 1997. The GOS and the
    health unions must minimize disputes to make further progress in
    service delivery.

[^10]: ^5^? The hospital sector share diminished from 60% of operating
    budget allocations to 40% between 1989 and 1995. Aided by donors\'
    focus on primary health care activities, the first tier system
    received a more equitable allocation, increasing to 32% of total
    allocations by 1995. The Government also has improved the ratio of
    wage to non-wage or operating expenditures; wages declined from
    67.6% of total recurrent expenditures in 1993 to 53% in 1996 while
    operating expenditures increased from 30% to 45%.

[^11]: ^6^ Studies by HYGEA, July 1997, and Tulane University, REDSO
    Regional Project report, Dec 1997.

[^12]:     ^?^ Armor, Thomas, 1997. *Organizational and Staffing Plans
    for USAID/Senegal.* Management Sciences International for
    USAID/Senegal.

[^13]:     ^?^These figures are respectively from (a) *Femmes
    Sénégalaises a l\'Horizon 2015. Etude Prospective*. GOS:Ministere de
    la Femme, de l\'Enfant et de la Famille (MFEF) and the Population
    Council, 1993,and (b) statistics gathered from MFEF.

[^14]:     ^?^Source: *Enquête sur les Priorites.* GOS Ministere de
    l\'Economie, des Finances et du Plan/Direction de la Prevision et de
    la Statistique, 1992. (pp.14-15).

[^15]:     ^?^*Private Sector Survey, Part I: Formal Sector Report, The
    Manual for Action in the Private Sector (MAPS) Study,* (Senegal:
    1990). Survey conducted by Cabinet Aziz Dieye/Coopers and Lybrand.
    Labat-Anderson Incorporated. (pp.10-11).

[^16]:     ^?^*Private Sector Survey, Part II: The Informal Sector, The
    Manual for Action in the Private Sector (MAPS) Study,* (Senegal:
    1990). Survey conducted by Cabinet Aziz Dieye/Coopers and Lybrand.
    Labat-Anderson Incorporated. (p.9).

[^17]:     ^?^*Technical Evaluation of the Kaolack Agricultural
    Enterprise Development Project*, SENAGROSOL-USAID/Senegal, 1995.
    (p.2-3).

[^18]:     ^?^El Hadj Amadou Wone, *Etude sur le Commerce Sous-Regional
    des Produits Horticoles en Afrique de l\'Ouest: Cas du Senegal,* Abt
    Associates, Bethesda, MD, 1996.

[^19]:     ^?^Madiodio Niasse, *Réforme Foncière et Equite: La Loi sur
    le Domaine National à l\'Epreuve dans les Périmètres Irrigués de la
    Vallée du Fleuve Sénégal.* Paper presented at the conference on
    *Réformes Foncieres et Décentralisation au Sahel* held in
    N\'Djamena. July 1997. (p.9).

[^20]:     ^?^*Plan d\'Action Foncier,* GOS: Ministere de
    l\'Agriculture/Unite de Politique Agricole, Dakar, 1996.

[^21]:     ^?^M. Niasse, op. cit.

[^22]: ^?^Sheldon Gellar, *Le Climat Politique et la Volonte de Reforme
    Politique et Economique au Senegal: Rapport Final.* Version
    Francaise. USAID/Senegal, 1997. (p.84).