**PUBLIC NOTICE**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**445 12^th^ Street, SW**

**Washington, DC 20554**

#######  {#section .unnumbered}

####### DA 04-3198 {#da-04-3198 .unnumbered}

**November 15, 2004**

###### MULTIPLE ADDRESS SYSTEMS SPECTRUM AUCTION {#multiple-address-systems-spectrum-auction .unnumbered}

##### SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 26, 2005 {#scheduled-for-april-26-2005 .unnumbered}

**COMMENT SOUGHT**

**ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND**

###### OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURES {#other-auction-procedures .unnumbered}

**Report No. AUC-04‑59-A (Auction No. 59)**

By this *Public Notice*, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
("Bureau") announces the auction of 4,226 Multiple Address Systems
("MAS") licenses in the Fixed Microwave Services from the 928/959 and
932/941 MHz bands to commence on April 26, 2005 (Auction No. 59). [^1]
In Auction No. 59 licenses will be offered in each of the 176 geographic
areas known as Economic Areas (EAs), where available. [^2] These
geographic areas encompass the United States, Guam and the Northern
Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and the Gulf of Mexico. Due to the large number of
licenses in Auction No. 59, the complete list of licenses available for
this auction will be provided in electronic format only, available as
"Attachment A" to this Public Notice at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/.

The following table contains the MAS block/frequency bands
cross-reference list for Auction No. 59:

**\*** The individual frequencies listed in this chart are the *center*
frequencies of each frequency pair in the block to be auctioned. *See*
47 C.F.R. §§ 101.147(b)(3), (4). Each block consists of two channels of
equal bandwidth. For example, in Block AA, 928.85625 and 959.85625 are
the *center* frequencies and each frequency pair is comprised of two
12.5 kHz wide channels. Therefore, the two channels in Block AA are
928.8500 -- 928.8625 MHz and 959.8500 -- 959.8625 MHz.

\*\* This represents the total bandwidth for the block, which is the
combination of each channel in the pair.

*Note: For Auction No. 59, licenses are not available in every block
listed in the above table in every market. The complete list of licenses
available for Auction No. 59 will be provided in electronic format only,
available as "Attachment A" to this Public Notice at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/.*

The Communications Act requires the Commission to "ensure that, in the
scheduling of any competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate
period is allowed . . . before issuance of bidding rules, to permit
notice and comment on proposed auction procedures . . . ."[^3]
Consistent with the provisions of the Communications Act and to ensure
that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with
the specific rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an
auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing
delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific
procedures prior to the start of each auction. [^4] We therefore seek
comment on the following issues relating to Auction No. 59.

# Auction Structure

## Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design 

We propose to award all licenses included in Auction No. 59 in a
simultaneous multiple-round auction. As described further below, this
methodology offers every license for bid at the same time with
successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. We seek
comment on this proposal.

## Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility 

The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area and the value of similar spectrum.[^5] As described further below,
the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to
establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to
the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous or
insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from
which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction.[^6] With
these guidelines in mind for Auction No. 59, we propose to calculate
upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using the following
formula:

> \$0.00000375 \* kHz \* License Area Population with a minimum of
> \$1,000 per license. [^7]

Accordingly, in Attachment A we list all licenses included in Auction
No. 59 and the proposed upfront payment for each license. Attachment A
is available in electronic format with this public notice at
<http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/>. We seek comment on this
proposal.

We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a
bidder will determine the maximum number of bidding units on which a
bidder may place bids. This limit is a bidder's initial eligibility.
Each license is assigned a specific number of bidding units equal to the
upfront payment listed in Attachment A, on a bidding unit per dollar
basis. (An electronic copy of Attachment A is available with this public
notice at <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/>.) This number does not
change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is
not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on
any combination of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units
associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility.
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating
its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the **maximum**
number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in
any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number of
bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

## Activity Rules 

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage
of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction
rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not
satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the
next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if any remain).

We propose to divide the auction into two stages, each characterized by
an increased activity requirement. The auction will start in Stage One.
We propose that the auction generally will advance from Stage One to
Stage Two when the auction activity level, as measured by the percentage
of bidding units receiving new high bids, is approximately twenty
percent or below for three consecutive rounds of bidding. However, we
further propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages
unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this
discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder
activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there are
new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in
revenue. [^8] We seek comment on these proposals.

For Auction No. 59, we propose the following activity requirements:

**Stage One:** In each round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder
desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on
licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current bidding
eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will
result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next
round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage
One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).

**Stage Two:** In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).

We seek comment on these proposals. Commenters that believe these
activity rules should be modified should explain their reasoning and
comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are
advised to support their claims with analyses and suggested alternative
activity rules.

## Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current bidding
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity rule
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round. **Note: Once a proactive waiver is
submitted, that waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not
yet closed.**

The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient
activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available)
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will
automatically apply a waiver (known as an "automatic waiver") at the end
of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below the
minimum required unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers
available; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum
requirements. **Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not
satisfy the required activity level, its current eligibility will be
permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the auction.**

A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder
must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the
bidding period by using the "reduce eligibility" function in the bidding
system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced to
bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described
above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted
to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep
the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive
waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding system)
during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are submitted,
the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be
preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no
new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in Auction No. 59 be provided with three
activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion during
the course of the auction as set forth above. We seek comment on this
proposal.

## Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

For Auction No. 59, we propose that, by public notice or by announcement
during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction
in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an
auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, or administrative or
weather necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and
efficient conduct of competitive bidding.[^9] In such cases, the Bureau,
in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting from
the beginning of the current round, resume the auction starting from
some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network
interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. We
emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely within the
discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute
for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule
waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

# Bidding Procedures

## Round Structure

The Commission will conduct Auction No. 59 over the Internet.
Alternatively, telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll free
telephone number through which telephonic bidding may be accessed will
be announced in a later public notice. The FCC Wide Area Network will no
longer be available as a contingency plan.

The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be
released at least one week before the start of the auction, and will be
included in the registration mailings. The simultaneous multiple-round
format will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the
release of round results. Details regarding the location and format of
round results will be included in the same public notice.

The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to
foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders'
need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The
Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding
rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending
upon the bidding activity level and other factors. We seek comment on
this proposal.

## Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

The Communications Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods
for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum opening bid
when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the Commission
determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the
public interest.[^10] Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has
directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid
and/or reserve price prior to the start of each auction.[^11]

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an
item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is
the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which no
bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the competitive
bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the discretion to lower
the minimum opening bid amount later in the auction. It is also possible
for the minimum opening bid and the reserve price to be the same amount.

In light of the Communications Act's requirements, the Bureau proposes
to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 59. The Bureau
believes a minimum opening bid, which has been used in other auctions,
is an effective bidding tool.[^12]

Specifically, for Auction No. 59, the Commission proposes the following
license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening bids:

> \$0.00000375 \* kHz \* License Area Population with a minimum of
> \$1,000 per license. [^13]

The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in Auction
No. 59 is set forth in Attachment A of this Public Notice. (An
electronic copy is available with this public notice at
<http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/>.) We seek comment on this
proposal.

If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will result in
substantial numbers of "unwon" licenses, or are not reasonable amounts,
or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why
this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses
and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas.
In establishing the minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment
on such factors as the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of
incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size
of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with other
spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have
an impact on valuation of these MAS licenses. We also seek comment on
whether, consistent with the Communications Act, the public interest
would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

## Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments 

In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a given
license in any of nine different amounts.[^14] The FCC Automated Auction
System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. In the rounds after a bid is placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing high bid
plus the defined increment.

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC Automated
Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for that license
for the following round, as described below. The difference between the
minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will
define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid
plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using multiple
bid increments (*i.e.*, the second bid amount equals the standing high
bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid amount equals the
standing high bid plus three times the bid increment, etc.).

For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes to use a 10 percent bid
increment. This means that the minimum acceptable bid for a license will
be approximately 10 percent greater than the previous standing high bid
received on the license. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be
calculated by multiplying the standing high bid times one plus the
increment percentage -- *i.e*., (standing high bid) \* (1.10). We will
round the result using our standard rounding procedures for minimum
acceptable bid calculations: results above \$10,000 are rounded to the
nearest \$1,000; results below \$10,000 but above \$1,000 are rounded to
the nearest \$100; and results below \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest
\$10.

As stated above, until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference
between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage
increment, rounded as described above, and the minimum opening bid. That
is, I = (minimum opening bid)(1 + N){rounded}- (minimum opening bid).
Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be
approximately ten percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the
second, twenty percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.

In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has been
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second highest bid
received for the license. [^15] The additional bid amounts are
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times one
plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second highest
bid.

The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bids
and bid increments if it determines that circumstances so dictate. The
Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. We
seek comment on these proposals.

## High Bids

At the end of a bidding round, a high bid for each license will be
determined based on the highest gross bid amount received for the
license. In the event of identical high bids on a license in a given
round (*i.e*., tied bids), we propose to use a random number generator
to select a single high bid from among the tied bids. If the auction
were to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the
winning bidder would be the one that placed the selected high bid.
However, the remaining bidders, as well as the high bidder, can submit
higher bids in subsequent rounds. If any bids are received on the
license in a subsequent round, the high bid again will be determined by
the highest gross bid amount received for the license. We seek comment
on this proposal.

A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid on the
same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from a
previous round is sometimes referred to as a "standing high bid."
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids count towards bidding
activity.[^16]

## Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

For Auction No. 59, we propose the following bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder
has the option of removing any bid placed in that round. By removing
selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may effectively "unsubmit"
any bid placed within that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the
same round is not subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes,
a bidder may no longer remove a bid.

A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous rounds
using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder that
withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the
bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules.[^17] We seek
comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission explained that
allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses
and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes
available during the course of an auction.[^18] The Commission noted,
however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for
improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the
auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding
abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively
exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which
bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a
particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the
Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.[^19]

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in Auction No.
59 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more than two rounds during
the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more
than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of
withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The two rounds in which
withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's discretion; withdrawals
otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission's rules. There is no
limit on the number of standing high bids that may be withdrawn in
either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized. Withdrawals will
remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the
Commission's rules. We seek comment on this proposal.

## Stopping Rule

The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during
multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within a
reasonable time.[^20] For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes to employ
a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule
means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding
closes simultaneously on all licenses.

Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the first round
in which no new bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are received.
Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will remain open
on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to exercise any of
the following options during Auction No. 59:

1\. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The
modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after
the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a
new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would not
keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.

2\. Keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are
submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the
effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver.
The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with
insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a
remaining activity rule waiver.

3\. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds ("special stopping rule"). If the Bureau invokes this
special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.

The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly,
there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the
auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. Before
exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to increase
the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number of
bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid
increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still a
high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

# Responses to this Public Notice

Comments are due on or before December 2, 2004, and reply comments are
due on or before December 9, 2004. Because of the disruption of regular
mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the Bureau requires that
all comments and reply comments be filed electronically. Comments and
reply comments, and copies of material filed with the Commission
pertaining to Auction No. 59, must be sent by electronic mail to the
following address: [auction59@fcc.gov]{.underline}.[^21] The electronic
mail containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or
caption referring to Auction No. 59 Comments and the name of the
commenting party. The Bureau requests that parties format any
attachments to electronic mail as Adobe^®^ Acrobat^®^ (pdf) or
Microsoft^®^ Word documents. Copies of comments and reply comments will
be available for public inspection during regular business hours in the
FCC Reference Information Center, Room CY-B402, 445 12th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20554 and will also be posted on the Auction 59 Home Page
at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/.

This proceeding has been designated as a "permit‑but‑disclose"
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's *ex parte* rules.[^22]
Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance of
the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects discussed.
More than a one or two sentence description of the views and arguments
presented is generally required.[^23] Other rules pertaining to oral and
written *ex parte* presentations in permit-but-disclose proceedings are
set forth in Section 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.[^24]

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the Auctions
and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, as
listed below:

For legal questions: Howard Davenport, Auctions and Spectrum Access
Division, (202) 418-0660

For general auction questions: Roy Knowles (717) 338-2888

Barbara Sibert (717) 338-2888

For service rule questions, contact the Public Safety and Critical
Infrastructure Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, as follows:
John Evanoff, (202) 418-0680; or Joan Howery, (717) 338-2646

**- FCC -**

[^1]: MAS licenses are available for the terrestrial point-to-multipoint
    and point-to-point fixed and mobile transmissions of a licensee's
    products or services, excluding video entertainment material, to a
    licensee's customer or for its own internal communications; and will
    authorize service in geographic areas based on Economic Areas.

[^2]: *See* Amendment of the Commission's Rules regarding Multiple
    Address Systems, WT Docket 97-81, *Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    11,956, 11,982-83 ¶ 68 (2000); *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 16
    FCC Rcd 12,181, 12,192-93 ¶ 28 (2001). Previously, in the Multiple
    Address Systems Spectrum Auction (Auction No. 42), 5,104 MAS
    licenses were offered and thirteen bidders won 878 licenses. *See*
    "Multiple Address Systems Spectrum Auction Closes," *Public Notice*,
    16 FCC Rcd 21011 (2001).

[^3]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (3) (F).

[^4]: Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive
    Bidding Proceeding, *Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice
    of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5697-5698 ¶ 16 (1997)
    ("*Part 1 Order*"); *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 0.131. *See* Amendment of
    Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive Bidding Procedures,
    Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal
    Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, *Third Report and Order and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 448 ¶
    124-125 (1997) ("*Part 1 Third Report and Order*") directing the
    Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms related to day-to-day
    auction conduct including, for example, the structure of bidding
    rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids or reserve
    prices, minimum acceptable bids, initial maximum eligibility for
    each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of the auction,
    activity rule waivers, criteria for determining reductions in
    eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid removal,
    stopping rules, and information relating to auction delay,
    suspension or cancellation.)

[^5]: *Part 1 Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98 ¶ 16. *See also Part 1 Third
    Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 425 ¶ 86; Implementation of Section
    309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, *Second Report
    and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2378-79 ¶¶ 171-175 (1994) ("*Competitive
    Bidding Second Report and Order*").

[^6]: *Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order,* 9 FCC Rcd 2348,
    2378-79 ¶¶ 171-176.

[^7]: All population figures are from the 2000 U.S. Census, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. *See* Census 2000
    Summary File 1 (SF1) and July 3, 2001, News Releases covering the
    U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and
    American Samoa. Results are rounded using our standard rounding
    procedure: results above \$10,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$1,000; results below \$10,000 but above \$1,000 are rounded to the
    nearest \$100; and results below \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$10.

[^8]: For example, when monitoring activity for determining when to
    change stages, we may consider the percentage of bidding units of
    the licenses receiving new high bids, excluding any FCC-held
    licenses.

[^9]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).

[^10]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (4F). The Commission's authority to establish
    a reserve price or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2104(c) and (d).

[^11]: *Part 1 Third Report and Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 454-55 ¶ 141.

[^12]: *See*, *e.g.*, "Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum
    Opening Bids or Reserve Prices," *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 16354 (1997);
    "Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses, Auction Notice
    and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting of Economic Area
    (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and Nationwide Licenses,
    Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and Other
    Procedural Issues," *Public Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998);
    "Auction of Licenses in the Multichannel Video Distribution and Data
    Service rescheduled for January 14, 2004, Notice and Filing
    Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments and Other
    Auction Procedures," *Public Notice,* 18 FCC Rcd 17553 (2003).

[^13]: *See* note 7, *supra*.

[^14]: Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the
    particular license. *See* Section I.B. ("Upfront Payments and
    Bidding Eligibility"), *supra*.

[^15]: *See* Section II.E. "Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid
    Removal," *infra*.

[^16]: *See* Section I.C. "Activity Rules," *supra*.

[^17]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g), 1.2109.

[^18]: *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 459-60 ¶ 150.

[^19]: *Id.*

[^20]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).

[^21]: Comments and reply comments in response to this Public Notice may
    not be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing
    System, which is used for the Commission's docketed rule making
    proceedings.

[^22]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200(a), 1.1206.

[^23]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b).

[^24]: *Id*.