# Session No. 37

### Course Title: Disaster Response Operations and Management

### 

### Session Title: Communications and Coordination

## Time: 50 minutes

**Objectives:**

37.1 Define communications and coordination, and explain who
participates in these vital functions.

37.2 Discuss the benefits of communication and coordination.

37.3 Identify the barriers that inhibit effective communication and
coordination.

37.4 Address how communication and coordination challenges can be
overcome to enhance response operations.

**Scope:**

**During this session, the professor helps students understand the
concepts of communications and coordination. After pointing out that
everyone involved in disaster response operations must communicate
effectively and strive for coordination, the professor acknowledges that
these functions are extremely difficult to implement in an effective
manner. The session includes a discussion about how barriers to
communications and coordination can be overcome. Students are given a
case study assignment before the class is concluded.**

**Session Requirements:**

1.  Instructor Reading:

> Aiken, Michael R., R. Dewar, J. Hage and G. Zeitz. 1975. *Coordinating
> Human Serivces*. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco.
>
> Auf Der Heide, Erik. 1989. "Inter-agency Communications." In *Disaster
> Response: Principles for Preparation and Coordination.*
> <http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/pdf/DisasterResponse.pdf.>
>
> Boyd, David. 2004. "Improving Public Safety Wireless Communications
> and Interoperability." Department of Homeland Security. 1 November.
> <http://www.safecomprogram.gov/statementofrequirements>.
>
> Coile, Russell C. 1997. "The Role of Amateur Radio in Providing
> Emergency Electronic Communication for Disaster Management." *Disaster
> Prevention and Management* 6 (3): 176-185.
>
> Denis, Helene. 1995. "Coordination in a Governmental Disaster
> Mega-organization." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
> Disasters* 13: 25-43.
>
> Dilling, Janet D. 1995. "Command vs. Coordination: Optimal Systems for
> EOC Management." ASPEP Journal 45-64.
>
> Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster
> Responses*. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado:
> Boulder, Colorado.
>
> Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. "Five Types of Strategies for Coordinating
> Disaster Responses. *ASPEP Journal*. 1-22.
>
> Drabek, Thomas E. and David A. McEntire. 2002. "Emergent Phenomena and
> Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the
> Research Literature." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
> Disasters* 20 (2): 197-224.
>
> Dwyer, Jim, and Kevin Flynn. 2005. *102 Minutes: The Untold Story of
> the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers.* Henry Holt: New York.
>
> Dwyer, Jim, Kevin Flynn and Ford Fessenden. 2002. "9/11 Explosed
> Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan." *New York Times*. July 7.
>
> General Accounting Office. 2004. "Key Cross-Agency Emergency
> Communications Effort Requires Stronger Collaboration." *Project
> SAFECOM*. United States General Accounting Office: Washington, D.C.
>
> Hall, Richard H., John P. Clark, P.C. Giorano, P.V. Johnson, and V.
> Roekel. 1977. "Patterns of Interorganizational Relationships"
> *Administrative Science Quarterly* 22: 457-74.
>
> Hightower, Henry C. and Michal Coutu. 1996. "Coordinating Emergency
> Management: A Canadian Example." Pp. 69-100 in Sylves, Richard T. and
>
> Hoffman, John. 1990. "Quick Language Translations For Emergency
> Communications." *9-1-1 Magazine* (July/August): 25-26.
>
> IAFC. 2004. "DHS Launches Office of Interoperability and
> Compatibility." International Association of Fire Chiefs. November 25.
> <http://www.iafc.org/news/article.asp?id=148.>
>
> Mahoney, Doug. 2004. "Panel: Interoperability About People More Than
> Technology*." Fire Chief*. *http://FireChief.com.*
>
> McEntire, David A. 2006. "Overcoming Typical Challenges." *Disaster
> Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience*. New
> York: Wiley.
>
> McEntire, David A. 2003. "The Community Dispatch Center: An Assessment
> of Neglected Component of Emergency Management." *Journal of Emergency
> Management* 1 (1): 41-61.
>
> McEntire, David A. 2002. "Coordinating Multi-Organizational Responses
> to Disaster: Lessons from the March 28, 2000, Fort Worth Tornado."
> *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 11(5): 369-379.
>
> McEntire, David A. 1998. "Towards a Theory of Coordination: Umbrella
> Organization and Disaster Relief in the 1997-98 Peruvian El Niño
> Disaster." *Quick Response Report No. 105*. Boulder, Co: Natural
> Hazards Research and Information Applications Center, University of
> Colorado.
>
> National Task Force on Interoperability. 2003. *Why Can't We Talk?
> Working Together to Bridge the Communication Gap to Save Lives*.
> February.
>
> Quarantelli, E. L. 1997. "Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management
> of Community Disasters." *Disasters* 21: 39-56.
>
> Scanlon, Joseph and Richard T. Sylves. 1990. "Conflict and
> Coordination in Responding to Aviation Disaster: The San Diego and
> Gander Experiences Compared." Pp. 109-129 in Sylves, Richard and
> William L. Waugh (eds.) *Cities and Disaster: North American Studies
> in Emergency Management*. Charles C. Thomas Publishers: Springfield,
> Il.
>
> Sullivan, Eileen. 2004. "State, Local Responders Want Guidance,
> Standards." *Federal Times*.
> <http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?s233115>.
>
> Tierney, Kathleen J. 1985. "Emergency Medical Preparedness and
> Response in Disasters: The Need for Interorganizational Coordination."
> *Public Administration Review* (Special Issue): 77-84.
>
> Toulmin, Llewellyn M, Charles J. Givans and Deborah L. Steel. 1989.
> "The Impact of Intergovernmental Distance on Disaster Communications."
> *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*. 7 (2):
> 116-132.
>
> Waugh, William L., Jr. 1993. "Coordination or Control: Organizational
> Design and the Emergency Management Function." *Disaster Prevention
> and Management* 2 (4): 17-31.
>
> William Waugh, Jr. (eds.) *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada:
> The Politics, Policy Making, Administration and Analysis of Emergency
> Management*. Charles C. Thomas Publisher: Springfield, Il.
>
> Wedel, Kenneth R. and Donald R. Baker. 1998. "After the Oklahoma City
> Bombing: A Case Study of the Resource Coordination Committee."
> *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 16 (3):
> 333-362.

1.  Student Readings:

> Auf Der Heide, Erik. 1989. "Inter-agency Communications." In *Disaster
> Response: Principles for Preparation and Coordination.*
> <http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/pdf/DisasterResponse.pdf.>
>
> Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. "Five Types of Strategies for Coordinating
> Disaster Responses. *ASPEP Journal*. 1-22.
>
> McEntire, David A. 2006. "Overcoming Typical Challenges." *Disaster
> Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience*. New
> York: Wiley.
>
> McEntire, David A. (2002). "Coordinating Multi-Organizational
> Responses to Disaster: Lessons from the March 28, 2000, Fort Worth
> Tornado." *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 11(5): 369-379.

2.  Handouts:

> Benefits of Coordination
>
> Case Study Assignment
>
> Reasons Why Communication and Coordination Are Problematic
>
> Factors That Facilitate Coordination
>
> Coordination Strategies

**Supplemental Considerations:**

1\. Journals such as *Fire Chief*, *9-1-1 Magazine*, and others
dedicated to first responders will have a number of articles that may be
useful for this discussion on communications and coordination.

2\. To bring communication difficulties to light for the students, the
professor may want to initiate a quick activity with the class. The
professor could privately relay to one student some fictitious facts
about a hypothetical disaster (such as *"The Fire Chief states that the
industrial complex is now fully engulfed and there is need for a third
alarm. He also recommends the presence of police for crowd and traffic
control. The nearby apartment buildings should be evacuated and the Red
Cross may be needed for sheltering*"). The professor should then have
this information communicated secretly to another student, who will
again share the statements to another in private. After at least five
iterations of this process, the professor should then ask the last
student to relay the information to the class. The professor may want to
compare the initial comments to the statements that are made by the last
student. After this has taken place, the professor may want the students
who participated in the activity to remark on the communication
difficulties they experienced and suggest what could be done differently
to improve the process in the future.

3\. The professor should reiterate repeatedly that coordination is a
major challenge in disasters, and a low degree of interaction with other
individuals and organizations may lead to injury, death, and
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in response operations.

4\. Some of the information presented in this session is technical.
Therefore, the professor may wish to discuss the nature of
communications technology with an expert in the field before the
session. The professor should be aware that this material may also
overlap logically with the session on the use of technology in emergency
response operations.

5\. The concept of "interoperable" communications has become extremely
important in the last few years. The professor may wish to review the
findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and discuss the communications
problems that existed between the New York Police Department and the
Fire Department of New York.

6\. There are a number of guest speakers that could be invited to
participate in this session on communications and coordination.
Possibilities include those working in dispatch, first responders, ham
radio operators, emergency managers or others that are involved in
emergency operations centers.

**Objective 37.1 Define communications and coordination, and explain who
participates in these vital functions.**

Present the following as a lecture.

I. **Communications** and **coordination** are two **common** and
**closely** **related** **activities** in all disaster response
operations. This brings up a **few important questions** about these
subjects:

> A. **What is communication and coordination?**
>
> B. **How are these functions related?**
>
> C. **Who participates in these activities?**

II\. There are probably **no widely accepted definitions** of
communication and coordination. However, we might assert that:

> A. **Communication may be defined as the process of relaying
> information through verbal, written and other symbolic forms** (e.g.,
> personal discussions, phone calls, pages, e-mails and faxes, teletype
> machines, text messaging, sign language, body language, etc.).
>
> 1\. In a disaster setting, **communication may have the purpose of
> understanding the impact of the event so that the needs of disaster
> victims can be met and vital functions can be performed quickly and
> effectively** in the crisis phase of emergency management.
>
> 2\. For instance, response **operations cannot take place unless**
> information has been relayed and received about the **location of the
> incident** and the **impact of the hazard** on individuals.
>
> B. **Drabek and McEntire** (2003) have reviewed the literature on
> coordination and **found a number of meanings** for this concept:
>
> 1\. Hall, Clark, Biordano, Johnson and Roekel (1977) define
> coordination as **"the extent to which organizations attempt to ensure
> that their activities take into account those of other
> organizations."**
>
> 2\. Warren, Rose and Bergunder (1984) assert that coordination
> involves **"a deliberate degree of adjustment to each other."**
>
> 3\. Dennis (1995) declares coordination "is **defined . . . in the
> broad sense of the integration of tasks reinforced by accepted
> behavioral norms."**
>
> 4\. Drabek and McEntire view coordination **"as the collaborative
> process through which \[individuals and/or\] multiple organizations
> interact to achieve common objectives"** (2003, 199).
>
> 5\. Summarizing such divergent views, Quarantelli notes **"The term
> coordination is neither self-explanatory nor a matter of consensus.
> Some groups view coordination . . . as informing other groups about
> what they will be doing. Others see coordination as the centralization
> of decision-making within a particular agency or among a few key
> officials, usually including themselves. Others again see
> coordination, correctly in our view, as mutually agreed upon
> cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks. Given such
> diverse views, even when there is formal pre-impact accord to
> coordinate in response, in the event of disaster recriminations often
> follow that one or both parties have failed to honor that agreement"**
> (1997, 48).

6.  In short, if communication helps those responding to disaster
    understand the **location of the incident** and the **impact of the
    hazard, coordination determines who will respond, what will be done
    and, and how this will take place.**

III\. As noted above, there is an **intricate link** between
**communication** and **coordination**.

> A. Auf der Heide asserts "In disasters, **communication \[is\] . . .
> often hard to separate from coordination . . ."** (1989, 5.1).
>
> B. **Communication is required if individuals and organizations are to
> be made aware of the need to coordinate, and the coordination of what
> people and groups are to accomplish and how this should be done
> involves communication.**
>
> C. In other words, if one entity cannot meet disaster demands alone,
> **they will need to relay this information to others**. In addition,
> **personnel and agencies will need to convey their thoughts about the
> best suited division of role assignments for goal attainment**.

IV\. Because of the nature of disasters, it is quite probable that
**everyone involved in disaster response operations may need to
communicate and coordinate** with at least some other individuals and
organizations. However,

> A. Communication and coordination will be very **common among first
> responders, dispatch, incident command, EOC personnel, neighboring
> communities, different levels of government** and, often unrecognized,
> among these entities and others in the **private** and **non-profit**
> **sectors**.

**Objective 37.2** **Discuss the benefits of communication and
coordination.**

Present the following as a class discussion.

I. Ask the class **"why are communication and coordination important and
advantageous in response operations?"**

II\. During the discussion, make sure the following points are covered
(provide Benefits of Coordination handout):

> A. **Identify and be made aware of needs, contingencies, goals,
> operations**, etc.
>
> B. Auf der Heide notes (1989, 80) **"the importance of communication
> is its ability to get people to work together on a common task or
> toward a common goal -- to coordinate."**
>
> C. Aiken, Dewar, Hage, and Zeitz (1975) declares that **"coordination
> ensures that the comprehensiveness of, compatibility among, and
> cooperation among elements are maximized."**
>
> D. Gillespie asserts that coordination **"is the cooperation of
> independent units for the purpose of eliminating fragmentation, gaps
> in service delivery, and unnecessary (as opposed to strategic)
> duplication of services"** (1991, 56).
>
> E. Granot affirms **"interorganizational cooperation is, in many
> societies, a widely held ideal shared by many emergency agencies"**
> (1997, 308).
>
> F. He also notes "few would doubt that in the complexity of emergency
> response, **cooperation and coordination among response agencies
> contributes to the reduction of losses and efficiency of rescue and
> recovery"** (Granot 1997, 308).
>
> G. Summarizing these points, McEntire, paraphrasing Auf der Heide,
> asserts **the lack of coordination may result in "an inability to
> determine priorities, misunderstandings among organizations, failure
> to fully utilize equipment and personnel, overly-taxed organizations,
> delays in service, omission of essential tasks, duplication of effort,
> safety problems, and counterproductive activity among other things"**
> (2003, 206).

I.  A **good example** is the exchange of information and harmonization
    of activity relates to **emergency medical personnel and
    hospitals**:

> 1\. **" . . . in order to muster their resources, hospitals need to
> have advanced warning that they will be receiving patients and timely
> estimates of the types, numbers, and severities of casualties to be
> expected. This information must come from those at the disaster scene.
> In addition, hospitals are at the mercy of those at the scene to see
> that casualties are equitably distributed, so that no one hospital
> receives an inordinate number"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.6).

**Objective 37.3 Identify the barriers that inhibit effective
communication and coordination.**

Present the following information as a discussion.

I. Ask the class **"why are communication and coordination difficult
during a disaster?"** During the discussion, be sure the following
points are addressed:

II\. **Communication** is often **difficult** during disasters **for a
number of reasons**.

> A. **Equipment and facilities** needed for communication may be
> **disabled** or **overloaded** (Auf der Heide 1989, 49-50).
>
> 1\. After the **terrorist attacks** on the World Trade Center, police
> and fire could not communicate due to the **loss of cell towers**, the
> **failure of repeaters**, **limited channel capacity**, and an
> **inability of radios to penetrate walls, stairwells and floors**.
>
> 2\. **"Flooding, tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes are all
> capable of toppling antennas and interrupting normal electrical power.
> Commercial broadcast stations and public safety radio networks may be
> rendered inoperable"** (Auf der Heide 1898, 5.10 paraphrasing Seismic
> Safety Committee 1983, 15).
>
> 3\. During the Coalinga, California earthquake, **"the police
> department's radio console fell on the floor and broke, disabling the
> system. The earthquake also cut off power to the hospital's radio, and
> the emergency back-up power system failed"** (Auf der Heide 5.10
> paraphrasing Tierney 1985, 33).
>
> 4\. **"Because of the unreliability of telephone communications in
> disasters, inter-organizational communications are best carried out by
> two-way radios.** Unfortunately, public safety radio frequencies have
> been assigned in such a manner as to make this very difficult. **Part
> of the problem is that radio traffic occurs on a number of different
> 'bands.'** A 'band' is a collection of neighboring frequencies, and it
> is technically possible to have a single radio that can switch to
> different radio frequencies on the same 'band.' **However, the
> difference in frequencies on separate bands is so great that
> completely different radio-electronic circuits and antennas are
> needed. In effect, for each band a completely different radio is
> needed. If several organizations are on different radio frequencies in
> the same band, it is possible for them to communicate with each other
> if they all switch their radios to the same frequency. This is not
> possible if the frequencies used by the organizations are on different
> bands. . . .** Even units of similar organizations in adjacent
> jurisdictions cannot talk to each other using their assigned
> frequencies" (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.11).
>
> 5\. Some communications equipment is **not interoperable** (i.e., one
> piece of equipment may **not** be **compatible** with another).
>
> B. However, "research on disaster suggests that **many communications
> problems are 'people problems,'** rather than 'equipment problems'"
> (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.3).
>
> 1\. **"Each person gives priority to the information needs of his own
> organization rather than that of the overall response effort"** (Auf
> der Heide 1989, 5.3).
>
> 2\. **"There is no mutual agreement as to who has the responsibility
> for the collection and dissemination of various types of information
> or to whom it should be distributed"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.3).
>
> 3\. **"Terminology and procedures used to exchange information vary
> among different organizations. There is a hesitancy to depend on other
> organizations, often due to lack of trusts or familiarity, or due to
> political, jurisdictional, and personal disputes"** (Auf der Heide
> 1989, 5.3).
>
> 4\. **"Persons possessing information do not realize that another
> person who needs it, doesn't have it"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.3).
>
> 5\. **"The information needs of other organizations are not
> understood"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.3).
>
> 6\. **"Many police departments, fire departments, rescue units, and
> ambulance services use radio codes for communication. These codes may
> vary from agency to agency, a situation which interferes with
> inter-organizational communication"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.7).

7.  **Too much information, breakdown in communication networks**, and
    **cross checking to confirm others' messages** may also **hurt
    communications** (Drabek 1985, 88).

> 8\. **Interorganizational rivalry** also **hinders communication**.
> Dwyer and Flynn (2005, 60) discovered that attempts for
> interoperability were never acted upon or resolved:
>
> a\. **"Indeed, the arrangements were being made by OEM \[NYC Office of
> Emergency Management\] over radios broadcasting at 800 megahertz. In
> 1996 and 1997, dozens of these radios had been distributed to select
> police and fire commanders so the agencies could communicate, an
> important recommendation from the 1990 Aviation Emergency Preparedness
> Working Group. There was a hitch, though. Who would be in control of
> the interagency frequency? Who would decide when it should be used and
> how? Representatives of the Police and Fire Departments had met for
> months to settle these questions, but the talks had broken down over
> unresolved issues of protocol. The radios were new and ready to use.
> It was just that no one outside of OEM was willing to talk on them
> yet. The fire chiefs kept them in the trunks of their cars. As for the
> police chiefs, the radios never left the shelves."**

II\. There are a number of reasons why **coordination is likewise
difficult** in times of disasters.

> A. **One explanation** for this challenge is the nature of disasters.
>
> 1\. Auf der Heide notes **"One of the reasons disaster response is
> difficult to coordinate is because disasters are different from
> routine, daily emergencies. The difference is more than just one of
> magnitude. Disasters generally cannot be adequately managed merely by
> mobilizing more personnel and material. Disasters may cross
> jurisdictional boundaries, create the need to undertake unfamiliar
> tasks, change the structure of responding organizations, \[and\]
> trigger the mobilization of participants that do not ordinarily
> respond to local emergency incidents . . . . As a consequence of these
> changes, the normal procedures for coordinating community emergency
> response may not be adapted well to the situation"** (1989, 49-50).
>
> B. **Other causes** for poor coordination include:
>
> 1\. **" . . . jurisdictional disputes unresolved on an everyday basis,
> do not tend to get resolved in disasters"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.5
> paraphrasing Quarantelli 1983, 105).
>
> 2\. **"The Robinson Crusoe syndrome:" a failure to recognize the
> involvement of other organizations or how one's own agency fits into
> the overall response effort** (Auf der Heide 1989, 57).
>
> 3\. **The complex federal system of government in the United States**
> (Drabek 1985, 86): **"Intergovernmental and intraorganizational
> complexity often lead to a lack of a coordinated response, distrust
> and conflict"** (Petak 1985, 5).
>
> 4\. **Interorganizational misunderstandings: distinct cultures and
> missions may hinder coordination** (Toulmin, Bivans and Steel 1989).
>
> 5\. **Divergent objectives: "government and private groups may have
> different interests, tasks and goals"** (Quarantelli 1997, 48).
>
> 6\. **"The failure to . . . \[create a multi-organizational plan at
> the time of the incident\] is one of the reasons that different
> organizations responding to the disaster often do not carry out a
> unified, concerted effort"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 9.18).
>
> C. McEntire (2002, 376) has identified **additional factors** that
> inhibited or discouraged coordination **after the Fort Worth
> Tornado**:
>
> 1\. **Insufficient, incomplete, inaccurate, or an overabundance of
> information**.
>
> 2\. **Lack of communication** among first responders and those in the
> EOC.
>
> 3\. **Loss of emergency communications equipment**.
>
> 4\. **Language barriers** among responders and victims.
>
> 5\. **Controlling or domineering attitudes** on the part of
> individuals responding to the disaster.

**Objective 37.4 Address how communication and coordination challenges
can be overcome to enhance response operations.**

Present the following information as a lecture.

I.  There are a **number of methods to overcome the people and equipment
    problems** associated with disaster communications.

> A. Bill Swan, Section Emergency Coordinator (SEC) for the North Texas
> Section of the American Radio Relay League, asserts that
> **communication** **is most effective when** **information sharing**
> **is calm, courteous, correct, and concise.**
>
> 1\. **Do not get caught up in the excitement** of the disaster.
>
> 2\. **Be respectful** to the others you talk to.
>
> 3\. Ensure that the **information** you share is as **accurate** as is
> possible.
>
> 4\. **Keep it short and simple** if possible.
>
> B. **"Inter-organizational communication is fostered by those factors
> which promote trust in other organizations and familiarity with how
> they function. These include: informal contacts, joint planning and
> training, preplanned agreements for the division of responsibilities,
> and the use of similar terminology, procedures, and performance
> criteria. Inter-organizational radio networks, common mapping systems,
> and computer networks also contribute to effective communications"**
> (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.2).
>
> C. **"One approach to the problem of inter-agency communications is
> the development of frequency sharing agreements and radio caches . . .
> .** A frequency sharing agreement is a mutual pact allowing multiple
> organizations involved in joint emergency operations to share
> frequencies licensed under single organizations" (Auf der Heide 1989,
> 5.14).
>
> D. **"To some extent, the difficulty of communications among
> organizations whose radios are on different bands can be overcome by
> the development of 'radio caches.'** Each radio cache has a collection
> of multi-channel portable radios each with the same frequencies, extra
> batteries, battery chargers, and, perhaps, portable repeaters. These
> caches are stored where they can be obtained and mobilized to provide
> linking communications nets in multi-agency emergency operations and
> disasters" (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.14).
>
> E. **"One method of communication among agencies on different bands
> involves the use of modern, programmable scanning receivers (receivers
> that scan a number of frequencies, pausing to listen on each frequency
> only when it is carrying radio traffic).** Although these devices
> cannot transmit, they can receive on multiple radio bands. With this
> technique, one person transmits on his two-way radio. The message is
> received on the second person's scanner. The second person then
> transmits his response on his two-way radio, and it is received on the
> scanner of the first person" (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.14-15).
>
> F. **"Specified frequencies can also be used to assure notification of
> various emergency or disaster-relevant agencies.** **In this case,
> each organization's dispatcher or radio operator has a tone-activated
> receiver (similar to a pager, or tone-activate weather frequency
> monitor). The area's communications center (or other prearranged
> organization) has a transmitter capable of emitting the tone alert,
> which activates the receivers. Different groups of organizations
> (e.g., all local fire departments, all local law enforcement agencies,
> all local hospitals), or all organizations having the receivers can be
> 'toned,' depending on the intended audience for the notification
> alert, update, or cancellation. One advantage of tone-activated
> receivers is that they are only activated when critical transmission
> of information is needed. They are, therefore, less likely to cause
> constant noise, resulting in people turning the volume down or off"**
> (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.15).
>
> G. **"In Southern California, fire agencies have designated a
> prearranged 'calling frequency.' This frequency is used solely for
> initial radio contact and instructions. Subsequent to initial contact,
> other frequencies are assigned to incoming responders, depending on
> their function, assigned task, and operations area.** There are
> advantages to this technique that are applicable to
> inter-organizational disaster communications. **One of the values of a
> prearranged regional or state-wide 'calling' frequency is that it can
> even facilitate the initiation of coordination with unexpected or
> unrequested responders.** Not only does a 'calling' frequency allow
> resources to report their presence to those coordinating incident
> operations, but it can also be used to obtain essential initial
> information . . . " (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.15).
>
> H. **"Multi-agency sharing of information about the present and
> predicted extent and location of disaster damage, secondary threats,
> vulnerable populations and structures, activities, transportation
> routes, and response activities generates the need for standardized
> maps and mapping grid systems.** Yet, in some disasters, as many as
> five or six different map types and map scales have been used by
> different agencies. This dissimilarity has caused considerable
> difficulty in communicating essential, geographically related
> information. **The provision of standardized maps and familiarity with
> a standardized way (coordinate system) of describing locations on the
> maps are essential components to disaster communication"** (Auf der
> Heide 1989, 5.16).
>
> I. **"Computers are not only useful for storing and analyzing disaster
> information, but also for sharing it. The graphic capabilities of
> modem personal computers have adapted themselves well to handling and
> transferring map data"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5. 16).
>
> J. There is also a need to ensure communications equipment is
> interoperable

II\. **Coordination**, too, may **be enhanced** through **various
methods**.

> A. **"When organizations have interacted and coordinated with each
> other before-hand, they have had fewer problems doing so in a
> disaster"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.4).
>
> B. **"When one is dependent on other team members, particularly in
> life-threatening situations, he needs to feel confident in their
> competence and reliability. Developing this level of trust often
> requires 'pre-incident' contact over a period of time"** (Auf der
> Heide 1989, 5.5).
>
> C. **" . . . familiarity with another organization's terminology or
> competence, engendered by previous contact during routine emergencies,
> is likely to facilitate interaction during a disaster"** (Auf der
> Heide 1989, 5.5).
>
> D. **"Knowledge about how other organizations function tends to
> promote inter-organizational . . . coordination"** (Auf der Heide
> 1989, 5.5 paraphrasing Dynes 1978, 55-58).
>
> E. "The effectiveness of disaster response may depend on the ability
> of organizations to share resources. However, when requesting
> resources from another organization**, the lack of standardized
> terminology may make it difficult to know what one will receive. The
> ability of a requested fire truck to carry out the mission for which
> it is requested may depend on the equipment it carries, its water
> capacity, and the number and training of its crew. All of these
> factors may vary among different fire departments. The problem is now
> being addressed in areas where the Incident Command System is in use,
> because it stipulates standardized terminology to describe common
> emergency response resources"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.6).
>
> F. **"The likelihood that one organization will interact with and
> depend on another organization is enhanced when it is perceived that
> its members are competent. This is facilitated when member of such
> groups pass a standardized test of their knowledge, skills and
> competence"** (Auf der Heide 1989, 5.7).
>
> G. After the Fort Worth Tornado, McEntire (2002, 377) observed that
> **coordination is facilitated when there has been or is**:
>
> 1\. **Strong** **leadership and a "team" orientation**
>
> 2\. **Planning, training and exercises**
>
> 3\. **Networking with other agencies**
>
> 4\. **Experience in prior incidents**
>
> 5\. **Useful technology**
>
> 6\. **Effective EOC management**

H. McEntire has pointed out **other requisites for coordination**:

> 1\. some sort of **pre-disaster links or ties among agencies** to help
> generate familiarity with one another and develop norms that stress
> collaboration.
>
> 2\. **a network or means within which information regarding a disaster
> situation can be easily shared and quickly transmitted** to others.
>
> 3\. **a willingness** - based on incentives - **to work together with
> others** to meet the needs of relief recipients (1998, p. 3).
>
> 4\. He adds further that **"the degree of coordination . . . will be
> significantly lower when the above three requisites are not met. As an
> example, and for the most obvious of reasons, it is doubtful that
> coordination will take place among organizations if they are unaware
> of each other and if a professional association has not been
> established among them before a calamity strikes. Likewise, if
> organizations do not generate standards of conduct or agreements to
> operate in unison with others, there will be a lower chance for
> coordination. What is more, coordination between groups will be
> substantially impaired if there are no forums or communicative
> instruments available to convey information or discuss policy options.
> Also, coordination will become much more difficult, if not prevented
> altogether, provided that organizations do not overcome the
> disincentives to cooperate (e.g. competition for publicity and
> funding), or if agency managers do not fully comprehend how the
> operations of another may complement their own and/or benefit the
> disaster victims whom they are trying to serve**" (McEntire 1998, p.
> 3).
>
> I. Drabek (2003) recommends that emergency managers **employ five key
> strategies** to coordinate disasters. These include:
>
> 1\. **Core**: Emergency managers may enhance coordination by
> **clarifying agency roles** before a disaster, **determining** who is
> given **authority** in a certain circumstance, and **knowing** what
> **resources** can be accessed for the response.
>
> 2\. **Consequences**: Those involved in the response can promote
> coordination by **keeping track of needs and how they are being met**
> (e.g., with a status board or computer resource management tool).
>
> 3\. **Customer**: Coordination can be increased when an effort is made
> to **serve partner agencies, stakeholders and victims** of a disaster.
>
> 4\. **Control**: Responders and emergency managers can improve
> coordination by **reminding** those they are working with of
> **approved plans, experiences from past disasters or exercises, the
> need to decentralize authority, the value of improvising, and the
> advantages of working with emergent organizations**.
>
> 5\. **Cultural**: Helping other agencies **understand cultural
> differences** of responding agencies, **view multi-agency responses
> critically** and **celebrating successes** may also help organizations
> to coordinate.
>
> J. Drabek (2003) also implies that the **degree of success or
> failure** of response operations **can be determined**, at least
> theoretically, by **two** **variables**.
>
> 1\. The **frequency of communications** (i.e., whether this is daily,
> weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly, etc.).
>
> a\. The **more often** an organization communicates with others **the
> better**.
>
> 2\. The **breadth of coordination** (i.e., the number of organizations
> an individual, department or agency coordinates with).
>
> a\. The **more organizations** one coordinates with **the better**.

**Questions to be asked:**

1.  **What is coordination?**

2.  **Who participates in communication and coordination in disaster
    response operations?**

3.  **What are the benefits of effective communication and coordination
    in disaster response operations?**

4.  **Why is it so difficult to communicate and coordinate with other
    individuals and organizations under disaster conditions?**

5.  **What is interoperability and why is it necessary?**

6.  **How can communication and coordination be improved during response
    operations?**

7.  **Why should the development of communication and coordination
    skills be encouraged among those working in emergency management?**

**Benefits of Coordination**

-   **Identify needs, contingencies, goals, operations**

-   **Promote collaborative efforts**

-   **Eliminate fragmentation, gaps or duplication of services**

-   **Reduce disaster losses**

-   **Increase efficiency and effectiveness**

Reasons Why Communication and

Coordination Are Problematic

-   Disabled facilities and equipment

-   Loyalty to one organization

-   No agreement on information collection and dissemination

-   Different terminology

-   Information needs of others are not understood

-   Formal radio codes

-   Too much, a lack of, or incorrect information

-   Breakdown in communication networks

-   Cross checking of information from others

-   The nature of disasters

-   Jurisdictional disputes

-   Robinson Crusoe syndrome (belief that you are responding alone)

-   The federal emergency management system

-   Inter-organizational misunderstandings

-   Divergent objectives

-   Failure to adapt and improvise

-   Language barriers

-   Controlling or domineering attitudes

**Factors That Facilitate Coordination**

(McEntire 2002)

-   **Strong** **leadership and a "team" orientation**

-   **Planning, training and exercises**

-   **Networking with other agencies**

-   **Experience in prior incidents**

-   **Useful technology**

-   **Effective EOC management**

Coordination Strategies

(Drabek 2003)

-   **Core**

-   **Consequences**

-   **Customer**

-   **Control**

-   **Cultural**

Case Study Assignment

1.  Identify a mass emergency or disaster event and search for
    information about communication or coordination in academic journals
    and/or on the Internet. Be sure to include at least 4 citations (at
    least two of which must be from a disaster researcher).

2.  Write a short paper (3-4 pages) addressing the following questions:

-   What was the role of communication and coordination in this
    incident?

-   What communication or coordination problems were evident in the
    response?

-   How were they dealt with by the individuals and organizations
    involved?

-   What could have been done differently to improve communication and
    coordination in the response?

-   What lessons did you learn from your investigation into these issues
    and how can they be applied in emergency management in the future?

3\. Turn the paper in at the beginning of the next class session.