**Revolutionary and Evolutionary Change**

**in Emergency Management:**

**Assessing Paradigm Shifts, Barriers, and**

**Recommendations for the Profession**

**David A. McEntire, Ph.D.**

**Department of Public Administration**

**University of North Texas**

**Abstract**

The following paper acknowledges that disasters are on the rise and
asserts that proposed paradigm shifts to meet this challenge are valid
to the extent that they are based on sound epistemological assumptions.
The central finding of this paper is that significant change in
emergency management is needed, but this goal may not be easily or
completely achieved. Therefore, preparedness and response operations can
never be eliminated as may be unintentionally implied by certain
proposals in the academic literature. Progress is both likely and
advantageous, however, as long as it is built on - but goes much further
than - our efforts of the past.

**Introduction**

Are disasters becoming more frequent and intense as compared to the
past? Will a paradigm shift occur in emergency management, making it
completely different in the future than it is today? Can all of our
goals for progress in this field be reached and the barriers to change
overcome? The following paper will address these questions and attempt
to illustrate that emergency management should and will promote a more
proactive approach for disaster reduction. However, there is a
possibility that some of the current proposals for the future may amount
to an unrealistic revolution that inadvertently discount the necessity
of traditional approaches to emergency management. Change will take
place in the emerging profession, though, and this progress will include
strides to reduce disasters in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Before proceeding with this argument, the author wishes to emphatically
stress that he is not opposed to more stringent and broader mitigation
measures. In fact, his research has been supportive of further steps for
disaster prevention (see McEntire 2004a; McEntire 2004b; McEntire 2004c;
McEntire et. al. 2002; McEntire 1997).[^1] The purpose of this article
is to point out that preparedness and response functions will always be
needed (although the activities in these phases will likely be
undertaken by more educated and well-trained professionals in a variety
of organizations with the assistance of new perspectives, tools,
techniques and strategies). Therefore, this paper should in no way be
construed as an argument against further steps for disaster reduction.
It instead should be viewed as a critical epistemological assessment
along with a proposal to amend current policy proposals.

**Disasters on the Rise**

In the early 1980s, Frederick Cuny (1983) asserted that the magnitude
and impact of disasters were on the rise. Others have noted similar
trends in both developed and developing nations (see Burton, Kates and
White 1993). There is some disagreement if we are experiencing more
earthquakes, tornadoes and tsunamis as compared to the past. Cuny (1983,
14) asserted that hazardous events are remaining constant but observed
that we are experiencing more disasters because of changes in
vulnerability. However, there is evidence that there are more flooding
episodes today and this type of hazard is occurring at rates and
intensities and in places where they have never occurred before (perhaps
as a result of the wide-spread use of concrete and asphalt in today's
urban settings). It is also true that some natural hazard agents (e.g.,
hurricanes) might be more active during certain historical periods than
others, and there is agreement that climate changes will alter episodes
of flooding and drought. In addition, the increased presence and use of
hazardous materials and reliance on computers is creating or will result
in more technological disasters as time goes by (Quarantelli 1997;
Quarantelli 1993). There is also a likelihood of a greater number of
terrorist attacks in the future and these may be more devastating than
the events on 9/11 - especially if they involve weapons of mass
destruction (Falkenrath et. al. 1998). New biological hazards such as
SARS or Avian Flu appear to be present today as well. But this focus on
hazards reveals only a portion of the story. As mentioned, human
activity is augmenting vulnerability to disaster in other ways, and it
is this element of disaster that we are most able to control, influence
and reduce (McEntire 2004a).

Along these lines, E.L. Quarantelli (1993) has illustrated that there
will be more and worse disasters in the future. He declares, among other
things, that industrialization, urbanization and demographic patterns
are putting people at risk and/or decreasing the ability of certain
individuals and groups to protect themselves. Culture, government
policies, bureaucratic politics, code enforcement, construction
practices, business activities, weak emergency management institutions
and a myriad of other variables are likewise increasing vulnerability
(McEntire 2004a; Wisner et. al. 2004; Mileti 1999; Platt 1999).
Vulnerability is certainly the significant contributing factor for the
occurrence and adverse impact of disasters. Without people, there can be
no disasters -- only natural hazards.

The net result of ubiquitous hazards and our ongoing changes in
vulnerability is intense disasters that occur more often. Although the
loss of life resulting from disasters is down in the United States and
in other industrialized countries because of better engineering
techniques, warning processes and response operations, more people die
in the poor nations of the world (e.g., the recent tsunami killed an
estimated 300,000 in various countries surrounding the Indian Ocean).
The United Nations and Munich Reinsurance provide ample evidence that
the financial costs of disasters are also up and are increasing at
exponential rates (see <http://www.unisdr.org/disaster-statistics/>

[introduction.htm]{.underline} and
<http://www.munichre.com./pdf/pd_2000_02_29_anhang3_e.pdf>). Mileti
(1999, 66) also reveals that losses owing to natural hazards in the
United States total over \$1 billion per week. Such figures may perhaps
result in part from growing wealth as well as more property, appliances
and goods needed to service a growing population (Mileti 1999, 104).
Rising losses may have a great deal to do with poor land-use choices and
other factors that increase physical exposure to hazards or limit the
effectiveness of steps taken for preparedness, response and recovery.
Regardless, these trends say nothing about the social, psychological,
political and other consequences of disaster. All in all, these facts
point to a somewhat dismal -- but not hopeless -- future (Quarantelli
1993).

**Paradigm Shifts and The Possibility of Their Success**

Considering the above context an important and indispensable debate
about the future of emergency management is ensuing. One school of
thought believes revolutionary change is needed; the other acknowledges
the desire and possibility of progress, but is hesitant to declare more
than evolutionary change in the field. Dennis Mileti (1999) is
representative of the former view. He rightfully argues that we must
alter our values, attitudes and practices in order to curb the growing
quantity of disasters and their associated rising losses. In particular,
he emphasizes structural and non-structural mitigation, further steps to
protect the environment, and altered social, political and economic
relations. Claire Rubin (2000) might be indicative of the latter school
in that she suggests that the emergency management house must be
remodeled even though it will continue to rely on its existing
historical foundation. She recognizes that there are new threats that
will require more effort and attention, but seems to imply that we
cannot escape the need to prepare ourselves to respond to future
disasters (although we must do so more effectively than we have in the
past).

Both of these perspectives make valid points and each alternative might
advocate a paradigm shift of some sort. Disagreement is likely to emerge
between the two camps, however, as the meaning of "paradigm shift" can
be interpreted in distinct ways. For instance, some scholars may see a
paradigm shift as the need for wiser land-use planning, improved
construction practices, or government policies that do not subsidize
risk (Mileti 1999; McEntire and Fuller 2002; Platt 1999). Others may
define a paradigm shift in terms of technological breakthroughs, more
preparedness activities, and increased networking or collaboration with
other disaster stakeholders (McEntire et. al. 2002; Mileti 1999).
Massive public education campaigns and the promotion of personal
responsibility may be considered desired approaches also (McEntire and
Myers 2004; Mileti 1999). Environmental protection, concern for special
populations and further reliance on insurance could be viewed in similar
fashion (Mileti 1999; McEntire 2004a). Striving to spend more on
mitigation in comparison to disaster relief will also be viewed as a
justified paradigm shift. Rethinking the merit of the "hazards"
management viewpoint in favor of the concept of vulnerability might also
prove useful (Wisner et. al. 2004; McEntire 2004a). All of these views
and many others have merit and should be incorporated into the future of
emergency management.

The problem regarding the notion of a "paradigm shift" in emergency
management is certainly not what is promoted or advocated. All scholars
agree that more must be done to reduce disasters and that change should
be pursued. The questionable aspects of paradigm shifts often arise from
hidden implications or mistaken assumptions in the scholarship that
supports them (see McEntire and Marshall 2003). As an example, some
scholars have requested that emergency management be "couched within a
general sustainability framework" (Thomas and Mileti 2003, 18). Dennis
Mileti's book, *Disasters by Design* (1999), supports this view and it
has understandably been praised for a very comprehensive reassessment of
natural hazards and what we should do about them (Myers et. al. 2000).
Nevertheless, Mileti's proposed shift to sustainable hazards mitigation
may unintentionally imply that we can control natural hazards, it may
unfortunately suggest that sustainability will resolve all types of
disaster problems, and it may unnecessarily downplay the value of
traditional approaches to emergency management (McEntire et. al. 2002).
Research has consistently shown that giving preference to hazards
instead of vulnerability is a major error among scholars and
practitioners (Cannon 1993; Hewitt 1983; O-Keefe et. al. 1976), that
sustainable hazards mitigation may not help us deal with certain
disasters such as terrorist events (McEntire 2000), and that the concept
of sustainability may only be related the mitigation and recovery phases
of emergency management (Berke 1995). Regarding this latter issue, the
scholars that advocate sustainable hazards mitigation may unconsciously
give the impression that we will have no problem turning the field
completely upside down as preparedness and response activities are
seemingly divorced from this new paradigm for emergency management.
Mitchell, too, has noted this possibility and declares that disasters
and the crisis phase of emergency management are not always captured by
the sustainable development concept:

> Differences between hazard mitigation and sustainable development
> ensure that important parts of each subject remain outside of the
> frame of reference of the other. In other words, safety (a prime
> consideration in hazards management) does not necessarily equal
> sustainability, and contingencies (of which hazards and disasters are
> good examples) may require different responses than enduring problems
> (1999, 505).

Interestingly, Mileti seems to be aware of this tenuous relationship at
times and he admits, as an example, that "warning systems seem to have
little direct bearing on sustainable development" (1999, 197). Mileti
does observe that " . . . preparedness and response are vital to a
society's ability to survive extreme natural and technological events
over the *long term*" (emphasis added) (1999, 239). And he continues
this train of thought by asserting that "this contribution to disaster
resiliency is by far the strongest link between preparedness and
response and sustainable hazards mitigation . . ." (Mileti 1999, 239).
Nonetheless, this intended and seemingly exclusive emphasis on recovery
and the implementation of mitigation seems to downplay the indispensable
nature and documented benefit of well-devised and implemented activities
in the immediate emergency post-disaster period. Furthermore, Mileti's
use of the term resiliency appears to be a crutch that is required to
show what appears to be a distant or indirect relation between the
preparedness and response phases and sustainable hazards mitigation.

Without being overly critical of Mileti's impressive work, his
discussion of the relationship between traditional approaches to
emergency management and sustainable hazard mitigation is especially
telling:

> Sustainable hazards mitigation will not eliminate the need for
> emergency preparedness and disaster response to deal with the physical
> destruction, losses and human suffering imposed by disasters. In
> addition, there is a great opportunity to make progress toward
> sustainable hazard mitigation by setting policies and practices for
> recovering from disasters (Mileti 1999, 209).

Again, it is noteworthy that *these remarks do not say preparedness and
response are closely associated with and integral to sustainable hazards
mitigation*; *they only reveal that these two traditional phases of
emergency management will be needed in spite of a paradigm shift to
sustainable hazards mitigation*.

As a result of this apparent exclusion of these phases in sustainable
hazards mitigation, the call for holistic and interdisciplinary research
issued in *Disasters by Design* may never be fully reached if the
concerns or reservations expressed and implied by Berke, Mitchell and
Mileti himself are correct as they appear to be. For instance, how does
sustainable hazards mitigation relate to emergency operations planning?
Disaster exercises? Grant management and budgeting? The establishment
and management of an emergency operations center? Warning? Evacuation?
Mass fatality management? Damage assessment? Disaster communications?
Emergency medical care? Volunteer management? Donations management or
other disaster response functions? There have been no clear answers to
these questions in works on sustainability. This subsequently calls into
question the applicability of this proposed paradigm shift to certain
actors and organizations including emergency planners, first responders,
accountants, meteorologists, coroners, Red Cross representatives, ham
radio operators, emergency medical technicians, and certain volunteer
organizations. Berke is aware of this limitation when he notes:

> The interest groups involved in mitigation . . . and long-range
> disaster recovery are likely to be closely associated with the
> interests of sustainable development advocates. However, for those
> interest groups concerned with emergency preparedness and response
> issues (e.g., disaster warning, search and rescue, evacuation and
> sheltering) the relationship with sustainable development would be
> less salient (Berke 1995, 14-15).

Are these actors and the activities they perform in disasters
unimportant or even optional then? This epistemological impression is
accidentally conveyed by the sustainable hazards mitigation paradigm,
which could have a devastating impact upon practical efforts to deal
with disasters. Mitchell has called into question this type of
supposition in a most eloquent manner: "To assume that sustainable urban
development can be achieved without attention to problems of contingency
. . . is to court frustration and failure" (1999, 506). Berke agrees and
states "naïve assumptions about sustainable development eliminating
\[disaster\] impacts could lead to the shaping of flawed policy" (1995,
14).

Perhaps it is for these and other reasons why Wisner et. al. (2004, p.
29) and McEntire and Floyd (2003) state that sustainability is at times
a slippery concept for the disaster field. Hooke (1999) has even stated
that sustainable development is or should be out of the disaster debate.
While there are undoubtedly many advantages of the concept of
sustainability and even though this concept has a close and justifiable
relation to increased mitigation measures (McEntire and Floyd 2003),
Aguirre (2004) also wonders if the paradigm espoused in *Disasters by
Design* can "sustain" emergency management scholars and practitioners in
the future. Considering the possible validity of these concerns, it may
be wise to consider how the field might progress in terms of a holistic
approach rather than be completely transformed by a proposed paradigm
shift that may not ultimately lead to its desired revolution.

**Barriers to Revolutionary Change**

There are numerous other factors that limit the possibility of
revolutionary change as suggested by the sustainable hazards mitigation
paradigm. First, everyone is in agreement that we are having more and
worse natural and technological disasters as mentioned earlier. Clarke
(2005), for one, believes it is time to think about worst case
scenarios. This automatically indicates that we must do more to prevent
disasters and mitigate their effects. But it also leads to the
conclusion that preparedness activities will remain necessary and cannot
be discounted in future disaster paradigms.

Second, in light of the current political situation in many countries
and the rising hatred for Americans and Western Societies among some
Islamic fundamentalists around the world, we will probably experience
terrorist attacks on a more frequent basis and possibly with greater
impact and complexity (Falkenrath et. al. 1998). Terrorist leaders have
requested that their followers to acquire weapons of mass destruction
and the use of a nuclear weapon would decimate a major portion of a
large city while even a dirty bomb could possibly leave the geographic
area uninhabitable for many years to come. At attack involving
biological agents could kill thousands, hundreds of thousands or even
millions of people. A chemical release would be less deadly but even its
resulting response would require specialized knowledge, equipment and
personnel. Consequently, response and recovery operations are likely to
be more complex in the future because of the threat of terrorism,
suggesting the need to make improvements in this area also.

A further issue hindering the revolution espoused by sustainable hazards
mitigation is the truism that people often occupy dangerous areas
because they provide jobs, food, goods and services. Burton, Kates and
White (1993) acknowledge that people require resources to maintain their
livelihoods. Humans therefore accept certain levels of risk because the
alternative options of where to live are less appealing. Of course, some
people are constrained in their decisions because of external economic
and political forces, and these circumstances must be recognized and
corrected (McEntire and Fuller 2002). At the same time, other "people
who have been observed coping with risk and uncertainty in the
environment appear to take account of likely economic outcomes . . . but
the resulting behavior rarely conforms to what should be optimum by
their standards of utility" (Burton et. al. 1993, 100). For instance,
Mileti and Passarini (1996) have shown through various case studies
that, for the vast majority of the population affected by deadly
earthquakes, there is little or no effort to leave dangerous areas in an
attempt to prevent a future recurrence of that type of disaster. We must
therefore admit that "benefit-cost analysis should be an integral part
of risk analysis" and that there are often advantages "associated with
hazardous activities" (Heaney et. al. 2000, 8).

What is more, we must accept the fact that there are no hazard-free
areas (McEntire 2004d; see also Mileti's discussion of hazards 1999).
Some locations are undoubtedly safer than others, but this should not be
taken as an indication that a move away from California, Florida or
Texas will keep one safe. If people are not confronted with earthquakes,
hurricanes or tornadoes they will likely be dealing with drought, fires,
ice or snow storms, traffic accidents involving hazardous materials,
railroad derailments, plane crashes, floods, workplace violence or other
unpleasant events. We may move away from the most prevalent hazards, but
we cannot hide from all emergencies and disasters.

Even when we undertake a variety of steps to protect ourselves, it must
also be recognized that our best efforts will still fall short at times
(e.g., even the reportedly "unsinkable" Titanic sank and people died
unnecessarily because it was assumed that additional life boats would
not be required). A modern-day example of our limitation comes from the
recent hurricanes that hit Florida. It has been revealed that "buildings
that were suppose to be the strongest and safest -- emergency operations
centers, police and fire stations, hospitals and hurricane shelters --
failed" (Morgan et. al. 2004). While these buildings may not have been
constructed with the latest engineering techniques, nature's strength
should come as no surprise as compared to our obvious lack of
omnipotence.

Another point to consider is that it has taken us a long time to create
risk in our communities -- sometimes decades or even centuries (see
Oliver-Smith 1994 for an excellent example). Steps pursued to reverse
this trend will not be easily or quickly achieved. We will logically
need to be both proactive and reactive until we can find some degree of
harmony in the natural environment (assuming that is possible when we
will always be exposed to hazards of various types).

A seventh reason why preparedness and response will remain vital aspects
of emergency management is because interested stakeholders frequently
lack complete knowledge about and control over hazards and disaster
prevention (Mileti 1999). Lovins and Lovins (1981, 63) remind us that
"the impact of human fallibility and malice on hazardous, essential, and
highly engineered systems is not at root an engineering problem but a
people problem. It arises because the world is peopled by human beings
rather than angels or robots." Similarly:

> Fallibility problems . . . \[will\] become more prominent as
> \[vulnerable systems\] . . . proliferate, salesmen outrun engineers,
> investment conquers caution, routine dulls commitment, boredom
> replaces novelty, and less skilled technicians take over in countries
> with little technical infrastructure and tradition (Lovins and Price
> 1975, 17-18 as quoted by Quarantelli 1999, 17).

We must likewise admit that it is difficult at times to determine risks
in an accurate manner (Quarantelli 1999; Burton et. al. 1993):

> The sheer complexity of many technical systems can defeat efforts to
> predict their failure modes. 'The sequence of human and mechanical
> events leading to the two most serious power reactor failures in the
> U.S. \[at Browns Ferry and Three Mile Island\] were excluded from
> fault tree analysis in the most comprehensive study of reactor safety
> ever undertaken' (from Rasumusson et. al. as cited by Lovins and
> Lovins 1981, 63 in Quarantelli 1999).

Omniscience is not possible and, as long as this is remains the case,
disasters will recur.

Apathy is an eighth reason why a paradigm shift that excludes
preparedness and response in an epistemological sense is unlikely.
People see disasters as improbable events (Mileti 1999) and this
complicates efforts to effectively mitigate them. In his review of the
research literature, Auf der Heide (1989) reveals other factors:

-   Some people are unaware of the hazards that threaten them, their
    multiple vulnerabilities, and the potential negative effects of
    disasters in all their variety (see also Burton et. al. 1993).

-   Other individuals and groups downplay risk, ironically even when
    disasters are immanent and warnings have been issued (see also
    Stallings 1984; Perry 1983)

-   Citizens view disasters as Acts of God which cannot be controlled by
    human kind (see also McEntire 2001).

-   The public has fatalistic attitudes about disasters, thereby
    discouraging prevention and preparedness measures (see also McEntire
    and Fuller 2002).

-   The political culture in the United States limits government
    influence over personal decisions and consequently jeopardizes the
    passing of laws, enforcement of codes, and compliance on the part of
    the populace (see also Platt 1999).

-   Leaders of communities have difficulty in justifying the benefits of
    mitigation when an event may or may not occur in the near future -
    or ever (see also Waugh 2000).

-   Public servants and government agencies often over-estimate their
    ability to deal with disasters and their adverse consequences (see
    also Mileti 1999).

Besides these observations, it is widely known that there are competing
priorities in societies (Mileti 1999). Crime has to be fought, schools
have to be built, and roads have to be repaired (Auf der Heide 1989).
There are not unlimited funds to address and fix every single problem we
are faced with including disasters. Even when more serious attention is
directed toward disaster mitigation, some organizations will do all they
can to protect their turf (i.e., fire fighters have very strong lobbies
as compared to emergency managers). Other interest groups including land
owners, developers and builders may actively oppose additional disaster
legislation and increased regulations (Godschalk 1991). This
unfortunately reveals that institution building for proactive emergency
management will be fraught with resistance and occasional set-backs.

A tenth issue that restricts the probability of revolutionary change is
owing to the fact that there are trade-offs that have to be considered
(Auf der Heide 1989). All of the scholars that propose a paradigm shift
to sustainability focus on natural hazards alone. In many ways this is
justified as scholars observe that terrorist attacks are less likely to
occur than natural disasters (Waugh 2004). However, one intentional or
instrumental disaster could conceivably have far greater impact than a
natural event (Falkenrath et. al. 1998). Therefore, selecting which
hazards to deal with or the appropriate balance among alternative
policies is not an easy one to determine (McEntire 2004d).[^2] If we
concentrate too much attention on one hazard over another, we inevitably
open ourselves up to the possibility of not always being able to deal
effectively with distinct types of disasters as we would prefer.

An additional issue that has a bearing on the occurrence of disasters is
in relation to policy making in democratic societies. Richard Sylves
(2004) has illustrated a tension between the Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian models of agenda setting. Scholars and policy experts would
like to see more laws and regulations in relation to emergency
management. In contrast, citizens often want less government influence
over their lives. Which of these perspectives should be deemed correct
or most appropriate? Is it ethical if the government ignores
researchers' pleas to protect the populace? Is it right for the
government to protect citizens from disasters even if it might be
against their will? Unless dictatorship is a desired option, there will
always be some disagreement between epistemic communities and the people
they are trying to serve. This obviously has unavoidable implications on
the probability and impact of disaster.

A twelfth variable that influences the probability of disasters espouses
an irony associated with the sustainable hazards mitigation paradigm in
emergency management. In California, the recent fires in the Southern
part of the state were exacerbated due in part to the hesitancy to thin
forests of fuel because of environmental concerns. Therefore, policies
intended to reduce certain disasters may inadvertently augment others.
This is not the only example that could be given. The prohibition of
certain fire fighting foams may hinder the ability to deal with oil
fires which could spiral out of control and lead to further
environmental damage. Hence, sustainability is not necessarily a perfect
fit for the disaster problem as is currently affirmed by dogma in the
field (Aguirre 2004; Wisner et. al. 2004; McEntire and Floyd 2003;
Mitchell 1999; Berke 1995). Disasters are complex phenomena, not
amenable to simple or piecemeal solutions only.

This discussion could be expanded in terms of the arguments made and the
evidence provided. It is important to reiterate that we must obviously
do more to tackle these and other problems that have a bearing on the
occurrence of disaster and their associated consequences. Increased
education to alter attitudes about emergency management is only one of
many steps that must be taken to reverse the disturbing trends
associated with disasters (McEntire 2004b). However, suffice it to say
that disasters cannot be prevented in every instance. Quarantelli
reveals that "a risk free society is a chimerical dream . . . \[and he
reminds us that\] the notion that hazards and subsequent disastrous
occasions can be completely eliminated is not borne out by history"
(1997, 17). On one occasion he even asserts that giving the highest
priority to mitigation is a fad (Quarantelli 1997, 101), which is
probably an overstatement considering that he does advocate further
steps to reduce disasters in other research outlets (Quarantelli 1999).
Nevertheless, we should humbly acknowledge that there are limits to what
can be done in terms of disaster mitigation.

The overall lesson to be drawn from this essay is that, while mitigation
clearly needs to be given additional attention, this does not mean that
preparedness and response operations can be discounted in future
disaster paradigms. Mitchell proposes additional land-use planning
measures but he also observes ". . . . *mega-cities must be prepared to
cope with unexpected or unfamiliar events* as well as long-term
problems; *acute natural hazards* as well as chronic crises of
environmental degradation" (emphasis added) (1999, 505). Even Mileti,
who unintentionally appears to exclude traditional approaches to
emergency management in his paradigm of sustainable hazards mitigation,
recognizes the value of such activities for disaster reduction:
"effective preparedness and response activities help save lives, reduce
injuries, limit property damage, and minimize all sorts of disruptions
that disasters cause" (Mileti 1999, 239).

These scholars are not alone however. Several recent assessments by many
of the most respected scholars and practitioners logically recognize the
need to focus attention on disaster prevention and mitigation. At the
same time, these individuals also support the need for continued and
even improved preparedness and response functions. For instance, at a
June 13, 2003, Disasters Roundtable meeting in Washington, D.C.,
nationally recognized researchers and professionals did not assert that
preparedness and response are unimportant in or irrelevant to the future
of the profession. Conversely, several of the participants noted the
need for additional training, increased interoperability of
communications, more involvement of LEPCs and CERTs, further political
support and resources for emergency managers, and additional reliance on
technology in disaster response operations.

The International Association of Emergency Managers, too, reiterates the
importance of knowledge, skills and abilities pertaining to the
preparedness and response portions of the emergency manager's
responsibilities. Similar competencies relating to preparedness and
response have been identified by Wayne Blanchard, FEMA's Higher
Education Program Manager, in his outline of "Competencies to Develop
Successful 21^st^ Century Hazard or Disaster or Hazard Risk Managers"
(see <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/EMCompetencies.asp>).
Moreover, in October 2003, a large group of acclaimed scholars met to
discuss "Educational Opportunities for the Hazards Manager of the
Future." It was recorded in the proceedings that emergency/hazards
management includes all four phases of emergency management, even though
it was acknowledged that finding the proper balance is difficult (Thomas
and Mileti 2003, 17).

To be sure, each of these assessments did reveal that we must take
additional steps to reverse the trend of more and worse disasters.
Without placing a much greater focus on mitigation and recovery, our
efforts to deal with disasters will obviously be incomplete and foolish.
Nonetheless, in none of these assessments was it revealed that
preparedness and response would be unnecessary as seems to be implied in
certain academic perspectives. Scholars and practitioners concluded
instead that we must also be more effective in these areas as well.
Accordingly, paradigm shifts that ignore these facts are questionable in
theory and unrealistic in practice. Emergency managers are not likely to
"whither away" in the future as questioned by Britton in an excellent
article on the subject (1999), but it is probable that their
preparedness and response duties will expand and include a very heavy
emphasis on mitigation and recovery (especially as these phases relate
to disaster prevention). It is also likely that the functions emergency
managers perform will be shared with and incorporated by others in the
public, private and non-profit sectors. Change will undoubtedly occur in
emergency management, but the barriers mentioned above will
unfortunately constrain at least some of our goals for disaster
reduction.

**Clarification and an Alternate Proposal**

Although the barriers presented above are real, the discussion about
them should not be interpreted as a call to maintain or return to the
reactive approaches of the past. Emergency management must spend a
considerable amount of time, energy and attention on mitigation --
dramatically more so than is currently being done today (McEntire
2004b). Emergency managers must also take advantage of the "windows of
opportunity" made evident during recovery in order to implement more
stringent mitigation policies (Olson et. al. 1998). There is no question
that this is the case. The purpose of this article is not to discredit
mitigation or recovery therefore; it is in contrast to illustrate that
disasters have always occurred - and will always take place - for a
variety of reasons. Preparedness activities and response operations will
thus remain integral aspects of emergency management. Reputable scholars
and practitioners assert that these phases must be retained and even
improved in the future.

Can there be a paradigm shift, then, that not only pushes for further
mitigation measures but also takes into account the realities of the
challenges and limitations that lie ahead? One possible way to advance
the field and overcome the weaknesses of other paradigms is to rely on,
but alter the concept and policy guide of Integrated Emergency
Management (IEM) (see McEntire et. al. 2002). IEM initially involved a
three step process of 1) assessing risks, 2) determining capabilities,
and 3) working to reduce the gap between them. To illustrate this point,
emergency managers in the past were to determine the community's
exposure to earthquakes along with its ability to put out associated
fires, and work to reduce risk and increase their capacity through
planning measures and the effective performance of post-disaster
functions. These processes, more than any others, get at the heart of
emergency management. Nevertheless, IEM tended to focus on physical
issues and response operations alone, and consequently overlooked
social/organizational variables as well as other more proactive
approaches to emergency management (McEntire et. al. 2002).

In an attempt to overcome these limitations but retain the strengths of
IEM, the concept of "vulnerability management" has been proposed
(McEntire 2004a; McEntire et. al. 2002). Rather than assess physical
risks alone, vulnerability management recommends that we also determine
susceptibility - the level of social/organizational liabilities. The
proposal retains a focus on capabilities, but these are clarified as
being elements of resistance and resilience (see Table 1).

With a reliance on this model, emergency managers might be better able
to assess the wide range of liabilities and capabilities pertinent to
the physical and social/organizational environments. These liabilities
and capabilities include location/exposure, building construction, the
use of technology, environmental degradation, politics, demographic
patterns, culture, economics, and an ability to enforce building codes,
warn the public, improvise, and conduct damage assessment, among other
things. (McEntire 2004a). Also, by incorporating the concepts of risk,
susceptibility, resistance and resilience, this modification of IEM
makes the field dramatically more proactive than the past (McEntire
2004d). Focusing on vulnerability (which humans determine and can
reduce), for instance, rather than hazards (which we have less or no
control over) may amount to a revolutionary paradigm shift as well. In
other words, we must take natural hazards as a given but ask what we
must do to protect ourselves and deal with them in a more effective
manner. In addition, the proposal presented in this paper remodels the
house of emergency management for concerns of the future as suggested by
Rubin (2000), but it likewise saves the foundation because vulnerability
is related to all phases of disaster and it is related to IEM (McEntire
2004a). Furthermore, by including all of the hazards, variables, phases,
and actors associated with vulnerability (McEntire 2004a), it is
possible for research and emergency management to accept complexity and
become more holistic or inter-disciplinary (McEntire 2004d). It is
therefore more plausible that the disaster reduction profession will
progress in the future through a paradigm shift toward the concept of
vulnerability rather than experience an impossible revolution through
proposals that visibly concentrate on hazards and mistakenly imply that
sustainability is completely possible in the future. One is justified in
promoting increased attention toward mitigation, recovery, environmental
protection and social justice issues, but it would be unwise to accept a
paradigm that diminishes the ongoing need for successful preparedness
activities and response operations.

**Table 1**

> **Environments**
>
> Physical Social/Organizational

(including natural, (including cultural, political

> built, technological) psychological, economic)
>
> Liabilities *Risk* *Susceptibility*

## Environmental 

##  Attributes

> Capabilities *Resistance* *Resilience*

Adapted from "Triggering Agents, Vulnerabilities and Disaster Reduction:

Towards a Holistic Paradigm." McEntire, David A. (2001)

*Disaster Prevention and Management.* 10(3): 189-196.

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that we are having more disasters as compared to the
past. These trends naturally suggest the need for much greater attention
on mitigation and recovery as we are undoubtedly not doing enough to
prevent disasters or reduce their deadly, destructive and disruptive
impacts. This should not mean that preparedness and response can be
discounted as is presumed by some of the current literature in the field
however. There are simply too many barriers to be overcome and scholars
and practitioners alike recognize these realities.

In short, disasters can be reduced in quantity and in quality, but they
can never be completely eliminated from human experience. Consequently,
progress in emergency management will be more realistic and advantageous
if undertaken with the lessons of both hindsight and foresight. One
possible approach is to build the field on the foundation of IEM but
alter it substantially by making vulnerability management the concept
and policy guide of the future. The goal is not just to prepare and
respond as has been the case in traditional approaches to emergency
management. The aim is instead to do all that is possible to reduce the
factors that increase physical exposure and social/organizational
proneness, while also increasing the ability to withstand disasters and
successfully respond and recover from them if our efforts to prevent
them or mitigate their impact are less than ideal. Liability reduction
(i.e., the diminution of risk and susceptibility) and capacity building
(i.e., the augmenting of resistance and resilience) in all sectors of
society and at all levels of government are what matters -- certainly
not the development of emergency operations plans and first responder
capacities alone as was done in the past.

The challenges that lie ahead of us are clear. Will we accept and
implement policies that will meet the broad range of realities that lie
ahead? Specifically, will we do more to mitigate disasters while also
prepare to successfully respond and recover if they cannot be prevented?
Logic, empirical evidence and the recommendations of the most reputable
scholars and practitioners in the field dictate that we should recognize
both the opportunities and limits of what can be achieved in the
disaster reduction profession. In spite of these facts, there is
agreement that we should aggressively push for change and not be content
with the reactive approaches of yesterday.

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[^1]: The author's research pushes for a proactive, holistic, integrated
    and interdisciplinary perspective of vulnerability which is
    consistent with the recommendations of many scholars (Mileti 1999,
    35; Salter 1997/98, 22; Geis 2001, 152; and Weichselgartner 2001,
    86).

[^2]: Waugh (2005) explores in a lucid manner the misunderstanding of
    the relationship among the all-hazards model and terrorism, and the
    confusion about them may extend to the risk-based approach to
    emergency management as well. The all-hazards model is a misnomer in
    some ways as it really deals with the functions that are common to
    various hazards (e.g., warning, evacuation, sheltering) rather than
    focusing on all types of disasters. In other words, the all-hazards
    model does not necessarily address every hazard; it instead builds
    capabilities to perform the generic activities that occur in many
    disaster events - regardless of their classification. With this in
    mind, it may not be necessary to plan for terrorism, per se, as most
    disasters require similar efforts in fire suppression, public
    information and disaster assistance. Waugh is careful to recognize
    the need to accept a broader and more complex perspective though
    (2005, 10). In addition, Webb (2002) illustrates that human behavior
    in terrorism is similar to people's activities in other disasters,
    but Peek and Sutton (2003) provide empirical evidence that
    conflict-type disasters require unique or more complex forms of
    responses as compared to consensus-type disasters. Site security,
    evidence collection, decontamination, mass fatality management,
    crisis counseling, or medical inoculations may be dramatically
    different after a biological or chemical terrorist attack than a
    natural disaster. Complicating things further is the fact that a
    risk-based approach to emergency management typically looks at
    probability but not necessarily consequences (Mileti 1999, 106).
    Terrorism is undoubtedly less probable in the United States than
    other disasters, but there is a great possibility that it could have
    more deadly, devastating and disruptive consequences than most
    tornadoes, earthquakes and hurricanes if it involves weapons of mass
    destruction. Therefore, an accurate assessment of potentialities
    must include not only probability but impact as well. Furthermore,
    even if there is a desire to plan for the most common disasters
    (i.e. take a risk-based approach), a hazard and vulnerability
    assessment would be incomplete if it did not initially consider
    every type of event ranging from a wildfire in a suburban area or
    flood episode in the middle of the city to the breach of a dam in a
    lightly populated area or a hazardous materials release on a crowded
    freeway. In this sense, even the risk-based approach to emergency
    management is concerned with all types of hazards. All of this
    suggests that dilemmas and complexity exist among terrorism, the
    all-hazards model and the management of risk. Nonetheless, it should
    be clear that our efforts to deal with terrorism should be built
    upon the existing disaster framework, rather than dismantling
    current emergency management institutions to plan for terrorist
    attacks.