STATEMENT BY

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE**

**FOR**

**WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS**

# ROGER F. NORIEGA

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON WELLNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

# OCTOBER 16, 2003

# 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss United States policy toward Cuba.
I\'m delighted to have this opportunity to address this important topic.
One point I\'d like to make from the start, which relates directly to
the challenges to achieving a transition: recent events in Cuba have
opened the eyes of many around the world to the true nature of the
Castro regime.

The climate is changing dramatically. Just a few days ago, a trendy
crowd in Paris, including Catherine Deneuve and Pedro Almodóvar \-- was
chanting \"Cuba sí, Castro no.\" When the Bush Administration and the
French Communist Party both condemn Castro\'s repression, you know that
Castro is in deep trouble.

How did we get here?

First, President Bush is committed to a rapid, peaceful transition to
democracy in Cuba. This Administration has extended more material
support and more moral support to the opposition than ever before, and
has encouraged our gratifyingly eager European allies to reach out to
the dissidents, too. Just last Friday, the President announced several
new initiatives, which I will describe in detail, to encourage a
transition to a free and democratic Cuba.

The President has dashed Castro\'s hopes for an accommodation: he has
unambiguously pledged to veto embargo-busting bills. Castro\'s escape
route \-- using U.S. tourist dollars or direct U.S. financing to prop up
his police state \-- has been cut off.

Castro also understands that he dare not use the desperation of the
Cuban people to flee his tyranny to blackmail the United States. We
clearly told the Cubans: \"Cuba should understand that any political
manipulation of the desire of Cubans to escape from Cuba that results in
a mass migration to the United States would be considered a hostile
act.\" No escape, and no blackmail.

That Castro runs a dictatorship which denies Cubans their basic rights
was not a surprise to us. But for many, it was a revelation, and one
that has helped us all \-- Americans, and our allies around the world
\-- to recognize that we all agree that the Cuban regime has betrayed
its people politically and failed them economically. We recognize that
the Cuban people will be best served by an end to the dictatorship,
followed by a full transition to democracy characterized by open markets
and the respect for human rights. Our commitment to helping Cubans
achieve genuine democracy is an important unifying concept, drawing us
together on an issue more often marked by disagreements.

**[Growing Multilateral Consensus for Change and Title
III]{.underline}**

The growing international consensus on the nature of the regime and the
need for change plays out in many contexts: many of those who had stood
by Castro in those early days have now begun to speak out publicly
against the abuses of his regime. Even before the regime\'s ruthless
repression of civil society in March of this year, President Luis Inacio
Lula da Silva of Brazil said in late 2002, "Let's not confuse the
passion that my generation has for the Cuban revolution and what it
represented then with any approval of the Cuban regime today. I defend
religious freedom, freedom for trade unions and political freedom."

Nobel Prize-winning Portuguese novelist Jose Saramago, a dedicated
Communist and previously an admirer of the Cuban revolution, put it
succinctly in reacting to Castro's crackdown: \"This is as far as I go
\... to dissent is a right."

The critical factor in the coalescence of this unprecedented
multilateral consensus on Cuba was the egregious act of repression which
took place in March and April. Rather than detail the injustices of the
Cuban regime\'s repression here, I would direct the Committee to the
superb Amnesty International report, \"Essential Measures? Human Rights
Crackdown in the Name of Security,\" which is an extremely complete and
credible depiction of the mechanism of Castro's brutality. It is
important to note that the Cuban regime\'s actions were not a sign of
strength, but of fear \-- fear of its own people and fear that it will
not survive Castro's demise. As the noted exiled Cuban academic Juan
Antonio Blanco recently pointed out, the regime convicted people to
lengthy jail sentences for owning a decrepit typewriter to send a simple
message: it will treat Cubans who seek their fundamental freedoms
peacefully \"with the same implacable rigor with which it smashed
earlier armed opposition to the revolution.\" The Castro regime knows
that it is in a fight for its life.

This is a fight that the regime will lose. In their superb analysis and
call for action published in the Washington Post on September 21, former
eastern European Presidents Vaclav Havel, Arpad Goncz and Lech Walesa,
each a product of his own country\'s progress from repression to
democracy, said that, even in the wake of the repression, \"the voices
of free-thinking Cubans are growing louder, and that is precisely what
Castro and his government must be worried about.\"

That repression provoked our European and some Latin American allies to
denounce the regime in some of the most dramatic and compelling terms
ever. Latin American nations led the effort at the 2003 Human Rights
Commission to win approval for a resolution on Cuba.

As the Committee is well aware, the right of U.S. nationals that own
claims to confiscated property in Cuba to bring suit under Title III of
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act may be
suspended for six month-periods only if the President \"determines and
reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least
15 days before such effective date that the suspension is necessary to
the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba.\" In justifying previous waivers, this
Administration has cited the growing international consensus to bring
pressure for real change in Cuba and the need to encourage and
strengthen that multilateral approach to advance democracy, human rights
and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. For example:

-   In March, the European Union (EU) condemned the arrests of the 75
    Cuban dissidents.

-   In both April and in May, the EU's Council of Foreign Ministers
    condemned the GOC crackdown and called for the immediate release of
    all political prisoners.

-   On April 30, the European Commission decided to postpone
    indefinitely Cuba's bid to join the Cotonou agreement, a
    preferential trade pact.

-   On June 5, in an action that infuriated the dictator Castro, the EU
    announced its decision to limit bilateral high-level governmental
    visits, reduce the profile of member states\' participation in
    cultural events, and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day
    celebrations.

Individually, governments have taken actions and made statements, too:

-   the Italian national assembly called on the government to cut off
    all assistance to Cuba.

-   the Dutch Economic Ministry cancelled an official trade mission to
    Cuba.

-   Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio cited the "very serious human
    rights violations" in Cuba, causing Castro to shut down the Spanish
    Cultural Center in Havana.

-   United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office Parliamentary
    Under-Secretary of State Bill Rammell condemned "the lack of
    fundamental freedoms and rights in Cuba" and called upon the Cuban
    government to respect international standards as set out in the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

-   In June, the French Foreign Ministry announced its decision to
    reassess its cooperation with Cuba in view of the GOC's "violation
    of the freedoms of expression and opinion," and later announced its
    decision to seek to aid the Cuban people but not the government \--
    precisely mirroring the U.S. position.

-   The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Czech Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs expressed grave concern over the arrests and called on Cuba
    to cooperate with the UNCHR.

There have been actions taken in our hemisphere, as well:

-   In April, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated its
    profound concern about violations of Cubans\' rights by the regime.

-   In May, 17 OAS member states, including 14 of Cuba's Latin American
    neighbors, issued a declaration citing the arrest and severe
    sentencing of 75 Cuban citizens who were exercising their
    fundamental rights.

-   Both the Chilean House and Senate passed resolutions opposing the
    crackdown, as did the Central American Parliament.

-   Finally, in April, a coalition of Latin American and European
    nations sponsored \-- and the UNCHR approved \-\-- a resolution on
    Cuba, reiterating its call for a visit to Cuba by a personal
    representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The
    Cuban government continues to refuse to allow a visit.

I must note with disappointment that two Latin American leaders \--
President da Silva of Brazil, and Foreign Minister Bielsa of Argentina
\-- visited Cuba within the last month and did not meet with the
opposition leaders or publicly address the recent crackdown by the
Castro regime. We believe that public recognition of the opposition and
open support for democratic development and proper observation of human
rights should be an essential part of any such visit to Cuba. To do
otherwise sends the wrong message to the dissidents and to Castro and
his henchmen.

Unfortunately, the actions -- or lack of actions -- by Brazilian and
Argentine officials during visits to Cuba reflect an ambivalence of many
Western Hemisphere nations to the recent repression in Cuba. Given their
own struggles for political and civil rights \-- for societies built on
the law of rule, not the rule of one man or a junta -- it is sad that
they appear to have turned their back on those struggling in Cuba for
rights now codified in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

As Secretary Powell said so eloquently in Santiago in June, after the
OAS General Assembly: "how could we, as a Community of Democracies which
has seen what we have been able to achieve in this hemisphere over the
last fifteen or twenty years, fail to speak out with respect to what
Castro is doing to his people?\"

It is my profound desire, and I take as a personal mission, to encourage
greater involvement by Latin American governments in the quest for
democracy and development in Cuba, that is consistent with our shared
commitment as articulated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

###### Title IV and Foreign Investment Flows

The record on Title IV is equally clear: foreign investment in Cuba is
tailing off, partially because Cuba is bad for business, and partially
because of the dissuasive impact Title IV has had on potential
investors.

As the Committee is aware, the Cuban economy is controlled by the
government, which is the dominant employer. The GOC permits only
carefully-controlled foreign investment in joint ventures. The economy
went into a tailspin when Soviet subsidies were ended, causing the
regime to take desperate moves in a period which it qualified as nearly
like a state of war. Some limited \"elements of capitalism\" were
permitted.

While the \"elements of capitalism,\" increased remittances and foreign
investment in the tourist and mining sectors, permitted the regime to
ride out the storm, the economy nonetheless lost 40% of GDP \-- a
catastrophic depression. Now the regime is busily walking back by
withdrawing permits, raising taxes, and staging detailed \"inspections\"
of these quasi-capitalistic microenterprises. The message is clear:
Castro will permit the minimum economic activity to avoid the abyss, but
not at the risk of loosening political control.

And it\'s hurting Cubans. The UN Economic Commission on Latin America
(ECLAC), in a study compared in conjunction with at Cuban government
think-tank, concludes that Cuba must ease restrictions on small
businesses to revive its suffering economy. Cuba needs deregulation in
order to be able to achieve real growth, but Castro cannot allow that
without ceding decision-making authority.

One regime move which remains in place is its effort to encourage joint
ventures, also known as \"economic associations,\" to draw in foreign
investors. The record has been extremely poor from the perspective of
the investors. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since such endeavors
were legalized more than 20 years ago, only 397 remained at the end of
2002. The number of joint ventures formed each year has been steadily
declining since 1997, which I don\'t need to remind this committee is
the year after the LIBERTAD Act was passed. To put this in perspective,
when the LIBERTAD Act was under consideration, Cuban figures numbered
joint ventures in the 360-375 range,

with projections that these would grow at a pace of 50-60 a year. Today,
there are 397, maybe an increase of 25 such ventures in the seven years
since LIBERTAD's enactment.

It has been estimated by U.S.-based academicians, using the few hard
facts which the Cuban regime divulges regarding its economy, that
foreign direct investment flows decreased from \$448 million in 2000 to
\$39 million in 2001, rising only slightly to \$60 million in 2002. In
that year, the Cuban government authorized 24 investment proposals with
partners from 13 countries. The value of total foreign investment has
been given as US\$100 million, but 10 proposals were effected outside
Cuba in third countries. Thus, Cuba directly benefited from only 14 new
foreign-investment ventures in 2002, out of a total of 397 ventures in
operation.

The trend lines of new foreign investment are dropping, and we believe
that one reason why is the continued pressure on foreign firms not to
traffic in confiscated property. Certainly we receive regular inquiries
from foreign firms about the implications of the legislation, and from
U.S. claimants who have been contacted by foreign firms

######  Another factor is the regime\'s offensive and hamhanded approach to its foreign investors. We know that European countries are the biggest foreign investors in Cuba, and that European tourists are the principal foreign visitors to the island. But Castro has gone out of his way to denounce European leaders, especially Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar and Italian President Silvio Berlusconi, in the most insulting of terms \-- even though Spanish and Italian investors and tourists rank in the top three of both categories in Cuba.

Europeans are getting tired of this state of affairs, and in July 2002
presented the regime with a coordinated document detailing,
point-by-point, the difficulties in doing business in Cuba. For example,
the document cited problems in obtaining work and residence permits for
foreign workers; noted complaints that the Cubans gave European
investors little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, forcing professionally
unsuitable workers on the European investors, yet reserved to the regime
the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. The regime
responded with a blast in the form of a diplomatic note blaming Europe
for Cuba\'s problems \-- a foretaste of Castro\'s reaction when the
Europeans dared to criticize his crackdown on the opposition.

###### U.S. Programs to Promote Democracy and Human Rights

It is clear that with Castro there can be no reform in Cuba. President
Bush's Initiative for a New Cuba challenged the Castro government to
undertake political and economic reforms. The President made clear that
his response to such concrete reforms would be to work with the U.S.
Congress to ease the restrictions on trade and travel between the United
States and Cuba. For the first time since the Castro regime came to
power, the United States offered to match steps toward freedom and more
open markets by the Government of Cuba with steps to ease the embargo
and travel restrictions. Not surprisingly, the Castro regime rejected
this opportunity to help move his country toward a soft landing.

The Administration will not wait for Fidel Castro to show that he is
interested in change, because we don't believe that day will come. What
we will continue to do is focus on actions designed to accelerate and
shape the democratic changes the Cuban people seek. Toward that end, we
are:

-   Maintaining and augmenting our [support for Cuba's growing civil
    society]{.underline}. Much has been done; we need to redouble our
    efforts in this climate of increased repression, bringing in new
    Cuban and international actors.

-   [Increasing efforts to break the information blockade Castro has on
    the Cuban people. Steps have already been taken to improve the
    effectiveness of Radio and TV Marti through]{.underline} innovative
    new technical measures.

-   [Maintaining multilateral and international momentum]{.underline}
    against the regime's abuses and for fundamental change that will
    increase pressure on the regime itself. The international consensus
    that Castro created by revealing the true, oppressive nature of his
    government is the single most important new factor in the quest to
    encourage democratic development in Cuba. We will work with foreign
    governments, with regional parliaments, with political party
    internationals, and in all available international organizations to
    make clear the international community's insistence on real reform.

-   [Maintaining our pressure on human rights issues
    generally]{.underline}, including by working with like-minded
    governments to adopt a UN Human Rights Commission resolution on Cuba
    which reflects the international consensus on Cuba today.

-   [Raising our profile in the public diplomacy and public affairs
    arenas]{.underline}, particularly to transmit our message of support
    for the Cuban people for rapid and effective change in Cuba.

-   I believe it is critical to [augment our outreach to
    Congress]{.underline} on developments in Cuba and with respect to
    our policy, and I'm committed to regular discussions with the
    relevant committees to accomplish this.

-   We will continue to work to [make sure that travel by Americans to
    Cuba consistently supports our policy goals]{.underline}. We have
    begun this process by eliminating and refining license categories.
    Working with Treasury's OFAC and other involved agencies, we will
    also seek enforcement actions against those who travel in violation
    of the law.

-   We have taken a number of actions to [confront the challenges of
    Cuban espionage against the United States]{.underline} by insisting
    that Cuba's representatives here are authentic diplomats and not
    spies.

-   We continue to demand [reciprocal treatment for Cuban Interests
    Section staff]{.underline}, compared to treatment by Cuba of our
    diplomats in Havana.

-   The Administration remains committed to taking concrete steps, using
    the legal tools available to us, to [confront trafficking by foreign
    corporations in properties confiscated by the regime from
    Americans]{.underline}.

**[President\'s October 10 Speech]{.underline}**

There is more. The President spoke on October 10, underscoring his
commitment to breaking the information blockade imposed on the Cuban
people by the regime. He noted recent innovations that are helping to
bring more broadcasts to more Cuban households.

The President also announced three important new initiatives to show our
solidarity with the Cuban people and help them to achieve a democratic
transition. Those steps included:

-   Formation of a [Commission for Assistance to a Free
    Cuba]{.underline}, co-chaired by Secretaries Powell and Martinez and
    comprised of U.S. Executive Branch agency representatives, to help
    prepare the U.S. government to provide effective assistance to a
    free Cuba. The Commission will consider the elements of a
    comprehensive program to assist the Cuban people to establish
    democracy and the rule of law, create the core institutions of free
    enterprise, modernize infrastructure, and provide health, housing,
    and human services.

-   [Greater Enforcement of Travel Restrictions:]{.underline} We believe
    that greater enforcement of travel restrictions will make more
    certain that permitted travel for Americans (like family visits,
    humanitarian aid, research) is not abused and used as cover for
    illegal business travel, to skirt restrictions on carrying cash into
    Cuba, or tourism. Our concern is that violations of restrictions
    serve only to funnel funds to the dictator, and our goal is to help
    the Cuban people while not benefiting Castro\'s repressive regime.
    Enforcement agencies will increase inspections of travelers and
    shipments to and from Cuba and target those who illegally travel to
    Cuba via third countries or on private vessels.

-   [Migration]{.underline}: The U.S. Government needs to improve its
    ability to identify and protect those who face persecution in Cuba
    and provide them the opportunity to come to the United States
    safely. Our goal is to see that no Cuban finds it necessary to risk
    his or her life on the high seas to come to the United States. One
    consequence of this action should be to increase the number of new
    migrants admitted from Cuba through a safe, legal, and orderly
    process. We will undertake a public diplomacy campaign in the U.S.
    and Cuba to better inform Cubans about safe and legal migration
    options. Two related initiatives which I feel strongly about are the
    need to resume full monitoring of all returned migrants, and the
    need to hold a new lottery \-- whether or not the regime approves
    \-- to replenish the data base of Cubans who wish to leave Cuba
    legally.

### CONCLUSION

This is a crucial time for the cause of a free Cuba. Some of our
efforts, like Titles III and IV of the Libertad Act, are bearing fruit.
Too, our allies, especially in Europe, see the regime for what it is,
and are insisting on democratic change like never before. Even more
encouraging is that Cubans of conscience with a commitment to democracy
and reform are working day-by-day for change. The Bush Administration
will work with you to do everything we can to support them.

The best news is that the crackdown did not crush the opposition, but
rather imbued the remaining activists with a new sense of urgency and
purpose. Oswaldo Paya has reconstructed his network of civil society
activists, and in an act of real defiance, delivered another 14,000
signatures to the regime last week. Oscar Elias Biscet, Marta Beatriz
Roque, and Raul Rivero are in jail for daring to think about the future
in defiance of a dictatorship trapped in the past. Former East European
presidents Havel, Walesa, and Goncz recently wrote about Cuba: \"the
internal opposition is getting stronger, it has not been brought to its
knees by the police round up last March, times are changing, the
revolution is getting old and the regime is getting nervous.

Mr. Castro has reason to be nervous in the face of an international
community which is confident and united as never before. President Bush
is committed to seeing the end of the Castro regime, and the dismantling
of the apparatus which keeps him in power. And we are preparing for the
day when Castro\'s regime and its repression are no more.

Thank you for the chance to speak with you today.