**[An Interview by Harald Atmanspacher.]{.underline}**

(This interview is to be published in

J. Consciousness Studies: September 2006)

1\. You have been actively interested in the relationship between mind
and matter for almost half a century. Shortly after receiving your PhD
at Berkeley, you went to work with Wolfgang Pauli at the ETH in Zurich,
in 1958, the year Pauli died. During that period, you told me, you
drafted a manuscript entitled \`\`Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics\'\'
which was never published. But its title reappeared in your book of
1993. What stimulated your interest so early on in your career, and what
were your ideas at that time?

HPS: 1959 was indeed early in my career as a PhD, but more than a dozen
years into my concerns with these matters. Already in high school I had
become very interested in the wave-particle puzzle, and my driving
motive in becoming a physicist was really to solve that mystery. Looking
now at my 1959 essay I find it remarkably mature. I had a solid grasp of
the technical and philosophical aspects of the situation. I find in it
today nothing that I would emend or consider naive or deficient. It is a
well-reasoned and sober assessment of the situation, and ends with the
conclusion that quantum theory \`\`primarily is a synthesis of the
idealistic and materialistic world views. To some extent it also
reconciles the monistic and pluralistic attitudes, provides a natural
understanding of creation, and permits a reconciliation of the
deterministic aspects of nature with the action of free will.\'\' I now
say much more about these matters, but nothing contrary to what I said
then.

2\. Since a bit more than a decade, the problem of how to relate
consciousness to brain activity has been put back onto the agenda, first
in the philosophy of mind, notably due to the courageous efforts of
David Chalmers and others. This has led to an increased attention in
other fields as well, including cognitive neuroscience, complex systems
research, evolutionary biology, and others. However, I think it is fair
to say that the mainstream position in the sciences is still that mental
activity can be reduced to brain activity in the sense that the mind
will be completely understood once the brain is completely understood.
Yet there are counterarguments against this position, for instance the
famous qualia arguments. How do you think about them, and which of these
counterarguments appear to be most striking to you?

HPS: I believe that the arguments advanced in favor of the idea that
\`\`understanding the brain\'\' entails \`\`understanding the mind\'\'
are malformed and irrational. What does \`\`understanding the brain\'\'
mean? What does the word \`\`brain\'\' mean as opposed to \`\`mind\'\'?
The aimed-at, and completely reasonable, meaning in this context of the
phrase \`\`understanding the *brain*\'\' is that this understanding
should be basically in terms of the laws and concepts of *physics*. If
\`\`understanding the brain\'\' is not basically tied into understanding
the brain in terms of the laws and concepts of physics then the notions
\`\`mind\'\' and \`\`brain\'\' are nebulous and ill-defined, and no
sharp conclusions can be reached. But if the phrase means understanding
the brain in terms of the laws and concepts of physics then the first
question is: *which physics, classical or quantum*?

The answer is clear! The classical laws are fundamentally incorrect at
the ionic level at which be basic dynamics occurs, hence one must in
principle use the quantum laws and concepts. There is no rational
controversy about whether or not quantum effects occur in the brain \--
of course they do! The crucial question is the extent to which the
quantum, as opposed to classical, precepts are essential for the
dynamics of the brain; and to what extent a classical approximation is
valid in a warm, wet, noisy brain?

To resolve these issues one must examine how well the possible quantum
effects can survive in an environment that is potentially lethal to many
of them. Careful analysis shows that one particular quantum effect, the
\`\`quantum Zeno effect\'\' can survive, and indeed can play an
essential role in the causal relationship between a mind and its brain.

Of course, understanding *any* aspect of nature \`\`completely\'\' may
very well entail understanding all of nature completely. But this does
not mean that understanding what physics alone can say about the
mind-brain system completely entails understanding the psychologically
described aspects completely. In fact, in the orthodox quantum
description neither of the two kinds of aspects is, by itself,
dynamically complete \-- rather, they complement each other. A specific
problem is that within contemporary quantum theory the physical
description does not by itself determine the occurrence or the character
of certain *interventions* that are needed to complete the dynamics. In
actual scientific practice the causal roots of these interventions are
described in psychological terms, e.g., in terms of the intentions of
experimenters. Thus, according to contemporary orthodox basic physical
theory, but contrary to many claims made in the philosophy of mind, *the
physical domain is not causally closed*. A causally open physical
description of the mind-brain obviously cannot completely account for
the mind-brain

as a whole.

3\. In your articles you emphasize that your way to address the
mind-matter problem does not go beyond what you like to call
\`\`orthodox quantum theory\'\'. However, quantum physics in its usual
understanding excludes anything like mind, mental states, psyche, etc.
even if issues of observation and measurement are discussed. Obviously,
most experiments today are carried out in an entirely automatized way,
so conscious human observers are not at all needed to register a
measured outcome.

HPS: By \`\`orthodox quantum theory\'\' I mean, specifically, versions
of quantum theory \--such as the original pragmatic Copenhagen
interpretation, validated by actual scientific practice, and also von
Neumann\'s extension of it \-- that explicitly recognize the fact that,
*prior to the appearance of an experimental outcome*, a particular
experiment needs to be set up. This \`\`setting up\'\' *partitions* a
continuum of quantum potentialities into a finite set of discrete
possibilities. A simple example of such a partitioning is the placing of
a detector of some particular size and shape in some particular
location. The distinction between the firing and non-firing of this
detector during some specified temporal interval then induces a
bifurcation of a continuous space of potentialities into two subspaces,
each correlated with a distinctive event, or lack thereof.

Von Neumann referred to this essential physical act of partitioning as
\`\`process-1\'\' and represented it in terms of projections unto
different subspaces. Quantum theory depends upon the injection of such
process-1 *interventions* into the dynamical evolution of the state of
the system under study, which, except at the moments of these
interventions, is controlled by the Schr\\\"odinger equation (which von
Neumann called \`\`process-2\'\'). An adequate theory of nature must
accommodate physical process-1 actions even in situations in which no
human agent seems to be involved. These interventions into the physical
dynamics are perhaps the most radical innovation of quantum theory,
*vis-à-vis* classical physics.

4\. If the formal structure of orthodox quantum theory remains unchanged
in your approach, this can only mean that it also remains restricted to
the material aspects of reality. This implies that, in order to include
the mental domain, you have to invoke truly substantial additions to
your framework of thinking, which are outside the realm of established
physics. For this purpose you must have an ontology which (i) is
consistent with our knowledge of (quantum) physics; (ii) allows a
plausible incorporation of the mental, and (iii) provides ideas about
how the two are related to each other \-- quite a program! How would you
briefly sketch such an ontology?

HPS: In the first place, the structure of orthodox quantum theory allows
us to make statistical predictions about correlations between initially
known experimental conditions and the knowledge gleaned from their
experienced outcomes. In Bohr\'s words (Bohr 1963, p.60): \`\`Strictly
speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and
electrodynamics merely offers rules of calculation for deduction of
expectations about observations obtained under well-defined experimental
conditions specified by classical physical concepts\'\'. In this sense,
quantum theory concerns *directly* (i) the creation and experiencing of
\`\`well defined conditions specified by classical physical
concepts\'\'; (ii) the experiencing of outcomes of these actions; and
(iii) certain predictions concerning relations among these two kinds of
experiences. An adequate conceptual framework must provide an
understanding of our role in the creation of conditions that will allow
us to make quantum predictions pertaining to our resulting experiences.

In short, already the orthodox version of quantum mechanics, unlike
classical mechanics, is not about a physical world detached from
experiences; detached from minds. It is about predictions of
relationships \-- entailed by a particular theoretical structure \--
between certain specified kinds of experiences.

The natural *ontology* for quantum theory, and most particularly for
relativistic quantum field theory, has close similarities to key aspects
of Whitehead\'s *process ontology*. Both are built around
psycho-physical events and objective tendencies (Aristotelian
\`\`potentia\'\', according to Heisenberg) for these events to occur. On
Whitehead\'s view, as expressed in his *Process and Reality* (Whitehead
1978), reality is constituted of \`\`actual occasions\'\' or \`\`actual
entities\'\', each one of which is associated with a unique extended
region in space-time, distinct from and non-overlapping with all others.
Actual occasions actualize what was antecedently merely potential, but
both the potential and the actual are *real* in an ontological sense. A
key feature of actual occasions is that they are conceived as
\`\`becomings\'\' rather than \`\`beings\'\' \-- they are not substances
such as Descartes\' res extensa and res cogitans, or material and mental
states: they are processes.

4a. So what you suggest is to start from the ontologically neutral
Copenhagen interpretation and supplement it with an ontology that is
different from all other ontological interpretations of quantum theory
that we know of. It combines Heisenberg\'s ontology of potentia with
Whitehead\'s process ontology. Let us first talk about Heisenberg\'s
ideas, and how they go beyond the picture of a materially tangible
reality.

HPS: In his *Physics and Philosophy*, Heisenberg (1958, p.50) asked:
\`\`What happens \`really\' in an atomic event?\'\' He referred to
events as happenings: \`\`Observation \... selects of all possible
events the one that has actually happened \... Therefore, the transition
from \`possible\' to \`actual\' takes place during the act of
observation\'\' (Heisenberg 1958, p.54).

Heisenberg\'s ontology is about sudden events and about \`\`objective
tendencies\'\' for such events to happen. The natural ontological
character of the \`\`physical\'\' aspect of quantum theory, namely the
part described in terms of a wave function or quantum state, is that of
a \`\`potentia\'\' or \`\`tendency\'\' for an event to happen.
Tendencies for events to happen are not substance-like: they are not
static or persisting in time. When a detection event happens in one
region, the objective tendency for such an event to occur elsewhere
changes abruptly. Such behavior does not conform to the philosophical
conception of a substance.

Thus, neither the event nor its tendency to happen are ontologically
substantive or self-sufficient: they are intrinsically connected to one
another. Descartes\' identification of two different \`\`substances\'\'
in reality is neither helpful for nor concordant with quantum theory.
However, the conception of two differently described *aspects* of
reality accords with both the theoretical and the practical elements of
quantum theory.

4aa. Whitehead\'s ontology is particularly radical insofar as it
considers *process* as primordial, not substance \-- substance as
understood in a philosophical sense. This is in contradistinction to all
established sciences and almost all mainstream philosophy. How do you
see the chances to establish a process ontology in the sciences?

HPS: Heisenberg never fully reconciled his ontological ideas with the
epistemological stance of the Copenhagen interpretation. Chapter 3 of
*Physics and Philosophy* (Heisenberg 1958) is clearly an effort to bring
these two aspects together. But to bring them successfully together in a
rationally coherent and intellectually satisfying scheme requires one to
say something about how the particular event that actually occurs comes
to be selected.

Heisenberg did not address this issue, but Whitehead\'s account aims to
explain it. Whitehead's fundamental process is the process of combining
the pre-existing psychologically and physically described aspects of
reality together to form a new psycho-physical actual entity, or actual
occasion, that is identifiable as an actual event (\\\`a la Heisenberg),
whose physical manifestation is represented by a von Neumann process-1
action. I am merely proposing that Heisenberg\'s incomplete ontology be
completed by accepting what I regard as Whitehead\'s main ideas. The aim
of this approach is to understand how the psychological and physical
aspects of reality conspire to select the events that actually occur. It
allows the basically anthropocentric features of the pragmatic
epistemological Copenhagen interpretation to be embedded within the
general framework of a non-anthropocentric world process. (For more
details see Stapp 2006.)

4ab. So introducing Whitehead not only brings in process; it also, at
the same time, integrates the psychologically described and the
physically described aspects of reality into an overall processual
dynamics.

HPS: Yes. And getting now to your question about the possibility of
infiltrating these ideas in science, I need to stress that the core idea
that the events in our streams of consciousness are two-way causally
linked to events in the physical world lies at the intuitive heart of
our daily dealings with reality. A theory that breaks this link is
highly counterintuitive, and is also difficult to really make sense of
either in everyday life or scientific practice.

School children during the mechanical age were readily able to accept
the idea that the solid appearance of a table was an illusion; that the
table was \`\`actually\'\' mostly empty space, with tiny particles
whirling around inside. How much easier will it be for future scientists
growing up in the age of information, computers and flashing pixels to
accept the idea of a world made of events and of potentialities for
these events to occur?

My point here is that our most profound and deeply held intuition is not
about the nature of the external physical world. It is rather that our
human thoughts and efforts can make a difference in the behavior of our
bodies. Our entire lives are based squarely on this perpetually
re-validated intuition, as opposed to the proclamation of some
philosophers, that our direct awareness of the physical efficacy of our
thoughts is an illusion. The Heisenberg/Whitehead quantum ontology is
thus concordant with both our most basic intuitions and with actual
scientific practice. For this reason, I don\'t see why it should be
difficult to shift science over to this improved way of conceptualizing
nature and our role in nature.

4b. Whitehead treats matter and mind in terms of physical and mental
poles of an actual occasion. This has the flavor of a dual-aspect
approach, for which a number of other examples exist, such as Pauli\'s,
Bohm\'s, Chalmers\', or Velmans\'. How do they differ from Whitehead\'s
thinking, and from your own?

HPS: Pauli, in his discussion with Bohr about the notion of a
\`\`detached observer\'\', emphasized that the questions we pose cause
nature some \`\`trouble\'\'. The actions that instantiate these
questions are the logically needed process-1 partitionings described by
von Neumann. My work carries forward Pauli\'s emphasis on this crucial
point, but I remain so far uninfected by his speculations about
archetypes and the like. Bohm\'s approach to consciousness brings in an
infinite tower of explicate and implicate orders, each one
\`\`in-forming\'\' the one below and \`\`in-formed\'\' by the one above.
This picture is altogether different from the much more concrete
Whiteadian quantum ontology. Chalmers appears to be moving in the right
direction, but I believe he lacks a sufficiently firm grasp of quantum
theory to be able to develop his approach in a way that I think would be
fruitful. Velmans proposes an \`\`ontological monism combined with an
epistemological dualism\'\' in which the quantum-induced failure of
causal closure at the microphysical level is compensated for by a causal
closure at the neurophysiological level. However, our conscious
experiences are ontological realities in their own right, not mere
epistemological bits of knowledge. So the claim of ontological monism
seems unnatural, and the possibility of uncontrolled microscopic
fluctuations exploding into uncontrolled neurophysiological fluctuations
makes problematic the claim of dynamical completeness at the
neurophysiological level.

But why go that route at all when quantum theory offers the possibility
of *bona fide* straightforward real influences of conscious efforts upon
physical brains, and consequently upon bodily behavior, without any
demand of a causal closure of the physical at any level? Why hang onto
one of the most controversial aspects of a materialist worldview, namely
the notion that the causal efficacy of our conscious efforts is an
illusion, when quantum theory seems to say just the opposite, and even
provides the technical means for implementing the causal efficacy of our
efforts?

4c. What about panpsychism, a key feature of both dual-aspect types of
approaches and Whitehead\'s ontology? At which point in biological
evolution do you think that the psychological aspect, the mental pole of
actual occasions, becomes manifest? Or does it go all the way down to
elementary particles?

HPS: Reduction events cannot act microscopically on individual
particles. That would destroy the oft-observed interference effects. So
we do not have end-to-end \`\`panpsychism\'\'. Indeed, von Neumann\'s
analysis of the measurement problem shows that it is nearly impossible
to establish, below the level of human involvement, any failure of the
unitary law (process-2) of purely physically determined evolution. The
need for actual occasions even at the human level derives only from the
philosophical commitment to accept as the foundation of objective
science the outcomes of experiments \`\`regarding which we are able to
communicate to others what we have done and what we have learned\'\'
(Bohr 1963, p.3). At present, we lack the empirical evidence needed to
specify, on objective scientific grounds, the details of the embedding
non-anthropocentric ontology which Whitehead's ideas demand. But we are
certainly not yet at the end of science.

5\. As to the physical pole of Whitehead\'s actual occasions, you
suggest a drastic reinterpretation, or better a major extension, of von
Neumann\'s account of quantum measurement (von Neumann 1932, Chaps.5,6).
While von Neumann discussed the physical aspects of measurement only,
you refer to Bohr\'s and Heisenberg\'s distinction of (i) choices made
by an observer (or experimenter) in terms of questions that are posed to
nature and (ii) choices made by nature in order to answer those
questions. The second aspect clearly refers to physics and places us in
the role of detached observers, i.e., as \`\`impotent witnesses\'\'.
However, the first aspect introduces intentional actions by conscious
human beings, at least if controlled experiments are discussed. As such,
it escapes a purely physical discussion and points to the causal gap
that you indicated above.

HPS: Von Neumann, the mathematician, described the purely physical
aspect of the probing action, whereas Bohr, as physicist-philosopher,
described the enveloping conceptual structure needed to tie the
mathematical formalism to the activities and the knowledge of human
beings. Bohr\'s pragmatic epistemology rationally accommodates the
process-1 partitioning that is not understandable from within the causal
framework provided by the mathematical formalism alone. This deficiency
in the purely physical description is the causal gap. Bohr\'s pragmatic
epistemology, eschewing ontological commitments, fills this gap by
referring to the free choices of human beings. But Whiteheadian quantum
ontology accepts *in reality* what Bohr accepts only pragmatically,
namely the idea that our conscious intentions cause, at least in part,
our intentional actions. This can be achieved by regarding the quantum
reduction events to be the physical manifestations of the termination of
a psycho-physical process. Bohr's free choices are the psychological
correlate of such a process-1 action, and, conversely, von Neumann's
process-1 actions are the physical correlates of these conscious choice.
The physical and psychological aspects of reality are thus tied together
in the notion of a quantum event.

Within orthodox thinking, the physical process-1 action results from, as
von Neumann\'s words emphasize, an intervention from outside the
physically described domain. This process has, according to contemporary
quantum theory, no sufficient causal roots in the physical alone. The
experimenter\'s \`\`free choice\'\' *participates* in the selection of
the needed partition that physical processes alone are unable to
achieve. It is then the job of a satisfactory ontology to place these
anthropocentric elements of human effortful attention within a broader
non-anthropocentric conception of reality.

Ontological uniformity requires, plausibly, every such quantum event to
have *some* experiential or felt component. But it does not require
every actual occasion to have the full richness of a fully developed
\`\`high-grade\'\' human experience. The richness of the experience
would naturally be expected to be correlated with the complexity of the
physical system upon which von Neumann\'s process-1 acts.

5a. The correlation between physical state reduction (via projection)
and mental subjective experience is posited as an assumption in your
ontology, but it certainly does not follow from quantum theory! It is
very much analogous to von Neumann\'s assumption of a psycho-physical
parallelism of brain and mind. Although von Neumann sometimes alludes to
the mind (\`\`abstract ego\'\'), he actually refers to the brain in his
discussion of quantum measurement.

HPS: Von Neumann focused on the mathematics, and avoided getting overly
enmeshed in philosophical issues of interpreting quantum theory. But
Heisenberg, speaking from the pragmatic epistemological perspective,
said: \`\`The observation itself changes the probability function
discontinuously; it selects of all possible events the actual one that
has taken place\'\' (Heisenberg 1958, p. 54). Thus, Heisenberg tied the
mathematically described reduction events to the process of
\`\`observation\'\'.

In order to have a useful scientific theory one needs to link the
mathematics to the perceptual aspects of our experience. The
mathematical structure of quantum theory is such that the classical
materialist accounts of the physical aspects of nature simply do not
work. To achieve a conceptualization that ties the new mathematics to
actual empirical scientific practice, in a rationally coherent and
practically useful way, the founders of quantum theory switched to a
conceptualization of the physical world based on empirical events, such
as the click of a Geiger counter, and on potentialities for such events
to occur. The mathematics thereby becomes linked to empirical phenomena.

5b. The notion of an interaction between mind and matter, as in your
recent paper (Stapp 2005) on \"interactive dualism\", may be somewhat
misleading. It seems to me that things are much more subtle than a
straightforward interaction between the mental and the physical (which
one might naively interpret as basically similar to a collision of
billiard balls). The proposal by Eccles, whose physical features were
worked out by Beck, has this overly simplistic appeal because some
\`\`mental force\'\' is assumed to act directly on synaptic, i.e.
material, transport processes. Your picture is definitely much more
subtle: the requirement that physical and mental outcomes of an actual
occasion must match, i.e. be correlated, acts as a constraint on the way
in which these outcomes are formed within the actual occasion. So the
notion of an interaction should be replaced by the notion of a
constraint set by mind-matter correlations.

HPS: It would indeed be misleading to understand the \`\`action of mind
upon brain\'\' directly via a \`\`force\'\'. The effect is associated
with a modulation of the frequency of certain process-1 actions that act
directly upon large-scale (brain-sized) patterns of neurological
activity. This modulation of frequencies is achieved, strictly within
the pragmatic framework (that is, without any of Whitehead's ontological
superstructure) by exploiting certain human \`\`free choices\'\' that
are allowed within that pragmatic framework. This language suggests that
the conscious act is the cause, and the correlated physical process-1
action is the effect. This interpretation ties the theory most naturally
and directly to actual scientific practice. In actual practice the
experimenter chooses on the basis of reasons and goals which of the
experimental options will be pursued, within the array of possibilities
that the structure of the physical theory provides. Bohr (1958, p.73)
spoke, accordingly, of \`\`the free choice of experimental arrangement
for which the mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical formalism
offers the appropriate latitude\'\'. We are dealing here with the
sophisticated way in which mental intention influences quantum processes
in the brain. *Ideas* do not simply push classically conceived particles
around!

6\. A major point in your ontological framework is that physical state
reduction and mental subjective experience jointly constitute the
transition from the continuous and the potential to the discrete and the
actual. Another significant issue is the contrast between instantaneous
projections, which von Neumann introduced as an idealization that he
characterized as \`\`not enjoyable\'\', versus an objective dynamical
process of measurement that takes time, as advocated by a number of
physicists. For instance, Penrose strongly argues that way in his
speculations about mind and matter. Of course, this would require an
individual rather than a statistical description of quantum measurement,
of which no broadly accepted version is available so far.

HPS: The mathematical neatness of instantaneous (along a space-like
surface) reduction makes it the better option, technically and
mathematically, and I see no reason to complicate the dynamics by
smearing out in time the reduction events. Indeed, to do so would
confuse everything, since the smearing would not be strictly confined,
and hence process-2 would never hold rigorously.

The fact that we experience process as involving duration is adequately
explained by James\' \`\`marching band metaphor\'\'. Each instantaneous
\`\`snap shot\'\' corresponding to a single experience would catch the
components of brain activity correlated with the various stages from
just beginning to be experienced, to full blown vivid consciousness, to
fading out. This structure creates the impression that the experience
has duration, although it is really instantaneous \-- or confined to a
space-like surface \-- when mapped into real space-time (Stapp 1993).

7\. For details of what happens at the mental pole of an actual
occasion, the notions of attention and intention according to William
James in combination with your concept of a \`\`template for action\'\'
figure prominently in your work, e.g. in Stapp (1999) and in Schwartz,
Stapp, and Beauregard (2005). Could you outline how these terms are
related to one another?

HPS: A *template for action*\] is defined to be a macroscopic (extending
over a large portion of the brain) pattern of neurological activity
that, if held in place for a sufficiently long period, will tend to
produce a brain activity that will tend to produce an intended
experienced feedback. This pattern of brain activity is the neural
correlate (specified by a process-1 action) of a conscious effort to act
in an intended way. William James (1892, p.227) says that \`\`no object
can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the amount
of attention that an object receives after it has caught our attention
is another matter. It often takes effort to keep mind upon it. We feel
we can make more or less of the effort as we choose. \... This feeling
\... will deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable
ideas which else would fade away more quickly.\'\'

Effort is a particular feature of consciousness that we feel we can
control, and that has the effect of intensifying experience. Hence it is
reasonable to suppose that increasing effort increases the rate at which
conscious events are occurring. If the rate becomes sufficiently great
then the quantum Zeno effect will, according to the quantum laws, kick
in, and the repetitious interventions of the probing actions will tend
to hold in place the template for action. That effect will, in turn,
tend to make the intended action occur. By virtue of this dynamically
explained causal effect of willful conscious effort upon brain activity,
trial-and-error learning should hone the correlation between the
consciously experienced intention and an associated template for action
that produces, via the physical laws, the intended feedback. This
*explains* dynamically the capacity of an effortful intention to effect
its intended consequence.

7a. From a psychological point of view, one might distinguish a series
of steps: from a mental state with a particular intensity of attention
to the shift of that attention and finally to an intention to make a
decision, which is correlated with a neural template for action. This
template precedes the action \-- it is not already the action itself.
Are there empirically accessible psychological observables for these
different steps?

HPS: Actions include brain actions that control or guide other brain
actions. The theory says that each of the different experienced stages
should occur in conjunction with a different template for action. For
instance, the actualization of one early template could tend to set in
motion a multi-component sequence leading from neural activity somewhere
in the cortex to activity in the motor cortex to muscular activity.

7b. Concerning the neural correlates of such psychological states and
observables, we need the notion of a neural assembly. If you assume that
such neural assemblies are subject to a quantum Zeno effect, this
requires that they be in an unstable state, such as a quantum
superposition, or an entangled state. How do you think this condition
can be realized for an assembly of thousands of neurons?

HPS: Environmental decoherence effects will reduce the entire brain
state in question (represented by a reduced density matrix) to a
statistical mixture of states each of which is essentially a slightly
smeared out classically conceived possible state of the entire brain.
This decomposition of the state of the brain into a mixture of
almost-classical states is very useful in connection with this theory.
It allows neuroscientists to quite accurately conceive of the brain as a
collection of almost-classical possibilities that continually diffuse
into more diversified collections, but that are occasionally trimmed
back, in association with a conscious experience, to the subcollection
compatible with that experience. These processes all involve, or can
involve, assemblies of thousands or millions of neurons.

7ba. What do you mean by \`\`slightly smeared out\'\' and
\`\`almost-classical\'\'? If you have some remaining quantum features in
the brain state \-- which you need for the quantum Zeno effect to act
\-- you must assume that the brain state was a quantum state to begin
with. How is such a state constituted, or prepared? Or do you assume
that *every* system is fundamentally a quantum system which, under the
influence of its environment, decoheres more or less rapidly into
classical subsystems?

HPS: By \`\`slightly smeared out\'\' and \`\`almost-classical\'\' I mean
what you would get from a classically conceived state if you replaced
each point particle by a very tiny continuous cloud of possibilities.
Each physical system \-- including a brain or a template for action \--
inherits quantum features from the quantum state of the universe as a
whole. In the case of a brain, decoherence mechanisms are acting
strongly at all times, and they never allow its state to be anything
other than a mixture of almost-classical (i.e., slightly smeared out)
states. Hence the classical intuitions of neuroscience about the brain
are generally valid, except for two things. Firstly, at almost every
instant the cloud of possibilities is growing and diffusing into a wider
set of possibilities which, however, every once in a while (at a
reduction event) gets reduced to a subset. Secondly, the diffusing
action can be curtailed by the quantum Zeno effect which arises from the
small, but nonzero, quantum smearing of each one of the almost-classical
components.

In this way, the brain is described strictly quantum mechanically, yet
it can be understood to be very similar to a classical statistical
ensemble. Importantly, the relevance of the quantum aspects for
consciousness is not due to some macroscopic quantum superposition
effect, which would be extremely hard to realize. The pertinent
non-classical feature is the occasional occurrence of a sudden reduction
of the ensemble to a subensemble that is compatible with the content of
a co-occurring conscious experience.

The occurrences of such reductions are logically *possible* because the
state of the brain represents not an evolving material substance but
rather an evolving set of potentialities for a psycho-physical event to
occur. The occurrences of such reductions are logically *necessary*
because the expanding ensemble of almost classical states is a
continuous structure that must be decomposed into a collection of
discrete alternatives, each associated with a distinct kind of
experience. It is only by means of this partitioning that the theory is
tied securely to human experiences, and to the empirically validated
rules of quantum theory. The smear of almost-classical possibilities
must be partitioned, prior to each experience, into a specified
collection of components at least one of which corresponds to a
distinctive experience, or lack thereof.

7c. As you said before, brain states or templates for action cannot be
Zeno-stabilized simply by the direct action of something like a mental
force \-- this would lead to the same basic problem that Eccles has with
his proposal for a direct mental influence on synaptic processes. So
what do you concretely assume at the neural level that is capable of
exerting a quantum Zeno effect upon the template for action?

HPS: As an example, let us suppose that the occurring process-1 action
partitions the state of the brain into two parts. One of them, the
\`\`yes\'\' part, is the neural correlate of the mental intent to, say,
\`\`raise the arm\'\'. This neural correlate is a template for action.
The immediately felt psychological effect of an increased intentional
effort is an intensified experience of the projected intended feedback.
(These *projected* experiences are constructed from the memories of
earlier experiences, as discussed in Stapp (1993).)

Now the *timings* of the process-1 actions are an aspect of the \`\`free
choice\'\' on the part of the human observer. It is therefore plausible
to conjecture that the effort-induced increase in the intensity of the
projected intended experience is *caused* by an increase in the
observer-controlled rate at which the associated process-1 actions are
occurring. If a sequence of essentially identical process-1 actions
occur in sufficiently rapid succession, then the associated neural
correlate (i.e., the template for action) will be held in place by the
quantum Zeno effect. The resulting *persistent* neural pattern of
activity will then tend to cause the intended action to occur. The
*effect* of the effort-induced increase in the rate of the process-1
probing actions is thus to hold in place the entire macroscopic template
for action. The dynamical effect, via the neural machinery, of this
holding in place is the likely occurrence of the intended action.

This scenario differs in two important ways from the proposal by Beck
and Eccles. First, the action does not take place at the synaptic, i.e.
*microscopic*, level: the effect is directly upon the entire template
for action, specified by von Neumann's process-1 action. And, in answer
to your question about \`\`mental force\'\', there is no action of any
forces, mental or otherwise, upon the parts of a material substrate: no
pushing around of the atoms that produces, in some totally miraculous
and unaccountable way, the action that the person has in mind. No! The
effect of the effort is on an entire macroscopic neural pattern of brain
activity. This pattern has been singled out by von Neumann's process-1
action and is held in place by the quantum Zeno effect. By coupling von
Neumann\'s dynamical rules to learning, one can rationally account for
the observed \-- and essential for human life and survival \--
correspondence between experienced intent and experienced feedback.

8\. After all, this amounts to an overall theoretical picture that
offers a strong sense of formal and conceptual coherence and is
intuitively appealing in a number of respects, but also confronts us
with a remarkable degree of complexity. What do you think: Is there any
chance that empirical work can confirm or falsify particular features of
your approach?

HPS: First of all, it is evidently forever impossible to falsify, by
empirical data alone, the opposing blatant assertion that the apparent
causal efficacy of our conscious efforts is an illusion. It is
impossible to disprove empirically the physicalist contention that our
conscious experiences are merely causally irrelevant pyrotechnics that
*seem to be* influencing the course of bodily events, but are, in
reality, merely impotent by,-products of causally self-sufficient neural
activities. But what rational argument could adequately justify such an
outrageous and completely unsupported claim? Like solipsism, such a
claim cannot be empirically falsified, but only rejected on the grounds
of its lack of reasonableness and utility.

During the nineteenth century, before the precepts of classical physics
had been shown to be *fundamentally* false, scientists and philosophers
had some sound reasons to conjecture that the physical aspects of
reality were causally closed. However, even then this led to an
unreasonableness noted by William James (1890, p.138): consciousness
seems to be \`\`an organ, superadded to the other organs which maintain
the animal in its struggle for existence; and the presumption of course
is that it helps him in some way in this struggle, just as they do. But
it cannot help him without being in some way efficacious and influencing
the course of his bodily history.\'\' James went on to examine the
circumstances under which consciousness appears, and ended up: \`\`The
conclusion that it is useful is, after all this, quite justifiable. But
if it is useful it must be so through its causal efficaciousness, and
the automaton-theory must succumb to common-sense\'\' (James 1890,
p.144).

That was James\'s conclusion even at a time when classical physical
theory seemed irrefutable, and the thesis of brains as mechanical
automatons was rationally supported by physics-based legs. Today,
however, classical physics has been superseded by a theory with causal
gaps that *need to be* filled in some way, and that *can be* filled by
allowing our efforts to do what they seem to be doing. Embedded in an
adequate ontology, quantum theory has the technical capacity to explain
how a person\'s conscious efforts can influence his or her bodily
actions. Consequently, there is now no rational reason whatsoever to
reject William James\'s persuasive argument.

Beyond these philosophical considerations one can reasonably claim that
the entire body of neuropsychological experimentation is confirmatory of
this theory. All the data, to the extent that it is precise enough to
say anything about the relationship between mind and brain is in line
with this theory. A large number of particular empirical findings in
neuropsychology and in the psychology of attention are discussed in
Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard (2005).

8a. The current support for this novel picture, especially as far as
cognitive neuroscience is concerned, is merely qualitative though.

HPS: Well, there are plenty of ways to falsify the quantum model. It
demands close connections between the psychological and the physical
aspects of psycho-physical events. This includes, in particular, the
putative attention-induced quantum Zeno effect of holding in place the
templates for intentional action. But there is evidently no way to
counter the claim that *whatever* connections are empirically found are
exactly what the *it\'s-all-an-illusion* proponents could claim that
their theory allows. For that position has no theoretical foundation in
established physics, and hence no basis upon which to falsify it.

Many scientists and philosophers have forced themselves to accept the
rationally unsatisfactory and unsupported physicalist position in the
mistaken belief that this is what basic physical theory demands. But the
converse is true: contemporary physical theory demands certain
interventions into the physical! The associated causal gap in a purely
physically determined causation provides a natural opening to an
interactive but non-Cartesian dualism.

9\. Since your approach does emphatically refer to attention, intention
and, if I may use this term, \`\`free will\'\', it must have ethical
implications. Would you say that proper ethical behavior can be
facilitated or even entailed by reflecting and realizing the ontological
conditions of a given situation? Or, conversely, that ethical
misbehavior is a consequence of lacking insight of appropriate
ontological conditions? Might a processually conceived quantum theory,
comprehending both psychological and physical aspects of nature, provide
insights that could underpin a science-based rational ethical theory?

HPS: Behavior, insofar as it concerns ethics, is guided by conscious
reflection and evaluation. It is not mere unreflective response. The
output of such reflections and evaluations depends, of course, on the
input, and the core of the effective input is the individual\'s
self-image in relation to his or her conception of the situation in
which he or she is embedded. One\'s weighting of the welfare of the
whole, and one\'s sensitivity to the feelings of others will surely be
enhanced when the individual sees his or her own judgments and efforts
as causally effective \-- hence important \-- inputs into a cooperative
effort to develop the vast yet-to-be-fixed potentialities of a quantum
universe that, as Bohr emphasized, can be properly conceived only as an
intricately interconnected whole.

Such a comprehension of self stands in strong contrast to an image of
the self as a cog in a pre-ordained mechanical universe \-- a cog that
thinks of his or her strenuous efforts to choose rightly as making no
actual difference whatever in the course of physical events. Such a
degradation in self-image will undoubtedly be correlated with a
debasement in behavior. Conversely, what you call ethical misbehavior
would surely be diminished by a shift in self-image from mechanical cog
to quantum player.

9a. If this is extended beyond individual human beings, it must also
have implications for human societies and their ways to interact with
each other.

HPS: The proposition, foisted upon us by a materialism based on
classical physics \-- that we human beings are essentially mechanical
automata, with every least action and thought fixed from the birth of
the universe by microscopic clockwork-like mechanisms \-- has created
enormous difficulties for ethical theory. These difficulties lie like
the plague on western culture, robbing its citizens of any rational
basis for self-esteem or self-respect, or esteem or respect for others.
Quantum physics, joined to a natural embedding ontology, brings our
human minds squarely into the dynamical workings of nature. With our
physically efficacious minds now integrated into the unfolding of
uncharted and yet-to-be-plumbed potentialities of an intricately
interconnected whole, the responsibility that accompanies the power to
decide things on the basis of one\'s own thoughts, ideas, and judgments
is laid upon us. This leads naturally and correctly to a concomitant
elevation in the dignity of our persons and the meaningfulness of our
lives. Ethical theory is thereby supplied with a rationally coherent
foundation that an automaton account cannot match.

But beyond supplying a rational foundation for Western culture, the
rooting of ethics in science, with its universal character and appeal,
shifts values toward the ecumenical, and away from those aspects of
religions that are hostile to, and preach violence against, followers of
other faiths. Such a shift is sorely needed today.

References

Bohr N.(1958): *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge*, Wiley, New York.

Bohr N.(1963): *Essays 1958/1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge*,
Wiley, New York.

Heisenberg W.(1958): *Physics and Philosophy*, Harper \\& Row, New York.

James W.(1890): *The Principles of Psychology, Vol.1*, Dover, New York
1950.

James W.(1892): ( *Psychology: The Briefer Course*). In ( *William
James: Writings 1879\--1899*), ed.by G.E.Myers, Library of America, New
York 1992.

Neumann J.von (1932): *Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik*,
Springer, Berlin. Translated as *Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1955.

Schwartz J., Stapp, H. & Beauregard, M. (2005): Quantum Physics in
Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind/Brain
Interaction. *Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. B360*, 1309-27

Stapp H.P.(1993). A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface.

In *Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics*, Springer, Berlin,
pp.145\--172.

Stapp H.P.(1999): Attention, intention, and will in quantum physics.

*Journal of Consciousness Studies* \\bf 6(8/9), 143\--164.

Stapp H.P.(2005): Quantum interactive dualism: an alternative to
materialism. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* \\bf 12(11), 43\--58.

Stapp H.P.(2006): Whitehead, James, and Quantum Theory. Submitted to
*Mind and Matter*.

Schwartz J.M., Stapp H.P., and Beauregard M.(2005): Quantum theory in
neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind/brain
interaction. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* B \\bf
360, 1309\--1327.

Whitehead A.N.(1978): *Process and Reality*, corrected edition by
D.R.Griffin and D.W.Sherburne, Free Press, New York. Originally
published 1929.