Chapter 3: Mitigation

# Chapter Outline

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in this chapter.

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A.  Tools for Mitigation

    i.  Hazard Identification and Mapping

    ii. Design and Construction Applications

    iii. Land Use Planning

    iv. Financial Incentives

    v.  Insurance

    vi. Structural Controls

B.  Impediments to Mitigation

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2.  Case Studies

    A.  Deerfield Beach, Florida: A Project Impact Community

    B.  Avalanche Mitigation in the Western United States

    C.  Tornado Safe Rooms

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary Of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

7.  Suggested Out Of Class Exercises

# Introduction

The discipline of mitigation provides the means for reducing the impacts
of disaster events. Mitigation is defined as a sustained action to
reduce or eliminate risk to people and property from hazards and their
effects.

The function of mitigation differs from the other emergency management
disciplines because it looks at long-term solutions to reducing risk as
opposed to preparedness for hazards, the immediate response to a hazard
or the short-term recovery from a hazard event. Mitigation is usually
not considered part of the emergency phase of a disaster as in response,
or as part of emergency planning as in preparedness.

The recovery function of emergency management still represents one of
the best opportunities for mitigation, and until recently, this phase in
a disaster provided the most substantial funding for mitigation
activities. In recent years, there has been a trend to greater Federal
spending on pre-disaster mitigation first in Project Impact and the
establishment of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program.

There is another difference that sets mitigation apart from the other
disciplines of emergency management. Implementing mitigation programs
and activities requires the participation and support of a broad
spectrum of players outside of the traditional emergency management
circle. Mitigation involves, among others, land use planners,
construction and building officials, both public and private, business
owners, insurance companies, community leaders and politicians.

**Tools for Mitigation**

Most practitioners agree that the primary intent of mitigation is to
ensure that fewer communities and individuals become victims of
disasters. The goal of mitigation is to create economically secure,
socially stable, better built and more environmentally sound,
communities that are out of harms way. There are numerous tools
available to accomplish this task.

*Hazard Identification and Mapping*

The most essential part of any mitigation strategy or plan is an
analysis of what the hazards are in a particular area. The resources for
hazards identification are numerous. The Federal government has
extensive programs that map virtually every hazard and these products
are available to communities. FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) provides detailed flood maps and studies and the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) provides extensive earthquake and landslide studies and
maps. Many State agencies have refined the products for hazards
identification. For example, special soil stability studies and
geological investigations which are required in some parts of California
further refine this analysis.

Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have become ubiquitous and staples
for all local planning organizations. What is often missing from the
available tools is the ability to superimpose the human and built
environment onto the hazards, thereby providing a quantified level of
risk. FEMA has developed one such tool called HAZUS. HAZUS is a
nationally applicable methodology for estimating losses from earthquakes
at the community or regional level. Currently, FEMA is expanding HAZUS
to cover hurricane, or wind losses and floods.

*Design and Construction Applications*

The design and construction process provides one of the most
cost-effective means of addressing risk. This process is governed by
building codes, architecture and design criteria, and soils and
landscaping considerations. Most often code criteria that support risk
reduction apply only to new construction, substantial renovation or
renovation to change the type or use of the building.

Enactment of building codes are the responsibility of the States and
most State codes are derivatives of one of the three model codes which
reflect geographical differences across the United States. Some States
delegate code adoption responsibility to more local governmental
authorities. Because of cost, codes that require rehabilitation of
existing potential-hazardous structures have been rarely implemented.

The construction process offers other opportunities. For example, using
fire retardant building materials such as slate instead of wood for
roofing, is important in areas of wildland/urban interface such as
Oakland, CA. Constructing houses on pilings allows for uninterrupted
flow of high velocity waves in coastal areas.

Landscaping is particularly critical in areas of potential wildfires
because vegetation close to structures can become fuel for a fire.
Clearing, grading, and siting all have potential impacts to soil
stability and erosion and can be included as part of a design or
building permit review process.

*Land Use Planning*

Mitigation programs are most successful when undertaken at the local
level where most decisions about development are made. The strategies
for land use planning offer many options for effecting mitigation. These
include: acquisition, easements, storm water management, annexation,
environmental review, and floodplain management plans. It also
encompasses a myriad of zoning options such as density controls, special
uses permits, historic preservation, coastal zone management, and
subdivision controls.

Land use planning was one of the earliest tools used to encourage
mitigation. In 1968 Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act
that established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This act
required local governments to pass a flood plain management ordinance in
return for Federally backed, low-cost flood insurance being available to
the community.

Moving structures out of harms way through property acquisition is
clearly the most effective land use planning tool but it is also the
most costly. Following the Midwest Floods of 1993, FEMA worked with
Congress to make property acquisition more feasible by providing a
substantial increase in funding for acquisition after a disaster.

*Financial Incentives*

This is one of the emerging areas for promoting mitigation. Among the
approaches being used by localities to reduce risk are creation of
special tax assessments, passage of tax increases or bonds to pay for
mitigation, relocation assistance and targeting of Federal community
development or renewal grant funds for mitigation.

The economic impacts of repetitive flooding led the citizens of Napa,
California and Tulsa, Oklahoma to pass small tax increases to pay for
flood mitigation activities. In both cases, the tax had minimal impact
on the citizens of the community but had a major impact in reducing the
potential economic losses from future floods. Berkeley, California has
passed over ten different bond issues to support seismic retrofit of
public buildings, schools and private residences.

Funding from the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been used
extensively to support local efforts at property acquisition and
relocation. These funds have been used to meet the non-Federal match on
other Federal funding which has often been a stumbling block to local
mitigation. Other Federal programs of the Small Business Administration
(SBA) and the Economic Development Administration provide financial
incentives for mitigation.

*Insurance*

There are some people who would argue with the inclusion of insurance as
a mitigation tool. Their reasoning is that insurance by itself really
only provides for a transfer of the risk from the individual or
community to the insurance company. While this is a true statement, the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the prime example of how, if
properly designed, the insurance mechanism can be a tool for mitigation.
The NFIP is considered to be one of the most successful mitigation
programs ever created.

The NFIP was created by Congress in response to the damages from
multiple, severe hurricanes and inland flooding and the rising costs of
disaster assistance after these floods. At that time, flood insurance
was not readily available or affordable through the private insurance
market. Since many of the people being impacted by this flooding were
low income, Congress agreed to subsidize the cost of the insurance so
the premiums would be affordable.

The idea was to reduce the costs to the government of disaster
assistance through insurance. The designers of this program, with great
insight, thought the government should get something for their subsidy.
So in exchange for the low cost insurance they required that communities
pass an ordinance directing future development away from the floodplain.

Today there are over 20,000 communities in the NFIP who have mitigation
programs in place.

*Structural Controls*

Structural controls are controversial as a mitigation tool. Structural
controls have usually been used to protect existing development. In
doing so, they can have both positive and negative impacts on the areas
they are not protecting. In addition, as the name implies they are used
to control the hazard not reduce it. Invariably, as was seen so
graphically in the Midwest floods, they lose control and nature wins.
However, in some circumstances, structural controls are the only
alternative.

The most common form of structural control is the levee. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (COE) have designed and built levees as flood control
structures across the United States. Levees are part of the aging
infrastructure of America. As mitigation tools, they have obvious
limitations. They can be overtopped or breached, as in the 1993 Midwest
Floods, and they give a false sense of safety that often promotes
increased development and they can exacerbate the hazard in other
locations.

After the 1993 Floods, a major rethinking of our dependency on levees
has occurred. Efforts are being made to acquire structures built behind
the levees, new design criteria are being considered and other more
wetland friendly policies are being adopted. But for a city like New
Orleans, which is built below sea level and relocation is impractical,
levees can be used effectively to protect flood prone areas.

Other structural controls are intended to protect along coastal areas.
Sea walls, bulkheads, breakwaters, groins and jetties are intended to
provide stabilization of the beach or reduce the impacts of wave action.
These structures are equally controversial as they provide protection in
one place and increase the damage in another. The shore of New Jersey is
a prime example of the failure of seawalls as a solution to shoreline
erosion problems. Cape May, New Jersey, where cars used to be raced on
the beach, lost all of its beachfront. An on going beach replenishment
project is the only thing that has brought some of it back.

**Impediments to Mitigation**

If there are so many tools that can be applied, why hasn't risk
reduction and mitigation programs been more widely applied. There are
several factors including denial of the risk, political will, costs and
lack of funding and the taking issue. In spite of the best technical
knowledge, historic occurrence, public education and media attention,
many individuals don't want to recognize that they or their communities
are vulnerable.

Recognition requires action and it could have economic consequences as
businesses decide to locate elsewhere if they find the community is at
risk. Some people are willing to try to beat the odds but if a disaster
strikes, they know the government will help them out. Gradually,
attitudes are changing. Potential liability issues are making
communities more aware, media attention to disasters has brought public
pressure and the government has provided both incentives and penalties
for not taking action.

As we have said, mitigation provides a long-term benefit. Our political
system tends to focus on short-term rewards. Developers are large
players in the political process and are often concerned that mitigation
means additional costs. Mitigation strategies and actions require
political vision and will. As Tip O'Neil, former Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives said, "All politics is local." Well, so is
mitigation. Local elected officials are the individuals who have to
promote, market and endorse adopting risk reduction as a goal. For many
elected officials, the development pressures are too much, funding is
lacking and other priorities dominate their agendas. However, with the
increasing attention to the economic, social and political costs of not
dealing with their risks, more elected officials are recognizing that
they can't afford not to take action.

Mitigation costs money. Most mitigation of new structures or development
can be passed on to the builder or buyer without much notice. Programs
of retrofit of existing structures or acquisition and relocation
projects are expensive and almost always beyond the capacity of the
local government. Funding for mitigation comes primarily from Federal
programs that need to be matched with State or local dollars. As State
and local budgets constrict, their ability to match is reduced.

Strong arguments can be made that it is in the best financial interest
of the Federal government to support mitigation. These arguments and a
series of large disasters resulted in substantial increases in Federal
funding, including new monies for pre-disaster mitigation. But the fact
remains, mitigation needs far outweigh mitigation funding.

Many mitigation actions involve privately owned property. A major legal
issue surrounding this is the taking issue. The Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of property without just
compensation. What constitutes a taking, under what circumstances and
what is just compensation have been the focus of numerous legal cases.
Several have dealt with the use of property in the floodplain and the
use of oceanfront property on a barrier island. The decisions have been
mixed and taking will continue to be an issue in implementing mitigation
programs and policies.

The three case studies included in this chapter highlight a cross
section of available mitigation tools, the process of community
involvement and partnership building that is a significant part of the
mitigation planning process and some of the impediments to effective
mitigation.

## Case Study 3.1: Deerfield Beach, Florida: A Project Impact Community

# Background

After having spent over \$20 billion in ten years (1988-1998) to help
communities repair and rebuild after natural disasters, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) decided to take a proactive approach
to reduce these costs, focusing on mitigation efforts. In 1997, FEMA
Director James Lee Witt initiated Project Impact: Building Disaster
Resistant Communities. The main goal of Project Impact, Director Witt
stated during a kick-off speech, was "to change the way America prevents
and prepares for disasters".

Project Impact was built upon three basic principles:

1.  Preventive actions must be decided at the local level;

2.  Private sector partnerships and participation is vital; and

3.  Long-term efforts and investments in prevention measures are
    essential.

Elements of the project included a national awareness campaign and
outreach to businesses and communities to educate and to encourage both
to become disaster resistant. To kick off the program, seven pilot
communities were selected that were willing to participate in FEMA's
effort to "break the damage-repair, damage-repair cycle," as stated by
Director Witt.

FEMA promised to guide communities through a risk assessment process to
identify and prioritize mitigation initiatives and to work with
community leaders to generate support and resources. These communities,
taking action to mitigate the impact of future natural disasters, would
demonstrate the economic benefits of pre-disaster mitigation to state
and local government officials, which in turn would provide a tangible,
measurable incentive for other communities to take similar action.

President Clinton committed \$50 million to Project Impact in 1998, of
which FEMA promised to provide up to \$1 million to each community
participating in the project, dedicating the "seed" money to mitigation
projects throughout the community. The local incentive for participating
in Project Impact was that these communities would have the ability to
show that "a disaster resistant community can rebound from a natural
disaster with far less loss of property and consequently much less cost
for repairs...moreover, the time lost from productive activity is
minimized for both businesses and their employees".

#### Deerfield Beach, FL Project Impact

Deerfield Beach, Florida, a coastal community of over 66,000 people, was
the first Project Impact community to partner with FEMA. Deerfield Beach
is well-acquainted with damages a natural disaster can invoke upon a
community. Having been hit by seven major hurricanes in 75 years,
residents knew more hurricanes were statistically almost a certainty.
The community's determination to decrease damages sustained from future
hurricanes, after a particularly bad blow from Hurricane Andrew in 1992,
followed by near misses of Erin and Opal in 1995, left no question as to
its selection to be the pilot Project Impact community.

Although city management was skeptical of FEMA's initial proposition,
FEMA personnel conducted frequent visits and eventually their
"sincerity" won the community over. With guidance from FEMA, Deerfield
Beach identified and prioritized mitigation projects that would be most
beneficial to the community. One of the first efforts undertaken was
retrofitting the Deerfield Beach High School, which also serves as a
community shelter during emergencies. Hurricane straps were added to the
cafeteria and auditorium, and wind shutters were placed on all the
school's windows. Deerfield Beach also retrofitted the Chamber of
Commerce with hurricane-resistant windows and put shutters on the City
Hall. Other projects that Deerfield Beach used their Project Impact
"seed" money for are included in Table 3.1.1 (below).

Table 3.1.1. Project Impact Funding Expenditures

+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| **Mitigation Effort**                               | **\$ Used**    |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Awareness Programs - CERT, EOC                      | 16,710.04      |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Business Alliance Quarterly Mtgs.                   | 3,655.01       |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| CERT Training                                       | 65,417.13      |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Critical Facilities Shuttering and                  | 348,747.06     |
|                                                     |                |
| Disaster Resistant Improvements                     |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| EOC Computers/Equipment                             | 9,378.08       |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Emergency Operations Plan                           | 30,000         |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| CERT Exercise at Universal Studios                  | 2,165.04       |
|                                                     |                |
| 1998, 1999, 2000                                    |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Hurricane Awareness Expo                            | 9,165.45       |
|                                                     |                |
| 1998, 1999, 2000                                    |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Mentoring                                           | 3,371.94       |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Public Awareness                                    | 6,008.56       |
|                                                     |                |
| PI Pins, TV Program, Vehicle Decals                 |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Mitigation Operations Center                        | 85,000         |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Neighborhood Emergency Team                         | 22,739.33      |
|                                                     |                |
| Organizational Meetings                             |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| CERT Fire and Rescue Open House                     | 9,165.88       |
|                                                     |                |
| 1999, 2000                                          |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Project Impact Booklet                              | 21,107.28      |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Office Supplies                                     | 2,036.68       |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| Shutters for Single Family Residences               | 365,332.52     |
|                                                     |                |
| Senior Citizens, Low Income Households              |                |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+
| **TOTAL**                                           | **             |
|                                                     | 1,000,000.00** |
+-----------------------------------------------------+----------------+

> **(Ruback, 2004)**

##### 

##### Partnerships and Participants 

Other Project Impact initiatives in Deerfield Beach focused on tapping
into the volunteer spirit pervasive throughout the community. In one
such project, Deerfield Beach built a \$2 million Boys and Girls club
funded by city donations, using some Project Impact funds to ensure the
building was hurricane resistant. The structure, built to be beyond the
building code requirements, now qualifies as a Broward County emergency
shelter.

To better inform the community of Project Impact efforts, Deerfield
Beach used their local cable channel to broadcast a weekly television
program focused on hazard mitigation, which ran from April through
September of 1998. Deerfield Beach also sponsored a yearly Hurricane
Awareness Exposition to educate and inform its citizens. These combined
efforts were successful in motivating volunteers in the community into
action, which in turn prompted Broward County to offer four
well-attended Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) classes in the
two years that followed. These seven-week classes (which can be found at
training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/CERT/) included training in first aid, search
and rescue, and hazard mitigation preparedness. In total, over 100
Deerfield Beach residents graduated from these classes during the
FEMA-sponsored years of Project Impact.

Another concept that was nationally-based, that also proved highly
successful in Deerfield Beach, was Project Impact's Spring Break
efforts. Members of AmeriCorps, students from several colleges and
universities, and other community volunteers participated in this annual
event. The following is a description of the program taken from a FEMA
news release:

> "Led by the AmeriCorps members, the students will make minor repairs
> to the homes of elderly and low-income people to make them more
> disaster-resistant, make non-structural changes to reduce the damage
> from earthquakes, remove debris and other hazards from public places
> and place benchmarks and flood-elevation marks to raise flood
> awareness in the community." (FEMA 1997)

In Deerfield Beach during Spring Break of 1998, volunteers installed
metal shutters on five single-family homes for low-to-moderate income
homeowners. Program organizers were able to secure donated materials and
technical support from corporate partners, which included Southeast
Metals, Inc. and Home Depot. Project Impact Spring Breaks directly
helped individuals in the community, but also served to raise awareness
of Project Impact and ongoing community mitigation projects.

Building partnerships was a key element of Project Impact. One of those
partners was the Home Depot. Nationwide, Home Depot supported, and
continues to actively support the communities where it serves through
organized employee volunteer "Team Depot" groups. These teams help
repair homes of elderly and disabled residents. The corporation also
offers a six-month no payment/interest Disaster Relief Credit Program
for home repair materials in disaster-impacted areas. In Deerfield
Beach, the Home Depot maintained a "Project Impact Aisle", offering
products and informational materials on making buildings more disaster
resistant. During the initial two years of the program, the store also
designated a senior manager as a Project Impact advocate, allowing him
to spend 80% of his time in support of Project Impact activities.

Other Deerfield Beach initial Project Impact partners supported the
community in a variety of ways. The following list describes their
efforts:

> Solutia, Inc. -- Donated hurricane resistant glass to retrofit the
> Deerfield Beach Chamber of Commerce.
>
> Deerfield Builders Supply -- Corporate sponsor of the annual Hurricane
> Awareness Week and member of the Local Mitigation Strategy working
> group; donated labor to install windows/doors in the Chamber of
> Commerce.
>
> Fannie Mae Home Loans -- Partnered with FEMA to offer competitive rate
> loans designed to assist homeowners in financing certain disaster
> preventative improvements.
>
> Marina One Yacht Club -- Built first hurricane resistant marine
> storage facility, designed to withstand 125 mph winds, offering
> 2,600,000 cubic feet of storage.
>
> State Farm Insurance -- Worked with Deerfield Beach to construct a
> Mitigation Operations Center and meeting facility, retrofitted against
> local hazards; designed and built the Good Neighbor House.

State Farm's Good Neighbor House (GNH) has proven to be a valuable
community resource. This model house was built using a variety of
disaster resistant construction and technology. It was built to
withstand a Category 5 hurricane with 156 mile-per-hour winds. Other
aspects of the GNH include child and family safety features, electrical
surge protection, energy efficiency, fire prevention, home security,
water damage, and wind and hail resistant features. The GNH is open to
the public for tours and educational seminars, providing guidance for
building and maintaining safer homes.

In addition to the previously-mentioned public-private partnership
efforts, the Deerfield Beach Business Alliance was formed in 1997. This
alliance, formed to develop joint initiatives, began *Operation: Open
for Business!* The initiative was designed to "establish partnerships
between the business community in Deerfield Beach and local lenders to
develop and administer a low cost loan program for structural
retrofitting and energy efficiency upgrades for eligible, targeted
businesses". The program worked through the Business Emergency
Preparedness Network (BEPN), a county-wide program led by Broward
County's Emergency Management. The BEPN programs were designed to
"address business risk and vulnerability assessment, joint
public-private sector exercises of response plans, and the development
of innovative business risk reduction programs that feature the use of
financial incentives to promote hazard mitigation". *Operation: Open for
Business!* has been one of many model programs initiated in Deerfield
Beach, making the community a desirable host for mentoring to other
communities interested in enhancing mitigation efforts.

# Current Status of the Project

Although FEMA funding for Project Impact ended in 2001, Deerfield Beach
continues to sponsor Project Impact programs under the same program
name. The community has received about \$1.6 million in grants over the
past seven years, not including FEMA's initial \$1 million Project
Impact grant. Although the working relationship between Deerfield Beach
and the State of Florida is not as strong as it initially was with FEMA
championing efforts, the State continues to prove a valuable partner to
Deerfield Beach and other Florida communities advocating mitigation.
City and County relationships, according to Mr. Deetjen, remain
positive.

Deerfield Beach no longer sponsors Project Impact Spring Breaks, but it
does continue to host an annual Hurricane Awareness Week each Spring. In
2004, the program celebrated its seventh straight year holding the
event. Hurricane Awareness Week promotes mitigation awareness and
volunteer opportunities, and includes food and entertainment,
firefighter and police participation, ocean rescue demonstrations, and
private sector mitigation information booths. Citizens are also
introduced to CERT training and can register for courses if interested.
In fact, because of these and other recruitment efforts, Deerfield Beach
has graduated almost 600 people in the CERT training program since it
began in 1998, and it has conducted well over 20 full-length course
sessions.

While individual enthusiasm continues to thrive in many areas, as
evidenced by the successful CERT training, business partnerships are not
as strong as they were during the years of FEMA support. Ron Ruback,
Deerfield Beach Hazard Mitigation Coordinator, claims that motivating
businesses and residents has always been the biggest challenge of
mitigation efforts. Mr. Ruback attributes the increasing complacency to
the fact that Hurricane Andrew was ten years ago and people have adopted
the "it's not going to hit here" attitude once more.

When City Manager Deetjen was asked about the diminishing level of
participation from the community, he responded that he is not certain if
it is the lack of motivation from the businesses or from the Chamber of
Commerce that has slowed down mitigation efforts.

# Analysis

Deerfield Beach's successes at the beginning of Project Impact can be
attributed to the community's existing awareness of its risks and
vulnerabilities, with the primary natural disaster experienced by the
community being hurricanes. With Hurricane Andrew still quite fresh in
citizens' minds, the media blitz accompanying the kick-off of Project
Impact was highly successful in both stirring up the volunteer spirit
and in establishing local partnerships. With FEMA personnel supporting
the community's initiatives at the Federal and State levels, Deerfield
Beach was able to focus on developing support and partnerships at the
local level.

With partnerships being a key factor in the success of mitigation
efforts, a dedicated staff was required to maintain sufficient momentum
throughout the community. Deerfield Beach is fortunate in that it has
two champions of Project Impact that have remained active in the
community. Both the City Manager and the Hazard Mitigation Coordinator
have continued to make progress in mitigation efforts, despite that
Project Impact is just one of many responsibilities each of these people
have.

To maintain partnerships, communication is critical. The multitude of
partnerships necessary for continued success in mitigation efforts are
found at the local, state and federal government levels, businesses,
educational institutions, health-care-related organizations, and
religious institutions and affiliates. Local networks of partners,
including city government partners, community businesses, and local
branches of national chains need to collaborate on a regular basis.
Unfortunately, complacency continues to affect the community in the
absence of a full-time champion to pull things together again.

A lack of political commitment to this effort, combined with a lack of
funding to support mitigation efforts, is steadily resulting in a less
robust mitigation program in Deerfield Beach. Project Impact had begun
to provide a national platform for increasing disaster resistance
efforts, with an association of Project Impact members taking shape just
before the program was discontinued. On the positive side - even without
an established association, Deerfield Beach and other successful Project
Impact communities have mentored other communities, including hosting
overseas cities who were interested in learning about their mitigation
efforts.

Deerfield Beach has steadily been losing momentum with mitigation
efforts becoming a lower priority for the community, with no recent
disasters to use as tools of motivation. Overall local community support
has decreased, and businesses are focusing more on profit margins and
other internal needs while mitigation support is being given minimal
attention. Although the private sector in Deerfield Beach seems to have
a clearer understanding of risks and vulnerabilities than in other
communities, what is expected of them on a continuing basis seems to be
unclear and confusing, while little or no effort is being put into
seeking or providing answers.

In addition to these setbacks, the advertising campaigns and regular
meetings at the Chamber of Commerce that played a large part in keeping
the community players involved are not held as often. A general lack of
interest that occurred over time contributed to lack of participation in
these events. However, such a phenomenon is not unexpected. As Kathleen
Tierney, Director of the Disaster Research Center at the University of
Delaware, stated, "Disasters create windows of opportunity---teachable
moments when communities are more willing than at other times to take
the steps necessary to reduce losses". Without that added sense of
urgency, complacency sets in.

# Lessons Learned

Deerfield Beach has not given up on their mitigation efforts. In fact,
they are continuing to make progress as expressed earlier. City Manager
Deetjen has stated that "Deerfield Beach approached Project Impact like
other critical issues such as economic development and crime prevention.
You get what you put into it!". Mitigation efforts are ongoing, and
funding for construction of an \$8,000,000 Mitigation Operations Center
(MOC), to be built with state-of-the-art mitigation construction, is set
to begin next year. The MOC is being built in partnership with Florida
Atlantic University. When asked what the City's greatest success of
Project Impact was, Mr. Deetjen responded that it hasn't occurred yet,
but it will be, by far, the completion of the MOC.

Deerfield Beach continues to support Project Impact, albeit to a lesser
degree, and publicizes small successes as well as providing updates on
longer-term projects such as the MOC. Seeing progress helps maintain
community interest and keeps stakeholders informed. Continuing to hold
the annual Hurricane Awareness event is another way that Deerfield Beach
has succeeded in promoting community involvement.

Mr. Deetjen said another lesson learned is what it means to be a
partner: To get more out of a partnership, all partners must bring
something to the table. The most successful partnerships are those that
are approached with one partner taking the lead and thinking that they
want to give more than the other partner. As one partner sees how much
the other is willing to give, that partner is motivated to give more.
Looking at the successful partnerships the community was able to
establish during the initial Project Impact years, this strategy worked
for Deerfield Beach.

#### Conclusion

Project Impact positively impacted Deerfield Beach. The community was at
its peak in mitigation efforts and awareness when FEMA was working
hand-in-hand with them, advising, guiding and supporting their efforts.
To keep a community involved and motivated to pursue mitigation projects
takes a commitment of resources: money, partners, and government
support. Without any one of these three entities, momentum can quickly
be lost. People need to be kept informed during all phases of a
community's efforts so they can develop a sense of ownership and pride
in their community.

Partnerships, as stated by James Lee Witt upon initiating Project
Impact, play a crucial role in successful mitigation efforts. That
direction needs to be given as to what is expected in a partnership
cannot be forgotten. FEMA, as evidenced in Deerfield Beach, was a
tremendous partner. Personnel were committed to helping Project Impact
communities and remained community advocates throughout the formally
funded duration of the program. Loss of the Federal Government
commitment to Project Impact created a change in Florida State
Government commitment to mitigation efforts, which squelched the effort
being put forth at the community level in Deerfield Beach. Without
support for mitigation efforts, Deerfield Beach was forced to cut back
on its progress, but due to committed individuals in the community,
Project Impact lives on. This is a community to be watched and emulated,
as Deerfield Beach continues to make progress despite setbacks.

### [References:]{.underline}

Deetjen, Larry. 2004. Deerfield Beach City Manager. Personal interview
by Lori Fagan. April 5.

DRC (Disaster Research Center). 2002. "Disaster Resistant Communities
Initiative: Assessment of Ten Non-Pilot Communities." The University of
Delaware. Project #EMW-97-CA-0519. Report to EMA. August 30.

EIIP Virtual Forum Panel Discussion. 1999. "Project Impact Revisited."
Participants: Larry Deetjen, City Manager, Deerfield Beach, FL, Renee
Domingo, Oakland, CA, Dave Jones, NBC4. Washington, DC. February 17.

EIIP Virtual Library. 2000. "Evaluation of the Project Impact Disaster
Resistant Community Initiative." Interview with Kathleen Tierney,
Director, Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware.
November 29.
[www.emforum.org/pub/eiip/lc001129.txt](http://www.emforum.org/pub/eiip/lc001129.txt).

FDEM (Florida Division of Emergency Management). N/D. "Mitigation
Successes, State of Florida: Deerfield Beach Showcase Community
Project."
www.floridadisaster.org/brm/Mit_Success/ms_broward_deerfield_beach_showc.htm.

FEMA. 1998. "After Floyd: Relieved but Ready in Deerfield Beach, Fl."
October 18. 116.112.200.141/impact/fldeerbch.htm.

FEMA. 1999. "Project Impact at Work in Deerfield Beach, Fl." August 23.
femaweb2.fema.gov/impact/dbpi0823.htm.

FEMA. 2000. "Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant Communities."
February 7. [www.osp.state.or.us/oem/](http://www.osp.state.or.us/oem/).

FEMA. 1997. "Students, Volunteers Donate Time During Spring Break to
Help Build Disaster-Resistant Communities." March 28.
[www.fema.gov/nwz98/98053.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/nwz98/98053.shtm).

FEMA. 1998. "FEMA Director Witt and Wall Street's Financial Community
Announce Public/Private Partnership to Change Way Businesses Deal with
Natural Disasters." March 25.
[www.fema.gov/nwz98/98051.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/nwz98/98051.shtm).

FEMA2. 1998. "Deerfield Beach to Host FEMA Project Impact Spring Break
Volunteer Event." April 14.
[www.fema.gov/nwz98/98064.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/nwz98/98064.shtm).

Ruback, Ron. 2004. Deerfield Beach Hazard Mitigation Coordinator.
Personal interview by Lori Fagan.

State Farm Insurance. N/D. "Good Neighbor House." Website.
[www.statefarm.com/homesafety.htm](http://www.statefarm.com/homesafety.htm).

Taylor, Cynthia. 2001. [USA Today (Magazine).]{.underline} "Building
Disaster-Resistant Communities." July 2001.

Witt, James Lee. 1998. Project Impact National Kick-Off Speech. National
Press Club. Washington, DC. June 3.

Witt, James Lee. 1997. Deerfield Beach Chamber of Commerce Breakfast.
Deerfield Beach Florida. November 6.

Witt, James Lee. 1998. Disaster Recovery Journal. Winter.
[www.drj.com/win98/witt.htm](http://www.drj.com/win98/witt.htm)

.

**Sidebar 3.1.1: Deerfield Beach, Florida, Signs Agreement to Become
First Disaster-Resistant Community Under New FEMA Initiative**
(<http://www.fema.gov/nwz97/97283.shtm>)

WASHINGTON November 6, 1997 \-- The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) today launched [Project Impact](http://www.fema.gov/impact/), a
national effort to change the way America deals with disaster, by
designating [Deerfield Beach,
Florida](http://www.fema.gov/about/dbfl.htm), as the first pilot
\"disaster resistant\" community. With Project Impact the focus of
emergency management changes from responding to disasters to taking
actions in advance of disasters that reduce potential damage.

\"We\'ve got to change the way we deal with disasters. We have to break
the damage-repair, damage-repair cycle,\" said FEMA Director James Lee
Witt. \"We need to have communities and businesses come together to
reduce the costs and consequences of disasters. It is my number one
priority.\"

Under Project Impact, seven pilot communities will be designated to
demonstrate the economic benefits of pre-disaster
[mitigation](http://www.fema.gov/mit/) to state and local governments,
businesses and individuals. A Project Impact Guidebook offers a formula
that communities can follow to become \"disaster resistant.\"

Communities in addition to Deerfield Beach that have been identified for
Project Impact are: Allegany County, Md.; Oakland, Calif.; Pascagoula,
Miss.; Seattle, Wash.; Tucker and Randolph counties, W. Va.; and
Wilmington, N.C.

Under the terms of the memorandum of understanding with Deerfield Beach
signed today, FEMA will provide up to \$1 million in seed money for
disaster resistant actions. As an example, \$150,000 will be used to put
hurricane straps on the auditorium and cafeteria of the local high
school, which serves as a shelter during a disaster. Wind shutters will
also be installed on all the high school windows.

Local and national businesses have pledged to join in the effort as
well. Home Depot in Deerfield Beach unveiled a display on disaster
resistance and will offer Product Knowledge courses for local homeowners
on steps they can take to protect against future storm damage.

\"We recognize the need for mitigation efforts especially in storm-prone
areas,\" said Home Depot district manager Dan Paris. \"Home Depot makes
every effort to assure that people have the proper equipment and
information to protect themselves against disaster.\"

In addition, other corporate partners participating in the Deerfield
Beach Project Impact initiative are Florida Power and Light, the Promus
Hotel Corporation, and the Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel.

**Sidebar 3.1.2: Florida Kicks Off Disaster Resistant Spring Break with
Project Impact\
Damage Reduction Efforts Make a Difference in Deerfield Beach**
(<http://www.fema.gov/regions/iv/1999/r4_04.shtm>)

Deerfield Beach, FL, March 16, 1999 \-- Federal Emergency Management
Agency Director James Lee Witt kicked off a disaster-resistant Spring
Break today by noting the efforts of Deerfield Beach, Fla. In 1997,
Deerfield Beach became the first of 118 Project Impact communities
nationwide. Project Impact is a national initiative designed to involve
citizens, government officials and the business community in actions to
make their communities more disaster-resistant.

Joined by 10 Marine Corps ROTC students on Spring Break from Deerfield
Beach High School, Director Witt installed hurricane shutters into the
home of Elder BT Weston, a resident of Deerfield Beach. This heralds the
beginning of the second annual Project Impact Spring Break - in which
youth across the country become involved in disaster-prevention and
damage-reduction activities in their own communities. This year, several
Project Impact communities will hold Spring Break activities, including
Pascagoula, Miss.; Wilmington, N.C.; and Oakland, Calif.

\"By installing shutters, strengthening windows, making minor repairs
and teaching others how to safeguard themselves from the next natural
disaster, these Spring Break participants are making America safe from
natural disasters,\" said Director Witt.

Deerfield Beach homeowners benefit not only from these volunteer efforts
but from Project Impact corporate partners like Fannie Mae, which joined
FEMA to make consumer installation loans at competitive interest rates
available to American homeowners for the purpose of making certain
disaster-prevention improvements. The first recipient of a Fannie Mae
disaster-prevention home loan in Deerfield Beach will be announced soon.

\"We are proud of the steps the Deerfield Beach community has taken to
protect their homes and families from unnecessary losses,\" said Steve
Seibert, Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs for the State
of Florida. \"Through the educational and economic support of Project
Impact, Deerfield Beach is on its way to becoming a community that can
withstand disaster.\"

Deerfield Beach citizens are also learning how to prevent damage through
a disaster-resistant home built by State Farm and the City of Deerfield
Beach. It will be open to the public for information on Project Impact
and disaster-resistance.

Since joining the efforts in 1997, Deerfield Beach business
representatives, local officials and members of the community have been
actively involved in making their community safe from natural disasters.
Susceptible to hurricanes, tropical storms and flooding, Deerfield Beach
has been hit by at least seven major hurricanes in the last 75 years.

\"Living in an area prone to violent weather, we all need to take
responsibility for our safety and well-being,\" said Deerfield Beach
City Manager Larry Deetjen. \"Project Impact is showing us that you can
in fact teach an old dog new tricks.\"

During his visit to Deerfield Beach, Witt evaluated several sites in the
community, in which damage-reduction measures are already in place. The
Deerfield Beach Chamber of Commerce is currently being retrofitted with
shatter-resistant glass from Project Impact corporate partner Solutia
Inc.

\"The Chamber of Commerce is a landmark in this community and we had to
do something to limit the damage from hurricanes,\" said Janyce Becker,
Executive Director of the Chamber of Commerce. As part of Solutia\'s
partnership with Project Impact, Solutia will provide their new
hurricane-resistant KeepSafe Maximum glass along with technological and
informational support to several targeted communities.

\"This is exactly what we needed,\" said Becker. \"By building a
disaster-resistant community we are taking the proper steps to prevent
further damage from natural disasters.\"

Director Witt also recognized the efforts of Thomas Tyghem, owner of
Deerfield Beach\'s Marina One, who broke ground today on a new
disaster-resistant facility. This facility will be the first of its kind
in the marine industry, offering 2,600,000 cubic feet of
hurricane-resistant marine storage for up to 50 boats. It will be able
to withstand sustained 125 mph winds.

\"As a business owner and a resident of Deerfield Beach, I knew I had to
change my attitude toward rebuilding after disasters,\" said Tyghem. \"I
had to stop cleaning up after the storm and start taking the necessary
steps to prevent the possible damage. Joining the effort to build a
disaster-resistant Deerfield Beach was the best way I could protect my
marina from the economic losses of a hurricane.\"

Local officials from Deerfield Beach applaud the efforts made on behalf
of their community and Project Impact. \"When Deerfield Beach signed on
to building a disaster-resistant community, we knew it would forever
change the way we dealt with disasters,\" said Deerfield Beach Mayor Al
Capellini.

Case Study 3.2: Avalanche Mitigation in the Western United States

##### 

##### Introduction

An avalanche is a large mass of snow, ice, earth, rock, or other
material in swift motion down a mountainside or over a precipice. Snow
avalanches, which are most commonly triggered by either heavy snowfall,
rain, thaw, or physical disturbance, can occur whenever a sufficient
depth of snow is deposited or accumulates on slopes steeper than 20 to
30 degrees (with the most dangerous coming from slopes in the 35-40
degree ranges.) Generally, slopes of less than 20 degrees are not steep
enough for sliding to occur, while those greater than 60 degrees will
not be able to maintain a heavy enough load of snow to pose an avalanche
risk.

The physical processes by which avalanches develop, are triggered, and
move have been studied extensively and are understood well. This high
level of understanding has resulted in the ability of emergency managers
to correctly identify and mitigate them. The National Snow and Ice Data
Center divides avalanches into three main parts -- starting zone, track
and runout zone. The **starting zone** is the most volatile area of a
slope, where unstable snow can fracture from the surrounding snow cover
and begin to slide. The **track** is the path or channel that an
avalanche follows as it goes downhill. The **runout zone** is where the
snow and debris finally come to a stop. During the avalanche, the snow
behaves much like a liquid as it slides down the affected slope.

Avalanches typically follow the same paths year after year, leaving
scarring along their paths. As such, areas that are prone to the hazard
can easily be identified with a high degree of accuracy by trained
experts. However, unusual weather conditions can produce new paths or
cause avalanches to extend beyond their normal paths, and the
identification of these risk areas takes a greater amount of expertise
and speculation.

# 

# Consequences of the Avalanche Hazard

In addition to the obvious impacts relating to human life and safety,
avalanches affect transportation systems (roads and railways), cause
damage to built structures including residential and commercial
buildings and other infrastructure, impact private businesses, and
disrupt services and utilities (such as gas and electric power). The
closure of a major interstate highway or other major transportation
route blocked by an avalanche can result in significant economic damage.
For instance, serious delays and increased costs resulting from the need
for trucking and rail companies to use alternate routes can be both
devastating to private and public entities and can cause shortages of
food and other vital supplies. Additionally, communities, businesses
national parks and forests that are involved with snow and
mountain-related recreational and tourism activities (skiing, climbing,
snowmobiling, etc.) can be negatively impacted by avalanches if the
tourists cannot arrive or if they fear that their safety would be
compromised by visiting.

Colorado leads the United States in the number of avalanche-related
deaths that have occurred in the past 20 years. The Colorado Avalanche
Information Center (CAIC), a program of the Colorado Geological Survey
(CGS), tracks these fatality figures in the United States and the world
(See sidebars 3.1 and 3.2). The avalanche statistics are referenced by
winter season, which runs from the fall of one year through the spring
of the next (for example, the 2003-2004 reporting period began in the
fall of 2003 and finishes in the spring of 2004.) In the period from
1985-86 to 2003-04 (19 "winters"), there were a total of 416 avalanche
related deaths, which is an average of 21.9 per year. Over the same
19-winter period, there were 2,821 fatalities reported worldwide.
According to the same report by the Colorado Avalanche Information
Center, the United States, at 416, ranks fourth behind France (556),
Austria (471), and Switzerland (435).

The majority of fatalities in the United States occur from January
through March, when the snowfall is greatest in most mountain regions.
However, deaths have occurred in May and June, resulting primarily from
spring snowfall and the subsequent melting season. Fatalities and
injuries do occur during the summer months, but it is often climbers who
are caught in these avalanches because of their more remote nature.

# Mitigation and Prevention Programs

The primary avalanche hazard mitigation measures that are performed are
grouped into six general categories:

1.  Installing protective measures that retain, redistribute or retard
    the avalanche flow

2.  Initiating controlled avalanches

3.  Zoning

4.  Corridor management

5.  Detection, forecasting and monitoring systems, and

6.  Avalanche training and awareness programs.

## Protective Measures

A wide variety of protective measures has been developed that can be
used to shield homes, buildings, subdivisions, roads and infrastructure
components from moving snow. These devices include:

-   Retention Structures

-   Redistribution Structures

-   Retarding and Catchment Structures

**Retention Structures** serve to anchor snow, thus holding it where it
is. These devices include snow rakes, snow bridges, and nets (See
Illustrations 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). While effective, these structures do
have two major drawbacks. The first is that they tend to impair the
aesthetic nature of the land where they are installed, as they are
visible in the absence of snow and cause unnatural patterns when snow is
present. The second drawback is that their effectiveness is limited by
the depth of the snow they are able to retain. Once their maximum depth
has been exceeded, they will be of little use.

**Redistribution Structures**, more commonly known as snow fences (See
Illustration 3.2.3), are effective in placing snow where it is less
likely to cause an avalanche. Snow fences can be placed such that they
either cause snow to accumulate in a certain area, or so that they
prevent it from accumulating in another area. They pull wind-driven snow
out of the air, allowing the air to move through. Snow fences can even
be made out of natural materials, such as shrubs, trees, and
occasionally grasses, and are referred to as 'living snow fences.'

**Retarding and Catchment Structures** serve not to prevent the
avalanche from occurring, but to prevent the disastrous consequences
during the avalanche's approach. These structures are installed in an
attempt to stop, divert, confine, or slow the approach of the snow mass.
Examples of these structures include ditches, terraces, dams, and
mounds. These structures tend to be sustainable as they are made simply
by redistributing earth and rock such that the landscape itself is
changed.

## Controlled Avalanches

[]{.mark}

Controlled avalanches are actual avalanche events that are initiated by
one of various trigger mechanisms in order to cause the accumulated snow
to be released before a more dangerous accumulation of snow occurs (See
Illustration 3.2.4). Controlled avalanches are also performed to assess
the accuracy of avalanche forecasting. According to Department of
Geological/Mining Engineering & Sciences at the Michigan Technological
University (MTU) there are two basic methods for triggering planned
avalanches. The first is to do so manually - having an experienced
technician cause the collapse of small cornices using some tool or
device he or she uses in close proximity. The second, and more popular
form, is causing avalanches by means of explosives. The use of
explosives has gained widespread acceptance and approval in the United
States, with an estimated 10,000 avalanche-related detonations performed
annually. The standard charge used is 1 kilogram of TNT, which is a
quantity that is considered easy and safe to handle. TNT is favored as
an explosive because of its high detonation speed.

Explosives can be hand delivered or shot from a cannon (the 'artillery'
method). Hand delivery requires that a person hike to a specific
location and detonate the explosive charge. This method is simple and
accurate, but traveling to the site can be both difficult and dangerous
due to weather conditions and the remote nature of avalanche-prone
terrain. The use of artillery triggers for controlled avalanches is the
most common method of avalanche control in the United States. The
advantages of these cannons is that they can be fired accurately in
almost any weather condition, and prevent the need to risk the safety of
personnel. Additionally, these devices are designed such that they can
easily be mounted on a portable, light support structure.

The California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") uses several
different types of triggers to initiate controlled avalanches when
deemed necessary. As described in the Caltrans 'Snow and Ice Control
Operations Guide', avalanches pose a substantial threat to the safety of
the traveling public and Caltrans maintenance workers. Caltrans performs
snow surveys in known avalanche areas to determine the likelihood of an
avalanche, and should it be determined that an avalanche is emanate,
Caltrans will close a highway until the avalanche hazard can be safely
mitigated.

Caltrans uses the GAZ-EX system developed by Schippers, S.A. of Le
Touvet, France for the majority of its avalanche control. The GAZ-EX
utilizes stored propane and oxygen piped into a fixed cannon located in
an avalanche starting zone. The system directs a controlled gas
explosion towards the ground to dislodge accumulated snow. For close
range avalanche control work, Caltrans also uses a gas propelled
explosive projectile that is fired from an Avalauncher. This device has
limited range, but it is inexpensive and easy to operate. As a last
resort, Caltrans will deploy explosive hand charges. This operation is
very time consuming and requires trained and certified personnel. These
hand charging operations often take place during the most extreme
conditions on the snow laden cornice areas over looking the highways.
The hand-thrown charges are used to release avalanches in areas where no
other methods are effective or available.

## Zoning

As long as the avalanche hazard is known and is adequately mapped,
regulations can be applied to undeveloped areas thereby limiting the
placement of structures and infrastructure in the path of avalanches.
Avalanche zoning can be divided into hazard sub zones, that allow for
certain types of construction while limiting others. For instance, in
areas where it is determined that either the number of events will be
high or the amount of snow that will be involved in an avalanche is
great, no construction would be allowed, while in areas where avalanches
might occur but the quantity of snow would be minimal, more
robustly-constructed buildings could be allowed. Without the interaction
of the snow and the world of man, avalanches are not a hazard. Thus, by
limiting this interaction by allowing for construction only in the lower
hazard 'zones', the avalanche hazard has effectively been minimized.

Ketchum, Idaho has, as part of its Planning and Zoning Code, a
designated Avalanche Zone District (sec 17.92 of the code). The
Avalanche Zone District is a zoning overlay district for the purposes of
identifying areas where an avalanche potential exists; providing notice
to the public of the areas identified; and minimizing health and safety
hazards, disruption of commerce and extraordinary public expenditures.
The Zone District regulates those building single-family homes, lessees,
renters and subtenants of property, as well as ensuring that utilities
are installed underground. The restrictions the Zone District stipulate
say that any structure built within the Avalanche Zone without having an
engineering study conducted cannot be leased, rented or sublet from
November 15th through April 15th of each year. Also, there can be no
further subdivision of any real property, which would result in the
creation of a lot or building site, in whole or part, within the
Avalanche Zone.

## Corridor Management

Although it can be relatively easy to ensure that structures are not
built in the path of known avalanches, the same cannot be said for
transportation 'corridors'. In mountainous regions there is often a very
limited set of possibilities for where a road can be built, and as such
it is often necessary to build through these known hazard areas. The
idea for mitigation, then, is to protect the corridor in the areas where
the hazard threat exists. There are several ways in which this can be
done, including preventing access during times when avalanches have
occurred or are imminent, building bridges or tunnels that prevent the
moving snow from directly crossing the path of traffic, or using traffic
monitors to determine if any vehicles are trapped in the resulting snow
mass after an avalanche has occurred. Several examples of corridor
management are provided below:

-   The Seward Highway in Alaska is a heavily visited recreation and
    tourism destination. The road is closed by avalanches an average of
    5 times a year for approximately 4 hours each time. The Alaska
    Department of Transportation and Public Facilities is in charge of
    ensuring that the highway is free of snow during the winter months.
    An electronic sign has been installed on the highway at its northern
    end to advise travelers of conditions they should expect to
    encounter, including the risk of avalanches. Avalanche gates have
    been installed in all potential avalanche areas to prevent access
    during critical risk and post avalanche periods. Additionally,
    current and planned reconstruction projects will attempt to relocate
    the Seward highway out of several known avalanche zones.

-   The National Cooperative Highway Research Program\'s Innovations
    Deserving Exploratory Analysis (NCHRP-IDEA) project seeks to
    introduce new technologies, methods, or processes for application to
    highways and intermodal surface transportation through the
    development and testing of nontraditional and innovative concepts,
    including application of those from other technology sectors that
    have not yet been tested in the highway sector. One such program -
    Corridor Management During Avalanches - aims to test technologies
    along a 16-mile stretch of State Route 21 in Idaho where there are
    57 established avalanche paths. According to the Intelligent
    Transportation Systems, Joint Program Office of the U.S. Department
    of Transportation, traffic logging stations at either end of the
    corridor and avalanche sensors at the roadside have been installed.
    Based upon readings from the roadside sensors, automatic gates will
    prevent drivers from entering the corridor during avalanches. As
    traffic counts will be made at the entry and exit of the corridor,
    it can be calculated if any vehicles remain in the corridor at the
    onset of the avalanche. The results of this corridor management
    study are not yet available, but from site specific testing in Utah
    and Colorado, it has been satisfactory in keeping trucks and cars
    out of the paths of avalanches despite some reliability issues. Full
    implementation is dependent on funding of each system, which cost
    between \$500,000 to \$3 million per site.

-   The I-90, Snoqualmie Pass East project of the Washington State
    Department of Transportation (WSDOT) is another example. Interstate
    90 is a major corridor linking Puget Sound to Eastern Washington and
    beyond, and avalanches can completely close the route several times
    each year. The use of tunnels and other mitigation measures like
    retention, redistribution and deflection structures for avalanches
    and rock fall are planned to minimize avalanche closures as well as
    other hazards such as rock fall. This project will reduce the risk
    of avalanches to the traveling public and eliminate road closures to
    clear avalanches, increase the capacity of the highway, reduce the
    risk of rock and debris from unstable slopes reaching the roadway,
    and improve sight distance and safety by straightening some roadway
    curves. WSDOT has estimated that this project will cost between
    \$300 to \$900 million for the entire 15-mile corridor, depending
    upon the actual route selected.

This form of avalanche hazard mitigation is also used on ski slopes and
on park trails. If an avalanche threat is identified, the affected ski
run, slope, mountain, or trail is closed and other preventative measures
(like signage and access control) are taken. As the thinking goes, no
one can be injured or killed if there is no one on the slope or the
trail.

## Training and Awareness Programs

The National Avalanche Center (NAC) claims that, "Nearly all avalanches
that involve people are triggered by the victims themselves or a member
of their party. This is actually good news; it means that if we know how
to recognize avalanche danger, we can avoid it.

This is where awareness programs can play an important role."

Organizations like the American Avalanche Association (AAA), US Forestry
Service's National Avalanche Center, and the National Ski Patrol, among
others, offer courses on and information about avalanches. The
information they provide focuses primarily on how to interact with a
potential avalanche situation, based on the type of activity one will be
engaged in such as back country skiing, climbing, or snowmobiling, for
example. On the web site of the National Snow and Ice Data Center
(NSIDC), there is a section focused on Avalanche Awareness. Topics
discussed and answers provided are illustrated by the following list of
subject areas found on the site:

-   Why avalanche awareness?

-   Who gets caught in avalanches?

-   When and where avalanches happen

-   Anatomy of an avalanche

-   Avalanche factors: what conditions cause an avalanche?

-   How to determine if the snow pack is safe

-   Avalanche gear

-   Tips for avalanche survival

-   Avalanche danger scale

-   Avalanche quick checks.

Onsite courses at the like National Avalanche School (NAS) are offered
by The National Avalanche Foundation (NAF) in conjunction with the
National Ski Areas Association (NSAA). NAS has been providing its
avalanche education program for 18 years, and offers a nationally
recognized certificate upon completion. The existence of the course is a
sign of the professionalization of the management of avalanches.

Communities are also getting involved in avalanche awareness. Ketchum,
Idaho, in addition to its Avalanche Zone District, maintains a regular
Avalanche Awareness program. Their comprehensive program has been
designed to develop awareness of the conditions that contribute to
avalanche conditions. Detection and search techniques are discussed and
equipment preparedness reviewed.

A widely accepted scale of avalanche risk is the Avalanche Danger Scale
(See Sidebar 3.2.3). Despite minor differences in terminology, the scale
is very similar to what is used in Canada and Europe. This alerting
mechanism, designed to warn the public, is similar in function to the
advisory terms like Small Craft Advisory, Gale Warning, etc. used by the
National Hurricane Center and the Homeland Security Advisory System
(color codes) employed by the Department of Homeland Security. The
Avalanche Danger Scale is used by avalanche centers in the United
States, and serves to standardize the categorization and recommended
reaction to all avalanche threats throughout the nation. The same scale
is also recognized and utilized internationally.

# 

# Recent Legislation

On April 29, 2003 the Federal Land Recreational Visitor Protection Act
of 2003 (S.931) was introduced. This legislation will direct the
Secretary of the Interior to undertake a program to reduce the risks
from and mitigate the effects of avalanches on visitors to units of the
National Park System and on other recreational users of public land.
Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska, a proponent of the Act, clearly stated
its intent in saying, \"The U.S. averages 30 deaths a year from
avalanches, a majority of which are the result of recreational
activities in unmitigated avalanche areas. This bill brings those
resources to the entities that need them the most, enabling us to
significantly reduce the effects of avalanches on visitors, recreational
users, transportation corridors, and our local communities.\"

S.931 gives the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Agriculture the ability to make grants to:

(1) Assist in the prevention, forecasting, detection, and mitigation of
    avalanches

(2) Maintain essential transportation and communications affected or
    potentially affected by avalanches

(3) Assist avalanche artillery users to ensure the availability of
    adequate supplies of artillery and other unique explosives required
    for avalanche control; and

(4) Fund research and development activities to minimize reliance on
    military weapons for avalanche control.

This legislation also establishes a central depository for weapons,
ammunition, and parts for avalanche control purposes, including an
inventory that can be made available to Federal and non-Federal entities
for avalanche control purposes.

# 

# 

# Conclusion

Aside from the basic structural avalanche mitigation measures like snow
fences, redirection structures and artillery, there are a number of very
innovative programs in use. Two of these innovative measures include
zoning, like Ketchum Idaho's Avalanche Zone District, and corridor
management, like the I-90, Snoqualmie Pass East project in Washington
State. Mandated and enforced zoning is effective in preventing damage to
structures by keeping them out of known (and zoned) avalanche paths.
Corridor management is effective in reducing injury, death, and damage
to property, and it reduces the chances of negative economic impacts
that result from road closures.

The Committee on Ground Failure Hazards Mitigation Research wrote that
hazard mitigation requires measures ranging from appropriate land-use
management and effective building codes in avalanche-prone areas to the
timely issuance of emergency warnings and programs of public education.
Centralized avalanche information and forecast centers currently play an
important hazard-reduction role in Colorado, Utah, and Washington. These
centers are funded by a variety of state, federal, and private
organizations, but the funding base is not secure in all cases and their
survival is an issue of concern. This committee claims that, despite our
knowledge of the destructive nature of snow avalanches and the hazards
they pose to mountain residents and vacationers, the United States still
lacks coordinated national leadership on avalanche issues. There is
currently no national program for avalanche prediction, land-use
planning, research, and education. The Federal Land Recreational Visitor
Protection Act of 2003 (S.931) could be a step towards a more
coordinated approach. S.391 will provide a funding vehicle for avalanche
research, prevention and mitigation through grants.

# [References]{.underline}

America's Byways. N/D. America's Byways website.
<http://www.byways.org/browse/byways/10390/before_you_go.html>

California Department of Transportation ("CALTRANS"). 1999. "Snow and
Ice Control Operations, Avalanche Control Areas." Pp. 13-14.
[www.dot.ca.gov/hq/roadinfo/snwicecontrol.pdf](http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/roadinfo/snwicecontrol.pdf)

Colorado Avalanche Information Center. N/D. "US & World Avalanche
Statistics." CAIC Web Site. <http://geosurvey.state.co.us/avalanche/>

Committee on Ground Failure Hazards Mitigation Research. 1990. \"Snow
Avalanche Hazards and Mitigation in the United States.\" National
Academy Press. 1990.

Intelligent Transportation Systems. N/D. "Corridor Management During
Avalanches." Joint Program Office. U.S. Dept of Transportation web
site.: <http://itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov/inform/p25.htm>

Ketchum, ID. N/D. "Avalanche Zone District (A)." Zoning Code Section
17.92. <http://www.ketchumidaho.org/pdf/zone17.92Avalanch.pdf>

Mears, Arthur. 2002. Avalanche Zoning.
[http://www.avalanche.org/\~moonstone/zoning/AVALANCHE%20ZONING.htm](http://www.avalanche.org/~moonstone/zoning/AVALANCHE ZONING.htm).

Merriam-Webster. N/D. Merriam-Webster
Website.[www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com/)

Michigan Technological University. N/D. Department of Geological/Mining
Engineering & Sciences web site.
<http://www.geo.mtu.edu/department/classes/ge404/rhsawall/passive.html>

National Avalanche Center. N/D. US Forest Service Website.
<http://www.avalanche.org/~nac/basics/sled_index.html>

National Snow and Ice Data Center. N/D. "Avalanche Awareness ." NSIDC
Website. <http://nsidc.org/snow/avalanche/index.html>

Orator.com. 2003. "108th CONGRESS, 1st Session,\
S.931 - Federal Land Recreational Visitor Protection Act of 2003."
Orator.com Website. <http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s931.html>

Washington State Department of Transportation. N/D. "I-90, Snoqualmie
Pass East." <http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/projects/I90SnoqualmiePassEast/>

## Sidebar 3.2.1: US AVALANCHE FATALITIES BY STATE, 1985/86 - 2003/04

  ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -------------
  **STATE**   **85-86**   **86-87**   **87-88**   **88-89**   **89-90**   **90-91**   **91-92**   **92-93**   **93-94**   **94-95**   **95-96**   **96-97**   **97-98**   **98-99**   **99-00**   **00-01**   **01-02**   **02-03**   **03-04**   **19-winter
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  totals**

  CO          4           11          5           4           4           6           9           12          1           9           7           1           6           6           8           4           8           6           3           114

  **AK**      **0**       **6**       **2**       **1**       **1**       **1**       **2**       **7**       **2**       **6**       **8**       **4**       **3**       **12**      **5**       **4**       **11**      **4**       **3**       **82**

  UT          5           2           0           0           1           0           5           3           1           5           2           6           2           5           2           6           3           1           4           53

  **MT**      **2**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **1**       **1**       **6**       **3**       **3**       **1**       **7**       **2**       **2**       **7**       **10**      **4**       **0**       **51**

  CA          2           0           0           0           1           0           2           1           0           2           0           0           1           1           0           2           1           1           1           15

  **WA**      **2**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **2**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **5**       **2**       **4**       **1**       **3**       **0**       **1**       **7**       **29**

  WY          2           0           0           0           0           0           2           1           1           1           3           2           1           2           0           7           1           7           1           31

  **ID**      **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **2**       **0**       **0**       **3**       **3**       **3**       **0**       **2**       **0**       **1**       **3**       **4**       **22**

  OR          0           0           0           1           0           0           0           1           2           0           0           0           1           0           0           0           0           0           0           7

  **NV**      **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **3**

  NH          0           0           0           0           0           1           0           0           0           0           3           0           0           0           1           0           0           2           0           7

  **NY**      **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **2**

  AZ          0           0           0           0           0           0           0           0           0           1           0           0           0           0           0           0           0           0           0           1

  **NM**      **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**

  total       17          21          8           7           8           8           24          29          13          28          30          22          26          32          22          33          35          30          23          416
  ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -------------

<http://geosurvey.state.co.us/avalanche/Default.aspx?tabid=49>

**Sidebar 3.2.2: Avalanche Fatalities in the World (by IKAR\*
countries), 1985/86 - 2003/04**

  ------------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
                      **85-86**   **86-87**   **87-88**   **88-89**   **89-90**   **90-91**   **91-92**   **92-93**   **93-94**   **94-95**   **95-96**   **96-97**   **97-98**   **98-99**   **99-00**   **00-01**   **01-02**   **02-03**   **03-04**   **19-year
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          totals**

  Switzerland         34          15          24          16          28          38          13          28          21          20          17          24          13          36          20          32          24          21          11          **435**

  **France**          **40**      **24**      **24**      **17**      **22**      **47**      **28**      **23**      **23**      **23**      **44**      **23**      **35**      **44**      **28**      **30**      **29**      **26**      **26**      **556**

  Austria             43          31          37          14          12          20          9           23          13          24          37          27          11          50          39          22          17          34          8           **471**

  **Italy**           **27**      **16**      **38**      **11**      **14**      **38**      **10**      **24**      **24**      **12**      **10**      **13**      **14**      **12**      **16**      **29**      **7**       **24**      **22**      **361**

  Germany             2           3           0           0           1           8           1           3           1           1           3           4           0           3           0           1           3           3           0           **37**

  **Liechtenstein**   **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **2**       **0**       **0**       **2**

  Slovenia            7           1           0           0           0           1           0           0           3           1           6           0           1           1           0           1           0           2           2           **26**

  **Slovakia**        **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **0**       **nr**      **nr**      **4**       **4**       **2**       **5**       **0**       **2**       **5**       **5**       **4**       **6**       **37**

  Spain               4           1           0           7           6           21          6           2           0           6           2           4           0           nr          0           nr          nr          1           3           **60**

  **Andorra**         **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **3**       **0**       **0**       **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **3**

  U.K.                2           2           0           0           0           1           0           0           1           0           nr          nr          0           5           0           0           2           1           0           **16**

  **Croatia**         **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **3**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **nr**      **0**       **0**       **nr**      **0**       **0**       **3**

  Norway              22          7           4           4           3           1           4           1           5           3           2           4           6           1           6           9           4           2           4           **92**

  **Poland**          **1**       **4**       **5**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **1**       **1**       **0**       **5**       **5**       **2**       **5**       **0**       **1**       **2**       **8**       **9**       **49**

  Czech Republic      0           1           4           0           0           1           nr          4           0           0           0           0           2           0           0           0           nr          nr          nr          **12**

  **Bulgaria**        **0**       **0**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **0**       **1**       **1**       **0**       **0**       **2**       **4**       **2**       **0**       **2**       **0**       **nr**      **nr**      **nr**      **13**

  Sweden              nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          nr          2           1           nr          nr          1           **4**

  **Canada**          **9**       **7**       **7**       **6**       **9**       **12**      **6**       **12**      **8**       **15**      **9**       **16**      **21**      **16**      **10**      **12**      **13**      **29**      **11**      **228**

  U.S.A.              17          21          8           7           8           8           24          29          13          28          30          22          26          32          22          33          35          30          23          **416**

  **TOTALS**          **210**     **133**     **152**     **81**      **101**     **196**     **103**     **151**     **112**     **140**     **171**     **148**     **138**     **208**     **147**     **176**     **143**     **184**     **126**     **2821**
  ------------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------

\*IKAR = International Commission for Alpine Rescue nr = no report

<http://geosurvey.state.co.us/avalanche/Default.aspx?tabid=109>

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="2.8569444444444443in"
height="3.145138888888889in"}Illustrations 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 -- Examples
of Snow Bridges

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="3.5208333333333335in"
height="1.9895833333333333in"}

[**www.fao.org/docrep/
x5376e/x5376e04.htm**](http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5376e/x5376e04.htm)

Illustration 3.2.3: Snow Fence

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="4.861111111111111in"
height="3.388888888888889in"}

[**www.photolib.noaa.gov/
historic/nws/wea01920.htm**](http://www.photolib.noaa.gov/historic/nws/wea01920.htm)

**Illustration 3.2.4: Controlled Avalanche Explosive Detonation**

![](media/image4.jpeg){width="4.331944444444445in"
height="3.2402777777777776in"}

www.explosives.org/ Uses.htm

# Sidebar 3.2.3: Avalanche Danger Scale

![](media/image5.png){width="6.5in" height="3.6506944444444445in"}

<http://www.nwac.noaa.gov/education_resources/dangerscale.htm>

###### **Case Study 3.3: Tornado Safe Rooms**

#### 

#### Introduction

Tornadoes are an unavoidable factor in the lives of people living
throughout most of the United States. Every year without fail, they
cause death, damage and distress. Of course, some areas of the country
are at significantly greater risk than others. For years these high-risk
states and communities have struggled to find ways to educate the public
about the hazard risk and to reduce the hazard's impact.

Researchers at Texas Tech University studied various engineering methods
and common sense approaches aimed at protecting lives and property
during tornadoes. The tornado safe room idea was borne out of these
efforts in the late 1970s; developed in the 1980s; and was gradually
implemented in the 1990s. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
fully embraced and marketed the concept of safe rooms after a
particularly devastating outbreak of tornadoes that struck in 1998. The
states located in the so-called "Tornado Alley" were targeted for the
construction of these safe rooms. In one such initiative in Oklahoma,
more than 6,000 safe rooms were built following a set of twisters that
struck the Midwest in 1999.

President Bill Clinton publicly advocated the construction of safe rooms
after the events described above and others. As safe room construction
became more widespread, the emergence of success stories increased,
anecdotally proving the worth of such mitigation measures. One community
in particular, Moore, Oklahoma, which had suffered through the 1999
tornado events, claimed that many of its citizens were saved from a
repeat of the tornado events in 2003 by the widespread use of safe room
construction that had occurred in the interim.

The wide acceptance of safe rooms as a mitigation technique for
tornadoes has led to standards and regulations to self-police the
industry. Though not all safe room builders and the shelters they
construct meet FEMA guidelines, the code community has continued to work
towards the development of unified standards. Congress, though not
mandating safe rooms, is exploring legislation for wind hazard
reduction - the first of its kind that addresses tornadoes, hurricanes
or any other wind-driven events. The safe room concept has shown how
mitigation techniques can succeed if a community, its residents, the
government, and the private sector join forces to address a hazard or
risk that will not simply vanish on its own.

#### Background / Events

##### 

##### Jarrell, Texas

Jarrell, Texas, lost 3 percent of its population on May 27, 1997, when a
tornado with winds measured at over 261 mph devastated the small
community in a matter of minutes. Twenty-seven deaths and \$20 million
in damages were observed. Assessments ranked this tornado an F5 on the
Fujita Tornado Scale (See Sidebar 3.3.1), one of only six twisters
registered at that intensity during the ten-year period of 1987-1997.
Its seven-mile long, one-half mile wide path destroyed homes, families
and any old notions about tornado preparedness that may have existed in
the minds of residents.

Tornado sirens had been sounded a full ten minutes before the winds had
arrived, but still, 27 people died, and scores of others suffered
personal injuries. Such a great number of casualties is rarely seen due
to the relative rarity of intensity F5 events. Bathtubs and weakly
constructed interior closets had often been cited as ideal shelters in
various news reports, but these areas did not provide the promised
levels of safety to the citizens who sought shelter there. One official
described the aftermath of the powerful twister in stating that,
"There's no way anyone in that area, no matter how much warning they
had, could have survived". Luckily, many people did survive, but not
without living through a harrowing experience.

Following the event, as has occurred in most disasters throughout
history, the drive to rebuild the community began as soon as the dead
were buried:

> "For the most part, the search for survivors was a heartbreaking one,
> turning up only bodies and body parts. The passage of time brought
> burials, sorrow, numbness, the ebbing of hope. In the end, it seemed
> as if the resolve to rebuild was rekindled only because there was
> little else left to do".

The key question for Jarrell, and any other community recovering from a
tornado, was how they would rebuild. The Jarrell city administrators
could not have know that within their own state, at Texas Tech
University, a new technology called the "Safe Room," or In-Residence
Shelter," was being developed and tested to reduce the risk of what had
just violently transpired within their jurisdiction.

# 

# Tornadoes in the United States. 

# 

# Protecting life is, of course, one of the ultimate goals of emergency management and in particular, of mitigation, which aims to reduce the impacts of disasters. In the United States, tornadoes are most commonly observed during the spring and summer months, when meteorological conditions are perfect for their generation. The events are actually more common than most people might be aware. In fact, the National Weather Service reports that each year, about 1,200 tornadoes touch down in the United States, resulting in the death of approximately 70 people and the injury of a further 1,500 (NOAA 2, N/D). More than 30 percent of these tornadoes occur between 3:00 and 6:00pm, with another 25 percent striking between 6:00 and 9:00pm. The vast majority of tornadoes recorded during the past 45 years, a full ninety percent in fact, have been categorized as either F0 (31 percent), F1 (37 percent) or F2 (22 percent). Of the other three more severe rankings on the Fujita Tornado Damage Scale, the rate of occurrence is thankfully much lower, including the F3 (7 percent), F4 (2 percent) and F5 (less than 1 percent) twisters. The following list briefly describes the scale, which is expanded upon in Sidebar 3.3.1.

# F0 - "light" damage

# F1 - "moderate" damage

# F2 - "considerable" damage

# F3 - "severe" damage

# F4 - "devastating"

# F5 - "incredible" 

# (FEMA 431, November 2003).

Perhaps the most important information used in assessing tornado risk,
based upon historical data collected, are the locations where tornadoes
have touched down. The two maps at the end of this study, Illustrations
3.3.1 and 3.3.2, identify the areas facing the greatest risk for tornado
and high-wind activity. The first map shows four defined wind zones in
the United States. Zone IV, with wind potentials of 250 mph, stretches
from Detroit in the north to Jackson, Mississippi, in the south; and
from the state of Oklahoma in the west to most of Ohio, Kentucky and
Tennessee in the east. This area of greatest activity is commonly
referred to as "Tornado Alley." The second map, also produced by FEMA,
shows F3-F5 tornado activity based on historical data from 1950-1998.
The dark red, dark orange and light orange colors help identify tornado
risks to residents and communities.

Extrapolations of data regarding the locations, time of day, types of
tornadoes and other information have led to more refined knowledge about
tornado risk throughout the country. This information has served to
determine where safe rooms should be implemented.

Tornado forecasting, based upon statistical and scientific knowledge of
storm conditions and other specific meteorological indicators, is
something that has become more refined through time and has afforded
citizens with an additional level of resilience. To illustrate this
progress, one need only consider the series of tornadoes that struck in
May of 1953 - the third deadliest year for twisters in the United
States. On a single day that month, tornadoes affected three cities in
particular: Waco, Texas (three individual tornadoes); Flint, Michigan;
and Worcester, Massachusetts. These five tornadoes, which came as a
complete surprise in the absence of any warning or prediction system,
led to 324 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries. Following these events, the
first Texas Tornado Warning Conference was called in June of that year,
leading to an integrated weather radar system that would have the
capability of providing timely information on such events.

Advancements in computer technology have also led to improvement in
weather prediction. For example, meteorologists can now replicate
atmospheric motions using computer models that draw upon formulas too
complex for old (legacy) computer processors. This capability, combined
with improved systems for analyzing weather patterns, has helped to
advance severe weather prediction to its current status where an average
lead time of over 11 minutes is provided for tornado warnings issued by
National Weather Service (NWS) forecasters.

As technology has improved, and with it the ability to forecast where
tornadoes will form, people began to feel more confident in their levels
of protection. Large storm systems, which provide the greatest
opportunity for accurate prediction of tornado events, resulted in
numerous successful aversions of disaster. However, small or weak
systems like the one that led to the F5 activity in Jarrell, Texas, are
much more difficult to predict, even for the more modern technologies.
Additionally, as is true with many emergent technologies, bugs and
faults in the system are often not detected until it is too late.
Consider Xenia, Ohio, which was struck by two tornadoes in 25 years.
After the first event struck in 1974, the town invested in 10 tornado
warning sirens. However, sixteen years later when a late September
tornado struck, many of the sirens could not sound because power
failures had preceded the events and had rendered the system useless. In
addition to the \$20 million in damages suffered, one person died and
100 more were injured.

It became apparent that, even as weather prediction radar systems and
warning sirens were improved upon and implemented, providing greater and
greater lead time for people to seek shelter, it was the precise nature
of that shelter that ultimately ensured the safety of the population.
All the warning time in the world was useless if residents did not have
a safe place to protect themselves. Outdated beliefs that interior
rooms, basements, or bathtubs would provide adequate protections were
tragically proved incorrect time and time again throughout tornado
alley. This at-risk population, students and researchers at Texas Tech,
and FEMA officials all sought to find a system where "near absolute
protection" could be ensured. The Safe Room project emerged as the
answer to these concerns.

### 

### The Participants

##### 

##### Texas Tech University

Following the F5 tornado that ripped through Xenia, Ohio in 1974, which
killed 33 people, many photographs emerged of damage and destruction.
One such picture inspired a young engineer at Texas Tech University
named Ernst Kiesling to seek out a solution to the inadequacies of
shelter that seemed to have been the primary causative factor in the
tragedy. He studied a picture of a home that had been almost completely
destroyed, and noticed that the small interior bathroom had somehow
withstood the powerful wind. "Viewing that picture from Xenia, Ohio,
inspired the shelter concept," Kiesling later said.

Kiesling went on to play a primary role in the development of the safe
room, with one FEMA engineer going as far as to call him the "father of
the safe room". In the 1970's, after conceiving of the safe room
concept, Kiesling, a professor of civil engineering at Texas Tech
University, needed more data. He and his team of researchers at Texas
Tech's Wind Science and Engineering Research Center had to determine
wind speed and the type of construction that would stop flying debris
from piercing such a shelter. A major finding they made early on, based
upon observed tornado damage and supplemental engineering analysis, was
that tornado wind speeds were not 600 mph as previously thought, but
rather about 250 mph. This speed would become recognized as the standard
for shelter design.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, researchers at Texas Tech conducted
extensive research to better understand how to mitigate the effects of
severe winds. More than 90 windstorms that occurred across the country
were investigated by the team. In the late 1980s, Kiesling and Co.
developed construction plans, or blueprints, for "in-residence" shelters
that were made available to the public. As research continued, Kiesling
and his team identified three primary advantages of safe rooms: 1)
accessibility; 2) low cost; and, 3) multiple use. The research center's
Web site explains:

> The accessibility of a shelter within the house makes the in-residence
> shelter highly advantageous over an outdoor cellar or community
> shelter because it eliminates the extreme danger of being struck by
> flying debris while attempting to reach a cellar or community shelter.
> Unlike the cellar, the in-residence shelter has a daily functional
> use - bathroom, closet, utility room, etc. It permits a family to
> continue regular living patterns during a weather watch with the peace
> of mind of knowing that a place of safety from extreme winds is only a
> few seconds away (TTU Wind Science Web Site).

During a tornado, one of the primary concerns is flying debris or
"missiles." A missile impact facility was created to test different
sizes of debris under certain wind conditions against specific building
types, walls, roofs and doors. Through this research, standards were
determined for the best materials under certain weather environments.
The key to safe room design, it was determined, rests most squarely in
the quality of the welded connections between the roof, walls and floor.

In 1997, national television coverage focused on the aftermath of the
tornadoes in Jarrell, Texas, but reporters also covered the research
efforts at Texas Tech. The media attention was the key factor in
"spark\[ing\] interest in the construction of in-residence safe rooms
and shelters".

# 

# The Role of FEMA 

# 

# In 1998, FEMA officials were looking for ways to provide improved guidance for citizens and communities in dealing with tornadoes, and the agency turned to Texas Tech's research. One-hundred and twenty people had died that year because of tornadoes, spurring the federal agency to sponsor a National Tornado Forum (August, 1998) that brought together a full range of stakeholders, including other federal entities, the private sector, academic representatives, and journalists. At the forum, National Weather Service (NWS) Director John Kelly commented that tornado warnings have improved, but "even a perfect warning system is reduced to an academic exercise if people don't receive it and react to it". A tornado that touched down in Florida in February 1998 killed 40 people overnight because most residents were in bed and sleeping. FEMA reiterated their encouragement of the use of weather radios, but acknowledged that the key to survival and safety in such situations is having a place to go after receiving a warning.

And so, one of the highlights of this forum was the introduction, and
subsequent endorsement, of the new tornado safe rooms concept. "Having a
shelter, or safe room built into a home can help protect people and
families from injury or death caused by the dangerous force of extreme
winds," said FEMA Director James Lee Witt. Witt added, "When constructed
according to the plans, the safe room can provide protection against
winds of up to 250 miles per hour and projectiles traveling at 100 miles
an hour".

A 25-page publication, entitled, "Taking Shelter from the Storm,"
compiled 25 years of field research by Kiesling and his partners at
Texas Tech's Wind Engineering Research Center. State and local officials
had been clamoring for some guidance and information on new mitigation
strategies, and this document provided the detailed planning and
construction guidelines, including schematics and cost estimates, that
they so desperately sought. Over 200,000 copies of the first edition
were distributed before a second edition was produced with greater
planning detail.

**The May 3, 1999 Tornado Events**

Beth Bartlett, a resident of Del City, Oklahoma, took FEMA's advice and
had a safe room built in her house in February 1999. On May 3^rd^ of
that year, more than 70 tornadoes hit Oklahoma and Kansas; in Oklahoma,
44 people died and nearly 800 were injured. Eight thousand homes were
damaged or destroyed. In Kansas, schools were particularly hard-hit,
though thankfully, classes were not in session at the time.

What emerged from the death and destruction caused by these tornadoes
was a tale of survival that was to become an example to the country.
Bartlett, her mother, two dogs and two cats, walked into their safe
room, located in a bedroom closet as a twister approached. "After the
storm passed, the unharmed but shaken women emerged to find their brick
home completely destroyed. The safe room, miraculously, was left
standing amidst the debris. In their Del City neighborhood alone, five
people died. It was undeniable that Bartlett and her family would have
raised those numbers had they not taken such prudent measures.

News reports cited how engineers, neighbors and other contractors had
been skeptical of Bartlett's investment just six months prior to the
tornado. "They thought it was overkill," but Bartlett added, "they've
apologized, several of them". Federal and local officials touted
Bartlett as a living example of safe room success. Even the top federal
government official offered his ardent endorsement for safe rooms.
During a visit to Del City, President Bill Clinton told residents, "If
you don't remember anything else I say today, for goodness' sake, build
a safe room in your home when you rebuild. We will be able to save
nearly everybody if we can do this".

Seven days after the tornadoes struck, FEMA's Mitigation Directorate
sent a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) to Oklahoma and
Kansas to assess the damage caused by both the core and exterior of each
of the tornadoes. The BPAT investigated residential, commercial and
other facilities for their structural successes and failures. Successes
cited included safe rooms; failures were plenty, which included extreme
wind force that caused damage; debris that penetrated buildings, leading
to more wind damage; and poor construction techniques and materials.
However, the major conclusion from this report was clearly stated; "The
BPAT concluded that the best means to reduce loss of life and minimize
personal injury during any tornado event is to take refuge in
specifically-designed tornado shelters".

**Residential Expansion of Safe Rooms**

As a result of the Midwest tornadoes of 1999, Tulsa, Oklahoma, proposed
using its Hazard Mitigation Grant Program resources to encourage
residents to build safe rooms within their homes. At the time, Tulsa was
a Project Impact community, which helped establish and initiate
public/private partnerships, public outreach and other projects to
reduce damage from disasters. Tulsa officials worked with the state
emergency management agency, the public works division, State Farm
Insurance and Tulsa home builders to develop building and construction
standards, certification and compliance procedures and public outreach
campaigns. This unique coalition aimed to build a safe room in every
newly constructed and existing home by 2020. The cost of each safe room
averages \$2,000-\$10,000.

This pilot program soon spread to the entire state of Oklahoma. The
federal and Oklahoma State governments put forth a major initiative to
build thousands of safe rooms throughout that state. A \$2,000 rebate
was offered by FEMA director James Lee Witt and Oklahoma Governor Frank
Keating, with Witt commenting that "this (program) is very unusual, and
this is the first program of its kind". Oklahoma was recognized as a
prime candidate for this effort because of the extensive damage, and
likewise, its high disaster risk in relation to tornadoes. According to
FEMA, 2,207 single-family residences were destroyed, 1,383 were severely
damaged and 2,601 suffered minor damage. A task force convened with
three goals: public education, financial assistance and quality control.

The public education component of the initiative consisted of three
elements: public service announcements (PSAs), a speaker's bureau, and
resource materials. The last two were served by a FEMA "Safe Room
Traveling Road Show" that traversed the state, reaching thousands of
residents in dozens of cities, towns and villages. Advisers answered
questions, provided information and emphasized how to build
disaster-resistant homes, most notably with safe rooms.

The financial portion of this program helped residents pay for the safe
rooms with the \$2,000 rebates after the shelters were built - which had
to meet local codes and FEMA guidelines. The allocated \$12 million came
directly from the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), a fund that
serves to assist communities following a presidentially declared
disaster in order to reduce the impact of repetitive damage. In an
effort to minimize initial paperwork and to get the program out to as
many people as possible, a toll free phone number was established. The
most notable eligible applicants for this funding were the 5,000
residents whose homes had been destroyed in designated disaster areas.
Beth Bartlett joined Witt and Keating at the press conference that
announced the initiative, stating, "The only thing still standing is the
safe room, which we're building our house back around".

Throughout the rest of 1999, over 6,000 safe rooms were constructed in
Oklahoma homes. A FEMA report stated, "As a result, thousands of
Oklahoma residents who were previously at risk from tornadoes and high
winds now have ready access to places of safety designed to provide
protection from the most severe wind hazards". Oklahoma City became one
of the first examples of a public-private-government partnership in
"Tornado Alley" that served to mitigate against future twisters.

**Community Expansion of Safe Rooms**

Many communities recognized that people are not always home during
tornadoes, and it was likely that not all people would build safe rooms
in their homes. So, community shelters became another component of the
safe room initiative. FEMA produced a manual in July 2000 titled,
"Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters." This
publication mirrored the residential guide and provided instructions,
rationales and blueprints for "the design of engineered shelters that
will protect large numbers of people during a high-wind event".

**School Expansion of Safe Rooms**

The Midwest tornadoes also struck Kansas. That state decided to invest
in safe rooms at schools, which led one school official to comment that
"students, staff and parents have a place \... to go while at school so
that they will feel safe and secure during tornado activity".

Wichita and Sedgwick Counties had experienced their share of tornadoes
from 1950-2002. Seventy-two tornadoes struck the county during those 52
years, with nine of those incidents registered as category F3 or
greater. According NOAA statistics, \$426 million in damages and 13
deaths resulted in that area during these five decades. In 1999, two
Wichita schools were damaged severely, but classes were not in session.
Those schools had designated hallways for shelter, however, "the
hallways in both schools suffered extensive damage". The event was a
reminder of the importance of the standards set forth in the FEMA
tornado safe room initiatives.

HMGP and additional Congressional funds were used to aid in the
construction of safe rooms in schools. Partnerships between the Kansas
Division of Emergency Management and the Kansas Hazard Mitigation Team
helped to lead this effort in coordination with Wichita Public Schools
and the county emergency management officials. Emergency management and
school officials determined the best method to build safe rooms --
either construct an addition to the school or construct a new school and
retrofit an area. Guidelines and criteria for construction derived from
FEMA's community shelter publication.

A \$285 million bond issue that complemented the federal matching
dollars funded the work. Citizens approved the measure within one year
of the 1999 tornadoes. In all, safe rooms were constructed in 26
schools, with another eight either currently under construction or
planned. Wichita focused more on elementary, special education and early
childhood schools because they typically offered less shelter; larger
high schools in larger buildings offered more options for protection.
According to FEMA, the safe rooms that were constructed serve 7,800 of
Wichita's 49,000 students, and the shelters will also be used for voting
locations, church services and other outreach activities.

Five groups were cited by FEMA as critical to a successful school
shelter initiative in Wichita: the legislature and school boards; local
school and building officials; the private sector; school staff; and
students. Each group played a role in providing protection for a portion
of Wichita's student population. Not all schools have shelters, but the
Kansas' director of emergency management said:

> "I hope some day that every Kansas school has a tornado safe
> room\...Weather prediction and warning advancements now provide us the
> advantage of time to take shelter. But, all the warning time in the
> world doesn't do any good unless there is a refuge area for our
> children to go" (FEMA Mitigation Case Studies, August 2002).

**Lessons Learned**

**Post-May 1999**

FEMA spent \$50 million during the past few years expanding the safe
room idea to homes, schools and communities. Inevitably, FEMA, local
communities and residents have learned lessons. "We have found that,
through our efforts to develop and transfer the "technology" of safe
rooms and community shelters, the more people are predisposed to
building them," said one FEMA official. "In areas with a high threat of
tornadoes or severe hurricanes, the interest is greater due to the
perceived higher threat. People's interest wanes and the emergency
management community (not just FEMA) should promote tornado shelters".

Consider the town of Moore, Oklahoma, and its experience with the May 3,
1999, tornadoes. These tornadoes split Moore in two, killing five people
in the town, injuring many and causing damage to hundreds of buildings.
Many residents of Moore took advantage of the FEMA/state initiative to
build safe rooms, leading the town to be dubbed the "safe room capital
of the world":

> "As of May 8, 2003, Moore officials had records of about 750 safe
> rooms \... including 460 supported by the '99 FEMA initiative. In all,
> Moore has about 14,000 dwelling units. This may well be one of the
> highest ratios of safe rooms per capita in the brief history of the
> safe room phenomenon" (Patton, 2003).

While Wichita supported shelters in schools, Oklahoma focused on
residential shelters. As far as Moore's emergency manager was concerned,
the town would not be building or endorsing community shelters because
it was felt that people should not venture outside during a tornado.

In interviews with residents of Moore following the 1999 tornadoes, many
lessons were learned that were replicated in other Midwestern
localities. These lessons included actions by residents: believing they
are at risk but can survive a tornado nonetheless; building safe rooms
or at least identifying shelter before a tornado; helping neighbors; and
believing they can recover. The first and last points show how the
residents of Moore embraced their recovery options, while a separate
survey, conducted by FEMA on other residents in "Tornado Alley" showed
that more than half believed they could not ensure their safety, leading
them to take no preventive actions.

In qualitative interviews with residents, many expressed their sense of
lessons learned after the 1999 events. Resident Don Staley said, "We
didn't have a safe room in '98 (another major tornado) or '99. We rode
out the tornadoes twice in the bathroom, and I said, never again". On
May 8, 2003, Staley and the residents of Moore experienced another
severe tornado outbreak, an F3, but no deaths resulted. Serious damage,
however, was the widespread. Shannon Scott and Robert Wallace's home was
destroyed, but having survived after they sought refuge in their safe
room, both credited the room with saving their lives. Ernest Smith used
the FEMA money in 1999 to build a safe room, adding \$2,500 of his own
funds. In 2003, he and his family used the shelter and it, too, saved
their lives. "We're just grateful to FEMA that we had that shelter this
time". These people in Moore now have a unique connection with Beth
Bartlett in Del City. In testimony before Congress in 2004, Anthony
Lowe, FEMA's mitigation division director, described how the 2003 storms
were weathered better because of the addition of safe rooms:

> "Following these storms, Albert Ashwood, the director for Emergency
> Management for the State of Oklahoma, publicly stated that the safe
> rooms, built with FEMA's HMGP program funds, had saved many lives that
> day. Undersecretary (Michael) Brown and I toured several of these
> damaged homes ourselves and saw both the tremendous damage and
> excellent performance of these safe rooms. This is the kind of work
> FEMA is most proud of: saving lives and property, and getting people
> to take action before disaster strikes" (Lowe, March 24, 2004)."

Other states in "Tornado Alley" have provided some assistance for
homeowners to build safe rooms, but not to the scale of the Oklahoma
initiative. For example, Racine, Wisconsin, added a few safe rooms to
low-income housing in 2000. Iowa parceled out \$87,000 of federal money
in 2000 for residents to build safe rooms and for some shelters in
public building such as the Sioux City American Red Cross office. Tulsa
partnered with the Home Builders Association of Greater Tulsa and 11
builders to construct the country's first safe room subdivision, named
"Legacy Park," which may ultimately include 1,000 safe room equipped
homes.

Xenia, Ohio, represents another case of residents trying to rebuild and
learn from previous tornadoes. In 1974, Xenia was hit with an F5 twister
that caused extreme damage. In 2000, another set of storms hit Xenia
that destroyed or damaged more than 300 homes and 34 businesses. Media
reports followed the lead of other states with headlines such as "Xenia
Events to Focus on Safer Home Construction." FEMA brought its traveling
road show to Xenia and held a mitigation fair. As a result of the 2000
tornadoes, Xenia was the first city named a Project Impact community
after a disaster. Xenia received \$200,000 in federal money to prepare
for future disasters, especially tornadoes. At the mitigation fairs,
safe rooms were encouraged as they were in Oklahoma and Wichita.

Other communities learned lessons and followed the example of Wichita's
school initiative as five other counties in Kansas planned to build safe
rooms. As of August 2002, 50 schools had plans for shelters. One key
aspect of the expansion of safe rooms through all of these jurisdictions
was that FEMA did not intend to make safe rooms mandatory, which
propelled home builders to either support the idea or not oppose it.

> "In recent times, we have seen little homebuilder opposition," said a
> FEMA official, "especially once they became comfortable that FEMA was
> not going to try to get the building code organizations to make
> shelters mandatory. Our role has been limited to technology transfer
> and some construction grants, so the homebuilders don't feel
> threatened by our mitigation activities. In some communities, like
> Tulsa, the home builders are actively involved in promoting shelters"
> (FEMA Official, April 2004).

**Standards and Regulations**

As the safe room initiative unfolded, it became clear to many officials
that some sort of standard or certification needed to be instituted.
Residents in Oklahoma, for example, did not receive their rebates until
the safe rooms were approved according to FEMA and local standards.
However, quality control has remained an issue through the last few
years. In 2001, the National Storm Shelter Association (NSSA) was formed
to provide industry standards for safe room construction. According to
its mission statement, the NSSA ensures the "highest quality of
manufactured and constructed storm shelters for protecting people from
injury or loss of life \...".

Because of the high propensity for tornadoes in certain parts of the
country, local codes have become a critical aspect of safe room policy.
The FEMA guidelines published in its manuals serve as a critical
catalyst for safe room construction. Twenty-five years of research by
Texas Tech has gone a long way in assisting the construction of safe
shelter, but lessons learned have clearly shown that some safe rooms do
not meet the current standards. Now, the International Code Council
(ICC) has joined with the NSSA to work on a new safe room standard.
Expected to be ready in early 2006, FEMA is helping to fund the
research, in conjunction with cooperative work from other government
officials, design professionals, industry representatives and academics.
According to an ICC news release, "The Storm Shelter Standard will
provide design and construction regulations for community shelters and
residential shelters. The level of wind resistance required for the
shelters will be very high, based on rare storms". By working through
this complex process, the ICC will be able to provide a basis for
legally enforcing the construction of storm shelters. Ultimately, these
standards will apply to the scores of safe room building companies that
have recently been established. According to Texas Tech, 31 safe room
builders completed debris impact tests that meet FEMA and NSSA
standards, but many more companies exist.

**Legislation**

According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the federal government
has spent more than \$39 billion for natural disaster assistance in the
past 12 years. Compared with other natural disasters, wind damage
mitigation resources do not rank as highly in terms of proportional
spending. For example, the federal government spends over \$100 million
a year on earthquake mitigation, but only \$6 million (per year) for
wind disaster mitigation (including tornadoes and hurricanes). After a
twister, "not all tornado damage claims are equal. Like just about every
other item in the arcane appropriations process on Capitol Hill, tornado
damages are susceptible to the vagaries of politics".

As previously stated, FEMA has contributed \$50 million for safe rooms,
but what concerns legislators is the rising cost of each tornado. For
example, two tornadoes struck Fort Worth, Texas, in March 2000, costing
\$450 million in damage. "Because storms such as tornadoes are becoming
so costly, there has been a move to spend more on disaster preparedness,
such as building storm shelters in tornado-prone states". After the May
1999 tornadoes in the Midwest, Rep. Dennis Moore (D-KS) co-founded the
Congressional Wind Hazard Reduction Caucus, a bipartisan group that aims
to raise awareness among legislators about the public safety, economic
toll and mitigation techniques for wind events such as tornadoes and
hurricanes.

Various forms of legislation have been proposed, but languished, within
the U.S. Congress to reduce the impacts of wind events. The latest
version, proposed March 17, 2004, calls for the establishment of a
National Windstorm Impact Reduction Program. One of the primary
components of this legislation calls for cost-effective and affordable
practices to reduce damages. In testimony before a U.S. House committee,
Anthony Lowe, FEMA's mitigation director, said most funds for wind
hazard mitigation come from the National Hurricane Program, but those
resources are used primarily for hurricane evacuation studies. Overall,
though, Lowe said no federal wind hazard reduction program exists. He
testified about the successes of tornado safe rooms, while he also
encouraged a coordinated, federal effort in mitigating wind event
damages. Echoing the proposed legislation, Lowe said, "It is essential
to identify 'cost effective and affordable' wind hazard mitigation
approaches. There would be little value in coming up with great
approaches only to find that no one will implement them because they are
too difficult or too expensive". A federal program would help
legislators and states deal more effectively with tornado damage because
standards would be set. Said one FEMA official to describe the
difficulty in funding such programs:

> "Politicians have the difficult job of deciding how to allocate the
> limited tax dollars they have. That is one of the things they are
> elected to do. If their constituents are interested in shelters then
> they are. No community has unlimited funds to fund activities. So,
> those activities that a community deems the highest priorities are
> funded first. This is usually not shelters" (FEMA Official, April
> 2004).

**Conclusion**

### 

### The fact that Safe Rooms work has been proven by residents and local community support, and endorsed by both President Bill Clinton and his successor's chief mitigation officer. Comparing Oklahoma tornadoes in 1999 versus 2003, government officials cited the success of safe rooms in protecting lives. Though safe rooms only exist in a relatively small proportion of all homes in "Tornado Alley", it is easier to sell a home with a safe room -- some people actually want to pay for these shelters. Granted, "tornadoes are low probability/high consequence events. Even in Oklahoma, the chances of an individual building or person being destroyed by a tornado are not very high and difficult to estimate," as was described by Tulsa's Ann Patton. But Texas Tech estimates that each year over three billion man-hours are spent in the United States under tornado watches. "In more than half the watches issued, a tornado occurs somewhere within the watch area." People in tornado prone areas experience anxiety and loss of productivity unless a safe place is readily available. FEMA has determined that safe rooms, be they residential, community or school ones, best serve the people of "Tornado Alley" and beyond, to people in coastal regions who are under threats during hurricane season. The example of Moore, Oklahoma, best exemplifies the key ingredients for a successful mitigation project: community support, financial support (in its case, from the state) and leaders willing to push the issue. Four years after the 1999 tornadoes, lives were saved in Moore because of safe rooms. Yes, the political willpower must lead to an all-winds hazard program so the safe room concept can be more broadly exposed. Financial institutions and the government need to provide more incentives because at a cost of a couple of thousand dollars, the price tag scares some people away.

According to the National Weather Service, over 1,000 tornadoes are
reported each year. Only a fraction of these produce F3-F5 conditions,
but they do happen. One need only consider the cases of Xenia, Ohio,
Jarrell, Texas, and Moore, Oklahoma, as well as many other communities
in the Midwest, for proof. Tornadoes will occur in 2006, 2012, 2020 and
every year in between and beyond. Meteorological devices have improved
warning times, but ultimately the actual shelter makes the difference.
It also comes down to cost, education and willpower to move forward and
build a safe room. As one resident of Moore reflected after the 2003
twister that she rode out in her safe room, "It doesn't matter what the
cost, because in that case, your whole lives are depending on it".

### 

### [References]{.underline}

Associated Press. 2002. "More Schools Installing 'Safe Rooms' as Tornado
Shelter." November 11.

Associated Press. 2000. "State Promotes 'Safe Rooms'; Tornadoes:
\$87,000 in Federal Money Will Help Build Shelters." September 7.

Associated Press. 1997. "Texas Town Flattened By Rare 'F5' Tornado; 27
Are Killed." May 27.

Associated Press. 2004. "Wichita Schools Build Safe Rooms to Withstand
Storms, Tornadoes." March 15.

Barnaby, Jacqlyn. 2001. "Tulsans Encouraged to Build Safe Rooms." Tulsa
World, April 18.

Chulindra, Warisa. 1999. "Killer Twisters Stir Interest in Safe Rooms."
The Topeka Capital-Journal, June 24.

Dallas Morning News. 1999. "Concrete-Encased Room Serves as Storm
Cellar." July 5.

FEMA 320. 1998. "Taking Shelter From the Storm: Building a Safe Room
Inside Your House." October.

FEMA 342. 1999. "Midwest Tornadoes of May 3, 1999: Observations,
Recommendations and Technical Guidance," Building Performance Assessment
Report, October.

FEMA 361. 2000. "Design and Construction Guidance for Community
Shelters." July.

FEMA 431. 2003. "Tornado Protection: Selecting Refuge Areas in
Buildings." November.

FEMA. 2002. "Protecting School Children from Tornadoes: State of Kansas
Shelter Initiative." Mitigation Case Studies. August.

FEMA. 2003. "Safe Rooms Save Lives: State of Oklahoma Safe Room
Initiative." Mitigation Case Studies. January.

FEMA. 1998. "FEMA and Texas Tech Team Up for Tornado Protection in the
Home." News Release. August 18.

FEMA2. 1998. "National Tornado Forum to Focus on Safety Issues." News
Release. August 15.

FEMA Official. 2004. Personal Interview by Greg Licamele. April.

FEMA. N/D. "Timeline: In-Residence Shelter History."
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/mit/saferoom/netc_pdfs/netc_history.pdf.

Fox News.com. 2004. "Safe Rooms Increase Survival Rates in Tornadoes."
March 26.

Hannah, James. 2000. "Xenia Learns Another Lesson in Tornado Readiness."
Associated Press. September 28.

H.R. 3980. 2004. "National Windstorm Impact Reduction Act of 2004." U.S.
House of Representatives. March 17.

Haddow, George D. and Jane A. Bullock. 2003. "Introduction to Emergency
Management." Butterworth-Heinemann.

Hurt, Jeanette. 2000. "Public Housing to Have 'Safe Room'; Low-Income
Project to Include Disaster Shelter." Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. August
25.

International Code Council. 2004. "New Safe Room Standard Will Save
Lives When Tornadoes Strike." News release. March 30.

Kissell, Margo Rutledge. 2000. "'74 Photo Inspires Shelter Concept."
Dayton Daily News. October 6.

Lawless, Margaret. 2004. Class Presentation. The George Washington
University. March 29.

Lowe, Anthony. 2004. Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Research, and Subcommittee on
Environment, Technology and Standards. March 24.
http://www.windhazards.org/pdf/Lowe-FEMA.pdf.

Luscombe, Belinda. 1997. "Nowhere to Run." Time magazine. June 9.

McFeatters, Ann. 2003. "U.S. Looks to Curb Rising Cost of Natural
Disasters." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. May 7.

Moore, Dennis. 2003. "Moore Reintroduces Legislation to Mitigate Losses
from Tornadoes." News release. May 7.

National Storm Shelter Association. N/D. Web Site. http://www.nssa.cc.

NOAA. N/D. Web Site. [http://www.noaa.gov](http://www.noaa.gov/).

NOAA 2. N/D. "Thunderstorms, Tornadoes, Lightning; Nature's Most Violent
Storms." The U.S. Department of Commerce and the American Red Cross.
[www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/ttl.pdf](http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/ttl.pdf).

Patton, Ann. 2003. "Surviving the Storm: Sheltering in the May 2003
Tornadoes in Moore, Oklahoma." Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center Quick Response Report.

Quaid, Libby. 2000. "FEMA: Study of Oklahoma, Kansas Twister Shows
Damage Can Be Reduced." Associated Press. March 28.

Ruble, Renee. 1999. "Keating Announces Rebates for Safe Rooms."
Associated Press, June 18.

Schmid, Randolph. 1998. "Government to Encourage Building Home Tornado
Shelters." Associated Press. August 19.

Spotts, Peter. 1998. "Trying to Blunt Twisters' Destruction." Christian
Science Monitor. February 25.

Stout, David. 1998. "'Safe Rooms' Urged in Areas Prone to Tornadoes."
The New York Times. August 19.

TTU Wind Science. N/D. Web Site. http://www.wind.ttu.edu/.

Tulsa Project Impact. 2001. "Tulsa Builders Launch First Safe Room
Subdivision, Legacy Park." Newsletter article. February 6.

Waller, James and Ernst Kiesling. 2003. "Building Codes and Storm
Shelter Safety." The Building Safety Journal. August.

Watson, Traci. 1999. "Shelter Weathers Deadly Okla. Tornadoes." USA
Today. May 17.

Wolf, Richard. 1997. "Twister's Wounds Run Deep." USA Today. November.

Wynn, Kelli. 2001. "Project Impact Hits Home Today When Xenia Signs on
Dotted Line." Dayton Daily News. May 25.

##### Sidebar 3.3.1: The Fujita Tornado Scale

##### ![](media/image6.jpeg){width="6.495833333333334in" height="5.868055555555555in"}

##### [**www.srh.noaa.gov/ shv/ETOpages/fujita.htm**](http://www.srh.noaa.gov/shv/ETOpages/fujita.htm) 

##### ![](media/image7.png){width="6.756944444444445in" height="5.190277777777778in"}Illustration 3.3.1: Wind Zones in the United States

**(FEMA, 1998)**

![](media/image8.png){width="6.756944444444445in"
height="5.006944444444445in"}**Illustration 3.3.2: Tornado Activity in
the United States**

**(FEMA, 1998)**

**Additional Sources of Information on Project Impact:**

Allegany County Maryland Project Impact -
<http://gov.allconet.org/impact/welcome.htm>

Baton Rouge, Louisiana Project Impact -
<http://brgov.com/Dept/OEP/projectimpact.htm>

Disaster Resource Center (University of Delaware) -
<http://www.udel.edu/DRC/projectimpact.html>

Freemont County, Wyoming Project Impact -
<http://www.fremontcounty.org/projectimpact.htm>

King County Washington Project Impact -
<http://www.metrokc.gov/prepare/programs/projectimpact.aspx>

Project Impact Spring Break -
<http://www.preparerespondrecover.com/springbreak/>

Provo, Utah Project Impact -
<http://www.provo.org/emergency/Project_Impact/project_impact.html>

Research Triangle (NC) Project Impact -
<http://www.tjcog.dst.nc.us/prjimp/>

Seattle Project Impact - <http://www.cityofseattle.net/projectimpact/>

Stearns County, Minnesota Project Impact -
<http://www.co.stearns.mn.us/departments/emergency/projectimpact.htm>

**Additional sources of information on Avalanche Mitigation:**

American Avalanche Association -
<http://www.americanavalancheassociation.org/>

American Avalanche Institute - <http://www.avalanchecourse.com/>

Avalanche.org -- [www.avalanche.org](http://www.avalanche.org/)

Canadian Avalanche Association - <http://www.avalanche.ca/>

Forest Service (US) National Avalanche Center -
<http://www.fsavalanche.org/>

National Snow and Ice Data Center Avalanche Page -
<http://nsidc.org/snow/avalanche/>

Regional Avalanche Centers -
<http://www.fsavalanche.org/forecastcenters/forecast_index.html>

State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management -
<http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/mitigation/landava.htm>

##### Additional Sources of Information on Safe Rooms

FEMA Safe Room Page - <http://www.fema.gov/mit/saferoom/>

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Safe Room Initiative -
<http://www.msema.org/mitigate/mssaferoominit.htm>

NOAA Safe Room Page - <http://www.crh.noaa.gov/top/saferooms.htm>

**Glossary of Terms:**

Avalanche - a large mass of snow, ice, earth, rock, or other material in
swift motion down a mountainside or over a precipice

Cornice - an overhanging mass of snow, ice, or rock usually on a ridge

Runout Zone -- where the snow and debris in an avalanche come to a stop

Safe Room -- a reinforced room or area within a built structure (such as
a house) that is designed to withstand hurricane force winds and direct
impact by flying debris

Starting Zone - the most volatile area of a slope, where unstable snow
can fracture from the surrounding snow cover and begin to slide

Tornado - a violent destructive whirling wind accompanied by a
funnel-shaped cloud that progresses in a narrow path over the land

Track -- the path or channel that an avalanche follows as it goes
downhill

**Acronyms:**

AAA -- American Avalanche Association

BEPN -- Business Emergency Preparedness Network

BPAT -- Building Performance Assessment Team

CAIC -- Colorado Avalanche Information Center

Caltrans -- California Department of Transportation

CERT -- Community Emergency Response Team

CGS -- Colorado Geological Survey

DRC -- Disaster Research Center

EIIP -- Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership

EOC -- Emergency Operations Center

FDEM -- Florida Division of Emergency Management

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency GNH -- Good Neighbor House

GAO -- General Accounting Office

HMGP -- Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

ICC -- International Code Council

IDEA -- Innovations Deserving Exploratory Analysis

MOC -- Mitigation Operations Center

MTU -- Michigan Technological University

NAC -- National Avalanche Center

NAF -- National Avalanche Foundation

NAS -- National Avalanche School

NCHRP -- National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NOAA -- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

NSAA -- National Ski Areas Association

NSIDC -- National Snow and Ice Data Center

NSSA -- National Storm Shelter Association

NWS -- National Weather Service

PI -- Project Impact

PSA -- Public Service Announcement

TTU -- Texas Tech University

WSDOT -- Washington State Department of Transportation

**Discussion Questions**

####### General

1.  Compare mitigation and preparedness. What are the advantages and
    shortcomings of both.

2.  Is mitigation something that can be done on the individual level?
    Explain.

3.  How can a community measure whether or not a certain mitigation
    measure was or will be cost effective?

4.  How can community leaders be convinced to dedicate funding on
    disaster mitigation over other social projects, when the mitigated
    hazard may or may not occur during their administration?

5.  Is insurance a mitigation technique? Why or why not?

6.  Some mitigation techniques have been blamed for increasing the
    number of people exposed to a certain hazard. For instance, flood
    levees have made areas in the floodplain seem safer, resulting in
    increased development to occur where it would have been impossible
    before. Can you think of any other situations where mitigation may
    have actually increased the risk to life and property?

####### Project Impact

> 1\. What are the primary factors behind the success of Project Impact?
>
> 2\. How do partnerships contribute to the success of a mitigation
> project?
>
> 3\. What mitigation initiatives exist today at the Federal, State, or
> local levels? Are these programs effective?
>
> 4\. What is the advantage of having businesses participate in
> mitigation?
>
> 5\. How would you sell the mitigation concepts and ideas espoused by
> Project Impact to community leaders?

**Avalanche Mitigation**

1.  Do you consider Avalanches to be a high-priority mitigation issue?
    Why or why not?

2.  Should the aesthetic implications of avalanche mitigation measures
    be a reason to avoid their use in certain areas? In all areas? Why?

3.  What are some innovative ways that corridor management mitigation
    measures could be funded?

4.  Do you consider structural or non-structural mitigation methods to
    me more effective? Explain.

5.  If you were told that your residence was within the runout zone of a
    300 year avalanche, would you feel compelled to move? Explain.

# Safe Rooms

1.  Should Safe Rooms be mandated? Why or why not?

2.  Would you pay more to buy a house just because it had a Safe Room
    installed? Why or why not?

3.  Should federal money be spent retrofitting the houses of residents
    who live in tornado prone areas, or should they be responsible for
    making these improvements themselves? Explain your answer.

4.  Should tax benefits be given to people who have installed Safe Rooms
    in their homes? Why or why not?

**Suggested Out Of Class Exercises**

1.  Research what Project Impact projects took place in your State.
    Contact the project administrators if you can locate their
    information, or contact current staff within the office of emergency
    management, and interview them about the current status of this
    mitigation project.

2.  Examine the primary activities that have led to avalanche fatalities
    during the past 19 years, using data from the Colorado Avalanche
    Information Center, and determine if these activities have changed
    over the years as more and more mitigation measures are implemented.

3.  Obtain plans for a safe room. Determine how much it would cost to
    install in your residence and how difficult such construction would
    be.

4.  Talk to your community's office of emergency management to find out
    if there have been any mitigation projects in your community. Find
    out what the original problem was, and why they chose to use the
    mitigation technique that was employed. Other questions to ask could
    include whether or not they had problems getting funding for the
    project, whether or not the public was accepting of the idea, or
    whether or not strong political support needed to be developed
    before the project could begin. Report your findings to the class.

5.  Study the hazards that affect your community. Choose one, and find
    out what mitigation techniques are available to manage that hazard
    risk. Compare each of these for cost effectiveness, and decide among
    them which would be the most appropriate considering all local
    factors. Find out if this particular approach has been taken by the
    community to address the hazard or not.