# BACKGROUND "THINK PIECE" FOR 

# THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROUNDTABLE MEETING 

# EMI, MARCH 5-6, 2007

**ON**

**WHAT IS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT?**

**AND**

**WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

B. Wayne Blanchard, PhD, CEM

Emergency Management Higher Education Project Manager

Emergency Management Institute, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security

Emmitsburg, Maryland

March 2, 2007 Draft

**CONTENTS**

Background

What Is Emergency Management? \-- Definition and Discussion

One-Page Summary of Emergency Management Definition, Mission and
Principles

Outline of Emergency Management Fundamentals

Fundamentals of Emergency Management Sections

Appendix A: What Is Expected of Participants of the March 5-6, 2007 EM
Roundtable

# Appendix B: Historical Example of Community Capability Building versus Catastrophe Focus

Appendix C: Examples of Fundamental Principles of Disaster Management,
Dr. David Etkin

Appendix D: Principles of Emergency Management from *Introduction to
Emergency Management* (2^nd^ Ed.) by George D. Haddow and Jane A.
Bullock (2006)

Appendix E: Principles of Emergency Management, IS 230, Principles of EM
(EMI/FEMA)

Appendix F: Auf der Heide Principles of Disaster Response Preparation
and Coordination

Appendix G: EM Concepts and Principles Derived From ICDRM/GWU Course for
Veterans Affairs: "Emergency Management Principles and Practice for
Healthcare Systems," 2006.

Appendix H: Select Definitions of "Doctrine"

Appendix I: Selected Definitions of the word "Principles"

Appendix J: References

# BACKGROUND

The following is meant to assist in jumpstarting a planned meeting at
EMI, March 5-6, 2007 on the topic of "basic" emergency management in the
United States. This "investigation" started last summer when I emailed
several people seeking input for an upcoming "all-hands" meeting at
FEMA's Emergency Management Institute on the future of training and
education at EMI. Mike Selves, the Emergency Manager for Johnson County
Kansas, and President of the International Association of Emergency
Managers, wrote to me the following:

> Wayne, I don\'t know how receptive the \"powers that be\" in DHS/FEMA
> would be to this, but it seems to me that the single most helpful
> thing EMI could do in conjunction with the academic and practitioner
> E.M. communities would be to revive the concept of emergency
> management principles (integrated, comprehensive, all-hazard,
> coordination, linked to research, etc.).  This should be developed,
> not by a \"beltway bandit\" contractor, but by a task force of
> academics and practitioners.  The purpose of this exercise would be to
> set forth the basic underpinnings upon which all courses (EMI,
> collegiate, etc.) in E.M. theory and practice would be based.  Our
> current problems with FEMA and the role of emergency management in the
> federal structure stems, in my humble opinion, almost entirely from
> the lack of any generally understanding or acceptance of these
> basics.  One use of this concept would be the creation of a short
> course on emergency management for all DHS and FEMA employees.  We are
> requiring NIMS training of virtually everyone in the country, what
> good is NIMS training if you don\'t understand the context within
> which NIMS must operate.  The current screw up of preparedness and
> response concepts at the Federal level is due to this problem of
> defining everything using an \"emergency services\" first responder
> framework.  Our efforts on Capitol Hill have only born any fruit at
> all because we are finally getting some key members and staffers to
> understand this bigger picture.  The system is not failing because
> first responders need more attention, it is failing because the
> coordinators and decision-makers need more attention.  (July 10, 2006
> email)

I agree that one of the fundamental problems in emergency management
today is that a broad array of very "instrumental" audiences does not
understand, or does not adequately understand, what emergency management
is. By "instrumental" I refer to people who impact significantly upon
the evolution of emergency management, such as personnel within the
Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and within Congress. It is also
the case, I believe, that too many within the "emergency management
community" do not adequately know or understand "basic emergency
management principles."

Several months after the Mike Selves communication in the Fall of 2006,
and shortly after Dr. Cortez Lawrence assumed the position of
Superintendent of the Emergency Management Institute, I forwarded the
Mike Selves email to Dr. Lawrence. A few days later he asked me to set
up a meeting with Mike and a small working group of other stakeholders
to discuss what could be done about the situation he described in his
communication.

The outline below is divided into several components in an attempt to
clarify my own thinking as I prepare for that meeting. When I taught an
Introduction to Emergency Management course at Shenandoah University in
1999 I too had difficulty distinguishing between background contexts,
principles, and the practice of emergency management. There is not an
established "Emergency Management Doctrine," shall we say, to clear this
all up. This I obfuscated by developing sections under the heading of
"Fundamentals of Emergency Management" wherein all three were discussed
-- i.e. background contexts, principles, and practice.

I was reminded how difficult this differentiation is this past Spring
while attending a Canadian hazards conference and listening to a plenary
presentation on "The Principles of Emergency Management" by Dr. Ian
Davis, a Professor from the United Kingdom. He noted that his
international research indicates that many if not most hazard, disaster,
emergency management and related organizations have difficulty deciding
what a "principle" is as opposed to a goal, value, strategy, practice,
philosophical orientation, task, objective, core topic, etc. He then
noted, that even within the category of what he recognized as
"principles" there was not the type of consensus he would have expected
after more than fifty years of emergency management professional
practice -- dating back to the development of civil defense cadres and
practice during and after World War II. The post WWII experience has
been continuous, with civil defense evolving into emergency management
or something like-minded \-- thus his surprise at the disarray, and his
call for clearer thinking.

The term "context" has been chosen to make the point that emergency
management does not happen in a vacuum. The exercise of emergency
management is both very much constrained as well as informed by various
political, economic, social, bureaucratic/administrative and other
contexts. To be successful emergency managers need sufficient knowledge,
training, and experience to be able to navigate within these bigger
waters.

From *Webster's* *New World Dictionary*, the term "principle" is defined
as "a fundamental truth, law, doctrine, or motivating force, upon which
others are based." As Dr. David Etkin, Coordinator of the Emergency
Management Program at York University in Toronto, and Dr. Ian Davis of
Cranfield University, Oxford, UK, write in their working draft monograph
"The Search for Principles of Disaster Management," "Principles guide
people's decisions and actions and procedures developed by
organizations, and laws and doctrines of political entities" (Etkin and
Davis 2006, p. 1). Coming to grips with the underlying principles of
this or any other profession is very important. Not only do I believe
that there are underlying principles of emergency management in the U.S.
which need to be clearly promoted, understood and taken to heart, I
believe that there are more or less universal Principles of Emergency
Management that transcend geo-political borders. The primary purpose
behind the scheduling of "International Disaster Management" breakout
sessions during the last several Annual Emergency Management Higher
Education Conferences at the Emergency Management Institute was to
discuss what the universal principles of disaster or emergency
management might be.

Those Conference Breakout Sessions, though, as well as the investigation
by Dr's Etkins and Davis, and this current "exercise," demonstrate that
this is also a quite challenging task. As Dr. Etkins put it in a
December 5^th^ communication in reference to the listings of Emergency
and Disaster Management "Principles" we had each put together,

> "both mine and yours are different from the ones Ian has suggested. I
> think it is important for our community continue to grapple with the
> issue of what the principles of emergency and disaster management
> are.  Certainly it is difficult, but the very fact that experienced,
> well informed professionals (that\'s you and Ian) create different
> lists speaks volumes to the lack of depth in this area. Why is there
> this lack of depth?  I think it goes to the comment that Drabek made
> about a lack of theory - that we borrow bits and pieces from other
> disciplines, but otherwise what we have is set of practices that make
> sense in an empirical way - and therefore depend very much upon ones
> orientation and perspective."[^1]

Even after considering the words of Professors Davis and Etkin though,
and engaging in this "think piece" exercise, I still think that it is
less problematic to discuss the "Fundamentals" of Emergency Management.
Perhaps some consensus on Emergency Management "Principles" might follow
the development of a general consensus on "Fundamentals" of Emergency
Management.

On December 14^th^, Dr. Lawrence asked me if I would be willing to talk
for a few minutes at a December 19^th^ EMI All-Hands staff meeting on
"my emergency management doctrine" project. While I had used the word
"doctrine" in communicating with him on what we might do to improve upon
the situation Mike Selves described, and while I had recently received a
communication from an old boss, Dr. John Brinkerhoff, on the topic of
the need for an emergency management doctrine, I had not really came to
grips with trying to focus my thoughts on the identification of specific
components of an emergency management doctrine. Like the word
"Principles," the word "Doctrine" can be difficult to grapple with. On
December 15^th^ Dr. Lawrence forwarded to me a
"Doctrine-Policy-Strategy" 12-page document developed by the Department
of Homeland Security Lexicographer, whom I did not know existed. These
two communications served to focus my attention on emergency management
doctrine. It occurred to me that if we are going to try to enunciate an
emergency management doctrine, it should, at least in outline form, be
reproducible on one-page in such places as inside the cover of the EMI
Course Catalog, printed EMI training materials, and FEMA publications in
general.

After several attempts to develop a conception of an Emergency
Management Doctrine document, though -- one different than an Emergency
Management Principles document -- I gave up, deciding that "Doctrine"
was more of an organizational-specific and operationally-oriented task
than the guiding "Principles" of a profession and academic discipline.
It appears to me that "Principles" should be formulated prior to the
formulation of "Doctrine." Thus I decided to focus on first things
first.

**WHAT IS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT?**

**Emergency Management Definition**[^2]**:**

Emergency Management is the coordinated and collaborative integration of
all relevant stakeholders into the four phases of emergency management
(mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to natural,
technological, and intentional hazards (NGA, 1978).[^3]

Despite the balanced approach perception inherent in the NGA definition
of emergency management noted above, traditionally, emergency management
practice has been almost synonymous with the preparedness phase -- the
development by the emergency program manager of an emergency operations
plan, followed by training and exercising on this disaster response
oriented plan. This is a problem -- both in terms of a too narrow
conception of the function and in terms of the emergency manager as a
drafter of an emergency operations plan (a technician), as opposed to
someone who coordinates and manages the drafting of such a plan by
personnel found in other jurisdictional organizations (a manager),
amongst many other duties.

\[In a review of this "think piece," Robert Freitag at the University of
Washington notes that in his opinion "the operative word here is
management. It is not the study of emergencies, but the management of
them. Solving problems, reducing risk through the four phases of
emergency management -- the comprehensive management of
emergencies."\][^4]

Today there is a new and different problem. One gets the distinct
perception that when viewed from the outside "emergency management" is
almost synonymous with disaster response -- after all, isn't emergency
management the management of emergencies?

Amongst the many other competing definitions of "Emergency Management"
are those that focus on risk:

> "A simple definition is that *emergency management* is the discipline
> dealing with risk and risk avoidance" (Haddow and Bullock 2006, p. 1).

This definition is singled out from the many other competing definitions
in that several comments received on this "think piece" noted inadequate
attention and priority given to risk and risk management within the
definition of emergency management as well as within the "principles"
section.

The emergency management community needs to come to grips with a
consensus definition.

**What Emergency Management is Not:**

It is *not synonymous with **Emergency Services*** -- Organizations
involved in law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical technicians
and service, search and rescue organizations and the like.

As the President of the International Association of Emergency Managers,
Mike Selves, said on the occasion of the unveiling of a new national
logo for emergency management on December 1, 2006:

> "...one of the biggest challenges emergency managers face, as a
> profession, is dispelling the misconception that our function is
> simply the sum total of the efforts and resources of the emergency
> services.  The public can identify with firefighters, police and
> EMTs.  However, the idea that there is a profession of public
> administration, called Emergency Management, whose job is to
> facilitate the creation of basic disaster policy framework and to
> coordinate the implementation of the policy during a disaster, is not
> well understood.  Our job ties together not only the responders but
> also the decision makers, public and private agencies not normally
> associated with emergency response and a whole array of other elements
> of the local community before, during and after any disaster event."

It is *not synonymous with **First Responders*** -- Organizations such
as Emergency Services, Public Health, Public Works, voluntary
organizations active in disaster and other organizations and personnel
involved in immediate disaster response.

It is *not synonymous with **Homeland Security*** -- Homeland Security
is first about the prevention of terrorism in the U.S., secondly with
preparedness for and response to the use of weapons of mass destruction,
thirdly with catastrophe readiness and response, and finally with a host
of issue areas as reflected in the names of Department of Homeland
Security constituent elements \-- Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration
Service, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard
(including boater safety and protecting the coast), U.S. Secret Service
(includes, besides protecting key government officials, counterfeiting
and child pornography), and cyber-security.

**What Emergency Management Shares:**

Emergency Management shares the interest **E*mergency Services***
organizations have in certain phases of certain hazards. Thus an
emergency manager will share with the fire department an interest in
hazardous materials. The fire department will not share the interest the
emergency manager has in working with a community planning department
and developers to zone and develop in the future in a way that will not
aggravate flooding problems from storm water runoff or in floodplains.

Emergency Management shares with ***First Responders*** their concern
that they be adequately supported in a disaster response situation.
Usually the first responders are in the field engaged in tactical
operations, while emergency managers are in emergency operations centers
engaged in coordinating support operations. First responders, though,
will not share the interest the emergency manager has in working with
health and medical personnel on pandemic planning.

Emergency Management shares with ***Homeland Security*** an interest in
catastrophe readiness and response. It also shares an interest in
preparedness for the intentional hazard of a terrorist attack, and in
developing capabilities to respond. It does not share the homeland
security interest in such other areas as customs enforcement,
immigration regulation, boater safety, counterfeiting money, or child
pornography. Homeland Security personnel who work within such topical
areas, or in terrorism prevention, do not engage, as emergency managers
engage, in activities such as working with a planning department and
with developers on zoning and construction to minimize or prevent
flooding from rivers or storm water runoff.

**Who are Emergency Mangers?**

A professional emergency manager is someone who coordinates with and
collaboratively integrates all relevant stakeholders into the four
phases of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery) related to natural, technological, and intentional hazards --
whether for a political subdivision or a private sector organization.

Ideally, an emergency manager is someone who can "see the big picture"
and communicate a strategic "big picture" vision to others within an
organization or jurisdiction. Ideally, an emergency manager provides
leadership within a jurisdiction or organization on the topics of
hazards, disasters and what to do about them (referred to as emergency
management in the public sector).

In that at all levels of government, the emergency management office is
a small office with smaller numbers of personnel and smaller budgets
compared against other, more operational jurisdictional organizations,
the task of coordinating activities relating to hazards, disasters and
what to do about them with these bigger players is huge. If not done
smartly and professionally, it runs a real risk of being marginalized
and ineffective. It has been argued that the most effective approach, in
these circumstances, is to focus on the development of a risk-based
strategic plan for the jurisdiction establishing a vision for the way
forward, led by an executive level emergency program manager/coordinator
who serves as the chief advisor to the chief executive officer on all
matters relating to hazards, disasters and what to do about them
(Canton, 2006).

One of the long-standing problems of U.S. emergency management, at all
levels of government, is the selection of emergency program
managers/coordinators from within the ranks of response-oriented
emergency services and military personnel who fail to transcend their
response-oriented backgrounds to develop truly all-phase strategic plans
and programs. As Canton argues, this response orientation devolves too
often into a disaster operations plan-centric program rather than a
risk-based strategic plan oriented program. As Haddow and Bullock (2006,
p. 58) expand upon this point:

"Implementing mitigation programs and activities requires the
participation and support of a broad spectrum of players outside of the
traditional emergency management circle. Mitigation involves, among
others, land-use planners, construction and building officials, both
public and private, business owners, insurance companies, community
leaders, and politicians.

> "The skills and tools for accomplishing mitigation (i.e., planning
> expertise, political acumen, marketing and public relations, and
> consensus building) are different from the operational,
> first-responder skills that more often characterize emergency
> management professionals. In fact, historically, emergency management
> professionals have been reluctant to take a lead role in promoting
> mitigation. A state director of emergency management once said words
> to the effect: 'I will never lose my job for failing to do mitigation,
> but I could lose my job if I mess up a response'."

*Local Government.* At the local government level most counties and many
cities and other municipalities have an emergency management office.
Sometimes such offices are led by a full time professional. Some
governments maintain only a part-time emergency manager, or someone
without professional competencies and credentials, or unpaid volunteers.
Some emergency management coordinators will have an assistant or
secretary. Some, particularly if the community has a large population,
is well developed, and is in a hazard prone locale, will have a staff of
several or more employees. It is not uncommon to find local emergency
managers who "wear other hats" than the emergency management
coordinator, or their primary job is something else, and emergency
management is "the other hat." A FEMA Emergency Management Institute
Independent Study course (IS-1) is devoted this topic -- "Emergency
Manager: An Orientation to the Position" -- and can be accessed at:
[http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is1.asp[^5]](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is1.asp)

*State Government*. At the State level every State has an Emergency
Management Office, though they can go by other names, and staff --
ranging from several dozen to several hundred employees.

*Federal Government.* At the Federal level, emergency managers and
emergency management personnel are to be found in most Federal
Departments and Agencies. The primary locus of emergency management,
though, is the Federal Emergency Management Agency, now within the
Department of Homeland Security. Historically FEMA has employed about
2,000 personnel. When Hurricane Katrina struck FEMA personnel strength
was down to a little better than 1,500 employees (out of an authorized
strength of about 2,200). FEMA employees are located principally at FEMA
Headquarters in Washington, DC, in ten Federal Regions, and in two
training establishments (the Emergency Management Institute in
Emmitsburg MD and Mt. Weather in northern VA.

*Private Sector.* In terms of the public sector, at every level of
government emergency management is inadequately supported
administratively, inadequately funded, inadequately and inappropriately
staffed, and particularly at the local government level, not well paid
-- if paid at all. The private sector is less universal at establishing
"emergency management" related functions in their organizations.[^6] In
those that are established though, they tend to be more professional,
better staffed, funded, and paid.

*Others.* There are a very large number of other people who have an
interest in one or more hazards, or in one or more of the emergency
management phases, or in working with some sub-set of stakeholders
interested in a particular hazard. When engaged in such activity, it is
accurate to say that they are engaged in emergency management. It is not
accurate to say that they, thus, are emergency managers. They are
whatever their employment status would indicate.

**One-Page Conception of Emergency Management Definition, Mission and
Principles**

**Definition:** Emergency Management is the risk-based coordinated and
collaborative integration of all relevant stakeholders into the four
phases of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery) related to natural, technological, and intentional hazards
(All-Hazards).

**Mission:** To safeguard life and property from all-hazards, and to
protect the environment and economy.

# Principles:

1.  *Comprehensive Emergency Management* (CEM). CEM is the central
    organizing principle and definition of professional emergency
    management \-- all-hazards, all phases, all actors.

2.  *Intergovernmental Structure*. Emergency Management is a shared
    responsibility of local, State, Tribal and Federal government. Its
    framework is both top-down as well as bottom-up. Authorities to
    mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from hazards and
    disasters should be supervised by one official at each level of
    government.

3.  *Horizontal and Vertical Integration*. Integrated Emergency
    Management is best accomplished through the integration of emergency
    management principles and practice into the regular routine of a
    wide range of community, governmental and private sector
    organizations.

4.  *Building Disaster Resistant and Resilient Communities*. The First
    Aim of Emergency Management is creating a Culture of Disaster
    Prevention and Preparedness -- recognizing that it is better to
    prevent or reduce impact of disasters through risk-based management
    approach than to respond and recover.

5.  *Nationwide System of Effective Disaster Response and Recovery*.
    Recognizing that not all disasters can be prevented, the Second Aim
    of Emergency Management is to build a nationwide disaster Response
    and Recovery system.

6.  *Building//Maintaining Relationships*. Emergency Management is
    guided by the constant practice of Collaboration, Coordination,
    Customer-Service, Information-Sharing and Team Building.

7.  *All Disasters Are Different*. While there are many similarities in
    disaster events, it is a fundamental principle of emergency
    management that all disasters are different. It necessarily follows
    that "one size fits all" approaches are inadequate and that such
    attributes as Flexibility, Innovation, and Improvisation must be
    practiced.

8.  *All Disasters Are Local First*. A recognition of this principle of
    emergency management drives the centrality of local Community
    Capability Building as the foundation of national preparedness.

9.  *Disasters Impact Differentially*. Some segments of communities and
    society experience disaster and suffer the consequences more than
    other segments, such as the economically disadvantaged, the
    disabled, and the institutionalized elderly. Emergency management
    recognizes that its resources need to target high-risk and highly
    vulnerable segments of the population in order to increase their
    resilience and decrease their vulnerability.

10. *Professionalism*. Emergency Management is a science and
    knowledge-based profession, valuing education, training, experience,
    ethical practice, public stewardship, and continuous improvement.

FUNDAMENTALS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Outline)

1.  **Mission: Safeguarding Life and Property** **Mission -- Public
    Safety Public Trust**

2.  **Comprehensive Emergency Management**

3.  **Intergovernmental Structure**

4.  **Building Disaster Resistant and Resilient Communities**

5.  **Building Nationwide System of Effective Disaster Response and
    Recovery**

6.  **All Actors: Building and Maintaining Relationships --
    Communication, Collaboration, Coordination, Customer Focus and
    Service, Information-Sharing, Team Building**

7.  **All Hazards, Functionalism and Anticipating Anything That Could
    Happen**

8.  **All Phases \-- Four Phases of Emergency Management**

9.  **All Disasters Are Different**

10. **All Disasters Are Local First**

11. **Disasters Impact Differentially**

12. **Integrated Emergency Management**

13. **Disasters Are A Growth Business**

14. **Emergence Management Is Situated in Political, Social, Economic,
    Administrative, Historical, Contexts**

15. **Professional Emergency Management Is Science and Knowledge-Based
    -- A Full-Time Occupation Which Requires Education, Training,
    Experience and Continuous Improvement**

16. **Models of Emergency Management Organization Matter**

17. **Approaches to Emergency Management Matter**

18. **Emergency Management Standards and Certification**

# FUNDAMENTALS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

1.  **Safeguarding Life and Property**

> Safeguarding life and property from natural, technological and
> intentional hazards is the primary mission of emergency management.
>
> There seems to be a virtual unanimity within the emergency management
> on this primary mission. It has been argued however that the primary
> mission of emergency management is, or ought to be, the protection of
> life, property, the economy and the environment.[^7] There seems to be
> less consensus on whether the protection of the economy and the
> environment are secondary missions or part of the primary mission.
>
> In 1979 the National Governors' Association wrote that the principle
> objectives of a comprehensive emergency management program were to:

-   Reduce (if not eliminate) the incidence of disasters wherever
    possible...;

-   Reduce the damage (health, property, economic) caused by disasters
    that could not be prevented; and

-   Reduce the costs of emergency response and disaster recovery while
    increasing their effectiveness." (NGA 1979, 39)

> In 1993 FEMA, after much discussion and debate (according to James Lee
> Witt), came to a consensus that the FEMA Mission was to "reduce the
> loss of life and property and protect our institutions from all
> hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive,
> risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness,
> response, and recovery." (Witt 2002, p. 26)
>
> According to Witt (pp. 26-27, 44-45, 60) under-girding the new FEMA
> Mission Statement were the following "**core values**" --
>
> **Customer Service**[^8]
>
> **Public Stewardship**
>
> **Creativity and Innovation**
>
> **Continuous Improvement**
>
> **Honest Communication**[^9]
>
> **Respect for Nature**

In November 2006 the National Emergency Management Association, the
International

Association of Emergency Managers, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency

agreed that the phrase **"Public Safety, Public Trust,"** best
conceptualized in four words

what emergency management was all about.

2.  **Comprehensive Emergency Management**

> Comprehensive Emergency Management is the central organizing principle
> and definition of professional emergency management. It means
> all-hazards, all phases, all actors.
>
> Coined in the National Governors' Association report of 1978 entitled
> *State Comprehensive Emergency Management*, the term was defined, as
> noted above, as the coordinated and collaborative integration of all
> relevant stakeholders into the four phases of emergency management
> (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to natural,
> technological, and intentional hazards.

The term was "invented"[^10] to reflect the fact that civil defense and
emergency preparedness as practiced at the time was very fragmented and
was not all hazards, all phases,[^11] and all actors. Instead, civil
defense/emergency preparedness prioritized the single hazard of nuclear
attack preparedness at the federal level, reactively focused almost
exclusively on the phases of preparedness and response at the State and
local government levels,[^12] and too infrequently ventured beyond the
circle of emergency services personnel in the universe of stake-holders.

3.  **Intergovernmentalism**

> Emergency Management is an intergovernmental shared responsibility of
> local, State, Tribal and Federal government. Its framework is both
> top-down as well as bottom-up -- meaning that the theory and practice
> of emergency management has been significantly shaped by contributions
> from all levels of government.
>
> While an argument can be made that "intergovernmentalism" is part of
> the background context of emergency management -- just the way it is
> in our system of government -- and not a "principle," it can also be
> argued that if this were not "just the way it is" then this is the way
> it ought to be, a fundamental principle that should transcend
> geo-political borders. It takes all levels of government to "make
> emergency management work" in the U.S. -- and probably elsewhere as
> well.
>
> This latter point is reinforced by the position of current FEMA
> Director David Paulison to the effect that one of the lessons of
> Hurricane Katrina is that "we are all in this together," that the
> emergency management system should be "one for all, and all for one."

4.  **Building Disaster Resistant and Resilient Communities**

> *The Aim of Emergency Management* should be Building Disaster
> Resistant and Resilient Communities. This principle promotes proactive
> mitigation and preparedness initiatives over reactive response ***in
> combination*** with efforts to ***build community-level
> capabilities*** so that communities can tolerate and overcome hazards
> and respond to disasters without outside assistance. While
> professional, effective and efficient disaster response capabilities
> are absolutely essential, it is quite obviously better to prevent,
> mitigate and prepare in the first place than to respond and recover
> afterwards.
>
> Promoting a Culture of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness furthers
> this aim. This aim is served through self, public, and stakeholder
> education as well as "walking the talk" or serving as a model.
>
> In order to draw attention to the importance of building disaster
> resistant and resilient communities, it was said during the James Lee
> Witt years as the Director of FEMA, that "mitigation is the
> cornerstone of emergency management," meaning lessening the effects of
> disaster, reducing hazard risks, as well as preventing disaster in the
> first place. While the other three components on the four phases of
> emergency management (preparedness, response, and recovery) are
> performed either in reaction to hazards or in anticipation of their
> consequences, mitigation measures seek to reduce the likelihood or
> consequences of hazard risk before a disaster ever strikes. While a
> strong case can be made that mitigation should be the cornerstone of
> emergency management, mitigation is not how and has never really been
> the cornerstone of the broader local, state and federal government
> emergency management community.
>
> Today, given the national focus on operational response issues,
> mitigation is little more than an afterthought, given little more than
> lip-service. One scarcely sees how today's response-centric approach
> will contribute to building disaster resistant and resilient
> communities. Given the virtual inevitability of the decades long trend
> toward ever increasing disaster loses, though, it would appear that at
> some point in the future serious attention will once again have to be
> devoted to disaster prevention, reduction and mitigation -- and
> building disaster resistant and resilient communities.
>
> Thus, it would seem that the way forward is to better "marry"
> preparedness to mitigation than the current situation with the
> marriage of preparedness to response. The role of preparedness is
> pivotal in either event. Indeed it has been argued that preparedness
> is the foundation of emergency management:
>
> I see preparedness covering planning, partnership building, training,
> and exercises for mitigation, prevention, reduction, response, and
> recovery, so it is the broadest term among emergency management
> phases. If you don\'t have it as the foundation, you will eventually
> get lost in a philosophical fog....
>
>  

We are on the wrong path causing ever increasing losses, because we need
to go back to the basics, and fully fund preparedness - sharing
actionable information with the public about mitigation, facilitating
strategic and operational planning and partnership building community by
community, training tactical and leadership professionals, exercising
various all hazard scenarios. (Goss, 2006)

5.  **Building Nationwide System of Effective Disaster Response and
    Recovery**

Recognizing that not all disasters can be prevented, the second aim of
emergency management is to build a nationwide system of effective and
efficient disaster response and recovery. The current nationwide model
for disaster response is the National Incident Management System.

6.  **All Actors -- Building and Maintaining Relationships --
    Communication, Collaboration, Coordination and Customer Service**

> Emergency management is guided by the ***Principle of Building
> Relationships***[^13] -- that is through the constant practice of
> Coordination,[^14] Facilitation,[^15] Collaboration, Consultation,
> Cooperation, Communication,[^16] Openness, Networking[^17],
> Partnering, Stakeholder Involvement, Reaching Out to Others,
> Information-Sharing, Customer-Service Attitude and Team Approach[^18]
> -- with a wide range of audiences in the public, private and "third"
> sectors.[^19] The audience for emergency management ranges from the
> Chief Executive to the citizen. This is what is meant by the "all
> actors" component of comprehensive emergency management -- all actors,
> all phases, all hazards. It is preferable, as an example, to plan
> "with" a community than "for" a community.

Of course one can engage in communication, coordination, facilitation,
collaboration and the like in a pro-forma, top-down, perfunctory,
less-than-fully-serious way. One cannot, though, build trustful,
meaningful, respectful, on-going and equitable relationships this way.
This is one reason that a customer service attitude is essential.
According to Haddow and Bullock (2006, pp. 196-197):

> A customer service approach includes placing the needs and interests
> of individuals and communities first, being responsive and
> informative, and managing expectations.... (Each customer) has special
> needs, and a good communications strategy considers and reflects their
> requirements. Good communication starts with a commitment by the
> leadership of the emergency management organization to sharing and
> disseminating information both internally and externally.[^20]

Emergency Managers must actively reach out to and engage a wide range of
stake-holders in their communities or organizations, do so on a regular
and frequent basis, and do so meaningfully and seriously. As Haddow and
Bullock note (2006, 221)[^21]:

> "Successful coordination and cooperation can lead to great success and
> many lives saved, but infighting, turf battles, and nonparticipation
> can lead to confusion and even cause a second disaster."[^22]
>
> These attributes characterize U.S. EM -- building and maintaining
> relationships -- and serve as the best means to build disaster
> resistant and resilient communities. ***This is the emergency
> management model and approach.***
>
> The Antithesis to this Principle of Building Relationships through
> collaboration and coordination is the ***Command and Control Approach
> and Model*** -- characterized by top-down, hierarchical,
> authoritarian, centralized, bureaucratic (rules trump results),
> regimented, formalistic, scripted, catalogued, secretive systems and
> styles. Recently Admiral Keating, Commander of the U.S. Northern
> Command in Colorado Springs, stated in a press briefing, that NORTHCOM
> "has adopted the phrase collaboration and communication instead of
> classic military command and control (C2)..." (Brewin, December 12,
> 2006)

7.  **All Hazards** -- **Being Ready For Anything.**

> The principle or concept of all-hazards in the emergency management
> context means natural, technological and intentional (including
> terrorism) hazards. In other words it means anticipating just about
> any disaster that could confront one's organization or jurisdiction.

When captured in the definition of Comprehensive Emergency Management in
the 1978 NGA CEM report, it reflected (1) the necessity of evolving
emergency management/civil defense away from a nuclear attack centric
world view, and (2) addressing the fractured state of emergency
management and civil defense planning that characterized the times.

Planning then was hazard centric. One could go into a community and find
a bookshelf of single hazard focused plans in the emergency manager's
office. Then one would find other single-hazard focused plans,
uncoordinated in their development with the emergency management office,
in various emergency services departments, public works, public
utilities, schools, hospitals, prisons, and so on -- not infrequently,
literally dozens.

> By adopting a new "functional" approach to planning, the all-hazards
> approach recognized that while every disaster is different, there are
> from a planning view, many commonalities that do not need to be
> regurgitated ad infinitum in a vast array of plans. Thus, common
> elements such as communications or warning could be combined into the
> main text of a basic emergency operations plan.[^23] That plan would
> then be supplemented with appendices that dealt with the unique
> aspects of individual hazards.
>
> The "All-Hazards" approach also recognizes that for the response
> phase, it is preferable to set up a single set of management
> arrangements capable of encompassing all hazards, rather than
> fractured management arrangements.
>
> In the post 9/11 world of homeland security this is frequently
> misunderstood. This is demonstrated by the argument that terrorism is
> different from natural hazards and thus needs to be dealt with
> independently, and frequently in isolation. In reality, all *natural*
> hazards are different from each other and their unique aspects must be
> fully understood and dealt with in any emergency management program.
> In terrorism, as in all the other natural, technological and
> intentional hazards, there are commonalities with the other emergency
> management hazards and there are unique aspects.
>
> The all-hazards approach also facilitated the move toward a
> recognition that the more effective approach to hazards was one that
> built capabilities at the local level in recognition of the broad
> array of hazards potentially confronting a community. Even if one's
> sole preoccupation was nuclear attack preparedness, advocates of
> all-hazards emergency management in the State and local government
> practitioner world and from within the social science hazard and
> disaster research community argued in one voice that the best way "to
> get there" was through local community capability building for
> all-hazards.
>
> Note the different take on what "All-Hazards" means in the following:
>
> "**[All-Hazards vs. Terrorism Planning]{.underline}**
>
> **Question: How does the Department of Homeland Security's approach to
> HSPD-8**[^24] **represent 'all-hazards' planning? How is 'all-hazards'
> planning specifically reflected in the Goal?**
>
> **Answer:** HSPD-8 defines 'all-hazards' preparedness as preparedness
> for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
> emergencies. HSPD-8 states that Federal preparedness assistance is
> intended primarily to support State and local efforts to build
> capacity to address major (or catastrophic) events, especially
> terrorism. To meet those requirements, the Department adopted an
> all-hazards planning approach focused on the potential scope of
> catastrophic events and associated capabilities. The approach does not
> include every possible threat and hazard; rather it uses a range of
> high-impact threats and hazards to identify capabilities and levels of
> capability that the range of scenarios would demand...."[^25]

"All-Hazards" within the emergency management context translates into
preparing for the

expected as well as the unexpected, the disaster as well as the
catastrophe, being ever-ready,

and seeing the "big picture" of what can go wrong.

8.  **All Phases,** or **The Four Phases of Emergency Management**

> As coined by the NGA in the *1978 Emergency Preparedness Project Final
> Report*, all phases was defined as the Four Phases of Mitigation,
> Preparedness, Response and Recovery. (NGA 1978, p. xiv)
>
> For simplicity purposes, mitigation was defined in terms of prevention
> and mitigation, even though "to prevent," and "to mitigate" are verb
> forms with different meanings. These were combined to refer to actions
> that prevent, reduce, or mitigate disaster losses.
>
> Similarly, distinctions between such terms as response, relief,
> reconstruction, reconstitution, rehabilitation, and recovery were
> collapsed for simplicity purposes into response and recovery.
>
> Today, the four phases of emergency management are so integral to our
> conception of emergency management that it seems that it must have
> always been this way. This is not the case, however. As the NGA noted
> in their reports in 1978 and 1979, based on extensive surveys of
> local, State and federal "emergency management" and other personnel,
> emergency management was conceived then in terms of preparedness and
> response. Mitigation and recovery were "not my job" (NGA 1978, pp.
> xvi, 73). As the NGA stated in arguing for a new conception of
> emergency management, "It is evident that the close links between
> mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery are not adequately
> understood." (NGA 1979, p.7)
>
> Each emergency management phase requires its own skill set.
>
> Confusing matters a bit, after the creation of the Department of
> Homeland Security, RAND Corporation employees under contract to DHS to
> develop the National Response Plan and the National Incident
> Management System, invented their own terminology -- what I call the
> Five Phases of Homeland Security: Prevention, Mitigation, Readiness,
> Response and Recovery. This new terminology was invented, according to
> those I have communicated with who came into contact with RAND
> personnel during the review phase of the earlier conceptions of the
> NRP, to play to the law enforcement and intelligence communities and
> their mission of preventing terrorism. As noted earlier, emergency
> management and homeland security are not synonymous. The newly
> invented Five Phases of Homeland Security operate within Homeland
> Security and do not supplant or replace the Four Phases of Emergency
> Management -- which is, again, all-hazards, all-phases, all-actors.

9.  **All Disasters Are Different.**

It is a fundamental principle of emergency management that all disasters
are different. While there are a great many similarities to be found in
disaster events it is none-the-less a fact of life that every disaster
is different. This is not an insignificant or glib statement -- real
implications ensue.

> It necessarily follows that **one size does not fit all.** One cannot
> build a regimented, scripted, top-down approach to disasters -- at
> least one that works.
>
> If all disasters are different, and a one size fits all approach is
> inappropriate, then it follows that such traits as ***Flexibility,
> Innovation and Improvisation*** are absolutely necessary and should
> trump bureaucratized regimented processes and procedures.
>
> The attributes of flexibility, innovation and an ability to improvise
> do not spring forth from a vacuum. They are developed and enhanced by
> **knowledge** of hazards, disasters and emergency management
> principles and systems, **training**, **experience** and **skilled
> application.**

10. **All Disasters Are Local First**.

All disasters, regardless of scale, happen first in communities. A
recognition of this principle of emergency management drives the
centrality of local Community Capability Building -- Building Disaster
Resistant and Resilient Communities. Local emergency management laws and
standards need to be put in place, emergency management needs to be
integrated into existing community structures and procedures, and
elected and appointed officials need to be cognizant of their hazard and
disaster-related responsibilities and able to meet their
responsibilities in a disaster environment, and initiatives put forward
that seek to prevent or reduce the impact of disasters in the first
place.

> This principle also drives and explains the **Emergency Management
> Philosophy** that:

The better communities are able to deal with the full range of hazards
actually confronting them (the "all hazards" approach) the better they
will be able to contend with anything else.

> This principle and philosophy are in contrast to a prevalent and
> contending national security or homeland security approach \-- namely:
>
> The better a community is prepared to deal with a single catastrophic
> hazard (nuclear attack, nuclear power plant accident, terrorist
> attack) the better it will be prepared to deal with any lesser hazard.

(See section below on historical case which illustrates these contending
approaches.)

> (Note: The all-hazards approach is risk-based while the catastrophic
> hazard approach is vulnerability-based -- typically worst-case or
> fear-based. That is, the emergency management "all hazards" approach
> centers on the conduct of a risk assessment of all relevant hazards
> and threats -- identification and analysis of hazards, followed by
> assessing risks, vulnerabilities and capabilities -- which then leads
> to the development of plans, procedures, programs, the development of
> capabilities (risk management). The vulnerability approach begins with
> the thought what are the worst things that could happen to us. Only
> after the worst cases are determined (those things that keep us up
> late at night), are risk-management approaches applied to that
> universe of hazards.)

11. **Disasters Impact Differentially**.

When disasters impact a community, they differentially impact the
citizens of that community. Historically, some groups typically
experience disaster and suffer the consequences more than other groups.
Typically these are such groupings as those that are economically
depressed or living in poverty, minorities, the elderly, the very young,
the home-bound, the institutionalized (as in nursing home residents), in
our society.

This is one of the reasons that "one size fits all" approaches to
emergency management are inappropriate. Programs that target the
identification of such groupings of highly vulnerable and at-risk people
in our communities, and follow-through on the development of approaches
to either reduce their vulnerability and risk, or that increase and
enhance their resilience are what is needed -- not the "biggest bang for
the buck," "one size fits all," utilitarian approach that is sometimes
practiced in U.S. emergency management.

12. **Integrated Emergency Management, or IEMS (Integrated Emergency
    Management System)**.

The concept of integration can also be found in the 1978 Emergency
Preparedness Project NGA report mentioned earlier.[^26] It was
recognized that that for a range of reasons, emergency management needs
to be integrated or mainstreamed into other components of a political
jurisdiction or an organization.

> Emergency managers are not lone rangers who can do it all alone.
> Emergency Management
>
> can only be accomplished via the successful efforts of emergency
> managers working with
>
> members of other organizations as an advocate for the integration of
> hazard and disaster
>
> concerns into those organizations.
>
> Social science research concludes that the most effective disaster
> response is one that utilizes in-place organizations and disaster
> response structures that are as close as possible to routine
> organizational structures and procedures. This is one reason why it is
> important to integrate emergency management into those organizations
> and to make it as routine as possible.
>
> \[*Background Context of IEMS.* IEMS is historical terminology. IEMS
> was a political devise conceived within the Federal Emergency
> Management Agency to use the unarguable need for integration as a tool
> to accomplish several purposes. Given the friction that existed
> between Federal emergency management on the one hand and State and
> local emergency management on the other over nuclear attack centric
> civil defense and emergency management, it was difficult for those
> coming into a new FEMA organization after the last Presidential
> election to just accept the term "Comprehensive Emergency Management."
> In part, this was a reflection of a "not invented here mindset." The
> new FEMA administrators after the Macy FEMA administration wanted
> their own terminology. And, in part, this was a reflection of the
> "culture war" of the times. CEM was developed as a concept by "the
> other side" \-- the National Governors Association, representing the
> State and local government community, in part, to break the
> strangle-hold of the nuclear attack centric Federal government
> approach to preparedness.

The development of this terminology was also part of an effort to turn
the tables on State and local governments on the nuclear attack
question, via the argument that part of the integration must be the
inclusive of nuclear attack preparedness.

> In addition, IEMS was constituted as an approach to sell nuclear
> attack oriented civil defense to an increasingly skeptical Congress.
> It would be more difficult for "Congress" to argue against an
> Integrated Emergency Management System, than a nuclear attack oriented
> civil defense system.\]

Today the concept of "integrated" emergency management remains as a
fundamental principle of the profession.

13. **Disasters Are Growth Business \-- Disaster Losses Are Large,
    Growing, Expected to Become Worse, No End In Sight**

Whether viewed as part of the background context of emergency management
in the United States, as well as in the rest of the world, or a
fundamental of emergency management, it is the case that for at least
the last four decades, which comprises the professional life-spans of
the great majority of emergency management personnel, it is fundamental
to their experience that they have always been behind the curve of
rising disaster losses, and there is no end in sight.

Disaster losses are large -- approximately \$50 billion per year in
annualized losses, or about \$1 billion per week.

For the last several decades disaster losses have been rising in the
U.S. -- doubling to tripling per decade. Clearly, as in doubling a
penny, this eventually becomes unsustainable. Disaster losses have been,
and are going up, in terms of total losses, in terms of federal disaster
relief outlays, in terms of insurance outlays, and in terms of a
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product.

Disasters are going to be a growth business for the foreseeable future.
While the current terrorism threat is sometimes depicted as a one or two
generations hazard, natural and technological hazards and disasters are
going to be with us in an escalating way for multiple generations.

Disasters are predicted to increase in category (with new disaster
agents coming onto the scene), some in frequency, and some in intensity.
With flooding, as an example, as a result of a number of factors such as
where and how development takes place, a growing number of locations
that have never experienced a flooding event, will do so in the future.
In addition, a growing number of other locations that have experienced
flooding, will in the future experience more severe flooding. This is
without taking global warming into account, and any adverse impact this
would have on future disaster losses.

I am aware of no person or organization who forecasts the day wherein
the disaster loss curve will start to flatten or decline in the U.S.

There have been historical periods in the U.S. where thousands of people
have been killed as the result of individual natural and technological
disaster events. Prior to 9/11 and Katrina there was about a six decade
period without such catastrophic loss of life (measured in thousands of
deaths), though there have been many near misses wherein had the
disaster event happened a bit differently, catastrophic loss of life
could have been experienced. There is scant reason to believe that 9/11
and Katrina were "one-off" events, and that catastrophic loss of life to
disaster is in our past.

14. **Political, Social, Economic, Administrative, Historical,
    Attitudinal Contexts of Emergency Management**

Emergency Management in the U.S. is very much conditioned and
constrained by the various contexts within which it must function.

We have, for example, a federal system with a national, State and local
governments, along with a variety of regional governmental authorities.
By law emergency management is a "joint" Federal and State/local
responsibility.[^27] Another position advocated is that *"...equal
local-state-federal partnership is the most effective approach to a
comprehensive national system of emergency management"* (NGA 1978,
xxii). There are serious implications which flow from each of these two
"orientations." For example, when it comes to the phase of disaster
response, it has been the position of the federal government since at
least 1958 that federal resources are only brought to bear in a disaster
response after State and local resources have been "exhausted." This is
not equal "partnership" but a hierarchical relationship.

Recently, as a result of the failed governmental response to Hurricane
Katrina, and a broadening realization that natural hazards can be
catastrophic, FEMA Director David Paulison has said that we are now in
an "all for one and one for all" environment (FEMA, November 30, 2006).
Director Paulison stated that one of the goals of "the new FEMA" was to
"challenge the traditional emergency management paradigm" noted above.
This is indicative of a movement toward the proposition put forward by
the National Governors' Association in 1978 quoted above.

Emergency management operates within this changing intergovernmental
system. The "power relationship" amongst these levels of government has
shifted over time when it comes to hazards, disasters, emergency
management, and now homeland security. A prevailing point of view on
this is shared by the emergency management practitioner community and by
that part of the social science community involved in hazards and
disaster research:

> "The most successful emergency management systems are those in which
> local emergency management agencies maintain operational control of
> all phases of emergency management, with regional and national
> authorities only intervening in a supportive role and never assuming
> any leadership control." (Coppola 2007, p.350)

At each level of government emergency management also operates within an
intro-governmental system -- and not from a position of power. A local
government emergency manager, for example, does not just go to the
Police Chief, the Fire Chief, the Public Works Director, the Public
Health Director, the Planning Office, and the like and dictate their
participation in emergency management programs, much less the
integration of emergency management concerns into their standard plans
and procedures.

For an emergency manager to effectively operate, he or she will need to
acquire an understanding of and ability to function within these
situational contexts.

15. **Professional Emergency Management Is Science and Knowledge-Based
    -- A Full-Time Job That Requires Education, Training, and
    Experience**

There is a wide and growing body of emergency management knowledge --
the transfer of which is best accomplished through education, training,
and experience.

The days when just about anybody could get a job as an emergency manager
needs to end. It should be clear from the discussion above that
emergency management is of some importance, and is very complex. It used
to be that emergency management was primarily populated by people
retiring or moving into it from another occupation or profession -- such
as the military, the fire service, or law enforcement -- without any
specific emergency management credentials[^28] -- just whatever
credentials their prior occupation bestowed.

The idea seemed to be that anybody can be an emergency manager -- can
just walk into the job without any specific emergency management
education or training or experience and just learn on the go. That is no
longer acceptable. Think of it in the following way. Say that in your
community the Police Chief, Fire Chief, or Public Health Director
retires. You go to the Chief Executive Officer for the community and
argue that your next-door neighbor is a personable, smart, go-getter
kind of person in need of a job -- give them the job. How credible is
this? Yet that has been happening in emergency management for decades.

Another continuing problem is that too many communities continue to
assign emergency management as "another duty as required," or as a
"second-hat," or as a part-time or volunteer position to someone who is
not an emergency management professional.

*Education:* In the past emergency management has been
experientially-based. People learned on the job, from the experience and
assumptions of others, and from whatever related experience their prior
occupation provided. That is no longer enough. Emergency Management
needs to be built upon a foundation of social and natural science,
theory, and knowledge.

*Training:* Besides social and natural science knowledge, emergency
management requires of those who would practice it, a wide range of
technical knowledge and skills \-- interpersonal, leadership,
managerial, political, technical and crisis management[^29].

*Experience*. Experience is not by definition a good or a bad teacher --
it can go either way. Experience has the potential to be a good teacher
-- particularly if the recipient has had the proper education and
training that allow him or her to pick the wheat from the chaff of
experience and actually move forward. Experience will indicate whether
the recipient has or can develop the necessary *attributes*, in addition
to education and training skills, to be successful -- such as, adaptive,
imaginative, flexible, creative, possessing initiative, ethical,
compassionate, has and practices integrity, can think not only
tactically but strategically.

*Continuous Improvement* -- Through a combination of continuing
education, training, experience, membership in professional
associations, attending conferences related to hazards, disasters and
what to do about them, and other such activity, emergency management
requires continuous improvement. The world of hazards and disasters is
not a static one -- it is ever changing, and thus those who work in
emergency management must dedicate themselves to a lifetime of learning
and continuous improvement.

Side-bar relating to "professional" emergency management from the 1978
National Governors Report *Comprehensive Emergency Management -- A
Governor's Guide*:

> "A series of tornadoes across the state inflicted severe damage on two
> medium-sized cities. In visiting both, the governor noticed that
> cleanup seemed to be further along in the more severely hit city. He
> found that the local emergency services coordinator (EMC) was well
> respected in town and had worked out and tested an emergency response
> plan for early warnings from the National Weather Service. He had
> initiated installation of new warning sirens at the fire department
> and had coordinated health services, evacuation procedures, search and
> rescue operations, debris clearance, temporary shelter construction,
> feeding programs, and other response services. He had made
> particularly good use of trained volunteers. The other city had a
> part-time EMC, who was not on duty when the tornado hit. Warnings to
> the city, as well as notification to city and state officials were
> delayed. The second city, although less severely struck, took longer
> to respond to and recover from the emergency." (NGA 1979, p. 16)

16. **Models of Emergency Management Organization**

I will assert that how one organizes to do the job matters -- quite
possibly a lot. Quoting Coppola again,

> "In a best-case scenario, the emergency management structure is its
> own department, ministry, or agency, reporting directly to the most
> senior executive..." (p. 353)

Authorities to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from
hazards and disasters should be supervised by one official at each level
of government. This was one of the principles drawn upon in the creation
of FEMA.

*Civil Defense Model*. Historically today's cadre of emergency managers
can trace their roots back to the passage of the Civil Defense Act of
1950, and as importantly, to its modification in 1958 allowing the
Federal government to pay up to 50% of the personnel and administrative
expenses of State and local government civil defense offices (called
originally the P&A Fund). While civil defense had had "starts and fits"
earlier, as during World War I, and World War II, and even though
natural disaster experience was far from missing, there was no cadre of
Federal, Sate and local government personnel devoted to civil defense
until after the passage of the Civil Defense Act of 1950. Slowly,
through the urging the Fede3ral Civil Defense Administration, some State
and local governments began to establish Offices of Civil Defense and
hire Civil Defense Directors and personnel -- for the national security,
nuclear attack preparedness mission. But, not enough.

It was eventually realized by the Federal government that advocacy for
the creation of such positions was not enough -- the majority of State
and local governments had not created Offices of Civil Defense. Thus the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was modified in 1958 to allow the
Federal government to more or less pay for the development of such a
cadre via the incentive mechanism of offering to pay for up to 50% of
the personnel and administrative costs of such offices on a yearly
basis. Congress, however, did not begin to actually fund this new
mechanism until several years later during one of the Berlin crises of
the time.

With this funding now flowing to State Offices of Civil Defense, and
through them to local County Offices of Civil Defense, a cadre of
personnel was developed. (It bears repeated that community experience
with natural disasters did not lead to the creation of "emergency
management" cadres around the country. It took a national security
concern to do this.

So it came to be that many, if not most, of the people hired to populate
Civil Defense Offices, because of the national security focus and
mission of their work, came from the ranks of retired military and,
secondarily, emergency services personnel. Their work was nuclear attack
preparedness centric, based on programs and expenditures prescribed by
Washington, DC. Over time many of these offices and personnel were
relegated to a corner in a municipal, county, or State government
because they were not as relevant to other hazards that governments
faced besides nuclear attack as their employers would have liked, and
the skill-set of many civil defense personnel did not lend themselves to
being viewed as part of the executive governing team in their political
jurisdiction. (As an aside, this explains why today at the State level
the State Adjutant General (National Guard, Military Department)
oversees Emergency Management in a number of States)

*Emergency Services Model.* By the time of the end of the Cold War there
was significant movement from the nuclear attack centric civil defense
model to two others -- the Emergency Services Model and the Public
Administration Model -- both of which were more "All-Hazards" than the
Civil Defense Model. Within the emergency services model, emergency
management was moved organizationally to either the Fire Service or Law
Enforcement (more often than not County Sheriff Offices at the local
level and the State Police at the State level). Whether the emergency
management officer was a civilian or an emergency services employee,
emergency management concerns usually played second fiddle at best to
the primary missions of the home organization.

*Public Administration Model*. By the time of 9/11 a plurality of
emergency management offices were either independent offices or
organized in some other department than fire or law enforcement -- and
their numbers were growing at the expense of the other two options. This
is the preferred emergency management public sector practitioner
model.[^30]

*Homeland Security Model*. After the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security some State and local emergency management offices
changed their name to Homeland Security, or modified their name to
include Homeland Security. In some jurisdictions new Homeland Security
Offices have been created in addition to the already established
Emergency Management Offices. This movement has many parallels to the
earlier Civil Defense Model -- a primary focus on a national security
threat -- this time terrorism and weapons of mass destruction instead of
nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Again, military and emergency
services personnel are coming into such positions in significant
numbers. Again, the programs and the funding are essentially developed
and mandated from Washington DC. There are many strictures, strings
attached, to Federal funding requiring that for all intents and purposes
expenditures be contribute to, be consistent with, and do not detract
from terrorism preparedness. Obviously, if a jurisdiction spent federal
terrorism-centric funding on say flood-gauge monitors instead of say
chemical detection suits and kits and the like, then that would detract
from terrorism preparedness.

17. **Approaches to Emergency Management**

*Traditional or Technocratic Approach* -- focus on hazards as agents,
hazards management, response-oriented disaster operations planning.

*Social Vulnerability Approach* -- focus on reducing social
vulnerability and increasing social resilience.

*Prevention and Risk Reduction Approach* -- focus on risk management.

18. **Emergency Management Standards and Certification**

*National Fire Protection Association Standard 1600 (NFPA-1600)*

*Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP)*, National Emergency
Management

Association.

*Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) Credential*, International
Association of Emergency

Managers.

> **Appendix A:**

**What Is Expected of Participants of the March 5-6, 2007 Emergency
Management Roundtable at EMI**

It is expected that all participants of the March 5-6, 2007 Emergency
Management Roundtable will do homework -- reflect, if not do some
research, on the issues to be discussed. The primary issues appear to
be:

What is emergency management and what is it not?

How are the answers to these two questions best communicated to others?

What does the word "Principle" mean in the emergency management context.
In other words, what level of aggregation does the word "Principle"
imply?

What are the core Emergency Management Principles for the Profession of
Emergency Management?

Are the "Principles" of Emergency Management different from a
conceptualization of "Emergency Management Doctrine"?

If so, what are the components of an "Emergency Management Doctrine"?

What "deliverables" or end products need to be eventually developed to
address the fundamental problems raised in the Selves email?

# It is our hope that the March 5-6, 2007 Emergency Management Roundtable not degenerate into a "gab fest" with just notes of the meeting at the end of the process. Prior preparation and deliberation should lead to the development of a more concrete way forward. In addition, full and active participation is anticipated of each participant. We hope that no participant will feel the need to hold their cards close to their vest. 

# Appendix B

# Historical Example of Community Capability Building versus Catastrophic Hazard Focus

Historically contending philosophies or approaches to emergency
management were on display and contention during the pre-emergency
management era of civil defense against nuclear attack. During the
fifty's, sixty's and seventies, the prevailing federal point of view was
that nuclear attack threatened the very survival of the country, that
what civil defense personnel, programs and systems did could very well
spell the difference between the survival of the United States following
a nuclear attack or its eventual dissolution and destruction on the
other.

When I was hired by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the
Department of Defense just prior to it\'s incorporation into the newly
created FEMA, there was a strong organizational culture \-- one that
took its mission very seriously \-- believing that millions of lives
could be effected by what it did or did not do \-- perhaps the existence
of the nation state itself in jeopardy \-- and not one that was very
open to partnership with State and Local Government \"counterparts\" \--
put into quotation marks because such personnel were not really viewed
as counterparts but people who were provided funding to do what the
civil defense program managers required \-- i.e., it was very much a
top-down, \"command and control\" type philosophical orientation. The
world view was one of how can the States and Locals fit into our
universe.

Thus federal monies were provided to State Offices of Civil Defense and
through them to local Offices of Civil Defense -- to do the federal
bidding through federal requirements and strings attached to the
funding. Nuclear attack civil defense funding had to be spent for
nuclear attack civil defense preparedness purposes -- as conceived and
mandated by the federal government. As examples, federal civil defense
funds were provided to States to hire Radiological Defense Officers in
State Office of Emergency Management -- to work on nuclear
attack-related civil defense issues and planning. State Civil Defense
Directors were not allowed to draw upon these personnel to work on
radiological issues or planning related to nuclear poser plants in their
states -- that was not a nuclear attack civil defense purpose.
Similarly, federal civil defense funding was provided to the States to
hire and maintain Nuclear Civil Protection Planners -- to work on
nuclear attack related civil defense plans and procedures. State
Directors were not allowed to draw upon these personnel to work on other
than the nuclear attack hazard -- say on hurricane evacuation planning.

State and local governments and State and local civil defense personnel
became very dissatisfied with this state of affairs and argued and
lobbied strongly for changes that would allow them to use federal
nuclear attack oriented civil defense funding for a broader array of
hazards. Eventually the pressure was such that the "Dual Use" approach
was implemented. Under "Dual Use" provisions State and local governments
could utilize federal civil defense funding to build capabilities for
other hazards "to the extent that the use of such funds contributed to,
was consistent with, and did not detract from nuclear attack civil
preparedness."

The "Dual Use" approach was nonetheless contentious, with seemingly
endless argument and disagreement over exactly what was consistent with,
contributed to, and did not detract from nuclear attack preparedness
purposes.

The eventual end of this debate can be traced to several factors. I
highlight two which I believe to be instrumental. First was the
publication in 1978 of the National Governors' Association report on
*Comprehensive Emergency Management.* This report contributed to
President Carter's reorganization of federal disaster and civil defense
activity -- via the creation of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.[^31]

The second was the appointment of James Lee Witt, the State Director of
Emergency Management in Arkansas, and the first FEMA Director with
direct emergency management experience. After the serious operational
problems FEMA was confronted with in Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, which
led to calls for FEMA\'s abolishment, the new FEMA Director, amongst
other changes, made \"customer service\" a cornerstone of the agency \--
and the worldview eventually changed from how can others, such as State
and Local government personnel, fit into our universe to how can we
(FEMA) fit into their universe \-- and lo-and-behold things got better,
to the point that FEMA came to be touted as a model federal agency!

Eventually within FEMA the tide turned in favor of acceptance of the
position of State and local governments, one also reflected in a growing
body of social science hazards and disaster research, that the better
States and local governments are prepared to cope with the broad range
of hazards faced by States and communities on an historical basis, the
better positioned they would be for anything else.

Ultimately it came to be fairly well recognized in the emerging federal
emergency management community that the capabilities "bought" with
federal funding through a single-minded focus on the nuclear attack
hazard were in large measure "illusory." That is, those capabilities
tended to reside mainly in the heads of federal civil defense
bureaucrats. If structures, equipment, personnel, programs, procedures,
planning and the like are not utilized on a more or less routine basis,
then real-world capabilities that one can count on to be there when
needed, are not developed. Thus the centrality of the focus on nuclear
attack preparedness gave way to "all hazards" community capability
building. This took place during the 1980's and was well established in
the 1990's -- up to 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and the focus on the centrality of the terrorism hazard. Post
Katrina this focus has evolved to encompass "catastrophe" preparedness,
with pride of place belonging to a range of terrorism-based weapons of
mass destruction scenarios. There are many similarities between the
hey-day of the top-down nuclear attack civil defense era and the new
terrorism centric homeland security era.

**Appendix C**

**Examples of Fundamental Principles of Disaster Management**

**(Working Draft, December 5, 2006)**

**Dr. David Etkin**

**Coordinator, Emergency Management Program**

**York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada**

A. Good governance

> i\. Accountability
>
> ii\. Responsibility
>
> iii\. Transparency
>
> iv\. Honesty
>
> v\. Institutional structures that support the other principles

B. Equity & fairness

> i\. Intergenerational (looks at temporal issues and examines how the
> policies debated and decided upon today affect future generations)
>
> ii\. Intragenerational (looks at current distributional effects)
>
> iii\. Procedural (looks at the process by which negotiations and
> decisions occur)
>
> iv\. Consequentialist (looks at outcomes)

C. Sustainable development [\[4\]]{.underline}

> i\. Development that meets the needs of the present without
> compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
> needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of "needs",
> in particular the essential needs of the world's poor; and the idea of
> limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization
> on the environment's ability to meet present and the future needs.
> (Brundtland Commission, 1987).

D. Efficiency (might fit better in strategies)

> i\. "The ratio of the effective or useful output to the total input in
> any system." This would emphasize the importance of mitigation and
> prevention over response.

E. Efficacy (might fit better in strategies)

> i\. "The power or capacity to produce a desired effect." Many aspects
> of DM are under-resourced (mitigation being typical), which negatively
> affects capacity to effectively reduce disaster impacts.

F. Environmental stewardship (this might be considered subset of
sustainable development)

> i\. Promotion of healthy ecosystems, protection of the natural
> environment, through the wise use of and interaction with our
> environment.

G. Evidence/reality-based practice (might fit better in strategies)

> i\. The integration of best research evidence with DM practices --
> thus the avoidance of disaster myths.

H. Cultural context

> i\. Any DM strategy must be developed within the context of an
> existing set f cultural values. Not taking them into consideration can
> result in a poor scheme at best, or doing a great deal of harm at
> worst.

I. Address root causes, as much as possible (might fit better in
strategies)

>       i. For example, develop a 'culture of safety'
>
> ii\. Many root causes are deeply embedded into the social fabric --
> addressing them can be extraordinarily difficult, particularly if it
> requires challenging existing values or elite power structures.

J. Social justice

> i\. Several issues related to social justice result in increased
> vulnerability and decreased resilience to hazards and disasters.
> Examples include large disparities in wealth, health, access to power
> and justice systems, and human rights issues. Should this issue be
> considered as part of equity?

K. Controllability

> i\. There is a limit our ability to control events that are large
> scale and complex. A management approach should include an expectation
> of surprises, loss of control, other(?) and plan for failure as well
> as success. This would include safe-fail design as well as fail-safe
> (thus, when the dyke breaks, what then?).

**Appendix D**

**Principles of Emergency Management**

**Derived From *Introduction to Emergency Management* (2^nd^ Ed.)**

**by George D. Haddow and Jane A. Bullock (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006),
329-336.**

**And from Personal Email Communication, March 1, 2007**

1.  Secure leadership and support from top executives for the emergency
    management mission.

2.  Clearly define the emergency management mission.

3.  All-Hazards Approach to Emergency Management

4.  Functional Approach to Emergency Management

5.  Customer Focus and Service (internal and external)

6.  Making Mitigation the Cornerstone of Emergency Management

7.  Build Partnerships (among disciplines, across sectors, including
    private sector and media)

8.  Communicating to the Public, Partners, and the Media

9.  Development and Application of New Technologies

10. Provide emergency management workers with the training and the tools
    they need to do their jobs

> **Appendix E:**
>
> **Principles of Emergency Management from IS-230 (FEMA/EMI), April 21,
> 2006**
>
> **(Inferred -- document never explicitly states a principle)**
>
> "The goals of emergency management are to: save lives, prevent
> injuries, protect property and the environment." (p. 2-8)
>
> 1\. Integrated Emergency Management System (Unit 2) \[Inferred summary
> of IEMS is that it
>
> is all hazards, all resources, all jurisdictions, all phases.\]
>
> 2\. Incident Management Spectrum (Unit 3) -- NIMS, ICS, NRP, Five
> Phases (replaces 1998
>
> "Four Phases" section.
>
> "An integrated emergency management system provides a conceptual
> framework for organizing and managing emergency protection efforts.
> This framework prescribes when and how local officials and agencies
> will work together to deal with a full range of emergencies, from
> natural disasters to terrorism" (p. 9-1). \[Note that the principle of
> "horizontal and vertical integration" is not addressed, but rather a
> disaster response-oriented "framework."\]
>
> 3\. Building a Network of Relationships (Unit 4: Roles of Key
> Participants)
>
> "The effectiveness of emergency management rests on a network of
> relationships among partners in the system." (p. 1)
>
> "Effective response to and recovery from an emergency or disaster
> requires the active involvement of numerous partners." (p. 2-10)
>
> "A successful emergency management program facilitates the development
> of a network of relationships among local officials and staff who
> understand their roles and are able to act when needed." (p. 2-16)
>
> "In this unit, you practiced applying emergency management principles
> of coordination and interdependence and explained the fundamental
> features of an Integrated Emergency Management System" (p. 8-12).
>
> 4\. Emergency Operations Plan as Emergency Management Program
> Centerpiece (Unit 5)
>
> 5\. Planning and Coordination (Unit 6) -- \[Mostly devoted to
> elaboration on ICS and EOP.\]
>
> 6\. Core Functions of an Emergency Management Program (Unit 7)
>
> \[Describes functions from within the practice of emergency management
> -- derived from State and Local Guide 101, Guide for All-Hazard
> Emergency Operations Planning and from FEMA's Capability Assessment
> for Readiness survey) and never asserts a "principle" or uses the word
> itself.\]
>
> **Appendix F**
>
> **Select Listing of Principles from Eric Auf der Heide's**
>
> ***Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Cooperation***
> (Mosby, 1989)

1.  Because of the limited resources available, disaster preparedness
    proposals need to take cost-effectiveness into consideration. (p.
    23)

2.  Planning should be for disasters of moderate size (about 120
    casualties); disasters of this size will present the typical
    inter-organizational coordination problems also applicable to larger
    events. (p. 25)

3.  Interest in disaster preparedness is proportional to the recency and
    magnitude of the last disaster. (p. 28) \[Thus\] the best time to
    submit disaster preparedness programs for funding is right after a
    disaster (even if it has occurred elsewhere). (p. 30)

4.  Disaster planning is an illusion unless: it is based on valid
    assumptions about human behavior, incorporates an
    inter-organizational perspective, is tied to resources, and is known
    and accepted by the participants. (p. 35)

5.  Base disaster plans on what people are "likely" to do, rather than
    what they "should" do. (p. 38)

6.  The *process* of planning is more important than the written
    document that results. (p. 44)

7.  Good disaster management is *not* merely an extension of good
    everyday emergency procedures. It is more than just the mobilization
    of additional personnel, facilities, and supplies. Disasters often
    pose unique problems rarely faced in daily emergencies. (p. 52)

8.  In contrast to most routine emergencies, disasters introduce the
    need for *multi-organizational* and *multi-disciplinary*
    coordination. (p. 78)

9.  In disasters, what are thought to be "communications problems" are
    often coordination problems in disguise. (p. 81)

10. Those who work together well on a daily basis tend to work together
    well in disasters. (p. 83)

11. Disasters create the need for coordination among fire departments,
    law enforcement agencies, hospitals, ambulances, military units,
    utility crews, and other organizations. This requires inter-agency
    communication networks utilizing compatible radio frequencies. (p.
    96)

**Appendix G**

**Emergency Management Concepts and Principles Derived From**

***Emergency Management Principles and Practice for Healthcare
Systems***

**Washington DC: Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management,
George Washington University (Educational Course developed for U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs: 2006)**

1\. Emergency Management is a Management Science

2\. Comprehensive Emergency Management

3\. The Four Phases

4\. All Risks (All Hazards)

5\. CEM applicable across all levels of government and the private
sector

6\. IEMS (Integrated Emergency Management System)

7\. Incident Command System

8\. National Incident Management System

9\. National Response Plan

10\. Relevant Emergency Management Standards

**Appendix H**

> **Some Selected Definitions Of "Doctrine"**

1.  **From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia** (accessed December 16,
    2006)

"**Doctrine**, from Latin *doctrina* (compare *doctor*), means \"a code
of beliefs\", \"a body of teachings\" or \"instructions\", taught
principles or positions, as the body of teachings in a branch of
knowledge or belief system. The Greek analogy is the etymology of
catechism. Often *doctrine* specifically connotes a corpus of
**religious dogma** as it is promulgated by a church, but not
necessarily: *doctrine* is also used to refer to a principle of **law**,
in the common law traditions, established through a history of past
decisions, such as the doctrine of self-defense, or the principle of
fair use...

"The term also applies to the concept of an established procedure to a
complex operation in warfare. The typical example is **tactical
doctrine** in which a standard set of maneuvers, kinds of troops and
weapons are employed as a default approach to a kind of attack...."

"(DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgment in application."

2.  **(Funk & Wagnalls *Standard College Dictionary* (Text Edition),
    1966.)**

"...A particular principle or tenet that is taught, or a body of such
principles or tenets."

3.  **From the DHS Lexicographer's December 4, 2006 document:**

United States Coast Guard contribution:

"Fundamental prinicples that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is
authoritative but not directive. It distills the insights and wisdom
gained from our collective experience. Doctrine influences the way in
which poliyc and plans are developed, forces are organized, trained and
employed, and equipment is procured and maintained. It is
interpretative: based on conditions, operating units can apply the
doctrine differently, within the constraints of establisheds policy."
(p. 7)

FEMA contribution: "Fundamental principles that guide the employment of
personnel and resources." (p. 8)

OPS contribution: "The fundamental principles and beliefs that guide an
organization's actions in pursuing specified obectives."

**Appendix I**

**Selected Definition of "Principles"**

Definitions of the work "**Principle"** on the Web:

A basic generalization that is accepted as true and that can be used as
a basis for reasoning or conduct; \"their principles of composition
characterized all their works\"

A rule or standard especially of good behavior; \"a man of principle\";
\"he will not violate his principles\"

A basic truth or law or assumption; \"the principles of democracy\"

A rule or law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a
complex system; \"the principle of the conservation of mass\"; \"the
principle of jet propulsion\"; \"the right-hand rule for inductive
fields\"

A rule of personal conduct

A rationale: (law) an explanation of the fundamental reasons (especially
an explanation of the working of some device in terms of laws of
nature); \"the rationale for capital punishment\"; \"the principles of
internal-combustion engines\"\
[wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn](http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&start=0&oi=define&q=http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn%3Fs%3Dprinciple&usg=__ECS-DELdw07ycnvRZPjtiK-wCKU=)

According to the Webster\'s New World Dictionary of the American
Language a principle is a \"a fundamental truth, law, doctrine, or
motivating force upon which others are based. Principles are
overwhelming obvious ideas that are often accepted as a matter of
faith.\"

With regard to fundamentals although not concerning details.
(<http://www.elook.org/dictionary/in-principle.html>)

**Appendix J**

> **Sources Cited**

Auf der Heide, Eric. *Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and
Cooperation* (St. Louis, C.V. Mosby Co., 1989)

Brewin, Bob. "Northcom's New C2: Collaboration and Communications."
*FCW.com* (Federal Computer Week), December 12, 2006. Accessed at:
<http://fcw.com/article97086-12-12-06-Web>

Canton, Lucian G. *Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for
Effective Programs.*. Wiley, 2006.

Coppola, Damon P. *Introduction to International Disaster Management*.
Amsterdam, Butterworth-Heinemann (Imprint of Elsevier), 2007, 547 pages.

Davis, Ian. "The Development of Principles for the use of Indicators to
Measure Effective Performance in Community Based Disaster Management
(CBDRM)." Cranfield University, UK: Resilience Centre, working draft
paper, November 2005 and January 2006, 5 pages.

Department of Homeland Security. "Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked
Questions: National Preparedness Goal." Undated. Accessed December 7,
2006 at: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm>

Department of Homeland Security Lexicographer. "Doctrine-Policy-Strategy
-- S1a -- 12042006.doc" email.

Drabek, Thomas E. "Theories Relevant to Emergency Management Versus a
Theory of Emergency Management." *Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol.
3, No. 4, July/August 2005, pp. 49-54.

Etkin, David, Ian Davis. "The Search for Principles of Disaster
Management." December 2006 working draft paper, 10 pages.

FEMA. *Director Paulison Lays Out Vision for a 'New FEMA'.*" Washington,
DC: FEMA, National Press Club Presentation, November 30, 2006 (Release
No. FNF-06-019). Accessed at:
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=31850>

FEMA. *Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Position*. EMI,
Independent Study (IS-1), March 24, 2006. Accessed at:
<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is1.asp>

FEMA. *Principles of Emergency Management*. EMI, Independent Study
(IS-230), February 2006. Accessed at:
<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp>

Frietag, Robert. Personal communication, January 3, 2007.

Goss, Kay C. Email communication, February 18, 2007.

Haddow, George D., and Jane A. Bullock. *Introduction to Emergency
Management* (2^nd^ Ed.). Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006.

Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management, George Washington
University. *Emergency Management Principles and Practices for Health
Care Systems* (Educational Curriculum). Washington, DC: Veterans Health
Administration, June 2006. Accessible at:
<http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=122>

May, Fred. "Emergency Managers -- Who's On First?" Jacksonville, AL:
Jacksonville State University, Institute for Emergency Preparedness,
draft paper, November 30, 2006.

International Association of Emergency Managers. *IAEM President's
Communiqué* (Issue 2006-13). December 5, 2006.

National Governors' Association. *Comprehensive Emergency Management --
A Governor's Guide*. Washington DC: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency,
May, 1979.

National Governors' Association. *1978 Emergency Preparedness Project --
Final Report*. Washington, DC: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 1978.

Waugh, William L. Jr. and Gregory Streib. "Collaboration and Leadership
for Effective Emergency Management." *Public Administration Review*,
December 2006 (Special Issue).

Witt, James Lee, and James Morgan. *Stronger In The Broken Places: Nine
Lessons For Turning Crisis Into Triumph*. New York: Time Books, 2002.

[^1]: This is a reference to an article by Dr. Thomas E. Drabek entitled
    "Theories Relevant to Emergency Management Versus a Theory of
    Emergency Management," in *Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol. 3,
    No. 4, July/August 2005, pp. 49-54.

[^2]: This document is not the place to get into "what do we call what
    we do?" -- emergency management, disaster management, and the like.
    This document is concerned with identification and discussion of the
    core fundamentals and/or principles of the profession that deals
    with hazards, disasters and what to do about them -- that is more
    often than not referred to as emergency management.

[^3]: A recent, but more narrow definition, in that it pertains only to
    the public sector, can be found in the \"Post-Katrina Emergency
    Management Reform Act of 2006\" (Title VI of H.R. 5441) (now Public
    Law 109-295) wherein emergency management is defined as \"...the
    governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities
    necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare
    for, protect against, respond to, recover from or mitigate against
    threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism or other
    man-made disasters.\" 

[^4]: January 3, 2007 email.

[^5]: Citation does not imply I agree with everything in IS-1. For
    example, I disagree with the first statement after the question
    "What Is Emergency Management?" -- to wit, "In its simplest terms,
    emergency management may be as simple as a homeowner responding to a
    broken water pipe and a flooded basement." This reinforces the
    notion I take issue with in this document that "anyone can be an
    emergency manager."

[^6]: In the private sector terms such as "contingency planner" and
    "recovery manager" are frequently used in addition to "emergency
    manager."

[^7]: Robert Freitag January 3, 2007 communication.

[^8]: "At FEMA, we defined our customers as people either preparing for
    or recovering from disasters. The moment we decided to measure our
    success based on how those people wee served, instead of how our
    programs were run, we were on the road to beating crisis...We
    broadened the idea of the customer to include everyone, both inside
    and outside the agency -- the people in the next office, the
    congressmen on Capitol Hill, the FEMA staffers in the field, our
    counterparts at the state and local levels. If you accept that your
    job is to serve your customer, then there's no place for the primacy
    of programs or the fostering of fiefdoms." (Witt 2002, p. 116)

[^9]: "Communication is more than just talking -- it's the honest and
    open exchange of personal views." (Witt 2002, 45)

[^10]: "...the often-used term 'Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness'
    employed by many disaster professionals, has come to place too much
    emphasis in practice if not legislative intent, on the preparedness
    phase of emergency management. For this reason, a new term
    'Comprehensive Emergency Management' may better answer today's
    needs" (NGA 1978, 85).

[^11]: "CEM should be distinguished from *comprehensive emergency
    preparedness*, a term now generally in use, which emphasizes, in
    practice if not legislative intent, the preparedness and response
    phases of emergency management almost exclusively." (NGA 1979, p.
    56)

[^12]: "Local governments should recognize and upgrade, where needed,
    the responsibilities of local civil defense coordinators to
    emergency management coordinators for all hazards." (NGA 1979, p.
    60)

[^13]: "Field respondents did not give much emphasis to such factors as
    funding and staffing for improving state and federal relations.
    Rather, they indicated that 'prior working relationships' are the
    dominant factor" (NGA 1978, 49).

[^14]: Described as "the crucial element" the response phase (NGA 1978,
    35).

[^15]: "...the state must forge a network of facilitative working
    relationships that extend both vertically and horizontally
    throughout all levels of government and private organizations" (NGA
    1978, p. 70).

[^16]: "You reap what you sow...In this mobile, fast-paced world, it's
    easy to let relationship wither... In organizations, as in marriage,
    steady and clear communication is the key to contentment." (Witt
    2002, p. 121)

[^17]: "I find 'networking' a very descriptive buzzword. The word itself
    implies how one person draws a line to another and another and
    another, and how each of those people draws lines to still other
    people, and before you know it, you've woven something much stronger
    than any of the individual parts. In times of crisis -- business or
    personal -- you want and need that net....Much of life is about
    building bridges -- and keeping them in good repair.... In my
    experience, the difference between success and something less is the
    difference between reaching out and digging in." (Witt 2002, p. 115)

[^18]: "Teamwork issues are, first of all, about attitude.... Teams
    operate horizontally, not vertically. A manager's job, then, is to
    disassemble the stovepipe structure and reassemble it as a maze of
    connecting pipes.... \[It's\] about egalitarianism, colleagueism,
    anti-showboatism." (Witt, pp. 172-173)

[^19]: "The number of organizations, agencies, and individuals called on
    to deal with emergencies will always be large. Careful spade work
    can lead to a strong foundation for inter-organizational
    relationships. It must include development of at least the following
    six factors: Prior working relationships; Clear roles and
    responsibilities; Competent personnel; Clear communications systems;
    Common goals; Simple procedures" (NGA 1978, p. 25).

[^20]: Haddow and Bullock include several examples of how FEMA Director
    James Lee Witt reached out to FEMA employees, the State and local
    government emergency management community, disaster victims, the
    media and many other stakeholders, and in doing so helped to create
    "a positive image and reputation" for the agency.

[^21]: Haddow and Bullock cite: *Natural Disasters: Protecting the
    Public's Health* (Pan American Health Organization, Scientific
    Publication No. 575).

[^22]: Less than successful and adequate communication and coordination
    contributing to a disaster within a disaster brings Katrina to mind.

[^23]: Other typical functional areas would be direction and control,
    emergency public information, evacuation, mass care, health and
    medical, and resource management.

[^24]: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National
    Preparedness.

[^25]: Department of Homeland Security. "Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked
    Questions: National Preparedness Goal." Undated. Accessed December
    7, 2006 at: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm>

[^26]: "...integrated emergency management for all risks (attack,
    man-made, and natural) should make the most efficient use of
    available resources" (p. 17).

[^27]: The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, which stated that civil
    defense was primarily a State and local responsibility, was modified
    in 1958 to make it a shared, joint, responsibility. This concept was
    carried over into the Stafford Act when the Federal Civil Defense
    Act of 1950 was abolished in the 1990s.

[^28]: "...some local officials appoint unqualified people to local
    civil defense director positions which are poorly paid or non-paid."
    (NGA 1978, p. xvi)

[^29]: "In my experience, the people who handle crisis best are the ones
    who, either naturally or through training, tend to think of others
    before they think of themselves.... Whether you're a victim or a
    recovery worker, focusing on the welfare of those around you is a
    key to negotiating the emotional undercurrents of a crisis
    situation." (Witt, p. 145)

[^30]: See Mike Selves article on "Local Emergency Management: A Tale of
    Two Models," 1997, accessible at:
    [http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/LOCAL%20EMERGENCY%20MANAGEMENT.doc](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.doc)

[^31]: "On June 19, 1978, after strong resistance from some of the
    federal agencies concerned, President Carter submitted
    Reorganization Plan Number Three to Congress. He did so because of
    strong pressure for the plan from civil defense and emergency
    services organizations, state and local officials, and public
    interest groups, among which NGA played a key role." (NGA 1979, p.
    3)