NASA Glenn Research Center

**Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate**

####### 

####### SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITIES

####### May 6, 2005

The following are highlights of key activities during the week ending
May 6, 2005 for the Glenn Code Q/Safety and Mission Assurance
Directorate (SMAD):

**[Risk Related Decisions/Actions]{.underline}:**

**[Programmatic]{.underline}:**

None Reported

**[Institutional]{.underline}:**

None Reported

**[Key Activities]{.underline}:**

**[Code QD/Plum Brook Reactor Decommissioning Program
Office]{.underline}:**

Two individuals from the Decommissioning Project Team were recognized at
the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate Quarterly All Hands
Meeting. Julie Fuerstenberg was given an award for her Administrative
Support to the directorate and William Stoner, the Project Radiation
Safety Officer, was recognized as the Employee of the Quarter by his
peers on the Decommissioning Project.

[Current Site Activities]{.underline} \-- The Embedded Piping Evaluation
Team continues to make progress toward refining the options and
scenarios that will be evaluated for cost and schedule impacts to the
project. This evaluation will continue until mid-June. Once the
evaluation team completes its work and makes recommendations to the US
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and NASA, a path forward will be
selected.

The USACE had an independent contractor evaluate the Embedded Piping
Evaluation Team this week. The conclusion reached by the evaluator was
that the evaluation process appeared to be sufficient to provide the
information for decision making in the June time frame. There were two
cautions given by the evaluator; first, that the risks for all scenarios
should be determined and understood by the decision makers; and second,
that the waste streams from each option should be considered fully.
There is an interim update to NASA and USACE management planned for the
week of May 23, 2005.

**[Code QE/Risk Management Office (RMO)]{.underline}:**

**[PROGRAM SMA]{.underline}**

**[Exploration Systems Mission Directorate]{.underline}**

**Human System Research and Technologies**

[Fluids and Combustion Facility (FCF)]{.underline} \-- Initiated review
of the revised Combustion Integrated Rack (CIR) Phase III Flight Safety
Data Package.

Continued independent review of CIR hazard control verifications. (215
out of 358 CIR verifications are scheduled for review.) To date, 6.5%
are complete and 5% with findings are being worked with the Project.

Continued to witness software tests. The CIR Software Hazard Control
test, CIR Health monitoring test and Fuel-Oxidizer Management Assembly
(FOMA) Control Unit test were completed. The IPSU-A (Image Processing
and Storage Unit Analog) test verified the software successfully, but a
hardware anomaly was documented.

Participated in the Software Change Control Board for a FOMA Control
Unit software change. (Because of its importance for safety, FOMA
changes are rigorously scrutinized.) Also, reviewed changes to the IOP
(Input-Output Processor) and IPSU.

Supported a software load of IPSU Main Processor software on a CIR IPSU.
Also witnessed a load of IOP software on the CIR rack.

Participated in a meeting to discuss the software change process and
agreed to begin implementing a more formal process, including
approval/rejection of software changes through an ERB (Engineering
Review Board).

Reviewed the updated signals list and provided comments and questions.
Also updated several PRACAs (Problem Reports and Corrective Action) and
prepared some for closure at the PRACA Review Board meeting.

Recalculated effective mean time between failure (MTBF) for about 95% of
the blocks in the CIR and Fluids Integrated Rack (FIR) availability
models. (Will use as inputs for updated availability predictions based
on revised duty cycles.) Also, discussed sparing options for various
Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) and workarounds for certain types of
failures.

Sent comments to Prime Contractor on their Limited-Life Items (LLI)
List. Working with the contractor to correct deficiencies.

Met with Contract Risk Manager to review and update closure rationale on
open risks. Finished developing rationale on all remaining open risks.

Supported the Software Test Team weekly meeting to review open software
risks and action items. Closed seven action items and five risks.

[Flow Enclosure Accommodating Novel Investigations in the Combustion of
Solids (FEANICS)]{.underline} \-- Met with lead operations engineer and
electrical engineer to discuss preliminary failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) and possible design changes to the PI box configuration.
Also began evaluation of proposed modification to the radiant heater
halogen bulb design.

RMO Safety establishing a simple one page chart to more easily identify
the different categories of safety-critical fasteners. This will
mitigate the risk of specifying, procuring and/or installing the wrong
type of fastener for safety-critical applications.

Reviewed two commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) boards for parts issues.
Recommended these boards may be used for flight provided handling and
environmental screening procedures for COTS are followed, but radiation
testing is recommended.

[Flame Extinguishment Experiment (FLEX)]{.underline} \-- Reviewing the
Phase III Flight Safety Data Package.

[Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME)]{.underline} \-- Met with
Project Manager and team to discuss the draft Product Assurance Plan.
Reviewed deviations proposed for \"fast track approach\" and possible
options for mitigating risk.

Completed the review and signed-off on the Phase II Flight Safety Data
Package.

[Dust Aerosol measurement Feasibility Test (DAFT)]{.underline} \--
Supported very successful Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) with the
Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) related to hardware damage that
occurred during transportation between JSC and KSC. The TIM included
discussions on the repair/re-verification of the hardware. All repairs
and re-verifications were found to be acceptable by the PSRP.

[Packed Bed Reactor Experiment (PBRE)]{.underline} \-- Reviewed the
preliminary Form 1230 for use at the upcoming Requirements Definition
Review (RDR).

Reviewing venting methodologies.

[Binary Colloidal Alloy Tests (BCAT)]{.underline} \-- Drafted memo
concerning BCAT-3 operations (including updates to Safety Data Package)
to support continued on-orbit testing of BCAT samples during Increment
12 on the International Space Station.

**Integrated Product Teams (IPT)**

Supported S&MA Integrated Product Team (IPT) Reconciliation Workshop at
University of Maryland. Eight IPTs asked to reduce bottoms-up resource
estimates by 60% overall (30% for S&MA Team) and identify associated
risks. Worked with JSC and MSFC to re-scope S&MA proposal using reduced
resources. (Final resource allocation expected by end of May.)

**Project Prometheus Program**

[Prometheus]{.underline} I \-- A risk identification workshop was
facilitated for the Power Process Unit element. After a brief
presentation, the team discussed the current risks and identified new
risks. A presentation was created to give for the Electric Propulsion
(EP) Implementation Review to be held May 12, 2005. The first draft of
the EP Segment Risk Management Plan was completed. This plan should
prevent any further concerns with roles and responsibilities for risk
management on the EP Segment Project.

**Constellation**

[Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)]{.underline} \-- Participated in the
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Capture team meeting on May 3, 2005. A
GRC "Experience & Capabilities for CEV" package presentation to senior
GRC managers was reviewed.

**[Space Operations Mission Directorate]{.underline}**

[Return to Flight]{.underline} \-- The Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis for the Orbiter Integrated Sensor Inspection System (ISIS)
\[Sensor Package 1\] was reviewed and comments provided. Some concern
was expressed about two failure modes. The Pan Tilt Unit (PTU) mounting
fixture shaft fails to rotate (jammed due to contamination or induced
damage). This means that the crew cannot aim the Laser Dynamic Range
Imager and Intensified Television Camera to pan all the area needed to
carry out inspection. The other failure mode is PTU Motor Failure. The
drive motor that rotates the sensor package fails: No Output. These
comments were forwarded to JSC for discussion.

Ballistics testing was witnessed for the reinforced carbon-carbon
composite (RCC) panels with PDL (Product Development Laboratory) foam at
45 degrees at different velocities. The tested panels were then taken to
the Nondestructive Evaluation Laboratory (NDE) to determine the damage
area. It was determined that the PDL foam was more destructive to the
RCC panels than the BX-265 foam that encases the external tanks. These
tests are considered on the critical path for the shuttle launch.

**[Science Mission Directorate]{.underline}**

[Stirling Radio-isotope Generator (SRG)]{.underline} \-- Simulations
were carried out using Rapid Assessment Prototyping Tool for Operational
Readiness (RAPTOR) programs for three, fourteen, and seventeen year
SRG-110 missions addressing seven active subsystems. The subsystems
include: two heat sources, two converters, a gas management valve (GMV),
a pressure relief device (PRD), and an electronic controller. Subsystem
mean time to failures (MTTF) was varied from 10 times to 1000 times the
mission duration to make relative comparisons of system availability and
reliability.

Preliminary reliability data was received from Lockheed Martin
concerning the GMV and the PRD. Further detail is needed before
including data in simulations.

RMO participated in the Reliability Working Group (RWG) Tele-Conference
call. Discussion occurred regarding the Reliability Summit meeting in
Stevenson, Washington slated for June 21st thru June 23rd. The GRC Lead
Project Engineer furnished an e-mail to the group explaining the
objective of the Summit, which is to create a basis from which an
overarching Stirling power conversion reliability plan can be developed
that provides guidance to the developers of the technology, and offers
verification of reliability to the potential end users. The summit is
intended to be a first meeting of independent thought with subsequent
follow-up meetings.

**[Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate]{.underline}**

Started working with the software safety and flight software development
groups to develop a brief overview of GRC capability relative to the
certifiability of the software planned for the autonomous/resilient
vehicle systems demonstrations. Plan to meet with GRC AVSSP (Aviation
Safety and Security Program Security Program) management to discuss this
in-house capability.

**[SMA TECHNOLOGY]{.underline}**

**[NASA Engineering and Safety Center]{.underline}**

[NESC ISS Recurring Anomaly Review Team]{.underline} \-- The assessment
of which Quick Disconnects (QD) PRACAs are related to human factors
(i.e. the discrepancies resulted in modifications to ground and flight
procedures, or the development of tools to assist in QD maintenance
functions) was completed.

[(NESC) Safety and Mission Assurance]{.underline} \-- Participated in
the NASA Safety Engineering Center (NESC) Safety and Mission Assurance
(SMA) Working Group Meeting telecon on May 11, 2005, led by Wayne
Frazier and Ken Cameron. Discussions centered on the Space Shuttle
Program (SSP) Assurance Process Analysis, led by Dr. Steve Newman. This
SSP Assurance Process was outlined in detail as to the roles and
responsibilities of each of the interactive SMA functions throughout the
Agency. The NESC Management Communication Center (MCC) status was
discussed with regard to the use of a Microsoft Widows sharing tool
being used for knowledge sharing and its link to the Chief Engineer
office.

**[Safety and Mission Assurance]{.underline}**

[Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical (EEE) Parts]{.underline} \--
Participated in the NASA Electronics Parts Advisory Group International
Telecom on May 4, 2005. Topics of discussion were European surface mount
devices, the use of pure tin in NASA parts, the International Audit
schedule and the definition of \"Space qualified\" parts.

**[Code QV/Quality Management Office (QMO)]{.underline}:**

**[PROGRAM QUALITY ASSURANCE]{.underline}**

**[Exploration Systems Mission Directorate]{.underline}**

**Human System Research and Technologies**

[Fluids and Combustion Facility (FCF)]{.underline} \-- The Quality
Management Office (QMO), is reviewing and accepting FCF hardware and
attending documentation, assuring that hardware turned over to the
government conforms to the Delivery Order requirements. DD250s will be
signed by QMO for 44 FCF packages, consisting of approximately 1200
kits.

[Flow Enclosure Accommodating Novel Investigations in the Combustion of
Solids (FEANICS)]{.underline} \-- QMO is helping the project select
baffle and screen materials associated with the filter section.

QMO is working to establish and document a better method of identifying
safety-critical fasteners during the design phase to benefit the project
in the procurement of flight fasteners.

Quality Management Office personnel attended the TEST procedure review
meeting of FEANICS-TEST-0-120 for testing the Fit Functional Model in
the Combustion Integration Rack (CIR), Engineering Model (EM). The team
detailed procedural inputs incorporating the latest comments and
iterations. Pending any further comments or revisions, the document
should be updated and routed for signatures.

> Quality Management Office (QMO), provided guidance in electronic parts
> selection and in key assembly procurements to best support NASA flight
> qualification requirements.

[Investigating the Structure of Paramagnetic Aggregates from Colloidal
Emulsions (InSPACE-2)]{.underline} \--Participated in a meeting to
review project status and the storage review plan. Made recommendations
on bonded storage of hardware and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and
discussed concerns about having GSE operating at the launch site.

[Light Microscopy Module (LMM)]{.underline} \-- Provided support to the
Light Microscopy Module (LMM) Project Engineering Review Board for the
LMM humidity exception.

[Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME)]{.underline} \--
Participated in the SAME Project meeting to discuss potential
modifications to the Product Assurance Plan (PAP) to reflect the fact
that it is a fast-track project. Gave numerous recommendations for
achieving more flight-worthy hardware while reducing paperwork and
costs.

**[INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE]{.underline}**

[Lessons Learned]{.underline} \-- Hosted NASA Headquarters sponsored
workshop on the NASA Lessons Learned Process, establishing an effective
NASA Center Process for Lessons Learned. Participants at this workshop
included GRC\'s Chief Engineer and representatives from various GRC
Offices and Directorates. The participants were very outspoken and
provided NASA Headquarters with much valuable feedback and opinion about
this topic and how it relates to GRC.

**[Code QS/Glenn Safety Office (GSO)]{.underline}:**

Ken O'Connor of the GSO received the Wings of Excellence Award from
outstanding service to the Agency and the community. The award is given
by the Cleveland\'s Federal Executive Board.

[Safety, Health and Environmental Board]{.underline} \-- GSO supported a
special meeting of the Safety, Health and Environmental Board. The Board
discussed the Center\'s Emergency Management Program.

[GSO Support for Design of Projects Impacted by Airport
Expansion]{.underline} \-- Worked with the GSO Fire Protection and Life
Safety Engineer to finalize Altitude Combustion Stand (ACS) project
specification sections of interest to the Glenn Safety Office. The
completed sections are due by 5/6/05 to meet the SAA3 Project Manager\'s
schedule.

Updated the GSO Chief on the status of the Altitude Combustion Stand
(ACS) project. Presented a schedule for the completion of the design as
well as a schedule for the procurement and construction phase.
Subsequently, gave a similar presentation to the appropriate GSO staff.

Consulted with the Central Chemical Storage Facility (CCSF) B215
Building Manager regarding some chemical fume hood design issues.

[Safety Training]{.underline} \-- An extension was issued by the Chief,
GSO on fire extinguisher training to all GRC personnel requiring Hot
Work Permit for welding and grinding at the Center. The extension was
issue to support scheduled work tasks while training requirements are
fulfilled.

**[Code QO/Environmental Management Office (EMO)]{.underline}:**

Dan White of the EMO received the Wings of Excellence Award from
outstanding service to the Agency and the community. The award was given
by the Cleveland\'s Federal Executive Board.

**[CHEMICAL MANAGEMENT]{.underline}**

[Hazard Communication Training]{.underline} **\--** Hazard communication
training was given to two civil servants in the Building 21 Learning
Center auxiliary room on April 27. The next scheduled hazard
communication training will be May 10 in the Building 21 Learning Center
auxiliary room.

The Chemical Management Team (CMT) has also been working with Sue Gott
to set up hazard communication training for college interns. Since CMT
posted the availability of the web based hazard communication refresher
training, 234 individuals have taken the refresher training.

[Chemical Inventory Program]{.underline} \-- The CMT converted 22
chemical containers to "active" status and 113 containers to "inactive"
status.

The CMT initiated the active scanning process in Building 77. The CMT
also organized a meeting with the building manager, some of the key
branch managers in the Building 5 complex, and the Waste Management Team
to discuss issues pertinent to the Chemical Inventory Audit scheduled to
begin the week of May 9.

The CMT began hand entering data for newly bar coded containers
discovered during the physical inventories of Buildings 49 and 106. Over
500 entries have been made in the past week.

**[ENVIRONMENTAL]{.underline}**

The Closure Report for the 315 gallon diesel tank removed from the
Building 43 parking area has been approved and sent to the Bureau of
Underground Storage Tank Regulations.

The Environmental Team (ET) submitted the asbestos blanket authorization
report to the Cleveland Bureau of Air Pollution Control.

The ET provided comments on the draft revision of the Firing Range
remedial design. The document was revised and then submitted to the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

The ET evaluated the data failures for the four wells near Building 109,
determined the cause, and proposed a solution to the Ohio EPA. Ohio EPA
agreed with the proposed solution. Selected wells will be re-sampled,
but only for polychlorinated biphenyls analysis.

The ET has been working with the Facilities Division on soil and water
issues related to the Altitude Wind Tunnel Demolition, Phase II.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process of Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is complete for
the Expansion and Renovation of DeLaRoche Hall at St. Bonaventure
University in the Town of Allegany, Cattaraugus County, New York. The
final NEPA notice appeared in the Olean Times Herald on May 3 and 4,
2005. There is no requirement to wait an additional 30 days, based on
the fact that the draft FONSI was previously published for 30-day public
comment period and remained unchanged from draft version to final.

**[INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND HEALTH PHYSICS]{.underline}**

The Industrial Hygiene and Health Physics Team (IHHPT) responded to a
request for assistance from the First Responders regarding an odor
complaint in the clean room high bay area of Building 110. Once the high
bay was cleared of the odors, an office-type waste can containing waste
rags was found to be the cause. The IHHPT has been meeting with
employees in the area to review material cleaning procedures.

The IHHPT conducted employee exposure monitoring during the removal of
aluminized Mylar wrap in Building 301, VF-5. After about an hour of
removal, the employee, who was wearing a filtering face piece, was asked
to stop work so the need for half-mask respirators could be evaluated.

The IHHPT recommended that employees not be allowed to move into a
presently vacant space in Building 14 until a mold contaminated wall is
safely removed by professionally trained mold remediation workers.