**13. Overview.**

The message of this book is that von Neumann's Process 1, which was
introduced to order create a mathematically well defined physical
theory, injects causally efficacious and non-redundant mind into the
causal workings of nature. Consequently, quantum theory, by virtue of
its logical structure, entails a connection between mind and brain that
is radically different from what emerges from the conception of nature
that defined science at the end of the nineteenth century. In this final
chapter I shall compare this quantum view with some contemporary main
streams of thought on the subject.

A tremendous burgeoning of interest in the problem of consciousness has
occurred during the last few years. The grip of the behaviorists who
sought to banish consciousness from science has finally been broken.
This shift is ratified by the recent appearance of a special issue of
Scientific American entitled "The Hidden Mind." The lead article,
written by Antonio Damasio, begins with the assertion: "At the start of
the new millennium, it is apparent that one question towers above all
others in the life sciences: How does the set of processes we call mind
emerge from the activity of the organ we call brain?" He notes that some
thinkers "believe the question to be unanswerable in principle'' while
"For others, the relentless and exponential increase in knowledge may
give rise to the vertiginous feeling that no problem can resist the
assault of science if *only the science is right* and the techniques are
powerful enough." (My emphasis.) He notes that "The naysayers argue that
exhaustive compilation of all these data (of neuroscience) adds up to
*correlates* of mental states but to nothing resembling *an actual
mental state.*" (His emphasis.) He adds that: "In fact, the explanation
of the physics related to biological events is still incomplete" and
states that "the finest level of description of mind ... might require
explanation at the quantum level." Damasio makes his own position clear:
"I contend that the biological processes now presumed to correspond to
mind in fact *are* mind processes and will be seen to be so when
understood in sufficient detail."

With "biological processes" understood to be quantum processes, as
contrasted to classically describable processes, I agree that mind
processes are biological brain processes. The point is that biological
brain processes demand, for the reasons described in Chapter 10, the
application of quantum physics, and that makes feelings, for the reasons
explained in Chapters 11 and 12, critical components of brain dynamics.

The possibility that quantum physics might be relevant to the connection
between conscious process and brain process was raised also by Dave
Chalmers, in his article *The Puzzle of Consciousness*, However, he
effectively tied that possibility to a proposal put forth by Roger
Penrose, and, faulting that particular approach, rejected the general
idea.

The deficiency of Penrose's approach identified by Chalmers is that it
fails to bring in consciousness: it is about certain brain processes
that may be related to consciousness, but "...the theory is silent about
how these processes might give rise to conscious experience. Indeed, the
same problem arises with any theory of consciousness based only on
physical processing." That negative conclusion is based, however, on the
presumption that brain processes can be described in a way that leaves
out feelings and other experiential-type realities. But, according to
the present view, Process I plays a crucial dynamical role of physical
processing, and hence the brain dynamics of an alert agent cannot be
described without taking experiential-type realities explicitly into
account.

Chalmers goes on to expound upon the "explanatory gap" between
theoretical understanding of the behavioral and functional aspects of
brain process and an explanation of how and why the performance of those
functions should be accompanied by conscious experience. However, the
notion that such a "gap" exists depends upon the presumption that a
valid understanding or conception of brain behavior and functioning can
be divorced from the associated conscious experiences. The whole notion
that such a separation is possible arises only from the fundamentally
false and incorrigibly inadequate classical model.

The confounding of reality itself with the caricature of it suggested by
the work of Descartes and Newton has blighted the philosophy of science,
the philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and aesthetics for more than
three centuries, and it still retains its blinding effect on the views
of even those philosophers who absolutely reject that dualistic view.
For example, Daniel Dennett, one of the most out-spoken critics of
Cartesian dualism, says that his own thinking rested on the idea that "a
brain was always going to do what it was caused to do by current, local,
mechanical circumstances." By making that judgment he tied his thinking
to the physical half of Cartesian/Newtonian dualism, or its child,
classical physics, and thus was forced in his book "Explaining
Consciousness" to leave consciousness out, as he himself admits, but
tries to justify, at the end. By thus accepting the fundamentally
erroneous classical-physics understanding of brain processes, instead of
the view offered by modern science, Dennett cut himself off from any
possibility of explaining consciousness.

Many important features of the von Neumann approach being described here
can be brought out by contrasting them with the contrary properties of
Penrose's proposal. The first key difference is that Penrose does not
introduce the von Neumann Process I, which is essential to von Neumann
quantum theory. Penrose uses instead the Process III: State Vector
Reduction, which he calls R. This difference is crucial! State Vector
Reduction, which Penrose *does* use, brings in the unnecessary global
non-locality, whereas Process I, which he *does not* use, accounts for
the causal effect of mind on brain.

A second essential difference between the present proposal and that of
Penrose, and his collaborator Stuart Hameroff, is that their theory
depends on establishing macroscopic quantum coherence over an extended
portion of the brain, whereas the theory being described here does not.
Most physicists deem it highly unlikely that such large-scale coherence
could be sustained in a warm, wet, living brain.

A third difference is that their theory depends on the complex question
of quantum gravity, which is currently not under good theoretical
control, whereas the theoretical ideas that are the basis of the present
approach are the fundamental mathematical principles of quantum theory,
which, thanks to the work of John von Neumann, are under much better
control.

The fourth difference is that the justification that Penrose gives for
believing that quantum theory has something to do with human
consciousness is a very much disputed argument that claims to deduce
from (1), the fact that mathematicians construct proofs that they
believe to be valid, and (2), some deep mathematical results due to Kurt
Godel, the conclusion that conscious thought must involve quantum
theory. But in the von Neumann approach the relevance of consciousness
arises from its connection to Process I, which is a basic feature of
orthodox quantum theory.

The fifth difference is the fact, already emphasized by Chalmers, that
Penrose's theory of consciousness turns out to be about a conceivable
neural correlate of consciousness, but is silent about how that brain
activity might give rise to conscious experiences, whereas the present
work is directly about the relationship of brain processes to conscious
experiences.

Francis Crick and Christof Koch begin their essay *The Problem of
Consciousness* with the assertion: "The overwhelming question in
neurobiology today is the relationship between the mind and the brain."
But after a brief survey of the difficulties in getting an answer they
conclude that "Radically new concepts may indeed be needed\-\--recall
the modifications in scientific thinking forced on us by quantum
mechanics. The only sensible approach is to press the experimental
attack until we are confronted with dilemmas that call for new ways of
thinking."

However, the two cases are extremely dissimilar. The switch to quantum
theory was forced upon us by the fact that we had a very simple system,
consisting of one proton and one electron, that was so simple that it
could be exactly solved by the methods of classical physics, but the
calculated answer did not agree with the empirical results. There was no
conceptual problem. It was rather that precise computations were
possible, but gave wrong answers. Here the problem is reversed: precise
calculations of the dynamical processes associated with conscious
experiences are not yet do-able, and hence have not revealed any
mismatch between theory and experiment, but the *concepts of classical
physics* that most neurobiologists want to use are clearly inadequate:
they lack the conceptual ingredients needed to account for conscious
experience. Dave Chalmers recognizes this conceptual difficulty, and
concludes that experimental work by neurobiologists is not by itself
sufficient to resolve of *The Puzzle of Conscious Experience*: also
needed are better concepts. He suggests that the stuff of the universe
might information, but then rejects the replacement of classical
physical theory, which is based on material substance, by quantum
theory, which builds (its conception of) nature out of a non-substantive
stuff that can be characterized as information imbedded in a
mathematical structure.

John Searle is perhaps the strongest contemporary voice calling for a
forthright acknowledgement of both the existence of the subjective
realities that *are* the experiential qualities, and also the need to
explain them, rather than trying to explain them away. His views mesh
well with the quantum approach developed here.

I shall use as my source Searle's article in the Journal of
Consciousness Studies, which is based on his talk at the Tucson 2000
conference on Consciousness. This presentation seems to me to represent
his best effort to come to grips with the problem.

Searle reiterates his longtime themes:

1.  Consciousness is a real biological phenomenon.

> 2\. It consists of inner, qualitative, subjective, unified states of
> sentience, awareness, thoughts and feelings.
>
> 3\. This unified field of conscious subjective awareness is not
> reducible to any third-person phenomena.
>
> 4\. All of our conscious states are caused by lower-level neuronal
> processes in the brain.
>
> 5\. All of our conscious states are themselves features of the brain.

If one were to accept the classical-physics conception of the brain then
there would appear to be a conflict between claims 3 and 5. For if a
brain were a conglomeration of particles, which, as the objective
elements of nature are third-person entities, and conscious states are
features of these conglomerations, then consciousness seems to be
reduced to third-person phenomena. However, if one accepts the quantum
idea that the states of consciousness characterized in properties 1, 2,
and 3, above, are first-person subjective features of the brain, which
is an informational structure that combines distinct first-person and
third-person informational features, then this conflict is resolved.

Later on, Searle introduces "psychological processes" by observing that
people sometimes give 'reasons' for acting as they do. But he notes that
these 'reasons' are not always conclusive, or sufficient to entail the
actions they promote. He wishes to consider the possibility that
although the psychological processes may be indeterministic, the
underlying "neurobiological process" is deterministic. He then says that
psychological indeterminism with neurobiological determinism\-\--

"is intellectually unsatisfying because it is a modified form of
epiphenomenalism. It says that the psychological processes of decision
making really do not matter. The entire process is deterministic at the
bottom level, and the idea that the top level has an element of freedom
is simply a systematic illusion. ... The bodily movements would be
exactly the same regardless of how these processes occurred.

"Maybe that is how it will turn out, but if so the hypothesis seems to
me to run against everything we know about evolution. It would have the
consequence that the incredibly elaborate, complex, sensitive and
\-\--above all\-\--biologically expensive system of human and animal
conscious rational decision-making would actually make no difference
whatever to the life and survival of the organism. Epiphenomenalism is a
possible thesis, but it is absolutely incredible, and if we seriously
accept it, it would make a change in our world view, that is, in our
conception of our relations to the world, more radical than any previous
change, including the Copernican Revolution, Einsteinian relativity
theory and quantum theory."

The sort of epiphenomenal consciousness that Searle is considering, and
finds incredible, is what naturally arises from a classical-physics
conception of the brain. But quantum theory gives consciousness a causal
power that is outside the control of the bottom-level local
deterministic laws that are the quantum counterparts of the classical
laws of motion. The causal power of consciousness arises from the way
that consciousness fills a *causal gap* in those bottom-level laws. This
lacuna is filled in a natural way by causal agents, who supply the
logically needed elements of definiteness.

The description of nature's process given in earlier chapters is perhaps
overly formal and austere. I shall give now a more intuitive account,
focusing on the question of how conscious process can be seen as a
feature of brain process.

The evolving state of the universe is a giant mass of conflicting
potentialities. Within this huge space there can occasionally appear an
island of stability. Because the potentialities are 'potentialities for
feelings to actualize', these islands of stability will have associated
"potential feels," which are characterizations of their internal
harmony. The potential feel of a possible state is presumably connected
to mathematically describable features of that state in specified ways,
but the potential feels themselves are taken to be ontological
primitives, probably of a genus more primitive than the quantum state,
and containing the elements out of which the quantum state is
constructed. Von Neumann's Process I is a boot-strapping action in which
the potential feel actualizes itself by lifting the island of stability
with which it is associated out of the mass in which it is imbedded,
creating a separation of the total state into two branches. I believe it
is not profitable at this point in the development of science to try to
specify in detail exactly how the feel of the actualized state is
connected to the mathematical structure of the state, presumably via the
elements out of which the state itself is constructed. Because I am
trying to sticking closely to von Neumann's ideas, with minimal
speculation, I will be content to characterize the feel of an actualized
state as an aesthetic evaluation of a quality of coherent organization
of that state.

The purpose of this work is to provide understanding. The idea that
science could or should provide understanding was very much out of favor
in the first half of the twentieth century, due partly to the Kantian
thesis that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and partly to the
influence of the logical positivists. But while certainty about the
exact nature of the world in which our thoughts are imbedded is
unattainable, partial contemporary understandings based on the best
available data, and on efforts to construct theories that rationally and
coherently account for that data, is a hallmark of contemporary science.
It is essential to strive to produce improved science-based
understandings because otherwise ignorance-based understandings will
come to rule the world by default, with likely disastrous consequences.