# Higher Education Conference Transcription, Speaker: Dr. Wayne Blanchard[^1]

**[THE DIRTY BAKER'S DOZEN]{.underline}**

### Hazards, Disasters and Emergency Management in the Year 2001

It would be quite easy to stand here for an hour and talk about all the
positive things that are happening today that relate to hazards,
disasters, and what you do about them. There are a lot of very positive
things that are taking place, but I am not going to be talking for an
hour about all the positive things that are taking place today. I'm
going to take a different approach that focuses more on adverse trends
and on areas that need improvement or change. These points are organized
under thirteen headings

**Point 1 -- Disaster Losses Are Enormous.**

It's perhaps a simple point, though not everyone reflects on it. We're
not talking about something trivial or small. Even in the U.S. scheme of
things, where there are large issues and large money associated with
other concerns we have as a Nation, disaster losses are nationally
significant. The U.S. has experienced about \$500 billion in disaster
losses over the last decade.[^2] That averages \$50 billion a year or
roughly 1 billion dollars a week year after year after year to
disasters.[^3] Most of these losses are not insured and the
disaster-insured losses are going up.[^4]

The loss of life in this country, annually, is about 1,500 lives lost
per year due to hazards.[^5]

Federal costs are large: According to data compiled for the U.S. Senate
by the General Accounting Office, federal agencies obligated about
\$119.7 billion (in constant 1993 dollars) in disaster assistance
between 1977 and 1993. FEMA accounted for 22% of this amount.[^6]

Federal costs are the tip of the iceberg. As large as federal costs are,
they are only the tip of the iceberg because the far larger burden is at
the local level \-- local government, business and industry, and
citizens. Then there are State Government costs and losses.

Individual hazard losses are large:

-   Annual US earthquake losses average about \$4.4 billion.[^7]

-   Flood loss is about \$6 billion.[^8]

(Although, in testimony 2 weeks ago before a Congressional committee,
the General Services Administration, citing FEMA data, pointed out that
between 1982 and 1999 (9-year period) losses for 20 flooding events were
97 billion dollars.[^9] At that rate flood losses would be about 9
billion dollars each year.)

-   Hail averages about 2.3 billion dollars in loss.[^10]

-   Hurricanes about \$5.4 billion.[^11]

-   Landslides about 1 to 2 billion dollars per year.[^12]

-   Lightening about \$1 billion per year.[^13]

-   Structural fire losses about \$10 billion per year.[^14]

-   Tornadoes about \$2.9 billion per year.[^15]

-   Winter storms about \$1 billion per year.[^16]

That list I just went through comes to about \$34 billion per year.[^17]

It does not include; drought, heat waves, hazardous materials,
transportation accidents (train derailments, airplanes going down,
etc.), or wildfires.

The figures that I did mention, to quote the FEMA document which several
of them came from, are extremely conservative because they do not cover
damage and losses to critical facilities, transportation and utility
lifelines, crop losses, or indirect economic losses.

## Point #2: We Are Becoming A More Vulnerable Society

> "Future prospects are sobering. Continued U.S. population growth,
> increased urbanization and concentration in hazard-prone coastal
> areas,[^18] increased capital and physical plant,[^19] accelerated
> deterioration of the urban infrastructure, and emerging but unknown
> new vulnerabilities posed by technological advance virtually guarantee
> that economic losses from natural hazards will continue to rise
> throughout the early part of the coming century."[^20]

75% of the US housing stock is susceptible to natural hazards.[^21]

In 1970, 31% of the US population was at risk to hurricanes. Twenty
years later, 50 percent of the U.S. population is at risk to
hurricanes.[^22]

The 1926 Miami Hurricane caused \$76 million in losses. The very same
event today in the very same place would result in \$80 billion in
losses[^23] \--an order of magnitude difference.

Though there are hot spots of disaster activity across the country,
there is no place, and I am going to quote now from the Congressional
Natural Hazards Caucus: "No part of the country is free from natural
hazards."[^24] As you can see, this point is visualized on the screen
behind me which plots Presidential disaster declarations on a map of the
US.

This increase in vulnerability is primarily driven by social factors,
not natural ones. Quoting from one disaster researcher:

> "...increasing losses are primarily due to increasing vulnerability
> arising from a variety of societal changes, including a growing
> population in higher risk coastal areas and large cities, more
> property subject to damage, and lifestyle and demographic changes
> subjecting lives and property to greater exposure."[^25]

And according to Dr. Dennis Meleti, the director of the Natural Hazards
Information and Research Center, at the University of Colorado, Boulder:

> "We are becoming more vulnerable to natural hazards because we
> continue to build **where** we want, and the **way** we want, and we
> just attribute natural disasters to nature or acts of God.
>
> Changes in who we are as a nation foretell greater risk to natural
> hazards. Income disparity has been increasing for at least a dozen
> years. We are becoming more a nation of the rich and poor, as opposed
> to a growing middle class. Middle class white guys are now a minority.
> We are becoming a more diverse nation and it is the poor and the
> ethnic minorities who are impacted the most and who suffer the most
> when disaster strikes. Much of what we do in the name of natural
> disaster reduction won't \-- it only postpones them."[^26]

Add to this, demographics such as age. We are becoming an older Nation
and when you look at vulnerability, one of the groups that is highly
vulnerable are segments of the elderly (the frail, mobility impaired,
mentally impaired).

**Point 3 -- Disaster Losses Have Been Going Up.**

# An increase in vulnerability does what? It drives disaster losses up. It is the increase in vulnerability which primarily explains why disaster losses have been going up in this country.

Mike Armstrong, previous Associate Director of the Mitigation
Directorate said late last year, "In the last 10 years, 460 major
disasters have been declared by the President, nearly double the
declarations of the previous 10-year period."[^27] For those who might
argue there is some political influence going on; the Red Cross disaster
fund has experienced a trend nearly identical to FEMA's.[^28]

According to the Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus, led by Senator
Edwards of North Carolina and Senator Stevens of Alaska. *"*Each decade,
property damage has doubled or tripled in terms of constant
dollars."[^29] \[Normalizing for inflation\]. This has been going on for
several decades now and we can predict, fairly safely, this next decade
will see a doubling or tripling of already significant disaster losses.

Also, according to the Caucus Workgroup:

> "The cost of natural disasters are rising in the U.S. despite our
> unprecedented scientific understanding of the nature of natural
> hazards, the new technology, and tools for protecting lives and
> property, and an unparalleled ability to forecast and warn the
> population."[^30]

This is not just the U.S.; the worldwide trend is even more dramatic
than what we see in the United States.[^31]

**Point 4 -- Disaster Losses Projected to Become Even Worse**

I argue that what we see now is going to be certainly and definitely
exacerbated in the future and not simply a continuation of a trend.

Quoting from a previous FEMA Director, "We have every reason to believe
that our citizens are going to face even bigger disasters in the
future."[^32] This statement was made a few months ago.

Eric Tolbert, head of the North Carolina Division of Emergency
Management, stated earlier this year, "In our lifetime, probably within
two decades, Americans will see one to two catastrophic events that will
be beyond our comprehension."[^33]

Harvey Ryland, Director of the IBHS, has written: "...multi-billion
dollar mega-disasters are looming on the horizon."[^34]

If you go to the Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Web site, they're
projecting that if \[an event such as\] the San Francisco earthquake or
the 1964 Alaska earthquake struck again in a heavily populated area, we
are talking about a \$500-billion dollar single event.[^35]

Hurricanes: If another storm of Camille's intensity ---and it's not a
question of **if** that will happen again; it **will** happen again \--
if one strikes in a populated coastal area, the National Science and
Technology Council predicts catastrophe approaching 100-billion
dollars.[^36]

That's my scientific interpretation of plotting these things \[referring
to PowerPoint slide projecting an upward trend\]. My belief is that the
top end is going to go even steeper, upwards. If we started doing things
differently today, it would be many years before this trend would be
effected.

Quoting Mileti again, whose book *Disaster by Design* really should be
used in many classrooms. "We don't really know what the natural hazards
problem is \[in this country\]... but what we can say is that things are
getting worse and will continue to get worse no matter what we do
next."[^37]

Finally, on this point, a quote from the National Research Council Board
on Sustainable Development, which offers, I think, a rather
precautionary view of where we are going in the future:

> "Based on our analysis of persistent trends and transitions, the Board
> concludes that certain current trends of population, habitation,
> wealth and consumption, technology and work, connectedness and
> diversity, and environmental change are likely to persist well into
> the coming century and could significantly undermine the prospects for
> sustainability. If they do persist, many human needs will not be met,
> life support systems will be dangerously degraded, and the numbers of
> hungry and poor will increase."[^38]

**Point #5: Disasters Impact Differentially \-- Some are more
vulnerable, more at risk, and less resilient than others.**[^39]

It is not the physical characteristics of hazard that primarily explain
the differential impact of hazards in a community. When you look time
and again at disaster effects in a community, some groups suffer
disaster more than others[^40] and take longer to recover.[^41] And when
you try to study the explanation for that, those tend to be found in the
social sciences. Political, economic, social, and cultural variables
frequently explain increases in vulnerability. Sometimes, one or more of
these variables pose as obstacles to increasing resilience in a
community.

After studying the Whittier, California earthquake Dennis Mileti said
that, "it took your average middle-class, well-educated white guy 7
weeks to get back into permanent housing. It took the average single
woman of color with children 7 years."[^42]

The following quote is from John Twig, of the Benfield-Greg Hazard
Research Center, University College in London,

"To understand what makes people vulnerable, we have to move away from
the hazard itself to look at a much wider and much more diverse set of
influences. The whole range of economic, social, cultural,
institutional, political, and even psychological factors that shape
people's lives and create an environment that they live in.
Vulnerability is socially constructed."[^43]

## Point 6 -- Past & Current Practices Are Not Effective Enough

One can conclude, as I have, that if you do nothing else but look at the
normalized escalating losses due to disasters, it should be obvious that
what is being done now is not effective enough. Some change has to be
made. This, in turn, could lead to a conclusion that change needs to be
made if we hope to level out or see a downturn in the escalating cost of
hazards. But, in order to fairly draw such a conclusion, several
questions need to be addressed and answered.

And the first is: Are natural events outpacing our ability to cope,
because if that's the case, that hazard frequency and magnitude are
increasing in such a way that it's outpacing our ability to cope, then
you couldn't necessarily make the argument that we have to change what
we are doing.

Sarewitz and Pielke addressed this question last year and draw our
attention to a 1999 study by the German firm, Munich Reinsurance
Company, in which 1960s and 1990s statistics were compared. The study
concluded that

"...the number of great natural catastrophes increased by a factor of
three with economic losses---taking into account the effects of
inflation---increasing by a factor of more than 8 and insured losses by
a factor of no less than sixteen."

Sarewitz and Pielke then note "And yet scientists have been unable to
observe a global increase in the number or the severity of extreme
weather events."[^44]

A contemporary U.S. hazards survey reports that, "In the USA, most
measures of the economic impacts of weather and climate extremes reveal
increasing losses over the last several decades, although most related
weather and climate extremes do not exhibit comparable increases.[^45]
This suggests that the increasing losses are primarily due to increasing
vulnerability arising from a variety of societal changes."[^46]

This report adds a footnote: "Climate change remains a 'wildcard' with
the possibility that it will alter the frequency and intensity of
climate and weather extremes."[^47]

Climate always changes. There is no such thing as a static climate. But
there is still some controversy over the impact of how extreme climate
change will be in terms of sea-level rises and driving an increase in
the intensity and frequency of hurricanes, flooding events, and
drought.[^48] That may well happen in the future but that doesn't
explain the increased losses in the country today.

Thus, we cannot argue that nature is outpacing our ability to cope. Not
at this point.

Then is it the case that there isn't much that we can do? Maybe we just
don't know enough? I will argue very strongly that is not the case. We
do know **what** to do, and we know **how** to do it.

Quoting from the UN's International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction Secretariat, back when it was put into place for the 90s,

"The decade has been established on the basic understanding that
sufficient scientific and technological knowledge already exists, which
with more extensive application, could save thousands of lives and
millions of dollars in property losses from natural and similar
disasters."[^49]

Two years ago, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said "We know what has to
be done, what is now required is the political commitment to do
it."[^50]

Quoting from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, "The causes of
natural hazards are sufficiently well understood to provide a basis for
undertaking action to mitigate their effects."[^51]

And, from the UN's Denis Benn: "Solutions exist and the knowledge and
technology necessary to apply them are readily available."[^52]

Bill Hook, now a Senior Policy Fellow of the American Meteorological
Society, has said,

"...we need not be continually and repeatedly victimized by natural
disasters. By using capabilities in hand, and through targeted research
and technology development, and effective policy formulation, we can
reduce our vulnerability dramatically."[^53]

My point from these quotations is: We know enough today. And one could
go on for hours quoting from the literature on all the things that we
know what to do. Yes, while improvements could be made in technology and
engineering, and social vulnerability reduction approaches --- we know
enough today to significantly reduce loss of life and economic losses to
the hazards we face right now.[^54]

Perhaps, though, it's just too expensive to do this stuff. Study after
study, though, indicates that the areas that have the payoff are
Prevention and Mitigation. Virtually none of the money spent in a
response operation---Preparedness and Response---have anything to do
with, or any effect upon **future** disaster losses. The effects that
have some bearing on future disaster losses are Prevention and
Mitigation. There are simply too many studies and conclusions that
indicate this time and again \--mitigation pays.

The World Bank and the USGS said in the early 90s, that money invested
in disaster mitigation and preparedness would accrue \$7 for every \$1
invested.[^55] FEMA has a much more conservative estimate and argues
that for every \$1 invested in Mitigation, you get at least \$2 return
on disaster investment.[^56] I have several additional references with
me on the cost-effectiveness of structural and residential mitigation,
the added costs, etc., that buttress these points and they could be
supplied for any of you who wish to get deeper into this after the
presentation.[^57]

My point here is that it's not only affordable, it pays dividends to
invest in disaster prevention and mitigation.

Thus, if disaster costs have been escalating, and if disaster costs are
still escalating, and if by all measures it looks like disaster costs
will continue to escalate, and it's not because we are seeing a dramatic
increase in the incidence rate of natural events, just their
destructiveness, and it's not because we don't know what to do, and it's
not because we can't afford to do what needs to be done, or that it
isn't cost-effective---then---obviously what we have been doing and are
currently doing is **not** effective enough.

## Point 7 -- Disasters Don't Kill People, People Kill People

If it is the case that people are being harmed or killed in disasters,
and it is the case that we are suffering significant economic and social
losses, and if it is the case that we **know** what to do to prevent and
significantly mitigate these losses, and if it is the case that we know
that it is cost effective, and that we can afford it, then it isn't
disasters that are killing most of the people who die in disasters, it
is people. Individuals and government decision-makers who are killing
people by their failure to do the right things.

To quote Mileti once again, "What is most wrong in this country in the
area of natural hazards is that we do not own up to our problems and
responsibilities. We blame nature or God."[^58] The previous FEMA
Director has said, "The large disasters we have experienced during the
last decade have been the result of the lethal combination of fierce
nature and human decisions."[^59] From the Project Impact FEMA Web site;
"You can't prevent the weather, but you **can** prevent the
damage."[^60]

Elsewhere in the paper being quoted here,[^61] attention is drawn to the
fact that the Federal Government, over the last 50 years has assumed "a
greater share of the liability for inappropriate...decisions by all
levels of government,"[^62] that have led to disaster losses, economic
losses, and loss of life.

> "Human beings \-- not nature \-- are the cause of disaster losses,
> which stem from choices about **where** and **how** human development
> will proceed."[^63]

Mileti: "We build **what** we want to build, **where** we want to build,
the **way** we want to build because of our narrow, short-term interest
and because we don't care that our grandchildren or great-grandchildren
will die as a result....Natural hazards are not a problem \-- they are a
symptom \-- of short-sighted, self-interested economic
development."[^64]

Golden and Snow, in their study of building codes, noted that, "The
rather unique

sociopolitical framework of building codes and practices in the United
States presently hinders effective technology transfer and mitigation
practice."[^65] The U.S. is one of the few countries in the world,
developed or developing, that does not have a national building code. In
fact, many local jurisdictions have no building code and in many States
that have codes, the codes are suggestive.

I am going to give a few examples, and I am going to start with
international examples because I have found that even though you are
saying why you are doing that, it is somehow psychologically easier to
accept the premise that it's inappropriate decisions made by people,
including government decisions, that lead to increases in disaster
losses and loss of life if you point elsewhere. It's easier to accept
that premise than pointing the finger at ourselves first.

In the El Salvador earthquake of January 13, the official death toll was
700, with thousands missing, and more than 1 million people, or
one-sixth of the total population, homeless.[^66] That earthquake
destroyed or left uninhabitable over 192,000 dwelling places. Public
hospitals in Santa Tecla and Zacatecoluca were left uninhabitable and
the main hospital in the eastern city of San Miguel was condemned.[^67]

As one commenter has noted, "The region is particularly susceptible to
natural disasters. El Salvador experienced a devastating earthquake in
1986 that killed 1000 people, and in 1998 was one of the nations hit and
devastated by Hurricane Mitch."[^68]

Ben Wisner, in his *Radical Interpretation of Nature* Web site, wrote:

> "...we witness the same old story: an earthquake in Central America,
> the 18^th^ damaging one since 1990. The toll is tragically familiar:
> more than 700 dead, 2,000 missing..."[^69]

Dr. Wisner refers to the approximately 1,200 people believed to be
missing from one event -- the landslide in the suburban neighborhood of
Las Colinas pictured in the screen behind me.[^70] The landslide was a
result of development on the mountain above where developers were
putting in a gated middle-class community. There was already a law in
place preventing this kind of development because it was on a volcanic
mountain, known to be unstable land. But the government did nothing to
prevent the development. The landslide started where a road had just
been cut through, going laterally across the mountaintop. If you look at
the top of the slide, that is where it starts, and it wiped out an
entire section. 1,200 people are now missing.

That's why Wisner writes that "these terrible losses were not
necessary....Road building, deforestation, and property development on
the slope above Los Colinas should never have been allowed."[^71]

If you look at the recent Indian earthquake,[^72] governmental reports
\[written\] before the earthquake and after it make the same point. In
this recent quake, which effected an area the size of Wells or West
Virginia and reduced much of it to rubble, 12,000 bodies have been
recovered.[^73] In one building alone, 400 children were crushed to
death[^74] and in the town of Bhuj over 90 percent of the houses were
damaged or collapsed.[^75]

That is a very seismic part of the country. It was the eighth time that
that area has recorded tremors measuring 8 or above on the Richter scale
\-- which is very high.[^76] Ben Wisner writes that, "It is not an 'act
of God' that no more than 10 percent of the multi-story structures in
Indian cities are built according to earthquake-resistant norms. The
earthquake didn't kill, but the buildings did."[^77]

This was predicted in an Indian government report. That's where I got
the idea for the title of point 7 -- disasters don't kill people, people
kill people. This report was produced several years before the
earthquake and noted that building codes needed to be strengthened, but
only local and regional governments could enforce existing building
codes and monitor construction practices, including the materials used.
If governments enforced these regulations, they could significantly
reduce estimated losses due to earthquakes. There was a line in this
government report that said, "When this happens, and many are predicting
it will happen, it will not be the earthquake that kills our citizens,
it will be the buildings."[^78]

The same thing could be said for numerous hazards. It's not the disaster
that kills people. All too often than not, though a tornado may come
down with little warning and just destroys a house and the people in it,
the loss of life is due to poor decisions and failures of responsibility
by individuals and governments. It is a similar story is here in this
country. Fortuitously, not as extreme, but one can reasonably argue that
it's not been because our practices are all that better, but we have
been very lucky. When you look at some of the major disasters of just
recent memory, they were all near misses and could have been worse by an
order of magnitude.

Hurricane Hugo did not hit Charleston, it hit near to Charleston.
Hurricane Andrew did not hit Miami, and when it went across and through
Louisiana, it did not hit New Orleans. The Loma Prieta earthquake did
not hit San Francisco. The Northridge earthquake did not hit Los
Angeles. These were all major disasters with losses of life and high
economic consequences and yet, they could have been, by an order of
magnitude, much more catastrophic than they were if they had actually
hit the more populated areas.

So, it's not necessarily because we're really doing that great of a job
that explains why we have large losses of life in some other countries
and not in the United States. We could have had, and there are people
predicting now, that we are going to have catastrophic disasters in this
country, with losses of life in the order of 1,000 people or more. And I
predict that is when we are going to see changes made. We saw changes
made in how emergency management is done in this country as a result of
Hugo, Northridge, and Loma Prieta. These events caused major changes in
how we do business in emergency management. That's because there were
weaknesses in the system before these events, but only as a result of
the media and public attention devoted to those weaknesses, were major
changes made. They \[the changes\] should have been made earlier, but it
was the media and public attention that caused it.

There are major weaknesses in the hazards, disasters, and what we do
about them "system" today, and I predict that these weaknesses will
probably remain until a catastrophic event with major loss of life
happens. Then there will be media and public attention which will drive
the implementation of needed major changes (which could be implemented
today but are not). I find that very frustrating.

"My name is Doris Wilson and my home was flooded in 1997 after a
developer destroyed a 3-acre wetland that protected my home from
flooding for more than 20 years. It was flooded again this year."[^79]

There was a rubber-stamp waiver to building in that floodplain that
allowed this to happen. I quote this woman because there are thousands
of similar cases that one could quote where developers are allowed to
build in floodplains and wetlands.

As an aside, one could develop in a floodplain in a way that does not
increase flooding losses, but the problem is that people are allowed to
develop without doing mitigation \-- measures such as adding retention
ponds, etc.

"Every year developers and agribusiness destroy nearly 120,000 net acres
of wetlands..."[^80] That's going on , year in and year out.

> "American developers, timber companies, and agribusinesses have
> drained and destroyed half of our original wetlands, through 1985
> according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates. In the
> Midwest, that destruction represents the loss of 90 million acre feet
> of flood storage \-- more than twice the volume of the 1993
> Mississippi River flood at St. Louis."[^81]

"Floods have caused greater loss of life and property and disrupted more
families than all other natural hazards combined. In recent decades,
over 80 percent of Presidentially declared disaster areas have been
floods that resulted in billions of dollars of losses."[^82]

That is from FEMA. Amongst all the hazards, floods are the probably the
easiest to mitigate because you can predict, fairly precisely, what will
happen. You can predict the floodplain areas, you can predict exactly
what will happen with X and Y number of inches of rain. One example, and
there are thousands that one could quote, is the Texas Medical Center in
Houston, Texas. It is the largest in the world, with 22 hospitals and
medical schools in one facility. One hundred thousand daily population
including staff, patients, students, and visitors. It is estimated that
on the order of \$25 million in losses would occur for each and every
day they would be closed.[^83]

But there is no zoning in Houston, Texas. Guess where the Texas Medical
Center is? It is in a floodplain. A 10-year flood level event can flood
the center.[^84] It can entirely circle the Texas Medical System and cut
off every one of the six roads that lead in and out of the place. In a
1976 flood there were bodies floating out of the morgue. The morgue is
in the basement of a building in a floodplain. They had substances from
their labs, which are also in the basement level, all kinds of
substances you might imagine you would find in hospitals and medical
centers, \[floating up out of the basement.\][^85] Today, \$450 million
of Federal money is going into a flood control project for the Texas
Medical Center to address **its** flood problem. They are now replacing
14 area bridges, including one built by the State \[of Texas\] just a
few years ago, which turns out to be 14 feet too low for a projected
flood event in Houston. That **one** bridge is costing the Federal
Government \$40 million.[^86] So much for applying lessons learned.[^87]

> "...while we know a great deal about mitigation, we do very little to
> act on our knowledge. Loma Prieta and Northridge confirmed our
> knowledge of seismic forces and building behavior, yet we still build
> single-family homes on poor soil, and steep slopes. In the Bay area
> right now, new homes are under construction, atop not only the Hayward
> fault but also in related ancient landslides."[^88]

These problems frequently stem from the failure to apply lessons learned
-- and this failure can and does cost lives and money. FEMA's previous
Director, James Lee Witt, recently said "Enough, enough wasted money,
enough needless pain. Much of our disaster loss was preventable. We can
turn this around by applying what we already know."[^89]

**Point #8: Too Many Disasters Stem From Failure To Manage Risk.**

I will pick on California and Florida. "Florida, like California, was
not born risky, it was built that way."[^90] And that is the case, in
lesser measure, all across the country. "'Risk' is the probability of
loss and this depends on three elements: hazard, vulnerability, and
exposure."[^91] \[On screen in background is a triangle with these three
legs.\]

In this country, in the past, what we have been doing, typically, is to
focus on the hazard leg: We ask, what are the characteristics of the
hazard? Our approach is to attempt address these characteristics and, in
essence, to control nature.[^92] We are going to build the dams, dykes
and levies to control flood. Only people move in behind these monuments
and a year later, we have \[events\] like the Midwest
floods---exacerbated disaster losses.

This is what we tend to focus on in this country, the hazard. Yet,

> "Many disaster losses are the predicted result of the interaction
> among the three major systems: the physical environment, which
> includes the hazard events \[the hazard leg\]; the social and
> demographic characteristics of the community that experiences them
> \[that's the vulnerability leg\]; and the buildings, roads, bridges,
> and other components of the constructed environment \[that's the
> exposure leg\]."[^93]

"Understanding your risk is the first step to disaster prevention."[^94]

The point is: If you focus your attention on the other two legs of the
risk triangle as well, exposure, for example, you are going to reduce
your risk and thus, by inference, your losses. The same applies if you
focus on vulnerability and make positive efforts to reduce vulnerability
or build resilience; you will reduce your risk and thus your losses in
the future.

The starting premise of the IDNDR[^95] was that we needed to do risk
assessments. FEMA says that the basic foundational building block of any
emergency management program is a risk assessment, and yet, find one. I
challenge you---find **one***.*

More often than not when I ask to see or hear about someone's risk
assessment, what I get is a hazard identification and a hazard analysis
with some historical portrait of what has transpired.

One rarely finds a vulnerability assessment, which is a component of a
risk assessment, or a community profile \-- the demographics of a
community, where groupings of people are, where hazardous materials
industries are, where resources are in this community, etc.

Nor do most "hazard identification or analyses contain an assessment of
risk. For example, if a 7.2 earthquake hit in our community, given our
demographics, here's what we predict will happen. That is a risk
assessment element of a process you would call Risk Assessment.

Yet most State and local governments have not performed one even though
the IDNDR stated that every country should do one. The U.S. has not done
one Federal risk assessment to date either.[^96]

## Point 9 -- Failure is Primarily Governmental

I argue that this failure is primarily governmental. Yes, there is a
business and industry side to this, but I will argue that emergency
management is still primarily the government's responsibility.

A disaster researcher (David Neal, I think), once told me a story. He
went to a builder who was building an apartment complex in a floodplain
and said, "Hey, don't you realize you are in a floodplain and that this
facility will be flooded?" The builder knew he was building in a
floodplain; this was attractive property with profit potential. The
builder said, "My risk is 6 months." We are talking about a 100-year
flood \[in this case.\] "I can get in here, build, and get out." More
often than not, builders have a short risk environment. The people who
buy the property and live in it -- they have the risk. And, when a flood
comes along, they suffer the consequences. So you can't rely on the
market system. The market system provides incentives for irresponsible
behavior.

While I am very much opposed to building in floodplains, I nonetheless
recognize the pressures to develop \-- attractive vistas, etc. But one
can, as the Tulsa, Oklahoma, example demonstrates, build in a floodplain
and not increase the flood risk. In Tulsa, they have funds to mitigate
against flood losses and instead of building a retention pond, you
contribute money to that fund. They build the retention ponds where they
think it really needs to go or implement other flood mitigation losses.
The flood losses have gone down instead of up, even though there has
been development within their floodplain.[^97]

Public safety is a government responsibility.

"The police power, delegated to local governments by the state
authorizes local government actions that protect the public health,
safety and general welfare. It can be argued that local governments are
under an affirmative duty to promote the health, safety and general
welfare of their citizens. It can be further argued that refraining from
managing growth and development in a responsive manner is a dereliction
of that duty. Protection of the community from hazards is clearly within
the purview of health, safety, and general welfare duties."[^98]

From FEMA, a comment on disaster in the U.S.:

"What is not readily evident is how preventable much of this destruction
is. What we don't realize at first glance is that many of these towns
have been down this road before, suffering previously from the vagaries
of nature, rebuilding without a plan for mitigating future losses, and
then facing the same disaster again."[^99]

That was written 2 years ago, but that could have been said recently in
relation to some of communities along the Mississippi river which are
flooding again this year.

"We have created unsustainable, non-resilient communities by directly
placing people and property in harm's way."[^100] Many of the people who
go into developed floodplains don't realize the danger. However, more
often than not, the infrastructure -- developers, builders, and
governmental leadership in the community do know. That's where the
problem is.

A major vehicle or tool to use is land-use planning -- zoning,
regulations, building codes, inspections and such. Whose responsibility
are these in the country? Are they the responsibility of the private
sector? No, they are governmental responsibilities.

Bill Hooke, with the Natural Science and Technology Council, writes that
"economic losses continue to rise..." and lists as one of the reasons:
"A continuing failure to use best seismic, wind, fire, and flood
mitigation and engineering practice...a huge amount of existing
construction has taken place in an unsafe manner...\[and\] in dangerous
locations\..."[^101]

I have several pages of quotes along those lines \-- shoddy workmanship,
lack or weakness of local building codes, lack of enforcement of
existing building codes \-- all driving the point that we need more
responsible, rather than merely responsive, government.[^102] It's the
lack of state and local government commitment to and capacity for
mitigation that is a fundamental impediment to this loss
reduction.[^103]

A related point, not putting the entire burden on local government, is
that local governments have a real problem saying, "We should not do X,
Y, and Z," when right next door, State and Federal governments are doing
X, Y, and Z. "State and Federal governments should lead by
example."[^104] \[Larry Larson, Executive Director of the American
Floodplain Association and National Association of Floodplain Manager\].
The United States Postal Service builds a post office in a floodplain
\-- that's a problem. The State of Colorado builds a new wing at the
University of Colorado at Boulder in a floodplain. A married-student
housing complex was also built on a floodplain. Having a person in place
that can make a persuasive and articulate case at the local level will
lead to more correct decisions being made.

## Point 10 -- It Is Primarily a Political Problem

As Dr. Francis Winslow, City of San Jose Emergency Manager, tells me,
"All the risk assessments in the world will not replace local courthouse
politics."[^105] I see the point -- though this is not an argument for
not doing risk assessments. You could have all the facts and figures on
your side (her example was in unsuccessfully trying to keep a school
from being built between two hazardous materials-using plants), and
still lose.[^106]

My argument under this point is that attention needs to be placed on
executive leaders in jurisdictions, elected and appointed.[^107] After
all, they do get attention from the other direction.[^108] And, I think
Federal and State governments, not only local government, need to do
more to reach political decision-makers at the local government level to
try to increase the probability that more responsible decisions will be
made in the future.

There is nothing I would like better than to stand here and say, "This
is the primary problem, and if we all just address this level, we can
fix the problem." But I can't say that because it is more complex, and
that while I think there is this descending ladder that gets down to the
political decision-maker at the local level, we should point out that
there are many enablers out there, whether it's the local developers,
citizen inattention and nonchalance, State governments building where
they should not, Federal governments building where they should not, and
then paying to recover disaster losses.

\[In response to an unrecorded comment from the audience.\]

Developers can do basically what they want to do in a wise way if the
community worked with them. There are many success stories of a
community, emergency management, or a floodplain manager, or a college
or university in a community building partnerships \... and saying "hey
here's how we can do this better." It's not that we don't want
development, here's how to do smart growth. That is where we need to go.
There are avenues to approach that kind of problem. Which drives me to
Point #11: The Creation of a Culture of Disaster Prevention.

## Point 11 -- We Must Create A Culture of Disaster Prevention

As James Lee Witt recently said, "Decisions made today will determine
whether in the future our money will go to disaster response and relief
or to education and health."[^109]

One of these days when that catastrophic disaster hits and you see the
news coverage, we are going to get to a point where the public will
start asking questions:

Why is it this way?

Why aren't we doing more?

I was watching a 10-minute news segment on the earthquake in India
recently and the questions asked were: Are they getting enough disaster
relief and are response agencies coming in? Not one question was asked,
\[such as\]:

Why did this kind of destruction happen?

Why this large loss of life?

What about building codes and building practices and enforcement?

I predict that one day the news media, which really could be an ally in
making things change, will start asking when a disaster hits one of our
communities hard:

Why did this damage have to happen?

> Why did we lose these lives and what about the building codes, zoning,
> and regulations?

Why were the roofs not nailed down to the frame?

And that probably will only happen after we experience a catastrophic
disaster loss in our country. I have several pages of what I mean by
disaster prevention culture, but we are running short on time, so that
will have to wait until another time.[^110]

## Point 12 -- Emergency Management Needs To Continue To Change

"We cannot do today's job with yesterday's methods and be in business
tomorrow."[^111]

This quote is from John Salter of Australia, with their Disaster
Emergency Management College, who is making a case for moving to a
risk-based approach to emergency management.[^112] That is the position
we are in today in this country. We are trying to do today's job with
yesterday's methods. That is my argument, though there are plenty who
would disagree with me. I think it is time for fundamental changes to be
made,[^113] and they will probably not be made until we experience a
catastrophic disaster.

Neil Britton of New Zealand writes that, "Disaster management needs to
undergo fundamental reform to meet the needs and expectations of society
in the next millennium."[^114] I have made several critical statements
about how we are not basing our programs, plans, policies and procedures
on doing risk assessments. What kind of programs do we need to
implement?[^115] What kind of procedures do we need to have? What part
of the risk do we accept? What parts do we ignore, and what parts do we
transfer to someone else through an insurance mechanism?

We are still a responsive emergency management community \-- all too
willing to use large resources to get ready to respond to a disaster,
and then frequently "the sky's the limit" when actually responding \--
but unwilling to throw a fraction of those resources into prevention and
mitigation.

By and large, too many members of the emergency management community are
unable to make an articulate, persuasive case to local decision-makers
on making appropriate decisions that relate to hazards and development
in their communities[^116] and do not spread their net wide enough in
forming supporting networks and coalitions,[^117] or in seeking to
reduce the vulnerability of those most at risk in their communities and
modifying standard practices to fit unique circumstances.[^118]

## Point 13 -- Education is Key

The last point is on the role of education -- particularly at the
college and university level**.**

"Although knowledge does not guarantee power over natural catastrophes,
it is a prime requisite of disaster prevention."[^119]

That is David Alexander from the University of Massachusetts.

> "Success in significantly reducing disasters is within our reach. Now
> is the time to act, for tomorrow is always too late."[^120]

I think that colleges and universities have a major role to play in
changing how and what we do in the hazards, disasters and emergency
management domain. One of the reasons for this belief is the legitimacy
granted to academicians by local decision-makers, frequently going over
and above the legitimacy granted to public employees in emergency
management.

I am borrowing from a slide presentation from someone who is here today,
Dr. Nancy Mock from the CDMHA (Center for Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance).

> "The role of the university is to

-   Create the infrastructure and culture necessary for engagement[^121]

-   Provide curricula that promotes engagement[^122]

-   Redefine scholarship to include both basic and applied research and
    professional service

-   As a knowledge hub: find new ways to disseminate and receive
    knowledge to and from the local, national, and international
    communities[^123]

-   Form new funding partnerships for engagement activities

-   Develop systems accountability for engagement activities; and

-   Be a proactive local, regional, national, and international
    citizen."[^124]

It is much more than simply offering classes and teaching students that
is important here. It is playing a citizenship role in a community by
getting outside the classroom and into the community to make a
difference. It is using today's knowledge to do a better job and to
radically change the way we do business today. Academics can make major
changes by helping coalitions come together in a local area to promote
progressive disaster prevention, reduction and emergency management
practices.

We need to cultivate a savvy media and start pointing fingers of blame.
We need to explain why the loss of life and economic losses are not acts
of God, but human decisions that were made that should not have been
made.

I see that while I have more to say I do not have more time. Perhaps we
could entertain a couple questions.

\[Several questions, that could not be captured, followed the
presentation.\]

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[^1]: The views expressed herein are the views of Dr. Blanchard and do
    not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency.

[^2]: Dennis Mileti. *Disasters By Design: A Reassessment of Natural
    Hazards in the United States* (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press,
    1999). And, according to Dr. Raymond Burby (University of North
    Carolina at Chapel Hill), "if crops are included and losses
    standardized to 1994 dollars, the figure jumps to \$1trillion."
    (Raymond Burby. "Session 1 Overview." P. 1-3 in *Building Disaster
    Resilient Communities* (FEMA, EMI Higher Education Project Working
    Draft College Course).)

[^3]: JoAnne DeRouen Darlington and David Simpson. "Envisioning
    Sustainable Communities: The Question of Disasters" (Editorial), p.
    43 in *Natural Hazards Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 2001.

[^4]: Harvey Ryland, President of the Institute for Business and Home
    Safety, noted in 1999 that the U.S. suffered \$90 billion in insured
    damage since 1989 and that the losses were going up. Harvey Ryland.
    "Laying the Groundwork, p. 260." In Ingleton (ed.), *Natural
    Disaster Management* (Leicester, England: Tudor Rose Holdings
    Limited, 1999).

[^5]: Kenneth E. Kunkel, Roger A. Pielke Jr., and Stanley A. Chagnon.
    "Temporal Fluctuations in Weather and Climate Extremes That Cause
    Economic and Human Health Impacts: A Review." *Bulletin of the
    American Meteorological Society* (Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1999), p.
    1080.

[^6]: General Accounting Office. *Disaster Assistance -- Information on
    Federal Costs and Approaches for Reducing Them, Statement of Judy A.
    England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development Issues,
    Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division*
    (GAO/T-RDED-98-139). Washington DC: GAO, March 26, 1998, p. 1.
    Cynthia Ramsey Taylor (FEMA Project Impact National Public Affairs
    Manager) wrote this year that "...FEMA has spent more than \$25
    billion in repairs and rebuilding over the past ten years." P. 84 in
    "Making an Impact," *Disaster Recovery Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2,
    Spring, 2001. In addition to that FEMA has paid out \$9.3 billion in
    Flood Insurance claims since 1969. (FEMA. *Rebuilding for a More
    Sustainable Future -- An Operational Framework* (FEMA 365).
    Washington, DC: FEMA, November 2000.

[^7]: FEMA. 2001. *FEMA Study Identifies High-Risk, High-Loss Areas For
    Earthquakes, Estimates Annualized U.S. Losses At \$4.4 Billion*.
    Downloadable from: www.fena.gov/nwz01_13.htm.

[^8]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Work Group. 2001a (Jan 22).
    "Discussion Paper for the Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus," p.
    3. At: www.agiweb.org/workgroup.

[^9]: General Accounting Office. 2001 (May 16). *Flood Insurance --
    Emerging Opportunity to Better Measure Certain Results of the
    National Flood Insurance Program* (GAO-01-736T). Washington DC: GAO,
    p. 1.

[^10]: Kunkell et al. 1999.

[^11]: FEMA 2001, 1; citing The National Climatic Data Center.

[^12]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Work Group, 2001a, p. 2.

[^13]: Kunkel, et al., 1999, 1080.

[^14]: FEMA/USFA/National Fire Data Center. 1998. *Fire in the United
    States 1986-1995* (10^th^ Edition). Emmitsburg, MD: Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration, p.
    2.

[^15]: Kunkel, et al., 1999, 1080.

[^16]: Ibid.

[^17]: An additional good source for selected hazard loss estimates is
    the National Center for Atmospheric Research. See, for example,
    *Extreme Weather Sourcebook 2001: Economic and Other Societal
    Impacts Related to Hurricanes, Floods, Tornadoes, Lightning, and
    Other U.S. Weather Phenomena*. At:
    http://www.esig.ucar.edu/sourcebook.

[^18]: For example, The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics
    and the Environment notes that the density of development in several
    high risk coastal study areas increased by more than 60% over the
    last 20 years. See www.fema.gov/nwz00/erosion.htm.

[^19]: Not, unfortunately, all governed by good building codes.
    According to Mike Armstrong "while the International Code Council
    has established a universal building code standard for application
    throughout the United States
    ([http://www.intlcode.org](http://www.intlcode.org/)), many areas
    have not passed ordinances in support of this standard and those
    communities that have passed the code do not always enforce it."
    (Armstrong 2000, 53)

[^20]: National Science and Technology Council, Committee on the
    Environment and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Natural Disaster
    Reduction. 1996. *Natural Disaster Reduction: A Plan for the Nation*
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 3).

[^21]: William D. Wagoner. 2000. *Hazard Mitigation/Comprehensive Plan
    Interface -- Integration of Emergency Management Into The
    Comprehensive Planning Process* (FEMA EMI Student Manual G626).
    Emmitsburg MD: FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, p. SMI-10;
    citing FEMA.

[^22]: FEMA. 2000 (Sep.). *Planning for a Sustainable Future* (FEMA
    364). Washington DC: FEMA, p. 7.

[^23]: Daniel Sarewitz and Roger Pielke, Jr. 2000. "Breaking the
    Global-Warming Gridlock." *The Atlantic Monthly* (July) online:
    www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm.

[^24]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup, 2001a, p. 3.

[^25]: Kunkel, et al. 1999, 1077.

[^26]: Dennis Mileti. 2001. "Risk Assessment." Presentation given April
    1, 2001, at the National Symposium on Mitigating Severe Weather
    Impacts---Design for Disaster Reduction, Tulsa Convention Center,
    Tulsa, OK, March 31-April 5.

[^27]: Michael J. Armstrong. "The Political Economy of Hazards."
    *Environmental Hazards* (Vol. 2, No. 2, June, p. 53).

[^28]: Kunkel, et al., 1999, p. 1081; citing U.S. Congress, Bipartisan
    Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief. 1995. *Federal Disaster
    Assistance* (Washington DC: US Senate, 104-4).

[^29]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup. 2001b. "A
    National Priority: Building Resilience to Natural Hazards," p. 1.
    At: www.ucar.edu/communications/awareness/2001.

[^30]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup, 2001a, p. 2.

[^31]: "Over the past four decades, the frequency of natural
    catastrophes has tripled, inflation-adjusted economic losses have
    multiplied by a factor of nine and insurance losses have multiplied
    by a factor of fifteen." (Gerhard Berz (Munich Reinsurance Co.,
    Germany). 1999. "The Financial Impact of Disaster," p. 12 in
    Ingleton, op cit.)

[^32]: James Lee Witt. 2001 (April 3). "Keynote Presentation, Session
    III," National Symposium on Mitigating Severe Weather
    Impacts---Design for Disaster Reduction, Tulsa OK, March 31-April 4,
    2001.

[^33]: Eric Tolbert. 2001. "U.S. To Face One or Two Catastrophic Events
    'Beyond Comprehension'." Remarks from presentation during mid-year
    conference of the National Emergency Management Association, 10-14
    February 2001, Crystal City, Virginia; quoted in *Emergency
    Preparedness News*, Vol. 25, No. 5, February 27, 2001, p. 42.

[^34]: Ryland 1999, p. 260.

[^35]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup, 2001a, p. 3.

[^36]: National Science and Technology Council, 1996. *Natural Disaster
    Reduction*, p. 3).

[^37]: Mileti, 2001.

[^38]: National Research Council. 1999. *Our Common Journey -- A
    Transition Toward* Sustainability (Washington DC: NRC, p. 101).

[^39]: The literature on hazards and social vulnerability is large and
    growing. Four documents in particular that should be consulted are:
    (1) Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner. *At Risk:
    Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and Disasters*. London and
    New York: Routledge, 1994, (2) Elaine Enarson and Betty Hearn Morrow
    (eds.). *The Gendered Terrain of Disaster -- Through Women's Eyes*.
    Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998, (3) Walter Gillis Peacock, Betty
    Hearn Morrow and Hugh Gladwin, *Hurricafne Andrew: Ethnicity,
    Gender, and the Sociology of* Disasters. Miami, FL: Florida
    International University, Laboratory for Social and Behavioral
    Research, 1997, and (4) Robert Bolin and Patricia Bolton. *Race,
    Religion, and Ethnicity in Disaster Recovery* (Monograph #42).
    Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral
    Science, 1986.

[^40]: "Studies have shown that in general it is the weaker groups in
    society that suffer worst from disasters: the poor (especially), the
    very young and the very old, women, the disabled, and those who are
    marginalized by race or caste." (John Twigg, "Physician, Heal
    Thyself? The Politics of Disaster Mitigation." Disaster Management
    Working Paper #1, p. 2. At: [http://bghrc.com](http://bghrc.com/).
    See also Luis R. Duran, "The Social Impact of Disaster," pp. 16-18
    in Ingleton, op cit., wherein he writes that in answer to the
    question "why are the poor still the most vulnerable" to disasters,
    that "nature is not to blame" but that "disasters are caused by
    weaknesses and factors present before and during the disaster that
    are still present today with no end in sight" (pp. 16-17).

[^41]: "The unequal distribution of the hazard impact causes a
    proportion of the population to experience major loss, while most of
    the rest of the community was less inconvenienced. Very often it is
    the most socio-economically (and sometimes politically disadvantaged
    that settle in the areas at most hazard risk." Linda Berry and David
    King. "The Power of Education," p. 96 in Ingleton.

[^42]: Mileti, 2001.

[^43]: John Twigg, 2001, p. 2.

[^44]: Sarewitz and Pielke, 2000.

[^45]: Cited is: Stanley A. Changnon and David Changnon. 1999.
    "Record-High Losses for Weather Disassters in the United States
    During the 1990s: How Excessive and Why?" *Natural Hazards*, Vol.
    18, No. 3, pp. 287-300.

[^46]: Neville Nicholls. 2001. "Atmospheric and Climatic Hazards:
    Improved Monitoring and Prediction for Disaster Mitigatin." *Natural
    Hazards*, Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3, March, p. 137.

[^47]: Ibid.

[^48]: See, James Bruce (Chair, IDNDR Scientific and Technical
    Committee, 1990-1994). 1999. "Lessons from the 1990s -- Disaster
    Loss Mitigation and Sustainable Development," p. 30, in Ingleton.

[^49]: Terry Jeggle. 1999. "1990-2000 -- The Goals and Aims of the
    Decade," in Ingleton, p. 24. See, also, David Alexander. 2000.
    *Confronting Catastrophe -- New Perspectives on Natural Disasters*
    (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157-158 & 241).

[^50]: At IDNDR closing conference; quoted in Twigg, 2001, p. 3.

[^51]: Robert Hamilton (National Academy of Sciences). 1999. "Natural
    Disaster Reduction in the 21^st^ Century," p. 305, in Ingleton.

[^52]: Denis Benn (Director, United Nations Secretariat for the
    International Strategy for Disaster Reduction). 2001. "Earthquakes
    in El Salvador and India -- Asking the Right Questions, Finding the
    Right Solutions!" ISDR *Monthly Highlights*, Vol. IV, Issue 1,
    January, p. 4.

[^53]: William Hooke. 2001. "Remarks by Dr. William Hooke, Congressional
    Natural Hazards Caucus Roundtable Event, January 22, 2001." At:
    www.agiweb.org/workgroup/hooke012201.html.

[^54]: Hooke bears quoting again: "We can't cap the volcano, or
    forestall the earthquake, or halt the winter storm. However, we can
    limit the damaging impacts of these extremes -- by appropriate
    policy, by cautious land use, proper engineering, and other steps,
    including public education and awareness well in advance of the
    hazardous event." Ibid.

[^55]: Cited in Twigg, 2001, p.3.

[^56]: James Lee Witt. 1999. "Case Study -- Project Impact: Building a
    Disaster Resilient Community," p. 231 in Ingleton.

[^57]: For example, EQE International, 1998, *Developing Initial
    Priorities for Disaster Mitigation in Oakland, California: Phase I
    -- Benefit/Cost Study of Earthquake Hazard Mitigation for
    Single-Family Residential Buildings* (Oakland CA: EQE Int., June 15;
    J. Schneider, G. Rao, S. Daneshvaran and J. Perez, 2000, "Natural
    Hazards Risk Analysis: Mitigating Property and Business Losses," p.
    256 in Ingleton; Tony Gibbs, 2001, "Letter to the Editor," *The
    Economist*, February 19; "Mitigation Far and Wide," Minnesota Page
    (2001), [http://hazmit.net/State
    Pages/MNPage.htm](http://hazmit.net/State Pages/MNPage.htm); and
    FEMA's website ([www.fema.gov](http://www.fema.gov/)) under
    Mitigation and Project Impact.

[^58]: Mileti, 2001.

[^59]: Witt, 2001.

[^60]: [www.fema.gov/impact](http://www.fema.gov/impact), 1May2001.

[^61]: Reference is made to a Power Point slide with a quote from the
    Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup to the effect: "In
    many instances, we already know how to reduce the losses from
    natural disasters, but we just do not do it." Page 2 of January 22,
    2001 paper.

[^62]: Ibid.

[^63]: Dennis Mileti. 1999. "The Challenge for a Safer 21^st^ Century,"
    p. 291 in Ingleton.

[^64]: Mileti, 2001. See, also, May, Burby, et al.: "The effects of
    earthquakes, floods, and other hazardous events are as much a
    function of human activities as they are of the natural events. By
    locating development in hazard-prone areas, building structures that
    fail in natural disasters, and depleting the resilience of natural
    processes, humans both contribute to increased risk and modify
    natural hazards in undesirable ways." Pp. 11-12 in *Environmental
    Management and Governance*, by Peter J. May, Raymond J. Burby, Neil
    J. Ericksen, John W. Handmer, Jennifer E. Dixon, Sarah Michaels, and
    D. Ingle Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

[^65]: Joseph H. Golden and John T. Snow. 1991. "Mitigation Against
    Extreme Windstorms." *Review of Geophysics*, Vol. 29, No. 4,
    November, p. 477.

[^66]: *El Salvador Watch*, January-February 2001, "Massive Earthquake
    Hits El Salvador: A Natural and Social Disaster"
    (http://www.cispes.org/html/eswatch.html).

[^67]: Ibid.

[^68]: Chris Herlinger. 2001. "Church Agency Criticizes El Salvador's
    Response To Devastating Earthquake." *Ecumenical News International
    Daily News Service*, 25 January, p. 1.

[^69]: Ben Wisner. 2001. "Disasters: What the United Nations and its
    World Can Do," p. 1. (www.anglia.ac.uk/geigraphy/radix/index/html).

[^70]: Herlinger, 2001, p. 1.

[^71]: Wisner, 2001, p. 1.

[^72]: Gujarat Earthquake, 26 January 2001, 7.9-8.0 on the Richter
    scale.

[^73]: Wisner, 2001, p. 1.

[^74]: *The Economist*, "Gujarat's Catastrophe" (Editorial, 3 February
    2001). At: (www.anglia.ac.uk/geigraphy/radix/index/html).

[^75]: Ravi Sinha (Associate Prof., Dept. of Civil Engineering, IIT),
    January 26, 2001 email to Radix website, ibid.

[^76]: <Agribuzzreports@agribuzz.com>. "Indian Earthquake Update,"
    January 31, 2001.

[^77]: Wisner, 2001, p. 1.

[^78]: *Report of the Expert Group on Natural Disaster Prevention,
    Preparedness and Mitigation having a bearing on Housing and Related
    Infrastructure* (1998, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, New
    Delhi, India; and cited by Barry Bearak in "Too True, Buildings
    Kill: Will India Pay Heed Now?," *The New York Times*, January 31,
    2001, p. A3. See, also, "El Salvador, India, Buildings That Fall
    Down," *The Boston Globe*, copied at:
    www.anglia.ac.uk/geigraphy/radix/index/html.

[^79]: Bret Hulsey (Director, Sierra Club Protect Our Families from
    Floods Project), et al. 2000. *Permitting Disaster: In America -- A
    Report by the Sierra Club.* (Madison, WI, March, p. 2.) Copies
    available by phoning (608) 257-4994.

[^80]: Ibid.

[^81]: Ibid., p. 4.

[^82]: James Lee Witt. 1995. *National Mitigation Strategy*, (Washington
    DC: FEMA, p. 1).

[^83]: Richard E. Wainerdi (Texas Medical Center). 2001. Presentation
    (April 2) at National Symposium on Mitigating Severe Weather Impacts
    -- Design for Disaster Reduction, March 31-April 5, 2001, Tulsa
    Convention Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

[^84]: Translates into 5 inches of rain in a short time span. Ibid.

[^85]: Ibid.

[^86]: Philip B. Bedient (Rice University). 2001. "Flood Warning."
    Presentation given April 1, 2001 at National Symposium on Mitigating
    Severe Weather Impacts, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

[^87]: This presentation was given just three days before Tropical Storm
    Allison hit Houston and the Texas Medical Center (June 9).
    Preliminary damage estimates from flood and secondary damage are
    over \$1 billion ("Washington Delegation Tours Crippled UT-Houston
    Medical School," June 25, 2001, at
    <http://www.uthouston.edu/forMedia/newsreleases/nr2001/MSB-FLOOD.htm>).
    Basements and ground floors were again flooded, electrical systems
    went down, heroic efforts had to be administered to prevent the loss
    of life -- 80 infants required hand ventilation breathing assistance
    \-- "with no power, the incubators and infant warmers weren't
    working..." ("Heroes of the Storm, Part Two: Saving the Babies," p.
    1, at:
    <http://uhouston.edu/forMedia/newsreleases/nr2001/msb-flood-update.htm>).
    Emergency rooms were without power, life support systems failed, a
    pharmacy was flooded, patients (including pregnant women about to
    give birth) carried on boards in the dark down stairwells and
    evacuated -- one woman who had a C-section delivery the night before
    walked down 12 flights of stairs with only a flashlight, while
    someone carried her newborn baby (Ibid.), 4,700 research animals
    drowned in basement labs, high-tech lab equipment inundated and
    research projects destroyed -- "We have lost blood and urine samples
    there were being used to identify genetic abnormalities and proteins
    involved in major human diseases, diseases that we can't cure now"
    (p. 2 of June 25 report noted above). And while animals drowned and
    valuable research was lost and flood waters were being contaminated
    by materials in basement labs, safe and dry is an athletic facility
    on the eighth floor of the University of Texas Medical School ("The
    Medical School, History of a Building," p. 1 at
    <http://www.uthouston.edu/FORMEDIA/NEWSRELEASES/NR2001/MSB-history.htm>).
    We have the same old story \-- administrators of the Texas Medical
    Center Complex were not unaware of the floodplain location of their
    facilities and previous flooding events and scares, yet sufficient
    measures were not taken to prevent the preventable.

[^88]: Francis Winslow (Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, City
    of San Jose, CA), 2001 (April), *Networks Disaster Preparedness
    News* (CA Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Vol. 1, No. 1, p.
    4).

[^89]: Witt 2001.

[^90]: Ted Steinberg. 2000. *Acts of God -- The Unnatural History of
    Natural Disaster in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.
    47).

[^91]: David Crichton. 1999. "The Risk Triangle," p. 102 in Ingleton.

[^92]: "One central problem is that many of the accepted methods for
    coping with hazards have been based on the idea that people can use
    technology to control nature to make themselves safe." (Mileti,
    *Disasters by Design*, p. 2.)

[^93]: Mileti, *Disasters By Design*, p. 3.

[^94]: Cindy Taylor (FEMA Project Impact National Public Affairs
    Director). "Americans Know Disaster Risks, Underestimate Prevention
    Capabilities." Washington DC: FEMA News Release,May 17, 2001.

[^95]: UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.

[^96]: "...disaster reduction can and should be a national priority. The
    incoming administration can build U.S. resilience to extreme events
    by taking the following steps: Conduct, with Congress and the
    nation, a national assessment of community vulnerability..."
    (Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup, "A National
    Priority: Building Resilience to Natural Hazards," p. 2.)

[^97]: See: Ann Patton. *From Harm's Way -- Flood Hazard Mitigation in
    Tulsa Oklahoma*. Tulsa: City of Tulsa Public Works Department,
    December 1993.

[^98]: Anna K. Schwab, David J. Brower and Timothy Beatley. "Sustainable
    Development, Resilient Communities and Smart Growth," Session 6 in
    *Building Disaster Resilient Communities*, a FEMA EM Higher
    Education Project College Course in working draft.

[^99]: Witt, 1999, p. 230.

[^100]: Anna K. Schwab, David J. Brower and Timothy Beatley.
    "Sustainable Development, Resilient Communities and Smart Growth,"
    Session 3 in *Building Disaster Resilient Communities*, a FEMA EM
    Higher Education Project College Course in working draft.

[^101]: William Hooke. "Progress and Challenges in Reducing Losses From
    Natural Disasters" (p. 280 in Ingleton.

[^102]: See, for example, Schwab/Brower/Beatley, op cit. or Golden and
    Snow, pp. 498 and 501, op cit.

[^103]: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup, January 22,
    2001, p. 7.

[^104]: Larry Larson (Executive Director, American Society of Floodplain
    Managers). "Remarks, April 3, Session III: Mitigating Flood Impacts
    for Disaster Resilient Communities." National Symposium on
    Mitigating Severe Weather.

[^105]: Or as Dr. David Alexander puts it: "...natural disaster
    mitigation is seldom a political card that is worth playing, for it
    depends on prudence and wisdom, not show; it usually produces
    unremarkable results, not quick transformations." (Alexander, 2000,
    p. 240.)

[^106]: As Dr. David Glasser (University of Arkansas) puts it: "Unless
    you have the political will, all the technological solutions in the
    world won't matter." Presentation, April 2, 2001, at the National
    Symposium on Mitigating Severe Weather Impacts, Tulsa OK.

[^107]: "If each of us demanded safer communities from our local
    elected/appointed officials there would be tremendous impact on
    budgets. We have to shift the U.S. culture: Hazard mitigation must
    be a basic American value." (Dr. Dennis Mileti, "The Second
    Assessment: Implications for Disaster Public Education," remarks at
    FEMA Community and Family Preparedness National Conference, June 8,
    1999, Emmitsburg, MD.)

[^108]: "Land use carries many opportunities to promote disaster
    mitigation, but often the political expedience of promoting economic
    growth at the expense of disaster mitigation is too tempting for
    authorities. Moreover, development interests often have significant
    political influence, particularly through the medium of campaign
    contributions to those seeking to win or maintain political office."
    (Dr. Richard T. Sylves. *The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency
    Management*, a FEMA EM Higher Education Project College Course,
    Emmitsburg, MD. At: http://www.fema.gov/emi/edu.)

[^109]: Witt, 2001.

[^110]: Though he doesn't use the term "disaster prevention culture,"
    Mileti's *Disasters by Design* has much to say here.

[^111]: John Salter (City of Adelaide). "A Risk Management Approach to
    Disaster Management," in Ingleton, op cit., p. 113.

[^112]: "It is important to recognize that the risk management approach
    is not 'business as usual', nor does it merely provide 'a tool' (for
    analysis/assessment). This approach provides a fundamental basis for
    the systematic application of management policies, procedures and
    practices to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, evaluating,
    treating and monitoring risk." Ibid., p. 113.

[^113]: "Agencies must broaden their agenda from emergency management to
    risk reduction." Andrew Maskrey, in "Reducing Global Disasters," p.
    86 in Ingleton, op cit.

[^114]: Dr. Neil Britton (New Zealand Ministry of Emergency Management
    and Civil Defense). "Political Commitment," in Ingleton, op cit., p.
    216. Britton notes elsewhere that within New Zealand "...the
    emphasis has changed from the 'emergency' side of the balance sheet
    to the 'management' side." ("A New Emergency Management for the New
    Millennium?" Keynote Paper, Emergency Management Session, Cities on
    Volcanoes, 2^nd^ International Conference, Auckland, New Zealand,
    February 11-16, 2001, p. 1.

[^115]: "Does the top-down disaster planning and management approach
    reduce vulnerability or increase it? The top-down approach, with
    stress on physical protection of vulnerable areas, forecasting,
    early warning systems, evacuation, and loss reduction strategies
    may, indeed, increase risks more often by providing people a false
    sense of security. The 'protective' measures may either be
    inadequate or fail miserably; the 1993 Mississippi flooding and the
    devastation caused by it is a good example." M.Q. Zaman. "Disaster
    Research, Management and Mitigation: Past Trends and Future Agenda
    -- A Review Article." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*,
    Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 103.

[^116]: "Technical solutions to most hazards management issues exist,
    but getting them used requires effectively communicating the
    solutions to end-users and convincing potential users that they are
    desirable, feasible, and cost-effective." Shirley Mattingly. "Public
    Understanding As A Key To Emergency Management Effectiveness," p.
    136 in Ingleton, op cit.

[^117]: "Disaster management needs to be undertaken within, and in
    support of, the wider social, cultural, environmental and economic
    fabric of communities....Disaster Management cuts across all sorts
    of national and local activities. Effective horizontal and vertical
    partnerships must be created and maintained. Significant linkages
    and relationships are required throughout the wider community to
    achieve effective disaster management. However, many disaster
    management agencies have difficulty in gaining acceptance among
    other agencies that are influential in the adoption of risk
    management This is primarily due to a misconception that disaster
    management is solely about preparing for and responding to events.
    It is therefore important that the wider interests of disaster
    management are communicated on an ongoing basis, and that those
    working in the field strengthen existing partnerships, as well as
    forging new ones." Britton, 1999, p. 215. See, also, Mileti (2001)
    -- "We are not addressing hazards in a contextual manner -- we don't
    get enough people in enough contiguous communities involved -- don't
    partner enough."

[^118]: "Mechanistic approaches to disasters and how to deal with them
    will not be successful. There is urgent need to realize that
    disasters do not take place in a vacuum. They involve people,
    organizations and societies that have their specific social,
    economic, cultural and political characteristics." Kuha Uitto
    (United Nations University, Japan), "Information Dissemination and
    Shared Experience," in Ingleton, op cit., p. 182.

[^119]: Alexander, 2000, p. 249.

[^120]: Federico Mayor. "Statement From The Director-General of UNESCO,"
    p. 4 in Ingleton, op cit.

[^121]: "Universities have the responsibility to foster change." John
    Snow (Dean, College of Geosciences, University of Oklahoma).
    Presentation, April 2, 2001, at the National Symposium on Mitigating
    Severe Weather Impacts, Tulsa Oklahoma, op cit.

[^122]: In answer to the question, "What do we need to do to change the
    culture of mitigation in this country?", Bill Anderson, then with
    the National Science Foundation's Hazard Research Program, responded
    by saying "...we need to give increasing attention to...educating
    the next generation of practitioners and researchers. I think that
    we have not done a good job here and currently are not doing a good
    job, especially in the social sciences." *Environmental Hazards*, "A
    Conversation with William Anderson and Elenora Sabadell,"
    (*Environmental Hazards*, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 2000, p. 48.

[^123]: On this point see also Alvarez: "These \[disaster prevention and
    reduction\] requirements can only be met through an educational
    effort that will provide the knowledge and tools so that all
    concerned practice hazard mitigation on a regular basis. Education
    of everyone involved, from children to adults, professionals in many
    fields to elected officials, from bureaucrats to the
    citizen-at-large, becomes an essential component of mitigation."
    (Ricardo Alvarez, Florida International University, "Tropical
    Cyclone," p. 36 in Ingleton, op cit.

[^124]: Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
    (Tulane University and the University of South Florida). *The Role
    of Academia and Science in the Prevention, Preparation and Response
    to Emergencies -- Power Point Presentation Delivered at 10^th^
    Annual Emergency Management Conference, Puerto Rico, May 23-28,
    2000.* At: www.cdmha.org.