**THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S**

**SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

***General***

The Senior Review Panel's mission was to review the human relations
environment in the Army with particular emphasis on sexual harassment
issues. Our assessment took us to Army locations worldwide. The Panel
visited units forward deployed, in garrison, at training sites, and in
classrooms. We saw America's soldiers in every conceivable location,
performing every type of mission. The Panel delved deeply into the human
relations environment, identified shortcomings, and has recommended
changes. While there are definitely shortcomings that need to be
addressed and are discussed within this report, it is important to state
that the Panel also saw a trained and ready Army\--the best Army that
the Panel members have seen in over 200 years collective experience with
the Army. Our soldiers are ready to perform any mission assigned,
effectively and efficiently, anywhere in the world. America's sons and
daughters who are today's soldiers are better trained and better
equipped than any Army before and they are rightfully proud to be called
soldiers.

***Purpose***

The Secretary of the Army has said, "The Army is based on trust." In the
fall of 1996, the trust between leaders and soldiers was called into
question by serious allegations of sexual impropriety at several Army
installations. Investigation indicated that breakdowns in good order and
discipline had occurred and that some leaders had abused the authority
and power vested in them. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army
directed that a Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment be established
to undertake the following missions:

-   Conduct a systems review of the Army's policies on sexual harassment
    and of the processes currently in place.

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-   Recommend changes needed to improve the human relations environment
    in which our soldiers live and work, with the specific goal of
    eradicating sexual harassment.

-   Examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and
    exercise their responsibility to prevent sexual harassment,
    specifically addressing behaviors that fail to acknowledge the
    dignity and respect to which every soldier is entitled.

***Scope and Methodology***

The focus of the Panel's assessment has been the human relations
environment in which our soldiers live and work, measured in terms of
the dignity and respect we extend to one another as an Army. Panel
members, supported by a working group of over 40 military and civilian
personnel, conducted an extensive policy review, collected data at 59
Army installations worldwide, and completed exhaustive analysis of the
data collected. We used four methods of inquiry to collect the data:
surveys, focus groups, personal interviews, and observation. Before
leaving a unit or installation, Panel members outbriefed senior leaders
on their observations. This allowed leaders to immediately begin
addressing issues raised at their installations. This has been a very
positive aspect of the Panel's efforts\--teaching and advising, not just
the gathering of data. In all, the effort took eight months with results
based on information provided by over 30,000 Army respondents.

***Findings***

Our findings center on four main areas: the Army equal opportunity (EO)
program, the extent of sexual harassment in the Army, leadership, and
Initial Entry Training (IET). We found that:

-   The Army lacks institutional commitment to the EO program and
    soldiers distrust the EO complaint system.

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-   Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing gender, rank,
    and racial lines; sex discrimination is more common than is sexual
    harassment.

-   Army leaders are the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and
    enforcing an environment of respect and dignity in the Army; too
    many leaders have failed to gain the trust of their soldiers.

-   The overwhelming majority of drill sergeants and instructors perform
    competently and well, but respect as an Army core value is not well
    institutionalized in the IET process.

***Conclusions and Recommendations***

The Panel concludes that the human relations environment of the Army is
not conducive to engendering dignity and respect among us. We are firmly
convinced that leadership is the fundamental issue. Passive leadership
has allowed sexual harassment to persist; active leadership can bring
about change to eradicate it.

Our recommendations are broad based and cover a wide variety of Army
processes, including: leader development, EO policy and procedures, IET
soldierization, unit and institutional training, command climate, and
oversight. Key recommendations follow:

-   Assign to one Department of the Army (DA) staff agency the primary
    responsibility for leadership, leader development, and human
    relations for the Army.

-   Incorporate the human dimension of warfare into Army operational
    doctrine.

-   Conduct a critical review of the staffing and organization of the DA
    elements responsible for human relations problems and issues and of
    the resourcing of those agencies responsible for assisting
    commanders in implementing and executing human relations policy.

-   Embed human relations training in the Army training system as a
    doctrinal imperative.

-   Re-engineer the EO program from top to bottom to make it responsive
    to leaders and soldiers, to protect those who use it, and to ensure
    that those working in it are not stigmatized.

-   Mandate the conduct of a command climate assessment down to
    company-sized units at least annually; establish a mechanism to hold
    commanders accountable for their unit's command climate.

-   Publish Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, *Army Command Policy*,
    immediately and publish interim changes in a timely manner.

-   Increase the length of IET to allow for more intense, rigorous
    soldierization and the inculcation of Army values; design new
    training to inculcate Army values, appropriate behavior, and team
    building in IET.

-   Improve IET cadre and recruiter training to include tools and
    techniques for addressing inappropriate behaviors in units;
    incorporate ethics and human relations training in recruiting and
    IET cadre courses, to include professionally facilitated sensitivity
    training.

-   Implement a renewed Advanced Individual Training (AIT) approach that
    focuses on the continuation of the soldierization process begun in
    Basic Combat Training (BCT), as well as tactical, technical, and
    soldier skills and attitudes.

-   Ensure that professionals and leaders (e.g., commanders, inspectors
    general, health care practitioners, criminal investigators,
    chaplains) who are expected to deal with soldiers reporting
    incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior are trained and
    qualified.

The Panel very strongly believes that we must ensure that we maintain a
positive human relations environment in the Army. Personnel readiness
relies on a positive human relations environment. It is the vital base
upon which we build our Army, and the combat effectiveness of our most
important weapon system\--the soldier.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| [Secti          |                                             | [Pa |
| on]{.underline} |                                             | ge] |
|                 |                                             | {.u |
|                 |                                             | nde |
|                 |                                             | rli |
|                 |                                             | ne} |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Executive       |                                             | 1   |
| Summary         |                                             |     |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Table of        |                                             | 5   |
| Contents        |                                             |     |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Forwarding      | Report of the Secretary of the Army's       | 8   |
| Letter          | Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment    |     |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Part I          | Introduction                                | 11  |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Part II         | Recommendations                             | 14  |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Part III        | The Senior Review Panel and the Report      | 33  |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Part IV         | Senior Review Panel Assessment              | 39  |
|                 |                                             |     |
|                 | The Equal Opportunity (EO) Program          | 39  |
|                 |                                             |     |
|                 | The Extent and Impact of Sexual Harassment  | 56  |
|                 |                                             |     |
|                 | and Sex Discrimination                      | 69  |
|                 |                                             |     |
|                 | Leadership                                  | 78  |
|                 |                                             |     |
|                 | Initial Entry Training                      |     |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Epilog          |                                             | 91  |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex A         | Senior Review Panel Charter                 | A-1 |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex B         | Panel Member Biographies                    | B-1 |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex C         | Acronyms / Abbreviations                    | C-1 |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex D         | Installations and Locations Visited         | D-1 |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex E         | Review of Policies                          | E-1 |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+
| Annex F         | Events Connected with Equal Opportunity in  | F-1 |
|                 | the Army Since 1947                         |     |
+-----------------+---------------------------------------------+-----+

  ----------------------- ---------------------------------------------- --------------------
  [Section]{.underline}                                                  [Page]{.underline}

  Annex G                 Contemporary Military Documents Relating to    G-1
                          Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harassment in the 
                          Uniformed Army                                 

  Annex H                 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program     H-1

  Annex I                 Bibliography                                   I-1
  ----------------------- ---------------------------------------------- --------------------

**LIST OF TABLES**

  --------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- --------------------
  [Table]{.underline}                                                         [Page]{.underline}

  1                     EOA Staffing as of March 31, 1997                     43

  2                     EOA and EOR Responsibilities                          52

  3                     Were you sexually harassed in the last 12 months?     57

  4                     Sexual Harassment by Rank and Gender                  57

  5                     Sexual Harassment by Race and Gender                  58

  6                     Experienced Behaviors Described in Sexual Experiences 58
                        Questionnaire                                         

  7                     Perceptions of Contribution                           64

  8                     Toleration of Senior-Subordinate Sexual Relationships 67

  9                     Leaders Set and Enforce Standards                     70

  10                    Leaders Exemplify Standards                           71

  11                    Perceptions of Company Leadership                     72

  12                    Trainee Responses: Experienced Sexual Harassment and  81
                        Inappropriate Behaviors in the Different Training     
                        Components                                            

  13                    Sources of Harassment                                 82

  14                    Trainer Responses: Experienced SEQ Behaviors          83
  --------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- --------------------

**LIST OF FIGURES**

  ---------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- --------------------
  [Figure]{.underline}                                                         [Page]{.underline}

  1                      Percentage Reporting any SEQ Behavior, Sexual         60
                         Harassment, or that Sexual Harassment was a Problem   
                         in their Unit                                         

  2                      The Flow from Recruiter to First Duty Assignment      79
  ---------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- --------------------

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S**

**SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  This report provides the observations, findings, conclusions, and
  recommendations of the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on
  Sexual Harassment. The Secretary established the Panel on November 21,
  1996, in response to the allegations of sexual misconduct at Aberdeen
  Proving Ground, Maryland. The Secretary directed the Panel to examine
  the human relations environment in the United States Army, review
  policies and procedures that contribute to that environment, and
  recommend ways to achieve an Army where all soldiers and civilians are
  treated with dignity and respect. Panel members were:

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Major General Richard S. Siegfried   | Senior Review Panel Chair     |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote    | Senior Review Panel Vice      |
|                                      | Chair                         |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Mr. John P. McLaurin III             | Deputy Assistant Secretary of |
|                                      | the Army (Military Personnel  |
|                                      | Management and Equal          |
|                                      | Opportunity Policy)           |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Lieutenant General Claudia J.        | Deputy Chief of Staff for     |
| Kennedy                              | Intelligence                  |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Major General Larry R. Ellis         | Commanding General,           |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | 1st Armored Division          |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Mrs. Ruby B. DeMesme                 | Deputy Assistant Secretary of |
|                                      | the                           |
|                                      |                               |
|                                      | Air Force (Force Management   |
|                                      | and Personnel)                |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Command Sergeant Major Cynthia A.    | Post Command Sergeant Major,  |
| Pritchett                            |                               |
|                                      | Fort Belvoir, Virginia        |
+--------------------------------------+-------------------------------+

***Acknowledgments***

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Panel could not have accomplished its mission without the hard work
  and assistance of the over 40 officers, noncommissioned officers, and
  Army civilian employees who were members of the Panel's working group.
  These full-time members provided support in developing data collection
  tools, coordinating and conducting field visits to 59 Army
  installations and locations worldwide, collecting and analyzing data,
  and providing detailed policy research.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

The Panel was aided by the following consultants who provided invaluable
contributions to the overall effort:

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  LTG Robert H. Forman, USA (Ret.)    Dr. Laura Miller

  COL Karen L. Frey, USA (Ret.)       BG Mary Morgan

  Dr. Annabel Hagood                  Dr. Mady Segal

  Mr. Dan Lumpkin                     Dr. Judith Youngman
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Panel also wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of the thousands
  of soldiers and Department of the Army civilians who facilitated our
  visits and participated in the data collection. Finally, the Panel
  wishes to recognize the editorial support provided by the United States
  Army Center of Military History and the contributions of the various
  consultants and outside agencies, both federal and private, who
  provided valuable time and expertise to this effort.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+
| Richard S. Siegfried              |   | Evelyn P. Foote                |
|                                   |   |                                |
| Major General, United States Army |   | Brigadier General, United      |
|                                   |   | States Army                    |
| Senior Review Panel Chair         |   |                                |
|                                   |   | Senior Review Panel Vice Chair |
+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+
| Mr. John P. McLaurin III          |   | Claudia J. Kennedy             |
|                                   |   |                                |
| Deputy Assistant Secretary of the |   | Lieutenant General, United     |
| Army                              |   | States Army                    |
+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------+---+---+----+-------------------------+
| Larry R. Ellis                    |   | M |    |                         |
|                                   |   | r |    |                         |
| Major General, United States Army |   | s |    |                         |
|                                   |   | . |    |                         |
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|                                   |   | A |    |                         |
|                                   |   | s |    |                         |
|                                   |   | s |    |                         |
|                                   |   | i |    |                         |
|                                   |   | s |    |                         |
|                                   |   | t |    |                         |
|                                   |   | a |    |                         |
|                                   |   | n |    |                         |
|                                   |   | t |    |                         |
|                                   |   | S |    |                         |
|                                   |   | e |    |                         |
|                                   |   | c |    |                         |
|                                   |   | r |    |                         |
|                                   |   | e |    |                         |
|                                   |   | t |    |                         |
|                                   |   | a |    |                         |
|                                   |   | r |    |                         |
|                                   |   | y |    |                         |
|                                   |   |   |    |                         |
|                                   |   | o |    |                         |
|                                   |   | f |    |                         |
|                                   |   | t |    |                         |
|                                   |   | h |    |                         |
|                                   |   | e |    |                         |
|                                   |   | A |    |                         |
|                                   |   | i |    |                         |
|                                   |   | r |    |                         |
|                                   |   | F |    |                         |
|                                   |   | o |    |                         |
|                                   |   | r |    |                         |
|                                   |   | c |    |                         |
|                                   |   | e |    |                         |
+-----------------------------------+---+---+----+-------------------------+
| Cynthia A. Pritchett              |   |   |    |                         |
|                                   |   |   |    |                         |
| Command Sergeant Major, United    |   |   |    |                         |
| States Army                       |   |   |    |                         |
+-----------------------------------+---+---+----+-------------------------+

**Part I**

**INTRODUCTION**

*An army is based on trust . . . the trust of the American people that
we will defend them and trust of our soldiers that their leaders will do
what's best for them. When we violate that trust, we disappoint our
country and betray our soldiers.*

Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army

November 8, 1996

***Our Army***

The basic purpose of the United States Army is to fight and win our
nation's wars. In the post cold war era, strategic projection of land
power has become the conceptual framework for decisive victory.
Fundamentally, it is accomplished through the presence of soldiers on
the ground in distant places, demonstrating military capability and
commitment. Clearly, our strength as a land power rests with our
soldiers. Indeed, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J.
Reimer, has said, "Our soldiers are our credentials."

***Readiness***

What impacts soldiers impacts combat effectiveness. One such factor is
the human relations environment in which our soldiers live and work. The
Army subscribes to a human relations environment based on dignity and
respect. Respect is a bedrock value of both the Army and the Nation.
Inherent in American society since the framing of the Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution, the importance of
treating soldiers with dignity and respect is reflected in early
military doctrine, regulations, and codes of conduct as a basic tenet of
leadership. In 1789, Frederick von Steuben wrote in the *Regulations for
the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* that a
leader's first priority should be "treating \[soldiers\] with every
possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and
when well founded, seeing them redressed."

***Trust***

Respect encompasses more than the traditional military courtesies that
leaders and soldiers observe in deference to rank and position. It is a
deep and abiding sense of the human worth of our comrades in arms. In
peace, it brings us together as a team and, in war, it holds us together
against our enemies. When soldiers are treated with respect and dignity
by their leaders and their peers, a strong bond develops between them.
This bond is founded on mutual trust and serves to cement unit cohesion
and to build esprit de corps. When this commitment to treating one
another with dignity and respect falters, we risk destroying that which
we must hold most precious\--the indomitable, warfighting spirit of our
soldiers.

In the fall of 1996, the trust between leaders and soldiers was called
into question by serious allegations of sexual impropriety at several
Army installations. Investigation indicated that breakdowns in good
order and discipline had occurred and that some leaders had abused the
authority and power vested in them. Some leaders had placed their own
personal wants above their responsibility to take care of their
soldiers. As a result, soldiers were grievously mistreated.

***The Panel's Charter***

Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army directed that a Senior Review
Panel on Sexual Harassment be established to undertake the following
missions:

-   Conduct a systems review of the Army's policies on sexual harassment
    and of the processes currently in place.

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-   Recommend changes needed to improve the human relations environment
    in which our soldiers live and work, with the specific goal of
    eradicating sexual harassment.

-   Examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and
    exercise their responsibility to prevent sexual harassment,
    specifically addressing behaviors that fail to acknowledge the
    dignity and respect to which every soldier is entitled.[^1]

In his personal charge to the Panel, Secretary West stated that both he
and the Army Chief of Staff believed that the views, opinions, and
experiences of soldiers should be considered. To that end, the Senior
Review Panel traveled around the world to gather first-hand information
from the grass roots of the Army. In fact, this assessment provides an
unprecedented examination of human relations in the Army, reflecting the
collective voice of over 30,000 Army personnel, including soldiers,
civilians, and leaders.

***The Soldiers' Story***

What follows in subsequent sections of this report is the soldiers'
story\--what they told the Senior Review Panel about themselves, their
leaders, and their Army. It is not always a good news story. The Senior
Review Panel found disturbing trends of a declining EO program, a lack
of soldier confidence in some of their leaders, and a human relations
environment in which inappropriate behavior is often tolerated and in
which the concept of "respect and dignity for one another" has not
always been practiced.

***A Time for Change***

Recommendations emanating from this report represent what the Senior
Review Panel believes are those crucial first steps that the Army must
take as it moves towards meeting the challenges of the 21^st^ Century.
These recommendations, firmly grounded in the Panel's collection and
analysis of data, focus on making systemic change in the Army's human
relations environment.

General Creighton W. Abrams, Army Chief of Staff from October 1972 to
September 1974, had a steadfast belief in the Army's soldiers. He said:

> *People are not **in** the Army, people **are** the Army.*[^2] *. . .
> By people I do not mean personnel. . . . I mean living, breathing,
> serving, human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They
> have spirit and will, and strength and abilities. They have weaknesses
> and faults; and they have means. They are at the heart of our
> preparedness . . . and this preparedness\--as a nation and as an
> Army\--depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that
> gives the Army . . . life. Without it we cannot succeed.*[^3]

When told on one occasion by a staff member that company grade officers
were idealistic, General Abrams replied, "Yes . . . and our job is to
keep them that way."

If there is an overarching theme to this report, it is this: we must
rededicate ourselves to the fundamental truths so eloquently stated by
General Abrams. We must strengthen the human relations environment in
the Army. Personnel readiness relies on a positive human relations
environment. It is the vital base upon which we build the Army, and the
combat effectiveness of the Army's most important weapon system\--the
soldier. In strengthening the bonds of trust among all soldiers, we will
ensure that the United States Army remains our nation's preeminent
fighting force for today, tomorrow, and into the future.

**Part II**

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Army is an institution grounded in seven core values: honor,
integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty, and respect. When
respect for the individual soldier is not maintained, the Army's human
relations environment suffers. Combat readiness is directly correlated
with a unit's human relations environment; a "do more with less"
approach and a "zero defects mentality" lead to a diminished human
relations environment that causes soldiers to lose trust and confidence
in their leaders. That loss of faith, in turn, degrades combat
readiness.

Our Army is the preeminent military ground force in the history of the
United States, and the world. This status is key both to decisive
success in combat and to the deterrence of would-be aggressors. Should
we fail to promote a healthy human relations environment in a timely and
effective fashion, our ability to fight wars and promote peace will
surely suffer. The recommendations that follow are designed to address
the broad scope of issues identified by the Panel, not to solve each and
every shortcoming noted within the body of the report.

**ISSUE 1: Leadership**

-   **Leadership is the key to the problem of sexual harassment in the
    Army and the key to the solution to that problem.**

Leaders set the values compass for the Army; it is from them that
respect and dignity flow. Many leaders are currently seen as practicing
a zero defects mentality, caring only about themselves and their
careers. Soldiers do not uniformly have trust and confidence in their
leaders. Unfair treatment, double standards, and a lack of discipline
were raised to Panel representatives time and again during team visits
to various installations and commands. Such a negative view of leaders
is counterproductive to the objectives of EO, unit cohesion, and combat
readiness. It is also indicative of a serious communication problem
between leaders and the led. A leader needs to be sensitive to the
possibility that young soldiers' experiences may be very different from
the leader's own.

Overarching the leadership issue are systemic problems that need to be
addressed to remedy leadership failures in general, and sexual
harassment and other human relations problems in particular. Both unit
and individual leadership and human relations training have disconnects
throughout the Army. Army leadership doctrine does not effectively
address the critical nature of the human relations environment as it
relates to the warfight. There is no DA level proponent for unit
leadership or human relations programs and training. Individually, there
is no systemic synchronization at any of the precommissioning sources
(United States Military Academy, Reserve Officers' Training Corps,
Officer Candidate School) or at U.S. Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) schools for individual training.

According to Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership,* Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA) staff responsibility for leadership and
leader development is divided between the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel (DCSPER) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
(DCSOPS). This division of responsibilities and functions between these
two staffs is confusing because of the blurring of the definitions for
leadership and leader development. Leadership doctrine is the
responsibility of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort
Leavenworth, a part of the Combined Arms Center and TRADOC. The Center
for Army Leadership was intended to be the center of gravity for Army
leadership, but has been unable to maintain a strategic viewpoint
because of its location within TRADOC. The Center for Army Leadership is
including a chapter on values in the new Field Manual (FM) 22-100,
*Military Leadership.* This is a step in the right direction, but falls
short of ensuring a fully integrated, concentrated effort, and a central
point for all aspects of doctrine related to leadership in terms of
human relations.

Findings indicate that leadership and human relations are not currently
embedded in warfighting doctrine and thus are not considered important.
Leaders at training centers are focused on future concepts and doctrine
and do not spend enough time on personal leadership tasks. Our training
centers do not include leadership or human relations as a specific
battlefield operating system.

**ISSUE 1 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Assign to one DA staff agency the primary responsibility for
    leadership, leader development, and human relations for the Army.

-   Designate a center of gravity for leadership and human relations
    doctrine within the Army, which reports directly to the DA staff
    proponent.

-   Make leadership and human relations readiness part of the monthly
    Unit Status Report for all units.

-   Make the concepts of leadership and human relations a battlefield
    operating system at our training centers, and an integral element of
    Army leader development.

-   Effectively incorporate the human dimension of warfare into Army
    operational doctrine.

-   Refocus senior leaders on the personal leadership role only they can
    perform.

**ISSUE 2: Human Relations Environment**

While the human relations environment is a force protection and unit
cohesion issue that directly contributes to combat readiness, it has not
been viewed as a combat multiplier by some Army leaders. Over the past
several years, DA has reduced the human resource structure responsible
for the human relations environment for DA as a whole. Consequently the
Army's ability to provide strategic direction, integration, and
oversight of human relations has significantly diminished and the Army's
ability is limited to reacting to events as they occur. To address the
issues surfaced by the Panel, DA requires a significantly better staffed
and organized team of human relations professionals who are well trained
to take steps to address our human relations problems.

**ISSUE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Conduct a critical review of the staffing and organization of the
    Department of the Army elements responsible for human relations
    problems and issues.

-   Immediately augment staffing levels with trained professionals to
    address actions surfacing during the review and while proposed
    restructuring and resourcing is being implemented.

**ISSUE 3: Human Relations Policy and Practices**

Although current human relations policy is adequate as written, it has
not been effective in practice. Had existing policy been executed by
commanders as intended by DA, the Panel's work might well not have been
necessary. Commanders are not the exclusive agents responsible for
ensuring compliance with Army policy. Responsibility for developing
packages and tools to support commanders in policy execution is vested
in agencies below HQDA. Unfortunately, many of these agencies are
inadequately resourced to execute their mission. Representative examples
are TRADOC Headquarters and the U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute
(SSI). Tasked to develop the EO training support packages (TSPs) for
TRADOC, SSI has but one authorized position for this critical job. Until
the Army applies its resources to solving problems in the human
relations environment, the problems will continue and probably become
more severe.

**ISSUE 3 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Make comments on the state of their organizations' human relations
    environment mandatory in leaders' officer evaluation reports (OERs)
    and noncommissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOERs).

-   Conduct a critical review of the resourcing of those agencies
    responsible for assisting commanders in implementing and executing
    human relations policy.

-   Immediately augment staffing levels with trained professionals for
    those agencies to deal with current requirements until the review is
    concluded and while its proposed resourcing is being implemented.

**ISSUE 4: Human Relations Training**

Training in the Army is much more than preventive maintenance; it is the
critical way in which Army doctrine is embedded into Army operations and
into the hearts and minds of soldiers. Human relations training, of
which EO and the prevention of sexual harassment (POSH) are important
parts, is inadequate and ineffective. Soldiers uniformly find POSH
training is monotonous, viewing it as no more than a compulsory
formation to be endured to satisfy a requirement. When taught, POSH is
segregated from other topics, lecture-based, repetitive, and neither
progressive nor sequential. Leaders are not personally involved in the
training and seldom attend. The inadequate content and ineffective
methods of human relations training throughout the Army diminish the
stature and emphasis on human relations issues within the Army.

**ISSUE 4 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Embed human relations training in the Army training system as a
    doctrinal imperative.

-   Ensure that leaders and other human relations trainers are
    adequately trained and prepared to conduct progressive, sequential,
    interactive, small group human relations training, and provided the
    proper training support packages for the conduct of this training.

-   Task TRADOC to conduct a comprehensive review of the programs of
    instruction of all leader development training to ensure that human
    relations training is embedded in every training program, including
    all pre-command courses.

-   Assign proponency for human relations training to the appropriate
    level within TRADOC.

-   Ensure that leaders participate in human relations training with
    their soldiers.

-   Hold leaders accountable for preparing and executing human relations
    action plans in support of the Army.

**ISSUE 5: Equal Opportunity Policies and Processes**

One of the key charges to the Panel was to assess how well EO policies
and processes serve the individual soldier. During the 1980s, staffing
for the Army's EO program diminished and the military occupational
specialty (MOS) for human relations specialists was deleted from the
inventory. Commanders went from being assisted by a core of trained and
seasoned professionals to soldiers rotating in and out of the program
for one tour of duty outside their principal MOS after being trained at
the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). By rotating
equal opportunity advisors (EOAs) into and out of the EO program, the
Army hoped to reinforce a positive human relations environment
throughout the Army; this did not occur. Commanders were expected to
ensure that the EO program emphasis was maintained. Instead, other
responsibilities were allowed to override those of the EO program and EO
resources were among the first to be cut during the current drawdown of
the Army force structure.

Further exacerbating the problem of inadequate EOA resources is the
rapid expansion of the number of tenant activities on Army
installations. The installations are not staffed with sufficient EOAs to
handle EO issues. Current policy dictates that tenant activities must
use their own unit's EO resources. Thus tenant activities must rely on
EOA resources residing at other locations with their parent unit. Parent
units can be hundreds, even thousands, of miles distant.

Equal opportunity in the Army has been marginalized, under-resourced,
and dismissed as a distraction rather than a combat multiplier. The
extent to which the program has worked as well as it has is a tribute to
those dedicated, committed EO personnel working hard to ensure that
soldiers' needs are effectively addressed; as well as those commanders
who, as exceptions to the rule, have actively participated in and
supported human relations as a combat readiness multiplier.

Notwithstanding these laudatory efforts, the failure of the EO program
is a leadership failure from which our soldiers are suffering. Clearly
the system suffers from a lack of credibility and effectiveness.
Reconstruction of the program will require a major effort.

**ISSUE 5 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Re-engineer the EO program from top to bottom to make it responsive
    to leaders and soldiers, to protect those who use it, and to ensure
    that those working in it are not stigmatized. Re-engineering should
    address the need for a human relations military occupational
    specialty and an improved rank structure for all EOAs.

-   While the program is being re-engineered:

> \--Establish and sufficiently staff a Directorate for Strategic Human
> Resources with responsibility for assessing, training, researching,
> benchmarking, reporting, and integrating EO program activities.
>
> \--Properly resource EOA positions by rank and grade in accordance
> with current regulatory guidance.
>
> \--Provide adequate host installation EOA resources for tenant
> activities.
>
> \--Monitor training support package development.
>
> \--Make EOA utilization and human relations/equal opportunity training
> a mandatory item in Quarterly Training Briefs.
>
> \--Explore the need for a temporary sexual harassment assistance
> office at the installation level until trust and confidence can be
> reestablished in the EO complaint system.
>
> \--Implement a "Respect for Others" program patterned after the
> Military District of Washington's "Consideration of Others" program
> for Army Active Component, Reserve Components, Reserve Officers'
> Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS).
>
> \--Either properly train and assign equal opportunity representative
> (EOR) duties to senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or eliminate
> EOR positions altogether and hold the commander personally responsible
> for EO unit training.
>
> \--Ensure commanders understand the EO program and personally
> participate in EO training.
>
> \--Embed human relations training in all leadership training.

**ISSUE 6: Climate Assessments**

The human relations environment is first and foremost a combat readiness
issue. Anticipating issues and preventing problems is one of the most
important steps in ensuring a positive human relations environment. A
climate assessment survey provides leaders with a baseline appraisal of
a unit's environment and can be key to promoting a commander's
understanding and awareness of his/her unit's human relations
environment. Currently, climate assessments are encouraged, not
required. The assessment instruments are neither standardized nor
effective, nor are they readily available to commanders. Periodic
command climate assessments must be conducted. Leaders must be held
accountable for this important aspect of combat readiness.

**ISSUE 6 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Develop and field a command climate assessment instrument tailored
    to each type unit.

-   Mandate the conduct of a command climate assessment down to
    company-sized units at least annually.

-   Provide standardized guidance from HQDA concerning the use of
    assessment results.

-   Create a mechanism for holding commanders accountable for command
    climate.

**ISSUE 7: Army Command Policy**

Interim change 4, chapter 6, AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, expired
almost two years ago. Since that time, the proponent has revised, but
not published, the regulation. Many important changes are captured in
the revision and would provide important guidance to the field Army.
There are also other Army agencies responsible for human relations
documents (e.g., Department of the Army pamphlets and training
circulars) that depend on the information published in the regulation as
the basis for revising the documents for which they exercise
responsibility.

Over the past two years, each time the proponent was prepared to publish
the revised regulation a new issue would surface. In response, the
proponent would halt publication awaiting resolution of the problem and
related regulatory changes. Until the revised AR 600-20 is published,
the field Army will fall farther and farther behind in understanding and
applying human relations policy and guidance.

**ISSUE 7 RECOMMENDATION:**

-   Publish AR 600-20 immediately and publish interim changes as they
    develop.

**ISSUE 8: Support for Training Base**

Being a soldier is a learned behavior. If soldiers fail to appreciate
that good order and discipline, Army values, and teamwork are the
essence of the Army, the soldierization process has failed. Our soldiers
represent a cross section of the Nation's young people who come into the
Army with their individual outlooks on life and individual value
systems. It is through the Army's soldierization process that they
become equal members of the Army team\--that they become soldiers. If we
expect soldiers of both genders, all races, and diverse backgrounds to
live and work together as a team, soldierization must teach them how to
accomplish this task.

This mission belongs to the training base. The training base is woefully
under-resourced to accomplish its assigned mission. With the proper
resources, the Army might have avoided many of the breakdowns in
discipline that have been so highly publicized. The command and control
structure is inadequate, and the soldierization process suffers as
training cadre are extended beyond their physical, mental, and emotional
limits.

A key to addressing human relations issues, including sexual harassment,
is assigning enough female role models to set the example for all
trainees. Twenty percent of Army accessions are women, but the training
base is composed of only ten percent female drill sergeants. Further,
combat arms personnel, who have the least experience in dealing with
sexual harassment issues, comprise the majority of key command and cadre
positions. Most of these leaders, whether combat arms or not, have not
received adequate training in how to deal with sexual harassment issues
that may arise in their units. Added to this void are reorganizations
and consolidations, which over the last several years have created gaps
in the command and control structure, leaving no one to monitor the
environment of trainees.

The same facts and almost identical issues apply to recruiters who serve
as the Army's interface with the American public. Recruiters and drill
sergeants hold positions of similar difficulty and importance, and they
set the example not just for new recruits but for the Nation as a whole.

**ISSUE 8 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Task TRADOC to review the command and control structure at each
    installation responsible for IET and, where it is inadequate, remedy
    it.

-   Increase the length of IET to allow for more intense, more rigorous
    soldierization and the inculcation of Army values.

-   Better utilize drill sergeants as trainers of Army values.

-   Staff drill sergeant, command and cadre positions, and recruiting
    positions with a more appropriate mix of trained men and women
    professionals.

**ISSUE 9: Initial Entry Training**

New recruits form and hold their most lasting impressions of the Army
from the cadre they encounter during IET. These leaders have more
contact with young trainees than any other leadership segment of the
Army. Their preparatory training, key to their success in this role, is
inadequate. Drill sergeant school and instructor training courses do not
provide the essential tactics, techniques, and procedures required of
leaders assigned to the critical tasks of influencing the soldierization
process. Instruction must focus not only on dignity and respect for
recruits and their fellow soldiers, but provide realistic insights into
what leaders will face and techniques for handling inappropriate
behaviors by members of their units and for handling the potential for
inappropriate personal behavior. Training must equip leaders with the
tools they will need to conduct continuous evaluations of their units
for inappropriate behaviors and teach them how to recognize and deal
with those behaviors when they occur.

Currently drill sergeants are trained at three different locations.
Creating three quality human relations training programs would be
unnecessarily difficult and only add to the overhead costs associated
with running three training sites. More importantly, one drill sergeant
school would ensure uniform quality, maximize use of resources, and
bring greater and more consistent focus and attention to this critical
human relations training shortcoming.

Recruiters are similarly hampered by a lack of training in how to deal
with handling the inappropriate behaviors of prospective enlistees and
how to handle their own potential for inappropriate personal behavior.

In addition to drill sergeants and recruiters, the quality of the other
soldiers and civilians who support training is very important. For
example, drivers from the motor pool, administrative clerks at reception
and processing stations and in units, and supply clerks, require similar
training in recognizing and preventing inappropriate personal behaviors.

**ISSUE 9 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Improve IET cadre and recruiter training to include tools and
    techniques for addressing inappropriate behaviors in units and for
    recognizing and interrupting the potential for inappropriate
    personal behavior.

-   Incorporate ethics and human relations training in recruiting and
    IET cadre courses, to include professionally facilitated sensitivity
    training.

-   Combine the three separate drill sergeant schools into one school,
    properly resourced and staffed to educate all Army drill sergeants
    to a given standard of excellence.

**ISSUE 10: Drill Sergeant and Instructor Selection**

It has already been described that drill sergeants and cadre are key
elements in the formative stages of a soldier's life in the Army. They
are the first and most important contacts new trainees have with the
Army and it is imperative that drill sergeant selectees are themselves
of the highest quality soldiers. This same philosophy holds true for
trainee instructors. It is critical that evaluation criteria and
procedures be used to ensure NCOs and officers selected/nominated for
drill sergeant, instructor, and cadre positions have the requisite
qualifications. Although the Army presently conducts some limited
screening of drill sergeant nominees, it does not screen for cadre and
instructors.

**ISSUE 10 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Implement and improve screening procedures for drill sergeants,
    cadre, and instructors in IET, including psychological screening.

-   Ensure that failure to complete the Drill Sergeant School does not
    end or mar a candidate's career, unless the failure results from
    misconduct or failure to meet the baseline requirements for an NCO.

**ISSUE 11: Advanced Individual Training**

In many locations, AIT has become a "school house" rather than a
continuation of the soldierization process of IET. In part, this
attitude may have been caused by the shortage of personnel in TRADOC
schools. Much of the problem, however, has been caused by the focus on
technical skills at the expense of soldier skills and attitudes. In
years past, the duration of IET was reduced significantly on the theory
that AIT would be a continuation of the soldierization process and not
separate from it. Advanced Individual Training has fallen away from that
concept, and must be refocused as a continuation of the soldierization
process initiated in BCT. Advanced Individual Training must be rigorous,
satisfying, and challenging. Advanced Individual Training must not be
permitted to adopt a "campus" orientation.

Other detractors also exist at AIT. Service members from other military
services and reclassified soldiers attending AIT are treated in a
different, much more collegial manner than trainees. Trainees view this
treatment as a double standard that further degrades an already troubled
environment. Drill sergeants must take on a more meaningful training
role in AIT.

**ISSUE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Implement a renewed AIT approach that focuses on the continuation of
    the soldierization process begun in BCT as well as tactical,
    technical, and soldier skills and attitudes.

-   Treat all trainees in a like manner, to include other Service
    attendees and reclassified soldiers, or place these personnel in
    separate courses from IET personnel.

-   Increase the training responsibilities of drill sergeants in AIT
    after the current shortage of drill sergeants is remedied.

**ISSUE 12: Army Core Values**

The Army is a values-based organization with specific core values. These
Army values must be instilled in our soldiers prior to and during IET
and must be reinforced throughout their careers. The bonds of trust
between our soldiers are built on these common values, the traditions of
the Army, the shared disciplined life of a soldier, and the common
experiences of working as a team. Initial Entry Training is critical in
calibrating the human relations compass of each soldier and setting
appropriate expectations for them, their peers, and their leaders. In
addition to the previously discussed lack of discipline and rigor in
IET, IET trainees lack training in Army values.

**ISSUE 12 RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-   Develop and provide literature to new recruits on the Army's core
    values, ethics, and ethos.

-   Build a new training program into IET to inculcate Army values,
    appropriate behavior, and team building.

**ISSUE 13: Victim Assistance**

Throughout the Army, soldiers who have been victims of inappropriate
sexual behavior have reported incidents to professionals and leaders.
These same professionals and leaders have not received sufficient
training in working with victims and are left to rely on rudimentary
perceptions of how victims want to be treated. As a result, victims are
reluctant to report inappropriate behaviors for fear of being
re-victimized by the very system that was put in place to deal with
their complaints. This reluctance contributes to soldiers' lack of trust
and confidence in the chain of command and in Army leaders in general.

**ISSUE 13 RECOMMENDATION:**

-   Ensure that professionals and leaders who are expected to deal with
    soldiers reporting incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior are
    trained and qualified.

**ISSUE 14: Confidentiality for Victims**

One of the best ways in which the Army can assist victims of sexual
harassment is to ensure that adequate counseling services are available,
whether through mental health professionals or chaplains. The real or
perceived lack of confidentiality that exists in military mental health
and chaplaincy counseling sessions is a tremendous impediment to
victims' decisions about whether to avail themselves of these services.
When a victim in need of counseling services is worried that whatever he
or she says may end up as material for the defense of the perpetrator or
serve as the basis for adverse action against the victim, that victim
thinks long and hard about seeking help. The Panel heard mental health
professionals and chaplains echo the concern regarding victims'
confidentiality.

**ISSUE 14 RECOMMENDATION:**

-   Pursue relief from current rules that limit confidentiality for
    victims of sexual harassment.

**Part III**

**THE SENIOR REVIEW PANEL AND THE REPORT**

***Panel Composition***

To serve as Chair of the Senior Review Panel, the Secretary of the Army
recalled to active duty Major General Richard S. Siegfried, a combat
arms officer with extensive experience in Army training policies and
practices. Six other members were selected for Panel duty.[^4] They were
Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, another veteran officer who was
recalled to active duty by the Secretary to serve as Panel Vice Chair;
Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence; Major General Larry R. Ellis, Commanding General, 1st
Armored Division; Mr. John P. McLaurin III, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity
Policy); Mrs. Ruby B. DeMesme, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Force Management and Personnel); and Command Sergeant Major
Cynthia A. Pritchett, the Post Command Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia.[^5]

***Consultants***

Secretary West also named three consultants to assist the Panel. They
were Brigadier General Mary Morgan, Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Soldier Support Institute; Judith A. Youngman, Ph.D., Chair of the
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services; and Mady Wechsler
Segal, Ph.D., a professor in the Department of Sociology at the
University of Maryland. They provided advice to the Panel throughout its
deliberations.

In addition to these consultants, the Panel members called upon other
individuals from both the military and civilian sectors whose knowledge
and subject matter expertise were of invaluable assistance throughout
the Panel's deliberations. These included Lieutenant General Robert H.
Forman, USA(Ret.), former Deputy Commanding General for Training, U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command; Colonel Karen L. Frey, USA(Ret.),
Human Resource Consultant; Dr. Annabel Hagood, Professor Emerita,
University of Alabama; Mr. Dan Lumpkin, Lumpkin and Associates; Dr.
Laura Miller, Harvard University Fellow; and Dr. Naomi Verdugo, Senior
Demographer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(ODCSPER), HQDA.

***Panel Working Group***

To support the Senior Review Panel, a working group of more than 40
soldiers and civilian employees was assembled. Included in this group
were officers and NCOs from combat, combat support, and combat service
support branches. Some members were former drill sergeants or former
recruiters; other members were soldiers trained at and assigned to DEOMI
or within ODCSPER. A DA civilian employee with many years of experience
in the equal employment opportunity (EEO) program was also a member of
the working group. Seven of this group's members hold Ph.D.s with
expertise in social psychology, anthropology, industrial/organizational
psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior. Legal experts and
officers from the Reserve Components provided additional depth. In all,
the working group reflected a diverse array of backgrounds, races,
ranks, and perspectives, bringing a rich mix of professional experience
to bear on the issues being addressed.

***Panel Organization***

The Panel organized itself into four teams. One team dedicated its main
effort to a review of Army policies and acted as a sustaining body for
the other teams which were organized as field teams for data collection.
On the average, each traveling team had six soldiers and one civilian
employee as members. Uniformed members included an NCO with drill
sergeant experience, an officer with human resource management
experience, and an NCO trained at DEOMI. The civilian member of each
data collection team was a scientist assigned to the U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. In their travels, each
field team was accompanied by a Senior Review Panel member, who was
either the Chair, the Vice Chair, or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army. All other Panel members traveled with teams as often as their
other duties permitted.

***Panel Preparation***

Prior to traveling, the Panel and working group members received a
series of briefings, as well as extensive training from agencies within
DA or the Department of Defense (DoD). Representatives from DEOMI
briefed on EO programs. Officers of the Office of The Judge Advocate
General briefed the legal aspects of sexual harassment, and Department
of the Army Inspectors General covered the status of sexual harassment
investigations ongoing within their agency. The U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command and one of its major subordinate commands, the U.S.
Army Soldier Support Institute, provided personnel to present
information concerning EO training programs and initiatives. The policy
dimension of EO was discussed by representatives from ODCSPER. The
status of sexual harassment investigations was briefed by members of the
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

***Methodology***

Four methods were used by the Panel to assess the human relations
environment of the Army. The data collection entailed sampling from Army
leaders, soldiers, and civilians.[^6]

***Individual Interviews.*** First, Panel members and field teams
conducted individual interviews with the Army's military and civilian
leaders, mental health professionals, equal opportunity (military) and
equal employment opportunity (civilian) personnel, chaplains, and judge
advocates. Using carefully developed interview protocols, these key
individuals were asked their perceptions and recommendations concerning
the human relations environment in their commands. Their comments were
then entered into a computer program for categorization, coding, and
analysis.

***Focus Groups.*** Focus group sessions were the second method of data
collection. The sessions consisted of single-gender groups of eight to
twelve people stratified into distinct categories (i.e., junior enlisted
soldiers, junior NCOs, senior NCOs, company grade officers, field grade
officers, civilian employees, drill sergeants, instructors, and
trainees). Each focus group was restricted to one of these categories.
Participants were randomly selected by the last digit of their social
security number. Focus group facilitators and note takers, also the same
gender as the group, conducted their sessions by using protocols which
contained standardized questions about the human relations environment.
As with the interview data, the focus group data were entered into a
program for subsequent analysis.

***Surveys.*** The third data collection method was a written survey
which addressed the subjects of leadership, cohesion, and sexual
harassment. In order to accommodate different types of groups (i.e.,
company-level units, military students, and the training base) several
survey versions were used. They were administered by working group
members to entire randomly-selected company-sized units. Subsequently,
the data gathered were analyzed by using a standard statistical software
package.

***Observation.*** The Panel's fourth method of data collection was by
observation. Panel members spoke with soldiers, leaders, civilians,
family members, and others who provided their perspective concerning the
human relations environment in which they worked and/or lived. Panel
members spent many hours visiting barracks, dining facilities,
recreation centers, gymnasiums, and other soldier facilities. Wherever
they traveled, they took a measure of whether soldiers lived and worked
in an atmosphere characterized by respect and dignity. Insights gathered
worldwide proved to be invaluable complements to the voluminous amount
of scientific data. In addition, a detailed outbrief to the senior
leaders at each location visited allowed them to immediately begin
taking corrective actions.

***Scope***

The Panel conducted an extensive policy review, collected data at 59
Army installations throughout the world, [^7] and completed exhaustive
analysis of the data collected. After more than seven months of
intensive study, 808 Army leaders had been interviewed, 7,401 soldiers
and 1,007 civilian employees had participated in focus groups, and
22,952 soldiers had completed surveys.

***The Report***

The report reflects the results of the effort described above. It must
be noted that the Panel could not have completed its work without the
willing cooperation of the soldiers, leaders, and civilians with whom we
met. In many cases, their input was provided with personally painful
recollection of incidents of mistreatment. We acknowledge how difficult
it was for them to air emotionally charged feelings and we appreciate
everyone's frank participation in the data collection.

***Non-attribution.*** Throughout our study we observed strict rules of
confidentiality, and the data contained in this report adheres to that
same standard of non-attribution. Where we have used direct quotations,
we have kept them anonymous. These quotations have been carefully
selected to be illustrative of what we heard overall. They are not
idiosyncratic and are not intended to single out any one individual as
unique or distinct in their comments.

***Definition of Terms.*** There are terms used throughout this report
for which a common understanding is essential. The following definitions
establish this frame of reference for future discussion within the
report:

-   ***Commanders.*** The term "commanders" refers to officers holding
    command positions.

-   ***Equal opportunity.*** Equal opportunity is a principle fixed in
    law that recognizes the right of an individual to consideration and
    treatment based on merit, fitness, and capability without regard to
    race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. In any discussion
    of equal opportunity as an Army policy or program it is important to
    distinguish between equal opportunity (EO) and equal employment
    opportunity (EEO). Equal opportunity covers military members and EEO
    covers civilian employees.[^8]

-   ***Human relations.*** Human relations are the interactions between
    people, one with another. Human relations is an overarching term
    encompassing many dimensions of human interaction including equal
    opportunity, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment.

-   ***Inappropriate behavior.*** The term "inappropriate behavior" is
    derived from the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (Fitzgerald,
    1988), which categorizes sexual harassment behaviors (e.g., crude or
    offensive language such as sexual jokes; sexist behavior such as
    displaying pinup calendars; unwanted sexual attention such as
    touching; sexual coercion; and sexual assault).

-   ***Leaders*.** "Leaders" include the most junior noncommissioned
    officer to the most senior commissioned officer.

-   ***Sex Discrimination*.** Sex discrimination, sometimes referred to
    as gender discrimination, is discrimination based solely on an
    individual being male or female. Discrimination based on one's sex
    is often linked to a set of assumptions based on sex role
    stereotypes concerning the abilities, competence, status, and roles
    of the particular group, resulting in a disparate treatment of or
    impact on that group.

-   ***Sexual harassment.*** Sexual harassment is a form of sex
    discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
    sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
    nature when:

> a\. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
> a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or career, or
>
> b\. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as
> a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or
>
> c\. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
> with an individual's work performance or creates an intimidating,
> hostile, or offensive working environment.
>
> This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as
> "abusive work environment" harassment, need not result in concrete
> psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe or
> pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does
> perceive, the work environment as hostile or offensive. ("Workplace"
> is an expansive term for military members and may include conduct on
> or off duty, 24 hours a day.) Any person in a supervisory or command
> position who uses or condones any form of sexual behavior to control,
> influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a military member or
> civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, any
> military member or civilian employee who makes deliberate or repeated
> unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual
> nature is engaging in sexual harassment. [^9]

-   ***Soldiers*.** Except as otherwise noted, the discussions pertain
    to active duty soldiers and not to the Reserve Components or to
    Department of the Army civilian employees.

-   ***Trainees*.** Those soldiers attending Basic Combat Training
    (BCT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), or One Station Unit
    Training (OSUT).

-   ***Trainers.*** "Trainers" are defined as drill sergeants and
    instructors.

***Report Organization.*** Our report is divided into two volumes. Each
volume begins with the same executive summary and forwarding letter.

***Volume I.*** Volume I consists of four parts. Part I is our
introduction. Part II summarizes our conclusions and provides our
recommendations. Part III has background information on the Panel and
the report. Part IV reports the results of our assessment in four
subsections. We first review the Army EO Program and then, in turn,
examine the Extent of Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination in the
Army, Leadership, and Initial Entry Training in successive sections.

***Volume II.*** Volume II contains a complete explanation of our study
scope and methodology and fully details our data analysis. This analysis
covers all the data we collected from surveys, focus groups, and
interviews. Copies of the instruments and protocols we used are also
contained in Volume II.

**Part IV**

**SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ASSESSMENT**[^10]

**THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (EO) PROGRAM**

***Historical Context***

The EO program policy provides the foundation and sets the framework for
the Panel's review. In 1964, the Army established its EO program to
ensure equal opportunity and just treatment for soldiers and their
families on and off post.[^11] That same year, per DoD guidance, the
Army implemented its first regulation concerning equal opportunity, AR
600-21, *Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel*. Since
then, the Army's efforts to achieve equal opportunity have centered
around three issues: improving race relations, eliminating gender
discrimination, and eliminating sexual harassment.

***Race Relations***

During the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, the Army concentrated on
the problem of race relations. The Civil Rights movement, the
accompanying unrest of the 1960s, the institutional turmoil caused by
the Vietnam War, the end of the draft, and the need to establish a
volunteer Army all exacerbated tensions and heightened racial
polarization in the Army. Concerned that these problems were affecting
unit readiness, the Army directed its efforts toward educating soldiers
and leaders, and placing trained EO experts into the field. By 1972,
more than 2000 school-trained EO officers and NCOs were on hand, filling
formally established positions in Army unit organizational manning
tables, to assist commanders in eliminating racism and discrimination in
the Army.

The objective of the Army's race relations education program was "to
maintain the highest degree of organizational and combat readiness by
fostering harmonious relations among all military personnel under Army
control."[^12] Army policy mandated a yearly 18-hour block of race
relations and equal opportunity (RR/EO) instruction for all soldiers,
taught by instructors trained at the Defense Race Relations Institute
(DRRI). Unit commanders, however, had no responsibility for EO training.
In 1973, AR 600-21, newly titled as *Race Relations and Equal
Opportunity*, placed the responsibility for conducting the unit RR/EO
program squarely on the chain of command. Surveys showed this directed
focus increased soldiers' trust that the Army was serious in solving the
most pressing EO problems.

***Army Proponency***

In 1971, the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs (OEOP) was established
as a division in ODCSPER to carry out the development, management, and
execution of the EO program. The OEOP was originally under the direction
of a general officer and senior colonels. By 1985 the OEOP was just a
small branch within the Leader Policy Division of the Human Resources
Directorate (HRD), ODCSPER, under the direction of a major. In 1986, the
HRD was disestablished with its remaining functions going to other
directorates. In 1990, the HRD was reestablished to more centrally
manage human resources programs. Today's OEOP, now authorized a
lieutenant colonel and sergeant major, is located within the Leadership
Division of HRD, ODCSPER. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy has the
responsibility for monitoring the Army's EO program. The DCSPER, a
member of the Army General Staff, is responsible for the development,
management, and execution of the EO program.

***Women in the Army***

While women's issues were evident during the years of the Women's Army
Corps (WAC), the WAC chain of command typically ensured the resolution
of problems when and where they occurred. Change began in 1973 with the
end of the draft and the beginning of the all-volunteer Army. A policy
decision was made to expand the number of Army women and to integrate
them more widely into Army career fields. This decision was made in part
to sustain a quality force in the post-draft era and to ensure the
viability of the all-volunteer Army. Also, in 1973, the Army implemented
a policy change to provide for equal opportunity and treatment for
uniformed members withhold regard to not only race, color, religion, or
national origin, but also gender.

Organizationally, the years 1972 to 1978 were years of change: women
entered the Army ROTC program in 1972, began integrating into Table of
Organization and Equipment (TOE) units in 1975, and enrolled at the
United States Military Academy (USMA) in 1976. By 1977, women started
training alongside men in basic training, and female officers served in
all branches of the Army except combat arms. In 1978, the Women's Army
Corps was disestablished and women were integrated into the Army. By
1990, women could serve in 90% of the Army enlisted MOSs, and in January
1994, the Secretary of Defense directed that all positions be opened to
women except those in units below brigade level that had a primary
mission of engaging in direct ground combat.

***Command Responsibility***

In 1977, the Army changed the name of its basic EO regulation to *Equal
Opportunity Program in the Army*. This regulation affirmed that the EO
program was a single, integrated program that concerned all military
members of the Army. Commanders at all levels were responsible for the
development and implementation of EO programs for their organization.
The major commands (MACOMs) specified minimum unit EO training
requirements for subordinate organizations consistent with command needs
and local conditions. It was left to individual commanders to determine
the content and development of local programs.

In 1988, the Army incorporated AR 600-21 into AR 600-20, *Army Command
Policy*, sending an even stronger signal that EO was intended to be a
command program. Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, which establishes the current
Army EO program, is explicit in affixing responsibility on the chain of
command. Chapter 6 also establishes EO hotlines at all installations,
prescribes EO policies, defines sexual harassment, lists the staffing
requirements and duties of EOAs, explains the complaint process,
addresses mandatory unit training requirements, and outlines the
parameters for professional military education course training
requirements.

***DoD Sexual Harassment Definition***

The Army last updated Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 in September 1993, with
Interim Change 4. Change 4 expired in September 1995. A new AR 600-20
has been drafted and is pending publication.[^13] The existing
regulation does not incorporate verbatim the 1995 DoD definition of
sexual harassment, as required by DoD Directive 1350.2, *Department of
Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program*, August 18, 1995.[^14]
Under the provisions of AR 600-20, commanders must develop an
affirmative action plan and review it at least annually. Guidance to the
field in this area also is outdated in that the DA Affirmative Action
Plan, found in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-26, was last
published in May 1990.

***Complaint System***

In 1993, the Army restructured the complaint system described in AR
600-20 in response to a reported lack of confidence in the old system.
Although the primary and preferred channel for identifying and
correcting discriminatory practices is the chain of command, the new
system gives a soldier a number of alternative channels for filing
complaints if the complainant feels uncomfortable in filing a complaint
with the chain of command, or if the complaint is against a member of
the chain of command. Other channels available to soldiers include the
EO advisor, inspector general (IG), chaplain, provost marshal/criminal
investigation command, medical agencies, staff judge advocate, and
housing referral office. Ultimately, the chain of command is responsible
for ensuring that human relations issues are taken seriously and acted
upon as necessary.

***Command Authorities***

Commanders have the authority under current law, rule, and regulation to
deal with cases of unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment. Army
Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-4, "Soldier Conduct," provides that
"\[e\]nsuring the proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command.
Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army . . . to . . . \[t\]ake
action against military personnel in any case where the soldier's
conduct violates good order and discipline." Although chapter 6 of AR
600-20 is not punitive, the commander's inherent authority to impose
administrative sanctions and the nonjudicial punishment and punitive
articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provide
commanders with sufficient authority to enforce Army policy in matters
of discrimination and harassment.

Commanders have the full range of administrative actions available to
them to deal with violators of Army policy on equal opportunity,
including sexual harassment. A commander can initiate administrative
action against a soldier who committed an offense, as a single action or
in conjunction with action under the UCMJ. Administrative action is
meant to be corrective and rehabilitative. These actions range from
counseling to involuntary separation.

When administrative measures are inadequate due to the nature of the
offense or the record of the soldier, nonjudicial punishment and trial
by court-martial are available for use by a commander depending on the
severity of the offense. If a commander decides, after investigation,
that an offense is too serious for nonjudicial punishment, authorized by
Article 15, UCMJ, then the commander may seek to have charges referred
for trial by court-martial. A commander may also forward charges for
disposition by a superior commander.

***Panel Assessment of the EO Program***

The Panel's review of the Army's EO program began with a review of the
purposes served by specific policies and procedures and concluded with
an assessment of how well these policies and procedures serve the
individual soldier in practice. Four main concerns emerged from the
review: institutional commitment to the EO program; trust on the part of
soldiers in the EO complaint system, which, if absent, inhibits
effective communications between soldiers and their leaders; EO
training; and EO resourcing.

***Lack of Institutional Commitment***

-   **Many commanders have not demonstrated commitment to the EO
    program.**

Thirty-three years after implementing its EO program, the Army continues
its attempts to eradicate discrimination. It has long been a leader in
this effort, but is now in danger of failing to meet its own standards.
The experience of the Army in dealing with race relations, gender
discrimination, and sexual harassment has been that a successful program
depends in large measure on unit leaders' perceptions of how these
problems affect combat readiness\--the greater the perceived effect on
combat readiness, the higher the level of command emphasis and the
better the EO program. The current EO program is a command
responsibility, therefore command emphasis is critical to successful
implementation.

Unfortunately, many commanders fail in their responsibility to develop
and implement the EO program within their organizations. In failing to
accept the EO program as their personal responsibility, these commanders
delegate its operations to a subordinate (e.g., the executive officer,
adjutant, command sergeant major, or the EO advisor). Viewed another
way, many commanders are not committed to the EO program because they do
not see the value added. While the value of the EO program to the human
element, the individual soldier, should be self-evident, it is not.
Correcting this misperception will require a solution driven by senior
leaders.

-   **The number of equal opportunity advisors (EOAs) assigned is
    unacceptably low.**

Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 6-6a(2), states that one enlisted
soldier (sergeant first class or higher) with primary duty as an EOA
will be available full-time as the advisor for each brigade-level or
equivalent and higher unit commander.[^15] As evidenced by Table 1,
however, neither EOA authorizations nor the assigned strength comply
with the prescribed policy.

**Table 1\--EOA Staffing as of March 31, 1997**

  --------------- -------------- -------------------- -------------- ------------- ------------ --------------
  **Regulatory                   **Authorizations**                                **EOAs       
  Requirement**                                                                    Assigned**   

  **Officer**     **Enlisted**   **Officer**          **Enlisted**   **Officer**                **Enlisted**

  36              547            16                   324            16                         277
  --------------- -------------- -------------------- -------------- ------------- ------------ --------------

Of the 547 enlisted positions required by regulation, only 324 (59%) are
authorized as positions to be filled. Of those positions authorized for
fill, only 277 (51%) have EOAs assigned. Manning documents that
establish positions and actions needed to fill these positions are
normally established and initiated by the individual commands. As the
Army has drawn down its force, some of the first positions cut have been
EOA positions. The fundamental reason for these cuts was that other
positions were seen as more directly tied to unit readiness and thus
more important. This failure to comply with established policy indicates
that the EO program is not seen as a priority in many commands. The EOA
positions were simply shifted to meet other needs in a downsizing,
"do-more-with-less" environment.

Officers face a unique situation regarding EOA coverage. With only
sixteen officer EOAs in the Army, officers must consult with enlisted
EOAs or use other less skilled alternatives. According to focus group
comments, this situation contributes to a general reluctance on the part
of officers to seek help if sexually harassed.

-   **Current EOA demographics give the appearance of a minority or
    woman's program.**

The current demographic make-up of EOAs does not parallel the
demographic make-up of the Army. Enlisted EOAs are currently 56% black,
as compared to the Army\'s enlisted composition of 27% black. Women
comprise 32% of enlisted EOAs, while 14% of the Army's enlisted force
are women. This finding gives unintended support to the common
perception held by many leaders and soldiers that the Army\'s EO program
is irrelevant\--a peripheral program designed for and comprised of only
minorities and women.

The Commanding General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), is
charged to select officers and NCOs for training and duty as EOAs. Most
officers assigned to EO positions are graduates of the two-week Equal
Opportunity Program Manager course taught by DEOMI (formerly DRRI).
Noncommissioned officers assigned to EOA positions must be graduates of
the 16-week DEOMI resident course. A lack of rigor in the selection
process has prompted PERSCOM to change its selection procedure for EOAs
to one that will be nominative, with centralized management. PERSCOM
will also take action to realign EOA demographics with those of the Army
by May 1999.

It is imperative that these initiatives, as well as others described
later in this section, be implemented and institutionalized. Currently,
EO assignments are not considered to be career enhancing for either
officers or NCOs. Some officers and NCOs have gone to great lengths to
ensure their official records do not reflect the fact that they served
in EO positions or attended EO training. Others have been counseled by
PERSCOM career managers that EO assignments are not career enhancing.
While adequate staffing and education are the central pillars needed to
support an effective EO program, until the Army, as an institution,
places value on EO duty, it will always be viewed as a less than career
enhancing assignment and the EO program itself will be characterized
similarly.

-   **The EO program policy is adequate but has failed in practice.**

Equal opportunity policy, as defined in AR 600-20,[^16] has long been
viewed by commanders, EOAs, and by Congress as a success story. "The
system is in place" was a common statement from leaders interviewed by
the Panel. The 1993 revamping of EO complaint procedures was viewed as
yet another positive step by both commanders and the EO community at
large. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 National Defense Authorization Act,
Congress recommended that the other military services adopt the Army's
EO policy and procedures.[^17] On paper, the policy is clear and
unequivocal; commanders have authority sufficient to enforce the policy,
and the complaint procedures are well defined.

Unfortunately, paper policy has not translated into reality in the
field. Although many senior leaders in the field actively voiced their
support for EO, the actual level of support usually diminished at each
successively lower level of the chain of command. Lower level commanders
perceive that other missions take precedence; and, as a result, many
commanders are not making the EO program a priority, nor taking the
necessary steps to implement and institutionalize it.

As has been noted earlier, the EO program is a commander's program. In
1984, the Army removed the Military Occupational Specialty, "00U" (full
time, school-trained EO specialist) for EOAs. With this action, the Army
reinforced the fact that the EO program is a commander's program, but
diminished the likelihood of properly trained specialists. Rather than
having a corps of trained career professionals assist him/her in
operating the EO program, the commander now runs the program with the
aid of soldiers from other specialties, who have received training for
what is usually one tour of duty as an EOA. The theory behind this shift
in approach was a vision that more EO trained soldiers would move into
leadership positions over time and, thus, more effectively
institutionalize EO Army-wide. That vision, however, has not been
achieved. Equal opportunity duty is viewed as something less than
beneficial to a soldier's career. As a consequence, the EO program has
suffered.

Views on the EO program itself are quite divergent. Most commanders view
the system as functioning properly. Almost all commanders interviewed
reported that they can freely investigate and resolve EO complaints.
"There is an open climate here, I am encouraged to pursue
\[investigations\]," was the type of comment often heard from
commanders. Most EOAs agreed that they are free to make inquiries into
discrimination complaints. Many EOAs, however, do not believe they
receive enough command support. They cited both a lack of EO support and
of commanders' understanding of the EO system as frustrating aspects of
the job. One EOA remarked, "I have considered asking to be taken out of
the EOA position because of the frustration with the command, and four
other EOAs that I know feel the same way." Soldiers, on the other hand,
often view the system as irrelevant and not working for them;
representing the interests of the chain of command rather than the
interests of the soldier. Further, some soldiers reported that they do
not trust their EOAs or EORs because both work for the commander and not
for the soldier. Although the vast majority of EOAs are dedicated,
hard-working soldiers, the perceived lack of leadership commitment to
the EO program, in general, promotes parallel distrust of EOAs. Policy,
no matter how well conceived and written, cannot adequately substitute
for commitment on the part of the chain of command.

***Lack of Trust in the EO Complaint System***

-   **Soldiers do not use the established reporting system for EO or
    sexual harassment complaints.**

Soldiers are reluctant to use the EO reporting system because they see
no positive benefits for reporting EO violations or sexual harassment.
Said another way, the negative consequences of reporting sexual
harassment operate to discourage use of the EO complaint procedures.

In effect, the system stigmatizes an individual for reporting.
Frequently, complainants find that their working conditions worsen once
a complaint is surfaced. Soldiers who complain are often ostracized by
other soldiers in their unit and/or by their chain of command, or find
themselves being transferred to another unit. In effect, victims are
re-victimized by the system. The individual soldier, as a result, often
chooses to simply put up with the harassment.

One company grade officer's story illustrates this point: "I was grabbed
in a bar by a soldier. I confronted the situation with a witness
\[reported the violation\], but I was made to feel like I had done
something wrong. The whole experience was so awful that it might have
dissuaded me to ever challenge a situation again." An EOA explained,
"The procedures are in place but there is tremendous reluctance to
report for fear of bringing unwanted attention or being isolated by
others."

In order for the reporting system to operate effectively in achieving
the goal of zero tolerance for sexual harassment, positive inducements
must come from the entire unit: peers, NCOs, and officers. Unit leaders
must take charge, set the example, and lead the way. Unfortunately, in
some instances, soldiers who reported sexually inappropriate behavior to
their chain of command or other agencies have been mistreated. Most
prominently, such mistreatment included insensitive questioning of the
soldier victim, together with the implication that, somehow, the victim,
not the perpetrator, created the problem.

In the survey administered by the Panel, soldiers were asked, if they
had been sexually harassed, how they chose to resolve the sexual
harassment. Of the soldiers who indicated that they were sexually
harassed in the last twelve months, 12% used the formal complaint
system, while 33% resolved their sexual harassment complaint informally.
The other 55% apparently chose either to ignore the sexual harassment,
or to handle it in a way that they did not consider "formal" or
"informal"\--handling incidents of sexual harassment themselves or
putting up with the sexual harassment rather than using the reporting
system. The reasons offered by soldiers for not reporting fall into five
basic categories:

> ***Fear of reprisals from the chain of command and other
> soldiers*.**[^18] This was the most often stated reason given by
> soldiers. One soldier remarked, "You can report it, but they get you
> sooner or later." A senior NCO stated, "Various reprisals will result
> if you report. Reporting can affect favorable actions such as
> assignment considerations, adverse NCOER/OER,[^19] etc." Another
> soldier stated, "Experience has been that every woman that filed a
> complaint was out in two years for one reason or another." A junior
> NCO said, "I'd report it, but after you'll have to go through hell and
> high water." One soldier stated, "You get labeled as a troublemaker,
> get bad mouthed if you file any kind of claim, it goes into your
> permanent file." Another said, "You become a problem and whistleblower
> stuff does not work." Other soldiers responded that they could endure
> the harassment until it stopped or they left the unit, so as "not to
> hurt my career." In the training base, trainees feared being kept in a
> holdover[^20] status and thus were reluctant to report sexual
> harassment.
>
> ***Distrust of the system*.** Often, the EO reporting system is seen
> as an extension of the chain of command, there to protect the chain of
> command as opposed to assisting soldiers. A soldier stated, "The good
> old boy system works here. A buddy is not going to call another buddy
> on sexual harassment." A field grade officer stated, "I don't believe
> that the leadership at this installation would do the right thing in
> solving problems."
>
> ***A belief that nothing will be done if they do report*.** Many
> soldiers believe that the chain of command will not act on a
> complaint. One soldier stated, "I'm not afraid of something happening,
> I'm afraid of nothing happening." "Nothing happens and they treat you
> bad," said another. "You have to get really tough-skinned around here.
> Some things you just have to suck up and take. Learn to deal with it."
>
> ***A belief that problems can be resolved at the individual level.***
> Some soldiers believe they can resolve sexual harassment or
> inappropriate behavior at their personal level, as recommended by
> prevention of sexual harassment (POSH) training. One soldier reported
> that, "I first address the person who's giving me the problem."
> Another said, "I've always been able to deal with these types of
> cases."
>
> ***A belief that some inappropriate behaviors are "normal."***
> Finally, a few soldiers stated that they grew up in an environment
> where some inappropriate behaviors were considered "normal." These
> behaviors, while fitting the definition of sexual harassment, were not
> viewed as a big deal "back in high school or college." Despite POSH
> training to the contrary, these soldiers continue to apply their own
> definitions of sexual harassment in determining what behaviors they
> will or will not tolerate.

***Zero Defects***

Closely tied to these reasons for not using the EO complaint procedures
is the often referenced "zero defects mentality" that affects and
concerns leaders at all levels; that is, one mistake and your career is
ruined. The Panel found that, in most cases, when sexual harassment was
reported to the battalion or higher level, the chain of command took
action. Many incidents, however, do not reach the battalion level. Lower
level leaders often perceive that an EO complaint is an adverse
reflection on their leadership and a "defect" from which they can never
recover if it becomes known higher up the chain of command. This
"defect" view can result in problems being improperly "contained" within
the unit as well as the negative consequences of reporting sexual
harassment previously discussed, e.g., reluctance to use the EO
complaint system and re-victimizing the victim. With this "zero defects
mentality" in place, trust in already suspect complaint procedures
erodes even further.

The true barometer for the effectiveness of the EO complaint reporting
system lies in the trust and confidence that individual soldiers have in
the system. As noted, many soldiers lack this requisite trust and
confidence, do not report harassment, and do not use the established
system. But, in addition to the chain of command, there exist multiple
avenues for soldiers to report EO complaints. With the core EO complaint
system suspect, however, even the IG and other support elements (e.g.,
chaplain, mental health office, staff judge advocate, criminal
investigation command) are painted with the same brush and considered by
some to be too aligned with the chain of command. One soldier reported
that, "The chaplain is just another man in uniform."

Because soldiers do not use the established complaint procedures, senior
leaders quickly delude themselves into thinking they do not have
problems. Unfortunately, there is often a huge gap between what senior
leaders and junior enlisted soldiers think.

***Ineffective EO Training***

-   **Current Army EO training is often ineffective and does not
    adequately train soldiers.**

Equal opportunity training received by soldiers rarely facilitates
understanding and dialogue either among peers or between soldiers and
their leaders. Too often, EO training is dismissed as unimportant. Many
leaders do not attend or participate in the training. The absence of
leader involvement speaks volumes about the lack of commitment and
represents a missed opportunity for leaders to dialogue with their
soldiers.

In the early 1970s, EO training was a mandatory 18-hour standardized
program taught annually by DRRI-trained instructors. Today, EO training
is required at least twice a year, with commander discretion in
determining some of the program content, duration of training, the
attendees, and the instructor.

When Army-wide training on sexual harassment was mandated in 1982,
TRADOC developed standardized training plans for use in all service
schools and ROTC courses. In 1986, HQDA mandated an intensification of
unit EO and POSH training in response to survey and anecdotal evidence
that female soldiers were not receiving proper treatment. In addition,
DoD Directive 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity
(MEO) Program*, requires that all military personnel, from trainee to
general officer, receive training in EO, human relations, and POSH on a
recurring basis, and at all levels of professional military education.
Training is to include comprehensive material on leadership roles and
responsibilities for EO programs, complaints processing, legal
implications, reprisal prevention and detection, climate assessment
methodologies, and managing civilian EEO systems. Army training policy
meets the mandatory training requirements of DoD Directive 1350.2.

Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy,* mandates the conduct of
unit EO training at least twice a year. This guidance differs from AR
350-1, *Army Training,* and AR 350-41, *Training in Units,* which
require commanders to conduct refresher training on EO and POSH, but
leave the frequency of training up to the commander. Refresher training
is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. This type of
training depends on the local situation and the commander's assessment
of need.

Training materials, such as DA Pamphlet 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity
Training Guide*, and Training Circular (TC) 26-6, *Commander's Equal
Opportunity Handbook,* provide the commander with a limited array of
off-the-shelf training programs. Unfortunately, some commanders with
whom the Panel spoke were unaware of the existence of such training
aids.

The extent and quality of human relations training[^21] that future
officers receive varies greatly depending upon their source of
commission. The United States Military Academy employs a comprehensive
program entitled *Bedrock II: Consideration of Others*. This program
provides 58 hours of human relations training over a cadet's four-year
term, of which 25 hours deal with EO and gender issues. The Military
District of Washington has adapted USMA's program for its Army
installations. Reserve Officers' Training Corps human relations training
is not standardized. The U.S. Army Cadet Command has directed local ROTC
commanders to evaluate and devise their own programs based upon training
needs. Soldiers at OCS receive a two-hour block of instruction in the
area of human relations.

The Army is providing relatively little emphasis on human relations
training in its service schools. For example, the Command and General
Staff College teaches only 3.2 hours of EO out of 1,616 contact hours,
and only 20 minutes of POSH.[^22] The Sergeants Major Academy currently
has 4.7 hours of EO training, of which 30 minutes are devoted to POSH.
The Army War College has no POSH training, but will add a block of
instruction for academic year 1997-98. The Panel's analysis shows that
institutional EO training is neither sequential, progressive, nor
integrated across schools.

Within the last two years, however, TRADOC has developed a common core
concept that has reduced the number of TSPs required for EO and POSH
from fifteen to four and standardized training on these subjects at the
following levels: the basic leader level (platoon leaders and squad
leaders) through the senior leader level (sergeants major, warrant
officers, and majors). Upon implementation of these TSPs, all soldiers
from accession through separation will receive discussion-based,
non-repetitive, progressive, and sequential training. The EO TSPs for
IET and drill sergeant school are not included as part of the common
core, but are separate training requirements. Updated TSPs are being
implemented in IET and drill sergeant school training. Changes are
occurring, but slowly. This is due in large measure to the inadequate
resourcing of the Adjutant General's School, U.S. Army Soldier Support
Institute, which is responsible for EO TSPs for all Army schools. The
School is staffed with only one authorized person to accomplish this
mission. Inadequate resourcing of agencies responsible for supporting
and implementing EO policy reflects a poor level of institutional
commitment to the EO program.

Most EOAs reported that, except for the Chief of Staff of the Army\'s
chain teaching package,[^23] unit leaders do not usually participate in
EO training. Soldiers described unit EO training as "boring," "bland,"
"unrealistic," and "repetitive." Equal opportunity advisors reported
that junior enlisted and junior NCOs attend EO training while senior
leaders of the company, to include field grade officers, are absent. One
EOA commented, "Rarely is the senior leadership attending training. They
ensure soldiers attend, but do not make an appearance themselves."
Training is often done in large assemblies and is not interactive. Many
soldiers also said training should be relevant to their current job
level. They called for changes in most of the teaching methods now used,
stating that methods need to include small discussion groups and other
"uncanned" programs. Many soldiers said EO training tends to be trendy
and reactive. For example, the latest round of EO training usually
included extremist organization training, which was viewed by soldiers
as a reaction to the 1996 Secretary of the Army\'s Task Force on
Extremist Activities. Some soldiers reported that the vignette-based
sexual harassment videotape distributed by DA in 1996 was having a
positive impact on awareness. Soldiers would also like current
"real-world" case studies to use in their training, but these type
summaries are not currently available.

While plans are underway to improve the quality of EO and POSH training,
existing tools have been largely ineffective. Although TSPs and other
training tools undergoing development and fielding are significantly
better than those available in the past, they are simply tools; their
effectiveness is only as good as the instructors using them and the
leaders who stand behind them. Leader and instructor training has yet to
be effectively addressed. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute trains EOAs to be instructors to some degree during the
16-week course. But EOAs can conduct only a small percentage of the
necessary training. Normally unit personnel and/or junior leaders are
tasked with the responsibility. With the advent of newer, interactive,
discussion-based training methodologies, instructors will require school
training in these techniques to present effective training.

***Inadequate EO Resources***

-   **Soldiers lack understanding about the roles, missions, and
    functions of the EOA and EOR.**

The Panel found evidence of ineffective EOA utilization in the field.
Equal opportunity is intended to be a commander's program, yet many EOAs
are forced to go through a "gatekeeper," e.g., the executive officer,
adjutant, or command sergeant major, to gain access to the commander.
Many EOAs are buried in the staff sections making access to commanders
difficult. Although most EOAs attend weekly staff meetings, few have a
"speaking part" and only about one-third of EOAs stated that they met
with their commander weekly. The access problem is further exacerbated
by the rank differential presented when a sergeant first class EOA is
expected to interface routinely with a brigade commander. Some EOAs
commented that their main responsibility is focusing on ethnic
celebrations or unrelated work, not on recommending strategies to
prevent and eliminate discrimination and sexual harassment. The
following table depicts the typical profile of EOA and EOR duties and
training levels.

**Table 2\--EOA and EOR Responsibilities**

  --------- --------------- ------------ -------------- -------------- ---------------
            **Rank**[^24]   **Assigned   **Supports**   **Training**   **Typical
                            as**                                       Role/Duty**

  **EOA**   SFC at brigade  Primary Duty Brigade and    DEOMI trained  Process
            level, MSG-SGM               higher         for 16 weeks   individual
            at division and                                            complaints
            higher                                                     

  **EOR**   SSG-SFC at      Additional   Battalion and  Locally        Refer
            company and     duty         below          trained for 2  individual
            battalion                                   weeks          complaints to
            levels                                                     appropriate
                                                                       agency
  --------- --------------- ------------ -------------- -------------- ---------------

Overwhelmingly, the Panel found that most soldiers and commanders are
confused about the different roles of an EOR and an EOA. As noted
earlier, the EOA is in a full-time position assigned to brigade level
and is a graduate of the 16-week DEOMI course. Equal opportunity
representatives assist commanders at battalion-level and below in
carrying out the EO program within their units. Unlike EOAs, EORs do not
attend the 16-week DEOMI program of instruction and are not utilized in
special duty assignments. Equal opportunity representative duties are a
part-time, secondary responsibility.

Equal opportunity representative training is a command/installation
responsibility. There is, however, no uniform training of EORs. Commands
and installations have developed their own training materials.
DEOMI-trained EOAs train EORs with a local 80-hour course, but the
course is often erratic: training aids are limited and some EOAs do not
have all the necessary skills to conduct the training adequately. The EO
proponent for the development of TSPs for Army schools is the Adjutant
General's School, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute. In order to
better support commanders, the Adjutant General's School is developing a
program of instruction (POI) for EOR training. Implementation of the POI
is scheduled for October 1998. Equal opportunity advisors believe that
training inconsistencies and lack of command emphasis are limiting the
positive contributions EORs could have on unit cohesion.

Unlike EOAs, EORs are not trained to process individual complaints of
discrimination or sexual harassment. Despite this lack of training, they
often are used to handle informal complaints at the company and
battalion levels.

Equal opportunity advisors are not authorized to receive sworn
statements from soldiers or to conduct formal investigations when they
receive a complaint. According to AR 600-20, EOAs are expected to
provide advisory assistance to commanders and comment on investigation
reports for compliance with DoD and DA policy. Formal investigations are
limited to the IG or to an investigating officer appointed by the
commander under the provisions of AR 15-6, *Procedure for Investigating
Officers and Boards of Officers*. Many EOAs believe they are hampered by
this limitation on their authority to conduct an investigation. The
Panel also saw evidence of poorly conducted AR 15-6 investigations. Some
investigating officers are very junior and do not have the experience
necessary to conduct proper investigations. Equal opportunity advisors
and, in some instances, judge advocates are not consulted during the
course of investigations. The Panel also heard many comments relating to
perceptions of bias, e.g., some investigating officers were believed to
be too closely tied to the unit they were tasked to investigate.

-   ***Survey tools available to commanders are inadequate.***

Climate assessments are a key mechanism for commanders to anticipate and
prevent problems. Climate assessments are designed to be used by
commanders and other leaders to identify issues that might not otherwise
come to their attention. The current array of climate assessment tools
available to commanders do not adequately meet their needs.

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, published August 18, 1995,
directs that the Services "\[r\]equire commanders to assess their
organizational EO climate, preferably as part of their assumption of
command, and schedule follow-up assessments periodically during their
command tenure." The current version of AR 600-20 (Interim Change 4)
recommends that commanders conduct a unit climate assessment within 90
days of assuming command and then annually thereafter. While this
guidance is not in compliance with the DoD Directive, the draft revision
to AR 600-20 remedies this shortfall by requiring commanders to conduct
a unit climate assessment within 90 days of assuming command and
annually thereafter.

The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) is the most common
assessment survey instrument currently in use across the Army.
Commanders who request this survey must send the completed survey forms
to DEOMI for analysis and a report. The Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute has indicated that, because of insufficient
staffing, it will be unable to meet the demand for analysis of MEOCS,
once the AR 600-20 provisions requiring all commanders to conduct an
annual climate assessment are put into effect\--assuming MEOCS is the
assessment tool commanders employ.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-69, *Unit Climate Profile
Commander's Handbook*, also contains a climate assessment survey
instrument available to commanders. It does not include questions on
sexual harassment, but does include three questions asking if the
officers, NCOs, or immediate leaders in the unit treat soldiers fairly
without regard to race, ethnic background, or sex.

The current Army-wide survey of command climate, the biannual Sample
Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP), includes items on sexual harassment
on a recurring basis. This survey is targeted at the whole Army with the
exception of soldiers in training, in transit, in the hospital, or
attending school, and does not provide an assessment specifically geared
to one commander.

The Human Resources Directorate, ODCSPER has developed a short command
climate survey instrument. This instrument is only now being fielded and
feedback is limited. Another comprehensive human relations climate
assessment survey instrument is being developed under the direction of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).

***Other Issues***

***EOAs of Tenant Organizations***

Equal opportunity advisor resourcing of tenant units[^25] is another
issue that concerns the Panel. For example, a medical center that is
part of the Army Medical Command (AMEDD) but resides on a TRADOC
installation is considered a tenant unit, with a requirement to report
both to the AMEDD and TRADOC commanders. A tenant unit without an
assigned EOA is usually required to go to its next higher headquarters,
from which it is geographically separated, for EO coverage and complaint
processing. This was often found to be the case, even if there was a
designated installation EOA. The impact of this situation is a lack of
effective EOA coverage and confusion on the tenant unit\'s part. Little
guidance on this issue exists\--tenant units are not addressed in the
current version of AR 600-20.

***EO Program Funding***

Equal opportunity program funding varied with command interest.
According to AR 600-20, commanders of major Army commands are required
to provide personnel, funding, and other resources to carry out the EO
program. The Panel found some EO programs had insufficient funding to
adequately maintain awareness and conduct external training for EOAs.

***Racial Discrimination***

The Panel's written survey data reflected that the majority of those
surveyed do not believe that there are high levels of racial or ethnic
discrimination in their company-sized units. Likewise, race did not
surface as a factor in sexual harassment reporting. In line with this
finding are the results of the SSMPs conducted from 1992 to 1995, which
consistently reported a decrease in racial discrimination. The Panel
found little evidence of overt racial discrimination, but noted many
expressions of subtle racial discrimination, similar to those concerns
noted in the Report of the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on
Extremist Activity issued in 1996. Focus group data also indicated that
many soldiers believe they are not treated fairly in terms of promotions
and job assignments, and that subtle racial discrimination is a problem.

The Inspector General released findings of its Special Assessment of
Equal Opportunity in November 1990. It found significant achievements
with the Army's EO since the 1970s and predicted no imminent return to
the widespread racial unrest of that period. It also found, however,
that EO program emphasis was declining in the Army, as evidenced by poor
training, lack of visible chain of command participation in the program
and training, and the consolidation and elimination of EOA positions.
The Panel shares the same concerns in 1997 that the IG surfaced in 1990.
Under current practices, the individual soldier is not well served by
the EO system.

**THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

**AND SEX DISCRIMINATION**

***Panel Assessment***

The Panel's assessment of survey results, focus group discussions, and
individual interviews has produced four significant findings pertaining
to sexual harassment in the Army:

> ***Sexual harassment.*** Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army,
> crossing gender, rank, and racial lines.
>
> ***Inappropriate behavior.*** Inappropriate behaviors are commonplace
> throughout the Army. In many cases, however, soldiers subjected to
> such behaviors do not equate them with sexual harassment. Further,
> soldiers seem to accept such behaviors as a normal part of Army life.
>
> ***Sex discrimination.*** Sex discrimination is more common throughout
> the Army than is sexual harassment. Soldiers often misconstrue and
> report sex discrimination as sexual harassment.
>
> ***Perception of disparate treatment.*** Some male soldiers perceive
> that certain Army policies are inequitable in that they establish less
> demanding standards for female soldiers.

-   **Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing gender,
    rank, and racial lines.**

Over a period of years, a number of surveys administered by a variety of
agencies, to include the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences, DoD, independent research teams, and other military
services, have assessed and reported on the extent of sexual harassment
experienced by soldiers. Likewise, the Senior Review Panel found sexual
harassment to be a serious problem throughout the uniformed Army.[^26]
Although both male and female soldiers are subjected to sexual
harassment, women are disproportionately impacted. These findings are
consistent with those of previous surveys.

The results of the SSMP, a semi-annual Army-wide survey conducted by the
U.S. Army Research Institute indicate the rate at which both male and
female soldiers responded affirmatively to the question, "Were you
sexually harassed in the last 12 months?" The rates for males remained
level throughout survey years 1992, 1993, and 1995. The drop from 1992
to 1993 for women was a statistically significant difference. The same
question was posed in precisely the same language on the Panel survey.
In the SSMP surveys, the definition of sexual harassment was provided to
participants. The Panel survey did not advise participants of the
definition of sexual harassment. Yet, the responses were similar. Table
3 records soldiers' affirmative responses to the question, "Were you
sexually harassed in the last 12 months?", categorized by survey and
gender of the respondent.

Table 3\--Were you sexually harassed in the last 12 months?

+----------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------------+
|          | **SSMP      | **SSMP       | **SSMP      | **Panel     |
|          | (1992)**    | (1993)**     | (1995)**    | (1997)**    |
|          |             |              |             |             |
|          | **N =       | **N =        | **N =       | **N =       |
|          | 8,849**     | 9,130**      | 15,113**    | 14,498**    |
+----------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------------+
| **Men**  | 2.9%        | 2.6%         | 2.8%        | 7%          |
+----------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------------+
| *        | 29.8%       | 24.4%        | 24.9%       | 22%         |
| *Women** |             |              |             |             |
+----------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------------+

The number of male soldiers who responded that they had been sexually
harassed increased substantially from the SSMP surveys to that of the
Senior Review Panel. The number of women who reported having been
sexually harassed remained generally constant across the 1992, 1993, and
1995 SSMPs and the Panel survey.

Although the consistency in statistical findings supports the scientific
validity of the Panel survey instrument and sample, the result suggests
that this issue is one of which the Army has been long aware, and that
to date, Army policies and processes implemented to combat and eradicate
sexual harassment have had little, if any, impact. As one soldier noted,
"Women have been reporting sexual harassment for five years, and the
Army's just now looking into it." Many soldiers believe that their
complaints and concerns have been ignored and that only the recent media
attention has forced Army leaders to focus on this issue.

Table 4 sets forth the percentage of soldiers, broken out by rank and
gender, whose Panel survey responses indicate that they had been
subjected to sexual harassment. Junior enlisted women reported
experiencing substantially higher rates of harassment than any other
rank category. Although higher rank and status does not protect a
soldier from sexual harassment, it appears that soldiers' junior rank
and status may invite harassment or establish them as the harasser's
most likely targets.

Table 4\--Sexual Harassment by Rank and Gender

  ----------------- ------------------- ---------------- -----------------
  **N = 14,498**    **Junior Enlisted** **NCOs**         **Officers**

  **Men**           10%                 5%               2%

  **Women**         29%                 17%              6%
  ----------------- ------------------- ---------------- -----------------

Table 5 shows the percentage of sexual harassment, by race and gender,
as reported on the Panel survey. Black male soldiers reported
experiencing slightly higher levels of sexual harassment than did white
male soldiers (10% to 6%), while black female soldiers reported slightly
less sexual harassment than did white female soldiers (20% to 23%).

Table 5\--Sexual Harassment by Race and Gender

  ----------------- ------------------- ---------------- -----------------
  **N = 14,498**    **White**           **Black**        **Other**[^27]

  **Men**           6%                  10%              7%

  **Women**         23%                 20%              27%
  ----------------- ------------------- ---------------- -----------------

-   **Inappropriate behaviors are commonplace throughout the Army.**

Table 6 presents the findings of both the DoD Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC) 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey and the Senior Review Panel
survey, concerning the extent to which soldiers reported having
experienced uninvited, unwanted sex-related behaviors.

Table 6\--Experienced Behaviors Described in Sexual Experiences
Questionnaire

+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
|                | **Crude | **Sexist | **       | **Sexual | **     |
|                | or      | Be       | Unwanted | Co       | Sexual |
|                | Of      | havior** | Sexual   | ercion** | Ass    |
|                | fensive |          | Att      |          | ault** |
|                | Beh     |          | ention** |          |        |
|                | avior** |          |          |          |        |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **DMDC         |         |          |          |          |        |
| (1995)**       |         |          |          |          |        |
|                |         |          |          |          |        |
| **Army N =     |         |          |          |          |        |
| 13,599**       |         |          |          |          |        |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **Men**        | 35%     | 16%      | 8%       | 4%       | 2%     |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **Women**      | 74%     | 67%      | 47%      | 18%      | 8%     |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **Panel        |         |          |          |          |        |
| (1997)**       |         |          |          |          |        |
|                |         |          |          |          |        |
| **N = 14,498** |         |          |          |          |        |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **Men**        | 76%     | 63%      | 30%      | 8%       | 6%     |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+
| **Women**      | 78%     | 72%      | 47%      | 15%      | 7%     |
+----------------+---------+----------+----------+----------+--------+

The behaviors about which soldiers were queried were derived from
Fitzgerald's (1988) Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ).[^28] A
comparison of survey results reveals that female soldiers participating
in the Panel survey reported experiencing SEQ behaviors at a rate almost
identical to that of the DMDC survey. Male soldiers participating in the
Panel survey reported experiencing significantly higher levels of SEQ
behaviors than did male soldier participants in the DMDC survey.[^29]
Overall, the Panel found that 84% of Army women and 80% of Army men
reported experiencing some type of SEQ behavior.

It should be noted that there was a definitional distinction between the
1995 DMDC survey and the Panel survey. The 1995 DMDC survey defined
sexual harassment as experiencing any one of Fitzgerald's SEQ behaviors.
The Panel survey queried soldiers about their experience of SEQ
behaviors, but did not define these behaviors as sexual harassment or
tie SEQ behaviors to that term. Rather, the Panel survey contained three
separate types of questions: one asking soldiers if they had experienced
SEQ behaviors; the second asking soldiers if they had been sexually
harassed; and the third, whether sexual harassment was a problem in the
soldier's unit.

Although soldiers reported being subjected to inappropriate sexual
behaviors at high rates (80% of men and 84% of women, as illustrated in
Figure 1, below), many soldiers, apparently, do not perceive these SEQ
behaviors as sexual harassment. A large number of soldiers reported
experiencing at least one of the categories of SEQ behaviors. However,
the number of soldiers who reported having been subjected to sexual
harassment was substantially smaller (7% of men and 22% of women). The
number of soldiers who believed that sexual harassment was a problem in
their unit also was relatively small (10% of men, 17% of women). From
these statistics and from focus

group input, the Panel learned that many soldiers do not equate SEQ
behaviors with sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the Panel notes that all
of the SEQ behaviors may meet the criteria for sexual harassment under
the DoD and Army definitions.

![](media/image1.emf)

**Figure 1\--Percentage Reporting any SEQ Behavior, Sexual Harassment,**

**or that Sexual Harassment was a Problem in their Unit**

Of soldiers who reported experiencing crude or offensive behaviors,
sexist behaviors, or unwanted sexual attention, only 11% believed they
had been sexually harassed. This statistical finding was borne out by
focus group research. One soldier commented about "lots of low level
sexual harassment . . . but they don't define it as harassment. \[It's\]
just part of the environment." Focus group participants alternatively
referred to the existence of these less offensive behaviors as "noise,"
"static," or "clutter." Although soldiers expressed some level of
discomfort with such noise, static, and clutter, soldiers perceive that
their exposure to these behaviors is inevitable. The high level of SEQ
behaviors experienced and tolerated by Army men and women, when compared
to the much smaller number of soldiers who stated that they were
sexually harassed, indicates that, for whatever reasons, some SEQ
behaviors that may fall within the official definition of sexual
harassment are "the norm" throughout the Army.

This difference in percentages of soldiers reporting the experience of
SEQ behaviors and those who believed they were sexually harassed can be
attributed to several factors. First, many soldiers have low
expectations of what constitutes acceptable behavior. One soldier
commented that, "If I reported it \[these behaviors/sexual harassment\]
every time it happened, I'd keep reporting it every day. But I handle it
better than most." Another soldier stated that, "I have an established
tolerance level." Second, although soldiers generally understand the
Army's organizational definition of sexual harassment, they tend to
apply a different, personal, informal, working definition of sexual
harassment to their personal experiences. One soldier commented that the
official definition of sexual harassment is "too broad now. If someone
came into our unit who is not part of the group, they would take things
as sexual harassment when it is really only bantering back and forth."

The Panel found that soldiers are likely to perceive that they are being
sexually harassed only when SEQ type behaviors rise to the level of
sexual coercion or sexual assault. Of the soldiers reporting that they
had been subject to sexual coercion or assault, 52% believed that they
had been sexually harassed. These SEQ behaviors are the most serious
and, inherently, are the most likely to cause physical, mental, and
emotional harm to their victims. As one soldier stated, "As long as no
one is touching me, I don't care."

Further, many soldiers commented on the key role perceptions play in
identifying sexual harassment. As one officer stated, "It's all in how
you perceive it. You may go home and think\--was it sexual harassment?"

-   **Sex discrimination is more common throughout the Army than is
    sexual harassment.**

Focus group participants who responded that they had been sexually
harassed described experiences that do not comport with the official
definition of sexual harassment, but are more appropriately
characterized as sex discrimination (e.g., soldiers given certain duties
solely because of their gender). As stated in Part III of Volume I, sex
discrimination is discrimination based solely on an individual being
male or female. It is often linked to a set of assumptions and sex role
stereotypes concerning the abilities, competence, status, and roles of
the particular gender, which results in the disparate treatment of or
negative impact on that gender. Sex discrimination takes a variety of
forms including, but not limited to, sexist remarks, assigning soldiers
to particular duties that "fit" their gender, and generally disregarding
or discounting the value of a soldier's contributions to mission
accomplishment based on gender. The Panel found that incidents of gender
bias, sexism, and sex discrimination occur often throughout the Army.

In the Panel survey, soldiers were asked if they were treated
differently because of their sex. Many of the women (51%) and few of the
men (22%) said they were treated differently because of their gender.
These percentages are significantly higher than the 22% of the women and
7% of the men who reported that they had been sexually harassed.

Focus group commentary supports this statistical data. A group of female
senior NCOs spoke heatedly to Panel members about having no voice in
meetings with male NCOs of their units. "We speak, but it's as if we do
not exist. They ignore us," said one NCO. Focus group discussion also
revealed that, although participants perceive "zero tolerance" within
the Army for racial discrimination, the same standard is not applied to
sex discrimination. This perception exists even though the standard has
been repeatedly used by DoD leaders in describing the Department's
policy with respect to sex discrimination. A female soldier remarked,
"You can't get away with saying blacks shouldn't be in the Army, but you
can say women shouldn't be in the Army . . . or call us dumb females.
How can they \[men\] get away with that?" When soldiers are taken out of
their MOS to perform stereotypical "women's work" or "men's work" in
their units; when commanders refuse to consider qualified soldiers for
certain duty positions (e.g., driver, aide-de-camp) because of their
gender; when women's contributions to unit mission are given less weight
than that of men; the Army is allowing the practice of sex
discrimination to exist.

In group discussions with soldiers worldwide, the Panel asked them to
describe the most and the least satisfying aspects of their careers. The
often-cited positive aspects included working with and helping soldiers,
learning new skills, travel and educational opportunities, and personal
growth.

Of the dissatisfying aspects, one of the women's most frequent responses
was that they feel devalued as soldiers and marginalized in their units
just because they are women. One female field grade officer said, "I
always have to fight the male mind set about what a woman can and cannot
do." A female junior NCO remarked that a male new to the unit is
accepted at face value, but that a new female soldier has to prove
herself and her competence repeatedly. This theme of having to "prove
yourself" was restated to Panel members many times in many locations. A
young enlisted woman observed that "in working with males, you're
discounted and accused before you ever get a chance to explain." One
junior enlisted woman said, "This is the first time I've been stationed
in a unit where 90% of the soldiers are men. The automatic perception
they have of me is that I don't know my job. If you're a female, you're
always tested."

Male soldiers also are dissatisfied with unfair treatment and double
standards. One soldier said, "Double standards\--officer/enlisted,
male/female, black/white\--they're all here \[in the unit\]." An officer
said, "No longevity anymore, no job security, retirement benefits are
getting cut, reduced family support; everything is being taken from us."

-   ***Some male soldiers perceive that certain Army policies are
    inequitable in that they establish less demanding standards for
    female soldiers.***

The likelihood of polarization along gender lines and its corresponding
detriment to the human relations environment is heightened by the
perception among some male soldiers that certain Army policies hold
female soldiers to a less demanding standard.

***The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)***

The Army has considered gender, as well as age, in establishing the
different standards to be achieved by male and female soldiers on the
APFT. The APFT is designed to measure the fitness of an individual
soldier. A soldier's fitness is measured on a graduated scale adjusted
for gender and age. The differences in performance standards reflect
physiological differences between genders and between younger and older
soldiers. Soldiers understand and accept the age standards, but they
question the different standards based on gender. Some male soldiers
commented that the lower APFT standards for women are "too low"; that
the APFT is "biased in favor of female soldiers"; and that "the lower
standards reflect that a woman will never be in as good physical shape
as a man."

Generally, men believe that both men and women should be required to
perform the same number of repetitions of push-ups and sit-ups, and
complete the two-mile run in the same period of time in order to achieve
a passing score on the APFT. Generally, the few women who agree with
this proposition expressed themselves to the Panel as follows: "I'm just
so sick and tired of being told by men that I'm 'getting over' on the PT
test. Let's just make one standard." The criticism that women are
"getting over" in physical training adversely affects some women's
morale. A junior female NCO commented that "when a general officer had a
discussion about the PT \[physical training\] standards, he made jokes
about females not being able to run."

Soldiers who participated in focus groups voiced complaints about
leaders who set PT standards above those required by regulation. The
women perceived that their leaders established these more stringent
standards not as a means of promoting the unit's overall fitness and
mission accomplishment, but rather as a means of excluding women from
full participation in an important and visible unit function, that of
group PT. One female NCO said, "Male soldiers always lead PT and expect
us to meet unrealistic standards, for example, pyramid pushups and a
five-mile run in 30 minutes. The men always dog out the women if they
can't finish. I can blow them away with sit-ups, but I don't dog them
out about it."[^30] As another female senior NCO stated, "It's just
another way for men to tell us that we can't hang, that we don't belong.
When men see a woman falling out of a three-mile run at a seven minute
mile pace, they automatically lose respect for her. Suddenly, she
doesn't deserve to be part of the unit."

***Pregnancy***

Male soldiers also perceive that the utilization of pregnant female
soldiers is governed by special policies that negatively and unfairly
impact the unit. Pregnancy requires the issuance of a temporary physical
profile to the pregnant soldier. Essentially, a pregnant woman is
limited in the type and extent of physical training she can perform.
Further, her utilization to perform workplace duties is often curtailed
by the number of hours she is able to work without fatigue and the types
of work she is able to perform. One example cited by a focus group of
male officers was that of a pregnant pilot. The woman had to be
temporarily grounded and removed from flight status, rendering her
non-deployable. The remaining pilots, both men and women, had to fly the
pregnant pilot's missions and "pick up the other slack" caused by her
absence.

Another example cited in a focus group was that of a battalion-level
fuel handler who became pregnant. Because the chemical hazards
associated with her MOS could seriously impact her unborn child's
health, Army policy prohibited the fuel handler from working in her MOS
until after the birth of her child and her convalescence. The pregnant
fuel handler was assigned to "desk-duty." As it happened, the female was
one of only a few fuel handlers in her unit; fuel handling is considered
a critical, but low-density MOS. While she was prohibited from
performing fuel handler duties, the battalion was left short-handed. The
female fuel handler remained "on the unit books," however, assigned
against her fuel handler position, which effectively precluded the unit
from requesting and receiving a replacement fuel handler. The unit
suffered, as did the pregnant soldier, because the other fuel handlers
in her unit reacted negatively to her, making plain their
dissatisfaction at having to "do her work on top of their own"
particularly when they were already undermanned. Despite the fact that
the female fuel handler had no control over Army policy and its
application to her personal situation, the male soldiers considered her
to be personally responsible for her circumstances.

The Panel found that some pregnant women make a conscious decision to
place themselves and their unborn child "in harm's way" in an effort to
prevent similar negative reactions from members of their units. Although
many women's ability to work and to engage in physical activity is
unaffected by pregnancy, medical considerations require other women to
cut back on the number of hours they work, the types of tasks they
perform, and to modify the intensity of their physical training
routines. The Panel found that despite physical discomfort, some
pregnant women continue to perform strenuous duties, work long hours,
and participate in unit physical training, simply to avoid derision at
the hands of their counterparts. Other profiles given to both male and
female soldiers (e.g., for temporary injuries or illnesses) were not
listed in the same negative manner as pregnancy.

***Work Assignments***

Almost one-half of the men surveyed believe that women in their units
are treated more favorably. Eighty percent of female soldiers disagreed
with that premise. Table 7 reveals that while most female soldiers
believe that they "pull their load" in their unit, only one-half of
their male peers agreed. By contrast, almost all soldiers of both
genders believe that male soldiers "pull their load."

Table 7\--Perceptions of Contribution

  ----------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------
                          **Men**                    **Women**   

  **N = 14,498**          **Agree**   **Disagree**   **Agree**   **Disagree**

  **In this company, the  81%         7%             83%         7%
  male soldiers pull                                             
  their load.**                                                  

  **In this company, the  50%         30%            77%         11%
  female soldiers pull                                           
  their load.**                                                  
  ----------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------

Some female soldiers complained that their units effectively preclude
them from working in their MOS or from performing all tasks associated
with their MOS. Rather, they are assigned to administrative duties
viewed as "more appropriate work for a woman." Women noted that, in many
cases, male soldiers step in and perform duties that fit the stereotype
of "men's work."

For whatever reason, some leaders afford deferential treatment to women
in assigning unit work tasking. Contrary to soldiers' perceptions, this
perceived favoritism is usually unsolicited by female soldiers and has
no basis in Army policy. One female soldier, the only woman in a unit of
200 men, complained that her first sergeant would not let her go to the
field with her unit. Leaders who show deferential treatment to female
soldiers in the assignment of tasks reinforce erroneous perceptions held
by many males that the contributions of female soldiers are not
essential to the unit's successful performance of its mission. Leaders
must make the conscious decision to distribute the workload equitably,
without regard to the gender of the soldier, and to hold all soldiers to
the same performance standards. Soldiers of both genders must be tasked
with an equal number of "clean" and "dirty" tasks. Gender considerations
should have no part in a leader's determination of how to task any job,
whether administrative duties or ditch digging.

***The Effects of Sexual Harassment***

In more than 200 company-size units in the United States and overseas,
in leader interviews, and in interviews with EOAs, the Panel asked
soldiers about the effects of sexual harassment. Those soldiers who
believed they had suffered or had directly observed sexual harassment
most frequently cited "the erosion of trust between soldiers in my
unit." A soldier said that sexual harassment "causes a lot of chaos
because certain people can't work together." In one unit with
significant levels of sexual harassment, none of the female soldiers
wanted to come to work. A female junior NCO who was leaving the Army
after six years said that throughout her career, wherever she was
assigned, men in her unit "hit" on her. Even when she reported the
incidents to her chain of command, no action was taken. These
experiences, not surprisingly, had prompted her decision to leave the
Army for good.

A number of male soldiers expressed a fear of being falsely accused of
sexual harassment. Men who raise this concern apparently believe that
their careers will be permanently damaged by the allegation alone
whether they are guilty or not. Many men have determined that the only
way to avoid such an allegation is to avoid interaction or contact with
women. Female soldiers confirmed this trend in male perception and
behavior, expressing concern about being isolated in their units by male
soldiers who no longer even speak with them. Many women also feel that
they are being blamed by the men "for all the negative events happening
in the Army since the Aberdeen Proving Ground scandal." In the present
tension-ridden atmosphere, male and female soldiers are far less likely
to interact normally, much less to work as members of a cohesive team.

Despite the common occurrence of sexual harassment, inappropriate
behaviors, and sex discrimination throughout the Army, soldiers of both
genders assured Panel members that "the mission is still being
accomplished." As one junior enlisted soldier said, "Things are getting
done; it's the individuals, not the unit, who are affected by sexual
harassment." An NCO shared that the "mission gets done, but cohesion
among the soldiers is affected." Another soldier said that "sexual
harassment doesn't do anything to the unit. It continues to function. A
private can't take it anymore and ETSs \[leaves the Army\]. There's a
new private to replace them. We're expendable." Panel members noted that
sexual harassment, inappropriate behaviors, and sex discrimination are
not viewed by many soldiers as affecting a units' ability to do its job.
The Panel believes that, although "the Army goes rolling along," it
rolls more slowly and less effectively when its soldiers live and work
in a negative human relations environment.

Today, there exists in our force a degree of tension and uneasiness
grounded in the perception of many soldiers that the Army's leaders have
overreacted to highly publicized incidents of sexual harassment and
sexual misconduct and the media fallout from those events. Soldiers
expressed concern that leader attention will diminish once the media
attention diminishes. Many soldiers, both male and female, believe that
the Army has strongly overreacted to "Aberdeen" and is trying to train
itself out of a human relations problem by mandating excessive POSH
training. Most soldiers feel the current training is ineffective and
"by-the-numbers," with little discussion between or interaction among
the soldier participants.

One particular form of sexual harassment not addressed in the survey but
commented on in a few focus groups and by other female soldiers in
informal discussions, was the fear of being accused of being a
homosexual. Female soldiers who refuse the sexual advances of male
soldiers may be accused of being lesbians and subjected to investigation
for homosexual conduct. As in the case of men falsely accused of sexual
harassment, women accused of lesbianism believe that the mere allegation
harms their careers and reputations irreparably.

Another effect of sexual harassment in the current environment is the
reluctance of male leaders to mentor female soldiers, much less select
women for coveted assignments. Again, the fear of a false allegation of
sexual harassment holds many men in its grip. As one soldier remarked,
"Sexual harassment has generated a 'close ranks' mentality, and
mentoring is out the window."[^31]

***Other Issues\--Personal Relationships***

Sexual harassment is sometimes confused with fraternization.
Fraternization in itself is a confusing and often misunderstood area of
interpersonal relations. Army legal and policy prohibitions on
fraternization focus on the relationship between a superior and a
subordinate, when such relationship (1) causes actual or perceived
partiality, preferential treatment, or unfairness; (2) undermines
authority, morale, or discipline; or (3) involves an abuse of rank,
position, or authority for personal gain.[^32] Fraternization is not
limited to sexual relationships or interactions. Both leaders and
soldiers expressed a general sense of confusion regarding the
circumstances that constitute fraternization and emphasized the need for
a clarification of Army policies in this regard. As one leader stated,
"The bare-bones definition just does not provide any help when I am
trying to determine whether a particular relationship is acceptable."

Similarly, Army policies governing senior-subordinate relationships that
exist both inside and outside the chain of command are a concern of
leaders and soldiers. They both openly discussed with Panel members the
problems created by consensual sexual relationships between members of
the same unit, particularly when such relationships involve soldiers of
different ranks. Table 8 shows that nearly one-fifth of the soldiers
surveyed believe their units would tolerate sexual relationships between
leaders and subordinates; one-fourth of the survey participants were
"not sure."

**Table 8**\--**Toleration of Senior-Subordinate Sexual Relationships**

  ------------------------------------ ----------- ----------- --------------
  **N = 14,498**                       **Agree**   **Not       **Disagree**
                                                   Sure**      

  **Sexual relationships between       58%         24%         18%
  leaders and their subordinates would                         
  not be tolerated in this company.**                          
  ------------------------------------ ----------- ----------- --------------

Some field commanders complained to the Panel that DA policy on
senior-subordinate relationships is overly vague, leaving local leaders
in the difficult position of interpreting policy, and leaving soldiers
without behavioral guidance. Both commanders and soldiers emphasized the
need for "clear rules" and effective training in applying those rules.

A number of soldiers believe that the Army's shift to mixed-rank club
facilities sets-up soldiers for social interactions that are improper.
As one NCO stated "With everyone in civilian clothes, how can we know if
we can associate with someone unless we ask about the person's rank."

Some male soldiers said that a heightened level of consensual, sexual
activity in a unit can create an atmosphere in which the female soldiers
are viewed as sex objects, not fellow soldiers. Rather than operating as
a cohesive team, the unit structure fragments along the lines of these
informal relationships. As one soldier stated, "Everyone's more
concerned about who she's \[female soldier\] dating now than about doing
their jobs."

The Panel agrees that the boundaries between professional and personal
relationships have become blurred, posing issues of good order and
discipline. It is essential that clear lines of professional conduct be
established and observed, especially in terms of senior-subordinate
relationships. Abuse of power is a prevalent theme in dealing with cases
of sexual harassment and sexual assault, not only in the military but in
society at large. The Panel believes that the current Army policy
concerning senior-subordinate relationships is appropriate but often
misunderstood. Training in this area is almost nonexistent. Given the
lack of understanding among soldiers and leaders concerning
senior-subordinate relationships, a renewed training effort is required.

**LEADERSHIP**

***Panel Assessment***

Explicit in our charter from the Secretary of the Army was the mandate
"to examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and
exercise their responsibility to address sexual harassment." We found
issues of leadership throughout our review. In fact, it has become a
common thread of discussion throughout this report. In this section, we
present four main findings: the synergy between leadership and human
relations; distrust of leaders by soldiers; tentative commitment to the
human dimension; and a void in central oversight of leadership and human
relations programs.

***Leadership and Human Relations***

-   **Concerned, committed leadership is integral to the creation of a
    positive human relations climate.**

Good leadership is crucial to the creation and maintenance of a positive
human relations environment. The truth of this basic tenet was
reinforced in every aspect of the Panel's assessment. Data from the
Panel survey revealed a direct correlation between good leadership and a
reduction in inappropriate behaviors. Respect between soldiers and
increased acceptance of soldiers of diverse backgrounds as team members
also correlated with positive leadership.[^33] Army leaders define and
reinforce the Army's culture\--those shared values, beliefs, norms, and
assumptions the Army holds true. The Army's desired culture is based on
the core values of honor, integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty,
duty, and respect.

In cases where the Panel noted a successful human relations environment,
the chain of command "made it happen." Good leaders can create and
maintain a positive human relations environment in even the most
challenging situations. In fact, one of the most positive examples of a
healthy, flourishing human relations environment observed by the Panel
was in a forward deployed unit. The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and
personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) were accelerated, and the physical
environment was harsh and demanding. The chain of command refused to
allow these challenges to detract from either mission accomplishment or
from its commitment to taking care of soldiers and ensuring that
soldiers took care of each other. The chain of command had repeatedly
emphasized that each soldier, male and female, was important, both as a
member of the unit team, and as an individual. Soldiers were encouraged
to voice complaints and to suggest solutions, without fear of
retaliation. Though performing an arduous mission under great physical
and mental stress, soldiers evidenced extraordinary personal discipline,
coupled with a positive attitude. Their comments to the Panel about
their leaders and their living and working environments reflected
general satisfaction.

***Good Leadership***

In our travels and research, the Panel found four characteristics common
to and necessary for the exercise of good leadership. Good leaders set
standards for members of their organizations; exemplify adherence to
those standards in their personal conduct; enforce and maintain those
standards for other members of the organization; and demonstrate genuine
care and concern for their soldiers. These leadership characteristics
are universal, that is, they can be applied effectively to the
development and sustainment of tactical and technical military skills,
as well as to the creation and maintenance of a positive human relations
environment. The Panel is convinced that should a leader lack any one of
these characteristics, both the unit's tactical and technical readiness
and human relations environment will be adversely impacted.

***Setting, Maintaining, and Enforcing Standards***

Soldiers participating in the Panel survey were asked to respond to a
series of questions pertaining to leadership in their companies. As
shown in Table 9, many male and female soldiers agreed that leaders in
their companies set and enforce high standards for soldiers in terms of
good behavior and discipline.

Table 9\--Leaders Set and Enforce Standards

  ------------------------------------ ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------
                                       **Men**                    **Women**   

  **N = 14,498**                       **Agree**   **Disagree**   **Agree**   **Disagree**

  **The leaders in this company set    71%         19%            61%         28%
  high standards for soldiers in terms                                        
  of good behavior and discipline.**                                          

  **The leaders in the company enforce 65%         17%            54%         26%
  the standards they set for good                                             
  behavior.**                                                                 
  ------------------------------------ ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------

***Exemplifying Standards***

Policies, regulations, or decrees alone will not create or enforce a
positive human relations environment. The old adage that "actions speak
louder than words" has never been more true than in this instance. As
one focus group participant said, "The more you hear leaders speak it,
and then watch them do it \[maintain standards\], you know that it is
important." The chain of command must "lead by example," maintaining
high standards of personal conduct.

-   **Soldiers do not necessarily perceive that leaders hold themselves
    to the same standards they set for soldiers.**

Panel survey data reveal that while many soldiers believe that their
leaders set high standards for behavior, fewer perceive that their
leaders actually behave as good examples. As shown in Table 10, soldiers
do not necessarily perceive that leaders hold themselves to the same
standards they set for soldiers.

**Table 10\--Leaders Exemplify Standards**

  -------------------------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------
                                         **Men**                    **Women**   

  **N = 14,498**                         **Agree**   **Disagree**   **Agree**   **Disagree**

  **The leaders in this company set good 54%         30%            41%         43%
  examples for soldiers by behaving the                                         
  way they expect soldiers to behave.**                                         

  **The leaders in this company are more 43%         41%            47%         38%
  interested in looking good than in                                            
  being good.**                                                                 

  **The leaders in this company are more 37%         43%            40%         42%
  interested in furthering their careers                                        
  than in the well-being of their                                               
  soldiers.**                                                                   
  -------------------------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------

Quotations from soldier focus group participants anecdotally support the
survey data. The Panel frequently received focus group comments to the
effect of "Yeah, most of our leaders do \[exemplify the standard\].
There's one or two that walk a thin line though."; and "We have some
commanders who say do what I say and not what I do."; and "An officer
here struck a tree DUI and was allowed to remain in command."; and
"Leaders have slack standards\--they don\'t even take the PT test."

***Distrust of Leaders by Soldiers***

-   **Some soldiers perceive that leaders are not interested in their
    welfare.**

***Caring for Soldiers***

When officers and NCOs were asked by the Panel what they found most
satisfying about their time in the Army, most cited the opportunity to
work with and to develop young soldiers. Panel survey data reveal,
however, that in a majority of cases, this care and concern is not
transmitted to or perceived by soldiers.

**Table 11\--Perceptions of Company Leadership**

  -------------------------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------
                                         **Men**                    **Women**   

  **N = 14,498**                         **Agree**   **Disagree**   **Agree**   **Disagree**

  **My officers are interested in what I 47%         31%            41%         36%
  think and how I feel about things.**                                          

  **My officers are interested in my     47%         27%            42%         32%
  personal welfare.**                                                           

  **My NCOs are interested in what I     61%         24%            55%         32%
  think and how I feel about things.**                                          

  **My NCOs are interested in my         62%         20%            57%         27%
  personal welfare.**                                                           

  **I am impressed with the quality of   39%         40%            31%         51%
  leadership in this company.**                                                 

  **I would go for help with a personal  46%         37%            34%         52%
  problem to people in the company chain                                        
  of command.**                                                                 
  -------------------------------------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------

This perceived lack of interest on the part of leadership has
contributed to a weakening of the essential bond of trust between
leaders and their soldiers. This breakdown is evidenced by the survey
finding that less than one-half of the soldiers responding to the
Panel's survey indicated that they would approach their company chain of
command for assistance with a personal problem.

In focus groups, soldiers remarked that "I just don't feel comfortable
going to my squad leader about this," or that "I would never trust my
chain of command to deal with sexual harassment." Many leaders recognize
this breakdown in trust; one field grade officer remarked, "I don't
think we know what goes on with the junior enlisted." Additionally, many
leaders, because they have not experienced it, deny the existence of
sexual harassment. A leader must be sensitive to the possibility that
enlisted soldiers' experiences may be outside of the realm of the
leader's personal experience.

Distrust of leaders is particularly evident in the survey responses of
female soldiers. Only one-third would "go for help with a personal
problem to people in the company chain of command." In focus group
sessions, soldiers, especially women, repeatedly asserted that they
require a system through which they can report inappropriate behaviors
or other complaints without fear of reprisal. They expressed concern
that existing agencies (e.g., IG, EOA, chaplain, etc.) work more for the
chain of command than for soldiers. Soldiers seek only fair, respectful,
and dignified treatment from their chain of command and agencies to whom
they go for support and assistance. Unfortunately, many soldiers simply
do not trust the present system to deal with their concerns.

-   **Some leaders' concern for their own career progression takes
    priority over caring for their soldiers.**

The Panel is disturbed by the perception, as expressed by a number of
soldiers in their survey responses and recorded in both Tables 10 and
11, that some leaders' concern for their own career progression takes
priority over caring for their soldiers. Over one-third of male (37%)
and female (40%) soldiers agreed with the survey statement that leaders
are more interested in furthering their careers than in the well-being
of their soldiers. More female soldiers (47%) than male soldiers (43%)
agreed that the leaders in their company are more interested in looking
good than in being good. Only 39% of the men and 31% of the women agreed
that they are impressed with the quality of leadership in their company.
Focus group comments reinforced these survey findings. Many enlisted
soldiers, particularly those in the grades of staff sergeant and below,
believe that their leaders' paramount concerns are for themselves and
their careers. "They \[leaders\] see us \[soldiers\] as getting them
where they want to go. They could care less if we get where we need to
go or what we have to put up with to get there." Survey data, focus
groups, and personal interviews consistently reinforced the concept that
the Army must make a concerted and continuous effort to improve and
maintain our soldiers\' trust and confidence in the chain of command.

***Commitment to Soldiers***

-   **The Army is sending a mixed message about its commitment to its
    soldiers.**

The Panel notes several factors that detract from leaders' efforts to
create a positive human relations environment. The stresses of expanding
missions, diminishing resources, and increasing competition for
advancement are real challenges confronting our leaders. One leader
complained in a focus group that "there is simply not enough time,
money, equipment, or people to get the mission done and to concentrate
on maintaining a positive human relations environment." The high OPTEMPO
and PERSTEMPO of today's Army also leave soldiers confused and without a
clear mission focus. Complicated by the downsizing of the force, a high
OPTEMPO requires leaders and soldiers to do "more with less." This
reality is reflected in soldier perceptions that there are not enough
dollars to buy modernized equipment, maintain their workplaces and
housing, and to improve their quality of life. Further, many soldiers
expressed concern that key medical, educational, and retirement benefits
are eroding. Consequently, many believe that the Army has violated or
broken its commitment to them.

***Zero Defects***

In focus groups, leaders vocalized distress at the existing "zero
defects mentality," typified by an intense competition for promotion and
advancement, wherein any mistake is perceived as a "discriminator" and,
in effect, a career terminator. Leaders at all levels claimed to avoid
risk-taking and creativity in problem solving because "failure is simply
not tolerated." "Zero defects is affecting how I make decisions. One bad
decision and my career is over." Another officer commented that, "zero
defects determines if you do the right thing or please the person above
you. It creates a moral dilemma."

One collateral effect of this "zero defects" environment is that "bad
news," to include incidents of sexual harassment or sex discrimination,
is consciously contained at the lowest level of command. In an effort to
prevent their more senior leaders from recognizing that one of their
subordinates has a problem or has failed, junior leaders avoid reporting
"bad news" to their superiors. The Army's leadership philosophy of
"solving problems at the lowest level," designed to promote the exercise
of personal responsibility by lower level leaders, has in certain cases
served to delay the resolution of issues and to perpetuate problems.
Panel assessments reveal that when senior leaders say "solve problems at
the lowest level," junior leaders perceive them as meaning "I don't want
to hear your problems." When junior leaders fail to bring problems to
the attention of their superiors, they are deprived of the benefit of
the more extensive leadership and human relations experiences of their
higher-level commanders. In turn, higher-level commanders are deprived
of the capacity to monitor and assess trends in their subordinate units,
and to implement measures to correct current defects and to forestall
future problems. In the end, it is the soldier and the unit who pay the
price.

Soldiers easily recognize their leader's fear of failure or reluctance
to ask for assistance from higher-level leaders. Soldiers perceive these
traits as conclusive evidence that their leader is concerned only for
his or her own career and will sacrifice the welfare of individual
soldiers and the unit to secure personal advancement. One typical
response from a soldier was that "senior NCOs and officers worry more
about ticket stamps \[punching\]. The morale goes straight down the
tubes when that happens." Another soldier noted that "leaders are more
worried about their next promotion than their people." As stated by a
female soldier commenting on her own experience in reporting an
allegation of sexual harassment, "Things are always swept under the
carpet to keep the unit or officer from looking bad. They just move the
harasser."

***Job versus Profession***

Many leaders and soldiers expressed concern that the Army is becoming
more like a civilian job than a profession. Individual rights and
privacy concerns, they say, are beginning to receive priority over the
core values espoused by the Army. This attitude engenders a "9 to 5"
mentality where only a soldier's workplace behavior is deemed subject to
leader scrutiny or concern. Any intrusion, inquiry, or demand related to
a soldier's private life and personal values is considered "off-limits"
to the military leader.

The result is twofold. First, many leader focus group participants
reported a reluctance to get involved in the private lives of their
soldiers. Leaders shrink from venturing into the barracks, visiting the
homes of their soldiers, or simply getting to know their soldiers. As a
result, human relations problems grow unnoticed. One NCO remarked,
"There is a hands off mentality. What they do on their own time has
become their own business." Many leaders appear to have misinterpreted
the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) program and Single
Soldier Initiatives, which promote the overall quality of life for
single and unaccompanied soldiers, as imposing limits on leader
involvement in the lives of soldiers. Focus group comments routinely
indicated that leaders have "walked away from the barracks." Many
leaders have asserted, incorrectly, that the BOSS program (and Single
Soldier Initiatives) have deprived them of the authority to intervene in
the barracks or in soldiers' private lives.

***Erosion of Bedrock Values***

Second, the shift from the perception of military service as a
profession to "just a job" encourages soldiers' beliefs that the
requirement to adhere to Army values and standards extends only as far
as their installation's front gate. Like their leaders, soldiers
perceive that anything that occurs "outside the gate" is personal,
private, and beyond the bounds of legitimate Army concern or interest.
One soldier characterized the situation saying, "We lead dual lives."
One life applies in the workplace where the soldier adheres to the
values, rules, and norms of the Army. The other life revolves around
private values, personal rules, and "off-time" activities.

Further, some soldiers reported their belief that the moral code
applicable to other soldiers did not apply in their specific duty
location. One soldier referred to his one year overseas tour as
"TDY,"[^34] or "Temporarily Divorced for a Year." The Panel believes
that this unacceptable and inappropriate mindset results from the
absence of command support for and enforcement of Army values.

-   **Women perceive that the Army is not committed to accepting them as
    members of the force.**

There exists a general perception that, while the Army as an institution
claims to have fully accepted women as an essential element of the
force, it has not taken the steps necessary to inculcate this commitment
into the Army culture. Many female soldiers routinely hear that their
selections for promotion, schooling, command, or other highly visible
assignments have taken slots and opportunities away from male soldiers.
In addition, females are often excluded from competition for positions
for which male soldiers of their same rank/grade and branch/functional
area are considered. Women perceive that they are selected for
administrative and staff positions as opposed to operational or line
assignments, and are often denied assignments in their primary career
field in favor of work deemed "more appropriate for a woman."

***Mentoring***

Of particular concern to the Panel is the lack of mentoring, coaching,
and career counseling available to all soldiers, and female soldiers in
particular, on both formal and informal levels. Many male leaders
expressed a reluctance and even an inability to address what they
perceive as "women's issues." The Panel believes that this absence of
mentoring stems from a lack of commitment on the part of many of our
leaders, coupled with male leaders' fear that a close relationship with
a female soldier, although professionally based and conducted, will
generate perceptions of impropriety and prompt allegations of sexual
harassment.

***Central Oversight of Human Relations and Leadership Programs***

-   **There is no departmental cell specifically charged with strategic
    oversight of the human relations environment.**

Commitment to a positive human relations environment begins at the
highest levels of leadership. As the Panel conducted its review of
policy and survey of soldier opinions, it became apparent that in the
area of human relations, the Army has been in the reactive mode too
long. There is no cell in the Army staff specifically tasked to provide
strategic oversight of the Army's human relations environment,
leadership doctrine, and leader development. Although a human resources
directorate exists in ODCSPER, that directorate has been downsized
dramatically and must, of necessity, devote most of its efforts to
reacting to problems. In the past, the directorate was led by a major
general. For the past year, however, it has been headed by a
colonel.[^35] Officers assigned to the EO desks frequently lack command
experience and EO training.

Headquarters, Department of the Army staff responsibility for leadership
and leader development policy is divided between the DCSPER and the
DCSOPS. Because the definitions of leadership and leader development are
not clearly delineated in AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, the division of
responsibilities and functions between ODCSPER and the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) staffs is confusing. Key
issues that are not addressed by AR 600-100 include the assignment of
primary responsibility for advising the Army Chief of Staff on
leadership and leader development policy, and what resources are
required by MACOMS.

There is currently no Army agency responsible for the integration of
research and policy in the human relations area. Also, the Army lacks
both an effective reporting requirement, and a central repository to
receive, analyze, and maintain such information. Neither DA nor
individual commanders have any way to monitor the \"big picture\" in
important human relations trends. Without a strategic view of the human
relations environment, the Army will never be able to anticipate or take
proactive steps to forestall or prevent problems.

In recent years, the Army has not made a substantive commitment to human
resource issues, as disparities between policy and practice are
prevalent. Soldiers view the Army's reaction to the so-called
"sex-scandal" at Aberdeen Proving Ground as "knee-jerk" and believe
that, without the intense media interest, the Army would not have
altered its "business as usual" practices. Further, many soldiers
believe that once media attention to this issue abates, command emphasis
will dissipate similarly.

Only good leadership can alter these soldiers' perceptions. Army leaders
are the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and enforcing an
environment of respect and dignity in the Army. Army leader action will
ultimately determine the impact of the Panel's report.

**INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING**

***Background***

***Civilian to Soldier***

Young men and women obtain their strongest and most enduring impressions
of the Army when they are making the transition from civilian to
soldier. It is at this time that they learn Army values and gain
discipline from being held to standards. Trainees' first contact with
the Army is through their recruiters. Once recruited, trainees are
qualified for enlistment at a Military Entrance Processing Station
(MEPS). After successful qualification, they enlist for a MOS and are
given a date to begin IET. Upon arrival at a training installation, new
recruits report to a reception battalion. Usually recruits spend three
to seven days in reception processing before being sent to a training
company.

***Training Components***

There are three training components of IET: Basic Combat Training (BCT),
which is followed by Advanced Individual Training (AIT), or a
combination of BCT and AIT called One Station Unit Training (OSUT). Most
soldiers in combat support and combat service support MOSs enter the
Army through BCT and are trained in gender-integrated companies. After
they complete the eight-week BCT course, they proceed to AIT where each
will receive instruction and training applicable to their specific MOS
(such as cook or light vehicle mechanic). Advanced Individual Training
can last from four to 52 weeks depending upon the specific MOS. All AITs
are gender-integrated. Soldiers in combat arms and some combat support
MOSs enter OSUT,[^36] completing their basic combat skills and advanced
individual training in one unit, at one location, with one group of
soldier peers, and one group of drill sergeants and instructors. In all
components, drill sergeants and instructors are key to the training
process. They not only teach technical skills necessary for survival on
the battlefield, they instill personal and unit discipline and Army
values. They are the influential link between the trainee and the rest
of the Army and serve as role models for new soldiers.

In BCT and OSUT, training is usually conducted by drill sergeants. In
AIT, drill sergeants are primarily responsible for the daily
administrative management of soldiers, physical training, and common
soldier tasks training. Most of the MOS specific training in AIT is
committee taught[^37] by senior NCO instructors who hold that MOS. After
completing OSUT or AIT, soldiers report to their first duty assignment
with a unit. This progression from recruit to new soldier is depicted in
Figure 2.

**IET**

**Figure 2\--The Flow from Recruiter to First Duty Assignment**

***Panel Assessment of Initial Entry Training***

***What We Did***

The Panel's review of the Army's training base consisted of written
surveys and focus groups for trainees, drill sergeants, and instructors.
The Panel traveled to training installations throughout the Army to
document and record information depicting trainees' and trainers'
experiences and opinions regarding sexual harassment, discrimination,
and their perceptions of fair treatment. It also solicited the opinions
and experiences of drill sergeant and instructor candidates attending
schools designed to prepare them for their new duties, and spent a
considerable amount of time observing training and talking with
trainees, trainers, officers, command sergeants major, and civilian
employees at both training installations and drill sergeant/instructor
training schools.[^38]

***What We Found***

There was a very positive aspect of the Panel's review in that it found
trainees believe that the overwhelming majority of drill sergeants and
instructors perform competently and well. The Panel's personal
observations were similar. Panel members saw and met many hardworking
drill sergeants who impressed them with being committed to the welfare
of new recruits entrusted to their care and dedicated to training them
to be proficient, disciplined soldiers. However, four major concerns
were identified: lack of dignity and respect in the IET environment;
inadequate preparation of trainers for IET duty; inadequate selection
and assignment of trainers; and negative consequences of the focus on
sexual harassment in IET.

***Lack of Dignity and Respect in the IET Environment***

-   **Soldierization in IET tolerates sexualized behaviors that are
    inconsistent with instilling respect as an Army core value.**

***Extent of Sexual Harassment among Trainees***

Initial Entry Training is designed to challenge trainees mentally and
physically and to develop in them the ethical base, discipline, and team
spirit to become professional soldiers. Nevertheless, trainees
experienced rates of sexual harassment lower than the rest of the Army
in BCT and OSUT, and higher in AIT. In a single question assessing
sexual harassment rates, 7% of the men and 24% of the women in AIT
asserted that they had been sexually harassed since joining the Army.
This corresponds to 7% of the men and 22% of the women in the Panel's
Army-wide survey.

***Higher Rates in AIT***

As seen in the following table, trainees in AIT reported experiencing
higher rates of sexual harassment and inappropriate behavior than
trainees in either BCT or OSUT. Female trainees in AIT said they had
experienced sexual harassment, crude or offensive behavior, or unwanted
sexual attention at a rate greater than female soldiers who participated
in the Panel's Army-wide survey. The percentages of trainee survey
participants reporting any of the SEQ behaviors are shown in Table 12.

**Table 12\--Trainees Responses: Experienced Sexual Harassment and**

**Inappropriate Behaviors in the Different Training Components**

  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      **BCT**               **OSUT**               **AIT**               **Total               **Army-wide**   
                                                                                         IET**                                 
  ------------------- --------- ----------- ---------- ----------- --------- ----------- --------- ----------- --------------- -----------
                      **Men**   **Women**   **Men**    **Women**   **Men**   **Women**   **Men**   **Women**   **Men**         **Women**

  **N =**             1613      778         1154       288         3415      1979        6182      3045                        

  **Experienced       6%        15%         4%         15%         9%        30%         7%        24%         7%              22%
  Sexual                                                                                                                       
  Harassment**[^39]                                                                                                            

  **Crude behavior**  64%       64%         70%        74%         71%       82%         69%       75%         76%             78%

  **Sexist behavior** 43%       56%         50%        65%         55%       71%         50%       65%         63%             72%

  **Unwanted sexual   17%       27%         21%        33%         28%       50%         24%       41%         30%             47%
  attention**                                                                                                                  

  **Coercion**        3%        3%          2%         4%          7%        13%         5%        10%         8%              15%

  **Assault**         1%        2%          1%         3%          3%        5%          2%        4%          6%              7%
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed in the "Extent of Sexual Harassment" section of Part IV,
Volume I, IET soldiers are being subjected to inappropriate behaviors
but do not define or identify those behaviors as sexual harassment. This
is particularly true of female soldiers in the AIT environment. Most
trainees are able to generalize parts of the Army's definition of sexual
harassment without truly understanding that inappropriate behaviors may
lead to and include sexual harassment. Many trainees reported that they
do not view many of the behaviors encompassed in the Army's definition
of sexual harassment as harassment or as inappropriate. These trainees
view such acts as consensual behavior or flirting. In trainee focus
groups, most trainees indicated that sexual jokes, sexual comments, and
touching are common and are often not viewed as offensive by either the
perpetrator or the recipient. There are, however, some trainees who do
not like or condone such actions or language. They reported that this
behavior is endured because, "it's just the way the Army is." A female
trainee said, "Males make comments that are uncalled for. They need
education and/or manners. I know it's because of how and where they grew
up, but they need to stop." Clearly the soldierization process has
failed to adequately promote a climate of dignity and respect and an
understanding of appropriate and inappropriate behavior.

When asked to provide examples of sexual harassment, trainees' answers
covered a wide range of behaviors from "simply talking to women" to
committing rape. A trainee said, "I don't think it can be explained. It
depends on the individual." Another trainee reported, "I think I'm
supposed to read minds." Supporting this comment was a response by a
female trainee, "If one guy looks at you but you like him, it's
flirting. If he gives you the 'creeps,' it's sexual harassment." The
lack of a clear understanding of sexual harassment leads to continued
incidence of inappropriate behaviors and a normalized environment that
is counter to Army core values.

Some male and female trainees reported that "sexual harassment is 'blown
out of proportion.' The media is taking it further than it should go." A
few trainees said, "It's gone way, way too far. You don't know what it
\[sexual harassment\] is anymore." Many trainees of both sexes wanted
concrete examples or a "list" of behaviors that constitute sexual
harassment. The Panel questions whether such a list would be beneficial.
It could be used as a means of getting "off the hook,\" without taking
responsibility or being held accountable for potentially offensive
behavior unless it is contained within a specific list. What is certain
is that sexual harassment in the broader context of dignity and respect
is not part of trainees' frame of reference.

-   **Some drill sergeants harass their soldiers and/or do not correct
    inappropriate behavior between trainees.**

Our data analysis suggests that sexual harassment is degrading good
order and discipline in some parts of the training base. Some drill
sergeants are committing acts of sexual harassment/misconduct as well as
failing to set the proper example or correcting inappropriate behavior
between trainees. The majority of trainees who reported that they had
been sexually harassed since joining the Army indicated that the
harassment had occurred either during training or in the barracks. As
seen in Table 13, the major source of sexual harassment for male
trainees was drill sergeants, while female trainees identified other
trainees as the major source of sexual harassment.

**Table 13\--Sources of Harassment**

  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------
  **Trainees**            **Drill Sergeants**     **Other Trainees**

  **Men (N = 736)**       42%                     22%

  **Women (N = 409)**     27%                     42%
  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------

This personal misconduct and/or failing to correct inappropriate
behavior between trainees affects not only the trainee who is being
victimized, but all trainees in the unit who fail to learn appropriate
behavior because of a lax attitude on the part of some drill sergeants.
Trainers, as well as trainees, must be more conscious of Army core
values, especially in terms of their leadership responsibilities.

-   **Generally, trainers reported they have not observed sexual
    harassment in their unit, but a significant number of female
    trainers reported they have experienced sexual harassment.**

***Extent of Sexual Harassment among Trainers***

Of the 254 trainers surveyed, 75% were men and 24% were women.[^40] Most
of the men (83%) and many of the women (67%) had not observed sexual
harassment in their current training company. However, 39% of the women
and 2% of the men reported that they had been subjected to sexual
harassment in the last 12 months. They reported that the most frequently
observed behaviors were crude or offensive behavior, sexist behavior,
and unwelcome sexual advances. Male trainers indicated that, with regard
to the most recent act of sexual harassment to which they had been
subjected, AIT instructors, officers in their chain of command, or other
drill sergeants had been the harassers. Female trainers identified other
drill sergeants, first sergeants, and other NCOs as the prevalent
harassers in their most recent experience.

Overall, 92% of the trainers reported experiencing at least one of the
SEQ behaviors. As shown in Table 14, most male and female trainers
reported that they had been subjected to crude or offensive behaviors
and sexist behaviors. Trainers were more likely than soldiers in the
Panel's Army-wide survey to report experiencing crude or offensive
behaviors, sexist behaviors, and unwanted sexual attention. Because of
the small sample of female trainers, their data should be viewed with
caution. Trainers experienced SEQ behaviors in higher numbers than any
other group surveyed.

**Table 14\--Trainer Responses: Experienced SEQ Behaviors**[^41]

+---------+------------+----------+------------+----------+----------+
|         | **Crude or | **Sexist | **Unwanted | **Co     | **A      |
|         | offensive  | be       | sexual     | ercion** | ssault** |
|         | behavior** | havior** | a          |          |          |
|         |            |          | ttention** |          |          |
+---------+------------+----------+------------+----------+----------+
| **Men** | 90%        | 73%      | 39%        | 6%       | 2%       |
|         |            |          |            |          |          |
| **(N =  |            |          |            |          |          |
| 190)**  |            |          |            |          |          |
+---------+------------+----------+------------+----------+----------+
| **      | 93%        | 93%      | 83%        | 40%      | 10%      |
| Women** |            |          |            |          |          |
|         |            |          |            |          |          |
| **(N =  |            |          |            |          |          |
| 61)**   |            |          |            |          |          |
+---------+------------+----------+------------+----------+----------+

One trainer commented, "I see more gender discrimination than sexual
harassment." Another trainer reported, "I had a complaint on my First
Sergeant. . . . He was allowed to PCS[^42] and I was moved to another
unit."

-   **Drill Sergeants, instructors, and officers are treating each other
    with varying degrees of respect, dignity, and support.**

***Peers***

Trainers were asked a series of questions about their relationships with
one another and with their officer leaders. Most of the male and female
trainers reported fair treatment from peers. Men more than women
mentioned in surveys and focus groups that trainers treat one another
with respect and courtesy and work together as a team. Female trainers,
however, reported negative relationships with male trainers due to
gender conflicts.

***Chain of Command***

Over two-thirds of the male trainers, but only half of the female
trainers, believe they have been treated fairly by their chain of
command overall or in sexual harassment matters. Most of the male
trainers and many of the female trainers feel they have the support of
their chain of command. Most men reported, however, that officers do not
treat them with respect and dignity. Many women echoed this concern. A
few drill sergeants complained that officers are spending too much time
with trainees doing "sergeant's business,\" either out of boredom or a
distrust of the drill sergeants, and they view this as disrespect. A
male trainer said, "Commanders are too involved; officers do too much of
our business." Two other trainers said, "Commanders are running scared
because of the media blitz,\" and "Officers will support you until he or
she gets in trouble. The staff sergeant or sergeant first class will
take the fall, not the officer." Men frequently mentioned disrespect
from senior officers as contributing to negative relationships.

***Inadequate Preparation of Trainers for IET Duty***

-   **Trainers complain that current EO training is not preparing them
    to handle sexual harassment situations.**

In assessing their Drill Sergeant Course or Instructor Training Course,
most trainers said they had been trained in effective ways to train
soldiers; however, only

some said their training prepared them for their current job. Trainers
complained that most of the training they received consisted of
memorizing modules or regulations, but did not teach them how to handle
sensitive situations when they occurred. One trainer highlighted this
point by saying "\[I was\] not trained to deal with \[sexual\] advances
by trainees." Another trainer said, "They show you a little film \[on
sexual harassment\], they show you how to recognize it, but not how to
handle it." Finally, another trainer discussed the problem with the
current training by saying, "\[The\] course \[on sexual harassment\]
needs to be updated. \[The\] situations are too old."

***POSH Training***

All trainers interviewed had received POSH training in the last 12
months. Many of the men reported that this training was effective in
making them aware of behaviors that might constitute sexual harassment,
but many women viewed the training as ineffective. Many trainers said
they were receiving POSH training too frequently; the Army was
"oversaturating" them with POSH training.

The Panel believes training for drill sergeants should address the fact
that attraction between drill sergeants and trainees does occur. Thus,
drill sergeants need training in recognizing inappropriate
feelings/behaviors in themselves and taking action to control the
situation. Currently, the Drill Sergeant Course and Instructor Training
Course do not prepare trainers to handle sexual harassment/misconduct
challenges that confront them in the IET environment. The POSH training
the Panel reviewed used simplistic examples of appropriate/inappropriate
behavior that offered little guidance in helping a trainer work through
difficult and complex interpersonal situations.

***Drill Sergeant School***

Drill sergeant training is conducted at three separate locations (Fort
Leonard Wood, Fort Jackson, and Fort Benning). The Panel sees a true
advantage in combining the three schools into one. There would be an
efficiency in resources and a uniform standard of quality for EO
training, affording candidates a common, shared understanding of sexual
harassment issues and Army ethics. Ultimately, the human relations
environment in the training base and in the Army as a whole would
benefit.

***Selection and Assignment of Trainers***

-   **The screening of candidates for drill sergeant duty lacks rigor.**

***Selection***

Drill sergeants and instructors are the most important contact new
trainees have with the Army. The demanding nature of drill
sergeant/instructor duties places these NCOs in positions of high
authority, autonomy, and respect. It is vitally important that these
NCOs be persons of the highest caliber, who demonstrate personal
discipline and character, and are held to strict standards of
professionalism.

The Army has established standards of selection for drill
sergeants.[^43] AR 614-200, *Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training
and Assignment*, states that, "Since the drill sergeant is the primary
representative of the Army during the formative weeks of an enlistee's
training, only the most professionally qualified soldiers will be
assigned these duties."[^44] In fact, however, the Panel observed a
general lack of rigor in the drill sergeant/instructor selection
process. Most of the drill sergeant candidates are selected at DA level.
Selectees are subjected to a records check that includes, among other
things, a personnel records screen. When a soldier volunteers, the
candidate's current chain of command must review and endorse the
candidate's suitability for the position. There is no psychological
testing of any type, other than a check of medical records. Once
soldiers have been selected as drill sergeant candidates, they risk
serious harm to their careers if they turn down or otherwise fail to
complete the program.

-   **The number of drill sergeants and their utilization present issues
    for Army review.**

***Assignment***

Army regulations require that BCT and OSUT drill sergeants be assigned
on a ratio of one drill sergeant for every 20 soldiers. In AIT, drill
sergeants are supposed to be assigned on a ratio of one drill sergeant
for every 50 soldiers. While the Army generally meets standards for BCT
and OSUT units, the Panel found that the number of drill sergeants in
AIT is woefully inadequate.[^45] No training unit visited by the Panel
had a full complement of drill sergeants. The Panel noted ratios as
large as one drill sergeant for every 200 soldiers in AIT units. Some of
the problems resulted from drill sergeants' attendance at schools, being
TDY, or being assigned to perform additional duties not normally
assigned to a drill sergeant (i.e., they were assigned these duties
because other support positions in units had been cut). The Army must
ensure drill sergeants are utilized appropriately, are of sufficient
number to maintain good order and discipline, and oversee the
soldierization process of their soldiers.

***Negative Consequences of Sexual Harassment Focus in IET***

-   **Trainees report a negative backlash in the form of ad hoc
    segregation as a consequence of emphasis of sexual harassment
    training.**

The publicity over sexual misconduct has prompted the Army to increase
requirements for POSH training. As a result, trainees perceive that the
Army is trying to prevent sexual harassment by "scaring" them into
compliance, rather than teaching them how to behave properly and
professionally. The result is that some soldiers reported alienation
between men and women.

Some trainees said that the Army has "gone overboard" with POSH
training. One male soldier said, "It becomes a joke if you receive too
much training. People stop paying attention." The established training
policy is to encourage gender-integrated training that reflects the
reality of a mixed-gender Army. It appears that, out of fear for their
own careers or possible embarrassment, some leaders have implemented an
unofficial policy of gender segregation within an integrated unit. This
results in divisiveness between soldiers, not the unified, high
performance team the Army must bond to ensure mission readiness.

Trainees note that gender segregation is occurring in their units. Some
male trainees stated they are afraid to even talk to female trainees,
not to mention working side-by-side with them every day. One male
trainee said, "In BCT, we are told to stay away from females. Climb up a
tree, whatever, avoid at all cost." One trainee reported that men and
women eat separately in the same dining facility, and that they shine
their boots on different bleachers. Some trainees reported that
gender-integrated basic training is "de facto" a "segregated-integrated"
basic training. A female trainee reported that, "If they won't let us
\[men and women\] talk to each other or help each other, why are we
training together?" In some of the male trainee focus groups, a number
of trainees said, "We are expected to work together. Why can't we train
together?" and "We are integrated, but segregated within."

-   **Trainers fear that if they are charged with sexual harassment,
    they will be treated unfairly by their leaders.**

Some male trainers indicated that they are fearful of potential sexual
harassment charges due to possible retaliation from trainees. Many male
drill sergeants and instructors expressed a belief that trainees'
complaints against drill sergeants are automatically viewed as credible,
even if lacking in merit. Most feel they receive adequate support from
their leadership\--until they become the subject of an accusation of
sexual harassment. A male trainer said, "I'd be gone. . . people are
expendable." Another trainer reported, "Once your name is mucked up with
a false allegation,[^46] the privates get away with making a false
allegation, but you never can clear your name."

Overall, trainers asserted the need for more strict punishment for
individuals who make false allegations. Many drill sergeants believe
that trainer and trainee roles have been improperly reversed with regard
to authority and credibility. According to many drill sergeants,
trainees who allege harassment or abuse at the hands of a drill sergeant
are more likely to be believed than the drill sergeant who denies the
allegation. Once a sexual harassment allegation is made, the trainer is
suspended from his/her training responsibilities. Even if the
allegations are unfounded, many drill sergeants expressed a belief that
the damage to their careers and reputations is permanent. Although the
UCMJ and Army regulations provide commanders with the authority to
process those who make false allegations, trainers do not perceive that
their leaders would take any action to punish trainees who complain
falsely.

Most drill sergeants understand the Army's definition of sexual
harassment. A few, however, complained of inconsistency in the
application of standards to NCOs and officers against whom an allegation
of sexual harassment is made. For example, a few NCOs thought it
"unlikely" that any officer would be charged with sexual harassment,
even though an NCO would be punished severely for the same conduct. One
trainer said, "An O-6 \[Colonel\] gets away with things an E-6 \[Staff
Sergeant\] would be killed for."

The Panel believes leadership is central to dealing with these negative
consequences. As discussed in the "Leadership" section of Part IV,
Volume I, leaders who practice good leadership can mitigate such adverse
effects.

***Other Issues***

-   **Generally, trainees perceive drill sergeants treat men and women
    equally, but some male trainees perceive they are expected to meet a
    higher standard.**

***Fair Treatment***

Most male trainees and many female trainees reported that, regardless of
gender, all soldiers receive equal encouragement to succeed and complete
training by both male and female drill sergeants. Men and women believe
that the drill sergeants uphold the same standards for all trainees.
Several female trainees reported, "I don't like the drill sergeants, but
they are all very fair," and "We all get our fair share of being picked
on." A few female trainees, however, indicated that female trainers are
harder on female trainees than on male trainees. In a trainee focus
group, a female trainee said, "Female drills are harder on females
because they want you to succeed." Another trainee reported, "Female
drill sergeants have high\[er\] expectations which leads to the
perception that women drill sergeants are harder."

Although the majority of trainees reported that drill sergeants
encourage men and women equally, more than one-half of male trainees
believed that they are expected to train to a higher standard than
women. Most female trainees, however, believe that women are expected to
achieve the same training standards as men. This perception of inequity
by men may lead to resentment and further alienation. A male trainee
reported, "\[We are assigned\] different details\--females do paperwork
and males dig up trees." This has the consequence of reinforcing sex
role stereotypes and diminishes the value of female trainees in the
unit.

Some male and female trainees reported that male/female double standards
are a problem in their training, but most trainees were referring to
physical training standards established by Army policy. Physical
training remains a misunderstood program when it comes to male and
female standards. Most soldiers understand different standards based on
age group, yet different standards based on gender receive much more
negative attention. A few male trainees also complained that the
military demeanor and conduct of female soldiers is more lax and
attributed this to more lenient treatment during training. Again,
leaders hold the key. It is their responsibility to maintain uniform
standards and to dispel misperceptions of preferential treatment or
double standards.

Other detractors also exist at AIT. Service members from other military
services and reclassified soldiers attending AIT are treated in a
different, much more collegial manner than trainees. Trainees view this
treatment as a double standard that further degrades an already troubled
environment. Drill sergeants must take on a more meaningful training
role in AIT.

-   **Trainees are more likely to report sexual harassment than soldiers
    in the rest of the Army.**

***Reporting Sexual Harassment***

When asked if they would report an incident of sexual harassment or
discrimination, most trainees replied that they would report an incident
of sexual harassment, if they were unable to handle it on their own or
if the harassment continued. One male trainee said, "The standard is
zero tolerance and if we don't report it we are wrong." Several female
trainees echoed this sentiment. One female trainee stated, "We feel we
have an obligation to report. If we don't report, the violator could
continue to harass others."

If unable to resolve a sexual harassment incident informally on their
own, most trainees stated that they would use formal methods to resolve
the situation. Most of the male trainees (70%) and many of the female
trainees (66%) agreed that the formal complaint procedures are clear.
Both male and female trainees said they would first report a sexual
harassment incident to their chain of command, specifically to the
officers in their chain of command, then to drill sergeants or
instructors, and finally to an outside source like a chaplain, an EOA,
or an EOR.

In many units, however, the EOR was a drill sergeant. Some trainees
complained that it is difficult to bring an EO or sexual harassment
complaint to an EOR who is a drill sergeant, particularly if the
complaint concerns another drill sergeant in the same unit.

**EPILOG**

The preceding pages represent the views of thousands of soldiers who met
with the Senior Review Panel. They have told the Panel their perceptions
of the Army's human relations environment and the impact of that
environment on their lives. The recommendations that have been made to
address problems in soldier workplaces are but the critical first steps
that Army leaders must take to improve the Army's human relations
environment.

This Report, the Panel's analysis in this volume and the data contained
in Volume II, represents the most comprehensive exploration of the human
relations environment of the United States Army ever compiled. Its very
existence underscores the Army's commitment to its soldiers.

Lastly, Panel members believe that one of the most important benefits of
its work is the impact its travels have had, and will continue to have,
on soldiers. They will long remember the great soldiers, men and women,
with whom they were privileged to meet.

**ANNEX B**

**SENIOR REVIEW PANEL MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES**

**Major General Richard S. Siegfried**

Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. MG Siegfried
retired from the U.S. Army on October 1, 1995, after 34 years of service
and was recalled to active duty by the Secretary of the Army to chair
the Panel. Previous assignments include Commanding General of Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, and Deputy Inspector General, Department of the
Army. His last assignment in the Army was as Inspector General, U.S.
Army.

**Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote**

Vice Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. BG Foote
retired from active duty on September 1, 1989, and was recalled to
active duty in December 1996, to serve with the Senior Review Panel.
During her 29 years of duty, she held a variety of command and staff
positions to include Deputy Inspector General (Inspections), Department
of the Army. Her career culminated with her assignment as Commanding
General of Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

**Mr. John P. McLaurin, III**

Assistant Vice Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment.

Mr. McLaurin is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military
Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy. He is a retired
Colonel of the U.S. Army and a lawyer. His key active duty assignments
before concluding his career in the Judge Advocate General's Corps
included Staff Judge Advocate of the 2nd Infantry Division in the
Republic of Korea, and of the Health Services Command in San Antonio,
Texas. In 1996, Mr. McLaurin served as a member of the Secretary of the
Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities.

**Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy**

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. LTG Kennedy has
served for over 28 years in first the Women's Army Corps and then in the
Army as a Military Intelligence Officer. She has held a variety of
command and staff positions both in the United States and in overseas
assignments. LTG Kennedy is currently serving as the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence.

**Major General Larry R. Ellis**

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. MG Ellis has
served for over 27 years as an Infantry Officer in various command and
staff assignments in the United States, Vietnam, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the Republic of Korea. From October 1996 to May 1997, he
served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. MG Ellis is
currently assigned as the Commanding General of 1st Armored Division.

**Mrs. Ruby Butler DeMesme**

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. Mrs. DeMesme is
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Force Management and
Personnel. She has served both the Army and the Air Force at the Senior
Executive Staff level since 1990. Mrs. DeMesme is a former Senate
staffer and has been an Army spouse for over 30 years.

**Command Sergeant Major Cynthia A. Pritchett**

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. CSM Pritchett
has served for over 23 years in leadership positions including Drill
Sergeant, student and faculty Battalion Commander at the United States
Army Sergeants Major Academy. CSM Pritchett is the Army's Senior
Enlisted Advisor to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the
Services. In 1996, she worked on the Secretary of the Army's Task Force
on Extremist Activities. CSM Pritchett is currently assigned as Post
Command Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir, Virginia\--the first woman
chosen to serve in this position.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **ANNEX C**                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| **ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS**                                          |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

  --------------- -------------------------------------------------------
  AAP             Affirmative Action Plan

  AIT             Advanced Individual Training

  AMEDD           Army Medical Department

  APFT            Army Physical Fitness Test

  AR              Army Regulation

  ARI             Army Research Institute

  ASI             Additional Skill Identifier

  BCT             Basic Combat Training

  BG              Brigadier General

  BOSS            Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers

  CAL             Center for Army Leadership

  CONUS           Continental United States

  CSM             Command Sergeant Major

  DA              Department of the Army

  DACOWITS        Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

  DA Pam          Department of the Army Pamphlet

  DCPC            Direct Combat Position Coding

  DCSOPS          Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

  DCSPER          Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

  DEOMI           Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute

  DIBRS           Defense Incident-Based Reporting System

  DoD             Department of Defense

  DMDC            Defense Manpower Data Center

  DRRI            Defense Race Relations Institute

  EEO             Equal Employment Opportunity

  EEOC            Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

  EO              Equal Opportunity

  EOA             Equal Opportunity Advisor

  EOR             Equal Opportunity Representative

  ETS             Expiration Term of Service

  FM              Field Manual

  FY              Fiscal Year

  GAO             U.S. General Accounting Office

  HQDA            Headquarters, Department of the Army

  HRD             Human Resources Directorate

  IET             Initial Entry Training

  IG              Inspector General

  LTG             Lieutenant General

  MACOM           Major Command

  MEPS            Military Entrance Processing Station

  MEOCS           Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey

  MG              Major General

  MOS             Military Occupational Specialty

  MPR             Military Police Report

  MSG             Master Sergeant

  MWR             Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

  NAACP           National Association for the Advancement of Colored
                  People

  NAFI            Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality

  NCO             Noncommissioned Officer

  NCOER           Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report

  NIBRS           National Incident-Based Reporting System

  OCONUS          Out of the Continental United States

  OCS             Officer Candidate School

  ODCSOPS         Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

  ODCSPER         Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

  OEOP            Office of Equal Opportunity Programs

  OER             Officer Evaluation Report

  OPTEMPO         Operational Tempo

  OSUT            One Station Unit Training

  PERSCOM         U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

  PERSTEMPO       Personnel Tempo

  PME             Professional Military Education

  POI             Program of Instruction

  POSH            Prevention of Sexual Harassment

  PT              Physical Training

  Ret.            Retired

  ROTC            Reserve Officers' Training Corps

  RR/EO           Race Relations/Equal Opportunity

  SEQ             Sexual Experiences Questionnaire

  SFC             Sergeant First Class

  SGM             Sergeant Major

  SIR             Serious Incident Report

  SQI             Skill Qualification Identifier

  SSG             Staff Sergeant

  SSI             U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute

  SSMP            Sample Survey of Military Personnel

  TC              Training Circular

  TDA             Table of Distribution and Allowances

  TDY             Temporary Duty

  TOE             Table of Organization and Equipment

  TRADOC          U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

  TSP             Training Support Package

  UCMJ            Uniform Code of Military Justice

  USMA            United States Military Academy

  WAC             Women's Army Corps
  --------------- -------------------------------------------------------

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **ANNEX D**                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| **INSTALLATIONS AND LOCATIONS VISITED**                               |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

The Panel visited the following installations/locations between January
21, and May 21, 1997:

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **CONUS (Continental United       |                                   |
| States)**                         |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland | Fort Lee, Virginia                |
|                                   |                                   |
| Army Materiel Command (AMC)       | Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri       |
|                                   |                                   |
| Headquarters, Virginia            | Letterkenny Army Depot,           |
|                                   | Pennsylvania                      |
| Baltimore Recruiting Battalion,   |                                   |
|                                   | Fort Lewis, Washington            |
| Maryland                          |                                   |
|                                   | Fort McClellan, Alabama           |
| Fort Belvoir, Virginia            |                                   |
|                                   | Fort Meade, Maryland              |
| Fort Benning, Georgia             |                                   |
|                                   | Headquarters, Department of the   |
| Fort Bliss, Texas                 | Army                              |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Bragg, North Carolina        | (Pentagon)                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Campbell, Kentucky           | Fort Polk, Louisiana              |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Carson, Colorado             | Fort Rucker, Alabama              |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Drum, New York               | Fort Sam Houston (AMEDD School),  |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Eustis, Virginia             | Texas                             |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Gordon, Georgia              | Seattle Recruiting Battalion,     |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Hood, Texas                  | Washington                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Huachuca, Arizona            | Fort Sill, Oklahoma               |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Irwin, California            | Tobyhanna Army Deport,            |
|                                   | Pennsylvania                      |
| Fort Jackson, South Carolina      |                                   |
|                                   | U.S. Total Army Personnel Command |
| Kansas City Recruiting Battalion, |                                   |
|                                   | (PERSCOM), Virginia               |
| Kansas                            |                                   |
|                                   | Walter Reed Army Hospital,        |
| Fort Knox, Kentucky               | District of                       |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Leavenworth, Kansas          | Columbia                          |
|                                   |                                   |
|                                   | White Sands Missile Range,        |
|                                   |                                   |
|                                   | New Mexico                        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **OCONUS (Out of the Continental  |                                   |
| United States)**                  |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **Alaska**                        | **Italy**                         |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Richardson                   | Vincenza                          |
|                                   |                                   |
| Fort Wainwright                   | **Japan**                         |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Bosnia**                        | Camp Zama                         |
|                                   |                                   |
| Tuzla                             | Okinawa                           |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Germany**                       | **Korea**                         |
|                                   |                                   |
| Heidelberg                        | Camp Casey                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| Mannheim                          | Camp Humphries                    |
|                                   |                                   |
| Ramstein                          | Camp Stanley                      |
|                                   |                                   |
| Baumholder                        | Yongsan                           |
|                                   |                                   |
| Darmstadt                         | **Kuwait**                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| Wurzburg                          | Camp Doha                         |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Hawaii**                        | **Panama**                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| Johnston Island                   | Fort Clayton                      |
|                                   |                                   |
| Schofield Barracks                | **Saudi Arabia**                  |
|                                   |                                   |
| Tripler Army Medical Center       | Dhahran                           |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Honduras**                      | Riyadh                            |
|                                   |                                   |
| Joint Task Force Bravo            |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

**ANNEX E**

**REVIEW OF POLICIES**

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

Before describing current Army policy regarding equal opportunity (EO)
for soldiers, it is appropriate to synopsize the Army's efforts during
the last thirty years.. In 1964, in respons to Department of Defense
(DoD) Directive 5120.36, *Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces*, the
Army implemented its first regulation concerning EO, Army Regulation
(AR) 600-21, *Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military* *Personnel*.
Since then, the Army's efforts to achieve equal opportunity have
centered around three issues: improving race relations, eliminating
gender discrimination, and eliminating sexual harassment.

***Race Relations***

During the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, the Army concentrated on
the problem of race relations. The Civil Rights movement, the
accompanying unrest of the 1960s, the institutional turmoil caused by
the Vietnam War, the end of the draft, and the need to establish a
volunteer Army all exacerbated tensions and heightened racial
polarization in the Army. Concerned that these problems were affecting
unit readiness, the Army directed its efforts toward educating soldiers
and leaders, and placing trained EO experts into the field. By 1972,
more than 20002012 school-trainEOE offics and noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) were on hand, filling formally established positions in the Army
unit organizational manning tables, to assist commanders in eliminating
racism and discrimination in the Army.

As stated in AR 600-42, *Race Relations Education for the Army*, Tte
objective of the Army race relations education program was "to maintain
the highest degree of organizational and combat readiness by fostering
harmonious relations among all military personnel under Army
control."[^47] Army policy mandated a yearly 18-hour block of race
relations and equal opportunity (RR/EO) instruction for all soldiers,
taught by instructors trained at the Defense Race Relations Institute
(DRRI), now known as the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
(DEOMI). Unit commanders, however, had no responsibility for EO
training. Regulations did direct leaders to nonsider the quality and
effectiveness of subordinates' leadership and support of RR/EO
principles and policies when evaluating them. ed a yearly 18 hour block
of classes fmmand implementation of the EOEOons program a special
subject for inspections.

In 19734, R 600-21, newly titled as *Race Relations and Equal
Opportunity*, and AR 600-42 placed the responsibility for conducting the
unit RR/EO program squarely on the chain of command. The Army developed
Lleader handboos, discussion outlines, and Army subject sces were
developed to as in training their soldiers. Surveys showed this directed
focus increased soldiers' trust that the Army was serious in solving the
most pressing EO problems.

\] coany-level commanders became ambivalent about their training
requirements, however*.*

> *On the one hand, they claimed that they did not have the time to
> devote to it; that they did not have the training to teach them how to
> conduct an effective program; that their personnel were not interested
> in it; that they had a difficult time getting personnel to attend
> because of conflicting "mission related" duties; that the RR/EO staff
> did not really provide adequate support; and that the program was
> being "crammed down their throats." On the other hand, they maintained
> that they wanted more responsibility for determining whether they
> needed a program in their units,* *how often training should be
> conducted, what topics should be covered, and who should attend.*[^48]

***Army Proponency***

The responsibility for monitoring the Army EO program was assigned to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army\--Equal Opportunity. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), a member of the Army
General Staff, was responsible for the development, management, and
execution of the EO program. In 1971, the Office of Equal Opportunity
Programs (OEOP) was established as a division in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) to carry out this
function. "This Office developed the policy and guidance for the Army's
EO program, and served as the Army's principal action office in helping
to resolve RR/EO problems throughout the Army."[^49]Department of Army
level managements' activities with regardams, (first in the Military
Policies Directorate and later the Directes Directorate (HRD)in
existence since 1971, initially was originally under the direction of a
general officer and a series of senior colonels. By 1985, the OEOP was a
just small branch within sources Directorate (HRD), ODCSPER, under the
direction of a major. In 186, the HRDantrally manage human resources
programs."people programs." Tonow authorized a lieutenant colonel and
sergeant major, is located within the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel, Leadership Division of HRD, ODCSPER.

***Women in the Army***

While women's issues were evident during the years of the Women's Army
Corps (WAC), the WAC chain of command typically ensured the resolution
of problems when and where they occurred. Change began in 1973 with the
end of the draft and the beginning of the all-volunteer Army. That same
year, Army policy changed to when de for equal opportunity and treatment
for uniformed members without regard to not only race, color, religion,
or national origin, but also gender. in 1973. On an individual basis,
women were no longer required to learvice onwhen pregnantcy, married
women were allowed to enlist, and women were given fu benefits for tir
dependentsrights. Organizationally, the years 1972 to 1978 were years of
change: women enthe Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program
in 1972, began integrating into Table of Organization and Equipment
(TOE) units in 1975, enrolled at West Pointthe United States Military
Academy (USMA) in 1976. By 1977, women startg alongside men in basic
training, and1976 female officers served in all branches of the Army
except combat arms. In 1978, the Women's Corps was disestablished and
women were integrated into the Army.

During the early and mid 1980s, changes in the Army's interpretation of
the combat exclusion policy resulted in several military occupational
specialties (MOSs) being closed to women and thousands of positions,
once open to women, being recoded male only. The Army's looked
reexamined its policy in to criticism from the General Accounting Office
(GAO) and the DoD Task Force on Women in the MilitaryJanuaryof the . By
1990, women coue in 90% of the listed MOSs; the remaining 10% that
remained closed arms, which were closed to women by the Ccombat
Eexclusion Ppolicy, which ws desiged toeep wmen out ofcombat. In January
1994, the Secretary of Defense directed that all positions be opened to
women except those units below brigade level that had a primary mission
of engaging in direct ground combat.

In 1977, the Army consolidated AR 600-21 and AR 600-42 under a new AR
600-21, *Equal Opportunity Program in the Army*. This regulation
affirmed that the EO program was a single, integrated program that
concerned all members of the Army. from Race Relations*rtunity* to
reathat the program w all members of y. Unit cCommandrs ar the content
velnoit an EO progrr organization., but no minimum training hours were .
The major commands (MACOMs) specifirdinate organizations consitent with
command needs and local conditions. It was left to individual commanders
to determine the content and development of local programs. In 1988, the
Army incorporated AR 600-21 into AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*,
sending an even stronger signal that EO was a command program.felt

***Policy on Sexual Harassment***

Department of Defense and Army policies have prohibited sexual
harassment of military and civilian personnel since 1981. Since then,
numerous policy memoranda by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Army, and the Army Chief of Staff of the Army have emphasized that
sexual harassment tolerated and that successful mission accomplishment
can only be achieved in an environment of mutual respect, dignity, and
fair treatment.been "unequivocal" in eliminating sexual harassmen
paragraph ondefining sexual harassment. was included in the equal
opportunity regula merged with AR 600-20 *Army Command* *Policies* in
1988. Since e first policy definition of se981, teu the definition
several

When Army-wide training on thxual harassment was mandated in 1982, the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed standardized
training plans for use in all service schools and ROTC courses.toIn
1986, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) mandated an
intensification of unit EO and prevention of sexual harassment (POSH)
training in response to survey and anecdotal evidence that female
soldiers were not receiving proper treatment.

**EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (EO)** **POLICY**

In Executive Order 9981 of 1948, President Harry S. Truman declared it
"to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without
regard to race, color, religion or national origin." Department of
Defense Directive 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military Equal
Opportunity* *(MEO) Program,* provides current policy guidance on
military equal opportunity. Its directives include the following:

> *2. Promote an environment free from personal, social, or
> institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the
> highest level of responsibility possible. Service members shall be
> evaluated only on individual merit, fitness, and capability. Unlawful
> discrimination against persons or groups based on race, color,
> religion, sex, or national origin is contrary to good order and
> discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission
> accomplishment. Unlawful discrimination shall not be condoned.*
>
> *3. Use the command to promote, support, and enforce the MEO program.
> The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for
> identifying and correcting discriminatory practices. This includes the
> processing and resolving of complaints of unlawful discrimination and
> sexual harassment, and for ensuring that human relations and EO
> matters are taken seriously and acted upon as necessary. The chain of
> command is responsible for creating and maintaining a MEO environment
> that incorporates the policies set out in this Directive.*
>
> *6. Provide for an environment that is free from unlawful
> discrimination and sexual harassment.*[^50]

The Army established its EO program in 1964 to ensure equal opportunity
and just treatment of soldiers and their families on and off post.
Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, establishes the current
Army EO program and states that the program "formulates, directs, and
sustains a comprehensive effort to maximize human potential and to
ensure fair treatment of all soldiers based solely on merit, fitness,
and capability, which support readiness."[^51]

Army Regulation 600-20 is explicit in affixing responsibility for EO to
the chain of command.

> *The chain of command, whether military or civilian, has the primary
> responsibility for developing and sustaining a healthy EO* *climate.
> This responsibility entails, but is not limited to, promoting positive
> programs that enhance unit cohesion, esprit, and morale; communicating
> matters with EO significance to unit personnel and higher
> headquarters; correcting discriminatory practices by conducting rapid,
> objective, and impartial inquiries to resolve complaints of
> discrimination; encouraging the surfacing of problems and preventing
> reprisal for those who complain; and taking appropriate action against
> those who violate Army policy.*[^52]

Chapter 6 also establishes EO hotlines at all installations, prescribes
EO policies, defines sexual harassment, lists the staffing requirements
and duties of equal opportunity advisors (EOAs), explains the complaint
process, addresses mandatory unit training requirements, and outlines
the parameters for professional military education course training
support packages.

The Army last updated Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 in September 1993, with
Interim Change 4. Change 4 expired in September 1995. The proponent,
ODCSPER, has continued the regulation until the new AR 600-20 is
published.[^53] The current regulation does not incorporate the 1995 DoD
definition of sexual harassment, as required by DoD Dictive 1350.2.

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, commanders must review their
affirmative action plan at least annually. Guidance to the field in this
area also is outdated in that the Department of the Army Affirmative
Action Plan, found in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-26,
was last published in May 1990.

***EOA/EOR Duties and Responsibilities***

In accordance with Chapter 6 of AR 600-20,*A* military personnelwith EO
as their primary duty are assigned to assist commanders at
installations, organizations, and agencies that are brigade-level or
equivalent and higher commands. The Commanding General, U.S. Total Army
Personnel Command Personnel Command (Pd to select officers and NCOs for
training and duty as the EOAs. Most officers assigto EO positions are
graduates of the two-week Equal Opportunity Program Manager course
taught by DEOMI. NoncommissionedN officers assigned t EOA positions must
be graduates of the 16-week DEOMI resident course.There is

Equal opportunity representatives (EORs) assist commanders at
battalion-level and below in carrying out the EO program within their
units. Unlike EOAs, EORs do not attend the 16-week DEOMI program of
instruction and are not utilized in special duty assignments. Equal
opportunity representative duties are a part-time, secondary
responsibility.

***Complaint System***

In 1993, the Army restructured the complaint system described in AR
600-20 in response to a reported lack of confidence in the old system.
Although the primary and preferred channel for identifying and
correcting discriminatory practices is the chain of command, the new
system gives a soldier a number of alternate channels for filing
complaints if the complainant feels uncomfortable in filing a complaint
with the chain of command, or if the complaint is against a member of
the chain of command. Other channels available to soldiers include the
EOA, inspector general, chaplain, provost marshal/criminal investigation
command, medical agencies, staff judge advocate, and housing referral
office. Ultimately, the chain of command is responsible for ensuring
that human relations issues are taken seriously and acted upon as
necessary.

***Command Authorities***

Commanders have the authority under current law, rule, and regulation to
deal with cases of unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment. Army
Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-4, "Soldier Conduct," provides that
"\[e\]nsuring the proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command.
Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army . . . to . . . \[t\]ake
action against military personnel in any case where the soldier's
conduct violates good order and discipline." Although Chapter 6 of AR
600-20 is not punitive, the commander's inherent authority to impose
administrative sanctions and the nonjudicial punishment and punitive
articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provide
commanders with sufficient authority to enforce Army policy in matters
of discrimination and harassment.

Commanders have the full range of administrative actions available to
them to deal with violators of Army policy on equal opportunity,
including sexual harassment. A commander can initiate administrative
action against a soldier who committed an offense, as a single action or
in conjunction with action under the UCMJ. Administrative action is
meant to be corrective and rehabilitative. These actions range from
counseling to involuntary separation.

When administrative measures are inadequate due to the nature of the
offense or the record of the soldier, nonjudicial punishment and trial
by court-martial are available for use by a commander depending on the
severity of the offense. Nonjudicial punishment is authorized by Article
15 of the UCMJ. Its purpose, according to the Manual for Courts-Martial
is to provide "commanders with an essential and prompt means of
maintaining good order and discipline and also promotes positive
behavior changes in servicemembers without the stigma of a court-martial
conviction."[^54]

If a commander decides, after investigation, that an offense is too
serious for nonjudicial punishment, then the commander may seek to have
charges referred for trial by court-martial. A commander may also
forward charges for disposition by a superior commander. Figures 4-7 and
6-1, DA Pam 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide,* list sexual
harassment behaviors and equal opportunity violations subject to UCMJ
actions..

***DoD Sexual Harassment Definition***

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military
Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program*, August 1995, requires that the
military services adopt the following definition of sexual harassment:

> *\[1\]* *A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual
> advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
> conduct of a sexual nature when:*
>
> *a.* *Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
> implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or career, or*
>
> *b.* *Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used
> as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person,
> or*
>
> *c. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
> with an individual's work* *performance or creates an intimidating,
> hostile, or offensive working environment.*
>
> *This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable
> as "abusive work environment" harassment, need not result in concrete
> psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe or
> pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does
> perceive, the work environment as hostile or offensive. ("Workplace"
> is an expansive term for Military members and may include conduct on
> or off duty, 24 hours a day.) \[2\]* *Any person in a supervisory or
> command position who uses or condones* *any form of* *sexual behavior
> to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a Military
> member or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment. \[3\]*
> *Similarly, any Military member or civilian employee who makes
> deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or
> physical contact of a sexual nature is engaging in sexual
> harassment.*[^55]

This definition of sexual harassment consists of three parts. The first
part, indicated by \[1\] above, is similar to that used for civilian
employee cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, and as defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).[^56] A case law commentary by DoD follows part \[1\]. The second
and third parts, indicated by \[2\] and \[3\] above, are agency policies
on sexual harassment that DoD has added to the traditional Title VII
definition.

There are two categories of sexual harassment addressed in the first
part of the definition. These categories are *quid pro quo* and hostile
environment. *Quid pro quo* literally means "this for that," and
encompasses those behaviors defined in paragraphs a and b of the
definition. A hostile environment occurs when soldiers or civilians are
subjected to unwanted behavior of a sexual nature that causes
unreasonable interference with work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment, i.e., paragraph c of
the definition. This type of behavior may include verbal behavior, such
as deliberate or repeated comments of a sexual nature, and/or nonverbal
behavior, such as leering, ogling, display of pinup calendars, or
inappropriate touching.

A hostile environment is measured by its impact upon those affected, not
by the intent of those exhibiting the behaviors. Impact, not intent, is
the key. Whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined
only by looking at all the circumstances. One must consider whether a
reasonable person would find the environment hostile or abusive as well
as the victim's subjective perception that the environment is abusive.

Gender, or sex, discrimination is defined as discrimination based solely
on an individual being male or female. Discrimination based on one's sex
is often linked to a set of assumptions based on sex role stereotypes
concerning the abilities, competence, status, and roles of the
particular group, resulting in a disparate treatment of or impact on
that group.

Some conduct based on sex role stereotypes falls into a gray area.
Although it may not particularly create a hostile environment or set up
a *quid pro quo*"situation, the conduct as offensive and intimidating
for the recipient. The conduct might be based on everyday
misunderstandings in communication or customary, taken- or- ganted
remarks and actions that may or may not be classified as discriminatory
or harassing.

***Fraternization***

Sexual harassment is sometimes confused with fraternization.
Fraternization occurs when an officer or NCO engages in a relationship
with a subordinate that (1) causes actual or perceived partiality,
preferential treatment, or unfairness; (2) undermines authority, morale,
or discipline; or (3) involves an abuse of rank, position, or authority
for personal gain. The Army policy on fraternization is in AR 600-20,
chapter 4, and DA Pam 600-35, *Relationships Between Soldiers of
Different Ranks,* which define and distinguish proper and improper
relationships between soldiers of different ranks. Fraternization
focuses on the senior-subordinate relationship, and does not necessarily
depend upon a male-female or sexual relationship.

Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and NCOs may be criminally
punished under Article 134, UCMJ, for fraternizing with subordinates on
terms of military equality.[^57] The gist of this offense is a violation
of the custom of the service. The Manual for Courts-Martial explains
that not all contact or association between officers and enlisted
persons is a criminal offense; it depends on the surrounding
circumstances. "The acts and circumstances must be such as to lead a
reasonable person experienced in the problems of military leadership to
conclude that the good order and discipline of the armed forces has been
prejudiced by their tendency to compromise the respect of enlisted
persons for the professionalism, integrity, and obligations of an
officer."[^58] Regulations, directives, and orders may also govern
conduct between officer, NCO, and enlisted personnel on both an
Army-wide or local basis. Violations of such regulations, directives, or
orders may be punished under Article 92, UCMJ.

environmen onon hostile en **Training**

In the early 1970s, EO training was a mandatory 18-hour standardized
program taught annually by DRRI-trained instructors. Today, EO training
is required at least twice a year, with commander discretion in
determining some of the program content, duration of training, the
attendees, and the instructor.

qual pportunity epresentativespDe 13.2 requires that all military
personnel, from trainee to general officer, receive training in EO,
human relations, and POSH on a recurring basis, and at all levels of
professional military education. Thedated in DoD Regulation eehensive
material on leadership roles and responsibilities for EO programs,
complaints processing, legal implications, reprisal prevention and
detection, climate assessment methodologies, and managing civilian equal
opportunity (EEO) systems. Army training policy meets the mandatory
training requirements of DoD Directive 1350.2.

Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, mandates the conduct of
unit EO training at least twice a year. This guidance differs from AR
350-1, *Army Training*, and 350-41, *Training in Units*, which require
commanders to conduct refresher training on EO and POSH, but leave the
frequency of training up to the commander. Refresher training is used
when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. This type of training
depends on the local situation and the commander's assessment of need.
Refresher training may be designed to support unit cohesion, discipline,
and morale, the lack of which can adversely affect the command climate
and unit readiness, and, therefore, mission accomplishment.

Training materials, such as DA Pam 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity
Training Guide*, and Training Circular (TC) 26-6, *Commander's Equal
Opportunity Handbook*, provide the commander with a limited array of
off-the-shelf training programs. Unfortunately, some commanders with
whom the Panel spoke were unaware of the existence of such training
aids.

The extent and quality of human relations training that officer
candidates receive varies greatly depending upon their source of
commission. The United States Military Academy employs a comprehensive
program entitled *Bedrock II: Consideration of Others*. This program
provides 58 hours of human relations training over a cadet's four-year
term, of which 25 hours deal with EO and gender issues. The Military
District of Washington has adopted USMA's program for its Army
installations. Reserve Officers' Training Corps human relations training
is not standardized. The U.S. Army Cadet Command has directed local ROTC
commanders to evaluate and devise their own programs based upon training
needs. Soldiers at the Officer Candidate School (OCS) receive a two-hour
block of instruction in the area of human relations.

The Army is providing relatively little emphasis on human relations
training in its service schools. For example, the Command and General
Staff College teaches only 3.2 hours of EO out of 1,616 contact hours,
and only 20 minutes of POSH. The Sergeants Major Academy currently has
4.7 of EO training, of which 30 minutes are devoted to POSH. The Army
War College has no POSH training, but will add a block of instruction
for academic year 1997-98.fur The following tables show the current
enlisted and officer training hours for EO and POSH.[^59]

**Table** **1\--EO and** **POSH** **Training** **in** **Enlisted**
**Service Schools**

  ---------------------------------- ------------ ------------- --------------
  **Training Course**                **Total      **Equal       **Prevention
                                     Hours of     Opportunity   of Sexual
                                     Training**   Course        Harassment
                                                  Hours**       Course Hours**

  **Basic Combat Training**          320 hours    3.2 hours     40 minutes

  **Primary Leadership Development   160-179      4.7 hours     15 minutes
  Course**                           hours                      

  **Basic NCO Course**               208-279      5.1 hours     35 minutes
                                     hours                      

  **Advanced NCO Course**            200-744      6.0 hours     25 minutes
                                     hours                      

  **Drill Sergeant Course**          344 hours    3.0 hours     50 minutes

  **First Sergeant Course**          200 hours    4.9 hours     50 minutes

  **Sergeant Major Course**          1536 hours   4.7 hours     30 minutes

  **Command Sergeant Major Course**  40 hours     1.5 hours     20 minutes
  ---------------------------------- ------------ ------------- --------------

**Table** **2\--EO and** **POSH** **Training in Officer Service
Schools**

  ------------------------------ -------------- ------------- --------------
  **Training Course**            **Total Hours  **Equal       **Prevention
                                 of Training**  Opportunity   of Sexual
                                                Course        Harassment
                                                Hours**       Course Hours**

  **Officer Basic Course**       400-892 hours  5.2 hours     25 minutes

  **Officer Advanced Course**    200-800 hours  6.3 hours     25 minutes

  **Warrant Officer Candidate    240 hours      5.2 hours     25 minutes
  Course**                                                    

  **Warrant Officer Advanced     240-560 hours  6.3 hours     30 minutes
  Course**                                                    

  **Pre-Command Course**         40-80 hours    1.5 hours     20 minutes

  **Command and General Staff    1616 hours     3.2 hours     20 minutes
  College**                                                   
  ------------------------------ -------------- ------------- --------------

Within the last two years, TRADOC has developed a common core concept
that has reduced the number of training support packages (TSPs) required
for EO and POSH from fifteen to four and standardized training on these
subjects at the following levels: basic leader level (platoon leaders
and squad leaders) through the senior leader level (sergeants major,
warrant officers, and majors). Upon implementation of these TSPs, all
soldiers from accession through separation will receive
discussion-based, non-repetitive, progressive, and sequential training.
The EO TSPs for initial entry training (IET) and drill sergeant school
are not included as part of the common core, but are separate training
requirements. Updated TSPs are being implemented in IET and drill
sergeant school training.

As stated earlier, EOAs attend the 16-week DEOMI program of instruction.
Equal opportunity representative training is a command/installation
responsibility. There is no uniform training of EORs. Commands and
installations have developed their own training materials. DEOMI-trained
EOAs train EORs with a local 80-hour course, but the course is often
erratic: training aids are limited and some EOAs do not have all the
necessary skills to conduct the training adequately. The EO proponent
for the development of TSPs for Army schools is the Adjutant General's
School, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute. In order to better support
commanders, the Adjutant General's School is developing a program of
instruction (POI) for EOR training. Implementation of the POI is
scheduled for October 1998.

**Survey** **of** **leadership in** **Army** **documentsRegulations**

> *The leaders we develop must be competent in and dedicated to the
> profession of arms and experts in the art of war; they must be
> committed to upholding the dignity and respect of all soldiers,
> civilians and subordinates; they must be dedicated to the nation; they
> must demonstrate physical and moral courage; and they must be
> forthright and candid in all their dealings.*[^60]

The Senior Review Panel reviewed AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*; DA Pam
350-*5*8, *Leader Development for America's Army,* *The Enduring
Legacy*, DA Pam 600-50, White Paper, *Leadership* *"Makes the
Difference"*,;DA Pam 600-80, *Executive Leadership*,; M 100-1, *The
Army*; FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, FM 22-102, *Soldier Team*
*DevelopmentBu* and the hree volumes of TC 22-9, *Leader Development
Program, for* *Militarofessionalism.* Throughout Army leadership
doctrine, mission accomplishment and unit readiness are tied to Army
values, and the ned to treat soldiers with dignity and respect. What
follows is a précis of these regulations.

> *Integrity. This* *is the thread woven through the fabric of the
> professional Army ethic. Integrity means honesty, uprightness, the
> avoidance of deception and steadfast adherence to standards of
> behavior.*
>
> *All leaders are responsible for:* *(1) Accomplishing the unit's
> mission.* *(2)* *eEnsuring subordinates welfare to include physical,
> moral, personal, and professional well-being.,* *. . (4) sStting and
> exemplifying the highest professional and ethical standards.,* *.* *.
> (13)* *tTreting subordinates with dignity, respect, fairness and
> consistency.*
>
> *Senior level leaders promote Army values by establishing and
> maintaining the command climate of their organizations through sound,
> ethical organizational policies and practices.* *. . .* *Senior
> leaders must consider individual perceptions and their effects in
> establishing and maintaining a healthy command climate.*
>
> *Leaders at the direct level affect values and behavior by
> establishing day-to-day procedures, practices and working norms, by
> their personal example, and by building discipline, cohesion,
> motivation, consistency and fair play.* *. . .* *The values leaders
> personally practice have a major impact in determining unit and
> organizational value systems.*
>
> AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, pp. 1-2 (September 1993)
>
> *Behavior refers to actions or reactions to specific situations*
> *based on attitude, beliefs, and values.* *Unlike attitudes, behavior
> is easily measured and influenced through positive and negative
> reinforcement*.
>
> DA Pam 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army, The Enduring
> Legacy*, p. 3 (October 1994)
>
> *Caring means much more than a cursory interest in others. It means
> sincere involvement in helping to find solutions to problems and
> improving welfare. Caring means setting examples of moral and
> professional excellence in order to inspire the subordinates to new
> heights. It means talking with and listening to subordinates, not
> simply talking at them; doing something about hardships or problems,
> not paying lip service to them; teaching individuals by counseling,
> not by abusing them. Caring means fostering a command climate where
> people are challenged, where they feel their contributions make a
> difference, and where they feel good about themselves and the Army
> they serve. Caring and leading go together. You can't have one without
> the other!*
>
> DA Pam 600-50, White Paper*, Leadership* *"Makes the Difference*,*"*
> p. 8 (April 1985)
>
> *The young people who join the Army and each of the other Services
> come with their own hopes and expectations. The commitment of a human
> resources program is to these young people, but it is also to their
> parents, families, and communities. These young people are the
> nation's most valuable resource for the future. Their service may span
> a single enlistment or an entire career. If, during that time, they
> learn fairness and justice, if their experience has led to growth in
> skills and maturity\--then the Army will have fulfilled a most
> important obligation to society. This is a contribution to
> nation-building in the truest sense, and is fundamental to defending
> the Constitution\--not by arms alone.* *. .* *.* *Society's view of
> whether or not the obligation is fulfilled will be determined, in
> large part, by the perceptions of "reality" at the operating level, as
> seen by serving sons and daughters*.
>
> DA Pam 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, pp. 43-44 (June 1987)
>
> *As a leader, you are* *responsible for understanding and directly
> transmitting the Army's values to* *your* *soldiers.* *. . .* *Since
> the Army's purpose is to protect the nation and its values, the Army's
> ethic must be consistent with national will and values.* *. . .*
> *Beliefs are assumptions or convictions* *you hold* *as true about
> some thing, concept, or person.* *. . .* *Values are attitudes about
> the worth or importance of people, concepts, or things.* *. . .*
> *Norms are the rules or laws normally based on agreed-upon beliefs and
> values that members of a group follow to live in harmony*.
>
> FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, pp. 22-24 (July 1990)
>
> *A mature soldier develops physically, socially, emotionally, and
> spiritually. Physical fitness and development provide the stamina
> necessary for sustained action and intense stress. Social maturity
> provides the willingness to work with others in cohesive teams.
> Emotional maturity gives stability to deal with the stress of combat.
> Spiritual maturity gives the soldier hope and purpose to face the
> dangers and uncertainty of combat.*
>
> *Research has shown that during* *IET* *values that enhance teamwork
> become more important while values that reflect individual
> accomplishment become less important. IET begins to instill team
> values, and the process continues as the soldier moves from unit to
> unit.*
>
> *Teaching such values is not an attempt to drastically change the
> soldier.* *. . .* *If soldiers are going to become productive team
> members, they must begin to share the values that enhance team
> performance.*
>
> *These values* *will* *become the standards of the unit. Standards are
> those principles or rules by which behaviors and tasks are measured as
> successfully accomplished.* *. . .* *Soldiers will measure other
> soldiers by it. It gradually becomes a criterion for acceptance into
> the team.* *. . .* *When members of a squad, section, or platoon share
> these values and adhere to the standards that flow from them, they are
> a more cohesive team.*
>
> FM 22-102, *Soldier Team* *Development*, pp. 3, 18-19 (March 1987)
>
> *The Army ethos, the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that
> characterize and motivate the Army, is succinctly described in one
> word\--**DUTY**.* ***Duty*** *is behavior required by moral
> obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness.*
> *. . .* *It requires the impartial administration of standards without
> regard to friendship, personality, rank, or other bias.* *. . .*
> *Compassion is basic respect for the dignity of each individual;
> treating all with dignity and respect. It is the personification of
> the "Golden Rule," treat others as you want them to treat you.*
>
> FM 100-1, *The Army*, pp. 5-9 (June 1994)
>
> *American soldiers come from a wide range of cultural backgrounds.
> Upon entering the military service, they are called upon to adapt
> their individual values to those of the military profession.*
>
> FM 100-1, *The Army*, p. 10 (June 1994)
>
> *1.* *Compliance with a specific value occurs when a soldier behaves
> in a particular manner based solely on anticipated reward or
> punishment. Compliance requires the actual or imminent presence of the
> leader. The statement, "I don't* *cheat* *because I may get caught,"
> is an example of compliance.* *2.* *Identification with a value set
> occurs when a soldier acts in accordance with the value set of the
> group in order to become a full member of the group rather than to
> avoid punishment. The statement, "I will not* *cheat on the rifle
> range* *because 1st Platoon* *does not cheat on the rifle range* *and
> I am a member of 1st Platoon," reflects a group value a soldier
> adheres to in order to be an accepted member.* *3.* *Internalization
> occurs when a soldier adopts the group's value set as his own. The
> soldier believes in the values and acts accordingly in any
> circumstance. The soldier's behavior persists regardless of the
> situation. "I don't* *cheat because it is wrong to cheat," is an
> example of internalization*.
>
> STP 21-II-MQS, *Military* *Qualification* *Standards II, Manual of
> Common Tasks for Lieutenants and Captains*, Leadership S1-9001.10-0002
> Explain the Professional Army Ethic (January 1991)
>
> *Army leaders must not only be technically and tactically competent,
> they must commit themselves to the highest standards of ethical
> conduct. They must understand the values of the professional soldier
> and model them in their daily lives. Only in this way will they earn
> the trust, confidence, and respect of their subordinates and fellow
> soldiers.*
>
> TC 22-9-1, -2, -3, *Leader Development Program for Military
> Professionalism*, p. iii (May 1986)
>
> *Every organization, no matter whether a squad, platoon, or company,
> has only a finite amount of energy to expend to accomplish its
> mission. That energy can be wasted or enhanced. In a unit with a
> positive healthy climate, that energy is, or can be, more than the sum
> total of the energy of its members. . . .* *but the energy of an
> organization can be wasted as well. If you are forced to expend energy
> looking over your shoulder, preparing to cover yourself for some
> inspection, building a wall of numbers and statistics to look good,
> you will have little energy left to teach your soldiers, be
> innovative, or accomplish your mission.*
>
> TC 22-9-2, *Leader Development Program for Military Professionalism
> (Company/Battery Instruction)*, pp. 60-61 (May 1986)
>
> *Many of our ethical conflicts in peacetime occur because we have some
> members of the profession who forget that the real test occurs on the
> battlefield.* *use "efficient" centralized methods of training and
> "zero dAnd that* *demandsincludes* *our ethics.* *. . .* *Our values
> of* *fairness andcern for* *the individual are supportedbyour national
> values, but they also contribute to unit loyalty and cohesiveness.
> Military values originate and command our adherence primarily because
> they are useful. They create standards of behavior that members of a
> professional Army need if we are to fight and win the next war. And
> that is the only reason we are here.*
>
> TC 22-9-3, *Leader Development Program for Military Professionalism*
> *(Battalion Instruction)*, p. 10 (May 1986)

**Data Collection and Reporting**

The Senior Review Panel reviewed Department of Justice and DoD
requirements for data collection and reporting of discrimination and sex
crimes. Also analyzed were Army reporting requirements as contained in
AR 190-40, *Serious Incident Report*; AR 190-45, *Law Enforcement
Reporting*; AR 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities*; AR 380-13,
*Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated
Persons and Organizations*; and Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, *Army Command
Policy*.

On October 15, 1996, DoD published DoD Directive 7730.47, *Defense
Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS).* The Defense Incident-Based
Reporting System is a data collection system and repository meant to be
responsive to a series of statutory reporting requirements and to
anticipated congressional and DoD information needs. It will meet data
requirements for the Uniformed Crime Reporting Act of 1988 and the Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act of 1994 and permits DoD to monitor and
measure compliance with the Victims Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.

The Uniformed Crime Reporting Act of 1988 established the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the national counterpart of
DIBRS. The National Incident-Based Reporting System collects and
annually reports statistics on crime in the United States. The
Department of Defense must report incidents in accordance with the
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime
Reporting Handbook. According to a recent DoD point paper, "only ten
states and no federal agencies are fully compliant with the provisions
of NIBRS."[^61]

Department of Defense 7730.47-M, *Manual for the Defense Incident-Based
Reporting System*, requires the submission of specified data elements.
Reportable incidents include (1) those reportable under the Uniform
Crime Reporting Handbook; (2) criminal incidents not reportable under
this handbook, but punishable under the UCMJ, which include such
high-interest incidents as sexual harassment, sexual assault, rape, and
fraternization; (3) civilian criminal incidents committed by military
personnel on active duty resulting in a felony conviction; and (4) other
reportable incidents, such as sudden infant death syndrome and suicide.
The Department of Defense and the military services are currently
working on implementing DIBRS. There is some concern that, in its
present form, DIBRS is an unnecessary and offensive invasion of privacy.
"When finished, DIBRS will provide a standard data system that tracks
criminal incidents from initial allegation to final disposition through
the law enforcement, criminal investigation, command action, judicial
and corrections phases."[^62]

Army Regulation 190-40 mandates submission of a Serious Incident Report
(SIR) to HQDA for selected serious incidents or criminal offenses. The
SIR contains a data entry for racially or ethnically motivated criminal
acts. Field experience, however, finds that racial or ethnic motivation
is not always immediately discernible. Often, such determinations are
made later in the investigation, after the SIR has been submitted. There
is no requirement for a subsequent "add-on" report once this
determination has been made. Although no data entry currently exists for
crimes resulting from religious intolerance or sexual orientation, a
forthcoming revision to AR 190-40 will encompass all forms of
significant hate and bias crimes.

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, paragraph 6-15, the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA, wollects, records, and
maintains racial, ethnic group, and gender data and statistics needed to
support the Army EO program, to include affirmative action plan (AAP)
reporting requirements. Heads of DADA sff elements, MACOMs, separate
agencies, and other activities and units required to publish AAPs are
authorized to collect, record, and maintain data and statistics.
Statistical data is maintained for the various AAP subject areas using
the raciethnic, and gender designations*.*

Major commands and the designated heads of Army staff agencies,
directorates, and field operating agencies submit an annual narrative
and statistical report on equal opportunity progress to HQDA. The report
includes (1) progress made in achieving established EO goals; (2) unit
EO complaints by type (race, national origin, religion, gender, and
sexual harassment) with race and ethnic group, gender, and method of
resolution marked for each type on DA Form 7280-R, *Unit EO Complaint
Report*; and (3) the number of subordinate units by echelon and the
number of unit climate assessments conducted.

Department of Army Pamphlet 600-26, *Department of the Army Affirmative
Action Plan*, has various reporting requirements to HQDA for annual
narrative and statistical reports on affirmative action progress.
**CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS**

Climate assessments are a key mechanism for commanders to anticipate and
prevent problems. Climate assessments are designed to be used by
commanders and other leaders to identify issues that might not otherwise
come to their attention. The current array of climate assessment tools
available to commanders do not adequately meet their needs.

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, August 1995, directs that the
Services "\[r\]equire commanders to assess their organization EO
climate, preferably as part of their assumption of command, and schedule
follow-up assessments periodically during their command tenure."[^63]
The current version of AR 600-20 (Interim Change 4) recommends that
commanders conduct a unit climate assessment within 90 days of assuming
command and then annually thereafter. While this guidance is not in
compliance with the DoD Directive, the draft revision to AR 600-20
remedies this shortfall by requiring commanders to conduct a unit
climate assessment within 90 days of assuming command and annually
thereafter.

Training Circular 26-6, *Commander's Equal Opportunity Handbook*, uses
language similar to that contained in AR 600-20. It, too, must be
revised to be in compliance with DoD Directive 1350.2 and to be
consistent with the draft revision to AR 600-20. Department of the Army
Pamphlet 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide*, references AR
600-20, but notes "commanders must conduct a climate assessment and unit
training needs assessment NLT \[not later than\] 60 days after assuming
command."[^64] Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, thus, differs
from both the current and the draft revision to AR 600-20.

Assessments of unit climate can and should be based on several methods.
Methods described in TC 26-6 include surveys, interviews, sensing
sessions, observations, and reviews of records and reports. While most
assessment methods require no particular tools, the survey method
requires careful development of an appropriate instrument. Although a
number of survey instruments have been developed for the Army or DoD
over the years, most climate assessment survey instruments are dated and
do not include questions about sexual harassment.

The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) is the most common
assessment survey instrument currently in use across the Army.
Commanders who request this survey must send the completed survey forms
to DEOMI for analysis and a report. The Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute has indicated that, because of insufficient
funding, it will be unable to meet the demand for analysis of MEOCS,
once the AR 600-20 provisions requiring all commanders to conduct an
annual climate assessment are put into effect\--assuming MEOCS is the
assessment tool commanders employ.

DA Pam 600-69, *Unit Climate Profile Commander's Handbook*, also
contains a climate assessment survey instrument available to commanders.
It does not include questions on sexual harassment or hostile
environment and barely touches the issue of gender discrimination. It
does include three questions asking if the officers, NCOs, or immediate
leaders in the unit treat soldiers fairly without regard to race, ethnic
background, or sex. The assessment does not allow for certain
demographic information of the respondent, such as race, gender, and
rank.

The current Army-wide survey of command climate, the biannual Sample
Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP), includes items on sexual harassment
on a recurring basis. This survey is targeted at the whole Army with the
exception of soldiers in training, in transit, in the hospital, or
attending school, and does not provide an assessment specifically geared
to one commander.

The Human Resources Directorate, ODCSPER has developed a short command
climate survey instrument. This instrument is only now being fielded and
feedback is limited. Another comprehensive human relations climate
assessment survey instrument is being developed under the direction of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).

**ACCESSIONS**

The Army regulations governing enlisted and officer accessions include
AR 145-1, *Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program*:
*Organization, Administration, and Training*; AR 351-5, *United States
Army Officer Candidate* *School*; and AR 601-210, *Regular Army and Army
Reserve Enlistment Program*. Personnel enter the Army by enlisting or by
obtaining a commission as an officer. The sources of officer
commissioning include USMA, ROTC, OCS, and direct appointments (e.g., as
with some physicians, nurses, lawyers).

The accessions process utilizes local police and national security
checks for information on prior offenses that might indicate an
applicant's unsuitability for military service. During the applicant
interview, the recruiter questions the applicant on any records of
arrest, charges, juvenile court adjudications, traffic violations,
probation periods, dismissed or pending charges or convictions,
including those ordered expunged or sealed. A police records check is
only initiated if the applicant states that he or she has a prior record
or if the recruiter has reason to believe that the applicant is
concealing information. Although a police records check may be
warranted, law enforcement authorities within the jurisdiction queried
may refuse to provide any information contained in sealed juvenile
records. If a written refusal is received or if the information
requested is subject to charges or a fee, the police records check is
not required. A police records check is performed on all officer
accessions subject to the same limitations regarding sealed records,
written refusals, and fee demands. Army Regulation 601-270, *Military
Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS)*, requires that a preenlistment
interview be conducted prior to the oath of enlistment to obtain any
additional information that may have a bearing on the applicant's
qualification for military service.

In 1996, USMA instituted a requirement for a local police records check
on all academy applicants. If an arrest and/or conviction is cited by
the local law enforcement agency queried, a judge advocate review is
required before the candidate is rejected. In addition to the police
records check, a prospective candidate must complete a personal data
record that includes the question, "Have you ever been arrested for any
offense?" The normal admissions process also includes letters of
recommendation that are reviewed for negative comments concerning sexual
harassment, discrimination, or acts in violation of USMA's
*Consideration of Others* program. Any adverse information is verified
to determine whether the event represents an isolated incident.[^65]

The commissioning process for officers includes the requirement for a
national security clearance. Prior to appointment, all applicants (USMA,
ROTC, OCS, and direct appointments) must possess a secret security
clearance based on a favorable National Agency Check. Any applicant,
whether officer or enlisted, may be rejected based on the provisions of
AR 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness.* Doctors may medically reject
applicants for personality or behavior disorders, as evidenced by
frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies, antisocial attitudes,
or behavior that would prevent the individual from adapting to military
service.

**REVIEW OF THE PRACTICES OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY AND THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

In addition to reviewing Army policies and procedures regarding EO and
POSH, the Panel examined the practices of other organizations, both
public and private sector. The following practices were common among
organizations that have distinguished themselves as leaders in the human
resource arena and in the prevention and elimination of sexual
harassment:

-   Diversity is linked to strategic vision.

-   Management is responsible for and held accountable for setting a
    positive climate.

-   Human resource programs have top level support.

-   Systems and procedures support diversity.

-   Recruitment, promotion, and development trends are continually
    monitored.

-   Awareness education is an organizational priority.

-   Rewards are based on results.

-   Benefits are enhanced to recognize diverse needs.

-   A multi-pronged approach is utilized regarding the advancement of
    women and minorities.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **ANNEX F**                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| **EVENTS CONNECTED WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMY SINCE 1947**    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | The **President's Committee on Civil Rights** condemned      |
| 47    | racial injustice in the United States in its report, **To    |
|       | Secure These Rights**. The biracial group called for a       |
|       | positive program to eliminate segregation from American      |
|       | life.                                                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The **Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948**       |
| 48    | established the Women's Army Corps in the Regular Army and   |
|       | authorized the enlistment and appointment of women in the    |
|       | Regular Air Force, Regular Navy and Marine Corps, and in the |
|       | Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine  |
|       | Corps.[^66]                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | In **Executive Order 9981**, President Truman declared it    |
| 48    | "to be the policy of the President that there shall be       |
|       | equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the |
|       | armed services without regard to race, color, religion or    |
|       | national origin."[^67]                                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | When the first U.S. ground troops landed in South Korea,     |
| 50    | only 22,000 women were on active duty\--approximately one    |
|       | percent of the total force.                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | President Truman issued **Executive Order 10240**, which     |
| 51    | authorized the services to terminate the commission,         |
|       | warrant, or enlistment of any woman serving in the Regular   |
|       | Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force, regardless of rank,  |
|       | grade, or length of service, "(2) whenever it is established |
|       | . . . that the woman (a) is the parent, by birth or          |
|       | adoption, of a child under such minimum age as the Secretary |
|       | concerned shall determine, (b) has personal custody of a     |
|       | child under such minimum age, (c) is the step-parent of a    |
|       | child under such minimum age and the child is within the     |
|       | household of the woman for a period of more than thirty days |
|       | a year, (d) is pregnant, or (e) has, while serving under     |
|       | such commission, warrant, or enlistment, given birth to a    |
|       | living child."[^68]                                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | The **Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services    |
| 51    | (DACOWITS)** was established by then Secretary of Defense,   |
|       | George C. Marshall, to advise and assist the Secretary of    |
|       | Defense on policies and matters relating to women in the     |
|       | Armed Services. Still in existence today, its members are    |
|       | non-federal government civilian members and serve for three  |
|       | years.[^69]                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | The Supreme Court, in **Brown v. Board of Education**,       |
| 54    | concluded that \"in the field of public education the        |
|       | doctrine of 'separate but equal\' has no place. Separate     |
|       | educational facilities are inherently unequal.\" The court   |
|       | heId that the segregation of white and black children in     |
|       | state public schools solely on the basis of race denies to   |
|       | black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed   |
|       | by the Fourteenth Amendment.[^70]                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | The Defense Department announced that there were no longer   |
| 54    | any all-Negro units.                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | Montgomery bus boycott began. Local black leaders, led by    |
| 55    | Martin Luther King, Jr., launched a boycott against the      |
|       | local bus company to petition the city of Montgomery,        |
|       | Alabama, to desegregate its bus system.                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Little Rock desegregation crisis. In September, Arkansas     |
| 57    | Governor Orval Faubus intervened to halt a local plan for    |
|       | the gradual desegregation of Little Rock\'s Central High     |
|       | School. Faubus mobilized the Arkansas National Guard to      |
|       | block the entry of black students. Later that month, bowing  |
|       | to a federal judge\'s order, Faubus withdrew the guardsmen.  |
|       | The next day, fearing violence, President Eisenhower         |
|       | federalized the Arkansas National Guard and dispatched       |
|       | paratroopers to Little Rock to ensure the children\'s        |
|       | safety.                                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Feb   | Sit-in, Greensboro, North Carolina. In February 1960, four   |
| 60    | black students from North Carolina Agricultural and          |
|       | Technical College in Greensboro ordered coffee at a          |
|       | department-store lunch counter. Told that \"we do not serve  |
|       | Negroes,\" the students refused to budge. Thus began the     |
|       | sit-in movement, which quickly spread northward.             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | **Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)** formed. |
| 60    | This movement, inspired by the Greensboro sit-in, sought to  |
|       | challenge the status quo through nonviolent protest acts.    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure**.            |
| 62    |                                                              |
|       | "**10. Chain of Command.** Every commander has two basic     |
|       | responsibilities in the following priority: accomplishment   |
|       | of his mission, and the care of his personnel and property.  |
|       | . . . A superior in the chain of command holds his           |
|       | subordinate commanders responsible for everything their      |
|       | command does or fails to do. Thus, in relation to his        |
|       | superior, a commander cannot delegate any of his             |
|       | responsibilities.                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **34. Relationship of superiors toward subordinates.**       |
|       | Second only to the accomplishment of their military mission, |
|       | leaders are responsible for the welfare of their troops.     |
|       | Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned |
|       | officers will enhance the will to fight for their country in |
|       | their subordinates by instilling in them a sense of          |
|       | responsibility as citizens of the United States, a sense of  |
|       | responsibility in conduct and behavior as service members,   |
|       | and a spirit of loyalty to the democratic principles on      |
|       | which the American way of life is based. . . . Commissioned  |
|       | officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers     |
|       | will keep in close touch with personnel within their         |
|       | command, will take an interest in their organization life,   |
|       | will hear their complaints, and will endeavor on all         |
|       | occasions to remove those causes which make for              |
|       | dissatisfaction."                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | George Wallace inaugural address as governor of Alabama      |
| 63    | included \"Segregation now. Segregation tomorrow.            |
|       | Segregation forever.\"                                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The **Gesell Committee** (The President's Committee on Equal |
| 63    | Opportunity in the Armed Forces) submitted to the President  |
|       | an initial report, **Equality of Treatment and Opportunity   |
|       | for Negro Military Personnel Stationed within the United     |
|       | States**. Findings included the following:                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The military had made far-reaching advances toward complete  |
|       | integration. With some variations from service to service,   |
|       | there had been substantial progress toward equality of       |
|       | treatment and opportunity. The progress made was not enough, |
|       | however.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Blacks in the military and their families were daily         |
|       | suffering humiliation and degradation in communities near    |
|       | bases at which they were stationed.                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | No one in the military was charged with responsibility to    |
|       | listen to equal opportunity complaints. There was no         |
|       | satisfactory method for handling complaints.                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Installation commanders lacked specific directives to guide  |
|       | them in dealing with off-base discrimination and, in fact,   |
|       | did not view this as a military command responsibility.      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The **U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,** in its study        |
| 63    | entitled **Overall Evaluation and Comments on the Department |
|       | of Defense Study: The Services and Their Relations with the  |
|       | Community**, reported that off-base discrimination had a     |
|       | detrimental effect on the morale and efficiency of a         |
|       | significant number of military personnel.                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | **DoD Directive 5120.36, Equal Opportunity in the Armed      |
| 63    | Forces**.                                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "It is the policy of the Department of Defense to conduct    |
|       | all of its activities in a manner which is free from racial  |
|       | discrimination, and which provides equal opportunity for all |
|       | uniformed members and all civilian employees irrespective of |
|       | their color." (para. I.)                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "The military departments shall . . . issue appropriate      |
|       | instructions, manuals and regulations in connection with the |
|       | leadership responsibility for equal opportunity, on and      |
|       | off-base, and containing guidance for its discharge." (para. |
|       | II.B.1.)                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose   |
|       | discriminatory practices affecting his men and their         |
|       | dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them, not     |
|       | only in areas under his immediate control, but also in       |
|       | nearby communities where they may live or gather in off-duty |
|       | hours." (para. II.C.)                                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | "The largest single protest demonstration in United States   |
| 63    | history occurred at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington,      |
|       | D.C., where 250,000 blacks and whites gathered to lobby for  |
|       | passage of sweeping civil rights measures by Congress." Dr.  |
|       | Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his "I Have a Dream"      |
|       | speech at the Lincoln Memorial.[^71]                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Congress passed the **Civil Rights Act of 1964**, a sweeping |
| 64    | civil rights act, which included provisions prohibiting      |
|       | discrimination in public accommodations and discrimination   |
|       | in employment.                                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military     |
| 64    | Personnel**.                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**3. Policy.**                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. It is the policy of the Army to conduct all of its      |
|       | activities in a manner which is free from racial             |
|       | discrimination, and which provides equal opportunity and     |
|       | treatment of all uniformed members irrespective of their     |
|       | race, color, religion, or national origin.                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. All actions taken to implement the above policy will be |
|       | based on the following fundamental principles:               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Equal and just treatment of all personnel exerts       |
|       | direct and favorable influence on morale, discipline, and    |
|       | command authority. Since these are key factors contributing  |
|       | to combat efficiency, such treatment is related to the       |
|       | primary mission of command.                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) In opposing discriminatory practices and in providing  |
|       | equal opportunity to Army personnel and their dependents,    |
|       | the unity of purpose and spirit essential to the creation of |
|       | effective military organizations is more readily developed.  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Commanders at all levels being responsible for the     |
|       | well being of their personnel, can best discharge their      |
|       | responsibility by the early detection of, and continuing     |
|       | efforts to remove, those influences which adversely affect   |
|       | their personnel.                                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **4. Responsibility.** Every opportunity will be afforded    |
|       | the local commander to resolve problems peculiar to the      |
|       | local environment. Problems that require assistance at       |
|       | departmental level will be brought to the attention of       |
|       | appropriate authorities without delay.                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **10. Racial Incidents.** Racial incidents will be reported  |
|       | in accordance with applicable provisions of AR 1-55.         |
|       | Commanders will insure that their higher headquarters are    |
|       | notified concurrently with notification to Headquarters,     |
|       | Department of the Army.                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **11. Complaints.**                                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Installation commanders should be aware of and maintain |
|       | such records as are necessary to reflect the number, type,   |
|       | validity, and disposition of racial complaints submitted by  |
|       | military personnel of their commands."                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Race riots broke out in the first of the \"long hot          |
| 64    | summers.\" In Harlem and Rochester, New York, and in several |
|       | cities in New Jersey, brutal actions by white police         |
|       | officers, including vicious unprovoked beatings in police    |
|       | stations, sparked riots in black neighborhoods.              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | **AR 600-22, Processing Requests of Military Personnel For   |
| 64    | Action by the Attorney General Under the Civil Rights Act of |
|       | 1964**.                                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**1. Purpose.** This regulation is in implementation of DoD |
|       | Instruction No. 5525.2, dated 24 July 1964, providing        |
|       | command assistance to military personnel requesting action   |
|       | by the Attorney General under Titles II, III, and IV of the  |
|       | Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241). Its    |
|       | purpose is to promote Department of Defense and Department   |
|       | of the Army policy of fostering equal treatment for military |
|       | personnel and their dependents by prescribing policies and   |
|       | procedures for the processing of requests for civil rights   |
|       | suits by military personnel electing to utilize command      |
|       | assistance in forwarding such requests to the Attorney       |
|       | General.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **13. Discrimination not covered by Civil Rights Act of      |
|       | 1964.** The fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not  |
|       | provide a judicial remedy in a given case of discrimination  |
|       | affecting military personnel or their dependents does not    |
|       | relieve a commander of the responsibility affirmatively to   |
|       | seek equal treatment and opportunity for his men, and for    |
|       | their dependents, off the installation as well as on."       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Feb   | Malcolm X was assassinated. For many blacks, Malcolm X, the  |
| 65    | chief spokesperson for the Black Muslims, symbolized black   |
|       | frustration with the white establishment. A compelling       |
|       | figure in life, in death he would become a hero to           |
|       | increasing numbers of black nationalists and proponents of   |
|       | Black Power.                                                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military     |
| 65    | Personnel**. Superseded AR 600-21, Jul 64.                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | Change 8 to **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and             |
| 65    | Procedure**, Jul 62.                                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**46.1 Participation in public demonstrations.**            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (Added) Participation in picket lines or any other public    |
|       | demonstrations, including those pertaining to civil rights,  |
|       | may imply Army sanction of the cause for which the           |
|       | demonstration is conducted. Such participation by members of |
|       | the Army, not sanctioned by competent authority, is          |
|       | prohibited-                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. During the hours they are required to be present for    |
|       | duty.                                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. When they are in uniform.                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. When they are on a military reservation.                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *d*. When they are in a foreign country.                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *e*. When their activities constitute a breach of law and    |
|       | order.                                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *f*. When violence is reasonably likely to result."          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure**. Superseded |
| 67    | AR 600-20, Jul 62, including changes.                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Race riots erupted in Newark, Detroit, and other cities,     |
| 67    | making it the worst summer of racial disturbances in         |
|       | American history.                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | President Lyndon B. Johnson signed **Public Law 90-130**, an |
| 67    | "Act to amend titles 10, 32, and 37, United States Code, to  |
|       | remove restrictions on the careers of female officers in the |
|       | Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and for other       |
|       | purposes." This new law removed restrictions on women's      |
|       | promotions (including general/flag grades); equalized        |
|       | retirement rules; and removed the 2-percent ceilings on      |
|       | regular line officer and enlisted strengths.[^72]            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | The **Kerner Commission (National Advisory Commission on     |
| 68    | Civil Disorders)** issued its report, warning that the       |
|       | United States was "headed toward two communities, 'one       |
|       | black, one white, separate and unequal.'"[^73]               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. Blacks rioted  |
| 68    | in 168 cities and towns, looting and burning white           |
|       | businesses and properties. Incidents also occurred in        |
|       | Vietnam, such as the burning of a wooden cross and the       |
|       | flying of a Confederate flag at the base at Camranh Bay.     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | "More than a hundred black soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas,     |
| 68    | staged an all-night demonstration to protest being sent to   |
|       | Chicago for possible riot control at the Democratic National |
|       | Convention. They feared that they might be used to combat    |
|       | Chicago blacks."[^74]                                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Riot at the Long Binh stockade outside Saigon, an            |
| 68    | overcrowded stockade where the majority of prisoners were    |
|       | black. One white soldier was killed and several wounded      |
|       | after a black takeover of the stockade.                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Violence exploded at Camp Lejuene, North Carolina. One white |
| 69    | marine was killed in a fight allegedly begun in an attack by |
|       | 30 black and Hispanic Marines on 14 white Marines.           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | In **Executive Order 11478**, President Nixon declared it to |
| 69    | be "the policy of the Government of the United States to     |
|       | provide equal opportunity in Federal employment for all      |
|       | persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of |
|       | race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to       |
|       | promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity |
|       | through a continuing affirmative program in each executive   |
|       | department and agency. This policy of equal opportunity      |
|       | applies to and must be an integral part of every aspect of   |
|       | personnel policy and practice in the employment,             |
|       | development, advancement, and treatment of civilian          |
|       | employees of the Federal Government."[^75]                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DoD issued its first **Human Goals Charter**. The charter is |
| 69    | the foundation of DoD EO programs. Since it was first        |
|       | issued, it has been endorsed by each Secretary of Defense    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Army Chief of Staff directed that race relations training be |
| 69    | incorporated into the Army's educational system. The U.S.    |
|       | Army Infantry School created a 4-hour block of instruction,  |
|       | \"Leadership Aspects of Race Relations,\" by September 1970. |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | An Army study of race relations in U.S. Army bases           |
| 70    | throughout the world reported a widespread increase in       |
|       | racial tensions. It warned that increased racial             |
|       | confrontations could be expected unless immediate action was |
|       | taken. The Army Chief of Staff, General William C.           |
|       | Westmoreland, commissioned the study in the summer of 1969.  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Close to 1000 black soldiers met at the Heidelberg           |
| 70    | University campus for a day of protest and planning. From    |
|       | this meeting came an announcement of the intention to unite  |
|       | all black soldiers in West Germany to protest discrimination |
|       | in assignments, promotions, military justice, housing, and   |
|       | recreational facilities.                                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | The first Army-wide race relations conference, held at Fort  |
| 70    | Monroe, Virginia, examined the race-related problems facing  |
|       | the Army.                                                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | **Department of Defense Directive 1100.15, Equal Opportunity |
| 70    | Within the Department of Defense**.                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | Change 2 to **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of  |
| 70    | Military Personnel**, May 65.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "6. The Department of the Army views off-post discrimination |
|       | as a serious detriment to morale and, ultimately, to combat  |
|       | efficiency. It is inimical to the welfare of Army personnel. |
|       | Every commander has the responsibility to oppose             |
|       | discriminatory practices affecting his men and their         |
|       | dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them, not     |
|       | only in areas under his control, but also in nearby          |
|       | communities where they live or gather in off-duty hours."    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | In response to requests from black soldiers stationed in     |
| 71    | Europe, as well as news accounts of increased racial         |
|       | tensions there, the National Association for the Advancement |
|       | of Colored People (NAACP) sent a team to Germany to evaluate |
|       | the situation in West Germany. It submitted a report, **The  |
|       | Search for Military Justice, Report of an NAACP Inquiry into |
|       | the Problems of the Negro Serviceman in West Germany**, to   |
|       | the Secretary of Defense in April 1971. In its conclusion,   |
|       | the report stated that "an uncomfortable number of the       |
|       | younger Negro servicemen are disenchanted, alienated, and    |
|       | have lost faith in the capacity and the will of the Armed    |
|       | Forces to deal honestly with their problems."                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | Army established housing referral offices to address issues  |
| 71    | of off-post housing discrimination.                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure**. Superseded |
| 71    | AR 600-20, Jan 67, including all changes.                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | **DoD Directive 1322.11, Department of Defense Education in  |
| 71    | Race Relations for Armed Forces Personnel**.                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Established the policies and designated the organizational   |
|       | elements assigned responsibility for developing an active    |
|       | DoD program of education in race relations and for assuring  |
|       | the attainment of those objectives. Established the Defense  |
|       | Race Relations Institute (DRRI) as a DoD field activity.     |
|       | "The mission of the DRRI will be to conduct training for     |
|       | Armed Forces personnel designated as instructors in race     |
|       | relations, develop doctrine and curricula in education for   |
|       | race relations, conduct research, perform evaluation of      |
|       | program effectiveness, and disseminate educational           |
|       | guidelines and materials for utilization throughout the      |
|       | Armed Forces." (para IV.B.2.)                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | Chief of Staff Regulation 15-11 established the Army Race    |
| 71    | Relations/Equal Opportunity Committee as a continuing        |
|       | committee at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | Racial disturbances at Fort McClellan, Alabama, resulted in  |
| 71    | the arrest of 139 black soldiers. Some alleged that the Army |
|       | was punishing only blacks.                                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | The **Office of Equal Opportunity Programs** was established |
| 71    | as a division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for |
|       | Personnel (ODCSPER), HQDA. It developed the policy and       |
|       | guidance for the Army's equal opportunity program, and       |
|       | served as the Army's principal action office in helping to   |
|       | resolve race relations/equal opportunity problems throughout |
|       | the Army.                                                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The Army "adopted the policy that every unit in the Army     |
| 72    | would have a race relations training program using the Core  |
|       | Curriculum and other materials developed by the DRRI. This   |
|       | 18-hour program, designed to improve interracial             |
|       | communications, was to be taught by DRRI-trained instructors |
|       | in prime training time, and all military personnel were      |
|       | required to attend one such session per year. . . .This Core |
|       | Curriculum was organized around six themes or phases:        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Discussion of DoD and service race relations policies and    |
|       | goals to set the tone and direction of the educational       |
|       | program;                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Recognition of personal racism, intentional or otherwise, in |
|       | oneself and others and how ignorance sustained it;           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Understanding of how institutions founded upon majority      |
|       | values tended to ignore minority values, thus polarizing     |
|       | these two groups;                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Examination of the misunderstanding generated between        |
|       | minority and majority groups in the service because of poor  |
|       | communication;                                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Understanding that the racial problems in the armed services |
|       | were an extension of those in the civilian community and     |
|       | require a knowledge of all the cultural elements             |
|       | represented; and                                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Examination of the particular duty station for its peculiar  |
|       | racial problems."[^76]                                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | The first Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan     |
| 72    | (AAP) was published.                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | DoD **Report of the Task Force on the Administration of      |
| 72    | Military Justice in the Armed Forces**. The Task Force       |
|       | affirmed that vestiges of discrimination remained in the     |
|       | military system. It identified two types of racial           |
|       | discrimination, intentional and systemic. It defined         |
|       | intentional discrimination "as the policy of a military      |
|       | authority or action of an individual or group of individuals |
|       | which is intended to have a negative effect on minority      |
|       | individuals or groups without having such an effect on       |
|       | others." It defined systemic discrimination "as neutral      |
|       | practices or policies which disproportionally impact         |
|       | harmfully or negatively on minorities."[^77]                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | The Secretary of the Army signed an order allowing WACs to   |
| 72    | command any unit in the Army except those with a combat      |
|       | mission.                                                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Feb   | The first General Officer Race Relations/Equal Opportunity   |
| 73    | Orientation and Seminar was conducted at various locations   |
|       | across the Army.                                             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | The Supreme Court held in **Fronterio v. Richardson** that   |
| 73    | certain challenged statutes, which required a female member  |
|       | of the uniformed services to prove the dependency of her     |
|       | husband, but did not require the same for male members,      |
|       | violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[^78] |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | **DA Pam 600-16, Improving Race Relations in the Army,       |
| 73    | Handbook for Leaders**.                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | **AR 600-21, Race Relations and Equal Opportunity**.         |
| 73    | Superseded AR 600-21, May 65, including all changes.         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "This regulation establishes the requirement for development |
|       | of race relations/equal opportunity affirmative actions      |
|       | plans; contains guidance for the use of equal opportunity    |
|       | staff personnel; considers operation of equal opportunity    |
|       | programs as a criterion for evaluating leadership            |
|       | performance of military personnel; . . . and also provides   |
|       | for equal opportunity for military women. Local limited      |
|       | supplementation of this regulation is permitted, but is not  |
|       | required." (p. i)                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**3. Principles.**                                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. The primary goal of all Army race relations and equal   |
|       | opportunity actions is the positive creation of an           |
|       | atmosphere of racial harmony; it is not the simple avoidance |
|       | of racial disorders.                                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Army commanders at all levels are responsible for       |
|       | achievement of race relations and equal opportunity (RR/EO)  |
|       | objectives.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. Army RR/EO activities are based on affirmative actions  |
|       | which go beyond nondiscrimination to planned and positive    |
|       | steps to identify and correct existing discrepancies and     |
|       | inequities as a matter of the highest priority.              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *f*. Effective implementation of the Army RR/EO program      |
|       | requires high level policy formulation, decentralized        |
|       | execution, maximum participation by all levels of command,   |
|       | and compliance monitoring procedures.                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *g*. The primary emphasis of Army race relations education   |
|       | and training is the changing of behavior and the creation of |
|       | an improved appreciation of individuals and members of       |
|       | groups as human beings.                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **4. Policy.** *a*. It is the policy of the Army to provide  |
|       | equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed members,       |
|       | irrespective of race, color, religion, national origin, or   |
|       | sex. Accordingly all personnel, male and female, consistent  |
|       | with law and physical capabilities, must be afforded equal   |
|       | opportunity and just treatment.                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 5.*d*. Equal Opportunity Program. Actions designed to        |
|       | correct structural deficiencies, eliminate personal and      |
|       | institutional discrimination against minorities and assure   |
|       | upward mobility of all qualified personnel.                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 5.*e*. Race Relations Program. Actions designed to eliminate |
|       | prejudice and to promote racial harmony and attitudes        |
|       | supportive of Army objectives.                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **8. Efficiency report entries.** Commissioned and           |
|       | noncommissioned officers at all levels of command and        |
|       | supervision are responsible for implementing and supporting  |
|       | DA policies, practices, and procedures in support of equal   |
|       | and just treatment of military personnel and their           |
|       | dependents, both on and off post. Rating and indorsing       |
|       | officials . . . will consider the quality and effectiveness  |
|       | of . . . support of RR/EO principles and policies.           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **9. Race relations/equal opportunity staff personnel.**     |
|       | *a*. Personnel will be assigned primary duty as RR/EO staff  |
|       | personnel by commanders of units, installations, and         |
|       | agencies down to and including brigades and brigade          |
|       | equivalent units.                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. Equal opportunity personnel within a single office      |
|       | should represent a racial-ethnic-age-sex mix (when possible) |
|       | and, to preclude stereotyping, should be of a different      |
|       | racial or ethnic group than their immediate predecessors.    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *d*. Command priority, commitment and involvement in equal   |
|       | opportunity matters are directly related to the positioning  |
|       | and use of equal opportunity staff personnel. RR/EO staff    |
|       | offices will remain in the DCSPER/G1/S1/DPCA family and will |
|       | be positioned no lower than one step below the               |
|       | DCSPER/G1/S1/DPCA. Commanders retain the prerogative of      |
|       | elevating the RR/EO staff office to the personal or          |
|       | principal staff level if desired. In any case, the RR/EO     |
|       | officers will be positioned so as to have access to the      |
|       | commander."                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | **AR 600-42, Race Relations Education for the Army**.        |
| 73    |                                                              |
|       | Implemented DoD Directive 1322.11 concerning the             |
|       | establishment of a comprehensive educational program of race |
|       | relations for all members of the military services and       |
|       | provided guidance for developing race relations training     |
|       | programs and related activities within the Army.             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | DoD "told the services that policies permitting involuntary  |
| 74    | separation of women for pregnancy and parenthood were no     |
|       | longer 'viable' and that separations would be voluntary. The |
|       | services objected, but the DOD stuck to its guns and told    |
|       | them to develop joint policies to carry out this concept.    |
|       | The date set for the new rules to take effect was 15 May     |
|       | 1975."[^79]                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | WAC Career Management Branch was discontinued. All WAC       |
| 74    | officers were transferred to combat support and combat       |
|       | service support branches of the Army.                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | The Army revised its Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) to "place |
| 75    | responsibility for Affirmative Action in the hands of        |
|       | commanders and their managers in order to infuse affirmative |
|       | actions into the traditional system of command               |
|       | management."[^80]                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | Section 803, **Department of Defense Appropriation           |
| 75    | Authorization Act, 1976**, required the services to admit    |
|       | women into the three service academies (United States        |
|       | Military Academy, United States Naval Academy, and United    |
|       | States Air Force Academy) beginning in calendar year         |
|       | 1976.[^81]                                                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | Effective 1 January, single men, single women, and           |
| 76    | unaccompanied soldiers were to serve the same length         |
|       | overseas tours.                                              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | First women graduated from Army Reserve Officers' Training   |
| 76    | Corps (ROTC) programs and were commissioned.                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | DoD reissued **Department of Defense Directive 1100.15** to  |
| 76    | outline the DoD Equal Opportunity Program, expand and update |
|       | the Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity policies, and      |
|       | assign responsibility for assuring DoD-wide compliance with  |
|       | equal employment opportunity laws and regulations.           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | Women first entered the United States Military Academy       |
| 76    | (USMA) (Class of 1980).                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | After 1 October, female and male officer candidates trained  |
| 76    | together at the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School.          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | In January 1976, the DCSPER directed his staff to revalidate |
| 76    | the program for the expanded utilization of women in the     |
|       | Army. The study was published in December 1976, and was      |
|       | known as the **Women in the Army (WITA) Study**.             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | **Uniform Service School Standards for Race Relations/Equal  |
| 76    | Opportunity Instruction** contained guidance and specific    |
|       | content for standardized instructional programs in the Army. |
|       | "For each course at a given racial awareness training level, |
|       | the standards provided for specific outcomes and goals that  |
|       | must be reached by the student at the end of training,       |
|       | specific lesson plans that led to the achievement of these   |
|       | goals, objective tests to measure the achievement of the     |
|       | students, and supplementary annexes to be used with the      |
|       | lesson plans."[^82]                                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | **DA Pam 600-42, Unit Equal Opportunity Discussion           |
| 77    | Outlines**.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**2. Objective.** The objective of the Unit Equal           |
|       | Opportunity Discussion Outlines is to help maintain the      |
|       | highest degree of unit readiness. The outlines are designed  |
|       | to expand upon and support the unit training prescribed by   |
|       | AR 600-42."                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | **DA Pam 600-43, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial   |
| 77    | Discrimination in the Army**.                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | The Army held a "symposium, 'Women in the Army,' during      |
| 77    | which representatives from all major commands, the other     |
|       | services, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense         |
|       | discussed women's issues and their resolution."[^83]         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army**.        |
| 77    | Superseded AR 600-21, Jul 73.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "This regulation establishes the requirement for the         |
|       | development and implementation of an Equal Opportunity       |
|       | Program throughout the Active and Reserve Components. . . .  |
|       | Supplementation of this regulation at MACOM level is         |
|       | required." (p. i)                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS**                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 1-2.*b*. Personal, direct and continuous involvement of      |
|       | commanders at all levels is essential. What the commander    |
|       | does to assure evenhandedness, to eliminate activities which |
|       | are divisive, and to translate goals into action sets the    |
|       | tone for the entire organization in equal opportunity.       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 1-4.*b*. The chain of command is the primary channel for     |
|       | correcting discriminatory practices and for communications   |
|       | on equal opportunity matters.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 1-4.*d*. Army Equal Opportunity activities are based on      |
|       | affirmative actions which go beyond nondiscrimination and    |
|       | include planned and positive steps to identify and, where    |
|       | found, eliminate existing discriminatory practices, past or  |
|       | present.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 1-5.*b*. The Affirmative Actions component consists of a     |
|       | series of initiatives aggressively pursued to search out     |
|       | areas of inequity and discrimination to take corrective      |
|       | action. The objective is to assure that treatment of all     |
|       | personnel is based on merit, fitness, capability and         |
|       | job-related factors, and not arbitrarily on race, color,     |
|       | sex, age, national origin, religious, or other irrelevant    |
|       | factors.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 1-5.*c*. The Education and Training component is a           |
|       | continuing Army-wide effort to impart to all members of the  |
|       | Army an awareness concerning equal opportunity matters, to   |
|       | develop positive attitudes toward the program, and to foster |
|       | good relationships among individuals and groups. Special     |
|       | attention will be given to the Army's expectations           |
|       | concerning the behavior of individual members in carrying    |
|       | out their duties and responsibilities and in their           |
|       | interacting with other personnel.                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **CHAPTER 3 EDUCATION AND TRAINING**                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 3-1.*c*. Education and training courses will be conducted    |
|       | through formal training in Army training centers, Army       |
|       | Service schools, USAR schools, Army area schools, and        |
|       | individual units; through special training of Army leaders   |
|       | and managers; and through unit training sessions which       |
|       | stimulate lateral and vertical communications on equal       |
|       | opportunity matters. Instruction will focus on interpersonal |
|       | relations; the impact of institutional discrimination;       |
|       | equality of opportunity; and contemporary factors            |
|       | influencing unit harmony, effectiveness, and mission         |
|       | accomplishment.                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **3-2.** **Entry level training.** Formal training on equal  |
|       | opportunity will be included in the program of instruction   |
|       | given to all trainees during BCT/BT/OSUT and all newly       |
|       | commissioned officers during the Officers Basic Course.      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **3-3.** **Individual education for Army leaders, managers   |
|       | and supervisors.** *a*. Education in equal opportunity will  |
|       | be institutionalized in the Army Service school system at    |
|       | all levels so that officers, warrant officers,               |
|       | noncommissioned officers, and their civilian counterparts    |
|       | know their responsibilities under the Army EO program and    |
|       | have the requisite sensitivity and skills in dealing with    |
|       | all matters pertaining to equal opportunity within their     |
|       | authority.                                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **3-4.** **Unit training.** *a*. The thrust of unit training |
|       | will be toward informing unit members of policies and        |
|       | activities concerning equal opportunity; familiarizing unit  |
|       | members with racial, ethnic, cultural, and gender-related    |
|       | differences so that such differences can more readily be     |
|       | accepted as positive aspects of American and Army life       |
|       | rather than as negative; and impressing upon unit members    |
|       | the importance of open communication among all unit members  |
|       | as essential to unit effectiveness.                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*.(1) Members of the chain of command, to include          |
|       | supervisors, will participate in unit equal opportunity      |
|       | sessions as instructors, discussion leaders, or as resource  |
|       | persons for answering questions concerning policy and        |
|       | practices.                                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 3-5.*c*. Unit Discussion Leaders \[UDL\], whose role is to   |
|       | assist commanders in the conduct of unit EO training and to  |
|       | act as discussion leaders, moderators, or facilitators, will |
|       | be selected, trained and made available locally, as          |
|       | prescribed by MACOM's.                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 3-5.*d*. UDL duty will be accomplished on a part-time or     |
|       | additional duty basis. Majority group members and minority   |
|       | group members, men and women, will be given equal            |
|       | consideration in selection for attendance at a UDL course.   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **CHAPTER 4 ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY   |
|       | OFFICE**                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 4-1. In reality, the commander is the Equal Opportunity      |
|       | Officer and, as such, is assisted by staff members having    |
|       | Equal Opportunity responsibilities.                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 4-2.*a*. Command priority for, commitment to, and            |
|       | involvement in Equal Opportunity matters is reflected in the |
|       | organizational placement of Equal Opportunity Offices. The   |
|       | Equal Opportunity Staff Officer will have direct access to   |
|       | the commander at all times.                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 4-3.*a*. \[I\]t is not intended that the EO staff officer's  |
|       | charter usurp or duplicate the traditional functions of      |
|       | other staff officers who must be involved in EO matters as   |
|       | an integral part of their day-to-day activities.             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 4-5.*a*. Equal Opportunity and Organizational Effectiveness  |
|       | are complementary and mutually reinforcing functions,        |
|       | directed toward a common goal.                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **APPENDIX D GUIDELINES FOR UNIT EO TRAINING**               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | D-1.*b*. There are four specific learning objectives.        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) To facilitate and improve the soldier's understanding  |
|       | of the entire Equal Opportunity Program for the United       |
|       | States Army.                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) To inform unit members about potential sources of      |
|       | minority/gender dissatisfaction and interracial/intersexual  |
|       | tension in the Army and about what the Army is doing to      |
|       | remove any grounds for dissatisfaction and tension in        |
|       | specific areas.                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) To increase the soldier's understanding and acceptance |
|       | of different cultural modes.                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(4\) To provide the chain of command with contemporary      |
|       | information and feedback on the status and progress of the   |
|       | Equal Opportunity Program."                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel authorized the Army  |
| 77    | Research Institute (ARI) to evaluate the performance of      |
|       | women in their military occupational specialties and their   |
|       | ability to adapt to field conditions during the Army's       |
|       | annual REFORGER (Repositioning of Forces in Germany)         |
|       | exercise between July and October 1977. ARI reported its     |
|       | findings of **REFORGER 77** to the Army staff in November    |
|       | 1977, finding that the addition of women had no adverse      |
|       | impact on unit missions.                                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Integrated basic initial entry training for men and women    |
| 77    | began at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and Fort Jackson, South    |
|       | Carolina. Integrated training began at Fort Dix, New Jersey, |
|       | and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in October 1978.            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | Secretary of the Army announced the Army's **combat          |
| 77    | exclusion policy**. "It applied to all women in the          |
|       | Army\--Regular Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard.   |
|       | An all-Army message stated: *Combat Exclusion Policy*. Women |
|       | are authorized to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty |
|       | except those listed below, at any organizational level, and  |
|       | in any unit of the Army, except in Infantry, Armor, Cannon   |
|       | Field Artillery, Combat Engineer, and Low Altitude Air       |
|       | Defense Artillery units of battalion/squadron or smaller     |
|       | size."[^84]                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | There are no statutory combat restrictions for Army women.   |
|       | With the dissolution of the WAC in October 1978, and the     |
|       | subsequent integration of women into the Army's mainstream,  |
|       | the Army developed its own combat exclusion policy based on  |
|       | its interpretation of congressional intent as reflected in   |
|       | the statutes affecting the other services.                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | The Army revised its AAP to extend coverage to ethnic        |
| 78    | minorities and women. The previous Army AAP focused almost   |
|       | exclusively on racial minorities.[^85]                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | Women\'s Army Corps disestablished.[^86]                     |
| 78    |                                                              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DRRI changed its name to the Defense Equal Opportunity       |
| 79    | Management Institute (DEOMI).[^87]                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1979  | Senate and House subcommittees of the Armed Services         |
| -1980 | Committees held hearings on the issues of women in combat    |
|       | and registration of women for the draft.                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 80    | By 1980, over 170,000 women were on active duty, making up   |
|       | 8.5 percent of the U.S. armed forces.                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedures**.           |
| 80    | Superseded AR 600-20, Apr 71, including all changes.         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**5-7. Relationship of superiors toward subordinates.**     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *e*.(1) . . . Moreover, they should emphasize the importance |
|       | of individual conduct and behavior as service members.       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *f*. Relationships between service members of different rank |
|       | which involve (or give the appearance of) partiality,        |
|       | preferential treatment, or the improper use of rank or       |
|       | position for personal gain, are prejudicial to good order,   |
|       | discipline, and high unit morale. Such relationships will be |
|       | avoided. Commanders and supervisors will counsel those       |
|       | involved or take other action, as appropriate, if            |
|       | relationships between Service members of different rank-     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness,    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Involve the improper use of rank or position for       |
|       | personal gain, or                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Can otherwise reasonably be expected to undermine      |
|       | discipline, authority, or morale.                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Chapter 5 Section V Pregnancy and Dependent Care           |
|       | Counseling**                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **5-35. Counseling Procedures.** *a*. Commanders will        |
|       | identify members of their command whose status is defined .  |
|       | . . below. They will counsel them on their rights and        |
|       | responsibilities for the care of their dependents as they    |
|       | relate to their responsibilities to the Service."            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | The Army established the **Women in the Army Policy Review   |
| 81    | Group (WITAPRG)**. This group analyzed Army personnel        |
|       | policies as they related to mission, combat readiness,       |
|       | quality of life, and utilization of female soldiers.         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | The Secretary of the Army signed a memorandum, **Department  |
| 81    | of the Army Policy on Sexual Harassment**, for all personnel |
|       | emphasizing the unacceptability of sexual harassment. The    |
|       | memorandum urged individuals subjected to sexual harassment  |
|       | to make it clear to the offending person that such behavior  |
|       | is offensive and to report the harassment to the appropriate |
|       | supervisory level.                                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The Supreme Court held in **Rostker v.** **Goldberg** that   |
| 81    | Congress has the constitutional authority to exclude women   |
|       | from the military draft.[^88]                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O'Connor as the first  |
| 81    | female Supreme Court Justice.                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | DoD policy memorandum, **Department of Defense Policy on     |
| 81    | Sexual Harassment**, signed by the Secretary of Defense, was |
|       | the first to address this issue at the DoD level.            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 82    | The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)         |
|       | developed standardized training to counter sexual harassment |
|       | for use in all enlisted and officer service schools and in   |
|       | Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) courses. The Army    |
|       | also produced standard training programs on the prevention   |
|       | of sexual harassment to present to civilian employees and    |
|       | their supervisors.                                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | The Secretary of Defense directed the military services to   |
| 82    | "aggressively break down those remaining barriers that       |
|       | prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities   |
|       | of women in providing for our national defense."             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Fall  | The Army discontinued coeducational basic training. Many     |
| 82    | women leaders considered the decision to end coed basic      |
|       | training a step backward. Army spokesmen, however, insisted  |
|       | that it was not meant to discriminate against women but to   |
|       | toughen the men. Men and women had been training in          |
|       | integrated companies since 1977.                             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | The **Women in the Army Policy Review Group** completed its  |
| 82    | report. Its conclusions were "(1) The Army should implement  |
|       | a system whereby soldiers are matched to the physical        |
|       | demands of their job. (2) Assignment policy for each MOS     |
|       | must recognize the combat probability of each MOS and        |
|       | restrict assignment of women in those with a high            |
|       | probability of routinely engaging in direct combat."[^89]    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 83    | The Army developed the **Direct Combat Probability Coding    |
|       | (DCPC)** system, which ascribed to each Army job an          |
|       | assessment of the probability of that job participating in   |
|       | direct combat. Direct combat was defined as engaging an      |
|       | enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being     |
|       | exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct   |
|       | physical contact with the enemy, and a substantial risk of   |
|       | capture. Direct combat occurs while closing with the enemy   |
|       | in order to destroy or capture, or while repelling assault   |
|       | by fire, close combat, or counterattack.                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | The Secretary of Defense stated that it "is the policy of    |
| 83    | this Department that women will be provided full and equal   |
|       | opportunity with men to pursue appropriate careers in the    |
|       | military services for which they can qualify. This means     |
|       | that military women can and should be utilized in all roles  |
|       | except those prohibited by combat exclusion statutes and     |
|       | related policy. This does not mean that the combat exclusion |
|       | policy can be used to justify closing career opportunities   |
|       | to women. The combat exclusion rule should be interpreted to |
|       | allow as many as possible career opportunities for women to  |
|       | be kept open."                                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Fall  | 170 women deployed to Grenada in **Operation Urgent Fury**.  |
| 83    |                                                              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army**.        |
| 84    | Superseded AR 600-21, Jun 77; DA Pam 600-16, Jun 73; and DA  |
|       | Pam 600-42, Mar 77.                                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**Chapter 2 Policy**                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 2-1.*a*. The policy of the United States Army is to provide  |
|       | equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed members and    |
|       | their families irrespective of race, color, religion, sex,   |
|       | or national origin and to provide an environment free of     |
|       | sexual harassment.                                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **2-2. Sexual harassment**                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Sexual harassment is an unwelcome form of sex                |
|       | discrimination. It is not limited to the work environment    |
|       | and can occur at almost any place. Sexual harassment         |
|       | violates acceptable standards of integrity and impartiality  |
|       | required of all Army personnel and interferes with mission   |
|       | accomplishment and unit cohesion. Many of the acts and       |
|       | neglect that constitute sexual harassment are prohibited and |
|       | punishable under civil and military law as criminal acts of  |
|       | a sexual nature, and should be treated as such. Any military |
|       | member or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment |
|       | who-                                                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Through behavior of a sexual nature attempts to         |
|       | control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a   |
|       | military member or civilian employee.                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Makes deliberate or repeated verbal comments or         |
|       | gestures of a sexual nature that are offensive to the person |
|       | to whom addressed                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. Makes abusive physical contact of a sexual nature.      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 2-4.*b*. *Command and Staff relationships*. The principal    |
|       | EOA will have direct access to the commander at all times.   |
|       | So long as the above condition is met, where the EO office   |
|       | is placed within the organization is a matter of local       |
|       | command discretion or other applicable directives.           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 2-4.*d*. *Roles and duties of EOAs***.**                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Recognizes sexual harassment in both overt and subtle  |
|       | forms.                                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(4\) Recommends remedies appropriate to reduce or prevent   |
|       | discrimination and sexual harassment.                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **2-12. Training**                                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Minimum DA criteria for local unit training programs    |
|       | are as follows:                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Unit training will focus on the following:             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*a*) Army policies on EO, affirmative actions, and sexual   |
|       | harassment.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*b*) Objectives of the Army EO program.                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*c*) Objectives of affirmative actions.                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*d*) Behavioral characteristics and other indicators of EO  |
|       | problems.                                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*e*) The impact of individual and institutional             |
|       | discrimination on mission accomplishment.                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*f*) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*g*) Legal consequences applicable to individuals           |
|       | participating in acts of sexual harassment.                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*h*) Individual responsibilities concerning equal           |
|       | opportunity and prevention of sexual harassment.             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*i*) The importance of honest and open interpersonal        |
|       | communications in promoting a healthy equal opportunity      |
|       | climate.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*.(1) Formal training on EO subjects will be conducted     |
|       | during initial entry training and will include-              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*b*) An awareness of racial, cultural, and gender-related   |
|       | differences and attitudes as they relate to Army missions    |
|       | and activities.                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*c*) Complaint procedures according to this regulation and  |
|       | AR 20-1, AR 210-51, and AR 600-20.                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*d*) Legal and career consequences for those who do not     |
|       | comply with EO policies.                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*e*) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(5\) *Command and staff college-level (CSC) and enlisted    |
|       | skill level 5*. Training conducted during CSC, the warrant   |
|       | officer senior course, the first sergeants' course, and the  |
|       | sergeants major course will include-                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*b*) Specific roles and responsibilities of senior officers |
|       | and NCOs in carrying out installation and MACOM EO programs. |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*c*) Effective employment of the staff EO advisor.          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*d*) Impacts of individual and institutional discrimination |
|       | on mission accomplishment.                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*f*) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(6\) *Army War College*.                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*b*) The international (host nation) aspects of EO.         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*c*) The relationship of EO to readiness and mission        |
|       | capability.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | (*d*) Army leadership responsibilities in identifying and    |
|       | countering sexual harassment.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(7\) *Training for senior officials*. Emphasis will be on   |
|       | contemporary problems in EO, sexual harassment, and other    |
|       | topics.                                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Glossary**                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Sexual harassment**                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Advances, requests for favors, and other sexually related    |
|       | verbal or physical conduct when-                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or |
|       | implicitly a condition of a person's job, pay , or career    |
|       | status.                                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person  |
|       | is used as a basis for career or employment decisions        |
|       | affecting this person.                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. Such conduct interferes with a person's performance of  |
|       | duty or otherwise creates an intimidating, hostile, or       |
|       | offensive environment."                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 84    | The Army eliminated the Military Occupational Specialty      |
|       | (MOS), 00U (full-time, school-trained EO specialists) for EO |
|       | advisors (EOAs). The theory behind this shift in approach    |
|       | was a vision that more EO trained soldiers would move into   |
|       | leadership positions over time and, thus, institutionalize   |
|       | EO. The Army still trained EOAs at DEOMI for assignment at   |
|       | brigade level and higher staffs. After a successful tour of  |
|       | duty as EOAs, the soldiers were to return to duty in their   |
|       | primary MOSs.                                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army** (30 Apr |
| 85    | 85 Update with change 3 to AR 600-21, Jan 84).               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | This Update changed the word "sex" to "gender" throughout.   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "**2-6. Procedures for processing complaints**               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Individuals will be encouraged to use command channels  |
|       | for redress of grievances. Commanders will ensure that       |
|       | members are fully aware of procedures for obtaining redress  |
|       | of complaints including those against members of the chain   |
|       | of command. These procedures will be in writing and will be  |
|       | displayed at all times where all unit members have access to |
|       | them."                                                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | The Secretary of Defense reiterated his policy statement on  |
| 85    | sexual harassment.                                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | **AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army** (30 Apr |
| 86    | 86 Update with change 4 to AR 600-21, Jan 84).               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **2-2. Sexual harassment**                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Added following to discussion of sexual harassment: "[Army   |
|       | leaders at all levels are responsible for taking both        |
|       | preventive and appropriate corrective action to combat this  |
|       | unacceptable form of behavior.]{.underline}"                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "2-4.*a*.(2) One full-time enlisted EOA will be available to |
|       | each brigade-level or equivalent commander, and one          |
|       | full-time officer EOA will be available to the commander of  |
|       | each major combat formation (division, corps, Army) and at   |
|       | each MACOM.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Glossary**                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Sexual harassment**                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Any soldier or civilian employee is engaging in sexual       |
|       | harassment who-                                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Through behavior of a sexual nature attempts to         |
|       | control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a   |
|       | soldier or civilian employee.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Makes deliberate or repeated verbal comments or         |
|       | gestures of a sexual nature that are offensive to the person |
|       | to whom addressed.                                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. Makes abusive physical contact of a sexual nature."     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedures**.           |
| 86    | Superseded AR 600-20, Oct 80.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "5-7.*g*. Relationships between officer and enlisted         |
|       | soldiers are prohibited and are contrary to the custom of    |
|       | the service and may constitute the offense of fraternization |
|       | under the provisions of Article 134, UCMJ."                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | Change 2 to **DoD Directive 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling  |
| 86    | Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed  |
|       | Forces**, September 1969.                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "III.G. [Prohibited Activities]{.underline}. Military        |
|       | personnel must reject participation in organizations that    |
|       | espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal        |
|       | discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion,   |
|       | or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or         |
|       | violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive         |
|       | individuals of their civil rights. Active participation,     |
|       | such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising,    |
|       | recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading   |
|       | such organizations is incompatible with Military Service,    |
|       | and is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to    |
|       | employ the full range of administrative procedures,          |
|       | including separation or appropriate disciplinary action      |
|       | against military personnel who actively participate in such  |
|       | groups."                                                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | The Secretary of Defense reiterated his policy statement on  |
| 86    | sexual harassment.                                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 88    | The DoD **risk rule** was developed to help standardize the  |
|       | services' assignment of women deploying to a hostile area.   |
|       | The rule stated: "Risks of direct combat, exposure to        |
|       | hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing     |
|       | noncombat positions or units to women, when the type,        |
|       | degree, and duration of such risks are equal to or greater   |
|       | than the combat units with which they are normally           |
|       | associated within a given theater of operations. If the risk |
|       | of non-combat units or positions is less than comparable to  |
|       | land, air or sea combat units with which they are            |
|       | associated, then they should be open to women. Non-combat    |
|       | units should be compared to combat land units, air to air    |
|       | and so forth."                                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | DoD **Task Force on Women in the Military** Report was       |
| 88    | published. "The Secretary of Defense established this Task   |
|       | Force as a direct result of continuing concerns raised by    |
|       | the DACOWITS about the full integration of women in the      |
|       | armed forces. The Secretary's direction was to address three |
|       | primary topics: attitudes toward and treatment of women in   |
|       | the military, and their impact on the morale and quality of  |
|       | life for women; consistency in application of combat         |
|       | exclusion statutes and policies, and their impact on         |
|       | effective utilization of women; and the manner in which      |
|       | various force management policies may impact adversely on    |
|       | women's career development. Discussion and recommendations   |
|       | for action in response to that direction are contained in    |
|       | the sections \[of the report\] that follow."[^90]            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Feb   | **DoD Instruction 1350.3, Affirmative Action Planning and    |
| 88    | Assessment Process**. This prescribes DoD policy, assigns    |
|       | responsibilities, and establishes minimum reporting          |
|       | requirements by category and subject for annual Military     |
|       | Equal Opportunity Assessments submitted to DoD.              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy**. Superseded AR 600-20,    |
| 88    | Aug 86, and AR 600-21, Apr 85.                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "4-1.*b*. While military discipline is the result of         |
|       | effective training, it is affected by every feature of       |
|       | military life. It is manifested in individuals and units by  |
|       | cohesion, bonding, and a spirit of teamwork; . . . and by    |
|       | fairness, justice, equity for all soldiers, regardless of    |
|       | race, ethnic origin, gender, or religion.                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **4-12. Extremist Organizations**                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent   |
|       | with the responsibilities of military service. Active        |
|       | participation by soldiers is prohibited.                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the            |
|       | Constitution, must reject participation in organizations     |
|       | which-                                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Espouse supremacist causes.                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on      |
|       | race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin.    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise    |
|       | engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil      |
|       | rights.                                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving  |
|       | literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although    |
|       | strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service,  |
|       | are not prohibited by Army policy. Positive actions to limit |
|       | soldier participation are listed in d below.                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c*. The prohibited activities concerning extremist groups   |
|       | include the following:                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Participating in a public demonstration or rally.      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Knowingly attending a meeting or activity while on     |
|       | duty, when in uniform, when in a foreign country, or in      |
|       | violation of off- limits sanctions or commander\'s order.    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Conducting fund-raising activities.                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(4\) Recruiting or training members (including encouraging  |
|       | other soldiers to join) .                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(5\) Organizing or leading such a group                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(6\) Distributing literature on or off a military           |
|       | installation.                                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(7\) Participating in any activity that is in violation of  |
|       | regulations, constitutes a breach of law and order, or is    |
|       | likely to result in violence.                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *d*. Commanders should take positive actions when soldiers   |
|       | in their units are identified as members of extremist groups |
|       | and /or when they engage in extremist group activities.      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *e*. Actions taken by commanders must be appropriate to the  |
|       | specific facts surrounding any incident. Not every incident  |
|       | warrants separation or UCMJ action.                          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **4-14. Relationships between soldiers of different rank**   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. The commander will be responsible for establishing the  |
|       | leadership climate of the unit. This sets the parameters     |
|       | within which command will be exercised and, therefore, sets  |
|       | the tone for social and duty relationships within the        |
|       | command.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *d*.(3) . . . A leadership climate in which all soldiers are |
|       | treated with fairness, justice, and equity will be crucial   |
|       | to development of this confidence within soldiers.           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *e*. All soldiers and Army civilians must understand that    |
|       | this policy is based on the principle of good judgment. . .  |
|       | . Just because a certain relationship does not break the     |
|       | law, does not mean it is acceptable or appropriate.          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Prejudgements in evaluating relationships and          |
|       | associations between soldiers of different rank have no      |
|       | place in military society. An association between soldiers   |
|       | of different rank who also are of different gender does not  |
|       | necessarily create a greater potential for impropriety than  |
|       | one between soldiers of the same gender. Relationships       |
|       | between males of different rank in the male-dominated        |
|       | military organization have as much potential for real or     |
|       | perceived partiality.                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Same sex relationships between soldiers of different   |
|       | rank may cause problems. The Army affirms managing our       |
|       | personal relationships to promote the health and welfare of  |
|       | all concerned and maintaining good order, morale, and        |
|       | discipline.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(5\) Certain structures within the military demand closer   |
|       | scrutiny because of the greater risk that they will involve  |
|       | partiality or an abuse of authority. . . . These include     |
|       | Initial Entry Training (IET), Advanced Individual Training,  |
|       | and military schools. Military commanders have always        |
|       | closely controlled relationships between trainers and        |
|       | trainees. . . . These relationships are regulated in a very  |
|       | restrictive manner. Also discouraged are relationships       |
|       | between senior and subordinate members of the same unit or   |
|       | between soldiers closely linked in the chain of command or   |
|       | supervision. They are fraught with the possibility of actual |
|       | or perceived favoritism, and are, therefore, potentially     |
|       | destructive of discipline, authority, morale, and soldier    |
|       | welfare.                                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **4-15. Trainee and soldier relationships**                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Relationships between permanent party personnel and IET      |
|       | trainees not required by the training mission are            |
|       | prohibited. This prohibition applies to permanent party      |
|       | officers and noncommissioned officers without regard to the  |
|       | installation of assignment of the permanent party member or  |
|       | IET trainee.                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **Chapter 6 Equal Opportunity Program in the Army**          |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **6-1. Concept**                                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. The Equal Opportunity Program formulates, directs, and  |
|       | sustains a comprehensive effort to ensure fair treatment of  |
|       | all soldiers based solely on merit, fitness, capability, and |
|       | potential, which supports readiness. As such, EO is a        |
|       | responsibility of leadership and a function of command.      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **6-6. Staffing**                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b. Command and Staff relationship*. The principal EOA has   |
|       | direct access to the commander at all times. . . . EO office |
|       | placement within the organization is a matter of local       |
|       | command discretion provided it is in compliance with AR      |
|       | 5-3."                                                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | U.S. Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) released its       |
| 88    | report, **Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government: An    |
|       | Update**. This report discussed the results of a MSPB study  |
|       | to determine the nature and extent of sexual harassment in   |
|       | the federal government. It updated the findings of an        |
|       | earlier study reported in 1981. The 1988 report found that   |
|       | sexual harassment remained a widespread problem in the       |
|       | federal workplace.                                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released its        |
| 88    | report, **Women in the Military: More Military Jobs Can Be   |
|       | Opened Under Current Statutes**. "This report responds to    |
|       | your . . . request that we review how service policies       |
|       | implementing the combat exclusion provisions affect the      |
|       | number and assignment of women in the military, and whether  |
|       | other factors limit job opportunities for women. In the      |
|       | report we address the numerical impact of the statutory      |
|       | restrictions, and how service policies unrelated to          |
|       | statutory restrictions limit the availability of jobs for    |
|       | women."[^91]                                                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | During **Operation JUST CAUSE** in Panama, women in several  |
| 8     | specialties\--particularly aviation, military police,        |
| 9-Jan | transportation, and medical support\--found themselves       |
| 90    | involved in combat in the streets of Panama City.            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | DoD Defense Manpower Data Center released its report,        |
| 90    | **Sexual Harassment in the Military: 1988**. "This report    |
|       | provides the results of the 1988 DoD Survey of Sex Roles in  |
|       | the Active-Duty Military, mandated by then Secretary of      |
|       | Defense Frank Carlucci in response to a recommendation of    |
|       | the Task Force on Women in the Military."[^92]               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | A DA **Inspector General Assessment on Equal Opportunity**   |
| 90    | indicated a need for renewed emphasis on sexual harassment   |
|       | and equal opportunity training throughout the Army.          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 90-91 | "Of the more than half a million U.S. troops deployed to the |
|       | Persian Gulf during **Operations Desert Shield and Desert    |
|       | Storm**, approximately 7 percent (about 41,000) were         |
|       | women."[^93] About 26,000 female soldiers were among those   |
|       | deployed (8.6 percent of all soldiers deployed).             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | The Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum, **Department of  |
| 91    | Defense Strategies to Eradicate Sexual Harassment in the**   |
|       | **Military and Civilian Environment,** to all DoD            |
|       | components, directing each to implement a program            |
|       | emphasizing that sexual harassment will not be tolerated.    |
|       | Each program had to incorporate seven specified actions.     |
|       | Components were tasked to provide annual updates to DoD on   |
|       | the progress and effectiveness of their program.             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | The 1991 Tailhook Convention was held at the Las Vegas       |
| 91    | Hilton Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada, from September 5-8, 1991.   |
|       | Hundreds of aviators, male and female, including active      |
|       | duty, reserve, and retired officers from both the Navy and   |
|       | Marine Corps aviation communities attended. The Tailhook     |
|       | Convention was an annual event sponsored by the Tailhook     |
|       | Association. Allegations of assaults on female attendees and |
|       | other inappropriate conduct at the convention were later     |
|       | made public.                                                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Fort McClellan conducted prototype of gender-integrated One  |
| 91    | Station Unit Training (OSUT) for military police and         |
|       | chemical military occupational specialties (MOSs).           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | In Section 531 of the **National Defense Authorization Act   |
| 91    | of Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993**, Congress repealed 10 United |
|       | States Code (U.S.C.) 8549, which restricted the Air Force's  |
|       | assignment of women to aircraft engaged in combat missions,  |
|       | and amended language in 10 U.S.C. 6015 relating to the       |
|       | assignment of women in the Navy and Marine Corps to aircraft |
|       | or naval vessels engaged in combat missions. (The Army has   |
|       | never been statutorily restricted from assigning women to    |
|       | combat aircraft.) Sections 541-550 of the Act established    |
|       | the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in    |
|       | the Armed Forces. The purpose of the Commission was to       |
|       | assess the laws and policies restricting the assignment of   |
|       | female service members and make findings, conclusions, and   |
|       | recommendations on such matters.[^94]                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 92    | The Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP) survey        |
|       | questions in the areas of EO and sexual harassment were      |
|       | modified.                                                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | Change 2 to **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy**, Mar 88.      |
| 92    |                                                              |
|       | "**6-4 Sexual Harassment**                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | a\. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that   |
|       | involves unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual     |
|       | favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual     |
|       | nature, when:                                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made     |
|       | either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a     |
|       | person's job, pay, or career;                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person |
|       | is used as a basis for career or employment decisions        |
|       | affecting that person; or                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) such conduct interferes with an individual's           |
|       | performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or          |
|       | offensive environment.                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | b\. Any soldier or civilian employee**:**                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) In a supervisory or command position who uses or       |
|       | condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior to control,    |
|       | influence, or affect the career, pay or job of another       |
|       | soldier or civilian employee is engaging in sexual           |
|       | harassment.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Who makes deliberate or repeated unwelcomed verbal     |
|       | comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature   |
|       | is engaging in sexual harassment.                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | c\. Sexual harassment is not limited to the workplace, can   |
|       | occur at almost any place, and violates acceptable standards |
|       | of integrity and impartiality required of all Army           |
|       | personnel. It interferes with mission accomplishment and     |
|       | unit cohesion. Such behavior by soldiers or Army civilians   |
|       | will not be tolerated.                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 6-6a.(2) One full-time enlisted EOA will be available to     |
|       | each brigade-level or equivalent commander, and one          |
|       | full-time officer EOA will be available to the commander of  |
|       | FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USAREUR."                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | DA policy memorandum, **Army Policy Statement on Equal       |
| 92    | Opportunity**, signed by the Secretary of the Army and the   |
|       | Army Chief of Staff.                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| S     | Fort Jackson, South Carolina was tasked with running a test  |
| pring | of squad level gender-integrated Basic Combat Training       |
| 92    | (BCT). The test found no differences in performance between  |
|       | men and women trained in single gender and gender-integrated |
|       | companies.                                                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | At the request of Congress, the U.S. General Accounting      |
| 92    | Office (GAO) reviewed the issue of sexual harassment at all  |
|       | three of the service academies. It presented its preliminary |
|       | results at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Manpower and |
|       | Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, on June 2,       |
|       | 1992.[^95]                                                   |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | The Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, testified  |
| 92    | before the House Armed Services Committee on the subject of  |
|       | sexual harassment in the Army. He stated that "the Army is   |
|       | firmly opposed to sexual harassment in any form. . . . The   |
|       | Army is dependent on cohesion and trust among its soldiers   |
|       | and leaders to be able to accomplish the difficult and often |
|       | dangerous tasks of training for war. In such an environment, |
|       | sexual harassment is dysfunctional; it undermines the fabric |
|       | of the force; it is contrary to what we stand for as an      |
|       | institution. . . . I want to reinforce the commitment of the |
|       | Department of the Army to providing those serving the nation |
|       | under the Army Seal an environment free of any form sexual   |
|       | harassment."[^96]                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | **Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the  |
| 92    | Armed Forces** submitted to the President its final report   |
|       | containing a review of existing laws and policies and its    |
|       | recommendations for the future assignment of women in the    |
|       | Armed Forces. It defined 17 critical issues relevant to this |
|       | matter.                                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | Training support packages (TSPs) in equal opportunity and    |
| 92    | the prevention of sexual harassment were developed for       |
|       | Individual Entry Training (IET) and for every Army           |
|       | leadership course. These TSPs were implemented in early      |
|       | 1993.                                                        |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 92-93 | "More than 18,000 U.S. Service members are sent to Somalia   |
|       | to assist the United Nations in a humanitarian relief        |
|       | mission, **Operation Restore Hope**. Over 300 of the service |
|       | members participating are women."[^97]                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Feb   | The U.S. Army Soldier Support Center conducted an assessment |
| 93    | of Army school implementation of the EO TSPs.                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | DA Sexual Harassment Action Plan published. Army's senior    |
| 93    | leadership mandated that the plan be periodically reviewed   |
|       | and revised.                                                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ap    | The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Inspector    |
| r-May | General conducted a follow-on assessment of EO training in   |
| 93    | Army schools.                                                |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| S     | The Inspector General School added a four-hour block of      |
| pring | instruction for all new inspectors general. The instruction  |
| 93    | covers equal opportunity, to include the prevention of       |
|       | sexual harassment.                                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Questions for sexual harassment were fielded in the Spring   |
|       | 1993 SSMP survey.                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | Army installations established EO/prevention of sexual       |
| 93    | harassment hotlines. Operating 24 hours a day, the hotlines  |
|       | "provide procedural information on the filing of complaints  |
|       | and advise callers in identifying acts or behaviors which    |
|       | constitute sexual harassment."[^98]                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | **DA Pam 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide**.    |
| 93    |                                                              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Sep   | Change 4 to **AR 600-20, Army Command Policy**.              |
| 93    |                                                              |
|       | "**6-3. Equal opportunity policy**                           |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*.(2) Extends to soldiers, civilian employees, and their   |
|       | families.                                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. . . . The following are exceptions to a totally         |
|       | nonbiased personnel management process:                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) The assignment and utilization of female soldiers.     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Support for established equal opportunity goals, such  |
|       | as to increase representation of a particular group in one   |
|       | or more monitored area(s) of affirmative action plans        |
|       | (AAPs).                                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **6-5. Chain of command responsibilities**                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The chain of command, whether military or civilian, has the  |
|       | primary responsibility for developing and sustaining a       |
|       | healthy EO climate. This responsibility entails, but is not  |
|       | limited to, promoting positive programs that enhance unit    |
|       | cohesion, esprit, and morale; communicating matters with EO  |
|       | significance to unit personnel and higher headquarters;      |
|       | correcting discriminatory practices by conducting rapid,     |
|       | objective, and impartial inquiries to resolve complaints of  |
|       | discrimination; encouraging the surfacing of problems and    |
|       | preventing reprisal for those who complain; and taking       |
|       | appropriate action against those who violate Army policy.    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **6-6. Staffing**                                            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c. Command and staff relationships*. The principal EOA will |
|       | have direct access to the supported commander at all times   |
|       | and that commander will be either the EOA's rater or senior  |
|       | rater.                                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | **6-8. Procedures for processing complaints of               |
|       | discrimination**                                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *a*. *Individual rights*. Soldiers and their family members  |
|       | have the right to\--                                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Present a complaint to the command without fear of     |
|       | intimidation, reprisal, or harassment;                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Communicate with the commander concerning their        |
|       | complaints;                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *b*. *Individual responsibilities*. Individuals have the     |
|       | responsibility to \--                                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) Attempt to resolve a complaint by first informing the  |
|       | alleged offender that the behavior must stop. (Depending     |
|       | upon the severity of the offense, this may not always be     |
|       | plausible);                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) Advise the command of the specifics of sexual          |
|       | harassment and discrimination complaints and provide the     |
|       | command an opportunity to take appropriate action to         |
|       | rectify/resolve the issue; and                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) Submit only legitimate complaints and exercise caution |
|       | against unfounded or reckless charges.                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *c. Entering the complaints processing system*.              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(1\) *Informal Complaint.*                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) *Formal Complaint.*                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *f. Actions of the commander*.                               |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(2\) The unit commander will conduct an inquiry to          |
|       | determine if sufficient evidence exists to warrant a full    |
|       | investigation. . . . Should such evidence exist, the         |
|       | commander must refer the case to the battalion- or           |
|       | brigade-level commander for the appointment of an AR 15-6    |
|       | investigating officer.                                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | \(3\) . . . The EOA will review and comment on the findings  |
|       | of the investigation to ensure compliance with DoD /DA       |
|       | policies and objectives.                                     |
|       |                                                              |
|       | *h. EOA assistance*. . . . An EOA's skills in complaint      |
|       | handling and conflict resolution and training in the         |
|       | subtleties of discrimination and sexual harassment enable    |
|       | him or her to advise the commander or any investigating      |
|       | officer in this complex area."                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | The Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, directed the      |
| 93    | reinstatement of EOAs in Army divisions and the warfighting  |
|       | Corps headquarters.                                          |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | The Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, announced a new policy  |
| 94    | regarding women in combat that rescinded the 1988 "risk      |
|       | rule." Under the new policy, soldiers are eligible to be     |
|       | assigned to all positions for which they are qualified,      |
|       | except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units |
|       | below brigade level with the primary mission of engaging in  |
|       | direct combat on the ground. As a result of this policy, 80  |
|       | percent of all military positions can now be filled by       |
|       | either men or women.                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | DA policy memorandum, **Army Policy Statement on Equal       |
| 94    | Opportunity**, signed by the Secretary of the Army and the   |
|       | Chief of Staff of the Army. "People are the cornerstone of   |
|       | readiness. Sophisticated weapons systems and modern          |
|       | technology are of little value without a dedicated, trained  |
|       | team of professional soldiers and civilians. They must know  |
|       | they will be treated fairly, and with dignity and respect in |
|       | all aspects of performing the mission."                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released its        |
| 94    | report, **DoD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to      |
|       | Eliminate Sexual Harassment**. GAO "reviewed the issue of    |
|       | sexual harassment at all three of the service academies.     |
|       | This report addresses (1) the extent to which sexual         |
|       | harassment occurred at the academies, the forms it took, and |
|       | its effect on those subjected to it and (2) an evaluation of |
|       | the academies' efforts to eradicate sexual harassment. This  |
|       | report expands upon the preliminary results we presented at  |
|       | the hearing on the service academies before the Subcommittee |
|       | on Manpower and Personnel on June 2, 1992."[^99]             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | The DoD Inspector General noted in a report that several EO  |
| 94    | specialists it interviewed indicated they did not have the   |
|       | direct access to commanders their responsibilities           |
|       | required.[^100]                                              |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | The House Armed Services Committee held hearings on **Sexual |
| 94    | Harassment of Military Women and Improving Military          |
|       | Complaint System**.[^101]                                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | The Deputy Secretary of Defense expressed concern in a       |
| 94    | memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force and the         |
|       | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)     |
|       | that DoD had yet to develop and implement fully the policies |
|       | and procedures necessary to rid DoD of sexual harassment. He |
|       | requested a plan of action and a calendar for developing and |
|       | implementing these policies and regulations.                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Apr   | The Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of    |
| 94    | Defense for Personnel and Readiness submitted a sexual       |
|       | harassment policy action plan to the Deputy Secretary of     |
|       | Defense containing five main elements. One of those elements |
|       | was to establish the **Defense Equal Opportunity Council     |
|       | Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment** to      |
|       | review the military services' discrimination complaints      |
|       | system and recommend improvements.                           |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jul   | DA policy memorandum, **Army Policy on Sexual Harassment**,  |
| 94    | signed by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff   |
|       | of the Army.                                                 |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | The Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum,         |
| 94    | **Prohibition of Sexual Harassment in the Department of      |
|       | Defense (DoD)**.                                             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | "As of October 1994, 67% of all positions in the Army are    |
| 94    | open to women, with the Navy at 94%, Air Force at 99%,       |
|       | Marine Corps at 62%, and the Coast Guard at 100%."[^102]     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | Section 532 of the **National Defense Authorization Act for  |
| 94    | Fiscal Year 1995** stated:                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "(d) MILITARY DEPARTMENT POLICIES. \-- (1) The Secretary of  |
|       | the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force shall review and |
|       | revise the regulations of the Department of the Navy and the |
|       | Department of the Air Force, respectively, relating to equal |
|       | opportunity policy and procedures in that Department for the |
|       | making of, and responding to, complaints of unlawful         |
|       | discrimination and sexual harassment in order to ensure that |
|       | those regulations are substantially equivalent to the        |
|       | regulations of the Department of the Army on such matters. . |
|       | . . (3) The Secretary of the Army shall review the           |
|       | regulations of the Department of the Army relating to equal  |
|       | opportunity policy and complaint procedures and revise the   |
|       | regulations as the Secretary of Defense considers            |
|       | appropriate to strengthen the regulations in accordance with |
|       | the recommendations and experience described in              |
|       | subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2)." \[Paragraph (2) |
|       | references approved recommendations of the Department of     |
|       | Defense Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment   |
|       | and experiences of the Services regarding EO cases.\][^103]  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Oct   | **Training Circular (TC) 26-6, Commander\'s Equal            |
| 94    | Opportunity Handbook**.                                      |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Fall  | The first companies at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri and Fort  |
| 94    | Jackson, South Carolina completed coed basic training under  |
|       | the newly approved policy of \"gender-integrated basic       |
|       | training.\"                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | A House Armed Services Committee task force conducted focus  |
| 94    | group sessions with soldiers at 19 installations to          |
|       | determine their views on EO. It issued its report in         |
|       | December 1994.[^104]                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | GAO released it report, **DoD Service: Update on Extent of   |
| 95    | Sexual Harassment**. "On January 31, 1994, we issued a       |
|       | report on sexual harassment at the three Department of       |
|       | Defense (DoD) service academies as part of a series of       |
|       | reports originally requested by Senator Nunn and Senator     |
|       | Glenn. As requested, we updated that previous work, and this |
|       | report compares the results of our 1990-91 survey with the   |
|       | extent to which sexual harassment was reported to have       |
|       | occurred at the academies in the 1993-94 academic year, the  |
|       | forms it took, and the views of academy men and women on the |
|       | consequences of reporting it."[^105]                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| May   | **Defense Equal Opportunity Council, Report of the Task      |
| 95    | Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment**.             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Report identified goals and principles for an effective      |
|       | equal opportunity system. Recommended 48 improvements in the |
|       | way the Armed Services deal with discrimination and          |
|       | harassment.                                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DA policy memorandum, **Army Policy Statement on Equal       |
| 95    | Opportunity**, signed by the Secretary of the Army and the   |
|       | Chief of Staff of the Army.                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DA policy memorandum, **Army Policy Statement on Sexual      |
| 95    | Harassment**, signed by the Secretary of the Army and the    |
|       | Chief of Staff of the Army.                                  |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DoD reissued **DoD Directive 7050.6, Military Whistleblower  |
| 95    | Protection**. This directive extended protected              |
|       | communication to include complaints of sexual harassment or  |
|       | unlawful discrimination.                                     |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aug   | DoD reissued **DoD Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense   |
| 95    | Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program**.                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "C. [DEFINITIONS]{.underline}. Terms used in this Directive  |
|       | are defined in enclosure 2. Service implementing documents   |
|       | shall adopt the terms contained herein and shall define      |
|       | those terms exactly as they are defined in this Directive.   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | [DEFINITIONS]{.underline}                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | 15\. [Sexual Harassment]{.underline}. A form of sex          |
|       | discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances,      |
|       | requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical     |
|       | conduct of a sexual nature when:                             |
|       |                                                              |
|       | a\. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or  |
|       | implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or    |
|       | career, or                                                   |
|       |                                                              |
|       | b\. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person   |
|       | is used as a basis for career or employment decisions        |
|       | affecting that person, or                                    |
|       |                                                              |
|       | c\. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably   |
|       | interfering with an individual's work performance or creates |
|       | an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be     |
|       | actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment, need    |
|       | not result in concrete psychological harm to the victim, but |
|       | rather need only be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable |
|       | person would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the     |
|       | work environment as hostile or offensive. . . . Any person   |
|       | in a supervisory or command position who uses or condones    |
|       | any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect |
|       | the career, pay, or job of a Military member or civilian     |
|       | employee is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, any    |
|       | Military member or civilian employee who makes deliberate or |
|       | repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical    |
|       | contact of a sexual nature in the workplace is also engaging |
|       | in sexual harassment."                                       |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | Two white soldiers killed two black civilians in             |
| 95    | Fayetteville, NC.                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | The Secretary of the Army established a task force to        |
| 95    | examine extremist activities in the Army.                    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jan   | GAO released its report**, Military Equal Opportunity:       |
| 96    | Problems With Services' Complaint Systems Are Being          |
|       | Addressed by DoD**. GAO had been asked to identify the       |
|       | Services' processes for handling EO complaints and determine |
|       | whether there were opportunities for improving the           |
|       | processes. This report completed a three-part effort. In     |
|       | April 1995, GAO issued a report that identified previous DoD |
|       | studies on discrimination in the military. In November 1995, |
|       | it issued a report that examined the services' military EO   |
|       | assessment.[^106]                                            |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mar   | The **Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist        |
| 96    | Activities** issued its report.                              |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "The Task Force found no widespread or organized extremist   |
|       | activity in the Army." (p. 5)                                |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt      |
|       | racism and discrimination are suppressed by the Army's       |
|       | unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and firm enforcement of |
|       | that policy.                                                 |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The human relations environment is best where the chain of   |
|       | command is clear in its policy, proactive, and both quick    |
|       | and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial integration, and      |
|       | equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet most         |
|       | minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle      |
|       | racism exists. Most report that off-duty socialization often |
|       | polarizes along racial, ethnic, cultural, or other lines.    |
|       | This behavior, however, is often viewed as natural and       |
|       | acceptable.                                                  |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Senior Army leaders believe the Army's human relations       |
|       | environment is shaped by institutional mores and operational |
|       | requirements and reflects Army values. . . . Junior soldiers |
|       | reported an undercurrent which . . . focuses on racial,      |
|       | ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism,  |
|       | self-polarization, misperception and individual racial       |
|       | animosity." (pp. 13-14)                                      |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "The Army relies on its Equal Opportunity Program and        |
|       | requisite training to address these issues. The quality of   |
|       | Equal Opportunity Advisors and Representatives was found to  |
|       | range from excellent to fair, resulting in uneven unit Equal |
|       | Opportunity training throughout the Army. . . . The          |
|       | assessment also revealed several installations where Equal   |
|       | Opportunity staffing was inadequate.                         |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Recently, equal opportunity training has focused             |
|       | predominately on sexual harassment and sexism. Currently,    |
|       | most soldiers and leaders believe that sexism is more        |
|       | prevalent than racism at the unit level." (p. 14)            |
|       |                                                              |
|       | "The high Operational Pace for units is contributing to a    |
|       | stressful human relations environment.                       |
|       |                                                              |
|       | Today\'s Army is still experiencing the effects of           |
|       | downsizing, base realignments, and increased contingency     |
|       | operations, which contribute to a perception of instability  |
|       | and career insecurity in the force. . . . \[M\]any soldiers  |
|       | and leaders . . . perceive a zero-defect environment         |
|       | developing. Zero defect is viewed as no tolerance for        |
|       | mistakes, no opportunity for recovery, and a demand for      |
|       | perfection." (p. 15)                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Jun   | The Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia Military           |
| 96    | Institute's (VMI) all male policy violates women's           |
|       | constitutional rights to equal protection.[^107]             |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | Allegations of sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Ground  |
| 96    | brought to public's attention.                               |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nov   | The Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the     |
| 96    | Army Inspector General to review and assess the sexual       |
|       | harassment policies and procedures at basic and advanced     |
|       | individual training organizations and units at Aberdeen      |
|       | Proving Ground and throughout the Army Training Base.        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The Secretary established the **Senior Review Panel on       |
|       | Sexual Harassment**.                                         |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Dec   | **DoD Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 1995 Sexual        |
| 96    | Harassment Survey** report published.                        |
|       |                                                              |
|       | The three survey forms used in the study "document a decline |
|       | in harassment experiences and reflect DoD and the Services'  |
|       | increased emphasis on combating sexual harassment."[^108]    |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **ANNEX G**                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| **CONTEMPORARY MILITARY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND   |
| SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE UNIFORMED ARMY**                             |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

  ---------- -------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------
  **Date**   **Document**   **Quote**                          **Remarks**

  ---------- -------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------

+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | DoD    | In all that we do, we must show |                      |
| a | Human  | respect for the serviceman, the |                      |
| y | Goals  | servicewoman, the civilian      |                      |
| 9 | C      | employee, and family members,   |                      |
| 4 | harter | recognizing their individual    |                      |
|   |        | needs, aspirations, and         |                      |
|   |        | capabilities.                   |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | Sec    | It remains the policy of the    |                      |
| u | retary | Department of Defense (DoD)     |                      |
| g | of     | that sexual harassment is       |                      |
| 9 | D      | strictly prohibited in the      |                      |
| 4 | efense | Armed Forces and the civilian   |                      |
|   | Memor  | work force.                     |                      |
|   | andum, |                                 |                      |
|   | *Prohi |                                 |                      |
|   | bition |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Sexual |                                 |                      |
|   | Hara   |                                 |                      |
|   | ssment |                                 |                      |
|   | in the |                                 |                      |
|   | Depa   |                                 |                      |
|   | rtment |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | D      |                                 |                      |
|   | efense |                                 |                      |
|   | (DoD)* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DoD    | **C.                            | Basis for chapter 6  |
| u | Dir    | [DEFINITIONS]{.underline}**     | of AR 600-20, *Army  |
| g | ective |                                 | Command Policy.*     |
| 9 | 1      | Terms used in this Directive    |                      |
| 5 | 350.2, | are defined in enclosure 2.     | This 1995 DoD        |
|   | *Depa  | Service implementing documents  | definition is not in |
|   | rtment | shall adopt the terms contained | published Army       |
|   | of     | herein and shall define those   | documents; included  |
|   | D      | terms exactly as they are       | in draft revision of |
|   | efense | defined in this Directive.      | chapter 6, AR        |
|   | Mi     |                                 | 600-20*.*            |
|   | litary | **D. [POLICY]{.underline}**     |                      |
|   | Equal  |                                 |                      |
|   | Oppor  | It is DoD policy to:            |                      |
|   | tunity |                                 |                      |
|   | (MEO)  | 2\. Promote an environment free |                      |
|   | Pr     | from personal, social, or       |                      |
|   | ogram* | institutional barriers that     |                      |
|   |        | prevent Service members from    |                      |
|   |        | rising to the highest level of  |                      |
|   |        | responsibility possible.        |                      |
|   |        | Service members shall be        |                      |
|   |        | evaluated only on individual    |                      |
|   |        | merit, fitness, and capability. |                      |
|   |        | Unlawful discrimination against |                      |
|   |        | persons or groups based on      |                      |
|   |        | race, color, religion, sex, or  |                      |
|   |        | national origin is contrary to  |                      |
|   |        | good order and discipline and   |                      |
|   |        | is counterproductive to combat  |                      |
|   |        | readiness and mission           |                      |
|   |        | accomplishment. Unlawful        |                      |
|   |        | discrimination shall not be     |                      |
|   |        | condoned.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 3\. Use the command to promote, |                      |
|   |        | support, and enforce the MEO    |                      |
|   |        | program. The chain of command   |                      |
|   |        | is the primary and preferred    |                      |
|   |        | channel for identifying and     |                      |
|   |        | correcting discriminatory       |                      |
|   |        | practices. This includes the    |                      |
|   |        | processing and resolving of     |                      |
|   |        | complaints of unlawful          |                      |
|   |        | discrimination and sexual       |                      |
|   |        | harassment, and for ensuring    |                      |
|   |        | that human relations and EO     |                      |
|   |        | matters are taken seriously and |                      |
|   |        | acted upon as necessary. The    |                      |
|   |        | chain of command is responsible |                      |
|   |        | for creating and maintaining a  |                      |
|   |        | MEO environment that            |                      |
|   |        | incorporates the policies set   |                      |
|   |        | out in this Directive.          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 4\. Ensure that the Military    |                      |
|   |        | Services (to include the        |                      |
|   |        | Reserve components) establish   |                      |
|   |        | MEO and affirmative action      |                      |
|   |        | programs that identify and      |                      |
|   |        | resolve EO problems through     |                      |
|   |        | formulating, maintaining, and   |                      |
|   |        | reviewing affirmative action    |                      |
|   |        | plans (AAPs) with established   |                      |
|   |        | objectives and milestones,      |                      |
|   |        | including accountability in     |                      |
|   |        | personnel management,           |                      |
|   |        | consistent with DoD Instruction |                      |
|   |        | 1350.3.                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 5\. Provide periodic, mandatory |                      |
|   |        | education and training in EO    |                      |
|   |        | and human relations at          |                      |
|   |        | installation and fleet unit     |                      |
|   |        | commands, during                |                      |
|   |        | pre-commissioning programs and  |                      |
|   |        | initial entry training, and     |                      |
|   |        | throughout professional         |                      |
|   |        | military education (PME)        |                      |
|   |        | systems, as part of the overall |                      |
|   |        | effort to achieve EO within the |                      |
|   |        | Department of Defense. This     |                      |
|   |        | training shall be provided to   |                      |
|   |        | all Service members, enlisted   |                      |
|   |        | and officer, including flag and |                      |
|   |        | general officers. The training  |                      |
|   |        | shall include comprehensive     |                      |
|   |        | material on leadership roles    |                      |
|   |        | and responsibilities for EO     |                      |
|   |        | programs, complaints            |                      |
|   |        | processing, legal implications, |                      |
|   |        | reprisal prevention and         |                      |
|   |        | detection, climate assessment   |                      |
|   |        | methodologies, and managing     |                      |
|   |        | civilian equal employment       |                      |
|   |        | opportunity (EEO) systems.      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6\. Provide for an environment  |                      |
|   |        | that is free from unlawful      |                      |
|   |        | discrimination and sexual       |                      |
|   |        | harassment.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 7\. Ensure that all on-base     |                      |
|   |        | activities and, to the extent   |                      |
|   |        | of the ability of the           |                      |
|   |        | Department of Defense, any      |                      |
|   |        | off-base activities available   |                      |
|   |        | to military personnel are open  |                      |
|   |        | to all military personnel and   |                      |
|   |        | their family members regardless |                      |
|   |        | of race, color, religion, age,  |                      |
|   |        | physical or mental disability,  |                      |
|   |        | sex, or national origin, as     |                      |
|   |        | called for by the DoD Human     |                      |
|   |        | Goals Charter.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **F.                            |                      |
|   |        | [                               |                      |
|   |        | RESPONSIBILITIES]{.underline}** |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 2\. The [Secretaries of the     |                      |
|   |        | Military                        |                      |
|   |        | Departments]{.underline} are    |                      |
|   |        | responsible for EO and for      |                      |
|   |        | ensuring compliance with this   |                      |
|   |        | Directive within their          |                      |
|   |        | respective Services and shall:  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | b\. Require commanders to       |                      |
|   |        | assess their organizational EO  |                      |
|   |        | climate, preferably as part of  |                      |
|   |        | their assumption of command.    |                      |
|   |        | Commanders shall be held        |                      |
|   |        | accountable for the EO climate  |                      |
|   |        | in their commands.              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **[DEFINITIONS]{.underline}**   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 15\. Sexual Harassment. A form  |                      |
|   |        | of sex discrimination that      |                      |
|   |        | involves unwelcome sexual       |                      |
|   |        | advances, requests for sexual   |                      |
|   |        | favors, and other verbal or     |                      |
|   |        | physical conduct of a sexual    |                      |
|   |        | nature when:                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | a\. Submission to such conduct  |                      |
|   |        | is made either explicitly or    |                      |
|   |        | implicitly a term or condition  |                      |
|   |        | of a person's job, pay, or      |                      |
|   |        | career, or                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | b\. Submission to or rejection  |                      |
|   |        | of such conduct by a person is  |                      |
|   |        | used as a basis for career or   |                      |
|   |        | employment decisions affecting  |                      |
|   |        | that person, or                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | c\. Such conduct has the        |                      |
|   |        | purpose or effect of            |                      |
|   |        | unreasonably interfering with   |                      |
|   |        | an individual's work            |                      |
|   |        | performance or creates an       |                      |
|   |        | intimidating, hostile, or       |                      |
|   |        | offensive working environment.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | This definition emphasizes that |                      |
|   |        | workplace conduct, to be        |                      |
|   |        | actionable as "abusive work     |                      |
|   |        | environment" harassment, need   |                      |
|   |        | not result in concrete          |                      |
|   |        | psychological harm to the       |                      |
|   |        | victim, but rather need only be |                      |
|   |        | so severe or pervasive that a   |                      |
|   |        | reasonable person would         |                      |
|   |        | perceive, and the victim does   |                      |
|   |        | perceive, the work environment  |                      |
|   |        | as hostile or offensive. . . .  |                      |
|   |        | Any person in a supervisory or  |                      |
|   |        | command position who uses or    |                      |
|   |        | condones any form of sexual     |                      |
|   |        | behavior to control, influence, |                      |
|   |        | or affect the career, pay, or   |                      |
|   |        | job of a Military member or     |                      |
|   |        | civilian employee is engaging   |                      |
|   |        | in sexual harassment.           |                      |
|   |        | Similarly, any Military member  |                      |
|   |        | or civilian employee who makes  |                      |
|   |        | deliberate or repeated          |                      |
|   |        | unwelcome verbal comments,      |                      |
|   |        | gestures, or physical contact   |                      |
|   |        | of a sexual nature in the       |                      |
|   |        | workplace is also engaging in   |                      |
|   |        | sexual harassment.              |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| F | DoD    | A. Assigns responsibilities and | Basis for DA Pam     |
| e | Instr  | establishes minimum reporting   | 600-26, *Department  |
| b | uction | requirements by category and    | of the Army          |
| 8 | 1      | subject for annual Military     | Affirmative Action   |
| 8 | 350.3, | Equal Opportunity Assessments.  | Plan.*               |
|   | *DoD   |                                 |                      |
|   | Affir  | C. It is DoD policy for the     |                      |
|   | mative | Military Services to monitor    |                      |
|   | Action | and report on selected          |                      |
|   | Pl     | dimensions of their personnel   |                      |
|   | anning | programs to ensure equal        |                      |
|   | and    | opportunity and fair treatment  |                      |
|   | Asse   | for all Service members through |                      |
|   | ssment | affirmative actions and other   |                      |
|   | Pr     | initiatives.                    |                      |
|   | ocess* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DoD    |                                 |                      |
| u | Dir    |                                 |                      |
| g | ective |                                 |                      |
| 9 | 5      |                                 |                      |
| 3 | 500.7, |                                 |                      |
|   | *Sta   |                                 |                      |
|   | ndards |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Co     |                                 |                      |
|   | nduct* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DoD    | **[CHAPTER 12 ETHICAL           |                      |
| u | 550    | CONDUCT]{.underline}**          |                      |
| g | 0.7-R, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Joint | SECTION 3. [CODE OF ETHICS FOR  |                      |
| 3 | Ethics | GOVERNMENT SERVICE]{.underline} |                      |
|   | Regul  |                                 |                      |
| w | ation* | SECTION 4. [DoD HUMAN           |                      |
| / |        | GOALS]{.underline}              |                      |
| c |        |                                 |                      |
| 2 |        | SECTION 5. [ETHICAL             |                      |
|   |        | VALUES]{.underline}             |                      |
| M |        |                                 |                      |
| a |        | 12-501.g.                       |                      |
| r |        | [Respect.]{.underline} To treat |                      |
| 9 |        | people with dignity, to honor   |                      |
| 6 |        | privacy and to allow            |                      |
|   |        | self-determination are critical |                      |
|   |        | in a government of diverse      |                      |
|   |        | people. Lack of respect leads   |                      |
|   |        | to a breakdown of loyalty and   |                      |
|   |        | honesty within a government and |                      |
|   |        | brings chaos to the             |                      |
|   |        | international community.        |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DoD    | **D. [POLICY]{.underline}**     | Included in draft    |
| u | Dir    |                                 | revision of AR       |
| g | ective | 1\. Members of the Armed Forces | 600-20.              |
| 9 | 7      | shall be free to make a         |                      |
| 5 | 050.6, | protected communication to a    |                      |
|   | *Mi    | Member of Congress; an          |                      |
|   | litary | Inspector General (IG); a       |                      |
|   | W      | member of a DoD audit,          |                      |
|   | histle | inspection, investigation, or   |                      |
|   | blower | law enforcement organization;   |                      |
|   | Prote  | or any other person or          |                      |
|   | ction* | organization (including any     |                      |
|   |        | person or organization in the   |                      |
|   |        | chain of command) designated    |                      |
|   |        | under Component regulations or  |                      |
|   |        | other established               |                      |
|   |        | administrative procedures to    |                      |
|   |        | receive such communications.    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 3\. Members of the Armed Forces |                      |
|   |        | shall be free from reprisal for |                      |
|   |        | making or preparing a protected |                      |
|   |        | communication.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 4\. No person may take or       |                      |
|   |        | threaten to take an unfavorable |                      |
|   |        | personnel action, or withhold   |                      |
|   |        | or threaten to withhold a       |                      |
|   |        | favorable personnel action, in  |                      |
|   |        | reprisal against any member of  |                      |
|   |        | the Armed Forces for making or  |                      |
|   |        | preparing a protected           |                      |
|   |        | communication.                  |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DA     | People remain the cornerstone   |                      |
| u | Memor  | of readiness. . . . Each must   |                      |
| g | andum, | be treated fairly and with      |                      |
| 9 | *Army  | dignity and respect in all      |                      |
| 5 | Policy | aspects of daily interactions.  |                      |
|   | Sta    | We expect all to treat one      |                      |
|   | tement | another as they would want to   |                      |
|   | on     | be treated. Leaders at all      |                      |
|   | Equal  | levels must continue to         |                      |
|   | Opport | establish and maintain command  |                      |
|   | unity* | climates that focus efforts     |                      |
|   |        | toward mission accomplishment.  |                      |
|   |        | If either the perception or the |                      |
|   |        | reality of unequal treatment    |                      |
|   |        | exists in the organization, the |                      |
|   |        | mission suffers. We all         |                      |
|   |        | rightfully expect standards to  |                      |
|   |        | be enforced as we live the      |                      |
|   |        | Army's values.                  |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DA     | The policy of the United States |                      |
| u | Memora | Army is that sexual harassment  |                      |
| g | ndum*, | is unacceptable conduct and     |                      |
| 9 | Army   | will not be tolerated. Army     |                      |
| 5 | Policy | leadership at all levels must   |                      |
|   | on     | be committed to creating and    |                      |
|   | Sexual | maintaining an environment      |                      |
|   | Haras  | conducive to maximum            |                      |
|   | sment* | productivity and respect for    |                      |
|   |        | human dignity. . . . To this    |                      |
|   |        | end, we expect the commitment   |                      |
|   |        | of each of you to establish and |                      |
|   |        | maintain a work and duty        |                      |
|   |        | environment free of sexual      |                      |
|   |        | harassment for all personnel,   |                      |
|   |        | whether civilian or military,   |                      |
|   |        | active duty or reservist. . . . |                      |
|   |        | The Army bases its success on   |                      |
|   |        | mission accomplishment.         |                      |
|   |        | Successful mission              |                      |
|   |        | accomplishment can only be      |                      |
|   |        | achieved in an environment of   |                      |
|   |        | mutual respect, dignity and     |                      |
|   |        | fair treatment. This            |                      |
|   |        | necessitates zero tolerance of  |                      |
|   |        | sexual harassment.              |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **1-4. Responsibilities**       |                      |
| a | 20-1*, |                                 |                      |
| r | Ins    | *a*.(10)(*a*) Provide a system  |                      |
| 9 | pector | for resolving problems of       |                      |
| 4 | Ge     | soldiers, family members,       |                      |
|   | neral* | civilian employees, and         |                      |
|   | *Acti  | retirees; protect               |                      |
|   | vities | confidentiality to the maximum  |                      |
|   | and    | extent possible; and guard      |                      |
|   | Proce  | against reprisal.               |                      |
|   | dures* |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*.(10)(*c*) Process Equal     |                      |
|   |        | Opportunity complaints, to      |                      |
|   |        | include complaints of sexual    |                      |
|   |        | harassment, as Inspector        |                      |
|   |        | General Assistance Requests.    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 1 Section IV Punitive |                      |
|   |        | Prohibitions**                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 1-10.*b*.(2) *Prohibition on    |                      |
|   |        | reprisal against a military     |                      |
|   |        | whistleblower*.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **6-6. Actions on certain types |                      |
|   |        | of Inspector General Action     |                      |
|   |        | Requests**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b. Soldier EO Complaints*. The |                      |
|   |        | EO advisor, under provisions of |                      |
|   |        | AR 600-20, the IG, or an        |                      |
|   |        | investigating officer appointed |                      |
|   |        | under AR 15-6, may address EO   |                      |
|   |        | complaints made by soldiers.    |                      |
|   |        | The manner in which EO          |                      |
|   |        | complaints are addressed and    |                      |
|   |        | who specifically addresses the  |                      |
|   |        | complaint is a command          |                      |
|   |        | decision.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | AR     | **Chapter 18 Victim/Witness     |                      |
| u | 2      | Assistance**                    |                      |
| g | 7-10*, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | Mi     | This chapter implements . . .   |                      |
| 4 | litary | Victim/Witness Protection Act   |                      |
|   | Ju     | of 1982 . . . Victim of Crime   |                      |
|   | stice* | Act of 1984 . . . and Victims'  |                      |
|   |        | Rights and Restitution Act of   |                      |
|   |        | 1990. It also establishes       |                      |
|   |        | policy, designates              |                      |
|   |        | responsibility, and provides    |                      |
|   |        | guidance for the assistance and |                      |
|   |        | treatment of those persons who  |                      |
|   |        | are victims of offenses under   |                      |
|   |        | the UCMJ and those persons who  |                      |
|   |        | may be witness in proceedings   |                      |
|   |        | conducted pursuant to the UCMJ. |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | AR     | **2-32. Personality, behavior,  |                      |
| u | 4      | or academic skills disorders**  |                      |
| g | 0-501, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Sta   | The causes for rejection are as |                      |
| 5 | ndards | follows:                        |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | M      | *a*. Personality or behavior    |                      |
|   | edical | disorders, as evidenced by      |                      |
|   | Fi     | frequent encounters with law    |                      |
|   | tness* | enforcement agencies,           |                      |
|   |        | antisocial attitudes or         |                      |
|   |        | behavior which, while not       |                      |
|   |        | sufficient cause for            |                      |
|   |        | administrative rejection, are   |                      |
|   |        | tangible evidence of impaired   |                      |
|   |        | characterological capacity to   |                      |
|   |        | adapt to military service.      |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **2-4. Duties and functions of  |                      |
| u | 1      | boards**                        |                      |
| n | 90-24, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Armed | The AFDCBs will-                |                      |
| 3 | Forces |                                 |                      |
|   | Discip | *b*. Receive reports, and take  |                      |
|   | linary | appropriate action on           |                      |
|   | C      | conditions in their area of     |                      |
|   | ontrol | responsibility relating to any  |                      |
|   | Boards | of the following\--             |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | Off-   | \(1\) Disorders and lack of     |                      |
|   | Instal | discipline.                     |                      |
|   | lation |                                 |                      |
|   | L      | \(5\) Racial and other          |                      |
|   | iaison | discriminatory practices.       |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | Opera  |                                 |                      |
|   | tions* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| N | AR     | **1-4. Responsibilities**       | Under revision.      |
| o | 1      |                                 |                      |
| v | 90-40, | *b*. Commanders of major Army   |                      |
| 9 | *S     | commands (MACOMs) will-         |                      |
| 3 | erious |                                 |                      |
|   | In     | \(3\) Implement a reporting     |                      |
|   | cident | system . . . and ensure that    |                      |
|   | R      | the MACOM headquarters submits  |                      |
|   | eport* | the SIR to HQDA (overseas       |                      |
|   |        | MACOMs only).                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*. Continental United States  |                      |
|   |        | (CONUS) installation commanders |                      |
|   |        | will-                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Report serious incidents  |                      |
|   |        | to HQDA.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *d*. All Active Army, Army      |                      |
|   |        | National Guard (ARNG), or       |                      |
|   |        | United States Army Reserve unit |                      |
|   |        | (USAR), agency, or activity     |                      |
|   |        | commanders, to include          |                      |
|   |        | commanders of Army elements of  |                      |
|   |        | unified or combined commands,   |                      |
|   |        | will-                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Expeditiously notify the  |                      |
|   |        | CONUS installation commander    |                      |
|   |        | having geographic reporting     |                      |
|   |        | responsibility or the overseas  |                      |
|   |        | MACOM commander, as             |                      |
|   |        | appropriate, of serious         |                      |
|   |        | incidents.                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **2-3. Incidents not reportable |                      |
|   |        | by Serious Incident Report**    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *h*. Incidents involving        |                      |
|   |        | subversion and espionage        |                      |
|   |        | directed against the U.S. Army  |                      |
|   |        | and deliberate security         |                      |
|   |        | violations.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Appendix C Category 2         |                      |
|   |        | Reportable Serious Incidents**  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | C-1. Actual or alleged          |                      |
|   |        | incidents involving the         |                      |
|   |        | following:                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*. Racially or ethnically     |                      |
|   |        | motivated criminal acts.        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *r*. Maltreatment of soldiers   |                      |
|   |        | or DA civilians to include      |                      |
|   |        | assaults, abuse, or             |                      |
|   |        | exploitation, when the offender |                      |
|   |        | has a trainer, supervisor or    |                      |
|   |        | cadre-trainee relationship with |                      |
|   |        | the victim, regardless of       |                      |
|   |        | whether they are members of the |                      |
|   |        | same organization. Instances of |                      |
|   |        | consensual sex are not          |                      |
|   |        | reportable unless other         |                      |
|   |        | considerations such as sexual   |                      |
|   |        | harassment or adverse publicity |                      |
|   |        | are involved.                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | C-2. Any other incident that    |                      |
|   |        | the commander determines to be  |                      |
|   |        | of concern to HQDA based on the |                      |
|   |        | nature, gravity, potential for  |                      |
|   |        | adverse publicity, or potential |                      |
|   |        | consequences of the incident.   |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| S | AR     | **4-2. Military Police Report   | Proponent changing   |
| e | 1      | (MPR)**                         | MPR, DA Form 3975,   |
| p | 90-45, |                                 | to include NIBRS     |
| 8 | *Law   | *b. Cautionary rule*. An        | requirements.        |
| 8 | Enfor  | incident will not be reported   | Dissemination of     |
|   | cement | as a founded offense unless     | MPR: local           |
| w | Repo   | adequately substantiated by     | commanders and       |
| / | rting* | police investigation.           | supervisors, U.S.    |
| c |        |                                 | Army Crime Records   |
| 1 |        | **DA Form 3975, Military Police | Center, other. No    |
|   |        | Report**                        | requirement to       |
| S |        |                                 | report to HQDA.      |
| e |        | **DA Form 4833, Commander's     |                      |
| p |        | Report of Disciplinary or       |                      |
| 9 |        | Administrative Action**         |                      |
| 3 |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Table 4-2** **Offense Code    |                      |
|   |        | List**                          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 5E Civil Rights                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6 Sex Crimes                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **DA Form 2819, Law Enforcement |                      |
|   |        | and Discipline Report**         |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | AR     |                                 | Describes the        |
| c | 195-2, |                                 | investigative        |
| t | *Cr    |                                 | authority of the     |
| 8 | iminal |                                 | U.S. Army and        |
| 5 | I      |                                 | provides guidelines  |
|   | nvesti |                                 | for determining if   |
| w | gation |                                 | an Army interest     |
| / | Activ  |                                 | exists in a given    |
| c | ities* |                                 | criminal offense.    |
| 1 |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
| S |        |                                 |                      |
| e |        |                                 |                      |
| p |        |                                 |                      |
| 9 |        |                                 |                      |
| 3 |        |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | AR     | **2-5. PO \[Private             |                      |
| c | 210-1, | Organization\] employment and   |                      |
| t | *P     | membership practices**          |                      |
| 9 | rivate |                                 |                      |
| 0 | O      | *a*. POs will not be allowed to |                      |
|   | rganiz | operate on DA installations if  |                      |
|   | ations | their employment practices      |                      |
|   | on     | discriminate based on-          |                      |
|   | Depa   |                                 |                      |
|   | rtment | \(1\) Sex, age, religion, race, |                      |
|   | of the | color, national origin, or      |                      |
|   | Army   | marital status.                 |                      |
|   | I      |                                 |                      |
|   | nstall | \(2\) Lawful political          |                      |
|   | ations | affiliation.                    |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | Of     | \(3\) Labor organization        |                      |
|   | ficial | membership.                     |                      |
|   | P      |                                 |                      |
|   | artici | \(4\) Physical handicaps.       |                      |
|   | pation |                                 |                      |
|   | in     | *b*. POs will not discriminate  |                      |
|   | P      | in membership on the basis of   |                      |
|   | rivate | race, color, sex, national      |                      |
|   | Or     | origin, or religion.            |                      |
|   | ganiza |                                 |                      |
|   | tions* | *c*. The installation commander |                      |
|   |        | may approve the operation of    |                      |
|   |        | certain POs that restrict       |                      |
|   |        | membership to one sex. One or   |                      |
|   |        | more of the following must      |                      |
|   |        | apply-                          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) The PO's purpose is       |                      |
|   |        | philanthropic and, by           |                      |
|   |        | tradition, its membership has   |                      |
|   |        | been of one sex.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) The PO's purpose and      |                      |
|   |        | function is to benefit one sex, |                      |
|   |        | and its membership is composed  |                      |
|   |        | of that sex. (Examples are      |                      |
|   |        | scouting organizations or       |                      |
|   |        | women's and men's sports        |                      |
|   |        | associations.)                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) The PO has a specific     |                      |
|   |        | purpose and function that       |                      |
|   |        | restricts membership to one     |                      |
|   |        | sex, but also has a counterpart |                      |
|   |        | organization with the same      |                      |
|   |        | purpose and function. (Examples |                      |
|   |        | are women's and men's sports    |                      |
|   |        | clubs, women's and men's civic  |                      |
|   |        | associations, and boy and girl  |                      |
|   |        | scouting organizations.)        |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **1-14. General policies**      |                      |
| a | 2      |                                 |                      |
| y | 10-50, | *f*. Housing will be provided   |                      |
| 9 | *H     | on a non-discriminatory, equal  |                      |
| 0 | ousing | opportunity basis regardless of |                      |
|   | Manag  | race, color, religion, national |                      |
|   | ement* | origin, gender, age, or         |                      |
|   |        | disability.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 6 Housing Referral    |                      |
|   |        | Service**                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Section III Housing           |                      |
|   |        | Discrimination Complaints**     |                      |
|   |        | \[discusses equal opportunity   |                      |
|   |        | in off-post housing program\].  |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| S | AR     | **7-33. Nondiscrimation**       |                      |
| e | 215-1, |                                 |                      |
| p | *Non   | MWR activities do not           |                      |
| 9 | approp | discriminate on the basis of    |                      |
| 5 | riated | race, color, religion, sex,     |                      |
|   | Fund   | age, national origin, marital   |                      |
|   | Instr  | status, political affiliation,  |                      |
|   | umenta | or physical handicap. A NAFI    |                      |
|   | lities | may not be affiliated by        |                      |
|   | and    | membership, dues or non-dues    |                      |
|   | M      | paying, with any private sector |                      |
|   | orale, | recreational, trade, or         |                      |
|   | We     | professional association that   |                      |
|   | lfare, | practices discrimination in any |                      |
|   | and    | form. No MWR facility or        |                      |
|   | Recr   | activity will be made available |                      |
|   | eation | to any organization that        |                      |
|   | Activ  | practices discrimination nor    |                      |
|   | ities* | will any NAFI use the land,     |                      |
|   |        | facilities, or services of such |                      |
|   |        | organizations.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-11. Entertainment,          |                      |
|   |        | commercial**                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Performers, shows, or acts that |                      |
|   |        | are known to have given offense |                      |
|   |        | to any racial, ethnic, or       |                      |
|   |        | religious group, or             |                      |
|   |        | entertainers who are attired in |                      |
|   |        | a manner that may offend        |                      |
|   |        | members of the audience are not |                      |
|   |        | booked. Female topless and      |                      |
|   |        | female and male bottomless      |                      |
|   |        | entertainment is prohibited.    |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **1-5. Policy**                 |                      |
| u | 3      |                                 |                      |
| l | 40-21, | *b*. Collect only the personal  |                      |
| 8 | *The   | information about an individual |                      |
| 5 | Army   | that is legally authorized and  |                      |
|   | P      | necessary to support Army       |                      |
|   | rivacy | operations. Disclose this       |                      |
|   | Pr     | information only as authorized  |                      |
|   | ogram* | by the Privacy Act and this     |                      |
|   |        | regulation.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **3-2. Blanket routine use      |                      |
|   |        | disclosure**                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c. Disclosure of requested     |                      |
|   |        | information*. If the            |                      |
|   |        | information is relevant and     |                      |
|   |        | necessary to the requesting     |                      |
|   |        | agency's decision, a record may |                      |
|   |        | be disclosed to a Federal       |                      |
|   |        | agency in response to its       |                      |
|   |        | request in connection with-     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Hiring or retention of an |                      |
|   |        | employee.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Issuance of a security    |                      |
|   |        | clearance.                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) Reporting of an           |                      |
|   |        | investigation of an employee.   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **4-5. First amendment rights** |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | No record describing how an     |                      |
|   |        | individual exercises rights     |                      |
|   |        | guaranteed by the first         |                      |
|   |        | amendment will be kept unless   |                      |
|   |        | expressly authorized by Federal |                      |
|   |        | statute, by the subject         |                      |
|   |        | individual, or unless pertinent |                      |
|   |        | to and within the scope of an   |                      |
|   |        | authorized law enforcement      |                      |
|   |        | activity. Exercise of these     |                      |
|   |        | rights includes, but is not     |                      |
|   |        | limited to, religious and       |                      |
|   |        | political beliefs, freedom of   |                      |
|   |        | speech and the press, and the   |                      |
|   |        | right of assembly and to        |                      |
|   |        | petition.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | AR     | **4-6. CMT \[Common military    | Guidance differs     |
| u | 350-1, | training\] categories**         | from AR 600-20. AR   |
| g | *Army  |                                 | 600-20 requires unit |
| 8 | Tra    | *a. Program (P).* Program       | EO training twice a  |
| 1 | ining* | training applies to the         | year. AR 350-1       |
|   |        | majority of soldiers and is     | leaves frequency of  |
| w |        | conducted in a structured       | EO training up to    |
| / |        | manner as follows:              | the commander.       |
| c |        |                                 |                      |
| 1 |        | \(1\) \[T\]raining base         | Program training in  |
|   |        | (resident training) is          | schools.             |
| A |        | conducted in accordance with an |                      |
| u |        | approved Program of             | Awareness training   |
| g |        | Instruction.                    | in schools.          |
| 8 |        |                                 |                      |
| 3 |        | \(2\) \[T\]raining in units is  |                      |
|   |        | conducted on a continuing or    |                      |
|   |        | cyclical basis.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c. Refresher ( R).* Refresher  |                      |
|   |        | training is used when periodic  |                      |
|   |        | or recurring emphasis is        |                      |
|   |        | required. This type of training |                      |
|   |        | depends on the local situation  |                      |
|   |        | and the commander's assessment  |                      |
|   |        | of need. In some instances,     |                      |
|   |        | refresher training is needed to |                      |
|   |        | reinforce or review important   |                      |
|   |        | skills or knowledge acquired    |                      |
|   |        | during initial entry training.  |                      |
|   |        | In other cases, it is training  |                      |
|   |        | designed to support unit        |                      |
|   |        | cohesion, discipline, and       |                      |
|   |        | morale. *Refresher training     |                      |
|   |        | frequency is left to the        |                      |
|   |        | commander's discretion.*        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *e. Awareness (A).* Awareness   |                      |
|   |        | training can be accomplished by |                      |
|   |        | briefings or orientations. . .  |                      |
|   |        | . *How and when this training   |                      |
|   |        | is conducted is discretionary   |                      |
|   |        | and depends on the commander's  |                      |
|   |        | evaluation of need.*            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Table 4-1** **Common Military |                      |
|   |        | Training**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Subject AR Proponent Enlisted   |                      |
|   |        | Officer                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Equal Opportunity 600-21 DCSPER |                      |
|   |        | R R                             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Moral & Ethics Dev. 600-30 CC A |                      |
|   |        | A                               |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **B-3. CMT codes and examples** | Guidance differs     |
| a | 3      |                                 | from AR 600-20. AR   |
| r | 50-41, | *b*.(1) *Program (P) training   | 600-20 requires unit |
| 9 | *Tr    | code*. Program training applies | EO training twice a  |
| 3 | aining | to the majority of soldiers and | year. AR 350-41      |
|   | in     | is conducted in a structured    | requires refresher   |
|   | Units* | manner as follows:              | training on EO and   |
|   |        |                                 | sexual harassment,   |
|   |        | (*a*) \[T\]raining in schools   | but leaves frequency |
|   |        | is programmed.                  | of training up to    |
|   |        |                                 | the commander.       |
|   |        | (*b*) \[T\]raining in units is  |                      |
|   |        | conducted on a continuing or    |                      |
|   |        | cyclical basis.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(9\) *Refresher ( R) training  |                      |
|   |        | code*. Refresher training is    |                      |
|   |        | used when periodic or recurring |                      |
|   |        | emphasis is required. . . . In  |                      |
|   |        | other cases, refresher training |                      |
|   |        | is designed to support unit     |                      |
|   |        | cohesion, discipline and        |                      |
|   |        | morale. The lack of any of      |                      |
|   |        | these three factors can         |                      |
|   |        | adversely affect the command    |                      |
|   |        | climate and unit readiness and, |                      |
|   |        | therefore, mission              |                      |
|   |        | accomplishment. . . . Refresher |                      |
|   |        | training frequency is left to   |                      |
|   |        | the commander's discretion*.*   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(11\) *Awareness (A) training  |                      |
|   |        | code*. Awareness training . . . |                      |
|   |        | can be accomplished by          |                      |
|   |        | briefings or orientations. . .  |                      |
|   |        | . How and when this training is |                      |
|   |        | conducted is discretionary and  |                      |
|   |        | depends on the commander's      |                      |
|   |        | evaluation of need*.*           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Table B-1** **Common military |                      |
|   |        | training in units**             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Subject AR Proponent Enlisted   |                      |
|   |        | Officer                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | EO/Sex Harass 600-20 DCSPER R R |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Legend**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | R\--Refresher                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Table B-2** **Common training |                      |
|   |        | in Army Schools**               |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Subject AR B A P Bn An S F Ob   |                      |
|   |        | Oa C Cg                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | EO/Sex Harass 600-20 P P P P P  |                      |
|   |        | P A A A A                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Standards of Conduct 600-50 P R |                      |
|   |        | R P R                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Legend**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | B\--BCT/OSUT, A\--AIT/OSUT,     |                      |
|   |        | P\--PLDC, Bn\--BNCOC,           |                      |
|   |        | An\--ANCOC, S\--SMC,            |                      |
|   |        | F\--Functional, Ob\--OBC/WOCS,  |                      |
|   |        | Oa\--OAC/SWOT, C\--CAS^3^ ,     |                      |
|   |        | Cg\--CGSC/MWOT                  |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | AR     | 2-12.*l*.(2) The masthead for   |                      |
| c | 3      | CE \[civilian enterprise\]      |                      |
| t | 60-81, | publications that have          |                      |
| 8 | *C     | advertising will also contain   |                      |
| 9 | ommand | the following statements:       |                      |
|   | Infor  |                                 |                      |
|   | mation | (*a*) "Everything advertised in |                      |
|   | Pr     | this publication shall be made  |                      |
|   | ogram* | available for purchase, use or  |                      |
|   |        | patronage without regard to     |                      |
|   |        | race, color, religion, sex,     |                      |
|   |        | national origin, age, marital   |                      |
|   |        | status, physical handicap,      |                      |
|   |        | political affiliation, or any   |                      |
|   |        | other non merit factor of the   |                      |
|   |        | purchaser, user or patron."     |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **Chapter 4 Eliminations**      |                      |
| u | 600    |                                 |                      |
| l | -8-24, | **4-1. Overview**               |                      |
| 9 | *O     |                                 |                      |
| 5 | fficer | *c*. An officer who has his or  |                      |
|   | Tra    | her security clearance          |                      |
|   | nsfers | withdrawn or withheld due to    |                      |
|   | and    | unfavorable information         |                      |
|   | Disch  | regarding loyalty, subversion,  |                      |
|   | arges* | or security may be processed    |                      |
|   |        | for involuntary separation      |                      |
|   |        | according to AR 604-10.         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **4-2. Reasons for              |                      |
|   |        | Elimination**                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | While not all inclusive, when   |                      |
|   |        | one of the following or similar |                      |
|   |        | conditions exist, elimination   |                      |
|   |        | action may be or will be        |                      |
|   |        | initiated as indicated below    |                      |
|   |        | for-                            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*. Substandard performance of |                      |
|   |        | duty.                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*. Misconduct, moral or       |                      |
|   |        | professional dereliction, or in |                      |
|   |        | the interest of national        |                      |
|   |        | security.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(5\) Acts of personal          |                      |
|   |        | misconduct (including but not   |                      |
|   |        | limited to acts committed while |                      |
|   |        | in a drunken or drug            |                      |
|   |        | intoxicated state).             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(8\) Conduct unbecoming an     |                      |
|   |        | officer.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(13\) Failure to respond in a  |                      |
|   |        | reasonable length of time to    |                      |
|   |        | rehabilitative efforts          |                      |
|   |        | regarding repeated acts of      |                      |
|   |        | child/spouse maltreatment or    |                      |
|   |        | abuse and/or acts of family     |                      |
|   |        | violence.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **1-12. Overall policy for the  |                      |
| a | 6      | female soldier**                |                      |
| r | 00-13, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Army  | *a*. The Army's assignment      |                      |
| 2 | Policy | policy for female soldiers      |                      |
|   | for    | allows women to serve in any    |                      |
|   | the    | officer or enlisted specialty   |                      |
|   | Assi   | or position except in those     |                      |
|   | gnment | specialties, positions, or      |                      |
|   | of     | units (battalion size or        |                      |
|   | Female | smaller) which are assigned a   |                      |
|   | Sol    | routine mission to engage in    |                      |
|   | diers* | direct combat, or which         |                      |
|   |        | collocate routinely with units  |                      |
|   |        | assigned a direct combat        |                      |
|   |        | mission.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*. Female soldiers will be    |                      |
|   |        | provided full and equal         |                      |
|   |        | opportunity to pursue careers   |                      |
|   |        | in the military and will be     |                      |
|   |        | assigned to all skills and      |                      |
|   |        | positions according to the      |                      |
|   |        | above policy.                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 2-2.*b*. The following two      |                      |
|   |        | codes will be used to classify  |                      |
|   |        | positions:                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) P1 will indicate those    |                      |
|   |        | positions to which women may    |                      |
|   |        | not be assigned.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) P2 (open to women) will   |                      |
|   |        | be used for all other           |                      |
|   |        | positions.                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 2-3.*b*. Procedures for         |                      |
|   |        | classifying positions under     |                      |
|   |        | DCPC \[Direct Combat Position   |                      |
|   |        | Coding\] will be accomplished   |                      |
|   |        | as follows.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Positions will be coded   |                      |
|   |        | closed (P1) only if-            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | (*a*) The specialty or position |                      |
|   |        | requires routine engagement in  |                      |
|   |        | direct combat.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | (*b*) The position is in a      |                      |
|   |        | battalion or smaller size unit  |                      |
|   |        | that has a mission of routine   |                      |
|   |        | engagement in direct combat.    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | (*c*) The position is in a unit |                      |
|   |        | that routinely collocates with  |                      |
|   |        | battalion or smaller size units |                      |
|   |        | assigned a mission to engage in |                      |
|   |        | direct combat.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | (*d*) The position is in a      |                      |
|   |        | portion of a unit that          |                      |
|   |        | routinely collocates with a     |                      |
|   |        | battalion or smaller size unit  |                      |
|   |        | having a direct combat mission. |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Positions will be coded   |                      |
|   |        | open (P2) if they do not meet   |                      |
|   |        | the criteria of a closed (P1)   |                      |
|   |        | position as defined above.      |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **2-1. Chain of Command**       | Undergoing revision. |
| a | 6      |                                 |                      |
| r | 00-20, | *b*. Commanders are responsible |                      |
| 8 | *Army  | for everything their command    |                      |
| 8 | C      | does or fails to do.            |                      |
|   | ommand |                                 |                      |
| w | P      | *d*. Soldiers have a            |                      |
| / | olicy* | responsibility to ensure their  |                      |
| c |        | unit commander is made aware of |                      |
| 4 |        | problems which affect the       |                      |
|   |        | discipline, morale, and         |                      |
| S |        | effectiveness of the unit.      |                      |
| e |        |                                 |                      |
| p |        | **4-4. Soldier Conduct**        |                      |
| 9 |        |                                 |                      |
| 3 |        | *a*. Ensuring the proper        |                      |
|   |        | conduct of soldiers is a        |                      |
|   |        | function of command. Commanders |                      |
|   |        | rely upon all leaders in the    |                      |
|   |        | Army, whether they are on or    |                      |
|   |        | off duty or in a leave status,  |                      |
|   |        | to-                             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Take action against       |                      |
|   |        | military personnel in any case  |                      |
|   |        | where the soldier's conduct     |                      |
|   |        | violates good order and         |                      |
|   |        | military discipline.            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **6-3. Equal opportunity        |                      |
|   |        | policy**                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6-3.*a*.(2) Extends to          |                      |
|   |        | soldiers, civilian employees,   |                      |
|   |        | and their families.             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*. The following are          |                      |
|   |        | exceptions to a totally         |                      |
|   |        | nonbiased personnel management  |                      |
|   |        | process:                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) The assignment and        |                      |
|   |        | utilization of female soldiers. |                      |
|   |        | (AR 600-13, Army Policy for the |                      |
|   |        | Assignment of Female Soldiers,  |                      |
|   |        | prescribes policies,            |                      |
|   |        | procedures, responsibilities,   |                      |
|   |        | and the position coding system  |                      |
|   |        | for female soldiers.)           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Support for established   |                      |
|   |        | equal opportunity goals, such   |                      |
|   |        | as to increase representation   |                      |
|   |        | of a particular group in one or |                      |
|   |        | more monitored area(s) of       |                      |
|   |        | affirmative action plans.       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **6-5. Chain of command         |                      |
|   |        | responsibilities**              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The chain of command, whether   |                      |
|   |        | military or civilian, has the   |                      |
|   |        | primary responsibility for      |                      |
|   |        | developing and sustaining a     |                      |
|   |        | healthy EO climate. This        |                      |
|   |        | responsibility entails, but is  |                      |
|   |        | not limited to, promoting       |                      |
|   |        | positive programs that enhance  |                      |
|   |        | unit cohesion, esprit, and      |                      |
|   |        | morale; communicating matters   |                      |
|   |        | with EO significance to unit    |                      |
|   |        | personnel and higher            |                      |
|   |        | headquarters; correcting        |                      |
|   |        | discriminatory practices by     |                      |
|   |        | conducting rapid, objective,    |                      |
|   |        | and impartial inquiries to      |                      |
|   |        | resolve complaints of           |                      |
|   |        | discrimination; encouraging the |                      |
|   |        | surfacing of problems and       |                      |
|   |        | preventing reprisal for those   |                      |
|   |        | who complain; and taking        |                      |
|   |        | appropriate action against      |                      |
|   |        | those who violate Army policy.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **6-6. Staffing**               |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6-6.*c*. The principal EOA will |                      |
|   |        | have direct access to the       |                      |
|   |        | supported commander at all      |                      |
|   |        | times and that commander will   |                      |
|   |        | be either the EOA's rater or    |                      |
|   |        | senior rater.                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6-6.*e. Roles and duties of     |                      |
|   |        | EOAs*.                          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(11\) Receiving and assisting  |                      |
|   |        | in processing individual        |                      |
|   |        | complaints of discrimination    |                      |
|   |        | and sexual harassment.          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **6-8. Procedures for           |                      |
|   |        | processing complaints of        |                      |
|   |        | discrimination**                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*. *Individual rights*.       |                      |
|   |        | Soldiers and their family       |                      |
|   |        | members have the right to\--    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Present a complaint to    |                      |
|   |        | the command without fear of     |                      |
|   |        | intimidation, reprisal, or      |                      |
|   |        | harassment;                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Communicate with the      |                      |
|   |        | commander concerning their      |                      |
|   |        | complaints;                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*. *Individual                |                      |
|   |        | responsibilities*. Individuals  |                      |
|   |        | have the responsibility to \--  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Attempt to resolve a      |                      |
|   |        | complaint by first informing    |                      |
|   |        | the alleged offender that the   |                      |
|   |        | behavior must stop. (Depending  |                      |
|   |        | upon the severity of the        |                      |
|   |        | offense, this may not always be |                      |
|   |        | plausible);                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Advise the command of the |                      |
|   |        | specifics of sexual harassment  |                      |
|   |        | and discrimination complaints   |                      |
|   |        | and provide the command an      |                      |
|   |        | opportunity to take appropriate |                      |
|   |        | action to rectify/resolve the   |                      |
|   |        | issue; and                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) Submit only legitimate    |                      |
|   |        | complaints and exercise caution |                      |
|   |        | against unfounded or reckless   |                      |
|   |        | charges.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*.(1) *Informal complaints*.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*.(2) *Formal complaints*.    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6-8*.f*.(2) The unit commander  |                      |
|   |        | will conduct an inquiry to      |                      |
|   |        | determine if sufficient         |                      |
|   |        | evidence exists to warrant a    |                      |
|   |        | full investigation. . . .       |                      |
|   |        | Should such evidence exist, the |                      |
|   |        | commander must refer the case   |                      |
|   |        | to the battalion- or            |                      |
|   |        | brigade-level commander for the |                      |
|   |        | appointment of an AR 15-6       |                      |
|   |        | investigating officer.          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) The EOA will review and   |                      |
|   |        | comment on the findings of the  |                      |
|   |        | investigation to ensure         |                      |
|   |        | compliance with DoD/DA policies |                      |
|   |        | and objectives.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *h*. An EOA's skills in         |                      |
|   |        | complaint handling and conflict |                      |
|   |        | resolution and training in the  |                      |
|   |        | subtleties of discrimination    |                      |
|   |        | and sexual harassment enable    |                      |
|   |        | him or her to advise the        |                      |
|   |        | commander or any investigating  |                      |
|   |        | officer.                        |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| D | AR     | **Chapter 3 Unfavorable         |                      |
| e | 6      | Information in Official         |                      |
| c | 00-37, | Personnel Files**               |                      |
| 8 | *Unfav |                                 |                      |
| 6 | orable | **3-4. Filing of nonpunitive    |                      |
|   | Inform | administrative letters of       |                      |
| w | ation* | reprimand, admonition, or       |                      |
| / |        | censure in official personnel   |                      |
| c |        | files**                         |                      |
| 1 |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
| O |        |                                 |                      |
| c |        |                                 |                      |
| t |        |                                 |                      |
| 9 |        |                                 |                      |
| 4 |        |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| S | AR     | 1-8.*a*.(4) *Integrity*. This   |                      |
| e | 60     | is the thread woven through the |                      |
| p | 0-100, | fabric of the professional Army |                      |
| 9 | *Army  | ethic. Integrity means honesty, |                      |
| 3 | Leade  | uprightness, the avoidance of   |                      |
|   | rship* | deception and steadfast         |                      |
|   |        | adherence to standards of       |                      |
|   |        | behavior.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 2 Responsibilities**  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **2-1. General**                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*. All leaders are            |                      |
|   |        | responsible for:                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(1\) Accomplishing the unit's  |                      |
|   |        | mission.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Ensuring subordinates     |                      |
|   |        | welfare to include physical,    |                      |
|   |        | moral, personal, and            |                      |
|   |        | professional well-being.        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(4\) Setting and exemplifying  |                      |
|   |        | the highest professional and    |                      |
|   |        | ethical standards.              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(13\) Treating subordinates    |                      |
|   |        | with dignity, respect, fairness |                      |
|   |        | and consistency.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*.(2) Senior level leaders    |                      |
|   |        | promote Army values by          |                      |
|   |        | establishing and maintaining    |                      |
|   |        | the command climate of their    |                      |
|   |        | organizations through sound,    |                      |
|   |        | ethical organizational policies |                      |
|   |        | and practices. . . . Senior     |                      |
|   |        | leaders must consider           |                      |
|   |        | individual perceptions and      |                      |
|   |        | their effects in establishing   |                      |
|   |        | and maintaining a healthy       |                      |
|   |        | command climate.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*.(3) Leaders at the direct   |                      |
|   |        | level affect values and         |                      |
|   |        | behavior by establishing        |                      |
|   |        | day-to-day procedures,          |                      |
|   |        | practices and working norms, by |                      |
|   |        | their personal example, and by  |                      |
|   |        | building discipline, cohesion,  |                      |
|   |        | motivation, consistency, and    |                      |
|   |        | fair play. . . . The values     |                      |
|   |        | leaders personally practice     |                      |
|   |        | have a major impact in          |                      |
|   |        | determining unit and            |                      |
|   |        | organizational value systems.   |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **Chapter 7 Section II          |                      |
| u | 60     | Advancement to Pay Grades E-2,  |                      |
| l | 0-200, | E-3, E-4**                      |                      |
| 8 | *En    |                                 |                      |
| 4 | listed | 7-13.*i*. \[B\]oards may only   |                      |
| w | Per    | be used for soldiers who need a |                      |
| / | sonnel | time in service waiver.         |                      |
| c | Mana   |                                 |                      |
| 1 | gement | \(2\) The board will include    |                      |
| 5 | S      | voting members of minority      |                      |
| S | ystem* | ethnic groups. The board will   |                      |
| e |        | also include at least one       |                      |
| p |        | voting member of the same sex   |                      |
| 9 |        | as those being considered, if   |                      |
| 0 |        | available.                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Section III Promotion to Pay  |                      |
|   |        | Grades E-5 and E-6**            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 7-19.*a*.(5) \[T\]he board will |                      |
|   |        | be comprised of at least one    |                      |
|   |        | voting member of the same sex   |                      |
|   |        | as those being considered.      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(6\) \[W\]ill appoint members  |                      |
|   |        | of minority ethnic groups . . . |                      |
|   |        | even though the board may not   |                      |
|   |        | be considering soldiers of      |                      |
|   |        | minority ethnic groups. No      |                      |
|   |        | specific number or ratio of     |                      |
|   |        | these soldiers will be on any   |                      |
|   |        | given board; however, the board |                      |
|   |        | will not be comprised of all    |                      |
|   |        | minority ethnic group members.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Section IV Promotion to Pay   |                      |
|   |        | Grades E-7, E-8, E-9**          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **7-38. Selection boards**      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a. Composition*. . . . Female  |                      |
|   |        | officers and enlisted women     |                      |
|   |        | will be routinely appointed to  |                      |
|   |        | serve as members of the board.  |                      |
|   |        | . . . Minority ethnic group     |                      |
|   |        | representation will be          |                      |
|   |        | routinely provided.             |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | AR     | **2-4. Selection criteria**     |                      |
| a | 601-1, |                                 |                      |
| r | *Assi  | *a*. To qualify for selection   |                      |
| 9 | gnment | as a U.S. Army recruiter,       |                      |
| 2 | of     | either as a volunteer or as a   |                      |
|   | En     | DA selected recruiter, a        |                      |
|   | listed | soldier must-                   |                      |
|   | Per    |                                 |                      |
|   | sonnel | \(20\) Never have had action    |                      |
|   | to the | taken (including proceedings    |                      |
|   | U. S.  | under the provisions of Article |                      |
|   | Army   | 15, Uniform Code of Military    |                      |
|   | Recr   | Justice) . . . by any authority |                      |
|   | uiting | for-                            |                      |
|   | Co     |                                 |                      |
|   | mmand* | (*b*) Any offense that involves |                      |
|   |        | moral turpitude, regardless of  |                      |
|   |        | sentence received. (No waiver   |                      |
|   |        | authorized.)                    |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| F | AR     | **2-10. Moral and               |                      |
| e | 60     | administrative criteria**       |                      |
| b | 1-210, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *R     | *a. Applicant Interview***.**   |                      |
| 5 | egular | Recruiter will interview        |                      |
|   | Army   | applicant on any records of     |                      |
|   | and    | arrest, charges, juvenile court |                      |
|   | Army   | adjudications, traffic          |                      |
|   | R      | violations, probation periods,  |                      |
|   | eserve | dismissed or pending charges or |                      |
|   | Enli   | convictions.                    |                      |
|   | stment |                                 |                      |
|   | Pr     | \(1\) If applicant claims none, |                      |
|   | ogram* | processing may continue without |                      |
|   |        | a police records check.         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) If applicant admits to an |                      |
|   |        | offense, or recruiter has       |                      |
|   |        | reasons to suspect applicant    |                      |
|   |        | may be concealing a record,     |                      |
|   |        | start police records check      |                      |
|   |        | procedures.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b. Police Clearance**.***      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *e. Delay of police reply.* If  |                      |
|   |        | reply from police authorities   |                      |
|   |        | is not received within 21 days, |                      |
|   |        | a copy of the DD Form 369       |                      |
|   |        | request will be forwarded to    |                      |
|   |        | the \[battalion\] whose area    |                      |
|   |        | includes the city in question.  |                      |
|   |        | \[Battalion\] commander will    |                      |
|   |        | exert every effort to obtain    |                      |
|   |        | police clearance and return     |                      |
|   |        | results to requesting           |                      |
|   |        | recruiting station. If efforts  |                      |
|   |        | to obtain information fail,     |                      |
|   |        | process allegation as           |                      |
|   |        | self-admitted offense.          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *i. Police records check not    |                      |
|   |        | required***.** If law           |                      |
|   |        | enforcement agency states, in   |                      |
|   |        | writing, that it will not       |                      |
|   |        | provide information or that a   |                      |
|   |        | fee is required and copy of     |                      |
|   |        | that statement is maintained in |                      |
|   |        | recruiting battalions, police   |                      |
|   |        | records check will not be       |                      |
|   |        | required. DD Form 369 will      |                      |
|   |        | contain reference to that       |                      |
|   |        | written statement. The form     |                      |
|   |        | will be forwarded with          |                      |
|   |        | enlistment packet.              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **4-24. Nonwaiver medical,      |                      |
|   |        | moral, and administrative       |                      |
|   |        | disqualifications**             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The following are               |                      |
|   |        | disqualifications that cannot   |                      |
|   |        | be waived:                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*. Questionable moral         |                      |
|   |        | character.                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *f*. Sexual perversion.         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *h*. History of antisocial      |                      |
|   |        | behavior.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 6** **MEPs Processing |                      |
|   |        | Phase**                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Section II Guidance Counselor |                      |
|   |        | Processing Phase**              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 6-5.*c*. Specifically, question |                      |
|   |        | applicant on existence of       |                      |
|   |        | juvenile and youthful offender  |                      |
|   |        | records. Explains thoroughly to |                      |
|   |        | each applicant the Army policy  |                      |
|   |        | that adjudication as a youthful |                      |
|   |        | offender or juvenile delinquent |                      |
|   |        | by a State, or disposition by   |                      |
|   |        | Federal juvenile authorities,   |                      |
|   |        | will not prevent enlistment if  |                      |
|   |        | applicant is otherwise          |                      |
|   |        | eligible.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | AR     | **Chapter 6 Operating           |                      |
| p | 60     | Procedures**                    |                      |
| r | 1-270, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *Mi    | **6-5. MEPS preenlistment       |                      |
| 6 | litary | interview**                     |                      |
|   | En     |                                 |                      |
|   | trance | MEPS will interview applicants  |                      |
|   | Proc   | (before the Oath of Enlistment  |                      |
|   | essing | is administered) for the        |                      |
|   | S      | purpose of assisting recruiting |                      |
|   | tation | activities. . . . Any           |                      |
|   | (      | additional information obtained |                      |
|   | MEPS)* | from applicants which may have  |                      |
|   |        | a bearing on their              |                      |
|   |        | qualification for military      |                      |
|   |        | service will be furnished to    |                      |
|   |        | the appropriate MEPS examining  |                      |
|   |        | officer . . . for resolution.   |                      |
|   |        | Specific interview requirements |                      |
|   |        | and procedures will be          |                      |
|   |        | established by the Commander,   |                      |
|   |        | USMEPCOM, in coordination with  |                      |
|   |        | recruiting Service commanders.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 9 Processing of       |                      |
|   |        | Selective Service System        |                      |
|   |        | Registrants**                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *Note*: This chapter will be    |                      |
|   |        | implemented upon direction of   |                      |
|   |        | Headquarters, Department of the |                      |
|   |        | Army.                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **9-15. Initial Screening**     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Registrants are unacceptable    |                      |
|   |        | when their record of            |                      |
|   |        | convictions or adverse juvenile |                      |
|   |        | adjudications reflects frequent |                      |
|   |        | difficulties with law           |                      |
|   |        | enforcement agencies, criminal  |                      |
|   |        | tendencies, a history of        |                      |
|   |        | antisocial behavior,            |                      |
|   |        | alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual  |                      |
|   |        | misconduct, or questionable     |                      |
|   |        | moral character.                |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| S | AR     | **1-8. Authority to act on      |                      |
| e | 60     | retention actions**             |                      |
| p | 1-280, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Army  | *f*. In those cases where a     |                      |
| 5 | Ret    | soldier is fully qualified for  |                      |
|   | ention | retention but his commander     |                      |
|   | Pr     | believes it is not in the best  |                      |
|   | ogram* | interest of the Army for the    |                      |
|   |        | soldier to continue to serve    |                      |
|   |        | (but a Bar to Reenlistment is   |                      |
|   |        | not warranted), the commander   |                      |
|   |        | may forward the soldier's       |                      |
|   |        | request for reenlistment or     |                      |
|   |        | extension through command       |                      |
|   |        | channels to the first Colonel   |                      |
|   |        | or higher in the soldier's      |                      |
|   |        | chain of command. . . . If      |                      |
|   |        | denial of the requested action  |                      |
|   |        | is supported, the commander     |                      |
|   |        | will provide his or her         |                      |
|   |        | comments, attached as an        |                      |
|   |        | endorsement . . . through the   |                      |
|   |        | servicing senior Career         |                      |
|   |        | Counselor to the Commander,     |                      |
|   |        | PERSCOM. . . . The Commander,   |                      |
|   |        | PERSCOM, may, on a case-by-case |                      |
|   |        | basis, deny reenlistment and/or |                      |
|   |        | extension to any soldier who    |                      |
|   |        | does not have a statutory       |                      |
|   |        | entitlement to reenlist. . . .  |                      |
|   |        | Any commander who is a          |                      |
|   |        | commissioned officer in the     |                      |
|   |        | soldier's chain of command may  |                      |
|   |        | stop the process for denial and |                      |
|   |        | approve the soldier's request.  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **3-9. Moral and Administrative |                      |
|   |        | Disqualifications**             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-2. Standards for            |                      |
|   |        | Reenlistment**                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*. Only soldiers of high      |                      |
|   |        | moral character, personal       |                      |
|   |        | competence, and demonstrated    |                      |
|   |        | adaptability to the             |                      |
|   |        | requirements of the             |                      |
|   |        | professional soldier's moral    |                      |
|   |        | code will be reenlisted in the  |                      |
|   |        | Active Army.                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-4. Criteria**               |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *d*. *Soldiers against whom a   |                      |
|   |        | Bar to Reenlistment may be      |                      |
|   |        | initiated*.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(13\) Cannot adapt to military |                      |
|   |        | life; uncooperative; involved   |                      |
|   |        | in frequent difficulties with   |                      |
|   |        | fellow soldiers.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(15\) Causes trouble in the    |                      |
|   |        | civilian community.             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(17\) Personal behavior brings |                      |
|   |        | discredit upon his unit or the  |                      |
|   |        | Army.                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-5.** **Procedures**         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*.(2) A Bar to Reenlistment   |                      |
|   |        | should not be based on          |                      |
|   |        | generalities, approximate       |                      |
|   |        | dates, vague places or time. It |                      |
|   |        | should be based on specific     |                      |
|   |        | incidents substantiated by      |                      |
|   |        | official remarks made at the    |                      |
|   |        | time of each occurrence. The    |                      |
|   |        | soldier should be counseled on  |                      |
|   |        | each occurrence and told that   |                      |
|   |        | all instances are made matter   |                      |
|   |        | of official record when acts    |                      |
|   |        | considered unworthy of the U.S. |                      |
|   |        | Army are performed.             |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **1-14. Female officer          |                      |
| u | 61     | designation/utilization**       |                      |
| n | 1-101, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *      | *a*. It is the current Army     |                      |
| 5 | Commis | policy that female officers may |                      |
|   | sioned | be designated in any branch or  |                      |
|   | O      | functional area except Infantry |                      |
|   | fficer | (11), Armor (12), Special       |                      |
|   | Cl     | Forces (18), and all other AOCs |                      |
|   | assifi | except Cannon Field Artillery   |                      |
|   | cation | (13E) and SHORAD Artillery      |                      |
|   | S      | (14B).                          |                      |
|   | ystem* |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *b*. Female officers may be     |                      |
|   |        | designated in all other branch  |                      |
|   |        | and functional area AOCs, but   |                      |
|   |        | will not be assigned to         |                      |
|   |        | positions coded with Direct     |                      |
|   |        | Combat Position Coding (DCPC)   |                      |
|   |        | P1; for example, to Mechanized  |                      |
|   |        | Infantry.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **1-11. Military Occupational   |                      |
| u | 61     | Specialty (MOS) physical        |                      |
| n | 1-201, | demands analysis and ratings**  |                      |
| 9 | *      |                                 |                      |
| 5 | Career | *f*. Pending publication of an  |                      |
|   | Mana   | Army Regulation outlining       |                      |
|   | gement | proponent responsibilities and  |                      |
|   | Fields | methodology for assessing       |                      |
|   | and    | physical demands, the           |                      |
|   | Mi     | procedures outlined in appendix |                      |
|   | litary | G, Women in the Army Policy     |                      |
|   | Occupa | Review, ODCSPER, DA 12 November |                      |
|   | tional | 1982 will be used by proponents |                      |
|   | Spec   | to prepare the . . . (Physical  |                      |
|   | ialty* | Demands Analysis Worksheet).    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 4 MOS, SQI and ASI    |                      |
|   |        | Not Available to Women          |                      |
|   |        | Soldiers**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **4-1. General**                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The Direct Combat Probability   |                      |
|   |        | Coding Policy determines where  |                      |
|   |        | women may serve. Women may not  |                      |
|   |        | serve in units or in positions  |                      |
|   |        | in units that would routinely   |                      |
|   |        | require them to perform in      |                      |
|   |        | direct combat.                  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **4-2. MOS, SQI and ASI closed  |                      |
|   |        | to women**                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The Army has recognized the     |                      |
|   |        | high probability that soldiers  |                      |
|   |        | classified in some MOS and SQI  |                      |
|   |        | will routinely engage in direct |                      |
|   |        | combat. Therefore, SQI "G"      |                      |
|   |        | Ranger,                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | SQI "V" Ranger-Parachutist, and |                      |
|   |        | the MOS listed in Table 4-1 are |                      |
|   |        | closed for accession or         |                      |
|   |        | reclassification of female      |                      |
|   |        | soldiers.                       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | 1-5.*n*. The direct combat      |                      |
| u | 61     | probability coding (DCPC)       |                      |
| l | 4-200, | policy determines positions in  |                      |
| 8 | *Sel   | which women may serve. Under    |                      |
| 4 | ection | DCPC women may not be assigned  |                      |
|   | of     | to positions coded P1 on TO&E.  |                      |
| w | En     | The P1 positions have the       |                      |
| / | listed | highest probability of routine  |                      |
| c | So     | participation in direct combat. |                      |
| 1 | ldiers | DCPC of positions is visible    |                      |
| 5 | for    | only on TO&E, male only.        |                      |
|   | Tr     | Identify codes on MTOE should   |                      |
| S | aining | correctly correlate to P1 codes |                      |
| e | and    | on TO&E. Women may be assigned  |                      |
| p | Assig  | to all other positions.         |                      |
| 9 | nment* |                                 |                      |
| 0 |        | 1-5.*v*. Soldiers will be given |                      |
|   |        | equal assignment opportunity    |                      |
|   |        | without regard to race, color,  |                      |
|   |        | age, religion, national origin, |                      |
|   |        | marital status, or whether or   |                      |
|   |        | not they will be accompanied by |                      |
|   |        | their spouses. Martial status   |                      |
|   |        | or the employment, educational, |                      |
|   |        | or volunteer activities of the  |                      |
|   |        | spouse will not be considered   |                      |
|   |        | in the selection of a soldier   |                      |
|   |        | for PCS or duty assignments.    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 8 Section II Drill    |                      |
|   |        | Sergeant Program**              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-17. Selection criteria**    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *d*. Have no record of          |                      |
|   |        | emotional instability as        |                      |
|   |        | determined by screening of      |                      |
|   |        | health records.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *g*. Have no record of          |                      |
|   |        | disciplinary action . . .       |                      |
|   |        | during current enlistment or in |                      |
|   |        | last 3 years, whichever is      |                      |
|   |        | longer.                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **8-20. Relief form drill       |                      |
|   |        | sergeant candidate status or    |                      |
|   |        | drill sergeant duties**.        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*.(1) Failure to maintain     |                      |
|   |        | high standards of military      |                      |
|   |        | appearance, military courtesy,  |                      |
|   |        | bearing, conduct, and/or        |                      |
|   |        | professionalism.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*.(3) Infractions of training |                      |
|   |        | policies or violations of the   |                      |
|   |        | UCMJ.                           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *k*. When a serious incident    |                      |
|   |        | occurs that requires an         |                      |
|   |        | investigation to clarify the    |                      |
|   |        | issues, commanders will relieve |                      |
|   |        | the drill sergeant from         |                      |
|   |        | assigned duties and temporarily |                      |
|   |        | suspend special duty assignment |                      |
|   |        | pay, pending completion of the  |                      |
|   |        | investigation. Mere occurrence  |                      |
|   |        | of an incident or the conduct   |                      |
|   |        | of an investigation is not      |                      |
|   |        | intended to be a basis for      |                      |
|   |        | relief from the program.        |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | AR     | **Chapter 1 General             |                      |
| u | 63     | Provisions**                    |                      |
| l | 5-200, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *En    | **1-1. Purpose and scope**      |                      |
| 4 | listed |                                 |                      |
| w | Pers   | *b*. The separation policies in |                      |
| / | onnel* | this regulation promote the     |                      |
| c |        | readiness of the Army by        |                      |
| 1 |        | providing an orderly means to-  |                      |
| 5 |        |                                 |                      |
| J |        | \(1\) Judge the suitability of  |                      |
| u |        | persons to serve in the Army on |                      |
| n |        | the basis of their conduct and  |                      |
| 9 |        | their ability to meet required  |                      |
| 6 |        | standards of duty performance   |                      |
|   |        | and discipline.                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 13 Separation for     |                      |
|   |        | Unsatisfactory Performance**    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **13-2. Criteria**              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *a*. Commanders will separate a |                      |
|   |        | soldier for unsatisfactory      |                      |
|   |        | performance when it is clearly  |                      |
|   |        | established that-               |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(3\) The seriousness of the    |                      |
|   |        | circumstances is such that the  |                      |
|   |        | soldier's retention would have  |                      |
|   |        | an adverse impact on military   |                      |
|   |        | discipline, good order, and     |                      |
|   |        | morale, and                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(4\) It is likely that the     |                      |
|   |        | soldier will be a disruptive    |                      |
|   |        | influence in present or future  |                      |
|   |        | duty assignments, and           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(5\) It is likely that the     |                      |
|   |        | circumstances forming the basis |                      |
|   |        | for initiation of separation    |                      |
|   |        | proceedings will continue or    |                      |
|   |        | recur, and                      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(6\) The ability of the        |                      |
|   |        | soldier to perform duties       |                      |
|   |        | effectively in the future,      |                      |
|   |        | including potential for         |                      |
|   |        | advancement or leadership, is   |                      |
|   |        | unlikely.                       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 14** **Section III    |                      |
|   |        | Acts or Patterns of             |                      |
|   |        | Misconduct**                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 14-12.*b. A pattern of          |                      |
|   |        | misconduct.*                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | \(2\) Conduct prejudicial to    |                      |
|   |        | good order and discipline.      |                      |
|   |        | Discreditable conduct and       |                      |
|   |        | conduct prejudicial to good     |                      |
|   |        | order and discipline includes   |                      |
|   |        | conduct violative of the        |                      |
|   |        | accepted standards of personal  |                      |
|   |        | conduct found in the UCMJ, Army |                      |
|   |        | regulations, the civil law, and |                      |
|   |        | time-honored customs and        |                      |
|   |        | traditions of the Army.         |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| S | AR     | **1-7. Personal appearance      |                      |
| e | 670-1, | policies**                      |                      |
| p | *Wear  |                                 |                      |
| 9 | and    | *a.* *General*. The Army is a   |                      |
| 2 | Appe   | uniformed service where         |                      |
|   | arance | discipline is judged, in part,  |                      |
|   | of     | by the manner in which the      |                      |
|   | Army   | individual wears the uniform as |                      |
|   | Un     | prescribed.                     |                      |
|   | iforms |                                 |                      |
|   | and    | **26-28. Umbrellas, black       |                      |
|   | Ins    | (female only)**                 |                      |
|   | ignia* |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c. How worn*. Female personnel |                      |
|   |        | may carry an umbrella when      |                      |
|   |        | wearing the service, dress, and |                      |
|   |        | mess uniforms. The umbrella may |                      |
|   |        | not be carried when wearing     |                      |
|   |        | field or utility uniforms.      |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| D | DA Pam | 2-18.*a*. Moral ownership has   |                      |
| e | 1      | become an integral part of the  |                      |
| c | 65-15, | life of our soldiers. Each and  |                      |
| 8 | *Moral | every soldier is charged with   |                      |
| 6 | Leade  | this obligation. A lack of this |                      |
|   | rship/ | attribute causes unit and       |                      |
|   | V      | personal disintegration.        |                      |
|   | alues: |                                 |                      |
|   | Re     |                                 |                      |
|   | sponsi |                                 |                      |
|   | bility |                                 |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | Lo     |                                 |                      |
|   | yalty* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DA Pam | Lesson plans include: The       | Proponent to revise  |
| u | 3      | Army's Equal Opportunity        | this guide after     |
| g | 50-20, | Program, Duties and             | release of new AR    |
| 9 | *Unit  | Responsibilities of Equal       | 600-20. This         |
| 3 | Equal  | Opportunity Leaders, Cultural   | publication provides |
|   | Oppor  | Issues Related to Equal         | unit leaders with    |
| w | tunity | Opportunity, Prevention of      | standardized lesson  |
| / | Tr     | Sexual Harassment,              | plans for a variety  |
| c | aining | Discrimination, Uniform Code of | of EO subjects*.*    |
| 1 | Guide* | Military Justice Implications   |                      |
|   |        | of the Equal Opportunity        |                      |
| J |        | Program, Enforcement of Equal   |                      |
| u |        | Opportunity Policies,           |                      |
| n |        | Implementation of the Equal     |                      |
| 9 |        | Opportunity Program, Leadership |                      |
| 4 |        | Issues Related to Cultural      |                      |
|   |        | Diversity, Techniques for Equal |                      |
|   |        | Opportunity Assessment, Equal   |                      |
|   |        | Opportunity Action Plan, The    |                      |
|   |        | Affirmative Action Plan,        |                      |
|   |        | Techniques for Equal            |                      |
|   |        | Opportunity Training,           |                      |
|   |        | Identification of Current Army  |                      |
|   |        | Equal Opportunity Issues,       |                      |
|   |        | Techniques to Champion the      |                      |
|   |        | Equal Opportunity Program.      |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Lesson Plan 14 Identification |                      |
|   |        | of Current Army Equal           |                      |
|   |        | Opportunity Issues**            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Racial and cultural differences |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Sexual harassment               |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Women in military service       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | DA Pam | Behavior refers to actions or   |                      |
| c | 3      | reactions to specific           |                      |
| t | 50-58, | situations based on attitude,   |                      |
| 9 | *      | beliefs, and values. Unlike     |                      |
| 4 | Leader | attitudes, behavior is easily   |                      |
|   | Devel  | measured and influenced through |                      |
|   | opment | positive and negative           |                      |
|   | for    | reinforcement. (p. 3)           |                      |
|   | Ame    |                                 |                      |
|   | rica's |                                 |                      |
|   | Army,  |                                 |                      |
|   | The    |                                 |                      |
|   | En     |                                 |                      |
|   | during |                                 |                      |
|   | L      |                                 |                      |
|   | egacy* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | DA Pam | **1-4. Objective**              |                      |
| a | 6      |                                 |                      |
| y | 00-26, | *a*. The thrust of the Army EO  |                      |
| 9 | *Depa  | Program continues to be, "to    |                      |
| 0 | rtment | firmly embed the equal          |                      |
|   | of the | opportunity function within the |                      |
|   | Army   | Army's leadership framework."   |                      |
|   | Affir  | Fairness, justice, and equity   |                      |
|   | mative | for all soldiers, regardless of |                      |
|   | Action | race, color, ethnicity, gender, |                      |
|   | Plan*  | or religion are obligations of  |                      |
|   |        | leadership and functions of     |                      |
|   |        | command.                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *c*. The AAP must direct        |                      |
|   |        | affirmative actions in support  |                      |
|   |        | of Army policy that will        |                      |
|   |        | provide equal opportunity and   |                      |
|   |        | treatment for all soldiers      |                      |
|   |        | regardless of race, color,      |                      |
|   |        | gender, religion, or national   |                      |
|   |        | origin. It must reflect the     |                      |
|   |        | high priority afforded these    |                      |
|   |        | important tasks and the         |                      |
|   |        | commitment of the Army to       |                      |
|   |        | achieve its objective.          |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| D | DA Pam | **1-1. Purpose.** This pamphlet |                      |
| e | 6      | explains the policy on soldier  |                      |
| c | 00-35, | relationships contained in AR   |                      |
| 9 | *R     | 600-200, paragraphs 4-14        |                      |
| 3 | elatio | through 4-16.                   |                      |
|   | nships |                                 |                      |
|   | B      | 1-4.*c*. Professional soldiers  |                      |
|   | etween | consider some relationships,    |                      |
|   | So     | like social relationships in a  |                      |
|   | ldiers | training environment or         |                      |
|   | of     | involving the chain of command, |                      |
|   | Dif    | as having so much potential for |                      |
|   | ferent | abuse or having such a damaging |                      |
|   | Ranks* | effect on morale or discipline  |                      |
|   |        | that these are consistently     |                      |
|   |        | held to be improper.            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | *e*. The current policy was     |                      |
|   |        | first published as a change to  |                      |
|   |        | AR 600-20, in 1978. The Women's |                      |
|   |        | Army Corps disbanded and female |                      |
|   |        | soldiers were integrated into   |                      |
|   |        | the Army in greater numbers,    |                      |
|   |        | serving in positions not        |                      |
|   |        | previously filled by women.     |                      |
|   |        | Women began to associate with   |                      |
|   |        | their male counterparts in      |                      |
|   |        | integrated units. Female        |                      |
|   |        | soldiers often no longer had    |                      |
|   |        | direct tutelage, mentoring and  |                      |
|   |        | disciplining by senior women    |                      |
|   |        | officers and noncommissioned    |                      |
|   |        | officers. The manner in which   |                      |
|   |        | relationships between male and  |                      |
|   |        | female soldiers had been        |                      |
|   |        | regulated changed.              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 1-5.*b*. Soldiers must remain   |                      |
|   |        | aware that relationships        |                      |
|   |        | between soldiers of different   |                      |
|   |        | rank may lead to perceptions of |                      |
|   |        | favoritism or influence. The    |                      |
|   |        | appearance of impropriety can   |                      |
|   |        | be as damaging to morale and    |                      |
|   |        | discipline as actual            |                      |
|   |        | misconduct.                     |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| A | DA Pam | Caring means much more than a   |                      |
| p | 6      | cursory interest in others. It  |                      |
| r | 00-50, | means sincere involvement in    |                      |
| 8 | White  | helping to find solutions to    |                      |
| 5 | P      | problems and improving welfare. |                      |
|   | aper*, | Caring means setting examples   |                      |
|   | "Lead  | of moral and professional       |                      |
|   | ership | excellence in order to inspire  |                      |
|   | Makes  | the subordinate to new heights. |                      |
|   | the    | It means talking with and       |                      |
|   | Differ | listening to subordinates, not  |                      |
|   | ence"* | simply talking at them; doing   |                      |
|   |        | something about hardships or    |                      |
|   |        | problems, not paying lip        |                      |
|   |        | service to them; teaching       |                      |
|   |        | individuals by counseling, not  |                      |
|   |        | by abusing them. Caring means   |                      |
|   |        | fostering a command climate     |                      |
|   |        | where people are challenged,    |                      |
|   |        | where they feel their           |                      |
|   |        | contributions make a            |                      |
|   |        | difference, and where they feel |                      |
|   |        | good about themselves and the   |                      |
|   |        | Army they serve. Caring and     |                      |
|   |        | leading go together. You can't  |                      |
|   |        | have one without the other! (p. |                      |
|   |        | 8)                              |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | DA Pam |                                 |                      |
| u | 600-   |                                 |                      |
| l | 66-85, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *Lead  |                                 |                      |
| 6 | ership |                                 |                      |
|   | in     |                                 |                      |
|   | A      |                                 |                      |
|   | ction* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | DA Pam |                                 |                      |
| c | 6      |                                 |                      |
| t | 00-69, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *Unit  |                                 |                      |
| 6 | C      |                                 |                      |
|   | limate |                                 |                      |
|   | P      |                                 |                      |
|   | rofile |                                 |                      |
|   | Comma  |                                 |                      |
|   | nder's |                                 |                      |
|   | Han    |                                 |                      |
|   | dbook* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | DA Pam | The young people who join the   |                      |
| u | 6      | Army and each of the other      |                      |
| n | 00-80, | Services come with their own    |                      |
| 8 | *Exe   | hopes and expectations. The     |                      |
| 7 | cutive | commitment of a human resources |                      |
|   | Leade  | program is to these young       |                      |
|   | rship* | people, but it is also to their |                      |
|   |        | parents, families, and          |                      |
|   |        | communities. These young people |                      |
|   |        | are the nation's most valuable  |                      |
|   |        | resource for the future. Their  |                      |
|   |        | service may span a single       |                      |
|   |        | enlistment or an entire career. |                      |
|   |        | If, during that time, they      |                      |
|   |        | learn fairness and justice, if  |                      |
|   |        | their experience has led to     |                      |
|   |        | growth in skills and maturity   |                      |
|   |        | \-- then the Army will have     |                      |
|   |        | fulfilled a most important      |                      |
|   |        | obligation to society. This is  |                      |
|   |        | a contribution to               |                      |
|   |        | nation-building in the truest   |                      |
|   |        | sense, and is fundamental to    |                      |
|   |        | defending the Constitution \--  |                      |
|   |        | not by arms alone.              |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The Army's current leaders have |                      |
|   |        | focused attention on this       |                      |
|   |        | obligation in the stated values |                      |
|   |        | of recruiting themes. Society's |                      |
|   |        | view of whether or not the      |                      |
|   |        | obligation is fulfilled will be |                      |
|   |        | determined, in large part, by   |                      |
|   |        | the perceptions of "reality" at |                      |
|   |        | the operating level, as seen by |                      |
|   |        | serving sons and daughters.     |                      |
|   |        | (pp. 43-44)                     |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | FM     | Leaders must guard against the  |                      |
| u | 2      | natural peacetime tendency to   |                      |
| l | 2-100, | use "efficient" centralized     |                      |
| 9 | *Mi    | methods of training and "zero   |                      |
| 0 | litary | defects" approaches to          |                      |
|   | Leade  | day-to-day operations. (p. vii) |                      |
|   | rship* |                                 |                      |
|   |        | As a leader, you are            |                      |
|   |        | responsible for understanding   |                      |
|   |        | and directly transmitting the   |                      |
|   |        | Army's values to your soldiers. |                      |
|   |        | . . . Since the Army's purpose  |                      |
|   |        | is to protect the nation and    |                      |
|   |        | its values, the Army's ethic    |                      |
|   |        | must be consistent with         |                      |
|   |        | national will and values. (p.   |                      |
|   |        | 22)                             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Beliefs are assumptions or      |                      |
|   |        | convictions you hold as true    |                      |
|   |        | about some thing, concept, or   |                      |
|   |        | person. (p. 22)                 |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Values are attitudes about the  |                      |
|   |        | worth or importance of people,  |                      |
|   |        | concepts, or things. (p. 23)    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Norms are the rules or laws     |                      |
|   |        | normally based on agreed-upon   |                      |
|   |        | beliefs and values that members |                      |
|   |        | of a group follow to live in    |                      |
|   |        | harmony. (p. 24)                |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | FM     |                                 |                      |
| u | 2      |                                 |                      |
| n | 2-101, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *Lead  |                                 |                      |
| 5 | ership |                                 |                      |
|   | Couns  |                                 |                      |
|   | eling* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | FM     | A mature soldier develops       |                      |
| a | 2      | physically, socially,           |                      |
| r | 2-102, | emotionally, and spiritually.   |                      |
| 8 | *S     | Physical fitness and            |                      |
| 7 | oldier | development provide the stamina |                      |
|   | Team   | necessary for sustained action  |                      |
|   | Develo | and intense stress. Social      |                      |
|   | pment* | maturity provides the           |                      |
|   |        | willingness to work with others |                      |
|   |        | in cohesive teams. Emotional    |                      |
|   |        | maturity gives stability to     |                      |
|   |        | deal with the stress of combat. |                      |
|   |        | Spiritual maturity gives the    |                      |
|   |        | soldier hope and purpose to     |                      |
|   |        | face the dangers and            |                      |
|   |        | uncertainty of combat. (p. 3)   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Research has shown that during  |                      |
|   |        | IET, values that enhance        |                      |
|   |        | teamwork become more important  |                      |
|   |        | while values that reflect       |                      |
|   |        | individual accomplishment       |                      |
|   |        | become less important. IET      |                      |
|   |        | begins to instill team values,  |                      |
|   |        | and the process continues as    |                      |
|   |        | the soldier moves from unit to  |                      |
|   |        | unit. (p. 18)                   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Teaching such values is not an  |                      |
|   |        | attempt to drastically change   |                      |
|   |        | the soldier. . . . If soldiers  |                      |
|   |        | are going to become productive  |                      |
|   |        | team members, they must begin   |                      |
|   |        | to share the values that        |                      |
|   |        | enhance team performance. (pp.  |                      |
|   |        | 18-19)                          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | These values will become the    |                      |
|   |        | *standards* of the unit.        |                      |
|   |        | Standards are those principles  |                      |
|   |        | or rules by which behaviors and |                      |
|   |        | tasks are measured as           |                      |
|   |        | successfully accomplished. . .  |                      |
|   |        | . Soldiers will measure other   |                      |
|   |        | soldiers by it. It gradually    |                      |
|   |        | becomes a *criterion* for       |                      |
|   |        | acceptance into the team. (p.   |                      |
|   |        | 19)                             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | When members of a squad,        |                      |
|   |        | section, or platoon share these |                      |
|   |        | values and adhere to the        |                      |
|   |        | standards that flow from them,  |                      |
|   |        | they are a more cohesive team.  |                      |
|   |        | (p. 19)                         |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | FM     |                                 |                      |
| u | 2      |                                 |                      |
| n | 2-103, |                                 |                      |
| 8 | *Lead  |                                 |                      |
| 7 | ership |                                 |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | C      |                                 |                      |
|   | ommand |                                 |                      |
|   | at     |                                 |                      |
|   | Senior |                                 |                      |
|   | L      |                                 |                      |
|   | evels* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | FM     | **[The Army                     |                      |
| u | 100-1, | Ethos]{.underline}**            |                      |
| n | *The   |                                 |                      |
| 9 | Army*  | The Army ethos, the guiding     |                      |
| 4 |        | beliefs, standards and ideals   |                      |
|   |        | that characterize and motivate  |                      |
|   |        | the Army, is succinctly         |                      |
|   |        | described in one                |                      |
|   |        | word\--**DUTY**. **Duty** is    |                      |
|   |        | behavior required by moral      |                      |
|   |        | obligation, demanded by custom, |                      |
|   |        | or enjoined by feelings of      |                      |
|   |        | rightness. . . . It requires    |                      |
|   |        | the impartial administration of |                      |
|   |        | standards without regard to     |                      |
|   |        | friendship, personality, rank,  |                      |
|   |        | or other bias. (pp. 5-7)        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Compassion** is basic respect |                      |
|   |        | for the dignity of each         |                      |
|   |        | individual; treating all with   |                      |
|   |        | dignity and respect. It is the  |                      |
|   |        | personification of the "Golden  |                      |
|   |        | Rule," treat others as you want |                      |
|   |        | them to treat you. (p. 9)       |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **[The American                 |                      |
|   |        | Soldier]{.underline}**          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | American soldiers come from a   |                      |
|   |        | wide range of cultural          |                      |
|   |        | backgrounds. Upon entering the  |                      |
|   |        | military service, they are      |                      |
|   |        | called upon to adapt their      |                      |
|   |        | individual values to those of   |                      |
|   |        | the military profession. (p.    |                      |
|   |        | 10)                             |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | STP    |                                 |                      |
| c | 21-1   |                                 |                      |
| t | -SMCT, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Sol   |                                 |                      |
| 4 | dier's |                                 |                      |
|   | Manual |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Common |                                 |                      |
|   | Tasks, |                                 |                      |
|   | Skill  |                                 |                      |
|   | Level  |                                 |                      |
|   | 1*     |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | STP    |                                 |                      |
| c | 21-24  |                                 |                      |
| t | -SMCT, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Sol   |                                 |                      |
| 2 | dier's |                                 |                      |
|   | Manual |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Common |                                 |                      |
|   | Tasks, |                                 |                      |
|   | Skill  |                                 |                      |
|   | Levels |                                 |                      |
|   | 2-4*   |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | STP    |                                 |                      |
| a | 21-    |                                 |                      |
| y | I-MQS, |                                 |                      |
| 9 |        |                                 |                      |
| 0 | *Mi    |                                 |                      |
|   | litary |                                 |                      |
|   | Q      |                                 |                      |
|   | ualifi |                                 |                      |
|   | cation |                                 |                      |
|   | Sta    |                                 |                      |
|   | ndards |                                 |                      |
|   | I,     |                                 |                      |
|   | Manual |                                 |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Common |                                 |                      |
|   | Tasks  |                                 |                      |
|   | (Prec  |                                 |                      |
|   | ommiss |                                 |                      |
|   | ioning |                                 |                      |
|   | Re     |                                 |                      |
|   | quirem |                                 |                      |
|   | ents)* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | STP    | **Lieutenants**                 |                      |
| a | 21-I   |                                 |                      |
| n | I-MQS, | **Leadership**                  |                      |
| 9 | *Mi    |                                 |                      |
| 1 | litary | **S1-9001.10-0002 Explain the   |                      |
|   | Qu     | Professional Army Ethic**       |                      |
|   | alific |                                 |                      |
|   | ation* | **Standards**. Describe the     |                      |
|   | *Sta   | process of internalizing        |                      |
|   | ndards | values.                         |                      |
|   | II,    |                                 |                      |
|   | Manual | **Description**.                |                      |
|   | of     |                                 |                      |
|   | Common | 1\. Compliance with a specific  |                      |
|   | Tasks  | value occurs when a soldier     |                      |
|   | for    | behaves in a particular manner  |                      |
|   | Lieut  | based solely on anticipated     |                      |
|   | enants | reward or punishment.           |                      |
|   | and    | Compliance requires the actual  |                      |
|   | Cap    | or imminent presence of the     |                      |
|   | tains* | leader. The statement, "I don't |                      |
|   |        | cheat because I may get         |                      |
|   |        | caught," is an example of       |                      |
|   |        | compliance.                     |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 2\. Identification with a value |                      |
|   |        | set occurs when a soldier acts  |                      |
|   |        | in accordance with the value    |                      |
|   |        | set of the group in order to    |                      |
|   |        | become a full member of the     |                      |
|   |        | group rather than to avoid      |                      |
|   |        | punishment. The statement, "I   |                      |
|   |        | will not cheat on the rifle     |                      |
|   |        | range because 1st Platoon does  |                      |
|   |        | not cheat on the rifle range    |                      |
|   |        | and I am a member of 1st        |                      |
|   |        | Platoon," reflects a group      |                      |
|   |        | value a soldier adheres to in   |                      |
|   |        | order to be an accepted member. |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | 3\. Internalization occurs when |                      |
|   |        | a soldier adopts the group's    |                      |
|   |        | value set as his own. The       |                      |
|   |        | soldier believes in the values  |                      |
|   |        | and acts accordingly in any     |                      |
|   |        | circumstance. The soldier's     |                      |
|   |        | behavior persists regardless of |                      |
|   |        | the situation. "I don't cheat   |                      |
|   |        | because it is wrong to cheat,"  |                      |
|   |        | is an example of                |                      |
|   |        | internalization.                |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Soldier and Unit Support      |                      |
|   |        | System**                        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **S3-0010.00-0014 Implement     |                      |
|   |        | Equal Opportunity at Unit       |                      |
|   |        | Level**                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **ENABLING LEARNING             |                      |
|   |        | OBJECTIVES**                    |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Action 1**. Describe the      |                      |
|   |        | purpose, policy, procedures,    |                      |
|   |        | and key terms associated with   |                      |
|   |        | the EO program and sexual       |                      |
|   |        | harassment (SH) at the unit     |                      |
|   |        | level.                          |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Action 2**. Identify the      |                      |
|   |        | legal implications of adverse   |                      |
|   |        | EO behavior as a person or      |                      |
|   |        | leader.                         |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Action 3**. Analyze           |                      |
|   |        | situations with indicators of   |                      |
|   |        | positive and negative EO and SH |                      |
|   |        | behavior. Recommend platoon and |                      |
|   |        | equivalent level actions.       |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| J | STP    |                                 |                      |
| u | 21-II  |                                 |                      |
| n | I-MQS, |                                 |                      |
| 9 | *Mi    |                                 |                      |
| 3 | litary |                                 |                      |
|   | Qu     |                                 |                      |
|   | alific |                                 |                      |
|   | ation* |                                 |                      |
|   | *Sta   |                                 |                      |
|   | ndards |                                 |                      |
|   | III,   |                                 |                      |
|   | Leader |                                 |                      |
|   | Devel  |                                 |                      |
|   | opment |                                 |                      |
|   | Manual |                                 |                      |
|   | for    |                                 |                      |
|   | Majors |                                 |                      |
|   | and    |                                 |                      |
|   | Lieu   |                                 |                      |
|   | tenant |                                 |                      |
|   | Col    |                                 |                      |
|   | onels* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | TC     | Chapters include **Professional | Military ethics.     |
| a | 2      | Commitment, Honesty in the      |                      |
| y | 2-9-1, | Military, Physical and Moral    | Teaches Army         |
| 8 | *      | Courage, Professional           | standards and        |
| 6 | Leader | Competence, Rules of War.**     | values.              |
|   | Devel  |                                 |                      |
|   | opment | Army leaders must not only be   |                      |
|   | Pr     | technically and tactically      |                      |
|   | ogram, | competent, they must commit     |                      |
|   | Mi     | themselves to the highest       |                      |
|   | litary | standards of ethical conduct.   |                      |
|   | Pro    | They must understand the values |                      |
|   | fessio | of the professional soldier and |                      |
|   | nalism | model them in their daily       |                      |
|   | (P     | lives. Only in this way will    |                      |
|   | latoon | they earn the trust,            |                      |
|   | /Squad | confidence, and respect of      |                      |
|   | I      | their subordinates and fellow   |                      |
|   | nstruc | soldiers. (p. iii).             |                      |
|   | tion)* |                                 |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | TC     | Chapters include **Introduction | Military ethics      |
| a | 2      | to Military Professional        |                      |
| y | 2-9-2, | Ethics, Ethical Reasoning,      | Teaches Army         |
| 8 | *      | Ethical Behavior in War,        | standards and        |
| 6 | Leader | Leadership, and Command         | values.              |
|   | Devel  | Climate.**                      |                      |
|   | opment |                                 |                      |
|   | Pr     | Every organization . . . has    |                      |
|   | ogram, | only a finite amount of energy  |                      |
|   | Mi     | to expend to accomplish its     |                      |
|   | litary | mission. That energy can be     |                      |
|   | Pro    | wasted or enhanced. In a unit   |                      |
|   | fessio | with a positive healthy         |                      |
|   | nalism | climate, that energy is, or can |                      |
|   | (Com   | be, more than the sum total of  |                      |
|   | pany/B | the energy of its members. . .  |                      |
|   | attery | . But the energy of an          |                      |
|   | I      | organization can be wasted as   |                      |
|   | nstruc | well. If you are forced to      |                      |
|   | tion)* | expend energy looking over your |                      |
|   |        | shoulder, preparing to cover    |                      |
|   |        | yourself for some inspection,   |                      |
|   |        | building a wall of numbers and  |                      |
|   |        | statistics to look good, you    |                      |
|   |        | will have little energy left to |                      |
|   |        | teach your soldiers, be         |                      |
|   |        | innovative, or accomplish your  |                      |
|   |        | mission. (pp. 60-61)            |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| M | TC     | Chapters include **Loyalty and  | Military ethics.     |
| a | 2      | Professional Commitment,        |                      |
| y | 2-9-3, | Integrity and Personal          | Teaches Army         |
| 8 | *      | Responsibility, Institutional   | standards and        |
| 6 | Leader | Pressures, Command Climate.**   | values.              |
|   | Devel  |                                 |                      |
|   | opment | Many of our ethical conflicts   |                      |
|   | Pr     | in peacetime occur because we   |                      |
|   | ogram, | have some members of the        |                      |
|   | Mi     | profession who forget that the  |                      |
|   | litary | real test occurs on the         |                      |
|   | Pro    | battlefield. Everything we do   |                      |
|   | fessio | must be geared to preparing for |                      |
|   | nalism | combat. And that includes our   |                      |
|   | (Bat   | ethics. . . . Our values of     |                      |
|   | talion | fairness and of concern for the |                      |
|   | I      | individual are supported by our |                      |
|   | nstruc | national values, but they also  |                      |
|   | tion)* | contribute to unit loyalty and  |                      |
|   |        | cohesiveness. Military values   |                      |
|   |        | originate and command our       |                      |
|   |        | adherence primarily because     |                      |
|   |        | they are useful. They create    |                      |
|   |        | standards of behavior that      |                      |
|   |        | members of a professional Army  |                      |
|   |        | need if we are to fight and     |                      |
|   |        | win. . . . And that is the only |                      |
|   |        | reason we are here.             |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| O | TC     | **Chapter 1: The Army's Equal   |                      |
| c | 26-6,  | Opportunity Program**           |                      |
| t | *Comma |                                 |                      |
| 9 | nder's | Effective human relations and   |                      |
| 4 | Equal  | equal opportunity are both      |                      |
|   | Oppor  | moral and operational           |                      |
|   | tunity | imperatives for our Army. Just  |                      |
|   | Han    | as a poor safety program will   |                      |
|   | dbook* | threaten a unit's readiness, so |                      |
|   |        | too will real or perceived acts |                      |
|   |        | of unequal treatment. . . . The |                      |
|   |        | chain of command's challenge is |                      |
|   |        | to provide effective leadership |                      |
|   |        | which promotes a command        |                      |
|   |        | climate that fosters equal      |                      |
|   |        | opportunity to enhance unit     |                      |
|   |        | cohesion and mission            |                      |
|   |        | accomplishment. . . . People    |                      |
|   |        | who work in an atmosphere free  |                      |
|   |        | of dissension and sexual        |                      |
|   |        | harassment, and one containing  |                      |
|   |        | a strong sense of equal         |                      |
|   |        | opportunity, are more           |                      |
|   |        | productive and team oriented. . |                      |
|   |        | . . A healthy EO environment is |                      |
|   |        | a key factor in developing      |                      |
|   |        | readiness. Army readiness       |                      |
|   |        | begins with people. The         |                      |
|   |        | advanced technology and         |                      |
|   |        | modernization efforts would     |                      |
|   |        | fail if leaders lost the        |                      |
|   |        | sincere and dynamic commitment  |                      |
|   |        | to the total well-being of the  |                      |
|   |        | Army Family. (p. 1-1)           |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 2: Equal Opportunity  |                      |
|   |        | Duties of Unit Leaders**        |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | The Army's Equal Opportunity    |                      |
|   |        | program requires a team effort. |                      |
|   |        | To make the program effective,  |                      |
|   |        | the unit commander and other    |                      |
|   |        | unit leaders must take a        |                      |
|   |        | positive, proactive approach in |                      |
|   |        | carrying out their EO duties    |                      |
|   |        | and responsibilities. (p. 2-1)  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | Commanders are strongly         |                      |
|   |        | encouraged to conduct **a**     |                      |
|   |        | unit climate and needs          |                      |
|   |        | assessment within 90 days of    |                      |
|   |        | assuming command and once       |                      |
|   |        | annually thereafter. The        |                      |
|   |        | assessments should have three   |                      |
|   |        | objectives. The first objective |                      |
|   |        | should provide you with an      |                      |
|   |        | assessment of how well your     |                      |
|   |        | unit has implemented the        |                      |
|   |        | Army\'s EO program. The second  |                      |
|   |        | objective of the assessment     |                      |
|   |        | area will provide you with      |                      |
|   |        | information on your soldier\'s  |                      |
|   |        | perceptions about EO, gender,   |                      |
|   |        | sexual harassment, and other    |                      |
|   |        | human relation concerns.        |                      |
|   |        | Finally, you should be able to  |                      |
|   |        | ascertain and identify the      |                      |
|   |        | direction and scope of future   |                      |
|   |        | training to include topic areas |                      |
|   |        | and target audiences. (p. 2-2)  |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | As a commander you are          |                      |
|   |        | responsible for ensuring that   |                      |
|   |        | soldiers under your command     |                      |
|   |        | receive EO training at least    |                      |
|   |        | twice a year. EO training       |                      |
|   |        | should be incorporated as part  |                      |
|   |        | of the unit\'s overall training |                      |
|   |        | plan. Whenever possible EO      |                      |
|   |        | issues should be integrated     |                      |
|   |        | with other appropriate subject  |                      |
|   |        | areas. EO training will be      |                      |
|   |        | documented on the unit\'s       |                      |
|   |        | training schedule and on a      |                      |
|   |        | memorandum which contains the   |                      |
|   |        | names of instructors or         |                      |
|   |        | facilitators who conducted the  |                      |
|   |        | training, roster of attendees,  |                      |
|   |        | date, time, and length of       |                      |
|   |        | session, and major topics       |                      |
|   |        | covered in the session.         |                      |
|   |        | Commanders at brigade level and |                      |
|   |        | above are required to provide   |                      |
|   |        | EO training for senior NCOs,    |                      |
|   |        | field grade officers, and       |                      |
|   |        | senior DA civilians. (p. 2-3)   |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | EO training, just like other    |                      |
|   |        | unit training, should be        |                      |
|   |        | planned and presented as an     |                      |
|   |        | integral part of the unit\'s    |                      |
|   |        | training program. From time to  |                      |
|   |        | time a commander may conduct EO |                      |
|   |        | training in response to a unit  |                      |
|   |        | incident. However, if the       |                      |
|   |        | incident was isolated or its    |                      |
|   |        | severity affected only a few    |                      |
|   |        | unit members, then the timing   |                      |
|   |        | may not be right for everyone   |                      |
|   |        | to receive training. If timing  |                      |
|   |        | for the training is not         |                      |
|   |        | considered, it may only be      |                      |
|   |        | perceived as a form of mass     |                      |
|   |        | punishment. (p. 2-5)            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 3: Leadership Issues  |                      |
|   |        | Related to Cultural Diversity** |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 4: Prevention of      |                      |
|   |        | Sexual Harassment**             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 5: Equal Opportunity  |                      |
|   |        | Complaint Process**             |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 6: Equal Opportunity  |                      |
|   |        | Climate Assessment**            |                      |
|   |        |                                 |                      |
|   |        | **Chapter 7: Intervention and   |                      |
|   |        | Action Planning**               |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+
| D | TC     | **Preface**. When an            | No mention of        |
| e | 26-10, | organization, unit, or staff    | command climate      |
| c | *The   | section becomes aware of a      | assessment.          |
| 8 | Leader | pending change of leadership,   |                      |
| 8 | Trans  | its overall efficiency may be   |                      |
|   | ition* | reduced for as much as three to |                      |
|   |        | six months. . . . The reduced   |                      |
|   |        | efficiency may continue because |                      |
|   |        | personnel are unable to         |                      |
|   |        | anticipate the new leader's     |                      |
|   |        | priorities and plan for         |                      |
|   |        | activities that he \[she\]      |                      |
|   |        | considers important.            |                      |
+---+--------+---------------------------------+----------------------+

**ANNEX H**

**EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) PROGRAM**

***Overview***

The EEO Program, which covers Department of the Army (DA) civilian
employees, differs significantly from the equal opportunity (EO)
program, which covers military personnel. While philosophically the two
programs share the same goals and objectives, their policies and
practices are different. The programs are guided by separate laws and
regulations, and the roles and mission of the equal opportunity advisor
(EOA) and the EEO officer differ with regard to the respective programs.

Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policies, directives, and
regulations outline the procedures and remedies for addressing
discrimination and harassment complaints by soldiers. On the other hand,
the Army must conform with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regulations in implementing the civilian complaints program. The
EEOC is the federal agency with oversight responsibility and enforcement
activities relating to EEO for federal employees and applicants for
employment.

***Complaints Process***

Federal employees or applicants for employment who file complaints of
discrimination, to include sexual harassment complaints, must follow set
procedures with specified time limits. An employee's first step in
filing a complaint is to contact an EEO counselor. The EEO counselor
conducts an inquiry to obtain that information necessary to reach an
informal resolution of the person's allegations.

If the complaint is not resolved, the EEO counselor is required to
notify the employee, in writing, of the right to file a formal
complaint. The complainant may file a formal written complaint with the
EEO office. The agency may reject or dismiss a complaint, in whole or in
part; for example, a complaint may be rejected because it is untimely,
not within the purview of governing laws and regulations, is
duplicative, or not against the proper agency. If the agency rejects or
dismisses the complaint in whole or in part, the complainant may appeal
immediately to the EEOC's Office of Federal Operations. If the complaint
is accepted, in the Army, it is forwarded to the Office of Complaints
Investigation, a DoD agency, for investigation.

The complainant may request a final agency decision (FAD) based on the
record or, in some cases, request a hearing and recommended decision
from an EEOC administrative judge (AJ). The agency may accept, reject,
or modify the findings and conclusions of the AJ in issuing its FAD. The
complainant has the right to appeal the FAD to the EEOC or to file a
civil action in federal court. Soldiers who are not satisfied with the
Army's handling of an EO complaint have no such legally protected right
to a review by federal court.

If the Army or EEOC finds that a civilian employee was the subject of
unlawful discrimination, then the complainant is "made whole." That is,
the complainant must be placed in as good a position as he or she would
have been in the absence of discrimination. Remedial actions include
such things as nondiscriminatory placement, back pay, fees and costs,
and compensatory damages.

***EEO Officers***

EEO officers are responsible for advising the commander on all matters
relating to EEO. They develop, coordinate, and evaluate the affirmative
action programs for minorities and women and special emphasis programs;
manage and operate the complaints system; supervise and train EEO office
staff and counselors; and conduct training for the work force.

***EEO Training***

Equal employment opportunity is included in the supervisory training
required for new supervisors, both military and civilian, of civilian
employees. The training consists of a supervisory development
correspondence course and the on-site Leadership Education and
Development Course (LEAD). The supervisory development course includes
instruction on a supervisor's responsibilities in EEO, complaints
processing, and civilian personnel management.

At the installation level, training for managers and supervisors may
include affirmative employment responsibilities, the EEO complaints
program, alternate dispute resolution, diversity, and other EEO related
topics. This on-site training is generally conducted by the installation
EEO officer or office staff. The quality of the training provided varies
by installation.

***Prevention of Sexual Harassment Training***

Army guidance is that there should be annual training in the prevention
of sexual harassment (POSH) for civilian employees and their
supervisors, both military and civilian. Training consists of a basic
and a refresher course conducted at the local level by course managers
who have successfully completed a three-day certification program.

The objectives of the course are to ensure that participants can
identify sex role stereotyping, define sex discrimination, define and
recognize sexual harassment, state the legal bases prohibiting sexual
harassment, and identify potential situations and recognize who has
responsibility for dealing with the incident. Supervisors receive help
in counseling employees on required behavior standards. Employees learn
avenues of redress for dealing with sexual harassment and are given help
in responding assertively to inappropriate behavior.

**SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE**

The Panel's research efforts included only a limited sampling of DA
civilians. The Panel's intent was to ascertain the perspective of
civilian employees on the human relations environment in the Active
Army. Civilian employees participated in the study through focus groups
and individual interviews. A total of 1,007 civilian employees[^109]
participated in civilian focus group sessions, and the Panel interviewed
20 civilian managers and 34 EEO officers[^110].

As noted elsewhere in this report, based on the limited numbers of
civilian employees interviews and surveys conducted, the general
conclusions expressed herein should be viewed as areas of concern
meriting further review and clarification by the Army.

***Focus Group Comments***

While the Panel was principally concerned with sexual harassment in the
Active Army, civilian employees were asked whether they had witnessed or
experienced sexual harassment in the last 12 months, and whether they
felt that they could report any discrimination or harassment without
fear of reprisal. Approximately one fifth of the female responses and
one tenth of the male responses indicated that they had experienced
sexual harassment. Almost one half of the focus group comments by both
men and women indicated that they would report sexual harassment. Only a
few women expressed a fear of reprisal; however, they said that would
not dissuade them from reporting sexual harassment.

In response to the question as to whether they had received POSH
training in the last 12 months, most male participants and many female
participants indicated that they had. Many of the comments from both men
and women indicated that the training was effective in helping them
recognize sexually-harassing behavior.

***Interview Comments***

Interviews were conducted with civilian supervisors and managers at
grade levels GS-12 through GS-15. Questions included whether senior
level management support EEO; how the interview participants support EEO
in their organizations; and steps the participants take to prevent
sexual harassment in the workplace. Generally, the supervisors and
managers said that senior level management at their particular locations
support EEO principles. When the participants were asked what steps they
themselves take to ensure that sexual harassment does not occur in their
organizations, they said that they talk with employees about the issue
of sexual harassment, hold meetings with subordinates to discuss Army
policy, monitor the workplace, and have modified their own behavior.

Of the thirty-three EEO officers and one EEO assistant interviewed, most
believe that both top management and lower-level managers and
supervisors support EEO principles. Most of the EEO officers said that
they believe the chain of command at their locations took quick
corrective action to deal with sexual harassment and that the action
taken was effective.

***Other Areas of Concern***

-   ***Misunderstanding and perceived double standards applied toward
    civilian employees by military supervisors and peers.***

Frequent focus group and individual interview comments from both men and
women concern relationships between civilian employees and military
personnel, especially military supervisors. The significant differences
in the military and civilian personnel systems are not always well
understood by either military or civilian personnel. As a result, these
differences can become the basis for misunderstandings and a perceived
double standard in the treatment of military and civilian personnel. As
one focus group participant said, "Civilians are not viewed as equals.
You could answer the question, but they look for green suiters to ask
instead." Another participant said, "There is partiality among the
military. They tolerate more things from military personnel than they
would from civilians. You don't feel part of the team." Many focus group
participants expressed their perceptions that military supervisors treat
their military subordinates more favorably than similarly situated
civilian employees. If left unremedied, the general lack of
communication and understanding between civilian and military personnel
has the potential to be a serious problem.

-   ***Inadequate/insufficient training***

Training of the civilian work force in the prevention of sexual
harassment is not being conducted in a timely manner at some locations
nor is it being tracked to ensure that supervisors and managers receive
the training. Some civilian supervisors and EEO personnel believe the
training is required only when an employee changes jobs and then only at
the request of the first level supervisor. Few installations have a
mechanism to monitor and evaluate the training.

Supervisory training in its current form is not adequate for new
supervisors and, in many cases, military supervisors of civilian
employees do not take the required courses.

-   ***Evaluation of EEO program and EEO climate*.**

Oversight of the EEO program is an important management function and
must be accomplished formally in order to ensure a proactive approach to
the human relations environment for the civilian work force. EEO program
evaluation/review is conducted in conjunction with regularly scheduled
civilian personnel management surveys or one-time special studies, EEO
climate assessments, or inspector general (IG) inspections.

Civilian personnel management surveys typically focus on work force
profile, management support and program administration, and advisory and
communication services. These core elements are designed to measure the
effectiveness of commanders, managers, supervisors, and EEO and other
civilian personnel officials in accomplishing their respective
responsibilities for administering a local EEO program. Information to
evaluate the program is obtained from on-site visits and questionnaire
responses.

Whereas EEO climate assessments are usually conducted at the request of
a local commander, DAIG inspections are at the discretion of the Army
leadership. Although somewhat similar in scope to civilian personnel
management surveys, climate assessments are more focused on the
perceptions of the work force. Employee sensing sessions,
questionnaires, and statistical and narrative reports are components of
this process. While these tools are available, their discretionary
application has led to their usage almost exclusively in reaction to a
problem rather than as a preventive tool.

-   ***Some EEO offices are understaffed and/or staffed with personnel
    inadequately trained in EEO***.

Some EEO officers are not proactive in their EEO responsibilities nor
are they conducting proper internal evaluations of their programs.
Reductions in EEO staff have placed many EEO staffs in reactive modes as
installations face downsizing, reductions in force, consolidations, and
base closures. Just as with the reduction of EOA positions for the
Active Army, similar reductions are taking their toll on some EEO
offices The Army must review its resourcing levels for EEO offices.

***Conclusion***

This is by no means a thorough review of EEO in the Army for the reasons
previously stated, and these observations need to be validated. They
are, however, concerns of the Panel and are thus included in this
report. Headquarters, Department or the Army should delve into these
concerns to determine the best course of action for each.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **ANNEX I**                                                           |
|                                                                       |
| **BIBLIOGRAPHY**                                                      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Thomas, James A., ed. [Race Relations Research in the U. S. Army in the
1970's: A Collection of Selected Readings]{.underline}. Alexandria,
Virginia: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences, Sept. 1988.

Vickers, Jeanne. [Women and War]{.underline}. London: Zed Books, 1993.

Webb, Susan L. [Step Forward: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: What
You Need to Know]{.underline}. New York: MasterMedia, 1991.

United States. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel. [Women in the Army Policy Review]{.underline}.
Washington: The Pentagon, Nov. 1982.

United States. Department of Defense, Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services. [History and Accomplishments]{.underline}.
Washington: DACOWITS, Feb. 1997.

United States. Department of Defense, Defense Equal Opportunity Council.
[Report of the Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual
Harassment]{.underline}. 2 vols. Washington: The Pentagon, May 1995.

United States. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.
[Sexual Harassment in the Military: 1988]{.underline}. Arlington,
Virginia: DMDC, Sept. 1990.

United States. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.
[1995 Sexual Harassment Survey]{.underline}. 2 vols. Arlington,
Virginia: DMDC, Dec. 1996.

United States. Department of Defense. [Report of the Task Force on Women
in the Military]{.underline}. Washington: The Pentagon, Jan. 1988.

United States. Department of Labor, Glass Ceiling Commission.
[Successful Initiatives for Breaking the Glass Ceiling to Upward
Mobility for Minorities and Women]{.underline}. Washington: DoL, 1993.

United States. General Accounting Office. [DoD Service Academies: More
Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual Harassment]{.underline}. Washington:
GAO, Jan. 1994.

United States. General Accounting Office. [DoD Service Academies: Status
Report on Reviews of Student Treatment]{.underline}. Washington: GAO,
June 1992.

United States. General Accounting Office. [DoD Service Academies: Update
on Extent of Sexual Harassment]{.underline}. Washington: GAO, Mar. 1995.

United States. General Accounting Office. [Equal Opportunity: DOD
Studies on Discrimination in the Military]{.underline}. Washington: GAO,
1995.

United States. General Accounting Office. [Federal Employment: Inquiry
Into Sexual Harassment Issues at Selected VA Medical
Centers]{.underline}. Washington: GAO, June 1993.

United States. General Accounting Office. [Military Equal Opportunity:
Certain Trends in Racial and Gender Data May Warrant Further
Analysis]{.underline}. Washington: GAO, Nov. 1995.

United States. General Accounting Office. [Military Equal Opportunity:
Problems With Services' Complaint Systems Are Being Addressed by
DoD]{.underline}. Washington: GAO, Jan. 1996.

United States. General Accounting Office. [Women in the Military:
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1993.

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United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
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the Military Complaint System]{.underline}. Washington: GPO, 1994.

United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
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Problem of Sexual Harassment]{.underline}. Washington: GPO, 1992.

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Task Force on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services. [An Assessment of Racial Discrimination in the Military: A
Global Perspective]{.underline}. Washington: GPO, Dec. 1994.

United States. Merit Systems Protection Board, Office of Policy and
Evaluation. [A Question of Equity: Women and the Glass Ceiling in the
Federal Government]{.underline}. Washington: MSPB, Oct. 1992.

United States. Merit Systems Protection Board. [Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Workplace: Trends, Progress, Continuing Challenges]{.underline}.
Washington: MSPB, Oct. 1995.

Yarmolinsky, Adam. [The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American
Society]{.underline}. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

[^1]: A copy of the Senior Review Panel Charter signed by the Secretary
    of the Army is at Annex A,

    Volume I.

[^2]: Lewis Sorley, [Thunderbolt]{.underline} (New York, New York: Simon
    & Schuster, 1992), p. 346.

[^3]: Lieut. Gen. Harris Hollis, "The Heart and Mind of Creighton
    Abrams," [Military Review]{.underline}, April 1985, p. 63.

[^4]: The Panel originally had nine members. Early in the Panel process,
    two members' requests to be excused were approved by the Secretary.

[^5]: Biographies of the Panel members are found in Annex B, Volume I.

[^6]: Detailed methodological discussions are found in Volume II of this
    report.

[^7]: The list of installations visited is at Annex D, Volume I.

[^8]: The Panel collected limited data from the civilian work force in
    the course of its examination of the Active Component. The
    statistical sample was small and the data inconclusive in terms of
    assessing sexual harassment in the civilian work force. However,
    some potential issues and conclusions related to the civilian work
    force were identified and are discussed in Annex H, Volume 1. The
    results of the data collection are provided in Volume II.

[^9]: The source of this definition is Department of Defense Directive
    1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO)
    Program, August 1995. Annex E, Volume I, provides further discussion
    of sexual harassment.

[^10]: Percentages used in this assessment are based on survey analysis.
    Focus groups and individual interviews were used to give dimension
    to the quantitative data. The Panel uses the terms "few," "some,"
    "many," and "most" to report the number of responses from focus
    group and individual interview analyses. "Few" means 25% and below,
    "some" means 26% - 50%, "many" means 51% - 75%, and "most" means 76%
    and above.

[^11]: A more detailed discussion of the history of the Army's EO
    program is at Annex E, Volume I, "Review of Policies," and Annex F,
    "Events Connected With Equal Opportunity in the Army Since 1947."

[^12]: Dep't of Army, Regulation 600-42, Race Relations Education for
    the Army, para. 2 (December 11, 1973).

[^13]: ODCSPER is currently revising and updating AR 600-20 pending the
    recommendations from this Panel's report.

[^14]: The Army's definition of sexual harassment is found in Dep't of
    Army, Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-4 (March 30,
    1988) (IO4, September 17, 1993).

[^15]: A brigade is comprised of approximately 2,000 soldiers.

[^16]: "The U.S. Army will provide equal opportunity and treatment for
    soldiers, civilian employees, and their families without regard to
    race, color, religion, gender, or national origin and provide an
    environment free of sexual harassment." Dep't of Army, Regulation
    600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-3a (March 30, 1988) (IO4,
    September 17, 1993).

[^17]: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L.
    103-337, § 532, 108 Stat. 2663, 2759 (1994).

[^18]: Another aspect that the Panel considered was the issue of
    labeling female soldiers as homosexuals if they report sexual
    harassment. The Panel heard this issue in a few female focus groups,
    but further data to support it were limited.

[^19]: An NCOER is a noncommissioned officer evaluation report; an OER
    is an officer evaluation report.

[^20]: Trainees in a holdover status are held at their current location.

[^21]: Human relations training encompasses not only EO training, but
    also topics such as leadership, ethics, counseling, communication,
    drug abuse prevention, and suicide prevention.

[^22]: The figures used in this paragraph were current at the time of
    the Panel review. The Army is in the process of revising the period
    of time devoted to human relations training.

[^23]: Chain teaching is the dissemination of standardized information
    by the chain of command.

[^24]: SSG is the acronym for staff sergeant, E-6; SFC is the acronym
    for sergeant first class, E-7; MSG is the acronym for master
    sergeant, E-8; and SGM is the acronym for sergeant major, E-9.

[^25]: A tenant unit is an organization that resides on another major
    command's installation.

[^26]: The findings concerning sexual harassment reported in this
    section pertain to soldiers who are other than training base
    personnel. Those findings concerning trainees and trainers appear in
    the subsection entitled "Initial Entry Training."

[^27]: The relatively small number of other minorities surveyed makes
    descriptive statistics difficult to interpret.

[^28]: The behaviors of the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire
    (Fitzgerald, 1988) can be divided into five categories. Crude or
    offensive behavior includes unwanted sexual jokes, stories,
    whistling, and staring. Sexist behavior includes insulting,
    offensive, and condescending attitudes based on the gender of the
    person. Unwanted sexual attention includes unwanted touching or
    fondling and asking for dates even though rebuffed. Sexual coercion
    includes classic *quid pro quo* instances of job benefits or losses
    conditioned on sexual cooperation. Sexual assault includes attempted
    and actual rape.

[^29]: The higher percentages for experienced SEQ behaviors for men on
    the Panel survey in relation to the DoD survey may reflect a
    slightly different wording. The Panel survey asked only if the SEQ
    behavior was experienced. The DoD survey asked for frequency of
    experienced behavior, but also qualified the behavior as being
    offensive. The difference between the Panel and DoD surveys may show
    that men experience the behaviors at the higher rates, but do not
    consider it offensive. Interestingly, the percentages for women did
    not differ across the surveys.

[^30]: The APFT has been redesigned and is awaiting implementation. The
    redesign marks the first time the Army has validated the principal
    of equal effort based on scientific evidence and the reality of
    physiological differences between men and women.

[^31]: Panel members found that very few soldiers are being mentored.
    The few who are, however, are male soldiers. Mentoring for female
    soldiers seems to be virtually nonexistent.

[^32]: Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and NCOs may be
    criminally punished under Article 134, UCMJ, for fraternizing with
    subordinates on terms of military equality. Early case law held that
    the offense of fraternization under the Manual for Courts-Martial
    did not apply to senior enlisted persons. Later case law put NCOs on
    notice that fraternization with enlisted subordinates may now be
    charged as a violation of UCMJ, Article 134. [See]{.underline}
    United States v. Clarke, 25 M.J. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1987).

[^33]: For a more detailed discussion, see Table 4 in Survey Results,
    Volume II.

[^34]: TDY is an acronym that in the normal usage means Temporary Duty.
    Here, the soldier was referring to a one-year tour overseas in which
    his family did not accompany him.

[^35]: As this report was being written, a brigadier general was named
    to be head of the human resources directorate.

[^36]: The OSUT military occupational specialties include the Armor,
    Chemical Corps, Engineers, Field Artillery, Infantry, and Military
    Police. Currently, 7% of OSUT trainees are women, almost all of whom
    are training in the Chemical and Military Police MOSs. All other
    MOSs go to BCT and AIT.

[^37]: The term "committee taught" refers to the system of instruction
    used at AIT. An instructor, from a group or "committee" of
    instructors, is assigned to teach specific classes on a rotational
    basis.

[^38]: A detailed training base scope, methodology, and data analysis
    discussion is provided in Volume II.

[^39]: BCT, OSUT, and AIT were asked, "Have you ever been sexually
    harassed since joining the Army?" The Army wide survey asked, "In
    the last 12 months, have you been sexually harassed?"

[^40]: Question response rates for each question vary as not all
    respondents answered all questions.

[^41]: Percentage experiencing at least one inappropriate behavior. The
    data for trainers are based on a small number of cases and should be
    viewed with caution.

[^42]: PCS is an acronym for Permanent Change of Station. In other
    words, a soldier moves on to his or her next duty assignment.

[^43]: An NCO either volunteers or is selected by DA to attend the
    nine-week Drill Sergeant Course.

[^44]: Dep't of Army, Regulation 614-200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers
    for Training and Assignment, para. 8-16b (September 17, 1990).

[^45]: Twenty percent of Army accessions are women, but the training
    base is composed of only ten percent female drill sergeants.

[^46]: A false EO complaint is one "containing information or
    allegations that the complainant knew to be false." AR 600-20, para.
    6-8q.

    "A substantiated EO discrimination complaint is a complaint that,
    after the completion of an inquiry or investigation, provides
    evidence to indicate that the complainant was more likely than not
    treated differently because of his or her race, national origin,
    gender, or religion and that corrective action must be taken." AR
    600-20, para. 6-8j.

    "There are two types of unsubstantiated complaints\--complaints for
    which there is no corroboration and those for which the
    corroborating evidence is insufficient to substantiate the
    allegations." AR 600-20, para. 6-8k.

[^47]: Dep't of Army, Regulation 600-42, Race Relations Education for
    the Army, para. 2 (December 11, 1973).

[^48]: James A. Thomas, ed., [Race Relations Research in the U.S. Army
    in the 1970s, A Collection of Selected Readings]{.underline} (United
    States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
    Sciences, 1988), p. 47.

[^49]: [Ibid.]{.underline}, p. 36.

[^50]: Dep't of Defense, Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense
    Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, para. D (August 18, 1995).

[^51]: Dep't of Army, Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-1
    (March 30, 1988) (IO4, September 17, 1993).

[^52]: Dep't of Army, Reg. 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-5 (March
    30, 1988) (IO4, September 17, 1993).

[^53]: ODCSPER is currently revising and updating AR 600-20 pending the
    recommendations from this Panel's report.

[^54]: Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. V, para. 1c (1995).

[^55]: Dep't of Defense, Directive 1350.2, *supra* note 4, Definitions
    para. 15.

[^56]: The EEOC definition of sexual harassment is at 29 Code of Federal
    Regulations (CFR) § 1604.11.

[^57]: Early case law held that the offense of fraternization under the
    Manual for Courts-Martial did not apply to senior enlisted persons.
    Recent case law has put NCOS on notice that fraternization with
    enlisted subordinates may now be charged as a violation of UCMJ,
    Article 134. See United States v. Clarke, 25 M.J. 631 (A.C.M.R.
    1987).

[^58]: Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, para. 83c
    (1995).

[^59]: The figures used in these tables were current at the time of the
    Panel review. The Army is in the process of revising the period of
    time devoted to human relations training.

[^60]: Dep't of Army, Pamphlet 600-32, *Leader Development for the Total
    Army, The Enduring Legacy*, p. 7 (May 1991).

[^61]: Point Paper by Mike Pearce, OUSD(PI), undated, subject: Defense
    Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS).

[^62]: [Ibid.]{.underline}

[^63]: Dep't of Defense, Directive 1350.2, *supra* note 4, para. F.2.b.

[^64]: Dep't of Army, Pamphlet 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training
    Guide, lesson plan 10 (August 30, 1993).

[^65]: Conversation with Colonel Michael L. Jones, Director of
    Admissions, Office of Admissions, U.S. Military Academy, May 22,
    1997.

[^66]: Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ch. 449, Pub. L.
    625 (1948).

[^67]: Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).

[^68]: Exec. Order No. 10240, 16 Fed. Reg. 3689 (1951).

[^69]: [See]{.underline} Dep't of Defense, Directive 5120.14, Defense
    Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) (April 3,
    1987); Dep't of Defense, Directive 1304.3, Establishment of a
    Unified Recruiting Program for Women in the Services (October 12,
    1951).

[^70]: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

[^71]: Alton Hornsby, Jr., [Milestones in 20th-Century African-American
    History]{.underline} (Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1993), p. 73.

[^72]: Act of November 8, 1967, Pub. L. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (codified
    as amended in scattered sections of 10, 32, and 37 U.S.C.).

[^73]: Hornsby, *supra* note 6, p. 90.

[^74]: Jack D. Foner, [Blacks and the Military in American
    History]{.underline} (New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
    1974), p. 212.

[^75]: Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).

[^76]: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
    Social Sciences (ARI), [Race Relations Research in the U.S. Army in
    the 1970s, A Collection of Selected Readings]{.underline} (James A.
    Thomas, ed., 1988), pp. 36-7.

[^77]: Letter, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower
    and Reserve Affairs (Equal Opportunity), Task Force on the
    Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces, Nov. 30,
    1972, subject: submission of the Task Force report to the Honorable
    Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense.

[^78]: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

[^79]: Maj. Gen. Jeanne Holm, USAF(Ret.), [Women in the Military, An
    Unfinished Revolution]{.underline} (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
    1982), p. 300.

[^80]: ARI, *supra* note 11, p. 42.

[^81]: Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, Pub.
    L. No. 94-106, § 803, 89 Stat. 531, 537 (1975).

[^82]: ARI, *supra* note 11, p. 42.

[^83]: Col. Bettie J. Morden, USA(Ret.), [The Women's Army Corps,
    1945-1978]{.underline} (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
    Office, 1990), p. 388.

[^84]: [Ibid.]{.underline}, p. 384.

[^85]: [See]{.underline} Dep't of Army, Pamphlet 600-26, Department of
    the Army Affirmative Action Plan (October 1, 1978).

[^86]: Department of the Army, General Order No. 20, November 21, 1978,
    disestablished the Women's Army Corps effective October 20, 1978,
    pursuant to Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act,
    1979, Pub. L. 95-485, § 820, 92 Stat. 1611, 1627 (1978).

[^87]: [See]{.underline} Dep't of Defense, Directive 1322.11, Education
    and Training in Human/Race Relations for Military Personnel
    (September 12, 1978) (C1, August 2, 1979).

[^88]: Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

[^89]: Dep't of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
    Women in the Army Policy Review, p. 9 (November 12, 1982).

[^90]: Dep't of Defense, Report, Task Force on Women in the Military,
    pp. 1-2 (January 1988).

[^91]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional
    Requesters, Women in the Military: More Military Jobs Can Be Opened
    Under Current Statutes, GAO/NSIAD-88-222, p. 1 (September 7, 1988).

[^92]: Dep't of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Sexual Harassment
    in the Military: 1988, p. iii (September 1990).

[^93]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of
    Defense, Women in the Military: Deployment in the Persian Gulf War,
    GAO/NSIAD-93-93 (July 13, 1993).

[^94]: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
    1993, Pub. L. 102-190, §§ 531, 541-550, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).

[^95]: U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Service Academies: Status
    Report on Reviews of Student Treatment, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41 (June 2,
    1992).

[^96]: Statement by General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army,
    before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
    Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 30, 1992).

[^97]: Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS),
    History and Accomplishments, p. 18 (February 1997).

[^98]: *Sexual Harassment of Military Women and Improving the Military
    Complaint System, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services,
    House of Representatives*, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1994)
    (statement of Joe R. Reeder, Under Secretary of the Army).

[^99]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional
    Requesters, DoD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate
    Sexual Harassment, GAO/NSIAD-94-6, p. 1 (January 31, 1994). [See
    also]{.underline} U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Service
    Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment,
    GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41 (June 2, 1992).

[^100]: Dep't of Defense, Assistant Inspector General for Departmental
    Inquiries, Review of Military Department Investigations of
    Allegations of Discrimination by Military Personnel (March 1994).

[^101]: *Sexual Harassment of Military Women and Improving the Military
    Complaint System, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services,
    House of Representatives*, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1994).

[^102]: DACOWITS, *supra* note 32, p. 20 (February 1997).

[^103]: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L.
    103-337, § 532, 108 Stat. 2663, 2759 (1994).

[^104]: House Armed Services Committee Task Force on Equality of
    Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, An Assessment of
    Racial Discrimination in the Military: A Global Perspective
    (December 30, 1994).

[^105]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional
    Requesters, DoD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual
    Harassment, GAO/NSIAD-95-58 (March 31, 1995).

[^106]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Equal Opportunity:
    Problems With Services' Complaint Systems Are Being Addressed by
    DoD, GAO/NSIAD-96-9 (January 26, 1996). *See also* U.S. General
    Accounting Office, Equal Opportunity: DoD Studies on Discrimination
    in the Military, GAO/NSIAD-95-103 (April 7, 1995); U.S. General
    Accounting Office, Military Equal Opportunity: Certain Trends in
    Racial and Gender Data May Warrant Further Analysis, GAO/NSIAD-96-17
    (November 17, 1995).

[^107]: United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996)

[^108]: Dep't of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, 1995 Sexual
    Harassment Survey, DMDC Report No. 96-014, p. viii (December 1996).

[^109]: ^1^ The DA civilian population is approximately 200,000.

[^110]: ^2^ The Army has 185 EEO officers.