**REPORT**

![](media/image1.wmf){width="4.058333333333334in" height="4.125in"}ET
Docket No. 02- 135

November 2002

Federal Communications Commission

**[Spectrum Policy Task Force]{.underline}**

Paul Kolodzy, Director

Peter Tenhula, Co-Director

Lauren Van Wazer, Deputy Director

Mike Marcus, Senior Technical Advisor

Maureen McLaughlin, Special Counsel

Richard Engelman, International Bureau

David Furth, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau

Kathleen O'Brien Ham, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau

Evan Kwerel, Office of Plans and Policy

Keith Larson, Media Bureau

Chris Murphy, International Bureau

John Williams, Office of Plans and Policy

John Wong, Media Bureau

**[Spectrum Policy Executive Committee]{.underline}**

Ed Thomas, Chief, Office of Engineering & Technology

Thomas Sugrue, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau

Robert Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy

Ken Ferree, Chief, Media Bureau

Donald Abelson, Chief, International Bureau

**[Spectrum Policy Task Force Working Groups]{.underline}**

*[Interference Protection]{.underline}*

Keith Larson, Chair

Lisa Cacciatore

Susan Crawford

Thomas Eng

Ed Jacobs

Jay Jackson

Joe Levin

Bill Luther

Mike Marcus

Tim Maguire

Bob Nelson

Sankar Persaud

Ron Repasi

Bruce Romano

Tom Stanley

John Williams

John Wong

*[Spectrum Efficiency]{.underline}*

Rick Engelman, Chair

Kwaku Abrokwah

George Dillon

Gardner Foster

Gordon Godfrey

Trey Hanbury

Charlene Lagerwerff

Wayne Leighton

Mike Marcus

Roger Noel

Jerilyn Payton

Jennifer Tomchin

John Williams

Allen Yang

*[Unlicensed Devices & Experimental Licenses]{.underline}*

Mike Marcus, Chair

Jim Burtle

Bruce Franca

Ahmed Lahjouji

Neal McNeil

*[Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities]{.underline}*

David Furth, Chair

Diane Conley

Lloyd Coward

Howard Griboff

Karl Kensinger

David Krech

Evan Kwerel

Arthur Lechtman

Sara Mechanic

Chris Murphy

Paul Murray

Bruce Romano

Priya Shrinivasan

Martha Stancill

Scot Stone

Doug Webbink

[Table of Contents]{.underline}:

I. Introduction [1](#introduction)

II\. Executive Summary [3](#executive-summary)

III\. Current State of U.S. Spectrum Policy
[7](#current-state-of-u.s.-spectrum-policy)

A. Regulatory Background [7](#regulatory-background)

B. Spectrum Use [10](#spectrum-use)

C. Spectrum Reform Considerations [11](#spectrum-reform-considerations)

IV\. Spectrum Policy Reform: The Time is Now
[11](#spectrum-policy-reform-the-time-is-now)

A. Explosive Demand for Spectrum-Based Services and Devices
[12](#explosive-demand-for-spectrum-based-services-and-devices)

B. Technological Advances: Enabling Changes in Spectrum Policy
[13](#technological-advances-enabling-changes-in-spectrum-policy)

C. Increased Access: Mitigating Scarcity of Spectrum Resource
[14](#increased-access-mitigating-scarcity-of-spectrum-resource)

V. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy
[15](#key-elements-of-new-spectrum-policy)

A. Maximizing Flexibility of Spectrum Use
[16](#maximizing-flexibility-of-spectrum-use)

B. Clear and Exhaustive Definition of Spectrum Rights and
Responsibilities
[17](#clear-and-exhaustive-definition-of-spectrum-rights-and-responsibilities)

C. Accounting for All Dimensions of Spectrum Use
[19](#accounting-for-all-dimensions-of-spectrum-use)

D. Promoting Efficiency [21](#promoting-efficiency)

E. "Good Neighbor" Incentives [22](#good-neighbor-incentives)

F. Periodic Review of Rules [22](#periodic-review-of-rules)

G. Enforcement [23](#enforcement)

VI\. Interference Avoidance [25](#interference-avoidance)

A. Interference Challenges [25](#interference-challenges)

B. Adopting Quantitative Standards: Interference Temperature
[27](#adopting-quantitative-standards-interference-temperature)

C. Additional Methods of Interference Control
[31](#additional-methods-of-interference-control)

D. Transition [33](#transition)

VII\. Spectrum Usage Models [35](#spectrum-usage-models)

A. Comparison of Alternative Spectrum Usage Models
[35](#comparison-of-alternative-spectrum-usage-models)

B. Application of Exclusive Use and Commons Models
[38](#application-of-exclusive-use-and-commons-models)

1\. Factors Favoring Exclusive Use Model
[38](#factors-favoring-exclusive-use-model)

2\. Factors Favoring Commons Model [39](#factors-favoring-commons-model)

C. Limited Use of Command and Control
[41](#limited-use-of-command-and-control)

1\. International and Satellite Issues
[41](#international-and-satellite-issues)

2\. Public Safety [42](#public-safety)

3\. Broadcasting [44](#broadcasting)

D. Transition Issues [46](#transition-issues)

1\. General Transition Considerations
[46](#general-transition-considerations)

2\. Available Transition Mechanisms
[47](#available-transition-mechanisms)

3\. Factors Affecting the Choice of Transition Mechanism
[49](#factors-affecting-the-choice-of-transition-mechanism)

VIII\. Promoting Access to Spectrum [54](#promoting-access-to-spectrum)

A. Designating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Use
[54](#designating-spectrum-bands-for-unlicensed-use)

B. Secondary Market Rights and Easements
[55](#secondary-market-rights-and-easements)

C. Access to Spectrum in Rural Areas
[58](#access-to-spectrum-in-rural-areas)

D. Experimental Licensing [60](#experimental-licensing)

E. Transition Issues [61](#transition-issues-1)

IX\. Policy Recommendations [64](#policy-recommendations)

A. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy Recommendations
[64](#key-elements-of-new-spectrum-policy-recommendations)

B. Interference Avoidance Recommendations
[64](#interference-avoidance-recommendations)

C. Spectrum Usage Models Recommendations
[65](#spectrum-usage-models-recommendations)

D. Promoting Access to Spectrum Recommendations
[67](#promoting-access-to-spectrum-recommendations)

Appendix A: Legislative Recommendations
[69](#appendix-a-legislative-recommendations)

# Introduction 

The Spectrum Policy Task Force is pleased to report to the Commission
its findings and recommendations with regard to improving the way that
the electromagnetic radio spectrum is "managed" in the United States.
Chairman Powell established the Task Force in June 2002 to assist the
Commission in identifying and evaluating changes in spectrum policy that
will increase the public benefits derived from the use of radio
spectrum. The creation of the Task Force initiated the first ever
comprehensive and systematic review of spectrum policy at the FCC.

The Task Force is a team of high-level, multi-disciplinary professional
FCC staff -- economists, engineers, and attorneys -- from across the
Commission's Bureaus and Offices. The Task Force's mission is to:

-   Provide specific recommendations to the Commission for ways in which
    to evolve the current "command and control" approach to spectrum
    policy into a more integrated, market-oriented approach that
    provides greater regulatory certainty, while minimizing regulatory
    intervention; and

-   Assist the Commission in addressing ubiquitous spectrum issues,
    including interference protection, spectral efficiency, effective
    public safety communications, and international spectrum policies.

As Chairman Powell stated when announcing the formation of the Task
Force, the government has an almost impossible task in trying to keep
pace with the ever-increasing demand for spectrum and the continuing
advances in wireless technology and applications. In this fast-moving
world, the Commission cannot rely on outmoded procedures and policies.
While the Commission has recently made some major strides in how
spectrum is allocated and assigned in some bands, principally through
flexible rules and competitive bidding, spectrum policy is not keeping
pace with the relentless spectrum demands of the market. The Task Force
has begun the process of reexamining 90 years of spectrum policy to
ensure that the Commission's policies evolve with the consumer-driven
evolution of new wireless technologies, devices, and services. The Task
Force hopes and expects that this Report will serve as a catalyst for
further advancement of spectrum policy at the FCC.

**[Process]{.underline}.** On June 6, 2002, the Spectrum Policy Task
Force released a Public Notice seeking comment on existing spectrum
policies and recommendations for possible improvements.[^1] The Public
Notice set forth specific questions related to spectrum policy to give
detailed information to the public about the issues the Spectrum Policy
Task Force planned to review. Commenters were not limited to responding
to these questions, however, and were encouraged to comment on all
spectrum-related issues.

The questions raised in the Public Notice were divided into five
categories: (1) Market-Oriented Allocation and Assignment Policies; (2)
Interference Protection; (3) Spectral Efficiency; (4) Public Safety
Communications; and (5) International Issues. Specifically, with respect
to market allocation and assignment policies, the Task Force requested
comment on the relative effectiveness of the approaches the Commission
has employed for facilitating optimal spectrum use and their
applicability across different bands with different incumbents' rights.
Questions on interference protection addressed the ramifications of
technological limits on radio operation, particularly with regard to
control of the interference between radio systems and what constitutes
acceptable interference. Spectral efficiency questions focused on how to
promote and measure efficiency. The Task Force also sought comment on
how best to preserve and protect the ability of public safety entities
to do their important jobs in light of the increasing spectrum demands.
Finally, with respect to international issues, the Task Force sought
guidance on the international spectrum coordination process and what
role international considerations should play in spectrum policy. ET
Docket No. 02-135 was established to collect comments in response to the
Public Notice.

Parties filed over 200 comments. These comments were submitted by
numerous types of entities, including: manufacturers of electronics,
software, infrastructure, and wireless technology; wireless Internet
service providers (WISPs), including those providing wireless broadband
to rural areas, and other unlicensed spectrum operators; radioastronomy;
satellite/broadcast; consumer groups and individual consumers; other
wireless providers, including fixed wireless and land mobile; academics,
economists, and scientists; commercial mobile radio services (CMRS)
providers; radio (including private radio operators, public, and
commercial radio) and TV; public safety and government; consultants,
journalists, and telecommunications services brokers; engineers;
energy/transportation; and telecommunications companies, including rural
telephone companies.

The Task Force held numerous information meetings as well as four public
workshops: Experimental Licenses and Unlicensed Spectrum, August 1^st^;
Interference Protection, August 2^nd^; Spectrum Efficiency, August
5^th^; and Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities, August 9^th^.
Approximately 75 panelists and outside moderators participated. These
panelists represented a cross-section of interested parties:
manufacturers/product vendors; think tanks, academia, consulting, and
financial services; wireless CMRS carriers, other licensed operators,
and frequency coordinators; satellite/broadcast; attorneys; WISPs and
other unlicensed wireless services; government; public safety; radio/TV;
and consumer groups.

The Task Force created the following four working groups: Interference
Protection, Spectrum Efficiency, Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities,
and Unlicensed and Experimental. The working groups reviewed and
analyzed all of the comments and statements made in the workshops. From
this information, the Working Groups drafted reports summarizing the
comments submitted and setting forth findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.[^2]

The Task Force's web site, <http://www.fcc.gov/sptf>, contains
information related to the proceedings, including: the Task Force's
mission statement, a link to all public comments, transcripts of the
four public workshops and agendas, a calendar of spectrum policy events,
spectrum policy speeches, links to government-sponsored spectrum-related
web sites, and contact information (including telephone and e-mail
address) for the Task Force.

# Executive Summary

**Task Force Major Findings and Recommendations**

-   Advances in technology create the potential for systems to use
    spectrum more intensively and to be much more tolerant of
    interference than in the past.

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-   In many bands, spectrum access is a more significant problem than
    physical scarcity of spectrum, in large part due to legacy
    command-and-control regulation that limits the ability of potential
    spectrum users to obtain such access.

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-   To increase opportunities for technologically innovative and
    economically efficient spectrum use, spectrum policy must evolve
    towards more flexible and market-oriented regulatory models.

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-   Such models must be based on clear definitions of the rights and
    responsibilities of both licensed and unlicensed spectrum users,
    particularly with respect to interference and interference
    protection.

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-   No single regulatory model should be applied to all spectrum: the
    Commission should pursue a balanced spectrum policy that includes
    both the granting of exclusive spectrum usage rights through
    market-based mechanisms and creating open access to spectrum
    "commons," with command-and-control regulation used in limited
    circumstances.

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-   The Commission should seek to implement these policies in both newly
    allocated bands and in spectrum that is already occupied, but in the
    latter case, appropriate transitional mechanisms should be employed
    to avoid degradation of existing services and uses.

**Spectrum Use**

-   Preliminary data and general observations indicate that many
    portions of the radio spectrum are not in use for significant
    periods of time, and that spectrum use of these "white spaces" (both
    temporal and geographic) can be increased significantly.

-   Additional information and measurement is needed in order to more
    accurately quantify and characterize spectrum usage.

**The Case for Spectrum Reform**

-   Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices is
    straining longstanding and outmoded spectrum policies.

-   As a result, it is important to evolve from current spectrum
    policies, which reflect an environment made up of a limited number
    of types of operations, to policies that reflect the increasingly
    dynamic and innovative nature of spectrum use.

-   The Commission should also strive, wherever possible, to eliminate
    regulatory barriers to increased spectrum access.

**Common Elements of Spectrum Policy**

-   No single regulatory model can or should be applied to all spectrum,
    but there are certain common elements that the Commission should
    incorporate into its spectrum policy regardless of the regulatory
    model that is used.

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-   Maximum feasible flexibility of spectrum use by both licensed and
    unlicensed users.

-   Clear and exhaustive definition of spectrum users' rights and
    responsibilities.

-   Policies that account for all potential dimensions of spectrum usage
    (frequency, power, space, and time).

-   Incentives for efficient spectrum use.

-   Policies that encourage grouping of spectrum "neighbors" with
    technically compatible characteristics.

-   Periodic review and revision of spectrum rules to account for
    technological advances and other changes.

-   Efficient and reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure regulatory
    compliance by all spectrum users.

**Interference Avoidance**

-   Interference management has become more difficult because of the
    greater density, mobility and variability of radio frequency (RF)
    emitters. Interference management becomes even more problematic when
    and if users have been granted increased flexibility in their
    spectrum use. As a result, the complexity of predictive interference
    models has increased dramatically, and is expected to increase even
    more in the future.

-   The Commission should adopt, where feasible, a more quantitative
    approach to interference management based on the concept of
    "interference temperature."

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-   The interference temperature metric would establish maximum
    permissible levels of interference, thus characterizing the "worst
    case" environment in which a receiver would be expected to operate.

-   Different threshold levels could be set for each band, geographic
    region or service.

-   These thresholds should be set only after review of the condition of
    the RF environment in each band. To that end, the Task Force
    recommends that the Commission undertake a systematic study of the
    RF noise floor.

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-   The Commission should consider applying receiver performance
    requirements for some bands and services, either through incentives,
    regulatory mandates, or some combination of incentives and mandates.

**Spectrum Rights Models**

-   Based on the principle that "one size does not fit all" in spectrum
    policy, the Commission should consider a balance among three general
    models for assigning spectrum usage rights:

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-   ["Exclusive use" model.]{.underline} A licensing model in which a
    licensee has exclusive and transferable flexible use rights for
    specified spectrum within a defined geographic area, with flexible
    use rights that are governed primarily by technical rules to protect
    spectrum users against interference.

-   ["Commons" model.]{.underline} Allows unlimited numbers of
    unlicensed users to share frequencies, with usage rights that are
    governed by technical standards or etiquettes but with no right to
    protection from interference.

-   ["Command-and-control" model.]{.underline} The traditional process
    of spectrum management in the United States, currently used for most
    spectrum within the Commission's jurisdiction, in which allowable
    spectrum uses are limited based on regulatory judgments.

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-   The Commission should expand the use of both the exclusive use and
    commons models throughout the radio spectrum.

-   The exclusive use model should be applied primarily but not
    exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively high and
    transaction costs associated with market-based negotiation of access
    rights are relatively low.

-   The commons model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in
    bands where scarcity is relatively low and transaction costs are
    relatively high.

-   The commons approach also has potential applicability in the
    creation of "underlay" rights in spectrum for low-power, low-impact
    applications, *e.g.*, for operations below an established
    interference temperature threshold.

-   Command-and-control regulation should be reserved only for
    situations where prescribing spectrum use by regulation is necessary
    to accomplish important public interest objectives or to conform to
    treaty obligations.

-   Dedication of spectrum in conformity with international
    harmonization considerations is sometimes appropriate to foster
    internationally ubiquitous services and economies of scale.

-   Spectrum currently set aside for public safety use should remain
    subject to the command-and-control model to ensure provision of
    essential life-and-safety services. At the same time, because of the
    variability of public safety use, public safety users should have
    flexibility to lease spectrum capacity during lower-use periods to
    commercial users.

-   Broadcast spectrum should remain subject to the current regulatory
    model, which is based on statutory public interest objectives. Over
    the longer term, the Commission should periodically reevaluate its
    broadcast spectrum policies.

-   With the exceptions noted above, existing spectrum that is subject
    to command-and-control regulation should be transitioned to the more
    flexible exclusive use and commons models to the greatest extent
    possible. In determining whether and how to transition legacy
    command-and-control bands to more flexible rights models, the
    Commission should consider several alternative approaches, and
    should focus first on initiating transition in those bands where
    additional flexibility will provide the greatest benefits at the
    least cost.

**Promoting Access to Spectrum**

-   The Commission should, where feasible, seek to designate additional
    bands for unlicensed spectrum use to better optimize spectrum access
    and provide room for expansion in the fast-growing market for
    unlicensed devices and networks.

-   In licensed spectrum bands, the Commission should pursue secondary
    markets policies that encourage licensees to provide access for
    "opportunistic" uses above the interference temperature threshold
    through leasing of spectrum usage rights.

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-   The Commission should also explore the possible use of
    government-granted "easements" for some opportunistic uses in new
    spectrum bands, but should be sensitive to the potential impact of
    this approach on planning and investment by licensed users.

-   The Commission should explore ways to promote spectrum access and
    flexibility in rural areas, including flexible regulation of power
    levels, secondary markets mechanisms to encourage leasing of
    spectrum usage rights in rural areas, and consideration of rural
    issues in defining geographic licensing areas.

-   Experimental spectrum uses should be encouraged through improvements
    to the experimental licensing frequency coordination process and
    dissemination of more information identifying bands that are
    particularly suitable for experimental applications.

#  Current State of U.S. Spectrum Policy

## Regulatory Background

[Statute]{.underline}. Domestic U.S. spectrum policy and regulation
began 90 years ago. Largely as a consequence of the communications
failures associated with the sinking of the Titanic, the Federal
government established control of the electromagnetic spectrum.[^3] The
Radio Act of 1912 established the principle that no one could use
spectrum without a federal license and a series of spectrum policy
principles that continue to the present. The Radio Act of 1927
established the Federal Radio Commission and set forth as its intent to
"maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of
interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of
such channels, but not the ownership thereof." The 1927 Act provided
that the new Commission shall, "as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires" classify radio stations, prescribe the nature of the
service, assign bands of frequencies or wave lengths and determine the
power, time, and location of stations and regulate the kind of apparatus
to be used. Licenses were to be granted by the Commission for a limited
duration (three years for broadcast licenses and five years for all
others), but all federal government stations were to be assigned by the
President.

Seven years later, the Communications Act of 1934 abolished the Federal
Radio Commission and transferred the authority for spectrum management
to the newly created Federal Communications Commission.[^4] The 1934 Act
brought together the regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio
services within a single independent federal agency. The 1927 Radio Act
was absorbed largely intact into Title III of the 1934 Act.

From 1934 to the early 1990s, Congress enacted many amendments to Title
III, but there were no fundamental changes to the core provisions that
can be traced back to the 1912 and 1927 Acts. However, two noteworthy
additions to the 1934 Act inserted in 1983 by Congress are section 7[^5]
and section 307(e).[^6] Section 7(a) establishes that it is the policy
of the United States "to encourage the provision of new technologies and
services to the public" and that anyone who opposes a new technology or
service will have the burden of demonstrating that the proposal is
inconsistent with the public interest. In addition, section 307(e)
provides that the Commission, "notwithstanding any licensing requirement
established in this Act," may "by rule authorize the operation of radio
stations without individual licenses" in certain services.

In 1993, Congress amended Title III of the 1934 Act to authorize the
Commission to assign licenses through competitive bidding.[^7] The 1993
Act also required the transfer of certain amounts of spectrum from
federal government use to commercial use,[^8] amended Section 332 of the
1934 Act with regard to the regulatory treatment of commercial and
private mobile radio services, and required the Commission to collect
regulatory fees from licensees and other Commission regulatees.[^9]

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 added Section 336 to the 1934 Act to
provide for broadcast spectrum flexibility and authority to collect
certain additional fees.[^10] The 1996 Act also eliminated the cap on
license terms for non-broadcast licenses in Section 307(c) of the 1934
Act. In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress expanded the
Commission's auction authority, provided for the transfer of additional
spectrum from federal government use and granted the Commission explicit
authority to allocate electromagnetic spectrum so as to provide
flexibility of use.

[Administrative]{.underline}. Although the communications statutes (and
treaties) discussed above are generally implemented and enforced by the
FCC, other federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce,
through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), and the Department of State, also play important roles in
developing spectrum policy. Until recently, spectrum policy at the
administrative agency level, especially at the FCC, was generally
formulated on a band-by-band, service-by-service basis, typically in
response to specific requests for particular service allocations or
station assignments. This *ad hoc* approach has garnered criticism over
the years.

It does not appear that any general spectrum management review or
comprehensive planning has taken place at the FCC. It was not until the
1990s that specific efforts were made to examine policies surrounding
spectrum management in the United States on a more comprehensive basis.
First, in December 1989, NTIA began a "Comprehensive Policy Review of
Use and Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum." This review was the
first major examination of fundamental spectrum policy objectives and
issues by NTIA since its organization in 1978. In 1991, NTIA issued its
Report, "U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda for the Future," which
made a number of significant recommendations, some of which ultimately
led to legislation being enacted as part of the 1993 Budget Act.

In the 1990s, while the FCC continued with an *ad hoc* approach to
spectrum allocations and policy, significant efforts in the area of
broader spectrum policy review by the Commission took three forms: (1)
implementation of competitive bidding authority; (2) *en banc* hearings
before the full Commission; and (3) policy statements. As noted above,
Congress provided the Commission authority to use competitive bidding
for licensing certain classes of spectrum users and uses. While much of
the implementation of these statutory changes took place on a
service-by-service basis, in 1994 the Commission established the general
framework for auctions across all services.[^11] The Commission also
completed other more comprehensive proceedings to implement changes to
Sections 332 and 309(j) of the Communications Act.[^12]

In March 1996 and April 1999, the Commission held two *en banc* hearings
on Spectrum Management.[^13] Information presented at the hearings
provided insight from industry and academia on their views of how the
Commission's spectrum management responsibilities should evolve. Two key
focus areas emerged: (1) promoting greater efficiency in spectrum use
and (2) making more spectrum available. Flexibility was also emphasized
for both allocations and service rules. Other key suggested initiatives
included: negotiated interference; new spectrum efficient technologies;
innovative and streamlined assignment mechanisms; a more active
secondary market; and more unlicensed spectrum.

In November 1999, the Commission issued a Policy Statement on
"Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of
Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium."[^14] The
Commission has also convened a Technological Advisory Committee to
provide expert advice to the Commission on how to respond to rapid
advances in technology, with a particular focus on spectrum
management.[^15]

In November 2000, after holding a public forum on secondary markets in
radio spectrum usage rights, the Commission concurrently adopted a
Policy Statement, "Principles for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum by
Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets,"[^16] and a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, "Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum through
Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets."[^17]
The Policy Statement enunciated general goals and principles for the
further development of secondary markets in spectrum usage rights, while
the Notice proposed concrete steps the Commission might take to
implement that policy with respect to wireless radio services and
satellite services. Other countries have undertaken similar reviews of
spectrum management policies and practices.[^18]

## Spectrum Use 

Preliminary data and general observations indicate that portions of the
radio spectrum are not in use for significant periods of time. To assess
actual spectrum use, the FCC's Enforcement Bureau measured spectrum use
below 1 GHz in Atlanta, Chicago, New Orleans, San Diego, and in a
Washington, DC suburb during various periods in July 2002.[^19] These
preliminary measurements indicate that, while some bands are heavily
used -- such as those bands used by cellular base stations -- many other
bands are not in use or are used only part of the time. Thus, there may
be opportunities for spectrum-based devices to operate in both the
temporal white spaces -- those resulting from variability in the
operations of existing spectrum users over time -- and the geographic
white spaces -- those resulting from the geographic separation of
existing spectrum users.

These data offer a useful starting point, and, indeed, confirm some
long-held views regarding actual spectrum usage. More information,
however, is needed in order to quantify and characterize spectrum usage
more accurately so that the Commission can adopt spectrum policies that
take advantage of these spectrum white spaces. Currently, no federal
agency or other organization systematically measures temporal spectrum
use.

Also, it is generally understood that certain types of spectrum users,
such as the public safety community, have significant variability in
their spectrum use and, as such, much of their allocated spectrum lies
fallow during non-peak periods. For example, the Task Force received
some usage data regarding a particular police dispatch channel in New
York State.[^20] These data indicate that, for the measurement period,
typical channel occupancy was less than 15%, while the peak usage was
close to 85%.

Spectrum above 50 GHz is also not heavily used because, until recently,
radio technology has not been sufficiently advanced to use this portion
of the spectrum. For example, developments in millimeter-wave
technologies -- that is, technologies that can effectively propagate
pencil-beam like signals -- have made higher spectrum bands, such as
those above 70 GHz, possible for use.[^21] The potential uses for these
technologies include high-speed wireless local area networks, broadband
access systems for the Internet, point-to-point communications, and
point-to-multipoint communications.

In light of the preliminary FCC measurements, the acknowledged
variability of some types of licensed spectrum users, and the recent
advances in technology, the Task Force concludes that there is evidence
to suggest that spectrum use can be increased significantly.

## Spectrum Reform Considerations

Over the years, as it considered various allocation and service
proposals for parts of the spectrum, the Commission has taken into
account any number of "public interest" considerations. For example, in
determining whether to reallocate spectrum for another use or to change
particular service rules, the Commission has considered the reliance
interests of existing spectrum users, including their investments and
reasonable expectations, in order to make sure any transition to new
uses is equitable. Other important factors that have come into play are
the benefits (and harms) of allocations to national security and
emergency preparedness. It is important to ensure that critical defense
systems do not risk exposure to harmful interference and to provide
adequate spectrum resources to public safety entities. In making
spectrum policy in certain proceedings, especially those involving
spectrum used for global satellite systems, the Commission also has
ensured that spectrum coordination among countries allows for adequate
domestic and international operations. Access to specialized services
for persons with disabilities has also been an important concern
addressed in numerous proceedings. As a final example of its public
interest considerations, the Commission's policies surrounding spectrum
allocated for broadcasting service, especially in the context of the
conversion from analog to digital television, have taken into account
localism and access to free-over-the-air television.

#  Spectrum Policy Reform: The Time is Now

The Spectrum Policy Task Force believes that the time is ripe for
spectrum policy reform. Increasing demand for spectrum-based services
and devices are straining longstanding, and outmoded, spectrum policies.
The overarching goal of effective spectrum policy is to maximize the
potential public benefits to be derived through spectrum-based services
and devices. The Task Force believes that the Commission can and should
modify current spectrum policy through increased flexibility in order to
achieve this goal. This section of the Task Force's report discusses why
spectrum policy reform is needed.

## Explosive Demand for Spectrum-Based Services and Devices 

There has been a dramatic increase in overall demand for spectrum-based
services and devices, accompanied by particular demand for mobile and
portable spectrum-based applications. This is true for both traditional,
licensed services and for services offered through unlicensed devices.
This increased demand is propelled by a host of factors: the economy has
moved towards the communications-intensive service sector, the workforce
is increasingly mobile, and consumers have been quick to embrace the
convenience and increased efficiency of the multitude of wireless
devices available today.

While the Task Force recognizes the societal trends that have
contributed to the increased demand for spectrum-based services and
devices, it is also difficult to make accurate projections of future
demands. Historically, both industry and Commission projections for
spectrum use have significantly and consistently underestimated the need
for additional spectrum and the public's utilization of new technologies
and applications. One illustrative example is the explosive growth in
consumer demand for mobile wireless services. In 1994, the Commission
allocated spectrum based on a projection of 54 million domestic mobile
services users for the year 2000. By the year 2000, however, there
actually were approximately 110 million mobile services users.[^22]

Advances in technologies have significantly increased the diversity of
service offerings and have also qualitatively improved existing
services, thereby increasing consumer demand for spectrum-based services
and devices. For example, advances in spread spectrum techniques have
spawned significant consumer demand for associated applications. Spread
spectrum technology -- which spreads the energy of a radio signal over a
bandwidth that is greater than that required to transmit a particular
signal[^23] -- was originally developed for military applications and
the Commission first approved its use for commercial applications was
first approved by the Commission in 1985. While this technology has been
used for cordless telephones for some time, advances in this technology,
coupled with developments of industry protocols for its use, such as
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, have contributed to the surging demand for wireless
devices that enable computer and data networking through wireless local
area networks (WLANs). Consumers are increasingly demanding wireless
computer and data networking because most businesses and many homes now
have multiple computers, and, as a result, users often find it desirable
to install local area networks to share resources, such as printers,
scanners and broadband or dial-up Internet connections. Indeed,
developing a local area network using wireless unlicensed devices can be
a cost-attractive mobile alternative to wired networks.

New technologies also often enhance existing spectrum-based services and
devices, thereby contributing to increased consumer demand. Third
generation, or advanced wireless services, will have better packet data
control and higher-speed transmission rates than current second
generation technologies. For consumers, these technological advances
translate into a wider diversity of potential service offerings,
particularly Internet and wireless data services, which can be delivered
at faster rates. The projected growth in this area is significant --
some analysts predict that wireless mobile data traffic will eventually
eclipse mobile voice traffic.

Not only is the overall demand for spectrum-based services and devices
steadily increasing, because the applications are increasingly dynamic,
they are adding even more strain to current spectrum policies. Among
other things, they present increasingly complex interference management
issues. For example, the same frequencies are used by cordless phones
and 802.11b Wi-Fi devices. Because these devices often change locations
during their operations and their use is often in close proximity to one
another, the technical geometries or parameters that determine
interference vary accordingly as well. Using typical worst case
predictive interference models would significantly reduce the potential
of these devices to operate. As a result, it is important to evolve from
current spectrum policies, which reflect a spectrum world made up of a
limited number of types of operations, to policies that reflect the
increasingly dynamic and innovative nature of spectrum use.

## Technological Advances: Enabling Changes in Spectrum Policy

While technological advances are contributing to the increased diversity
of spectrum-based consumer applications and, consequently, their use is
resulting in more demand for spectrum, technological advances are also
providing some potential answers to current spectrum policy challenges.
Some recent and significant technological advances include the increased
use of digital technologies and the development of software-defined
radios.

Growth in the use of digital spectrum-based technologies not only
increases the potential throughput of information, it also has
potentially significant ramifications for interference management.
Digital signals are inherently more robust, and resistant to
interference, than analog signals. Moreover, digital signal processing
techniques, such as coding and error correction, are more effective at
rejecting interfering signals. Thus, spectrum policies can and should
reflect this increased ability to tolerate interference. Moreover, given
the increased ability of new technologies to monitor their local RF
environment and operate more dynamically than traditional technologies,
the predictive models used by the Commission can be updated, and perhaps
eventually replaced, by techniques that take into account and assess
actual, rather than predicted, interference.

Software-defined radios are a significant technological advancement
illustrating how technological advances can enable more intensive
spectrum use. Unlike traditional radios, in which technical
characteristics are fixed at the time of manufacture and cannot
subsequently be modified, operating parameters in software-defined
radios (such as the operational frequency and modulation type) are
determined by software. The fact that these parameters are determined by
software means that a software-defined radio can be programmed to
transmit and receive on many frequencies and to use any desired
modulation or transmission format within the limits of its hardware
design. A software-defined radio can also be programmed to receive
different types of radio signals on varying frequencies. Often
technologies such as software-defined radios are called "smart" or
"opportunistic" technologies because, due to their operational
flexibility, software-defined radios can search the radio spectrum,
sense the environment, and operate in spectrum not in use by others. By
operating in so-called white -- or unused -- spaces in the spectrum,
software-defined radios can enable better and more intensive use of the
radio spectrum.

Historically, due in large part to technological limitations in radio
performance, the Commission's spectrum policies have parceled -- or
assigned -- spectrum according to particular operational frequencies and
geographic areas of operations. Smart technologies, such as
software-defined radios, potentially allow operators to take advantage
of the time dimension of the radio spectrum. That is, because their
operations are so agile and can be changed nearly instantaneously, they
can operate for short periods of time in unused spectrum. The
Commission's current policies do not take into account the time
dimension of spectrum use. In addition, the Commission's current
policies do not allow new technologies to take advantage of geographic
white space. In order to be responsive to these increased technological
capabilities, the Commission's spectrum policies can and should remain
technology agnostic, but they should not be technology antagonistic. As
a result, the Commission should strive, wherever possible, to eliminate
regulatory barriers to increased spectrum access.

## Increased Access: Mitigating Scarcity of Spectrum Resource

Due to the growth in demand for spectrum-based services, many spectrum
users seek additional spectrum and it now appears as though spectrum
demand is outstripping spectrum supply. Indeed, most prime spectrum has
already been assigned to one or more parties, and it is becoming
increasingly difficult to find spectrum that can be made available
either for new services or to expand existing ones. As noted above, in
connection with its spectrum policy inquiry, the Task Force reviewed
preliminary data regarding spectrum usage. While additional, and more
comprehensive, spectrum measurements can and should be undertaken to
improve the understanding of actual spectrum use, preliminary
measurements show that significant spectrum capacity remains untapped.
Thus, if the Commission were to permit greater access to the radio
spectrum, the effects of the physical scarcity of the spectrum resource
could be minimized.

Improving access to the spectrum can be achieved through permitting
current licensees greater flexibility. Often a licensee has variable
needs and therefore does not use its spectrum for particular periods of
time. At the same time, due to restrictions based in Commission
policies, licensees are usually unable to make their spectrum available
to others, even if a market exists to do so. While this concept will be
addressed in greater detail, *see infra* Section VIII, granting
licensees additional flexibility to make their licensed bands available
to others would increase access to the spectrum and, correspondingly,
minimize the impact of spectrum scarcity.

Another significant reason that spectrum may be underutilized, as noted
earlier, is that the Commission's regulations do not reflect and
capitalize upon the significant advancements made in spectrum-based
radio technologies. Because new, smart technologies can sense the
spectrum environment and because they have the agility to dynamically
adapt or adjust their operations, increasing access to the spectrum for
smart technologies, such as software-defined radios, can improve
utilization, through more efficient access, of the radio spectrum
without detriment to existing spectrum users.

In the near term, the Commission should consider adopting policies that
increase opportunities for access to the radio spectrum through granting
additional flexibility. The Commission also may want to consider options
for increasing the benefits derived from the radio spectrum by providing
incentives for technologies that improve the throughput of information.

Eventually, it may be possible that spectrum access is fully optimized
for certain bands and locations (that is, that the spectrum is not only
fully licensed but also heavily used.) At that point in time, the
Commission may need to focus solely on promoting improved throughput of
information. In the interim, however, to ensure that existing services
can continue to grow to accommodate marketplace needs, and that new
services have a chance to take hold and grow, it is important that the
Commission continue to optimize and facilitate access to and use of the
radio spectrum.

#  Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy 

To facilitate the Commission's goal of promoting access to and use of
radio spectrum, the Task Force recommends that the Commission evolve its
spectrum policy toward more flexible and market-oriented spectrum
policies that will provide incentives for users to migrate to more
technologically innovative and economically efficient uses of spectrum.
As discussed below, there is no single regulatory model that can or
should be applied to all spectrum to accomplish these goals, but there
are certain common elements that should be incorporated into the
Commission's general approach to spectrum policy regardless of the
regulatory model that is used. These elements also inform the Task
Force's approach to interference, spectrum rights, and spectrum access
discussed in subsequent sections of this report. Specifically, the
Commission should seek to meet the following fundamental objectives in
spectrum policy:

-   Allow for maximum feasible flexibility of spectrum use by both
    licensed and unlicensed users;

-   Clearly and exhaustively define spectrum users' rights and
    responsibilities;

-   Account for all potential dimensions of spectrum usage (frequency,
    power, space, and time);

-   Provide incentives for efficient spectrum use;

-   Encourage grouping of spectrum "neighbors" with technically
    compatible characteristics;

-   Provide for periodic review and revision of spectrum rules to
    account for technological advances and other changes; and

-   Establish efficient and reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure
    regulatory compliance by all spectrum users.

## Maximizing Flexibility of Spectrum Use

As a general proposition, flexibility in spectrum regulation is critical
to improving access to spectrum. In this context, "flexibility" means
granting both licensed users and unlicensed device operators the maximum
possible autonomy to determine the highest valued use of their spectrum,
subject only to those rules that are necessary to afford reasonable
opportunities for access by other spectrum users and to prevent or limit
interference among multiple spectrum uses. Flexibility enables spectrum
users to make fundamental choices about how they will use spectrum
(including whether to use it or transfer their usage rights to others),
taking into account market factors such as consumer demand, availability
of technology, and competition. By leaving these choices to the spectrum
user, this approach tends to lead to efficient and highly-valued
spectrum uses. In most instances, a flexible use approach is preferable
to the Commission's traditional "command-and-control" approach to
spectrum regulation, in which allowable spectrum uses are limited based
on regulatory judgments.

Of course, as discussed further below, there are some necessary limits
to the degree of flexibility that can be afforded to any single spectrum
user. For example, clear technical rules (*e.g.* power limits,
interference standards) remain necessary in all spectrum bands in order
to facilitate co-existence of multiple spectrum uses in common and
adjacent bands.[^24] In addition, there are limited instances in which
regulating spectrum use on a command-and-control basis may continue to
be necessary to achieve certain public interest objectives.[^25]
Finally, the degree of flexibility that is afforded to particular
spectrum users should take into account the importance of promoting
reasonable access to spectrum for other potential users. [^26]

Even with these limitations, however, the potential exists for the
Commission to significantly increase the amount of flexibility that is
afforded to spectrum users in much of the spectrum that it regulates.
The Commission should seek to avoid rules that restrict spectrum use to
particular services or applications, so long as the user operates within
the technical parameters applicable to the particular band in question.
Furthermore, these technical parameters should themselves be limited to
those that are necessary to define the user's RF environment in terms of
maximum allowable output and required tolerance of interference.

Such flexibility can be implemented under more than one regulatory model
for defining spectrum usage rights. As discussed further below, the Task
Force advocates expanding the future use of two alternative regulatory
models -- one based on awarding exclusive spectrum usage rights and the
other on creating unlicensed spectrum "commons" -- both of which are
premised on the concept of flexible use.[^27] Under either model, the
Commission should give spectrum users maximum possible autonomy in the
following areas:

-   [Choice of uses or services that are provided on
    spectrum.]{.underline} Spectrum users should have the maximum
    possible flexibility to decide how spectrum will be used, *e.g.,*
    whether to provide commercial services or to use spectrum for
    private, internal needs, so long as they comply with the general
    parameters applicable to the band (including any applicable power
    limits or interference limits).

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   [Choice of technology that is most appropriate to the spectrum
    environment.]{.underline} Spectrum users should be allowed to choose
    the technology that is best-suited to their proposed use or service.
    They should be allowed adapt their technology to their particular
    spectrum environment, *e.g.,* to use lower power in
    spectrum-congested areas and higher power in less-congested (*e.g.,*
    rural) areas.

-   [Right to transfer, lease, or subdivide spectrum
    rights.]{.underline}[^28] An efficient secondary markets regime
    should be in place to facilitate the negotiated movement of spectrum
    rights from one party to another. In more narrowly-defined services
    (*e.g.,* public safety), spectrum users should have the ability to
    lease excess capacity for other uses through time sharing of
    spectrum or other mechanisms.[^29]

## Clear and Exhaustive Definition of Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities

While commenters and workshop participants were vocal about their desire
for more flexible rights, they were equally interested in firmness and
clarity in the rules they are required to follow. Most commenters and
workshop participants also agreed with the proposition that spectrum
users' rights and obligations are often not defined with sufficient
clarity under the FCC's current rules. An overarching principle
eventually emerged: all spectrum users require clear rules governing
their interactions with the Commission and other spectrum users.
Regardless of how or to whom particular rights are assigned, ensuring
that all rights are clearly delineated is important to avoiding
disputes, and provides a clear common framework from which spectrum
users can negotiate alternative arrangements.

To provide this framework, the Commission must clearly define the
following basic spectrum rights parameters for all licensed and
unlicensed spectrum uses:

1.  Designated frequency range and bandwidth;

2.  Geographic scope of right to operate;

3.  Maximum RF output, both in-band and out-of-band; and

4.  Interference protection, *i.e.* the maximum level of
    noise/interference that the spectrum user must accept from other RF
    sources.[^30]

Also, to ensure that rights are exhaustively assigned, the rules should
be written to define spectrum rights in terms of spectrum uses that are
excluded, prohibited, or limited. Thus, the Commission's approach should
be that licensees and unlicensed users are allowed to do anything not
explicitly prohibited by the Communications Act, the Commission\'s
rules, Commission orders, licenses or authorizations, rather than the
presumption being that anything not affirmatively authorized requires a
rule change or waiver before it can be done.

The first three of the parameters listed above essentially define the
scope of the maximum allowable RF output of a given spectrum use in
terms of frequency, bandwidth, space, and power. These are typically
defined with relative clarity in the FCC rules using objective criteria,
*e.g.,* licensing area borders, antenna height, and transmitter power
limits, etc.[^31] However, the fourth criterion (interference
protection) is distinct because it pertains to the universe of outside
RF sources (in band and out-of-band) that may cause interference to the
spectrum user. Because all of these sources may not be known or
anticipated, capturing this variable is more difficult. Indeed,
commenters and workshop participants almost uniformly cited the FCC's
interference rules as the prime example of rules that are not clearly
defined. A common refrain was that the FCC rules speak of the right to
be protected from "harmful interference," but this term is not defined
in technical terms, making objective measurement difficult.[^32] To
address these issues, the Commission needs to define interference rights
more clearly on a prospective basis. The Task Force discusses possible
ways to accomplish this in Section VI below.

## Accounting for All Dimensions of Spectrum Use 

The Task Force also analyzed the benefits of parceling out spectrum
using variations in frequency, space, power, and time to maximize the
use of spectrum. In the past, the Commission has recognized and licensed
spectrum primarily by defining spectrum rights in terms of the first
three dimensions. The Task Force found that new technological
developments are changing the way in which each of these spectrum
dimensions is used. In addition, new technology now permit the
Commission to increasingly consider the use of time, in combination with
frequency, power, and space, as an added dimension that could permit
more dynamic allocation and assignment of spectrum usage rights.

Frequency or bandwidth requests have long been the mainstay of the
spectrum allocation and licensing process. Parties file applications
with the Commission seeking allocations for a particular service and
licensing in a specific bandwidth based on the type of service they
envision providing. This process requires all interested parties to
evaluate the applicant's proposal through filings at the Commission. The
Commission is then required to make a determination as to the
desirability of the allocation and rules for the service, including the
appropriate bandwidth for a particular licensee. Several technological
trends are now affecting this traditional paradigm, however. First, the
development of spread spectrum technology has increased demand for
contiguous broadband spectrum allocations. Second, technology is making
increased use of higher frequencies, *e.g.,* bands above 50 GHz, that
previously were considered to have limited utility. Finally, the
development of frequency-agile technology has created the potential for
development of services and uses that are not tied to specific frequency
bands.

Space and power are related but slightly different dimensions that
define the geographic scope of spectrum use for spectrum management
purposes. The Task Force found that the Commission should expand the
ability of spectrum users to partition their geographic service areas,
or space, so that portions of their service areas that would otherwise
lay fallow could potentially be put to use.

The Task Force also found that spectrum use can be improved is by
permitting transmitter power levels to be adjusted to match the
environment of the transmitter and the intended service area. For
example, maximum power levels could be increased in rural areas so that
service can be provided over larger areas at lower cost. In congested
urban areas, where high transmitter power levels on one frequency can
often adversely impact the use of other frequencies, the Commission
should look towards enabling the use of lower power transmissions. For
example, high-power digital television broadcasters could be permitted
to operate single frequency low-power distributed transmission systems
within their present service areas. Other site-licensed services could
be provided similar flexibility. The Commission could also consider
whether it should offer incentives for reducing transmitter power (such
as an increased interference protection).

The Task Force also recommends that the Commission seek methods for
fostering technologies, such as advanced antennas and system design
techniques, that maintain as close to uniform power flux density signal
levels as possible throughout a service area. As discussed in the
Spectrum Efficiency Working Group and Interference Protection Working
Group Reports, these technologies could avoid interference between
users, and could provide for greater spectrum reuse.

Finally, with respect to power, the Task Force concluded that the
Commission also should promote the co-location of high power
transmitters. In general, interference between services is often less
likely when the signal strengths from the services are similar;
co-location of high power transmitters helps ensure comparable signal
strengths throughout the service areas.

To better account for use of spectrum in the time dimension, the Task
Force also recommends that the Commission examine methods for promoting
technologies that will facilitate time-sharing of spectrum between
multiple users. For example, the Commission should consider permitting
traditionally-narrow services, such as public safety, to lease excess
capacity to other services. The Commission should also consider whether
the use of trunking technology, where several users automatically share
frequencies, should be expanded, Time divided or aggregated use of
spectrum is becoming a necessity in order to meet the burgeoning demand
with limited opportunities for allocating new services. The Task Force
also recommends that the Commission consider methods for allowing access
to spectrum with typically low utilization on an interruptible basis,
*i.e.*, allowing the interruptible use of otherwise authorized spectrum
when it is not being used by the primary licensee but requiring the user
to suspend operations when the primary licensee is transmitting. This
type of opportunistic use along with the technology for such use should
be studied to determine whether it can be authorized without interfering
with the established rights of licensees or whether licensees are in the
best position to evaluate such use.

Cutting across the four dimensions of spectrum management discussed
above is the concept of whether to allow spectrum licensees to lease
access to other spectrum users in one or more of these dimensions under
a secondary markets approach, or whether to create regulatory
"easements" in one or more of these dimensions that allow users access
on a conditional, non-interfering basis. One possibility discussed below
is to permit unlicensed systems or devices to operate at very low power
up to a defined interference temperature limit [^33] Another issue
discussed below is whether and how to facilitate access to spectrum by
"opportunistic" frequency-agile devices that can take advantage of
spectrum "holes" in time and frequency without interfering with other
operations in the bands they utilize.[^34] The Task Force recommends
that the Commission investigate these concepts and the possible
parameters for allowing such increased use of the spectrum.

## Promoting Efficiency

The Task Force identified three variations on and definitions for the
term "efficiency," as applicable to spectrum management: spectrum
efficiency, technical efficiency, and economic efficiency. Spectrum
efficiency occurs when the maximum amount of information is transmitted
within the least amount of spectrum. Technical efficiency occurs when
inputs, such as spectrum, equipment, capital, and labor, are deployed in
a manner that generates the most output for the least cost. Economic
efficiency occurs when all inputs are deployed in a manner that
generates the most value for consumers. The Task Force found that
spectrum and technical efficiency are components of economic efficiency,
but that measuring spectrum and technical efficiency does not
necessarily provide any meaningful information with respect to economic
efficiency.

The Task Force also attempted to develop a methodology for measuring
spectrum efficiency. It concluded that while it is generally easiest to
assess technical efficiency on a per-device basis in terms of
bits/seconds/hertz, after reviewing the comments and the record, it was
neither possible nor appropriate to select a single, objective metric
for comparing spectrum efficiency across different radio services. Any
metric would, inherent in its assumptions, provide advantages to one
service or another. In addition, measuring technical efficiency does not
provide any information with respect to economic efficiency.

The Task Force concluded that the Commission can best promote economic
efficiency by providing spectrum users with flexibility of spectrum use
and ease of transferability in order to allow maximization of the value
of the services provided. Flexibility provides incentives for
economically efficient use and discourages economically inefficient use
by ensuring that spectrum users will face the opportunity cost of their
spectrum use. In most instances, the application of flexible service
rules and efficient secondary market mechanisms are the best means of
achieving this goal. The Task Force recognized that there may be
situations where the Commission finds it necessary to promote spectrum
or technical efficiency (as opposed to economic efficiency) in order to
promote particular public interest goals. However, in those instances,
where marketplace forces may be inadequate, *e.g.,* in spectrum that is
allocated for government use, alternative mechanisms such as user fees
should be considered to stimulate improvements in efficiency. In
addition, to the extent that wireline or hybrid technologies may be
efficient alternatives to existing use of radio spectrum in some
instances, Commission policy should promote the use of such alternatives
whenever appropriate. It should be noted that the Task Force recommends
that the Commission conduct a cost-benefit analysis as part of the
spectrum management process and that, while the analysis will often
favor market-oriented approaches, there are instances where the analysis
will support regulation.

##  "Good Neighbor" Incentives 

In addition to improving access to spectrum through flexible use
policies, as discussed above, it may be desirable, where possible, to
group technically compatible systems and devices in close spectrum
proximity. One of the challenges presented by permitting additional
flexibility within assigned spectrum is the potential for incompatible
adjacent systems. For instance, low-power systems or devices with a high
sensitivity to interference could be grouped with similar systems, and
systems or devices with high power could be placed elsewhere. System or
device spectrum incompatibility can require additional constraints in
the form of guard bands, consuming valuable spectrum, or expensive
filtering systems to avoid adjacent band interference. The Task Force
believes that the Commission should consider making spectrum policy
decisions encouraging like systems or devices to be grouped in spectrum
"neighborhoods" with like systems. At the same time, it is important to
be mindful of the importance of allowing flexible use of spectrum.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission rely primarily on its
general spectrum management authority to consider whether future
allocations should be grouped based on mutually-compatible technical
characteristics. Specifically, such a "good neighbor" policy would group
future systems or devices by specifying comparable maximum levels of
power and compatible interference protection levels. For existing
services, flexible use policies could create the incentive for
spectrum-based systems or devices to migrate to compatible bands based
on marketplace forces. In some limited instances, however, there may be
particular types of systems or devices, public safety for example, that
require more direct regulatory intervention (*e.g.,* through creation of
guard bands or other direct regulation of out-of-band interference)
because the marketplace may not independently encourage such
compatibility. In addressing those issues, however, the Commission
should be careful not to compromise or undermine the overall concept of
flexible use. Over time, the Commission could consider whether the
tightening of out-of-band emission limits in services would obviate the
need for allocations to be grouped.

## Periodic Review of Rules

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider adjusting its
regulations on a periodic basis to prevent rules that are calibrated to
older technologies from inhibiting access by newer, more efficient
technologies that develop over time. For instance, as discussed below,
it may be possible to adjust interference standards over time based on
technological advances. Public Workshop participants, as well as parties
that commented on the Public Notice, generally agreed that it would be
useful to set term limits on Commission rules so that the rules would be
revisited automatically on a periodic basis.

While the Task Force concludes that the Commission should subject
spectrum regulations to periodic re-evaluation, it is also important
that such reevaluation occur at sufficiently spaced intervals so as not
to undermine the stability of current spectrum users' business plans and
investment. The Task Force continues to believe that a level of
certainty regarding one's ability to continue to use spectrum, at least
for some foreseeable period, is an essential prerequisite to investment,
particularly in services requiring significant infrastructure
installation and lead time. Therefore, any periodic reevaluation of
rules, and any resulting implementation of new rules, should be on a
predetermined schedule, *e.g.,* every 5 to 10 years. Specific timetables
for review of rules need not be the same for all services, devices, and
spectrum bands, but can vary based on such factors as service provider
and customer investment requirements, apparent public expectations, and
anticipated speed of technological development. In addition, periodic
review of rules to accommodate new technologies should be distinguished
from the license renewal process, which focuses on licensee
qualifications and compliance with Commission rules. Thus, licensees in
bands that are subject to periodic review should nonetheless be entitled
to a strong renewal expectancy if they meet the renewal criteria set
forth in the Commission's rules.

## Enforcement

The Task Force believes that in order for the Commission to be able to
meet the increasingly complex spectrum management demands being
presented by the enormous growth in spectrum use, the Commission must
devote sufficient resources to monitoring spectrum use and enforcing the
spectrum management rules. The Task Force recommends that the Commission
undertake an examination of its field offices' and monitoring
facilities' needs and consider providing additional funding and
resources to accommodate the spectrum management proposals made in this
Report. In addition, the Commission should ensure that it has sufficient
resources to independently obtain critical spectrum management data for
decision makers and the ability to implement the proposals discussed in
this Report. In addition, the Commission may want to seek a review and
possible increase in its statutory forfeiture authority in order to
provide additional incentives for spectrum users to comply with the
Commission's rules.

#  {#section .unnumbered}

#  Interference Avoidance

## Interference Challenges[^35]

As the Commission considers how to provide opportunities for an
ever-increasing array of spectrum-based technologies and services, one
recurring and often thorny issue is how to protect users against harmful
interference.[^36] Ensuring adequate interference protection has been a
key responsibility of the Commission since inception and continues to be
one of its core functions. Section 303(f) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, directs the Commission to make regulations "it may
deem necessary to prevent interference between stations" as the public
interest requires. Sufficient interference protection is a necessary and
fundamental building block in any spectrum policy. Indeed, without
adequate interference management, new spectrum-based services could be
prematurely thwarted and, correspondingly, mature services might not be
able to reach their full potential.

Managing interference has always been challenging. Despite the fact that
the Commission has had extensive, and generally successful, experience
in managing interference issues, these issues have been increasing in
technical difficulty and prevalence due to the changing RF environment
generated by new devices and new technology. Interference management
requires more than determining the ways in which to engineer around
potential degradation to a radio signal. Rather, interference management
necessarily involves technical and economic tradeoffs. For example,
although requiring licensees to use more selective rather than more
sensitive receivers may improve interference management because such
receivers are less vulnerable to adjacent channel interference, it may
also increase the cost of the communications systems by requiring more
infrastructure.[^37]

This already challenging issue has become even more difficult as a
result of the increasingly intensive use of the radio spectrum. There
are now fewer and fewer opportunities to allocate unused spectrum for
new services and, correspondingly, fewer and fewer bands in which
interference is not a significant issue. Interference management has
become more difficult because of the greater density, mobility and
variability of RF emitters and because users have been granted increased
flexibility in their spectrum use. As a result, the complexity of
predictive interference models has increased dramatically. Whether a
user operates a fixed or mobile communications system affects the
technical variables required to assess interference. Many types of
mobile emitters have very low signal levels. Although the energy
radiated by a single emitter might not be likely to cause harm, the
cumulative emissions of secondary/unlicensed emitters and out-of-band
emissions of primary licensed emitters and emitter types (radio
telemetry, unlicensed devices, cell phones, etc.) could result in
interference and, thus, must be considered. Technological changes in a
communications system -- for example, the type of waveform used to
transmit a particular signal -- also affect assessments of interference.
As a result, comprehensive interference predictive analyses are not
always possible, calling into question the adequacy of the Commission's
current interference framework to manage increasingly congested RF
environments in the future.

Commenters and participants in the public workshop were divided on the
need for new definitions of what constitutes acceptable interference and
harmful interference. Some appreciated the flexibility attendant with
the Commission's current case-by-case approach. Others, frustrated by
what they see as the uncertainty associated with such an *ad hoc*
approach, advocate the adoption of more quantitative measures for
interference management. These parties contend, for example, that the
current definition of *harmful interference* is subjective and does not
reflect modern technology and communications markets. On balance, the
Task Force concludes that the current general definitions of
interference sufficiently address the broad operational and technical
characteristics of the many communications services contained in the
Commission's Rules. Rather, in lieu of suggesting that the Commission
change or refine its definitions related to interference management, the
Task Force believes that quantitative metrics can be used to augment and
clarify the application of existing definitions.

The Task Force believes that, although the Commission's rules and
processes for managing interference have historically been effective in
many bands, current interference management approaches and tools need to
be reexamined. As supported by the record and described in greater
detail in the report of the Interference Protection Working Group, the
rapidly changing technology and RF environment will challenge the
continued effectiveness of such current approaches as predictive
interference modeling, technology compatibility testing, and spectrum
use decisions based on a qualitative knowledge of the local environment.
Moreover, given the increasing flexibility in the types of
spectrum-based services and, correspondingly, more intensive use of the
radio spectrum, the Task Force believes that the Commission should
adopt, wherever feasible, a more quantitative approach to interference
management or quantitatively augment its existing rules. Quantitative
standards reflecting real-time spectrum use would provide users with
more certainty and, at the same time, would facilitate enforcement.

## Adopting Quantitative Standards: Interference Temperature

The Task Force recommends that, as a long-term strategy, the Commission
shift its current paradigm for assessing interference -- based on
transmitter operations -- toward operations using real-time adaptation
based on the actual RF environment through interactions between
transmitters and receivers. In general, it is the ability of a receiver
to select and receive a particular signal that determines whether the
signal has been degraded by interference. The environment in which the
receiver operates should be considered; *i.e.*, the total amount of
undesired power -- generated by other emitters and noise sources -- that
is present at the receiver. Thus, the Commission's rules should specify
a more accurate measure of interference that takes into account the
cumulative summation of all the undesired RF energy available to be
captured by a particular receiving antenna for delivery to the receiver.

To achieve this objective, as well as to transition interference
management to more accurate real-time measurements, the Task Force
recommends that the Commission adopt a new metric, "interference
temperature," to quantify and manage interference. The interference
temperature measures the RF power available at the receiving antenna per
unit bandwidth.[^38] Conceptually, as illustrated in Figure 1,
interference temperature

![](media/image2.wmf){width="5.995833333333334in"
height="2.9298611111111112in"}

**Figure 1**

measurements would be taken at various receiver locations to estimate
the real-time condition of the RF environment. The degree of certainty
of the estimate of the environment would depend on such factors as
transmitter signal ranges, uniformity of signal levels over an area, the
density of temperature measuring devices and the sharing of the data
taken by nearby devices; *e.g.,* through "*ad hoc* cooperative wireless
networks." Measuring devices could be designed with the option to
include or exclude the energy contributions of particular signals with
known characteristics; for example, the emissions of subscribers of
licensees assigned the spectrum on an exclusive basis in a particular
geographic area.

The Commission could use the interference temperature metric to
establish maximum permissible levels of interference, thus
characterizing the "worst case" environment in which a receiver would be
expected to operate. Different threshold levels could be set for each
band, geographic region or service, and these thresholds should be set
after the Commission has reviewed the condition of the RF environment in
each band. This review should include actual spectrum measurements of
the RF noise/interference floor. In addition to obtaining better data
regarding the noise floor, the Commission should adopt a standard
methodology for measuring the noise floor. Further, the Task Force
recommends that the Commission create a public/private partnership for a
long-term noise (interference temperature) monitoring network and for
the archiving of data, for use by the FCC and the public.

![](media/image3.wmf){width="5.799305555555556in"
height="2.4569444444444444in"}

**Figure 2**

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate significant benefits of capping the permitted
interference temperature. Figure 2 depicts a possible scenario resulting
from the current open ended nature of the RF noise floor. A
communications system has been designed to operate to a distance from
the transmitting antenna at which the signal strength approaches the
level of the noise floor that existed when the system was established.
Over time, the noise floor can rise unpredictably -- this due to
additional interfering signals, perhaps including out-of-band emissions
from new users and further aggregation of unlicensed devices. As a
result, signal coverage can be degraded without warning. Additional
interfering signals will progressively worsen coverage. Figure 3
modifies the scenario by placing an interference temperature cap over
the service area.

![](media/image4.wmf){width="5.793055555555555in"
height="2.7784722222222222in"}

**Figure 3**

The Task Force believes that two key benefits will result from the
application of the interference temperature metric: First, licensed
spectrum users will obtain certainty with regard to the maximum
permissible level of aggregated noise, or interference, in their band.
The interference temperature would quantify the level of acceptable
interference in a particular band. For example, any transmissions from
other sources that increase the noise level above the interference
temperature would be considered "harmful interference" in accordance
with Commission rules. Second, to the extent that the interference
temperature in a particular band is not reached, other users (*e.g.*,
unlicensed devices) could operate in the same band -- with the
interference temperature serving as the maximum cap on the potential RF
energy they could introduce in the band. This would thus increase access
to the band for other users or devices.

Interference temperature sensory and control mechanisms could be used to
maintain both in-band and out-of-band emissions within permissible
limits. For example, a low power unlicensed RF device could be designed
to scan its particular frequency band before transmitting. Its built-in
"thermometer" would record interference temperature data and compute the
appropriate statistical aggregate value. The device would then project
the increase in interference temperature due to its operation over its
nominal range. This value would be compared with the permissible limit.
If its operation would exceed the limit, the device's controller could
execute an appropriate response such as reducing power, switching to a
different transmit frequency (if available) or, perhaps, continuing the
scanning/sensing process to locate an opportune time to transmit. The
technology now exists to build such sensory control systems. Automated
transmitter power control, for instance, is used in certain types of
wireless and satellite communications systems. Cordless telephones also
adapt to the environment by selecting an unused frequency.

Interference temperature mechanisms would serve in conjunction with
existing out-of-band emissions on adjacent frequencies. In the future,
however, it is possible that interference temperature mechanisms could
serve as an alternative to out-of-band emissions limitations. Indeed,
depending on spectrum use characteristics and the severity of emission
limits, some users might find the temperature sensory control approach
to be more economical than expensive transmitter filtering. It could
also permit operation at higher power levels in areas or frequency bands
with low interference temperature levels.

In sum, where it could be applied, the interference temperature metric,
in conjunction with sensory control systems, could significantly enhance
interference management. Incumbents would be provided greater certainty
regarding the maximum permissible level of interference in their
particular bands. Interference temperature limits would also provide a
"worst case" characterization of the RF environment and, thus, establish
benchmarks for communications equipment and system designers; *i.e.*,
the limits could assist designers in balancing the numerous technical
and economic tradeoffs involved in radio system planning. Effective
enforcement of these interference temperature limits is also an
essential component of this concept, in order to ensure successful
interference management. Finally, continuous monitoring of the
interference temperature would enable the Commission to maintain current
data on the RF environment.

## Additional Methods of Interference Control

In addition to interference temperature, there are several other ways in
which the Commission can improve interference management. As noted
earlier, Commission regulations for controlling interference set forth
permissible technical operational parameters for transmitters. Receiver
robustness generally has not been taken into account in Commission
regulations. On those occasions when it has been necessary to consider
receiver quality, the Commission either applies a set of worst case
receiver parameters or uses general receiver characteristics for its
analyses.[^39] This transmitter-centric policy is not necessarily
efficient in today's spectrum environment.

Most parties support the need for the development of receiver standards
or guidelines, or, in the alternative, minimum receiver performance
requirements. Indeed, many of the parties asserted that, from a purely
technical standpoint, interference susceptibility, as well as increased
spectrum efficiency is highly dependent on the quality and selectivity
of the receiver used. Parties supporting receiver standards assert that
such standards would promote spectrum sharing and system
interoperability, and would provide common performance parameters that
all equipment manufacturers must achieve. A few opposing parties assert
that receiver standards could stifle innovation and could present
administrative and enforcement challenges. Even those parties opposing
receiver standards support, in varying degrees, the adoption of minimum
receiver performance requirements.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider applying receiver
performance requirements, either through incentives, regulatory
mandates, or some combination of incentives and mandates. The Task Force
generally prefers the use of voluntary receiver performance
requirements, over mandatory standards. Thus, while receivers could be
manufactured that do not meet the voluntary performance requirements,
the Commission would not protect users of such receivers against
interference resulting from failure to meet the performance
requirements. Voluntary receiver performance requirements could be
promoted through industry groups, or incentives could be developed for
the use of advanced receivers. Receiver performance requirements may be
particularly appropriate when the marketplace does not adequately
promote receiver performance (*e.g.,* when the service provider does not
control the manufacturing of the receivers). Receiver performance
requirements also may serve as a useful transition mechanism for
interference management until the Commission is able to implement
interference temperature thresholds for particular bands. While the Task
Force believes that the Commission currently has the requisite statutory
authority to promulgate receiver performance standards, it also
recommends that legislation more explicitly granting such authority be
enacted. Also, it would be useful to conduct a study to evaluate
receiver performance in the current RF environment.

With the coming advances in technology, the Task Force does not believe
that minimum receiver performance requirements would necessarily stifle
innovation. In the future it is expected that, to a considerable extent,
interference problems will be eliminated or adequately mitigated by
flexible software solutions built into the receiver; for example,
software-controlled filter responses. Further, it is likely that, in the
future, manufacturers will design receivers with a more reliable
expectation of the environment. On balance, the Task Force believes that
the potential benefits of minimum receiver tolerances -- whether through
Commission mandates or incentives -- outweigh the risk that such actions
could stifle innovation.

There are many other steps that the Task Force recommends that the
Commission should take to control interference. These include:

-   Promoting the increased use of automated transmitter power and
    frequency control -- such as the long-term sensory control
    mechanisms suggested in conjunction with the interference
    temperature metric and, in the near-term, increased use of automated
    transmitter power control that would adjust the power to match the
    amount that is actually needed to provide service; for example, in
    point-to-point microwave systems.

-   Promoting the use of advanced antenna technology and system design
    techniques that would enhance the uniformity of transmitted signal
    strength levels through a service area.

-   Consider the tightening of out-of-band emission limits over time, so
    that widely disparate uses of the spectrum can have less
    interference impact on each other.

-   Harmonizing the references to interference in the Commission's
    regulations:

    -   to ensure a consistent understanding of the impact of
        interference qualifiers such as *harmful*, and to remove or
        clarify undefined terms such as *objectionable;*

    -   to improve the consistency of technical terms and units related
        to interference management.

-   Developing technical bulletins that explain the Commission's
    interference rules for all radio services -- with web site access to
    not only a particular service's interference rules, but also with
    links to related information contained elsewhere in the Commission's
    rules.

-   Developing a "best practices" handbook -- a compendium of available
    information broadly relating to interference management, which could
    include, for example:

-   current industry guidelines for coordinating spectrum use;

-   steps that could be taken to resolve interference problems;

-   a discussion on how to best use FCC databases and related tools.

## Transition

As an additional interference management paradigm for the long-term, and
to augment current approaches, the Commission should pursue use of the
interference temperature metric, in conjunction with self-enforcing
sensory control mechanisms. The Commission should also consider
developing a program to test the concept on a limited basis. The Task
Force recognizes that there are hurdles that must be overcome before the
interference temperature metric could serve as a useful management tool.
Foremost among these is the need to acquire data on the RF noise floor
for different frequency bands and geographic regions. To that end, the
Task Force recommends that the Commission undertake a systematic study
of the RF noise floor.

Moreover, in addition to obtaining requisite data regarding the noise
floor, there are many factors that the Commission would need to consider
before setting an interference temperature for a particular band. Some
potential factors that may be considered are: (1) nature and extent of
incumbency; (2) the nature and types of the services (for example, the
criticality of services like public safety); (3) the susceptibility of
services and existing equipment to interference; (4) state of
development of technology; and (5) propagation characteristics.

In the near term, the Commission should consider establishing receiver
performance requirements to supplement its transmitter-centric
interference management approaches. Use of modern receiver filtering and
related digital system processing techniques could enhance interference
management in the near-term, while the interference temperature concepts
are being developed. Receiver improvements could also facilitate
interference mitigation and more efficient spectrum use in situations in
which the interference temperature approach would be inapplicable;
*e.g.,* as a safeguard against "blanketing" interference.[^40] The Task
Force recommends that the Commission pursue receiver performance issues
in a *Notice of Inquiry*.

#  {#section-1 .unnumbered}

#  {#section-2 .unnumbered}

# Spectrum Usage Models 

## Comparison of Alternative Spectrum Usage Models

The Task Force examined the Commission's spectrum policies and rules in
relation to three general models for assigning spectrum usage rights:

-   ["Command-and-control" model.]{.underline} The traditional process
    of spectrum management in the United States, currently used for most
    spectrum within the Commission's jurisdiction, allocates and assigns
    frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific
    government-defined uses. Service rules for the band specify
    eligibility and service restrictions, power limits, build-out
    requirements, and other rules.

-   ["Exclusive use" model.]{.underline} A licensing model in which a
    licensee has exclusive and transferable rights to the use of
    specified spectrum within a defined geographic area, with flexible
    use rights that are governed primarily by technical rules to protect
    spectrum users against interference. Under this model, exclusive
    rights resemble property rights in spectrum, but this model does not
    imply or require creation of "full" private property rights in
    spectrum.

-   ["Commons" or "open access" model.]{.underline} Allows unlimited
    numbers of unlicensed users to share frequencies, with usage rights
    that are governed by technical standards or etiquettes but with no
    right to protection from interference. Spectrum is available to all
    users that comply with established technical "etiquettes" or
    standards that set power limits and other criteria for operation of
    unlicensed devices to mitigate potential interference.

There is, of course, some overlap among these models as well as
variations that combine elements of each. For example, spectrum users
that are regulated on a command-and-control basis may have some of the
same rights as spectrum users who are subject to the exclusive use model
(*e.g.,* exclusive and transferable rights, interference protection).
Moreover, spectrum that is subject to the exclusive use or commons model
may nonetheless be subject to some degree of command-and-control
restriction (*e.g.,* limiting usage based on international allocation
restrictions). Nonetheless, the key distinction between the
command-and-control approach and the other two models is that the former
typically imposes significantly greater usage restrictions on spectrum
(and sometimes on the eligibility of spectrum users), thereby
restricting flexibility of spectrum use to a far greater degree than
either of the other two models.

Commenters and participants in the workshops generally criticized the
costs and inefficiencies imposed on spectrum users and the public by
command-and-control regulation, and argued that these costs could be
substantially reduced by moving from command-and-control regulation to
more flexible, market-oriented approaches, whether under an exclusive
use model, a commons model, or a combination of the two. Some
commenters, however, argued in favor of retaining a command-and-control
approach for certain services (*e.g.,* public safety) on the grounds
that exclusive reliance on market-based spectrum usage models would
undervalue or thwart the provision of such services. Moreover, while
most commenters and workshop participants favored expanded application
of flexible, market-oriented spectrum policies, there was a significant
split between those who favored an exclusive use approach and those who
favored a commons approach.

Commenters who favored the exclusive use model argued that it promotes
economic efficiency because its key characteristics -- clearly defined
rights, exclusivity, flexibility, and transferability -- are necessary
for efficiently allocating any scarce resource among competing uses.
They also argued that without exclusive rights and interference
protection, spectrum users would face uncertainty and would lack the
incentive to invest in new technologies or services. These parties also
tended to express skepticism regarding the commons approach, contending
that a spectrum commons would result in overuse, interference, and
underinvestment.

Supporters of the commons model argued that this approach leads to
greater technological innovation and spectrum efficiency than an
exclusive use approach. Because no spectrum is exclusively held,
spectrum commons users have incentive to create spectrally efficient
frequency-hopping technologies, whereas licensed spectrum typically sits
idle when the license-holder is not transmitting. Furthermore,
proponents of an open, commons approach claimed that spectrum scarcity
might actually be reduced under such a regime because of the
efficiency-enhancing possibilities and fundamentally different spectrum
demands of new system architectures such as mesh networks. Commenters
also contended that even in spectrum that was otherwise subject to an
exclusive use approach, a commons approach should be used to create
"underlay" rights for low-power, non-interfering devices.

Despite this split, most commenters and workshop participants supported
the proposition that in spectrum policy, "one size does not fit all,"
and that the Commission should therefore strike a balance between the
exclusive rights and the commons models. For example, many commenters
suggested that granting flexible exclusive use rights to spectrum users
did not preclude the Commission from imposing some regulatory
limitations on use, analogous to zoning restrictions that are placed on
property owners by local governments. Other commenters argued that
unlicensed spectrum should not be seen as a complete replacement for
licensed spectrum, but that some spectrum should be set aside for
unlicensed use in the same manner than some land is set aside for public
parks.

The Task Force agrees with the consensus view expressed by participants
in this process that "one size does not fit all" in spectrum policy. An
examination of the exclusive use and commons models as they have been
applied to date suggests that each model has encouraged different
equally beneficial types of technical and economic efficiencies. In
broadband PCS, for example, licensees have developed centrally managed
wireless networks that cover large geographic areas and accommodate
large numbers of mobile customers. The licensing of multiple users has
also led to significant competitive benefits in the CMRS market. More
recently, the designation of bands for open access by Part 15 devices
has fostered the emergence of "smart" low power devices that can support
sophisticated applications such as peer-to-peer networking. This has
resulted in a significant surge of economic investment in these services
or devices use over the last several years.

The Task Force therefore recommends that the Commission base its
spectrum policy on a balance of the three basic spectrum rights models
outlined above: an exclusive use approach, a commons approach, and (to a
more limited degree) a command-and-control approach. It is further
recommended that the Commission fundamentally alter the existing balance
among these models -- which is dominated by legacy command-and-control
regulation -- by expanding the use of both the exclusive use and commons
models throughout the radio spectrum, and limiting the use of the
command-and-control model to those instances where there are compelling
public policy reasons. Thus, to the extent feasible, the Commission
should identify more spectrum for both licensed and unlicensed uses
under flexible rules, and should transition existing spectrum that is
subject to more restrictive command-and-control regulation to these
models to the greatest extent possible, as discussed in Section D below.

In proposing to reshape the balance among the three models, the Task
Force recognizes that the models themselves are not pure and mutually
exclusive approaches to spectrum management, but rather are
representative approaches on a broader continuum that may be subject to
variation in particular instances. Thus, for any given spectrum band or
proposed use, the Commission may find it beneficial to incorporate
elements from more than one model. For example, as discussed further
below, spectrum that is licensed under an exclusive use approach could
also be subject to an "underlay" easement that is available to low-power
unlicensed devices using a commons approach. Similarly, services that
require some dedication of spectrum on a command-and-control basis
(*e.g.,* public safety) may benefit from partial application of the
exclusive-use model to enable them to lease spectrum capacity to others
when it is not otherwise needed. As a general matter, however, the Task
Force believes that there is considerable room to move from the largely
*ad hoc* regulation of particular bands that has evolved historically to
a more consistent and comprehensive application of these models across
the radio spectrum as a whole. If these models are consistently applied
in all Commission spectrum policy decisions, it has the potential to
significantly reduce the artificial scarcity of spectrum that currently
exists as a result of barriers to access. This approach will have the
beneficial effect of reducing the cost of obtaining exclusive spectrum
rights in the market and will also help to alleviate congestion of
spectrum that is made available on a commons basis, thus mitigating the
risk of the "tragedy of the commons" -- oversaturation resulting in
inefficient use.

## Application of Exclusive Use and Commons Models 

The recommendation to move towards greater reliance on exclusive use and
commons models requires that the Commission determine the appropriate
balance between these two models. Ultimately, wherever there are
competing uses for a resource -- that is, wherever there is scarcity --
some mechanism must exist for allocating that resource. A mechanism
based on markets, such as an exclusive use model, will be most efficient
in most cases. However, government may also wish to promote the
important efficiency and innovation benefits of a spectrum commons by
allocating spectrum bands for shared use, much as it allocates land to
public parks.

There are a number of variables that may be relevant to this
determination with respect to any particular band, but the Task Force
believes that the key factors to be considered are (1) spectrum
scarcity, and (2) transaction costs associated with moving spectrum from
less efficient to more efficient use. In this context, "spectrum
scarcity" means the degree to which particular spectrum is subject to
competing demands for use so that the demand exceeds the current supply;
and "transaction costs" means the expenditure of time and resources
required for a potential spectrum user to obtain the spectrum access
rights from one or many parties necessary to its proposed spectrum use.

### Factors Favoring Exclusive Use Model

The exclusive use model should be applied to most spectrum, particularly
in bands where scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs
associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively
low. The exclusive use model is appropriate because where spectrum is
subject to competing demands, and therefore more likely to have a high
market value, this approach creates the strongest incentives for parties
to put spectrum to its highest valued use. In addition, where rights and
responsibilities are clearly defined and effectively enforced, the
characteristics of this model -- *e.g.*, exclusivity, flexibility, and
transferability -- generally provide a clear framework for market-based
assignment and negotiation of access rights among spectrum users,
thereby limiting transaction costs.

These variables suggest that in the lower portion of the radio spectrum,
particularly bands below 5 GHz, the Commission should focus primarily,
though not exclusively, on using the exclusive use model. The
propagation characteristics in this portion of the spectrum (which can
support a wide variety of high- and low-power, fixed and mobile uses),
combined with the high level of incumbent use (including government as
well as non-government uses), result in a large number of competing
demands for a relatively small amount of available spectrum. These
factors tend to weigh in favor of an exclusive use approach with
flexible rules because it provides a mechanism for spectrum users to
choose among the full range of technically feasible spectrum use options
based on market forces. Moreover, the typical transaction costs
associated with negotiation of access rights tend to be relatively low
in relation to the value of this spectrum.

Even in situations where usable spectrum is scarce but transaction costs
are potentially high, the exclusive use model still may be most
appropriate, though other variables may also come into play. The
presence of high transaction costs means that some transfers of spectrum
will not occur, and some valuable uses therefore will not appear in the
market. However, wherever scarcity exists, there will be competing
claims to the resource, and the exclusive use model is most effective at
balancing these competing claims. Moreover, the greater the scarcity,
the greater will be the incentive for parties to find ways to overcome
these high transaction costs. In contrast, as discussed below, a commons
approach may be less effective in cases of high scarcity, despite its
advantages in addressing high transaction costs.

Finally, while these factors weigh in favor of applying the exclusive
use model under the above-described circumstances, it should be
emphasized that they do not preclude the introduction of unlicensed
"underlays" into exclusive use bands. As discussed below, the criteria
that favor use of the commons model apply to potential underlay uses of
spectrum below the interference temperature threshold, and may apply in
some cases to opportunistic uses above the threshold, depending on the
nature of the proposed use.

### Factors Favoring Commons Model 

The commons model should be applied to significant portions of the
spectrum, particularly in bands where scarcity is low and transaction
costs associated with market mechanisms are high. The commons approach
makes increased access possible by replacing the negotiation of spectrum
access rights among rights holders and prospective users with a commons
model governed by user protocols and etiquette. These protocols promote
efficiency through spectrum sharing, typically by requiring commons to
operate at low power for a short time in limited areas, which allows
multiple users to operate on the same spectrum. This approach also
promotes technological innovation by providing a spectrum environment in
which to develop new technologies. Users do not pay for access to the
spectrum, so they will channel their investment exclusively into
developing robust technology that can function in this environment and
continue to function as the environment grows more congested.

Where both spectrum scarcity and transaction costs are low, the commons
model again may be the most appropriate, though this situation is less
clear. Under these circumstances, the presence of low transaction costs
would add to the efficiency-creating characteristics of the commons. On
the other hand, it also is possible that the exclusive use model would
provide comparable benefits, as the price will be close to zero if
spectrum is abundant. With low transaction costs as well as low price,
interested users should have unrestricted access to the spectrum they
need.

The variables described above tend to tilt in favor of expanded use of
the commons model in higher spectrum bands, particularly above 50 GHz,
based on the physical characteristics of the spectrum itself. In these
bands, the propagation characteristics of spectrum preclude many of the
applications that are possible in lower bands (*e.g.,* mobile service,
broadcasting), and instead favor short-distance line-of-sight operation
using narrow transmission beams. Thus, these bands are well-suited to
accommodate multiple devices operating within a small area without
interference. Moreover, administering these uses on an individualized
licensed basis would involve very high transaction costs.

The Task Force does not advocate the wholesale conversion of all
spectrum to a commons approach as some commenters appear to advocate.
Although the commons model is in many ways a highly deregulatory
"Darwinian" approach, as its proponents point out, productive use of
spectrum commons by unlicensed devices, particularly in lower spectrum
bands, typically requires significant regulatory limitations on device
transmitter power that preclude many other technically and economically
feasible spectrum uses that rely on higher-power signal propagation over
longer distances, or that require greater protection from interference.
In addition, some commons proponents themselves state that setting aside
additional spectrum for use on a commons basis is not essential to the
continued success of unlicensed technology because the technological
capability exists to prevent congestion from occurring in existing
unlicensed bands.

This does not, however, mean that only higher band spectrum should be
subject to a commons approach. The record shows that the Commission's
dedication of some lower band spectrum to unlicensed uses, *e.g.,* 2.4
GHz, is yielding significant technological and economic benefits in the
form of low-power short-distance communications and emerging mesh
network technologies that should be further encouraged. The Task Force
therefore recommends that the commons model continue to be applied
selectively to other lower spectrum bands.

In addition, the commons approach has potential applicability in the
creation of underlay rights across the entire range of spectrum for
low-power, low-impact devices. To the extent that the Commission
establishes "interference temperature" rules for particular bands, as
discussed in Section VI above, the spectrum environment that is created
below the temperature threshold has the characteristics that weigh most
heavily in favor of the commons approach: low scarcity due to technical
restrictions on the power and operating range of devices and high
transaction costs associated with negotiating access. Therefore, the
commons approach should presumptively be used for operations below the
interference temperature threshold. In addition, the commons model may
be appropriate for some opportunistic, non-interfering uses of
exclusively licensed spectrum above the interference temperature
threshold, although this approach raises more significant challenges.
These issues are presented in greater detail in Section VIII.B., below,
in the discussion of secondary markets and government-granted easements.

An important caveat must accompany any recommendation for a commons
model: although there are indications that technology can go a long way
to forestall scarcity concerns, if scarcity eventually does arise in
particular spectrum bands in the future, then the commons model may need
to evolve to address the problem. Because there is no price mechanism in
the commons model to use as a tool for allocating scarce resources among
competing users, there is always the risk that free access will
eventually lead to interference and over-saturation, *i.e.,* the
"tragedy of the commons." These problems can be overcome to some extent
through regulatory guidance, requirements such as power and emission
limits, and sharing etiquettes. But if actual spectrum scarcity still
occurs, rights may need to be redefined and market mechanisms (*e.g.,*
band managers) introduced because without them there are insufficient
incentives to avoid overuse.

## Limited Use of Command and Control 

The command-and-control model should be applied only in situations where
prescribing spectrum use by regulation is necessary to accomplish
important public interest objectives or to conform to treaty
obligations. With respect to the command-and-control model, as noted
above, the Task Force recognizes that continued use of this approach may
be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by regulation
is necessary to accomplish compelling public interest objectives.
However, such objectives should be carefully defined, and the amount of
spectrum subject to a command-and-control regime should be limited to
that which ensures that those objectives are achieved. Many spectrum
users will claim that they warrant special consideration and thus
deserve exemption from any reform of their service allocation rules. It
is therefore critical to distinguish between special interest and the
public interest, establishing a high bar for any service to clear prior
to receiving an exemption.

In general, command-and-control regulation should be reserved only for
spectrum uses that provide clear, non-market public interest benefits or
that require regulatory prescription to avoid market failure. For
example, radioastronomy may need to have dedicated, protected spectrum
bands for the foreseeable future, due to its highly sensitive
applications and the fact that its benefits accrue to society as a whole
and only over the long run. Public safety and critical infrastructure
may also require dedicated spectrum at particular times to ensure
priority access for emergency communications. Other areas where limited
use of command-and-control may be justified include
international/satellite, public safety, and broadcasting, which are
discussed in greater detail below.

Subject to these exceptions, the Commission should eschew
command-and-control regulation, and legacy command-and-control bands
should be transitioned to more flexible rules and uses to the maximum
extent possible (whether under the exclusive rights or the commons
model). The Task Force's recommendations with respect to transition
mechanisms are discussed in greater detail in Section D, below.

### International and Satellite Issues 

A number of commenters stressed that the United States should make a
better effort to harmonize its spectrum management policies and
allocations with those of the rest of the world, when possible. To the
extent domestic policies and allocations complement international
decisions, U.S. consumers and businesses will reap important benefits
such as more international roaming and better economies of scale with
regard to equipment manufacturing. These commenters also pointed out
that while the satellite, maritime, aeronautical, public safety and
radioastronomy services have long required and benefited from extensive
international coordination, terrestrial services like third generation
wireless and radio local area network (*e.g.,* Wi-Fi) services are also
becoming increasingly ubiquitous requiring the same level of
international coordination.

Other parties commented on the importance of the Commission considering
how spectrum-based services and devices using spectrum that has
international treaty implications are affected by spectrum use models,
often reducing the amount of flexibility available to users
domestically. It was stated, for example, that the Commission should
take account of the effect that interference caused by licensees
offering newly flexible services would have on existing cross-border
interference agreements with Canada and Mexico. The Task Force also
noted that spectrum used for satellite services typically requires
extensive international and global coordination under the International
Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations, inherently limiting a
licensee's flexibility. Commenters asserted that a broader regional
perspective on spectrum management by the Commission could speed
deployment of services to U.S. consumers by resolving cross-border
coordination and regional policy issues earlier.

The Task Force also noted that in the Open-Market Reorganization for the
Betterment of International Telecommunications Act of 2000 (ORBIT Act),
the Congress passed legislation excluding spectrum used for
international and global satellite services from assignment through
auctions. In order to provide more flexibility in allocating and
licensing spectrum used for satellite services, the Task Force
recommends that the Commission consider a statutory proposal for
Congress that would assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act
to consider permitting, but not requiring, the Commission to utilize
competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive applications for
global and international satellite services.

*Conclusions/recommendations.* International considerations must be
taken into account in two ways:

-   First, because regional and world wide harmonization of band use can
    have significant advantages both in terms of truly ubiquitous
    services and economies of scale, in developing domestic spectrum
    policies and allocations, the Commission should consider the
    potential impact on international objectives, among other
    objectives.

-   Second, U.S. consumers could benefit from improved (*i.e.,* quicker
    and more flexible) spectrum management coordination with the United
    States' regional neighbors, especially Canada and Mexico.

-   In addition, the Commission should assess and re-examine Section 647
    of the Orbit Act to consider permitting, [but not
    requiring]{.underline}, the Commission to utilize competitive
    bidding to resolve mutually exclusive applications for global and
    international satellite services.

### Public Safety 

The Task Force sought information regarding what spectrum use models the
Commission should employ to ensure public safety access to spectrum.
Most commenters and workshop participants who addressed this issue
agreed that there are some important differences between the spectrum
needs of commercial systems, which require high system capacity to
support large numbers of users and applications, and those of public
safety systems, which require less average capacity but need very robust
and reliable communications, particularly for emergencies. Public safety
spectrum users also typically have different funding mechanisms, are
inherently more budget-constrained, and have longer equipment
replacement cycles than commercial users.

But commenters and workshop participants also suggested that changes in
spectrum policy could encourage greater efficiency on the part of public
safety providers. For example, some public safety agencies indicated
that they are becoming more innovative through creative licensing
schemes, such as forming partnerships between state and local agencies
and utilities and federal agencies. By sharing costs and spectrum with
others, public safety entities have the potential to obtain more
technologically advanced wide-area systems than they could afford on
their own.

Some spectrum should continue to be dedicated on a command-and-control
basis for public safety use. In light of the above considerations, the
Task Force recommends that spectrum currently set aside for public
safety use remain subject to the command-and-control model. Eventually,
if the cost of spectrum is driven down by enhancing access and reducing
scarcity, it is possible that public safety users could acquire spectrum
in the market on the same basis as non-public safety users, but these
conditions do not exist currently and should not form the basis for
meeting the core spectrum needs of public safety entities.

At the same time, there is considerable potential for introduction of
market-oriented policies that would help rather than burden public
safety, and that would allow for more efficient use of spectrum to meet
both public safety and commercial spectrum needs. The Commission
therefore should explore mechanisms for meeting public safety needs
other than through dedication of spectrum on a command-and-control
basis.

Public safety users should have flexibility to lease their dedicated
spectrum capacity that is available during lower-use periods to
commercial users with a "take-back" mechanism when public safety use
increases. Public safety spectrum use is typically highly variable, with
periods of low traffic and occasional usage "spikes" during certain
times of the day or week or during emergencies. Accordingly, there is
benefit to be gained from permitting public safety entities to lease
some of their spectrum capacity to commercial users during low-use
periods, under an arrangement whereby the spectrum can be reclaimed
immediately when needed for public safety use. The potential for this
type of shared use will increase as smart transmitters and receivers are
developed that can be shut down immediately upon command.

![](media/image5.wmf){width="5.993055555555555in" height="2.96875in"}

**Figure 4**

For major regional or national emergencies, additional public safety
spectrum needs could be addressed through enhanced easement rights to
non-public safety spectrum. In extraordinary national or regional
emergencies (*e.g.,* terrorist attack, major natural disaster), public
safety providers may require priority access to spectrum resources
significantly beyond the amount of spectrum required to handle their
normal emergency workload. Because of the extraordinary nature of these
events, permanent dedication of spectrum to public safety to meet these
contingencies is likely to be highly inefficient. An alternative would
be to address these needs through an easement mechanism that would
enable public safety users to operate on non-public safety spectrum in
such extraordinary emergencies, but to revert to operations on public
safety dedicated spectrum when the emergency subsided. *See* Figure 4.

### Broadcasting 

The Commission has traditionally allocated spectrum specifically for
broadcast use, based on statutory public interest considerations and the
free over-the-air nature of broadcast service. Many commenters argue
that these characteristics distinguish broadcasting from other
market-based uses of spectrum, and that the Commission should therefore
continue to dedicate some spectrum specifically for broadcast use on a
command-and-control basis. Other commenters contend that the continued
dedication of spectrum for broadcasting, and particularly for commercial
broadcasting, is increasingly anachronistic as the public gains access
to alternative sources of programming and information from cable
television, satellite services, the Internet, and other outlets.

The Task Force concludes that for the time being, there are valid
reasons to continue applying the "command-and-control" model to existing
broadcast spectrum. Broadcast service is traditionally not
subscriber-based; rather, it provides "universal" news, information, and
entertainment services to the general public. As such, broadcasting has
consistently been a central focus of Congress and the Communications
Act, which regulates broadcast content and behavior by placing certain
public interest obligations on broadcast licensees.[^41] In addition,
localism and diversity of ownership are two important public interest
objectives that have been associated with broadcasting to a greater
degree than other spectrum uses. Finally, the broadcaster's relative
lack of control over receiver equipment affects the rapidity with which
technological advances can be introduced into the marketplace and
assimilated by consumers -- a factor that has complicated the DTV
transition.

The transition of broadcast to a digital world, which is already under
way, should help to increase the efficiency and flexibility in use of
broadcast spectrum. As broadcasters convert to digital, some broadcast
spectrum can be recovered for reallocation and reassignment to more
flexible uses, as in the case of the 700 MHz band. The Commission has
also allowed for some flexible use of broadcast spectrum,[^42] and
should consider additional ways to allow greater flexibility consistent
with broadcasters continuing to meet their core public interest
responsibilities. In addition, the Commission can take steps to make
"white space" in the broadcast bands available for other uses.

Over the longer term, the Commission should periodically reevaluate its
broadcast spectrum policies to determine whether they remain necessary
to accomplish the public interest objectives they are intended to
promote. In particular, such reevaluation should consider the extent to
which the public interest benefits provided by dedication of spectrum to
broadcasting under a command-and-control regime can be provided through
the application of more flexible, market-oriented spectrum policies. It
is likely that there will be a continued need to set aside some spectrum
for non-market based broadcast uses, such as non-commercial and
educational broadcasting. Assuming that technological advances continue
to occur and that scarcity of access to spectrum resources decreases,
however, it is equally likely that the continued application of
command-and-control policies to commercial broadcasting spectrum could
be substantially relaxed, or may not be needed at all, to ensure the
public availability from multiple sources, including alternative
technologies, of the types of information and programming that
commercial broadcasters provide.

## Transition Issues 

As discussed above, this report recommends that the Commission move
towards assigning flexible usage rights in spectrum within its
jurisdiction, whether under an exclusive rights or a commons model.
However, the practical reality is that most spectrum within the
Commission's jurisdiction is already occupied by incumbent spectrum
users. Moreover, most of these incumbents are governed by legacy
command-and-control regulations that substantially limit allowable uses
of the spectrum. Therefore, successful implementation of the
recommendations in this report requires the Commission to consider how
to migrate away from restrictive legacy licensing regimes to more
flexible rights models that create opportunities for new, more efficient
and beneficial uses. Specifically, the Commission must determine which
bands should be transitioned to expanded flexible rights models and how
the transition should be accomplished.

### General Transition Considerations

In determining whether and how to transition legacy command-and-control
bands to more flexible rights models, the Commission should focus first
on initiating transition in those bands where additional flexibility
will provide the greatest benefits at the least cost. In general, the
greatest benefits will be realized in those bands in which the current
regulatory regime has led to significant underutilization or inefficient
use of the spectrum. However, the Commission must also weigh the
potential cost of transition, both in terms of its impact on incumbents
and on the public.

Assessing these potential costs and benefits, the Task Force notes that
there are some bands where the Commission has already taken steps to
implement a flexible rights approach. These include exclusive-use bands
that are already licensed under flexible use rules or are allocated for
such use (*e.g.,* broadband PCS), and bands that are dedicated for use
by Part 15 unlicensed devices (*e.g.,* 2.4 GHz). Because many of the
benefits of flexibility have already been realized in these bands, and
spectrum uses have developed accordingly, there is not a significant
need for fundamental regulatory changes in these bands in the near term.
However, to the extent that the Commission enhances flexibility in the
long-term as recommended in this report, such changes are potentially
applicable to these bands and would likely not impose significant costs
in light of the regulatory steps the Commission has already taken.

The Task Force also does not recommend fundamental regulatory changes in
the near term with respect to spectrum that is currently dedicated for
public safety use, or with respect to currently allocated broadcast
spectrum. In the case of public safety, attempting a sweeping transition
of existing public safety spectrum to an exclusive use or commons model
could be highly costly and disruptive to existing public safety uses,
and does not appear to offer countervailing public interest benefits.
Nevertheless, the Task Force does recommend consideration of measures
discussed above to empower public safety users to make their existing
spectrum available for other uses when it is not in use for public
safety purposes. In the case of broadcasting, evolution towards greater
flexibility is governed for the time being by the statutorily-mandated
DTV transition process, making additional regulatory changes impractical
at least until that process is complete.

Implementing a transition may also be difficult in spectrum bands that
are currently shared with the federal government, because the Commission
cannot regulate federal spectrum uses, and the presence of federal users
in such bands may limit the benefits of any flexibility that would be
afforded to non-federal spectrum users. However, the Task Force
recommends consideration of these bands for transition purposes to the
extent that transition would be beneficial, and recommends that the
Commission work with NTIA to consider alternatives for introducing
greater flexibility and efficiency into federal government uses of
spectrum.

In bands that fall outside these categories, the Task Force recommends
that the Commission initiate proceedings to begin the transition of its
spectrum regulations to allow more flexible uses. Moreover, in the long
term, the Commission should consider transitioning to a flexible rights
model in all bands throughout the spectrum where such action would
further the Commission's spectrum policy goals.

### Available Transition Mechanisms

Once the Commission identifies particular bands that are suitable for
transition, it will need to identify appropriate transition mechanisms.
Historically, the Commission has used a number of different transitional
mechanisms to move spectrum from narrowly-defined legacy uses to more
flexible new uses. In addition, other mechanisms that have not
previously been used are also available. Generally, the core issue for
all of these transition mechanisms is the treatment of incumbents: Do
they remain in the band or are they cleared or relocated? If incumbents
are cleared or relocated out of the band, what mechanisms are used? If
incumbents remain in the band, does the Commission grant them expanded
rights outright or does it use a new licensing vehicle to award expanded
rights?

Transition options generally fall into the following categories, though
variations and combinations of each are also possible: (1) reallocating
a particular band to the flexible rights model, with assignment of the
expanded rights to new licensees and the mandatory relocation of
incumbents to other bands; (2) allowing incumbents to remain as
licensees for those portions in a band that they currently occupy, while
assigning "overlay" licenses for additional rights and/or unoccupied
"white space" not assigned to incumbents; (3) reallocating and assigning
spectrum to new licensees under the flexible rights model, and using
voluntary market-based band-restructuring incentives, such as a
two-sided auction, to encourage incumbents to clear or restructure the
band; or (4) granting expanded, flexible rights to the incumbent
licensees already occupying the band. Each of these options is discussed
in general below.

#### Expanded rights "overlay" licenses combined with mandatory relocation of incumbents

Under this option, the Commission reallocates a particular band of
spectrum to allow for more flexible uses, grants the expanded usage
rights under new licenses (generally via auctions) and requires
incumbent licensees and the services they provide to clear the band and
either cease operating or relocate to other bands. The Commission has
used this option in several instances, including broadband PCS.

There are several variations of this option, depending on the conditions
that must be met in order for mandatory relocation of incumbents to
occur. Under one approach (which was used for broadband PCS), new
spectrum licenses are issued under flexible rules while incumbents are
required to clear, relocate, or retune to alternative bands by a
specified date. In addition, the new licensees may be required to pay
the costs of relocating incumbents. Under a more conditional approach
(which was adopted for 700 MHz DTV spectrum), incumbents are required to
clear or relocate only if and when certain external conditions are met,
such that there is no fixed time frame for clearing and relocation.
Under this approach, while new licensees are not required to pay the
costs of clearing and relocating incumbents, they may pay for voluntary
early clearing by incumbents.

#### Expanded rights "overlay" licenses combined with grandfathering of incumbents

Under this option, the Commission grants expanded usage rights under new
licenses, which are "overlaid" on top of the incumbent licenses.
Incumbents retain their existing rights (including interference and
renewal rights) on a grandfathered basis, and are not subject to
mandatory band-clearing or relocation.

The overlay option has been used in services such as paging and SMR
where the Commission is converting from site-based to geographic-area
licensing, there is unlicensed "white space" (geographic areas where
incumbents are not currently authorized), and incumbent and potential
new uses are generally compatible. Under this option, incumbents can
only acquire expanded rights, including the ability to expand their
systems beyond their existing site-based contours, by obtaining overlay
licenses. Alternatively, new overlay licensees must protect incumbents'
existing systems unless they buy the incumbents out.

#### Expanded rights "overlay" licenses combined with voluntary band-clearing/restructuring incentives for incumbents

Under this option, the Commission reallocates restricted spectrum to
more flexible use, grants the expanded usage rights under new licenses,
and establishes a simultaneous market-based exchange mechanism to
encourage voluntary band-clearing or restructuring of the band by
incumbents. This mechanism is designed to create incentives for
incumbents either to relinquish their licenses and clear the band for
new users or to exchange their restricted-use licenses for the expanded
rights available under the new license.

The Commission has not employed this option to date, but a number of
potential mechanisms have been proposed that could facilitate this type
of exchange. For instance, one mechanism that has been suggested is a
"two-sided" auction, in which the Commission would auction expanded
usage rights to spectrum under new licenses, and incumbents would
voluntarily make their spectrum rights in the band available for auction
at the same time. Under this approach, incumbents would be eligible to
participate in the auction for expanded rights only if they offered
their own spectrum licenses for sale in the same auction. Moreover,
incumbents would be allowed to "bid" on their own spectrum in addition
to spectrum offered by other incumbents and by the FCC. Incumbents who
chose not to offer their licenses would retain their incumbent rights,
but would not be granted expanded rights. This mechanism provides
several incentives to incumbents to offer their spectrum rights for
possible exchange. First, if incumbents voluntarily participate, they
would immediately have their licenses converted to expanded flexible
rights licenses, thus increasing the value of their spectrum usage
rights. In addition, incumbents would not be forced to sell their
spectrum usage rights to others, although they would face the
opportunity cost of not doing so. Finally, incumbents would be able to
keep any proceeds from the sale of their rights to others, and could, as
well, potentially obtain rights to relocate to other parts of the
auctioned band (or other bands altogether) that might be more
advantageous to them.

#### Expanded rights granted to incumbent licensees under existing licenses

Under this option, the Commission grants expanded flexible rights
directly to incumbents through modification of their existing licenses.
Potential new entrants are not able to bid for or otherwise obtain these
expanded rights, except by acquiring the licenses from incumbents
through the secondary market. This option has been used by the
Commission in several bands. For example, in the CMRS Flexibility
proceeding, the Commission granted CMRS providers the right to provide
fixed in addition to mobile services under their existing licenses.

### Factors Affecting the Choice of Transition Mechanism

The Commission must consider a number of factors when deciding which
transition mechanisms to implement. These factors may vary significantly
from band to band, suggesting possible advantages to taking different
approaches in different bands.

Major factors in the Commission's evaluation of options include:

-   The restrictive nature of licensee rights currently afforded
    incumbents in the band when compared with the flexibility that would
    be gained by transitioning to an expanded flexible rights model;

-   The types of services currently offered in the band and the
    potential consumer impact of transitioning to an expanded flexible
    rights model of licensing;

-   The number of incumbents in the band;

-   The likelihood that expanded flexibility would lead to rapid changes
    in the use of the band or instead would have only a gradual impact
    on existing systems and uses;

-   The practical effect on incumbent systems of providing expanded
    flexibility under a new licensing model (*e.g.,* the potential for
    new users to co-exist in the band with incumbents);

-   The nature and extent of investments made by incumbents in their
    acquisition of licenses and the building of systems, including
    whether incumbents have had the opportunity to recoup their
    investments; and

-   The time and transaction costs associated with developing and
    implementing any particular transition mechanism in a particular
    band or bands, compared to other transition mechanisms.

[New overlay licensing with mandatory relocation.]{.underline} As a
preliminary matter, consideration of this option depends on the
availability of alternative spectrum that would be suitable for use by
incumbent licensees required to relocate. Assuming that alternative
spectrum is available, this option may be preferred in cases where
band-clearing is likely to be critical because of the technical
incompatibility between existing uses by incumbents and prospective
uses. However, it is important that the benefits to be obtained through
mandatory band-clearing outweigh the costs and time required to complete
the relocation of incumbents, and that the relocation be consistent with
the Commission's broader spectrum goals for the relocation band.

In order to ensure maximum efficiency gains in the near term and avoid
holdout problems, it is preferable under this option for there to be a
fixed timetable for mandatory relocation. Furthermore, this option is
likely to work best when there are market incentives for new licensees
and incumbents to negotiate voluntary relocation agreements, although it
may also be appropriate to develop mandatory compensation mechanisms in
the event that the voluntary ones prove inadequate.

[New overlay licensing with incumbent grandfathering.]{.underline} The
"overlay option" generally requires the presence of a significant amount
of unlicensed "white space" that would lend itself to an overlay
licensing scheme. This option also is likely to work best where there is
a limited need to relocate incumbents to other bands and where
incumbents have incentives to acquire rights to the surrounding white
space, *e.g.,* in bands that are being converted from site-based to
geographic area licensing and where incumbent uses and potential new
uses are generally compatible. In considering use of this option, the
Commission needs to assess the degree of risk that incumbents will hold
out against transitioning to more flexible use, which could hinder the
Commission's goals of enabling more efficient use of the spectrum.

[New overlay licensing with voluntary
band-clearing/restructuring.]{.underline} This option has potential
advantages when (1) the new flexible rights regime being implemented
represents a significant increase in flexibility over the legacy rules,
and (2) this expanded flexibility is likely to lead to rapid changes in
the market value and the actual use of the spectrum. In such cases, a
simultaneous exchange mechanism may be the fastest and most efficient
means of enabling incumbents and potential new spectrum users to
restructure and reassign spectrum rights within the band to facilitate
new uses. In determining whether to employ this option, the Commission
should compare the administrative costs and efficiency of implementing a
simultaneous exchange mechanism with that of employing other transition
options, particularly the option of granting expanded rights to
incumbents discussed below.

[Expanded rights granted to incumbents.]{.underline} This option has
potential advantages where the practical impact of granting incumbents
additional flexibility is limited or is likely to be gradual rather than
immediate, in which case it is likely that the operation of secondary
markets over time can effectively distribute these flexible rights so
that efficiency gains can be achieved. As a practical matter, this
option also requires that there be no "white space," *i.e.,* that all
spectrum in the band be previously assigned to incumbents (to avoid
ambiguity as to who is entitled to additional rights). While granting
incumbent licensees additional flexibility may allow for more immediate
expansion of the availability of flexible rights licensing models, it
also may raise equity issues relating to possible windfalls or unjust
enrichment. The larger issue is whether such a policy would encourage
parties to make future bids on presumably low-cost spectrum that is
allocated for low-value uses and that has no flexibility, then petition
for an expansion of those rights after acquiring the license.
Accordingly, in considering this option, these equity issues will need
to be balanced against the potential gains in administrative efficiency
and the potential public benefits of providing additional flexibility to
incumbents in the band.

*Conclusions/recommendations.* The Task Force recommends that the
Commission undertake the following:

-   Identify encumbered bands licensed under legacy command-and-control
    regimes that are suitable for transitioning to expanded flexible
    rights licensing models within the next five years --

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Set a goal of identifying 100 megahertz of spectrum below 5 GHz for
    this transition phase.

-   Develop processes for determining which bands provide greatest
    opportunity for improving efficient use through adoption of expanded
    flexible rights licensing schemes.

-   Look for band "defragmentation" opportunities (*i.e.*, consolidating
    narrowband spectrum "slices").

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Choose appropriate transition mechanisms for the different bands
    being transitioned --

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Look for bands in which to test different transition mechanisms.

-   Promote policy and legislative changes to facilitate the conducting
    of two-sided auctions.

-   Encourage migration of compatible technologies into common band
    groupings.

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# Promoting Access to Spectrum 

## Designating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Use 

The currently available spectrum for unlicensed operations has spawned a
significant market for unlicensed devices and, as a result, the
Commission should consider designating additional bands for unlicensed
use to better optimize spectrum access. It is estimated that sales of
unlicensed consumer devices are more than \$2 billion per year. In
addition, the growing popularity of computer networking has stimulated a
heightened interest in unlicensed technology and one of the fastest
growing applications of unlicensed devices is for WLANs. Among the more
popular wireless data services are devices that operate in the 2.4 GHz
band in accordance with the 802.11b or "Wi-Fi" standards and protocols
developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
Unlicensed devices are also being developed to provide very short-range
wireless "personal area" networks (WPANs), such as Bluetooth. The
wireless LAN market posted its eighth consecutive quarter of
double-digit growth; total growth from 2000 has been over 150 percent.

Much of the spectrum below 50 GHz is available for low-powered
unlicensed use. Higher-powered operations are permitted in several
bands, however.[^43] A significant number of parties stated that
additional spectrum should be made available for unlicensed use. And,
based on the record, it is generally perceived that the creation of
unlicensed bands has been very successful in allowing the rapid
introduction of new technology and that additional unlicensed bands
would create more such opportunities. However, there was a general lack
of information on how the Commission should create such unlicensed bands
and what priority they should be given relative to other spectrum
requests.

The Task Force finds that, while it is not practical at this point to
develop estimates of the optimal amount of spectrum that should be
provided for unlicensed operations, it appears that additional spectrum
is needed for unlicensed devices. This is particularly true in light of
recent trends towards increased use of short distance wireless systems,
which use fixed infrastructure to provide end-to-end connectivity. In
large area wireless systems, it has been difficult to control mutual
interference without entry and technical regulation. As radio ranges
become smaller, this justification for licensing becomes less universal.
An ever increasing fraction of today's radio applications have ranges
measured in yards rather than miles. For new unlicensed bands, access
should be controlled by a new type of band manager or frequency
coordinator selected by the FCC.

In addition, while there is great interest in making available
additional unlicensed spectrum, there is no consensus on how such
spectrum should be obtained, especially at frequencies in the lower
regions of the spectrum, *i.e.*, at 5 GHz and below. The Industrial,
Scientific, and Medical (ISM)/spread spectrum bands were relatively easy
to designate for unlicensed use because the microwave ovens and other
ISM equipment using them made these bands of little value to most
traditional spectrum users. However, having used this opportunity, there
is little "low-hanging fruit" left for unlicensed band use. As it
considers any expansion of unlicensed use, the Commission will have to
pay careful attention to legitimate concerns of other spectrum users and
consider untraditional approaches to obtaining spectrum use. In spectrum
above 50 GHz, however, the Task Force recommends that future rulemakings
routinely review *de novo* whether licensing is in fact necessary.

The record also indicated that wireless ISPs (WISPs) often experience
difficulty in tailoring their communications systems to meet particular
needs due to the lack of flexibility in equipment authorizations. For
example, WISPs may be unable to change antennas to suit a particular
application, even though such change does not alter the operating
parameters of the system. In addition, WISPs (and point-to-point
systems) should be permitted to increase their power limits in rural
areas. The Task Force recommends that the Commission facilitate
increased flexibility for both systems and power limits, to the extent
possible.

## Secondary Market Rights and Easements

The record also suggests that the there are ways to improve access to
licensed spectrum by new entrants. As technological advances have
increased the potential for spectrum to accommodate multiple
non-interfering uses, two alternative and possibly complementary
approaches have been suggested to facilitate access in licensed bands.
Some commenters and Workshop participants advocated reliance on
"secondary markets" arrangements involving the lease of spectrum usage
rights. Under this approach, licensees would hold the rights associated
with determining which potential entrants could have access to the
spectrum and under what conditions. Other commenters and Workshop
participants advocated allowing open access to licensed spectrum for
non-interfering devices through expanded use of government-defined
"easements." In the latter case, the Commission, and not the licensee,
would establish conditions for user access to the spectrum, and the
consent of the licensee would not be required so long as the
non-licensee user complied with the conditions.

Commenters disagreed, however, on how to balance these approaches.
Proponents of secondary market arrangements asserted that the market can
solve most types of access problems if licensees have flexibility and
exclusive rights. Secondary markets proponents were also skeptical of
the easement approach, arguing that (1) "non-interfering" operation
tends to work better in theory than in practice, and (2) even where
spectrum is otherwise not being used by the licensee, creating easements
for third party access without the licensee's consent could lead to
squatter's rights problems. Some commenters also argued that easement
rights should not be created on spectrum that has already been licensed
by the Commission, contending that incumbent licensees have already
built out their systems and made other technical decisions in reliance
on being able to control access by third parties that could possibly
create harmful interference.

Proponents of easements asserted that requiring negotiation of access
rights in the market would not facilitate, and might even inhibit,
access by the very technology that is revolutionizing efficient spectrum
use, *i.e.,* smart, frequency-agile devices. They pointed out that the
Commission currently allows some unlicensed devices to operate in
licensed spectrum without the users of those devices obtaining
permission from the licensee. Easement proponents also contended that
exclusive rights holders will prefer to block access by such devices to
protect their investment, and that the only way to open spectrum to new
uses is to vastly expand the use of the easement model. They also
contended that new technology is sufficiently sophisticated to overcome
concerns regarding interference with the licensed user's operations.

The Commission has already taken some steps to initiate and expand
access to spectrum. For example, in the Secondary Markets proceeding,
the Commission has begun to explore possible market arrangements that
would give licensees greater flexibility to authorize others to use
otherwise unused portions of their licensed spectrum. The Commission has
also used an easement approach in cases such as UWB, but this is still a
very limited application compared to the type of easement access that
some commenters advocate. As discussed above, developments in new
technology such as SDR, frequency-agile radios, and spread spectrum have
heightened the importance of the access issue by making multiple dynamic
uses of spectrum possible that were not technologically feasible in the
past. The Task Force therefore recommends that the Commission develop
access models that take this new technological potential into account.
At the same time, these models must take into account the need for
licensed spectrum users to have flexible and clearly-defined spectrum
usage rights that promote efficient and beneficial spectrum use.

Going forward, the Task Force believes that there is room for the
balanced and expanded use of both the secondary market and easement
approaches to facilitate spectrum access. First, as discussed above, the
Task Force recommends that in bands where an interference temperature
threshold is established, the Commission use an easement approach to
create spectrum usage rights for unlicensed devices that operate below
the threshold.[^44] An easement approach appears appropriate for these
operations because by definition, the licensee is required to accept any
RF energy that is created by such devices so long as the threshold is
not exceeded.

Second, the Task Force recommends looking primarily at the use of
secondary markets, but possibly at some limited use of easements as
well, to facilitate access to licensed spectrum for opportunistic,
non-interfering devices that operate above the temperature threshold.
Under the secondary markets approach, licensees would have broad
flexibility to allow secondary uses of their spectrum by devices
operating above the interference temperature threshold. Such devices
would operate as secondary users based on an agreement with the
licensee, which can be negotiated directly with the licensee or through
a private intermediary (*e.g.,* band manager or frequency coordinator)
that manages the secondary uses on the licensee's behalf.

In most cases of potential opportunistic use of spectrum, efficient
secondary market mechanisms can be developed that would allow negotiated
access at reasonable transactions costs. The secondary markets model
takes advantage of the flexibility and adaptability of the market to
solve access problems. Because licensees have economic incentives to use
spectrum in ways that will yield the highest return to them, they will
generally find it advantageous to allow others to use unused portions of
their spectrum if they are adequately compensated.

The Task Force does not agree with commenters that contend that making
an exclusive licensee the access "gatekeeper" (*i.e.,* requiring
potential spectrum users to obtain licensee consent) will inhibit access
by new technology, although there may be occasional instances of this
type of restrictive behavior. If the rights afforded to licensees are
sufficiently well-defined and flexible, and the secondary market
mechanism is fast and efficient with low transaction costs, licensees
will have ample incentive to negotiate with potential secondary users
for such access. It is also important to realize that a secondary
markets approach to access by opportunistic devices does not necessarily
require the prospective opportunistic user to negotiate individually
with each affected licensee: band managers, clearinghouses, and other
intermediaries such as clearinghouses can facilitate these negotiated
transactions. Thus, the secondary market approach has significant
potential to foster opportunistic technologies, such as
agile-frequency-hopping radios, software defined radios, and adaptive
antennas, at reasonable transaction costs. In fact, it is anticipated
that as the access-enhancing potential of these technologies continues
to improve, exclusive licensees will often wish to encourage and even
develop such technologies in order to provide new services and devices
and serve more customers.

To facilitate use of the secondary markets model, it is essential to
have in place a flexible and efficient regulatory regime that allows for
the negotiation of the necessary access rights and keeps the transaction
costs of negotiation low. To further this goal, the Task Force
recommends as an essential first step that the Commission take action to
adopt rules in the ongoing Secondary Markets proceeding, and that it
take additional steps to implement secondary markets to the extent that
its current statutory authority allows. In addition, to the extent that
statutory constraints continue to exist, the Task Force recommends
legislative changes that would provide explicit authority for the
Commission to implement a fully flexible approach to secondary markets.

While the Task Force generally recommends that access rights for devices
operating above the interference temperature threshold be negotiated
through the secondary market, there may be instances where secondary
markets work less well because they impose such significant transaction
costs on parties that negotiations will not occur. In such cases, the
easements model may offer a viable alternative approach. Under this
approach, unlicensed devices operating above the interference
temperature threshold would be allowed to operate on licensed spectrum
on a non-interfering basis subject to specified conditions and with no
negotiation with the licensee required. Non-interfering operation would
be ensured by allowing operation at a higher power on a not-to-interfere
basis using standard protocols. The FCC or a frequency coordinator would
administer and resolve harmful interference issues. By definition, the
easements model allows for efficient and low-cost access to spectrum,
because the government establishes overall rules and protocols under
which any user would be allowed access to the spectrum, and negotiations
with individual licensees are not required. The easements model also
bears greater consideration than in the past because the increased
sophistication of technology allows for the possibility of enhanced
spectrum use by third parties on a non-interfering basis with the
licensee.

Nevertheless, broad application of the easement approach to operations
above the interference temperature threshold presents significant
challenges. Because the easement model inherently limits the flexibility
afforded to the licensee to some degree, and relies on government to
define the scope of the easement, it should be applied cautiously. For
example, currently all Part 15 devices are limited to extremely low
power levels in order to minimize the possibility of interference. If
opportunistic devices are to be authorized at higher powers in the
future, this will require regulations or protocols to ensure that such
devices have the ability to "listen" before they transmit and to cease
transmitting instantly when continued transmission would cause
interference. In addition, there is the concern that once unlicensed
devices begin to operate in an easement, it may be difficult legally or
politically to shut down their operations even if they begin to cause
interference or otherwise limit the licensed user's flexibility. Thus,
as proponents of the secondary market model note, the potential for
"squatter's rights" issues to arise is another potential downside of the
easement model that must be addressed.

To address these concerns, the Task Force recommends that in the first
instance, the Commission focus on use of the secondary markets model to
facilitate access above the interference temperature threshold. Once
there has been an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of this
approach, the Commission can then assess whether there is a need to
pursue an easement approach for some types of access. Even then, any
decision whether to use an easement approach will require careful
consideration of the time, space, and frequency-agility dimensions of
the proposed spectrum use. In addition, in making such decisions, the
Commission will need to be sensitive to the potential impact of allowing
easement-based access by opportunistic devices on the expectations,
business plans, and investment made by licensed spectrum users.

## Access to Spectrum in Rural Areas

The Task Force addressed the issue of whether the Commission's approach
to spectrum management should vary in different portions of the
spectrum, in different geographic areas, or for different types of uses.
Many commenters focused considerable discussion on the issue of rural
areas, where spectrum is almost uniformly uncongested even in the most
heavily used bands below 3 GHz. Although some parties indicated that the
Commission should not adopt different spectrum allocation and assignment
policies for different portions of the spectrum or different geographic
regions, it was generally recognized that the economic and technical
considerations in rural areas are different than in urban areas, and
there is some support in the record for applying different rules to
spectrum usage in urban and rural areas.

Some advocates for rural interests asserted that rural carriers have
difficulty gaining access to spectrum, even though spectrum in rural
areas is typically the least congested. Specifically, rural carriers
argued that the Commission's tendency to use large geographic licensing
regions that encompass both urban and rural areas discourages rural
carriers from seeking to acquire licenses. In addition, rural carriers
contended that the Commission's partitioning and disaggregation rules do
not benefit rural providers because they must incur significant
transaction costs to negotiate access to rural spectrum with multiple
large carriers that may prefer in any event to retain such spectrum for
future use. It was further argued that licensing build-out requirements
that are based on population coverage tend to lead to build-out only in
urban areas, with rural spectrum going unused.

Commenters also discussed whether there should be different interference
standards for rural and urban areas. Certain parties advocated higher
permissible power levels for rural areas on the theory that where there
is less congestion, higher permissible power levels would allow for
fuller usage of spectrum. Others objected to this idea, arguing that
having different rural and urban regimes is impractical because it is
not a simple matter to define urban versus rural, as many areas fall
somewhere in between and problems may arise when formerly rural areas
undergo development. Thus, there was a difference of opinion as to
whether different technical rules for rural areas are feasible or
desirable.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission explore ways to promote
spectrum access and flexibility in rural areas. As a threshold matter,
however, it is important to note that the distinction between high- and
low-congestion areas does not necessarily require non-uniform rules for
the latter, so long as the rules do not artificially cause spectrum
congestion or constrain the use of uncongested spectrum. Interference
and other technical rules should generally be calibrated to conditions
in areas where spectrum is likely to be in the greatest demand and the
most congested, which will typically be urban areas. Thus, the
obligations of spectrum users to avoid interference should be set at
levels suitable for such areas, as should their obligation to accept
interference from others. However, these rules should also afford
spectrum users the flexibility to operate at higher power in less
congested areas, which are typically rural, so long as such higher power
operations do not cause interference and do not receive additional
interference protection. These same principles should be applied to
unlicensed bands so that higher-power operation of unlicensed devices is
permitted in less congested areas.

To improve providers' ability to gain access to spectrum in rural areas,
the Commission should promote the development of an efficient and
flexible secondary markets regime that, in addition to partitioning,
facilitates the leasing of spectrum usage rights in rural areas, which
would significantly lower transaction costs. The Commission could also
consider expanding "easements" on licensed spectrum (as discussed in
Section VIII.B. above) in low-congestion areas to allow access, on a
non-interference basis, by other spectrum users. Such an approach,
however, would require the use of technology that is capable of
measuring the level of spectrum congestion in the area and adjusting
power accordingly.

In addition, when licensing by geographic area, the Commission should
consider the impact of its rules on access to rural spectrum. In some
instances, it may be appropriate to use licensing areas that distinguish
between rural and urban areas so that rural interests can more readily
acquire spectrum in the areas they serve. However, in other instances,
larger spectrum areas may be beneficial to rural interests by allowing
licensees to take advantage of economies of scale or scope based on
regional or nationwide footprints.

## Experimental Licensing

Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (the Act)
authorizes the Commission to provide for experimental use of frequencies
and charges the Commission with encouraging "the larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest."[^45] Experimental
licenses provide the opportunity for manufacturers, inventors,
entrepreneurs, and students to experiment with new radio technologies,
new equipment designs, characteristics of radio wave propagation, and
new service concepts related to the use of the radio spectrum, which may
not otherwise be permitted under existing service rules. In order to
encourage innovation, the experimental license rules provide great
flexibility with regard to allowable frequency range, power, and
emission. However, to protect previously-allocated services,
experimental licenses are issued on condition that experimental
operations do not cause interference to existing services, and
experimental operations are not protected from interference from
allocated services.

Only a few parties addressed the topic of experimental licenses. The
principal concern of these parties appeared to be potential delay
involved in obtaining an experimental license due to interagency
frequency coordination and, in particular, difficulties associated with
testing systems being developed for government transfer bands and for
overseas markets with different allocation plans. Concerns were also
raised about the non-interactive nature of the coordination process from
the point of view of private entities seeking to experiment with new
technologies.

Experimental license applications that request use of spectrum used
exclusively by the federal government or shared with the federal
government must be coordinated with NTIA to assess any potential
interference issues. In practice, NTIA refers such applications to the
Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which is composed of
all federal agencies that are major spectrum users.[^46] Most
coordination requests are handled promptly, but some applications remain
in the coordination process for a considerable period of time and, in
some instances, are not resolved after periods in excess of one
year.[^47]

The Task Force believes that a slight modification in the frequency
coordination process may effectively facilitate expeditious resolution
of any potential interference issues. A suggestion from the parties,
that the Task Force supports, is to permit more direct communications
between parties who have applied for experimental licenses and the
federal government entities concerned about their pending experimental
applications on a more regular basis. The parties suggest that such
contacts would allow them to explore possible modifications in their
experimental license applications that might lead to mutually acceptable
outcomes, such as restricting location, operating power, and operating
hours. Although the Task Force recognizes that classification issues
related to certain federal government systems may make direct
communication impractical in all cases, at least in some instances,
communications between the parties is possible and that new procedural
and organizational mechanisms should be put in place to improve
communications between commercial parties desiring to implement
experiments and federal users of the spectrum. To this end, the Task
Force recommends that the FCC and NTIA consider implementing a new
interface for non-federal government spectrum users with IRAC members to
help search for workable compromises for experimental license
applications. One possible approach, also suggested by commenters, would
be to consider appointing an advocate or ombudsman for the private
sector.

In addition, the Task Force believes that it would be helpful to have
more information about the use of certain bands for experimentation --
particularly government transfer bands \-- available to the public. To
facilitate experimentation in bands that are designated for transfer to
the private sector, perhaps the FCC and NTIA could work together to
identify -- or pre-clear -- some location, frequency, and time
combinations where non-federal government spectrum users would be
permitted to conduct experiments. These joint FCC-NTIA efforts would
greatly facilitate the ability of the private sector to rapidly deploy
consumer services in these bands after transfer from federal government
use.

## Transition Issues

As discussed, there are many ways to increase access to the radio
spectrum. The Task Force recognizes, however, that these proposed
changes cannot, and should not, be implemented without giving serious
consideration to the reliance interests of incumbent spectrum users.
Thus, for example, while the Task Force believes that it is important to
conduct a review to determine which bands may be feasible for unlicensed
use, it is equally important to assess and address the expectations of
incumbent users in any candidate band.

There are few transition issues implicated in using the general
secondary markets model to facilitate access to currently occupied
spectrum, because access under this model is premised on negotiation
with the licensee. Licensed spectrum users would gain greater
flexibility, and private negotiations would determine availability of
particular spectrum for use by others. To the extent, however, that
government-defined easements are contemplated as an alternative to the
general secondary markets model, the issue of incumbency would be among
the many serious challenges in deciding whether such easements would be
appropriate.

#  Policy Recommendations

The following is a list of the Task Force's specific policy
recommendations, which correspond to the recommendations listed at the
end of each section. Specific recommendations that would require
legislative action are listed in Appendix A.

## Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy Recommendations

1.  Permit broad, highly flexible use within technical parameters of the
    allocation.

    a.  Permit traditionally narrow services to lease excess capacity to
        other services.

2.  Investigate rule changes that enable the lowering of permitted power
    in urban areas and the increasing of permitted power in rural areas.

    a.  Permit high-power digital television broadcasters to operate
        single frequency low power distributed transmission systems
        within their present service area.

    b.  Promote the co-location of high power transmitters.

3.  Foster technologies for uniform signal strength generation
    throughout a service area.

4.  Consider user fees or other steps to stimulate improvements in
    efficiency when marketplace is inadequate.

5.  Promote shift to hybridizations with wireline delivery whenever
    appropriate.

6.  Group future allocations based on mutually-compatible technical
    characteristics (power flux density and sensitivity to
    interference), and improve the out-of-band interference performance
    of transmitters and receivers over time so as to reduce the need for
    this kind of grouping.

7.  Conduct periodic evaluations of allocation parameters with respect
    to evolving technology and uses.

8.  Time-limit spectrum rights and subject them to periodic review.

    a.  Every 5 to 10 years, review spectrum rights and obligations,
        interference criteria, and definitions, and modify if
        appropriate.

    b.  But spectrum users should be entitled to rely on rules remaining
        constant between periodic reviews.

    c.  Licensees should still have strong renewal expectancy.

## Interference Avoidance Recommendations

9.  Quantify acceptable levels of interference through "interference
    temperature" concept (long-term objective).

10. Obtain better data regarding noise floor:

    a.  Adopt standard method for measuring noise floor.

11. Create a public/private partnership for long term noise
    (interference temperature) monitoring network and archiving of data
    for use by FCC and public.

12. Include receiver tolerances in regulation (either through (1)
    additional incentives, (2) mandates, or (3) some combination of
    incentives and mandates) to be used until can migrate to
    "interference temperature" regulatory scheme and to be used for the
    long term where use of interference temperature would be
    inapplicable; *e.g.,* for systems in which licensees do not have
    control over receivers.

13. Move to interference-limited policies.

14. Issue Notice of Inquiry to characterize current and future receiver
    environments and to explore issues to consider, such as, performance
    parameters and protection for legacy receivers.

15. Award contractual study to evaluate receiver performance in current
    environment.

16. Promote voluntary receiver performance requirements through industry
    groups.

17. Consider incentives for use of advanced receivers.

18. Promote transmitter enhancements for interference control: (a)
    foster technologies that enhance uniform signal levels throughout a
    service area; (b) promote greater use of automated transmitter
    control systems; and (c) consider tightening out-of-band emission
    limits over time.

19. Improve communications on interference issues with public.

    a.  Harmonize interference language in FCC rules and affected
        international rules.

    b.  Ensure consistent and appropriate use of interference
        terminology.

    c.  Develop technical bulletins that explain interference rules for
        all radio services.

    d.  Develop best practices handbook.

20. Add language to the Act expressly allowing the Commission to
    establish rules or performance requirements for receivers.

21. "Interference temperature" concept should form the basis for better
    defining interference rights.

22. Accompany clearer interference definition with effective
    enforcement.

## Spectrum Usage Models Recommendations

23. Expand the use of both the exclusive rights and commons models, and
    move away from the command-and-control model, with limited
    exceptions.

24. Transition legacy command-and-control bands to more flexible rules
    and uses to the maximum extent possible (whether under the exclusive
    rights or commons model), with only limited exceptions.

25. Assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider
    permitting, [but not requiring]{.underline}, the Commission to
    utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive
    applications for global and international satellite services. Take
    into account international concerns, including frequency
    coordination with Canada and Mexico and global harmonization of
    uses.

26. Continue to dedicate some spectrum on a command-and-control basis
    for public safety use.

27. Address additional public safety needs through alternative "safety
    valve" mechanisms to make spectrum is available to public safety in
    emergency situations when more capacity is needed.

    a.  Because some public safety spectrum use is characterized by
        intermittent "spikes," public safety users should have
        flexibility to lease spectrum capacity that is available during
        lower-use periods to commercial users with a "take-back"
        mechanism when public safety use increases.

    b.  For major regional or national emergencies, additional public
        safety spectrum needs should be addressed through enhanced
        easement rights to non-public safety spectrum.

28. Develop more flexible policy for addressing public safety spectrum
    needs, including leasing/take-back arrangements with commercial
    users and easement rights to non-public safety spectrum in major
    emergencies.

29. For new spectrum allocations and the associated spectrum
    assignments, apply the following basic framework:

    a.  Base choice of exclusive rights, commons, or command-and-control
        model in particular bands on factors previously identified.

    b.  Make underlay rights based on interference temperature a
        component of new spectrum allocations and assignments.

        i.  This does not require a constant interference temperature
            definition across all bands.

    c.  Clearly define access rights for opportunistic devices whether
        based on secondary markets, easements, or a combination of the
        two.

30. For encumbered spectrum, identify bands that are suitable for
    initiating transition within the next five years and develop a
    transition plan for each band.

    a.  Set a goal of identifying highly valuable 100 megahertz of
        spectrum for this transition phase.

    b.  Look for band "defragmentation" opportunities (consolidating
        narrowband spectrum "slices" and encouraging migration of
        compatible technologies into common band groupings).

    c.  Interference temperature should be specified for most new
        allocations and associated assignments, and underlay operations.

    d.  Address underlay/easement rights in transition bands on a
        going-forward basis (avoid retroactive easements).

31. Develop mechanisms to improve efficiency of secondary markets in
    facilitating transition.

    a.  Move forward with the Secondary Markets proceeding.

    b.  Facilitate use of leasing, band managers, and similar mechanisms
        to promote transition, particularly in multi-use bands.

    c.  Address spectrum access issues in rural areas.

    d.  Recommend that Congress amend Section 309(j) of the Act to
        include an express grant of authority to the FCC to conduct
        two-sided auctions and simultaneous exchanges.

    e.  Recommend that Congress amend the Act to authorize the use of
        auction funds to pay relocation expenses to incumbents.

    f.  Recommend that Congress eliminate the 2007 expiration date on
        the Commission\'s statutory auction authority and grant the
        Commission permanent auction authority.

## Promoting Access to Spectrum Recommendations

32. Consider methods for additional spectrum access for unlicensed
    devices, which include:

    a.  Access to new band controlled by a new type of band manager or
        frequency coordinator.

    b.  Opportunistic or dynamic use of existing bands -- through either
        cognitive radio techniques to find "white space" in existing
        bands or use protocols to get out of the way of primary users.

    c.  Underlay beneath primary users:

        i.  Unlicensed devices operate below acceptable interference
            level (that is, operate on a non-interference basis with
            licensees); and/or

        ii. Unlicensed devices can operate at higher powers if negotiate
            with licensee -- negotiations can either take place directly
            or through private band manager.

33. In licensed spectrum bands, pursue secondary markets policies that
    encourage licensees to provide access for "opportunistic" uses above
    the interference temperature threshold through leasing of spectrum
    usage rights.

    a.  At a later time, after evaluating the effectiveness of secondary
        markets approach, assess whether there is a need to create
        government-granted "easements" for some types of access, but
        consider the potential impact of this approach on planning and
        investment by licensed users.

34. Millimeterwave bands: all future rulemaking for terrestrial use
    above 50 GHz should include *de novo* review of the merits of
    licensing.

35. Wireless ISPs (WISPs) and point-to-point microwave systems:

    a.  Facilitate greater flexibility by making it easier for operators
        to better tailor their equipment for particular application.

    b.  Increase power limits for WISPs (and point-to-point systems) in
        rural areas.

36. In general, technical rules should be calibrated to areas where
    spectrum is in the greatest demand and the most congested, which are
    typically urban areas.

    a.  In less congested areas, the rules should not prevent licensees
        from operating at higher power on a non-interference basis, but
        licensees operating in such areas should not have expanded
        interference protection rights or reduced obligations to avoid
        interference.

    b.  In unlicensed bands, technical rules should allow for
        higher-power operation in less congested areas.

37. The Commission should increase incentives and reduce transaction
    costs on parties seeking access to rural spectrum

    a.  Geographic licensing areas that distinguish between rural and
        urban areas may be appropriate in some bands to allow focused
        bidding on rural areas

    b.  More important is the development of an efficient and flexible
        secondary markets regime that facilitates leasing of rural
        spectrum in all licensed bands

    c.  The Commission could also consider expanding "easements" on
        licensed spectrum in rural areas to allow access by other
        spectrum users.

38. [Experimental Licensing]{.underline}: Recommend an interface with
    IRAC members to help search for workable compromises for
    experimental applications and suggest that NTIA or DOC to appoint an
    advocate/ombudsman for the private sector.

39. Recommend that NTIA and FCC identify some (frequency, location,
    time) combinations in the transfer bands for experiments that have
    low risk of interference to Federal systems, \"pre-clear\" them and
    announce availability for experiments in a \"broad area
    announcement\"-like PN.

# Appendix A: Legislative Recommendations {#appendix-a-legislative-recommendations .unnumbered}

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider the statutory
proposals detailed below for submission to Congress. These
recommendations resulted from a thorough examination of the current
statutory structure contained in the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, as well as related laws. They are intended as a blueprint for
working with Congress to effectuate a more flexible spectrum policy
regime.

-   Initiate a review of the potential use of spectrum fees for
    non-market based spectrum uses. *See* Section V.D.

-   Request language in the Communications Act to clarify the scope of
    the Commission's authority to establish rules or performance
    requirements for all receivers. *See* Section VI.B.

-   Consider amending Section 309(j) of the Communications Act to
    provide the Commission authority to conduct two-sided auctions and
    simultaneous spectrum exchanges. *See* Section VII.D.

-   Support existing legislative measures that would amend the
    Communications Act to authorize the use of auction funds to pay
    relocation expenses to Federal government incumbents and suggest
    expanding such measures to include non-Federal entities. *See*
    Section VII.D.

-   Undertake a review of Section 310 of the Communications Act to
    determine the feasibility of providing the Commission with
    additional flexibility to improve the operation of secondary markets
    and the processing of other transactions. *See* Section VIII.B.

-   Assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider
    permitting, [but not requiring]{.underline}, the Commission to
    utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive
    applications for spectrum used for global and international
    satellite services. *See* Section VII.C.

[^1]: "Spectrum Policy Task Force Seeks Public Comment on Issues Related
    to Commission's Spectrum Policies," *Public Notice,* ET Docket No.
    02-135 (rel. June 6, 2002).

[^2]: Each Working Group has submitted a report in ET Docket 02-135.
    These reports can be found at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/.

[^3]: The first international radio conference took place in 1903,
    followed by another in 1906. The second conference adopted a
    convention requiring receipt of priority distress calls from ships
    and created the first two radio frequency service categories:
    general public service in the 187-500 kHz band and long-range or
    other services for assignment in other frequencies. Additional
    international spectrum conferences have been held under the auspices
    of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on a regular
    basis and are now called World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC).
    From a domestic spectrum policy standpoint, the outcome of the WRCs
    have a direct impact on U.S. allocation issues as the WRC Final Acts
    constitute treaty agreements requiring ratification by the United
    States Senate. The Commission implements the Final Acts through the
    rulemaking process.

[^4]: 47 U.S.C. § 151 *et seq.*

[^5]: 47 U.S.C. § 157.

[^6]: 47 U.S.C. § 307(e).

[^7]: Section 309(j) was further amended in the Balanced Budget Act of
    1997. In the Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of
    International Telecommunications Act of 2000 (ORBIT Act), the
    Congress passed legislation excluding spectrum used for
    international and global satellite services from assignment through
    auctions.

[^8]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 923.

[^9]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 159.

[^10]: 47 U.S.C. § 336.

[^11]: *See* Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications
    Act - Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, Second Report and
    Order, 9 FCC Rcd 2348 (1994).

[^12]: *See* Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
    Communications Act Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, GN
    Docket No. 93- 252, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 1411(1994).

[^13]: *See* "Commission Announces Panelists, Agenda for *En Banc*
    Hearing on Spectrum Policy," *Public Notice,* DA 96-190 (rel. Feb.
    14, 1996) and "FCC Announces Panelists for *En Banc* Hearing on
    Spectrum Management," *Public Notice* (rel. Apr. 1, 1999).

[^14]: "Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the
    Development of Telecommunications Technologies for the New
    Millennium," *Policy Statement,* 14 FCC Rcd 19868 (1999).

[^15]: *See* "Report of First Meeting of the Technical Advisory Council"
    (April 30, 1999), which can be found at:
    <http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tac/report990430.pdf>.

[^16]: "Principles for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum By
    Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets," *Policy
    Statement,* 15 FCC Rcd 24178 (2000).

[^17]: "Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum through Elimination of
    Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets," *Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking,* WT Docket No. 00-230, 15 FCC Rcd 24203 (2000).

[^18]: For example, Canada and administrations in Europe have recently
    carried out extensive and comprehensive reviews of their spectrum
    policies. In the United Kingdom, the government commissioned an
    "independent review" of radio spectrum management in the U.K. by
    Professor Martin Cave, who participated in one of the Task Force's
    workshops. Professor Cave's report was published in March 2002 and
    made 47 wide-ranging recommendations on the future management of
    radio spectrum. The U.K. government published its response to the
    report on October 15, 2002, accepting nearly all of the report's
    recommendations. *See*
    [http://www.spectrumreview.radio.gov.uk](http://www.spectrumreview.radio.gov.uk/).

[^19]: The Spectrum Efficiency Working Group Report contains a more
    detailed discussion of these preliminary measurements.

[^20]: *See* Comments of Statewide Wireless Network, New York State
    Office for Technology.

[^21]: *See* In the Matter of Allocations and Service Rules for the
    71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz Bands, WT Docket No. 02-146, 17
    FCC Rcd 12182 (2002).

[^22]: *See* Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
    Reconciliation Act of 1994, Annual Report and Analysis of
    Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile
    Services, Sixth Report, FCC 01-192, 16 FCC Rcd 13350 (2001) at 21.

[^23]: The Commission's rules define "spread spectrum systems" as
    follows: "A spread spectrum system is an information bearing
    communications system in which: (1) Information is conveyed by
    modulation of a carrier by some conventional means, (2) the
    bandwidth is deliberately widened by means of a spreading function
    over that which would be needed to transmit the information alone.
    (In some spread spectrum systems, a portion of the information being
    conveyed by the system may be contained in the spreading function.)"
    *See* 47 C.F.R. § 2.1.

[^24]: *See* Section VI, *infra*.

[^25]: *See* Section VII, *infra*.

[^26]: *See* Section VIII, *infra*.

[^27]: *See* Section VII, *infra*.

[^28]: Where spectrum is made available on a commons basis, spectrum
    usage rights are non-exclusive, and therefore new users do not
    depend on the transferability of such rights to obtain access to the
    spectrum. Nonetheless, there is no reason to restrict the
    transferability of such rights.

[^29]: *See* Section VII.C.2, *infra*.

[^30]: In the case of unlicensed uses and in some shared licensed bands,
    interference protection rights are "defined" as a nullity, *i.e.,*
    spectrum users have no interference protection rights.

[^31]: As discussed in the next section, however, there are ways in
    which the rules governing these dimensions of spectrum use can be
    refined. *See* Section V.C, infra.

[^32]: Obviously, this is not an issue for bands in which spectrum users
    have no interference protection, *e.g.*, unlicensed bands. Moreover,
    in licensed bands, the establishment of maximum power and emission
    levels at the geographic and spectrum borders of each licensed
    spectrum block provides a form of interference regulation, because
    each licensee knows in advance the maximum output that it is
    required to accept from co-channel and adjacent channel licensees
    that are subject to these rules. This approach only works, however,
    if all of the potential RF emitters are known and subject to defined
    RF output limits. It works less well where output rules for
    different spectrum uses are established at different times or the
    rules do not account for unanticipated technologies.

[^33]: *See* Section VI, *infra*.

[^34]: *See* Section VIII.B, *infra*.

[^35]: For a more extensive discussion, *see* Interference Protection
    Working Group Report section entitled "Future Challenges Warranting
    Consideration of New Interference Protection Paradigms."

[^36]: "Interference" is defined as follows, according to the
    Commission's rules: "The effect of unwanted energy due to one or a
    combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception
    in a radio-communication system, manifested by any performance
    degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of information which could
    be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy." 47 C.F.R. §
    2.1. "Harmful interference" is defined as follows: "Interference
    which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or
    other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or
    repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in
    accordance with these \[international\] Radio Regulations." 47
    C.F.R. § 2.1.

[^37]: Generally, selectivity is achieved by adding filters to the front
    end of a receiver, and these usually increase the receiver noise
    figure -- decreasing its sensitivity to RF signals.

[^38]: The idea of an interference temperature as a measure of the
    "noise" power in a particular band and location is synonymous with
    the concept of antenna temperature: the "equivalent temperature of
    the power received at an antenna." *See,* for example, Wolfram
    Research at
    <http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/physics/AntennaTemperature.html>.
    Antenna temperature is a component of the total noise temperature of
    a receiver system, which also includes the thermal noise generated
    within the receiver.

    Interference temperature, expressed in units of degrees Kelvin, can
    be calculated as the power received by an antenna in watts divided
    by the associated RF bandwidth in Hertz and a term known as
    Boltzman's Constant (equal to 1.3807 watt-sec/ºKelvin).
    Alternatively, interference temperature can be calculated as the
    power flux density available at an antenna in watts per meter
    squared multiplied by the effective capture area of the receiving
    antenna in meters squared divided by both the associated RF
    bandwidth in Hertz and Boltzman's constant. An "interference
    temperature density" can also be defined as the interference
    temperature per unit area, expressed in units of ºKelvin per meter
    squared, and calculated as the interference temperature divided by
    the effective capture area of the receiving antenna. This quantity
    could be measured for particular frequencies using a reference
    antenna and, thereafter, would be independent of receiving antenna
    characteristics.

[^39]: For example, the Commission adopted provisions for interim
    interference protection of analog signals in the Multipoint
    Distribution and Instructional Television Fixed Services from a new
    service in an adjacent frequency band. In so doing, the Commission
    assumed a typical numerical value for a key interference rejection
    characteristic of the receiving equipment, based on information
    provided by a manufacturer of that equipment. *See Memorandum
    Opinion and Order* in GN Docket No. 96-228 (1997).

[^40]: Blanketing interference occurs when an undesired signal on a
    frequency different than that of the desired signal is sufficiently
    strong to overpower the front end amplifier stage of a receiver,
    thereby preventing proper operation of the receiver.

[^41]: These include requirements that broadcasters provide "reasonable
    access" to candidates for federal elective office and afford "equal
    opportunities" to candidates for any public office, children's
    educational programming requirements, restrictions on airing of
    indecent programming, and provisions relating to the rating of video
    programming, and equal employment opportunities rules. *See* 47
    U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), 47 C.F.R. §73.1944 (reasonable access); 47
    U.S.C. § 315, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (equal opportunities); 47 U.S.C. §
    303(b), 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.671, 73.673, 73.3526 (children's educational
    programming); 18 U.S.C. § 1464; 47 U.S.C. § 303, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999
    (indecent programming); 47 U.S.C. § 303(w) (rating of video
    programming); 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (equal employment opportunities).

[^42]: Broadcast spectrum can be used for ancillary or supplementary
    services that do not interfere with the primary broadcast signal,
    *e.g.*, through use or leasing of the vertical blanking interval to
    provide telecommunications services. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.646. In
    the digital context, broadcasters may provide ancillary and
    supplementary services such as subscription television programming,
    computer software distribution, data transmission, teletext,
    interactive services, and audio signals so long as such services do
    not interfere with the required provision of free over-the-air
    programming. *See* In the matter of Advanced Television Systems and
    Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, *Fifth
    Report and Order* at para. 29 (citations omitted). *See also* 47
    U.S.C. § 336.

[^43]: These bands include: 902-928 MHz; 1910-1930 MHz, 2390-2483.5 MHz,
    5150-5350 MHz, 5725-5825 MHz, and 57,000-64,000 GHz.

[^44]: *See* Sections VI and VII.B, *supra*.

[^45]: *See* Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g). This discussion is based in part on the
    NPRM in Docket 96-256, 11 FCC Rcd 20130 (1996). The rules addressing
    experimental licenses are contained in Part 5 of the Commission's
    rules. *See* 47 CFR Part 5.

[^46]: NTIA coordination is actually carried out by the IRAC Frequency
    Assignment Subcommittee (FAS).

[^47]: OET's Experimental Branch has recently instituted a procedure in
    which new applications that not successfully coordinated in one year
    are dismissed without prejudice.