------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
  ![](media/image1.jpeg){width="1.875in"      2100 Second Street, S.W.\
  height="0.6722222222222223in"}Commandant\   Washington, DC 20593-0001\
  United States Coast Guard                   Staff Symbol: G-ICA\
                                              Phone: (202) 366-4280\
                                              FAX: (202) 366-7124

  ------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

**U. S. COAST GUARD**

**STATEMENT OF**

**REAR ADMIRAL JOHN C. ACTON**

**ON THE**

**ROLE OF THE COAST GUARD RESERVE**

**AS AN OPERATIOAL RESERVE COMPONENT**

**BEFORE THE**

**COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**JULY 19, 2006**

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission.
It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the pioneering
role played by the Coast Guard Reserve as the ready surge force for
America's Maritime First Responder. Because you have already heard from
Rear Admiral Venuto and Master Chief Smith, I'll try not to repeat what
they have said, and will keep my statement brief. Permit me however, to
introduce myself. I am Rear Admiral John C. Acton. I am a Reservist
whose billet is Deputy Commander for Mobilization and Reserve Component
Affairs, Coast Guard Atlantic Area in Portsmouth, Virginia. Currently, I
am serving temporarily as Deputy Director of Operations at NORTHCOM.

Let me begin by stating that there is no better measure of the readiness
of a Reserve Component than its ability to rapidly mobilize and carry
out its mission. Consider, for instance, the events of September 11,
2001. By nightfall on that same tragic day, over 600 Coast Guard
Reservists were on duty safeguarding America's ports and waterways,
including New York harbor and the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. They
donned personal protective gear, drew weapons and got underway with
their active duty counterparts using the Active Component boats and
equipment they trained with while drilling. Initially, mobilization
orders were authorized under Title 14 of the United States Code to
facilitate a rapid Coast Guard response. Ultimately, all mobilized
Reservists were shifted to Title 10 authority. Since 9/11, cumulative
recalls of Coast Guard Reservists under Title 10 have totaled over
6,800, a figure that represents well over 80 percent of our 8,100-member
Selected Reserve (SELRES) force, and right now more than 300 remain
mobilized under Title 10. Our rapid response to the 9/11 attacks and
subsequent Coast Guard operations, both at home and overseas, are a
testament to the success of our integration and the validation of our
SELRES force as an operational reserve.

To fully understand the nature of our integrated and operational Coast
Guard Reserve, it is necessary to review a brief history of our Reserve
Component, which was founded in 1941 and provided the bulk of Coast
Guard manpower during World War II. Although the Coast Guard Reserve
largely went dormant shortly after World War II, it was revived during
the Cold War with Reserve units training for mobilization, in effect
forming a strategic reserve. By the early 1970s, however, during a
period of budgetary retrenchment, the value of a strategic Coast Guard
Reserve was questioned, and a means was sought to improve the return on
the taxpayers' investment. Reservists, assigned to Reserve units, thus
began day-to-day augmentation of Active Component units. Although this
brought Coast Guard Reservists into somewhat better alignment with the
active Coast Guard and its missions, it also maintained the legacy of
separate reserve units, a separate pay and personnel system, and a
cultural barrier between active and reserve members.

In the mid-1990s, following the successful mobilization of about 10
percent of our SELRES force for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM, we decided we could improve how we do business, to maximize
readiness and value to the taxpayer, through the historic and highly
successful integration of Reservists into the Active Component
organization. We began by merging the infrastructure for pay and
personnel, increasing efficiency through elimination of many redundant
and incompatible systems. More significantly, we disestablished Reserve
units, integrating the bulk of our SELRES force directly into Active
Component units, where they became full members of the Coast Guard team.
Not only did this help break down the traditional cultural barriers, but
it also eliminated dual administrative and command chains while ensuring
Reservists could train on the same equipment as their active-duty
shipmates.

Today, over 90 percent of our 8,100 SELRES members are assigned to
operational units where they support Maritime Homeland Security, Defense
Operations and disaster response. The majority -- 69 percent -- are
directly assigned to active Coast Guard shore units, where they hone
mobilization skills through classroom instruction and on-the-job
training with their active-duty counterparts. Twenty-two percent are
dedicated primarily to supporting Defense Operations, with most of that
group assigned to our eight deployable Port Security Units, or PSUs. As
you know, these surge units are predominantly staffed by Reservists and
are designed to primarily support the Combatant Commanders in strategic
ports of debarkation overseas. Since 9/11, however, they have also been
deployed for domestic operations, such as support for Hurricane Katrina.
The remaining SELRES force provides critical support for the rest of the
team.

Our Reserve Force is an operational reserve in every sense of the word,
thanks to the success of integration, but we haven't rested on our
laurels. Since September 2001, when we embarked on the largest
mobilization of Coast Guard Reservists since World War II, we have
redoubled our efforts to capture and capitalize on lessons learned to
further improve readiness and ensure a Reserve Force with the right
people, skills and training for the missions of the 21^st^ century. We
examined our systems for recruiting, training, mobilizing and
demobilizing Reservists to identify and close readiness gaps. More
significantly, we undertook a comprehensive review of the Coast Guard
Reserve that resulted in

adoption of a policy statement that embodies the three core strategic
functions of the Reserve Force:

-   *Maritime Homeland Security,*

-   *Domestic and expeditionary support to National Defense,* and

-   *Domestic disaster response and recovery, whether man-made or
    natural.*

The individual competencies required to support these core functions
center on boat operations, contingency planning and response,
expeditionary warfare, law enforcement, marine safety and port security,
with appropriate force levels invested in the administrative and
logistical support our Reserve Force requires.

None of this represents a radical change for the Coast Guard Reserve,
but rather an affirmation of the vital role an operational Reserve plays
as the Coast Guard's ready surge force. One key component of that ready
surge force is availability and accessibility of individuals for
mobilization. As with members of the other Reserve Components, our
people are subject to involuntary mobilization under Title 10 for
national security contingencies. Unlike members of the other Reserve
Components, Coast Guard Reservists can also be involuntarily mobilized
by the Secretary of Homeland Security under 14 USC 712 for up to 30 days
at a time for domestic contingencies, including natural and man-made
disasters and terrorist attacks. The unique authority provided under
Title 14 has been used over a dozen times since the 1970s to mobilize
Coast Guard Reservists for a wide range of emergencies ranging from the
1980 Mariel Boat Lift to Midwest floods, hurricanes and other natural
disasters.

Most recently, that authority was used last year to respond to the
largest natural disaster in U.S. history. When Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast region last summer, members of the Coast Guard Reserve
immediately joined their active-duty shipmates in the largest Coast
Guard rescue and recovery operation in history, some of them voluntarily
and some of them after being mobilized by the Secretary of Homeland
Security under Title 14. In all, some 700 members of the Coast Guard
Reserve were called to duty under this unique provision of the law. When
they arrived on scene, either as individual members of units based in
the Gulf Coast region, or as members of the two Port Security Units we
mobilized, or as individuals augmenting Coast Guard operations, they
were virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the Coast Guard team.
They were trained, equipped and ready to do their jobs. They remain
trained, equipped and ready today to respond to a range of contingencies
at home and abroad, including this year's hurricane season, thanks to
the integrated nature of our Coast Guard.

H.R. 889, the "The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006,"
which has been cleared for the President's signature, contains language
that will expand the Secretary of Homeland Security's Title 14 recall
authority to permit mobilization of Coast Guard Reservists "to aid in
prevention of an imminent serious natural or manmade disaster, accident,
catastrophe, or act of terrorism." Other provisions extend the limits on
the period of recall to not more than 60 days in any four-month period
and to not more than 120 days in any two-year period. This will
significantly enhance our ability to mitigate major natural disasters
and thwart terrorist attacks by enabling us to bring Coast Guard
Reservists on line before disaster strikes. When enacted into law,
expanded Title 14 authority will only increase our value to the American
public as an operational reserve strategically positioned to prepare for
and respond against all hazards and all threats.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
will be happy to answer any questions you may have.