**CHAPTER 11**

**COMMUNITY DISASTER RECOVERY**

# This chapter defines disaster recovery in terms of its distinctive activities and explains how it differs from activities that take place during other phases of the emergency management cycle. The chapter begins with a brief description of the routine functioning of US communities and then turns to the housing, economic, and psychological recovery of households and the operational recovery of businesses. The chapter then turns to the recovery assistance that can be expected from state and federal government and from insurance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of local government's preimpact recovery planning and the implementation and improvisation of that plan during a disaster's aftermath.

**The Routine Functioning of US Communities**

The process of community recovery from disaster cannot be properly
understood without understanding how communities function before a
disaster strikes. First, a *community* is commonly understood to be a
specific geographic area and is frequently considered to be equivalent
to a political jurisdiction such as a town, city, or county. However, a
community also has two additional elements---psychological ties and
social interaction (Poplin, 1972). Psychological ties involve a sense of
shared identity that arises from common goals, values, and behavioral
norms (shared expectations of appropriate behavior) that lead "insiders"
to distinguish themselves from "outsiders" (Lindell & Perry, 2004).
Moreover, insiders interact with each other more frequently with each
other than they do with outsiders and these interactions involve
differentiated roles (e.g., parent-child, supplier-customer,
citizen-bureaucrat) that involve the exchange of resources. Communities
are ecological networks (Bates & Pelanda, 1994; Peacock & Ragsdale,
1997) in which the basic types of units are households, businesses, and
government agencies. Each social unit has people (family members in the
case of households and employees in the case of businesses and
government agencies) and resources. As Figure 11-1 indicates, households
supply labor to businesses in exchange for money. In turn, households
pay money to obtain goods and services from private suppliers (ranging
from grocers to doctors), infrastructure (water, sewer, electric power,
fuel, transportation, telecommunications), and government services
(e.g., fire protection, education, parks). In addition to these economic
exchanges, households engage in behavioral interaction with peers such
as friend, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers. These exchanges
sometimes involve goods and services, but they are more frequently
characterized by exchanges of affection and emotional support.

Businesses use the labor they receive from households to produce goods
or services, which they then sell (to the degree they are more
successful than their competitors) to their customers. As is the case
with households, businesses use the money they obtain from customers to
pay suppliers, infrastructure, and government. (For-profit) businesses
provide goods and services for a fee and government provides them in
exchange for taxes. However, there are also (nonprofit) NGOs that
provide goods and services at or below cost---and sometimes free. For
example, Habitat for Humanity relies substantially on donated materials
and volunteer labor to construct affordable housing. The American Red
Cross and other NGOs use donated money, goods, and services to provide
shelter, food, clothing, medicine, and financial grants to those in
distress. The steady flow of money in exchange for goods and services,
known as *cash flow*, is critically important to social units that have
insufficient savings.

In a free market economy, government establishes broad rules within
which individual parties can freely establish contracts for the exchange
of resources. For example, government declares certain goods (e.g.,
heroin) and services (e.g., prostitution) to be unacceptable and,
therefore, illegal. It also requires private parties to undertake
certain activities (e.g., obtain a license to practice medicine; provide
an accurate accounting and annual statement of corporate assets) and
provides some services that the private sector cannot or will not
otherwise provide at acceptable cost (e.g., rural electrification,
routine mail delivery). It is important to recognize that the units in
the community network differ in their resources and, thus, their power.
Thus, units with more social, economic, and political power can force
less powerful units to accept less favorable outcomes.

[**Figure 11-1**. Routine Relationships Among Social Units.]{.underline}

Moreover, these basic community units act in cooperation, competition,
and conflict (Poplin, 1972; Thomas, 1992). *Cooperation* refers to
activities that result in mutual benefit. A prime economic example is a
business relationship in which a supplier provides a good or service to
a customer in exchange for money. *Competition* exists when two parties
strive toward a goal that only one can achieve. In fair competition, the
parties abide by methods of goal achievement that are mutually accepted
as legitimate. For example, two businesses compete to sell a product to
customers on the basis of quality and price. *Conflict* occurs when one
party attempts to directly frustrate the goal achievement of another.
For example, one business might attempt to use its greater resources to
force its suppliers to refuse to serve its competitor. There are many
social institutions, such as schools and churches, that seek to promote
agreement on basic values and legitimate methods of goal achievement by
socializing their members. Complete consensus is never reached, so
political institutions exist to resolve differences and to provide an
authoritative allocation of public resources.

Within each of these three categories, social units vary in their
assets. Households, businesses, and government agencies have *human
assets* such as cognitive, psychomotor, physical abilities, and
personality characteristics which, together with their time and effort,
constitute what economists consider to be *labor* (Schneider & Schmitt,
1986). In addition, they have *physical assets* such as land, buildings,
equipment, furniture, clothes, vehicles, crops, and animals, which
economists classify as *goods*. Finally, they have *financial (capital)
assets* such as cash, stocks, bonds, savings, insurance. In many cases,
these assets were accumulated by incurring *financial liabilities* such
as loans, mortgages, and credit card debt. However, the assets they have
accumulated generate *income* from employment, rental of physical
assets, interest or dividends from financial assets. (Of course,
government derives most of its income from taxes.) This income must be
balanced against expenses for *consumption* (e.g., households' purchases
of shelter, food, clothing, medical care, entertainment and other goods
and services), and *production* (e.g., businesses' and government
agencies' payments for raw materials, infrastructure, and employees'
labor), as well as *investment* in additional assets (e.g.,
training/education to increase human assets, equipment to provide more
efficient production). Finally, social units vary in the amounts of
resources they possess. As noted in Chapter 6, households with certain
demographic characteristics such as ethnic minorities, aged, and
female-headed status frequently have fewer resources. Similarly, small
businesses (i.e., those with few employees) and small local
jurisdictions (i.e., those with small tax revenues) also have fewer
resources. This makes it difficult for them to withstand an extended
disruption of the community system that is, as Chapter 6 indicated,
precisely what a major disaster produces.

*Household Activities*

Households engage in a variety of activities over the course of the day
and the amount of time spent in different activities can be described in
term of their *time budgets.* Table 11-1 reports the results of a recent
time budget study conducted by Wiley, et al. (1991). The table lists 26
different categories of activities that were combined from a larger list
of nearly 100. The activities are listed in terms of their population
means (averages) for minutes per day. Some activities are performed by
all people (e.g., sleeping) whereas others are performed by only a small
part of the population (e.g., singing and dancing), so the mean number
of minutes per day is listed separately for the entire population and
doers (i.e., those who engage in the activity).

**Table 11-1**. Community Residents' Activities.

+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| > Activity | Pop     | Doer     | Activity     | Pop     | Doer     |
|            | ulation |          |              | ulation |          |
|            | mean    | mean     |              | mean    | mean     |
|            | (min)   | (min)\*  |              | (min)   | (min)\*  |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Sleeping   | 504     | 506      | Child care   | 18      | 79       |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Working    | 194     | 424      | Active       | 16      | 88       |
|            |         |          | sports       |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Electronic | 143     | 184      | Outdoor      | 11      | 134      |
| media      |         |          | recreation   |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Travel     | 109     | 118      | Cultural     | 10      | 143      |
|            |         |          | events       |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Eating     | 89      | 93       | Errands      | 8       | 41       |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| S          | 56      | 115      | Car repair   | 6       | 48       |
| ocializing |         |          |              |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Personal   | 50      | 58       | Hobbies      | 5       | 114      |
| care       |         |          |              |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Readi      | 48      | 104      | Bars/lounges | 4       | 101      |
| ng/writing |         |          |              |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Education  | 46      | 237      | Animal care  | 3       | 33       |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Cooking    | 38      | 73       | Sin          | 3       | 106      |
|            |         |          | ging/dancing |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| House      | 34      | 87       | Other        | 2       | 29       |
| cleaning   |         |          |              |         |          |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Shopping   | 25      | 66       | Dry cleaners | 1       | 73       |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+
| Yard work  | 20      | 111      | Services     | 1       | 83       |
+------------+---------+----------+--------------+---------+----------+

Adapted from Wiley, et al. (1991).

These time budget data reveal two significant aspects of people's daily
activities. First, some activities such as sleeping and eating are
essential, as indicated by small differences between population means
and doer means. By contrast, other activities such as cultural events
and singing/dancing are highly discretionary, as indicated by large
differences between population means and doer means. Discretionary
activities can be substantially reduced or eliminated when the need
arises. Second, some of the activities with large differences between
population means and doer means arise from the household division of
labor in which some activities are age or gender stereotyped. For
example, adult males are more likely to be the household members
involved in yard work and car repair, whereas adult females are more
likely to be the ones involved in shopping and child care. In recent
years, it is increasingly likely for both adult males and females to be
involved in work outside the home. However, children of both genders
participate in education. As will be seen later, households attempt to
maintain their normal patterns of daily activities in the face of
disasters---especially what are considered to be the most essential
activities---as well as household members' division of labor in
performing those activities.

*Business Activities*

The businesses in most towns and cities produce a wide variety of goods
and services. The Bureau of the Census devised the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS, revised in 2002), which was
formerly known as the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). NAICS
categorizes all businesses into 20 industries and assigns a numerical
code to each. Table 11-2 shows the two digit codes for these industries,
but this is a very coarse grouping. These broad industrial classes are
divided into finer categories that are identified by six digit codes
(see www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/).

**Table 11-2**. North American Industry Classification System (2002).

+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| Co | Activity                    | Co | Activity                    |
| de |                             | de |                             |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 11 | Agriculture, Forestry,      | 53 | Real Estate & Rental &      |
|    | Fishing & Hunting           |    | Leasing                     |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 21 | Mining                      | 54 | Professional, Scientific,   |
|    |                             |    | and Technical Services      |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 22 | Utilities                   | 55 | Management of Companies and |
|    |                             |    | Enterprises                 |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 23 | Construction                | 56 | Administrative and Support  |
|    |                             |    | and Waste Management and    |
|    |                             |    | Remediation Services        |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 3  | Manufacturing               | 61 | Educational Services        |
| 1- |                             |    |                             |
| 33 |                             |    |                             |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 42 | Wholesale Trade             | 62 | Health Care and Social      |
|    |                             |    | Assistance                  |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 4  | Retail Trade                | 71 | Arts, Entertainment, and    |
| 4- |                             |    | Recreation                  |
| 45 |                             |    |                             |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 4  | Transportation &            | 72 | Accommodation and Food      |
| 8- | Warehousing                 |    | Services                    |
| 49 |                             |    |                             |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 51 | Information                 | 81 | Other Services              |
|    |                             |    |                             |
|    |                             |    | (except Public              |
|    |                             |    | Administration)             |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+
| 52 | Finance and Insurance       | 92 | Public Administration       |
+----+-----------------------------+----+-----------------------------+

Each community has its own pattern of reliance on these 20 industries,
which can be assessed in terms of its location quotient,

> LQ = (e~i~/e~t~)/(E~i~/E~t~)

where *e~i~* is local employment in industry *i*, *e~t~* is total local
employment, *E~i~* is national employment in industry *i*, and *E~t~* is
total national employment (Blair & Bingham, 2000). Some of the
industries in Table 11-2 generate more exports from the community to
other areas of the country and, thus, define its *economic base*.

More specifically, the economic base model identifies the relative
amount of the community's production of goods and services that is
derived from basic (export) economic activities, internal investment,
and internal consumption (Chapin & Kaiser, 1985). More money is
available for internal investment and consumption when exports, the sale
of goods and services outside the community, exceed imports. Indeed, a
*multiplier effect* is set in motion when money that is received from
outside the community is spent inside the community. As a result, urban
areas obtain between \$1.50 and \$2.50 in induced local income for every
dollar of revenue from exports (Blair & Bingham, 2000). The size of the
multiplier for any given region can be determined from input-output
analyses that use detailed information about the degree to which the
firms in each sector obtain their inputs (raw materials and
infrastructure) from inside the community and export their outputs to
firms outside the community. This is modified by the size of each
economic sector in that region. In general, mining, manufacturing,
wholesale and retail trade, banking and finance, and high quality
service facilities (e.g., nationally renowned medical clinics) are
considered to be significant contributors to a community's economic
base. However, there can be exceptions to this rule and it can be
difficult to clearly classify businesses as basic or service activities,
to define the base area, and to measure the size of the base and service
sectors (Chapin & Kaiser, 1985).

These economic concepts also have significant implications for disaster
recovery. First, communities having a weak economic base characterized
by low exports, low investments, and high internal consumption will need
considerable assistance in recovering from a disaster. Second, basic
industries that produce exports should receive immediate attention in
the disaster aftermath so they can generate income whose multiplier
effect will stimulate local investment and consumption. This will spread
the recovery to other community industries.

*Government activities*. The governments of most local
jurisdictions---towns, cities, and counties---perform a variety of
functions that cannot reasonably be performed by businesses in the
private sector (Caiden, 1982; Graham & Hays, 1993; Nigro & Nigro, 1980).
Each function is assigned to governmental subunit called an agency or
department. All of the departments report to the jurisdiction's CAO, who
might be a mayor, city manager, or Chair of the County Board of
Supervisors. Figure 11-2 displays an organization chart listing the
departments typically found in local jurisdictions and indicates the
direct reporting relationship by the solid line connecting each
department directly to the CAO.

[**Figure 11-2**. Sample Jurisdictional Organization Chart.]{.underline}

The seven departments at the bottom are usually called *line agencies,*
whereas the six departments at the top of the organization chart are
labeled *staff agencies*. In general, line agencies deliver services
directly to the public, whereas staff agencies provide services to the
line agencies and each other. By this point, it should be clear what
*Emergency Management* does, so that department will not be discussed
further. Among the other staff agencies, *Intergovernmental/Public
Relations* provides information about the jurisdiction's activities to
those outside the organization. The *Human Resources* department
develops and oversees the jurisdiction's systems for personnel
recruitment, selection, training, and performance evaluation. *Finance &
Administration* is responsible for budget preparation and control,
accounting, property assessment, taxes and licenses, procurement, and
property and records management. *Planning* assesses population and
economic trends, develops the comprehensive plan and the capital
improvements plan, formulates policies for land use regulation, and
grants permits for land development. *Legal Counsel* is responsible for
drafting ordinances, resolutions, and business contracts, as well as
rendering legal opinions about proposed administrative actions and
representing the jurisdiction in lawsuits.

Among the line agencies, *Law Enforcement* conducts patrols and criminal
investigations, and operates jails. *Fire/Rescue* is responsible for
fire prevention, fire suppression, hazmat response, and EMS. *Public
Works* is responsible for constructing and maintaining public buildings,
streets, and lights; traffic engineering; sewers and storm drains; and
garbage and trash collection. The *Social Services* department
administers public housing and welfare programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and food stamps. *Public Health* monitors
environmental contamination, epidemics, and immunizations. *Parks &
Recreation* maintains public parks and administers programs for
children's athletics and some noncredit adult education. The department
of *Building Construction* reviews and approves building blueprints,
inspects new construction at critical points in the construction
process, and inspects existing buildings to determine if they must be
condemned as unsafe for habitation. In some communities, an *Electric
Utility* that purchases power and operates the electric distribution
system would be added to this organization chart. The figure includes no
*Education* department because this function is usually performed by an
independent school district.

**An Overview of Community Disaster Recovery**

Disaster recovery is the phase of the emergency management cycle that
begins with the stabilization of the incident and ends when the
community has recovered from the disaster's impacts. The term *incident
stabilization* refers to the point in time at which the immediate
threats to human safety and property resulting from the physical impacts
of the primary and secondary hazard agents have been resolved. Thus, the
sense of uncertainty and urgency that is the hallmark of the emergency
response is beginning to be replaced by thoughts about how to rebuild
damaged structures, restore infrastructure services, and return the
community to its normal patterns of activity. For example, earthquake
recovery could be said to begin after most buried victims have been
extricated, buildings in danger of collapse have been shored up, and
fires have been extinguished.

As Chapter 6 indicated, most people's objective in disaster recovery is
to restore the patterns of household, business, and government activity
exactly as they existed before the disaster struck. To do this, they
typically assume they must rebuild the buildings and infrastructure as
it was. Of course, it is now understood that restoring the community to
its previous status will also reproduce the hazard exposure, physical
vulnerability, and social vulnerability that led to the disaster. Thus,
there are four questions that must be addressed. First, do stricken
communities recover from disasters and, if so, how do they acquire the
resources needed to replace those that were destroyed? Second, what
happens to households, businesses, and government agencies as they
struggle to recover? Third, can communities do to promote a more rapid,
complete, and equitable recovery? Finally, what can communities do to
reduce their hazard exposure and make themselves more resilient when
extreme environmental events occur?

The answer to the first question is that US communities clearly do
recover relatively quickly from disasters. There is general agreement
with the explanation offered by Friesma, et al. (1979) that the local
economic costs of disasters are redistributed over the entire country by
means of an extensive network of social, economic, and political
linkages. The paths to recovery appear to be determined by the physical
characteristics of the disaster agent, the types and quantities of
community resources that survive the disaster, the external aid the
community can obtain, and the reconstruction strategies these
communities adopt and implement. However, the fact that communities *as
a whole* recover does not mean that specific neighborhoods or households
within those neighborhoods recover at the same rate or even at all.
Similarly, it does not mean specific economic sectors or individual
businesses within those sectors will be able to maintain or even resume
operations. Thus, it is important to anticipate which population
segments and economic sectors will have the most difficulty in
recovering. This will enable community authorities to intervene with
technical and financial assistance when it is needed, monitor their
recovery, and encourage them to adopt hazard mitigation measures to
reduce their hazard vulnerability.

Disaster recovery has both physical and social dimensions that arise
from the physical and social impacts described in Chapter 6. Thus,
disaster recovery includes actions taken to cope with
casualties---households must find emotion focused strategies for dealing
with the loss of affective support from loved ones, as well as problem
focused strategies for coping with the loss of physical resources needed
to generate an income, manage the home, and rear the children. Moreover,
injuries can add the emotional strain of reassuring those who have been
hurt and the financial strain of their medical care. Similarly,
businesses must cope with the unavailability of trained personnel who
might be dead, injured, overwhelmed with caring for families and
friends, or simply trying to find a place for their households to eat,
sleep, and resume a semblance of a normal life.

Disaster recovery also includes actions taken to cope with property
damage. Thus, households must repair minor damage and rebuild
substantially damaged property. Businesses and government agencies
repair commercial and industrial structures, critical facilities such as
hospitals, police stations and fire stations, and infrastructure such as
water, sewer, electric power, fuel, transportation, and
telecommunications.

Perhaps the most distinctive, but unfortunately elusive, aspect of
disaster recovery is the restoration of disrupted community social
routines and economic activities. The process of "getting back to
normal" involves restoring people's psychological stability, learning
positive lessons from the disaster experience, and restoring satisfying
patterns of interaction with family, friends, relatives, neighbors, and
coworkers. It also involves returning to full-time employment that
provides at least a preimpact level of income and reestablishing normal
patterns of community governance.

Unfortunately, "normal" is almost inevitably what got the community in
trouble in the first place. When cities allow too much development in
floodplains, or in fireprone foothills, or allow substandard housing to
be built that collapses in an earthquake, "normal" is an unsustainable
condition. Consequently, a disaster resilient community learns from its
harsh experience which areas of the community have excessive levels of
hazard exposure. It also identifies the types of buildings,
infrastructure, and critical facilities that have inadequate designs,
construction methods, and construction materials. Finally, it recognizes
which households, businesses, and government agencies have inadequate
resources, lifestyles, or operational patterns that make them unable to
recover effectively from a disaster.

Moreover, a disaster resilient community learns how to use the disaster
as a focusing event that changes people's beliefs about their hazard
vulnerability, the availability of hazard adjustments to reduce that
vulnerability, and the portfolio of hazard adjustments that is likely to
be most suitable for their community. In addition, a disaster resilient
community develops effective mechanisms for mobilizing community support
to change development policies as well as government capacity and
commitment for implementing those policies effectively.

# The Recovery Process

This section begins by examining the most prominent typologies of
disaster phases---periods of time that are characterized by specific
types of activities. Next, it describes the typical processes involved
in household and business recovery.

*Phases of Disaster Recovery*

Researchers have divided disaster recovery into a number of stages, but
these definitions vary. Kates and Pijawka's (1977) frequently cited four
phase model begins with the *emergency* period, which lasts for a period
that ranges from a few days to a few weeks and encompasses the emergency
response period when the EOP is implemented. Next comes the
*restoration* period, when repairs to utilities are made, debris is
removed, evacuees return, and residential, commercial, and industrial
structures are repaired. This period can take weeks to months. The third
phase, the *reconstruction replacement* period, involves rebuilding
capital stocks and returning the economy to predisaster levels. This
period can take months to years. Finally, there is the *development*
phase, when commemorative structures are built, memorial dates are
institutionalized, and attempts are made to improve the community.
Sullivan (2003) used a similar typology consisting of four
"intra-recovery elements". These include *post-impact*, *restoration*,
*replacement/reconstruction*, and *commemorative, betterment, and
developmental* reconstruction.

Others have divided the recovery period into somewhat different phases.
United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO, 1984) called the
period from the disaster impact to Day 5 the *immediate relief* period,
followed by the *rehabilitation* (Day 5 to Month 3) and *reconstruction*
(Month 3 onward) periods. Schwab and his colleagues (1998) adopted a
similar three phase typology that broadly distinguished among *emergency
response*, *short term recovery*, and *long term recovery*. Alexander
(1993) described three stages of disaster recovery, with the first, the
*rehabilitation* stage, involving the continuing care of victims. During
the *temporary reconstruction* stage, temporary bracing is installed for
unstable buildings and bridges and prefabricated or other temporary
housing is established. Finally, the *permanent reconstruction* stage
relies on good administration and management to achieve full community
recovery.

As was the case with conceptualizing emergency management as a sequence
of phases---hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency
response, and disaster recovery---defining disaster recovery as a
sequence of phases is also problematic. Even the early formulations
noted that these phases often overlap in practice, shortening the whole
recovery period (Kates, 1977). It is now generally accepted that
disaster recovery encompasses multiple activities, some implemented
sequentially and others implemented simultaneously. At any one time,
some households might be engaged in one set of recovery activities while
others are engaged in other recovery activities. Indeed, some households
might be fully recovered months or years after others and there might be
households or businesses that never recover at all. Thus, attempts to
define finely differentiated phases of disaster recovery are inherently
limited in their validity. Because of the simple and self explanatory
nature of their typology, Schwab and his colleagues' (1998) very broad
distinctions among emergency response, short term recovery, and long
term recovery will be used to organize the discussion in the rest this
chapter. However, the sections that follow begin with a description of
what happens to two basic social units---households and businesses.

*Facilitating Conditions for Disaster Recovery*

Rubin (1991) found that community recovery depends upon a number of
variables. Three of these variables cannot be controlled by local
government. These are *federal influences and conditions*, *state
influences and conditions*, and *community based needs and demands for
action*. By contrast, local governments do have some control over
*personal leadership*, *ability to act*, and *knowing what to do*. One
important commonality among the 14 cases Rubin, et al. (1985) studied is
that the speed, efficiency, and equity of community recovery depended
significantly upon local government's ability to improvise effective
recovery strategies. That is, communities recovered more quickly and
effectively if they could identify and respond to the specific problems
that arose from its unique circumstances.

Rubin and her colleagues' (Rubin, 1991; Rubin, et al., 1985) research on
disaster recovery is consistent with other researchers' (see Drabek,
1986; Tierney, et al., 2001) findings on emergency response in
suggesting that disaster recovery will be facilitated if local
government agencies anticipate the most significant recovery demands in
terms of their likelihood of occurrence and criticality to the recovery
process. Anticipating recovery demands allows local agencies to plan
their organizational structures and general strategies before disaster
impact and improvise their tactics during recovery rather than improvise
the entire recovery effort---organizational structures, strategies,
tactics, and operational procedures---during the midst of the emergency
response. Similarly, disaster recovery is facilitated if the recovery
organization identifies the resources it will need, and the sources of
those personnel, equipment, and supplies. Thus, preimpact recovery
preparedness will increase emergency managers' ability to act and
enhance the personal leadership exercised during disaster recovery.

Predisaster planning is an excellent way to direct people's attention to
the demands of disaster recovery (Schwab, et al., 1998). These scholars
view the recovery process as a set of sequenced tasks that are performed
in different locations, rather than distinct phases. There are short
term decisions such as where to locate displaced households and how to
remove and dispose of debris. There are also long term decisions such as
how to finance reconstruction, where to allow rebuilding, and how to
revitalize the local economy. According to Schwab, et al. (1998), timely
and effective recovery decisions benefit from a predisaster recovery
preparedness process that is undertaken at the same time as emergency
preparedness, comprehensive planning, and mitigation planning (see
Figure 11-3).

Developing preimpact plans for disaster recovery allows a community to
ensure hazard mitigation and sustainable development are incorporated
into recovery. Preimpact recovery plans can help local officials resist
postimpact pressure to restore their community to the *status quo ante*
that caused the disaster's physical and social impacts. By developing
disaster resilience, communities can minimize disaster impacts,
strengthen their ability to recover with minimal outside assistance, and
facilitate the recovery of all population segments and economic sectors.
These are complex issues that require time and preparation, both of
which are in short supply immediately after a disaster. Preimpact
recovery planning provides an excellent opportunity to incorporate
sustainable development goals through a process termed "holistic
disaster recovery" (Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center, 2001).

*Disaster Recovery Functions*

The strategic contingencies involved in the recovery process can be
represented in terms of a network of tasks that need to be performed by
community subunits. As Path A in Figure 11-4 indicates, affected
households go through a process that can be described in terms of their
movement through emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary
housing, and permanent housing (Quarantelli, 1982).

[**Figure 11-3**. The Relationship of Disaster Recovery to other Hazard
Management Activities.]{.underline}

As Path D indicates, affected businesses pass through a slightly
different sequence because they can suspend operations (represented as a
dashed line) until they find a temporary operating location. As Path B
indicates, households and businesses need utilities such as
water/wastewater, electric power, fuel, transportation, and
telecommunications before they can resume normal operations. Finally,
Path C is especially important because disaster assessment and a federal
disaster declaration are preconditions for the federal financial aid
that the most severely stricken communities need to support the
restoration of public infrastructure and the recovery of households and
businesses. To explain this figure more completely, the following
sections examine household recovery, business recovery, infrastructure
restoration, and the disaster declaration process.

### **Household Recovery**

There are three basic components to household recovery. These are
housing recovery, employment recovery, and psychological recovery (Bolin
& Trainer, 1978). All three of these components require resources to
recover. However, households must invest time to obtain these resources.
This includes time to find and purchase alternate shelter, clothing,
food, furniture, and appliances to support daily living (Yelvington,
1997). Time is also needed to file insurance claims, apply for loans and
grants, and search for jobs. The time required for these tasks is
increased by multiple trips to obtain required documentation and
understaffing of providers (Morrow, 1997). FEMA provides telephone
registration, but its value was undercut by loss of telephone service
after Hurricane Andrew. Moreover, there will be increased commuting time
to work, shopping, and services if cars, street signs, traffic signals,
and landmarks are destroyed and no public transit is available for
weeks. Adding to the time burden is increased cost for many items due to
supply scarcities. Finally, victims needed skill and self confidence to
cope with the disaster assistance bureaucracy (Morrow, 1997).

[**Figure 11-4.** The Recovery Management Process.]{.underline}

*Housing Recovery*

Households typically use four types of housing recovery following a
disaster (Quarantelli, 1982a). The first type, *emergency shelter*,
consists of unplanned and spontaneously sought locations that are
intended only to provide protection from the elements, typically open
yards and cars after earthquakes (Bolin & Stanford, 1991, 1998). The
second type is *temporary shelter*, which includes food preparation and
sleeping facilities that usually are sought from friends and relatives
or are found in commercial lodging, although mass care facilities in
school gymnasiums or church auditoriums are acceptable as a last resort.
The third type is *temporary housing*, which allows victims to
reestablish household routines in nonpreferred locations or structures.
The last type is *permanent housing*, which reestablishes household
routines in preferred locations and structures. The process of housing
recovery can, in principle, be described as a stochastic process in
which there is a specific probability that a household will move from
one housing type to another in a given period of time (Coleman, 1964).
This produces a table in which the rows indicate the current housing
type, the columns indicate the housing type to which households move,
and the cell values are the conditional probabilities of households
moving from the row type to the column type (see Table 11-3). These
conditional probabilities are represented by the mathematical notation
P(*B*│*A*), where the symbol P (*X*) indicates the probability of event
*X*, *A* is the housing type *from* which the household moves, *B* is
the housing type *to* which it moves, and the vertical bar indicates
that this is the probability of a household being in type *B*, *given
that it previously was in type* *A*.

Unfortunately, none of the studies of housing recovery following
disasters has yet estimated the transition probabilities associated with
this process, but qualitative descriptions of the occupancy levels in
each of Quarantelli's four housing types suggests that two distinct
transition probability matrices distinguish the first week after a major
disaster from later time periods. After a disaster strikes, a
substantial number of households are forced to seek emergency shelter
(*ES*) and in the following days most of them remain in that type of
housing. Thus, according to the hypothetical probabilities in the table,
the probability of remaining in emergency shelter is P(*ES*│*ES*) =
0.6). However, a significant proportion of the households move on to
temporary shelter (*TS*), making P(*TS*│*ES*) = 0.4. None of the
households is expected to move directly from emergency shelter to
temporary housing (*TH*) or permanent housing (*PH*), so P(*TH*│*ES*) =
P(*PH*│*ES*) = 0.0. In addition, the vast majority of those in temporary
shelter remain in that housing type, so P(*TS*│*TS*) = 0.9, but a small
fraction of them move to temporary housing, so P(*TH*│*TS*) = 0.1.
Similarly, the vast majority of those in temporary housing remain in
that status \[P(*TH*│*TH*) = 0.1\], but a small fraction of them move to
permanent housing \[P(*PH*│*TH*) = 0.1\]. A small fraction of those in
permanent housing move from that status to emergency shelter or
temporary shelter because of occupants' fears about structural stability
or because building inspections have determined that the structures are
indeed unsafe.

[**Table 11-3**. Hypothetical]{.underline} Daily Housing Status
Transition Probabilities.

+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
|        | #### |      |      |      | Week |      |      |      |
|        | # We |      |      |      | 2    |      |      |      |
|        | ek 1 |      |      |      | and  |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      | be   |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      | yond |      |      |      |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
|        | Em   | Te   | Te   | Pe   | Em   | Te   | Te   | Pe   |
|        | er-g | mp-o | mp-o | rm-a | er-g | mp-o | mp-o | rm-a |
|        | ency | rary | rary | nent | ency | rary | rary | nent |
|        | She  | She  | Hou  | Hou  | She  | She  | Hou  | Hou  |
|        | lter | lter | sing | sing | lter | lter | sing | sing |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
| Eme    | .60  | .40  | .00  | .00  | .50  | .50  | .00  | .00  |
| rgency |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| S      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| helter |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
| Tem    | .00  | .90  | .10  | .00  | .00  | .90  | .10  | .00  |
| porary |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| S      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| helter |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
| Tem    | .00  | .00  | .95  | .05  | .00  | .00  | .95  | .05  |
| porary |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| H      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| ousing |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
| Per    | .03  | .05  | .00  | .92  | .00  | .00  | .00  | 1.00 |
| manent |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| H      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| ousing |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
+--------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+

According to these hypothetical probabilities, Weeks 2 and beyond differ
from Week 1 in two respects. First, the rate at which households move
from emergency shelter to temporary shelter is higher in Week 2 than in
Week 1. Second, the rates at which households move from permanent
housing to emergency shelter and temporary shelter is lower than in
Week 1. These transition probabilities can be used to generate a
distribution over time of the postdisaster housing status of the impact
area population (see Figure 11-5).

This figure shows that the utilization of emergency shelter peaks on the
day of the disaster and declines rapidly thereafter. However, this
decrease in the utilization of emergency shelter does not produce
immediate increases in occupancy rates for permanent shelter. Indeed,
the proportion of the affected population in permanent shelter continues
to decline because many households must move to this state through the
two intermediate housing types. Thus, the transition probabilities in
Table 11-3 result in the displaced population continuing to rise,
reaching a delayed peak some days after impact. These results are
generally consistent with Bolin's (1993) finding that it took nine days
for shelter occupancy to peak after the Whittier Narrows earthquake.
Other support can be found in data from Hurricane Andrew. Yelvington
(1997) reported that temporary shelters experienced increased demand as
buildings were condemned by authorities or landlords begin
reconstruction on damaged structures. On 4 September, 10 days after
Hurricane Andrew, there were 41 people at Harris Field and 58 people at
Florida City. Three days later the figures were 1125 and 467,
respectively. By the end of September, there were more than 4000 people
in four tent cities.

Sites for temporary shelter include homes of friends and relatives,
commercial facilities such as hotels and motels, and mass care
facilities such as Red Cross shelters. Lindell, et al. (2004) reported
that during Hurricane Lili 3% of evacuees stayed in Red Cross shelters,
30% in hotels and motels, and 53% with friends and relatives. The
percentage staying in shelters averages 15% but ranges from less than 1%
to over 43% (Mileti, et al., 1992). The location where a household seeks
temporary shelter is relatively predictable. Severity of damage and the
availability of relatives nearby predict who stays with relatives,
whereas income, homeownership, and availability of relatives nearby
predicts who accepts relatives (Morrow, 1997). Moreover, kin networks
are likely to seek temporary shelter together, especially if all
relatives became victims because they lived so close together
(Yelvington, 1997). Households with higher incomes who lack nearby
friends and relatives with undamaged homes seek commercial facilities,
whereas lower income households in such conditions are forced to accept
mass care facilities.

[**Figure 11-5.** Impact Area Residents' Changes in Housing Status over
Time.]{.underline}

![](media/image1.wmf){width="5.833464566929134in"
height="2.9799212598425195in"}

Areas with large minority populations can pose problems for disaster
assistance administrators because of their extended households (Bolin,
1993; Yelvington, 1997). Some are multigenerational (grandparents,
parents, and children), whereas others are multinuclear kinship (linked
by siblings) or multinuclear friendship (originating from the same town
or province). These complex household structures create problems in
identifying a single *head of household* to whom an assistance check can
be issued. In addition to the normal reluctance to seek mass shelter and
housing, some victims hesitate to approach authorities because they have
no immigration documents (Yelvington, 1997).

Similarly, sites for temporary housing include homes of friends and
relatives, commercial facilities such as rental houses and apartments,
and mass facilities such as trailer parks. Some of these sites are in or
near the stricken community, but others are hundreds or even thousands
of miles away. Lack of alternative housing within an acceptable distance
of jobs or peers led some households to leave the Miami area after
Hurricane Andrew. The population loss was 18% in South Dade County, 33%
in Florida City, and 31% in Homestead (Dash, Peacock & Morrow, 1997).
Other households remained in severely damaged units---or even condemned
units---without electric power or telephone service for months
(Yelvington, 1997) or doubled up with relatives (Morrow, 1997).

The loss of housing in a disaster can be extremely problematic in a
tight housing market. After Hurricane Andrew, housing availability
dropped to 1.6% from 5.5% a year earlier. This shortage increased rents
by 15-20%, which priced low income victims out of the market
(Yelvington, 1997). Even when temporary housing can be found, the return
to permanent housing can be long. In one working class neighborhood, the
average length of displacement was 95 days and the percentage of
returnees was still only 62% nearly a year after the disaster (Morrow,
1997).

Households encounter many problems during reconstruction, including high
prices for repairs, poor quality work, and contract breaches (Bolin,
1993). The rebuilt structures do benefit from improved quality and
hazard resistance (Bolin, 1993, indicates 50% of respondents reported
this) and this is especially true for public housing (Morrow, 1997).
However, few victims think the improvements are worth the inconvenience
they experienced.

As noted in Chapter 6, lower income households tend to have higher
hazard exposure because they live in more hazard prone locations. They
also have higher physical vulnerability because they live in structures
that were built according to older, less stringent building codes, used
lower quality construction materials and methods, and have been less
well maintained (Bolin & Bolton, 1986). Because lower income households
have fewer resources on which to draw for recovery, they also take
longer to return to permanent housing, sometimes remaining for extended
periods of time in severely damaged homes (Girard & Peacock, 1997).
Indeed, they sometimes are forced to accept as permanent what originally
was intended as temporary housing (Peacock, et al., 1987). Consequently,
there might still be low income households in temporary sheltering and
temporary housing even after high income households all have relocated
to permanent housing (Berke, et al., 1993; Rubin, et al., 1985).

*Employment Recovery*

Insurance coverage varies by hazard agent, with Bolin and Bolton (1986)
reporting 86% coverage for a tornado and Bolin (1993) reporting 25% for
an earthquake. Risk area residents are particularly likely to forego
earthquake insurance because they consider premiums to be too high and
deductibles too large (Palm, et al., 1990). Income, education, and
occupational status all correlate with earthquake insurance purchase
(Bolin, 1993).

Strategies for coping with uninsured losses include obtaining SBA or
commercial loans, obtaining FEMA or NGO grants, withdrawing savings, and
deciding not to replace damaged items (Bolin, 1993). SBA loans can be
problematic because they involve long term debt that takes many years to
repay (Bolin, 1993). FEMA grants require households to meet specific
standards, including proof that they are indeed residents of the
disaster impact area. However, there can be problems in registering
people who evacuated or were rescued without identification (Yelvington,
1997). Relaxed standards seem humane but can allow the chronically
homeless and out of area construction workers to obtain access to
services intended only for disaster victims. In turn, resentment toward
"freeloaders" can curtail services to victims.

Some households' economic recovery takes place quickly, but others'
takes much longer. For example, the percentage of households reporting
complete economic recovery after the Whittier earthquake was 50% at the
end of the first year but 21% reported little of no recovery even at the
end of four years (Bolin, 1993). Economic recovery was positively
related to household income and negatively related to structural damage,
household size, and the total number of moves (Bolin, 1993). In some
cases, this is due to the loss of permanent jobs that are replaced only
by temporary jobs in temporary shelter management, debris cleanup, and
construction---or are not replaced at all (Yelvington, 1997).

There are systematic differences in the rate of economic recovery among
ethnic groups. For example, Bolin and Bolton (1986) found that Black
households (30%) lagged behind Whites (51%) in their return to preimpact
economic conditions eight months after the 1982 Paris, Texas, tornado.
However, the variables affecting economic recovery were relatively
similar for Black and White families (see Figure 11-6). In both ethnic
groups, economic recovery was negatively related to family size (larger
families had lower levels of recovery), but positively related to
socioeconomic status (SES---education, profession, and income), use of
disaster assistance, insurance adequacy, and aid adequacy. In addition,
Black household recovery was negatively related to primary group aid and
the number of household moves. The direct effect of family size and SES
on economic recovery was compounded by the indirect effects of these
variables via their impacts on the use of disaster assistance, insurance
adequacy, aid adequacy, and household moves. The variables that had
positive direct effects on economic recovery (use of disaster
assistance, insurance adequacy, aid adequacy) were negatively related to
family size and positively related to SES. That is, larger households
were less likely---and higher SES households were more likely---to use
disaster assistance, have adequate insurance, or receive adequate aid.
Moreover, these variables were positively related to family size and
negatively related to SES. That is, larger households made more moves
and higher SES households made fewer moves. The overall effect of this
complex pattern of relationships is for large poor households to be
doubly handicapped in their economic recovery.

[**Figure 11-6.** Patterns of Household Economic Recovery.]{.underline}

Source: Bolin and Bolton (1986)

*Psychological Recovery*

Few victims develop major psychological problems from disaster impacts.
Indeed, Gerrity and Flynn (1997, p. 108) proposed "the overarching
principle of mental health services after disasters is that the
recipients of services are normal people, responding normally, to a very
abnormal situation." Consequently, the vast majority of disaster victims
experience mild psychological distress. For example, Bolin and Bolton
(1986) found negative impacts such as upsets with storms (61%), time
pressures (48%), lack of patience (38%), and strained family
relationships (31%) after the Paris Texas tornado. However, victims also
experienced positive impacts including strengthened family relationships
(91%), decreased importance of material possessions (62%), and increased
family happiness (23%). The data showed only minor differences between
Blacks and Whites in the prevalence of psychosocial impacts.

Similarly, roughly 35% of affected households reported one or more
symptoms of psychological distress attributable to the Whittier
earthquake (Bolin, 1993). These included startle response (60%), sadness
(38%), avoidant thinking (36%), vivid upsetting memories (33%),
unexplained agitation (29%), social isolation (25%), bad dreams (20%),
and sleep disturbances (15%). Degree of emotional recovery was
positively related to age, male gender, previous disaster experience,
social integration, and receipt of aid from primary groups.

Researchers have also examined public records in their search for
psychological impacts of disasters. For example, Morrow's (1997)
examination of vital statistics (births, marriages, deaths, and divorce
applications) had no significant long term trends due to Hurricane
Andrew. However, domestic violence rates remained constant for about six
months after the hurricane but increased about 50% for nearly two years
after that. In all, only 12% of the households affected by Hurricane
Andrew expressed a need for counseling (Morrow, 1997). After the
Whittier earthquake, Disaster Assistance Centers referred only 5% of
victims to mental health counseling (Bolin, 1993). The effects most of
these victims have experienced are usually not debilitating but are,
rather, part of the normal process of grieving people use to understand
and assimilate important, traumatic events. Moreover, victims accumulate
many minor and major frustrations throughout the disaster recovery. This
is especially true for those who must interact repeatedly with public
(governmental) and private (e.g., insurance companies) bureaucracies.

Nonetheless, there are especially vulnerable groups that might need
extra attention if they show signs of long standing problems due to the
disaster. It should be obvious that people with preexisting mental
conditions are likely to need postdisaster psychological support.
Moreover, victims who have witnessed the death or severe injury of loved
ones should have professional psychological services available (Perry &
Lindell, 1978). Single female heads of household experienced extremely
high levels of stress in their relationships with significant others,
children, and relatives and friends (Morrow, 1997). In a community where
the schools were on half day sessions, children in one third of families
displayed behavioral problems (Morrow, 1997). Moreover, approximately
50% of children displayed symptoms of moderate to severe PTSD after
Hurricane Andrew (Vernberg, LaGreca, Silverman & Prinstein, 1996).
Finally, professionals involved in particularly difficult search
operations and medical personnel who handle extraordinary work loads
during disaster periods might also benefit from postdisaster counseling.

In summary, the majority of victims and responders recover relatively
quickly from the stress of disasters without psychological
interventions. Those who suffer the greatest losses to their material
resources (e.g., the destruction of their homes) and their social
networks (e.g., spouses and other family members) are likely to
experience the most psychological distress, but not necessarily an
amount that is personally unmanageable. Thus, the appropriate strategy
for psychological recovery by victims and first responders seems to be
one of minimal intervention to provide information about sources of
material support (for victims) and to facilitate optional involvement in
social and emotional support groups (for victims and first responders).

*Sources of household recovery assistance*. Household recovery can also
be defined in terms of the sources of assistance. Bolin and Trainer
(1978) defined these sources as the family structure (stage in the
family lifecycle) and resources (socioeconomic status), the kinship
network (cohesiveness), and the community resource (financial, human,
and material resources) and normative (beliefs about appropriate
policies for distributing postdisaster aid) structure. The extent to
which households rely on one or another of these sources of recovery
assistance defines their mode of recovery as autonomous, kinship, or
institutional---although few households actually rely on only one
source.

Autonomous recovery depends on the household's available human,
material, and financial resources. Human resources are available to the
extent the household members have come through the disaster alive,
uninjured, and with a sense of optimism that they can recover. Household
recovery also depends on the degree to which members can continue to
derive generate income from employment, rental of physical assets, or
interest/dividends from financial assets. Moreover, household recovery
depends on the degree to which material resources are available. This
includes the extent to which its possessions---land, buildings,
equipment, furniture, clothes, vehicles, crops, and animals---are
undamaged or can be restored at reasonable expense. A household's
recovery also depends on the degree to which its financial resources are
available. This includes an ability to withdraw savings quickly from
banks, to quickly liquidate stocks and bonds at a fair price, and to
receive adequate compensation from its insurer. In some cases, household
recovery also depends on the degree to which creditors will accept
delayed payments on financial liabilities such as loans, mortgages, and
credit card debt. Finally, household recovery depends on the degree to
which members can reduce consumption such as purchases of shelter, food,
clothing, medical care, entertainment, and other goods and services).

Kinship recovery depends on the physical proximity of other nuclear
families in the kin network, the closeness of the psychological ties
within the network, the assets of the other families and, of course, the
extent to which those families also suffered losses. Institutional
recovery quite obviously depends on whether victims meet the
qualification standards, usually documented residence in the impact area
and proof of loss. However, institutional recovery depends more subtly
on households' ability to devote the time and effort required to travel
to assistance centers and wait to process any applications, the
availability of transportation and child care needed to free that time
from other activities, and the ability to fill out the paperwork and
cope with the impersonal bureaucratic requirements of the recovery
system.

Some aspects of household recovery are relatively similar across ethnic
groups, but others reveal distinct differences. For example, Table 11-4
shows Anglos, Blacks, and Hispanics experienced similar levels of
frustration in coping with the challenges of living in damaged homes,
job relocation, dealing with agencies, behavioral problems with
children, and loss of household members. However, most of these
commonalities were for relatively infrequently experienced problems (the
ones listed at the bottom of the table). By contrast, there were
significant differences in the experience of other problems, many of
which were frequently experienced. For some problems, the Anglos
reported the greatest frequency of frustration, whereas for other
problems it was Hispanics experiencing the greatest frustrations. In
general, Blacks had the highest level of frustration with more problems
than either of the other two groups.

# Business Recovery

Several studies of the economic impacts of environmental disasters have
examined the ways in which individual businesses prepare for, are
disrupted by, and recover from these events. Dahlhamer and D'Souza
(1997), Dahlhamer and Reshaur (1996), Drabek (1991c, 1995), Lindell and
Perry (1998), Tierney (1997a, 1997b), Tierney and Dahlhamer (1998), and
Whitney, et al. (2001) studied the adoption of hazard adjustment (hazard
mitigation, emergency preparedness, and disaster recovery preparedness)
measures for environmental hazards. These studies found older, larger
(measured by the number of employees), and more financially stable
businesses are more likely to adopt hazard adjustments, as are
businesses in the manufacturing, professional services, and finance,
insurance and real estate sectors.

These studies have found disasters disrupt business operations through a
variety of mechanisms (Alesch, et al., 1993; Kroll, et al., 1990;
Tierney, 1997b; Tierney & Nigg, 1995; Webb, et al., 2000). Direct
physical damage to buildings, equipment, vehicles, and inventories has
obvious effects on business operations. However, it might be less
obvious that disruption of infrastructure such as water/sewer, electric
power, fuel, transportation, and telecommunications frequently forces
businesses to shut down in the aftermath of a disaster. For example,
Tierney (1997b) reported that extensive lifeline service interruption
after the 1993 Midwest floods caused a large number of business closures
in Des Moines, Iowa, even though the physical damage was confined to a
relatively small area.

**Table 11-4**. Household Recovery Problems, by Ethnic Group.

  ---------------------------------------- ------- ------- ---------- -------
  Problem Perceived To Be Large            Anglo   Black   Hispanic   Total

  Dealing with mortgage companies about    68      49      68         64\*
  insurance money                                                     

  Dealing with building inspectors         52      38      76         63\*

  Living in damaged home                   59      63      59         60

  Neighborhood conditions                  55      60      39         47\*

  Living in temporary quarters             45      61      38         46\*

  Dealing with insurance companies         33      26      48         40\*

  Dealing with contractors                 38      18      45         37\*

  Unemployment                             11      29      30         25\*

  Household finances                       14      40      20         22\*

  Neighborhood crime                       34      23      16         22\*

  Transportation                           2       28      17         16\*

  Job relocation                           7       21      17         15

  Dealing with agencies                    11      20      13         15

  Behavioral problems with children        19      18      10         14

  Family violence                          17      11      5          9\*

  Gain of member(s)                        14      0       4          5\*

  Loss of member(s)                        4       0       13         4
  ---------------------------------------- ------- ------- ---------- -------

Source: Morrow (1997) Difference between highest and lowest percentage
significant at p \< .05.

Small businesses are more physically vulnerable because they are more
likely than large businesses to be located in nonengineered buildings
and are less likely to have the capacity to design and implement hazard
management programs to reduce this physical vulnerability. Thus, in this
respect, small businesses are equivalent to the most physically
vulnerable households---ones that are poor, female headed, or members of
ethnic minorities. At the same time as they face increased costs to
repair structures and replace contents, these businesses also face
reduced patronage if they must move far from their previous locations.
Three years after the Whittier earthquake, 50% of destroyed commercial
space and 100% of damaged commercial space had been replaced (Bolin,
1993). In the meantime, however, a number of businesses in the old
central business district---predominantly located in unreinforced
masonry structures---were forced to relocate. Because Whittier is
located within the Los Angeles metropolitan area, local residents could
readily obtain the goods and services they needed from undamaged
businesses in adjacent communities. Thus, by the time the space is
available for reoccupancy, it must be leased to new tenants because the
old ones did not have the resources to wait that long.

Perhaps the least obvious effects of disaster impact are population
dislocation, losses in discretionary income among those victims who
remain in the impact area---which can weaken market demand for many
products and services---and competitive pressure from large outside
businesses. All of these indirect effects cause small local businesses
to experience a high rate of failure in the aftermath of a disaster
(Alesch & Holly, 1996; Alesch, Holly, Mittler & Nagy, 2001). Indeed,
these factors can produce business failures long after the precipitating
event, especially if the community was already in economic decline
before the event (Bates & Peacock, 1993; Durkin, 1984; Webb, et al.,
2002). Thus, businesses that were marginally profitable before a
disaster strikes are more likely to close immediately after the event.

There also is variation among business sectors in their patterns of
recovery. Whereas wholesale and retail businesses generally report
experiencing significant sales losses, manufacturing and construction
companies often show gains following a disaster (Durkin, 1984; Kroll, et
al., 1990; Webb, et al., 2000). Moreover, businesses that serve a large
(e.g. regional or international) market tend to recover more rapidly
than those that only serve local markets (Webb, et al., 2002). Small
businesses, in particular, have been found to experience more obstacles
than large firms and chains in their attempts to regain their
predisaster levels of operations. Compared to their large counterparts,
small firms are more likely to depend primarily on neighborhood
customers, lack the financial resources needed for recovery, and lack
access to governmental recovery programs (Alesch & Holly, 1996; Alesch,
et al., 2001; Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1998; Durkin, 1984; Kroll, et al.,
1990). Thus, business sector and business size can be seen as indicators
of operational vulnerability that are equivalent to the demographic
indicators of social vulnerability in households.

Businesses' hazard vulnerability explains the changes a disaster causes
in businesses' production, sales, and profits and, thus, the dynamics of
business recovery. In particular, four cases can be used to illustrate
firms' variation in their postdisaster sales levels (Zhang, Lindell &
Prater, 2004). According to Figure 11-7, gains and losses in sales (the
vertical axis) over time (the horizontal axis) are defined by the area
enclosed within the (vertical) disaster line, the (horizontal)
predisaster sales level, and the (diagonal) recovery curve. Gains are
represented by the size of the area above the predisaster sales level
and losses are represented by the size of the area below the predisaster
sales level (the shaded area in each panel).

[**Figure 11-7**. Patterns of Business Sales Changes after Environmental
Disasters.]{.underline}

Source: Zhang, et al. (2004)

The first case is defined by businesses in the impact area that have
minimal hazard vulnerability. Such businesses---professional services
are an example---experience only small decreases in sales after disaster
impact and return quickly to their predisaster levels (Figure 11-7a).
The second case consists of businesses that also are in the impact area,
but have moderate vulnerability. Such businesses---large manufacturers,
for example---experience a larger initial drop in their sales levels and
their recovery takes a longer time (Figure 11-7b). Tourism oriented
businesses may also suffer initial losses and take some time to recover
to their prior level of profitability because they may be stigmatized in
the aftermath of a disaster and can take several seasons to shed the
image of danger and destruction.

By contrast, the third case consists of businesses that experience
initial sales losses because they are inside (thus experiencing direct
losses) or near (thus experiencing indirect losses) the impact area.
However, they later experience an increase in demand for their
products/services during disaster aftermath (Figure 11-7c).
Recovery--related businesses in the building construction, construction
materials, and hospitality (e.g., hotels and restaurants) industries
exemplify a pattern in which an initial loss (e.g., due to minor damage
or infrastructure disruption) is rapidly restored and followed by
increased sales. The final case describes recovery related businesses
that are just outside the impact area. Not only do they avoid any
initial losses, but they also can take advantage of expanded demand in
the disaster stricken community and reap gains in the aftermath of the
disaster (Figure 11-7d).

Although the available data are limited, some of these principles are
revealed in data from business recovery in two communities affected by
Hurricane Andrew (Dash, et al., 1997). Homestead had a larger
population, a higher per capita income, and a higher average home value
than Florida City. Homestead was 42% Anglo and 35% Hispanic, whereas
Florida City was 61% Black and 37% Hispanic. Even though Florida City is
slightly farther from the point at which the hurricane eye made
landfall, there was essentially no initial difference in the hurricane's
impact on the two city's businesses. The overall commercial property
loss after the hurricane was 29% in Homestead and 32% in Florida City.
However, Table 11-5 describes the business impacts of the hurricane in
terms of the changes in the number of businesses, number of employees,
and sales volume in each of the industries operating in these cities.

Overall, there were significant differences in the two communities over
the next year. For example, total sales volume declined 83% in Florida
City but only 1.1% in Homestead. However, inspection of Table 11-5
reveals that there are distinct differences from one industry to another
and the magnitude of the impact depends on whether one examines the
change in the number of businesses, the number of employees, or sales
volume. For example, Florida City shows dramatic declines for
agriculture on all three indicators but no change or even modest
increases in construction. By contrast, Homestead showed a slight
increase in the number of agricultural businesses, but significant
increases in the number of agricultural jobs and sales volume. Moreover,
it experienced significant declines for all three indicators in
construction---almost the opposite pattern of Florida City. These
differences in business impacts indicate local authorities should
carefully assess the businesses in their communities before a disaster
strikes and monitor their economic viability in the disaster's aftermath
to determine if government intervention is needed.

# The Role of State and Federal Governments

State and federal agencies can play significant roles in disaster
recovery, but the burden most frequently falls on local governments
because only about 19% of all disasters receive state disaster
declarations and 1% qualify for Presidential Disaster Declarations
(PDDs). Thus, local governments should prepare to undertake a variety of
functions during a disaster recovery process, understanding that they
might not receive any aid from higher levels of government for minor
disasters. The main factor affecting the level of involvement of state
and federal government is the scope of the event. After a major
disaster, a PDD opens a broad range of programs for relief and
reconstruction. In such cases, the state plays a coordinating role,
working with both federal and local governments. Moreover, disaster
response might be mostly over before the PDD is granted, but federal
assistance is certainly welcome when it finally arrives. The Recovery
Function Annex of the National Response Plan of January 2003, available
on the DHS Web site (www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/), lists 71 federal disaster
recovery programs that are administered directly by the DHS or by dozens
of other federal and volunteer organizations. The following discussion
is not exhaustive, but gives an overview of some of the key programs.

**Table 11-5. Changes in the Number of Businesses, Employees, and Sales
Volume after Hurricane Andrew.**

+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|              | Busi   |        | Emp    |        | Sales  |        |
|              | nesses |        | loyees |        | Volume |        |
|              | Change |        | Change |        | Change |        |
|              | (%)    |        | (%)    |        | (%)    |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Industry     | F      | Hom    | F      | Hom    | F      | Hom    |
|              | lorida | estead | lorida | estead | lorida | estead |
|              | City   |        | City   |        | City   |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Agriculture  | -71    | +4     | -92    | +74    | -93    | +66    |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Construction | 0      | -20    | +12    | -20    | +12    | -59    |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| M            | 0      | -12    | -67    | -19    | -59    | -32    |
| anufacturing |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Tra          | -50    | +9     | -100   | +4     | -26    | +51    |
| nsportation/ |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|              |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| c            |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ommunication |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Wholesale    | -60    | -4     | -50    | +6     | -84    | +57    |
| trade        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Retail trade | -64    | -2     | -84    | +16    | -84    | -5     |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Finance/     | -20    | 0      | -59    | -1     | -32    | -32    |
|              |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| in           |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| surance/real |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| estate       |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Business     | -63    | +6     | -94    | -5     | -65    | -14    |
| services     |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Professional | -45    | -3     | -73    | +16    | -69    | +1     |
| services     |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Public       | -50    | +38    | -69    | +7     | n/a\*  | n/a\*  |
| ad           |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ministration |        |        |        |        |        |        |
+--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+

Source: Dash, et al. (1997), Sales volume is not applicable to public
sector organizations.

The lead agency at the federal level is FEMA, renamed the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate when it was placed in the new
Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Other federal agencies might be
called upon when a PDD is granted, including the Small Business
Administration, the US Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, and the Economic Development Administration,
among others. Each of these agencies funds specific disaster recovery
programs.

The National Response Plan provides for the establishment of Disaster
Field Offices (DFOs) in the vicinity of the disaster. Emergency Response
Teams (ERTs) are located in the DFOs. These include an Operations
Section that coordinates federal, state, and voluntary efforts. The ERT
Operations Section has a Human Services Branch that is responsible for
many tasks including needs assessment; establishment of Disaster
Recovery Centers; initiation, coordination, and delivery of recovery
programs authorized by the Stafford Act; and managing DHS and state
grant programs. Finally, there is an Infrastructure Support Branch to
facilitate restoration of public utilities and other infrastructure
services. There is also a Deputy Field Coordinating Officer for
Mitigation who coordinates with the Infrastructure Support Branch and
otherwise promotes mitigation and preparedness activities.

The main types of programs providing recovery assistance are Individual
Assistance, Infrastructure Support (formerly Public Assistance), and
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. Individual Assistance is available to
households through the Temporary Housing Assistance program, Individual
and Family Grants, Disaster Unemployment assistance, legal services,
special tax considerations, and crisis counseling programs. Individuals
and businesses can receive aid through the Small Business Administration
Disaster Loans program, which can provide loans for repairs to housing
and businesses, and also for operating expenses. In the past, many loan
programs have been inaccessible to low income households, which tend to
rent rather than own their housing. Thus, they failed to qualify for
loans because of their low incomes and lack of collateral. The
Individual and Family Grant Program was intended to fill the need for a
program targeting those whose needs were not being met by the SBA loan
program, private insurance, or NGO assistance. However, the amounts
awarded tend to be small.

Public Assistance programs offered through the Infrastructure Support
Branch are targeted at state and local governments, certain nonprofit
organizations that provide emergency services, and Indian tribes. These
programs provide funds for the repair or replacement of public
facilities damaged by disaster. They may be classified as Emergency Work
under Category A (Debris Removal) or Category B (Emergency Protective
Measures) or Permanent Work, under Category C (Roads and Bridges),
Category D (Water Control Facilities), Category E (Buildings and
Equipment), Category F (Utilities), or Category G (Parks, Recreational
Facilities, and Other Items).

Assistance provided under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has
increased in importance since the passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act
of 2000. This legislation requires local governments to identify
potential mitigation measures that could be incorporated into the repair
of damaged facilities in order to be eligible for pre- and postdisaster
funding. This policy represents a significant shift from previous FEMA
policies that inhibited the implementation of mitigation measures
because repairs were only funded to the level of predisaster conditions.
The recent shift is putting more emphasis on activities eligible under
Section 406 of the Stafford Act, known as *406 mitigation.* These
activities include hazard mapping, mitigation planning, development of
building codes, development of training and public education programs,
establishing Reconstruction Information Centers, and assisting
communities to promote sustainable development.

State governments vary widely in the level of attention and resources
they devote to planning for and implementing disaster recovery. Some
states have established programs providing assistance to households and
local governments for recovery from disasters that do not receive a PDD.
In order to support these programs, some states have created state
disaster funds and designated several state level departments to provide
resources and expertise that are available during recovery. One example
is a state planning or community development department, which can
provide data or guidance on integration of sustainable development and
recovery. Other examples are state environment departments, which might
have coastal management programs or water quality programs, and state
economic development agencies, which might administer Community
Development Block Grants that can fund repairs to low income housing.

States can fund their programs through the creation of state disaster
funds, but only about half of the states have done so. Typically, state
legislatures have appropriated funds after disasters on the basis of
need. Another type of disaster fund is a disaster trust fund, which
creates revenue by dedicating a percentage of sales taxes or other
revenues to the fund. For a more detailed discussion of federal and
state disaster recovery programs, see Smith (2004).

**The Role of Hazard Insurance**

As noted in Chapter 7, hazard insurance is a preimpact recovery
preparedness action. As such, it has the potential for completely
replacing current programs of disaster relief. In addition, hazard
insurance decreases government workload and expense after disasters by
shifting part of the administrative burden for evaluating damage to
insurance companies in the private sector. Finally, hazard insurance
defines the terms of coverage in advance, thus reducing opportunities
for politicians to increase benefits after disaster. The desire to
appear to be generous creates a temptation to vote for "pork barrel"
projects. The problem is that generous aid for uninsured victims angers
those who had the foresight to purchase insurance in advance and, thus,
provides a disincentive to purchase insurance in the future.

Unfortunately, the potential contribution of hazard insurance remains to
be fully realized. There are many difficulties in developing and
maintaining an actuarially sound hazard insurance program. The National
Flood Insurance Program has made significant strides over the past 30
years, but it continues to require operational subsidies. One of the
basic problems is that those who are most likely to purchase flood
insurance are, in fact, those who are most likely to file claims
(Kunreuther, 1998). This problem of *adverse selection* makes it
impossible to sustain a market in private flood insurance. The federal
government has tried to solve this problem by requiring flood insurance
for structures located in the 100 year flood plain that are purchased
with federally backed mortgages. Unfortunately, homeowners frequently
allow their policies to lapse after the first year and the program has
no effect on those who purchase their homes without a mortgage or have
paid off their mortgages. Consequently, some homes are rebuilt soon
after a disaster because their owners have high quality insurance
coverage, whereas other homes take much longer because they are only
partially insured. In some cases, the homeowners lack *any* insurance
because they cannot afford quality insurance or were denied access to it
because of "redlining" (Peacock & Girard, 1997).

In addition to these institutional problems, there are cognitive
obstacles to developing a comprehensive hazard insurance program.
Building on earlier hazards research (see Burton, et al., 1993, for a
summary) and psychological research on judgment and decisionmaking (see
Slovic, et al., 1974, for an early statement and Baron, 2000, or
Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002, for more recent summaries),
researchers have identified numerous logical deficiencies in the ways
people process information in laboratory studies of risk.

One important issue concerns what economists call moral hazard and
psychologists refer to as a felt lack of personal responsibility for
protection. The concept of moral hazard/felt responsibility for personal
protection has important policy implications because the Interagency
Floodplain Management Review Committee (1994) report concluded federal
disaster relief policy creates this condition by relieving households of
the responsibility for providing their own disaster recovery resources.
This might be a significant reason why only 20% of structures affected
by the 1993 Mississippi floods were insured. However, there appears to
be no data on the extent to which households explicitly consider the
availability of disaster relief in making decisions about whether to
purchase hazard insurance and adopt other hazard adjustments.

**Non Governmental Organizations and Community Based Organizations**

The role of NGOs such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and
Mennonite Disaster Service is widely publicized and the role of CBOs
such as local churches and service organizations is increasingly
recognized. These organizations provide housing, food, clothing,
medicine, and financial assistance to disaster victims. In most cases,
the *existing* government social service agencies are supplemented by
NGOs that *expand* their membership to perform the tasks they are
expected to perform during disaster recovery (Dynes, 1970). By contrast,
existing CBOs typically *extend* themselves beyond their normal tasks to
perform novel activities. In addition, there are situations in which
existing, expanding, and extending organizations cannot successfully
meet the recovery needs of disaster victims. In such cases, government
agencies, NGOs, and CBOs form an *Unmet Needs Committee,* which is an
*emergent* organization that is designed to serve those whose needs are
not being addressed by existing programs.

In some cases, the need for such emergent organizations arises from
political organization and activism by population segments that believe
they are being neglected (Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Phillips, 1993a).
Local authorities should anticipate recovery demands, plan for an *Unmet
Needs Committee,* and communicate its existence throughout the
community. When emergent organizations do arise, they can be
incorporated into the ongoing recovery management process in order to
learn from their knowledge about the unmet needs and ensure that there
is an equitable distribution of disaster recovery resources. For a more
detailed discussion of NGO activities in disaster recovery, see Smith
(2004).

# Local Government Recovery Functions

After a disaster, local government needs to perform many tasks very
quickly, and many of these must be performed simultaneously. It is
therefore critical to plan for disaster recovery, as well as for
disaster response (Schwab, et al., 1998). The line between emergency
response and disaster recovery is not clear because some sectors of the
community might be in response mode while others are moving into
recovery, and some organizations will be carrying on both types of
activity at the same time. This means that there will be little time to
plan for disaster recovery once the emergency response has begun. By
planning for recovery before disaster strikes, resources can be
allocated more effectively and efficiently, increasing the probability
of a rapid and full recovery. The following discussion is based on the
concept of preimpact planning for disaster recovery because a lack of
planning will delay decisions about the allocation of recovery resources
and the procedures by which they will be used. A lack of preimpact
planning can also increase the probability of conflicts arising due to
competition over scarce resources during the recovery period.

The previous sections of this chapter have described the tasks that
households and businesses perform during disaster recovery and the
resources they use to implement this recovery. When households and
businesses lack the knowledge of how to recover or the resources needed
to recover, government can provide assistance. Local government must
also perform specific tasks during disaster recovery, some of which
involve restoring services it performed before the disaster (e.g.,
providing functioning roads, street lights and signs, and traffic
control devices). In addition, local government must rebuild any
critical facilities (e.g., police and fire stations) that were damaged
or destroyed. Finally, local government has a heightened need to perform
its regulatory functions regarding land use and building construction.
These two functions require rapid action under conditions of a greatly
multiplied workload, so special provisions are required to expedite the
procedures for reviewing and approving the (re)development of private
property.

In approaching the task of preimpact recovery planning, a community must
overcome three major misconceptions about disaster recovery. The first
misconception is that the entire recovery effort can be improvised after
the emergency response is complete. In fact, a timely and effective
disaster recovery requires a significant amount of data collection and
planning that will delay the recovery if they are postponed until after
the emergency response is over. It is important to recognize that the
disaster response phase's uncertainty and urgency about human safety has
been replaced by households' and businesses' urgency to return to normal
patterns of functioning and government agencies' uncertainty about how
to organize the community to accomplish this.

The second misconception is that there will be ample time to collect
data and plan the recovery during the emergency response. It is true
that some recovery relevant data must be collected during the emergency
response. However, an assessment of "lessons learned" from the disaster
impact should be used to guide a recovery process that has been designed
before the disaster strikes. Finally, the third misconception is that
the objective of disaster recovery should be to restore the community to
the conditions that existed before the disaster. As noted earlier, this
will simply reproduce the community's existing disaster vulnerability.

In many ways, the process of preparedness for disaster recovery is quite
similar to the process of preparedness for emergency response. Thus, the
community should establish a Recovery/Mitigation Committee before
disaster strikes that will establish a vision of community disaster
recovery and articulate the basic strategies that will be implemented
before and after disaster impact. In addition, the committee should
assign each recovery function to a specific organization, develop a
Recovery Operations Plan (ROP), and acquire any necessary resources to
implement it. Finally, the committee should conduct the training and
tabletop exercises needed to ensure the ROP can be implemented
effectively.

*The Recovery/Mitigation Committee*

The LEMC's Recovery/Mitigation Committee can be an important part of an
effective, rapid disaster recovery process. As noted in Chapter 3, this
committee should be established before a disaster during the preimpact
recovery planning process. Personnel should be designated to serve on
this committee, including a chairperson and a lead agency, usually the
local planning department. The jurisdiction's Chief Administrative
Officer, usually the city mayor or the county executive, should publish
a planning directive, and the Recovery/Mitigation Committee chairperson
should establish a planning schedule. Many government agencies should
participate in the Recovery/Mitigation Committee, including the
directors of the local planning, building, public works, engineering,
parks and recreation, economic development, finance, housing, and social
services departments, as well as the jurisdiction's PIO (Schwab, et al.,
1998). In addition, there should be representatives from local utility
companies, other local business organizations, religious and charitable
organizations, and representatives of neighborhood associations.

The Recovery/Mitigation Committee should examine the findings from the
community HVA to identify the locations having the highest levels of
hazard exposure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. The
committee should begin to work with the rest of the community, and
especially with those at greatest risk, to formulate a vision of the
disaster recovery it intends to implement.

Next, the committee should develop an ROP that integrates the likely
disaster impacts, community goals, and public and private sector
capabilities within the community. In addition, the ROP should identify
external sources of assistance (federal, state, NGO), recognize their
loan/grant requirements, and integrate these into a comprehensive
program of disaster assistance. The committee should also develop a
financial plan for responding to the disaster. Bolin (1993) reported
that city revenues from a heavily damaged central business district were
5% of total revenues before the earthquake, declined sharply in the year
after the earthquake, and took about four years to return to previous
level. This clearly affects the jurisdiction's tax revenues.

Moreover, the committee should establish agreements with NGOs and CBOs
(especially local churches, neighborhood associations, and other
citizens' groups) for support in disaster recovery because these
organizations provide financial and in-kind support, as well as legal
and technical assistance. After a disaster strikes, the
Recovery/Mitigation Committee should ensure that organizations respond
within the scope of their responsibilities to implement the ROP.

*Envisioning a Community Recovery Strategy*

The Recovery/Mitigation Committee needs to work with the community
before and after a disaster to articulate a vision of community disaster
recovery. The recovery process needs to strike a balance between
corporate centered and community based economic development (Bingham,
2000). According to a *corporate centered economic development*, usually
advocated by the local business community, government provides resources
such as land and money to the private sector to invest without any
restrictions. This market based strategy tends to produce results that
are good in aggregate but produces an inequitable recovery. By contrast,
*community based economic development* involves active participation by
government to ensure that the benefits of recovery will also be shared
by economically disadvantaged segments of the community.

The short term recovery following a major disaster can generate an
economic boom as state and federal money flows into the community to
reconstruct damaged buildings and infrastructure. These funds are used
to pay for construction materials and the construction workforce and, to
the extent that the materials and labor are acquired locally, they
generate local revenues. In addition, the building suppliers hire
additional workers and these, along with the construction workers, spend
their wages on places to live, food to eat, and entertainment. Unless
there are undamaged communities within commuting distance that can
compete for this money, it will all be spent within the community.

Communities must also consider the long term economic consequences of
disaster recovery. What will happen after the reconstruction boom is
over? They can attract new businesses if they have a skilled labor pool
and good schools---especially colleges whose faculty and students can
support knowledge based industries. Other assets include low crime
rates, low cost of living, good housing, and environmental amenities
such as mountains, rivers, or lakes (Blakely, 2000). A community can
also enhance its economic base if it can attract businesses that are
compatible with the ones that are already there. Such firms can be
identified by asking existing firms to identify their suppliers and
distributors. These new firms might be attracted by the newer buildings
and enhanced infrastructure that has been produced during disaster
reconstruction.

If a disaster stricken community does not already have such assets, they
can invest in four fundamental components of economic
development---locality development, business development, human
resources development, and community development. *Locality development*
enhances a community's existing physical assets by improving roads or
establishing parks on river and lakefronts. *Business development*
involves efforts to retain existing businesses or attract new ones.
Although it is not easy, this can be accomplished working with
businesses to identify their critical needs. In some cases, this might
involve establishing a business incubator that allows startup companies
to obtain low cost space and share meetings rooms. *Human resources
development* expands the skilled workforce, possibly through customized
worker training. Finally, *community development* utilizes NGOs, CBOs,
and local firms that will hire current residents of the community whose
household incomes are below the poverty level. For example, a
comprehensive program for developing small businesses, affordable
housing, community health clinics, and inexpensive child care can help
to eliminate some of what new businesses might consider to be one of the
risks of relocating to the community.

*Developing a Recovery Operations Plan*

As was the case with emergency response, the demands of disaster
recovery imply that specific functions be performed. Table 11-6
identifies four principal disaster recovery functions---disaster
assessment, short term recovery, long term reconstruction, and recovery
management. The recovery phase's disaster assessment function should be
integrated with the emergency response phase's emergency assessment
function in identifying the physical impacts of the disaster. Short term
recovery focuses on the immediate tasks of securing the impact area,
housing victims, and establishing conditions under which households and
businesses can begin the process of recovery. Long term reconstruction
actually implements the reconstruction of the disaster impact area and
manages the disaster's psychological, demographic, economic, and
political impacts. Finally, recovery management monitors the performance
of the disaster assessment, short term recovery, and long term
reconstruction functions. It also ensures they are coordinated and
provides the resources needed to accomplish them. The following section
describes each of these functions in greater detail.

**Table 11-6**. Disaster Recovery Functions.

+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| *Disaster Assessment*             |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Rapid assessment              | -   Victims' needs assessments   |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Preliminary damage assessment | -   "Lessons learned"            |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Site assessment               |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| *Short Term Recovery*             |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Impact area security          | -   Emergency demolition         |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Temporary shelter/housing     | -   Repair permitting            |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Infrastructure restoration    | -   Donations management         |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Debris management             | -   Disaster assistance          |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| *Long Term Reconstruction*        |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Hazard source control and     | -   Infrastructure resilience    |
|     area protection               |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Land use practices            | -   Historic preservation        |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Building construction         | -   Environmental recovery       |
|     practices                     |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Public health/mental health   | -   Disaster memorialization     |
|     recovery                      |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Economic development          |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| *Recovery Management*             |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Agency notification and       | -   Public information           |
|     mobilization                  |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Mobilization of recovery      | -   Recovery legal authority and |
|     facilities and equipment      |     financing                    |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   Internal direction and        | -   Administrative and           |
|     control                       |     logistical support           |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| -   External coordination         | -   Documentation                |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+

*Disaster Assessment*

Disaster assessment includes both physical and social impact assessment.
Physical impact assessment, which is usually called *damage assessment*,
must address residential, commercial, and industrial buildings. In
addition, there is a need to conduct damage assessment for
infrastructure such as water, sewer, electric power, fuel,
transportation, and telecommunications systems. Finally, damage
assessment also must address critical facilities such as hospitals,
police stations, and fire stations. In addition, there is a need for
social impact assessment, usually called victims' needs assessment to
assure that the available recovery programs are meeting victims' needs.
Finally, "lessons learned" examines the disaster's physical and social
impacts to identify ways in which the mitigation actions can be taken to
reduce the community's hazard vulnerability.

*Damage assessment*. There are three basic types of damage assessment
(FEMA, 1995c). The first type, *rapid assessment*, is usually conducted
during the emergency response, preferably within the first 24 hours
(Schwab, et al., 1998). The purpose of rapid assessment is to identify
the areas affected by the disaster and the approximate magnitude of the
disaster's physical impacts. It is especially important to assess the
need for lifesaving activities very quickly, so rapid assessment should
be completed within one to three hours after disaster impact. In turn,
this allows emergency managers to determine where there are collapsed
buildings requiring search and rescue operations and whether there is a
potential for secondary impacts such as hazmat releases after an
earthquake. Rapid assessment also provides information about the status
of infrastructure and critical facilities, as well as whether there is
likely to be a need for assistance from other local jurisdictions or
other levels of government. A rapid assessment is performed by available
police, fire, and public works personnel---both on shift and recalled to
duty---to conduct assessments in predetermined geographic sectors of the
community. Supplementary data can be provided for a rapid assessment
from the private sector organizations that own or operate lifelines and
critical facilities.

The second type of assessment is the *preliminary damage assessment*,
which is designed to produce counts of destroyed, severely damaged,
moderately damaged, and slightly damaged structures. This level of
assessment should be completed within a 3-4 days, depending on the size
and accessibility of the impact area and the number and prior training
of the damage assessment teams. The data from the preliminary damage
assessment are used to support requests for state and federal disaster
declarations. A preliminary damage assessment is performed by having
local government personnel perform *windshield surveys* by driving along
all of the streets in the impact area (as the name suggests, they do not
get out of their cars). Inspectors tally counts of damaged structures,
with residential structures being classified by income levels and
structural categories (single family, mobile home, multifamily
residential structures). Buildings can then be tagged red, yellow, or
green depending on the level of damage and occupant safety, with red
tagged buildings being unsuitable for occupancy. A preliminary damage
assessment should also include estimates of percentages of households
with insurance coverage because this will affect the speed with which
affected individuals and communities are able to replace their housing.

Finally, a *site assessment* is meant to produce detailed estimates of
the cost to repair or replace each affected structure. This information
is used to support requests for federal assistance to the owners of the
damaged property. It includes estimates of losses to residential
properties in order to understand both the level of need for temporary
shelter and temporary housing and for repair assistance. Losses to
commercial and industrial structures are assessed in order to understand
the level of need for repair assistance and economic injury assistance.
Losses to public property must be assessed in order for the community to
apply for repair assistance. Site assessments require technically
trained personnel such as architects, structural engineers, and building
inspectors for multistory structures such as apartment buildings. These
personnel can usually be drawn from city staff, but additional personnel
might be recruited from other local organizations or obtained from
outside the community (e.g., through mutual aid agreements with other
jurisdictions or memoranda of agreement with professional societies).
Skilled construction professionals can be supplemented by volunteers who
can conduct site assessments for most single family residences if they
have been trained in the use of well designed checklists. A site
assessment might take weeks to complete, depending on the size and
accessibility of the impact area as well as the number and training
level of the assessment personnel. These methods of damage assessment
can be compared to the procedures of cost estimation that are used in
routine construction projects, as shown in Table 11-7.

**Table 11-7**. Types of Postdisaster Damage Assessments.

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  Damage Assessment                   Routine Construction Cost
                                      Estimation

  Rapid Damage Assessment             

  Preliminary Damage Assessment       

  Site Assessment                     Preliminary Cost Estimate

                                      Detailed Cost Estimate
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

In preparing for the necessary damage assessments, staff from local
government departments should be assigned to Damage Assessment Teams
(DATs). Their numbers should be augmented as needed by staff from local
private sector organizations and neighboring jurisdictions through
memoranda of agreement (MOAs) or other contractual arrangements. All DAT
members should be trained in a common assessment procedure in order to
speed up the process and generate results that are comparable across all
DATs within the jurisdiction.

*Victims' needs assessment*. The effects of disasters are not confined
to physical damage. In addition, affected communities must assess the
needs of those individuals and groups who have lost property, been
injured, or lost family members. This procedure, called a *victims'
needs assessment*, should begin during the preimpact recovery planning
process. The first step is to identify the community's vulnerable
segments, which may be defined as specific locations and neighborhoods,
or types of households and businesses. The local jurisdiction should
assign staff to Victims' Needs Assessment Teams (VNATs) and supplement
them with staff from other organizations. These supplementary staff
should be assigned by contract with NGOs and CBOs and trained together
with the government staff in methods of victims' needs assessment.

The need for public assistance to finance household and business
recovery is inversely related to the savings rate. That is, the lower
the savings rate, the higher the need for public assistance.
Unfortunately, the savings rate in the US has been extremely low for the
past decade, so the VNATs should be prepared to find large numbers of
households and businesses needing recovery assistance. In addition to
housing needs, VNATs should also be prepared to identify households'
needs for employment and other economic assistance (e.g., food,
clothing, and other basic needs), as well as their psychological needs.
If they are given adequate preimpact training, VNAT team members will be
knowledgeable about the availability of local, state, federal, and NGO
disaster recovery programs. In turn, this will enable them to accurately
diagnose victims' needs and refer them to the appropriate recovery
programs.

*"Lessons learned"*. Unless the Recovery/Mitigation Committee
establishes evaluation procedures, few lessons are likely to be learned
and applied to improving the community's resilience. Therefore, it
should establish a "Lessons Learned" subcommittee, procedures for
studying the event, and a well defined scope for its report. The
recovery team should use the damage assessment as an opportunity to
determine what are the ways, if any, that the jurisdiction should modify
its land use plan, building code, and other community operations in the
light of the disaster impact. Other issues to be considered should
include infrastructure location and replacement, the capital
improvements program, and the provisions of the ROP itself. The delivery
date of the report should be set fairly early in the recovery process,
perhaps 30 days after the disaster, so its recommendations can be
incorporated into the recovery process. This should be an adequate
amount of time to collect data, deliberate the implications, and make
recommendations for policy revision if the jurisdiction has declared a
30 day moratorium on reconstruction.

*Short Term Recovery*

*Impact area security and reentry.* First, there is a need to maintain
security in the impact area to ensure residents do not return before it
is safe to do so and also to protect vulnerable property from the threat
of looting. Addressing these issues requires jurisdictions to develop
procedures for residents' reentry. Unfortunately, there is little
research on ending evacuations to guide the planning process (Stallings,
1991), but there is anecdotal evidence of problems that have arisen
after disasters. The available evidence indicates a need to provide for
temporary reentry to remove essential items (e.g., clothing and
medications) and permanent reentry for continuous habitation. In both
cases, hazardous conditions must have abated sufficiently to allow
people to enter safely. In some cases, hazard abatement might include
the demolition of severely damaged buildings and the removal of heavy
debris. In addition, proper identification listing a local address is
needed to ensure only residents or authorized reconstruction personnel
are allowed to enter. Finally, a jurisdiction must establish basic
habitability criteria, such as the restoration of transportation and
sewer systems. It is possible to allow people to return before electric
power is available because some people have their own generators, but
the criteria should be established ahead of time. If the disaster has
had a regional impact, reentry should be coordinated with neighboring
jurisdictions.

*Temporary population shelter/housing*. As indicated in the discussion
of households' housing recovery, victims first find temporary shelter in
the homes of friends and relatives, commercial facilities such hotels
and motels, or mass care facilities such as auditoriums and gymnasiums.
The evidence is clear that the majority of evacuees prefer the homes of
friends and relatives. Among those whose friends and relatives are
either too far away or are themselves victims, the more affluent choose
commercial facilities and the poor---usually 10-25% of the
evacuees---stay in mass care facilities (Mileti, et al., 1992).

Mass care facilities must accommodate differences due to age (elderly
and children), ethnicity, and physical limitations (e.g., mobility).
Such facilities make it difficult to accommodate household differences
in such behaviors as personal sanitation, privacy, child rearing, and
hours and loudness of social interaction. They also place increased
demands on time for other tasks, which reduces time for child care,
resulting in loss of control over children. Lack of personal space and
privacy consistently generate ethnic and class tensions among those in
mass shelters and closely spaced semiprivate shelters such as tents
(Yelvington, 1997). Operation of mass care facilities can be especially
complex after major disasters in urban areas. In such cases, there will
be a need for a large contingent of local multilingual volunteers to
assist in multiethnic communities and enough people to provide continued
staffing for a long duration displacement. Emergency managers can expect
thousands of volunteers in first few weeks, but there are likely to be
dramatic drops in volunteerism after the second week (Yelvington, 1997).
Crowding and stress make it important to maintain transparency in making
decisions about facility operation and to establish procedures for
coping with predisaster homeless, construction workers, and others who
do not qualify for shelter and housing (Bolin, 1993).

The incentives for moving from temporary shelter to temporary housing
should be obvious. "Doubling up" with friends and relatives eventually
causes friction in interpersonal relationships, commercial facilities
are a drain on family finances, and mass care facilities are crowded,
noisy, and lack the privacy to which people are accustomed. When the
number of displaced households is less than the vacancy rate for
affordable housing within commuting time of jobs, the existing housing
market can accommodate the relocation. To the degree that there are few
vacancies, the rental rates are high, or the commuting time is excessive
(either because of the travel distance or because crowded routes
decrease average driving speed), government is likely to be called upon
to increase the stock of temporary housing by bringing in mobile homes.

The ROP should recognize that the need for temporary housing increases
in importance as the size of the socially vulnerable population
increases, especially when there is a limited amount of affordable
housing outside the impact area. The number of displaced households will
be compounded by those evicted from undamaged homes because they lost
their jobs and could not make rental or mortgage payments. In a major
urban area struck by a large scope disaster, this could be thousands of
mobile homes. Where will these be located---on victims' lots (utilities
already installed, maintains neighborhood integrity, allows supervision
of reconstruction) or in mobile home parks? If trailer parks are
established, local officials should try to reduce social friction by
locating people within kin and friendship networks to the greatest
extent possible.

*Temporary business operation*. Just as households need temporary
housing, so too do businesses need temporary operating locations when
their normal locations have been severely damaged or destroyed. Many
small businesses have customers who are loyal enough to travel an extra
distance, but loyalty does have its limits. Consequently, government
might need to permit the establishment of temporary business operations
in parking lots or other open spaces that are close to the displaced
businesses' normal locations. The ROP should also identify sites for
temporary housing and temporary business operations, which may be needed
for as much as a year (and even longer in some cases).

*Infrastructure restoration*. There are often many households and
businesses that cannot resume normal functioning simply because of the
lack of potable water, sewer, electric power, fuel, telecommunications,
or transportation---not because of damage to their homes or places of
business. Consequently, there is a need to inspect and repair any damage
to pipelines and power lines, as well as streets, bridges, street signs,
and street lights. In addition to returning these households and
businesses to normal functioning, restoration of infrastructure to these
areas also provides places where emergency workers and construction
crews can live while they are rebuilding the structures that have been
damaged or destroyed. On the other hand, generating a rapid economic
recovery might suggest a different set of priorities---emphasizing the
restoration of infrastructure for the area's dominant export industries.
Thus, there are likely to be conflicting priorities and few easy
decisions. Consequently, priorities must be established in the preimpact
recovery plan with links to the damage assessment procedures that allow
the recovery managers to adapt the predetermined infrastructure
restoration priorities to the needs of each specific situation.

*Critical facility operation*. It should be quite obvious that there
will be a need to quickly repair critical facilities such as hospitals,
police stations, and fire stations. However, a community's public
infrastructure is also served by other critical facilities such as water
treatment plants, transit bus barns, public works equipment yards, and
government offices. There is also privately operated infrastructure that
includes electric power stations, television and radio facilities (both
stations and broadcast towers), and telephone switching facilities. An
inventory of these facilities should be available from the
hazard/vulnerability analysis.

*Debris management*. Most of the natural disasters, and explosions among
the technological disasters, can destroy a substantial number of
structures. In turn, this can produce an enormous amount of debris that
must be removed. Debris management should designate temporary sites for
sorting recyclable from nonrecyclable materials, with the latter being
moved to permanent sites for disposal. Debris management is complicated
in situations where evidence must be gathered in a systematic manner as
in investigations of accidents (e.g., National Transportation Safety
Board investigations of airline crashes or train derailments) or when
the site is be considered a possible crime scene (e.g., the bombing of
the Murrah Federal building Oklahoma City). In such cases, debris
removal is likely to be delayed, so temporary sorting sites will be
needed to separate out material evidence from useless debris.
Ultimately, a catastrophic event such as the World Trade Center collapse
or Hurricane Katrina can produce millions of tons of debris that can
overwhelm landfill capacity.

*Emergency demolition*. It is likely that some structures will be
damaged severely enough to pose a threat of collapse, so procedures are
needed to rapidly assess their stability and determine if they should be
reinforced and rebuilt or demolished. This assessment clearly requires
competent structural engineering assistance, but historic
preservationists should also be consulted if the building has cultural
significance (Donaldson, 1998). Indeed, historic structures should be
surveyed and inventoried before disaster strikes and postimpact damage
assessment procedures should be developed to avoid unnecessary
demolition of damaged historic structures (Kariotis, 1998; Kimmelman,
1998). The ROP should establish policies that include criteria for
emergency demolition of severely damaged structures and adequate
notification for owners who might have evacuated. In addition, the
implementing procedures should contain samples of the contracts to be
signed with demolition companies. These contracts require the
involvement of the jurisdiction's legal counsel to ensure the
administrative process respects personal property rights.

*Repair permitting*. The ROP should contain criteria for determining
which structures will be eligible for reoccupancy based upon the percent
damage to the different elements of the building---foundation, wall, and
roof systems, exterior walls, interior walls, floors and flooring
materials, plumbing, electrical systems, HVAC systems. The large number
of requests for building repair permits following a disaster can
overwhelm a local code enforcement department (Schwab, et al., 1998). In
preparation for this eventuality, the permit office staff should be
augmented with staff from other jurisdictions and the private sector as
needed. In addition, the ROP should establish an emergency permitting
process that includes 10 day moratorium on minor repairs and a 30 day
moratorium on permits for substantial repairs involving 50% or more of
the preimpact property assessment. This allows time for the city to
acquire enough staff to evaluate the properties and areas involved and
establish policies for improving the building stock as needed. Of
course, exemptions may be needed for reconstruction of critical
facilities. The process should be streamlined as much as possible by,
for example, placing permit staff in a DAC. The streamlined process
should be continued for a limited time period, often 90 days after
impact, that has been defined in the ROP. Local jurisdictions should
consider deferring application fees during this period.

ROPs for urban areas should anticipate the possibility of developers
purchasing many damaged single family residences in the expectation of
replacing them with apartment buildings. To avoid this problem, one city
established a five month moratorium on applications for construction of
new apartments. It also established restrictions on new buildings to
ensure a Design Review Board could exclude building designs that were
incompatible with the character of the neighborhoods in which they were
to be constructed.

*Donations management*. Major disasters frequently produce an outpouring
of material (rather than financial) assistance from households and
businesses outside the impact area. There is usually a substantial
amount of useful material in these donations, but there also is a
substantial amount of junk. Dynes (1970) and others have listed
donations such as women's formal gowns, parkas (after summer disasters
in the South), outdated medicines, and other items that impede the
recovery by diverting personnel to the task of sorting through the
donations. Even useful items must be sorted. For example, donated
clothing must be sorted by category, gender appropriateness, and size.
It is common for victims to reject food donations because these items
are incompatible with local tastes and to refuse specific types of
temporary housing because the buildings are incompatible with local
cultural preferences or climatic conditions. Another problem with
donations is that an influx of useful material resources precludes the
need to buy from local businesses, thus threatening their revenues.
Thus, in most cases, financial donations are preferable to material
donations. Since material donations will inevitably arrive, local
emergency managers need procedures to manage them. One important
component of a donations management procedure is to establish a staging
area outside the impact area where incoming donations can be received,
sorted, and prepared for delivery to locations where they will be made
available to disaster victims.

*Disaster assistance*. Under normal circumstances, people rarely need to
visit government agencies. Moreover, when they do make these visits,
they only need to visit one agency. During disaster recovery, however,
people often need to contact multiple agencies within a short period of
time. Moreover, the large number of other people attempting to visit
each of those agencies and the small number of staff available to
process the contacts results in long lines. In some disasters, these
problems have been compounded by the periodic movement of agencies field
offices from one location to another during the course of the disaster
recovery. Consequently, it is important for local emergency managers to
provide "one-stop shopping" so victims can resolve all of their needs at
a single location that is maintained throughout the short term recovery
period. It is also important that the location be readily accessible by
public transportation and that additional staff be recruited and trained
to minimize victims' processing delays. The ROP should also designate
DAC sites that are capable of housing financial aid assistance
(including grants, loans, and tax deductions/deferrals), in-kind
assistance (food, clothes, bedding), and legal and technical assistance.
The ROP should identify primary and augmentation staff for all of these
sites, including the donations management, debris sorting, debris
disposal sites, and the DACs.

*Long Term Reconstruction*

As Chapter 3 indicated, a disaster usually opens a window of opportunity
for changes in environmental hazard management policy (Prater & Lindell,
2000). If the Recovery/Mitigation Committee has "done its homework", it
will already have assessed the community's hazard exposure, physical
vulnerability, and social vulnerability. In addition, it will be well
prepared with suggestions for ways in which to reduce future risks by
integrating hazard mitigation into disaster recovery (Schwab, et al.,
1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004). Finally, the committee should identify
sources of funding for the mitigation projects they propose.

*Hazard source control and area protection*. The Recovery/Mitigation
Committee should have begun to examine the prospects for hazard source
control and area protection before a disaster strikes and continue this
effort in the immediate aftermath. As indicated in Chapter 7, these
mitigation strategies are not feasible for some hazards. The committee
should anticipate induced growth in the protected area if hazard source
control or area protection measures are implemented. However, linking
the new source control or area protection measures to changes in the
land use and building construction practices within the affected areas
can avoid the expected increase in future vulnerability.

*Land use practices*. Implementation of long term reconstruction
planning means setting in motion any changes in land use policies that
were developed during the preimpact recovery planning process. This is
also an opportune time to reexamine the community's existing land use
plans and to pass new ordinances that will reduce hazard exposure.
Alternative land uses can reduce the total population and property at
risk, sometimes by reducing development in high hazard areas. This can
be accomplished by purchasing private property, purchasing development
rights, relocating public facilities and other infrastructure away from
hazardous areas, and redirecting new capital improvements away from
hazardous areas. Road width and access regulations might also need to be
established or revised at this stage. Lot restrictions can be used to
reduce population densities by downzoning and setbacks can be used to
maximize distances from hazards. Landscaping and vegetation requirements
can be established to reduce the potential for flooding, landslides, or
fires. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ROP should provide
guidance on the reconstruction of *nonconforming uses*, which are
structures that do not meet the zoning requirements for their geographic
areas. Usually these are older structures whose construction preceded
the establishment of the current zoning requirements and, thus, are
"grandfathered".

*Building construction practices*. The ROP should also address the
implementation of new mitigation requirements such as elevating
structures located in floodplains. Other building codes can also reduce
the physical impact of a disaster on structures located in risk areas.
These include increasing disaster resistance of the building structure
and increasing the resistance of "soft spots" in the structure. In
addition to addressing new code requirements, the ROP should also
address the building construction process. In particular, virtually
every disaster produces complaints about out of area building
contractors who receive advance payment for work that never performed.
Thus, the ROP should address the need to monitor them---especially by
registering out-of-area contractors and providing contract advice to
owners of damaged property. Care should be taken to ensure regulation of
outside contractors and construction workers does not impede the ability
of NGOs such as Habitat for Humanity to use volunteer labor from out of
the area to assist in the reconstruction effort. The ROP needs to
balance the legitimate interests of local contractors against the needs
of the community for rapid provision of affordable housing for low
income residents (Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997).

*Public health/mental health recovery*. Most natural disasters in the US
have had minimal public health consequences because the country has few
endemic diseases whose incidence is likely to increase after a disaster.
Contrary to many people's beliefs, dead bodies are a public health
threat only if those who died had communicable diseases when they were
alive. Death itself does not spontaneously generate disease. Waterborne
illnesses are a problem if survivors drink from, wash food in, or bathe
in water sources that have been contaminated by raw sewage or chemical
spills. Of course, such exposures can be avoided by having survivors use
bottled water or by evacuating the impact area until infrastructure has
been restored. Disease vectors other than ingestion must also be
controlled in areas where pests harbor diseases. For example, mosquito
control has become increasingly important as mosquito transmitted
diseases, such as West Nile virus, have become increasingly prevalent.

Similarly, natural disasters produce minimal mental health consequences.
Clinical psychologists found nearly 20 years ago that few victims use
formal psychological services in the aftermath of disaster (Gist &
Stolz, 1982). Since that time, an extensive research has confirmed that
finding (Salzer & Bickman, 1999). This has led many psychologists
examine the typical problems victims face and, in so doing, found that
the two most prominent are material resource loss (Freedy, et al., 1992)
and disruption of social networks (Kaniasty & Norris, 1995). The first
of these problems, material resource loss, is addressed by the programs
for housing and economic recovery. However, mental health professionals
can facilitate the recovery process by acting as victim advocates,
especially for victims who are unaccustomed to working with white collar
bureaucracies (Salzer & Bickman, 1999). Other recommendations include
designing community interventions to provide social support by
establishing victim locator systems, facilitating self-help groups, and
community organizing (Salzer & Bickman, 1999)

Nonetheless, others have concluded that the failure to seek formal
psychological counseling is a potential threat to the mental health of
victims and even first responders. In connection with the latter,
Mitchell (1983) developed a system called the *Critical Incident Stress
Debriefing*, which involves preincident training, individual crisis
support, demobilization (e.g., informational debriefings as personnel
rotate off duty), defusing (small group discussions about the emotional
significance of the event), family support, and referral to other
support services (e.g., psychiatric, psychological, legal, career).
Despite its proponents claims of empirical support for this method, the
most rigorous scientific evaluations have found no evidence of its
effectiveness (McNally, Bryant & Ehlers, 2003). One problem seems to be
that establishing a rigid schedule for victims to discuss traumatic
events disrupts their ability to control the alternation between
psychological phases of active processing and avoidance (Pennebaker &
Harber, 1993). A related problem is the requirement for group discussion
with their professional peers shortly after the event (usually within 12
hours). In the case of emergency responders, this conflicts with their
preference for seeking support from spouses and others outside the
workplace (Gist, et al., 1999). Thus, there appears to be no scientific
justification to plan for anything other than routine referrals for
psychological distress.

*Economic development*. The ROP should provide guidance on the economic
development of the disaster stricken areas. The basic strategy for
redevelopment should have been planned during the process of envisioning
the community recovery strategy. Thus, this is the time at which the
strategy is implemented. In communities that are highly dependent on
tourism, active promotion is needed to assure prospective visitors that
all facilities are back in operation.

*Infrastructure resilience*. One opportunity that is likely to arise
during disaster recovery is an opportunity to decrease the physical
vulnerability of community infrastructure. In most cases, roads and
bridges can be strengthened. Similarly, aboveground lines can be
undergrounded to reduce their vulnerability to wind and ice. In some
cases, pipelines for water, sewer, and fuel and major transmission lines
for electric power and telephone can be rerouted to reduce
vulnerability. However, most of these lifelines must pass through high
hazard exposure areas at some point. For example, all lifelines must
cross seismic faults to serve customers on the other side. All of these
lifelines are critical to a community's disaster resilience, so
preimpact planning or postimpact improvisation should provide for
rerouting and strengthening infrastructure to decrease its vulnerability
to future disasters.

*Historic preservation*. The disaster recovery period is an opportune
time to examine the physical vulnerability of undamaged historic
structures to determine how to protect them from future disasters
(Cliver, 1998). The federal government has funds, as do many states, for
the preservation of historic buildings. However, the affected community
must initiate the process by recognizing the value of these structures
and investing time and money into their preservation (Alfaro, 1998).

*Environmental remediation*. Hazmat spills are an increasing problem
during natural disasters and the process of cleaning up oil and chemical
spills could take months (Lindell & Perry, 1997b; Showalter & Myers,
1994). In most cases, such work will be performed by specialized
contractors hired by state or federal government. However, such efforts
should be coordinated with local personnel from the department of public
health, land use planning, or fire/hazmat response.

*Disaster memorialization*. Disaster recovery is a critical time in the
life of a community. In the case of major loss of life or of major
damage to a community's stock of historic buildings, the sense of loss
can be tremendous. Communities frequently derive some collective solace
from the establishment of a memorial structure or for the definition of
a memorial day to be commemorated annually. These disaster memorials can
play an important part in the recovery of a community's sense of
identity and pride. Thus, they should be considered when a community has
suffered a traumatic event. They must be planned and developed in a
carefully designed, transparent, and participatory process in order to
be effective instruments of community healing. In most disasters, the
Recovery/Mitigation Committee should seek representation from a wide
range of religious and secular groups. In some cases, the 9/11 World
Trade Center attack being one of many examples, a committee of victims'
families has exerted substantial influence on the memorialization
process.

*Recovery Management*

*Agency notification and mobilization*. Unlike the incident management
function performed during emergency response, the recovery management
function performed during the disaster recovery does not require special
procedures for agency notification and mobilization because agencies
will be well aware of the disaster by the time recovery is initiated.
The rapid assessment noted earlier might seem like a counterexample, but
this task is actually part of the emergency response.

*Mobilization of recovery facilities and equipment*. Recovery management
does require the mobilization of recovery facilities for donations
management, debris management, and disaster assistance (the DACs). As
noted earlier, a community with a large population of displaced victims
and a small housing vacancy rate might need to develop one or more
mobile home parks to provide enough temporary housing. Rapid
mobilization of such facilities requires preimpact screening to identify
appropriate sites. Site selection criteria should, of course, include
suitable zoning and access to utilities such as water/sewer, fuel and
electricity. In addition, planners should also focus on sites that have
access to public transportation and close proximity to the types of jobs
that will be held by a low income population.

*Internal direction and control*. There is a need for internal direction
and control among agencies within the jurisdiction because many aspects
of the recovery process require multiagency coordination. Disaster
recovery typically involves local government agencies in tasks that are
more like their normal duties than is the case for the emergency
response. Thus, the ROP's allocation of recovery functions to agencies
will be relatively simple. In addition, disaster recovery does not
require an equivalent to the Incident Commander who oversees the
emergency response. Instead, different departments will usually be
coordinated by the Recovery/Mitigation Committee. Finally, there is less
time pressure during the disaster recovery than during the emergency
response, so this committee's meetings can be scheduled for daily or,
later, weekly frequency. Nonetheless, decisions about recovery programs
must often be made while victims still focused on satisfying basic needs
such as food and shelter. Thus, recovery decisions may need to be made
before citizens are ready to participate in a planning process (Smith,
2004).

*External coordination*. There is a need for external coordination,
especially in presidentially declared disasters, because of the presence
of personnel from other jurisdictions and other levels of government. As
is the case for internal direction and control, there should be a
relatively clear understanding of which agencies will address each
disaster response function. In addition, local agencies need to
understand what are the restrictions associated with different state,
federal, NGO, and CBO programs.

*Public information*. There is also a need for public information,
especially to inform disaster victims about recovery policies and
procedures. However, there is also a need to inform other citizens about
the progress of the recovery. Thus, the ROP should describe the
procedure for disseminating public information during disaster recovery.
The procedure should describe which agencies will be the source of each
type of information, what will be the general content of their messages,
and what communication channels they will use. As indicated in Chapter
4, general information about the recovery process and sources of
additional information can be distributed through the mass media.
Brochures can be targeted at individuals and organizations located in
vulnerable zones (before a disaster strikes) or impact areas (after a
disaster strikes). Telephone hotlines can be useful for answering
questions about the recovery process, and a full time PIO should be on
staff at the DAC during short term recovery. Public meetings should be
held frequently to involve community residents in the reconstruction
planning process.

Research on disaster recovery has reported that some victims believe
there is favoritism toward business interests at the expense of
households. Similar concerns have arisen in other disasters where
historic preservation, neighborhood, and ethnic organizations mobilized
public demonstrations, pressured administrators in hearings, and filed
lawsuits (Bolin, 1993). These organizations can slow recovery and make
it more expensive (Bolin, 1993) unless there is a transparent process as
well as clear and consistent answers to questions such as "Who is
eligible for assistance?" and "How will land use change in the impact
area and how will this affect adjacent areas?"

*Recovery legal authority and financing*. The Recovery/Mitigation
Committee needs to obtain legal authority for a wide range of short term
recovery actions including a development moratorium, temporary repair
permits, demolition regulations, and zoning for temporary housing
(Schwab, et al., 1998). They also need to explore the feasibility of an
*adequate public facility ordinance* requiring developers to pay for
extending infrastructure to locations where it does not already exist,
*increased participation in the National Flood Insurance Program*, and
revising *annexation procedures* for incorporating additional land. In
addition, the Recovery/Mitigation Committee should examine the adequacy
of existing zoning tools including *development density controls* that
limit the number of lots per acre of developed land, *overlay districts*
that add special restrictions to the customary limitations of type
(residential, commercial, and industrial) of construction, and *setback
requirements* for minimum distances from hazardous terrain or landscape
features. In addition to ensuing adequate legal authority, the
Recovery/Mitigation Committee must identify financial tools for
achieving mitigation objectives. Financing can be obtained by *directing
Community Development Block Grant funds* to mitigation activities,
*establishing special assessment districts*, and *charging impact fees*
for new development--- especially when it is in a hazard prone area.

*Administrative and logistical support*. During the recovery period, the
pace of operations decreases so the management of specific emergency
response and recovery functions does not need to be focused at incident
scenes or centralized in the EOC. Thus, the activities performed by the
Planning, Logistics, and Administration Sections within the IMS are
gradually dispersed back to the jurisdiction's normal departments listed
in Figure 11-2. Nonetheless, special provisions are required to support
the additional staff generated by obtaining mutual aid personnel from
other jurisdictions and volunteer personnel such as architects and
engineers used as building inspectors. Moreover, records accumulated by
the Finance Section must be available to provide a justification for
expenditures on disaster recovery and hazard mitigation that are
reimbursable by state and federal agencies.

*Documentation*. As is the case in the emergency response, documentation
is needed during disaster recovery to provide the basis for
organizational learning. Maintaining an event log of who took what
actions in response to what conditions will provide the Recovery/
Mitigation Committee with the information it needs to produce the
"Lessons Learned" document and, later, to revise the ROP. In addition,
detailed documentation provides the jurisdiction's legal counsel with
the information that might be needed to defend against any lawsuits.

**Case Study: Disaster Recovery in Wichita Falls**

An F-4 tornado struck Wichita Falls on April 10, 1979 that killed 46
people and injured another 3245 (Bolin, 1982). The tornado also
destroyed 2500 homes, seriously damaged 879, and slightly damaged 1659.
In addition, it destroyed 1274 apartment units, 85 mobile homes, and 81
businesses. In the aftermath of the storm, nearly one fifth of the
city's population of 100,000 was homeless. Temporary housing began to be
delivered after four days, telephone service was restored after nine
days, and debris clearance from private lots had begun within two weeks.
Although the EOC was deactivated five days after the storm, the
emergency declaration was not lifted for a month. By that time, basic
services (water, sewer, electric power, fuel, telecommunications, and
transportation) were restored. Debris clearance was delayed by the need
to obtain permission from property owners who were, understandably, not
readily accessible due to relocation elsewhere. Nearly 50% of all
homeless families had temporary housing within 45 days after the storm
and almost all had temporary housing within 90 days. Most major
commercial businesses had resumed operations within 120 days. Housing
reconstruction was delayed by Small Business Administration funding
problems, some victims' lack of insurance and inability to qualify for
federal aid, and the scarcity of building contractors and building
materials. Nearly 90% of the lost housing had been rebuilt by the end of
two years, but there were problems in the interim. First, the influx of
construction workers increased pressure on the tight housing market.
Second, reconstruction in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods was only 30%
at 18 months when reconstruction in higher socioeconomic neighborhoods
reached 80%. The community faced a number of foreseeable recovery issues
for which it was unprepared. First, the city council reversed itself
twice on the issue of siting mobile homes on lots where owners were
attempting to rebuild. Second, the council imposed rent and price
controls, but these only delayed increases that skyrocketed as soon as
they were terminated. Third, the city incurred substantial costs for
rebuilding infrastructure at a time when its revenues were down because
of the losses in the property tax base.