Alliance for Food Aid

WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ANDREW BARNES, DIRECTOR OF FOOD SECURITY of FOOD
FOR THE HUNGRY on behalf of the ALLIANCE FOR FOOD AID

Before the

Subcommittee on Specialty Crops, Rural Development and Foreign
Agriculture

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 16, 2008

**Food Crisis in the Horn of Africa**

The United Nations reported on July 11^th^ that approximately 14 million
people in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti,
Uganda and Kenya) are facing an unprecedented food crisis. These
countries are suffering from both rapidly rising food costs and an
extensive drought. The 14 million includes 1.2 million pastoralists in
northern Kenya, 700,000 Ugandans, and approximately 2.6 million people
in Somalia. However the vast majority are in Ethiopia, which has 10.4
million individuals facing an acute lack of food.

The situation in Kenya is typical for the region. In Kenya drought, high
fuel prices and political instability have contributed to the food
crisis. The impacts of the food crisis are being felt in both urban and
rural areas but the urban areas are facing the greatest difficulties.
The country is being hit with increased inflation, increased costs of
production, and lower crop production in 2008. Food prices for staples
have risen rapidly; the price of corn flour has risen by more then 40%.
These price increases are particularly hard on the poor who already
spend a large portion of their income on food. To survive in this
situation many are pulling children out of school and families skipping
meals. Increased prices for fertilizers and fuel have resulted in a 50%
increase in land preparation costs making land preparation less
affordable and the results will be lower agricultural production. The
reduced production will obviously extend and increase the intensity of
the crisis.

I served as Food for the Hungry's Country Director in Ethiopia from June
2004 until June 2008 when I took the position of Director of Food
Security with Food for the Hungry in Washington. The majority of my
comments will focus on Ethiopia because of my experience in that
country.

**Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program**

Ethiopia\'s economy and its people remain largely dependent on
subsistence farming. This dependency has proven to be very problematic
because of a number of factors including high variability of rainfall
from year to year. However frequent droughts are not the only factors
contributing to Ethiopia\'s food security problems. The average farmer
works to feed his or her family on less than two acres of land and this
land is often over cultivated and subjected to intense soil erosion.
Ethiopia\'s population growth remains very high with an annual rate of
approximately 2.4%, causing further reductions in farm size. As farm
size decreases the intensity of agriculture increases contributing to
further land degradation and soil erosion. These perennial problems make
Ethiopia one of the world's poorest countries. Ethiopia\'s children bear
the brunt of this poverty; approximately 50% of children under the age
of five are moderately to severely stunted.

Donors (including USAID), the Government of Ethiopia and PVOs have
worked together to limit the adverse affects of this situation. The
drought of 2002-2003 resulted in 21% of Ethiopia's population needing
relief aid. The US responded generously and many lives were saved. While
saving lives is obviously necessary, those interested in Ethiopia\'s
future realize that more must be done to break the vicious cycle of
drought and poverty.

Approximately 8.5 million people, 10 percent of Ethiopia\'s population
are chronically food insecure (face annual food deficits). These people
are very vulnerable to the negative consequences of any variability in
rainfall or other negative events. During an emergency situation their
ability to survive depends on the \"mining\" of their already limited
capital and assets including, physical assets (tools and oxen), natural
assets (land and water) and human capital (education and labor). The
mining of assets occurs when families take last resort actions such as
taking children out of school, or selling productive assets and
household goods in order to survive. These survival strategies result in
[long-term]{.underline} negative impacts. After the drought has passed,
these families must rebuild their capital to become productive again;
consequently, the economic impacts of a crop failure are long-term and
result in [lifelong reductions]{.underline} in earnings. With each
shock, families and communities become less able to cope and fall
farther into food insecurity.

Before the introduction of the Productive Safety Net in 2005 a large
portion of food aid was programmed "on the fly". Food aid appeals were
made based on annual crop assessments. The timing of these assessments
and appeals made it difficult to receive the food aid on time and many
people had to sell assets to survive until the food arrived. Also the
food for work activities associated with these annual appeals were
hastily planned and the quality of the activities was in many cases less
than desired. Truly, a new approach to programming food aid was needed
for the lives of these food insecure households and communities to
improve.

Ethiopia\'s recent history makes it clear that weather related problems
and annual food shortages will continue to occur regularly in the
future. Consequently, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) was
designed with the expectation of these annual food shortages. In the
Productive Safety Net food aid is program based on long term historical
needs and in a typical year no emergency appeal is need beyond the
programmed PSNP resources. In this program the food aid is planned in
advance and made available during the annual hunger period; therefore
the safety net helps the chronically food insecure communities
[before]{.underline} the onset of the food shortage season and
[before]{.underline} they must use negative coping strategies. By
eliminating the need to sell scarce assets to survive the food shortage
season, the hard hit communities are able to retain and build upon their
asset base. Through this innovative program American PVOs using Title II
resources are working together with local communities to prevent annual
food shortages, build community assets that will contribute to long term
productivity and reduce the need for poor families to sell assets to
survive until next year.

The following figure represents a generalization of food availability
throughout the year for a high-land community in Ethiopia. Food
availability begins to increase in October when the harvest begins. It
peaks in December but then begins to decline from March to June or July
when it reaches the low point. It remains low through September and then
climbs again at the start of the new harvest.

![](media/image1.wmf){width="5.999305555555556in"
height="2.1152777777777776in"}

The Productive Safety Net Program is based on this food availability
calendar. From January to June communities involved in the PSNP work on
previously designed "Public Works" that build community assets such as
soil conservation systems, irrigation systems, roads etc. They then
receive food as payment for their labor during the hunger period later
in the year.

The lives of the safety net participants have been greatly improved.
Families in the program no longer need to "mine" personal assets to
survive the normal annual food deficient period. Community assets are
being constructed through food for work activities and many of the
assets are being synergistically linked to and utilized by other
agricultural and food security programs to improve productivity and
income.

Graduation from the program is the ultimate goal of the PSNP and will
result in the reduction of the number of households requiring external
food aid and assistance. As community assets are built and are linked to
other agricultural and income generating programs family assets are
protected and can actually increase. After a family's assets grow to an
appropriate level graduation from the Productive Safety Net program will
occur.

This program has been operating in Ethiopia since 2005. USAID is funding
six PVOs (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Food for the Hungry, REST (an
indigenous Ethiopian organization), Save the Children and World Vision)
to implement the Productive Safety Net in over 40 districts. The program
is supported by wheat, peas and vegetable oil produced by American
farmers and is partially funded by monetization of vegetable oil.
Without monetization this program would lack adequate funding and be
greatly reduced in scale.

**The Productive Safety Net and the Current Situation in Ethiopia.**

The Productive Safety Net has stabilized and greatly improved the lives
of millions of people in Ethiopia. As intended community assets are
being built, livelihoods are being protected and improved and the
[normal]{.underline} annual food gap is been filled.

The Productive Safety Net was designed to fill the food gap during an
average year. In general the food gap is about six months long and USAID
and its partner PVOs have based their programs on a six month hunger
period, understanding that abnormal years will occur and that actions
outside the Productive Safety Net will be necessary in such a year.
Unfortunately 2008 has developed into an extremely difficult year and
the needs are well beyond the capacity of planned Productive Safety Net
resources.

Three factors have combined to make this food crisis much worse than any
seen in Ethiopia in recent history. Some have used the analogy "Perfect
Storm" to describe the situation. I disagree with the term "storm"
because storm implies a short term, passing event, unfortunately the
developing crisis will likely continue for the long term. The three
major contributors to the current situation in Ethiopia are: 1) low crop
yields due to inadequate rain, 2) the soaring cost of food and 3) very
low food supplies in Ethiopia's Emergency Food Security Reserve. Past
emergencies were primarily the result of the low availability of food;
however this year rising food prices and low food reserves are
exacerbating the problem.

[Current Drought -- Low yields and poor harvest]{.underline}.

In April 2008, the Government and its partners released a joint document
that set out the

humanitarian requirements for 2008. This analysis was based on an
assessment conducted in November/December 2007. As a result, the
Government-led multi-agency needs assessment estimated approximately 2.2
million people would require emergency food assistance in 2008. The
situation however deteriorated greatly after the April report.

The performance of the seasonal rains in the highlands including the
*Belg*, (rains from March to May) were very poor and the area of
farmland planted declined significantly as a result of the lack of rain.
Pastoral and agro-pastoral areas also experienced very limited rains
resulting in greatly reduced availability of pasture, reduced animal
productivity, increased disease and many livestock deaths. Poor rains
have also affected root crop production in southern Ethiopia where they
make a significant contribution to the food security of many
communities.

[Rising Food Costs]{.underline}

The Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia reports that general
inflation is running at over 20% annually and food prices have risen by
over 40% in the past year. However, the prices of some staples such as
wheat and corn have more than doubled and the price of cooking oil has
increased by about one third. Local cereal prices have now become higher
than global market prices. According to the World Food Program, imported
wheat is currently cheaper than the local price of maize and sorghum.
The current local price of wheat is US\$ 660/MT compared to import
parity of US\$ 425/MT[^1]. In Food for the Hungry program areas corn has
increased from 250 dollars per ton a year ago to 650 dollars and barley
has increased from 150 dollars per ton to 450 dollars per ton.

These rising food costs are causing great hardships around the country
but especially for the urban poor. In an attempt to reduce the impact of
the rapidly rising food costs the Ethiopian government has been selling
staples such as corn at subsidized prices to the urban poor.

The government of Ethiopia has also restricted export of cereals and
local purchases by aid agencies, in an attempt to control inflation of
prices. It is believe that the government is planning to import cereals
to be sold in major cities with the intention of stabilizing the market
situation in Ethiopia.

Unfortunately this situation is likely to get worse as the hunger season
(April to September) progresses. The *belg* harvest is expected to be
very poor which contributes to the expectation that price will remain
very high until the next major harvest in October.

[Low Stocks in the Emergency Food Security Reserve]{.underline}

The Emergency Food Security Reserve Agency (EFSRA) was set up in
Ethiopia as a source of food to be stored and released when emergencies
like the current food crisis occur. The EFSRA has been every effective
and has allowed rapid responses to previous food shortages. Government
agencies, PVOs, and others borrow from the food reserve while waiting
for food shipments to arrive from abroad or for food to be purchased
locally if it is available.

The EFSRA has been a very important component of the emergency response
system in Ethiopia, however this year its stocks are very low. The
government of Ethiopia's attempt to stabilize food prices is one of the
major reasons for the low stock levels. As stated above the government
has been selling staples such as corn at subsidized prices to the urban
poor. These commodities have been sold from the EFSRA and this attempt
to stabilize prices has resulted in a depletion of inventory.
Consequently, there have been "pipeline" breaks in food supplies for
both the emergency response and the Productive Safety Net. Early in 2008
Food for the Hungry tried to borrow 8,000 tons from the reserve but was
only able to obtain 5,000 because of limited stocks.

The situation is critical. The need for emergency food has increased to
over 400,000 tons and the food reserve is well below its minimum desired
level of 100,000 tons and most agencies are being told food is
unavailable for borrowing.

According to the recent assessments by the government of Ethiopia the
total number of individuals that will require emergency food assistance
is 10.4 million people. Of this total 4.6 million will be individuals
who are not involved in the Productive Safety Net and will require five
or six months of assistance. The remaining 5.8 million people are in the
PSNP and will need an extra three months of assistance because of the
failed *belg* rains (rains from March to May). These numbers are
expected to increase after the completion of the Ethiopian government
led multi-agency assessment of the *belg* rains.

**Solutions**

[Short Term Needs and Solutions]{.underline}

The Productive Safety Net has been successful and greatly improved the
lives of millions of people since its startup in 2005. Because of the
USAID Title II funded safety net communities and families have been able
to build assets, avoid using destructive coping strategies and have
moved toward self sufficiency. Unfortunately the current food crisis has
the potential to undermine the progress that has been made over the past
four years. The PSNP districts that rely on the belg rains are facing an
additional three months of limited food and will need assistance so that
the progress made over the past four years will not be lost.

With this need in mind the PVO's implementing the PSNP with USAID
resources have prepared a Joint Emergency Operation Program with
Catholic Relief Services acting as the lead agency. The proposal is base
on the Government of Ethiopia's recent appeal and has been submitted to
USAID and is under review. Because of the above mentioned factors rapid
mobilization of resources will be very important. The next few months
are critical.

[Long term Needs and Solutions]{.underline}

Unfortunately the developing food crisis in Ethiopia and other countries
in the Horn of Africa will not be quickly resolved. Long term solutions
are needed. One possible solution is the increased use of monetization
of food commodities in the Horn. The prices of staples such as wheat,
corn and vegetable oil are soaring. Increased monetization of these
commodities in the Horn may help to stabilize prices over the long run.

Innovative, long-term food aid programs such as the USAID funded
Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia are needed in other countries.
Kenya and Uganda would both greatly benefit from a long-term safety net
type program. Unfortunately Kenya was recently removed from the priority
country list and Title II programs in Kenya are currently shutting down.
Long term food based programs would help address the food crisis and
lead to development.

There also needs to be a renewed focus on increasing yields of small
scale agriculture and food security in rural areas of the Horn. High
food prices will provide farmers the opportunity to increase household
income. To accomplish this traditional agriculture and livestock farming
will need to be improved through effective agricultural extension and
marketing. Example programs would be the promotion of small scale
irrigation for production of high value crops, protecting and improving
the capacity of the land and improving access to credit in rural areas.

In conclusion, the developing food crisis in the Horn of Africa is
tragic and US food aid programs are needed now more than ever.
Short-term, timely emergency assistance is urgently needed to mitigate
the affects of the soaring food costs and the current drought. Timely
assistance will save thousands of lives. Long-term food based
developmental assistance is also needed. Increased monetization of
commodities in these countries may help to stabilize prices over the
long run and the expansion of Title II food aid programs into other
countries will help address the food crisis and lead to development.

[^1]: World Food Program