TGDC MEETING

TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 2005

**(START OF AUDIOTAPE)**

MR. USTIS: First of all I would like to welcome the public on the
coldest day of the year to a very important event and the development of
voluntary voting system guidelines under HAVA. My name is Allen Ustis. I
am the project leader for the NIST Systems Voting Standards team.

We will have a chance to introduce ourselves here at the table and we
are most honored to have two of the U.S. election assistance
commissioned commissioners here with us today. They will address us as
well but before we move into the meeting itself and I ask Dr. Smurgian
to open the meeting, I would like to go through a very important
reminders in regards to safety here.

And of course \-- well let me see if I can fix this first of all, so we
can see this. It is the world of technology. Everything is \-- we're in
the green auditorium down in the lower left as you're facing it. Should
we have an emergency fire, or other related events, you, of course will
see strobe lights on and you will hear a warning, a verbal warning.
There are a number of exits. There are exits both in the front and the
rear. If you walk out of the auditorium to the rear and you take a left,
and another left, you will see the glass doors where you can walk out.

There are also wheelchair accessible bathrooms around the other side,
taking a left and a left. We will be able to eat lunch in the cafeteria,
which is a right and a right. We will break at approximately 12:30 for
lunch. We are going to try and keep very much on schedule because we
have \-- this is being broadcasted on the Internet, on the web, and we
need to keep on track for the people who are doing the closed captioning
for the blind.

I think that pretty much covers those issues there. As I told you in the
emergencies themselves, you will see the flashing strobe lights and you
will follow the instructions. In case of severe weather, which I don't
believe we will have today, it's just going to be very cold, but if it
does occur we would take shelter in the basement. So that ends those
issues.

Please turn down or turn off your cell phones while you are here. Thank
you. And in addition, while you are here, we would appreciate you
wearing your badge at all times for security reasons. If you plan to
return tomorrow, this badge will be important. You will not need to go
all through security. You can show this with a driver's license at the
gate and come right back into Building A101, Green Auditorium.

With that again, I welcome you all here and I would now defer to the
Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards of Technology,
Dr. Smurgian.

DR. SMURGIAN: Good morning everyone and welcome to NIST. Good to have
you all here. Is everybody awake? Good morning.

AUDIENCE: Good morning.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. I am (Unintelligible) Smurgian I am the Acting
Director of NIST. It is a real pleasure to have you here. I am also
serving today as the chair of the Technical Guidelines Development
Committee. I hereby call to order the second meeting of this committee
today, Tuesday January 18, 2005. Now let us stand and pledge allegiance
to the flag.

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America. And to
the republic for which it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible,
with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. At this time I recognize Mr. Craig Burkhart as the TGDC
parliamentarian. Mr. Burkhart, is sitting behind me and requests that he
determine if a quorum of the committee is present. Mr. Burkhart?

MR. BURKHART: Thank you. A role call for quorum. Please answer with aye
if you are present, either in the room or by telecommunication.
Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Davidson? Miller?

MS. MILLER: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Turnerbuoy? Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKEESE: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Here.

MR. BURKHART: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Here.

MR. BURKHART: That would be 13 out of 15, Mr. Chair. My advice is that a
quorum is present. That being a simple majority.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Mr. Burkhart. I also thank members of this
committee for your active participation to date and the contribution of
your significant expertise to the formidable challenges ahead of us.
Your willingness to volunteer significant time to work \-- to the work
of this committee, is a mark of the highest ideals of citizenship and
civic responsibility and I am sure every American voter will benefit
from your commitment.

At this time I would like to offer to all members of the TGDC who are
present, a chance to introduce themselves and provide a short summary of
their backgrounds, that they bring to the work of this committee.
Perhaps we can start from that end. Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Could you please turn your \-- push the button there.

DR. REVEST: There we go. Good morning. My name is Ron Revest. I am at
MIT. I am a professor of computer science. I have a background in
security and cryptography.

MS. CALDISE: Good morning my name is Ann Caldise. I am with the American
National Standards Institute ANSI, which coordinates voluntary consensus
standards in this country and they are characterized by openness,
balance, due process, and consensus.

DR. SCHUTSER: Good morning my name is Dan Schutser. I am currently
vice-president at Citigroup and Information Security and Business
Planning. I have been there for over 20 years and have a PhD in
electrical engineering and have had a varied career working for
companies like IBM, Bell Laboratories. I worked for the government where
I was technical director of naval intelligence among other things. So I
have a good background in security and systems, human factors et cetera.

MS. PURCELL: Good morning. My name is Helen Purcell. I am the county
recorder in (unintelligible) Arizona, that's Phoenix, responsible for
voter registration and elections in our area of about a median of
700,000 registered voters.

DR. WILLIAMS: I am Brett Williams. I am a professor of merits of
computer science and information systems at Kennesaw State University. I
have been involved with computer based voting systems for about 18
years. I was an advisor to the FEC during the development of the voting
systems standards in 1999 and again in 2002.

MR. GANNON: Good morning. I am Patrick Gannon and I currently serve as
president and CEO of OASIS, the Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards. I have been involved in information
technology standards for some 15 years and currently oversee efforts in
the development of standards in both security areas as well as election
mark up language.

MR. BURGER: Hello, I am Steve Burger. I am here representing the
Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers. There, I chair
Standard Coordinating Committee 38, which oversees standards dealing
with elections and voting equipment. My technical background is in the
area of product compliance and standards related to regulatory
compliance issues.

MR. KRAFT: Good morning I am Paul Kraft. I am here representing the
National Association of State Election Directors. Since 1991, I have
been Chief of the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification for the state
of Florida. We provide not only certification services but we also
provide our counties with technical assistance on system use, security,
and election administration issues.

MS. QUESENBERRY: My name is Whitney Quesenberry, professionally I am a
usability professional with expertise in interactive and informational
systems. I am also the president of Usability Professionals Association
for this year and I have been working for the past year with the IEEE
standards committee on voting systems standards.

MR. HARDING: Good morning. I am a little different than everybody else.
I am not an election expert. My name is J.R. Harding and I am here by
way of presidential appointment to the U.S. Access Port and an advocate
throughout the state of Florida in building codes to transportation to
voc. rehab.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well thank you to all and I would like to again thank all
of you for the time and effort you have put into this activity, clearly,
a national priority. And I would like to thank you for your very hard
work over the last few months.

Yes, we have \-- I believe three people on the phone. Maybe I could ask
you to introduce yourselves also.

MS. TURNERBUOY: Good morning my name is Sharon Turnerbuoy. I am
representing (Unintelligible) the International Association of Clerk
Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers. I am director of elections
for Kansas City, Missouri where we have 220,000 registered voters.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you.

MR. ELLEKESE: Good morning, Jim Ellekese, can you hear me?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. ELLEKESE: Good morning. I like Mr. Harding, am a presidential
appointee to the U.S. Access Board and come not with a expertise in
voting but a 27 year history in regulatory compliance and technology,
regarding access by persons with disabilities to the built environment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you.

MS. MILLER: Good morning. I am Alice Miller. I am the executive director
for the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics. I have been here for a
little over 15 years and have done everything from actually running the
elections to arguing the position in Court as \-- working as a general
counsel for the D.C. Board of Elections.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you very much. Did we cover everybody on the phone?
Thank you. At this time I will extend a motion to adopt January 18th and
19th 2005, meeting agenda for the Technical Guidelines Development
Committee, which is included in your book. Do I hear a second?

MALE SPEAKER: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any comments or discussion? All in favor, say aye.

AUDIENCE: Aye.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any against? Thank you. Since our July 9, 2004, planning
meeting, Dr. (Unintelligible) was appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate as Director of the National Science Foundation.
We have benefited from his leadership at NIST and as the first chairman
of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, I assure the members
of the committee and the election assistance commissioners, that I share
his commitment to the important work of the TGDC.

Public Law 107252, To Help America Vote Act, establishes the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee. HAVA charters the members of this
committee, to assist the election assistance commission with the
development of voluntary voting system guidelines. This committee's
initial set of recommendations for these guidelines, are due to the
executive director of the election assistance commission in April 2005
in accordance with HAVA's nine month deadline.

In the interim, the 2002 voting system standards adopted by the Federal
Election Commission, serve as the first set of voluntary voting system
guidelines under HAVA. At this time, I note that the latest revised
version of Robert's rules of orders was adopted on July 9, 2004, to
govern technical guidelines development committee and sub committee
proceedings. I call on Mr. Burkhart to review the logistics of this
second meeting of the TDGC.

MR. BURKHART: Good morning to everybody, all the members of the TGDC,
our audience and hopefully the thousands of people that are following
our proceedings by Internet web cast from the National Institute of
Standards in Technology today.

I am Craig Burkhart. I am the chief legal counsel on technology matters
for the U.S. Department of Commerce. I am here first of all to welcome
everybody here on behalf of the president and on behalf of Don Evans who
is the Secretary of Commerce. They are so happy that you, as voluntary
public servants, have agreed to spend so much time and I know that later
you will hear from the Election Assistance Commission and I am sure they
will agree with me, on that opinion.

I want to introduce Phil Green who is seated in the back. He will be the
assistant parliamentarian during the meeting and will be filling in for
me during much of the time tomorrow.

I will take a very brief moment to announce a couple of acronyms for
those who are following on the web cast and who are in our audience so
they can understand the proceedings of the meeting. And then I will very
briefly go through, if you will, parliamentary or meeting bureaucracy
aspects of what we're going to be doing today.

First of all for those of you in the audience, you will hear a number of
acronyms today. One is NIST, that stands for the National Institute of
Standards in Technology and it's the advisory organization to the TGDC.

The TGDC is an acronym for Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
This is a committee, which has been jointly appointed by the Election
Assistance Commission and the executive director of NIST. This is the
organization that will be rendering an initial recommendation on
voluntary voting systems standards, that the statue requires us to do
sometime later in April.

The other acronym you will hear referred to today from time to time, is
EAC, that stands for Election Assistance Commission. The Election
Assistance Commission is the presidential appointed commission which
actually will receive the advice of this committee through a number of
other advisory committees as well and will eventually act on adopting
and proposing to the nation, a voluntary voting system guidelines set.

The meeting proceeding today will be fairly simple. For those of you who
have attended a simple city council meeting, that will be essentially
the type of proceeding that we will follow today.

You will note in your book \-- under the tabbed proposed resolutions,
that there are a number of written resolutions, which will be proposed
or moved by a member of the TGDC later today. They will be proposed. Of
course there will be a second in the Standard of Roberts Rules of Order
Parliamentary Procedure and then the written resolution will immediately
be put to discussion.

As a guideline, not as a requirement but as a guideline as your
parliamentarian, I am requesting that those who are going to present the
resolutions, give perhaps a five minute explanation of what the
resolution embraces and then we would move to open discussion, all of
which of course, would be controlled through Chairman Smurgian.

Not as a limitation to your discussion, but just simply as information
to you, our timekeeper will also alert you as to when 15 minutes has
passed, just so you are aware of the passage of time.

The resolutions are grouped by subject matter and they are each
numbered. So the numbering system and so forth does not require the
introduction of those resolutions in that particular order. We will be
looking to the chairs of the various sub committees for their discretion
as to what may be a logical order of the resolutions.

Of course, a motion to pass, it is seconded, it's put into discussion.
Toward the conclusion of discussion, when a vote would be taken, each
will be a role call vote, which either I or Mr. Green will call for you,
and we will take the ayes and nays at that point. Eight TGDC members
would make a majority of our quorum, so that would be the requisite
number of votes to pass.

If you wish to amend one of the written resolutions, you may do so by
making a motion to the chair to amend. Generally speaking since these
are written resolutions, the most effective or if you will, efficient
manner in which to make resolutions is to actually refer to the
resolution by perhaps a paragraph and a line number that you might count
and provide substitute wording. If you do not have substitute wording
but your amendment is more conceptual in nature, you may do that as
well.

Mr. Green is available to draft for you during today and during tomorrow
any new resolutions that you would like to introduce today. And he is
able to write those up for us right on the spot, distribute copies to
everybody and of course all of these resolutions will be posted on the
screen above us so those members of the audience can follow along,
especially those resolutions which might be introduced a bit later.

Finally, later on this morning we will talk what happens after
resolutions are adopted into the future. Generally speaking, I will just
make a note, that any resolutions which are adopted, which take policy
positions and which give instruction to NIST to provide work product to
you in the form of technical support, that technical support work
product will come back to you for your review, approval, amendment or
disapproval for future meetings. That would be all Mr. Chair.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Mr. Burkhart. Before we go on with the meeting,
I would like to entertain a motion to accept the minutes of the July 9,
2004, meeting of the TGDC.

FEMALE SPEAKER: So moved.

DR. SMURGIAN: Second?

MALE SPEAKER: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: The minutes are in your book. Does anybody have any
questions or comments? Not hearing any, all those in favor of adoption
of the minutes say aye.

AUDIENCE: Aye.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any against? Thank you. Our second meeting has an
ambitious agenda with specific outcomes that are necessary for us to
accomplish in order to move forward with the committee's HAVA mandates.
Specifically, as a committee, we will consider resolutions drafted by
the three working subcommittees, human factors and privacy, security and
transparency, and core requirements and testing.

The time required to accomplish the agenda items, means that the
committee cannot take public comment at this meeting. However, there
will continue to be opportunities for the public to comment on relevant
issues. Comments and position statements should be sent to
<voting@nist.gov> where they will be posted on the NIST voting website,
vote.nist.gov. The comments we have received to date have been posted
and reviewed by NIST staff and TGDC committee members.

At the first planning session of the TGDC on July 9, 2004, a number of
resolutions were adopted that have guided our work up to this phase of
the guidelines development process, mandated by HAVA. They were \-- I
will not read \-- well maybe I will read them for the folks who are on
the phone but also we're showing them on the screen here. The first one
was \--

MALE SPEAKER: Are these in the book?

MALE SPEAKER: They are in the books as well, yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: They are part of the minutes. Resolved that three
subcommittees be established to gather analyzed information.
Subcommittees shall be comprised only of TGDC members. Subcommittees
shall propose resolutions to the TGDC on best practices, specifications
and standards. Subcommittees shall be named one, security and
transparency; two, human factors and privacy; and three core
requirements and testing.

Mark Skull chief of the Software Diagnostic and Conformance Testing
Division will brief us shortly on the work process of the subcommittees.

Second resolution was, resolve that the chair survey, in the interest of
TGDC members and thereafter appoint the members and the chairs of the
subcommittees. The subcommittee chairs are Ms. Whitney Quesenberry,
human factors and privacy; Dr. Ron Revest, security and transparency;
and Dr. Dan Schutser, core requirements and testing. The members of the
subcommittees are as follows: human factors and privacy, Quesenberry,
Turnerbuoy, Miller, Davidson and Ellekese; security and transparency,
Revest, Caldise, Purcell, Gannon; core requirements and testing,
Schutser, Williams, Kraft, Burger, and Harding.

Third resolution, was resolve that resolutions prepared by subcommittees
be considered by the TGDC. Resolutions adopted by the TGDC shall be
referred to NIST for technical assistance and editing. Upon return from
NIST, the TGDC shall review the resolutions to confirm they conform to
its intent.

Fourth resolution was, resolve that adopted resolutions and appropriate
explanatory materials comprise the first set of recommendations mandate
by The Help America Vote Act.

MALE SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman, I don't have that document or summary of the
resolutions that were passed here. If you could refer to the two pages
it might make it a little easier.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes for those of you who couldn't find these resolutions,
they are on page 11 of the minutes.

At this time I would like to call on your Election Assistance Commission
Vice Chair, Mr. Paul Degoreo as well as Commissioner Ray Hernandez for
presenting some comments. I certainly would like to thank them for
attending this meeting. I think we are \-- we have undertaken this work
to help them in the process of setting \-- providing standards and I
would appreciate any comments they would like to present and assist us
in accomplishing our HAVA mandates.

MR. DEGOREO: Thank Dr. Smurgian and a very warm welcome today on this
very cold day in Washington particularly to our friends from Arizona and
Florida. We want this welcome to be as warm as can be.

On behalf of our Chair Greg Helman who unfortunately could not be here
this morning and Commissioner Buster Soares who could not be here either
this morning, but I am certainly pleased to have my fellow commissioner
Ray Martinez here and he will give you some remarks too.

And Commissioner Martinez and myself and some of our staff members who
are here, we have brought some of the top staff of the EAC with us today
and tomorrow to listen to your deliberations. Carol Burket is our
interim executive director and she will be working very closely with the
TGDC and with NIST as you proceed to come up with these voluntary system
guidelines.

Julie Thompson is our legal counsel and she is also here in the back and
will be listening to what you have to say. Brian Hancock, a person who
has been involved for 15 years plus in voting system standards
development, when he was with the FEC for a number of years and now with
us, in following the process very closely, is also here and will listen.
And then we have Adam Imbrogian who is an attorney, and a special
assistant to Commissioner Martinez and my special assistant Dan Murphy
who was with the Los Angeles county election authority for years. So we
have brought our top people here to be part of and will listen to what
you have to say.

And let me first thank each and every one of you on behalf of the
Election Assistance Commission for the work that you have put in since
July, and I know many of you have put in work in this area for many
years. And you have come long distances, you've put in a lot of time.

I know since July I have followed your work very closely as the Federal
Officer for the TGDC. I have followed your work closely and have been
involved in the email traffic and I know that you have committed a lot
of your time and effort, in an effort that I know that you are not even
being paid for. So I appreciate and thank you on behalf of the
commission, for the work that you have put in for this very important
project for the citizens of the United States of America.

Subcommittee chairs, I know have put in a lot of work too, to guide
their committees and to guide the work of their committees. And you have
come up with some tremendous resolutions. I have read them very
carefully this past weekend, and I know that a lot of thought and effort
has gone into them and that will bring some lively probably
deliberations over the next 48 hours as you do your work. So I
appreciate that.

I appreciate Dr. Smurgian and his staff at NIST. We have had a very
close relationship with NIST since the very beginning of the EAC just
over a year ago. We have had some of our very first meetings with NIST
and the leadership of NIST and with their staff. And Craig Burkhart and
his staff from the Commerce Department has been very \-- worked very
closely with the EAC over the past year to help us in our work and help
to get this committee up and going, back in the summer months and
provide assistance to it over these past few months. So we appreciate
it.

And we appreciate the Congress for providing funding to the EAC that we
have been able to pass on to NIST. It is a very significant portion of
our budget, that we have devoted to this effort because we feel that it
is a very top priority for the EAC, the work that you all are doing and
the support that NIST is giving to you. So we appreciate the President
and Congress for providing the funding to us because as you know in the
past, in the development of voting system standards by the National
Association of State Election Directors, there hasn't been much funding,
nor did they have the benefit of the strong technical support that only
NIST can give in this country. So we're appreciative of that.

And we want to thank the public that's here today. We saw the list of
folks who have signed up to be here. And we want to thank the public
that have come today and will be here tomorrow to listen to these
deliberations and also the people who have contributed to the process in
the past few months by going to the website and by providing the TGDC
with their opinions because we feel that that's very important to all of
you.

Last July, our former chairman Buster Soares who is probably the most
eloquent speaker of the four of us because he is a Baptist minister in
Shepherd's 5000 people in his church in New Jersey every Sunday. You
know in your minutes there, there is a very good synopsis of the remarks
that he gave but I just want to reemphasize something that he said back
then which is still true today.

You know, you all are a bipartisan committee that represents the
geographical and philosophical differences of the United States and we
want to encourage you to keep focused on your mission. We want to
encourage you to have open minds, have an open exchange and on one hand
keep the process open and transparent but on the other hand to keep it
united, sufficient to gel as a team and foster a sense of team effort.
That is what Chairman Soares charged to you last July and those words
still are important today as you get to the \-- this session of your
work.

As you know The Help America Vote Act requires that the TGDC provide its
first initial set of recommendations to the executive director of the
EAC no later than nine months. Since all of you were appointed in July
and have been working diligently and we are aware of the challenges that
you all face in becoming fully operational and greatly appreciate the
early logistical and financial support of the TGDC provided by NIST to
this committee.

But it is imperative that the TGDC strive to adhere to the statutory
timeframes mandated by HAVA, given that the states are expecting
guidance this year from the EAC and this committee in making procurement
decisions to replace or upgrade voting systems.

Moreover, it is equally important that the initial set of
recommendations forwarded to the EAC this coming April, be as
comprehensive as possible and consist of usable concrete draft
guidelines which can be fully considered and deliberated upon by all
interested parties.

Finally, we wish to reiterate the importance we place in the topic of
security and audibility of voting systems. In short, it is the EAC's top
priority when it comes to the development of voting system guidelines.
It is clear that voters, policy makers and election administrators alike
want to ensure that machines cannot predetermine election through
manipulation of the voting technology. Therefore, we request that the
TGDC dedicate appropriate resources and its vast expertise to address
the legitimate concerns and all sides of this important issue. And I
know by reading over the resolutions that you have all put forth before
today, that you are considering this issue very appropriately.

The EAC remains firmly committed to fulfilling the promise of HAVA, to
improve the process of election administration in the United States of
America. We are proud to work with the TGDC in ensuring that the
American public has confidence in the integrity, accuracy and fairness
of federal elections that it deserves. We thank you for your selfless
commitment, to this important endeavor and we are also open to any
advice and suggestions that you can give us as we improve the election
process in the United States of America. Thank you.

DR. SMURGUAN: Thank you Commissioner Degoreo. I owe an apology. We have
a Ray Hernandez at NIST and somehow it came out that way. Commissioner
Martinez and Vice Chair Degoreo as well as all the other \-- the other
two members of the commission as Vice Chair Degoreo said, you know they
have been working very closely with us. We want to make sure that we
meet their needs, everybody is under pressure to get the job done and
get it done the first time which is the NIST motto. So we want to make
sure that we get the job done right the first time. And we very much
appreciate the Commissioner's continued support in this regard.

Commissioner Martinez would you like to make a few comments?

MR. MARTINEZ: Thank you Dr. Smurgian I was delighted to hear that you
got my last name wrong because I wasn't sure what justice I would do to
yours while I was up here.

So we're off to a great start. I feel very liberated already. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to say a few words. I am
pleased to be here with my colleague and now our Vice Chairman Paul
Degoreo who I think has done a terrific job in working with this very
important committee and working with NIST to get us to the point that we
are today, which is to get into the real core, the real crux of what
this committee is all about.

I will be brief in my comments this morning Mr. Chairman, as I know this
committee has a full agenda for the next two days and I am looking
forward to spending the next two days here as well in the audience.

Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to all of the members of the
TGDC for your dedicated work on behalf of the American public. It does
not go unnoticed at the EAC that The Help America Vote Act, while
calling for this advisory committee to be comprised of experts of each
of your respective fields, also requires that your service on the TGDC
go uncompensated. Yet, despite your busy schedules, since its inception
last July, you have each given generously, of your time and of your
experience. And in doing so, have shown the true essence of public
service and for that we are certainly grateful.

Additionally let me also express our sincerest appreciation to you, Dr.
Smurgian, and your exceptional team here at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Since 1901 NIST has worked to develop
standards and technology to improve the quality of life for all
Americans. We are proud to work cooperatively with NIST and to call on
your experience and expertise to help the EAC to improve the process of
election administration.

Let me also say a quick word of thanks to our many important partners
who have helped the EAC to achieve a level of success in its first year
of operation. Notably organizations such as the National Association of
State Election Directors, NASAD, whose work produced the first and
subsequent set of current voting system standards. The National
Association of Secretaries of State, whose leadership and advocacy has
improved the process of election administration. There are of course
other important organizations, (unintelligible) the election center and
others, all of whom we are proud to call partners on the road to better
election administration.

In 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed, an unprecedented
piece of legislation called The Help America Vote Act of 2002, which
created the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. At its core, the EAC's
sole and exclusive purpose is to assist states and local governments to
improve upon the process of the administration of federal elections.

To put HAVA in its proper context Mr. Chairman, consider that the very
last time Congress contemplated granting a substantial federal role to
assist states with election administration was back in 1890, some 150
years ago. The Federal Elections Bill as it was called then, which
eventually failed in the Senate by one vote was the only other major
foray other than HAVA into this realm, into the realm of election
administration which traditionally and most appropriately is occupied by
state and local governments.

The reason I share this important piece of history with you this morning
is because in preparing for my remarks today, I too, as our Vice
Chairman reviewed the minutes of the July meeting, and came across the
words of our former Chairman Buster Soares. During his remarks,
Commissioner Soares correctly noted two important myths about election
administration that I think bear repeating.

First, the commonly held notion among average Americans that the federal
government is much more involved in the process of election
administration then it really is or at least was until HAVA was created.
And the second myth being, that voting machines routinely go through the
kind of scrutiny in technology and application that automobiles and our
household appliances go through as well. Two very important myths, which
I think again bear repeating.

Clearly after this last presidential election cycle in which the process
of election administration was under an intense national spotlight,
those myths have been largely dispelled. And yet it remains for the EAC
to convince the American public that the process of elections is
improving, as a result of more direct federal involvement.

Moreover, it is the heady responsibility of this committee to turn the
second myth into reality and that is to give Americans the confidence
that they deserve and the reliability of our voting systems by
developing comprehensive guidelines by which to judge the integrity and
accuracy of these systems. We believe that you are well on your way to
doing just that.

Although HAVA requires that the EAC be comprised of two republicans and
two democrats, there has been consensus among the EAC commissioners on
every single issue, that has come before this agency since our creation
back in December of 2003. The same holds true with regard to our
collective view towards voting systems standards, which we believe ought
to be developed under the following two principles.

Number one, a commitment to the timeframe mandated by HAVA. As you know,
HAVA requires this committee to produce its first set of guidelines to
be presented to the EAC within nine months of all of its members being
appointed. It is our hope that come this April, the EAC will be able to
share a complete set of draft guidelines with our Board of Advisors and
our Standards Board and to put a process in place, to ensure that any
and all interested parties have an opportunity to further contemplate
and deliberate these draft voting system standards.

Clearly and it certainly goes without saying, there is a sense of
urgency attached to the work of this committee. Over the past year the
EAC has worked diligently to distribute unprecedented federal funds to
states to implement the various mandates required by HAVA. Perhaps the
most significant of these new federal mandates is the need to comply
with new voting system standards, including standards, which would allow
persons with disabilities, the opportunity to vote privately and
independently.

The National Association of Secretaries of State, reports that at least
one third of the states, will spend between 60 and 90 percent of these
unprecedented federal funds on purchasing new voting systems. These
states are looking to the EAC and the work of the TGDC to provide much
needed guidance on the integrity, the reliability, and the security of
voting systems before making decisions on which systems to purchase.

We urge the TGDC to stay focused on the key deliverables that were
agreed upon during last July's meeting, including producing for the EAC
by this April, a list of publicly vetted requirements for voluntary
voting system standards.

The second principle is transparency and inclusion in the process.
During last July's organizational meeting of the TGDC, the former NIST
director and former chair of the committee, Dr. (Unintelligible) stated
and I quote, "Public comment that this committee receives electronically
and in open meetings will be critical to the standards development
process." We could not agree more and we urge the TGDC to continue its
efforts to ensure that the process to develop its first set of
recommended guidelines, is one which is fully open to public view and
scrutiny and one which ensures that public comment is welcomed, fully
heard and considered.

Finally, since I have borrowed so freely from other people's remarks let
me end this morning with my own about the significance of your work.
Last July I came before this committee and said that the work of the
TGDC was perhaps the most important thing the EAC would do during the
2005 calendar year. Well I no longer wish to sound equivocal or
ambivalent.

In short, given the right that all Americans deserve for fairness in our
elections and the importance of transparency and the conduct of our
elections, I am convinced that adoption of sound guidelines by which to
judge the efficacy of our voting systems, is the most important matter
that will face the EAC in 2005 and perhaps beyond this calendar year. We
must not disappoint those who have placed immense responsibility upon
us, policy makers, election administrators, advocates and most important
of all the American people.

The EAC is confident in your ability and we're proud to be your partner
in this important endeavor. And with that Mr. Chairman, I yield the
floor back to you and thank you again for the time to say a few words.

DR. SMURGIAN: I would like to thank the Commissioners for their
statements. I believe our committee understands the critical need to
provide the EAC with the required technical guidance to allow the
commissioners to meet HAVA mandates on voluntary voting systems
standards in a timely fashion.

From July 2004, until today the three subcommittees engaged in
information gathering, research and analysis including the taking of
public testimony at a two day hearing in September 2004. In addition,
public testimony has been requested, accepted and posted electronically
at the NIST voting website vote.nist.gov.

The work product of the subcommittees will be presented at this meeting
as a series of resolutions. The resolutions will be debated for
potential amendment and adoption. Adopted resolutions will form the
basis for the document drafting phase of the guidelines development
process.

At this time I would like to call on Mark Skull Information Technology
Laboratory to provide a summary of the subcommittee work process and the
proposed framework for drafting April 2005 guidelines. Mark?

MR. SKULL: Thank you Dr. Smurgian. Good morning. My name is Mark Skull
and I am the Chief of the Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing
Division within NIST. I am going to speak about the subcommittee work
process, of course TGDC is familiar with this process so this will be a
summary to you but I would also like to make that the public is informed
about what we're doing in this very, very important activity.

It doesn't seem to work. Okay there we go. In July the TGDC like Dr.
Smurgian said before, established a resolution which established three
subcommittees to gather and analyze information.

DR. SMURGIAN: May I point out that you have a copy of this presentation
in your book where it says, technical presentations.

MR. SKULL: The three committees were the security and transparency
committee, the human factors and privacy committee and the core
requirements in testing subcommittee. Subsequent to this July meeting
perhaps several weeks later, the chair people for each of the sub groups
were selected and the composition of each subgroup was determined.

There were still some more procedural hurdles to go through, various
forms needed to be signed by TGDC members before we could begin \--
before the subgroups could begin meeting and there were procedural
notice that had to be given.

Subsequently it was, I believe the beginning of October that the
subcommittees began to meet. And the subcommittees began meeting at
least every two weeks via teleconference. The NIST staff participates at
each of those telecons. There are occasional face to face meetings as
well but logistically it is very difficult to hold many face to face
meetings and of course we are very grateful for the TGDC to volunteer
their time. We do realize they are volunteers and have full time jobs as
well, so face to face meetings are clearly difficult but we did have a
few when they were absolutely necessary. We had at least one in the
security subgroup and we had one in the core requirements and testing.

So we would have these meetings every two weeks and work is done in
between the meetings. So typically at the end of a telecon, there would
be action items assigned both to members of the TGDC and as well to NIST
staff. If action items were not assigned, we at NIST would meet and
assigned our own action items to us to ensure that the work progressed
and that we had enough information to review when we had the next
telecon. So these action items took the form of research or perhaps
drafting of preliminary documents.

Now, due to the interdisciplinary nature, there is a need to coordinate
among the subcommittees. It is a tremendous challenge to make sure
everyone coordinates especially when there are three subcommittees
meeting independently. And we don't want the subcommittees to work in
isolation. So we felt we needed to develop a common framework for all
the subcommittees to adhere to. The core requirements and testing
subgroup took the lead in developing this framework and then shared it
with the other subgroups.

The subcommittees don't vote of course, so the idea was not to get
formal approval but just to develop a framework so we all had a common
model to speak to.

So the first question was, how do we organize voting. You can do this in
a number of ways. You can organize voting by function, i.e. what has to
happen for voting systems to work correctly or you can organize them by
process, meaning we can look at the various activities that occur in
each stage of the voting process. Obviously both are necessary and we
chose to take our first cut by function and then relate these functions
to stages in the voting process.

So we developed a high level set of organizing principles, which
encompassed these functions. We also developed a process model and those
are both in your briefing books.

So these high level organizing principles allow us to make sure
everything is covered, to enable us to figure out where things fit in,
to explain the link between detail requirements that we will be
developing in the April timeframe and what a voting system is supposed
to do, and to help us ensure that the end to end system is addressed.

In developing these high level principles, we researched various
documents including the HAVA legislation, NIST workshops, other
researches and we even looked at a counsel of Europe report. Again, the
need is to convey to people both inside and outside the election
community how the requirements that we will be developing, were defined
and how they were derived. And we need the public to understand this as
well.

So this is a quick look at the eight high level principles we have
developed. Again these are high level, very, very broad. They allow us
much discretion in drilling down to develop specific requirements and
this is a draft that we are continually refining. This is far from being
cast in concrete.

I will just quickly address each of these. The first principal deals
with the right of all voters to have equal access to the voting system
without discrimination.

The second, ensures that each ballot is counted once and only once. The
third, looks at the right of the voter to have a ballot that reasonably
accommodates the usability and accessibility requirements.

The fourth, ensures the accurate accumulation and recording of ballots.
The fifth, ensures that the voting system must not reveal how a voter
cast his or her ballot and minimizes the voter's ability to prove how he
or she voted.

The sixth, ensures that the physical characteristics of the voting
system is fit for its intended purpose. The seventh, ensures that the
voting system is able to withstand various disruptions including
disruptions from national disasters, disruptions from electrical
services, and disruptions from cyber security attacks. The eight
principle addresses the verification of the correct operation of the
voting process.

So these principles are being reviewed and revised. There are some
questions about the viability of some of the principles. Some of the
TGDC members express some reservations about some of them, that some may
be primarily procedural rather than resulting in technical requirements
and thus should perhaps be eliminated.

There is some feeling among some TGDC members that one or two of the
principles may be distributed across the other principles and thus also
could be eliminated. And some people also feel that at least one of the
principles relates to election management and not the voting system and
should be eliminated.

So again these are things being discussed and we haven't come to any
formal conclusions but this is a working model so we can all communicate
and develop our requirements. And we welcome comments and suggestions.

So I wanted to talk for a minute about our strategy for developing
requirements. These are the detailed requirements that vendors will
implement for the voting systems. These requirements need to be at a
sufficient level of specificity to enable the determination of whether
or not the requirement has been implemented correctly. They must be
precise, unambiguous, consistent and testable. They must use normative
language like shall or must.

Now ideally in an ideal world, these requirements would be defined not
in English but in what we call a formal language. This is done in some
other standards committees. English is a very, very difficult language
to be precise. When you and I communicate, sometimes we might have
difficulty in communication because of the ambiguity of the English
language.

The ideal scenario would be to use a mathematical and what we call a
formal specification. Commissioner Martinez talked about having
confidence in the voting system to the same level of various other
systems like, automobiles and planes. Now these types of mission
critical systems, typically do use formal methods to define the
requirements. However, in the voting system this is really not practical
for many, many reasons.

Number one, it takes much longer to develop standards that are based on
formal methods then it does to do ones based on English and HAVA does
not give us the luxury of that time.

Secondly, standards developed using a formal method system is more
difficult to read to the layman than is the English language and we
certainly want the public to be able to understand everything we do. So
like it or not we really are faced with using the English language and
it is again, I just want to remind everybody, we have been involved in
standards for a long, long time. It is a tremendous challenge to use the
English language and be precise in defining requirements.

So we will drill down from our high level organizing principles to
develop precise testable requirements. We will also develop a conformist
clause. That is one of the resolutions in front of you today. Conformist
clauses need to specify what must conform and how it must conform. And
also address things like, if in fact the standard is partitioned. We
will have for instance different requirements for different voting
systems, DREs versus optical stands. So a conformist clause talks about
what must be done in each of those scenarios to claim conformance.

The conformance clause also addresses a concept we call extensions. All
standards have features, which must be implemented by an implementer to
claim conformance. However the question comes up, what if additional
features are implemented. Is that conforming implementation? A
conformist clause addresses that issue as well.

So we will start with the 2002 VSS and use those requirements whenever
feasible. If a requirement is not sufficiently specified, we will
attempt to rewrite it. However, HAVA puts additional emphasis on
computer security and human factors, including assistant technologies
for individuals with disabilities including blindness and varying levels
of literacy. Many of these requirements cannot be extracted from the
2002 VSS and when that is the case, we will identify completely new
requirements.

So we realize how important an activity this is and want to prioritize
our tasks. The initial focus to produce the April deliverable will be on
the most important aspects of voting. And what is most helpful to the
community, each subcommittee's initial focus is looking at one of these
three high level principles.

So human factors and privacy is looking at principle number three, each
cast ballot shall capture the intent of the voter who cast that ballot.
Core requirements and testing is looking at principle number four, the
voting process shall accurately accumulate, count and report legitimate
votes. And security and transparency is looking at requirement or
principle number eight, independent observers shall be able to verify
the correct operation of the voting process.

So again, each subcommittee will drill down in each of these areas to
develop precise testable requirements while at the same time beginning
to extract requirements from the other principles as well. Thank you for
your time.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Mark. I would like to point out that of course
you had copies in your books but there are also hard copies outside in
case people did not get them. And this presentation in its entirety will
also be on our website.

At this point I would like to ask our parliamentarian to walk through
our procedures so to speak and walk us through the memo that is in your
book again. It is under the agenda mark, ahead of your agenda. I hope
everybody can find it.

MR BURKHART: It is actually resolution number one under proposed
resolutions, the proposed resolution tab.

DR. SMURGIAN: At this time we will basically start establishing the
framework of how this committee will continue working after various
resolutions are passed. But to establish this framework I would like to
entertain a motion to adopt Resolution 1-05, that is presented by NIST.
Do I have a motion?

MALE SPEAKER: So moved.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I hear a second?

MALE SPEAKER: I will second for discussion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. I would like to ask our parliamentarian, Mr.
Burkhart to walk us through this motion and explain various parts of it.
Mr. Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Point of order, should we not discuss parliamentary procedure
before we go into the business of adopting motions?

DR. SMURGIAN: Well what do you mean by parliamentarian \--

MR. KRAFT: It is my understanding that he is about to explain the
process that we are to use for adopting motions. So you are proposing
that we begin adopting a particular motion before we receive that
explanation.

DR. SMURGIAN: That was my mistake. Mr. Burkhart had already walked
through the procedures earlier on how to introduce the motions, and the
seconding et cetera \--

MR. KRAFT: Okay and then I have a second point of order. As you are
aware Mr. Chairman, the version of these motions that we have before us,
was distributed by NIST around noon yesterday on a holiday while pretty
much everybody at this table was in travel. Do the federal laws provide
us with any guidance as to the appropriateness if that?

I mean you reference here that various notices and other administrative
tasks have been accomplished so the proceedings will comply with
applicable statues. Is the distribution of the drafts to be discussed on
the federal holiday, the day before the meeting, appropriate and in
compliance with the applicable statues?

DR. SMURGIAN: I will wait for our parliamentarian to make a comment. My
understanding is that these resolutions were sent in the middle of last
week. There were some last minute changes and editing. To my knowledge,
there is no particular requirement as to the time \-- you know, advance
notice so to speak but perhaps I will ask our parliamentarian to comment
on this.

MR. KRAFT: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would comment that not only do you
not know how the drafts that went out yesterday, that are in this book,
differ from the ones that were distributed last week but no one sitting
on this committee, unless they were involved in yesterday's draft, has
that knowledge. It makes it very difficult to proceed, to evaluate and
discuss materials that we frankly have not had an opportunity to
evaluate. And placing reliance upon assurances that there are only minor
differences between these things that were distributed yesterday and
what was distributed last week, would be foolish.

MR. BURKHART: The drafts of the resolutions which have been worked on
for the last two weeks were distributed by the NIST staff on Wednesday
at the request of specific members of the EA \-- of the TGDC who were
involved or interested in specific resolutions, some resolutions were
revised by NIST staff at their specific request. Resolution 1-5, is one
which I drafted. That's unusual but since the others have been drafted
by technical people this is something that goes to procedure in the
future. And there has been no change in draft 1-5 since the version that
you had received back on Wednesday.

DR. WILLIAMS: In keeping with this conversation I would like to offer an
amendment to this resolution. May I?

MR. BURKHART: The Chair makes those decisions.

DR. SMURGIAN: Would you like to do that now or \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Well there is a motion and second on the floor, so I
would like to \-- I would like to do that now.

MR. BURKHART: Well it would be up to the Chair to decide whether or not
you would want to advise the committee to have a discussion as to the
content of this motion and then entertain \--

DR. SMURGIAN: If I may, I would like to address Mr. Kraft's concern
first of all. As I pointed out the resolutions were mailed \-- were sent
out on Wednesday. As I said before there were some changes made, last
minute changes. When we come to each resolution, perhaps the chairs of
the subcommittees can explain what, if any, last minute changes were
made so that people can understand and appreciate any specific changes
made.

And then based on that, I would like to go on with the motion \--
otherwise basically we will not be acting on any other resolutions if we
go by that \-- and since we are not aware of any legal requirement, I
would propose that we make sure that this is a matter of information
sharing and making sure that every member understands what's in the
particular resolution. And I will ask the Chairs of each subcommittee to
pay specific attention and point out to us any last minute changes made.

DR. WILLIAMS: I still would like to make an amendment to this.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MR. BURKHART: A second would be required.

DR. WILLIAMS: In the last paragraph at the end of the first sentence \--

MR. BURKHART: What page? What is the number on the bottom of the page?

MALE SPEAKER: Three.

DR. WILLIAMS: Two.

MR. BURKHART: Two, okay.

DR. WILLIAMS: It is this paragraph that begins, during subsequent
meetings.

DR. SMURGIAN: On page three.

MR. BURKHART: Page three.

DR. SMURGIAN: Go to the last \--

DR. WILLIAMS: I'm sorry. I am looking at the one that was distributed
last week. Sorry about that.

MR. BURKHART: Might I, just as parliamentarian as everybody to refer to
the double spaced versions, which are under the tab denoted proposed
resolutions in the bound notebook that you have.

DR. WILLIAMS: Is this the one that was sent out yesterday?

MR. BURKHART: I think the gentleman's question \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Okay page three, the paragraph that begins, during
subsequent meetings. At the end of that sentence I would like to insert
the following sentence. All work products to be considered for adoption
by the TGDC, will be transmitted to the members of the committee at
least five working days prior to the meeting in which they are to be
considered.

MALE SPEAKER: I will second that.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any discussion or comments?

MALE SPEAKER: Yes. Could we have confirmation on receipt of the
documents by the members?

DR. SMURGIAN: Could you repeat that part? I didn't quite \-- is that an
additional \--

MALE SPEAKER: Well the gentleman \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Or was that a question?

MALE SPEAKER: \-- Well it was an addition. The gentleman indicated that
he wanted all documents to be received five working days prior to
voting. I was only suggesting that staff confirm receipt of said
documents by members because technology has difficulties, sometimes
FedEx has difficulties and people's travel schedules might be difficult
so we just want to confirm that the members are working off of the
properly documented work products for voting matters.

DR. WILLIAMS: Well we all have official addresses on file and if they
send the document to that official address then it is our responsibility
to see to it that we get it.

MALE SPEAKER: And that was our email addresses?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. We all agreed that we're going to use email
addresses as our official address. Then if you send it to my email
address, then you can document that you sent it to my email address.
Then from then on, it is my responsibility.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Well since we're discussing this, I might offer that we
have at least one member of the committee who is reading materials
through assistive devices and we might want to confirm that he has not
only received the material but is able to read it.

MR. ELLEKESE: Hello?

DR. SMURGIAN: Please identify yourself so that we know.

MR. ELLEKESE: Jim Ellekese U.S. Access Board. I am totally blind. Just
as a matter of the history I received the CD from Mr. Hustis that he put
together last week. And I received late yesterday afternoon a printed
package which, my assistant has taken the responsibility of scanning it
into my computer. Anything that was placed out, I have an accessible
format here and I take it as my responsibility as a member of the
committee to ensure that I have viable information in front of me.

I also have immediate access via the computer I am sitting before with
adaptive technology to access the NIST website and the EAC website as
necessary for these meetings.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Any other comments?

MALE SPEAKER: Yes, Mr. Chairman, will our staff be reviewing this whole
resolution for us? I was just interested in the meaning of page 2.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes. Mr. Burkhart will walk through that but we have a
motion to amend this prior to discussion but I guess we will go forward
with that.

MR. BURKHART: It would be appropriate if there is no more comment, then
it would be appropriate for you to ask me to repeat the language, of the
amendment and then take a vote on that.

DR. SMURGIAN: All right can we \--

MR. BURKHART: Okay. As follows then, first matter of voting today, this
would be an amendment to Resolution 1-05, adding to the bottom of the
third page of that resolution, the following product offered by Member
Williams, all NIST work product will be sent so it is received five days
prior to consideration at upcoming TGDC meetings. Is that accurately
stated?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Repeat that one more time.

MR. BURKHART: All NIST work product will be sent so it is received five
days prior to consideration at a future TGDC meeting, offered by Mr.
Williams.

MALE SPEAKER: My notes on Mr. Williams \--

DR. WILLIAMS: For NIST or anybody else.

MALE SPEAKER: \-- My notes on Mr. Williams' comment said that all work
products to be considered by the TGDC should be received by TGDC members
five days prior to the meeting in which the item is to be discussed.

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Regardless of who sends it, whether it's NIST or a
committee chairman or what.

MR. BURKHART: That's a fine way to say it. So you would adopt his
reading of it?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. BURKHART: Okay great.

DR. WILLIAMS: I have got it here.

MR. BURKHART: Okay wonderful.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: Is it five days or five working days?

DR. WILLIAMS: Five working days.

MR. BURKHART: Mr. Green did you get all that?

MR. GREEN: Could you read it one more time?

MALE SPEAKER: All work products to be considered by the TGDC, should be
received by the TGDC members five working days prior to the meeting in
which the items are to be discussed.

MR. BURKHART: As a matter of meeting procedure Mr. Chair, what I would
say is that we will \-- any revisions to documentation, which Mr. Green
will do, will be immediately printed and passed to the sponsors so they
can reconfirm that the wording was accurate.

MALE SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman, during this momentary break, can I make a
comment?

DR. SMURGIAN: Sure.

MALE SPEAKER: Might I suggest \-- I see our sign language interpreter in
the corner with the shadow and so forth and anyone with hearing
impairments may have some difficulties in the shadows and perhaps, using
real time captioning during our meetings would accurately capture not
only for motion makers and so forth but putting real time text on the
wall for members of the audience and so forth and that would assist us
in capturing items like we're doing right this very moment for accuracy
of motions and seconds and so forth. And perhaps we could implement that
for our February meetings.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. We will definitely take that under
consideration for the February meeting.

MALE SPEAKER: Just a clarification on this, just to make sure I
understand, because in some cases resolutions present that we have
informal phone conversations for a subcommittee where we have quorum and
we discuss that. As a result of that discussion, resolutions can get
changed and in addition, resolutions can be introduced. Is that to be
allowed?

MR. BURKHART: There would be \-- of course the statute itself does not
prevent a member from offering a resolution right on the floor during
the course of a meeting. If I take the gentleman's motion as a whole, I
think what he is saying is that when members of the TGDC instruct NIST
staff to perform services for them, that particular work product needs
to get out in that five day business. Of course the motion doesn't
restrict members of the TGDC from requesting further services after the
five days or even arriving on site with a resolution nobody has ever
seen. I think the spirit is the earlier the notice, the better.

MALE SPEAKER: Well I don't think it is limited to NIST work product. It
is limited to draft documents, which are circulated for consideration at
the meeting, must be out five days before the meeting, five working
days. That does not preclude resolutions being proposed on the floor
during the meeting but it does propose that written work product that
presumably has been labored over very carefully thought out, will allow
the people who are going to make decisions on it, to spend some time
carefully considering its merits before they discuss it and before they
make decisions on it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well certainly I am in agreement with that interpretation,
otherwise we will not \-- everything has to be cast in concrete a week
before the meeting which will not be very productive. So with that
clarification, and not hearing any further comments, may I ask for a
vote on this particular amendment? Those in favor say aye.

AUDIENCE: Aye.

DR. SMURGIAN: Those against? I guess it has passed. Thank you. We will
proceed with Mr. Burkhart's comments.

MR. BURKHART: Okay. It is unusual for the parliamentarian to make
comments on the substance of a motion and I will not be doing so for the
balance of the meeting but since this is one that I drafted, it was only
done on the basis to try to speed the consideration.

Resolution 1-5 as amended, anticipates that resolutions will be passed
today and tomorrow which in part will make certain findings, and which
will in part provide instructions to NIST staff to provide certain
specified technical support.

What is embraced in Resolution 1-5 is a series of options should in the
course of providing the technical assistance, NIST staff determine that
a factual matter or other information has come to their attention which
makes advisable some type of supplementation of the instructions which
are given to the NIST staff, for technical support.

And example would be if a resolution requests a particular type of
support from NIST, where in the course of NIST providing its technical
support, it is determined that it is scientifically infeasible for
instance, to provide that particular option.

Rather then waiting for your next meeting, say in a month, because of
the timeliness issues that we face, what the resolution does is it
provides options so that NIST staff can identify this to representatives
of the TGDC so some supplementation of that instruction can be provided.
I would say that of course the resolution itself is not (unintelligible)
the intentions and findings which are embraced in any resolution that
this committee would adopt, of course are not changed by a subgroup of
this committee providing NIST with just additional supplemental
instructions as to their work.

And as an example, if you would look on page two, the paragraph
beginning with the word, if in the course of providing technical
assistance, the fifth line of the page, on page two, this would be an
example of what would happen if significant errors are found in the
resolution or a scientific issue arises. What would the NIST staff do?

What they would do is they would contact the Chair. The Chair would
contact the appropriate subcommittee Chair, and the individual who
offered the resolution. And if those three individuals agree that the
instructions to NIST should be changed in some manner they would issue
supplemental written instructions to NIST and then a copy of that
supplemental instruction would be provided to the entire TGDC so that
you are aware of that circumstance.

A similar approach would follow on the top of page three, where two
resolutions are adopted by the TGDC which are in direct conflict with
each other and NIST scientific staff does not believe that they can get
appropriate resolution to that conflict as to what their instructions
are. The same individuals, with respect to a given resolution would
again be consulted. In this case of course it would be multiple
resolutions for some type of further instruction to be given to NIST
again, so they can move forward their work product and have something
for you to consider.

At the bottom of page two, another option is provided to the NIST staff.
If in the course of providing the technical assistance which you have
directed them to do, if it becomes apparent to NIST that a desirable
alternative or supplemental approach should be provided to you, this
would allow NIST staff to of course, develop that supplemental approach.
Of course it would require them to provide that instruction which you
have provided them, so they would have to give you what you want and if
there is a supplemental or an alternative approach they of course could
provide that to you as well.

The first page of the Resolution 1-5 essentially goes to the issue that
\-- what you ask the NIST staff to do by your resolutions today and
tomorrow, will come back to you. And then you will have \-- and then it
will come back to you if this resolution is adopted with the five
working day requirement. You will then, just like you have the ability
to look at and approve or disapprove amend these resolutions, you will
be able to do the same thing with respect to that work product.

So just because NIST staff is presenting work product to you, does not
give any authority to that work product until you say that it is \-- it
is consistent with the intentions of your resolution and the
instructions to which you have given to the NIST staff.

That is the essential underpinnings of the resolution, Mr. Chair.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any further comments or questions? Okay so then the
resolution is to be voted upon with the amendment that was passed prior
to this discussion. So all those \--

MR. BURKHART: Actually for the actual adoption of the resolutions, these
will be by roll call. So I will just simply go down and ask for the ayes
and nays by reading the names. If that is acceptable Mr. Chair?

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. I stand to be corrected. Would you please
proceed that now?

MR. BURKHART: I will call the ayes and nays then at the request of the
Chair. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Davidson? No answer. Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Purcell? Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Revest?

MR. REVEST: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Aye.

MR. BURKHART: There are 13 ayes. There are no nays Mr. Chairman. You may
declare it adopted.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Mr. Burkhart. The resolution is adopted with the
amendment.

MALE SPEAKER: I have another question (unintelligible). In one of the
documents that was circulated, you said that it would take eight votes
to pass an amendment. Is that true with a quorum of 13?

MR. BURKHART: Yes it is.

MALE SPEAKER: Okay. So we have a majority of the entire committee with
\--

MR. BURKHART: Yes the way the Federal Advisory Committee statutes work,
you need that eight even if there are only 10 people here.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. I believe we are right on schedule. We will take a
half hour break until 11:00 a.m. As was pointed out before the cafeteria
is to your right and restroom are to your left. We will see you then.

**(SHORT BREAK)**

MALE SPEAKER: Can we all take are seats so we can start our 11:00 a.m.
session please?

We are going to break at 12:30 p.m. for lunch. Again because this is web
cast and we're doing closed captioning, we need to keep as close to
schedule as we can. I have been asked to give one brief logistic note.
If you are on a shuttle, using our shuttle service to get back to Shady
Grove, to get a metro, you need to be out front at 5:15 p.m. this
afternoon.

The plans now are that this will go to 5:15 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. but if you
are on the shuttle, to be safe be out front at 5:15 p.m. The first
shuttle will run tomorrow morning. You can pick it up at 8:15 a.m. and
it will get you here in plenty of time for the 9:00 beginning of the
session tomorrow. And with that I hand it back to Dr. Smurgian.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay if we could come to order. I would like to call on
the human factors and privacy subcommittee chair, Ms. Whitney
Quesenberry to provide the committee with a brief summary of the issues
relevant to the human factors resolutions that will be considered for
adoption. And if you wish to call on NIST staff for any technical
assistance please do so. Thank you Ms. Quesenberry.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Thank you Chairman Smurgian and also the commissioners.
Each of our subcommittees faces challenges unique to our subject area.
And in the case of the human factors and privacy subcommittee, we are
filling gaps in the existing voting system standards, not just proposing
amendments to the voluntary federal standards or guidelines, but are
moving them forward drawing on proven regulations, research and
practice.

VSS2002 introduced accessibility for the first time in voting system
standards and includes an informative annex on usability. HAVA added
mandates for accessible voting systems to make is possible for some 56
million Americans of voting age with disabilities, to vote independently
and privately. There have also been new regulations since then,
specifically the recently updated ADA accessibility guidelines or the
ADAAG, a new industry consensus work on usability standards and
accessibility standards in the IEEE committees.

One of our goals is to bring the voting system standards up to date with
the best current practice from the human factors and accessibility
communities, drawing on that practice to improve our voting systems and
our elections. Our basic approach is to examine carefully each place
where the voter interacts with the voting system and draft requirements
that will ensure usability, accessibility and privacy to the best of our
ability.

We have built on the work of the human factors report, improving the
usability and accessibility of voting systems and products, which was
delivered to Congress by the EAC in May 2004 as required under section
243 of HAVA. This report makes 10 recommendations and outlines a roadmap
for developing robust human factors standards. We are following that
roadmap.

We have also taken a practical approach in setting our priorities
mindful of what we can achieve in the timeframe set forth in our TGDC
mandate and our HAVA mandate. Where there are indications that there is
"research needed" I would like to hasten to assure everyone that this is
not open ended, academic research but the practical work to create the
benchmarks needed for ITA testing guidelines.

As you will see in the resolutions we have proposed, our top priorities
are two important aspects of human factors and privacy both
accessibility and the capturing of the voters' intent at the polling
place. Accessibility is critical not just because it's important to so
many Americans but because it is the law. We will build on existing well
researched, regulations, standards, guidelines, and other documentation
for these requirements. We will also focus on how to serve a diverse and
again population with many individual needs.

The usability standards around capturing the voters' intent is a major
gap in the existing standards. For this work we will build on the work
of the IEEE industry standard committee as well as on current
established practice. We will be extending this work by developing what
we hope will be cost effective, reproducible tests to be used in the
certification process.

Two other comments. One is that in any place where we are referencing
existing regulations and guidelines and other material, we are in all
cases referring to the most recent version of that. I think one of the
most specific ones is the ADAAG, which was revised this September \--

MALE SPEAKER: July 24th.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Thank you, July 24th.

MALE SPEAKER: 2004.

MS. QUESENBERRY: 2004. Although we are presenting ten separate
resolutions, they are all, and I think especially the first seven,
interrelated. We have broken them apart for ease of discussion and into
separate areas where we believe we can write firm and testable
requirements versus areas where either because of the material or the
current state of the art, we will only be able to suggest guidelines.
Together however, I believe they will take a major step in ensuring the
usability and accessibility of our voting systems.

I would like to now call on Dr. Sharon Liskowski of the NIST staff to
give you a little technical background on some of the issues we're
facing.

DR. LISKOWSKI: Thank you Whitney. Good morning Chairman, and committee
members. I just have a few slides just to act as clarification for the
resolutions that you are going to see.

As Whitney said, our \-- the goal that we started with and that we're
working towards with these resolutions is of course accessible, useable
voting systems. And that means that we have to have a good understanding
of the voting application, we have to apply existing standards,
guidelines and best practices and from that develop standards which have
objective measures to determine if voting equipment meets those
standards and the test must be feasible and not too costly.

And we would like them to be as much implementation and technology
independent where possible because that makes for easier definition of
the testing and a lot less complex standards. And because when you look
at where the voter interacts with a voting system, you can't just
separate out the equipment from the entire system. Any guidelines that
are important in achieving our goal for the voting system as a whole, we
also have looked at. And because of our tight deadlines, we formed our
resolutions to produce a sooner rather than later, so we have been very
practical as well.

I am not going to read these. They are in the packet, at the end of the
tab that says presentations in your binder. These 10 are just thumbnail
sketch, so for details read the human factors report. This was the
report that the EAC delivered to Congress in the spring. I have bolded
out number 1 and 10 because they do play a role in the development of
the \-- some of our resolutions.

And that is one recommendation out of the report was that where possible
performance based high level, very precise voting system standards that
would support independent testing authority certification or
qualification process or what is needed for usability. And then 10 the
conformance tests for those standards described in 1, does require some
applied research.

Just some terminology to the \-- that we used in our resolutions to act
as clarification because we find that sometimes people get kind of
confused about standard guideline test. We used standard in the
following sense in our resolutions. That is, a requirement that is
suitable for independent testing, authority qualification and
certification testing, that is what piece of equipment is going to be
\-- certifies as meaningless standard or not.

When we refer to guidance or guideline, that is not enforceable by the
ITA testing process. So that means either that it is not testable or it
is out of the scope \-- outside of the scope of testing the actual
equipment.

When we use the word conformance test, that is a test to determine if a
standard is met. And when we say usability test or human performance
test in the context of our resolutions, this is a type of conformance
test that requires the use of \-- in a controlled situation, performing
a test with voters interacting with t5he equipment.

Let me just say a few words of what the differences are between design
and performance standards. A design standard specifies how a product is
designed. A performance standard describes how a product functions such
as time to vote, errors in voting, voter satisfaction. So I have three
simple examples here.

The first one is very specific design standard. The stub shall read \--
this is for an audio ballot, use the triangle shape green next and the
yellow back buttons to move through the list of candidates. Press the
round red select button to make choices or to cancel them. At the end of
this list of candidates is a selection to exit to the next contest. This
is a specification for how \-- what exactly an audio ballot should say
for a particular piece of equipment.

As you might imagine you have an awful lot of design standards you have
got to be that specific and implementation dependent.

The second one is also from an audio ballot context. This is a design
standard but it is implementation independent. Provide audio information
and stimulus that enables the voter to request repetition of any
information provided by the system. So that is not implementation
independent.

Here is an example of a performance standard. The system should be
tested for usability to ensure that voters can cast their votes
correctly. Use the voting system to register their intended selections
with minimal errors and easily correct errors when they occur.

Now how would you test minimal errors? You need a benchmark and those
benchmarks to develop a conformance test for that, based on the research
described in the human factors report, suggest that, yes, we can design
such conformance tests but we need to develop those benchmarks. Some
experimentation and validation needs to be done.

And my last slide on \-- so at this time usability performance of voting
systems is not being measured. And we know that following design
standards and guidelines, although we recommend these highly in our
resolutions, does not necessarily ensure usability. But best practice in
the usability, engineering and human factors community does provide
measurement methods, but not necessarily to the degree we need for
voting. So sort of our slightly longer term research, beyond April, says
that if you're going to have usability performance standards, you need
the development of benchmarks and test protocol suitable for conformance
testing of such standards.

And I have got a diagram, horizontal line on the left, testing for
usability by some informal evaluation with a few voters, that's easy.
Results can vary a lot. That can get you started at identifying certain
base level of usability not suitable for conformance test. On the right
of the line, we have complex reliable tests, which are based in rigorous
human factors research and experiments that those tend to be very narrow
and costly to perform.

So what we want to do is move from the left to the right to a point on
that spectrum where you have feasible but reproducible, validated tests
for usability performance. And that is where we want our conformance
testing to be.

So with that, we will start going through our 10 resolutions. And I need
\--

MS. QUESENBERRY: So let me just introduce the first one. I would like to
introduce Resolution Number 2-05, which we have entitled, accessible
voting systems. These titles are informative only.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay do I have a second for this motion?

MALE SPEAKER: Second.

MALE SPEAKER: Do we have a motion?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I was halfway through my sentence. I was getting there
slowly.

MALE SPEAKER: She has not actually presented \-- I mean do we want to
present the resolutions and then have motions or do we want a motion
before we allow it to even be presented?

MS. QUESENBERRY: So question, should we actually read these out loud
given that there is some question about the wording? I think we might
\--

DR. SMURGIAN: I would suggest that we formally move you know, to adopt a
motion, have a second, and then as part of the discussion, you can
provide explanatory remarks.

MALE SPEAKER: Okay then I move that we adopt Resolution 2-05 for the
sake of discussion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I have a second?

MALE SPEAKER: I'll second it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay the floor is open for discussion and for comments,
perhaps first from Ms. Quesenberry.

MS. QUESENBERRY: This resolution deals with the need for standard
requirements for the accessibility of voting systems. And it currently
reads as follows. The TGDC has examined the issue of what is required to
ensure accessible voting systems. It has concluded that standards for
voting systems should include requirements for accessibility that meet
the HAVA requirement for accessible voting by incorporating the latest
federal standards for accessibility.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards based on but not
limited to, existing requirements from the VSS2002, IEEE P1583 draft
5.3.2a, ADA accessibility guidelines, the ADAAG and other relevant and
usability \-- other relevant usability and accessibility guidelines and
federal laws and regulations.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you.

MR. KRAFT: I have a motion for an amendment to that language.

DR. SMURGIAN: Would you please go forward? Are we recording?

MR. KRAFT: Yes, if it is appropriate. I am suggesting that we amend that
language to read as follows. The technical guidelines development
committee has concluded that standards for voting systems should include
requirements for accessibility that include available, accessible
technology for voting systems and which meet the HAVA requirement for
accessible voting.

Let me try that again. Has concluded that standards for voting systems,
\-- I hate a stigmatism \-- should include requirements for
accessibility that meet the HAVA requirement for accessible voting by
incorporating the latest available, accessible technology in voting
systems.

Further, the TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards based on
but not limited to existing requirements from the Voting System
Standards 2002 that continues to the end of that sentence, IEEE, P1583,
draft 5.3.2a, ADA accessibility guidelines and other relevant usability
and accessibility guidelines and federal laws and regulations in order
to develop future accessibility requirements for voting systems.

So what I am trying to do with that, if I was successful is to take the
key points of our recent litigation with AAPD in Duvall County, where
the court has ruled that a voting system is a facility and that new
facilities must include currently available accommodations.

There are accommodations out there, principally the audio ballot, which
I believe HAVA very closely, or very directly points to, those that can
be incorporated now, need to be in place for January '06. And then there
remains much work to be done pushing the industry and the developer of
systems to full compliance with all the guidelines that are out there.

DR. SMURGIAN: I am not quite sure if we have followed \-- rather than
reading the whole motion, maybe you can point out the changes that you
are making. Well let me first get the motion so that we understand what
we're seconding. You are suggesting after the TGDC has \--

MR. KRAFT: We will strike out, has through systems \-- or through it. We
will strike, has through it. So the technical guidelines development
committee has concluded, because we haven't really examined anything. We
have discussed. We have concluded, and then we will strike, federal
standards in line 4, inserting \-- I had available accommodations and
Whitney told me that I couldn't use the accommodations word, so
available accessible technology for accessibility in voting systems.

And then strike, the, in the sentence and say further. And then at the
end of that sentence, to develop future accessibility requirements. It
would help if I handed this one back?

DR. SMURGIAN: Probably.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Chairman?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. HARDING: Could I seek to get clarification on Mr. Kraft's motion?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes. If you can do that \-- we're trying to \-- I am still
not clear. So maybe we can read this one more time. You are basically
taking out the statement that says that TGDC has examined the issue of
what is required? You are taking an issue with that statement?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: And so you are taking that out and saying that TGDC has
concluded that standards for voting system should include requirements
\-- the rest of that is okay until the latest and instead of saying
federal standards for accessibility, you want to say latest available
technologies?

MR. KRAFT: Correct.

DR. SMURGIAN: Period?

MR. KRAFT: For voting systems. In other words, there are \-- there are a
number of thing in federal standards for accessibility and accessible
computer systems which have not been developed in voting systems. And we
cannot require 11 months before our next general election
(unintelligible) functional requirements that simply have not yet been
designed. And the case law doesn't indicate that we are required to. We
are required to take those accessibility devices that have been
developed, that do exist, that can be put into place and require those
be a part of all voting systems. That's where I want to get to.

DR. SMURGIAN: Let me make sure that we all \--

MR. ELLEKESE: Mr. Chairman \--

DR. SMURGIAN: \-- capture what is exactly being offered. Let me read it
and see if it's \--

MR. ELLEKESE: \-- Mr. Chairman, before you \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. ELLEKESE: This is Jim Ellekese from the Access Board.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. ELLEKESE: I hate to be a nitpicker on words but should is a nice
(unintelligible) when it comes to legal documents, shall is a directive.
In other words, it should read \-- rather then should, it should read
shall, that way it is a directive to do what is necessary. Should is
like yes, you can do it, maybe.

MR. KRAFT: Let's see where are we using should.

MALE SPEAKER: First sentence.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Voting systems shall include requirements \--

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Is that \-- would you consider that a firm amendment? Do
we have a motion?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay then \-- if I understand it correctly, the resolution
will read, the TGDC has concluded that standards for voting systems
shall include requirements for accessibility that meet the HAVA
requirement for accessible voting by incorporating the latest available
technologies for voting systems.

MR. KRAFT: For voting system accessibility or for accessibility in
voting systems.

DR. SMURGIAN: The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards
based but not limited to existing requirements from the VSS2002, IEEE,
P1583, ADAAG, and other relevant usability and accessibility guidelines
and federal laws and regulations in order to develop future
accessibility requirements.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Isn't that redundant, directs the research and draft?

MR. KRAFT: Well I'm \-- basically the first sentence is supposed to
provide that NIST will prescribe that current art now and the current
standards. The second sentence provides that NIST will go forward with
research based on the existing standards and the accessibility
guidelines to provide the future standards.

FEMALE SPEAKER: But I thought \--

DR. SMURGIAN: If I may so, I think we are getting into a discussion now.
So does everybody understand the wording of the amendment and the
resolution in its amended form?

MR. HARDING: Mr. Chairman?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. HARDING: Just for clarity I think that sometimes the legalese
confuses people. I believe what Mr. Kraft is indicating, that we're
going to require the utilization of existing, boding, accessibility
standards and indicate to the world that we want to explore further
accessibility in compliance with 508 as that technology and skill become
available. Would that be correct Paul?

MR. KRAFT: That is almost correct, J.R. I don't believe the current
voting systems standards, correct me if I am wrong \--

DR. SMURGIAN: May I make a point of order please. We still don't have a
second, so I am trying to get there and then we will discuss \-- I am
just trying to capture the wording. Did we capture the wording properly?

MALE SPEAKER: I don't think so.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone)

MALE SPEAKER: If I can make a comment. The language up here that you see
on the display here, this is not authoritative. This is catching up
based on what \--

FEMALE SPEAKER: Well let's catch up because \--

MALE SPEAKER: Let's catch up.

MR. KRAFT: Okay. The TGDC has concluded that standards for voting
systems shall include requirements for accessibility that meet the HAVA
requirement for accessible voting by incorporating the latest available
technology for accessibility and voting systems. I am happy with that
sentence.

DR. SMURGIAN: And then the addition to the very end.

MR. KRAFT: Further, the TGDC directs NIST to research and draft, shall
we say future standards \--

FEMALE SPEAKER: New standards.

MR. KRAFT: \-- New standards, based on but not limited to, all of that
and then come down at the end ADAAG and insert, section 508 \-- what is
the proper site for that?

MALE SPEAKER: Section 508.

MALE SPEAKER: CFR1193.

MR. KRAFT: CFR1193.

**(END OF TAPE 1, START OF TAPE 2)**

MR. KRAFT: \-- Accessibility guidelines and federal laws and
regulations.

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone)

MR. KRAFT: Yeah, regulations.

DR. SMURGIAN: I thought that's what you added.

MR. KRAFT: Yeah but I think she is right.

DR. SMURGIAN: So it's redundant? Okay.

FEMALE SPEAKER: So just cut everything (inaudible).

MALE SPEAKER: I was in error on those. It is 1193, section two, which we
may also want to \--

FEMALE SPEAKER: Which one?

MALE SPEAKER: 1194 is section 508, 1193 is 255. We may also want to
include that as the (unintelligible) guidelines.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Wait a minute \-- based on but not limited to, is
certainly doesn't include \--

DR. SMURGIAN: We don't have to include everything. It says other
relevant guidelines and federal laws.

MALE SPEAKER: Okay so 1194 is IT and 1193 is telecom.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MR. KRAFT: Okay I am told that it should be read for the people on the
phone, so I will take one more pass at this. Okay. It is a motion for an
amendment to Resolution 2-5, which reads as follows. The TGDC has
concluded that standards for voting systems shall include requirements
for accessibility that meet the HAVA requirement for accessible voting
by incorporating the latest available technology for accessibility and
voting systems.

Paragraph two, further the TGDC directs NIST to research and draft new
standards based on but not limited to, existing requirements from the
voting system standards 2002, IEEE P1583 draft 5.3.2a, the ADA
accessibility guidelines (ADAAG), CFR1194 (508), and other relevant
usability and accessibility guidelines and federal laws and regulations.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. Now that's the motion. Do I hear a second?

AUDIENCE: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any discussion?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well I do. Having gotten this far, I wonder, given that
one of our goals is to be technology neutral in setting standards, that
is to allow for future technology, or unanticipated technology, if we
actually want to have this say, incorporating the latest available
technology for accessible voting systems.

MR. KRAFT: (Unintelligible) I think there was a Congressional intent
that very frankly we put in an audio ballot test screen machine in every
polling place in the country.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And does that preclude other accessibility \--

MR. KRAFT: No. But that is the minimal standard for being an accessible
voting system in this coming cycle. In addition to \-- there are already
in the 2002 standards, design standards to make it accessible to
wheelchairs. There is a lot of work and research being done on
alternative devices such as (unintelligible) and switches but none of
that is mature enough for us to mandate it right now on all voting
systems.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Because I am suggesting that we don't mandate any of
them in specific at all but that we mandate a result.

MR. KRAFT: The problem is you have got to have once again a measurable
standard.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest and then Mr. Burger.

DR. REVEST: Yes, I have a question, the way I read this there seems to
be an implicit assumption that later is better. That concerns me.

MR. KRAFT: The assumption is that anything beyond the technologies that
are currently developed are simply not going to be available when this
standard goes into place January 1, 2006, and will not be available for
the '06 election cycle. And we really don't want a standard out there
that is going to, by the way it is drafted render all the existing
systems, or the best of the existing systems, non compliant.

And actually the vendors are struggling at this moment as we speak to
bring up audio ballot machines, which will meet the standards
established in Florida that requires the audio and video ballot to work
simultaneously. Two of the three major vendors are struggling with that
in development, trying to get it out by January '06. We don't really
want to send them scurrying trying to develop yet more stuff that
doesn't yet exist.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: I would like to support Paul's comment. I think we need to
be very concerned that what we do in mass not be disrupted to the system
but rather support improvement and ongoing quality. It's normal in
standards for this issue to come up across the board and we typically in
industry standards, develop standards with the realization that
revisions will be done in the future and at that time we will address
new innovations and technology that may be introduced.

And I would suggest we conduct our work with that anticipation. I know
we have a resolution later that specifically speaks to that. So as
innovations come up, we will hope that some future committee can
consider how they are incorporated. But let's take care of current
equipment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any comments from the people on the phone? Okay hearing no
further comments we will vote on the amendment. And we will take a roll
call.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Are we voting on the amendment? Are there two votes or
one vote that we are about to take?

MALE SPEAKER: I think first, we vote for the amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yeah.

MR. KRAFT: It's actually been rewritten enough that we could do both
votes in one roll call. Would anyone have objections to that?

DR. SMURGIAN: We will leave it up to \-- I think the originator of the
motion should make that decision. Do you feel that it's significantly
different or \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: I still would prefer that we \-- I think I would be
happier if we clarified the language around technology more specifically
in the draft and the draft language. But I think I understand what we
mean now. The question is, does everyone else understand what we mean?
Let's just do it. You said it would be two votes. Let's just go ahead
\-- instead of just talking about it.

MALE SPEAKER: So one vote or two votes.

MALE SPEAKER: She said two votes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Go ahead.

MR. HARDING: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Before the vote I just hate to
postpone it but I think greater debate amongst ourselves about what that
actually means and what the expectation is, so that we have clarity on
what it is that we are voting on, I think would serve this body and the
public very well. And if we could, I would begin it if I could.

DR. SMURGIAN: Please.

MR. HARDING: Okay. In my eyes I understand this to mean that in the
upcoming '06 election that there would be the expectation that all
currently accessible technologies that meet the expectation of
accessibility would be utilized and then that in the future as
technologies evolve, that that borrowed threshold incorporating let's
say more accessible machines, reaching a greater independence for the
smaller and smaller minorities within the disabled community would be
met. Is that a fair representation Paul?

MR. KRAFT: Yes, J.R. and I guess as an extreme example of something that
is out there, new art to be done, no one has come up with a way that a
blind person can independently cast an absentee ballot. Right now
absentee ballots are all being in done in paper.

MR. HARDING: And mail in.

MR. KRAFT: Yes and mail in absentee ballots. There is some work to be
done there. It is something that the Florida code demands that we
continue to work on but that certainly \-- one of the items that you
know our advocates for disabilities in Florida are pushing for as the
future. That's the kind of thing that we're leaving the door open to,
for future research and development.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other comments? Okay we will go forward with our roll
call for the amendment as documented here.

MR. GREEN: Okay roll call vote on the amendment. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Against.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Is that a yes?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: I abstain and at an appropriate time would like to explain
my vote.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

MR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

MR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Twelve votes affirmative, one against, one abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: The amendment has passed. Unless there are further
comments, we will go ahead and take a roll \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Actually would this be an appropriate time to hear Ms.
Caldise' comment?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, thank you.

MS. CALDISE: Yes. My abstain vote, actually I will be abstaining from
votes on all substantive resolutions and that is because I represent the
American National Standards Institute ANSI and as such, I am not \--
cannot vote on technical contents of documents that may at some point in
the future come before ANSI for approval as an American National
Standard or consideration by our technology advisory group as a ISO or
IEC standard or incorporation into a conformity assessment program.

So my vote will be abstain and that is what you will hear from me for
the technical resolutions.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Hearing no further comments, then we will take
a roll call on the original resolution as amended.

MR. GREEN: Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Against.

MR. GREEN: Davidson is absent, Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

MR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

MR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Again that is 12 votes for, one against, one abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay resolution as amended has been adopted. Thank you.
Ms. Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes. I would like to offer our second resolution, it's
entitled accessibility at polling place. Perhaps I should read it as we
offer it in and then we can open it for discussion.

MALE SPEAKER: I can't hear you.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Our second resolution numbered 3-05, is entitled
accessibility at the polling place. The TGDC has examined the issue of
what is required to ensure access to the polling place by voters with
disabilities. It is concluded that physical accessibility is a function
of both the machine used to the vote and the environment of the polling
place.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft accessibility guidance on
the layout, setup and administration of the polling places. These
guidelines should be combined with the accessibility standards described
in Resolution 2-05.

MR. KRAFT: At an appropriate time, I have an amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I have a second to this motion?

MR. KRAFT: I will second this motion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay we are open for discussion.

MR. KRAFT: I would like to move an amendment to the motion. That
amendment again with what will probably become a routine striking of the
language from has through it, in the second sentence, so that it will
read the TGDC has concluded that physical accessibility is a function of
both the machine use to vote and the environment of the polling place.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft accessibility guidance for
voting systems, which will include the layout, setup and administration
of polling places as a specification for the voting systems'
environment. These guidelines should be combined with the accessibility
standards described in Resolution 2-05.

My intent in this is \-- I mean this is a motion which steps across into
election administration. One of the ways of handling it, and I agree
that it needs to be done, one of the ways in handling it is to make it
part of the environmental specification for the system. If you are not
using the system and you are not setting it up in a precinct within
these specifications, then all other factors out there, you are still
not using the certified voting system with the accommodations you know,
which were designed into it.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I would like to suggest that we take these as two
separate amendments and vote on them separately. Or offer them
separately.

MALE SPEAKER: That's your right as a sponsor.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay.

MR. KRAFT: Okay.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So perhaps we can take the first one, which is the
strike \-- I guess we need a second on it. Let me clarify which one I
mean. The first amendment is striking the clause the TGDC has examined
the issue of what is required to ensure access to the polling place by
disabilities, jumping from the TGDC has concluded. So I would like to
consider that resolution if we can have a second for it.

MR. KRAFT: I will second that.

DR. SMURGIAN: You can't.

MR. KRAFT: Oh.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do we have a second?

MALE SPEAKER: All right let me point out if she doesn't \-- if she could
consider that a friendly amendment?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Could I just say why because maybe it would be easier
if I just said what's in my mind which is that these opening sentences
and this format is used in all of our resolutions, is intended to frame
the content of the resolution that follows. And I believe that striking
those phrases in their entirety leaves these very unclear.

I would be happy to amend them across the board to say something like is
considering. But those phrases really are framing for what comes after
it and removing them I think leaves the text unclear.

MR. KRAFT: And my concern is by saying, has examined, we're really
asserting that we have done a lot more discussion and research on these
issues then we have.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So could we take it as, is considering the issue rather
than has examined the issue?

MR. KRAFT: That would be acceptable.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MS. QUESENBERRY: Right as written now it states \-- it makes a clearer
assertion. We have done something. And I am saying that the language
following that phrase is the part that I am concerned about and if we
change the opening preface to say, we are considering the issue of,
whatever that issue is, then we have \-- I think we may have met Mr.
Kraft's objections while preserving the language.

MR. KRAFT: Yes, if we simply strike examined and insert considered.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah.

MR. KRAFT: Then yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: So would you consider that a friendly amendment then?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: So we don't need to \-- so we will then keep that first
sentence and we will simply change the word examined to considered.

MR. ELLEKESE: Excuse Mr. Chairman, Jim Ellekese. In all resolutions, so
I can clarify it on my computer, all resolutions, that will be a
consistent change under the human factors and security?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I believe we will have to make that specific statement
on each of them so we will catch them up as we go.

MR. ELLEKESE: Thank you.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Now on to your more specific amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: The changes to the second part.

MR. KRAFT: Okay the changes to the second part. I guess as a second
motion, will be to insert language after accessibility guidance, to
insert the language, for voting systems, which will include, and will
strike the word own, and continue with the text, the layout, setup and
administration of polling places, insert new language, as a
specification for the voting system environment.

So we're getting our nose out of the election administration tent and
we're saying that when you use a voting system that we have certified as
meeting these accessibility requirements, that the vendor will specify
the environment for that device as needed in order to ensure that it is
accessible.

I mean if you have got a voting booth that is wide enough and tall
enough for a wheelchair to get under it, that is negated if you, you
know, face that device against the wall 24 inches from the wall. So
you're system operator manuals, instructions of the vendors provide on
how to set this equipment up will include these specifications. And
election administrators who failed to meet that specification leave
themselves exposed as not using a compliant system.

DR. SMURGIAN: Ms. Quesenberry will you consider this a friendly
amendment or do you want to vote on it? Did everybody get the language?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes, I am sort of waiting for the language to sort of
catch up here.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MS. QUESENBERRY: Why don't we just hand them the \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Let me read it again. See if I capture this right. The
TGDC directs NIST to research and draft accessibility guidance for
voting systems, which include the layout, setup and administration of
polling places as a specific \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Specification.

DR. SMURGIAN: \-- specification for the voting environment. Is that
correct?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: And the rest stays as it is.

MALE SPEAKER: Does examine become consider \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: We have already accepted that.

DR. SMURGIAN: We have already done that. We're talking about the second
part. Do I \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: So your intent in this is to simply say that the scope
of these guidelines will be the use of the machine in the voting
environment?

MR. KRAFT: Yes. And we already have that concept in the 2002 standards
that the voting system includes, hardware, software and it includes
supplies, it includes cots, serve environments, it includes a set of
user manuals that a user must follow.

MS. QUESENBERRY: What happens \--

DR. SMURGIAN: If I could just interrupt for just a moment? We seem to be
going into the discussion without a second. I did not hear a second for
this motion.

MR. HARDING: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: So discussion.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So I would just like to work through this a little bit
to clarify it because I think we are all here and I think it will help
us in drafting to be more clearer. Let's say you have a device that in
order to be seen well, requires good lightening. Would that be part of
what we would consider?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay, then I have \--

MR. KRAFT: And we have I think somewhere in the 2002 standards, we have
requirements for lightening. And if you are going to rely on overhead
lights, then as part of the system design specification for the
environment, you specify that overhead lightening.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Absolutely. Okay I think \-- I am \-- I would consider
this a friendly amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay so we consider these changes as a friendly amendment.
Unless we have a comment, yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Yes, it is my understanding that what we're trying to do
with the changes here is to direct the focus on the election systems \--
requirements for election systems accessibility as oppose to a broad
accessibility to the voting \-- the polling place environment. Is that
correct?

MR. KRAFT: That's correct. The polling place environment I think is
strictly outside the scope of this committee and its mission.

MS. QUESENBERRY: How would \-- well \--

MALE SPEAKER: To further clarify, I would suggest one change to the
amendment and a change to the title. First in the title, again it seems
to imply broad accessibility to the polling place, so I would suggest
although the title is not normative, it would be accessibility of voting
systems at the polling place, just so that it doesn't set the wrong
expectation. But specific suggested change to further clarify in the
first sentence, after the words to ensure access to, I would insert
voting systems in, prior to the polling place.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Could I suggest that the access to the ballot or access
to the active voting? Well let me \-- because I have a different answer
than Paul so maybe I should just jump in \--

MALE SPEAKER: This is an important distinction that I think we need to
make whether or not \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think it is and we specifically separated this
resolution from the previous one, because it is a fine point and I think
it is one that is worth considering carefully. One of the things that I
certainly observed on November 2nd, and I believe others did, was a
tension between a system, which in a perfect environment might be
completely accessible but which is nonetheless deployed in an imperfect
environment for many, many reasons.

The many reasons why that might happen \-- but it seemed to me or \-- I
guess I will just say me, that if our goal is in fact \-- if the
broadest goal is not just to ensure accessible systems but to ensure
that people with disabilities can vote on those systems, that in order
to do that, we need to say something about the environment in which
those systems need to be deployed. And that's why this exists, so I'm
not as concerned about access to the voting system although that
certainly is a piece of it. What I am concerned about is access to
voting. And I know that's a very \-- I mean I just made a fairly fine
point although these are of course legal resolutions and fine points are
in order.

MALE SPEAKER: I understand the desire, my concern is the scope of what
we're focused on which is voting system guidelines and that is the
reason why I was suggesting that \-- whether to have the resolution
called into question, as being out of scope for the work of the TGDC. I
was suggesting wording that would tend to make sure that this resolution
was entirely within the scope of the TGDC.

MR. KRAFT: It's within the scope and I am trying to move it to a higher
more enforceable plane. J.R. and I have discussed his observations of
polling places that while they had accessible equipment, were not
properly set up, coworkers whose training apparently did not prepare
them to properly set up the polling place.

When you find those kinds of violations, number one, I think under the
ADA they are not truly a violation unless someone needs the
accessibility and is not provided it. This would basically move it to a
higher level so that that specification for accessible configuration of
the equipment in the polling place would be mandated as part of the
system definition. And like administrators who failed to properly follow
that specification, would be putting themselves in the position of
having an uncertified system. So I think it is something that could be
used to bring a little higher attention to it as people define their
polling places and set them up.

MR. ELLEKESE: Mr. Chairman?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, would you please identify yourself?

MR. ELLEKESE: It's Jim Ellekese from the Access Board. In the comments
that were shared relating Mr. Harding's observations, I too made similar
observations here in New Jersey and had those observations shared with
Mr. Harding as well as well as Chairman Hillman. So it is not, if
anybody is thinking that perhaps this is unique to Florida, it is
clearly not because we observed almost identical considerations here in
New Jersey.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Ms. Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Mr. Chairman, I just want to clarify that in this context
that we are not talking about access to the polling place itself but
rather to the system within that polling place because we're talking
about two different things. Though I have to worry about both of those,
\--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Actually Paul Kraft just said something in his most
recent statement that triggered an idea for me for language that might
clarify this for all of us, which is to draft accessibility guidance on
the deployment and configuration of systems in the polling place.
Because I think that is what we're bouncing around, and that both
narrows it to the setup of the equipment but also says that it is the
equipment in the environment.

MR. KRAFT: Right and puts the burden on the vendor once again to specify
that environment for the items that he is bringing to examination. And
that leads the ITAs in a posture where they can now look at his
physically constructed devices and look at his documentation for how it
is to be setup and make a determination, is that in fact accessible.

DR. SMURGIAN: Ms. Quesenberry, are you proposing to change the title, to
that new one, to the new language?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well I think I can accept it although I do have a \--

DR. SMURGIAN: No you just mentioned \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: No I was actually proposing to change the language
within the thing.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And the language I was proposing is that on the
sentence that begins the TGDC directs NIST to draft accessibility
guidance for voting systems which will include the deployment and
configuration of systems in the voting environment or the polling place.
Have we ever defined voting system?

MALE SPEAKER: That is a very good question and I think access then
speaks to both of those issues.

FEMALE SPEAKER: It was defined in the (unintelligible).

MR. KRAFT: Equipment in the polling place.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Does that do it because it gets rid of the word
administration, gets rid of \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Could you, either Mr. Kraft or Ms. Quesenberry read that
second part as modified?

MS. QUESENBERRY: The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft
accessibility guidance for voting systems which will include the
deployment and configuration of equipment in the polling place as a
specification for the voting system environment. I don't know if that is
quite English but it sort of works.

Sharon do you have that definition?

MS. LISKOWSKI: Yes for the purpose of the human factors report, we took
a more holistic view and defined voting system to be a combination of
environment, equipment, ballot voters and other persons, eg. poll
selection officials in the voting process.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So you took system to mean the entire \-- the biggest
possible word and maybe we should be talking about machines or
equipment.

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes, for the purposes of this committee it sounds like
we have a more focused definition.

DR. SMURGIAN: Are we stopping there or are we thinking out the rest of
them?

MS. QUESENBERRY: No. We are letting them catch up behind us so that we
know what we're voting on.

DR. SMURGIAN: But my question is, are we taking out the rest of those?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. KRAFT: He will have it up in just a minute.

DR. SMURGIAN: Does that capture it properly, the TGDC directs NIST to
research and draft accessibility guidance for voting systems which will
include the deployment and configuration of equipment in the polling
place as a specification for the voting system environment.

MR. KRAFT: Did we lose the fact of requiring the vendors to specify
that?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I don't know that we can require that.

MR. KRAFT: Yeah we can make that a \-- we can make that a requirement.

MS. QUESENBERRY: (Off microphone).

MR. KRAFT: I guess \--

MALE SPEAKER: Please speak up.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I'm sorry.

MR. KRAFT: \-- my thoughts on this if making the vendors device
accessible in the polling place relies on setting it up a specific way,
setting a table a particular height, setting it at a particular distance
from the wall, then that needs to be specified in the vendors
documentation and become a part of this system.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think we have a separate resolution on documentation.

DR. SMURGIAN: That this says a specification for the voting system
environment, I mean doesn't that basically cover that?

MR. KRAFT: Okay. Let me read it through the way it is on this machine
right now and let everybody else follow that. The TGDC has concluded
that physical accessibility \--

MR. QUESENBERRY: Has considered.

MR. KRAFT: Has considered.

DR. SMURGIAN: Oh you have taken that out? We restored that, remember.

MR. KRAFT: You guys messed with it and (unintelligible). Okay considered
the issue of physical accessibility \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: What is required \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Basically what you have crossed out has been restored.

MR. KRAFT: Okay, I apologize.

DR. SMURGIAN: And we changed the word examined to considered.

MR. KRAFT: It has concluded that physical accessibility is a function of
both machine use to vote and the environment of the polling place. The
TGDC directs NIST to research and draft accessibility guidance for
voting systems which will include the deployment and configuration of
equipment in the polling place as a specification for the voting system
environment.

DR. SMURGIAN: That's right.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And I think going back to Mr. Gannon's original \-- I
think we are accepting this as a friendly amendment, the change of the
title to accessibility of the voting system at the polling place noting
that in this committee we are using, system, in the narrow sense.

MR. GANNON: The major recommendation was also to clarify in the first
sentence, when you say consider the issue, was required to ensure access
to voting systems, or you were suggesting other wording but something to
clarify that first sentence.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Oh yes, to ensure access to the voting system not the
polling place.

MR. KRAFT: Oh yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Okay so voting system is a subset of the polling place?

MS. QUESENBERRY: That's correct.

DR. SMURGIAN: By voters with disabilities, right. Okay. Do we have any
other comments on this? Ms. Quesenberry would you consider this a
friendly amendment or do you want to \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think we could consider this a friendly amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN+: Okay.

MALE SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman, could you read it for the record for the
gentleman on the phone sir.

DR. SMURGIAN: The TGDC has considered the issue of what is required to
ensure access to the voting system by voters with disabilities. It has
concluded that physical accessibility is a function of both the machine
used to vote and the environment of the polling place.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft accessibility guidance for
voting systems which will include the deployment and configuration of
equipment in the polling place as a specification for the voting system
environment.

MR. ELLEKESE: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

DR. SMURGIAN: These guidelines should be combined with the accessibility
standards described in Resolution 2-05. Any questions, comment from
members on the phone?

MR. ELLEKESE: It is clear, thank you.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay since this is considered \-- yes Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: (Off microphone).

MR. KRAFT: It would only if the sign in table became part of the voting
systems. Say you have a device at the sign in table where a voter swipes
their driver's license to get authenticated, which is some of the stuff
that is in the works right now. In that case that would become part of
the voting system and would have to be covered by this.

But for most systems, the sign in table is not actually part of the
voting system. It's really a separate paper administrative process.

DR. SMURGIAN: If no further comments we will take a roll call for
adoption of this resolution as amended.

MR. GREEN: Roll call. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller? Miller? I believe she was on the phone.

MR. GREEN: We will come back to her.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

Ms. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That is 12 votes for, Miller and Davidson not voting, Caldise
abstaining.

MR. MILLER: If I may this is Alice Miller. I'm sorry my phone cut off
but I would vote yes on that if it is not too late to do that.

MR. GREEN: That's fine. That's 13 votes for, 1 abstaining and Davidson
absent.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. The resolution is adopted as modified. Ms.
Quesenberry would you like to continue?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Moving onto Resolution 4-05 which is longer than the
other two and I hope we can move through it quickly. The title of this
resolution is human factors and privacy requirements for capturing voter
intent.

The text of the resolution is as follows. The TGDC recognized the need
for voting system requirements to include human factors and privacy
requirements for capturing voter intent based on current research. These
requirements should be specified so that systems can be evaluated for
meeting the requirements.

Unclear specifications such as intuitive, unambiguous or meaningful
should be avoided, further performance based standards are preferred
over specific design standards because performance standards address the
total effectiveness of the system more directly then do design standards
and typically they are not technology specific.

The TGDC directs NIST to number one, create an outline of the human
factors and privacy requirements related to capturing voter intent.
Number two, write draft human factors and privacy standards based on
this outline by using existing requirements from the VSS2002, IEEE P1583
draft 5.3.2a and I would like to make a tiny amendment as I read it, the
2004 ADA accessibility guidelines or the ADAAG and other relevant
usability and accessibility guidelines and regulations.

Number three, identify where further requirements \-- where further
requirements development for capturing user intent is needed, noting
when performance based usability standards are possible. Number four,
write all requirements so that they are testable and the test themselves
can be conducted either by inspection, by a person with reasonable
knowledge of systems, user interface design and accessibility, or by
performance based usability tests with clear repeatable protocols.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do we have a second?

MR. KRAFT: I will second and at an appropriate time I have an amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: How come I knew that was coming?

MS. QUESENBERRY: He is not allowed to sit next to me anymore.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, Mr. Kraft.

MR. KRAFT: I would like to move an amendment, striking the words voter
intent and substituting the language the indication of the voter's
choice. A very good friend of mine in the Florida legislature in 1999,
put the words voter intent into the Florida's statues and you recall
that led to much litigation.

The corrective measure that we have taken which stood the test of
litigation in 2002, 2004 was the indication of the voter's choice. There
is no way that you can get into the mind of the voter. You can never win
the argument as to whether or not you have captured the voter's intent.

What you can do, in human factors, is make it easier for the voter to
make his choice perhaps allow him to get closer in the choices he makes
and the choices he intends to make. I have trouble with that on my
monthly budget every month. And to make systems that make it very, very
clear what choice he has made. So I offer that as what I hope will be
taken as a friendly amendment.

MR. QUESENBERRY: I think we can accept that as a friendly amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: So accepted.

MALE SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: An additional friendly amendment for consistency. Can we
add the section 508 issue in there?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah down in number two, after ADAAG, it's CFR
1194(section 508).

DR. SMURGIAN: With no objection so changed. Any other comments? Yes Dr.
Revest?

DR. REVEST: I would like to ask the proposer whether this is intended to
include merely the initial capture of the voter's choice, or indication
of the voter's choice or also in the verifiability, if you have a
verifiability portion of the capture process?

MS. QUESENBERRY: We have in fact spent some time talking about this and
let me see if I can capture the discussions we have had so far. I am
concerned with what the voter does in interacting with the system from
the beginning to end of that interaction.

MALE SPEAKER: So the answer \-- yes that would include all.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So I think the answer is yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Thank you.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other comments?

MR. ELLEKESE: Mr. Chairman, Jim Ellekese, if you could just before the
vote, the sentence \-- read where the editing changes, so I am clear as
to the content?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes, I think we will be sure to do that.

MR. ELLEKESE: Thank you.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other comments? If not let me repeat the changes.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Hang on. We also need to correct the title if we're
going to change voter intent \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Capture and indication of voter choice?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah, capture and indication of voter choice, thank
you. Oh and number one also has the same phrasing.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay well why don't we say that there will be a global
search and change and we will replace the words voter intent with
indication of voter choice.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And occurs in four places, in the title, in the first
sentence and directive number one and in directive number three.

DR. SMURGIAN: So the wording in three is a little different but so we
will say for capturing indication of voter choice?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Uh-huh.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay so the title then will be human factors and privacy
requirements for capturing indication of voter choice. The first
sentence will be modified to read the TGDC recognized the need for
voting system requirements to include human factors and privacy
requirements for capturing indication of voter choice based on current
research.

Number two \-- item two, in addition to replacing voter intent with this
phrase, number two after IEEE P1583 draft \-- before ADA I guess we will
say 2004 ADAAG and then insert after ADAAG CFR 1194(section 508) and
then continue as it is, and other relevant usability and accessibility
guidelines and regulations. Is that correct?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes I think so.

MR. KRAFT: Looks good.

DR. SMURGIAN: Did everybody hear that okay?

MR. ELLEKESE: It's clear thank you.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay hearing no further comments or questions we will move
to a roll call. Mr. Green?

MR. GREEN: Voting on the motion as amended. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVERT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 13 votes for, 1 voter absent, 1 voter abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay the resolution has been adopted as amended. Next
resolution, I think we have time to \-- perhaps for one more.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I will introduce it. Our next resolution is Resolution
5-05. It is entitle human performance based standards and usability
testing. Before I read it I would just like to say a couple of things
about it. One is that it has been broken up into a number of directives
in order for us to stagger the work so that we can deliver parts of this
in April and parts of it in a later timeframes. This has been an issue
that has come up in all of the standards work I have been associated
with.

And we have often concluded that because it couldn't be finished fast,
we shouldn't begin it. This is an attempt to create a structure in which
we can begin the work in an orderly process. So the text of the
resolution is, the TGDC has determined, although I think we are going to
take a friendly amendment here to say has considered, or has \-- yeah
considered, has considered that voting system requirements should be
based whenever possible \-- or concluded \-- has concluded that voting
system requirements should be based wherever possible on human
performance bench marks for efficiency, accuracy or effectiveness and
voter confidence or satisfaction.

This conclusion is based in part on the analysis in the NIST report
improving the usability and accessibility of voting systems and products
otherwise known as NIST special publication 500-256. Performance
requirement should be preferred over design requirements. They should
focus on the performance of the interface or interaction rather than
implementation details.

When it is not possible to specify performance requirements, whether
because performance tests cannot be formulated or because they would be
too onerous to implement, testable implementation neutral design
requirements should be used.

Conformance test for performance requirements should be based on human
performance tests conducted with human voters as the test's
participants. The TGDC also recognizes that this is a new approach to
the development of usability standards for voting systems and will
require some research to develop the human performance benchmarks and
test protocols.

Therefore the TGDC directs NIST to, number one, crate a road map for
developing performance based standards based on the preliminary work
done for drafting the standards described in Resolution 4-05. Number
two, develop human performance metrics for efficiency, accuracy and
voter satisfaction. Number three, develop the performance bench marks
based on human performance data gathered from measuring current state of
the art technology.

Four, develop a conformance test protocol for usability measurement of
the benchmarks. Five, validate the test protocol. And six, document the
test protocol and benchmarks so that an independent test laboratory can
reproduce the testing.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Ms. Quesenberry. Do I hear a second?

MR. KRAFT: I will second for sake of discussion. I am not sure exactly
what we're doing here. Are we \-- we have the terminology, human
performance test.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. KRAFT: And we are actually speaking of human performance and
interacting with systems?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes, so for example we could say all important words
shall be in red and that would be a design requirement. We could say \--

MR. KRAFT: Which would be discriminatory.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Which would also be discriminatory so \-- which I used
specifically. Or we could say \-- let me do it \-- we could say in order
to ensure that people with color blindness or other color deficiencies
can read it, and then have a huge list of design requirements, which
might or might not actually make it possible for me \-- or we can say
the system must enable people to read it as demonstrated by an
appropriate test.

MR. KRAFT: Okay. I guess what I am looking for in this, is a direction
to NIST to do further work in research and usability. And there is quite
a bit that we know about usability that we have recently learned such
as, you don't start contests at the bottom of a ballot in column one and
finish them in column two. There is much more anecdotal theory out there
about usability and I am looking for a directive to NIST that will get
some hard research done in that area. And I am not sure if this is it or
not.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well I think the intent of both number two and number
three to develop metrics and to develop performance bench marks is
intended to do that but I would be happy to see a specific number seven
or 2a, wherever we are going to put it, that says that as part of that
work, they need to be both looking at what we have learned recently
about voting system performance and also doing independent usability
research into how those systems perform. I am not sure we are going to
do that by April however.

MALE SPEAKER: Can I get some clarification on your preliminary remarks?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: You are not proposing this activity for something that
would be in the 2006 standard, is that correct? You are looking at
future directions here and things that we ought to be doing but
considering the April timeframe that we're operating against \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes. This is specifically broken up not to \-- so that
all of this will not be done in the April timeframe.

MALE SPEAKER: I am not sure any of this will be done in the April
timeframe. That is my point. It's a worthy go.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think that a road map could certainly be laid out.
And I think that the guidance that where possible we should be moving
towards performance benchmarks rather than towards design guidelines, is
an important one. Are you okay?

MALE SPEAKER: Yeah, I am fine. I just got excited.

MS. QUESENBERRY: But I have to say that in reading a document written by
John O'Hara, is it part of IEEE \-- it is part of the IEEE
(unintelligible), I think it is one of the saddest things that I have
read which says we can't possibly get this done by our deadline two
months from now but a year and a half later we are still working against
that deadline.

And had we begun that work and put it into the process, we might have
been much further along this road by now then we are and I would like to
make sure that we are beginning the process of doing that work to move
us forward.

MALE SPEAKER: Sure but when we leave here at the end of tomorrow, NIST
is going to have a laundry list that borders on impossible.

MS. QUESENBERRY: That is correct. And this will be prioritized
appropriately. And I think that for instance item number one, to create
a road map so that we know where we are going is something that could be
done in a short timeframe. I hope that Sharon would agree but that
developing those benchmarks is certainly not going to happen in the next
two months.

MALE SPEAKER: I have a question, in terms of the process that NIST will
go forward, whether or not it's important to add this into the
directions or if this is a general method by which NIST will be
developing these and that is to be sure that since this involves the
conformance testing of the voting systems, whether the independent
testing laboratories and the voting system vendors themselves will have
input either during the NIST drafting process or is that simply expected
after these guidelines are drafted and then made available for public
review? What's your expectation in terms of the directions we're giving
NIST on this?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Boy I don't know. Sharon would you like to speak to
that?

MS. LISKOWSKI: Well we certainly accept comments on the vote.nist.gov
website and I will read them and make sure the committee is available so
vendors can comment anytime on these resolutions and their opinions and
their timeframe. And when drafts are made public they can certainly
comment. So we do have a method for that kind of input.

DR. SMURGIAN: But for the purpose of transparency maybe we can take a
more proactive role and let the ITAs be aware that these activities are
being undertaken to make sure that they know about it and we don't leave
it to chance that they participate or express their concerns. So I think
we can be more proactive.

MS. LISKOWSKI: Well I believe there was a meeting held for potential
ITAs a few months ago on the certification process and what was coming
so we have initiated that process to keep them in the loop.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Let me try this. I think it would certainly be prudent
to get feedback from principles or key stake holders before you launch
something out into public. I didn't assume that they would be
participating in the initial drafting except as by offering advice or
comment. That is, my assumption was that the development of those
benchmarks would be done by the NIST staff at NIST.

MALE SPEAKER: Good assumption.

MR. KRAFT: I think I will go on the record as supporting then this
resolution with the friendly amendment that she has already included.
But very clearly with understanding that this is very important future
research that NIST is to do and that our expectation is that these items
be properly vetted, that theories be properly developed and that
reasonably research and verification of theories take place.

DR. SMURGIAN: I would like to make a comment supporting following up,
you know, the comment made by Dr. Williams that indeed at the end of the
day, tomorrow we will have to look at the list of tasks given to NIST
and we will have to make some prioritization. That clearly has to be
made by the committee because I think you need to decide which ones are
the most immediate tasks and which are things that could be done at a
later time. So that is certainly a very valid \--

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: I am quite aware of that. And that is why we would very
much appreciate your participation in the prioritization process.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So I just want to confirm we brushed over the statement
about gathering \-- having an active task, what we have already learned.
Do we want to actually add that as a number 7 item or \@a, or are we
okay without it.

MR. KRAFT: I think we are okay without. I think this \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: I just didn't want to brush past anything.

MR. KRAFT: No, I think this \-- this says we're going to get on about
doing some serious research and usability rather than talking about it.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I hope so. Thank you.

MDR. SMURGIAN: Yes Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes I had a question for the proposer. On the bottom of page
eight, there is a metric for voter's satisfaction, and that is a little
unclear to me. I was wondering if whether it included for example, a
measure of voter confidence, that their vote was casted as intended and
counted as cast, where confidence being so important with these systems?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think it could. There are metrics \-- there are
existing metrics for measuring satisfaction in more commercial
environments. We have looked at them. They are probably not entirely
suitable for the voting environment, but I believe that we could develop
something that would look at their overall satisfaction with process.

And I would think that knowing \-- that feeling that your vote \-- that
believing that your vote was being counted correctly would be a huge
piece of satisfaction with the system. But that is a personal belief.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think you need your mike on.

MALE SPEAKER: Since we're defining future research, part of the research
could be to define what satisfaction means.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Indeed.

DR. REVEST: I am satisfied with that.

DR. SMURGIAN: well since everybody is satisfied, I'll move to take a
roll call on this resolution as amended, Resolution 5-05.

MR. GREEN: Resolution as amended, roll call vote. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes on Resolution 4-05.

DR. SMURGIAN: No, this Resolution 5-05.

MS. TURNERBUOY: All right, I'm sorry. I must not have the current
packet. Yes is my vote.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MR. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 13 votes for, one voter absent, one voter abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well the resolution has been adopted as amended. I think
this committee is doing a great job and staying on time. So this is an
appropriate time for us to break for lunch. We will come back sharp at
1:30 p.m. Please let's get back so that we can get started on time.
Thank you very much.

**(SHORT BREAK)**

MALE SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman?

DR. SMURGIAN: Could I make one announcement? We're spending a lot of
time making amendments. If people have amendments planned, you know,
would you please share them with our staff so that they can put them on
the computer so that we don't have to wait for things to be typed. So
for today and tomorrow if you have specific amendments you have planned,
please submit them so that we can have them typed ahead of time. Thank
you.

MALE SPEAKER: A couple of administrative issues. We have assistive
listening devices. (Unintelligible) in the back has one if it would help
you here. I would ask that the \-- this was requested by the way from
the web cast people, to please remember when you speak to push the
button and it would be most helpful, and this comes from the folks that
are doing the closed captioning, if you identify who you are. And with
that we will start.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay this committee will come to order and we will proceed
with the set of proposals, set of resolutions put forth by the human
factors and privacy subcommittee chaired by Ms. Whitney Quesenberry.

I understand \-- we had advised the subcommittee chairs that we may or
may not be able to get through all of the resolutions today and
tomorrow, that they should prioritize their resolutions so that in case
we run out time, we will at least have addressed the most important
resolutions. So Ms. Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: With that in mind, I have done some reordering. Our
next resolution that we will be considering is Resolution 11-05. It's
title is availability of voting machines for validating benchmarks and
conformance tests, since it flows directly from our previous.

The text of this resolution is the TGDC is aware that the definition and
validation of human performance benchmarks and human performance test
protocols as described in the NIST report, and proving the usability and
accessibility of voting systems and products, Special Publication
500-256, requires testing on a typical \-- set of typical state of the
art voting machines.

The TGDC directs NIST to work with the AEC to determine a means to
acquire such voting machines and then make them available to NIST to
perform the work described in Resolution 5-05.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I hear a second?

MR. KRAFT: I'll second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any discussion?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Quick let's vote.

MR. BURKHART: There needs to be some level of discussion. It is actually
required (unintelligible).

MS. QUESENBERRY: I would say that this resolution exists simply to
remind us of the importance of having real systems to work with and not
just creating standards that are based on our imagination.

MR. KRAFT: And I am supporting this with the assumption that NIST is
going to be aware of the importance of making sure they get production
machines and not prototypes as they do their initial studies.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: So noted. Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: Mr. Chairman, with your allowance I would like to correct
something that I said this morning in this discussion. Both Ms.
Quesenberry and I referred to the IEEE as being industry standard and in
fact that is a colloquial but inaccurate term. In fact under anti rules,
we're required to have all materially affected parties represented and
we actually work very hard to make sure that are committees are
balanced. So I would like to amend my comments to reflect that they're
consensus standards.

DR. SMURGIAN: So noted. Thank you Mr. Burger. Any other questions or
comments?

MALE SPEAKER: I had one comment. I noticed an incomplete citation that
we have been referring to in \-- referring to 508. I believe we need a
number prior to the CFR site.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Can we get you a full citation for that and we have it
we will let you know what it is and we will update all references
accordingly?

MALE SPEAKER: Okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Gannon?

MR. GANNON: This is Patrick Gannon. I have a question Whitney. Is there
any other alternative then NIST having the machines to do this? Is this
not something that NIST could get results from a testing lab that would
have the machines?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I don't believe so. I think that if we're going to have
NIST do the research to set benchmarks, they have to have the machines
to not only test their tests but create the benchmarks. They have to
have real machines to work on.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well not hearing any further comments, I will call for a
roll call.

MR. GREEN: This is for Resolution 11-05 as it appears originally.
Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: I'm sorry I couldn't hear that, Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 13 votes for, one voter absent, one voter abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: Then this resolution accepted as presented with no
changes. Next resolution, Ms. Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: The next resolution I will offer is Resolution 9-05 and
I will be making two amendments to it as I read it. I will tell you what
they are as I go.

The title of this resolution is General Voting System Human Factors and
Privacy Considerations. The amendment is in the first opening phrase, it
is amended to, errors in the voting process can be due to human error
and the TGDC notes many examples from recent elections to support this
statement. While requirements for capturing the \-- I'm sorry what is
the phrase?

MR. KRAFT: Clear indication of voter choice.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Clear indication of voter choice, another amendment, is
the primary area for human factors and privacy standards development.
The TGDC recognizes that all proposed requirements involved human
interaction with \-- that involve human interaction with the voting
system, should address any possible human factors and privacy
implications.

Therefore the TGDC directs NIST to review all proposed requirements,
assess which requirements involve human interaction and perform the
evaluation or research needed to ensure that basic usability,
accessibility and privacy is maintained when those requirements are
applied to a voting system. I'm sorry that is a grammatical error.

MR. KRAFT: I will second as amended \-- I'll second \-- this is Paul
Kraft \-- for discussion as amended.

DR. SMURGIAN: Could we clarify the change because I didn't capture it?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah, the change is the first sentence. It said \--
originally said many errors are due. It is changed to errors in the
voting process can be due.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And voter intent is changed as we are doing
universally, to capture indication of voter choice. And in the last
sentence, these requirements are applied.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MR. KRAFT: And I guess to begin discussion, are you contemplating within
this, that the election administrators interaction with the system?

MS. QUESENBERRY: No. We were simply contemplating that while we are
drafting sections that are specifically on human factors and privacy,
that the NIST staff monitor other requirements work as it's being done
in this committee and weigh in on human factors when necessary.

MR. KRAFT: The biggest source of heartache in election administration
and probably the source of most litigation regarding the outcomes of
elections, is frankly caused by the human factors of the election
administrator actually trying to run the system. We see in a number of
the systems that the use of the databases and the ballot generation
utilities within the systems, do not go near as far as they should
perhaps in preventing easily predictable errors. And those are things
which, to get to a reliable elections and system integrity, those are
areas that we need to look at. I don't know if we need a separate motion
for that.

MS. QUESENBERRY: We actually have a resolution that will cover that.

MR. KRAFT: Do we? Okay.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Thank you.

MR. KRAFT: 805?

MS. QUESENBERRY: 805.

MR. KRAFT: I'll go look at that while everybody else talks.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Microphone please.

DR. REVEST: If we stick to the voting system itself, does ease of set-up
of the voting station figure in this resolution?

MS. QUESENBERRY: My intent with this resolution was not to expand any
scope of these requirements but simply to say that as the TGDC \-- as a
whole considers requirements that we \-- that we remain aware that there
are human factors, that is usability and accessibility implications of
things that may not traditionally fall within that area.

It was really \-- it's quite a \-- I mean my intent was really quite
narrow. Which doesn't say that the rest of those things don't need to be
considered, it just wasn't the intent of this resolution.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other comments? If not, let's go on with a vote and a
roll call.

MR. GREEN: All right this is 9-05 with amendments. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 13 votes for, one voter absent, one voter abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well the resolution has been adopted as amended. Next
resolution.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Thank you. My next resolution is 8-05, since we
referred directly to it. This is Usability Guidance for Instructions,
Ballot Design and Error Messages. There are some minor amendments that
we have been making all along. I will be making them as I read it.

The original language is TGDC has examined, we have changed that to the
TGDC has considered the issue of what is required to improve usability
and reduce errors for capturing, again a change, the indication of
voter's choice. It is concluded that usability is a function of the
machine used to vote as well as other characteristics of the voting
system such as the instructions for voters and poll workers, ballot
design and machine error and help messages, sorry machine errors and
help messages. Research and best practices in the areas of plain
language design, form design and usability, are potential relevant \--
sorry that is a grammatical error, potentially relevant to such voting
system characteristics.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft guidelines and standards
where possible, to improve the usability of instructions, ballot design
and error or help messages. These guidelines should be combined with the
standards described in Resolution 4-05.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I hear a second?

MR. HARDING: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Comments?

MR. HARDING: Yes. J.R. Harding.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. HARDING: Thank you Mr. Chairman. For instructions and so forth, is
it \-- of course these things would be in an alternative format and
blah, blah blah.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think this would include any format that any voter or
person using the system, used it in.

MR. HARDING: Great.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Would you like clarification in that as an amendment or
are you fine with \--

MR. HARDING: Well if it's \-- since it was vague to me if the other
members would concur, well then perhaps we should make as a friendly
addition in terms of usability, instruction and ballot design and so
forth, would be made in alternative format as necessary.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Right. So perhaps at the end of the second sentence,
help messages in all formats used.

DR. SMURGIAN: So we will consider that a friendly amendment?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other comments? Not hearing any further comments, I
will put the resolution to a vote. Mr. Green, will you please have a
roll call?

MR. GREEN: Resolution 8-05 as amended. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 13 votes for, one voter absent, one voter abstaining.

DR. SMURGIAN: The resolution has been adopted as modified.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay. Are next resolution will be Resolution 10-5. This
resolution concerns the usability of the standards themselves and is
titled Usability of the Standards. The text is as follows, and I have, I
believe no amendments to it.

The TGDC recognizes the importance of the usability of voting system
standards. Independent test laboratories, election officials, and
vendors needs to understand these standards and also understand how a
system is tested for conformance to the standards in order to have
confidence in the voting systems that pass the conformance tests.
Therefore the voting system standard should be written in plain
language, understandable by both text experts and voting officials who
are not experts in human factors or design.

The TGDC directs NIST to determine how to evaluate the standards for
usability and then perform the evaluation on the standards we offer.

MR. KRAFT: I'm Paul Kraft. I second and support.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you Mr. Kraft. Any comments, or questions?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Somebody has to have one.

MR. KRAFT: I intended the support to be the comment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: I was just wondering if this is a new area or was research
being done on usability of standards or is it a prior art in standard
usability?

MS. QUESENBERRY: There is prior art certainly on regulatory usability
and I think that would include standards as well. There is a significant
body of work within U.S. and state governments on writing material in
plain language. There is also a body of work in the elections world in
drafting the ballot simplification explanations for complicated legal
ballot resolutions.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes. One of my questions has to do with the role of NIST in
evaluating standards as well as in writing standards. So if we're asking
NIST to write the standards then shouldn't we be asking them to
basically use that information in writing not just, you know, \-- is one
team going to write and then another team comes along and evaluate what
the first team wrote? This seems to be overly complicated in what I
understand the NIST role to be here.

MS. QUESENBERRY: That's a good point. Would you be happier if it simply
directed NIST to write the standards in a usable format?

MR. KRAFT: Do we need to do that?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Would NIST be happier? It is a little around the bend.

MR. KRAFT: I guess this may be one of those where we need to break it
into a long-range goal and a short-range goal. While in the short range
this is an admirable goal, getting the new standard out, getting a
legally enforceable standard out by January 1, 2006, is a higher,
immediate priority. And then I think there needs to be continuing work
to you know, fine tune the standards and make them more understandable
to more people.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah I think that was certainly one of my points. The
other is sort of an ongoing point, is that we have had discussions
across various subcommittees meetings, about who the target audience of
the standard is and whether they \-- what terms of art they might
understand, that is how technical these standards can be and still be
intelligible to them.

And I think this is an attempt to acknowledge that the readers of the
standard are not just technical experts but are also election officials,
ITAs and so on and the clearly that we are in our work that the better
off we will be.

MR. GANNON: And the second question I have is, does this apply to \--
indirectly to any standard that is referenced by the standard that is
put forward?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I don't know that we can require other standard making
bodies to alter their writing while we might wish to.

MR. GANNON: I understand, that does not come out as being clear in this
resolution, what it applies to. So in essence if NIST is evaluating an
existing standard from another body, whether it be IEEE, then they would
have to make you know, perform evaluations on those standards and
somehow does that imply that they have to give feedback to those other
bodies? That's what I am saying this is a little unclear when it comes
to the applicability, who it applies to.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I see. So if we amended the third sentence to say,
therefore the TGDC voting system, or the voting system requirements
drafted by the TGDC, or proposed by the TGDC?

DR. WILLIAMS: Maybe we could just skip this one entirely. I don't know
of a definition of plain language. In fact my experience is that a lot
of people up North just don't understand plain language.

**(LAUGHTER)**

So as much as we're asking NIST to do, maybe this is something we can
relieve them of.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Should we shelve this \-- well I see some other people
with some discussion. I would be happy to come back to it at the end of
our time, if we have time.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: Well I completely support the resolution in principle but I
think I agree with Brett on the practical aspect. I had a little
experience with this and what it requires is typically for the engineers
to do their best to get all the technical details right and then someone
to come in as a secondary process and rewrite the whole thing so it
reads smoothly. That adds real time and budget impact. So it's a great
thing but I am not sure we have time to do it in this round.

DR. WILLIAMS: Well Steve that has some implications for a standard
because there are parts of it that should be technical and if you go
back and write out the technical specifications, you may considerably
weaken the standard.

MR. BURGER: Yeah, where I know it has been done is where the committee
had the budget to actually pay a technical writer to go through it and
then come back to the committee and then make sure that all the details
were right. It was a wonderful thing.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well I would offer an example from Washington State
where the Washington State standards for safety \-- health and safety
and environment were rewritten in the due course of legislation, that is
they didn't embark on a project simply to rewrite them but when they
were revised in a legislative process, one of the goals of that process
was to write them in a readable format. And that was certainly covering
a lot of very technical material about ladders and equipment and so on.

MR. KRAFT: I will attempt a friendly amendment here. Beginning at the
end of line four, insert behind therefore, to the extent possible, the
voting system standards should be written in plain language
understandable by both tech experts and voting officials who are not
experts in human factors or design, period and then strike the rest of
the paragraph.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MR. KRAFT: Well I think we are setting a principal and a goal. I mean it
is not an absolute.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Kraft, sir, you are proposing to take out the last
sentence?

MR. KRAFT: Take out the last sentence.

DR. SMURGIAN: So it is simply an expression of \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Of principle.

DR. SMURGIAN: Desire or principle.

MR. KRAFT: Principle.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I could accept that and adding to the extent possible
again, qualifying it that we're not putting a hard line in the sand but
putting a wavy directional line in the sand.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay so we have added after, therefore to the extent
possible.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Uh-huh.

DR. SMURGIAN: And then taking out the last sentence. And you accept that
as a friendly amendment?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I will accept that.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any other questions or comments?

MR. ELLEKESE: Excuse Mr. Chairman.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, please go ahead.

MR. ELLEKESE: Could you just read the last sentence as it now has been
edited, so I am clear?

DR. SMURGIAN: After the fourth line \--

MR. ELLEKESE: Okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: At the end of the fourth line, where it says therefore,
after that we have added to the extent possible, and then the rest goes
on as is. And then we delete the last sentence that says, the TGDC
directs NIST to determine how to evaluate the standards. So basically
this really no longer has an action item. It is simply an expression of
principle, sort of the general overall principle that we want to
accomplish.

MR. ELLEKESE: Thank you. That's clear.

DR. SMURGIAN: Is that correct?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Correct.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any further comments? If not let's take a vote on this.
Role call, please Mr. Green.

MR. GREEN: Resolution 10-05 as amended. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: No.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: No.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 10 votes for, one voter absent, two abstaining. I'm
sorry and two no's.

DR. SMURGIAN: Two no's and two abstaining. Okay the resolution 10-05 has
been adopted as amended. Ms. Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay our next resolution is 7-05. It is a parallel to
Resolution 3-05 and I therefore I have slight amendment in the title.
The current title reads Usability and Privacy at the Polling Place. It
would be amended to read Usability and Privacy of the Voting System at
the Polling Place, although I am not sure voting systems have privacy.
How about Usability and Privacy for Voters using Voting Systems at the
Polling Place.

At any rate, the resolution reads the TGDC has considered the issue of
what is required to ensure privacy and easy access at the polling place
by voters. It has concluded that usability and privacy are functions of
both the machine use to vote and the environment of the polling place.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft usability and privacy
guidance on the layout setup and the administration of polling places.
This guidance should be provided with the standards described in 4-05.

And I think we probably want to amend this so that instead of saying
guidance on the layout setup and administration, we say deployment and
configuration of systems at the polling place as we did before.

MR. KRAFT: Yeah, except this appears to be a little redundant from that.
We could have just as easily bring privacy and easy access into the
other amendment (unintelligible).

MS. QUESENBERRY: That's true. Do we want to go back and amend the
earlier one and just add usability?

DR. SMURGIAN: Could I interrupt just for a moment for formality?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I'm sorry.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do I have a second. I assume Mr. Kraft was \--

MALE SPEAKER: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay we have a second, go ahead. So which resolution are
we talking about?

MS. QUESENBERRY: We're talking about 7-05.

DR. SMURGIAN: Right but \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: And Mr. Kraft suggested that we could simply our
proceedings if we simply added \-- if we went back to Resolution 3-05
and amended to include usability and privacy. And since we have already
negotiated the words there, it would be a lot easier then starting that
over. I agree. I think that's a good suggestion.

DR. SMURGIAN: May I \-- since we will be putting \-- I mean there \--
there seems like there is a general agreement on the spirit of this. And
rather then trying to edit it right now, could I suggest that the
subcommittee chairs work with Mr. Kraft to modify 3-05 and then we will
take that up at a later time?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I would be happy to do that, yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well we have something on the floor, how do we make it
go away now?

DR. SMURGIAN: Well we basically \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Do I withdraw it?

DR. SMURGIAN: Well we can table that until you bring it up for a vote at
a later time to formulate a motion.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I think what I need to do is withdraw Resolution 7-05
from consideration.

DR. SMURGIAN: So ordered. Thank you.

MS. QUESENBERRY: In that case my last resolution, maybe we will be a
little ahead of time, is Resolution 6-05, Universal Design Principles.
This was also a fairly general statement of principle rather than
something with firm direct although it is aimed at some of the work that
we will be doing between now and April, it does not have very strong
actions for that period. I will also be offering an amendment based on a
suggestion from Mr. Burger when I get to it.

The text of this reads, the TGDC recognizes that there is a wide range
of voter abilities and that voting machines need to be designed to be
usable across this wide range. The voting population is typically viewed
as primarily including people who do not have a disability however, this
population includes large numbers of people who do not consider
themselves disabled but who do have reading and language problems,
vision problems not considered blindness, issues with aging et cetera.

The TGDC is aware that there is an existing research and engineering
practice called the Universal Design and Universal Usability. And here
is the amendment, it also recognizes the design principles embodied in
\-- and I will get you the complete reference, Section 508, and has
concluded that this merits further investigation.

The TGDC directs NIST to assess what universal design principles are
relevant to voting systems, determine how these can be used as
requirements or guidelines, and develop a plan for creating
recommendations and writing standards and guidelines for universal
design in voting systems.

MR. KRAFT: I'll second for discussion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Could we get the amendment right \-- did we
capture that on the screen?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Why don't you start the talk and I'll get this changed
while you \--

MR. KRAFT: I am a little concerned over exactly what we mean by
universal design whether that is an established definition that we all
understand. And also voting systems are an assemblage of various
components. And many of those components are not interchangeable. And
example is providing the audio ballot in precincts. There is nothing in
the current standards that requires the audio ballot to reside on all on
the equipment in a precinct.

MS. QUESENBERRY: That's correct.

MR. KRAFT: I could see where if you started requiring all the units to
have the same capability, you could really restrict development of new
technologies to help more accessible needs. So I am not sure where we
are going with this.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Sharon, do you have handy a definition of universal
design?

MS. LISKOWSKI: (Off microphone).

MS. QUESENBERRY: Okay. If I could just speak to a few of the points you
made. It is certainly \-- none of that was my intent. Perhaps this is
poorly worded and/or should be withdrawn for rewriting but the concept
behind this resolution picks up from material introduced at the hearings
in September by Dr. Vanderhyden. Since that is available for us to look
at, we might as well quote him.

His point, and I thought it was a very good one, is that we tend to
simply say this machine is for everybody, and this machine is for people
with particular disabilities. When in fact, humans have a vast range of
needs and abilities. I mean I wear bifocals. People have temporary
disabilities, who may not walk up and say I need the audio ballot but
who nonetheless could be helped if we designed in a way that
accommodated a more universal definition of people.

Not that the design becomes \-- not that one machine must do everything,
not that kind of universal design, but universal in the sense of people,
universal. Sorry this is not very eloquent.

MR. KRAFT: Okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: Let me offer a couple of further comments and I think I will
introduce an amendment at the end of this that may be helpful. I had the
privilege of serving on two access board federal advisory committees for
Section 255 and 508. SO I have been through this quite a bit.

In both of those, the structure was at the highest level to give the
performance specifications that were desired, that equipment be usable
by people who were blind, people who have hearing loss and so forth. And
then under them there were specific technical guidelines that give
specifics that are testable, objectively verifiable, that reflect what's
currently possible in the art. And in each case there is a limit both
coming from the ADA.

In the case of 255, which is the mandatory requirement for all telecom
equipment, it requires, and I am going to bring this up in my amendment,
that what be done in the equipment is that which is readily achievable,
which of the four levels of requirement in the ADA is the lowest level.
Basically in the colloquial it means if it is cheap and easy, you have
to do it.

And I think probably that's what we would want to see in every machine.
You know if it is cheap and easy to make this equipment more useable by
a greater portion of the population, it should be done. In 508, which is
a government purchase requirement, where government monies can fund a
price impact of the equipment, a different requirement was selected and
that was that it not be an undo burden to the purchasing agent to
provide the accessibility.

And I think probably at the voting system level, that's more the intent
that we would have, a higher level on the system but on the equipment.
So I will move that we add the language on the equipment level, that
universal design be adopted to the degree it is readily achievable as
defined in the ADA.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah, that \-- I think we are okay with that.

MR. BURGER: Okay.

DR.SMURGIAN: So what is the exact amendment? Do you have the amendment?

MR. BURGER: The amendment would be that universal design be applied on
individual equipment, pieces of equipment to the degree it is readily
achievable to do so, as defined in \-- as readily achievable is defined
in the Americans with Disabilities Act.

MS. QUESENBERRY: So perhaps that's an amendment to number 1, asses what
design principles are relevant to voting principles and are achievable
under the \--

MR. BURGER: Readily achievable.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And readily achievable under the definition of the ADA.

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. HARDING: Question, Mr. Chairman.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, Mr. Harding.

MR. HARDING: From my understanding again, this would be for the
(unintelligible) level as opposed to in the future because readily
achievable under any future circumstances would be a higher threshold.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Good point.

MR. HARDING: Okay. We need to be real careful here that if we're, you
know, codifying readily achievable under 2005 standards, right now, in
2010 that's going to be a much higher level of readily achievable as
technologies and equipment continue to evolve. And how a court or an
individual or a clerk would determine what is readily achievable depends
on what is available. And so we cannot predict at this point, what is
readily achievable in the future.

DR.SMURGIAN: Would you like to modify that language, say something like
readily achievable at the time or something like that?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Maybe we should break this into two points and insert a
new point between number one and two. We will call it 1a for the moment,
which says in addition to assessing what principles are relevant to
voting systems determine \--

MR. KRAFT: I think we have already required what is readily achievable
in an earlier resolution.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah we have. We did actually.

DR. SMURGIAN: But this was within the context of this universal design
so \--

MR. KRAFT: I am still not sure that I am comfortable with universal
design. I am comfortable with applying it to systems, but not to
individual components within systems.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Could you explain the difference?

MR. KRAFT: Yeah, basically an audio ballot being required in a voting
system, so that the election administrator can put one in every
precinct, does not mean that the audio ballot has to go on the
(unintelligible) devices. The system has to support and have an audio
ballot.

MS. QUESENBERRY: This is interesting. I was thinking of the other side,
things like for instance the proposed \-- the current draft of the IEEE
includes requirements for contract \-- for the individual to be able to
change the font size, or the contrast to be able to see it better, even
on the general machines.

That that's there because many people might need to work with a
different contrast ratio where they wouldn't necessarily be going to the
audio ballot. So we could say well we can determine the average human
and we can write a standard that says this contrast ratio is good enough
and this font is good enough, that in fact we're suggesting that a range
of capabilities be included where possible in all systems.

MR. KRAFT: Well I guess I would be comfortable passing this as another
call for continued research or possibly tabling it and some of us
working \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Well let me suggest this, there is some open questions
and I note that I had had some comments on the access board that didn't
get into this draft as well. I wonder if in the interest of time, what
we should is table or withdraw this resolution and the other, turn the
table over and then pick up again at the end, with a cleaner draft that
we can circulate and people can look at in a more easy way? Because I
think we could spend a lot of time here or we could move on to more
pressing needs.

DR.SMURGIAN: No, I think that is a more efficient use of our time, so
with your concurrence \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: \-- Then we will withdraw this motion for consideration
for later on in the meeting.

MR. KRAFT: I will second that.

DR. SMURGIAN: Was that the last of your \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: That was the last of my resolutions.

DR. SMURGIAN: That's great. We're making progress. So I believe, since
we have some time we will move on to the resolutions put forth by the
Security and Transparency subcommittee, chaired by Dr. Revest. And I
will \--

MR. KRAFT: Mr. Chairman as a point of order, since none of us have
basically had the opportunity to read both voter verifiable one and two,
and since it kind of at best suggest, and they're naming that they may
be interchangeable, is there someway within the rules of order, that Dr.
Revest could present the two ideas and discuss the differences to them
prior to us making any motion?

DR. REVEST: Yeah, my intent was at the beginning of my remarks to go
through all of the resolutions and give the elevator pitch for each real
quickly, if that is what you are looking for. Just a real quick summary
so you get the ideas. And those two are viewed as alternatives in my
mind. I would need to present the second one first and the first one if
the second one is not approved.

MR. KRAFT: Well I guess that is what I am seeking to avoid. I don't
really want to be placed in the position of having to make a decision on
12-05 without having discussed the elements and merits of 13-05. I find
when \--

DR. REVEST: I think it would be great to discuss them together if we can
arrange that, sure.

MR. KRAFT: When people structure the sequence of my decisions, they are
often structuring my decisions and I don't like that.

DR. REVEST: I sympathize with that and if there is a framework within
which we can discuss these together somehow because they go together,
that would be great with me.

MR. BURKHART: You can do that or any member has the right to sever
individual issues so we can discuss them either simultaneously or they
can be reduced down to a number of smaller separate ideas.

MR. KRAFT: Okay what if I make a motion \--

MR. BURKHART: (Unintelligible) at the time that they are in motion.

MR. KRAFT: What if I make a motion that the committee ask Dr. Revest to
discuss and compare the relative characteristics of 12-05 and 12-06 \--

DR. SMURGIAN: 13-05 you mean.

MR. KRAFT: \-- 12-05 and 13-05 prior to proceeding with the rest of the
resolutions?

DR. REVEST: I think no resolution will be necessary I will just do it.

MALE SPEAKER: Paul did you want to include 21-05 in that?

MR. QUESENBERRY: Why don't we just ask Dr. Revest to give his opening
comments and perhaps allow some time for discussion of those comments?

MR. KRAFT: Okay I withdraw my motion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay the floor is yours.

DR. REVEST: I would like to begin \-- I have a little USB memory card
here if we can fit that into the machine, not for right away but in just
a minute. So let me start with a few opening remarks and then we will
move on to the slides that I just gave Allen which lists all of the
resolutions produced by our subcommittee in a real quick summary of
their ideas and we can proceed then to discuss them.

I guess I would like to thank my subcommittee for all of the work they
have put in to getting to this point. We have had quite a pile of
interesting issues to deal with and they have worked hard to get there
and I thank them for that.

Security is a very interesting set of topics to deal with. It's
pervasive, we care about the basics of voting, integrity of the result,
the privacy of the vote and the basic premises, you want votes to be
cast privately as intended and sort of counted publicly as cast. And the
situation is adversarial. We are basically concerned about a smart
adversary or adversaries trying to defeat the system goals of just
mentioned.

And we have had lots of excellent testimony on \-- let's leave that up
for now, I guess. Lots of excellent testimony on these topics from
experts from the field, and we appreciate that.

One of the main things you notice about the security area of course is
that there are many tradeoffs involved. If you do restricted \-- design
one way, you may restrict the efficiency or the usability of the system,
the cost of the system and other aspects. So security resolutions tend
to put restrictions on what developers can do or what voters need to do
et cetera. So we are definitely in the field of trade offs.

And as a result there are lots of hard policy questions that need to be
made about how to trade off risks in the security area versus other
aspects of the system.

And you never get a perfectly secure system, of course. There are \-- as
my friend (unintelligible) likes to say, there is no secure system there
is only degrees of insecurity and if you want to have the insecurity,
you have to double the cost, which is often a good guideline.

But there are you know, varieties of risk that need to be dealt with.
Some of them are minor, you know if there is a risk that a voter could
unplug the voting system, you know, that may affect at worst a few
votes. It shouldn't affect any.

On the other hand, if somebody could engineer a major rewriting of some
software in a central place, central count or some other place, that may
have a very large affect on the integrity of the election. So obviously
there are degrees of risks that we need to think about and compare with
these other aspects as well.

There is also tradeoffs with the process that we are involved with here,
which is standards writing. You know, certain kinds of risks are more
difficult to deal with and to write standards for. Other situations are
much easier to deal with.

So this committee has taken as its charter to \-- the subcommittee has
taken as its charter to tee up for the TGDC's consideration here some of
the major policy questions that we face in the area security and make
recommendations. These are not simply questions. I expect lively debate
and discussion on these items. There are tradeoffs we need to make as a
committee here on some of these items. And they are not simple issues to
decide.

These are not slam-dunks here. These are all hard questions and we need
to discuss how we want to evaluate these tradeoffs, how we want to come
up with recommendations to the country on these issues.

So with that I think I would like to start discussing the resolutions
themselves and start \-- along the lines that Paul requested, which is
to have some initial framework for what these resolutions are, what they
are about and you know, how I view them.

So why don't we move to the first slide. There are two slides. There are
13 resolutions, all together. I apologize that the resolutions
themselves tend to be somewhat wordy. I admire my co-chairs on the other
subcommittees for their conciseness and elegance of wording. I think
ours, probably we can do some excision to improve them.

So we have 13 resolutions all together. And I guess there are seven on
this slide and six on the next slide. If we can just flip back and forth
so you can \-- up through 24. So if you can go back.

MALE SPEAKER: Do you want us to renumber our book to agree with the
slides?

DR. REVEST: Are they not?

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MALE SPEAKER: No in the latest handout they \-- that supercedes what you
have.

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. REVEST: I hadn't noticed that there was a duplicate. Maybe we can
proceed by referring to the titles of the \--

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: There is \-- excuse me. There is a typo here. What's on
page 24, which is \-- the title is wireless, that really should be
15-05.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MALE SPEAKER: Well what about page 25?

DR. REVEST: Oh yes, there are two 14s.

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Yeah, I guess there \-- they are all off.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone) \-- and I think that supercedes what's in
the book.

DR. REVEST: So if we have two 14s maybe we should just number one of the
second one, as something else.

**(END OF TAPE 2, START OF TAPE 3)**

MR. KRAFT: Mr. Chairman, should we perhaps take a break while you all
sort this out?

DR. REVEST: Do we have a number for every resolution now?

MR. BURKHART: Greg Burkhart, the Parliamentarian. The Wireless
Resolution, contrary to anything you've said before will be numbered
Resolution 34-05. We will continue to use as the authoritative copy of
resolutions during our conversations those resolutions, which are in
your notebook.

There will be additional resolutions 32 and 33 slipped into your
notebooks tomorrow prior to Mr. Schutser's presentation.

Sorry for the confusion. So all resolutions continue as they are with
the exception that the Wireless Resolution is now Resolution 34.

MR. ELLEKESE: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, Jim Ellekese.

DR. SMURGIAN: Go ahead.

MR. ELLEKESE: If you could just tell me the page in the binder as I've
got these things I can scan this so I know what we're clearly working on
because I have three different (unintelligible).

DR. SMURGIAN: Currently we are talking about the resolution that's on
page 24. That was originally numbered 14-05. That is being renumbered as
34-05.

MR. ELLEKESE: So noted.

DR. SMURGIAN: 34-05, and there a couple of additional resolutions that
are not in the books currently but they will be inserted for tomorrow's
discussion so that the numbering systems will be okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, we're leaving that as is. The numbers \--

DR. REVEST: Go back to the beginning. As I said, there's two kinds of
people, those who can count and those that can't.

If you go to the first page of \-- so what I'd like to do would be to
spend a little bit of time on each resolution to give a general
orientation to that so we can talk about how we might proceed.

I tried to organize these sort of hot pot first if you will or most
significant first. We have issues which I think this committee should be
addressing and so they're teed up first.

There also the more difficult and controversial ones and may take more
discussion. I expect they will take more discussion and so as we proceed
down the list I think we get the resolutions which are still important
but, you know, if we don't get to them maybe that's less significant.

The first two deal with the issue of Voter Verification. They ask the
question how should we write standards which consider the ability of the
voter to verify that his vote was cast as intended and they make an
essential distinction between direct verification and indirect
verification.

Direct verification of your vote meaning being able essentially to
verify a paper ballot directly with your own eyes, being able to
directly see the ballot, you're not trusting intermediary software and
hardware, versus indirect verification where you're working on
electronic representation through some intermediation of hardware and
software. I think that from a security viewpoint is a very important
distinction.

And then these two resolutions work within that framework to try to
organize our security recommendations one way or the other, depending on
how the committee wishes to go.

The first resolution envisions a standard, which we could proceed along
so these are alternative paths. The first, Voter Verification, one, says
we don't require direct voter verification, that there's no necessity of
a paper ballot that the voter verifies. Indirect verification is allowed
but that is recognized as being introducing many additional security
risks and the standards will recognize that by being much, much, much
tougher for those kinds of systems.

We realize that that's hard to do and many of our folks coming to
testify from the computer security field said that's essentially
impossible to do.

MR. KRAFT: Dr. Revest, are you suggesting then the voter verifiable
paper ballot machines be held to a lower level of security and integrity
than other systems?

DR. REVEST: I think that you get some of the verification you want from
the verification of the ballot. So for example if the voter \--

MALE SPEAKER: (Unintelligible).

DR. REVEST: Pardon? I didn't hear the comment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Would you repeat the comment, please?

FEMALE SPEAKER: I think it was interference.

DR. REVEST: The overall system may be held at the same high standards.
The components of the system may be held to different standards
depending on whether their output is checked or not because you've got
verification that they're performing their job correctly.

DR. WILLIAMS: (Off microphone). (Unintelligible) kind of paraphrase it.
What that argument says is that if you've got paper ballots you just
don't have to worry that much about security, you can let the bad stuff
flow or through and then catch it after the fact.

DR. REVEST: I don't believe that the systems with voter verification
should get no standards whatsoever of course but I do believe that
because you've got the checking following the overall system is \--

MR. KRAFT: Well I think the systems with voter verification actually
have a higher risk because you've got fairly inexpensive components that
are printing the (unintelligible) ballots and you may actually need to
hold them to a higher standard because you have a concern whether or not
they're going to work.

DR. REVEST: So these are the kinds of things we need to discuss. I mean
those are the perspectives and so \-- I don't know whether we want to
get into all that now or talk of the individual motions but those are
exactly right on target for the kinds of things we need to be talking
about, our judgments on these kinds of issues.

MR. KRAFT: I say we're going to hang a \$19 printer on a machine and
hold it then to a lower standard and not look at it as close is simply
not \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: Could we let Dr. Revest finish his opening remarks?

DR. SMURGIAN: Exactly. Let's hear the story and then get into the
discussion otherwise we'll be discussing everything twice.

DR. REVEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So there's lots to discuss there
obviously and strongly held opinions and so we'll dive into those first
and I expect that will be a discussion that we'll have.

The next topic is COSS software and this addresses the risk that by use
of software for which the vendor and/or NIST, or the voting system
testing laboratories does not have the source code, that we're
introducing risk that the software could have vulnerabilities that are
not perceived or evaluated.

MR. KRAFT: I'm sorry, how did we get voter verifiable one to COSS
Software?

DR. REVEST: The first discussion we had was on voter verifiable one \--
oh, sorry, you're right.

MR. KRAFT: You have voter verifiable one and two.

DR. REVEST: I was moving along too far. Backing up to Voter Verifiable
Two; Voter Verifiable Two basically says that the indirect mode of
verification is too difficult to secure, too difficult to write
standards for and that it would take us too long to meet our deadlines
as a committee and therefore only admits the possibility of direct voter
verification of paper, paper ballots by the voter.

> MALE SPEAKER: At the polling place.
>
> DR. REVEST: At the polling place, yes, that's

correct.

> This is a commonly held position, I think one of the

positions that the country is asking us to express an opinion on and
it's teed up here for you to express those opinions and for us to vote
on. That's Voter Verifiable Two.

And so 12-05 and 13-05 are essentially alternates. 13-05 admits a
narrower set of voting machines, 12-05 admits a larger class but has
tougher testing requirements for those that don't have the voter
verifiable and paper ballots.

Any questions at the high level about those two?

DR. WILLIAMS: Just a comment. When the HAVA legislation was debated in
Congress this issue was debated by Congress and they went with your
version one I believe.

DR. REVEST: That's correct.

DR. WILLIAMS: So version two, you're suggesting that we adopt standards
that override the intent of the Congress.

DR. REVEST: That's a good question. I don't think that any standard
efforts per se override the intent if it restricts voting machines, one
way or another, if we say that a standard has \-- correct me if I'm
wrong, but, you know, the intent of writing a standard is to take a
large class of potential systems consistent with legislation and to
further refine that and say well not only does it need to fit within the
legislation but it needs to be done one way or the other and if that's
\-- if we need counsel or other advice on that we can, you know, take
that as it is.

MALE SPEAKER: Should be discussing or wait \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest, you're opening the floor to discussion. I
thought we agreed you would go through it and then open it for
discussion.

DR. REVEST: I'm sorry, yes. I was going to go through it. I was
responding to the comment on \-- yes, good.

These are sticky issues. Everybody has lots of opinions and it's hard to
keep moving but I will try.

COSS software addresses the issue that I think I said already that the
software that's used in these voting systems may be such that it's
difficult to assess the security impact of using them because software
for them is not available and that's again a difficult issue.

The proposed resolution here generally prohibits that with some
exceptions. It's managing the exceptions that's the difficult part of
this and this makes some attempt at proposing how to manage those
exceptions.

Number 34, which is next on the list in terms of the priorities given
here, is addressing wireless and it generally prohibits voting system to
have wireless transmitters and receivers because of the security risks
perceived there.

The next resolution addresses software distribution and the issue of
making sure we don't use wireless or networks to distribute software to
these voting machines, that a machine that can have its software
uploaded by wireless if the previous resolutions is adopted wouldn't be
possible.

Updating software by networks while perhaps very convenient also
introduces risks and the recommendation here is that we require that
networks never be used as the software distribution vehicle.

Again that's probably controversial because wireless networks are very
convenient in some sense to upload software into these machines but
there's definitely security risks you'd be trading off there.

Set up validation address the question of how to determine whether a
given voting system is indeed set up in the configuration with the
software that's been qualified and certified.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. REVEST: I'm sorry.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone). Did you skip software distribution?

DR. REVEST: I just talked about that. No, I did not skip software
distribution.

Set up validation basically requires a vendor to supply along with his
voting system a procedure to election officials to use to help them or
to allow them to determine whether a system is set up correctly. This
could be either used forensically or more likely just at the beginning
at the day to do a spot check or even a universal check if you wanted,
that your voting systems were properly configures.

Could we have the next slide, please? The next resolution talks about
testing and the main import of that resolution is that it requires
significant essentially white box penetration testing as part of the
validation process.

While we look in the standards process for repeatable simple tests that
can be done, security is different in character to some extent because
it requires \-- you're trying to defeat an adversary who can use any
possible cleverness to exploit any possible vulnerability he can find
and to provide the kind of assurance that you'd like on these voting
systems we recommend here that an evaluation of the security of the
voting systems have some open-ended testing that \-- give some analysts
the code, complete system documentation, just take an open-ended look at
this, tell us what vulnerabilities you can find.

Number 18, this is on documentation and emphasizes the importance of
documentation to the security assessment and requires significant
documentation from the vendor as part of the submission package on the
security of the system that they're submitting.

Number 19 talks about the issue of the publication of information about
the system derived from the testing or submitted for testing. I think we
had a good bit of discussion earlier in this committee saying there's
not enough being made public about these systems and the testing process
and it's perceived that there is significant security advantages to
making it more public.

I'll talk a little bit more about why it's structured like it is but as
it's structured it basically says the evaluation will be a little less
tough is more information is made public as part of the process so it
offers a trade off to the vendor.

Number 20 talks about machine readability of ballots that have
information on that that a voter is verifying directly. As well as being
machine read it basically says that that information should be both
human readable and machine readable for consistency between the two.

Number 21 raises the issue of multiple representations of ballots. You
may have a machine which has both a paper representation and one or more
electronic representations of the ballot and it ask NIST to direct some
research and effort to writing standards that accommodates the
complexity of these computer based voting systems which have multiple
representations and one has to worry about consistency and which one
should be evaluated in different context for recounts et cetera.

Number 22 is federal standards using appropriate federal standards for
information systems when appropriate.

And then number 23 talks about common ballot format specifications and
recommends that NIST proceed to look at the issues that are involved
with those and try to write standards that accommodate existing
standards when appropriate.

So that's the list. It's a big list and we may not get to all of these.
I wouldn't be surprised if we didn't get to all of them but it's what
we're proposing for discussion here.

If there are any other questions at the high level about the
interrelationships between these or the structure of the proposals here,
I could take them.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, would you then go forth and present the first
resolution that you want to discuss?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Which one would you like to start with?

DR. REVEST: I think if we could start with in line with Paul's request,
a more extended discussion of Voter Verifiability One and Two because
they're a coherent issue and they both address there \-- so let's just
talk about the definitions that are common between the two and the basic
choice we need to make there. And I think one takes one path and one
takes the other one. There may be other paths even you want to suggest
but these two seem to be the basic choice we need to make.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, perhaps then without moving forward with a motion to
move a particular resolution, maybe you want to have just a general
discussion?

DR. REVEST: Yes, I talked to Counselor earlier and he suggested we could
have a general discussion about two of them simultaneously before either
one is moved.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. Dr. Schutser.

DR. SCHUTSER: As a general observation for what I'm hearing on both
sides, it seems to me that what I'm hearing is that from a security
design point of view the security people would feel much more
comfortable is there was verifiable paper because they don't really know
how to solve all the security aspects as if it was presented in a
computer.

But on the other side of the hand I'm hearing that from a practical
point of view in the election administration worrying about printers
failing and not sufficient paper and a bunch of other issues such as
that, there's a whole raft of concerns on the other side.

And that in addition what I'm hearing is that there hasn't been any
legislation to require paper verification so it would seem to me as a
compromise you might want to combine these two to say that there are
some standards that you would need depending upon whether a voting
system were using a paper verifiable trail or not, using some other
technique and that in both those instances a different set of standards
and issues surrounding the security area you would probably want to have
developed to specify it, neither of which would be perfect but they
would have different minimum criteria. That's what I think I'm hearing.

DR. REVEST: So that's Voter Verifiability One basically, which admits
both and says they need to have separate security considerations because
the security issues are different for those two.

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes, that's what I think I'm hearing.

DR. REVEST: Yes, right.

DR. SMURGIAN: I'd like to make one comment. You talk about the experts
on computer security et cetera, in case you are referring to the folks
at NIST, I just want to make it clear that we are not promoting one or
the other. I think our philosophy generally is it's really up to the
election officials to make those decisions and this guidance is meant to
provide them, depending on which road they may be taking.

DR. SCHUTSER: I wasn't referring to NIST. I was referring to the fact
that if you go to some security experts in academia and so forth, they
will say gee, it's really difficult to trust the machine, that what
you're seeing on a screen is really what you see. How could I specify
that, and there would be some compromises and it wouldn't be absolutely
secure, which would lead people to want to go to the paper trail but
there are another set of issues from a practical concern there.

So I think I'm agreeing with you in recommending that we go to this
first resolution, abandon the other and talk about the fact that it's up
to the election administration to decide which machine they want and
then there would be separate set of standards that would address the
appropriate concerns to the greatest extent practical, depending upon
whether they went with a paper verifiable trail or not.

MR. KRAFT: Well Congress has very clearly left it up to the states
whether states will adopt any kind of a verifiable voter paper ballot.
They have additionally left it up to the states to define what a voter
verifiable paper ballot would mean.

For example, when somebody makes a mistake on a voter verifiable paper
ballot how many chances do they get? When you do a recount and the voter
verifiable paper ballots don't total the machine totals, what do you do,
which one controls?

Those are all issues left to the state. It is probable since neither
Congress nor the courts have yet told us that there's a due process
issue and a equal protection issue on the voter verifiable paper ballots
that they will be handled differently by different states.

That means they become an optional part of the voting system and they
have to be evaluated as an optional part. You can not require them to be
a part of the system and as an optional component they will have to be
evaluated on the overall voting system requirements for reliability and
accuracy, and whether or not they meet the design criteria for it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Williams, I think was \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Just for the record I'd like to say that even computer
scientists and security experts are not in agreement on this issue. That
there are a set of very vocal computer scientists/security experts that
claim that there's no such thing as a secure voting system but there is
an equal or greater number that believes that is.

DR. SMURGIAN: Ms. Quesenberry.

MS. QUESENBERRY: While we're throwing things on the table, I noticed
that there's an item in one of the resolutions that's not in the other,
that refers to reviewing methods of verification useable by voters with
disabilities and makes recommendations for how to resolve that issue.

I think that wherever one comes down on the issue of whether there
should or shouldn't be a paper audit trail we have to consider that what
the voters handle is part of the voting system and therefore we need to
figure out whether we're going to require that that be made full
accessible or that it is accessible through accommodation.

MR. KRAFT: And there are some research projects being done. There's a
gentleman in Bavard County, Florida who is working on a logical
validation that actually could allow those with visual impairments to
electronically verify their ballot was cast as they intended.

Jim Adler with votehere.net is working on some other dreams and schemes.

There is lots of research being done looking at this but we're not at
the point where we can require it and we're certainly not at the point
where we can jeopardize the '06 elections by requiring it at this time.

MALE SPEAKER: Well I'd second what Brett said. In my hearing of the
debate I've heard no consensus among experts in security. It's quite a
lively debate.

I think the reason is that when you focus specifically on the equipment
you might reach one conclusion, which when you pull back to the total
security of the voting system you have another set of issues and I think
there's a certain degree of well, it's paper, it's out of the machine,
it's not my problem but there's a whole other set of problems as to how
you make sure that paper is what actually gets counted and added up in
the final total.

I personally am unconvinced that there's any incremental improvement in
security on either system. I think both need to be very carefully
guarded albeit at different points.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I'd just like to add one thing. I'm not a security
expert and I've tried very hard to learn as much as I can about
elections in a short period of time but the thing that I have found
missing as I've considered this, I assume that all of us have thought
about this issue in one way or another, is a kind of dispassionate
layout of the pros and cons and the relative costs of various solutions
in a way that would let us balance them. Because I suspect that what
we're about to engage on is in fact some sort of balancing act and
wherever we come down on security, I think we're going to be talking
about balancing acts both in usability, accessibility and I don't have
materials to really understand what the trade offs we're really making
are and I hope that somewhere in these resolutions we can ask for
something like that.

MR. KRAFT: Well while I'm against and fairly vocal against voter
verifiable paper ballot, there is much that can be done to improve the
security of these systems and one of the most pressing things, which I'm
very disappointed NIST has not completed the work on, Resolution 5 are
our July meeting was for NIST to move forward aggressively and get the
National Software Reference Library set up where we could validate
voting systems and local officials could validate it.

And I've had an analyst assigned to that project who basically isn't
getting any assistance from NIST in getting that job done.

If you cannot validate the system, if the local official can't validate
it, the voters, the courts, can't validate the system and prove that in
fact the system you're running is the system that was tested then we're
all wasting our time here. This work is for nothing and that's something
that we really need to put our emphasis on and get down the road doing
rather then arguing this silly voter verifiable paper ballot routine.

There are many ways to validate systems. There are many ways to audit
them. A lot of jurisdictions across the country do not do that. In
Florida I've got a team of four people who go out and validate systems
upon request. Even they don't have enough time to validate all of the
systems in the state before each election. Therefore it is imperative
that NIST, and if NIST does, then Florida will move forward and put up
an automated web-based system validation application that local
jurisdictions can use to insure the integrity of the process.

DR. REVEST: That relates more to the other resolution than this one.

DR. WILLIAMS: Well but these are all inter-related and I think Dan's
approach is right here and that is to \-- on this committee we really
don't have a choice on this issue because we're not a law making body.
We can't create law. We have to work within the framework that was set
up by HAVA and within the framework that's been endorsed by the
commissioners and that is that this question of a voter verifiable paper
ballot is left as an option to the states and so we have to treat in our
standards as an option, which puts us with what you're calling version
one I think, that says if you want to do voter verified paper ballots
here's the way we recommend you do them.

Now that's desperately needed and all you've got to do to see that is go
look at what happened in Nevada. With the lack of a standard vendors
tried to respond to Nevada's demands for a voter verified paper ballot
and it's a botched effort.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I guess I would say the other side as well, which is if
you're not going to include something that allows the only person who
can tell if their choice is correctly reflected to do that, then you
also have to figure out what you need to do to secure that system if you
don't have it. So I think both sides have to be \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, but this gets to some of his other resolutions that
have to do with validation.

DR. REVEST: Some of that, yes. If we proceed along the path of allowing
systems without voter verified paper trails then the difficulty of
securing the systems against forms of attack to the same degree is much,
much harder and these other resolutions make some first steps on that
but it's a very difficult path and I think it would be \-- we don't see
the cost here because you're familiar to dealing with it.

We're used to dealing with paper but the cost of actually securing these
systems to the kind of level you would need to have trust that our
national election is being properly recorded to the voters intent, or
the indication of the voters choices is being properly recorded is going
to be a path which is much more expensive and much longer, including the
writing of standards.

I think that's putting a big burden on NIST to produce standards in this
area quickly and we may find ourselves failing and I'm concerned that
with the time scales we've got, trying to cover both the voter
verifiable path and the non-voter verifiable path if you will in the
very near timeframe is a daunting task.

MR. KRAFT: Ron, I disagree strongly. Basically it is not that daunting a
task. The traditional approach is to security separation of duties,
separation of access, elimination of incompatible functions, physical
and logical security, that coupled with a process that will allow you at
any time to validate that the system has not been tampered with, is
pretty much all you need and that's a heck of a lot cheaper than what a
bunch of printers and paper rolls are going to cost the nation. It's
simple good computer security practice.

DR. REVEST: We have many good principles I think to base ourselves on
and you're right, and it is true that printers cost money. We already
have some requirement for printers already in HAVA though and if you
want to argue about where those go, whether they're central printers or
sufficient \--

MR. KRAFT: The only printers that are required in HAVA are the ones that
print out the results in the precincts.

DR. REVEST: I think it might be helpful for me to understand a little
bit more. I mean there were these claims made that some of these things
are left explicitly to the states and I don't think I understand that
argument in the sense that I haven't seen the law that says these
particular choices are left explicitly to the states.

There are things left unsaid, just as there's things left unsaid about
wireless or about some of these other things. If it is indeed the case
\-- and then maybe the Chairman or counsel can advise us on some of
these points, but if it's indeed the case that that particular choice is
left explicitly to the states by law, then if that's our interpretation,
we have counsel's advice that that's the case or something \--

DR. WILLIAMS: The Constitution of the United States leaves anything not
specifically allocated to the federal government to the states. This
issue was no specifically addressed by the Congress. Therefore the
Constitution says it's left to the states.

DR. REVEST: Does the same apply to wireless?

MR. KRAFT: Sure. And wireless since you brought it up, the issue is not
the political issue of prohibiting wireless and that is a political
standard. The security standard is basically authorized users have
access to the system, unauthorized users do not and the system is
protected from tampering and sabotage and recently built so that it is
accurate.

Those are the standards. Now the risks with wireless are entirely
different and the mitigation of those risks when you go to wireless
requires different techniques.

But to sit here and try to rule out wireless because you think wireless
is risky is inappropriate. That is the application of a political idea
into the standards rather than a clear engineering or security standard.

DR. REVEST: I don't understand why it's political. There's nothing
political about it.

MR. KRAFT: It is a political decision that hey, we don't like wireless
because we think wireless is risky therefore we're going to prohibit it
rather then saying okay, these are the risks with wireless and these are
the risks that you've got to mitigate before you can use wireless. Two
totally different approaches.

DR. WILLIAMS: When the 2002 standards were under development, the
Internet voting issue was a big one and we wrestled with that, and
wrestled with it, and wrestled with and finally came to the realization
that you don't have to address technologies.

You don't have to say the Internet is not secure. You don't have to say
wireless is not secure. What you have to do is define the requirements
for a network and then if somebody can come in and show that they're
using the Internet and they can meet those requirements then that's a
valid use of the Internet.

And the same thing with wireless. There's some people sitting in the
third row here that operate a wireless voting system and the way they
operate it is they use that wireless capability in the warehouse, and if
I say this wrong, nod this way, okay? They use that wireless capability
in the warehouse to set up a large number of voting stations.

Now wireless in a warehouse is not a security vulnerability because you
can isolate a warehouse. Plus if something does happen in that warehouse
you're doing that in front of your logic and accuracy test so anything
that happens you catch it in logic and accuracy.

Now when they take that system into the polling place, they turn off the
wireless because although it can be used to activate the voting stations
for voters and things like that, the feeling is that to sit there with
that vulnerability on an eight hour or 12 hour voting day is a risk you
don't want to take.

So in a polling place they \--

DR. REVEST: I think we disagree that having a warehouse with voting
machines with a wireless turned on and software that could be uploaded,
is a serious risk. I mean it can be done correctly of course but I'm not
sure why we need to take that risk and that's just \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Well let me give you an example. Fulton County has 3,000
voting stations. When they prepare for an election they have to sit
there and manually insert 3,000 PC cards into a slot and try to keep
them segregated by precinct. It's a tremendous task.

DR. REVEST: It's a lot of work.

DR. WILLIAMS: They would love to be able to sit in a warehouse with a
console and program those 3,000 voting stations without having to
physically make those 3,000 cards.

DR. REVEST: So would the guy in the van outside with the transmitters.

DR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, right. Okay, if you believe in little green men that
I quit.

DR. SMURGIAN: Ms. Quesenberry.

MS. QUESENBERRY: A couple of hours ago we were talking about
accessibility in the polling place and usability and privacy and we had
a discussion about whether it was appropriate for this committee to
consider functions \-- I hate to use this word, but administrative
functions, functions of administering and applying those machines in the
polling place.

And we said well we can write some guidelines that will help insure that
the officials setting up and deploying those machines know what they
need to do to insure that they're in compliance and if they're not
they're operating an uncertified machine.

But I just heard you say now essentially, well if you have proper
procedures around it then you've got a secure system and yet we're
writing standards for the machine itself and so I just wonder whether
we're saying two sides of the same argument depending on what we're
talking about.

MR. KRAFT: I don't think we are. I think in the first case we said that
a voter's access to the machine and the machine's design for that access
will be affected by set up requirements in the polling place.

Therefore the vendor shall be required to prescribe what that
environment is and I think that is very much the same line of thought as
this and that there's a problem there, providing access the vendor must
come up with a solution to provide that access and to the extent that
that is a combination of procedural, environmental, and hardware,
software design elements, that combination will be part of the defined
system.

I think this is very much the same in that a vendor is required to
provide security for the system whether he wants to telecommunicate
through wireless, or the Internet, or a closed network, or Sneaker Net
is up to his design but he's going to have to come up with procedures
that actually achieve it.

MS. QUESENBERY: So I just have a follow-up because one of the things
that I don't understand about these standards, they are of course
voluntary although at the state level they may be raised to the level of
legislation, is what happens to the people operating an election, the
people running an election when it is discovered or if it is discovered
that those procedures were not followed and that there was a problem in
the election because of it?

I mean the third piece of most standards is what the requirements are,
how you test the requirements, and penalties for failing to meet those
requirements.

I don't understand how in a general sense, and I'm sorry, I'm just
asking a general question, is what happens when we say look, we can make
the equipment so good but then rest relies on your following
specifications for operation. What happens when those aren't followed
and in fact there's a problem?

MR. KRAFT: In Florida they can be subject to criminal prosecution for
failing to follow this.

DR. WILLIAMS: (Off microphone). (Unintelligible) that's probably a good
idea.

Elections are a human endeavor. Unfortunately as long as people run
elections you're going to have mishaps at the human level. Names are
going to be left off of ballots. Candidate names are going to
misspelled. The list goes on and on, and one, and one.

And the answer to your question is, we can't \-- you know, we can have
laws, we can be mean, we can put people in jail if they make human
errors, but that's still not going to stop it.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I guess where I was going with that, because I agree
with you. I mean you can't legislate human error out of the world. But
one of the things that I think as we consider the cost benefit tradeoffs
of pretty much everything we're going to consider, I think we also have
to consider the cost of rerunning an election as part of that equation.

DR. WILLIAMS: Well, yeah, but you have that anyway and, you know, \--

DR. REVEST: It's mostly a function of how close the election is.

DR. WILLIAMS: Nothing takes away from a candidate their legal rights. A
candidate can challenge an election and take it all the way through the
court system to the Supreme Court and hardly an election is held in a
major state that some portion of that election, a judge doesn't order it
rerun. This is not an uncommon occurrence.

Now what we can do on things like this wireless issue and the paper
ballot issue is we can make it extremely difficult for a vendor to get a
system like that qualified. We put a big burden on the vendor that says
if you choose to use this technology the burden is really going to be on
you to convince the testing authorities that you have put in the hooks
and proper facilities that will enable somebody to secure that system.

DR. REVEST: Yes, that's the philosophy of voter verifiable one
basically. It says that these systems are different. There's going to
take a lot more on the vendor side to secure a system which does not
have the voter verifiable directly and you can argue the same \--

DR. WILLIAMS: (Off microphone). The same with communications whether
we're talking about wireless or any other kind of \--

DR. REVEST: That's right. We can take that approach and, you know, the
difficulty of doing that I think depends on which \--

MR. KRAFT: But if you take that approach, once you start down that
slippery slope, you have a set of voting system standards for ballot
printing machines, you have a set of voting system standards for ballots
without printers, you have a set of voter system standards for those who
use wireless, who use the Internet, who use a closed network, who use a
free standing machine in a locked room. Where does it end?

You need to set a set of voting system security standards that you can
apply to any machine and you can assess the risk on any machine or any
system, and make sure that those risks have been properly mitigated.

MALE SPEAKER: Yeah, but I think that different systems, you have to
specify them in different ways. What you can do is you can give a
standard level of confidence at a minimum level that they all have to
meet and that might translate for one system design to an entirely
different set of requirements then to another. So one way around it is
to make sure that they all apples to apples then apples to oranges.

So if you're building a machine here that has paper verifiable trail and
here one that doesn't for example, they both need to meet some minimum
level of assurance of voter verifiability and probably neither one of
them is perfect and of course when we state that we all have to state it
somehow around the whole environment in terms of the recommended
calibrations set up and so forth, all those things we discussed but I
think that's about the only way to address this.

MALE SPEAKER: But voter verifiability \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Excuse me, we are going on for almost an hour now. I will
give the last word to Mr. Burger and then I will cut off this general
discussion and Dr. Revest then I think it's up to you to decide which
resolution to put forth and whether you want to combine a couple of them
or whether you want to introduce them as separate, and in what order.

You had that order to start with but you may want to reconsider based on
the discussion. So I'll let Mr. Burger to ask the last question. That's
should give you a few minutes to think about your strategy.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And we're also past break time.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. BURGER: Okay, thank you. I'm not sure what it means to have the last
word on this subject but \--

Well I would like to return to a comment by Ms. Quesenberry that at the
end I think every proposed implementation is a compromise and we would
do well to weigh the relative merits and the difficulties of each one.

And I'm concerned if we give any implementation too easy an out on its
own vulnerabilities and the fact that in one implementation those
vulnerabilities may switch from technical to administrative or actually
at one point that concerns me a great deal in this resolution where it
says that if a disabled voter could in principle verify his or her
ballot through the use of human proxy, essentially creating a separate
but equal standard to give one implementation an easy out for
difficulty.

I have difficult with that. I think we need to let that implementation
wrestle with its own problems as the others should wrestle with theirs.

And so I would just close saying I think at the end we're going to
accept a compromise and hopefully we'd properly weigh the merits and
difficulties of each one.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, with that I propose that we take a 15 minute break
and then come back and give the floor to Dr. Revest.

**(SHORT BREAK)**

MALE SPEAKER: Let's take our seats so we can finish up the afternoon
session.

DR. SMURGIAN: Can we take our seats, please? The meeting will come to
order. We're continuing with deliberations of the Security and
Transparency Subcommittee. Dr. Revest, the floor is yours.

DR. REVEST: I'd like to thank you Chairman for giving us the opportunity
to have such an open-ended discussion earlier and also for arranging
that breath of fresh air. Perfectly timed.

So now we'd like to get down to the individual resolutions that the
subcommittee on Security and Transparency has proposed and go through
them one by one.

I would like to start with Resolution 13-05, Voter Verifiability Two,
and then after that depending on what happens we'll address the other
one. I think this is the proper order to raise these two motions.

DR. SMURGIAN: So we have a motion to move Resolution 13-05. Do I have a
second?

MR. HARDING: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Could you identify yourself, please?

MR. HARDING: Yes, J.R. Harding, Access Board. I'm now on the phone for
the remainder of the meeting.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you, J.R. Okay, comments, discussion.

DR. REVEST: Let me start. I wanted to start by just a parliamentary
inquiry but maybe that should have been done before the motion was
passed, as to whether this was within the scope of TGDC, and if you
could ask our Counsel on that point because that was brought up. If you
think that's proper.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burkhart, would you like to comment on that?

MR. BURKHART: My advice of course is rendered to the Chair of the TGDC
and the question has been asked as to whether or not the resolution,
that being Voter Verifiability Number Two, that the subject matter
within that is within the scope or the duty if you will of what the TGDC
is requested to do or if you will, allowed to do under the Help America
Vote Act.

The Help America Vote Act describes our duty as follows, to assist the
Executive Director of the Commission in the development of the Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines. That's the duty as described.

A way to analyze whether or not a particular matter would be within the
scope of this organization's duty would be to say, is it the kind of
thing that would be reasonably written about in a Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines? Whether we believe it is advisable or appropriate is
beside the point. Is it capable, is it reasonably related to appearing
in a Voluntary Voting System Guidelines?

As an example, something that would be outside the scope would be
somebody asking a question like, should we have partisan or non-partisan
election judges in a polling place. That is clearly not the kind of
thing that would normally be written about in a Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines.

DR. WILLIAMS: (Off microphone). What's the basis for that statement?

MR. BURKHART: It's not technical in nature.

My parliamentarian's advice to the Chair is that the resolution which
would require paper trail is within the scope because it's the kind of
thing that whether it's advisable or not would reasonably be related to
appearing in a Voluntary Voting System Guideline. So my advice is that
it is within the scope of the TGDCs ability to discuss. Again whether
it's advisable or not is something that can be discussed.

DR. WILLIAMS: (Off microphone).

MR. BURKHART: If the Chair is agreeable to that, yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, go ahead, Dr. Williams. Microphone, please.

DR. WILLIAMS: Should we keep our guidelines within say the framework of
the Constitution of the United States?

MR. BURKHART: Well as an administrative body, we are not interpreters of
the Constitution. We follow strictly the statute which has been provided
to us, which we assume to be constitutional.

DR. WILLIAMS: Well I guess then my question is, do you think the people
who framed that statute just assumed that we would operate within
federal law et cetera?

MR. BURKHART: A way to look at this since we are administrative actors
as opposed to lawmakers, a way to look at this is, is there something in
the Help America Vote Act which prohibits this committee from taking up
a particular technical issue like mandatory paper trail and there's
nothing in there that prohibits us from doing that and is it reasonably
within the only provision which describes our duty, which is to provide
advice on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, it's pretty hard to
say, but again advisable or not, it's pretty hard to say that mandatory
paper trail is not something that is reasonably within that scope of
duty.

MR. KRAFT: Notwithstanding that Congress debated and notwithstanding
that the sponsors of the bill later published a document saying that was
not intended.

MR. BURKHART: We are not a judicial body that looks to the issue. We are
a statutory body that follows strictly the statute, which is provided to
us.

MR. KRAFT: Well as somebody who has been doing administrative law for a
number of years I have learned that when my legislature isn't clear on
something but I very clearly know their intent and they have taken steps
to share it and they have debated an issue, if I go against that intent
it usually works out badly for me.

MR. BURKHART: Well in any case that would be my advice to the Chair.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Chairman, this is J.R.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, go ahead J.R.

MR. HARDING: I'm a little confused. We began with Resolution 12-5 and
then our Counsel was giving us thoughts on 12-6. How did we jump
subjects so quickly?

DR. SMURGIAN: No, we are actually on Resolution 13-05. That's the one
that Dr. Revest chose to put forth first.

MR. HARDING: I'm sorry. Go ahead then. For some reason I thought he said
the 12-05 and you're indicating 13-05. Go ahead.

DR. SMURGIAN: Right.

MR. KRAFT: As a point of order would that mean that Mr. Harding did not
know what he was seconding?

MR. HARDING: Well technically that would be accurate, Paul.

MR. KRAFT: Pardon?

MR. HARDING: You would be accurate on that. I thought I was seconding
12-05.

MR. KRAFT: Then I suggest there's no second on the motion.

MR. ELLEKESE: Jim Ellekese. I'll second it for purposes of expediting
the discussion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well Dr. Schutser also seconded it. Excuse me just a
minute. Well based on the advice from the Counsel, I declare this
resolution in scope in the sense that it does not violate any of the
spirit of the law. I think it's up to this committee to decide whether
it is advisable or not. I think that's up to this committee to act
accordingly.

So having said that, did you have any other comments, Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes, I would like to propose a friendly amendment or
something here I guess. I feel that paragraph four should be deleted. I
think it's interpretation to HAVA, which we don't need to do in this \--

DR. SMURGIAN: So that's the paragraph that says, in such cases?

DR. REVEST: In such cases.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Does that continue on to page 19?

DR. REVEST: Oh, sorry.

MS. QUESENBERRY: No, that's a new paragraph.

DR. REVEST: No, it does not. I'll stop there for now and I guess as
proposer maybe I could continue if there's no comment.

Sections four, five, and six of this could be severed and I think maybe
bring those up as separate items later, having to do with \--

DR. SMURGIAN: I didn't quite catch that.

DR. REVEST: I'm also just suggesting that we sever sections four, five,
and six for possible later

**(END OF SIDE A, START OF SIDE B)**

MR. KRAFT: (Off microphone). That paragraph on 19, that's a bit
presumptuous to force that interpretation on HAVA.

DR. REVEST: Yeah, that's why I'm deleting it to remove any \--

MR. KRAFT: So the first paragraph on 19 you're deleting as well?

DR. SMURGIAN: Is that correct?

DR. REVEST: I think that's just quoting. If you have objections to it
\-- it's not germane to what happens later. I mean it quotes HAVA and I
don't believe there's any \--

MR. KRAFT: It misquotes HAVA.

DR. REVEST: You think it misquotes HAVA?

MR. KRAFT: I think it misquotes HAVA.

DR. REVEST: Well we can delete that anyway. HAVA says what it says and
\-- so the bottom paragraph on page 18, the top of 19.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger, you had a question.

MR. BURGER: Actually it was the same question but Ron, I think I need to
come to the paragraph then right under it, the second paragraph on page
19. I'm not sure if that's implying that HAVA requires the verified
paper record. I think that sentence could be read two ways there.

DR. REVEST: Perhaps we could take a look at HAVA for a second to read
what it says. Section 301 to (B)(1), it says, the voting system shall
produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such
system.

MR. KRAFT: Right, and that has been interpreted by the sponsors of the
bill to mean the tape that prints out totals on the precinct device so
that you can bring those tapes in and compare them to the transmitted
totals.

DR. REVEST: I don't know what exactly you're saying, Paul, whether
you're saying that the sponsors of that bill meant it could mean that or
whether it doesn't necessarily means that. What you're suggesting is not
in HAVA as a language but merely your statement as to what they meant,
or allowed, or something. Is that correct?

MR. KRAFT: That's my understanding, that they have separately stated
that that's what they intended, was the totals print out from the device
that each system produces.

DR. SMURGIAN: If I may comment, there is nothing in the legislation that
specifically says verified by the voter.

DR. REVEST: No, the intent of this proposal here, this resolution in
front of this committee is that a paper record will be produced for the
voter to verify and approve or not and there's an identification here I
guess with the paper record required by \-- it is required by HAVA.
Maybe that could be changed in this resolution to make that separate if
that would be clearer. If you want to have two paper records, one which
the voter verifies and one which you deeming the HAVA compliant one,
that would be maybe clearer at wording.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Chairman, this is J.R. Can I get some questions
answered by our subcommittee Chair?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, J.R., go ahead.

MR. HARDING: I guess I need some distinguishing \-- some clarity on what
you're defining as this paper trail. Are you defining it as a receipt
the voter could take home or a record that the precinct is keeping?

DR. REVEST: The second.

MR. HARDING: Okay, all right. And then along that line on page 19, third
paragraph and perhaps elsewhere, do we need to change voter intent to
voter choice for our continuity from earlier this morning?

DR. REVEST: Yes. Consider that a friendly amendment.

MR. HARDING: So at this point we now have paragraph \-- last one on 18
and the first two on 19 eliminated with the language changed from intent
to choice and that is where we are at this point.

DR. REVEST: No, the second on 19 I believe is \-- Mr. Chairman, if I may
speak?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

DR. REVEST: I believe the second one on 19 is still open for possible
revision.

MS. QUESENBERRY: The first one on 19 was eliminated.

DR. REVEST: The first one on 19, yeah.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yeah, the last one on 18 and the first paragraph on 19 has
been eliminated.

MR. HARDING: Okay.

DR. WILLIAMS: That second paragraph on 19 that starts off, the TGDC has
concluded is a futuristic type statement. The TGDC has not concluded
that at all but if we approve this today then it will be interpreted as
something we have concluded.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well we need to decide.

DR. REVEST: Which paragraph are you referring to?

DR. WILLIAMS: The one that says the TGDC has concluded. I missed a few
meetings but I don't recall any vote where we concluded that or any
meeting where we had a consensus of that at all.

DR. REVEST: This vote concludes that. Yeah, this vote would conclude
that and that's the interpretation.

DR. WILLIAMS: So what we're talking about is if we pass this today then
that becomes a true statement.

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. WILLIAMS: So having determined by the parliamentarian that this is
certainly something that we're within our rights to discuss legally,
then the only remaining question is whether or not we want to embarrass
the commissioners and the Congress of the United States by getting out
in front of them on this issue.

MALE SPEAKER: That's about it.

DR. WILLIAMS: I believe that everybody on this committee has an opinion
on this and that we could debate it until the proverbial cows come home
without changing anybody's mind so I'd like to call a vote on this.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any objection? Having a second we will take a roll call.
Before we vote on it let me just clarify again that we have deleted the
last paragraph on page 18, the first paragraph on page 19. In the third
paragraph where it says voter intent will be modified to be consistent
with previous changes we made to resolutions. What was the wording?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Voter choice.

MR. REVEST: Indication of voter choice.

DR. SMURGIAN: Indication of voter choice. And then also deleting items
four, five, and six on page 20, is that correct?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Is that clear to everybody?

MR. HARDING: Completely. This is J.R. again.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes?

MR. HARDING: We need absolute clarity here because I think we're
getting, you know, the horse before cart and I just want to make sure,
if this resolution is passed as we have modified it, are we indicating
that yes, we want a paper trail that will stay in the precinct or will
it be interpreted by the laypersons out that that we're creating a paper
trail in which the voter will take with them?

MR. KRAFT: I think J.R. that basically if this amendment passes we are
talking about having voter verifiable ballots which the voter will not
take with them but we are talking about creating the paper record of
every vote cast and retaining those in the precinct and making that a
requirement for all voting systems. And we are probably putting the '06
elections for the United States of America in violation of the
standards.

MR. HARDING: Right, okay.

DR. SMURGIAN: Any further clarification?

MR. HARDING: No, thank you.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, Mr. Green would you take the roll call?

MR. GREEN: A roll call vote on 13-05 as amended. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: No.

MR. GREEN: Miller?

FEMALE SPEAKER: She is no longer on the conference call.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: No.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: No.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: No.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: No.

MR. GREEN: Caldese?

MS. CALDESE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: My comment, I haven't heard any consensus in the IEEE
membership as they debated this so I vote no.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: No.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: No.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: No.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Nine votes no, one vote yes, three abstain, and two absent.

DR. SMURGIAN: Resolution 13-05 is not passed. Dr. Revest, the next
resolution.

DR. REVEST: Yes. So now that we've decided 13-05, I'd like to suggest we
move to 12-05. Given that 13-05 did not pass I offer 12-05 as an
alternate that we may wish to adopt, which we have on the screen.

Basically it notes a fundamental distinction between voting systems,
those where there's direct verifiability of essentially a printed
representation of the vote by the voter, it's called Direct
Representation here, and one where there is not that.

I can read the entire resolution if you'd like, Chairman.

DR. SMURGIAN: Well I think it is important, especially since there have
been some changes. Perhaps we could read the whole thing.

DR. REVEST: Yes, I'd be happy to particularly given the issues
surrounding the interpretation of HAVA and so on too, some of those
sentence may need to be deleted or changed et cetera.

I'll read it to you. Voter Verifiability Number One, Resolution 12-05.
The TGDC has considered the various means by which a voting system
allows a voter to verify that his or her vote was captured as the voter
intended. All voting systems must provide such means as stated in HAVA
2002, Section 301, a 1 AI.

Such voter verification means can be categorized as either direct as
with optical scan or machine generated paper ballot where the voter can
directly examine the representation of his ballot or indirect as with
many touch screen direct recording electronic DRE machines where the
voter can only verify the fundamental representation of his ballot
through the assistance of intervening hardware and/or software.

For voting systems that create more then one representation of the
voter's ballot, such as one electronic and one on paper, the TGDC
interprets that HAVA language to require that such voter verification
must apply to the representation to be called here the Fundamental
Representation that is used for the initial vote tabulation.

The TGDC therefore finds it useful to divide voting systems into two
categories, those called Class DV where each voter is presented a
fundamental representation of his ballot that the voter may directly
verify, and those Class IV, not in Class DV. For this definition the
voting system accessible by disabled voters is considered to be in CLASS
DV. If a disabled voter could in principle verify the fundamental
representation of his ballot through the use of some human proxy.

The TGDC has concluded that voting systems in Class IV must be held to
significantly higher security requirements including stronger
constraints on voting system development, greater requirements for
systems documentation, and more stringent testing to mitigate the
additional risk associated with Class IV voting systems.

The TGDS therefore requests that NIST perform research and develop
standards documents that one, clarifies the distinction between Class DV
and Class IV voting systems as may be necessary, and two, define
security requirements to be satisfied by DV voting systems, and three,
elaborates and defines the additional requirements to be satisfied by
Class IV voting systems.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you, Dr. Revest. Do I hear a second?

MS. QUESENBERRY: I second it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, we have a second.

MS. QUESENBERRY: And I loved to offer an amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Go ahead.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I'd like to remove the final sentence of the first
paragraph for this definition of voting a system accessible by disabled
voters.

DR. SMURGIAN: Second paragraph?

MS. QUESENBERRY: First page, first paragraph, last sentence. I'd like to
remove that entire sentence and I'd like \--

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MS. QUESENBERRY: I'm sorry, second paragraph, last sentence, for this
definition a voting accessible et cetera, and I'd like to add a
directive number four, which I haven't worded very properly but it picks
up language from the previous resolution that asks that NIST review
methods of verification usable by disabled voters and make
recommendations as to how they could be incorporated into either DV or
IV systems.

DR. REVEST: I'd be happy to consider that a friendly amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Would you repeat that again?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Oh, no. Yes. So I'm removing a sentence and I'm adding
a number four, which is that NIST reviews methods of verification usable
by disabled voters and makes recommendations \-- what did I say, as to
how a system can incorporate these methods to be classified as either a
DV or an IV system. Is that English when I get done?

DR. REVEST: Do we have it on the screen?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes. And the sentence I'm picking up is actually in 13
(unintelligible).

MR. KRAFT: I'll second Whitney's motion for the sake of discussion and
if I have the floor?

DR. SMURGIAN: Go ahead, Mr. Kraft.

MR. KRAFT: I have absolutely no problem with NIST going forward and
doing research into voter verifiable technology.

As I said earlier there are some interesting projects going out there
with things other then paper. There is at this time nothing out there
that exists beyond pretty rough prototypes, which could possibly meet
the standard or any standard for a voter verifiable paper ballot.

Once again, this is a thing that if we try to impose it's going to
through the '06 election into jeopardy and I vehemently object to this
concept of putting different voting systems at different standards. You
cannot do that.

The standards for reliability have to be there so that the reliability
of every system certified is not subject to question. When you certify a
system that's going to rely on this paper at a lower standard what do
you do when the paper goes out. That's simply an acceptable course for
public policy on this to go through.

The very concept that Congress was very much aware of, the equal
protection issue in requiring the audio ballot to now tell people with
visual impairments, hey, you're not quite as equal as you were because
sighted guys can verify their voter paper ballot but you're going to
have to rely on the audio ballot to do it. That's not appropriate.

So if you want to cut this thing back with a perhaps hostile amendment
that directs NIST to move forward, monitor developments to this
technology, do further research in it then I would support that.

Other then that if it stays as written I'm ready to vote.

DR. REVEST: I'd like to comment on what Paul just said if I may?

I think that I agree with Paul in the sense that we want a uniform set
of principles to apply to all voting systems. Absolutely, there's issues
of integrity and accessibility and so on that are absolutely pervasive
and common to all systems.

But when we start getting into the details there are significant
differences in the specific risks that different architecture run.

If you're dealing with paper you have the issues that you bring up with
paper that need to be dealt with and paper systems that involve paper
handling need to have standards about how that paper handling is
supposed to be done that are specific to paper and not part of systems
that don't deal with paper.

Similarly systems that don't have a voter verifiability step at the end
there where the voter can directly see has specific risks that need to
be handled that aren't common with other systems of other architectures.

So when we're getting down to the details of architectural design of
voting systems and the specific risk they run and how to mitigate them,
and how to write standards that mitigate risks along the spectrum of
these voting risks, we can't stay at the general level forever and we
need to have specific instructions to vendors about how to deal with and
how to get approved, qualified on a standard for architectures of
various flavors.

So I think that this resolution makes a strong stand there in the sense
of saying there are specific risks associated with systems that do not
have direct voter verifiability and that we need to have standards which
recognize those specific risks and impose additional testing
requirements to mitigate those risks.

DR. WILLIAMS: I don't have a problem with that. The current 2002
standard has separate sections for optical scan and DRE, et cetera,
which is along the lines of what you're saying.

The wording of that paragraph though I do have a problem with \-- I
would have no problem with saying that we've concluded that these two
types of voting systems might have different requirements but to say
that we're gong to do a better job developing one then we are the other,
I have a problem with that.

When we say that we're going to hold one to higher requirements for
security, that we're going to have more constraints on development or
better documentation of one than the other, I think those are onerous.

But I would have no problems with changing that sentence to say that we
recognize the fact that there may be different security constraints and
documentation constraints, et cetera. And one other thing, I'd like to
delete the word only in the last sentence of paragraph one.

DR. SMURGIAN: Mr. Burger.

MR. BURGER: I think in keeping with several of the comments I'd like to
propose an amendment starting in the last line on page 16, to change
higher security requirements to different security requirements.

And going to page 17, change greater requirements to different
requirements for system documentation. Similarly at the end of that
sentence replacing more stringent testing with different testing. And in
the next line, additional risks to different risks.

And then in points two and three; in point two add IV as well as DV, and
in point three to say elaborate and defines the \-- again now changing
additional to different requirements to be satisfied by, and include
both classes DV and IV.

The thrust of all that is to say that both implementations have unique
concerns and the risks change and both need to be addressed.

DR. SMURGIAN: Could I get a clarification? I didn't catch the last
change for item three.

MR. BURGER: Was simply to say \-- let me just read it. Elaborates and
defines the \-- instead of additional, different requirements to be
satisfied by Class DV and IV voting systems.

DR. SMURGIAN: I guess if you add IV to item two doesn't number three
become redundant or is there an additional purpose?

MS. QUESENBERRY: No, I think you're right.

MR. BURGER: Okay, I agree.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest?

DR. REVEST: Well I think there's a point that's trying to be made in
this memo, which is that the risks of IV systems are significantly
harder to mitigate.

If you just have number two saying requirements satisfied by DV and IV
voting systems, and the union of IV voting systems with DV voting
systems is all voting systems, then it just says basically define
security requirements to be satisfied by voting systems.

MR. KRAFT: The fundamental disagreement here though is not that they're
harder to mitigate but they're different. We don't really know what it's
going to take to mitigate the risk in paper ballot systems. We will
concede that they'll be different.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Actually it seems like what we really want to do is get
rid of two and say elaborate and define the different requirements to be
satisfied by IV and DV systems to get at the point you're making.

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Also another minor editing point in the second line of
the first page, we have another as the voter intended instead of,
accurately captures the voter's choice.

DR. SMURGIAN: Where was that?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Page 16, second line, middle of the line, we have
another as the voter intended. We need to \--

DR. REVEST: There's also something that Steve missed in his proposal
too, the word stronger appears on the last line of 16 and I presume you
intend to include that. It's different \-- consistent with your
proposal.

DR. SMURGIAN: So the amendment then is to change the word higher or
stronger referring to the comparison between the two systems, to
different in all cases, is that right?

So basically this last section will read, the TGDC has concluded the
voting systems in Class IV and DV \-- do we need to add that? Must be
held to significantly different security requirements including
different constraints on voting system development, different
requirements for system documentation, and different testing to mitigate
the difference risks associated with Class \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: No, with each system, with each type of system.

DR. SMURGIAN: With each \--

MR. HARDING: Voting system.

DR. SMURGIAN: \-- Type of voting system. And then basically the
amendment also takes out item two and modifies item three as item two,
to read, elaborates and defines the different requirements to be
satisfied by Class IV and DV voting systems. Does that capture \--

MALE SPEAKER: That captures it.

DR. REVEST: Yes, and given sort of the sentiment I'm sensing here, in
spite of my personal preference for the original wording I think that
there is in fact not much difference in the kinds of standards we could
write under these two wording and so I will take this as a friendly
amendment.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, so those changes are \--

MR. HARDING: And we also captured the voter choice as opposed to
intended on the top of page 16, correct?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes, we got that, J.R.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes. Well if these are considered friendly amendments \--

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: \-- Then let me just summarize all the friendly amendments
I heard. I'm very pleased that we're very friendly here.

In the first sentence we replaced the last two words of that first
sentence with, indication of voter choice. We replaced the last sentence
of \-- I guess it is one paragraph. I thought it was three paragraphs.
But the first big paragraph which started \--

DR. REVEST: I think it's actually paragraphs in the original solution.

DR. SMURGIAN: I thought so.

DR. REVEST: I propose that we consider the \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. So the last sentence of the third paragraph, which
read before, for this definition the voting system accessible et cetera,
we are replacing that with \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: No, we're eliminating that. Just scrap it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, I thought we put in something else.

DR. WILLIAMS: We did, a number three.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yeah, we put in a new four, new thing at the end.

DR. SMURGIAN: At the end of this paragraph.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, so basically then we've taken that last sentence out
completely. We've added as I read before, modify the paragraph that
starts at the bottom of the page, replacing whenever we had IV or DV,
putting both of them and then replacing the higher, stronger et cetera,
with different, and then took out item two and made item three item two,
and replaced the word additional with different, and added DV after IV.

And then at the very end we added NIST reviews methods of verification
usable by disabled voters and makes recommendations or something to that
effect.

MS. QUESENBERRY: As to how those methods can enable a system to be
classified as either DV or IV.

DR. SMURGIAN: This got pretty complicated. Do we have all the \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: (Off microphone). I'm sorry, a minor addition to the
new number three directive, not usable by but accessible by. Reviews
methods verification accessible by disabled voters.

MR. HARDING: Use your microphone, please.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Got it, sorry. The final new number three directive to
NIST, change that from reviews methods of verification usable by
disabled voters to accessible by voters with disabilities.

DR. SMURGIAN: I think we'll wait for a minute to make sure that we
capture the whole thing on the screen. Is that captured correctly?

Okay, Alan, would you please read for the benefit of the folks on the
phone from the beginning with all the modifications?

MALE SPEAKER: The TGDC has considered the various means by which a
voting system allows a voter to verify that his or her vote was captured
as the indication of voter choice. All voting systems must provide such
means as stated in HAVA 2002, Section 301, a 1 A i.

Such voter verification means can be categorized as either direct as
with optical scan or a machine generated paper ballot where the voter
can directly examine the representation of his ballot, or indirect as
with many touch screen direct recording electronic DRE machines where
the voter can only verify the fundamental representation of his ballot
through the assistance of intervening hardware and/or software.

For voting systems that create more then one representation of the
voter's ballot such as one electronic and one on paper, the TGDS
interprets the HAVA language to require that such voter verification
must apply to the representation to be called here the fundamental
representation that is used for the initial vote tabulation.

The TGDC therefore finds it useful to divide voting systems into two
categories, those Class DV, where each voter is presented a fundamental
representation of his ballot that the voter may directly verify and
those Class IV, not in Class DV. The TGDC has concluded that voting
systems in Class IV must be held to significantly different security
requirements including different constraints on voting system
development, different requirements for system documentation, and
different testing to mitigate the different risk associated with each
type of voting system.

The TGDC therefore requests that NIST perform research and develop
standards documents that one, clarifies the distinction between Class DV
and Class IV voting systems as may be necessary and two, elaborates and
defines the different requirements to be satisfied by Class IV and DV
voting systems, and review methods of verification accessible by voters
with disabilities and make recommendations as to how these methods can
enable a system to be classified as DV or IV.

DR. SMURGIAN: Would you please move the and from the end of one to the
end of two.

MR. ELLEKESE: Mr. Chairman, Jim Ellekese.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, go ahead.

MR. ELLEKESE: In the material Alan just read, is it the TGDC requests
NIST or directs NIST?

MALE SPEAKER: Written as requests currently.

MR. ELLEKESE: Okay, thank you.

MS. QUESENBERRY: (Off microphone). We've been directing in the previous
resolutions. Sorry, in previous resolutions we've been directing.

DR. SMURGIAN: We listen and we take to heart so I don't think it matters
to NIST whether you say direct or request. I think in the spirit of
being friendly, we'll take requests.

Any other discussion or clarification on this? So far we've dealt with
friendly amendments. Dr. Revest, you are agreeable to these changes?

DR. REVEST: I'll take that as a friendly amendment, yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. Any other issues, comments? Sound like we are ready
for a vote. So we're voting on Resolution 12-05, with several friendly
modifications as noted here. Mr. Green, will you please take a roll
call?

MR. GREEN: On 12-05 as amended, Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller? Miller?

MALE SPEAKER: Miller has left I believe.

MR. GREEN: Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Couldn't hear that.

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: No.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 11 yes, one no, one abstain, two absent.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you. Resolution 12-05 has passed. Dr. Revest, would
you like to proceed?

DR. REVEST: Thank you, Chairman and thank you for my colleagues on the
committee here for dealing with the first difficult issue in an
expeditious manner. I think we made good progress.

So the next resolution is Resolution 14-05 on Commercial Off the Shelf
Software, otherwise known as COSS software. Another difficult and
sometimes contentious issue that I think it would be useful for us to
address next.

Basically when a voting system is developed it incorporates not only
software written by the vendor itself but may include software packages
and other components available commercially or otherwise and from a
security viewpoint the concern is that vulnerabilities may be being
introduced by the incorporation of such software that was not written by
the vendor and is not available for review by the testing laboratories.
So that's the concern.

This resolution then attempts to address that.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest, may I ask for a second before we proceed.

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Do we have a second.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Second it.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, go ahead.

DR. REVEST: Thank you. So this is intended to address a major concern
with the existing standards, which generally exempts COSS software from
review and the process of using COSS software as I said is complex.

By and large if one wants to mitigate the risk there I think one needs
probably nonetheless to accept there's going to have to be exceptions to
a policy as this resolution proposes. It basically says you can't have
COSS software so it proposes specific exemptions and asks NIST to
perhaps identify other procedures that might work as well or better.

So let me read the resolution if the Chairman permits.

DR. SMURGIAN: Please.

DR. REVEST: The TGDC has consider the advisability of using the
commercial off the shelf software, COSS software within voting systems
from a security perspective. This concluded that generally speaking the
use of COSS software introduces excessive and unnecessary risks and
should be avoided while specific well motivated exceptions to this rule
may be required upon occasion.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards documents
requiring one, that the use of COSS software within voting systems is
not allowed unless it meets specific exceptional conditions and two,
that the criteria for exceptions to be drafted by NIST generally
prohibits COSS software for which the source code is not available for
examination and compilation.

And B, COSS software lacking sufficient documentation for reasonable
evaluation of its security, and I think that the indentation here is
incorrect. The (unintelligible) COSS software may be allowed should go
out to the level of that so that this is not a part of B anymore. So A
and B specify the general policy that COSS software is not allowed if it
doesn't have source coder documentation.

And now we get to the exceptional conditions even then, which say COSS
software may be allowed if it has available source code and sufficient
documentation and passes an appropriate security evaluation, or if two,
its usage in the voting system is such that any output errors caused by
corruption of COSS software or either such that they could in no way
compromise any voting system requirements, or such that they are being
subject to being caught in an immediately following independent voter
verification step, or if three, in an extreme case there's absolutely no
alternative, no vulnerabilities are know to exist in the software.

The software has been in extensive use in other applications and an
acceptable argument can be made that none of the voting system
requirements will be jeopardized by the use of this software.

The TGDC requests NIST to suggest variations on the above policy if any,
which increase flexibility without sacrificing security.

That's the text of the proposed resolution.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Second.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, we have a second. Any questions, comments?

MR. KRAFT: Well I guess I'll start the comments. What you propose here
ultimately requires voting system vendors to go way outside the scope of
the expertise they currently have.

They've got to build operating systems, storage systems, backup systems,
printer drivers, audio file players and interpreters, all the little off
the shelf utilities that the vendors currently rely on to make these
systems do all the tricks that we're now prescribing they must do. They
must take responsibility for developing all that code themselves, which
actually increases their risk of making errors in developing the
systems.

DR. REVEST: Paul, I think you're brining a good argument and I want to
clarify. It primarily encourages the vendors when there are alternatives
available, find such sources that have source code available for
evaluation.

So if a vendor has a choice between printer driver A and printer driver
B, and printer driver A has a source code available, then the vendor
would be mandated or encourage by the standard to \--

MR. KRAFT: Yeah, but the vendor's not going to choose printer driver A
or B. He's going to basically require the client to buy a printer, you
know, a report printer in the office and to load the appropriate driver
for that printer.

The vendor is not going to get down to a level of specifying exactly
which of the HP series of printers a voting system user must buy.

MS. QUESENBERRY: That sounds like administrative back office systems not
voting \--

MR. KRAFT: No, you still have \-- I mean the core part of the system
that accumulates results from the precincts and reports results, that is
part of the voting system and it is part of \-- this is written would
cover.

DR. REVEST: We could separate this out into separate systems if you'd
like. There are different issues there and I think the possible
contamination of the recording of the voters' intent is the most
sensitive issue and having as Whitney suggest, standards that are
particularly directed towards voting systems in front of the voter \--

MR. KRAFT: So you're talking about only DRE devices?

DR. REVEST: I think that we need to address this overall and there may
be different \-- this resolution is directly primarily to the DRE
devices, yes.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Speaker, please.

DR. WILLIAMS: What problem are you trying to solve here? What is the
security vulnerability that you're trying to address here by prohibiting
COSS software?

DR. REVEST: The software for which you don't have the source code, you
don't know really what it's doing. If it was written offshore somewhere
and acquired by another vendor for which \-- you know, you don't really
have a very good idea as to how that's going to affect your voting
system. It's a very nice back door for getting software into your system
that does nefarious things and I think we'd like to try to close this
door as well as we can.

DR. WILLIAMS: If we view that as a real risk, why is it more of a risk
in the voting station then it is in the office computer that does the
official tally?

DR. REVEST: Because in the voting station you don't have the ability of
redoing the essential function of the voting station, which is taking
the voter's intent out of his head and getting it turned into an
indication of his choice, getting it turned into a record in the
machine.

In the system central tabulation you've got precinct tallies that you
can re-add or other things in general.

There is concern there altogether but it's qualitatively a bit
different.

DR. WILLIAMS: But let's talk about what we're really talking about.
We're talking about Microsoft Windows, we're talking about the Office
Suite of products, we're talking about the Adobe Suite of products.
Those are the mainstream products that these vendors are relying on to
support their systems.

Those are also the products that a local election administration
official can go out and get at a reasonable price to configure the
systems specified for the vendor.

It's not that they're going off and getting some data based engine that
no one ever heard of that's built in a foreign country and bringing that
in for use.

DR. REVEST: I understand what you're saying, Paul. It might help if I
describe how this resolution ended up in this current form.

It's difficult to draft a resolution, which tries to address this
security concern but handle the flexibility and the exceptions you may
want to have.

We had an earlier version of this version, which said that a list of
approved COSS software would be maintained somehow and that vendors
could use software off those lists, which implies an mechanism for
maintain such a list. It gives you the flexibility to say you can use
Windows if you want.

But the problem with that resolution is that it's not clear that it's
within our scope as the TGDC to require such a mechanism because it
requires a means of getting stuff on that list, getting it off the list,
maintaining it. I think that might better meet your concerns, Paul, to
have such a list like that and it could be also adapted to meet the
concerns I have, you know, pretty well I think, depending on how that
list is maintained.

But I don't think we can pass a resolution like that here so this
resolution was drafted as a best attempt to get close to a process which
distinguishes between stuff you can evaluate and what you can't, which
is the software basis. Do you have the software available or not.

Windows is not a mandated choice. There are good choices. It opens to
software Lenox and so on to deal with drivers and everything else.
There's software available. Those can be evaluated.

There are commercial companies that produce real time operating systems
that provided source code. There's no need to get into the names but
there is availability of the kind of things we're talking about here. It
requires the vendor to look around a little bit but there's certainly
nothing that mandates Windows because it's the only vendor in town and
other vendors do provide software so I don't think there's a strong
argument to be made that says we have to use Windows.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Ron, just help me understand this. Again, it's a little
bit outside of my area of expertise.

You say that one of the exceptions that will allow COSS software is if
it's such the output errors caused by problems with that software would
either not compromise the voting system or could be immediately caught.
Could you give me an example? I mean obviously that's not sort of the
underlying operating system but you must have a specific example in
mind. Maybe that would help sort of get us down to specifics.

DR. REVEST: If the software \-- you're in section two here, so COSS
software that could no way compromise any voting system requirement,
that's sort hard to come up with good examples for frankly.

MR. KRAFT: The only example you're giving us is basically reinforcing a
vendor who comes out with voter verifiable paper ballot doesn't have to
worry about this.

DR. REVEST: I think there are privacy requirements and so on too that
are important. There are different requirements. With the voter verified
paper trail there are integrity requirements which are if those violated
can be caught by (unintelligible). But there's also privacy requirements
that you need to look at the software for and so it's \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: I mean what about for instance a Visa driver to drive a
touch screen. Generally I would assume that when you bought \-- however
you built your system you're probably not manufacturing your touch
screens if you're building a touch screen system.

MR. KRAFT: You will have to, if this passes.

MS. QUESENBERRY: But you're probably building a driver \-- you're buying
a piece of commercial hardware and that comes with software that goes
with it.

DR. REVEST: And it that software was made in some foreign country as
most of them are, how do you give yourself confidence that it's not \--

MR. KRAFT: Well how you do that is by actual testing of the code. You
look at the application that's gong to be loaded on that environment,
you look at what it's supposed to do, you go in, you verify that it is
doing it and you thoroughly test the application on its specified
environment.

DR. REVEST: I think most security professionals would say the testing is
not a good way to determine whether there's a malicious code in there.
It can detect, you know, consistent flaws, bugs in the software that
show up on a predictable basis but malicious \--

MS. QUESENBERRY: It's interesting because I thought that something like
the screen driver would be something that's immediately detectable and
actually has nothing to do with final verification of the ballot because
if you said make it larger and it didn't get larger you would
immediately know that something had gone wrong even if you as the voter
didn't know what had gone wrong.

So the kinds of things where the voter is doing direct manipulation of
the system and the system is expected to feed back to them in a very
direct way I would think \-- that doesn't get to the voter verification
issue but it does get to things where the interaction is immediate and
ongoing.

DR. REVEST: If one in every thousand touches on a particular spot in the
screen just didn't register and it was known that in a certain state
that the republican candidate was always at that spot or something like,
you know, you could have \--

MR. KRAFT: Ron, I can test for malicious code. I can't test and where
testing breaks down is looking for random errors.

DR. REVEST: You can test for consistently malicious code.

MS. QUESENBERRY: But if there's usability and accessibility requirements
for example, which we're probably going to be proposing, that user
actions with regard to the system have some sort of feedback mechanism,
whether you touch a spot and the checkmark appears, or it buzzes, or it
bleeps, or it blinks, or it does something to let you know that it's
heard you, it says, uh-huh \--

DR. REVEST: Most of the malicious behavior in the worst scenario is
triggered by some input. You have a scenario where it looks fine in most
situations but then \-- if I wanted to muck with code, you know, I would
put it so it looks fine for all your testing but under certain
conditions, which can be triggered somehow within an election, it would
act maliciously.

MS. QUESENBERRY: But we were even seeing non-malicious problems where
people were \--

DR. REVEST: Sure, that's another set of issue.

MS. QUESENBERRY: Where people were trying to use touch screen systems
and were misapplying commands to them so they were saying next, not
realizing what they were voting for but they had a chance to catch that
up because there was another screen that said you've just voted for \--
so that seems to me a case where there is in fact an independent voter
verification step within the process of indicating your choices.

DR. REVEST: Yes. In that case you've got a check on the behavior of the
software.

MR. KRAFT: You and some of your associates have been beating this horse
of malicious code for a very long time and I challenged you all when I
spoke before your MIT Cal Tech group in LA back in 2001 to show us that
this can be done.

I mean there's a whole bunch of people saying \--

DR. REVEST: There was a great class that Robby Ruben ran where his
students were asked to take a collection of software that implemented
the voting system and to introduce malicious code and then they swapped
it between the groups to see if they could find the malicious code and
they did not succeed. These are graduate students. They did not \--

MR. KRAFT: But the question is can you install that in a deployed
installed voting system in a county breeching their physical security
around that and also get it to talk to the rest of the system where it
would not be discovered.

DR. REVEST: If you have a patch coming in for some COSS software, says
oh, we need to install this patch, you know, the week before the
election is run \--

DR. WILLIAMS: We don't do that. We don't do that.

DR. REVEST: You don't do that. Or whatever \--

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MR. KRAFT: You've got lots of ifs but show us you can do it.

DR. REVEST: That's a separate set of risks.

MS. QUESENBERRY: But it's been reported that that hasn't been done.

MR. KRAFT: It hasn't been done. Nobody's documented it yet.

DR. WILLIAMS: We're getting wrapped around the axle here by looking at
components of this thing without looking at qualification and
certification in its entirety.

Later we're going to talk about software distribution, we're going to
talk about setup validation, we're going to talk about testing. These
all speak to this. The way that you qualify and install and use a voting
system right now is that the vendor submits to the ITA a complete system
consisting of a specific version of each of these pieces of software.

When that comes into the state we don't get it from the vendor and we
don't get it from any of the software vendors. We get it from the IPA so
that when we get that disc we know that what we've got is what was
tested. We do a signatory analysis on it that's exactly the same thing
NIST does on law enforcement software.

DR. REVEST: Yes, that's testing that what installed is what was
certified, which is important and we have a separate resolution
addressing that but knowing that the software that was approved or
qualified does what you want it to do \--

DR. WILLIAMS: All right, then you brought up Robby Ruben and his little
classroom experiment. I'm here to tell you as a college professor and
you know this too, that you can do things in a laboratory in a computer
science lab that you absolutely cannot do in the real world and that's
one of them.

DR. REVEST: We've got defense and (unintelligible). You're saying that
there's layers of things in the system and that's absolutely right, and
sometimes an adversary might be able to get through one and not get
another but if the assertion is that the other mechanisms are entirely
adequate for protecting against this kind of behavior I reject that.

DR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, but when you say things like I get a new version and
I install it, that indicates to me a lack of understanding of how an
election system is managed. You don't go out and get a new version of
some piece of software and put it in a test \--

DR. REVEST: I guess I read the papers too much.

DR. WILLIAMS: \-- In place election system.

DR. REVEST: I mean there are last minute repairs \--

DR. WILLIAMS: Well if people are going to do that \-- it's against the
standards right now and if people are going to violate the standards \--
you know, we've got speeding laws and people violate them every day so
there's nothing we can do about that. But in the standard \-- what I'm
talking about is what the standard says right now. It says that if you
change any component of that voting \--

DR. REVEST: Those are all good procedures and I agree with them.

DR. WILLIAMS: \-- You violated the qualification.

DR. REVEST: But I think part of what we want to do is make sure that the
software that we're certifying in the beginning does what we think it
does as well as we can and that means making use of source code
available alternatives whenever we can if you've got an equivalent \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Revest, I have a clarification question for you.

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: When you say open off the shelf software where the source
code is available, I guess the question is, available to whom? I mean
would a scheme where lets say a particular organization, NIST or
somebody else who actually looks at the code, makes sure that there are
no cookies, no under the table code, and once \--

DR. REVEST: We're not talking about public publication in this
resolution. This is making the source code available to the evaluators,
the people trying to do the security evaluation who need to look at the
code and say here's all the code the vendor wrote and then here's this
big opaque blob of other code, which they're not really sure what it
does and if it does only what I think it does it's probably okay.

And maybe that's the situation in most cases but who knows what \-- the
people who are doing the security evaluation of this software system
cannot state with any certainty that the system isn't full of trap doors
and problems if they can't see for sure what some of this code does.

DR. SMURGIAN: But if a specific organization can analyze the code and
assure ourselves that there are no underlying schemes and then basically
sort of compare any software that will be installed on a machine to that
original through the signature or whatever so that we know this
identical to the one that has been evaluated.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. REVEST: That's a separate resolution for it to cover the comparing,
but yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: My question is \-- I mean, you know, if you say well we
have no source code and everybody doesn't know what's in there, that's a
big requirement if we say \--

DR. REVEST: When I say \-- source code available to the testing labs is
what's intended here. So I think it's desirable also to make source code
generally public but that's a separate topic to talk about.

The point here is to make the source code available when possible and
perhaps some mechanism for dealing with it. There are risks associated
with software for which you don't have the source code and that's the
thing this committee must address.

I mean this is a particular attempt of trying to resolve that and the
committee may feel it's not right resolution but I think it's the best I
can see how to \--

MR. KRAFT: Well frankly I like your original resolution of defining
those off the shelf products, which are basically commonly used in the
industry in which the vendor community is currently relying on. That's a
pretty limited quantity of stuff. It's well definable and it can be
(unintelligible) as you go through time.

DR. REVEST: That they're going to implement some policy, I agree, Paul,
you may want to have some qualification process for that which involves
some kind of security considerations as well.

DR. SMURGIAN: Could I use the Chairman's prerogative? I think everybody
is chiming in here. We need a little bit of an order here so Mr. Burger.

MR. BURGER: Thank you. Ron, just listening to the debate I'm wondering
if the subcommittee looked at possibly other conceptual ways to address
this. And the one \-- I heard a little bit of discussion and I'm
wondering if you all looked into it. You made the comment that malicious
code would react to input.

Is there perhaps an avenue of isolating the ballot definition so that
the code and particularly the COSS code would be prevented from knowing
what a specific area on a touch screen or a specific button meant and
therefore be basically blocking the input (unintelligible).

DR. REVEST: It could be another kind of thing. It could be a CD driver
that's writing one of your three record copies that whenever it sees
something formatted in the extensible mark up language with a particular
kind of format, it recognizes that it's writing out election data to the
CD and changes them at that point, for example. I mean so it could be
input that's not user input.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone). (Unintelligible) it could go in and
switch votes with the democrats and the republicans (unintelligible).

DR. REVEST: Yes, whatever.

DR. SMURGIAN: Speak up, please.

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone). (Unintelligible) that are surrounding an
election.

DR. REVEST: Well if you've got voter verified paper trail, yes, you have
that issue but if you don't have that then you've got the issue that the
votes that are being \-- you've got certainly points in the software
when a change can be made.

There are single points of failure in the processing of a vote between
the voter's finger and the time it gets recorded permanently when you've
got single points of failure that could cause the vote to be changed.

DR. SMURGIAN: Let me interrupt just for a minute to make sure that the
folks that are on the phone have a chance to get in if they have any
questions. Any questions from the members on the phone?

MALE SPEAKER: Not at this time. It's been a clear discussion.

DR. SMURGIAN: Thank you.

MR. HARDING: This one's a little bit beyond me so I'm learning as I'm
listening.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay. Mr. Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: No.

DR. SMURGIAN: Dr. Williams.

DR. WILLIAMS: I guess what I'd like to see is on that number two item,
that says that the criteria for exceptions be drafted by NIST, general
prohibited. I'm concern that NIST is not going to have enough to do and
what I'd like to do is \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Please don't worry about that.

DR. WILLIAMS: I'd like to put a period there instead of that colon and
delete the rest of that and let NIST go out and look at voting systems,
look at how these things are implemented, look at the security
surrounding them and come up with some recommendations on how to qualify
and accept COSS software, and take out all of these operi ori
constrictions and make the constrictions based on what actually happens
in elections and not what Robby Ruben's students can do in a laboratory.

DR. REVEST: Is that an amendment or is that just a discussion?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, I would like to propose that as an amendment, yes.

MR. KRAFT: I'll second that.

DR. WILLIAMS: I'll leave out the comment about Robby Ruben but \--

DR. SMURGIAN: Could you be a little more specific exactly what to
change?

DR. WILLIAMS: That item two, be changed to read that the criteria for
exceptions to be drafted by NIST generally prohibit, period. That's not
a good sentence. That NIST draft the criteria for exceptions.

**(END OF TAPE 3, START OF TAPE 4)**

MALE SPEAKER: To be drafted by NIST, period and strike everything below
that.

MALE SPEAKER: That sentence starts with the TGDC directs NIST \--

DR. WILLIAMS: To research and draft standards, documents requiring the
criteria for exceptions.

MR. KRAFT: Well is there prior art here. I mean people in the banking
industry does not run their servers all on proprietary operating systems
and proprietary drivers. I doubt that even the NSA runs everything that
that they do on you know, custom developed operating systems, system
drivers, device drivers.

There certainly must be some prior art out there for determining when
(unintelligible) software is reliable, when it's acceptable, and when
you can reasonably depend on it.

MALE SPEAKER: Well we generally use \--

**(INTERRUPTION IN THE RECORDING)**

MALE SPEAKER: \-- laboratory where you can come and be certified and get
a code mark of acceptance that's (unintelligible) not completely
successful because for all practical purposes, not all this software is
in, even the dominant ones.

There have been offers actually from Microsoft and others to make some
of this source code available for purposes of validation such as this,
so that \-- and that is beginning to look somewhat promising, although I
can't tell you it's really being done universally.

So therefore one of these recommendations is something that people
aren't considering but is in totally common practice. I mean the
formidability of taking the number of millions of lines of code that
even if it were made available in Microsoft operating systems software
and to validate that is a monumental task.

So I guess I would say it might be prudent to do as recommended to say
that \-- denote that there is a risk with commercial off the shelf
software and that there ought to be drafted, what are some of the
criteria for exceptions, and that criteria would be some set of things
that NIST could provide for today's specifications.

And then as we proceed, forward in the future, might be another set of
things and clearly there are other options. In some cases we do use Lynx
and other kinds of software like that. And we know that the Department
of Defense and others in come cases actually have certain versions of
Lynx that they would trust more than others because they have been
through some sort of extensive source code verification.

I hope I didn't complicate things.

MS. QUESENBERRY: I would just like to say, to do this, is essentially to
push the debate out until we're seeing formal resolutions \-- formal
requirement language. So I guess for those of us who are not security
experts and are not software architects, I hope that along with any
formal language we could also have some examples.

I'd also just because I can't resist saying it, like to say that this is
another really compelling reason why it is critical that NIST have
access to voting systems to work with.

MR. KRAFT: I would like to come back though to, you mentioned a variety
of risks and a variety of risks in different systems. Some of the open
source operating systems to me are a higher risk because anyone who gets
to that system, who can get to the source, can make changes to it and it
can be difficult to detect that unless you are validating your operating
system on a routine basis.

DR. REVEST: Well \--

MR. KRAFT: Let me continue sir. Additionally, one of the biggest risks
right now in computer systems is failure to frequently update and apply
patches to your operating system. So one of the things we won't issue
restrictions to do and the vendors to do, as they go forward in time is
to quickly apply those patches when they come out and keep the system
secure from new and emerging threats.

That said, the application itself, should be very limited, very tight,
so that it runs on an operating system without a lot of reliance on the
operating system for logic. You can determine that in your source code
analysis. There are ways of studying that and doing that without
restricting the vendors to a fairly draconian process of vetting their
off the shelf software.

DR. REVEST: I think the issue you have though, is some of the very kinds
of resolutions we talked about in the earlier section in terms of
usability. When you start giving some of that universality and more
flexibility, that's exactly the kinds of software that get you in
trouble a lot of times in terms of \-- and the more you tightly button
it down, therefore make it a little more rigid the less variability you
have.

But I do agree that if you talk about it as a closed system you \--
after you have tested it you don't apply patches, it's not on a network,
then you are in much better control of the situation then you are, let's
say when we're providing online banking to an arbitrary PC that a
customer has where we have no knowledge or control over the environment
and the patches that they have applied.

MR. KRAFT: Right. Well it's a risky world. I'm just not sure that
restricting the use of COSS software reduces the risk and I am afraid
that it may actually increase it as vendors go into realms of software
development that they haven't previously been in.

DR. SMURGIAN: Could I see where we are because we have had a lot of
discussion.

MALE SPEAKER: I think we have an amendment on the table don't we?

MALE SPEAKER: Well that's what I was trying to capture.

DR. SMURGIAN: If I understand it correctly, what was being suggested was
to start at the last sentence of the first paragraph, that says TGDC
directs NIST to research and draft \-- and then if I can suggest
criteria for exceptions to the use of COSS software. Is that the bottom
line? And then take out everything else, is that what was being
proposed?

MALE SPEAKER: Please read that again.

DR. SMURGIAN: Basically, the entire resolution focuses on instructing
NIST to develop criteria for exceptions to the use of COSS.

DR. REVEST: Well exceptions to the rule that COSS should not be used.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, okay.

MALE SPEAKER: And the rationale behind this is that there has been a lot
of work done in this area, and some of it directly related to election
systems. The IEEE has a committee that is looking at this issue and you
can go in and look at how its handled now, not just what the standards
say but how its actually handled by the ITAs and by the election
jurisdictions that are \-- got solid security procedures in place and
face the recommendations that ultimately come up on behavior in election
system as oppose to just general concern that there are conspirators out
there that are going to do us all in no matter what we do.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay Dr. Williams \--

MALE SPEAKER: I mean exceptions could be testing procedures and so
forth. I mean not to add confusion but I will have to say if you were to
talk about \-- I think if you ask any security expert \-- if you were to
talk about not using off the shelf security software like encryption,
the answer is that would be very foolhardy because if somebody just
handcrafts some encryption software on their own, and it hasn't been
around for a while and it hasn't been fully vetted, just the
implementation, it's likely to be not effective software. It's likely to
be a way someone can get around and break it. So it's a very complex
issue.

MR. KRAFT: Mr. Chairman, let me attempt to read a modification.

DR. REVEST: This is a modification to the amendment?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Did we capture the \-- let me capture the amendment first
of all.

MR. KRAFT: That's what I am trying to do, is capture the \-- I'm sorry
capture the amendment that we discussed. And I have been making notes as
you all spoke. So let try reading through this and see if it gets to
what everybody is thinking.

The TDGC has considered the advisability of using commercial off the
shelf software COSS within voting systems. From a security perspective
the use of COSS software introduces risks and should be avoided whenever
possible.

While specific well motivated exceptions to this rule may be required
upon occasion, the TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards,
documents requiring that the use of COSS within voting systems be
avoided unless it meets specific exceptional conditions and that the
criteria for exceptions be drafted by NIST.

DR. SMURGIAN: Is that \-- Dr. Revest is that acceptable to you?

DR. REVEST: I would treat that as a friendly amendment actually with the
following provisional that I am concerned as all of us are, with the
impact on the industry out there. And that this memo as its drafted I
think is perhaps a bit clearer for the vendors to follow then this,
which essentially defers the \-- the proposed amendment which defers the
issue.

But if we can prioritize this for NIST work to put it high on the list,
to give guidance to the vendors so that they can quickly adapt to
whatever this may require in the end, then I think we can \--

MALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

DR. SMURGIAN: Microphone please.

DR. WILLIAMS: I agree that when and if we get around to prioritizing
Mark's work, this one needs to go up towards the top of the list.

DR. SMURGIAN: We will get to that.

MS. QUESENBERRY: See Ron, you wonder how we made it so short.

MR. KRAFT: You are holding it well, Ron.

DR. REVEST: I think we are making good progress here.

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes, Mr. Burger?

MR. BURGER: Just while we're doing the editing if I can offer a comment,
I think Dan pointed to something and a couple of other people that is
very important. Perhaps one of the solutions in this area is to find an
area that's mush more deeply resourced and tuck in the voting behind it.

So if NSA has qualified the software, if the banking industry has
qualified the software, as Brett said, the IEEE has a project going on
now on qualifying operating systems for security. There may be
additional requirements for voting but leverage bigger resource pools.

DR. REVEST: Good idea.

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Off microphone).

MR. KRAFT: The thoughts are there but the English is having problems.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay so you take out the number one and two, right?

FEMALE SPEAKER: No they stay.

MR. KRAFT: Yeah they stay.

DR. REVEST: I think Paul you had moderated the \--

MR. KRAFT: Yeah, I think it introduces a risk. I think NIST needs to
figure out if it is excessive and unnecessary.

DR. SMURGIAN: Item two should probably say the criteria for exceptions
to be drafted or shall be drafted. Dr. Revest is that acceptable to you?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay I think we are ready for a vote.

MALE SPEAKER: Could you have someone please read that?

DR. SMURGIAN: This is resolution 14-05. The TGDC has considered the
advisability of using commercial, off the shelf software, (COSS
software) within voting systems. From a security perspective, the use of
COSS software introduces risk and should be avoided while specific well
motivated exceptions to this rule may be required upon occasion.

The TGDC directs NIST to research and draft standards, documents
requiring that the use of COSS software within voting systems be avoided
unless it meets specific exceptional conditions, and the criteria for
exceptions shall be drafted by NIST.

MR. KRAFT: You all have wide shoulders. Shall we vote?

MALE SPEAKER: Yes.

DR. SMURGIAN: Okay, we are voting on Resolution 14-05 as modified.
Please Mr. Green, get a role call.

MR. GREEN: Okay 14-05 as amended. Smurgian?

DR. SMURGIAN: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Miller? Turnerbuoy?

MS. TURNERBUOY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Purcell?

MS. PURCELL: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Ellekese?

MR. ELLEKESE: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Caldise?

MS. CALDISE: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Burger?

MR. BURGER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Williams?

DR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Kraft?

MR. KRAFT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Revest?

DR. REVEST: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Schutser?

DR. SCHUTSER: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Gannon?

MR. GANNON: Abstain.

MR. GREEN: Quesenberry?

MS. QUESENBERRY: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That's 11 voting yes, two abstaining, two absent.

DR. SMURGIAN: The Resolution 14-05 as amended has passed. Thank you for
the hard of this committee today. I think this is probably an
appropriate time to adjourn for the day and start again tomorrow morning
at 9:00. Thank you for the audience and everybody else, our visitors and
the EAC commissioners for participating in this meeting. We will see you
all tomorrow morning starting at 9:00. Thank you. Meeting adjourn.

**(END OF AUDIOTAPE)**

[CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY]{.underline}

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\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

CAROL J. SCHWARTZ

PRESIDENT