DRAFT

Post-Katrina Rebuilding Needs:

An Environmental Scan

November 21, 2005

# 

[Purpose 3](#purpose)

[Background 3](#background)

[The Impacts and Scope of Damages on the Critical Infrastructure
4](#the-impacts-and-scope-of-damages-on-the-critical-infrastructure)

[Damages to Highways & Bridges 5](#damages-to-highways-bridges)

[Potential Volpe Support in Remote Sensing Technologies and Promotion of
Advanced Materials
6](#potential-volpe-support-in-remote-sensing-technologies-and-promotion-of-advanced-materials)

[Rail and Transit Damage 6](#rail-and-transit-damage)

[Potential Rail Strategies for Restoration, Relocation, and Realignment
8](#potential-rail-strategies-for-restoration-relocation-and-realignment)

[Airport Damage 9](#airport-damage)

[Potential Volpe Support for Communications and Navigation Improvements
9](#potential-volpe-support-for-communications-and-navigation-improvements)

[Port Damage 9](#port-damage)

[Potential Volpe Support for Deployment of Advanced Navigation Systems
and Port Technologies
10](#potential-volpe-support-for-deployment-of-advanced-navigation-systems-and-port-technologies)

[Levee Damage 11](#levee-damage)

[Volpe Support for the Development of Effective Flood Control,
Infrastructure Monitoring, and Disaster Prevention/Recovery Strategies
11](#volpe-support-for-the-development-of-effective-flood-control-infrastructure-monitoring-and-disaster-preventionrecovery-strategies)

[Damages to Oil Refineries 13](#damages-to-oil-refineries)

[Volpe Support for Environmental Remediation, Remote Sensing,
Alternative Energy, and Climate Change Assessment
13](#volpe-support-for-environmental-remediation-remote-sensing-alternative-energy-and-climate-change-assessment)

[Damages to Other Residential, Commercial, Industrial, and Federal
Facilities
15](#damages-to-other-residential-commercial-industrial-and-federal-facilities)

[Volpe Support to State/Local Governments for Transportation and
Land-Use Planning
16](#volpe-support-to-statelocal-governments-for-transportation-and-land-use-planning)

[Damages to Utilities and Other Public Infrastructure
17](#damages-to-utilities-and-other-public-infrastructure)

[Volpe Support for Promoting an "All Hazards Approach" to Managing
Infrastructure Risks, Preparing for Natural Disasters, and Ensuring
Federal/State/Local ER Coordination/ Interoperability
18](#volpe-support-for-promoting-an-all-hazards-approach-to-managing-infrastructure-risks-preparing-for-natural-disasters-and-ensuring-federalstatelocal-er-coordination-interoperability)

[Closing Comments 19](#closing-comments)

#   {#section-1 .unnumbered}

# Purpose

This paper conducts an informal fact finding survey of the damages in
the Gulf Coast area in the aftermath of Katrina and Rita hurricanes, and
identifies the ongoing plans for rebuilding. The paper assesses the
scope and intensity of the damages, identifies the plans for restoration
of the transportation infrastructure and commercial and industrial
establishments, and identifies potential support areas in which the
Volpe Center has a proven track record for technology leadership and
innovative solutions.

# Background 

In mid-September 2005, about two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made
landfall in the Gulf region, the President of the United States pledged
to rebuild the devastated Gulf Coast with "one of the largest
reconstruction efforts the world has seen."[^1] On October 28, 2005, the
President submitted to Congress a package designed to maintain fiscal
responsibility through the following provisions:

-   No new federal funds. Of the \$60B previously provided for FEMA's
    Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), this request would reallocate \$17B in
    previously appropriated DRF funds not expected to be used by May,
    2006, to begin rebuilding critical infrastructure in the Gulf Region
    and to continue recovery efforts**.**

-   A rescission package that would cancel \$2.3B from previous
    appropriations, rescinding the unused balances in 55 federal
    programs. The package requires funds to be used to replace critical
    infrastructure, facilities, and equipment damaged during this year's
    hurricanes and support additional recovery activities package.
    <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051028-6.html>

The funds are to be expended in a manner that promotes a "continued
robust and compassionate recovery" through, among others:

*Repairing Critical Infrastructure*:

-   Highways: \$2.3B to repair and rebuild highways and bridges on
    Interstates and US Routes to facilitate commerce and restore the
    economy.

-   Levees and Waterways: \$1.6B for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    (USACE) to rebuild levees, improve waterways and restore wetlands,
    and \$4.6M to accelerate a levee upgrade study.

-   Restoring Air Traffic: \$40.6M to rebuild damaged air traffic
    control facilities to ensure safety and facilitate the recovery of
    business and commercial aviation.

-   Community Development: \$1.5B for Community Development Block Grants
    to help affected states restore basic community infrastructure that
    supports the revitalization of neighborhoods and business districts.

*Revitalizing the Economy:*

-   Small Business: \$466M for credit enhancement and associated costs
    to support \$3.4B in disaster loans for small businesses and homes.

-   Agriculture: \$410M to help farmers, ranchers, and timberland owners
    remove debris and rehabilitate land; \$15.2M to repair and begin
    rebuilding Agricultural Research Service buildings and facilities in
    New Orleans and Poplarville, MS.

-   Job Training: \$125M to continue delivering National Emergency
    Grants for disaster relief and needed job training

-   NASA: \$153M to rebuild NASA's Michoud and Stennis centers; \$39M to
    repair damaged Space Shuttle external tanks and support equipment:
    \$132M for NASA to complete hurricane emergency operations and
    resume normal space programs

-   Fishing Industry. \$13.2 M to begin repairs on the damaged NOAA
    science center. [^2]

On November 1, an Executive Order created the Gulf Coast Recovery and
Rebuilding Council. The Executive Order also appointed the FDIC
chairman, Donald E. Powell, as the chairman of the Council and Assistant
to the President for Economic Policy.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051101-9.html>. The
Council will consist of all nine Departmental Secretaries (including
DOT), the Administrator of EPA and the Director of OMB, the coordinator
of Federal Support for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast
Region, Donald Powel, and several other federal agencies. The member
agencies will assist and provide information to the Council for the
performance of its function under the Order. The Council is to be
terminated 3 years from the date of the order.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051101-6.html>

On November 2, Secretary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, submitted to
the Vice President and the Speaker of the House a bill titled "Gulf
Region Accountable Transportation (GREAT) Act of 2005." The bill is to
"provide new financing programs and tax incentives to spur investment in
rebuilding and improvement projects to restore the transportation
infrastructure of the Gulf coast regions of Louisiana and Mississippi
devastated by Hurricane Katrina to a state of the art transportation
system, and for other purpose." [^3] The GREAT Act is designed to
implement the rebuilding vision through a "coordinated, innovative,
systems approach to all modes of transportation," [a vision that
underscores the key role to be played by RITA in the rebuilding
effort.]{.underline} OMB has advised the Secretary that there is no
objection to the presentation of the bill.

# 

# The Impacts and Scope of Damages on the Critical Infrastructure 

On August 29, Katrina, a Category 4 storm, made landfall in the Gulf
region. In a September 14, 2005 situation report, Secretary Mineta
stated that Hurricane Katrina would likely be remembered as the
costliest natural disaster in American history, with estimates of losses
ranging between \$100B and \$200B. At the time, deaths had stood at 595.
The Congress approved a \$62.3B spending package for relief, received
mostly by FEMA.[^4] By a later estimate, death tolls stood at 1,200,
with over 1 million displaced. Property damage estimates rose over
\$200B. [^5]

The damage exposure area, as defined by the Census Bureau, included 31
parishes in Louisiana, 15 counties in Mississippi, and 3 counties in
Alabama. In Louisiana, the city of New Orleans (with a population of
484,000 people) had three hard-hit parishes -- Orleans, St. Bernard, and
Jefferson. In Mississippi, the damaged area included the Gulfport-Biloxi
area with a combined population of 125,000, and the Harrison County
(that connected these two cities) with a population of 185,000.

The immediate transportation sector effects of the storm were service
disruption for key transportation modes serving the affected region, and
destruction of the underlying infrastructure. The storm knocked out a
wide variety of communications infrastructure, including disruptions in
communication among ER personnel. The disruption affected the operations
of airports, rail and transit infrastructure, highways and marine ports.

Rebuilding efforts began within weeks of the storms. By the third week
of September, the federal government had hired five private contractors
to begin the process of rebuilding homes in the affected areas. Bechtel
National, Fluor Corp, Shaw Group, CH2M Hill, and Dewberry Technologies
were the first recipients of what is expected to be a long list of
federal rebuilding contracts.

As for funding, according to a November GAO report, the Congress has
appropriated over \$64 billion for Katrina relief as of the first week
of November. Over 95% of the funds have been administered through
DHS/FEMA.[^6] In anticipation of the impact of the damages on the
economic growth of the U.S. economy, the Congressional Budget Office, in
early September estimated that the overall economic growth during the
second half of 2005 will be reduced by 0.5% to 1.0%, relative to the
expected growth of 3% to 4% prior to Katrina.

The following sections review the extent of the damage to the critical
infrastructure in the affected area. Each section is followed by a
review of the Volpe Center capabilities in infrastructure rebuilding and
vulnerability mitigation, addressing how the Center is positioned to be
instrumental in offering innovative approaches to the rebuilding efforts
and potentially affect significant changes in how the risks of natural
hazards are assessed and mitigated.

## Damages to Highways & Bridges

Damaged highways and bridges were the most costly segments of the
affected public infrastructure. The "big ticket" items of transportation
infrastructure repair -- estimated to cost \$1.5B -- included:

-   Rebuilding of the US. Route 90 pavement-damage, a 30-mile segment
    that runs in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, along the coast of
    the Gulf of Mexico.

-   Replacement of the Twin Span Bridge of US Route 10 that connects New
    Orleans to Slidell over Lake Pontchartrain.

-   Rebuilding or repairs on major bridges along the U.S. Route 10 in
    Mississippi and across Mobile Bay.

Damages to the Twin Span Bridge were most extensive, with an estimated
40% of the twin spans destroyed by the storm surge. To repair the bridge
a barge carrying a crane had to be re-positioned around the span to pick
up fallen concrete segments. FHWA, through its emergency relief program,
dispatched funds in early September to Mississippi to reimburse the
state for repairs to US 90 and I-10, and other federal roads and
bridges. For the remaining Twin Span Bridge repair, LADOTD awarded a
\$31M contract to Boh Brothers Construction.

The University of Buffalo, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research (MCEER) has documented the infrastructure damages
to the region through field observations and damage estimates linked to
a GIS database. [^7] Shortly after Katrina made landfall, MCEER
dispatched reconnaissance teams to investigate damages and file real
time reports. The team used remote sensing technologies and in-field
investigations to collect data and visual images, using, among other
devices, the patented VIEWS© system to rapidly collect video survey of
damage over a large geographical area. The first MCEER team arrived on
September 6 through11. A second tem visited on October 5 through 11 to
examine structural damages and gather information on how transportation
agencies and utilities can use VIEWS© and the remote sensing systems to
collect video surveys of damages. The findings are included in a
Preliminary Damage Report and Preliminary VIEWS Deployment report. The
reports documented damages on the segments of the highway network
outlined above.

### Potential Volpe Support in Remote Sensing Technologies and Promotion of Advanced Materials

The Volpe Center capabilities in remote sensing technologies and
geospatial data collection and event monitoring offer valuable support
capabilities for disaster response and rebuilding. The Center is also
well positioned to work with FHWA's Turner Fairbanks Research Center
(TFRC) to facilitate application of advanced composite materials for
hurricane rebuilding efforts. Advanced materials allow replacement of
conventional structural forms with components made out of
fiber-reinforced composite materials. These fiber-reinforced composite
materials have several advantages, including superior strength/weight
ratio, a better stiffness/weight ratio, a high degree of chemical
inertness, and flexible custom design characteristics. These materials
can be used for bridge and pavement replacement as well as other
purposes. At TFRC work has begun for reconstruction remedies for
hurricane relief, including:

-   A rapid-setting concrete (brand name Pavement, produced by Ceratech)
    has been introduced.

-   A van for collecting road data, equipped with a broadband ground
    penetrating radar system.

-   Fiber optic embedded sensors for detecting water movement through
    levees, measuring the relative internal humidity of concrete. In
    this device, a coating of hydroscopic gel is used to measure
    relative humidity. This sensor has several advantages over
    conventional electronic sensors, including its small size, freedom
    from corrosion and electromagnetic interference, and the capability
    of putting hundreds of these sensors along a single fiber. The
    product is being developed as a Phase II SBIR project by Infoscitex
    Inc. of Waltham, MA.

-   Digital Highway Measurements (DHM) is another innovative system that
    contains both the hardware and software components needed to measure
    and estimate highway metrics for collecting data on traffic speeds
    and offering video analysis (e.g., 3-D reconstruction using
    stereoscopic cameras based on automated feature recognition and
    match.)

## Rail and Transit Damage

New Orleans serves as a major interchange point for the five U.S. Class
1 railroads and the Canadian National Railway (CN). It is also home to
three short lines, more than 20 small railroads, and a streetcar system.
New Orleans is also a major Amtrak connection hub.

The hurricane heavily damaged the region's hundreds of miles of track,
leaving behind dislocated tracks and right-of-way (ROW) components,
dozens of destroyed or damaged bridges, and a significant number of
damaged signal systems and grade-crossing components. These
storm-related damages are estimated to have cost the Class 1 railroads
and the short lines several hundred millions of dollars to repair.

CSX suffered most from Katrina, with an estimated \$250 million in
losses, including lost revenue. CSX operates 39 miles of mainline tracks
that run along the Gulf Coast from New Orleans to Pascagoula, Miss. One
26-mile long contiguous stretch from New Orleans east was nearly all
destroyed. Some segments of the tracks were displaced some 10 to 50
feet, and six bridges were damaged or destroyed, including the
10,000-foot Bay Saint Louise Bridge that lost its deck. Adding to the
track damage were the 10 shrimp boats that were swept up and deposited
on the tracks near Port Bienville, Miss. By mid-September, most of the
CSX tracks were repaired and highway-rail crossing operations and
signals restored, using generator power. The company managed to restore
most service, partly by rerouting freight to other gateways.

Norfolk Southern had to spend 10 days to repair the damaged 5.8-mile
Lake Pontchartrain Bridge. Recruitment of the needed manpower posed the
major challenge to the task of bridge repair. The railroad brought 365
employees and volunteers from other regions to help with the repairs,
removing 5,500 trees from the line leading to the bridge, using 8 cranes
and a diving team to raise the track that had fallen in the lake. By
September 13, 10 days after the repairs began, Norfolk Southern workers
had restored important interchanges with western carriers.

BNSF, CN, and Union Pacific (UP) reported minimal damages. BNSF reopened
its mainline from the west to New Orleans on September 1, after
completing repairs on its bridge over Bayou Boeuf at Morgan City, which
was damaged during the storm by a barge. CN had to remove fallen trees
and debris and make minor track repairs. UP, within hours after
Katrina's landfall, dispatched employees to help with the UP recovery
operations at UP's dispatching center for the Louisiana Gulf Coast
region, coordinating with other railroads and providing relief
operations.

Kansas City Southern (KCSR), with reported track damages amounting to
\$2M, succeeded in restoring service along its Meridian Speedway between
Meridian, Miss. and Shreveport, LA by August 31, after clearing downed
trees and debris. Service along the remaining lines was restored a few
days later.

The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad suffered damages amounting to
\$65M, and has estimated that it would take at least a year to be able
to get back to pre-hurricane conditions. (This is assuming contractors
could be found, the rail carrier points out, since rebuilding
contractors are in short supply because of the damages to various
Florida railroad lines earlier in the season.)

The New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (NORA) suffered damages as
well. DOT announced on October 4 that it would provide NORA a portion of
the \$47 million in emergency funding (with the remaining funding to go
to Baton Rouge Capital Area Transit System) to restore transit services,
including streetcar lines. [^8] Amtrak restored service within a month,
but is operating on a revised schedule.

According to Railway Age, the railroads for the most part have not yet
assessed the full financial impact of the two hurricanes on the 3^rd^
quarter or full-year earnings. The overall impact on the financial
prospects of the rail sector, as judged by the Wall Street reaction to
the events, is not expected to be too severe. Analysts expect that the
losses for the railroads are balanced by the increased revenues from the
flow of cargo in the region to supply the needed materials for
rebuilding.

### Potential Rail Strategies for Restoration, Relocation, and Realignment

Service restoration, ROW relocation, or a combination of the two with
network realignment and renovation, are among alternative strategies
emerging in the aftermath of Katrina.

The strategy currently pursued by the Class Is consists of repairing the
damaged segments of the infrastructure and resuming normal operations.
By quickly restoring service, the railroads count on recouping some of
the investment they have made in the recent years in the pre-existing
infrastructure and facilities in New Orleans.

The argument in favor of relocation has been made by KCSR and several
short-line railroads. Some of these carriers believe that if fewer cars
stopped in or passed through New Orleans proper, the overall traffic
flow would improve. They maintain that large Class Is could speed
east-west flow if they didn't have to maintain this below-sea-level,
hurricane-prone city as a key interchange point, and moved their
interchange points to locations other than New Orleans.[^9] KCSR, that
operates the so-called "Meridian Speedway" between Meridian, Miss. and
Dallas, Texas, supports the relocation strategy, arguing that either
Shreveport or Dallas could serve as a good interchange point instead of
New Orleans.

KCSR has been promoting the "Speedway" as an alternative gateway for
some time. The reopening of this link two days after Katrina hit the
region made possible the restoration of service not only to the KCSR
customers, but also to Norfolk Southern's. Through an agreement with
KCSR, NS uses the Speedway as a bridge for its intermodal traffic
between Meridian, Miss. and Alliance, Texas. KSCR has engaged in several
bilateral discussions with other area rail carriers whose services were
affected by Katrina. The rail carriers have been working together to
find the best alternatives for routing rail traffic in the Gulf Coast
Region. KCSR is also working with CSX and the Meridian and Bigbee
Railway to divert non-intermodal traffic from New Orleans and
Birmingham, Ala, to Meridian. A KSCR spokesman has maintained that
voluntary cooperation among Class I and smaller carries to address
service outages will result in the most speedy restoration of service
for shippers.

To support the relocation/network realignment strategy, KCSR has been
adding capacity to its lines by putting in sidings, sections of double
track, overpasses and flyovers. Since early 2004, KCSR has made
substantial capital investments to expand the capacity of the Speedway,
mostly in rail infrastructure in Mississippi. The carrier has maintained
that because New Orleans has always been vulnerable and complicated
interchange point, the Speedway is a good opportunity to move traffic
east and west. (The only interchange point that's more complicated that
New Orleans, KCSR argues, is Chicago.) Even with the expanded capacity,
KCSR has experienced traffic backlog because of the high traffic
volumes.[^10] While dealing with growing traffic volumes, the carrier's
website states that "KCSR will continue to work with other railroads on
a bilateral basis to identify the best alternative route solutions
around hurricane damaged rail facilities so as to restore the greatest
degree of rail service possible." [^11]

Other short-line operators have expressed similar sentiments about
service realignment. An executive of Public Belt railroad has maintained
that the rail industry needs to analyze transportation plans as a whole
and figure out the most efficient way to move trains through all
gateways.[^12]

Most Class Is have played down the need for relocation and significant
realignment. CSX has maintained that while the 100-mile damaged segment
of the CSX tracks was a significant blow to the carrier's operations, it
constituted a relatively small segment of CSX's 22,000-mile network. CSX
rerouted freight to other gateways, an accomplishment that the company
attributes to technological advances and regulatory flexibilities that
the railroads have enjoyed in the post-deregulation era. [^13]
Ultimately, the relocation strategy will be a compelling option for
railroads if the restoration of the previous routes and levels of
service to pre-hurricane levels is not feasible.

Another argument in favor of relocation is the unreliable location of
rail tracks and ROW along the coast. The CSX tracks run parallel to the
coastline, less than a quarter mile from the shoreline at some points.
The unintended consequence of this ROW location, as the Mississippi
Transportation Commissioner pointed out in a congressional testimony,
was that the railroad served as a levee against the tidal surge of the
storm, protecting some of the northern ROW neighborhoods, while the
southern part of the railroad was completely destroyed. Finally, a
strategy of renovating the existing system by removing at-grade
highway-rail intersections can prove an effective response to the
hurricane. CSX, for instance, has approximately 160 at-grade crossings
intersecting the carrier's tracks between Louisiana and Alabama state
lines. Efforts to remove and renovate these crossings would improve the
safety and resilience of the system. [^14]

## Airport Damage

The Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport was seriously damaged. The
Administration's rebuilding package includes funds for restoring air
traffic, allocating \$40.6M to rebuild damaged air traffic control
facilities. On September 1, the FAA Crisis Response Working Group,
headquartered in Dallas, began spearheading efforts to help restore
aviation facilities and services devastated by the hurricane. This
effort took place in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and local authorities. The main thrust of the FAA recovery
effort was to assess the damage to airports, airport control towers, and
ground-based navigational aids, and to bring in temporary facilities,
including mobile towers, to keep essential traffic moving safely. To
help with this effort, FAA set up command centers closer to the action
in Baton Rouge and Mobile, and also utilized the FAA's System Command
Center in Herndon, Virginia to control access to the airspace in order
to expedite commercial aviation and to prevent interference with the
emergency rescue and relief aircraft operating in the area.

### Potential Volpe Support for Communications and Navigation Improvements 

The Volpe Center competencies in ETMS and navigational support could
provide effective support to the FAA efforts to set up portable towers,
help with traffic monitoring, and prevent disruptions in agency command,
control and communications capabilities.

## Port Damage

Damages to the Gulf Coast ports were estimated at \$1.7 billion in the
following five ports. The storms disrupted the region's waterway
navigational system, destroyed port facilities, damaged bridges and
locks, and disrupted communications systems in area ports, including the
following:

-   Port of New Orleans: two bridges and a lock were destroyed, with
    damages amounting to \$1.6 billion

-   Port of South Louisiana suffered damages to its communications
    systems estimated at \$1.85M

-   Port of St. Bernard suffered damages estimated at \$40M

-   Port Fourchon incurred damages to publicly owned facilities and
    private port property estimated at \$61M

-   Plaquemines Parish Port Commission incurred significant damages but
    estimates of losses are not available yet.

### Potential Volpe Support for Deployment of Advanced Navigation Systems and Port Technologies[^15]

-   For port navigation, the Volpe Center is well positioned to develop
    a portable harbor navigation system to assist in restoring the full
    use of the waterway affected by a natural disaster. This system
    would include the application of Automatic Identification System
    (AIS) technology, electronic charting aids, and high accuracy
    Differential GPS navigation. This system would offer the capability
    for updating the port's electronic chart on-demand, with the latest
    channel sounding information from hydrographic surveys conducted
    immediately after the disaster and during infrastructure recovery,
    allowing vital rescue and supply to fully utilize the capacity of
    the channel under all weather and lighting conditions.

-   To address the emergency loss of a harbor's control system, the
    Volpe Center is in a position to design and build an Emergency
    Harbormaster Control Center (EHCC) to be used to restore or augment
    traffic control and port management operations at maritime ports
    damaged during a natural disaster. The system has the potential to
    provide office space for marine traffic control personnel (ISO
    certified containers) and possess the capability for voice and data
    communications. The system could provide for the tracking and
    monitoring of vessels operating in the area of responsibility,
    utilizing transponder- based systems, marine radar, electronic
    charting systems, and video monitoring.

-   To address loss of operational capability at a marine port, the
    Volpe Center is well positioned to design and build a rapidly
    deployable, modular port operation system that could be used to
    augment the commercial marine construction assets during disaster
    recovery. The modular port operation system could be staged at
    strategic locations inland from the coast and would be moved to the
    port by truck, rail or ship. Staging the system inland, away from
    the coast, would ensure that it would not be damaged by the storm
    surge and would be immediately available for mobilization.

-   The Volpe Center has capabilities in developing a prototype Agile
    Port system for circumstances where normal port operations are
    disrupted. Volpe's current project on Agile Ports and Terminals
    evaluates state of the art material and cargo handling technologies,
    high speed ground transportation systems including maglev, cargo
    tagging, tracking, and information management systems for use in
    improving the efficiency of commercial ports and terminals. There
    are four basic elements to the Agile Ports and Terminals concept:
    efficient marine terminal, inland multi-modal freight hub, dedicated
    surface transportation link, and network architecture. One of the
    key project responsibilities is the development and implementation
    of dual-use marine technologies in support of commercial and
    military, as well as freight and passenger transportation interests.
    The Volpe team is currently working with a number of marine
    terminals at the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and the inland
    agile port site at former George Air force Base near Victorville,
    California.

-   The Volpe Center has the capability to develop portable antenna
    towers to assist with the deployment of emergency communications
    towers such as the one deployed by the Coast Guard during the
    storms. In the aftermath of Katrina, the USCG restored full maritime
    radio communications in parts of Louisiana by using a new Disaster
    Recovery System portable antenna tower that enabled search and
    rescue operations to continue in the damaged region, even though
    normal communications channels were knocked out. The tower was
    designed as a critical component of the Rescue 21 command and
    control system to provide emergency communications following a
    crisis. [^16]

## Levee Damage 

The storms damaged the coastal area levees and floodwalls through two
event sequences: flooding and the levee breach. According to a recent
report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the flooding
(overtopping) of the levees and floodwalls was predicted for a storm
stronger than a Category 3 hurricane. However, the failure (breach) of
the levees and floodwalls was not anticipated. The four breaches along
three New Orleans canals and the floodwall of the Lake Pontchartrain
contributed to the majority of floodwater damage. The breaches
represented a structural failure that happens when their design standard
is exceeded, and is distinct from overtopping. The CRS report points out
that the agency emergency response plans did not consider levee failure
as a central contingency to be addressed. [^17]

The USACE has already appropriated \$1.3B for repairs to the flood
protection levee system. An additional \$4.6M has been allocated for an
accelerated levee upgrade study. In October, the Corps had a news
release stating that the rebuilding will take place with full federal
funding, as the Corps has waived the normal cost-sharing requirements
for repairing the area flood protection facilities.

### Volpe Support for the Development of Effective Flood Control, Infrastructure Monitoring, and Disaster Prevention/Recovery Strategies 

-   *Support to the USACE to assist in its responsibility for oversight
    and planning of hurricane prevention and flood control projects*.
    The Volpe Center is well positioned to support the USACE in charting
    a course for an effective flood control strategy, including those
    developed jointly with state/local governments. Among such policy
    options would be more stringent building codes and zoning laws and
    policies that make the receipt of federal funding for disaster
    preparedness contingent on more strict laws. Determining the extent
    of the needed coastal protection and whether flood protection system
    should be designed to withstand a Category 3 storm or Category 4 and
    5 are among policy issues to be addressed. [^18] By one estimate,
    flood protection to withstand Category 5 storm from Morgan City, LA
    to Slidell, LA would cost \$22B.[^19] Among other policy issues to
    address would be a reevaluation of the federal National Flood
    Insurance Program (NFIP,) the effectiveness of the current wetlands
    protection policies, and the feasibility of programs that make
    developers pay for the environmental costs of building in a
    disaster-prone area.

-   *Volpe support in deployment of remote sensing and geospatial
    imaging systems for monitoring local area conditions.* The value of
    these capabilities is particularly recognized in predicting the
    resilience of the local infrastructure and providing early warning
    and recovery assistance. Recent research findings suggest that while
    advances in sensor technologies have been significant, capabilities
    for making more locally specific event predictions have been lagging
    behind. Advances in capabilities to predict natural disasters have
    improved disaster modeling and contributed to the first-responders
    ability to take effective measures. But often, as in the case of
    Katrina, the elaborate capabilities to predict the storm's landfall
    locations did not extend to the local area. The devices for
    predicting the hurricanes could provide virtually no measurements of
    wind force and direction near the ground. Had instruments and
    sensors been deployed ahead of time in areas likely to be hit by the
    storms, they would have provided the needed information to reduce
    the intensity of the damage.[^20] The Volpe Center knowledge base of
    sense-and-respond and security monitoring, remote sensing systems,
    and geospatial databases could be useful in develop better
    engineering and design standards for the region's infrastructure
    protection system.

-   *Volpe support to DHS and FEMA for Disaster Prevention*. The
    Center's wide range of expertise in conducting vulnerability
    assessment is a valuable asset in support of federal disaster
    prevention efforts. It is an accepted fact among risk management
    experts that it is more effective to prevent an incident through
    pre-disaster measures than to respond to and recover from incidents.
    Katrina has made it evident once again that it is in fact cheaper to
    prepare for disaster than to respond**.** The Volpe Center can
    provide effective research, test and analysis to demonstrate the
    relative value of preparedness for natural and man-made disasters.
    Numerous studies have demonstrated that the funds allocated to
    [responding]{.underline} to incidents can be used for
    [preparation]{.underline} of several times as many locations. Data
    from the 1989 San Francisco earthquake validate this finding. In
    1988, a 6.8 earthquake in Armenia killed 25,000 people. In 1989, a
    more powerful 7.1 earthquake in San Francisco killed just 62 people.
    The reason was a new building code imposing strict requirements for
    construction in earthquake--prone areas that had prepared San
    Francisco. As a result of enforcing these stringent codes, the cost
    of construction in San Francisco rose, but the human tragedy and
    greater economic losses were prevented.

-   *Framing a National Disaster Prevention R&D Strategy.* The Volpe
    Center is in a position to participate in framing a national
    strategy to address this problem by supporting R&D to improve
    understanding of, preparation for, and response to all hazards.
    Natural disasters have been costing the U.S. an average of about
    \$300 million per week, or over \$15 billion each year. The number
    of natural disasters has continued to rise, but preventive measures
    have not grown at the same pace. Losses resulting from natural
    hazards such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and
    wildfire, cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars each year. These
    costs are escalating due, in part, to the growing population in
    coastal and other high-risk areas, and to the increasing complexity
    of the nation\'s infrastructure. In addition to improving disaster
    prediction capability, Volpe can participate in developing long-term
    loss reduction strategies to improve the resilience of communities
    and infrastructure. Among the proposed strategies for this purpose
    is development of a comprehensive national loss database, and a
    greater use of loss modeling to assist in identifying longer-term
    R&D efforts, with an emphasis on technologies that can reduce
    infrastructure losses and better protect individuals and property.
    [^21]

## Damages to Oil Refineries

Large numbers of offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico
were damaged during the storms. A total of 8 refineries, accounting for
a fifth of the nation's refining capacity, were shut down. Insurance
industry's estimates of the offshore energy facilities suggest that
damages to these facilities amounted for \$2B to \$5B in insured losses,
accounting to 5-8 percent of the total insurance losses of \$40B to 60B.
[^22]

Citgo Petroleum refinery near Lake Charles, LA, the fourth largest U.S.
oil plant, was heavily damaged by Hurricane Rita, but resumed full
operations within a short period. Shutting a refinery down is a costly
step, resulting in a loss of \$1 million each day the production
capacity is down. Adding to the losses due to the shutdown was that
after reopening, the plant capacity could be brought up to normal very
gradually, checking for leaks in the plants' hundreds of miles of pipes
and valves. But apart from the shutdown, the refineries did not suffer
significant physical damage. Part of the damage occurred in the channel,
where the storm surge twisted one pier, obstructing the movement of the
supertankers carrying crude oil from Venezuela to the Gulf of Mexico and
the Citgo plant. One reason the damage was minimal was that the Citgo
refinery stands on a marshy bluff above sea level. Had the storm surge
risen to 20 feet, the plant would have gone under water.

Concentration of energy resources in the disaster prone Gulf Coast
locations has contributed to the vulnerability of the nation's energy
supplies. With 29% of domestic oil production, and 19% of domestic
natural gas production coming from the Gulf area, the energy shock from
the storm damages was significant, calling for a rethinking of the
nation's energy policy options. [^23]

### Volpe Support for Environmental Remediation, Remote Sensing, Alternative Energy, and Climate Change Assessment

-   *Environmental Remediation.* Environmental damages from Katrina were
    significant, calling for immediate remediation programs. The
    chemical pollution generated in the Gulf triggered a declaration of
    fishery failure from NOAA on September 9. Another environmental
    disaster was the noxious raw sewage and petroleum products created
    in New Orleans as a consequence of the levee failures. The Volpe
    Center expertise in environmental remediation would provide valuable
    support to USACE, USCG, DOT, and other responsible federal agencies.

> Among other environmental issues to be addressed are the impacts the
> Stafford Act that exempt many federal rebuilding actions taken in
> response to hurricane Katrina from National Environmental Policy Act
> (NEPA.) The 1969 NEPA requires all federal agencies to consider the
> environmental impacts of a proposed project by preparing either an
> environmental impact statement (EIS) for projects with "significant"
> impacts, or conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA) if it is not
> clear whether a project would have significant impacts. [^24] Some
> members of Congress have suggested legislation to provide waivers or
> streamlining methods of compliance with NEPA's environmental review
> process. Some of the issues raised by Congressional scrutiny of NEPA
> include the role of NEPA-related litigation in delaying past
> flood-control projects or contributing to high energy prices because
> of delays in oil exploration projects and refinery permitting. The
> evaluation would also address the extent to which NEPA has been used
> as an excuse for the failure of the flood protection measures.

-   *Remote Sensing and Geospatial Imaging*. Volpe capabilities in
    remote sensing and geospatial imaging are also valuable for
    monitoring environmental disasters and incidents. The Volpe Center
    is well positioned to assist federal/ state/local governments to
    prepare for natural disasters through deployment of advanced remote
    sensing technologies and geospatial imaging and monitoring tools.
    These tools have proven indispensable for damage survey and cost
    estimates, and are highly effective in identifying mitigation
    measures to address the risks of natural and man-made disasters.
    Current advances in visualization and situation display tools are
    enabling response agencies to make timely decisions at times of
    emergency. Lack of visually meaningful, real-time and archived
    information data often hamper emergency response. The need for a
    platform that enables decision-makers to provide common situational
    awareness and facilitate decisions on a timely basis has been well
    recognized. The Volpe Center is in a position to collect and analyze
    remote sensing and georeferenced data sources and use data fusion
    techniques to conduct prioritization and risk assessment in critical
    emergency conditions.

-   *Climate Change.* Another environmental issue to be addressed in
    this context relates to the observed linkage between climate change
    and extreme weather patterns. Federal agencies have begun to address
    these linkages in the aftermath of the hurricane, as more supporting
    evidence becomes available. The Volpe Center is well positioned to
    provide transportation-industry expertise on the global warming
    issues. Underscoring the importance attached to the climate change
    issue is that, in the wake of the recent storms, for the first time
    the insurance industry has begun addressing the global warming issue
    when making decision on rates and premium levels.

-   *Alternative Energy Research*. Research and analysis of the world
    energy supplies will also be in demand. Katrina was a stark reminder
    of the interconnectedness of our petroleum markets and the
    vulnerability of these markets to disruption, natural or man-made.
    These markets have become stressed over time, in part because of the
    proliferation of special gasoline blends that have raised costs and
    effected operations at refineries, pipelines, and storage terminal.
    Katrina also caused damage to electricity transmission lines and
    production facilities. Because the Gulf coast refining industry is a
    net exporter of petroleum products to all other regions of the
    country, retail gasoline prices in many parts of the nation have
    reacted dramatically to disruptive incidents in this region.

-   *Energy Supplies*. Interconnections among global petroleum markets,
    refinery capacity, alternative fuels, and electricity markets have
    also given rise to critical policy challenges. For instance, in a
    recent report, GAO has called on EPA and DOE to reexamine the
    benefits of using special fuels and balance the environmental
    benefits of using such fuels against the impacts they might have on
    the gasoline supply infrastructure. GAO has asked these agencies to
    balance the environmental benefits of using special fuels with the
    impacts these fuels have on the gasoline supply infrastructure, and
    has demanded that EPA implement statutory and policy changes. The
    Volpe Center is well positioned to provide support to federal
    agencies for regulatory evaluation and impact assessment. GAO has
    also recommended that an assessment be made of the vulnerability of
    the nation's infrastructure to natural and manmade disasters,
    calling for an evaluation of the factors determining prices in the
    petroleum industry as a whole, and gasoline prices in particular.
    The agency has also recommended addressing security challenges of
    maritime facilities for handling and transporting petroleum,
    petroleum products and natural gas, and assessing the viability of
    the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to respond to disruptions such as
    Katrina.

-   *Fuel Economy Standards*. Issues relating to fuel economy and CAFÉ
    will also need to be addressed in the post-Katrina era. The Energy
    Policy Act of 2005 calls for a comprehensive inventory and analysis
    of oil and gas reserves for all areas of the Outer Continental Shelf
    -- 85% of which is now off limits to development -- but did little
    to address the nation's growing demand for oil. In a letter written
    in the aftermath of Katrina, the Natural Resources Defense Council
    president stated that the U.S. reserves are not enough to influence
    world oil prices, and that the only way to reduce our dependence on
    oil would be to improve fuel economy of our vehicles (which consume
    40% of the our oil) and to rely on cleaner and more innovative
    sources of energy to power our economy. [^25]

## Damages to Other Residential, Commercial, Industrial, and Federal Facilities 

The heaviest property damage from the storms and flooding was
experienced in five counties -- Orleans Parish, LA; St. Bernard Parish,
LA, Jefferson Parish, LA, Harrison County, MS, and Hancock County, MS.
Most of the construction damages were to residential structures. The
three New Orleans parishes -- with an estimated 431,000 housing units --
suffered the most widespread damage, not only from the wind, but also
flooding. By one estimate, over 60% the Orleans Parish and 100% of the
St. Bernard Parish housing stock will have to be rebuilt. In addition to
these three parishes, the city of Slidell in St. Tammany Parish, with a
population of 27,000 sustained serious damage from the storm surges from
Lake Pontchartrain. By one estimate, half of the city's 10,000 homes was
completely destroyed and will have to be rebuilt. Because of the poor
economic conditions of the affected areas, the pre-hurricane forecasts
for the construction starts for the area called for a 9% decline in
single-family starts for the three counties combined. To reflect these
cautious estimates, the revised post-Katrina forecasts call for
rebuilding of 184,000 housing units in the three parishes. [^26]

On the non-residential side, the damages have been less intense. Most of
the downtown and tourist segments of Orleans Parish missed the major
flooding. Some downtown attractions, however, will have to undergo major
renovation work. Estimated costs of an overhaul of the Superdome are at
\$400M, while the \$250M planned expansion of the Ernest Morial
Convention Center has been postponed for the time being. Most of the
hotels have been relatively spared, with damages mostly limited to
windows and ground floor facilities. By the third week of September, the
Royal Sonesta Hotel in the historic French Quarter had reopened for
business. Marriott International also reported that all 14 of its New
Orleans hotels escaped structural damages.

The gambling industry in Harrison and Hancock Counties in Mississippi
suffered major commercial losses. Estimates of damages to Biloxi's
casinos suggest that the storm may have put at least eight of the
casinos out of business permanently and caused millions of dollars in
damage to the other four. The Biloxi Hard Rock Café hotel and casino
sustained damage to half of its structure, with no date set for its
opening. The casino barge for Harrah's Grand Casino Biloxi was pushed
offshore by the hurricane and washed across the US Highway 90. Another
casino, the Treasure Bay Casino in Biloxi was considered a total loss,
with an estimated cost of over \$100M to replace.

Other federal facilities damaged by the storms included NASA's Michoud
and Stennis centers (with \$153M appropriated to rebuild), and the Space
Shuttle external tanks and support equipment (with \$39M appropriated
for damage repairs). NASA received another \$132M to complete hurricane
emergency operations and resume normal space programs. Two Veterans
Administration hospitals and a military base were among other federal
facilities damaged.

On the whole, the estimates of the "insured losses" from Katrina range
between \$40 Billion and \$60 Billion. These losses do not include the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) reimbursements. [^27]

### Volpe Support to State/Local Governments for Transportation and Land-Use Planning 

-   *Transportation Planning Support*. Volpe's track record in providing
    planning, deployment, and oversight support to state/local
    governments will prove valuable for natural disaster mitigation
    programs. Planning support for addressing transportation access and
    equity issues, as well as zoning and land-use reform are among the
    services the Center is well positioned to provide.

> An example of the priorities of the state and local officials in the
> Gulf coast area is provided by the list of transportation planning and
> improvement tasks that have been identified and outlined below by the
> Mississippi Transportation Commissioner: [^28]

-   Raise the height of the levee at the coastline (where the old CSX
    right-of-way used to lie) and use the existing ROW for an urgently
    needed east-west thoroughfare which could also accommodate a bus
    rapid transit (BRT) or light rail.

-   Plan for enhanced multi-modal access and interconnectivity among
    rail, truck, air, and seaports for expansion and long-term growth

-   Consider port expansion to include inland ports -- inland terminal
    or distribution centers that are not located on a water channel.

-   Plan for a new north-south corridor that will improve evacuation
    routes.

-   Plan for public transportation for citizens who need it most -- the
    elderly, poor, and handicapped.

-   Evaluate public transit or trolley on the beach

-   Provide cruise ship port accessibility

-   Calm Highway 90 traffic; convert sections of the highway to parkway
    boulevard sections.

Risk-based land-use planning support is critical to effective
pre-disaster preparation. Even before Katrina hit the Gulf Coast,
natural disasters were costing the US an average of about \$300 million
per week, or \$15.6 billion annually, according to a 2003 RAND report
prepared for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
[^29] In the aftermath of Katrina, addressing these risks in the context
of public infrastructure design/financing decision has gained the center
stage in urban planning. The policy issues to be addressed include the
need for strategic planning and benefit-cost assessment to assess the
costs of continuing to build on flood plains. Among preventive measures
that have proven effective are zoning laws used to control development
in such hazard-prone areas as flood plains and low-lying coastal areas
susceptible to storm surge. A reassessment of the levee design system --
built specifically to avoid the outcomes encountered during the storms
-- is among planning and analytical services that the Volpe Center can
provide.

Encouraging more stringent building codes that require new buildings to
be better able to withstand natural disasters is one such strategy.
While such codes increase the initial costs of new construction, they
dramatically reduce future losses if disaster strikes. Offering federal
incentives and tax breaks to state/local governments and property owners
for improvements that strengthen the existing structures is another
strategy. For such strategies to succeed, the federal/state/local
decision makers need to take a longer view of the land use issues. The
Katrina reconstruction effort has placed policy makers on a critical
path of decision-making. The Volpe Center/RITA can participate in a
national level planning team to address critical questions that involve
a national priority-setting process for public flood protection.
Ultimately, such efforts would reverse the prevailing piecemeal approach
to infrastructure building and protection, and attempt to conduct a
systematic assessment of the consequences of the present land-use
patterns and their attendant tradeoffs. [^30]

## Damages to Utilities and Other Public Infrastructure 

The total cost of rebuilding the public infrastructure has been
estimated at \$3.5B. In this estimate, public infrastructure includes
the shoreline levee protection system, destroyed roads and bridges,
damaged public utilities such as drinking water and waste water systems,
and damaged power stations and communications lines.

Reconstruction cost estimates for the region's public utilities include
\$500M required for the cleanup of drinking water systems in New Orleans
and rehabilitation of the flood-water pumping systems. Damage to the
water and waste water system has been particularly severe. Before the
storm season, New Orleans was in the middle of increasing the capacity
and integrity of its wastewater system in compliance with a 1998 consent
decree with EPA. The city had completed the construction of underground
pipelines and begun plans for upgrading most of the city's 83 pumping
stations. Running these pumping stations to help the utilities recover
from the storm damage added at a minimum another \$150M to the total
costs.

### Volpe Support for Promoting an "All Hazards Approach" to Managing Infrastructure Risks, Preparing for Natural Disasters, and Ensuring Federal/State/Local ER Coordination/ Interoperability

-   *Promoting an "All Hazards" Approach.* A widely accepted approach at
    DOT and DHS in recent years has been to train transportation
    emergency managers to respond to incidents through an "all hazards
    approach" -- whether related to a terrorism event, a hazardous
    material spill, or a weather-related crisis. The "all hazards
    approach" recognizes that emergency management operates on a
    continuum, and that it makes little difference who or what causes
    disasters; what matters is who is responsible for what. To address
    this critical point, equal consideration has to be given to
    prevention, mitigation, response and recovery.[^31] To promote an
    all-hazards approach to managing disasters, DOT's field support
    teams from programs such as Incident Command System (ICS) or Traffic
    Management Center (TMC) need coordination of many diverse
    activities, and integration of databases and communications systems.
    Yet, most of our national strategies and tactics for dealing with
    emergencies create an artificial distinction between man-made and
    natural disasters, a distinction that interferes with effective
    system-level risk management. This is in part because man-made
    disasters evoke a greater intensity of risk perception than natural
    disasters. Yet historically, natural disasters have caused greater
    damage than man-made attacks.

-   *Promoting Preventive Strategies.* In the post-9/11 era, programs to
    prepare for terrorism-related events have trumped natural disaster
    preparedness efforts. As a result, funding anti-terrorist security
    projects has been at the expense of infrastructure maintenance.
    State/local governments can more easily get funding for
    anti-terrorism measures than for prevention of natural disasters. In
    the past four years, funding for emergency response (ER) has been
    more readily available than for preventive measures, and the
    state/local governments have not been able to use the ER funding for
    disaster preparedness. However, as risk experts have recognized, ER
    should be the last resort. It should never be relied on as a primary
    strategy for preventive disasters. Because expanding the size of the
    local force is not always economically feasible, a more effective
    strategy would be one that focuses on preventive measures that
    reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate the potential severity of events
    if they do occur.

> *Supporting Coordination and Interoperability Efforts.* Volpe's
> capabilities in managing IT systems and in asset tracking are of
> potential value to DHS efforts to improve ER. A September 2005 audit
> report by the Office of Inspector General at DHS pointed out several
> weaknesses in ER coordination, noting the lack of alignment in the
> Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate's strategic
> plan and FEMA's plan. The metrics used in the two agencies' plans are
> not aligned and consistent. For example EP&R has metrics for response
> time and program delivery costs, but FEMA does not have corresponding
> metrics. Two new DHS systems with implications for EP&R IT management
> deal with *Electronically Managing Enterprise Resources for Government
> Effectiveness and Efficiency,* known as *eMerge^2^*, which is an
> on-going project to consolidated and integrate DHS's budget,
> accounting and reporting, cost management, asset management,
> acquisition management and grant functions. [^32] The OIG office also
> emphasized the critical importance of the coordination of FEMA's IT
> systems with the agency's other logistics systems. FEMA is currently
> pilot-testing a Total Asset Visibility System to track shipments in
> real time. Such coordination is needed to determining what
> assets/personnel are deployed, what is en-route, and what responses
> are already available in the field. [^33]

### Closing Comments 

The post-Katrina events can be seen as a turning point in the way the
nation's critical infrastructure is managed. The impacts of the
hurricane -- and any technology solutions applied to remedy the damages
-- can be summarized in the context of the chain of events that led to
[failures in]{.underline}:

-   Intermodal network connectivity: When the weakest link failed other
    segments of the network did not have enough built-in redundancy and
    robustness to bounce back quickly.

-   Critical infrastructure resilience: The interdependencies of the
    infrastructure (flood protection system, energy, transportation,
    private supply chains, etc.) added to the intensity and scope of
    damages.

-   Planning/risk mitigation: Land-use and urban planning are divorced
    from risk management. Assessment of the critical infrastructure
    vulnerabilities and the risks associated with the failure of the
    transportation and communications network need to be addressed
    through a multi-layered, "all hazards" approach to preparedness.

[^1]: The sentiments expressed repeatedly were: "I can't imaging the
    world without New Orleans"

[^2]: The package lists over \$64B in hurricane relief made available to
    date, including FEMA funds:

    \$60B Disaster Relief Fund, with \$19.6B obligated to signed
    contracts or awarded as grants or spent on other recovery efforts;
    \$7.15B for housing assistance, \$1.45 B for infrastructure, among
    others.

    \$2B for Flood Insurance, with nearly 30,000 claims paid to date,
    with the "total Federal flood insurance claims associated with the
    hurricane expected to exceed \$20B."

    \$429M in State and Local Government Assistance, by waiving Disaster
    Relief Fund cost-share requirements for debris clean up and
    emergency protective measures, and an additional \$1B in
    low-interest loans for localities.

    \$4.5B provided to Army Corps of Engineers for hurricane relief and
    recover, including \$181.8 M for emergency dredging of navigation
    channels and waterways, and \$141.7M for repair and rehabilitation
    of flood and hurricane protection systems.

[^3]: Letter from Secretary Mineta to R. Cheney to Dennis Hastert,
    accompanying the bill, November 2, 2005.

[^4]: Secretary Mineta, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report Twenty Sever,
    September 14, 2005.

[^5]: University of Buffalo, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
    Engineering Research (MCEER)

[^6]: GAO, Nov. 2, 2005, "Hurricanes Katrina and RITA: Contracting for
    Response and Recovery Efforts," Testimony before the House. The
    report points out that in January 2003, GAO designated the 22
    agencies merged into DHS as "high-risk" because of the size and
    complexity of the effort and the wide array of existing challenges
    in the merged components.

[^7]: The database was hosted at Cornell University, a Data Collection
    Form in Excel format and additional photographs.

[^8]: Progressive Railroading, October 2005.

[^9]: Progressive Railroading, October 2005.

[^10]: "KC Southern Railway reopens Mississippi-Louisiana line," Kansas
    City Business Journal, September 2, 2005.

[^11]: Kansas City Southern, September 1, 2005.

[^12]: Progressive Railroading, October 2005.

[^13]: "Back on Track", Issue 1, September 9, 2005.

[^14]: Testimony of Dick Hall, Miss Transportation Commission, before
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on
    Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, October 27, 2005.

[^15]: The first four capabilities in this section are based on Rod
    Cook's proposed port systems.

[^16]: See http://www.eia.doe.gov.

[^17]: Nicole T. Carter, "New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane
    Damage Protection", *Congressional Research Service, September* 6,
    2005.

[^18]: Before Katrina struck, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) had
    a comprehensive plan to restore the marshes and improve flood
    control in the city with a new system of levees that would cost
    \$14B. But the proposal was stalled in Congress because of its high
    price tag.

[^19]: Testimony of Johnny Bradbury, Secretary, LADOT, to Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways,
    Transit, and Pipelines, October 27, 2005.

[^20]: Charles Mead, RAND Corporation, "Get Proactive with Disasters,"
    printed in Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27, 2005.

[^21]: RAND Corp., Assessing Federal Research and Development for Hazard
    Loss Reduction. *Charles Meade and Megan Abbott. ISBN 0-8330-3442-1.
    Rand document #MR-1734-OSTP. 2003.*

[^22]: Reported by Risk Management Strategies (RMS)

[^23]: The reason for the concentration, says an executive of the
    American Petroleum Institute, is that the government policies have
    limited offshore exploration and production to the central and
    western Gulf Coast. Elsewhere in the Gulf Coast, and along the
    Atlantic and Pacific oceans, offshore drilling is largely
    prohibited.

[^24]: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for "NEPA and
    Hurricane Response, Recovery , and Rebuilding Efforts, Linda Luther,
    September 28, 2005.

[^25]: Government Executive, October 15, 2005, GovExec.com

[^26]: According to Construction.com, in 2004, these five counties
    report \$1.7B in new construction starts, or 0.3% of the national
    total. During that year, total construction in the 49-county
    impacted area was reported at \$7.1 billion, or 1.2% of the national
    total for the year. The necessity for cleanup work over the next few
    months means that most new construction in the nonresidential and
    residential sectors will have to be deferred for a while. This will
    represent a negative loss to the overall level of U.S. construction
    starts, but only to a very modest degree.

[^27]: Risk Management Strategies (RMS) estimates

[^28]: Based on recommendations of Dick Hall, Mississippi Transportation
    Commissioner.

[^29]: *Assessing Federal Research and Development for Hazard Loss
    Reduction*, Charles Meade and Megan Abbott, Prepared for the Office
    of Science and Technology, RAND, Science and Technology Policy
    Institute, 2003.

[^30]: As RAND's Charles Mead has pointed out, the city of New Orleans
    was built below sea level, in a bowl rimmed with levees to keep Lake
    Pontchartrain and the Mississippi from pouring in. "The city sink
    deeper by the day -- an unintended consequences of keeping it
    dry....The levees disrupt the natural replenishment process for the
    soil on which the city sits. Restraining the river pushes silt
    deposits too far into the Gulf of Mexico, starving the marshes south
    of New Orleans. Three miles of march can absorb a foot of storm
    surge. But the marshes are disappearing." Charles Mead, "Get
    Proactive with Disasters," RAND Commentary, published in
    Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27, 2005.

[^31]: Comments of Scott Fosler, a past president of the National
    Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). Federal Executive, "Clean
    Sweep: Katrina will spawn the biggest relief effort in recent
    history, a massive public works project and a major reassessment of
    emergency response. It also could resture government at every
    level.", October 15, 2005.

[^32]: "Emergency Preparedness and Response Could Better Integrate
    Information Technology with Incident Response and Recovery," Office
    of Information Technology, DHS, September 2005.

[^33]: The DHS systems that remain to be coordinated include the
    Logistics Information Management System III (LIMS III), the agency's
    inventory system used to manage equipment and accountable property,
    Automated Deployment Database (ADD), used to identify and deploy
    personnel to disaster sites, and The National Emergency Management
    Information System (NEMIS), the backbone of the FEMA IT system for
    response and recovery operations used to manage disaster assistance
    payments and grants.