**Fighting the Opium Trade in Afghanistan:**

**Myths, Facts, and Sound Policy**

We, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, in
conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF and
international partners, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, are now engaged in a comprehensive initiative to fight the
production and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan. There is significant
skepticism among the public and the media regarding the counternarcotics
effort. We therefore provide the following paper to correct some of the
myths about the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan, and to clarify how
our programs address the situation on the ground.

In summary:

1.  Wealthy land owners in the fertile South increasingly control Afghan
    poppy cultivation.

2.  Concentration of poppy cultivation is directly correlated with
    insecurity.

3.  Poppy cultivation is not expected to increase substantially this
    year.

4.  Poppy has largely disappeared from traditional growing areas, and is
    now cultivated largely on land where legitimate crops once grew.

5.  The number of provinces in which poppy cultivation is found has
    decreased.

6.  Counternarcotics activities are led by the Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan, not international contractors.

7.  U.S. support of aerial eradication is contingent upon the consent of
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

8.  The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community
    agree that forced, targeted, non-negotiated eradication of the
    fields owned by the wealthy land owners is a necessary law
    enforcement and counterinsurgency tool.

9.  Four high-value drug traffickers have been removed from Afghanistan
    and indicted abroad.

**Poppy Cultivation: Myths and Facts**

**[Myth:]{.underline} Opium poppy cultivation is skyrocketing throughout
Afghanistan.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **While overall opium poppy cultivation has increased in Afghanistan
> over the last two years, the number of provinces cultivating poppy has
> in fact decreased.**

-   In 2008, 26 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are expected to have less
    than 3,000 hectares of cultivation according to the UNODC Opium
    Rapid Assessment Survey (ORAS).

-   Only 4% of agricultural land in Afghanistan is used for poppy
    cultivation.

-   According to the 2008 ORAS, three formerly major poppy-growing
    provinces -- Balkh, Badakhshan, and Nangarhar -- have slashed or
    eliminated cultivation altogether.

-   As demonstrated by the map below, poppy cultivation is now confined
    almost entirely to Afghanistan's insecure South, where it helps fund
    the Taliban and other insurgent and criminal groups and where the
    Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has difficulty delivering
    counternarcotics programs.

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="5.958333333333333in"
height="4.449305555555555in"}

**[Myth:]{.underline} Afghan poppy is only grown by poor farmers.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **The poor farmers in Afghanistan's mountainous North and East who
> grew poppy two to three years ago have now mostly stopped, as
> security, governance and development opportunities have improved in
> these areas. In the South, where most of the poppy is now grown,
> cultivation is organized by wealthy traffickers and big landowners who
> plant poppy because of high profits and the absence of law enforcement
> in insecure areas.**

-   Concentration of poppy cultivation and processing is now correlated
    with insecurity and insurgency, and most Afghan poppy is now grown
    by wealthy land-owners, corrupt officials and Taliban
    sympathizers---not poor farmers. The UK and the U.S. are helping the
    Afghan Government to target eradication at the wealthy, not the
    poor.

-   Research indicates that, on average, wealthy Southern landowners
    could give up opium poppy and still earn more than most farmers
    elsewhere in the country.

-   Research indicates that in Helmand, Afghanistan's wealthiest
    province, 41% of families' derived income from poppy cultivation in
    2007, versus a national average of 4%.

-   Subsistence and tenant farmers in Helmand live on \$1 a day,
    according to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
    The high profits from the drug trade do not necessarily reach poor
    people in Helmand, but insecurity caused by the narcotics trade does
    prevent some of them from receiving alternative development
    assistance.

-   According to the 2007 UNODC opium survey, the number of poppy-free
    provinces increased from 6 to 13, as cultivation is increasingly
    concentrated in the insecure South and West, which represent over
    70% of total cultivation.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   USAID has accomplished the following:

    -   Trained 1.5 million farmers in modern farming practices

    -   Provided \$49 million in credit

    -   \$878 million of economic impact

    -   Repaired over 1,000 km of rural roads

-   DFID has supported the Afghan Government to build roads, irrigation,
    provide finance for agriculture and schools, and provided \$40M of
    support to Helmand Province.

**[Myth:]{.underline} The United Nations is predicting another
significant increase in the Afghan poppy crop in 2008.**

**[Fact:]{.underline}**

> **On the contrary, recent reporting suggests that poppy cultivation
> will not increase significantly and that the poppy crop is
> increasingly contained in five contiguous Southern provinces.**

-   The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime February 2008 Opium
    Rapid Assessment Survey (ORAS) predicts that Afghanistan's 2008
    poppy cultivation may be equal to or slightly lower than 2007.

-   With effective counternarcotics efforts over the coming months, 2008
    could herald an overall drop in cultivation and an increase in the
    number of poppy-free provinces, according to the 2008 ORAS report.

**[Myth:]{.underline} Farmers plant poppy because they have been doing
so for generations; it is part of their culture, and they have no
alternatives available.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **Many Afghan farmers who previously grew viable traditional crops
> have abandoned traditional crops in the last seven years in order to
> grow poppy.**

-   According to UNODC, more than half the poppy farmers in Afghanistan
    started planting poppy after 2001, and in Helmand, 70% of poppy
    cultivation is new in the last three years.

-   Reports suggest that in some areas, well-financed narco-farmers are
    now irrigating previously fallow desert lands in order to grow more
    poppy---expanding poppy fields in wide-open plains near cities and
    irrigation infrastructure.

**[Myth:]{.underline} Many farmers are coerced by drug traffickers into
planting poppy.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **We have seen very little to suggest that poor farmers are coerced at
> gunpoint to plant poppy with any regularity. It is more common that
> financial incentives rather than physical pressure from traffickers
> keep farmers planting.**

-   While there is limited anecdotal evidence of drug traffickers
    forcing farmers to grow opium poppy, there is no information to
    suggest that this practice is widespread.

-   Reporting suggests that farmers enter financing and sales agreements
    with drug traffickers.

-   Because some farmers become indebted to drug traffickers, the UK,
    Canada, U.S. and other ISAF countries are helping the Islamic
    Republic of Afghanistan expand micro-credit programs to offer
    farmers licit pre-planting loans on better terms than they can
    receive from drug traffickers.

**Poppy Eradication: Myths and Facts**

**[Myth:]{.underline} The U.S. thinks the best way to solve
Afghanistan's drug problem is to simply eradicate the poppy fields.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **Successful counternarcotics campaigns in the Andes, Thailand, Burma,
> Pakistan and India have taught us that a balanced and coordinate
> effort is the only way to achieve sustainable reductions in drug
> production. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has developed a
> comprehensive counternarcotics strategy widely supported in the
> international community, and the U.S. Government has a similarly
> balanced supporting strategy.**

-   The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is implementing an eight-pillar
    National Drug Control Strategy that comprises institutional
    capacity-building, law enforcement and interdiction, demand
    reduction, criminal justice reform, public education, regional
    cooperation, alternative livelihoods, and poppy eradication.

-   According to the Atlantic Society Report, "The drug issue must be
    addressed now in a comprehensive and effective way if Afghanistan is
    to become a successful state. Bold thinking and a holistic approach
    combining development and enforcement tools are essential."

-   Virtually every successful anti-opium campaign in history has
    required a downside risk to deter poppy cultivation at the level of
    the individual farmer, and eradication is just one risk factor among
    many.

**[Myth:]{.underline} The U.S. is planning to execute an aerial spray
eradication program in Afghanistan despite opposition from the sovereign
Afghan government**.

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **The U.S., the UK, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and ISAF
> partners collectively advocate a policy of forced, non-negotiated,
> targeted poppy eradication in Afghanistan, to be carried out
> exclusively by force-protected ground teams employing manual
> eradication methods**.

-   Force protection is critical to enable eradication teams to
    eradicate the fields of the wealthiest and most powerful
    narco-traders, many of whose profits directly feed the insurgency.

-   Aerial spray eradication is the other method through which to
    accomplish forced non-negotiated poppy eradication, but there are no
    plans to carry out this method of eradication in Afghanistan.

**Narcotics and the Insurgency: Myths and Facts**

**[Myth:]{.underline} The narcotics trade and the Taliban-led insurgency
are unrelated or only tangentially related. The counternarcotics effort
wastes precious resources that would be better spent fighting the
insurgency.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **The opium trade and the insurgency are closely related. Poppy
> cultivation and insurgent violence are correlated geographically, and
> opium now provides the Taliban with a portion of its revenues.**

-   In December 2007, ISAF troops retaking the former Taliban stronghold
    of Musa Qala seized approximately 11,000 kg of opium and 32
    kilograms of heroin, drug processing equipment, and drug ledgers.

-   ISAF Commanding General Dan McNeill has publicly stated, "When I see
    a poppy field, I see it turning into money and then into IEDs
    \[improvised explosive devices\], AKs \[assault rifles\], and RPGs
    \[rocket propelled grenades\]."

-   The U.S., UK, UNODC, ISAF and other major international stakeholders
    all acknowledge that the Taliban-led insurgency and the Afghan drugs
    trade are increasingly linked.

-   The Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board (JCMB) led by the Afghan
    Government and the international community recently agreed that
    narcotics production is now strongly linked to the insurgency and
    that decisive action must be taken against narcotics.

**Interdiction: Myths and Facts**

**[Myth:]{.underline} Everyone knows who the high-value drug traffickers
are in Afghanistan. Why don't we just arrest them?**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **When there is sufficient evidence, drug traffickers are brought to
> justice, either in Afghan or U.S. courts. More importantly, the
> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains focused on disrupting the
> trade and cutting off the funding that supports the traffickers and
> the insurgency in Afghanistan.**

-   The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan seized approximately 40,000 kg
    of opium, morphine base, and heroin in 2007.

-   In 2007 there were over 278 convictions for narcotics offences, up
    from 182 convictions in 2006.

-   The U.S. Department of Justice has indicted four high-value Afghan
    narco-traffickers with ties to the Taliban-led insurgency: Khan
    Mohammad, Haji Bashir Noorzai, Mohammad Essa and Haji Baz Mohammad.

-   Because of the necessity of building the capacity to gather
    evidence, remove suspects, and try complex cases, it will take some
    time until the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is able to
    systematically prosecute major drug traffickers.

-   This reality makes other law enforcement operations such as
    interdiction of drug shipments, removal of corrupt officials and
    eradication of poppy crops particularly critical in the near term.

**Political Will to Fight the Drug Trade: Myths and Facts**

**[Myth:]{.underline} Counternarcotics is a fight waged by certain
outside countries, not the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan leads the fight against Afghan
> poppy cultivation and trafficking, with unified allied support. Drugs
> harm Afghanistan. The trade fuels insecurity and the insurgency. It
> weakens governance and drug addiction in Afghanistan is increasing.**

-   The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, operational since December
    2004, leads this effort in accordance with the Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan's National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).

-   UNODC estimates that in 2005, there were 920,000 drug users in
    Afghanistan.

-   Eradication and interdiction operations are carried out by the
    Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, a specialized branch of the
    Afghan National Police.

-   According to UK government estimates, the major markets for Afghan
    heroin are in Central Asia, Iran, Russia and China, where demand is
    increasing. The UK receives less than 4% of total production, the US
    almost none.

-   Afghanistan and its neighbors have signed the Good Neighborly
    Relations Declaration to help end the trafficking of opium in the
    region.

**[Myth:]{.underline} The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan lacks the will
or the capacity to take serious action against the drug trade. Why
doesn't the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remove corrupt officials
from line ministries, and appoint strong provincial governors able to
crack down on drugs in the provinces?**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **Where the security situation allows, the Islamic Republic of
> Afghanistan can and does take action on the drug trade; as the recent
> successes in Balkh, Badakshan and Nangarhar demonstrate. All of these
> provinces are expected to show significant decreases in poppy
> cultivation in 2008 and are taking significant steps to go after
> traffickers as well.**

-   Some governors have reduced poppy cultivation, improved alternative
    livelihood programs, and extended the rule of law, where the
    security situation allows.

-   There are governors who lack the capacity to fight drugs within
    their province or district, and many who do tackle the problem
    aggressively and effectively. We will help the Afghan Government
    tackle corruption.

**[Myth:]{.underline} The easiest way to solve the drug problem is to
buy all the opium, a solution the U.S. and the U.K. refuse to
consider.**

> **[Fact:]{.underline}**
>
> **The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) rejects magic
> bullets like buying crops from farmers. The governments of
> Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are opposed to
> the legalization of opium in Afghanistan, as are the relevant
> technical agencies of the United Nations.**

-   There is no legitimate world demand for legally produced opium from
    Afghanistan.

-   The price for legal opium is significantly lower than the price for
    illegal opium.  As a result, any buy-out scheme would have to be
    heavily subsidized.

-   A crop buyout would be incredibly costly; the current estimated
    Afghan poppy crop is worth \$1 billion, with 14% of the population
    involved in opium cultivation. If we introduced an incentive to grow
    poppy, a buyout would cost billions of dollars per year as more
    farmers began growing.

-   Countries which produce licit opium for the pharmaceuticals
    market---namely Turkey and India--- have strict controls,
    sophisticated law enforcement, and licensing systems -- and still
    admit to significant illegal diversion. Afghanistan has less
    regulation capacity than either of these countries, virtually
    guaranteeing that an unacceptable amount of government-subsidized
    opium would be diverted to the illegal drug market.

-   In sum, legalization would expand and entrench the drug trade,
    retarding economic diversification, undermining rule of law, and
    ensuring a steady flow of funds to the Taliban-led insurgency.