**CHAPTER 9**

**PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE**

This chapter begins with an examination of the basic principles of
emergency planning and outlines the process of assessing the emergency
response organization's ability to perform four basic
functions---emergency assessment, hazard operations, population
protection, and incident management. Communities are most effective in
preparing to implement these functions if they follow eight fundamental
principles of emergency planning. In addition, emergency preparedness is
supported by three recent organizational structures---the Urban Areas
Security Initiative, Metropolitan Medical Response System, and National
Incident Management System. The latter is implemented through the
Incident Command System and the jurisdiction's Emergency Operations
Center. The chapter continues with a discussion of Emergency Operations
Plan development and concludes with a discussion of emergency
preparedness by households, businesses, and government agencies.

**Introduction**

Emergency preparedness can be defined as *preimpact activities that
establish a state of readiness to respond to extreme events that could
affect the community.* It establishes organizational readiness to
minimize the adverse impact of these events by means of active responses
to protect the health and safety of individuals and the integrity and
functioning of physical structures. As indicated in Chapter 3, emergency
preparedness is achieved by planning, training, equipping, and
exercising the emergency response organization. That is, members of the
LEMC establish the basic plan, annexes, and appendixes of the
jurisdiction's EOP, train members of the emergency response organization
to perform their duties, and test the plan's effectiveness with
emergency exercises. They must also acquire the facilities, equipment,
and materials needed to support the emergency response. Finally, the
LEMC should develop comparable organizational structures, plans, and
preparedness for the disaster recovery phase. Recovery preparedness will
be addressed in Chapter 11.

Emergency planning is most likely to be successful when it is viewed,
either explicitly or implicitly, from a systems perspective (Lindell &
Perry, 1992). This entails an understanding of the goals of the
emergency response, the resources of the community as a system, and the
functional interactions of the different units within the system. The
*primary goal* of the emergency response is to protect the health and
safety of the emergency responders and the public. In addition, the
emergency response should protect public and private property and the
environment, as well as minimize the disruption of community activities.
The *resources* of the community include trained personnel, and
emergency relevant facilities, equipment, and materials. The *units of
the system* are the elements that take action (households, governmental
agencies, private organizations), while *organizational functions* are
defined as the "most general, yet differentiable means whereby the
system requirements are met, discharged or satisfied" (DeGreene, 1970,
p. 89). In the case of emergency response organizations, the description
of system functions can then be elaborated into operational event
sequences and component processes that include the identification of job
operations, together with personnel positions and their associated
duties (Kidd & VanCott, 1972; Buckle, Mars & Smale, 2000). In the
conceptual design stage of a system, analysts define broad constraints
that human limitations are likely to exert on system operation. As the
system design develops in detail, the analysts develop correspondingly
more detailed statements of the requirements for personnel
qualifications and training, workgroup organization, workspace layout
and equipment design, and job performance aids (Chapanis, 1970; Lindell,
et al., 1982).

Such analyses are typically applied to the normal operations of complex
technological systems such as high performance aircraft and the control
rooms of nuclear power plants, but they also can be applied in similar
form to the problems of community emergency planning. Whether a novel
technological system is being developed for use in a normal environment
or a novel social system such as an emergency response organization is
being developed to respond to an unusually threatening physical
environment, the rationale for systems analysis is the same---the
opportunities for incremental adjustment through trial and error are
extremely limited. The analysis of a social system conducted for an
emergency management program must first identify the range of hazards to
which a given community is vulnerable and the demands that the hazards
would place upon the community.

The often expressed opinion "every emergency is unique" is true but the
usual conclusion "we can improvise during an emergency rather than plan
beforehand" does not follow. It is true that emergency responders must
always improvise to meet the demands of a specific situation, but it is
important to understand that there are different types of
improvisation---reproductive, adaptive, and creative---that differ from
*organizational continuity* (continuation of normal organizational
routines) and *organizational contingency* (implementation of an EOP
(Wachtendorf, 2004). Specifically, *reproductive improvisation* responds
to a deficiency (e.g., failure of a siren) by using a substitute (e.g.,
police officers going door-to-door) to achieve the same emergency
response objective. *Adaptive improvisation* involves modifying normal
routines or contingency plans to achieve operational goals. In this
context, "adaptive" only means a change, not necessarily an improvement.
*Creative improvisation* responds to an unanticipated disaster demand by
developing a new course of action.

It is important to recognize that improvising and implementing response
actions takes more time than implementing preplanned actions---and time
is usually very limited in an emergency. Moreover, improvisations can
impede or duplicate the response actions of other organizations. For
example, Perry, et al. (1981) reported that firefighters fed and
sheltered flood victims because neither they nor the victims knew about
a mass care facility that had been activated not far away. Consequently,
emergency managers should develop community emergency preparedness so
they can limit the amount of *unnecessary* improvisation even though
they cannot eliminate improvisation altogether.

In fact, research has identified many regularities in the demands
emergencies place upon response organizations (Dynes, 1970; Drabek,
1986; Tierney, et al., 2001). Emergency managers should identify the
functions that must be performed to respond to these demands and the
resources required to accomplish the response functions. The resources
required for emergency response can then be compared with those
maintained within the community. Any special actions required to ensure
the continued availability of the emergency response resources can be
made an integral part of the emergency preparedness program.

One very important aspect of the systems assessment for emergency
response operations arises from the environmental conditions that
prevail during major disasters. At such times, response personnel often
confront confusing and conflicting cues about the current status of
hazard agent and its impacts, as well as major uncertainties about the
future behavior of the hazard agent and impacts yet to come. During the
1979 nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island and the chemical
plant accidents in 1984 at Bhopal, India, and in 1985 at Institute, West
Virginia, the inability of plant personnel to accurately assess the
status of the emergency severely impeded their ability to communicate
appropriate protective action recommendations to offsite agencies. A
similar inability to conduct timely and accurate assessments on the Mt.
St. Helens volcano led to casualties and property destruction. In all of
these cases, the complexity of the situation---together with time
pressure and the severity of the potential consequences---created
conditions that were unforgiving of error and, thus, highly stressful
for emergency response personnel.

To increase organizational effectiveness when there is enough time to
respond, but not enough time to improvise a coordinated response plan,
communities must engage in emergency preparedness*.* A major component
in emergency preparedness is the development of preimpact EOPs that
provide emergency responders with the resources they need to take prompt
and effective response actions. This chapter will examine EOP
development, emphasizing that plans are only a part of preparedness. The
primary focus is on the planning practices of local agencies having
explicit emergency response missions (e.g., emergency management, fire,
police, and EMS). The chapter begins with the guiding principles of
emergency planning and then turns to a discussion of the supporting
analyses needed to adapt the plan to local conditions. It continues with
an examination of the principal organizational structures involved in
emergency preparedness---the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI),
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), and National Incident
Management System (NIMS). The latter is implemented through the Incident
Command System (ICS) and the jurisdiction's Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). The chapter concludes with a discussion of preparedness by
households, businesses, and government agencies that do not have
explicit emergency management missions.

**Guiding Principles of Emergency Planning**

Preparedness is best thought of as a *process*---a continuing sequence
of analyses, plan development, and the acquisition of individual and
team performance skills achieved through training, drills, exercises,
and critiques (Dynes, et al., 1972; Kartez & Lindell, 1987, 1990). The
practice of emergency response planning varies considerably among
communities. In some, the planning process is quite formal; there is a
specific assignment of responsibility to an office having an
identifiable budget. In other communities it is informal; responsibility
is poorly defined and a limited budget is dispersed among many agencies.
Moreover, the planning products might be either written or unwritten. To
some extent, the emergency planning process correlates with the size of
the community in which it takes place. Larger communities---
characterized by an elaborate structure of governmental offices, many
resources and personnel, and perhaps higher levels of staff
turnover---tend to evolve formalized processes and rely more heavily
upon written documentation and agreements. In smaller communities, the
planning process might generate few written products and rely
principally on informal relationships. Formalization of the planning
process is also likely to vary with the frequency of hazard impact. In
communities subject to frequent threats, emergency response may be a
practiced skill rather than a hypothetical action. In one frequently
flooded community, the fire department evacuates residents of the low
lying areas (in the usual manner, by fire truck, to the usual location,
the local school) when the flood water reaches a certain street (Perry,
et al., 1981).

Despite the many superficial variations in EOPs, researchers have
identified some consistencies in emergency planning. The following
prescriptions, derived from Quarantelli (1982b), can be described as
fundamental principles of community emergency planning that are
systematically related to high levels of community preparedness (see
Table 9-1).

*Managing Resistance to the Planning Process*

Emergency planning is conducted in the face of apathy by some and
resistance from others (Auf der Heide, 1989, McEntire, 2003,
Quarantelli, 1982b). A basic reason for apathy is that most people,
citizens and public officials alike, don\'t like to think about their
vulnerability to disasters. A common objection to planning is it
consumes resources, that, at the moment, might seem like more pressing
community issues---police patrols, road repairs, school expansion, and
the like. Planning mandates help (for example, radiological emergency
planning after the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident and
chemical emergency planning under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act of 1986---SARA Title III after Bhopal), but are
insufficient to overcome such resistance. Consequently, the initiation
of planning activities requires strong support from a jurisdiction's
Chief Administrative Officer, an *issue champion* (or *policy
entrepreneur*) who has the expertise and organizational legitimacy to
promote emergency management, or a disaster planning committee that can
mobilize a constituency in support of emergency management (Lindell, et
al., 1996a, Prater & Lindell, 2000). However, acceptance of the need for
emergency planning doesn't eliminate conflict. Organizations seek to
preserve their autonomy, security, and prestige, so they resist
collaborative activities that can threaten these objectives (Haas &
Drabek, 1973). Emergency planning involves the allocation of power and
resources (especially personnel and budget), so every unit within an
organization wants its "proper role" recognized and a budget allocation
commensurate with that role.

**Table 9-1**. Fundamental Principles of Community Emergency Planning.

1.  Emergency planners should anticipate both active and passive
    resistance to the planning process and develop strategies to manage
    these obstacles.

2.  Preimpact planning should address all hazards to which the community
    is exposed.

3.  Preimpact planning should elicit participation, commitment, and
    clearly defined agreement among all response organizations.

4.  Preimpact planning should be based upon accurate assumptions about
    the threat, typical human behavior in disasters, and likely support
    from external sources such as state and federal agencies.

5.  EOPs should identify the types of emergency response actions that
    are most likely to be appropriate, but encourage improvisation based
    on continuing emergency assessment.

6.  Emergency planning should address the linkage of emergency response
    to disaster recovery and hazard mitigation.

7.  Preimpact planning should provide for training and evaluating the
    emergency response organization at all levels---individual, team,
    department, and community.

8.  Emergency planning should be recognized as a continuing process.

*Adopt an All Hazards Approach*

The emergency planning process should also integrate plans for each
hazard agent into a multihazard EOP. Emergency planners should use their
community HVAs to identify the types of natural hazards (e.g., floods,
tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes), technological accidents (e.g.,
toxic chemical releases, nuclear power plant accidents), and deliberate
incidents (e.g., sabotage or terrorist attack involving hazardous
materials) to which their communities are vulnerable. Following
identification of these hazards, emergency planners should consider the
extent to which different hazard agents make similar demands on the
emergency response organization. When two hazard agents have similar
characteristics, they are likely to require the same emergency response
functions. Commonality of emergency response functions provides multiple
use opportunities for personnel, procedures, facilities, and
equipment---which, in turn, simplifies the EOP by reducing the number of
functional annexes. In addition, it simplifies training and enhances the
reliability of organizational performance during emergencies. Only when
hazard agents have very different characteristics, and thus require
distinctly different responses, will hazard-specific appendixes will be
needed.

*Promote Multiorganizational Participation*

Emergency planning should promote interorganizational coordination by
developing mechanisms that elicit participation, commitment, and clearly
defined agreement among all response organizations. This obviously
should include public safety agencies such as emergency management,
fire, police, and emergency medical services. However, it also should
include organizations that are potential hazard sources, such as
hazardous materials facilities and hazardous materials transporters
(pipeline, rail, truck, and barge) and organizations that must protect
sensitive populations, such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.
Coordination is required because emergency response organizations that
differ in their capabilities must work in coordination to implement an
effective emergency response. To perform their functions effectively,
efficiently, and promptly requires members of the community emergency
response organization to be aware of one another\'s missions,
organizational structures and styles of operation, communication
systems, and mechanisms (such as agreed upon priorities) for allocating
scarce resources.

*Rely on Accurate Assumptions*

Emergency planning should be based upon accurate knowledge of community
threats and likely human responses to those threats. Accurate knowledge
of community threats comes from HVAs. As discussed in Chapter 6,
emergency managers must identify hazards to which their communities are
vulnerable, determine which geographical areas are exposed to those
hazards (e.g., 100 year flood plains and toxic chemical facility
Vulnerable Zones), and identify the facilities and population segments
located in those risk areas. They also need to understand the basic
characteristics of these hazards such as speed of onset, scope and
duration of impact, and potential for producing casualties and property
damage.

When identifying the hazards to which their community is exposed,
planners and public officials frequently recognize the limits of their
expertise. They recognize their lack of accurate knowledge about the
behavior of geophysical, meteorological, or technological hazards and
contact experts to obtain the information they need. Unfortunately, the
same cannot usually be said about accurate knowledge about likely human
behavior in a disaster. As a familiar saying goes, the problem is not so
much that people don\'t know what is true, but that what they do "know"
is false. As noted in the previous chapter, Quarantelli and Dynes (1972)
and Wenger, et al. (1980) have described widespread myths regarding
people's disaster response that persist despite research refuting them.
Belief in disaster myths hampers the effectiveness of emergency planning
by misdirecting resource allocation and information dissemination. For
example, officials sometimes cite expectations of panic as a reason for
giving the public incomplete information about an environmental threat
or withholding information altogether. This response to the myth of
panic is actually counterproductive because people are more willing to
comply with recommended protective actions when they are provided with
complete risk information. For these reasons, the planning process must
be firmly grounded not only on the physical or biological science
literature on the effects of hazard agents on human safety, health, and
property, but also on the behavioral literature describing individual
and organizational response in emergencies.

Finally, household, business, and government agency emergency plans must
be based on accurate assumptions about aid from external sources. In
major disasters, hospitals might be overloaded; destruction of
telecommunication and transportation systems (highways, railroads,
airports, and seaports) could prevent outside assistance from arriving
for days; and restoration of disrupted water, sewer, electric power, and
natural gas pipeline systems could take much longer. Consequently, all
social units must be prepared to be self reliant for as much as a week.

*Identify Appropriate Actions while Encouraging Improvisation*

An effective preparedness process must balance planning and
improvisation (Kreps, 1991). The EOP establishes the emergency response
organization's basic structure and broad strategies before a disaster
strikes. In particular, it will document which organization is
responsible for each emergency response function and, in general terms,
how that function will be performed. Similarly, per-disaster training
must explain how to perform any specific tactics and operational
procedures that are likely to be needed during response operations. Even
though emergency managers can forecast what types of disaster demands
are likely to arise, there will always be some degree of uncertainty
about the magnitude and location of those demands. For example, the
emergency manager of a hurricane prone community should develop
procedures for mass evacuation, but will be never be completely certain
about how the population in each neighborhood will respond. The fact
that people's response to warnings is reasonably well understood makes
it foolish to improvise an evacuation plan as a hurricane is
approaching.

Nonetheless, uncertainty about what proportion of the households in each
neighborhood will begin an evacuation at each point in time makes it
foolish to devise a rigid evacuation plan that has no provision for
modification as an incident unfolds. An emphasis on specific detail can
be problematic in at least four ways: (1) the anticipation of all
contingencies is simply impossible (Lindell & Perry, 1980); (2) very
specific details tend to get out of date very quickly, demanding
virtually constant updating of written products (Dynes, et al., 1972);
(3) very specific plans often contain so many details that the wide
range of emergency functions appear to be of equal importance, causing
response priorities to be unclear or confused (Tierney, 1980); and (4)
the more detail incorporated into written planning documents, the larger
and more complex they become. This makes it more difficult to use the
plan as a device for training personnel to understand how their roles
fit into the overall emergency response and consequently makes it more
difficult to implement the plan effectively when the need arises.

In summary, planning and training should identify the actions that are
most likely to be appropriate, but also should emphasize flexibility so
those involved in response operations can improvise in response to
unexpected conditions. That is, planning and training should address
*principles* of response in addition to providing detailed standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and should encourage improvisation based on
continuing assessment of disaster demands.

*Link Emergency Response to Disaster Recovery and Hazard Mitigation*

There will be an overlap between emergency response and disaster
recovery because some portions of the community will be engaged in
emergency response tasks while others will have moved on to disaster
recovery tasks (Schwab, et al., 1998). Moreover, senior elected and
appointed officials need to plan for the recovery while they are being
inundated with policy decisions to implement the emergency response.
Consequently, emergency managers should link preimpact emergency
response planning to preimpact disaster recovery planning. Such
integration will speed the process of disaster recovery and facilitate
the integration of hazard mitigation into disaster recovery (Wu &
Lindell, 2004). The necessary coordination between preimpact emergency
response planning and preimpact disaster recovery planning can be
achieved by establishing organizational contacts, and perhaps
overlapping membership, between the committees responsible for these two
activities.

*Conduct Thorough Training and Evaluation*

Disaster planning should also provide a training and evaluation
component. The first part of the training process involves explaining
the provisions of the plan to the administrators and personnel of the
departments that will be involved in the emergency response. Second, all
those who have emergency response roles must be trained to perform their
duties. Of course, this includes fire, police, and emergency medical
services personnel, but there also should be training for personnel in
hospitals, schools, nursing homes, and other facilities that might need
to take protective action. Finally, the population at risk must be
involved in the planning process so they can become aware that planning
for community threats is underway, as well as what is expected of them
under the plans. As noted previously, they need to know what is likely
to happen in a disaster and what emergency organizations can *and
cannot* do for them.

It is also essential that training include tests of the proposed
response operations. As noted above, emergency drills and exercises
provide a setting in which operational procedures can be tested. They
also facilitate interorganizational contact, thus allowing individual
members to better understand each other's professional capabilities and
personal characteristics. Furthermore, multifunctional exercises
constitute a simultaneous and comprehensive test of emergency plans and
procedures, staffing levels, personnel training, facilities, equipment,
and materials. Finally, multifunctional exercises produce publicity for
the broader emergency management process, which informs community
officials and the public that disaster planning is underway and
preparedness is being enhanced.

*Adopt a Continuous Planning Process*

Finally, effective emergency planning is a continuing process. Hazard
vulnerability, organizational staffing and structure, and emergency
facilities and equipment change over time, so the emergency planning
process must detect and respond to these changes. Unfortunately, this
point is frequently not recognized. Wenger, et al. (1980, p. 134) have
found "there is a tendency on the part of officials to see disaster
planning as a product, not a process", a misconception that confuses
tangible products with the activities that produce them. Of course,
planning does require written documentation, but *effective* planning is
also made up of elements that are difficult to document on paper and are
not realized in hardware. These include the development of emergency
responders\' knowledge about resources available from governmental and
private organizations, the acquisition of knowledge about emergency
demands and other agencies' capabilities, and the establishment of
collaborative relationships across organizational boundaries. Tangible
documents and hardware simply do not provide a sufficient representation
of what the emergency planning process has produced. Furthermore, by
treating written plans as final products, one risks creating the
illusion of being prepared for an emergency when such is not the case
(Quarantelli, 1977). As time passes, the EOP sitting in a red three ring
binder on the bookshelf looks just as thick and impressive as it did the
day it was published despite the many changes that have taken place in
the meantime. For example, new hazardous facilities might have been
built and others decommissioned, new neighborhoods might exist where
only open fields were found previously, and reorganization might have
been taken place within different agencies responsible for emergency
response. In short, the potential for changes in hazard exposure,
population vulnerability, and the staffing, organization and resources
of emergency response organizations requires emergency plans and
procedures to be reviewed periodically, preferably annually.

**Functional Capability Analysis**

To ensure adequate emergency preparedness, emergency managers should
analyze their emergency response organization's capability to perform
its basic emergency response functions. Historically, these functions
have been categorized as agent generated and response generated demands
(Quarantelli, 1981a). The agent generated demands arise from the
specific mechanisms by which a hazard agent causes casualties and
damage, whereas response generated demands arise from organizing and
implementing the emergency response. Lindell and Perry (1992, 1996b)
elaborated Quarantelli's typology by drawing on federal emergency
planning guidance (National Response Team, 1987; US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980) to define four
basic emergency response functions. These are emergency assessment,
hazard operations, and population protection (which are agent generated
demands) and incident management (which encompasses the response
generated demands). *Emergency assessment* consists of those diagnoses
of past and present conditions and prognoses of future conditions that
guide the emergency response. *Hazard operations* refers to expedient
hazard mitigation actions that emergency personnel take to limit the
magnitude or duration of disaster impact (e.g., sandbagging a flooding
river or patching a leaking railroad tank car). *Population protection*
refers to actions---such as sheltering in-place, evacuation, and mass
immunization---that protect people from hazard agents. *Incident
management* consists of the activities by which the human and physical
resources used to respond to the emergency are mobilized and directed to
accomplish the goals of the emergency response organization. The
operational aspects of implementing these functions will be addressed in
more detail in the next chapter, but rest of this section will address
the actions that must be taken to prepare to implement them. These
preparedness actions involve analyzing the disaster demands to identify
the personnel, procedures, facilities, equipment, materials, and
supplies the emergency response organization will need.

*Emergency Assessment*

Preparedness for emergency assessment requires the emergency response
organization to *detect and classify an environmental threat*. Some
natural hazards---such as many flash floods and earthquakes---are
detected and classified by local agencies. Other natural hazards---such
as hurricanes, tornadoes, major floods, and tsunamis---are detected and
classified by federal agencies. Moreover, incidents at fixed site
facilities are usually detected and classified by plant personnel,
whereas transportation incidents are detected by carrier personnel,
local emergency responders (e.g., police and fire), and sometimes by
passers-by.

The local emergency manager should review the community HVA to identify
all hazards to which the community is exposed in order to determine how
detection is likely to be achieved and transmitted to the appropriate
authorities. Locally detected hazards require the emergency manager to
ensure the necessary detection systems (e.g., stream and rain gauges for
flash floods) are established and maintained. For hazards detected by
other sources, the emergency manager must ensure that a report of hazard
detection can be called in to a community warning point that is staffed
around the clock, usually the jurisdiction's dispatch center.

Another important aspect of emergency assessment is *hazard monitoring*,
which requires continuous awareness of the current status of the hazard
agent as well as projections of its future status. The technology for
performing hazard monitoring varies by hazard agent. In many cases,
continuing information about the hazard agent is provided by the same
source as the one that provided the initial hazard detection. For
example, the National Hurricane Center provides hurricane updates every
six hours (or more frequently, if needed). Similarly, plant personnel
should provide continuing information about a hazardous materials
release.

*Environmental monitoring* is also needed when the geographical areas at
risk are determined by atmospheric processes. As noted in Chapter 5,
toxic chemicals, radiological materials, and volcanic ash are carried
downwind, so changes in wind direction, wind speed, and atmospheric
stability must be monitored to determine if the area at risk will change
over time. Thus, procedures must be established and equipment acquired
to obtain current weather information and forecasts of future weather
conditions. Environmental monitoring is also needed for hazmat spills
into waterways because, for example, the speed and direction of ocean
currents determine which sections of shoreline will be affected.

Moreover, *damage assessment* is needed to identify the boundaries of
the risk area and initiate the process of requesting a Presidential
Disaster Declaration. Here also, personnel, procedures, and equipment
must be designated to perform this function. Finally, *population
monitoring and assessment* is needed to identify the size of the
population at risk if the number of people in the risk area varies over
time (e.g., tourists present in the summer but not in the winter). This
requires emergency managers to maintain calendars of major events, such
as festivals and athletic contests, that bring large numbers of people
into their jurisdictions. It also necessitates working with schools,
hospitals, and nursing home administrators to monitor the progress of
special facility evacuations and with traffic engineers to monitor
evacuation routes for risk area residents.

*Hazard Operations*

Preparedness actions for hazard operations vary significantly from one
hazard agent to another. In some cases, hazard operations require
equipment that is normally available within the community. For example,
preparedness for structural fires, conflagrations, and wildfires mostly
requires equipment that local fire departments use in routine methods of
*hazard source control*. However, some hazard agents require special
preparation. For example, chemical incidents might require special foams
to suppress vapor generation. Area *protection works* are another type
of hazard operations that is best illustrated by elevating levees during
floods. The large number of sandbags needed for such operations also
requires advance preparation. Moreover, some hazard agents such as
earthquakes require special preparation for postimpact operations to
implement *building construction practices* and *contents protection
practices*. For example, heavy construction equipment is needed to
stabilize buildings, extricate victims, and protect building contents
from further damage.

*Population Protection*

Preparedness for population protection sometimes requires emergency
managers to develop procedures for *protective action selection*. For
some hazard agents, there is only one recommended protective action.
People threatened by tornadoes or volcanic ashfall should shelter
in-place whereas those threatened by lava flows, inland floods, storm
surges, and tsunamis should evacuate. In other cases, such as toxic
chemical and radiological releases, the appropriate protective action
depends on the situation (Lindell & Perry, 1992; Sorensen, Shumpert &
Vogt, 2004). Consequently, communities exposed to such hazards should
develop procedures for protective action selection in advance.

Similarly, emergency managers should devise procedures for *warning* the
risk area population for each of the different hazards identified in the
community HVA. In slow onset incidents, such as main stem floods, there
is likely to be adequate time for mechanisms such as face-to-face
warnings. However, rapid onset incidents such as toxic chemical releases
might require the acquisition of siren systems. Emergency managers
should also prepare for *search and rescue* by considering whether
special training and equipment is needed for swiftwater rescue from
floods, heavy rescue from buildings collapsed by earthquakes, and other
specialized circumstances. *Impact zone access control/security, hazard
exposure control,* and *emergency medical care* require special
protective equipment for emergency responders in CBR hazards so
emergency managers should prepare for these hazards as well.

*Incident Management*

Because incident management activities are directed toward the response
generated demands of an incident, preparedness for this function varies
relatively little from one hazard agent to another. *Agency notification
and mobilization* requires the acquisition of equipment such as pagers
and the development of procedures such as the designation of watch
officers to ensure that key personnel are notified rapidly.
*Mobilization of emergency facilities and equipment* is achieved by
acquiring critical documents (e.g., maps, plans, and procedures) and
storing these in close proximity to the room that will be activated as
the EOC (if the jurisdiction does not have a permanent installation).
*Communication and documentation* are supported by the acquisition of
radios, telephone systems, and personal computers as well as the
establishment of procedures for message routing and recording. Emergency
managers prepare for many of the emergency response organization's
specific activities such as *analysis/planning*, *internal direction and
control, logistics, finance/administration,* and *external coordination*
by identifying the ways in which personnel will perform tasks or have
reporting relationships that differ from the ones they encounter in
normal conditions. The emergency manager can work with personnel
assigned to the emergency response organization to devise organization
charts, task checklists, telephone lists, and other job performance aids
that will assist them in their emergency duties. Preparedness for
*public information* can be facilitated by identifying a joint
information center (JIC), providing extra phone lines for media
personnel, and developing basic background information about the
jurisdiction, its hazards, and the emergency response organization.

**Organizational Structures for Emergency Preparedness**

There are many organizational structures that have been developed to
support emergency response to environmental hazards. Three of the most
important are the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), Urban
Areas Security Initiative (UASI), and National Incident Management
System (NIMS). MMRS and UASI are federally funded programs that support
interjurisdictional collaboration. NIMS includes a standardized
structure for emergency preparedness and response titled the Incident
Command System (ICS) that must link effectively to the jurisdiction's
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Each of these organizational
structures is discussed below.

*Metropolitan Medical Response System*

The Metropolitan Medical Strike Team program was initiated in 1997 by
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. The
program quickly changed its designation to the Metropolitan Medical
Response System to reflect both integration into local incident
management systems and the extensive involvement of multiple
governments, not just municipal agencies but also private sector
organizations. Of the original 26 MMRS cities established before 1999,
only two (Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C.) retained the strike
team framework. In March, 2004, 124 city and regional MMRS programs had
been established. These tend to be concentrated in high population
density areas and other areas that are high probability terrorist
targets, but 43 states have at least one MMRS program, yielding very
broad geographic coverage and high levels of national population
coverage.

The initial purpose of the MMRS program was to enhance local efforts to
manage very large mass casualty incidents arising from terrorists' use
of weapons of mass destruction (Perry, 2003). In part the program
mission was driven by the realization that, for local governments,
specialized federal assets for terrorist attacks are 48-72 hours away
even under the best of circumstances. The MMRS program goal is to ensure
cities can operate independently until support arrives and develop a
strong local incident management system that can effectively and
efficiently integrate specialized extra community (especially federal)
resources. Unlike many federal programs, the MMRS purpose statement has
evolved over time, largely in ways that emergency managers consider
constructive. The focus has come to include CBR agents as well as any
other agent (natural or technological) that could produce large numbers
of casualties; it has become firmly established as an *all hazards*
program. Perhaps the two most distinctive features of the MMRS program
from a local government perspective are funding and organization. DHHS
allocated funds directly to cities, eliminating concerns about funding
losses to intermediate government levels and increasing purchasing
flexibility for municipalities. The organizational constraint is that
focal cities must create programs that include broad participation by
municipal departments (not just fire and police), as well as county and
state agencies and the private sector (e.g., hospitals). Although the
funding conditions are generally considered a blessing, the
organizational issues have been treated as (and undoubtedly are)
significant challenges.

The most significant feature of an MMRS is that it links multiple
response systems. Horizontal linkages involve first responders (e.g.,
firefighters, hazmat technicians, technical rescue technicians,
emergency medical personnel), public health, emergency management, law
enforcement, and medical and behavioral health services. There also are
vertical linkages; for example, public health participation involves
city, county, and state agencies. Also, private sector organizations are
included in the planning process to establish contact with hospital
emergency departments, environmental cleanup companies, ambulance
systems, funeral director associations, and similar organizations that
provide critical services in mass casualty incidents. MMRS cities must
also plan for receipt and integration of important federal assets by
building a relationship with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
and developing a capacity to receive pharmaceuticals from the national
stockpile, as well as other specialized assets from a variety of federal
programs.

Whether by design or not, the MMRS program has imposed a comprehensive
emergency management process on recipient cities. Municipalities are
required to operate an incident management system; link it to a
jurisdictional EOC; enhance mutual aid agreements with surrounding
communities; integrate county and state agencies; and conduct joint
planning, training, and exercises on a continuing basis. MMRS program
requirements address some mitigation and recovery issues, but emphasize
preparedness and response. As a condition of declaring an MMRS "fully
operational", each city must conduct a full scale exercise with federal
evaluation. Achievement of operational status is treated at the federal
level as only one milestone in the continuing development---through
planning, training, and exercising---of an MMRS.

In March 2003, responsibility for the MMRS program passed from DHHS to
DHS. Ultimately---except for the National Urban Search and Rescue
Program---the MMRS program represents the only federally devised model
for disaster operations that has been tested through repeated exercises
and deployments. The challenge for the MMRS program is sustainability;
to maintain "adequate funding and effective management of preparedness
and efforts to keep domestic preparedness as a policy priority"
(Grannis, 2003, p. 210). Through the years of DHHS oversight, funds to
sustain established MMRS cities were made available, although on a
highly variable basis. An indicator of the strength of the program and
proof of serious local commitment is that cities kept their MMRS
programs alive, even during years of small federal allocations, by
making hard choices about the distribution of local resources. Funds to
sustain the established MMRS programs have continued under DHS, but
future federal support is no more guaranteed for MMRS than for any other
program. No new MMRSs have been established since 2003, but this program
appears to be one significant success in a long history of federal
efforts to promote local emergency management where successes have been
rare. Interestingly, the FY2005 allocation for the federal MMRS Program
decreased to slightly more than \$29 million, down from \$50 million in
FY2004. The 2005 allocation was also subject to retention of 20% at the
state level, making the federal commitment to the successful MMRS cities
even more tenuous.

*Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)*

In July of 2002, President Bush approved the *National Strategy for
Homeland Security* as a framework for national efforts to prevent and
respond to terrorist actions. Beginning in 2003, the DHS Office for
Domestic Preparedness (ODP, formerly part of the Department of Justice)
inaugurated the Urban Areas Security Initiative as part of the National
Strategy for Homeland Security. In late 2003, President Bush approved
the FY2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which continued and
expanded UASI at a funding level exceeding \$4 billion. Seven urban
areas were approved for funding in 2003, and that number grew to 50 in
2004. For 2005, DHS added seven new UASI jurisdictions while, without
public explanation, discontinuing funding for seven urban areas that had
been funded in 2004. The financial awards were substantial, ranging in
FY2005 from a high of more than \$207 million to New York City to a low
of \$5 million for Louisville, Kentucky. In addition to these grants, 25
mass transit systems (heavy rail and commuter rail systems) were funded
in 2004 on the basis of ridership and total system miles.

Former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge (U. S. Department of Homeland Security,
2004d, p. iii) stated the purpose of UASI is to "create a sustainable
national model program to enhance security and overall preparedness to
prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism." In launching
UASI, technical vulnerability assessments were used to identify high
threat, high population density areas to participate in the program. The
level of funding assigned to urban areas has been based in part upon the
vulnerability assessments and other needs assessments. UASI does not
impose a generic response model on participating urban areas, but
requires local governments located around a designated core city to
cooperate in developing a strategic plan that either creates anew or
supplements existing disaster plans for terrorist attacks anywhere in
the urban area. UASI then authorizes program expenditures across five
areas: planning, equipment acquisition, training, exercises, and
management and administration (the latter is limited to 3% of the total
allocation). The funding mechanism is intergovernmental, with federal
money being allocated to states (which can retain up to 20%) that, in
turn, distribute funds to local governments. Local governments receive
funds based on the area's strategic plan as well as agreements among the
core city's Urban Area Administrator, participating municipal
governments, and county and state emergency management agencies. All
expenditures are subject to federal review.

These general funding rules for UASI continued through the FY2005
allocations, although DHS has changed its approach to funding local
government programs. The DHS Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) Office for Domestic Preparedness
has created a program that combines the application process for six
major federal programs and delegates the responsibility for that process
to state governments. The programs brought under this umbrella
application process are UASI, the MMRS Program, the State Homeland
Security Program, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, the
Citizen Corps Program, and Emergency Management Performance Grants. Some
of the budget allocations appear to have increased, whereas others
decreased from previous years. It is clear that this new process gives
states additional resources (programs like MMRS which were previously
immune to the 20% funds retention by the state under UASI are now
subject to the retention), but also a considerably greater
administrative role and burden. It is not clear how effectively this
consolidation of programs will be implemented by the federal government
and states, nor how well it will be received by local governments.

For the most part, emergency managers view UASI as promising. It
provides substantial funding for local needs (rarely accomplished by
previous federal programs) and allows a degree of local choice in
planning, administration, and funding. Another positive point is that 47
core cities of the 50 UASI urban areas already had existing MMRS
programs. This means they had already engaged in substantial emergency
planning and, therefore, possessed an existing structure on which to
build further capability. Complaints include concern that federal
authorities tightly define authorized expenditures within each
predetermined budget category and that local governments bear a
substantial financial accounting load. There is also concern that the
pass-through mechanism from federal to state and then to local agencies
is complex and administratively demanding, thus risking the diversion of
funds from emergency preparedness to other uses. Finally, if UASI is to
succeed in creating a functioning local emergency management capability,
there must be high levels of continuing cooperation among federal,
state, county, and municipal governments---and particularly among the
municipal governments within each urban area. Sylves' (1991) work on the
inherent difficulties with intergovernmental relations indicates the
required agreements on operational plans and budget allocations will
prove to be serious challenges.

At the present time, there is little basis for judging the success of
the UASI program. Not only is the program new, but plans must be kept
secure to avoid divulging their contents to potential adversaries. When
combined with the usual administrative and operational hurdles to data
collection, these obstacles inhibit the amount of information available
in the open literature that can be used to evaluate the program. Most
urban areas funded in the FY03 budget cycle obtained federal approval of
strategic plans, but implementation requiring such intense
intergovernmental collaboration and massive equipment purchases can be
expected to be slow under even the best of circumstances. There has
simply not been time to establish a capability that could be evaluated
in functional or full scale exercises. Although many of these urban
areas have MMRS programs that provide emergency management system
models, it is not clear if the UASI strategic plans build upon these
capabilities, revise them, or change them entirely.

*The National Incident Management System*

The concept of incident management systems is neither new nor confined
to traditional emergency management. Incident management has military
origins and law enforcement agencies have long used the Incident Command
System (ICS) for large scale incident response. Both ICS and IMS
(Incident Management System, Brunacini, 1985) are preplanned
organizational structures for emergency response that will be treated
here as interchangeable, although there are small differences that will
be discussed in the next section. In fact, an important issue regarding
IMS/ICS is the confusion about meaning; different professions, different
professionals, and different times have embraced different meanings.
Municipal fire departments use IMS and the National Fire Protection
Association adopted a standard (NFPA 1561) on emergency services IMSs in
2000. Similarly, the Law Enforcement Incident Command System (LEICS) was
systematized and endorsed by the Police Officers Standards and Testing
organization (Bartosh, 2003). The Hospital Emergency Incident Command
System (HEICS), used in public health organizations, originated with the
Orange County, California, Emergency Medical Services Agency and has
diffused widely through the medical community.

In addition to the myriad systems currently available for incident
management, the federal government has now required NIMS. Homeland
Security Presidential Directive Number 5 (HSPD-5), a direct response to
multijurisdictional, multiorganizational problems arising in the
response to the September 11^th^ attacks, established NIMS as part of
the US National Response Plan. The Department of Homeland Security
(2004b) issued the documentation for NIMS on March 1, 2004. HSPD-5
required all federal agencies to adopt NIMS immediately and all state
and local organizations to adopt NIMS as a condition for federal
preparedness funding by FY2005. The State of California negotiated with
DHS to retain SEMS (a standardized emergency management system it had
developed before NIMS), but the overall reception of the NIMS among
other emergency responders is currently unknown.

While all IMSs focus on the operational response to an incident, NIMS
addresses this issue and also many others that are considered to be
emergency preparedness rather than emergency response activities. There
are six components to NIMS (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004b).
The first, labeled *command and management*, includes the traditional
component of ICS (NIMS here uses ICS rather than the more conventional
IMS term), plus a definition of "multiagency coordination systems" and
"public information systems". The ICS described here appears to be
almost identical to California's SEMS (which also is more comprehensive
than a simple ICS) and similar to a traditional fire service IMS. What
DHS identifies separately as multiagency coordination systems and public
information systems overlap the structure of traditional fire services
incident management. The conventional version of IMS structurally
accommodates the need to link with incident management systems operated
by different classes of agencies and governments (e.g., public works,
EMS, law enforcement, hospitals) and includes joint information systems
to disseminate incident information to the public (Brunacini, 2002).
These same features also characterize all municipal MMRS programs.

The second component of NIMS is labeled *preparedness* and "involves an
integrated combination of planning, training, exercises, personnel
qualification and certification standards, equipment acquisition and
certification standards, and publication management processes and
activities" (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004b, p. 4). Much of
this component appears to be conventional guidance that, to maintain any
ICS (or IMS), one needs to engage in planning, training, and exercising,
as well as develop mutual aid pacts. The parts that are both different
and confining include the notion that DHS will issue standards and test
personnel to certify their ability to perform "NIMS-related functions."
This certification process also will be applied to equipment. Finally,
this component specifies that forms used in ICS---including the incident
action plan, organization assignment list, and many others---be
standardized by federal fiat. Indeed Appendix A, Tab 9 of the *National
Incident Management System* reproduces facsimiles of appropriate form
formats (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004b, p. 105-120).

The *resource management* component of NIMS is complex and extensive.
There is a requirement for inventorying resources, along with a DHS
supplied "resource typing system", that provides specific definitions of
each type of resource and how it is to be categorized. There are also
rules for determining what resources are needed for an incident, as well
as how they are to be ordered, mobilized, tracked, reported, and
recovered. Finally, there is a section requiring certification and
credentials for personnel, but it is unclear from the description
whether this means resource management personnel must be certified or
whether they are charged with ensuring incident command personnel and
equipment are properly certified.

The final three components of NIMS are less well defined than those just
discussed. The "communication and information management" component
develops standards for communications (including interoperability
between responder organizations) at an incident and specifies processes
for managing incident information. The *supporting technologies*
component exhorts locals to acquire and continually review the
availability of new technology for incident management. The *ongoing
management and maintenance* component "establishes an activity to
provide strategic direction for and oversight of the NIMS, supporting
both routine review and the continuous refinement of the system and its
components over the long term" (US Department of Homeland Security,
2004b, p. 6)

It is difficult to evaluate NIMS at this stage of implementation. With
regard to its origins, "Both NRP \[National Response Plan\] and NIMS
have been developed in a top down manner, centrally coordinated by
DHS... \[and\] \[v\]iews differ on the scope and intent of stakeholder
involvement in developing NRP and NIMS." (Hess & Harrald, 2004, p. 2).
It appears that disaster research was minimally considered, if at all,
in the process of generating NIMS. It is unclear how other guidance was
solicited by DHS, from whom, or how it was incorporated. Drafts of the
NRP were widely distributed via electronic mail along with requests for
comment and many of these messages reached municipal emergency managers.
What appears to be an even greater concern to municipal emergency
management and response agencies is the detail in which processes and
protocols are specified within NIMS. In what could be regarded as a
significant understatement, Christen (2004, p. 96) states that, in the
fire service, "not everyone is happy with national standards and
protocols that supersede local preferences." More important is the
question of whether such detailed specification promotes or retards the
effective and efficient management of emergencies and disasters.

On a practical level, the likelihood of successful NIMS implementation
is difficult to estimate. There is no doubt DHS can impose a requirement
for agencies accepting federal disaster preparedness funding to adopt
NIMS. However, effective implementation is quite a different matter from
official adoption. A veneer of nominal adoption sometimes substitutes
for the reality of an executable capability at the local level. The ICS
component is similar to the IMS that is used by most large fire services
agencies in the United States, although implementation by public works,
hospitals, and law enforcement agencies is difficult to estimate. To
effectively operate an IMS, an agency must address the planning,
training, and exercising issues contained in other NIMS components.
There are serious practical challenges---including a reliance on
intergovernmental relationships that has plagued implementation efforts
for other federal programs. As another example, immense resources will
be required for DHS to produce standards and annually test and certify
every command officer in the United States. If equipment must also be
certified, the task will be even more daunting, especially when one
remembers NIMS is designed for federal, state, local, and tribal
governments (Ridge, 2004). The Phoenix Fire Department operates a
Command Training Center for certifying its own command officers (and
others from the surrounding region), but the simulation models, props,
computers, and software require a financial investment far beyond the
resources of most fire departments. Hence, even if the certification and
testing were passed to local jurisdictions, many would be overwhelmed
and would likely see the process as another "unfunded federal mandate".
For local agencies that do not routinely use some ICS or IMS or use it
infrequently, the additional resources required to comply with NIMS will
be substantial. DHS has created a "NIMS Integration Center" (with a Web
site at www.fema.gov/nims) as part of the federal effort to manage NIMS
and answer questions regarding system adoption. In addition, the
DHS/FEMA Emergency Management Institute offers multiple online classes
that address both NIMS and basic ICS.

**Organizational Structures for Emergency Response**

Organizational structures for emergency response must be based on two
basic principles. First, the organizational structure used to respond to
everyday emergencies will form the basis of an expanded structure to
deal with disasters. Second, the local response structure must be
flexible enough to readily expand as additional external resources are
added to match the increasing agent generated and response generated
demands of the disaster. The prevailing organizational structures for
emergency response are ICS and IMS. These two organizational structures
differ, but relatively slightly.

### *Incident Command System/Incident Management System*

For many years, the federal government provided state and local
governments with criteria for evaluating their EOPs (US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980;
National Response Team, 1987, 1988; Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1988, 1990, 1996b). However, it avoided requiring---or even
recommending---a specific structure for emergency response organizations
to meet those criteria. In part, that reluctance seems to have been
based on the principle that a federal system should allow state and
local governments to meet the federal planning criteria in any way that
they deemed appropriate. Moreover, as a practical matter, state
governments across the country differ from each other in their normal
organizational structures and resources, as do local governments.
Consequently, the imposition of a single structure for emergency
response organizations might have seemed doomed to failure. The
consequence of the federal government's performance oriented (rather
than prescriptive) approach was a proliferation of organizational
structures, positional titles, resource names, and operational
procedures that sometimes impeded interjurisdictional cooperation---even
among identical emergency response agencies (e.g., fire departments)
from neighboring jurisdictions.

Following a major series of wildfires in Southern California in 1970,
fire departments joined to address the lack of a common organizational
structure, inadequate emergency assessments, poorly coordinated
planning, uncoordinated resource allocation, and inadequate interagency
communications at the incident scene. This led to the development of the
ICS, which can be summarized in terms of seven basic principles (cf.
Irwin, 1989, see also National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 1994;
National Response Team, no date). First, all jurisdictions use a common
organizational structure that encompasses standardized names and
functions for subunits (*standardization*). This includes standardized
names and duties for individual positions to make personnel from
different jurisdictions interchangeable. Second, there is a division of
labor, so each unit is assigned a specific function to perform
(*functional specificity*). Third, subunits are established to limit the
number of personnel directly supervised by each unit manager
(*manageable span of control*). This is usually five subordinates, but
the number can range from three to seven. Fourth, personnel from a given
professional discipline (e.g., police or fire) are assigned to the same
unit in the emergency response organization to facilitate teamwork and
also to simplify recordkeeping (*unit integrity*). Fifth, most incidents
are managed by a single Incident Commander (IC), but a Unified Command
team manages the emergency response when multiple agencies have
statutory authority and responsibility for a specific type of incident
(*unified command*). Sixth, senior incident managers develop action
plans that include specific, measurable objectives and evaluate their
effectiveness by monitoring the achievement of these objectives
(*management by objectives*). Seventh, the IC or Unified Command team
direct the allocation of all resources---including personnel,
facilities, vehicles, and equipment---to emergency response tasks
(*comprehensive resource management*).

Over the next decade, ICS received increasing support as a collection of
organizing rules designed to serve the needs of fire and police
departments (Kramer & Bahme, 1992). Unfortunately, the way in which ICS
was implemented tended to be region specific and, in some cases,
idiosyncratic to a single jurisdiction. By the 1980s, the fire services
in particular became concerned that responding departments needed a
common ICS to increase the effectiveness of response to larger
incidents. With funding from FEMA, FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of
Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies) developed a
version of ICS that was ultimately adopted and promoted by the FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1987). FIRESCOPE ICS is a planning
based emergency response system that combines planning functions with
the functions of an EOC. Planning and coordination is achieved by a
multiagency coordination system (MAC) that is operated by a team of
agency directors and divided into two functional tasks. The first is a
computer-based Fire Information Management System that stores fire
relevant data. The second is an operations coordination system that
implements policy devised by the MAC. The EOC component of FIRESCOPE
comprises sections that deal with issues of field operations, logistics,
planning and finance.

Although this version of ICS was tailored specifically to large scale
incidents and to the jurisdictional structure of Southern California
fire services, it was a major improvement over previous systems (Coleman
& Granito, 1988; Lesak, 1989). The basic system was very popular and
promising, but was used for several years only on major
multijurisdictional emergencies, rather than for minor fire department
incidents. With support from the National Fire Protection Association,
Brunacini (1985, 2002) adapted and enhanced the FIRESCOPE system so it
could be used as readily in small events as large ones. Brunacini
changed the command function to include specialized advisors, expanded
the operations function to include routine departmental response demands
(hazardous materials response, technical rescue, evacuation, etc.), and
included explicit connections to a municipal EOC and police incident
commanders. The advantage of this revised structure, called the Incident
Management System (IMS), was that daily use on all incidents---minor and
major---would enhance the effectiveness of the system when it needed to
be used in the rarely experienced major incidents. IMS is now widely
used in the American, Canadian, British, and Australian fire services.
For more than a decade, the Oklahoma State University Fire Services
Program and the National Fire Protection Association have provided IMS
instruction in the US and internationally. DHS is in the process of
requiring all jurisdictions to adopt the NIMS version of ICS as a
condition for reimbursement of disaster expenses. Despite this
requirement, this chapter will discuss IMS as it has been implemented by
Phoenix Fire because the differences from NIMS/IMS are not substantial.
In addition, Chapter 10 will show that both of these systems lack
adequate structures for managing large scale population protection tasks
effectively.

A principal consequence of IMS is to make all resources of the
jurisdiction available for every incident, whether it is a routine
emergency or a communitywide disaster. The resources are provided
automatically, as the IC escalates the response to meet the emerging
incident demands. The IMS itself is a field structure that can manage
resources at multiple impact scenes from an Incident Command Post. In
such cases, the IMS might not necessarily be supported by activation of
an EOC, especially in minor incidents. In disasters that are diffuse and
present no real geographic location for scene operations, the
jurisdictional EOC can assume the role of the onscene Incident Command
Post in using IMS to manage the emergency response. This would be
particularly likely in response to a terrorist attack involving a
biological agent where impacts might not be detected until long after
the attack, at which point the source might be unclear and remain the
subject of investigation.

The advantage of using the local IMS (supplemented by a jurisdictional
EOC) as the basis for emergency and disaster response lies in its
enhancement of the ability to quickly and effectively initiate emergency
operations. Thus, every incident is initially addressed by trained and
equipped emergency responders guided by an IC. These personnel are
always on duty, responding to all calls. Especially in CBR terrorist
threats, this approach reduces the chance that untrained, unprotected
responders will enter an incident scene and become casualties
themselves. Whether the incident is known to be a disaster (such as a
major flood, hurricane, or chemical plant incident) or initially appears
to be a routine incident that becomes a disaster (e.g., an emergency
call for "people down" is the first indication that terrorists have
launched a chemical attack), IMS is an organizational structure for
emergency response that is already established and can be expanded to
fit situational demands.

### *Basic IMS Principles*

The IMS as a system is built around responsibilities vested in
standardized roles rather than the idiosyncratic abilities of
individuals. The fundamental principle of IMS is that there must always
be one (and only one) IC at every incident scene. In principle, any
emergency responder may assume the role of IC. In practice, however, the
IC is usually the first arriving company officer (usually of an engine
company or ladder company) or Battalion Chief (supervisor). Thus, it is
the duty of the most senior officer who is first to arrive at the
incident scene to assume command. Once established, command may be
transferred to other more senior officers as they arrive. Figure 9-1
shows a fully implemented IMS structure that would be appropriate for a
major disaster, but IMS size and composition expand as the IC seeks to
meet incident demands. Thus, the structure begins with the assumption of
command and the designation of specialized functional units to address
the hazard at the scene. This includes responding to agent generated
demands that involve addressing the threat itself (e.g., a fire;
structural damage; victim rescue, treatment, and transportation). It
also includes dealing with response generated demands that involve
supporting the emergency responders (e.g., logistics of acquiring needed
equipment and supplies; rescue for endangered responders) and
coordinating with other agencies (e.g., communicating information about
the incident to the EOC and the public).

[**Figure 9-1**. Sample IMS Organizational Structure.]{.underline}

IMS uses the terms *sections*, *branches,* and *sectors* to describe
different sized functional groupings of personnel, equipment, and
apparatus. In Figure 9-1, *Command* is shown with five sections directly
attached to it. The five sections---*Planning*, *Operations*,
*Administration*, *Safety*, and *Logistics*---are staffed as appropriate
to the incident size and conditions. Section chiefs in the Incident
Command Post work with the Command staff to formulate an overall
emergency response strategy. The section chiefs then direct and monitor
tactical operations, whereas branch and sector officers implement
tactical operations. In a fully implemented IMS, *branches* are
established under sections and are functional tactical areas relevant to
each section. For example, Figure 9-1 shows five branches under the
operations section---transport, rescue, hazardous materials, fire, and
medical.

The naming of branches follows the specific activity they perform; the
number of branches depends upon the intensity of the demand for each of
the functions needed in the incident response. Thus, an IMS for an urban
earthquake would include a heavy rescue branch. Sectors are defined
beneath branches and execute specific tasks. Typically, sectors contain
fire companies or special teams. Branches and sectors are activated in
response to (or, better still, in anticipation of) incident demands.
Hence, in small hazardous materials incidents where few victims are
present, the medical branch would be only a single unit and is called a
medical sector. In events where there is no fire, the fire branch would
not be activated. Although basic principles of IMS are easy to grasp,
more advanced concepts provide a complex method of allocating
responsibility for response strategy, tactics, and tasks (Brunacini,
2002; Carlson, 1983).

As indicated earlier, there are some differences between IMS and ICS
structures. Under ICS, there is neither a Senior Adviser nor a Support
Officer. Instead, there is a Scientific Officer in the Command Section
and the Safety function is staffed by a single officer in the Command
Section rather than by a separate section. Moreover, ICS has only a
single Liaison Officer rather than separate police and EOC liaisons.
Finally, ICS defines Finance and Administration as two separate sections
rather than combining them as in IMS.

*IMS Implementation*

In larger incidents, the IC may be supported by a Support Officer and
Senior Advisor. Senior officers typically fill these two additional
roles within the IMS Command section as they arrive at the scene. After
assuming command, the IC establishes a command post and, throughout the
incident, performs seven activities.

-   Conduct initial situation evaluation and continual reassessments

-   Initiate, maintain, and control communications

-   Identify the incident management strategy, develop an action plan,
    and assign resources

-   Call for supplemental resources, including EOC activation

-   Develop an organizational command structure

-   Continually review, evaluate, and revise incident action plan

-   Provide for continuing, transferring, and terminating command

Through these duties, the IC develops and maintains the strategy and
resources that will be needed to terminate the incident. The Senior
Advisor and Support Officer perform duties assigned by the
IC---including reviewing, evaluating, and recommending changes to the
incident action plan. In particular, the *Senior Advisor* focuses on the
overall incident management or "big picture" issues. This officer
monitors the overall incident, evaluating possible responses to current
and future incident demands in order to determine the need for
activating additional branches or sections. The Senior Advisor also
evaluates the need for liaison with other jurisdictional departments,
outside agencies, public officials, property owners, tenants, and other
parties impacted by the incident. In addition, the *Support Officer*
provides direction related to tactical priorities, critical factors, and
safety. Thus, this officer assists with creation of tactical worksheets
(written plans) for control and accountability and evaluates the
viability of the response organization and span of control. The Support
Officer also evaluates the need for additional resources at the scene
and assigns logistics responsibilities.

When there is a major emergency or a community-wide disaster, most
jurisdictions provide for the Command staff to be supported by an
onscene *Public Information Officer* (PIO) and a *Police Liaison* to the
law enforcement command posts In addition, there is an *EOC Liaison* who
is responsible for coordination between the incident scene and the EOC.
The goal of an *Articulated Command* is to spread the functions to
specialists where possible, permit effective communication with
responders on scene and emergency authorities off scene, and allow the
IC to focus on the incident demands.

As soon as it is practical, Command establishes a *Public Information
Sector* to deal with the mass media and provide the information the
media will need to accurately report the status of the incident and the
response to it. The staff PIO directs the sector, establishes a media
area that does not impede operations (as necessary), and gathers
information about the incident. In a major incident, the onscene PIO
coordinates with the EOC PIO and PIOs of other responding agencies to
insure consistent, accurate information dissemination and to avoid
release of potentially sensitive information.

In complex incidents, particularly suspected or identified terrorist
attacks, Command assigns a *Police Liaison Sector*. A police
supervisor's presence may be requested in the Fire Command Post or
communications may be directly established with the Police Command Post.
The Police Liaison Sector deals with all activities requiring
coordination between the two departments, including (but not limited to)
traffic control, crowd control, incident scene security, evacuations,
crime scene management, and persons interfering with Fire Department
operations.

Within the IMS structure, Command delegates responsibility for
implementing its emergency response strategy to the five section chiefs.
The *Planning Section* is charged primarily with technical liaison,
forecasting incident demands, and other planning functions. The Planning
Section serves as the Incident Commander's "clearinghouse" for
information. In CBR incidents, this function is particularly critical
because specialized information from a variety of specialists (e.g.,
toxicologists and physicians) will flow to the scene, and the Planning
Section relays information from these sources to Command.

The *Operations Section* deals directly with all hazard source control
activities at the incident site. In addition, this section is
responsible for the safety and welfare of personnel working within the
section. A critical administrative duty of the Operations Section is to
establish branches that accomplish specific tasks to meet incident
demands. The Operations Section creates and oversees as many branches as
needed depending on the demands of the specific incident. Branches
typically include primary operational functions: transport, rescue,
hazmat, fire, and medical. Transport Branch is responsible for
transporting injured persons from the incident scene to hospitals for
definitive care. Rescue Branch is charged with search and rescue and
extrication of firefighters who become lost, trapped, or endangered.
This branch may oversee a potentially large number of units serving as
Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC units) commensurate with the size of the
incident. RIC units stage, at full ready, with the exclusive
responsibility of first responder rescue. In addition, an Evacuation
Branch or Sector can be created to deal with endangered citizens.

The Hazardous Materials Branch typically houses four sectors
representing the four principal functions of research, monitoring,
decontamination, and site entry. In a hazmat incident, the Hazardous
Materials Branch addresses critical response priorities; identifies the
hazard agent; designates hot, warm, and cold zones; and coordinates with
law enforcement resources for site access control and special services
(e.g. Bomb Squad or Special Weapons and Tactics). To assist in agent
identification, this branch is supported by the Planning Section,
onscene toxicology specialists (if appropriate), and other specialized
personnel operating in the EOC. An Entry Team Sector is responsible for
hot zone entry and is supported by a Backup Team Sector. The latter is
present for relief or rescue of the entry team. Although emergency
decontamination of victims can begin with the first units on scene, the
Hazardous Materials Branch assembles specialized decontamination lines
and equipment and performs technical decontamination.

Fire Branch is charged with the management and suppression of fires and,
as appropriate, operates sectors (a tactical or task level function).
Fire Branch is charged with the suppression of fire in the incident.
When fire occurs in context of other hazard agents such as explosives or
hazardous materials, Fire Branch confers with the Incident Commander to
identify priorities. In some cases, Fire Branch will operate in a
defensive posture until other hazards have been addressed and then shift
to offensive operations to extinguish fire. In the operational phase,
Fire Branch operates a safety sector that includes one company in
reserve for rapid rescue of trapped firefighters. Building related
(e.g., inside, lobby, outside) sectors are used in high rise incidents
to control access and conduct inside firefighting. Directional sectors
(e.g., north, south, roof) are established for both defensive and
offensive attacks. After the fire has been declared to be controlled and
flames are knocked down, the Overhaul Sector is established to search
for and extinguish any remaining active fire. Depending upon the
materials burning, the Overhaul Sector will remain at the site for long
periods to extinguish spontaneous combustions.

The Medical Branch coordinates the activity of sectors and/or units to
address extrication, triage, and treatment of patients. The Extrication
Sector is responsible for locating, extricating, and removing patients
to treatment areas. Triage Sector performs the initial assessment of
patient conditions and treatment needs. In hamat incidents, this
function may be performed before, simultaneously with, or after
decontamination. The toxicity of the agent determines victim assessment
and, in the case of nerve agents, the timing of antidote administration.
Triage and initial treatment may also be performed within the
Extrication Sector, depending upon the stability of the area where
patients are located. Similarly, contingent upon the agent, antidote
administration may be appropriate at the earliest moment. In such cases
treatment and extrication personnel with appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE) would begin administration prior to or during mass
decontamination. When time is not critical to survival, antidote
administration may take place at treatment areas, which can also serve
as patient collection areas. Triage tags are used to categorize patient
injuries and record treatments administered in the field. The triage tag
number also becomes the tracking mechanism for patients.

Particularly in a hazmat incident, Behavioral Health will operate as a
sector within the Medical Branch. These personnel and units may be
assigned in a variety of activities at the scene. The onscene Behavioral
Health Coordinator works through the Medical Branch Officer while
maintaining liaison with the Planning Section and the EOC (if the latter
has been activated). Behavioral Health units, with appropriate PPE, may
oversee and assist patients awaiting decontamination, during
decontamination, in treatment, and during transportation.

The Transportation Branch can expand as incident demands escalate,
typically to four sectors. Transport north and south represent different
directional movement points for ground transportation to local hospitals
or mass care facilities (usually established through the Red Cross
contact in the EOC). This movement may involve different vehicles as
appropriate to patient needs, including buses for uncontaminated or
decontaminated "walking wounded", as well as ambulances or other
vehicles obtained through the National Guard, public transit, or other
organizations. The jurisdictional fire department might operate its own
ambulance system, and formal agreements (as well as mutual and automatic
aid agreements) should be established for transport vehicles from local
EMS providers and ambulance services. The Air Sector moves patients by
rotary wing aircraft if this is safe, given the hazard agent involved
and the requirements of the patients' conditions. Finally, the NDMS
Sector prepares patients in accordance with the local NDMS plan and
moves them to the designated collection point for transport to other
locations.

The *Safety Section* is staffed by a Safety Officer who is responsible
for mobilizing this unit and maintaining safe operations at the incident
scene. This officer's primary task is to develop and implement plans for
rescue, incident scene safety practice, and environmental remediation
after emergency response operations have been terminated. In large
incidents, the Safety Officer is supported by additional personnel who
monitor reports from all incident scenes and report progress to the
Command Section. If safety observers discover a pattern of unsafe
practices, the Safety Officer is authorized to stop operations at an
incident scene.

The *Administration Section* focuses on procurement, cost recovery,
liability, and risk management. These activities involve contracting
with vendors to deliver services that cannot be provided by the
responding agencies and recording the time of use for rental equipment.
They also include establishing resource sharing agreements among
responding agencies as well as documenting casualties and property
damage to settle later claims.

The *Logistics Section* is the support mechanism for the emergency
response organization. This section oversees a variety of functions and
establishes sectors (which operate at a tactical and task level) to
execute its functions. Figure 9-1 shows four principal sectors under
Logistics: Staging, Accountability, Rehabilitation, and Resources.
Staging oversees the initial arrivals of unassigned companies (units).
Accountability tracks the units and individual crews responding to an
incident to insure their safety. The Rehabilitation Sector is
responsible for the monitoring and care of deployed personnel,
addressing both physical and psychological ability to function
effectively. This sector uses specialized equipment and also provides
food, fluids, and debriefing for personnel. Finally, the Resource Sector
oversees all equipment and apparatus, provides any needed communications
equipment, and handles repairs and resupply. In a hazmat incident, this
sector will be responsible for supervising the movement of antidotes,
other pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and equipment from local
jurisdictional caches to the scene.

In summary, the IMS is a flexible structure for organizing emergency
response. Its value lies in the close linkage between emergency plans
and emergency response operations. To adequately plan for a threat, it
is imperative that the emergency response organization adapt to the
specific demands of each incident. The IMS both reflects and directs the
capabilities of the organizations that respond to the incident, so
planning processes that account for the local IMS have greater
flexibility and a greater likelihood of being successfully implemented
in the field. The principal advantage of IMS over the earlier ICS is
that it provides for a better accounting of the activities that must be
performed away from the incident scene. For example, IMS explicitly
addresses activities such as warning, evacuation, and mass care of
victims that are not addressed within ICS. Unfortunately, these
activities must all be addressed by the Operations Section. For example,
an Evacuation Branch (staffed by either police or fire personnel, or
both) would be established to coordinate the movement of people from
risk areas adjacent to the scene and coordinate information releases to
the public through the onscene PIO. However, this arrangement requires
the Operations Chief at an incident scene to be responsible for branches
or sectors that s/he cannot supervise directly (because they are in
other locations). Moreover, assignment of these activities to the
Operations Chief has the potential for violating the principle of
manageable span of control if s/he must supervise warning, evacuation,
and mass care branches in addition to transport, rescue, hazmat, fire,
and medical branches. Unfortunately, there has been no empirical
research on the effectiveness of IMS or ICS as an organizing mechanism
for incident command. In part, this situation exists because there is no
formally structured alternative command system to which it might be
compared. There have been attempts to adapt the IMS more directly to
EOCs, but these efforts have been descriptive rather than data based
(Perry, 1995). Ultimately, the use of IMS rests upon the intuitive
strength of the assumption that implementing the seven basic principles
will yield more effective incident management.

**Acquisition and Maintenance of Emergency Response Resources**

To support the emergency response organization, emergency managers must
acquire and maintain the resources needed for effective operations. This
includes the construction and equipping of EOCs and the acquisition and
maintenance of equipment.

*Emergency Operations Centers*

EOCs are facilities that provide technical assistance to emergency
responders at the scene of an incident. EOCs, which are permanently
located in areas expected to be safe from hazard exposures, provide
support for the performance of emergency response functions at the
incident scene. An EOC is important because the resources needed to
respond to an incident are often widely dispersed, so the specific
resources needed to respond to a particular type of incident at a given
location cannot be predicted with certainty in advance. Moreover, many
organizations participate in the incident response and each organization
must have a capability for obtaining and processing timely information
about the incident. This capability is established by collocation of
essential personnel with telecommunications and information processing
equipment in an EOC that will provide an effective division of labor
while maintaining coordination of action. Lessons learned in previous
incidents suggest that considerable decisionmaking authority should be
allocated to organizations close to the incident site because of their
superior knowledge of local conditions. However, greater technical
knowledge and resources generally are available at higher levels. Thus,
close coordination is needed among organizations at all levels.

A jurisdiction's EOC should be sited at a location that provides ready
access by those who are essential to a timely and effective emergency
response. This includes both those who have technical knowledge as well
as those with policymaking responsibilities. In the case of a
transportation incident, an IC establishes a Command Post at the
incident scene and maintains regular communication with the local EOC
(if necessary). In addition, the Incident Command Post directs the
emergency response by coordinating the activities of field teams from
the shipper or carrier with local government response teams such as fire
fighters who are attempting to terminate the emergency and minimize
population exposures.

An EOC must be designed with enough space to house to support the
emergency response functions that take place within it. Moreover, it
must provide a layout that places its staff in close proximity to the
equipment, information, and materials they need. Previous guidance and
practice (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1984; Lindell, et al.,
1982; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1981) indicates EOC designers
must perform the following tasks:

1.  Establish the EOC design team.

2.  Analyze the organization of the EOC.

3.  Assess the flows of resources associated with each position.

4.  Determine the workstation requirements for each position.

5.  Assess the environmental conditions needed to support each position.

6.  Determine the space needs for each position.

7.  Develop a conceptual design for the EOC.

8.  Document the design basis for the EOC.

During Task 1, a design team should be established that contains
expertise from emergency preparedness, information technology,
ergonomics, and architecture. The design team should interview
representatives of all functional teams that will work within the EOC to
obtain the information needed to develop the design basis. During Step
2, the design team should examine the EOP and its accompanying
procedures to determine what are the functional teams into which the EOC
is organized, the positions to be staffed within each team, and how the
positions are related to one another. In addition, the design team
should assess the flows of resources associated with each
position---especially the flows of information. Static information such
as EOPs, plant layouts, evacuation route locations, and air infiltration
rates for local residential structures can be gathered ahead of time and
stored for easy retrieval. Dynamic information about the status of
hazard conditions (e.g., flood forecasts, hazmat facility conditions)
must be collected from the appropriate sources, routed to those who need
it, and processed quickly and accurately to support critical decisions.
Both static and dynamic information can be conveyed in three different
formats---verbal (words), numeric (numbers), or graphic (pictures or
figures). The inherent difficulty in transmitting some types of
information (especially graphic information) can combine with the volume
of information transmitted (especially large tables of numbers) to
severely strain the capacity of EOC staff to perform their functions
unless advanced telecommunication technologies such as electronic mail
and computer based information displays are used to manage the flow.

The flow of materials generally is not very significant unless paper is
the medium by which information is conveyed. Similarly, equipment flows
generally are minimal in dedicated EOCs although they can be significant
if the EOC is located in a space that normally is used for another
purpose (e.g., a conference room). However, flows of personnel are very
intense during the EOC's initial activation and shift changes. Moreover,
some positions require a considerable amount of movement. For example,
many emergency organizations have analysis teams whose leaders link
their teams with an Executive Team or Emergency Director (e.g., mayor or
city manager), so the team leaders need to move back and forth between
groups. Because of this frequent movement, EOCs must be designed to
ensure the team leaders remain informed about events that take place in
one group when they are with the other group, yet do not disrupt others
as they move back and forth.

During Step 3, the Design Team should identify the workstation
requirements for each position, especially for vertical storage space,
horizontal workspace, and the number of personnel using them
concurrently. It is advisable to provide seating and, in some cases,
work surfaces, whose height can be adjusted readily to accommodate
differences in workers' body dimensions. Similarly, keyboard heights and
computer viewing angles also should be adjustable.

During Step 4, the Design Team should assess the environmental
conditions needed to support each position. All positions within the EOC
are likely to have similar needs for heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning, but there can be significant differences in the need for
lighting and noise suppression. Variation in lighting needs can be
accommodated by providing locally controllable task lighting, and noise
suppression can be achieved with acoustically absorbent material. During
Step 5, the design team should determine the space needs for each
position. The space needed for each position will be determined largely
by the amount of horizontal workspace and also by the requirement for
circulation space (the area needed for people to move about freely in
the work area). Variation in the staffing needs for different types of
incidents generally requires a design that provides flexibility in space
allocation from one activation to another. In most cases, this
flexibility can be provided by open space designs with moveable
partitions between team areas.

During Step 6, the design team's architect can use the information flow
to construct an adjacency matrix, which describes the degree to which
each of the EOC teams needs to be located in close proximity to each of
the other teams. The adjacency matrix, together with the information
from the space analysis, can be used to develop an idealized layout. In
most case, this idealized layout must be adapted to the physical
constraints of an existing building in which the EOC will be
constructed. During Step 7, the Design Team should prepare a design
basis document that summarizes the results of their analyses and the
resulting design. This document should be reviewed by those responsible
for the EOC's operations and by a committee representing each team that
will staff the EOC. This review will provide an opportunity for users to
verify the accuracy of the design basis and to provide a benchmark
against which subsequent proposals for EOC renovations can be assessed.

# *Equipment Acquisition and Maintenance*

Each agency should identify the equipment it needs to perform its
assigned tasks, paying special attention to tasks that are only
performed during emergencies. Special purpose equipment that is not used
routinely will require personnel to be trained and periodically tested
in its proper use. In addition, such equipment might need periodic
preventive maintenance, battery checks, and recalibration. An emergency
manager should maintain a computer database of emergency-relevant
equipment that is owned by the jurisdiction. To provide a capability for
rapid search during an emergency, this database should contain fields
listing the euipment's name, model and manufacturer, names and contact
numbers for personnel authorizing release of the equipment, names, and
contact numbers for qualified operators, contact numbers for repairs,
and critical dates such as preventive maintenance, battery check, and
recalibration.

**EOP Development and Implementation**

For many years, the federal government provided state and local
governments with criteria for evaluating their EOPs. Some of this
guidance was developed for specific hazards such as nuclear power plants
and toxic chemical incidents whereas other guidance had an all hazards
approach. The guidance for chemical hazards (National Response Team,
1987, 1988) appears to have been derived from the earlier guidance for
radiological hazards (Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1980), but there are marked differences between the
guidance for these two hazards, on the one hand, and the all hazards
guidance on the other (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996b). Of
course, no emergency manager wants to develop one EOP for
chemical/radiological incidents and another EOP for all other hazards.
Consequently, the presentation below attempts to integrate these two
different sources of guidance for EOP development.

## EOP Components

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (1996) *State and Local Guide*
(SLG-101) advocates structuring EOPs in terms of four basic components

-   A basic plan,

-   Functional annexes,

-   Hazard-specific appendices, and

-   SOPs and checklists.

*Basic Plan*

The basic plan should describe the EOP's

-   Purpose,

-   Situation and assumptions,

-   Concept of operations,

-   Organization and assignment of responsibilities,

-   Administration and logistics,

-   Plan development and maintenance, and

-   Authorities and references.

The *purpose* states what the EOP is supposed to do and briefly
summarizes the basic plan, functional annexes, and hazard-specific
appendices. The *situation and assumptions* briefly reviews the
information developed in the jurisdiction's HVA and describes any
policies that limit the authority of the emergency response
organization. The *concept of operations* provides a narrative
describing the sequence of emergency response activities, beginning with
activation upon notification of emergency conditions, continuing through
hazard operations to combat the hazard agent and population protection
activities to save lives, and ending with deactivation upon termination
of the emergency. The *organization and assignment of responsibilities*
describes the structure of the emergency response organization and
explains which agency, NGO, or private sector organization is
responsible for each emergency response function. The *administration
and logistics* section describes policies for expanding the emergency
response organization through mutual aid, and incorporation of
volunteers. It also addresses policies for identifying resource needs,
expedited acquisition of additional resources, tracking resources
allocation, and payment or other compensation. The *plan development and
maintenance* section defines the provisions for reviewing, exercising,
and updating the EOP. The *authorities and references* section addresses
the legal and administrative basis for the EOP and refers the reader to
other documents, such as the HVA and departmental SOPs for further
details.

In addition, the first page of every plan should contain the date of the
original plan and the dates of all plan revisions arranged
chronologically. Typically, copies of EOPs are provided to multiple
offices and organizations (some inside and some outside a jurisdiction).
Emergency managers must ensure all people and organizations on the plan
distribution list have the most current version of the document.

*Functional Annexes*

The definition of the functional annexes is a problematic aspect of
writing an EOP. SLG-101 lists direction and control, communications,
warning, emergency public information, evacuation, mass care, health and
medical, and resource management as the eight core functions that
emergency response organizations perform. This appears to be a
reasonable list but, as Table 9-4 indicates, it is inconsistent with
federal guidance for nuclear power plants (NUREG-0654) and chemical
incidents (NRT-1). Moreover, as will be discussed later, the core
functions proposed in federal planning guidance are inconsistent with
the basic functions defined in the Incident Command System and Incident
Management System. Fortunately, local jurisdictions still retain the
authority to decide how they will define these emergency response
functions in their EOPs. Thus, a jurisdiction can organize its EOP in
the way that is most compatible with its normal organizational
structure. Nonetheless, local jurisdictions that favor the NUREG/NRT
function definitions will tend to be most compatible with the emergency
response organizations for nuclear power plants and chemical shippers
and carriers. Similarly, local jurisdictions that favor the ICS/IMS
function definitions will have the greatest compatibility with external
fire and law enforcement agencies providing support under mutual aid
agreements.

Whatever typology a jurisdiction uses for defining its EOP annexes, the
set of annexes must collectively address all disaster demands. Thus, the
emergency manager must provide coordination among those writing the
annexes. It is especially important for those who must implement an
annex to be the ones who write it. In most cases, a single organization
will have responsibility for an entire annex (e.g., the fire department
will write the fire annex), but multiple organizations may need to
collaborate in other cases (Mass Care). Each annex should address the
federal Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) from the National Response
Plan that would be expected to provide support to that annex (see the
appendix at the end of this chapter).

*Hazard-Specific Appendices*

Hazard-specific appendixes provide information about the ways in which
the response to a particular hazard agent differs from the standard
response to community emergencies. It is important to avoid confusing
specific types of threats (such as terrorist attacks) with general
emergency response functions. Terrorist attacks can involve any one of
four types of hazard agents---flammables/explosives, chemicals,
nuclear/radiological materials, or biohazards. Each of these is a
specific hazard that will require substantial adjustments to some
emergency response procedures (e.g., emergency assessment) and much
smaller adjustments to others (e.g., incident management). Thus,
terrorist attacks should be addressed in hazard-specific appendixes, not
functional annexes.

*SOPs and Checklists*

SOPs and checklists describe the steps that individuals and
organizations will take to perform specific emergency response tasks.
Some of these may be included in the EOP whereas others may simply be
referenced.

*Training and Exercising*

All personnel who are expected to participate in the jurisdiction's
emergency response need to be trained to perform their assigned tasks.
In addition, they should participate in periodic refresher training to
ensure their knowledge and skills remain current. In general, the
highest priority should be given to tasks that are *infrequent,
critical,* and *difficult to perform*. Training is needed for
infrequently performed tasks because people's knowledge and skill decay
over time. Training is needed for critical tasks because the cost of an
error is high. Training is needed for tasks that are difficult to
perform because these are the ones for which skill decay is most rapid.
There is increasing recognition that people must be trained to perform
both taskwork and teamwork (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; McIntyre &
Salas, 1995). *Taskwork* involves the performance of positional duties.
For example, a hazmat technician must be trained to don personal
protective equipment, patch and plug leaky containers, replace defective
valves, and conduct decontaminations (in addition to many other tasks).
Training for taskwork usually involves cross-training to develop
interpositional knowledge (teaching one team member how to perform
another team member's job) and explaining the emergency response
organization's overall concept of operations to all emergency
responders.

Another consequence of the infrequent occurrence of disasters is not
possible to evaluate emergency responders' performance frequently.
Accordingly, emergency management agencies schedule periodic drills and
exercises to test performance and critiques to provide feedback. These
topics will be discussed more completely in Chapter 12.

**Table 9-4**. Typologies of Emergency Response Functions.

+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
| Organiz | Organizational | NRT-1         | ICS        | Local Plan |
| ational |                |               | Functions  | Annexes    |
| Fu      | Subfunctions   | Functions     |            |            |
| nctions |                |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
| Em      |                |               |            |            |
| ergency |                |               |            |            |
| ass     |                |               |            |            |
| essment |                |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Threat         | Ongoing       |            |            |
|         | detec          | incident      |            |            |
|         | tion/emergency | assessment    |            |            |
|         | classification |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Hazard/        | Ongoing       | Planning   |            |
|         |                | incident      |            |            |
|         | environmental  | assessment    |            |            |
|         | monitoring     |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Population     |               |            |            |
|         | monitoring and |               |            |            |
|         | assessment     |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Damage         |               |            | Recovery   |
|         | assessment     |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
| Hazard  |                |               |            |            |
| ope     |                |               |            |            |
| rations |                |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Hazard source  | Containment   | Operations | Fi         |
|         | control        | and cleanup   |            | refighting |
|         |                |               |            | *or*       |
|         |                |               |            | Fi         |
|         |                |               |            | re/rescue; |
|         |                |               |            | Hazmat/Oil |
|         |                |               |            | spill      |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Protection     | Public works  | Operations | Public     |
|         | works          |               |            | works/     |
|         |                |               |            | E          |
|         |                |               |            | ngineering |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Building       |               | Operations |            |
|         | construction   |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Contents       |               | Operations |            |
|         | protection     |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         |                |               | Operations | Utilities  |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
| Pop     |                |               |            |            |
| ulation |                |               |            |            |
| pro     |                |               |            |            |
| tection |                |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Protective     |               |            |            |
|         | action         |               |            |            |
|         | selection      |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Population     | Warning       |            | Warning    |
|         | warning        | systems and   |            |            |
|         |                | emergency     |            |            |
|         |                | public        |            |            |
|         |                | notification  |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Protective     | Personal      |            | E          |
|         | action         | protection of |            | vacuation/ |
|         | implementation | citizens      |            | Trans      |
|         |                |               |            | portation; |
|         |                |               |            | Ra         |
|         |                |               |            | diological |
|         |                |               |            | protection |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Impact zone    | Law           |            | Law        |
|         | access         | enforcement   |            | e          |
|         | co             |               |            | nforcement |
|         | ntrol/security |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Reception/care | Human         |            | Sh         |
|         | of victims     | services      |            | elter/Mass |
|         |                |               |            | care;      |
|         |                |               |            | Human      |
|         |                |               |            | services   |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Search &       | Fire and      |            | Search &   |
|         | rescue         | rescue        |            | rescue     |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Emergency      | Health and    |            | Heal       |
|         | medical care   | medical       |            | th/Medical |
|         |                |               |            | services   |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Hazard         | Response      |            |            |
|         | exposure       | personnel     |            |            |
|         | control        | safety        |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
| I       |                |               |            |            |
| ncident |                |               |            |            |
| man     |                |               |            |            |
| agement |                |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Agency         | Initial       |            | Warning    |
|         | notification/  | notification  |            |            |
|         |                | of response   |            |            |
|         | mobilization   | agencies      |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Mobilization   |               | Planning   |            |
|         | of emergency   |               |            |            |
|         | facili         |               |            |            |
|         | ties/equipment |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Communication/ | Responder     |            | Direction  |
|         | documentation  | c             |            | & control  |
|         |                | ommunications |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Ana            |               | Planning   |            |
|         | lysis/planning |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Internal       | Direction and | Command    | Com        |
|         | direction &    | control       |            | munication |
|         | control        |               |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Public         | Public        | Command    | Emergency  |
|         | information    | information/  |            | public     |
|         |                | Community     |            | i          |
|         |                | relations     |            | nformation |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Finance/       | Resource      | Planning;  | Resource   |
|         |                | management    | logistics; | management |
|         | administration |               | fin        |            |
|         |                |               | ance/admin |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | Logistics      |               | Logistics  | Donations  |
|         |                |               |            | management |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         | External       | Direction and | Command    |            |
|         | coordination   | control       |            |            |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+
|         |                |               |            | Legal      |
+---------+----------------+---------------+------------+------------+

**Emergency Preparedness by Households and Businesses, and Government
Agencies**

Research on household emergency preparedness has been conducted on a
variety of hazard agents (especially earthquakes and hurricanes) and has
yielded consistent findings across studies that have been summarized
recently in the Protective Action Decision Model discussed in Chapter 4.
Specifically, there is evidence that people have become increasingly
aware of hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness actions they can
take to protect themselves from environmental hazards (Lindell & Perry,
2000), but awareness of hazard adjustments does not imply accuracy of
risk area residents' beliefs about them. For example, Kunreuther, et al.
(1978) found most non-policyholders who were aware earthquake insurance
coverage was available could not provide an accurate estimate of its
cost. A quarter of them were unable to give *any* estimate of the
premium and most of the rest overestimated premium rates (see also Palm,
Hodgson, Blanchard & Lyons, 1990).

Information derived from others is important because disasters occur so
infrequently that it is difficult to learn by trial and error from
personal experience. Researchers have examined two sources of social
influence---peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers) and the
mass media---and found evidence that both types are associated with
seismic adjustment. In particular, Mileti and O\'Brien (1992) found
adoption of seismic adjustments immediately after the Loma Prieta
earthquake was significantly related to information quality
(specificity, consistency, and source certainty) and information
reinforcement (number of warnings). Similarly, Mileti and Fitzpatrick
(1992) found significant effects for frequency of information receipt,
message specificity, and source consistency in their study of the
Parkfield prediction. More recently, Mileti and Darlington's (1995,
1997) study of the effects of a hazard awareness campaign in the San
Francisco Bay area found that respondents had engaged in a large number
of seismic adjustments. Many of these were adopted before the campaign,
but even more were undertaken in the following year. For example,
emergency equipment storage rose from 50% to 81%, food and water
stockpiling increased from 44% to 75%, and earthquake insurance
purchases went from 27% to 40%. Mileti and Darlington (1997) reported
adoption of these and other adjustments was positively correlated with
the number of information channels and the presence of response
guidance.

Emergency preparedness by businesses and government agencies suffers
from many of the same limitations as was observed among households.
Environmental hazards have low salience until an imminent threat arises,
so emergency preparedness (and hazard mitigation) must compete with
routine demands for space on the organizational agenda. This tendency is
especially pronounced in organizations with limited financial assets.
Generalizing from research in the broader literature on implementation
indicates emergency preparedness programs are difficult to implement
because emergency management tends to be viewed as an intractable
problem; disaster reduction policies lack clear and measurable
performance objectives; jurisdictions have insufficient resources;
public and official support is minimal; and higher levels of government
fail to provide sufficient emergency management guidance to local
jurisdictions (Waugh, 1988).

A basic problem is that only a very few organizations are specifically
evaluated on their preparedness to continue operations after disaster
strikes---known as *continuity of government (COG)* and *continuity of
operations (COO)*. COG deals with the measures that assure government
survives during and after a disaster---the survival of the basic
elements of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government. COO addresses the measures ensuring organizations can
deliver essential services during and following a disaster. In the case
of government, this includes services such as tax assessment, official
records, and human services. Few organizations prepare for the need to
continue operations following disasters when they are called upon to
meet "normal" demands (Anthony, l994; Cooke, l995; Wolensky & Wolensky,
l990). As with households, disaster is only a vague threat that "ought
to be addressed someday" when more resources are available.

Federal agencies and the federal government are required by statute,
Presidential Decision Directive 67, and Executive Order 12656 to
establish both continuity of government and continuity of operations
plans. Federal Preparedness Circulars 65, 66 and 67
(www.app1.fema.gov/library/ libfpc_a.htm) lay out specific guidance for
executives and emergency planners regarding plan development and
content, training and exercise requirements and the acquisition of
alternate facilities for continuity of operations. The US General
Services Administration (2002) maintains a COO plan template
(www.gsa.gov) for use by federal planners.

COG and COO plans both have nine major elements:

-   Concepts of operations are guided by the jurisdiction emergency
    plan.

-   Essential functions are identified and prioritized.

-   Unambiguous lines of succession for executives are specified.

-   Authority delegations and emergency decision-makers are
    predetermined.

-   EOCs and alternate work facilities are identified.

-   Interoperable communications are established.

-   Security is enhanced for personnel, facilities, and critical
    resources.

-   Vital records and databases are protected.

-   Schedules of training and exercises are maintained.

Comparatively little research attention has been devoted to COO
preparedness among agencies lacking emergency response functions
(Lindell & Meier, l994). Virtually all of the existing research on such
agencies has been conducted on municipal and county organizations. Three
factors have been consistently identified as correlates of COO
preparedness, the first of which is organizational size (Quarantelli,
1981a; Quarantelli, 1984). The explanation for this correlation is
larger organizations have more resources and are also likely to have a
greater perceived need for strategic planning, (Gillespie & Streeter,
1987; Banerjee & Gillespie, l994; Lindell, et al., l996a). Second, the
level of perceived risk among organizational and department managers is
positively correlated with emergency preparedness (Mileti, l983, Mileti
& Sorensen, l987; Drabek, l990). Finally, the extent to which managers
report seeking information about environmental hazards is positively
correlated with organizational preparedness (Lindell, et al., l996a;
Barlow, l993; Stallings, l978). Perry and Lindell (l997c) assembled
these factors into a model predicting earthquake preparedness by
municipal and county departments. The three variables ultimately
explained about two thirds of the variance in earthquake preparedness,
with risk perception and self reported information-seeking behavior
being the most important of the variables.

FEMA (no date, c) has developed an *Emergency Management Guide for
Business & Industry* that outlines a COO planning process, identifies
critical corporate emergency management functions, provides information
about a variety of hazards, and lists sources to contact for further
information. However, few research studies have examined the degree to
which businesses have implemented the recommended activities and most of
that research focused on limited samples of organizations. For example,
Drabek (1991c, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c) studied tourist oriented firms,
whereas Whitney, Dickerson, and Lindell (2001) studied hospitals, and
Quarantelli, et al. (1979), Gabor (1981), and Lindell and Perry (1998)
examined hazardous materials handlers. It is only more recently that
researchers have conducted research on large, representative samples of
business organizations (Dahlhamer & D'Souza, 1997; Mileti, et al., 1993;
Nigg, 1995; Webb, Tierney & Dahlhamer, 2000, 2002).

The available research shows businesses display limited levels of COO
preparedness. Drabek (1994a) found only 31% of the businesses in his
survey of 185 tourist oriented firms had adequate levels of evacuation
preparedness. Fewer than half of the businesses Mileti, et al. (1993)
interviewed in the San Francisco Bay Area had developed emergency plans,
trained employees, and conducted drills---despite this area's experience
in the Loma Prieta earthquake only a few years earlier. A study
conducted in Memphis and Des Moines found low levels of business
emergency preparedness---businesses in Memphis had implemented an
average of only 4 out of 17 recommended preparedness activities and
those in Des Moines had implemented an average of only 1.7 out of 13
measures (Dahlhamer & D\'Souza, 1997).

As is the case for government agencies, the most consistent variable
predicting business emergency preparedness is organizational size. The
Quarantelli, et al. (1979) study of chemical companies reported larger
companies had more extensive planning processes than smaller ones, a
finding replicated in Lindell and Perry's (1998) study of Los Angeles
hazardous materials handling firms following the 1994 Northridge
earthquake. Increasing size was also associated with evacuation planning
in tourist oriented firms (Drabek, 1991c, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c) and
Dahlhamer and D'Souza (1997) reported a positive correlation between
size and preparedness.

As is the case for households, there does seem to be a positive
relationship of disaster experience with business emergency preparedness
(Dahlhamer & Reshaur, 1996; Dahlhamer & D'Souza, 1997; Webb, Tierney &
Dahlhamer, 2000). In addition, other organizational characteristics such
as business age, scope (local vs. national) and type have also been
found to correlate with emergency preparedness, but the findings across
studies are inconsistent.