Before the

**NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION**

Washington, D.C. 20230

In the Matter of )

)

Market for Satellite )

Communications and the ) Docket No. 990405086-9086-01

Role of Intergovernmental )

Satellite Organizations )

**COMMENTS OF COMSAT CORPORATION**

COMSAT Corporation ("COMSAT"), the U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT and the
former U.S. Signatory to the now fully privatized Inmarsat, hereby
submits its comments in response to the Notice released by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") of the
Department of Commerce in the above-captioned proceeding.

In its Notice (which was issued in connection with a reporting
requirement imposed by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998[^1]), NTIA requests "an assessment of progress
toward fulfilling a pro-competitive privatization of \[INTELSAT and
Inmarsat\]."[^2] The Notice also requests public comment on "the
advantages, in terms of immunities, market access, or otherwise, in the
countries or regions served by INTELSAT and Inmarsat, \[and\] the
reasons for such advantages\[.\]"[^3]

As set forth in detail below, Inmarsat was fully privatized consistent
with U.S. competition objectives on April 15, 1999, and INTELSAT is
making significant progress toward a pro-competitive privatization. In
the meantime, INTELSAT, as an intergovernmental organization ("IGO"),
continues to enjoy certain privileges and immunities. At present,
neither this factor nor any other so-called IGO "advantage" has any
adverse effect on competition in the United States, because INTELSAT
does not offer services directly in the United States; rather, COMSAT
offers the capacity it owns on the INTELSAT system in the U.S. market.
Unlike INTELSAT, COMSAT is not immune from U.S. taxation or from the
jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust, securities, or FCC regulators in the
provision of these services. COMSAT is a publicly-traded U.S. company
that is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and
is fully subject to U.S. laws.

**I.** **An Assessment of the Privatization Process**

**A. Inmarsat**

Inmarsat is no longer an intergovernmental organization, but rather a
private corporation licensed in the United Kingdom. The privatization of
Inmarsat was conducted in full conformity with U.S. policy to ensure
that it would be pro-competitive. Moreover, the U.K.'s commitments under
the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement will further ensure that the
privatized Inmarsat operates in a pro-competitive manner.

All of the assets and liabilities of the former Inmarsat IGO were
transferred to a new operating company, Inmarsat Ltd., on April 15,
1999.[^4] Inmarsat Ltd. is wholly owned by a holding company, Inmarsat
Holdings, Ltd., which is a private limited company organized under the
laws of England. As of the date of the asset transfer, the former
Signatories to Inmarsat became shareholders in Inmarsat Holdings. Each
former Signatory was assigned shares in the new company proportionate to
the size of its former investment share in the IGO. Inmarsat Holdings
will be publicly traded and is expected to have an initial public
offering ("IPO") within approximately two years after the asset
transfer. The exact timing of the IPO will be determined based on market
conditions and the advice of investment bankers.[^5]

The new operating company, Inmarsat Ltd., is fully subject to all rules
and regulations governing commercial communications companies in the
United Kingdom. Its space station facilities are licensed by the U.K.
government in accordance with the U.K. Outer Space Act. Both Inmarsat
Holdings and Inmarsat Ltd. have

fiduciary boards of directors, and neither has any privileges or
immunities of any kind. They are subject to the same laws as other
companies in the U.K. and Europe, and will also be subject to all
applicable U.S. laws to the extent they operate in the United
States.[^6]

Pursuant to a Land Earth Station Operators ("LESO") Agreement, COMSAT
(along with numerous other former Signatories) has a non-exclusive right
to provide mobile satellite services using Inmarsat Ltd.'s existing
satellites. COMSAT no longer has the exclusive right to provide space
segment for traffic originating in the United States.[^7]

A small, residual intergovernmental organization has been retained to
administer at arms length a contractual relationship with Inmarsat Ltd.
to provide space segment capacity for Global Maritime Distress and
Safety Services ("GMDSS").[^8] Since GMDSS is offered without charge
(like 911 service), the existence of a thriving commercial company is
essential to ensure that GMDSS remains available. The residual entity
was developed with the

support of the U.S. and is comprised of governments only. There is no
signatory role and COMSAT has no status in the residual entity.

The privatization of Inmarsat is the result of years of effort by
COMSAT, Inmarsat, the U.S. government, and other Parties and Signatories
to change the structure of the IGO into a form more suitable to conduct
commercial business in a competitive marketplace. Inmarsat Ltd. now has
the financial flexibility, rapid decision-making governance and
commercial orientation necessary to succeed in a highly competitive
environment.

**B. INTELSAT and New Skies**

INTELSAT privatization is also making progress. In March 1998, the
INTELSAT Assembly of Parties agreed to divest a portion of INTELSAT's
assets (consisting of five satellites in orbit and one under
construction) and transfer them to a new, fully independent private
commercial satellite company.[^9] That company was subsequently
incorporated in the Netherlands as New Skies Satellites N.V. ("New
Skies"). The transfer of assets to New Skies was completed in November
1998.[^10] A board of directors has been elected, a CEO and other senior
managers have been appointed, and the company is now fully operational.

INTELSAT and New Skies are prohibited from having any common officers,
directors or employees. While INTELSAT initially provided some
transitional services to New Skies pursuant to contract, most of those
arrangements have ended and New Skies is now primarily managing its
affairs internally. New Skies has no privileges and immunities. Further,
to address any concerns about links between INTELSAT and New Skies, both
INTELSAT and its Signatories agreed to waive their immunity with respect
to any dealings between INTELSAT and New Skies. In addition, the member
nations of INTELSAT agreed as part of this restructuring that all
satellite service providers, consistent with national law and
international obligations, would receive fair and non-discriminatory
treatment in their markets.[^11]

The current owners of New Skies are INTELSAT signatories whose initial
ownership was proportionate to their ownership in INTELSAT as of the
date of the asset transfer. However, New Skies is committed to an IPO
that will bring in substantial external ownership. Initially, that IPO
had been targeted to occur by the end of 1999, but because of market
conditions and uncertainty in obtaining market access authorization in
the U.S., New Skies now anticipates that an IPO is likely to take place
early in 2000.[^12]

According to the investment bankers that New Skies has consulted, there
are three prerequisites for a successful IPO of New Skies. First, New
Skies must become a self-sufficient company independent of INTELSAT.
Second, New Skies must show revenue growth over a meaningful period of
time. Third, New Skies must formulate a long-range business to
demonstrate future growth. New Skies' management has undertaken to
satisfy all three prerequisites by the end of this year, so that an IPO
can be initiated as early as the first quarter of next year. However,
this is highly dependent on New Skies obtaining unconstrained access to
the U.S. market, which so far has not occurred. The timing of an IPO is
also dependent on external factors, such as the state of the economy
generally and of the satellite sector in particular.[^13]

Significantly, at the time of the decision to create what became New
Skies, there was broad-based recognition by INTELSAT's member nations
that this would constitute only the first step in reforming
INTELSAT.[^14] Since then, there has been overwhelming support for full
privatization of INTELSAT's remaining assets. Most recently, on April 9,
1999, INTELSAT's 29th Meeting of Signatories unanimously endorsed the
privatization of INTELSAT. The Signatories called on INTELSAT Management
and the Board of Governors to perform the necessary studies that will
enable the Board in September 1999 to recommend a single option for full
privatization to the October 1999 Assembly of Parties, so that a
decision to implement the preferred option can be made during the fourth
quarter of 2000.[^15]

In addition to establishing a timetable for privatization, the
Signatories identified several core principles that should govern any
privatization program. First, global connectivity should be preserved;
INTELSAT's lifeline users should not be cut off from the communications
services they rely on to remain connected to the rest of the world.
Second, the privatization process should adhere to the principles and
practices of fair competition. Third, privatization must occur in a
manner that ensures the competitiveness and commercial viability of the
privatized entity; INTELSAT should be privatized in a manner that
maximizes value for customers and investors. Fourth, there should be no
more division of INTELSAT's assets; further privatization should
encompass the entire organization.[^16]

While it is not yet clear precisely which form of restructuring INTELSAT
will adopt, two models are currently under development. Both envision
the complete privatization of INTELSAT's assets, the elimination of
privileges and immunities, and the subsequent dilution of Signatory
ownership of the privatized entity.

Under the first privatization model being considered, all of INTELSAT's
assets would be transferred to a privatized successor entity, but a
residual IGO would remain in place. The residual IGO would be modeled on
the residual Inmarsat and would exist for the sole purpose of ensuring
that INTELSAT preserves global connectivity and continues to serve all
lifeline users on a commercial basis. The residual IGO would not
function as a provider of space segment, and the role of Signatories
would cease to exist.[^17]

The second privatization model being considered also calls for all of
INTELSAT's assets to be transferred to a privatized successor entity.
However, under this approach, no residual IGO would remain in place.
Instead, the privatized entity's corporate structure would include a
mechanism for ensuring global connectivity and service to lifeline
users. This mechanism might be manifested in the articles and bylaws of
the privatized entity or through individual contracts, special voting
rights or special board procedures.[^18]

INTELSAT is also considering an approach which combines these two models
by using the first as a transition to the second. In any event, there is
general agreement that the structure and governance of an IGO are not a
suitable means of responding to competition in today's marketplace.
Indeed, it appears likely that an agreement in principle to privatize
the remainder of INTELSAT can be reached as early as this year, and that
privatization can be completed by January 1, 2002, or even sooner.
COMSAT is fully engaged with the U.S. government in ensuring a
pro-competitive outcome.

**II. An assessment of alleged IGO advantages**

**A. Privileges and immunities**

INTELSAT and Inmarsat were formed in 1963 and 1978, respectively, as
internationally-owned cooperatives to provide satellite communications
on a worldwide basis. The Communications Satellite Act and the
International Maritime Telecommunications Act designated COMSAT as the
sole U.S. participant in INTELSAT and Inmarsat.[^19]

The INTELSAT Agreement and Inmarsat Convention established the two
entities as intergovernmental organizations and required all member
nations (including the United States) to grant them appropriate
privileges and immunities.[^20] In the case of INTELSAT, which is
headquartered in the United States, these privileges and immunities were
also guaranteed by a Headquarters Agreement between INTELSAT and the
U.S. government.[^21] Following the passage of the Anti-Bribery Act, the
Secretary of State

(acting upon authority delegated from the President) designated the
INTELSAT Agreement and the Headquarters Agreement as "international
agreements to which the United States is a party" which require the
United States to continue to afford INTELSAT immunity from suit and
legal process.[^22] In addition, the President has previously designated
both INTELSAT and Inmarsat as international organizations entitled to
the privileges and immunities afforded by the International
Organizations Immunities Act.[^23]

Inmarsat is now fully privatized and no longer has any privileges or
immunities. However, that is not the case with respect to INTELSAT. In
particular, INTELSAT is exempt from taxation, including U.S. property
taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, and customs duties; the
non-U.S. employees working at INTELSAT's Washington, D.C. headquarters
also pay no personal income taxes. In addition, INTELSAT is immune from
national laws, including the U.S. antitrust laws; immune from national
regulation, including regulation by the FCC; and immune from suit and
legal process.

COMSAT is immune from suit and legal process only when acting in its
capacity as U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT (and in its former capacity as
U.S. Signatory to Inmarsat).[^24] COMSAT has [no]{.underline} immunity
with respect to its commercial provision of INTELSAT service as a
carrier, or in any other non-Signatory capacity. Nevertheless, in its
1998 *DISCO-II* Order, the FCC held that COMSAT's limited Signatory
immunity conferred a competitive advantage that warranted its exclusion
from the U.S. domestic market.[^25]

COMSAT strongly disagrees that its limited immunity confers any
competitive advantage, because that immunity does not apply to COMSAT's
conduct in the marketplace; it applies only to its conduct within
INTELSAT, and in that role COMSAT is fully subject to U.S. government
instruction. To the extent that COMSAT's immunity within INTELSAT could
have any potential effect on competition, the instructional process is a
more than adequate substitute for conventional legal process.[^26] In
addition, it should be abundantly clear that any alleged advantage
conferred by COMSAT's limited immunity is more than canceled out by the
[dis]{.underline}advantage inherent in having to seek prior government
approval for its actions within INTELSAT.

Under current industry structure, INTELSAT's privileges and immunities
also have no effect on competition in the U.S., but for a different
reason: INTELSAT does not have direct access to the U.S. market at the
retail level. Rather, COMSAT offers the capacity it owns on the INTELSAT
system to U.S. users on a non-discriminatory basis. Unlike INTELSAT,
COMSAT is fully subject to U.S. taxation, and unlike INTELSAT, COMSAT is
fully subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC, as well as to
the antitrust laws for its carrier activities. Thus, any competitive
advantage that might accrue from INTELSAT's special status is, in
effect, filtered out by virtue of COMSAT's role as the U.S. provider of
INTELSAT service.[^27]

That would not be the case, however, if INTELSAT were allowed to access
the U.S. market directly prior to privatization. In that event, INTELSAT
[would]{.underline} have a substantial competitive advantage, primarily
due to its tax-exempt status. INTELSAT's tax exemption would afford it a
significant cost savings over other satellite service providers, which
would result in customers receiving below-cost access. These lower rates
would reflect economic distortions produced by INTELSAT's

tax-exempt status rather than genuine economic efficiencies.[^28]

INTELSAT's tax-exempt status would also result in losses to U.S.
taxpayers if it were allowed to compete directly in the U.S. market.
This loss is obvious with respect to the business that INTELSAT would
divert from its tax-paying competitors. But U.S. tax revenues would be
lost even if INTELSAT simply expanded its business by growing with the
market (as opposed to taking business from other providers), because
such expansion would make use of personnel and other assets on a
tax-exempt basis at the expense of other sectors of the U.S. economy. In
this manner, direct access could operate as a direct U.S. government
subsidy to INTELSAT.[^29]

Tax implications aside, INTELSAT's provision of services directly to
U.S. customers could distort the operation of the marketplace by virtue
of INTELSAT's total immunity from U.S. antitrust laws and FCC
jurisdiction. When COMSAT, as a common carrier, competes for customers
in the U.S. market against other providers, it is fully subject to FCC
regulation and U.S. competition laws. INTELSAT, in contrast, would be
able to offer service subject to rates and practices that are entirely
beyond U.S. control.[^30]

**B. Market Access**

It is often alleged that INTELSAT and COMSAT have a competitive
advantage by virtue by INTELSAT's "universal market access." In fact,
INTELSAT's market access is [not]{.underline} universal. Although
INTELSAT provides some services in virtually every country, it is barred
from providing certain services in many countries. In some cases, this
is because countries give preferential treatment to domestic or regional
satellite systems as a matter of government policy. For example, in the
United States, COMSAT is completely barred from providing U.S. domestic
services using INTELSAT facilities (except on an incidental basis),
whereas all of its competitors are free to offer both domestic and
international services on an unrestricted basis.[^31] This not only
disadvantages U.S. customers, but prevents COMSAT from fully utilizing
its own satellite capacity. Moreover, until recently COMSAT could
provide other satellite services, such as ground segment access, only
through a separate subsidiary, thereby putting COMSAT at a further
disadvantage vis-à-vis its U.S. and foreign competitors.

In addition, many INTELSAT Signatories do not have the same incentive as
COMSAT to promote the use of INTELSAT to provide innovative services.
For example, many Signatories were slow to utilize INTELSAT for the
provision of satellite services on customer premises (e.g., VSAT
services) because they perceived such services as a threat to their
terrestrial networks. Unlike COMSAT, other Signatories typically control
both domestic and international facilities, including land lines and
undersea

cables as well as satellites, and they are also the dominant providers
of virtually all telecommunications services in their home markets.
Moreover, their ownership in INTELSAT is small, both in absolute terms
and relative to their ownership of other facilities. Under these
circumstances, other Signatories often have little interest in
maximizing INTELSAT's full potential as a provider of "universal market
access."

It is also alleged that INTELSAT plays a role in restricting market
access for competing systems, but such claims are incorrect. The
INTELSAT intergovernmental agreements and structure do not dictate the
market access or regulatory policies of INTELSAT's member countries. On
the contrary, the structure is designed to be transparent to the
particularities of any single country.

Whether a country does or does not open its market to competition has
nothing to do with INTELSAT or its structure. The U.S., for example, has
authorized use of several competing U.S. satellite companies, as well as
foreign satellites, including Canada's Anik system, Argentina's Nahuel
satellites, and Japan's JC-Sat. At the same time (as noted above), the
U.S. prohibits the use of INTELSAT for purely domestic service. The
point is that U.S. market access policies are not controlled or
determined by INTELSAT --- and the same is true for other countries.

When the U.S. agreed to the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement in
February 1997, 69 countries had submitted market access
commitments.[^32] Virtually all of these countries (65) are members of
INTELSAT. Further, 75% of those countries included market access
commitments for satellite services. The FCC found that WTO countries
representing 80% of satellite service revenues had agreed to permit
access for these services.[^33]

Moreover, the number of countries committed to open markets is growing.
As of December 1998, the WTO reported that 80 countries have now
scheduled basic telecommunications commitments.[^34] In addition,
virtually all of the countries that signed the Basic Telecom Agreement
also signed the Reference Paper on regulatory principles, including the
establishment of a regulatory authority independent of any operator. The
WTO is

having an ongoing positive effect on market access. As stated by the
FCC: "The significant liberalizing and market-opening steps taken prior
to and since concluding the WTO Agreement are changing dramatically the
nature of international communications. The era of national monopoly
telephone companies is ending. Prices are falling, and service is
improving."[^35]

Another positive development in this regard is the privatization of
INTELSAT's Signatories. Whereas at one time COMSAT was virtually the
only INTELSAT Signatory that was [not]{.underline} a government entity,
today about 75% of INTELSAT's ownership is held by companies that are
fully or partly privatized. In fact, of those Signatories with an
ownership share of .5% or more, all but six are fully or partly private,
and four of those six have announced plans to privatize in the near
future.

In sum, COMSAT has no market access advantages by virtue of its role in
INTELSAT. To the extent that foreign Signatories enjoy advantages in
their home markets, these are diminishing as a result of privatization,
liberalization, and commitments under the WTO to market access and
independent regulators. Any lingering market access problems in
particular countries should be addressed directly with the governments
or PTTs involved. These issues cannot be addressed successfully by
putting pressure on INTELSAT or COMSAT (as some parties have suggested),
because neither INTELSAT nor COMSAT controls the local bottlenecks that
are the source of the problem.[^36]

Respectfully submitted,

COMSAT Corporation

> By\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Keith H. Fagan

Robert A. Mansbach

> Its Attorneys

6560 Rock Spring Drive

Bethesda, MD 20817

301-214-3457

May 12, 1999

[^1]: International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
    L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) ("Anti-Bribery Act").

[^2]: Notice, 64 Fed. Reg., April 12, 1999 at 17,625.

[^3]: *Id*. at 17,625-26.

[^4]: *See Requests for Special Temporary Authority to Change Points of
    Communications from Inmarsat to Inmarsat Ltd.*, DA-99-679 (released
    April 12, 1999).

[^5]: *See* Inmarsat Ltd. Shareholders' Agreement, Feb. 9, 1999, at
    Sections 3.1-3.7.

[^6]: As a foreign company licensed in a WTO-member country, Inmarsat
    will be required to meet the standards for entry into the U.S.
    market set forth in the DISCO II Order. *In the Matter of Amendment
    of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed
    Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite
    Services in the United States,* IB Docket No. 96-111, Report and
    Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094 (1997) ("DISCO II Order").

[^7]: COMSAT's exclusive rights for U.S. traffic conferred by the
    Inmarsat Act are no longer effective, as the intergovernmental
    organization for which COMSAT was the exclusive U.S. operating
    entity no longer provides service.

[^8]: *See* Inmarsat Master Transition Agreement, Schedule 9, Feb. 9,
    1999.

[^9]: INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record Decisions of the
    Twenty-second (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-22-3E Final at 4
    ("AP-22-3E"). *See also Requests for Special Temporary Authority to
    Operate on INTELSAT Satellites Transferring to New Skies, N.V*., 13
    FCC Rcd 23,373 (1998).

[^10]: *Requests for Special Temporary Authority to Operate on INTELSAT
    Satellites transferring to New Skies Satellites, N.V.,* 13 FCC Rcd
    23,373 (1998).

[^11]: AP 22-3E.

[^12]: See *Ex Parte* Letter from Stephen L. Goodman, Counsel for New
    Skies Satellites, N.V., to Magalie Roman Salas, FCC Secretary, dated
    May 4, 1999 ("NSS Ex Parte Letter").

[^13]: NSS Ex Parte Letter.

[^14]: AP 22-3E.

[^15]: *See* INTELSAT, Report of the Meeting of Signatories Regarding
    the Future Evolution of INTELSAT, MS-29-21E, April 9, 1999
    ("MS-29-21E").

[^16]: *See* Letter from Conny L. Kullman, Director General and CEO of
    INTELSAT to Senator Ernest L. Hollings, April 26, 1999 ("Kullman
    Letter"). *See also* MS-29-21E.

[^17]: *See* INTELSAT, Report of the Board of Governors regarding the
    Future Evolution of INTELSAT, AP-24-8E, P/10/99, MS-29-21E, M4/99,
    April 9, 1999; Kullman Letter.

[^18]: *Id.*

[^19]: *See* 47 U.S.C. Sections 701(c), 735(a)(1), 735(a)(2), 735(b)(4)
    (INTELSAT); 47 U.S.C. Section 752(a)(1) (Inmarsat).

[^20]: INTELSAT Agreement, Art. XV; Inmarsat Agreement, Art. 26.

[^21]: Headquarters Agreement, Arts. 1, 16.

[^22]: Anti-Bribery Act, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998);
    Department of State, Designation Under Section 5(d)(2) of the
    International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 64 Fed.
    Reg. 14,301, March 24, 1999.

[^23]: *See* Executive Order No. 11,996, 42 Fed Reg. 4331 (1977);
    Executive Order No. 1223, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,877 (1980).

[^24]: *Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications
    Satellite Corp.,* 946 F.2d 168, 175 (2d Cir. 1991, *cert. denied*,
    502 U.S. 1096 (1992).

[^25]: DISCO II Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094 at 125.

[^26]: *See, e.g., COMSAT Corp*., FCC 99-21, released February 11, 1999;
    *COMSAT Corp*., 5 FCC Rcd 763 (1990); *Satellite Business Systems*,
    91 FCC 2d 940 (1987).

[^27]: *See* Comments of COMSAT Corporation, IB Docket No. 98-102, File
    No. 60-SAT-ISP-97, filed Dec. 22, 1998 at 63 ("COMSAT Direct Access
    Comments").

[^28]: *See* COMSAT Direct Access Comments at 63. *See also* Statement
    of Professors Jerry R. Green and Hendrik S. Houthakker, Harvard
    University, and Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, The Brattle Group, *An
    Economic Assessment of the Risks and Benefits of Direct Access to
    INTELSAT in the United States* (addendum to COMSAT Direct Access
    Comments) at 8-9 ("Brattle Analysis").

[^29]: *Id*.

[^30]: COMSAT Direct Access Comments at 63.

[^31]: DISCO-II Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094 at 126 (COMSAT required to waive
    its "privileges and immunities" as a precondition to providing
    domestic service). This produces the anomalous result that
    foreign-owned and -licensed companies are permitted to serve the
    U.S. market while COMSAT, a U.S.-owned and ­ -licensed company, is
    barred from this market.

[^32]: *See generally* DISCO II Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094 at 19-27.

[^33]: *See* Statement of Peter Cowhey, Chief, International Bureau,
    FCC, before the Subcommittee on Communications, Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, July
    30, 1997 at 7.

[^34]: WTO Report, *GATS Commitments in Telecommunications*.

[^35]: International Bureau Report on Developments in International
    Telecommunications Markets, Report No. IN 98-58 (released Nov. 19,
    1998).

[^36]: *See generally* Schwartz, "Competition in International Satellite
    Services: Whither INTELSAT Restructuring?" (Nov. 19, 1997).