Testimony of Colonel (R)Jeff Smith

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

To the House Select Committee to Investigate the

Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina

[December 14,
2005\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_]{.underline}

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members,

I am Jeff Smith, Deputy Director For Emergency Preparedness with the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and I
am pleased to testify here today concerning events leading up to
Hurricane Katrina and the aftermath. Katrina is the single largest
disaster in our nation's history.

I am here today to share my views of what went right and what went
wrong, to tell you of our plans for the future, and to ask for your
support in Louisiana's recovery.

As part of my testimony I have brought some charts that show the
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, and I refer you to Appendix A to this
written testimony, which I incorporate by reference.

Please remember that the damage suffered by Louisiana was caused by a
horrific storm. It was not caused in any way by the response, but by a
catastrophic event. When you look at the numbers you can clearly see
that Katrina stands alone as the number one natural disaster in history.

I was listening to a radio show last week with Senator Trent Lott from
Mississippi as a guest. Senator Lott indicated that while he had some
concern about the federal response and the aftermath, he indicated that
people need to realize that this was the worse natural disaster in
American history.

An analyst at Fitch Rating, when describing Louisiana's bond rating
downgrade, said, in part, "the magnitude of the hurricane -- related
losses will present the State with economic and financial challenges for
the foreseeable future. In particular, the implication of the total and
extended evacuation of a major city, New Orleans, distinguish this from
other catastrophes."

To complicate things further, in just a little over three weeks after
the worst hurricane in history, along came Hurricane Rita. While I
realize Rita has little bearing on this hearing, one should keep in mind
that Louisiana was still in a full response mode for Katrina when Rita
hit us in the southwest. Rita re-flooded St. Bernard and Plaquemine.
Rita breached the temporary repair to the Industrial Canal levee.

To a degree Louisiana is still in response mode for Katrina and Rita.
The recovery efforts will indeed be monumental and will last for many
years to come.

You have heard many in the news media and some Federal officials ask why
Louisiana did not do more in the week preceding Hurricane Katrina to
prepare. Some have even suggested that we should have evacuated a week
before the storm hit.

Let's look at the weather reports\-\--a week before Hurricane Katrina
hit Louisiana, it does not even exist. The first weather advisory for
[Tropical Depression 12]{.underline} is issued on August 23, 2005 at 4
p.m. --this is 6 days before landfall.

Four days before landfall, on Thursday, August 25, 2005 at 1:00 p.m
Eastern Daylight Time the National Weather Service reports:
Reconnaissance aircraft indicate the center of [Tropical
Storm]{.underline} Katrina is located near a latitude 26.2 North
longitude 79.5 West or about 40 miles east, northeast of Fort
Lauderdale, Florida or about 40 miles east, southeast of Boca Raton,
Florida. This storm is not even in the Gulf of Mexico on Thursday
afternoon, it is still in the Atlantic.

Katrina enters the Gulf sometime Friday morning with projections
indicating that it will most likely make landfall in the mid- panhandle
of Florida.

Friday morning the 10:00 am National Weather Service advisory still
projects a Florida Panhandle landfall. Remember, this is less than three
(3) days prior to actual Louisiana landfall.

In the early afternoon of Friday, August 26, the hurri-vac models
reflects one of the most dramatic shifts in weather history. The
projected path of Katrina moves approximately [150 miles
west]{.underline} in a matter of hours.

For the first time, Louisiana is in the predicted path of Katrina.

The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
spins up. We start our conference calls with the fifteen (15) parishes
in the Southeast Hurricane Task Force. The Governor declares a State of
Emergency---all of this by five o'clock on Friday afternoon\-\-- within
a matter of hours once the storm's path shifts and places Louisiana in
the potential path of danger.

Governor Blanco, the State Police, and DOTD begin coordinating contra
flow with the State of Mississippi. Louisiana starts staging assets that
would be necessary to execute an evacuation. The National Guard and
other state agencies go on alert and begin staging personnel and
equipment.

Throughout Saturday and Sunday preparation for the storm intensifies.
Local, state, federal, private, non-profit and other States' resources
move to assist Louisiana.

LOHSEP's and other state agencies' actions are detailed in the thousands
of pages of documents and information that has been provided to this
committee. I will not go through each event; however, I would like to
cover some of the major pre-landfall activities that the LOHSEP
undertook.

In the conference call of 6:30 a.m. Saturday morning, the State
recommends that the evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana be
implemented. Some parishes have already begun evacuation proceedings;
however, we want to make it clear that we are recommending execution of
the State plan for Southeast Louisiana. Many, many conference calls
occur Saturday, Sunday and Monday morning with the Southeast Hurricane
Taskforce, the Southwest Hurricane Taskforce, and the Shelter Taskforce.
These calls disseminate information to the parishes and receive
information from the parishes.

The Governor requests an emergency declaration from the President on
Saturday and an expedited major declaration on Sunday. These
declarations acknowledge that local and state resources will be
overwhelmed. She advises that the federal government is needed for the
response. FEMA's emergency response team ("ERT") A from Denton, TX and
an ERT-N team from FEMA headquarters arrive at the EOC on Saturday
afternoon. These teams immediately begin integrating into the state and
other federal agencies where a unified command is established. Saturday
and Sunday are spent preparing.

The size of Hurricane Katrina is unparalleled. In fact, I heard an
analyst from NOAH report that both New Orleans and Biloxi were actually
in the eye wall at the same time. This is a huge storm. There are
hurricane force winds over Louisiana for almost 11 hours. Therefore,
most of the day Monday is spent hunkering down planning and preparing.
There is not much you could do with 150 mile per hour winds. As we now
know, some of the many levees in Katrina's path breach on Monday. The
effects of the levee breaches become worse on Tuesday. It is now
apparent that Louisiana has suffered two disasters\-\--the Hurricane and
the flood from the levee breaches. Even Mike Brown acknowledges this.

The Governor directs that the primary emphasis is to save lives.
Certainly, getting people evacuated from the Superdome and later from
the Convention Center are very important, but during the first days when
life is so fragile---people in water, people on rooftops---saving lives
is the priority. Requests are made to FEMA, local responders, non-profit
agencies and through EMAC, (Emergency Management Assistance Compact), to
bring resources. Louisiana needs everything it can get. Requests are
made early, in an unprecedented volume to respond to this truly
catastrophic event. . The State's capability to respond is overwhelmed.
Over 1,000 EMAC requests are made to other states and territories.
Forty-eight states and two territories respond to this catastrophic
event.

Let's discuss benchmarks for success. When judging performance of an
activity and deciding what went right and what went wrong, what is the
measure of success? I ask you, what is the benchmark for evacuating over
one million people out of an area such as New Orleans that has very
restricted roadways in and out? The Governor's pre-landfall evacuation
plan is executed almost flawlessly. We estimate that over one million
people, or approximately 90% of the affected parishes' populations,
evacuate in about a forty hour period. I don't know of any other
evacuation that has occurred with that many people under these
circumstances with that high of percentage of people being evacuated in
that short of a time period.

The search and rescue efforts occur primarily during the first five days
of this event. About 62 thousand people are rescued off of rooftops and
out of water. These are primary rescues. These do not include those who
were already at the Superdome or in other areas considered high ground.
These are direct rescue missions, people who are in peril.

I would like to know from anyone if there has ever been that number of
people rescued in that short of a period of time, under these
circumstances, in any disaster in this country. I ask again, what is the
benchmark for success?

Now, let me turn my attention to the Superdome, the Convention Center,
and the Cloverleaf.

As the flood water moves through New Orleans, people leave their homes,
apartments and hotels, and migrate to high ground.

Some 78 thousand people are evacuated from the Dome, the Convention
Center and the Cloverleaf. They are taken to shelters in Louisiana and
multiple states.

Contrary to what you heard in the news media, the people in the Dome
have water. They have food. They have shelter. They have medical care.
They have security. And, they have all of this for the entire time that
they are there.

The initial population in the Superdome is reported to be 10,000 to
15,000. As the effects of the flood become known, more and more people
migrate to the dome. People are transported there by search and rescue.
The population in the Dome swells to 40,000 over a 36 hour period.

People seek refuge at the Convention Center, a place that has not been
designated as a shelter by the City of New Orleans. By Friday, the
population at the Convention Center is estimated to be 20,000.

The Cloverleaf springs up as a collection point. Helicopters drop
evacuees. People migrate there. At the end, it is thought that 14,000
are evacuated from the Cloverleaf.

Several thousand people are evacuated out of St. Bernard Parish by the
DOTD ferry, and brought to safety in school buses.

The special needs patients and hospital patients are evacuated by
aircraft, boat and ambulance.

Where we initially thought we had 15,000 people to evacuate out of the
Dome, we now realize that there are many, many more people who did not
or were not able to heed the warnings to evacuate.

The State addresses these transportation and logistical challenges.
Louisiana does not wait for FEMA buses. Louisiana begins to evacuate
using school buses and tour buses that are obtained by order of the
Governor.

The State requests buses and aircraft from FEMA; aircraft, ambulances,
and buses through EMAC; and private corporations provide even more
ambulances.

A few FEMA buses begin to roll on late Wednesday. By Thursday morning,
there is a constant flow of buses. By Friday evening, the Superdome is
virtually evacuated. The Convention Center is evacuated by Saturday
afternoon. The Cloverleaf is evacuated by Friday. Air evacuations
continue, and people are now taken to the airport for transport to
shelters.

I would like to point out that had the levees not broken, scientific
estimates indicate that only 30 percent of Orleans would have flooded.
This would have been due to overtopping of the levees from storm surge.
Without the breach in the levees, the people in the Dome would have been
sheltered in New Orleans, and would not have required evacuation from
the City. Power would have been supplied by generators. Food, water and
medical care would have continued to be delivered.

Instead, the broken levees caused 80% of the City to flood.

It was the flood that caused the evacuation, not the hurricane force
winds of Katrina. The severity and the magnitude of the flood in Orleans
Parish was not fully scoped and identified until Tuesday morning.

Back to the benchmarks, how quickly should the evacuation of
approximately 78,000 people occur? The Superdome is a virtual island.

There is only one way into the City, and one way out.

By Saturday, September 3, 2005, Louisiana evacuates 78,000 people to
safety, all the while search and rescue continues.

I would like to recap the results of the three (3) major events in the
first days of the response to Katrina: the pre-landfall evacuation,
search and rescue, and the post-landfall evacuation.

What is the benchmark for evacuating over one million people from a city
such as New Orleans? Louisiana accomplishes this in a forty hour period
and achieved a 90% evacuation rate. I would submit to you that because
of the Governor's phased evacuation plan and the flawless execution by
the National Guard, the State Police, and DOTD as coordinated through
the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
this is an excellent result!

How quickly should you be able to pluck over 62,000 people out of the
water, off rooftops, and out of attics and move them to safety?
Louisiana did it in about five days. This averages 12,000 rescues per
day. This is nothing short of outstanding.

How quickly should you be able to evacuate 78,000 people from a flooded
city and move them to shelters in multiple states, while you are
simultaneously rescuing and saving the lives of over 62,000? We did it
in 3-4 days. This is impressive!

We made a conscious choice that life-saving was, by far, the most
critical activity during the first days. Saving lives is more important
than the evacuation of those who, while miserable, had food, water,
medical care, and shelter.

The Louisiana Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
engaged in numerous activities to prepare for the 2005 hurricane season.
One of the events is the publicized hurricane PAM catastrophic planning
event that had its roots back in 2000. By the summer of 2004, FEMA had
funded the project and LOHSEP held a week long exercise based on a
scenario of a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. This event was
followed up by workshops that occurred in November, 2004 and in July,
2005. It is important to know that the Hurricane Pam planning process
has still not been completed. As a matter of fact, the draft of the
medical plan, one of the key components of the plan, was received from
the contractor in September of 2005. The process of completing this plan
was slowed by a funding issue with FEMA. A finalized plan is only the
first step in the process. The plan must then be resourced, and then the
plan must be exercised. Adjustments are then made to the plan. We
weren't even through phase one at the time Katrina hit. Having said
that, the planning that came from PAM benefited the response to Katrina
greatly in the search and rescue area, the medical area, and the
logistics areas.

The next major thing that happened in the year preceding Katrina was the
Governor's action in ordering the re-tooling of the evacuation plan for
Southeast Louisiana. The Governor saw that the evacuation for Hurricane
Ivan did not work effectively. There were traffic jams and many people
did not evacuate because of the bottlenecks. She ordered the State
Police, DOTD, augmented by our agency to come up with a better plan.
Phased evacuation was developed for the entire coastal area of the
state.

A copy of this plan has been provided to you.

An intensive public education effort followed, and included public
service announcements and distribution of hundreds of thousands of
copies of the plan.

In my opinion, the phased evacuation plan and its execution prior to
landfall were directly responsible for saving thousands and thousands of
lives.

The Pam exercise predicted a death toll of over 60,000. As of last week,
there were less than 1,100 deaths attributed to Katrina. All are tragic.
Most were due to the flood, and not the winds.

Our agency met with emergency managers and their local elected officials
in preparation for the 2005 hurricane season. From February of 2005
through July of 2005 we visited over twenty (20) parishes to discuss
emergency procedures and organizational structure for manning a local
EOC.

Prior to hurricane season, key personnel from FEMA Region VI personnel
traveled to LOHSEP to work with our staff in planning and preparing for
hurricane season. One of the issues discussed was logistic operations
and unified command, both key issues in the Katrina response.

The week before Katrina, we hosted a state-wide two (2) day emergency
management conference attended by emergency managers from most of the
parishes. Topics included emergency operations procedures that included
the use of E-team, methods for requesting assistance and other disaster
related procedures.

During the 2004 hurricane season, the emergency managers indicated that
the pre-landfall conference calls that our agency conducted could be
improved. We put together a team of emergency managers and state
agencies to revitalize and revamp the conference calls. It has been
widely reported that emergency managers and other people who
participated in the conference calls, believe the new format for the
calls to be an effective and efficient communication tool. Our agency
also conducted a training exercise to test the new conference calls with
each task force.

Our state has three task forces: the Southeast Hurricane Taskforce, the
Southwest Hurricane Taskforce, and a Shelter Taskforce. Prior to the
2005 hurricane season, we attended numerous task force meetings.
Coordination and preparation for the upcoming hurricane season was
accomplished.

The state emergency operation plan was updated to be reflective of the
National Response Plan. Each State agency had input in the plan and
signed off on the new plan.

While we have noted many successes in the response to Katrina, we want
to improve. Most of our state agencies have conducted internal after
action reviews. On December 6, LOHSEP conducted an after action review
(AAR) with all state agencies that were involved in the response. Our
plan is to conduct an extensive 2-day AAR involving the local, state,
and federal government agencies, non-profit organizations, private
businesses, as well as those responders from around the country in the
first quarter of 2006. I have submitted a request to FEMA Region VI
asking for funding for travel expenses and a contractor. We need to get
as many participants as possible and capture all lessons learned.

Let me take just a minute to recap some of the things that I think went
right. It is very clear to me that the pre landfall activities, the
conference calls, the forming of the unified command, the pre-landfall
evacuation process went extremely well, and was responsible for saving
thousands of lives.

Search and rescue was truly a team effort, and included our state
resources, local resources, National Guard, active military, Coast
Guard, other Federal agencies, EMAC forces from other states---all of
these entities came together to handle this monumental effort. To a
large degree, I credit this success to the Hurricane Pam exercise.

While there were monumental challenges to the evacuation of the Dome,
the Convention Center and the Cloverleaf, those who wanted to leave New
Orleans were evacuated, and they were taken to shelters.

The pre-hurricane season planning developed a camaraderie and a
connection between FEMA Region VI and our office. This is another bright
spot.

The medical response was outstanding. The largest ever deployment of the
National Disaster Medical System ("NDMS") occurred after Katrina. NDMS
combined efforts with Louisiana's Department of Health and Hospitals
(DHH). Thousands of civilian first responders: local, state, and
literally from all over the country came together to provide medical
care to those in need. What a smashing success.

The pre-staging of FEMA assets at Camp Beauregard, the pre-positioning
of search and rescue teams, DMAT teams, DMORT teams, allowed these
resources to move into the area quickly.

The plan for distribution of commodities worked extremely well. You did
not see long lines of Louisiana people waiting for food, water, and ice.

I am very proud of our agency personnel. These individuals all worked
tirelessly for days on end with little or no rest. They performed far
beyond the call of duty and did an outstanding job without complaint.
The career FEMA workers were there with us, shoulder to shoulder working
diligently for our citizens.

The EMAC process was a huge success. Almost every state in the nation
sent assets to Louisiana. These were not just National Guard assets.
About half of the EMAC requests were for non-Guard resources and
personnel. These were medical, fire, police, EMS. Individuals from all
over the nation came in, assisted us, and worked with us in our time of
need. The emergency managers in other states that stepped up and offered
to house our displaced citizens were again critical to this response and
this something that we can never repay.

Before we discuss lessons learned, I would like to remind you this is
hard to measure. Many of these particular identified areas for
improvement would never have surfaced if we weren't dealing with the
worst natural disaster in history. Many of these items would not have
occurred during a normal disaster.

Much has been said about the degradation of communication during the
first several days of Hurricane Katrina. Our state did have redundant
communication systems; however, the devastation was so great that not
only towers and antennas were blown down, and phone lines were inundated
by flood water. Due to the heroic efforts of State Police, our agency
and others, the 800 mzh system was boosted fairly quickly. Most of the
time there was some form of communication, it just was not communication
on demand. The number of frequencies available on our 800 mhz system
were not nearly enough to handle the thousands of first responders who
were in the area. When you needed to communicate, you were continually
being stepped on, thereby making communication very difficult.

In many cases cell phones would reach out of state or out of the area,
as did some satellite phones. However, cell phone service between New
Orleans and Baton Rouge was virtually impossible.

First responders coming in from all over the country, as well as federal
assets were not using the same communication system as Louisiana.

We should all take heart in this lesson and push to develop redundant
inter-operable communication systems that can be used from the local to
the state to the federal, indeed, a nation-wide interoperable
communication system.

Our emergency agency is part of the Louisiana State Military Department.
As such, the agency relies on the state military department to increase
staffing during times of disaster. In this catastrophic event, our
resources were stretched to the limit. The Governor and the Louisiana
Legislature recognized the need for more resources and in a special
legislative session, added 30 full time positions to the agency which
will bring the staffing level to 74. Even this level of manning may not
be sufficient for another catastrophic event, necessitating contingency
plans to augment permanent staffing.

We did not have a sufficient response to the media. We should have
confronted and rebutted the rumors at the time the inaccurate
information was reported. Here are a few of the myths: 300-400 people
were dead in the Superdome. In truth, six (6) people died at the dome, 4
of natural causes, one drug overdose and an apparent suicide.

Another myth: there was no food, no water and no medical care at the
Dome.

And another: National Guard not present at the Dome.

Not only did irresponsible reporting create the appearance that
Louisiana was not responding properly, and that the response was going
array, it also created an atmosphere of fear. Some first responders,
school bus drivers, contractors, and others refused to go into the area
to assist in the evacuation because they were concerned for their
safety.

I believe that we should develop, train and equip incident management
teams. The teams would be composed of a LOHSEP agency representative and
individuals from the key agencies responsible for emergency response.
These teams would be deployed pre-storm to the parishes most likely to
receive the greatest impact. They would have robust communication
equipment, to include voice, data, and video. The goal is to increase
situational awareness, provide rapid resource requests, and other
assistance to the local parish emergency managers in the critical first
hours, and days of the response operation.

After Katrina, a mobile command center is a must. Immediately after an
event, it is essential to move forward with key personnel from our
agency and other ESFs. On scene situational awareness and evaluation
will provide immediate feed back to the emergency operations center.
Information is the key to triggering action and coordination of delivery
of resources.

We received assistance from virtually every parish throughout the state,
including local sheriffs, fire departments, public works departments and
EMS. This process should be streamlined through formalized regional and
state-wide mutual aide agreements for all locations throughout the
state.

Each State agency that is assigned the lead for an emergency support
function (ESF) should continue to improve and refine its emergency
operations plans. These plans must incorporate the use of all supporting
ESF agencies.

The current inability to contract for resources pre-storm hinders the
response. It is necessary that LOHSEP and others be allowed to contract
for certain critical items such as generators for special needs shelters
prior to the storm. We must be able to ensure that these critical assets
are available when needed.

A disaster historian is needed to document key events. An intelligence
cell that monitors live media coverage is a must. This is another tool
for obtaining situational awareness.

Our agency needs to provide more assistance to local entities in
reviewing their emergency operations plans and their continuity of
operations and continuity of government plans.

Our State is already reviewing the existing laws and regulations
pertaining to evacuation of nursing homes and special needs facilities.
The evacuation of hospitals is also being evaluated in light of Katrina.

In addressing the shortcomings in the Federal response, I share the
views of many other emergency managers and other that many of the
shortcomings are directly a result of FEMA being brought under the
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While I believe
that it was correct to combine all enforcement and intelligence sharing
agencies under one umbrella, I feel that it was absolutely the wrong
thing to bring the agency responsible for mitigation, emergency
preparedness, response and recovery under an umbrella of law
enforcement. Emergency management is made up of ten disciplines:

1\) Law Enforcement

2\) Emergency Medical Services

3\) Emergency Management

4\) Fire Services

5\) HAZMAT Response

6\) Public Works

7\) Government Administration

8\) Public Safety Communications

9\) Health Care

10\) Public Health

It is my understanding that the Department of Homeland Security is made
up some 180,000 employees of which FEMA is barely over 2,000. Critics of
the current federal structure have been validated by the response of DHS
and FEMA to Katrina. It is apparent that DHS does not understand the
full spectrum of emergency management. DHS hindered FEMA's ability to
plan and coordinate. It appears that DHS has literally stripped FEMA of
its assets: just recently the Preparedness Division of FEMA was taken
away from FEMA and moved into DHS.

While natural disasters such as Katrina cannot be prevented, there can
be preparation. The desperately needed ability to prepare has been
stripped from FEMA. When you read about the role of the new preparedness
division that is now in DHS, it is clear that the emphasis is terrorism
and preventing terrorism. This is not the same as "preparing". Only one
short reference is made to natural disasters.

DHS publicizes that it is "all hazards" but the grant guidelines reflect
an entirely different picture. Unless the training exercise has
something to do with weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"), it is very
difficult to get funding.

The complexity that DHS has added to grant applications, reporting and
guidelines have many local emergency managers ready to tell DHS to keep
its money as it is not worth the effort. DHS funding has six (6)
separate funding streams with five (5) solution areas and three (3)
grants years may be open at one time. The expenditures must be tracked
separately requiring accounting for as many as ninety (90) accounts. A
local emergency manager needs to be a CPA and attorney to administer DHS
programs!

The Federal response did not follow the National Incident Management
System ("NIMS") as outlined in the National Response Plan which calls
for a unified command. In essence, in Katrina, there were three (3)
Federal commands, not one, unified command. The Primary Federal Official
("PFO") by doctrine is not supposed to be an operational person directly
involved in response activities. This individual is supposed to
de-conflict conflicts between Federal agencies and keep the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security and the President apprised of
situations. The PFO in Katrina went operational and began directing and
guiding response operations and to a large degree left out the Federal
Coordinating Officer ("FCO") who, by doctrine, is the individual that is
supposed to be in charge of response operations. The PFO cell was
operating on its own, communicating directly with the Governor,
communicating directly with the Mayor of New Orleans and a myriad of
other local elected officials. There was a unified joint command at the
Joint Field Office with the FCO and the State Coordinating Officer
("SCO"). The problems with a disjointed Federal command are not limited
to communications outside the chain of command. Whenever the task force
commander of Hurricane Katrina, General Honoré, came onto the scene, he
was also operating independently with little regard whatsoever for the
Joint Field Office, which should have been the only unified command. DHS
in essence acknowledges that there was a problem as reflected in the
third or fourth week of the disaster, when DHS appointed the PFO as the
FCO as well. DHS discovered the PFO did not have the authority to
obligate money. Only the FCO has authority to obligate money. NIMS calls
for a unified command where all entities work together. In this case,
anyone who was there, anyone who chose to look, would realize that there
were literally three separate Federal commands.

There are conflicts between the National Response Plan and those items
that can be funded by the Stafford Act. As an example, the re-interment
of disinterred remains is, according to the National Response Plan, an
activity that the Federal government will handle in a catastrophic event
such as Katrina. The State of Louisiana requested this assistance and
was initially told that the Federal government would perform this
function. Later the State was told that FEMA could not perform this
function because the Stafford Act would not allow such funding. This is
only one example of a conflict between the National Response Plan
responsibilities and the funding through the Stafford Act.

Two huge issues emerged with FEMA in resourcing: Not only were resources
slow in coming, but there is no tracking system in place. FEMA could not
advise with a degree of certainty when a particular resource would
arrive. Once something is ordered FEMA has no way to determine the
arrival date. When FEMA provided an arrival date, yet did not deliver,
huge problems were created. The most notable example is the failure to
deliver buses, as promised, to evacuate the City of New Orleans.

Generators are a key element in emergency response. FEMA's method to
supply generators is totally absurd. There are many documented cases
where it took three and four days to get generators in place and
operating, when there were generators on hand at a staging area.

After 911 the nation recognized a need to address prevention of
terrorism. Indeed the Department of Homeland Security has taken many
steps in preventing a catastrophic terrorist event. However, nothing has
been done to address the Federal legislation that provides the recovery
from such a catastrophic event, the Stafford Act.

The FCO for Katrina described the Stafford Act as like bringing a donkey
to the Kentucky Derby -- it just doesn't cut it because the needs are so
great in a catastrophic event and the Stafford Acts ability is so
limited. Our nation's failure to address and amend the Stafford Act to
define a catastrophic event and then to allow additional funding under
defined criteria, is a failure on the nation's part.

Contract review by FEMA headquarters has taken weeks in many cases. I
have been told that contracts now have to be reviewed by FEMA legal and
programs as well as DHS. It seems no one in the headquarters contracting
element understands what "emergency" means. This double review is
absurd. The FCO indicated that after FEMA came under DHS that his
authority to make decisions in the field has been curtailed and many of
his actions are now subject to review at FEMA headquarters and in many
cases DHS. This slows the recovery process greatly.

The biggest single failure of the Federal response was the Department of
Homeland Security's failure to recognize that Katrina was a catastrophic
event and implement the catastrophic incident annex to the National
Response Plan. Had DHS recognized Katrina for the event that it was, a
truly catastrophic event, had DHS implemented the catastrophic incident
annex to the National Response Plan, Louisiana should have had have a
significant number of Federal troops and Federal assets, days prior to
their actual arrival. The National Weather Service issued an ominous
warning mid-day Sunday indicating just how devastating Katrina was
predicted to be in the New Orleans area. Had the catastrophic incident
annex been implemented on Sunday, Federal resources and troops, per the
National Response Plan, should have been leaning forward preparing.
These assets should have moved in after the storm without a request from
the State of Louisiana (even though the State did ask for this
assistance). Had the catastrophic incident annex been implemented, I
submit that there should have been thousands of Federal troops on the
ground performing search and rescue and performing evacuation, by late
Tuesday and surely by Wednesday morning. Instead federal troops did not
arrive in number until Saturday, after the evacuations of the Dome,
Convention Center and Cloverleaf were complete. The failure to recognize
Katrina for what it was, the worst natural disaster in U.S. history,
cost precious time and strained Louisiana's already overwhelmed
resources.

Thank you for allowing me to share my views with this Committee. I
sincerely hope that this testimony, in some small way, will assist our
State and Nation in improving future emergency response operations.