**Bessenyey & Van Tuyn, LLC**

**310 K Street, Suite 200**

**Anchorage, AK. 99501**

**(907) 278-2000 (907) 278-2004 fax**

**United States Senate**

**Committee on Energy and Natural Resources**

**Hearing on BP pipeline failure: its effects on oil supply and how to
prevent a recurrence**

**Written Testimony of Peter Van Tuyn,**

**Partner, Bessenyey & Van Tuyn**

**Submitted on behalf of:**

**Alaska Wilderness League, Alaska Coalition, Alaska Forum for
Environmental Responsibility, National Audubon Society, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center,
Republicans for Environmental Protection, Sierra Club, The Wilderness
Society, U.S. Public Interest Research Group**

**Tuesday, September 12, 2006 Dirksen SD-106**

**Introduction**

Chairman Domenici, Ranking Member Bingaman, Members of the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on
the effects of the BP pipeline failures in the Prudhoe Bay Oil Field and
what steps may be taken to prevent a recurrence of such events.

Unfortunately, warning flags have been flying above Prudhoe Bay and
Alaska's North Slope for many years, heralding the possibility that an
event like the BP pipeline failure and field shutdown could occur. The
facts demonstrate that BP has had significant management and operation
failures which BP must fix before its oil fields can have true
operational integrity. The facts also demonstrate that the type of
failures that haunt BP could be experienced by other North Slope
operators as well, both because of deficiencies in their management and
operation systems and because there has been, in essence, a programmatic
failure of state and federal governments to effectively plan for and
regulate against impacts from oil and gas-related industrial activities.

Understanding why the oil industry, and state and federal regulators,
did not, and regularly do not, heed the warning flags is important to
understanding what can be done to prevent a recurrence of such events.
In my testimony I explore those warnings, and make recommendations to:
minimize the likelihood that a major oil field spill and closure would
recur; to protect special and especially sensitive areas such as the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the Teshekpuk Lake region of the
National Petroleum Reserve -Alaska; and to limit the impact of such
events on energy supplies, should it recur.

I provide this testimony as an attorney with nearly 15 years of
experience working on energy issues, including those related to oil and
gas, in Alaska.[^1] During this period, I have counseled and represented
numerous Alaska-based and national conservation organizations, Native
tribes and villages, and other entities on energy issues. I have
litigated numerous lawsuits against oil company and federal and state
agency concerning energy production activities in Alaska. I have
reviewed, counseled and represented clients on innumerable state and
federal administrative proposals to authorize and regulate energy
activities in Alaska. I am also familiar with federal and state proposed
and enacted legislation concerning energy issues in Alaska and
elsewhere, and have counseled clients on the intent and legal effect of
such legislation.

**Recommendations**

Although it is impossible to totally eliminate the risks of major spills
taking place from the oil fields, the ***first category*** of
recommendations provided here includes proposals aimed at minimizing the
likelihood that a significant polluting and supply disruption event
would recur on Alaska's North Slope. These include:

\* Authorizing, performing, and implementing the recommendations of an
independent audit of maintenance and operation practices of oil
facilities in Alaska;

\* Creation of a Citizen's Oversight Group, modeled after the post
*Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill Prince William Sound Regional Citizen's
Advisory Council, that uses dedicated funds to serve as an independent
watchdog over North Slope and TAPS operations;

\* Improved Federal pipeline regulation;

The ***second category*** of recommendations includes a call to place
off-limits to oil activities particularly special or sensitive Arctic
environments. BP's Prudhoe Bay spill exposes the fallacy that oil
drilling and a pristine environment can co-exist, and Congress should
heed this reality by:

\* Closing in perpetuity the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas leasing, exploration, development,
production or transportation-related activities and permanently
designating it as Wilderness;

\* Placing off-limits to oil and gas activities particularly sensitive
places such as the Teshekpuk Lake region in the Northeast Planning Area
of the National Petroleum Reserve---Alaska (NPRA or the "Reserve").

The ***final category*** of recommendations is a request that Congress
begin the important and inevitable process of:

\* Harnessing clean, renewable, and homegrown, energy sources like
properly-sited wind, solar and farm-based bio-fuels;

\* Reducing our dependence on oil by setting specific and meaningful
targets for that reduction, using improved gas mileage, better
transportation choices, and more efficient homes, buildings ands
appliances;

\* Investing significant money and providing valuable tax credits over a
substantial period of time for the research, development and
implementation of energy-saving and renewable energy technologies.

**"Past is Prologue"**

In March 2003 the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences released a congressionally-requested report on the cumulative
impact of oil development on Alaska's North Slope.[^2] The National
Research Council found that there had been little assessment of the
cumulative impact of such activities, and that information about
cumulative impacts is "critical to support informed, long-term
decision-making about resource management."[^3]

Just five days ago, a federal district court judge released a
preliminary ruling indicating that he is likely to halt a federal lease
sale in the sensitive Teshekpuk Lake region of the Northeast area of the
Reserve because the U.S. Department of the Interior had "failed to fully
consider the cumulative effects of the proposed development...."[^4] The
court stated that the Interior Department had represented to it in a
previous case concerning an oil and gas lease sale in the Northwest
portion of the Reserve that Interior would analyze the cumulative
impacts of simultaneous oil development in both of the Reserve planning
areas as part of its decision to lease the Teshekpuk Lake region in
Northeast portion of the Reserve.[^5] When Interior yet again put off
the analysis -- this time saying it would do so when development
actually occurs -- the court, at least preliminarily, concluded that
Interior had violated the law.

Consequently, despite the "critical" importance of information about
cumulative impacts to informed agency decision-making,[^6] specific and
formal agency promises to do so were broken.

BP's failures at Prudhoe Bay are perfectly analogous to this situation.
As this quote from 2001 demonstrates, BP has long promised that Prudhoe
Bay is safe and in good shape:

> We believe Prudhoe Bay is safe and that *BP has always had as its
> number one priority* the safety of our employees and contractors and
> *the integrity of the North Slope system*.[^7]

BP's March 2006 oil spill -- the largest in North Slope oil field
history \-- and its early August announcement that it was going to shut
down the largest oil field in the United States due to pipeline
integrity problems demonstrate the hollow nature of this promise.

Avid drilling advocate Senator Ted Stevens also bemoaned the broken
promises:

> I am disturbed not only by the fact that over the years, when I've
> taken members of Congress up there -- particularly senators and people
> from the administration -- we've been briefed that this is the safest
> area in the world, and how it's been maintained, and how they've got
> special procedures to check for corrosion and erosion and any sludge
> inside the pipeline.

As a matter of fact, it just wasn't done. ...

> They sold us the fact their processes would perform. And they
> didn't.[^8]

This section of the testimony reviews the broken promises of safe,
responsible, informed and vigilant oversight of the industrial
activities of Alaska's oil patch. As the example at the beginning of
this section portends, this promise is broken not just by BP, but by
others involved in the oil patch; other oil companies and governments
alike. This history is recounted here because understanding it is
critical to crafting and implementing any plan to remedy the problems;
unless Congress takes the time \-- right now \-- to fully analyze and
remedy the problems that led to the Prudhoe Bay debacle, we will be
destined to repeat history, and in the process further risk worker
safety, the environment, and a portion of our nation's energy supply.

***BP has a long history of inadequate management and operations***

That BP has been a troubled actor in the oil fields has been apparent
for some time. For example, in the late 1990's, BP pled guilty to felony
illegal waste disposal charges. Despite laws prohibiting injecting below
the tundra anything classified as hazardous, a BP contractor had for
years been doing just that with barrels of hazardous foreign substances,
such as glycol and paint thinners. When a worker questioned this
practice in 1995, BP characterized the re-injection as two isolated
incidents. But in reality, the illegal disposal was ongoing for years
and took place under the cover of darkness. After an extended
investigation, BP, its drilling contractor Doyon Drilling, and three
workers paid \$1.55 million in criminal fines and were placed on
criminal probation for five years. BP paid an additional \$6.5 million
in civil penalties, while BP and Doyon Drilling agreed to spend an
additional \$17 million to improve their environmental compliance
programs.[^9]

In 2001, after North Slope workers complained that budget cuts forced
them to work with worn-out and dangerous equipment, BP insisted that its
North Slope operations were safer than ever.[^10] In early 2002, Bill
Burkett, a veteran BP Prudhoe Bay worker, warned, "if they continue to
cut corners the way they do now I fear a catastrophic event is
imminent."[^11] His warning proved prophetic. In August of that year, an
explosion and fire at a Prudhoe Bay well house put a veteran worker in
the hospital with serious burns. BP immediately claimed that well
inspections prior to the blast had been properly conducted. Later
admitting that this claim was false, BP again promised to improve its
field monitoring and safety programs. Four months later, a welder
repairing a high-pressure line at Prudhoe Bay was tragically killed when
a plug blew out of the line.[^12]

Another BP worker told Congress in 2002 of this telling experience on
the North Slope:

> \[l\]ast year ... Senator \[Frank\] Murkowski came to Prudhoe with
> \[Interior Secretary\] Gail Norton and publicly dared anyone to find
> oil or contamination in the well house that they were standing in.
> Before his arrival, we put fresh gravel in the well house, and cleaned
> the well and manifold buildings on the pad. All the good Senator
> needed to do was, scrape off the 4 inches of clean gravel with his
> shoe and he would have found some evidence.[^13]

With that larger context, independent analyst Richard Fineberg provides
this compelling summary of BP's corrosion-related history:

> For years, BP workers had risked their jobs to send word to the
> company's top
>
> executives that, due to cost-cutting pressures, the nation's largest
> oil field was in danger of a catastrophic event that could injure or
> kill workers, harm Alaska's environment and cut off a major portion of
> the West Coast oil supply and state revenues. These warnings
> frequently mentioned BP's problems with corrosion....
>
> • In 1999, the dangers of corrosion on non-regulated pipelines were so
>
> significant that BP entered into an agreement with the Alaska
> Department
>
> of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) to develop a work plan, hold
> semiannual
>
> work sessions with ADEC and file an annual progress report with
>
> the agency. ...
>
> • In January 2001, corrosion problems again were among the items
> listed by
>
> concerned BP North Slope technicians relayed to BP Chairman Lord John
>
> Browne by Charles Hamel of Alexandria, Virginia, who frequently serves
> as a
>
> conduit for the health, safety and environmental concerns of
> beleaguered North
>
> Slope workers. According to that letter, "(w)e are way behind on our
> corrosion
>
> inspection and repair."
>
> • In March 2002, BP North Slope worker and health and safety officer
> Bill Burkett listed his numerous efforts to contact monitoring
> agencies about his concerns -- including corrosion -- in a letter to
> ... Democratic Senators Joseph Lieberman and Bob Graham. Burkett, then
> due to retire shortly, also gave a lengthy broadcast interview in
> which he discussed his numerous concerns.
>
> • In a 2004 letter, Hamel wrote to BP board environmental safety
> subcommittee
>
> chair Walter Massey to warn of \"cost cutting, causing serious
> corrosion damage\"
>
> that contributed to worker fears of \"a catastrophic event.\"
>
> • On January 20, 2005, Hamel sent a letter to Senator \[Ted\] Stevens
> discussing BP's \[\] other safety problems on the North Slope. That
> letter concluded with the warning that "money saving 'Russian
> Roulette' risks taken are jeopardizing the vital North Slope crude
> deliveries to the lower 48."[^14]

As reported in the media, throughout this time, "BP ha\[d\] issued rosy
annual reports to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
about how its corrosion monitoring on the North Slope is getting better
all the time."[^15] And, as it turned out, at least the first such
report, if not the later ones, was doctored to make it appear that BP's
corrosion control program, including its refusal to run maintenance or
smart pigs down the lines to clean and assess the integrity of the line
(respectively), was more substantial and comprehensive than was actually
the case:

> \[T\]he original version... said BP\'s corrosion-monitoring program
> \"makes it difficult to develop a qualitative understanding of the
> basis for their corrosion strategy.\" That reference was replaced by
> this: \"BP has demonstrated a clear commitment to corrosion
> control.\"[^16]

And then, in March of 2006, BP caused the largest oil spill in North
Slope oil field history, during which one of its pipelines at Prudhoe
Bay corroded and spilled over 200,000 -- 260,000 gallons of crude oil
onto the tundra.[^17] Fast forward to early August, after BP had
received orders from the federal Department of Transportation, Pipeline
And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to conduct pig
tests on its Prudhoe lines, BP "discovered" that its pipeline system at
Prudhoe Bay was at serious risk of failure due to corrosion, and
literally shut down significant portions of the largest oil field in
North America.[^18]

And even with that, and all the attention it brought on (including the
scheduling of this hearing), BP's risk-taking continued:

> As the week \[of August 10\] has progressed, BP has shifted its stance
> and now says it may be able to keep the western half of the field
> open, a move that would send a reassuring signal to global energy
> markets and Californian drivers alike. But, company officials here
> acknowledge that if it decides to keep pumping, it would do so without
> using the smart pig tests, a move that critics say leaves the company
> vulnerable to more problems in the western field.[^19]

***Other Oil Companies Are Also Risk Takers***

Although BP's North Slope problems have made headlines recently, BP is
by no means the sole actor in Alaska's oil patch whose substandard
performance has raised serious health and safety issues while
jeopardizing a major portion of the West Coast's oil supply. To learn
and address the lessons from the BP failures, it is therefore necessary
to consider the patterned behavior of other oil and gas companies and
partnerships operating in Alaska.

As an initial matter, BP operates some of the oil fields on behalf of
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips and other more minor company leaseholders.
Just because these companies are "absentee landlords" does not absolve
them of their legal obligation to ensure that their oil fields are being
managed with management and operational integrity; they too are
responsible for the problems at Prudhoe Bay.

Industry-wide problems were revealed in a series of detailed reports by
the conservation community in the late 1980's (Oil in the Arctic), early
1990's (Tracking Arctic Oil) and late 1990's (Under the Influence: Oil
and the Industrialization of America\'s Arctic).[^20] And of course the
*Exxon Valdez* oil spill in 1989 revealed to the nation and the world
that promises to respond to and clean up oil on Alaska's coasts were
empty. Indeed, oil from that tragedy still soils beaches in Prince
William Sound; so much so that the state and federal governments are
pursuing more money from Exxon to continue the clean up. And 17 years
after the spill, Exxon still refuses to pay the civil judgment for the
lives and livelihoods it soiled.

In August 2004, EPA imposed a \$485,000 civil penalty on ConocoPhillips
for Clean Water Act violations at its drilling platforms in Cook Inlet,
Alaska. There had been 470 violations of the rig's National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System Permit over a five-year period, and six
unauthorized discharges of pollutants. Earlier that year the Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation imposed an \$80,000 civil
penalty on ConocoPhillips for Clean Air Act violations at the supposedly
"hallmark" Alpine oil field. High carbon monoxide emissions from
turbines at the Central Processing Facility used to re-inject natural
gas exceeded the air quality permit over a year-long period. [^21]

This followed a history of Clean Air Act violations at Alpine even prior
to production. During development drilling in 1999, DEC fined
ConocoPhillips a total of \$24,000 for penalties and damages (\$19,500
suspended) in three cases of permit violations for excess emissions
sources from the drilling mud plant, and other drilling operations.[^22]
The Alpine oil field began producing in 2000.[^23] By January 2001, ADEC
found that the secondary power turbines were not operating as permitted
and produced high emissions of Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) for which
ConocoPhillips was fined \$16,875 in damages (\$11,875 suspended). [^24]

Further, the Environmental Protection Agency is conducting what is
apparently still an on-going criminal investigation into intentional
dumping of drilling wastes contaminated with hazardous material from an
ice pad into the Beaufort Sea by Pioneer Natural Resources Company.
Supervisors ordered that thousands of gallons of toxic drilling mud at
the Oooguruk exploratory well be dumped into the sensitive coastal
waters near Prudhoe Bay to save costs of proper disposal in March 2003,
according to workers. [^25]

Pursuant to its master plan for oil spill response, Alyeska Pipeline
Services Company, the operator of the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System (TAPS) between the North Slope and Valdez, is legally required to
maintain a variety of spill response equipment that is readily available
for rapid response to any emergency.[^26] One of the listed items is a
bullet hole clamp. But when a miscreant shot a hole in the pipeline with
a high-powered rifle in October 2001, it was revealed that the existing
bullet hole clamp could not be used. Alyeska tardily set about inventing
a new bullet hole clamp. As a result, a thick stream of crude oil poured
into the nearby trees for 36 hours, destroying nearly 2-1/2 acres of
trees.[^27]

Early in 2005, two veteran maintenance engineers left Alyeska after 30
years of service. Prior to their separate departures, both warned that
the management was failing to address environmental concerns. Later in
the year, the company's chief operating officer was removed from his
position nine days after he presented the TAPS owners with a list of 101
serious risks on TAPS.[^28]

***State and Federal Failures***

Alaska and the federal government have also made and broken promises,
and undertaken risky behavior, both in the planning and regulatory
arenas. This section provides examples of these failures, and
demonstrates that there has been a programmatic failure to make informed
agency decisions and follow through with stringent regulations.

The TAPS right-of-way renewal provides an example applicable to both the
state and federal governments. Despite numerous examples of other
performance failures on TAPS, in late 2002 and early 2003 state and
federal authorities renewed Alyeska's right-of-way agreements, issued 30
years earlier, without taking steps to address the numerous problems on
TAPS expressed by concerned citizens, environmental and other public
interest groups.[^29]

[State of Alaska]{.underline}

In past decades, Alaska had stringent planning requirements. These came
from two primary sources. First, Alaska law required that any decision
to commit state lands to oil and gas activities would only go forward if
it was in the "best interest" of the State, as determined after a
thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of going forward. Second,
the Alaska Coastal Management Program (ACMP) contained stringent
environmental and community protection standards, developed by local
communities as well as state agencies, and was applicable to development
activities in Alaska's ample coastal communities.

A series of lawsuits successfully challenged Alaska's "best interest"
finding and ACMP compliance in Alaska decisions to proceed with, among
other things, oil and gas lease sales in the Arctic.[^30] In response,
the Alaska legislature amended the statutory "best interest"
requirements to get rid of the requirement that full costs of a leasing
proposal be examined before a lease sale is actually held.[^31]
Furthermore, Governor Frank Murkowski directed the final evisceration of
the ACMP.[^32]

In another controversial move, Governor Murkowski abolished the habitat
division of the State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game, which was
responsible for implementing the waterway-based environmental
protections contained in Title 16 of Alaska's laws. He transferred what
responsibilities were left to implement Title 16 to the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources, the resource development agency that
sits at the top of the state's administrative hierarchy.[^33]

On the regulatory front, the State of Alaska cannot claim that it was
not forewarned about the high level of corrosion risk present in the
North Slope oil fields, especially Prudhoe Bay. The state DEC was the
recipient of the above-described original Coffman Report.[^34] Rather
than heed its warnings and compel BP to implement a more thorough
corrosion monitoring program, including the routine use of maintenance
and smart pigs, DEC set aside the concerns raised by its well-respected
lead oil spill prevention engineer, whose position it was that changes
should only occur where factual inaccuracies are proven,[^35] and
allowed the report to be altered.

Well before the Coffman report controversy, however, the state was on
notice that the corrosion monitoring and leak detection systems on the
North Slope were unnecessarily risky. Administrative comments to DEC
from Trustees for Alaska on the Prudhoe Bay spill plan (C-Plan) from
2002 are particularly telling given BP's September 7, 2006 testimony in
the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight that costs are
not a factor in field maintenance at Prudhoe Bay:

> In BPXA's case, ADEC has confirmed, and BPXA has acknowledged that the
>
> crude oil transmission lines do not comply with the leak detection
> standards for pipelines. *See* 18 AAC 75.055(a)(1);18 AAC
> 75.425(e)(4)(A)(iv). Leak detection standards have been in place since
> 1992 -- ADEC should not allow any further delay in installing, testing
> and ensuring that BPXA's transmission lines meet regulatory standards.
> Further AS 46.04.030(e) requires that the applicant use the best
> available technology *at the time the plan was renewed*. The
> technology
>
> exists (for example, the use of turbine meters in conjunction with
> other technology was determined to be best available technology at
> facilities like Lisburne), **yet BPXA has failed to implement such
> technology at Prudhoe Bay because of the cost of additional meters
> (estimated at around \$10 million).** Yet cost is not necessarily an
> excuse to fail to implement best available technology -- especially in
> the largest oil field in Alaska.[^36]

BP's position on that spill plan, which DEC ultimately accepted, appears
to directly rebut last week's BP testimony.

Finally, with respect to low stress pipelines such as those that failed
or were in danger of failing during 2006 at Prudhoe Bay,[^37] DEC
regulates BP's faulty pipelines under its "crude oil transmission
pipeline" requirements.[^38] Current DEC requirements do not deal
specifically with corrosion; however DEC's general oil pollution
prevention authority[^39] would have allowed inspectors to require
pipeline operators to take steps to prevent corrosion-related oil
discharges. That of course never happened.[^40]

DEC remarkably takes the position that its primary oil spill-related
"obligation is to ensure that an operator takes specific measures to be
prepared to effectively respond to spills from the operation once a
permit to drill has been issued."[^41] Moreover, its recent regulatory
revision process was designed to "improve clarity"[^42] although in
reality it mirrored an oil industry wish list.[^43]

And even the oil spill response focus of the proposed regulations was a
step back from the existing regulations. As the North Slope Borough
stated in its comments on the proposed regulations, "none of the
proposed regulatory changes will lead to measurable improvements in oil
spill response capability for the North Slope, a number of these
proposals will weaken the oil spill prevention and response systems
currently in place."[^44]

  Some experienced oil field workers have speculated as to the causes
for the lax state oversight of the oil industry. As former BP worker
Bill Burkett explained "\[a\]ny attempts by the State to increase
environmental protection would be met with threats from the industry to
take their business elsewhere. So when critics raised any safety or
environmental concerns through the State Agencies charged with
oversight, they went nowhere."[^45]

This dynamic is also recognized by independent energy industry analysts:

> \[T\]he sources of BP's apparent neglect of its pipelines may stem
> less from the company's own culture than from the regulatory vacuum
> surrounding feeder pipelines. Although feeder lines are subject to
> state regulations, it would be delusive to expect Alaska, an oil state
> heavily dependent on oil and gas investments, to effectively fill the
> federal regulatory gap when it is struggling to attract billions of
> dollars in gas pipeline investments from the very companies it is
> supposed to regulate. If indeed the root cause of BP's problems is
> regulatory rather than company-specific, pipeline problems might exist
> undetected at other Alaskan facilities that have not been subject to
> the scrutiny brought on BP by its recent safety record.[^46]

While the BP debacle should serve as a wake up call to Alaska to
overhaul its planning and regulatory programs, statements by Alaska's
leaders do not bode well for such change. Governor Murkowski recently
led a tour of reporters to the North Slope. At Prudhoe Bay, he intoned
"Let me welcome you to the best oil field in the world,\" and then
touted the quality of the field\'s operation.[^47]

[Federal Government]{.underline}

The Teshekpuk Lake discussion presented as the introduction to this
section demonstrates that federal land management and planning efforts
also suffer from broken promises and risky behavior. In fact, the
"promise" of BLM's decision to lease the Teshekpuk Lake region goes
beyond an analysis of cumulative impacts because it allows pipelines to
crisscross even those areas it deigns too sensitive for direct drilling
on the assumption that pipelines are benign elements of the industrial
infrastructure.[^48] Yet it is the risk posed by the inevitable
spills[^49] and intensive human activity (e.g., the need to monitor
pipelines by aircraft) such as that seen at Prudhoe Bay that the
scientists and local residents tell us will so gravely threaten that
region's remarkable natural resources.[^50] Consequently, while other
examples exist, the Teshekpuk Lake situation is sufficiently timely and
on point to act as the sole illustration of this point.

Turning to the regulatory world, BP's pipeline problems on the North
Slope amply demonstrate that investing in pipeline safety pays off in
environmental and economic benefits,[^51] though we are also failing to
heed this fact. DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) has jurisdiction over BP's pipelines, however
BP's so-called "transit" pipelines currently are exempt from federal
regulation. This means that other pipelines like BP's have no federal
corrosion prevention requirements or federal inspectors checking on
operations. Based on information PHMSA presented at the September 7
House Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee hearing, there were a
very large number, i.e., over 180, locations of significant wall
thinning from corrosion on BP's Eastern Operating Area pipeline. If this
pipeline were regulated, these locations of wall thinning would require
repairs under 49 CFR 195.452(h)(4)(iii).

Yet the history of attempts to place federal regulations on low stress
pipelines is not a pretty one. The following timeline shows actions the
federal government has taken and not taken to address the low-pressure
pipeline exemption:

> \* 1969: All low-pressure pipelines exempted from regulation.
>
> \* 1988: National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives
> (state pipeline regulators) sends the U.S. DOT a resolution asking
> that the low-pressure exemption be eliminated.[^52]
>
> \* 1990: U.S. DOT asks for comments on "whether and to what extent" to
> remove the low-pressure exemption from its regulations.[^53]
>
> \* 1992: Congress passes the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (Pub. L.
> 102-508) and directs U.S. DOT not to exempt pipelines from its
> regulations "only because the facility operates at low internal
> stress."[^54]
>
> \* 1992: Volpe National Transportation Systems Center issues a report
> for U.S. DOT[^55] estimating that there are 20,000 miles of onshore
> rural gathering lines and 22,000 miles of unregulated low-pressure
> transmission pipelines. The Volpe study also estimated that 38% of the
> 22,000 miles (nearly 7,000 miles) were near a populated area or a
> navigable waterway (leaving 15,000 miles of low-pressure transmission
> pipelines unregulated.)[^56]
>
> \* 1993: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking applying pipeline standards to
> low-pressure transmission pipelines that traverse a populated area or
> a navigable waterway. U.S. DOT deferred a decision on regulation of
> low-pressure lines in environmentally sensitive areas awaiting its
> development of a definition of environmentally sensitive areas.[^57]
>
> \* 1994: Final rule applying pipeline standards to low-pressure
> transmission pipelines located in non-rural areas and areas currently
> used for commercial navigation.[^58]
>
> \* 2006: American Petroleum Institute and the Association of Oil Pipe
> Lines submit a proposal in June to PHMSA identifying which
> low-pressure pipelines should be regulated.[^59]
>
> \* 2006: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
> Infrastructure marks-up H.R. 5782 in July, closely tracking industry's
> proposal identifying which low-pressure pipelines should be regulated.
> U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee holds a
> July hearing on a Discussion Draft for the reauthorized pipeline
> safety law which does not include details on which low-pressure
> pipelines should be regulated.
>
> \* 2006: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking applies *limited* pipeline
> standards to low-pressure transmission pipelines and gathering lines
> within ¼ mile of "unusually sensitive areas," which represent only 17%
> of the unregulated gathering and transmission pipeline universe
> according to the NOPR and 14% of the unregulated transmission pipeline
> universe.[^60] Using the figure of 15,000 unregulated miles developed
> by the Volpe Center, however, less than 5% (684 miles of 15,000 miles)
> of the low-stress transmission pipeline universe would be regulated
> under the NOPR.

Today, 18 years after state pipeline regulators asked U.S. DOT to remove
the exemption covering low-pressure pipelines entirely, PHMSA last week
proposed to regulate an incremental sliver of the unregulated low-stress
transmission pipeline universe. This means that many, many miles of
low-stress transmission pipelines remain unregulated and susceptible to
BP-like problems with their corresponding, adverse environmental and
economic consequences \-- on the North Slope this may be the vast
majority of the 1,600 miles of pipelines existing in the North Slope oil
fields. And PHMSA will never even know about most such problems because
unregulated pipelines need not report their releases to U.S. DOT -- out
of sight, out of mind.

The oil industry itself has always enjoyed special treatment in the form
of exemptions from environmental regulations that apply to the exact
same pollution originating from different industrial sources. Oil
industry-specific exemptions exist under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act,
and the Clean Water Act, among other laws.[^61] The very existence of
these exemptions belies any assertion that oil industry activities are
held to the highest possible environmental standards.

**The United States Can Control Its Destiny**

There is no question that BP needs to clean up its internal management
mess. The origin of the culture of intimidation and harassment within BP
must be found and rooted out -- including divorcing the performance of
good faith but potentially costly system integrity functions from
whatever bonuses and stock options are granted to critical BP employees.
Indeed, it would seem prudent that the timely and complete performance
of these functions be a condition of continued employment for such
workers.

That said, the United Sates must stop relying on industry to take the
lead in doing what is best for this nation. Government can and should
take the lead in ensuring the short and long-term viability and
integrity of our energy production and delivery systems. This should be
done to minimize risk to workers, who put their lives at risk in the
energy field, as well as to safeguard the environment. It should also be
done to minimize interruption of our nation's energy supply.

A good start to doing so would include implementation of the following
recommendations.

***Ensuring the Integrity of Alaska Oil Facilities***

A series of actions could begin the arduous but necessary task of
ensuring the integrity of Alaska's critical oil and gas industry
infrastructure including an independent audit of the management and
operations of such infrastructure, the creation of a citizen's oversight
group to watchdog the industry and government regulators, and the
inclusion of low stress pipelines in federal regulation. Each of these
recommendations is discussed, in turn, below.

*Congress should commission an independent, functional audit of Alaska
North Slope production facilities and cross-country delivery systems to
Valdez.*

To ascertain and address the root causes of the circumstances that have
recently come to light, Congress should authorize and fund an
independent panel to conduct a functional audit of the North Slope
delivery system and TAPS.[^62] In order to ensure the operational
integrity of this system, the personnel conducting this investigation
must have intimate, "boots-on-the-ground" knowledge of Alaska's
production and transportation system, similar to the expertise and
independence exhibited by participants in the State of Alaska's 1991
*Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill Commission. The audit, which must include a
follow-up to ensure positive results, should be conducted over a
two-year period, and along the following lines:

An initial report, to be completed in nine months, should examine both
the management structures and systems used in Alaska, including
government oversight, as well as physical hardware. In this regard, the
first task (taking, perhaps, three months) should be to determine
whether the North Slope production and delivery system, and its
operators, provide a reasonable margin of safety in all aspects of its
operations by:

\* Detecting problems critical to safe operations in a timely manner;

\* Providing timely response to critical problems, thereby minimizing
risk to workers, risk to the environment and interruption of a critical
component of this nation's energy supply; and

\* Demonstrating the capability to learn from experience and adapt to
changing conditions.

Based on these findings, the panel should assess root causes and
recommend institutional changes to address the identified problems. The
initial audit final report should be tendered to Congress within nine
months.

As we have seen, an audit without follow-through is not likely to result
in correction of problems identified in that audit review. Therefore,
nine months after completion of the initial audit, the panel should
reconvene to review (1) the status of the management system and hardware
problems identified in the initial report; (2) actions taken to address
the institutional problems identified in the initial report; and (3) new
developments the panel may elect to address. The follow-up report should
be tendered to Congress six months later, or two years after the initial
audit commences.

*Congress should establish a Citizens' Oversight Group for the*

*North Slope oil facilities and TAPS*

Shortly after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress established two
citizen oversight groups in Alaska -- one for Prince William Sound and
the other for Cook Inlet.[^63] However, no similar group was established
for the northern two-thirds of TAPS, or for the production complex at
Prudhoe Bay. At this time Congress should establish a Citizens'
Oversight Group, with dedicated funding from the North Slope production
and transportation operations that covers the entirety of this vital
domestic transportation system. Its function would be to ensure, through
independent citizen and community involvement, that the important North
Slope and TAPS energy systems are maintained and operated in a manner
that safeguards system integrity, the workers and the natural resources
of Alaska, and ensures the integrity of continued oil production and
shipment.

The structure for the group would best be developed in consultation with
the individuals and local communities of the affected regions. To assure
its independence from industry, the new citizens' oversight groups must,
at a minimum, be:

\* Funded at a guaranteed annual level; and

\* Made up of individuals appointed (but not employed) by local
governments, federally recognized tribes, indigenous groups,
environmental groups and other concerned citizens. (Industry and agency
regulatory agency personnel could participate actively but in an
*ex-officio* capacity.)

The creation of a group for the North Slope and all aspects of TAPS not
covered by the current regional citizens advisory councils would help
combat systemic operational and oversight problems such as those that we
are experiencing today. The group would oversee a staff whose expertise
provides regulators, the industry and the general public with a truly
independent evaluation of the efforts and accomplishments of the North
Slope and TAPS oil facility operations. The funding for the group could
come from external trust or escrow accounts set up to ensure the future
dismantling and removal of facilities and rehabilitation of the land on
which these oil facilities rest; thus ensuring that another promise of
the oil patch is fully met.

The owners of the TAPS have collected funds for the future dismantling,
removal and restoration (DR&R) of TAPS from shippers through pipeline
tariffs. That money, collected on an accelerated basis, is currently
passed through to the parent companies of the TAPS Owners. A 2004
analysis suggested that if TAPS operates through 2034 at historical
inflation and industry earnings rates, the industry's retention of the
pre-collected funds will generate income of approximately \$50 billion
after dismantling costs and all taxes are paid. Moreover, the TAPS
owners have collected sufficient funds to cover dismantling expenses in
2034, even if inflation averages an historically unprecedented 10%
between now and that time.[^64] To provide funds to ensure the safe and
environmentally sound operation of TAPS and promote the integrity of
continued North Slope development, the TAPS Owners should be required to
(a) place funds necessary for TAPS dismantling in an escrow account and
(b) contribute a portion of the excess income that they will earn from
past DR&R collections to a fund that would generate a minimum of \$3
million per year to help finance the North Slope and TAPS oversight
group.

The TAPS DR&R provisions apply only to the 800-mile TAPS right-of-way.
On the North Slope, six North Slope common carrier "feeder" pipelines
that carry oil between separate leases also generate DR&R funds. These
pipelines are much shorter than the 800-mile TAPS and their DR&R
collections are much smaller. The producing fields themselves operate
under different leasing terms from the pipeline right-of-way leases. The
field leases typically contain a requirement to restore the land to
original condition or to the conditions acceptable to the designated
agency official but do not specify a funding mechanism.[^65] Information
on how North Slope field operators charge users and account for this
long-term liability is not readily available.[^66] Congress should
investigate this issue and establish laws, as necessary, to ensure that
funds for future North Slope field dismantling will be available as
needed, but will not be over-collected, and that some portion of the
interest on this money can be directed to the oversight group as well.

*Congress should mandate regulation of low stress pipelines*

Although this committee does not have in initial jurisdiction over
pipeline operations, this subject is a critical to ensuring the safety
of the nation's energy supply. For this reason, the 2006 PHMSA proposed
rulemaking on low stress pipelines warrants comment here. The proposed
rules follow national attention to BP's North Slope problems. Moreover,
in developing its 2006 pipeline regulation rulemaking, PHMSA ignored
technical and other information provided to it by public interest
organizations and instead moved forward with industry\'s proposal
substantially intact.  This reactive, pro-industry posture must change
to one where federal regulation is proactive in preventing problems
before they happen.

The rulemaking proposal includes a patchwork of requirements taken from
49 CFR 195 with no credible evidence that the new application of these
requirements will reduce releases significantly. For example, the
proposed standards would reduce six pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations on pipeline integrity management (49 CFR 195.452) to one
unenforceable paragraph stating that pipeline operators \"may\" choose
to use smart pigs (or the equivalent).[^67] Additionally, the proposed
standards for regulated gathering lines do not include any type of
integrity management whatsoever.

Moreover, the "buffer zone" methodology -- covering pipelines in
unusually sensitive areas plus one-quarter mile \-- proposed by industry
and now by PHMSA should be rejected. Based on their dubious performance
record, all low-pressure pipelines deserve federal regulation and those
that may affect "High Consequence Areas" (as defined in 49 CFR 195.450)
should meet federal integrity management requirements (49 CFR 195.452).

Further, in an unprecedented action, PHMSA's proposal allows regulated
low-pressure transmission pipelines to meet much weaker standards than
other transmission pipelines. These pipelines should be regulated to the
higher standards applicable to other transmission lines, including the
low-pressure transmission pipelines that U.S. DOT regulated in 1994
(non-rural pipelines and pipelines near commercially navigable
waterways).

Finally, it should be noted that the costs for compliance with a more
comprehensive regulatory scheme would not be large, particularly in
comparison to the high costs to society when pipelines fail. PHMSA
predicts that its proposal will cost operators only \$17 million,[^68] a
relatively small amount given the likely higher costs when pipelines
like BP's fail, and a ridiculously low cost when compared to the tens of
billions of dollars routinely brought in as profits by oil companies in
recent years.

***Protecting Special Places***

The North Slope of Alaska is our nation's only arctic ecosystem. A
balanced approach would give wilderness protection to the coastal plain
of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and permanent protection for the
most biologically and culturally important areas of NPR-A and the Arctic
Ocean, while maximizing oil and gas potential in the central arctic
around Prudhoe Bay and elsewhere in the NPR-A.

The BP Prudhoe Bay debacle is but the latest example of the prudence of
this approach. The industrial complex necessary to produce oil from
Alaska's North Slope includes Prudhoe Bay as well 26 other producing oil
fields. These oil fields are spread across over 1,000 square miles of
Alaska's North Slope -- which is equal to the size of Rhode Island.
There are nearly 5,000 wells, over 500 miles of roads, over 1,800 miles
of pipelines on the North Slope, plus the 800 mile-long Trans Alaska
Pipeline, dozens of gravel mines, and multiple refineries, airports,
power plants and other industrial infrastructure.[^69]

Oil and gas drilling is a complicated endeavor and even regulations
designed with the best of intentions will not prevent pollution. The
legal and permitted aspects of the oil industry on Alaska's North Slope
allow for simply massive amounts of air pollution.[^70] Spills of oil
and other hazardous substances on Alaska's North Slope average well over
one a day, and are increasing in frequency. As noted above, even
Alaska's congressional representative Don Young, an ardent drilling
advocate if ever there was one, recently stated, "\[t\]he fact of the
matter is that sometimes leaks will occur."[^71] The facts are
impossible to escape; oil and gas activities are inherently dirty, and
fully industrialize the areas in which they occur.

There isn't a single federal or state agency evaluating questions about
which special landscapes and sensitive habitats on the Arctic coast
should be placed off limits to development. That the integrity of the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is continually under attack to be opened
to incompatible oil and gas development shows how far the scales are
already tipped away from conservation on the North Slope. It seems that
the governments are only interested in what can be opened and how fast
it can be done.

Indeed, given the present pace and scope of leasing and proposed oil
development, it is quite possible that the entire Arctic coast, on- and
offshore, will be crisscrossed with the infrastructure of industrial oil
development in our life times. This would be a real loss for the future
generations who would never know a wild Arctic. It would also be a loss
for science, as the National Research Council recommended establishing
protected areas---free of the influence of the oil industry---to serve
as scientific controls for the evaluation of the effects of oil and gas
activity and climate change.[^72]

[The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge]{.underline}

Created by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1960 to protect wilderness and
wildlife and expanded when President Jimmy Carter signed the 1980 Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), America\'s Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge has been one of the greatest conservation
legacies of both Republican and Democratic administrations. The Arctic
Refuge was established to conserve fish and wildlife populations and
habitats in their natural diversity; fulfill the international treaty
obligations of the US with respect to fish and wildlife and their
habitats, such as migratory waterfowl agreements and the Canada-US
Porcupine River caribou herd agreement; provide the opportunity for
local residents to continue their subsistence way of life; and to
protect water quality and quantity.\
\
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which manages the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge, today calls it \"the only conservation system unit that
protects, in an undisturbed condition, a complete spectrum of the arctic
ecosystems in North America.\" Such a broad spectrum of diverse habitats
occurring within a single protected unit is unparalleled in North
America; no other conservation area in the entire circumpolar north
hosts such abundant and diverse wildlife. Blanketed with snow for much
of the year, the Coastal Plain explodes with life during the brief
spring and summer months, earning the nickname of \"America's
Serengeti.\"

> \* The Porcupine River herd of 129,000 caribou gathers annually on the
> Coastal Plain to bear and nurse their young;
>
> \* Polar Bears rely on the Coastal Plain of the Arctic Refuge as their
> most important on-land denning habitat on American soil;
>
> \* Grizzly bears, wolves, wolverines, foxes, golden eagles, and snowy
> owls gather here to hunt and den.
>
> \* In the fall, the Coastal Plain of the Arctic Refuge supports up to
> 300,000 snow geese which detour to feed from their nesting grounds in
> Canada.
>
> \* Millions of other birds use the Arctic Refuge to nest and as a
> critical staging area before journeying on to every state in the
> country, and many countries in the world.

And the Arctic Refuge supports more than just wildlife. For a thousand
generations, the Gwich'in people of Northeast Alaska and Northwest
Canada have depended upon the Porcupine (River) caribou herd to sustain
their culture. The herd is central to their way of life, providing food,
clothing, and a critical link to their traditional ways. To the Gwich'in
people, the Coastal Plain is sacred ground.[^73]

The inevitable industrialization of the Arctic Refuge that would occur
were Congress to open it to oil and gas activities is simply not
compatible with these values of the Refuge. Congress should rebuff any
attempts to drill the Refuge, and permanently protect it through
legislation designating the Coastal Plain of the Refuge as designated
Wilderness.

[Sensitive Areas Within the NPRA]{.underline}

The National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska is the largest single unit of
public lands in the Nation. It harbors rich and important wildlife and
wildlands and a cultural heritage that sustains Inupiaq communities. The
conservation community recognizes that there will be additional oil and
gas leasing and development in this area. That said, a balanced approach
for development in the NPRA requires permanent protection of its special
places and values and development must adhere to strict environmental
standards, including those related to operations, cleanup and
restoration.

In recent years, the Interior Department has offered 11 million acres of
the NPR-A for oil and gas leasing, and 2.8 million acres are currently
under active leases. Of this, 1.3 million acres is in the Northeast
Planning Area of the Reserve, 87% of which was open to such leasing in
1998.

Absent congressional action, a final court injunction, or an
administrative retraction, the Interior Department is now scheduled to
offer 100 % of this area to leasing, most at a September 27 lease sale.
This would include the sensitive region around Teshekpuk Lake, which
harbors extremely important waterfowl and caribou habitat. Even James
Watt did not go this far, as he protected the area north and east of
Teshekpuk Lake because of its critical, international importance to
molting geese.

And Interior's decision is based on an extremely faulty foundation.
First, as described above, Interior once again deferred a full analysis
of the impacts of its decision on the environment, leading a federal
judge to preliminarily rule that Interior violated the law and that the
lease sale should not go forward.[^74] Further, an underlying premise of
Interior's decision to open 100% of this area of the Reserve to oil
leasing was that pipelines are low impact and thus their presence in
goose molting habitat (areas where geese go to replenish their flight
feathers, and are thus very sensitive to disturbance of any kind because
they cannot fly away) would not cause any harm.  As the experts tell us
(and these are the pre-eminent bird biologists in the country) the kind
of disturbance caused by such intensive human presence in the pipeline
areas could have population-level impacts on these waterfowl.[^75]

The decision to lease 100% of the Northeast Planning Area ignores the
voices of leading scientists, sportsmen from across the nation, and the
Alaska Native people who depend on the wildlife and subsistence
resources of the region. As Mayor Edward S. Itta of the North Slope
Borough stated in a recent letter to Interior Secretary Kempthorne:

> We understand the pressures in today's world to expand the lands and
> waters available for oil and gas leasing, exploration, and
> development. We must all recognize as well, however, that preservation
> of the special and sensitive surface values of some discreet areas is
> simply incompatible with industrial development. The risks posed to
> such areas by industrialization outweigh the benefits.

Expressing similar concerns, and well before the full extent of the
troubles at Prudhoe Bay were known, a bipartisan coalition of senators
wrote to Interior Secretary with a request to put on hold oil and gas
leasing in the sensitive areas around Teshekpuk Lake.

The BP Prudhoe Bay debacle thus provides but the latest in a long line
of reasons why leasing this region of the NPR-A is a bad idea. Congress
should therefore put a stop to it.

***Diversifying Our Energy Sources***

No amount of domestic drilling will bridge the gap between the oil we
use and the oil we might have under our soil, or lower gasoline prices.
The inescapable fact is that the United States consumes 25 percent of
the world's daily oil production, but we sit atop just three percent of
the world's oil supply.

To ensure a reliable source of energy for the United States, therefore,
we simply must diversify our sources of energy. Expert analyses
demonstrate that an immediate and long term commitment to alternative
energy can yield significant energy dividends in short order. Doing so
would also have an insulating effect on our energy supply, limiting the
impact on supply and prices caused by troubles in the oil fields.
Further, these investments in alternative energy would also help address
global warming, providing yet another benefit to mankind. Finally,
having a growing percentage of our energy portfolio in renewable energy
resources means stabilizing electric rates for consumers. In the world
wide energy environment in which we currently exist, continued reliance
on fossil fuels means higher and higher energy costs for these
consumers.

Therefore, developing alternative energy makes sense at every layer of
the energy debate. The recommendations provided here are just examples
of what can be done to promote alternative energy; Congress should
consider all of them and work with due haste to pass an alternative
energy policy.

First, when considering developing alternative energies as a
recommendation in response to BP's Prudhoe Bay debacle, perhaps it is
most appropriate to use Alaska itself as an example of the possibilities
afforded by investing in alternative energy. Alaska has some of the best
renewable energy resources in the world, and has just begun to develop
them. In our relatively small urban grid connected areas Alaska has
several opportunities for large-scale wind development including the
Fire Island proposal (located off of Anchorage in Cook Inlet) which
could generate between 50-100 MW for Anchorage, thus generating 10 to
20% of Anchorage's peak load requirements.

The utility in the Fairbanks area is also pursuing wind projects and has
an internal goal of producing 20% of its power from renewables by 2014.
At least one large geothermal resource (50-100 MW) is located near the
urban grid near Mt. Spurr, a volcano within sight of Anchorage. Alaskans
have gone to Iceland to see how that small country has become a world
leader in geothermal power, and just last month the small community of
Chena Hot Springs commissioned the first geothermal power plant in
Alaska using cutting edge technology; it produces electricity with the
lowest temperature geothermal water in the world (165 F).

In over 200 remote, mostly Alaska Native, communities around the state
the high price of oil means that the diesel those communities rely on to
generate electricity is making basic even the basics unaffordable.
Villagers already pay on average 4-5 times what urban Alaskan pay for
power. A \$200 or \$300 monthly electric bill in the winter means those
communities are just trying to survive, let alone prosper. Yet, there
are an estimated 60-70 villages that could utilize small wind turbines
to displace diesel and stabilize electric rates. Six villages already
have wind-diesel hybrid systems and other villages are waiting line for
systems.[^76]

As a start to developing these resources, enterprising Alaskans prepared
an alternative energy atlas of the state. (Attached). This atlas was
based on a similarly amazing alternative energy atlas of the Western
United States, which was created by a number of non-governmental
organizations, using private foundation funding. The Western U.S. Atlas
is an 80-page full color presentation of renewable energy sources such
as wind, solar, geothermal and biomass power, and it is available
on-line, thus making for an easy to use reference for developers,
landowners, and policy-makers.[^77] The United States government should
support the development of such atlases across the country.

At the same time, no longer can we sit back and just study the potential
for alternative energy. So while developing a full Alternative Energy
Atlas of the United States is an important step, we must also take
action. As an initial matter, a common, and common sense, element to the
vision for alternative energy is that the U.S. Congress pass a law that
provides a long-term alternative energy production tax credit to help
fuel our transition away from fossil fuels. Beyond that, the following
proposals outline specific action.

The National Association of State Public Interest Research Groups
endorses the following set of policies:

\* Reduce our dependence on oil and target a savings of one-third of the
oil we use today by 2025 (7 million barrels per day) through improved
gas mileage, better transportation choices and clean fuels;

\* Harness clean, renewable homegrown energy sources like properly-sited
wind, solar and alternative fuels for at least a quarter of all energy
needs by 2025.

\* Save energy with high-performance homes, buildings and appliances so
that by 2025 we use 10 percent less energy than we do today.

\* Invest in the New Energy for America Initiative, which would commit
\$30 billion over the next ten years to research and development funding
for energy-saving and renewable technologies so we can accomplish the
goals mentioned above.[^78]

The Sierra Club emphasizes that we could save over 3 million barrels of
oil each day if all of the vehicles in the U.S. averaged 40 miles per
gallon,[^79] which is far more than the 400,000 barrels provided by
Prudhoe Bay. The Sierra Club proposes changes to our current energy
policy that are quick, clean, cheap and safe:

> Quicker - Increasing energy efficiency technology and fuel efficiency
> will decrease our energy use and help relieve summer shortages
> immediately. In addition, wind turbines can be installed in six months
> and new, combined-cycle natural gas plants can begin saving energy and
> reducing pollution from old, dirty and inefficient plants by next
> year.
>
> Cleaner - By choosing energy options such as solar, wind and
> energy-efficient technologies, we can protect our clean air, clean
> water and climate.
>
> Cheaper - Not only do we save energy by using more efficient
> appliances and technologies, such as compact fluorescent lightbulbs,
> but we save billions of dollars, too. Raising fuel economy standards
> for cars, SUVs and other light trucks will save consumers \$45 billion
> a year at the gas pump.
>
> Safer - An energy plan that provides a strong balance of efficiency,
> renewable energy and cleaner natural gas production is safer for our
> public health and environment.[^80]

As a final example, the Natural Resources Defense Council has proposed a
"responsible Energy Plan for the United States which includes the
following elements and reasoning:

\* A commitment to save at least 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in
2015 and 10 million barrels per day by 2025. Technologies exist today
that can achieve these savings. We can put American manufacturers to
work building the most energy-efficient cars and trucks, and we can put
American farmers to work growing crops for new biofuels. We can save
American consumers money by increasing the efficiency of our cars and
trucks and strengthening smart growth policies. All of these steps will
reduce dangerous air pollution, including emissions that cause global
warming. Congress should set these savings in motion by enacting a
national requirement to reduce our oil use by 2.5 million barrels per
day.

\* The fastest, cleanest, and cheapest way for America to address its
growing energy demand is through energy efficiency-getting more and
better service using less energy. Thanks to readily available technology
for improving heating and cooling systems in buildings and increasing
the efficiency of everyday appliances, America can make dramatic cuts in
energy use without sacrificing comfort or profitability. Indeed, the
economic benefits of investing in efficiency measures typically outweigh
costs by a ratio of 2 to 1. To tap this underutilized energy resource,
NRDC is calling on Congress to extend the performance-based energy tax
incentives adopted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

\* Clean energy such as wind, solar, and biomass provides electricity
without damaging the environment or releasing dangerous air pollution.
In order to ensure that all Americans can take advantage of these clean
resources, NRDC endorses a federal renewable portfolio standard to
require electricity providers to include a minimum level of clean energy
resources in the electricity mix they deliver to their customers. We
also recommend extending the renewable-energy production tax credit to
keep renewables on their continued march to cost-competitiveness.[^81]

The United States Senate has before it right now a bill, introduced by
Senator Jeffords, to combat global warming, which deserves support in
its own right and as a way to strengthen our energy future.[^82] This
bill deserves your vote, and a quick passage.

**Conclusion**

In his book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed,[^83]
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Jared Diamond assesses the choices we face
today in the context of the fate of previous civilizations. He traces
how the ancient Mayans flourished for over 600 years until deforestation
and the erosion that followed destroyed their agriculture. In contrast,
he examined how other societies, such as the Icelanders of the 15^th^
century, saw the threat posed to their natural resources by overgrazing
and, in a practice that continues to this day, placed a cap on the
number of sheep in their herds so that they could sustainably interact
with their environment.

If anything, we face even more dire choices today, as not only is our
civilization here in the United States at risk, but so is our entire
world. We can choose to ignore the health, safety, and environmental
warning flags flying over our country and continue a myopic reliance on
oil and gas to fuel our society. Or we can begin an aggressive
transition to alternative, renewable, forms of energy; energy that will
allow us to interact with our world in a more sustainable manner. And do
so in a way that protects the special places and values that have helped
define the United States as a great civilization.

All of this is not to say that we should ignore the most immediate
lessons taught by the Prudhoe Bay debacle. As we bridge to these
alternative energy sources we must also struggle against the great
influence that the oil and gas giants have over our society, and ensure
that government acts in its proper role as steward of our environment
and protector of the existing energy supply infrastructure.

We can meet the short-term challenges by implementing the first category
of recommendations relayed above. By protecting, and respecting, special
and especially sensitive places like the Arctic Refuge and the area near
Teshekpuk Lake, and by pursuing alternative energy sources, the United
States can also start meeting the long-term challenges faced by our
society, and do so in a manner that will allow future generations to
inherit much of that which makes the United States of America the
greatest country on Earth; our vision and our environment.

[^1]: Mr. Van Tuyn would like to thank the following people for their
    assistance in preparing this testimony: Lois Epstein, Richard
    Fineberg, Mike Frank, Dan Lawn, Pamela A. Miller, Chris Rose, Stan
    Stephens, Stan Senner, Mike Steeves, Justin Tatham, Deborah Williams
    and others too sensitive or numerous to name. Any mistakes or
    omissions are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.

[^2]: National Research Council, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil
    and Gas Activities on Alaska's North Slope, National Academies Press
    (2003) (NRC Report).

[^3]: NRC Report at 1.

[^4]: National Audubon Society vs. Kempthorne, Memorandum Decision
    (Preliminary) at 15, September 6, 2006, No. 1:05-cv-00008-JKS (D.
    Ak.) (Audubon Memorandum Decision).

[^5]: Audubon Memorandum Decision at 14.

[^6]: NRC Report at 1.

[^7]: Statement of Bob Malone, then-regional president of BP U.S., as
    reported in The Wall Street Journal. Jim Carlton, Oil and Ice, In
    Alaskan Wilderness, Questions About Bush's 'Friendlier Technology',
    The Wall Street Journal (April 13, 2001) (emphasis added).

[^8]: Richard Mauer, BP Failure "shocked" Stevens, Anchorage Daily News
    (August 18, 2006).

[^9]: See Eric Nelson, Poisoning the Well: Whistleblower Disclosures of
    Illegal Hazardous Waste Disposal on Alaska's North Slope, The Alaska
    Forum for Environmental Responsibility, January 1997.
    (http://www.alaskaforum.org/reports.html). BP's "isolated incidents"
    claim was made by Richard C. Campbell (President, BP Exploration
    \[Alaska\], Inc.), \"URGENT --- Response to Alaska Forum Release\"
    (e-mail communiqué to all BP employees), Jan. 29, 1997. See U.S.
    Dept. of Justice, Press Release \"North Slope Driller Admits Illegal
    Disposal of Hazardous Waste; \$3 Million Plea Agreement Announced\"
    (April 30, 1998) (detailing fines and penalties); see also Maureen
    Clark, Associated Press, \"BP to pay \$22 million for dumping on
    slope,\" Fairbanks Daily News-Miner ( Sept. 24, 1999).

[^10]: See Kim Clark, "Danger in the oil patch: Workers say BP is
    violating probation," U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 6, 2001, p. 21.

[^11]: Jonathan Rugman, Oilfield Revelations, Channel 4 News, Anchorage,
    AK, March 11, 2002.

[^12]: The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission eventually fined
    BP \$1.3 million for safety violations in this incident, then added
    another \$100,000 penalty for failures to execute the new
    procedures. See: Sheila McNulty, "Well testing is cold comfort for
    Alaskan staff," Financial Times, Aug 27, 2002 and "BP admits test
    lapse at Alaskan well," Financial Times, Sept. 11, 2002; and Wesley
    Loy, "BP to pay \$ 1.4 mm for safety violation cases," Anchorage
    Daily News, Jan. 8, 2005; Ben Spiess, "Welder struck by plug, killed
    \-- Prudhoe Bay: Victim, 2 others were working on water pipeline,"
    Anchorage Daily News, December 22, 2002.

[^13]: Robert Brian, Instrument Technician for BP Exploration (Alaska)
    Statement before Senators Lieberman and Graham, March 11, 2002; see
    also Tony Hopfinger, Second BP Vet Blows the Whistle, Anchorage
    Daily News, March 13, 2002 at A1 (Robert Brian stating that "Working
    for BP is like working for a drunk driver \[who\] insists on driving
    you home.")

    .

[^14]: See Richard Fineberg, "Shocking?" Evidence Mounts from Alaska and
    Elsewhere that BP's Inadequate North Slope Performance Should Have
    Been No Surprise to Public Officials or Monitors (September 3, 2006)
    [www.finebergresearch.com](http://www.finebergresearch.com/)
    (footnotes omitted).

[^15]: Dermot Cole, For six years, BP reported progress on corrosion
    inspections, Fairbanks Daily News Miner (August 11, 2006).

[^16]: Jim Carlton, U.S. Officials Are Investigating Changes Made to
    Report on BP, Wall Street Journal (August 24, 2006); see also Dow
    Jones Newswires, BP Sought Lenient Assessment Of Alaska Oil Ops
    (August 24, 2006) ("BP complained that the Coffman assessment was
    \"biased and unduly negative\" and should be rewritten. In January
    2002, Coffman released a toned-down report, which included only one
    of the original criticisms..."); Matthew Dalton And John M. Biers,
    Consultant Warned BP Of Pipe-Network Corrosion, Wall Street Journal
    at A-3 (August 24, 2006) (BP "pipeline system vulnerable to
    localized corrosion, with large blind spots where problems would be
    difficult to detect.").

    The original Coffman documents, as well as an analysis of them
    prepared by former BP worker Glenn Plumlee, are available at
    [http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/AlaskanPipeline.html.](http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/AlaskanPipeline.html. )

[^17]: See
    <http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy06/060302301/060302301_index.htm>
    (State of Alaska information on spill);
    <http://www.finebergresearch.com/pdf/Neport060315Rev.pdf>
    (independent analyst's report on March spill);
    <http://www.alaskaforum.org/news_stories.html> (media regarding the
    spill).

[^18]: See
    [http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Oil-Field-Shutdown.html?hp&ex=1155009600&en=4ca2929e3a060a67&ei=5094&partner=homepage;\
    ](http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Oil-Field-Shutdown.html?hp&ex=1155009600&en=4ca2929e3a060a67&ei=5094&partner=homepage; %0B)http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7020594.

[^19]: John Biers, BP Pumping West Prudhoe Bay Would Be Without \'Pig\'
    Test, Dow Jones Newswires (August 14, 2006); see also Jessica
    Resnick-Ault, Wall Street Journal, BP to Keep Some Prudhoe Oil
    Flowing (August 12, 2006) (\"Over the last five days we have doubled
    spot inspections over a key five-mile segment of the oil transit
    pipeline serving the western side of the field,\" BP America
    President Bob Malone said in a press release. \"The results have
    been encouraging and have increased our confidence in the
    operational integrity of this pipeline. With greatly enhanced
    surveillance and response capability, I am confident we can continue
    to safely operate the line.\")

[^20]: See Oil in the Arctic, Trustees for Alaska, NRDC, NWF (1988);
    Tracking Arctic Oil, Trustees for Alaska et al. (1991),
    [http://www.trustees.org/Supporting%20Documents/Tracking%20Arctic%20Oil.pdf](http://www.trustees.org/Supporting Documents/Tracking Arctic Oil.pdf);
    Oil and the Industrialization of Amercia's Arctic, Trustees for
    Alaska (1998),
    [http://www.trustees.org/Supporting%20Documents/Under%20the%20Influence.pdf](http://www.trustees.org/Supporting Documents/Under the Influence.pdf).

[^21]: See Recent Oil Company Fines and Penalties in the North Slope
    Oilfields, and cites therein.
    [http://www.northern.org/artman/uploads/oil_company_fines_and_penalties8-9-06.pdf#search=%22ConocoPhillips%20Clean%20Air%20Act%20%2480%2C000%22](http://www.northern.org/artman/uploads/oil_company_fines_and_penalties8-9-06.pdf#search=).

[^22]: DEC Compliance Order by Consent No. 99-267-50-1332 to ARCO Alaska
    Inc. (Nov. 7, 1999);

    DEC Compliance Order by Consent No. 99-267-50-1372 to ARCO Alaska
    Inc. (Nov. 22, 1999); DEC Compliance Order by Consent No.
    99-370-50-1381 to ARCO Alaska Inc. (for Doyon Drilling Units) (Dec.
    20, 1999).

[^23]: Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska Oil and Gas Report
    at pages 3-35 (December 2004),
    [www.dog.dnr.stat.ak.us](http://www.dog.dnr.stat.ak.us/).

[^24]: DEC Compliance Order by Consent (COBC) No. 00-586-50-1712 to
    Phillips (Jan. 10, 2001).

[^25]: Jim Carlton, EPA Pursues Report that oil crew dumped polluted mud
    in Alaska, *Wall Street Journal* (October 19, 2005).

[^26]: The major owners of Alyeska are BP (46%), ConocoPhillips (28%)
    and ExxonMobil (20%).

[^27]: Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, et al., *Joint
    After-Action Report for the TAPS Bullet Hole Response* (October
    2001), Feb. 8, 2002, http://www.state.ak.us/dec/dspar/perp/home.htm.
    For the TAPS oil spill contingency plan reference to the bullet hole
    clamp, see Trans Alaska Pipeline System, Pipeline Oil Discharge
    Prevention and Contingency Plan -- General Provisions, Dec, 31, 2003
    (Ed. 4, Rev. 1) , pp. 1-375-376. (The version of the TAPS C-plan
    approved three months after the Oct. 4, 2001 spill \[Rev. 0, Dec.
    31, 2001\] contains identical language at pp. 179-180.)

[^28]: See Richard A. Fineberg, "Documents Reveal Trans-Alaska Pipeline
    In Trouble; Monitors Punt**" (**November 2, 2005),
    http://www.finebergresearch.com/archives/spilling.html; and Jim
    Carlton, "Alaskan Pipeline Faces Safety Risk, Executive Warned,"
    Wall Street Journal (September 17, 2005).

[^29]: State renewal of its right-of-way lease agreement was formally
    issued on Nov. 26, 2002; the federal grant was renewed six weeks
    later. For information concerning the performance failures on the
    TAPS right-of-way renewal, see Richard A. Fineberg, "Background
    Report: TAPS Lease Renewal \-- Opportunity Lost" (August 2004),
    http://www.finebergresearch.com/tapsenviro.html.

[^30]: See e.g., *Trustees for Alaska v. State of Alaska, Dept. of Nat.
    Resources*, 865 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1993) (holding that DNR's best
    interest finding regarding oil and gas leasing near Demarcation
    Point was inadequate because it failed to address the risks of
    transporting oil from the sale area to market and it failed to
    consider impacts on the Porcupine caribou herd and on the
    subsistence users of the herd); *Trustees for Alaska v. State of
    Alaska, Dept. of Nat. Resources*, 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993)
    (holding that DNR's consistency determination regarding the sale of
    oil and gas leases in Camden Bay violated the ACMP by, among other
    things, inadequately addressing geophysical hazards).

[^31]: Compare AS 35.05.035 as it existed in 1990 with AS 35.05.035 as
    it exists today.

[^32]: Governor Issues 'Streamlining' Executive Orders, Anchorage Daily
    News, B2 (Feb. 13, 2003).

[^33]: Murkowski issues habitat division order, Fairbanks Daily
    News-Miner (February 12, 2003).

[^34]: See infra footnotes 16 -- 17 and accompanying text.

[^35]: This situation was exposed at the House Energy and Commerce
    Committee, Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, Hearing on
    BP's Pipeline Spills at Prudhoe Bay: What Went Wrong? (September 7,
    2006).

[^36]: Letter from Trustees for Alaska to DEC re BP Exploration (Alaska)
    (BPXA) Greater Prudhoe Bay Unit, Oil Discharge Prevention and
    Contingency Plan, ADEC Plan Number 014-CP-5079 at page 7

    (February 18, 2002),
    [http://www.trustees.org/Supporting%20Documents/C-Plan/Greater%20Prudhoe%20Bay%20C-Plan%202002%20Comments.pdf](http://www.trustees.org/Supporting Documents/C-Plan/Greater Prudhoe Bay C-Plan 2002 Comments.pdf)
    (italics emphasis in original, bold emphasis added).  

[^37]: "*Low-stress pipeline* means a hazardous liquid pipeline that is
    operated in its entirety at a stress level of 20 percent or less of
    the specified minimum yield strength of the line pipe." (49 CFR
    195.2)

[^38]: 18 AAC 75.055.

[^39]: For example, 18 AAC 75.005, Responsibility states: The owner or
    operator of an oil tank vessel, oil barge, pipeline, oil terminal,
    railroad tank car, exploration facility, or production facility
    subject to the requirements of [AS
    46.04.030](http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/stattx05/query=%5BJUMP:'AS4604030'%5D/doc/{@1}/hits_only?firsthit)
    or [AS
    46.04.055](http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/stattx05/query=%5BJUMP:'AS4604055'%5D/doc/{@1}/hits_only?firsthit)
    (j) is responsible for meeting the applicable requirements of this
    chapter and *for preventing the discharge of oil into waters or onto
    land of the state* (emphasis added).

[^40]: A former DEC air pollution expert identifies problems with the
    air pollution regualotry regime on the North Slope:

    > The state, with the acquiescence of the federal Environmental
    > Protection Agency, has significantly aggravated air pollution by
    > piecemeal permitting of small parts of each facility. This is a
    > problem since air pollution is regulated by assigning limits to an
    > entire facility. By substituting multiple sub-units for a single
    > facility, the allowable emissions have been increased many times
    > over.

    Letter from Bill McClarence to Anchorage Daiy News, (published
    September 9, 2006).

[^41]: DEC, Oil Discharge Prevention & Contingency Plan, Regulation
    Revisions, Public Noticed September 8, 2003 -- October 13, 2003,
    Response To Comments at 5 (May 14, 2004).

[^42]: See id. at 1.

[^43]: See Alaska Oil and Gas Association (AOGA), "AOGA Briefing Paper
    on Improving the Contingency Plan Process," submitted to ADEC on
    October 15, 2002. Meanwhile, the North Slope Borough, which had been
    asking for new, tougher regulation for years, complained to DEC that
    "only one of its proposed regulatory changes was even considered by
    DEC." Comment Letter from North Slope Borough Planning Department to
    DEC at 4 (July 3, 2003).

[^44]: Comment Letter from North Slope Borough Planning Department to
    DEC at 2 (July 3, 2003). DEC is also abdicating its responsibility
    to review spill planning for offshore well blowouts. See A Fair
    Warning: Diminished State Oversight Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans
    at pages 3-9 (February 2006),

    [http://www.trustees.org/Supporting%20Documents/C-Plan/A%20Fair%20Warning%20C-Plan%20FINAL%202-2006.pdf](http://www.trustees.org/Supporting Documents/C-Plan/A Fair Warning C-Plan FINAL 2-2006.pdf).

[^45]: William B. Burkett, Statement before Chairman J. Lieberman and B.
    Graham, March 4, 2002.

[^46]: Antoine Halff, Veronique Lashinski, Beyond Prudhoe, FIMTA Energy
    Research (August 7, 2006).

[^47]: Wesley Loy, Governor visits the Slope, Anchorage Daily News
    (August 11, 2006).

[^48]: See Map, Potential Teshekpuk Lake Development Allowed under BLM
    ROD (January 2006), Alaska Center for the Environment, Conservation
    GIS (map created May 5, 2006) (attached); see also NPRA NE FEIS at
    4-17 (January 2005) (\"\[N\]umerous technological advancements have
    been made during the decades of operations on the North Slope that
    have allowed current development activities to proceed at a lower
    cost and with less environmental impact than previous operations.\")

[^49]: Even staunch drilling proponents such as Representative Don Young
    admit that "\[t\]he fact of the matter is that sometimes leaks will
    occur." Congressman Don Young, Press Release, House Transportation
    Committee Hearing on Pipeline Safety (March 16, 2006). The facts of
    North Slope oil development, where spills of oil and other hazardous
    substances are on the rise and average well over one a day, support
    his statement. See Facts, North Slope Oil Development,
    <http://www.northern.org/artman/uploads/northslopefactsspills3-29-05.pdf>,
    and cites therein; see also
    [http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=%22national%20research%20council%20north%20slope%20oil%22](http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=)
    (same).

[^50]: See e.g., Letter by Terry Crawforth, Chairman, Pacific Flyway
    Council to Interior Secretary Gale Norton at page 1 (August 2005)
    (BLM's approach "would allow facilities and infrastructure for oil
    and gas production to impinge on sensitive molting geese ... \[a\]nd
    minimizes the value of contiguous undisturbed habitat that is the
    essence of why molting geese have established a strong tradition of
    molting in \[this\] region"); Letter from Kenneth Able et al.
    (including about \~200 ornithologists, wildlife biologists and
    environmental scientists) to BLM's NE NPR-A Amendment Planning Team
    at page 2 (August 23, 2004) ("Molting geese will run at the sight of
    a distant person, and disturbance by aircraft overhead---to which
    brant apparently do not habituate--- is a major problem"); see also
    Audubon Alaska, Wildlife and Oil Development at Teshkpuk Lake,
    <http://www.audubon.org/chapter/ak/ak/images/Teshekpuk_low.pdf>
    (providing information on the environment of the Teshekpuk Lake
    region, the threat posed to it by oil development, and the opinions
    of scientific experts; see also Letter from North Slope Borough to
    Interior Secretary Kempthorne (August 31, 2006) (expressing
    continued objection to the scheduled September 27, 2006 oil and gas
    lease sale for the Northeast Planning Area of the Reserve based on
    the incompatibility of industrial development with the critical
    subsistence resources and harvests of that region).

[^51]: For example, among the economic costs of the BP situation was the
    fact that the state of Alaska lost \$6.4 million in royalties and
    taxes for each day the oil field was shut-down. Matt Volz, Murkowski
    institutes hiring freeze after shutdown, Anchorage Daily News
    (August 9, 2006).

[^52]: Resolution 1988-1-P1, 20 Percent SMYS, sent to U.S. DOT on August
    4, 1988.

[^53]: See 55 Federal Register 45822 (October 31, 1990).

[^54]: See 49 USC 60102(k).

[^55]: *Economic Evaluation of Regulating Certain Hazardous Liquid
    Pipeline Operating at 20% or Less of Specified Minimum Yield
    Strength*, Deanna Mirsky of EG&G/Dynatrend and The Hazardous
    Materials Transportation Special Projects Office, Volpe National
    Transportation Special Projects Office, July 21, 1992.

[^56]: In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) published in the
    Federal Register on September 6, 2006, however, PHMSA used industry
    data -- *which includes irrelevant offshore gathering line
    information and gathering lines too small to be regulated* -- to
    estimate that only 5,000 miles of low-pressure transmission pipeline
    currently are unregulated. In section 6.1.1 of the Regulatory
    Evaluation for this NOPR (U.S. Department of Transportation Docket
    Number
    [RSPA-2003-15864-36](http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?documentid=412529&docketid=15864)),
    PHMSA says it used the Association of Oil Pipe Lines' "Pipeline 101"
    estimate of 35,000 miles of gathering line mileage which includes
    onshore and offshore gathering lines and gathering lines as small as
    2" in diameter. Section 6.1.2 of the Regulatory Evaluation describes
    how PHMSA subtracted these 35,000 miles from the approximately
    40,000 miles of unregulated pipelines and concluded that there are
    only 5,000 miles of unregulated, low-stress transmission pipelines
    (i.e., disregarding the fact that the 35,000 mile figure contains
    significant offshore and small diameter gathering line mileage).

[^57]: [See]{.underline} 58 Federal Register 12213 (March 3, 1993).

[^58]: [See]{.underline} 59 Federal Register 35465 (July 12, 1994).

[^59]: U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Number
    [RSPA-2003-15864-22](http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?documentid=400769&docketid=15864).

[^60]: [See]{.underline} 71 Federal Register 52515 (September 6, 2006).

[^61]: See Testimony of Peter Van Tuyn, House Resources Committee,
    Hearing on H.R. 39, text accompanying endnotes 37 to 43 (March 12,
    2003),
    http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/archives/108/testimony/petervantuyn.htm.

[^62]: After the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress authorized -- but
    never funded -- an audit of North Slope transportation systems.
    (See: Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990, Sec. 8103. Presidential Task
    Force.)

[^63]: Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990, Sec. 5002(d).

[^64]: See Richard A. Fineberg, Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
    Dismantling, Removal and Restoration (DR&R): Background Report and
    Recommendations, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory
    Council, 2004, Appendix Tables 6-8.

[^65]: Summarized from documents submitted by the Alaska Departments of
    Environmental Conservation, Law and Natural Resources and the Alaska
    Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to a joint hearing of the Alaska
    State House of Representatives and Senate Resources Committees, Aug.
    18, 2006; and by Vice Adm. Thomas G.Barrett, Administrator, Pipeline
    And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, to the U.S. House
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of
    Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (September 7,
    2006).

[^66]: In its 2003 report on cumulative environmental effects of Alaska
    North Slope oil and gas activities, the National Research Council
    noted that, "there has been no comprehensive estimate of the costs
    of dismantlement and removal of infrastructure and subsequent
    restoration and rehabilitation (DRR) of affected North Slope areas."
    NRC Report at 150.

[^67]: [See]{.underline} 71 Federal Register 52519 (September 6, 2006),
    proposed section 195.12(b)(10).

[^68]: [See]{.underline} 71 Federal Register 52515 (September 6, 2006).

[^69]: See Facts, North Slope Oil Development,
    <http://www.northern.org/artman/uploads/northslopefactsspills3-29-05.pdf>,
    and cites therein; see also
    [http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=%22national%20research%20council%20north%20slope%20oil%22](http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=)
    (same).

[^70]: See Facts, North Slope Oil Development,
    <http://www.northern.org/artman/uploads/northslopefactsspills3-29-05.pdf>,
    and cites therein; see also
    [http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=%22national%20research%20council%20north%20slope%20oil%22](http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Facts-OilSpillsAndFines.pdf#search=)
    (same). This huge industrial complex emits air pollution in such a
    large volume that it can be detected hundreds of miles away. The air
    pollution includes massive amounts of greenhouse gases, as well as
    smog and acid rain-producing Nitrogen Oxide in amounts twice that of
    the D.C. metropolitan area. See id.

[^71]: See infra note 49, citing Congressman Don Young, Press Release,
    House Transportation Committee Hearing on Pipeline Safety (March 16,
    2006).

[^72]: See NRC Report at 151.

[^73]: For more background on the Arctic Refuge, see
    [http://www.alaskawild.org/campaigns_arctic.html#coastal%20plain](http://www.alaskawild.org/campaigns_arctic.html#coastal plain);
    <http://www.wilderness.org/OurIssues/Arctic/>;
    <http://www.savearcticrefuge.org/learnmore.html>;
    http://www.savebiogems.org/arctic/
    <http://www.sierraclub.org/arctic/>.

[^74]: See infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.

[^75]: See e.g., Letter by Terry Crawforth, Chairman, Pacific Flyway
    Council to Interior Secretary Gale Norton at page 1 (August 2005)
    (BLM's approach "would allow facilities and infrastructure for oil
    and gas production to impinge on sensitive molting geese ... \[a\]nd
    minimizes the value of contiguous undisturbed habitat that is the
    essence of why molting geese have established a strong tradition of
    molting in \[this\] region"); Letter from Kenneth Able et al.
    (including about \~200 ornithologists, wildlife biologists and
    environmental scientists) to BLM's NE NPR-A Amendment Planning Team
    at page 2 (August 23, 2004) ("Molting geese will run at the sight of
    a distant person, and disturbance by aircraft overhead---to which
    brant apparently do not habituate--- is a major problem"); Audubon
    Alaska, Wildlife and Oil Development at Teshekpuk Lake,
    <http://www.audubon.org/chapter/ak/ak/images/Teshekpuk_low.pdf>
    (summarizing expert opinions on development in the Teshekpuk Lake
    region).

[^76]: Alaska summary above taken from email from Chris Rose, executive
    director, Renewable Energy Alaska Project (REAP), September 8, 2006
    (on file with the author).

[^77]: See <http://www.energyatlas.org/>. The Hewlett Foundation and The
    Energy Foundation sponsored the Atlas, and the following
    organizations joined together to create it: the Land and Water Fund
    of the Rockies, Northwest Sustainable Energy for Economic
    Development, Green Info Network and Integral GIS.

[^78]: See <http://newenergyfuture.com/newenergy.asp?id2=18565>; see
    also Rising to the Challenge: Six Steps to Cut Global Warming
    Pollution in the United States,
    <http://uspirg.org/uspirg.asp?id2=26147>.

[^79]: <http://www.sierraclub.org/globalwarming/biggest_single_step/>.

[^80]: <http://www.sierraclub.org/globalwarming/bush_plan/factsheet.asp>.

[^81]: <http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rep/execsum.asp>.

[^82]: See
    <http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/06/07/072006climatebill.html>.

[^83]: Viking Penguin (2005).