![](media/image1.png){width="0.7819444444444444in"
height="0.7006944444444444in"}**NASA PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS**

**NPR: 8715.3A**

**Effective Date: September 12, 2006**

**Expiration Date: September 12, 2011**

NASA General Safety Program Requirements

**Responsible Office:** **Office of Safety and Mission Assurance**

**NASA Procedural Requirements**

####### **NPR: 8715.3A**

**Effective Date: September 12, 2006**

**Expiration Date: September 12, 2011**

**NASA General Safety Program Requirements**

**Responsible Office: Office of Safety and Mission Assurance**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**[Cover]{.underline}**

**[Preface]{.underline}**

P.1 PURPOSE\
P.2 APPLICABILITY\
P.3 AUTHORITY\
P.4 REFERENCES\
P.5 CANCELLATION

**[CHAPTER 1. Institutional and Programmatic Safety
Requirements]{.underline}**

1.1 Overview of the NASA Safety Program\
1.2 NASA General Safety Program Roles and Responsibilities\
1.3 Public Safety

1.4 Institutional Roles and Responsibilities in the NASA Safety Program

1.5 Program Management Roles and Responsibilities in the NASA Safety
Program\
1.6 Risk Assessment and Risk Acceptance

1.7 Technical Safety Requirements for NASA-Unique Designs and
Operations\
1.8 SMA Program Reviews\
1.9 Advisory Panels, Committees, and Boards\
1.10 Coordination with Organizations External to NASA\
1.11 Safety Motivation and Awards Program\
1.12 Safety Management Information\
1.13 Safety Variances

[**CHAPTER 2. System Safety**]{.underline}

2.1 Introduction\
2.2 Institutional Roles and Responsibilities\
2.3 System Safety Framework\
2.4 Scope of System Safety Modeling\
2.5 Core Requirements for System Safety Processes\
2.6 System Safety Reviews\
2.7 Change Review\
2.8 Documentation

[**CHAPTER 3. Operational Safety**]{.underline}

3.1 Purpose and Objectives\
3.2 Motor Vehicle Safety\
3.3 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)\
3.4 Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout Program)\
3.5 Pressure System Safety\
3.6 Electrical Safety\
3.7 Hazardous Material Transportation, Storage, and Use\
3.8 Hazardous Operations\
3.9 Laboratory Hazards\
3.10 Lifting Safety\
3.11 Explosive, Propellant, and Pyrotechnic Safety\
3.12 Underwater Operations Safety\
3.13 Launch, Entry, and Experimental Aeronautical Vehicle Operations
Safety\
3.14 Test Operations Safety\
3.15 Non-Ionizing Radiation\
3.16 Ionizing Radiation\
3.17 Confined Spaces

[**CHAPTER 4. Aviation Safety**]{.underline}

4.1 Purpose and Scope\
4.2 Aviation Safety Program Responsibilities\
4.3 Interfaces with Other Agencies

[**CHAPTER 5. Fire Safety**]{.underline}

5.1 Purpose, Goals, and Objectives\
5.2 Responsibilities\
5.3 Fire Safety Program\
5.4 Fire Protection Systems\
5.5 Firefighting\
5.6 Emergency (Pre-Fire) Planning and Procedures\
5.7 Fire Safety Training\
5.8 Reporting\
5.9 Current Regulations, Codes, and Standards and Variances

[**CHAPTER 6. Nuclear Safety for Launching of Radioactive
Materials**]{.underline}

6.1 Purpose\
6.2 Responsibilities\
6.3 Nuclear Launch Safety Approval Process\
6.4 Report Requirements

[**CHAPTER 7. Safety Training and Personnel Certification**]{.underline}

7.1 Purpose\
7.2 Responsibilities\
7.3 Planning and Implementation of the Safety Training Program\
7.4 Personnel Safety Certification Programs for Potentially Hazardous
Operations and Materials\
7.5 Mission Critical Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

7.6 Hazardous Materials and Chemicals Risk Information

7.7 Exclusions

[**CHAPTER 8. Safety for Facility Acquisition, Construction, Activation,
and Disposal**]{.underline}

8.1 Purpose\
8.2 Roles and Responsibilities\
8.3 Facility Acquisition, Construction, and Activation Objectives\
8.4 Basic Requirements for Facility Acquisition, Construction, and
Activation\
8.5 Facility Managers\
8.6 FSMP

[**CHAPTER 9. Safety and Risk Management** **for NASA
Contracts**]{.underline}

9.1 Purpose\
9.2 Applicability and Scope\
9.3 Authority and Responsibility\
9.4 Requirements\
9.5 Access to NASA Facilities by State and Federal Compliance Safety and
Health Officers\
9.6 Contractor Citations\
9.7 Grants

[**Appendices**]{.underline}

A. Acronym and Abbreviation List\
B. Glossary of Safety and Risk Management Terms

C. Safety Motivation and Awards Program

D. Activity and Radioactive Material Limits - Basic A~1~/A~2~ Values\
E. Sample Safety and Health Plan for Service or Operations Contracts\
F. Sample System Safety Technical Plan for Systems Acquisition,
Research, and Development Programs\
G. Aviation Safety Panel

H. NASA Operations and Engineering Panel for Facilities

**NPR 8715.3A, NASA General Safety Program Requirements\
Change History**

  ---------- ---------- ----------------------------------------------------
  **Change   **Date**   **Description**
  No.**                 

                        

                        

                        
  ---------- ---------- ----------------------------------------------------

**PREFACE**

**P.1 [PURPOSE]{.underline}**

a\. This NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) provides the basis for the
NASA Safety Program and serves as a general framework to structure more
specific and detailed requirements for NASA Headquarters, Programs, and
Centers. This document does not stand alone and is to be used in
conjunction with the references listed in paragraph P.4.

b\. This NPR is directed toward safety requirements and is not meant to
provide requirements for occupational health or environmental health
personnel or to provide requirements for occupational health and
environmental activities. Some health and environmental safety
references are included to assist Center safety personnel in
interactions with occupational health and environmental personnel.
Occupational safety and health requirements that implement 29 CFR Part
1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees, Occupational Safety
and Health Programs and Related Matters, are specified in NPR 8715.1,
NASA Occupational Safety and Health Programs. Environmental requirements
are specified in NPD 8500.1, NASA Environmental Management.

c\. This NPR does not provide requirements for emergency planning.
Emergency planning requirements are specified in NPD 8710.1, Emergency
Preparedness Program.

d\. To address special processes and/or discipline-unique processes, the
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance publishes standards that provide
specific instructions that are beyond the scope and detail of this
document. A listing of applicable Federal requirements, NPRs, and
standards can be found in paragraphs P.3 and P.4 of this NPR.

**P.2 [APPLICABILITY]{.underline}**

a\. This NPR is applicable to NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers
including Component Facilities, and Technical and Service Support
Centers. This NPR applies to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) or to
other contractors or grant recipients only to the extent specified or
referenced in applicable contracts, grants, or agreements.

b\. The procedural requirements in this document apply: (1) to all NASA
organizations, elements, entities, or individuals; (2) to visitors on
NASA property; (3) to all NASA equipment, property, systems, and
facilities; (4) during all phases of the life cycle of systems or
facilities; and (5) as specified in contract requirements.

c\. The provisions of this document apply to non-NASA, non-contractor
personnel when on NASA property.

d\. The requirements in this NPR do not supersede more stringent
requirements imposed by other Federal, State, or local government
agencies.

e\. In this NPR, a requirement is identified by a "shall" statement and
followed by the phrase "(Requirement xxxxx)." The number (xxxxx) is
assigned to each requirement statement for the Safety and Mission
Assurance Requirements Tracking System.

> *Note: The word \"shall\" indicates that the rule is mandatory.
> Noncompliance with a \"shall\" statement requires approval of a
> variance. Any text that does not contain a "shall" statement is for
> information and contextual purposes only.*

f\. In this NPR, the word "project" refers to a unit of work performed
in programs, projects, and activities. Management of a work unit is
referred to as "project management," which includes managing programs,
projects, and activities.

g\. In this NPR, a system is: (a) the combination of elements that
function together to produce the capability to meet a need and (b) the
end product (performs operational functions) and enabling products
(provide life-cycle support services to the operational end products)
that make up a system. The elements include all hardware, software,
equipment, facilities, personnel, processes, and procedures needed for
this purpose.

h\. The Center Director for NASA Headquarters is the Assistant
Administrator for Infrastructure and Administration. In this NPR,
requirements for Center Directors applicable to NASA Headquarters also
pertain to the Assistant Administrator for Infrastructure and
Administration.

**P.3 [AUTHORITY]{.underline}**

a\. 42 U.S.C. § 2473( c )(1), Section 203 ( c )(1) of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended.

b\. 5 U.S.C., Government Organization And Employees, Paragraph 7902;
[Safety
Programs](http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=7902&url=/uscode/html/uscode05/usc_sec_05_00007902----000-notes.html).

c\. 5 U.S.C. § 7903, Protective Clothing and Equipment.

d\. 29 U.S.C., Labor, Paragraph 651 et seq.

e\. 40 U.S.C. § 3312, Compliance with Nationally Recognized Codes.

f\. 49 U.S.C., Transportation § 1421, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, as amended.

g\. 49 U.S.C § 5102, Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Definitions.

h\. 5 CFR Part 532, Prevailing Rate Systems.

i\. 5 CFR Part 550, Pay Administration (General).

j\. 14 CFR Part 1214, Subpart 1214.5, Space Flight: Mission Critical
Space Systems Personnel Reliability Program.

k\. 14 CFR Part 1216, Subpart 1216.3, Procedures for Implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

l\. 21 CFR Part 1040, Performance Standards for Light Emitting Products.

m\. 21 CFR Part 1040.10, Laser Products.

n\. 21 CFR Part 1040.11, Specific Purpose Laser Products.

o\. 29 CFR Part 1904.32, Annual Summary.

p\. 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards.

q\. 29 CFR 1926, Safety And Health Regulations For Construction.

r\. 29 CFR Part 1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees,
Occupational Safety and Health Programs and Related Matters.

s\. 45 CFR Part 46, Protection of Human Subjects.

[]{.mark}

t\. 48 CFR Part 1807, NASA FAR Supplement; Acquisition Planning.

u\. 48 CFR Part 1823, NASA FAR Supplement; Environment, Energy and Water
Efficiency, Renewable Energy Technologies, Occupational Safety, and
Drug-Free Workplace.

v\. 48 CFR Part 1842, NASA FAR Supplement; Contract Administration and
Audit Services.

w\. 48 CFR Part 1846, NASA FAR Supplement; Quality Assurance.

x\. 49 CFR Part 171.8, Hazardous Material Regulations; Definitions and
Abbreviations.

y\. 49 CFR Part 172.101, Purpose and Use of Hazardous Materials Table.

z\. 49 CFR Part 177, Carriage by Public Highway.

aa. 49 CFR Part 571, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

ab. EO 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad Of Major Federal Actions.

ac. EO 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal
Employees, dated February 26, 1980, as amended.

ad. EO 13043, Increasing Seat Belt Use in the United States, dated April
16, 1997, as amended.

ae. Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum Number
25 (PD/NSC-25), Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible
Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Aerospace Use of Major
Radioactive Sources.

af. NPD 8710.2, NASA Safety and Health Program Policy.

**P.4 [REFERENCES]{.underline}**

a\. NPD 1000.0, Strategic Management and Governance Handbook.

b\. NPD 1000.3, The NASA Organization.

c\. NPD 1001.0, 2006 NASA Strategic Plan.

d\. NPD 1800.2, NASA Occupational Health Program.

e\. NPD 2820.1, NASA Software Policy.

f\. NPD 6000.1, Transportation Management.

g\. NPD 7100.8, Protection of Human Research Subjects.

h\. NPD 7120.4, Program/Project Management.

i\. NPD 8500.1, NASA Environmental Management.

j\. NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success.

k\. NPD 8700.3, Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Policy for
Spacecraft, Instruments, and Launch Services.

l\. NPD 8710.1, Emergency Preparedness Program.

m\. NPD 8710.3, NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation.

n\. NPD 8710.5, NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized
Systems.

o\. NPD 8720.1, NASA Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Program
Policy.

p\. NPD 8730.5, NASA Quality Assurance Program Policy.

q\. NPD 8820.2, Design and Construction of Facilities.

r\. NPR 1441.1, NASA Records Retention Schedules.

s\. NPR 1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures.

t\. NPR 2810.1A, Security of Information Technology.

u\. NPR 3451.1, NASA Awards and Recognition Program.

v\. NPR 4100.1, NASA Materials Inventory Management Manual.

w\. NPR 4200.1, NASA Equipment Management Manual.

x\. NPR 5100.4, Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NASA/FAR
Supplement).

y\. NPR 5800.1, Grant and Cooperative Agreement Handbook.

z\. NPR 7120.5, NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements.

aa. NPR 7120.6, Lessons Learned Process.

ab. NPR 7123.1, Systems Engineering Procedural Requirements.

ac. NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements.

ad. NPR 7900.3, Aircraft Operations Management.

ae. NPR 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements.

af. NPR 8580.1, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act and
Executive Order 12114.

ag. NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.

ah. NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems.

ai. NPR 8705.4, Risk Classification for NASA Payloads.

aj. NPR 8705.5, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA
Programs and Projects.

ak. NPR 8705.6, Safety and Mission Assurance Audits, Reviews, and
Assessments.

al. NPR 8715.1, NASA Occupational Safety and Health Programs.

am. NPR 8715.2, NASA Emergency Preparedness Plan Procedural
Requirements.

an. NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program.

ao. NPR 8820.2, Facility Project Implementation Guide.

ap. NASA-STD-8709.2, NASA Safety and Mission Assurance Roles and
Responsibilities for Expendable Launch Vehicle Services.

aq. NASA-STD-8719.7, Facilities System Safety Guidebook.

ar. NASA-STD-8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review
Process Standard.

as. NASA-STD-8719.9, Standard for Lifting Devices and Equipment.

at. NASA-STD 8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire Protection.

au. NASA-STD-8719.13, Software Safety Standard.

av. NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard.

aw. NSS/WS 1740.10, NASA Safety Standard for Underwater Facility and
Non-Open Water Operations.

ax. NSS 1740.12, Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and
Pyrotechnics.

ay. NSS 1740.14, Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting
Orbital Debris.

az. MIL-STD-882, Standard Practice for Safety Systems.

ba. National Incident Management System, Department of Homeland
Security, March 1, 2004.

bb. SSP 50021, Safety Requirements Document.

bc. Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements Tree:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/doctree/qdoc.htm).

bd. Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS):
http://nen.nasa.gov/portal/site/llis.

be. NASA MSDS Inventory: http://msds.ksc.nasa.gov.

bf. NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS):
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/nsrs/index.htm.

bg. Wallops Flight Facility Range Safety Manual: see
http://www.wff.nasa.gov/\~code803/pages/RSM20022.pdf.

bh. AFSPCMAN 91710, Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch: see
http://thefederalregister.com/d.p/2005-03-01-05-3916.

bi. Air Force AFOSH Standard 48-12, Health Hazard Control for Laser
Operations.

bj. EM 385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Safety and Health
Requirements: see
http://www.usace.army.mil/usace-docs/eng-manuals/em385-1-1/toc.htm.

bk. Federal Standard 313, Material Safety Data, Transportation Data and
Disposal Data for Hazardous Materials Furnished to Government
Activities, as revised: see
http://assist.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/basic_profile.cfm?ident_number=53769.

bl. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Safety Series Number 6,
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1985 Edition
as amended in 1990, Section III, paragraphs 301 through 306.

bm. MIL-STD 454, Standard General Requirements for Electronic Equipment.

bn. Range Commanders Council (RCC) Document 316-91, Laser Range Safety:
see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ccw/316-98/index.html.

bo NFPA 1, Uniform Fire Code.

bp. NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using
Chemicals.

bq. NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

br. NFPA 70E: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.

bs. NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.

bt. NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations.

bu. NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management
System.

bv. NFPA Life Safety Code Handbook.

bw. ANSI 358.1, Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment, latest edition.

bx. ANSI D6.1, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways.

by. ANSI Z117.1, Safety Requirements for Confined Space.

bz. ANSI Z136.1, American National Standard for Safe Use of Laser.

ca. ANSI Z136.2, Safe Use of Optical Fiber Communication Systems
Utilizing Laser Diode and LED Sources.

cb. ANSI Z136.4, Recommended Practice for Laser Safety Measurements for
Hazard Evaluation.

cc\. ANSI Z136.6, Safe Use of Lasers Outdoors.

cd\. ASTM Manual 36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems.

ce. Guide for Safety in the Chemical Laboratory, Manufacturing
Chemists\' Association, Inc.

cf. NIOSH Publication No. 87-113, A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces:
see http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/87-113.pdf.

cg. Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale
Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space,
dated December 14, 1977, as revised on May 8, 1996.

ch. S. Kaplan and B.J. Garrick, "On the Quantitative Definition of
Risk," Risk Analysis, 1, 11-27, 1981.

ci\. National Research Council's report "Understanding Risk: Informing
Decisions in a Democratic Society," National Academy Press, Washington,
DC, 1996.

**P.5 [CANCELLATION]{.underline}**

NPR 8715.3, dated January 24, 2000.

/s/ Bryan O'Connor\
Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance

**CHAPTER 1. Institutional and Programmatic Safety Requirements**

**1.1 Overview of the NASA Safety Program**

1.1.1 This document provides the procedural requirements that define the
NASA Safety Program. Safety program responsibility starts at the top
with senior management\'s role of developing policies and providing
strategies and resources necessary to implement and manage a
comprehensive safety program. The NASA Safety Program is executed by the
responsible Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center
Directors, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), component
facility managers, safety managers, project managers, systems engineers,
supervisors, line organizations, employees, and NASA contractors.

> *Note: The basic principles for governing, managing, implementing,
> monitoring, and controlling work at NASA are addressed in NPD 1000.0,
> Strategic Management and Governance Handbook, which provides direction
> for Mission Directorates and Centers to execute programs and
> projects.*
>
> *The Center Director for NASA Headquarters is the Assistant
> Administrator for Infrastructure and Administration.*

1.1.2 As stated in NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission
Success, the objectives of the NASA Safety Program are to protect the
public from harm, ensure the safety of employees, and affect positively
the overall success rate of missions and operations through preventing
damage to high-value equipment and property.

1.1.3 In general, the success or failure of an organization\'s safety
efforts can be predicted by a combination of leading indicators (e.g.,
the number of open vs. closed inspection findings, awareness campaigns,
training metrics, progress toward safety goals/objectives, the amount of
hazard and safety analyses completed, and close calls) and its
achievement measured by lagging indicators (e.g., the number of
incidents involving injury or death to personnel, lost productivity
\[lost or restricted workdays\], environmental damage, or loss of, or
damage to, property). Like many successful corporations, NASA has
learned that aggressively preventing mishaps is good management and a
sound business practice.

1.1.4 NASA undertakes many activities involving high risk. Management of
this risk is one of NASA\'s most challenging activities and is an
integral part of NASA\'s safety efforts.

1.1.5 The policy for the NASA Safety Program is provided in NPD 8710.2,
NASA Safety and Health Program Policy, for specific health program
requirements in NPD 1800.2, NASA Occupational Health Program, and for
environmental requirements in NPD 8500.1, NASA Environmental Management.

1.1.6 Policies, requirements, and procedures for mishap investigations
are provided in NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and
Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.

1.1.7 NASA identifies issues of concern through a strong network of
oversight councils and internal auditors including the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP), the Operations and Engineering Panel (OEP), and
the Aviation Safety Panel.

1.1.8 NASA's goal is to maintain a world-class safety program based on
management and employee commitment and involvement; system and worksite
safety and risk assessment; hazard and risk prevention, mitigation, and
control; and safety and health training.

> *Note: NASA's goals are provided in NPD 1001.0, 2006 NASA Strategic
> Plan.*

**1.2 NASA General Safety Program Roles and Responsibilities**

Table 1 lists responsible entities that have roles and responsibilities
for NASA safety along with the associated paragraphs in this NPR that
explain the responsibilities.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **Table 1. Roles and     
  Responsibilities for     
  NASA Safety              
  Requirements**           
  ------------------------ ----------------------------------------------
  **Responsible Entity**   **NPR 8715.3 Paragraph**

  NASA                     1.8.3.1, 1.8.4, 1.8.6, 1.8.7, 1.8.8, 1.8.9,
                           1.9.2, 3.13.5.1

  NASA Administrator       6.2.1

  Associate Administrator  4.1.2
  for Aeronautics Research 

  Chief, Safety and        1.9.3.1, 1.9.6, 1.10.1, 1.11.1, 1.13.6,
  Mission Assurance        3.13.2, 3.13.4.5.1, 4.2.2, 6.2.3, 7.2.2

  Chief Engineer           1.13.7

  Chief Health and Medical 1.13.8
  Officer                  

  Chief of Strategic       1.12.2
  Communications           

  Mission Directorate      1.2.1, 2.2.1, 4.2.1, 6.1.3, 6.2.2, 6.2.4,
  Associate Administrators 6.2.5, 7.4.1, 7.4.6.3, 7.5.3, 7.6.1, 7.2.1

  Office of Security and   6.2.9
  Program Protection       

  Director, Safety and     1.4.2, 3.2.4.1, 4.2.3, 5.2.1
  Assurance Requirements   
  Division                 

  Operations and           1.9.3.2
  Engineering Panel (OEP)  

  NASA Interagency Nuclear 6.2.7, 6.3.7.2
  Safety Review Panel      
  (INSRP) Coordinator      

  NASA INSRP Member        6.2.8

  Nuclear Flight Safety    6.3.3.2, 6.3.4.2, 6.3.5.2, 6.3.6.2, 6.3.8.2,
  Assurance Manager        6.3.9.2, 6.4.2.2

  NASA Aviation Safety     4.2.4
  Manager                  

  NASA ELV Payload Safety  3.13.4.5.2
  Manager                  

  Center Directors         1.2.1, 1.3.1, 1.4.3, 1.4.4, 1.6.1.1, 1.6.2.1,
                           1.8.2, 1.8.3, 1.8.4, 1.9.6, 1.12.1, 1.13.4,
                           2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2.2, 3.2.2.3,
                           3.2.3.1, 3.2.5.1, 3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.5.1, 3.6.1,
                           3.7.5.1, 3.7.6.1, 3.8.2, 3.9.2, 3.9.3.1,
                           3.9.4.1, 3.9.5.2, 3.10.1, 3.11.1, 3.11.2,
                           3.11.3, 3.12.2, 3.13.4.2, 3.13.4.3, 3.13.4.4,
                           3.13.4.5.4, 3.14.2, 3.14.3.2, 3.14.5.1,
                           3.14.6.1, 3.14.7.2, 3.15.3, 3.15.4, 3.17.3,
                           3.17.4, 4.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.1, 5.4.2.1, 5.5.2,
                           5.7.1, 5.8.1, 5.9.1, 5.10.1, 6.1.3, 6.2.2,
                           6.2.5, 7.2.1, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.6.3, 7.5.3,
                           7.6.1, 8.2.1, 8.3.1, 8.3.2, 8.3.3, 8.4.1,
                           8.5.1, 8.6.1, 9.2.1, 9.5.1, 9.5.2, 9.6.1

  Center Safety and        1.3.2, 1.12.3, 1.13.5, 2.2.2, 3.8.3, 7.3.3,
  Mission Assurance (SMA)  7.4.2, 7.4.5.1, 7.4.5.2, 9.3.4, 9.4.2
  Directors                

  Project Managers         1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.5.2, 1.6.1.1, 1.6.2.1,
                           1.7.1.1, 1.7.2.1, 1.7.3.1, 1.7.4, 1.13.4,
                           2.2.1, 2.5.1.1, 2.5.3.1, 2.5.4.1, 3.5.1,
                           3.8.2, 3.9.2, 3.9.3.1, 3.9.4.1, 3.10.1,
                           3.11.1, 3.11.2, 3.12.2, 3.13.4.2, 3.13.4.3,
                           3.13.4.4, 3.14.2, 3.14.3.2, 3.14.4.1,
                           3.14.5.1, 3.14.6.1, 3.14.7.2, 3.15.3, 3.15.4,
                           3.15.7.1, 3.15.8.1, 3.15.9.1, 3.17.4, 4.2.1,
                           7.2.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.6.3, 7.5.3, 7.6.1, 9.2.1,
                           9.2.2, 9.3.1, 9.5.1, 9.5.2, 9.6.1, 9.7.1

  Program Executives       6.1.3, 6.2.2, 6.2.4, 6.3.1, 6.3.3.1, 6.3.4.1,
                           6.3.5.1, 6.3.6.1, 6.3.8.1, 6.3.9.1, 6.4.2.1

  System Safety Managers   1.7.4, 2.5.3.2, 2.5.4.2, 2.5.1.3, 2.5.2.1,
                           2.6.2, 2.7.1, 2.8.1, 2.8.2, 9.3.2, 9.3.4

  NASA Launch and Landing  6.2.6
  Site Managers            

  Pilot-in-Command         3.15.7.2

  Medical Offices and      7.4.3
  Cognizant Health         
  Officials                

  Line Managers            1.4.4, 1.4.5, 1.6.1.1, 2.2.1, 4.2.1, 6.2.5,
                           7.2.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.4

  Supervisors              1.3.1, 1.4.5, 1.4.6, 3.3.6, 3.6.2, 3.17.5,
                           7.4.6.3, 7.5.3, 7.6.1

  System Safety Engineers  2.5.2.2

  Center Training and      7.2.3, 7.4.6.1, 7.4.6.2
  Personnel Development    
  Offices                  

  Authority Having         5.2.3
  Jurisdiction             

  Explosive Safety Officer 3.11.4

  Laser Radiation Safety   3.15.5.2
  Officer                  

  Contracting Officers     9.2.2, 9.3.2, 9.3.3, 9.4.1, 9.4.3

  Operators of Motor       3.2.2.1, 3.2.3.2
  Vehicles                 

  Receiving Offices        3.7.6.2
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

1.2.1 Per NPD 1000.3, The NASA Organization, Mission Directorate
Associate Administrators, through their project managers, and Center
Directors, through their line managers, are responsible for the safety
of their assigned personnel, facilities, and mission systems. Toward
that end, they shall establish a safety program that adheres to the
following principles (Requirement 25005):

a\. Ensure that their safety planning and direction; the development of
safety requirements, safety policies, safety methodology, and safety
procedures; and the implementation and evaluation of their safety
programs achieve the safety requirements in this NPR (Requirement
25006).

b\. Ensure the conduct of assessments of quantitative and/or qualitative
safety risks to people, property, or equipment, and include
recommendations to either reduce the risks or accept them (Requirement
31816).

c\. Ensure that safety assessments of all system changes are conducted,
prior to changes to these systems being implemented, so as to preclude
an unknown increase in risk to personnel or equipment (Requirement
25010).

d\. Ensure that employees are informed of any risk acceptance when the
employees are the ones at risk (Requirement).

e\. Ensure that safety surveillance and periodic inspections are
conducted to assure compliance with NASA safety policies and to assess
the effectiveness of NASA safety activities as required by Federal,
State, and local regulations, NASA policy, and national consensus
standards (Requirement 25012).

f\. Ensure that technical reviews of the safety of development efforts
and operations are conducted in accordance with sound system safety
engineering principles (Requirement 25009).

g\. Ensure that trained individual(s) determine the corrective actions
needed for mitigating or controlling safety risk for all activities
(Requirement 31814).

h\. Ensure that NASA employees and safety professionals are trained for
their roles and responsibilities associated with specific safety
functions (Requirement).

i\. Ensure that software safety is included in their safety programs
(Requirement).

> *Note: Software safety policy and requirements are provided in NPD
> 2820.1, NASA Software Policy; NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering
> Requirements; NASA-STD-8719.13, Software Safety Standard; and
> NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard.*

j\. Ensure that an interagency review and approval process is
implemented for the use of radioactive materials in spacecraft to avoid
unacceptable radiation exposure for normal or abnormal conditions,
including launch aborts with uncontrolled return to Earth (See Chapter
6) (Requirement 25021).

k\. Ensure that research and development for new or unique safety
functions and technologies are conducted to help meet NASA goals
(Requirement 25013).

l\. Ensure the integrity of information and information systems, where
compromise may impact safety, by adherence to NASA information
technology security procedures as required by NPR 2810.1, Security of
Information Technology (Requirement).

**1.3 Public Safety**

1.3.1 Center Directors, project managers, supervisors, and NASA
employees shall:

a\. Eliminate risk or the adverse effect of NASA operations on the
public, or provide public protection by exclusion or other protective
measures where the risk or the adverse effect of NASA operations on the
public cannot be eliminated (Requirement 25026).

> *Note: The responsibility for public safety includes major events such
> as air shows, open houses, or other events that may be attended by
> large crowds.*

b\. Disallow non-NASA (either by contractors or visitors) research and
development operations (under grants or cooperative agreements) that
interfere with or damage NASA facilities or operations or threaten the
health and safety of NASA personnel (Requirement 25027).

1.3.2 Center SMA Directors shall:

a\. Require non-NASA research and development personnel and operations
exposed to hazardous operations on NASA property to follow all Federal,
NASA, and Center safety precautions and to procure needed protective
clothing and equipment at their own expense (Requirement 31868).

b\. Assure non-NASA research and development personnel operating or
using potentially hazardous NASA equipment have received required
training and are certified as qualified operators in accordance with
Chapter 7 of this NPR (Requirement 31869).

1.3.3 Center Directors are delegated the authority to approve variances
to public safety requirements for onsite non-NASA personnel (e.g.,
press, visitors) if appropriate safety requirements are in place and the
risk is no greater than the risk to uninvolved employees.

> *Note: Diligence should be practiced when waiving public safety
> requirements since there are situations where NASA employees are
> exposed to unusual risk which they inherently understand by virtue of
> their unique job function and experience and they behave accordingly
> and cautiously based on their knowledge. Members of the public or
> non-NASA employees may not understand the nuance of particular
> situations and not know when or how to behave accordingly.*

**1.4 Institutional Roles and Responsibilities in the NASA Safety
Program**

1.4.1 The Chief Health and Medical Officer shall:

a\. Terminate any NASA operation considered an immediate health hazard
(Requirement).

b\. When termination occurs, immediately notify affected Center offices
(Requirement).

1.4.2 The Director, Safety and Assurance Requirements Division, OSMA,
shall:

a\. Establish and develop the overall NASA safety program policy and
priorities (Requirement 8005).

b\. Serve as the senior safety official for the Agency and exercise
functional management authority over all NASA safety and risk management
activities (Requirement 8006).

c\. Terminate any operation that presents an immediate and unacceptable
risk to personnel, property, or mission operations (Requirement).

d\. When termination occurs, immediately notify affected Center and
Mission Directorate officials (Requirement).

1.4.3 Center Directors shall:

a\. Be responsible for safety at NASA facilities (Requirement 32643).

b\. Place their safety organization at a level that ensures the safety
review function can be conducted independently (Requirement).

c\. Designate a senior manager as the Center safety and health officer
and the safety program implementation authority (Requirement 25015 and
8021).

> *Note: Senior manager is interpreted to mean that the safety and
> health officer can interface directly with the Center Director when
> problems arise.*

d\. Ensure that:

\(1\) Adequate resources (personnel and budget) are provided to support
mishap prevention efforts (Requirement).

\(2\) Resource control is independent from any influence that would
affect the independence of the advice, counsel, and services provided.

e\. Ensure that policies, plans, procedures, and standards that define
the characteristics of their safety program are established, documented,
maintained, communicated, and implemented (Requirement 25017).

> *Note: The Annual Operating Agreements enacted and signed at each
> Center reflect the agreed upon support activity level of the Center
> safety organization to the program/projects and institutional
> operations at the Centers. (See NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and
> Mission Success.)*

f\. Ensure that the development, implementation, and maintenance of an
effective safety and health program are in compliance with NASA,
Federal, State, and local requirements (Requirement 8022).

g\. Ensure the establishment of an effective system safety program based
on a continuous risk assessment process to include the development of
safety requirements early in the planning phase, the implementation of
those requirements during the acquisition, development, and operational
phases, and the use of a scenario-based risk assessment and tracking
system to maintain the status of risks during the process (Requirement
25019). (See Chapter 2.)

h\. Ensure that all NASA operations and operations performed on NASA
property are performed in accordance with existing safety standards,
consensus national standards (e.g., ANSI, NFPA), or special supplemental
or alternative standards when there are no known applicable standards
(Requirement 25022).

i\. Ensure that for hazardous NASA operations, procedures are developed
for the following circumstances: 1) to provide an organized and
systematic approach to identify and control risks, 2) when equipment
operations, planned or unplanned, are hazardous or constitute a
potential launch, test, vehicle, or payload processing constraint, or 3)
when an operation is detailed or complicated and there is reasonable
doubt that it can be performed correctly without written procedures
(Requirement 31859). (See Chapter 3 of this NPR for requirements for
hazardous operating procedures.)

j\. Ensure that an aviation safety program that meets the specific
operational needs of their Center is established and maintained to
comply with national standards and NASA directives and requirements
(Requirement 25023). (See Chapter 4.)

k\. Ensure that safety lessons learned are disseminated and included in
Center communication media to improve the understanding of hazards and
risks, the prevention of mishaps, and to suggest better ways of
implementing system safety programs (Requirement).

> *Note: Requirements for lessons learned are provided in NPR 7120.6,
> Lessons Learned Process. The Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS)
> provides a library of lessons learned data for use by program
> managers, design engineers, operations personnel, and safety
> personnel. Procedures for disseminating lessons learned can be found
> at the following Internet address:
> http://nen.nasa.gov/portal/site/llis.*

l\. Inform personnel of the availability of the NASA Safety Reporting
System (NSRS) at their Center (Requirement 25048).

> *Note: The NSRS supplements local hazard reporting channels and
> provides NASA employees and contractors with an anonymous, voluntary,
> and responsive reporting channel to notify NASA's upper management of
> concerns about hazards or unsafe conditions. The NSRS should be used
> in the following circumstances: 1) if a hazard has been reported
> locally and it does not appear any action has been taken, 2) if
> someone is not satisfied with the response to a reported hazard, or 3)
> if someone fears reprisal if they were to report the hazard locally. 
> NSRS reports are guaranteed to receive prompt attention.*
>
> *Information about the NSRS and a copy of the NSRS form can be found
> at the following Internet address:
> http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/nsrs/index.htm.*
>
> *NASA contracting officers (COs) and contracting officers technical
> representatives (COTRs) are encouraged to implement the NSRS program
> at contractor facilities by citing the NASA FAR Supplement Clause (NFS
> 1852.223-70). Pre-addressed postage-paid forms can be obtained at any
> Center Safety Office or from other distribution locations across the
> Center. Forms should be mailed to:*

*NASA SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM\
P.O. BOX 5826\
BETHESDA, MD 20824-9913*

m\. Assist with the investigation of NSRS reports (Requirement).

n\. Ensure that all facilities are designed, constructed, and operated
in accordance with applicable/approved codes, standards, procedures, and
requirements (Requirement 25024). (See Chapters 8 and 9.)

o\. Ensure that the safety responsibilities of each organizational
element are defined and accomplished (Requirement 31818).

p\. Ensure that line managers incorporate safety and health requirements
into the planning, support, and oversight of hosted programs, projects,
and operations as part of their management function (Requirement 31819).

q\. Evaluate and document the incorporation of safety and health
requirements into the planning and support of hosted programs, projects,
and operations in senior managers\' performance evaluations (Requirement
31820).

r\. Ensure a qualified safety workforce is available to perform the
safety function (Requirement 25020).

s\. Ensure that properly equipped and trained personnel are provided to
perform or support potentially hazardous or critical technical
operations (Requirement).

> *Note: Special circumstances involving access to mission critical
> space systems and other critical equipment may dictate the need for
> the Personnel Reliability Program (14 CFR Part 1214, Subpart 1214.5,
> Space Flight: Mission Critical Space Systems Personnel Reliability
> Program). (See Chapter 3.)*

t\. Ensure that SMA risk-based acquisition management requirements are
included in procurement, design, development, fabrication, test, or
operations of equipment and facilities (Requirement 25018).

u\. Analyze and utilize nonconformance and process control data as
feedback in the assessment and management of technical risk
(Requirement). 

> *Note: Examples of nonconformance data include process escapes,
> waivers/deviations, and the results of audits, tests, and
> inspections.  *

v\. Ensure that qualitative and quantitative risk assessment results,
hazard controls, and risk mitigation strategies are not negated when
accounting for the analysis of nonconformance and process control data
in the assessment and management of technical risk (Requirement).

> *Note: Quality assurance requirements are provided in [NPD
> 8730.5](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PD_8730_0005_&page_name=main),
> NASA Quality Assurance Program Policy.*

w\. Ensure the results of contractor safety and health provision
evaluations are provided to the award fee boards for use in fee
determination (Requirement 31856).

x\. Ensure that the Governance Model is being implemented in the
procurement process for the acquisition of hardware, software, services,
materials, and equipment (Requirement 31857). (See Chapter 9.)

> *Note: The Governance Model includes participation by Engineering,
> SMA, and the project manager during the entire life-cycle of
> procurement.*

y\. Pursue and obtain, within two years, certification under the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP) or through an equivalent recognized
occupational safety certification program (Requirement).

> *Note: The OSHA VPP is established by 5 U.S.C. § 7902; 29 U.S.C. § 651
> et seq.; 49 U.S.C. § 1421, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
> 1970, as amended, to assure every working man and woman in the Nation
> safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
> resources by encouraging employers and employees to reduce the number
> of occupational safety and health hazards at their work places and to
> institute new (and to perfect existing) programs for providing safe
> and healthful working conditions.*

z\. Ensure their safety organization (or its support contractors) has
access to certified safety professionals meeting the requirements of the
OSHA VPP (Requirement 31858).

1.4.4 Center Directors and line managers shall ensure that up-to-date
configuration control is maintained on all assigned equipment and
systems (Requirement 25008).

> *Note: NPR 7123.1, NASA Systems Engineering Procedural Requirements,
> requires* *Center Directors or designees to* *establish and maintain a
> process to include activities, requirements, guidelines, and
> documentation for configuration management.*

1.4.5 Line managers and supervisors are accountable for the safety and
health of their assigned personnel. To that end, they shall:

a\. Ensure employee safety and health training is completed by employees
pursuant to the requirements of the job to be performed (Requirement).

b\. Ensure that safety is included in the employee's performance plan
objectives (Requirement).

c\. Encourage safe performance through safety and health incentive
awards programs or other institutional programs establishing the safety
organization (Requirement 31824).

1.4.6 Supervisors shall:

a\. Incorporate measurable leading safety and health performance
criteria in line managers\' performance plans (Requirement).

b\. Evaluate and document achievement of the measurable safety and
health performance criteria in the line manager's performance
evaluations (Requirement 31822).

**1.5 Program Management Roles and Responsibilities in the NASA Safety
Program**

## 1.5.1 Paragraph 2.2.2.a.1.vi of NPR 7120.5, NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements, requires project managers to prepare and implement a comprehensive SMA Plan early in program formulation to ensure program compliance with all regulatory safety and health requirements from OSHA and all NASA SMA requirements. The importance of upfront safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance requirements should be emphasized in all program activities. 

1.5.2 Project managers shall ensure that the SMA Plan (Requirement):

a\. Addresses life-cycle, safety-relevant functions and activities
(Requirement).

b\. Graphically represents project organizational relationships and
assurance roles and responsibilities employing a Mission Assurance
Process Map as described in NPR 8705.6, Safety and Mission Assurance
Audits, Reviews, and Assessments (Requirement).

c\. Reflects a life-cycle SMA process perspective, addressing areas
including: procurement, management, design and engineering, design
verification and test, software design, software verification and test,
manufacturing, manufacturing verification and test, operations, and
preflight verification and test, disassembly, and disposal
(Requirement).

d\. Contains data and information to support each section of the SMA
Plan for each major milestone review to include the Safety and Mission
Success Review (formerly SMA Readiness Review) (Requirement).

e\. Contains trending and metrics utilized to display progress and to
predict growth towards SMA goals and requirements (Requirement).

f\. As a minimum, addresses the following topics and associated
requirements (Requirement):

\(1\) Safety per this NPR.

\(2\) Reliability and maintainability per NPD 8720.1, NASA Reliability
and Maintainability (R&M) Program Policy.

\(3\) Risk assessment per [NPR
8705.5,](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PR_8705_0005_&page_name=main)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and
Projects.

\(4\) Quality assurance per NPD 8730.5, NASA Quality Assurance Program
Policy.

\(5\) Software safety and assurance per NASA-STD-8719.13, Software
Safety Standard, and NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard.

\(6\) Occupational safety and health per [NPR
8715.1,](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PR_8715_0001_&page_name=main)
NASA Occupational Safety and Health Programs.

\(7\) Range safety per NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program.

\(8\) Human-rating per NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space
Systems.

\(9\) Mishap reporting per NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for
Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.

\(10\) Compliance verification, audit, SMA reviews, and SMA process maps
per NPR 8705.6, Safety and Mission Assurance Audits, Reviews, and
Assessments.

1.5.3 Project managers shall ensure that contractor operations and
designs are evaluated for consistency and compliance with the safety and
health provisions provided in their contractual agreements (Requirement
31855).

**1.6 Risk Assessment and Risk Acceptance**

1.6.1 Risk Assessment. The primary purpose of risk assessment is to
identify and evaluate risks to help guide decision making and risk
management regarding actions to ensure safety and mission success. Risk
assessment should use the most appropriate methods that adequately
characterize the probability, consequence severities, and uncertainty of
undesired events and scenarios. Quantitative methods can be used to
evaluate probabilities, consequences, and uncertainties, whenever
possible. Qualitative methods characterize hazards, and failure modes
and effects provide valuable input to the risk assessment. When
qualitative methods are used to assess risks, the qualitative values
assigned should be rationalized. The results of the risk assessment
along with the results of system safety analyses form the basis for
risk-informed decision making. More discussion of system safety and risk
assessment is provided in Chapter 2 of this NPR.

1.6.1.1 Project managers for flight systems and line managers for
institutional systems shall:

a\. Use a process for risk assessment that supports decisions regarding
safety and mission success as well as other decisions such as the
development of surveillance plans and information security (see Chapter
2) (Requirement).

> *Note: Requirements for risk management are provided per NPR 8000.4,
> Risk Management Procedural Requirements; requirements for
> probabilistic risk assessments are provided per* [*NPR
> 8705.5,*](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PR_8705_0005_&page_name=main)
> *Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and
> Projects.*

1.6.2 Risk Acceptance. Center Directors and project/program managers are
delegated the authority to accept residual risk associated with hazards
based on risk assessment results and all relevant factors for their
assigned activities. Center Directors and program managers should
include involvement of the Technical Authority as a part of the risk
analysis, evaluation, and decision-making processes. For technical
matters related to project/program design, development, and operations
and involving the risk of safe and reliable operations as related to
human safety, the Technical Authority has approval authority but the
project/program manager must still formally accept the residual risk.

1.6.2.1 Center Directors and project managers shall:

a\. Establish and document a formal, closed loop, transparent
decision-making process for accepting residual risk for their assigned
activities, personnel, and/or property [(Requirement
25085).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Meet Federal safety and health standards when making risk-informed
decisions to accept residual risk (Requirement).

c\. Reduce the risk to an acceptable level using the technical safety
requirements provided in Paragraph 1.7 of this NPR (Requirement).

> *Note: The risk that remains after all mitigation and controls have
> been applied is the residual risk.*

d\. Only accept residual risk consistent with NASA requirements and, in
all cases, ensure the acceptance of risk to NASA employees and/or
equipment does not endanger the public or NASA employees (Requirement).

e\. Document the basis for any risk-informed decisions (Requirement).

f\. Communicate to: 1) the cognizant office of primary responsibility
(OSMA, Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE), Office of the Chief Health
and Medical Officer (OCHMO)) for review, decisions regarding residual
risk acceptance and 2) to any employee or person for whom the risk has
been accepted (Requirement 31870).

**1.7 Technical Safety Requirements for NASA-Unique Designs and
Operations**

Developing and maintaining technically sound and defensible safety and
health requirements are essential to serve as a basis for system design
and for system safety analysis efforts. A combination of quantitative
(for example, probabilistic) and qualitative (for example, failure
tolerance or redundancy) technical safety and mission success
requirements complement each other by compensating for weaknesses in one
or the other analysis type. This NPR establishes a minimum set of
technical SMA requirements to be applied to programs/projects.

To properly support design and operational decisions, it is necessary
that alternatives be analyzed not only with respect to their impact on
the mission's performance and programmatic objectives, but also with
respect to their impact on safety and health. Risk management uses the
results of the risk assessment as the basis for decisions to reduce the
risk to an acceptable level.

1.7.1 Risk Reduction Protocol

1.7.1.1 Project managers shall ensure that hazards are mitigated
according to the following stated order of precedence (Requirement):

a\. Eliminate hazards.

b\. Minimize the hazard risk through design/operation.

c\. Incorporate safety devices.

d\. Provide cautions and warning devices.

e\. Develop administrative procedures and training.

> *Note: Improvements in the state-of-knowledge regarding key
> uncertainties that drive the risk associated with a hazard (i.e.,
> uncertainty reduction) should be considered as a means of risk
> reduction. Some hazards may require a combination of several of these
> above approaches for prevention, mitigation, and/or control. Designs
> for hazard control and accident prevention and mitigation should
> include considerations for the possibility of human errors.*

1.7.2 Reliability and Failure Tolerance

Safety critical operations must have high reliability. High reliability
is verified by reliability analysis using accepted modeling techniques
and data in which uncertainties are incorporated. Where this cannot be
accomplished with a specified confidence level, the design of safety
critical operations shall have failure tolerance and safety margins in
which critical operability and functionality are ensured. Failure
tolerance is the ability of a system to perform its function(s) or

maintain control of a hazard in the presence of failures of its
subsystems. Failure tolerance may be accomplished through like or unlike
redundancy. Safety margins are the difference between as-built factor of
safety and the ratio of actual operating conditions to the maximum
operating conditions specified during design.

> *Note: Failure tolerance requirements for human space systems are
> provided in NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems.*

1.7.2.1 To assure operability and functionality and to achieve failure
tolerance, project managers shall:

a\. Design safety critical systems such that the critical operation or
its necessary functions can be assured. To provide assurance, design the
component, subsystem, or system so it is capable of being tested,
inspected, and maintained (Requirement).

b\. Where high reliability cannot be verified by reliability analysis
using accepted data in which uncertainties are incorporated, design
safety critical systems so that no combination of two failures and/or
operator errors (fail-safe, fail-safe as a minimum) will result in loss
of life (Requirement).

> *Note: Safety-critical operational controls are applied to conditions,
> events, signals, processes, or items for which proper recognition,
> control, performance, or tolerance are essential to safe system
> operation, use, or function.*

c\. When requesting a variance from the two-failure tolerance
requirement, provide evidence and rationale that one or more of the
following are met (Requirement):

\(1\) Two-failure tolerance is not feasible for technical reasons.

\(2\) The system or subsystem is designed and certified in accordance
with approved consensus standards.

> *Note: Safety variances are processed in accordance with the
> requirements of paragraph 1.13 of this NPR.*

d\. Where high reliability cannot be verified by reliability analysis
using accepted data in which uncertainties are incorporated, design
safety critical operations so that no single failure or operator error
(fail-safe) will result in system loss/damage or personal injury
(Requirement).

e\. Where high reliability cannot be verified by reliability analysis
using accepted data in which uncertainties are incorporated, provide
functional redundancy where there is insufficient time for recovery or
system restoration. Where there is sufficient time between a failure and
the manifestation of its effect, design for restoration of safe
operation using spares, procedures, or maintenance provides an
alternative means of achieving failure tolerance (Requirement).

f\. Design safety critical systems and operations to have a safety
margin (Requirement).

g\. When using redundancy, verify that common cause failures (e.g.,
contamination, close proximity) do not invalidate the assumption of
failure independence (Requirement).

h\. When using redundancy in operations that could cause or lead to
severe injury, major damage, or mission failure (safety critical
operations), verify operability under conditions that singularly or
separately added together represent the operating intended condition
(Requirement).

i\. When using reliability analyses, assess the probability of failure
to provide the function and the time to restore the function, where loss
of life, serious injury, or catastrophic system loss can occur.
Uncertainties shall be incorporated in these assessments. The time to
restore the function shall include the active time to repair and the
time associated with the logistics or administrative downtime that
affect the ease or rapidity of achieving full restoration of the failed
function (Requirement).

1.7.2.2 To assure functional protection, project managers shall ensure
that:

a\. Loss of functional protection for safety-critical operations
requires termination of the operation at the first stable configuration
[(Requirement
25031).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. At least one single level of functional protection is used to
protect high-value facilities and flight systems [(Requirement
31882).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. In addition to the requirement in paragraph 1.7.2.1.b, for systems
intended to be operated by humans, rescue and/or escape are a valid
means of life protection and, if used, shall include validation,
training, and certification [(Requirement
31881).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

1.7.3 Inhibits

1.7.3.1 Where high reliability is not verified by reliability analysis
using accepted data with uncertainties incorporated, the project manager
shall ensure that:

a\. Operations that require the control of a condition, event, signal,
process, or item for which proper recognition, performance, or tolerance
is essential to safe system operation, use, or function are designed
such that an inadvertent or unauthorized event cannot occur (inhibit)
(Requirement).

b\. Operations have three inhibits where loss of life can occur
(Requirement).

c\. Operations have two inhibits where personal injury, illness, mission
loss, or system loss or damage can occur (Requirement).

d\. The capability of inhibits or control procedures when required in
operations by this paragraph are verified under operational conditions
including the verification of independence among multiple inhibits
(Requirement).

> *Note: Inhibits (designs that specifically prevent an inadvertent or
> unauthorized event from occurring) are not to be confused with the
> lockout/tagout program, which is a program to isolate or control
> facility system hazards; e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic,
> pneumatic, chemical, thermal, or other energy.*

1.7.4 System Safety Managers shall assure that the above requirements
are placed in program/project requirements and that any variances to
those requirements are processed in accordance with the requirements of
this NPR (Requirement). (See paragraph 1.13 of this NPR.)

**1.8 SMA Program Reviews**

1.8.1 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, conducts audits, reviews,
and assessments of NASA Centers, programs/projects, supporting
facilities, and operations.

> *Note: Requirements for conducting and supporting independent SMA
> audits, reviews, and assessments are provided in NPR 8705.6, Safety
> and Mission Assurance Audits, Reviews, and Assessments.*

1.8.2 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. The Center's safety program is formally assessed annually
(Requirement 25032).

b\. The Center's annual safety program assessment is conducted by
competent and qualified personnel (Requirement).

> *Note: In addition to normal management surveillance, the Center's
> annual safety program review can be accomplished through safety staff
> assistance visits, inspections, and safety audits. The Center\'s
> safety staff or an independent outside source may perform the formal
> assessments.*

1.8.3 Center Directors shall ensure that the Center's formal annual
assessment has the following elements:

a\. A formal assessment report that includes a discussion of the safety
posture of the Center and each program reviewed (Requirement).

b\. An assessment of the effectiveness of safety program management
(Requirement 31885).

c\. A safety culture survey that includes at least the management and
communications functions of the Performance Evaluation Profile (PEP)
survey (Requirement).

d\. An assessment of safety program documentation (e.g., plans,
procedures, monitoring data) (Requirement).

e\. An assessment of the adequacy of safety standards and procedures
(Requirement 31889).

f\. Interviews of key facility and/or program personnel (Requirement).

g\. Observations and inspections of workplace compliance with safety
practices (Requirement 31890).

h\. Identification of deficiencies in the safety program (Requirement
31887).

i\. The development of formal plans of actions and milestones to correct
all open deficiencies that shall be tracked to completion including
interim controls that will be implemented if the hazard cannot be
immediately corrected (Requirement).

j\. Assessment and verification of corrective actions from previous
assessments (Requirement 31888).

k\. Evaluation of the implementation of 5 U.S.C. § 7902; 29 U.S.C. § 651
et seq.; 49 U.S.C. § 1421, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, as amended; E.O. 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs
for Federal Employees dated February 26, 1980, as amended; OSHA
regulations at 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health
Standards; and other pertinent Federally-mandated requirements
(Requirement 31886).

1.8.4 Center Directors shall ensure that periodic training is conducted
for Center safety personnel on safety program assessments covering
prereview, review, and postreview procedures and requirements
(Requirement).

**1.9 Advisory Panels, Committees, and Boards**

1.9.1 NASA strives to use the Nation\'s most competent safety resources
to provide review and advice on the NASA Safety Program.

> *Note: In keeping with this philosophy, NASA enlists the advice of
> consultants, interagency and interdisciplinary panels, and ad hoc
> committees consisting of representatives from industry (management and
> union), universities, and government (management and union).*

1.9.2 NASA has established an ASAP as an advisory committee in
accordance with Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act, 1968 (PL 90-67,
codified as 42 U.S.C. 2477).

> *Note: The ASAP reviews and evaluates program activities, systems,
> procedures, and management policies and provides assessment of these
> areas to NASA management and Congress. It is in this role that the
> ASAP provides independent advice on NASA safety issues to the Chief,
> Safety and Mission Assurance and to the Administrator. The ASAP Web
> site is http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/asap/.*

1.9.3 OEP

1.9.3.1 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall establish and
maintain an OEP (Requirement).

> *Note: The panel supports the OSMA on special assignments related to
> facility operations and engineering activities.*

1.9.3.2 The OEP shall evaluate processes and systems for assuring the
continuing operational integrity of NASA test facilities, operations,
and engineering technical support systems, address problems and issues
at Centers, and provide recommendations to the Chief, Safety and Mission
Assurance (Requirement).

> *Note: The OEP also studies technical support system problem areas and
> develops alternate solutions or methods. See Appendix H, Operations
> and Engineering Panel, for further details.*

1.9.4 NASA has established the Software Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) Board of Directors to advise the OSMA as approval
authority for IV&V support to programs and projects. The IV&V Board of
Directors acts in an advisory capacity to provide input to the Chief,
Safety and Mission Assurance, concerning the annual IV&V budget for
support to programs and projects.

1.9.5 NASA has established and maintains a Space Flight Safety Panel to
promote flight safety in NASA space flight programs involving flight
crews and to advise appropriate Mission Directorate Associate
Administrators on all aspects of the crewed space program that affect
flight safety.

> *Note: See NPD 1000.3, The NASA Organization, paragraph 6.21, for
> further details.*

1.9.6 Center Directors and the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance,
shall have the authority to establish ad hoc committees to provide
safety oversight review of programs, projects, and other activities
(Requirement).

**1.10 Coordination with Organizations External to NASA**

1.10.1 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, in coordination with the
Office of External Relations (for exchanges with the Department of
Defense (DoD), intelligence agencies, and foreign entities) and in
consultation with the NASA Office of the General Counsel, shall
establish guidelines for exchanging safety information with
organizations external to NASA (Requirement 25038).

> *Note: New and different methods and practices that may be beneficial
> to the NASA Safety Program should be brought to the attention of the
> responsible Headquarters Office by those that may encounter these
> practices used outside NASA.*

1.10.2 NASA shall encourage participation by NASA safety professionals
in outside safety-related professional organizations (Requirement).

> *Note: Examples are functions and committees of the National Safety
> Council, National Fire Protection Association, DoD Explosive Safety
> Board, National Academy of Sciences, System Safety Society, Federal
> Agency Committee on Safety and Health, American Society of Safety
> Engineers, Field Federal Safety and Health Councils, and the Joint
> Army, Navy, NASA, Air Force Propulsion Committee (and subcommittee).*

**1.11 Safety Motivation and Awards Program**

1.11.1 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall establish a Safety
Motivation and Awards Program that recognizes the safety achievements of
NASA and other Federal Government employees supporting NASA objectives
in all occupational categories and grade levels (Requirement 25041).

> *Note: NASA is committed to continued improvement of safety in all
> operations. NASA\'s policy is to stimulate the participation of
> employees in this effort. The presentation of awards is considered
> appropriate for recognizing outstanding safety-related
> performance/contributions and is an effective means of encouraging
> safety excellence. NASA recognizes responsible individuals and
> organizations for the following: taking significant safety
> initiatives, making truly innovative safety suggestions, meeting major
> safety goals, making significant achievements leading to the safer and
> more effective use of resources or execution of NASA operations, and
> encouraging and rewarding safety excellence among employees (applies
> to supervisors).*
>
> *NASA safety awards programs may provide for the recognition of
> non-Government personnel (e.g., JPL employees) supporting NASA
> objectives.*
>
> *The Space Flight Awareness Employee Motivation and Recognition
> Program for NASA, supporting Government agencies, private industry,
> and international organizations, promotes safety, particularly for
> human space flight programs. The goal of this program is to instill in
> employees the need to reduce human errors and mistakes that could lead
> to space-flight mishaps and mission failure.*

**1.12 Safety Management Information**

Efficient communication of safety information is necessary to meet the
needs of safety officials and the managers they support. This includes
communications between and among operational and safety organizations.
NASA safety organizations will pursue every practical means for
communicating verbal and written safety management information, lessons
learned, and statistics. Examples of NASA information systems are the
Incident Reporting Information System and the LLIS. Records and reports
of accidents, occupational injuries, incidents, failure analyses,
identified hazards, mishaps, appraisals, and like items contain
information necessary for developing corrective measures and lessons
learned.

Detailed records of occupational injuries are reported to OSHA in
accordance with 29 CFR Part 1960, Subpart I, Recordkeeping and Reporting
Requirements, and NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap
and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping. Safety forms
and reports are retained per NPR 1441.1, NASA Records Retention
Schedules.

1.12.1 Center Directors shall provide or make accessible to the OSMA
(through an Internet Web site):

a\. Center executive safety committee or board documentation (e.g.,
minutes and reports) (Requirement 31904).

b\. Results of external (such as OSHA) safety program management reviews
(Requirement 31905).

c\. Top-level Center or program safety procedure documents that
implement Headquarters requirements (Requirement 31906).

> *Note: Electronic versions or Web addresses are acceptable and should
> be forwarded in conjunction with the data.*

d\. Copies of safety variances granted at the Center (see paragraph
1.13) (Requirement 317910).

1.12.2 The Chief of Strategic Communications shall provide or make
accessible (through Internet Web site), to the OSMA, copies of comments
sent to outside regulatory agencies (e.g., OSHA, Department of
Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) concerning
proposed rule-making that could affect the NASA Safety Program
(Requirement 31908).

1.12.3 Center SMA Directors shall maintain a census of Government and
contract employees performing safety, reliability, maintainability and
quality functions (engineering, operations, and assurance) by
organization or contractor company at their sites (Requirement).

1.12.4 COs and COTRs shall ensure that the census of employees
performing safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality functions
(engineering, operations, and assurance) by organization is a
requirement under contracts.

**1.13 Safety Variances**

1.13.1 This paragraph provides policy and associated requirements for
requesting and approving variances to safety requirements specified as
overall SMA requirements for which OSMA is the Office of Primary
Responsibility (OPR). The primary objective of this variance policy is
to assure that NASA Headquarters maintains oversight of the Agency SMA
requirements while providing the Centers and project managers with the
authority and flexibility to accept reasonable risks necessary to
accomplish their tasks. This policy is consistent with the ISO 9001
requirement for maintaining process control of services that an
organization provides. This policy applies to all requirements for which
OSMA is the OPR unless otherwise specified for a set of SMA requirements
in an Agency requirements document.

1.13.2 A variance consists of documented and approved permission for
relief from an established SMA requirement. There are three types of
variances to NASA SMA requirements that may be requested at different
times during the life cycle of a program/project: exceptions,
deviations, and waivers. Variances can result from tailoring in the
early phases of planning or from the analysis of designs, test results,
and failures that occur throughout the project or facility life cycle.
Tailoring is the process of determining which specific requirement(s) in
a governing document shall be implemented. This process involves
establishing minimum success criteria. Tailoring also authorizes relief
from a specific requirement because it is not applicable to a specific
mission, program/project operation, or facility and may include
permanent exceptions (see paragraph 1.13.2.a of this NPR) and temporary
deviations and waivers (see paragraphs 1.13.2.b and 1.13.2.c of this
NPR).

a\. An **exception** authorizes permanent relief from a specific
requirement and may be requested at any time during the life cycle of a
program/project. An exception typically addresses a situation where a
requirement does not apply to a portion of a system. An exception may
involve the approval of alternative means that provide an equivalent or
lower level of risk, or formal acceptance of increased risk due to the
fact that the requirement is not satisfied.

b\. A **deviation** authorizes temporary relief in advance from a
specific requirement and is requested during the
formulation/planning/design stages of a program/project operation to
address expected situations. A deviation involves the approval of
alternative means that provide an equivalent or lower level of risk or
formal acceptance of increased risk due to the fact that the requirement
is not satisfied.

> *Note: Exceptions and deviations may be approved as part of tailoring;
> i.e., a process that occurs early in the planning stages of a project
> and involves documenting and formally approving project requirements.*

c\. A **waiver** authorizes temporary relief after the fact from a
specific requirement and is requested during the implementation of a
project or operation to address situations that were unforeseen during
design or advanced planning. A waiver involves the approval of
alternative means that provide an equivalent or lower level of risk, or
formal acceptance of increased risk due to the fact that the requirement
is not satisfied.

1.13.3 It is NASA policy for final approval of an SMA variance to
incorporate the following:

a\. All variances to project-level safety, reliability, and quality
requirements require signature (indicating approval of the technical
approach) by the Center Director (or designee) that hosts, or is
directly responsible for, the project, operation, or facility. This
constitutes final approval for a variance where there is an equivalent
or lower level of risk.

b\. All variances to program-level safety, reliability, and quality
requirements require signature by the Headquarters requirement owner
(OCE, OSMA, OCHMO, etc. or designee). This constitutes final approval
for a variance where there is an equivalent or lower level of risk.

c\. If there is a net increase in risk, in addition to the signature(s)
specified in paragraphs 1.13.3.a and b, a variance requires co-signature
(indicating formal acceptance of the risk associated with the variance)
by the responsible project/program manager and by each Center Director
(or designee) responsible for people or property exposed to the
associated risk.

> *Note: NASA does not have approval authority for variances to Federal,
> State, or local regulations (e.g., OSHA, Cal OSHA), nor to consensus
> standards that are referenced by Federal regulations (e.g., ANSI,
> American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists) that apply
> to NASA. Any variance of a Federal, State, or local regulation must be
> reviewed by OSMA prior to submittal to the appropriate
> Federal/State/local agency for approval. For example, the NASA
> Alternate Safety Standard for Suspended Load Crane Operations was
> approved by OSHA.*

1.13.4 Center Directors (or designees) and project managers shall:

a\. Establish and implement Center/program/project-level processes and
requirements as needed to satisfy the SMA variance policy and associated
requirements provided in this NPR to include processes for preparation,
review, and approval of variance requests (Requirement).

b\. Ensure that all variance requests include (but are not limited to)
documentation as to why the requirement cannot be met, alternative means
to reduce the hazard or risk, the type of variance, the duration of the
variance if temporary, and comments from any affected workers or their
representatives if the variance affects personnel safety (Requirement).

c\. Ensure all variance requests include a risk assessment that
determines whether there is an increase in risk because the requirement
is not satisfied or that the intent of the requirement is met through
alternate means that provide an equivalent or lower level of risk
(Requirement).

d\. Ensure all requests for deviations or waivers include a plan for
correcting the associated deficiency and identify a date or development
milestone for bringing the project into compliance with the associated
requirement (Requirement).

e\. Ensure variance requests are approved in accordance with the policy
in paragraph 1.13.3 of this NPR (Requirement).

f\. Provide copies of all approved safety variances to the OSMA
(Requirement).

g\. Forward any request for variance to Federal, State, or local
regulations to the OSMA for review prior to submittal to the appropriate
Federal/State/local agency (Requirement).

1.13.5 Center SMA Directors shall:

a\. Assist programs/projects in the preparation of variance requests
(Requirement).

b\. Assure that the risk associated with a variance request is properly
characterized (quantitatively or qualitatively) and that any increase in
overall risk (as compared to a system or operation designed to meet the
requirement in question) is properly identified (Requirement).

c\. Assure that the variance process is carried out in accordance with
this NPR (Requirement).

d\. Concur (or nonconcur) with variance requests based on paragraphs
1.13.5.b. and 1.13.5.c. above (Requirement).

> *Note: Center SMA Directors and their personnel do not serve as
> approving officials unless specifically designated to do so by their
> Center Directors (for project level requirements) or Headquarters OSMA
> (for program level requirements).*

1.13.6 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall:

a\. Serve as the approving official for variances to program-level
safety, reliability, and quality requirements under SMA cognizance
(ownership) (Requirement).

b\. Oversee Center/project/program implementation of the variance policy
and associated requirements provided in this NPR (Requirement).

c\. Review all requests for variance to Federal, State, or local
regulations before submittal to the Federal/State/local agency for
approval (Requirement 31912).

1.13.7 The Chief Engineer shall serve as the approving official for
variances to program level technical requirements under OCE cognizance
(ownership) (Requirement).

1.13.8 The Chief Health and Medical Officer shall serve as the approving
official for variances to program level requirements under Chief Health
and Medical Officer cognizance (ownership) (Requirement).

# 

# CHAPTER 2. System Safety 

**2.1 Introduction**

This chapter establishes requirements for the implementation of system
safety processes to support decision making aimed at ensuring human
safety, asset integrity, and mission success in programs/projects.

System safety assessment is a disciplined, systematic approach to the
analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the
environment, and mission assets. It is a critical first step in the
development of risk management strategies. System safety covers the
total spectrum of technical risk and management activities including
safety and risk assessments and safety performance monitoring.

The format of this chapter is different than that of the rest of this
NPR because of the need to discuss new advanced concepts in system
safety. The explanatory material will be transferred to a handbook.

**2.2 Institutional Roles and Responsibilities**

2.2.1 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
program and project managers, and line managers shall ensure that system
safety activities are conducted for all programs and projects including
system acquisitions, in-house developments (research and technology),
design, construction, fabrication and manufacture, experimentation and
test, packaging and transportation, storage, checkout, launch, flight,
reentry, retrieval and disassembly, maintenance and refurbishment,
modification, and disposal [(Requirement
25243).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

2.2.2 Center Directors, through their Center SMA Directors, shall ensure
that knowledgeable system safety and technical risk analysts are made
available to program/project managers and Center engineering directors
to define and conduct system safety activities, including assurance of
prime contractor system safety activities (Requirement 25087).

**2.3 System Safety Framework**

2.3.1 The term "system," as used here, refers to one integrated entity
that performs a specified function and includes hardware, software,
human elements, and the environment within which the system operates. A
"hazard," as used here, is a state or a set of conditions, internal or
external to a system, that has the potential to cause harm. Generally,
one or more additional conditions need to exist or additional events
need to occur in conjunction with the existence of the hazard in order
for an accident or mishap[^1] with consequences adverse to safety[^2] to
result. These additional events enable the hazard to proceed to the
adverse consequence. The term "mishap" is NASA's preferred
generalization of an accident and it will be used in this document to
refer to events leading to safety-adverse consequences. The term
"accident" will be retained in the context of risk assessment
methodology because of its wide acceptance in the practice of this
methodology. The term "state" or "condition" is used in a broad sense to
include any intrinsic property and characteristic of the material,
system, or operation that could, in certain circumstances, lead to an
adverse consequence[^3].

2.3.2 Hazards analysis involves the application of systematic and
replicable methods to identify and understand hazards and to
characterize the risk of mishaps that involve hazards. MIL-STD-882
describes the systems engineering approach to hazard analysis. This
standard is used in conjunction with the following paragraphs to develop
a comprehensive scenario-based system safety analysis program.

2.3.3 Risks originate from hazards -- the absence of a hazard implies a
freedom from the associated risk. In the context of making decisions to
manage risk, it is useful to consider "risk" as a set of triplets[^4]:
*accident scenarios* involving hazards; associated *frequencies*[^5];
and associated adverse *consequences*. Each triplet is a statement about
the likelihood of realizing a postulated accident scenario with the type
and magnitude of potential adverse consequences. The expression for risk
as a set of triplets is:

$$\text{Risk} \equiv$$

The "triplet" concept of risk is operationally useful because it makes
clear that in order to define, assess, and understand risk, it is
necessary to produce:

-   A definition of the scenarios that may happen. This definition is
    especially useful when organized in logical fashion to identify the
    cause-consequence relationship of events that constitute accident
    scenarios.

-   A characterization of the probabilities of the accident scenarios
    that have been identified. This characterization is expressed
    quantitatively in the form of a probability over some reference
    period of time or set of activities, or as a "frequency;" i.e., a
    probability per unit of time.

-   A characterization of the severity of the consequences associated
    with the accident scenarios that have been identified. This
    characterization is expressed quantitatively in the form of a
    numeric parameter or set of parameters that best represent the
    magnitude and type of the adverse consequences.

It is also important to identify the uncertainties in the probabilities
and consequences and to quantify them to the extent feasible.

2.3.4 NASA uses the term "safety" broadly to include human safety
(public and workforce), environmental safety, and asset safety[^6].
Therefore, safety-adverse consequences of interest to NASA may include:

a\. General public death, injury, or illness.

b\. Local public[^7] death, injury, or illness.

c\. Astronaut death, injury, or illness.

d\. Ground crew and other workforce (occupational) death, injury, or
illness.

e\. Earth contamination.

f\. Planetary contamination.

g\. Loss of, or damage to, flight systems.

h\. Loss of, or damage to, ground assets (program facilities and public
properties).

2.3.5 Risk management involves making decisions that eliminate hazards
or reduce the frequency and/or consequences of accidents involving
hazards to an acceptable level by introducing hazard control measures
and modifying system design (e.g., hardware, software) and/or
procedures. Risk management may also importantly involve activities to
identify and reduce uncertainties. Monitoring the effectiveness of risk
reduction and uncertainty reduction strategies is an important element
of risk management activities. The NASA's continuous risk management
process shown below (Figure 2.1) provides an approach to track the
effectiveness of implemented risk reduction strategies.

### ![](media/image2.wmf)

Figure 2.1: The Continuous Risk Management Process

2.3.6 Scenario-based Modeling for Hazards Analysis

2.3.6.1 Scenario-based modeling of hazards as illustrated in Figure 2.2
provides a general framework for the analysis of how hazards lead to
adverse consequences. The identified scenarios then provide a basis for
the assessment of risk. In the scenario modeling approach, for each
hazard, an initiating event is identified, and necessary enabling
conditions that result in undesired consequences are also identified.
The enabling conditions often involve the failure to recognize a hazard
or the failure to implement appropriate controls such as protective
barriers or safety subsystems (controls). The resulting accident
scenario is the sequence of events that is comprised of the initiating
event and the enabling conditions and/or events that lead to the adverse
consequences. Scenarios can be classified according to the type and
severity of the consequences (i.e., according to their end states). In
the scenario-based modeling framework, a linkage between hazards and
adverse consequences of interest is established. Modeling of the
characteristics of this linkage (i.e., how the presence of a hazard is
linked with the occurrence of other events; e.g., hardware failures,
software errors, human errors, or phenomenological events leading to
formation of a mishap) should be the fabric of hazard analysis. As part
of this modeling, the following items are addressed:

a\. How a hazard enables or contributes to the causation of initiating
events; i.e., the mechanism by which the hazard is translated to the
initiating event.

b\. How a hazard enables or contributes to the loss of the system's
ability to compensate for (or respond to) initiating events.

c\. How a hazard enables or contributes to the loss of system's ability
to limit the severity of the consequences.

d\. Who or what the consequences affect; i.e. the target of the
consequences.

![](media/image3.wmf)

Figure 2.2: Scenario-based Modeling of Hazards

In carrying out a hazard analysis, it is important to describe the
context for the hazard, which involves identifying the hazard,
identifying the enabling conditions and events, and identifying the
target of the consequences; i.e., does the hazard represent potential
adverse consequences to humans, to the environment, or to the equipment?
Analyzing hazards, in the context of the above factors, supports risk
management activities that involve prevention of (reduction of frequency
of) adverse accident scenarios (ones with undesired consequences) and
promotion of favorable scenarios. Understanding the elements of the
adverse scenarios (i.e., the structure of accident scenarios and
contributing hazards), the risk significance of the adverse scenarios,
and elements of successful scenarios are essential to an effective
system safety and risk management program. This scenario-based risk
information provides required input to risk management that is used to
allocate resources optimally for risk reduction.

2.3.6.2 Evaluating uncertainties[^8] is an important part of evaluating
risks, in particular the uncertainties associated with the accident
scenario probabilities and the accident scenario consequences.
Randomness (or variability) of physical processes modeled in risk
assessments requires use of probabilistic models to represent
uncertainty in possible scenario outcomes. The probabilistic models for
the accident scenarios reflect these process-inherent uncertainties
(referred to as "aleatory uncertainties"). These process-uncertainties
are realized for initiating events and system behavior and must be
treated explicitly in the hazards modeling. The development of accident
scenarios and their risks involves using model assumptions and model
parameters that are based on what is currently known about the physics
of the relevant processes and the behavior of systems under given
conditions. Because there is uncertainty associated with these
potentially complex conditions, probabilistic models are also used to
represent the state-of-knowledge regarding the numerical parameter
values and the validity of the model assumptions. These
state-of-knowledge uncertainties (referred to as "epistemic
uncertainties") must be properly accounted for as part of risk
characterization. The expanded representation of the risk triplets that
accounts for epistemic uncertainties is shown below. It is also shown
notionally in Figure 2.3.

$$\text{Risk} \equiv$$

#### ![](media/image2.wmf)

Figure 2.3: Expressing Risk as a Set of Triplets[^9]

2.3.7 Strategies to Manage Safety Risks

Risk management decisions can involve the elimination of hazards or the
reduction in the probability or consequences associated with accident
scenarios by modifying designs and/or introducing additional design
features (e.g., hardware, software, ergonomic), and/or operational or
management procedures that prevent the occurrence of an accident
scenario or its propagation (individual events within the scenario) or
by mitigating the consequences. Improvements in the state-of-knowledge
regarding key uncertainties (i.e., uncertainty reduction) that drive the
risk associated with a hazard can also be used to manage risk. (See
paragraph 1.7.1 of this NPR.)

2.3.8 Program success is achieved by ensuring that technical objectives
of the program are accomplished safely within the constraints of cost
and schedule and consistent with stakeholder expectations. Safety is one
of NASA's core values. Ensuring safety involves the following high-level
safety objectives:

a\. Protect public health.

b\. Protect workforce health.

c\. Protect the environment.

d\. Protect program (systems and infrastructures needed to execute a
mission) and public assets.

In order to properly support key design and operational decisions, it is
necessary that design and operational alternatives[^10] are analyzed not
only with respect to their impact on the mission's technical and
programmatic objectives, but also with respect to their impact on these
high-level safety objectives. Probabilistic risk assessments[^11]
developed as part of system safety modeling activities and supported by
qualitative safety analyses (e.g., Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA),
Fault Tree Analysis) are used to assess the impact of a decision
alternative on the overall objectives. It should be noted that a typical
probabilistic risk assessment model combines many engineering models
including qualitative safety and reliability models (e.g., PHA, Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)) and quantitative hardware and human
reliability models for the purpose of quantifying risk. Qualitative
system safety analyses are mostly "deterministic," and uncertainties
which remain unquantified are managed using redundancy, design for
minimum risk, physical margins, and safety factors. The roles of both
probabilistic risk assessment and qualitative system safety analyses in
decision making are depicted in Figure 2.4. In this NPR, the term
"System Safety Models" is used to include both qualitative safety
analysis and probabilistic risk assessment models. It is important to
emphasize that qualitative safety analysis, to be most effective, needs
to be scenario-based, even if the risks of scenarios are not explicitly
quantified.

![](media/image3.wmf)

Figure 2.4: The Role of System Safety Models in Decision Making

Figure 2.4 shows, importantly, that probabilistic risk assessment
complements and supports qualitative safety analyses and does not
replace it. The deliberation that takes place before a decision is made
utilizes the insights and results of both the qualitative
"deterministic" analyses and the probabilistic risk assessment. Possible
conflicts between these results may be resolved during the deliberation.
This process of decision making is therefore risk-*informed*, not
risk-*based*. It is important to note that the decision is the result of
a combination of analysis and deliberation[^12].

The deliberation at the end of the process imposes a responsibility on
the decision makers who must consider subjectively the impact of each
decision option on various metrics[^13] that represent technical and
programmatic objectives as well as on metrics that represent safety
considerations. Consequently, it would be desirable to move as much of
this burden as possible from the deliberation to the analysis and to
begin such analysis early in Formulation.

2.3.9 To facilitate the deliberation, we develop the hierarchical tree
of Figure 2.5, which shows how system safety models along with other
models are utilized to assess the impact of a decision alternative on
safety and other objectives.

The top tier of this tree is "Program Success." The idea is to evaluate
the impact on this ultimate objective of each decision alternative
listed in the diamond at the bottom of the figure. Since "Program
Success" is very general, a hierarchical approach is employed to develop
quantitative metrics that will measure the achievement of this top-level
objective. The next tier in the tree lists the general objective
categories that constitute program success; i.e., "Affordability,"
"Program technical objectives," "Safety," and "Stakeholder
support[^14]." At the next tier, these categories are elaborated upon
further by listing a number of objectives. Thus, the category "Safety"
becomes the four objectives: "Protect public health," "Protect workforce
health," "Protect environment," and "Protect program and public assets."
The next tier of the tree, labeled "potential adverse consequences,"
shows quantitative metrics for each objective. For example, two metrics
for the objective "protecting environment" are: "earth contamination"
and "planetary contamination." These metrics, also called Performance
Measures (PMs), allow quantitative assessment of the impact of each
decision alternative on the objectives. This hierarchical, tree-like
structure shows the objectives that the decision maker values in making
the decision. It provides a convenient structure for:

a\. Identification of safety PMs (measures of safety adverse
consequences) and other technical and programmatic PMs in the context of
the program's high-level objectives.

b\. Formulating risk tradeoff studies.

c\. Capturing of decision maker's preferences[^15] .

d\. Ranking of decision alternatives according to their desirability
(based on consideration of PMs and preferences).

e\. Deliberation that is required as part of the decision-making
process.

2.3.10 A PM is a metric that is related to risk and/or the constituents
of risk (e.g., probability, consequence). It provides risk insight into
a process, a project, or a product to enable assessment and improvement.
Safety PMs are metrics that provide measures of the safety performance
of a system. Because adverse space mission mishaps are rare and an
absence of mishaps does not assure that no mishaps will occur in the
future, safety PMs provide a means of assessing and monitoring safety
performance to enable design and operational decisions aimed at
preventing mishaps and optimizing safety. High-level safety PMs (see the
hierarchy shown in Figure 2.5) can be defined in terms of the
probability of a consequence type of a specific magnitude (e.g.,
probability of any general public deaths or injuries) or the expected
magnitude of a consequence type (e.g., the number of public deaths or
injuries). Metrics such as "Probability of failure to meet a mission
critical function" can be used as non-safety PMs. Safety and non-safety
PMs, along with other performance measures such as reliability, provide
decision makers with the ability (1) to set performance goals (e.g.,
safety goals), (2) to trade performances, and (3) to monitor
performances at different stages of the system life cycle.

![](media/image4.wmf)

Figure 2.5: The Role of System Safety Models and Other Models in
Risk-informed Decision Making

2.3.11 Relationship of System Safety Technical Processes with Other
Technical Processes

The system safety technical processes provided in this chapter cannot be
effective unless they are performed by well-trained and experienced
safety analysts and are supported by engineering and safety-related
activities that include:

a\. Ensuring that safety, software, and quality standards are applied
and utilized throughout the project life cycle (e.g., NASA-STD-8719.13,
Software Safety Standard, and NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance
Standard). These are included in the box "Qualitative System Safety
Analysis" of Figure 2.4 and in the deliberation.

b\. Monitoring processes to ensure that lessons learned are used as
feedback to inform safety-related models and activities.

c\. Ensuring that best practices in system engineering are followed in
the design of the system.

> *Note: Requirements for system engineering are provided in NPR 7123.1,
> Systems Engineering Procedural Requirements.*

**2.4 Scope of System Safety Modeling**

Decision makers throughout the entire life cycle of the project,
beginning with concept design and concluding with decommissioning, must
consider safety. However, the level of formality and rigor that is
involved in implementing the system safety processes should match
project potential consequences, life-cycle phase, life-cycle cost, and
strategic importance. To assist in determining the scope of activities
for safety evaluations as a function of project characteristics, two
tables are provided. The categorization scheme identified in Table 2.1
is used to determine a project priority. This table is similar to Table
1 from NPR 8705.5, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for
NASA Programs and Projects.

Table 2.1. Criteria for Determining the Project Priority

+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| **CONSEQUENCE | **CRITERIA |                         | **Project   |
| CATEGORY**    | /          |                         | Priority    |
|               | S          |                         | Ranking**   |
|               | PECIFICS** |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| **Human       | Public     | Planetary Protection    | **I**       |
| Safety and    | Safety     | Program Requirement     |             |
| Health**      |            |                         |             |
|               | and Health |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               |            | White House Approval    |             |
|               |            |                         |             |
|               |            | (PD/NSC-25)             |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               |            | Space Missions with     |             |
|               |            | Flight Termination      |             |
|               |            | Systems                 |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               | Human      |                         |             |
|               | Space      |                         |             |
|               | Flight     |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| **Mission     | High       |                         |             |
| Success**     | Strategic  |                         |             |
| (             | Importance |                         |             |
| for non‑human | Projects   |                         |             |
| rated         |            |                         |             |
| missions)     |            |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               | Limited    |                         |             |
|               | Window     |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               | High Cost  |                         |             |
|               | (See NPR   |                         |             |
|               | 7120.5)    |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               | Medium     |                         | **II**      |
|               | Cost (See  |                         |             |
|               | NPR        |                         |             |
|               | 7120.5)    |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+
|               | Low Cost   |                         | **III**     |
|               | (See NPR   |                         |             |
|               | 7120.5)    |                         |             |
+---------------+------------+-------------------------+-------------+

Once the project priority is determined, the scope of system safety
modeling is determined using Table 2.2.

2.4.2 Projects identified as "Priority I" ranking from Tables 2.1 are
generally the most visible and complex of NASA's product lines. Because
of this, the system safety technical processes for Priority I projects
must include probabilistic risk assessment as specified in NPR 8705.5,
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and
Projects. For Priority II or III projects, Table 2.2 provides latitude
to adjust the scope of system safety modeling. This graded approach to
the application of system safety modeling also operates on another
dimension. That is, the level of rigor and detail associated with system
safety modeling activities must be commensurate with the availability of
design and operational information[^16]. The two-dimensional nature of
the graded approach is intended to ensure that allocation of resources
to system safety technical activities considers the visibility and
complexity of the project and to ensure that the level of rigor
associated with system safety models follows the level of maturity of
the system design.

Table 2.2: Graded Approach to System Safety Modeling

+--------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Priority Ranking   | Scope                                           |
|                    |                                                 |
|                    | (The level of rigor and details are             |
|                    | commensurate with the level of design maturity) |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| I                  | Probabilistic risk assessment (per NPR 8705.5)  |
|                    | supported by qualitative system safety analysis |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| II                 | Qualitative system safety analysis supplemented |
|                    | by probabilistic risk assessment where          |
|                    | appropriate                                     |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| III                | Qualitative system safety analysis              |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------------+

**2.5 Core Requirements for System Safety Processes**

The system safety modeling approaches previously described should be
implemented as part of technical processes that represent system safety
activities. Conceptually, system safety activities consist of three
major technical processes as shown in the circular flow diagram in
Figure 2.6. These processes are designed to systematically and
objectively analyze hazards and identify the mechanism for their
elimination or control. These processes begin in the conceptual phase
and extend throughout the life cycle of a system including disposal. In
general, requirements for safety system technical processes must provide
a risk-informed perspective to decision makers participating in the
project life cycle. The three critical technical processes to a
successful system safety program are (1) system safety modeling, (2)
life-cycle applications of models for risk-informed decisions and, (3)
monitoring safety performance. The circular flow indicates that these
technical processes are linked and are performed throughout the project
life cycle. A System Safety Technical Plan is used to guide the
technical processes and establish roles and responsibilities. This plan
is established early in the formulation phase of each project and
updated throughout the project life cycle.

![](media/image5.wmf)

[]{.mark}

Figure 2.6: The System Safety Technical Processes

2.5.1 System Safety Technical Plan (SSTP)

The SSTP is designed to be a technical planning guide for the technical
performance and management of the system safety activities. The SSTP can
be a stand-alone document or part of the SMA plan or the Systems
Engineering Management Plan (SEMP). It provides the specifics of the
system safety modeling activities and describes what and how safety
adverse consequences will be modeled, how system safety models
(qualitative and probabilistic risk assessments) will be integrated and
applied for risk-informed decision making and safety monitoring, how the
technical team(s) responsible for generating and maintaining system
safety models will interact with the system engineering organizations,
the reporting protocol, and the cost and schedule associated with
accomplishing system safety modeling activities in relation to the
critical or key events during all phases of the life cycle.

2.5.1.1 Project managers shall:

a\. Ensure, for Category I project/programs, that the SSTP is approved
by the governing Program Management Council (PMC) and has concurrence by
the cognizant SMA managers and the project's senior engineer
(Requirement).

b\. Ensure that the System Safety Manager and the prime contractor (for
out-of-house projects) have the resources to implement the SSTP
(Requirement 25082).

c\. Ensure, for Category I project/programs, that changes to the SSTP
are approved by the governing PMC and have concurrence by the Chief,
Safety and Mission Assurance (Requirement).

d\. When the SSTP is not an integral part of the SEMP, ensure that the
SSTP is coordinated with the SEMP for the integration of system safety
activities with other system engineering technical processes
(Requirement).

2.5.1.2 The Center SMA Director shall:

a\. In coordination with the program/project manager, assign a System
Safety Manager to have specific responsibility for the development and
implementation of the SSTP [(Requirement
25081).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Ensure that the assigned System Safety Manager has demonstrated
expertise in safety analysis including, in the case of Category I and II
projects, the application of probabilistic risk assessment techniques
(Requirement).

c\. Ensure that all personnel with project safety oversight
responsibilities are funded by other than direct project funding sources
(Requirement).

2.5.1.3 The assigned System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Develop a SSTP during the project formulation phase and update the
plan throughout the system life cycle (Requirement).

b\. Ensure that the scope of system safety technical processes in the
SSTP follows the graded approach specified in Tables 2.1 and 2.2
(Requirement 32105).

c\. Ensure that the SSTP provides the specifics of the system safety
modeling activities and their application to risk-informed decision
making and safety monitoring throughout the project life cycle
(Requirement).

d\. In consultation with the project managers, establish and document,
in the SSTP, the objectives and scope of the system safety tasks and
define applicable safety deliverables and performance measures
(Requirement).

e\. Provide technical direction and manage implementation of system
safety activities as specified in the SSTP (Requirement).

f\. Ensure that system safety engineering activities are integrated into
system engineering technical processes (Requirement).

g\. Determine the acceptability of residual risk stemming from safety
assessments (Requirement).

h\. Ensure that specific safety requirements are integrated into overall
programmatic requirements and are reflected in applicable program and
planning documents including the statement of work for contractor
designs [(Requirement
32120).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

i\. Maintain appropriate safety participation in the program design,
tests, operations, failures and mishaps, and contractor system safety
activities at a level consistent with mishap potential for the life of
the program [(Requirement
25094).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

j\. Establish an independent safety reporting channel to keep the Center
SMA Director apprised of the system safety status (including tests and
operations), particularly regarding problem areas that may require
assistance from the Center, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center, or
Headquarters [(Requirement
25095).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

k\. Support OSMA requirements for audits, assessments, and reviews
(Requirement).

2.5.2 System Safety Modeling

Developing and maintaining technically sound and traceable safety models
are essential activities for ensuring safety. In these activities,
analysts use all the relevant and available information including design
documents, operational procedures, test results, operational history,
and human and software performance to develop comprehensive system
safety models. Developing these models is multidisciplinary and may
involve diverse and geographically dispersed groups. Thus, it is
important for the safety modeling activities to be coordinated in order
to ensure consistency and technical quality.

Safety models need to be synchronized with the system design and
operational state-of-knowledge to ensure the models match the collected
engineering information during operation with model predictions.

2.5.2.1 System Safety Managers shall ensure that the system safety
modeling activities are fully integrated into system engineering and are
supported by domain, systems, and specialty engineers (Requirement).

2.5.2.2 System safety engineers shall:

a\. Ensure that system safety models use systematic, replicable, and
scenario-based techniques to identify hazards, to characterize the risk
of accidents, to identify risk control measures, and to identify key
uncertainties (Requirement 32122).

b\. Initially conduct system safety analyses during project formulation
and design concept phases (prior to the Preliminary Design Review) and
maintain and update these analyses continuously throughout the project
life cycle (Requirement 32126).

c\. Ensure, for Category I and II program/projects, probabilistic risk
assessment techniques are used for system safety analysis (Requirement).

d\. Ensure that the system safety models are developed in an iterative
process to allow model expansion, model updating, and model integration
as the design evolves and operational experience is acquired
(Requirement).

e\. Ensure that relevant leading-indicator (or precursor[^17]) events
are documented and evaluated for their impact on the system safety
analyses assumptions and on system risk. Trending of these precursor
events should be conducted and contrasted to applicable PMs.

f\. Use system-specific and all relevant data including failure
histories, mishap investigation findings, and the NASA LLIS in system
safety analysis (Requirement).

g\. Maintain an up-to-date database of identified hazards, accident
scenarios, probabilities and consequences, and key uncertainties
throughout the life of the program [(Requirement
25093).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

h\. Document the bases for the system safety analyses including key
assumptions, accident scenarios, probabilities, consequence severities,
and uncertainties such that they are traceable (Requirement).

2.5.3 Application of System Safety Models for Risk-informed Decisions

Safety and technical risk considerations are critical in the
decision-making process. When faced with a decision, several conflicting
alternatives may be available to the decision maker. In a risk-informed,
decision-making framework, the decision maker considers safety and other
technical attributes as well as programmatic attributes, such as cost
and schedule, to select the best decision alternative.

2.5.3.1 Program/project managers shall:

a\. Ensure that a framework is constructed for systematically
incorporating system safety analysis results into the evaluation of
decision alternatives (Requirement).

b\. Establish and document a formal and transparent decision-making
process for hazard closure[^18] and formally accepting residual risk
that has been determined to be acceptable by the cognizant technical
authority [(Requirement
25085).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. Ensure acceptable residual risks[^19] are accepted in writing
[(Requirement 32114). (See paragraph 1.6 of this
NPR.)](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

d\. Ensure that decisions to accept risk are coordinated with the
governing SMA organization and communicated to the next higher level of
management for review [(Requirement
32115).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html) (See
paragraph 1.6.2 of this NPR.)

e\. Where residual risks have been determined by either the cognizant
technical authority or the cognizant SMA authority as "unacceptable,"
initiate risk mitigation/control activities, as appropriate, to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level (Requirement).

f\. Ensure that the requirements of this chapter are specified in
related contracts, memoranda of understanding, and other agreement
documents (Requirement). (See Chapter 9 of this NPR.)

2.5.3.2 The System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Ensure that system safety models are constructed to support the
implementation of the risk-informed decision framework (Requirement).

b\. Ensure that the system safety models incorporate all the safety
attributes important to risk-informed decision making by working with
the project manager and other decision makers as deemed appropriate
(Requirement).

c\. Establish the methods and tools that are used in the risk-informed
framework (Requirement).

d\. Check and validate the methods and tools before implementation and
obtain concurrence from the project manager (Requirement).

e\. Document the bases for the methods and tools used and analytical
results (Requirement).

2.5.4 Performance Monitoring

Safety, like other performance attributes, is monitored during the
entire life cycle to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is
maintained.

2.5.4.1 Project managers shall ensure that the performance attributes
and precursors that are identified as being important indicators of
system safety are monitored (Requirement).

2.5.4.2 The System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Establish the methods and tools that are used in the performance
monitoring and precursor assessments (Requirement).

b\. Check and validate the methods and tools used for performance
monitoring and precursor assessments before implementation
(Requirement).

c\. Maintain an up-to-date database of the performance monitoring
results and precursor results (Requirement).

d\. Ensure that the performance monitoring and precursor data are fed
back into system safety analyses and the results updated (Requirement).

e\. Document the bases for the methods and tools that are used in the
performance monitoring and precursor assessments (Requirement).

**2.6 System Safety Reviews**

System Safety and Mission Success Program Reviews are conducted in
conjunction with other program milestones. The purpose of these reviews
is to evaluate the status of system safety and risk analyses, risk
management, verification techniques, technical safety requirements, and
program implementation throughout all the phases of the system life
cycle.

2.6.1 The program/project manager shall:

a\. Conduct periodic system safety and mission success reviews of their
program/project depending on the complexity of the system [(Requirement
25099).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

> *Note: The greater the risks, complexity of the system, or visibility
> of the programs, the greater the independence and formality of the
> reviews.*

b\. Document the periodicity of the System Safety and Mission Success
Program Reviews in the SSTP (Requirement).

c\. Ensure that the System Safety and Mission Success Program Reviews
focus on the evaluation of management and technical documentation,
hazard closure, and the safety residual risks remaining in the program
at that stage of development [(Requirement
32129).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

d\. Establish and maintain dedicated independent assessment activities
for Priority I programs and projects, such as the Constellation Program
[(Requirement
32113).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

2.6.2 The System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Conduct periodic independent reviews of the system safety tasks
keyed to project milestones [(Requirement
25091).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Assist and support independent review groups established to provide
independent assessments of the program [(Requirement
25092).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. Support the OSMA independent safety assessment process to determine
readiness to conduct tests and operations having significant levels of
safety risks (Requirement).

**2.7 Change Review**

Systems are changed during their life cycle to enhance capabilities,
improve safety, provide more efficient operation, and incorporate new
technology. With each change, the original safety aspects of the system
can be impacted, either increasing or reducing the risk. Any aspect of
controlling hazards can be weakened, risks can be increased, or
conversely, risks can be decreased. Even a change that appears
inconsequential could have significant impact on the baseline risk of
the system. Accordingly, proposed system changes should be subjected to
a safety review or analysis, as appropriate, to assess the safety and
risk impacts, including implications on controls and mitigations for
significant hazards and FMEA/CILS.

2.7.1 The project manager and the System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Update the system safety analyses to identify any change in risk
[(Requirement
25102).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Ensure that safety personnel assess the potential safety impact of
the proposed change and any changes to the baseline risk and previously
closed hazards [(Requirement
32137).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. Ensure that proposed changes to correct a safety problem are
analyzed to determine the amount of safety improvement (or detriment)
that would result from incorporation of the change [(Requirement
32138).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

d\. Ensure that the safety impact for every change that is proposed to a
program baseline (even if the statement is \"No Impact") is documented
[(Requirement
32139).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

**2.8 Documentation**

The maintenance of the SSTP is required to provide ready traceability
from the baseline safety requirements, criteria, and efforts planned in
the conceptual phases through the life cycle of the program.

2.8.1 The project manager (or designated agent) and the System Safety
Manager shall:

a\. Ensure that all pertinent details of the system safety analysis and
review are traceable from the initial identification of the risks
through their resolution and any updates in the SSTP [(Requirement
25100).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Ensure that records are maintained per NPR1441.1, NASA Records
Retention Schedules [(Requirement
32130).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

2.8.2 The System Safety Manager shall:

a\. Submit a system safety analysis report to the program/project
manager at each milestone (formulation, evaluation, implementation, or
other equivalent milestones \[e.g., Safety Requirements Review[^20],
Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, and Flight Readiness
Review\]) detailing the results of the system safety analyses completed
to date to document the status of system safety tasks [(Requirement
25101).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

b\. Ensure that each submitted revision to the system safety analysis
report lists the risks that have been addressed, the risks that have yet
to be addressed, and expected residual risks that will remain following
the implementation of risk reduction strategies [(Requirement
32132).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. Ensure that the system safety analysis report documents management
and technical changes that affect the established safety baseline (by
changes in the planned approach, design, requirements, and
implementation) and is revised when required [(Requirement
32133).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

d\. Ensure that a final approved system safety analysis report is
produced that contains a verification of the resolution of the risks and
a written acceptance of the residual risks from the program/project
manager to complete the audit trail [(Requirement
32134).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

**CHAPTER 3. Operational Safety**

**3.1 Purpose and Objectives**

This chapter establishes safety procedural requirements for NASA
operational safety. The objective of this chapter is to protect the
public; flight, ground, laboratory, and underwater personnel; the
environment; aircraft; spacecraft; payloads; facilities; property; and
equipment from operations-related safety hazards. This NPR is not
inclusive of all regulations and requirements governing operations.
Citations are indicated throughout the text for applicable standards,
specifications, and other references.

3.1 NASA has established an Engineering and Construction Innovations
Committee to nurture and foster the identification and appropriate use
of new innovations and practices to improve the process of delivering
high-quality facilities projects. Each Center or off-site facility with
responsibility for construction projects has one member/vote on the
Engineering and Construction Innovations Committee.

3.1.1 Center Directors shall conduct safety inspections of all
facilities, occupied or unoccupied, at least annually to ensure
compliance with safety, fire protection, and building codes and
standards (Requirement).

**3.2 Motor Vehicle Safety**

3.2.1 Center Directors shall ensure that motor vehicle operating
procedures comply with Federal, State, and local motor vehicle safety
regulations (Requirement 25139).

3.2.2 Motor Vehicle Operation

> *Note: Motor vehicles include electric utility cars.*

3.2.2.1 Operators of motor vehicles on NASA property or operating a NASA
vehicle both on and off NASA property shall:

a\. Not drive a motor vehicle for a continuous period of more than 10
hours, including a combination of personal driving and driving for
official NASA business (Requirement).

b\. Not drive a motor vehicle for a combined duty period that exceeds 12
hours in any 24-hour period, without at least 8 consecutive hours of
rest (Requirement 32269).

c\. Not use hand-held communication devices while the vehicle is motion
except for emergency, security, and fire vehicles during official
operations (Requirement).

> *Note: This includes cell phones, UHF radios, or other hand-held
> wireless communication devices. When there are two individuals
> traveling in an emergency, security, or fire vehicle during official
> operations, the passenger should be the person to use the hand-held
> communication device.*

d\. Ensure that children unable to use seat belts while in Federal
vehicles are secured in DOT-approved child safety seats that are
properly installed (Requirement 32276).

e\. Have formal training, as required in paragraph 7.3.1 of this NPR, if
operation of the vehicle involves skills beyond those associated with
normal, everyday operation of private motor vehicles (Requirement).

3.2.2.2 Center Directors shall ensure that any variation from the above
policy has safety office approval (Requirement 32270).

3.2.2.3 Center Directors shall ensure that all NASA motor vehicles used
off NASA Centers are inspected to the standards of the State or other
jurisdiction\'s vehicle safety inspection requirements (Requirement
32273).

3.2.3 Seat Belts

Executive Order 13043, Increasing Seat Belt Use in the United States,
dated April 16, 1997, as amended, requires all Federal employees to use
seat belts while on official business. The EO states seat belt use is
required by Federal employees operating or in any vehicle with seat
belts while on Federal business.

3.2.3.1 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. Center policy requires passengers not be carried in the cargo area
of pickup trucks, flatbeds, or special purpose equipment such as fire
trucks or escape trucks unless designated occupant positions with seat
belts are provided (see 49 CFR Part 571, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards) (Requirement 32277).

b\. Center policy requires the use of seats belts for all occupants of
motor vehicles operated on NASA property, including delivery vans and
trucks of all sizes, at all times the vehicle is in motion (Requirement
32278).

3.2.4 Annual Seat Belt Report

3.2.4.1 Director, Safety and Assurance Requirements Division, shall:

a\. Prepare and submit an annual status report to the Secretary of
Transportation on NASA-wide seat belt use (Requirement 32280).

> *Note: Required by EO 13043, Increasing Seat Belt Use in the United
> States, dated April 16, 1997, as amended. The annual report includes
> seat belt usage rates and statistics of crashes, injuries, and related
> costs involving Federal employees on official business. DOT
> consolidates this data into an annual status report to the President
> for all Federal Agencies.*

b\. Coordinate data for the annual report with the Office of
Institutions and Management and the OCHMO (Requirement).

> *Note: The format and submittal date for the report will be as
> directed each year by the Secretary of Transportation.*

3.2.5 Traffic Control Devices and Markings

3.2.5.1 Center Directors shall use the ANSI D6.1, Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, for guidance when
setting traffic control devices or marking roads for motor vehicle
operations on NASA property (Requirement 25142).

**3.3 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)**

3.3.1 Requirements for the stocking and issuance of PPE are provided in
NPR 4100.1, NASA Materials Inventory Management Manual.

3.3.2 Requirements for the accountability of PPE are provided in NPR
4200.1, NASA Equipment Management Manual.

3.3.3 Requirements for the use, including the training for, storage, and
maintenance, of PPE are provided in 29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart I,
Personnel Protective Equipment.

3.3.4 Examples of PPE. Items which may be purchased and issued by NASA
include, but are not limited to, the following:

a\. Safety goggles and safety spectacles (plain and prescription).

b\. Welding helmets and shields.

c\. Safety shoes.

d\. Steel sole and/or toe safety boots.

e\. Aprons, suits, and gloves (e.g., fire resistant materials, leather,
rubber, cotton, and synthetics).

f\. Protective head gear (e.g., hard hats and caps, liners, helmets, and
hoods).

g\. Face shields.

h\. Specialty items of protective nature (e.g., cryogenic handlers
suits, Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble suits, firefighter
suits, foul weather gear, harnesses, life belts, lifelines, life nets,
insulated clothing for \"cold test\" exposure, supplied air suits, and
electrical protective devices).

j\. Hearing protective devices.

3.3.5 Center Directors shall:

a\. Issue PPE to NASA employees at Government expense in those
situations where engineering controls, management controls, or other
corrective actions have not reduced the hazard to an acceptable level or
where use of engineering controls, management controls, or other
techniques is not feasible (Requirement 32282).

b\. Authorize (or deny) the purchase of PPE after the purchase request
has been reviewed by safety and health professionals to determine proper
specifications and adequacy of abatement.

> *Note: The authority for the purchase of PPE with appropriated funds
> is provided in 5 U.S.C. 7903, Protective Clothing and Equipment. It is
> recommended that local safety and health committees be involved in the
> decision to purchase PPE.*

c\. Ensure that only clothing and equipment meeting Federal regulations,
industrial standards, or NASA special testing requirements are used for
PPE (Requirement 32286).

> *Note: Transients or visitors may be furnished PPE on a temporary
> basis if they are on site for NASA-related business purposes or at
> NASA\'s invitation.*

d\. Ensure that non-NASA, contractor, and noncontractor personnel at
their Center procure their own PPE to provide an equivalent level of
safety (Requirement 32290).

e\. Ensure that non-NASA, contractor, and noncontractor personnel at
their Center provide the appropriate training, fit testing, and
compliance with other Federal, State, local, and NASA PPE requirements
(Requirement).

f\. Have a formal Respiratory Protection Program if respirators are used
at their Center (Requirement 32294).

> *Note: The OCHMO at NASA Headquarters provides guidance for
> purchasing, training, selection, and qualification for use of
> respiratory protective devices and other health-related PPE.*

3.3.6 COs and COTRs shall ensure that contracts require non-NASA,
contractor, and non-contractor personnel to procure their own PPE.

3.3.7 NASA hosts, guides, or area supervisors shall be responsible for
obtaining, issuing, and recovering PPE issued to transients or visitors
onsite for NASA-related business purposes or at NASA\'s invitation
(Requirement 32289).

**3.4 Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout Program)**

3.4.1 Requirements for all NASA Centers, facilities, and operations that
have the responsibility for controlling hazardous energy involving
electrical, pressure, hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical systems are
given in 29 CFR 1910.147, The Control of Hazardous Energy
(lockout/tagout).

3.4.2 Center Directors shall establish a program for controlling
hazardous energy during service and maintenance operations where the
unexpected energizing or startup of equipment could cause injury to
employees or equipment damage (Requirement 32295).

**3.5 Pressure System Safety**

Requirements for NASA pressure vessel and vacuum system safety are
provided in NPD 8710.5, NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and
Pressurized Systems.

3.5.1 Center Directors and Project Managers shall use NPD 8710.5, NASA
Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems, to protect
personnel and property from hazards posed by pressure vessels and
pressurized systems.

> *Note: This document assigns responsibilities for the various aspects
> of a NASA pressure vessel and pressurized systems safety program,
> references the codes, standards, guides, and Federal regulations that
> must be followed, and establishes unique NASA requirements.*

**3.6 Electrical Safety**

This paragraph provides requirements for protecting personnel and
property from electrical hazards. It applies to all NASA uses of
electrical power.

3.6.1 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. Electrical systems are designed in accordance with NFPA 70, National
Electric Code, MIL-454, Standard General Requirements for Electronic
Equipment, or Center-specific requirements if more specific (Requirement
32297).

b\. Electrical systems are operated and maintained to adequately control
hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm or severe system
damage (Requirement 32298).

c\. All electrical systems are reviewed by the Center\'s safety office
for appropriate location and for proximity to ignitable or combustible
material such as gas, vapor, dust, or fiber (Requirement 32322).

d\. All electrical work deemed hazardous by job safety analysis is
performed by personnel familiar with electrical code requirements in
accordance with NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace, and qualified/certified for the class of work to be performed
(Requirement 32300).

e\. Transformer banks or high-voltage equipment (600+ volts) are
protected by an enclosure to prevent unauthorized access with metallic
enclosures being grounded (Requirement 32305).

f\. Entrances to enclosed transformer banks or high-voltage equipment
(600+ volts) not under constant observation are kept locked (Requirement
32306).

g\. Signs warning of high voltage and prohibiting unauthorized entrance
are posted at entrances and on the perimeter of enclosed transformer
banks or high-voltage equipment (600+ volts) (Requirement 32307).

h\. An authorized access list of qualified personnel is maintained for
enclosed transformer banks or high-voltage equipment (600+ volts)
(Requirement 32308).

i\. Inductive floors or other methods are used where electrostatic
discharge is a significant hazard to personnel or hardware (Requirement
32309).

3.6.2 Supervisors shall ensure that:

a\. No person works alone with high-voltage electricity (Requirement
32303).

b\. One person, trained to recognize electrical hazards, is delegated to
watch the movements of other personnel working with electrical equipment
to warn them if they get dangerously close to live conductors or perform
unsafe acts and to assist in the event of a mishap (Requirement 32304).

**3.7 Hazardous Material Transportation, Storage, and Use**

3.7.1 This paragraph provides requirements for protecting persons and
property during the transportation, storage, and use of hazardous
materials. NASA policy for transporting hazardous material or hazardous
or radiological waste is contained in NPD 6000.1, Transportation
Management.

> *Note: The OCHMO maintains a Web-based hazardous materials information
> database (ChemWatch) that is available for use by all NASA and NASA
> contractor personnel. Contact the Senior Environmental Health Officer
> for Web access to the database on (321) 867-2961.*

3.7.2 Requirements for the transport of hazardous materials on both
Federal property and public roadways are provided in applicable Federal
regulations (e.g., DOT, EPA, and OSHA) and State and local laws and
regulations.

3.7.3 Hazardous material is defined by law as a substance or materials
in a quantity and form which may pose an unreasonable risk to health and
safety or property when transported in commerce (49 CFR Part 171.8,
Regulations, Definitions, and Abbreviations). The Secretary of
Transportation has developed a list of hazardous materials given in 49
CFR Part 172.101, Purpose and Use of Hazardous Materials Tables.

3.7.4 Typical hazardous materials are those that may be highly reactive,
poisonous, explosive, flammable, combustible, corrosive, and
radioactive; produce contamination or pollution of the environment; or
cause adverse health effects or unsafe conditions.

3.7.5 Transporting Hazardous Material

3.7.5.1 Center Directors shall ensure:

a\. That the mode of transportation is inspected to the standards of the
Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of
Transportation, and Federal Railroad Administration (Requirement 32314).

b\. That all contractor motor vehicles, rail cars, boats, and ships
covered by NASA Bill of Lading and used for the transportation of
hazardous material have passed an inspection prior to loading to assure
that the vehicle or vessel is in safe mechanical condition (Requirement
32313).

c\. That all vehicles transporting hazardous materials on NASA and
public roadways display all DOT-required placards, lettering, or
numbering (Requirement 32315).

d\. That hazardous material defined in 49 CFR Part 171.8, Hazardous
Material Regulations, Definitions, and Abbreviations, is not transported
in NASA administrative aircraft (Requirement 32316).

> *Note: To ensure hazardous material is not inadvertently loaded on
> administrative aircraft, all cargo for shipment should be routed
> through the Center\'s transportation office or, if en route, cargo
> should be accepted only from a certified shipper or freight forwarding
> agency.*

3.7.6 Hazardous Material Storage, Use, and Disposal Inventories

3.7.6.1 Center Directors shall ensure:

a\. That hazardous material storage, use, and disposal inventories are
conducted at least annually (Requirement).

b\. That the conditions of materials in storage are assessed at least
quarterly, and those determined to be unsuitable for use are removed
from active inventory (Requirement 32317).

c\. That local procedures address the requirements for release
prevention, control, countermeasures, and contingency planning and
include a listing of restricted/prohibited materials for purchasing and
use at Centers.

> []{.mark}
>
> *Note: Requirements for the storage, use, and disposal of hazardous
> materials are provided in Federal and State regulations.*

d\. That NASA procurement activities reference 29 CFR Part 1910.1200,
Hazard Communication, and Federal Standard 313, Material Safety Data,
Transportation Data and Disposal Data for Hazardous Materials Furnished
to Government Activities, as revised, in commodity specifications,
purchase descriptions, purchase orders, contracts, and other purchase
documents (Requirement 32318).

e\. That electronic, magnetic, optical, or paper copies of all Material
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are maintained in the work area where the
material is being used or stored (Requirement 32320).

f\. The employees in work areas where hazardous materials are being used
or stored are permitted to view any MSDS sheet maintained on file
(Requirement).

> *Note: The NASA MSDS Inventory is accessible at:
> http://msds.ksc.nasa.gov.*

3.7.6.2 Receiving offices at each Center shall provide copies of the
MSDS for receipt of such commodities to the central office responsible
for maintaining the MSDS records (Requirement 32319).

> *Note: Safety forms and reports are retained per NPR 1441.1, NASA
> Records Retention Schedules.*

**3.8 Hazardous Operations**

3.8.1 NASA hazardous operations involve materials or equipment that, if
misused or mishandled, have a high potential to result in loss of life,
serious injury or illness to personnel, or damage to systems, equipment,
or facilities. Adequate preparation and strict adherence to operating
procedures can prevent most of these mishaps. This paragraph applies to
operations that occur on a routine or continuous basis. Requirements for
protecting personnel and property during hazardous test operations are
provided in paragraph 3.14 of this NPR.

3.8.2 Center Directors and project managers shall:

a\. Identify, assess, analyze, and develop adequate safety controls for
all hazardous operations (Requirement 32323).

b\. Ensure that all hazardous operations have a Hazardous Operating
Procedure or a Hazardous Operating Permit (HOP) (Requirement 32324).

> *Note: HOPs consist of a detailed plan listing step-by-step functions
> or tasks to be performed on a system or equipment to ensure safe and
> efficient operations. HOPs list special precautions, start and stop
> time of the operation, and the approving supervisor(s). Certain
> operations (e.g., rigging, high voltage) depend on adherence to
> overall standards and general guidelines and specific training as
> opposed to HOPs for each specific operation.*

c\. Ensure that all HOPs developed at NASA sites or for NASA operations
have concurrence from the responsible fire protection or safety office
(Requirement).

d\. Ensure that all HOPs are approved by the NASA Center safety office
or the contractor safety office to assure that a review has been
performed (Requirement 32329).

e\. Ensure that deviations or changes to HOPs are also approved by the
cognizant NASA Center safety office or contractor safety office to
assure that a review has been performed (Requirement 32330).

> *Note: If deviations or changes to HOPs are approved by the
> contractor's safety office, a copy should be forwarded to the local
> NASA safety office for informational purposes.*

f\. Ensure facility operating instructions and changes are developed
based on the facility mission and operational requirements (Requirement
32504).

g\. Ensure that all procedures include sufficient detail to identify
residual hazards and cautions to NASA personnel (Requirement 32505).

h\. Ensure that hazardous procedures are marked conspicuously on the
title page; e.g., "THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES," to alert operators that strict adherence to the procedural
steps and safety and health precautions contained therein is required to
ensure the safety and health of personnel and equipment (Requirement
32328).

i\. Ensure that specific personnel certification requirements are
established, as listed in Chapter 7, in cases where hazardous operations
(e.g., rigging, high voltage) depend on adherence to specific standards,
guidelines, and training (Requirement 32325).

j\. Ensure that personnel other than certified operators are excluded
from exposure to hazardous operations that depend on adherence to
specific standards, guidelines, and training (Requirement 32326).

k\. Ensure that personnel use the buddy system whereby an adjacent or
nearby person not directly exposed to the hazard serves as an observer
to render assistance where the risk of injury is high (Requirement
32327).

3.8.3 Center SMA Directors or their designee shall review and approve
HOPs (Requirement).

**3.9 Laboratory Hazards**

3.9.1 This paragraph provides guidance for protecting personnel and
property in a laboratory environment. For the purposes of this document,
a laboratory is a facility in which experimentation, testing, and
analyses are performed on human or animal subjects, organisms,
biological and other physical materials, substances, and equipment
(including bioinstrumentation). Included also are certain equipment,
repair, and calibration operations and processing of materials.

3.9.2 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that:

a\. The design of laboratories incorporates the requirements of State
and Federal codes required for the individual Center (e.g., building,
electrical, and fire protection for laboratory facilities)
(Requirement).

b\. Escape routes are provided, designed, and marked in accordance with
the NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (Requirement 32333).

c\. Occupational safety and health considerations such as ventilation,
shower stalls, and eyewash stations are included in the design of
laboratories (Requirement 32334).

> *Note: For facility acquisition and construction safety requirements,
> see Chapter 8.*

d\. The design, fabrication, or modification of laboratories used for
experimentation, testing, or analyses performed on human or animal
subjects are coordinated in advance with the OCHMO at (202) 358-2390
(Requirement).

e\. Laboratory facilities and areas with significant quantities of
flammable, combustible, corrosive, and toxic liquids, solids, or gases
are protected in accordance with provisions of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire
Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, as modified below
(Requirement 32335).

f\. Laboratories not using or fitting the above chemical classification,
yet housing unique, mission-critical, or high-value research equipment,
conform to the provisions of NASA-STD 8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire
Protection (Requirement 32336).

> *Note: In the design of laboratories, special facilities should be
> considered to ensure the integrity of the terrestrial environment as
> well as the integrity of biological and physical samples returned from
> space.*

g\. Laboratory designs include additional considerations for biohazards
resulting from use or handling of biological materials such as
infectious microorganisms, viruses, medical waste, or genetically
engineered organisms (Requirement 32338).

> *Note: See 29 Part CFR 1910.1030, Blood Borne Pathogens, and NPR
> 1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures, for additional
> details.*

h\. Laboratory designs include additional considerations to protect
physical samples returned from space against terrestrial contamination
and to protect the terrestrial environment against potential biological
or toxic hazards due to these samples (Requirement).

3.9.3 Chemical and Hazardous Materials

In addition to pertinent safety requirements found elsewhere in this
document, the following requirements are specifically applicable to
laboratories.

3.9.3.1 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that:

a\. Laboratories meeting the definition as described in 29 CFR Part
1910.1450, Occupational Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories,
are operated in accordance with chemical hygiene plans (Requirement
32340).

b\. Suitable facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and
body of any person exposed to injurious corrosive materials are provided
within the work area for immediate emergency use (Requirement 32341).

c\. Installation, maintenance, and access to facilities for quick
drenching and flushing of the eyes and safety showers are in accordance
with ANSI 358.1, Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment, latest edition
(Requirement 32342).

d\. Eyewashes and/or safety showers are located no more than 10 seconds
or 50 feet distance away from the hazard source (Requirement 32343).

3.9.4 Solar Simulators

3.9.4.1 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that all
personnel wear skin and eye protection while in direct view of a bare
pressurized arc lamp, whether energized or not, unless the system is
locked out or tagged out for maintenance or repair (Requirement 32344).

3.9.5 Ventilation

3.9.5.1 Policy and requirements for ventilation systems are provided in
NPR 1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures.

3.9.5.2 Center Directors shall ensure that their occupational health
programs assure proper ventilation (Requirement).

3.9.6 Glassware

Because some laboratory operations use a considerable amount of
glassware and ceramics, necessary safeguards shall be employed to
minimize personnel injury. Refer to the Guide for Safety in the Chemical
Laboratory, Manufacturing Chemists\' Association, Inc., and Handling
Glassware.

**3.10 Lifting Safety**

3.10.1 Center Directors and project managers shall comply with
NASA-STD-8719.9, Standard for Lifting Devices and Equipment, for
protecting persons and property during lifting operations (Requirement
25150).

> *Note: This standard establishes minimum safety requirements for the
> design, testing, inspection, personnel certification, maintenance, and
> use of overhead and gantry cranes, mobile cranes, derricks, hoists,
> special hoist-supported personnel lifting devices, hydrasets, hooks,
> mobile aerial platforms, power industrial trucks, jacks, and slings
> for NASA-owned and NASA contractor-supplied equipment used in support
> of NASA operations at NASA Centers.*

**3.11 Explosive, Propellant, and Pyrotechnic Safety**

3.11.1 Center Directors and project managers shall use NSS 1740.12,
Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics, for
protecting personnel and property from hazards of explosives and
explosive materials, including all types of explosives, propellants
(liquid and solid), oxidizers, and pyrotechnics (Requirement 25151).

> *Note: ASTM Manual 36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems,
> addresses the requirements for working with* e*xplosive, propellant,
> and pyrotechnic substances.*

3.11.2 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that
explosive, propellant, and pyrotechnic operations are conducted in a
manner that exposes the minimum number of people to the smallest
quantity of explosives for the shortest period consistent with the
operation being conducted (Requirement 32349).

3.11.3 Center Directors shall designate, in writing, an Explosive Safety
Officer (ESO) for explosives, propellant, and pyrotechnic operations at
their Center (Requirement 32350).

> *Note: The Center SMA Director may recommend a candidate for Center
> ESO, if requested by the Center Director. For specific
> responsibilities of the ESO, refer to NSS 1740.12, Safety Standard for
> Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics.*

3.11.4 The ESO shall:

a\. Manage the Center Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnic Safety
Program to assure a robust mishap prevention program is in place
(Requirement).

b\. Ensure that the Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnic Safety
Program meets all Federal, NASA, State, and local requirements
(Requirement).

c\. Represent the Center Director in this program to help assure that
minimum number of required personnel and critical resources are exposed
to the minimum amount of explosives for the minimal amount of time for
all explosive operations (Requirement).

d\. Advise the Center Director on the programmatic health of the
Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnic Safety Program (Requirement).

e\. Represent the Center Director for all explosives, propellants, and
pyrotechnic safety matters (Requirement).

f\. Assure oversight of all processes required by NSS 1740.12, Safety
Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics (Requirement).

g\. Review all operating procedures for handling explosives,
propellants, and pyrotechnics (Requirement).

h\. Review and participate in the development of construction and/or
modification plans for facilities or structures containing explosives,
propellants, and pyrotechnics (Requirement).

i\. Review all locations and routes that provide for the transportation,
storage, and handling of explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnic
materials (Requirement).

j\. Provide oversight for staff training and records and participate in
the evaluation of selected training programs for explosive, propellant,
and pyrotechnic safety (Requirement).

> *Note: Safety forms and reports are retained per NPR 1441.1, NASA
> Records Retention Schedules.*

k\. Process and provide inputs for the approval of all explosive-related
site plans and review current explosive site plans on an annual basis
(Requirement).

l\. Manage deviations and waivers in accordance with Chapter 1 of this
NPR (Requirement).

m\. Validate, approve, and sign all explosive licenses (Requirement).

> *Note: As defined in NSS 1740.12, Safety Standard for Explosives,
> Propellants, and Pyrotechnics: [Licensed Explosive
> Locations]{.underline} - Ammunition and explosive storage locations
> (not for explosive operations and excluding Hazard Division 1.1 &
> 1.2), which are normally outside the Center's explosive storage area
> but within NASA\'s area of control.*

n\. Review all Memorandums of Agreement associated with explosive,
propellant, and pyrotechnic operations (Requirement).

> *Note: If the ESO represents NASA as a tenant organization, the ESO
> assures compliance with the host requirements though formal
> negotiations and documentation of those agreements. If the ESO
> represents NASA as the Host, the ESO assures compliance with all
> appropriate elements of this NPR. In all cases, the ESO assures that
> agreements are formalized to maximize the health and safety of NASA
> employees and facilities.*

o\. Perform an independent hazard assessment of all laboratories and
test facilities having activities that involve the mixing, blending,
extruding, synthesizing, assembling, disassembling and other activities
involved in the making of a chemical compound, mixture, or device which
is intended to explode (Requirement).

**3.12 Underwater Operations Safety**

3.12.1 Requirements for open-water operations are given in NPR 1800.1,
NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures.

3.12.2 Center Directors and project managers shall use NSS/WS 1740.10,
NASA Safety Standard for Underwater Facility and Non-Open Water
Operations, as the minimum standard to establish the safety requirements
for all NASA neutral buoyancy facilities, equipment, personnel, and
operations involving underwater activities including the simulation of a
weightless environment (Requirement 25152).

> *Note: This standard also applies to NASA personnel participating in
> underwater operations at non-NASA facilities.*

**3.13 Launch, Entry, and Experimental Aeronautical Vehicle Operations
Safety**

3.13.1 This paragraph provides policy and requirements for protecting
the safety of the public, the workforce, and assets during operations
involving space launch or entry vehicles or experimental aeronautical
vehicles and their associated payloads. These vehicles include, but are
not limited to, reusable launch vehicles, Expendable Launch Vehicles
(ELVs), experimental aerospace vehicles, entry vehicles, sample return
capsules, uninhabited aerial vehicles, balloons, sounding rockets, and
drones.

> *Note: This paragraph does not apply to conventional piloted aircraft.
> See Chapter 4, Aviation Safety, of this NPR.*

3.13.2 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall:

a\. Establish and oversee the Agency Safety Operations Program elements
needed to assure successful implementation of operations safety
requirements and assure related concerns are evaluated and resolved
(Requirement).

b\. Approve and promulgate Agency-level operations safety policy and
requirements, including the provisions of this NPR and associated
implementation documents (Requirement).

c\. Designate Agency safety representatives needed to:

\(1\) Monitor preparations for operations to determine compliance with
Agency safety policies, processes, and requirements (Requirement).

\(2\) Support programs/projects to provide advice and technical support
and act as a link to independent engineering, safety, and assessment
capabilities (Requirement).

\(3\) Maintain cognizance over safety issues that have the potential to
be elevated to NASA Headquarters for resolution (Requirement).

\(4\) Provide a concurrence or nonconcurrence on the safety readiness to
begin operations when the decision is elevated to NASA Headquarters
(Requirement 32347).

\(5\) Participate prior to and during operations to communicate the
Agency safety position to appropriate program/project officials
(Requirement 32348).

3.13.3 Range Safety

3.13.3.1 NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, contains NASA's range safety
policy, roles and responsibilities, requirements, and procedures for
protecting the safety of the public, the workforce, and property during
range flight operations. These operations include the launch or entry of
an orbital, suborbital, or deep space vehicle or operation of an
experimental aeronautical vehicle. NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program,
defines the range safety-related roles and responsibilities for all
levels of NASA management, including the Agency Range Safety Manager.
NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, also incorporates NASA's public risk
acceptability policy for range flight operations.

3.13.4 Payload Safety

3.13.4.1 [Payload Safety Policy]{.underline}. It is NASA policy to
safeguard people and resources (including flight hardware and
facilities) from hazards associated with payloads controlled by NASA and
hazards associated with payload-related Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
by eliminating the hazards or reducing the risk associated with the
hazard to an acceptable level. To accomplish this policy NASA shall:

a\. Establish and maintain technical and procedural safety requirements
applicable to the design, production, flight-area processing and
testing, vehicle integration, flight, and planned recovery of NASA
payloads.

b\. Coordinate with U.S. or foreign entities that participate in NASA
payload projects as needed to ensure compliance with all safety
requirements that apply to each payload.

c\. Incorporate all applicable safety requirements into the overall
requirements for each NASA payload, the contracts for any related
procurements, and any related cooperative or grant agreements.

d\. Maintain an independent payload safety review and approval process
designed to ensure that each NASA payload project properly implements
all applicable safety requirements and to facilitate safety risk
management appropriate to each payload.

3.13.4.2 [Manned Space Flight Payloads]{.underline}. For payloads that
will fly on, or interface with, a manned space launch vehicle,
spacecraft, or entry vehicle controlled by NASA, Center Directors and
program/project managers shall establish the processes and requirements
needed to satisfy Paragraph 3.13.4.1 of this NPR (Requirement).

> *For example: Space Shuttle payloads are subject to NSTS 1700.7,
> Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space
> Transportation System; NSTS/ISS 13830, Payload Safety Review and Data
> Submittal Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Shuttle and
> International Space Station; and KHB 1700.7, Space Shuttle Payload
> Ground Safety Handbook.*

3.13.4.3 [Unmanned Suborbital Payloads]{.underline}. For a payload that
will fly on an unmanned suborbital vehicle controlled by NASA (such as a
sounding rocket, balloon, or experimental aeronautical vehicle), Center
Directors and program/project managers shall establish the processes and
requirements needed to satisfy Paragraph 3.13.4.1 of this NPR
(Requirement).

> *For example: The Wallops Flight Facility Range Safety Manual applies
> to Wallops-controlled suborbital payloads.*

3.13.4.4 [Return-to-Earth Payloads]{.underline}. For a payload that will
be launched into space and will return to Earth for recovery or purposes
other than disposal, Center Directors and program/project managers shall
establish the processes and requirements needed to satisfy Paragraph
3.13.4.1 of this NPR for the recovery aspects of the mission
(Requirement).

> *Note: Disposal of space flight hardware is covered by the NASA
> Orbital Debris Program. See paragraph 3.13.6 of this NPR.*

3.13.4.5 [ELV Payloads]{.underline}. To ensure that Paragraph 3.13.4.1
of this NPR is satisfied for payload missions that will fly on ELVs, the
OSMA has established the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program. The
responsibilities and requirements of the ELV Safety Program (see NPD
8700.3, Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Policy for Spacecraft,
Instruments, and Launch Services) apply to unmanned orbital and unmanned
deep space payloads managed or launched by NASA, whether developed by
NASA or any contractor or independent agency in a joint venture with
NASA. The ELV Safety Program applies to spacecraft procurement,
integration and testing, launch processing and launch of ELV payloads,
including payload provided upper stages, payload/launch vehicle
interface hardware, and GSE used to support payload-related operations.

3.13.4.5.1 [The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance,]{.underline} (or
designee) shall:

a\. Oversee the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (Requirement).

b\. Approve and promulgate Agency-level ELV payload safety policy and
requirements, including the provisions of this NPR and associated
implementation documents (Requirement).

c\. Designate in writing, fund, and provide input to the performance
evaluation of the NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager (see paragraph
3.13.4.5.2 of this NPR) (Requirement).

d\. Designate in writing the members of the NASA ELV Payload Safety
Executive Team (see paragraph 3.13.4.5.3 of this NPR) (Requirement).

3.13.4.5.2 [The NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager]{.underline} shall:

a\. Lead the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program and serve as the Agency
focal point for all matters involving ELV payload safety, to include
managing ELV Payload Safety Program funds and participating in panels,
joint working groups, and safety policy initiation or change activities
affecting NASA ELV payloads (Requirement).

b\. Develop and maintain Agency-level ELV payload safety policy,
processes, and requirements in accordance with the applicable Agency
directives development processes (Requirement).

c\. Develop and administer the safety review and approval process for
NASA ELV payloads in coordination with the NASA ELV Payload Safety
Executive Team (Requirement).

d\. Provide NASA ELV payload projects with guidance on the
implementation of the safety policy, processes, and requirements
(Requirement).

e\. Provide input and guidance to NASA officials responsible for
development of ELV payload- related contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements with entities internal and external to NASA, including
foreign entities (Requirement).

f\. Report on ELV payload safety concerns to the NASA Headquarters OSMA
(Requirement).

g\. Perform an audit as an element of the NASA Headquarters SMA Audits,
Reviews, and Assessments program defined by NPR 8705.6, Safety and
Mission Assurance Audits, Reviews, and Assessments, for the area of ELV
payload safety (Requirement).

h\. Participate in independent assessments of payload safety processes
at NASA Centers, component and range facilities, payload processing
facilities (including commercial or contractor facilities used to
process NASA ELV payloads), and launch sites (Requirement).

i\. Coordinate independent assessments of payload safety processes with
the audits, reviews, and assessments performed by the OSMA to ensure an
effective and efficient overall safety assessment process (Requirement).

j\. Open or further enhance communication with U.S. and foreign entities
that support NASA ELV payload projects and document partnerships, joint
activities, and special arrangements through formal agreements
(Requirement).

k\. Coordinate safety review activities and actions with the NASA ELV
Payload Safety Executive Team, NASA Centers, ELV payload projects,
launch vehicle contractors, appropriate Technical Authority official,
range safety and other launch site safety organizations, and other U.S.
and foreign entities as needed to resolve payload safety concerns and
support approval for flight (Requirement).

l\. Establish and maintain an ELV payload safety training program to
ensure that project and other personnel, as appropriate, are
knowledgeable of the NASA ELV payload safety requirements and safety
review and approval processes and related activities (Requirement).

m\. Provide a forum for technical interchange and lessons learned to
include educational conferences and workshops for the benefit of the ELV
payload community (Requirement).

n\. Track and implement lessons learned for continuous improvement and
update policy, processes, and requirements as needed (Requirement).

3.13.4.5.3 [The NASA ELV Payload Safety Executive Team]{.underline}
shall:

a\. Participate in the ELV payload safety review process and approve the
safety readiness of NASA ELV payloads, facilities, and related GSE for
launch-area processing and launch in coordination with all authorities
for each mission (Requirement).

b\. Support the NASA Safety and Mission Success Review (or equivalent)
for each NASA ELV payload mission (Requirement).

c\. Interpret safety requirements, if requested, and support each
payload project as needed to ensure proper implementation (Requirement).

d\. Approve alternative approaches to satisfying a safety requirement in
coordination with the appropriate technical authority (or equivalent)
responsible for the requirement (Requirement).

e\. Assess proposed variances to safety requirements and assure that any
residual risk associated with a variance is properly characterized
(Requirement).

f\. Coordinate with all variance approval authorities, including the
technical authority (or equivalent) responsible for the requirement and
the Center Director(s) or other NASA official(s) responsible for people
or property exposed to any risk associated with the variance (see the
safety variance policy in paragraph 1.13 of this NPR) (Requirement).

g\. Coordinate with each range safety and launch site safety
organization that shares responsibility for a NASA ELV payload mission
to ensure that any mission-specific decision made by the Executive Team
is consistent with NASA's safety requirements and the safety
requirements of the other organizations (Requirement).

3.13.4.5.4 [Each Center Director Responsible for a Payload, Payload
Processing Facility, or Launch Site (or designee)]{.underline} shall:

a\. Establish the Center-level processes and associated requirements
needed to ensure Paragraph 3.13.4.1 of this NPR is satisfied for each
ELV payload project that uses the Center's resources (Requirement).

b\. Support independent safety assessments of ELV payload activities and
respond to all findings and recommendations for which the Center is
responsible (Requirement).

c\. Ensure that training defined in 3.13.4.5.2.l is completed
(Requirement).

3.13.4.5.5 [Each ELV Payload Project Manager (or designee)]{.underline}
shall:

a\. Ensure that funding and other resources are allocated for payload
projects to satisfy all aspects of the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program,
including proper implementation of the applicable safety requirements
and successful completion of the payload safety review and approval
process (Requirement).

b\. Ensure that the payload project's timeline provides for compliance
with the established payload safety review and approval process
(Requirement).

c\. Establish and implement any project-level processes and requirements
needed to satisfy safety requirements and successfully complete the
payload safety review and approval process (Requirement).

3.13.4.5.6 [Each NASA Contract, Grant, Cooperative Agreement, or Other
Agreement Officer]{.underline} shall coordinate with the NASA ELV
Payload Safety Manager to ensure that all applicable safety requirements
are incorporated into the agreement(s) governing each payload, including
compliance with Federal, State, and local requirements relating to
safety as specified in NPR 5800.1, Grant and Cooperative Agreement
Handbook, and safety requirements pertaining to the use of NASA
facilities and equipment (Requirement).

3.13.5 Commercial Launch and Entry Operations

Chapter 2 of NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, contains policy and
requirements applicable to NASA missions that involve the use of
commercially available space launch or entry services. Also see
NASA-STD-8709.2, NASA Safety and Mission Assurance Roles and
Responsibilities for Expendable Launch Vehicle Services.

3.13.6 Orbital Debris Safety

Safety policies, processes, and requirements that apply to the disposal
of space flight hardware at the end of a mission are contained in NPD
8710.3, NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation, and NSS
1740.14, Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital
Debris.

**3.14 Test Operations Safety**

3.14.1 This paragraph provides requirements for protecting personnel and
property during test operations for both human-controlled and unoccupied
or robotic tests. Testing includes hazardous training activities and
demonstrations of test hardware or procedures. The requirements stated
herein apply to test facilities; test equipment located within, or
attached to, test facilities; equipment being tested; test personnel;
test conduct; and test documents.

3.14.2 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that test
plans are developed and evaluated to assure test performance within safe
operating limits (Requirement 25163).

> *Note: Evaluations will address the test article, test facility,
> testing procedures, test conditions, operator involvement, and
> potential risk to adjoining facilities and personnel.*

3.14.3 Safety Documentation

3.14.3.1 Safety documentation establishes the basis for safe test
conduct by means of engineering analyses (including hazard analyses).

3.14.3.2 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that
established test controls are clearly identified in test drawings,
facility drawings, and test procedures (Requirement).

3.14.4 Test System Requirements

3.14.4.1 Project managers responsible for developing test systems shall:

a\. Design test systems such that test personnel or critical test
hardware are not subjected to a test environment wherein a credible
single-point failure (e.g., power loss) could result in injury, illness,
or loss to the critical test hardware (Requirement 32372).

b\. Construct all systems (electrical, mechanical, pneumatic, and/or
hydraulic) so that no single failure could cause a critical condition
(Requirement 32373).

c\. Ensure that software that may interface with test systems meets the
requirements stated in Chapter 1 of this NPR (Requirement 32374).

> *Note: Software by itself is not hazardous; however, when interfaced
> with test hardware, software could command a hazardous condition in
> the hardware. See NASA-STD-8719.13, Software Safety Standard, for
> further information.*

d\. Calibrate and certify safety-critical instrumentation before test
operations and as required by test documentation or the test
organization\'s internal procedures (Requirement 32375).

e\. Ensure all personnel involved in tests are informed of potential
hazards, safety procedures, and protective measures (Requirement 32376).

f\. Ensure the availability of appropriate emergency medical treatment
facilities (Requirement 32376).

g\. Conduct formal reviews of engineering designs that are complicated
or potentially hazardous to facilities (Requirement 32378).

h\. Ensure test result reports include anomalies, safety implications,
and lessons learned (Requirement 32379).

3.14.5 Test Readiness Review

3.14.5.1 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that Test
Readiness Reviews:

a\. Are conducted for tests involving new or modified hardware and/or
procedures (Requirement).

b\. Determine and document the safety, technical, and operational
readiness of the test (Requirement 32381).

3.14.6 Pre-test Meeting

3.14.6.1 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that a
pre-test meeting is conducted with all involved personnel to discuss the
facility, design, instrumentation, safety, and operator training and
certification (Requirement 32382).

> *Note: The meeting should also establish the test plan, identify test
> constraints to ensure facility safety, and determine test article
> readiness, ground support equipment readiness, and procedural
> readiness.*

3.14.7 Human Research Subjects

3.14.7.1 The requirements for the protection of human research subjects
are contained in NPD 7100.8, Protection of Human Research Subjects, and
45 CFR Part 46, Protection of Human Subjects.

3.14.7.2 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that:

a\. Tests involving hazardous substances, where human test subjects or
test team personnel may be exposed, are reviewed for adequacy of test
team safeguards, including direct communication between the test
subjects and test conductors (Requirement 32383).

b\. A facility environmental control system failure or failure in the
distribution system affecting one pressure-suited occupant shall not
affect any other pressure-suited occupant for tests requiring crew
participation in a pressure suit (Requirement 32384).

c\. A means exists for immediately detecting an incipient fire or other
hazardous condition in each crew compartment of any test area
(Requirement 32385).

d\. Automatic fire detection is provided for critical areas not suitable
for visual monitoring (Requirement 32386).

e\. Crewed test systems are designed for timely and unencumbered rescue
of incapacitated crew members (Requirement 32387).

f\. Software controlling crewed test systems are thoroughly analyzed to
ensure that no command results in death or injury to the test subjects
(Requirement 32388).

> *Note: Policies and requirements for software are given in NPD 2820.1,
> NASA Software Policy, and NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering
> Requirements.*

g\. Crewed test systems are designed to provide for manual overrides of
critical software commands to ensure the safety of test subjects during
any system event or test scenario (normal operation, malfunction,
emergency) (Requirement 32389).

h\. Manual overrides of critical software commands support safe test
termination and egress of test subjects (Requirement 32390).

i\. Medical resources and facilities needed for response are alerted,
on-call, and immediately available as needed (Requirement 32391).

**3.15 Non-Ionizing Radiation**

3.15.1 Requirements for non-ionizing radiation are provided in NPR
1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures. Microwave and radar
protection standards are covered in various State regulations, national
consensus standards, and Federal standards including 29 CFR Part
1910.97, Non-ionizing Radiation. This paragraph provides requirements
for protecting personnel and property during laser use in NASA
operations. The primary laser hazard to humans is eye and/or skin damage
from direct exposure to the beam or specular reflection, and in some
cases, from viewing a diffuse reflection.

3.15.2 Exposure requirements for laser radiation are provided in 21 CFR
Part 1040, Performance Standards For Light-Emitting Products.
Requirements for the procurement and manufacture of laser products are
provided in 21 CFR Part 1040.10, Laser Products, and 21 CFR Part
1040.11, Specific Purpose Laser Products.

3.15.3 Center Directors and project managers shall comply with these
regulations unless a specific exemption is obtained from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration
(Requirement 32398).

3.15.4 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that:

a\. Only trained and certified employees are assigned to install,
adjust, and operate laser equipment (Requirement 25168).

b\. Personnel operating lasers are trained and certified in accordance
with Chapter 7 of this NPR (Requirement 32423).

c\. Laser operations during any open-air laser scenario conducted on
DoD-controlled ranges or test facilities or by DoD personnel use the
Range Commanders Council Document 316-91, Laser Range Safety
(Requirement 25165).

d\. Laser operation conforms to the principles and requirements set
forth in ANSI Z136.1, American National Standard for Safe Use of Laser,
and ANSI Z136.2, Safe Use of Optical Fiber Communication Systems
Utilizing Laser Diode and LED Sources (Requirement 32399).

e\. Exposure of personnel to laser radiation does not exceed the
permissible exposure levels provided in ANSI Z136.1, American National
Standard for Safe Use of Laser

(Requirement 32395).

f\. To the maximum extent practicable, laser hazards to personnel are
eliminated by engineering design before they become operational, or
procedures are developed and equipment provided to reduce the risk for
those hazards that cannot be eliminated (Requirement 32396).

g\. Any laser that can cause injury or damage has a Center-approved
safety documentation, test plan, and test procedure review (Requirement
32400).

3.15.5 Laser Radiation Safety Officer

3.15.5.1 The Center SMA Director shall designate a qualified Laser
Radiation Safety Officer for their site (Requirement).

3.15.5.2 The Laser Radiation Safety Officer shall:

a\. Contact the laser safety clearing house to obtain a \"Site Window\"
clearance where a planned laser operation has the potential for the beam
to strike an orbiting craft (Requirement 32401).

> *Note: Clearance is obtained from the Orbital Safety Officer, U.S.
> Space Command / J3SOO, 1 NORAD Road, Suite 9-101, Cheyenne Mountain
> AFB, CO 80914-6020, Stop 4, Phone: (719) 474-3056/4404/4444.*

b\. Review procedures for all tests that use lasers (Requirement 32402).

c\. Be onsite to monitor all laser tests (Requirement 32403).

3.15.6 Ground Operations Using Class III-B and IV Lasers

3.15.6.1 Class III-B and IV laser users shall:

a\. Operate Class III-B and IV lasers only in controlled environments or
designated areas that have no unintended reflective or transmitting
surfaces (Requirement 32404).

b\. Post laser operations areas with standard warning placards as set
forth in ANSI Z136.1, American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers
(Requirement).

c\. Ensure that the posted area is isolated to prevent inadvertent entry
(Requirement 32405).

d\. Wear laser goggles or other approved methods of eye protection in
accordance with requirements of ANSI Z136.1, American National Standard
for Safe Use of Lasers (Requirement 32406).

e\. Keep all flammable materials/vapors away from any laser during
operation unless specifically authorized by the operation/test plan
(Requirement 32407).

3.15.7 Airborne Operations Using Class III-B and IV Lasers

3.15.7.1 Project managers shall:

a\. Identify the airborne use of Class III-B and IV lasers early in the
system acquisition process and track their use throughout the program
life cycle (Requirement 32409).

> *Note: A realistic and timely application of safety engineering to
> laser systems can avoid or reduce the costs involved in redesign, time
> lost in modification, and loss of mission capability.*

b\. Ensure the design of laser systems for NASA aircraft and spacecraft
includes a system of interlocks to prevent inadvertent laser beam output
(Requirement 32411).

c\. When a test circuit switch is provided to override the ground
interlock to aid ground test operations, maintenance, or service, ensure
the design precludes inadvertent operation (Requirement 32412).

d\. Ensure that the crew will not operate the laser except in accordance
with the prescribed mission profile (Requirement 32413).

e\. For long-range laser shots, designate as large an exclusion area as
practical to minimize the risk to the people outside the area
(Requirement 32415).

> *Note: A buffer area should be added around the exclusion area. Air
> Force AFOSH Standard 48-12, Health Hazard Control for Laser
> Operations, includes a guide for operation of lasers from aircraft. It
> can be used to develop the buffer zone for space-based laser shots
> directed at the ground. (See Range Commanders Council (RCC) Document
> 316-91, Laser Range Safety.)*

f\. Ensure a hazard evaluation and written safety precautions are
completed prior to airborne laser operations (Requirement 32416).

g\. Ensure that the hazard analysis considers catastrophic events and
the need for very reliable, high-speed laser shutdown should such events
occur (Requirement 32417).

> *Note: See ANSI Z136.1, American National Standard for Safe Use of
> Lasers, for hazard evaluation and control information.*

h\. Ensure that qualified personnel perform laser hazard evaluations to
determine specific hazards associated with specific uses, establish
appropriate hazard control measures, and identify crew and
public-at-large protection requirements (Requirement 32418).

i\. When completing the hazard evaluation, consider and document the
atmospheric effects of laser beam propagation, the transmission of laser
radiation through intervening materials, the use of optical viewing
aids, and resultant hazards; e.g., electrical, cryogenic, toxic vapors
(Requirement 32419).

3.15.7.2 The Pilot-in-Command shall ensure that the laser system is used
in accordance with the test plan (Requirement 32414).

3.15.7.3 Program managers and safety evaluators shall assess the safety
aspects, compliance with safety requirements, and resolution of laser
safety-related problems (Requirement 32410).

3.15.8 Laser Software

3.15.8.1 Project managers shall ensure that:

a\. Laser software provides safety precautions for fast-moving lasers
and prevents misdirected laser operation (Requirement 32420).

b\. Laser software development is subjected to a software safety
analysis per Chapter 1 of this NPR (Requirement 32421).

c\. Existing laser software systems are reviewed to assure that safety
precautions are provided (Requirement 32422).

> *Note: See NASA-STD-8719.13, Software Safety Standard, for further
> information.*

**3.16 Ionizing Radiation**

Policies and requirements for the handling, use, and storage of
radioactive material and radiation generating equipment are contained in
directives under the purview of the occupational health organizations.
See NPD 1800.2, NASA Occupational Health Program.

**3.17 Confined Spaces**

3.17.1 Requirements for operations in confined spaces are provided in
OSHA 29 CFR Part 1910.146, Permit-Required Confined Spaces.

3.17.2 A confined space is any space that exhibits all three of the
following characteristics:  large enough to bodily enter and perform
work, not designed for continuous human occupancy, and limited means of
entry or exit.  A permit-required confined space is a confined space
that contains any recognized serious safety or health hazard.  No entry
into permit-required confined spaces will be made until an assessment of
that space has been made and a permit or operating procedures are
posted.

3.17.3 Center Directors shall develop and document a confined space
operations plan that, at a minimum, establishes a confined space working
group, outlines the confined space permit process, and identifies all
confined spaces on their Center (Requirement).

3.17.4 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure that:

a\. Entry into permit-required confined spaces is performed with written
procedures and authorizations (Requirement 32424).

b\. No entry into confined spaces is made until an assessment of that
space has been made and a permit or operating procedures posted
(Requirement 32425).

c\. All contractors or persons performing work on the Center are
notified of all confined spaces (Requirement).

3.17.5 Supervisors shall have the overall responsibility for entry and
work in confined spaces and ensure compliance with ANSI Z117.1, Safety
Requirements for Confined Space, and the NIOSH Publication No. 87-113, A
Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces (Requirement 32426).

> *Note: Permit requirements for confined spaces are given in 29 CFR
> 1910.146, Permit-Required Confined Spaces.\
> *

**CHAPTER 4. Aviation Safety**

**4.1 Purpose and Scope**

4.1.1 This chapter provides the procedural requirements for the NASA
Aviation Safety Program not covered by NPR 7900.3, Aircraft Operations
Management. These requirements provide for managers and aviation safety
personnel to establish and implement their aviation mishap prevention
programs. NASA philosophy is that mishaps are preventable and that
mishap prevention is an inherent function of leadership and management.
NASA's major involvement in aeronautics dictates a commitment to
aviation safety, not only through the Aviation Safety Program but also
in all technology programs.

> *Note: Requirements for an aviation safety program for each respective
> flight activity are set forth in NPR 7900.3, Aircraft Operations
> Management.*

**4.2 Aviation Safety Program Responsibilities**

4.2.1. Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, and line managers shall ensure that adequate resources
are applied to aviation operations to meet aviation safety objectives
(Requirement).

4.2.2 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall:

a\. Establish NASA Aviation Safety Program requirements and provide
support and functional oversight of NASA aviation safety (Requirement
25174).

b\. When required, provide the NASA Administrator with an independent
assessment of NASA's aviation safety status and provide immediate
information on critical safety issues (Requirement 32433).

> *Note: The Aviation Safety Panel (refer to Appendix G) is chartered by
> the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, to assist in the independent
> oversight of NASA\'s aviation safety.*

c\. Conduct reviews (staff assistance visits, safety inspections, and
process verifications) to provide insight and to monitor management's
effectiveness in aviation safety (Requirement 32428).

d\. Provide technical and operational assistance to improve the overall
aviation safety program (Requirement 32429).

e\. Assure that the highly diversified aviation activities within NASA
have an Aviation Safety Program at Headquarters that covers each flight
activity (Requirement).

f\. Assure Aviation Safety Program requirements are comprehensive and
proactive in covering all aspects of flight (Requirement).

g\. Assure that NASA Aviation Safety Program requirements cover each
level of aviation management (Requirement).

4.2.3 The Director, Safety and Assurance Requirements Division, shall
designate the NASA Aviation Safety Manager (Requirement).

4.2.4 The NASA Aviation Safety Manager shall:

a\. Coordinate all OSMA requirements affecting aviation safety or
reporting (Requirement 32436).

b\. Identify aviation safety issues through mishap investigation and
analysis (Requirement 32438).

c\. Participate in the annual NASA Aviation Safety Officer meeting
(Requirement 32440).

d\. Monitor the implementation of the Agency's Aviation Safety Program
requirements (Requirement 32441).

e\. Attend selected program flight readiness and safety reviews
(Requirement 32442).

f\. Serve as an advisor to the Inter-Center Aircraft Operations Panel
(IAOP) and participate in IAOP activities, including meetings, reviews,
and subpanel activities (Requirement 32443).

g\. Develop the NASA Aviation Safety Reference Manual and ensure that it
is current and meets the needs of NASA (Requirement 32444).

h\. Conduct aviation safety staff assistance visits and reviews
(Requirement 32448).

i\. Coordinate recommendations from mishap investigations that require
corrective action from sources or agencies outside of NASA (Requirement
32449).

j\. Participate in selected aircraft flight operations (Requirement
32450).

k\. Serve as ex officio board member to major aircraft mishap
investigations and provide independent oversight and expert guidance in
investigation procedures and techniques (Requirement 32439).

l\. Provide aviation safety oversight to ensure Headquarters and Center
aircraft operations comply with NASA safety policy (Requirement 32435).

m\. Interface with other safety organizations involving aviation safety
(Requirement 32446).

**4.3 Interfaces with Other Agencies**

NASA aviation activities interface with the aircraft industry,
DOT/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DoD, and foreign governments.

4.3.1 Center Chiefs of Flight Operations shall have a process in place
for communicating with outside organizations to exchange flight
information that affects their assigned aircraft (Requirement 32475).

4.3.2 DoD

4.3.2.1 Because NASA uses many military airfields and aircraft common to
the military services, Center Chiefs of Flight Operations shall:

a\. Ensure coordination with the United States Air Force, Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps where applicable (Requirement 32478).

b\. Ensure the use of the various military safety publications,
cross-exchange of accident prevention data, and participation in joint
safety efforts (Requirement 32479).

**CHAPTER 5. Fire Safety**

**5.1 Purpose, Goals, and Objectives**

5.1.1 This chapter establishes the overall requirements for the NASA
Fire Safety Program. The goals of this program are zero loss of life
from fires, a reduction in number of fires to zero, protection for
facilities and equipment to preclude major losses, and a reduction in
the magnitude of loss for those fires that occur. The objective of NASA
fire safety policy is to protect human life, property, and the
environment from the risk of fire-related hazards.

5.1.2 Each NASA Center should develop and aggressively pursue a Fire
Safety Program with the primary goal to reduce or eliminate the
potential for fires through the application of effective fire prevention
techniques and by heightening the fire safety awareness of all NASA and
contractor personnel.

5.1.3 Requirements for fire safety are provided in 40 U.S.C. § 3312,
Compliance with Nationally Recognized Codes, 29 CFR Part 1910 Subpart L,
Fire Protection, 29 CFR Part 1910.38, Employee Emergency Plans, and 29
CFR Part 1910.39, Fire Prevention Plans.

**5.2 Responsibilities**

5.2.1 Director, Safety and Assurance Requirements Division, shall:

 

a\. Provide advocacy for fire protection for Construction of Facilities
(CoF) projects (Requirement).

 

b\. Support NASA Center budget submittals for fire protection, fire
suppression, and fire research (Requirement).

c\. Review NASA Center fire safety programs (Requirement).

5.2.2 Center Directors shall:

a\. Be responsible for identifying and reducing fire risks, ensuring
fire safety of Center operations, and implementing the requirements of
this chapter (Requirement 32520).

b\. Implement a comprehensive fire safety program at their Center and
facilities in accordance with specific program requirements and
procedures given in NASA-STD-8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire
Protection (Requirement 25197).

c\. Ensure that the fire safety program complies with National Fire
Protection Association standards including their appendices, unless the
requirements of local codes are more stringent; nationally recognized
building and fire safety codes and requirements; and local building and
fire codes and requirements (Requirement 32541).

d\. Ensure implementation of NASA operational fire safety procedures
(Requirement 32521).

e\. Ensure each Center adopts, implements, and trains in the use of the
Incident Management System in accordance with NFPA 1561, Standard on
Emergency Services Incident Management System and the National Incident
Management System, when responding to and managing any emergency or
disaster (Requirement).

f\. Ensure that the Center Security Office is notified of all fires that
are suspicious in nature (Requirement).

g\. Ensure that employees, other than trained professional firefighters,
trained volunteers, or emergency response personnel, do not fight fires
except in cases where the fire is incipient in nature (Requirement).

h\. Ensure that compliance with NASA-STD-8719.11, Safety Standard for
Fire Protection, is made part of contractual requirements at NASA
Centers with contractors performing work as deemed necessary by the CO
and the responsible NASA Center fire safety program office
(Requirement).

i\. Appoint, in writing, an Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for NASA
fire protection (Requirement 32522).

> *Note: The Center SMA Director should interface directly with the
> Center Director concerning Fire Safety Officer activities.*

5.2.3 The AHJ shall:

a\. Be a safety or fire protection professional with requisite skills
and knowledge (Requirement 32523).

> *Note: For specific responsibilities of the AHJ, refer to
> NASA-STD-8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire Protection.*

b\. Designate personnel responsible for the investigation of all fires
at their Center and facilities (Requirement).

c\. Perform a risk assessment and determine on a case-by-case basis the
need to incorporate newer requirements and standards into existing
facility and equipment operating procedures when standards are updated
and superseded by newer, more stringent requirements (Requirement
32533).

**5.3 Fire Safety Program**

5.3.1 Center Directors shall ensure that the implementation of an
effective fire safety program at their Center complies with the
following minimum requirements:

 

a\. Requirements are established for a reasonable level of fire safety
and property protection from the hazards created by fire and explosions
in accordance with NFPA 1, Uniform Fire Code (Requirement).

b\. An appropriate level of fire service operations is provided to
protect lives and property based on the size and mission of the Center
(Requirement).

c\. Risk management processes are applied in order to assess individual
programs and adopt additional fire safety requirements (Requirement).

d\. Fire hazards are identified through documented annual engineering
surveys, fire inspections, and comprehensive fire risk evaluations
(Requirement 32526).

e\. Fire safety discrepancies are documented and abatement plans
prepared for corrective action(s) and tracking (Requirement 25199).

f\. Fire safety discrepancies that cannot be corrected or funded locally
are forwarded to Headquarters for resolution (Requirement 32525).

g\. Fire safety violations are reviewed and corrected (e.g., work orders
for repair, construction, follow-up, and acceptance).

h\. All project design criteria, conceptual plans, and design documents
with life safety and/or fire protection/prevention implications are
reviewed and approved (Requirement 32524).

i\. CoF projects are reviewed for fire safety and protection
(Requirement).

j\. Procedures are in place for control of flammable materials and
hazardous operations (Requirement).

k\. Automatic fire detection and suppression systems for all facilities
containing significant hazards, mission essential equipment, or
permanently housed personnel are in place (Requirement).

l\. Requirements are established for life-cycle review and replacement
for fire suppression and protection equipment (Requirement).

m\. Requirements are established for proper functioning of the Center
Fire Department and/or coordination with the responsible local fire
department (Requirement).

n\. Procedures are in place and reviewed for reporting and investigating
fires (Requirement).

o\. Emergency action plans and a Center fire safety program plan are
developed and reviewed (Requirement).

 

p\. Assistance is available for assuring the adequacy of fire design and
code compliance from a contractual and cost benefit standpoint for major
construction projects (Requirement).

 

q\. Facility design drawings are reviewed for inclusion of adequate fire
protection features and systems and for compliance with applicable codes
and criteria (Requirement).

r\. All contract documents are reviewed for fire protection
specifications (Requirement).

**5.4 Fire Protection Systems**

5.4.1 Fire Protection Doctrine

The nature of NASA's mission is such that a significant number of
specialized facilities and operations exist along with more conventional
structures and work routines. As a result, difficulties arise in the
determination of the required level of fire safety. In most instances,
conventional fire protection doctrine and existing codes and standards
are appropriate. However, specialized facilities may have fire risks not
specifically addressed by conventional means. In those instances,
safeguards can be assured by following the requirements contained in
this document and in NASA-STD-8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire
Protection.

5.4.2 Extinguishing Systems

5.4.2.1 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. Extinguishing systems and fire extinguishers comply, as a minimum,
with the NFPA codes and standards (Requirement 32528).

b\. All fire protection equipment are Underwriter Laboratories (UL)
listed, Factory Mutual (FM), or Canadian Safety approved (Requirement
32529).

**5.5 Firefighting**

5.5.1 Firefighting organizations may be established or provided from
outside sources to ensure adequate protection to life and property.

5.5.2 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. NFPA recommendations and OSHA regulations are used for determining
type, size, and training of firefighting organizations (Requirement
25201).

b\. Firefighting organizations are equipped with a sufficient amount of
firefighting vehicles and equipment to combat anticipated fires
(Requirement).

c\. Agreed-upon arrangements with external agencies to provide NASA with
fire protection services are documented and retained on file
(Requirement 32530).

**5.6 Emergency (Pre-Fire) Planning and Procedures**

Specialized facilities and critical areas that constitute a major
portion of NASA operations demand a unique, pre-planned response from
the entire Agency. See NPD 8710.1, Emergency Preparedness Program,
NASA-STD-8719.11, Safety Standard for Fire Protection, and respective
emergency preparedness plans for further information on specific
critical areas and emergency plan procedures.

**5.7 Fire Safety Training**

5.7.1 Center Directors shall ensure that fire safety training for NASA
employees is conducted in accordance with the requirements contained in
Chapter 7 of this NPR (Requirement 25203).

**5.8 Reporting**

5.8.1 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. Reporting is an integral part of the fire safety program
(Requirement 25204).

> *Note: Effective reporting procedures disseminate the knowledge and
> experience gained by one Center to the rest of NASA and the Federal
> Government.*

b\. Investigation of fire-related mishaps is in accordance with NFPA
921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, in addition to NPR
8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping (Requirement 32531).

> *Note: Requirements for mishap investigation, reporting, and
> recordkeeping are provided in NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements
> for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and
> Recordkeeping.*

**5.9 Current Regulations, Codes, and Standards and Variances**

5.9.1 With the goal of protecting life and property, Center Directors
shall comply with the most current fire requirements in the design,
construction, and operation of all NASA buildings and structures
(Requirement 25205).

> *Note: Existing buildings and facilities do not automatically need to
> implement all code upgrades.*

**CHAPTER 6. Nuclear Safety for Launching of Radioactive Materials**

**6.1 Purpose**

6.1.1 This chapter provides internal NASA procedural requirements for
characterizing and reporting potential risks associated with a planned
launch of radioactive materials into space, on launch vehicles and
spacecraft, during normal or abnormal flight conditions. Procedures and
levels of review and analysis required for nuclear launch safety
approval vary with the quantity of radioactive material planned for use
and potential risk to the general public and the environment.

6.1.2 An analysis or evaluation may be required in accordance with
paragraph 9 of Presidential Directive/National Security Council
Memorandum Number 25 (PD/NSC-25), Scientific or Technological
Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and
Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space, dated December 14, 1977, as
amended, in obtaining nuclear launch safety approval. Guidance on
procedures, requirements, or licensing details for using, storing,
shipping, or handling radioactive materials in ground processing
facilities or activities or in preparation for space uses is not
included in this chapter (see paragraph 3.16). The tracking of radiation
exposures to workers is also not included in this chapter.

6.1.3 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
and program executives shall ensure that NASA missions involving the
launch of radioactive materials comply with the provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and
follow the policy and procedures contained in 14 CFR Part 1216, Subpart
1216.3, Procedures for Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), NPR 8580.1, Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act and Executive Order 12114 (Requirement 25118).

**6.2 Responsibilities**

6.2.1 The NASA Administrator or designee shall:

a\. Determine, for NASA, the acceptability of the potential risk of
launching and using nuclear materials in space as described in Table 6.1
(Requirement 32190).

b\. Request empanelment of an Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
(INSRP) with membership and responsibilities in accordance with
PD/NSC-25 after receiving a request from the Program Executive (in
coordination with SMA). (Requirement 32257).

c\. Appoint a NASA member to the empanelled INSRP with consideration of
the recommendations(s) by the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance
(Requirement).

6.2.2 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
and program executives involved with the control and processing of
radioactive materials for launch into space shall ensure:

a\. Compliance with space nuclear launch safety requirements and
processes provided in this NPR (Requirement 25119).

b\. Basic designs of vehicles, spacecraft, and systems utilizing
radioactive materials provide protection to the public, the environment,
and users such that radiation risk resulting from exposures to
radioactive sources are as low as reasonably achievable (Requirement).

c\. Nuclear safety considerations are incorporated from the initial
design stages throughout all project stages to ensure that overall
mission radiological risk is acceptable (Requirement 25120).

d\. All space flight equipment (including medical and other experimental
devices) that contain or use radioactive materials are identified and
analyzed (per paragraph 6.3 of this NPR) for radiological risk
(Requirement 25121).

e\. Development of site-specific ground operations and radiological
contingency plans commensurate with the risk represented by the planned
launch of nuclear materials (Requirement 25122).

f\. Contingency planning, as required by the National Response Plan,
includes provisions for emergency response and support for source
recovery efforts (Requirement 32191).

> *Note: NPD 8710.1, Emergency Preparedness Program, and NPR 8715.2,
> NASA Emergency Preparedness Plan Procedural Requirements, address the
> NASA emergency preparedness policy and program requirements.*

g\. Involve the OCHMO in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
planning process (Requirement).

6.2.3 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall:

a\. Assure that NASA missions involving the launch of radioactive
materials comply with paragraph 9 of PD/NSC-25, as appropriate
(Requirement 32192).

b\. Assist in the review and evaluation of nuclear safety risk
(Requirement 32193).

c\. Per Table 6.1, prepare, coordinate, and provide the required
notification of planned launches of radioactive materials to the
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) (Requirement 32196).

d\. Designate a Nuclear Flight Safety Assurance Manager (NFSAM)
(Requirement).

e\. Designate a NASA INSRP Coordinator (Requirement).

f\. Nominate a NASA member for each empanelled ad hoc INSRP following a
request by the program or mission office to the NASA Administrator
(Requirement).

> *Note: The NFSAM and NASA INSRP Coordinator may be separate
> individuals*.

g\. Provide assistance to the cognizant NASA Mission Directorate and
project office(s) in meeting nuclear launch safety analysis/evaluation
requirements (Requirement 32197).

h\. Review all radiological contingency and emergency planning as part
of the SMA audits, reviews, and assessments process. (Requirement).

> *Note: The requirements for conducting and supporting these reviews
> are provided in NPR 8705.6, Safety and Mission Assurance Audits,
> Reviews, and Assessments.*

i\. Ensure that the OCHMO is notified of the intent to launch
radioactive materials (Requirement).

j\. Coordinate health physics aspects with the OCHMO periodically and in
the event of any related radiological emergencies during the mission
(Requirement).

6.2.4 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators and program
executives shall:

a\. Designate an individual responsible for ensuring the implementation
of the requirements for nuclear launch safety approval in accordance
with paragraph 9 of PD/NSC-25 (Requirement 32200).

b\. Notify the NASA Headquarters NFSAM, in writing, as soon as
radioactive sources are identified for potential use on NASA spacecraft
to schedule nuclear launch safety approval activities (Requirement
32201).

c\. Identify the amount of radioactive material and the process for
documenting the risk represented by the use of radioactive materials to
the NFSAM in accordance with paragraph 6.4 of this NPR (Requirement).

d\. Provide required reports to the NFSAM in accordance with paragraphs
6.3 and 6.4 of this NPR (Requirement 32202).

e\. Prepare or have prepared the nuclear safety analyses (Requirement).

f\. Obtain nuclear launch safety approval or launch concurrence in
accordance with paragraph 6.3 of this NPR (Requirement 32203).

6.2.5 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
and line managers shall:

a\. Ensure, to the extent of responsibility applicable under defined
licensing/permitting documentation or agreements, compliance with all
pertinent directives, licenses, agreements, and requirements promulgated
by regulatory agencies relative to the use of radioactive materials
planned for a space launch (Requirement 32204).

b\. Coordinate with appropriate project office(s) to ensure radioactive
material source reports that are submitted per paragraph 6.4 of this NPR
accurately reflect all known radioactive material sources intended for
flight (Requirement 32205).

6.2.6 NASA launch and landing site managers shall:

a\. Apply range safety requirements, with regard to the safe launch of
radioactive materials, specified in range safety standards (Requirement
25123).

> *Note: Requirements for range safety concerning the launch of
> radioactive material are given in the Air Force Space Command Manual
> 91-710, Volume 2, Safety, Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume
> 2 - Flight Safety Requirements (1 July 2004).*

b\. Develop and implement site-specific ground operations and
radiological contingency plans to address potential ground handling
accidents and potential launch/landing accident scenarios and to support
source recovery operations commensurate with the radioactive materials
present (Requirement 32207).

> *Note: Requirements for contingency plans are provided in NPR 8715.2,
> NASA Emergency Preparedness Plan Procedural Requirements.*

c\. Coordinate radiological contingency plans and exercises with the
OCHMO (Requirement).

d\. Exercise contingency response capabilities as deemed necessary to
ensure adequate readiness of participants and adequacy of planning to
protect the public, site personnel, and facilities (Requirement 32208).

e\. Ensure appropriate and timely coordination with regional Federal,
State, territorial, and local emergency management authorities to
provide for support to, and coordination with, offsite emergency
response elements (Requirement 32209).

f\. Make provisions for special offsite monitoring and assistance in
recovery of radioactive materials that could spread into areas outside
the geographical boundaries of the launch site (Requirement 32210).

g\. Establish a radiological control center (RADCC) for launches and
landings with radioactive sources possessing a significant health or
environmental risk, or having an activity of A~2~ mission multiple
greater than 1,000 as determined per paragraph 6.3 of this NPR, or as
specified in applicable interagency agreements (Requirement 32211).

h\. Ensure, when required, that the RADCC provides technical support and
coordination with other Federal, State, territorial, and local agencies
in the case of a launch or landing accident that may result in the
release of radioactive materials (Requirement).

i\. Ensure, when required, that the RADCC is operational during launch
and landing phases any time there is a potential for an accident that
could release radioactive material (Requirement 32213).

j\. Ensure, when required, that the RADCC is staffed commensurate with
the risk associated with the radioactive materials present (Requirement
32212).

6.2.7 The NASA INSRP Coordinator shall:

a\. Coordinate NASA\'s participation in activities supporting empanelled
INSRP(s) to ensure adequate information is available to the INSRP(s)
(Requirement 32214).

b\. Make arrangements for NASA personnel to provide technical assistance
to empanelled INSRP(s) (Requirement 32215).

c\. Coordinate the support needs of those selected to provide assistance
to empanelled INSRP(s) as may be appropriate (i.e.; travel, funding,
technical) (Requirement 32216).

d\. Coordinate health physics aspects with the OCHMO (Requirement).

6.2.8 The NASA member of an empanelled INSRP shall:

a\. Represent NASA in accordance with PD/NSC-25 (Requirement).

b\. Provide technical liaison between the empanelled INSRP and NASA
management (Requirement).

6.2.9 The Office of Security and Program Protection shall:

a\. Ensure appropriate coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security (Federal Emergency Management Agency) to provide adequate
emergency and recovery planning for all NASA missions above a threshold
of 1,000 for A~2~ mission multiple as defined in paragraph 6.3 of this
NPR (Requirement 32194).

b\. Ensure that radiological emergency and recovery plans are developed
and implemented where NASA is the Lead Federal Agency as defined by the
National Response Plan - Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex
(Requirement 32195).

c\. Upon request, provide the program executive and OSMA with
mission-specific information recommended for consideration during launch
or potential accident site emergency response and clean-up planning as
part of the nuclear launch approval process (Requirement).

**6.3 Nuclear Launch Safety Approval Process**

The level of analysis, evaluation, review, and the concurrence or
approval required for a radiological risk assessment varies with the
total amount of radioactive materials planned for launch as follows:

6.3.1 For all planned launches of radioactive materials, program
executives shall:

a\. Use the A~2~ mission multiple value to determine the level of
assessment required (Requirement 32217).

b\. Use total mission radioactive material inventory contained on the
launch to calculate the total A~2~ mission multiple per Appendix D,
Activity and Radioactivity Limits -- Basic A~1~/A~2~ Values (Requirement
32222).

c\. Use the highest of the algebraic sum of the isotopes\' A~2~
multiples at launch, any time the spacecraft will be in Earth orbit or
during near-Earth interplanetary flight (e.g., Earth Gravity Assists) to
determine the level of assessment required (Requirement 32223).

d\. Consult with the NFSAM and the NASA Office of the General Counsel to
determine what provisions, if any, of this chapter apply when NASA
participates in the launch of a vehicle or spacecraft from other
countries or territories, and these vehicles or spacecraft contain a
radioactive source (Requirement 32221).

6.3.2 Internal NASA Nuclear Launch Safety Process.

A summary of the nuclear launch safety review, reporting, and approval
requirements is provided in Table 6.1, Nuclear Launch Safety Approval
Summary.

  -------------------------------- ---------- --------------- ---------- ------------- ---------------
  A~2~ Mission Multiple            Launch     Launch          Launch     Required      Approval/
                                   Reported   Concurrence/    Reported   Level of      Concurrence
                                   to NFSAM   Approval by     to OSTP    Review and    
                                                                         Reports       

  A~2~ \< 0.001                    Yes        NFSAM           no         Paragraph     Concurrence
                                                                         6.3.3         letter from
                                                                                       NFSAM

  0.001[\<]{.underline}A~2~\<10    Yes        NFSAM           yes        Paragraph     Concurrence
                                                                         6.3.4         letter from
                                                                                       NFSAM

  10[\<]{.underline}A~2~ \<500     Yes        Chief, Safety   yes        Paragraph     Approval letter
                                              and Mission                6.3.5,        from Chief,
                                              Assurance                  Nuclear       Safety and
                                                                         Safety Review Mission
                                                                                       Assurance

  500[\<]{.underline}A~2~\<1,000   Yes        NASA            yes        Paragraph     Approval letter
                                              Administrator              6.3.6, Safety from NASA
                                                                         Analysis      Administrator
                                                                         Summary (SAS) 

  1000[\<]{.underline}A~2~         Yes        Executive       yes        Paragraph     NASA
                                              Office of the              6.3.7, Safety Administrator
                                              President                  Analysis      requests
                                                                         Report        approval via
                                                                                       Director, OSTP
  -------------------------------- ---------- --------------- ---------- ------------- ---------------

Table 6.1 Nuclear Launch Safety Approval Summary

6.3.3 For launches with A~2~ mission multiples less than 0.001:

6.3.3.1 Program executives (in addition to requirements in paragraph 6.2
of this NPR) shall:

a\. Request nuclear launch safety concurrence, in writing, from the
NFSAM (Requirement 25132).

b\. Submit the request to the NFSAM a minimum of 4 months prior to
launch (Requirement).

> *Note: The request should be accompanied by the Radioactive Materials
> On-Board Report defined in paragraph 6.4.1 of this NPR.*

6.3.3.2 The NFSAM shall review the report and inform the program
executive, in writing, of concurrence (or nonconcurrence) and any safety
concerns not less than two months prior to launch (Requirement 32227).

6.3.4 For launches with A~2~ mission multiples between 0.001 and 10:

6.3.4.1 Program executives (in addition to requirements in paragraph 6.2
of this NPR) shall:

a\. Request nuclear launch safety concurrence, in writing, from the
NFSAM (Requirement 25133).

b\. Submit the request to the NFSAM a minimum of four months prior to
launch (Requirement).

> *Note: The request should be accompanied by the Radioactive On-Board
> Materials Report defined in paragraph 6.4 with a brief technical
> description of the radioactive material.*

6.3.4.2 The NFSAM shall:

a\. Review the request and inform the program executive, in writing, of
nuclear launch safety concurrence (or nonconcurrence) and any safety
concerns not less than two months prior to launch (Requirement).

b\. Report launches with these quantities of radioactive material to the
OSTP prior to launch (Requirement 32228).

6.3.5 For launches with A~2~ mission multiples equal to or greater than
10 but less than 500:

6.3.5.1 Program executives (in addition to requirements in paragraph 6.2
of this NPR) shall:

a\. Develop and document, in consultation with the NFSAM, a mutually
agreed upon schedule for developing a nuclear safety review
(Requirement).

b\. Prepare or have prepared a nuclear safety review of the radiological
risk for the proposed mission (Requirement 32232).

c\. Ensure that the nuclear safety review contains the report described
in paragraph 6.4 of this NPR (Requirement 32233).

d\. Ensure that the nuclear safety review contains program excerpts
describing the mission (Requirement 32234).

e\. Ensure that the nuclear safety review contains an analysis of the
probabilities of launch and in-flight accidents which could result in
the terrestrial release of radioactive materials (surface and air)
(Requirement 32235).

f\. Ensure that the nuclear safety review contains an estimate of the
upper bound of health and environmental effects due to a radioactive
material release (Requirement 32236).

g\. Ensure that the nuclear safety review contains mission-specific
information recommended for consideration in the launch or potential
accident site emergency response and clean-up planning (Requirement
32237).

h\. Provide the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, and the NFSAM with
the nuclear safety review along with a request for nuclear launch
concurrence at least five months prior to launch (Requirement 32238).

6.3.5.2 The NFSAM shall:

a\. Make a preliminary scoping evaluation of the radiological risk to
identify the extent of analyses needed as part of a prelaunch nuclear
safety review (Requirement 32230).

b\. Develop and document, in consultation with the program executive, a
mutually agreed upon schedule for developing a nuclear safety review
(Requirement 32231).

c\. Notify OSTP of the planned launch with these quantities of
radioactive material as a part of the quarterly report (Requirement
32239).

6.3.6 For launches with A~2~ mission multiples equal to or greater than
500 but less than 1,000:

6.3.6.1 Program executives (in addition to requirements in paragraph 6.2
of this NPR) shall:

a\. Develop and document, in consultation with the NFSAM, a mutually
agreed upon schedule for developing a nuclear safety review
(Requirement).

b\. Prepare or have prepared a Safety Analysis Summary (SAS) that, in
coordination with the NFSAM, addresses the radiological risk of the
proposed mission (Requirement 32244).

> *Note: The level of detail in the SAS will be commensurate with the
> radiological risk. The program is encouraged to use other program
> documentation to provide mission and potential accident information in
> the SAS.*

c\. Ensure that the SAS contains a brief description of the planned
mission, schedule, launch vehicle, and spacecraft to include operations
while in-orbit and during near-Earth flight (Requirement 32245).

d\. Ensure that the SAS contains a description of all radioactive
materials, their physical state/chemical form, and quantities
(Requirement 32246).

e\. Ensure that the SAS contains probabilities and resulting
consequences of launch and in-flight accidents that could result in the
terrestrial release of radiological materials (Requirement 32247).

f\. Ensure that the SAS contains an estimate of any health and
environmental effects due to a radioactive material release (Requirement
32248).

g\. Ensure that the SAS contains mission-specific information
recommended for consideration in the launch or potential accident site
emergency response and clean-up planning (Requirement 32249).

h\. Provide the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, with the SAS along
with a request for nuclear launch concurrence at least six months prior
to launch (Requirement).

i\. Provide the OCHMO with the SAS at least six months prior to launch
(Requirement).

j\. Forward the SAS to the NASA Administrator, along with the
concurrence of the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, no later than
four months before launch, and request nuclear launch safety approval
from the NASA Administrator (Requirement 32251).

6.3.6.2 The NFSAM shall:

a\. Make a preliminary assessment of the radiological risk and provide a
written assessment to the program executive (Requirement 32242).

b\. Develop and document, in consultation with the program executive, a
mutually agreed upon schedule for nuclear launch safety analyses and
review activities to be conducted to support a nuclear launch safety
concurrence request (Requirement 32243).

c\. Review the SAS and provide timely comments to the program in
accordance with the mutually agreed upon schedule (Requirement 32250).

d\. Notify OSTP of the planned launch as a part of the quarterly report
(Requirement 32252).

6.3.7 For launches with A~2~ mission multiples equal to or greater than
1000:

6.3.7.1 Program executives (in addition to requirements in paragraph 6.2
of this NPR) shall:

a\. Request, in coordination with the Chief, Safety and Mission
Assurance, the NASA Administrator to empanel an ad hoc INSRP for the
mission (Requirement 32255).

b\. Factor the time required for an INSRP into the program master
schedule (Requirement 32256).

c\. Develop and document, in consultation with the NFSAM, the empanelled
INSRP, the program, and the appropriate Department of Energy (DOE)
offices (in accordance with interagency agreements for specific
missions), a schedule for the delivery of a Safety Analysis Report
(SAR), using a phased approach, with the complete final SAR being
delivered no later than ten months prior to launch (Requirement 32260).

> *Note: The mutually agreed upon schedule should address the planned
> analysis schedule, base assumptions, analysis limitations/bounds, and
> model descriptions associated with the SAR development. Interim
> reviews should be held for all individual analyses before completion
> and to provide a status of analyses as of a given date.*

d\. Prepare or have prepared a SAR (Requirement 32258).

> *Note: The level of detail and content of the SAR will be commensurate
> with the mission radiological risk. In cases where the DOE provides
> the radioactive material, the DOE programmatic SAR may be adopted to
> satisfy this requirement, in accordance with the interagency
> agreement(s) for specific missions. In cases where launch vehicles,
> configuration, and radioactive materials are similar, the program
> executive, in consultation with the NFSAM and the INSRP, is encouraged
> to use a comparative analysis based upon previous mission(s) safety
> analyses that bound the anticipated risk for the new mission. Where
> radioactive materials are being provided from multiple sources, the
> program executive may provide a single or multiple SAR document(s) to
> best meet this requirement.*
>
> *The program executive is encouraged to begin coordination with the
> empanelled ad hoc INSRP in the early stages of mission development.
> The program executive should invite the INSRP to review the
> development of launch and mission accident scenarios, probabilities of
> occurrence, dispersion, specification of associated environments, and
> health effects via documentation and program safety reviews. The INSRP
> normally reviews and evaluates all program documentation associated
> with radioactive material safety for completeness and defensibility.
> The INSRP evaluation is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report
> (SER). The INSRP is normally assisted in its evaluation effort by
> expert consultants in various specialized areas from a number of
> Government agencies, national laboratories, industry, and academia.*

e\. Deliver the agreed upon iterations of the SAR to the INSRP according
to the documented schedule (Requirement).

6.3.7.2 Following the approval by the NASA Administrator to empanel an
INSRP, the NASA INSRP Coordinator shall, in accordance with paragraph
6.2.7, facilitate the preparation of an INSRP-developed SER of the
radiological risk for the proposed nuclear mission as required by
PD/NSC-25 (Requirement 32261).

> *Note: The SER should typically be completed no later than six months
> prior to launch. The SER, along with the final SAR and other related
> documents, are considered by the NASA Administrator before requesting
> nuclear launch safety approval in accordance with PD/NSC-25.*

6.3.8 For orbiting spacecraft being resupplied or modified in which the
U.S. Government is the lead (e.g., International Space Station) and the
A~2~ mission multiple is equal to 10 but less than 1000:

6.3.8.1 Program executives shall:

a\. Request a nuclear launch safety approval from the NFSAM (Requirement
25137).

b\. Perform a safety analysis to the level of detail defined in
paragraph 6.3.6 of this NPR (Requirement 32262).

c\. Meet the launch concurrence/approval requirements defined in
paragraph 6.3.6 of this NPR (Requirement).

6.3.8.2 The NFSAM shall conduct reviews as defined in paragraph 6.3.6 of
this NPR (Requirement).

6.3.9 For orbiting spacecraft being resupplied or modified in which the
U.S. Government is the lead (e.g., International Space Station) and the
A~2~ mission multiple exceeds 1000:

6.3.9.1 Program executives shall:

a\. Request a nuclear launch safety approval from the NFSAM
(Requirement).

b\. Perform a safety analysis to the level of detail defined in
paragraph 6.3.7 of this NPR (Requirement).

c\. Meet the launch concurrence/approval requirements defined in
paragraph 6.3.7 of this NPR (Requirement).

6.3.9.2 The NFSAM shall:

a\. Advise the program executive concerning a request to the NASA
Administrator to empanel an INSRP as per paragraph 6.2.2 of this NPR.

b\. Coordinate a safety evaluation as defined in paragraph 6.3.7.1 of
this NPR (Requirement).

**6.4 Report Requirements**

6.4.1 Nuclear launch safety analyses (e.g., SAS, SAR) and evaluation
(e.g., SER) are described in previous paragraphs.

6.4.2 Radioactive Materials Report

6.4.2.1 NASA program executives, Center Directors, facility managers,
laboratory managers, and launch and landing site managers shall:

a\. Use the Planned Launches of Radioactive Materials Report shown in
Figure 6.1 to report planned launches of radioactive materials and
request for nuclear launch concurrence/approval (Requirement 32265).

b\. Ensure that entries are made for each isotopic source for planned
launch and resupplying missions (Requirement 32267).

> *Note: Isotopes of similar size, chemical form, and activity level may
> be combined on a single line entry.*

6.4.2.2 The NFSAM shall use the format of the Radioactive Materials
Reports shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 for the quarterly report to
notify OSTP of planned launches (Requirement 32266).

> *Note: Figure 6.2 shows the format for the report for resupplying
> radioactive materials to on-orbit spacecraft.*

  ------------ ----------- -------- --------- --------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------
  Vehicle/     Planned     Launch   Number of Isotope   Total      A~2~      A~2~       Remarks
  Spacecraft   Launch Date Site     Sources             Activity   Limit for Multiple   
                                                                   Isotope   for Each   
                                                                   (Ci)      Isotope    
                                                                             Source     

               *(Use one                                                                
               line for                                                                 
               each                                                                     
               isotope                                                                  
               type, size,                                                              
               and form)*                                                               

                                                                                        

               *(Use one                                                                
               line to sum                                                              
               the A~2~                                                                 
               mission                                                                  
               multiples                                                                
               for the                                                                  
               each                                                                     
               mission)*                                                                
  ------------ ----------- -------- --------- --------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------

Figure 6.1 Planned Launches of Radioactive Materials Report

  --------- -------------- --------- ---------- ----------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------
  Isotope   Date Arrived   Number of Total      Isotope     Activity   A~2~      Current    Remarks
            On-Board       Sources   Activity   Half-life   as of      Limit for A~2~       
                                     at Arrival             Mission    Isotope   Multiple   
                                     (Ci)                   Start (Ci) (Ci)      for Each   
                                                                                 Isotope    
                                                                                 Source     

            *(Use one line                                                                  
            for each                                                                        
            isotope type,                                                                   
            size, form,                                                                     
            and arrival                                                                     
            date)*                                                                          

                                                                                            

            *(Use one line                                                                  
            to sum the                                                                      
            A~2~ mission                                                                    
            multiples for                                                                   
            the                                                                             
            spacecraft)*                                                                    
  --------- -------------- --------- ---------- ----------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------

Figure 6.2 Radioactive Materials On-Board Report

> *Note: The Activity and Radioactive Material Limits table is located
> in Appendix D.*

**CHAPTER 7. Safety Training and Personnel Certification**

**7.1 Purpose**

This chapter describes the requirements for establishing safety training
programs and the minimum training certification levels necessary for
personnel involved in potentially hazardous NASA operations. Much of
this training is available on the Internet. Instructor-based courses are
available through the NASA Safety Training Center (NSTC). The NSTC can
be reached by telephone at (281) 244-1284. This chapter also references
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements that may be imposed for
certain mission-critical job functions.

**7.2 Responsibilities**

7.2.1 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, and line managers shall provide training to assist
managers/supervisors and employees with their specific roles and
responsibilities in safety programs (Requirement 25103).

> *Note: EO 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal
> Employees, dated February 26, 1980, as amended, and 29 CFR 1960,
> Subpart H, Training, require that NASA establish comprehensive safety
> training programs. See NPR 8715.1, NASA Occupational Safety and Health
> Programs.*

7.2.2 The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, shall:

a\. Assist Center counterparts in ensuring that 29 CFR Part 1960, Basic
Program Elements for Federal Employees, Occupational Safety and Health
and Health Programs, and Related Matters, requirements are followed
(Requirement).

b\. Ensure Agency-wide consistency and uniformity in the NASA safety
training program (Requirement 25109).

c\. Act as a clearinghouse for information regarding available safety
training courses and materials (Requirement).

d\. Develop, in conjunction with the Training and Development Division
at NASA Headquarters, training courses suited to specific Agency safety
needs (Requirement 32145).

e\. Co-develop, in conjunction with the OCHMO at NASA Headquarters,
training courses and materials in areas of overlapping regulatory or
programmatic responsibility (Requirement 32146).

> *Note: Safety forms and reports are retained per NPR 1441.1, NASA
> Records Retention Schedules.*

7.2.3 Center training and personnel development offices and safety
offices shall be jointly responsible for:

a\. Determining safety and certification training needs (Requirement
25105).

b\. Overseeing training efforts (Requirement).

c\. Identifying budget requirements for training (Requirement 32141).

d\. Developing training courses and materials (Requirement 32142).

e\. Assuring that training records reflect employee safety training
(Requirement 32143).

**7.3 Planning and Implementation of the Safety Training Program**

7.3.1 Center Directors shall:

a\. Formulate and document a comprehensive safety training program (see
Figure 7-1 below) at their Center (Requirement 32147).

b\. Develop and maintain a Center Safety Training Plan (Requirement).

c\. Ensure that all persons engaged in physical work are instructed in
accident prevention and fully informed of the hazards involved
(Requirement 32301).

d\. Ensure that training for all persons engaged in electrical work
includes first-aid procedures and cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(Requirement 32302).

e\. Ensure that personnel at risk of exposure to cryogenic liquids
receive training in correct first aid measures for these liquids
(Requirement).

f\. Provide system safety training to meet the needs of programmatic
activities [(Requirement
32116).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

g\. Ensure that software safety personnel and project/program lead
software safety analysts are trained to NASA-STD-8719.13, Software
Safety Standard, and NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard
(Requirement).

h\. Ensure that operators of motorized equipment (including motor
vehicles) have formal initial training, consisting of both classroom and
operational testing, if operating the motorized equipment involves
skills beyond those associated with normal, everyday operation of
private motor vehicles, to assure operator proficiency (Requirement
32271).

i\. Ensure that operators of motorized equipment have periodic refresher
training and testing, as determined by the safety office, if operating
the motor vehicle requires skills beyond those associated with normal,
everyday operation of private motor vehicles (Requirement 32272).

j\. Annually review operations being performed at their Center to ensure
that the implemented safety training program is working effectively and
to identify and include training for jobs that are potentially hazardous
in addition to the mandatory listing in paragraph 7.4.5 (Requirement).

> *Note: Employee safety committees, employee representatives, and other
> interested groups should be provided an opportunity to assist in the
> hazardous job identification process.*

7.3.2 Center subject matter experts shall review NASA training materials
at least annually and update materials as needed when regulatory
agencies or changes in NASA policy documents generate technical changes
(Requirement 32148).

7.3.3 Center SMA Directors shall maintain a current copy of the Center
Safety Training Plan (Requirement 25111).

**7.4 Personnel Safety Certification Programs for Potentially Hazardous
Operations and Materials**

7.4.1 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, and line managers shall ensure that:

a\. Personnel who perform or control hazardous operations or use or
transport hazardous material have been trained and certified with the
necessary knowledge, skill, judgment, and physical ability (if specified
in the job classification) to do the job safely (Requirement 25113).

> *Note: Many NASA operations involve hazardous materials or chemicals,
> technology, or systems with potential hazards to life, the
> environment, or property.*

b\. Personnel obtain hazardous operation safety certification for those
tasks that potentially have an immediate danger to the individual
(death/injury to self) if not done correctly, or could create a danger
to other individuals in the immediate area (death or injury), or are a
danger to the environment (Requirement 32150).

> *Note: Detailed training and certification requirements may be found
> in specific NASA Standards; e.g., NASA-STD-8719.9, Standard for
> Lifting Devices and Equipment, or NSS 1740.12, Safety Standard for
> Explosives, Propellants and Pyrotechnics.*

c\. All contractor personnel engaged in potentially hazardous operations
or hazardous material handling are certified via a process similar to
that for NASA personnel (Requirement 32173).

7.4.2 Center SMA Directors shall develop required safety certification
programs for their Center (Requirement 25106).

7.4.3 Medical offices and cognizant health officials shall:

a\. Determine the need for physical and medical examinations including
their depth, scope, and frequency to support certification requirements
(Requirement).

b\. Be responsible for medical certification in health hazard and
related activities (Requirement 32144).

c\. Oversee or conduct required personnel medical examinations in
support of the safety certification effort (Requirement).

d\. Ensure that physical and medical examinations to support
certification requirements are in compliance with OSHA and other
Federal, State, and local agency applicable codes, regulations, and
standards covering the occupation or environment including medical
monitoring and recordkeeping requirements (Requirement 32187).

> *Note: The need for fitness-for-duty examinations should be based on
> the hazardous consequences of the employee's inability to perform the
> job correctly due to physical or mental deficiencies.*

7.4.4 Line managers shall manage the certification program for their
employees and contractors in accordance with procedures in this NPR
(Requirement 25107).

7.4.5 Hazardous Operations Requiring Safety Certification.

> *Note: This list is not all inclusive, other safety certification
> requirements are found in other NASA requirement documents.*

7.4.5.1 Center SMA Directors or their designees shall ensure:

a\. Flight crew member certification (FAA licensing may not be
sufficient) (Requirement 32151).

b\. Firefighter certification (Requirement 32152).

c\. Propellant and explosives user certification per NSS 1740.12
(Requirement 32153).

d\. Propellant and explosives handler certification per NSS 1740.12
(Requirement 32154).

e\. Rescue personnel certification (Requirement 32155).

f\. Self-contained breathing apparatus user certification (Requirement
32156).

g\. Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus user certification
(Requirement 32157).

h\. High-voltage electrician certification that adheres to NASA and
State/local requirements (Requirement 32158).

i\. Altitude chamber operator certification (Requirement 32159).

j\. High-pressure liquid/vapor/gas system operator certification
(Requirement 32160).

k\. Hyperbaric chamber operator certification (Requirement 32161).

l\. Tank farm worker certification (Requirement 32162).

m\. Wind tunnel operator certification (Requirement 32163).

n\. Welder certification (Requirement 32164).

o\. Laser operator/maintenance personnel certification (Requirement
32165).

p\. Centrifuge operator certification (Requirement 32166).

q\. Range safety officer certification (Requirement 32167).

r\. Crane operator certification (Requirement 32168).

s\. Certification for riggers for hoisting operations (Requirement
32169).

t\. Heavy equipment operator certification (Requirement 32170).

u\. Confined space entry personnel certification (Requirement 32171).

v\. Certification for lockout/tagout personnel (Requirement 32172).

w\. Certification for individuals involved strictly with the handling,
transport, or packaging of hazardous materials that will not otherwise
disturb the integrity of the basic properly packaged shipping container
that holds the hazardous material (Requirement 25115).

> *Note: Operations that involve the reduction of palletized or
> otherwise combined items of packaged hazardous materials qualify as
> handling.*
>
> *Center safety officials or their designees may require additional
> hazardous operations safety certifications.*

7.4.5.2 Center SMA Directors who certify individuals to perform or
control hazardous operations, or to use or transport hazardous material,
shall ensure the individuals possess the necessary knowledge, skill,
judgment, and physical ability to do the job in a safe and healthful
manner (Requirement 32331).

7.4.6 Certification Requirements.

7.4.6.1 Center training and personnel development offices and safety
offices shall ensure that hazardous operations certification and
hazardous material handler certification include as a minimum:

a\. A physical examination (see paragraph 7.4.3) (Requirement 32175).

b\. Initial training (classroom, online, and/or on-the-job) (Requirement
32176).

> *Note: The level and structure of training is established according to
> the hazards of the job being performed.*

c\. A written examination to determine adequacy and retention of
training (Requirement 32177).

d\. Periodic refresher training, as determined by the Center safety
official, including review of emergency response procedures (Requirement
32178).

e\. A recertification period as determined by the Center safety official
in the absence of any local, State, or Federal requirements (but not to
exceed a four-year interval) (Requirement 32179).

f\. Applicable requirements of 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and
Health Standards (Requirement).

g\. Specific training in the Federal, NASA, and local rules for
preparing, packaging, marking, and transporting hazardous material
and/or equipment operation associated with the job (Requirement 32181).

7.4.6.2 Center training and personnel development offices and Center
safety offices shall ensure that drivers or operators of vehicles
transporting hazardous materials are instructed in the specific hazards
of the cargo or material in their vehicle and the standard emergency and
first-aid procedures that should be followed in the event of a spill or
exposure to the hazardous material (Requirement 32182).

> *Note: Training requirements can be found in 29 CFR Part 1910,
> Occupational Safety and Health Standards, and 49 CFR Part 177,
> Carriage by Public Highway.*

7.4.6.3 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, and supervisors shall ensure that:

a\. Personnel who are hazardous-operations-safety-certified or
hazardous-material-handler-certified are identified through the issuance
of a card, license, or badge (to be immediately available) or a listing
on a personnel certification roster or database (Requirement 32188).

b\. Personnel certification rosters indicate the name, date, materials
or operations for which certification is valid, name of certifying
official, and date of expiration (Requirement 32189).

**7.5 Mission Critical Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)**

7.5.1 The Director of each NASA installation shall designate mission
critical areas for the Space Shuttle and other critical systems
including the International Space Station, designated ELVs, designated
payloads, Shuttle Carrier Aircraft, and other designated resources that
provide access to space (Requirement).

7.5.2 Personnel having unescorted access to these areas shall meet the
suitability, qualification, and screening provisions detailed in 14 CFR
Part 1214.5, Space Flight: Mission Critical Systems Personnel
Reliability Program: Screening Requirements (Requirement).

7.5.3 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, supervisors, COs, and COTRs shall ensure that
contracts cover mission-critical operations or areas referenced by 48
CFR Part 1852.246-70, NASA FAR Supplement, Mission Critical Space System
Personnel Reliability Program (Requirement).

**7.6 Hazardous Materials and Chemicals Risk Information**

7.6.1 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Center Directors,
project managers, and supervisors shall ensure that:

a\. The risk of all hazardous chemicals produced or imported are
evaluated and included in their safety training and certification
program (Requirement 32183).

b\. Information involving the risk of all hazardous chemicals is made
available to all employees in accordance with 29 CFR Part 1910.1200
(Requirement 32184).

**7.7 Exclusions**

7.7.1 This chapter does not apply to personnel engaged in operations
that already require skill certification by quality assurance
organizations, such as soldering, brazing, welding, crimping, or
potting, or to personnel performing inspections using dye penetrant,
magnetic particle, ultrasonic, radiograph, and magnaflux.

7.7.2 Certification of equipment and facilities is not within the scope
of this chapter but may be as important as personnel certification in
relation to safety. Information concerning equipment and facilities
certification for operational readiness is found in Chapters 6, 8, and
9.

7.7.3 This chapter shall not be used as a justification for allowing
hazardous duty payments, environmental differential pay, or premium pay,
nor will the fact that a job qualifies for hazardous duty pay imply that
it is covered by this chapter. It has always been NASA safety policy to
make all operations as safe as possible. Hazard duty pay differentials
are covered in 5 CFR Part 532, Prevailing Rate Systems, and 5 CFR Part
550, Pay Administration (General).

**CHAPTER 8. Safety for Facility Acquisition, Construction, Activation,
and Disposal**

**8.1 Purpose**

8.1.1 This chapter establishes procedural requirements for the safety
and mission success of the NASA facility acquisition, construction,
activation and disposal process. Facility operational safety
requirements are covered in Chapter 3. Except in case of imminent
danger, it is not the intent of this chapter to require upgrades to
existing facilities to meet new codes.

8.1.2 NPR 8820.2, Facility Project Implementation Guide, provides
requirements for incorporating safety criteria and requirements into
project design criteria before the start of facility project design.
Specific safety tasks to be accomplished during construction, operation,
maintenance, and final disposition of a facility are documented in a
Facility Safety Management Plan (FSMP) in accordance with NPR 8820.2,
Facility Project Implementation Guide. The FSMP for each facility
acquisition should include those tasks appropriate to the size and
complexity of the project and the associated risks.

8.1.3 This chapter does not provide direct instructions to NASA
contractors responsible for planning, architect-engineering design, or
construction services. It provides requirements for the responsible NASA
Center project management, contracting office, and safety assurance and
fire protection organization personnel who implement safety programs
essential to meeting each facility acquisition and construction work
package in accordance with NPD 8820.2, Design and Construction of
Facilities, and NPR 8820.2, Facility Project Implementation Guide.

**8.2 Roles and Responsibilities**

8.2.1 Center Directors shall:

a\. Ensure this NPR is applied to the CoF projects and facility
maintenance projects (Requirement 25273).

b\. Ensure this NPR is applied to Center-approved facility projects
according to the degree of safety policy impact and regulatory
considerations on those projects (Requirement 32486).

c\. Ensure that the requirements in this NPR do not supersede more
stringent requirements imposed by individual NASA organizations and
other Government agencies (Requirement 32487).

d\. Use NASA-STD-8719.7, Facilities System Safety Guidebook, which
provides for a review of the facility life cycle and the safety tasks
that shall be accomplished during acquisition, modification, and test
activities and facility operations, maintenance, and disposal
(Requirement 32485).

e\. Ensure that existing facilities undergoing major renovations meet
national consensus codes in effect at the time of the renovations
(Requirement 25272).

> *Note: Major renovations are any facility modifications controlled by
> a design review process as provided in NASA-STD-8719.7, Facility
> System Safety Guidebook.*

**8.3 Facility Acquisition, Construction, and Activation Objectives**

8.3.1 Center Directors shall ensure that NASA facility acquisition,
construction, and activation safety activities:

a\. Identify, track, and resolve hazards at the earliest possible
life-cycle phase to eliminate risk to personnel and mission success and
to minimize the cost and need for a retrofit program (Requirement
32488).

b\. Perform safety oversight functions to ensure compliance with NASA
safety policies (Requirement 32489).

c\. Monitor facility construction, modification, repair, and
rehabilitation for compliance with safety, fire protection, and building
codes and standards (Requirement 32492).

d\. Provide for the programmatic and technical review of all proposed
facility acquisition, design, and construction projects to assure that
all safety requirements are specified and funded (Requirement 32491).

e\. Maintain current building configurations during all phases of the
facility acquisition, maintenance, operation, and disposal process
(Requirement 32496).

f\. Process any change to facility hardware, software, or procedures
through the configuration management program (Requirement 32497).

g\. Include the safety inspection of all facilities, occupied or
unoccupied, at least annually to ensure compliance with safety, fire
protection, and building codes and standards (Requirement 32498).

8.3.2 For projects with safety or fire protection implications, Center
Directors shall ensure that:

a\. NASA fire protection and safety personnel formally monitor fire
protection and safety compliance efforts during the various phases of
the projects (Requirement 32493).

b\. NASA fire protection and safety monitoring efforts are documented
(Requirement).

c\. Fire protection or safety monitoring document(s) have formal
concurrence from the safety office or fire protection office
(Requirement 32494).

8.3.3 Center Directors shall ensure that:

a\. Any final inspection effort (operational readiness inspection,
operational readiness review, test readiness review, pre-final
inspection, final inspection) includes a safety and/or health
representative (Requirement).

b\. All facility safety and health issues are documented, resolved, or
adequately controlled prior to acceptance, activation, and operation
(Requirement 32495).

**8.4 Basic Requirements for Facility Acquisition, Construction, and
Activation**

8.4.1 Center Directors shall:

a\. Designate and assign facility safety program management
responsibilities to a NASA Center SMA organization that is independent
from the specific facility (user) management (Requirement 32499).

b\. Assure that the NASA fire protection and safety organizations review
all proposed NASA-owned, controlled, or operated facility configuration
changes and construction work change orders that have a potential fire
protection or safety impact (Requirement 32500).

> *Note: This does not preclude the use of checklists and other
> guidelines to assist the project in determining the potential fire or
> safety impact and necessary protection requirements.*

c\. Ensure compliance with EM 385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Safety and Health Requirements or local Center requirements, which ever
are most stringent, for construction undertaken at NASA sites and
facilities by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Requirement 32503).

> *Note: For related NASA-managed projects, EM 385-1-1 is considered an
> advisory document.*

**8.5 Facility Managers**

8.5.1 The Center Directors or designees shall:

a\. Appoint a facility operations manager or facility coordinator to
oversee proper operation of the facility (Requirement 25195).

> *Note: A safety coordinator may be appointed to assist the manager.*

b\. Ensure that the extent of each facility operations manager's
authority is detailed in writing for the complete safety coverage of all
facility operations (Requirement 32509).

> *Note: The Center safety office will interface with the facility
> operations managers or safety coordinators, as appropriate, to ensure
> proper safety program implementation.*

**8.6 FSMP**

8.6.1 Center Directors shall:

a\. Develop and maintain a written FSMP that includes facility
acquisition, modification, test activities, operations, maintenance, and
disposal to monitor timely completion of all required life-cycle safety
program tasks (Requirement 32510).

b\. Ensure that the FSMP includes a facility hazard analysis, hazard
analysis tracking index, and hazard resolution verification in
accordance with NASA-STD-8719.7, Facilities System Safety Guidebook
(Requirement).

c\. Ensure that the FSMP is used to implement safety requirements
including organizational responsibilities, resources, milestones,
methods of accomplishment, depth of efforts, and integration with other
program engineering and management activities (Requirement 32511).

d\. Ensure that the FSMP includes applicable local directives,
instructions, and guidelines for minor or normal acquisitions and
facility modification projects, as a minimum (Requirement 32512).

e\. Ensure that the FSMP contains a realistic milestone schedule
commencing with the development of functional requirements during the
facility conceptual development phase to monitor timely completion of
all required safety program tasks for facility design (Requirement
32513).

f\. Ensure that all FSMP milestones support the scheduled facility need
date or occupancy date, as appropriate (Requirement 32515).

**CHAPTER 9. Safety and Risk Management for NASA Contracts**

**9.1 Purpose**

This chapter provides the procedural requirements for assuring that NASA
contractors have effective safety and risk management programs. This
chapter provides requirements for NASA officials with responsibility for
assuring safety under NASA contracts.

**9.2 Applicability and Scope**

9.2.1 When NASA activities include contractor involvement, Center
Directors and project managers shall include contractors in the NASA
Safety Program (Requirement 25054).

9.2.2 Center SMA Directors, project managers, COs, and COTRs shall
ensure that NASA contracts are written to hold contractors accountable
for the safety of their employees, their services, their products, and
for complying with NASA and Center safety requirements (Requirement
31915).

**9.3 Authority and Responsibility**

9.3.1 Project managers shall:

a\. Work with cognizant safety officials to develop and approve safety
requirements and objectives for efforts to be contracted, and advise COs
and COTRS of specific safety concerns or issues related to contract
performance (Requirement 31917).

b\. Ensure that the application of the requirements in Chapter 2 of this
NPR are specified in related contracts, memoranda of understanding, and
other documents for joint ventures between NASA and other parties
including commercial services, interagency efforts, and international
partnerships [(Requirement
32103).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

c\. Ensure that NASA responsibilities are specified in contracts,
memoranda of understanding, and other documents for joint ventures
between NASA and other parties including commercial services,
interagency efforts, and international partnerships
[(Requirement).](http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/Q_ReqNumbers.html)

d\. Ensure that contracts contain safety, mission success, and risk
management requirements for design, development, fabrication, test, and
the operations of systems, equipment, and facilities in consultation
with Center SMA Directors (Requirement 25060).

e\. Use the software safety requirements in NASA-STD-8719.13, Software
Safety Standard, and NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard, as
the basis for contracts, memoranda of understanding, and other documents
related to software (Requirement).

f\. Provide specific safety tasks to the CO for incorporation into
contracts (Requirement 31919).

g\. Define the surveillance of contractor safety matters with respect to
the nature of the procurement (Requirement 31920).

h\. Ensure that performance-based contracts have a surveillance plan
(Requirement 31921).

9.3.2 System Safety Managers, COs, and COTRs shall:

a\. Develop safety requirements and objectives that are clearly
delineated in contract specifications in conjunction with project
officials (Requirement 31918).

b\. Establish safety performance as an element to be evaluated in
contracts with fee plans (Requirement 31924).

c\. Require copies of MSDS for new hazardous materials as requested by
the local NASA safety office (Requirement 31925).

d\. Participate in onsite visits and pre-bid conferences to ensure
potential bidders understand safety provisions (Requirement 31927).

e\. Review, comment, and approve (or disapprove) the contractors' safety
risk assessment, submitted in response to paragraph 9.3.3, before the
start of any hazardous deliverable work or support operations
(Requirement).

f\. Coordinate any matter regarding proposed deviations to safety
requirements of 48 CFR Part 1823.70, Safety and Health, with the OSMA,
or designated representative (Requirement 31923).

g\. Implement NPR 5100.4, Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(NASA FAR Supplement) (Requirement 25058).

h\. Implement 48 CFR Parts 1807, Acquisition Planning; 1823,
Environment, Energy and Water Efficiency, Renewable Energy Technologies,
Occupational Safety, and Drug-Free Workplace; 1842, Contract
Administration and Audit Services; and 1846, Quality Assurance
(Requirement).

9.3.3 COs or the COTR shall ensure the contractors' safety risk
assessments are developed and provided to NASA for approval before the
start of any hazardous deliverable work or support operations
(Requirement).

9.3.4 System Safety Managers shall:

a\. Assist the CO and COTR in evaluating the prospective contractor's
safety record and safety program (Requirement 32095).

b\. Assist the CO and COTR in applying any special safety provisions to
grants or cooperative agreements (see paragraph 2.7) (Requirement
32096).

c\. During the pre-award phase of acquisition, develop, document and
provide to the CO criteria for the safety performance elements to be
evaluated in contracts with fee plans in a timely manner to ensure
inclusion in the solicitation (Requirement).

**9.4 Requirements**

9.4.1 COs and COTRs shall:

a\. Ensure contract solicitations require the submission of safety and
risk management documentation (e.g., corporate safety policies,
implementation procedures, safety performance experience, and mishap
rates by the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS)
codes and draft program planning documents, such as safety and health
plans and risk management plans) as provided by the Center's SMA
Organization (Requirement 25061). (See Appendix E and Appendix F for
more information to ensure that solicitation instructions include the
requirements outlined in both Appendices.)

b\. Ensure contract solicitations include the evaluation of safety and
risk management documentation (e.g., corporate safety policies,
implementation procedures, safety performance experience, and mishap
rates by the NAICS codes) and draft program planning documents, such as
safety and health plans and risk management plans as a factor for
evaluating bids (Requirement). (See Appendix E and Appendix F for more
information.)

c\. Ensure that safety and risk management evaluation criteria and
solicitation instructions are developed in conjunction with responsible
project personnel and Center SMA organization representatives
(Requirement). (See Appendix E and Appendix F for more information.)

9.4.2 Center SMA Directors shall:

a\. Brief all onsite contractors on local safety requirements to include
incident and accident reporting, emergency evacuation procedures, fire
reporting, medical emergency notification and response actions,
hazardous material spill reporting and response, site entry/exit
procedures, and hot work permit requirements before contract performance
begins and at least annually, thereafter (Requirement 25062).

b\. Document the onsite contractors briefings (Requirement 32097).

c\. Inform the onsite contractor of any adjacent NASA and any other
contractor operations that could pose a hazard to their operation and
employees (Requirement).

d\. Assist the program or project manager or other responsible official
in implementing contractor safety surveillance and evaluation programs
(Requirement 25066).

e\. During the pre-award phase of acquisition, develop, document, and
provide to the CO safety, mission success and risk management
requirements for design, development, fabrication, test, and the
operations of systems, equipment, and facilities in a timely manner to
ensure inclusion in the solicitation (Requirement).

f\. During pre-award phase of acquisition, develop, document, and
provide to the CO a statement of work elements, evaluation criteria, and
solicitation instructions requiring the submittal of safety and risk
management documentation (e.g., corporate safety policies,
implementation procedures, safety performance experience, and mishap
rates by the NAICS codes and draft program planning documents, such as
safety and health plans and risk management plans) in a timely manner to
ensure inclusion in the solicitation (Requirement).

g\. Participate in the contractor selection and evaluation process
providing support to the CO to ensure the proper evaluation of
contractor proposal information (e.g., corporate safety policies,
implementation procedures, safety performance experience, and mishap
rates by the NAICS codes) and draft program planning documents, such as
safety and health plans and risk management plans, as a factor for
evaluating bids (Requirement).

9.4.3 Center SMA Directors, COs, and COTRs shall ensure that contracts
include a provision to require the contractor to provide a written plan
for mitigating risks from hazardous operations to adjacent and other
contractors (Requirement 32098). (See Appendix E and Appendix F for more
information.)

**9.5 Access to NASA Facilities by State and Federal Compliance Safety
and Health Officers**

9.5.1 Unless exclusive Federal jurisdiction is claimed by Federal OSHA,
Center Directors and project managers shall allow both Federal and State
OSHA compliance safety and health officers and investigators to review
and survey contractor operations and investigate contractor mishaps at
NASA Centers.

> *Note: If the State does not have a Department of Labor-approved
> safety plan or the Center is under exclusive Federal jurisdiction,
> only Federal compliance officers shall have the right of access to
> NASA or contractor operations. Further access requirements for OSHA
> and National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health are provided
> in NPR 8715.1, NASA Occupational Safety and Health Programs.*

9.5.2 Center Directors and project managers shall:

a\. Notify the OSMA, the OCHMO, Occupational Health Division, and the
Designated Agency Safety and Health Official (DASHO) of any OSHA
(Federal or State) impending investigations (Requirement).

b\. Provide the results of Federal and State OSHA investigations to the
OSMA, Safety Assurance and Requirements Division, the OCHMO, and the
DASHO (Requirement 32100).

**9.6 Contractor Citations**

9.6.1 Center Directors and project managers shall ensure contractor
organizations are accountable for providing their employees with safe
working conditions regardless of where the employees are working
(Requirement 25072).

> *Note: This provision is required by 5 U.S.C. § 7902; 29 U.S.C. § 651
> et seq.; 49 U.S.C. § 1421, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
> 1970, as amended, and therefore, it is the contractor's responsibility
> to submit a timely reply to any OSHA citation it receives. The
> contractor is responsible for settling citations issued against its
> operation unless specifically addressed in the contract.*

**9.7 Grants**

9.7.1 Project managers that select research projects that could contain
possible safety issues shall:

a\. Identify the need for special safety conditions to be included in
grants or cooperative agreement award documents (Requirement 25073).

> *Note: A \"special safety condition\" addressing safety should be
> included in grants and cooperative agreements when contract
> performance involves NASA facilities, Government-Furnished Equipment,
> or hazardous or energetic materials or chemicals that may pose a
> significant safety or health risk to the public, NASA employees, and
> contractor employees when used.*

b\. Identify special safety conditions that include provisions for
applicable OSHA requirements and host institution and general
industry-accepted practices to be followed during research to eliminate
or control risks associated with implementing the grant or cooperative
agreement (Requirement 32101).

**APPENDIX A: Acronym and Abbreviation List**

AFB Air Force Base

AFOSH Air Force Occupational Safety and Health

AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction

ANSI American National Standards Institute

ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CO Contracting Officer

CoF Construction of Facilities

COTR Contracting Officers Technical Representative

DASHO Designated Agency Safety and Health Official

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

EAV Experimental Aerospace Vehicle

ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle

EM Engineering Memorandum

EO Executive Order

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ESO Explosive Safety Officer

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FED-STD Federal Standard

FHA Facility Hazard Analysis

FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

FOM Facility Operations Manager

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

FSMP Facility Safety Management Plan

GAO Government Accountability Office

GSE Government Supplied Equipment

GSE Ground Servicing/Support Equipment

HOP Hazardous Operating Procedure or Hazardous Operating Permit

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IAOP Inter-Center Aircraft Operations Panel

INSRP Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel

IV&V Independent Verification and Validation

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

KHB Kennedy Handbook

LED Light Emitting Diode

LLIS Lessons Learned Information System

MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet

NAICS North American Industrial Classification System

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA-STD NASA Standard

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NFS NASA FAR Supplement

NFSAM Nuclear Flight Safety Assurance Manager

NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

NPD NASA Policy Directive

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

NSRS NASA Safety Reporting System

NSS NASA Safety Standard

NSTC NASA Safety Training Center

NSTS National Space Transportation System

OCE Office of the Chief Engineer

OCHMO Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer

OEP Operations and Engineering Panel

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSMA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PD/NSC Presidential Directive/National Security Council

PEP Performance Evaluation Profile

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PL Public Law

PM Performance Measure

PMC Program Management Council

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

QASAR Quality and Safety Achievement Recognition

RAC Risk Assessment Code

RADCC Radiological Control Center

RCC Range Commanders Council

SAR Safety Assessment Report, Safety Analysis Report

SAS Safety Analysis Summary

SER Safety Evaluation Report

SEMP Systems Engineering Management Plan

SMA Safety and Mission Assurance

SSP Space Shuttle Program

SSTP System Safety Technical Plan

UL Underwriter Laboratories

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

VPP Voluntary Protection Program

**APPENDIX B. Glossary of Safety and Risk Management Terms**

[Acceptance Testing]{.underline}. Tests to determine that a part,
component, subsystem, or system is capable of meeting performance
requirements over the environmental and operating ranges prescribed in
the specification documents.

[Acceptable Risk]{.underline}. A level of risk, referred to a specific
item, system or activity, that, when evaluated with consideration of its
associated uncertainty, satisfies pre-established risk criteria.

[Accident]{.underline}. A severe perturbation to a mission or program,
usually occurring in the form of a sequence of events, that can cause
safety adverse consequences, in the form of death, injury, occupational
illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the
environment.

[Accident Prevention]{.underline}. Methods and procedures used to
eliminate the causes that could lead to a accident.

[Action Centers]{.underline}. Emergency centers set up by the
appropriate Center official or program official to coordinate all
communications, responses, and other actions for mishaps that have
international, national, or regional implications; high visibility; or
major public interest.

[Aviation Life Support Equipment]{.underline}. Includes helmets, oxygen
masks, parachutes, and survival gear used for aviator safety.

[Applied Load (Stress)]{.underline}. Actual load (stress) imposed on a
system.

[Arming]{.underline}. Bringing a device or system to a state or
condition that will allow its subsequent activation.

[Assessment]{.underline}. Review or audit process, using predetermined
methods, that evaluates hardware, software, procedures, technical and
programmatic documents, and the adequacy of their implementation.

[Assurance.]{.underline} Providing a measure of increased confidence
that applicable requirements, processes, and standards are being
fulfilled.

[Audit]{.underline}. Formal review to assess compliance with hardware or
software requirements, specifications, baselines, safety standards,
procedures, instructions, codes, and contractual and licensing
requirements.

[Availability]{.underline}. Measure of the percentage of time that an
item could be used as intended.

[Biomechanics]{.underline}. Interdisciplinary science (comprising mainly
anthropometry, mechanics, physiology, and engineering) of the mechanical
structure and behavior of biological materials. It concerns primarily
the dimensions and mass properties of body segments.

[Buddy System]{.underline}. An arrangement used when risk of injury is
high, where personnel work in pairs, with one person in the pair
stationed nearby, not directly exposed to the hazard, to serve as an
observer to render assistance if needed.

[Catastrophic]{.underline}. (1) A hazard that could result in a mishap
causing fatal injury to personnel and/or loss of one or more major
elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility. (2) A condition that
may cause death or permanently disabling injury, major system or
facility destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or
vehicle during the mission.

[Certification Test]{.underline}. Test whose objective is to determine
and then certify that system specifications are satisfied or personnel
skills are present.

[Certified Personnel]{.underline}. Personnel who have completed required
training and whose specified knowledge or proficiency in a skill has
been demonstrated and documented.

[Configuration Item]{.underline}. An item that is designated for
configuration management.

[Contractor Safety Plans]{.underline}. Written plans prepared by the
contractor detailing the overall safety program that will cover the
employees, equipment, and facilities used to fulfill the contract.

[Contributing Root Cause]{.underline}. A factor, event, or circumstance
which led, directly or indirectly, to the dominant root cause, or which
contributed to the severity of the mishap.

[Controlled (Risk) Hazard]{.underline}. The likelihood of occurrence or
severity of the associated undesirable event has been reduced to an
acceptable level through the imposition of appropriate, readily
implementable, verifiable controls, resulting in minimal residual risk.

[Credible Condition (Event)]{.underline}. Condition (event) that
reasonably may be anticipated and planned for based on experience with
or analysis of a system.

[Crew Rating]{.underline}. Certifying the incorporation of enhanced
environmental support, reliability, and safety features into the design
and operation of hardware and software essential for the preservation of
life during crewed tests or operations.

[Critical]{.underline}. A condition that may cause severe injury or
occupational illness, or major property damage to facilities, systems,
or flight hardware.

[Critical Lifting Operations]{.underline}. Lifting and lowering
operations involving major programmatic or institutional hardware that
is irreplaceable, or will cause serious program or mission delays if
damaged, or is hazardous to personnel if dropped or uncontrolled, or
will require special budgetary actions to repair damages suffered from
lifting malfunctions.

[Critical Single Failure Point]{.underline}. A single item or element,
essential to the safe functioning of a system or subsystem, whose
failure in a life or mission essential application would cause serious
program or mission delays or be hazardous to personnel.

[Critical Software Command]{.underline}. A command that either removes a
safety inhibit or creates a hazardous condition.

[Design Burst Pressure]{.underline}. Pressure at which an element of a
pressurized system would be expected to burst if it meets the exact
design conditions.

[Design Margin]{.underline}. Percent by which a factor of safety of 1.0
is exceeded or deficient.

[Deviation]{.underline}. An authorization for temporary relief in
advance from a specific requirement, requested during the
formulation/planning/design stages of a program/project operation to
address expected situations. OSHA refers to this as an alternate or
supplemental standard.

[Dominant Root Cause]{.underline}. Along a chain of events leading to a
mishap, the first causal action or failure to act that could have been
controlled systemically either by policy/practice/procedure or
individual adherence to policy/practice/procedure.

[Eliminated Hazard]{.underline}. A hazard that has been eliminated by
completely removing the hazard causal factors.

[Emergency]{.underline}. Unintended circumstance bearing clear and
present danger to personnel or property which requires an immediate
response.

[Exception]{.underline}. An authorization for permanent relief from a
specific requirement and may be requested at any time during the life
cycle of a program/project.

[Exposure]{.underline}. (1) Vulnerability of a population, property, or
other value system to a given activity or hazard; or (2) other measure
of the opportunity for failure or mishap events to occur.

[Facility Hazard Analysis (FHA)]{.underline}. The FHA is a preliminary
hazard analysis performed during the planning and decision phases of a
facility design and acquisition program. It may later be updated to
become the OHA.

[Factor of Safety (Safety Factor)]{.underline}. Ratio of the design
condition to the maximum operating conditions specified during design
(see also Safety Margin and Margin of Safety).

[Fail-Operational]{.underline}. Ability to sustain a failure and retain
full operational capability.

[Fail-Safe]{.underline}. Ability to sustain a failure and retain the
capability to safely terminate or control the operation.

[Failure]{.underline}. Inability of a system, subsystem, component, or
part to perform its required function within specified limits.

[Failure Analysis]{.underline}. A systematic examination of a failed
item or system to identify the failure mode and cause.

[Failure Cause]{.underline}. Physical or chemical process, design
defect, quality defect, or other process that initiates a sequence of
events leading to failure.

[Failure Effect]{.underline}. Consequence of a failure mode on the
operation, function, or status of an item or system.

[Failure Mode]{.underline}. Particular way in which a failure can occur,
independent of the reason for failure.

[Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)]{.underline}. A bottoms-up
systematic, inductive, methodical analysis performed to identify and
document all identifiable failure modes at a prescribed level and to
specify the resultant effect of the modes of failure. It is usually
performed to identify critical single failure points in hardware. In
relation to formal hazard analyses, FMEA is a subsidiary analysis.

[Failure Rate]{.underline}. Number of failures per unit of time or other
measure of opportunity for failures to occur.

[Fault Detection]{.underline}. Process that discovers or is designed to
discover faults.

[Failure Tolerance]{.underline}. Built-in capability of a system to
perform as intended in the presence of specified hardware or software
failures.

[Fault Tree]{.underline}. A schematic representation resembling an
inverted tree that depicts possible sequential events (failures) that
may proceed from discrete credible failures to a single undesired final
event (failure). A fault tree is created retrogressively from the final
event by deductive logic.

[Fault Tree Analysis]{.underline}. An analysis that begins with the
definition or identification of an undesired event (failure). The fault
tree is a symbolic logic diagram showing the cause-effect relationship
between a top undesired event (failure) and one or more contributing
causes. It is a type of logic tree that is developed by deductive logic
from a top undesired event to all sub-events that must occur to cause
it.

[Firmware]{.underline}. Computer programs and data loaded in a class of
memory that cannot be dynamically modified by the computer during
processing.

[Flight Hardware]{.underline}. Hardware designed and fabricated for
ultimate use in a vehicle intended to fly.

[Fracture Mechanics]{.underline}. Engineering methods used to predict
flaw-growth and fracture behavior of materials and structures containing
cracks or crack-like flaws.

[Functional Redundancy]{.underline}. A situation where a dissimilar
device provides safety backup rather than relying on multiple identical
devices.

[Ground Support Equipment]{.underline}. Ground-based equipment used to
store, transport, handle, test, check out, service, and control
aircraft, launch vehicles, spacecraft, or payloads.

[Handlers of Hazardous Material]{.underline}. Individuals who handle but
who do not open or otherwise disturb the integrity of the basic,
properly packaged, shipping container that holds the hazardous material.
As an example, this includes personnel who prepare, package, mark, or
transport hazardous material. Personnel who reduce palletized or
otherwise combined items into smaller increments, without exposing the
hazardous material, are considered handlers.

[Hazard]{.underline}. A state or a set of conditions, internal or
external to a system that has the potential to cause harm.

[Hazard Analysis]{.underline}. Identification and evaluation of existing
and potential hazards and the recommended mitigation for the hazard
sources found.

[Hazard Control]{.underline}. Means of reducing the risk of exposure to
a hazard.

[Hazardous Event]{.underline}. Event that contributes to a hazard.

[Hazardous Material]{.underline}. Defined by law as "a substance or
materials in a quantity and form which may pose an unreasonable risk to
health and safety or property when transported in commerce\" (49 U.S.C §
5102, Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Definitions). The Secretary
of Transportation has developed a list of materials that are hazardous
which may be found in 49 CFR Part 172.101. Typical hazardous materials
are those that may be highly reactive, poisonous, explosive, flammable,
combustible, corrosive, radioactive, produce contamination or pollution
of the environment, or cause adverse health effects or unsafe
conditions.

[Hazardous Operation]{.underline}. Any operation involving material or
equipment that has a high potential to result in loss of life, serious
injury to personnel, or damage to systems, equipment, or facilities.

[Hazardous Operation Safety Certification]{.underline}. Certification
required for personnel who perform those tasks that potentially have an
immediate danger to the individual (death/injury) if not done correctly,
could create a danger to other individuals in the immediate area (death
or injury), and present a danger to the environment.

[High Value]{.underline}. Facilities/equipment valued at 1 million
(\$1,000,000) dollars and above.

[Human Engineering]{.underline}. Area of engineering that applies
scientific knowledge to the design of systems and operations to achieve
effective human-system integration.

[Human Factors Engineering]{.underline}. Area of engineering dealing
with human biomedical and psychosocial characteristics. It includes, but
is not limited to, principles and applications in the areas of human
engineering, personnel selection, training, life-support, job
performance aids, and human performance evaluation.

[Imminent Danger]{.underline}. Condition or practice that could be
reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately
or in the near term. These are classified as Risk Assessment Code (RAC)
1 using the typical NASA risk assessment matrix.

[Independent Inhibit]{.underline}. An inhibit that will continue to
operate independent of other design features.

[Independent Verification and Validation]{.underline}. Test and
evaluation process by an independent third party.

[Inhibit]{.underline}. Design feature that prevents operation of a
function.

[Integrated Hazard Analysis]{.underline}. Comprehensive evaluation of
hazards, taking into account all subsystems and elements that are
included in the overall system being analyzed, including the system, and
operational and environmental envelopes.

[Interface Hazard Analysis]{.underline}. Evaluation of hazards which
cross the interfaces between a specified set of components, elements, or
subsystems.

[Interlock]{.underline}. Hardware or software function that prevents
succeeding operations when specific conditions are satisfied.

[Limit Load]{.underline}. Maximum combination of loads which a structure
is expected to experience in a specified operational environment.

[Margin of Safety]{.underline}. Deviation of the actual (operating)
factor of safety from the specified factor of safety. Can be expressed
as a magnitude or percentage relative to the specified factor of safety.

[Mishap Preparedness and Contingency Plan]{.underline}. Pre-approved
documents outlining timely organizational activities and
responsibilities that must be accomplished in response to emergency,
catastrophic, or potential (but not likely) events encompassing
injuries, loss of life, property damage, or mission failure.

[Mission Assurance]{.underline}. Providing increased confidence that
applicable requirements, processes, and standards for the mission are
being fulfilled.

[Mission Critical]{.underline}. Item or function that must retain its
operational capability to assure no mission failure (i.e., for mission
success).

[Mission Safety Evaluation Report]{.underline}. A formal report for a
specified mission to document the independent safety evaluation of
safety risk factors that represent a change, or potential change, to the
risk baseline of the program.

[Mission Success]{.underline}. Meeting all mission objectives and
requirements for performance and safety.

[NASA Safety Standard (NSS)]{.underline}. A NASA safety document that
requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide for safe employment and places of operation. The
document is promulgated by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance and implemented and enforced by the Center Safety and Mission
Assurance organizations.

[Noncritical Lifting]{.underline}. A lifting operation whose failure or
malfunction (loss of control, dropping a load, or other) would not cause
loss of life, loss of space vehicle, loss of payload, loss of mission
essential hardware, or damage to flight or space hardware.

[Nondestructive Evaluation]{.underline}. Test and inspection methods
used to determine the integrity of equipment that does not involve
destruction of the test object. Examples are ultrasonic, magnetic
particle, eddy current, x-ray, and dye penetrant.

[Nuclear Flight Safety Assurance Manager (NFSAM)]{.underline}. The
person in the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance responsible for
assisting the project offices in meeting the required nuclear launch
safety analysis/evaluation.

[Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)]{.underline}. The
Federal agency which promulgates and enforces workplace safety
regulations and guidance.

[Operability.]{.underline} As applied to a system, subsystem, component,
or device is the capability of performing its specified function(s)
including the capability of performing its related support function(s).

[Operational Safety]{.underline}. That portion of the total NASA safety
program dealing with safety of personnel and equipment during launch
vehicle ground processing, normal industrial and laboratory operations,
use of facilities, special high hazard tests and operations, aviation
operations, use and handling of hazardous materials and chemicals from a
safety viewpoint.

[Oversight/Insight]{.underline}. The transition in NASA from a strict
compliance-oriented style of management to one which empowers line
managers, supervisors, and employees to develop better solutions and
processes.

[Potentially Serious]{.underline}. Condition or practice that could
reasonably be expected to cause injury or illness over the operational
lifetime of the system or process. These are classified as RAC 2 using
the typical NASA risk assessment matrix.

[Precursor]{.underline}. An occurrence of one or more events that have
significant failure or risk implications.

[Pressure Vessel]{.underline}. Any vessel used for the storage or
handling of a fluid under positive pressure. A pressure system is an
assembly of components under pressure; e.g., vessels, piping, valves,
relief devices, pumps, expansion joints, gages.

[Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)]{.underline}. A PRA is a
comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at
identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the
purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance in
the face of uncertainties. PRA assesses risk metrics and associated
uncertainties relating to likelihood and severity of events adverse to
safety or mission.

[Programs]{.underline}. For the purposes of this NPR the term
\"programs\" shall be interpreted to include programs, projects, and
acquisitions.

[Proof Load Test]{.underline}. A load test performed prior to first use,
after major modification of the load path, or at other prescribed times.
This test verifies material strength, construction, and workmanship and
uses a load greater than the rated load.

[Quality]{.underline}. The composite of material attributes including
performance features and characteristics of a product or service to
satisfy a given need.

[Radiological Control Center (RADCC)]{.underline}. A temporary
information clearinghouse established on an as-needed basis to
coordinate actions that could be required for mitigation, response, and
recovery of an incident involving the launching of nuclear material.

[Range Safety]{.underline}. Application of safety policies, principles,
and techniques to ensure the control and containment of flight vehicles
to preclude an impact of the vehicle or its pieces outside of
predetermined boundaries from an abort which could endanger life or
cause property damage. Where the launch range has jurisdiction,
prelaunch preparation is included as a safety responsibility.

[Rated Load Test]{.underline}. A load test performed at predetermined
intervals with a load equal to the rated load.

[Redundancy]{.underline}. Use of more than one independent means to
accomplish a given function.

[Reliability.]{.underline} The probability that a system of hardware,
software, and human elements will function as intended over a specified
period of time under specified environmental conditions.

[Reliability Analysis]{.underline}. An evaluation of reliability of a
system or portion thereof. Such analysis usually employs mathematical
modeling, directly applicable results of tests on system hardware,
estimated reliability figures, and non-statistical engineering estimates
to ensure that all known potential sources of unreliability have been
evaluated.

[Residual Risk]{.underline}. Risk that remains from a hazard after all
mitigation and controls have been applied.

[Risk]{.underline}. The combination of (1) the probability (qualitative
or quantitative) of experiencing an undesired event, (2) the
consequences, impact, or severity that would occur if the undesired
event were to occur and (3) the uncertainties associated with the
probability and consequences.

[Risk Management]{.underline}. An organized, systematic decision-making
process that efficiently identifies, analyzes, plans, tracks, controls,
communicates, and documents risk to increase the likelihood of achieving
project goals.

[Risk (Safety) Assessment]{.underline}. Process of qualitative risk
categorization or quantitative risk (safety) estimation, followed by the
evaluation of risk significance.

[Safe Haven]{.underline}. A location that affords life-saving protection
in the event of a maximum credible event.

[Safety]{.underline}. Freedom from those conditions that can cause
death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or
property, or damage to the environment. In a risk-informed context,
safety is an overall mission and program condition that provides
sufficient assurance that accidents will not result from the mission
execution or program implementation, or, if they occur, their
consequences will be mitigated. This assurance is established by means
of the satisfaction of a combination of deterministic criteria and risk
criteria.

[Safety Analysis]{.underline}. Generic term for a family of analyses,
which includes but is not limited to, preliminary hazard analysis,
system (subsystem) hazard analysis, operating hazard analysis, software
hazard analysis, sneak circuit, and others.

[Safety Analysis Report (SAR)]{.underline}. A safety report of
considerable detail prepared by or for the program detailing the safety
features of a particular nuclear system or source.

[Safety Analysis Summary (SAS)]{.underline}. A brief summary of safety
considerations for minor sources; a safety report of less detail than
the SAR.

[Safety Assistance Visit]{.underline}. Onsite evaluations by specialists
and safety personnel who, after making spot checks and sampling visits
and holding discussions with appropriate levels of management, provide
informal or formal reports to the affected organization.

[Safety Assurance]{.underline}. Providing confidence that acceptable
risk for the safety of personnel, equipment, facilities, and the public
during and from the performance of operations is being achieved.

[Safety Critical]{.underline}. Term describing any condition, event,
operation, process, equipment, or system that could cause or lead to
severe injury, major damage, or mission failure if performed or built
improperly, or allowed to remain uncorrected.

[Safety Critical Function]{.underline}. A system, equipment, or facility
function or process that, by not performing as intended, causes a safety
critical condition or event.

[Safety Critical Item]{.underline}. Single failure point or other
element or item in a life or mission-essential application that, as
determined by the results of failure modes and effects analysis or other
safety analysis, is essential to the safe functioning of a system or
subsystem.

[Safety Device]{.underline}. A device that is part of a system,
subsystem, or equipment that will reduce or make controllable hazards
which cannot be otherwise eliminated through design selection.

[Safety Evaluation Report (SER)]{.underline}. A safety report prepared
by the INSRP detailing the INSRP\'s assessment of the nuclear safety of
a particular source or system based upon INSRP\'s evaluation of the
program-supplied SAR and other pertinent data.

[Safety Margin]{.underline}. Difference between as-built factor of
safety and the ratio of actual operating conditions to the maximum
operating conditions specified during design.

[Safety Oversight]{.underline}. Maintaining functional awareness of
program activities on a real-time basis to ensure risk acceptability.

[Safety Program]{.underline}. The implementation of a formal
comprehensive set of safety procedures, tasks, and activities to meet
safety requirements, goals, and objectives.

[Safeing]{.underline}. Sequence of events necessary to reconfigure a
system to a lower level of risk.

[Serious]{.underline}. When used with \"hazard,\" \"violation,\" or
\"condition,\" denotes there is a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result.

[Significant Root Cause]{.underline}. The major anomalous event
immediately preceding a mishap in the absence of which the mishap would
not have occurred.

[Single Failure Point]{.underline}. An independent element of a system
(hardware, software, or human) the failure of which would result in loss
of objectives, hardware, or crew.

[Sneak Circuit]{.underline}. Unintended system design condition in
electrical circuits or software source code not caused by a failure,
which can inhibit wanted functions or cause unintended functions to
occur through a stimulus, path, or a response relationship.

[Sneak Circuit Analysis]{.underline}. A technique by which the system
safety engineer can identify latent conditions (e.g., electrical,
hydraulic, or other control systems) not caused by component failure
that can inhibit desired functions or cause undesired functions to
occur.

[Software Hazard Analysis]{.underline}. Identification and verification
of adequate software controls and inhibits; and the identification,
analysis, and elimination of discrepancies relating to safety critical
command and control functions.

[Software Safety Critical]{.underline}. Software operations that, if not
performed, performed out of sequence, or performed incorrectly, could
directly or indirectly cause or allow a hazardous condition to exist.

[Supervisor-in-Charge of the Workplace (Establishment)]{.underline}. A
building manager, building operator, facility manager, facility
operations manager, facility engineering head, or other designated
official who normally initiates requests for repairs or maintenance for
a particular building of a facility or area within a facility.

[System Concept Review]{.underline}. A review conducted when sufficient
system functional requirements have been established. Safety verifies
the adequacy of the system requirements definitions, ensures designers
are acquainted with interface technical requirements, reviews design
approaches to be optimized and complete, and evaluates system interfaces
for risks.

[System Safety]{.underline}. Application of engineering and management
principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety and reduce risks
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost
throughout all phases of the system life cycle.

[System Safety Manager]{.underline}. A designated management person who,
qualified by training and/or experience, is responsible to ensure
accomplishment of system safety tasks.

[Users of Hazardous Material]{.underline}. Users are those personnel who
open the incremental hazardous material shipping container, thereby
exposing the material to mix, transfer, burn, freeze, pour, vent, react,
dispose, or otherwise use or alter the material.

[Vacuum System]{.underline}. An assembly of components under vacuum,
including vessels, piping, valves, relief devices, pumps, expansion
joints, gages, and others.

[Vacuum Vessel]{.underline}. A vessel in which the internal pressure has
been reduced to a level less than that of the surrounding atmosphere.

[Validation]{.underline}. (1) An evaluation technique to support or
corroborate safety requirements to ensure necessary functions are
complete and traceable; or (2) the process of evaluating software at the
end of the software development process to ensure compliance with
software requirements.

[Variance]{.underline}. An authorization for temporary relief in advance
from a specific requirement and is requested during the
formulation/planning/design stages of a program/project operation to
address expected situations.

[Verification (Software)]{.underline}. (1) The process of determining
whether the products of a given phase of the software development cycle
fulfill the requirements established during the previous phase (see also
validation); or (2) formal proof of program correctness; or (3) the act
of reviewing, inspecting, testing, checking, auditing, or otherwise
establishing and documenting whether items, processes, services, or
documents conform to specified requirements.

[Waiver]{.underline}. A variance that authorizes departure from a
specific safety requirement where a certain level of risk has been
documented and accepted.

**APPENDIX C. Safety Motivation and Awards Program**

1\. The following awards represent NASA's primary means for recognizing
outstanding safety performance:

a\. [NASA Honor Awards]{.underline}. These awards are approved by the
Administrator and represent the highest honorary recognition bestowed by
NASA. Government and non-Government personnel making significant safety
contributions may be nominated for these awards following the guidelines
provided in NPR 3451.1, NASA Awards and Recognition Program.

b\. [NASA Space Flight Awareness, Flight Safety Award.]{.underline} This
award is managed by the Space Flight Safety Panel in accordance with NPD
1000.3, The NASA Organization, paragraph 6.21. It is bestowed in
recognition of contributions to space flight safety made through design,
device, or practice. The purpose of the award is to acknowledge the
individuals whose personal efforts, above and beyond their job
commitment, result in significant, direct contributions to space flight
safety. The award is given to both individuals and groups. Every
Government and industry employee supporting NASA's human space flight
programs is eligible for this award.

c\. [NASA QASAR Award.]{.underline} QASAR stands for Quality and Safety
Achievement Recognition. The QASAR Award recognizes NASA, other
Government, and prime/subcontractor individuals for significant quality
improvements to products or services for NASA, as well as safety
initiatives within products, programs, processes, and management
activities. NASA Headquarters and each of the Centers have local QASAR
Award programs; annually, the "Best of the Best" in each award category
is chosen for Agency recognition by the Administrator.

d\. [Center Safety Awards.]{.underline} The majority of NASA safety
awards are issued at the local level as part of each Center's overall
safety effort. Safety programs at NASA Centers include an awards
program, designed in accordance with this document, to recognize and
encourage safety in all operations.

2\. NASA safety awards should be properly designed to motivate and
maintain safe behavior. The following principles should be considered
when developing safety awards:

a\. Any award based on competition must be carefully designed to avoid
possible negative aspects. (For example, employees involved in a
competition to reduce on-the job injuries have been known to avoid
seeking medical attention for an injury so that it would not be
reported.)

b\. The safety awards program should be part of the participating safety
program and include all personnel.

c\. The responsible NASA safety organization should clearly define the
purpose of each award, those who are eligible, and the criteria for
selection.

d\. Award presentations and the safety contributions made by award
recipients should be sufficiently publicized to heighten employee safety
awareness and to encourage active employee participation in all efforts
designed to improve safety performance.

e\. Awards should be granted on the basis of merit without regard to
age, color, handicap, marital status, national origin, politics,
participation or non-participation in a labor organization, race,
religion, or sex.

f\. NASA awards for safety excellence should be granted based on
specific published criteria. Nominations should be evaluated against the
individual awards criteria and not against any unwritten standards or
interpretations.

3\. In conjunction with safety awards, NASA safety programs may
distribute items of minimal value to individuals as a means of promoting
safe work practices and heightening safety awareness. The following
apply to the purchase and distribution of safety promotional items:

a\. Procurements made with Federally appropriated funds are subject to
the rulings of the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Safety
promotional items usually are interpreted by GAO as personal gifts, and,
therefore, have not been allowed. It is recommended that
non-appropriated funds be used for the procurement of safety promotional
items whenever possible.

b\. Safety promotional items should be distributed for valid reasons and
shall not be given with such frequency that they lose meaning.

c\. All items shall be clearly identified as NASA safety program items
via printed markings and/or safety logos.

**Appendix D. Activity and Radioactive Material Limits - Basic A~l~
/A~2~ Values**

1\. Determination of A~2~ Mission Multiple.

The A~2~ multiplier for each radioactive source is based upon the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Safety Series Number 6,
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1985 Edition
as amended in 1990, Section III, paragraphs 301 through 306, and summed
to determine the A~2~ mission multiple.

Table I of this Appendix contains the referenced IAEA document section
which tabulates the A~2~ values for specific isotopes and forms of
radioactive material. Except as noted, for radioisotopes whose A~2~
limit in Table I is \"Unlimited\" or is unlisted, the value of
3.7x10^-2^ teraBecquerals (TBq) (1.0 Curies (Ci)) shall be used as the
A~2~ value.

Exceptions are Sm-147, use 9x10^-4^ TBq (0.024 Ci) and Th-232, use
9x10^-5^ TBq (0.0024 Ci) as their respective A~2~ values.

The A~2~ mission multiple shall be determined as follows:

where n represents each source or line on the report in paragraph
5.4.1.2 for each radioactive material on the launch vehicle and
spacecraft.

2\. Values of A~1~ and A~2~ for individual radionuclides, which are the
basis for many activity limits elsewhere in this NPR, are given in Table
I.

*This section has been reproduced with permission of the IAEA.*

DETERMINATION OF A~1~ AND A~2~

3\. For individual radionuclides whose identities are known, but which
are not listed in Table I, the determination of the values of A~1~ and
A~2~ shall require competent authority approval or, for international
transport, multilateral approval. Alternatively, the values of A~1~ and
A~2~ in Table II may be used without obtaining competent authority
approval.

4\. In the calculations of A~1~ and A~2~ for a radionuclide not in Table
I, a single radioactive decay chain in which the radionuclides are
present in their naturally occurring proportions and in which no
daughter nuclide has a half-life either longer than 10 days or longer
than that of the parent nuclide shall be considered as a single
radionuclide, and the activity to be taken into account and the A~1~ or
A~2~ value to be applied shall be those corresponding to the parent
nuclide of that chain. In the case of radioactive decay chains in which
any daughter nuclide has a half-life either longer than 10 days or
greater than that of the parent nuclide, the parent and such daughter
nuclides shall be considered as mixtures of different nuclides.

5\. For mixtures of radionuclides whose identities and respective
activities are known, the following conditions shall apply:

\(a\) For special form radioactive material:

\(b\) For other forms of radioactive material:

where B(i) is the activity of radionuclide i and A~1~(i) and A~2~(i) are
the A~1~ and A~2~ values for radionuclide i, respectively.

TABLE I. A~1~ and A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES

  -------------- ---------------- --------- ------- --------------- ----------
  Symbol of\     Element and\     A~1~      A~l~    A~2~ (TBq)\     A~2~ (Ci)\
  radionuclide   atomic number    (TBq)     (Ci)    (approx. ^a^)   (approx.
                                                                    ^a^)

  ^225^Ac (b)\*\ Actinium (89)    0.6\      10\     1 x 10^-2^2 x   10
  ^227^Ac\                        40\       1000\   10^-1^\         
  ^228^Ac                         0.6       10      2 x 10^-5^5 x   
                                                    10^-4^\         
                                                    0.4             

  ^105^Ag\       Silver (47)      2\        50\     2\              50\
  ^108^Ag^m^\                     0.6\      10\     0.6\            10\
  ^110^Ag^m^\                     0.4\      10\     0.4\            10\
  ^111^Ag                         0.6       10      0.6             10

  ^26^Al         Aluminum (13)    0.4       10      0.4             10

  ^24l^Am\       Americium (95)   2\        50\     2 x 10^-4^5 x   
  ^242^Am^m^\                     2\        50\     10^-3^\         
  ^243^Am                         2         50      2 x 10^-4^5 x   
                                                    10^-3^\         
                                                    2 x 10^-4^5 x   
                                                    10^-3^          

  ^37^Ar\        Argon (18)       40\       1000\   40\             1000\
  ^39^Ar\                         20\       500\    20\             500\
  ^4l^Ar\                         0.6\      10\     0.6\            10\
  ^42^Ar (b)                      0.2       5       0.2             5

  ^72^As\        Arsenic(33)      0.2\      5\      0.2\            5\
  ^73^As\                         40\       1000\   40\             1000\
  ^74^As\                         1\        20\     0.5\            10\
  ^76^As\                         0.2\      5\      0.2\            5\
  ^77^As                          20        500     0.5             10

  ^211^At        Astatine (85)    30        800     2               50
  -------------- ---------------- --------- ------- --------------- ----------

-   Note: (b) indicates a footnote at the end of Table I: this form is
    used to avoid confusion with the superscript m.

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| Symbol  | Element     | A~1~      | A~l~ (Ci) | A~2~      | A~2~   |
| of\     | and\        | (TBq)     |           | (TBq)\    | (Ci)\  |
| radio   | atomic      |           |           | (approx.  | (a     |
| nuclide | number      |           |           | ^a^)      | pprox. |
|         |             |           |           |           | ^a^)   |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Gold (79)   | 6\        | 100\      | 6\        | 100\   |
| 193^Au\ |             | 1\        | 20\       | 1\        | 20\    |
| ^       |             | 10\       | 200\      | 10\       | 200\   |
| 194^Au\ |             | 2\        | 50\       | 2\        | 50\    |
| ^       |             | 3\        | 80\       | 0.5\      | 10\    |
| 195^Au\ |             | 10        | 200       | 0.9       | 20     |
| ^       |             |           |           |           |        |
| 196^Au\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^       |             |           |           |           |        |
| 198^Au\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^199^Au |             |           |           |           |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Barium (56) | 2\        | 50\       | 2\        | 50\    |
| 131^Ba\ |             | 10\       | 200\      | 0.9\      | 20\    |
| ^133    |             | 3\        | 80\       | 3\        | 80\    |
| ^Ba^m^\ |             | 0.4       | 10        | 0.4       | 10     |
| ^       |             |           |           |           |        |
| 133^Ba\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^140^Ba |             |           |           |           |        |
| (b)     |             |           |           |           |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^7^Be\  | Beryllium   | 20\       | 500\      | 20\       | 500\   |
| ^10^Be  | (4)         | 20        | 500       | 0.5       | 10     |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Bismuth     | 0.6\      | 10\       | 0.6\      | 10\    |
| 205^Bi\ | (83)        | 0.3\      | 8\        | 0.3\      | 8\     |
| ^       |             | 0.7\      | 10\       | 0.7\      | 10     |
| 206^Bi\ |             | 0.3\      | 8\        | 3 x       |        |
| ^       |             | 0.6\      | 10\       | 10^-2^8 x | 10\    |
| 207^Bi\ |             | 0.3       | 8         | 10^-1^\   | 8      |
| ^21     |             |           |           | 0.5\      |        |
| 0^Bi^m^ |             |           |           | 0.3\      |        |
| (b)\    |             |           |           | .         |        |
| ^       |             |           |           |           |        |
| 210^Bi\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^212^Bi |             |           |           |           |        |
| (b)     |             |           |           |           |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Berkelium   | 2\        | 50\       | 2 x       |        |
| 247^Bk\ | (97)        | 40        | 1000      | 10^-4^5 x |        |
| ^249^Bk |             |           |           | 10^-3^\   |        |
|         |             |           |           | 8 x       |        |
|         |             |           |           | 10^-2^ 2  |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^76^Br\ | Bromine     | 0.3\      | 8\        | 0.3\      | 8\     |
| ^77^Br\ | (35)        | 3\        | 80\       | 3\        | 80\    |
| ^82^Br  |             | 0.4       | 10        | 0.4       | 10     |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^11^C\  | Carbon (6)  | 1\        | 20\       | 0.5\      | 10\    |
| ^14^C   |             | 40        | 1000      | 2         | 50     |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^41^Ca\ | Calcium     | 40\       | 1000\     | 40\       | 1000\  |
| ^45^Ca\ | (20)        | 40\       | 1000\     | 0.9\      | 20\    |
| ^47^Ca  |             | 0.9       | 20        | 0.5       | 10     |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Cadmium     | 40\       | 1000\     | 1\        | 20     |
| 109^Cd\ | (48)        | 20\       | 500\      | 9 x       |        |
| ^113    |             | 0.3\      | 8\        | 10^-2^ 2\ | 8\     |
| ^Cd^m^\ |             | 4         | 100       | 0.3\      | 10     |
| ^115    |             |           |           | 0.5       |        |
| ^Cd^m^\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^115^Cd |             |           |           |           |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Cerium (58) | 6\        | 100\      | 6\        | 100\   |
| 139^Ce\ |             | 10\       | 200\      | 0.5\      | 10\    |
| ^       |             | 0.6\      | 10\       | 0.5\      | 10\    |
| 141^Ce\ |             | 0.2       | 5         | 0.2       | 5      |
| ^       |             |           |           |           |        |
| 143^Ce\ |             |           |           |           |        |
| ^144^Ce |             |           |           |           |        |
| (b)     |             |           |           |           |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+
| ^       | Californium | 30\       | 800\      | 3 x       |        |
| 248^Cf\ | (98)        | 2\        | 50\       | 10^-3^8 x |        |
| ^       |             | 5\        | 100\      | 10^-2^\   |        |
| 249^Cf\ |             | 2\        | 50\       | 2 x       |        |
| ^       |             | 0.1\      | 2\        | 10^-4^5 x |        |
| 250^Cf\ |             | 40\       | 1000\     | 10^-3^\   |        |
| ^       |             | 3 x       | 6 x       | 5 x       |        |
| 251^Cf\ |             | 10^-3^8 x | 10^-4^1 x | 10^-4^1 x |        |
| ^       |             | 10^-2^    | 10^-2^    | l0^-2^\   |        |
| 252^Cf\ |             |           |           | 2 x       |        |
| ^       |             |           |           | 10^-4^5 x |        |
| 253^Cf\ |             |           |           | 10^-3^\   |        |
| ^254^Cf |             |           |           | 1 x       |        |
|         |             |           |           | 10^-3^2 x |        |
|         |             |           |           | 10^-2^\   |        |
|         |             |           |           | 6 x       |        |
|         |             |           |           | 10^-2^ 1  |        |
+---------+-------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| Symbol    | Element and\  | A~1~   | A~l~ | A~2~ (TBq)\ | A~2~    |
| of\       | atomic number | (TBq)  | (Ci) | (approx.    | (Ci)\   |
| rad       |               |        |      | ^a^)        | (       |
| ionuclide |               |        |      |             | approx. |
|           |               |        |      |             | ^a^)    |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^36^Cl\   | Chlorine (17) | 20\    | 500\ | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^38^Cl    |               | 0.2    | 5    | 0.2         | 5       |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^240^Cm\  | Curium (96)   | 40\    | 1    | 2 x 10^-2^5 | 20      |
| ^241^Cm\  |               | 2\     | 000\ | x 10^-1^\   |         |
| ^242^Cm\  |               | 40\    | 50\  | 0.9\        |         |
| ^243^Cm\  |               | 3\     | 1    | 1 x 10^-2^2 |         |
| ^244^Cm\  |               | 4\     | 000\ | x 10^-1^\   |         |
| ^245^Cm\  |               | 2\     | 80\  | 3 x 10^-4^8 |         |
| ^246^Cm\  |               | 2\     | 100\ | x 10^-3^\   |         |
| ^247^Cm\  |               | 2      | 50\  | 4 x 10^-4^1 |         |
| ^248^Cm   |               |        | 50\  | x 10^-2^\   |         |
|           |               | 4 x    | 50   | 2 x 10^-4^5 |         |
|           |               | 10^-2^ |      | x 10^-3^\   |         |
|           |               | 1      | 5 x  | 2 x 10^-4^5 |         |
|           |               |        | 10   | x 10^-3^\   |         |
|           |               |        | ^-5^ | 2 x 10^-4^5 |         |
|           |               |        |      | x 10^-3^\   |         |
|           |               |        |      | 1 x 10^-3^  |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^55^Co\   | Cobalt (27)   | 0.5\   | 10\  | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^56^Co\   |               | 0.3\   | 8\   | 0.3\        | 8\      |
| ^57^Co\   |               | 8\     | 200\ | 8\          | 200\    |
| ^         |               | 40\    | 1    | 40\         | 1000\   |
| 58^Co^m^\ |               | 1\     | 000\ | 1\          | 20\     |
| ^58^Co\   |               | 0.4    | 20\  | 0.4         | 10      |
| ^60^Co    |               |        | 10   |             |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^5l^Cr    | Chromium (24) | 30     | 800  | 30          | 800     |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^129^Cs\  | Cesium (55)   | 4\     | 100\ | 4\          | 100\    |
| ^131^Cs\  |               | 40\    | 1    | 40\         | 1000\   |
| ^132^Cs\  |               | 1\     | 000\ | 1\          | 20\     |
| ^1        |               | 40\    | 20\  | 9\          | 200\    |
| 34^Cs^m^\ |               | 0.6\   | 1    | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^134^Cs\  |               | 40\    | 000\ | 0.9\        | 20\     |
| ^135^Cs\  |               | 0.5\   | 10\  | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^136^Cs\  |               | 2      | 1    | 0.5         | 10      |
| ^137^Cs   |               |        | 000\ |             |         |
| (b)       |               |        | 10\  |             |         |
|           |               |        | 50   |             |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^64^Cu\   | Copper (29)   | 5\     | 100\ | 0.9\        | 20\     |
| ^67^Cu    |               | 9      | 200  | 0.9         | 20      |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^159^Dy\  | Dysprosium    | 20\    | 500\ | 20\         | 500\    |
| ^165^Dy\  | (66)          | 0.6\   | 10\  | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^166^Dy   |               | 0.3    | 8    | 0.3         | 8       |
| (b)       |               |        |      |             |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^169^Er\  | Erbium (68)   | 40\    | 1    | 0.9\        | 20\     |
| ^171^Er   |               | 0.6    | 000\ | 0.5         | 10      |
|           |               |        | 10   |             |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+
| ^147^Eu\  | Europium (63) | 2\     | 50\  | 2\          | 50\     |
| ^148^Eu\  |               | 0.5\   | 10\  | 0.5\        | 10\     |
| ^149^Eu\  |               | 20\    | 500\ | 20\         | 500\    |
| ^150^Eu\  |               | 0.7\   | 10\  | 0.7\        | 10\     |
| ^1        |               | 0.6\   | 10\  | 0.6\        | 10\     |
| 52^Eu^m^\ |               | 0.9\   | 20\  | 0.9\        | 20\     |
| ^153^Eu\  |               | 0.8\   | 20\  | 0.8\        | 10\     |
| ^154^Eu\  |               | 20\    | 500\ | 2\          | 50\     |
| ^155^Eu\  |               | 0.6    | 10   | 0.5         | 10      |
| ^156^Eu   |               |        |      |             |         |
+-----------+---------------+--------+------+-------------+---------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| Symbol    | Element and\  | A~1~    | A   | A~2~ (TBq)\  | A~2~    |
| of\       | atomic number | (TBq)   | ~l~ | (approx.     | (Ci)\   |
| rad       |               |         | (   | ^a^)         | (       |
| ionuclide |               |         | Ci) |              | approx. |
|           |               |         |     |              | ^a^)    |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^18^F     | Fluorine (9)  | 1       | 20  | 0.5          | 10      |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^52^Fe    | Iron (26)     | 0.2\    | 5\  | 0.2\         | 5\      |
| (b)\      |               | 40\     | 10  | 40\          | 1000\   |
| ^55^Fe\   |               | 0.8\    | 00\ | 0.8\         | 20\     |
| ^59^Fe\   |               | 40      | 20\ | 0.2          | 5       |
| ^60^Fe    |               |         | 1   |              |         |
|           |               |         | 000 |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^67^Ga\   | Gallium (31)  | 6\      | 1   | 6\           | 100\    |
| ^68^Ga\   |               | 0.3\    | 00\ | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| ^72^Ga    |               | 0.4     | 8\  | 0.4          | 10      |
|           |               |         | 10  |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^146^Gd   | Gadolinium    | 0.4\    | 10\ | 0.4\         | 10      |
| (b)\      | (64)          | 3\      | 80\ | 3 x 10^-4^8  |         |
| ^148^Gd\  |               | 10\     | 2   | x 10^-3^\    | 100\    |
| ^153^Gd\  |               | 4       | 00\ | 5\           | 10      |
| ^159^Gd   |               |         | 100 | 0.5          |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^68^Ge    | Germanium     | 0.3\    | 8\  | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| (b)\      | (32)          | 40\     | 10  | 40\          | 1000\   |
| ^71^Ge\   |               | 0.3     | 00\ | 0.3          | 8       |
| ^77^Ge    |               |         | 8   |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^172^Hf   | Hafnium (72)  | 0.5\    | 10\ | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| (b)\      |               | 3\      | 80\ | 3\           | 80\     |
| ^175^Hf\  |               | 2\      | 50\ | 0.9\         | 20      |
| ^18l^Hf\  |               | 4       | 100 | 3 x 10^-2^8  |         |
| ^182^Hf   |               |         |     | x 10^-1^     |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^194^Hg   | Mercury (80)  | 1\      | 20\ | 1\           | 20\     |
| (b)\      |               | 5\      | 1   | 5\           | 100\    |
| ^1        |               | 10\     | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| 95^Hg^m^\ |               | 10\     | 2   | 10\          | 200\    |
| ^1        |               | 4       | 00\ | 0.9          | 20      |
| 97^Hg^m^\ |               |         | 2   |              |         |
| ^197^Hg\  |               |         | 00\ |              |         |
| ^203^Hg   |               |         | 100 |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^163^Ho\  | Holmium (67)  | 40\     | 10  | 40\          | 1000\   |
| ^1        |               | 0.6\    | 00\ | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| 66^Ho^m^\ |               | 0.3     | 10\ | 0.3          | 8       |
| ^166^Ho   |               |         | 8   |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^123^I\   | Iodine (53)   | 6\      | 1   | 6\           | 100\    |
| ^124^I\   |               | 0.9\    | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^125^I\   |               | 20\     | 20\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^126^I\   |               | 2       | 5   | 0.9          | 20      |
| ^129^I\   |               |         | 00\ |              |         |
| ^131^I\   |               | Unl     | 50  | Unlimited\   | 10\     |
| ^132^I\   |               | imited\ |     | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^133^I\   |               | 3\      | 80\ | 0.4\         | 10\     |
| ^134^I\   |               | 0.4\    | 10\ | 0.5\         | 8\      |
| ^135^I    |               | 0.6\    | 10\ | 0.3\         | 10      |
|           |               | 0.3\    | 8\  | 0.5          |         |
|           |               | 0.6     | 10  |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^111^In\  | Indium (49)   | 2\      | 50\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^1        |               | 4\      | 1   | 4\           | 100\    |
| 13^In^m^\ |               | 0.3\    | 00\ | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| ^         |               | 6       | 8\  | 0.9          | 20      |
| 114^In^m^ |               |         | 100 |              |         |
| (b)\      |               |         |     |              |         |
| ^         |               |         |     |              |         |
| 115^In^m^ |               |         |     |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| Symbol  | Element     | A~1~ (TBq) | A~l~ (Ci) | A~2~     | A~2~   |
| of\     | and\        |            |           | (TBq)\   | (Ci)\  |
| radio   | atomic      |            |           | (approx. | (a     |
| nuclide | number      |            |           | ^a^)     | pprox. |
|         |             |            |           |          | ^a^)   |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^       | Iridium     | 10\        | 200\      | 10\      | 200\   |
| 189^Ir\ | (77)        | 0.7\       | 10\       | 0.7\     | 10\    |
| ^       |             | 1\         | 20\       | 0.5\     | 10\    |
| 190^Ir\ |             | 10\        | 200\      | 10\      | 200\   |
| ^       |             | 0.2        | 5         | 0.2      | 5      |
| 192^Ir\ |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^193    |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^Ir^m^\ |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^194^Ir |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^40^K\  | Potassium   | 0.6\       | 10\       | 0.6\     | 10\    |
| ^42^K\  | (19)        | 0.2\       | 5\        | 0.2\     | 5\     |
| ^43^K   |             | 1          | 20        | 0.5      | 10     |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^8l^Kr\ | Krypton     | 40\        | 1000\     | 40\      | 1000\  |
| ^85     | (36)        | 6\         | 100\      | 6\       | 100\   |
| ^Kr^m^\ |             | 20\        | 500\      | 10\      | 200\   |
| ^85^Kr\ |             | 0.2        | 5         | 0.2      | 5      |
| ^87^Kr  |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^       | Lanthanum   | 40\        | 1000\     | 2\       | 50\    |
| 137^La\ | (57)        | 0.4        | 10        | 0.4      | 10     |
| ^140^La |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| LSA     | Low         | activity   | (see      | 131 of   | Doc    |
|         | specific    | material   | p         | Parent   | ument) |
|         |             |            | aragraph. |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^       | Lutetium    | 0.5\       | 10\       | 0.5\     | 10\    |
| 172^Lu\ | (71)        | 8\         | 200\      | 8\       | 200\   |
| ^       |             | 20\        | 500\      | 8\       | 200\   |
| 173^Lu\ |             | 8\         | 200\      | 4\       | 100\   |
| ^174    |             | 30         | 800       | 0.9      | 20     |
| ^Lu^m^\ |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^       |             |            |           |          |        |
| 174^Lu\ |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^177^Lu |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| MFP     | For mixed   | products,  | formula   | mixtures | Table  |
|         | fission     | use        | for       | or       | II     |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^28^Mg  | Magnesium   | 0.2        | 5         | 0.2      | 5      |
| (b)     | (12)        |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^52^Mn\ | Manganese   | 0.3\       | 8         | 0.3\     | 8      |
| ^53^Mn\ | (25)        | Unlimited\ |           | Un       |        |
| ^54^Mn\ |             | 1\         | 20\       | limited\ | 20\    |
| ^56^Mn  |             | 0.2        | 5         | 1\       | 5      |
|         |             |            |           | 0.2      |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^93^Mo\ | Molybdenum  | 40\        | 1000\     | 7\       | 100\   |
| ^99^Mo  | (42)        | 0.6        | 10        | 0.5      | 10     |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^13^N   | Nitrogen    | 0.6        | 10        | 0.5      | 10     |
|         | (7)         |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^22^Na\ | Sodium (11) | 0.5\       | 10\       | 0.5\     | 10\    |
| ^24^Na  |             | 0.2        | 5         | 0.2      | 5      |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^92     | Niobium     | 0.7\       | 10\       | 0.7\     | 10\    |
| ^Nb^m^\ | (41)        | 40\        | 1000\     | 6\       | 10\    |
| ^93     |             | 0.6\       | 10\       | 0.6\     | 10\    |
| ^Nb^m^\ |             | 1\         | 20\       | 1\       | 20\    |
| ^94^Nb\ |             | 0.6        | 10        | 0.5      | 10     |
| ^95^Nb\ |             |            |           |          |        |
| ^97^Nb  |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^       | Neodymium   | 4\         | 100\      | 0.5\     | 10\    |
| 147^Nd\ | (60)        | 0.36       | 10        | 0.5      | 10     |
| ^149^Nd |             |            |           |          |        |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+
| ^59^Ni\ | Nickel (28) | 40\        | 1000\     | 40\      | 1000\  |
| ^63^Ni\ |             | 40\        | 1000\     | 30\      | 800\   |
| ^65^Ni  |             | 0.3        | 8         | 0.3      | 8      |
+---------+-------------+------------+-----------+----------+--------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| Symbol   | Element and\    | A~1~   | A   | A~2~ (TBq)\  | A~2~    |
| of\      | atomic number   | (TBq)  | ~l~ | (approx.     | (Ci)\   |
| radi     |                 |        | (   | ^a^)         | (       |
| onuclide |                 |        | Ci) |              | approx. |
|          |                 |        |     |              | ^a^)    |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^235^Np\ | Neptunium (93)  | 40\    | 10  | 40\          | 1000    |
| ^236^Np\ |                 | 7\     | 00\ | 1 x 10^-3^2  |         |
| ^237^Np\ |                 | 2\     | 1   | x 10^-2^\    | 10      |
| ^239^Np  |                 | 6      | 00\ | 2 x 10^-4^5  |         |
|          |                 |        | 50\ | x 10^-3^\    |         |
|          |                 |        | 100 | 0.5          |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^185^Os\ | Osmium (76)     | 1\     | 20\ | 1\           | 20\     |
| ^19      |                 | 40\    | 10  | 40\          | 1000\   |
| 1^Os^m^\ |                 | 10\    | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^191^Os\ |                 | 0.6\   | 2   | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^193^Os\ |                 | 0.2    | 00\ | 0.2          | 5       |
| ^194^Os  |                 |        | 10\ |              |         |
| (b)      |                 |        | 5   |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^32^P\   | Phosphorus (15) | 0.3\   | 8\  | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| ^33^P    |                 | 40     | 1   | 0.9          | 20      |
|          |                 |        | 000 |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^230^Pa\ | Protactinium    | 2\     | 50\ | 0.1\         | 2\      |
| ^23l^Pa\ | (91)            | 0.6\   | 10\ | 6 x 10^-5^1  | 20      |
| ^233^Pa  |                 | 5      | 100 | x 10^-3^\    |         |
|          |                 |        |     | 0.9          |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^201^Pb\ | Lead (82)       | 1\     | 20\ | 1\           | 20\     |
| ^202^Pb\ |                 | 40\    | 10  | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^203^Pb\ |                 | 3\     | 00\ | 3\           | 80      |
| ^205^Pb\ |                 | Unli   | 80  | Unlimited\   |         |
| ^210^Pb  |                 | mited\ |     | 9 x 10^-3^2  | 8       |
| (b)\     |                 | 0.6\   | 10\ | x 10^-1^ ,\  |         |
| ^212^Pb  |                 | 0.3    | 8   | , .3 , , ,   |         |
| (b)      |                 |        |     |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^103^Pd\ | Palladium (46)  | 40\    | 1   | 40\          | 1000\   |
| ^107^Pd\ |                 | Unli   | 000 | Unlimited\   | 10      |
| ^109^Pd  |                 | mited\ |     | 0.5          |         |
|          |                 | 0.6    | 10  |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^143^Pm\ | Promethium (61) | 3\     | 80\ | 3\           | 80\     |
| ^144^Pm\ |                 | 0.6\   | 10\ | 0.6\         | 10\     |
| ^145^Pm\ |                 | 30\    | 8   | 7\           | 100\    |
| ^147^Pm\ |                 | 40\    | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^14      |                 | 0.5\   | 10  | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| 8^Pm^m^\ |                 | 0.6\   | 00\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^149^Pm\ |                 | 3      | 10\ | 0.5          | 10      |
| ^151^Pm  |                 |        | 10\ |              |         |
|          |                 |        | 80  |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^208^Po\ | Polonium (84)   | 40\    | 10  | 2 x 10^-2^5  |         |
| ^209^Po\ |                 | 40\    | 00\ | x 10^-1^\    |         |
| ^210^Po  |                 | 40     | 10  | 2 x 10^-2^5  |         |
|          |                 |        | 00\ | x 10^-1^\    |         |
|          |                 |        | 1   | 2 x 10^-2^5  |         |
|          |                 |        | 000 | x 10^-1^     |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^142^Pr\ | Praseodymium    | 0.2\   | 5\  | 0.2\         | 5\      |
| ^143^Pr  | (59)            | 4      | 100 | 0.5          | 10      |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^188^Pt  | Platinum (78)   | 0.6\   | 10\ | 0.6\         | 10\     |
| (b)\     |                 | 3\     | 80\ | 3\           | 80\     |
| ^191^Pt\ |                 | 40\    | 10  | 9\           | 200     |
| ^19      |                 | 40\    | 00\ | 40\          | **1000\ |
| 3^Pt^m^\ |                 | 10\    | 10  | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^193^Pt\ |                 | 10\    | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^19      |                 | 20     | 2   | 0.5          | 10**    |
| 5^Pt^m^\ |                 |        | 00\ |              |         |
| ^19      |                 |        | 2   |              |         |
| 7^Pt^m^\ |                 |        | 00\ |              |         |
| ^197^Pt  |                 |        | 500 |              |         |
+----------+-----------------+--------+-----+--------------+---------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| Symbol    | Element and\ | A~1~    | A   | A~2~ (TBq)\  | A~2~    |
| of\       | atomic       | (TBq)   | ~l~ | (approx.     | (Ci)\   |
| rad       | number       |         | (   | ^a^)         | (       |
| ionuclide |              |         | Ci) |              | approx. |
|           |              |         |     |              | ^a^)    |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^236^Pu\  | Plutonium    | 7\      | 1   | 7 x          | 1 x     |
| ^237^Pu\  | (94)         | 20\     | 00\ | 10^-\ 4^\    | 10^-2^\ |
| ^238^Pu\  |              | 2\      | 5   | 20\          | 500     |
| ^239^Pu\  |              | 2\      | 00\ | 2 x 10^-4^5  |         |
| ^240^Pu\  |              | 2\      | 50\ | x 10^-3^\    | 5 x     |
| ^241^Pu\  |              | 40\     | 50\ | 2 x 10^-4^ 5 | 10^-3^  |
| ^242^Pu\  |              | 2\      | 50\ | x 10^-3^\    |         |
| ^244^Pu   |              | 0.3     | 10  | 2 x 10^-4^\  |         |
| (b)       |              |         | 00\ | 1 x 10^-2^2  |         |
|           |              |         | 50\ | x 10^-1^\    |         |
|           |              |         | 8   | 2 x 10^-4^5  |         |
|           |              |         |     | x 10^-3^\    |         |
|           |              |         |     | 2 x 10^-4^5  |         |
|           |              |         |     | x 10^-3^     |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^223^Ra   | Radium (88)  | 0.6\    | 10\ | 3 x 10^-2^8  |         |
| (b)\      |              | 0.3\    | 8\  | x 10^-1^\    |         |
| ^224^Ra   |              | 0.6\    | 10\ | 6 x 10^-2^   |         |
| (b)\      |              | 0.3\    | 8\  | 1\           |         |
| ^225^Ra   |              | 0.6     | 10  | 2 x 10^-2^5  |         |
| (b)\      |              |         |     | x 10^-1^\    |         |
| ^226^Ra   |              |         |     | 2 x 10^-2^5  |         |
| (b)\      |              |         |     | x 10^-1^\    |         |
| ^228^Ra   |              |         |     | 4 x 10^-2^ 1 |         |
| (b)       |              |         |     |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^81^Rb\   | Rubidium     | 2\      | 50\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^83^Rb\   | (37)         | 2\      | 50\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^84^Rb\   |              | 1\      | 20\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^86^Rb\   |              | 0.3\    | 8   | 0.3\         | 8       |
| ^87^Rb\   |              | Unl     |     | Unlimited\   |         |
| Rb        |              | imited\ |     | Unlimited    |         |
| (natural) |              | Un      |     |              |         |
|           |              | limited |     |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^183^Re\  | Rhenium (75) | 5\      | 1   | 5\           | 100\    |
| ^1        |              | 3\      | 00\ | 3\           | 80\     |
| 84^Re^m^\ |              | 1\      | 80\ | 1\           | 20\     |
| ^184^Re\  |              | 4\      | 20\ | 0.5\         | 10      |
| ^186^Re\  |              | Unl     | 100 | Unlimited\   |         |
| ^187^Re\  |              | imited\ |     | 0.2\         | 5\      |
| ^188^Re\  |              | 0.2\    | 5\  | 0.5          | 10      |
| ^189^Re\  |              | 4       | 100 |              |         |
| Re        |              |         |     | Unlimited    |         |
| (natural) |              | Un      |     |              |         |
|           |              | limited |     |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^99^Rh\   | Rhodium (45) | 2\      | 50\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^101^Rh\  |              | 4\      | 1   | 4\           | 100\    |
| ^1        |              | 2\      | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| 02^Rh^m^\ |              | 0.5\    | 50\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^102^Rh\  |              | 40\     | 10\ | 40\          | 1000\   |
| ^1        |              | 10      | 10  | 0.9          | 20      |
| 03^Rh^m^\ |              |         | 00\ |              |         |
| ^105^Rh   |              |         | 200 |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^222^Rn   | Radon (86)   | 0.2     | 5   | 4 x 10^-3^1  |         |
| (b)       |              |         |     | x 10^-1^     |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^97^Ru\   | Ruthenium    | 4\      | 1   | 4\           | 100\    |
| ^103^Ru\  | (44)         | 2\      | 00\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^105^Ru\  |              | 0.6\    | 50\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^106^Ru   |              | 0.2     | 10\ | 0.2          | 5       |
| (b)       |              |         | 5   |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^35^S     | Sulfur (16)  | 40      | 1   | 2            | 50      |
|           |              |         | 000 |              |         |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^122^Sb\  | Antimony     | 0.3\    | 8\  | 0.3\         | 8\      |
| ^124^Sb\  | (51)         | 0.6\    | 10\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^125^Sb\  |              | 2\      | 50\ | 0.9\         | 20\     |
| ^126^Sb   |              | 0.4     | 10  | 0.4          | 10      |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| Symbol | Element and\             | A~1~   | A~l~   | A~2~( | A~2~  |
| of\    | atomic number            | (TBq)  | (Ci)   | TBq)\ | (Ci)\ |
| radion |                          |        |        | (ap   | (ap   |
| uclide |                          |        |        | prox. | prox. |
|        |                          |        |        | ^a^)  | ^a^)  |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^      | Scandium (21)            | 0.5\   | 10\    | 0.5\  | 10\   |
| 44^Sc\ |                          | 0.5\   | 10\    | 0.5\  | 10\   |
| ^      |                          | 9\     | 200\   | 0.9\  | 20\   |
| 46^Sc\ |                          | 0.3    | 8      | 0.3   | 8     |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 47^Sc\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^48^Sc |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| SCO    | Surface                  | contam | o      | 144   | Docu  |
|        |                          | inated | bjects | of    | ment) |
|        |                          |        | (see   | P     |       |
|        |                          |        | parag. | arent |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^      | Selenium (34)            | 3\     | 80\    | 3\    | 80\   |
| 75^Se\ |                          | 40     | 1000   | 2     | 50    |
| ^79^Se |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^      | Silicon (14)             | 0.6\   | 10\    | 0.5\  | 10\   |
| 31^Si\ |                          | 40     | 1000   | 0.2   | 5     |
| ^32^Si |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^1     | Samarium (62)            | 20\    | 500    | 20    | 500\  |
| 45^Sm\ |                          | Unli   |        |       | Unlim |
| ^1     |                          | mited\ | 1000\  | 4\    | ited\ |
| 47^Sm\ |                          | 40\    | 100    | 0.5   | 100\  |
| ^1     |                          | 4      |        |       | 10    |
| 51^Sm\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 153^Sm |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^      | Tin (50)                 | 4\     | 100\   | 4\    | 100\  |
| 113^Sn |                          | 6\     | 100\   | 2\    | 50\   |
| (b)\   |                          | 40\    | 1000\  | 40\   | 1000\ |
| ^117^  |                          | 40\    | 1000\  | 0.9\  | 20\   |
| Sn^m^\ |                          | 0.6\   | 10\    | 0.5\  | 10\   |
| ^119^  |                          | 0.2\   | 5\     | 0.2\  | 5\    |
| Sn^m^\ |                          | 0.3    | 8      | 0.3   | 8     |
| ^121^  |                          |        |        |       |       |
| Sn^m^\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^1     |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 25^Sn\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 126^Sn |                          |        |        |       |       |
| (b)    |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^82^Sr | Strontium (38)           | 0.2\   | 5\     | 0.2\  | 5\    |
| (b)\   |                          | 5\     | 100\   | 5\    | 100\  |
| ^85^   |                          | 2\     | 50\    | 2\    | 50\   |
| Sr^m^\ |                          | 3\     | 80\    | 3\    | 80\   |
| ^      |                          | 0.6\   | 10\    | 0.5\  | 10\   |
| 85^Sr\ |                          | 0.2\   | 5\     | 0.1\  | 2\    |
| ^87^   |                          | 0.3\   | 8\     | 0.3\  | 8\    |
| Sr^m^\ |                          | 0.8    | 5      | 0.5   | 10    |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 89^Sr\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^90^Sr |                          |        |        |       |       |
| (b)\   |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 91^Sr\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^92^Sr |                          |        |        |       |       |
| (b)    |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| T (all | Tritium (1)              | 40     | 1000   | 40    | 1000  |
| forms) |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^1     | Tantalum (73)            | 1\     | 20\    | 1\    | 20\   |
| 78^Ta\ |                          | 30\    | 800\   | 30\   | 800\  |
| ^1     |                          | 0.8    | 20     | 0.5   | 10    |
| 79^Ta\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 182^Ta |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+
| ^1     | Terbium (65)             | 40\    | 1000\  | 10\   | 200\  |
| 57^Tb\ |                          | 1\     | 20\    | 0.7\  | 10\   |
| ^1     |                          | 0.9    | 20     | 0.5   | 10    |
| 58^Tb\ |                          |        |        |       |       |
| ^      |                          |        |        |       |       |
| 160^Tb |                          |        |        |       |       |
+--------+--------------------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| Symbol    | Element and\  | A~1~    | A   | A~2~ (TBq)\  | A~2~    |
| of\       | atomic number | (TBq)   | ~l~ | (approx.     | (Ci)\   |
| rad       |               |         | (   | ^a^)         | (       |
| ionuclide |               |         | Ci) |              | approx. |
|           |               |         |     |              | ^a^)    |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^         | Technetium    | 2\      | 50\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| 95^Tc^m^\ | (43)          | 0.4\    | 10\ | 0.4\         | 10\     |
| ^96^Tc^m^ |               | 0.4\    | 10\ | 0.4\         | 10\     |
| (b)\      |               | 40\     | 1   | 40\          | 1000    |
| ^96^Tc\   |               | Unl     | 000 | Unlimited\   |         |
| ^         |               | imited\ |     | 0.7\         | 10\     |
| 97^Tc^m^\ |               | 0.7\    | 10\ | 8\           | 20\     |
| ^97^Tc\   |               | 8\      | 2   | 0.9          | 20      |
| ^98^Tc\   |               | 40      | 00\ |              |         |
| ^         |               |         | 1   |              |         |
| 99^Tc^m^\ |               |         | 000 |              |         |
| ^99^Tc    |               |         |     |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^118^Te   | Tellurium     | 0.2\    | 5\  | 0.2\         | 5\      |
| (b)\      | (52)          | 5\      | 1   | 5\           | 100\    |
| ^1        |               | 2\      | 00\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| 21^Te^m^\ |               | 7\      | 50\ | 7\           | 100\    |
| ^121^Te\  |               | 30\     | 1   | 9\           | 200\    |
| ^1        |               | 20\     | 00\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| 23^Te^m^\ |               | 20\     | 8   | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^1        |               | 0.6\    | 00\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| 25^Te^m^\ |               | 0.6\    | 5   | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^         |               | 0.7\    | 00\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| 127^Te^m^ |               | 0.4     | 50\ | 0.4          | 10      |
| (b)\      |               |         | 10\ |              |         |
| ^127^Te\  |               |         | 10\ |              |         |
| ^         |               |         | 10\ |              |         |
| 129^Te^m^ |               |         | 10  |              |         |
| (b)\      |               |         |     |              |         |
| ^129^Te\  |               |         |     |              |         |
| ^1        |               |         |     |              |         |
| 31^Te^m^\ |               |         |     |              |         |
| ^132^Te   |               |         |     |              |         |
| (b)       |               |         |     |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^227^Th\  | Thorium (90)  | 9\      | 2   | 1 x 10^-2^2  | 20      |
| ^228^Th   |               | 0.3\    | 00\ | x 10^-1^\    |         |
| (b)\      |               | 0.3\    | 8\  | 4 x 10^-4^1  | 5       |
| ^229Th^\  |               | 2\      | 8\  | x 10^-2^\    |         |
| ^230^Th\  |               | 40      | 50\ | 3 x 10^-5^8  |         |
| ^231^Th\  |               |         | 1   | x 10^-4^\    |         |
| ^232^Th\  |               | Unl     | 000 | 2 x 10^-4^5  |         |
| ^234Th^   |               | imited\ |     | x 10^-3^\    |         |
| (b)\      |               | 0.2\    | 5   | 0.9\         |         |
| Th        |               | Un      |     | Unlimited    |         |
| (natural) |               | limited |     |              |         |
|           |               |         |     | 0.2\         |         |
|           |               |         |     | Unlimited    |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^44^Ti    | Titanium      | 0.5\    | 10\ | 0.2\         | 5\      |
| (b)\      | (22)\         | 0.8\    | 20\ | 0.8\         | 20\     |
| ^200^Ti\  | Thallium (81) | 10\     | 2   | 10\          | 200\    |
| ^201^Ti\  |               | 2\      | 00\ | 2\           | 50\     |
| ^202^Ti\  |               | 4       | 50\ | 0.5          | 10      |
| ^204^Ti   |               |         | 100 |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+
| ^167^Tm\  | Thulium (69)  | 7\      | 1   | 7\           | 100\    |
| ^168^Tm\  |               | 0.8\    | 00\ | 0.8\         | 20\     |
| ^170^Tm\  |               | 4\      | 20\ | 0.5\         | 10\     |
| ^171^Tm   |               | 40      | 1   | 10           | 200     |
|           |               |         | 00\ |              |         |
|           |               |         | 1   |              |         |
|           |               |         | 000 |              |         |
+-----------+---------------+---------+-----+--------------+---------+

TABLE I. A~l~ AND A~2~ VALUES FOR RADIONUCLIDES (Continued)

+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| Symbol of\         | Element   | A~1~   | A~ | A~2~       | A~2~  |
| radionuclide       | and\      | (TBq)  | l~ | (TBq)\     | (Ci)\ |
|                    | atomic    |        | (C | (approx.   | (ap   |
|                    | number    |        | i) | ^a^)       | prox. |
|                    |           |        |    |            | ^a^)  |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^230^U\            | Uranium   | 40\    | 1  | 1 x        |       |
| ^232^U\            | (92)      | 3\     | 00 | 10^-2^2 x  |       |
| ^233^U\            |           | 10\    | 0\ | 10^-1^\    |       |
| ^234^U\            |           | 10\    | 8  | 3 x        |       |
| ^235^U\            |           | Unl    | 0\ | 10^-4^8 x  |       |
| ^236^U\            |           | imited | 20 | 10^-3^\    |       |
| U (natural)\       |           | ^c^\   | 0\ | 1 x        |       |
| U (enriched 5% or  |           | 10\    | 2  | 10^-3^2 x  |       |
| less)\             |           | Unli   | 00 | 10^-2^\    |       |
| U (enriched more   |           | mited\ |    | 1 x        |       |
| than 5%)\          |           | Unli   | 2  | 10^-3^2 x  |       |
| U (depleted)       |           | mited\ | 00 | 10^-2^\    |       |
|                    |           | Unl    |    | Unlimited  |       |
|                    |           | imited | 2  | ^c^\       |       |
|                    |           | ^c^\   | 00 | 1 x        |       |
|                    |           | 10\    |    | 10^-3^2 x  |       |
|                    |           | Unl    |    | 10^-2^\    |       |
|                    |           | imited |    | Unlimited\ |       |
|                    |           |        |    | Unlimited  |       |
|                    |           |        |    | ^d^\       |       |
|                    |           |        |    | Unlimited  |       |
|                    |           |        |    | ^c,d^\     |       |
|                    |           |        |    | 1 x 10^-3^ |       |
|                    |           |        |    | ^d^ 2 x    |       |
|                    |           |        |    | 10^-2^\    |       |
|                    |           |        |    | Unlimited  |       |
|                    |           |        |    | ^d^        |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^48^V\             | Vanadium  | 0.3\   | 8\ | 0.3\       | 8\    |
| ^49^V              | (23)      | 40     | 10 | 40         | 1000  |
|                    |           |        | 00 |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^178^W(b)\         | Tungsten  | 1\     | 2  | 1\         | 20\   |
| ^181^W\            | (74)      | 30\    | 0\ | 30\        | 800\  |
| ^185^W\            |           | 40\    | 80 | 0.9\       | 20\   |
| ^187^W\            |           | 2\     | 0\ | 0.2        | 10\   |
| ^188^W (b)         |           | 0.2    | 1  |            | 5     |
|                    |           |        | 00 |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 5  |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 5  |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^122^Xe (b)\       | Xenon     | 0.2\   | 5\ | 0.2\       | 5\    |
| ^123^Xe\           | (54)      | 0.2\   | 5\ | 0.2\       | 5\    |
| ^127^Xe\           |           | 4\     | 10 | 4\         | 100\  |
| ^131^Xe^m^\        |           | 40\    | 0\ | 40\        | 1000\ |
| ^133^Xe\           |           | 20\    | 1  | 20\        | 500\  |
| ^135^Xe            |           | 4      | 00 | 4          | 100   |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 50 |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 1  |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 00 |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^87^Y\             | Yttrium   | 2\     | 5  | 2\         | 50\   |
| ^88^Y\             | (39)      | 0.4\   | 0\ | 0.4\       | 10\   |
| ^90^Y\             |           | 0.2\   | 1  | 0.2\       | 5\    |
| ^91^Y^m^\          |           | 2\     | 0\ | 2\         | 50\   |
| ^91^Y\             |           | 0.3\   | 5\ | 0.3\       | 8\    |
| ^92^Y\             |           | 0.2\   | 5  | 0.2\       | 5\    |
| ^93^Y              |           | 0.2    | 0\ | 0.2        | 5     |
|                    |           |        | 8\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 5\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 5  |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^l69^Yb\           | Ytterbium | 3\     | 8  | 3\         | 80\   |
| ^175^Yb            | (70)      | 30     | 0\ | 0.9        | 20    |
|                    |           |        | 8  |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 00 |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^65^Zn\            | Zinc (30) | 2\     | 5  | 2\         | 50\   |
| ^69^Zn^m^ (b)\     |           | 2\     | 0\ | 0.5\       | 10\   |
| ^69^Zn             |           | 4      | 5  | 0.5        | 10    |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 1  |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 00 |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+
| ^88^Zr\            | Zirconium | 3\     | 8  | 3\         | 80\   |
| ^93^Zr\            | (40)      | 40\    | 0\ | 0.2\       | 5\    |
| ^95^Zr\            |           | 1\     | 1  | 0.9\       | 20\   |
| ^97^Zr             |           | 0.3    | 00 | 0.3        | 8     |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 2  |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 0\ |            |       |
|                    |           |        | 8  |            |       |
+--------------------+-----------+--------+----+------------+-------+

^a^ The curie values quoted are obtained by rounding down from the TBq
figure after conversion to Ci.

This ensures that the magnitude of A~l~ or A~2~ in Ci is always less
than that in Tbq.

^b^ A~l~ and/or A~2~ value limited by daughter product decay.

^c^ A~l~ and A~2~ are unlimited for radiation control purposes only. For
nuclear criticality safety this material is subject to the control
placed on fissile material.

^d^ These values do not apply to reprocessed uranium.

Alternatively, an A~2~ value for mixtures may be determined as follows:

where f (i) is the fraction of activity of nuclide i in the mixture and
A~2~ (i) is the appropriate A~2~ value for nuclide i.

6\. When the identity of each radionuclide is known but the individual
activities of some of the radionuclides are not known, the radionuclides
may be grouped and the lowest A~1~ or A~2~ value, as appropriate, for
the radionuclides in each group may be used in applying the formulas in
paragraphs 3 - 5. Groups may be based on the total alpha activity and
the total beta/gamma activity when these are known, using the lowest
A~1~ or A~2~ values for the alpha emitters or beta/gamma emitters,
respectively.

7\. For individual radionuclides or for mixtures of radionuclides for
which relevant data are not available, the values shown in Table II
shall be used.

TABLE II. GENERAL VALUES FOR A~1~ AND A~2~

Contents A~1~ A~2~\
TBq (Ci)^a^ TBq (Ci)^a^

Only beta or gamma emitting 0.2 (5) 0.02 (0.5)\
nuclides are known to be present

Alpha emitting nuclides are 0.1 (2) 2 x 10^-5^ (5 x 10^-4^) known to be
present or no relevant data are available

^a^ The curie values quoted in parentheses are approximate values and
are not higher than the TBq values

**Appendix E. Sample Safety and Health Plan for Service or Operations
Contracts**

A detailed Safety and Health Plan is submitted as part of a Service or
Operations contract proposal, showing how the contractor intends to
protect the life, health, and well-being of the public and NASA and
contractor employees as well as property and equipment. The plan should
include detailed discussions of the policies, procedures, and techniques
for all anticipated working conditions that will be encountered
throughout the performance of the contract. The safety and health of
subcontractor employees should be included in the plan for any proposed
subcontract whose value is expected to exceed \$1,000,000 including
commercial services and services provided in support of a commercial
item. An approved Safety and Health Plan will be included as a part of
any resulting contract.

If the contractor will conduct work or be located on a NASA site or in a
NASA facility, the Safety and Health Plan should discuss measures to be
taken to ensure the protection of property, equipment, and the
environment in the production of contractor deliverables and/or in the
pursuit of any of its activities. An approved onsite contractor will
develop and subsequently implement a Safety and Health Program based on
the approved plan that will includes policies and procedures for
compliance with pertinent NASA policies and requirements and Federal,
State and local regulations for safety, health, environmental
protection, and fire protection. The contractor's Safety and Health
Program will be used to assure integration of the onsite contractor as a
full participant in the Center\'s Safety and Health Program.

The proposed Safety and Health Plan should contain the following
information:

CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSED SAFETY AND HEALTH PLAN

1.0 MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION.

1.1 Policy. Provide the contractor\'s corporate safety policy statement.
Compare this policy statement with those of NASA and OSHA and discuss
any differences.

1.2 Goals and Objectives. Describe specific goals and objectives of the
Safety and Health Plan. Discuss these goals and objectives using the
Performance Evaluation Profile (PEP) as safety performance criteria.
Describe the approach (including milestone schedule) to achieve and
maintain level 5 of the PEP in all areas (see contents of PEP).

1.3 Management Leadership. Describe the process and procedures for
implementing management commitments to safety and health through visible
activities and initiatives including the exercise of controls to ensure
workplace safety and health. Include a statement from the project
manager or designated safety official indicating that the plan will be
implemented as approved and that the project manager will take personal
responsibility for its implementation.

1.4 Employee Involvement. Describe procedures to implement and promote
employee (e.g., non-supervisory) involvement in safety and health
program development, implementation, and decision making. Describe the
scope and breadth of employee participation so that all safety and
health risk areas are addressed.

1.5 Assignment of Responsibility. Describe the line and staff
responsibilities for safety and health program implementation. Identify
any other personnel or organizations that provide safety services or
exercises any form of control or assurance in these areas. State the
means of communication and interfaces concerning related issues used by
line, staff, and others (such as documentation, concurrence
requirements, committee structure, sharing of the work site with NASA
and other contractors, or other special responsibilities and support).
As a minimum, the contractor will identify the following:

a\. Safety Representative. Identify, by title, the individual who will
be responsible for the contractor\'s adherence to Center-wide safety,
health, environmental, and fire protection concerns and goals and will
participate in meetings and other activities related to the Center\'s
Safety and Health Program.

b\. Company Physician. Provide the identification of a company physician
to facilitate communication of medical data to the head of the NASA
clinic. The contractor shall identify the point of contact by name,
address, and telephone number to the NASA Center Clinic. Any changes
that occur in the identity of the point of contact will be promptly
conveyed to the NASA Center Clinic.

c\. Building Fire Wardens. Each building occupied by the contractor will
have an assigned individual to facilitate the Center\'s fire safety
program. Duties will include coordination of fire-related issues with
the NASA facility manager, and emergency planning and response officials
and their representatives. Identify the assigned contractor Building
Fire Warden.

d\. Designated Safety Official. Identify, by title, the official(s)
responsible for implementing the proposed Safety and Health Plan.
Identify all formal contacts with regulatory agencies and with NASA.

1.6 Provision of Authority. Compare the provisions and procedures in the
proposed Safety and Health Plan with applicable NASA requirements and
contractual directions and applicable Federal, State, and local
regulations. Identify the lines of authority and responsibility for each
requirement and regulation. Discuss how the subsequent contractor\'s
Safety and Health Program will be controlled to maintain the identified
lines of authority and responsibility for the life of the contract.

1.7 Accountability. Describe the procedures for ensuring that management
and employees will be held accountable for implementing their tasks in a
safe and healthful manner. The use of traditional and/or innovative
personnel management methods (including discipline, motivational
techniques, or any other technique that ensures accountability) should
be referenced, as a minimum, and described as appropriate.

1.8 Program Evaluation. Describe the method to be used for internal
program reviews and evaluations. The program review and evaluation may
consist of either (1) participation in PEP surveys at the request of the
Government or (2) described in a written report that documents the
methods and procedures for determining the existence and criticality of
the contractor\'s hazardous operations.

If the proposed plan provides for internal reviews and evaluations other
than participation in PEP surveys, the submitted report should include,
but not be limited to, methods and procedures for the following:
identification of the contractor\'s hazardous operations and products;
the approach to be used for conducting risk evaluations; the approach to
be used for risk ranking with respect to consequence severity, risk
management techniques to be applied to unacceptable safety risks, and
the documentation of the results. The report should also include an
identification of the personnel who will conduct the reviews and
evaluations, to whom the reports will be made, and the frequency (at
least annually) at which the reviews and evaluations will be performed.
The reviews and evaluations should include subcontracted tasks. The
submitted report should clearly describe the correlation between the
proposed program review and evaluation approach and applicable criteria
of the PEP.

When a written program review and evaluation is requested, it should be
delivered to the Government no later than 30 days after the end of each
contract year or at the end of the contract, whichever is applicable.
Distribution of these program reviews and evaluations will be the same
as that for the Safety and Health Plan. The PEP surveys will be
scheduled and administered at the discretion of the Government.

1.9 The prospective contractor will describe the approach to be taken to
document its safety and health program performance to provide necessary
visibility and insight. This description should include: the
identification, acquisition, and processing of safety and health data;
development of procedures; recordkeeping; statistical analyses including
metrics; and the furnishing of data and reports to the Government.
Electronic access by the Government to this data is preferred as long as
Privacy Act requirements are met and the Government safety and health
professionals and their representatives have full and unimpeded access
for review and audit purposes.

For contractor activities conducted on NASA property, the contractor
will identify what records will be made available to the Government in
accordance with the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) criteria of OSHA
as implemented in \[the local Center\'s\] Requirements Handbook for
Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection, as revised. For the
purpose of this plan, safety and health documentation includes, but is
not limited to, logs, records, minutes, procedures, checklists,
statistics, reports, analyses, notes, or other written or electronic
document which contain in whole or in part any subject matter pertinent
to safety, health, environmental protection, or emergency preparedness.
The contractor will acknowledge the following as a standing request of
the Government to be handled as described below.

a\. Roster of Terminated Employees. NASA expects the contractor to
identify and report terminated employees to the Center occupational
health program office. This report should be sent to the Occupational
Health Officer no later than 30 days after the end of each contract year
or at the end of the contract, whichever is applicable. At the
contractor\'s discretion, the report may be submitted for personnel
changes during the previous year or cumulated for all years.

Information required:

\(1\) Date of report, contractor identity, and contract number.

\(2\) For each person listed: provide name, social security number,
assigned Center badge number, and date of termination.

\(3\) Name, address, and telephone number of contractor representative
to be contacted for questions or other information.

b\. Material Safety Data. Describe the procedure to be used by the
contractor to prepare and/or deliver to NASA, Material Safety Data for
hazardous materials brought onto Government property or included in
products delivered to the Government. These data are required by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation, 29 CFR
Part 1910.1200, Hazard Communication, and Federal Standard 313 (or
FED-STD-313), Material Safety Data, Transportation Data and Disposal
Data for Hazardous Materials Furnished to Government Activities, as
revised. A single copy of each Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) will be
sent upon receipt of the material for use on NASA property to the
Center\'s Central Repository, Mail Code \_\_\_\_. Information on new or
changed locations and/or quantities of hazardous materials normally
stored or used onsite should also be sent to the Center\'s Central
Repository. If the MSDS arrives with the material and is needed for
immediate use, the MSDS should be delivered to the Central Repository by
close of business of the next working day after it enters the site.

c\. Hazardous Materials Inventory. The contractor will be responsible to
compile and report the inventory of all hazardous materials within the
scope of 29 CFR Part 1910.1200, Hazard Communication, and Federal
Standard 313 (or FED-STD-313), Material Safety Data, Transportation Data
and Disposal Data for Hazardous Materials Furnished to Government
Activities, as revised and its located on Government property. The call
for this annual inventory will be issued by the \[responsible NASA
official\], Mail Code or Suite Number \_\_\_\_. The inventor should
contain the following information:

\(1\) The identity of the material.

\(2\) The location of the material onsite by building and room.

\(3\) The quantity of each material normally kept at each location.

1.10 Government Access to Safety and Health Program Documentation. The
contractor shall recognize in its plan that it will be expected to make
all safety and health documentation (including relevant personnel
records) available for inspection or audit at the Government\'s request.

1.11 The contractor may be requested to participate in the review and
modification of safety requirements that are to be implemented by the
Government including any referenced documents therein. This review
activity will be implemented at the direction of the NASA Contracting
Officer\'s Technical Representative in accordance with established NASA
directives and procedures.

1.13 Procurement. Identify procedures used to assure that the
contractor\'s procurements are reviewed for safety considerations and
that specifications contain appropriate safety criteria and
instructions. Set forth authority and responsibility to assure that
safety tasks are clearly stated in subcontracts.

2.0 WORKPLACE ANALYSIS. Describe the method and techniques the
contractor will use to systematically identify the hazards within the
workplace for the duration of the contract. The discussion should
describe the information collection process including a combination of
surveys, analyses, inspections of the workplace, investigations of
mishaps and close calls, and the collection and trend analysis of safety
and health data such as records of occupational injuries and illnesses;
findings and observations from preventive maintenance activities;
reports of spills and inadvertent releases to the environment;
facilities-related incidents related to partial or full loss of systems
functions; and employee reports of hazard.

Every hazard identified by any of the techniques given below shall be
ranked and processed in accordance with Center procedure. All hazards
identified on NASA property that are immediately dangerous to life or
health should be reported immediately to the NASA safety office. All
safety engineering products, which address operations, equipment, and
other aspects of safety engineering, on NASA property will be subject to
the review and concurrence of the NASA Safety Office unless otherwise
specified in the approved safety and health plan. The contractor is
expected to have processes to address similar instances in contractor
facilities utilizing contractor resources to manage such instances.

2.1 Hazard Identification. Describe the procedures and techniques to be
used to compile an inventory of hazards associated with the work to be
performed on this contract. This inventory of hazards shall address the
work specified in the contract as well as the hazards associated with
operations and work environments in close proximity to contract
operations. The hazard inventory results will be reported to the
Government in a manner suitable for inclusion in facilities baseline
documentation as a permanent record. Specific techniques to be
considered include:

a\. Comprehensive Survey. A \"wall-to-wall\" engineering assessment of
the work site including facilities, equipment, processes, and materials
(including waste).

b\. Change Analysis. Address modifications in facilities, equipment,
processes, and materials (including waste); and related procedures for
operations and maintenance. Periodic change analyses will be driven by
new or modified regulatory and NASA requirements.

c\. Hazard Analysis. Address facilities, systems/subsystems, operations,
processes, materials (including waste), and specific tasks or jobs.

2.2 Inspections. This paragraph should include the procedures and
frequency for regular inspections and evaluations of work areas hazards
and who will be accountable for implementing of corrective measures. The
contractor will describe administrative requirements and procedures for
the control of regularly scheduled inspections for fire and explosive
hazards. The contractor has the option, in lieu of the above detail, to
identify policies and procedures with the stipulation that the results
(including findings) of inspections conducted on NASA property or
involving Government furnished equipment will be documented in safety
program evaluations or monthly Accident/Incident Summary reports.
Inspections will identify the following:

a\. Discrepancies between observed conditions and current requirements.

b\. New (not previously identified) or modified hazards.

2.3 Employee Reports of Hazards. The contractor will identify the
methods to be used to encourage employees to report hazardous conditions
(e.g., close calls) and analyze/abate hazards. The contractor will
describe steps to be taken to create reprisal-free employee reporting
with emphasis on management support for employees and describe methods
to be used to incorporate employee insights into hazard abatement
activities.

3.0 MISHAP INVESTIGATION AND RECORD ANALYSIS.

3.1 Mishap Investigation and Reporting. The contractor will identify the
methods to assure that the mishap investigation process includes
reporting both mishap investigation findings and corrective actions to
be implemented to prevent recurrence. The contractor will describe the
methods to be used to investigate and report on NASA property and on
contractor or third party property. The contractor will describe
procedures for implementing the NASA mishap investigation and reporting
forms or use alternate contractor forms with emphasis on the timely
notification of NASA. The contractor discussion should include:
investigation procedures; exercise of jurisdiction over a mishap
investigation involving NASA and other contractor personnel; follow up
of corrective actions; communication of lessons learned to NASA; and
solutions to minimize duplications in reporting and documentation
including use of alternate forms or other solutions. The contractor will
discuss its procedures for the immediate notification of fires,
hazardous materials releases, and other emergencies. The contractor will
include appropriate details to address the use of NASA Form 1627, Mishap
Report (or equivalent), including 24-hour and ten-day mishap reports to
the Occupational Safety Office, Mail Code or Suite Number
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

3.2 Trend Analysis. The contractor will describe the approach to be used
to perform trend analysis of data (occupational injuries and illnesses;
facilities, systems, and equipment performance; maintenance findings;
etc.). The discussion should include methods to identify and abate
common cause failures or occurrences indicated by the trend analysis.
The contractor should discuss the following methods of providing data,
in support of site-wide trend analysis to be performed by the
Government.

a\. Accident/Incident Summary Report. The contractor will describe how
monthly Accident/Incident Summary Reports are prepared and delivered, as
specified on \[specify locally used format\]. All new and open mishaps,
including vehicle accidents, incidents, injuries, fires, and any close
calls will be described in summary form along with their current status.
Negative reports are also required monthly; date due is the 10th day of
the month following each month reported. Reports will be delivered to
the Center Safety Office, Mail Code \_\_\_\_\_.

b\. Log of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses. For each location on or
off NASA property that performs work on this contract, the contractor
will deliver to the Government (under separate contractor\'s cover
letter), a copy of an annual summary of occupational injuries and
illnesses (or equivalent) as described in 29 CFR Part 1904.32, Annual
Summary. If the contractor is exempt by regulation from maintaining and
publishing such logs, equivalent data in the contractor\'s format is
acceptable (such as loss runs from insurance carrier). This data will be
compiled and reported each calendar year and provided to the Government
within 45 days after the end of the year to be reported (e.g., not later
than February 15 of the year following).

4.0 HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROL. Identified hazards must be eliminated
or controlled. In the multiple employer environment of the Center, it is
required that hazards including discrepancies and corrective actions be
recorded in the Center\'s information data system (provide name of
system here) for risk management purposes. Describe the approach to
implementing this requirement.

4.1 Appropriate Controls. Discuss the approach to be used for
considering and selecting controls. Discuss the use of the hazard
reduction precedence sequence. Discuss the approach to be used to
identify and accept any residual risk. Discuss the implementation of
controls including verifying their effectiveness. Discuss the scope of
coverage (hazardous chemicals, equipment, discharges, waste, energies,
or other). Discuss the need for coordination with safety, health,
environmental service, and emergency authorities at NASA.

4.1.1 Hazardous Operations. Establish methods for notifying personnel
when hazardous operations are to be performed and when hazardous
conditions are found to exist during the course of this contract. NASA
policy will serve as a guide for defining, classifying, and prioritizing
hazardous operations. Develop and maintain a list of hazardous
operations to be performed during the life of this contract. The list of
hazardous operations will be provided to the contracting officer as part
of the safety and health plan for review and approval. The contracting
officer and the contractor will decide jointly which operations are to
be considered hazardous, with the contracting officer having final
authority. Before hazardous operations commence, the contractor will
provide a schedule for the development of written hazardous operations
procedures with particular emphasis on identifying the safety steps
required. The contractor may implement this requirement as follows:

a\. Identify contractor policies and procedures for the management and
implementation of hazardous operations procedures together with a
statement that NASA will have access, on request, to any contractor data
necessary to verify implementation; or

b\. In lieu of contractor management and development of such procedures,
identify the method whereby the contractor will identify and submit
hazardous operations procedures to the NASA Occupational Safety Office
for review and approval.

4.1.2 Written Procedures. Provide methods to assure that relevant
hazardous situations and proper controls are identified in documentation
such as inspection procedures, test procedures, and other related
information. Describe methods to assure that written procedures are
developed for all hazardous operations, including testing, maintenance,
repairs, and handling of hazardous materials and hazardous waste.
Procedures will be developed in a format suitable for use as safety
documentation (such as a safety manual) and be readily available to
personnel as required to correctly perform their duties.

4.1.3 Protective Equipment. Describe procedures for obtaining,
inspecting, and maintaining protective equipment, as required, or
reference written procedure pertaining to this subject. Describe methods
for keeping records of such inspections and maintenance programs.

4.1.4 Hazardous Operations Permits. Identify facilities, operations,
and/or tasks where hazardous operations permits will be required as
specified in the Center\'s local requirement. Describe the process to be
used to ensure guidance adherence to established NASA Center procedures.
Clearly state the role of the safety group or function to control such
permits.

a\. Operations Involving Potential Asbestos Exposures. Describe methods
for assuring compliance with the Center\'s Asbestos Control Program as
established in local policy.

b\. Operations Involving Exposures to Toxic or Unhealthful Materials.
Such operations must be evaluated by the NASA Occupational Health Office
and must be properly controlled as advised by same. Describe the process
to be used to notify the NASA Occupational Health Office prior to
initiation of any new or modified operation potentially hazardous to
health and safety.

c\. Operations Involving Hazardous Waste. Identify procedures to be used
to manage hazardous waste from the point of generation through disposal.
Clearly identify divisions of responsibility between contractor and NASA
for hazardous waste generated throughout the life of the contract.
Operations which occur on site must also be evaluated by the Center
environmental services office and must be properly controlled as advised
by same. Describe the process to be used to notify the Center
environmental services office prior to initiation of any new or modified
hazardous waste operation on site.

d\. Operations Involving New or Modified Emissions/Discharges to the
Environment. Describe methods for identifying new or modified
emissions/discharges and coordinating the results with the Center
environmental services office. Discuss procedures to minimize or
eliminate environmental pollution. Address the management of hazardous
materials; substitution of non-hazardous or less hazardous materials for
hazardous materials; proper segregation of hazardous wastes from
non-hazardous wastes; and other methods described by NASA. Emphasis
shall be placed on providing sufficient lead-time for processing permits
through the appropriate State agency and/or the Environmental Protection
Agency.

4.2 Discuss responsibilities for maintaining facility baseline
documentation in accordance with Center requirements. The contractor
will implement any facility baseline documentation tasks (including
safety engineering) as provided in the contractor\'s safety and health
plan approved by NASA or as required by Government direction.

4.3 Preventive Maintenance. Discuss the approach to be used for
preventive maintenance. Describe scope, frequency, and supporting
rationale for the preventive maintenance program including facilities
and/or equipment to be emphasized or de-emphasized. Discuss methods to
promote awareness in the NASA community (such as alerts or safety
flashes) when preventive maintenance reveals design or operational
concerns in facilities and equipment (and related processes where
applicable).

4.4 Medical Program. Discuss the medical surveillance program used to
evaluate personnel and workplace conditions, identify specific health
issues, and prevent degradation of personnel health as a result of
occupational exposures. Discuss the approach for using cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, first aid, and emergency response.

5.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE. Discuss the approach to be used for emergency
preparedness and contingency planning that addresses fire, explosion,
inclement weather, environmental releases, etc. Discuss compliance with
29 CFR Part 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response,
and the role the contractor will play in the local Incident Command
System. Discuss methods to be used for notification of Center emergency
forces including emergency dispatcher, safety hotline, director\'s
safety hotline, or other. Discuss the establishment of pre-planning
strategies through procedures, training, drills, or other. Discuss
methods to verify emergency readiness.

6.0 SAFETY AND HEALTH TRAINING. Describe the contractor\'s training
program including the identification of responsibility for training
employees in safe work practices, hazard recognition, and appropriate
responses (including protective and/or emergency countermeasures).
Address the management techniques used to identify and utilize any
Center training resources (such as asbestos worker
training/certification, hazard communication, confined space entry,
lockout/tagout, or other), as appropriate, with particular emphasis on
programs designed for the multiple employer work environment on NASA
property. Describe the approach to be used for training personnel in the
proper use and care of protective equipment. Discuss tailoring of
training towards specific audiences (management, supervisors, and
employees) and topics (safety orientation for new hires, specific
training for certain tasks or operations). Discuss the approach to
ensure that training is retained and practiced. Discuss personnel
certification programs. Certifications should include documentation that
training requirements have been satisfied and learning validated by one
or more of the following: physical examination, testing, on-the-job
performance, or other. All training materials and training records will
be provided for NASA review upon request.

**Appendix F. Sample System Safety Technical Plan for Systems
Acquisition, Research, and Development Programs**

The NASA program manager (or designee) will publish and maintain an
approved System Safety Technical Plan (SSTP) that includes a risk
management plan, appropriate to and for the life of the program. This
plan may be incorporated in the more comprehensive safety and mission
assurance plan, mission assurance plan, or other plan, provided that the
required data are identifiable and complete.

1\. The SSTP defines the objectives, responsibilities, and methods to be
used for overall safety program conduct and risk management control.
Integration of system/facility safety provisions into the SSTP is vital
to the early implementation and ultimate success of the safety effort.
Inclusion of these provisions in the plan will send an unmistakable
message to all program participants that safety and risk management are
an integral part of the management process and all tasks. The authority
to conduct the safety program must originate in the respective SSTP
governing each NASA program.

2\. The program SSTP will be the vehicle for safety and risk management
task planning. The plan should include detailed task requirements for
each system safety task, as appropriate for the program. The NASA
program organization and system safety relationships and
responsibilities will be described along with reporting channels for
this task. In particular, the plan will show how NASA will manage its
independent safety oversight role. The plan will stipulate the specifics
of the system safety modeling activities and describe what and how
safety adverse consequences will be modeled, how system safety models
(qualitative and probabilistic risk assessments) will be integrated and
applied for risk-informed decision making and safety monitoring, how the
technical team(s) responsible for generating and maintaining system
safety models will interact with the system engineering organizations,
the reporting and approval protocol, and the cost and schedule
associated with accomplishing system safety modeling activities in
relation to the critical or key events during all phases of the life
cycle. It will also address requirements for NASA and contractor
participation in design, safety, and readiness reviews. The program SSTP
should be a compliance document in the request for proposal. Data
requirements for the program SSTP are in the data requirements document.
For a multi-Field Installation program, each Center should provide a
supplement to the plan to ensure compatibility among Field Installation
organizations and the ability to comply with task requirements.

3\. The level of safety directly correlates with management\'s emphasis
on the safety of the system/facility being developed. Proper
identification of the system/facility safety program elements is the
first step towards developing a successful program. Each functional
safety program will have the following basic elements:

a\. Requirement management.

b\. System safety modeling activities (system safety, risk assessment,
uncertainty assessment)

c\. Data collection and analysis activities.

d\. Decision-making process to manage and monitor risk.

e\. Implementation (planning, organization, interface/coordination, and
reporting).

4\. Each of these elements is aligned with an overall approach to risk
evaluation by:

a\. Identifying system/facility safety hazards.

b\. Determining the risk scenarios associated with the hazard.

c\. Assessing the probabilities and consequences associated with the
risk scenarios.

d\. Assessing the uncertainties associated with the probabilities and
consequences.

e\. Determining risk control strategies to either eliminate or control
the safety hazard.

f\. Recommending corrective action or alternatives to the appropriate
management level for a decision to either eliminate the hazard or accept
the risk. Risks acceptance is the responsibility of the program manager.
In all cases, notification of risk acceptance will be communicated to
the next higher authority (see Chapter 2).

g\. Documenting those areas in which a decision has been made to accept
the risk, including the rationale for the risk acceptance.

5\. During the concept development phase, appropriate safety tasks
should be planned that will become the foundation for safety efforts and
risk management efforts during system definition, design, manufacture,
test, and operations.

a\. Identify special safety studies and risk assessments that may be
required during system definition or design.

b\. Estimate gross personnel requirements for the safety program for the
complete system life cycle.

c\. Perform trade studies by using the results of hazard analyses and
risk assessments that identify high hazardous areas or identify high
risk sensitivities, with recommended alternatives.

d\. Establish safety and risk goals and objectives that will be used to
determine the type of safety and risk inputs for the overall program.

> \(1\) The goals should be measurable and state what would be
> accomplished by performing the various safety tasks and risk
> management tasks.
>
> \(2\) The goals should be structured so that safety tasks and risk
> management tasks can be selected to accomplish them.
>
> \(3\) Task results should clearly demonstrate that the goals have been
> met.

e\. Complete hazard analyses and risk assessments to identify
potentially hazardous systems and to develop initial safety requirements
and risk management criteria.

f\. Continuously review hardware procedural requirements and concepts to
maintain an understanding of the evolving system.

g\. Use pertinent historical data from similar systems as input to the
risk assessment and to refine initial evaluations.

**Appendix G. Aviation Safety Panel**

**1. PURPOSE**

1.1 This charter establishes the Aviation Safety Panel and sets forth
its functions, membership, meetings, and duration.

1.2 The Aviation Safety Panel (hereafter referred to as the \"Panel\")
is established to aid the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, in
fulfilling oversight responsibilities for aviation safety.

**2. APPLICABILITY/SCOPE**

This charter applies to NASA Headquarters and all NASA Centers,
including Component Facilities.

**3. AUTHORITY**

42 U.S.C. 247(c)(1), Section 203(c)(1) of The National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, as amended.

**4. FUNCTIONS**

4.1 The Panel will promote NASA aviation safety and advise and assist
the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, in the oversight of operational
aviation safety programs. It will deal with Agency-wide concerns
affecting safety of aviation operations or those that cannot be resolved
at a Center level.

4.2 The Panel will assist the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, in
the development of guidelines and criteria to use in the evaluation of
aviation safety.

**5. MEMBERSHIP**

5.1 The membership of the Panel includes the following:

a\. Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Chair, Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance.

b\. NASA Headquarters Aviation Safety Assurance Manager, Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance.

c\. Aviation Safety Officer from each NASA Center (Aviation Safety
Officer subpanel of the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel).

d\. An Executive Secretary, appointed by the Chair, who will publish
meeting minutes and retain all Panel records, files, and reports.

**6. MEETINGS**

The Panel will meet, via telecon, bimonthly or at the call of the Chair.

**7. DURATION**

The Panel will remain in existence until abolished by the Chief, Safety
and Mission Assurance.

**8. RECORDS**

The Executive Secretary is responsible for the maintenance of this
charter and all other records associated with the Panel.

**Appendix H. NASA Operations and Engineering Panel for Facilities**

**1. PURPOSE**

1.1 This charter establishes the NASA Operations and Engineering Panel
(OEP).

1.2 The OEP evaluates and recommends a consistent and cost-effective
program ensuring the continuing operational integrity and safety of NASA
launch facilities, programmatic operations, and test facilities, such as
wind tunnels and pressure systems.

**2. APPLICABILITY/SCOPE**

This charter is applicable to NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers,
including Component Facilities, and to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) to the extent specified in its contract.

**3. AUTHORITY**

42 U.S.C. 2473(c)(1), Section 203(c)(1) of the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, as amended.

**4. FUNCTIONS**

4.1 The OEP will provide an independent technical engineering and
operational review of specifically selected NASA facilities and facility
operations in support of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the
NASA Mission Directorates, and the NASA Centers, including Component
Facilities. The OEP will produce written evaluations and recommendations
to improve NASA engineering and operations.

4.2 The NASA OEP reviews and assesses the effect of changes in the NASA
facilities engineering and operations infrastructure on the safety and
mission success of NASA programs. In performance of its duties, the OEP
shall do the following:

a\. Support the mission and goals of the NASA Mission Directorates and
functional performance improvement initiatives of the Director,
Facilities and Real Property Division, Office of Infrastructure and
Administration, through technical engineering and safety, reliability,
maintainability, and quality reviews of NASA facilities and operations.

b\. Evaluate and recommend a consistent and reasonable program for
ensuring the operational safety, reliability, and integrity of NASA
facilities within the current environment of declining personnel and
budget resources.

c\. Identify, analyze, communicate, and initiate the resolution of
issues that impact facilities and operations belonging to NASA.

d\. Support incorporation of safety, reliability, maintainability, and
quality assurance disciplines in NASA facilities projects, from
inception through completion.

e\. Evaluate operations and engineering technical support systems
problems and issues, develop innovative solutions and/or methods for
arriving at solutions, and provide recommendations to management in
these areas.

f\. Review for effectiveness the facility configuration management
activities (especially those related to safety).

g\. Assist the Director, Facilities and Real Property Division, in
encouraging the adoption and use of Reliability Centered Maintenance
methodologies to help streamline facilities maintenance programs while
maintaining an acceptable level of safety.

h\. Support the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Director,
Facilities and Real Property Division, on any special assignments
related to facilities, operations, and engineering activities.

i\. Exchange technical expertise and operational experience among key
operating officials throughout the Agency so that lessons learned and
innovative technologies, processes, and techniques are transferred and
applied to promote mission success and to achieve cost effectiveness.

j\. Support incorporation of cost-effective pollution prevention and
sustainable development principles in facilities projects and assure
that operations comply with environmental requirements.

4.3 The OEP will provide a written evaluation, along with any
recommendations for engineering or operational improvements, to the
Associate Administrator, who has Agency-wide institutional
responsibilities, and to the Center Director responsible for the
reviewed facility.

4.4 The OEP Executive Secretary within the Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance will retain all OEP records, files, reports, and meeting
minutes.

4.5 The OEP Chairperson will provide a report on OEP activities to the
Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, at the end of each fiscal year.

4.6 NASA OEP members will communicate and coordinate OEP recommendations
with their respective NASA Centers and the Manager of the NASA
Management Office-Jet Propulsion Laboratory and monitor OEP activities
relating to their facilities.

**5. MEMBERSHIP**

5.1 The OEP will be composed exclusively of full-time NASA employees;
however, non-NASA employees may be invited to participate as advisers or
observers. The OEP will consist of a Chairperson, an Executive
Secretary, and members.

5.2 The members of the OEP will be appointed as follows:

a\. The Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, will serve as an ex officio
member of the OEP and will appoint the Chairperson, Executive Secretary,
and one representative from the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance,
Review and Assessment Division.

b\. The Assistant Administrator for Infrastructure and Administration
will appoint one representative for Facilities Engineering and one
representative for Environmental Management.

c\. The Mission Directorates will each appoint one representative.

d\. The Center Directors will each appoint one representative.

e\. Manager of the NASA Management Office-Jet Propulsion Laboratory will
appoint one representative.

f\. Manager of the Wallops Flight Facility will appoint one
representative.

g\. Manager of the White Sands Test Facility will appoint one
representative.

5.3 The OEP may establish such subpanels and subgroups as the
Chairperson considers necessary.

5.4 The NASA General Counsel and Chief Engineer, or their designees,
will act as permanent advisors to the OEP. The Chairperson may appoint
additional advisors and invite observers on a permanent or temporary
basis.

**6. MEETINGS**

The OEP will meet at the call of the Chairperson in support of the
Associate Administrator. The OEP may also meet at the request of the
Center Director of the facility to be reviewed or at the request of the
Director, Facilities and Real Property Division.

**7. DURATION**

The Panel will remain in existence until abolished by the Chief, Safety
and Mission Assurance.

**8. RECORDS**

The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance is responsible for the
maintenance of this charter and all other records associated with the
OEP.

[^1]: NASA defines mishap as "An unplanned event that results in at
    least one of the following: Injury to NASA personnel, caused by NASA
    operations; Injury to non-NASA personnel, caused by NASA operations;
    Damage to public or private property (including foreign property),
    caused by NASA operations or NASA funded development or research
    projects; Occupational injury or occupational illness to NASA
    personnel; Destruction of, or damage to, NASA property except for a
    malfunction or failure of component parts that are normally subject
    to fair wear and tear."

[^2]: For example, the presence of fuel vapor in the crew module of a
    spacecraft is a hazard. Another example is the inoperability of the
    fire detection system.

[^3]: For example, just having a toxic chemical in a tank constitutes a
    hazard because of the intrinsic toxicity property of the chemical.

[^4]: S. Kaplan and B.J. Garrick, "On the Quantitative Definition of
    Risk," Risk Analysis, 1, 11-27, 1981.

[^5]: The frequency estimate for each postulated accident scenario must
    account for the length of time during which the accident can
    possibly occur. This duration is often referred to as "exposure
    time" or "time at risk."

[^6]: The broad definition is "freedom from those conditions that can
    cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of
    equipment or property, or damage to the environment." In the context
    of risk-informed decision making, safety can be considered as an
    overall mission and program condition that provides sufficient
    assurance that accidents will not result from the mission execution
    or program implementation, or, if they occur, their consequences
    will be mitigated. This assurance is established by means of the
    satisfaction of a combination of deterministic requirements and risk
    criteria.

[^7]: The term "local public" refers to the population in the vicinity
    of a site for a NASA operation but not directly associated with the
    operation.

[^8]: "Uncertainty" is a broad and general term used to describe an
    imperfect state of knowledge or a variability resulting from a
    variety of factors including, but not limited to, lack of knowledge,
    applicability of information, physical variation, randomness or
    stochastic behavior, indeterminacy, judgment, and approximation.
    Uncertainty is generally classified into two broad categories or
    types: epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic
    uncertainty is that uncertainty associated with incompleteness in
    the analyst's (or analysts') state of knowledge. Aleatory
    uncertainty is that uncertainty associated with variation or
    stochastic behavior in physical properties or physical
    characteristics of the system being addressed.

[^9]: In the above, "RISK" denotes risk with uncertainty, which is an
    inherent part of risk.

[^10]: Decision making is the process of selecting \"the most
    preferential (according to predetermined rules) choice" from a
    number of available choices. Each choice represents a decision
    alternative.

[^11]: Probabilistic risk assessments are used to systematically develop
    the set of risk triplets discussed earlier. Probabilities, magnitude
    of consequences, and associated uncertainties are evaluated using
    various analytical models (including reliability and availability
    models) and all available evidence, which includes physics, past
    experience, and expert judgment.

[^12]: Details on the analytic-deliberative decision-making process are
    given in the National Research Council's report "Understanding Risk:
    Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society," National Academy
    Press, Washington, DC, 1996.

[^13]: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
    defines metric as a quantitative measure of the degree to which a
    system, component, or process possesses a given attribute.

[^14]: These objectives must be *fundamental* objectives; i.e.,
    objectives that the decision maker fundamentally cares about.

[^15]: The PMs (adverse consequences), in general, are not valued
    equally by the decision maker.

[^16]: For example, during the formulation phase, an order-of-magnitude
    or bounding assessment may be performed. In this type of assessment,
    the probability and/or the magnitude of consequence is approximated
    or bounded instead of deriving a best-estimate. These assessments
    are useful for screening purposes and initial risk tradeoff studies.

[^17]: A precursor is an occurrence of one or more events that have
    significant failure or risk implications.

[^18]: Closure of a hazard condition or other safety issue is the
    demonstration that all safety requirements expressly formulated to
    address the condition or issue have been satisfied.

[^19]: Residual risk is the level of risk that remains present after
    applicable safety-related requirements have been satisfied. In a
    risk-informed context, such requirements may include measures and
    provisions intended to reduce risk from above to below a defined
    acceptable level.

[^20]: Safety requirements include both deterministic and risk-informed
    requirements. A deterministic safety requirement is the qualitative
    or quantitative definition of a threshold of action or performance
    that must be met by a mission-related design item, system, or
    activity in order for that item, system, or activity to be
    acceptably safe. A risk-informed requirement is a safety requirement
    that has been established, at least in part, on the basis of the
    consideration of a safety-related risk metric and its associated
    uncertainty.