**International Constraints and Indigenous Strengths**

**in Preventive Development**

# Jonathan Moore

I agree with Brady Anderson's guidance that "USAID's development policy
and portfolio include integrated interventions aimed at addressing the
effects of underlying social, economic and political problems." My point
of departure is that the only real prevention of conflict is root cause
development, and that this cannot be separated from ---but is closely
connected to and part of---the crucial stage of post-conflict mitigation
and rebuilding efforts. I will attempt to consider the implications for
this proposition in three parts: the international "outside"
perspective; the outlook from "inside" the crisis country; and where,
broadly, combining these two points of view brings us.

# I

There are several identifiable challenges in the current post-war
international environment which require changes by the international
community in order for it to provide effective development assistance to
mitigate or prevent conflict.

First, it must be recognized that the task of assisting unstable
developing states, whether "failed" or not, whether vulnerable to or
already damaged by conflict, is almost unimaginably huge. The successful
"encouragement of indigenous development of institutions and processes
to help societies change in peaceful ways," quoting from Dr. Lute's
paper, is as awesome an objective as it is admirable. But, the problem
is we pretend otherwise---partly out of reality denial, partly because
we know we are unable to respond proportionally, and partly to be able
to sustain hopefulness---and thereby reduce our characterization of the
magnitude and complexity of the problem to the approximate level of the
various assets we are capable of devoting to the task: political will
and support, money, troops, time. This is by nature distorting, inflates
expectations, won't work, and results in recrimination.

Second, the fundamental definition of self-interest on the part of the
strongest, richest, most active members of the international community
must expand, or deepen, so as to encompass the kind of phenomena we are
considering here. It is not now sufficiently inclusive as to include
limiting the implications of conflict in susceptible nations. Such a
sense of essential connectedness or the lack thereof will to a great
degree dictate the eventual outcome of our efforts here. My own opinion
is that perceiving the gap in the world between the haves and the
have-nots as directly compromising our own needs is an essential element
of an enriched conception of national interest, and that less
squeamishness in inserting our ideals into the definition of our
livelihood so as to recognize these urgent problems beyond our borders
is also required. In any event, the prospect of such a strengthened
concept of national interests is daunting.

Third, the international actors, whether acting multilaterally or
bilaterally, tend not to adjust their own notions and designs enough to
be consistent with the particulars on the ground---the culture,
capabilities and evolution extant in the afflicted country. In the need
to achieve the right balance, roles and chemistry in the mutually
reinforcing relationships desirable between the "outside" offerings and
the "inside" realities, much more emphasis must be given the latter. In
seeking a redemptive mix between what we want and what works for them,
indeed recognizing that our programs are marginal rather than
determining, we must do a better job of matching in their direction. For
instance, the external players need to compromise on their preferences
for fast democracy and early exit. I believe that democratization cannot
be seriously undertaken without large amounts of social and economic
development, and the patience and time for both to happen, and this goes
against our grain.

Fourth, the current priorities of the major international actors place
development assistance of any variety, whether transitional or
longer-term, last behind political, humanitarian and security efforts.
These other priorities should be designed and carried out so as to
support development efforts, but aren't. As I've indicated,
developmental assistance must be interpreted, translated,
operationalized into post-conflict peace-building. This also means that
humanitarian operations, transitional development assistance and
longer-term development programs need to be carefully synchronized---
there is too much natural overlap and interaction for them to be pursued
in isolation from one another, let alone with the pernicious disdain or
worse which too much reflect their relationships now. Finally,
development must be integral, organic, competitive within U.S. foreign
policy in the situations we are considering here, rather than a
rhetorical ornament or afterthought, if we are to deal with them
seriously.

# II

In order to portray the outlook from "inside" the crisis countries in
question to help define a good way for us to work in unstable
post-conflict transitions, I am going to use illustratively the War-Torn
Societies Project. WSP (now WSP-International) was founded in Geneva by
Matthias Stiefel about five years ago for the express purpose of
providing post-conflict rehabilitation assistance in a feasible manner
expressly oriented to the needs and capacities of the indigenous actors.
It believed that existing mandates relating mostly to natural disasters,
refugee flows and conflicts between states and the traditional
mechanisms available to carry them out were insufficient to deal with
the dynamics of poor, conflict-prone, often ethnically stricken
countries struggling for recovery, stability and progress. It has set up
programs operating since in Mozambique, Eritrea, Guatemala and Somalia.
It receives political and financial support from a number of donor
states and U.N. agencies.

The essential methodology of this U.N.-linked NGO is to support the
creation and working of a process of local participatory
priority-setting, consensus-building, and program-designing including
all the stakeholders of rehabilitation programs. A collective mechanism
seeks to achieve the collaborative contributions of the national or
regional government, civil society, former adversaries, victims and
victimizers, ethnic groups and others. It has a major action research
component to provide relevant data, analysis and substantive expertise
for the collaborative decision-making effort. Representatives of the
international donor community in the country are kept fully informed and
have active in-put to this process, but do not sit at the table. The
government representatives do not dominate. The leaders of the process
and its staff are all indigenous. If this works, the outcome is not only
concrete rehabilitation undertakings with the necessary political
support for implementation already built-in, but real progress toward
reconciliation and democratization.

In summary, WSP-I thus attempts to serve as a catalyst to get a process
started in figuring out how to be a viable nation state. Its essential
principles are: to deal pragmatically and programmatically with
particular local needs by creating a neutral space for the active
engagement of participants from all aspects of society, and to assure
the partnership and support of international actors in such a way that
they will not pre-empt. This methodology requires adaptability, mutual
respect and trust, evocation rather than imposition, lean international
staff, close observation, timely funding, and the withdrawal of WSP-I
when the process has taken hold except for on-call assistance at the
request of a local successor body.

## III

In bringing together these two outlooks---"outside" international and
"inside" indigenous -- in order to learn more about working to help in
unstable conflict-related situations what do we find, what do we face?
Trouble.

The main problem, in my opinion, is that the kind of changes in
commitment, motivation and performance indicated as necessary in my
comments concerning the international community are not going to happen
significantly in the foreseeable future. If this speculation is true,
then what do we do?

First, we keep trying as best we can, without breaking our picks or our
hearts, to bring over time the desired outside changes to come about.
But, second, we do not act in the meantime as if they surely will, let
alone that they already have. Third, of course we should press the new
policies which we are now learning are valuable toward programs in, and
relationships with, the indigenous conditions, actors and assets inside
the recipient countries in need.

But our overall mode should express its devotion with some caution and
deliberation, not trying to force too much too soon in the way of
radical policy change or structural bureaucratic revision. This isn't
defeatist, and it is smart. A lot of time can be wasted and wheels spun
to no avail, with immediate opportunities missed. Here, the political
constraints and the bureaucratic stubbornness can be ferocious; from
working over time in the U.S. government and the U.N., I know. In the
field, even if we have a new model which is right doesn't mean it will
work; and the implementation is all that counts. We need to avoid
getting out ahead of ourselves, ahead even of what David Hamburg
characterizes as the human condition, even as we try to elevate it. As
we push forward, we need to respect what exists, the limitations of our
assumed knowledge and the presumption of our power, and the incredible
complexity involved---not just at the same time pursuing our ideals but
in order that they survive. We've got to effect the change we want by
building on rather than renouncing, pursuing real, not concocted
opportunities, taking advantage of existing momentum to advance the
progress we want.

An advantage of not trying to do too much too fast and not inflating
expectations for ourselves and others---being more effectively resolute
by practicing greater realism and honesty---is that then the message is
conveyed more credibly to the local actors that they cannot rely on us
to do very much and that they must do the job themselves, to get their
own act together. The outside-inside equilibrium in this respect could
benefit.

I agree with the statement in Mr. Pherson's paper that success will
depend on how quickly and effectively specific questions concerning
resources and mechanics such as the ones he identifies can be answered,
although I believe it will depend even more on what degree the major
shareholders inhibit their own drives, cultures and politics. Among the
new choices which can be made, a critical one is to get more
attention---and that includes resources---given to the transition phase
which follows conflict and the intense injection of emergency
humanitarian relief. Too much emphasis on preventive development through
more conventional longer-term assistance leaves a big gap.

Finally, what are the three most needed commodities in our new paradigm?
William James made a good start when he identified the three most
important human qualities as: kindness, kindness, kindness. When we were
trying to get WSP underway we thought of three more: process, process,
process. But, here, in the context of today's deliberation are yet three
others: time, time, time.