"Embedded Technologies to Secure the Supply Chain from End-to-End"

Dr. Bahar Barami, Senior Economist (<Barami@volpe.dot.gov>)
617-494-2150, Volpe Center, SOLE 2004 Norfolk, VA, September 2, 2004

The juxtaposition of "embedded technologies" and "securing the supply
chain" in the title of this paper evokes an intrinsic contradiction. You
would ask: isn't supply chain management the domain of the private
sector? Wouldn't securing it through embedded technologies conjure up
sinister images of the Big Brother with hidden surveillance cameras and
monitoring devices? This arbitrary distinction between supply chain
management and homeland security is widely held. It perpetuates a model
of the world built around decision-making stovepipes; a world where
security is the domain of the public sector, and supply chain management
that of the private sector.

In this paper I suggest that in today's complex global economy, where
uncertainty is the norm, security and supply chain efficiencies are so
inexorably intertwined that it is no longer defensible to stovepipe
strategies into separate spheres of public and private. The seemingly
opposing forces of "market" and "governmental" interests represent only
different points on a risk spectrum that spans across order and chaos;
efficient supply chain logistics and disruptive catastrophic events.
Along this spectrum, public and private entities operate with different
priorities, but not divergent goals. Security and supply chain
objectives alike need to be firmly codified in the business and
governmental processes.

I suggest that because of the intertwined nature of the supply-chain and
homeland security objectives, investing in embedded dual-use
surveillance and tracking technologies is a better approach to managing
uncertainty. Embedded technologies have fewer inefficiencies than the
"bolted on" fixes commonly employed, though they still pose many
intractable challenges. The key challenges of promoting the concept
relate to three fundamental tradeoffs: costs, privacy, and
centralization of control. By addressing these key issues we can reframe
many pivotal technology deployment challenges, and attempt to integrate
the seemingly divergent objectives and priorities of the private and
public decision makers.

First let's begin by asking what we mean by "embedded." It is hoped that
it would not evoke notions such as an embedded reporter in the
battlefield, an embedded software application, or an intelligent agent.
Although in its common usage the concept is associated with a
design-based infusion of technologies in the infrastructure, or with a
virtual embedding of algorithms and autonomous response capabilities,
this is not the concept I have in mind. Nor do I use the concept as a
method of replacing the regulatory structure with tax breaks and
investment incentives. This last connotation is how some technology
analysts may have interpreted the statement of the Deputy Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Gordon England, when he called
for using "embedded economic incentives as a stimulant to encourage
homeland security measures." According to this view, "embedded
incentives" would be seen as "market-based" processes -- rather than
"regulatory requirements" -- that would "help private companies and
local government agencies to develop methodologies....and obtain the
most effective counter-terrorism technologies."[^1] This incentive model
is not very different from the models used in the past two decades to
relax the prevailing command-and-control regulatory requirements. But a
tax-based incentive model is not the approach I find needed to reframe
the way we deploy technologies.

A more visionary concept of the embedded security may have been
suggested by Deputy Secretary England when he likened it to the infusion
of total quality management (TQM) in the U.S. auto manufacturing
industry, observing that: "People talk about the number of containers we
inspect, and you're left with the impression that if you're successful,
you'd be inspecting 100% of the containers. But the reality is, if
you're very successful, you don't inspect any of them... It is like
inspecting quality into a car. You are not going to do it. If you are
successful in containers, you would know what's in each one, it would be
sealed, and you would know where it was delivered....you'll inspect none
of the containers."[^2] This latter vision of embedded security is more
in line with what I have in mind about a set of processes and
technologies that are fully encoded and integrated into the strategies
we pursue to sustain the nation's critical infrastructure and ensure the
competitiveness of the supply chains.

I propose a definition of "embedded security" as a strategy based on a
systemic restructuring of security in all processes, designs, rules of
operation, and related regulations. The concept would signify structural
changes in how security countermeasures are codified and implemented.
Embedded technologies viewed in this way could potentially transform how
we manage our supply chains and secure our infrastructures. The concept
-- and the concomitant technologies and processes -- would be gradually
encoded in the fabric of the nation's critical infrastructure assets.

With over 70% of the nation's infrastructure assets in private
ownership, the intersection of the public interests and private assets
is vast. If public entities own only about a third of the critical
infrastructure assets, how do we deal with the spillover effects of
security threats into the private arena? What resources need to be
available to the private sector to manage and protect the assets valued
at over \$7 trillion? Who should pay for them? What are the limits of
the private rights and public interests? How much technology is enough?
Can we successfully resolve the conundrum of the public interests and
private rights by codifying new approaches to technology deployment in
the laws and processes governing them and embedding them in the physical
infrastructure?

Much of the physical embedding of the technologies has already happened.
But it has happened haphazardly and in an *ad hoc* fashion. Reframing
the issues would help address the process more systematically.

First, let's examine how the private sector manages its infrastructure
and supply chains. Supply Chain Management has been defined as: "A set
of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers,
manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced
and distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, and at
the right time, in order to minimize system-wide costs while satisfying
service level requirements." [^3] Logistics managers have similarly
formulated the best ways to optimize the processes and operations. [^4]
These accepted definitions closely echo the military models for managing
logistic flows from "*factory to the foxhole"* and from "*fort to
port."* The concerns of the civilian supply chain manager for
*in-transit visibility* of the supplies -- from "the shipper's loading
dock to the customer door" -- are no different from the concerns of our
homeland security agents who monitor the flows of containerize cargo
across international borders.

What are the technologies that help supply chain managers track their
supply flows to ensure cargo integrity and on-time delivery, and
validate the accuracy of the information?

Today's enterprise logistics management and its associated techniques --
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Sense and Respond (SAR) adaptive
enterprise models, pull logistics, collaborative manufacturing
alliances, etc. -- use an array of advanced technologies and software to
reduce inventory control costs, increase the speed of supply movements,
and improve service and customer response. ERP is essentially about
asset visibility and agile response: managers want to know the
where/when/what/how much involved in the processing and distribution of
the materials and assets. With the mantra of *faster, better, cheaper*
--borrowed from our defense strategists of a couple of decades ago --
our supply-chain logistics managers are using technology to automate the
functions relating to the capture of information on cargo and inventory.
They have deployed a panoply of "bolted-on," but often not "embedded,"
technologies -- computerized databases and information, communications
and sensing systems equipped with radio frequency identification (RFID),
GPS and other sensors -- to track shipments, manage inventory, and
locate assets and cargo in-transit. These technologies, along with
"intelligent adaptive" software systems for demand forecasts, have
allowed ERP managers to avoid risks of unpredictable shortages,
bottlenecks, and oversupplies. As one analyst has put it, ERP managers
have essentially created a system that serves an "uncertainty
absorption" function. [^5]

The ERP technology most commonly associated with end-to-end supply
tracking is RFID. With a current market size of about \$1 billion -- for
a system that includes transponder tags, and networked readers and data
processing systems -- RFID application areas are expected to grow at 20%
percent per year in the near future. Until recently, the application
areas were limited to tagging cargo containers and conveyances for
inventory control and asset identification. As the price of a tag drops
-- from \$5-\$10 a few years ago to less than \$1 today -- RFID is
likely to replace barcode for supply chain tracking. In June 2003,
Wal-Mart announced it would require its top 100 suppliers to install
RFID in the goods sent to its distribution centers starting in January
2005. A few months later, Sun Microsystems, Inc. announced that it would
open an RFID test center where Wal-Mart suppliers could test their RFID
solutions to guarantee compliance with the Wal-Mart standards. Also, at
the beginning of 2003, Gillette Inc., announced the purchase of 500
million RFID tags from Alien Technology, saying that it planned to use
the tags with the "smart shelf" technology for pilferage prevention as
well as inventory control. However, because of the latest market
fluctuations (and the privacy concerns discussed below,) Wal-Mart had to
scale down its 2003 plans, announcing that the 2005 U.S. initiative
would be launched within a limited Texas market.

Pervasive Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications in our
highways and vehicles have also contributed to today's
technology-intensive infrastructures. With congressionally authorized
spending of over \$600 million in the past five years, the US DOT has
deployed technologies that range in application from traffic congestion
monitoring to electronic license plate readers and toll systems.
Tracking the deployment of integrated ITS technologies in 78 of the
largest metropolitan areas shows that some 90% of the emergency
management vehicles in these metropolitan areas are under computer-aided
dispatch; some 85% of the fixed-route transit vehicles are equipped with
automatic vehicle location (AVL); some 81% of the toll collection lanes
have electronic toll collection (ETC) capability; and some 70% of the
signalized intersections are under centralized or closed loop
control.[^6]

The vast ITS network of sensors and communications devices installed
today is used almost exclusively for traffic management, safety, and
emergency response functions. However, there are some potentially
significant applications of ITS technologies for security, including the
use of the existing instrumented infrastructure for preventing disasters
and responding to emergencies. Researchers at the University of
California at Davis have created an Intelligent Vehicle Infrastructure
(IVI) that utilizes the region's extensive ITS-enabled
vehicle-road-driver "system of systems." Among the devices developed at
the university are the "Smart Loop," a signal that identifies exact
attributes of a vehicle, complementing the video cameras for tracking a
vehicle, and a "Video Image Processing" system for identifying potential
threats to the infrastructure. By using these ITS-based devices,
UC-Davis has been able to integrate security with the regional traffic
management operations and track the vehicles crossing the U.S-Mexico
border. [^7]

Many of today's supply chain technologies are either dual-use or driven
by the military logistics goals. For instance, in September 2003, DOD
announced that it will require its suppliers to put passive RFID tags on
the lowest possible shipping element operationally feasible -- whether
product/part or case and pallet -- by January 2005. Other dual-use
technology markets that were formerly limited to military applications
are also growing rapidly. The total market for Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellites used as navigation devices for locating and tracking
assets is estimated at \$16 billion, though the split among commercial,
military, and consumer-product uses is not known. Portable Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are another security technology likely to emerge
as a major commercial market. These remote--controlled drones the size
of a model airplane are essentially aerial robots capable of carrying
out missions autonomously without human command or intervention.
Increasingly, UAVs are capable of flying longer missions, carrying more
sensors, and collecting more data. While full-size UAVs have been in
military use for decades, the portable ones -- small enough to fit into
a briefcase and snapped together in five minutes -- are relatively new
and have a wide appeal among civilian users, for both private uses and
public security purposes. Workplace identification and biometric devices
-- initially developed for access control to military and government
facilities -- are also growing rapidly in civilian and commercial
applications and are estimated at about \$1 billion in size.

These technology growth trends suggest a sustained process of embedding
an array of tracking and surveillance technologies in the nation's
critical infrastructure. These same technologies helped galvanize the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the 1970s, with the deployment
of advanced satellite, radar, and computing technologies that
transformed the global war-fighting capability away from nuclear to
advanced missile technology. The three underlying capabilities of the
RMA -- precision, remote deployment of firepower, and advanced computing
-- are the underpinnings of today's security and supply chain
technologies.

The growing proliferation of these embedded technologies has to a large
extent blurred the lines between the public and the private. When
tallying the nation's security expenditures, we see that a growing
segment of the outlays are made by the private sector. But we have not
begun to fully sort out the public and private sources of these outlays.
By one estimate, the total homeland security outlays -- by federal,
state, local, and private entities -- have grown from \$5 billion in
2000, to between \$85 billion to over \$100 billion in 2004. The same
source forecasts that homeland security outlays are likely to grow as
high as \$210 billion by 2010. [^8]

Another factor further fueling the blurring of the public-private line
has been the recent reversal in the direction of the flow of dual-use
technologies between the military and civilian sectors. After the end of
the Cold War, strategies for cutting defense spending led to concerted
efforts to lower procurement and supply costs by using commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) products for military use. Today, the trend is in
the opposite direction. Competitive pressures on private companies to
cut costs have led to a major shift in the private sector attitude
towards military technologies, says the manager of the Montana State
University TechLink Center in charge of facilitating technology
exchanges between the DOD and the private sector. He points out that
many firms have concluded that adopting devices developed by the
military can be cheaper than developing them in house, a shift in part
driven by the fact that the products have already passed many demanding
performance tests. [^9]

Two factors have been contributing to the rapid growth in the markets
for supply chain tracking and surveillance technologies: plummeting
prices and fusion capabilities.

Plummeting prices is the most immediate factor contributing to a growing
embedding of tracking technologies. RFID tag prices have dropped to as
low as \$0.50 or \$0.10 a piece. As prices have come down, both
commercial and government security applications have grown. Security
applications for RFID in the public arena have grown partly because
lower tag prices have enabled ports, airports, and transit agencies to
track objects and vehicles that pose a potential security threat. This
trend is illustrated by the large number of airports across the country
that have begun deploying RFID for tracking passenger baggage. McCarran
International Airport in Las Vegas, for example, announced in November
2003 that it was conducting tests on some 20 million tags expected to be
put to use per year, at a cost of \$0.20 per tag. In biometrics as well,
where products were first used for access control and personnel
screening at government facilities and for security of computer
networks, prices have declined and commercial application areas are
growing. As prices for biometric devices have declined, new markets have
also developed. For example, introduction of inexpensive standardized
components such as DSPs (digital signal processors) used with many
biometric devices has stimulated demand for biometrics and helped with
its growing market penetration in the civilian markets.

A second factor galvanizing the growth of tracking and surveillance
technologies has been the development of capabilities that fuse the
forces of information technology with those of nanotechnology,
biotechnology, and robotics. Cutting edge developments in nano- and
bio-tech and in artificial intelligence have not only created new
opportunities for the growth of tracking and surveillance operations,
but have also stimulated new applications in fusion of RFID, making it
even more pervasive:

-   Fusion of robotic devices with RFID, GPS and other sensors has
    allowed robots today to perform hazardous tasks and conduct security
    sweeps in addition to many other civilian dual-use operations. A
    robot can effectively replace human operators by automating or
    augmenting the human tasks which are "dangerous, difficult, dull, or
    demeaning," as the director of the General Robotics, Automation,
    Sensing and Perception Lab at the University of Pennsylvania has
    described it. [^10] Consider a commonly used robotic crawler,
    equipped with wide angle zoom cameras, sensors, and Pentium 3
    processor brains connected to an Ethernet hub, that is capable of
    operating autonomously from a distance and relay intelligence to the
    local command center. Recently, several of these radio-controlled
    robots -- equipped with chemical-agent detectors, GPS and digital
    compasses, were dispatched to search for WMD in Iraq and transmit
    radio signals back to the command center.

-   Application of artificial intelligence to the design of
    security-embedded infrastructures is another facet of today's
    emerging technology-fusion capabilities. At Sandia National
    Laboratories, researchers have developed Intelligent Robust
    Infrastructure Systems (IRIS) in an effort to build infrastructures
    that "are aware, actively adapt, preserve their function, and
    protect their users." IRIS relies on tools that develop intelligent
    systems, fusing them with real-time bio-detectors, and a wide-band
    intelligent sensor Web. These networks of sensors can be built
    around buildings and infrastructures, or around a region covered
    with an information web of ubiquitous sensors, resulting in a system
    of buildings or even cities that are instrumented to make them
    interconnected, and able to share information and help with
    decision-making, adaptation and response. [^11]

-   Developments in nanotechnology have also helped with proliferation
    of embedded sensors and tracking technologies. Advances in
    deployment of cheap, reliable, and low power micro-electronics have
    allowed cameras, processors, and power supplies to be installed in a
    wide array of civilian and defense-related applications.
    Applications of multiple sensors in Video Surveillance and
    Monitoring (VSAM), for instance, take advantage of these
    nano-devices. Variations in VSAM applications have resulted in the
    development of a "Forest of Sensors" at the MIT Artificial
    Intelligence lab. The trees in the Forest of Sensors are small
    disposable autonomous vision modules (dVAM) currently being tested
    in security applications for performing surveillance and making
    critical visual observations from locations too dangerous for
    personnel. [^12]

-   Fusion of bio-tech sensors and nano devices has given rise to a host
    of technologies such as ZigBee that foretell potentially radical
    structural changes in how technologies are embedded. ZigBee is a
    technology that coordinates communications among thousands of tiny
    sensors that can detect and transmit information about motion, heat,
    chemical composition and particle content. It puts under a single
    standardized control interface an array of infra-red remote control
    devises, so that they can interconnect into a network, with
    protocols based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standards. ZigBee offers the
    potential to unify methods of data communication for sensors,
    actuators, appliances, and asset tracking devices. "Smart Dust" is
    one application of these nano sensors, allowing the construction of
    a reliable and affordable network backbone that uses much lower
    power and bandwidth than average sensors, with longer battery life
    and lower cost, offering immense opportunities for a wide array of
    applications in security as well as household and supply-chains.
    [^13]

Finally, how do we reframe the issues and challenges? How can we go from
"bolted-on" to embedded technologies?

I suggest that the concept of a "layered defense in depth" can serve as
a unifying framework for examining the opportunities offered by the
emerging nano-, bio-, and robotics technologies to develop integrated
networks. These enabling technologies, when fully integrated and
embedded in the critical infrastructure, could potentially secure the
homeland as well as the supply chains. The defense in depth is a useful
concept for incorporating multiple levels of embedded interventions that
overlay the chain of disruptive events at multiple points and reduce the
probability of a single-point failure. It would involve the strategic
application of risk-driven countermeasures through the deployment of
multiple technologies for sensing and detecting. The concept has been
explored at George Washington University by a group of researchers who
have formulated a framework for managing the risks of a maritime attack
at a port. Such a framework would call for security to be incorporated
in the evolution of each subsystem within a port, emphasizing that to
build security into a nation's ports and waterways retroactively, the
system would have to go beyond protecting assets. Instead, it would
identify the extent to which the subsystems have been driven solely by
economic efficiency, and instigate systemic interventions to correct for
the imbalance. [^14]

A layered system of defense-in-depth offers a useful framework for
deployment of embedded dual-use technologies to support private
supply-chain activities and, in addition, help create robust, resilient,
and survivable infrastructures that would withstand severe disruptions.
The concepts of "robust" and "resilient" infrastructures are often used
together in reference to design-basis security provisions that are
integrated with transportation and logistics operations, and add to the
hardiness of the infrastructure and ability to resume service after a
disruptive event. Researchers at the Institute for Civil Infrastructure
Systems (ICIS), New York University, are investigating the elements of a
resilient infrastructure, including the concept of "structure
monitoring," which creates a system for "sensing" the relevant
structures through the use of built-in fiber-optic sensors. The sensors
monitor the facilities' structural changes to see if the structure is
deteriorating or how it could respond to adverse events. [^15] The
concept can unify the panoply of technology applications -- forests of
sensors, "smart dust" networks, etc. -- that are currently in use to
prevent potentially counterproductive outcomes when deployment decisions
are made ad hoc and without integration.

Do the technologies and processes reviewed in this paper have the
potential to be fully embedded and codified in the fabric of the
nation's critical infrastructure assets? Is RFID -- or any other
combination of dual-use bio- or nano-tech technologies used for
supply-chain and security -- poised to be a ubiquitous technology,
embedded in the infrastructure from end-to-end? Regardless of whether
any of the technologies will dominate -- and perhaps it is still too
early at this point to speculate on any -- we need to address three key
challenge:

-   One challenge has to do with making the "business case" for RFID or
    any other tracking technology. The business users of RFID have
    acknowledged the benefits at the operational level but have failed
    to make a business case for the "network level" application
    benefits. The benefits from deployment of dual use and supply-chain
    specific technologies have been undeniable. The private supply chain
    managers have made a business case for investment in RFID and ERP
    systems by quantifying the operational efficiency benefits from
    deploying the ERP technologies: lower labor cost and greater speed
    and accuracy of shipment processing and inventory control. The
    supply chain managers have also benefited from greater visibility of
    the supplies that have allowed better forecasting capability, and
    have reduced both downstream fluctuations in manufacturing suppliers
    and upstream demand volatility. [^16] But how can a business case be
    made for an investment when the benefits are not necessarily
    captured by the firm alone, but rather accrue to the users external
    to the firm, to the network as a whole, or to the society?

> Compounding the difficulty of the network-level benefit capture is
> that it has not been clear to many ERP managers that such vast amounts
> of information are needed for managing supply flows.[^17] Further
> complicating the balance of costs and benefits is that the full
> benefits of network connectivity may be harder to realize because the
> data ownership issues have prevented complete data sharing. Because
> assessing the broad-based benefits is more difficult than the firm
> level benefits, network level benefits are often undervalued.
> Conversely, assessing the direct, internal costs is a lot easier than
> calculating the external costs. Consequently, external costs --
> security threats, environmental costs, congestion costs, etc. -- are
> likely to be underestimated. Unless we understand what the full costs
> and benefits of these technologies are, we won't have a clear idea of
> where these capabilities will take us. Without a good framework for
> assessing the costs and benefits, we're going to fall prey to either
> out of control spending -- because of the exaggerated benefit
> estimates -- or decide on a total rejection of all new technologies
> because of irrational fears about their disruptive effects.

-   The second challenge has to do with privacy concerns, but in a
    broader sense it also relates to how we assess the benefits and
    costs of a technology. The privacy issue is at the core of the
    tradeoffs we have to weigh when evaluating the feasibility of
    deploying any advanced technology system. Assessing the full impact
    of the loss of individual rights is pivotal to any technology
    evaluation. An impact assessment should balance the public security
    interests against privacy rights of the citizens. Privacy concerns
    are likely to further complicate the assessment of embedded
    technologies for two other reasons: they could impede the free flow
    of data and inter-sector information-sharing; and further curtail
    the willingness of firms to deploy such technologies or join the
    network.

> Concerns about privacy have already cast doubts about the extent to
> which RFID will be used at the product level, as illustrated by the
> case of the Italian clothing producer, Benetton. Early in 2003,
> Benetton hired Philips Semiconductor to tag a complete line of its
> clothing at more that 5,000 stores globally. Philips had planned to
> ship 15 million chips for use in labels to be attached to clothing
> during manufacture. The tagged items would be placed in shipping boxes
> that would also be tagged. By doing this, Benetton wanted to be able
> to track the clothes from the point of manufacture to sale. As it was
> originally designed, the chips would remain active even after the
> clothes were sold, so that the returns could be tracked. Overall
> efficiency would also increase since the inventory control would be
> done remotely, and the individual scanning of the items would not be
> needed. The project was discontinued after a flood of protest and
> consumer boycotts driven by fears that the movements of the wearer of
> the clothes would be tracked permanently.
>
> Extreme suspicions of the adverse effects of surveillance technologies
> conjure up doomsday scenarios -- "nanobots" and autonomous robots run
> amok, and spy gadgets built into our clothes, buildings, and
> ultimately in our brains. These fears are counterproductive. Rather
> than make us more adept at evaluating the consequences of any
> technology, they would prevent us from objective and dispassionate
> evaluation of their impacts.

-   The third challenge has to do with the growing complexity and
    centralization of the critical infrastructure components. To the
    extent that the increased technology intensity of the
    infrastructures can lead to a greater reliance on large and
    centralized networks, the system vulnerability to cascading failures
    could potentially grow. Researchers in resilient infrastructures
    have found that reducing reliance on large networks, and building
    more distributed networks and matrix systems, can create
    infrastructure systems with a potential for less severe disruption.
    Greater reliance on distributed technologies, greater use of
    alternative sources of energy and solar power, and a move towards
    less intensive land-use are steps that are likely to make urban
    infrastructures relatively less vulnerable to disruption. Advances
    in nano technologies suggest that one way to address this potential
    problem would be to develop distributed energy production and
    communications systems that are portable, close to the users, and
    capable of autonomous operation. [^18]

To conclude, I'd like to close with a reference to the "environmental
model" for embedded technologies. The sea change in the U.S. corporate
approach to responding to environmental regulations suggests that the
model has to a large extent been effective in embedding the issue of
external costs into our business culture. It has not been perfect, but
the change has gone to the core of how we include air quality and
environmental considerations into the business decision-making, guiding
business activities at points extending from production centers to
distribution networks -- from "cradle to grave." A solid legal framework
to enforce a set of regulatory requirements, open technology standards,
and technology investment incentives driven by business processes and
not tax advantages, have helped embed, though admittedly imperfectly,
environmental costs into our business calculus. Security has the
potential to be codified in the fabric of business logistics on the
basis of a similar model.

**End Notes**

[^1]: Molly Peterson, "Homeland official foresees security embedded in
    "fabric of society," *National Journal's Technology Daily,* April
    23, 2003, [www.GovExec.com](http://www.GovExec.com/)

[^2]: "Security Becomes Embedded," Business Week On Line, April 28,
    2003.

[^3]: David Simchi-Levi, Philip Kaminsky, Edith Simchi-Levi, "Designing
    and Managing the Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies, and Case
    Studies, Irwin McGraw Hill, 2000.

[^4]: The Council of Logistics Management has defined logistics as: "The
    process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient,
    cost effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process
    inventory, finished goods, and related information from
    point-of-origin to point-of-consumption for the purpose of
    conforming to customer requirements."

[^5]: Edmund W. Schuster, et. al, "The Prospects for Improving ERP Data
    Quality Using Auto-ID", Paper to be published in The Cutter Journal:
    Information Technology and their Pursuit of Quality, 2004.

[^6]: ITS Joint Program Office, Tracking the Deployment of the
    Integrated Metropolitan Intelligent Transportation Systems
    Infrastructure in the USA: FY 2000 Results, July 2001.

[^7]: Ahmed Benouar, Center for ITS Commercialization, University of
    California, TRB presentation, January 15, 2002.

[^8]: Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC), 2003. "Homeland
    Security Industry -- Trends." [www.hsrc.biz](http://www.hsrc.biz/)

[^9]: Business Week, "War, Technology's Proving Ground,"
    [http://www.BusinessWeekOnline.com](http://www.BusinessWeekOnline.com/),
    April 9, 2003.

[^10]: *Robotics Trends*, September 06 and September 12, 2003. "Vender
    Spotlight -- Security & Defense."

[^11]: Gerold Yonas, "Some Thoughts on the War on Terrorism," Advanced
    Concepts Groups, Sandia National Labs, Presentation at MIT, February
    11, 2002.

[^12]: See MIT's web site for Forest of Sensors,
    <http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/vsam/>

[^13]: See "Home networking with ZigBee, April 20, 2004,
    [http://www.embedded.com](http://www.embedded.com/)

[^14]: John Harrald, Hugh Stephenes, Johann Rene vanDort, "A Framework
    for Sustainable Port Security," Journal of Homeland Security and
    Emergency Management, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2004.

[^15]: Rae Zimmerman, "Building Resilient Infrastructure to Combat
    Terrorism: Lessons from September 11," Lecture at MIT's Technology
    and Policy Program and Engineering Systems Division, November 14,
    2002.

[^16]: Larry Lapide, "RFID: What's in it for the Forecaster?". *The
    Journal of Business Forecasting*, Summer, 2004.

[^17]: Professor Yossi Sheffi, "RFID and the Innovation Cycle," MIT
    Center for Transportation and Logistics, April 2004.

[^18]: Rae Zimmerman, Op. Cit.