Guide for All-Hazard

**Emergency Operations Planning**

[State and Local Guide (101)]{.smallcaps}

# [Chapter 6]{.smallcaps}

# [Attachment G \-- Terrorism]{.smallcaps}

## Federal Emergency Management Agency

**April 2001**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

###  [Page]{.underline}

A. PURPOSE 6-G-3

B. THE HAZARD 6-G-3

1\. Nature of the Hazard 6-G-3

2\. Hazard Agents 6-G-5

3\. Potential Targets 6-G-8

4\. Release Area 6-G-8

C. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 6-G-9

1\. Situation 6-G-9

2\. Assumptions 6-G-9

D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 6-G-11

1\. Direction and Control 6-G-11

2\. Communications 6-G-14

3\. Warning 6-G-14

4\. Emergency Public Information 6-G-14

5\. Protective Actions 6-G-15

6\. Mass Care 6-G-15

7\. Health and Medical 6-G-16

8\. Resources Management 6-G-16

E. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES 6-G-16

1\. Local Emergency Responders 6-G-16

2\. Interjurisdictional Responsibilities 6-G-17

3\. State Emergency Responders 6-G-17

4\. Local Emergency Planning Committees, State Emergency Response\
Commissions, and Tribal Emergency Response Commissions 6-G-17

5\. Federal Emergency Responders 6-G-17

F. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 6-G-18

**FIGURE**

1\. Coordination Relationships in Terrorism Incident Response 6-G-13

**TABLES**

1\. General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use 6-G-5

2\. General Indicators of Possible Biological Agent Use 6-G-6

3\. General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological Agent Use
6-G-7

4\. Suggested Emergency Operations Plan Elements 6-G-10

5\. Responses to a WMD Incident and the Participants Involved 6-G-12

### TABS

###  [Page]{.underline}

A. Suggested Format for a Terrorist Incident Appendix to a Basic

All-Hazards Emergency Plan 6-G-A-1

B. Federal Departments and Agencies: Counterterrorism‑Specific Roles
6-G-B-1

C. Hotlines and Online Resources 6-G-C-1

D. Incident Indications and First Responder Concerns 6-G-D-1

E. Potential Areas of Vulnerability 6-G-E-1

F. Definitions 6-G-F-1

G. Acronyms 6-G-G-1

**Chapter 6**

**Hazard-Unique Planning Considerations**

**Attachment G -- Terrorism**

A. PURPOSE

> The purpose of Attachment G is to aid State and local emergency
> planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident Appendix
> (TIA) to an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) for incidents involving
> terrorist-initiated weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[^1] The
> planning guidance in this Attachment was prepared with the assistance
> of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human
> Services, Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the Environ­mental Protection
> Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the National Emergency
> Management Association; and the International Association of Emergency
> Managers.
>
> State and local governments have primary responsibility in planning
> for and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using
> available resources in the critical hours before Federal assistance
> can arrive. The information presented in this Attachment should help
> planners develop a TIA that integrates the Federal, State, and local
> responses. The TIA resulting from this guidance should supplement
> existing State and local EOPs. A suggested format for a TIA is shown
> in Tab A.
>
> Federal departments and agencies have developed plans and capabilities
> for an integrated Federal response to a WMD incident. This Attachment
> summarizes that response for State and local planners. The Federal
> Response Plan (FRP), including its Terrorism Incident Annex, provides
> additional information.
>
> While primarily intended for the use of planners, this Attachment
> contains information that may be of value to first responders.
> Planners should consider whether, and how best, to incorporate such
> information into their plans, procedures, and training materials for
> first responders.

B. THE HAZARD

> The TIA should identify and discuss the nature of the WMD hazard(s),
> the hazard agents, potential targets, and release areas, as described
> below.

1.  **Nature of the Hazard.** The hazard may be chemical, biological,
    nuclear/radiological, and/or explosive.

> a\. **Initial Warning.** While specific events may vary, the emergency
> response and the protocol followed should remain consistent. When an
> overt WMD incident has occurred, the initial call for help will likely
> come through the local 911 center. This caller probably will not
> identify the incident as a terrorist incident, but rather state that
> there was an explosion, a major "accident," or a mass casualty event.
> Information relayed through the dispatcher prior to arrival of first
> responders on scene, as well as the initial assessment, will provide
> first responders with the basic data to begin responding to the
> incident. With increased awareness and training about WMD incidents,
> first responders should recognize that a WMD incident has occurred.
> The information provided in this Attachment applies where it becomes
> obvious or strongly suspected that an incident has been intentionally
> perpetrated to harm people, compromise the public's safety and
> well-being, disrupt essential government services, or damage the
> area's economy or environment.

b\. **Initial Detection.** The initial detection of a WMD terrorist
attack will likely occur at the local level by either first responders
or private entities (e.g., hospitals, corporations, etc.). Consequently,
first responders and members of the medical community---both public and
private---should be trained to identify hazardous agents and take
appropriate actions. State and local health departments, as well as
local emergency first responders, will be relied upon to identify
unusual symptoms, patterns of symptom occurrence, and any additional
cases of symptoms as the effects spread throughout the community and
beyond. First responders must be protected from the hazard prior to
treating victims. Tab D contains an overview of first responder concerns
and indicators related to chemical, biological, and nuclear/radiological
WMDs.

> The detection of a terrorism incident involving covert biological
> agents (as well as some chemical agents) will most likely occur
> through the recognition of similar symptoms or syndromes by clinicians
> in hospital or clinical settings. Detection of biological agents could
> occur days or weeks after exposed individuals have left the site of
> the release. Instead, the "scene" will shift to public health
> facilities receiving unusual numbers of patients, the majority of whom
> will self-transport.

c\. **Investigation and Containment of Hazards.** Local first responders
will provide initial assessment or scene surveillance of a hazard caused
by an act of WMD terrorism. The proper local, State, and Federal
authorities capable of dealing with and containing the hazard should be
alerted to a suspected WMD attack after State/local health departments
recognize the occurrence of symptoms that are highly unusual or of an
unknown cause. Consequently, State and local emergency responders must
be able to assess the situation and request assistance as quickly as
possible. For a list of Federal departments and agencies with
counterterrorism-specific roles, see Tab B; for telephone and online
resources from selected organizations, see Tab C.

2\. **Hazard Agents**

a\. **Chemical.** Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously
injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A
terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate
reaction from emergency responders---fire departments, police, hazardous
materials (HazMat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and
emergency room staff---who will need adequate training and equipment.
Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be
introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol
generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an
attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a
nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious
consequences. Some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents are
listed in Table 1. Early in an investigation, it may not be obvious
whether an outbreak was caused by an infectious agent or a hazardous
chemical; however, most chemical attacks will

> **Table 1. General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use**

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **Stated Threat to Release a Chemical Agent**                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals**                       |
|                                                                       |
| -   For example, lack of insects, dead birds                          |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **Unexplained Casualties**                                            |
|                                                                       |
| -   Multiple victims                                                  |
|                                                                       |
| -   Surge of similar 911 calls                                        |
|                                                                       |
| -   Serious illnesses                                                 |
|                                                                       |
| -   Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, or convulsions      |
|                                                                       |
| -   Definite casualty patterns                                        |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ### Unusual Liquid, Spray, or Vapor                                   |
|                                                                       |
| -   Droplets, oily film                                               |
|                                                                       |
| -   Unexplained odor                                                  |
|                                                                       |
| -   Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ### Suspicious Devices or Packages                                    |
|                                                                       |
| -   Unusual metal debris                                              |
|                                                                       |
| -   Abandoned spray devices                                           |
|                                                                       |
| -   Unexplained munitions                                             |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

be localized, and their effects will be evident within a few minutes.
There are both persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents. Persistent
agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks.
Nonpersistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air,
and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties
after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small,
unventilated areas.

> b\. **Biological.** Recognition of a biological hazard can occur
> through several methods, including identification of a credible
> threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent,
> clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an
> agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent), and detection
> (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data).
>
> When people are exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox,
> they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are
> infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some
> time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, or incubation
> period, is character­istic of infectious diseases. The incubation
> period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the
> exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or
> some hazardous chemicals, the initial response to a biological attack
> on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and
> the public health community.
>
> Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect
> agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a
> virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local or even
> national economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should
> also be considered during the planning process.

Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological
agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event (see Tab C
for resources). Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological
agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the
disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox,
plague). Some indicators of biological attack are given in Table 2.

**Table 2. General Indicators of Possible Biological Agent Use**

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **Stated Threat to Release a Biological Agent**                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| **Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals**                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| #### Unusual Casualties                                               |
|                                                                       |
| -   Unusual illness for region/area                                   |
|                                                                       |
| ```{=html}                                                            |
| <!-- -->                                                              |
| ```                                                                   |
| -   Definite pattern inconsistent with natural disease                |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ###### **Unusual Liquid, Spray, or Vapor**                            |
|                                                                       |
| -   Spraying and suspicious devices or packages                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

c\. **Nuclear/Radiological.** The difficulty of responding to a nuclear
or radio­logical incident is compounded by the nature of radiation
itself. In an explosion, the fact that radioactive material was involved
may or may not be obvious, depending upon the nature of the explosive
device used. Unless confirmed by radiological detection equipment, the
presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain. Although many
detection devices exist, most are designed to detect specific types and
levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for measuring or ruling
out the presence of radiological hazards. Table 3 lists some indicators
of a radiological release.

> Table 3. General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological
> Agent Use

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -   A stated threat to deploy a nuclear or radiological device        |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -   The presence of nuclear or radiological equipment (e.g., spent    |
|     fuel canisters or nuclear transport vehicles)                     |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -   Nuclear placards or warning materials along with otherwise        |
|     unexplained casualties                                            |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

The scenarios constituting an intentional nuclear/radio­logical emergency
include the following:

\(1\) Use of an **Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)** includes any
explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the
type of trigger device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can
fuel these devices. While "weapons-grade" material increases the
efficiency of a given device, materials of less than weapons grade can
still be used.

\(2\) Use of a **Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)** includes any
explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material upon
detonation. Any improvised explo­sive device could be used by placing it
in close proximity to radioactive material.

\(3\) Use of a **Simple RDD** that spreads radiological material without
the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical
isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner.

> d\. **Conventional Explosive Devices.** The easiest to obtain and use
> of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised
> bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to
> disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components
> are readily available, as are detailed instructions to construct such
> a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being
> explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive
> materials to explode and/or cause fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap
> and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist
> weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be
> outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be
> designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio
> transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing
> incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Historically, less
> than five percent of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a
> threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little
> signature, and are not readily detectable. Secondary devices may be
> targeted against responders.
>
> e\. **Combined Hazards.** WMD agents can be combined to achieve a
> synergistic effect---greater in total effect than the sum of their
> individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and
> delayed consequences. Mixed infections or intoxications may occur,
> thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple
> agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects,
> such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the
> likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed
> so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective
> measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the
> potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple
> municipalities.
>
> 3\. **Potential Targets.** In determining the risk areas within a
> jurisdiction (and in multiple jurisdiction areas participating in an
> emergency response), the vulnerabilities of potential targets should
> be identified, and the targets themselves should be prepared to
> respond to a WMD incident. In-depth vulnerability assessments are
> needed for determining a response to such an incident. For examples of
> vulnerability areas to be considered, see Tab E. In addition,
> reference Risk Management Plans and Emergency Planning and Community
> Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) Plans, which include potential target areas
> and information on industrial chemical facilities, can be obtained
> from the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) in your area.

4\. **Release Area.** Standard models are available for estimating the
effects of a nuclear, chemical, or biological release, including the
area affected and consequences to population, resources, and
infrastructure. Some of these models include databases on infrastructure
that can be useful in preparing the TIA. A good source of information on
available Federal government models is the *Directory of Atmospheric
Transport and Diffusion Consequence Assessment Models*, published by the
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM). The directory
is available both in print and online on OFCM's web page,
http://www.ofcm.gov (select "Publications," then "Publications Available
Online," then the directory). The directory includes information on the
capabilities and limitations of each model, technical requirements, and
points of contact.

C. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1\. **Situation.** The situation section of a TIA should discuss what
constitutes a potential or actual WMD incident. It should present a
concise, clear, and accurate overview of potential events and discuss a
general concept of operations for response. Any information already
included in the EOP need not be duplicated in the TIA. The situation
overview should include as much information as possible that is unique
to WMD response actions, including the suggested elements listed in
Table 4.

> WMD situation planning should include provisions for working with
> Federal crisis and consequence management agencies. The key to
> successful emergency response involves smooth coordination with
> multiple agencies and officials from various jurisdictions regarding
> all aspects of the response.

2\. **Assumptions.** Although situations may vary, planning assumptions
remain the same.

> a\. The first responder (e.g., local emergency or law enforcement
> personnel) or health and medical personnel will in most cases
> initially detect and evaluate the potential or actual incident, assess
> casualties (if any), and determine whether assistance is required. If
> so, State support will be requested and provided. This assessment will
> be based on warning or notification of a WMD incident that may be
> received from law enforcement, emergency response agencies, or the
> public.
>
> b\. The incident may require Federal support. To ensure that there is
> one overall Lead Federal Agency (LFA), the Federal Emergency
> Management Agency (FEMA) is authorized to support the Department of
> Justice (DOJ) (as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
> \[FBI\]) until the Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to
> FEMA. (Source: FRP, Terrorism Incident Annex) In addition, FEMA is
> designated as the lead agency for consequence management within the
> United States and its territories. FEMA retains authority and
> responsibility to act as the lead agency for consequence management
> throughout the Federal response. In this capacity, FEMA will
> coordinate Federal assistance requested through State authorities
> using normal FRP mechanisms.

c\. Federal response will include experts in the identification,
containment, and recovery of WMD (chemical, biological, or
nuclear/radiological).

d\. Federal consequence management response will entail the involvement
of FEMA, additional FRP departments and agencies, and the American Red
Cross as required.

**Table 4. Suggested Emergency Operations Plan Elements**

+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **Maps**  | -   Use detailed, current maps and charts.               |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Include demographic information.                     |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Use natural and manmade boundaries and structures to |
|           |     identify risk areas.                                 |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Annotate evacuation routes and alternatives.         |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Annotate in-place sheltering locations.              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **Environ | -   Determine response routes and times.                 |
| ment^a^** |                                                          |
|           | -   Include bodies of water with dams or levees (these   |
|           |     could become contaminated).                          |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Specify special weather and climate features that    |
|           |     could alter the effects of a WMD (e.g., strong       |
|           |     winds, heavy rains, etc.).                           |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| ## Popu   | -   Identify those most susceptible to WMD effects or    |
| lation^b^ |     otherwise hindered or unable to care for themselves. |
|           |                                                          |
|           | ```{=html}                                               |
|           | <!-- -->                                                 |
|           | ```                                                      |
|           | -   Identify areas where large concentrations of the     |
|           |     population might be located, such as sports arenas   |
|           |     and major transportation centers.                    |
|           |                                                          |
|           | ```{=html}                                               |
|           | <!-- -->                                                 |
|           | ```                                                      |
|           | -   List areas that may include retirement communities.  |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Note location of correctional facilities.            |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Note locations of hospitals/medical                  |
|           |     centers/schools/day care centers where multiple      |
|           |     evacuees may need assistance.                        |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Identify non-English-speaking populations.           |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **Metro   | -   Identify multi-jurisdictional perimeters and         |
| politan** |     boundaries.                                          |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Identify potentially overlapping areas for response. |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Identify rural, urban, suburban, and city (e.g.,     |
|           |     city-sprawl/surroundings) mutual risk areas.         |
|           |                                                          |
|           | -   Identify specific or unique characteristics such as  |
|           |     interchanges, choke points, traffic lights, traffic  |
|           |     schemes and patterns, access roads, tunnels,         |
|           |     bridges, railroad crossings, and overpasses and/or   |
|           |     cloverleafs.                                         |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+

^a^ The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will work with local and
State officials on environmental planning issues.

^b^ The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in close cooperation with
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), will work with State
and local officials on these issues.

e\. Jurisdictional areas of responsibility and working perimeters
defined by local, State, and Federal departments and agencies may
overlap. Perimeters may be used to control access to the affected area,
target public information messages, assign operational sectors among
responding organizations, and assess potential effects on the population
and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by
different authorities, which will impede the overall response if
adequate coordination is not established.

D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The TIA should include a concept of operations section to explain the
jurisdiction's overall concept for responding to a WMD incident. Topics
should include division of local, State, Federal, and any intermediate
interjurisdictional responsibilities; activation of the EOP; and the
other elements set forth in Chaper 4 (Basic Plan Content) of State and
Local Guide (SLG) 101. A suggested format for a TIA is given in Tab A.

1\. **Direction and Control.** Local government emergency response
organizations will respond to the incident scene(s) and make appropriate
and rapid notifications to local and State authorities (Table 5).[^2]
Control of the incident scene(s) most likely will be established by
local first responders from either fire or police. The Incident Command
System (ICS) that was initially established likely will transition into
a Unified Command System (UCS) as mutual-aid partners and State and
Federal responders arrive to augment the local responders. It is
recommended that local, State, and Federal regional law enforcement
officials develop consensus "rules of engagement" early in the planning
process to smooth the transition from ICS to UCS. This UC structure will
facilitate both crisis management and consequence management activities.
The UC structure used at the scene will expand as support units and
agency representatives arrive to support crisis and consequence
management operations. The site of a terrorist incident is a crime scene
as well as a disaster scene, although the protection of lives, health,
and safety remains the top priority.

> Figure 1 summarizes the coordination relationships between the UC and
> other response entities. It is assumed that normal disaster
> coordination accomplished at State and local emergency operations
> centers (EOCs) and other locations away from the scene would be
> addressed in the basic EOP. Any special concerns relating to State and
> local coordination with Federal organizations should be addressed in
> the TIA.

Local, State, and Federal interface with the FBI On-Scene Commander
(OSC) is coordinated through the Joint Operations Center (JOC). FEMA
(represented in the command group) will recommend joint operational
priorities to the FBI based on consultation with the FEMA-led
consequence management group in the JOC. The FBI, working with local and
State officials in the command group at the JOC, will establish
operational priorities.

> Response to any terrorist event requires direction and control. The
> planner must consider the unique characteristics of the event,
> identify the likely stage at which coordinated resources will be
> required, and tailor the direction and control process to merge into
> the ongoing public health response.

Table 5. Responses to a WMD Incident and the Participants Involved

  ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------
  **Events**                               **Participants**

                                           

  1\. Incident occurs.                     

  2\. 911 center receives calls, elicits   911 Center, first responders.
  information, dispatches first            
  responders, relays information to first  
  responders prior to their arrival on     
  scene, makes notifications, and consults 
  existing databases of chemical hazards   
  in the community, as required.           

  3\. First responders arrive on scene and Incident Command: Fire, Law
  make initial assessment. Establish       Enforcement, Emergency Medical
  Incident Command. Determine potential    Services (EMS), and HazMat
  weapon of mass destruction (WMD)         unit(s).
  incident and possible terrorist          
  involvement; warn additional responders  
  to scene of potential secondary          
  hazards/devices. Perform any obvious     
  rescues as incident permits. Establish   
  security perimeter. Determine needs for  
  additional assistance. Begin triage and  
  treatment of victims. Begin hazard agent 
  identification.                          

  4\. Incident Command manages incident    Incident Command.
  response; notifies medical facility,     
  emergency management (EM), and other     
  local organizations outlined in          
  Emergency Operations Plan; requests      
  notification of Federal Bureau of        
  Investigation (FBI) Field Office.        

  5\. Special Agent in Charge (SAC)        FBI Field Office: SAC.
  assesses information, supports local law 
  enforcement, and determines WMD          
  terrorist incident has occurred.         
  Notifies Strategic Information and       
  Operations Center (SIOC), activates      
  Joint Operations Center (JOC),           
  coordinates the crisis management        
  aspects of WMD incident, and acts as the 
  Federal on-scene manager for the U.S.    
  government while FBI is Lead Federal     
  Agency (LFA).                            

  6\. Local Emergency Operations Center    Local EOC: Local agencies, as
  (EOC) activated. Supports Incident       identified in basic Emergency
  Command, as required by Incident         Operations Plan (EOP).
  Commander (IC). Coordinates consequence  
  management activities (e.g., mass care). 
  Local authorities declare state of       
  emergency. Coordinates with State EOC    
  and State and Federal agencies, as       
  required. Requests State and Federal     
  assistance, as necessary.                

  7\. Strategic local coordination of      SIOC: FBI, Department of
  crisis management activities. Brief      Justice (DOJ), Department of
  President, National Security Council     Energy (DOE), Federal
  (NSC), and Attorney General. Provide     Emergency Management Agency
  Headquarters support to JOC. Domestic    (FEMA), Department of Defense
  Emergency Support Team (DEST) may be     (DoD), Department of Health
  deployed. Notification of FEMA by        and Human Services (HHS), and
  FBI/SIOC triggers FEMA actions.^a^       Environmental Protection
                                           Agency (EPA).

  8\. Manage criminal investigation.       FBI; other Federal, State, and
  Establish Joint Information Center       local law enforcement
  (JIC). State and local agencies and FEMA agencies. Local Emergency
  ensure coordination of consequence       Management (EM)
  management activities.                   representatives. FEMA, DoD,
                                           DOE, HHS, EPA, and other
                                           Federal Response Plan (FRP)
                                           agencies, as required.

  9\. State EMS support local consequence  State EOC: State EMS and State
  management. Brief Governor. Declare      agencies, as outlined in EOP.
  state of emergency. Develop/coordinate   
  requests for Federal assistance through  
  FEMA Regional Operations Center (ROC).   
  Coordinate State request for Federal     
  consequence management assistance.       

  10\. DEST provides assistance to FBI     DEST: DoD, DOJ, HHS, FEMA,
  SAC. Merges into JOC, as appropriate.    EPA, and DOE.
  ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------

Table 5 (Cont.)

  ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------
  **Events**                               **Participants**

                                           

  11\. FEMA representative coordinates     FBI, FEMA, EPA, DoD, DOE, HHS,
  Consequence Management Group. Expedites  and other FRP agencies.
  Federal consequence management           
  activities and monitors crisis           
  management response to advise on areas   
  of decision that could impact            
  consequence management response.         

  12\. Crisis management response          FBI, Incident Command System
  activities to incident may continue.     (ICS), Special Operations,
                                           Hazardous Materials Response
                                           Unit (HMRU), Joint Technical
                                           Operations Team, Joint
                                           Inter-Agency Intelligence
                                           Support, and additional
                                           authorities, as needed.

  13\. Federal response efforts            ROC and regional-level
  coordinated and mission assignments      agencies.
  determined. A consequence management     
  support team deploys to incident site.   
  All EOCs coordinate.                     

  14\. An Emergency Response Team -        ERT-A: Regional-level FEMA and
  Advance Element (ERT-A) deploys to State FRP primary support agencies,
  EOC and incident site, as needed. Base   as needed.
  installation sites identified for        
  mobilization centers. Liaisons from      
  WMD-related agencies requested for       
  Emergency Support Team (EST) and ROC.    
  Disaster Field Office (DFO) liaisons as  
  needed (may be after extended response   
  phase).                                  

  15\. A consequence management support    FEMA, DOE, DoD, HHS, EPA, and
  team provides operational technical      FBI.
  assistance to Unified Command.           

  16\. Recovery operations. Transition of  
  LFA from FBI to FEMA.                    
  ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------

> ^a^ FEMA may initiate FRP response prior to any FBI/SIOC notification.

![](media/image7.png){width="4.40625in" height="3.561111111111111in"}

> **FIGURE 1 Coordination Relationships in Terrorism Incident Response
> (Source: FRP, Figure TI-4, p. TI-9)**

2\. **Communications.** In the event of a WMD incident, rapid and secure
communi­ca­­tion is crucial to ensure a prompt and coordinated response.
Strengthening communi­ca­tions among first responders, clinicians,
emergency rooms, hospitals, mass care providers, and emergency
management personnel must be given top priority in planning.

3\. **Warning.** Every incident is different. There may or may not be
warning of a potential WMD incident. Factors involved range from
intelligence gathered from various law enforcement or intelligence
agency sources to an actual notification from the terrorist organization
or individual. The EOP should have HazMat facilities and transportation
routes already mapped, along with emergency procedures necessary to
respond.

a\. The warning or notification of a potential WMD terrorist incident
could come from many sources; therefore, open communica­tion among local,
State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and emergency response
officials is critical. The local FBI Field Office must be notified of
any suspected terrorist threats or incidents.

b\. **Threat Level.** The FBI operates with a four-tier threat level
system:

\(1\) **Level Four (Minimal Threat).** Received threats do not warrant
actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or
resources on a heightened alert.

\(2\) **Level Three (Potential Threat).** Intelligence or an articulated
threat indicates the potential for a terrorist incident; however, this
threat has not yet been assessed as credible.

\(3\) **Level Two (Credible Threat).** A threat assessment indicates
that a potential threat is credible and confirms the involvement of WMD
in a developing terrorist incident. The threat increases in significance
when the presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a
significant destructive event, prior or actual injury or loss is
confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high
probability that a device exists.

\(4\) **Level One (WMD Incident).** A WMD terrorism incident has
occurred resulting in mass casualties that requires immediate Federal
planning and preparation to provide support to State and local
authorities. The Federal response is primarily directed toward the
safety and welfare of the public and the preservation of human life.

4\. **Emergency Public Information.** Accurate and expedited
dissemination of information is critical when a WMD incident has
occurred. Preservation of life and property may hinge on instruc­tions
and directions given by authorized officials. In the event of a
terrorist attack, the public and the media must be provided with
accurate and timely information on emergency operations. Establishing
and maintaining an effective rumor control mechanism will help clarify
emergency information for the public. Initial interaction with the media
is likely to be implemented by an information officer, as directed by
the Incident Commander. To facilitate the release of information, the
FBI may establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) comprised of
representatives from Federal, State, and local authorities for the
purpose of managing the dissemination of information to the public,
media, and businesses potentially affected by the incident. An act of
terrorism is likely to cause widespread panic, and ongoing communication
of accurate and up-to-date information will help calm fears and limit
collateral effects of the attack.

5\. **Protective Actions.** Evacuation may be required from inside the
perimeter of the scene to guard against further casualties, either from
contamination by an agent released or the possibility that additional
WMD or secondary devices targeting emergency responders are present.
"In‑place sheltering" may be required if the area must be contained
because of the need for quarantine or if it is determined to be safer
for individuals to remain in place. The TIA should be flexible enough to
accommodate either contingency. As with any emergency, State and local
officials must be involved in making protective action decisions.
Multi-jurisdictional issues regarding mass care, sheltering, and
evacuation should be pre‑coordinated and included in the TIA.

6\. **Mass Care.** The location of mass care facilities will be based
partly on the hazard agent involved. Decontamination, if it is
necessary, may need to precede sheltering and other needs of the victims
to prevent further damage from the hazard agent, either to the victims
themselves or to the care providers. The American Red Cross (the primary
agency for mass care), the Department of Health and Human Services, and
the Department of Veterans Affairs should be actively involved with the
planning process to determine both in-place and mobile mass care systems
for the TIA. A "mid-point" or intermediary station may be needed to move
victims out of the way of immediate harm. This would allow responders to
provide critical attention (e.g., decontamination and medical services)
and general lifesaving support, then evacuate victims to a mass care
location for further attention. General issues to consider for inclusion
in the TIA are:

a\. Location, setup, and equipment for decontamination stations, if any.

b\. Mobile triage support and qualified personnel.

c\. Supplies and personnel to support in‑place sheltering.

d\. Evacuation to an intermediary location to provide decontamination
and medical attention.

e\. Determination of safety perimeters (based on agent).

7\. **Health and Medical.** The basic EOP should already contain a
Health and Medical Annex. Issues that may be different during a WMD
incident and that should be addressed in the TIA include
decon­tamination, safety of victims and responders, in-place sheltering
versus evacuation, and multihazard/multiagent triage. Planning should
anticipate the need to handle large numbers of people who may or may not
be contaminated but who are fearful about their medical well-being.

The response to a bioterrorism incident will require the active
collaboration of the clinicians and local public health authorities
responsible for disease monitoring and outbreak investigation. Their
activities should be factored into the overall response process.

> 8\. **Resources Management.** The following considerations are highly
> relevant to WMD incidents and should be addressed, if appropriate, in
> one or more appendixes to a resource management annex:
>
> a\. Nuclear, biological, and chemical response resources that are
> available through interjurisdictional agreements (e.g., interstate
> pacts).
>
> b\. Unique resources that are available through State authorities
> (e.g., National Guard units).
>
> c\. Unique resources that are available to State and local
> jurisdictions through Federal authorities (e.g., the National
> Pharmaceutical Stockpile, a national asset providing delivery of
> antibiotics, antidotes, and medical supplies to the scene of a WMD
> incident).
>
> d\. Unique expertise that may be available through academic, research,
> or private organizations.

E. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

As with any hazard-specific emergency, the organization for management
of local response may vary for a WMD incident and should therefore be
defined in the TIA. The effects of a terrorist act involving a WMD have
the potential to overwhelm local resources, which may require assistance
from State or Federal governments. The following response roles and
responsibilities should be articulated in the TIA.

1\. **Local Emergency Responders.** Local fire departments, law
enforcement personnel, HazMat teams, and EMS will be among the first to
respond to a WMD incident. As response efforts escalate, the local
emergency management agency and health department will help coordinate
needed services.

*Primary Duties*. The duties of local departments, such as fire, law
enforcement, and EMS, along with those of the local emergency management
agency and health department should be addressed in their respective
EOPs. Any special duties necessary to respond to a suspected terrorist
WMD incident should be set forth in the local TIA.

2\. **Interjurisdictional Responsibilities.** The formal arrangements
and agreements for emergency response to a WMD incident among
neighboring jurisdictions, State, Tribal, local, and neighboring States
(and those jurisdictions physically located in those States) should be
made **prior** to an incident. When coordinating and planning, the Risk
Assessment and Risk Area sections of the TIA (areas where potential
multiple jurisdictions could overlap and interplay) will be readily
identifiable. Federal response is already predisposed for interagency
and interdepartmental coordination.

3\. **State Emergency Responders.** If requested by local officials, the
State emergency management agency has capabilities to support local
emergency management authorities and the Incident Commander (IC).

*Primary Duties*. The duties of all responding State agencies should be
addressed in the State EOP. Any special duties necessary to respond to a
WMD incident should be set forth in the State's TIA.

4\. **Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), State Emergency
Response Commissions (SERCs), and Tribal Emergency Response Commissions
(TERCs).** These entities are established under the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Title III and the implementing
regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). LEPCs develop
and maintain local hazardous material emergency plans and receive
notifications of releases of hazardous substances. SERCs and TERCs
supervise the operation of the LEPCs and administer the community
right-to-know provisions of SARA Title III, including collection and
distribution of information about facility inventories of hazardous
substances, chemicals, and toxins. LEPCs will have detailed information
about industrial chemicals within the community. It may be advisable for
LEPCs, SERCs, and TERCs to establish Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) with
agencies and organizations to provide specialized resources and
capabilities for response to WMD incidents.

*Primary Duties*. Any responsibilities germane to terrorism preparedness
or response should be outlined in local, State and Tribal hazardous
materials emergency response plans or the hazardous materials annex to
the local emergency plan.

5\. **Federal Emergency Responders.** Upon determination of a credible
WMD threat, or if such an incident actually occurs, the Federal
government may respond through the appropriate departments and agencies.
These departments and agencies may include FEMA, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and FBI, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department
of Energy (DOE), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
EPA, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and possibly the American Red Cross and Department of
Veterans Affairs. The roles and responsibilities for Federal departments
and agencies participating in both crisis management and consequence
management are discussed in more detail in Tab B. See the United States
Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan and
the Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan for
information on the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments and
agencies responding to terrorism incidents involving WMD.

*Primary Duties*. Upon determining that a WMD terrorist incident is
credible, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), through the FBI
Headquarters, will initiate liaison with other Federal agencies to
activate their operations centers. The responsible FEMA region(s) may
activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a
representative(s) to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA
region(s) activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI
Field Office(s) to request a liaison. If the FBI activates the Strategic
Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters, then other
Federal agencies, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the
SIOC, as required. Once the FBI has determined the need to activate a
Joint Operations Center (JOC) to support the incident site, Federal,
State, and local agencies may be requested by FEMA to support the
Consequence Management Group located at the JOC.

**F. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

There are many factors that make response to a WMD terrorist incident
unique. Unlike some natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, floods, winter
storms, drought, etc.), the adminstration and logistics for response to
a WMD incident require special considerations. For example, there may be
little or no forewarning, immediately obvious indicators, or WMD
knowledge (lead time) available to officials and citizens. Because the
release of a WMD may not be immediately apparent, caregivers, emergency
response personnel, and first responders are in imminent danger
themselves of becoming casualties before the actual identification of
the crime can be made. Incidents could escalate quickly from one scene
to multiple locations and jurisdictions.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

#### TAB A

# SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR A TERRORIST INCIDENT APPENDIX TO A BASIC ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY PLAN

**Supplement to a State or Local Basic Emergency Operations Plan**

a\. Promulgation Document

b\. Signature Page

c\. Authorities and References

d\. Table of Contents

e\. Purpose

The purpose of the Terrorist Incident Appendix (TIA) is to develop a
consequence management plan for responding to and recovering from a
terrorist-initiated weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident. The TIA
supplements the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) already in effect.

F. THE HAZARD

1\. **Nature of the Hazard** {Identify WMD hazards that could
potentially affect the jurisdiction.}

2\. **Incident** {Statement of the situations that would cause the
consequence management plan for a WMD incident to go into operation.}

3\. **Hazard Agents** {Separate sections for each of the following
hazards may be used, as risk area, treatment, etc., are unique to each
incident. The plan for identification of the hazard agent may be
included here, as well as an assessment of the risk and definition of
the risk area.}

a\. **Chemical** {Statement on chemical terrorism. A Tab with the names
of chemicals, composition, reference materials (activation, lethality,
treatment, handling, mixture, etc.) may be created and included in the
TIA.}

\(1\) Assessment of risk

\(2\) Risk area

b\. **Biological** {Statement on biological terrorism. Reference
material (identification, handling, treatment, lethality, etc.,) may be
created and included in the TIA in a Tab.}

\(1\) Assessment of risk

(2) Risk area

c\. **Nuclear/Radiological** {Statement on nuclear terrorism. Reference
material can be listed in a Tab and may include lethality, handling,
treatment, etc.}

\(1\) Assessment of risk

\(2\) Risk area

> d\. **Explosives** {Statement on explosives terrorism. A Tab with the
> names of explosives, composition, reference materials (activation,
> lethality, treatment, handling, mixture, etc.) may be created and
> included in the TIA.}
>
> \(1\) Assessment of risk
>
> \(2\) Risk area

G. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1\. **Situation:** Basic information on the terrorist incident threat or
potential threat. A description of the locale for which the plan is
being written. Any information listed below that is already included in
the EOP need not be duplicated here. A general description of the area
may be given, with the following information in a Tab. Consideration
should be given to maintaining information in a secure place.

a\. **Environment**

\(1\) Geographic conditions (terrain).

\(2\) Weather (climate).

b\. **Population:** General and special needs individuals, retirement
communities and nursing homes, schools, day care centers, correctional
facilities, non-English-speaking communities, etc.

c\. **Metropolitan:** Rural/urban/suburban/city
(city-sprawl/surroundings).

d\. **Critical Infrastructure/Transportation:** Major highways,
secondary roads, tertiary roadways, dirt/gravel roads. Details may
include interchanges, choke points, traffic lights, traffic schemes and
patterns, access roads, tunnels, bridges, railroad crossings,
overpasses/cloverleafs.

e\. **Trucking/Transport Activity:** Cargo loading/unloading facilities
(type of cargo), waterways (ports, docks, harbors, rivers, streams,
lakes, ocean, bays, reservoirs, pipelines, process/treatment facilities,
dams, international roll-on/roll-off container shipments, HazMat \[oil\]
flagged registry).

f\. **Airports:** Carriers, flight paths, airport layout (air traffic
control tower, runways, passenger terminal, parking).

g\. **Trains/Subways:** Physical rails, interchanges, terminals,
tunnels, cargo/\
passengers.

h\. **Government Facilities:** Post office, law enforcement,
fire/rescue, town/city hall, local mayor/governor's residences, Federal
buildings, judicial personnel (i.e., judges, prosecutors, residences,
offices).

i\. **Recreation Facilities:** Sports arenas, theaters, malls, theme
parks.

j\. **Other Facilities:** Financial institutions (banking
facilities/loan institutions), universities, colleges, hospitals, and
research institutes (nuclear, biological, chemical, medical clinics).

k\. **Military Installations**

l\. **HazMat Facilities:** Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) sites with Risk Management Plan requirements,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) sites, nonreporting Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) facilities (i.e., combustion sites, generating sites, and
treatment, storage, and disposal \[TSD\] sites), facilities inventoried
by the Toxic Release Inventory System (TRIS), utilities and nuclear
facilities, chemical stockpile and/or manufacturing sites.

2\. **Assumptions:** This plan will go into effect when a WMD incident
has occurred or a credible threat has been identified.

H. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1\. **Direction and Control** {Based on the above assessments, provide
wiring diagram/flow chart showing the chain of command and control.
These diagrams/charts may be specific to WMD or more generally pertinent
to any incident.}

> 2\. **Communications** {May elaborate on communications described in
> the basic EOP.}
>
> a\. Security of communications among responding organizations.
>
> b\. Coordination of communications with Federal responders.

3\. **Warning**

> 4\. **Emergency Public Information** {The plan should identify
> specific methods (channels) to notify the public that an incident has
> occurred, direct their actions, and keep them informed as the
> situation progresses. Evacuation and sheltering in place are key
> actions that may need to be communicated to the public, and continuous
> updating will be required.}

5\. **Protective Actions**

a\. In-place sheltering.

b\. Evacuation routes/means of conveyance should be predetermined based
on area and type of agent.

c\. Evacuation support.

6\. **Mass Care**

a\. Safe location of mass care facilities

b\. Structural safety

c\. Health and medical services

d\. Provisions for food and water

e\. Policy and procedures for pet care

7\. **Health and Medical**

8\. **Resources Management**

9\. **Recovery Operations**

**I. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES**

In concert with guidance already in existence, supplementing the EOP,
the roles and responsibilities are outlined here for all jurisdictions
and entities.

1\. Local

2\. Interjurisdictional Responsibilities

3\. State

4\. Tribal

5\. Federal

**J. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

The administrative framework for WMD response operations is outlined
here.

1\. General support requirements

2\. Availability of services

3\. Mutual aid agreements

4\. Emergency Management Assistance Compacts

5\. Administrative policies and procedures (e.g., financial record
keeping)

K. TABS

1\. Acronyms.

2\. Key definitions.

3\. Points of contact.

4\. Each of the WMD hazard agents may have a separate Tab with
subcategories and subsets of information specific to each, including the
identification of departments and agencies that have authority and
expertise relevant to incidents involving specific agents.

> a\. Index of chemical agents.
>
> b\. Index of biological agents.
>
> c\. Index of nuclear/radiological materials.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**TAB B**

# FEDERAL dEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: cOuNTERTERRORISM‑SPECIFIC ROLES

A. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management and acts in support
of the FBI in Washington, DC, and on the scene of the crisis until the
U.S. Attorney General transfers the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) role to
FEMA. Though State and local officials bear primary responsibility for
consequence management, FEMA coordinates the Federal aspects of
consequence management in the event of a terrorist act. Under
Presidential Decision Directive 39, FEMA supports the overall LFA by
operating as the lead agency for consequence management until the
overall LFA role is transferred to FEMA and in this capacity determines
when consequences are "imminent" for purposes of the Stafford Act.
(Source: Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999)
Consequence management includes protecting the public health and safety
and providing emergency relief to State governments, businesses, and
individuals. Additional information on Federal response is given in the
United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan (http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/conplan/).

> Web site: www.fema.gov

1\. **Office of the Director/Senior Advisor to the Director for
Terrorism Preparedness.** The Senior Advisor (1) keeps the FEMA Director
informed of terrorism-related activities, (2) develops and implements
strategies for FEMA involvement in terrorism-related activities, and
(3) coordinates overall relationships with other Federal departments and
agencies involved in the consequence management of terrorism-related
activities.

2\. **Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate** **(PT).** This
office provides planning guidance for State and local government. It
also trains emergency managers, firefighters, and elected officials in
consequence management through the Emergency Management Institute (EMI),
National Fire Academy (NFA), and the National Emergency Training Center
(NETC) in Emmitsburg, Maryland. EMI offers courses for first responders
dealing with the consequences of a terrorist incident. PT conducts
exercises in WMD terrorism consequence management through the
Comprehensive Exercise Program. These exercises provide the opportunity
to investigate the effectiveness of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to
deal with consequence management and test the ability of different
levels of response to interact. PT also manages FEMA's Terrorism
Consequence Management Preparedness Assistance used by State and local
govern­ments for terrorism preparedness planning, training, and
exercising.

3\. **Mitigation Directorate.** This office has been assigned the
responsibility of providing the verified and validated airborne and
waterborne hazardous material models. The office also is responsible for
developing new, technologically advanced, remote sensing capabilities
needed to assess the release and dispersion of hazardous materials, both
in air and water, for guiding consequence management response
activities.

4\. **Response and Recovery Directorate.** This office manages Federal
consequence management operations in response to terrorist events. In
addition, it manages the Rapid Response Information System, which
inventories physical assets and equipment available to State and local
officials, and provides a database of chemical and biological agents and
safety precautions.

5\. **U.S. Fire Administration (USFA).** This administration provides
training to firefighters and other first responders through the NFA in
conjunction with the Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate.
The NFA offers courses pertaining to preparedness and response to
terrorist events.

B. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ)

Web site: **www.usdoj.gov**

**Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The FBI is the lead agency for
crisis management and investigation of all terrorism-related matters,
including incidents involving a WMD. Within FBI's role as LFA, the FBI
Federal On-Scene Commander (OSC) coordinates the overall Federal
response until the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA.

Web site: **www.fbi.gov**

> 1\. FBI Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section (DTCTPS).
> Within the FBI Counter Terrorism Division is a specialized section
> containing the Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass
> Destruction Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
> Countermeasures Unit, and the Special Event Management Unit. Each of
> these units has specific responsibilities in investigations of crimes
> or allegations of crimes committed by individuals or groups in
> violation of the Federal terrorism and/or Weapons of Mass Destruction
> statutes. The DTCTPS serves as the point of contact (POC) to the FBI
> field offices and command structure as well as other Federal agencies
> in incidences of terrorism, the use or suspected use of WMD and/or the
> evaluation of threat credibility. If the FBI's Strategic Information
> and Operations Center (SIOC) is operational for exercises or actual
> incidents, the DTCTPS will provide staff personnel to facilitate the
> operation of SIOC.
>
> During an incident, the FBI DTCTPS will coordinate the determination
> of the composition of the Domestic Emergency Support Teams (DEST)
> and/or the Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST). All incidents
> wherein a WMD is used will be coordinated by the DTCTPS WMD Operations
> Unit.
>
> 2\. FBI Laboratory Division. Within the FBI's Laboratory Division
> reside numerous assets, which can deploy to provide assistance in a
> terrorism/WMD incident. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU)
> personnel are highly trained and knowledgeable and are equipped to
> direct and assist in the collection of hazardous and/or toxic evidence
> in a contaminated environment. Similarly, the Evidence Response Team
> Unit (ERTU) is available to augment the local assets and have been
> trained in the collection of contaminated evidence. The Crisis
> Response Unit (CRU) is able to deploy to provide communications
> support to an incident. The Bomb Data Center (BDC) provides the
> baseline training to public safety bomb disposal technicians in the
> United States. BDC is the certification and accreditation authority
> for public safety agencies operating bomb squads and is in possession
> of equipment and staff that can be deployed to assist in the
> resolution of a crisis involving suspected or identified explosive
> devices. The Explosives Unit (EU) has experts who can assist in
> analyzing the construction of suspected or identified devices and
> recommend procedures to neutralize those items.
>
> 3\. FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). CIRG has developed
> assets that are designed to facilitate the resolution of crisis
> incidents of any type. Notably, the Crisis Management Unit (CMU),
> which conducts training and exercises for the FBI and has developed
> the concept of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), is available to
> provide on-scene assistance to the incident and integrate the concept
> of the JOC and the Incident Command System (ICS) to create efficient
> management of the situation. CIRG coordinates a highly trained group
> of skilled negotiators who are adroit in techniques to de-escalate
> volatile situations. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) is a tactical
> asset, trained to function in contaminated or toxic hazard
> environments, that is available to assist in the management of the
> incident.
>
> 4\. National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). NDPO is to
> coordinate and facilitate all Federal WMD efforts to assist State and
> local emergency responders with planning, training, equipment,
> exercise, and health and medical issues necessary to respond to a WMD
> event. The NDPO's program areas encompass the six broad areas of
> domestic preparedness requiring coordination and assistance: Planning,
> Training, Exercises, Equipment, Information Sharing, and Public Health
> and Medical Services.
>
> **Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS).**
> This office, within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), has a State
> and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program that
> provides technical assistance in three areas: (1) general technical
> assistance; (2) State strategy technical assistance, and (3) equipment
> technical assistance. The purpose of this program is to provide direct
> assistance to State and local jurisdictions in enhancing their
> capacity and preparedness to respond to WMD terrorist incidents. The
> program goals are to:

-   Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to develop,
    plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness; and

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-   Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to sustain and
    maintain specialized equipment.

> Technical assistance available from OSLDPS is provided without charge
> to requesting State or local jurisdiction. The following organizationa
> are eligible for the State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical
> Assistance Program:

-   General technical assistance: units and agencies of State and local
    governments.

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-   State strategy technical assistance: State administrative agencies,
    designated by the governor, under the Fiscal Year 1999 State
    Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program.

-   Equipment technical assistance: units and agencies of State and
    local governments that have received OSLDPS funding to acquire
    specialized equipment.

> Web site: **www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps/**
>
> 1\. **General Technical Assistance.** OSLDPS provides general overall
> assistance to State and local jurisdictions for preparedness to
> respond to WMD terrorist incidents. This technical assistance
> includes:

-   Assistance in developing and enhancing WMD response plans.

-   Assistance with exercise scenario development and evaluation.

-   Provision of WMD experts to facilitate jurisdictional working
    groups.

-   Provision of specialized training.

> 2\. **State Strategy Technical Assistance.** OSLDPS provides
> assistance to States in meeting the needs assessment and comprehensive
> planning requirements under OSLDPS' Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic
> Preparedness Equipment Support Program. Specifically, OSLDPS:

-   Assists States in developing their three-year statewide domestic
    preparedness strategy.

-   Assists States in utilizing the assessment tools for completion of
    the required needs and threat assessments.

> 3\. **Equipment Technical Assistance.** OSLDPS provides training by
> mobile training teams on the use and maintenance of specialized WMD
> response equipment under OSLDPS' Domestic Preparedness Equipment
> Support Program. This assistance will be delivered on site in eligible
> jurisdictions. Specifically, OSLDPS:

-   Provides training on using, sustaining, and maintaining specialized
    equipment.

-   Provides training to technicians on maintenance and calibration of
    test equipment.

-   Provides maintenance and/or calibration of equipment.

-   Assists in refurbishing used or damaged equipment.

C. Department of Defense (DoD)

Web site: www.defenselink.mil

In the event of a terrorist attack or act of nature on American soil
resulting in the release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
material or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices, the local law
enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel who are first to
respond may become quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the attack.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has many unique warfighting support
capabilities, both technical and operational, that could be used in
support of State and local authorities, if requested by FEMA, as the
Lead Federal Agency, to support and manage the consequences of such a
domestic event.

Due to the increasing volatility of the threat and the time sensitivity
associated with providing effective support to FEMA in domestic CBRNE
incident, the Secretary of Defense appointed an Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD\[CS\]). The ATSD(CS) serves
as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary
of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for the oversight of policy,
requirements, priorities, resources, and programs related to the DoD
role in managing the consequences of a domestic incident involving the
naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate release of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosives.

When requested, the DoD will provide its unique and extensive resources
in accordance with the following principles. First, DoD will ensure an
unequivocal chain of responsibility, authority, and accountability for
its actions to ensure the American people that the military will follow
the basic constructs of lawful action when an emergency occurs. Second,
in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE event, DoD will always play a
supporting role to the LFA in accordance with all applicable law and
plans. Third, DoD support will emphasize its natural role, skills, and
structures to mass mobilize and provide logistical support. Fourth, DoD
will purchase equipment and provide support in areas that are largely
related to its warfighting mission. Fifth, reserve component forces are
DoD's forward-deployed forces for domestic consequence management.

All official requests for DoD support to CBRNE consequence management
(CM) incidents are made by the LFA to the Executive Secretary of the
Department of Defense. While the LFA may submit the requests for DoD
assistance through other DoD channels, immediately upon receipt, any
request that comes to any DoD element shall be forwarded to the
Executive Secretary. In each instance the Executive Secretary will take
the necessary action so that the Deputy Secretary can determine whether
the incident warrants special operational management. In such instances,
upon issuance of Secretary of Defense guidance to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff will translate the
Secretary's decisions into military orders for these CBRNE-CM events,
under the policy oversight of the ATSD(CS). If the Deputy Secretary of
Defense determines that DoD support for a particular CBRNE-CM incident
does not require special consequence management procedures, the
Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DoD Executive Agent
through normal Director of Military Support, Military Support to Civil
Authorities (MSCA) procedures, with policy oversight by the ATSD(CS).

As noted above, DoD assets are tailored primarily for the larger
warfighting mission overseas. But in recognition of the unique
challenges of responding to a domestic CBRNE incident, the Department
established a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS)
headquarters at the United States Joint Forces Command, to plan for and
integrate DoD's consequence management support to the LFA for events in
the continental United States. The United States Pacific Command and
United States Southern Command have parallel responsibilities for
providing military assistance to civil authorities for States,
territories, and possessions outside the continental United States.
Specific units with skills applicable to a domestic consequence
management role can be found in the Rapid Response Information System
(RRIS) database maintained by FEMA. Capabilities include detection,
decontamination, medical, and logistics.

Additionally, DoD has established 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CST), each composed of 22 well-trained and equipped
full-time National Guard personnel. Upon Secretary of Defense
certification, one WMD-CST will be stationed in each of the 10 FEMA
regions around the country, ready to provide support when directed by
their respective governors. Their mission is to deploy rapidly, assist
local responders in determining the precise nature of an attack, provide
expert technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification
and arrival of follow-on military assets. By Congressional direction,
DoD is in the process of establishing and training an additional
17 WMD-CSTs to support the U.S. population. Interstate agreements
provide a process for the WMD-CST and other National Guard assets to be
used by neighboring states. If national security requirements dictate,
these units may be transferred to Federal service.

D. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

> Through its Office of Emergency Response, the DOE manages radiological
> emergency response assets that support both crisis and consequence
> management response in the event of an incident involving a WMD. The
> DOE is prepared to respond immediately to any type of radiological
> accident or incident with its radiological emergency response
> assets.[^3] Through its Office of Nonproliferation and National
> Security, the DOE coordinates activities in nonproliferation,
> international nuclear safety, and communicated threat assessment. DOE
> maintains the following capabilities that support domestic terrorism
> preparedness and response.
>
> Web site: **www.dp.doe.gov/emergencyresponse/**

1\. **Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** Radiological assistance
operations may require the use of aerial monitoring to quickly determine
the extent and degree of the dispersal of airborne or deposited
radioactivity or the location of lost or diverted radioactive materials.
The AMS is an aircraft-operated radiation detection system that uses
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters equipped with state-of-the-art
technology instrumentation to track, monitor, and sample airborne
radioactive plumes and/or detect and measure radioactive material
deposited on the ground. The AMS capabilities reside at both Nellis Air
Force Base near Las Vegas, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base near
Washington, D.C. The fixed-wing aircraft provide a rapid assessment of
the contaminated area, whereas the helicopters provide a slower, more
detailed and accurate analysis of the contamination.

2\. **Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC).** Radiological
assistance operations may require the use of computer models to assist
in estimating early phase radiological consequences of radioactive
material accidentally released into the atmosphere. The ARAC is a
computer-based atmospheric dispersion and deposition modeling capability
operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The ARAC's
role in an emergency begins when a nuclear, chemical, or other hazardous
material is, or has the potential of being, released into the
atmosphere. The ARAC's capability consists of meteorologists and other
technical staff using three-dimensional computer models and real-time
weather data to project the dispersion and deposition of radioactive
material in the environment. The ARAC's computer output consists of
graphical contour plots showing predicted estimates for instantaneous
air and ground contamination levels, air immersion and ground-level
exposure rates, and integrated effective dose equivalents for
individuals or critical populations. The plots can be overlaid on local
maps to assist emergency response officials in deciding what protective
actions are needed to effectively protect people and the environment.
Protective actions could impact distribution of food and water sources
and include sheltering and evacuating critical population groups. The
ARAC's response time is typically 30 minutes to 2 hours after
notification of an incident.

3\. **Accident Response Group (ARG)**. ARG is DOE's primary emergency
response capability for responding to emergencies involving
United States nuclear weapons. The ARG, which is managed by the DOE
Albuquerque Operations Office, is composed of a cadre of approximately
300 technical and scientific experts, including senior scientific
advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety
and high-explosive safety, health physicists, radiation control
technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and
transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE weapons
complex. ARG members will deploy with highly specialized,
state-of-the-art equipment for weapons recovery and monitoring
operations. The ARG deploys on military or commercial aircraft using a
time-phased approach. The ARG advance elements are ready to deploy
within four hours of notification. ARG advance elements focus on initial
assessment and provide preliminary advice to decision makers. When the
follow-on elements arrive at the emergency scene, detailed health and
safety evaluations and operations are performed and weapon recovery
operations are initiated.

4\. **Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).**
For major radiological emergencies impacting the United States, the DOE
establishes a FRMAC. The center is the control point for all Federal
assets involved in the monitoring and assessment of offsite radiological
conditions. The FRMAC provides support to the affected states,
coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and
assessment activities, maintains a technical liaison with Tribal nations
and State and local governments, responds to the assessment needs of the
LFA, and meets the statutory responsibilities of the participating
Federal agency.

5\. **Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST)**. NEST is DOE's program for
dealing with the technical aspects of nuclear or radiological terrorism.
A NEST consists of engineers, scientists, and other technical
specialists from the DOE national laboratories and other contractors.
NEST resources are configured to be quickly transported by military or
commercial aircraft to worldwide locations and prepared to respond
24 hours a day using a phased and flexible approach to deploying
personnel and equipment. The NEST is deployable within four hours of
notification with specially trained teams and equipment to assist the
FBI in handling nuclear or radiological threats. Response teams vary in
size from a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment
of dozens of searchers and scientists who can locate and then conduct or
support technical operations on a suspected nuclear device. The NEST
capabilities include intelligence, communications, search, assessment,
access, diagnostics, render-safe operations, operations
containment/damage mitigation, logistics, and health physics.

6\. **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)**. Under the RAP, the DOE
provides, upon request, radiological assistance to DOE program elements,
other Federal agencies, State, Tribal, and local governments, private
groups, and individuals. RAP provides resources (trained personnel and
equipment) to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation of
actual or perceived radiation hazards and risks to workers, the public,
and the environment. RAP is implemented on a regional basis, with
regional coordination between the emergency response elements of the
States, Tribes, other Federal agencies, and DOE. Each RAP Region
maintains a minimum of three RAP teams, which are comprised of DOE and
DOE contractor personnel, to provide radiological assistance within
their region of responsibility. RAP teams consist of volunteer members
who perform radiological assistance duties as part of their formal
employment or as part of the terms of the contract between their
employer and DOE. A fully configured team consists of seven members, to
include one Team Leader, one Team Captain, four health physics
survey/support personnel, and one Public Information Officer. A RAP team
may deploy with two or more members depending on the potential hazards,
risks, or the emergency or incident scenario. Multiple RAP teams may
also be deployed to an accident if warranted by the situation.

7\. **Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).**
The REAC/TS is managed by DOE's Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.. The REAC/TS maintains a 24‑hour
response center staffed with personnel and equipment to support medical
aspects of radiological emergencies. The staff consists of physicians,
nurses, paramedics, and health physicists who provide medical
consultation and advice and/or direct medical support at the accident
scene. The REAC/TS capabilities include assessment and treatment of
internal and external contamination, whole-body counting, radiation dose
estimation, and medical and radiological triage.

8\. **Communicated Threat Credibility Assessment.** DOE is the program
manager for the Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) at LLNL. The NAP is a
DOE-funded asset specifically designed to provide technical,
operational, and behavioral assessments of the credibility of
communicated threats directed against the U.S. Government and its
interests. The assessment process includes one-hour initial and
four-hour final products which, when integrated by the FBI as part of
its threat assessment process, can lead to a "go/no go" decision for
response to a nuclear threat.

E. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the lead Federal
agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 (health and medical
services), provides coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State
and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs
following a major disaster or emergency. Additionally, HHS provides
support during developing or potential medical situations and has the
responsibility for Federal support of food, drug, and sanitation issues.
Resources are furnished when State and local resources are overwhelmed
and public health and/or medical assistance is requested from the
Federal government.

HHS, in its primary agency role for ESF #8, coordinates the provision of
Federal health and medical assistance to fulfill the requirements
identified by the affected State/local authorities having jurisdiction.
Included in ESF #8 is overall public health response; triage, treatment,
and transportation of victims of the disaster; and evacuation of
patients out of the disaster area, as needed, into a network of Military
Services, Veterans Affairs, and pre-enrolled non-Federal hospitals
located in the major metropolitan areas of the United States. ESF #8
utilizes resources primarily available from (1) within HHS, (2) ESF #8
support agencies, (3) the National Disaster Medical System, and (4)
specific non-Federal sources (major pharmaceutical suppliers, hospital
supply vendors, interna­tional disaster response organizations, and
international health organizations).

Web site: www.hhs.gov

1\. **Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP).** OEP manages and
coordinates Federal health, medical, and health-related social service
response and recovery to Federally declared disasters under the Federal
Response Plan. The major functions of OEP include:

> a\. Coordination and delivery of Department-wide emergency
> preparedness activities, including continuity of government,
> continuity of operations, and emergency assistance during disasters
> and other emergencies;
>
> b\. Coordination of the health and medical response of the Federal
> government, in support of State and local governments, in the
> aftermath of terrorist acts involving WMD; and
>
> c\. Direction and maintenance of the medical response component of the
> National Disaster Medical System, including development and
> operational readiness capability of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
> and other special teams that can be deployed as the primary medical
> response teams in case of disasters.

2\. **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).** CDC is the
Federal agency responsible for protecting the public health of the
country through prevention and control of diseases and for response to
public health emergencies. CDC works with national and international
agencies to eradicate or control communicable diseases and other
preventable conditions. The CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Program oversees the agency's effort to prepare State and local
governments to respond to acts of bioterrorism. In addition, CDC has
designated emergency response personnel throughout the agency who are
responsible for responding to biological, chemical, and radiological
terrorism. CDC has epidemiologists trained to investigate and control
outbreaks or illnesses, as well as laboratories capable of quantifying
an individual's exposure to biological or chemical agents. CDC maintains
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile to respond to terrorist incidents
within the United States.

Web site: **www.cdc.gov**

3\. **National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).** NDMS is a cooperative
asset-sharing partnership between HHS, DoD, the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), FEMA, State and local governments, and the private sector.
The System has three components: direct medical care, patient
evacuation, and the non-Federal hospital bed system. NDMS was created as
a nationwide medical response system to supplement State and local
medical resources during disasters and emergencies, provide backup
medical support to the military and VA health care systems during an
overseas conventional conflict, and to promote development of
community-based disaster medical service systems. This partnership
includes DoD and VA Federal Coordinating Centers, which provide patient
beds, as well as 1,990 civilian hospitals. NDMS is also comprised of
over 7,000 private-sector medical and support personnel organized into
many teams across the nation. These teams and other special medical
teams are deployed to provide immediate medical attention to the sick
and injured during disasters, when local emergency response systems
become overloaded.

> a\. **Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT).** A DMAT is a group of
> professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a
> cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide
> emergency medical care during a disaster or other event. During a WMD
> incident, the DMAT provides clean area medical care in the form of
> medical triage and patient stabilization for transport to tertiary
> care.
>
> b\. **National Medical Response Team--Weapons of Mass Destruction
> (NMRT-WMD).** The NMRT-WMD is a specialized response force designed to
> provide medical care following a nuclear, biological, and/or chemical
> incident. This unit is capable of providing mass casualty
> decontamination, medical triage, and primary and secondary medical
> care to stabilize victims for transportation to tertiary care
> facilities in a hazardous material environment. There are four such
> teams geographically dispersed throughout the United States.
>
> c\. **Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT).** The DMORT
> is a mobile team of mortuary care specialists who have the capability
> to respond to incidents involving fatalities from transportation
> accidents, natural disasters, and/or terrorist events. The team
> provides technical assistance and supports mortuary operations as
> needed for mass fatality incidents.

F. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)

EPA is chartered to respond to WMD releases under the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) regardless of the
cause of the release. EPA is authorized by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); the
Oil Pollution Act; and the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to
Know Act to support Federal, State, and local responders in
counterterrorism. EPA will provide support to the FBI during crisis
management in response to a terrorist incident. In its crisis management
role, the EPA On-Scene Commander (OSC) may provide the FBI Special Agent
in Charge (SAC) with technical advice and recommendations, scientific
and technical assessments, and assistance (as needed) to State and local
responders. The EPA OSC will support FEMA during consequence management
for the incident. EPA carries out its response according to the FRP, ESF
#10, Hazardous Materials. The OSC may request an Environmental Response
Team that is funded by EPA if the terrorist incident exceeds available
local and regional resources. EPA is the chair for the National Response
Team (NRT).

The following EPA reference material and planning guidance is
recommended for State, Tribal, and local planners:

• Thinking About Deliberate Releases: Steps Your Community Can Take,
1995 (EPA 550-F-95-001).

• Environmental Protection Agency's Role in Counterterrorism Activities,
1998 (EPA 550-F-98-014).

Web site: **www.epa.gov**

G. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

It is the policy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to be
prepared to respond swiftly in the event of national security, natural
disaster, technological, and other emergencies at the national,
regional, State, and county levels to provide support and comfort to the
people of the United States. USDA has a major role in ensuring the
safety of food for all Americans. One concern is bio-terrorism and its
effect on agriculture in rural America, namely crops in the field,
animals on the hoof, and food safety issues related to food in the food
chain between the slaughter house and/or processing facilities and the
consumer.

Web site: **www.usda.gov**

> 1\. **The Office of Crisis Planning and Management (OCPM).** This USDA
> office coordinates the emergency planning, preparedness, and crisis
> management functions and the suitability for employment investigations
> of the Department. It also maintains the USDA Continuity of Operations
> Plan (COOP).

2\. **USDA State Emergency Boards (SEBs).** The SEBs have responsibility
for coordinating USDA emergency activities at the State level.

3\. **The Farm Service Agency.** This USDA agency develops and
administers emergency plans and controls covering food processing,
storage, and wholesale distribution; distribution and use of seed; and
manufacture, distribution, and use of livestock and poultry feed.

> 4\. **The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).** This USDA agency
> provides food assistance in officially designated disaster areas upon
> request by the designated State agency. Generally, the food assistance
> response from FNS includes authorization of Emergency Food Stamp
> Program benefits and use of USDA-donated foods for emergency mass
> feeding and household distribution, as necessary. FNS also maintains a
> current inventory of USDA-donated food held in Federal, State, and
> commercial warehouses and provides leadership to the FRP under ESF
> #11, Food.

5\. **Food Safety and Inspection Service.** This USDA agency inspects
meat/meat products, poultry/poultry products, and egg products in
slaughtering and processing plants; assists the Food and Drug
Administration in the inspection of other food products; develops plans
and procedures for radiological emergency response in accordance with
the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP); and provides
support, as required, to the FRP at the national and regional levels.

6\. **Natural Resources Conservation Service.** This USDA agency
provides technical assistance to individuals, communities, and
governments relating to proper use of land for agricultural production;
provides assistance in determining the extent of damage to agricultural
land and water; and provides support to the FRP under ESF #3, Public
Works and Engineering.

7\. **Agricultural Research Service (ARS).** This USDA agency develops
and carries out all necessary research programs related to crop or
livestock diseases; provides technical support for emergency programs
and activities in the areas of planning, prevention, detection,
treatment, and management of consequences; provides technical support
for the development of guidance information on the effects of radiation,
biological, and chemical agents on agriculture; develops and maintains a
current inventory of ARS controlled laboratories that can be mobilized
on short notice for emergency testing of food, feed, and water safety;
and provides biological, chemical, and radiological safety support for
USDA.

8\. **Economic Research Service.** This USDA agency, in cooperation with
other departmental agencies, analyzes the impacts of the emergency on
the U.S. agricultural system, as well as on rural communities, as part
of the process of developing strategies to respond to the effects of an
emergency.

9\. **Rural Business-Cooperative Service.** This USDA agency, in
cooperation with other government agencies at all levels, promotes
economic development in affected rural areas by developing strategies
that respond to the conditions created by an emergency.

10\. **Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.** This USDA agency
protects livestock, poultry, crops, biological resources, and products
thereof, from diseases, pests, and hazardous agents (biological,
chemical, and radiological); assesses the damage to agriculture of any
such introduction; and coordinates the utilization and disposal of
livestock and poultry exposed to hazardous agents.

> 11\. **Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service
> (CSREES).** This USDA agency coordinates use of land-grant and other
> cooperating State college, and university services and other relevant
> research institutions in carrying out all responsibilities for
> emergency programs. CSREES administers information and education
> services covering (a) farmers, other rural residents, and the food and
> agricultural industries on emergency needs and conditions; (b)
> vulnerability of crops and livestock to the effects of hazardous
> agents (biological, chemical, and radiological); and (c) technology
> for emergency agricultural production. This agency maintains a close
> working relationship with the news media. CSREES will provide guidance
> on the most efficient procedures to assure continuity and restoration
> of an agricultural technical information system under emergency
> conditions.
>
> 12\. **Rural Housing Service.** This USDA agency will assist the
> Department of Housing and Urban Development by providing living
> quarters in unoccupied rural housing in an emergency situation.
>
> 13\. **Rural Utilities Service.** This USDA agency will provide
> support to the FRP under ESF #12, Energy, at the national level.
>
> 14\. **Office of Inspector General (OIG).** This USDA office is the
> Department's principal law enforcement component and liaison with the
> FBI. OIG, in concert with appropriate Federal, State, and local
> agencies, is prepared to investigate any terrorist attacks relating to
> the nation's agriculture sector, to identify subjects, interview
> witnesses, and secure evidence in preparation for Federal prosecution.
> As necessary, OIG will examine USDA programs regarding
> counterterrorism-related matters.

15\. **Forest Service (FS).** This USDA agency will prevent and control
fires in rural areas in cooperation with State, local, and Tribal
governments, and appropriate Federal departments and agencies. They will
determine and report requirements for equipment, personnel, fuels,
chemicals, and other materials needed for carrying out assigned duties.
The FS will furnish personnel and equipment for search and rescue work
and other emergency measures in national forests and on other lands
where a temporary lead role will reduce suffering or loss of life. The
FS will provide leadership to the FRP under ESF #4, Firefighting, and
support to the Emergency Support Functions, as required, at the national
and regional levels. FS will allocate and assign radio frequencies for
use by agencies and staff offices of USDA. FS will also operate
emergency radio communications systems in support of local, regional,
and national firefighting teams. Lastly, the FS law enforcement officers
can serve as support to OIG in major investigations of acts of terrorism
against agricultural lands and products.

H. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

> The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the Lead Federal Agency (in
> accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) for
> facilities or materials regulated by the NRC or by an NRC Agreement
> State. The NRC's counterterrorism-specific role, at these facilities
> or material sites, is to exercise the Federal lead for radiological
> safety while supporting other Federal, State and local agencies in
> Crisis and Consequence Management.
>
> Web site: **www.nrc.gov**
>
> 1\. **Radiological Safety Assessment.** The NRC will provide the
> facility (or for materials, the user) technical advice to ensure
> onsite measures are taken to mitigate offsite consequences. The NRC
> will serve as the primary Federal source of information regarding
> on-site radiological conditions and off-site radiological effects. The
> NRC will support the technical needs of other agencies by providing
> descriptions of devices or facilities containing radiological
> materials and assessing the safety impact of terrorist actions and of
> proposed tactical operations of any responders. Safety assessments
> will be coordinated through NRC liaison at the Domestic Emergency
> Support Team (DEST), Strategic Information and Operations Center
> (SIOC), Command Post (CP), and Joint Operations Center (JOC).
>
> 2\. **Protective Action Recommendations.** The licensee and State have
> the primary responsibility for recommending and implementing,
> respectively, actions to protect the public. They will, if necessary,
> act, without prior consultation with Federal officials, to initiate
> protective actions for the public and responders. The NRC will contact
> State and local authorities and offer advice and assistance on the
> technical assessment of the radiological hazard and, if requested,
> provide advice on protective actions for the public. The NRC will
> coordinate any recommendations for protective actions through NRC
> liaison at the CP or JOC.
>
> 3\. **Responder Radiation Protection.** The NRC will assess the
> potential radiological hazards to any responders and coordinate with
> the facility radiation protection staff to ensure that personnel
> responding to the scene are observing the appropriate precautions.
>
> 4\. **Information Coordination.** The NRC will supply other responders
> and government officials with timely information concerning the
> radiological aspects of the event. The NRC will liaison with the Joint
> Information Center to coordinate information concerning the Federal
> response.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

##### TAB C

# HOTLINES AND Online resources

> *Note: The Internet sites listed here are current as of April 2001.
> Users of this Tab should be aware that the Internet is a changing
> environment. New sites are added frequently. Sites also may be
> relocated or discontinued. Updated information on online resources
> will be provided through the FEMA web site, http://www.fema.gov.*

# A. TELEPHONE HOTLINES

# 

Domestic Preparedness Chemical/Biological HelpLine (phone: 800-368-6498,
fax: 410-612-0715, Web: http://www.nbc-prepare.org or
http://dp.sbccom.army.mil, e-mail: cbhelp@sbccom.apgea.army.mil) This
service provides technical assistance during business hours to eligible
State and local emergency responders and their organizations.

National Response Center Hotline (800-424-8802) A service that receives
reports of oil, chemical, biological, and radiological releases and
actual or potential domestic terrorism; provides technical assistance to
emergency responders; and connects callers with appropriate Federal
resources. The hotline operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (301-816-5100, collect
calls accepted) Accepts reports of accidents involving radiological
materials.

# B. INTERNET REFERENCE ADDRESSES

Army Training Support Center (http://www.atsc.army.mil) Provides a
digital library with approved training and doctrine information. Files
include Field Manuals, Mission Training Plans, Soldier Training Pubs,
and more.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (http://www.bt.cdc.gov)
Information regarding infectious diseases.

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
([http://www.apgea.army.m](http://www.cbdcom.apgea.army.m/)il)
Information on chemical/biological defense equipment and chemical
agents.

CBIAC: Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center
(http://www.cbiac.\
apgea.army.mil) Collects, reviews, analyzes, and summarizes chemical
warfare/contraband detection (CW/CBD) information.

Chemical and Biological Warfare -- Health and Safety
(<http://www.ntis.gov/health/health.html>) Department of Commerce
National Technical Information Service (NTIS) site has infor­mation on
chemical and biological agents, Government research, detoxification and
decontamination studies, developing immunizations, and drug theories.

Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO)
([http://www.epa.gov/\
ceppo/](http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/)) Information on the CEPPO office,
upcoming events, publications, legislation and regulations, and links to
outside resources. Also contains information on accident prevention and
risk management planning.

Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC)
([http://www.cmahq.com)](). Source of technical assistance from chemical
product safety specialists, emergency response coordinators,
toxicologists and other hazardous materials (HazMat) specialists.

Disaster Management Central Resource (DMCR)
(<http://206.39.77.2/DMCR/dmrhome.html>) Lackland Air Force Base (AFB)
site with information on civilian support resources, triage of mass
casualty situations, medicine and terrorism, terrorism injuries, and WMD
medical library.

FEMA -- Bio, Toxic Agents, and Epidemic Hazards Reference
([www.fema.gov/emi/edu/\
biblol1.html](http://www.fema.gov/emi/edu/biblol1.html)) Emergency
management-related bibliography on biological, toxic agents, and
epidemic hazards.

FEMA -- Emergency Management -- Related Bibliography
(http://[www.fema.gov/emi/edu/\
biblo12.htm](http://www.fema.gov/emi/edu/biblo12.html)) Currently 35
links to various emergency management-related bibliographies. At least
10 of these relate to WMD.

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
(http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/AEOD/FRERP/ downld.html)

U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)
(http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil) Home Page providing links especially
requests for CHPPM services. Links connect to Directorates of
Environmental Health Engineering, Health Promotion and Wellness,
Laboratory Sciences, Occupational Health, and Toxicology.

U.S. Army Medical Research and Development (R&D) Command
(http://MRMC-www.army.mil) Links include military infectious disease,
chemical and biological links, scientific and technical reports, and Web
site links.

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
(http://chemdef.apgea.army.mil) Provides data links to open literature
for medical management of chemical casualties and assay techniques for
chemical agents.

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(http://www.usamriid.army.mil) Provides links to Medical Command
(MEDCOM), Ebola site, outbreak reporting site, CDC, Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC), U.S. Army, and more.

C. Cross-Reference Web sites

1\. **Federal Departments/Agencies**

a\. **Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)**

\(1\) EPA's Chemical Emergency and Prevention Office (CEPPO). CEPPO
provides leadership, advocacy, and assistance to prevent and prepare for
chemical emergencies, respond to environmental crises, and inform the
public about chemical hazards in their community.
[***http://www.epa.gov/\
ceppo/***](http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/)

\(2\) EPA's Environmental Response Team (ERT). The ERT is a group of
skilled experts in environmental emergencies who provide on-scene
assistance on a "round-the-clock" basis to deal with environmental
disasters. ***http://www.ert.org/***

\(3\) EPA's Role in Counterterrorism. This Web site describes EPA's
counterterrorism efforts and shares relevant counterterrorism
information and resources.
[***http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cntr-ter.html***](http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/cntr-ter.html)

b\. **Department of Defense (DoD)**

\(1\) DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center.
This Web site is DoD's focal point for chemical and biological warfare
information.
[***http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil***](http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/)

\(2\) DoD's Counterproliferation: Chem Bio Defense. This is a DoD
"webnetwork" on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.
***[http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/](http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/main.htm)***

\(3\) DoD's Hazardous Technical Information Services (HTIS). HTIS is a
service of the Defense Logistics Agency, located in Richmond, Virginia.
[***http://www.dscr.dla.mil/htis/htis.htm***](http://www.dgsc.dla.mil/this/this.htm)

\(4\) DoD's Medical (Army Surgeon General). This Web site contains
extensive medical documents, training materials, audiovisual clips, a
search engine, and links to other sites.
[***http://www.nbc-med.org***](http://www.nbc-med.org/)

c\. **Department of Justice (DOJ)**

\(1\) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

\(a\) Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program
(ANSIR). The ANSIR is the "public voice" of the FBI for espionage, cyber
and physical infrastructure protection.
[***http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsd/ansir/ansir.htm***](http://www.fbi.gov/ansir/ansir.htm)

\(b\) National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The NDPO Web site
provides a location for information regarding the available Federal
training and programs intended to enhance the capabilities of the public
safety community in dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
NDPO mission, members, services, newsletter, and recommended links are
contained on this site.
[***http://www.ndpo.gov***](http://www.ndpo.com/)

\(2\) Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS).
OSLDPS provides technical assistance to States and local jurisdictions
to enhance their ability to develop, plan, and implement a program for
WMD preparedness. ***http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps/***

d\. **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

\(1\) Backgrounder: Terrorism. This FEMA Web site provides basic
background information on terrorism-related issues.
[***http://www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm***](http://www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm)

> \(2\) Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan. The site includes
> the full text of the Annex in PDF format that can be downloaded and
> reproduced. ***http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/frpterr.pdf***

\(3\) United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan. The link provides the full text of the plan, which is
designed to provide information to Federal, State, and local agencies on
how the Federal government will respond to potential or actual terrorism
threats. The document is in PDF format and can be downloaded and
reproduced. ***http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/conplan/***

\(4\) FEMA's Rapid Response Information System (RRIS). This Web site
provides descriptions and links to eight major chemical and biological
agent resources. ***http://www.fema.gov/rris/reflib2.htm#chembio***

> \(5\) National Fire Academy. The National Fire Academy homepage
> provides links to the course catalog and to specific courses and job
> aids relating to terrorism preparedness.
> ***http://www.usfa.fema.gov/nfa/***

\(6\) FEMA's Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study Course. This Web
site provides a link to a self-study course designed to provide basic
awareness training to prepare first responders to respond safely and
effectively to incidents of terrorism. ***http://www.usfa.fema.gov/\
nfa/tr_ertss1.htm***

e\. **Department of Health and Human Services**

\(1\) Office of Emergency Preparedness / National Disaster Medical
System -- The website provides information on current and previous
disaster responses, counter terrorism programs and links to other
Federal sites. ***http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov***

\(2\) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Program -- The website provides information on
bioterrorism preparedness issues, response planning and recent
publications related to bioterrorism. ***http://www.bt.cdc.gov***

> The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also provide
> helpful (though not comprehensive) lists of chemical and biological
> agents that might be used by terrorists. These lists are included in
> "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness
> and Response*,*" in CDC's *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*,
> April 21, 2000 (Vol. 49, No. RR‑4), available at
> http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/mmwr_rr.html.

\(3\) Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) -- Although the MMRS
program is locally controlled, this website provides information which
will assist any local, State or Federal planner or responder working
with domestic preparedness issues. ***http://www.mmrs.hhs.gov***

2\. **Other Resources**

a\. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. This Web site provides
information on the Administration's current initiatives in critical
infrastructure protection.
[***http://www.ciao.gov***](http://www.ciao.gov/)

b\. DOE's Radiation-Related Web sites. This Web site is maintained by
DOE's Office of Civilian Radiation Waste Management.
[***http://www.rw.doe.gov/***](http://www.rw.doe.gov/)

c\. National Response Team (NRT). The NRT Web site contains information
about standing NRT committees, the Regional Response Teams (RRTs),
upcoming events, and NRT publications.
[***http://www.nrt.org/***](http://www.nrt.org/)

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**TAB D**

# INCIDENT Indications and First Responder Concerns

**NOTE:** Extensive additional information on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) hazards and response, including information addressing
first responder concerns, is available from various commercial
publishers.

A. BIOLOGICAL

1\. **Indications.** Indicators that a WMD incident involving biological
agents has taken place may take days or weeks to manifest themselves,
depending on the biological toxin or pathogen involved. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently developed the following
list of epidemiologic clues that may signal a bioterrorist event:

a\. Large number of ill persons with a similar disease or syndrome.

b\. Large numbers of unexplained disease, syndrome, or deaths.

c\. Unusual illness in a population.

d\. Higher morbidity and mortality than expected with a common disease
or syndrome.

e\. Failure of a common disease to respond to usual therapy.

f\. Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent.

g\. Multiple unusual or unexplained disease entities coexisting in the
same patient without other explanation.

h\. Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.

i\. Multiple atypical presentations of disease agents.

j\. Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or
spatially distinct sources.

k\. Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of
agent.

l\. Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence.

m\. Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in noncontiguous areas,
domestic or foreign.

n\. Atypical aerosol, food, or water transmission.

o\. Ill people presenting near the same time.

p\. Deaths or illness among animals that precedes or accompanies illness
or death in humans.

q\. No illness in people not exposed to common ventilation systems, but
illness among those people in proximity to the systems.

> 2\. **First Responder Concerns**

a\. The most practical method of initiating widespread infection using
biological agents is through aerosolization, where fine particles are
sprayed over or upwind of a target where the particles may be inhaled.
An aerosol may be effective for some time after delivery, since it will
be deposited on clothing, equipment, and soil. When the clothing is used
later, or dust is stirred up, responding personnel may be subject to
"secondary" contamination.

b\. Biological agents may be able to use portals of entry into the body
other than the respiratory tract. Individuals may be infected by
ingestion of contaminated food and water, or even by direct contact with
the skin or mucous membranes through abraded or broken skin. Use
protective clothing or commercially available Level C clothing. Protect
the respiratory tract through the use of a mask with biological
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.

c.  Exposure to biological agents, as noted above, may not be
    immediately apparent. Casualties may occur minutes, hours, days, or
    weeks after an exposure has occurred. The time required before signs
    and symptoms are observed is dependent on the agent used. While
    symptoms will be evident, often the first confirmation will come
    from blood tests or by other diagnostic means used by medical
    personnel.

B. CHEMICAL

1\. **Indications.** The following may indicate a potential chemical WMD
has been released. There may be one or more of these indicators present.

a\. An unusually large or noticeable number of sick or dead wildlife.
These may range from pigeons in parks to rodents near trash containers.

b\. Lack of insect life. Shorelines, puddles, and any standing water
should be checked for the presence of dead insects.

c\. Considerable number of persons experiencing water-like blisters,
weals (like bee-stings), and/or rashes.

d.  Numbers of individuals exhibiting serious heath problems, ranging
    from nausea, excessive secretions (saliva, diarrhea, vomiting),
    disorientation, and difficulty breathing to convulsions and death.

e\. Discernable pattern to the casualties. This may be "aligned" with
the wind direction or related to where the weapon was released
(indoors/outdoors).

f\. Presence of unusual liquid droplets, e.g., surfaces exhibit oily
droplets or film or water surfaces have an oily film (with no recent
rain).

g\. Unscheduled spraying or unusual application of spray.

h\. Abandoned spray devices, such as chemical sprayers used by
landscaping crews.

i\. Presence of unexplained or unusual odors (where that particular
scent or smell is not normally noted).

j\. Presence of low-lying clouds or fog-like condition not compatible
with the weather.

k\. Presence of unusual metal debris---unexplained bomb/munitions
material, particularly if it contains a liquid.

> l\. Explosions that disperse or dispense liquids, mists, vapors, or
> gas.
>
> m\. Explosions that seem to destroy only a package or bomb device.
>
> n\. Civilian panic in potential high-profile target areas (e.g.,
> government buildings, mass transit systems, sports arenas, etc.).
>
> o\. Mass casualties without obvious trauma.

2\. **First Responder Concerns.** The first concern must be to recognize
a chemical event and protect the first responders. Unless first
responders recognize the danger, they will very possibly become
casualties in a chemical environment. It may not be possible to
determine from the symptoms experienced by affected personnel which
chemical agent has been used. Chemical agents may be combined and
therefore recognition of agents involved becomes more difficult.

C. Nuclear/Radiological

1\. **Indications.** Radiation is an invisible hazard. There are no
initial characteristics or properties of radiation itself that are
noticeable. Unless the nuclear/radiological material is marked to
identify it as such, it may be some time before the hazard has been
identified as radiological.

2\. **First Responder Concerns.** While there is no single piece of
equipment that is capable of detecting all forms of radiation, there are
several different detectors for each type of radiation. Availability of
this equipment, in addition to protective clothing and respiratory
equipment, is of great concern to first responders.

#### TAB E

# POTENTIAL AREAS OF VULNERABILITY

Areas at risk may be determined by several points: population,
accessibility, criticality (to everyday life), economic impact, and
symbolic value. The identification of such vulnerable areas should be
coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Traffic**               | Determine which roads/tunnels/bridges    |
|                           | carry large volumes of traffic.          |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Identify points of congestion that could |
|                           | impede response or place citizens in a   |
|                           | vulnerable area.                         |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note time of day and day of week this    |
|                           | activity occurs.                         |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Trucking and Transport  | Note location of hazardous materials     |
| Activity**                | (HazMat) cargo loading/unloading         |
|                           | facilities.                              |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note vulnerable areas such as weigh      |
|                           | stations and rest areas this cargo may   |
|                           | transit.                                 |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Waterways**             | Map pipelines and process/treatment      |
|                           | facilities (in addition to dams already  |
|                           | mentioned).                              |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note berths and ports for cruise ships,  |
|                           | roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and      |
|                           | container ships.                         |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note any international (foreign) flagged |
|                           | vessels (and cargo they carry) that      |
|                           | conduct business in the area.            |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | **NOTE:** The Harbor and Port            |
|                           | Authorities, normally involved in        |
|                           | emergency planning, should be able to    |
|                           | facilitate obtaining information on the  |
|                           | type of vessels and the containers they  |
|                           | carry.                                   |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Airports**              | Note information on carriers, flight     |
|                           | paths, and airport layout.               |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Annotate location of air traffic control |
|                           | (ATC) tower, runways, passenger          |
|                           | terminal, and parking areas.             |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Trains/Subways**        | Note location of rails and lines,        |
|                           | interchanges, terminals, tunnels, and    |
|                           | cargo/passenger terminals.               |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note any HazMat material that may be     |
|                           | transported via rail.                    |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Government Facilities** | Note location of Federal/State/local     |
|                           | government offices.                      |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Include locations of post office, law    |
|                           | enforcement stations, fire/rescue,       |
|                           | town/city hall, and local                |
|                           | mayor/governor's residences.             |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Note judicial offices and courts as      |
|                           | well.                                    |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Recreation Facilities** | Map sports arenas, theaters, malls, and  |
|                           | special interest group facilities.       |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Other Facilities**      | Map location of financial institutions   |
|                           | and the business district.               |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Make any notes on the schedule           |
|                           | business/financial district may follow.  |
|                           |                                          |
|                           | Determine if shopping centers are        |
|                           | congested at certain periods.            |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **Military                | Note location and type of military       |
| Installations**           | installations.                           |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **HazMat Facilities,      | Map location of these facilities.        |
| Utilities, and Nuclear    |                                          |
| Facilities**              |                                          |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+
| **NOTE:** Security and    |                                          |
| emergency personnel       |                                          |
| representing all of the   |                                          |
| above facilities should   |                                          |
| work closely with local   |                                          |
| and State personnel for   |                                          |
| planning and response.    |                                          |
+---------------------------+------------------------------------------+

**TAB F**

# DEFINITIONS

**Aerosol --** Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas, for
example, fog or smoke.

**Biological Agents --** Living organisms or the materials derived from
them that cause disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants or
cause deterioration of material. Biological agents may be used as liquid
droplets, aerosols, or dry powders.

**Chemical Agent --** A chemical substance that is intended to kill,
seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects.
Generally separated by severity of effect: lethal, blister, and
incapacitating.

**Consequence Management --** Measures to protect public health and
safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency
relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the
consequences of terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary
authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism. (Source: FRP
Terrorism Incident Annex, page TI-2, April 1999). The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has been designated the Lead Federal Agency
(LFA) for consequence management to ensure that the Federal Response
Plan is adequate to respond to terrorism. Additionally, FEMA supports
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in crisis management.

**Crisis Management --** This is the law enforcement aspect of an
incident that involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the
resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat of
terrorism. The FBI is the LFA for crisis management for such an
incident. (Source: FBI) During crisis management, the FBI coordinates
closely with local law enforcement authorities to provide successful law
enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also coordinates with
other Federal authorities, including FEMA. (Source: FRP Terrorism
Incident Annex, April 1999)

**Decontamination --** The process of making people, objects, or areas
safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or
removing the HazMat.

**Federal Response Plan (FRP) --** The FRP establishes a process and
structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of
Federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or
emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S. Code \[USC\], et seq.).
The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex defines the organizational structures
used to coordinate crisis management with consequence management.
(Source: FRP Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999)

> **Lead Agency --** The Federal department or agency assigned lead
> responsibility under U.S. law to manage and coordinate the Federal
> response in a specific functional area. The FBI is the lead agency for
> crisis management and FEMA is the lead agency for consequence
> management. Lead agencies support the overall Lead Federal Agency
> (LFA) during all phases of the response.
>
> **Lead Federal Agency (LFA) --** The agency designated by the
> President to lead and coordinate the overall Federal response is
> referred to as the LFA and is determined by the type of emergency. In
> general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to
> assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in
> order to provide an initial assessment of the situation, develop an
> action plan, monitor and update operational priorities, and ensure
> each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities under
> U.S. law and supports the LFA in carrying out the President's relevant
> policy. Specific responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the
> agency's unique statutory authorities.

**Mitigation --** Those actions (including threat and vulnerability
assessments) taken to reduce the exposure to and detrimental effects of
a WMD incident.

**Nonpersistent Agent --** An agent that, upon release, loses its
ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high
evaporation rate, is lighter than air, and will disperse rapidly. It is
considered to be a short-term hazard; however, in small, unventilated
areas, the agent will be more persistent.

**Persistent Agent --** An agent that, upon release, retains its
casualty-producing effects for an extended period of time, usually
anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A persistent agent usually has
a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier than air; therefore, its
vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term
hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution
should be taken to avoid skin contact as well.

**Plume --** Airborne material spreading from a particular source; the
dispersal of particles, gases, vapors, and aerosols into the atmosphere.

**Preparedness --** Establishing the plans, training, exercises, and
resources necessary to achieve readiness for all hazards, including WMD
incidents.

> **Radiation --** High-energy particles or gamma rays that are emitted
> by an atom as the substance undergoes radioactive decay. Particles can
> be either charged alpha or beta particles or neutral neutron or gamma
> rays.

**Recovery --** Recovery, in this document, includes all types of
emergency actions dedicated to the continued protection of the public or
promoting the resumption of normal activities in the affected area.

**Response --** Executing the plan and resources identified to perform
those duties and services to preserve and protect life and property as
well as provide services to the surviving population.

**Terrorism --** The unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives. Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who
are based and operate entirely within the United States and
U.S. territories without foreign direction and whose acts are directed
at elements of the U.S. government or population.

**Toxicity --** A measure of the harmful effects produced by a given
amount of a toxin on a living organism.

**Weapons-Grade Material --** Nuclear material considered most suitable
for a nuclear weapon. It usually connotes uranium enriched to above 90
percent uranium-235 or plutonium with greater than about 90 percent
plutonium-239.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction --** Any explosive, incendiary, or poison
gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than
4 ounces, or a missile having an explosive incendiary charge of more
than 0.25 ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; poison gas;
weapon involving a disease organism; or weapon that is designed to
release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.
(Source: 18 USC 2332a as referenced in 18 USC 921)

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

##### TAB G

# ACRONYMS

AFB Air Force Base

AMS Aerial Measuring System

ANSIR Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program

ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability

ARG Accident Response Group

ARS Agriculture/Research Service

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATSD(CS) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support

BDC Bomb Data Center

CBIAC Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Material, or
High-Yield Explosive

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group

CEPPO Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act

CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation Emergency Center

CHPPM Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine

CIRG Crisis Incident Response Group

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM Consequence Management

CMU Crisis Management Unit (CIRG)

CRU Crisis Response Unit

CSREES Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service

CST Civil Support Teams

CW/CBD Chemical Warfare/Contraband Detection

DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team

DFO Disaster Field Office

DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team

DMCR Disaster Management Central Resource

DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DPP Domestic Preparedness Program

DTCTPS Domestic Terrorism/Counter Terrorism Planning Section (FBI HQ)

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center

EM Emergency Management

EMI Emergency Management Institute

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOP Emergency Operations Plan

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to Know Act

ERT Emergency Response Team (FBI)

ERT-A Emergency Response Team -- Advance Element

ERTU Evidence Response Team Unit

ESF Emergency Support Function

EST Emergency Support Team

EU Explosives Unit

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEST Foreign Emergency Support Team

FNS Food and Nutrition Service

FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan

FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

FRP Federal Response Plan

FS Forest Service

HazMat Hazardous Materials

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit

HQ Headquarters

HRT Hostage Rescue Team (CIRG)

HTIS Hazardous Technical Information Services (DoD)

IC Incident Commander

ICS Incident Command System

IND Improvised Nuclear Device

JIC Joint Information Center

JOC Joint Operations Center

JTF-CS Joint Task Force for Civil Support

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

LFA Lead Federal Agency

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

MEDCOM Medical Command

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MSCA Military Support to Civil Authorities

NAP Nuclear Assessment Program

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office

NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team

NETC National Emergency Training Center

NFA National Fire Academy

NMRT National Medical Response Team

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRT National Response Team

NSC National Security Council

NTIS National Technical Information Service

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness

OFCM Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology

OIG Office of the Inspector General (USDA)

OSC On-Scene Commander

OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PHS Public Health Service

POC Point of Contact

PT Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate (FEMA)

R&D Research and Development

RAP Radiological Assistance Program

RCRA Research Conservation and Recovery Act

RDD Radiological Dispersal Device

REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site

ROC Regional Operations Center

RRIS Rapid Response Information System (FEMA)

RRT Regional Response Team

SAC Special Agent in Charge (FBI)

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (U.S. Army)

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SEB State Emergency Board

SERC State Emergency Response Commission

SIOC Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI HQ)

SLG State and Local Guide

TERC Tribal Emergency Response Commission

TIA Terrorist Incident Appendix

TRIS Toxic Release Inventory System

UC Unified Command

UCS Unified Command System

USC U.S. Code

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFA U.S. Fire Administration

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMD-CST WMD Civil Support Team

[^1]: Definitions of terms and acronyms used in this document are given
    in Tabs F and G, respectively.

[^2]: Table 5 provides an overview of events likely to occur in a WMD
    incident. It is designed to help planners better understand the
    interface that State and local response will likely have with
    Federal response organizations. The table includes both crisis
    management and consequence management activities that would be
    operating in parallel and is intended to illustrate the complex
    constellation of responses that would be involved in a WMD incident.

[^3]: ^\*^ For facilities or materials regulated by the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC), or by an NRC Agreement State, the
    technical response is led by NRC as the LFA (in accordance with the
    Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) and supported by DOE
    as needed.