**February 1, 2008 FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Program
Report**

**(1) Bellavita Article "Changing Homeland Security: Continuing
Commentary:**

Posting herein today another commentary on the quote below from an
unidentified former senior DHS official in Christopher Bellavita's
recent article, "Changing Homeland Security: The Year In Review --
2007." *Homeland Security Affairs*, V. 4, Is.1, Jan 2008. 
<http://www.hsaj.org/pages/volume4/issue1/pdfs/4.1.1.pdf>

 

> "The biggest issue in Homeland Security in FY \'07 was the reemergence
> of Emergency Management and the subsequent subjugation of homeland
> security.  The idea of homeland security as a discipline, that it is a
> system of systems, responsible for risk management in a jurisdiction,
> was greatly set back. The resurgence of emergency management has
> greatly slowed the progress that was made on getting the individual
> disciplines (fire, law enforcement, public health, infrastructure
> protection, EMS, public works, medical (physicians, nurses and
> hospitals), communications, intelligence, agriculture etc.) involved
> in homeland security to look at themselves as a part of a greater
> whole. Homeland Security appears to have regressed back to its
> previous 9/11 state of stove piped planning and possibly response."

**Commentary**

"The biggest issue in Emergency Management in 2002 was the emergence of
Homeland Security, and the complete lack of recognition at the federal
level of the importance of the work that FEMA (and indeed Emergency
Management as a whole) was doing.  This issue continued through August
2005 when it became apparent that forcing Emergency Management\'s
subjugation to Homeland Security was a cataclysmic mistake.   The notion
that Homeland Security is a \"discipline\" is unsupported by any
academic standard.  Further, to state that Homeland Security is a
\"system of systems responsible for risk management in a
jurisdiction\" is to display at a fundamental level a misunderstanding
of what Homeland Security\'s true identity and function is at the local
level.

"The so-called \"resurgence of Emergency Management\" was not a movement
in opposition to Homeland Security, but one precipitated by the narrow
focus presented by Homeland Security.  Emergency Management is, and
always has been, at its core about relationships and partnering at the
local, state and federal level.  It has long-embraced an all-hazard
approach that is focused on risk-assessment.  Homeland Security has not
regressed to its pre-9/11 state; indeed, the interests of Homeland
Security have moved more appropriately into the spectrum of hazards
under Emergency Management\'s purview.  Risk management done correctly
at the local, state and federal level encompasses more than terrorism. 
It is the foundation by which Emergency Management informs decisions and
seeks to create disaster resistant and resilient communities.  
Emergency Management is a discipline and emerging profession that has
long been a fundamental function of effective government.  Homeland
Security has not been set-back by Emergency Management; a more accurate
appraisal is that Homeland Security set itself back."

(Carol Cwiak, Emergency Management Program faculty, North Dakota State
University)

**(2) National Guard Commission Final Report -- Guard Not Prepared for
Disaster:**

Spiegel, Peter. "Guard, Reserves Called Inadequate for Domestic
Disasters." *Los Angeles Times*, 1 Feb 2008. Accessed at:
<http://lists.iaem.com/read/archive?id=9260>

\[Excerpt: **"**National Guard and reserve forces remain inadequately
equipped and unprepared to deal with a wide range of domestic disasters,
particularly an attack with unconventional weapons, a congressional
commission has concluded. In its final report, the panel said Thursday
that congressional and Pentagon policymakers had been reluctant to
acknowledge that the military remains the only institution that can
respond quickly to natural and man-made disasters. That reluctance
\"places the nation at risk,\" because it has led to shortfalls in
planning and readiness, the report said." \[Report on which this article
is based is noted and quoted from below.\]

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR). *Transforming the
National Guard and Reserves into a 21^st^ Century Operational Force*
(Final Report to Congress, Sec. of Defense). 31Jan08, 448 pp. At:
[http://www.cngr.gov/Final%20Report/CNGR%20Final%20Report.pdf](http://www.cngr.gov/Final Report/CNGR Final Report.pdf)

**\[**Excerpts: **"**The final report of the Commission... contains six
major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings....
Second, we assess the Department of Defense's role in the homeland and
whether it is clearly defined and sufficient to protect the nation; the
role that the reserve components, as part of DOD, and other interagency
partners should play in preparing for and responding to domestic
emergencies; the role and direction of U.S. Northern Command, the joint
command in charge of federal homeland defense and civil support
activities; the role that states and their governors should play in
homeland response; the need to rebalance forces to better address
homeland response needs; and the implications of these assessments for
the readiness of the reserve components." (CNGR, p.2)

"National security challenges fall into five categories:

-   The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that constitute a
    growing threat across the globe, including to the U.S. homeland, and
    the potential access to such weapons by individuals or terrorist
    groups who wish to use them indiscriminately on civilian
    populations.

-   Violent extremists, Islamist and other, who seek to control
    populations and geographic areas, attack U.S. soil, and harm U.S.
    interests throughout the world.

-   Disasters in the homeland such as pandemic disease, hurricanes,
    earthquakes, and floods that can harm populations and cause losses
    that equal or exceed those incurred by war.

-   Failed states; numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts that
    can cause humanitarian crises and endanger global stability; and
    nation-states containing safe havens for uncontrolled forces that
    threaten us.

-   Traditional nation-state military threats, including the rise of a
    near-peer competitor." (7)

"The nature and scope of the Department of Defense's role in providing
support to civil authorities have been described in policy. DOD's
*Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* recognizes that
homeland defense and civil support are total force responsibilities, and
it directs a "focused reliance" on the reserve components for those
missions. But there is no equivalent statement of DOD's homeland role in
law, and Congress has not specifically tasked the Department with its
civil support responsibilities. Policymakers seem reluctant to
acknowledge what is obvious to almost every expert who has written on
the subject or spoken to the Commission: because of its manpower,
communications, and transportation capabilities, **DOD is the only
organization that can deal with the consequences of a catastrophe
incapacitating civilian government over a substantial geographic area,
such as an attack by a weapon of mass destruction. The Commission
believes that this reluctance to acknowledge reality places the nation
at risk**." (CNGR, p.12; emphasis added)

"Another element not yet written in law is the proper role of the
reserve components in emergency response activities. **Nowhere is
specified the role that the National Guard and Reserves should play in
providing homeland civil support, up to and including responding to a
major catastrophe of the type described above**. While civil support is
a responsibility of the total force, it is a mission that the National
Guard and Reserves are particularly well-suited to performing. National
guardsmen and reservists live and work in communities throughout the
country. Their nationwide presence gives them a unique capability as
well as the knowledge, experience, and relationships needed to assist
civil authorities effectively in restoring order, protecting the public,
mitigating damage, and relieving suffering." (Ibid; emphasis added)

"Because the nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated
for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficient
trained, ready forces available. **This is an appalling gap that places
the nation and its citizens at greater risk**." (Ibid, 13)

"**There remain significant continuing challenges associated with U.S.
Northern Command**. The commander of NORTHCOM is responsible for the
planning, exercising, and command and control of Title 10 (federal)
forces in response to a domestic contingency. NORTHCOM should focus
equally on homeland defense and civil support missions. Although DOD
agreed in principle with the Commission's March recommendation to alter
the staffing at NORTHCOM and its component commands, and the Secretary
of Defense prescribed that "a significant percentage" of NORTHCOM's
billets should be filled by National Guard and Reserve personnel, U.S.
Northern Command has made only limited progress toward that goal."
(Ibid)

"The National Response Plan; its successor, the National Response
Framework; and related preparedness efforts have not been translated
adequately into DOD's programming and budgeting requirements. As we
discussed in our March report, **the Department of Defense has neither
explicitly programmed and budgeted for civil support missions nor
adequately equipped the National Guard for its domestic missions,
relying on the flawed assumption that they are derivative of its wartime
missions. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security has not
demonstrated a commitment to assuming its responsibility as the lead
agency for identifying the requirements that the Department of Defense
must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions.** DOD
has now agreed, as part of its budget processes, to evaluate civil
support requirements generated by DHS, but DHS has thus far failed to
generate those requirements for DOD to evaluate. In the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act, Congress requires DHS and DOD to coordinate
their programming for civil support. While this constitutes important
progress, DOD and DHS must demonstrate continuing commitment to the
successful implementation of this initiative in order for it to fulfill
its purpose of making the nation and its people safer." (Ibid, emphasis
added)

**"D. Providing Governors the Authority to Direct all Military Forces
within their State:**

There is a need to clarify lines of authority for military actions in
the homeland. The foundational tenet of national emergency management is
that problems should be solved at the lowest level practicable, and most
domestic response efforts will be managed at the state level or below.
Unity of command, by which we mean the direction of the efforts of all
military forces by one government official, is a time-honored principle
of military doctrine. However, no mechanism has been established to
permit a governor to direct within his or her state the unified efforts
of all military forces that are responding to domestic contingencies. In
a catastrophe, this lack could lead to confusion, wasted efforts, and
loss of life and property. The Department of Defense disagreed with the
Commission's March 1 recommendation to develop protocols that allow
governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to
an emergency such as a natural disaster, and incorrectly suggested that
such an approach is inconsistent with established law. In fact, similar
protocols are employed routinely overseas when U.S. forces are placed
under the command of a foreign commander. The process is fully
consistent with law and precedent. The President, as commander in chief,
can assign a task force of active duty forces as a supporting command to
a state military joint task force while retaining ultimate command
authority over those federal forces. This decision by the Department to
reject the Commission's recommendation, while offering no viable
substitute, places the nation at risk of a disjointed federal and state
military response to a catastrophe." (Ibid, p.14)

"**Conclusion Two**: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to
protect American lives and property in the homeland. DOD must improve
its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to
major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide
geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to
its combat responsibilities. As part of DOD, the National Guard and
Reserves should play the lead role in supporting the Department of
Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and states in addressing
these threats of equal or higher priority." (Ibid)

**Recommendations:** "Congress should codify the Department of Defense's
responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. This statutory
language should include the acknowledgment that responding to natural
and man-made disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD, of
equal importance to its combat responsibilities. Congress should also
clearly state that DOD should be prepared to provide the bulk of the
response to a major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian government
over a substantial geographic area and that DOD should initiate the
necessary planning, training, and coordination for such events." (Ibid)

\[BWB Note: On Conclusion Two and Recommendation noted above, compare to
testimony to the Commission on 13Dec06 by DHS Preparedness Under
Secretary George Foresman: "We have to have the capacity to prevent,
protect, and respond and recover domestically across a wide range of
hazards and threats that form our risk continuum. While the **military**
(whether we are talking about **active, reserve, or National Guard**),
are going to be important components, **they should not be foundational
components**. We know there are millions of State and local officials of
which approximately two million are firefighters, police officers,
public health officials, EMS professionals who are available to not only
respond to events within their jurisdiction, but also respond to events
across the country with the confine of interstate mutual aid. This
"force" of state and local civilian personnel is comparable to the size
of the U.S. military." (p. 2; emphasis added)

"Natural disasters can quickly overwhelm civilian response capabilities
and require military intervention to save lives and restore
communities." (CNGR, 59)

**"Forward Deployment of Military First Responders in the Homeland**

The 1.1 million service members in the National Guard and Reserves can
also be thought of as being forward deployed in their thousands of
communities across America. These service members are pretrained and
ready to respond to an emergency that exceeds the capacity of local
government personnel. Because they are based within their communities,
they often can respond immediately to help restore security, mitigate
suffering, and assist local and state officials in numerous other ways
that otherwise might not be available for days. When disaster strikes at
home, the first military responders will be national guardsmen and
reservists coming to the aid of their friends and neighbors. The value
of this linkage cannot be discounted. Examples of occasions when support
was required include Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Katrina, the Los
Angeles riots, and western forest fires.60 National Guard and Reserve
centers provide communities a shelter and a place to coordinate response
efforts. The value of this capability cannot be calculated using
traditional budget metrics. In contrast to the nationwide presence of
reserve component forces, the nation's active duty military forces are
increasingly isolated, interacting less frequently with the civil
society they serve. There are fewer active duty military bases, and
members of the active component reside in or near this limited number of
government facilities.

"*Civilian Skills*: The reserve component is a community-based force
filled with highly skilled members who are also representative of the
men and women in their larger communities. The diversity in their ranks
and the complementary value of their military and civilian skills, as
well as their grassroots connection with localities, add significant
value to the nation. Reservists bring to their service their civilian
skills, training, and professional experiences that are not easily
maintained in the active components.... To take the example of just one
service, Vice Admiral John C. Cotton pointed out that "the Navy has
identified 800 civilian skills among reservists that don't exist in the
active duty service \[.\]" Reservists are city planners, power plant
operators, waterworks directors, computer specialists, fire chiefs, and
police chiefs.63 Others are 'double-board-certified physicians'." (CNRG,
70)

**"**The reserve components are a valuable resource---a supply of
pretrained military manpower that is ready for domestic emergencies..."
(CNRG, 72)

"Despite producing policy documents claiming that protecting the
homeland is its most important function, the Department of Defense
historically has not made civil support a priority. This shortcoming is
especially glaring in the post-9/11, post--Hurricane Katrina
environment. Ensuring that the homeland is secure should be the top
priority of the government of the United States.13 In fact, the Joint
Staff has described it as the nation's "first priority . . . and . . . a
fundamental aspect of the national military strategy," further stating
that "\[i\]t is . . . essential to America's ability to project power,
sustain a global military presence, and honor its global security
commitments." (CNRG, 90)

Second, the charge of responsibility \[CNGR recommendation to Congress\]
should state that responding to natural and man-made disasters in the
homeland is a core competency of DOD that is equal in priority to its
combat responsibilities. Such a declaration does not mean that DOD
should "become the default manpower resource for other Federal agencies
or State or local governments" in every disaster.19 Nor does it mean
that DOD should displace DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) as the agency responsible for emergency management. It simply
underscores that the Department's role in protecting the American people
at home is of priority equal to defeating their enemies overseas. Given
the threat of mass casualty terrorism and the increased sensitivity to
the danger posed by natural disasters, DOD can no longer view its
disaster response--related responsibilities as a derivative or "lesser
included" capability. Only a statutory charge of responsibility will
cause DOD to shift its priorities so that it begins to sufficiently
plan, train, and exercise for the mission.

"And third, the charge of responsibility should clearly state that in
the event of a major catastrophe incapacitating civilian government over
a wide geographic area, DOD can be expected to provide the bulk of the
response. **While the Department of Homeland Security has the lead in
overall coordination of federal incident management activities, it is
not clear that it would have the capacity to coordinate the response to
such a catastrophic event**. Indeed, many knowledgeable experts flatly
state that only DOD has that ability. Terrorist attacks or natural
disasters of greater magnitude than Hurricane Katrina are very real
possibilities. A major nuclear attack on a large metropolitan area or a
Category 5 hurricane striking a large city would kill great numbers of
people and cause enormous damage to property and infrastructure. If such
an event occurs, it is likely that civilian government at some level
will be unable to deal with the consequences. In some circumstances,
until civilian government is able to do so, the

only organization with the manpower, communications, and transportation
capabilities sufficient to deal with the crisis will be the Department
of Defense. In that case, DOD may be required to perform many of the
functions of civil government until the crisis is resolved and civilian
government and the private sector are functioning. While this and other
nightmare scenarios have a low probability of occurring, their
consequences are so severe that DOD must be prepared to respond to them.
Such responses require advance planning, training, and coordination,
which DOD should initiate now." (CNGR, pp. 91-92)

\[Referring to the DOD's *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support***,** the CNGR writes:\] In that document, the Department
recommends a "Focused Reliance \[on\] the Reserve Components" for
homeland defense and civil support missions. It further asserts that
such reliance is not inconsistent with the total force policy.25 At a
Commission hearing, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale explained
what this statement means:

> 'we use the phrase "focus\[ed\] reliance" to indicate the obvious
> benefit . . . of using domestically-based reserve component
> capabilities, capabilities that are spread in reserve centers and
> National Guard armories throughout the United States---forward
> deployed if you will---to rapidly respond in an effective way to
> domestic missions, be they missions
>
> related to war fighting---and that is the defense of critical
> infrastructure---or consequence
>
> management after a natural or man-made disaster. It simply made sense
> to us to recognize the fact that we had a lot of trained personnel in
> military uniforms spread throughout the United States able to defend
> our nation and well-trained to do so.'
>
>  

"In contrast to the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*'s
use of the phrase "focused reliance," the White House report on
Hurricane Katrina recommended that "the National Guard \[and\] other
reserve components . . . should modify their organization and training
to include a

priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security
missions." The report went on to state that "the reserve components are
too valuable a skilled and available resource at home not to be ready to
incorporate them in any Federal response planning and effort..." (p. 93)

**"Finding:** U.S. Northern Command still does not adequately consider
and utilize all military components---active and reserve, including the
National Guard---in planning, training, and exercising and in the
conduct of military operations while in support of a governor, in
support of another lead federal agency, or in the defense of America."
(CNRG, 99)

"NORTHCOM must incorporate personnel who have greater knowledge of
National Guard and Reserve capabilities, strengths, and constraints and
must assemble a cadre of experts on the intricacies of state and local
government, law enforcement, and emergency response. Such knowledge
currently resides in the National Guard and Reserves and, despite the
Commission's earlier recommendations, remains untapped and unintegrated,
in disparate commands. A larger percentage of reservists on the staff
and in key leadership positions, including in the position of commander
or deputy commander, would provide NORTHCOM with greater insight into
the unique skills and strengths available in the reserve forces.
Increasing the numbers of members of the National Guard and Reserves
within the service components of NORTHCOM would ensure that those
preparing and coordinating homeland missions will consider the unique
contributions of the reserve component." (CNRG, 100)

"**Finding:** The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
generating civil support requirements. To date, it has not done so."
(CNRG, 103)

"The Commission wishes to emphasize...that DOD has historically resisted
accepting civil support as a mission for which it must program and
budget, and DHS has thus far failed to sufficiently engage DOD in
preparedness planning. Moreover, this shift will require deep
interagency cooperation between DOD, DHS, and other relevant
agencies---and such cooperation has heretofore been extremely limited."
(CNRG, 106)

"Because the nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated
for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficient
trained, ready forces available. This is an appalling gap, which puts
the nation and its citizens at greater risk." (CNRG, 107)

"**Finding:** There is no established process whereby governors can gain
operational control over federal military assets within a state to
respond to emergencies." (CNRG, 109)

"...allowing governors to direct the efforts of federal military forces
responding to a disaster is consistent with the nation's approach to
emergency management---that domestic incidents should be managed at the
lowest level possible---and will promote unity of command.101 Under the
current approach, National Guard responders will be directed by the
governor, while federal military forces within the state will be
directed by the President through NORTHCOM through a joint task force.
Allowing the governor to direct the efforts of all military forces
within his or her state will prevent the confusion and error possible
when two separate chains of command are present in the same operation.
Unity of command, by which we mean the direction of the efforts of all
military forces by one government official, is a time-honored principle
of military doctrine." (Ibid)

"Current military doctrine explicitly allows members of the United
States armed forces to serve under the operational control of foreign
commanders, with the President retaining ultimate command over U.S.
forces. If the command relationship with the President can be maintained
while American troops are operating under the control of foreign
commanders, we see no convincing reason that it cannot be maintained
while troops are under the control of a state governor acting through
the adjutant general.... If governors can be trusted to direct National
Guard soldiers from their own state or from other states, then they can
be trusted under similar circumstances to direct federal active and
reserve component forces as well." (CNRG, 110)

"Recommendation: 8. Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to
provide service Secretaries the authority to involuntarily mobilize
federal reserve components for up to 60 days in a four-month period and
up to 120 days in a two-year period during or in response to imminent
natural or man-made disasters, similar to that employed to mobilize the
Coast Guard Reserve under 14 U.S.C. §712." (CNRG, 112)

"**Finding:** Readiness standards do not incorporate information on
full-time manning levels or on the readiness of Guard and Reserve forces
to perform homeland missions." (CNRG, 184)

**(3) New FEMA:**

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *New FEMA 2008 -- Moving The Vision
Forward*. FEMA Fact Sheet, Jan 2008. At:
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=42442>

\[Note: Notice that the traditional four phases of emergency management
(1978-2006) are back -- in the first paragraph -- mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery. In 2007 it was protection,
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery \-- or prevention,
protection, response and recovery \-- depending on the document.\]

 

The End

 

B.Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., CEM

FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Program Manager

Emergency Management Institute, FEMA, DHS

<wayne.blanchard@dhs.gov>

<http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu>

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