**Eurasia 2020**

**Global Trends 2020 Regional Report**

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

### 

The Eurasia workshop for the National Intelligence Council's *Global
Trends 2020* report took place in Budapest, Hungary on April 25 to 27,
2004. The workshop gathered 21 participants from seven countries, in
addition to representatives from the National Intelligence Council and
the sponsoring institutions. The summary below represents discussions
that took place during the workshop and background papers prepared in
advance. It is not meant to cover all points raised, but to capture the
main themes that emerged during the course of the workshop. It should be
stressed also that the analysis presented here does not necessarily
represent the views of all participants. The goal is to present the main
findings, not to summarize the content of all workshop sessions.

The workshop was structured so that initial discussions focused on
sources of change in Eurasia over the next fifteen years. The findings
of these discussions were then assembled in patterns that constitute
potential scenarios for the future.

# 

# Drivers 

In scenario-building exercises, a 'driver' is an underlying force that
is variable and can lead to systemic change. Driver categories are
necessarily broad, such as demography, natural resources, or the
environment. During the course of discussion the focus on drivers
narrows. For example, the demographic driver is transformed into more
specific themes, such as the impact of dramatic changes in population or
large-scale immigration on the economy and society. Driver discussions,
particularly the interaction of drivers, form the foundation of the
scenario-building exercise that follows. As such, the scenario building
exercise is a bottom-up process.

# 

# Driver One: Economics and Natural Resources

One of the critical drivers of change in Eurasia will be the region's
economy. For Russia, the most important economic issue will be the
tension between **resource dependence** and **economic
diversification.** Through 2020, resource extraction will remain an
important part of Russia's economy. Russia is a world leader in terms of
resource extraction, particularly in the energy sector.

-   Estimates of Russian **oil reserves** vary from 50 billion barrels
    (BP) to 87 billion (World Bank) to 115 billion (Russian Ministry of
    Natural Resources).

-   Russia's total proved **gas reserves** in Eastern Siberia and the
    Far East amount to 45 trillion cubic meters, which translates into
    75 years of extraction. However, proved reserves are estimated to be
    only one-fifth of all available gas reserves in Russia. Russia will
    continue to be a major producer and exporter (currently, Russia
    delivers gas to every fourth European customer).

Russia is endowed with significant reserves of other critical resources
and remains a world leader in areas including **fresh water**, **arable
land**, and **forestland**.

The key economic challenge facing Russia from now through 2020 is
whether it can move beyond resource extraction and make the necessary
structural changes in order to diversify the economy, take advantage of
Russia's human capital, and become more integrated into the world
economy. The failure to diversify the economy could well lead to the
petro-state phenomenon of **underdevelopment**, huge **income
inequality**, **capital flight,** and **social tensions**. In this
context, economic development and growth through 2020 are integrally
interlinked with **effective governance structures**. This refers not so
much to liberal democracy but to an **efficient bureaucracy**,
**predictable and evenly enforced rules** and **regulations**, **the
rule of law** and other factors, such as **tax policies**, that can
stabilize the business climate in the country and allow for an
alternative to resource-dependent economic growth. Reforms in these
areas can encourage **foreign direct investment** outside of the energy
sector and allow Russia to take greater advantage of its proximity to
Europe and Asia. Reform of state structures, rather than state-directed
economic strategies, is likely to lead to economic diversification,
long-term growth, and higher standards of living. Cooperation with other
world regions, such as Europe and Asia, could allow Russia to take
advantage of natural strengths it has in certain areas of science and
technology and help its economic profile to grow beyond natural
resources and arms sales.

While resource wealth is sometimes seen as a potential impediment to
structural reform, the view of participants was that given the time
frame of this study, the relatively weak economic position in which
Russia currently finds itself, and Russia's current political and social
structures, reasonably high commodity prices are important preconditions
for structural reform. Reform is far more likely to occur over the next
15 years under conditions of relative prosperity than as a response to a
**resource shock**. The collapse of commodity prices and the
accompanying economic dislocation it would cause could severely hinder
economic diversification and growth, and could gut the emerging middle
class. It could also turn the population, which is adapting to current
conditions, away from the free market and its vagaries. Conversely, the
steadily growing **middle and entrepreneurial classes**, and the
emergence of highly skilled **business managers**, which are in part a
byproduct of current conditions, are likely, over time, to make demands
on government that will facilitate diversification and create a
foundation for long-term growth. In other words, tensions between
resource-based industries and other sectors (the Military Industrial
Complex, the IT sector etc.) can drive needed reforms.

Russia's growth, and growth within the entire former Soviet space, will
be regionally uneven and will reflect different levels of resources and
investment. For other resource-rich countries in Eurasia, particularly
in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) and the Caucasus
(Azerbaijan), there is less optimism about the potential for significant
economic diversification over the next 15 years. Kazakhstan has the best
prospects in this regard and may prove the exception. The countries will
continue to rely on **resource extraction** and suffer the economic and
social impacts of **skewed wealth distribution** and **severe economic
inequality**. All countries of Central Asia are likely to be challenged
by the twin pressures of **growing population** on the one hand, and a
**lack of arable land** and **water resources** on the other**.**

For countries with more limited supplies of natural resources, such as
Ukraine and Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the
challenge will be to develop effective production and service
industries. While the countries might benefit from the need to be
entrepreneurial, such development is very challenging and would require
a significant modification of governance structures, leading to more
efficiency and greater predictability. Changes are more likely to be
inspired by exogenous sources, such as the potential for (even limited)
membership in the European Union. While participants believed that full
membership in the European Union was highly unlikely by 2020, it was
noted that lesser forms of association under the rubric of flexible
geometry were possible within the time frame of the study. (This belief
was shared by participants of the National Intelligence Council's Europe
workshop.) Resource-poor countries could also benefit greatly from the
spillover effect of a dynamic and growing Russian economy, and could
cooperate with Russia on development of transportation corridors for
energy supplies.

Another issue that might have a significant impact on economic growth is
**demography.** The decline in population in Russia and the
corresponding population increase in Central Asia (see Driver Two) could
have significant economic consequences. Related to this, and critical
for countries of Western Eurasia (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), is the
issue of **brain drain**. A key question is whether these countries can
reverse trends from the past fifteen years and retain well-trained
workers, or even convince emigrants to return 'home'. As Europe's
population declines, this challenge might grow more acute. The economic
and demographic challenges can also be negatively impacted by
**environmental degradation,** which has been accelerated by the current
high rates of 'dirty' resource extraction. Were Russia to integrate more
into the world economy and enter into international regimes, such as the
**World Trade Organization** and the **Kyoto protocols**, it would face
pressure to address underlying environmental issues which could dampen
growth initially, but which might avoid worse difficulties in the
future.

# Driver Two: Demography and Health

Russia is clearly facing a **demographic crisis**. If current rates
continue, Russia will lose approximately one million people a year
through 2020, leaving it with a population of around 130 million people,
less if more pessimistic scenarios are realized. If current trends in
terms of low birth rate and short life expectancy continue, Russia could
have a population as low as 86 million by 2050. The potential growth of
**HIV/AIDS**, for which there are not currently reliable statistics, and
**drug resistant tuberculosis**, which is currently found primarily in
the prison population, could exacerbate already difficult circumstances.
The demographic decline poses challenges for the economy, because of a
potential shortage of available labor, for the **armed forces**, which
faces an ever-decreasing pool from which to conscript troops, and for
**national identity**, because one of the primary means through which to
address the demographic crisis is through immigration. One of the
primary challenges for political leaders will be to recognize the degree
of the crisis and to create a rational **immigration policy.** Expanded
immigration policies are likely to be met with opposition from
nationalist politicians, who could attempt to exploit the issue to
mobilize support. Due to **high population growth rates in Central
Asia**, particularly in Uzbekistan, this region could be one of the main
sources of potential immigrants to Russia. **China is another potential
source of workers**, but managing such immigration will be extremely
challenging and could create acute social tensions and potentially
tensions with China itself. Moreover, the rate of Chinese immigration
remains relatively low at this point, with Chinese preferring to develop
business relationships rather than settling in Russia permanently. The
potential to attract ethnic Russians from the 'near abroad' is not
sufficient to address likely needs. Moreover, Ukraine and Kazakhstan,
which have been significant net 'donors' to Russia in terms of
migration, might become sources of competition. Finally, Russia will
continue to face a challenge of **brain drain** of its highly skilled
and mobile population which itself is attracted to work in Europe, North
America, Australia, Israel, and beyond.

The challenge in **Central Asia** will be different. The population is
increasing significantly in most of the countries. Political leaders
will face challenges of keeping social peace in a context of **high
population growth in a relatively young population** with **limited
economic prospects**. The social and political consequences of this
growth, barring an outlet for the young population in Russia and
countries of Western Eurasia, could be severe.

## 

## Driver Three: Social and Ethnic Identity, Federalism and Regionalism

Russia's emergence from the former Soviet Union is characterized by a
larger degree of ethnic homogeneity, a centralized unitary state, and
weakening elements of federalism. Russian, as opposed to Soviet,
identity has strengthened and overlaps often with local and regional
identities. As generations change over the next fifteen years, Russian
identity is likely to continue to strengthen. However, due to Russia's
size and its regions' demographic, economic, religious, and social
differences, **regional identities will persist in spite of
centralization**. While they will often complement Russian national
identity, there remains the potential for significant tension.

As far as Russian federalism is concerned, it appears likely that
**Russia will continue to have weak regions and a strong central
state**. It is a strong possibility that Russia will have fewer federal
units than its current 89 regions, 22 of which are associated with
titularly recognized ethnic nationalities.

**Ethnic unrest** could result from changes in federalism if such
changes are instituted without consideration of local interests. Areas
that are particularly susceptible include the **northern Caucasus,
Tatarstan and Yakutia**. Unrest in the northern Caucasus, including the
difficulties in **Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia**, may prove
insoluble and could persist in one form or another through 2020. Another
potential source of ethnic relates to **xenophobia** which can emerge in
large urban areas and areas of high migration. There is also the
potential for aggressive **nationalist politicians using anti-Western
rhetoric** to sharpen tensions with **Europe** and the **United
States**. Russian relations with **China** could likewise be subject to
difficulties should Chinese migration expand and become more permanent,
creating a potential backlash.

Social and ethnic tensions might also develop in Central Asia, where
approaches to Islam can be a key source of tension. For example,
Kyrgyzstan has a more 'Westernized' North and an 'Islamicist' South,
where more **exclusivist approaches to Islam** thrive. Economic
difficulties, a **youth population bulge**, **developments in the Middle
East**, and the presence of **American military bases** could exacerbate
ethnic and religious tensions.

Countries in Western Eurasia will continue to balance between the pull
of Russia and the West. Ukraine will likely continue to seek admission
to **NATO** and the **European Union**. Georgia and Moldova are likely
to do the same or at least maintain their orientation in that direction
(with Moldova attempting to benefit from a European Romania). Russia
could either stand in the way, creating economic roadblocks or fomenting
social and ethnic tensions in some of these countries, or, it could
choose to pursue special relationships with Europe and NATO for itself.
Some form of formal association with Europe, including a lesser form of
membership under the general rubric of 'flexible geometry,' and an
increased role in NATO are not precluded. Full membership in the
European Union is highly unlikely. Alternatively, greater political and
economic integration might occur in the former Soviet space, led by
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and an inward looking turn could take
place. If the door to Western institutions is slammed on countries of
Western Eurasia, the reconsolidation of former Soviet space becomes more
likely.

# 

# Driver Four: Science, Technology and the Military

Russia is the only country in the former Soviet space that is likely to
be an important player with a worldwide impact in terms of **scientific
and technological developments,** although there is some potential for
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Russia will preserve its position as a developer
of **systems technologies** in areas such as **rocket and space
technology**, **nuclear energy**, **military aviation**, **computer
programming**, and some **information technology (IT)** areas. It is
unlikely that Russia would become a major producer outside of the
military sphere, but its strength in certain areas could place it in a
position to cooperate with Europe in competition with the United States.
Russian economic diversification could create a demand for new
technologies, but in the time frame of this study such indigenous
sources of demand for innovation are likely to be limited.

Russia's military will continue to be focused on protecting the
homeland. It will be **limited in terms of its capacity to project
force** and to control the high seas. The military will be challenged by
a combination of demographic decline, which will affect its capacity to
draft and/or recruit troops, and the relative backwardness of its
military technology. Given the challenges, Russia may attempt to make
the transition to a **professional army**. The growth of Russia's
military sales abroad and the potential of a scientific and
technological 'leap forward' exist and may inspire innovation,
particularly toward the end of the period to 2020. However, it is likely
that Russian scientific and technological development in the military
sphere will mostly be reactive and that Russia will continue to lag in
terms of its capabilities in the '**new generation of warfare**,'
particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Russia might also continue to
face a tremendous challenge in terms of its capacity to combat
untraditional enemies who use asymmetrical warfare. Under certain
circumstances, such as a growing threat from radical Islam, or a major
terrorist attack, the need to develop **'non-traditional warfare'**
could lead to increased cooperation between Russia, the United States,
and Europe.

## Other Drivers

Two other drivers emerged in discussion that, while they are intertwined
in the analysis presented above, are worth singling out in their own
right:

-   **Governance** plays a central role in terms of the capacity of
    countries to respond to new political and social challenges at home
    and threats from abroad. Governance also is critical to the creation
    of stable and predictable conditions necessary for economic growth.
    Administrative reform and sound policies can encourage, or at least
    remove impediments to, investment. In some countries there may also
    be fundamental changes in the political system (such as Ukraine,
    which could shift to a parliamentary form of government) that can
    have tremendous long-term impacts.

-   **Membership in international organizations,** including the
    **European Union**, **NATO** and the **WTO**, could inspire reforms
    through, for example, the necessity of complying with the ***acquis
    communitaire*** or rules concerning energy prices**.** Membership of
    certain countries could also create backlash. Moreover, the
    definitive **denial of potential membership** could have substantial
    consequences for individual countries and could alter regional
    dynamics.

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-   **Developments in China** will have a significant impact on Eurasia.
    **Economically**, if strong growth continues in China it will create
    a huge demand for Russian natural resources and keep prices high.
    Conversely, a collapse in the Chinese economy could undercut Russian
    economic development and dampen prices of natural resources.
    **Demographically**, China's large population makes it an obvious
    source for labor, given Russian needs. Should there be a large
    influx of ethnic Chinese into Russia, however, their presence could
    be a source of social tension and lead to strains between the two
    countries. In **foreign policy**, should tensions between China and
    the United States escalate, Russia is likely to sit on the sidelines
    and attempt to benefit where it can from, for example, arms sales.
    However, if China becomes **aggressively nationalistic**, it could
    push Russia and the United States closer together. Finally,
    **China's role in Central Asia** has yet to be defined. China could
    serve as a strong counterweight to Russia and the United States in
    the region. It could also ally with the United States and Russia to
    attempt to quell tensions should destabilization occur or should
    radical Islam spread.

## 

## Regional Variations

Perhaps the greatest challenge in the workshop was to develop scenarios
that could account for developments in what are now 12 distinct
countries in former Soviet space (the Baltic countries were not included
in the workshop). Russia, because of its size, strength, and resources,
was the primary focus of discussion, and was viewed to be critical to
developments of the region as a whole (in fact Russia can be considered
a driver for the rest of the region). At the same time, it should be
acknowledged that distinct regional developments could occur under very
different circumstances and regardless of the trajectory of Russia. For
example, Ukraine's path to the European Union (on however limited a
basis) is far more dependent upon developments within the EU and Ukraine
than developments in Moscow. Conversely, factors from outside of Russia
might have a tremendous impact on Russian developments. A failed state
in Central Asia or NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine are wildcards
that produce change.

Below are some of the main factors that will determine change in the
individual countries and regions and questions raised by them:

# Russia

-   **Effective governance**: Can Russia create functioning democratic
    institutions and can it accept more robust political competition?
    Even if Russia does not develop into a liberal democracy, can the
    Russian government create stable, predictable and functioning
    political institutions and develop the rule of law? Can local
    governments develop sufficiently to promote regional growth and
    quell potential sources of social and ethnic tension?

-   **Economic diversification**: Will Russia prove capable of shifting
    from an economy based on resource extraction and to one with
    significant service and manufacturing components? Can Russian
    business harness more effectively Russia's scientific and technical
    potential?

-   **Demography and immigration**: Will the government institute a more
    immigrant-friendly policy? Can Russia absorb immigrants without
    excessive social disruption?

-   **Ethnic Tensions:** Can the Russian identity limit xenophobic
    elements and can it continue to coexist with regional identities,
    particularly if there is a shift in federal structures? Will Russia
    shift to an isolationist path or will it remain engaged with the
    outer world?

-   **Border stability:** How would Russia respond to a failed state in
    Central Asia, the spreading of the conflict in Chechnya, or tension
    with China over immigration?

-   **Military:** Can Russia effectively modernize its military without
    draining excessive resources from areas in desperate need of
    investment, including infrastructure?

# Ukraine/Belarus/Moldova plus Caucasus

-   **Governance Structures**: Will more democratic and effective
    governance structures emerge? Will there be dramatic shifts in
    governments that are currently more authoritarian (Belarus) or
    democratic (Georgia)?

-   **International Institutions:** How will admission to, or rejection
    from, important international institutions, particularly the
    European Union and NATO, influence political, social and economic
    reform?

# Economic Development and Relations with Russia: Most of the countries will remain dependent on Russia for natural resources. Can resource-poor countries prove sufficiently entrepreneurial to spur long-term economic growth? Can they depend on Russia for resources and develop economic relations without falling prey to Russia's economic might?

#  Identity: To what extent can the countries develop a Western/European identity or will their identity be rooted in former Soviet space?

# Central Asia

-   **Governance/Succession:** A number of the authoritarian leaders of
    the region may leave their positions due to age or other pressures
    by 2020. Will succession processes create significant ruptures? Will
    any of the states collapse? Will the younger generation, which is
    currently shut out of power opportunities, have new opportunities?

-   **Demography:** Can the Central Asia countries that are undergoing a
    huge population explosion accommodate the growing young population?
    Will migration to neighboring countries, particularly Russia, be
    feasible?

-   **Economy:** Can countries of the region that are energy rich, such
    as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, attract foreign investment? Can they
    adjust to a reduction in commodity prices?

-   **Resources/Environment:** Can Central Asian countries feed and
    provide water for their population? How will dependence on Russia
    for critical resources affect their autonomy?

-   **Social Tensions:** Given current demographic trends, corrupt
    governance, and economic difficulties, will radical Islamic
    fundamentalism develop as a growing outlet for social discontent?

# Scenarios

One of the primary goals of the *Global Trends 2020* project is to
develop scenarios for the Eurasian region for 2020. Scenarios are not
projections, predictions, or preferences but plausible, internally
coherent illustrations of the future. Scenario building is an approach
designed to stimulate questions, widen perspectives, and explore
uncertain aspects of the future. As the authors of the *Scenarios Europe
2010* argued:

> Illustrating the future by means of scenarios is a way to overcome
> human beings' innate resistance to change. Scenarios can thus open
> mental horizons that allow the individual to accept and understand
> change, and so be able to shape the world. Scenarios may help seizing
> new opportunities ahead as well as avoiding undesirable effects of
> misconceived action.[^1]

Scenarios are designed to take policy-makers out of the present and to
allow them to confront conventional assumptions about the future.
Scenarios may also provide policy-makers with early warning of
troublesome trends that could impact regional or global stability, or
alert them to opportunities for constructive engagement.[^2]

# 

# Scenario One: Economic Prosperity and Political Stability

Russia prospers. Russia remains a leading world supplier of natural
resources, particularly in the energy field. Energy prices remain
relatively high and stable. Due to an evolutionary improvement in
governance, the decline in corruption, and the growth of effective,
stable and predictable institutions, Russia is able to diversify its
economy beyond the extraction of natural resources and into areas of
manufacturing and service. In cooperation with European countries its
intellectual capital is tapped to produce new goods based on scientific
breakthroughs. Foreign direct investment in Russia grows. There is a
more equitable distribution of wealth and a growth in Russia's middle
class. An increasing number of decision-makers in government and
business emerge whose formative years occurred during Russia's
transition from totalitarian rule, and who are sympathetic to more
transparent and predictable structures of governance. The huge
demographic challenge facing Russia is somewhat ameliorated by
immigration policies. Russia experiences a decline in brain drain and
becomes a destination for immigrants, particularly from Central Asia.
Russian prosperity allows it to absorb immigrants without significant
disruption or ethnic tensions.

There is increasing diversity in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine and
other countries, potentially including Moldova, a post-Lukashenka
Belarus, and Georgia, feel the pull of the new Europe and push for
association with it through forms of 'flexible geometry.' While full
membership is unlikely to be achieved, the clear path to membership and
status within the Union pushes the countries to adopt internal changes
due to the *acquis communitaire* and to develop more effective
governance structures. Russia is tolerant of this orientation and Russia
and Europe create some type of special relationship based on cooperation
in a number of fields. Russian cooperation with Europe in scientific and
technological fields grows. The wealthy nations of the region, including
Russia and Kazakhstan, remain close to each other, but tolerant of
others. Central Asia remains stable.

# Scenario Two: Muddling Through

The Russian economy remains dependent upon extraction of natural
resources. While this allows for economic growth, the economy does not
become diversified. Russia fails to develop efficient and stable
institutions of governance. Political power remains highly centralized,
competition is highly circumscribed, and governmental structures are not
transparent. There remains a tremendously inequitable distribution of
wealth with a relatively small middle class. Significant elements of
oligarchic structures remain intact. Foreign direct investment, outside
of the energy sector, remains low and capital flight persists. Labor
mobility is limited while brain drain of scientific and technical
experts continues. The country's capacity to respond to demographic
decline is limited, creating a long-term drag on the economy. Russia
maintains a fairly strong influence within the post-Soviet space but
this influence will be limited because of Russia's limited capacity to
project power

Post-Soviet space experiences asymmetric heterogeneity and increasing
regionalization. Ukraine faces similar difficulties to Russia and its
response depends upon the potential of its admission to European
institutions. To the extent that there is optimism about admission to
Europe, it will follow its own path. Should the door to Europe be
closed, it will move closer to Russia. Belarus remains authoritarian,
with an orientation towards Russia.

Central Asia remains underdeveloped politically and economically.
Russian cooperation with Kazakhstan remains strong. The Caucasus region
continues to struggle both politically and economically, with ethnic
tensions and the potential for democratic backsliding.

**Scenario Three: Decline and Isolation**

Post-Soviet space becomes united and more isolated from the rest of the
world. Russia remains stable but with highly circumscribed democratic
possibilities and strong limits on civil society. Nationalist rhetoric
increases and xenophobic tendencies emerge. Views of a special Russian
path of development grow more popular. The Russian economy stagnates.
Natural resource prices fluctuate and might decline, and Russia
experiences little economic diversification. Demographic challenges,
including low birthrates and an aging population persist. Popular
attitudes and government policies remain hostile to immigration,
particularly from Central Asia. Economic and demographic challenges
produce tremendous pressure on the economy and income inequality grows.

The difficulty of digesting new entrants into the European Union and
intra-European tensions make it clear that prospects of countries from
Western Eurasia joining the EU in any significant numbers are limited,
resulting in a substantial inward turn. Integration within the former
Soviet space grows significantly. The United States is less engaged in
the region and more concerned with stability, so its role in terms of
promoting democracy in Western Eurasia declines. Inter-ethnic conflict
in the northern Caucasus persists, as do tensions between countries in
the Caucasus region. In Central Asia, Islamic fundamentalism is on the
rise in response to frustrations of the growing young population and
failure to create and governmental reforms. An external shock, such as a
disintegrating or civil-war torn Iraq, or the collapse of the Saudi
regime, inspires more radical actions against established authoritarian
regimes. Some of the Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, face potential collapse. A power vacuum is
created and the region becomes a battleground between Russia, the United
States, Middle Eastern countries, and China.

# 

# Scenario Four: Central Asian Meltdown

Tensions in Central Asia brought on by authoritarian rule, high
population growth, and little opportunity for unemployed and
disenfranchised youth bring on rising Islamic fundamentalism. Due to US
failure in Iraq and Afghanistan and more aggressive support from Middle
Eastern regimes, regime collapse occurs in one country and/or an
aggressive Islamic state emerges. In response, other countries become
more closely integrated with Russia. Russia, with strong American
support and European acquiescence, becomes an important front in a
worldwide terrorism battle, and US/Russian cooperation in the security
sphere deepens, particularly in response to non-traditional warfare.
Russian/Kazakh cooperation deepens. Other countries of the region, such
as Ukraine, benefit from Western cooperation with Russia and enjoy
greater flexibility in terms of their long-term strategic choices.

**Wild Cards**

A "wild card" is a significant surprise, a discreet event or occurrence
that has tremendous potential to alter the future in a significant way.
Examples of wild cards include: a large-scale terrorist incident; the
assassination of a key leader; or a key technological breakthrough.

Some of the wild cards mentioned include the following:

-   **Failed state and/or succession crisis in Central Asia.** One of
    these developments would have significant implications for the roles
    of Russia and the United States in the region, and for the potential
    growth of radical Islam.

-   **Collapse of the regime in Belarus.** A collapse of the regime
    could result in absorption into Russia or a new country seeking to
    join Europe.

-   **European crisis.** Should internal tensions, particularly related
    to expansion, sunder the European Union it would have significant
    consequences for the countries of Western Eurasia.

-   **NATO membership for Ukraine/Georgia.** NATO membership could
    solidify these countries' position vis-à-vis the West but could
    create a huge backlash within Russia spurring on anti-American and
    anti-Western sentiment.

-   **US failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.** A total US defeat and
    pullout of the area could embolden regimes in the Middle East,
    particularly countries, like Iraq, which share ethnic affinities
    with groups in Central Asia, to push greater autonomy and/or Islamic
    fundamentalism.

[^1]: *Scenarios Europe 2010: Five Possible Futures for Europe*, Gilles
    Bertrand, Anna Michalski, and Lucio R. Pench eds., Working Paper,
    July 1999, p. 10.

[^2]: *Scenarios Europe 2010: Five Possible Futures for Europe*, Gilles
    Bertrand, Anna Michalski, and Lucio R. Pench eds., Working Paper,
    July 1999, pp. 9-10.