Review of Systems for\
Early Detection and Rapid Response

June 6, 2002

Jim Worrall

USDA Forest Service

Forest Health Protection

For the National Invasive Species Council

### Introduction

The purpose of this review is to study systems in use by a variety of
organizations for early detection and rapid response to undesirable
events whose scope and impact may be reduced by prompt action. It is
hoped that these systems will provide models and con­cepts for potential
use in a comprehensive, integrated, biosecurity system for early
detec­tion and rapid response to invasive species in the United States.

It is universally agreed that prevention/exclusion is the most effective
approach to the problem of invasive species. However, there is a similar
consensus that more introduc­tions are inevitable in the current climate
of trade and travel. Because the chances for eradication or containment
are greatest immediately after introduction, early detection and rapid
response will be an important part of our system to manage the prob­lem.

> **Early Detection**, as applied to invasive species, is a
> comprehensive, integrated system of active or passive surveillance to
> find and verify the identity of new invasive species as early after
> entry as possible, when eradication and control are still feasible and
> less costly. It may be targeted at: a) areas where introductions are
> likely, such as near pathways of introduction, and; b) sensitive
> ecosystems where impacts are likely to be great or invasion is likely
> to be rapid.
>
> **Rapid response** is a systematic effort to eradicate, contain or
> control invasive species while the infestation is still localized. It
> may be implemented in response to new introductions or to isolated
> infestations of a previously established, non­native organism.
> Preliminary assessment and subsequent monitoring may be part of the
> response. It is based on a system and infrastructure organized in
> advance so that the response is rapid and efficient.

A brief examination of critical elements and analysis follows the
description of each system. In lieu of an executive summary, the review
closes with a statement of conclu­sions and recommendations.

Table of Contents

[APHIS Veterinary Services 4](#aphis-veterinary-services)

[APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine
10](#aphis-plant-protection-and-quarantine)

[Forest Pathogens and Insects 16](#forest-pathogens-and-insects)

[Early Warning and Rapid Response System for Invasive Plants
19](#early-warning-and-rapid-response-system-for-invasive-plants)

[Interagency Fire Management 23](#interagency-fire-management)

[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
27](#centers-for-disease-control-and-prevention)

[Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force
34](#aquatic-nuisance-species-task-force)

[Harmful Algal Blooms 38](#harmful-algal-blooms)

[Oil Spills 42](#oil-spills)

[Incident Command System 45](#incident-command-system)

[Case Studies of Rapid Response 49](#case-studies-of-rapid-response)

[Conclusions 54](#conclusions)

# APHIS Veterinary Services

Within USDA-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
Services is responsible for surveillance for and response to outbreaks
of domestic, introduced and emerging animal diseases. The system, as
well as exclusionary measures, were recently reviewed by the National
Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA 2001). This
[Safeguarding Review](http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/safeguard.htm) frames
the system within the larger issue of biosecu­rity: "The primary goal of
biosecurity is to protect against the risk posed by disease and
organisms; the primary tools of biosecurity are exclusion, eradication,
and control, sup­ported by expert system management, practical protocols,
and the rapid and efficient securing and sharing of vital information."

### Detection and Surveillance

Systems of active surveillance for foreign animal diseases (FADs) by VS
include programs targeted to detect/eradicate domestic diseases (e.g.,
brucellosis, tuberculosis and pseudorabies) as well as some FADs such as
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease), classical swine
fever, and some others. Additional FADs, though not targeted, may be
detected during some of these surveillance activities. These activities
include inspection and testing at livestock markets, slaughterhouses,
etc. and are imple­mented by a combination of state and federal
employees.

In addition, the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) examines
animals before and after death and looks for lesions or other symptoms.
Animals with FAD symptoms are prevented from slaughter and referred to
APHIS. These inspections pro­vide another type of active surveillance.

Passive detection occurs when a report of a suspected FAD is received
from a private practitioner, veterinary school, state veterinarian,
industry, or any other source. Federally accredited veterinarians are
required by law to report certain diseases; this requirement is
implemented by states. Incentives to become accredited include not only
status, but also authority to sign certain certifications for health of
animals. However, veterinary medical practitioners in general are
sensitized to the danger of disease outbreaks and FADs in particular.
States require industry to report certain particularly virulent/exotic
dis­eases. Veterinary schools generally have laboratories and teaching
hospitals and may receive samples or reports of unusual occurrences in
their area, and would further report cases that appear to be FADs.

Laboratories provide another avenue of passive detection. Veterinary
laboratories are generally closely linked with the National Veterinary
Services Laboratories (NVSL). NVSL is a reference laboratory. Other
laboratories send questionable samples to NVSL, obtain checks on the
performance of their testing, obtain technical information, etc. NVSL
evaluates, standardizes and defines protocols for use by other
laboratories and provides training to state laboratories, Veterinary
Medical Officers and others on testing for domestic and selected exotic
diseases. A special course at the For­eign Animal Disease Diagnosis
Laboratory (FADDL) on Plum Island focuses on clinical recognition of
FADs. An unusual sample would be reported and would generally be sent to
NVSL.

Several systems in VS monitor and report animal health nationally, but
are not expected to be primary detectors of an invasive disease. The
National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) can serve in assessing
outbreaks. The National Animal Health Reporting Sys­tem collects monthly
and annual disease reports from states and provides them nationally.

### Response

The initial report of a possible FAD usually goes through the State
Veterinarian's office or VS's Area Veterinarian in charge (AVIC). These
positions are co-located in most cases so communication is enhanced. A
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) is generally dispatched to
the premises. FADDs are trained at the FADDL on Plum Island, take
continuing education courses, and are federally certified for this role.
They may be state or federal employees. The FADD rapidly assesses the
situation, determines spread, and judges whether a FAD is unlikely,
possible, or highly likely. He/she collects samples and sends them to
the NVSL for processing. The samples are prioritized by NVSL based on
the FADD's classification of the situation. If the situation warrants,
the FADD may institute a quarantine even before laboratory results are
avail­able, but after consultation with the State Veterinarian and/or
AVIC.

If a FAD is likely, the FADD stays on the scene, tracing the movement of
animals into and out of the premises, establishing a quarantine,
educating owners, checking humans and other animals for disease, and
coordinating with the State Veterinarian, AVIC, NVSL, and state
emergency management agencies.

An Early Response Team (ERT) may come to the scene to support the work
of the FADD. It is usually composed of an epidemiologist, pathologist,
and laboratory special­ist. They look at the scope of the problem,
collect additional samples, and generally con­duct a broader
investigation than the FADD can do alone.

If the scale of the situation is large or a highly contagious disease is
involved, a Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization
(READEO) would usu­ally be mobilized. The READEO, composed of VS and
state personnel and military liai­son, has a broader array of specialists
and logistical support than the ERT. They receive training and undergo
mock exercises to prepare for mobilization. There are currently two
READEOs in the country corresponding to APHIS regions.

With declining budgets, the scope of functional areas and resources
available to READEO teams have become more limited. VS relies
increasingly on state agencies to provide some of those resources and
particularly logistical support, equipment, quaran­tine enforcement, etc.
As it turns out, state people can often handle those aspects more
effectively than federal personnel because they have local resources,
know the local agencies, and are familiar with the area and agricultural
industry.

### Response Facilities

APHIS maintains an Emergency Operations Center (formerly Emergency
Manage­ment Operations Center) at Riverdale. This is essentially a
situation room for monitoring and communications during a large-scale
emergency response. To manage data collected during an outbreak for
epidemiology, mapping, sample and animal tracking, logistics, etc., VS
has developed a database, Emergency Management Response System. It was
formerly based on Lotus Notes, but is migrating to a web-based system so
that non-federal coop­erators can access it.

### National Animal Health Emergency Man­agement System (NAHMS) Guidelines

The NAHMS Guidelines are essentially detailed written operational plans
for an emergency response. Formerly, they were under the name United
States Emergency Response Plan System (USERPS). At that time, there was
a manual, or "Red Book," for the response to each specific FAD that was
anticipated. Now, VS is no longer orient­ing these manuals toward
particular diseases but to functional areas involved in the response
(biosafety, disposal, compensation, vaccination, etc.). They give very
detailed guidelines for response activities. For example, euthanasia
procedures are described, the procedures for carcass disposal are
described and diagrammed, and details of quarantine imple­mentation and
enforcement are described. It is felt that orienting the manuals to
functional areas rather than diseases will not only reduce redundancy,
but also facilitate the response to unknown as well as known diseases.

### Declaration of emergency

When VS determines that the situation warrants and has concurrence from
the Administrator of APHIS, the Assistant Secretary for Mar­keting and
Inspection Services is notified and a Secretarial declaration of a
National Emergency is requested. Issuing a declaration of Emergency
allows the Secretary to transfer funds from other sources in the
Department to support the emergency program and to obtain resources and
support from other departments, such as the military. Sources of funding
include the Commodity Credit Corporation, a USDA-managed corpo­ration
initially established to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and
prices. Fed­eral quarantines (regulating interstate and international
movement of animals) may be imposed. States are requested to enforce the
federal quarantine regulations.

If adequate measures are not taken by states to control the disease, the
Secretary of Agriculture may declare an Extraordinary Emergency. An
Extraordinary Emergency requires confirmation of the diagnosis by NVSL.
This authorizes the Department to seize, quarantine and dispose of
animals, even if they are not involved in interstate movement.
Additional authorities for inspection of conveyances and premises are
also provided. It also allows the Secretary to compensate owners for
destruction of animals and reimburse states or other groups for response
costs.

Congress recently enacted Public Law 107-9, Animal Disease Risk
Assessment and Control. This requires VS to report to Congress plans for
response to two especially seri­ous FADs, foot-and-mouth disease and
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease). Such an emergency
could exceed the scope of a READEO and exhaust the resources of the
affected states. VS is working with FEMA to coordinate the detailed
implementation of a large-scale emergency response. This would require a
Presidential Declaration of Emergency. Scenarios for FEMA involvement
include an outbreak of mad cow disease comparable to the recent one in
the UK and an intentional disease intro­duction (bioterrorism) at many
sites. FEMA can rapidly supply the logistical support needed for such a
response. FEMA has encouraged VS to use the Incident Command System (see
separate section) to manage a response, and VS is studying that system.

### Some comments from the Animal Health Safeguarding Review

**Detection**

The Safeguarding Review noted that there needs to be more integration
and shared vision of surveillance activities. The National Surveillance
System (NSS) that is recommended in the Safeguarding Review is intended
to deal with outbreaks of endemic diseases, introduced foreign dis­eases,
and emerging diseases.

The elements of an effective surveillance system, as recom­mended in the
review, are:

**Standardization**. Data must be collected and diagnoses made and
reported in a consistent manner. A "diagnostic and reporting standards
group" is recommended.

**Identification**. A national identification system is needed to
support NSS and meet international expectations.

**Data capture**. Information management must be built into NSS as it
develops. It should accommodate endemic, emerging and foreign animal
diseases. Although many databases exist at many levels, they are not
consistent in data definitions, operating systems and database formats.

**Data description and analysis**. The NSS should permit summary
statistics and queries to quickly identify areas in need of further
investigation or resources.

**Interpretation**. Data collected for the NSS must be interpreted in
context to evaluate its implications for animal health. This must occur
before communi­cating risk or recommendations for response.

**Dissemination and feedback**. Surveillance reports should be broadly
accessible and easily exchanged among participants and interested
parties. They can be used to substantiate animal health claims,
illuminate emerging issues, and direct program efforts.

> **Response**
>
> **Response plan**. A response plan should be dynamic and include
> enhanced train­ing; mobilization of supplies, resources and personnel;
> clarification of roles and responsibilities for agencies and groups;
> and coordination of response providers. A single-volume response
> manual should be prepared.
>
> **Legal authorities** should be arranged so that challenges or appeals
> do not delay and jeopardize effective emergency response.
>
> **READEO**. Strengthen the Regional Emergency Animal Disease
> Eradication Organization (READEO) so that it is prepared to mesh with
> other groups, using the incident command system. Contingency plans
> must be in place for emergencies that are larger than READEO can
> handle.
>
> **Personnel**. Create a pool of emergency responders from retired
> animal health officials at state, federal and university levels;
> multiple agencies; private practitioners, other skilled personnel.
> Consider use of military and reserve veterinarians and support staff.
>
> **Laboratories**. Ensure that there is a federal/state network of
> diagnostic laborato­ries to support response actions.
>
> **Decisions in advance**. There must be clear lines of authority,
> ready financial resources and clear rules for compensation for
> destruction of private property to ensure rapid and effective
> response.

### Analysis and critical elements

The apparent respect for and effectiveness of VS in detection and
response to outbreaks and introductions of animal diseases is probably
due to several factors:

1.  VS has close working relationships with State Veterinarians, with
    clearly defined roles. In most cases the Area Veterinarian in Charge
    (the VS representative, usu­ally at the state level) is co-located
    with the State Veterinarian.

2.  Veterinary medicine practitioners generally belong to professional
    societies that actively integrate members into national and state
    issues and activities. Accred­ited veterinarians are required by law
    to report certain diseases and are sensitized to the need to be on
    the lookout for new diseases.

3.  VS has a high-caliber staff.

4.  The national leadership of VS is reinforced by their role in
    national training and cer­tification of veterinarians, Foreign Animal
    Disease Diagnosticians and other veterinary professionals. The
    training is of high quality and very popular.

5.  VS has established clear, effective and relatively simple systems
    for active and pas­sive surveillance and for response. Procedures,
    roles, responsibilities, and notifications are clearly laid out.
    There seems to be little redundancy in the sys­tems.

6.  Although VS provides leadership and organization, many of the roles
    in detection and response can be played by state, federal or other
    personnel. States provide most of the funding and resources for
    response until an emergency is declared. States are closely
    integrated into the system. For instance, whether a FADD is a state
    or federal employee, he/she has the same clearly defined role and
    procedures to follow. Similarly, regardless of whether a READEO team
    member is from a federal, state, military, industry or other
    organization, he/she knows his role in the team effort and how to
    accomplish it.

7.  Because domesticated animals generally undergo close scrutiny and
    comprise a restricted scope of surveillance relative to wild
    habitats, detection of introduced animal diseases generally occurs
    soon after introduction.

# APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine

Plant Protection and Quarantine, in addition to facilitating
certification for commod­ity export, is responsible for preventing the
entry and establishment of invasive plant pests in the form of insects,
plant diseases and invasive weeds. Exclusion is a large part of the
effort, but detection and control of invaders is a significant and
growing part of the program.

The scope of the problem facing PPQ is enormous. The plant resources to
be pro­tected include not only agricultural and horticultural crops, but
also forestry resources and natural ecosystems: nothing less than all
the native and cultivated plants in the coun­try. Potentially invasive
species of pathogens, insects and weeds probably number in the tens of
thousands and many have not yet been described by science. Despite
exclusion efforts, increases in international travel and trade have
increased the likelihood of intro­ductions. As described in the 1999
stakeholder review, "Safeguarding American Plant Resources," the result
has been a constant state of emergency for PPQ, state plant protec­tion
agencies, and stakeholders.

PPQ recently reorganized detection and emergency response activities
under the new program, Surveillance and Emergency Programs Planning and
Coordination (SEPPC). Other groups involved in response include Invasive
Species and Pest Management (ISPM) and National Identification Services
under PPQ Plant Health Programs, the New Pest Advisory Group under
Center for Plant Health Science and Technology, and Regional Rapid
Response Teams. The roles of these groups are discussed below.

![](media/image1.png){width="5.991666666666666in"
height="4.089583333333334in"}

Organization of APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine for early
detection and/or response. Groups with major responsibility are in
larger type.

### Detection

Detection has been a weak link in PPQ's safeguarding system in the past,
and PPQ appears to recognize the need to develop better early detection
systems. In recent years funding for detection has increased. This year
additional funds are planned in the budget.

Active detection in PPQ consists largely of the Cooperative Agricultural
Pest Survey (CAPS). This program funnels funds to states for surveys.
CAPS is now organized in three tiers; there are National, Regional and
State CAPS Committees. The National Committee sets policy and the
State/Regional Committees recommend priorities for sur­vey needs. PPQ
provides national and regional coordination, funding, and technical
sup­port for CAPS surveys.

In past years, states exercised great freedom in spending those funds,
often using them for surveys of endemic diseases or to support export
certification of disease-free areas, for instance. With increased
funding, PPQ is identifying lists of unwanted exotics and increasingly
encouraging more surveys oriented toward them. Some surveys are ori­ented
at specific pests but opportunities are sought to simultaneously detect
other, unknown pests. The scope of the program includes forest and
wildlands as well as agri­cultural lands.

Surveys are managed by states, but may be implemented by master
gardeners, agri­cultural consultants, tree wardens, as well as PPQ, other
federal agencies and the states themselves. PPQ is developing networks
of groups to do the surveys.

CAPS surveys generate a need for identifications to determine if
organisms are native or introduced. CAPS is currently assembling its own
team of identifiers for surveys. These identifiers may work in the
National Identification Services (part of PPQ's Plant Health Programs)
but there will be a liaison with SEPPC to ensure that there is a focus
on detection of post-entry invasives rather than just port
interceptions. PPQ is also planning to develop networks of identifiers
that include university and state workers.

Data from CAPS surveys are managed in a national database called
National Agri­cultural Pest Information System (NAPIS), housed at Purdue
University. Some of the data are geo-referenced and can be used in GIS
systems to generate maps; some data are also presented on the web as
maps. Normally, the CAPS State Survey Coordinator pro­vides the data
entry point for NAPIS.

For forest diseases and insects, another important database is the
Exotic Forest Pest Information System for North America
([ExFor](http://www.exoticforestpests.org/english/english.htm)). It
contains information on identification, biology, potential for
introduction and establishment, and management for some of the major
pathogens and insects, most of which are not established in North
America. It is supported by the Canadian Forest Service, Canadian Food
Inspection Agency, Sanidad Forestal (Mexico), USDA Forest Service and
APHIS. It was established by the North American Forestry Commission, a
regional group under the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization.

In addition to CAPS, there are program detection activities for certain
targeted inva­sive pests that are already in the country or are
introduced frequently. Funds for these targeted surveys are sent to
states via cooperative agreements. APHIS and the states get the work
done cooperatively. Some detection of forest pathogens and insects is
organized in cooperation with the Forest Service. For instance, the two
agencies are cooperating on a national survey to provide early detection
of sudden oak death in new locations.

Although most detection of new invasive species occurs through passive
detection, mechanisms to support that avenue of detection do not appear
to have been emphasized and developed up to this point. Cooperative
Extension offices may make initial observa­tions or receive reports,
samples or inquiries related to new detections. Currently most
detections are relayed informally by word of mouth until they reach
someone in a posi­tion to act on it.

PPQ does have a designated official in each state, the State Plant
Health Director, but this position does not appear to have a major role
in detection of invasives.

### Response

The Plant Protection Act, effective June 2000, provides the authority
for the Secretary of Agriculture to prevent the introduction or spread
of a plant pest or noxious weed. This Act provides the authority to take
emergency action, pending promulgation of quaran­tines and regulation, to
seize, treat, or destroy articles or products related to plant pests new
to or not known to be widely prevalent in the United States and to
regulate the movement of plant pests and their carriers, into or through
the United States.

In February 2002, PPQ updated the [Emergency Programs
Manual](http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/emergencyprograms/manual.pdf), a
guide to the organi­zation and conduct of a response. The Manual
provides: (a) a checklist of general activities to organize and schedule
a program and assign responsibilities; (b) response guidelines with
information about specific, new plant pests, and; (c) national-level
guidelines for the survey, regulatory, and control aspects of emergency
eradication pro­jects. Currently, the Manual is somewhat ambiguous with
regard to emergency response organization and procedures. However, if it
is improved and updated as needed to reflect reorganization, lessons
learned, and new opportunities, if decision-making and funding are
prompt and adequate, and if the Manual is followed, PPQ's response to
future inva­sions will be swift and sure.

When a new pest is detected, one of the first actions is to prepare a
fact sheet within a few days, giving the basic known facts from the
literature about the organism and the cir­cumstances of its detection.
This can be used to disseminate information to stakeholders and as a
starting point for the New Pest Advisory Group.

PPQ has established the New Pest Advisory Group (NPAG) to help gather
informa­tion on new invasives and to recommend response. It is led by
personnel from PPQ's Center for Plant Health Science and Technology at
Raleigh, NC, but has a fluid makeup that includes any officials and
scientists that are appropriate for the pest being considered. NPAG has
specialist subgroups and may include representatives from states,
industry, universities, etc. NPAG gathers information, including that
from the country of origin, may call for more surveys, and essentially
conducts a risk assessment on which recom­mendations for regulatory
action or other response are based. The databases mentioned earlier,
NAPIS and ExFor, can help to supply information for assessments.

PPQ already has action plans prepared for some pests that have been here
before or are anticipated. In that case NPAG is generally not used.

Each of the two APHIS regions has a PPQ Rapid Response Team (RRT). These
teams are made up of PPQ employees who are on call to set up programs
when and where they are needed. The goal is to respond within 48 hours.
These teams work with local and State officials to assess the situation
and develop a strategy to determine the extent of infestations and to
eradicate the pest or disease.

RRT members may be drawn from PPQ managers, supervisors, officers,
technicians, and administrative support personnel. Each region
determines the number of members needed on their team, establishes a
committee to review applications and make selections of team members,
establishes membership, and a process for replacing members to ensure
that the RRT retains qualified, motivated members. No specific training
for RRT members beyond an orientation is required by the national
program.

After a response is launched, a larger, long-term organization may
become necessary. Such an organization may evolve from or relieve the
RRT. The organizational structure is flexible and apparently varies
considerably. The suggested organization from the Emergency Programs
Manual is reproduced below. In the Manual, federal and state per­sonnel
are encouraged to maintain a flexible attitude when structuring a
project to best accomplish the goal. In practice, projects generally
have co-directors, including a state and a federal representative.

![](media/image2.png){width="5.997916666666667in"
height="3.4145833333333333in"}

*Structure of an emergency response organization recommended in PPQ's
Emergency Programs Manual.*

PPQ-SEPPC currently spends approximately \$200 million per year in
emergency activities, focused largely on four programs: Asian longhorn
beetle, plum pox, karnal bunt and citrus canker.

The response procedures used are determined by the New Pest Response
Guidelines, if one exists for that pest, or by guidance from the New
Pest Advisory Group and other sources.

Emergency response programs funded by PPQ are managed and implemented
largely by states and local agencies, with assistance from local APHIS
employees. For instance, as of October 2001 the Citrus Canker
Eradication Program had 134 federal employees, with 62 additional
positions planned, and states had about 850 positions, most of them
seasonal. The amount of direct involvement from headquarters SEPPC staff
varies con­siderably. For instance, the plum pox eradication effort now
proceeds with little head­quarters involvement because it is
geographically restricted (small portion of Pennsyl­vania), going
according to plan, and survey and eradication procedures are managed
locally. In contrast, karnal bunt, which is widespread, unpredictable,
and has major export implications, extensively involves SEPPC staff.
Efforts are focused on preventing further spread, surveying, and
certifying disease-free areas for export.

Because of the nature of plant pests and the amount of spread that may
occur before detection, response may well be rapid but must be sustained
over a long time. It is diffi­cult to define when the "emergency" is
over, and the funding and effort that people are willing to invest may
decline before the pest is eradicated.

Invasive Species and Pest Management has a mission that overlaps with
that of SEPPC, to provide program planning and coordination for response
to domestically regulated pests. The division of responsibility between
ISPM and SEPPC is somewhat ambiguous and could change as discussions of
the most effective organizational structure continue. SEPPC is
responsible for all detection activities as well as management of some
of the larger emergency programs. In general ISPM deals with pests for
which eradication is no longer considered a viable possibility. Weed
programs are generally managed by ISPM. ISPM currently has a larger
portfolio of pests it is dealing with, but some are relatively minor,
dormant programs (e.g., European larch canker) while others are very
active (e.g., sudden oak death, glassy-winged sharpshooter). In some
cases SEPPC and ISPM must decide which group will administer reponse
programs. ISPM also provides aircraft support to other PPQ programs.

### Declaration of Emergency

The same authorities for declaration of emergency and extraordinary
emergency that apply to VS apply to PPQ. There are typically one or two
requests for emergency decla­ration from PPQ per year. The process for
emergency declaration and disbursement of funds is somewhat slow. PPQ
currently has six requests pending at the Office of Man­agement and
Budget, which reviews the requests. OMB sometimes denies access to these
emergency funds.

### Comments from PPQ Safeguarding Review:

Restructure the existing Cooperative Agricultural Pest Survey (CAPS)
program to create a federal and state Cooperative Invasive Plant Pest
Survey (CIPPS) program. CIPPS will establish a nationwide surveillance
program, identify potential pest organisms and high-risk, sentinel areas
for introductions, set invasive plant pest survey and detection
priorities nationally, provide standardization, and support export
certifica­tion and domestic program duties.

Restructure funding base for detection and response activities. A
mechanism recom­mended for response funding is establishment of a no-year
fund (permitting carry­over) to pay for emergency eradication efforts. If
this fund is adequately capitalized and replenished, it would permit
more rapid and effective response than the current system of emergency
funding. This fund would be accessible at the discretion of the
Secretary of Agriculture.

Encourage stakeholder involvement in detection activities. Stakeholder
involvement in detecting, identifying and reporting pests would benefit
the agency by providing a greater "field" presence. This would increase
the probability that an introduction could be detected and eradicated at
the earliest possible time.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  Rapid, cooperative decision-making is needed. Because of overlapping
    responsi­bilities among federal and state agencies, there can be
    indecisiveness while hop­ing that another agency will act to solve
    the problem. Processes for assessment and determining a response
    should be clear and rapid.

2.  Strong commitment of funds is needed in the early stages of
    response. Efforts at eradication and containment are most effective
    while the scale of the problem is small. Unfortunately, it is often
    difficult to get funds for response until the invader spreads and
    grows, and the severity of the problem is all too clear. The no-year
    fund recommended in the safeguarding review may be a mechanism that
    could be adopted comprehensively for the nation.

3.  Although active surveillance efforts are expanding and improving, as
    they should, in some systems passive detection can be supported and
    enhanced. The knowl­edgeable, curious people that might discover a
    new weed, insect or disease, for instance, greatly outnumber the
    surveyors that could ever be deployed. In many resource areas,
    passive detection has been a more fruitful avenue than active
    detection. Programs to enhance its effectiveness are likely to be
    more cost-effec­tive than active detection.

# Forest Pathogens and Insects

The USDA Forest Service has been involved in detection and response to
forest pathogens and insects, including invasives, for many years.
Recently the portion of the effort directed at invasives and the degree
of coordination with APHIS have increased.

The Forest Service's Forest Health Protection (FHP) leads a substantial
infrastructure of about 250 personnel (126 entomologists and
pathologists) who respond to field reports of anomalous tree problems,
conduct aerial and ground surveys of about 600 million acres/year to
detect and characterize outbreaks, identify organisms, and support
control projects with technical assistance and funding. There are two
main levels of organization: a national Forest Health Protection group
and groups in each of the 9 Forest Service regions. The Forest Service
provides technical and financial assistance for insect and pathogen
problems on all forested lands, including DOI, DOD and Army Corps of
Engineers. On state and private lands, these activities are coordinated
with the state foresters and health specialists of the 50 states.
Annually, about \$30 million is spent each year for prevention and
control projects.

Gypsy moth provides examples of both early detection and rapid response.
Across the country, in areas where the gypsy moth is not established,
the Forest Service and states work with APHIS to place and evaluate
detection traps, baited with pheromone, along routes used by
long-distance travelers and in campgrounds and other areas used by
tourists. If moths are detected, more are placed for delimitation of the
infestation. In several western states, rapid response successfully
eradicated established populations. The program has thus far kept gypsy
moth out of the West. In the East, along the margin of infested areas,
the Forest Service coordinates and funds a Slow-The-Spread program that
functions similarly to restrict the expanding front. It has limited the
southwest expansion of gypsy moth by 60%.

When sudden oak death was recognized as a new disease in the central
coast of California, the Forest Service initiated surveys to map its
occurrence and detect new infestations. Late in 2001, several small
infestations were found on private land in Oregon, far from the main
range of the disease. The Forest Service implemented a plan to eradicate
the new infestation and will increase surveys to monitor the success and
detect any new spots.

APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine is coordinating an eradication
campaign for Asian longhorn beetle with Forest Service support. APHIS
provides funds and assistance to communities and states for detection
and tree destruction; the Forest Service provides tree climbers and is
responsible for reforestation.

As invasive species have become more important, an increasing problem
has been funding of emergency projects. The 2003 budget proposes a \$12
million Emerging Pest and Pathogen Fund to partially address this issue.
It would be used for emergency response. The general approach adopted
now is that all invasive, nonnative organisms that are detected are
aggressively eradicated if possible.

### Forest Service / APHIS Rapid Detection Pilot Surveys

The Forest Service and APHIS's Plant Protection and Quarantine initiated
a Memorandum of Understanding to establish an Exotic Forest Pest Rapid
Detection and Response Program that began in 2001. Although goals are
broader, efforts thus far have focused on pilot studies of trapping to
detect 10 exotic bark beetles and nun moth.

A National Executive Team (NET), which provides direction and policies,
is composed of at least one state forest health specialist and
representatives from the National Plant Board, National Association of
State Foresters, APHIS, and research and management branches of the
Forest Service. An Exotic Pest Rapid Detection Team takes direction from
NET and sets common protocols for use nationally. Sampling efforts are
organized separately for the Northeast, South, and West. Forest Service,
APHIS and state personnel in each of those regions cooperatively select
appropriate sampling sites and identify individuals to place and check
the traps in each location.

The team designed a trapping system using host volatiles and bark beetle
pheromones as bait. Traps were placed around nine ports. Plots were
established and traps monitored and sampled by a combination of Forest
Service, active and retired PPQ, military, state and local workers. Many
of these insects are also being surveyed by certain states in the CAPS
system, but this pilot test was established in areas that were not
covered by ongoing CAPS surveys.

One targeted and one non-targeted exotic beetle were detected in North
America for the first time during the 2001 pilot test. In addition, the
known ranges of other exotic and native insects were expanded. No nun
moths were detected. Improvements to baits, trapping systems and
selection of trap sites were identified. For instance, results indi­cated
that wood/pallet recycling facilities and urban forests are important
sites for detec­tion. Very few insects were trapped in ports themselves.
Data have been entered in NAPIS (see APHIS-PPQ).

The biggest impediment for the pilot is the availability of taxonomists
with exper­tise needed to identify the insects. These are specialists
with tools, specialized libraries and reference collections of insects.
In the second year, there will be more prescreening and presorting of
insects to make identification more efficient.

Response to the first discovery of a targeted exotic was limited to
cursory survey around the trap sites. The team noted that procedures for
reporting and prioritization of response are unclear.

There are tentative plans to expand the surveys to include exotic fungi
that are often vectored by such beetles. The technical procedures and
difficulties of identification are even more challenging for fungi than
for insects.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  An important feature of the Forest Service forest health system is
    the size of the cadre, mostly distributed in the field, and the
    funding available to address exotic and native pathogens and
    insects.

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4.  The Forest Service has authority to address problems on all
    ownerships through its federal and cooperative programs.

5.  The pilot study suggests that active surveillance surveys using
    targeted pests and specialized methods is necessary to detect some
    types of invasive species.

6.  A network of field personnel from various federal, state and local
    groups can imple­ment surveys, but they must be committed, competent
    and trained.

7.  Active surveillance and perhaps even encouragement of passive
    surveillance will sometimes create demands for identification that
    exceed the availability of highly qualified identifiers.

8.  Pilot studies to assess the relative value of survey locations for
    specific types of invasives may increase the efficiency of active
    surveillance.

# Early Warning and Rapid Response System for Invasive Plants

Based on a draft (March 15 2002) action plan by the Federal Interagency
Committee for the Management of Noxious and Exotic Weeds (FICMNEW)

The system reviewed here is not currently functional; a draft of the
plan is in review. This review will be restricted largely to an attempt
to summarize the key functional ele­ments of the planned system. The plan
includes some exclusionary efforts, such as monitoring of e-commerce,
that are not considered here.

USDA-APHIS and cooperating state agencies have responsibility for
protecting the nation from economically important plant and animal pests
and diseases. This includes invasive, exotic plants. However, the
introduction to the plan states that a lack of resources and organized
constituencies requires a new and systematic approach to addressing new
invasive plants.

### Structure of the system

![](media/image3.png){width="5.9944444444444445in"
height="4.100694444444445in"}

Selected structural elements of the proposed early warning and rapid
response system for invasive plants. Some additional APHIS and USGS
elements are not shown. Dashed lines with arrows refer to initial
detection reporting described in the proposal.

There are Early Warning Coordinators at three levels: national, regional
(four regions are envisioned), and state. The national position, which
has a staff, is designated as fed­eral. The state position is "designated
by state-level interagency partner groups." The regional position could
be federal or state-supported.

Coordinating committees are specified at the national and regional
levels. At the national level is the FICMNEW National Early Warning
Action Committee, which has general oversight and advisory roles. It is
also responsible for verifying the identification of new regional or
national records. Also at the national level, the FICMNEW Early Warning
Technical Advisory Group (FEWTAG) would conduct biological assessments
of new national plant records. At the regional level, there are Regional
Interagency Technical Support Teams. There are also references to state
teams and state-level inter­agency partner groups, but these are not
explicitly defined.

### Detection

The system depends on passive detection from two elements. The general
public is encouraged, through brochures, fact sheets and a media
campaign, to report suspected new plants through local contact agencies,
a website, or a toll-free phone number. Local contact agencies include
local offices of Natural Resource Conservation Service, County Extension
Service, APHIS, county weed supervisors, etc. The plan specifies that
federal land management agencies will refer reports directly both to a
state committee (not defined) and the Regional Early Warning
Coordinator. It is not clear how reports are routed after that; nor is
it clear how agencies other than federal land management agen­cies are
supposed to route reports. The website and phone number are managed by
the staff of the National Early Warning Coordinator; presumably they
would refer the reports to some more local element of the system for
follow-up.

The National Early Detection Network is the second detection source. It
is composed of active amateur and professional collectors and has a
directory and listserv for commu­nication, incentives for participation,
and a program of training and certification for vol­unteers. Although the
plan does not clearly state how reporting from the National Early
Detection Network occurs, Diagram 1 of the plan suggests that they may
report to desig­nated state herbaria or to the same points noted above
for the general public.

### Identification, assessment and data management

National Early Detection Network members would submit specimens to
herbaria or diagnostic labs designated in each state for identification
and specimen vouchering. A network of plant systematists will be
designated for identification of difficult specimens if they are
suspected new state or national records. Another network of professional
field botanists and plant scientists will be used to verify new state or
national records, using defined criteria. New records will be archived
in databases. The plan lists 9 databases or types of databases and
states that information sharing will be encouraged. Certain data­bases
will be designated for archival. A single web gateway may eventually
allow searching of these multiple databases.

The USGS Center for Integration of Natural Disaster Information is
designated to dis­seminate information on new records to designated
officials. The route that the informa­tion would take to USGS and the
list of designated officials are not presented.

After a protocol for biological/ecological assessments is developed, the
FICMNEW Early Warning Technical Advisory Group will conduct such
assessments of verified, new, national plant records. Although this is
part of the pest risk assessment currently conducted by the New Pest
Advisory Group in APHIS-PPQ, the proposed system would have NPAG
conducting *regulatory* risk assessments only. Some mechanism would be
established to share information between the two groups and avoid
duplication. State groups will prepare assessments for new state
records, with assistance from regional or federal groups as needed.

Based on assessments, an action classification system will be applied.
It is not clear if that classifies the severity of the problem (relative
need for action) or determines the types of action needed (e.g.,
regulation, eradication, control). A database of completed assessments
will be available for future use.

### Response

Generic response plans will be prepared and made available for use by
local, state and regional partner groups. The Regional Interagency
Technical Support Teams will "pro­vide on site and distant support on
rapid assessment initiatives." Expert systems will be developed to help
land managers identify management options. A listserv will be used to
share knowledge.

A system for organizing an actual interagency response and mobilizing
resources when a local agency's resources or response become inadequate
is not presented. The plan mentions new local weed management areas for
rapid response, but the structure and function of these is not
explained.

### Invasive Plant Atlas for New England (IPANE) project

This project can be characterized as a partial, regional implementation
of the national system. Les Mehrhoff, University of Connecticut, is
building the project with a USDA-CSREES grant and was also involved with
FICMNEW in the national plan. A draft/summary of the early detection and
rapid response components, dated March 15, 2002, was reviewed.

The draft lists components of a system including field
observers/volunteer network and a volunteer coordinator position that
has been filled. Volunteers are largely drafted from the New England
Wildflower Society. The volunteers will conduct active surveil­lance for
new as well as known, established species and also increase the
likelihood of passive detection. These individuals will submit suspect
specimens to state herbaria for verification of identification and
vouchering. New records will be forwarded to a regional herbarium for
recording in the IPANE database and notification of state and fed­eral
officials.

The plan focuses on detection and identification. A "rapid response
team" will be designated. It will consist of the project director, a
control and management expert, and one or more persons with regulatory
responsibility. Local and state people will be encouraged to
participate. From the site visit an action plan will be developed.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  The FICMNEW plan contains a potential model for encouraging and
    exploiting pas­sive detection, which is likely to be the means of
    detection for weeds and many other invasives. It contains more
    detailed general public education and out­reach methods than
    presented here as well as a system for developing a higher-level
    amateur and professional network of observers. The regional New
    England plan also includes some active surveillance plans.
    Application of such a model would probably require further
    consideration of reporting pathways.

# Interagency Fire Management

Federal, state and local firefighters are linked in a system that is
highly effective at monitoring conditions, responding rapidly and
cooperating to suppress wildfires. The [National Interagency Fire
Center](http://www.nifc.gov/) (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho coordinates this
effort. NIFC houses an Equipment Development Shop, Remote Sensing,
Infrared Technology, Radio Cache, the National Fire Equipment System,
Smokejumpers, Fire Training Group, and the National Interagency
Coordination Center (NICC). Cooperators in NIFC are:

-   Forest Service (USDA)

-   Bureau of Land Management (DOI)

-   National Park Service (DOI)

-   Bureau of Indian Affairs (DOI)

-   Fish and Wildlife Service (DOI)

-   National Association of State Foresters

In addition, the National Weather Service (NOAA, Commerce) and DOI's
Office of Aircraft Services provide support.

Fire management and response are coordinated at four hierarchical levels
in the United States. These are:

  -------------------- --------------------------------------------------
  **Level**            **Name**

  Unit level           Local agency office (e.g., a Forest Service
                       district office)

  Zone level           Interagency Dispatch Center

  Geographic area      Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)
  level                

  National level       National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC),
                       Boise
  -------------------- --------------------------------------------------

### Detection

In the early 20^th^ century, fire towers were built in many forests for
the purpose of detecting and observing wildfires. They were often
staffed 24 hours during the fire sea­son and equipped to determine the
position of the fire and communicate with a station for reporting. As
population, road density, and particularly air traffic around forests
have increased, fire towers have largely been
[abandoned](http://www.firelookout.org/) for detection purposes.

Most fire detection now is passive, but there is a well-developed
reporting network. District offices of land management agencies and
local agencies frequently receive calls from the public when smoke is
sighted. Airline pilots commonly report smoke plumes to Air Traffic
Control, which has arrangements to report to the Geographic Area
Coordina­tion Center. This relationship is further strengthened by
cooperation in imposing flight restrictions over fire operations.
Various public safety, law enforcement and land man­agement agencies
encourage their field people to report smoke in order to determine if it
is a prescribed fire, waste burning on private land (which is often
pre-reported by the burner), or a reported or unreported wildfire.
Public interest in reporting fires is so great that agencies often put
signs along highways notifying travelers about prescribed fires so that
they are not deluged with reports.

Active detection is used during conditions of extreme fire danger and
after lightning storms. Under these circumstances, aircraft and spotters
may be dispatched to actively look for smoke. NOAA's Committee on Earth
Observation Satellites is considering active detection and monitoring of
fires by
[satellite](http://disaster.ceos.org/progress/reports/fire.html) and
NOAA\'s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
already has some [fire
detection](http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/activity/detect.html)
capability.

A key aspect of fire detection, suppression and prevention is monitoring
of fire con­ditions. Analysis of fuel loading and monitoring of fuel
moisture, humidity, and weather forecasts are integrated in models and
evaluated to determine the fire hazard at any time and place. There is a
lightning monitoring system to track storms. This information can be
used to trigger active surveillance for smoke, to trigger regulations
prohibiting camp­fires and waste burning, to trigger increased fire
prevention patrols, and to increase the readiness of response forces.
Aircraft are moved around the country to areas where risk is high based
on this information. Fuel loading is also used over the longer term to
iden­tify needs for management activities to reduce fire hazard, such as
prescribed fire and thinning.

Reports are usually made at the local unit level. Reports that come at a
higher level (e.g., airline pilot reports that are routed to the
Geographic Area Coordination Center) are immediately relayed to the
local unit.

### Response

Response to a reported fire ("incident") is well organized and planned
in advance. It is handled as follows:

1.  The local unit, which may be organized on an interagency basis, is
    the first to respond. As the incident requires, additional resources
    are dispatched from the local unit.

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9.  If the incident goes beyond the local unit's ability to continue
    supplying resources, requests for additional resources are sent to
    the zone level, or Inter­agency Dispatch Center.

10. When the Interagency Dispatch Center can no longer fill the orders,
    it turns to one of eleven Geographic Area Coordination Centers
    (GACCs) to fill the requests.

11. When the resource needs for an incident, or incidents, exceed the
    capability of the GACC, or when GACCs are competing for resources,
    the request for equipment and supplies is referred to the National
    Interagency Coordination Center (NICC), at Boise, Idaho.

NICC is an interagency operation, staffed by BLM and the Forest Service,
that pro­vides logistic support and intelligence reporting to all
wildland management agencies. Because it is an \"all-risk\" coordination
center, it also provides support in response to other emergencies such
as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. NICC coordinates sup­plies and
resources across the U.S., and provides support to incidents in foreign
countries. NICC dispatches crews, overhead personnel, aircraft, supplies
and services across the U.S. and Canada and to other foreign countries
if requested by the Office of Foreign Dis­aster Assistance of the U.S.
Department of State. Based upon the \"closest forces\" and \"total
mobility\" concepts, NICC will request the closest available qualified
resource, regardless of agency affiliation.

Detailed, written agreements are used very commonly to specify in
advance what procedures will be used in agency interactions, who will
provide what resources, and how finances are arranged. Agreements are
made and implemented at the lowest appropriate level. These agreements
may be local at the unit level, between neighboring zones, between
GACCs, and between agencies. There are coordinating boards at each level
of the organization, with agency representatives, that develop the
agreements. The National Multi-Agency Coordinating (MAC) Group, with
federal and state representatives, is the highest-level coordinating
board. The fire community is accustomed to these agreements and depends
on them so that, when it is time to respond, full attention can be
devoted to the response rather than negotiations.

The Incident Command System (ICS; see separate section for details) is
used univer­sally for wildland fire response organization. Unified
Command is used increasingly for large fires, especially if the fire may
cross boundaries, or depending on political issues or complexity.

Disagreements between agency representatives in fire management are
normally not a major problem. Each representative maintains contact with
an agency line officer as well as interfacing with the Unified Command.
The agencies are cooperating because they have common goals. Where they
differ, operations may be tailored differently depending on ownership or
jurisdiction. Fire management operations are becoming smoother and
without boundaries as agencies increasingly integrate their resources
and decision-mak­ing.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  Passive detection is effective in fire management because the public
    is highly sensi­tized to fire danger and fire and smoke are easily
    recognized.

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12. Active detection is employed at times and places determined by risk.

13. More stringent fire prevention regulations are imposed and
    treatments to reduce fuels are conducted at times or places with
    greatest risk. These prevention meas­ures are analogous to exclusion
    measures for invasive species.

14. Detection and response are local responsibilities and prerogatives
    (local here includes local offices of federal agencies). Zone, area
    and national resources and support are provided *if and when local
    authorities determine that they are needed*.

15. Even small fires that are detected and suppressed with strictly
    local resources are uniformly reported to a national database by any
    agency involved. This informa­tion is passed to the national fire
    management system for analysis and reporting.

16. Response at multiple levels and with multiple agencies is
    coordinated by the four tiers of the system: local unit, Interagency
    Dispatch Center (zone), Geographic Area Coordination Center, and
    National Interagency Coordination Center.

17. Detailed agreements, covering all contingencies, are developed at
    the appropriate level in advance to streamline response among
    agencies.

18. The Incident Command System is used effectively to organize
    interagency responses of any magnitude.

# Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

*CDC's role in early detection and rapid response to outbreaks of human
disease is broad and com­plex. This review touches on some key features.
Because the goal is to study general models of detection and response,
those aspects are considered for both native and nonnative diseases.*

CDC has long had responsibility for national surveillance and
coordination of response to epidemics of human disease, but this was
augmented when Congress allo­cated funds to its Bioterrorism Preparedness
Response Program (BPRP) in 1999. This capability is being further
emphasized in response to the terrorist attacks of 9-11, evi­dence of
chemical and biological weapons programs in other countries, and the
recent anthrax crisis.

The medical community recognizes that there is already a vast, complex,
decentral­ized infrastructure for public health in place, but it needs to
adapt for earlier detection and rapid response to a potential bioterror
attack. The changes since 9-11 have been charac­terized as "an organism
trying to grow a nervous system. . . . \[The\] network needs to develop
keener senses for perceiving threats, nerves to relay information, and a
brain to guide the response" (The Washington Post, April 7 2002, p. A3
and A9).

In April, 2000, CDC released its recommendations pursuant to BPRP,
"[Biological and Chemical
Terrorism](http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4904a1.htm):
Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response." It includes five focus
areas:

-   preparedness and prevention;

-   detection and surveillance;

-   diagnosis and characterization of biological and chemical agents;

-   response; and

-   communication.

Because of the important role of science, technology, and up-to-date
information in health care, CDC assumes a national leadership role by
providing such information and technical support to the medical
community. The maintenance of some of the nation's best expertise and
researchers in medical science, epidemiology, and laboratory technol­ogy
is important in the respect that CDC enjoys in medical and public health
arenas. This, in turn, encourages these state and local groups to form
partnerships with CDC and follow CDC's lead in surveillance and response
programs.

An example of CDC's role in information leadership regarding preparation
for epi­demics is The [Emerging Infectious Disease
Journal](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/)*.* This journal was established
in 1995 as part of an effort to enhance communication of public health
information so that the prevention measures can be implemented without
delay. It is available free on the inter­net.

Another important informational and leadership tool is [CDC
Recommends](http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/cdcRecommends/AdvSearchV.asp). It
gives public health practitioners quick access to the most current CDC
recommendations and guidelines for the prevention, control, treatment
and detection of medical conditions. It is a searchable compendium of
the full set of CDC\'s guidelines at a single point, regardless of where
they were originally published.

### Detection

Detection of epidemics of human disease or other medical emergency is
almost entirely passive. However, it is a highly developed passive
detection system and plans are in place to make it even more effective.
This works because humans generally seek medical help when they are
seriously ill and the medical community is highly attuned to detecting
and reporting anomalous diseases. In a local medical community,
surveillance partners include such elements as:

+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| -   State health department    | -   County health departments       |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Emergency Medical Services | -   Dispatch/911                    |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Social service agencies    | -   Volunteer organizations         |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Hospitals                  | -   Mental health professionals     |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Clinics and physicians     | -   Poison centers                  |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Epidemiologists            | -   Pharmacists                     |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Medical examiner/coroner   | -   Veterinary services             |
|                                |                                     |
| -   Clinical laboratories      |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+

Coordination among these agencies and organizations is enhanced through
activities such as the following:

-   Distribution of contact lists and communications information to
    critical response partners.

-   Education about public health surveillance, disease reporting,
    epidemiology, and response activities related to bioterrorism to
    public health response partners.

-   Collaboration on educational activities on topics related to
    bioterrorism prepared­ness for the general public or general medical
    community.

-   In-service training or "grand rounds" for the medical community.

"Reportable" diseases are those that must be reported to designated
health officials when detected. Compulsory reporting by medical
professionals is established by state laws. Often there are different
lists for laboratories vs. health care providers. Diseases vary in the
time requirement for reporting; some require immediate telephone
reporting and others allow some number of days. The official to whom
reporting occurs, who may be a county or state official, consolidates
reports and, if necessary, sends reports to state officials. Once a
week, state health officials send reports of nationally reportable
dis­eases to CDC's National Center for Health Statistics. These go
through the National Electronic Telecommunications System for
Surveillance (NETSS).

These provisional data are published weekly by CDC in the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report. The weekly reports provide information that CDC
and state or local epi­demiologists use to detect and more effectively
interrupt outbreaks. Final data are pub­lished annually in the Summary of
Notifiable Diseases, United States.

CDC operates numerous surveillance networks for specific diseases or
types of dis­eases. For instance, PulseNet is a national foodborne
disease surveillance network that detects outbreaks of foodborne illness
due to a common exposure occurring simultane­ously in separate locations.
PulseNet now operates in 40 public health laboratories and can detect
outbreaks of E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella*.*

More active detection may be employed in case of an outbreak. It may be
called "aggressive case-finding." Finding and treating all infected
persons is one of the approaches to stopping an epidemic.

CDC has recommended that local health commissioners institute a system
of "syn­dromic surveillance", also referred to as enhanced surveillance
with non-traditional part­ners. For major national events, such as
political conventions, Superbowl, and interna­tional Olympics, CDC
implements a special form of syndromic surveillance through its Enhanced
Surveillance Projects (ESP). Syndromic surveillance is an early-warning
sys­tem that looks locally for health anomalies that may be an indication
of a problem before any disease is diagnosed. Anomalies are investigated
to determine the cause. It has been instituted in many areas. On a daily
basis, for instance, a health commissioner may review the following
data:

-   ambulance runs and the complaints

-   absences from elementary schools

-   sales of over-the-counter flu medicine

-   dead cats and dogs collected by animal control

-   calls to nurse hotlines

CDC has a number of programs that provide funds through cooperative
agreements to assist state health agencies with detection and response.
In the document, [Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the
21^st^ Century](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/emergplan/), several programs
are described. The Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity program helps
states develop systems for early detection and investigation of
outbreaks, tracking antimicrobial resistance, and ensuring electronic
reporting of surveillance data. The Emerging Infections Program conducts
population-based surveillance and research that go beyond the routine
functions of local health departments to address issues in infectious
diseases and public health. In addition to conducting surveillance, the
EIP network participates in emergency outbreak responses. These programs
involve partnerships among state health departments, aca­demic centers,
and CDC.

### Data management

CDC maintains over 100 surveillance networks and health information
systems. Originally, most of these systems were designed to detect a
single organism or condition and are largely independent of one another.
To bring order and accessibility to the data, CDC has initiated the
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). NEDSS is
directed toward efficient, integrated, and interoperable surveillance
systems at federal, state and local levels. NEDSS will include data
standards, an internet-based communications infrastructure built on
industry standards, and agreements on data access, sharing, burden
reduction, and protection of confidentiality. The goals are to:

-   facilitate the electronic transfer of appropriate information from
    clinical informa­tion systems in the health care industry to public
    health departments

-   reduce provider burden in the provision of information

-   enhance the timeliness and quality of information provided.

NEDSS specifies data standards and lists of codes, such as list of
reportable diseases, list of ethnicity/race classification, etc. It is
not a monolithic database but a loosely coupled integration architecture
based on application-to-application asynchronous mes­saging. It is
designed so that it can interact with a variety of commercial
applications that are used in local and state public health offices and,
ultimately, provider locations.

To increase the ease and efficiency of reporting for labs and providers,
CDC is working with local and state health agencies to develop more
electronic reporting, and uniform reporting codes. Electronic
Laboratory-based Reporting is the program to coor­dinate this effort.

CDC's Health Alert Network is a project to improve communication with
state and local health departments. It partially funds high-speed
internet connections, distance learning capability, and infrastructure
for communication of health alerts.

### Response

CDC's website provides [notification
protocols](http://www.bt.cdc.gov/EmContact/Protocols.asp) for local and
state health departments to use in the event of a bioterrorist or other
emergency health threat. Many preparedness-related pages provide links
to that page so it is easy for a local worker to find.

CDC assists state and local health agencies in developing resources and
expertise for investigating unusual events and unexplained illnesses and
for a health care and decon­tamination response. CDC posts guidelines for
emergency preparedness plans (both a
[State](http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/documents/stateinventory.PDF) and a
[Local](http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/documents/localinventory.PDF) Emergency
Response Inventory), [Planning Guidance for State Public Health
Officials](http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/Planning/PlanningGuidance.PDF),
checklists, and self-evaluation plans. CDC can also help conduct
exer­cises to test the plan.

If requested by a state health agency, CDC will deploy response teams to
investigate unexplained or suspicious illnesses or unusual etiologic
agents and provide on-site con­sultation regarding medical management and
disease control. CDC maintains a program of postgraduate training and
experience called the Epidemic Intelligence Service. Thirty-four
officers were
[deployed](http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r020125.htm) to New
York City following the World Trade Center attack. They supported
emergency room activities, monitored injuries to rescue workers, and
implemented syndromic surveillance for a possible bioterror attack. They
were deployed again to various states to investigate the anthrax
occurrences, assisting with diagnosis and treatment and conducting
environmental sampling.

To ensure the availability, procurement, and delivery of medical
supplies, devices, and equipment that might be needed to respond to
terrorist-caused illness or injury, CDC initiated a National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile as part of the 1999 BPRP. First, there are
several immediate-response Push Packages. These are caches of
pharmaceuticals, anti­dotes, and medical supplies designed to address a
variety of biologic or chemical agents. Push Packages are positioned in
regional warehouses for immediate deployment to the affected area
following a federal decision to release NPS assets. If the incident
requires additional pharmaceuticals and/or medical supplies,
vendor-managed inventory supplies known as VMI Packages will be shipped
to the area. The follow-on VMI Packages can be tailored to provide
pharmaceuticals, supplies and/or products specific to the suspected or
confirmed agent or combination of agents. When deployed, they will be
transferred to state authorities in accordance with the state's
emergency preparedness plan.

CDC has specific plans for response to predictable epidemics. One is
influenza, which caused a global epidemic in 1918, killing 20 million
people, and is expected to do so again. CDC participates in the
interagency Group on Influenza Pandemic Prepared­ness and Emergency
Response, which developed a national influenza plan. In the event of an
influenza outbreak, CDC's role will be:

-   Confirming the cause and scope of the threat.

-   Establishing a communication network for prompt dissemination of
    information to public health officials, health care providers, and
    the general public.

-   Developing and testing candidate vaccines.

-   Implementing vaccine purchase and distribution.

-   Monitoring adverse events after vaccination.

-   Disseminating information and coordinating education campaigns
    through the national media.

-   Communicating and coordinating activities with other countries.

-   Evaluating the effectiveness of the national effort.

CDC supports a number of systems for communication with state and local
health agencies in the event of an emergency. These enhance disease
surveillance, rapid notifi­cation and information exchange regarding
disease outbreaks that may be related to bioterrorism, dissemination of
diagnostic results and emergency health information, and coordination of
emergency response activities.

Although CDC is widely praised for their expertise and support, some
have indicated that more rapid, decisive guidance is needed during a
crisis such as anthrax. "There was no doctor who stood up and said,
'This is what we have, and this is what we're going to do.' We needed a
Dr. Giuliani." (Julie Casani, bioterrorism division, Maryland Dept. of
Health and Mental Hygiene).

CDC recommends the Incident Command System (see separate section) to
states and locales for managing emergency response efforts. Although
emergency medical services are generally familiar with it, hospital and
public health workers need to be trained to participate in such an
organization.

**An example: Response to a smallpox outbreak**

Although smallpox was globally eradicated by 1970, there may be
uncontrolled stores of the virus and it is considered a likely candidate
for bioterrorism. CDC has organized a response plan. The strategy
involves "ring vaccination," meaning that people who have had close
contact with a case, and household members of contacts, are traced,
vaccinated, isolated and observed. The plan acknowledges that
implementation at the local level would quickly overwhelm federal
personnel and that state and local authorities must pre­pare for such
mobilization. Federal personnel will be available to assist state and
local authorities. The actions in the plan are presented briefly below,
organized by the roles of the parties.

**Medical practitioners:**

1.  Notify state and local public health authorities of suspected cases
    of smallpox.

**State and local public health authorities:**

1.  Notify CDC of a suspected smallpox cases or requests to test any
    material for small­pox virus. Three offices in CDC are specified for
    notification.

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19. Activate local and state emergency response plans.

20. Mobilize local and state public health resources for control
    measures.

21. Designate and manage sites for vaccine administration, patient
    isolation, and con­tact isolation.

22. Implement and enforce local/state isolation and quarantine
    regulations.

23. Designate local and state leads to coordinate control measures.

**CDC:**

1.  Maintains a stockpile of vaccine.

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24. Performs initial laboratory confirmation of smallpox and provides
    protocols for other laboratories.

25. Decides when to authorize release of the vaccine. Surgeon General
    and FBI, NSC are notified of a decision to release.

26. Delivers vaccine to local or state authorities.

27. Deploys CDC personnel to assist state and local personnel with
    implementation of control measures.

28. Develops vaccination strategies and priorities. Decides whether to
    offer voluntary vaccination to response personnel that have no
    direct involvement with patients or contacts.

29. Provides technical assistance to national authorities.

30. Enacts federal quarantines if needed.

31. Tracking and reporting of national surveillance and coordination
    between states for contact tracing.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  CDC maintains world-class science, technology, research and
    expertise in medi­cine oriented toward support of medical practice
    and public health. This encour­ages a close working relationship with
    state health agencies and translates into national leadership in
    setting standards and establishing practices in detection and
    response.

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32. CDC maintains a number of complementary avenues for communicating
    useful new research, best practices, and emergency information to
    health agencies and providers. These communications often involve
    aspects of detection and response.

33. CDC maintains an elaborate and diverse system of reporting and
    surveillance, in part for the purpose of detecting outbreaks. They
    are working to unify and sim­plify the system and to ease the burden
    of reporting.

# Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force

The Aquatic Nuisance Species (ANS) [Task
Force](http://anstaskforce.gov/) was created by the Nonindigenous
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act (NANPCA) of 1990 and charged
with pre­venting and controlling aquatic nuisance species. The NANPCA
mandates were expanded later with the passage of the National Invasive
Species Act in 1996. NANPCA also authorized funding for implementation,
but funding is to various agencies for their components. No funding goes
through the Task Force except some administrative funds.

The Task Force has representatives from the following organizations:

1.  Fish and Wildlife Service (co-chair)

2.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (co-chair)

3.  Coast Guard

4.  Army Corps of Engineers

5.  Environmental Protection Agency

6.  USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

7.  Department of State

In addition there are *ex officio* members from local and state
governments and an invited observer from Canada.

The goals of NANPCA are:

1.  to prevent unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous
    species into waters of the United States through ballast water
    management and other requirements;

2.  to coordinate federally conducted, funded or authorized research,
    prevention, control, information dissemination and other activities
    regarding the zebra mussel and other aquatic nuisance species;

3.  to develop and carry out environmentally sound control methods to
    prevent, monitor and control unintentional introductions of
    nonindigenous species from pathways other than ballast water
    exchange;

4.  to understand and minimize economic and ecological impacts of
    nonindi­genous aquatic nuisance species that become established,
    including the zebra mussel; and

5.  to establish a program of research and technology development and
    assistance to States in the management and removal of zebra mussels.

The ANS Task Force is primarily involved in prevention,
detection/monitoring, and control. It acts through three organizational
structures:

**The National [ANS Program](http://anstaskforce.gov/ansprogram.htm)**
is based on guidelines in NANPCA, which provides an out­line of how
agencies interact and assemble programs to address ANS. The Pro­gram
coordinates all federal activities related to ANS except intentional
introductions.

**Regional ANS Panels** develop regional priorities, make
recommendations to the national ANS Task Force, and coordinate
activities in their regions. Four Regional Panels are currently
recognized (Great Lakes, Western, Gulf of Mexico, Northeast) and more
are on the way. Regional panels have representatives from states,
federal field offices, universities and non-governmental organizations.
The panels are technically com­mittees of the national Task Force and are
organized to meet requirements of the Fed­eral Advisory Committee Act.
The majority of rapid response planning is to be con­ducted at this
level.

**State ANS Management Plans** are created and implemented by states
through a cost-share grant program administered by the Fish and Wildlife
Service. NANPCA calls for state management plans, which primarily
address prevention, education, monitor­ing, control, and coordination
with federal agencies.

### Detection

A goal of the ANS program is detection and monitoring of all
nonindigenous aquatic species rather than just those recognized as
actual or potential nuisances. This universal detection and monitoring
is attempted for several reasons:

a)  it is difficult to determine in advance or even for some time after
    introduction whether a given species will be a nuisance;

b)  information about distribution, rate and direction of dispersal, and
    reproduc­tive status is useful in determining the potential impacts
    of a new species;

c)  detection of any new nonindigenous species can identify gaps in the
    preven­tion system and help to close those gaps;

d)  such information also is useful in identifying research needs and
    priorities.

Continuously sampling the full range of aquatic ecosystems in the United
States would be prohibitively expensive and would not take advantage of,
and might even duplicate, existing aquatic biology data-gathering
mechanisms and efforts. A system of detection and monitoring was
designed after a review of existing sources of information on ANS
presence and distribution. Most monitoring and detection is still
focused on particular species and organized and managed directly by
states. Other information, such as that from academic research and
surveys, is communicated informally. The Detection and Monitoring
Committee of the ANS Task Force has not been active of late and efforts
to improve the detection and monitoring element of the National Program
are underway. Detection and monitoring elements include:

1.  An information system. The [National Nonindigenous Aquatic Species
    Informa­tion Center](http://nas.er.usgs.gov/) was established to
    provide timely, reliable data about the presence and distribution of
    nonindigenous aquatic species. It is operated by the USGS Florida
    Caribbean Science Center in Gainesville. The data repository has
    mapping capa­bility and stores information on publications,
    correspondence, locations and impacts. Detection and reporting may
    be provided by a variety of people with activities in an aquatic
    environment; no authorization is required to submit reports. Center
    staff work on confirmation of reports and require voucher speci­mens
    for detections in new areas. They also will assist with confirmation
    of specimen identification and prepare synopses and assessments of
    confirmed new species. This information is disseminated to
    interested parties.

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34. Coordination with related efforts. Biologists and agencies with
    ongoing data collec­tion are asked to contribute reports. The goal is
    to avoid duplication of effort and maximize use of available
    resources. The Detection and Monitoring Committee was established to
    advise the Task Force on detection and monitoring issues and to
    ensure coordination of detection and monitoring efforts.

35. Field studies. The Detection and Monitoring Element of the Program
    is intended to coordinate field studies to complement existing
    capabilities and to ensure the effectiveness of this activity. Field
    studies are necessary to confirm the presence of reported or
    potential nonindigenous species as well as to determine their
    distri­bution, whether they have become established, and any impacts
    that can be read­ily identified. Allocation of funding is done
    directly by agencies.

Another information resource on aquatic invasive species is the
[National Aquatic Nuisance Species
Clearinghouse](http://cce.cornell.edu/aquaticinvaders/nan_ld.cfm).
Operated by New York Sea Grant at SUNY Brockport and funded by NOAA, it
is essentially a literature search and retrieval tool. It has catego­ries
for animals but not plants or algae. Literature searches are provided
free and there is a charge for retrieval.

### Assessment

A Risk Assessment and Management Committee advises and supports the ANS
Task Force in determining risks associated with specific pathways and
species. The Commit­tee has developed a generic risk assessment process
that can be applied to new species and to pathways. The Committee
arranges such assessments when requested by the Task Force. It has been
an active component of the ANS Task Force. Assessments are funded
directly by agencies, primarily the Fish and Wildlife Service.

### Response

The Task Force or any other affected agency or entity may recommend
initiation of control. The Task Force specifies a process, following
guidelines in NANPCA similar to NEPA, for initiators to propose control
and for the Task Force to review and approve them. Funding is the
responsibility of the initiator/cooperator. States can initiate control
programs without going through the Task Force approval process, but
federal agencies and federal funding of state activities must follow the
process. Recent projects that have received Task Force approval and
support include the [brown tree
snake](http://anstaskforce.gov/BTS Control Plan.htm) and the ruffe
con­trol plans.

The Task Force also coordinates a mechanism for state management plans.
FWS contributes funds to states for implementation of these plans,
including monitoring.

Regional panels are developing protocols and plans for rapid response.
This has not been a first priority because eradication of aquatic
invasives is rarely feasible.

The Task Force itself does not conduct or fund control programs. Any
federal fund­ing comes directly from relevant agencies. The agency
representatives to the Task Force are usually involved in the relevant
funding decisions for their agency.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  The ANS Task Force began as a federal-centered organization, focused
    on coordi­nating federal activities. As time has passed, (1) more
    activity and responsi­bility have been assumed by regional panels and
    states, and; (2) the respective responsibilities of the federal
    government, regional panels and states have become clarified.

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36. State management plans are effective because the people on the
    ground doing the actual management and field work are directly
    involved in the process of coordination and planning.

37. Regional panels are effective for the same reasons, but also because
    the resource (aquatic ecosystems) is integrated and shared by
    multiple states, making regional interstate coordination essential.
    In addition, the mix of representa­tives from states, federal field
    offices, universities and NGOs leads to shared decision-making and
    broad consensus.

38. Although the ANS Task Force does not allocate funding, the federal
    agency repre­sentatives to the Task Force are often involved in
    relevant funding deci­sions in their agency. This is one mechanism of
    coordination between the Task Force and agency decisions.

# Harmful Algal Blooms

Certain algae produce toxins that, when algal populations are high
enough, affect the food web and may lead to toxic levels in shellfish
and fish. Increases in the frequency and severity of such harmful algal
blooms (HABs) in recent decades has stimulated national and state
initiatives to understand, prepare for and respond to HABs.

The Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act (HABHRCA)
was signed into law in 1998. Among other things, the act calls for a
[national
assessment](http://www.nsgo.seagrant.org/research/hab/National_HAB_Assessment.pdf)
of harmful algal blooms (published October 2000). Although an
interagency task force was created in the Act, its mandate was to
prepare several documents rather than to create and manage a national
system of HAB monitoring and response.

HABHRCA also provided funding (\$15+ million per year in the first three
years) to be used for research, assisting states with developing
monitoring systems, and for response. A major problem cited by a program
manager is the difficulty of funding responses to unpredictable events.

### Detection

Detection and monitoring for harmful algal blooms (HABs) may take three
forms. The first is passive detection through reports of lesions, odd
behavior, or mortality of fish or reports of seafood toxicity. These
reports may be made by anyone to state agencies.

The second is monitoring fisheries species for toxins. This is
predominantly a state activity, coordinated with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) through the Inter­state Shellfish Sanitation
Conference (ISSC). States differ in their monitoring strategies. Some,
such as Maine, Massachusetts, Florida, Oregon, and Washington, monitor
their shell-fish seasonally at sites along the coast and then close
specific areas to harvesting when toxins approach dangerous levels.
Other states (e.g., Alaska) maintain permanent shellfish closures due to
persistent toxicity or the logistical difficulties of monitoring remote
stretches of coastline.

The third approach is monitoring the environment for early evidence of
HAB, using techniques from microscopy and molecular detection in water
to satellite imagery. Many coastal states have developed monitoring
programs that provide early warning of HABs. Florida has been monitoring
for red tide since the 1950's. The program has prevented human exposure
except when blooms occurred in previously unaffected (and thus
unmonitored) areas. Many blooms can now be detected, characterized, and
their move­ments followed with satellite sensors.

In the SEAPORT (Signal Environmental And Plankton Observations in Real
Time) program, volunteers are trained to use field microscopes to do
real-time observations of plankton in coastal waters. These observations
are combined with other environmental information to help states focus
their toxicity monitoring efforts. SEAPORT programs are now active in
California and most New England states. In addition to helping states
expand their monitoring coverage, these programs have proven to be
effective for estab­lishing long-term baseline databases on coastal
plankton populations and for engaging the public in marine resource
management.

In a 1998 workshop, federal and state agencies successfully collaborated
on stan­dardized monitoring protocols for *Pfiesteria piscicida*. The
workshop was organized by NOAA and included EPA, CDC, FDA, USDA, USGS,
coastal states from New Jersey to Texas, and university researchers.

Today, more researchers are surveying more waterways for the presence of
HAB spe­cies using more sensitive and accurate tools than ever before.
Expanded aquaculture activities and reliance on fisheries resources have
led to a concomitant increase in moni­toring.

### Response

Direct control of HABs is rarely attempted. Approaches to direct bloom
control include chemicals, flocculants, and biological control agents.
Chemical agents presently available are often impractical and
environmentally objectionable. A flocculant, such as clay, scavenges
plankton and other particles as it falls to the sediments below; this
approach may hold the most immediate potential for success. Biological
control may eventually be feasible but knowledge is currently
inadequate.

Thus, most response consists of rapid characterization and delineation
of the event and mitigation, usually by closing fisheries and informing
the public.

Most response activity is at the state level. A state response plan is a
blueprint of how agencies coordinate with each other, avoiding
duplication of effort. Plans generally include monitoring to enhance
early detection of a HAB, and a system for communica­tion among
government officials, industry and with the public as part of a
response. Fact sheets may be prepared in advance for rapid modification
and use. There may also be a list of needs for preparedness, so that
ideas and documentation are ready when funding is available.

Some states supplement their monitoring programs with rapid response
teams that are deployed during suspected HAB events to assess the
blooms' extent and impacts. They use previously identified procedures
and protocols to characterize the bloom.

Major algal blooms may involve a federal response as well. The [Federal
Event Response Plan for Harmful Algal
Blooms](http://www.redtide.whoi.edu/pfiesteria/documents/fed_event_response.pdf)
identifies federal capabilities and resources that could be mobilized to
supplement existing state rapid response programs and to assist those
states who have not yet implemented a rapid response plan for suspected
out­breaks. This Plan was developed by NOAA's National Ocean Service with
EPA and the cooperation and support of participating federal agencies
and offices (CDC, FDA), the states, and the academic community. It is
oriented toward outbreaks of *Pfiesteria piscicida*, but the intent is
to expand it to include other types of HABs. The purpose of the Plan is
to:

-   Identify capabilities of federal agencies to assist states with
    response;

-   Create an interagency mechanism to facilitate rapid delivery and
    efficient coordina­tion of federal response assistance;

-   Describe the process by which the states can request federal
    assistance for response; and

-   Provide guidance for states to improve preparedness and interface
    with federal assistance.

The Plan makes clear that detection and investigation of HAB events are
state respon­sibilities. The federal assistance discussed in the Plan is
based on no statutory mandate and no funds specifically appropriated to
support response under such a plan. The Plan states that federal
assistance is subject to constraints that may delay or limit the
magni­tude of support.

The plan identifies specific agencies, offices, individuals, telephone
numbers and email addresses for coordinating and contact positions.
Obviously this necessitates fre­quent updating, but it also makes it
practical. Furthermore, revisiting and revising the plan frequently
keeps it fresh.

![](media/image4.png){width="5.9875in" height="4.082638888888889in"}

The pathway for notification and federal involvement as described in the
Federal Event Response Plan for Harmful Algal Blooms

A National Event Response Coordinator, from NOAA National Ocean Service,
stays in contact with all federal agencies, states and support personnel
to coordinate activities. Each federal agency has an identified contact
to represent that agency and some have a regional contact. States are to
first contact their Regional Federal Contact, but both are expected to
inform the National Coordinator. The Regional Contact arranges support
that is available within the Region. If the regional offices are unable
to provide sufficient assistance, the State and the Regional Contact are
to inform the National Coordinator. The National Coordinator works with
the agencies and puts the necessary support per­sonnel in contact with
the states to work directly with them. The federal agency support
personnel keep the National Coordinator informed of progress.

The plan specifies three functional categories of support and the
agencies that can provide it:

Environmental Assessment. Scientific advice, research assistance, toxin
assays, analyses of plankton, identification, sediment, fish health,
water quality. (NOAA and EPA).

Public Health. Epidemiology and public health support (CDC), screening
of sea­food for toxicity (FDA).

Field support. Boats, personnel, field equipment, and laboratory
support. For direct field support, a caveat is included that personnel
and equipment are subject to availability (NOAA and EPA).

The plan has not yet been fully activated for a HAB event. This is a
function of both the short time it has been in existence and the desire
by states to keep HABs quiet. Seri­ous economic impacts may result when
HAB events are publicized in the media. An informal, quiet response is
often preferable to a major federal response for that reason.

Information on federal event response activities is supposed to be
managed through a telephone or listserv exchange by the *Pfiesteria*
Clearinghouse at Woods Hole Oceano­graphic Institution. NSF and NOAA
support a general HAB [web page](http://www.redtide.whoi.edu/hab/) at
Woods Hole that apparently grew out of the Clearinghouse.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  The severe and immediate economic impacts of HABs to state economies
    provide a compelling interest in detection and response by states.
    Federal agencies pro­vide support for preparation and are involved in
    response only when requested. The compelling state interest may not
    carry over to many kinds of invasive spe­cies.

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39. There is substantial federal funding to assist states with
    preparation and monitor­ing.

40. Budgeting for response to unpredictable HABs, where needs vary
    greatly year to year, is a problem for federal agencies.

41. A wide variety of detection/monitoring approaches are used,
    including unsolicited reports from fishermen, shellfish toxin
    assays, water sampling and analysis, monitoring by trained
    volunteers, and satellite imagery.

42. Monitoring protocols (at least for *Pfiesteria piscicida*) are
    standardized so that the best techniques are used and communication
    is easier.

43. The Federal Event Response Plan is simple, clear and practical. It
    contains con­tact information and specifies responsibilities,
    capabilities and constraints of the various parties.

44. Logistical and scientific support provided by federal agencies is as
    important as any direct financial support.

# Oil Spills

### Detection

Detection of oil spills and other episodic pollution events is passive.
Someone is usu­ally present when a spill occurs, except in the case of
pipelines, which are monitored by operating companies to detect pressure
changes that may indicate leaks. The oil-handling industry is now
strongly sensitized and educated about the need to report spills
promptly. Because speed of response is critical, toll-free numbers are
provided.

Workers are instructed to report spills first to local responders. This
may be internal in the company, it may be through a state or regional
toll-free hotline, or it may be simply calling 911. Immediately
afterwards the National Response Center is to be notified through their
toll-free number. The [National Response
Center](http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/) (NRC) is housed in the Coast Guard
facility in Anacostia, MD. It is the sole federal point of contact for
reporting oil spills and other pollution incidents. All reports must be
routed through NRC. NRC then passes information to appropriate federal
and state officials; it does not play a role in the field response
itself. NRC receives nearly 100,000 calls and records about 30,000
putative pollution incidents per year.

In addition to its role as a point of reporting, NRC maintains and
reports data on spills to fulfill statutory mandates of the
participating agencies. As will be described below, it also serves as
coordination point for the response itself. NRC had a budget of about
\$2.25 million in 2000. It operates on the basis of fee for service to
EPA, Coast Guard, and the Departments of Defense and Transportation.

### Response

The National Oil & Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan
([NCP](http://www.nrt.org/epa/nrt/home.nsf/resources/PDFS/$File/ncp.pdf))
is part of the Code of Federal Regulations (40, part 300). NCP provides
for a National Response System (NRS). NRS is implemented by federal,
state and local governments to respond to pollution emergencies. The
federal component of NRS is implemented by the [National Response
Team](http://www.nrt.org/) (NRT). During an event, the NRT provides
technical advice and access to resources and equipment from the member
agencies. NRT is composed of representatives from 16 federal agencies:

> EPA (chair)
>
> Coast Guard (co-chair)
>
> FEMA
>
> GSA
>
> NOAA
>
> NRC

Departments of:

> Agriculture
>
> Defense
>
> Energy
>
> Health and Human Services
>
> Interior
>
> Justice
>
> Labor
>
> State
>
> Transportation
>
> Treasury

The interagency coordination framework is replicated at the regional
level through 13 Regional Response Teams (RRTs). Like the NRT, RRTs are
cochaired by EPA and Coast Guard representatives, but they also include
state representatives. The
[role](http://www.nrt.org/epa/nrt/home.nsf/resources/Publications/$File/RRT Factsheet.pdf)
of the RRT is: (1) preparedness planning and coordination as a standing
team; (2) support to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC, see below)
as an incident-specific team. Each RRT develops a Regional Contingency
Plan that describes the policies and procedures for a quick and
effective response to pollution incidents. More detailed plans are
developed at the sub-regional level by Area Committees and at the local
level by Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). LEPCs are
appointed and supervised by their State Emergency Response Commission
(SERC). One goal of the SERCs, LEPCs, and Area Committees is effective
preparedness among all levels of government and between pri­vate sector
and public response efforts.

Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) are pre-designated by EPA (inland
areas) and the Coast Guard (coastal areas). There are more than 250 EPA
and Coast Guard FOSCs located throughout the U.S. The FOSC coordinates
or directs response resources and efforts during a pollution incident.
The FOSC oversees area planning, provides access to the expertise of the
16 NRT member agencies, and provides support and infor­mation to the
local response community. The Department of Defense and the Depart­ment
of Energy provide FOSCs for hazardous substance pollution incidents at
their facilities or under their jurisdiction.

The FOSC maintains communication with the Regional Response Team. If the
assistance requested by a FOSC exceeds regional resources or
capabilities, the RRT may request further assistance from the National
Response Team. The RRT, as described in the NCP, may function as an
incident-specific team, supporting the FOSC during an inci­dent by:

-   monitoring the response;

-   coordinating on issues of concern that cannot be resolved within the
    response organization;

-   providing communications support;

-   making recommendations to the FOSC consistent with the RRT's
    expertise;

-   providing advice to the FOSC on the use of chemical countermeasures
    (e.g., dispers­ants and *in situ* burning), which have not been
    preapproved for use in the response area; and

-   assisting the FOSC in mobilizing resources available from RRT member
    agencies in the region.

One of the important resources that may be mobilized is the National
Strike Force (NSF) of the Coast Guard, created in 1973 by the NCP.
Composed of about 200 person­nel, NSF is headed by a Coordination Center
in North Carolina and has three teams across the country, the Atlantic
Strike Team, the Gulf Strike Team, and the Pacific Strike Team. The
Strike Teams provide rapid response to both marine and inland events in
the form of expert, experienced people and specialized equipment. For
larger efforts they can engage and monitor contractors. The Coordination
Center supervises a maintenance contract for the \$30-million inventory
of response equipment, maintains a database of worldwide availability of
response equipment in all sectors, provides a public information
assistance team, and commands and coordinates the strike teams. In
addition, they can provide experts in the Incident Command System to
assist with establishing ICS organi­zations, provide training, and
participate in integrated preparedness exercises with vari­ous agencies
and private industry.

The National Response Center (NRC) provides a communications core to the
National Response System. When it receives an incident report that
requires federal action, NRC relays the information to an appropriate
FOSC.

Significant oil spills involve numerous agencies and hundreds, possibly
thousands, of people conducting and supporting cleanup efforts. To
promote effective and quick coor­dination during oil spill responses, the
Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency use the Incident
Command System (ICS; see later section). The Coast Guard issues a [Field
Operations Guide](http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/response/fog.pdf) with
information on the ICS and its application to oil spill response.

The Unified Command System, a component of ICS, is recommended for oil
spill management to provide integrated command by representatives from
multiple organiza­tions. The FOSC, however, retains special authority
that is not typical of ICS imple­mentations. He or she may appeal to the
Regional Response Team to help resolve con­flicts. If the RRT cannot
resolve the issue, the FOSC has ultimate decision-making authority.
According to NCP, the FOSC, ". . . shall direct response efforts and
coordinate all other efforts at the scene of a discharge or release."
Realistically, however, the FOSC only has final authority over other
federal resources and the party responsible for the spill according to
federal law.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  For emergencies requiring reponse within hours, the National
    Response Center pro­vides a single, nationwide point for reporting
    and rapidly initiating federal response mechanisms.

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45. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator plays a critical role in directing
    the response (particularly federal elements and those of the
    responsible party), providing immediate funds when necessary, and
    mobilizing federal resources.

46. Response decisions and implementation are local, but there is a
    hierarchy of backup and support through Regional and National
    Response Teams.

47. A large and well-funded infrastructure provides resources for rapid,
    effective response.

# Incident Command System

The Incident Command System (ICS) is different from the other systems
reviewed here in that it is not a detection and response system as such,
but an organizational framework that is increasingly adopted as a
standard emergency response structure. Originally designed to
accommodate interagency fire management in California, it has since been
adopted by many states, FEMA (which produces [online course
materials](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/is195lst.htm)), other federal
agencies, oil spill response agencies, and various law enforcement
agencies. Some benefits of ICS are:

1.  It is organizationally flexible and can grow and shrink to meet the
    needs of inci­dents of any kind and size.

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48. It is sufficiently standard that personnel from a variety of
    agencies and diverse geo­graphic locations can rapidly meld into a
    common management structure.

49. Agencies can use the system on a day-to-day basis for routine
    situations as well as for major emergencies.

50. It is cost effective.

Without such a command structure, agencies cooperating in a rapid
response often experience difficulties due to ambiguous authority, clash
of organizational cultures, questions of jurisdiction, poor allocation
of resources, etc.

The organization of ICS is built around five major functions:

**COMMAND**. Sets objectives and priorities, has overall responsibility
at the incident or event.

**PLANNING.** Develops the action plan to accomplish the objectives,
collects and evalu­ates information, maintains resource status.

**OPERATIONS**. Conducts tactical operations to carry out the plan,
develops the tactical objectives and organization, directs all
resources.

**LOGISTICS**. Provides support to meet incident needs, provides
resources and all other services needed to support the incident.

**FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION**. Monitors costs related to incident, provides
accounting, procurement, time recording, cost analyses.

In a small incident, all of these activities may be handled by one
person, the Incident Commander. If the needs grow, people are added. A
basic ICS operating guideline is that the person at the top of the
organization is responsible unless and until the authority is delegated
to another person. Thus, on smaller situations where additional persons
are not required, the Incident Commander will directly manage all
aspects of the incident organization. A large Incident Command may look
like this:

![](media/image5.png){width="5.9944444444444445in"
height="7.153472222222222in"}

*Organization of a large incident command.*

Some of the concepts important in ICS are:

**Agency autonomy**. Agencies remain autonomous and power and authority
are not usurped. Agencies involved contribute to the command process.

**Management by objectives**. The objectives set by Command must be
\"real\" in the sense that subordinate positions agree that the
objectives can be met. Command is required to adjust any objectives that
subordinates state they cannot accomplish. This assures that plans are
realistic and that Command is clearly aware of organizational
limita­tions. It also increases the commitment of subordinate positions
because those who help to design their own assignments have a greater
motivation to reach objectives.

**Unit integrity**. Groups or units of people sent from one area or
agency are not integrated individually and then assigned to teams or
tasks. A guiding principle is to maintain those groups and assign them
as a unit. This improves communication, cohesion and practical matters
like timekeeping.

**Functional clarity**. Each part of the organization is designed so
that its members can concentrate on a primary assignment and not be
unnecessarily distracted by other responsibilities.

**Effective span of control**. A supervisor can effectively manage up to
seven subordi­nates. The optimum is five. Section chiefs and other
positions are added as needed to stay within the effective span of
control.

**Modular format**. The five functional activities listed above are
modular. The can be used for any incident and scaled up or down as
needed. The organization is top-down.

**Common terminology**. ICS provides a common terminology for
organizational posi­tions, resource elements, and facilities that are
readily understood by anyone with ICS training or experience.

**Integrated communications**. Primarily dealing with radio
communications, this pro­vides a ready communication plan including
frequency usage, plain-language com­munication (no agency-specific
codes), and procedures.

### Unified Command

Normally there is a single Incident Commander (with staff as needed),
but the system provides for Unified Command for complex responses that
cross jurisdictional bounda­ries or involve multiple agencies with
geographic or functional jurisdiction. Unified Command brings together
the "Incident Commanders" of all major organizations involved in the
response to function as a team with a common set of incident objectives
and strategies. Unified Command provides a systematic means of
organizing a variety of agencies into one concerted effort. The concept
offers uniform procedures that enable all involved agencies to perform
their roles effectively. As described by Erik Auf der Heide (1989,
[Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and
Coordination](http://216.202.128.19/dr/static.htm)):

"The guidelines for deciding who should be in command are simple and
apply at any level of incident complexity:

**Agency Role**. Responding agencies will be filling one of two roles.
They will be either jurisdictional, with direct statutory responsibility
and authority, or they will be sup-porting agencies who have been called
for help. Only jurisdictional agencies with statutory responsibility on
some part of the incident can assign one of the Unified Commanders.

**Agency Authority**. The agencies who assign Commanders must have the
authority to order, transport, and maintain the resources necessary to
meet Command objectives. This authority is not dependent on size or
budget level since even very small agencies may participate in a Unified
Command. It is dependent upon legitimate capability to pay the bills.
(In the case of small agencies, this capability may come from state and
federal assistance, but is nevertheless the required capability.) Only
agencies with fiscal authority may assign one of the Unified
Commanders."

The Forest Service has prepared a short training program called "ICS for
Executives." It covers areas of interest to executives considering ICS
for their agencies, including agency authority in an incident command
structure.

### Analysis and critical elements

1.  The benefits of ICS, as described above, address the needs of
    multiple organiza­tions responding to the detection of invasive
    species.

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51. These benefits apply equally to early stages of a rapid response and
    to a response that must be sustained over a period of years.

52. Although existing systems of rapid response to invasive species
    incorporate some features of the ICS, and some agencies are
    investigating ICS as a model, its uni­form adoption for response to
    invasive species would enhance interagency and federal-state
    cooperation, communication, and effectiveness.

# Case Studies of Rapid Response

## A success and a failure

### Success: black striped mussel in Australia[^1]

On March 27, 1999, the black striped mussel (probably *Mytilopsis
sallei*) was found in Darwin Harbour, Northern Territory, Australia. It
was discovered during a routine survey by the CSIRO Centre for Research
on Introduced Marine Pests. A similar survey in Sept. 1998 had shown no
evidence of it, but in March 1999 about 28,000 individuals per square
yard covered almost all surfaces of submerged structures at the Cullen
Bay Marina. A more thorough survey of structures in the Harbour
subsequently revealed smaller populations at two other marinas. It was
estimated that the original introduction was in October 1998 at Cullen
Bay and that the two other populations were secondary.

The mussel was quickly identified and determined to be a serious pest.
This group of mussels is native to protected marine and estuarine areas
of tropical Central and South America. It has caused problems in Fiji,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and India, and is regarded as one of the
world's most damaging marine pests.

A management committee was established in the Northern Territory, led by
the NT Dept. of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF) and with
representatives of other NT agencies. National government agencies, led
by Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia, established a national
working group on April 6, 1999 (nine days after the sur­veyors first saw
the mussel) to coordinate national action to prevent the spread of the
mussel to other states. Other agencies involved included Environment
Australia, CSIRO, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the
Australian Quarantine and Inspec­tion Service, the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority, the Australian Customs Service, the Australian
Government Solicitor and the Department of Defence (Navy).

A scientific subcommittee with representatives from CSIRO, the Northern
Territory University, and DPIF developed national protocols to detect
and treat the black striped mussel at sites and on vectors considered to
be at risk, from Fremantle on Australia's west coast to Sydney on the
east coast. Little was known about control of this group of mussels, as
there was little experience of situations where eradication of a mussel
infes­tation was feasible.

A quarantine and legal authorities were quickly established to control
the movement of vessels and any item in contact with contaminated water.
The Australian Cabinet approved the unqualified expenditure of funds
necessary to effectively address the response actions.

Four days after the detection, four treatments (chlorine, copper
sulphate, chlorine dioxide, detergent) had been tested and the
eradication treatment began. Fortunately, the three marinas were
enclosed with double gates across the entrances. Between March 31 and
April 19 1999, workers closed the gates, prohibited any further vessel
movement, poured sodium hypochlorite (bleach) and copper sulphate into
the water, and required vessel owners to pump the solution through their
water pipes. The solution contacted all vessels and submerged
structures, killing the mussels. Because the chemicals are general
biocides, most other marine life in the marinas was killed as well, but
the government states that the ecosystems were back to normal in 2000.

On April 23 1999 (less than a month after detection), with the mussel
completely eradicated from these areas, the marinas and mooring basin
were re-opened for normal use. Procedures were established for further
monitoring and sampling to detect new infestations. Thorough monitoring
of the marinas and surrounding areas of Darwin Har­bour showed that the
eradication effort was successful.

Actions undertaken involved over 300 personnel, and included the
tracking and treatment of vessels that had left infected sites, the
treatment of three sites and almost three hundred vessels in the Darwin
area and the initiation of a public awareness program to meet local and
national needs. The Northern Territory Government spent about \$A2.2
million, excluding personnel costs. Almost \$A1 million was reimbursed
by the National Government.

Review of the episode by the Australian invasive species community
suggested that increased preparedness for marine pests was needed. A
National Taskforce on the Pre­vention and Management of Marine Pest
Incursions was established in August 1999. A workshop concluded that,
while the local response actions taken after detection were quick and
effective, there was a delay in raising the alarm nationally. Regarding
detec­tion, they concluded that the two most effective methods for
introduced marine pests were: (1) an extensive monitoring and
surveillance program (active); and (2) enhanced public awareness to
stimulate voluntary reporting (passive).

Discussions highlighted the need for strong political commitment to the
issues of marine pest impacts and the need to obtain this commitment
from the various jurisdic­tions in order to obtain a secure funding base
for response. It was determined that sys­tematic risk management was an
essential approach to maximizing the effectiveness of preventing and
responding to marine pest outbreaks. An existing approach to dealing
with exotic animal diseases in Australia was endorsed as the model from
which to develop the required national, jurisdictional and local
emergency response and control plans for marine pest outbreaks.
Essential elements to consider in monitoring and evaluation actions were
identified as proactive research, surveillance for early warning, and
evaluation of past case studies and monitoring procedures.

### Failure: *Caulerpa taxifolia* in the Mediterranean Sea[^2]

*Caulerpa taxifolia*, sometimes called the killer alga, was found in the
Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Monaco in 1984. At this time it
covered only 1 m^2^. Today it occu­pies over 4600 ha, mostly along the
French-Italian coast, but with 99 colonies from the Croatian coast in
the Adriatic Sea to the Baleares Islands of Spain.

Caulerpa was first cultivated in aquaria around 1980. Beginning in 1982,
the Oceanographic Museum of Monaco, which Jacques Cousteau directed for
31 years, began to cultivate it in its aquaria. Two years later,
Dominique Bezard, a museum offi­cial, was diving below the building and
recognized the small colony on the ocean floor as the same alga in the
aquaria. Four years after spotting it, in 1988, he mentioned it to a
visiting marine biology student from the University of Nice and
expressed his astonish­ment that it could survive in the Mediterranean
Sea.[^3] The student collected it and told his professor, Alexandre
Meinesz, about it.

Meinesz, an authority on the genus *Caulerpa*, first saw it in 1989. It
covered over a hectare of sea floor and he was told that isolated
colonies could be found up to several kilometers away. He expressed
concern to Francois Doumenge, who replaced Cousteau as Director of the
Museum in 1988. Doumenge said it would probably disappear in the first
harsh winter and it was nothing to worry about. It was a curiosity and
perhaps even beneficial. However, Meinesz noted that there had been two
very severe winters since it was first observed in 1984.

Meinesz began to alert his university and French officials. Some said it
was in Monaco, so it was not their affair, ignoring the fact that Monaco
is only one square mile embedded along the coastline of France. The
Monacan government said it was up to the Museum to respond. Since the
Museum was subject to French law, it was strictly a French problem.
Others simply did not take the problem seriously. Meinesz began to feel
that a response would have to await spread into French waters.

In 1990, Meinesz told students and dive clubs about the alga and asked
them to be on the lookout for it. One of his students found it in French
waters in July. Meinesz wrote a report to government authorities and
contacted the media. The first of many media storms erupted. While
Meinesz tried to arouse people to the ecological damage it would cause,
Doumenge stated that, "on the contrary, this affair will be very
beneficial for the Côte d'Azur, which will see its underwater prairies,
currently in a bad way, . . . flourish again."

As the alga expanded its range, so did the controversy. More institutes
and govern­ment officials became involved, but it proved difficult to
even get a decision that any monitoring and research should be done, let
alone an attempt at control or eradication. When finally the national
agencies acknowledged the serious nature of the problem, it was with an
air of resignation rather than urgency. There was smooth shift from,
"the problem is not serious" to, "it is so bad there is nothing we can
do." Doumenge began to reject Museum responsibility for the
introduction. He provided a number of hypotheses to the media. It was a
native species that was exploding and changing in response to warm water
and pollution. It was introduced naturally through the Suez Canal, or by
a boat. He further argued that it was a beneficial species. Finally, he
accused Meinesz of raising alarm in order to secure funds for his
laboratory.

Meinesz believes that even in 1991 there was a chance for chemical or
manual eradi­cation. But the apparent controversy provided cover for
authorities who did not want to act. They urged for calm, saying there
was too much excitement over the issue. Report­ers picked sides, some
ridiculing Meinesz for his position. As evidence of the invasion
accumulated, France's marine research and administrative agency,
IFREMER, increas­ingly sided with Doumenge's theory that the alga was
native. After years of discussing it and making pronouncements, and
despite a fleet of research vessels and submersibles, no one from
IFREMER had actually gone to see the alga in the ocean.

Spain, which may have benefited from watching the French experience,
took a more aggressive attitude. In 1992 Caulerpa was found on the coast
of Majorca. A painstaking manual eradication was initiated on colonies
scattered over a hectare. Each year they removed resprouts. However in
1995 a larger area of infestation was found.

Caulerpa has spread rapidly, severely impacting the coastal ecosystems
of Croatia, France, Italy, Monaco, and Spain. It is anticipated that the
ecological damage will ulti­mately be much greater than at present.

Alexandre Meinesz summarized the difficulties as follows:

> "The polemic has been heated, fed by the defense of many different
> inter­ests. It was able to break out because key scientific and
> government authorities were lax and because of disdain for a problem
> that does not directly threaten human health. An abundance of
> communications on this affair masks inadequate knowledge and a failure
> of government experts. The object of byzantine debates between
> scientists, government experts, public figures, and the media, this
> sterile controversy slowed the recogni­tion of the threat. The threat
> was long underestimated while the time dur­ing which it might have been
> successfully contained dribbled away. The alga grew inexorably, and it
> still grows, disturbing the marine environment . . . and the human
> intellect."

### Analysis and critical elements

The elimination of the black striped mussel from Darwin Harbour was one
of the few successful aquatic pest eradication exercises ever to be
undertaken. It succeeded because:

1.  An active detection program was in place, inspecting marinas for
    non-native spe­cies. In this case, it facilitated early detection.

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53. The mussel already had a reputation as a serious pest, simplifying
    the assessment.

54. The response was extremely aggressive. Identification, assessment,
    formation of a territorial management committee, and planning,
    testing and initiation of eradi­cation were all done in less than a
    week. A short time later a national committee was in place and a
    quarantine was established.

55. Infested areas could be isolated by lock gates, facilitating
    treatment and quaran­tine enforcement.

The disaster of *Caulerpa taxifolia* in the Mediterranean Sea can
certainly be regarded as a classic case of bureaucratic wrangling and
evasion, but there is more to it. The problems were several:

56. Part of the delay can be attributed to the inability to clearly
    refute the claim that the alga was native. Greater knowledge of
    systematics and taxonomy, coupled with a record of biodiversity
    studies in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, might have settled this
    point quickly.

57. Although detection was early, recognition of the problem by anyone
    was not. The alga occupied only 1 m^2^ when it was first seen in
    1984, but no one outside the Museum was told. In 1988 Meinesz found
    out, but waited a year before inves­tigating further. Another year
    passed before major attempts to raise the alarm. If there were a
    generally recognized obligation or legal requirement to report
    discoveries of nonnative species to an agency that would be
    responsible for assessment, this delay and much of the controversy
    might have been avoided.

58. Meinesz believes that there are three lessons from his experience:

    a.  Decision makers depend too much on media and politics and not
        enough on scientific literature.

    b.  Biology has become more reductionist and less able to deal with
        ecologi­cal field biology.

    c.  Lack of data and good communication weakens analytic capability
        and favors deception.

# Conclusions

### Which model is best organizationally?

Among the models (and permutations of them) for local through federal
coordination described in this review, which works or would work best
for invasive species? Here are thumbnail descriptions of some of the
models described here:

> **APHIS-VS** -- VS shares information and provides resources to states
> and other veterinary groups.
>
> **APHIS-PPQ** -- For detection, PPQ works through three tiers of CAPS
> committees (state, regional and national), ultimately provides funds
> to the states and archives/organizes resulting information. For
> response, PPQ works directly with affected states.
>
> **Fire** -- Response is in a four-tiered system (local, dispatch
> center, GACC and NICC). A unique feature of this model, though, is
> that each higher level coordinates the *sharing of resources* among
> units of the lower level. This is clearly a bottom-up system. For the
> most part, no response decisions or funding are provided from above
> within this system.
>
> **CDC** -- CDC shares information with and provides resources to
> states, who do the same with county/local agencies.
>
> **Aquatic nuisance species** -- There are three tiers (state, regional
> and national). Most activity is at the state and regional level. The
> national level provides some funds, planning guidance, assessments and
> coordination among federal agencies.
>
> **Harmful algal blooms** -- Federal support is provided to states for
> preparation and monitoring and for response on request, according to
> predefined parameters and procedures.
>
> **Oil spills** -- All detections reported through federal reporting
> center. Response is *planned* in a four-tiered system (local, area,
> regional and national) but *imple­mented* by any agency on the scene
> under a federal coordinator and with access to considerable federal
> infrastructural support.

Although it may be argued that some of these systems are more effective
than others, there are so many other important features of the systems
(detailed below) that the organizational model cannot be clearly
isolated as a critical element of success.

Some systems have intermediate, regional bodies and others do not.
Regional bodies appear to be most needed when there are regional issues
that require coordination among subsidiary units (e.g., states). The
success of CDC in coordinating the large and complex system related to
human health suggests that a regional element is not always needed.
Regional bodies appear to be appropriate in the case of aquatic nuisance
species because of regional habitat and biogeographical features. They
make sense in the fire model because response resources are shared
within a geographic area, as logistically appropri­ate, before being
shared between areas. In other systems a regional body may be a need­less
complication.

Following are conclusions and recommendations based on the preceding
review and categorized as general, detection and response. Not
surprisingly, some of the same ideas can be found in the Invasive
Species Council's 2001 Management Plan.

### Conclusions -- General

1.  Some general features associated with effectiveness are listed here
    and discussed in more detail below:

    a.  strong interest by localities or states in detection and
        response

    b.  federal leadership through means in addition to funding
        (science, training, logis­tics, and leadership itself)

    c.  effective communication of ideas and data with stakeholders and
        partners

    d.  clear organization, authority and responsibility

    e.  exploitation of the most effective means of detection for the
        particular system

    f.  adequate funding.

    g.  advance, detailed planning of response organization and
        arrangements

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59. Effective systems work, in part, because there is strong local
    motivation for detection and response. The fire model and the
    CDC/human disease model are prime examples. The federal government
    need not be concerned with prompting action or handling local
    responses and details itself; local authorities are eager to take
    the initiative. The federal government need only provide support,
    coordination, and leadership. Local interest in detection and
    response to invasive species may be insufficiently compelling. This
    could be addressed through systems of incentives as well as
    agreements (see item 19) for mutual support among states and federal
    agencies that also require effective detection programs.

60. Scientific expertise and its service to partners is a key to
    enhancing national leader­ship, effective partnerships with states
    and other agencies, providing techni­cal assistance, and establishing
    standards. Because states increasingly have sophisticated scientific
    resources themselves, world-class expertise is needed at the federal
    level to provide this benefit. The expertise is likely to be most
    effec­tive if it is closely allied with the management arm of the
    agency it interacts with, although it may well be and probably
    should be engaged in research as well as technical support. Areas in
    which scientific expertise is likely to be useful to states are:

    a.  identification and systematics

    b.  techniques for surveillance, detection, monitoring, and related
        data analy­ses

    c.  eradication/control technology

    d.  biology/ecology with emphasis on risk assessments

    e.  these areas of expertise are needed in each taxonomic group or
        type of inva­sive species.

61. Federal programs that are successful include more than financial
    support. Simply disbursing funds and attempting to control states
    and localities with them is not likely to be successful in the long
    run. Provision of logistical and scientific sup­port and quality
    leadership engenders a close working relationship and a spirit of
    federal-state cooperation.

62. Agencies may achieve national leadership in and enhance quality of
    detection and response activities nationwide by providing
    high-quality training and, where appropriate, certification in
    technical fields related to detection and response. This is
    appropriate for survey managers, identifiers, specialists in control
    and monitoring technologies, etc.

63. Effective systems of detection and response require ready access to
    data. For inva­sive species, these needs may be most efficiently
    served from a central sys­tem, or at least standardization of a
    designated system for each group of invasives. The needs have been
    addressed in the Council's Invasive Species Management plan. They
    include:

    a.  Database of existing and potential invasive species in the U.S.
        with current:

        i.  geographic information

        ii. identification details

        iii. control information

    b.  Database of institutions and experts for identification and
        biology of inva­sive species in each taxonomic group.

    c.  Database of people and groups to contact in case of detection,
        depending on geographic location, type of invasive species, and
        potential threat (for use by a reporting point).

64. Authority is required to access various properties to inspect,
    survey and respond to invasives.

65. All groups established to address early detection and rapid response
    to invasive spe­cies should have clear, unique goals and lines of
    communication to and sup­port for field activities. Groups,
    committees, task forces, etc., dealing with inva­sive species seem to
    be proliferating as fast as the invasives themselves and are
    sometimes redundant and spend much of their time interacting with
    one another. The fire management system provides a useful model
    where there is a central "backbone" system with clearly related,
    hierarchical tiers. All working groups, boards, teams, etc. have
    clear relationships with the central backbone and its function.

66. Integration of all technical specialists and field detection and
    response activities into a common agency or group is probably not
    desirable. These activities need to be integrated into other aspects
    of management of the particular resource, and the methods and
    expertise needed are very diverse. Nevertheless, coordina­tion and
    integration of some aspects by a central "backbone" organization may
    be desirable. This integrative function may have already begun with
    the Invasive Species Council. Aspects that may be best coordinated
    centrally include:

    a.  Information management. There are many existing or nascent
        databases on particular kinds of invasives, but their quality
        and completeness vary. The technical demands of a high-end,
        user-friendly database with a web interface are great, and the
        information needs in the various disciplines may be compatible
        enough that this effort can be centralized.

    b.  Funding. An adequately capitalized, no-year fund, with
        investment author­ity and a rapid disbursement process, could be
        the most strategic approach to funding emergency programs across
        the nation for all types of invasives.

    c.  Interagency coordination of resources and communication for
        invasive spe­cies detection and response. There may be needs and
        opportunities for sharing personnel and equipment among agencies
        and invasive types for response. Communication services might
        include a central reporting point like the National Response
        Center (see Oil Spills).

67. Because invasive species and the expertise and agencies needed to
    manage them are so diverse, it may be useful to recognize standard
    types or categories in setting up detection and response systems.
    Responsible agencies and coordinating bodies for each group can be
    recognized and formally assigned responsibility for detec­tion and
    response in that group. These groups may be based on a combination
    of taxonomic and habitat criteria. Following is one possible
    grouping:

    a.  aquatic/marine and all animals

    b.  plants

    c.  animal/human pathogens and parasites

    d.  plant pathogens and insects

68. Adequate funding is important for the success of most systems of
    detection and response. Just as substantial funds are allocated to
    detection and response to human disease and response to oil spills
    and forest fires, they will be necessary to address the great
    diversity of life forms, habitats, technical needs and environmental
    challenges in the detection and response to invasive species (see
    also item 17 specifically relating to response).

### Conclusions -- Detection

69. Opportunities for substantial enhancement of passive, early
    detection should be exploited. For each type of invasive species,
    explicit consideration should be given to advan­tages and
    opportunities for passive vs. active detection. Most detection of
    our invasive species has been passive, and where it works it is
    certainly cost-effective. Multiple agencies, states, universities,
    private groups, amateur biologists, etc. may be engaged. Anyone who
    frequently goes into the field and has some knowledge of biology
    should be aware of the need for surveillance and enlisted to help.
    Publicly available, user-friendly databases would support this
    effort.

70. Active detection may be most effective when targeted to sites near
    invasion path­ways and to sensitive ecosystems. Pilot studies can
    indicate the types of sites and techniques that are most productive
    in detecting particular types of invasives.

71. A program of active detection should be flexible. For instance, when
    the United Kingdom learned of the occurrence of *Phyophthora
    ramorum* in the Netherlands and Germany and saw the devastating
    disease, sudden oak death, that it was causing in California and
    Oregon, the U.K. began intensive surveys in nurseries carrying
    rhododendron and viburnum, which are common host plants in trade.
    They detected it in four nurseries and immediately responded to
    eradicate it.

72. For many types of invasives, greater efforts at surveillance will
    create demands that exceed current capacity of high-level
    identification expertise. Greater emphasis on funding in
    biosystematic research will lead to more training in these fields.
    Agencies with identification needs should consider expanding
    laboratories with a dual mission of research and service to attract
    the best talent and put them in a productive environment.

73. Surveillance information should be communicated to stakeholders and
    the public in a freely available, user-friendly system. This
    encourages participation in sur­veillance and detection.

### Conclusions -- Response

74. The problem of budgeting for responses to unpredictable events that
    vary greatly from year to year was identified by managers in a
    number of these systems. Con­sideration should be given to building
    an adequately capitalized, no-year fund with investment authority.
    There are trade-offs in the choice between a single, universal fund
    vs. separate funds for different invasive types. Rapid
    decision-making in use of the fund is obviously crucial to rapid
    response. In 1997 Austra­lia established a [Natural Heritage
    Trust](http://www.nht.gov.au/), now about A\$2.5 billion, which
    includes actions related to invasive species as part of its mission.

75. Response cannot be rapid if elaborate steps are required between
    detection and actual attempts at containment or eradication. It took
    Australia four days after detection to initiate eradication of the
    black striped mussel. Although such speed may not be possible here
    because of the need for public involvement in some decisions, we
    should not set up additional requirements that are not needed in
    obvious cases. The process for assessment and decision-making should
    be flexible and simple.

76. Effective response systems involve detailed agreements worked out
    carefully in advance. They allow people to focus on the actual
    response rather than on nego­tiating in an atmosphere of confusion
    and ambigu­ity. Agreements may be numer­ous and involve many levels of
    a hierarchical sys­tem and multiple agencies. They specify what will
    be done by whom in any given situation, how leadership will be
    identified, how funding will be arranged, what preparation will be
    undertaken, etc. Agreements should be made at the lowest appropriate
    levels.

77. Although consensus and collaboration in a flexible organization is a
    popular man­agement model, efficient emergency responses require
    predetermined organiza­tions with clear areas of responsibility and
    clear lines of authority. The military is probably the best example
    of an emergency response organization and certainly functions on
    that basis. If flexibility in organizational structure is desired,
    this can be added after the preplanned organization is operating.
    Optional and ambiguous organizational design may lead to confusion
    and uncertainty in the early stages when action is needed. This does
    not imply a need for federal command and control or unilateral
    action. Positions of leadership in response organizations can and in
    many cases should be held by qualified state or local personnel.

78. Identify an organizational structure for response in advance, but
    appoint individu­als to positions as appropriate to the situation
    while organizing the response. In interagency responses, a system
    for assigning leaders of response organizations (Incident
    Commanders) should be identified through agreements made in advance.
    The Incident Command System should be adopted as a standard
    organ­izational model for rapid response, and considered also for
    long-term, interagency control projects.

[^1]: *Based on Australian Thematic Report on Alien Species, [Case
    Study](http://www.biodiv.org/doc/world/au/au-nr-ais-en.doc) and
    Comments on Principles, dated October 2000, by Environment Australia
    and from a Western Australia
    [website](http://www.wa.gov.au/westfish/hab/broc/marineinvader/marine07.html)
    on marine invaders.*

[^2]: *Summarized from: Meinesz, Alexandre. 1999. Killer Algae.
    University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Dan Simberloff, transl. 360
    pp.*

[^3]: *Caulerpa taxifolia* is a tropical alga. The clone used in aquaria
    and found in the Mediterranean is larger, more cold-tolerant, and
    faster growing than the alga in its native range. It may yet be
    described as a new species.