The Evolution of Conflict Through 2020:\
Demands on Personnel, Machines, and Missions

John B. Alexander

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

The Evolution of Conflict Through 2020:\
Demands on Personnel, Machines, and Missions

John B. Alexander

**A Joint Special Operations University Paper prepared for the
Conference on the "Changing Nature of Warfare," in support of the
"Global Trends 2020" Project of the U.S. National Intelligence Council**

# Introduction

It is generally agreed that war in the 21^st^ Century will be different
from previous conflicts. To preface my comments, I admit to certain
biases that influence my thinking. These have been detailed in *Winning
The War*. (1) First, the threat in the global war on terror (GWOT) needs
more specificity. The public resolve to take the steps necessary to win
GWOT is in doubt. Thus, we are destined to arrhythmic oscillations of
armed interventions against a plethora of amorphous opponents. (2) (See
Appendix A) These confrontations will certainly last through 2020 and
severely tax our resources. At any given time a catastrophic terrorist
attack could punctuate history. While there would be an emotional outcry
demanding immediate, and possibly irrational response, success in
countering the adversaries depends on comprehensive contingency planning
for events that boggle the imagination.

Second, I opine that we have actually entered the next global
confrontation, and it is ideologically based. Called World War X, it is
broader and more complex than GWOT. The consequences of losing are far
greater and could drastically alter our way of life. The primary
determinant in whether or not we emerge victorious will be the formal
recognition of the nature of this conflict and realization that we are
already engaged. While military forces will play a substantial role in
this conflict, the outcome of WW X will be determined by other factors
including economic strength, sustained public will, and changes in the
energy paradigm.

Several factors weigh heavily in this equation. I support Samuel
Huntington's notion that this is a *clash of civilizations*. (3) A world
defined as having two parts, Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Harb (House of War)
leaves little room for compromise. (4) In my view, the two most
significant factors that will influence future conflict will be the
population growth rate of the Islamic world, and their resistance to
secular education in many countries. (5) Of course, there are many other
issues that will threaten our national interests. There will be
geographic areas of instability on most continents that will continue to
demand preparation for, or actual armed intervention by, US forces.
These have been described adequately in the NIC 2020 documents (6)

# Impact of Incompatible Belief and Value Systems

We do not understand the threat. Worse, we don't know what we don't
know. At issue are basic incompatibilities in beliefs and values. These
discords are so fundamental as to overshadow all other issues. It is
with arrogance, hubris, and at great peril that we ignore the
foundations of the conflict. We must abandon the notion that all humans
think alike and share common values. Among the core concepts that may be
at odds are the following:

-   All people want the same things (life, liberty, and happiness)

-   Life, especially human life, has extraordinary value

-   Females and males should have equal rights and opportunities

-   Individuals are solely responsible for their actions

-   The value placed on *honor* and *shame*

-   Opposing belief systems can be accommodated within heterogeneous
    societies

-   Given a choice, people will choose to avoid pain and suffering

-   Democracy is the best form of governance and should be provided to
    all

-   Education is good, highly desirable, and is key to solution of most
    problems

-   Progress, measured in quantifiable increments, yields a high
    probability of success

-   Boundaries (geographic/social/economic/other) are absolute or
    sacrosanct

The nation-state as the primary building block of international
relations is a failing concept. However, at 2020 it will still be the
dominant form of macro-organizational interactions in the world.
Facilitated by information technology, emerging will be large-scale,
philosophically based institutions that have the capacity to direct or
influence the actions of far-reaching population groups. In some cases
these will be virtual organizations connected only by information
provided by sources whose identity may, or may not, be known. (7)

The impact of societal structures based on beliefs is already being
observed. The most noticeable current example is *jihad* as called for
by Osama bin Laden, and other fundamentalist Muslim clerics. Fighters,
considering themselves to be mujahideen, move from one zone of conflict
to another. Their objective remains constant; defeat of Western
ideology. Conversely, operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
executed by US led coalitions, and were fought to remove regimes of
countries that were believed to support terrorists and thereby
threatened US security. The coalition battlespace remains constrained by
country borders that were externally imposed upon local residents.

In the near future geographically base notions for bounding conflict
will be replaced by concepts in which people, supporting their belief
system, wage war regardless of cartographer's limitations. (8)
Understanding this shift, and being able to define the conflict
properly, is crucial in determining the outcome. (9)

Willingness to accept and inflict casualties will remain extremely
sensitive issues. We will accept casualty rates proportional to the
perceived threat. However, this is a sliding scale. The continuation of
terrorist attacks within US borders will increase our tolerance for both
accepting and inflicting casualties. Serious attacks, such as have been
forecast by terrorist organizations, would dramatically reduce the
American public's concern about collateral casualties. The danger is
that devastating retaliation may be acceptable in the short term but
have negative consequences in the long term. These are serious issues
that demand contemplation before the events occur. Conversely, we must
guard against attitudes that could make leaders unwilling to commit
force for fear that US casualties are not acceptable to their voting
constituents.

The foregoing topics deserve considerable explanation and space does not
allow that luxury. To protect our national interests through 2020 and
beyond, we must eschew our cerebralcentric worldview and focus on
preparing our security infrastructure for the complex tasks they will
face.

# Types of Future Wars

Three types of conflicts are likely between now and 2020. Some of these
wars, especially if initiated by foreign powers, could appear quite
traditional. When and how America intervenes could greatly influence the
nature of the conflict.

# Overt War

The primary focus of senior political and military leadership will be on
overt war such as our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Several
traditional adversaries will remain of concern. A nuclear capable North
Korea will be at the top of the list. The long-term intentions of China
are not sufficiently clear and they could pose a threat to US interests
in many areas. Also to be watched is the potential for direct
confrontation between India and Pakistan. While their relations wax and
wane, both are declared nuclear states with an enduring history of
conflict. These, and several other well-armed countries could present
situations for which introduction of large scale US forces could be
required. These possibilities will guide both future force structure and
technological development for weapons systems.

However, lessons learned from recent conflicts will impact significantly
on size and composition of the force, military doctrine, and the
political decisions to go to war. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom were conducted quite differently yet had common characteristics.
In both, the vast superiority of American military weapons technology
quickly decided the outcome of the initial battles. The apparent
victories were followed by extended periods of instability that require
commitment of substantial numbers of troops and other resources. The
need for invincible armored forces backed by devastating air power
quickly gave way to small unit operations and a complex juxtaposition of
force protection, elimination of dangerous insurgents, and civil
affairs-type interactions. The expense of the stability operations was
far greater than initially anticipated, as was resistance to coalition
occupation and American influence over the new governments.

# Covert War

Covert conflicts were pervasive throughout the Cold War. Among the best
known was the war fought by the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the
Soviets during the 1980s. For years the CIA provided support from
Pakistan. Emphasis was placed on acquisition of foreign materiel that
could not be traced directly to the US. Exceptions were made such as
introduction of Stinger antiaircraft missiles. That decision is credited
by many observers as being the turning point in the war and led to the
Soviets leaving the country. (10)(11)(12)(13)

The CIA, sometimes supported by special operations forces (SOF), engaged
in several covert operations around the world. Missions in Tibet, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Congo are a few examples that remain relatively
unknown to most Americans. Later, the war on drugs saw introduction of
other agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) into active
participation in hazardous missions. Together interagency
counternarcotics operations were conducted in Colombia, Peru, Thailand,
and other drug producing or transit regions of the world. The
continuation of GWOT will expand covert operations to more of the globe,
particularly to those nations that harbor and support terrorist.

# Outsourced War

Outsourced wars have begun in earnest. There have always been
mercenaries, but future conflicts will take the concept to new levels.
During the Cold War proxies fought as client states of the East and
West. The US frequently provided assistance to forces opposing those
supported by the Soviets in order to strain their military resources.
However, proxy wars are undergoing a metamorphosis and will emerge in
the form of nongovernmental outsourced wars. Some will have state
sponsorship, while others will not. This trend already can be observed
in the contracting of services traditionally done by military forces in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples include the Americans that provide
protection for President Karzai, advisors to foreign senior military
officials, and private guards for building and convoy security. (14)(15)
Many of these contractors are heavily armed and have used deadly force
on several occasions. Use of contractors in sensitive situations,
including interrogation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad,
has raised serious issues regarding both legal and ethical
responsibilities. (16)

Large transnational companies routinely engage contracted security. Many
of these contractors look like executive class mercenaries, but with a
professional imprimatur. They are often subsidiaries of well established
and respected companies. In corporate boardrooms around the world, the
image of the rogue soldier of fortune is being transformed into that of
elite master craftsmen. The impact will be profound for the US military.

The corollary to this trend is seen in protection afforded within the
United States where the ratio of private security guards to sworn law
enforcement offices is 5:1 and increasing. Some of these private
organizations provide security for the most sensitive government sites
and are prepared to engage protective services that equate to military
operations. The internationalization of private security in the US has
happened. As an example, Wackenhut, formerly an American company, is now
a subsidiary of Group 4 Falck of Copenhagen, Demark.

Non-state outsource wars are in their infancy, but will most certainly
expand. The legal limits have not been set. Controversy will abound as
perceived violations of established norms of warfare occur.

Outsourcing of military services has been embraced by the US as a means
to minimize exposure of troops and acquire services currently not
available due to personnel resource constraints. Undoubtedly, this will
lead to expansion of such techniques by other countries and larger
international organizations. The issue of preemptive operations by
contract organizations, key to counterterrorism, is totally unbounded.
The institutional and ethical boundaries have not been tested as to what
operations are appropriate. The question is whether or not Pandora's Box
has opened?

# Operational Considerations

America's supremacy in traditional military operations will remain
unchallenged through 2020. Defense budgets and force structure will
focus on our ability to deter or defeat conventional forces with
overmatching military capabilities including weaponry. Concurrently,
there will be comprehensive preparation for unconventional engagements,
post conflict, and stability operations.

The doctrine necessary for defeating a conventional adversary on land,
sea, or air is well developed. Success has been repeatedly demonstrated.
Once in theater, US forces can overwhelm any standing adversary,
establish and maintain air superiority, control sea lanes or littoral
waters, and seize geographic territory. Strategic lift capability is,
and will remain through 2020, the critical capability for force
projection for conventional warfare.

Because of the success of US forces, potential adversaries now
concentrate on asymmetric warfare. Strategically, our adversaries have
focused on undermining the resolve of Americans. Since Vietnam it has
been learned that the US does not respond well to wars of attrition. It
is assumed by some potential enemies that the US is unwilling to accept
casualties, especially if they can be dispersed over a long period of
time.

The events of 9/11 conclusively demonstrated that the US mainland was
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Concepts of defense, geared toward
fighting external wars, were severely tested and found failing. Laws
designed to protect civil liberties were subordinated as the Congress
passed The Patriot Acts. Efforts for protection of territorial integrity
included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The
Defense Department counterpart was the formation of Northern Command.

The effectiveness of these moves remains unclear. However, they will
bring about a dramatic shift in our internal defensive posture. There
will be unprecedented coordination between local, state, and federal
authorities. This includes elements of the DOD that have previously been
externally oriented. Renewed consideration must be given continuity of
government activities making the system more dispersed and agile.

Interagency relationships will evolve and strengthen. A delicate balance
must be maintained between traditional openness of a democratic society
and a *Fortress America* mentality. While border security must be
enhanced, the Defense Department must rigorously reject the oft-heard
plea that military units should be moved to our borders. We simply do
not have adequate forces and static defenses inevitably breakdown.
Further, there are laws, such as *Posse Comitatus*, that must be changed
to facilitate defensive operations in peacetime.

The ability to conduct traditional combat operations is a given.
However, the concept of full-spectrum warfare will be expanded to well
beyond current limits and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will
assume a far more prevalent role in the Defense establishment. Much of
this will be accomplished by SOF elements not as well known as Special
Forces, SEALS, Rangers, or Air Commandos.

# Direct Action

Conventional units will develop enhanced capabilities for direct action
missions such as raids. This will be essential for preemptive strikes to
neutralize terrorist elements. Combat in urban areas is likely to
dominate future conflict. Traditionally, urban battles have proven to be
extremely difficult, especially when the enemy employs human shields.
That will not change. Volumes have already been written on this topic so
I will only mention that it is an extremely important topic. Both
conventional and SOF units must train rigorously for it. Technologies
are available that could provide us a decided advantage in urban combat.
Unfortunately, they are not being pursued vigorously enough.

Special operations forces spend considerable time and resources training
for access into denied areas. Most of them maintain airborne status.
Their aircraft are designed especially for penetration missions. Some
units participate in underwater and HALO parachute infiltration
operations. These skills provide access into very difficult areas. They
also enhance esprit de corps that is much coveted in elite units. These
capabilities should remain available. However, in many future
operations, SOF troops will arrive at their destinations via
unpretentious civilian transportation. While a few units and
intelligence agencies currently employ such infiltration techniques,
there will be a need to train many more people on the ability to blend
into civilian surroundings, assemble at their operational objective,
execute their mission, and exfiltrate without being identified.

# Foreign Internal Defense

International relations have been a hallmark of USSOCOM activities as
they annually deployed troops to more than 150 countries. For many years
Special Forces soldiers have received extensive foreign area training
and operated in their assigned countries. One of their missions that
will take on new importance will be foreign internal defense (FID).
Previous FID operations focused on training of indigenous soldiers with
the intent of fostering regional stability. The SF personnel were also
noted for providing medical assistance in remote areas not routinely
serviced by doctors. As a result of the close interaction with the local
population, over time personal relationships are built between the
Special Forces troops and the people they serve.

Future FID missions will build on the established base. To accomplish
that, intense attention should be paid to personnel assignments to
insure the same soldiers interact with the same indigenous people on a
repetitive basis. Rather than spending months with foreign personnel,
these interpersonal interactions should continue over several decades.

These long-term personal relationships would provide quality
intelligence that is not available via any other means. It may be
feasible to identify potential coups, increasing societal and
inter-group tensions, attempts of terrorist organizations to subvert the
population, and pressure from criminal/drug cartels. These missions
would provide a basis for policy makers to determine appropriate courses
of action and the ability for early intervention while incipient
problems are more manageable.

Repeatedly we have injected operatives into difficult, often hostile
situations in which they had to improvise and spend valuable time
building trust before they could be effective. In the past some of these
hastily formed alliances yielded unintended consequences. As an example,
in Afghanistan warlords sometimes attempted to use American firepower to
settle old scores by stating that the opposition was supporting the
Taliban. The bottom line is that people trust people they know, and know
well. It takes a long time to gain a meaningful understanding of these
complex situations. Despite best efforts, some intertribal situations
are beyond Western comprehension.

# Counterproliferation

Counterproliferation (CP) missions will take on increased importance.
Training for such missions is very demanding and may call for technical
sophistication that is well beyond the capabilities of military units.
Interagency cooperation will be essential with SOF units working closely
with the Intelligence Community and Department of Energy personnel. The
complexity of the target set will determine the composition the task
force. Interagency matrix organizations and common training will become
the centerpiece of these operations.

# Counterterrorism

If laws and boundaries remain as currently configured, the three primary
organizations will be CIA, FBI, and SOF elements from the DoD. As with
CP missions, the task force assigned the mission may be augmented with
persons possessing highly specialized skills from other organizations.

Counterterrorism (CT) operations will demand increased planning and
attention. The amount of attention placed on this area will be directly
proportional to the threat posed by terrorists. Ironically, attention
will be inversely proportional to our success in preemptive operations
that disrupt terrorist activities before they reach fruition. These
operations must not be reflexive, post facto spikes. We must diligently
guard against reduction in support of CT operations simply because
attacks have decreased. CT units cannot be a victim of their success.

As urbanization intensifies, concern for collateral casualties will
remain. Therefore, CT operations generally will be surgical by nature.
For the next decade these missions will be embroiled in legal and
ethical controversy. Troops, however, must be trained to conduct a wide
range of CT operations including identifying, capturing and exfiltrating
individuals from hostile environments, to the targeting for removal of
selected individuals. Regicide is a viable option that minimizes
collateral casualties. The execution of such missions will rest on
political decisions and legal interpretations, but the capability should
be available.

Counterterrorist operations conducted in major metropolitan areas of the
US will likely integrate local law enforcement SWAT personnel. Well
trained SWAT teams often draw from prior military personnel. These teams
may be more current in their skills than military or federal
counterparts due to the frequency with which they are deployed on
dynamic entry missions. As an example, the Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department executes an average of 200 high-risk arrest warrants each
year. (17) Cooperative training with local SWAT teams has been conducted
quietly for many years. Interagency training will probably increase and
local law enforcement agencies may become involved in planning and
execution of missions.

The high probability of terrorist attacks in the US is acknowledged.
Local law enforcement and fire rescue personnel will be the first
responders in most cases and the true nature of the incident may not be
determined immediately. Initial planning for interagency response has
begun in major metropolitan areas around the country. More must be done
to integrate training between local and federal agencies and overcome
the endemic issues of interoperability. The independent procurement
processes of local agencies must be augmented to insure smooth
transition of command and control once an incident is determined to be a
terrorist strike. Planning and rehearsal for these eventualities are
imperative.

# Eyes on Target

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the ability of SOF elements to precisely
designate targets proved to be invaluable. However, this capability
needs to be improved. During December 2003, while I was in Afghanistan,
there were two horrific incidents. On 5 December an A-10 was dispatched
to attack the building housing a high value target at the village of
Petaw. The attack with 20-mm canon killed 9 children playing in the
yard. It was later learned that the targeted individual had left the
area two days before the mission took place. Five days later, in a
second incident at Gardez, six more children died in a bombing raid.
Both attacks made major news in the country and were picked up
internationally. Had spotters on the ground been present they could have
determined the situation in realtime and prevented the very bad
publicity that followed the killing of innocent people. (18)

The use of precision-guided munition will increase. The accuracy of
these systems will improve. Targeting will remain the critical factor in
determining success or failure of these missions. Having eyes on target,
either by SOF elements on the ground, or by enhanced sensor systems,
must be a core mission.

# Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

Two major elements of the SOF community have remained in relative
obscurity but will play increasingly important roles. These are the
active duty Psychological Operations (Psy Ops) battalions and Civil
Affairs (CA) units predominantly from the reserve components. At present
the decision has been made to keep these elements within USSOCOM.

It is a serious mistake to have most CA units in the reserve components.
This anachronism stems from prior planning for major wars. The thinking
was that after cessation of hostilities, technical people with
demonstrated organizational skills would be sent to rebuild the country.
Planners did not envision the current world, in which CA units are
deployed with alarming frequency. Unseen was the need to be able to plan
for, and develop basic infrastructures in countries such, as
Afghanistan, where none previously existed. Through 2020 it is
predictable that CA units will be continuously involved and that the
role will expand. Thus USSOCOM has been given authority to form a second
active duty CA battalion.

Operational Psy Ops is essential across the spectrum of conflict.
However, in GWOT it is an essential requirement. These capabilities must
be expanded to meet future needs. At the core there must be a firm
understanding of societies that are quite different from ours. Although
this principle has been recognized, we have failed to fully implement
it.

There is a critical shortfall in language skills that needs to be
rectified. Computerized translation systems will help but lack an
understanding of indigenous context. As with Special Forces units,
recurring assignments in areas of potential operations should be
implemented as much as practical for Psy Ops personnel.

It is recognized that Psy Ops responsibilities have been split along
strategic versus operational capabilities. Needed is a national policy
that is embraced by all agencies and does not vacillate on political
whims.

# Logistics

Logistics has probably been the greatest advantage that American forces
have had. Support for major operations requires Herculean efforts. The
ability to move troops and logistical support for all forces must be
improved. Shortening supply lines by adjusting the locations of
prepositioned materiel will occur, but not without considerable risk.
Transiency of coalitions will continue to be problematic. The necessity
to negotiate basing, overflight, and other rights for each operation
creates situations not favorable to US operations.

# Impact on Personnel

The size of the current active duty force is too small for the missions
assigned. Reliance on reserve components for repetitive call-ups will
have serious adverse consequences. The policies of the last decade in
which reserve forces were activated to meet day-to-day requirements of
the military were poorly thought out and are having a chilling effect.
Many people would be willing to serve if there were a direct armed
threat to America but do not want to participate as an extension of
routine foreign policy. The much hyped *peace dividend* was too quickly
spent, and those who bet on decades of quiescence, lost. Therefore,
either the active force must be increased or commitments decreased.

When in Kabul I talked to many National Guard soldiers assigned there.
While they were perfectly willing to defend the nation if necessary, the
common denominator was, "This is not what I signed up for." Some of them
were on their third activation in a few years. Many observers, including
me, believe that the US is headed for a severe recruiting and retention
problem for the reserve components.

Of all elements that will face retention problems, SOF may prove to be
unique. The introduction of epidemic outsourcing of security operations
will have unanticipated consequences for the US military in general and
SOF in particular. Never before have SOF skills been in such high demand
by both the military and civilian enterprises. Their well publicized
success in Operation Enduring Freedom brought these units to the public
consciousness. They also gained favor with senior officials of both the
legislative and executive branches of government. Of course, the
emphasis was on the ability of a few skilled operators to direct
precision munitions and destroy enemy targets. The success of a
relatively small force, including CIA operatives, in coordinating
attacks that led to the rapid defeat of the Taliban made war look easy.
While support of legislators is good for gaining funding, few on Capitol
Hill really understand SOF capabilities and limitations. There have been
calls for rapid expansion of SOF units. This belies the effort necessary
to create new SOF units. Elite units require extensive training and can
be expensive. Most importantly, the quality of the people must be
maintained and this militates against rapid proliferation.

Further, competition for highly motivated people with the ability to
acquire SOF skills will be intense. Previously mentioned were high
paying civilian contractor opportunities. These personnel demands will
increase. But the competition will also be with other government
agencies at federal, state, and local levels. Skills can be taught.
Motivation comes from within. The pool of suitable applicants is
limited.

Therefore, SOF will have to design innovative strategies to recruit and
retain their people. To accomplish this they should explore changes to
the military personnel system. This may include discontinuous active
duty, but with mechanism that allow rapid reintegration. It may be
necessary to establish interagency transfers on a much wider scale than
previously imagined.

During the race to downsize the Army, an unfortunate decision was made
to eliminate the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. The FAOs had proven
to be extremely effective in providing accurate information about their
assigned countries. The program should be reinstated. Additionally, more
foreign soldiers and their families should be brought to the US for
training.

For the FID missions mentioned, personnel must have repeated tours to
the same area. Then while on other assignments, they should periodically
return to their foreign site for the sole purpose of maintaining
personal relationships. There is no reason that these relationships
should not continue beyond retirement, or release from active duty, and
still be sponsored by the military.

# Implications for Intelligence

Actionable intelligence is essential. In recent conflicts commanders at
all levels have lamented the shortfalls of actionable intelligence.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was initiated prematurely when it was reported
that Saddam Hussein would be located at Dora Farms in Baghdad. A phone
call from an agent in the area began the process. Because this was the
beginning of the conflict the decision rested with President Bush. The
reaction time was too long, and if Saddam ever was there, he left before
the target could be hit.

By 2020 we should be able reduce the time from which a target is
detected until it is hit to under ten minutes. Currently, for DoD
elements, target identification and release must cycle back to the US
for approval. This is simply too slow. The kill chain, (Find, Fix,
Track, Target, Engage, and Assess) must be reduced. In addition to the
intelligence functioning faster, field units need pre-approved authority
to engage.

Obtaining human intelligence from tribal based societies will remain
difficult. However, it is not impossible as was demonstrated by an
operative identified as "Tim" in Bob Woodward's *Plan of Attack*. (19)
Tim was able to solicit cooperative agents inside Saddam's inner circle
who provided vital information. Despite advances in technology, bribery
on coercion will probably continue to be most effective methods
developing HUMINT sources necessary for determining the state of mind
and intent of the enemy's leadership.

# Superorganism 

While much emphasis is placed on identifying terrorist command and
control this may not be as useful as we think. Many of these groups are
linked only by philosophy and utility. Their leaders are often fiercely
independent but still need external support. Too frequently we assume
that since we have been successful in creating highly responsive
centralized command, control, and communications systems, other
organizations must follow suit.

For several years I have recommended that the concept of the
superorganism be explored as a model for command and control that
facilitates dispersed, effective action but does not rely on centralized
communication. The notion comes from simple organisms that do not have
the ability to apply complex thought. But, under certain conditions,
these organisms act as if the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts. An example is slime mold, which is unicellular and lives in moist
climates. When periodically faced by drought, slime mold cells come
together. Many of these cells commit suicide by allowing other slime
mold cells to stack on top of them forming tubes that reach into the
air. As they dry out, wind comes along and blows the top cells to new
locations. When they land in a moist area the colony is reconstituted.
The question is how does each cell determine the actions it should take
to support the superorganism? It appears this is from a series of simple
decisions that are programmed into each cell. There is no indication of
external command and control that informs them of individual
responsibilities. (20)

It seems that slime mold cells can detect a threat, make a determination
of individual versus collective threat, implement assembly orders,
voluntarily commit suicide, or move to a new location and then
reconstitute life. Therefore, we must anticipate what human terrorists,
with far more complex decision-making capability, can accomplish using
similar relative simple instructions. If terrorists use a superorganism
command and control paradigm it makes the task of locating them
extremely difficult. Each cell must be independently identified and
neutralized. The clues for findings these cells would be different from
an organization with a centralized system. There is reason to believe
that many of the terrorists trained in Afghanistan under Osama bin Laden
were taught these techniques. They know how to determine a target and
have authorization to attack independently.

Conversely, it would be wise to consider a superorganism model for
command and control for special circumstances. These include elements
operating in denied areas, CT or CP operations requiring rapid action,
or even committed conventional forces if faced with severely degraded or
destroyed C^4^I systems.

# Materiel Impact

While the focus of this session is not on weapons systems, there are
technology trends and materiel issues that should not be ignored.
Between Gulf Wars precision munitions improved dramatically. That trend
will continue. From Predator to Hermes unmanned systems are the wave of
the future. Robotic devices are already making an appearance on the
battlefield. These robots will increase as we search for efforts to
minimize exposure of our troops. Miniaturization, to include nanoscale
developments, will have significant impact on future conflicts. Command
and control, authority to shoot, and de-conflicting battlespace will be
key issues for unmanned systems.

Similarly, sensor systems, enabled by advanced computing capability
continuously improve the spectrums in which data can be collected. An
ethical balancing act will emerge between civilian applications for
sensor technologies, and the innate desire of military and intelligence
agencies to cloister such capabilities. The reality is that the speed of
development precludes safeguarding sensor capabilities for very long. It
has been observed that drug cartels and terrorists with large funds
available can buy almost anything. Therefore, our troops must be
prepared to face advanced sensors.

Materials science is playing a significant role in protecting personnel.
Body armor has reduced deaths dramatically. New lightweight armors will
allow additional protection to extremities. On the horizon are advances
in biotechnology that will allow medical attention to begin at the
instant of injuries. Biosensors will be able to assess injuries, begin
administration of medicines, and attempt to stop bleeding. Bioscience
will provide a range of capabilities from performance enhancement and
disease resistance to bio-computers with photosynthetic batteries.
Concurrently, there will be endemic concerns about the morality and
efficacy of these advances. (21) Of course the potential for
misapplication of biotechnology in development of weapons looms large.
Weaponization will almost certainly occur.

Space exploration has not received sufficient emphasis by the military.
The US military has taken the position that space exploration nearly
exclusively will be robotic. It is my view that manned space will
proliferate far faster than is being anticipated by military planners.
*Winning The War* addresses this topic in detail and recommends that the
US take the initiative while we still can, and weaponize space. In May
2004, as this presentation is given, legendary aerospace pioneer, Burt
Rutan, is within weeks of winning the X-Prize. That ten million dollar
prize goes to the first civilian company to launch a manned,
three-person, reusable vehicle into space twice in three weeks. (22)
Rutan's stated intent is to invigorate private space exploration. He is
not alone in his quest. Civilian companies are going to dramatically
drive down the cost paradigms associated with space travel. The military
must begin to plan for use of force in a manned space environment.

# Summary

The past fifteen years saw the end of the Cold War, disintegration of
the bi-polar world, and dramatic burgeoning of geopolitical instability.
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the undisputed technical superiority
of America's arsenal and caused adversaries to look for America's
asymmetric vulnerabilities. Peace support and nation building operations
met with mixed results. Sometimes, as in Somalia, there were disastrous
consequences. Terrorism waxed and became a global concern while the
notion of a super empowered individual was born. Containment worked in
some areas, yet North Korea became a nuclear power with missiles that
can directly threaten the United States mainland.

Western technology continues to improve. Weapons and sensor systems were
developed that can eviscerate any conventional adversary. Conquering was
proven to be easy. Holding the peace was a different matter.
Concurrently, the balance between technology and troop requirements
tipped too far.

What falls in the dustbin of history are large static wars between
conventional forces. What emerges are protracted conflicts on the margin
of acceptability. Terrorism and indirect attacks are the norm. To meet
the operational tempo, standing forces must be increased and the
personnel system revamped. Interagency cooperation must become seamless
and artificial boundaries abolished. Actionable intelligence becomes
paramount. The kill chain is reduced from hours to single digit minutes.

Special operations forces will be the surgical tools that shape the
battlefields. Some wars they will avert. Some they will mitigate. For
still others, they will be the units that pave they way for the
sledgehammer that will drive a stake into the heart our enemies. Then,
they will help rebuild.

Our adversaries thrust at the inherent weaknesses of a democratic and
open society. Foremost is the battle for public perception, at which we
have performed dismally. The core issues are conflicting belief systems.
Required is a better understanding of the nature of conflicts we face,
the ability to establish the parameters of the war, and the wisdom to
understand the strategic implications of use of force. It is at our
peril that we continue to define conflict in anachronistic terms.

References:

1.  John B. Alexander, *Winning The War*, St. Martin's Press, 2003

2.  John B. Alexander, "The Wrong Model of War," op-ed, *The
    Schwartzreport*, 2 May 2004

3.  Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign
    Affairs*, Summer 1993

4.  Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, Modern Library, 2003

5.  The birth rate, while varying at times, doubles the population every
    twenty years. Secular schools also vary by country. However, there
    are many Imams actively opposing them and actually destroying many
    schools.

6.  National Intelligence Council 2020 Project Reports

7.  John B. Alexander, *Future War*, Appendix A, St. Martin's Press,
    1999

8.  Alexander 2, op cited

9.  John B. Alexander, "The Importance of Defining the Conflict," *The
    Las Vegas Sun*, op ed 18 Oct 01

10. Milt Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy*, Random House, 2003

11. George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003

12. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace with
    America's Military*, W.W. Norton & Co. 2004

13. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, The Penguin Press, 2004

14. John B. Alexander, personal observations of President Karzai's
    guards, and while serving as a mentor to the Afghan deputy ministers
    of Defense, Fall 2003

15. Dana Priest, "Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters,"
    *The Washington Post*, 6 April 2004

16. Dana Priest and Joe Stephens, US Interrogation: Long History of
    Tactics in Overseas Prisons is Coming to Light," *The Washington
    Post*, 11 May 2004

17. Commander Charles "Sid" Heal, LA Sheriff's Dept, private
    communication, 12 May 2004

18. "U.S. Assault: Children found dead," *CNN* 10 December 2003

19. Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon and Schuster, 2004

20. Mitchell Resnick, *Turtles, Termites and Traffic Jams*, MIT Press,
    1994

21. "Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications,"
    *National Research Council*, 20 June 2001

22. "Private Manned Rocket Soars 211,400 Feet," *The Associate Press*,
    13 May 2004

**Appendix A**

**The Wrong Model of War**

By: John B. Alexander, Ph.D.

*The Schwartzreport*, 2 May 2004

Casualties mount. Mistakes are compounded. Troops are frustrated.
Progress is made. Yet, success eludes us. The reason is quite simple. We
have the wrong model of war for the global war on terror in general, and
Iraq in particular.

From the beginning, the war on terror was defined improperly. Terror is
a tactic used in the conduct of conflict. Most frequently it is a tool
employed by weak forces against those with overwhelming capability. It
is impossible to wage war against tactics or means. In order to win a
war there must be a clearly defined adversary. And, successful
conclusion to conflict can only come when that adversary acknowledges
defeat.

Terrorism is an emotionally laden term, one that is used to brand
repugnant groups or individuals. Domestically the line between criminal
activity and terrorism is severely blurred. As an example, Earth First,
an environmental group that has repeatedly committed criminal acts, has
been denounced as a terrorist organization by news commentators. PETA,
an animal rights group, as well as several racial and religious
segregationist organizations, and even motorcycle gangs have been
painted with the same brush. Some of these people may be criminals but
to label them as a terrorist detracts from combating our real enemies.
These examples, and others, clearly indicate that an adversary cannot be
identified by such an ill-defined term.

The war on terror is prosecuted selectively. The Maoist insurgents in
Nepal frequently employ terrorism but we pay no attention to that. Nepal
does not have oil, nor does it impact our national security. Various
African nations experience intertribal terrorism that threatens their
stability. This too is ignored, as Western Africa is not on the current
administration's agenda. Closer to home, terrorism is endemic in
Colombia and sporadically employed in other South American countries. In
response, we provide limited special operations forces, primarily to
assist in anemic drug interdiction missions. Little is done to counter
terrorism on that continent even though there are clear indications of
direct relationships between Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East
and South America.

Since 9/11 there have been two significantly different wars waged, one
by America and its allies, and the other by Muslim fundamentalists.
Operation Enduring Freedom led to the displacement of al Qaeda training
centers, removal of the Taliban, and installation of a new government in
Kabul. Through the politically expedient means we bought military
assistance from disparate warlords and supported them with high tech
weaponry. However, it would be a serious misjudgment to believe that the
converted mujahideen were philosophically transformed into proponents of
democracy. They were only looking out for their own self-interests, just
as they have for centuries.

Larger numbers of American and British forces engaged in Operation Iraqi
Freedom leading to regime change in Iraq. However, even with 135,000
troops remaining on the ground, resistance to coalition occupation
continues, and it appears to be intensifying. Actions by the
Administration in attempting to rapidly install an Iraqi government
sympathetic to their wishes bear similarity to the Vietnamization
program when we hastened to get out of that conflict. Astute observers
know the proposed solution is inviable. Like Vietnam, we proceed in an
inappropriate attempt to eschew responsibility for the consequences of
the aftermath.

American officials brand any participant in these conflicts who is not
native to the area as a *foreign terrorist*. At issue is the
anachronistic concept of geographically defined war. Many countries now
in turmoil had their boundaries imposed by Europeans who divided the
world up for their own purposes. Their cartographers' total disregarded
for traditional ethnic groupings and societal affiliations has
exacerbated existing grievances and resulted in near constant
instability throughout several regions of the world. Yet, we cling
tenaciously to the failing nation-state construct and inject our notion
of sovereignty to legitimize the conflict.

Conversely, our adversaries are waging jihad, or holy war. Years before
the attacks on 11 September, 2001 Osama bin Laden had issued a fatwa
against all Americans and extolled Muslims to join him in resisting
Western intervention throughout the Middle East. He frequently renews
those pleas. Therefore, the perspective of our adversaries is that
jihadists are simply moving to the battle, wherever that might be, and
irrespective of boundaries with which they never agreed. They view
themselves as mujahideen, or holy fighters, and therefore lawful
combatants, not *foreigners*.

Progress and success are not the same. Daily there are reports about the
progress we are making in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reports sound very
similar to "the light at the end of the tunnel" comments so prevalent
three decades ago. In Vietnam we constantly made progress, but in the
end we lost the war.

The notion that making progress in Afghanistan and Iraq insures success
is unsound. For the past few decades the military has adopted American
business practices that encourage constant progress reporting.
Therefore, in post-combat environments it is natural that they monitor
and report the physical changes and quantifiable improvements. From Iraq
and Afghanistan they report the number of schools that have been opened,
the number of hospitals repaired, the amount of electricity that is
generated, the amount of food distributed, and a host of other factors
that can be measured conveniently.

The basic assumption by our leaders is that if progress is being made,
we will be successful. As we are learning with ever increasing American
casualties, this logic is fatally flawed. It is a serious mistake to
confuse progress, demonstrated by counting material things, and success.
To be successful we must redefine the war so that it clearly identifies
a tangible adversary. Only then can everyone understand the objectives
and know when they have been achieved.