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1 MISSION SUMMARY [1](#mission-summary)

2 INTRODUCTION [5](#introduction)

3 TRAJECTORY [6](#trajectory)

3.1 LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORIES
[6](#launch-and-translunar-trajectories)

3.2 LUNAR ORBIT [6](#lunar-orbit)

3.2.1 Orbital Phase [6](#orbital-phase)

3.2.2 Descent [11](#descent)

3.2.3 Ascent and Rendezvous [12](#ascent-and-rendezvous)

3.2.4 Lunar Module Deorbit [12](#lunar-module-deorbit)

3.2.5 Orbit-Shaping Maneuver and Subsatellite Launch
[13](#orbit-shaping-maneuver-and-subsatellite-launch)

3.3 TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY TRAJECTORY
[13](#transearth-and-entry-trajectory)

4 LUNAR SURFACE SCIENCE [14](#lunar-surface-science)

4.1 SUMMARY OF LUNAR SURFACE ACTIVITIES
[14](#summary-of-lunar-surface-activities)

4.2 APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE CENTRAL STATION
[19](#apollo-lunar-surface-experiments-package-central-station)

4.3 PASSIVE SEISMIC EXPERIMENT [21](#passive-seismic-experiment)

4.4 LUNAR SURFACE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT
[23](#lunar-surface-magnetometer-experiment)

4.5 SOLAR WIND SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT
[24](#solar-wind-spectrometer-experiment)

4.6 HEAT FLOW EXPERIMENT [24](#heat-flow-experiment)

4.7 SUPRATHERMAL ION DETECTOR EXPERIMENT
[25](#suprathermal-ion-detector-experiment)

4.8 COLD CATHODE GAGE EXPERIMENT [26](#cold-cathode-gage-experiment)

4.9 LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR EXPERIMENT
[26](#laser-ranging-retro-reflector-experiment)

4.10 SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT
[27](#solar-wind-composition-experiment)

4.11 LUNAR SURFACE DRILL OPERATION [27](#lunar-surface-drill-operation)

4.12 LUNAR GEOLOGY [27](#lunar-geology)

4.12.1 Landing Site [27](#landing-site)

4.12.2 Extravehicular Traverses [28](#extravehicular-traverses)

4.12.3 Summary of Geology [30](#summary-of-geology)

4.12.4 Equipment [30](#equipment)

4.12.5 Photography [31](#photography)

4.13 SOIL MECHANICS EXPERIMENT [31](#soil-mechanics-experiment)

5 INFLIGHT SCIENCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY
[33](#inflight-science-and-photography)

5.1 GAMMA-RAY SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT
[36](#gamma-ray-spectrometer-experiment)

5.2 X-RAY FLUORESCENCE EXPERIMENT [37](#x-ray-fluorescence-experiment)

5.3 ALPHA-PARTICLE SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT
[37](#alpha-particle-spectrometer-experiment)

5.4 MASS SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT [38](#mass-spectrometer-experiment)

5.5 PARTICLE SHADOWS /BOUNDARY LAYER EXPERIMENT
[38](#particle-shadows-boundary-layer-experiment)

5.6 SUBSATELLITE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT
[38](#subsatellite-magnetometer-experiment)

5.7 S-BAND TRANSPONDER EXPERIMENT [39](#s-band-transponder-experiment)

5.7.1 Command and Service Module/Lunar Module
[39](#command-and-service-modulelunar-module)

5.7.2 Subsatellite [39](#subsatellite)

5.8 DOWN-LINK BISTATIC RADAR OBSERVATIONS OF THE MOON
[39](#down-link-bistatic-radar-observations-of-the-moon)

5.9 APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT
[40](#apollo-window-meteoroid-experiment)

5.10 ULTRAVIOLET PHOTOGRAPHY - EARTH AND MOON
[40](#ultraviolet-photography---earth-and-moon)

5.11 GEGENSCHEIN FROM LUNAR ORBIT [41](#gegenschein-from-lunar-orbit)

5.12 SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL PHOTOGRAPHY
[42](#service-module-orbital-photography)

5.12.1 Panoramic Camera [42](#panoramic-camera)

5.12.2 Laser Altimeter [43](#laser-altimeter)

5.13 COMMAND MODULE PHOTOGRAPHY [43](#command-module-photography)

5.14 VISUAL OBSERVATIONS FROM LUNAR ORBIT
[44](#visual-observations-from-lunar-orbit)

6 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE.
[45](#command-and-service-module-performance.)

6.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
[45](#structural-and-mechanical-systems)

6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER AND FUEL CELLS
[45](#electrical-power-and-fuel-cells)

6.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE [45](#cryogenic-storage)

6.4 COMMUNICATIONS [46](#communications)

6.5 INSTRUMENTATION [46](#instrumentation)

6.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
[46](#guidance-navigation-and-control)

6.7 PROPULSION [52](#propulsion)

6.7.1 Reaction Control Systems [52](#reaction-control-systems)

6.7.2 Service Propulsion System [52](#service-propulsion-system)

6.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION
[53](#environmental-control-and-crew-station)

6.8.1 Environmental Control System [53](#environmental-control-system)

6.8.2 Crew Station/Equipment [55](#crew-stationequipment)

6.9 CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS [55](#controls-and-displays)

6.10 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY EQUIPMENT
[56](#extravehicular-activity-equipment)

6.11 CONSUMABLES [56](#consumables)

6.11.1 Service Propulsion Propellant
[56](#service-propulsion-propellant)

6.11.2 Reaction Control System Propellant
[58](#reaction-control-system-propellant)

6.11.3 Cryogenics [60](#cryogenics)

6.11.4 Water [61](#water)

7 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE [62](#lunar-module-performance)

7.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
[62](#structural-and-mechanical-systems-1)

7.2 COMMUNICATIONS [64](#communications-1)

7.3 RADAR [65](#radar)

7.4 CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS [65](#controls-and-displays-1)

7.5 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
[66](#guidance-navigation-and-control-1)

7.6 PROPULSION [73](#propulsion-1)

7.6.1 Reaction Control System [73](#reaction-control-system)

7.6.2 Descent Propulsion System [73](#descent-propulsion-system)

7.6.3 Ascent Propulsion System [73](#ascent-propulsion-system)

7.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM [73](#environmental-control-system-1)

7.8 CONSUMABLES [74](#consumables-1)

7.8.1 Descent Propulsion System Propellant.
[74](#descent-propulsion-system-propellant.)

7.8.2 Ascent Propulsion System Propellant
[75](#ascent-propulsion-system-propellant)

7.8.3 Reaction Control System Propellant
[76](#reaction-control-system-propellant-1)

7.8.4 Oxygen [77](#oxygen)

7.8.5 Water [78](#water-1)

7.8.6 Electrical Power [79](#electrical-power)

8 LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT
[80](#lunar-surface-operational-equipment)

8.1 EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT [80](#extravehicular-mobility-unit)

8.2 LUNAR ROVING VEHICLE [84](#lunar-roving-vehicle)

8.2.1 Deployment [85](#deployment)

8.2.2 Steering [86](#steering)

8.2.3 Electrical Power [86](#electrical-power-1)

8.2.4 Navigation [86](#navigation)

8.2.5 Thermal [87](#thermal)

8.2.6 Crew Station [87](#crew-station)

8.2.7 EXTRAVEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
[87](#extravehicular-communications-equipment)

9 PILOT\'S REPORT [89](#pilots-report)

9.1 TRAINING [90](#training)

9.2 LAUNCH [90](#launch)

9.3 EARTH ORBITAL OPERATIONS [90](#earth-orbital-operations)

9.4 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION [91](#translunar-injection)

9.5 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT OPERATIONS [91](#translunar-flight-operations)

9.5.1 Transposition, Docking, and Extraction
[91](#transposition-docking-and-extraction)

9.5.2 Translunar Coast [92](#translunar-coast)

9.5.3 Scientific Instrument Module Door Jettisoning
[93](#scientific-instrument-module-door-jettisoning)

9.6 LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS PRIOR TO DESCENT
[93](#lunar-orbit-operations-prior-to-descent)

9.6.1 Lunar Orbit Insertion [93](#lunar-orbit-insertion)

9.6.2 Lunar Module Activation, Undocking and Separation
[94](#lunar-module-activation-undocking-and-separation)

9.7 POWERED DESCENT AND LANDING [94](#powered-descent-and-landing)

9.8 LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS [96](#lunar-surface-operations)

9.8.1 Lunar Module Cabin Activity [96](#lunar-module-cabin-activity)

9.8.2 Lunar Geology [98](#lunar-geology-1)

9.8.3 Lunar Surface Mobility Systems Performance
[101](#lunar-surface-mobility-systems-performance)

9.8.4 Lunar Surface Science Equipment Performance
[106](#lunar-surface-science-equipment-performance)

9.9 LUNAR ORBITAL SOLO OPERATIONS [107](#lunar-orbital-solo-operations)

9.9.1 Maneuvers [107](#maneuvers)

9.9.2 Science and Photography [107](#science-and-photography)

9.10 ASCENT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
[109](#ascent-rendezvous-and-docking)

9.10.1 Ascent [109](#ascent)

9.10.2 Rendezvous [110](#rendezvous)

9.10.3 Docking and Crew Transfer [111](#docking-and-crew-transfer)

9.11 POST-DOCKING LUNAR ORBITAL OPERATIONS
[112](#post-docking-lunar-orbital-operations)

9.11.1 Lunar Module Jettison [112](#lunar-module-jettison)

9.11.2 Flight Plan Updating [112](#flight-plan-updating)

9.11.3 Maneuvers [112](#maneuvers-1)

9.11.4 Command and Service Module Housekeeping
[113](#command-and-service-module-housekeeping)

9.12 TRANSEARTH FLIGHT OPERATIONS [113](#transearth-flight-operations)

9.12.1 Transearth Coast Extravehicular Activity
[113](#transearth-coast-extravehicular-activity)

9.12.2 Science and Photography [114](#science-and-photography-1)

9.12.3 Navigation [115](#navigation-1)

9.13 ENTRY AND LANDING [115](#entry-and-landing)

10 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION [141](#biomedical-evaluation)

10.1 BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA
[141](#biomedical-instrumentation-and-physiological-data)

10.2 MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS [149](#medical-observations)

10.2.1 Adaptation to Weightlessness [149](#adaptation-to-weightlessness)

10.2.2 Medications [150](#medications)

10.2.3 Sleep [150](#sleep)

10.2.4 Radiation [151](#radiation)

10.2.5 Visual Light Flash Phenomenon
[151](#visual-light-flash-phenomenon)

10.2.6 Water [151](#water-2)

10.2.7 Food [152](#food)

10.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS [152](#physical-examinations)

10.4 BONE MINERAL MEASUREMENT [153](#bone-mineral-measurement)

10.5 APOLLO TIME AND MOTION STUDY [154](#apollo-time-and-motion-study)

11 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE [155](#mission-support-performance)

11.1 FLIGHT CONTROL [155](#flight-control)

11.2 NETWORK [156](#network)

11.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS [156](#recovery-operations)

11.3.1 Command Module Location and Retrieval
[157](#command-module-location-and-retrieval)

11.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection [160](#postrecovery-inspection)

12 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
[162](#assessment-of-mission-objectives)

13 LAUNCH PHASE SUMMARY [165](#launch-phase-summary)

13.1 WEATHER CONDITIONS [165](#weather-conditions)

13.2 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICITY [165](#atmospheric-electricity)

13.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE [166](#launch-vehicle-performance)

14 ANOMALY SUMMARY [170](#anomaly-summary)

14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES [170](#command-and-service-modules)

14.1.1 Service Module Reaction Control System Propellant Isolation
Valves Closed
[170](#service-module-reaction-control-system-propellant-isolation-valves-closed)

14.1.2 Water Panel Chlorine Injection Port Leakage
[172](#water-panel-chlorine-injection-port-leakage)

14.1.3 Service Propulsion System Thrust Light On Entry Monitor System
[173](#service-propulsion-system-thrust-light-on-entry-monitor-system)

14.1.4 Integral Lighting Circuit Breaker Opened
[176](#integral-lighting-circuit-breaker-opened)

14.1.5 Battery Relay Bus Measurement Anomaly
[177](#battery-relay-bus-measurement-anomaly)

14.1.6 Mass Spectrometer Boom Talkback Indicated Half-Barberpole On
Retract
[178](#mass-spectrometer-boom-talkback-indicated-half-barberpole-on-retract)

14.1.7 Potable Water Tank Failure To Refill
[182](#potable-water-tank-failure-to-refill)

14.1.8 Mission Timer Stopped [184](#mission-timer-stopped)

14.1.9 Main Parachute Collapse [185](#main-parachute-collapse)

14.1.10 Data Recorder Tape Deterioration
[189](#data-recorder-tape-deterioration)

14.1.11 Digital Event Timer Obscured
[191](#digital-event-timer-obscured)

14.1.12 Crew Restraint Harness Came Apart
[193](#crew-restraint-harness-came-apart)

14.1.13 Loose Object In Cabin Fans [195](#loose-object-in-cabin-fans)

14.1.14 Scanning Telescope Visibility
[197](#scanning-telescope-visibility)

14.1.15 Gyro Display Coupler Roll Alignment
[198](#gyro-display-coupler-roll-alignment)

14.1.16 Unable To Open Circuit Breaker Supplying Main A Power To Battery
Charger
[200](#unable-to-open-circuit-breaker-supplying-main-a-power-to-battery-charger)

14.1.17 Pivot Pin Failure On Main Oxygen Regulator Shutoff Valve
[200](#pivot-pin-failure-on-main-oxygen-regulator-shutoff-valve)

14.1.18 Crew Optical Alignment Sight Fell Off Stowage Mount
[202](#crew-optical-alignment-sight-fell-off-stowage-mount)

14.2 LUNAR MODULE [203](#lunar-module)

14.2.1 Water/Glycol Pump Differential Pressure Fluctuations
[203](#waterglycol-pump-differential-pressure-fluctuations)

14.2.2 Water Separator Speed Decrease
[205](#water-separator-speed-decrease)

14.2.3 Broken Water Gun/Bacteria Filter Quick Disconnect
[206](#broken-water-gunbacteria-filter-quick-disconnect)

14.2.4 Intermittent Steerable Antenna Operation
[208](#intermittent-steerable-antenna-operation)

14.2.5 Descent Engine Control Assembly Circuit Breaker Open
[211](#descent-engine-control-assembly-circuit-breaker-open)

14.2.6 Abort Guidance System Warning
[211](#abort-guidance-system-warning)

14.2.7 No Crosspointer Indication [213](#no-crosspointer-indication)

14.2.8 Broken Range/Range Rate Meter Window
[215](#broken-rangerange-rate-meter-window)

14.3 SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT MODULE EXPERIMENTS
[217](#scientific-instrument-module-experiments)

14.3.1 Panoramic Camera Velocity/Altitude Sensor Erratic
[217](#panoramic-camera-velocityaltitude-sensor-erratic)

14.3.2 Loss of Laser Altimeter Altitude Data
[220](#loss-of-laser-altimeter-altitude-data)

14.3.3 Slow Deployment Of Mapping Camera
[222](#slow-deployment-of-mapping-camera)

14.3.4 Gamma Ray Spectrometer Calibration Shifts
[223](#gamma-ray-spectrometer-calibration-shifts)

14.4 APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE AND ASSOCIATED LUNAR
SURFACE EQUIPMENT
[224](#apollo-lunar-surface-experiments-package-and-associated-lunar-surface-equipment)

14.4.1 Problems During The Lunar Surface Drilling Operations
[224](#problems-during-the-lunar-surface-drilling-operations)

14.4.2 Central Station Rear Curtain Retainer Removal Lanyard Broke
[231](#central-station-rear-curtain-retainer-removal-lanyard-broke)

14.4.3 Intermittent Lock of Universal Handling Tool In Suprathermal Ion
Detector Fitting
[233](#intermittent-lock-of-universal-handling-tool-in-suprathermal-ion-detector-fitting)

14.5 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
[234](#government-furnished-equipment)

14.5.1 Television Control Unit Clutch Slippage
[234](#television-control-unit-clutch-slippage)

14.5.2 Lunar Communications Relay Unit Downlink Signal Lost
[235](#lunar-communications-relay-unit-downlink-signal-lost)

14.5.3 Lunar Surface 16-mm Camera Magazines Jammed
[238](#lunar-surface-16-mm-camera-magazines-jammed)

14.5.4 Lunar Module Pilot\'s 70-mm Camera Film Advance Stopped
[239](#lunar-module-pilots-70-mm-camera-film-advance-stopped)

14.5.5 Difficult to Obtain Water From Insuit Drinking Device
[240](#difficult-to-obtain-water-from-insuit-drinking-device)

14.5.6 Lunar Module Pilot Oxygen Purge System Antenna Was Damaged
[240](#lunar-module-pilot-oxygen-purge-system-antenna-was-damaged)

14.5.7 Retractable Tether Failure [241](#retractable-tether-failure)

14.6 LUNAR ROVING VEHICLE [243](#lunar-roving-vehicle-1)

14.6.1 Deployment Saddle Difficult To Release From Vehicle
[243](#deployment-saddle-difficult-to-release-from-vehicle)

14.6.2 Volt/Ammeter Inoperative [244](#voltammeter-inoperative)

14.6.3 Front steering System Inoperative
[245](#front-steering-system-inoperative)

14.6.4 Lunar Roving Vehicle Seat Belt Problems
[245](#lunar-roving-vehicle-seat-belt-problems)

15 CONCLUSIONS [247](#conclusions)

# MISSION SUMMARY

Apollo 15 was the first in a series of missions designed to conduct
exploration of the moon over longer periods, greater ranges, and with
more instruments for scientific data acquisition than on previous
missions. Major modifications and augmentations to the basic Apollo
hardware were made, the most significant being installation of a
scientific instrument module in one of the service module bays,
modification of the lunar module to carry a greater scientific payload
and permit a longer stay on the lunar surface, and the provision of a
lunar roving vehicle. The landing site chosen for the mission was an
area near the foot of the Apennine Mountains and adjacent to Hadley
Rille. The mission accomplished all of its objectives and is providing
the scientific community with a large amount of new information
concerning the moon and its characteristics.

The space vehicle was launched from the Kennedy Space Center, Complex
39A at 9:34:00.6 a.m. e.d.t. (13:34:00.6 G.M.T.), on July 26, 1971. The
spacecraft was manned by Colonel David R. Scott, Commander; Major Alfred
J. Worden, Command Module Pilot; and Lt. Col. James B. Irwin, Lunar
Module Pilot. The spacecraft /S-IVB combination was inserted into a
nominal earth parking orbit approximately 1-1 minutes 44 seconds after
lift-off. S- IVB restart for translunar injection was initiated during
the second revolution at about 2 hours and 50 minutes. The maneuver
placed the spacecraft /S-IVB combination on a translunar trajectory that
would allow return to an acceptable earth-entry corridor using the
reaction control system engines. Approximately 27 minutes after
injection into the translunar trajectory, the command and service module
was separated from the S-IVB and docked with the lunar module. The lunar
module was extracted from the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter. Shortly
thereafter, the S- IVB tanks were vented and the auxiliary propulsion
system was fired to target the S-IVB for a lunar impact. The first
spacecraft midcourse correction was performed at about 28 hours 40
minutes with a velocity change of 5.3 ft/sec. One other small midcourse
correction was performed during translunar flight.

The spacecraft was inserted into a lunar orbit of 170.1 by 57.7 miles at
approximately 78 hours 32 minutes. About 1 hour later, the impact of the
S-IVB stage was sensed by the Apollo 12 and 14 seismometers. The impact
point was about 146 kilometers (79 miles) from the planned point and
useful scientific data were obtained. The spacecraft was inserted into a
58.5-by-9.6 mile orbit at about 82 hours 40 minutes and a trim maneuver
was performed later to adjust the perilune for powered descent.
Undocking and separation occurred at about 100 hours 39 minutes and,
approximately 1 hour later, the command and service module was placed in
a near-circular orbit in preparation for the acquisition of scientific
data.

The lunar module touched down on the lunar surface about 550 meters
(1800 feet) from the planned target point at 104:42:29. The landing
point was 26 degrees 6 minutes 4 seconds north latitude and 3 degrees 39
minutes 10 seconds east longitude (referenced to the Rima Hadley Lunar
Photomap, Orbiter V site 26.1, First Edition, published by the U.S. Army
Topographic Command, April 1970). A hover time capability of about 103
seconds remained after touchdown.

About 2 hours after landing, the Commander stood on the ascent engine
cover with the upper part of his body extending through the upper hatch
opening to photograph and describe the area surrounding the landing
site. This extravehicular activity period lasted about 33 minutes.
Approximately 12 1/2 hours later, the first lunar surface extravehicular
activity commenced. Initially, the crew collected and stowed a
contingency sample, deployed the lunar roving vehicle, unstowed the
Apollo lunar surface experiments package and other equipment, and
configured the lunar roving vehicle for lunar surface operations. Some
problems were experienced in deploying and checking out the rover, but
these were worked out and the crew drove the vehicle to Elbow Crater
where they collected and documented samples, giving an enthusiastic and
informative commentary on lunar features. Television control during
various stops was provided by the Mission Control Center. After
obtaining additional samples and photographs near St. George Crater, the
crew returned to the lunar module using the lunar rover navigation
system. The distance driven was about 10.3 kilometers (5.6 miles). The
crew then proceeded to the selected Apollo lunar surface experiments
package deployment site, approximately 110 meters (360 feet)
west-northwest of the lunar module. They deployed the experiments
essentially as planned except that the second heat flow experiment probe
was not emplaced because drilling was more difficult than expected and
the hole was not completed. The first extravehicular activity lasted
about 6 hours and 33 minutes.

The crew spent about 16 hours in the cabin between the first and second
extravehicular periods. Upon egress for the second extravehicular
activity, the lunar rover was checked out and prepared for the second
sortie. The first leg of the 12.5-kilometer (6.8-mile) round trip was
south to the Apennine front, but east of the first traverse. Stops were
made at Spur Crater and other points along the base of the front, as
well as Dune Crater on the return trip. The return route closely
followed the outbound route. Documented samples, a core sample, and a
comprehensive sample were collected, and photographs were taken. After
reaching the lunar module, the crew returned to the experiments package
site where the Commander completed drilling the second hole for the heat
flow experiment and emplaced the probe. During this period, the Lunar
Module Pilot performed soil mechanics tasks. Drilling was again
performed by the Commander to obtain a deep core sample, but the
operation was terminated because of time constraints. The crew then
returned to the lunar module and deployed the United States flag. The
second extravehicular activity ended after about 7 hours 12 minutes.

The crew spent almost 14 hours in the cabin following the second
extravehicular period. The third extravehicular activity began later
than originally planned to allow additional time for crew rest. This and
other delays at the experiments package site required deleting the
planned trip to the North Complex. The first stop was at the experiments
package site to retrieve the deep core sample. Two core sections were
disengaged, but the drill and the remaining four sections could not be
separated and were left for later retrieval. The third geological
traverse was in a westerly direction and included stops at Scarp Crater,
Rim Crater, and The Terrace, an area along the rim of Hadley Rille.
Extensive samples were obtained as well as a double core tube and
photographs of the west wall of Hadley Rille where exposed layering was
observed. The return trip was east toward the lunar module with a stop
at the experiments package site to retrieve the remaining sections of
the deep core sample. One more section was separated and the remaining
three sections were returned in one piece. After returning to the lunar
module, the lunar rover was unloaded and parked for ground-controlled
television coverage of the lunar module ascent. The total distance
traveled during the third extravehicular activity was about 5.1
kilometers (2.8 miles), and it lasted about 4 hours 50 minutes. The
total distance traveled with the lunar roving vehicle during the three
extravehicular periods was 27.9 kilometers (15.1 miles) and the total
weight of lunar samples collected was about 170 pounds.

While the lunar module was on the surface, the Command Module Pilot
completed 34 lunar orbits operating scientific instrument module
experiments and cameras to obtain data concerning the lunar surface and
the lunar environment. Some of the scientific tasks accomplished during
this time were the photographing of the sunlit lunar surface; gathering
data needed for mapping the bulk chemical composition of the lunar
surface and determining the geometry of the moon along the ground track;
visually surveying regions of the moon to assist in identification of
processes which formed geologic features; obtaining lunar atmospheric
data; and surveying gamma-ray and X-ray sources. Good-resolution
panoramic and mapping camera photographs were obtained during the
mission.

After 66 hours 54 minutes and 53 seconds on the lunar surface, the
ascent stage lifted off at 171:37:23. A nominal lunar-module-active
rendezvous was performed followed by docking at about 173 hours 36
minutes.

The lunar module was jettisoned one revolution later than planned
because of some difficulty with verifying the tunnel sealing and suit
integrity. Jettisoning occurred at about 179 hours 30 minutes and, about
1 1/2 hours later, the lunar module was deorbited with lunar impact
occurring at 26 degrees 21 minutes north latitude and 0 degrees 15
minutes east longitude, about 23 1/2 kilometers (12.7 miles) from the
planned impact point and about 93 kilometers (50 miles) west of the
Apollo 15 landing site. The impact was recorded by the Apollo 12, 14,
and 15 seismic stations.

Before leaving lunar orbit, a subsatellite was deployed in an orbit of
approximately 76 by 55 miles, and all systems are operating as expected.
The transearth injection maneuver was initiated at about 223 hours 49
minutes.

At about 242 hours, transearth coast extravehicular activity began.
Television coverage was provided while the Command Module Pilot
retrieved film cassettes and examined the scientific instrument module
for abnormalities. This extravehicular activity lasted approximately 38
minutes. The-total extravehicular time during the mission was 19 hours
and 47 minutes.

A small midcourse correction of 5.6 ft/sec was performed at the seventh
midcourse correction opportunity. The command module was separated from
the service module as planned and a nominal entry followed with the
spacecraft being observed on the main parachutes. During the descent,
one of the three main parachutes failed, but a safe landing was made at
295:11:53. The best estimate of the landing coordinates is 26 degrees 7
minutes 48 seconds north latitude and 158 degrees 8 minutes 24 seconds
west longitude, about 1 mile from the planned landing point. The crew
was brought onboard the recovery ship by helicopter about 39 minutes
after landing. The Apollo 15 mission was successfully concluded with the
placing of the command module onboard the recovery ship about 1 1/2
hours after landing.

# INTRODUCTION

The Apollo 15 mission was the fifteenth in the series using Apollo
flight hardware and achieved the fourth manned lunar landing. The
objectives of the mission were to investigate the lunar surface in a
preselected area of the Hadley-Apennine region; emplace and activate
surface experiments; evaluate the capability of the Apollo equipment to
provide extended lunar surface stay time, increased extravehicular
operations, and surface mobility; and conduct inflight experiments and
photographic tasks from lunar orbit.

This report provides the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and other interested agencies with the results of the Apollo 15 mission.
Some aspects of the mission such as preliminary scientific results and
launch vehicle performance are reported in greater detail in other
publications (references 1 and 2). This report contains:

A discussion of the performance of spacecraft systems and onboard
equipment, including significant anomalies incurred and their
resolution. (The results of anomaly investigations not completed by the
time of publication will be reported individually.)

A description of the mission by the flight crew.

A summary of science operations.

A summary of the operational support provided by the flight control,
manned space flight network, and recovery teams.

A biomedical evaluation.

A summary of launch conditions and launch vehicle performance.

An assessment of mission objectives satisfactorily accomplished.

In addition, in Appendixes A through D, the configuration of the
spacecraft and the equipment aboard the spacecraft are identified, and
information is presented concerning spacecraft manufacturing and
checkout history, postflight testing, and data availability. A complete
analysis of all applicable data is not possible within the time frame of
the preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be
published as necessary. Appendix E lists the reports and gives their
status, either published or in preparation.

Times, unless otherwise specified, are elapsed time from range zero,
established as the integral second before lift-off. Range zero for this
mission was 13:34:00 G.M.T., July 26, 1971. Customary units are used
except in cases where metric units have a common usage, such as
measurement of lunar surface distance. In these instances, both metric
and customary units are given for convenience. All mileage distances are
in nautical miles and all weights are referenced to earth gravity.

# TRAJECTORY

The general trajectory profile of this mission was similar to that of
Apollo 14 except for a few refinements. The most significant difference
was that the angle of descent to the lunar surface was increased from 14
degrees to 25 degrees. Tables 3-1 and 3-11 give the times of major
flight events and definitions of the events; tables 3-111 and S-IV
contain trajectory parameter information; and table 3-V is a summary of
maneuver data.

## LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORIES

The launch trajectory is reported in reference 3. Because of earth
parking orbit insertion dispersions, the S-1VB instrument unit received
two navigation updates prior to translunar injection. Nominally, the
translunar injection maneuver is targeted to a 79-mile pericynthion. The
command and service module, a-long with the lunar module, lower this
pericynthion to 68 miles as a result of their ejection and separation
from the S-IVB. Although the translunar injection maneuver was targeted
to a 79-mile pericynthion, one of 139 miles was achieved. Two midcourse
correction maneuvers were performed in addition to the normal vehicle
separation maneuvers to reach the desired 68-mile pericynthion.

After command and service module/lunar module ejection, the S-IVB
performed an evasive maneuver. Then the S-IVB, using its auxiliary
propulsion system, performed two maneuvers designed to impact it at the
desired lunar location of 3 degrees 39 minutes south latitude and 7
degrees 35 minutes west longitude. Initial tracking after the two
maneuvers indicated that impact would be within 37 kilometers (20 miles)
of the target. However, because of an error in targeting due to
tolerances in the tracking vector and unexpected vehicle thrusting, the
impact occurred 146 kilo meters (79 miles) from the target at 1 degree
31 minutes south latitude and 11 degrees 49 minutes west longitude.

## LUNAR ORBIT

### Orbital Phase

The spacecraft was inserted into a 170.1-by-57.7-mile orbit around the
moon using the service propulsion system. Approximately 4 hours later,
the descent orbit insertion maneuver was performed, and the spacecraft
was lowered to an orbit having a 58.5-mile apocynthion and a 9.6-mile
pericynthion. This orbit gradually decayed, requiring a trim maneuver to
adjust the orbit for powered descent initiation.

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="6.235416666666667in"
height="8.29861111111111in"}

[TABLE 3-1.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS](../a15mr001.jpg)

![](media/image4.jpeg){width="6.795833333333333in"
height="7.697916666666667in"}

[TABLE 3-II. - DEFINITIONS OF EVENT TIMES](../a15mr002.jpg)

[TABLE 3-III.- TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS](../a15mr003.jpg)

![](media/image5.jpeg){width="5.395833333333333in"
height="6.145833333333333in"}

[TABLE 3-IV.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL
PARAMETERS](../a15mr004.jpg)

After lunar module separation, a circularization maneuver was performed
placing the command and service module in a 65.2-by-54.8-mile orbit. The
command and service module remained in this orbit until about 6 hours
prior to scheduled lunar module ascent when a 3-degree plane change
maneuver was made so that the orbital plane of both vehicles would be
coincident at the time of lift-off.

![](media/image6.jpeg){width="5.9631944444444445in"
height="5.3902777777777775in"}

[TABLE 3-V.- MANEUVER SUMMARY](../a15mr005.jpg)

### Descent

A landing site update of 853 meters (2800 feet) downrange was
incorporated at about 2 minutes into the powered descent to correct for
downrange error. No other updates were necessary. The crew made at least
seven site redesignations for a total change of 338 meters (1110 feet)
uprange and 409 meters (1341 feet) to the right. The landing point was
about 550 meters (1800 feet) northwest of the premission target point.
The coordinates of the landing site are 26 degrees 6 minutes 4 seconds
north latitude and 3 degrees 39 minutes 10 seconds east longitude,
referenced to the Rima Hadley Lunar Photomap, Orbiter V site 26.1, First
Edition, published by U.S. Army Topographic Command, April 1970 ( [fig.
3-1](../a15mr006.jpg))

![](media/image7.jpeg){width="5.416666666666667in"
height="5.770833333333333in"}

### Ascent and Rendezvous

The lunar module ascent occurred at 171:37:23 and the ascent stage was
inserted into a 42.5-by-9.0-mile orbit. Some trimming of velocity
residuals was required but, at insertion, the parameters were close to
the desired values and a vernier adjustment maneuver was not required.
The direct rendezvous technique, first used on Apollo 14, was executed
nominally, and the lunar module and command and service module were
harddocked about 1 hour 50 minutes after completion of the ascent
maneuver.

### Lunar Module Deorbit

Jettisoning of the lunar module ascent stage from the command and
service module was delayed one revolution to permit reverifications of
hatch and suit integrity. However, as a result of the delayed
Jettisoning, the lunar module attitude for the maneuver was different
than planned. With this change, the lunar module impacted the moon about
23.5 kilometers (12.7 miles) from the target. The coordinates of the
impact point were 26 degrees 21 minutes north latitude and 0 degrees 15
minutes east longitude which is about 93 kilometers (50 miles) west of
the Apollo 15 landing site.

The command and service module was to perform a 1-ft/sec retrograde
separation maneuver after lunar module Jettisoning to minimize the
possibility of recontact but, because of the Jettisoning delay, a
2-ft/sec posigrade maneuver was performed.

### Orbit-Shaping Maneuver and Subsatellite Launch

In preparation for launching the subsatellite just prior to transearth
injection, an orbit-shaping maneuver was performed during the 73rd lunar
revolution using the service propulsion system to optimize the
subsatellite orbit. The satellite was launched about an hour after the
shaping maneuver into an orbit having an inclination of minus 28.7
degrees with an apocynthion of 76.3 miles and a pericynthion of 55.1
miles. The orbital lifetime is expected to be in excess of 1 year.

## TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY TRAJECTORY

The transearth injection maneuver was performed at 223 hours 49 minutes.
On the transearth flight, no midcourse corrections were made until about
3 hours prior to entry. A 5.6-ft/sec maneuver was performed using the
service module reaction control system. The service module was separated
from the command module 15 minutes prior to entry. Conditions for the
entry of the spacecraft into the earth\'s atmosphere were nominal. The
best estimate of the spacecraft landing point is 26 degrees 7 minutes 48
seconds north latitude and 158 degrees 8 minutes 24 seconds west
longitude.

# LUNAR SURFACE SCIENCE

The following experiments associated with the Apollo lunar surface
experiment package are discussed in this section: suprathermal ion
detector, cold cathode gage, passive seismometer, lunar surface
magnetometer, solar wind spectrometer, heat flow, and lunar dust
detector. Other experiments and activities discussed consist of a laser
ranging retro-reflector experiment, a solar wind composition experiment,
lunar geology, soil mechanics, and lunar gravity measurement.
Additionally, the operation of the lunar drill, used in conjunction with
the heat flow experiment and to obtain a deep core sample, is described.
A comprehensive discussion of the preliminary scientific results of this
mission are contained in reference 2. References to descriptions of the
experiment equipment are contained in Appendix A.

## SUMMARY OF LUNAR SURFACE ACTIVITIES

Because of the variety of surface features, the Haaley-Apennine landing
site permitted extensive diversified geologic exploration and sampling.
During the approximately 67 hours on the surface, the crew conducted a
33- minute standup extravehicular activity as well as three
extravehicular activities for experiment operations and lunar roving
vehicle traverses. The timelines for the three extravehicular activity
periods are contained in table 4-1. The actual and planned traverse
routes are shown in figures 4.1 and 4-2, which are actual photographs of
the lunar surface taken with the panoramic camera.

![](media/image8.jpeg){width="6.756944444444445in"
height="7.802083333333333in"}

[TABLE 4-1.- EXTRAVEHICULAR TRAVERSE EVENTS](../a15mr007.jpg)

![](media/image9.jpeg){width="6.805555555555555in"
height="6.205555555555556in"}

[TABLE 4-1.- EXTRAVEHICULAR TRAVERSE EVENTS -
Concluded](../a15mr008.jpg)

The outbound route of the first extravehicular traverse was southwest
across the mare to the edge of Hadley Rille, south along the edge of the
rille to Elbow Crater (station 1, fig. 4-1); then along the edge of the
rille to an area near St. George Crater (station 2). The return route
was past Elbow Crater and directly across the mare to the lunar module.
After returning to the lunar module, the crew deployed the Apollo lunar
surface experiment package, the laser ranging retro-reflector, and the
solar wind composition experiment (fig. 4-3). The extravehicular
activity was approximately 6 hours 33 minutes in duration and the
traverse covered a distance of 10.3 kilometers (5.6 miles).

The second extravehicular activity was southeast across the mare to the
Apennine front (stations 6 and 6a) northwest to Spur Crater (station 7)
and north to the area of Dune Crater (station 4). The return was north
across the mare to the Apollo lunar surface experiment package site
(station 8) and then to the lunar module. The duration of the second
extravehicular activity was approximately 7 hours 12 minutes, and the
distance traveled was 12.5 kilometers (6.8 miles).

The third extravehicular activity included a 5.1-kilometer (2.8-mile)
traverse. The outbound trip was west to Scarp Crater (stations 9 and 9a)
and northwest along the edge of the rille (station 10). The return was
east across the mare to the lunar module. The duration of the third
extravehicular activity was approximately 4 hours and 50 minutes.

![](media/image10.jpeg){width="6.0055555555555555in"
height="7.597916666666666in"}\
[Figure 4-1.-Actual lunar surface traverse routes](../a15mr009.jpg)

![](media/image11.jpeg){width="5.7625in" height="7.202083333333333in"}

[Figure 4-2.-Planned lunar surface traverse routes.](../a15mr010.jpg)

## APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE CENTRAL STATION

The site selected for emplacement of the central station was
approximately 110 meters (360 feet) west-northwest of the lunar module.
During erection of the central station, the rear-curtain-retainer
removal lanyard broke, requiring the Lunar Module Pilot to remove the
pins by hand. (See section 14.4.2 for further discussion.)

Initial acquisition of a downlink signal from the Apollo lunar surface
experiment package was reported by the Canary Island station prior to
antenna installation. Initial data were received in the Mission Control
Center at 1850 G.M.T. (125:18:00) on July 31 and, within 1 hour, all
instruments were turned on and operationally checked out. (The initial
acquisition of data was earlier than expected because the shorting plug
was inadvertently activated.) The radioisotope thermoelectric power
source is providing 74.5 watts, the highest output of any Apollo lunar
surface experiment package, and sufficient to operate the large
complement of instruments. During the first lunar-night operation, the
system reserve power registered as low as 1 watt. The solid-state timer,
used for the first time on an Apollo lunar surface experiments package
has generated all scheduled 18-hour pulses to initiate certain automatic
functional changes.

Six days after startup, on August 6, the experiment package was
subjected to its first lunar eclipse. This was a total eclipse and the
package was closer to the center of the umbra than any previous Apollo
lunar surface experiments package during any previous eclipse. During
the eclipse, sun shield temperature of the central station dropped from
plus 140 F to minus 143 F with accompanying rates of change of
temperatures up to 260 F per hour. The central station engineering
measurements provided data on the varying solar intensity throughout the
eclipse. The instrument measured a lunar surface temperature change of
330 F during the eclipse. There was no indication of significant dust
collection on the instrument\'s solar cells as a result of the lunar
module ascent.

The system continues to exhibit normal performance. Equipment
temperatures during both lunar day and lunar night are within design
limits.

![](media/image12.jpeg){width="5.813888888888889in"
height="3.6798611111111112in"}

[Figure 4-3.-Apollo lunar surface experiment
deployment](../a15mr011.jpg)

## PASSIVE SEISMIC EXPERIMENT

The passive seismic experiment was deployed approximately 2.7 meters (9
feet) west of the experiment package central station and has functioned
well since its initial activation on July 31, 1971. One deviation from
nominal operation has occurred. The instrument internal temperature fell
below the predicted 126 F as the Apollo 15 site entered the first lunar
night. This will not detrimentally affect the operation of the
instrument except that degradation of gravity tidal data from the
experiment is expected. Photographs of the instrument show the shroud
skirt to be raised up at several places (fig. 4-4). Heat loss due to the
uneven shroud accounts for the low night temperature.

![](media/image13.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="4.479166666666667in"}

[Figure 4-4.- Passive seismic experiment deployment](../a15mr012.jpg)

The installation of this experiment at Hadley Rille provides a widely
spaced network of seismic stations on the lunar surface which is
essential for the location of natural lunar events. The first event to
be recorded on all three Apollo Lunar surface experiment package
stations was the impact of the lunar module ascent stage approximately
93 kilometers (50 miles) west of the Apollo 15 station. The signal
generated by this impact spread slowly outward, reaching the Apollo 15
station in 28 seconds, and reaching the Apollo 12 and 14 stations,
located to the southwest at distances of 1130 kilometers (610 miles) and
1049 kilometers (566 miles), respectively, in about 7 minutes (fig.
4-5). The fact that this small source of energy was detected at such
great range strongly supports the hypothesis that meteoroid impacts are
being detected from the entire lunar surface.

Two moonquakes were detected at all three stations during the moon\'s
travel through its first perigee following activation of the Apollo 15
station. Preliminary analysis places the focus of one of these
moonquakes 400 kilometers (216 miles) southwest of the Apollo 15
station. It is believed that the second moonquake was 1000 kilometers
(540 miles) southwest of the Apollo 12 and 14 stations and was 800
kilometers (432 miles) deep.

The S-IVB impact extended the depth to which lunar structure can be
determined by seismic methods to nearly 100 kilometers (54 miles). From
this and previous data from impacts of spent vehicles, it now appears
that a change in composition occurs at a depth of 25 kilometers (13.5
miles) beneath the surface. This implies that the lunar crust is
equivalent to the crust of the earth, and about the same thickness.

Two meteoroid impacts were recorded at the Apollo 15 station during the
first 2 weeks of its operation. One of these impacts was recorded at all
three stations and was located by triangulation. Fourteen impact events
were recorded by the Apollo 12 and 14 stations during this period.
Signals were also recorded that were caused by events and activities
associated with lunar surface operations, particularly the movements of
the lunar roving vehicle and the ascent from the lunar surface. The
lunar roving vehicle was detected at ranges up to 5 kilometers (2-7
miles) with an accuracy within approximately 0.5 kilometer (0.27 mile).
As in previous missions, numerous signals were also recorded from
venting of gases and thermal \"popping\" within the lunar module.

![](media/image14.jpeg){width="5.229166666666667in"
height="6.854166666666667in"}

[Figure 4-5.- Apollo landing sites and impact locations on the lunar
surface](../a15mr013.jpg)

## LUNAR SURFACE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT

The lunar surface magnetometer was deployed approximately 15 meters (48
feet) west-northwest of the Apollo lunar surface experiment package
central station. The experiment was initially commanded on near the end
of the first extravehicular activity. A-11 operations of the experiment
have been nominal. The electronics temperature has reached a high of 157
F at lunar noon, and a low of 41 F during lunar night. The instrument is
routinely commanded into a calibration mode every 18 hours by the
central station timer. The one-time site survey was
successfully-completed on August 6. The remanent magnetic field at the
site is lower than that measured at the Apollo 12 and 14 sites. The eddy
current produced by the interaction of the solar wind with the lunar
surface has been measured.

## SOLAR WIND SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT

The solar wind spectrometer was deployed 4 meters (13 feet) north of the
Apollo lunar surface experiment package central station and was
activated near the end of the first extravehicular activity. The
instrument recorded engineering and background data for approximately 2
earth days before the seven dust covers were removed.

The instrument recorded normal magnetospheric plasma data until the
instrument passed into the geomagnetic tail of the earth. As expected,
the plasma level in the geomagnetic tail was below the measurement
threshold of the instrument (and essentially no solar wind plasma was
detected) Upon emerging from the geomagnetic tail, the instrument was
switched to the extended-range mode with no operational problems. The
instrument will be left in this mode for correlation of data with the
Apollo 12 solar wind spectrometer which is also operating in the same
mode. A comparison of samples of simultaneous data from the two
instruments has already demonstrated differences in the electron and
proton components of the solar wind plasma that strikes the surface of
the moon at the two stations. The solar plasma levels during the lunar
night, as expected, were below the measurement threshold of the
instrument.

## HEAT FLOW EXPERIMENT

Deployment of the heat flow experiment was started on the first
extravehicular activity and completed on the second extravehicular
activity. A minor problem was experienced in removing two Boyd bolts
that fasten the heat flow experiment components to the subpallet and
problems were encountered in drilling the holes for two probes and
emplacing the second probe. Refer to sections 4.11 and 14.4.1 for
further discussion. The electronics box was placed about 9 meters (30
feet) north-northeast of the central station. The first probe hole was
drilled about 4 meters (12 feet) east of the electronics box and the
second, about 4.5 meters (15 feet) west of the box. The first hole was
drilled to a depth of about 172 centimeters (70 inches) and probe 1 was
emplaced during the first extravehicular activity, but the drilling of
the second hole and emplacement of probe 2 was deferred because of time
constraints. Drilling was resumed at the second hole during the second
extravehicular activity and a hole depth of about 172 centimeters (70
inches) was again achieved; however, damage to a bore stem section (sec.
14.4.1) prevented probe 2 from reaching the bottom of the hole. The
first heat flow experiment probe extends from a point 47 centimeters (19
inches) below the surface to a point 152 centimeters (62 inches) below
the surface. Because of the damage to the bore stem in the other hole,
the second probe extends from the surface to 105 centimeters (43 inches)
below the surface (see [fig. 4-6](../a15mr014.jpg)).

The experiment was turned on at 1947 G.m.t., July 31, and valid
temperature data were received from all sensors. Because of the shallow
emplacement of probe 2, high near-surface temperature gradients will
keep the differential thermometers on the upper section off-scale during
most of a lunar day-night cycle. The lower section of probe 2 and both
the upper and lower sections of probe 1 are returning valid data on
subsurface temperatures. Sensors on these sections that are shallower
than 80 centimeters (32 inches) are seeing the effects of the diurnal
cycle of surface temperature, but these variations are well within the
range of measurement. Lunar surface temperatures are being obtained from
five of the eight thermocouples in the probe cables that are just above
or on the lunar surface because of the shallow emplacement.

Data for the reference thermometer sampled with the probe 2 thermocouple
measurement went off-scale high at 1027 G.m.t - , August 7; however, the
data from this reference thermometer is also sampled with the probe 1
thermocouple measurement, and is valid. Therefore, no data have been
lost.

![](media/image15.jpeg){width="5.479166666666667in"
height="3.5416666666666665in"}

## SUPRATHERMAL ION DETECTOR EXPERIMENT 

The suprathermal ion detector experiment was deployed and aligned
approximately 17 meters (55 feet) east-northeast of the Apollo lunar
surface experiment package central station. Some difficulty was
encountered during deployment when the universal handling tool did not
properly interface with the experiment receptacle and, as a result, the
instrument was dropped. The instrument was initially turned on near the
end of the first extravehicular activity and operated normally,
returning good scientific data. After about 30 minutes of operation the
instrument was commanded to \"standby\" to allow outgassing. The dust
cover was removed by ground command prior to the second extravehicular
activity. Subsequently, the instrument was commanded on for five periods
of approximately 30 minutes each to observe the effects of: (1)
depressurization for the second extravehicular activity, (2)
depressurization for the third extravehicular activity, (3)
depressurization for equipment jettisoning, (4) ascent, and (5) lunar
module ascent stage impact. During some of this time simultaneous
observations of intense magnetosheath ion fluxes were made by all three
suprathermal ion detector instruments now on the moon. The high voltage
was commanded off prior to the hotter part of the first lunar day to
allow further outgassing and was commanded back on shortly before lunar
sunset.

## COLD CATHODE GAGE EXPERIMENT

The cold cathode gage experiment was deployed about 0.3 meter (1 foot)
northeast of the suprathermal ion detector experiment. The instrument
was turned on and the seal was commanded open 3 minutes prior to the end
of the first extravehicular activity. Upon initial turn-on, the gage
indicated full- scale, and during the first half hour, the output became
slightly less than full-scale. Subsequently, the high voltage was
commanded off to allow outgassing.

The experiment was operated five more times simultaneously with the
suprathermal ion detector experiment for periods of approximately 30
minutes each. The purpose of the operations was to observe the effects
of the lunar module depressurizations for the second and third
extravehicular activities and equipment jettison, the effects of the
lunar module ascent from the lunar surface, and lunar module ascent
stage impact. In each of the three depressurizations, the output of the
experiment was driven to full-scale for approximately 30 seconds. The
response to the lunar module depressurizations was very similar to that
obtained during the Apollo 14 mission. The lunar module ascent resulted
in the longest full-scale output (approximately 85 seconds). The exhaust
from the lunar module ascent was detected for approximately 17 minutes.

The high voltage was turned off until just prior to the first lunar
sunset to permit additional instrument outgassing. As the instrument and
the lunar surface cooled during lunar night, the output of the gage
gradually decreased to 10E-12 torr. This value is very near that
observed on the Apollo 14 gage during lunar night. Two gas clouds of
unknown origin were observed at the Apollo 15 site at 0400 and 1930
G.m.t. on August 15; these may be associated with Apollo 15 hardware
left on the lunar surface.

## LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR EXPERIMENT

The laser ranging retro-reflector was deployed during the first
extravehicular activity approximately 43 meters (140 feet)
west-southwest of the Apollo lunar surface experiment package central
station. Leveling and alignment were accomplished with no difficulty.
The McDonald Observatory team initially acquired a return signal from
the Apollo 15 instrument August 3, 1971, when atmospheric conditions
first permitted ranging. Based on successful acquisition on every
attempt, and the receipt of four to five consecutive returns during a
number of operations, the return signal strength appears higher than
returns from the Apollo 11 and 14 retroreflectors (fig. 4-5). No
degradation of the retro-reflector appears to have resulted from lunar
module ascent engine firing.

## SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT

The solar wind composition experiment, a specially prepared aluminum
foil designed to entrap noble gas particles, was deployed at the end of
the first extravehicular period and retrieved near the end of the third
extravehicular period. The experiment was deployed approximately 15
meters (50 feet) southwest of the lunar module for a total foil exposure
time of 41 hours and 8 minutes. Upon retrieval, the foil could not
readily be rolled up mechanically and had to be rolled manually. This
problem has been experienced on previous missions but does not affect
the experiment. The returned hardware showed that the edge of the foil
had rolled onto the reel- handle, which caused enough friction to stop
the mechanical wind-up. Good data on the abundance of the isotopes of
helium and neon in the solar wind have already been obtained.

## LUNAR SURFACE DRILL OPERATION

The lunar surface drill, used for the first time on the lunar surface,
provided a means for one crewman to emplace the heat flow experiment
probes below the lunar surface and collect a subsurface core. For the
heat flow experiment, the bore stems used in drilling remained in
position in the lunar soil and functioned as an encasement to preclude
cave-in of unconsolidated material. The subsurface core was obtained by
drilling six core stems into the lunar soil. The stems were then removed
and capped for return to earth.

The performance of the drill power-head and the core stem was good.
However, full depth penetration with the bore stems was a problem and
extraction of the core stems from the hole was difficult (see sec.
14.4.1). The two bore stem holes were drilled to a depth of about 172
centimeters (70 inches) instead of the desired 294 centimeters (120
inches), with one of the bore stem strings probably sustaining damage at
a point slightly above the first joint \[about 105 centimeters (43
inches) below the surface\] (see fig. 4-6).

## LUNAR GEOLOGY 

### Landing Site 

The lunar module landed on an undulating cratered plain adjacent to the
high and steep-sloped Apennine Mountains ( [fig. 4-7).](../a15mr015.jpg)
Most of the craters in the vicinity of the landing site are subdued and
are rimless or have low raised rims. Rock fragments and boulders are
abundant along the rim of Hadley Rille and around a few of the fresher
craters.

![](media/image16.jpeg){width="5.6875in" height="4.333333333333333in"}

### Extravehicular Traverses 

Areas visited during the extravehicular activities that are defined on
photogeologic maps were the mare surface of Palus Putredinis; the
Apennine Mountain Front; Hadley Rille; and a cluster of secondary
craters.

The standup extravehicular activity provided the geologic and terrain
setting for later traverse updating, and allowed the crew to familiarize
themselves with landmarks. Good photographs were obtained of the landing
site and the Had-ley Delta area by using the 60-mm and 500-mm
focal-length lenses. [Figure 4-8](../a15mr016.jpg) is typical of the
photographs obtained.

![](media/image17.jpeg){width="4.4375in" height="4.770833333333333in"}

On the first extravehicular traverse, station 1 and 2 tasks were
performed as planned. Refer to figures 4-1 and 4-2 for locations of
stations on actual and planned traverse routes. The radial sample was
collected at Elbow crater (station 1). Documented samples and a
comprehensive sample, including a double-core, were collected near St.
George crater (station 2). Station 3 on the planned traverse was not
visited because of time constraints.

The traverse time allowed during the second extravehicular activity was
shortened because of the time required to complete the Apollo lunar
surface experiment package site tasks that were not completed during the
first extravehicular activity. Therefore, the planned traverse to the
east along the front was shortened and only three stations along the
front, 6, 6a, and 7 (Spur Crater), were visited. Several documented
samples were collected at stations 6 and 6a, and a single core was
collected at station 6. Documented samples and a comprehensive sample
were collected at station 7. The planned stop at station 4 (Dune crater)
was accomplished on the return from the front.

The start of the third extravehicular activity was delayed and, as a
result, was shortened from 6 to 4 1/2 hours. The shortening of the
extravehicular period, plus the time required to remove the deep core
sample from its hole, required that the traverse to the North Complex
and mare station 14 be omitted. However, the premission-planned traverse
to stations 9 and 10 at Hadley Rille was made. A sample was collected
from the upper portion of a bedrock ledge exposed near station 9a.
Documented samples were collected at stations 9 and 9a, and a rake
sample and a double core were collected at station 9a.

### Summary of Geology

Samples were collected that appear to be representative of the Apennine
Front, the mare in the vicinity of the landing site, bedrock from the
rim of Hadley Rille, and a possible ray associated with Aristillus or
Autolycus. Some breccias were collected that appear similar to those
collected on Apollo 14; others appear to be indurated regolith. Abundant
glass, found as coatings on the rock surfaces and in fractures, is
associated with the breccias. Also collected were basaltic rocks ranging
from vesicular and scoriaceous to dense with phenocrysts greater than a
centimeter long.

Layered bedrock ledges are exposed in the upper parts of Hadley Rille.
These are probably a cross-section of mare flows and possibly bedded
pyroclastic materials. At least some of the samples from station 9a
(fig. 4- 1) are probably representative of the upper part of the mare
stratigraphic sequence.

Planar structures in the Apennine Front occur in different orientations
from one mountain to the next, which suggests rotation of large blocks
along the faults that are shown on the premission maps. The faults and
associated rotation were probably caused by the impact event that
produced the Imbrium Basin.

### Equipment

The equipment used during the geology portion of the extravehicular
activities performed well with the following exceptions:

Excessive time was required for the gnomon to damp.

Sample return container 2 did not seal properly because part of a
collection bag was caught in the seal area between the knife edge and
the indium seal.

The Lunar Module Pilot\'s camera did not advance film properly near the
end of the second extravehicular activity. The camera failed again
during the third extravehicular activity after six pictures had been
taken. (See section 14-5.4 for further discussion.)

Problems with the drilling were experienced as described in section
14.4.1.

The polarizing filter for the Hasselblad electric data camera could not
be installed because of excessive dust in the bayonet fitting.

Both retractable tethers (Yo-yo\'s) failed (sec. 14.5.7).

The tongs were difficult to operate during the third extravehicular
activity; however, a backup pair was supplied for such a contingency and
these operated satisfactorily.

### Photography

A total of 1152 photographs was taken on the lunar surface with the 60-
mm and 500-mm focal-length cameras. At least one 360-degree 60-mm
panorama was taken at every station except stations 3 and 4. Apollo 15
was the first mission using the 500-mm focal length lens mounted on the
70-mm Hasselblad electric data camera hand-held by a crewman. Good
photography was obtained of distant photographic targets such as the
Apennine Front and across and inside Had-ley Rille.

## SOIL MECHANICS EXPERIMENT

The soil mechanics experiment provided data on the physical
characteristics and Mechanical properties of the lunar surface and
subsurface soil. Activities during Apollo 15 unique to the soil
mechanics experiment were performed during a compressed timeline at
station 8 (fig. 4-1) near the end of the second extravehicular activity
with only one crewmember available to do the work instead of two as
scheduled. The Lunar Module Pilot excavated the soil mechanics trench,
exposing a Vertical face to an estimated depth of a little more than 1
foot without apparent difficulty. The vertical face exposed a
fine-grained, cohesive, gray material with small white fragments and
larger fragments of glass. Stratification was not observed. Digging of
the trench was followed by six of seven planned measurements using the
self- recording penetrometer. These tests consisted of four cone
penetration resistance tests and two plate load tests. No time was
available for the detailed planned photographic documentation of these
activities, nor was the television camera on the lunar roving vehicle in
a suitable position to provide a high degree of detail.

Data from the penetrometer tests were intended to provide quantitative
information on the physical properties of the lunar soil to depths up to
74 centimeters (30 inches). The data, now under study, will probably not
provide the quantitative detail on physical properties originally
anticipated because of the following reasons: (1) The soil structure at
the site had greater penetration resistance than had been anticipated
(2) A particularly resistant layer was encountered at a depth of only a
few centimeters; (3) The lunar surface plate on the penetrometer failed
to stay in the proper position during four of the tests because the
friction between the reference plate bushing and the shaft was less than
had been anticipated.

The average depth of lunar roving vehicle tracks was on the order of 1
centimeter (1/2 inch), in agreement with predictions based on
terrestrial wheel/soil interaction tests performed on simulated lunar
soil. [Figure 4-9](../a15mr017.jpg) illustrates vehicle tracks,
footprints, and excavated areas.

![](media/image18.jpeg){width="5.0625in" height="4.625in"}

The large number of photographs and the numerous observations made by
the crew concerning the interactions between the lunar surface and (1)
the crew, (2) the lunar module, (3) the lunar roving vehicle, and (4)
the experiment packages and handtools will be of value to the soil
mechanics experiment. The core tubes, which were modified for this
mission, performed satisfactorily.

***4.14 LUNAR GRAVITY MEASUREMENT***

Accelerometer data telemetered to earth between lunar module touchdown
and inertial measurement unit powerdown were obtained to determine the
observed lunar gravity. Nineteen measurements were taken during four
operating periods. The time spans and sequence of the periods were: 658
seconds, 240 seconds, 12 seconds, and 269 seconds. Lunar gravity at the
landing site will be calculated from the reduced data.

# INFLIGHT SCIENCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY

The inflight experiments and photographic tasks conducted during the
Apollo 15 mission are discussed in this section. The discussion is
concerned primarily with experiment hardware performance and data
acquisition operations. In instances where preliminary scientific
findings were available at the time of report preparation, they are
included, but more complete information on scientific results will be
found in reference 2.

The experiments located in the scientific instrument module bay of the
service module ( [fig. 5-1](../a15mr018.jpg)) consisted of a gamma ray
spectrometer, an X-ray spectrometer, an alpha-particle spectrometer, a
mass spectrometer; and a subsatellite which is the vehicle for a
particle shadows/boundary layer experiment, an S-band transponder
experiment, and a magnetometer experiment. The subsatellite ( [fig.
5-2](../a15mr019.jpg)) was launched successfully just prior to
transearth injection on August 4 at approximately 2100 G.m.t., and was
inserted into a 76.3-by-55.1-mile lunar orbit with an inclination of
minus 28.7 degrees. The three subsatellite experiments are expected to
acquire data for a period exceeding 1 year. At the time of launch, the
moon was in the magnetosheath (transition) region of the earth\'s
magnetosphere ( [fig 5.3](../a15mr020.jpg)), one of several data
collecting regions of scientific interest. All subsatellite experiments
are turned off while the battery is being recharged after each tracking
revolution. Both the magnetometer and particle shadows/boundary layer
experiments are acquiring data on all revolutions except those when the
battery is being charged.

![](media/image19.jpeg){width="5.208333333333333in" height="6.0in"}

![](media/image20.jpeg){width="4.406944444444444in"
height="4.134722222222222in"}

![](media/image21.jpeg){width="4.511805555555555in"
height="4.051388888888889in"}

Other inflight experiments consisted of ultraviolet photography of the
earth and moon, photography of the Gegenschein from lunar orbit, an
S-band transponder experiment using the command and service module and
lunar module S-band communication systems, a down-link bistatic radar
experiment using both the S-band and VHF communications systems of the
command and service module and an Apollo window meteroid experiment.

Photographic tasks that were designated as detailed objectives rather
than experiments are also discussed. They are the service module orbital
photography employing the panoramic camera, the mapping camera, and the
laser altimeter; and command module photography of lunar surface areas
and astronomical subjects. A brief description of the equipment used for
these experiments and photographic tasks is given in appendix A.

## GAMMA-RAY SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT 

The gamma-ray spectrometer was operated in lunar orbit for over 90
hours. The instrument was operated in the minimum-background mode for
prime data collection approximately 65 percent of the time. The
remaining of the time it was operated in various non-minimum-background
modes to determine the effects of background radiation sources on the
prime data. The instrument was also operated for approximately 50 hours
during transearth flight obtaining background data necessary for
analysis of the lunar data, and to acquire data from galactic sources.

The instrument as well as the deployment boom performed well throughout
the mission. However, two anomalous conditions occurred which affected
instrument calibration. First, a downward drift in the linear gain of
the photomultiplier or pulse analyzer was detected after the first boom
extension (prior to undocking in lunar orbit) when several lines in the
spectrum of the Apollo lunar surface experiment package fuel capsule
were used for calibrations. The drift decreased in magnitude from an
initial rate of 1 percent per hour to 0.4 percent per day and,
eventually, reached a fairly stable state. The second anomalous
condition was noted about 2-3/4 hours after transearth injection, when
spectrum zero shifted eight channels, causing loss of the
0.279-million-electron-volt calibration reference. Commencing at 246:56,
the problem disappeared for approximately 25 hours, returning at 271:47
and remaining for the rest of transearth flight. These problems are
discussed further in section 14.3.4.

The preliminary data indicates variations in radioactivity as the
spacecraft passed over different kinds of terrain. The western mare
areas are generally the highest in radioactivity, with the eastern maria
being somewhat lower. The highlands are the lowest in activity with a
slightly lower level in the far-side highlands. The data further
indicate a continuum level comparable to that predicted from Ranger 3
and Luna 10 data. Peaks due to potassium, thorium, oxygen, silicon, and
iron have been identified. Detailed analysis is expected to show the
presence and distribution of uranium, magnesium, aluminum, and titanium.

## X-RAY FLUORESCENCE EXPERIMENT

All X-ray spectrometer objectives were achieved and no hardware problems
were noted. About 90 hours of data were obtained from operation of the
instrument in lunar orbit, and approximately 26 hours of data were
acquired while in transearth flight. During this latter period, the
instrument was pointed at six preselected locations to acquire data on
possible variations in X-ray intensity. Two observations were
coordinated with simultaneous ground-based observations. After 276
hours, the instrument was left on to obtain data for use in the search
for new sources of X-ray emission and to improve spectral information on
known sources.

Near the end of transearth flight, an engineering test was conducted to
determine if the gas-filled proportional counters Would be damaged by
direct impingement of solar X-rays. The experiment continued to operate
satisfactorily after the test.

The preliminary data shows that the fluorescent X-ray flux was more
intense than predicted; that the concentration of aluminum in the
highlands is about 50 percent greater than in the maria; and that the
ratio of magnesium-to-aluminum in Mare Smithii and Mare Chrisium is
about 50 percent greater than in the highlands between, and to the east
and west of, the two maria. Analysis of the X-ray astronomy observations
made enroute to the earth has shown that the intensity in X-ray output
of Scorpius X-1 and Cygnus X-1 fluctuates with periods of several
minutes.

## ALPHA-PARTICLE SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT

All primary objectives of the alpha-particle experiment were achieved.
The spectrometer was operated for approximately 80 hours in lunar orbit
to acquire prime data, and approximately 50 hours during transearth
coast to acquire background data.

Two of the ten detectors were intermittently noisy. The noise was at a
very low rate (approximately 0.5 count per second) with occasional
bursts at higher rates. Since the noise was generally restricted to one
detector at a time, the loss of data is not expected to have a
significant effect on the validity of the analysis.

An engineering test was performed near the end of transearth flight (in
conjunction with the test on the X-ray spectrometer). The open
experiment covers, which permitted direct sunlight impingement on the
instrument, resulted in three of the ten detectors (including the two
noisy detectors) showing some evidence of photosensitivity.

The planned coverage of the lunar surface was obtained. The alpha
particle spectrometer did not detect any local areas of radon
enhancement (An objective of the experiment was to locate craters or
fissures by detecting alpha particles emitted by radon isotopes -
daughter products of uranium and thorium). The general radon evolution
rate of the moon is three orders of magnitude less than that of earth. A
refinement of the data, in which summation of counts from successive
orbital passes over the same area is made, will be required to make more
definitive statements about the lunar distribution of radon isotopes.

## MASS SPECTROMETER EXPERIMENT

Thirty-three hours of prime lunar orbit data were collected with the
command and service module minus X axis in the direction of travel, and
7 hours of background data with the command and service module pointed
in the opposite direction. During transearth coast, approximately 48
hours of data were gathered, including waste water dumps, oxygen purges,
and boom- retraction tests.

The mass spectrometer boom retract mechanism in the scientific
instrument module stalled during five of twelve cycles. Data, supported
by the Command Module Pilot\'s observations during extravehicular
activity, confirmed that the boom had retracted to within 1 inch of full
retraction.

Each of the five cycles in which the boom did not fully retract was
preceded by a period of cold soaking of the boom. In each instance, the
boom would retract fully after warm-up. The boom was fully retracted for
command module/service module separation. This anomaly is discussed
further in section 14.1.6.

The instrument operated well, providing good data. Even though the boom
retraction problem resulted in failure to collect prime data during one
scheduled period, and real-time scheduling problems prevented instrument
operation for another scheduled period, an adequate amount of data was
acquired.

The mass spectrometer measured an unexpectedly large amount of gas at
orbital altitude around the moon. This amount was an order of magnitude
greater than that seen during transearth coast. Many gases were
detected, including water vapor, carbon dioxide, and a variety of
hydrocarbons. Data obtained during transearth coast indicate that a
gaseous contamination cloud existed up to a distance of 4 feet from the
command and service module, but contamination was not detected at the
maximum extension of the mass spectrometer (24 feet).

## PARTICLE SHADOWS /BOUNDARY LAYER EXPERIMENT

The charged-particle telescope detectors were turned on immediately
after subsatellite launch and are operating normally. Proper operation
of the proton detection system was indicated when a large flux of
protons in the 35 000- to 100 000-electron-volt range were observed near
the magnetopause (fig. 5-3). Twenty-four hours after subsatellite
launch, the electrostatic analyzer detectors were turned on, and have
operated normally with no evidence of high-voltage corona or arcing.

When the moon is not in the earth\'s geomagnetic tail, the effect of the
moon\'s shadow on the solar wind electrons is clearly detected. The
variation in the shadow shape is rather large. With the moon in the
earth\'s tail, a very tenuous plasma is seen. Within the plasma sheet,
intensities increase with some flow of plasma from the earth\'s
direction.

## SUBSATELLITE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT

The magnetometer was turned on when telemetry from the subsatellite was
acquired, and the instrument has performed satisfactorily. The
experiment has operated continuously except for an 18-hour period after
the lunar eclipse of August 6, and periods when the power is turned off
to enable the batteries to return to full charge.

The magnetometer is returning better-than-expected information in
relation to detecting surface anomalies. The principal investigator is
carrying out hand calculations on far-side data that indicate excel-lent
repetitive information over the craters Gagarin, Korolev, and Van de
Graaff. While in the solar wind, the magnetometer is mapping the
signature of the diamagnetic cavity behind the moon. As the subsatellite
crosses the terminator, variations in the solar magnetic field by
factors of two to three are detected by the magnetometer. These may be
caused by interaction of the solar wind with local magnetic regions near
the limb. More careful long-term analysis is required to confirm this
preliminary finding.

## S-BAND TRANSPONDER EXPERIMENT

### Command and Service Module/Lunar Module

Good gravitational profile data along the spacecraft lunar ground tracks
were obtained. The anticipated degradation of the data caused by changes
in spacecraft position from uncoupled attitude control engine firings
was not significant. Indications are that the gross shapes of mascons in
Serenitatis, Crisium, and Smythii can be established. This complements
the Apollo 14 results on Nectaris. Detailed gravity profiles of the
Apennines and Procellarum regions were also obtained.

### Subsatellite

The initial data contained a high level of noise caused by a wobble
about the spin axis. The wobble was inherent in the subsatellite
deployment and was subsequently removed by the onboard wobble damper.

The subsatellite S-band transponder is working well, and is being
operated every twelfth lunar revolution. The tracking data shows that
the perilune variation is following preflight predictions and is
expected to confirm the predicted orbital lifetime (greater than 1
year). The subsatellite transponder has shown at least one new mascon in
the region of the crater Humboldt on the eastern lunar near side.
Repeated overflights of the lunar near side from varying altitudes as
the subsatellite orbit decays will be necessary before an accurate
gravitational map can be made and large anomalies defined.

## DOWN-LINK BISTATIC RADAR OBSERVATIONS OF THE MOON

The experiment data consists of records of both frequencies (S-band and
VHF) during the front-side passes on lunar revolutions 17 and 28. During
these dual-frequency periods, signals were bounced off the moon and
received at Goldstone (210-ft dish antenna for S-band) and at Stanford
University (150-ft dish antenna for VHF). On revolutions 53 through 57
(the crew sleep period), only the VHF frequency was reflected from the
moon to the earth.

The experiment results will require considerable data processing.
Determination of the bulk dielectric constant and near-surface roughness
along the spacecraft track appears possible with the present data.
S-band data from revolution 17 are not usable because of incorrect
spacecraft attitude. However, VHF data from revolution 17 appear to be
of high quality. The attitude error was discovered and corrected in time
for revolution 28, and all the data for that revolution are of excellent
quality. The VHF experiment conducted during revolutions 53 through 57
provided high quality data. Apollo 15 data may be correlated with data
obtained from the Apollo 14 bistatic radar experiment since the
spacecraft groundtracks of Apollo 15 during both S-band/VHF operation
and VHF-only operation intersect the Apollo 14 groundtrack during
S-band/VHF operation.

## APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT

The command module side and hatch windows were scanned at a
magnification of 20X prior to flight to determine the general background
of chips, scratches and other defects. Postflight, the windows will
again be scanned at 20X (and higher magnifications for areas of
interest) to map all visible defects. Possible meteoroid craters will be
identified to determine the meteoroid cratering flux of particles
responsible for the degradation of glass surfaces exposed to the space
environment.

## ULTRAVIOLET PHOTOGRAPHY - EARTH AND MOON

Ultraviolet photographs were obtained while in earth and lunar orbit,
and during translunar and transearth coast. The following table lists
the ultraviolet photography sequences performed on Apollo 15. Each
sequence consisted of two exposures without the use of a filter and two
exposures each with a 2600-angstrom filter, a 3750-angstrom filter, and
a 4000- to 6000- angstrom visual-range filter. In addition, some
color-film exposures were obtained, as planned, with the visual-range
filter. These are noted in the last column of table 5-1. Preliminary
examination shows that the exposures were excellent

![](media/image22.jpeg){width="5.5625in" height="6.5in"}\
\
[Table 5-I.- ULTRAVILOT PHOTOGRAPHY](../a15mr021.jpg)

## GEGENSCHEIN FROM LUNAR ORBIT

Photography of the Gegenschein and Moulton Point regions from lunar
orbit was performed twice, as planned, during revolutions 46 and 60, and
at least six exposures were obtained during each sequence. However, the
photographs are unusable because incorrect signs were used in premission
calculations of spacecraft attitudes. Ground-based photography in
support of the inflight photography was performed during the mission at
the Haleakala Observatory, Maui, Hawaii, and after the mission at the
McDonald Observatory, Fort Davis, Texas.

The camera system used for the Gegenschein experiment and other
astronomy tasks performed well. A comparison of preflight and postflight
calibration exposures with the faintest brightness observed in the
Apollo 15 exposures (of the Milky Way) demonstrates that this camera
system is very satisfactory for the Gegenschein experiment, now
scheduled for the Apollo 16 mission.

## SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL PHOTOGRAPHY

### Panoramic Camera 

The panoramic camera was carried on Apollo 15 to obtain high-resolution
panoramic photographs of the lunar surface. The areas photographed
included the Hadley Rille landing sites (fig. 4-1 and 4-2), several
areas being considered as the Apollo 17 landing site, the Apollo 15
lunar module ascent stage impact point, near-terminator areas, and other
areas of general coverage. Anomalous operation of the velocity/altitude
sensor (section 14.3.1) was indicated on the first panoramic camera pass
on revolution 4 and subsequent passes; however, good photography was
obtained over all critical areas.

The delay in lunar module jettison caused cancellation of photographic
passes planned for revolutions 58 and 59. These passes were rescheduled
for revolutions 60 and 63, but sidelap with adjacent areas photographed
on revolutions 33 and 38 was decreased.

All imagery is of very high quality. Examination of the film shows that
less than one percent of the total film exposed was seriously degraded
by the velocity/altitude sensor malfunction. 5.12.2 Mapping Camera

The mapping camera was carried aboard the Apollo 15 service module to
obtain high-quality metric photographs of the lunar surface. Mapping
camera operation was desired during all panoramic camera passes and on
selected dark-side passes to assist in analysis of data from the laser
altimeter. The camera functioned normally and, essentially, the entire
area overflown in daylight was photographed. However, the laser
altimeter failed (see the following section) and all scheduled dark-side
mapping activities subsequent to revolution 38 were deleted. A problem
with the mapping camera deployment mechanism was also experienced. The
camera extension and retraction cycles varied from 2 to 4 minutes as
compared to about 1 1/2 minutes required prior to flight. After the last
deployment, the camera did not completely retract. This anomaly is
discussed further in section 14.3.3.

The mapping camera was turned off during the panoramic camera pass over
the landing site on revolution 50 in a test to determine if the
velocity/altitude sensor anomaly might be related to the mapping camera
operation. This resulted in a minor loss of coverage. Also, the
photographic pass planned for revolution 58 was deferred until
revolution 60 because of the delay in lunar module jettison. The
consequence of this was a decrease in sidelap below the desired 55
percent.

Approximately 6 hours of mapping camera operating time remained at
transearth injection. About 1 1/2 hours of this were expended
photographing the receding moon, and 3 1/2 hours were used photographing
selected star fields with the stellar camera associated with the mapping
camera.

Image quality is excellent throughout the entire sequence of 3400
frames. The entire portion of the lunar surface which was overflown by
Apollo 15 in daylight has been covered by excellent stereoscopic
photography which is as well suited to detailed analysis and geologic
interpretation as it is to mapping.

### Laser Altimeter

The laser altimeter was flown to accurately measure lunar topographic
elevations in support of mapping and panoramic camera photography, and
inflight experiments. The altimeter was designed to supply a
synchronized altitude measurement for each mapping camera exposure on
light-side photography, and independent altitude measurements on the
dark side to permit correlation of topographic profiles with gravity
anomalies obtained from spacecraft tracking data.

Operation of the altimeter was nominal through revolution 24, but
improper operation was noted on the next operation (revolution 27). The
performance of the altimeter became progressively worse until, on
revolution 38, the altimeter ceased to operate (sec. 14.3.2).
Consequently, the altimeter was not operated on subsequent dark-side
passes , although operation on lightside mapping camera passes was
continued. On revolution 63, an attempt was made to revive the altimeter
through a switching operation by the Command Module Pilot, but the
effort was not successful.

Approximately 50 percent of the planned altimeter telemetry data were
actually obtained before the instrument failed. The data from the early
orbits have been correlated with S-band transponder data for the
frontside pass, and show the shape of the gravity anomalies as related
to mare basins. The complete circumlunar laser altimeter data show that,
relative to the mean lunar radius, the average lunar far side is about 2
kilometers (1.1 mile) high and the average near side is about 2
kilometers low.

## COMMAND MODULE PHOTOGRAPHY

While in lunar orbit, photographs were taken from the command module of
lunar surface sites of scientific interest, and of specific portions of
the lunar surface in earthshine and near the terminator. Also, while in
lunar orbit, photographs were taken of low-light-level astronomical
subjects including the solar corona, the zodiaca-1 light, lunar
libration point L4, and of the moon as it entered and exited the
earth\'s umbra during lunar eclipse. During translunar and transearth
coast, photographs were taken of a contamination test and star fields
were photographed through the command module sextant.

In accomplishing some of the tasks, the crewman obtained extra frames
and some with longer exposures than required. This will enhance the
value of the total data desired. The only 16-mm data acquisition camera
magazine containing very-high-speed black-and-white film was lost. About
35 percent of the magazine had been exposed during lunar orbital flight
and transearth coast for solar corona and sextant star field
photography. The most probable cause of the loss of the magazine was
that it floated through the hatch during the Command Module Pilot\'s
extravehicular activity. This required a substitution of a slower
black-and-white film magazine for the final sextant star field
photography and real-time update for contamination photography but,
because premission-planned exposure settings were used with the much
slower film, the sextant star field photographs are not clear.

Photographs were obtained of 21 of 23 specific lunar surface targets,
the solar corona, the moon during lunar eclipse as it entered and exited
the earth\'s umbra, star fields through the command module sextant,
lunar libration region L4, and specific areas of the lunar surface in
earthshine and in low light levels near the terminator. Near-terminator
strip photography scheduled on revolution 58, and 2 of the 23 lunar
surface targets scheduled on revolutions 58 and 59 were deleted because
of the delay in lunar module jettison due to problems during tunnel
venting operations and subsequent extension of the crew\'s sleep period.
Based on preliminary examination of the dim-light photography, it
appears that excellent quality imagery was obtained of the solar corona,
the zodiacal light and the lunar surface in earthshine.

## VISUAL OBSERVATIONS FROM LUNAR ORBIT

Visual observations from lunar orbit was an objective implemented for
the first time on this mission. The Command module Pilot was asked to
make and record observations of special lunar surface areas. Emphasis
was to be placed on characteristics difficult to record on film, but
which could be delineated by the eye, such as subtle color differences
between surface units. All of the scheduled targets were observed and
the results relayed. These results are documented in reference 2.
Significant observations were as follows:

Fields of cinder cones were discovered on the southeast rim of Mare
Serenitatis (Littrow area) and the southwest rim of the same mare basin
(Sulpicius; Gallos area).\
b. A landslide or rock glacier was delineated on the northwest rim of
the crater Tsiolkovsky on the lunar farside (fig. 4-5).\
c. A ray-excluded zone around the crater Proclus on the west rim of Mare
Crisium. was interpreted as being caused by the presence of a fault
system at the west rim of the crater.\
d. Layers on the interior walls of several craters were found and were
interpreted as volcanic collapse craters , or \"caldera\", in the maria.

# COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE.

## STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

Command module accelerometer data indicated a sustained 5-hertz
longitudinal oscillation of 0.35g peak-to-peak amplitude prior to first
stage center engine cutoff. Similar oscillations have occurred on
previous Apollo flights and are within acceptable structural design
limits . Oscillations measured during second and third stage boost were
less than 0.05g peak amplitude in any direction and were not
structurally significant.

Translunar docking loads were higher than those of previous missions
(see sec. 7-1).

Main parachute deployment for earth landing, beginning at approximately
10 500 feet, was normal. However, at approximately 6000 feet, one of the
three main parachutes was observed to have collapsed. Details of this
anomaly are reported in section 14.1.9.

## ELECTRICAL POWER AND FUEL CELLS

The electrical power system batteries and fuel cells performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission.

The entry, auxiliary, and pyrotechnic batteries performed normally.
Entry batteries A and B were charged nine times during flight (battery
A - 4 times; battery B - 5 times). Load sharing and voltage delivery
were satisfactory during each of the service propulsion firings. The
batteries were near the fully charged level at entry.

The fuel cells were activated 59 hours prior to launch and the system
was configured with fuel cell 2 on main bus A. Fuel cells 1 and 3 were
on open-circuit until 3.5 hours before lift-off when fuel cells 1 and 2
were placed on main bus A and fuel cell 3 on main bus B. This
configuration was maintained throughout the flight. Load variance
between fuel cells was a nominal 4 to 7 amperes during flight, with the
fuel cells supplying 653 kilowatt-hours of energy at an average current
and bus voltage of 77 amperes and 28.8 volts, respectively.

## CRYOGENIC STORAGE

The cryogenic storage system satisfactorily supplied reactants to the
fuel cells and metabolic oxygen to the environmental control system
throughout the mission. The quantities of oxygen and hydrogen consumedas
compared to preflight predictions are given in section 6.11-3.

The system supplied all demands including the extravehicular activity
during transearth coast when the system supplied a flow rate of
approximately 12.2 lb/hr and the pressure and heater temperatures
remained within the anticipated limits.

## COMMUNICATIONS

Performance of the command and service module communications system was
nominal throughout the mission, except that the Command Module Pilot\'s
lightweight headset microphone was inoperative when the headset was
removed from stowage. Inflight troubleshooting verified that the failure
was in the microphone. Past history shows three microphone amplifier
failures out of approximately 300 units in use. The headset was
transferred to the lunar module and jettisoned; therefore, the failure
could not be isolated to a specific component.

## INSTRUMENTATION

The instrumentation performed normally with three exceptions.

The service module reaction control system quad A fuel manifold pressure
measurement was intermittently noisy (about 4 percent). However, there
were other measurements for determining the manifold pressure.

The central timing equipment timer was reset at 97 hours 53 minutes. A
time correction was inserted by up-data link, and the timer continued to
operate properly throughout the flight. The noise susceptibility of the
reset line to the central timing equipment has been evident on other
spacecraft. However, because of the ease of updating, the problem has
not been considered significant enough to justify redesign.

The first 20 feet of tape on the data recorder reproducer became
degraded after about 100 dumps. This portion of the tape was not used
for the remainder of the flight. This anomaly is discussed further in
section 14.1.10.

## GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

Performance of the guidance, navigation, and the primary and backup
control systems was good throughout the flight. The two anomalies
experienced during the mission were minor in nature causing no loss of
system capability. They were excessive attenuation of light through the
scanning telescope, and improper alignment of the roll axis when the
gyro display alignment pushbutton was depressed. Descriptions of the
anomalies and the corrective action being taken are included in sections
14.1.15 and 14.1.16.

The primary guidance system satisfactorily monitored the trajectories
during launch and the translunar injection maneuver. The most probable
velocity errors at insertion were minus 1.5, minus 41.5, and minus 10.8
ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z platform axes , respectively. The errors were
determined from data obtained from several sources: the Saturn guidance
system, the command module guidance system, the Saturn guidance system
data modified by tracking data, and command module platform realignments
in earth orbit.

Separation from the S-IVB and the transposition maneuver were nominal.
Daring the docking sequence, the digital autopilot control mode was
changed from \"attitude hold\" to \"free\" while a plus-X translation
was being commanded in order to secure a positive capture latch
indication. The body rates induced by contact and the plus-X thrusting
were not nulled and resulted in misalignment angles of minus 1-1.0, plus
2.2, and plus 1.6 degrees in pitch, yaw and roll at the start of the
retract sequence (see fig. 6-1). The resultant misalignment caused a
greater-than-normal structural loading in the docking interface (see
sec. 7.1).

![](media/image23.jpeg){width="5.333333333333333in" height="6.1875in"}\
[Figure 6-1.](../a15mr025.jpg) -Rate and attitude error data during
transposition and docking sequence.

Body rate transients of less than 0.1 deg/sec in all three axes were
caused by jettisoning of the scientific instrument module door and
launching of the subsatellite.

Accelerometer biases and gyro drift terms were stable throughout the
flight. The gyro drift terms were updated only once, at 27:56. [Table
6-I](../a15mr022.jpg) is a summary of preflight histories and inflight
performance data of the inertial components. [Table
6-II](../a15mr023.jpg) is a summary of inertial measurement unit
realignments performed during the mission. [Table
6-III](../a15mr024.jpg) summarizes significant control parameters for
each of the service propulsion system maneuvers.

![](media/image24.jpeg){width="6.535416666666666in"
height="4.654861111111111in"}

![](media/image25.jpeg){width="6.49375in" height="4.663194444444445in"}

![](media/image26.jpeg){width="6.490972222222222in"
height="4.549305555555556in"}

During lunar orbital operations between 84 and 95 hours , the command
and service module maintained a period of local horizontal attitude hold
with the scientific instrument module toward the lunar surface. The
evaporator in the primary coolant loop was turned off to prevent
interference with the inflight science activities. The resulting large
temperature oscillations in the coolant loop gave some concern as to how
these temperature excursions would affect the guidance equipment. Since
no direct guidance equipment telemetry measurements of coolant
temperatures were available, an analysis was performed using a thermal
model of the coolant loop and a ground test was performed with
non-flight guidance equipment. Both indicated that considerable
temperature attenuation exists in the coolant loop and that temperatures
experienced during the flight were within acceptable limits. As a result
of the thermal analysis, the maximum temperature limits in the systems
operational data book are being raised to 90 F, peak, and 75 F, average,
over a 2-hour period. The effect of coolant temperature oscillations
upon accelerometer bias is shown in [figure 6-2](../a15mr026.jpg).

![](media/image27.jpeg){width="6.499305555555556in"
height="5.415972222222222in"}

Cislunar midcourse navigation exercises were performed during the
transearth phase to again demonstrate the capability to navigate to safe
entry conditions in the absence of communications with earth.

Separation from the service module, the maneuver to entry attitude, and
sensing of 0.05g during entry were all nominal. The command module
dynamics were seen to change suddenly when the parachute failure
resulted in a decrease in lift (sec. 14.1.9).

The guidance system controlled the vehicle attitude and lift vector
during entry and, based on computer readouts, guided the spacecraft to
landing coordinates of 26 degrees 7 minutes 48 seconds north latitude,
and 158 degrees 7 minutes 12 seconds west longitude.

Postflight testing of the entry monitor system scroll indicated that
intermittent scribing occurred after drogue deployment. Chemical
analysis revealed an improper mixture of the phenolic resin and the
encapsulated dye which is used to coat the scroll. The trace that was
scribed by the stylus was visible to the crew during entry but was not
visible postflight because the dye and resin did not develop properly.
No hardware changes will be made since only postflight testing of the
scroll is affected.

## PROPULSION

### Reaction Control Systems

Performance of the service module reaction control system was normal
throughout the mission except that some service module propellant
isolation valves closed as on previous missions. Indications that valves
were closed were reported by the crew following launch, S-IVB/command
and service module separation, and scientific instrument module door
jettison. In all cases, the valves were recycled open without incident.
A more complete discussion of this anomaly is given in section 14.1.1.

The performance of the command module reaction control system was
nominal throughout the mission. The effects of dumping raw fuel
following the propellant depletion firing sequence and the association
of this procedure with the parachute failure is discussed in section
14.1.9.

### Service Propulsion System

Service propulsion system performance was satisfactory during each of
the eight maneuvers. The steady-state pressure data, gaging system data,
and velocity differentials indicated essentially nominal performance.
Engine ignition procedures for lunar orbit insertion and transearth
injection were revised, however, because of a short which developed in
the ignition control circuitry on the downstream side of the bank A
solenoid valve. A discussion of this malfunction is given in section
14.1-3.

Previous flight results have shown the inflight mixture ratio to be
significantly less than expected from engine acceptance test data. The
service propulsion system engine was re-orificed to increase the mixture
ratio for this mission. [Figure 6-3](../a15mr027.jpg) shows the
propellant unbalance for the two major engine firings compared with the
predicted unbalance. The unbalance at the end of the transearth
injection firing was very small and shows that the modifications to the
engine were satisfactory.

![](media/image28.jpeg){width="6.493055555555555in"
height="4.6090277777777775in"}

## ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION

### Environmental Control System

Performance of the environmental control system was satisfactory,
although several discrepancies required corrective action or minor
changes to the planned operations.

Water leakage at the chlorine injection port was noted on two occasions
when the cap was removed for the daily chlorination. Retightening of the
port septum-retention insert by the crew successfully stopped the
leakage (see sec. 14.1.2). The crew also noted the presence of gas in
the water, especially after heavy usage such as at the end of an eating
period (see sec. 14.1.14). Another problem related to drinking water was
that, on two occasions, at 13 1/2 hours and 277 hours, the potable water
tank failed to refill after use while the waste water tank accepted the
normal fuel cell water production. Proper potable tank filling resumed
after a waste water dump at 28 1/2 hours, but the tank failed to refill
after meal preparation at 277 hours (see sec. 14.1-7).

Command module cabin pressure was increased prior to sleep periods again
on this flight to assist in measuring inflight cabin leakage. Estimates
of 0.03 lb/hr during translunar coast and 0.01 lb/hr during transearth
coast were determined from cabin pressure decay data.

Noises were heard from the cabin fans that were believed to have been
caused by an object striking the fan blades. Cycling of the fans allowed
the fans to run normally (see sec. 14.1.13).

Prior to crew transfer for lunar module housekeeping, difficulty was
experienced in obtaining proper lunar module/command module differential
pressure gage readings. The difficulty resulted in insufficient lunar
module pressure decay at cabin pressure equalization. Consequently,
extra lunar module venting was required to obtain additional oxygen
enrichment and assure minimum oxygen concentration for later suited
activities.

Radiator outlet temperatures while in translunar coast and lunar orbit.
were 10 to 150 F higher than preflight thermal studies indicated they
would be. During the flight, calculations using more accurate heat load
inputs resulted in considerably closer predictions, although some
degradation of radiator coating may have contributed to the
higher-than-predicted temperatures. The radiator outlet temperatures
were greater than on previous missions because of the vehicle attitude
and higher electrical loads required to support the scientific
instrument module experiments.

During preparations for lunar module jettison, after an apparently
successful hatch integrity check, the differential pressure decreased
between the command module cabin and tunnel, indicating the possibility
of a command module hatch leak. Although a subsequent 10-minute check
demonstrated satisfactory hatch integrity, an inspection of both the
lunar module and command module hatch seals was made. No evidence of
contamination or damage was found. The hatches were reinstalled and a
successful hatch integrity check was performed. The crew had also
experienced difficulty in obtaining an acceptable suit circuit integrity
check during the lunar module jettison preparations. After being unable
to pressurize the suit loop more than 1 psi above cabin pressure, the
crew doffed their helmets and gloves, and the Commander also unzipped
his pressure garment assembly, unlocked and removed the liquid cooling
garment connector, and installed a water connector plug. After rezipping
the suit and donning helmets and gloves, a successful integrity check
was completed. Subsequently, because of the hatch integrity problem
previously mentioned, the suit integrity was again broken, and the suit
check had to be repeated. This check was again unsatisfactory because
one suit glove was not properly connected. After making the correct
connection, a final suit circuit test was successfully completed. The
delay resulted in the lunar module being jettisoned one revolution later
than planned.

Droplets of water came from two of the three blue (supply) hoses when
they were relocated for the transearth injection firing. Since cabin
humidity continued to be normal and no recurrence of the problem was
observed, most likely the condensation was an effect of the large
primary coolant loop temperature transient on the suit circuit heat
exchanger during lunar orbit.

During the period of the entry propellant depletion firing, cabin
pressure continued to increase at a rate consistent with the ambient
atmospheric entry pressure. Manual closure of the cabin pressure relief
valves at that time should have prevented any additional inflow. Since
use of onboard gas supplies was not sufficient to account for the
change, apparently the manual valve was not completely closed or
abnormally high leakage occurred. Postflight examination of the cabin
pressure relief valves and the remote operating mechanism was conducted,
and no excess leakage was indicated.

While being used for postflight testing, the side-A shutoff valve on the
main oxygen regulator toggle arm pivot pin was found sheared. No problem
had been reported during the mission. This anomaly is discussed further
in section 14.1.18.

### Crew Station/Equipment

The performance of crew equipment was satisfactory. Three items of
equipment were reviewed as a result of problems experienced during the
mission.

The command module ultraviolet window filter was inspected to determine
what action may be required to prevent surface scratching and improve
the optical qualities of the filter. A change has been made to the
filter material to improve the abrasive resistance and optical
qualities.

Lengthening of the Command Module Pilot restraint tether was
investigated to provide additional reach for the crewman. The current
length is the maximum allowable to preclude loading of the oxygen
umbilicals.

The comma nd module crewman optical alignment sight which came loose
from its mount during landing has been inspected. This anomaly and the
corrective action being taken are discussed in section 14.1.19.

## CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS

The controls and displays performed normally with the following
exceptions.

Direct-current bus B and alternating-current bus 2 undervoltage alarms
occurred at approximately 33-3/4 hours; subsequently, an integral
lighting circuit breaker was found open. Since the circuits fed by this
breaker were not mission essential, the breaker was not reset. See
section 14.1.4 for further discussion of this anomaly.

At approximately 81-1/2 hours, the battery relay bus measurement read
13.66 volts instead of the nominal 32 volts, as evidenced by backup
measurement readings. Movement of the panel 101 systems test meter
switch caused the reading to return to normal. This anomaly is discussed
in section 14.1.5.

The mission timer on panel 2 stopped at about 125 hours. After several
attempts, the timer was restarted, and it operated properly for the
remainder of the mission. See section 14.1.8 for further discussion of
this anomaly.

During the crew debriefing, the Command Module Pilot stated that the
seconds digit of the digital event timer located on panel 1 became
obscured by a powder-like substance that formed on the inside of the
glass. For further discussion, see section 14.1.11.

Another problem noted during postflight testing of the vehicle was that
the battery charger main A circuit breaker on panel 5 could not be
manually opened. Corrosion was found around the indicator sleeve of the
breaker actuating knob. This anomaly is discussed in section 14.1-17.

## EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY EQUIPMENT

The environmental control system and crew equipment performed
successfully throughout the transearth extravehicular activity.
Operation of the new components, including the umbilical, suit control
unit, pressure control valve, oxygen control and communications panels,
and the extravehicular activity warning system was entirely nominal. All
checks and activities went smoothly, and the extravehicular portion
lasted less than 40 minutes. Cabin pressure was restored as planned,
using the three 1-pound oxygen bottles from the rapid repressurization
system and CMP-flow mode until 3.0 psia was reached, and then
discharging the unused oxygen purge system to bring the pressure above
5.0 psia. Subsequent depletion of the residual 2000 psi in the oxygen
purge system was accomplished by using it once to increase cabin
pressure prior to a sleep period and on the following day, when the
remainder was allowed to bleed into the cabin at a controlled rate.

## CONSUMABLES

The command and service module consumable usage during the Apollo 15
mission was well within the red line limits and, in all systems, was
close to the preflight predicted values.

### Service Propulsion Propellant

Service propulsion propellant and helium loadings and consumption values
are listed in the following [table](../a15mr028.jpg). The loadings were
calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to
lift-off.

![](media/image29.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="3.6875in"}

### Reaction Control System Propellant 

Service Module.- The propellant utilization and loading data for the
service module reaction control system were as shown in the following
[table](../a15mr029.jpg). Consumption was calculated from telemetered
helium tank pressure histories and was based on pressure, volume, and
temperature relationships.

![](media/image30.jpeg){width="6.499305555555556in"
height="5.179861111111111in"}

Command Module.- The loading and utilization of command module reaction
control system propellant were [as follows](../a15mr030.jpg).
Consumption was calculated from pressure, volume, and temperature
relationships.

![](media/image31.jpeg){width="6.16875in" height="4.185416666666667in"}

### Cryogenics

The total cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen quantities available at liftoff
and consumed were [as follows](../a15mr031.jpg). Consumption values were
based on quantity data transmitted by telemetry.

![](media/image32.jpeg){width="5.041666666666667in"
height="5.145833333333333in"}

### Water

The water quantities loaded, produced, and expelled during the mission
are shown in the following [table](../a15mr032.jpg).

![](media/image33.jpeg){width="6.063194444444444in"
height="6.154166666666667in"}

# LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE

## STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

The structural loads were within design values for all phases of the
mission based on guidance and control data, cabin pressure measurements,
command module acceleration data, photographs, and crew comments.

Translunar docking loads were higher than those of previous missions
because of a pitch misalignment angle of 11 degrees between the command
and service module and the lunar module/S-IVB prior to docking probe
retraction to the hard-docked configuration. The bending moment during
translunar docking was computed to be 425,000 inch-pounds which
approaches the design limit of 437,000 inch-pounds.

The sequence films from the onboard camera showed no evidence of large
structural oscillations during lunar touchdown, and crew comments agree
with this assessment. Landing on the lunar surface occurred with
estimated velocities of 6.8 ft/sec in the minus X direction, 1.2 ft/sec
in the plus Y direction, and 0.6 ft/sec in the plus Z direction. The
descent rate at probe contact was 0.5 ft/sec. Following probe contact,
the descent engine was shut down while the footpads were still about 1.6
feet above the surface, resulting in the 6.8 ft/sec velocity at footpad
contact. Computer simulations indicate 1.0 inch of stroke in each
primary strut except the forward strut, for which a 3.0-inch stroke is
estimated. The simulations also indicate that the forward footpad was
off the surface in the final rest position. The crew stated that the
forward footpad was loose and rotated easily, confirming the computer
results.

At touchdown, the lunar module was located partially inside a small
crater with the rim of the crater directly underneath the descent engine
skirt. The descent engine skirt buckled during landing. This is
accounted for in the touchdown dynamic analysis, and was expected as the
skirt length had been extended 10 inches over that of previous vehicles.
This buckling was noted by the crew and confirmed by photographs of the
damaged skirt ( [fig. 7-1](../a15mr033.jpg) ).

![](media/image34.jpeg){width="4.895833333333333in" height="3.9375in"}

The crew reported that there was a gap between the exit plane of the
skirt and the lunar surface, indicating that buckling was probably
caused by a buildup of pressure inside the nozzle due to proximity to
the lunar surface, and not due entirely to contact of the nozzle skirt
with the lunar surface. The crew also reported that the buckling seemed
to be uniform around the skirt periphery and that the exit plane height
above the surface was uniform.

The vehicle contact velocity and attitude data at touchdown show that
the landing was very stable in spite of the relatively high lunar
surface slope at the landing point. The plus-Z and plus-Y footpads
contacted the lunar surface nearly simultaneously, providing a nose-up
pitch rate of 17 deg/sec and a roll rate to the left of 15 deg/sec.
Final spacecraft settling occurred 1.8 seconds later. The vehicle
at-rest attitude, as determined from the gimbal angles, was 6.9 degrees
pitch up and 8.6 degrees roll to the left, resulting in a vehicle tilt
angle on the lunar surface of approximately 11 degrees from the
horizontal ( [fig. 7-2](../a15mr034.jpg)).

![](media/image35.jpeg){width="6.493055555555555in"
height="5.299305555555556in"}

The performance of the electrical power distribution system and
batteries was satisfactory. Descent battery management was performed as
planned, all power svitchovers were accomplished as required, and
parallel operation of the descent and ascent batteries was within
acceptable limits. The d-c bus voltage was maintained above 28.9 volts,
and the maximum observed current was 74 amperes, during powered descent.
Electrical power used during the mission is given in section 7.9.6.

## COMMUNICATIONS

The steerable antenna exhibited random oscillation characteristics
identical to those experienced on previous missions, and resulted in
three instances of temporary loss of voice and data. Also at random
times, small oscillations were noted and were damped out. The problems
with the antenna are discussed in section 14.2.4.

The lunar module did not receive VHF transmissions from the command
module during the descent phase of the mission. The checklist
erroneously configured the command module to transmit on 296.8 MHz and
the lunar module to receive on 259.7 MHz.

With the exceptions noted above, all functions including voice, data,
and ranging of both the S-band and the VHF equipment operated
satisfactorily during all phases of the mission.

## RADAR

The landing radar acquisition of slant range and velocity was normal.
The acquired slant range of 42,000 feet increased to about 50,000 feet
in approximately 10 seconds. The indication of range increase may have
been caused by blockage from a lunar mountain at initial acquisition.
Velocity was acquired at an altitude of approximately 39 000 feet above
the local terrain. Landing radar outputs were affected at an altitude of
about 30 feet by moving dust and debris.

Rendezvous radar tracking operation during the rendezvous sequence was
nominal. A lunar module guidance computer program was used after lunar
orbit insertion to point the rendezvous radar antenna at the command and
service module, thus enabling acquisition at approximately 109 miles.
Two problems were noted during the mission and are as follows:

During the VHF ranging system/rendezvous radar comparison test after
undocking and separation, a range difference of 2400 feet existed
between the rendezvous radar and VHF ranging systems. This difference
represents high-frequency ranging-tone cycle slippage in the rendezvous
radar, probably caused by excessive phase shift. Range errors associated
with cycle slippage, due to insufficient heater operation, have occurred
during system checkout and have produced phase shifts. Downlink data at
the time of the problem indicates that the rendezvous radar transponder
heater was not in operation when the rendezvous radar checkout was first
attempted; therefore, it is assumed that the phase shift was caused by
low temperatures.

b\. Acquisition with the rendezvous radar during ascent was
unsuccessful. The radar antenna was pre-positioned prior to lunar
lift-off to an approximate lunar-module guidance-computer designated
position for acquisition following insertion. In this position,
acquisition would have been accomplished when the command module came
into the rendezvous radar antenna field of view. A review of lift-off
television data revealed rendezvous radar antenna movement during the
first 2 seconds of flight. Analysis has also shown that expansion of the
ascent engine plume, after being deflected from the descent stage
structure, exerts sufficient pressure on the antenna to overcome gimbal
friction and move the antenna. Radar acquisition apparently was not
accomplished because the radar antenna moved. Rendezvous radar tracking
during ascent is not required.

## CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS

The controls and displays performed normally. The range/range-rate tape
meter glass was broken with about 20 percent of the glass missing;
however, the meter operated satisfactory during the flight. Section
14.2.8 contains a discussion of this anomaly.

## GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

Guidance, navigation, and control system performance was satisfactory
throughout the mission except for two anomalies. There was a
simultaneous indication of an abort guidance system warning light and
master alarm on two occasions (sec. 14.2.6), and no line-of-sight rate
information was displayed on the Commander\'s crosspointers during the
rendezvous braking phase (sec. 14.2-7). Neither anomaly affected overall
systems performance.

The primary guidance system was activated at 98 hours 26 minutes, the
computer timing was synchronized to the command module computer, and the
lunar module platform was aligned to the command module platform. The
crew had difficulty seeing stars in the alignment optical telescope
while performing the docked realignment of the lunar module platform,
but this is normal because of reflected light from the command- module
structure. [Table 7-1](../a15mr035.jpg) is a summary of all platform
realignments of the primary guidance system, both in orbit and on the
lunar surface. The calculated gyro drift rates compare well with the 1
sigma value of 2 meru and indicate good gyro performance. Accelerometer
performance was equally good although shifts in the X- and
Y-accelerometer bias of 0.39 and 0.46 cm/sec2, respectively, were
detected while on the lunar surface. The shift resulted from removing
and reapplying power to the inertial measurement unit and is not
unusual. [Table 7-II](../a15mr036.jpg) is a summary of preflight
inertial component calibration data.

![](media/image36.jpeg){width="6.495138888888889in" height="2.73125in"}

![](media/image37.jpeg){width="6.479166666666667in" height="4.25in"}

After a nominal separation from the command module, the abort guidance
system was activated, initialized, and aligned to the primary guidance
system. [Table 7-III](../a15mr037.jpg) is a summary of preflight and
inflight performance of the abort guidance system accelerometers and
gyros.

![](media/image38.jpeg){width="5.302083333333333in"
height="3.1013888888888888in"}

The powered descent to the lunar surface was initiated on time. [Table
7-IV](../a15mr038.jpg) is a sequence of significant events during
descent. A landing site update to move the targeted landing point 853
meters (2800 feet) downrange was made 95 seconds after ignition. The
computer began accepting landing radar updates and began adjusting its
estimate of altitude upward by 4800 feet. After enabling landing radar
updates, the primary guidance altitude flattened out for approximately
70 seconds ( [fig. 7-3](../a15mr039.jpg)). This resulted from the
initial estimate of the slope stored in the computer being 1 degree;
whereas, the true mare slope was zero. Convergence occurred rapidly once
the lunar module was over the Apennine foothills where the
computer-stored slope agreed more closely with the actual slope. Figure
7-3 is a time history of altitude from the primary and abort guidance
systems. Data indicate that 18 separate deflections of the hand
controller were made for landing point redesignations during the
approach phase program. The total effect of the redesignations moved the
landing site coordinates 338 meters (1110 feet) uprange and 409 meters
(1341 feet) to the north. Touchdown disturbances were nominal despite
the 11-degree slope upon which the landing occurred. [Figure
7-4](../a15mr040.jpg) is a time history of spacecraft rates and
attitudes at touchdown.

![](media/image39.jpeg){width="6.164583333333334in"
height="4.132638888888889in"}

![](media/image40.jpeg){width="5.020833333333333in"
height="6.645833333333333in"}

![](media/image41.jpeg){width="4.395833333333333in"
height="7.083333333333333in"}

Performance during ascent was nominal. For the first time, accelerometer
biases were updated while on the lunar surface to correct for the small
expected shifts experienced when the system was powered down. Since the
lunar surface bias determination technique had not been totally proven,
only half of the measured shift in the X accelerometer bias was
corrected. As a result, some bias error existed during ascent and
contributed about 2 ft/sec to the radial velocity error. Analysis is
continuing to determine the cause of the remainder of the radial
velocity error and possible causes will be discussed in a supplement to
this report.

Because the primary guidance system radial velocity was greater than
that from the powered flight processor and the abort guidance system,
the velocity residuals at engine shutdown were trimmed using the abort
guidance system solutions.

([Figure](../a15mr041.jpg))

![](media/image42.jpeg){width="6.298611111111111in"
height="1.667361111111111in"}

After trimming velocity residuals, an abort guidance system warning and
master alarm occurred. They were reset by the crew and a computer self-
test was performed successfully. System performance was nominal before,
during, and after the warnings. See section 14.2.6 for further
discussion of this anomaly. No vernier adjust maneuver was required, and
the direct rendezvous was accomplished without incident. [Table
7-V](../a15mr042.jpg) is a summary of rendezvous maneuver solutions.

![](media/image43.jpeg){width="5.678472222222222in" height="3.2125in"}

The Commander reported that there were no line-of-sight rate data
displayed on his crosspointers at a separation distance of 1500 feet.
However, line-of-sight rates existed at this time because thrusting
upward and to the left was required to null the -line-of-sight rates.
Also, the Command Module Pilot verified the presence of line-of-sight
rates. Section 14.2.7 contains a discussion of this anomaly.

After a successful docking, the lunar module was configured for the
deorbit maneuver and jettisoned. The velocity changes observed at
jettison in the X, Y, and Z axes were minus 1.24, minus 0.01, and minus
0.05 ft/sec, respectively. This is equivalent to a 206 lb-sec impulse.
For comparison, the separation velocities observed at undocking prior to
powered descent were minus 0.18, minus 0.02, and minus 0.04 ft/sec in
the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively, or an impulse of 205 lb-see. The
close agreement indicates the tunnel was completely vented and the
impulse was due entirely to the separation springs. After jettison, the
deorbit maneuver was accomplished and performance was nominal.

## PROPULSION

### Reaction Control System

The reaction control system performed satisfactorily throughout the
mission with no anomalies. Skillful use of the system by the crew
accounted for the propellant consumption being well below predicted
levels. Section 7.9.3 contains a summary of the consumables usage during
the mission.

### Descent Propulsion System

Data analysis indicates that the descent propulsion system performed
nominally during powered descent. The total firing time was 739.2
seconds . The propellant quantity gaging system indicated about 1055
Pounds of usable propellant remained at engine shutdown or about 103
seconds of hover time. The supercritical. helium system operated
nominally. The skirt of the engine was buckled during landing (sec.
7.1). Section 7.9.1 contains a summary of the descent propulsion system
consumables usage during the mission.

### Ascent Propulsion System

The ascent propulsion system performance during the lunar ascent
maneuver and the terminal phase initiation maneuver was satisfactory.
The total engine firing time for the two maneuvers was 433.6 seconds.
The ascent propulsion system consumables usage is summarized in section
7.9.2.

## ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

The performance of the environmental control system was satisfactory
throughout the mission. The waste management system functioned as
expected; however, the urine receptacle valve was inadvertently left
open for about 6 hours during the first lunar sleep period. This
resulted in the loss of about 8 pounds of descent stage oxygen before
the crew was awakened to close the valve.

The overspeed of the water separator which occurred on Apollo 14 during
cabin-mode operation was not evident during this mission because of a
decrease in flow with the helmet and gloves off that resulted from a
reconfiguration of valves and hose connections. The only off-nominal
performance of the water separator occurred following the cabin
depressurization for the standup extravehicular activity when the speed
decreased, causing a master alarm (see sec. 14.2.2).

After the first extravehicular activity, a broken quick disconnect
between the water bacteria filter and the water drink gun resulted in
spillage of about 26 pounds of water into the cabin (see sec. 14.2.3).
The water was cleaned up by the crew before the second extravehicular
activity.

Fluctuations in water/glycol pump differential pressure were noted
following the cabin depressurizations for the standup extravehicular
activity and the second extravehicular activity (see sec. 14.2.1).
Otherwise, the heat transport system functioned normally.

On Apollo 15, the suits were removed and dried for more than 1 hour by
connecting the oxygen umbilicals to the suits and allowing gas to flow
through them. This was accomplished at the beginning of each rest period
following the first two extravehicular activities.

## CONSUMABLES

All lunar module consumables remained well within red-line limits.

### Descent Propulsion System Propellant.

The descent propulsion system propellant load quantities shown in the
following table were calculated from known volumes and weights of
offloaded propellants, temperatures, and densities prior to lift-off.
([Figure](../a15mr043.jpg))

![](media/image44.jpeg){width="5.086805555555555in"
height="2.0527777777777776in"}

Supercritical helium.- The quantities of supercritical helium were
determined by computations using pressure measurements and the known
volume of the tank. ([Figure](../a15mr044.jpg))

![](media/image45.jpeg){width="5.225694444444445in"
height="2.1909722222222223in"}

### Ascent Propulsion System Propellant

The ascent propulsion system total propellant usage was approximately as
predicted. The loadings shown in the following table were determined
from measured densities prior to launch and from weights of off-loaded
propellants. ([Figure](../a15mr045.jpg))

![](media/image46.jpeg){width="5.8381944444444445in"
height="2.3069444444444445in"}

Helium. The quantities of ascent propulsion system helium were
determined by pressure measurements and the known volume of the tank.
([Figure](../a15mr046.jpg))

![](media/image47.jpeg){width="3.4493055555555556in" height="2.075in"}

### Reaction Control System Propellant

The reaction control system propellant consumption was calculated from
telemetered helium tank pressure histories using the relationships
between pressure, volume, and temperature. ([Figure](../a15mr047.jpg))

![](media/image48.jpeg){width="5.616666666666666in"
height="3.173611111111111in"}

### Oxygen

The actual quantities of oxygen loaded and consumed are shown in the
following [table](../a15mr048.jpg):

![](media/image49.jpeg){width="6.047916666666667in"
height="6.472916666666666in"}

### Water 

The actual water quantities loaded and consumed, shown in the following
[table](../a15mr049.jpg) , are based on telemetered data.

![](media/image50.jpeg){width="4.645833333333333in"
height="5.770833333333333in"}

### Electrical Power 

The total battery energy usage is given in the following
[table.](../a15mr050.jpg)

![](media/image51.jpeg){width="6.497916666666667in" height="2.2in"}

# LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

## EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

Throughout the extravehicular activity, the new configuration of the
pressure garment assembly provided good mobility and visibility,
allowing the crew to perform their functions in an effective manner.

Checkout of the Commander\'s portable life support system prior to the
first extravehicular activity was normal. Portable life support system
startup for the Lunar Module Pilot was normal until the feedwater was
turned on. The feedwater pressure increased faster and higher than
expected. A warning tone and, a short time later, a vent flow flag was
activated. The trouble was traced to a gas bubble trapped in the
feedwater bladder during charging by the flight crew ( [fig.
8-1](../a15mr051.jpg) [fig. 8-1, Con\'t.).](../a15mr053.jpg) The gas
bubble caused high feedwater pressure. Until the feedwater pressure had
decayed to the suit pressure level, the condensate stowage volume was
blocked by the feedwater bladder. This resulted in the water separator
becoming saturated and allowing droplets of water to be carried over to
the fan. This can reduce the fan speed, thereby activating the vent flow
flag. Data confirmed the presence of current spikes which are a
characteristic of water droplets hitting the fan.

![](media/image52.jpeg){width="5.645833333333333in"
height="6.770833333333333in"}

Subsequent to recharging the portable life support systems after the
first extravehicular activity, the problem associated with the Lunar
Module Pilot\'s water separator was found to have resulted from filling
the portable life support system at a 30-degree tilt, and the unit was
recharged thereafter while in the proper upright position.

Throughout the first extravehicular activity, the extravehicular
mobility units maintained crew comfort as required. The feedwater was
depleted in the primary tank of both the Commander and Lunar Module
Pilot, and the auxiliary tank activation and sublimator repressurization
were normal. During this period, the sublimator gas-outlet temperature
on the Commander\'s extravehicular mobility unit ran slightly higher
than expected. A comparative analysis of the extravehicular mobility
unit parameters indicates that the condition was most likely caused by
the cooling water flow running at a low-normal rate.

The first extravehicular activity was terminated about one-half hour
earlier than planned because of a higher-than-expected oxygen usage by
the Commander.

The communications check at the beginning of the second extravehicular
activity was initially unsuccessful for the Lunar Module Pilot because
his antenna was broken (sec. 14.5.6). The crewmen taped the antenna to
the oxygen purge system in the stowed configuration and the
communications check was successfully completed. In this configuration
the limiting range is about 305 meters (1000 feet) between crewmen. The
feedwater was depleted in the primary tank of both the Commander and the
Lunar Module Pilot during the second extravehicular activity, and the
auxiliary tank activation, the sublimator repressurization, and the
sublimator gas-outlet temperature were normal.

During portable life support system activation for the third
extravehicular period, the sublimator gas-outlet temperature and
feedwater pressure of the Lunar Module Pilot\'s extravehicular mobility
unit were both reading lower than expected. At lunar module
depressurization, these parameters began an upward trend which led to
normal readings by the time the Lunar Module Pilot reached the lunar
surface.

Oxygen, feedwater, and power consumption of the extravehicular mobility
units during the three extravehicular periods are shown in [table
8-1](../a15mr052.jpg). For the Commander\'s first and second
extravehicular activities, and the Lunar Module Pilot\'s first
extravehicular activity, the oxygen redline limits were approached,
indicating that the crew workload was approaching the portable life
support system capability.

The only problems associated with the lunar module crew station
equipment during the mission was that the Lunar Module Pilot could not
get water from the insuit drinking device during the first and second
extravehicular activities (see sec. 14.5-5), and the Commander\'s insuit
drinking device mouthpiece became displaced during the second
extravehicular activity. However, neither insuit drinking device problem
constrained the extravehicular activities. The insuit drinking device
was not used for the third extravehicular activity because of the short
extravehicular activity time.

![](media/image53.jpeg){width="5.983333333333333in" height="6.8in"}

![](media/image54.jpeg){width="6.347916666666666in"
height="5.434027777777778in"}

## LUNAR ROVING VEHICLE

The lunar roving vehicle ( [fig. 8-2](../a15mr054.jpg)) performed well
during the mission. During the three lunar surface extravehicular
activities, the vehicle traveled 27.9 kilometers (15.1 miles) during 3
hours and 8 minutes of driving at an average speed of 9.2 kilometers
(4.97 miles) per hour. A total of approximately 52 ampere-hours was
consumed. Navigation errors were within expected tolerances with small
distance errors and no apparent gyro drift. The combined wander and
wheel slip factor was within predicted limits.

The front-wheel steering was inoperative during the first extravehicular
activity, but operated normally for the second and third extravehicular
activities. Simultaneous front- and rear-wheel steering was found to be
more sensitive than desired, and difficulties were experienced with the
seat belts; but overall, the crew was very pleased with the vehicle\'s
performance, particularly, the speed and hill- climbing capability.

![](media/image55.jpeg){width="5.125in" height="4.802083333333333in"}

### Deployment 

Both walking hinge latches were found unlatched during the predeployment
inspection and were easily reset. Televised deployment operations showed
that, when the deployment tapes were pulled, the vehicle bounced on the
lunar surface in a manner similar to that seen during preflight
1/6-weight vehicle deployment tests. The orientation of the lunar module
(6.9 degrees pitch up and 8.6 degrees roll to the left, resulting in a
tilt of 11 degrees) required an additional hard pull on the deployment
cable by the Lunar Module Pilot after all four wheels had contacted the
surface. Two of the chassis hinge lock pins required additional pressure
to seat them properly. (This possibility had been anticipated and
corrective action was incorporated in the checklist.) The deployment
saddle and the Velcro seat tie-down were difficult to release. The
initial failure of the saddle to release was partially attributed to the
vehicle\'s having been moved sideways on the surface before saddle
release was attempted.

Section 14.6.1 discusses this problem further.

### Steering

During preparations for the first traverse, the front wheels did not
respond to steering commands. The Commander changed busses and observed
the ammeter closely to find out if power was being applied to the front
wheels in response to steering commands. No response was seen. He then
tried, without success, to manually force the front wheels to turn. The
front wheel steering remained inoperative, thus the rear wheels were
used for steering during the first traverse (see sec. 14.6-3). Little
difficulty was experienced in driving, except that attempts to avoid
nearby objects resulted in the rear wheels sliding into small craters
and objects that the driver was trying to avoid. In at least one slide,
the vehicle rotated through 180 degrees.

During checkout of the vehicle for the second traverse, the crew cycled
the forward steering power switch and circuit breaker, and found that
the front wheel steering operated normally. In starting the second
traverse, the Commander first tried dual steering. Then, after the dual
steering was found to be very sensitive, he tried front-wheel-only
steering. However, this mode was discontinued because the rear wheels
tended to wander. (It had been decided not to lock the rear wheels
mechanically because of the prior problem with the front wheels.)
Therefore, the dual steering mode was used for the remainder of the
second traverse and the entire third traverse.

### Electrical Power

The lunar roving vehicle used less power than predicted. The predicted
power consumption was based on worst-case surface roughness and soil
composition, but the actual surface conditions were less severe. The
cause of an initial ampere-hour reading of 105 ampere-hours instead of
121 amperehours is not known. Subsequent readings, correlated with
ammeter readings, produce an estimated total power consumption of 52
ampere-hours of the 242 ampere- hours available. The consumed electrical
power corresponds to a rate of 1.87 ampere-hours per kilometer. The
preflight prediction of the usage rate was 3.67 ampere-hours per
kilometer. Except for the ampere-hour indicator readings and the
inoperative battery 2 volt/ammeter (sec. 14.6.2), the electrical power
system operation was normal during the traverses.

After ascent, the video signal was lost from the lunar surface
television camera. Postflight analysis and tests show that this loss
(section 8-3) was probably caused by opening of the auxiliary power
circuit breaker under combined electrical and thermal loads. This
anomaly is discussed further in section 14-5.2.

### Navigation

The vehicle navigation system operation was normal. The odometer showed
a total distance traveled of 27.9 kilometers (15.1 miles). The
navigation system provided sufficient information to locate the lunar
module at any time during all traverses. Evaluation indicates that the
gyro drift rate was essentially zero and the distance error at the
maximum range of 5.0 kilometers (2-7 miles) was approximately 0.3
kilometer (0.16 mile). No traverse realignments were required. Closure
errors for the three traverses were 0, 100, and 200 meters, well within
predictions.

### Thermal

The thermal control system, in general, performed satisfactorily. drive
motors remained cool and battery temperatures were maintained within
established limits.

At the beginning of the second extravehicular activity, the battery 1
cover had closed automatically, as expected. Battery 2 apparently had
not cooled down enough and the cover was still open. It was closed
manually powering up the vehicle. When the vehicle was activated,
battery-1 temperature was 68 degrees F and battery-2 temperature was 78
degrees F. The difference was probably caused by the difference in dust
accumulation on the thermal mirrors. These temperatures are consistent
with predicted cool-down rates with the covers open and warm-up rates
with the covers closed. During the second traverse, the battery-1 and
battery-2 temperatures increased to 92 F and 98 F, respectively. The
battery covers were opened at the conclusion of the second
extravehicular activity period.

At the beginning of the third extravehicular activity, both covers were
open. Little battery cool-down had occurred, probably because of further
dust accumulation on both battery mirrors, although the battery covers
had been closed for the traverses. The covers must not have been closed
tight enough against the Velcro edges to keep dust off the mirror
surfaces. Only a small amount of dust on the surface will preclude the
desired cool-down. At the conclusion of the traverse, battery-1 and
battery- 2 temperatures had increased to 108 F and 113 F, respectively,
which is an acceptable level.

### Crew Station

The crew station was satisfactory except that the seat belts were
difficult to fasten (sec. 14.6.4). Prelaunch belt adjustment did not
properly account for the reduced gravity in combination with the
pressurized suits, and the belts were too short for lunar surface
operations. Additionally, the Commander\'s seat belt hook caught
repeatedly on the ground support equipment electrical connector on the
console post.

### EXTRAVEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

The lunar communications relay unit operated normally during all lunar
surface extravehicular activities. The voice and data quality were good.

Communications from the lunar roving vehicle while it was in motion or
temporarily stopped were satisfactory except that the lack of manual
realignment of the low-gain antenna to earth resulted in noisy down-link
voice at one time when the lunar roving vehicle was parked on a steep
slope during the second extravehicular activity.

Fixed-site television operation on the lunar roving vehicle was
satisfactory except for difficulty in using the antenna optical sight.
With the lunar roving vehicle pointed in the down-sun direction, the sun
was directly in the crewmen\'s eyes when using the optical sight. The
design concept was to orient the rotatable sight to a position where sun
glare would be avoided. When the lunar roving vehicle was parked north
or south, the sun was 90 degrees to the side and no glare resulted. In
those instances when glare prevented the use of the optical sight, the
lunar communication relay unit automatic gain control meter was used.

Lunar dust on the television camera lens caused a halo effect and sun
reflected glints. Improvement in picture quality was restored
periodically after the crew brushed the lens.

The ground-commanded television assembly operated successfully during
the three extravehicular activity periods and provided coverage of the
lunar lift- off. Good quality video signals were received while the
camera was operating with the lunar module and the lunar communications
relay unit. The elevation clutch began to slip during the second
extravehicular period and the condition became worse during the third
extravehicular period (section 14.5-1). The crew, on several occasions,
manually assisted the elevation mechanism to regain an operative camera
pitch angle.

The television camera was activated about 40 hours after the ascent from
the lunar surface. After about 13 minutes of satisfactory operation,
signals from the lunar communications relay unit were lost and all
attempts to reactivate this system have failed. Refer to section 14.5.2
for a discussion of this anomaly.

# PILOT\'S REPORT

This section contains a description of the Apollo 15 mission from the
standpoint of the pilots ( [Photo](../a15mr055.jpg). The actual sequence
of activities was very similar to the preflight plan. The flight plan,
as executed, is summarized in figure 9-1, located at the end of this
section.

![](media/image56.jpeg){width="6.458333333333333in"
height="5.270833333333333in"}

## TRAINING

The crew of Apollo 15 was able to concentrate their training time
primarily on learning new operational techniques and becoming qualified
in scientific aspects of the mission because of the demonstrated
reliability and performance of Apollo hardware and because they had the
experience of one complete training cycle as backup crew for Apollo 12.

Approximately one-third of the crew\'s training time was applied to
science. In addition, the crew participated in many phases of
development and planning of the new operational and scientific
techniques to be utilized in the accomplishment of the objectives of the
Apollo 15 mission.

Standard training for Apollo 15 included emphasis on the following new
items developed for this mission: Scientific instrument module and
associated extravehicular activity; lunar roving vehicle and associated
equipment; A7L-B pressure garment assembly; concepts and equipment for
expanded lunar geology investigation; and major modifications to the
computer program for the command module, lunar module, and abort
guidance system. Because of the vast amount of new equipment programmed
for lunar surface activity, considerable crew time and effort were
devoted to development of procedures in order to optimize the time
devoted to lunar surface exploration. Excellent support was received,
both in training and procedures development, throughout the 20 months of
preparation for the flight.

## LAUNCH

Countdown and launch preparations were well coordinated and timely.
Significant events were generally completed approximately 20 minutes
ahead of schedule. The crew was comfortable and the crew station was in
excellent condition.

Ignition and lift-off were positive with the same overall vehicle
vibration frequency throughout S-IC flight that has been noted on
previous flights. Noise levels were lower than those the Commander had
experienced on Apollo 9, and communications were excellent throughout
powered flight. S-IC staging was abrupt and was accompanied by a 3- to
4-degree vehicle yaw, which was corrected soon after S-II ignition. All
other displayed and physiological cues were as reported on previous
flights with the exception of a very low-amplitude 10- to 12-hertz
vehicle vibration during both S-II and S-IVB powered flight, and the
lack of a perceptible cue to the programmed shift in propellant
utilization during S-II operation.

## EARTH ORBITAL OPERATIONS

All systems checks during earth orbit were completed ahead of schedule
and in a satisfactory manner. Those checks included an alignment of the
inertial measurement unit, an entry monitor system test, and basic
checks of the environmental control and reaction control systems. The
alignment was within the drift tolerance voiced up from the ground, and
the entry monitor system test indicated an accelerometer bias of 0.01
ft/ sec. The reaction control system was tested using minimum impulse to
insure proper operation. During postinsertion checks, the secondary
isolation valve for quad B was found closed, but the valve was reset
satisfactorily. At about 1 hour, the quad D primary and secondary
isolation valves were also found closed and these were also reset.

The systems preparations for translunar injection were completed
approximately 20 minutes ahead of schedule, and updates were received in
a timely manner. A new procedure was employed to align the flight
director attitude indicator for translunar injection which would allow
smooth manual takeover at any time. Also, a new computer program was
utilized which allowed computer monitoring and shutdown of the
translunar injection burn if takeover had been required.

## TRANSLUNAR INJECTION

All events in the translunar injection sequence were as expected with
two exceptions. First, in repressurization of the S-IVB hydrogen tank,
the increase in pressure was much slower than that experienced in
preflight training; however, the ground confirmed that the
repressurization cycle was nominal and final pressure values were within
the expected range. Second, an S-IVB propellant utilization shift was
manifested as a marked surge in thrust 1 minute after ignition. A
low-amplitude vibration of about 10 to 12 hertz was felt throughout the
translunar injection maneuver. The S-IVB cutoff was 3 seconds early;
however, the crew had been informed by Mission Control to expect this.

## TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT OPERATIONS

### Transposition, Docking, and Extraction

The transposition and docking were accomplished in a fashion that was
slightly different from the checklist procedure. All of the procedures
up to the point of separation were accomplished as prescribed. The
separation was completed with the guidance and navigation system
autopilot in control of the spacecraft attitude. After separation,
however, attitude control was switched to the stabilization and control
system. The manual attitude pitch switch was placed in ACCEL CMD and the
spacecraft was pitched 180 degrees at a rate of 2 deg/sec. After
completion of the 180-degree pitch maneuver, control of spacecraft
attitude was returned to the guidance and navigation autopilot and an
automatic maneuver was made to the docking attitude. While the automatic
maneuver was being performed, forward thrusting was accomplished for
approximately 4 seconds to insure positive closing of the command and
service module and the S-IVB. The closing rate was approximately 0.1
ft/sec. On contact, there was no indication of probe capture latch
engagement. Forward thrusting was applied for approximately 1 to 2
seconds and the capture latch indication was then received. The probe
was activated to the retract position and the two spacecraft were
hard-docked. At the completion of the docking maneuver, the forward
hatch was removed and the latches were checked. One latch was not locked
onto the docking ring. That latch was recocked and latched manually. The
lunar module umbilicals were then attached, and the hatch was replaced.
Extraction of the lunar module from the S-IVB was nominal and, at its
completion, an automatic maneuver was made to an attitude which allowed
a view of subsequent S-IVB maneuvers.

### Translunar Coast

Spacecraft systems.- Shortly after the transposition and docking
maneuver, the service propulsion system thrust light on the entry
monitor system panel was illuminated, indicating a possible electrical
short in the service propulsion ignition system. A fault isolation
procedure was transmitted to the crew and the short was isolated to bank
A of the service propulsion system electrical circuitry. The first
midcourse correction was utilized for further troubleshooting. Ignition
was initiated by closing the pilot valve main A circuit breaker. Since
this started the engine, the nature and location of the short allowed
bank A to be manually controlled for subsequent maneuvers. A special
procedure was then developed for lunar orbit insertion and transearth
injection whereby the service propulsion system maneuvers would be
initiated normally with bank B after which the pilot valve main A
circuit breaker would be closed manually, turning on bank A. Prior to
the termination of the firing, the pilot valve main A circuit breaker
would be opened and the firing would be terminated automatically on bank
B. All other service propulsion system maneuvers were to be accomplished
using bank B only.

Passive thermal control was employed to insure uniform surface heating
as on previous flights. Because a new computer program was used to
establish the spin rate, new procedures were developed for the
initiation of passive thermal control. On the first two attempts, the
pitch and yaw rates were not satisfactorily damped before starting the
spin-up. However, passive thermal control was satisfactorily established
on the third and all subsequent attempts.

An electrical short occurred in the a-c power system somewhere in the
lower equipment bay -lighting circuitry, resulting in an opened circuit
breaker on the electrical systems panel. No troubleshooting was
performed to locate the short and the circuit breaker was left open. The
affected lights in the lower equipment bay and on the entry monitor
system scroll were out for the remainder of the mission. Rheostats for
the operable lights in the lower equipment bay were taped in the
positions in which they were found and they remained that way for the
remainder of the flight.

During a chlorination cycle, a water leak was discovered on the water
panel around the chlorine injector port. The leak appeared as a ball of
water around the port. The water was absorbed by towels until
information was received from Mission Control indicating that the insert
in the open end of the chlorine injector port was possibly loose. Tools
were obtained from the tool kit, the port was tightened, and the leak
subsided.

The first entry into the lunar module was made on schedule and all
planned equipment was transferred. The command and service module oxygen
hose was not used. During the inspection, the tunnel misalignment was
found to be less than 1 degree (plus or minus 10 degrees is allowed).
Also, the range/range-rate tapemeter glass was found broken. The command
module vacuum cleaner was used to clean up most of the glass fragments.
An additional entry into the lunar module was made at about 57 hours at
the request of Mission Control so that additional data on the batteries
could be obtained. The vacuum cleaner and lunar module cabin fans were
used to gather additional glass. No loose object was found that could
account for glass breakage.

Simulated cislunar midcourse navigation sightings were accomplished
during translunar coast for horizon calibration and on-the-job training.
The midcourse navigation exercises were valuable from the standpoint
that they allowed the Command Module Pilot to calibrate his eye to a
horizon for subsequent use in all transearth coast sightings.

Science and photography.- All science operations during translunar coast
were completed as scheduled. These operations included such things as
sextant photography of star patterns and ultraviolet photography of the
earth and moon. The ultraviolet photography was completed as prescribed,
requiring specific spacecraft attitudes and special operations
associated with command module window 5. A removable filter had been
installed to protect the crew from ultraviolet radiation. This filter
required removal to allow the ultraviolet photography. Because of the
handling, the filter became increasingly scratched during the flight.

### Scientific Instrument Module Door Jettisoning

The scientific instrument module door was jettisoned after the second
midcourse correction and prior to lunar orbit insertion. To prepare for
this, the crew donned their pressure garments, performed a pressure
integrity check, and maneuvered the spacecraft to the proper attitude.
Jettisoning of the door was felt as a very light \"thud\" in the command
module. The only abnormal indication was the closing of the service
module reaction control system B secondary propellant isolation valve,
which was reset with no difficulty. The door was first observed from
command module window 5 at a distance of about 50 feet and on a
trajectory 90 degrees from the longitudinal axis of the spacecraft. Door
jettison was accomplished without difficulty and with much less reaction
than had been anticipated.

## LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS PRIOR TO DESCENT

### Lunar Orbit Insertion

All checks for lunar orbit insertion were completed as scheduled in the
flight plan, and all systems were verified as acceptable for lunar orbit
operations. The maneuver to the lunar orbit insertion attitude was
verified by a sextant star check. Subsequently, the service propulsion
system thrusting program was activated and the velocities and angles
were verified by the ground. All commands from the ground were received
in a timely manner. The firing was accomplished as described in section
9.5.2. The maneuver was initiated with very small transients, the
attitude excursions were never greater than approximately 1 degree, and
the gimbal position indications showed a very smooth and positive
response to the shift in the center of gravity. The maneuver was
terminated by the guidance and navigation system with zero residuals.
The descent orbit initiation maneuver was accomplished using service
propulsion system bank B alone. This maneuver, as in the lunar orbit
insertion maneuver, was preceded by systems checks which were all
nominal, and the maneuver was nominal. A subsequent descent orbit
insertion trim maneuver that had been anticipated and scheduled prior to
flight was, in fact, required before undocking because of perturbations
in the orbit up to that point. It was a very small maneuver of
approximately 3 ft/sec and was accomplished using the reaction control
system maneuver program. All pre-maneuver checks were completed
nominally and the maneuver was performed satisfactorily.

### Lunar Module Activation, Undocking and Separation

On the day scheduled for landing, entry into the lunar module was about
40 minutes early. Final closure of the suit zippers was accomplished in
the lunar module. One procedural change was made in order to purge the
suit umbilical hoses: Both suit isolation valves were placed in the FLOW
position for 15 seconds, then in the DISCONNECT position, after which
the suit gas diverter valve was placed in the CABIN position. Checklist
functions were generally performed 10 minutes ahead of schedule.

As noted in earlier flights, stars were difficult to see through the
alignment optical telescope while docked with the command module.
However, the results of a two-star sighting using the cursor-spiral
technique indicated platform realignment could be achieved with the
optics.

The suit loop integrity check was unsuccessful on the first attempt. The
checklist procedure was followed, but there was obviously a leak because
the pressure drop was approximately 1 psi in 30 seconds. The valve
detents were checked, the regulator was rechecked, and then another
integrity check was made. This time, the pressure drop was acceptable at
0.1 psi in 1 minute. The time a1lowed to accomplish the required
functions for powered descent is more than sufficient. This became
apparent when a number of unanticipated events occurred. Condensate had
formed on the lunar module windows and the heaters had to be activated
in order to clear them. Undocking was delayed for approximately 40
minutes because the command module/lunar module power transfer umbilical
connections were not electrically engaged. A descent engine throttle
check had to be redone because the descent engine control assembly
circuit breaker was in the open position during the first check. The
timeline was regained by the time of the scheduled guidance and
navigation system platform realignment and the pace was very leisurely
as the time for powered descent initiation approached; the crew even had
time to eat lunch. The rendezvous radar self-test was normal but, after
separation, the range indicated by the rendezvous radar was
approximately twice that indicated by VHF ranging (see sec. 7.4).

## POWERED DESCENT AND LANDING

The angle of the final descent trajectory after high gate was increased
from 14 degrees to 25 degrees for Apollo 15. This afforded improved
dispersion conditions during the braking phase over the Apennine
Mountains, better visibility after pitchover, and more precise control
of manual landing site redesignations.

After receiving final uplinks from the Manned Space Flight Network, the
powered descent program was called up in the lunar module guidance
computer 10 minutes prior to ignition. The landing radar circuit breaker
was closed 5 minutes prior to ignition, as planned, and all events were
nominal through the first minute of powered flight. Automatic ullage and
ignition were clearly evident by physiological cues. A correction was
manually entered into the computer to move the targeted landing site
about 853 meters (2800 feet) west (downrange) just prior to ignition
plus 2 minutes. The indicated quantity of onboard fuel was 2 percent low
at this time, but this was considered acceptable by ground control.
Three minutes after ignition, the spacecraft was yawed to the planned
inplane face-up attitude. Immediately thereafter, at approximately 43
000 feet altitude, landing radar data became acceptable and computer
updates were initiated. Landing radar data were solid throughout the
remainder of powered flight.

Throttle recovery occurred on time, and manual attitude hold was
evaluated with the following expected results: positive response,
considerable reaction control system activity, and rapid return to
smooth automatic guidance at the Completion of the check. Predicted
pitchover time (high gate) was checked in the computer, and conformed to
the preflight nominal time of 9 minutes 22 seconds.

At an altitude of approximately 9000 feet, the upper fourth of Hadley
Delta Mountain (1-1 000 feet high) was visible out of the left window.
The feeling of slow, forward, floating motion was experienced and,
because of the relative position and motion with respect to the
mountain, an impression of a downrange overshoot was experienced. At
about 8000 feet altitude, ground control informed the crew that the
expected landing site was to be approximately 915 meters (3000 feet)
south of the targeted site.

Pitchover occurred on time and the only positive recognizable lunar
surface feature was Hadley Rille. Topographic relief was much less than
had been anticipated from the enhanced 20-meter (65-foot) resolution
photography and the associated preflight lunar terrain models. Sharp
landmark recognition features within the Plain of Hadley were almost
nonexistent; however the South Cluster was soon identified. Based upon
the apparent position relative to this feature, plus the 915-meter miss
distance to the south given by ground control, several landing point
redesignations were made to the right (north).

At an altitude of approximately 5000 feet, a pair of subdued craters,
which appeared to be Salyut and its northerly adjacent neighbor, were
identified. Uprange landing point redesignations were made so that the
landing could be made in the correct area northwest of Salyut Crater.
The touchdown point was selected from an altitude of 2000 feet and the
lunar module was maneuvered to land on what appeared to be a smooth
level surface. The low-gate phase (manual control) of the trajectory was
manually selected and confirmed at an altitude of 400 feet. Descent rate
reduction was initiated at a height of about 200 feet, and visual
reference was maintained by watching several fragments on the lunar
surface which were located 30 to 40 meters (100 to 130 feet) west of the
selected site. A trace of blowing surface dust was observed at a height
of 130 feet with only a slight increase down to 60 feet. Beginning at
this altitude, out-of-the window visibility was completely obscured by
dust until after touchdown.

Tapemeter altitude and altitude rate data readings, provided orally by
the Lunar Module Pilot, appeared to be consistent with the visual
observations throughout the terminal phase of the landing. Surface
features and texture became well defined at an altitude of approximately
1000 feet and, based on preflight experience with visual simulator
displays, descent rates appeared completely nominal and comfortable.
Sensations after manual takeover at 400 feet were almost identical with
those experienced in lunar landing training vehicle operations. The
combination of visual simulations and lunar landing training vehicle
flying provided excellent training for the manual portion of the lunar
landing. Comfort and confidence existed throughout this phase.

Additional manual maneuvering south and west could easily have been made
below 400 feet; however, because of increased surface mobility afforded
by the lunar roving vehicle, a landing anywhere within the 3-sigma
dispersion ellipse was considered a precise landing, and additional
maneuvering within this ellipse, other than for terrain obstacle
avoidance, was considered unnecessary.

The engine stop button was activated shortly after the contact lights
were illuminated to preclude excessive pressure buildup within the
nozzle of the descent engine (which had been extended 10 inches since
Apollo 14). Touchdown was firm but only slightly more so than nominal
lunar landing training vehicle landings. Roll and pitch rates were
evident at touchdown as the rear and left foot pads came to rest in a
shallow subdued crater which was not visible during the final phase of
the landing. The posttouchdown events were nominal; no spurious reaction
control system firings occurred, and permission for the lunar stay was
voiced by Houston in a timely manner.

## LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS

### Lunar Module Cabin Activity

Standup extravehicular activity This operation went very smoothly. No
problem was encountered in removing and stowing the drogue. There was no
direct sunlight on the lunar module panels as observations were made and
pictures taken from the high vantage point. The base of the Apennine
Front at Hadley Delta, as well as the North Complex, was visible from
this point, and because of the lack of obstacles, acceptable lunar
roving vehicle trafficability over all traverse routes was verified.

The secondary water separator was selected during this period because of
a caution light during primary separator operation. After the standup
extravehicular activity, the primary separator was reselected.

A picture taken during the standup extravehicular activity which reveals
the stratigraphy of Silver Spur is shown in [figure
9-2](../a15mr056.jpg). The sun angle during subsequent extravehicular
activities did not allow this observation.

![](media/image57.jpeg){width="4.8125in" height="4.78125in"}

Sleep.- The crew was able to sleep fairly well. Noise was minimized by
configuring the environmental control system in accordance with the
checklist and by using earplugs. The temperature was ideal for sleeping
in the constant-wear garment and sleeping bag, or in the constant-wear
garment and coveralls. A wider hammock would improve the conditions for
sleeping. Aslight light leak through the stitching on the window shades
interfered with getting to sleep.

Extravehicular activity preparation and post -extravehicular activity.
The times for preparation were consistently shorter than the times
allowed on the checklist. The only difficulty encountered was movement
in the cabin when in the pressurized suits. Several areas presented
obstacles: the forward corner on the data file, the portable life
support system stowage handle, and the stowed water hose. The portable
life support system recharge was accomplished during the eat period in
order to save time and the Lunar Module Pilot had difficulty in turning
the portable life support system water valve off. The suit was easy to
don and doff in 1/6 earth gravity. The crew found that it was possible
to lift themselves up, using the overhead bar, and place both feet in
the suit simultaneously.

Housekeeping.- When doffing the pressure garment assembly after lunar
surface extravehicular operations, the Commander stood on the midsection
step and the Lunar Module Pilot stood on his oxygen purge system to
avoid the dirty floor. A jettison bag was placed over the legs of the
suit to contain the dirt.

### Lunar Geology

The geological setting of the Hadley-Apennine landing site is such that
a great variety of features and samples were expected. Lack of high
resolution Photography of the site insured that variations in preflight
estimates of topographic relief, and surface debris and cratering could
also be expected. In all cases, actual conditions exceeded expectations.

In general, the mare surface at Hadley is characterized by a hummocky
lunar terrain produced by a high density of rounded, subdued, low-rimmed
craters of all sizes. The craters range in size up to several hundred
meters in diameter and are poorly sorted. There is a notable absenc of
large areas of fragmental debris or boulder fields. Unique, fresh, 1- to
2- meter-diameter, debris-filled craters, with glass-covered fragments
in their central 10 percent, occurred on less than 1 percent of the mare
surface.

The large blocks comprising the Apennine Mountains have extremely
rounded profiles with less than 0.1 percent exposed surface outcroppings
or fresh young craters. However, massive units of well-organized
uniformly parallel lineations appear within all blocks, each block
having a different orientation within the Hadley area. Mount Hadley is
the most dramatic of these blocks, where at least 200 lineations ( [fig.
9-3](../a15mr057.jpg)), dipping approximately 30 degrees to the
west-northwest, are exposed on its southwest slope. Discontinuous,
linear, patterned ground is visible superimposed over these lineations.
A more definitive exposure of these units was observed at Silver Spur
(fig. 9-2) where an upper unit of seven 60-meter (200-foot) thick layers
is in contact with a lower section of somewhat thinner parallel layering
having evidence of crossbedding and subhorizontal fractures. Also, three
continuous, subhorizontal, non-uniform lineations are visible within,
and unique to, the lower 10 percent of the Mount Hadley vertical
profile.

![](media/image58.jpeg){width="5.020833333333333in"
height="4.833333333333333in"}

The most distinctive feature of Hadley Rille is the exposed layering
within the bedrock on the upper 15 percent of the rille walls ( fig.
9-4). Two major units can be identified in this region; the upper 10
percent appears as poorly organized massive blocks with an apparent
fracture orientation dipping approximately 45 degrees to the north. The
lower 5 percent is a distinct horizontal unit exposed as discontinuous
outcrops partially covered with talus and fines. Each exposure is
characterized by approximately 10 different multilayered parallel
horizontal bedding planes. The remainder of the slope is covered with
talus, 20 to 30 percent of which is fragmental debris, with a suggestion
of another massive unit with a heavy cover of fines at a level 40
percent downward from the top. The exposures at this level appear
lighter in color and more rounded than the general talus debris. No
significant collection of talus is apparent at any one level. The upper
10 percent of the eastern side of the rille is characterized by massive
subangular blocks of fine-grained vesicular porphyritic basalt
containing up to 15 percent phenocrysts. This unit, as viewed toward the
south, has the same character as the upper unit on the western wall. The
bottom of the rille is gently sloping and smooth with no evidence of
flow in any direction. No accumulation of talus was evident on the
bottom except for occasional boulders up to 2 meters (6.6 feet) in size.

![](media/image59.jpeg){width="4.645833333333333in" height="4.8125in"}

The major concentration of craters, depicted on preflight maps, is the
South Cluster on the Hadley Plain. Because of the general lack of
morphological features on the slopes of Mount Hadley and Hadley Delta, a
linear concentration of craters up the slope of Hadley Delta, directly
south of the Cluster, indicates that a sweep of secondary fragments from
the north may have been the origin of the South Cluster. A buildup of
debris on the southern rim of these craters was not evident, although
the approximately 10-percent coverage of the surface by fragmental
debris in the region of the South Cluster is unique within the Hadley
region.

Sampling was accomplished in the general vicinity of all preplanned
locations with the exception of the North Complex, which was
unfortunately excluded because of higher priorities of activities
associated with lunar surface experiments. A great variety of samples
were collected; some are obviously associated with their location, while
others will require further study to determine a relationship. The
capability to identify rock types at the time of collection was
comparable to a terresterial exercise and was unhampered by the unique
environment of the moon. Identifiable sample features include:
anorthosite; basalts with vesicules of various sizes, distribution, and
orientation; basalts with phenocrysts of various quantities, sizes,
shapes, and orientation; olivine- and pyroxene-rich basalts; third-order
breccias with a variety of well-defined clasts; rounded glass fragments;
glass-filled fractures and glass-covered fragments; and other surface
features such as slickensides.

### Lunar Surface Mobility Systems Performance

Extravehicular mobility unit.- The mobility of the modified suit allowed
the lunar roving vehicle to be mounted easily. It was also possible to
bend down on one knee to retrieve objects from the surface.

The cooling performance of the portable life support system was
excellent. The Commander used maximum cooling for tasks such as the
drilling operations. The Lunar Module Pilot never used more than
intermediate cooling. For the driving portion of the lunar surface
exploration, minimum cooling was quite comfortable. During the first
extravehicular activity, the Lunar Module Pilot experienced several
warning tones. The suspected cause was a bubble in the portable life
support system water supply. When switchover to auxiliary water was
required, ground control recommended minimum cooling, which was new
information to the crew. The temperature in the suits gradually
increased over the three extravehicular activities.

The portable life support system straps were adjusted during the
preflight crew compartment fit and function procedure. The Commander\'s
straps worked fine. However, the Lunar Module Pilot\'s seemed short
since the controls were located too high and too far to the left for him
to reach. The Commander\'s portable life support system seemed loose at
the end of the third extravehicular activity.

Lunar roving vehicle.- The major hardware innovation for the lunar
exploration phase of the Apollo 15 mission was the lunar roving vehicle
( [fig. 9-5](../a15mr059.jpg).) Because of geological requirements
during surface traverses, time was limited for evaluating the
characteristics of the vehicle. However, during the traverses, a number
of qualitative evaluations were made. The following text discusses the
performance, and the stability and control of \"Rover 1\", as well as
other operational considerations pertaining to the vehicle.

![](media/image60.jpeg){width="4.875in" height="4.25in"}

The manual deployment technique worked very well. Simulations had
demonstrated the effectiveness of this technique and, with several minor
exceptions, it worked exactly as in preflight demonstrations. The first
unexpected condition was noticed immediately after removing the thermal
blanket when both walking hinges were found open. They were reset and
the vehicle was deployed in a nominal manner. The support saddle,
however, was difficult to remove after the vehicle was on the surface.
No apparent cause was evident. Additionally, both left front hinge pins
were out of their normal detent positions; both were reset with the
appropriate tool. After removal of the support saddle, the rover was
manually positioned such that \"forward\" would be the initial driving
mode.

Front steering was inoperative during the first extravehicular activity.
All switches and circuit breakers were cycled a number of times during
the early portion of the first extravehicular activity with no effect on
the steering. Subsequently, at the beginning of the second
extravehicular activity, cycling of the front steering switch apparently
enabled the front steering capability which was then utilized throughout
the remaining traverses.

Mounting and dismounting the rover was comparable to preflight
experience in 1/6-gravity simulations in the KC-135 aircraft. Little
difficulty was encountered. The normal mounting technique included
grasping the staff near the console and, with a small hop, positioning
the body in the seat. Final adjustment was made by sliding, while using
the footrest and the back of the seat for leverage. It was determined
early in the traverses that some method of restraining the crew members
to their seats was absolutely essential. In the case of Rover 1, the
seatbelts worked adequately; however, excessive time and effort were
required to attach the belts. The pressure suit interface with the rover
was adequate in all respects. None of the preflight problems of
visibility and suit pressure points were encountered.

The performance of the vehicle was excellent. The lunar terrain
conditions in general were very hummocky, having a smooth texture and
only small areas of fragmental debris. A wide variety of craters was
encountered. Approximately 90 percent had smooth, subdued rims which
were, in general, level with the surrounding surface. Slopes up to
approximately 15 percent were encountered. The vehicle could be
maneuvered through any region very effectively. The surface material
varied from a thin powdered dust \[which the boots would penetrate to a
depth of 5 to 8 centimeters (2 to 3 inches) on the slope of the Apennine
Front to a firm rille soil which was penetrated about 1 centimeter
(one-quarter to one-half inch) by the boot. In all cases, the rover\'s
performance was changed very little.

The velocity of the rover on the level surface reached a maximum of 13
kilometers (7 miles) per hour. Driving directly upslope on the soft
surface material at the Apennine Front, maximum velocities of 10
kilometers (5.4 miles) per hour were maintained. Comparable velocities
could be maintained obliquely on the slopes unless crater avoidance
became necessary. Under these conditions, the downhill wheel tended to
dig in and the speed was reduced for safety.

Acceleration was normally smooth with very little wheel slippage,
although some soil could be observed impacting on the rear part of the
fenders as the vehicle was accelerated with maximum throttle. During a
\"Lunar Grand Prix\", a roostertail was noted above, behind, and over
the front of the rover during the acceleration phase. This was
approximately 3 meters (10 feet) high and went some 3 meters forward of
the rover. No debris was noted forward or above the vehicle during
constant velocity motion. Traction of the wire wheels was excellent
uphill, downhill, and during acceleration. A speed of 10 kilometers per
hour could be attained in approximately three vehicle lengths with very
little wheel slip. Braking was positive except at the high speeds. At
any speed under 5 kilometers (2.7 miles) per hour, braking appeared to
occur in approximately the same distance as when using the 1-g trainer.
From straight-line travel at velocities of approximately 10 kilometers
per hour on a level surface, the vehicle could be stopped in a distance
of approximately twice that experienced in the 1-g trainer. Braking was
less effective if the vehicle was in a turn, especially at higher
velocities.

Dust accumulation on the vehicle was considered minimal and only very
small particulate matter accumulated over a long period of time. Larger
particles appeared to be controlled very well by the fenders. The
majority of the dust accumulation occurred on the lower horizontal
surfaces such as floorboards, seatpans, and the rear wheel area. Soil
accumulation within the wheels was not observed. Those particles which
did pass through the wire seemed to come out cleanly. Dust posed no
problem to visibility.

Obstacle avoidance was commensurate with speed. Lateral skidding
occurred during any hardover or maximum-rate turn above 5 kilometers per
hour. Associated with the lateral skidding was a loss of braking
effectiveness. The suspension bottomed out approximately three times
during the entire surface activity with no apparent ill effect. An
angular 30- centimeter (1-foot) high fragment was traversed by the left
front wheel with no loss of controllability or steering, although the
suspension did bottom out. A relatively straight-line traverse was
easily maintained by selection of a point on the horizon for directional
control, in spite of the necessity to maneuver around the smaller
subdued craters. Fragmental debris was clearly visible and easy to avoid
on the surface. The small, hummocky craters were the major problem in
negotiating the traverse, and the avoidance of these craters seemed
necessary to prevent controllability loss and bottoming of the
suspension system.

Vehicle tracks were prominent on the surface and very little variation
of depth occurred when the bearing on all four wheels was equal. On
steep slopes, where increased loads were carried by the downhill wheels,
deeper tracks were encountered - perhaps up to 3 or 4 centimeters (an
inch or two) in depth. There was no noticeable effect of driving on
previously deposited tracks, although these effects were not
specifically investigated. The chevron tread pattern left distinct and
sharp imprints. In the soft, loose soil at the Apollo lunar surface
experiment package site, one occurrence of wheel spin was corrected by
manually moving the rover to a new surface.

The general stability and control of the lunar roving vehicle was
excellent. The vehicle was statically stable on any slopes encountered
and the only problem associated with steep slopes was the tendency of
the vehicle to slide downslope when both crewmen were off the vehicle.
The rover is dynamically stable in roll and pitch. There was no tendency
for the vehicle to roll even when traveling upslope or downslope, across
contour lines or parallel to contour lines. However, qualitative
evaluation indicates that roll instability would be approached on the
15-degree slopes if the vehicle were traveling a contour line with one
crewmember on the downhill side. Both long- and short-period pitch
motions were experienced in response to vehicle motion over the
cratered, hummocky terrain, and the motion introduced by individual
wheel obstacles. The long-period motion was very similar to that
encountered in the 1-g trainer, although more lightly damped. The
\"floating\" of the crewmembers in the 1/6-g field was quite noticeable
in comparison to 1- g simulations. Contributions of shortperiod motion
of each wheel were unnoticed and it was difficult to tell how many
wheels were off the ground at any one time. At one point during the
\"Lunar Grand Prix\", all four wheels were off the ground, although this
was undetectable from the driver\'s seat.

Maneuvering was quite responsive at speeds below approximately 5
kilometers per hour. At speeds on the order of 10 kilometers per hour,
response to turning was very poor until speed was reduced. The optimum
technique for obstacle avoidance was to slow below 5 kilometers per hour
and then apply turning correction. Hardover turns using any steering
mode at 10 kilometers per hour would result in a breakout of the rear
wheels and lateral skidding of the front wheels. This effect was
magnified when only the rear wheels were used for steering. There was no
tendency toward overturn instability due to steering or turning alone.
There was one instance of breakout and lateral skidding of the rear
wheels into a crater approximately 1/2 meter (1-112 feet) deep and 1-1/4
meters (4 feet) wide. This resulted in a rear wheel contacting the far
wall of the crater and subsequent lateral bounce. There was no
subsequent roll instability or tendency to turn over, even though visual
motion cues indicated a roll instability might develop.

The response and the handling qualities using the control stick are
considered adequate. The hand controller was effective throughout the
speed range, and directional control was considered excellent. Minor
difficulty was experienced with feedback through the suited crewmember
to the hand controller during driving. However, this feedback could be
improved by a more positive method of restraint in the seat. Maximum
velocity on a level surface can be maintained by leaving the control
stick in any throttle position and steering with small inputs left or
right. A firm grip on the handle at all times is unnecessary.
Directional control response is excellent although, because of the many
dynamic links between the steering mechanism and the hand on the
throttle, considerable feedback through the pressure suit to the control
stick exists. A light touch on the hand grip reduces the effect of this
feedback. An increase in the lateral and breakout forces in the
directional hand controller should minimize feedback into the steering.

Two steering modes were investigated. On the first extravehicular
activity, where rear-wheel-only steering was available, the vehicle had
a tendency to dig in with the front wheels and break out with the rear
wheels with large, but less than hardover, directional corrections. On
the second extravehicular activity, front-wheel-only steering was
attempted, but was abandoned because of the lack of rear wheel
centering. Four-wheel steering was utilized for the remainder of the
mission. It is felt that for the higher speeds, optimum steering would
be obtained utilizing front steering provided the rear wheels are
center-locked. For lower speeds and maximum obstacle avoidance,
four-wheel steering would be optimal. Any hardover failure of the
steering mechanism would be recognized immediately and could be
controlled safely by maximum braking.

Forward visibility was excellent throughout the range of conditions
encountered with the exception of driving toward the zero-phase
direction. Washout, under these conditions, made obstacle avoidance
difficult. Up-sun was comparable to cross-sun if the opaque visor on the
lunar extravehicular visor assembly was lowered to a point which blocks
the direct rays of the sun. In this condition, crater shadows and debris
were easily seen. General lunar terrain features were detectable within
10 degrees of the zero phase region. Detection of features under
high-sun conditions was somewhat more difficult because of the lack of
shadows, but with constant attention, 10 to 11 kilometers (5-1/2 to 6
miles) per hour could be maintained. The problem encountered was
recognizing the subtle, subdued craters directly in the vehicle path. In
general, 1-meter (3 1/4-foot) craters were not detectable until the
front wheels had approached to within 2 to 3 meters (6-1/2 to 10 feet).

The reverse feature of the vehicle was utilized several times, and
preflight-developed techniques worked well. Only short distances were
covered, and then only with a dismounted crewmember confirming the
general condition of the surface to be covered.

The 1-g trainer provides adequate training for lunar roving vehicle
operation on the lunar surface. Adaptation to lunar characteristics is
rapid. Handling characteristics are quite natural after several minutes
of driving. The major difference encountered with respect to preflight
training was the necessity to pay constant attention to the lunar
terrain in order to have adequate warning for obstacle avoidance if
maximum average speeds were to be maintained. Handling characteristics
of the actual lunar roving vehicle were similar to those of the 1-g
trainer with two exceptions: braking requires approximately twice the
distance, and steering is not responsive in the 8- to 10-kilometer (4-
to 5 1/2-mile) per hour range with hardover control inputs. Suspension
characteristics appeared to be approximately the same between the two
vehicles and the 1/6-g suspension simulation is considered to be an
accurate representation with the exception of the crewmembers\' weight.

The navigation system is accurate and a high degree of confidence was
attained in a very short time. Displays are also adequate for the lunar
roving vehicle systems.

Lunar communications relay unit.- The lunar communications relay unit
and associated equipment operated well throughout the lunar surface
activities. The deployment techniques and procedures are good, and the
operational constraints and activation overhead are minimum. Alignment
of the high-gain antenna was the only difficulty encountered, and this
was due to the very dim image of the earth presented through the optical
sighting device. The use of signal strength as indicated on the
automatic gain control meter was an acceptable back-up alignment
technique.

### Lunar Surface Science Equipment Performance

Apollo lunar surface experiment package.- The packages were manually
removed from the scientific equipment bay. During unstowing of
equipment, the universal handling tools were difficult to remove from
the stowed position and the scientific equipment bay doors required
cycling to the fully closed position. In deploying the central station,
the strings which pull the rear pins on the sun shield cover were
broken, requiring the Lunar Module Pilot to pull the pins with his
fingers. Connection of the suprathermal ion detector experiment to the
central station was very difficult. The task required the Lunar Module
Pilot to use both hands and all the weight that he could bring to bear
on the locking collar. Another difficulty was in the deployment of the
suprathermal ion detector experiment. The universal handling tool was
not locked, which caused the suprathermal ion detector experiment to
fall off the tool when positioning the experiment.

Emplacement of the heat flow experiment and collection of the deep core
sample were difficult and required far more time and effort than
anticipated. Operation of the hardware components was acceptable with
the exception of the vise on the geology pallet. The vise was installed
incorrectly and was useless for separating the assembled stems.

The primary cause of the working difficulties encountered with the lunar
drill was the lack of knowledge of the regolith encountered at the
Hadley site. Because of the hardness of the material 1 meter (3 1/4
feet) below the surface, the bore stems for drilling the holes for the
heat flow experiment did not penetrate at the expected rates and did not
excavate deep material to the surface. Because of the resulting high
torque levels on the chuck-stem interface, the chuck bound to the stems
and, in one case, required destruction of the stem to remove the chuck
and drill. The deep core sample could not be extracted from the hard
soil by normal methods and required both crewmen lifting on the drill
handles to remove it. The exterior flutes contributed to this condition
since the core stems were pulled into the lunar surface when the drill
was activated. See section 14.4.1 for further discussion.

Soil mechanics.- The classic trench was easily dug in the vicinity of
the Apollo lunar surface experiment deployment site. Penetrometer
measurements were made at the trench and in the lunar roving vehicle
tracks. The floor of the trench was a very hard resistant layer. In
making the penetrometer measurements, the trench side was collapsed by
pushing on the flat plate positioned about 10 centimeters (4 inches)
from the trench wall. A problem with the penetrometer was that the
ground plane would not stay in the extended position because of
excessive spring force (see section 4.13).

Geology tools.- The retractable tethers (yo-yo\'s) failed during the
first extravehicular activity. These devices were used by the Commander
to secure tongs and by the Lunar Module Pilot to secure the extension
handle during the geology work. They would have been used to hold the
universal handling tools during deployment of the Apollo lunar surface
experiment package. Unfortunately, both yo-yos failed before the
experiment package was deployed. Cord was used for the flight equipment
instead of wire, as on the training equipment. The tongs, scoop, hammer,
and rake worked well, and the rake also functioned well as a scoop. The
newly designed core tube worked well in that the sample was completely
retained. Penetration of the surface with the core tube was usually
accomplished with a hard push; however, the hammer was required to
obtain a double core. The locking and unlocking of the buddy secondary
life support system bag attached to the rear of the geology pallet was
very difficult because the locking tab was hidden behind the bag. Sample
return container 2 was not sealed because a portion of the collection
bag was caught in the rear hinge.

Cameras.- The film in the 16-mm data acquisition camera would not pull
through the camera. Only one magazine worked on the lunar surface. Also,
the Lunar Module Pilot\'s 70-mm Hasselblad electric data camera
malfunctioned at the end of the second extravehicular activity. An
inspection in the lunar module cabin revealed excessive lunar material
on the film drive. The camera failed again on the third extravehicular
activity and was returned to earth. These anomalies are discussed in
sections 14.5.3 and 14-5.4.

## LUNAR ORBITAL SOLO OPERATIONS

### Maneuvers

Solo maneuvers in lunar orbit included circularization and a plane
change. Both of these maneuvers were accomplished using service
propulsion system bank B only because of the aforementioned circuit
problem with bank A. The maneuvers were nominal and were accomplished
with residual velocities of an order that required no further
maneuvering.

### Science and Photography

Scientific instrument module experiments.- The scientific instrument
module was operated during the three days of lunar surface activity
according to carefully detailed preflight planning. Because of the
complexity of the scientific instrument module, all operations during
this period were to be accomplished without deviation from the flight
plan. In the event that difficulties were encountered, items were to be
dropped from the flight plan. Some flight difficulties were experienced
with the scientific instrument module operations. These difficulties
were associated with the retraction of the mass spectrometer boom and
with the extension and retraction of the mapping camera. The mass
spectrometer boom extended normally but did not always indicate full
retraction. It was suspected that the boom was retracting into the
carriage, but not far enough to cause an indication of full retraction.
The monitoring, as well as the timing of the boom extensions and
retractions, required an expenditure of time which had not been
anticipated preflight. The mapping camera extended and retracted more
slowly than had been anticipated and it eventually failed in the
extended position. This also required additional monitoring time on the
part of the Command Module Pilot. The mass spectrometer boom retraction
problem is discussed in more detail in section 14.1.6 and additional
discussion on the mapping camera problem is given in section 14.3.3.

The scientific instrument module bay activity was essentially a
monitoring operation. Functions were performed at a prescribed time and
required very careful attention to the details in the flight plan. One
procedure that was used to assist in this monitoring activity was the
use of computer time on the display keyboard in the lower equipment bay.
The procedure required the initiation of an external delta-velocity
program at a prescribed time. The clock in the computer would then count
down to, and up from, that time. However, because of the calculations
required by the computer during operation of this program, the
spacecraft actually deviated out of the attitude control dead bands.
Therefore, after the first day in lunar orbit, the computer program was
used for very short intervals of time only. Consequently, the monitoring
of the scientific instrument module bay became much more difficult
because the timing of these events had to be accomplished using ground
elapsed time, and not time relative to an event. Also complicating the
monitoring was the fact that the lights in the lower equipment bay could
no longer illuminate the mission timer because of the previously
described short in the a-c electrical system.

All of the solo operations in lunar orbit were accomplished well within
the capability of the Command Module Pilot with respect to the amount of
work that had to be done in the time available. There were times when
visual observation of the surface and hand-held photography were
accomplished in conjunction with the operation of the scientific
instrument module bay. This posed no problem and was accomplished as
prescribed.

Command and service module photography.- The onboard photography was
accomplished generally as prescribed in the flight plan except that the
operation was more detailed than had been anticipated prior to flight.
Acquisition of all photographic targets was based on flight plan time.
However, with additional training just prior to flight, the Command
Module Pilot attained a sufficient degree of proficiency in target
recognition and in the geology of the lunar surface so that detailed
flight plan times were not required.

The photography was accomplished using the settings prescribed in the
flight plan and additional photographs were taken utilizing the settings
based on sun angles that were listed in both the orbit monitor charts
and by an orbit monitor wheel which was developed for that purpose. The
photography from window 5 posed some problems because of a Lexan filter
installed inside of the spacecraft (since no ultraviolet filter existed
within the window). The Lexan filter, at this time, was scratched and it
did not appear that good photography could be taken through that window,
so the filter was removed for the photography and then replaced.

Visual observations.- In conjunction with the photography, visual
observations of selected surface features were made. These observations
were designed to allow a better understanding of large-scale geologic
processes. Three areas of special interest were centered around the
crater Tsiolkovsky, the Littrow area, and the Aristarchus Plateau.

Tsiolkovsky is a large impact crater centered at 128 degrees east
latitude, and uniquely placed in the region between the large mare
basins and the upland areas on the back side. It is a deep crater with a
prominent central peak and steep rim walls; the crater walls are cut by
several faults. The smooth, dark crater floor resembles the mare
surfaces visible on the moon\'s near side. There is much evidence of
volcanic processes on the eastern side of the crater as shown by
numerous lava flows originating along fault zones and filling minor
craters around Tsiolkovsky. On the western side, there is a large rock
avalanche that extends from the rim northwest into the subdued crater
Fermi.

The Littrow area was viewed because of distinct color banding extending
out into Mare Serenitatis. This banding appears to have been produced by
volcanism in the form of flows or volcanic ash deposits. Within the
darkest band, there were numerous small positive features believed to be
cinder cones. These are the first well-documented cinder cones observed
on the moon.

The Aristarchus Plateau appears to be the most active volcanic area on
the moon. There are many lava flows and rille-like features in the
central plateau area.

One of the mysteries about the rilles has been the rille termini. If
these features were formed by lava flows, there would be delta-shaped
flow tongues formed at the outlets. Inflight observation resulted in the
conclusion that if these delta-shaped flow tongues were present, they
were covered by lava flows that inundated the rilles.

## ASCENT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING

### Ascent

Ascent ignition was automatic, the programmed pitchover was smooth and
positive, and the trajectory appeared nominal throughout the maneuver.
Five minutes after lift-off, radar lock-on was attempted with negative
results; 5 seconds of high slew in each direction also resulted in no
signal strength. Approaching insertion, Houston advised of a radial
error in the primary guidance and navigation system and recommended an
in-plane trim of the abort guidance system velocity residuals. At
automatic primary guidance and navigation system shutdown, the abort
guidance system indicated a residual velocity of minus 3.5 ft/sec. This
was trimmed to minus 2 ft/sec along the longitudinal axis. No vernier
adjustment was required, and the ground advised that the terminal phase
initiate maneuver would be off-nominal and that final approach would be
from near horizontal; these factors were due to the command and service
module orbit.

### Rendezvous

Lunar module.- The abort guidance system warning light came on shortly
after insertion. The light was reset normally and the abort guidance
system self-test was satisfactory. After insertion, there was early
confirmation of rendezvous radar, primay guidance and navigation system,
and abort guidance system guidance data. Automatic updating was enabled
in both the primary guidance system and the abort guidance system. At
final computation for terminal phase initiation, there were 26 marks in
the primary guidance and navigation system, and 13 range marks and 13
range-rate marks in the abort guidance system. Another accelerometer
bias update was made on the primary guidance system before terminal
phase initiation. The primay guidance and navigation system solution was
used.

Nominal procedures were used for primary guidance and navigation system
midcourse corrections. For the abort guidance system, several rangerate
inputs were manually inserted to insure that there were sufficient marks
to obtain good solutions. The technique used was to watch the mark
counter until the range changed to a plus value, then the range rate was
manually entered. The command and service module tracking light was not
visible until 40 minutes after sunset at a range of approximately 18
miles.

When approaching the last braking gate (1500 feet separation distance),
the Commander was surprised to see that no line-of-sight rates were
indicated by the rendezvous radar crosspointers. (Refer to sec. 14.2.7
for a discussion of this anomaly.) Line of site rates were verified by
the Command Module Pilot. Thrusting left and up approximately 4 ft/sec
was required to null the line-of-site rates. The resulting out-of-plane
angle at station keeping was approximately 20 degrees.

Command and service module.- The command and service module was prepared
for the rendezvous by deactivating all of the scientific instrument
module bay experiments, retracting all of the booms, and closing the
camera and experiment covers. All but four reaction control jets were
activated 3 hours before lunar module ascent initiation to allow proper
ground tracking and orbit determination. On the rendezvous revolution
itself, VHF contact was made just prior to ascent and the Manned Space
Flight Network relay was deactivated. All communications with the lunar
module were accomplished using the VHF. Just prior to insertion, VHF
ranging was activated. Several resets were required before the ranging
was locked, and subsequently, lock was broken only once.

After insertion, a lunar module state vector was uplinked from the
ground and an automatic maneuver was made to the rendezvous tracking
attitude. The rendezvous was completed using a minimum-key-stroke
(automatic sequencing) computer program. This program was new for this
flight, and was designed to relieve the Command Module Pilot\'s
workload. The computer automatically sequenced through the rendezvous
maneuvers and tracking periods. It was initiated at the pre-terminal
phase initiation program and was terminated with the final rendezvous
computer program, which maneuvered the command and service module to the
desired tracking attitude just prior to docking. The program functioned
as anticipated and allowed the Command Module Pilot much greater time
for optical tracking and systems monitoring.

There was same difficulty at first in actually seeing the lunar module
tracking light because the lunar module was not centered in the scanning
telescope. After going into darkness, the light was observed at about 15
degrees from the center of the telescope. After two marks were taken,
the optics tracked the lunar module in the center of the sextant. A
total of 18 optical and 19 VHF marks were taken before the final
solution was initiated. The maneuver to the terminal phase initiate
attitude was a small maneuver of approximately 20 to 30 degrees in
pitch. After the lunar module performed the terminal phase initiation
maneuver, the actual velocity changes were inserted into the computer.
The command and service module then was maneuvered automatically to the
tracking attitude. Ten optics and nine VHF marks were taken prior to the
first midcourse correction and 18 optics and 11 VHF marks were taken
prior to the second midcourse correction. All solutions were compared
with the lunar module solutions and were within the prescribed limits.
The lunar module subsequently accomplished the maneuvers based on its
own solutions.

### Docking and Crew Transfer

Beginning at terminal phase finalization, the spacecraft was maneuvered
to the crew-optical-alignment-sight tracking attitude to monitor the
lunar module and to verify line-of-sight rates. The lunar module assumed
a station keeping position with the command and service module and a
maneuver was initiated to allow photographs to be taken of the
scientific instrument module bay. After this was accomplished, the
spacecraft were maneuvered to the docking attitude. The docking was
initiated and completed by the command and service module. Again, the
closing rates were approximately 0.1 ft/sec, and the docking was
completed by thrusting along the longitudinal axis on contact until
capture latch engagement was indicated. After the capture latches were
engaged and the attitudes were stabilized, the probe was retracted and a
hard dock was accomplished.

Several operations were initiated almost simultaneously after the
docking. The scientific instrument module bay experiments were activated
and operated throughout the time of transfer of equipment from the lunar
module to the command and service module. The experiments operations
hindered the transfer to some extent because the Command Module Pilot
was required to monitor and observe the scientific instrument panel in
the command and service module. However, the transfer was successfully
completed and all transfer bags were stowed in the proper locations. The
lunar module crew transferred back into the command and service module
and preparations were made for undocking.

## POST-DOCKING LUNAR ORBITAL OPERATIONS

### Lunar Module Jettison

After all equipment was stowed, the crew donned their helmets and gloves
and prepared the tunnel for lunar module Jettison. Some difficulty was
experienced with venting the pressure in the tunnel. The differential
pressure across the tunnel hatch would not increase as expected. The
hatch was removed and the seals on both the lunar module hatch and the
command module hatch were checked. Both hatches were replaced and the
differential pressure check was completed satisfactorily. A pressure
suit integrity check was then accomplished; again, with some difficulty.
The crew considered that the liquid cooled garment connector was
responsible for the failure of one of the suits to pressurize properly,
so a plug was inserted into the Commander\'s suit. After the plug was
installed and the suits were rezipped, the suit circuit pressure
integrity check was accomplished normally. Because of the difficulty
with the tunnel and with the suit circuit integrity check, the lunar
module jettison was delayed approximately one revolution, after which it
was accomplished normally. However, because of the difference in orbital
position from the planned position at the time of the lunar module
jettision, the separation maneuver was recomputed to assure a positive
separation distance. This was accomplished about 20 minutes after
jettision and all subsequent events were nominal.

### Flight Plan Updating

After rendezvous and with all three crewmen aboard the command and
service module, the flight plan was updated to utilize the full
capability of the scientific instrument module bay. The flight plan
changes were considerable, but with one crewman free to copy the
updates, the other two crewmen were available to monitor and perform the
scientific instrument module activities. This meant that all three
crewmen were utilized a good percentage of the time. The operation was
performed satisfactorily and the real-time changing of the flight plan
was accomplished without difficulty. The philosophy that there would be
no changes in the flight plan during the solo operations and that the
flight plan would be subject to real-time change when all three crewmen
were aboard was satisfactory.

### Maneuvers

Prior to the transearth injection maneuver, an orbital shaping maneuver
was performed to launch the subsatellite into an orbit guaranteeing a
long lifetime. This was a relatively short thrusting maneuver and was
accomplished using service propulsion system bank B. The subsatellite
was jettisoned as scheduled and it was observed approximately 15 to 20
feet away from the spacecraft. All arms were extended and it was
rotating with a coning angle of approximately 10 degrees.

The next maneuver was the transearth injection maneuver which was
accomplished without difficulty. The service propulsion system was again
activated by the special procedure. Gimbal position indications were
very smooth and there was very little attitude excursion. The maneuver
was completed nominally.

###  Command and Service Module Housekeeping

Particular emphasis was placed on housekeeping throughout the flight in
order to maintain organization within the command module crew
compartment with the additional stowage requirements for the Apollo 15
mission. Normal cabin living activities required more time than
anticipated preflight because of additional equipment, onboard stowage
conditions, new pressure suits, a strict adherence to nutrition
schedules, and limitations on overboard dump periods. The most efficient
manner of completing these activities was to perform all cleaning,
dumping, canister change, and chlorination operations just prior to a
rest period, exclusive of any scientific instrument module activities.
Similarly, an exclusive waking and eat period just after the rest period
and prior to any other activities (such as scientific instrument module
activation and flight plan updates) conforms to normal daily activities
on earth and results in far more efficient utilization of time during
flight.

## TRANSEARTH FLIGHT OPERATIONS

### Transearth Coast Extravehicular Activity

Approximately 16 hours after the transearth injection maneuver, the crew
had completed preparations for an extravehicular activity which was
specifically planned to retrieve the panoramic and mapping camera
cassettes from the scientific instrument module. The preparation for the
extravehicular activity was accomplished in a nominal fashion and
required approximately 5 112 hours. Preparation of the command module
was partially accomplished during the night preceding the extravehicular
activity and was completed approximately 2 hours before the flight plan
time for the event. This allowed an unhurried, careful preparation of
all equipment and resulted in an extravehicular activity that was
accomplished on time and without difficulty. The final preparation
associated with the extravehicular activity involved the relocation of
some rock bags and containers, removal of the center couch, donning of
pressure suits, suit integrity checks, and the donning of the special
extravehicular activity umbilical and pressure suit equipment by the
Command Module Pilot. This was accomplished satisfactorily per the
check- list. The spacecraft was maneuvered to the extravehicular
activity sun-angle attitude which allowed illumination of the scientific
instrument module bay, while insuring that the sun did not shine
directly into the command module hatch. In this attitude the sun angle
was low with respect to the scientific instrument module, but
reflections in and around the module illuminated all of the equipment.
After side hatch opening, the television and 16-mm cameras were
installed on the hatch to record the extravehicular activity. The 16-mm
camera operated for only 3 or 4 frames and produced only one recoverable
picture ( [fig. 9-6](../a15mr060.jpg)). The camera had apparently been
turned on and then inadvertently turned off after a three-second
interval while set at a frame rate of one frame per second. The
television camera operated properly. The Command Module Pilot proceeded
to the scientific instrument module bay in a fashion similar to that
used during training. The operation required about 16 minutes and was
completed in an efficient manner even though an off-nominal condition
existed in that the mapping camera was extended and could not be
retracted. The panoramic camera cassette was returned to the hatch and
was tethered inside the command module. The mapping camera cassette was
returned on the second trip. Because of the difficulty with the mass
spectrometer boom, and the mapping camera extension and retraction
mechanism, a third trip was made to the scientific instrument module to
investigate these pieces of equipment. The spectrometer was observed to
have retracted to the point of capture by the guide pins in the carriage
but had not retracted fully. No external jamming of the mapping camera
carriage was seen. One additional problem, associated with the panoramic
camera, was investigated during the third trip. The panoramic camera
velocity/altitude sensor malfunctioned during lunar orbit operations.
The sensor was examined and nothing was in the line of sight of the
velocity/altitude sensor to account for the failure. Following the
extravehicular activity, the Command Module Pilot ingressed, the hatch
was closed, and the command module was pressurized using the three
1-pound oxygen bottles from the rapid repressurization system, the
Command Module Pilot\'s extravehicular umbilical flow, and the oxygen
purge system.

![](media/image61.jpeg){width="4.979166666666667in" height="3.4375in"}

### Science and Photography

The instruments in the scientific instrument module were operated during
the transearth coast to obtain background data needed for interpretation
of data obtained in lunar orbit and to acquire information on celestial
sources. These operations, at times, required specific attitude
pointing, and at other times, were accomplished during passive thermal
control periods. The operations, although accomplished in large part
based upon real-time planning, posed no difficulty in adhering to the
preflight-planned timeline. During transearth flight, ultraviolet
photographs were taken of both the earth and the moon, star patterns
were photographed through the sextant, and photographs were taken in an
attempt to record the particulate matter around the spacecraft following
a waste water dumping operation.

### Navigation

During transearth flight, a large portion of time was devoted to
cislunar midcourse navigation. This was done to demonstrate the
capability to perform onboard navigation to achieve safe entry
conditions in the event Manned Space Flight Network communications are
lost. Calibrations having been accomplished on translunar coast, the
midcourse exercises were performed, as closely as possible, according to
the schedule in the contingency checklist. This navigational exercise
was accomplished by maintaining a separate state vector stored in the
command module computer registers normally used for lunar module state
vectors. It was discovered that the navigation could, in fact, be
performed onboard to at least validate the state vector during a nominal
transearth coast. The techniques for accomplishing the cislunar
sightings were essentially the same as had been used during translunar
coast. The earth at this time appeared as a very thin crescent because
of the earth-sun relationship, but the horizon was easily discernible.
The sightings were taken with the spacecraft in minimum- impulse
control, and all but the last set of sightings were accomplished using
uncoupled thrusters for attitude control. Low attitude rates were
maintained and the sightings were easier than had been experienced
preflight. The onboard state vector was maintained until just prior to
entry and it would have been satisfactory in the event that a loss of
communications had been experienced.

## ENTRY AND LANDING

The preparation for entry was accomplished normally and the third
midcourse correction was performed to insure that the target point was
acceptable. In preparation for service module separation, all systems
were checked, chill-down of the spacecraft was accomplished as
prescribed, and the spacecraft was maneuvered to the service module
jettison attitude. The jettison was accomplished as planned. Entry was
nominal, with the entry interface occurring at the proper time. The
entry monitor system indicated 0.05g at the expected time and the entry
monitor system, the guidance and navigation system, and the
accelerometers were all in agreement during entry. The lack of entry
monitor system background lighting did not affect observation of the
scroll. The entry was normal, but during descent on the main parachutes,
one of the parachutes partially deflated. The main parachutes deployed
normally at 10 000 feet, and checklist items were performed. However,
following the reaction control system depletion firing, the
partially-deflated parachute was observed. The condition resulted in a
higher rate of descent than with three fully-inflated parachutes. Calls
were received from the recovery team indicating that the situation was
being observed by ground personnel. All checks subsequent to this were
made according to the checklist and, because of the higher rate of
descent, touchdown was accomplished about 32 seconds earlier than it
would have with all parachutes fully inflated. The landing loads were
higher than normal; however, it did not appear that the couch struts had
stroked. The only internal indication of a hard landing was that the
crew optical alignment sight was detached from its stowage bracket and
fell to the aft bulkhead.

All events after landing were normal. The parachutes were released and,
because of the low wind condition, settled around the command module.
The recovery ship and forces were near the spacecraft at landing and
recovery operations were normal.

![](media/image62.jpeg){width="6.674305555555556in"
height="8.20138888888889in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 1](../a15mr061.jpg)

![](media/image63.jpeg){width="6.5875in" height="7.865277777777778in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 2](../a15mr062.jpg)

![](media/image64.jpeg){width="6.660416666666666in"
height="7.868055555555555in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 3](../a15mr063.jpg)

![](media/image65.jpeg){width="6.375in" height="8.097916666666666in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 4](../a15mr064.jpg)

![](media/image66.jpeg){width="6.445833333333334in" height="8.0in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 5](../a15mr065.jpg)

![](media/image67.jpeg){width="6.5569444444444445in" height="8.3in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 6](../a15mr066.jpg)

![](media/image68.jpeg){width="6.689583333333333in"
height="8.196527777777778in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 7](../a15mr067.jpg)

![](media/image69.jpeg){width="6.736111111111111in" height="8.4in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 8](../a15mr068.jpg)

![](media/image70.jpeg){width="6.497916666666667in"
height="8.186111111111112in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 9](../a15mr069.jpg)

![](media/image71.jpeg){width="6.819444444444445in"
height="8.097916666666666in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 10](../a15mr070.jpg)

![](media/image72.jpeg){width="6.575694444444444in"
height="8.26736111111111in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 11](../a15mr071.jpg)

![](media/image73.jpeg){width="6.782638888888889in"
height="8.202777777777778in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 12](../a15mr072.jpg)

![](media/image74.jpeg){width="6.622916666666667in" height="8.16875in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 13](../a15mr073.jpg)

![](media/image75.jpeg){width="6.4625in" height="8.167361111111111in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 14](../a15mr074.jpg)

![](media/image76.jpeg){width="6.571527777777778in"
height="7.865972222222222in"}

![](media/image77.jpeg){width="6.701388888888889in"
height="8.098611111111111in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 15](../a15mr076.jpg)

![](media/image78.jpeg){width="6.49375in" height="8.202777777777778in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 16](../a15mr077.jpg)

![](media/image79.jpeg){width="6.69375in" height="8.301388888888889in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 17](../a15mr078.jpg)

![](media/image80.jpeg){width="6.627777777777778in"
height="8.20138888888889in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 18](../a15mr079.jpg)

![](media/image81.jpeg){width="6.61875in" height="8.098611111111111in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 19](../a15mr080.jpg)

![](media/image82.jpeg){width="6.611805555555556in"
height="8.001388888888888in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 20](../a15mr081.jpg)

![](media/image83.jpeg){width="6.61875in" height="8.202777777777778in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 21](../a15mr082.jpg)

![](media/image84.jpeg){width="6.629861111111111in"
height="8.497222222222222in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 22](../a15mr083.jpg)

![](media/image85.jpeg){width="3.529166666666667in"
height="8.153472222222222in"}

[Abbreviated Timeline 23](../a15mr084.jpg)

# BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION

This section is a summary of the Apollo 15 medical findings based on a
preliminary analysis of the biomedical data. A total of 885.5 manhours
of space flight experience was accumulated during the 12.3 days of
flight. The flight crew health stabilization program for this mission
was similar to that for Apollo 14. Nine of the one hundred and sixty
primary contact personnel were removed from primary contact duty because
of infectious illness. This was the first lunar landing mission in which
a postflight quarantine period was not required. The basis for the
decision to discontinue the quarantine was the absence of pathologic or
toxic properties attributable to the lunar materials returned on three
previous lunar missions. The crewmen remained in good health throughout
the mission.

## BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA

The Apollo 15 mission was the first on which sponge/pellet electrodes
were used in the bioharness. This type of biosensor was developed to
reduce skin irritation experienced with the previous continuous-wear
electrodes. Only one crewman\'s bioharness was worn and monitored at a
time during the translunar and transearth phases of the mission. The
wearing time was alternated between work-days and sleep periods for each
crewman. Physiological data were transmitted simultaneously from all
three crewmen only during launch, extravehicular activities, and entry.

The quality of data obtained with these new electrodes was good. Less
skin irritation was seen at the biosensor sites than has been seen on
previous Apollo missions. The only biomedical instrumentation problem
experienced during the flight occurred approximately 65 seconds after
lift-off when the impedance pneumograms (respiratory function) for all
three crewmen showed large baseline shifts which were caused by air
trapped within the electrodes sponge. At about 14 hours, the crewmen
restored their impedance pneumogram data by venting the electrodes.
Preflight altitude chamber tests had shown that venting the electrodes
would restore the data.

The Commanders heart rates ranged from 81 to 98 beats per minute during
lunar descent and 65 to 88 beats per minute during ascent (figs.
[10-1](../a15mr085.jpg) and [10-2](../a15mr086.jpg)). The metabolic
rates of the two lunar surface crewmen during the three lunar surface
extravehicular periods are correlated with their heart rates as shown in
figures [10-3 Part 1](../a15mr087.jpg), and [10-3 Part
2](../a15mr088.jpg), [10-4 Part 1](../a15mr089.jpg) and [10-4 Part
2](../a15mr090.jpg) and [10-5 Part 1](../a15mr091.jpg), and [10-5 Part
2](../a15mr092.jpg). The Commander\'s average heart rates for the first,
second, and third periods were 92, 84, and 85 beats per minute,
respectively; and the Lunar Module Pilot\'s average heart rates for the
three periods were 125, 107, and 105 beats per minute, respectively. A
summary of the average metabolic rates and total production during all
extravehicular activity periods is presented in [table
10-I.](../a15mr093.jpg)

![](media/image86.jpeg){width="5.333333333333333in"
height="2.4270833333333335in"}

![](media/image87.jpeg){width="4.583333333333333in"
height="2.8541666666666665in"}

![](media/image88.jpeg){width="6.020833333333333in" height="4.5625in"}

![](media/image89.jpeg){width="6.125in" height="4.875in"}

![](media/image89.jpeg){width="6.125in" height="4.875in"}

![](media/image90.jpeg){width="6.458333333333333in" height="4.4375in"}

![](media/image91.jpeg){width="6.291666666666667in" height="4.59375in"}

![](media/image92.jpeg){width="6.493055555555555in"
height="5.115972222222222in"}

![](media/image93.jpeg){width="6.020833333333333in"
height="4.572916666666667in"}

![](media/image94.jpeg){width="5.4375in" height="1.8541666666666667in"}

## MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS

### Adaptation to Weightlessness

Shortly after orbital insertion, each crewman experienced the typical
fullness-of-the-head sensation that has been reported by all previous
flight crews. The Commander adapted rapidly to weightlessness and noted
that on this flight, in contrast to his Apollo 9 experience, he felt
completely at ease in the weightless state and was able to move his head
rapidly without discomfort.

The Command Module Pilot apparently experienced no difficulty in
adapting to weightlessness; but the Lunar Module Pilot reported that his
sensation of head-fullness lasted 3 days. In addition, the Lunar Module
Pilot experienced slight giddiness which precluded rapid head or body
movements. This sensation disappeared shortly after landing on the lunar
surface and did not recur on returning to the zero-gravity environment.

None of the crewmen experienced nausea, vomiting, or disorientation
during any phase of the mission. An observation made by the crew was
that their facial features were distorted because of the lack of
gravity. The crew also reported the discomfort and soreness of the lower
back muscles associated with postural changes during weightlessness.

### Medications

Aspirin and nose drops were the only medications used during the
mission. The Commander took a total of 14 aspirin to relieve the pain he
developed in his right shoulder after the difficult deep core tube
drilling operation on the lunar surface. The Command Module Pilot used
nose drops just prior to earth entry to prevent possible middle ear
blockage.

### Sleep

Very little shift of the crew\'s normal terrestrial sleep cycle occurred
during the translunar and transearth coast phases of this mission. As a
result, all crewmen received an adequate amount of sleep during these
periods.

Displacement of the terrestrial sleep cycle during the three lunar
surface sleep periods ranged from 2 hours for the first sleep period to
7 hours for the third sleep period. This shift in the sleep cycle, in
addition to the difference between the command module and lunar module
sleep facilities, no doubt contributed to the lunar module crewmen
receiving less, sleep on the lunar surface than was scheduled in the
flight plan. However, the most significant factors causing loss of crew
sleep were operational problems. These included hardware malfunctions as
well as insufficient time in the flight plan to accomplish assigned
tasks. During the first sleep period, the crewmen went to sleep one hour
later than planned and had to arise one hour early to fix a cabin oxygen
leak. The crewmen again were an hour late in getting to sleep for the
second lunar surface sleep period. The final sleep period was changed so
that the beginning of the period was 2 1/2 hours later than originally
planned. The period, which had been planned to last 7 hours, was
terminated after 6 1/2 hours to begin preparations for the final
extravehicular activity. Lengthening the work days and reducing the
planned sleep periods on the lunar surface coupled with a significant
alteration of the lunar module crewmen\' circadian rhythm produced a
sufficient fatigue level to cause them to operate on their physiological
reserves until they returned to the command module.

### Radiation

The Commander\'s personal radiation dosimeter failed to integrate the
dosage properly after the first 24 hours of flight. In order to have
f\'unctional dosimeters on each lunar module crewman while on the lunar
surface, the Command Module Pilot transferred his unit to the Commander
prior to lunar module intravehicular transfer. The final readings from
the personal radiation dosimeters yielded net integrated (uncorrected)
values of 360 millirads for the Commander and 510 millirads for the
Lunar Module Pilot. The passive dosimeters worn continously by all
crewmen during the entire mission yielded an average of 300 millirads at
skin depth. This dosage is well below the threshold of detectable
medical effects.

### Visual Light Flash Phenomenon

Three observation periods of approximately 1 hour were conducted during
translunar and transearth coast as well as during lunar orbit. The crew
reported seeing the point sources of light noted by previous Apollo
crews. The frequency of the light flashes ranged from once every 2
minutes to once every 5 minutes for each crewman. The frequency of light
flashes was greater during translunar flight than transearth flight.

### Water

The crew reported that the taste of the drinking water in both the
command module and the lunar module was good. All scheduled inflight
chlorinations of the command module water system were reported
accomplished. Preflight testing of the lunar module potable water system
iodine levels showed that use of the bacterial filter would be necessary
to prevent bacterial contamination during the mission. The crew reported
the sporadic occurrence of gas bubbles in the command module drinking
water, but this did not interfere with food hydration.

The Commander consumed about 16 ounces of water during the first
extravehicular activity; however, his insuit drinking device slipped
under his neck ring on the second extravehicular activity and he was
unable to obtain any water. The Lunar Module Pilot was never able to
obtain drinking water from his device. The insuit drinking devices were
not used during the third extravehicular activity (see sec. 14-5.5).

Inflight water samples were taken on the first and last days of the
flight to determine the nickel ion concentration. Analysis of these two
inflight water samples revealed that the nickel ion concentration on the
first day of flight rose from a prelaunch value of 0.35 parts per
million to 6.3 parts per million. On the last day of the flight, 2.7
parts per million of nickel ion concentration were found. The latter was
not a representative sample because of the reported water system anomaly
(section 14.1.14) which occurred about 12 hours before the sample was
taken. This anomaly resulted in only a portion, if any, of the
chlorine/buffer/inhibitor solution being injected into the potable water
tank and, subsequently, the hot water heater. The nickel ion
concentration is believed to result from a chemical reaction between the
purification inhibitors and the nickel brazing used in the hot water
heater. Three postflight hot water port samples taken 8 hours, 13 hours,
and 17 days after recovery yielded nickel ion concentrations of 2.34,
2.02, and 0.34 parts per million, respectively. These data indicate that
the postflight nickel ion concentration diminishes as a function of time
when the water system is deactivated rather than increases as previously
presumed. Postflight analysis of the command module water showed no
chlorine residual. The level of nickel ions in the potable water is not
considered to be injurious to the crewmen.

### Food

The food system on this flight was similar to that of previous Apollo
missions with the exception that additional food stowage space was
provided in both the command and service module and the lunar module to
accommodate the extra food required for a 12.3-day lunar mission. Prior
to flight, each crewman evaluated about 100 available foods and selected
his menu. The food was arranged in meal packages for the first 10 days
of flight. Menus and supplemental food for the remainder of the mission
were selected in real time from the food pantry.

The inflight menus were designed to provide approximately 2400
kilocalories per man per day with 400 additional kilocalories in
beverages and extra food supplied in the pantry. Thus a total of 2800
kilocalories were available for each crewman on a daily basis. On launch
day, each crewman was also provided with a specially prepared and
packaged frozen sandwich, suits.

Estimates of the crews\' food consumption, based on the onboard food log
and the returned food, indicate that an average of 2801, 2372, and 2568
kilocalories per day were consumed by the Commander, the Command Module
Pilot, and the Lunar Module Pilot, respectively. The crew commented
favorably after the flight on the quality of the inflight food and the
food systems. The new insuit food bars were used by both lunar module
crewmen on the first and second extravehicular activities. They did not
carry the food bar on the third extravehicular activity.

## PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

Each crewman received a comprehensive physical examination at 28, 13,
and 5 days prior to launch, with brief examinations conducted daily
during the last 5 days before launch.

A comprehensive physical examination conducted shortly after landing
showed that the crew was in good health. Body weight losses incurred by
the Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot during the
mission were 2-3/4, 3, and 5-1/2 pounds, respectively. All crewmen
suffered varying degrees of minor skin irritiation at the biosensor
sites. The cause of this irritation was mechanical friction rather than
allergic reaction. The skin irritation subsided within 48 hours without
medical treatment.

The Commander had hemorrhages under the fingernails of the middle
finger, ring finger, and thumb of his right hand and on the ring finger
of his left hand. These hemorrhages were attributed to an insufficient
pressure suit arm-length size causing the finger tips to be forced too
far into the extravehicular gloves during hard-suit operations. The
pressure suit fit was adjusted to suit the Commander\'s preference to
increase his sensitivity of touch. The Commander\'s painful right
shoulder was due to a muscular/ligament strain which responded rapidly
to heat therapy.

The time required by the crew to return to preflight baseline levels in
lower body negative pressure measurements and bicycle ergometry tests
was longer than for previous flights. Some individual variations in the
return-to-baseline time occurred, but, in general, about 1 week was
required for each crewman to reach his preflight baseline levels.

Both the Commander and the Lunar Module Pilot had a cardiovascular
response to the bicycle ergometry tests not observed in previous
missions. This response was characterized by an almost normal response
at low heart rate levels and a progressively degraded response at the
higher heart rate levels.

## BONE MINERAL MEASUREMENT

The bone mineral measurement experiment (M-078) was conducted to deter
mine the occurrence and degree of bone mineral changes in the Apollo
crewmen which might result from exposure to the weightless condition.
This study employed a new and more precise method of estimating bone
mineral by using an X-ray technique that utilizes an iodine isotope
mono-energetic beam possessing predictable photon absorption
characteristics.

Essentially, no changes were observed in the mineral content of the
radius, especially when the crew results are compared with the mineral
changes seen in control subjects selected on the basis of availability,
age, body build, weight, and sex. Immediate preflight and postflight
values of radius bone and os calcis (heel) measurements are as follows:
( [Figure](../a15mr094.jpg))

![](media/image95.jpeg){width="4.166666666666667in"
height="2.6041666666666665in"}

The Commander regained his mineral content of these bones more rapidly
than did the Command Module Pilot. Both were within baseline values at
the end of 2 weeks. The magnitude of these losses and the variability
observed in the postflight control subjects represent a loss of about 4
percent due to the weightlessness.

The changes in os calcis mineral content observed in the Lunar Module
Pilot and on Apollo 14 are in concert with the results observed in
bed-rest subjects. The Apollo 15 results are consistent when compared
with all previous postflight bone density measurements.

## APOLLO TIME AND MOTION STUDY

Analysis of the time and motion data indicates that the crewmen adapted
readily and efficiently to the lunar surface environment. Changes in
walking speed were noted during the first and second extravehicular
activities as the crewmen gained experience and confidence in moving
about the lunar surface. The walking speed for both crewmen under
comparable conditions increased from 1.0 ft/sec to 1.5 ft/sec during the
first extravehicular activity and from 1.5 ft/sec to 2.0 ft/sec during
the second extravehicular activity. No further increase was observed on
the third extravehicular activity.

The time to perform tasks on the lunar surface varied. On the average,
tasks required 33 percent more time to perform on the lunar surface than
on earth. However, some tasks took less time to perform on the lunar
surface than in a 1-g environment.

# MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE

## FLIGHT CONTROL

Flight control provided satisfactory operational support for all
required areas during the Apollo 15 mission. A number of the problems
that were encountered are discussed elsewhere in this report. Only those
problems that are unique to flight control, or have operational
considerations not previously mentioned, are presented in this section.

A radial velocity error in the launch vehicle guidance system at
earth-orbit insertion necessitated a navigation update to minimize the
subsequent planned midcourse correction. Without the update, a 32-ft/sec
velocity change would have been required at 9 hours. After updating the
state vector, the actual midcourse correction was approximately 5 ft/sec
(See section 6.5.)

As a result of the service propulsion system thrust light anomaly
discussed previously, the crew was requested to deactivate both pilot
valve circuit breakers immediately after the light was first observed.
This measure was instituted to safeguard against an inadvertent firing
until the problem could be thoroughly understood. To isolate the cause
of the Malfunction, a test was conducted in conjunction with the first
midcourse correction and the problem was resolved, including the
development of workaround procedures. The crew was instructed to power
down the entry monitor system scroll in order to eliminate the nuisance
factor of a constant false light indication until the use of the entry
monitor system was required.

During the first period of scientific instrument module activity for
film advancement, the ground station (Madrid) had a problem in locking
onto the FM subcarrier. This was determined to be a site procedural
problem. All sites were briefed on the problem and no subsequent
problems were encountered.

After lunar module ingress and the crew\'s description of the broken
glass cover on the range/range rate tapemeter, ground tests were
performed to verify that the tapemeter would function properly with the
glass broken, exposing the inside of the instrument to the cabin
atmosphere. A careful review of procedures was made to evaluate crew
monitoring techniques during descent. A technique was developed to use
the abort guidance system for displaying raw landing radar altitude data
should the tapemeter and the primary guidance and navigation system
fail, but the technique was not voiced to the crew.

At acquisition of signal during the 12th lunar revolution, the lunar
module crew reported that they had been unable to separate from the
command and service module and that the Command Module Pilot was
investigating the probe umbilical integrity. An off-scale high docking
probe temperature was indicative of a possible umbilical problem. The
umbilicals were found to be the source of the problem, and the condition
was corrected. Meanwhile, the crew had been advised by Mission Control
that undocking and separation were not time critical. The separation was
achieved about 36 minutes late. Landmark tracking was deleted during the
umbilical integrity problem, but adequate data were later obtained when
the command and service module was in a higher orbit.

During the sleep period after the standup extravehicular activity, the
descent oxygen was being depleted at a rate about 1 pound/hour greater
than expected. The oxygen quantity was not critical, but the descent
oxygen tank pressure was critical to allow a full portable life support
system recharge for the third extravehicular activity, The crew was
awakened approximately 1 hour early to locate the leak. They found that
the leak was caused by the urine receptacle device being inadvertently
left open. The early completion of this task allowed preparations for
the first extravehicular activity to start about 20 minutes early.

## NETWORK

Adequate support was provided by the Mission Control Center and Manned
Space Flight Network. Although a number of minor discrepancies and
problems arose during the mission, there was no interruption of mission
support. The most significant problem, in terms of potential impact, was
an error in a command module computer delta-velocity return update. The
error was not discovered until after the load had been transmitted to
the spacecraft. A different load was then generated and transmitted to
correct the data in the command module computer. A correction to the
software will be made for the next mission.

## RECOVERY OPERATIONS

The Department of Defense provided recovery support in accordance with
the mission planning for Apollo 15. Ship support for the primary landing
area in the Pacific Ocean was provided by the helicopter carrier USS
Okinawa. Active air support consisted of five SH-3G helicopters from the
Okinawa and two HC-130 rescue aircraft staged from Hickam Air Force
Base, Hawaii. Two of the helicopters, designated \"Swim 1\" and \"Swim
2\", carried underwater demolition team personnel and the required
recovery equipment. The third helicopter, designated \"Recovery,\"
carried the flight surgeon and was utilized for the retrieval of the
flight crew. The fourth heliccpter, designated \"Photo,\" served as a
photographic platform for both motion picture photography and live
television coverage. The fifth helicopter, designated \"Relay,\" served
as a communications relay aircraft. The two HC-130 aircraft, designated
\"Hawaii Rescue 1\" and \"Hawaii Rescue 2,\" were positioned to track
the command module after it had exited from S-band blackout, as well as
to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange
or downrange of the target point. The inset in figure 11-1 indicates the
relative positions of the recovery ship and HC-130 aircraft prior to
landing. The recovery forces assigned to the Apollo 15 mission are shown
in [Table 11-I.](../a15mr095.jpg)

![](media/image96.jpeg){width="5.333333333333333in"
height="5.041666666666667in"}

### Command Module Location and Retrieval

Based upon a navigation satellite (SRN-9) fix obtained at 2o46 G.m.t.,
August 7, the Okinawa\'s position at the time of command module landing
was determined to be 26 degrees 12 minutes 54 seconds north latitude and
158 degrees 13 minutes 12 seconds west longitude. The ship-based
aircraft were initially positioned with respect to the target point as
shown in [figure 11-1](../a15mr096.jpg), and they departed station to
commence recovery operations after visual contact had been made with the
command module. The Okinawa is shown in figure 11-1 as it was positioned
at the time of command module landing.

![](media/image97.jpeg){width="4.958333333333333in" height="5.875in"}

Radar contact with the command module was first reported by the Okinawa
at 2037 G.m.t. This was followed by an S-band reported by Hawaii Rescue
1 at 2038 G.m.t. and VHF recovery beacon contact by the Okinawa at 2041
G.m.t. At approximately the same time, all recovery force aircraft
established VHF recovery beacon contacts. Shortly thereafter, two-way
voice communication was established between the Apollo 15 crew and
recovery forces.

Visual sighting of the command module occurred at 2041 G.m.t. by the
Swim 2, Photo, and Relay helicopters. At the time of initial sighting,
the command module was descending on three normal main parachutes. At
least two pilots, in different aircraft, saw one main parachute stream
at about 6000 feet.

The command module with the two main parachutes properly inflated and
one collapsed, landed at 2045:53 G.m.t., approximately 32 seconds
earlier than predicted, and remained in the Stable I flotation attitude.
The landing point was calculated using the navigation satellite fix of
the shin\'s position at spacecraft landing and a radar sighting which
established that the command module was 6.6 miles distant on a bearing
of 145 degrees east of north. Based upon these data, the landing point
coordinates were 26 degrees 7 minutes 30 seconds north latitude and 158
degrees 9 minutes west longitude.

After a visual inspection of the command module and assurance from the
crew that they were all in good condition, the Swim 2 helicopter managed
to secure one of the main parachutes before dropping swimmers who
installed the flotation collar on the command module. The Swim 1
helicopter dropped swimmers to secure a life raft to the forward heat
shield. One main parachute and the heat shield were retrieved.

The flight crew was delivered aboard the USS Okinawa by the recovery
helicopter at 2125 G.m.t. No quarantine procedures were required for
this mission. Command module retrieval took place at 26 degrees 7
minutes north latitude, 158 degrees 10 minutes 12 seconds west longitude
at 2220 G.m.t. on August 7.

he flight crew remained aboard the Okinawa until 1655 G.m.t., August 8,
and were then flown to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. After a brief
welcoming ceremony, a C-141 aircraft flew them to Ellington Air Force
Base, Texas.

The command module was offloaded at North Island Naval Air Station, San
Diego, California, on August 17. It was deactivated and delivered to
Downey, California, on August 20.

The following page shows a chronological listing of events during the
recovery and postrecovery operations. ( [Figure](../a15mr097.jpg))

![](media/image98.jpeg){width="5.25in" height="6.291666666666667in"}

### Postrecovery Inspection

Visual inspection of the command module in the recovery area revealed
the following minor discrepancies:

One of the VHF-antenna ground planes was damaged.

The O-ring that seals the forward heat shield cover to the tunnel was
loose.

The docking ring was slightly damaged, as generally occurs

A section of the aft heat shield, approximately 12 inches by 14 inches
by 1/2-inch deep, was missing. (This generally occurs to some degree
from the water impact.)

# ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES

The four primary objectives (ref. 4) assigned to the Apollo 15 mission
were:

Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials and
surface features in a pre-selected area of the Hadley-Appenine region.

Emplace and activate surface experiments.

Evaluate the capability of the Apollo equipment to provide extended
lunar surface stay time, increased extravehicular operations, and
surface mobility.

Conduct inflight experiments and photographic tasks from lunar orbit.

Twelve detailed objectives (derived from primary objectives) and
twenty-four experiments (listed in [table 12-1](../a15mr098.jpg) and
[table 12-1 Concluded](../a15mr099.jpg) and described in reference were
assigned to the mission. Preliminary indications are that adequate data
were obtained to successfully complete all objectives.

The Manned Spacecraft Center participated in two of nine approved
operational tests. The two operational tests were: lunar gravity
measurement (using the lunar module primary guidance system) and a lunar
module voice and data relay test (a lunar module and Manned Space Flight
Network test of voice and portable life support system data from the
Lunar Module Pilot). Both tests were completed.

The other seven tests were performed for the Department of Defense and
the Kennedy Space Center. These tests are designated as follows:

Chapel Bell (classified Department of Defense test)

Radar skin tracking

Ionospheric disturbance from missiles

Acoustic measurement of missile exhaust noise

Army acoustic test

Long-focal-length optical system

Sonic boom measurement

![](media/image99.jpeg){width="6.495138888888889in"
height="7.743055555555555in"}

![](media/image100.jpeg){width="4.8125in" height="2.2291666666666665in"}

TABLE 12-1. - DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS (Concluded)

a Fourteen 35-mm photographs were scheduled for the Gegenschein from
lunar orbit experiment. None of the photographs were obtained because of
an error in the spacecraft photographic attitudes used. The error was
incurred during the analytical transformation of the target coordinates
to spacecraft attitudes.

# LAUNCH PHASE SUMMARY

## WEATHER CONDITIONS

Gentle to moderate southerly winds extended from the surface to an
altitude of 25 000 feet at launch time. The maximum wind was 37 knots at
45 000 feet. Broken thin cirrostratus; clouds covered much of the sky at
25 000 feet, but no low or middle clouds were observed. Surface
temperature was 83 F and visibility was 10 miles.

## ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICITY

The Apollo 15 launch complex was struck by lightning on five different
days during the checkout activities. In all, eleven separate strikes
were recorded between June 14 and July 21, 1971. The direct damage
incurred was limited to the command and service module ground support
equipment.

Launch site lightning strikes have not been documented for program other
than Apollo and Gemini. Incidents reported for these two programs are as
follows:

On August 17, 1964, a lightning strike occurred near, but not directly
on, launch complex 19. The Gemini II vehicle was visually inspected and
found to be free of lightning-type markings or burns. Later, some failed
components were discovered which were believed to have resulted from the
lightning incident.

The first Apollo strike occurred in September 1964. The launch umbilical
tower was struck on launch complex 34 while the S-I launch vehicle was
being prepared for flight. No failures were reported.

The second, and final, Gemini incident was a strike near the launch
complex 19 power facility during the Gemini V countdown on August 19,
1965. No lightning-relatea damage was reported.

At least one lightning strike occurred on the mobile launcher for the
AS-201 vehicle. This occurred sometime between August 9 and August 27,
1965, at launch complex 39. Only the S-IB stage of the space vehicle
could have been on the pad at the time and no lightning damage was
reported.

At least two strikes were recorded on the mobile launcher for the
AS-50OF vehicle at launch complex 39A. This was a non-flight facility
test vehicle. The first incident occurred on May 27, 1966. On June 21,
1966, magnetic recording links on the mobile launcher were examined and
the reading indicated at least one strike had occurred between May 27
and June 21, 1966. During this time, the complete launch vehicle for the
AS-202 mission was on launch pad 37B and the complete launch vehicle for
the AS-203 mission was on launch pad 34. No lightning activity
associated with the latter two complexes was reported.

On July 27, 1967, a lightning strike occurred at launch complex 37B. The
complete launch vehicle was on the pad at the time of the incident.
Ground support equipment damage was found at a later date, which may
have been caused by the lightning.

The only other lightning strike reported prior to the Apollo 15
prelaunch activities occurred during the launch phase of the Apollo 12
mission. This occurrence is documented in reference 6.

Existing weather data were examined for the May-through-July periods
from 1966 to the launch of Apollo 15. Reported cloud-to-ground lightning
strikes for a period of 90 days within the general vicinity of Cape
Kennedy showed the daily average to be as follows:

![](media/image101.jpeg){width="4.791666666666667in"
height="0.8541666666666666in"}

( [Figure](../a15mr100.jpg))

Thunderstorms are more prevalent on the west side of the Indian River
and remain west of the launch pad. During the summer of 19T1, however,
the west winds prevailed more frequently than the preceding several
years, thus causing the thunderstorms to move east. The lightning
density in conjunction with the general easterly movement of the storms
contributed to the number of strikes being higher than in the past.

## LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

The eighth manned Saturn V Apollo space vehicle, AS-510, was launched on
an azimuth 90 degrees east of north. A roll maneuver was initiated at
12.2 seconds after lift-off and the vehicle was placed on a flight
azimuth of about 80 degrees. The trajectory parameters from launch
through translunar injection were nominal. Earth-parking-orbit insertion
conditions were achieved 4.4 seconds earlier than planned.

The performance of the S-IC propulsion system was satisfactory and the
specific impulse and mixture ratios were near the predicted values. Four
of the eight S-IC retromotors and all of the S-II stage ullage motors
were removed for this flight; therefore, the S-IC/S-II separation
sequence was revised. This sequence change extended the coast period
between S-IC outboard engine cutoff and S-II engine start command by one
second. The S-IC/S-II separation sequence and S-II engine thrust buildup
performance was satisfactory.

The S-II propulsion system performed normally. The specific impulse and
mixture ratios were near predicted values. This was the second S-II
stage to incorporate a center-engine liquid-oxygen feedline accumulator
as a longitudinal oscillation (POGO) suppression device. The operation
of the accumulator system was effective in suppressing these types of
oscillations.

The S-IVB stage J-2 engine operated satisfactorily throughout the first
and second firings and had normal start and cutoff transients. The
firing time for the first S-IVB firing was 141.5 seconds, 3.8 seconds
less than predicted. Approximately 2.6 seconds of the shorter firing
time can be attributed to higher than predicted S-IVB performance. The
remainder can be attributed to S-IC and S-II stage performances. The
specific impulse and engine mixture ratio were near the predicted
values.

Abnormal temperatures were noted in the turbine hot gas system between
the first S-IVB firing engine cutoff and second firing engine start
command. Most noticeable was the fuel turbine inlet temperature. During
liquid hydrogen chilldown, this temperature decreased from +130 to -100
F at the time of the second engine start command. The oxidizer turbine
inlet temperature also indicated a small decrease. In addition, the fuel
turbine inlet temperature indicated an abnormally fast decrease after
engine cutoff for the first firing. A possible cause of the decrease in
turbine inlet temperature was a small leak past the gas generator fuel
inlet valve.

The S-IVB firing time for translunar injection was 350.8 seconds. Upon
completion of the spacecraft separation, transposition, docking, and
extraction operations, the S-IVB evasive maneuver was performed and,
subsequently, the vehicle was placed on a trajectory to impact the lunar
surface in the vicinity of the Apollo 14 landing site. The
S-IVB/instrumentation unit impacted the lunar surface at 1 degree 31
minutes south latitude and 11 degrees 49 minutes west longitude with a
velocity of 8455 ft/sec. This impact point is approximately 146
kilometers (79 miles) from the target of 3 degrees 39 minutes south
latitude and 7 degrees 35 minutes west longitude. Although the impact
location was not within the preferred region, scientific data were
obtained from the impact.

The impact point projected from the first auxiliary propulsion system
maneuver was perturbed by unplanned attitude control thrusting that
occurred to counteract forces resulting from a water leak in the
sublimator. Following the second auxiliary propulsion system maneuver,
the small and gradually decreasing unbalanced force from the sublimator
water leak continued to act for a period of 5 hours and further
perturbed the point of impact.

The structural loads experienced during the S-IC boost phase were well
below design values. Thrust cutoff transients experienced were similar
to those of previous flights. During S-IC stage boost, 4- to 5hertz
oscillations were detected beginning at approximately 100 seconds. The
maximum amplitude measured at the instrumentation unit was
&plusmn;0.06g. Oscillations in the 4- to 5-hertz range have been
observed on previous flights. The structural loads experienced during
the S-IVB stage firings were well below design values.

The guidance and navigation system provided satisfactory end conditions
for the earth parking orbit and translunar injection. The control system
was different from that of Apollo 14 because of redesigned filters and a
revised gain schedule. These changes were made to stabilize structural
dynamics caused by vehicle mass and structural changes and to improve
wind and engine-out characteristics.

The launch vehicle electrical systems and emergency detection system
performed satisfactorily throughout all phases of flight. Operation of
the batteries, power supplies, inverters, exploding bridge wire firing
units, and switch selectors was normal. Vehicle pressure and thermal
environments in general were similar to those experienced on earlier
flights. The environmental control system performance was satisfactory.
All data systems performed satisfactorily through the flight.

More details of the launch vehicle operation and performance are given
in reference 1.

# ANOMALY SUMMARY

This section contains a discussion of the significant anomalies that
occurred during the Apollo 15 mission. The discussion is divided into
six major areas: command and service modules; lunar module; scientific
instrument module experiments; Apollo lunar surface experiments package
and associated equipment; government-furnished equipment; and the lunar
roving vehicle.

## COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES

### Service Module Reaction Control System Propellant Isolation Valves Closed

During postinsertion checks, the quad B secondary isolation valve
talkback indicated that the valve was closed, and the switch was cycled
to open it. Subsequently, talkbacks indicated that both the primary and
secondary valves for quad D were also closed, and these valves were
reopened. At S-IVB separation (approximately 3 hours 22 minutes), all
the aforementioned valves closed and were reopened. Upon jettisoning of
the scientific instrument module door, the quad B secondary valve closed
and was reopened.

This type of valve (a magnetic latching valve, shown in [fig.
14-1](../a15mr101.jpg)) has, in previous missions, closed as a result of
pyrotechnic shocks. Ground tests have shown that the valve will close at
a shock level of approximately 80g sustained for 8 to 10 milliseconds.
There were no indications of shock levels of the magnitude required to
close the valve during launch.

![](media/image102.jpeg){width="4.3125in" height="5.53125in"}

Testing has shown that if a reversed voltage of 28 volts is applied to
the valve, the latching voltage will drop to a point where the valve
will no longer remain latched (magnet completely degaussed). In
addition, at lower voltages with reversed polarity, the magnet would
become partially degaussed.

During acceptance testing of one valve for command and service module
117, the latching voltage had changed from approximately 13 volts to 3
volts. Additional testing of the spacecraft 117 valve verified the low
voltage condition. Additionally, the valve stroke was proper, thereby
eliminating contamination as a possible cause of the problem. During the
test, the valve was disconnected from spacecraft power (28 volts) and
was being supplied power through a variable power supply (approximately
20 volts, maximum, applied to the valve). The valve was most likely
subjected to a reversed polarity at a voltage level which would
partially degauss the magnet. This may have been the cause of the valve
closures during Apollo 15 launch phase.

A magnetic latching force test was not performed on the valves after
assembly into the system for the Apollo 15 command and service module,
as on some previous spacecraft. A test will be performed on subsequent
assemblies to verify that the valve latching forces are acceptable.

This anomaly is closed.

### Water Panel Chlorine Injection Port Leakage

Minor leakage was noted from the chlorination injection port when the
cap was removed to perform the prelaunch water chlorination. The cap was
reinstalled and the leak ceased. A leak of approximately 1 quart in 20
minutes also was noted at the chlorine injection port as the crew
removed the injection port cap for the third injection at about 61
hours. The crew tightened the septum retention insert ( [fig.
14-2](../a15mr102.jpg)) and satisfactorily stopped the leakage. Leakage
recurred at about 204 1/2 hours and was corrected.

![](media/image103.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="3.7916666666666665in"}

Postflight inspection and dimensional checks of the injection port
assembly showed that all components were within established tolerances.

However, when the insert was tightened in accordance with the drawing
requirements, the resulting septum compression was apparently
insufficient to prevent the insert from loosening as a result of
\"O-ring drag\" when the cap was removed. This allowed water leakage
past the relaxed septums.

For future spacecraft, a shim will be installed under the insert
shoulder to control the septum compression while allowing the
installation torque to be increased to a range of 48 to 50 in-lb and,
thus, preclude insert backout.

This anomaly is closed.

### Service Propulsion System Thrust Light On Entry Monitor System

The service propulsion system thrust light located on the entry monitor
system panel was illuminated shortly after transposition and docking
with no engine firing command present. This light indicated the presence
of a short to ground in the service propulsion system ignition
circuitry. Ignition would have occurred if the engine had been armed.

The short was isolated to the system A delta-V thrust switch which was
found to be intermittently shorted to ground ( [fig.
14-3](../a15mr103.jpg)).

![](media/image104.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in"
height="3.7708333333333335in"}

A test firing performed at 28:40:22 verified that the short existed on
the ground side of the service propulsion system pilot valve solenoids.

The delta-V thrust switch ( [fig. 14-4](../a15mr104.jpg)) was shorted to
ground both before and after removal of panel 1 from the command module
during postflight testing. After a change in panel position, the
short-to-ground disappeared. The switch was then removed from the panel
and X-rayed. The X- rays showed a wire strand extending from the braid
strap which was thought to have caused the grounding problem. After
switch dissection, an internal inspection verified that a strand
extended from the braid strap; however, it did not appear to be long
enough to cause a ground at any point within the switch(fig. 14-4). The
bracket assemblies (pivot brackets, pigtail braids, and movable
contacts) and the plastic liner were removed from the switch.
Microscopic examination revealed that a wire strand (approximately 0.055
inch long) was present on the flange on terminal 2 (fig. 14-5). The
strand appeared to be attached, but was later moved quite easily.

![](media/image105.jpeg){width="5.041666666666667in" height="6.1875in"}

The bottom of the plastic case liner was examined, and showed no
evidence of a scratch or deformation conforming to the shape of the wire
strand. A sample wire strand was placed on a feed-through flange of a
scrap switch unit, and the plastic case liner was pressed on as would
occur during normal switch assembly. When the scrap switch was
disassembled an indentation in the plastic case liner was readily
apparent. This test indicated that the strand could not have been
trapped between the case liner and the flange surface; therefore, it is
postulated that it might have been enclosed in the cavity of
feed-through terminal 2 ( [fig. 14-5](../a15mr105.jpg)). The maximum
clearance between the interior of the feed-through terminal wall and the
terminal itself is 0.040 inch. A 0.055-inch-long wire strand could
easily have bridged this distance, and yet is short enough to move quite
freely within the feed-through terminal cavity. In fact, the strand
subsequently fell into the cavity. Examination of the strand and cavity
wall showed evidence of arcing. The strand could not be detected on the
X-rays because that area was obscured by other poles in the switch.

![](media/image106.jpeg){width="5.0625in" height="6.5in"}

Most of the switches on Apollo 16 and 17 spacecraft (3000 or 4000
series) required for crew safety or mission success were screened
according to the following procedures.

Additional inspection points were employed during manufacturing.

The switches were X-rayed prior to acceptance testing.

The acceptance vibration test was 3-axis random (4000 series) or
single-axis sinusoidal (3000 series) test.

The switches were X-rayed after acceptance testing.

The following switches for Apollo 16 were of an earlier series and have
been replaced with 4000 series switches:

a\. Up telemetry data/back-up voice\
b. VHF ranging\
c. Battery charger\
d. Thrust vector control servo power\
e. Postlanding ventilation\
f .Crew optical alignment sight power\
g. Optics power\
h. Inertial measurement unit power\
i. Rendezvous radar transponder power

Switches required for crew safety and mission success for Apollo 17
which had not been screened according to the aforementioned procedures
will also be replaced. In addition, two science utility power switches
are to be disabled and stowed, and two circuit breakers are to be added
to provide series protection for the command and service module/lunar
module final separation function.

This anomaly is closed.

### Integral Lighting Circuit Breaker Opened

The a-c bus 2 and the d-c bus B under-voltage alarms occurred and,
subsequently, the integral lighting circuit breaker opened.

A short circuit sufficient to cause the circuit breaker to open would
also cause the alarms. As a result of the problem, some display keyboard
lights, the entry monitor system scroll lighting, and various other
backlighting were not used for the remainder of the mission.

Postflight testing of the vehicle disclosed that the short circuit was
in the mission timer. The timer was removed from the vehicle and
returned to the vendor for further analysis. Teardown analysis revealed
a shorted input filter capacitor.

The capacitor is rated for 200-volt d-c applications and is being used
in an a-c application at voltages up to 115 volts. Since the dielectric
in the ceramic capacitor is a piezolectric material (barium titanate),
the 400-cycle a-c voltage actually causes the materials in the capacitor
to mechanically vibrate at that frequency. Over a period of time, the
unit could break down because of mechanical fatigue. This may have been
the cause of failure of this capacitor.

There are two mission timers on the command module and one on the lunar
module. The unit on the lunar module is separately fused. Fuses will be
added to the units in the Apollo 16 and 17 command modules. Appropriate
action will be taken to correct the timer design and an inline change
will be made on both the command module and lunar module.

This anomaly is closed.

### Battery Relay Bus Measurement Anomaly

At approximately 81-1/2 hours, the battery relay bus voltage telemetry
measurement read 13.66 volts instead of the nominal 32 volts, as
evidenced by battery bus voltage measurements. The crew verified that
the same low voltage reading was present on the panel 101 systems test
meter. When the crew moved the systems test meter switch, the reading
returned to normal.

Postflight testing of the vehicle and all of the involved components
revealed no anomalous condition which could have caused the problem but
did isolate the problem to the instrumentation circuitry and verify that
the functional operation of the bus was not impaired. Analysis indicates
that the only way to duplicate the flight problem would be to connect a
resistance of 2800 ohms from ground to the battery relay bus measurement
circuit ( [fig. 14-6](../a15mr106.jpg)). No resistance near this
magnitude was measured during postflight testing. The most probable
cause of the anomaly was that insulation resistance at the output
terminal of the switch was lowered because of humidity.

![](media/image107.jpeg){width="5.395833333333333in"
height="3.2291666666666665in"}

This is the only time that a problem of this type has occurred during
the Apollo Program and the probability of recurrence is considered to be
very low. If the problem does occur again, other measurements are
available for the determination of the battery relay bus voltage.

This anomaly is closed.

### Mass Spectrometer Boom Talkback Indicated Half-Barberpole On Retract

The mass spectrometer boom did not fully retract on five of twelve
occasions. Data analysis, supported by the crew debriefing, indicates
that the boom probably retracted to within about 1 inch of full
retraction. Cold soaking of the deployed boom and/or cable harness
preceded each anomalous retraction. In each case, the boom retracted
fully after warmup.

The deploy/retract talkback indicator is normally gray when off, when
the boom is fully retracted, or when it is fully extended. The indicator
is barberpole when the boom is extending or retracting, and will show
half barberpole if the drive motor stalls. The crew noted this last
condition on the incomplete retractions.

An inflight test of the Apollo 15 boom indicated that the problem was a
function of temperature. Testing and examination of the Apollo 16
spacecraft showed that the failure was possibly caused by pinching of
the cable harness during the last several inches of boom retraction. The
cable could have been pinched between the bell housing and rear H-frame
bearing ( [figure 14-7](../a15mr107.jpg)), or a cable harness loop was
jammed by a boom alignment finger against the bell housing ( [fig.
14-8](../a15mr108.jpg)).

![](media/image108.jpeg){width="5.354166666666667in"
height="4.354166666666667in"}

![](media/image109.jpeg){width="5.104166666666667in" height="5.125in"}

The mass spectrometer boom mechanism was qualified by similarity to the
gamma ray boom mechanism. There are significant differences between the
two designs and they are:

a\. When extended, the mass spectrometer boom is 1 foot 10 inches
shorter than the gamma ray spectrometer boom.\
\
b. The mass spectrometer cable harness contains 6 more wires and,
therefore, is larger in cross section than the gamma ray spectrometer
cable. In addition, the harness coil diameter on the mass spectrometer
is 1/2 inch larger (6.7 inches compared to 6.2 inches).\
\
c. The mass spectrometer cable harness terminates with an in-line
connector; whereas, the gamma ray spectrometer harness terminates with a
90-degree connector.\
\
d. The mass spectrometer rear H-frame bearings retract past the lip of
the bell housing; whereas, the retracted bearing position for the gamma
ray experiment boom is even with the bell housing lip. Therefore, the
lip on the sides of the mass spectrometer bell housing is relieved about
1/2 inch for bearing clearance.

The differences between the two configurations are now considered to be
significant enough to have required separate testing for the mass
spectrometer boom assembly. Accordingly, a delta qualification test will
be instituted and a thermal vacuum environmental acceptance test will be
performed on each flight unit.

Additional failure modes revealed during the testing of the Apollo 16
unit are:

a\. Insufficient clearance between the spectrometer rear H-frame
bearings and the boom housing bearings in relation to the rail support
bean shim retainers. This could have been significant on Apollo 15, had
a jettison been attempted.\
\
b. Misalignment between the right-hand guide rail forward floating
section and the rigid rear section.

If the boom does not retract to within approximately 12 inches of full
retraction, it will be jettisoned prior to the next service propulsion
system firing. Tests have shown that the boom will not buckle during a
service propulsion system firing when retracted to within 14.5 inches of
full retraction.

Corrective actions for Apollo 16 are as follows:

a\. A thermal vacuum test will be added to the acceptance test
requirements.\
\
b. The brackets supporting the service loop at the experiment end of the
cable harness will be redesigned.\
\
c. The existing finger guides will be extended.\
\
d. The bell mouth housing will be extended.\
\
e. Lead-in ramps will be added to the inboard bearing housings.\
\
f. Rail support beam shim retainer movement will be corrected by using
anti-roll pins in place of shim retainers.\
\
g. A proximity switch modification kit will be installed to show when
the boom has reached to within about 1 foot of full retraction.

This anomaly is closed.

### Potable Water Tank Failure To Refill

The potable water tank quantity began to decrease during meal
preparation at approximately 277 hours and failed to refill for the
remainder of the flight. The waste water tank continued to fill normally
and, apparently, accepted fuel cell water for this period. A similar
occurrence had been noted earlier, at 13 1/2 hours, when the potable
tank quantity decreased as the crew used the water, and remained
constant until a waste water dump was performed at 28 1/2 hours. This
decrease had been attributed to a closed potable tank inlet valve until
the crew verified in their debriefing that the valve had been open
during this time. The amount of water drained from the tank verified
that the tank instrumentation was reading correctly.

During a postflight fill operation, with the waste tank inlet valve
closed, and water introduced at the hydrogen separator, both the potable
and waste water tanks filled.

The check valve between the fuel cell and waste tank dump leg (figure
14-9) was tested and found to leak excessively. A tear-down analysis of
the check valve was performed and a piece of 300-series stainless steel
wire (approximately 0.0085 by 0.14 inch) was found between the umbrella
and the seating surface ( [fig. 14-9](../a15mr109.jpg)). This
contaminant could cause the umbrella to leak and yet move around
sufficiently to allow adequate seating at other times. The wire most
probably came from a welder\'s cleaning brush and was introduced into
the system during buildup. Safety wires and tag wires are of a larger
diameter than the one found. The check valve at the potable water tank
inlet is of a different configuration and is spring loaded closed. The
1-psi pressure required to open this valve is a large pressure drop
compared to the other components at the low flow of 1-1/2 lb/hour, and
would, therefore, cause the water to flow to the waste tank.

![](media/image110.jpeg){width="5.416666666666667in"
height="6.666666666666667in"}

The potable water tank inlet check valve was found to be contaminated
with aluminum hydroxide, a corrosion product, of aluminum and the
buffer. The potable water tank inlet nozzle was clean and free of
corrosion. The check valve corrosion is not believed to have caused the
problem, but could have contributed by increasing the crack pressure of
the valve.

No corrective action is considered necessary since the contamination is
considered to be an isolated case. If the problem should recur, the
potable tank will start to fill when the waste tank is full.

This anomaly is closed.

### Mission Timer Stopped

The panel 2 mission timer stopped at 124:47:37. Several attempts to
start the clock by cycling the start /stop/reset switch from the stop to
the start position failed ( [fig. 14-10](../a15mr110.jpg)). The timer
was reset to 124:59:00 using the hours, minutes, and seconds switches,
and the timer again failed to start when the switch was cycled. The
switch was then placed in the reset position. The timer reset to all
zeros and started to count when the switch was placed in the start
position. The timer was then set to the proper mission time using the
hours, minutes, and seconds switches and operated properly for the
remainder of the mission.

![](media/image111.jpeg){width="5.416666666666667in"
height="3.6666666666666665in"}

The timer and all associated equipment were still operating properly
after the flight. Thermal , vacuum, and acceptance tests were performed
and the cause of the failure could not be determined. Circuit analysis
showed that the problem could be caused by one of five integrated
circuits on the mounting board circuitry. These suspect components were
removed and tested with negative results.

The failure was most probably caused by an intermittent problem within a
component which later cured itself. If the problem occurs on a future
mission and the timer will not restart, mission time can be obtained
from the other timer in the command module, or from mission control. The
failure would be a nuisance to the crew.

This anomaly is closed.

### Main Parachute Collapse

One of the three main parachutes was deflated to approximately one fifth
of its full diameter at about 6000 feet altitude. The command module
descended in this configuration to landing. All three parachutes were
disconnected and one good main parachute was recovered. Photographs of
the descending spacecraft indicate that two or three of the six riser
legs on the failed parachute were missing ( [fig.
14-11](../a15mr111.jpg)).

![](media/image112.jpeg){width="5.229166666666667in"
height="5.229166666666667in"}

Three areas that were considered as possible causes are:

The forward heat shield, which was in close proximity to the spacecraft
flight path.

A broken riser/suspension line connector link which was found on the
recovered parachute ( [fig. 14-12](../a15mr112.jpg)).

The command module reaction control system propellant firing and fuel
dump.

![](media/image113.jpeg){width="4.895833333333333in"
height="6.333333333333333in"}

Onboard and photographic data indicate that the forward heat shield -
was about 720 feet below the spacecraft at the time of the failure. The
failed link on the recovered parachute implies the possibility of a
similar occurrence on the failed parachute. Based on parachute tow
tests, however, more than one link would have had to fail to duplicate
the flight problem. The two possible causes have been identified as
hydrogen embrittlement or stress corrosion.

The command module reaction control system depletion firing was
considered as a possible candidate because of the known susceptibility
of the parachute material (nylon) to damage from the oxidizer. Also
because the oxidizer depletion occurred about 3 seconds prior to the
anomaly, and fuel was being expelled at the time the anomaly occurred (
[fig. 14-13](../a15mr113.jpg)). Further, the orientation of the main
parachutes over the command module placed the failed parachute in close
proximity to the reaction control system roll engines. Testing of a
command module reaction control system engine simulating the fuel
(monomethyl hydrazine) dump mode through a hot engine resulted in the
fuel burning profusely; therefore, the fuel dump is considered to be the
most likely cause of the anomaly.

![](media/image114.jpeg){width="5.9375in" height="6.90625in"}

In order to eliminate critical processing operations from manufacture of
the connector links, the material was changed from 4130 to Inconel 718.

Based on the low probability of contact and the minimum damage
anticipated should contact occur, no corrective action will be
implemented for the forward heat shield. Corrective actions for the
reaction control system include landing with the propellants onboard for
a normal landing, and biasing the propellant load to provide a slight
excess of oxidizer. Thus, for low altitude abort land landing case,
burning the propellants while on the parachutes will subject the
parachutes to some acceptable oxidizer damage but, will eliminate the
dangerous fuel burning condition. In addition, the time delay which
inhibits the rapid propellant dump may be changed from 42 to 61 seconds.
This could provide more assurance that the propellant will not have to
be burned through the reaction control system engines in the event of a
land landing. A detailed discussion of all analyses and tests is
contained in a separate anomaly report (reference 7).

This anomaly is open.

### Data Recorder Tape Deterioration

At about 240 hours, after over 100 tape dumps had been completed, the
ground was unable to recover the data contained on about the first 20
feet of tape. To alleviate the problem, that portion of the tape was not
used again.

An electrical and physical examination of the flight tape was conducted.
Observation of the bi-phase output of the 51.2 kilobit pulse code
modulated output from the playback showed a complete deterioration of
the waveform for the first 20 seconds (12-1/2 feet), together with
numerous complete dropouts. After 20 seconds, the bi-phase signal
gradually improved to the point where, at 30 seconds, the signal
appeared normal. The 64 kilobit pulse code modulated output was
similarly affected to a lesser degree.

The first 30 feet of tape was scanned under magnifications ranging from
50X to 400X. Under 50X magnification, a distinct pattern of embedded
particles could be observed ( [fig. 14-14](../a15mr114.jpg)). The
deposits were quite heavy over the first 12 feet of tape, and gradually
tapered out so that, at 20 feet, very few particles could be observed.
Under 400X magnification, individual flakes of deposited material were
observed. The portion of figure 14-14 at 400X magnification shows a
typical cluster of particles on the beginning portions of the tape.

![](media/image115.jpeg){width="4.395833333333333in" height="3.4375in"}

A 10-foot leader coated with a silver oxide compound is spliced to the
beginning and end of the magnetic tape roll to activate the end-of-reel
sensors on the tape transport. There has been a history of this material
flaking off and affecting tape performance. Tape screening procedures
were implemented by the manufacturer in 1968 to eliminate this problem.
No further problems were encountered until Apollo 15. The recording
method for Apollo 14 and previous missions was considerably different
than that for the Apollo 15 mission. Bit packing densities for the
Apollo 15 mission tape approach 9000 bits per inch while those for the
previous missions were only 800 bits per inch. Abnormalities in the tape
would have considerably more effect with the higher packing density. The
utilization of the Apollo 15 mission recorder is also considerably
higher, allowing more time for deposits to build up.

An acceptance test (except for environmental verification) with a new
tape was conducted on the flight recorder and all parameters were within
specification with little change in absolute values from the
pre-delivery test.

Inspection on the magnetic heads under 20X magnification disclosed four
scratches, one of which is shown in [figure 14-15](../a15mr115.jpg). An
overlay was made of the scratches with respect to the accumulation of
silver oxide on the tape; two of the four scratches aligned perfectly
with the silver oxide accumulation. The scratches must have scraped
loose the silver oxide on the leader. Operation of the recorder would
then distribute the silver oxide particles along the tape. During the
manufacture of the Apollo 16 recorder, it was discovered that the heads
were being scratched by handling. The Apollo 15 recorder heads were
probably also scratched during manufacture. The scratches would not have
been detected during acceptance inspection since they are not visible at
the 7X magnification used during that inspection.

![](media/image116.jpeg){width="4.9375in" height="4.208333333333333in"}

Removable head covers have been provided to protect the heads from
handling damage when the recorder covers are not installed. These covers
have been used since early in the buildup cycle of the Apollo 16 and 17
data recorders. The recorder heads have been examined under 20X
magnification and no scratches were found.

This anomaly is closed.

### Digital Event Timer Obscured 

The seconds digit of the digital event timer, located on panel 1, became
obscured by a powder-like substance that formed on the inside of the
glass. Postflight analysis of the unit disclosed that the substance on
the window was paint which had been scraped from the number wheel by the
idler gear. The idler gear is free to rotate on the shaft ( [fig.
14-16](../a15mr116.jpg)); however, the design allows the stainless-steel
shaft to also rotate. The stainless steel shaft bearing points are in
the magnesium motor plate and the shaft rotation wears away the softer
magnesium material.

![](media/image117.jpeg){width="4.666666666666667in" height="4.8125in"}

Inspection of the unit showed that the magnesium bearing points had been
elongated as shown in figure 14-17. Torque from the stepping motor
applied to the idler gear not only resulted in rotation of the shaft but
also caused the shaft to tilt ( [fig. 14-17](../a15mr117.jpg)). The
wearing eventually allowed the shaft to tilt sufficiently to cause the
gear to rub against the number wheel. \'When the timer counted down, the
motor torque threw the gear teeth into the front edge of the counter
wheel. Testing indicates that this bearing hole elongation occurs after
approximately 500 hours running time (specification life is 1400 hours).

![](media/image118.jpeg){width="5.166666666666667in"
height="4.114583333333333in"}

A review of the history of the unit shows that it was built in 1966.
Prior to installation in Apollo 15, the unit was modified because of
failures on other timers. Brass shims (fig. 14-17) were installed to
prevent the idler gear from rubbing on the number wheel.

The analysis of those failures revealed that the idler gear was rubbing
paint off the number wheel and paint particles prevented the slip rings
and brushes from making good contact. A review of drawing tolerances
showed that an interference could occur and the addition of the shims
appeared to be adequate corrective action. These failure analyses did
not reveal the problem of the elongation of the bearing points since it
is not obvious until the timers are disassembled.

Units for future flights will be visually inspected by looking through
the window for paint flakes and signs of wear.

This anomaly is closed.

### Crew Restraint Harness Came Apart

The restraint harness on the right side of both the center and right
crew couches came apart during lunar orbit. The assemblies had become
unscrewed, but the crew was able to retrieve all the parts except one
cap and reassemble the harnesses satisfactorily for landing. The mating
plug for the missing cap was held in place with tape.

The plug-and-cap assembly ( [fig. 14-18](../a15mr118.jpg)), which is
part of the universal assembly that attaches the restraint harness to
the couch seatpan, separated. (There are a total of six plug-and-cap
assemblies on the crew couch, two per man.) The plug component (bolt)
has a nylon insert in the threaded portion that acts as a locking
device. Back-and-forth rotation of the adjuster link can cause the
plug-and-cap assembly to unscrew from each other. Checks on the four
other Apollo 15 assemblies showed zero torque on two of the units and
minimum specification value (2.0 in-lb) on the others. The loss of
torque is apparently due to cold flow of the plastic self-locking
pellet, causing a loss of friction against the mating threads.

![](media/image119.jpeg){width="5.104166666666667in"
height="6.395833333333333in"}

A thread locking sealant will be used to prevent the problem on future
missions.

This anomaly is closed.

### Loose Object In Cabin Fans

During portions of the flight when the cabin fans (fig. 14-19) were
activated, the crew heard sounds like an object striking the blades.
Cycling the fans several times allowed the object to be retained in a
position that precluded it from interfering with fan operation.

Inspection of the fans revealed considerable gouging on the leading
edges of the blades of both fans ( [fig. 14-19](../a15mr119.jpg)). No
marks were found on the outlet de-swirl vanes of either fan. After
extensive examination, including the lunar dust filter, a 1/4-inch
washer was found in the ducting.

![](media/image120.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in"
height="6.291666666666667in"}

Although the fan inlet is protected by screens in addition to the heat
exchanger core, the outlet is relatively open and the washer could have
drifted in and out when the fans were not operating. The outlet was
protected only during the limited time when the lunar dust filter was
installed. The washer could also have been left in the duct during
assembly.

No hardware changes are contemplated. Should the anomaly occur on a
subsequent flight, no detrimental effects would result.

This anomaly is closed.

### Scanning Telescope Visibility

The crew reported that excessive attenuation of light through the
scanning telescope existed throughout the flight. The telescope was
adequate to perform landmark tracking while in lunar orbit, but the crew
was unable to identify constellations, even though large numbers of
stars could be seen by looking out the spacecraft window.

Visual observations through the telescope ( [fig.
14-20](../a15mr120.jpg)) were made at the spacecraft manufacturer\'s
facility, and no degradation could be observed. A luminescent
transmittance test was performed on the telescope before removal from
the spacecraft and transmittance was calculated to be 25 percent. This
compares with an acceptance test value of 55 percent. The decrease is
due to the entry environment and sea water contamination. The 30-percent
decrease agrees well with the expected results and is not significant as
far as being able to see and recognize constellations is concerned. For
comparison, the earth\'s atmosphere normally causes a 50 percent loss in
star intensity; therefore, observing stars from earth with a telescope
with a 50-percent transmittance would be equivalent to observing stars
from a spacecraft in flight using a telescope with a 25- percent
transmittance.

![](media/image121.jpeg){width="4.520833333333333in"
height="5.729166666666667in"}

The flight anomaly was reproduced in the laboratory by placing the
optical unit assembly, the removable eye piece, and the optics panel in
a chamber wherein the environmental conditions that existed in the cabin
during flight were duplicated. Condensation on the eyepiece window and,
to a lesser extent, on the prisms in the removable eyepiece caused the
transmittance to decrease to about 4 percent.

A heater will be added to the removable eyepiece to prevent fogging in
the eyepiece assembly and on the eyepiece window.

This anomaly is closed.

### Gyro Display Coupler Roll Alignment

The crew reported that the roll axis did not align properly when the
gyro display alignment pushbutton was pressed. The roll axis error was
not nulled, whereas, the pitch and yaw axes were. Only by depressing the
align pushbutton for progressively longer periods, and eventually, by
moving the roll-axis thumbwheel, could the roll error be nulled.

For normal operation during alignment, resolvers in the gyro display
coupler electronics are compared to resolvers, one for each axis, on the
thumbwheels used to set desired attitude. The difference is an error
signal. The error is displayed on the attitude error needles, and the
signal is used to drive the resolvers to match the attitude set on the
thumbwheels. The anomaly could have been caused by either of two failure
modes. An intermittent open in the roll axis align loop or a low gain
problem in the electronics ( [fig. 14-21](../a15mr121.jpg)).

![](media/image122.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in" height="3.8125in"}

The gyro display coupler and attitude set control panel were put into
the hardware evaluator simulator and functionally tested at the systems
level in the actual spacecraft configuration in an attempt to repeat the
flight problem. During this testing, an out-of-tolerance condition was
observed on the attitude set control panel. This condition could have
caused a gain type problem and been the cause of the flight anomaly. The
measured resistance of the thumb wheel resolvers increased from the
nominal in all three axes by as much as 1000 ohms. Normally, this value
does not vary by more than 1 ohm. In order for this condition to have
been the cause of the anomaly, a resistance change in the roll axis
would have had to be an order of magnitude larger than that measured
postflight. The resistance change is caused by contamination between the
slip rings and the thumbwheel resolvers. As a result of the flight
anomaly, several resolvers were examined and contamination was detected.
The corrective action is to wipe the resolvers clean by rotating them
several hundred revolutions. The attitude set control panels in Apollo
16 and 17 will be checked and the resolvers will be wiped clean, or will
be replaced if necessary.

The flight condition could also have been caused by either of two
golden-g\" relays failing to close. Two failure modes have been
determined. One failure mode is \"normally open-failure to close\", and
other, \"normally closed - failure to open\", both caused by
contamination. \"Golden-g\" relays were the subject of an extensive
review in 1966 and 1967. Relays were classified as (1) critical, (2) of
major importance, (3) of minor importance, and (4) having no effect. It
was decided at that time to (1) make critical relays redundant, (2)
improve screening tests, and (3) take no corrective action for
non-critical relays. Both of the suspect relays are of major importance
in that either one would cause loss of the normal alignment capability
of the backup attitude reference system. The attitude reference system
could be aligned, but extensive work-around procedures would have to be
used.

Tests performed on the roll axis align enabling relay revealed
contamination which could have caused the flight anomaly. The rationale
developed during the \"golden-g\" relay review is applicable at this
time.

This anomaly is closed.

### Unable To Open Circuit Breaker Supplying Main A Power To Battery Charger

The circuit breaker tying the battery charger to main bus A could not be
opened manually during postflight testing. This breaker was not required
to be opened during the flight.

A green residue on the aluminum indicator stem at the copper mounting
bushing jammed the stem and prevented operation. Some of the residue was
removed for chemical analysis. The rest of the residue was dissolved by
the application of distilled water, thereby freeing the breaker. The
green residue was predominantly sodium-copper carbonate hydrate. Traces
of sodium chloride, and other metals were also present. These products
would result from salt water corrosion. Salt water could have been
introduced by sea water splashing on the breaker after landing or by
urine or perspiration released in the cabin during flight.

No corrective action is considered necessary.

This anomaly is closed.

### Pivot Pin Failure On Main Oxygen Regulator Shutoff Valve

The toggle-arm pivot pin for the side-A shutoff valve of the main oxygen
regulator was found sheared during postflight testing. With the pin
failed, the shutoff valve is inoperative in the closed position, thus
preventing oxygen flow to the regulator.

The pivot pin attaches the toggle arm to the cam holder and is retained
in place by the valve housing when properly assembled ( [fig.
14-22](../a15mr122.jpg)).

![](media/image123.jpeg){width="4.854166666666667in"
height="6.520833333333333in"}

Failure analysis showed that the pivot pin failed in single shear and
bending. This failure resulted from improper shimming which allowed the
pivot pin to come out of one side of the cam holder as shown in figure
14- 22. Analysis and testing has shown that the pin strength is adequate
in double shear, but will fail in single shear and bending with a force
of about 70 pounds applied at the tip of the toggle arm when it is in
the closed position. No marks were found on the toggle arm to indicate
that it had been struck by some object.

Inspection criteria to assure that valves now installed in other
spacecraft are properly assembled have been developed from a study of
adverse tolerance buildups associated with the valve components. These
criteria are that the lock nut does not protrude and the number of shims
does not exceed six (fig. 14-22).

This anomaly is closed.

### Crew Optical Alignment Sight Fell Off Stowage Mount

The crew optical alignment sight fell from its stowage mount during
landing because the locking pin which secures it was not engaged.
Normally, when the sight is placed into the mount, the locking pin is
raised automatically by a ramp and the pin is moved into the locking pin
hole by spring action ( [fig. 14-23](../a15mr123.jpg)). Postflight
examination showed that the ramp had been gouged preventing raising of
the pin by the ramp. The cause of the gouge is not known.

![](media/image124.jpeg){width="4.979166666666667in"
height="4.979166666666667in"}

The crew optical alignment sights for Apollo 16 and future spacecraft
will be fit-checked to insure proper operation of the latching
mechanism. Also, the Apollo Operations Handbook and crew checklist are
being revised to include verification of the latching pin engagement
prior to entry.

This anomaly is closed.

## LUNAR MODULE 

### Water/Glycol Pump Differential Pressure Fluctuations

Variations were noted in the water/glycol pump differential pressure
shortly after the cabin depressurizations for the standup extravehicular
activity and the second extravehicular activity. The variations were
similar on both occasions. The pressure differential decreased from
about 20 psid (normal) to about 15 psid, then increased to about 27 psid
and returned to normal ( [fig. 14-24](../a15mr124.jpg)).

![](media/image125.jpeg){width="5.4375in" height="4.8125in"}

The total times for the cycles were 3 minutes during the standup
extravehicular activity and 10 minutes during the second extravehicular
activity. The pump discharge pressure remained relatively stable
throughout both periods. If pressure fluctuations had taken place in the
heat transport system, both the pump discharge pressure and differential
pressure should have varied together.

After the second fluctuation occurred, water/glycol pump 2 was selected
because of the erratic differential pressure. All parameters were normal
during pump 2 operation. The crew reselected pump 1 prior to egress for
the second extravehicular activity, and it operated satisfactorily.
Later, after docking, the pump was turned off momentarily and the pump
discharge pressure readout was verified as correct since it decreased to
the accumulator pressure of 7.8 psia.

The lunar module cabin humidity was high at the initial manning for
descent because the command module cabin humidity was high. Furthermore,
a water spill in the lunar module cabin after the first extravehicular
activity again produced high humidity. Consequently, water would have
condensed on the cold 1/8-inch water/glycol sense lines between the pump
assembly and the pressure transducer ( [figs. 14-25](../a15mr125.jpg)
and [14-26](../a15mr126.jpg)), and the water would have frozen and
sublimed at the next cabin depressurization. Since there is no flow in
the sense lines, as little as 0.002 inch of condensed moisture on the
outside of these lines would freeze the fluid and cause the fluctuations
in the indicated differential pressure, but would not affect system
operation. Consequently, no corrective action is required.

This anomaly is closed.

![](media/image126.jpeg){width="4.666666666666667in"
height="4.666666666666667in"}

![](media/image127.jpeg){width="5.270833333333333in" height="3.34375in"}

### Water Separator Speed Decrease

The speed of water separator 1 decreased to below 800 rpm and tripped
the master alarm during the cabin depressurization for the standup
extravehicular activity. Separator 2 was selected and operated properly
at approximately 2400 rpm. After approximately 1 hour of separator 2
operation, separator 1 was reselected and performed satisfactorily
throughout the remainder of the mission.

Cabin atmosphere is cooled and passed through one of the water
separators (fig. 14-27) where condensed water is separated by
centrifugal force and picked up by a pitot tube. The water is then piped
from the pitot tube, through a check valve, to the water management
system where it is used in the sublimator.

Cabin humidity was high before the standup extravehicular activity and,
because the water and structure were cold, the line between the water
separator pitot tube and the water management system was cold. Under
these conditions, water would condense on the outside of the line (
[fig. 14-27](../a15mr127.jpg)), and when the cabin was depressurized for
the standup extravehicular activity, the water on the outside of the
line would boil, freeze, and sublime, thereby freezing the water in the
line.

![](media/image128.jpeg){width="6.493055555555555in"
height="4.879861111111111in"}

Analysis shows that as little as a 0.01-inch film of water on the
outside of the line will freeze the line at cabin depressurization.
Freezing within the line will cause the separator to slow down and stall
because of excessive water. Separator 2 had not been used. Therefore, no
water was in its outlet line to freeze. Consequently, it operated
successfully when activated.

Analysis and tests have shown that freezing of the line will not damage
any spacecraft hardware. If such freezing occurs, the other separator
would be used. Therefore, no corrective action is required.

This anomaly is closed.

### Broken Water Gun/Bacteria Filter Quick Disconnect

A water leak occurred at the quick disconnect between the bacteria
filter and the water gun (fig. 14-28) shortly after the first
extravehicular activity. The leak was caused by the plastic portion of
the disconnect being broken and was stopped by removing the filter.

When the water gun/bacteria filter combination is properly stowed, the
gun is held in a U-shaped boot ( [fig. 14-28](../a15mr128.jpg)). Both
the gun and filter are held in place by straps with the hose protruding
above the liquid cooling assembly. Bending the hose can easily exceed
the force required to break the quick disconnect between the bacteria
filter and the water gun if the filter is not strapped down. A test
showed that a torque of 204.6 inch-pounds caused a similar quick
disconnect to break in half.

![](media/image129.jpeg){width="4.708333333333333in"
height="5.979166666666667in"}

Based on the torque value of 204.6 inch-pounds, a force of approximately
27 pounds applied at the hose quick disconnect interface would break the
disconnect between the filter and the water gun.

The plastic parts will be replaced by steel inserts in all locations
where the quick disconnects are used in the lunar module and command
module.

This anomaly is closed.

### Intermittent Steerable Antenna Operation

Random oscillations occurred while the steerable antenna was in the
auto-track mode. The oscillations were small, and damped without losing
auto-track capability ( [fig. 14-29](../a15mr129.jpg)). The three times
when the oscillations became divergent are shown in [figure
14-30](../a15mr130.jpg).

![](media/image130.jpeg){width="4.5in" height="6.520833333333333in"}

![](media/image131.jpeg){width="4.729166666666667in" height="6.25in"}

100:26 (revolution 12): This divergence occurred prior to separation and
was not caused by vehicle blockage or reflections from the command and
service module structure.

100:41 (revolution 12): The lunar module maneuver, performed
approximately 2 minutes after separation, caused the antenna to track
into vehicle blockage, which resulted in the antenna oscillation and
loss of lock.

104:07 (revolution 14): Earth look angles for this time period indicate
that the antenna was clear of any vehicle blockage.

All oscillations indicated characteristics similar to the conditions
experienced on Apollo 14 ( [fig. 14-31](../a15mr131.jpg)). After Apollo
14, one of the prime candidates considered as a possible cause was
incidental amplitude modulation on the uplink signal. A monitor capable
of detecting very small values of incidental amplitude modulation was
installed at the Manned Space Flight Network Madrid site for Apollo 15.
The data from this monitor indicated that no amplitude modulation
existed on the uplink at the frequencies critical to antenna stability
during the problem times. Consequently, incidental amplitude modulation
has been eliminated as a possible cause of the antenna oscillations, and
the problem must be in the spacecraft.

![](media/image132.jpeg){width="4.6875in" height="4.8125in"}

There are two possible causes of the problem in the spacecraft. The
first is that electrical interference generated in some other spacecraft
equipment is coupled into the antenna tracking loop. A test performed on
the Apollo 16 lunar module showed that no significant noise is coupled
into the tracking loop during operation of any other spacecraft
equipment in the ground environment. The second is that temperature or
temperature gradients cause an intermittent condition in the antenna
which results in the oscillations. The acceptance tests of the antennas
do not include operation over the entire range of environmental
temperatures; therefore, a special test is being conducted on a flight
spare antenna to determine its capability to operate over the entire
range of temperatures and gradients.

This anomaly is open.

### Descent Engine Control Assembly Circuit Breaker Open

The descent engine control assembly circuit breaker was found open
during the engine throttle check after lunar module separation from the
command and service module. The circuit breaker was closed and the check
was successfully performed.

If there was a short circuit condition, it is highly unlikely that the
fault would have cleared at the instant the breaker opened. Thus, when
the breaker was reset, it would have reopened. Data were reviewed for
current surges large enough to trip the 20-ampere breaker, but none were
found. The crew stated that they may have left the circuit breaker open.
This is the most probable cause of the anomaly.

This anomaly is closed.

### Abort Guidance System Warning

Abort guidance system warnings and master alarms occurred right after
insertion into lunar orbit and at acquisition of signal prior to lunar
module deorbit. The first one was reset by the crew; the second
persisted until lunar impact. Performance of the abort guidance system
appeared normal before, during, and after the time of the alarms.

Exceeding any of the following three conditions in the abort guidance
system can cause the system warning light to illuminate. In each case,
the warning light would reset automatically when the out-of-tolerance
condition disappears.

a\. 28 &plusmn;2.8 volts dc\
\
b. 12 &plusmn;1.2 volts dc\
\
c. 400 &plusmn;15 hertz

A fourth condition which could cause the warning light to illuminate is
the receipt of a test-mode fail signal from the computer. This condition
requires manually resetting the warning light by placing the
oxygen/water quantity monitor switch to the CW/RESET position.

The conditions for generating a test mode fail signal are as follows
(none of these conditions was indicated in any of the computer data).

a\. Computer restart: A restart would cause internal status indicators
to be reset and telemetry quantity \"Vdx\" to be set to a prestored
constant (minus 8000 ft/sec).\
b. Computer self test: Computer routines perform sum checks of computer
memory and logic tests. Failure of these would set a self-test fail
status bit.\
c. Program timing: If the computer program is executing any instruction
(except a \"delay\" instruction) at the same time that a 20-millisecond
timing pulse is generated, a test-mode fail will be generated.

Computer routines running at the time of the warning have a worst-case
execution time of 18.425 milliseconds of the allowable 20 milliseconds;
therefore, a timing problem should not have occurred.

After the warning at insertion, the crew read out the contents of the
computer self test address 412, but there was no indication of a
test-mode fail. The crew did not, however, reload all zeros into address
412 as is required to reset the flip-flop (fig. 14-32) which controls
the test-mode fail output in the computer. Consequently, a second
test-mode fail would not have caused an abort guidance system warning.
The fact that a second warning did occur restricts the location of the
failure to the output circuit of the computer, the signal conditioner
electronics assembly, or the caution and warning system.

The abort electronics assembly test mode fail output drives a buffer (
[fig. 14-32](../a15mr132.jpg)) in the signal conditioner electronics
assembly which, in turn supplies the test mode fail signal to the
caution and warning system. The test mode fail buffer is the only
application in the lunar module where a transistor supplies the input
signal to the buffer and where the low side of the input to the buffer
is not grounded. Tests have shown that some buffers feed back 10-kHz and
600-kHz signals to the buffer input lines. These signals are completely
suppressed when the low side of the buffer input is grounded.

![](media/image133.jpeg){width="6.4375in" height="5.1875in"}

With the noise signal voltages present, the test mode fail driver is
more susceptible to electromagnetic interference. An analysis indicates
that,, with worst-case noise signals present, an induced voltage spike
of only about 3.5 volts will cause the test mode fail driver to
momentarily turn on and latch the caution and warning system master
alarm and abort guidance system warning light on.

For future spacecraft, the low side of the input to the buffer will be
grounded.

This anomaly is closed.

### No Crosspointer Indication

There was no line-of-sight rate data on the Commander\'s crosspointers
during the braking phase of rendezvous. The existence of line-of-sight
rates was verified by observing the position of the command module
relative to the lunar module. The scale switch was in the low position;
however, none of the other switch positions was verified. The power fail
light was off, indicating that the Commander\'s crosspointer circuit
breaker was closed.

The rate error monitor switch is used to select either rendezvous radar
data or data selected by the mode select switch for display. The mode
select switch selects velocities from the primary guidance system, the
abort guidance system, or the landing radar for display. No telemetry
data are available on the position of the rate error monitor switch and
the mode select switch, and the Commander reported that he did not look
at the flight director attitude indicator.

Four possible conditions could have affected the display of radar
antenna rate data ( [fig. 14-33](../a15mr133.jpg)).

a\. The rate error monitor switch could have been in the wrong position.
If the LDG RD/CMPTR position was selected, lateral velocity data from
the abort guidance system would have been displayed, but only if the
mode select switch had been in the AGS position. However, lateral
velocity at the time of the problem would have been near zero. If the
mode select switch had been in the PGNS position no data would have been
displayed.\
\
b. Conductive contamination between two contacts in the rate error
monitor switch could have had the same effect on the crosspointer
display as condition \"a\". The switch in this lunar module was X-rayed
and screened before installation, and no contaminant was found; however,
it should be pointed out that present screening techniques might not
detect a single wire strand between two contacts.\
\
c. An open in the return line would cause loss of rate data to one or
both meters, depending upon the location of the open. The signal return
lead from the Commander\'s meter in panel 1 is routed to panel 2 where
it is connected to the signal return from the Lunar Module Pilot\'s
meter and routed to the rendezvous radar.\
\
d. An open in the wire in the rendezvous radar electronics assembly
which connects 15 volts at 400 hertz to two velocity filters (one each
for shaft and trunnion rate) could cause the loss of shaft and trunnion
rate data to both sets of crosspointers.

![](media/image134.jpeg){width="6.490972222222222in"
height="5.222222222222222in"}

The most probable failure is an open in the signal return line.
Information could still be deduced from antenna position data which is
displayed on the flight director attitude indicators. Ground tests and
checkout may not show this type of failure. If the open is temperature
sensitive, a complete vehicle test involving vacuum, temperature, and
temperature gradients would be required to insure that failures of this
type would not occur in the flight environment. This type of testing is
not practical at the vehicle level. Consequently, no corrective action
is planned.

This anomaly is closed.

### Broken Range/Range Rate Meter Window

Sometime prior to ingress into the lunar module, the window of the
range/range-rate meter broke ( [fig. 14-34](../a15mr134.jpg)). Upon
ingress, the crew saw many glass particles floating in the spacecraft,
presenting a hazardous situation.

![](media/image135.jpeg){width="4.6875in" height="6.520833333333333in"}

The window is an integral part of the meter case and is made of annealed
soda-lime glass 0.085-inch thick. The meter case is hermetically sealed
and pressurized with helium to 14.7 psia at ambient temperature. At the
maximum meter operating temperature and with the cabin at vacuum, the
pressure differential can be as high as 16.1 psi. This pressure
differential is equivalent to a stress level of 6680 psi in the glass.

Glass will break when there is a surface flaw large enough to grow at
the stress levels present. The threshold flaw size in a dry environment
is about the same as the critical flaw size and immediate breakage
occurs. The critical flaw size remains the same in a humid environment,
but the threshold flaw is much smaller. For annealed soda-lime glass at
a stress level of 6680 psi, the critical flaw depth is 0.0036 inch, and
for a humid environment, the threshold flaw depth is 0.000105 inch.

A surface flaw deeper than the threshold depth for the glass operating
stress must have existed on the outside of the meter window at launch.
The flaw started growing as the cabin depressurized during the launch
phase, and finally grew large enough for the glass to break.

For future missions, an exterior glass doubler will be added to the flaw
depth to 0.0036 inch and the critical flaw depth to 0.032 inch. This
should prevent future fatigue failures since there are no reported
fatigue failures in soda-lime glass at stresses below 2000 psi. In
addition, all similar glass applications in the lunar module and command
module were reviewed and changes are being made. In the command module,
transparent Teflon shields will be installed on the:

a\. Flight director attitude indicators.\
\
b. Service propu1sion system gimbal position and launch vehicle
propellant tank pressure indicator.\
\
c. Service propulsion system oxidizer unbalance indicator, and the
oxidizer and fuel quantity indicators.\
\
d. Entry monitor system roll indicator.

In the first three above applications, the shields will be held in place
with Velcro and will be installed only when the cabin is to be
depressurized. The shield on the entry roll monitor indicator will be
permanently installed.

In the lunar module, tape will be added to the flight director attitude
indicators and an exterior glass shield will be installed over the
crosspointers to retain glass particles. The data entry and display
assembly window was previously taped to retain glass particles.

This anomaly is closed.

## SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT MODULE EXPERIMENTS

### Panoramic Camera Velocity/Altitude Sensor Erratic

Telemetry received from the first panoramic camera pass on revolution 4
indicated that the velocity/altitude sensor ( [fig.
14-35](../a15mr135.jpg)) was not operating correctly.

![](media/image136.jpeg){width="3.7916666666666665in" height="6.625in"}

The velocity/altitude sensor measures the angular rate of travel of the
spacecraft relative to the lunar surface. The sensor output is used to
control the cycling rate of the camera, the forward motion compensation,
and the exposure. The sensor normally operates in the range of 45 to 80
miles altitude. If, at any time, the indicated velocity/altitude is out
of this range, the sensor automatically resets to the nominal value of
60 miles. The sensor operated properly for brief periods of time, but
would drift off-scale high (saturate), and then reset to the nominal
value corresponding to a 60-mile altitude.

Breadboard tests and circuit analyses of the velocity/altitude
electronics ( [fig. 14-36](../a15mr136.jpg)) did not indicate failure.
Tests were conducted in which endless belts of lunar scene photography
from Apollo 8 and 15 were passed in front of velocity/altitude sensors.
Sensors from the prototype and qualification units, and flight unit
number 1 were used. By varying the illumination level, sensor
performance somewhat similar to the Apollo 15 anomaly could be obtained.

![](media/image137.jpeg){width="5.104166666666667in"
height="5.395833333333333in"}

The results of the tests, coupled with analyses of the basic sensor
design, indicate that the problem is related to the optical
signal-to-noise ratio. The remaining flight hardware will be modified to
improve this ratio. The optical signal will be enhanced by increasing
the lens aperture from f/4.0 to f/3-5 and by deleting the infrared
filter. The optical noise (reflections) will be reduced by increasing
the length of the lens hood and by repositioning the sensor so that the
camera\'s forward plume shield will not be in the field of view of the
sensor. In addition, a manual override of the velocity/altitude sensor
will be provided on the remaining flight units. By using a
three-position switch, two preselected velocity/altitude ratios will be
provided, as well as the automatic function.

This anomaly is closed.

### Loss of Laser Altimeter Altitude Data

The laser altimeter exhibited two anomalous conditions during the
mission:

a\. Altitude data became intermittent after revolution 24 as the result
of a decrease in the laser output power.\
\
b. Beginning with revolution 38, the photomultiplier tube high-voltage
power supply was held in the idling (minimum-voltage level) mode until
after the laser fired, thereby causing the receiver to miss the return
pulse from the lunar surface ( [fig. 14-37](../a15mr137.jpg)). No
altitude data were obtained after this anomaly occurred.

![](media/image138.jpeg){width="5.583333333333333in" height="4.375in"}

The photomultiplier tube power supply anomaly was duplicated when a
relay which had been removed from a flight unit because it had an
audible \"buzz\" was installed in the prototype altimeter. The relay
serves no function in flight, but is a safety precaution for ground
personnel working on the altimeter ( [fig. 14-38](../a15mr138.jpg)). The
relay contacts close when the altimeter is turned off, discharging the
high voltage stored in the pulse forming network capacitors.

![](media/image139.jpeg){width="5.583333333333333in" height="4.375in"}

It is suspected that the audible \"buzz\" is accompanied by
electromagnetic interference that is coupled into the video amplifier in
the laser receiver ( [fig. 14-39](../a15mr139.jpg)). The video amplifier
is a principal element in the automatic gain control circuit which
controls the output of the photomultiplier tube power supply. The
electromagnetic interference from the relay can thereby result in the
automatic gain control holding the power supply in the idling mode until
the pulse forming network is discharged in firing the laser. The relay
and resistors that comprise the bleed-down circuit will be removed from
the remaining flight altimeters.

![](media/image140.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in"
height="3.3541666666666665in"}

The cause of the low output power anomaly has not been isolated. A
review of the manufacturing records has established that the flight unit
was the same as the qualification unit with regard to parts, processes,
and manufacturing methods. Investigations indicate that the fault most
likely occurred in the laser module.

An automatic power compensation circuit will be incorporated into the
remaining flight units. The circuit will increase the pulse forming
network voltage by about 50 volts each time the laser power falls below
an established threshold value as sensed by a photodiode. Design
feasibility tests have been completed on a breadboard circuit. The
results show that the circuit will maintain the power output at a level
sufficient to provide proper ranging.

This anomaly is closed.

### Slow Deployment Of Mapping Camera

The extension and retraction times of the deployment mechanism
subsequent to the first extend/retract cycle were two to three times
longer than the preflight nominal time of approximately 1 minute 20
seconds. Also, the camera could not be fully retracted after the final
deployment. During the transearth extravehicular activity, an inspection
of the mapping camera and associated equipment showed no evidence of
dragging or interference between the camera and the spacecraft
structure, the camera covers, or the cabling.

The first extend and retract cycle times were 1 minute 20 seconds and 1
minute 17 seconds, respectively. The second retraction required 2
minutes 30 seconds and the third retraction and fourth extension
required slightly more than 4 minutes. The second and third extensions
occurred while the telemetry, system was in the low-bit-rate mode;
therefore, these deployment times are not obtainable. Subsequent
extensions and retractions required 2 to 4 minutes.

Load tests show that a restraining force of 250 pounds would increase
the deployment time to 1 minute 45 seconds. With one of the two
extend/retract mechanism motors operating, the 250-pound restraint would
increase the deployment time to 2 minutes 25 seconds.

Voltage tests show that 12 volts to the motors (28 volts dc nominal
rating) would result in deployment times of approximately 4 minutes. Had
this occurred during the mission, however, the indicator which shows
that power is applied to the motors would have displayed a partial
barberpole during deployment operations. The barberpole indicator is
connected in parallel with the motors and, since the position is
voltage-dependent, it can be used to approximate the voltage levels to
the motors. During the flight, a full barberpole indication was always
observed.

Apparently, the problem first occurred sometime between the first and
second retractions. During this period, a 4-second service propulsion
system firing was performed for lunar orbit circularization. An
evaluation of vibration test data indicates, however, that the
circularization firing was probably not a factor in the anomaly. An
investigation is being made to determine if there is mechanical
interference between the camera and the reaction control system plume
protection covers.

This anomaly is open.

### Gamma Ray Spectrometer Calibration Shifts

During the mission, the gamma ray spectrometer experienced a downward
gain shift of approximately 30 percent, but this was compensated for by
commanding the high-voltage step function from the command module. The
drift decreased with time at an initial rate of 1 percent per hour and a
final rate of 0.4 percent per day. Near the end of the mission, the
gamma ray spectrometer was operating in a relatively stable state at
824.8 volts (high voltage step 6). (A step 4 voltage of 777.8 volts was
the normal position in preflight operation.) The spectrometer to be
flown on Apollo 16 was aged at flux rates representative of those
encountered in lunar operation. The unit has stabilized after having
experienced a gain change of approximately 8 percent.

After transearth injection, a temporary eight-channel zero reference
shift was observed. This shift disappeared when the instrument was
repowered after the transearth extravehicular activity, and subsequent
instrument operation was normal for about 25 hours during transearth
coast. Shortly before entry, the offset shift reappeared and remained
until the experiment was turned off. Normalization of the data during
processing will compensate for this offset.

Tests conducted with the qualification unit verified that the change in
gain was due to aging effects of the photomultiplier tube in the gamma
ray detector assembly as a result of high cosmic ray flux rates in lunar
operation. The zero shift appears to be associated with the run-down
inhibit signal between the clock-gate module and the analog-to-digital
converter ( [fig. 14-40](../a15mr140.jpg)).

![](media/image141.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="3.1041666666666665in"}

Absence of this signal at a particular point in the analog-to-digital
converter removes a 3-microsecond offset in the pulse height analyzer.
The resulting effect is an overall eight-channel offset in the spectrum.
The qualification unit was partially disassembled and tests showed that
either an open or a shorted wire within the pulse height, analyzer can
result in an eight-channel offset. An inspection of the circuit in the
qualification unit disclosed no design deficiency which would cause this
type of failure. Since the eight channel zero offset does not
significantly impact overall data quality, no corrective action is
contemplated.

This anomaly is closed.

## APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE AND ASSOCIATED LUNAR SURFACE EQUIPMENT

### Problems During The Lunar Surface Drilling Operations

The Apollo lunar surface drill performed well during the lunar surface
activities; however, the following problems related to drilling
operations were encountered:

a\. Penetration of the surface to the full depth with the bore stems was
not achieved.\
\
b. Releasing the bore stems from the drill adapter was difficult.\
\
c. Bore stem damage occurred near the first joint.\
\
d. Removing core stems from the drilled hole in the lunar surface was
difficult.\
\
e. Separation of core stem sections was difficult.

#### Difficulty in penetrating the surface to the desired depth with the bore stems {#difficulty-in-penetrating-the-surface-to-the-desired-depth-with-the-bore-stems .unnumbered}

Although the average penetration rate for the two bore stem holes was
reasonable (approximately 120 inches per minute for hole 1, and 18
inches per minute for hole 2), it was necessary to stop both holes at
approximately 60 percent of the depth desired.

The bore stem sections are made of a fiberglass and boron filament
laminate, chosen for its optimum thermal characteristics as a casing for
the heat flow experiment probe. The sections are approximately 21 inches
long with tapered male and female joints. One-inch double-thread spiral
lead flutes are provided on the exterior surface to transport the soil
chips from the drilled hole to the surface. The depth of the flutes is
0.050 inch for about 18 inches, but the flutes almost disappear at the
joint area where the wall thickness must follow the taper of the joint (
[fig. 14-41](../a15mr141.jpg)). As a result, the volume of chip flow to
the surface is slowed considerably in looser soil formations, and
stalled by the packing of the chips in high-density formations.

![](media/image142.jpeg){width="6.5in" height="5.239583333333333in"}

In order to reduce the time required, prevent damage to bore stems, and
increase the probability of attaining the full depth, the following
modifications and corrective actions are being implemented:

The bore stem joints will be changed from boron/fiberglass tapered
joints to threaded titanium inserts which provide continuous flutes as
do the core stems. The thread configuration also provides a more
positive connection, precluding inadvertent separation of the joint in
the hole.

The length of the first (bottom) bore stem section will be increased so
that the 43-inch probe for the heat flow experiment is housed entirely
in the boron/fiberglass material and the titanium joint is not in the
probe region.

The length of the remaining sections will be increased by a small
amount, which will reduce the number of joints for the crew to mate as
well as keep the titanium away from the experiment thermocouples.

Crew training will include boring and coring experience with a soil
model typical of the Hadley Rille soil characteristics as well as models
of less dense soil.

This anomaly is closed.

#### Difficulty in releasing bore stems from drill adapter {#difficulty-in-releasing-bore-stems-from-drill-adapter .unnumbered}

Use of the normal procedure for releasing the lunar surface drill head
from the bore stems was hampered by the bore stems turning freely in the
lunar soil.

![](media/image143.jpeg){width="5.895833333333333in" height="5.0in"}

In the bore stem drilling position, the key blocks are restrained
inside, and the spindle drives against the shoulder of the adapter outer
shell ( [fig. 14-42](../a15mr142.jpg)). The operational sequence to
release the bore stem from the adapter includes the following steps:

With the bore stem held stationary, the power head is rotated by hand 90
degrees counterclockwise. This moves the spindle and adapter shoulder
about 1/4-inch apart and releases the spring-loaded key blocks outward.

With the key blocks in the outward position, pulsing the power head
transfers power from the spindle through the key blocks to the collet
shoulder, thus moving the collet about 1/4-inch, and releasing the bore
stem.

In development ground tests, the soil friction usually kept the bore
stem from turning in this operation. When there was insufficient
friction from the soil, the bore stem was grasped with the gloved hand.
On Apollo 15, the soil did not hold the bore stem, and the core-stem
wrench was used to hold the bore stems for this operation.

The single-purpose core stem wrench is fitted to the 0.983-inch-
diameter titanium core stem, but the 1.088-inch throat will admit the
1.075inch-diameter bore stem. The softer bore stem (boron-fiberglass
laminate) can be deformed and present some difficulty in wrench removal,
with possible damage to the bore stem. A wrench to fit both bore and
core stems will be provided.

The change of the bore stem joint, discussed in the previous anomaly,
will result in the elimination of the present bore stem drill adapter.
The bore stem will thread into the power head spindle adapter in the
same manner as the core stems on Apollo 15 and a spindle thread reducer
will be provided to fit the core stems. In addition, the training models
and procedures will by updated to reflect equipment changes.

This anomaly is closed.

#### Bore stem damage near the first joint {#bore-stem-damage-near-the-first-joint .unnumbered}

The probe would not go to the bottom plug of the bottom bore stem in
hole 2, but stopped at a point about 6 inches above the first joint.
Examination of photographs and heat flow probe data indicate that, near
the end of the bore stem drilling operation, the first joint was
separated when the drill and drill string were moved vertically (up and
down) in an attempt to improve the drill penetration rate. Easier
penetration (for approximately 6 inches) was reported by the crew, but
it resulted from the bottom of the second section apparently performing
more in a coring manner ( [fig. 14-43](../a15mr143.jpg)) with the lunar
soil entering the second section of the bore stem.

![](media/image144.jpeg){width="4.395833333333333in"
height="4.572916666666667in"}

The change from boron/fiberglass to threaded titanium in the bore stem
joint will prevent a repetition of such a separation.

This anomaly is closed.

#### Difficulty in core stem removal from the drilled hole in the lunar surface {#difficulty-in-core-stem-removal-from-the-drilled-hole-in-the-lunar-surface .unnumbered}

Friction of the compacted soil in the drill flutes can build up
substantial forces against core stem removal in a deep hole in some soil
formations. This was illustrated in premission and drill development
experiences.

Interference from the compacted material in the drill flutes can be
reduced and core stem removal eased by pulsing the power head when at
the bottom of the hole without upward and downward motion of the drill
stem. Ground tests have indicated that the best results are obtained
when the power head is pulsed just before the power head is removed to
add each core stem section. The tendency to auger, as reported by the
crew, is also reduced by pulsing the power head before each new core
stem is added.

To assure maximum core return and minimum core disturbance for this
mission, and without having the benefit of some of the experience from
later ground tests, the crew did not pulse the power head. In addition,
the core stem string was left in the ground for several hours before the
crew returned for its final removal. The core stem string was removed
with considerable physical effort, but a very complete core was
recovered.

A mechanical assist (modified jacking mechanism) will be mounted on the
treadle for easier core removal from difficult formations. Training and
procedural changes will be implemented so that the drill motor will be
pulsed before the addition of each core stem.

This anomaly is closed.

#### 14.4-1.5 Difficulty in separation of core stem sections {#difficulty-in-separation-of-core-stem-sections .unnumbered}

The sections of the core stem string could not be separated using the
vise and wrench because the vise had been mounted on the pallet
backward. The six section core stem string was removed from the core
hole as a single unit and brought to the vise on the lunar roving
vehicle. Three sections were separated individually with hand friction
on one side of the joint and the wrench on the other side. The remaining
three sections were returned to the earth in one piece.

The configuration of the core stem vise is the same as that of the core
stem wrench head. The vise is mounted on a bracket on the lunar roving
vehicle aft chassis pallet, located on the right hand side of the
vehicle. The core stem wrench head is similar to the conventional pipe
wrench head, with one fixed jaw and one pivoted jaw. The throat width is
not adjustable and is designed to fit the outside diameter of the core
stem.

As mounted, the vise would hold the core stem so that the joint could be
tightened by rotating the wrench on the adjoining section. However, the
vise would not hold in the opposite direction so that the joint could be
loosened and separated ( [fig. 14-44](../a15mr144.jpg)). Working on the
inboard side of the vise, the core stem could have been held properly
for loosening; however, there is insufficient clearance on the inboard
side of the vise for wrench rotation, and the distance to the other side
of the lunar roving vehicle is greater than the length of a core stem
section.

![](media/image145.jpeg){width="5.291666666666667in"
height="6.458333333333333in"}

The installation drawing of the vise was in error and has been corrected
to assure correct orientation of the vise for Apollo 16. The training
vise was installed backward from the erroneous drawing, but correct for
loosening the stems.

This anomaly is closed.

### Central Station Rear Curtain Retainer Removal Lanyard Broke

To remove the retainer for the central station rear curtain, added for
Apollo 15, it was necessary to remove two retaining pins ( fig.14-45).
The two pins, a universal handling tool fitting, and the curtain
retainer are joined by a three-section lanyard. When the universal
handling tool was inserted in the fitting and raised to remove the first
pin, that section of the lanyard broke. When an effort was made to
remove both pins simultaneously by inserting the handle under the
lanyard joining the two pins, that part of the lanyard broke. The pins
and retainer were then removed by hand.

![](media/image146.jpeg){width="4.583333333333333in" height="6.5in"}

The Dacron lanyard is being changed from a 50-pound test rated material
to a 180-pound test rated material with acceptance pull tests being
increased to 20 pounds for the entire system.

This anomaly is closed.

### Intermittent Lock of Universal Handling Tool In Suprathermal Ion Detector Fitting 

While carrying the suprathermal ion detector experiment from the
subpallet to the emplacement site, the experiment fell off the universal
handling tool at least twice. The experiment sustained no visible damage
and has been operating satisfactorily.

The universal handling tool fitting on this experiment is in the highest
location above the lunar surface of any of the fittings and presents an
awkward position of the tool for insertion, locking, and maintaining
lock in the fitting ( [fig. 14-46](../a15mr146.jpg)).

![](media/image147.jpeg){width="4.770833333333333in"
height="6.583333333333333in"}

Corrective action includes training procedures to avoid inadvertent
tool-release triggering because of the position of the tool. There are
no present plans for the suprathermal ion detector experiment to be
carried on future missions, and no other scheduled experiments have a
similarly located fitting.

This anomaly is closed

## GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT

### Television Control Unit Clutch Slippage

During the second extravehicular activity, the camera could not be
elevated as the unit approached the upper or lower limits of angular
travel. The condition further deteriorated during the third
extravehicular activity.

Elevation control is provided to the camera cradle through a friction
clutch ( [fig. 14-47](../a15mr147.jpg)) which allows manual override of
the ground-commanded camera positioning. The camera-cradle pivot point
is approximately 3 inches below the center of gravity of the cradle with
the camera mounted. As the camera moves away from the horizontal
position, the unbalanced moment becomes progressively greater, and a
higher torque load must be supported by the clutch mechanism.

![](media/image148.jpeg){width="6.4944444444444445in"
height="4.411111111111111in"}

The elastomer clutch-facing material provided the required stable
friction properties in the specification and qualification test
temperature range (122\' F, maximum). However, the maximum temperature
on the television control unit during the third extravehicular activity
has been calculated as approximately 180\' F. Materials specifications
show that the compressive strength of the elastomer degrades rapidly at
this temperature, and ground tests with flight unit 4 verify severely
degraded performance with time at elevated temperature.

The clutch is being changed to a metal-to-metal spring ring design in
place of the elastomer disc. The clutch torque for Apollo 15 was set at
16 inch-pounds for ease of manual adjustment. For greater stability on
Apollo 16, the new clutch is being built with a torque of 30
inch-pounds, which is still comfortable for manual positioning and is
within design limits of the system, including the gear train (35
inch-pounds).

This anomaly is closed.

### Lunar Communications Relay Unit Downlink Signal Lost 

The lunar communications relay unit downlink signal was lost about 40
hours after lunar module ascent. The unit operated on internal battery
power during the extravehicular traverses. Near the end of the third
extravehicular activity, it was manually switched to lunar roving
vehicle power in preparation for viewing ascent and for continuing
television observations. The power distribution from the lunar roving
vehicle to the television system is shown in figure 14-48. The lunar
communications relay unit transmitter and television camera had been
commanded on from the ground 13 minutes rior to the RF downlink- signal
loss. The lunar communications relay unit status subcarrier had been
commanded on 7 minutes prior to signal loss. The television camera was
stationary and a 1-second incremental iris movement was occurring at the
time of signal loss.

The flight data ( [fig. 14-49](../a15mr149.jpg)) shows that the
automatic gain control measurement began to fall followed by the video
signal decay. This was followed by the decay of the lunar communications
relay unit temperature measurement. The RF signal level then decreased
below the ground receiver is threshold as indicated by complete signal
loss. The overall loss of the downlink signal within 5 milliseconds is
indicative of 28-volt d-c power loss. Decay of the temperature
measurement is indicative of 16.5 volt d-c power loss. The lunar
communications relay unit dc-to-dc converter ( [fig.
14-48](../a15mr148.jpg)) supplies both the 28-volt and 16.5-volt d-c
power. To verify loss of 16.5-volt power, an uplink voice signal was
transmitted to key the VHF transmitter on. No signal was received on the
Stanford 150-foot VHF antenna which indicates that the VHF transmitter,
powered from 16.5 volts dc, was inoperative.

![](media/image149.jpeg){width="6.5in" height="4.71875in"}

![](media/image150.jpeg){width="5.104166666666667in"
height="6.541666666666667in"}

In laboratory tests, the fault which duplicated the flight data was the
opening of the lunar roving vehicle power line prior to the
440-microfarad capacitor (figs. 14-48 and 14-49). The tests show that
the decay time of the lunar communications relay unit 28-volt and
14-volt power is increased by discharging the 440-microfarad capacitor.
Other induced faults resulted in shorter power decay times, affecting
the received signal accordingly. The temperature measurement output (see
thermistor in fig. 14-48) is proportional to the decay in 14-volt powcr.
Consequently, the 6-percent decay of the flight temperature measurement
corresponds to a 1.4-volt decay. This characteristic was duplicated when
the lunar roving vehicle power line was opened. The 28-volt power
decayed to 21.8 volts dc as the 14-volt power decayed to 12.6 volts. The
RF transmitter power at this voltage will be decreased by 6.4 dB, and
accounts for the total signal loss at this time since the ground
receiver would be below its operating threshold.

The lunar roving vehicle power line has a 7.5-ampere circuit breaker
forward of the 440-microfarad capacitor (fig. 14-48). Testing a
7.5-ampere circuit breaker under elevated temperatures (1800 F) and at
vacuum conditions showed that the current capacity is also dependent on
the connecting wire size because the wire provides a heat sink to the
circuit breaker thermal element. The rover 7.5-ampere breaker used
20-gage connecting wire. Test results show that the breaker, with
20-gage connecting wire, at elevated temperatures and under vacuum
conditions, will trip at 3.3 amperes. This corresponds to the calculated
lunar communication relay unit load at the time of power failure.

A 10-ampere circuit breaker instead of the 7.5-ampere breaker and, in
addition, a manual switch in the lunar rover circuit to override the
circuit breaker after completion of vehicle activity are being provided
for Apollo 16. Also, the lunar communications relay unit is being
modified so that its internal 7.5-ampere circuit breaker is bypassed
when operating in the external power mode.

This anomaly is closed.

### Lunar Surface 16-mm Camera Magazines Jammed

The crew experienced film jams with the lunar surface 16-mm camera film
magazines. Five out of eight magazines transferred to the lunar surface
jammed, two were not used, and one successfully transported the film to
completion.

Analysis of the returned magazines indicated two factors contributing to
jamming.

The first magazine used had drive-spline damage and scratches on the
front face, indicating that the installation in the camera was improper
and that the magazine and camera were misaligned. Misalignment of the
floating female spline of the camera with the male spline of the
magazine caused metal to be removed from the brass male spline. In
normal camera operation, the take-up claw advances one frame of film for
each exposure while the metering sprocket replenishes the supply loop
and removes a frame from the take-up loop, thus retaining the same
amount of slack film in both loops. When the metering sprocket is not
driven because of mismating, the camera claw removes film from the
supply loop, which is not being replenished, and adds it to the take-up
loop, resulting in the jammed condition shown in [figure
14-50](../a15mr150.jpg). Two other magazines had damaged drive splines,
indicating that mismating occurred on at least three occasions. Lunar
surface pictures which include the 16-mm camera show that a strip of
tape that is installed for latch stowage protection was not removed
prior to installation of a magazine. Leaving the tape strip in place
could have contributed to the camera/magazine mismating.

During troubleshooting between extravehicular activities, the crew
manually advanced the film through the aperture in all remaining
magazines. The amount of manual advancement varied from five to
twenty-one frames in the jammed magazines. The film supply loop (fig.
14-50) normally contains three to five excess frames. The normal
procedure is to inspect the magazine for proper frame alignment in the
aperture area, and manually advance the film not more than one frame, if
required to obtain proper alignment. The excessive manual advancement
depleted the film supply loops in all magazines.

![](media/image151.jpeg){width="5.125in" height="3.8854166666666665in"}

Hardware analysis, air-to-ground voice tapes, and crew debriefing
indicate that the lunar surface camera functioned properly, and the
jammed magazines resulted from procedural errors. Corrective actions are
to insure adequate crew training through scheduled prelaunch briefings,
stress malfunction procedures and corrective actions, and put a removal
flag on the tape.

This anomaly is closed.

### Lunar Module Pilot\'s 70-mm Camera Film Advance Stopped

Near the end of the second extravehicular activity, the 70-mm camera
ceased to advance film. The crew reported that the camera was again
operational after return to the lunar module. The camera was used again
on the third extravehicular activity; however, after a short series of
exposures had been made, the failure recurred. The camera was used for
additional photography during the transearth phase without recurrence of
the problem.

Postflight analysis of the hardware included operational testing,
disassembly and inspection, and measurement of battery charge.
Operational testing with film loads indicated proper film advancement
until approximately 200 cycles had been accumulated, at which time the
failure mode was duplicated several times in succession. The film did
not advance, although the motor was running. Disassembly and examination
of the drive mechanism showed that the two set screws in the drive
pinion were slipping on the motor shaft. After the last use of the
camera during the mission, the crew had difficulty removing the
magazine. This was caused by a rivet which had become detached from the
camera magazine latch mechanism.

Corrective action is as follows: Flats will be ground on the motor
shaft. A locking compound will be applied to the set screws when they
are properly torqued against the flats. Also, epoxy will be applied to
the tops of the screws to prevent them from backing off.

This anomaly is closed.

### Difficult to Obtain Water From Insuit Drinking Device

After satisfactory operation during the first extravehicular activity,
the mouthpiece of the insuit drinking device was displaced and the
Commander was not able to obtain water during the second extravehicular
activity. The Lunar Module Pilot was not able to actuate the drink valve
of the insuit drinking device during either the first or second
extravehicular activities.

After each extravehicular activity, the insuit drinking device was
removed from the suit and all of the water consumed, thus verifying
proper operation of the insuit drinking device drink valve. The problem
was associated with the positioning of the insuit drinking device within
the suit.

Ground tests using suited subjects and other equipment configurations
indicated that the existing equipment provides the optimum
configuration. The tests also showed that personal experience is
essential to obtaining optimum individual positioning. Crew training is
to include more crew experience in making the position adjustments
required for the individual\'s needs.

This anomaly is closed.

### Lunar Module Pilot Oxygen Purge System Antenna Was Damaged

The crew reported that the Lunar Module Pilot\'s oxygen purge system
antenna was broken off near the bottom during communications checkout
prior to the second extravehicular activity. Previously, a notch had
been observed in the antenna blade(see [fig. 14-51](../a15mr151.jpg)).

![](media/image152.jpeg){width="4.979166666666667in"
height="3.6458333333333335in"}

Antennas broken in training have shown similar flexure breaks.
Observation of the notch edges of the returned antenna indicates that
the notch started as a partial break in flexure, followed by material
being torn out the rest of the way. Test results of the returned antenna
indicated that the physical properties of the blade material were
satisfactory with no excessive brittleness.

A flap which covers the entire antenna will be added for Apollo 16 to
protect the antenna while the oxygen purge system is stowed and during
unsuiting after extravehicular activities. The antenna will not be
deployed until after egress to prevent it from being damaged inside the
cabin or during egress.

This anomaly is closed.

### Retractable Tether Failure

Both retractable tethers failed during lunar surface operations; the
Commander\'s tether cord broke during the first extravehicular activity,
and the tool clamp came off the end of the Lunar Module Pilot\'s tether.
The Commander carried the standard 3/8-pound pull tether which consists
of a case, a negator spring wound reel-to-reel on two spools, and a
30-pound cord wound on a spool mounted to one of the spring spools (
[fig. 14-52](../a15mr152.jpg)).

![](media/image153.jpeg){width="5.541666666666667in" height="4.0in"}

A tool clamp is attached to the external end of the cord. The Lunar
Module Pilot carried the optional, somewhat larger, 1-pound pull tether
of the same design.

Disassembly of the Commander\'s tether showed that the spring had
expanded off the spool, snarled, and jammed against the case as the
result of a no-load release of a slack cord (fig. 14-53).

The cord had broken against a sharp edge of the spring when an attempt
was made to extend the tether after the jam. The failure mode with the
release of the slack cord is repeatable. Disassembly of the Lunar Module
Pilot\'s tether showed that both the bowline and the figure-eight knot
attaching the cord to the clamp had untied ( [fig.
14-53](../a15mr153.jpg)) and this allowed the cord to retract into the
housing. Changing this knot to an improved clinch knot will provide a
more secure and permanent attachment. Crew training will emphasize
proper use of the tethers.

This anomaly is closed.

![](media/image154.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="3.8541666666666665in"}

## LUNAR ROVING VEHICLE

### Deployment Saddle Difficult To Release From Vehicle

The lunar roving vehicle deployment saddle was difficult to release from
the vehicle during the final stage of deployment operations.

The causes of this problem are twofold and interrelated.

a\. The saddle-to-vehicle connection (fig. 14-54) has close-tolerance
interfaces to provide the rigidity required to prevent release-pin
distortion and permanent binding. This design requires the
vehicle/saddle interface to be completely free of stress to permit easy
separation.\
\
b. The tilt of the lunar module to the rear and sideways, together with
an uneven lunar surface, provided some stress preloading of the
vehicle/saddle interface. Attempts by the crew to improve the rover
position by moving and pulling on it may have aggravated this situation.
The crew was aware that the interface had to be free of stress, and when
this was accomplished, the saddle separated.

![](media/image155.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="5.208333333333333in"}

Ground tests have shown that if the partially deployed lunar roving
vehicle resting on the surface but not yet detached from the saddle and
lunar module, is rolled either to the left or right, the saddle/rover
chassis interface will bind. The interface can be released, and the
saddle dropped to the ground by one crewman adjusting the roll back to
zero while the other taps the saddle with a hand tool. The corrective
action is to insure adequate crew training.

This anomaly is closed.

### Volt/Ammeter Inoperative

The lunar roving vehicle battery 2 volt/ammeter was inoperative upon
vehicle activation, and remained inoperative throughout the traverses.
Problems with the meter were experienced during its initial development;
however, after a more rigid acceptance test program was implemented, the
earlier problems were cleared. The flight problem was not duplicated
during any of the ground tests. Since the instrument is not essential
for the operation of the vehicle, no further action is being taken.

This anomaly is closed.

### Front steering System Inoperative

During initial lunar roving vehicle activation, the front steering was
inoperative. Electrical checks were made which verified that electrical
power was being supplied to the front steering system. Unsuccessful
attempts were made to manually rotate the wheels about their steering
axes and to detect steering motor stall current on the ammeter. The
forward steering circuit breaker and switch were cycled without any
apparent effect. Consequently, the front steering was switched off for
the first traverse. During preparations for the second traverse, the
forward steering circuit breaker and switch were cycled and front
steering was operative; however, the time that front steering capability
was restored is unknown. Front-wheel wandering did not occur during the
first traverse, indicating a mechanical problem. The steering continued
to function properly for the second and third traverses. During the
second traverse, the rear steering was turned off temporarily and
wandering of the rear wheels occurred.

The most likely cause of this anomaly is motor and/or gear train
binding, as indicated by the inability to drive back through the linkage
and gear train by manually pushing against the wheels. Electrical causes
are possible, but less likely.

The front steering system of the Apollo 16 lunar roving vehicle is
currently being analyzed because of an intermittent failure of a similar
nature. Manually pushing against the wheels would not always drive back
through the linkage and gear train and the motor stalled at limit
current for 0.8 second during a test of this condition.

This anomaly is open.

### Lunar Roving Vehicle Seat Belt Problems

The following seat belt problems were experienced throughout all
traverses

a\. The crew was trained to stow the belts, prior to egress, on the
inboard handholds. However, during egress and ingress, the belt hooks
would slip through the handholds to the floor area. Finding the belts
after ingress was difficult because of their displacement from the
proper stowage location.\
\
b. The belts snagged repeatedly on the ground Support equipment
connector on the console support structure when displaced from the
proper stowage locations.\
\
c. The belts were not of sufficient length to secure the hooks to the
outboard handholds easily. This resulted primarily from an unexpected
decrease in suit contour conformance to the seated position in 1/6g.
Consequently, the crewmen\'s laps were several inches higher than had
been anticipated.

The main causes of these problems, in addition to insufficient belt
length, were insufficient belt rigidity and lack of visibility of the
securing operation.

New, stiffer seatbelts with an over-center tightening mechanism will be
provided for Apollo 16 to eliminate adjustment after each ingress and to
provide more tightening capability.

This anomaly is closed.

# CONCLUSIONS

The Apollo 15 mission was the fourth lunar landing and resulted in the
collection of a wealth of scientific information. The Apollo system, in
addition to providing a means of transportation, excelled as an
operational scientific facility. The following conclusions are drawn
from the information in this report:

The Apollo 15 mission demonstrated that, with the addition of
consumables and the installation of scientific instruments, the command
and service module is an effective means of gathering scientific data.
Real- time data allowed participation by scientists with the crew in
planning and making decisions to maximize scientific results.

The mission demonstrated that the modified launch vehicle, spacecraft
and life support system configurations can successfully transport larger
payloads and safely extend the time spent on the moon.

The modified pressure garment and portable life support system provided
better mobility and extended the lunar surface extravehicular time.

The ground-controlled mobile television camera allowed greater real-time
participation by earth-bound scientists and operationsl personnel during
lunar surface extravehicular activity.

The practicality of the lunar roving vehicle was demonstrated by greatly
increasing man\'s load carrying capability and range of exploration of
the lunar surface.

The lunar communications relay unit provided the capability for
continuous communications enroute to and at the extended ranges made
possible by the lunar roving vehicle.

Landing site visibility was improved by the use of a steeper landing
trajectory.

Apollo 15 demonstrated that the crew can operate to a greater degree as
scientific observers and investigators and rely more on the ground
support team for systems monitoring.

The value of manned space flight was further demonstrated by the unique
capability of man to observe and think creatively, as shown in the
supplementation and redirection of many tasks by the crew to enhance
scientific data return.

The mission emphasized that crew training equipment must be flight
equipment or have all the fidelity of flight equipment.

APPENDIX A - VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

This section contains a discussion of changes to the spacecraft, the
extravehicular systems, and the scientific equipment since Apollo 14. In
addition, equipment used on Apollo 15 for the first time is described.

The Apollo 15 command and service module (CSM-112) was of the block II
configuration, but was modified to carry out a greater range of lunar
orbital science activities than had been programmed for any previous
mission. The lunar module (LM-10) was modified to allow an increase in
lunar surface stay time and accommodate a larger scientific payload. The
launch escape system and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter were
unchanged. The Saturn V launch vehicle used for this mission was AS-510.
The significant configuration changes for the launch vehicle are given
in reference 1.

A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES

A.1.1 Structure and Thermal Systems

A scientific instrument module was installed in sector I of the service
module ( [fig. A-2](../a15mr156.jpg)). The module containing instruments
for the acquisition of scientific data during lunar orbit was attached
with 1/4- inch bolts to radial beams 1 and 6, to the new cryogenic tank
panel, and to the aft bulkhead of the service module. The sides of the
scientific instrument module were constructed of aluminum stiffened
sheet, and the shelves that supported the instruments were made of
bonded aluminum sandwich. A door covered the module until about 4 1/2
hours prior to lunar orbit insertion when it was pyrotechnically cut
free and jettisoned in a direction normal to the X-axis of the
spacecraft ( [fig. A-2](../a15mr156.jpg)). Protective covers and thermal
blankets provided thermal control for individual instruments within the
module. For additional thermal control, the inside surfaces of the
module were coated with a material having an absorptivity- to-emissivity
ratio of 0-3/0.85; the surfaces facing the radial beams, and the radial
beams themselves, were coated with a material having an absorptivity-
to-emissivity ratio of 0.05/0.4. The instruments are discussed; in
section A.4.2.

Because of the requirement to retrieve film cassettes from the
scientific instrument module during transearth coast, extravehicular
activity handrails and handholds were installed along the sides of the
module and inside the scientific instrument module. A foot restraint was
also attached to the module structure ( [fig. A-3](../a15mr156.jpg)).

A.1.2 Cryogenic Storage

A third hydrogen tank was installed in sector I of the service module,
as planned for all J-type missions. The isolation valve between oxygen
tank 2 and 3 was moved from sector IV to the forward bulkhead to
decrease its vulnerability in the event of a catastrophic tank failure.
All single-seat check valves in the hydrogen and oxygen lines were
replaced with double-seat valves having greater reliability. Thermal
switches formerly used in the hydrogen tank heater circuits inside the
tanks were removed.

A.1.3 Instrumentation

A scientific data system was integrated with the existing telemetry
system ( [fig. A-4](../a15mr157.jpg)) to provide the capability for
processing, storing, and transmitting data from the scientific
instrument module. The data processor, located in the scientific
instrument module, necessitated changes to the data storage equipment
and the introduction of a data modulator and a tape recorder data
conditioner. The data storage equipment was modified to have twice the
recording time of the previous equipment, and was redesignated the data
recorder reproducer. The tape recorder data conditioner was added to
minimize flutter-induced jitter of recorded pulse- code-modulated data.

A.1.4 Displays and Controls

Switch S30 was deleted from panel 2 and its function was incorporated
into switch S29 so that both cabin fans operated simultaneously. Toggle
switch S137 was added to panel 2 for hydrogen tank 3 fan motor control.
The pressure and quantity outputs of hydrogen tank 3 were connected to
meter displays through switches S138 and S139 on panel 2. Panels 181 and
230 were added to provide controls for the experiment equipment in the
scientific instrument module. Experiment cover controls were added to
Panel 278. Panel 603 ( [fig. A-5](../a15mr158.jpg)) was added to provide
umbilical connections for extravehicular activity. Panel 604 ( [fig.
A-5](../a15mr158.jpg)) was added to provide an audio warning signal to
the extravehicular crewman in the event of low suit pressure or low
oxygen flow.

A.1-5 Propulsion

The diameter of the fuel inlet orifice in the service propulsion system
was decreased to improve the propellant mixture ratio.

A.1.6 Environmental Control System

Several oxygen components were added to accommodate the scheduled
extravehicular activity for retrieval of data from the scientific
instrument module. The command module components consisted of a larger
restrictor and filter for the higher flow rate, check valves to prevent
backflow, connectors for the attachment of the umbilical, and a pressure
gage.

A.1.7 Crew Provisions and Extravehicular System

The Command Module Pilot\'s space suit was basically the same as the
Apollo 14 lunar surface suits except that the water connector and lunar
module attach points had been removed. An umbilical assembly (fig. A-6)
was furnished to serve as a tether and provide oxygen, communications,
and electrocardiogram and respiration rate measurements for the
extravehicular crewman. An adapter plate mounted on the chest of the
suit allowed attachment of an oxygen purge system (transferred from the
lunar module). The purge valve was also brought from the lunar module to
be used with the oxygen purge system. A pressure control valve was
provided to maintain suit pressure at 3.5 to 4.0 psia at a flow rate of
10 to 12 lb/hr during the extravehicular activity. A suit control unit (
[fig. A-6](../a15mr159.jpg)) was connected to the suit end of the
umbilical to maintain the desired oxygen flow rate and activate the suit
pressure alarm if an anomalous condition had been sensed. An 8-foot
tether was furnished for use by the intravehicular crewman stationed at
the hatch (fig. A-5). The tether prevented forces from being applied to
his oxygen umbilical. In addition, a thermal cover was furnished to
protect his communications umbilical.

An extravehicular activity monitor system was furnished to allow
television and 16-mm camera coverage of the extra-vehicular crewman\'s
activities. The components the system consisted of a sleeve mount
attached to the side hatch handle and a 34-inch pole assembly to mount
the cameras.

![](media/image156.jpeg){width="5.645833333333333in"
height="5.208333333333333in"}

![](media/image157.jpeg){width="5.291666666666667in"
height="6.708333333333333in"}

![](media/image158.jpeg){width="6.492361111111111in" height="4.78125in"}

![](media/image159.jpeg){width="5.4375in" height="4.0625in"}

![](media/image160.jpeg){width="5.583333333333333in"
height="4.104166666666667in"}

A.2 LUNAR MODULE

A.2.1 Structure and Thermal Systems

A number of structural changes were made to the lunar module in order to
provide greater consumables storage capacity, permit stowage of a lunar
roving vehicle, and allow a heavier load of scientific equipment to be
carried. The most significant structural changes were as follows:

The descent stage propellant tanks and the openings for the tanks were
enlarged.

Two tanks and supporting structure were added in descent stage quadrant
IV for storage of water and gaseous oxygen.

The structure in descent stage quadrants I and III was modified to
accommodate the lunar roving vehicle and its equipment pallet,
respectively.

The descent stage beam panels, tank supports, lower diagonals, beam,
capstrips, and the ladder were strengthened structurally.

Descent batteries 1 and 2 (previously located in quadrant IV) and
descent batteries 3 and 4 (previously located in quadrant I) were moved
to the minus Z outrigger.

The size of the modular equipment stowage assembly was increased.

Heaters, additional insulation and shielding were incorporated in
quadrants I, III, and IV of the descent stage to protect equipment
stowed in those areas. Insulation in the docking tunnel was increased,
and shielding was added to reduce the heat leak to the cabin through the
docking tunnel. The fire-in-the-hole shield as well as the base heat
shield were modified to accommodate changes in the descent propulsion
system (par. A.2.4).

The ascent stage reaction control system tanks were insulated, and the
coating on the tank bay thermal shields was changed to a material with a
lower absorptivity-to-emissivity ratio to compensate for the extended
lunar stay time and higher sun angles.

A.2.2 Electrical Power

In addition to the four descent batteries (par. A.2.1), a fifth battery
(called the lunar battery) was provided to increase lunar stay time
capability. The capacity of each battery was 415 ampere-hours compared
with 400 ampere-hours for previous missions. Other differences in the
descent batteries were as follows:

The battery relief valve, cell manifold relief valve and pressurizing
port adapters were changed from nylon plastic to ABS plastic.

The method for attaching the cell manifold to the manifold relief valve
adapter was changed to prevent leakage.

A battery relay control assembly was added to route battery status
information to the proper channels because of the electrical control
assembly sections shared by batteries 2, 3, and the lunar battery, and
an interlock was added so that the lunar battery could not be switched
to both buses at the same time.

A-2.3 Instrumentation and Displays

Water sensors were changed from quantity measuring devices to pressure
transducers for greater reliability. Descent fuel and oxidizer
temperature sensors were changed from immersion to container-surface
measurements because the measurements would provide more useful data.
Temperature sensors were added in the modular equipment stowage assembly
to provide flight statistical data. Instrumentation was added, and
controls and displays were changed on panel 14 because of the addition
of the lunar battery.

A-2.4 Propulsion

The descent propellant system was modified to increase the tank capacity
1200 pounds, and the engine performance and operating life were
increased. These changes involved: (1) increasing the length of the
tanks, (2) changing material in the thrust chamber from an ablative
silicon to an ablative quartz, (3) replacing the exit cone with a
lightweight cone, and (4) increasing the nozzle extension 10 inches.
Routing of pressurization lines was modified to accommodate the larger
propellant tanks. Modifications to decrease the amount of unusable
propellant consisted of deleting propellant balance lines between like
tanks and adding trim orifices to the tank discharge lines (one orifice
is fixed and the other is adjustable).

The oxidizer lunar dump valve installation was modified to be identical
to the Apollo 14 fuel lunar dump valve configuration. Thus, both valves
were installed to reverse flow direction through them and an orifice was
added upstream of each valve. This change was made to insure that the
valve would remain open with either liquid or gas flow.

In the reaction control system, a weight reduction of approximately 25
pounds resulted from the removal of the isolation valves from all
engines.

A.2.5 Environmental Control System

Extended stay time on the lunar surface required an increase in the
supply of lithium hydroxide cartridges. The oxygen and water supply was
increased for the same reason by adding a storage tank in the descent
stage for each system. Check valves were added at the outlets of the
original and new tanks, and servicing quick disconnects and pressure
transducers were added in association with the new tanks.

A new high pressure (approximately 1400 psia) portable life Support
system recharge capability was incorporated in conjunction with the
added oxygen tank. The recharge assembly includes regulators, overboard
relief valves, an interstage disconnect, a shutoff valve, and a quick
disconnect to mate with the portable life support system recharge hose.
In addition, the recharge hose was lengthened by 10 inches to permit
recharging of the portable life support system before it was doffed.

Instead of providing stowed urine bags and a portable life support
system condensate container as on Apollo 14, a 5-gallon tank was
installed in quadrant IV of the descent stage for both urine and
portable life support system condensate.

A.2.6 Crew Provisions and Cabin Stowage

Neck ring dust covers were provided to keep lunar dust out of the
pressure garment assemblies when not being worn. Tool carriers,
attachable to the portable life support system, were provided to
facilitate carrying of geological tools, sample bags and rock bags. An
adapter was stowed to permit the crewmen to connect their liquid cooling
garments to the lunar module water supply after removal of their
pressure garment assemblies.

The ascent stage lower midsection and the lower left- and right-side
consoles were modified to carry additional lunar samples (each area
could carry a 40-pound bag). In order to carry the 70-mm, camera with
500-mm lens and 70-mm film magazines, a special multipurpose container
was installed in the area behind the engine cover.

A-3 LUNAR SURFACE MOBILITY SYSTEMS

A-3.1 Extravehicular Mobility Unit

The pressure garment assembly was changed to improve mobility and
visibility, to permit easier donning and doffing, and to improve it
otherwise. The changes were as follows:

Neck and waist joints were added.

The wrist rings were enlarged.

The shoulder area was modified.

The torso zipper was moved.

Gas connectors were repositioned.

A manual override relief valve was added.

The insuit drinking device was redesigned to hold 32 ounces of water
instead of 8 ounces.

The portable life support system was modified to extend the lunar
surface stay time capability. There were four major changes:

An auxiliary water bottle was added.

A larger battery was incorporated.

A higher pressure oxygen bottle was used.

Higher capacity lithium hydroxide cartridges were used.

A.3.2 Lunar Roving Vehicle

The lunar roving vehicle ( [fig. A-7](../a15mr160.jpg)), used for the
first time on Apollo 15, is a four-wheeled manually-controlled,
electrically-powered vehicle that carried the crew and their equipment
over the lunar surface. The increased mobility and ease of travel made
possible by this vehicle permitted the crew to travel much greater
distances than on previous lunar landing missions. The vehicle was
designed to carry the two crewmen and a science payload at a maximum
velocity of about 16 kilometers per hour (8.6 mi/hr) on a smooth, level
surface, and at reduced velocities on slopes up to 25 degrees. It can be
operated from either crewman\'s position, as the control and display
console is located on the vehicle centerline. The deployed vehicle is
approximately 10 feet long, 7 feet wide and 45 inches high. Its chassis
is hinged such that the forward and aft sections fold back over the
center portion, and each of the wheel suspension systems rotates so that
the folded vehicle will fit in quadrant I of the lunar module. The gross
operational weight is approximately 1535 pounds of which 455 pounds is
the weight of the vehicle itself. The remainder is the weight of the
crew, their equipment, communications equipment, and the science
payload.

![](media/image161.jpeg){width="6.354166666666667in"
height="4.958333333333333in"}

The wheels have open-mesh tires with chevron tread covering 50 percent
of the surface contact area. The tire inner frame prevents excessive
deflection of the outer wire mesh frame under high impact load
conditions. Each wheel is provided with a separate traction drive
consisting of a harmonic-drive reduction unit, drive motor, and brake
assembly. A decoupling\
mechanism permits each wheel to be decoupled from the traction drive,
allowing any wheel to \"free-wheel.\" The traction drives are
hermetically sealed to maintain a 7.5-psia internal pressure. An
odometer on each traction drive transmits pulses to the navigation
signal processing unit at the rate of nine pulses per wheel revolution.
The harmonic drive reduces the motor speed at the rate of 80:1 and
allows continuous application of torque to the wheels at all speeds
without requiring gear shifting. The drive motors are 1/4-horsepower
direct-current, series, brushtype motors which operate from a nominal
input voltage of 36 Vdc. Speed control for the motors is furnished by
pulse-width modulation from the drive controller electronic package. The
motors are instrumented for thermal monitoring and the temperatures are
displayed on the control and display panel.

The chassis ( [fig. A-8](../a15mr161.jpg)) is suspended from each wheel
by a pair of parallel triangular arms connected between the vehicle
chassis and each traction drive. Loads are transmitted to the chassis
through each suspension arm to a separate tension bar for each arm.
Wheel vertical travel and rate of travel are limited by a linear damper
connected between the chassis and each traction drive. The deflection of
the suspension system and tires combines to allow 14 inches of chassis
ground clearance when the lunar roving vehicle is fully loaded and 17
inches when unloaded.

![](media/image162.jpeg){width="5.291666666666667in" height="4.0in"}

Steering is accomplished by two electrically-driven rack and pinion
assemblies with each assembly steering a pair of wheels. Simultaneous
use of both front and rear wheel steering results in a minimum turning
radius of 122 inches. Steering is controlled by moving the hand
controller left or right from the nominal position. This operation
energizes the separate electric motors, and through a servo system,
provides a steering angle proportional to the position of the hand
controller. The front and rear steering assemblies are electrically and
mechanically independent of each other. In the event of a malfunction,
steering linkage can be disengaged, and the wheels centered and locked
so that operations can continue using the remaining active steering
assembly.

Speed control is maintained by the hand controller. Forward movement
proportionately increases the forward speed. A neutral deadband exists
for about the first 1.5 degrees of forward motion. A constant torque of
about 6 inch-pounds is required to move the hand controller beyond the
limit of the deadband. To operate the vehicle in reverse, the hand
controller is pivoted rearward. However, before changing forward or
reverse directions, the vehicle must be brought to a full stop before a
commanded direction change can be made. Braking is initiated in either
forward or reverse by pivoting the hand controller rearward about the
brake pivot point. Each wheel is braked by conventional brake shoes
driven by the mechanical rotation of a cam in response to the hand
controller.

The vehicle is powered by two silver-zinc batteries, each having a
nominal voltage of 36 Vdc and a capacity of 120 ampere hours. During
lunar surface operations, both batteries are normally used
simultaneously on an approximate equal load basis. These batteries are
located on the forward chassis and are enclosed by a thermal blanket and
dust covers. The batteries are monitored for temperature, voltage,
output current, and remaining ampere hours on the control and display
panel. Each battery is protected from excessive internal pressures by a
relief valve set to open at 3.1 to 7 psi differential pressure. The
circuitry was designed so that if one battery fails, the entire
electrical load can be switched to the remaining battery.

The control and display console is separated into two main functional
parts - navigation on the upper part and monitoring controls on the
lower part. Navigation displays include pitch, roll, speed, heading,
total distance traveled, as well as the range and bearing back to the
lunar module. Heading is obtained from a sun-aligned directional gyro,
speed and distance from wheel rotation counters, and range and bearing
are computed from these inputs. Alignment of the directional gyro is
accomplished by relaying pitch, roll and sun angle readings to earth
where an initial heading angle is calculated. The gyro is then adjusted
by slewing with the torquing switch until the heading indicator reads
the same as the calculated value. The displays utilize a
radioluminescent material (promethium) that provides visibility under
lunar shadow conditions.

Thermal control devices are incorporated into the vehicle to maintain
temperature sensitive components within the necessary temperature
limits. They consist of special surface finishes, multilayer insulation,
space radiators, surface mirrors, thermal straps, and fusible mass heat
sinks. The basic concept of thermal control for forward chassis
components is to store energy during operation, and transfer energy to
deep space while the vehicle is parked between sorties. The space
radiators are mounted on the top of the signal processing unit, the
drive control electronics, and on batteries 1 and 2.

A-3.3 Extravehicular Communications

Because the lunar roving vehicle takes the crew beyond the range of
reliable radio communications with the lunar module using the portable
life support system communications equipment, radio communications
equipment are provided on the lunar roving vehicle that operate
independently of the lunar module. This communications equipment is
capable of relaying voice and telemetry data from the moon to the earth
as well as transmitting color television pictures. The equipment also
provides the capability for reception of voice communications from the
earth, relay of voice to the crew, and ground-command control of the
television camera. The lunar roving vehicle radio equipment, technically
called the lunar communications relay unit, employs a VHF radio link
between the lunar roving vehicle and earth. The color television camera
with its positioning assembly, technically called the ground commanded
television assembly, is connected to the lunar communications relay unit
by a cable which carries ground commands to the television control unit
and returns the television pictures to the lunar communications relay
unit for transmission to earth. The crewmen communicate directly with
each other using their extravehicular communications systems. Three
batteries per crewman are provided for the three traverses. However, a
connection is made to the lunar roving vehicle power system when the
communications equipment is placed on the vehicle to provide a backup
power system for communications. A functional diagram of the lunar
communications relay unit is shown in [figure A-9](../a15mr162.jpg).

![](media/image163.jpeg){width="5.333333333333333in" height="4.125in"}

The lunar communications relay unit, and its S-band high-gain antenna
are installed on the forward chassis of the lunar roving vehicle by the
crew after vehicle deployment on the lunar surface. The S-band low-gain
antenna is installed into the lunar roving vehicle left inboard
handhold.

The lunar communications relay unit is thermally controlled by three
means: thermal blankets regulate the exposed radiating surface and
insulate the unit from external environment; secondary-surface radiating
mirrors reflect undesired solar heat and emit undesired heat generated
within the lunar communications relay unit; and change-of-phase wax
packages absorb excess heat and stabilize the unit temperature through
an absorption-discharge cycle.

A.4 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT

A.4.1 Lunar Surface Science Equipment

Descriptions of all of the Apollo 15 lunar surface science equipment may
be found in previous Apollo mission reports (references 8 through 11);
therefore, descriptions are not repeated here. [Figure
A-10](../a15mr164.jpg) illustrates the Apollo lunar surface experiment
package, and [figure A-11](../a15mr165.jpg) shows the geological tools
used on Apollo 15. [Table A-I](../a15mr163.jpg) lists the lunar surface
experiments and identifies the previous missions on which similar
experiments were deployed or conducted.

![](media/image164.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in"
height="5.583333333333333in"}

![](media/image165.jpeg){width="5.1875in" height="6.395833333333333in"}

![](media/image166.jpeg){width="6.493055555555555in"
height="5.011111111111111in"}

A.4.2 Inflight Science Equipment

Twelve experiments and several photographic activities utilized
equipment aboard the command and service modules during flight. Standard
spacecraft equipment was used to perform some scientific tasks. However,
most inflight science equipment was located in the scientific instrument
module in sector I of the service module. A view of the equipment in the
scientific instrument module, including some camera equipment, is shown
in figure A-1. All other cameras that were used for inflight experiments
or photography were located in the command module. The equipment used
and the kinds of information desired from each experiment and
photographic activity are described in the following paragraphs.

Gamma-ray spectrometer.- The gamma ray spectrometer experiment (S-160)
was conducted while in lunar orbit to obtain data on the degree of
chemical differentiation that the moon has undergone and the composition
of the lunar surface. The equipment was also operated during transearth
coast to provide calibration data on spacecraft and space background
fluxes, and provide data on galactic gamma-ray flux. A gamma-ray
detector, capable of measuring gamma radiation in the energy range from
200 000 to 10 million electron volts, was mounted on a 25-foot boom
located in the scientific instrument module (fig. A- 1). The boom could
be fully extended or extended to two intermediate positions, retracted,
or jettisoned by the crew using controls in the command module crew
station. Controls were also provided to activate or deactivate the
spectrometer, incrementally alter the sensitivity (gain) of the
detector, and select either of two detector counting modes.

X-Rav fluorescence.- The X-ray fluorescence experiment (S-161) equipment
consisted of an X-ray detector assembly capable of detecting X-rays the
energy range from 1000 to 6000 electron volts, a solar monitor, and an
X- ray processor assembly. The X-ray detector assembly, located in the
scientific instrument module (fig. A-1), detected X-rays reflected from
the moon\'s surface or emitted by galactic X-ray sources. The solar
monitor, mounted in sector IV of the service module (displaced 1800 from
the X-ray detector assembly), measured solar X-ray flux. The measurement
of fluorescent X- ray flux from the lunar surface and the direct solar
X-ray flux which produces the fluorescence was expected to yield
information on the nature of the lunar surface material and the
homogeneity of the upper few millimeters of the lunar surface. Deep
space measurements were expected to provide information on galactic
X-ray sources. Controls were provided in the command module crew station
to activate and deactivate the experiment, open the solar monitor door,
and open and close the X-ray detector protective cover.

Alpha particle spectrometer.- The alpha particle spectrometer experiment
(S-162) was designed to gather data to be considered along with the
gamma-ray and X-ray data in mapping the lunar chemical composition. The
types of information desired from this experiment were the gross rate of
lunar surface radon evolution and localized sources of enhanced radon
emission. In addition, transearth coast data were desired for background
and engineering evaluation of the alpha-particle and X-ray
spectrometers. The experiment equipment., consisted of an alpha particle
sensing assembly which could detect alpha particles in the energy range
from 3.5 million to 7.5 million electron volts, supporting electronics,
and temperature monitors housed in the same enclosure as the X-ray
fluorescence experiment assembly (fig. A-1). Controls were provided in
the command module crew station to deploy a shield protecting the
experiment detectors from spacecraft contamination sources, and to
activate and deactivate the experiment.

Mass spectrometer.- The mass spectrometer experiment (S-165) was
conducted to obtain data on the composition of the lunar ambient
atmosphere as an aid in understanding the mechanisms of release of gases
from the surface, as a tool to locate areas of volcanism, and as a means
of determining the distribution of gases in the lunar atmosphere. The
experiment assembly consisted of the mass spectrometer and its
electronic components mounted on a 24-foot boom which was extended from
the scientific instrument module (fig. A-1). The instrument was capable
of measuring the abundance of particles in the 12- to
66-atomic-mass-unit range. A shelf-mounted shield to protect the
spectrometer from spacecraft contamination sources when in its stowed
position opened and closed automatically when the boom was extended and
retracted. In addition to acquiring data while in lunar orbit, the
spectrometer was to be operated at various intermediate boom positions
for specified periods during transearth coast to determine the
concentration of constituents forming the command and service module
contamination \"cloud.\" Command module crew station controls were
provided to extend, retract, and jettison the boom; activate/deactivate
the spectrometer; select high and low spectrometer discrimination modes,
and multiplier gains; and activate/deactivate the spectrometer ion
source heaters and filaments.

S-band transponder (command and service module/lunar module).- The
command and service module and/or lunar module were tracked in lunar
orbit using the S-band transponders and high-gain antenna that were
normal vehicle equipment. The S-band Doppler resolver tracking data
obtained will be used to help determine the distribution of mass along
the lunar ground track. Tracking data were to be obtained from the
docked command and service module/lunar module while in the 170- by
60-mile elliptical orbit, the 60-mile circular orbit, and the
low-altitude portion of the 60- by 8-mile elliptical orbit. Data were
also to be obtained from the undocked command and service module during
the unpowered portions of the 60-mile circular orbit, and from the
undocked lunar module during unpowered portions of flight.

Subsatellite experiments.- The subsatellite, launched from the command
and service module during lunar orbit, is the host carrier for three
experiments for which data will be acquired over a planned one-year
period. The experiments are:

S-band transponder (S-164)

Particle shadows/boundary layer (S-173)

Subsatellite magnetometer (S-174)

The basic elements of the system, in addition to the subsatellite
itself, consisted of a mechanism to deploy and launch the subsatellite
from the scientific instrument module, and a housing which encased the
subsatellite and its deployment/launcher device (fig. A-1).

The subsatellite contains charged particle telescope detectors capable
of detecting electrons in the energy range from 20 000 to 320 000
electron volts and protons in the energy range from 50 000 to 2.3
million electron volts. Spherical electrostatic analyzer detectors are
used to detect electrons in selected energy bands from 580 to 15 000
electron volts. In addition, the subsatellite contains a biaxial
fluxgate magnetometer which acquires data over a dynamic range of
&plusmn;200 gammas, an optical solar aspect system for attitude
determination, a data storage unit, an S-band communications system, and
a power system. The primary power source consists of solar cells on the
subsatellite external surfaces. A rechargeable silver cadmium battery is
the secondary source of power that sustains operation during passage of
the subsatellite through shadow. The subsatellite is hexagonal in shape,
30 inches in length, and weighs approximately 85 pounds. It has three
equally-spaced booms mounted around its base that deployed automatically
at launch to a length of 5 feet. The magnetometer is mounted at the end
of one boom, whereas, the only purpose of the other two booms is to
achieve the desired spin-stabilization characteristics. The subsatellite
is shown in [figure A-12](../a15mr166.jpg).

![](media/image167.jpeg){width="5.104166666666667in"
height="4.354166666666667in"}

Controls in the command module crew station were used for launching the
subsatellite and retracting the deployment/launcher mechanism. The
relative parting velocity was approximately 4 ft/sec and the
subsatellite was spin-stabilized at approximately 12 revolutions per
minute about a spin axis nearly perpendicular to the ecliptic plane.

S-band transponder experiment: Two-way S-band Doppler tracking
measurements of the subsatellite are made to obtain lunar gravitational
field data in addition to the data obtained from tracking the command
and service module and the lunar module.

Particle shadows/boundary layer experiment: The charged particle
detectors, the electrostatic analyzer detectors, and the subsatellite
support systems are used to obtain data to study the formation and
dynamics of the earth\'s magnetosphere, the interaction of plasmas with
the moon, and the physics of solar flares.

Subsatellite magnetometer: The magnetometer and the subsatellite support
systems are used to make magnetic field measurements in lunar orbit.
These data will be used in studies of the physical and electrical
properties of the moon and the interaction of plasmas with the moon.

Bistatic radar.- This experiment, technically designated \"Downlink
Bistatic Radar Observations of the Moon\" (S-170), was conducted to
provide fundamental new information on the upper few meters of the lunar
crust, and to provide engineering and calibration data needed for
similar experiments planned for the future. While the command and
service module was in lunar orbit, S-band and VHF signals were
transmitted from the spacecraft, reflected from the lunar surface, and
recorded on the earth for subsequent analysis. The high-gain antenna was
preferred for S-band, although an omnidirectional antenna was
acceptable. The scimitar antenna was used for VHF. The crew was required
to maintain an attitude in which the antenna was pointed toward the
lunar surface during the time that bistatic radar measurements were
being made.

Ultraviolet Photography - Earth and Moon.- Ultraviolet photography (S-
177) of the earth was obtained from earth orbit, from different points
during translunar and transearth coast, and from lunar orbit to
determine ultraviolet emission characteristics of the earth\'s
atmosphere. A portion of the photographs taken from lunar orbit were of
the lunar surface. These will be used to extend the wavelength range of
ground-based colormetric work and search for short-wavelength
fluorescence.

The photographs were taken with a 70-mm Hasselblad electric camera and
105-mm ultraviolet transmitting lens. The camera was mounted on a
bracket in the right-hand side window. Two ultraviolet band-pass filters
(centered at 3750 and 2600 angstrom) and a visual-range filter (4000 to
6000 angstrom) were used. For each sequence of photographs requested, a
minimum of four were to be taken using black-and-white film and the
aforementioned filters, while one was to be taken using color film and a
visual range filter. The crew was required to install the mounting
bracket, mount and operate the camera, attach the filter slide and lens,
change filters, and record the exposure time. The crew was also required
to maintain the proper spacecraft attitude and attitude rates for each
sequence.

Gegenschein from lunar orbit..- The Gegenschein from lunar orbit
experiment (S-178) -required three sequences of photographs to be taken
from the command module while in the shadow of the moon - one in the
direction of the antisolar vector, one in the direction of the Moulton
point, and one midway between these two. A Nikon 35-mm camera and 55-mm
lens were used to obtain the photographs. The camera was mounted in the
right-hand rendezvous window on a fixed mounting bracket. Window shades
and a darkened spacecraft were required to minimize the effects of stray
light from the spacecraft. The crew was required to maneuver the
spacecraft to the proper attitude the mission control center provided
the proper spacecraft orientation for camera pointing), inhibit the
reaction control system engines after spacecraft attitude rates had been
damped, operate the camera, and record the exposure time.

Apollo window meteroid.- The Apollo window meteroid experiment (S-176)
utilizes the command module windows as meteroid detectors and
collectors. Data are obtained by high-magnification scanning of the
windows before and after the flight.

Service module orbital photographic tasks.- These photographic tasks
comprised a detailed objective which required the use of the 24-inch
panoramic camera assembly, the 3-inch mapping camera assembly, and the
laser altimeter, all mounted in the scientific instrument module (fig.
A-1).

Twenty-four-inch panoramic camera: This camera was included to obtain
high-resolution (1- to 2-meters from an altitude of 60 miles) panoramic
photographs with stereoscopic and monoscopic coverage of the lunar
surface. The photographs will aid in the correlation of other orbital
science data. The camera assembly consisted of a roll frame assembly, a
gimbal assembly to provide stereo coverage and forward motion
compensation, a main frame, a gaseous nitrogen pressure vessel to
provide gas for certain bearings, an optics system, a film drive and
control system, and a film cassette (that was required to be retrieved
by an extravehicular crewman during transearth coast). The camera did
not require deployment for operation. Controls were provided in the crew
station to activate/deactivate camera heaters, supply/remove primary
camera power, select operate/standby operation modes, supply film roller
torque to prevent slack in film during launch and maneuvers, activate a
five-frame film advance cycle if the camera was not operated in a
24-hour period, increase/decrease the width of the exposure slit, and
select the stereo or monoscopic mode of operation.

Three-inch mapping camera: This camera was provided to obtain high
quality metric photographs of the lunar surface and stellar photographs
exposed simultaneously with the metric photographs. The lunar surface
photographs will aid in the correlation of experiment data with lunar
surface features. The stellar photographs provide a reference to
determine the laser altimeter pointing vector and the cartographic lens
pointing vector. The resolution capability of the metric camera was
approximately 20 meters from a distance of 60 miles. The metric and
stellar camera subsystems were integrated into a single unit which was
deployed on a rail-type mechanism in order to provide an unobstructed
field of view for the stellar camera. The system used the same gaseous
nitrogen source as the panoramic camera to provide an inert pressurized
atmosphere within the cameras to minimize potential static electrical
corona discharge which could expose film areas. In addition to the
optics, the camera system included a film drive/exposure/takeup system
and a removable cassette (that was required to be retrieved by an
extravehicular crewman during transearth coast). Controls were provided
in the crew station to activate/deactivate camera heaters and functions,
compensate for image motion and extend/retract the camera on its
deployment rails.

Laser altimeter: The laser altimeter was furnished to obtain data on the
altitude of the command and service module above the lunar surface.
These data, acquired with a 1-meter resolution, were to support mapping
and panoramic camera photography as well as other lunar orbital
experiments. The laser altimeter could operate in either of two modes:

When the mapping camera was operating, the altimeter automatically
emitted a laser pulse to correspond to mid-frame ranging for each film
frame exposed.

The altimeter could be decoupled from the mapping camera to allow
independent ranging measurements (one every 20 seconds).

Command module controls were provided to activate/deactivate the
altimeter.

Command module photographic tasks.- Photographs were to be obtained of:

Lunar surface areas of high scientific interest and of specific portions
of the lunar surface near the terminator.

Diffused galactic light of celestial objects, solar corona, the lunar
libration region, and the zodiacal light.

The lunar surface to extend selenodetic control and mapping.

The moon during lunar eclipse by the earth, and of a comet if
appropriate trajectory and celestial conditions existed.

These tasks involved the use of the following operational cameras:

A 16-mm data acquisition camera with an 18-mm lens.

A 70-mm Hasselblad electric camera with 80-mm and 250-mm \'Lenses.

A 35-mm camera with a 55-mm lens.

Crew participation was required to operate the cameras, change lenses
and camera settings, record identification data, control the spacecraft
attitude and attitude rates, and control cabin illumination.

A.5 SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT

Nearly all experiments and detailed objectives require photography
either as a primary data source or for validation purposes. Photographic
equipment required for acquisition of data for experiments has been
discussed in conjunction with the applicable experiments in the
preceding section. For convenience, this equipment is also summarized in
[table A-II](../a15mr167.jpg) along with photographic equipment required
for other activities.

![](media/image168.jpeg){width="4.291666666666667in"
height="6.041666666666667in"}

A.6 MASS PROPERTIES

Mass properties for the Apollo 15 mission are summarized in [table
A-III](../a15mr168.jpg). These data represent the conditions as
determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage
during the flight. Variations in command and service modules and lunar
module mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase
from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage are based on reported
real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this
report. The weights and center-of-gravity of the individual modules
(command, service, ascent stage, and descent stage) were measured prior
to flight and inertia values calculated. All changes incorporated after
the actual weighing were monitored, and the mass properties were
updated.

![](media/image169.jpeg){width="5.259027777777778in"
height="7.129166666666666in"}

APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES

The history of command and service module (CSM 112) operations at the
manufacturer\'s facility, Downey, California, is shown in [figure
B-1](../a15mr169.jpg), and the operations at Kennedy Space Center,
Florida, in [figure B-2](../a15mr170.jpg).

The history of the lunar module (LM-10) at the manufacturer\'s facility,
Bethpage, New York, is shown in [figure B-3](../a15mr171.jpg), and the
operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in [figure
B-4](../a15mr172.jpg).

![](media/image170.jpeg){width="6.416666666666667in"
height="4.833333333333333in"}

![](media/image171.jpeg){width="5.604166666666667in" height="4.71875in"}

![](media/image172.jpeg){width="6.495138888888889in"
height="4.148611111111111in"}

![](media/image173.jpeg){width="5.791666666666667in"
height="4.989583333333333in"}

APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING

Postflight testing and inspection of the command module and crew
equipment for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation
of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor\'s and
vendor\'s facilities and at the Manned Spacecraft Center in accordance
with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests
(ASHUR\'s). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are
described in [table C-I part 1](../a15mr173.jpg), [part
2](../a15mr174.jpg), and [part 3](../a15mr175.jpg); and discussed in the
appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being
conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR\'s and the
basic contract are not included.

![](media/image174.jpeg){width="6.4944444444444445in"
height="4.929166666666666in"}

![](media/image175.jpeg){width="6.491666666666666in"
height="5.016666666666667in"}

![](media/image176.jpeg){width="6.491666666666666in"
height="2.4145833333333333in"}

APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY

Tables [D-I part 1](../a15mr176.jpg) and [D-I part 2](../a15mr177.jpg);
and [D-II](../a15mr178.jpg) are summaries of the data made available for
systems performance analyses and anomaly investigations. Table D-I lists
the data for the command and service module, and table D-II, the lunar
module. The following table contains the times that experimental data
were made available to the principal investigator for scientific
analyses.

Time, hr:min Time, hr:min

From To From To

73:43 78:30 174:13 220:50

79:00 82:20 222:18 223:00

83:40 95:50 224:10 238:34

105:30 165:00 245:57 271:30

165:20 168:17 273:00 288:20

For additional information regarding data availability, the status
listing of all mission data in the Central Metric Data File, building
12, should be consulted.

![](media/image177.jpeg){width="5.291666666666667in"
height="7.020833333333333in"}

![](media/image178.jpeg){width="5.145833333333333in"
height="6.802083333333333in"}

![](media/image179.jpeg){width="5.5in" height="5.5in"}

APPENDIX E - MISSION REPOPT SUPPLEMENTS

Table E-I contains a listing of all reports that supplement the Apollo 7
through Apollo 15 mission reports. The table indicates the present
status of each report not yet completed and the publication date of
those which have been published.

![](media/image180.jpeg){width="6.49375in" height="7.560416666666667in"}

[Part 1](../a15mr179.jpg)

[Part 2](../a15mr180.jpg)

![](media/image181.jpeg){width="5.5625in" height="6.104166666666667in"}

[Part 3](../a15mr181.jpg)

[Part 4](../a15mr182.jpg)

APPENDIX F -- GLOSSARY

Anorthosite: A granular, textured igneous rock regarded as having
solidified at considerable depth. It is composed almost entirely of a
soda-lime feldspar.

Apocynthion: The point in the orbit of a moon satellite which is
farthest from the moon.

Apolune: See apocynthion.

Bow shock: The shock wave produced by the interaction of the solar wind
with the earth\'s dipole magnetic field. It is also the outer boundary
of the magnetosheath (transition region).

Breccia: A course-grained rock composed of angular fragments of
pre-existing rocks in a fine-grained matrix.

Caldera: A broad crater-like basin surrounding a volcanic vent and
having a diameter many times that of the vent.

Circadian rhythm: Relating to biological variations with a cycle of
about 24 hours.

Cislunar: Pertaining to the space between the earth and moon.

Clast: A fragment of rock or mineral, commonly included in a larger
rock.

Comprehensive sample: A 1-kilogram collection of rocks representative of
a given area. Desired sample diameters range from approximately 3/8 inch
to 1 1/2 inches.

Contingency sample: Approximately 2 kilograms of lunar material
collected in the immediate vicinity of the lunar module during the early
part of the first extravehicular period. This is done to increase the
probabaility of returning a lunar sample to earth if early termination
of extravehicular operations is necessary.

Densitometric: Relating to determining the degree of opacity of any
translucent medium.

Diamagnetic cavity: An area having a magnetic permeability less than
one.

Diurnal: Recurring daily. On earth, diurnal processes repeat themselves
every 24 hours; on the moon, every 28 days.

Documented sample: A sample that is photographed before being picked up,
the area photographed after sample removal, and a reference photograph
taken to identify the location.

Double core tube sample: A sample obtained using two drive core tubes
connected end to end.

Earthshine: Illumination of the moon\'s surface by sunlight reflected
from the earth\'s surface and atmosphere.

Ecliptic: The plane defined by the earth\'s orbit about the sun.

Ergometry test: A test performed to measure muscular fatigue under
controlled conditions.

Front: The outer slopes of a mountain range that rises above a plain or
plateau.

Geomagnetic tail: An elongation of the earth\'s magnetic field whereby
it is drawn in the anti-solar direction to an undetermined distance. It
is also called the nagnetotail.

Gnomon: A rod mounted on a tripod in such a way that it is free to swing
in any direction and indicate the local vertical.

Hummocky: Multiple low, rounded hills or knolls.

J-missions: A classification of Apollo lunar exploration missions for
which provisions are made for extended lunar surface stay time, surface
vehicular mobility and communications, and more extensive science data
acquisition.

Kilocalorie: An amount of food having an energy-producing value of one
large calorie (equivalent to 1000 gram calories).

Limb: The outer edge of the apparent disc of a celestial body, as the
moon or earth, or a portion of the edge.

Lunar libration: A point in space which, from the viewpoint of an
observer on earth, is about 60 degrees from the earth-moon axis in the
direction of the moon\'s travel and on its orbital path.

Lunation: The average period of revolution of the moon about the earth
with respect to the sun. A period of 29 days 12 hours 44 minutes 2.8
seconds. Also called a synodical month.

Magnetosheath: The region between the solar wind bow shock and the
earth\'s dipole magnetic field. It varies in size and, within the
region, the solar wind is reduced and the magnetic field is poorly
defined. It is also called the transition region.

Magnetosphere: The region of the earth\'s atmosphere where ionized gases
contribute to the dynamics of the atmosphere and where the forces of the
earth\'s magnetic field are predominant.

Magnetospheric plasma: Plasma evolved in the magnetosphere.

Magnetotail: See geomagnetic tail.

Magnetopause: The boundary between the magnetosheath (transition region)
and the earth\'s dipole magnetic field.

Mare: A large, dark, flat area on the lunar surface (lunar sea).

Mascons: Large mass concentrations beneath the lunar surface. They are
believed to be large bodies that have impacted the lunar surface.

Meru: Milli earth rate unit. One thousandth of the earth\'s rotational
rate.

Metric photography: Photography having an appropriate network of
coordinates or reference points to permit accurate measurements.

Monoscopic photograph: A single photograph of a given area, or subject
obtained with a camera having one lens system and shutter.

Morphological: Relating to the shapes and contours of objects or areas.

Moulton Point: A theoretical point on the sun-earth axis thought to be
located about 940 000 statute miles from the earth in the anti-solar
direction. It is also designated as the Ll libration point of the earth.

Noble gases: Monatomic gases that are relatively inert.

Olivine: An igneous mineral that consists of a silicate of magnesium and
iron.

Pericynthion: The point in the orbit of a moon satellite that is nearest
to the moon, or the point in the trajectory of a vehicle that is nearest
to the moon.

Perilune: See pericynthion.

Phenocrysts: Crystals in igneous rocks that are larger than the
crystalline matrix in which they are imbedded.

Planar: Two-dimensional.

Plasma: An electrically conductive gas comurised of neutral particles,
ionized particles, and free electrons, but which as a whole, is
electrically neutral.

Plasma sheet: As used in this report, the term refers to a region in the
center of the geomagnetic tail, approximately 10 earth radii in width,
in which there is a marked increase in particle flux.

Porphyritic: The texture of rocks which contain distinct crystals
imbedded in a relatively fine-grained groundmass.

Pyroclastic rocks: Rocks formed by fragmentation as a result of volcanic
action.

Pyroxene: A mineral occurring in short, thick, prismatic crystals, or in
crystals of square cross section; often laminated, and varying in color
from white to dark green or black (rarely blue).

Radial sample: A sample consisting of material taken from a crater\'s
ejecta field at a crater\'s rim, at a distance equal to the crater\'s
radius, and at a distance equal to the crater\'s diameter.

Radon: A radioactive gaseous element with atomic number 86 and atomic
masses of 220 and 222. Formed by the radioactive decay of radium.

Regolith: The surface layer of unsorted fragmented material on the earth
or moon that overlies solid material

Rille: A long, narrow valley on the moon\'s surface.

Scoriaceous: Having the characteristics of rough, vesicular, cindery,
usually dark lava.

Selenodetic: Relating to the branch of applied mathematics that
determines by observation and measurement the positions of points on the
moon\'s surface and the size and shape of the moon.

Selenological: Relating to the branch of astronomy that deals with the
moon.

Slikensides: Smooth, grooved and polished surfaces of rocks produced by
friction on fault planes and joint faces.

Solar corona: The outer visible envelope of the sun.

Solar wind: Streams of particles (plasma) emanating from and flowing
approximately radially outward from the sun.

Spectrometric: Relating to the measurement of wavelengths of rays of a
spectrum.

Stereoscopic photographs: Two photographs obtained of a given area or
subject from different angles so that the images, when viewed through a
stereoscope, appear as a three-dimensional reproduction of the area or
subject photographed.

Talus: An accumulated mass of angular rock debris on a hill side or at
the foot of a mountain.

Terminator: The border between the illuminated and dark portions of the
moon or planets

Transition region: See magnetosheath.

Umbra: The darkest portion of the shadow of a large body such as the
earth or moon wherein light is completely blocked.

Vesicular: Containing small spherical cavities.

Zodiac: An imaginary belt that extends 8 degrees on either side of the
ecliptic. It includes the paths of the moon and principal planets.

Zodiacal light: A faint glow seen along the zodiac in the west after
sunset and in the east before sunrise.