**PUBLIC NOTICE**![](media/image1.png){width="0.7388888888888889in"
height="0.7458333333333333in"}

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**445 12th STREET, S.W.**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

News Media Information: (202) 418-0500

Fax-On-Demand: (202) 418-2830

Internet: http://www.fcc.gov

ftp.fcc.gov

####### DA 99-2624

November 23, 1999

**AUCTION OF LICENSES FOR**

**FIXED POINT-TO-POINT MICROWAVE SERVICES**

**IN THE 38.6 to 40.0 GHz (39 GHz) BAND**

##### SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 11, 2000

**COMMENT SOUGHT**

**ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND**

###### OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURAL ISSUES

**Report No. AUC‑99-30-A (Auction No. 30)**

By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
(\"Bureau\") announces the auction of licenses for fixed point-to-point
microwave services in the 38.6 to 40.0 GHz band ("39 GHz Auction"),
scheduled to commence on April 11, 2000.[^1] As discussed in greater
detail herein, the Bureau proposes that the 39 GHz Auction be composed
of 2,450 licenses in the

38.6-40.0 GHz bands ("39 GHz band"). Fourteen 100 megahertz licenses
(paired 50 megahertz channel blocks) will be offered in each of 172
Economic Areas (EAs) and 3 EA-like areas, covering the United States,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to \"ensure
that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this
subsection, an adequate period is allowed . . . before issuance of
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction
procedures . . . .\"[^2] Consistent with the provisions of the Budget
Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to
familiarize themselves with the specific provisions that will govern the
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,
under its existing delegated authority,[^3] to seek comment on a variety
of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. [^4]
We therefore seek comment on the following issues relating to the 39 GHz
Auction (Auction No. 30).

**I. Auction Methodology and License Groupings for the 39 GHz Auction**

Because it is most administratively appropriate, and allows bidders to
take advantage of any synergies that exist among licenses, we propose to
award the licenses in a single, simultaneous multiple-round auction.[^5]
We seek comment on this proposal. The following table contains the
proposed Block/Frequency Band Limits Cross Reference List for the 39 GHz
band:

######### 39 GHz Channels

  ---------- ----------- ----------------- ----------- ------------------
  License    Channel No. Frequency         Channel No. Frequency
  Suffix                                               

  A          1-A         38,600-38,650     1-B         39,300-39,350

  B          2-A         38,650-38,700     2-B         39,350-39,400

  C          3-A         38,700-38,750     3-B         39,400-39,450

  D          4-A         38,750-38,800     4-B         39,450-39,500

  E          5-A         38,800-38,850     5-B         39,500-39,550

  F          6-A         38,850-38,900     6-B         39,550-39,600

  G          7-A         38,900-38,950     7-B         39,600-39,650

  H          8-A         38,950-39,000     8-B         39,650-39,700

  I          9-A         39,000-39,050     9-B         39,700-39,750

  J          10-A        39,050-39,100     10-B        39,750-39,800

  K          11-A        39,100-39,150     11-B        39,800-39,850

  L          12-A        39,150-39,200     12-B        39,850-39,900

  M          13-A        39,200-39,250     13-B        39,900-39,950

  N          14-A        39,250-39,300     14-B        39,950-40,000
  ---------- ----------- ----------------- ----------- ------------------

### II. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder

The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area, and the value of similar spectrum.[^6] With these guidelines in
mind, we propose for the 39 GHz Auction the following upfront payments.

For licenses with populations of 1,000,000 or greater:

> License population \* \$0.04 (the result rounded to the nearest
> thousand).

For licenses with populations of less than 1,000,000:

> License population \* \$0.02 (the result rounded to the nearest
> hundred for levels below \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for
> levels above \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500 per
> license.

A complete list of all licenses, including their related population and
upfront payments, are attached hereto as Attachment A. We seek comment
on this proposal. We further propose that the amount of the upfront
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the initial maximum
eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront
payments will not be attributed to specific licenses, but instead will
be translated into bidding units to define a bidder\'s initial maximum
eligibility, which cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in
calculating the upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the
*maximum* number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering
that number of bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

### Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid 

The Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a
reasonable reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid
established when FCC licenses are subject to auction (*i.e.*, because
the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive applications for those
licenses), unless the Commission determines that a reserve price or
minimum bid is not in the public interest[^7][^8] Consistent with this
mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the
use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of
each auction[^9][^10] More specifically, the Bureau was directed to seek
comment on the methodology to be employed in establishing each of these
mechanisms. Among other factors the Bureau should consider are the
amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the
availability of technology to provide service, the size of the
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum
bands, and any other relevant factors that reasonably could have an
impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission
concluded that the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or
both of these mechanisms for future auctions[^11][^12]

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an
item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is
the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which
*no bids* are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario,
the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount later in
the auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the
reserve price to be the same amount.

In anticipation of this auction and in light of the Budget Act, the
Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bids for the 39 GHz
Auction. The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been
utilized in other auctions[^13] is an effective bidding tool.[^14] A
minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve price, will help to regulate
the pace of the auction and provides flexibility.

Specifically, for Auction No. 30, the Commission proposes the following
license-by-license formulas for calculating minimum opening bids, based
on the population (\"pops\") of the EA:

For licenses with populations of 1,000,000 or greater:

> License population \* \$0.08 (the result rounded to the nearest
> thousand).

For licenses with populations of less than 1,000,000:

> License population \* \$0.04 (the result rounded to the nearest
> hundred for results less than \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for
> results greater than \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500
> per license.

Comment is sought on this proposal. A complete list of all licenses
including their related population and minimum opening bids are attached
hereto as Attachment A. If commenters believe the formula proposed above
for minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of unsold
licenses, or is not a reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a
reserve price, they should explain why this is so, and comment on the
desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to
support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested reserve
prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas. In establishing the
formula for minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment on such
factors as, among other things, the amount of spectrum being auctioned,
levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service,
the size of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with
other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could
reasonably have an impact on valuation of the 39 GHz band.
Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, consistent with the Budget
Act, the public interest would be served by having no minimum opening
bid or reserve price.

### IV. Other Auction Procedural Issues

**a. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity Requirements, and Criteria
for Determining Reductions in Eligibility**

We propose to divide the auction into three stages: Stage One, Stage Two
and Stage Three. The auction will start in Stage One. We propose that
the auction will generally advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from Stage
One to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction
activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving
new high bids, is approximately ten percent or below for three
consecutive rounds of bidding in Stages One and Two. However, we further
propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages
unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this
discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder
activity including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the
percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in
revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage
of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of the auction
rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not
satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the
next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if any remain).

For the 39 GHz Auction, we propose the following activity requirements:

**Stage One**: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder
desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on
licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current bidding
eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will
result in a reduction in the bidder\'s bidding eligibility in the next
round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage
One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).

**Stage Two**: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 90 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by ten-ninths (10/9).

**Stage Three**: In each round of the third stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by fifty-fortyninths (50/49).

We seek comment on these proposals.

**b. Minimum Accepted Bids**

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment will be
applied to that license to establish a minimum acceptable bid for the
following round. For the 39 GHz Auction, we propose to use a smoothing
methodology to calculate bid increments, as we have done in several
other auctions. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
bid increment if it determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau
will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. We seek
comment on these proposals.

The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment for each
license based on a weighted average of the activity received on each
license in all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor the bid
increment for each license based on activity, rather than setting a
global increment for all licenses. For every license that receives a
bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license will be
established using the exponential smoothing formula.

The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each license in a
given round is made at the end of the previous round. The computation is
based on an activity index, which is calculated as the weighted average
of the activity in that round and the activity index from the prior
round. The activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be
set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a weighting factor
times the number of new bids received on the license in the most recent
bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity
index from the prior round. The activity index is then used to calculate
a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum percentage increment by
one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum
percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting
factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.1, and the maximum
percentage increment at 0.2.

### Equations

A~i~ = (C \* B~i~) + ( (1-C) \* A~i-1~)

I~i+1~ = smaller of ( (1 + A~i~) \* N) and M

where,

A~i~ = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

B~i~ = number of bids in the current round (round i)

A~i-1~ = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A~0~ is 0

I~i+1~ = percentage bid increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been
received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in
the following round will be the new high bid plus the dollar amount
associated with the percentage increment (variable I~i+1~ from above
times the high bid). This result will be rounded to the nearest thousand
if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest hundred if it is under ten
thousand.

#### 

#### Examples

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

[Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = \$1,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using exponential
smoothing:

A~1~ = (0.5 \* 2) + (0.5 \* 0) = 1

The smaller of I~2~ = (1 + 1) \* 0.1 = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage increment
(I~2~ from above)

0.2 \* \$1,000,000 = \$200,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = 1,200,000

[Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = 2,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using exponential
smoothing:

A~2~ = (0.5 \* 3) + (0.5 \* 1) = 2

The smaller of I~3~ = (1 + 2) \* 0.1 = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 3 using the percentage increment
(I~3~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,000,000 = \$400,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = 2,400,000

[Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = 2,400,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using exponential
smoothing:

A~3~ = (0.5 \* 1) + (0.5 \* 2) = 1.5

The smaller of I~4~ = (1 + 1.5) \* 0.1 = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage

increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage increment
(I~4~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,400,000 = \$480,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = 2,880,000

**c. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility**

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder\'s current bidding
eligibility despite the bidder\'s activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid
the loss of auction.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than
lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver (known as an \"automatic waiver\") at the end of any bidding
period where a bidder\'s activity level is below the minimum required
unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its bidding
eligibility, rather than use an activity rule waiver, must affirmatively
override the automatic waiver mechanism during the bidding period by
using the reduce eligibility function in the software. In this case, the
bidder\'s eligibility is permanently reduced to bring the bidder into
compliance with the activity rules as described above. Once eligibility
has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost
bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively apply an activity rule waiver as a means to
keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding
software) during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the
auction will remain open and the bidder\'s eligibility will be
preserved. Note: an automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there
are no new valid bids will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in the 39 GHz Auction be provided with five
activity rule waivers that may be used in up to five separate rounds at
the bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth
above. We seek comment on this proposal.

**d. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal**

For the 39 GHz Auction, we propose the following bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder
has the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the
remove bid function in the software, a bidder may effectively
\"unsubmit\" any bid placed within that round. A bidder removing a bid
placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal payments, but will
affect a bidder's activity for the round in which it is removed.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in
the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids from previous
rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder that withdraws its
standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the bid withdrawal
payment provisions.[^15] We seek comment on these bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission explained that
allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses
and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes
available during the course of an auction. The Commission noted,
however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for
improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the
auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding
abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively
exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which
bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a
particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the
Commission\'s bid withdrawal procedures.[^16]

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in the 39 GHz
Auction to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during the course of
the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more than two rounds
would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of withdrawals for
anti-competitive purposes. The two rounds in which withdrawals are
utilized will be at the bidder\'s discretion; withdrawals otherwise must
be in accordance with the Commission\'s rules. There is no limit on the
number of standing high bids that may be withdrawn in either of the
rounds in which withdrawals are utilized. Withdrawals will remain
subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the
Commission\'s rules. We seek comment on this proposal.

**e. Stopping Rule**

For the 39 GHz Auction, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous
stopping rule approach. The Bureau has discretion \"to establish
stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to
terminate the auction within a reasonable time.\"[^17] A simultaneous
stopping rule means that all licenses remain open until the first round
in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers or withdrawals are
received. After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on
all licenses. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding
would remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

The Bureau seeks comment on a modified version of the simultaneous
stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the auction for
all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits a
proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it
is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the
standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified
stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether this modified
stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in Stage Three of the
auction.

We propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to keep an auction open
even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted and no
previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the
same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule,
therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with insufficient activity
will either lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule
waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare that
the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds
(\"special stopping rule\"). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping
rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for licenses on
which the high bid increased in at least one of the preceding specified
number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to exercise this option only in
certain circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is
proceeding very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it
appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable
period of time. Before exercising this option, the Bureau is likely to
attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, moving the
auction into the next stage (where bidders would be required to maintain
a higher level of bidding activity), increasing the number of bidding
rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid
increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still a
high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

**f. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation**

For the 39 GHz Auction, we propose that, by public notice or by
announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel
the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle,
evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity,
administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason that
affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding.[^18] In
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to: resume the
auction starting from the beginning of the current round; resume the
auction starting from some previous round; or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely
within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a
substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their
activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

######## Due Diligence 

######## 

######## The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has reviewed the *Memorandum Opinion and Order* addressing the 39 GHz band and provides related comments.[^19]

######## 

######## VI. Conclusion

Comments are due on or before December 8, 1999, and reply comments are
due on or before December 20, 1999. To file formally, parties must
submit an original and four paper copies to the Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commission,
445 12th Street, S.W., TW‑A325, Washington, D.C. 20554. In addition,
parties must submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry
Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 4-A760, 445 12th Street S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available
for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public
Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C.
20554.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact Kenneth
Burnley, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau at (202) 418-0660; Lisa Stover or Bob Reagle,
Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau at (717) 338-2888.

-   FCC --

[^1]: The Commission released a *Memorandum Opinion and Order* that
    modified the interim rules for fixed point-to-point microwave
    services in the 39 GHz band. *See* Amendment of the Commission's
    Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, ET Docket
    No. 95-183, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 2910 (1997),
    62 Fed. Reg. 14015 (March 25, 1997) ("*First Memorandum Opinion and
    Order*"). On November 3, 1997, the Commission released a *Report and
    Order and Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making* that revised the
    licensing and technical rules for the fixed point-to-point microwave
    service in the 39 GHz band, and dismissed certain 39 GHz
    applications and amendments thereto that had been held in abeyance.
    *See* Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6
    GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, ET Docket No. 95-183, *Report and Order
    and Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 18600 (1997),
    63 Fed. Reg. 6079 (February 6, 1998) ("*Report and Order and Second
    NPRM*"). On July 29, 1999, the Commission released a *Memorandum
    Opinion and Order* that addressed pleadings filed concerning these
    two Commission items. *See* Amendment of the Commission's Rules
    Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, ET Docket No.
    95-183, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, FCC 99-179 (rel. July 29,
    1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 59663 (November 3, 1999) ("*Second Memorandum
    Opinion and Order*"). In the *Second Memorandum Opinion and Order*,
    the Commission revisits the 39 GHz band service areas,
    channelization plan, performance requirements, licensing rules and
    disposition of pending applications, and affirms application of the
    standard method for calculating unjust enrichment payments on a *pro
    rata* basis.

[^2]: Section 3002(a)(E)(i), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
    105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (\"Budget Act\").

[^3]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules---Competitive
    Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Order, Memorandum Opinion
    and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 5686,
    5677, ¶ 16 (1997) (\"*Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
    and Notice of Proposed Rule Making*") (\"We also clarify that
    pursuant to Section 0.131 of our rules, the Chief, Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau, has delegated authority to implement all
    of the Commission\'s rules pertaining to auctions procedures\").

[^4]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules \--
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz
    Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket
    No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, *Third Report and Order and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 448, ¶ 124
    (1998) (*\"Part 1 Third Report and Order\"*). The Commission
    directed the Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms related
    to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure
    of bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids
    or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum
    eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of
    the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining
    reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and
    bid removal, stopping rules, and information relating to auction
    delay, suspension or cancellation. *Id.* at ¶ 125.

[^5]: *See Report and Order and Second NPRM*, 12 FCC Rcd at 18648-49, ¶
    106.

[^6]: *See Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98, ¶ 16 (1997).

[^7]: ^.^

[^8]: *See* Budget Act, Section 3002(a). The Commission\'s authority to
    establish a reserve price or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47
    C.F.R. § 1.2104(c) and (d).

[^9]: ^.^

[^10]: *See* *Part 1 Third Report and Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 454-455, ¶
    141 (1998).

[^11]: ^.^

[^12]: *Id*.

[^13]: ^,^

[^14]: *S*e*e*, *e.g.*, Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band,
    Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, DA 97-2147, *Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd 16354 (1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses,
    Auction Notice and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting
    of Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and Nationwide
    Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and
    Other Procedural Issues, *Public Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998).

[^15]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g); 1.2109.

[^16]: *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 460, ¶ 150.

[^17]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).

[^18]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).

[^19]: *See* Letter attached hereto as Attachment B from William T.
    Hatch, Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Spectrum
    Management, National Telecommunications and Information
    Administration, to Dale N. Hatfield, Chief, Office of Engineering
    and Technology, Federal Communications Commission, re: Memorandum
    Opinion and Order \-\-- Amendment of the Commission's Rules
    Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, ET Docket No.
    95-183 \-\-- Competitive Bidding, 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz
    Bands, PP Docket No. 93-253 (September 23, 1999).