ANDREW JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS

[Book Review by Captain Christopher A. Love\*]{.smallcaps}

> *"Burn their dwellings-destroy their stock-slay their wives and
> children, that the very breed may perish."* [^1]

Shawnee Chief Tecumseh to the Creek Indians, 1811

> *"\[I\] think myself justified in laying waste their villages, burning
> their homes, killing their warriors and leading into Captivity their
> wives and Children."* [^2]

Andrew Jackson to Tennessee Governor Blount, 1812

The collision of cultures which spawned such rhetoric by American
Indians and government officials in the late Eighteenth and early
Nineteenth centuries fueled more than heated passions. It sustained the
longest series of wars in our nation's history. Over the course of a
generation, between 1789 and 1818, those wars reached a fevered pitch.
Their cumulative effects almost extinguished all Native American tribes
east of the Mississippi River. Those that did not fall to the musket or
the sword were forcibly relocated to the western territories[^3] under
an official government policy, innocuously termed "Removal."

In his most recent ode to Andrew Jackson, Professor Robert Remini in the
book, *Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars,* challenges his reader to
view the process of Indian Removal as a Nineteenth-century American. He
convincingly argues that Removal was a visceral response of both the
populace and their leadership to an ever-present Indian threat. Excusing
neither the policy nor the means by which it was implemented, Remini
paints Removal with a realist's brush, much as Jackson did throughout
his public life. In so doing, Remini offers an honest, meticulously
researched, and well-written account of a controversial period of
American history.

In Chapter One, Remini graphically portrays the Indian threat by
recounting Tecumseh's impassioned speech to the Creek tribal nation at
the annual tribal grand council of 1811.[^4] The viciousness to which
the Indians had been pushed by white settler encroachment is palpable in
the words of Tecumseh to the assembled Creeks, "Let the white race
perish.... Back whence they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be
driven!"[^5] To maximize the impact of such statements, Remini injects
them directly into his narrative text, without introduction or
paraphrasing. Although occasionally awkward, this technique of jumping
into the first person without notice, grabs the reader's attention and
imagination. The reader can almost envision Remini as the narrator of a
documentary film in which each character comes to life in a separate
voice. Of course, the most frequent voice is Andrew Jackson's.

Remini traces Jackson's perspective on Indian relations from the arrival
of his parents in America from Ireland in 1765. Indeed, Remini notes
that the Jacksons arrived during a wave of immigration that followed the
removal of the Catawba Indians from most of the South Carolina
Piedmont[^6] in 1761.[^7] Notwithstanding the relative safety that was
experienced in the area by the white population because of its
increasingly large size, owing mainly to the arrival of more immigrants
from Europe, Remini explains that Indian attacks from areas west or
north of the Piedmont remained a constant source of fear for the new
immigrants. Indeed, he cites a contemporary neighbor's characterization
of the Jacksons as "inveterate haters of the Indians" after the murder
of one of their "kinsmen."[^8]

Having established a direct nexus of fear and mistrust between Andrew
Jackson and the Indians, Remini embarks on a brief journey through the
early years of the future U.S. president's life, from action in the
Revolutionary War, to admission to the North Carolina Bar, to
appointment as a state prosecutor in the territory that would later
become Tennessee. His subsequent appointment as Judge Advocate for the
Davidson county militia in 1792 solidified his position within the most
important political circles of the burgeoning territory.[^9]
Notwithstanding its political importance,[^10] the position has been
described by another historian as not prominent, conferred chiefly
because Jackson was a lawyer; but it identified him with a calling for
which he was by nature eminently fitted.[^11] Although it served as his
entrée to the military establishment, Jackson's tenure as a judge
advocate was apparently short-lived.[^12]

In the treacherous American Frontier environment, Jackson often took
responsibility for protecting groups of settlers traveling between
enclaves of safety throughout the territory.[^13] According to Remini,
Jackson not only assumed, but actively pursued this role.[^14] More
significant to Jackson than isolated skirmishes with bands of Indians,
however, was what he called the "triple headed menace," the looming
presence of English, Spanish, and Indian belligerents along the American
border.[^15] Jackson considered this presence the greatest threat facing
the American Frontier and the nation.[^16]

England and Spain engaged in covert war against the United States during
the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries by providing frontier
Indians with firearms.[^17] Indeed, a key element of the British battle
plan for the invasion of New Orleans involved the creation of a large
Indian buffer zone along the Gulf Coast to protect their advance.[^18]
The violence facilitated by such foreign intervention prompted settlers
to continually petition the new federal government for help. These
petitions fell on deaf ears. According to Remini, Washington was more
disposed to reimburse the tribes in the East for lands already lost, and
to legislate against any further encroachment.[^19]

This divergence between federal action and local need gave rise to, or
at least perpetuated, what Remini terms the "Spanish Conspiracy," a view
to which many white settlers subscribed. They believed that they would
receive no protection from Washington against the Indians, and thought
that only the nearby Spanish could solve their security problem.

Incredibly, Remini suggests that even Jackson subscribed to this view.
Although he cites a Jackson letter threatening to "seek... protection
from some other source,"[^20] Remini does not explore the lengths to
which this perspective might have been an accurate portrayal of
Jackson's true sentiment toward his nascent federal government. Rather,
the whole of Remini's position on Jackson's treatment of the Indians
hinges on the depths of Jackson's national security concerns.

The ever-present conflict between frontier exigencies and the direction
of official Washington policy remains central to Remini's explanation of
Jackson's treatment of the Indians. Jackson's personal involvement in a
series of excursions against the Chickamauga Cherokees in 1794
illustrates this conflict quite well.[^21] In one of these operations,
he accompanied a detachment led by Major James Ore against a number of
Indian settlements near Chattanooga. Conducted under a veil of secrecy
and counter to express instructions from the Secretary of War to refrain
from all offensive action against the Indians, the military expedition
was a resounding tactical success. The extensive publicity which
resulted, however, forced the commanding general of the militia to
resign for disobeying the War Department. Shockingly, when no one would
accept appointment in his place, he quietly resumed command.[^22]
According to Remini, this blatant disregard for central authority
fostered in Jackson the belief that he could ignore superior orders
regarding Indian affairs when he thought that his course of action was
more compelling and more beneficial to frontier settlers.[^23] Jackson's
subsequent military exploits against the Indians appear to prove Remini
correct.

Remini next describes the political jockeying that surrounded Jackson's
election to the House of Representatives,[^24] the Senate,[^25] the
Tennessee Bench,[^26] and finally, to the position he most sought, Major
General of the Tennessee Militia.[^27] In his command of the Militia,
General Jackson demonstrated keen military intelligence, extraordinary
care for his men, and strict impartiality in his enforcement of the
terms of Indian treaties.[^28] Remini also readily notes that most of
the treaties that Jackson was left to enforce were largely contrived
land grabs. Indians who purchased goods from government stores on credit
were encouraged to enter "treaties" in which they agreed to relinquish
land for the cancellation of their debt. Remini makes particular note
that President Thomas Jefferson was an eager proponent of this
tactic.[^29] Unfortunately, Remini directs his readers to a citation
that recounts a particular example of the practice, rather than
documentary evidence of Mr. Jefferson's position on the practice.

Having set the stage delineating the multifaceted aspects of Jackson's
predilections, Remini next embarks on a chronology of Jackson's military
exploits against the Indians, the British, and the Spanish. As Jackson
ploddingly hacks away at this "triple headed menace," the reader is
faithfully reminded of Jackson's overriding inspiration \-- national
security \-- and the means by which Jackson believed that goal could
finally be secured, Indian Removal.

As early as 1809, Jackson corresponded with the governor of Tennessee on
the issue of removing the Indians to the Louisiana Territory.[^30]
Rather than forcing Indians into debt and then cheating them out of
their land, the idea of an even exchange was considered a more morally
acceptable solution by many frontier officials.[^31] Although both men
ardently supported Removal, it was an idea whose time had not yet come.
The federal government had displayed its preference to enter into
treaties with the Indians, and Jackson continued to be their chief
enforcer in the territories south of the Ohio River.

In preserving the rule of law on the American Frontier, Jackson was
evenly heavy-handed with both white and Indian transgressors. According
to Remini, Jackson characterized Indians who broke treaty laws as
"renegades" and "half-breeds," as opposed to the "true Indians" who
abided by his government's laws.[^32] He similarly viewed white
squatters on Indian lands as "troublemakers" who risked the safety of
all law-abiding frontier people.

However, Remini's own account calls into question the sincerity of
Jackson's assertions. White law breakers were delivered to civil
authorities for prosecution, and their stock was sold at auction, while
a decidedly less judicious end awaited the "renegades" and
"half-breeds":

\[W\]e have sent to demand the murderers, if they are not given up, the
whole creek nation shall be covered with blood, fire shall consume their
Towns and villages; and their lands shall be divided among the
whites.[^33]

Following his notorious victory at Horseshoe Bend during the Creek War,
Jackson negotiated the Treaty of Fort Jackson. Regarded by Jackson as a
shining success, this treaty resulted in the acquisition of over 25
million acres from the Creeks and Cherokees.[^34] Ironically, however,
Jackson's subsequent victory against the British in the Battle of New
Orleans effectively brought an end to the War of 1812 and actually put
his recent land acquisitions in jeopardy.

The Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, contained a provision
that obligated the United States to return all Indian land it had
acquired since 1811, and to terminate hostilities against all peaceful
tribes:[^35]

> The United States of America engage to put an end immediately after
> the ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the
> Tribes or Nations of Indians *with whom they may be at war at the time
> of such ratification* and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or
> Nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which
> they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight
> hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.[^36]

Remini suggests that this prompted Jackson to have the Tennessee
Senators push his treaty, which had been languishing in committee for
two months, through to ratification.[^37] While noting that the Treaty
of Fort Jackson was finally ratified on February 16, 1815, Remini fails
to point out that the Treaty of Ghent was then ratified a mere
twenty-four hours later.[^38] This timing serves only to strengthen
Jackson's position that his treaty removed the Creek Nation from the
scope of the Treaty of Ghent because it terminated the hostilities
between the United States and the Creeks before the Treaty of Ghent was
ratified.[^39]

Notwithstanding Jackson's eleventh-hour maneuver, the Secretary of War
notified him that "conciliatory" action toward the Indians was required
by the Treaty of Ghent, and expected by President Madison.[^40]
Recognizing, however, that such was not in the best interest of "the
western people," Jackson sent an armed contingent to escort the
surveyors who were plotting the lines contemplated in his treaty.[^41]
As Remini explains:

> Thus with Jackson refusing to honor the provisions of the peace treaty
> with Great Britain and steadily enforcing his own treaty, with the
> government unwilling to take any action against a war hero in defense
> of Indians, and with Britain unable, or unwilling to demand U.S.
> fulfillment of its promise to return Indian property, the systematic
> despoilation of the Creek Nation commenced.[^42]

The Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles would soon suffer the same fate,
in what Remini accurately characterizes as Jackson's obsession to rid
the entire eastern United States of the Indians and replace them with
white settlers.[^43] Curiously enough, soon after his bold stand against
Washington policy, Jackson himself was offered the post of Secretary of
War by James Monroe. Perhaps recognizing what little sway that position
actually held, Jackson declined the offer and remained in command of the
Army of the South.[^44]

From this position of power, Jackson continued to methodically seize
Indian land, either by military conquest or through adroit negotiation.
Remini recounts all the major negotiations in lengthy detail, and shows
Jackson to be as ruthless at the table as he was on the
battlefield.[^45] Undoubtedly, Jackson believed that as more settlers
arrived on the frontier from the East, the Removal policy would become
more attractive to the Indians. The complexity, however, of implementing
removal of many Indians to western regions is epitomized by Remini's
account of the military road from Florence, Alabama to the Gulf Coast,
near New Orleans, a project championed by Jackson. Again, employing a
national defense rationale, Jackson proposed and supported the road as a
means to transit troops and supplies quickly between the coast and the
interior. Once complete, the road also offered great economic benefits
as well. Among those to whom the road brought prosperity were local
Indians, who prospered by offering various services at points along its
almost 425-mile length. The income derived from this activity provided a
powerful incentive for many Indians in the East to resist Removal and
loss of this new found fortune.[^46]

According to Remini, such complexities infested the implementation of
Removal, and predictably wore on Jackson through the years immediately
preceding his U.S. presidency. Indeed, the complexities fueled a dispute
between the federal government and the states of Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi which confronted Jackson's presidency in its early
days.[^47] This dispute accelerated Jackson's introduction of Removal
legislation and brought the issue to the forefront of his
administration. Even after his Indian Removal Act[^48] was passed,
however, its terms required Indian removal to western regions as
provided by individual treaty, thus spurring another round of lengthy
negotiations, too often conducted by unscrupulous state and federal
officials.[^49] The implementation of this final phase resulted in the
deprivation and suffering that has come to symbolize the American
government's treatment of its aboriginal people.

As Remini points out, Jackson's desire to implement Removal with speed
and economy ultimately caused great misery.[^50] Moreover, the
ratification of more than seventy Removal treaties over a period of
eight years made oversight virtually impossible.[^51] Indeed, Remini
asserts that Jackson knew from early experience how futile federal
enforcement of Indian treaties had been.[^52] Yet his desire for
immediate results drove him to enter legally acceptable, but practically
worthless, treaties.

Remini's view of this final solution is simple, straightforward,
Jacksonian: "Jackson...\[forced\] Congress to face up to the Indian
issue and address it in the only way possible. And what it did at his
direction was harsh, arrogant, racist \-- and inevitable."[^53] Remini
ascribes blame to earlier administrations for entering into hollow
treaties, while he champions Jackson for dispensing with such
machinations and simply doing what had to be done.[^54] However, at
least one historian, slightly less enamored with Jackson, disagrees:

> The government for decades had maintained a dual policy, on the one
> hand appropriating money for educational purposes and trying to
> improve living conditions on their present reserves, while at the same
> time urging them to sell their lands and move westward, out of the way
> of white settlements. Jackson and his cohorts were determined to shift
> federal policy toward final and irrevocable removal.[^55]

Perhaps then, Removal was merely an alternative, rather than an
inevitable, means by which the Indian problem could have been solved.

Regardless of the means, however, the end was inevitable. Set in motion
decades before Jackson's presidency, the juggernaut of the industrial
revolution would not be denied the fertile hills and valleys of the
American Frontier.[^56] Remini, however, skirts this possibility,
asserting that the policy of Removal was never just a land grab, but an
affirmative effort on the part of Jackson to save the Five Civilized
Nations by relocating them in the West.[^57]

Undoubtedly, in the early years of the Nineteenth century, the Indians
posed a significant threat to national security. However, wars,
treaties, and demographics wholly eliminated that threat by 1830. Remini
suggests that Jackson recognized this fact, yet remained resolute in his
belief that Removal was the only course of action capable of preserving
the Indians' culture and preventing their extinction. The plausibility
of this explanation must be questioned in light of Jackson's steadfast
utilitarian approach to the Indian problem, so aptly portrayed earlier
in the book. Indeed, Remini offers no authority to directly support his
theory of Jackson's motive, and the reader is merely left with the
desire to believe that a laudable end resulted from contemptible means.

Despite Remini's strained attempt to end on a moral high note, he
remains true to his opening promise. He expertly analyzes a complicated
policy driven by a complex man without making excuses to appease current
sensibilities. *Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars* is a frank,
entertaining and thought provoking commentary on the extent to which
fear and mistrust may drive national policy.

[^1]: \* *Captain Christopher A. Love (B.A., Adelphi University; J.D.,
    Touro College;\
    LL.M., The Army Judge Advocate General School) is a judge advocate
    in the\
    U.S. Army Reserve assigned as a Legal Services Attorney with the 4th
    Legal\
    Services Organization, Bronx, New York. In his civilian capacity, he
    serves as legal counsel to the Suffolk County Police Department in
    Yaphank, New York. He is a member of the Bar of New York.*

    ^?^ [Robert]{.smallcaps} [V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian
    Wars 3]{.smallcaps} (2001).

[^2]: *Id.* at 57.

[^3]: *Id*. at 256.

[^4]: *Id*. at 1.

[^5]: *Id*. at 3.

[^6]: *Id.* at 9, referring to the upland area, known also as the
    Waxhaws, which stretched from North to South Carolina.

[^7]: *Id.* at 11. Following the Cherokee War of 1760-1761.

[^8]: *Id.* at 14. From the account of a neighbor of the Jackson's,
    precisely which member of the family was killed is uncertain, but
    Remini ascribes significant reliability to the source, Mrs. Susan
    Alexander, who gave her account in 1845, following the death of
    Andrew Jackson.

[^9]: *Id*. at 34.

[^10]: Although not powerful, the post had enormous potential. With
    every able-bodied male required to serve, the militia constituted
    the most extensive institution in the newly settled territory. To
    the frightened colonists, the militia official, no less than an
    officer of the law, promised protection against the forces of
    disorder. [James C. Curtis, Andrew Jackson and the Search for
    Vindication]{.smallcaps} 29 (1976).

[^11]: [John S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson]{.smallcaps} 26
    (1911).

[^12]: The last entry in Jackson's papers referring to the post is dated
    November 6, 1793. [Sam B. Smith and Harriet C. Owsley, The Papers of
    Andrew Jackson, Vol. I, 1770-1803]{.smallcaps} 41 (1980).
    Presumably, shortly after this entry, he no longer held this
    position; the historical record is unclear.

[^13]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at [26.]{.smallcaps} According to Remini, on
    average, one settler was lost to Indian attack every ten days.

[^14]: *Id.* at 29. "The accumulation of such events as these shaped
    Jackson into a bold and resourceful Indian fighter, thirsting for
    'encounters with the savages.'"

[^15]: *Id.* at 24. Effectively, the Mississippi River Valley from the
    Canadian border to the 31^st^ parallel.

[^16]: *Id.* at 23.

[^17]: *Id.* at 24.

[^18]: *Id.* at 94.

[^19]: *Id.* at 31.

[^20]: *Id.* at 33.

[^21]: *Id.* at 34.

[^22]: *Id.* at 35.

[^23]: Although Remini does not indicate whether Jackson still held the
    position of judge advocate at the time, it would likely not have
    mattered much. As Remini notes, it often seemed "that the general
    knew no law but his own." *Id.* at 157.

[^24]: *Id.* at 37.

[^25]: *Id.* at 43.

[^26]: *Id.* at 45.

[^27]: *Id.* at 47. *See id.* at 37 for an explanation of the electoral
    process within the militia.

[^28]: *Id.* at 47.

[^29]: *Id.* at 49.

[^30]: *Id*. at 54.

[^31]: *Id.* at 54. This idea is traced to Thomas Jefferson, yet Remini
    provides no citation to support this fact.

[^32]: *Id.* at 56.

[^33]: *Id.* The force of similar rhetoric echoes still today. *See*,
    Walter Russel Mead, *Braced for Jacksonian Ruthlessness*, [Wash.
    Post]{.smallcaps}, Sept. 17, 2001, at A27.

[^34]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 92 (citing the Treaty of Fort Jackson,
    American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 837-38). *See*, Treaty
    with the Creeks, 7 Stat. 120 (1814).

[^35]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 95; United Kingdom Peace and Amity
    (Treaty of Ghent), 1814 U.S.T. LEXIS 4; 12 Bevans 41.

[^36]: United Kingdom Peace and Amity (Treaty of Ghent), art IX, 1814
    U.S.T. LEXIS 4 \[emphasis added\]; 12 Bevans 41. Article IX.

[^37]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 95*.*

[^38]: *Id*. Remini calls attention to the signing of the Treaty of
    Ghent in December of 1814, lending the impression that it actually
    predated the Treaty of Fort Jackson.

[^39]: *See* *supra* note 35.

[^40]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 97.

[^41]: *Id*. at 99.

[^42]: *Id.* at 99.

[^43]: *Id.* at 113. "To give to \[the south\] a strong and permanent
    settlement of American citizens, competent to its defence."

[^44]: *Id.* at 117.

[^45]: *Id.* at 182. The large scope of Jackson's contribution to the
    land mass of the United States is illustrated graphically on pages
    182 and 240.

[^46]: *Id.* at 188.

[^47]: *Id.* at 226.

[^48]: Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.

[^49]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 237. Treaties executed pursuant to this
    act are codified at 7 Stat. 138, *et seq*.

[^50]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 238.

[^51]: *Id*.

[^52]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 280.

[^53]: *Id.* at 237.

[^54]: *Id*. at 279.

[^55]: [Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Long and Bitter Trail:]{.smallcaps}
    [Andrew Jackson and the Indians]{.smallcaps} 48 (1993).

[^56]: *Id.* at 6 (citing voracious worldwide demand for American
    cotton); *see also* [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 237.

[^57]: [Remini]{.smallcaps} at 280 (referring to the Creek, Cherokee,
    Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole tribes).