**September 5-7, 2005 FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Project
Activity Report**

\(1\) KATRINA RELATED ARTICLES AND MATERIALS:

\-- URL for City of New Orleans \"Emergency Preparedness\" page \--
click on \"Comprehensive Plans\" tab left side of this page and then on
each of the plans \-- another example of \"implementation\" not equaling
assignment of responsibilities in plans and plan expectations \--

[[http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=46&tabid=25]{.underline}](http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=46&tabid=25)

\-- URL for \"State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement
1A \-- Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan\"
(January 2000

Revision)\--
[[http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/plans/plansindex.htm]{.underline}](http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/plans/plansindex.htm)

Interesting reading \-- clearly there was a disconnect between the State
Plan and implementation of the plan \-- addresses Katrina-like
contingency and is designed to deal with such a contingency \-- Category
3-5 Hurricane, including possibility of \"levee overtopping or failure\"
(p. II-1).

September 5, 2005 \-- \"Cut The Red Tape, Lott Says \-- Criticizes FEMA
for Holding Up 20,000 Trailers \'Sitting in Atlanta\'.\" CNN.com,
accessed at:

[[http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/05/katrina.lott/index.html]{.underline}](http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/05/katrina.lott/index.html)

September 5, 2005 \-- \"Excerpts From Katrina Editorials in Florida
Newspapers.\" \"Associated Press\" \-- accessed at:

[[http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/12566765.htm]{.underline}](http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/12566765.htm)

September 6, 2005 \-- \"Katrina Proved Experts\' Early Warnings Right.\"
\"ABC News,\" September 6, 2005, accessed at:

[[http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/print?id=1101083]{.underline}](http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/print?id=1101083)

September 6, 2005 \-- \"Who\'s to Blame for Delayed Response to Katrina?
New Orleans\' Emergency Plan Not Followed, Federal Government Slow to
Take Lead.\"

\"ABC News,\" September 6, 2005, accessed at:

[[http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=1102467]{.underline}](http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=1102467)

September 7, 2005 \-- \"Lure of Coast Outweighs Risks \-- Experts Say
Many Regions Dangerously Overbuilt.\" \"Washington Post,\" accessed at:

[[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/06/AR2005090601]{.underline}](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/06/AR2005090601)

922.html

September 7, 2005 \-- The Emergency Management Assistance Compact
releases following press release:

\"Lexington, KY - September 7, 2005 - The Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC), state-to-state mutual aid agreement, is now
coordinating the largest deployment of personnel and resources in the
compact\'s history as a

result of Hurricane Katrina.

Dozens of states have sent more than 31,000 people to Louisiana and
Mississippi. They\'re assisting in countless functions, including search
and rescue, law enforcement, bio-medical waste management, fire-fighting
and re-establishing communications systems that have been decimated and
continue to seriously hamper relief efforts.

The total amount of assistance provided by other states isn\'t available
since the response is on-going, but the state of Florida alone - which
was hit by Hurricane Katrina - has provided more \$63 million in
personnel, equipment and other resources. Protocols established in EMAC
allow for Florida and all other assisting states to be reimbursed. EMAC
also has the procedures in place to resolve any liability issues before
resources are

deployed.

EMAC is neither a federal agency nor part of the federal government. It
is an agreement among 48 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands, to provide assistance across state lines when
any type of disaster occurs. The governor of the affected area must
first declare a state of emergency, and then that state must request the
help it needs. It is this request that triggers the response from other
EMAC-member states and

sets the EMAC Operations system of coordination and deployment in
motion.

EMAC gained national recognition in 2004 when four major hurricanes hit
the U.S. in a six-week period, precipitating what was then the largest
utilization to date of state-to-state mutual aid in the nation\'s
history.

In excess of 800 emergency management personnel, from 38 EMAC-member
states and California, were deployed for 99 consecutive days to Florida,
Alabama, and West Virginia in support of hurricane operations.

Established in 1996, EMAC was ratified by Congress and signed into law
(Public Law 104-321). It is the first national disaster-relief compact
to be ratified by Congress since the Civil Defense Compact of 1950. EMAC
is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).

Contact Information: Angela Copple, EMAC Coordinator, (859)244-8217;
acopple@csg.org;
[[http://www.emacweb.org]{.underline}](http://www.emacweb.org/).\"

September 7, 2005 \-- \"What Type of Leadership Is Needed In A Disaster?

Three Officials Join MSNBC\'s Matthews To Discuss Government
Management.\"

\[Former NYC Police Commissioner Howard Safir, Charleston, SC Mayor Joe
Riley, King County WA Emergency Management Director Eric Holdeman.\]
Accessed at:
[[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9240418/]{.underline}](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9240418/)

September 7, 2005 \-- \"LSU Analyst Foresaw Flood Results,\" Mike Dunne,
\"Baton Rouge Advocate\".

September 7, 2005 \-- Applebaum, Anne. \"Planning For Next Time.\"

\"Washington Post.\"

September 7, 2005 \-- Michele Jacklin. \"Homeland Security Failed Its
First Test.\" Hartford Courant. Accessed at:

[[http://www.courant.com/news/politics/hc-jacklin0907.artsep07,0,6384986,print]{.underline}](http://www.courant.com/news/politics/hc-jacklin0907.artsep07,0,6384986,print)

.column?coll=hc-utility-news-politics

\(2\) KATRINA \-- RESPONSE TO EM HI-ED PROJECT EMAIL ON PREPARING FOR
THE NEXT

CATASTROPHE:

September 6, 2005 \-- Sent email out soliciting ideas on what the
hazards, disasters, emergency management, homeland security higher
education communities could do to help their students and the country
prepare for the next inevitable Katrina-type catastrophe. Excerpts from
some of the responses are pasted in below:

\-- From Sarah K. Miller, Lecturer in Emergency Management, Western
Washington University:

\"What is clear to me is that we do not learn either from our mistakes
or from many of our drills and exercises. They have become something
other than learning tools. I ran across a copy of \"Acts of God\" by Ted
Steinberg today.

Somehow I had never managed to read it before. I was struck in the first
two minutes of reading by the fact that it could have been written in
the past week, referencing Katrina. We have repeated the same mistakes
yet again.

Only this time with far more devastating consequences than ever before.
I think it is critical that we educate students about ways to influence
the decisions made by government (yes, I have a bias in that my
background is public policy). \$5 billion spent to avert disaster is
better than \$10 billion spent to recover from one. I sit squarely in
the \"defense is the best offense\" camp. We had the knowledge,
experience, and capability to prevent much of the death toll in the Gulf
and probably some of the destruction as well. The fact that we as a
community of practice are unable to have our voices heard by those who
make the decisions is disheartening at best. The fact that many students
leave programs believing they must abide by the status quo is telling a
well. Critical decision making seems to be something left out of many
programs as well. The programs I have been involved in concentrate on
the nuts and bolts, but leave out the critical thinking and decision
making aspects of emergency management. Creative thinking falls into
this category as well. Certainly the entertainment industry is able to
come up with vivid scenarios that, unfortunately, approximate reality.
Why is it then that our emergency management community takes the \"it
won\'t happen like that\" attitude? The ability to think \"outside the
box\" is crucial to any catastrophe, both in planning and response. I\'m
hoping to build these very concepts into the new degree program we\'re
forming here at Western. I think at the least, we need to educate
students to be bold thinkers and vocal spokespersons for the ideas of
sustainability and all-hazards emergency management. What we\'re doing
now clearly isn\'t working. Or at least the people we\'re training
aren\'t high

enough in the food chain to make a difference.\"

\-- From Colleen Ridge, Chief of Police, University of Texas at Dallas:

\"\...maybe after Katrina more Universities will take EM seriously!\"

\-- From Mark Siegel, University of the District of Columbia\"

\"There are deep conceptual issues that need to be addressed about
preparedness in much the same way Quarantelli (1998) explored the
concept of \"disaster\". Preparedness cannot be understood the same way
at different scales of application. The concept held by an individual
and the actions he/she takes relative to a large threat is much
different from that of a local organization or of a state/federal
response. An essential component of effective problem solving is to
concentrate first on identifying the correct problem and not focus on
symptoms per se. To that end, one outcome of the conference should be a
taxonomy of scale and a set of questions germane to each level that
guides preparedness objectives and actions.

Associated with this task is to propose a set of metrics for
preparedness by scale level and complementary ways to format in a
meaningful way (for the

various audiences) quantitative and qualitative information. The goal is

not to develop scripted cookbooks but to provide a set of \"preparedness
first principles\" upon which decisions and actions can be based when
expected patterns crumble (as they always do). There is a saying in the
systems theory world that I\'ve always found instructive: All systems
are wrong, some systems are useful. With regard to Katrina, I can\'t
help thinking that the fundamental emergency management problem at all
levels (including the component of preparedness) was a failure to
examine explicitly on a regular basis the key operating assumptions and
to pose the associated operational questions. As I often told my
students, the assumptions you make determine the questions you ask, the
answers you develop, and the actions you ultimately take. When the
expected structures

fail, the cookbook strategy collapses. I hope the Conference will tackle

these issues as an organizing framework into which specific exemplar
programs of preparedness are incorporated. But it\'s the deep issues
about preparedness that need to be central.\"

\-- From Elliot Gould, Northern Pueblos Literacy Project, Rio Rancho,
NM:

\"The New Orleans Katrina experience reflected several tragedies in
response.

Seemingly these stem from the \"911\" syndrome equating that one just
need call for resources of the next level of government when there an
incident and secondly , it is a police matter/ or fire / or EMT matter.
Emergency management is far more inclusive. FEMA guidelines show 13
distinct emergency support functions\-- of which police, fire and
emergency medical responders are but part. Also included are more subtle
support functions such as public works ,social services, continuity of
government, and Press and media relations. Proper attention to each of
the support functions must be attended at the on-set of the declaration
of an emergency. In the New Orleans case, this was not done. Awash in
the flooding of New Orleans were literally hundreds of valuable assets
which could have been utilized had they been \"preserved and moved when
the declaration had been made.\" these include buses, heavy equipment,
and other mobile property of the City . When the declaration for
evacuation was clear, city and parish employees should nave been called
in, to the same degree as when a battle ship is under

attack\-- all hands in battle stations. This includes bus drivers,
secretaries, public health nurses and aides, clerks, etc. These very
people who make the day to day operations of a city the size and
magnitude New Orleans work . In the emergency situations or incidents of
national significance, the whole of government, whether it be at the
local or state level must be ready and deployable to avoid what the
nation witnessed in the aftermath of Katrina\-- an implosion of services
furthering the overwhelming effect of the initial disaster. The local
officials in totality are the defense against anarchy and
ineffectiveness of response. They in totality know the area, resources
and assets which can be organized and deployed to meet the crises at
hand.\"

\-- From Bob Schenck, Director of the Emergency Management Program,
College of Lake County, Grayslake, IL:

\"\....In my (more or less) humble opinion, Homeland Security should be
part of FEMA, not the other way around\....There needs to be more
attention paid to these types of situations rather than just homeland
security. A good emergency manager should be able to handle the
consequences of a homeland security incident, but the opposite doesn\'t
appear to be the case.

I intend to work out something along the lines of \"Preparing for
Catastrophe\" at our level\....I have seen too many politicians who
don\'t understand their responsibilities (moral and legal) in times of
emergency or disaster. They think the federal government will fix
everything and don\'t understand how the system works in the real
world.\"

\-- From Claire Rubin, George Washington University:

\"\....Having spent a lot of time talking to reporters in the past week,
I think some attention needs to be given to educating media types also.
I feel like I am giving a one-on-one educational program to each
reporter. That will not work, since there are a lot more of them than
there are disaster researchers and educations. Other issues include how
to get informed, credentialed people to provide information as
interviewees on radio and TV shows. Current students, and future
students, must be influenced by what they are seeing and hearing. Some
people are already worried that EM as a career is getting a black eye. I
have not seen anyone representing IAEM or NEMA on any news
program\....\"

\-- From Dr. David McIntyre, Director, Integrative Center for Homeland
Security, Texas A&M University:

\"\....I am telling people that we were lucky \-- none of the people
getting off the busses were radioactive or contagious \-- it could have
been a lot worse \-- it might be yet.\"

\-- From Dr. David McEntire, Emergency Management Program, University of
North Texas:

\"This is extremely disturbing considering the amount of money and
attention that has been given to emergency management in recent years.
It would probably be worse if Katrina had been a terrorist attack
involving WMD and not a natural catastrophe. At least we\'ve had
extensive experience with hurricanes before (although this one certainly
has unique characteristics).

I am especially disappointed in the Mayor of New Orleans. He did not
evacuate special populations and had no resources in the designated
shelter.

To blame FEMA for everything and not do anything at the local level is
absurd! FEMA is not blameless of course, but the Department of Homeland
Security has not helped disaster management much (as FEMA is buried in a
bureaucracy and has lost decision making ability and political power).\"

\-- From Gerald Lawver, Associate Professor, Center for Regional and
National Security, Eastern Michigan University:

\"I think each of us in the emergency management educational field saw
this coming. The track record for response to Hugo and what happened in
Homestead and now this one only indicates that as much a homeland
security wants to believe it is prepared, it is not. There should be an
automatic ramp up when it comes to category 3 and above. We profess to
have the management side under control i.e. Joint Operations Command and
following the guidelines of incident command, and unified command but
the system is broke for command and control\....I tell my current
students law enforcement, fire, EMT and regular students that we have
done some great work for the first responder but have neglected the
management side of the equation. If we were to take bio-terrorism or a
dirty bomb and unleash it in a city we would see the same results. So
why cant we figure this out. I truly believe we saw the train leave the
station and when FEMA was reduced and incorporated into Homeland
Security we were witnessing a train wreck in progress\....\"

\-- From Derin Ural, Director, Disaster Management Masters Degree
Program and Center, Istanbul Technical University:

Received an offer to share lessons learned from the 1999 Kocaeli
Earthquake

\-- 50,000 casualties.

B.Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., CEM

Higher Education Project Manager

Emergency Management Institute

National Emergency Training Center

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Department of Homeland Security

16825 S. Seton, N-430

Emmitsburg, MD 21727

\(301\) 447-1262, voice

\(301\) 447-1598, fax

wayne.blanchard@dhs.gov

[[http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu]{.underline}](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu)