**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | * | CC Docket No. 00-217         |
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| Joint Application by SBC         | ) |                              |
| Communications Inc.,             | * |                              |
| Southwestern Bell Telephone      | * |                              |
| Company, and Southwestern Bell   |   |                              |
| Communications Services, Inc.    | * |                              |
| d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long     | * |                              |
| Distance for Provision of        | ) |                              |
| In-Region, InterLATA Services in | * |                              |
| Kansas and Oklahoma              | * |                              |
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**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

**Adopted: January 19, 2001 Released: January 22, 2001\***

#  {#section .Appendix-Heading}

By The Commission: Chairman Kennard issuing a statement; Commissioner
Ness concurring and issuing a statement; Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and issuing a statement;
Commissioner Powell approving in part, dissenting in part, and issuing a
statement.

**Paragraph**

I. Introduction [3](#introduction)

II\. BACKGROUND [5](#background)

A. Statutory Framework [5](#statutory-framework)

B. History of this Application [6](#history-of-this-application)

1\. The Kansas Commission's Evaluation
[7](#the-kansas-commissions-evaluation)

2\. The Oklahoma Commission's Evaluation
[8](#the-oklahoma-commissions-evaluation)

3\. Department of Justice Evaluation
[9](#department-of-justice-evaluation)

III\. Procedural and Analytical Framework
[10](#procedural-and-analytical-framework)

A. Procedural Framework [11](#procedural-framework)

B. Analytical Framework [14](#analytical-framework)

1\. Analysis of Performance Data [15](#analysis-of-performance-data)

2\. Relevance of Previous Section 271 Approvals
[17](#relevance-of-previous-section-271-approvals)

IV\. Primary Issues in Dispute [19](#primary-issues-in-dispute)

A. Compliance with Section 271(c)(1)(A)
[20](#compliance-with-section-271c1a)

1\. Kansas [20](#kansas)

2\. Oklahoma [22](#oklahoma)

B. Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements
[23](#checklist-item-2-unbundled-network-elements)

1\. Pricing of Network Elements [23](#pricing-of-network-elements)

2\. Access to Operations Support Systems
[48](#access-to-operations-support-systems)

3\. UNE Combinations [84](#une-combinations)

C. Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops
[88](#checklist-item-4-unbundled-local-loops)

1\. Background [88](#background-3)

2\. Discussion [89](#discussion-1)

D. Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection
[114](#checklist-item-1-interconnection)

1\. Interconnection Trunking [114](#interconnection-trunking)

2\. Collocation [118](#collocation)

3\. Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection
[120](#technically-feasible-points-of-interconnection)

4\. Pricing of Interconnection [122](#pricing-of-interconnection)

V. Other Checklist Items [125](#other-checklist-items)

A. Checklist Item 6 -- Switching [125](#checklist-item-6-switching)

1\. Background [125](#background-6)

2\. Discussion [125](#discussion-4)

B. Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings
[128](#checklist-item-8-white-pages-directory-listings)

C. Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation
[129](#checklist-item-13-reciprocal-compensation)

D. Checklist Item 14 -- Resale [131](#checklist-item-14-resale)

E. Remaining Checklist Items (3, 5, 7, 9-12)
[133](#e.-remaining-checklist-items-3-5-7-9-12)

VI\. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE [134](#section-272-compliance)

A. Discussion [134](#discussion-5)

1\. Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section
272
[135](#structural-transactional-and-accounting-requirements-of-section-272)

2\. Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272
[137](#nondiscrimination-safeguards-of-section-272)

3\. Joint Marketing Provisions of Section 272
[138](#joint-marketing-provisions-of-section-272)

VII\. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS [139](#public-interest-analysis)

A. Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets
[139](#competition-in-local-exchange-and-long-distance-markets)

B. Assurance of Future Compliance [140](#assurance-of-future-compliance)

1\. Performance Remedy Plan [141](#performance-remedy-plan)

2\. Key Elements of the Enforcement Plans
[142](#key-elements-of-the-enforcement-plans)

C. Other Issues [145](#other-issues-2)

VIII\. SECTION 271(d)(6) enforcement authority
[146](#section-271d6-enforcement-authority)

IX\. CONCLUSION [148](#conclusion)

X. Ordering Clauses [148](#ordering-clauses)

Appendix A [1](#__RefHeading___Toc531683825)

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS [3](#__RefHeading___Toc531683826)

Appendix B [1](#__RefHeading___Toc531683827)

Statutory Requirements -- Checklist Items 3, 5, 7, 9-12
[1](#__RefHeading___Toc531683828)

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. KENNARD
[1](#separate-statement-of-chairman-william-e.-kennard)

*Re: Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc.
d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region,
InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma*
[1](#re-joint-application-by-sbc-communications-inc.-southwestern-bell-telephone-company-and-southwestern-bell-communications-services-inc.-dba-southwestern-bell-long-distance-for-provision-of-in-region-interlata-services-in-kansas-and-oklahoma)

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH,
[1](#statement-of-commissioner-harold-furchtgott-roth)

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
[1](#concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part)

# Introduction

1.  On October 26, 2000, SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance (collectively SWBT) filed
    this application for authority under section 271 of the
    Communications Act, as amended, to provide in-region, interLATA
    services in the states of Kansas and Oklahoma.[^1] We grant the
    application in this Order based on our conclusion that SWBT has
    taken the statutorily required steps to open its local exchange
    markets to competition in each of these states. As required by
    section 271, we find that SWBT has made a separate and independent
    showing of compliance for both states.

2.  This Order represents the first time that we have approved a section
    271 application for a more rural state, and the first time we have
    ruled on a section 271 application for a second state within a
    single BOC region. The general approach used by both the Kansas
    Corporation Commission (Kansas Commission) and the Oklahoma
    Corporation Commission (Oklahoma Commission) may serve as a model
    for the development of successful section 271 applications in other
    similarly situated states. In particular, we commend both states for
    using the successful work of the Texas Public Utility Commission
    (Texas Commission) as a starting point for the development of their
    own section 271 reviews. This approach demonstrates that more rural
    states can conduct successful section 271 reviews without
    overwhelming their regulatory resources by building on the work of
    other states in their region. In this regard, we also note that
    rural states may wish to cooperate and pool their resources in
    addressing section 271 compliance issues when uniform region-wide
    systems and procedures are used by the BOC.[^2]

3.  Both states have taken a number of important steps to facilitate the
    development of successful section 271 applications by SWBT. Both
    states conducted proceedings concerning SWBT's section 271
    compliance with opportunities for participation by interested third
    parties.[^3] Both states adopted a broad range of clearly defined
    performance measures and standards, and a Performance Assurance Plan
    designed to create a financial incentive for post-entry compliance
    with section 271. Although neither state provided for third party
    testing of SWBT's operations support systems (OSS) offerings, SWBT
    did arrange for an independent evaluation to determine whether
    certain automated OSS systems, which were found to satisfy the
    requirements of section 271 in Texas, were the same as those in
    Kansas and Oklahoma.[^4]

4.  Despite the fact that Kansas and Oklahoma are more rural than other
    states where this Commission has granted section 271 authorization,
    competition is developing in response to the market opening measures
    taken by SWBT and the state commissions in these states. For
    example, SWBT states that competitors serve between 9.0 percent and
    12.6 percent of the total access lines in its service area in
    Kansas.[^5] SWBT adds that competitive local exchange carriers
    (LECs) serve between 85,000 and 145,000 business lines and more than
    46,000 residential lines in its service territory in Kansas.[^6]
    While many of these lines are served through resale, SWBT states
    that there are at least 26 competitive LECs providing
    facilities-based local exchange service in Kansas.[^7] SWBT adds
    that between 37,000 and 98,000 lines in Kansas were served by
    competitors over their own facilities as of August 2000.[^8] SWBT
    also cites a number of factors as evidence that competition is
    growing rapidly in Kansas.[^9]

5.  SWBT also states that in Oklahoma competitive LECs serve between 5.5
    percent and 9.0 percent of the total access lines in SWBT service
    territory.[^10] This corresponds to between 115,000 and 170,000
    lines.[^11] SWBT adds that its competitors serve more than 66,000
    business lines and at least 49,000 residential lines in
    Oklahoma.[^12] SWBT also states that between 61,000 and 114,000
    lines are served by competitors over their own facilities.[^13] In
    addition, SWBT states that competition is growing rapidly in
    Oklahoma, citing a number of factors in support of this
    assertion.[^14]

6.  Our analysis in this Order is affected by that fact that this joint
    application follows on the heels of authorization in another of
    SWBT's in-region states, Texas. In many ways, SWBT's process of
    opening its local market and satisfying the requirements of section
    271 in Texas serves as a precursor, and as a model, for the process
    it followed in Kansas and Oklahoma. Rather than reiterate background
    matters and jurisprudence set forth in the *SWBT Texas Order*,[^15]
    and re-visit issues that were briefed, reviewed and resolved in that
    proceeding, we focus our analysis in this Order on a handful of
    issues that were contested by commenting parties, or that have not
    been addressed by the Commission in prior section 271 orders. Chief
    among these issues is pricing. We also consider SWBT's assertion
    that the systems and processes used to provision wholesale services
    to competing carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma should pass the
    checklist requirements because they are the same systems and
    processes found to be satisfactory in the Texas proceeding. As
    required by the statute, we have considered separately for each
    state covered by SWBT's application here whether SWBT has made all
    of the showings required by section 271. In conclusion, we find that
    SWBT has met its burden in demonstrating, for Kansas and Oklahoma
    respectively, that it complies with all applicable statutory
    requirements.

# BACKGROUND

## Statutory Framework

7.  In the 1996 Act, Congress conditioned BOC provision of in-region,
    interLATA service on compliance with certain provisions of
    section 271. Pursuant to section 271, BOCs must apply to this
    Commission for authorization to provide interLATA services
    originating in any in-region state.[^16] Congress has directed the
    Commission to issue a written determination on each application no
    later than 90 days after the application is filed.[^17]

8.  To obtain authorization to provide in-region, interLATA services
    under section 271, the BOC must show, with respect to each state for
    which it seeks authorization, that: (1) it satisfies the
    requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A), known as "Track A" or
    271(c)(1)(B), known as "Track B"; (2) it has "fully implemented the
    competitive checklist" or that the statements approved by the state
    under section 252 satisfy the competitive checklist contained in
    section 271(c)(2)(B);[^18] (3) the requested authorization will be
    carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272;[^19]
    and (4) the BOC's entry into in-region, interLATA market is
    "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
    necessity."[^20] The statute specifies that, unless the Commission
    finds that these four criteria have been satisfied, the Commission
    "shall not approve" the requested authorization.[^21]

9.  Section 271(d)(2)(A) requires the Commission to consult with the
    United States Attorney General before making any determination
    approving or denying a section 271 application. The Attorney General
    is entitled to evaluate the application "using any standard the
    Attorney General considers appropriate," and the Commission is
    required to "give substantial weight to the Attorney General's
    evaluation."[^22]

10. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state
    commission to verify that the BOC has one or more state approved
    interconnection agreements with a facilities-based competitor, or a
    Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT), and
    that either the agreement or general statement satisfy the
    "competitive checklist."[^23] Because the Act does not prescribe any
    standard for Commission consideration of a state commission's
    verification under section 271(d)(2)(B), the Commission has
    discretion in each section 271 proceeding to determine the amount of
    weight to accord the state commission's verification.[^24] The
    Commission has held that, although it will consider carefully state
    determinations of fact that are supported by a detailed and
    extensive record, it is the Commission's role to determine whether
    the factual record supports the conclusion that particular
    requirements of section 271 have been met.[^25]

## History of this Application

11. Both the Kansas Corporation Commission (Kansas Commission) and the
    Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Oklahoma Commission), after more
    than two years of reviewing SWBT's compliance with the requirements
    of section 271, have endorsed Southwestern Bell's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services in their respective states.

### The Kansas Commission's Evaluation 

12. On January 21, 1997, the Kansas Commission initiated a proceeding to
    examine SWBT's compliance with requirements of section 271.[^26]
    This proceeding was open to participation by all interested parties
    and numerous CLECs participated.[^27] SWBT filed a draft section 271
    application with the Kansas Commission on February 17, 1998.[^28] On
    March 16, 2000, SWBT filed a revised draft of its section 271
    application that included a model interconnection agreement ("Kansas
    Section 271 Interconnection Agreement" or "K2A").[^29] The K2A is
    based on a model interconnection agreement developed by the Texas
    Public Utilities Commission ("The Texas Commission"); [^30] but also
    includes arbitration decisions of the Kansas Commission and
    Kansas-specific terms. The K2A also includes a performance remedy
    plan, modeled after the plan adopted by the Texas Commission.[^31]

13. In May 2000, the Kansas Commission invited interested parties to
    file comments on SWBT's application in two phases.[^32] The initial
    phase focused on the K2A interconnection agreement, performance
    measures, and the performance remedy plan. The second phase focused
    on remaining portions of the draft application. On August 21, 2000,
    the Kansas Commission issued a report ("Kansas Commission Staff
    Report") in which it reviewed SWBT's compliance with section 271(c)
    (1)(A), the 14 checklist items in section 271(c)(2)(B), and the
    separate affiliate requirements of section 272. [^33] The Staff
    Report also reviewed the public interest requirements under section
    271(d)(3)(C) and the performance measures and performance remedy
    plan proposed by SWBT. Although recognizing areas of concern,
    Commission staff concluded that SWBT had met its obligations under
    section 271.[^34] In September and October, the Kansas Commission
    held several administrative meetings considering revisions and
    modifications to the K2A. On October 4, 2000, the Kansas Commission
    concluded that SWBT had satisfied the requirements of section 271,
    and that it would support SWBT's section 271 application. On October
    9, 2000, pursuant to the Kansas Commission's direction, SWBT filed a
    revised final K2A.[^35]

14. On November 17, 2000, the Kansas Commission filed comments in this
    proceeding. The Kansas Commission concluded that SWBT has complied
    with the checklist of section 271, that SWBT has complied with the
    requirements of section 272, and that it would be in the public
    interest to approve SWBT's application. [^36] On December 11, 2000,
    the Kansas Commission filed its reply comments. We commend the
    Kansas Commission for its analysis.

### The Oklahoma Commission's Evaluation

15. In 1997, this Commission rejected SWBT's initial application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services in Oklahoma, finding that SWBT
    did not face sufficient competition in Oklahoma to satisfy the
    requirements of "Track A" (section 271(c)(1)(A)).[^37] In February
    1998, SWBT filed a second draft application with the Oklahoma
    Commission.[^38] The Oklahoma Commission reviewed SWBT's application
    and heard testimony from participating parties. On June 9, 2000,
    SWBT submitted a revised draft of its proposed application to the
    Oklahoma Commission, which included a model interconnection
    agreement (the "Oklahoma Section 271 Agreement or the O2A").[^39]
    This model agreement, like the K2A, was based on the Texas 271
    Agreement, and incorporated arbitration decisions of the Oklahoma
    Commission and Oklahoma-specific terms. After hearings and review,
    the Oklahoma Commission approved the O2A on September 28, 2000,
    subject to several modifications.[^40] The Oklahoma Commission also
    set low interim rates for several unbundled network elements. To
    provide incentive to SWBT to establish permanent rates, the Oklahoma
    Commission held such rates would be subject to "true up" only until
    March 28, 2001.[^41] On October 24, 2000, SWBT filed a revised,
    final O2A pursuant to the Oklahoma Commission's request.[^42]

16. The Oklahoma Commission filed initial comments in this proceeding on
    November 17, 2000. The Oklahoma Commission recommended approval of
    the application on grounds that all statutory requirements have been
    satisfied, and also arguing that the entry of SWBT into the long
    distance market will benefit not only long distance markets within
    Oklahoma, but will encourage competition in the local exchange
    market in Oklahoma.[^43] On December 11, 2000, the Oklahoma
    Commission filed reply comments responding to specific issues raised
    by commenters in this proceeding. The Oklahoma Commission also urged
    that we give deference to its determination that competition exists
    in Oklahoma and that the requirements of section 271 have been
    met.[^44] We commend the Oklahoma Commission for its analysis.

### Department of Justice Evaluation

17. The Department of Justice filed its evaluation of SWBT's application
    on December 4, 2000. In its evaluation, the Department of Justice
    first focuses on the prices at which SWBT provides interconnection
    and unbundled network elements (UNEs) in Kansas and Oklahoma.[^45]
    The Department of Justice recommends that the Commission undertake
    an independent scrutiny of recurring and nonrecurring UNE rates in
    Oklahoma, and nonrecurring UNE rates in Kansas.[^46] The Department
    of Justice also expresses concern over the interim nature of the
    rates for collocation and a number of UNEs.[^47] The Department of
    Justice next questions the sufficiency of SWBT's evidence in support
    of its OSS in Kansas and Oklahoma. SWBT relies heavily in its
    application on assertions that it provides wholesale services in
    Kansas and Oklahoma through the same OSS as in Texas, and argues
    that it has previously demonstrated that these systems satisfy
    section 271 requirements.[^48] The Department of Justice finds that
    the evidence offered by SWBT to demonstrate that its OSS is, indeed,
    the same as in Texas, is "ambiguous and incomplete" in several
    respects. The Department of Justice also urges the Commission to
    establish the kind of evidentiary showing that will be expected of
    future applicants who seek to rely, as SWBT does, on findings from
    prior section 271 proceedings.[^49]

# Procedural and Analytical Framework

18. The terms of the competitive checklist generally incorporate by
    reference the core local competition obligations that sections 251
    and 252 impose on all incumbent LECs. In a variety of proceedings
    since 1996, the Commission has discharged its statutory authority to
    issue comprehensive rules and orders giving specific content to
    those obligations. In determining whether a BOC applicant has met
    the local competition prerequisites for entry into the long-distance
    market, therefore, we evaluate its compliance with our rules and
    orders in effect at the time the application was filed. We emphasize
    that a BOC must comply with all of the Commission's rules
    implementing the requirements of section 251 and 252 beginning on
    the dates specified by those rules.[^50]

19. As the Commission stated in the *SWBT Texas Order*, despite the
    comprehensiveness of our local competition rules, there will
    inevitably be, in any section 271 proceeding, new and unresolved
    interpretive disputes about the precise content of an incumbent
    LEC's obligations to its competitors -- disputes that our rules have
    not yet addressed and that do not involve *per se* violations of
    self-executing requirements of the Act. The section 271 process
    simply could not function as Congress intended if we were generally
    required to resolve all such disputes as a precondition to granting
    a section 271 application.[^51] Congress designed section 271
    proceedings as highly specialized, 90-day proceedings for examining
    the performance of a particular carrier in a particular State at a
    particular time. Such fast-track, narrowly focused adjudications are
    often inappropriate forums for the considered resolution of
    industry-wide local competition questions of general
    applicability.[^52] Second, such a requirement would undermine the
    congressional intent of section 271 to give the BOCs an incentive to
    open their local markets to competition. That incentive would
    largely vanish if a BOC's opponents could effectively doom any
    section 271 application by raising a host of novel interpretive
    disputes in their comments and demanding that authorization be
    denied unless each one of those disputes is resolved in the BOC's
    favor. Finally, simply as a matter of statutory construction, few of
    the substantive obligations contained in the local competition
    provisions of sections 251 and 252 are altogether self-executing;
    they rely for their content on the Commission's rules.[^53]

## Procedural Framework

20. In the context of section 271's adjudicatory framework, the
    Commission has established certain procedural rules governing BOC
    section 271 applications.[^54] Among other things, these rules
    provide an opportunity for parties other than the Department of
    Justice and the relevant state commission to comment on section 271
    applications.

21. These procedural rules have served the Commission well by deterring
    incomplete section 271 filings by the BOCs. In particular, they are
    designed to prevent applicants from presenting part of their initial
    *prima facie* showing for the first time in reply comments.[^55] We
    do not expect that a BOC, in its initial application, will
    anticipate and address every argument its opponents might make in
    their comments. Based on the state proceedings, however, the BOCs
    should be able to identify most of the significant arguments and
    allegations that parties are likely to make in their filings before
    the Commission.[^56] Thus, the rules provide that when an applicant
    files new information after the comment date, the Commission
    reserves the right to start the 90-day review period again or to
    accord such information no weight in determining section 271
    compliance.[^57] An exception to this approach exists for new
    information that is directly responsive to allegations raised in the
    comments. The Commission has also strictly limited the consideration
    of developments that occur after the date for filing comments.[^58]

22. In this proceeding, we waive these procedural requirements on our
    own motion pursuant to section 1.3 of the Commission's rules,[^59]
    to the extent necessary to consider rate reductions filed by SWBT on
    day 63 of the 90-day period for Commission review of the Kansas and
    Oklahoma section 271 applications. "\[A\] waiver is appropriate only
    if special circumstances warrant a deviation from the general rule
    and such deviation will serve the public interest." [^60] We
    conclude that the special circumstances before us in this case
    warrant a deviation from the general rules for consideration of
    late-filed information or new developments that take place late in
    the application review process. In the particular circumstances
    presented by this application, we conclude that considering these
    late-filed rate reductions will serve the public interest. At the
    same time, we emphasize that in the absence of such special
    circumstances, we will continue to adhere to our general rules
    designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for the consideration
    of section 271 applications within the 90-day statutory deadline.

23. There are a number of special circumstances that support grant of
    this waiver to permit consideration of these rate reductions in
    determining section 271 compliance, and thus satisfy the first
    element of the test for grant of a waiver described above. First,
    the rate changes at issue are quite limited in nature. Basically,
    SWBT has made uniform percentage rate reductions, subject to
    specified rate floors, in certain categories of rates in Oklahoma
    and Kansas.[^61] SWBT has not modified the rate structure developed
    in the state proceedings or modified the rates developed by the
    states with a combination of rate decreases and increases. As a
    result, addressing the effect of these rate revisions in terms of
    compliance with section 271 places a limited additional analytical
    burden on the Commission staff and commenting parties.[^62] This
    differs significantly from the consideration of more complex rate
    revisions. It also differs from consideration of promises of future
    action, which may or may not actually take place.[^63] It is also
    different from implementation of measures designed to achieve
    nondiscriminatory performance in the applicant's provision of
    service to competitive LECs, since it is often impossible to
    determine the actual effect of such changes on performance in
    advance. Second, because of the very limited nature of these rate
    changes, interested parties have had a reasonable opportunity to
    evaluate them and comment in a meaningful manner.[^64] The nature of
    these rate changes has also permitted the Commission staff to
    evaluate these rate changes reasonably, within the 90-day review
    period.

24. Third, this is an instance in which an applicant has responded to
    criticism in the record by taking positive action that will clearly
    foster the development of competition. This is very different from
    the typical situation in which late-filed material provided by the
    applicant consists of additional arguments or information concerning
    whether its current performance or pricing satisfies the
    requirements of section 271. Fourth, these are otherwise generally
    persuasive applications, which demonstrate a commitment to opening
    local markets to competition as required by the 1996
    Telecommunications Act.

25. We also conclude that, subject to certain limiting conditions
    described below, grant of this waiver will serve the public interest
    and thus satisfy the second element of the waiver standard described
    above. In particular, grant of this waiver permits the Commission to
    act on these section 271 applications quickly and efficiently
    without the procedural delays inherent in restarting the 90-day
    clock. Grant of this waiver also provides positive reinforcement to
    SWBT for responding to criticism in the record concerning its rate
    levels by making pro-competitive rate reductions. Given that
    interested parties have had a meaningful opportunity to comment on
    these rate reductions, we do not believe that the public interest
    would be served in this instance by strict adherence to our
    procedural rules. At the same time, as discussed below, we emphasize
    that we do not intend to allow a pattern of late-filed changes to
    threaten the Commission's ability to maintain a fair and orderly
    process for consideration of section 271 applications.

26. Although we conclude that grant of this waiver to permit
    consideration of these rate reductions at this time is superior to
    requiring that SWBT refile its application or restart the 90-day
    clock in order to obtain consideration of these rate reductions, we
    reiterate that we continue to expect applicants to make every effort
    to ensure that section 271 applications are complete when filed.
    Indeed, we believe it would be rare for other parties to satisfy the
    high bar set here in future applications. We expect the parties to
    file a complete application, including any prices on which they want
    the Commission to rely in its decision, on day one. Nonetheless,
    although we do not decide here whether we would ever accept
    amendments to prices within the first twenty days of the filing, for
    purposes of this application, we condition the grant of this waiver
    on delaying the effective date for 43 days after release. This
    represents one day for each day between day 20 and day 63, when SWBT
    filed these rate revisions. We believe that delaying the effective
    date in the instant application ensures that SWBT does not receive
    the full benefits of late-filed changes.

27. Under the special circumstances present in these applications, we
    cannot agree with the commenting parties that urge us to decline to
    consider these rate revisions or to treat these revisions as a new
    filing that starts the 90-day review period.[^65] We cannot agree
    that consideration of these late-filed rate reductions permits SWBT
    to benefit by delaying the opening of its local markets in these
    states to competition. If these rate reductions had become effective
    the day before SWBT filed these applications, there would be no
    question concerning the propriety of considering the new rates under
    our procedural rules. Moreover, the statute does not require that a
    BOC demonstrate that it has been in compliance with section 271 for
    some period of time before it files a section 271 application. While
    we strongly encourage applicants to resolve issues concerning rate
    levels fully before they file section 271 applications, we do not
    believe that the limited delay in reducing these rates in Oklahoma
    and Kansas is sufficient to warrant excluding them from
    consideration. At the same time, we share, to some extent, the
    concerns expressed by a number of parties that applicants might
    attempt to use grant of this waiver to "game" the section 271
    process with repeated last minute rate reductions.[^66] We have
    already made clear that we do not expect applicants to do this
    repeatedly and we will look with disfavor on any situation in which
    a single applicant attempts to make such rate reductions late in the
    application review period on multiple occasions. This concern about
    the potential for future abuse does not persuade us, however, that
    it would be better to refuse to consider the rate reductions in this
    case or treat them as the filing of a new application and restart
    the 90-day review period since we can address such problems if and
    when they actually occur.

## Analytical Framework

28. As part of our determination that a BOC has satisfied the
    requirements of section 271, we consider whether the BOC has fully
    implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)(2)(B).[^67]
    In demonstrating compliance with each item on the competitive
    checklist, a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and
    specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant
    to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices
    and other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it
    is currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist item
    in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an
    acceptable level of quality.[^68] In particular, the BOC must
    demonstrate that it is offering interconnection and access to
    network elements on a nondiscriminatory basis.[^69] Previous
    Commission orders addressing section 271 applications have
    elaborated on this statutory standard. First, for those functions
    the BOC provides to competing carriers that are analogous to the
    functions a BOC provides to itself in connection with its own retail
    service offerings, the BOC must provide access to competing carriers
    in "substantially the same time and manner" as it provides to
    itself.[^70] Thus, where a retail analogue exists, a BOC must
    provide access that is equal to (*i.e.,* substantially the same as)
    the level of access that the BOC provides itself, its customers, or
    its affiliates, in terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness.[^71]
    For those functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must
    demonstrate that the access it provides to competing carriers would
    offer an efficient carrier a "meaningful opportunity to
    compete."[^72]

29. We note that a determination of whether the statutory standard is
    met is ultimately a judgment we must make based on our expertise in
    promoting competition in local markets and in telecommunications
    regulation generally.[^73] We have not established, nor do we
    believe it appropriate to establish, specific objective criteria for
    what constitutes "substantially the same time and manner" or a
    "meaningful opportunity to compete."[^74] Whether this legal
    standard is met can only be decided based on an analysis of specific
    facts and circumstances. Therefore, we look at each application on a
    case-by-case basis and consider the totality of the circumstances,
    including the origin and quality of the information before us, to
    determine whether the nondiscrimination requirements of the Act are
    met. We reemphasize that the BOC applicant retains at all times the
    ultimate burden of proof that its application satisfies all of the
    requirements of section 271, even if no party files comments
    challenging its compliance with a particular requirement.[^75]

### Analysis of Performance Data

30. SWBT reports performance data pursuant to over 120 detailed metrics
    established by the Texas Commission, and adopted by the Kansas and
    Oklahoma Commissions. These performance measurements cover the
    pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and
    billing functions it performs in the course of providing wholesale
    services to competing LECs. For most of these performance
    measurements, SWBT's performance with respect to competitors is
    compared against either an analogous retail function or a benchmark
    performance level. Each of these categories of performance data is
    commercially important, and each has an effect on the ability of
    competitive LECs to attract, service and maintain customers. For
    example, a competing LEC must rely on timely responses to
    pre-ordering queries so that it can interact on a real-time basis
    with a prospective customer. Ordering and provisioning performance
    by the BOC will affect a competitor's ability to provide service to
    its customers within a commercially reasonable time frame, and
    delays or other flaws in these processes may (among other things)
    cause end users to cancel orders. In addition, end users may well
    decide to return to the incumbent if the BOC provides poor
    maintenance and repair service for unbundled local loops used by
    competitors.

31. As established in prior section 271 orders, and consistent with our
    analysis in this order, we have found that performance measurements
    provide valuable evidence regarding SWBT's compliance or
    noncompliance with individual checklist items. We emphasize,
    however, that we do not view each particular metric as wholly
    dispositive of checklist compliance. Nor do we suggest that the
    parity and benchmark standards established by state commissions
    represent absolute maximum or minimum levels of performance
    necessary to satisfy the competitive checklist. Rather, where these
    standards are developed through open proceedings with input from
    both the incumbent and competing carriers, these standards can
    represent informed and reliable attempts to objectively approximate
    whether competing carriers are being served by the incumbent in
    substantially the same time and manner, or in a way that provides
    them a meaningful opportunity to compete. Ultimately, the
    determination of whether a BOC's performance is consistent with the
    statutory requirements is a contextual decision based on the
    totality of the circumstances. To the extent there is no
    statistically significant difference between SWBT's provision of
    service to competing carriers on one hand, and retail customers or a
    state's performance benchmark on the other, we generally need not
    look any further -- particularly absent other evidence of
    discrimination by the BOC. Where a statistically significant
    difference exists, however, we will examine the evidence further to
    make our ultimate determination of whether the statutory
    nondiscrimination requirements are met.[^76] Thus, we will examine
    explanations proffered by SWBT or other commenters about whether
    these differences provide an accurate depiction of the quality of
    SWBT's performance. We also will consider the degree and duration of
    the performance disparity, and whether the performance is part of an
    improving or deteriorating trend.[^77]

32. Finally, in some instances, we may find statistically significant
    differences in certain performance measurements, but conclude that
    such differences do not warrant a finding of checklist
    noncompliance. In such cases, we may find that the performance
    differences are slight, or occur in isolated months, and thus
    suggest only an insignificant competitive impact. Furthermore, where
    there are multiple performance measures associated with a particular
    checklist item, we would consider the performance demonstrated by
    all the measurements as a whole. Accordingly, a disparity in
    performance for one measure, by itself, may not provide a basis for
    finding noncompliance with the checklist. We may also find that the
    reported performance data is impacted by factors beyond a BOC's
    control, a finding that would make us less likely to hold the BOC
    wholly accountable for the disparity. This is not to say, however,
    that performance discrepancies on a single performance metric are
    unimportant. Indeed, under certain circumstances, disparity with
    respect to one performance measurement may support a finding of
    statutory noncompliance, particularly if the disparity is
    substantial or has endured for a long time, or if it is accompanied
    by other evidence of discriminatory conduct or evidence that
    competing carriers have been denied a meaningful opportunity to
    compete.

33. In sum, we do not use performance measurements as a substitute for
    the 14-point competitive checklist. Rather, we use performance
    measurements as valuable evidence with which to inform our judgment
    as to whether a BOC has complied with the checklist requirements.
    Although performance measurements add necessary objectivity and
    predictability to our review, they cannot wholly replace our own
    judgment as to whether a BOC has complied with the competitive
    checklist.

### Relevance of Previous Section 271 Approvals

34. In the New York and Texas 271 proceedings, we were able to place
    significant reliance on two types of evidence in concluding that the
    BOC was providing interconnection, resold services, and access to
    unbundled network elements in accordance with the requirements of
    section 271. First, in both applications, the applicants offered
    sufficient and reliable evidence of nondiscriminatory performance,
    based on substantial volumes of transactions. Second, in both cases,
    a comprehensive test of the functions and capabilities of the BOC's
    operations support systems ("OSS") was conducted by an independent
    third party. In the instant application, the volumes of commercial
    orders -- although they have increased in recent months -- are
    significantly lower than they were in New York and Texas. In several
    instances, as discussed below, volumes are so low as to render the
    performance data inconsistent and inconclusive.[^78] In addition, no
    comprehensive, independent third party test of SWBT's OSS was
    conducted in either Kansas or Oklahoma.

35. In support of this application, SWBT urges us to place significant
    reliance on the Commission's findings in the *SWBT Texas Order*, on
    grounds that many of its systems and processes used in Kansas and
    Oklahoma, as well as the legal obligations imposed by the Kansas and
    Oklahoma Commissions, are the same as those reviewed and approved in
    the Texas 271 proceeding.[^79] We agree that findings in the *SWBT
    Texas Order* may be a relevant factor in our analysis in this
    proceeding. Where SWBT provides evidence that a particular system
    reviewed and approved in Texas is also used in Kansas and Oklahoma,
    our review of the same system in this proceeding will be informed by
    our findings in the *SWBT Texas Order*. Indeed, to the extent that
    issues have already been briefed, reviewed and resolved in a prior
    section 271 proceeding, and absent new evidence or changed
    circumstances, an application for a related state should not be a
    forum for re-litigating and reconsidering those issues. Moreover, as
    noted by the Department of Justice, this approach can "avoid the
    delay and expense of redundant testing."[^80] We emphasize, however,
    that the statute requires us to make a separate determination of
    checklist compliance for each state and, accordingly, we do not
    consider any finding from the *SWBT Texas Order* to be dispositive
    of checklist compliance in this proceeding. While our review may be
    informed by our prior findings, we will consider all relevant
    evidence in the record, including state-specific factors identified
    by commenting parties, the states, the Department of Justice.

36. We also find, as discussed in further detail below, that SWBT's
    actual performance in Texas may be relevant to our analysis of the
    commercial readiness of SWBT's OSS in this proceeding, as well as to
    determinations with respect to other checklist items.[^81] We find
    that performance data based on low volumes of orders or other
    transactions is not as reliable an indicator of checklist compliance
    as performance based on larger numbers of observations. Indeed, as
    SWBT itself recognizes, where performance data is based on a low
    number of observations, small variations in performance may produce
    wide swings in the reported performance data.[^82] It is thus not
    possible to place the same evidentiary weight upon -- and to draw
    the same types of conclusions from -- performance data where volumes
    are low, as for data based on more robust activity. We note,
    however, that we have always held that an applicant's performance
    towards competing carriers in an actual commercial environment is
    the best evidence of nondiscriminatory access to OSS and other
    network elements. [^83] Accordingly, even where an applicant seeks
    to rely on findings made in a prior, successful section 271
    application (the "anchor" state), then, our analysis will always
    start with actual performance towards competitors in the applicant
    state. Indeed, evidence of satisfactory performance in another state
    cannot trump convincing evidence that an applicant fails to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to a network element in the applicant
    state.

37. Moreover, because our review of a section 271 application must be
    based on a snapshot of a BOC's recent performance at the time an
    application is filed, we cannot simply rely on our findings relating
    to an applicant's performance in an anchor state at the time we
    issued the determination for that state. The performance in that
    state could change due to a multitude of factors, such as increased
    order volumes or shifts in the mix of the types of services or UNEs
    requested by competing carriers. Thus, even when the applicant makes
    a convincing showing of the relevance of anchor state data, we must
    examine how recent performance in that state compares to performance
    at the time we approved its section 271 application, in order to
    determine if the systems and processes continue to perform at
    acceptable levels.

38. We recognize, as does the Department of Justice, that this
    application presents us with the first opportunity to materially
    rely on this form of evidence in granting a section 271 application.
    We note, however, that the Commission has adopted the practice of
    reviewing evidence from other applications and states in previous
    section 271 proceedings. For instance, in the *First BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, we used our evaluation of BellSouth's OSS in South
    Carolina as a "starting point" for our evaluation of its OSS in
    Louisiana, where the Commission had recently released the *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*.[^84] Furthermore, in the three BellSouth
    section 271 orders, we found performance measurements covering
    performance in BellSouth's entire region to be relevant to our
    consideration of the individual applications.[^85] Such evidence was
    relevant, we explained, because BellSouth had adequately shown that
    it used essentially the same OSS system throughout its nine-state
    region.[^86] Appropriately employed, such a practice can give us a
    fuller picture of the BOC's compliance with the section 271
    requirements while avoiding, for all parties involved in the section
    271 process, the delay and expense associated with redundant and
    unnecessary proceedings and submissions.

# Primary Issues in Dispute

39. In prior orders, we organized our discussion of the section 271
    requirements sequentially, following the order of the statutory
    provision. In so doing, we have discussed in considerable detail the
    analytical framework and particular legal showing required to
    establish checklist compliance. Rather than simply recite prior
    jurisprudence, we focus instead in this order first on those issues
    and checklist items in controversy, based on the record developed in
    this proceeding. Accordingly, we begin by addressing whether SWBT
    has satisfied the requirements for Track A in both Kansas and
    Oklahoma. Next, we consider checklist item number two, which
    encompasses access to unbundled network elements, including issues
    related to OSS, combinations of network elements and Enhanced
    Extended Links (EELs). We then discuss checklist item number four,
    access to unbundled local loops, and checklist item number one,
    which covers interconnection and collocation. The remaining
    checklist requirements are then discussed briefly since they
    received little or no discussion from commenting parties, and our
    own review of the record leads us to conclude that SWBT has
    satisfied these requirements. Finally, we discuss issues concerning
    compliance with section 272 and the public interest requirement. It
    is our hope that this approach will serve to focus attention on the
    checklist items that tend to raise the most questions about
    compliance with section 271, while reducing the discussion of the
    checklist requirements that do not raise such questions.

## Compliance with Section 271(c)(1)(A)

40. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate
    that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A)
    (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^87] To qualify for Track A, a
    BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing
    providers of "telephone exchange service . . . to residential and
    business subscribers."[^88] The Act states that "such telephone
    service may be offered . . . either exclusively over \[the
    competitor's\] own telephone exchange service facilities or
    predominantly over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange
    facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications
    services of another carrier."[^89] The Commission concluded in the
    *Ameritech Michigan Order* that section 271(c)(1)(A) is satisfied if
    one or more competing providers collectively serve residential and
    business subscribers.[^90]

### Kansas 

41. We conclude, as the Kansas Commission did, that SWBT demonstrates
    that it satisfies the requirements of Track A based on the
    interconnection agreements it has implemented with competing
    carriers in Kansas. In support of its Track A showing, SWBT relies
    on interconnection agreements with Global Crossing, Sprint, Birch
    Telecom and Ionex Communications.[^91] Specifically, the record
    demonstrates that both Ionex Communications and Birch Telecom
    provide service to residential subscribers exclusively over their
    own facilities using the UNE platform.[^92] Sprint also provides
    local exchange service to business and residential subscribers.[^93]

42. Although there has been considerable dispute in the record regarding
    the exact number of residential customers served by these
    carriers,[^94] we conclude that a sufficient number of residential
    customers are being served by competing LECs through the use of
    their own facilities to demonstrate that there is an "actual
    commercial alternative" to SWBT in Kansas.[^95] We note that
    commenters have complained that SWBT's method of estimation
    overstates the number of customers.[^96] We find, however, that
    SWBT's response to these competitors in its reply comments, in
    conjunction with its *ex parte* submissions on this subject, support
    our conclusion that more than a *de minimis* number of residential
    customers are served via UNE-P in Kansas. [^97]

43. On January 18, 2001, Sprint filed a motion to strike an *ex parte*
    letter submitted by SWBT on December 20, 2000, on grounds that SWBT
    had failed to follow the proper procedures for filing confidential
    material and that a redacted version of the letter had not been
    placed in the public record.[^98] We deny this motion. The
    information contained in the letter related to the number of
    residential customers served via the UNE platform by six competitive
    carriers in Kansas other than Sprint. While Sprint suggests that "it
    is imperative that such data be vetted through the CLECs \[named in
    the letter\] themselves,"[^99] we note that one of the competing
    carriers, Birch Telecom, did confirm the customer estimate provided
    by SWBT.[^100] Consequently, all that Sprint (or any other
    commenter) could conceivably have argued, would have been to
    reiterate its opinion that only a *de minimis* number of residential
    customers are served by UNE-P in Kansas. As stated above, we reject
    that argument. Thus, we believe SWBT's omission resulted in harmless
    error. Moreover, while we view the *ex parte* letter as providing
    additional support for SWBT's assertion that it complies with "Track
    A," it is not the only basis of our decision, as noted above.[^101]

### Oklahoma

44. We conclude, as the Oklahoma Commission did, that SWBT demonstrates
    that it satisfies the requirements of Track A based on the
    interconnection agreements it has implemented with competing
    carriers in Oklahoma.[^102] Specifically, we find that Cox
    Communications (Cox) provides telephone exchange service either
    exclusively or predominantly over its own facilities to residential
    subscribers and to business subscribers.[^103] While several
    competing carriers, including Cox, challenge the accuracy of SWBT's
    estimates,[^104] there is no dispute that Cox serves a significant
    number of residential customers using its own facilities and
    represents an "actual commercial alternative" to SWBT in
    Oklahoma.[^105] Because Cox's customers alone satisfy Track A, we
    need not determine whether SWBT\'s estimates with respect to other
    competing carriers are correct.

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

45. We next determine whether SWBT has satisfied its obligation under
    checklist item 2 to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled
    network elements pursuant to section 251(c), at prices that meet the
    requirements of section 252(d). The Commission has identified a
    number of UNEs, including operations support systems (OSS), that
    incumbent LECs must make available under section 251(c)(3).[^106]
    The nondiscriminatory provision of OSS and the ability of competing
    carriers to combine unbundled network elements are integral aspects
    of the BOC's obligation to provide access to unbundled network
    elements. In this section, we address whether SWBT provides access
    to OSS and to combinations of UNEs in accordance with section
    251(c)(3) and our rules.[^107] Aside from OSS, the other UNEs that
    SWBT must make available under section 251(c)(3) are also listed as
    separate items on the competitive checklist, and are addressed below
    in separate sections for each checklist item.[^108]

46. In this section, we focus on those aspects of SWBT's compliance with
    this checklist item that were contested by commenting parties in
    this proceeding, and those issues and obligations that have not
    previously been considered by the Commission in a section 271 order.
    Accordingly, we start with an analysis of the prices charged for
    network elements in Kansas and Oklahoma. Next, under our analysis of
    whether SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS, we focus our
    analysis on two primary issues: the relevance of SWBT's assertion
    that the OSS used in Kansas and Oklahoma are the same as those
    previously approved in the Texas 271 proceeding, and whether SWBT
    provides access to loop qualification information as required under
    the *UNE Remand Order*. Finally, we turn to other key aspects of
    OSS, as identified in prior section 271 applications, and to issues
    relating to combinations of network elements.

### Pricing of Network Elements

47. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide
    "nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with
    sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)" of the Act.[^109] Section
    251(c)(3) requires local incumbent LECs to provide
    "nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
    at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions
    that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^110] Section
    252(d)(1) requires that a state commission's determination of the
    just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be based on the
    cost of providing the network elements, shall be nondiscriminatory,
    and may include a reasonable profit.[^111] Pursuant to this
    statutory mandate, the Commission has determined that prices for
    unbundled network elements (UNEs) must be based on the total element
    long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of providing those
    elements.[^112] The Commission also promulgated rule 51.315(b),
    which prohibits incumbent LECs from separating already combined
    elements before providing them to competing carriers, except on
    request.[^113]

48. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the
    Commission's pricing rules in 1996,[^114] the Supreme Court restored
    the Commission's pricing authority on January 25, 1999, and remanded
    to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the merits of the
    challenged rules.[^115] On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth
    Circuit concluded that while TELRIC is an acceptable method for
    determining costs, certain specific rules contained within the
    Commission's pricing rules were contrary to Congressional
    intent.[^116] The Eighth Circuit has stayed the issuance of its
    mandate pending review by the Supreme Court.[^117] Accordingly, the
    Commission's rules remain in effect for purposes of this
    application.

#### Pricing of Kansas Unbundled Network Elements

##### Background

49. In 1996, Sprint filed a petition with the Kansas Commission to open
    a generic cost proceeding.[^118] AT&T joined the request, and
    presented the competitive LECs' version of TELRIC-based cost
    studies.[^119] Over a four-year period, the Kansas Commission
    conducted extensive workshops, hearings, and other types of
    discovery as part of its cost docket.[^120] In 1997, the Kansas
    Commission adopted SWBT's cost model as the basis of determining
    forward-looking costs for unbundled network elements.[^121] The cost
    model was identical to the model utilized by the Texas Commission in
    its cost docket.[^122] In 1998, the Kansas Commission directed SWBT
    to rerun its recurring cost studies using certain prescribed inputs
    and cost assumptions.[^123] AT&T also reran its inputs through
    SWBT's cost model.[^124] The Kansas Commission reviewed all
    submitted cost data and set recurring rates for unbundled network
    elements in February 1999.[^125] In September 1999, the Kansas
    Commission issued an order on reconsideration adopting permanent
    recurring rates.[^126] In that order, the Kansas Commission directed
    parties to rerun inputs into their nonrecurring cost studies based
    on certain underlying TELRIC assumptions and determinations.[^127]

50. Ten months later, on November 3, 2000, the Kansas Commission set
    permanent rates for nonrecurring charges.[^128] The Kansas
    Commission found that neither SWBT's nor AT&T's submitted
    nonrecurring cost studies complied with the directives of its
    reconsideration order, and determined it could not accept either set
    of proposed rates.[^129] Based on its concern about the length of
    time that the nonrecurring rate docket had been open, and its
    agreement to support SWBT's 271 application, the Kansas Commission
    determined that it should utilize "information previously received
    in this matter" as well as "its best judgment" to set nonrecurring
    charges on reconsideration.[^130] The Kansas Commission found that
    the permanent rates it set on reconsideration fell "inside the range
    of prices that a reasonable application of TELRIC principles would
    produce."[^131] SWBT asserts that the recurring and nonrecurring
    rates ultimately adopted by the Kansas Commission were based on its
    TELRIC models and conform to the Commission's pricing rules.[^132]

51. On December 21, 2000, the Kansas Commission issued an order on
    reconsideration of its November 3, 2000 order.[^133] It affirmed
    most of its earlier conclusions regarding permanent nonrecurring
    charges, but it modified and clarified certain issues, including the
    following: (1) unless individually negotiated agreements between
    competitive LECs and SWBT include provisions for true-ups, no
    true-ups of the permanent nonrecurring charges exist; (2) the issue
    of whether SWBT is required to perform new combinations of UNEs is
    being decided in other outstanding dockets; and (3) individual
    nonrecurring charges, as well as a new service order charge, apply
    when a new customer moves into a location previously served by
    SWBT.[^134] Additionally, based on AT&T's assertions about SWBT's
    cost study inputs, the Kansas Commission reduced rates for 2-wire
    and 4-wire analog loops, 4-wire digital loops, 4-wire digital PRI
    loops, and electronic (mechanized) service orders.[^135]

52. On December 28, 2000, SWBT filed a letter with the Commission which
    outlined "voluntary reduction of some of the TELRIC-based
    nonrecurring rates in Kansas," as well as reductions to certain
    recurring and nonrecurring rates in Oklahoma.[^136] SWBT asserts
    that it takes these reductions as a "compromise" to mitigate
    commenters' concerns about prices in Kansas and Oklahoma.[^137] The
    Kansas Commission approved and adopted these rate modifications on
    January 5, 2001, stating that it set permanent rates for recurring
    and nonrecurring charges "in accord with the TELRIC methodology,"
    but that it "supports SWBT's efforts to address the concerns raised
    . . . that some of the Kansas rates are too high."[^138]

##### Discussion

53. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT's recurring
    and nonrecurring charges for UNEs made available in Kansas to other
    telecommunications carriers are just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory in compliance with checklist item 2. SWBT states
    that it provides UNEs at TELRIC-based rates.[^139] The Kansas
    Commission concludes that SWBT has satisfied the requirements of
    this checklist item.[^140]

###### Recurring Charges 

54. The Kansas Commission's February 1999 order,[^141] as revised by the
    Kansas Commission's September 1999 order on reconsideration,[^142]
    set permanent recurring rates and concluded that these rates were
    consistent with TELRIC principles. SWBT submits that the "Kansas
    Commission determined recurring UNE prices based on a TELRIC
    methodology, i.e., a determination of forward-looking economic costs
    plus a uniform allocation of joint and common costs."[^143] The
    Department of Justice urged us to review these rates independently,
    but did not set forth any specific objections for these rates.[^144]
    No commenter presents explicit objections to these rates.[^145]

55. We conclude that Kansas' recurring UNE rates fall within the
    reasonable range of TELRIC prices. Furthermore, the Kansas
    Commission's orders show a consistent application of TELRIC
    principles in the setting of recurring prices.[^146] Because no
    commenter presents evidence of clear errors in substantial factual
    matters, and the Kansas Commission followed TELRIC principles, we
    conclude that these prices comply with our rules.

###### Nonrecurring Charges 

56. Pursuant to its voluntary rate reduction outlined in its December 28
    *ex parte* letter, SWBT applied a 25 percent discount to all
    permanent nonrecurring charges in Kansas, subject to the following
    two conditions: (1) If the 25 percent reduction would lead to a rate
    below the corresponding rate in Texas, SWBT lowers the rate only to
    the level of the corresponding Texas rates.[^147] (2) SWBT compares
    the nonrecurring charge prescribed by the Kansas Commission in its
    December 21 reconsideration order to the rate that would be obtained
    by applying the 25 percent discount to the permanent rate adopted in
    November 3, 2000 order, and offers whichever rate is lower.[^148]

57. SWBT assesses a \$2.35 nonrecurring service order charge for each
    electronically-processed UNE service order or a \$12.35 nonrecurring
    service order charge for each manually processed service
    order.[^149] When a customer changes or "migrates" his or her
    telephone service provider from SWBT to a competitive LEC that
    provides service by leasing the unbundled network element "platform"
    (UNE-P),[^150] SWBT charges the competitive LEC a \$2.35 electronic
    service order charge,[^151] but does not assess any other
    nonrecurring charges.[^152] As discussed above, on December 28,
    2000, SWBT voluntarily reduced certain nonrecurring charges in
    Kansas, and as part of these reductions, the \$12.35 manual service
    order charge was reduced to \$11.25.[^153]

58. For each new service order (as opposed to a UNE migration), SWBT
    charges a competitive LEC a nonrecurring charge for each unbundled
    network element ordered, in addition to the service order
    charge.[^154] To provide new service through the use of the UNE-P,
    the competitive LEC would pay: (1) the nonrecurring service order
    charge, (2) a \$28.45 nonrecurring charge for a two-wire analog
    loop,[^155] (3) a \$26.70 nonrecurring charge for an analog
    loop-to-switch port cross connect,[^156] and (4) an additional
    \$16.35 nonrecurring central office access charge (COAC),[^157] for
    a total of \$73.85 for electronically-processed orders or \$83.85
    for manually-processed orders. As discussed above, SWBT voluntarily
    reduced these nonrecurring charges, which results in new totals of
    \$59.05 for electronically processed orders and \$67.95 for
    manually-processed orders.[^158]

59. SWBT's showing withstands the arguments of its opponents regarding
    this checklist item. We have previously held that we will not
    conduct a *de novo* review of a state's pricing determinations and
    will reject an application only if "basic TELRIC principles are
    violated or the state commission makes clear errors in factual
    findings on matters so substantial that the end result falls outside
    the range that the reasonable application of TELRIC principles would
    produce\[.\]"[^159] States also "retain the flexibility to consider
    'local technological, environmental, regulatory, and economic
    conditions.'"[^160] As discussed below, we find that SWBT's rates
    for nonrecurring charges are within a reasonable range of what
    TELRIC might produce.

60. Here, we find that basic TELRIC principles were followed, and we
    find no clear errors in substantial factual matters. We agree with
    the Kansas Commission that "it has appropriately exercised its
    flexibility to set prices within a range of TELRIC-based
    rates."[^161] Additionally, the Kansas Commission has demonstrated a
    commitment to setting rates pursuant to a TELRIC-based
    methodology.[^162] We note that the Kansas Commission modified
    various aspects of SWBT's cost model inputs once in 1999 and twice
    in 2000, and carefully considered and at times utilized alternative
    inputs from AT&T.[^163] We commend the Kansas Commission for its
    commitment to forward-looking pricing and the careful analyses it
    undertook in its ratemaking dockets. We note, however, that its
    efforts were hampered by carriers' failure to follow its directions
    in running their respective cost studies.[^164] Additionally, we
    agree with commenters that numerous nonrecurring charges are
    significantly higher than corresponding rates in Texas, which we
    previously determined were within a reasonable TELRIC range.[^165]
    We need not reach a conclusion as to whether the carriers' failure
    to follow the Kansas Commission's directions resulted in the
    permanent nonrecurring rates set by the Kansas Commission being out
    of compliance with our rules, because SWBT voluntarily reduced these
    rates in its December 28, 2000 *ex parte* letter.[^166] We find that
    these additional voluntary reductions eliminate any remaining
    concerns about whether Kansas' nonrecurring rates are within the
    range of what a reasonable application of TELRIC principles would
    produce.

61. SWBT imposes only a \$2.35 service order charge to migrate a
    customer from SWBT's retail service to a competitive LEC's
    UNE-P.[^167] UNE-P migrations account for the majority of new orders
    in Kansas [^168] Additionally, we note that nonrecurring charges for
    loops in Texas do not include certain installation and maintenance
    activity nonrecurring charges, which SWBT wanted to recover in Texas
    through its "trip charge" but which the Texas Commission
    disallowed.[^169] The fact that SWBT recovers the "trip charge" in
    Kansas, but not Texas, accounts for most of the disparity in
    nonrecurring 2-wire analog loop and loop cross-connect charges
    between the two states.[^170] We find nothing in the record to
    refute SWBT's claim that the trip charge is a legitimate expense,
    and we do not conduct a *de novo* review of the Kansas Commission's
    decision to allow such a charge.[^171]

62. We conclude that no commenters have raised specific allegations
    regarding "clear errors in factual findings on matters so
    substantial" that the end result falls outside the reasonable range
    of what TELRIC might produce. We disagree with commenters who assert
    that the Kansas Commission merely acted out of self-imposed pressure
    to quickly set permanent nonrecurring charges on reconsideration
    after it had approved SWBT's 271 application.[^172] The record
    indicates that the Kansas Commission labored for several years in
    setting cost-based nonrecurring charges.[^173] The Kansas Commission
    made a diligent effort to set permanent rates in a timely fashion
    despite the fact that its efforts were hampered by the noncompliance
    of parties to the cost docket.

63. We also disagree with AT&T's assertion that the Kansas nonrecurring
    charges violate TELRIC because they include inputs from SWBT that do
    not conform to TELRIC principles.[^174] The Kansas Commission
    explicitly rejected SWBT's incorrect inputs and instead utilized
    inputs, in some instances those proposed by AT&T, that it found were
    more reasonable in both its November 3 and December 21 orders
    setting nonrecurring charges.[^175] In its December 21 nonrecurring
    charges reconsideration order, the Kansas Commission carefully
    considered AT&T's most recent assertions,[^176] and in response
    modified SWBT's rates for 2- and 4-wire analog loop, 4-wire digital
    loop, and 4-wire PRI loop rates, and rates for service order
    charges.[^177] It declined to adopt AT&T's proposed adjustments to
    fallout factor, directory white pages, manual processing, and
    Dedicated Outside Plant assumptions, and denied AT&T's request that
    in the case of a new service order, only the service order charge
    should be applied.[^178] We find that the Kansas Commission
    considered and reasonably responded to each of these assertions, and
    AT&T presents no evidence that the Kansas Commission made clear
    errors or failed to follow basic TELRIC principles in either order.

64. We are not persuaded by commenters' assertion that the Kansas
    Commission's settlement-type approach for some nonrecurring charges,
    in which it adopted a weighted average of inputs submitted by SWBT
    and AT&T, causes SWBT to fail this checklist item.[^179] As
    discussed above, states have flexibility to set prices within a
    reasonable TELRIC range and to take state-specific factors into
    account.[^180] Utilization of a weighted average of two sets of cost
    inputs is not a violation of basic TELRIC principles. To the extent
    there is any doubt about whether SWBT's nonrecurring charges in
    Kansas fall within the reasonable range of what TELRIC would
    produce, such doubt is eliminated by SWBT's recent implementation of
    25 percent voluntary discounts from the November 3 rates.

65. We do not analyze the merits of WorldCom's assertion that
    nonrecurring charges for new UNE installations are so high that they
    preclude profitable entry into the Kansas market.[^181] As discussed
    below,[^182] incumbent LECs are not required, pursuant to the
    requirements of section 271, to guarantee competitors a certain
    profit margin. In order to comply with checklist item 2 of section
    271, incumbent LECs must provide UNEs at rates and terms that are
    just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, and that allow the
    incumbent LEC to recover a reasonable profit.[^183] We have analyzed
    SWBT's application under this standard.

66. We disagree with AT&T's assertion that allowing a 25 percent
    voluntary rate reduction is arbitrary and capricious.[^184] While we
    acknowledge that this type of discount is not based on a TELRIC
    methodology because it was derived by applying a percentage discount
    to the permanent rates, we find that such reduction does not cause
    SWBT to fail this checklist item. As discussed above, the Kansas
    Commission found that SWBT's permanent recurring rates were within a
    reasonable TELRIC range, and SWBT's voluntary reductions of those
    permanent recurring rates assuage the concerns of commenters that
    some of the rates were higher than corresponding rates in Texas.
    [^185] These discounts remove any doubt as to whether they fall
    within a reasonable range of what TELRIC might produce. If we were
    to disallow such a cost reduction, we would be depriving competitors
    of a significant benefit. Such a distinction would promote form over
    substance, which, given the necessarily imprecise nature of setting
    TELRIC-based pricing, is unnecessary.

67. We disagree with the assertion of IP and Sprint that we should deny
    SWBT's application because SWBT will attempt to raise rates as soon
    as its four-year contract with competitive LECs has expired.[^186]
    In order to gain in-region, interLATA entry, a BOC must support its
    application with actual evidence demonstrating its present
    compliance with the statutory conditions for entry, instead of
    prospective evidence that is contingent on future behavior.[^187]
    Should we receive evidence of non-cost-based pricing in the future,
    we may take appropriate enforcement action under section
    271(d)(6).[^188]

68. We also disagree with ALTS's assertion that if we accept SWBT's
    voluntary reductions, we will be improperly relying on promises of
    SWBT's future performance because the reductions have not yet gone
    into effect.[^189] As noted above, both the Kansas Commission and
    the Oklahoma Commission have adopted these amended rates,[^190]
    thereby mooting ALTS's argument. We find that IP's allegation that a
    voluntary 25 percent rate reduction could put rates below cost is
    without merit.[^191] Although below-cost rates would not comply with
    the statute and would create incentives for inefficient entry, it
    would be perverse to deny a 271 application because an incumbent
    LEC's rates offered to competitors are too low. Further, IP submits
    no evidence to support a finding that SWBT's rates are below cost.

#### Pricing of Oklahoma Unbundled Network Elements

69. *Permanent Rates.* Oklahoma's prices for recurring and nonrecurring
    UNEs were set by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on June 30,
    1998,[^192] and adopted by the Oklahoma Commission without
    modification on July 17, 1998.[^193] The prices were established in
    the context of an arbitration between SWBT and Cox Oklahoma, a cable
    facilities‑based competitor.[^194] The arbitration was then opened
    to other parties, including AT&T, as part of an ongoing generic cost
    docket.[^195] After reviewing the pre‑filed testimony and
    cross‑examination, the ALJ recommended that the Oklahoma Commission
    adopt the rates in the Cox stipulation.[^196] The ALJ noted that the
    stipulated rates: (1) fell within the reasonable range of cost-based
    rates proposed by AT&T and SWBT in the generic cost docket; (2)
    would allow SWBT a reasonable opportunity for recovery of capital;
    and (3) would allow competitive LECs in Oklahoma to effectively
    compete with SWBT.[^197] In adopting the stipulated rates, the
    Oklahoma Commission noted that the long run incremental cost (LRIC)
    studies performed by SWBT to calculate its rates were the functional
    equivalent of TELRIC.[^198]

70. *Promotional Rates.* On December 10, 1999, the Oklahoma Commission
    unanimously approved a stipulation between SWBT, Oklahoma Commission
    staff, and various competitive LECs regarding SWBT's transition to
    alternative regulation.[^199] Among other things, the stipulation
    provided promotional discount rates for certain UNEs.[^200]
    Recurring charges were discounted up to 25 percent, and nonrecurring
    charges were discounted up to 35 percent.[^201]

71. The promotional rates commenced on June 15, 2000, at which time SWBT
    notified competitive LECs in Oklahoma.[^202] Once the aggregate
    number of competitive LEC lines provided at the promotional rates in
    any exchange equals or exceeds 25 percent of the total access lines
    for a class of customers, the "competitive cap" is met, and rates
    for additional UNEs in that exchange revert to the permanent UNE
    rates for service to that class of customer.[^203] Otherwise, the
    rates for additional UNEs will automatically revert to permanent UNE
    rates on June 15, 2005 \-- five years after the commencement
    date.[^204] The Oklahoma Commission may initiate a new cost
    proceeding to reexamine the rates no earlier than June 15,
    2002.[^205] The Oklahoma Commission, however, may not implement any
    modification to the promotional rates in a particular zone until the
    earlier of June 15, 2005, or until the competitive cap has been met
    in the majority of SWBT exchanges within that zone.[^206]

72. On December 28, 2000, SWBT filed a letter with the Commission
    outlining additional reductions it would undertake
    voluntarily.[^207] Specifically, SWBT stated that it would extend
    the promotional reductions to include the recurring charges for all
    loops, including xDSL-capable loops.[^208] Also, SWBT agreed to
    reduce its nonrecurring charges significantly, as follows: (1) the
    promotional discounts will be extended to all cross-connect
    nonrecurring charges; (2) Oklahoma nonrecurring charges that are
    already subject to the promotional discounts and that are higher
    than the corresponding nonrecurring charge set by the Kansas
    Commission in its November 3 nonrecurring charges order will receive
    a percentage discount equal to the percentage discount the
    corresponding Kansas nonrecurring charge receives; (3) Oklahoma
    nonrecurring charges that are not subject to the promotional
    discounts will receive a 25 percent discount.[^209] Where any of the
    nonrecurring charge reductions led to a rate below the corresponding
    rate in Texas, SWBT agreed to lower the charge only to the Texas
    rate.[^210] SWBT has also agreed to remove the competitive cap, so
    that the rate changes they have adopted would remain in effect for
    the term of the O2A.[^211] On January 5, 2001, SWBT issued an
    Accessible Letter making the offer of the discounted rates available
    to all competitive LECs.[^212] On January 10, 2001, the Oklahoma
    Commission approved the rates set forth in the December 28 *Ex
    Parte* Letter.[^213]

##### Recurring Charges

73. We conclude that the recurring charges for UNEs in Oklahoma comply
    with section 252(d)(1) of the Act. For the reasons discussed below,
    we have serious doubts as to whether the permanent rates set forth
    in the O2A are at TELRIC-based levels. Nevertheless, we conclude
    that the presence of the promotional rates for many of the UNE-P
    recurring charges, together with the additional reductions to loop
    charges outlined in the SWBT December 28 *Ex Parte* Letter, provide
    competitive LECs with rates that are within the range that a
    reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce.

74. As we note above,[^214] we will reject a section 271 application
    "only if basic TELRIC principles are violated or the state
    commission makes clear errors in factual findings on matters so
    substantial that the end result falls outside the range that the
    reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce."[^215]
    Thus, even though we conduct an independent review of SWBT's
    Oklahoma rates, [^216] we do not conduct a *de novo* review of the
    state commission's ratemaking decisions.

75. The Oklahoma Commission approved a finding by the ALJ that the UNE
    rates are cost-based. The parties participating in the Oklahoma cost
    proceeding, including AT&T, agreed to use SWBT's cost model.[^217]
    The ALJ conducted his review by applying the state long run
    incremental cost (LRIC) standard.[^218] The ALJ's analysis of what
    is required under LRIC indicates that the standard he applied is
    similar to our TELRIC standard.[^219] We therefore conclude that the
    cost model itself was TELRIC-based, and so "basic TELRIC principles"
    were followed. AT&T contends, however, that the ALJ made a number of
    errors in considering inputs. Specifically, AT&T challenges the fill
    factor used in calculating loop costs and transport,[^220] the
    assessment of depreciation rates,[^221] and the size of switch
    discounts.[^222] In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*,
    the Commission anticipated that states would evaluate these and
    other inputs, and that they would vary among states.[^223] We
    presume that the value for one of these inputs is reasonable unless
    it is clearly outside the levels that could be obtained through
    application of the TELRIC methodology, or the state did not apply
    TELRIC in setting the input value.[^224]

76. We reject AT&T's challenge to the depreciation rates.[^225] SWBT
    proposed setting depreciation rates based on the equipment lives
    that it uses for financial accounting purposes,[^226] and the ALJ
    made no explicit adjustments.[^227] The ALJ, however, did
    acknowledge that depreciation lives are relevant, and stated that
    they were "amply addressed within the stipulation results which
    reduce recurring costs."[^228] We accept the ALJ's conclusion on
    this matter. Our rules state that the depreciation rates must be
    economic.[^229] While it would be reasonable for a state to follow
    the depreciation rates the Commission has set for regulation of
    SWBT's interstate services, as Kansas and other states have
    done,[^230] other approaches are not necessarily unreasonable. We
    have never stated that states should be precluded from setting
    depreciation rates that differ from the Commission's,[^231] and do
    not do so here. A state may find that a depreciation schedule such
    as the one proposed by SWBT is appropriate, and AT&T has failed to
    indicate why it would not be so here.

77. We also reject AT&T's contention that SWBT's switch inputs failed to
    include significant switch discounts it received or would receive in
    the future from switch manufacturers.[^232] The ALJ concluded that
    he would be unable to assume whether switch discounts would increase
    or decrease in the future. He noted that the only variables of which
    he could be certain were the size of the discount in the current
    contracts and current list prices. He therefore set the size of the
    discount using the discount in the then-current prices.[^233] We
    believe his decision was reasonable, and find that on this matter,
    AT&T fails to demonstrate clear error.[^234]

78. We do, however, agree with AT&T that the fill factors for transport
    and distribution cable that the ALJ used were not
    TELRIC-based.[^235] A fill factor is the estimate of the proportion
    of a facility that will be used. In other words, the per-unit cost
    associated with a particular element should take into account the
    total cost associated with the element divided by a reasonable
    projection of the actual total usage of the element. Network
    engineers include a certain amount of spare capacity to accommodate
    administrative functions, such as testing and repair, and some
    expected amount of growth. If a fill factor is set too high, the
    particular element will have insufficient capacity to accommodate
    anticipated increases in demand or service outages. If a fill factor
    is set too low, the network could have considerable excess capacity,
    which results in increases to the per-unit cost higher than an
    efficient firm's cost.

79. Although the fill factors for transport used by the ALJ do not
    adhere to TELRIC principles, we believe that the ALJ acted
    reasonably on this matter. The fill factors for terminal equipment
    and for fiber affect interoffice transport rate elements and
    dedicated entrance facility rate elements. The ALJ concluded that
    the use of actual fill for these elements was appropriate, because
    objective fill is speculative and might not be achieved.[^236] The
    ALJ failed to consider whether the actual fill factors were those of
    an efficient provider. Nevertheless, the ALJ noted that the
    transport rates were reduced 30 percent from SWBT's original
    proposal, and we believe the ALJ was reasonable in concluding that
    this adjustment adequately accounts for the low transport fill
    factor.[^237] Even if this adjustment were inadequate, however, the
    resulting difference in rates is minimal for shared transport,[^238]
    and any error is not of great enough magnitude to require denial of
    the application.

80. We cannot make the same conclusion with respect to the fill factor
    for distribution cable, which affects the rates for loops, and
    sub-loops for distribution. The ALJ used a loop fill factor of 30
    percent, and rejected the 50 percent figure proposed by AT&T.[^239]
    Under TELRIC, we determine what the LRIC would be for an efficient
    provider. We find that a fill factor that assumes that more than
    two-thirds of capacity is idle for an indefinite time is
    unreasonably low. By way of comparison, the Commission adopted fill
    factors ranging from 50 to 75 percent for the Universal Service Fund
    (USF) cost model, the Kansas Commission adopted a 53 percent fill
    factor for distribution cable, and the New York Public Service
    Commission adopted a 50 percent fill factor.[^240] The ALJ's
    decision violates TELRIC because it used current fill, and refused
    to consider the forward-looking fill or assume that the fill factor
    would increase over time.[^241]

81. Because states have considerable flexibility in setting UNE rates,
    certain flaws in a cost study, by themselves, may not result in
    rates that are outside the reasonable range that a correct
    application of our TELRIC rules would produce. Given our finding
    concerning the fill factor for the distribution cable, we must
    determine whether the ALJ's error is substantial, i.e., whether its
    presence results in rates "outside the range that the reasonable
    application of TELRIC principles would produce."

82. In making such a determination, we agree with the Department of
    Justice that we may, in appropriate circumstances, consider rates
    that we have found to be based on TELRIC principles.[^242] We
    therefore compare SWBT's rates in Oklahoma to SWBT's rates in Texas.
    We do so because they are adjoining states; because the two states
    have a similar, if not identical, rate structure for comparison
    purposes; and because we have already found the rates in Texas
    reasonable. AT&T has compared the rates in Oklahoma to those in
    Kansas rather than those in Texas.[^243] Given that the Commission
    has already found the rates in Texas to be TELRIC-based, however, a
    comparison that reasonably accounts for the differences in the rates
    between these two states would lead us to conclude that the rates in
    Oklahoma are also reasonable, regardless of how they compare with
    the Kansas rates. We note that for the same reasons, and given the
    fact that Oklahoma has higher teledensity than Texas, we clearly
    could have approved SWBT's Oklahoma rates if it had offered UNEs in
    Oklahoma at the same rates as it does in Texas.[^244]

83. In taking a weighted average of loop rates in Oklahoma and Texas, we
    find that Oklahoma's rates are roughly one-third higher than those
    in Texas.[^245] This difference is substantial, but by itself does
    not indicate that Oklahoma's rates are not at TELRIC-based levels.
    We disagree with commenters who argue otherwise,[^246] because as
    the Department of Justice notes, "\[s\]uch differences may arise
    either from differences in costs between states, or from different
    judgments -- both of which are reasonable -- on rate making issues
    that are not susceptible to precise determination."[^247]

84. As we note above, however, we cannot rely on the judgment of the ALJ
    with respect to loop costs. Consequently, we must either conclude
    that the rate differential is based on cost, or that Oklahoma's
    recurring rates are not TELRIC-based. Our USF cost model provides a
    reasonable basis for comparing cost differences between states. We
    have previously noted that while the USF cost model should not be
    relied upon to set rates for UNEs, it accurately reflects the
    relative cost differences among states.[^248] Using a weighted
    average of wire-center loop costs, the USF cost model indicates that
    loop costs in SWBT's Oklahoma study area are roughly 23 percent
    higher than loop costs in its Texas study area.[^249] We therefore
    attribute this portion of the differential, roughly two-thirds of
    it, to differences in cost.

85. The remainder of the differential, however, is not *de minimis*, and
    we cannot ignore its presence. SWBT fails to provide a reasonable
    explanation for its presence. SWBT contends that any comparison
    between the rates in Texas and Oklahoma should take into account the
    fact that Oklahoma's exchanges are generally smaller than exchanges
    in Texas, and that the largest exchanges in Oklahoma would only be
    in the suburban zone in Texas.[^250] These facts are significant,
    and consistent with the differences between the two states captured
    by the USF cost model.[^251] Ultimately, however, we need not decide
    whether these loop rates exceed levels that would be obtained using
    TELRIC, however, because of the presence of the promotional loop
    rates and the rates set forth in the SWBT December 28 *Ex Parte*
    Letter. We believe it is appropriate to evaluate these rates because
    they are available to everyone. Consideration of rates that are
    higher than what competitors need actually pay is unreasonable under
    the circumstances.

86. Despite some doubts as to whether SWBT's permanent loop rates are
    within the range that TELRIC would produce, we conclude that SWBT's
    promotional loop rates for Oklahoma, which now contain discounts
    that SWBT applies to all loop rates, including xDSL-capable loops,
    are within the range of rates that could be obtained through
    application of TELRIC.[^252] The weighted average of the Oklahoma
    discounted loop rates is roughly 11 percent higher than the weighted
    average of the loop rates in Texas.[^253] This differential between
    Oklahoma promotional and Texas rates is well within the 23 percent
    differential suggested by the USF cost model, and so we conclude
    that the discounted rates meet the requirements of the Act.

87. While the loop rates were not derived in total compliance with our
    TELRIC rules, this flaw is not fatal to SWBT's application. The
    discounts now available in Oklahoma compensate for the ALJ's use of
    a fill factor that was not compliant with TELRIC. By comparing the
    Oklahoma loop rates to those in Texas, and taking the different
    characteristics of the two states as reflected in the USF cost
    model, we find that the discounted rates currently available are
    within a range that could be obtained by using TELRIC. This fact
    makes the rates equivalent to cost-based rates, and we do not
    believe it appropriate to make a distinction between cost-based
    rates and rates that equal cost-based rates. Such a distinction
    would promote form over substance, which, given the necessarily
    imprecise nature of setting TELRIC-based pricing, is wholly
    unnecessary.

88. We note that the extension of this discount to all loops addresses
    concerns that the discounts are discriminatory against certain types
    of providers.[^254] SWBT's decision to remove the competitive cap
    also addresses the concern that the discounts were discriminatory,
    and designed to encourage only a limited amount of
    competition.[^255] We are not troubled by the fact that competitive
    LECs may, on a service order basis, receive either the promotional
    discounts or the SBC/Ameritech merger discount, but may not receive
    both at the same time,[^256] because the rates resulting from the
    promotional discounts are within the range that could be obtained by
    applying TELRIC. We evaluated UNE rates in Texas exclusive of the
    merger discount,[^257] so here we consider how the promotional rates
    in Oklahoma compare with the permanent Texas rates.

89. The fact that these rates are termed promotional rather than
    permanent is irrelevant because the rates in fact remain in effect
    during the term of the O2A.[^258] We also reject objections to
    SWBT's decision not to offer a promotional discount for all
    recurring charges.[^259] Because we have concluded that the
    recurring rates for elements other than loops were set consistent
    with TELRIC, SWBT is under no obligation to reduce these
    rates.[^260]

90. With respect to rates for UNEs other than loops, we reject the
    assertions that the ALJ's decision to split the difference between
    the rates proposed by SBC and AT&T cannot result in rates that are
    based on TELRIC,[^261] and that the ALJ could not pick a rate
    between the two proposals unless he found that both proposals were
    appropriately cost based.[^262] The ALJ did not simply "split the
    difference" between the two proposals. Rather, the ALJ carefully
    considered the merits of each potential input within the cost model.
    The ALJ's Recommendation included a 150-page distillation of the
    evidence provided by the parties, and the ALJ's findings and
    conclusions relied on that evidence. The ALJ relied on testimony
    indicating that had SWBT's cost studies been adjusted for reasons
    suggested by AT&T, including for the fill factor and depreciation,
    the rates proposed by SWBT would have been close to the rates
    ultimately set.[^263] While the conclusions that the ALJ drew may
    not be the ones that AT&T wanted, or even the ones we would have
    reached, other than as noted above, we cannot conclude that there is
    error.

91. We also reject AT&T's argument that because the cost models SWBT
    provided for Kansas and Oklahoma were nearly identical, the fact
    that the resulting rates are significantly different suggests that
    "the Kansas and Oklahoma recurring UNE rates cannot *both* be
    consistent with TELRIC."[^264] The Act requires that UNE rates be
    just and reasonable,[^265] and in other contexts, we have determined
    that standard to mean that any of a number of inputs or results from
    within a certain range could be appropriate.[^266] Thus,
    TELRIC-based pricing can result in a range of rates, which is wide
    enough to encompass the UNE rates in both Kansas and Oklahoma.
    Commenters' failure to identify errors by the Oklahoma Commission
    outside of how it established loop rates demonstrates this. AT&T
    would leave the states to serve as mere functionaries in the section
    251 and 252 pricing process, whereby their limited role would be to
    make sure that the pre-defined entries into the cost model are
    performed properly. The Act and our rules clearly provide states
    with a more significant role, by explicitly giving them the
    authority to set UNE rates.[^267] As the Supreme Court has observed,
    "\[i\]t is the States that will apply \[the Commission's\] standards
    and implement \[its\] methodology, determining the concrete result
    in particular circumstances."[^268]

92. Parties also assert that the Oklahoma promotional UNE rates are so
    high that no competitive LEC could afford to use the UNE platform to
    offer local residential service on a statewide basis.[^269] Such an
    argument is irrelevant. The Act requires that we review whether the
    rates are cost-based, not whether a competitor can make a profit by
    entering the market. Were we to focus on profitability, we would
    have to consider the level of a state's retail rates, something
    which is within the state's jurisdictional authority, not the
    Commission's.[^270]

93. Cox contends the promotional rates are discriminatory because the
    rates are not available to carriers with current agreements in place
    and those who are negotiating unique agreements.[^271] While
    carriers with current agreements may not be able to opt in to the
    new rates, this problem is not unique -- carriers face the identical
    problem in any state whenever the incumbent changes its rates.
    Carriers negotiating unique agreements have the ability to
    "pick-and-choose" rates contained within the revised
    agreement.[^272]

94. AT&T also argues that the promotional rates are discriminatory in
    violation of section 251(c)(3) of the Act because the discounts in
    zones 1 and 2 are greater than those in zone 3.[^273] We disagree
    that the differing discounts are discriminatory. Each competitive
    LEC is eligible for the same discount for the same element in the
    same zone, regardless of the type of service the competitive LEC is
    offering. Section 251(c)(3) requires us only to compare rates that
    two classes of customers pay for the same rate elements, not for
    different ones.[^274]

95. For these reasons, we conclude that SWBT has met the requirements of
    checklist item 2 with respect to its recurring UNE rates in
    Oklahoma.

##### Nonrecurring Charges

96. SWBT assesses a number of nonrecurring charges on UNE orders in
    Oklahoma. SWBT assesses a \$3.33 nonrecurring service order charge
    for each electronically-processed UNE service order or a \$47.95
    nonrecurring service order charge for each manually processed
    service order.[^275] When a customer changes or "migrates" his or
    her telephone service provider from SWBT to a competitive LEC that
    provides service by leasing the unbundled network element "platform"
    (UNE-P),[^276] SWBT charges the competitive LEC only the \$3.33
    electronic service order charge, on an interim basis, subject to
    true-up and pending resolution by the Oklahoma Commission.[^277] As
    discussed above, SWBT voluntarily reduced certain nonrecurring
    charges in Oklahoma. SWBT's alternative regulation plan, along with
    SWBT's further voluntary reduction, will reduce the nonrecurring
    service order charge for each manually processed service order to
    \$23.38.[^278]

97. As opposed to migrations, SWBT charges a competitive LEC a
    nonrecurring charge for each unbundled network element ordered, in
    addition to the service order charge. To provide new service through
    the use of the UNE-P, the competitive LEC would pay: (1) the
    nonrecurring service order charge, (2) a \$37.50 nonrecurring charge
    for a two-wire analog loop, (3) a \$1.20 nonrecurring charge for an
    analog line port, (4) a \$70.71 nonrecurring charge for an analog
    loop-to-switch port cross connect, and (5) an additional \$16.35
    nonrecurring COAC, for a total of \$129.09 for
    electronically-processed orders or \$173.71 for manually-processed
    orders.[^279] SWBT's alternative regulation plan reduces the
    nonrecurring charge for a two-wire analog loop to \$24.38,[^280] and
    the COAC to \$5.00.[^281] In addition, SWBT's promotional rates
    result in the nonrecurring charge for an analog loop-to-switch port
    cross connect to \$30.25.[^282] Thus, SWBT's voluntary reduction of
    nonrecurring charges will lead to new totals of \$64.16 for
    electronically-processed orders and \$84.21 for manually-processed
    orders.

98. We conclude that the nonrecurring rates for UNEs in Oklahoma comply
    with section 252(d)(1) of the Act. The record demonstrates that the
    ALJ carefully analyzed the various cost studies submitted for
    nonrecurring charges, and was committed to TELRIC principles in
    making his evaluations.[^283]

99. AT&T and the Department of Justice argue that it was unreasonable
    for the ALJ to assume all manual processing in calculating both the
    service order component of nonrecurring rates, and the nonrecurring
    charges for the provisioning of UNEs.[^284] The ALJ assumed manual
    processing for all service order charges. This assumption does not
    result in unreasonable rates for the service order component of
    nonrecurring rates, however, because subsequent to adoption of the
    ALJ's Recommendation, SWBT implemented a \$3.33 charge for
    electronic service orders.[^285] The rates that resulted from the
    ALJ's cost proceeding are used only for manual placement of service
    orders. Assumption of manual processing in determining a charge that
    applies only to manually processed orders is not unreasonable.

100. With respect to the nonrecurring charges for the provisioning of
     UNEs, the ALJ considered the competing claims of SWBT and AT&T, and
     rejected the contention of an AT&T witness who claimed that almost
     all processing could be done electronically.[^286] In so doing, the
     ALJ relied on studies provided by SWBT, and noted that AT&T's
     contention did not reflect the amount of activity required to
     unbundle the network upon a competitive LEC's request.[^287] The
     ALJ also noted that the nonrecurring charges that he recommended
     were 33 percent below those proposed by SWBT.[^288] We also
     recognize that SWBT has voluntarily reduced these amounts by an
     additional 25 percent. To the extent there was any doubt about the
     reasonableness of the Oklahoma nonrecurring charges, we find that
     the voluntary reductions have eliminated that doubt and brought
     these rates within the reasonable range that the application of
     TELRIC would produce. For these reasons, we reject AT&T's
     assertions.

101. The arguments of the Department of Justice and Sprint that the
     nonrecurring UNE rates are higher in Oklahoma than in Texas[^289]
     do not persuade us that Oklahoma rates are unreasonable,
     particularly when taking into account SWBT's recent voluntary 25
     percent discount. As we note in our discussion of Oklahoma
     recurring charges, differences in rates alone do not constitute
     sufficient grounds to conclude that the higher rates are not
     TELRIC-based. In addition to reasonable differences in judgment,
     legitimate factors can cause differences in nonrecurring UNE rates
     between two states, including differences in costs and the services
     to which the charges apply. For example, the nonrecurring loop
     rates in Texas do not include installation and maintenance
     activities, which SWBT intended to recover from the trip charge and
     that the Texas Commission refused to accept.[^290] In Oklahoma, on
     the other hand, the nonrecurring loop rates include this
     charge.[^291] Furthermore, although both the Oklahoma and Texas
     Commissions use the TELRIC standard, they differ in terms of inputs
     to that model and how much they anticipate future cost
     reductions.[^292] We also note that the nonrecurring UNE rates in
     Oklahoma are comparable to those in Kansas,[^293] which we find to
     be reasonable. Thus we find, as we did in Kansas, that the fact
     that Oklahoma nonrecurring rates are higher than those in Texas
     does not make them unreasonable, nor does it cause SWBT to fail
     this checklist item.[^294]

102. Parties' concerns that the nonrecurring UNE rates in Oklahoma are
     higher than in Texas should be mitigated by the reductions that
     SWBT has made with its alternative regulation plan, and its
     voluntary additional reductions.[^295] These lower rates should
     better support the growth of a competitive local exchange
     environment in the Oklahoma market. We therefore conclude that SWBT
     has met the requirements of checklist item 2 with respect to its
     nonrecurring UNE rates in Oklahoma.

### Access to Operations Support Systems

#### Background

103. Our discussion of SWBT's OSS begins by outlining our general
     approach to analyzing the adequacy of an applicant's OSS. Next, we
     describe the analytical roadmap we use in reviewing a BOC's
     contention that its OSS in the applicant state(s), in this case
     Kansas and Oklahoma, is the same as its OSS in a state where we
     have previously approved the BOC's section 271 application, *i.e.*,
     Texas. We then individually analyze SWBT's performance in providing
     access to the five critical OSS functions: pre-ordering (which
     includes access to loop qualification information), ordering,
     provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing. Finally, we
     address SWBT's change management process and the technical
     assistance that SWBT offers to competing carriers seeking to use
     its OSS.

104. The Commission has defined OSS as the various systems, databases,
     and personnel used by incumbent LECs to provide service to their
     customers,[^296] and consistently has found that nondiscriminatory
     access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful
     local competition.[^297] Competing carriers must have access to the
     functions performed by the incumbent's OSS in order to formulate
     and place orders for network elements or resale services, to
     install service for their customers, to maintain and repair network
     facilities, and to bill customers. The Commission has determined
     that without nondiscriminatory access to the BOC's OSS, a competing
     carrier "will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded
     altogether, from fairly competing" in the local exchange
     market.[^298] For OSS functions that are analogous to those that a
     BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, the
     nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer requesting
     carriers access that permits competing carriers to perform these
     functions in "substantially the same time and manner" as the
     BOC.[^299] For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC
     must offer access "sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete."[^300]

105. We analyze whether SWBT has met the nondiscrimination standard for
     each OSS function using the two-step approach outlined in prior
     orders. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has
     developed sufficient electronic (for functions that the BOC
     accesses electronically) and manual interfaces to allow competing
     carriers equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS
     functions.[^301] Under the second inquiry, we examine performance
     measurements and other evidence of commercial readiness to
     ascertain whether the BOC's OSS is handling current demand and will
     be able to handle reasonably foreseeable future volumes.[^302] The
     most probative evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready
     is actual commercial usage in the state for which the BOC seeks 271
     authorization. Absent sufficient and reliable data on commercial
     usage in that state, the Commission will consider the results of
     carrier-to-carrier testing, independent third-party testing, and
     internal testing in assessing the commercial readiness of a BOC's
     OSS. Finally, where, as here, the BOC proves that many of the OSS
     functions in the state for which it seeks 271 authorization are the
     same as in a state for which we have already granted such
     authorization, we will also look to performance in the latter state
     as additional evidence with which to make our determination.

#### Relevance of the *SWBT Texas Order*

106. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we conclude that SWBT
     has demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     OSS. We find that the evidence presented in this record shows that,
     under the first inquiry of our OSS analysis described above, SWBT
     provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions for
     pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and
     billing. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on detailed evidence
     provided by SWBT in this proceeding and, in certain instances, on
     our findings from the *SWBT Texas Order*. Under our second inquiry,
     we find that SWBT's OSS in both Kansas and Oklahoma are
     operationally ready to handle current demand and reasonably
     foreseeable future volumes. We base this determination on SWBT's
     actual performance in Kansas and Oklahoma and, in certain
     instances, on its performance in Texas.

107. SWBT relies heavily in this application on its argument that
     findings from the *SWBT Texas Order*, and the performance of its
     OSS in Texas, are relevant in this proceeding because it has
     deployed a region-wide OSS. Specifically, SWBT asserts that it
     provides wholesale services to competing carriers in Kansas,
     Oklahoma and Texas through one OSS, using common interfaces,
     systems, procedures and, to a large extent, common personnel. To
     support its claim, SWBT submits an attestation letter and a
     supplemental report from a third party consultant, Ernst &
     Young.[^303] Ernst & Young reviewed five OSS interfaces that
     provide competing LECs access to pre-ordering and ordering
     functions, and two OSS systems that are central to the ordering
     process.[^304] Ernst & Young concluded, on the basis of interviews,
     observing test orders, and examining programming code, that the
     several OSS interfaces and systems it reviewed are the same
     throughout SWBT's five-state operating region (including Kansas,
     Oklahoma and Texas).[^305] In addition to the Ernst & Young report,
     which addresses only a portion of SWBT's OSS, SWBT also provides
     substantial additional evidence, in affidavits filed with its
     application and its reply comments, that the interfaces, systems
     and processes it has in place in Kansas and Oklahoma are the same
     as those used in Texas.[^306] We also recognize that both the
     Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions concluded that SWBT uses a common
     OSS in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas.[^307]

108. We conclude that SWBT, through the Ernst & Young report and other
     aspects of its application, provides reliable evidence that the OSS
     systems in Texas are relevant and should be considered in our
     evaluation of SWBT's OSS in Kansas and Oklahoma. This showing thus
     enables us to rely, in certain instances, on findings relating to
     SWBT's OSS from the *SWBT Texas Order* in our analysis of SWBT's
     OSS in Kansas and Oklahoma. In addition, where low volumes render
     SWBT's performance data in Kansas and Oklahoma inconsistent and
     inconclusive, we find that data reflecting SWBT's performance in
     Texas can provide a particularly valuable indication of the
     commercial readiness of SWBT's OSS.

109. Under our first inquiry (the analysis of OSS functionality), our
     earlier conclusions about SWBT's OSS in Texas are relevant in this
     proceeding to the extent that SWBT uses the same systems, offering
     the same functionality, in Kansas and Oklahoma. For example, if we
     find (as we do below) that the interfaces used for pre-ordering are
     the same in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, then we may consider our
     findings in the *SWBT Texas Order* that these interfaces provide
     the full range of necessary functionality. With respect to our
     second inquiry (the analysis of commercial readiness), evidence
     that its OSS is the same across these three states allows us to
     broaden the scope of our review and look to evidence of SWBT's
     performance in Texas. While our analysis always starts with SWBT's
     performance in Kansas and Oklahoma, we find that SWBT's performance
     in Texas is relevant to the extent that SWBT demonstrates that it
     uses common systems and processes in all three states.

110. We agree with the Department of Justice that, because this is the
     first opportunity for the Commission to evaluate an application
     relying on this form of proof, we should establish the kind of
     evidentiary showing that will be expected of applicants in the
     future. By explaining clearly what types of evidence we have found
     to be persuasive in this instance, we are establishing a roadmap
     that can be followed by applicants in the future that seek to rely
     in part, as SWBT has, on evidence presented in another application.
     Moreover, we address in detail the Department of Justice's concerns
     about shortcomings in the evidence provided by SWBT in its initial
     application, and describe the additional evidence submitted by SWBT
     in response. As explained below, we find that SWBT has provided
     additional evidence in its reply comments and *ex parte* filings
     directly responsive to the Department of Justice's concerns, and
     find that this information adequately addresses these
     concerns.[^308] A future applicant seeking, as SWBT does, to
     establish the relevance of another state's OSS, should supply this
     type of evidence with its *initial application*.

111. The Department of Justice found the evidence provided by SWBT in
     its initial application to show that its OSS is the same in Texas,
     Kansas and Oklahoma, to be "ambiguous and incomplete" in two
     general respects. First, the Department of Justice found that SWBT
     had not been clear as to precisely what it means for OSS to be "the
     same" -- that is, whether this means the shared use of a single
     OSS, or the use of systems that are identical, but separate.[^309]
     We find that SWBT has provided a sufficiently detailed description
     of its OSS, which distinguishes between these two concepts of
     sameness. In most respects, SWBT demonstrates that competing
     carriers in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas share the use of a single
     OSS, not two or three separate OSS: a common set of processes,
     business rules, interfaces, systems and, in many instances, even
     personnel. Where SWBT has discernibly separate OSS, SWBT
     demonstrates that its OSS reasonably can be expected to behave the
     same way in all three states. As described below, for example, the
     use by SWBT of two different order processing systems (a SORD
     processor in Dallas for retail and wholesale orders in Texas, and a
     SORD processor in St. Louis for retail and wholesale orders in
     SWBT's other four in-region states) use the same programming code
     and, moreover, are designed to operate in an indistinguishable
     manner.

112. The Department of Justice further expressed concern that SWBT's
     application largely focused on certain mechanized aspects of its
     OSS, providing little evidence relating to the rest of the systems,
     processes and personnel that make up its OSS.[^310] We agree that,
     unless an applicant seeks to establish only that certain discrete
     components of its OSS are the same, a general assertion of OSS
     sameness should be supported by evidence relating to *all* aspects
     of its OSS -- including those OSS functions performed by BOC
     personnel.[^311] We also agree with the Department of Justice that
     SWBT's initial application, and its heavy reliance on the
     incomplete Ernst & Young report, did not provide a full picture of
     SWBT's Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas OSS. SWBT supplemented the record
     in this proceeding with a substantial amount of additional
     evidence, to support its assertions regarding its OSS.
     Specifically, in response to the Department of Justice's
     suggestions, SWBT provided additional information or clarification
     relating to its showing of sameness in four specific areas:
     functions performed by SWBT's personnel; the EDI ordering
     interface; the SORD processors in Dallas and St. Louis; and the
     scalability of its manual processing functions. While we address
     each of these four areas below, and encourage future applicants to
     provide this type of evidence in their initial applications, we do
     not suggest that these four items establish an exact script for
     future applicants to follow.[^312]

113. Of the issues identified by the Department of Justice as requiring
     additional evidence in this proceeding, the most complicated
     relates to the manual, or personnel, components of SWBT's OSS.
     Specifically, the Department of Justice indicated that SWBT should
     be required to show that the personnel involved in actual
     provisioning and maintenance/repair of CLEC orders in Kansas and
     Oklahoma will do their jobs in the same manner as those in Texas,
     and identified a range of evidence necessary to make such a
     predictive judgment. In response to the Department of Justice's
     evaluation, SWBT provided additional information regarding the
     aspects of its OSS that involve manual work. Factors we found
     particularly relevant to our analysis include the following. First,
     SWBT provided additional information about the range of functions
     relating to different states that are performed by the same
     workforce out of common, five-state centers. For example, SWBT uses
     a common ordering center to perform manual work on orders for all
     five states, and uses the same pool of employees to perform certain
     provisioning, maintenance/repair and billing functions across all
     five states as well. SWBT also provided additional details
     supporting its assertion that its personnel would do their jobs in
     the same manner in all three states, for work that necessarily is
     performed at the state level rather than at these regional centers.
     Specifically, SWBT explained that common centers coordinate field
     work activities in all five states; field personnel access the same
     systems and use the same procedures in all five states; personnel
     receive common training across all five states; and there is a
     common organizational structure across all five states. In the end,
     we find that it is reasonable to conclude that the existence of
     these similarities will result in similar performance.

114. We also find that SWBT has provided additional evidence sufficient
     to answer the Department of Justice's concerns about carriers'
     ability to develop and use SWBT's EDI ordering interface in Kansas
     and Oklahoma. Evidence that the key interfaces used by competing
     carriers are the same certainly is necessary for any showing that a
     BOC provides common OSS in different states. SWBT explains, in
     affidavits submitted with its Reply Comments, that carriers may
     construct and use one EDI interface to submit orders in all five
     states, without any state-specific modifications.[^313] SWBT also
     explains that precisely the same business rules for pre-ordering
     and ordering apply on a region-wide basis. Ernst & Young's report
     provides support for both of these points, indicating that the EDI
     interface uses the same computer code in each state, and that the
     business rules and user guides are the same.[^314] Also, the
     evidence in the record does not indicate that state-specific
     inputs, such as different product codes, require carriers to modify
     their interfaces or even their procedure for submitting
     orders.[^315] To the contrary, as SWBT explains, competing carriers
     input the product codes (most of which do not vary from state to
     state) into the same order fields on the order form.[^316] Finally,
     and perhaps most significantly, we find that SWBT's assertion that
     carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma have access to the same OSS
     interface as in Texas is not refuted by any carrier active in
     Kansas and Oklahoma. Indeed, SWBT notes that several carriers use
     EDI in all three states,[^317] and none have placed any evidence in
     the record to refute SWBT's assertion that EDI can be used
     region-wide.

115. Third, SWBT provided additional evidence, as urged by the
     Department of Justice, regarding the use of one order processor
     (its "SORD" processor) in St. Louis to handle resale and wholesale
     orders in Kansas and Oklahoma, and another in Dallas to handle
     resale and wholesale orders in Texas. SWBT explains that its two
     SORD processors are the same type of hardware running identical
     software. Ernst & Young's conclusion that these processors are the
     same, based on a review of the computer code used by these systems,
     supports this assertion. WorldCom correctly points out that SWBT
     would have to perform software updates and other changes that
     affect SORD simultaneously, or risk disrupting order processing for
     carriers operating both in Texas and in SWBT's other in-region
     states.[^318] We do not find that this creates a current problem,
     however, and note that a system change that results in
     discriminatory treatment of competing carriers would subject SWBT
     to the possibility of fines and an enforcement action.[^319]

116. Finally, we find that SWBT has adequately addressed the Department
     of Justice's concerns relating to the scalability of its manual
     processes. SWBT provided additional evidence in its reply
     affidavits describing its process for anticipating competing
     carriers' demands, and for hiring and training additional employees
     necessary to process increased volumes of transactions. Moreover,
     if SWBT is unable to keep pace with increased competing carrier
     demand in the future, and performance deteriorates, the company
     would open itself to the possibility of substantial liability under
     the state performance plans, and also to enforcement action by the
     Commission.

117. Several commenters also argue that SWBT provides only a partial
     showing that it uses a common OSS in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas
     and, thus, that it cannot rely on its Texas OSS in this proceeding.
     We find that this argument does not warrant a finding of checklist
     noncompliance for the same reasons, discussed above, that we found
     SWBT to have answered the Department of Justice's similar concerns.
     Specifically, we find no support in the record that OSS differences
     identified by WorldCom -- the use of different product codes and
     the existence of two SORD processors -- leads to different OSS
     performance from state to state or inhibits a carrier's opportunity
     to compete. We also find unpersuasive WorldCom's general
     speculation that other OSS differences are "likely" to exist.[^320]

118. We also disagree with WorldCom's contention that SWBT's application
     should fail because a third party did not examine SWBT's OSS in
     Kansas and Oklahoma. In prior section 271 orders, we have held that
     third party tests can provide critical information about the
     functionality and performance of a BOC's OSS. We have not, however,
     stated that checklist compliance cannot be proven without a third
     party test of an applicant's OSS. Indeed, we emphasize that our
     analysis of an applicant's OSS rests on a wide range of evidence,
     of which evidence from third party tests is but one part. The need
     to rely on a third party test is reduced in this instance because
     SWBT has established the relevance of its Texas OSS. We agree with
     the Department of Justice that, in this respect, SWBT's is a
     "sensible and efficient approach that can avoid the delay and
     expense of redundant testing."[^321]

#### Pre-Ordering

119. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS
     pre-ordering functions. Specifically, we find that SWBT
     demonstrates that: (i) SWBT offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop
     is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies; (ii) competing
     carriers successfully have built and are using
     application-to-application interfaces to perform pre-ordering
     functions and are able to integrate pre-ordering and ordering
     interfaces; and (iii) its pre-ordering systems provide reasonably
     prompt response times and are consistently available in a manner
     that affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.

120. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities
     that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information
     necessary to place an order.[^322] Most of the pre-ordering
     activities undertaken by a competing carrier to order resale
     services and UNEs from the incumbent are analogous to the
     activities a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own
     customers. For example, in this proceeding and in accordance with
     the *UNE Remand Order*, we require SWBT to provide competing
     carriers with access at the pre-ordering stage to the same detailed
     information SWBT makes available to itself concerning loop make-up
     information so that competitors may make fully informed judgments
     about whether to provision xDSL service to end users.[^323] In
     prior orders, we have emphasized that providing pre-ordering
     functionality through an application-to-application interface is
     essential in enabling carriers to conduct real-time processing and
     to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions in the same manner
     as the BOC.[^324]

##### Access to Loop Qualification Information

121. In this proceeding, we require a BOC to demonstrate for the first
     time that it provides access to loop qualification information in a
     manner consistent with the requirements of the *UNE Remand
     Order*.[^325] In particular, we require SWBT to provide access to
     loop qualification information as part of the pre-ordering
     functionality of OSS. In the *UNE Remand Order*, we required
     incumbent carriers to provide competitors with access to all of the
     same detailed information about the loop that is available to
     themselves, and in the same time frame, so that a requesting
     carrier could make an independent judgment at the pre-ordering
     stage about whether a requested end user loop is capable of
     supporting the advanced services equipment the requesting carrier
     intends to install. At a minimum, SWBT must provide carriers with
     the same underlying information that it has in any of its own
     databases or internal records.[^326] We explained that the relevant
     inquiry is not whether SWBT's retail arm has access to such
     underlying information but whether such information exists anywhere
     in SWBT's back office and can be accessed by any of SWBT's
     personnel. Moreover, SWBT may not "filter or digest" the underlying
     information and may not provide only information that is useful in
     the provision of a particular type of xDSL that SWBT offers. SWBT
     must provide loop qualification information based, for example, on
     an individual address or zip code of the end users in a particular
     wire center, NXX code or on any other basis that SWBT provides such
     information to itself. Moreover, SWBT must also provide access for
     competing carriers to the loop qualifying information that SWBT can
     itself access manually or electronically. Finally, SWBT must
     provide access to loop qualification information to competitors
     within the same time intervals it is provided to SWBT's retail
     operations or its advanced services affiliate, Advanced Solutions,
     Inc. (ASI).[^327] As we stated in the *UNE Remand Order*, however,
     "to the extent such information is not normally provided to the
     incumbent's retail personnel, but can be obtained by contacting
     back office personnel, it must be provided to requesting carriers
     within the same time frame that any incumbent personnel are able to
     obtain such information."[^328]

122. SWBT demonstrates that it offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop
     is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies. SWBT provides
     three ways for competing carriers to obtain loop make-up
     information. As we discuss in more detail below, competitors can
     request access to actual loop make-up information, theoretical, or
     design, loop make-up information,[^329] or can request that SWBT
     perform a manual search of its paper records to determine actual
     loop information. SWBT provides competitors access to actual loop
     make-up information contained in SWBT's back-end system Loop
     Facilities Assignment and Control System (LFACS) through the
     pre-ordering interfaces Verigate, Datagate and EDI/CORBA. Because
     LFACS was designed as a provisioning system, LFACS will provide the
     requesting carrier with actual information on the loop that SWBT or
     ASI, would use if it were going to provision the service
     requested.[^330] If, however, actual loop make-up information is
     not available in LFACS, SWBT will automatically provide
     theoretical, or design, loop makeup information. Specifically, SWBT
     will cause a query to be made into its LoopQual database for loop
     information based on a standard loop design for the longest loop in
     that end user's distribution area.[^331] The requesting carrier can
     then use this theoretical loop information to determine if it would
     be willing to provide xDSL service to that end-user. Additionally,
     a carrier may also request loop design information without having
     to first request an actual loop make-up query. Finally, carriers
     may also request that SWBT perform a manual search of SWBT's
     engineering records. Such a request may be submitted via Verigate
     or DataGate directly to SWBT's engineering operations personnel.
     Once SWBT engineers complete the manual search, they will update
     the information in LFACS and the competing carrier can either
     receive the results via email or review the results in LFACS.[^332]

123. We find that SWBT provides these mechanized and manual processes to
     competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory fashion and allows access
     to loop qualification functionality as a pre-ordering function in
     substantially the same manner as it does for itself. Where loop
     make-up information resides in an electronic format within SWBT's
     systems, SWBT enables competing carriers access to this
     information. SWBT uses the LFACS database to determine actual loop
     makeup information for its retail operations in exactly the same
     fashion that it is made available to competing carriers.[^333]
     LFACS will automatically return information on an available,
     non-loaded copper loop as if it were provisioning the requested
     service to the specific address.[^334] SWBT uses this same
     mechanized information for its own internal provisioning[^335] and
     ASI receives the exact same information via the exact same
     interfaces.[^336] In addition, when performing the manual lookup,
     SWBT performs the same process and returns the same type of
     information to the requestor regardless of whether it is for a
     competing carrier, or ASI, or itself.[^337]

124. Furthermore, SWBT allows competing carriers access to the same
     detailed information about the loop that is available in its
     records or databases. Specifically, in accordance with the
     requirements detailed in the *UNE Remand Order*,[^338] SWBT
     provides competing carriers access to information about: (1) the
     composition of the loop material, including both fiber and
     copper; (2) the existence, location and type of any electronic or
     other equipment on the loop, including but not limited to, digital
     loop carrier or other remote concentration devices,
     feeder/distribution interfaces, bridge taps, load coils, pair-gain
     devices, disturbers in the same or adjacent binder groups; (3) the
     loop length, including the length and location of each type of
     transmission media; (4) the wire gauge(s) of the loop; and (5) the
     electrical parameters of the loop, which may determine the
     suitability of the loop for various technologies.[^339]

125. SWBT's performance data reflect that it provides responses to
     competing carrier requests for loop information in substantially
     the same time and manner as for itself.[^340] Significantly,
     commenters have not asserted in this proceeding that SWBT returns
     loop make-up information in an untimely manner.

126. Commenters, however, have raised a number of claims alleging that
     SWBT's provision of loop make-up information is discriminatory and
     violates the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order*. For the
     reasons discussed below, we reject these claims. IP Communications
     claims that SWBT's actual loop makeup information database is
     inaccurate and thus harms competing carriers when they place orders
     for loops based on inaccurate information.[^341] As we noted above,
     when searching for loop qualification information, both competing
     carriers and SWBT utilize the LFACS system.[^342] Thus, any
     inaccuracies in SWBT's database, because they affect SWBT in the
     same fashion as competing carriers, are not discriminatory.

127. We also reject Allegiance's and McLeodUSA's assertion that SWBT's
     use of the green/yellow/red loop information and the theoretical
     loop design information violates the *UNE Remand Order*.[^343]
     These commenters contend that SWBT's use of this information denies
     competing carriers access to more detailed loop information and
     does not allow carriers to identify the physical attributes of the
     loop to make a more informed judgment about the possibility of
     offering service. We reject this contention because we find that
     this information is provided to competitors in addition to the
     actual loop makeup information. As noted above, the design loop
     information provided by SWBT is information on a theoretical loop
     based on a standard loop design for the longest loop in that end
     user's distribution area.[^344] SWBT's green/yellow/red designation
     is a graphical summary of the design loop information and an
     alternative way to provide the competitor with help in determining
     if the theoretical loop is adequate for providing advanced
     services.[^345] In addition to design loop information and
     green/yellow/red information, competing carriers can also access
     SWBT's actual loop makeup information, to the extent it is
     available and, upon request, SWBT will manually search its paper
     records to determine the actual makeup of the loop.[^346] We
     therefore find that SWBT's green/yellow/red designation merely
     supplements the other formats of loop makeup information SWBT
     provides.[^347] In accordance with the *UNE Remand Order*, we find
     that SWBT provides competing carriers access to the same "detailed
     information" about a loop that is available in its own databases or
     other internal records.[^348]

128. We also disagree with IP Communications' assertion that SWBT
     violates the *UNE Remand Order* by allowing competing carriers
     access only to "filtered" loop make-up information.[^349] According
     to IP, when SWBT returns actual and manual loop make-up information
     to the competing carrier, it provides information on only the
     "best" loop for the competing carrier, screening out information on
     other possibly available loops.[^350] IP asserts that there are
     numerous situations where a competing carrier may not want the loop
     SWBT provides and therefore needs to view loop information on all
     available loops.[^351] IP suggests that by failing to return
     information on all possible loops at an address, SWBT impermissibly
     "filters" the loop make-up information. SWBT acknowledges that it
     returns information on only one loop, but contends that the *UNE
     Remand Order* does not require more.[^352] We find that it is not
     self-evident from the *UNE Remand Order* that a BOC must provide
     loop make-up information on all loops that serve a particular
     address and thus we do not find SWBT to be in violation of that
     order. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to resolve this issue
     within the context of a section 271 proceeding. This issue is best
     resolved by a rulemaking proceeding in which all interested parties
     are able to comment. Therefore, we invite IP, or any other
     interested party, to file a petition for declaratory ruling or a
     petition for a rulemaking on this issue.[^353]

129. Finally, we reject IP's contention that SWBT does not comply with
     the *UNE Remand Order* because SWBT fails to return information on
     copper loops when end users are served by fiber (e.g., where SWBT
     has deployed fiber to remote terminals under its "Project Pronto").
     In such instances, IP states, SWBT returns information on
     characteristics of the loop served by the digital loop carrier that
     may be the "best" loop to a given end user but which is
     incompatible with the competing carrier's service.[^354] We agree
     that this practice, if true, would appear to violate the *UNE
     Remand Order*. In its reply comments, however, SWBT satisfactorily
     answers IP's assertion. SWBT explains that, in such an instance,
     its systems would automatically return loop make-up information on
     a copper loop running to the end user, if one exists or if a spare
     loop can be assigned, rather than make-up information on the fiber
     loop.[^355] Furthermore, SWBT clarifies that it instructs its
     engineers who perform manual look-ups to return information on an
     all-copper loop in those situations where the end user is served by
     both a digital loop carrier and the copper loop.[^356] We find that
     this satisfies the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order* and this
     checklist item.

##### Pre-Ordering Functionality and Integration

130. We also find that SWBT provides carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma
     nondiscriminatory access to all pre-ordering functions and enables
     these carriers to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions.
     SWBT offers requesting carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma access to
     the same application-to-application interface, DataGate, that it
     makes available to carriers in Texas.[^357] As in the Texas order,
     we find that the DataGate interface allows competing carriers to
     access the same pre-ordering functions that SWBT provides to
     itself.[^358] The DataGate interface allows competing carriers to
     perform a wide range of pre-ordering functions for both resale
     services and UNEs. Specifically, carriers are able to use DataGate
     to: (1) validate addresses; (2) retrieve customer service
     records; (3) select and reserve telephone numbers; (4) determine
     services and features available to a customer; (5) obtain due date
     availability; (6) access loop qualification information; (7) access
     DSL loop pre-qualification information; (8) determine theoretical
     DSL loop length; (9) view a customer's directory listing; (10)
     determine dispatch requirements; (11) retrieve local primary
     intraLATA carrier (LPIC) and primary interexchange carrier (PIC)
     list; (12) access the Common Language Location Identifier (CLLI)
     for the serving central office; and (13) verify channel facility
     assignment.[^359] We note that no commenter alleges that SWBT fails
     or refuses to offer any of these specific pre-ordering functions.

131. SWBT also offers access to these same pre-ordering functions
     through EDI and CORBA interfaces. EDI and CORBA, which operate
     according to industry standards, overlay SWBT's DataGate system and
     allow competing carriers to use industry standard interfaces to
     access DataGate's functionality.[^360] As we noted in the *SWBT
     Texas Order*, the availability of these interfaces is beneficial to
     competing carriers and we commend SWBT for continuing to develop
     and promote them.[^361] However, we do not consider the
     measurements associated with the timeliness and availability of
     EDI/CORBA in finding that SWBT meets the nondiscrimination
     requirements for OSS pre-ordering functions.[^362] Specifically, we
     rely only upon SWBT's performance measurements tracking the
     timeliness and availability of the DataGate and VeriGate
     pre-ordering interfaces.[^363]

132. SWBT demonstrates that competing carriers successfully have built
     their systems to connect with SWBT's region-wide DataGate
     interface. SWBT states that five region-wide carriers are utilizing
     DataGate for pre-ordering, two of which are certified to do
     business in Kansas or Oklahoma.[^364] Furthermore, a review of
     performance data submitted by SWBT confirms that carriers currently
     are using DataGate to perform many of the pre-ordering transactions
     listed above. Specifically, the data show that competing carriers
     are using DataGate to retrieve customer service records, validate
     addresses, select and reserve telephone numbers, determine services
     and features available to a customer, obtain due date availability,
     and retrieve local primary intraLATA carrier (LPIC) and primary
     interexchange carrier (PIC) list.[^365]

133. We find that SWBT has shown that it allows competing carriers to
     integrate successfully pre-ordering information obtained from the
     DataGate interface with SWBT's EDI ordering functions.[^366] We
     examined this issue closely in the Texas proceeding and found that
     the evidence in the record---including statements from competing
     carriers and the conclusions of a third party tester---demonstrated
     that these functions could be successfully integrated.[^367] We
     reach the same conclusion in this proceeding, based on SWBT's
     demonstration that competing carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma are
     utilizing the same interfaces. We also note that the Oklahoma
     Commission found that DataGate could be integrated with SWBT's EDI
     ordering function.[^368] Furthermore, commenters have not argued
     that competing carriers are unable to integrate DataGate with EDI
     ordering functions. Moreover, one of the competing carriers that
     integrated pre-ordering and ordering in Texas is also operating in
     Kansas and Oklahoma and has not complained of difficulties in
     placing orders in these states.[^369]

##### Interface Response Times and Availability

134. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides requesting carriers
     access to pre-ordering functionality in a manner that allows an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. We have
     held previously that an interface that provides responses in a
     prompt timeframe and is stable and reliable, is necessary for
     competing carriers to market their services and serve their
     customers as efficiently and at the same level of quality as SWBT
     serves its own customers.[^370] SWBT's performance data demonstrate
     that SWBT's Datagate interface has met or exceeded the relevant
     benchmarks, with only a few scattered disparities, for interface
     response time and availability in each of the last four months
     during the same period of time that competing carrier pre-order
     transactions have increased.[^371] We conclude that these
     performance disparities had a negligible competitive impact given
     that SWBT missed the relevant benchmarks by small margins.
     Significantly, commenters have not argued that SWBT fails to
     provide timely responses to pre-ordering inquiries or that its
     DataGate interface is unreliable.[^372] We therefore conclude that
     SWBT's interfaces are available in a stable and consistent manner
     and afford an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.

#### Ordering

135. In this section, we address SWBT's ability to provide competing
     carriers with access to the OSS functions necessary for placing
     wholesale orders. We find that SWBT demonstrates, with performance
     data and other evidence, that it provides competing carriers with
     access to OSS ordering functions, on a timely and consistent basis,
     and in a manner that allows these carriers a meaningful opportunity
     to compete.[^373] As in prior section 271 orders, we look primarily
     at the applicant's ability to return order confirmation notices,
     order reject notices, order completion notices and jeopardies, and
     its order flow-through rate.[^374] Significantly, SWBT has
     demonstrated that the interfaces, systems, processes and personnel
     that make up its ordering OSS in Kansas and Oklahoma are
     essentially the same as those used to process wholesale orders in
     Texas.[^375] Our findings from the *SWBT Texas Order* with respect
     to the functionality of SWBT's ordering OSS, for those aspects that
     are common to Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma, thus are relevant to our
     review here. Furthermore, as explained above, data reflecting the
     performance of SWBT's ordering OSS in Texas also is relevant to our
     analysis here.

136. We emphasize that we generally look at the totality of the
     circumstances in analyzing the OSS ordering functions. Performance
     disparity in one measurement or sub-measurement is unlikely to
     result in a finding of checklist noncompliance, unless the
     disparity is dramatic, or absent additional evidence of competitive
     impact. We review each individual measurement as one part of a
     larger picture that informs our determination of checklist
     compliance or non-compliance.

##### Order Confirmation Notices

137. In prior section 271 orders, we have held that order confirmation
     notices are important elements of the ordering process, and data
     demonstrating that they are provided in a timely manner is a key
     consideration for assessing whether competitors are allowed a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^376] In this proceeding, we use
     the same analysis and look to the same performance measurements as
     in the Texas proceeding where we found that SWBT provides competing
     carriers timely order confirmation notices. Based on this review,
     we find that SWBT provides order confirmation notices to
     competitors in a way that allows them a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. In making this determination, we look to the data that
     indicate that SWBT provides competing carriers access to
     confirmation notices for orders for resale, UNE-P, unbundled loop,
     xDSL, and number port.

138. SWBT's data indicate that it returns timely order confirmation
     notices to competing carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma that use
     mechanized interfaces (EDI and LEX) to submit orders or that submit
     orders for "manual" processing (i.e. via fax). The data demonstrate
     that SWBT met the relevant performance benchmark for each service
     type in both states from July to October 2000 with scattered
     exceptions.[^377] With respect to these few exceptions, we
     emphasize that we look at the totality of the circumstances and
     generally do not view individual performance disparities,
     particularly if they are isolated and slight, as they are here, as
     wholly dispositive as to whether SWBT has satisfied its checklist
     obligations. The performance disparities relate to SWBT's
     performance in returning manual order confirmation notices for xDSL
     capable loop orders and, in Kansas, in returning these manual
     notices for "number port" orders.[^378] Each of these disparities
     was minimal.[^379] Absent evidence of discrimination or competitive
     harm, we find that SWBT's performance appears to have little
     competitive impact.

139. We also recognize that performance data for both mechanical and
     manual order confirmation notices may be inconsistent because order
     volumes in Kansas and Oklahoma are low. As we stated above, where
     low volumes render SWBT's performance data in Kansas and Oklahoma
     inconsistent and inconclusive, data reflecting SWBT's performance
     in Texas can provide a valuable indication of the commercial
     readiness of SWBT's OSS. As a result, we look to SWBT's performance
     in Texas, where SWBT uses the same systems and processes as in
     Kansas and Oklahoma, to augment our review.[^380] In sum, SWBT
     generally satisfied the relevant benchmark in Texas for each
     sub-category of service and for each ordering interface.[^381]
     Where SWBT did not satisfy the relevant benchmark in each month,
     any disparity appears to be competitively insignificant.[^382] We
     therefore reject McLeodUSA's contention that SWBT's OSS denies
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete because its order
     confirmation performance in Texas has deteriorated.[^383] We find
     that SWBT's performance in returning timely order confirmation
     notices provides efficient competitors with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

140. Based on SWBT's Texas performance, and the factors discussed in the
     preceding paragraph, we also are not persuaded by Allegiance's
     contention that SWBT's xDSL disparity denies competitors a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^384] Furthermore, we reject
     Allegiance's contention that SWBT is not meeting performance
     standards for loop ordering and provisioning because it did not
     satisfy a benchmark in "at least one month" in four measurements
     involving order confirmation returns for LEX and manual
     orders.[^385] As we stated above, we do not view each particular
     measurement as wholly dispositive of checklist compliance, but will
     look to the totality of the circumstances in making a
     determination. Here, these performance discrepancies occur in
     isolated months and suggest only an insignificant competitive
     impact. We therefore decline to find checklist noncompliance.

##### Order Rejection Notices

141. We conclude that SWBT provides competing carriers with timely order
     rejection notices in a manner that allows them a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. SWBT uses the same systems and procedures
     in Kansas and Oklahoma as it does in Texas to provide mechanically
     generated rejection notices (returned over the same interface
     competing carriers use to submit the order) and manually generated
     rejection notices (returned over a separate graphical user
     interface).[^386] Here, SWBT's performance data demonstrate that it
     returns order rejection notices in a timely manner over both EDI
     and LEX.[^387]

142. SWBT's performance data also demonstrate that it returns manually
     generated rejection notices in a timely fashion. Although SWBT has
     not satisfied the six-hour benchmark in two of the last four months
     in both states, SWBT has returned manual rejection notices, on
     average, between three and nine hours in Kansas and between three
     and ten hours in Oklahoma over the last four months.[^388] In the
     *SWBT Texas Order*, we found that similar performance satisfied the
     Commission's nondiscrimination standard.[^389] Absent any clear
     evidence of discrimination or competitive harm, we find that this
     performance also demonstrates compliance with our requirements. We
     also note that here, as it was in the *SWBT Texas Order*, SWBT's
     performance is improving.[^390] We disagree with commenters who
     claim that SWBT's performance in handling manual rejections
     demonstrates that SWBT fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     its OSS.[^391] Additionally, because SWBT's ordering system is the
     same throughout the five-state region and because of the low order
     volumes in both Oklahoma and Kansas, we look to SWBT's current
     performance in Texas and note that it satisfies the requisite
     benchmark.[^392]

143. In addition, we find unpersuasive Sprint's claim that SWBT rejects
     too many competing carrier orders.[^393] This Commission has not,
     to date, engaged in a parity or direct benchmark analysis of a
     carrier's overall reject rate. We have, however, indicated that we
     will not hold a BOC accountable for rejects that occur for reasons
     within a competing carrier's control.[^394] As in the Texas and New
     York proceedings, order rejections in this instance vary widely by
     individual carrier, from 12.5 percent to 57.1 percent sent over EDI
     during September in Kansas alone.[^395] We find that such a wide
     variation in the individual reject rates suggests that the
     disparate reject rate may be a function of a competing carrier's
     experience using the system, rather than the system itself. In
     light of this variation, we conclude that the overall reject rates
     faced by competing carriers in this instance do not appear to
     indicate flaws in SWBT's OSS systems or processes. Furthermore, no
     commenter offers any explanation as to why they may be experiencing
     higher reject rates in Kansas or Oklahoma than in Texas. We thus
     conclude that SWBT provides competing carriers with timely order
     rejection notices in a manner that allows them a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^396]

##### Order Flow-Through Rate

144. We find that competing carrier orders flow through SWBT's systems
     in substantially the same time and manner as they flow through for
     SWBT's orders.[^397] In so finding, we employ the same review and
     look to the same performance measurements as we did in the Texas
     proceeding. Based on this review, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that its systems are capable of achieving high overall
     levels of order flow-through.[^398]

145. Despite some disparities in SWBT's performance, we are able to
     conclude that SWBT flows-through competing carriers' orders in
     substantially the same time and manner as its own orders. We reject
     Sprint's assertion that SWBT's EDI flow through performance in
     Kansas denies nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.[^399] While the
     EDI flow-through rate in Kansas has been as low as 61.1 percent in
     August, it has also been as high as 96.8 percent in July. This
     inconsistency may be attributable to the low number of orders
     submitted over EDI, which was as low as 33 in August, as well as
     the carriers' inexperience using the EDI interface. Evidence
     submitted by SWBT demonstrates that the two largest competing
     carriers in Kansas (in terms of the volume of orders submitted via
     EDI) achieved high flow-through rates.[^400] Additionally, since
     the Ernst & Young report found that SWBT's pre-ordering and
     ordering interfaces were the same region-wide, we look to Texas to
     address the inconsistent performance results. SWBT's Texas
     performance indicates that competitors' orders flowed through
     between 91.8 and 94.4 percent of EDI orders in the last four months
     and, moreover, achieved better than parity results in each
     month.[^401]

146. We also reject commenters' assertion that SWBT discriminates
     against competing carriers because its LEX flow-through rate in
     Oklahoma is lower than its analogous retail flow-through
     rate.[^402] The record in this proceeding does not reflect that
     SWBT's LEX flow-through fails to provide competitors with
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.[^403] SWBT points out that
     competing carriers' individual flow through rates vary, and that
     competing carriers that place a larger number of orders in Oklahoma
     attain better flow-through rates.[^404] We have consistently stated
     that a BOC is not accountable for orders that are rejected or fail
     to flow through due to competing carriers' mistakes.[^405]
     Moreover, as in the *SWBT Texas Order*, we place more weight on EDI
     flow-through results than on the LEX flow-through results because
     EDI is the industry standard application-to-application
     interface.[^406] We conclude that the LEX flow-through rate in
     Oklahoma indicates that competing carriers' orders are handled in a
     nondiscriminatory manner and, absent evidence of significant
     competitive impact, this satisfies our inquiry on this matter.

##### Jeopardy Notices

147. We find that SWBT provides "jeopardy" notices to competing carriers
     in a nondiscriminatory manner. In analyzing SWBT's performance in
     returning timely jeopardy notices, we review the same systems and
     procedures as in the Texas proceeding.[^407] SWBT provides
     mechanized jeopardy notifications to competing carriers via LEX or
     EDI if it determines, after a service appointment is scheduled,
     that the necessary facilities are unavailable.[^408] We conclude
     that SWBT provides "no facilities" jeopardy notices to competing
     carriers and to its own operations in substantially the same time
     and manner. SWBT provides these jeopardy notices to competitors and
     to itself in the same manner using the same databases.[^409]

148. SWBT also provides a second type of electronic jeopardy
     notification over a web-based GUI. SWBT explains that these GUI
     jeopardies include, for example, instances where a dispatch
     technician is unable to access an end user's property or discovers
     that additional driving instructions are needed.[^410] We also
     conclude that SWBT's process for returning these "other" jeopardy
     notifications provides efficient carriers with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. SWBT began reporting in October the
     percentage of orders that receive SWBT caused jeopardy notices and
     the average amount of time SWBT takes to return them. [^411] We
     note that, based on the October data, SWBT's performance appears to
     indicate that it is returning jeopardy notifications quickly and on
     a small percentage of orders. [^412]

149. WorldCom argues again, as it did in the Texas 271 that flaws in
     SWBT's jeopardy process in Texas -- specifically, that too many
     orders receive jeopardies and that jeopardies are sent too late in
     the process -- deny carriers a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^413] We conclude again that the record in this proceeding
     does not support its claim that an unreasonably high number of
     jeopardy notifications are returned to competing carriers. SWBT
     provides data indicating that less than four percent of all
     competing carriers' orders are placed into jeopardy status.[^414]
     While WorldCom claims that a slightly higher percentage of its
     order receive jeopardy notifications, we note that this number has
     declined recently.[^415] Furthermore, as we noted in the *SWBT
     Texas Order*, SWBT is held accountable through its performance
     measurements for instances where SWBT-caused jeopardy situations
     result in missed due dates. As discussed below, SWBT misses fewer
     due dates for competing LECs than it does for its own retail
     operations, across almost all categories of service. Accordingly,
     the record in this proceeding indicates that SWBT's performance
     with respect to jeopardy notices, in the context of SWBT's overall
     acceptable performance for ordering and provisioning, does not
     warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance.

##### Order Completion Notices

150. SWBT returns service order completion notices (SOCs) to competing
     carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma in the same manner and following
     the same procedures as it does in Texas and we thus analyze the
     same systems that we found to be nondiscriminatory in the Texas
     proceeding.[^416] We conclude that SWBT provides order completion
     notices to competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner. Since
     there is no equivalent retail process, SWBT's performance is
     measured against a benchmark.[^417] Here, we base our finding that
     SWBT provides sufficient order completion notices on SWBT's
     timeliness in providing service order completion notices to
     competing carriers. The data indicate that SWBT generally meets the
     benchmark for orders submitted via the electronic interfaces (LEX
     and EDI).[^418] While SWBT's performance on notices returned via
     EDI in Kansas has been inconsistent in recent months, we believe
     this performance is attributable to the low volumes of orders, and
     therefore we look to Texas performance. In Texas, over the past
     four months, SWBT consistently satisfied the benchmark for both EDI
     and LEX.[^419] We therefore that SWBT provides competing carriers
     with a meaningful opportunity to compete by returning timely order
     completion notices.

151. We reject WorldCom's complaint that SWBT discriminates against
     competitors by returning late service order confirmation notices
     for orders placed in Texas. WorldCom asserts that orders drop out
     of SWBT's OSS, which require manual interventions by SWBT's
     personnel. As a result, the return of SOCs is significantly slowed
     and competitors cannot begin billing end users. WorldCom admits,
     however, that SWBT has, in recent months, significantly reduced the
     number of late SOCs returned to competitors and, when WorldCom
     transmits a list of missing SOCs to SWBT, the SOCs are returned to
     WorldCom quickly.[^420] We also find unpersuasive WorldCom's
     speculative complaint that SWBT's solution to this problem of
     assigning additional manual resources jeopardizes SOC return in the
     future when those manual resources are not present.[^421] We note
     that SWBT's performance in returning timely SOCs for EDI orders is
     adequate.[^422] If we find that WorldCom is correct and SWBT's
     solution to this former problem is a staffing solution, we expect
     SWBT to continue to assign resources in a fashion that provides
     competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete.

##### Other Issues

152. We also find that SWBT makes available sufficiently detailed
     interface design specifications for EDI that enable competing
     carriers to modify or design their systems in a manner that will
     allow them to communicate with SWBT's systems and interfaces. In
     fact, several competing carriers have constructed and are using EDI
     interfaces throughout SWBT's region.[^423] In the *SWBT Texas
     Order,* we found that sixteen carriers were in production using
     SWBT's EDI interface gateway, and additional carriers were testing
     the EDI requirements.[^424] Now, SWBT has twenty-nine carriers
     utilizing its EDI interface, each of which could place an order on
     the same EDI gateway to submit a local service request in Kansas,
     Oklahoma or Texas.[^425] We thus conclude that SWBT makes available
     access to its EDI ordering systems and procedures to allow a
     competing carrier a meaningful opportunity to compete.

153. *Three-Order Process.* Finally, WorldCom asserts that SWBT's so
     called "three-order process," whereby SWBT breaks UNE-P conversion
     orders into three separate orders for processing purposes, inhibits
     WorldCom's ability to provide service. WorldCom first maintains
     that SWBT provides incorrect "C" orders (i.e., orders designed to
     provision the UNE and establish the billing format) to WorldCom
     when returning order confirmation and order completion
     notices.[^426] Although SWBT admits that this results in an end
     user being disconnected from the competing LEC, the parties
     determined that the problem arose in only three instances when an
     end user attempted to switch service from one competing LEC to
     another.[^427] While we agree that this issue has the potential to
     impact numerous competitors' end users, we note that SWBT has
     deployed an interim solution, is working through the change
     management process to resolve the issue permanently and, since the
     problem affected so few end users, we thus find it does not warrant
     a finding of checklist noncompliance.[^428] We note that, while we
     are encouraged by SWBT's effort, we expect its performance to
     continue at its current level. We also reject WorldCom's and
     McLeodUSA's complaint that the three-order process results in a
     loss of dial tone for their end users.[^429] Working with both
     WorldCom and McLeodUSA, SWBT determined that both they were
     mistaken in their belief that the problem arose from the
     three-order process.[^430] For example, WorldCom confirms that,
     after consulting with SWBT on this issue, 85 percent of the trouble
     tickets were problematic for reasons unrelated to the three-order
     process.[^431] Additionally, SWBT asserts that McLeodUSA's problem
     order was not attributable to the three-order process but rather a
     clerical error.[^432]

#### Provisioning

154. Consistent with our approach in prior section 271 orders, we
     examine the procedures SWBT follows when provisioning competitors'
     orders, its performance with respect to provisioning timeliness and
     its provisioning quality.[^433] Based on the evidence in the
     record, we conclude that SWBT provisions competing carriers' orders
     for resale and UNE-P services in substantially the same time and
     manner as it provisions orders for its own retail customers.[^434]

155. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory
     access to its provisioning processes. In the *SWBT Texas Order*, we
     found that SWBT's pre-ordering and ordering systems provided
     competing carriers with equivalent access to information on
     available service installation dates.[^435] SWBT assigns due dates
     for service orders at the LSC and transmits the orders for
     provisioning to the LOC in a nondiscriminatory fashion.[^436]
     SWBT's LSC uses the same due date selection and provisioning flows
     for competitor's orders as SWBT's retail service representatives
     use for provisioning service to SWBT's retail customers. For
     example, due dates for residential and simple business orders are
     determined by accessing SWBT's proprietary pre-ordering and
     ordering interface EASE, and due dates are assigned by the LSC
     depending on work load demand on installation forces.[^437] In the
     event that an order requires fieldwork, the next available date
     will be assigned using the same procedures regardless of whether
     SWBT's retail or wholesale office requests the date.[^438]
     Moreover, no competitor contends in this proceeding that SWBT does
     not allow nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning due date
     systems or even challenges its provisioning procedures.

##### Resale Orders

156. We conclude that SWBT provisions orders for resale "POTS" and
     "specials" to competitors in substantially the same time that it
     provisions equivalent orders to itself.[^439] As in our previous
     section 271 orders, we review SWBT's performance data to determine
     whether it provisions resale service at parity with its analogous
     retail services.[^440] SWBT demonstrates that it misses fewer
     competitors' customer appointments for installing resale POTS and
     special services, and provisions such services within equivalent
     average intervals, as compared to appointments and service for its
     own retail customers.[^441] Specifically, the data indicate that
     SWBT generally satisfied the parity standards for resale
     residential and most business POTS orders from July through October
     2000 in both Kansas and Oklahoma, narrowly missing the parity mark
     for one sub-measurement.[^442] Moreover, the Texas performance data
     show that SWBT has generally satisfied the parity standard for
     these measurements as well.[^443] Considering that the disparities
     were minimal and that no commenter complained about SWBT's
     performance, we conclude that this does not warrant a finding of
     checklist noncompliance.

157. SWBT also demonstrates that the quality of resale installations
     provided to competitors' customers was the same as, or better than,
     similar work performed for its own retail customers. The data
     demonstrate that SWBT's performance generally satisfied the parity
     standard for each type of resale POTS and specials service in both
     Kansas and Oklahoma from July through October.[^444] We find,
     however, that the disparities do not appear to be competitively
     significant in that the numbers of orders provisioned were small or
     that the actual disparities were slight.[^445] Additionally, SWBT's
     performance in Texas demonstrates that it generally satisfies the
     parity standard.[^446] Considering the foregoing and that no
     commenter complained about these issues, we find that SWBT's
     performance supports a finding of checklist compliance.

##### UNE-P Orders

158. Based on a review of corresponding performance measurements for
     UNE-P service, we conclude that SWBT also provisions competing
     carrier orders for these network combinations in the same time as
     it provisions equivalent retail services and at the same level of
     quality (*i.e.,* with a comparably low level of troubles reported
     within the first ten days after installation). SWBT's performance
     data demonstrate that, for the last four months in both states,
     SWBT provisioned UNE-P orders in substantially the same time that
     it provisioned similar orders for itself.[^447] SWBT's data also
     indicate that, over the last four months, it provisioned UNE-P
     orders in substantially the same manner (i.e. quality) as it
     provisioned comparable retail orders for itself in Kansas and
     Oklahoma.[^448] While there are disparities with respect to the
     sub-measurements relating to UNE-P provisioning, these disparities
     are minimal.[^449] Taken as a whole, we find this performance to be
     acceptable. In addition, performance data from Texas demonstrate
     that SWBT satisfied the parity measurement.[^450] Since the
     disparity in these sub-measurements is slight and no commenter
     complained about this issue, we find that SWBT's performance
     supports a finding of checklist compliance, particularly in light
     of SWBT's performance in Texas.

##### Other Issues

159. *Number Portability and Loop Cutover Coordination.* We reject
     allegations made by carriers that SWBT has problems coordinating
     number portability with loop cutovers.[^451] KMC, for example,
     maintains that, in Kansas, SWBT is either incapable or unwilling to
     coordinate loop cutovers in a manner that provides accurate
     provisioning dates and prevents end users from losing
     service.[^452] Similarly, Sprint contends that SWBT fails to
     process timely LNP cancellation notices for xDSL loops, resulting
     in service outages for Sprint's customers.[^453] Based upon our
     review of the record, we do not find that these allegations reflect
     a systemic failure that would warrant checklist
     noncompliance.[^454]

160. We also reject Sprint's contention that, in Kansas, SWBT has not
     demonstrated that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to
     ported loops.[^455] While Sprint maintains that SWBT has not met
     the benchmark with regard to premature disconnects for local number
     portability orders in June,[^456] performance information during
     the period pertinent to this application indicate that these
     problems have been addressed and no longer appear to be an
     issue.[^457] SWBT has also generally met the benchmark for the time
     it applies the ten-digit trigger prior to the local number
     portability due date. In July, the ten-digit trigger was
     implemented on only 73.91% of the orders.[^458] SWBT has, however,
     met the benchmark in August, September and October.[^459] In light
     of its improving performance in Kansas, we find that SWBT's
     performance indicates that it is providing nondiscriminatory access
     to ported loops. We are further encouraged that SWBT's performance
     in Kansas and Oklahoma on these measurements is in conformance with
     its performance in Texas.

#### Maintenance and Repair 

161. *Functionality.* We conclude that SWBT offers maintenance and
     repair interfaces and systems that enable a requesting carrier to
     access all the same functions that are available to SWBT's retail
     representatives. SWBT provides competing carriers with several
     options for requesting maintenance and reporting troubles.
     Competing carriers may electronically access SWBT's maintenance and
     repair functions for UNE-Loop, UNE-P, and resale through the GUI
     Toolbar Trouble Administration interface (Toolbar) or the
     application-to-application Electronic Bonding Trouble
     Administration interface (EBTA).[^460] Both the EBTA and Toolbar
     interfaces flow directly into SWBT's back-end OSS systems and
     enable competing carriers to perform the same functions, in the
     same manner, as SWBT's retail operations.[^461] We note that SWBT
     supports the same maintenance and repair functions in Kansas and
     Oklahoma as it provides carriers in Texas and that we found these
     functions to be satisfactory in the *SWBT Texas Order*.[^462] Based
     on this showing, and because no carrier disputes SWBT's case in
     this respect, we find once again that SWBT provides carriers with
     access to necessary maintenance and repair functions.

162. *Interface Response Times, Time to Restore and Quality of Work
     Performed*. We conclude that SWBT's maintenance and repair systems
     and processes are operationally ready and treat competing carriers
     in a nondiscriminatory manner. In previous section 271
     applications, we reviewed performance data reflecting the
     timeliness of the BOC's interfaces used for maintenance and repair
     functions, the timeliness of its repair work, and the quality of
     the repair work. SWBT's performance data indicates satisfactory
     performance in each of these areas. First, because SWBT has shown
     that carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma have access to the same
     Toolbar Trouble Administration interface as carriers in Texas, we
     find, as we did in the *SWBT Texas Order*, that SWBT is able to
     respond to competing carrier requests for maintenance and repair
     inquiries in substantially the same time as for itself.[^463]
     Second, the performance data show that SWBT repairs trouble reports
     for competing LECs' customers in substantially the same time as it
     repairs its own retail customers' troubles,[^464] and meets
     substantially the same percentage of repair commitments for
     troubles on competing carriers' lines as it does for comparable
     retail repair commitments.[^465] Third, the data reveal that
     competing carriers' customers that receive service via resale or
     UNE-P generally reported the same or a lower rate of trouble
     reports,[^466] and the same rate of repeat trouble reports,[^467]
     as SWBT's retail customers. Performance data in Texas confirm our
     findings that SWBT is providing adequate access to functions
     associated with SWBT's repair and maintenance systems in Kansas and
     Oklahoma.[^468] Finally, we note that no commenter has provided
     evidence to suggest that SWBT's systems and processes are
     inadequate in this area.

#### Billing

163. We conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     billing functions, which is necessary to enable competing carriers
     to provide accurate and timely bills to their customers.[^469] We
     base our conclusion on an assessment of SWBT's billing processes
     and systems, and its performance data. As we have required in prior
     section 271 orders, SWBT must demonstrate that it provides
     competing carriers with complete and accurate reports on the
     service usage of competing carriers' customers in substantially the
     same time and manner that SWBT provides such information to itself,
     and wholesale bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^470] SWBT explains that it
     provides competing carriers with billing information through the
     Usage Extract process and carrier wholesale bills, using the same
     processes and systems as it uses in Texas.[^471] The Usage Extract
     itemizes usage for records for competing carrier customers, while
     carrier bills serve as a monthly invoice that incorporates charges
     for all of the products and services provided to a competing
     carrier by SWBT. Similar mechanisms are used to provide billing
     information to SWBT's retail operations. As we concluded in the
     *SWBT Texas Order*, then, SWBT provides competing carriers
     nondiscriminatory access to the functionality of its billing
     systems.

164. We find that the performance standards and measurements established
     by the Texas Commission, and adopted by the Kansas and Oklahoma
     Commissions, provide a valuable measure of SWBT's ability to
     provide competing carriers with usage data in substantially the
     same time and manner that SWBT provides such information to itself.
     We note that SWBT reports performance data relating to the
     timeliness and accuracy of its usage data on a company-wide basis,
     rather than a state-specific basis. Because SWBT has shown that its
     systems and processes used for providing billing information to
     competing carriers are essentially the same on a company-wide
     basis, and because no carrier has challenged SWBT's assertion or
     shown that it receives different treatment in Oklahoma or Kansas
     than in other SWBT states, we find that this region-wide data is
     relevant in this proceeding.[^472] These performance data indicate
     that, during the period from July 2000 to October 2000, SWBT's
     actual commercial performance consistently satisfied the standards
     for usage data timeliness and accuracy.[^473]

165. We also find, as we did in the *SWBT Texas Order*, that SWBT's
     systems provide competing carriers with wholesale bills in a manner
     that enables them a meaningful opportunity to compete. SWBT's
     performance data provide evidence regarding the timeliness of only
     a small fraction of carriers' bills (*i.e.,* for those carriers who
     choose to receive their bills via EDI).[^474] SWBT explains,
     however, that its systems are designed to provide carrier bills in
     a prompt manner, whether delivered electronically or by
     paper.[^475] Because no carrier has offered evidence undermining
     this showing, we conclude that SWBT has carried its burden of
     demonstrating that it does not discriminate against competing
     carriers in the provision of wholesale bills.

#### Change Management Process

166. As explained in our prior orders, competing carriers need
     information about, and specifications for, an incumbent's systems
     and interfaces in order to develop and modify their systems and
     procedures to access the incumbent's OSS functions.[^476] Thus, in
     order to demonstrate that it is providing nondiscriminatory access
     to its OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate that it "has deployed the
     necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
     each of the necessary OSS functions and . . . is adequately
     assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use
     all of the OSS functions available to them."[^477] As part of this
     demonstration, the Commission has given substantial consideration
     to the existence of an adequate change management process and
     evidence that the BOC has adhered to this process over time.[^478]
     We conclude that SWBT demonstrates it provides the documentation
     and support necessary to provide competing carriers
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS by showing that it has an
     adequate change management process in its five-state region, which
     includes Kansas and Oklahoma. The record also reflects that SWBT
     has adhered to its change management process over time. Indeed, no
     commenter in this proceeding has complained about SWBT's change
     management process. All of this contributes to our finding that
     SWBT provides access to its OSS in a manner that allows an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.

167. *Adequacy of SWBT's Change Management Plan*. SWBT employs a
     region-wide change management plan that is identical in each of its
     five in-region states. Accordingly, the change management process
     used in Kansas and Oklahoma has the same characteristics and
     benefits as the process used by SWBT in Texas. We are thus able to
     conclude, for the same reasons that we did in the *SWBT Texas
     Order*, that SWBT's change management plan is adequate to achieve
     the ends described above.[^479] Moreover, the SWBT change
     management plan now includes an improvement that was not available
     during the Texas 271 proceeding. Specifically, in the *SWBT Texas
     Order* we noted that, although it was not currently deploying such
     functionality, we were encouraged by SWBT's plan to implement a
     process known as "versioning."[^480] Under versioning, SWBT
     continues to support an existing version of software for EDI/CORBA
     pre-ordering and EDI ordering interfaces even after releasing a
     subsequent version of the software.[^481] We approve of SWBT's
     subsequent implementation and find that versioning enhances SWBT's
     change management plan by providing significant additional
     assurance that changes will not disrupt competing carriers' use of
     SWBT's OSS.

168. We also conclude, as we did in the *SWBT Texas Order*, that SWBT
     provides competing carriers access to a stable testing environment
     that allows carriers to certify that their OSS will interact
     effectively with SWBT's OSS. The record demonstrates, with even
     more persuasive evidence than we relied on in the Texas order, that
     SWBT's testing environment available to competing LECs in Kansas
     and Oklahoma is stable, adequately mirrors the production
     environment, affords competing carriers an opportunity to test
     representative pre-ordering and ordering transactions, and offers
     the extended testing periods that competing carriers need for EDI
     implementation and new release testing. Since the time that SWBT
     filed its Texas application, thirteen additional carriers have
     utilized SWBT's testing environment to achieve production status on
     SWBT's EDI ordering gateway, with eight additional competing
     carriers currently in the process of testing and implementing EDI.
     Moreover, SWBT has released three different EDI/LSR releases and
     two LEX releases, and nine competing carriers were able to use the
     testing environment to sample these releases.[^482]

169. *Compliance With Its Change Management Process*. SWBT has
     demonstrated a pattern of compliance with its documented change
     management processes and procedures, providing competing carriers
     with change management notification and documentation in a manner
     sufficiently timely to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. No party disputes this contention. Indeed,
     there is nothing in the record to suggest that parties are
     dissatisfied with SWBT's performance relating to three region-wide
     EDI/LSR releases. SWBT has recently implemented a performance
     measure to track the number of "late" or supplemental notices it
     sends out after the deadline for release specifications. Although
     the measurement indicates that over half of the change
     announcements SWBT has sent to competing carriers have been "late,"
     we find that these results do not suggest that SWBT is failing to
     follow the change process, because SWBT explains that nearly all of
     the instances recorded in these measurements are merely
     supplemental information to notices that were provided in a timely
     manner. Therefore, we find this disparity to be competitively
     insignificant.[^483]

170. *Training, Technical Assistance and Help Desk Support.* As we did
     in the *SWBT Texas Order*, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that
     it provides the technical assistance and help desk support
     necessary to give competing carriers nondiscriminatory access to
     its OSS.[^484] The same organizations that we found performed these
     functions in the Texas proceeding also perform these functions for
     competing carriers operating in Kansas and Oklahoma.[^485] SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides efficient competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete by enabling them to understand how to
     implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.
     Because these support organizations' personnel are the same as
     those used by competing carriers in Texas, and because the record
     does not indicate that SWBT support organizations provide
     inadequate or discriminatory treatment to competing carriers, we
     find that we can rely on these findings again in our disposition of
     this joint application.

### UNE Combinations 

171. In this section, we conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory
     access to combinations of unbundled network elements.[^486] Based
     on the evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it provides
     access to UNEs in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
     combine those elements, and that SWBT provides access to
     preexisting combinations of network elements.[^487] We reject
     allegations that SWBT imposes unreasonable and discriminatory
     restrictions on certain types of combinations. We base our
     conclusion on evidence of actual commercial usage, and also on
     SWBT's legal obligation to provide such access as established in
     the K2A and O2A.

172. The record indicates that SWBT provides access to combinations of
     network elements in compliance with our UNE rules. [^488] The K2A
     and O2A provisions regarding combinations of unbundled network
     elements are identical to those in the T2A, which we found in the
     *SWBT Texas Order* to comply with our UNE rules.[^489] SWBT has a
     legal obligation, under the K2A and O2A, as well as certain other
     existing interconnection agreements and our rules, to provide
     access to preassembled combinations of network elements, including
     the loop-switch port platform combination (known as the UNE
     platform or UNE-P) and the Enhanced Extended Link (EEL), a
     combination of loop and transport facilities.[^490] The Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions likewise determined that SWBT provides access
     to combinations of network elements in compliance with our UNE
     rules.[^491]

173. The record further indicates that SWBT provides access to network
     elements in a manner that allows competitive carriers to combine
     such network elements for themselves.[^492] SWBT provides a variety
     of methods that allow competitive carriers to combine unbundled
     network elements. For example, in addition to the standard physical
     and virtual collocation arrangements, SWBT provides alternative
     collocation arrangements such as shared collocation cages, common
     cage, and cageless collocation arrangements, all of which may be
     used by competing LECs to combine network elements.[^493] Where
     space for physical collocation is not available, SWBT also permits
     competing LECs to collocate their equipment in adjacent controlled
     environmental vaults or huts.[^494] As required by our rules,
     competitive LECs may also request technically feasible methods of
     combining UNEs, other than collocation, that are consistent with
     the provisions of the 1996 Act and other governing statutes and
     decisions so that such carrier may combine network elements for
     themselves. [^495] For example, SWBT will provide interested
     competitive LECs access to a secured frame room (or cabinet, where
     space constraints require) that is set aside for accomplishing the
     necessary connections.[^496]

174. We reject Z-Tel's allegation that SWBT unlawfully restricts UNE-P
     carriers' use of UNEs to provide intraLATA toll service in Kansas
     and Oklahoma.[^497] In its reply comments, Z-Tel argues, that SWBT
     recently determined to preclude competitors, including Z-Tel, from
     utilizing UNEs to provide intraLATA toll service to end
     users.[^498] SWBT responds that Z-Tel's claim is incorrect, and
     that the relevant sections of the K2A and O2A are "exactly the
     same" as those sections in the T2A, which have been interpreted by
     the Texas Commission to preclude the use restriction of which Z-Tel
     complains.[^499] Indeed, SWBT commits to "interpret those sections
     of the O2A and K2A in exactly the same fashion that it was ordered
     to in \[Texas\]."[^500] Because we find that the O2A and K2A, by
     its terms, do not restrict the use of UNE-P to provide intraLATA
     toll service in Kansas and Oklahoma, and because we rely on SWBT's
     commitment to allow competing carriers to use UNE-P to provide
     interLATA toll service in Oklahoma and Kansas, we reject Z-Tel's
     claim. Should our reliance on SWBT's representations in this record
     prove to be misplaced, we will take the appropriate enforcement
     action at that time.

175. We also disagree with e.spire and other commenters that assert that
     SWBT's two-step EEL provisioning process intrinsically places
     unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions on combinations of
     loop and transport network elements in violation of our *UNE Remand
     Orders*.[^501] In our *UNE Remand Supplemental Order*, we
     temporarily conditioned a carrier's use of the EEL to provide
     exchange access services by requiring such use to include a
     significant amount of local exchange service, in addition to
     exchange access service, to given customers.[^502] On June 2, 2000,
     we clarified and extended that interim measure in a *UNE Remand*
     *Supplemental Order Clarification,* establishing safe harbor
     guidelines for what constitutes a "significant amount of local
     exchange service." [^503] In that order, we also established the
     procedures by which a requesting carrier may convert special access
     circuits to unbundled loop-transport combinations. To initiate the
     process, a requesting carrier must certify to the incumbent LEC
     that it is providing a significant amount of local exchange service
     over circuits currently purchased through the incumbent LEC's
     access tariffs, and specify the local usage option under which the
     requesting carrier seeks to qualify.[^504] Once a requesting
     carrier properly certifies that it is providing a significant
     amount of local exchange service, we required that the process by
     which special access circuits are converted to unbundled
     loop-transport combinations should be "simple and accomplished
     without delay."[^505] We specifically noted that the Access Service
     Request (ASR) process would likely suffice.[^506] In particular, we
     emphasized the utility of the ASR process for conversions because
     it does not require a special access circuit to be disconnected and
     re-connected simply to accomplish the billing changes necessary to
     implement UNE pricing.

176. E.spire argues that SWBT's two-step process for converting access
     circuits to UNE pricing, which requires a requesting carrier to
     complete both an ASR and LSR, violates the rules set forth in the
     *Supplemental Order Clarification* governing EEL
     provisioning*.*[^507] We disagree. In our *Supplemental Order
     Clarification,* we established a general rule to govern the EEL
     provisioning process in recognition that incumbent LECs may adopt
     different procedures to ensure that access circuits are converted
     to unbundled loop-transport combinations simply and without delay.
     We find that our rules do not expressly prohibit the two-step
     process performed by SWBT. Accordingly, based on the record in this
     proceeding, we can not conclude that SWBT's EEL provisioning
     process runs afoul of the rules set forth in our *Supplemental
     Order Clarification* without further evidence that such process
     cannot be accomplished simply, quickly and without an increased
     risk of disconnection. We note, however, that e.spire states in its
     comments that it has initiated a possible enforcement action by
     requesting, pursuant to Commission Rule 1.730(b),[^508] to begin
     pre-filing settlement negotiations with SWBT, claiming that SWBT
     has violated the Commission's rules on EELs provisioning.[^509] If
     it is determined on a more developed record that SWBT has indeed
     violated our UNE rules, we will, in that instance, take the
     appropriate enforcement action. [^510]

## Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops

### Background

177. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive
     checklist, requires that a BOC provide "\[l\]ocal loop transmission
     from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from
     local switching or other services."[^511] The Commission has
     defined the loop as a transmission facility between a distribution
     frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and
     the demarcation point at the customer premises. This definition
     includes different types of loops, including two-wire and four-wire
     analog voice-grade loops, and two-wire and four-wire loops that are
     conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed to provide
     service such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1-level signals.[^512]

178. In order to establish that it is "providing" unbundled local loops
     in compliance with checklist item 4, a BOC must demonstrate that it
     has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish loops and
     that it is currently doing so in the quantities that competitors
     demand and at an acceptable level of quality. A BOC must also
     demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to unbundled
     loops.[^513] Specifically, the BOC must provide access to any
     functionality of the loop requested by a competing carrier unless
     it is not technically feasible to condition the loop facility to
     support the particular functionality requested. In order to provide
     the requested loop functionality, such as the ability to deliver
     xDSL services, the BOC may be required to take affirmative steps to
     condition existing loop facilities to enable competing carriers to
     provide services not currently provided over the facilities. The
     BOC must provide competitors with access to unbundled loops
     regardless of whether the BOC uses digital loop carrier (DLC)
     technology or similar remote concentration devices for the
     particular loops sought by the competitor.

### Discussion

179. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled local
     loops in both Kansas and Oklahoma in accordance with the
     requirements of section 271. Specifically, we find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides new stand-alone loops, including
     xDSL-capable loops, in substantially the same time and manner as it
     does for SWBT's own retail service.[^514] We also conclude that
     SWBT demonstrates that it provides voice grade unbundled loops
     through "hot cut" conversions in a manner that affords competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. In evaluating SWBT's
     overall performance in providing unbundled local loops, we examine
     SWBT's performance in the aggregate (i.e., by all loop types) as
     well as its performance for specific loop types (i.e., by voice
     grade, xDSL-capable, BRI, and DS-1 types). In doing so, we are
     looking for patterns of systematic performance disparities that
     have resulted in competitive harm or otherwise denied competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

180. As we have noted in previous section 271 Orders, we examine the
     data for all the various loop performance measurements, as well as
     the factors surrounding the development of these measures. Isolated
     instances of performance disparity, especially when the margin of
     disparity or the number of measurements impacted is small, will
     generally not result in findings of checklist noncompliance. We
     also look to SWBT's performance in Texas (where SWBT has been
     handling commercial volumes to a greater degree and for a longer
     period of time) as evidence relevant to this checklist item because
     volumes in Kansas and Oklahoma are low and SWBT's OSS is the same
     as in Texas. Finally, we evaluate the information SWBT provided
     describing its processes for installing and maintaining loops, the
     capabilities of its workforce, and employee training to show that
     it provisions and maintains unbundled loops using the same methods
     and procedures throughout its five-state region.[^515]

181. As explained below, we evaluate SWBT's compliance with this
     checklist item by evaluating several performance measurements as
     they apply to five different types of unbundled local loops.[^516]
     For most measurements, SWBT shows that it performs at an acceptable
     level, generally meeting or exceeding the established benchmark or
     parity standards in the months leading up to its application. We
     find that SWBT's overall performance meets the checklist
     requirements, even though some performance measurements indicate
     isolated problems for some types of unbundled loops. As explained
     below, we believe that the marginal disparities in some
     measurements are not competitively significant and do not show
     signs of systemic discrimination. Instead of faulting a BOC's
     showing for checklist item 4, we believe such performance issues
     are better addressed through a Performance Assurance Plan, targeted
     enforcement action, or carrier-initiated complaints under the Act
     or an interconnection agreement.

#### xDSL-Capable Loops

182. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it is providing xDSL-capable
     loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. In
     analyzing SWBT's showing, we rely primarily on the performance data
     noted above and described in prior section 271 Orders. We note,
     however, that we do not rely on SWBT's separate affiliate to reach
     our conclusions because SWBT carried its burden of demonstrating
     checklist compliance with an evidentiary showing of performance to
     its wholesale xDSL customers.[^517]

183. SWBT demonstrates that it has a legal obligation to provide
     unbundled xDSL-capable loops to competing carriers.[^518] SWBT
     makes available unbundled xDSL-capable loops (including all
     technically feasible features, functions, and capabilities) in
     Kansas through the K2A and in Oklahoma through the O2A.[^519] Since
     June 2000, the volume of xDSL-capable loop orders in Kansas and
     Oklahoma has tripled.[^520] In recent months, SWBT has been
     providing a greater proportion of unbundled xDSL-capable loops to
     competing carriers. For the period July through October 2000, 50
     percent of the unbundled loops provided in Kansas were either DSL
     or BRI loops; likewise, 72 percent of the unbundled loops provided
     in Oklahoma were either DSL or BRI loops.[^521]

##### Order Processing Timeliness

184. *Firm Order Confirmation (FOC) Timeliness*. We conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides order processing for xDSL-capable
     loops in a timely manner that provides an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. In previous section 271
     applications, we have relied primarily on performance measurements
     that track a BOC's ability to provide firm order confirmations
     (FOCs) in a timely manner.[^522] In Kansas and Oklahoma, as in
     Texas, SWBT's FOC timeliness is measured against a benchmark of 24
     hours. Since June 2000, SWBT has performed better than the
     established standard by providing at least 96 percent of the FOCs
     to competing carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma within the required
     time frame.[^523] This performance is mirrored in Texas, where SWBT
     uses the same OSS for processing orders at significantly higher
     volumes.[^524] Although several commenters have alleged that SWBT
     is not providing FOCs for unbundled loops in a timely manner, these
     parties generally point to problems that occurred before July 1,
     2000.[^525] Current and more recent performance indicate that these
     problems have been addressed and no longer appear to be an issue.

##### Provisioning Timeliness

185. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions xDSL-capable
     loops for competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner that it installs xDSL-capable loops for its own retail
     operations. In analyzing SWBT's provisioning performance for
     checklist compliance, we continue to rely primarily upon the
     performance measurements identified in the Bell Atlantic New York
     and SWBT Texas Orders, i.e., missed installation due dates and
     average installation intervals. We also evaluate SWBT's
     provisioning processes. Because it uses the same processes
     throughout its region and we previously evaluated those processes
     in our review of SWBT's section 271 application for Texas, we also
     rely on SWBT's performance in Texas.

186. *Provisioning Processes*. We agree with the Kansas Commission and
     Oklahoma Commission that SWBT uses the same provisioning processes
     in those states as it does in Texas.[^526] To order unbundled loops
     in any state in the SWBT region, competing carriers submit Local
     Service Requests (LSRs) to SWBT's Local Service Center in Dallas,
     Texas.[^527] SWBT accepts LSRs for unbundled loops through an
     application-to-application interface, a graphical user interface
     (GUI), and through manual processes.[^528] Orders for unbundled
     loops are forwarded from SWBT's Local Service Center to its Local
     Operations Center for supervision and management of the
     installation process.[^529] With its staff in the Local Service
     Center and Local Operations Center, SWBT maintains centralized
     supervision and oversight of the provisioning process for unbundled
     loops purchased by competing carriers. After receiving an order for
     an unbundled loop, SWBT's Local Operations Center forwards the
     order to one of four Mechanized Loop Assignment Centers (MLACs),
     which are responsible for assigning facilities to the order and
     maintaining an overall inventory of SWBT's facilities.[^530] After
     completing its work, the MLAC forwards the order to one of two
     Circuit Provisioning Centers (CPCs), which are responsible for
     additional design and assignment work related to special
     services.[^531] The CPCs forward the order to SWBT's provisioning
     forces. For unbundled loop installations that do not require a
     dispatch, SWBT's Central Office Operations employees perform the
     necessary work. SWBT's Installation and Maintenance forces perform
     all installation work that requires a dispatch outside the central
     office. Provisioning a stand-alone unbundled loop (including xDSL
     loops) usually requires SWBT to dispatch a technician.

187. *Average Installation Intervals*. As evidenced by SWBT's
     performance data, SWBT installs xDSL loops in a nondiscriminatory
     manner.[^532] In Kansas, from August through October 2000, SWBT
     installed DSL loops in 6.7 days on average.[^533] In Oklahoma
     during the same period, SWBT installed DSL loops in 6.1 days on
     average.[^534] Although we recognize that these averages exceed the
     5-day benchmark established by the state commissions, we note that
     SWBT's performance has improved during the same period in both
     Kansas and Oklahoma as volumes have increased.[^535] This improving
     trend persuades us that SWBT's technicians are gaining sufficient
     expertise and are quickly adjusting to the growth of competition in
     these states. Moreover, SWBT's performance in Texas, where SWBT has
     installed unbundled DSL loops in 6.15 days on average for the
     period July through October 2000 while taking substantially greater
     volumes of orders, indicates that SWBT is capable of accommodating
     substantially greater volumes of orders for unbundled DSL loops
     without negatively impacting performance.[^536] We therefore find
     that these performance disparities do not warrant a finding of
     checklist noncompliance.

188. *Percent Missed Installation Due Dates*. Although SWBT's
     performance data indicate that it has continuing difficulties
     satisfying the state-approved benchmarks for missed installation
     due dates, this performance alone does not undermine our
     determination that SWBT installs xDSL-capable loops in a manner
     that satisfies the checklist. Although past performance indicates
     that there has been statistically significant facial disparity
     between SWBT's actual performance and the five percent benchmark
     established by the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions in their
     Performance Assurance Plans, the trend in Kansas and Oklahoma has
     been improving significantly, however, and, in the last two months,
     SWBT's performance has closed to within a few percentage points of
     the benchmark level.[^537] Moreover, this improved performance
     brings SWBT's performance in line with Texas, in which SWBT has
     missed an average of 7.9 percent of installation due dates for
     xDSL-capable loops in the last four months.[^538] Although we find
     this inability to satisfy the state-approved benchmarks to be
     troubling, we do not find that this constitutes per se
     discrimination requiring a finding of checklist noncompliance.
     Indeed, these performance disparities have been narrowed to a small
     margin, and SWBT's performance on other measurements related to
     xDSL-capable loops shows acceptable performance. Finally, as
     explained below, we find that the record in this proceeding does
     not reflect that performance at this level denies efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.

189. We are not persuaded that the issues raised by some parties defeat
     SWBT's showing that it provides nondiscriminatory access to
     unbundled xDSL-capable loops.[^539] These parties generally point
     to disparities in SWBT's performance data without providing
     additional evidence of competitive harm. Allegiance and McLeodUSA
     argue, for example, that SWBT's data for missed installation due
     dates demonstrates a failure to meet the requirements of checklist
     item 4.[^540] These parties have not indicated or otherwise
     submitted evidence that SWBT's performance has resulted in lost
     business, such as dissatisfied customers switching back to SWBT
     because of mistakes in the provisioning process or increased
     operating costs.[^541] Nor have these parties shown evidence of
     disputes arising under interconnection agreements, documentation of
     complaints provided to SWBT and subsequent efforts to resolve the
     performance problems, or formal or informal complaints filed with
     regulatory agencies. As we have stated in the past, isolated
     instances of performance disparity, along with evidence of
     generally acceptable performance in other areas, are generally not
     sufficient on their own to show that a BOC has failed to
     demonstrate compliance with the checklist.[^542]

190. As a final matter, we recognize that SWBT's data indicate that it
     continues to have some troubles with on-time provisioning of BRI
     loops, which are often used to provide xDSL services.[^543] These
     performance problems have affected both SWBT and competing carriers
     alike. In particular, we note that, in Kansas, SWBT missed an
     average of 23.7 percent of the installation due dates for BRI loops
     during the period July through October 2000 in Kansas[^544] and
     missed an average of 15.85 percent during the same period in
     Oklahoma.[^545] In Texas, SWBT's performance has been similar in
     this area.[^546] We are persuaded that SWBT's performance has not
     put competing carriers at a disadvantage because SWBT's data show
     that it has consistently performed worse when installing BRI loops
     for its own uses, so that competing carriers have generally enjoyed
     better installation service for BRI loops than SWBT's retail
     operations. As noted earlier in this Order, we evaluate SWBT's
     checklist showing based on the totality of the circumstances, and
     do not necessarily rely on its performance in a single
     measurement.[^547] We will continue to monitor SWBT's performance
     in this area so that, if SWBT's performance deteriorates further,
     or if we find evidence that suggests discriminatory or unequal
     treatment, we will take appropriate enforcement action.

##### Provisioning Quality

191. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides competing carriers
     an installation quality sufficient to afford them a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. As noted in previous section 271 Orders,
     trouble reports within 30 days after an installation indicate the
     quality of installation services provided to competing
     carriers.[^548] In Kansas, SWBT has generally met the benchmark of
     6 percent for trouble reports within 30 days of an installation for
     the period May through September 2000, and only missed the
     established standard by 0.7 percent in October 2000.[^549] SWBT
     appeared to experience performance difficulties in only one month
     during the period pertinent to its application. Specifically, in
     July 2000, SWBT reported a rate of 18.3 percent trouble reports
     within 30 days of an installation. In light of the generally steady
     performance in Kansas, and because the sample size is so small, we
     conclude that SWBT's poor performance in July appears to constitute
     an aberration from the installation quality provided to competing
     carriers. We likewise find that SWBT's installation quality in
     Oklahoma affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. For the period July through October 2000, troubles were
     reported on average on 6.6 percent of xDSL-capable loops within 30
     days of installation, which was only 0.6 percent higher than the
     established benchmark.[^550] Finally, we note that SWBT's
     performance in Texas has generally met the established
     benchmark.[^551] Because volumes of DSL loop orders are
     substantially higher in Texas than in either Kansas or
     Oklahoma,[^552] and because the provisioning processes are
     identical, we conclude that SWBT's Texas performance demonstrates
     that SWBT's provisioning systems and processes are capable of
     consistently providing quality installation service to competing
     carriers.

192. Although SWBT's data reveal some performance issues with BRI loops,
     we conclude that these issues are not fatal to SWBT's
     showing.[^553] As noted earlier, we evaluate SWBT's showing based
     on the totality of the circumstances, so that SWBT's performance in
     a single measurement or for a single category of loops is not
     necessarily dispositive for SWBT's showing of checklist
     compliance.[^554] In Kansas, competing carriers experienced an
     average of 12.3 percent trouble reports within 30 days after
     installation of a BRI loop compared to an average of 3.3 percent
     for SWBT's retail operations from August through October.[^555] In
     Oklahoma, competing carriers experienced an average of 11.03
     percent during the same period compared to a 3.5 percent average
     for SWBT's retail operations during the same period.[^556] We have
     not found evidence that these types of troubles on BRI loops have
     denied competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.
     Moreover, SWBT's performance in Texas shows an improving trend in
     this area.[^557] Finally, SWBT's ability to provide trouble-free
     loops in Kansas and Oklahoma is generally good. Based on the
     totality of SWBT's performance in provisioning xDSL-loops, we
     conclude that SWBT's performance has not denied efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.

##### Maintenance & Repair 

193. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides maintenance and
     repair of unbundled xDSL-capable loops in a manner that affords
     efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. In
     analyzing SWBT's showing for its maintenance and repair service, we
     continue to rely primarily upon the performance measurements
     identified in the Bell Atlantic New York and SWBT Texas Orders,
     i.e., the mean time to repair, the repeat trouble report rate, and
     the overall trouble report rate. We also evaluate SWBT's
     maintenance and repair processes and, because it uses the same
     processes throughout its region, SWBT's performance in Texas.

194. *Maintenance and Repair Processes*. We agree with the Kansas
     Commission and the Oklahoma Commission that SWBT's maintenance and
     repair processes are the same in these states as in Texas. The
     maintenance process starts when a competing carrier contacts SWBT's
     Local Operations Center via telephone or uses a graphical user
     interface (GUI) or application-to-application interface to initiate
     a trouble report.[^558] Employees in the Local Operations Center
     perform testing and then route the trouble report to SWBT's work
     units downstream in the process. SWBT's Central Office Operations
     perform any repair work needed in a central office; SWBT's
     Installation and Maintenance employees repair problems with SWBT's
     outside plant. SWBT's employees use standardized methods and
     procedures to perform their maintenance and repair work.[^559] The
     Local Operations Center monitors the status of the repair work
     throughout the maintenance and repair process.[^560] SWBT has shown
     that this process is the same as the one used in Texas.[^561]

195. *Mean Time to Repair*. SWBT's performance data show a proven track
     record of providing quality repair service to competing carriers
     operating in Kansas and Oklahoma. In both states, SWBT has
     generally restored service for DSL loops in less than 5 hours,
     which is significantly better than the established 9-hour
     standard.[^562] Although SWBT's October performance in Kansas
     missed the benchmark, we note that SWBT's performance generally has
     been acceptable. We believe that the disparity in SWBT's data for a
     single month may be attributable to the wide swings possible with
     low sample sizes. SWBT's performance in Texas appears to support
     this observation. In that state, SWBT has consistently restored
     service in an average of less than 4 hours since June 2000.[^563]
     We find that, particularly in light of the substantially greater
     volume of work required of SWBT's workforce in Texas, SWBT's
     performance in Kansas and Oklahoma, indicates that its repair
     service affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.

196. *Repeat Trouble Report Rate*. SWBT's repeat trouble report data
     show that competing carriers were rarely afflicted with continuing
     problems after a repair visit for a trouble on DSL loops. In
     Kansas, competing carriers have not experienced any repeat trouble
     reports since March 2000.[^564] Although SWBT has not performed as
     well in Oklahoma, SWBT's data are affected by the small number of
     repeat troubles. For example, only seven competing carriers
     reported trouble reports on DSL loops in September 2000, and only
     one of those carriers experienced a repeat trouble.[^565] Finally,
     SWBT's performance in Texas, where it uses the same maintenance and
     repair processes as are made available in Kansas and Oklahoma,
     shows that competing carriers enjoy a repeat trouble report rate
     that is well below the established benchmark.[^566]

197. *Trouble Report Rate*. SWBT's trouble report rates for DSL loops in
     Kansas and Oklahoma further supports our conclusion that SWBT
     provides competing carriers with maintenance and repair service in
     substantially the same time and manner as SWBT's own retail
     operations. Competing carriers in Kansas experienced a trouble
     report rate of only 2.75 percent on average for the months of July
     through October 2000, which is on average below the 3 percent
     benchmark.[^567] Similarly, competing carriers in Oklahoma
     experienced an average of only 2.32 percent during the same
     period.[^568] Furthermore, SWBT's performance in Texas demonstrates
     that it is capable of continuing to provide quality maintenance and
     repair service to competing carriers as volumes increase.[^569]

#### Voice-Grade Stand-Alone Loops

198. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides voice grade
     unbundled loops in a nondiscriminatory manner. At the outset, we
     note that SWBT does not provide as many voice-grade loops in Kansas
     and Oklahoma as it does xDSL-capable loops in those states, making
     the difficulty of analyzing data based on low volumes even more
     acute. We therefore look towards SWBT's performance in Texas to
     assist our analysis of SWBT's showing that it provides unbundled
     voice grade loops in accordance with the checklist requirements.
     Finally, we note that SWBT's provisioning processes are the same
     for voice grade unbundled loops as for xDSL-capable loops.[^570]

##### Hot Cut Loop Provisioning

199. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled loops
     through the use of coordinated conversions of active customers from
     SWBT to competing carriers, a process known as "hot cuts," in
     accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. Because there
     is no retail equivalent to a hot cut, SWBT must demonstrate that it
     provides unbundled loops through hot cuts "in a manner that offers
     an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete."[^571]

200. *Hot Cut Process*. SWBT makes available the same two hot cut
     processes that it makes available in Texas: the fully coordinated
     hot cut (CHC) process and the frame due time (FDT) hot cut process.
     CHC orders are manually handled in SWBT's order processing center
     and require intensive coordination and communication between SWBT
     and the competing carrier during the actual cutover from SWBT to
     the competing carrier.[^572] FDT hot cuts require both SWBT and the
     competing carrier to perform necessary work at pre-arranged times,
     with no communication required at the time of the hot cut.[^573]
     Unlike CHC orders, FDT orders are capable of flowing through SWBT's
     order processing center without manual work by SWBT's
     representatives.[^574] Competing carriers may freely choose between
     CHCs and FDT conversions, selecting the cutover methods that best
     fits their resources and priorities.[^575] We note, however, that
     very few competitive LECs have used the FDT provisioning process
     during the months leading up to the filing of this
     application.[^576]

201. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides hot cuts in
     Oklahoma and Kansas in accordance with checklist item 4 because
     competing carriers can choose freely between the CHC and FDT hot
     cut processes, and because it provides CHCs in a timely manner, at
     an acceptable level of quality, with minimal service disruption,
     and with a minimum number of troubles following installation. In
     our *SWBT Texas Order*, we concluded that SWBT provisioned hot cut
     loops through the CHC process in compliance with the criteria
     established in our earlier 271 orders,[^577] but that SWBT could
     not establish checklist compliance based on FDT conversions because
     of problems with service disruptions. [^578] Nevertheless, we
     concluded that SWBT provided hot cuts in Texas in accordance with
     checklist item 4 because competing carriers could choose freely
     between the CHC and FDT hot cut processes, and because the CHC
     process was in compliance with our hot cut processing criteria.
     Similarly, in this Order, we do not rely on the FDT hot cut process
     because carriers have not yet relied on this process sufficiently
     for us to conclude that SWBT demonstrates compliance with checklist
     item 4 based on FDT conversions. We thus conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provides hot cuts in Oklahoma and Kansas in
     accordance with checklist item 4 because competing carriers can
     choose freely between the CHC and FDT hot cut processes, and
     because it provides CHCs in compliance with the criteria
     established in our earlier 271 proceedings.

202. *Hot Cut Timeliness*. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it can
     complete a substantial percentage of CHCs it provisions within a
     reasonable time interval.[^579] Under the performance measurements
     developed by the Texas Commission, and adopted by the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions, SWBT's hot cut performance is measured
     according to the percentage of hot cut loops in orders of less than
     10 lines that SWBT completes within one hour.[^580] In Kansas, the
     aggregated data from July 2000 through October 2000 indicate that
     SWBT completed an average 96.5 percent of all CHC loops from orders
     with less than 10 lines within 1 hour.[^581] In Oklahoma, the
     aggregated data from July 2000 through October 2000 indicate that
     SWBT completed an average 94.2 percent of all CHC loops from orders
     with less than 10 lines within 1 hour.[^582] We are further
     encouraged that SWBT's performance in Kansas and Oklahoma on hot
     cut timeliness appears consistent with its current performance in
     Texas, where SWBT, using the same CHC process, has completed an
     average of 97 percent of all CHC loops from orders with less than
     10 lines within 1 hour from August 2000 through October 2000.[^583]
     Thus, we find that the aggregated data demonstrate that SWBT can
     provision a substantial percentage of competing carrier CHC loops
     within a 1 hour interval, and that this evidence is sufficient to
     overcome the claims of a few carriers discussed below that argue
     SWBT's hot cut provisioning is not performed in a timely manner.

203. *Hot Cut Quality*. We further conclude that SWBT demonstrates that
     it provisions CHCs at a level of quality that offers efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. Upon review of the
     evidence in the record regarding hot cut installation quality, and
     specifically the outage rate associated with failed SWBT CHCs, and
     the trouble rate following CHC installation, we find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provisions CHCs to competitors in a manner
     that meets the requirements of the checklist.

204. Because outages that occur on the day of a CHC were not reported by
     a SWBT performance measurement at the time of its
     application,[^584] we rely, when possible, on outage data that has
     been reconciled by the state commission. Under the auspices of the
     Texas Commission, SWBT and AT&T established the Performance Process
     Improvement Group (PPIG) to reconcile SWBT and competing carrier
     data relating to unexpected hot cut outage data, including such
     data in Kansas. [^585] In Kansas, the PPIG has focused its efforts
     on reconciling data for the Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City,
     Missouri serving area. [^586] During the period from June through
     August, reconciled data for the Kansas City market area demonstrate
     that SWBT completed at least 97.24 percent of CHCs without a
     service outage.[^587] Because the PPIG data reveal that during the
     period from June through August 2000, an average of less than 3% of
     all CHC loops that SWBT provisioned resulted in end-user service
     outages caused by SWBT provisioning failures, we conclude that SWBT
     makes available a hot cut process that provides efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^588]

205. In Oklahoma, neither AT&T nor any other competitive LEC has
     requested data reconciliation.[^589] As such, to assess the outage
     rate in Oklahoma, SWBT shows, based on its own internal records,
     that it completed 100% of CHCs without a service outage from April
     2000 to August 2000.[^590] SWBT further states that the only
     competitive LEC to complain about hot cut performance before the
     Oklahoma Commission was AT&T and that AT&T chose not to pursue data
     reconciliation in Oklahoma.[^591] We also note that no competitive
     LEC has complained of loop conversion-related outages in Oklahoma
     in this proceeding.[^592] We thus conclude that the record
     demonstrates that the CHC process SWBT makes available to competing
     carriers in Oklahoma minimizes service disruptions that may deny an
     efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete.

206. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that competing carrier end users
     experience only very low rates of installation troubles on lines
     provisioned by CHCs. From June through August 2000, competing
     carriers experienced troubles within 7 days after installation on
     an average of 1.45 percent of CHCs in Kansas and 2.34 percent of
     CHCs in Oklahoma.[^593] Although the Oklahoma trouble report data
     are slightly higher than that which we found to comply with
     checklist item 4 in Texas,[^594] there were only three reported
     instances of trouble in Oklahoma, and no commenter has complained
     about SWBT's Oklahoma CHC performance from July 2000 through
     October 2000.[^595] Thus, we find that SWBT installs hot cuts in
     Oklahoma of sufficient quality to provide an efficient competitor
     with a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^596]

207. We reject commenters' argument that, in Kansas, SWBT's true
     performance provisioning hot cuts is not captured in the
     performance data.[^597] For example, commenters argue that the CHC
     process is fundamentally flawed leading to customer outages,[^598]
     and that the hot cut performance data does not capture all of the
     SWBT-caused outages.[^599] In addition, KMC argues that, based on
     the performance data, it seems obvious that SWBT uses a different
     CHC process in Kansas and Oklahoma than the CHC process that it
     uses in Texas.[^600] Based on the record in this proceeding, we
     find commenters' anecdotal evidence insufficient to overcome SWBT's
     demonstrated compliance in Kansas with the timeliness and quality
     performance metrics discussed above.[^601] We also reject Sprint's
     argument that its troubles with the FDT process in Kansas warrant a
     finding of checklist non-compliance.[^602] As discussed above,
     because we do not rely on the FDT process to find that SWBT
     demonstrates compliance with checklist item 4, Sprint's alleged
     problems using the FDT process are not fatal to this application.
     We expect, however, that SWBT will address these issues with
     Sprint, and will continue to improve the FDT process as more
     competing carriers choose to avail themselves of this option.

##### New Stand-Alone Loop Provisioning

208. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions new unbundled
     stand-alone voice grade loops in accordance with the requirements
     of checklist item 4. When SWBT does not presently service the
     customer on the line in question, a hot cut loop is not required.
     In such instances, a competing carrier obtains a new stand-alone
     loop from SWBT, which dispatches a technician to the customer's
     premises to complete the installation. We find that SWBT
     demonstrates that it provisions xDSL-capable loops for competing
     carriers in substantially the same time and manner that it installs
     xDSL-capable loops for its own retail operations. In analyzing
     SWBT's provisioning for new stand-alone loops, we continue to rely
     primarily upon the performance measurements identified in the Bell
     Atlantic New York and SWBT Texas Orders, i.e., missed installation
     due dates and average installation intervals. We note that SWBT's
     provisioning processes for new stand-alone loops mirrors its
     processes for provisioning xDSL-capable loops, which we find is
     identical in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.

209. *Average Installation Interval*. Based on the record, we find that
     SWBT provisions new unbundled stand-alone loops to competing
     carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it does for
     its own retail service. Since July 2000, SWBT has generally met its
     3-day target average installation interval for both 8.0 dB and 5.0
     dB loops provided to competing carriers in both Kansas and
     Oklahoma.[^603] SWBT's performance in Texas, where it has been
     handling greater volumes for a longer period of time, shows that
     SWBT has consistently met the established benchmarks for unbundled
     voice grade loops provided on a stand-alone basis.[^604]

210. *Missed Installation Due Dates.* During the same period, SWBT
     missed either a lower percentage of installation due dates for
     competing carriers than for itself or a comparable percentage,
     depending on whether field work was required.[^605] For
     installations of 8.0 dB loops that did not require field work, SWBT
     did not meet the parity standard in Oklahoma for several months
     leading up to its application. SWBT persuades us, however, that the
     disparity in its data most likely stems from differences in the mix
     of work performed.[^606] Furthermore, SWBT's Texas performance data
     show that, for substantially greater volumes, SWBT usually misses
     less than 1 percent of the installation due dates for 8.0 dB loops
     that do not require field work.[^607]

211. Because these disparities in performance appear to be isolated and
     minimal, and because SWBT has demonstrated an ability to meet most
     of its other relevant benchmark and parity standards for other
     loop-related measurements, we are not persuaded by the arguments of
     KMC and others that certain isolated failures to meet due dates on
     SWBT's part shows that SWBT fails to provide voice grade loops in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^608] Again, no party has submitted
     evidence to show that SWBT's performance has resulted in actual
     competitive harm.

##### Maintenance and Repair of Voice Grade Loops

212. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides maintenance and
     repair functions for unbundled voice grade local loops to competing
     carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it does for
     its own retail customers.[^609] SWBT misses its own repair
     commitments for voice grade loops more frequently than it misses
     repair commitments for competing carriers.[^610] Competing carriers
     enjoy a lower rate of repeat trouble reports than SWBT's retail
     operations.[^611] In both Kansas and Oklahoma, competing carriers
     experience a comparable percentage of trouble reports as SWBT's
     retail operations.[^612] Likewise, SWBT demonstrates that it
     restores service for voice grade loops faster for competing
     carriers than for its own retail operations.[^613] When measured
     against the applicable parity standards, SWBT's performance
     measurements show that it often provides substantially better
     repair service to competing carriers than to itself.[^614]

#### High Capacity Loop Performance

213. We recognize that SWBT's performance with respect to provisioning
     high capacity loops on time has been poor in Kansas and Oklahoma.
     [^615] Given the low volumes of orders for high capacity loops in
     these states,[^616] we cannot find that SWBT's performance for high
     capacity loops results in a finding of noncompliance for all loop
     types. As noted above, SWBT performs at an acceptable level for
     most types of unbundled local loops. We note that SWBT uses the
     same processes for provisioning, maintaining, and repairing
     unbundled high capacity loops as it uses for other types of
     unbundled local loops.[^617] In addition, we note that SWBT
     installed high capacity loops for carriers in Kansas in 2.7 days on
     average, and in 5.8 days on average in Oklahoma, for the period
     August through October 2000.[^618] In both states, SWBT has
     improved its performance in October 2000. SWBT's average
     installation intervals indicate that it provisions DS-1 loops to
     competing carriers in a timely manner, and that SWBT quickly
     overcomes the challenges presented by a lack of facilities. We
     disagree with IP, KMC, Allegiance, and McLeodUSA that SWBT's
     failure to meet its installation dates for DS-1 loops in some cases
     requires a finding of checklist noncompliance.[^619] Again, we look
     to the totality of the circumstances in evaluating SWBT's
     performance in providing loops in accordance with the checklist
     requirements. Although we recognize specific performance problems
     for high capacity loops, we do not find that this disparity in and
     of itself is enough to render a finding of checklist noncompliance.
     We stress, however, that we will be actively monitoring SWBT's
     performance in this area and we will take swift and appropriate
     enforcement action in the event SWBT's provisioning performance for
     high capacity loops fails to improve.

#### Line Sharing 

##### Background

214. On December 9, 1999, the Commission released the *Line Sharing
     Order*, which introduced new rules requiring BOCs to offer
     requesting carriers unbundled access to the high-frequency portion
     of local loops.[^620] In the *Line Sharing Order*, we acknowledged
     that it could take as long as 180 days from the release of our
     order for BOCs and other incumbent LECs to develop and deploy the
     technical and operational modifications necessary to implement the
     new rules. This 180-day period concluded on June 6, 2000,
     approximately four months before SWBT filed the instant
     application. Accordingly, SWBT must demonstrate that it has a legal
     obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to line sharing,
     i.e., the unbundled high-frequency portion of the local loop.

##### Discussion

215. We find that SWBT demonstrates that, as of June 1, 2000, it has
     been making line sharing available in both Kansas and Oklahoma.
     SWBT makes line sharing available to competing carriers in an
     optional amendment to the K2A and the O2A.[^621] Until recently,
     however, no competing carriers submitted orders for the
     high-frequency portion of the loop.[^622] We conclude that we
     should not fault SWBT for the failure of competing carriers to
     deploy DSL service through line shared loops. We therefore focus
     our analysis of SWBT's line sharing performance for checklist
     compliance on SWBT's processes for provisioning line shared loops.
     To the extent there is any activity, we would expect to rely
     primarily upon the categories of performance measurements
     identified in the Bell Atlantic New York and SWBT Texas Orders.
     Specifically, a successful BOC applicant could provide evidence of
     BOC-caused missed installation due dates, average installation
     intervals, trouble reports within 30 days of installation, mean
     time to repair, trouble report rates, and repeat trouble report
     rates. In addition, a successful BOC applicant should provide
     evidence that its central offices are operationally ready to handle
     commercial volumes of line sharing and that it provides competing
     carriers with nondiscriminatory access to the pre-ordering and
     ordering OSS functions associated with the provision of line shared
     loops, including access to loop qualification information and
     databases. Finally, to the extent that a BOC applicant relies upon
     commercial data from another state to establish that it is
     providing nondiscriminatory access to line shared loops in a state
     where it requests section 271 authority, it should provide evidence
     that the OSS and provisioning processes are identical. To the
     extent its OSS provisioning processes are not identical, a BOC
     applicant bears the burden of showing that whatever differences are
     present are not material. In the instant application, because SWBT
     is not processing orders for line sharing from competing carriers
     in commercial volumes in either Kansas or Oklahoma, we look to
     SWBT's performance in Texas to assist our evaluation. In addition,
     we rely on SWBT's performance towards its separate affiliate,
     Advanced Solutions, Inc. (ASI), to assist our evaluation because
     SWBT has provided substantial volumes of line shared loops to its
     separate affiliate.[^623]

216. *Ordering, Provisioning, and Maintenance Processes*. We conclude
     that SWBT demonstrates that it has implemented the necessary
     processes for provisioning and maintaining the high-frequency
     portion of the loop in both Kansas and Oklahoma. The ordering,
     provisioning, and maintenance processes are nearly identical to
     those used to provision stand-alone xDSL-capable loops.[^624] To
     order the unbundled high-frequency portion of the loop in any state
     in the SWBT region, competing carriers submit LSRs (through an
     application-to-application interface, a graphical user interface
     (GUI), or manually) to SWBT's Local Service Center in Dallas,
     Texas.[^625] The LSR used by competing carriers is generally the
     same as the LSR used for stand-alone xDSL-capable loops, but some
     additional information (e.g., power spectral density information)
     is required to order the high-frequency portion of the loop.[^626]

217. *Line Sharing Performance Data*. Only recently have competing
     carriers started purchasing the unbundled high-frequency portion of
     the loop from SWBT, and even then, only one competing carrier
     ordered a single line shared loop.[^627] SWBT has been providing
     line sharing to competing carriers in Texas, however, and has been
     using the same provisioning and maintenance processes in Texas as
     it uses in Kansas and Oklahoma. In addition, because SWBT has been
     providing line sharing to its separate affiliate in Kansas,
     Oklahoma, and Texas, we can rely on SWBT's performance towards its
     separate affiliate to evaluate its operations in these states. We
     therefore look to SWBT's performance towards its affiliate and
     towards competing carriers in Texas to evaluate SWBT's ability to
     accommodate requests for line sharing in Kansas and Oklahoma once
     competing carriers start to order the product.

218. SWBT demonstrates that, in Texas, it provisions the unbundled
     high-frequency portion of the local loop to competing carriers in
     substantially the same time and manner as SWBT does for its own
     advanced services separate affiliate. In particular, SWBT
     provisioned line shared loops to competing carriers 3.44 and 3.55
     days in September and October 2000 respectively.[^628] By contrast,
     SWBT took about one day longer to provision the same type of line
     shared loops to its separate affiliate. Moreover, SWBT missed only
     2.1 and 1.8 percent of the installation due dates for line shared
     loops provided to competing carriers during the same months. We
     also find that SWBT installs the high frequency portion of the loop
     at an acceptable level of quality.[^629] Although SWBT has not
     performed as well in the maintenance and repair of line shared
     loops as it has for stand-alone DSL loops, SWBT demonstrates that
     competing carriers experience a comparable percentage of trouble
     reports on line shared loops as SWBT's separate affiliate.[^630]
     Similarly, competing carriers have experienced comparable repair
     times for line shared loops as SWBT's separate affiliate, even
     though SWBT's repair times were slow in September and October
     2000.[^631] SWBT's performance in Texas provides reasonable
     assurances that competing carriers will experience comparable
     service in Kansas and Oklahoma once they start ordering line shared
     loops.

219. We find that SWBT's performance towards its separate affiliate in
     Kansas and Oklahoma supports our analysis. In both states, SWBT has
     provisioned line shared loops to its separate affiliate in less
     than 5 days, since June 2000, while coping with substantial
     volumes.[^632] Similarly, SWBT missed less than 1.5 percent of the
     installation due dates for line shared loops provided its affiliate
     in September and October 2000.[^633] In light of SWBT's showing
     that orders for line sharing from competing carriers are treated by
     SWBT precisely as orders from its separate affiliate, we believe
     that competing carriers will experience comparable performance as
     they order line sharing. Although SWBT has an incentive to provide
     preferential provisioning and maintenance service to its separate
     affiliate, SWBT also has a duty to provide competing carriers with
     nondiscriminatory performance. We will therefore closely monitor
     SWBT's performance in this area to ensure that SWBT meets its
     nondiscrimination obligations in this area.[^634]

#### Line Splitting 

220. SWBT demonstrates that it makes it possible for competing carriers
     to provide voice and data service over a single loop -- *i.e.,* to
     engage in "line splitting."[^635] Specifically, SWBT demonstrates
     that it has a legal obligation to provide line splitting through
     rates, terms, and conditions in interconnection agreements and that
     it offers competing carriers the ability to order an unbundled
     xDSL-capable loop terminated to a collocated splitter and DSLAM
     equipment, and combine it with unbundled switching and shared
     transport.[^636] A competing carrier, either alone or in
     conjunction with another carrier, thus is able to replace an
     existing UNE-P configuration used to provide voice service with an
     arrangement that enables it to provide voice and data service to a
     customer.

221. WorldCom asserts in its Comments that, notwithstanding SWBT's
     assertions on the record in this proceeding, its K2A
     interconnection agreement in Kansas contains language that is
     plainly inconsistent with the line splitting obligation discussed
     above.[^637] Specifically, this language states that competing LECs
     "shall not utilize any SWBT splitters, equipment, cross-connects or
     OSS systems to facilitate \[line splitting\]."[^638] We agree with
     WorldCom that, on its face, this language appears to create a
     restriction that would make it virtually impossible for a carrier
     to provide voice and data service over a single loop in the manner
     envisioned in the *SWBT Texas Order*. SWBT, however, contends that
     it never intended this language to undermine its policy of
     permitting line splitting and, moreover, has never taken the
     position that this language precludes line splitting, as defined in
     the *SWBT Texas Order*.[^639] We need not reach the question of
     interpreting this language, however, because SWBT has stricken this
     language and has replaced it with language that appears to be
     consistent with the *SWBT Texas Order*.[^640] We thus conclude
     that, based on evidence in the record, SWBT has demonstrated that
     it currently satisfies its line splitting obligation in Kansas.

#### Pricing

222. Sprint and the Department of Justice take issue with certain rates
     in Kansas and Oklahoma, including those for loop conditioning, line
     sharing, and line splitting, because they are interim.[^641] We
     address these concerns with respect to collocation,[^642] and
     believe our conclusions are equally applicable here. Sprint further
     argues that the rates for loop conditioning proposed by SWBT are
     much higher than the interim rates, raising the possibility of
     enormous true-ups once the cost proceedings are completed.[^643]
     The Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions have indicated that they intend
     to conclude the proceedings for loop conditioning in the immediate
     future,[^644] so we are not worried about the true-up extending
     indefinitely. We also are not moved by the size of the
     differential. Based on the permanent rates that the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions have already adopted for unbundled network
     elements,[^645] and the expectation that in setting permanent
     rates, the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions will take into account
     concerns we raise in our decision today, we have confidence that
     the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions will set permanent rates that
     are in compliance with the Act and our rules. Thus, as we stated in
     the *SWBT Texas Order*, Sprint and other CLECs "face uncertainty
     about the imposition of a true-up only to the extent that they
     reasonably believe that they may in fact have a legal obligation to
     pay something greater than" the rates that the state commissions
     now impose.[^646] We observed in the *SWBT Texas Order* that
     carriers should expect to be affected by future resolutions of
     disputed issues, and that such concern is insufficient to warrant
     denial of a section 271 application.[^647] For these reasons, we
     therefore conclude that each state's loop conditioning, line
     sharing, and line splitting rates are reasonable under the
     three-pronged interim rate test enunciated in the *Bell Atlantic
     New York Order*.[^648]

## Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection

223. We conclude, as described below, that SWBT demonstrates that it
     provides equal-in-quality interconnection on terms and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with
     the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and as specified in section
     271 and applied in our prior orders.[^649] We further find that
     SWBT proves that it designs its interconnection facilities to meet
     "the same technical criteria and service standards" that are used
     for the interoffice trunks within its own network.[^650] We also
     find that SWBT makes interconnection available at any technically
     feasible point, including the option to interconnect at only one
     technically feasible point within a LATA,[^651] and that it is
     providing collocation in Kansas and Oklahoma in accordance with the
     Commission's rules.[^652] We note that both the Kansas and Oklahoma
     Commissions have found that SWBT has satisfied all aspects of this
     checklist item.[^653]

### Interconnection Trunking 

224. Based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that SWBT
     provides competing carriers with interconnection trunking in both
     Kansas and Oklahoma that is equal-in-quality to the interconnection
     SWBT provides to its own retail operations, and on terms and
     conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.[^654]
     SWBT makes interconnection available in Kansas and Oklahoma through
     interconnection agreements, including its state-approved K2A and
     O2A agreements.[^655] SWBT receives orders for interconnection
     trunks through the Access Service Request (ASR) process, and
     accepts ASRs through an electronic application-to-application
     interface, through a proprietary OSS system, and through manual
     orders.[^656] SWBT provides performance data to measure the quality
     of interconnection service provided to competing carriers.[^657] We
     note that no commenter in this proceeding raised concerns about
     trunk blockage or on-time provisioning of interconnection trunks.

225. *Interconnection Quality*. In prior section 271 applications, we
     relied on trunk blockage data to evaluate a BOC's interconnection
     quality.[^658] SWBT's performance data demonstrate that its
     provides interconnection that is equal-in-quality to the
     interconnection it provides in its own network. Specifically,
     SWBT's statewide performance data measuring the percentage of calls
     blocked on outgoing traffic (trunk blockage from SWBT end office
     and tandem to competitive LEC end office) demonstrate that in the
     three months immediately preceding its application, SWBT was in
     compliance with the relevant benchmarks established in Kansas and
     Oklahoma (*i.e.,* blockage not to exceed one percent on these
     trunks).[^659] Although the number of trunks provisioned in Kansas
     and Oklahoma is relatively low, this pattern is consistent with the
     trend in Texas, where SWBT follows the same processes and
     procedures.[^660]

226. *Interconnection Timeliness*. Other aspects of SWBT's performance
     data further indicate it is providing nondiscriminatory
     interconnection trunking in Kansas and Oklahoma.[^661] In previous
     section 271 applications, the Commission has evaluated missed due
     dates and average installation intervals to gauge trunk
     provisioning timeliness. SWBT's performance in both of these areas
     demonstrates satisfactory performance in Kansas and Oklahoma.
     Because of low volumes, we also look to Texas performance to
     confirm our findings. SWBT's performance data concerning the
     percentage of missed due dates for provisioning of interconnection
     trunks show that, in recent months, SWBT's provisioning performance
     for competitors in Kansas was as good as (at parity) or better than
     that provided on its own network.[^662] In Oklahoma, from July to
     October 2000 in the aggregate, SWBT-caused missed trunk
     installations averaged 22.9% for competitive LECs, and 28.6% for
     SWBT.[^663] These figures indicate that, in general, SWBT provided
     parity or better performance for competitors in Oklahoma for trunk
     installations.[^664] As we discussed above, we also look to SWBT's
     current performance in Texas, where, using the same processes and
     procedures, SWBT has been processing commercial volumes to a
     greater degree and for a longer period of time, to further
     determine whether SWBT's performance in Kansas and Oklahoma appears
     acceptable.[^665] The Texas data, which show that SWBT consistently
     misses fewer due dates for competing carriers than for itself,
     further suggests that SWBT's system of provisioning trunks is
     nondiscriminatory.[^666]

227. *Average Installation Intervals*. SWBT's performance data measuring
     the average time for installation of interconnection trunks in
     Oklahoma and Kansas show marginal disparities in performance
     between actual performance and the 20-day benchmark established by
     the Oklahoma and Kansas Commissions. For example, SWBT's
     performance data for average time to install interconnection trunks
     meet the Kansas 20-day benchmark in six out of seven months for
     which there are data during the twelve-month period of time ending
     October 31, 2000. Similarly, in Oklahoma, SWBT's data show that it
     meets the 20-day benchmark in seven out of nine months for which
     there are data.[^667] Once again, because of the low volume of
     orders in Kansas and Oklahoma, we find it instructive to look to
     Texas where SWBT follows the same procedures and has been handling
     larger commercial volumes of orders for a longer period of time. In
     Texas, SWBT's performance data show that it meets the 20-day
     benchmark nine out of the past twelve months.[^668] Finally, we
     note that no commenter has raised interconnection trunk
     provisioning timeliness as an issue. For all of these reasons, we
     find that SWBT's performance for installation of interconnection
     trunks provides competing carriers with a meaningful opportunity to
     compete and complies with checklist item 1.

### Collocation

228. SWBT demonstrates that its collocation offerings in Kansas and
     Oklahoma satisfy the requirements of sections 251 and 271 of the
     Act. SWBT provides physical and virtual collocation through
     state-approved tariffs.[^669] SWBT's Kansas and Oklahoma physical
     and virtual collocation tariffs are virtually identical to the
     Texas physical and virtual collocation tariffs, which we found to
     satisfy checklist item 1 in our *SWBT* *Texas Order*.[^670] In its
     application, SWBT indicates that shared, cageless, and adjacent
     collocation options are available in Kansas and Oklahoma, and that
     it has taken other steps necessary to implement the collocation
     requirements contained in the *Advanced Services First Report and
     Order* and *Advanced Services Reconsideration Order*.[^671]

229. SWBT's collocation performance data generally indicate that SWBT
     processed collocation requests and provisioned collocation
     arrangements within time frames established by the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions.[^672] SWBT states that it has provided 233
     physical collocation arrangements in 38 different SWBT central
     offices in Kansas, and 366 physical collocation spaces in 66
     different SWBT central offices in Oklahoma.[^673] Except where a
     competitive LEC places a large number of collocation orders in the
     same 5-business day period, SWBT responds to each request within 10
     calendar days.[^674] SWBT provides three measurements
     (disaggregated into various submeasures) for collocation:
     Percentage of Missed Collocation Due Dates (PM 107), Average Delay
     Days for SWBT Missed Due Dates (PM 108), and Percent of Requests
     Processed within the Tariffed Timelines (PM 109). Where data points
     are available, SWBT's data indicate it meets the measures for the
     months of July through October with few exceptions.[^675] Thus,
     based on the record in this proceeding, we are persuaded that SWBT
     is meeting its collocation obligations.[^676]

230. We reject MFNS's argument that SWBT's application should be denied
     because SWBT refuses to permit collocation of a fiber distribution
     frame in Texas.[^677] First, MFNS admits that this dispute does not
     arise out of a collocation dispute in either Kansas or Oklahoma.
     Second, SWBT must allow collocation of only that equipment which is
     "necessary for interconnection or access to \[UNEs\]."[^678] In
     accordance with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in *GTE v. FCC*,[^679]
     we currently are considering what equipment is "necessary" for
     these purposes.[^680] Finally, we believe that MFNS's alleged
     difficulties negotiating collocation arrangements with SWBT are
     best resolved through the section 252 negotiation and arbitration
     process or through the section 208 complaint process. As we have
     found in past section 271 proceedings, the section 271 process
     simply could not function if we were required to resolve every
     interpretive dispute about the precise content of an incumbent
     LEC's obligations to its competitors, including fact-intensive
     interpretive disputes.[^681]

231. We also disagree with Sprint that its problems concerning
     collocation in remote terminals in Kansas and Oklahoma warrant
     denial of SWBT's application.[^682] The state commissions
     determined that Sprint's issues concerning collocation in remote
     terminals were insufficient to overcome an overall finding of
     checklist compliance.[^683] In addition, the Kansas Commission has
     said that if Sprint, or any other CLEC continues to experience
     difficulties concerning collocation in remote terminals, it will
     address these issues as part of its six-month review of SWBT's
     collocation tariff in Kansas.[^684] Because this appears to be a
     fact-based interconnection dispute that is better resolved at the
     state-level, and because the state commissions have determined that
     Sprint's claims were insufficient to overcome an overall finding of
     checklist non-compliance, we are not persuaded that SWBT has failed
     to comply with its collocation obligations in Kansas and
     Oklahoma.[^685]

### Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection

232. We conclude that SWBT provides interconnection at all technically
     feasible points, including a single point of interconnection, and
     therefore demonstrates compliance with the checklist item. SWBT
     asserts that it makes each of its standard methods of
     interconnection available at the line side or trunk side of the
     local switch, the trunk connection points of a tandem switch,
     central office cross-connect points, out-of-band signaling transfer
     points, and points of access to UNEs.[^686] SWBT demonstrates that
     it has state-approved interconnection agreements that spell out
     readily available points of interconnection, and provide a process
     for requesting interconnection at additional, technically feasible
     points.[^687] SWBT further shows that, for purposes of
     interconnection to exchange local traffic, a competitive LEC may
     choose a single, technically feasible point of interconnection
     within a LATA.[^688]

233. Some commenters argue that SWBT effectively denies a competing
     carrier the right to select a single point of interconnection by
     improperly shifting to competing carriers inflated transport and
     switching costs associated with such an arrangement.[^689] For
     example, AT&T avers that, in a technical conference in Oklahoma
     after the adoption of the O2A, SWBT advanced several compensation
     arrangements relating to a competing carrier's choice of
     interconnection and collocation which require AT&T to pay inflated
     transport costs upon exercising its right to a single point of
     interconnection.[^690] SWBT responds that AT&T largely
     misunderstands the positions it advanced at the technical
     conference, and that AT&T's claims are best addressed at the state
     level through the negotiation and arbitration process.[^691] SWBT
     further argues that the Commission previously determined that
     carriers seeking a single point of interconnection should bear any
     additional cost associated with taking traffic to and from the
     point of interconnection in the other exchange.[^692]

234. Because these commenters, including AT&T, take issue only with
     positions advanced by SWBT in a technical conference, we find that
     the issues raised are hypothetical ones, and therefore do not
     warrant a finding of non-compliance with checklist item 1. Although
     SWBT's interpretation of the state-approved interconnection
     agreement raises potential future compliance issues regarding the
     interplay between a single point of interconnection and reciprocal
     compensation, our review must be limited to present issues of
     compliance.[^693] Indeed, we understand that AT&T has filed for
     arbitration of these issues in Oklahoma.[^694] To the extent that
     the parties believe that this is a matter requiring more explicit
     rules, we invite them to file a petition for declaratory ruling or
     petition for rulemaking with the Commission.

235. Finally, we caution SWBT from taking what appears to be an
     expansive and out of context interpretation of findings we made in
     our *SWBT Texas Order* concerning its obligation to deliver traffic
     to a competitive LEC's point of interconnection.[^695] In our *SWBT
     Texas Order*, we cited to SWBT's interconnection agreement with
     MCI-WorldCom to support the proposition that SWBT provided carriers
     the option of a single point of interconnection.[^696] We did not,
     however, consider the issue of how that choice of interconnection
     would affect inter-carrier compensation arrangements. Nor did our
     decision to allow a single point of interconnection change an
     incumbent LEC's reciprocal compensation obligations under our
     current rules. [^697] For example, these rules preclude an
     incumbent LEC from charging carriers for local traffic that
     originates on the incumbent LEC's network.[^698] These rules also
     require that an incumbent LEC compensate the other carrier for
     transport[^699] and termination[^700] for local traffic that
     originates on the network facilities of such other carrier.[^701]

### Pricing of Interconnection

#### Background

236. As discussed above, checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide
     "interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections
     251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)."[^702] Section 251(c)(2) requires
     incumbent LECs to provide interconnection "at any technically
     feasible point within the carrier's network ... on rates, terms,
     and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
     nondiscriminatory."[^703] Section 252(d)(1) requires state
     determinations regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of
     interconnection to be based on cost and to be nondiscriminatory,
     and allows the rates to include a reasonable profit.[^704] The
     Commission's pricing rules require, among other things, that in
     order to comply with its collocation obligations, an incumbent LEC
     provide collocation based on TELRIC.[^705]

#### Discussion

237. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT offers
     interconnection in Kansas and Oklahoma to other telecommunications
     carriers at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, in
     compliance with checklist item 1. The Kansas and Oklahoma
     Commissions conclude that SWBT currently provides collocation under
     approved interconnection agreements and tariffs, consistent with
     FCC, Kansas Commission, and Oklahoma Commission orders.[^706]

238. Sprint challenges SWBT's collocation rates in both states because
     the rates are interim. Sprint further asserts that the fact that
     SWBT has not yet set permanent rates in Kansas and Oklahoma is
     directly relevant to whether the Commission can discount the
     uncertainty and risk of non-cost-based interim rates.[^707] The
     Department of Justice also expresses concern over the interim
     nature of both states' collocation rates.[^708] We have previously
     set forth a three-pronged test to determine whether interim rates
     are acceptable: (1) the interim solution to a particular rate
     dispute is reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the state
     commission has demonstrated its commitment to our pricing rules;
     and (3) provision is made for refunds or true-ups once permanent
     rates are set.[^709] We conclude that each state's interim
     collocation rates meet this standard.

239. We find that the interim solutions adopted by the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions are reasonable under the circumstances.
     ConnectSouth alleges that SWBT's physical collocation rates are
     barriers to entry in Kansas and Oklahoma because they are
     significantly higher than the cost-based rates charged in
     Texas.[^710] We note that the Oklahoma rates cited by
     ConnectSouth[^711] have been superseded by the interim rates
     adopted by the Oklahoma Commission, which in fact are the Texas
     collocation rates.[^712] As the Commission noted in the *SWBT Texas
     Order*, the Texas Commission based its interim physical collocation
     rates on a TELRIC model developed by AT&T and MCI, with
     modifications.[^713] We believe that the rates contained within the
     Texas 271 application, including those that are interim, are
     reasonable starting points for interim rates for the same carrier
     in an adjoining state. In Kansas, the interim rates were set at
     SWBT's proposed rates, except for those for Site Conditioning and
     Power, which the Kansas Commission set at one-half of the rates
     proposed by SWBT.[^714] The Kansas Commission found that while the
     competitive LECs preferred Texas interim rates to those proposed by
     SWBT, they were more concerned with having a true-up in place, and
     acknowledged that SWBT's proposed rates were significant
     improvements over the Individual Case Basis (ICB) rates that were
     then in place.[^715] We view the Kansas Commission's decision as a
     reasonable attempt by the state commission to set an interim
     TELRIC-based rate pending its final determination.

240. We take notice that each state has pending cost proceedings to set
     permanent rates for collocation,[^716] and each has ordered that
     the interim rates be subject to true-up.[^717] We also recognize
     that each state set its interim collocation rates so that
     competitive LECs could obtain collocation subject to true up rather
     than through ICB pricing that was much more expensive and not
     subject to true up.[^718] Furthermore, each state has committed to
     complete its collocation cost docket in the near future.[^719] We
     conclude that the uncertainty surrounding the interim rates has
     been minimized. Based on the permanent rates that the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions have already adopted for unbundled network
     elements, and the expectation that in setting permanent collocation
     rates, the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions will take into account
     concerns we raise in our decision today, we have confidence that
     the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions will set permanent collocation
     rates that are in compliance with the Act and our rules.[^720] We
     believe that these steps adequately address the Department of
     Justice's concerns about the existence of interim rates in both
     states.[^721] Consequently, we find that SWBT has met its
     obligations under this checklist item for rates in both Kansas and
     Oklahoma.

# Other Checklist Items

## Checklist Item 6 -- Switching 

### Background

241. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[l\]ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop
     transmission, or other services."[^722] To satisfy its obligations
     under this subsection, an applicant must demonstrate compliance
     with the Commission rules effective as of the date of the
     application relating to unbundled local switching, most of which
     are set forth in detail in our prior 271 orders.[^723] The
     Commission revised these rules in the *UNE Remand Order*, which was
     released on November 5, 1999. That order generally retained the
     unbundling obligations for local switching while narrowing the
     scope of the obligation for certain geographic areas.[^724] In the
     *UNE Remand Order*, the Commission required that incumbent LECs
     need not provide access on an unbundled basis to packet switching
     except in certain limited circumstances.[^725]

### Discussion

242. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it complies with checklist item 6.[^726]
     Specifically, SWBT demonstrates that it provides: (1) line-side and
     trunk side facilities; [^727] (2) basic switching
     functions;[^728] (3) vertical features;[^729] (4) customized
     routing; [^730] (5) shared trunk ports; [^731] (6) unbundled tandem
     switching;[^732] (7) usage information for billing exchange access;
     [^733] and (8) usage information for billing for reciprocal
     compensation.[^734] The Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions conclude
     that SWBT is in compliance with checklist item 6.[^735]
     Furthermore, the terms and conditions for local switching in both
     the K2A and the O2A are similar to those in the T2A, which we
     considered in the Texas 271 proceeding and determined to satisfy
     the requirements of checklist item 6.[^736] One significant
     modification to the T2A, however, is the addition of a provision
     for unbundled packet switching which, as discussed below, we find
     satisfies the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order*.

243. With regard to the provision of unbundled packet switching, SWBT
     demonstrates that it has a legal obligation in Kansas and Oklahoma
     to provide packet switching according to the rules set forth in the
     *UNE Remand Order*. [^737] Indeed, SWBT's K2A and O2A incorporate
     verbatim the criteria adopted in our *UNE Remand Order* to
     establish when packet switching will be made available as an
     unbundled network element. [^738]

244. We disagree with commenters that argue that SWBT violates the
     Commission's rules because it asserts in an attached affidavit a
     predictive judgment that it will not have to make available its
     packet switching capability contained in its Project Pronto network
     architecture.[^739] These commenters do not allege that SWBT has
     denied them access to unbundled packet switching in Kansas or
     Oklahoma in contravention of our rules. Rather, these commenters
     take issue with SWBT's interpretation, set forth in this
     application, of its packet switching unbundling obligations as
     applied in the context of SWBT's Project Pronto.[^740]
     Specifically, they disagree with SWBT's assertion that packet
     switching capability deployed as part of its Project Pronto does
     not, and will not, qualify for unbundling because its Project
     Pronto architecture is designed in a way that prevents it from
     meeting the criteria established in the *UNE Remand Order* for such
     unbundling.

245. In assessing compliance with checklist item 6, we need not rule on
     SWBT's interpretation of the *UNE Remand Order* as it relates to
     packet switching that is part of Project Pronto because no party
     has yet requested packet switching in Kansas or Oklahoma, and
     neither the Kansas nor the Oklahoma Commission has expressly
     endorsed or affirmed this interpretation. Without a specific
     factual situation or further information, this is not an issue that
     is ripe for review in the context of a pending section 271
     application. Although SWBT's interpretation raises potential future
     compliance issues with packet switching unbundling obligations,
     [^741] our review must be limited to present and concrete issues of
     compliance. Therefore, we find that SWBT complies with checklist
     item 6 concerning unbundled packet switching because it has
     demonstrated that it has a present legal obligation under the K2A
     and O2A, as well as existing interconnection agreements, to provide
     access to unbundled packet switching in accordance with our rules.
     In doing so, we limit our finding to a review of the legal
     obligations contained in the K2A and O2A and expressly reserve
     judgment on SWBT's interpretation of its obligation with respect to
     unbundled packet switching until faced with more concrete factual
     circumstances. We emphasize that nothing in our *Pronto
     Modification Order* relieves SWBT of any obligations under sections
     251, 252 or any other provision of the Communications Act.[^742]

## Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings

246. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to
     provide "\[w\]hite pages directory listings for customers of the
     other carrier's telephone exchange service."[^743] Section
     251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive
     providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service
     to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listings.[^744] In
     the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission found that a
     BOC satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by demonstrating
     that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance and integration
     of white page directory listings to competitive LECs' customers;
     and (2) provided white page listings for competitors' customers
     with the same accuracy and reliability that it provides its own
     customers.[^745]

247. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8.[^746] The Kansas
     and Oklahoma Commissions also conclude that SWBT complies with this
     checklist item.[^747] We reject McLeodUSA and KMC's assertions that
     SWBT fails to provide white pages directory listings in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^748] Although McLeodUSA claims that
     Ameritech has not provided directory listing to its resale
     customers in Illinois and Wisconsin,[^749] McLeodUSA provides no
     evidence of problems with SWBT's white pages directory listings in
     Kansas and Oklahoma. Thus, McLeodUSA's argument is not relevant to
     a determination of whether SWBT meets checklist item 8 in Kansas
     and Oklahoma.[^750] KMC states that SWBT has failed to provide
     white pages directory listings for many KMC customers in
     Kansas.[^751] We conclude that there is no evidence to support that
     the difficulties KMC has encountered with SWBT's white pages
     directory listing procedures reflect systemic problems with SWBT's
     provisioning of their listings.

## Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation

248. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter
     into "\[r\]eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with
     the requirements of section 252(d)(2)."[^752] In turn, pursuant to
     section 252(d)(2)(A), "a State commission shall not consider the
     terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and
     reasonable unless (i) such terms and conditions provide for the
     mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated
     with the transport and termination on each carrier's network
     facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the
     other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such
     costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional
     costs of terminating such calls."[^753]

249. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT
     demonstrates that it has entered into reciprocal compensation
     arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section
     252(d)(2), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist
     item 13. SWBT demonstrates that it: (1) has in place reciprocal
     compensation arrangements in accordance with section
     252(d)(2),[^754] and (2) is making all required payments in a
     timely fashion.[^755] SWBT states that reciprocal compensation
     interconnection arrangements are available under rates set forth in
     the K2A and O2A and that Kansas and Oklahoma interconnection
     agreements contain negotiated, or arbitrated, reciprocal
     compensation rates.[^756] Both the Kansas Commission and Oklahoma
     Commission have concluded that SWBT complies with the reciprocal
     compensation requirements in item 13.[^757]

250. SWBT, however, has not paid reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound
     traffic in Kansas and Oklahoma, maintaining that such traffic is
     "non-local," and, therefore outside the reciprocal compensation
     requirement.[^758] Several commenters allege that SWBT's refusal to
     pay constitutes a failure of the reciprocal compensation
     requirement.[^759] E-spire further maintains that SWBT's choice to
     withhold the disputed amount and its protracted litigation are
     designed to keep competitors out of the market.[^760]

251. We find that the issues raised by the commenters do not evidence
     SWBT's failure to satisfy checklist item 13. Under a prior
     Commission order, ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the
     reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5) and
     252(d)(2);[^761] therefore, as we stated in our *Bell Atlantic New
     York Order*, whether a carrier pays such compensation is
     "irrelevant to checklist item 13."[^762] The D.C. Circuit vacated
     and remanded the Commission's order, and the Commission is now
     reconsidering the matter.[^763] Given that the Commission has not
     yet determined the status of ISP-bound traffic, refusing to pay
     reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic does not violate
     checklist item 13's requirements at this time. As we have stated,
     "\[i\]n the absence" of a Commission rule on reciprocal
     compensation, "parties may voluntarily include this traffic within
     the scope of their interconnection agreements ....\[and\] they are
     bound by those agreements, as interpreted and enforced by the state
     commissions."[^764] At this time, therefore, provided that a
     carrier follows states' interpretations and requirements
     promulgated under their interpretations of interconnection
     agreements, including states' requirements concerning ISP-bound
     traffic, such carrier has satisfied checklist item 13. Kansas has
     no final determination on the payment of reciprocal compensation
     for ISP-bound traffic.[^765] The United States Court of Appeals for
     the Tenth Circuit has recently affirmed the Oklahoma Commission's
     determination that reciprocal compensation must be paid for
     ISP-bound traffic.[^766] We expect that SWBT will comply with the
     final judicial determination of the matter.

## Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 

252. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make
     \"telecommunications services . . . available for resale in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and
     252(d)(3).\"[^767] Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude
     that SWBT demonstrates that it makes telecommunications services
     available in Kansas and Oklahoma for resale in accordance with
     sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3), and thus satisfies the
     requirements of checklist item 14.[^768] SWBT states that it allows
     resellers nondiscriminatory access to its systems in compliance
     with this checklist item,[^769] and the Kansas and Oklahoma
     Commissions agree.[^770] In Kansas, SWBT, AT&T and the KCC staff
     have agreed to a uniform avoided cost discount of 21.6 percent,
     which is incorporated in the K2A.[^771] In Oklahoma, the OCC has
     established a wholesale discount rate of 19.8%, which is
     incorporated into the O2A.[^772]

253. We find unpersuasive commenters' claims that the Commission should
     allow customers in long-term contracts to switch to competing
     telecommunications carriers without termination penalties under a
     "fresh look" argument. [^773] In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*
     and the *SWBT Texas Order*, we determined that although termination
     liabilities could, in certain circumstances, be unreasonable or
     anticompetitive, they do not on their face cause a carrier to fail
     checklist item 14.[^774] We also determined that if termination
     liabilities are not triggered by the assignment of a contract to a
     competitive LEC, such termination liabilities do not constitute a
     restriction on resale under checklist item 14.[^775] In both Kansas
     and Oklahoma, the assignment of a Customer Specific Arrangement to
     a competitive LEC does not trigger termination liabilities.[^776]
     Accordingly, these termination liabilities do not constitute a
     restriction on resale under checklist item 14. We note that KMC
     raised an identical "fresh look" argument in a Petition for
     Declaratory Ruling, which is currently pending.[^777] We find, as
     we did in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* and *SWBT Texas
     Order*, that this issue is best addressed in the context of that
     pending petition, and we decline to resolve the issue here.[^778]
     In any event, our resolution of this issue would not cast doubt on
     SWBT's overall compliance with checklist item 14 because SWBT meets
     our existing resale requirements.

254. Based on evidence in the record, we also find that SWBT satisfies
     the provisioning requirements of checklist item 14. As discussed
     above, SWBT is provisioning competitive LECs' orders for resale in
     substantially the same time and manner as for its retail
     customers.[^779]

## E. Remaining Checklist Items (3, 5, 7, 9-12) {#e.-remaining-checklist-items-3-5-7-9-12 .unnumbered}

255. An applicant under section 271 must demonstrate that it complies
     with checklist item 3 (poles, ducts, conduits and rights of
     way),[^780] item 5 (unbundled local transport),[^781] item 7
     (911/E911 access and directory assistance/operator services),[^782]
     item 9 (numbering administration),[^783] item 10 (databases and
     associated signaling),[^784] item 11 (number portability),[^785]
     and item 12 (local dialing parity).[^786] Based on the evidence in
     the record, and in accordance with Commission rules and orders
     concerning compliance with section 271 of the Act, we conclude that
     SWBT demonstrates that it is in compliance with checklist items 3,
     5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in both Kansas and Oklahoma.[^787] The
     Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions also conclude that SWBT complies
     with the requirements of each of these checklist items.[^788] No
     commenter raised allegations challenging SWBT's compliance with
     checklist items 3, 9 and 12. Insofar as commenters raised issues
     concerning checklist items 5, 7, 10 and 11, we address these issues
     elsewhere in this Order.[^789]

# SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 

256. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^790] The
     Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the
     *Accounting Safeguards Order* and the *Non-Accounting Safeguards
     Order*.[^791] Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate
     the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization
     between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate. In addition, these
     safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of their
     section 272 affiliates.[^792] As we stated in the *Ameritech
     Michigan Order*, compliance with section 272 is "of crucial
     importance" because the structural, transactional, and
     nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272 seek to ensure that
     BOCs compete on a level playing field.[^793]

## Discussion

257. Based on the record, we conclude that SWBT has demonstrated that it
     complies with the requirements of section 272. No commenter has
     challenged SWBT's showing that it complies with Section 272. In
     addition, we have previously found that SWBT met its burden of
     proving compliance with section 272 in Texas.[^794] Significantly,
     SWBT states that it maintains the same structural separation and
     nondiscrimination safeguards in Kansas and Oklahoma as it does in
     Texas.[^795] We address each section 272 requirement below.

### Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section 272

258. *Section 272(a) -- Separate Affiliate*. Section 272(a) requires
     BOCs and their local exchange carrier affiliates that are subject
     to section 251(c) to provide certain competitive services through
     structurally separate affiliates.[^796] For the reasons described
     in the subsequent section below, we conclude that SBC demonstrates
     that it will operate in accordance with section 272(a). No party
     challenges SWBT's showing that it complies with section 272(a).

259. The parent company, SBC Communications, Inc., has established one
     primary section 272 affiliate to provide in-region interLATA
     services in Kansas and Oklahoma upon gaining section 271 approval:
     Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. ("SBCS"), which
     does business as Southwestern Bell Long Distance.[^797] At this
     time, SBCS provides long distance service in Texas, and also
     conducts the company's calling card operations. Once earning
     section 271 approval, SBCS plans to provide in-region interLATA
     services in Kansas and Oklahoma by reselling wholesale network
     services of one or more unaffiliated providers.[^798] In its
     application, SWBT demonstrates that it has implemented internal
     control mechanisms reasonably designed to prevent, as well as
     detect and correct, any noncompliance with section 272.

260. *Section 272(b).* Based on the evidence in the record, and our
     prior determinations regarding SWBT's section 272 affiliate,[^799]
     we find that SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate
     complies with section 272(b) in the provision of services in Kansas
     and Oklahoma. Specifically, we find that SWBT has demonstrated that
     its separate affiliate "operates independently" as required under
     section 272(b)(1); [^800] maintains separate books, records and
     accounts as required under section 272(b)(2);[^801] maintains
     separate officers, directors and employees as required under
     section 272(b)(3); [^802] fulfills the credit arrangements
     requirements of section 272(b)(4); [^803] and complies with the
     arm's length and public disclosure requirements of section
     272(b)(5).[^804] Furthermore, we note, as we did in the *SWBT Texas
     271 Order*, that neither the Commission's review of SWBT's
     accounting information nor the audits conducted by independent
     auditors have revealed discrepancies with SWBT's corporate
     accounting procedures for affiliate transactions in the past three
     years.[^805] We also note that the section 272(d) joint
     Federal-State audit will provide an appropriate mechanism for
     detecting potential anticompetitive or otherwise improper conduct.
     Finally, no party challenges SWBT's showing that it complies with
     section 272(b).

261. *Section 272(c)(2) -- Accounting Principles*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it accounts for all
     transactions with its section 272 affiliates in accordance with the
     accounting principles designated or approved by the
     Commission.[^806] In the *Accounting Safeguards Order*, the
     Commission concluded that complying with the Part 32 affiliate
     transactions rules satisfies the accounting requirements of section
     272(c), which pertain to the BOC's "dealings" with its separate
     affiliate. We agree with SBC that its section 272 affiliates may
     share services (except OI&M) provided to its affiliated BOCs by a
     "shared services affiliate," but we emphasize that such services
     are subject to the appropriate non-structural safeguards.[^807]

262. *Section 272(d) -- Biennial Audit*. Based on the evidence in the
     record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with
     section 272(d), which requires an independent audit of a BOC's
     compliance with section 272 after receiving interLATA
     authorization.[^808] The section 272(d) biennial audit involves a
     thorough and systematic evaluation of a BOC's compliance with
     section 272 and its affiliate relationships performed by an
     independent auditor working under the direction of the Commission
     and state commissions.[^809] As noted in the *Accounting Safeguards
     Order*, once a BOC obtains section 271 approval, the Chief of the
     Common Carrier Bureau will form a joint Federal/State audit team to
     review the conduct of the audit and oversee the activities of the
     independent auditor.[^810] We view the active participation of the
     state commissions as critical to the success of the biennial audit
     at ensuring a BOC's compliance with section 272. As noted in
     previous orders, the section 272(d) biennial audit entails an
     examination into a BOC's affiliate relationships to ensure the
     company does not use its corporate affiliates as improper tools for
     circumventing statutory obligations.[^811] We emphasize that a BOC
     cannot circumvent legal and regulatory requirements through its
     affiliate structure.

### Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272

263. *Section 272(c)(1) -- Nondiscrimination Safeguards*. Based on the
     evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it
     will comply with section 272(c)(1), which prohibits a BOC from
     discriminating in favor of its section 272 affiliate in the
     "provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and
     information, or in the establishment of standards."[^812] The
     Commission's nondiscrimination safeguards require a BOC to, among
     other things, "provide to unaffiliated entities the same goods,
     services, facilities, and information that it provides to its
     section 272 affiliate at the same rates, terms, and
     conditions."[^813] Our review of SWBT's internal controls and
     standard operating procedures shows that SWBT requires its section
     272 affiliate to adhere to the same procedures for obtaining
     collocation space required of unaffiliated third parties, and that
     SWBT has procedures to ensure that unaffiliated entities have
     access to information for, among other things, the development of
     company-internal standards and processes.[^814] In addition, we
     note SWBT's OSS showing demonstrates that it meets the requirements
     of section 272(c)(1) regarding nondiscriminatory provision of
     information.[^815]

264. *Section 272(e) -- Fulfillment of Certain Requests.* Based on the
     evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with
     section 272(e), which requires SWBT to fulfill requests for, among
     other things, telephone exchange and exchange access services from
     unaffiliated entities within the same time period SWBT fulfills
     such requests for its own retail operations.[^816] In addition,
     section 272(e) also provides that a BOC "shall not provide any
     facilities, services, or information concerning its provision of
     exchange access to the \[section 272 affiliate\] unless such
     facilities, services or information are made available to other
     providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms
     and conditions."[^817] Finally, section 272(e) places certain
     accounting and nondiscrimination requirements on BOCs with respect
     to exchange access and facilities or services provided to their
     section 272 affiliates.[^818] We note that no party challenges
     SWBT's showing with respect to section 272(e).

### Joint Marketing Provisions of Section 272

265. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT has
     demonstrated that it will comply with the joint marketing
     provisions of section 272(g)(1),[^819] and the affiliate services
     requirements of section 272(g)(2).[^820] We note that no party
     challenges SWBT's showing.

# PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 

266. Separate from determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^821] We conclude that approval of this joint
     application is consistent with the public interest. In reaching
     this determination, we find that compliance with the competitive
     checklist is itself a strong indicator that long distance entry is
     consistent with the public interest. This approach reflects the
     Commission's years of experience with the consumer benefits that
     flow from competition in telecommunications markets.

267. Nonetheless, the public interest requirement is independent of the
     statutory checklist and, under normal canons of statutory
     construction, requires an independent determination. Thus, we view
     the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review the
     circumstances presented by the applications to ensure that no other
     relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional
     intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive
     checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest
     as Congress expected. Among other things, we may review the local
     and long distance markets to ensure that there are not unusual
     circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest
     under the particular circumstances of these applications.[^822]
     Another factor that could be relevant to our analysis is whether we
     have sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant
     of the application. While no one factor is dispositive in this
     analysis, our overriding goal is to ensure that nothing undermines
     our conclusion, based on our analysis of checklist compliance, that
     markets are open to competition. As discussed below, we conclude
     that the public interest would be met by granting the joint
     application for Kansas and Oklahoma.

## Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets

268. As set forth below, we conclude that approval of the joint
     application for Kansas and Oklahoma is consistent with promoting
     competition in the local and long distance telecommunications
     markets in each state. Consistent with our extensive review of the
     competitive checklist, which embodies the critical elements of
     market entry under the Act, we find that barriers to competitive
     entry in the local markets have been removed and the local exchange
     markets today are open to competition. We disagree with commenters'
     arguments that the public interest would be disserved by granting
     SWBT's application because the local market in Kansas and in
     Oklahoma have not yet truly been opened to competition.[^823]
     Commenters cite an array of evidence which, they argue,
     demonstrates that the local telecommunications market is not open
     and that competition has not sufficiently taken hold in Kansas and
     Oklahoma. For example, one commenter suggests that the low
     percentage of total access lines served by competitive LECs in both
     Kansas and Oklahoma, and the minimal competition for residential
     services in Kansas, indicate that these markets are not yet truly
     open.[^824] Given an affirmative showing that a market is open and
     the competitive checklist has been satisfied, low customer volumes
     in and of themselves do not undermine that showing. Factors beyond
     a BOC\'s control, such as individual CLEC entry strategies for
     instance, might explain a low residential customer base. We note
     that Congress specifically declined to adopt a market share or
     other similar test for BOC entry into long distance, and we have no
     intention of establishing one here.[^825] We further find that the
     record confirms our view, as noted in prior section 271 orders,
     that BOC entry into the long distance market will benefit consumers
     and competition if the relevant local exchange market is open to
     competition consistent with the competitive checklist^.^[^826]

## Assurance of Future Compliance

269. As set forth below, we find that SWBT's performance remedy plans
     for both Kansas and Oklahoma provide additional assurance that the
     local markets will remain open after SWBT receives section 271
     authorization. The Commission previously has explained that one
     factor it may consider as part of its public interest analysis is
     whether a BOC would continue to satisfy the requirements of section
     271 after entering the long distance market.[^827] Although the
     Commission strongly encourages state performance monitoring and
     post-entry enforcement, we have never required BOC applicants to
     demonstrate that they are subject to such mechanisms as a condition
     of section 271 approval.[^828] The Commission has stated that the
     fact that a BOC will be subject to performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms would constitute probative evidence that the
     BOC will continue to meet its section 271 obligations and that its
     entry would be consistent with the public interest.[^829]

### Performance Remedy Plan

270. SWBT's Performance Remedy Plans are part of the K2A and O2A
     standard interconnection contracts and are available to competing
     LECs through those agreements. The two Plans are nearly identical
     to the current Texas Performance Remedy Plan, itself a modified
     version of the plan we reviewed in the Texas 271 proceedings.[^830]
     That original plan has undergone review and modification through
     the ongoing Texas Commission and industry process under Texas
     Commission authority.[^831] While we do not require that one state
     commission adopt or use another state's Plan, we recognize the
     efficiency gained by all involved state commissions, SWBT and
     competing carriers from working together to develop and monitor
     common performance measures and similar remedy plans.

271. Under the Plans, SWBT collects and reports data on a wide range of
     performance areas, according to set definitions and business rules.
     The Performance Remedy Plans provide for two classes or "tiers" of
     performance penalties. Tier-1 penalties apply generally to
     customer-affecting measurements. Penalties for failure to comply
     with standards corresponding to these performance measurements are
     paid to competitive LECs receiving the substandard performance and
     that have opted into this section of the K2A or O2A. Tier-2
     penalties apply to competition-affecting measurements such as OSS
     availability, and are paid to the respective State Treasuries.
     Tier-1 damages are assessed if a performance measure is out of
     compliance for a single month, but Tier-2 fines apply only if a
     measurement is missed for three consecutive months. Alternately, if
     three consecutive months are not missed, but six of twelve months'
     measurements are missed, Tier-2 fines will also apply.[^832]

272. While the current Texas Plan forms the basis for the two new plans,
     both the Kansas and Oklahoma commissions modified their plans in
     certain aspects to address particular situations and conditions in
     those states. For example, as explained below, the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Plans differ from the current Texas Plan in certain
     details in mathematical formulas for some calculations, the level
     of penalty caps and references to state-specific statutes and
     requirements. While some commenters question the differences
     between the current Texas and the Kansas and Oklahoma Plans,[^833]
     we conclude that the state-specific modifications appear reasonable
     and do not detract from the overall effectiveness of the Plans.

### Key Elements of the Enforcement Plans

273. We have examined certain key aspects of these plans to determine
     whether they fall within a zone of reasonableness and are likely to
     provide incentives that are sufficient to foster post-entry
     checklist compliance. Plans may vary in their strengths and
     weaknesses, and there is no one way to demonstrate assurance.[^834]
     In our *SWBT Texas Order*, for example, we predicted that the
     enforcement mechanisms developed in Texas would be effective in
     practice.[^835] Both the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions adopted a
     variant of the current Texas Plan whose measures, coupled with a
     self-executing performance remedy plan, are designed to prevent
     backsliding. Both the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions recognize the
     importance of implementing and monitoring a remedy plan that
     produces sufficient incentives for SWBT to maintain a high level of
     wholesale service and sufficient disincentives for SWBT to engage
     in anti-competitive behavior after section 271 relief is granted in
     their state.[^836] As explained below, we conclude that both the
     Kansas and the Oklahoma Commissions established a performance
     remedy plan that would discourage anti-competitive behavior by
     setting the damages and penalties at a level above the simple cost
     of doing business.

274. *Total Liability At Risk.* We conclude that the total of \$45
     million for Kansas and \$44 million for Oklahoma in potential
     penalties placed at risk, on an annual basis, under the performance
     plans represents a meaningful incentive for SWBT to maintain a high
     level of performance.[^837] As a percentage of the applicant's
     in-state net return, these penalty plans place the same amount at
     stake as the plans adopted in Texas and New York. We thus disagree
     with commenters that suggest that this amount is insufficient and
     fails to provide adequate assurance of SWBT's compliance in the
     future.[^838] The performance plans adopted by the Kansas and
     Oklahoma Commissions do not represent the only means of ensuring
     that SWBT continues to provide nondiscriminatory service to
     competing carriers.[^839] In addition to the \$45 million in Kansas
     and \$44 million in Oklahoma at stake under the Plans, as noted
     above, SWBT faces other consequences if it fails to sustain a high
     level of service to competing carriers, including: federal
     enforcement action pursuant to section 271(d)(6); liquidated
     damages under interconnection agreements; and remedies associated
     with antitrust and other legal actions.

275. *Performance Measurements and Standards.* Performance measurements
     are intended to ensure that the reporting mechanism provides a
     "benchmark against which new entrants and regulators can measure
     performance over time to detect and correct any degradation of
     service rendered to new entrants."[^840] The Plans are not static,
     and we recognize that both the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions are
     committed to periodic review and modification of the plans based on
     input from both SWBT and competitive LECs.[^841] The Kansas and
     Oklahoma Plans include a semi-annual review process, similar to
     that adopted in the Texas Plan. This continuing ability of the
     measurements to evolve is an important feature because it allows
     the Plans to reflect changes in the telecommunications industry and
     the Kansas and Oklahoma markets.[^842]

276. *Structural Elements of the Plan.* The Kansas and Oklahoma Plans
     add to the current Texas Plan specific conditions for Z statistical
     calculations and the methodology for calculating the Fisher's Exact
     Test, among other changes.[^843] As we found in the Texas
     proceedings, the structural elements of the Plan appear reasonably
     designed to detect and sanction poor performance when it occurs.
     Some commenters offer specific suggestions for strengthening the
     plan,[^844] and Sprint contends that the Plans are flawed because
     they were not fully reviewed by the state commissions.[^845] The
     two Plans are structurally similar to the Texas Plan and have been
     adopted by each state commission and are subject to their periodic
     review and revision; therefore, these criticisms do not undermine
     our overall conclusion that the Plans provide a meaningful
     incentive to provide nondiscriminatory performance in the future.

277. *Self-Executing Mechanism.* The performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms appear to be reasonably self-executing, and
     are comparable to the mechanisms we found satisfactory in the *Bell
     Atlantic New York Order* and in the *SWBT Texas Order*.[^846]
     Specifically, we note that SWBT is required to provide performance
     data by the 20th day of the month following the reporting month,
     and is required to make payments, if necessary, by the 30th day
     following the due date of the performance measurement report for
     the month in which the obligation arose.[^847] Several commenters,
     however, suggest the Plans may not yet be in effect.[^848] Both the
     Kansas and the Oklahoma Tier-1 and Tier-2 penalty provisions are
     currently in operation and, therefore, in effect.[^849]

278. *Data Validation and Audit Procedures.* As we held in prior section
     271 orders, the reliability of reported data is critical: the
     performance measures must generate results that are meaningful,
     accurate, and reproducible. In particular, the raw data underlying
     a performance measurement must be stored in a secure, stable, and
     auditable file if we are to accord a remedy plan significant
     weight.[^850] The systems and processes used to generate SWBT's
     Kansas and Oklahoma data are the same as those used in the previous
     Texas 271 review.[^851] While Sprint suggests that neither the
     Kansas nor Oklahoma Commissions rigorously reviewed and validated
     the accuracy of the data,[^852] no competing LEC has demonstrated
     that SWBT's data are inaccurate. Further we note that SWBT provides
     competing carriers with access to their own specific data which
     acts as an additional check on the accuracy of the data.[^853] We
     thus find that we will accord significant weight to the data as we
     did in the Texas 271 proceedings.

279. On December 20, 2000 the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability
     to SWBT for issues pursuant to the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order
     regarding certain data reporting.[^854] All of the identified
     issues have been corrected. Except as noted above, with respect to
     only one specific performance measurement, no data reviewed in the
     current evaluation of this joint application was affected. While
     one of these findings does relate to data for the time period under
     review, we find as noted above that the issue identified by the
     auditors does not affect our conclusions.[^855]

280. *Accounting Requirements*. Consistent with our accounting rules,
     relating to antitrust damages and certain other penalties paid by
     carriers, SWBT should not reflect any portion of penalties paid out
     under these Plans as expenses in the revenue requirement for
     interstate services.[^856] As stated in prior orders, such
     accounting treatment ensures that ratepayers do not bear, in the
     form of increased rates, the costs of penalties paid out under the
     Plans in the event that SWBT fails to provide adequate service
     quality to competitive LECs.[^857]

## Other Issues

281. Commenters raise several other concerns which, they contend,
     support a finding that grant of this application is not in the
     public interest. AT&T's argument concerning insufficient economic
     margin with current unbundled network element prices is addressed
     above in the pricing section. MFNS contends certain interconnection
     issues cause a public interest concern. EMI's concerns about
     service outages in Oklahoma are isolated instances and do not
     constitute discrimination against competitive carriers, and we do
     not find that these service quality issues cited constitute a
     pattern of discriminatory conduct that undermines our confidence
     that SWBT's local market is open to competition. The Commission has
     previously found that although terminations liabilities could, in
     certain circumstances, be unreasonable or anticompetitive, they do
     not on their face cause a carrier to fail checklist item 14.[^858]
     Allegiance and McLeodUSA and CAPROCK suggests that SWBT has not
     complied with the filing requirement of demonstrating the measures
     taken to narrow the issues in dispute and the results of those
     measures.[^859] We believe the record adequately illuminates the
     measures SWBT, the state commissions and CLECs undertook to narrow
     and eliminate issues prior to the filing of this joint application.
     These arguments do not convince us that grant of this joint
     application would be inconsistent with the public interest.

282. Finally, several commenters contend that "Project Pronto," which
     refers to SWBT's plan to deploy equipment used to provide advanced
     services in fiber-fed remote terminals, might restrict competing
     carriers' ability to use the full features, functions, and
     capabilities of SWBT's local loops.[^860] As SWBT notes, however,
     nothing about its plan to increase the amount of fiber and remote
     terminals in its networks changes its fundamental obligation to
     provide access to the full features, functions, and capabilities of
     the local loop.[^861] Accordingly, we find no grounds to reject
     SWBT's application based upon these hypothetical concerns.

# SECTION 271(d)(6) enforcement authority

283. Section 271(d)(6) of the Act requires SWBT to continue to satisfy
     the "conditions required for ... approval"[^862] of its section 271
     application after the Commission approves its application. To this
     end, Congress gave the Commission specific post-approval
     enforcement powers to address possible "backsliding" by SWBT and
     other BOCs.[^863] This authority is critical to the statutory
     design that local markets are -- and remain -- open to competition,
     and evidences Congress's recognition that a BOC's incentives to
     cooperate with its local service competitors may diminish in a
     given state once the BOC obtains section 271 approval in that
     state.[^864] Several times in this order, we expressed concern
     about possible backsliding by SWBT once it obtains section 271
     approval and begins providing in-region interLATA service in Kansas
     and Oklahoma. We will exercise this authority in the event SWBT
     ceases to meet a condition of its approval. As we stated in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, "\[s\]wift and effective
     post-approval enforcement of section 271's requirements ... is
     essential to achieve Congress's goal of maintaining conditions
     conducive to achieving durable competition in local markets."[^865]

284. We described the post-approval enforcement framework, as well as
     our various section 271(d)(6) enforcement powers, in detail in the
     *Bell Atlantic New York Order*.[^866] Section 271(d)(6)(B) provides
     for the Commission to receive and review complaints filed by
     persons concerning alleged failures by a BOC to meet conditions
     required for long distance approval.[^867] Section 271(d)(6)(A)
     also specifies several enforcement actions that the Commission can
     take on its own motion, including ordering the BOC to correct a
     deficiency, assessing a forfeiture, and suspending or revoking the
     BOC's authority to provide long distance service.[^868] The
     Commission is required to provide a BOC with notice and an
     opportunity for a hearing if we exercise our authority pursuant to
     section 271(d)(6)(A). We will comply with this requirement and
     exercise this enforcement power without holding time-consuming
     formal, trial-type evidentiary hearings. Instead, we will resolve
     the matter through an expeditious paper proceeding.[^869]

285. We will monitor closely SWBT's post-approval compliance. In this
     regard, we require SWBT to provide the Commission with the monthly
     aggregated Performance Measures for Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas and
     SWBT's five-state region at least one year from the date of the
     release of this order, so that we can review its performance to
     ensure continued compliance with the statutory requirements. We
     stand ready to exercise our various statutory enforcement powers
     quickly and decisively in appropriate circumstances to ensure that
     the local market remains open in both Kansas and Oklahoma.
     Furthermore, we are confident that cooperative state and federal
     oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that may
     arise with respect to SWBT's entry into the Kansas and Oklahoma
     long distance markets.[^870]

# CONCLUSION

286. For the reasons discussed above, we grant SWBT's joint application
     for authorization under section 271 of the Act to provide
     in-region, interLATA services in the state of Kansas, and to
     provide in-region, interLATA services in the state of Oklahoma.

# Ordering Clauses

287. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
     and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
     154(i), 154(j) and 271, SWBT's application to provide in-region
     interLATA service in the State of Kansas, and in the State of
     Oklahoma, filed on October 26, 2000, IS GRANTED.

288. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by Sprint
     Communications Company on January 18, 2001, IS DENIED.

289. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that we waive our procedural rules regarding
     the consideration of late-filed evidence, but as a condition of
     this waiver, we delay the effective date of this Order by 43 days
     from the date of release. Therefore, this Order SHALL BECOME
     EFFECTIVE March 7, 2001.

     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

     Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc531683825 .anchor}Appendix A

**SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company**

**Southwestern Bell Communications Services**

**271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Kansas and
Oklahoma**

**CC Docket 00-217**

**COMMENTS**

Commenters Abbreviation

Adelphia Business Solutions Investment Adelphia

Allegiance Telecom, Inc Allegiance

Alliance for Public Technology APT

AT&T Corp AT&T

Campaign for Telecommunication Access CTA

Communications Workers of America CWA

ConnectSouth Communications, Inc ConnectSouth

Cox Communications, Inc COX

Department of Justice

E.Spire Communications, Inc \* E.spire

Environmental Management, Inc EMI

Focal Communications Group\* Focal

Global Crossing Global Crossing

Ionex Communications Inc Ionex

IP Communications IP Communications

Kansas Corporation Commission Kansas Commission

KMC Telecom Inc KMC

McLeodUSA Inc & CAPROCK Communications, Corp. McLeodUSA

Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc \* MFNS

Oklahoma Corporation Commission Oklahoma Commission

Sprint Communications Company Sprint

WorldCom WorldCom

**REPLY COMMENTS**

Commenters Abbreviation

Association for Local Telecommunications ALTS

AT&T Corp AT&T

Campaign for Telecommunications Access CTA

Environmental Management, Inc EMI

Ionex Communications Inc Ionex

IP Communications IP

Kansas Corporation Commission \* Kansas Commission

McLeodUSA Inc & CAPROCK Communications, Corp McLeodUSA

Oklahoma Corporation Commission Oklahoma Commission

Southwestern Bell Corporation SBC

WorldCom WorldCom

Z-Tel Corporation Inc Z-Tel

\* Denotes electronic filing.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc531683826 .anchor}SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS

**(filed January 8, 2001)**

Allegiance Telecom, Inc.

Association for Local Telecommunications Services

AT&T, Corp.

ConnectSouth Communications

Cox Communications, Inc.

Kansas Corporation Commission

McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc.

Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc.

Sprint Communications Company, L.P.

WorldCom, Inc.

Z-Tel Communications, Inc.

**SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY COMMENTS**

**(filed January 12, 2001)**

AT&T Corp.

Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board

Environmental Management, Inc.

National Consumer League

Oklahoma Corporation Commission

Southwestern Bell

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc531683827 .anchor}Appendix B

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc531683828 .anchor}Statutory Requirements --
Checklist Items 3, 5, 7, 9-12

1.  ***Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way***.
    Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide
    "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by the \[BOC\] at just and
    reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section
    224."[^871] Section 224(f)(1) states that "\[a\] utility shall
    provide a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier
    with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or
    right-of-way owned or controlled by it."[^872] Notwithstanding this
    requirement, section 224(f)(2) permits a utility providing electric
    service to deny access to its poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory basis, "where there is
    insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and
    generally applicable engineering purposes."[^873] Section 224 also
    contains two separate provisions governing the maximum rates that a
    utility may charge for "pole attachments."[^874] Section 224(b)(1)
    states that the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and
    conditions governing pole attachments to ensure that they are "just
    and reasonable."[^875] Notwithstanding this general grant of
    authority, section 224(c)(1) states that "\[n\]othing in \[section
    224\] shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission
    jurisdiction with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions, or
    access to poles, ducts, conduits and rights-of-way as provided in
    \[section 224(f)\], for pole attachments in any case where such
    matters are regulated by a State."[^876] As of 1992, nineteen states
    had certified to the Commission that they regulated the rates,
    terms, and conditions for pole attachments.[^877] However, none of
    the five states in which SWBT is a LEC, including Kansas and
    Oklahoma, have elected to regulate poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way.[^878]

```{=html}
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290. ***Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport***. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to
     provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
     local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
     services."[^879] The Commission has required that BOCs provide both
     dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers.[^880]
     Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities
     dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide
     telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting
     telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or
     requesting telecommunications carriers. [^881] Shared transport
     consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one
     carrier, including the BOC, between end office switches, between
     end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem
     switches, in the BOC's network.[^882]

291. ***Checklist Item 7* -- *911/E911 Access and Directory
     Assistance/Operator Services***. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the
     Act requires a BOC to provide "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to
     -- (I) 911 and E911 services."[^883] In the *Ameritech Michigan
     Order,* the Commission found that "section 271 requires a BOC to
     provide competitors access to its 911 and E911 services in the same
     manner that a BOC obtains such access, *i.e.,* at parity."[^884]
     Specifically, the Commission found that a BOC "must maintain the
     911 database entries for competing LECs with the same accuracy and
     reliability that it maintains the database entries for its own
     customers."[^885] For facilities-based carriers, the BOC must
     provide "unbundled access to \[its\] 911 database and 911
     interconnection, including the provision of dedicated trunks from
     the requesting carrier's switching facilities to the 911 control
     office at parity with what \[the BOC\] provides to itself."[^886]
     Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III)
     require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to "directory
     assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to
     obtain telephone numbers" and "operator call completion services,"
     respectively.[^887] Section 251(b)(3) of the Act imposes on each
     LEC "the duty to permit all \[competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service\] to have
     nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory
     assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^888] We concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
     Order* that a BOC must be in compliance with the regulations
     implementing section 251(b)(3) to satisfy the requirements of
     sections 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).[^889] In
     the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, the Commission
     held that the phrase "nondiscriminatory access to directory
     assistance and directory listings" means that "the customers of all
     telecommunications service providers should be able to access each
     LEC's directory assistance service and obtain a directory listing
     on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding: (1) the identity of
     a requesting customer's local telephone service provider; or (2)
     the identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose
     directory listing is requested."[^890] The Commission concluded
     that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and
     5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory assistance were technically
     feasible, and would continue.[^891] The Commission specifically
     held that the phrase \"nondiscriminatory access to operator
     services\" means that ". . . a telephone service customer,
     regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service
     provider, must be able to connect to a local operator by dialing
     '0,' or '0 plus' the desired telephone number."[^892]

292. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory
     assistance by either reselling the BOC's services or by using their
     own personnel and facilities to provide these services. Our rules
     require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOC's
     operator services and directory assistance to request the BOC to
     brand their calls.[^893] Competing carriers wishing to provide
     operator services or directory assistance using their own
     facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory listings
     either by obtaining directory information on a "read only" or "per
     dip" basis from the BOC's directory assistance database, or by
     creating their own directory assistance database by obtaining the
     subscriber listing information in the BOC's database.[^894]
     Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide
     directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis
     pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the Commission removed directory
     assistance and operator services from the list of required
     unbundled network elements in the *Local Competition Third Report
     and Order*.[^895] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's obligations to provide unbundled network elements
     are not subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252,
     including the requirement that rates be based on forward-looking
     economic costs.[^896] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's UNE obligations, however, still must be provided in
     accordance with sections 201(b) and 202(a), which require that
     rates and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unreasonably
     discriminatory.[^897]

293. ***Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration***. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to
     the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers," until
     "the date by which telecommunications numbering administration,
     guidelines, plan, or rules are established."[^898] The checklist
     mandates compliance with "such guidelines, plan, or rules" after
     they have been established.[^899] A BOC must demonstrate that it
     adheres to industry numbering administration guidelines and
     Commission rules.[^900]

294. ***Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling***.
     Section 271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling
     necessary for call routing and completion."[^901] In the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana Order,* we required BellSouth to demonstrate
     that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access
     to: "(1) signaling networks, including signaling links and
     signaling transfer points; (2) certain call-related databases
     necessary for call routing and completion, or in the alternative, a
     means of physical access to the signaling transfer point linked to
     the unbundled database; and (3) Service Management Systems (SMS)."
     [^902] We also required BellSouth to design, create, test, and
     deploy Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) based services at the SMS
     through a Service Creation Environment (SCE).[^903] In the *Local
     Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission defined
     call-related databases as databases, other than operations support
     systems, that are used in signaling networks for billing and
     collection or the transmission, routing, or other provision of
     telecommunications service.[^904] At that time the Commission
     required incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to their
     call-related databases, including but not limited to: the Line
     Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling database, the
     Local Number Portability database, and Advanced Intelligent Network
     databases.[^905] In the *UNE Remand Order*, we clarified that the
     definition of call-related databases "includes, but is not limited
     to, the calling name (CNAM) database, as well as the 911 and E911
     databases."[^906]

295. ***Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability***. Section 271(c)(2)(B)
     of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to comply with the number
     portability regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant to
     section 251.[^907] Section 251(b)(2) requires all LECs "to provide,
     to the extent technically feasible, number portability in
     accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission."[^908]
     The 1996 Act defines number portability as "the ability of users of
     telecommunications services to retain, at the same location,
     existing telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality,
     reliability, or convenience when switching from one
     telecommunications carrier to another."[^909] In order to prevent
     the cost of number portability from thwarting local competition,
     Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which requires that "\[t\]he
     cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration
     arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all
     telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as
     determined by the Commission."[^910] Pursuant to these statutory
     provisions, the Commission requires LECs to offer interim number
     portability "to the extent technically feasible."[^911] The
     Commission also requires LECs to gradually replace interim number
     portability with permanent number portability.[^912] The Commission
     has established guidelines for states to follow in mandating a
     competitively neutral cost-recovery mechanism for interim number
     portability,[^913] and created a competitively neural cost-recovery
     mechanism for long-term number portability.[^914]

296. ***Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity***. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide "\[n\]ondiscriminatory
     access to such services or information as are necessary to allow
     the requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in
     accordance with the requirements of section 251(b)(3)."[^915]
     Section 251(b)(3) imposes upon all LECs "\[t\]he duty to provide
     dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service
     and telephone toll service with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^916] Section 153(15) of the Act defines "dialing parity"
     as follows:

. . . a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of
any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications
services provider of the customer's designation . . .[^917]

297. Our rules implementing section 251(b)(3) provide that customers of
     competing carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits
     the BOC's customers dial to complete a local telephone call.[^918]
     Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer
     inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays,
     compared to the BOC's customers.[^919]

## SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. KENNARD {#separate-statement-of-chairman-william-e.-kennard .unnumbered}

## *Re: Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma* {#re-joint-application-by-sbc-communications-inc.-southwestern-bell-telephone-company-and-southwestern-bell-communications-services-inc.-dba-southwestern-bell-long-distance-for-provision-of-in-region-interlata-services-in-kansas-and-oklahoma .unnumbered}

I am pleased to support the application of Southwestern Bell (SWBT) to
offer long distance service in the States of Kansas and Oklahoma. We
have found today that SWBT has taken the steps required by the Act to
allow competitors into two rural markets.

Our action also is a testament to the work of the Kansas and the
Oklahoma Commissions. Here, for the first time, we are approving section
271 applications for two smaller, less urbanized states that build on a
previous, successful section 271 application for another state in the
same Bell Operating Company (BOC) region. This process demonstrates that
smaller, less urbanized states can successfully fulfill their vitally
important role in the section 271 process without overwhelming their
regulatory resources. I commend both Kansas and Oklahoma for their work
with SWBT in bringing these applications to fruition, and see their
general approach in building on the Texas application as a model that
other states may wish to follow.

And I also must commend the Department of Justice for its thorough
review of SWBT's application. The Department of Justice gave us some
areas on which to focus, one of which was pricing. And it was right:
some of SWBT's prices were not acceptable. I also agree that TELRIC
pricing, like demonstrated success in provisioning, are critical for new
entrants to meaningfully compete. Because SWBT voluntarily reduced its
prices to be within the zone that application of TELRIC would produce, I
am able to support its joint application. Importantly, by a vote of 4 to
1, this Order approves SWBT's pricing, not as originally filed, but as
revised by SBWT on December 28th.

I support the Commission's decision to waive its procedural rules to
permit consideration of these late-filed rate reductions by SWBT in the
unique circumstances of this application. At the same time, I believe
that the Commission must ensure that a pattern of last-minute rate
reductions or other changes in section 271 applications does not develop
in the future. Allowing such a pattern to develop could encourage the
BOCs to attempt to short circuit the critically important, statutorily
mandated state review process rather than engage in a good faith effort
to resolve contested issues under state auspices before filing a section
271 application with this Commission. Such a pattern of late-filed
changes could also undermine the Commission's long-term ability to
ensure a fair and orderly process for action on section 271 applications
consistent with the 90-day statutory time frame. The BOCs have
sufficient experience and guidance now to understand that their prices
must be TELRIC. The Commission has spoken loud and clear on this issue.

With this Order, the Commission has approved four section 271
applications -- two for large states with substantial urban population
centers and two for smaller, less urbanized states. The roadmap for a
successful section 271 is clear, and SWBT and Verizon have both shown
that they can successfully navigate these requirements, and open their
markets to competition. With this roadmap fully charted, I leave the
Commission confident that the BOCs can readily implement the
pro-competitive environment envisioned by Congress and reflected in the
requirements of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. I remain steadfast in
my belief that, over time, this pro-competitive environment will produce
substantial benefits for the American public by increasing consumer
choice, fostering innovation and lowering overall prices for
telecommunications services.

**SEPARATE STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER SUSAN NESS, CONCURRING**

> ***Re: Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
> Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
> Inc., d/b/a/ Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of
> In-Region InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma***

I commend SBC for its substantial efforts to open the local market to
competition in Oklahoma and Kansas, and the Kansas and Oklahoma
Commissions for working hard to jumpstart competition in their
respective markets. The order is particularly significant because it
demonstrates that citizens of rural states can reap the benefits of
increased competition. Although I have concurred in the decision to
grant SBC authority to provide long distance services originating in
these states, I disagree with certain aspects of the reasoning of the
order. In particular, this order grants a waiver of our rules and
accepts new rates filed by SBC on December 28^th^ -- day 63 of the
90-day statutory period. I believe this is ill-advised.

Section 271 requires the Commission to assess whether the local market
is open to competition as a pre-condition for authorizing a Bell company
to provide long-distance services. Prior to the filing of any 271
applications, we established the rule that an application must be
complete on the date it is filed. We have consistently reiterated the
importance of this rule.[^920] Resolving an adjudicatory proceeding
involving a massive record and innumerable issues within 90 days is
difficult, if not impossible, if parties are able to modify their prima
facie case while the application is pending. Such waivers give parties
an incentive to "game" the system by withholding evidence until late in
the 90-day process. A moving target also prejudices the ability of the
state commissions and the Department of Justice to advise us -- an
opportunity guaranteed by the statute. As a matter of fundamental
fairness, parties ought to be able to rely on the Commission's rules and
I am troubled by this decision to change the Commission's rules
mid-stream.

I am equally troubled by the remedy which is to delay the effective date
of the order for 43 days. Instead of the approach adopted in today's
decision, I would have restarted the clock on the day that SBC requested
us to examine its new rates. If this route had been followed, the
Commission in all likelihood would have been able to consider the new
application in an expedited fashion and issue a clean decision that
would have taken effect in the same timeframe as the date contemplated
by this order. Indeed, by granting a waiver, but delaying the effective
date, that is in essence what the order achieves.

In addition to the timing issue, I am uncomfortable with the manner in
which prices for unbundled network elements were set. Appropriate
pricing is at the heart of the statute. If prices are not based on
costs, the enduring competition envisioned by Congress will be thwarted.
I support today's decision insofar as it recognizes the Commission's
role in evaluating the rates a Bell company charges its competitors. As
the order makes clear, the Commission has an obligation in each section
271 application to examine the methodology used to arrive at the rates
and ensure that those rates are based on forward-looking costs.

Although the order concludes that the state commissions did not adhere
to forward-looking pricing principles in all respects, the late-filed
rates appear to be within a range of prices that would be consistent
with such principles, while the original rates were not. We must
recognize that a forward-looking cost methodology gives some latitude to
state commissions in setting rates. I encourage state commissions to
follow assiduously forward-looking cost methodologies so that the
Commission may avoid the need to second-guess rates in future
applications. I urge the Commission to engage in further dialogue with
our state colleagues on all 271 issues \-- and in particular to identify
best practices on pricing \-- *before* a Bell company files its
application. I am confident that future 271 applications will reflect
the benefits of these discussions, and I expect that future applicants
will have in place rates based on forward-looking costs prior to filing
an application.

## STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH,  {#statement-of-commissioner-harold-furchtgott-roth .unnumbered}

## CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART {#concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part .unnumbered}

> ***Re: Memorandum Opinion and Order, Joint Application by SBC
> Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and
> Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern
> Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in
> Kansas and Oklahoma (CC Docket No. 00-217).***

I concur in the decision to grant SBC Communication Inc.'s ("SBC")
application to provide in-region, inter-LATA services in Kansas and in
Oklahoma. I wish to make clear, however, that the basis for my
concurrence differs from that of the majority. As I have made clear in
previous statements, I believe that section 271 primarily requires the
Commission to determine whether a Bell operating company has fulfilled
its obligations under the specific interconnection agreements into which
it has entered. A central question, in my view, is whether competing
carriers have attempted to enforce their rights under the 1996 Act by
filing complaints arising out of these agreements, either with the
relevant state commission, or in federal district court. Where they have
not pursued such complaints, as is the case here, I think there is
little reason that the Commission should undertake, as an initial
matter, a review of their claims that the Bell company has not complied
with section 251's requirements.

I also wish to make clear that I do not base my approval of SBC's
application on any of the pricing information that SBC submitted after
it filed its application, including the information that it filed on the
sixty-third day of the review process. Although there may be some
circumstances in which it would be proper for the Commission to consider
late-filed evidence, those circumstances are not present here. If the
Commission would not have approved this application in the absence of
this late-filed information, I believe that SBC should have been
required to resubmit its application, thereby restarting the review
process.

Finally, I join with Commissioner Powell in dissenting from that part of
the order that delays by 43 days the date on which SBC's authorization
to provide long-distance service in these states becomes effective. I do
not believe that the Act permits us to invent procedural rules like this
one. Of course, if the Commission had refused to consider the late-filed
pricing information in the first place, it would not have found it
necessary to bend the statute in this way.

**STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MICHAEL K. POWELL,**

**APPROVING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART**

Re: Memorandum Opinion and Order, Joint Application by SBC
Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and
Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell
Long Distance for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas
and Oklahoma (CC Docket No. 00-217)

I am pleased to support this *Order*. In one small respect, however, I
cannot support this action fully, namely the decision to delay by 43
days the effectiveness of SBC's authorization to provide long distance
in these states. I am very supportive of the intention underlying this
decision, as I agree that we must remain vigilant to protect the
integrity of the section 271 process against unnecessary delays in the
filing of relevant evidence, even pricing evidence. Moreover, I wish to
join in the admonishment of future applicants that they risk rejection
if they file evidence after the due date for initial comments.
Nonetheless, I see no authority in the Act that permits us to conclude
that the statutory requirements are satisfied, but refuse to allow the
applicant to enter the long distance market for several more weeks. As
such, I must reluctantly dissent to this minor, procedural aspect of the
*Order.*

[^1]: A list of parties that submitted comments or replies is contained
    in Attachment A.

[^2]: The BOC must make an independent showing of section 271 compliance
    for each individual state, however.

[^3]: At the same time, we note that several parties criticize the state
    consideration of pricing issues. *See, e.g*., Z-Tel Supp. Comments
    at 2-3; IP Communications Supp. Comments at 2-3 and 7-8.

[^4]: *See infra*, Section IV.B.2.

[^5]: SWBT Smith/Johnson Aff. at 7; *see also*, SWBT Brief at 14. Since
    SWBT does not have access to exact information on the number of
    lines in Kansas and Oklahoma served by competitive LECs, it has used
    several methods to estimate the number of lines served by its
    competitors. Each of these methods produces a somewhat different
    result, and the ranges cited reflect these differences. *Id*. at 14,
    n.25; SWBT Smith/Johnson Aff. at 11.

[^6]: SWBT Application at 14.

[^7]: Smith/Johnson Aff. at 8; SWBT Application at ii-iii.

[^8]: *Id*. at 14.

[^9]: SWBT Smith/Johnson Aff. at 5.

[^10]: *Id*. at 7, Table 3.

[^11]: SWBT Application at 17.

[^12]: *Id.*

[^13]: *Id.*

[^14]: SWBT Smith/Johnson Aff. at 5.

[^15]: *See* *Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Texas,* Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC
    Rcd 18354, 18361, para. 13 (*SWBT Texas Order*).

[^16]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271.

[^17]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3).

[^18]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3)(A). The critical, market-opening provisions of
    section 251 are incorporated into the competitive checklist found in
    section 271. *See* *id.* § 251; *see also Implementation of the
    Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    CC Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (*Local Competition
    First Report and Order*), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom,
    *Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC*, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th
    Cir. 1997) and *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
    1997), *aff'd in part and remanded*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525
    U.S. 366 (1999).

[^19]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^20]: *Id.* § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^21]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3); *see SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 138
    F.3d 410, 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^22]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A).

[^23]: *Id*. § 271(d)(2)(B).

[^24]: *Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Service in the State of New York,* Memorandum Opinion and
    Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3953, 3962, para. 20 (*Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*); *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271
    of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,* CC Docket No.
    97-137, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20559-60 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan
    Order*); *see also* *SBC Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416
    ("although the Commission must consult with the State commissions,
    the statute does not require the FCC to give State commissions'
    views any particular weight").

[^25]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; *SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416-17.

[^26]: Kansas Commission Comments at 3.

[^27]: *See* SWBT Cleek Aff. at para. 25.

[^28]: Kansas Commission Comments at 3.

[^29]: Kansas Commission Comments at 4; SWBT Application at 5.

[^30]: *See* *Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services,
    Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Texas,* Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC
    Rcd 18354, 18361, para. 13 (*SWBT Texas Order*). In the Texas 271
    proceeding, a model interconnection agreement was developed and
    adopted which was referred to as the "Texas 271 Agreement" or "T2A."
    The Texas Commission, SWBT, and competing carriers worked
    collaboratively to identify and resolve a number of key issues
    related to SWBT's compliance with 271, including the operational
    readiness of SWBT's OSS, and the development of a performance
    monitoring and enforcement mechanism.

[^31]: SWBT Application at 5.

[^32]: Kansas Commission Comments at 4; SWBT Cleek Aff. at para. 38 ;
    SWBT Application at 5.

[^33]: Kansas Commission Comments at 4.

[^34]: *Id. See also* SWBT Cleek Aff., Attach. A at 134-138 (*In the
    Matter of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company-Kansas' Compliance
    with Section 271 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    Docket No. 97-SWBT-411-GIT, Staff's Recommendation)(August 21,
    2000)("Kansas Commission Staff Report"). The Kansas staff stated
    that there were several concerns regarding the proposed performance
    remedy plan. Some concerns expressed were the derivation of the "K"
    Table values, the verification and validation of source data, the
    frequency of small samples, the use of Z- testing as part of SWBT's
    benchmark testing and Type I and Type II errors. We agree with the
    Kansas Commission that none of these issues, based on evidence in
    this proceeding, warrant denial of the application.

[^35]: SWBT Application at 8.

[^36]: Kansas Commission Comments at 44.

[^37]: *See* *In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications Inc.,
    Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services In Oklahoma*, CC
    Docket No. 97-121, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8685
    (1997), *aff'd*, *SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC*, 138 F.3d 410
    (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^38]: SWBT Application at 10.

[^39]: SWBT Application at 10-11.

[^40]: *See* SWBT Application at 11; *Application of the Attorney
    General of the State of Oklahoma, et al., To Explore Southwestern
    Bell Telephone Co.'s Compliance with Section 271(c) of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Cause No. PUD 970000560, Order No.
    445180 (Oklahoma Commission, Sept. 28, 2000) ("Oklahoma Commission
    Sec. 271 Order").

[^41]: SWBT Application at 11.

[^42]: Oklahoma Commission Comments at 2.

[^43]: *Id.*

[^44]: Oklahoma Commission Reply Comments at 27.

[^45]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 2.

[^46]: *Id*. at 13-20, 25-27.

[^47]: *Id*. at 24-25, 27-28.

[^48]: *Id*. at 28-36.

[^49]: *Id*. at 29-30.

[^50]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18368, para. 29.

[^51]: *See American Tel. and Tel. Co.* *v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 631
    (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^52]: As the D.C. Circuit has held, "\[A\]llowing collateral challenges
    could change the nature of section 271 proceedings from an expedited
    process focused on an individual applicant's performance into a
    wide-ranging, industry-wide examination of telecommunications law
    and policy." *American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 631.

[^53]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18367, para. 27.

[^54]: *See, e.g., Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications
    Under New Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 11
    FCC Rcd 19708 (Dec. 6, 1996) (Dec. 6, 1996 Public Notice); *Revised
    Comment Schedule for Ameritech Michigan Application, as amended, for
    Authorization under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Michigan*, Public
    Notice, DA 97-127 (Jan. 17, 1997) (Jan. 17, 1997 Public Notice);
    *Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd
    17457 (Sept. 19, 1997) (Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice); *Updated
    Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company Applications Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, DA-99-1994
    (Sept. 28, 1999) (Sept. 28, 1999 Public Notice).

[^55]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20573, para. 54.

[^56]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20575, para. .

[^57]: Sept. 28, 1999 Public Notice at 3.

[^58]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36.

[^59]: 47 CFR § 1.3.

[^60]: *Northeast Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC*, 897 F.2d 1164 at 1166
    (D.C. Cir. 1990); *WAIT Radio v. FCC*, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir.
    1969).

[^61]: Letter from Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd &
    Evans, P.L.L.C., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed Dec. 28,
    2000) (SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter). SWBT's December 28, 2000 *ex
    parte* filing is an amended version of an *ex parte* filing it made
    on December 27, 2000.

[^62]: In light of this and the nature and extent of the comments filed
    concerning these rate reductions, we cannot accept claims that
    interested parties did not have a reasonable opportunity to comment.

[^63]: Contrary to the arguments of certain commenting parties, there is
    no uncertainty concerning the availability of these rates to
    competing LECs. The Kansas Commission has approved these rate
    reductions with the reductions to become effective immediately.
    Letter from Eva Powers, Assistant General Counsel, Kansas
    Corporation Commission, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 at 2 (filed Jan. 5,
    2001) (Kansas Commission Jan. 5 *Ex Parte* Letter) and Attach. 1
    (Order Approving Revisions to the K2A, Docket No. 97-SWBT-411-GIT at
    1-3 (Jan. 4, 2001)) (Kansas Commission Jan. 4 Order). The Oklahoma
    Commission adopted the modified rates on January 10, 2001. *See,*
    Letter from Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd &
    Evans, P.L.L.C. to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed Jan. 12,
    2001) (SWBT Jan. 12 *Ex Parte* Letter) at Attach. C (Final Order
    Approving Adoption of Amendment to Interconnection Agreement, Cause
    No. PUD 20010006 (Jan. 10, 2001))

[^64]: *See Comments Requested in Connection with Southwestern Bell's
    Section 271 Application for Kansas and Oklahoma*, CC Docket No.
    00-217, Public Notice, DA No. 00-2912 (rel. Dec. 27, 2001) (Dec. 27
    Public Notice); *Comment Schedule Set in December 27th Public Notice
    Remains the Same*, Public Notice, CC Docket No. 00-217, DA-00-2917
    (December 28, 2000).

[^65]: *See, e.g.,* ALTS Supp. Comments at 3-5; AT&T Supp. Comments at
    2; Allegiance Supp. Comments at 3-5; ConnectSouth Supp. Comments at
    3-4; Cox Supp. Comments at 1-4; IP Supp. Comments at 7-13; McLeodUSA
    Supp. Comments at 2; Sprint Supp. Comments at 2-4; WorldCom Supp.
    Comments at 1-3.

[^66]: *See, e.g.*, AT&T Supp. Comments at 1-3; IP Supp. Comments at 2-3
    & 7-8; Z-Tel Supp. Comments at 2-3.

[^67]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3). As set forth below, we conclude that
    SWBT has satisfied the requirements of subsection (c)(1)(A) ("Track
    A") and thus its application merits analysis under section
    271(d)(3)(A)(i) of our rules.

[^68]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973-74, para. 52.

[^69]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)(i), (ii).

[^70]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18373, para. 44; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44.

[^71]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^72]: *Id.*

[^73]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18374, para. 46; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 46.

[^74]: *Id.*

[^75]: *Id.*

[^76]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3976, para.
    59.

[^77]: *See, e.g., SWBT Texas Order* at paras. 175, 188 and 293
    (instances in which we found that an improvement in performance over
    time provided us with an indication that problems were being
    resolved).

[^78]: We have never required, however, an applicant to demonstrate that
    it processes and provisions a substantial commercial volume of
    orders, or has achieved a specific market share in its service area,
    as a prerequisite for satisfying the competitive checklist. *See
    Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77 (explaining
    that Congress had considered and rejected language that would have
    imposed a "market share" requirement in section 271(c)(1)(A)).

[^79]: *See* SWBT Brief at 19; SWBT Reply at 28-52.

[^80]: *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 28.

[^81]: *See* section IV.B.2, *infra*.

[^82]: *See* SWBT Dysart Decl. at para. 81 (noting that a small sample
    size could overstate disparities) and 88 (noting that, where order
    volumes are low, a single missed installation could preclude
    reaching a benchmark target).

[^83]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18376, para. 53; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53.

[^84]: *See Application by BellSouth Corporation, et al., Pursuant to
    Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to
    Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket No.
    97-231, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6258, para. 21
    (*BellSouth Louisiana Order*); *see also* *Application of BellSouth
    Corporation, et al., Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications
    Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
    South Carolina*, CC Docket No. 97-208, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
    13 FCC Rcd 539 (*BellSouth South Carolina Order*).

[^85]: *See* *Application by BellSouth Corporation, et al., Pursuant to
    Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to
    Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket No.
    98-121, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599, 20655, para.
    88 (*Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*); *BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6258, para. 21; *BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593-95, paras. 97 and 100.

[^86]: While we found region-wide evidence to be relevant in the
    BellSouth proceedings, we found in each instance that BellSouth,
    overall, had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it
    provided nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. *See, e.g., Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20657 *et seq.,* paras. 91
    *et seq.* We thus did not determine whether region-wide performance
    data, absent any state-specific data, could suffice to demonstrate
    checklist compliance. Moreover, because the region-wide performance
    data or holdings from prior orders were not decisional in those
    instances, we did not examine BellSouth's assertion that its OSS was
    the same throughout all of its in-region states with the same
    scrutiny as here.

[^87]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^88]: *Id.*

[^89]: *Id.*

[^90]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85; *see
    also BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 20633-35 at paras.
    46-48.

[^91]: SWBT Application at 15-16.

[^92]: SWBT Reply at 73; SWBT Smith Reply Aff. at para. 12; Birch
    December 29 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1-2 (confidential version). We
    recognize that SWBT, and other carriers, have requested confidential
    treatment of estimated and actual customer counts, pursuant to the
    protective order in this proceeding. *See* *In the Matter of
    Application of SBC Communications, Inc. Pursuant to Section 271 of
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA
    Services in Kansas and Oklahoma*, Protective Order, CC Docket No.
    00-217, DA-00-2415 (October 26, 2000).

[^93]: SWBT Application at 16; SWBT Reply at 72; *See also* Sprint
    Comments at 9.

[^94]: AT&T Turner Decl. at paras. 2-3; Sprint Comments at 8-9 and 14
    (arguing that its residential customers served on its facilities had
    been participating in pre-commercial testing and had only recently
    begun receiving bills, and that Birch appears to offer residential
    service only via resale); Cox Comments at 5; Global Crossing
    Comments at 1-3 (arguing that it has no facilities based residential
    customers in Kansas); ALTS Reply Comments at 4; WorldCom Reply
    Comments at 15, 20-22; *but see* Kansas Commission Comments at 6-7.

[^95]: *See* *SWBT Oklahoma Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 8695, para. 14
    (construing section 271(c)(1)(A) as requiring that "there must be an
    actual commercial alternative to the BOC in order to satisfy" Track
    A). The D.C. Circuit affirmed this reading of Track A. *See SBC
    Communications Inc. v. FCC*, 138 F.3d 410, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^96]: AT&T Turner Decl. 6-8 (arguing that SWBT's assumption of 2.75
    access lines per interconnection trunk overestimates the number of
    facilities-based CLEC lines and disputing SWBT's use of its
    E911database to estimate facilities-based CLEC activity); Cox
    Comments at 4; Sprint Comments at 4-6; WorldCom Reply Comments at
    19.

[^97]: *See* SWBT Reply at 71-73. SWBT stated that, at the time it filed
    its reply brief, it was in the process of investigating the number
    of UNE-P access lines used to provide service to residential
    customers in Kansas. *Id.* at 73, n.46. On December 20, 2000, SBC
    filed a written confidential ex parte letter presenting the results
    of its investigation, which indicate that Kansas competing carriers,
    including Birch Telecom, provide facilities-based service to a
    significant number of both residential and business customers via
    UNE-P. *See* SWBT Dec. 20 *Ex Parte* Letter; *see also* SWBT Smith
    Reply Aff. at para. 12.

[^98]: Motion to Strike of Sprint Communications Company (filed Jan. 18,
    2000) (*Sprint Motion to Strike*).

[^99]: *Sprint Motion to Strike* at 3.

[^100]: *See* Letter from Gregory C. Lawhon, Birch Telecom, to Magalie
    Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, December
    29, 2000 (requesting confidential treatment) (Birch Dec. 29 *Ex
    Parte* Letter). Sprint notes that this letter also was improperly
    filed (as it was not also submitted in redacted form). *Id.*, n.2.
    We nonetheless find that it is appropriate to consider it because it
    contains the type of confidential carrier-specific information that
    would be unverifiable by other parties.

[^101]: Finally, as the Commission has explained in a prior section 271
    proceeding, "if all other requirements of section 271 have been
    satisfied, it does not appear to be consistent with congressional
    intent to exclude a BOC from the in-region, interLATA market solely
    because the competitors' service to residential customers is wholly
    through resale." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20635, para. 48. Had we been unable to rely on SWBT's December 20
    *Ex Parte* Letter, or in its other methods of estimation put forth
    in its comments and replies, we would have been faced by this
    situation. Based on the totality of circumstances presented by this
    application, and based on our conclusions regarding checklist
    compliance, we likely would not have denied this application on
    "Track A" grounds, and would have relied on the existence of
    competitors' service to residential customers through resale.

[^102]: Oklahoma Commission Comments at 2.

[^103]: SWBT Application at 18; SWBT Reply at 72; Cox Comments at 4.

[^104]: AT&T Turner Decl. at 6-8; Sprint Comments at 4-6; Cox Comments
    at 4; WorldCom Reply Comments at 19; *but see* SWBT Reply at 71-73;
    SWBT Smith Reply Aff. at 7-12.

[^105]: *See* *SWBT Oklahoma Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 8695, para. 14.

[^106]: *See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report
    and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3704, para. 15 (*UNE Remand Order*)*.*

[^107]: 47 U.S.C. § 51.315(b).

[^108]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (for example, unbundled loops,
    transport and switching are listed separately as checklist items iv,
    v and vi).

[^109]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(B)(ii).

[^110]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^111]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^112]: *Local Competition First Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at
    15844-46, paras. 674-679; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501 *et* *seq*. *See also
    In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, and
    Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98,* Third Report
    and Order and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912, 20974,
    para. 135 *(Line Sharing Order)* (concluding that states should set
    the prices for line sharing as a new network element in the same
    manner as the state sets prices for other UNEs).

[^113]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b).

[^114]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (8^th^
    Cir. 1997).

[^115]: *American Tel. & Tel Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,* 525 U.S. 366
    (1999) (*AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.). In reaching its decision, the
    Court acknowledged that section 201(b) "explicitly grants the FCC
    jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act
    applies." *Id.* at 380. Furthermore, the Court determined that
    section 251(d) also provides evidence of an express jurisdictional
    grant by requiring that "the Commission \[shall\] complete all
    actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the
    requirements of this section." *Id.* at 382. The Court also held
    that the pricing provisions implemented under the Commission's
    rulemaking authority do not inhibit the establishment of rates by
    the states. The Court concluded that the Commission has jurisdiction
    to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local competition
    under the 1996 Act, including pricing for interconnection and
    unbundled access, as "it is the States that will apply those
    standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete
    result." *Id*.

[^116]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 219 F.3d 744 (8^th^ Cir. 2000),
    *petition for cert. filed sub nom. Verizon Communications v. FCC*,
    69 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2000) (No. 00-511).

[^117]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321 *et al.* (8^th^ Cir. Sept.
    25, 2000).

[^118]: SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 5.

[^119]: *Id.*

[^120]: Kansas Commission Comments at 21; SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para.
    5.

[^121]: SWBT Reply at 12; SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 7.

[^122]: SWBT Reply at 12; SWBT Ries/Smith Reply Aff. at paras. 7-8.

[^123]: SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 8.

[^124]: Kansas Commission Comments at 21; SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para.
    8.

    ^?^ SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 8.

[^125]: SWBT Application App. G, Vol. 2, Tab 22 (Final Order
    Establishing SWBT's Prices for Interconnection and UNEs, Docket No.
    97-SCCC-149-GIT (February 19, 1999)) (Kansas Commission Feb. 19
    Final Order), *see also* Kansas Commission Comments Attach. 12
    (Order Regarding Non-Recurring Charges for UNEs, Docket No.
    97-SCCC-149-GIT at 1 (Nov. 3, 2000)) (Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC
    Order); SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 8.

    ^?^ SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 8.

[^126]: SWBT Application App. G, Vol. 2, Tab 25 (Kansas Commission Order
    on Reconsideration, Docket No. 97-SCCC-149-GIT (Sept. 17, 1999))
    (Kansas Commission Sept. 17 Reconsideration Order).

[^127]: Kansas Commission Sept. 17 Reconsideration Order at 26.

[^128]: Kansas Commission Comments at 21; Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC
    Order, *passim*; SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at para. 9.

[^129]: Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at 4. The Kansas Commission
    noted the following compliance problems with SWBT's inputs: (1) In
    virtually every cost study, the Kansas Commission found that SWBT's
    reconsideration inputs were "substantially higher" than its original
    inputs, with inadequate explanations for the increases; (2) SWBT
    failed to remove certain labor costs, despite the Kansas
    Commission's directive to do so; (3) SWBT submitted a cost study
    based on fully manual service processes, despite the Kansas
    Commission's directive to submit electronic order charges along with
    a "modest surcharge" for manual processing; (4) SWBT applied
    incorrect fall-out factors to its network provisioning and switch
    features; (5) SWBT failed to remove costs associated with a certain
    database (TIRKS); (6) SWBT used incorrect Dedicated Outside Plant
    and Dedicated Inside Plant assumptions; (7) SWBT's cost studies were
    "disjointed" and required "inordinate amounts of labor to review and
    analyze;" (8) SWBT's electronically filed studies did not always
    match the corresponding paper copies; and (9) SWBT failed to comply
    with the Kansas Commission's requirement that all cost studies be
    submitted in a PC-based format. *Id.* at 13-23. The Kansas
    Commission also found a number of problems with AT&T's inputs. *Id.*

[^130]: Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at 4.

[^131]: *Id*. at 41.

[^132]: SWBT Reply at 12.

[^133]: Letter from Edwardo Rodriguez, Director-Federal Regulatory, SBC,
    to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed Jan. 3, 2001) at Attach. 1
    (Order on Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification, Docket
    No. 97-SCCC-149-GIT (Dec. 21, 2000)) (Kansas Commission Dec. 21 NRC
    Order).

[^134]: Kansas Commission Dec. 21 NRC Order at 4, 5, 10.

[^135]: *Id*. at 8-10.

[^136]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter. *See also* Dec. 27 Public
    Notice. *See* section IV(B)(1) *infra* for a discussion of SWBT's
    price reductions in Oklahoma.

[^137]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^138]: Kansas Commission Jan. 5 *Ex Parte* Letter and Attach. 1, Kansas
    Commission Jan. 4 Order; *see also* SWBT Jan. 12 *Ex Parte* Letter
    and Attach. C , Final Order Approving Adoption of Amendment to
    Interconnection Agreement.

[^139]: SWBT Reply at 11-12.

[^140]: Kansas Commission Comments at 21.

[^141]: Kansas Commission Feb. 19 Final Order.

[^142]: Kansas Commission Sept. 17 Reconsideration Order.

[^143]: SWBT Brief at 43 (citing SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 163).

[^144]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 13, 28.

[^145]: For instance, WorldCom objects to Kansas nonrecurring rates,
    Oklahoma recurring rates and Oklahoma nonrecurring rates, but is
    silent on Kansas recurring rates. WorldCom Reply at 2, 5-14. IP
    Communications does not cite any Kansas recurring rates as examples
    of violations of TELRIC pricing principles by Kansas regulators. IP
    Communications Comments at 6. AT&T explicitly objects only to Kansas
    nonrecurring rates, not recurring rates. AT&T Comments at 18.

[^146]: *See, e.g.,* Kansas Commission Sept. 17 Reconsideration Order at
    15-18.

[^147]: *Id*.

[^148]: *Id*.

[^149]: These rates were reduced from \$5.00 and \$15.00, respectively,
    in the Kansas Commission's Dec. 21 NRC Order. Kansas Commission Dec.
    21 NRC Order at 10.

[^150]: SWBT's UNE-P, or unbundled network element platform, consists of
    a 2-wire analog loop, an analog switch port, and an analog
    loop-to-switch port cross-connect. *See* SWBT Dec. 14 *Ex Parte*
    Letter, Attach. 3 at 1.

[^151]: Letter from Edwardo Rodriguez, Director-Federal Regulatory, SBC,
    to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 at Attach. 1, p. 1 (SWBT Nov. 28
    Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter; SWBT App. B-KS, Tab 1, K2A at
    Attach. UNE-KS, p. 53, § 14.2.

[^152]: Letter from Edwardo Rodriguez, Director--Federal Regulatory,
    SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed Dec. 13, 2000) (SWBT Dec. 13
    COAC *Ex Parte* Letter); SWBT App. B-KS, Tab 1, K2A at Attach.
    UNE-KS, p. 53, § 14.2; *see also* AT&T Flappan Reply Decl. at para.
    8.

[^153]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. A, p. 14.

[^154]: We note that the Kansas Commission recently determined that SWBT
    may assess individual nonrecurring charges associated with each UNE,
    as well as a service order change, when a new tenant moves into an
    existing home and orders service from the competitive LEC. Kansas
    Commission Dec. 21 NRC Order at 10. Additionally, pursuant to the
    K2A, SWBT may assess a Central Office Access Charge (COAC) on all
    such new orders. SWBT App. B-KS, Tab 1, K2A at Attach. UNE-KS, p.
    53, § 14.2; *see also* SWBT Dec. 13 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^155]: Kansas Commission Dec. 21 NRC Order at Attach. B., p. 1. The
    Kansas Commission reduced this charge from the \$30.75 rate it set
    on November 3, 2000. Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at Attach.
    B, p. 1.

[^156]: Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at Attach. B, p. 3.

[^157]: SWBT Dec. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 2; SWBT Nov. 28 Price
    Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 1, p. 15. This Commission found
    in the *SWBT Texas Order* that, because the Supreme Court's
    determination in *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd*. did not specifically find
    that incumbent LECs must combine separate UNEs, SWBT is not required
    to provide new UNE combinations and therefore may set market-based
    rates for such a service*. AT&T v.* *Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366;
    *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18474-75, paras. 234-35. Since
    then, the 8^th^ Circuit specifically reiterated its conclusion that
    incumbent LECs are not required to make new UNE combinations. *Iowa
    Utils. Bd. v. FCC,* 219 F.3d 744, 758-59 (8^th^ Cir. 2000*),
    petition for cert. filed sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
    FCC*, 69 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2000) (No. 00-511). The 8^th^
    Circuit, however, has stayed the issuance of its mandate pending the
    outcome of a petition for writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme
    Court. *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321 et al. (8^th^ Cir.,
    Sept. 25, 2000). We note that SWBT's interconnection agreements
    include a method, other than the COAC, of combining elements that
    are not previously combined in SWBT's network. *See* SWBT
    Application App. B-Kansas, Tab 1 at Attach. UNE-KS (K2A), p. 1, §
    2.2; SWBT Application App. B-Oklahoma, Tab 1 at Attach. UNE-OK
    (O2A), p. 1, § 2.2; *see also* SWBT Dec. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter
    at 1. Because of the court's determination, and because competitive
    LECs have a method of avoiding the COAC, we did not examine whether
    SWBT's COAC charges in Texas were cost-based, and we decline to do
    so here for similar reasons.

[^158]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. A, pp. 1, 14; SWBT
    Nov. 28 Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 1, p. 15.

[^159]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244.

[^160]: *Id*., *citing Local Competition First Report and* *Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 15559.

[^161]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085, para. 245.

[^162]: *See* Kansas Commission Comments at 21; Kansas Commission Reply
    Comments at 2-3; Kansas Commission Jan. 4 Order at 2-3. We find that
    Z-Tel produces no evidence to support its claim to the contrary.
    Z-Tel Supp. Comments at 12-13.

[^163]: Kansas Commission Comments at 21; Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC
    Order at 4, 23-25.

[^164]: *See* Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at 4, 24.

[^165]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18475, para. 236.

[^166]: *See* SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^167]: KCC Dec. 22 *Ex Parte* Letter at 10; *see also* SWBT Nov. 13
    COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 1.

[^168]: *See* SWBT Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2; AT&T Flappan/Brown
    Supp. Decl. at para. 8 ("\[A\] substantial percentage of the
    customers that purchase CLEC local services are 'new service'
    customers . . . .").

[^169]: SWBT Nov. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^170]: As to Allegiance's assertion that SWBT is not allowed to recover
    the COAC in Texas but recovers both the trip charge and COAC in
    Kansas and Oklahoma, which may indicate double-recovery of these
    costs in Kansas and Oklahoma, we note that the Texas, Kansas, and
    Oklahoma commissions each approved the COAC charge, and recovery for
    the charge is included in the K2A, O2A, and T2A. Allegiance Supp.
    Comments at 7 n.10. *See* SWBT Application App. B-Kansas, Tab 1,
    App. Pricing-UNE (K2A) at 13; SWBT Application App. B-Oklahoma, Tab
    1, App. Pricing UNE (O2A) at 16; *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    18474-75, paras. 234-37; SWBT Nov. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 1-2;
    SWBT Supplement Reply Comments Attach. D, Affidavit of Thomas G.
    Ries and Barbara A. Smith at paras. 25-26.

[^171]: *See also* SWBT Cleek Reply Aff. at paras 19-21 (SWBT assertion
    that if Kansas and Texas permanent (non-discounted) nonrecurring
    charges were amortized over the period of time that a competitive
    LEC would likely have a continuing business relationship with an end
    user, the total monthly costs for the UNE-P are less than for a
    competitive LEC operating in a comparable-sized exchange in Texas).

[^172]: AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Decl. at para. 78; WorldCom Reply
    Comments at 11-12; WorldCom Supp. Comments at 4-5, 7.

[^173]: Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at 1-3.

[^174]: AT&T Comments at 20; AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Decl. at para. 74;
    Letter from David L. Lawson, Sidley & Austin, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    00-217 at 9-10 (filed Dec. 22, 2000) (AT&T Dec. 22 *Ex Parte*
    Letter).

[^175]: Kansas Commission Nov. 3 NRC Order at 4, 23-26, 34-37; Kansas
    Commission Dec. 21 NRC Order at 8-10.

[^176]: Kansas Commission Dec. 21 NRC Order at 4-11.

[^177]: *Id*. at 8-10.

[^178]: *Id*. at 6-7, 10.

[^179]: AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Decl. at para. 77, AT&T Reply Comments
    at 19-20; *see also* Department of Justice Evaluation at 26
    (expressing concern about such method but not recommending denial
    based on it).

[^180]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244.

[^181]: WorldCom Reply at 13; *see also* AT&T Supp. Comments at 11.

[^182]: *See* section IV(B)(1)(b) (profit margin analysis).

[^183]: 47 U.S.C.§ 271(2)(B)(ii), *citing* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3) and
    252(d)(1).

[^184]: AT&T Supp. Comments at 10-11; *see also* section III(A),
    *supra*. Although discounts from the December 21 rates would have
    been even deeper, we reject AT&T's assertion that it was capricious
    for SWBT to have applied its voluntary discounts to the November 3
    rates instead. AT&T Supp. Comments at 10-11.

[^185]: *See, e.g.,* Department of Justice Evaluation at 9-10, 12-13;
    AT&T Comments at 7, 23-24.

[^186]: IP Supp. Comments at 3-4; Sprint Supp. Comments at 3.

[^187]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18371-72, para. 38; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 37.

[^188]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^189]: ALTS Supp. Comments at 5-6.

[^190]: Kansas Commission Jan. 4 Order at 1-3; SWBT Jan. 12 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at Attach. C.

[^191]: IP Supp. Comments at 3.

[^192]: Letter from Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd
    & Evans, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217, Attach. (filed Nov. 29, 2000),
    Amended Report and Recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge,
    Cause No. 970000213 (June 30, 1998) (Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation).

[^193]: SWBT Application App. G, Vol. 2, Tab 17 (Final Order, Cause No.
    PUD 970000213 (July 17, 1998)) (Oklahoma Commission Pricing Order).

[^194]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 2.

[^195]: *Id.* at 2-3.

[^196]: *Id.* at 167

[^197]: *Id.* at 158-159, 167.

[^198]: Oklahoma Commission Pricing Order at 3.

[^199]: SWBT Application App. G, Vol. 3, Tab 29 (Order Approving
    Stipulation, PUD Cause No. 990000613 (Dec. 10, 1999)) (Oklahoma
    Commission Stipulation Order). Among the competitive LECs that
    agreed not to oppose the stipulation were AT&T, Cox, Sprint, and
    WorldCom. By signing, these competitive LECs did not, however, agree
    that the promotional discount rates were or were not cost based.
    Oklahoma Commission Stipulation Order Attach. A at 4, 7.

[^200]: Oklahoma Commission Stipulation Order at 10.

[^201]: *Id.,* Attach. A of Attach. A. Rates not subject to the
    promotional discounts remain at the level established by the
    Oklahoma Commission Pricing Order. Oklahoma Commission Reply at
    21-22.

[^202]: *Id.* at 4.

[^203]: Oklahoma Commission Stipulation Order Attach. A at 2-3.

[^204]: *Id.,* Attach. A at 3-4.

[^205]: Oklahoma Commission Reply at 22; Oklahoma Commission Stipulation
    Order Attach. A at 4.

[^206]: Oklahoma Commission Reply at 22; Oklahoma Commission Stipulation
    Order Attach. A at 4.

[^207]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^208]: *See* *id*. at 3, Attach. C at 1.

[^209]: *Id*. at 2-3, Attach. B.

[^210]: *Id.* at 3.

[^211]: *Id*.

[^212]: Oklahoma Commission Supp. Reply at 2; SWBT Supp. Reply at
    Attach. B.

[^213]: The Oklahoma Commission approved the discounts that were
    incorporated into an amendment to the interconnection agreement
    between Southwestern Bell and Logix filed with the Oklahoma
    Commission on January 5, 2001. Oklahoma Commission Supp. Reply at
    1-2; SWBT Supp. Reply at Attach. C.

[^214]: *See* section IV.B.1.a.ii, *supra*.

[^215]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC at 4084, para. 244.

[^216]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 13.

[^217]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 156.

[^218]: *Id*. at 158.

[^219]: *See* *id*. at 158-59. For example, the ALJ noted approvingly
    that AT&T had acknowledged that the cost of capital satisfied "the
    costing standards set forth in section 252 . . . and is a
    forward-looking cost of capital." *Id*. at 159.

[^220]: AT&T Comments at 14-15.

[^221]: *Id.* at 15-16.

[^222]: AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 59-63.

[^223]: *See*, *e.g.*, *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 15847, 15849, 15856, paras. 682, 686, 702.

[^224]: *See* *American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 615; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC at 4084, para. 244.

[^225]: AT&T Comments at 15-16.

[^226]: *Id.* at 15.

[^227]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 167.

[^228]: *Id*.

[^229]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(3).

[^230]: *See* AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at 26, n.16.

[^231]: *See* *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15849, para. 686.

[^232]: AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 59-60; s*ee also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19.

[^233]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 162-63.

[^234]: The ALJ's decision contrasts with the New York Commission's
    decision to assume a lower switch discount for future purchases than
    the one Bell Atlantic had been receiving, although the New York
    Commission is now taking another look at the issue. *See* *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, paras. 246-47.

[^235]: AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 43-44; s*ee also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19 ("original rates submitted
    by SBC were calculated at least in part with an eye to historical
    cost recovery . . . . Serious questions have been raised about SBC's
    selection of . . . low fill factors . . . .\[and\] improper
    calculation of joint and common costs. . . .").

[^236]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 165.

[^237]: *Id*.

[^238]: For example, blended transport in zone 3 in Oklahoma is
    \$0.000607 per minute (a further promotional discount reduces this
    amount to \$0.000546), while the zone 3 blended transport rate in
    Texas is \$0.000399, a difference of roughly \$0.0002 per minute, or
    about \$0.20 per month assuming 1000 minutes of interswitch calling.
    *See* SWBT Nov. 28 Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 6.

[^239]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 161.

[^240]: *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket Nos.
    96-45 and 97-160, Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20156, 20369
    (1999) (*USF Tenth Report and Order*); AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff.
    at para. 42; Bell Atlantic New York Application App. G, Vol. 1,
    Opinion No. 97-2, Order Setting Rates for First Group of Network
    Elements (Phase 1) at 65.

[^241]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 161 ("A reflection of fill well
    beyond what is currently available and used by SWBT to provide
    retail services essentially asks SWBT to provide superior quality
    facilities to AT&T"), 165; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).

[^242]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 12.

[^243]: *E.g.*, AT&T Dec. 22 Pricing *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4; AT&T
    Supp. Comments at 3, 7-9.

[^244]: We recognize that many states lack the extensive resources that
    were dedicated to this process by New York and Texas, as detailed in
    our orders in those states. *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 3957-59, paras. 6-12; *SWBT Texas Order* at 18357-58, paras.
    3-4. We encourage states with limited resources to take advantage of
    the efforts devoted by New York and Texas in establishing
    TELRIC-compliant prices, by relying where appropriate on the
    existing work product of those states. Indeed, in the appropriate
    circumstances, such as those described above, a state would be
    entitled to a presumption of compliance with TELRIC if it adopted
    New York or Texas rates in whole and could demonstrate that its
    costs were at or above the costs in that state whose rates it
    adopted.

[^245]: The weighted average rates for a 2-wire analog loop in Texas and
    Oklahoma are \$14.10 and \$18.87, respectively. *See* Letter from
    Edwardo Rodriguez, Director -- Federal Regulatory, SBC, to Magalie
    Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 00-217 at Attach. (Confidential) (filed Jan. 5, 2001) (SWBT Jan.
    5 *Ex Parte* Letter); SWBT Nov. 28 Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter at
    Attach.; Letter from Edwardo Rodriguez, Director -- Federal
    Regulatory, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 at 2-3 (filed Jan.
    9, 2001) (SWBT Jan. 9 *Ex Parte* Letter). Our analysis focuses on
    loop rates because loops are focused on by the parties, and are the
    elements most affected by the fill factors.

[^246]: *See*, *e.g.*, ConnectSouth Comments at 3-4, IP Comments at 5-7,
    Sprint Comments at 41-42; Z-Tel Reply at 9-10.

[^247]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 12.

[^248]: *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No.
    96-45, Ninth Report and Order and Eighteenth Order on
    Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd 20432, 20455-56, paras. 41-42 (1999).
    This comparison is distinguishable from our rejection of AT&T's
    challenge of Bell Atlantic's New York application, where we approved
    prices based on the assumption that the "feeder" portion of the loop
    would always use optical fiber, while our USF cost model uses copper
    for short distances. *AT&T v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 619-20. There, AT&T
    challenged the state commission's decision to make a different
    assumption about a particular network design input than the cost
    model made, whereas here, we compare the relative differences in
    costs, produced by the cost model, between Oklahoma and Texas. The
    differential produced by the cost model reflects variations in
    forward-looking costs based on objective criteria, such as density
    zones and geological conditions. *See USF Tenth Report and Order*,
    14 FCC Rcd at 20170, para. 30.

[^249]: *See* http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/apd/hcpm.

[^250]: *See* SWBT Jones Reply Aff. at paras. 35-36; SWBT Dec. 14 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 2-3.

[^251]: *USF Tenth Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20171, para. 30 (the
    model reflects differences in structure costs by, *e.g.*, using
    different values for the density zone). *See also* AT&T Clarke Supp.
    Decl. at 9, Attach. 2 (contending that line density, not exchange
    size, is the relevant factor).

[^252]: *See* section III.A, *supra*, for a discussion on why we
    consider SWBT's promotional rates for this application.

[^253]: The weighted average rate for a 2-wire analog loop in Texas is
    \$14.10, while the weighted average for Oklahoma discounted 2-wire
    analog loops is \$15.70. *See* SWBT Jan. 5 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    Attach. (Confidential); SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter; SWBT Jan. 9
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 2-3.

[^254]: IP Reply at 4; AT&T Reply at 13-14; Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 23-24.

[^255]: AT&T Reply at 14-17; Department of Justice Evaluation at 24.

[^256]: IP Reply at 4; Letter from Howard J. Siegel, Vice President of
    Regulatory Policy, IP, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 at 1-2 (filed Jan.
    17, 2001); SWBT Jan. 9 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1-2.

[^257]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18471-77, paras. 231-41.

[^258]: *See* ALTS Supp. Comments at 5; Sprint Supp. Comments at 3.

[^259]: AT&T Supp. Comments at 9; IP Supp. Comments at 4.

[^260]: For the same reason, we reject AT&T's objection to the fact that
    reciprocal compensation rates did not receive the promotional rates,
    even though there are promotional rates for UNEs for local
    switching, common transport, and dedicated transport. AT&T
    Flappan/Browne Supp. Decl. at paras. 12-13. Furthermore, parties
    have not objected to the rates for reciprocal compensation. *See*
    section V.C., *infra*.

[^261]: AT&T Comments at 11-13.

[^262]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 18.

[^263]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 158.

[^264]: AT&T Comments at 7-8 (emphasis in original). *See also* WorldCom
    Reply at 5-7, Z-Tel Reply at 2.

[^265]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^266]: *See*, *e.g.*, *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*,
    CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8776, 8931, para.
    284 (1997) (defining a range of reasonableness for the amount of
    corporate operations expense per line supported through universal
    service mechanisms).

[^267]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1); 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501 *et seq*.

[^268]: *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. at 384.

[^269]: *See* AT&T Supp. Comments at 2-3; WorldCom Supp. Comments at
    10-12.

[^270]: *See also* *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 15922, para. 848 (declining to implement an imputation rule
    that would prevent price squeezes because doing so would impose
    substantial burdens on states to rebalance their retail rates).

[^271]: Cox Supp. Comments at 3-4.

[^272]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(i). *See* Oklahoma Commission Supp. Reply at 2;
    SWBT Supp. Reply at 2.

[^273]: AT&T Reply at 11-14.

[^274]: *See Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15928-29, para. 860-61 ("We find that it would be unlawfully
    discriminatory, in violation of sections 251 and 252, if an
    incumbent LEC were to charge one class of interconnecting carriers,
    such as CMRS providers, higher rates for interconnection than it
    charges other carriers. . . .").

[^275]: SWBT Nov. 28 Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 10-11.

[^276]: SWBT's UNE-P, or unbundled network element platform, consists of
    a 2-wire analog loop, an analog switch port, and an analog
    loop-to-switch port cross-connect. *See* SWBT Dec. 14 Ex Parte
    Letter at 2-3.

[^277]: SWBT Dec. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 1; SWBT App. B-Oklahoma,
    Vol. 1, Tab 1 (Interconnection Agreement-Oklahoma between
    Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and CLEC), Attach. 6 at 52, §
    14.2 (Sept. 28, 2000) (O2A); *see also* AT&T Flappan Reply Aff. at
    para. 8.

[^278]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. B at 13.

[^279]: SWBT Nov. 28 Price Matrix *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 1-3, and
    15.

[^280]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. B at 1.

[^281]: Oklahoma Commission Stipulation Order, Attach. A at 4.

[^282]: SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. B at 2.

[^283]: *See* Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 165 (discussing the cost
    studies in evidence for nonrecurring charges); Oklahoma Commission
    Pricing Order at 3 (noting that the LRIC studies utilized in the
    ALJ's proceedings were the functional equivalent of TELRIC).

[^284]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 19; AT&T Comments at 16-17.

[^285]: *See* SWBT Ries/Smith Reply Aff. at paras. 55-58.

[^286]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 166. We note that the Kansas
    Commission reached the same determination. *See* Kansas Commission
    Nov. 3 NRC Order at 25.

[^287]: Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 166.

[^288]: *Id.*

[^289]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 15-16; Sprint Comments at
    30-31.

[^290]: SWBT Reply at 10; SWBT Dec. 13 COAC *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.
    *See* section IV.B.1.a, *supra*, for a further discussion of the
    trip charge.

[^291]: SWBT Reply at 10.

[^292]: *Id*.

[^293]: *See* *generally* SWBT Dec. 28 *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. A,
    B; AT&T Clarke Supp. Decl. at 10.

[^294]: We note that IP alleges in its supplemental comments that SWBT
    charges \$1.37 to activate each feature even when a migrating
    customer already has the features. IP Supp. Comments at 5. Even if
    this unsupported allegation is true, we find that the amount in
    question is *de minimis*.

[^295]: Commenters' concerns about our consideration of the discounted
    rates are addressed in section III.B, *supra*. Commenters' concerns
    over the discounted rates themselves are addressed in the Oklahoma
    recurring cost discussion, *supra*.

[^296]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-90, para.
    83; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 585; *SWBT Texas
    Order*15 FCC Rcd at 18396-97, para. 92.

[^297]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585.

[^298]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83.

[^299]: *Id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3991, para. 85.

[^300]: *Id.* at 3991, para. 86.

[^301]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 87;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616, para. 136 (we
    determine "whether the BOC has deployed the necessary systems and
    personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS
    functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing
    carriers to understand how to implement and use all of the OSS
    functions available to them."). For example, a BOC must provide
    competing carriers the specifications necessary to design their
    systems interfaces and business rules necessary to format orders,
    and demonstrate that systems are scalable to handle current and
    projected demand. *Id.*

[^302]: We assess "whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed
    are operationally ready, as a practical matter." *See Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88.

[^303]: *See* SWBT Application, Appendix G, Tab 44 (Ernst & Young
    Report); s*ee also* Letter from Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Kellogg,
    Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, P.L.L.C. to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217
    (filed December 1, 2000), Attachment A ("Ernst & Young Supplemental
    Report"). The Department of Justice was unable to judge whether
    Ernst & Young conducted a review adequate to support its conclusion,
    finding that the attestation did not describe the specific methods,
    tests, and analyses upon which the conclusion was based. *See*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 32, n.97. Ernst & Young's
    subsequently-filed Supplemental Report provides critical details
    about the scope and methodology of the review. Without this support,
    we could have placed little reliance on the reviewer's conclusions.

[^304]: *See* Ernst & Young Supplemental Report at 3-4 (explaining that
    the following SWBT interfaces and systems were reviewed: EASE, LEX,
    EDI, DataGate, VeriGate, LASR, and SORD).

[^305]: Specifically, Ernst & Young concluded that, in all five SWBT
    states, the interfaces and systems it reviewed: process the same
    transactions; use the same programming code; provide the same
    functionality; and have the same supporting documentation. Ernst &
    Young Supplemental Report at 4.

[^306]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. paras. 13-18; SWBT Ham Reply Aff. paras. 7,
    8, 16, 19 and 29; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. paras. 5, 10, 11, 14, 20. *See
    also* SWBT Reply at 28.

[^307]: *See* SWBT Application, Appendix C-KS, Tab 259, at 18-19 (Kansas
    Commission Conclusion); SWBT Application, Appendix C-OK, Tab 275, at
    172, 174 (Oklahoma Commission Conclusion).

[^308]: We note that this additional evidence, provided by SWBT with its
    Reply Comments, is directly responsive to arguments raised by a
    party commenting on the application (here, the Department of
    Justice) and, consistent with the manner in which we have treated
    such responsive evidence in prior proceedings, may be considered
    without a waiver of our "freeze frame" rule. *See* *SWBT Texas
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18370, para. 35.

[^309]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 29.

[^310]: *Id.* at 30.

[^311]: As we have held previously, a BOC's OSS includes both mechanized
    systems and manual processes, and thus the OSS functions performed
    by BOC personnel have been part of our OSS functionality and
    commercial readiness reviews.

[^312]: Indeed, one issue not raised by the Department of Justice
    involves the OSS role played by SWBT's "back office" or "legacy"
    systems. These systems and databases are used in the processing of
    retail and wholesale orders, such as databases containing customer
    records and addresses, or those containing loop make-up information.
    SWBT notes that it is the only "Baby Bell" to survive intact as a
    regional BOC and, as such, has maintained a single region-wide set
    of OSS, including its back office systems, for its own retail use
    long before divestiture in 1984. *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para.
    5.

[^313]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 7-10. In addition to having
    a single region-wide EDI ordering interface, SWBT also explains that
    its other interfaces are the same region-wide, and do not vary from
    state to state (specifically, the interfaces to its Verigate,
    DataGate, EDI (preordering), CORBA, LEX, Order Status, Provisioning
    Order Status, and Trouble Administration systems). *Id.* at para. 7.

[^314]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 8 and 19; Ernst & Young
    Supplemental Report at 8 and 11-12.

[^315]: While WorldCom argues that the use of different product codes in
    each state *may* affect the performance of SWBT's OSS, it offers no
    evidence to suggest that it actually does so. *See* WorldCom
    Comments at 4-5; WorldCom Lichtenberg & Sivori Decl. at 18-20;
    Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel, Federal Law and Public
    Policy, WorldCom, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission dated January 3, 2001, at 4-7 (WorldCom
    January 3 *Ex Parte* Letter). WorldCom January 3 *Ex Parte* Letter
    at 4-7. If SWBT's systems fail properly to recognize these
    state-specific codes -- whether in Texas, Kansas or Oklahoma -- and
    the timely processing of carriers' orders is affected, SWBT would be
    subject to a possible enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).

[^316]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 14.

[^317]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 9 and Attach. B.

[^318]: *See* WorldCom McMillon & Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 21.

[^319]: Indeed, if SWBT modifies SORD, SORD software, or any other OSS
    system, in a manner that impacts competing carriers, it must provide
    adequate advance notice so that such carriers may make necessary
    changes to their systems and procedures.

[^320]: *See* WorldCom McMillon & Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 22. While
    competing carriers, such as WorldCom, are not well-positioned to
    identify differences in SWBT's proprietary back-office systems, we
    find that SWBT has provided sufficient evidence, particularly in its
    Reply Comments and Affidavits, to demonstrate that key aspects of
    its OSS are common in Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma. Moreover, as
    WorldCom itself recognizes, however, "it is quite likely that the
    OSS \[in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas\] is more similar between these
    three states than between other states in the country" because "a
    single legacy company -- SWBT -- historically provided local
    telephone service for all three states." WorldCom Comments at 6-7.

[^321]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 28.

[^322]: *See SWBT Texas* Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426, para. 148; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129. In prior
    orders, the Commission has identified the following five pre-order
    functions: (1) customer service record (CSR) information; (2)
    address validation; (3) telephone number information; (4) due date
    information; (5) services and feature information. *See id.*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4015, para. 132.

[^323]: As we have explained in the prior proceedings, because
    characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the presence of
    various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain
    advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to "pre-qualify"
    a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that will assist
    carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with or without
    the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced
    service. *See* *id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140.

[^324]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426, para. 148; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order* at 4014, para. 130; *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67, para. 105.

[^325]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3885, paras. 427-431.
    This aspect of the *UNE Remand Order* had not taken effect at the
    time SWBT filed its second section 271 application for the State of
    Texas, and thus was not part of our review in that proceeding. *See
    SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18367-68, para. 28.

[^326]: *See id.* For example, SWBT must provide (1) the composition of
    the loop material, including both fiber and copper; (2) the
    existence, location and type of any electronic or other equipment on
    the loop, including but not limited to, digital loop carrier or
    other remote concentration devices, feeder/distribution interfaces,
    bridge taps, load coils, pair-gain devices, disturbers in the same
    or adjacent binder groups; (3) the loop length, including the length
    and location of each type of transmission media; (4) the wire
    gauge(s) of the loop; and (5) the electrical parameters of the loop,
    which may determine the suitability of the loop for various
    technologies. *See id.*

[^327]: The Commission required SBC to create a separate advanced
    services affiliate as a condition of the company's merger with
    Ameritech. *See* *Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC
    Communications Inc., Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of
    Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to
    Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22,
    24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and 101 of the Commission's Rules*, CC Docket No.
    98-141, 14 FCC Rcd 14712 (1999)(*SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*). We
    note that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
    issued a decision overturning the Commission's determination, in
    conjunction with the SBC-Ameritech merger, that the merged company
    could avoid the resale obligation of section 251(c)(4) for the sale
    of advanced services if it provided those services through a
    separate affiliate. *Association of Communications Enterprises v.
    Federal Communications Commission*, 2001 WL 20519 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9,
    2001). Although this decision addresses the separate affiliate
    requirements of the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, it does not impact
    our ability to rely on SWBT's performance towards its separate
    affiliate in evaluating this application.

[^328]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-3887, paras. 427-431.

[^329]: Design loop information is the theoretical make-up of a loop
    based on the standard loop design for the longest loop in the end
    user's distribution area. *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 136. SWBT
    also provides a "green/yellow/red" graphic summary of the design
    loop information that allows requesting carriers to make a
    determination if a loop could support xDSL capabilities.
    "Green/yellow/red" is available to both competitors and SWBT. *See*
    SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 21-28; SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para.
    4.

[^330]: SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at paras. 3 and 4.

[^331]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 136; SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at para. 3,
    n.3.

[^332]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 30-31.

[^333]: SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at para. 3.

[^334]: *Id.* at para. 4; SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para. 5. SWBT will
    automatically perform a line and station transfer to ensure that
    competing carriers can provide DSL capable services on any spare
    loop available to a specific end-user's address in the event that
    the existing loop is incapable of supporting DSL service, such as a
    digital loop carrier, or if only one loop existed. In these
    circumstances, SWBT might connect portions of another loop to create
    an additional loop over which it could provide the DSL service.
    *See* SWBT Welch Reply Aff. at para. 5.

[^335]: SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para. 6.

[^336]: SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at para. 3. The interfaces are the GUI
    Verigate, application-to-application Datagate and the industry
    standard EDI/CORBA.

[^337]: *See* SWBT Chapman Aff. at para. 21.

[^338]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 427.

[^339]: *See* SWBT Chapman Aff. at para. 18.

[^340]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1, SWBT
    Region-wide, at 271-No 1c; SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 1.1-01, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No 1.1. We note
    that SWBT reports pre-ordering response time and availability on a
    region-wide basis. Since the record in this proceeding demonstrates
    that SWBT's pre-ordering systems and processes are the same
    throughout the five-state region, we need not review state specific
    performance data.

[^341]: IP Comments at 15-17.

[^342]: SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at para. 3.

[^343]: Allegiance Comments at 33; McLeodUSA Comments at 34.

[^344]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 136; SWBT Cullen Reply Aff. at para. 3,
    n.3.

[^345]: *See* SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 22-28.

[^346]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at para. 22-32; SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at
    para. 4.

[^347]: *Id.*

[^348]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 427.

[^349]: IP Comments at 13.

[^350]: *Id.*; *see also* Letter from Howard J. Siegel, Vice President
    of Regulatory Policy, IP Communications Corp. to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    00-217, at 2 (filed November 30, 2000) (IP November 30, 2000 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^351]: IP Comments at 13-14.

[^352]: *See* SWBT Reply at 69-70. SWBT explains that, when a pre-order
    request for actual loop make-up information is made and actual
    information is available, LFACS will transmit to the requestor
    information on the loop that LFACS would use if LFACS were
    provisioning the service requested.

[^353]: We note that, even in the event that the *UNE Remand Order*
    requirements are read to mean only the "best" loop, state
    commissions would nevertheless have the authority to impose
    additional obligations consistent with the Act.

[^354]: IP November 30, 2000 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^355]: SWBT Welch Reply Aff. at paras. 5-6; SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at
    para. 8.

[^356]: SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para. 11.

[^357]: The Ernst & Young Report found that SWBT's DataGate interface
    was the same throughout SWBT's five-state region. *See* SWBT Br. at
    20, n. 32; Ernst & Young Supplemental Report, Kelly Aff., Attach. A
    at 4.

[^358]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18427, para. 149. The DataGate
    interface is based on SWBT's proprietary pre-ordering functionality,
    and allows competing carriers to acquire pre-ordering information
    using their own software programs or applications. *See* SWBT Ham
    Aff. at para. 123.

[^359]: *See id.* at 118.

[^360]: *See id*. at para. 120.

[^361]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18427-28, para. 150.

[^362]: In the Texas proceeding, because SWBT did not report
    measurements concerning its EDI/CORBA interfaces, we relied solely
    on its measurements tracking the timeliness and availability of
    DataGate and VeriGate. However, in this proceeding, SWBT reports
    measurements reporting both the availability and timeliness of
    EDI/CORBA. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos.
    1-12 through 1-15, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No. 1d and SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 4-01.6 through
    4-01.11, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No. 4b. Although no commenter
    complained about the availability or timeliness of these interfaces,
    we do not rely upon them in making our finding. SWBT itself does not
    explain or rely on these new measurements in support of its
    pre-ordering showing.

[^363]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 1 and
    2, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No. 1a and SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 4, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No. 4a. The
    Verigate interface is a graphical user interface that operates with
    Windows for competing carriers that want to utilize LEX or EDI
    ordering functions but do not want to incur the programming and
    expenses required for EDI, CORBA and DataGate. *See* SWBT Ham Aff.
    at para. 126.

[^364]: SWBT Application at 26; SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 124.

[^365]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1, SWBT
    Region-wide, at 271-1a.

[^366]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 123.

[^367]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18432, para. 158. In reaching
    this conclusion, we rely, in part, on the Telcordia integration test
    performed as part of the Texas proceeding and we conclude that this
    test provides us with additional assurance that competing carriers
    are able to achieve integration while utilizing SWBT's OSS.

[^368]: SWBT Application, Appendix C-OK, Volume 25a-c, Tab 275, at 178.

[^369]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 133.

[^370]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025 and 4029,
    paras. 145 and 154.

[^371]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurements No. 1 and
    2, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No 1a. The sole exception was Average
    Response Time within "x" seconds-PIC Data, which SWBT missed in
    August. In that month, SWBT missed the 95% benchmark for response
    within 41 seconds by 5%, but was successful in making the 90%
    benchmark for response within 27 seconds. However, SWBT surpassed
    the benchmark for this measurement for every other month in the past
    year. Moreover, SWBT has satisfied the benchmark of 99.5%
    availability for six of the last seven months. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 4, SWBT Region-wide, at 271-No. 4a
    (April: 99.7%; May: 100%; June: 100%, July: 100%; August: 100%;
    September 99.4%; October: 99.7%).

[^372]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 24.

[^373]: Because most of these ordering functions lack a direct retail
    analogue, our standard of review is to determine whether SWBT's
    systems and performance allow an efficient carrier a meaningful
    opportunity to compete. For those functions of the ordering systems
    for which there is a retail analogue, we shall assess whether SWBT
    provides competing carriers with access to its OSS systems in
    substantially the same time and manner as it provides to its retail
    operations.

[^374]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18438, para. 170; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035-4039, paras. 163-166.

[^375]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 13-18; SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at
    paras. 7, 8, 16, 19 and 29; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at paras. 5, 10, 11,
    14, 20; Ernst & Young Report; Ernst & Young Supplemental Report.

[^376]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18438-40, paras. 163-164
    (discussing order confirmation notices). In this instance, as in the
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order* and the *SWBT Texas Order*, we are
    not presented with a retail analogue for order confirmation notices,
    and thus assess whether the process and performance offered by the
    applicant enables an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity
    to compete.

[^377]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 5a-5f; SWBT Aggregate Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 5.1, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 5.1a,
    5.1b; SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 94, Kansas
    and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 94a, 94c and 94e. We recognize that a third
    party review of SWBT\'s performance data uncovered irregularities in
    the way SWBT recorded the time that faxed manual orders were
    received. *See In the Matter of SBC Communications, Inc., Apparent
    Liability for Forfeiture*, File No. EB-00-IH-0432, Notice of
    Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, DA 00-2858 (Dec. 20, 2000) (*SBC
    Merger Audit NAL*). While this irregularity apparently was not
    corrected until August 2000, it does not appear that it had a
    significant impact on SWBT\'s reported performance data reviewed
    here, as SWBT's performance was not noticeably different in
    September and October. In any case, were we to rely exclusively on
    SWBT\'s September and October data for these "manual" order
    confirmation measurements, our conclusions would have been the same.

[^378]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1-05,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 5.1b; SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 94-15, Kansas, at 271-No. 94e.

[^379]: In Oklahoma, SWBT satisfied the benchmark for xDSL order
    confirmations in October and missed by only one late notice in July
    and August and five late notices in September. *See id.* In Kansas,
    SWBT satisfied the benchmark in August but missed the benchmark by
    only one late notice in July and October and by two late notices in
    September. With respect to the number port only orders, SWBT missed
    the benchmark from by 0.9 percent in September and by 0.7 percent in
    October.

[^380]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 13-18; SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at
    paras. 7, 8, 16, 19 and 29; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at paras. 5, 10, 11,
    14, 20.

[^381]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5,
    Texas, at 271-No. 5a-5f; SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 94, Texas, at 271-No. 94a, 94c and 94e; SWBT
    Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1, Texas, at 271-No.
    5.1a, 5.1b.

[^382]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5-07,
    Texas, ("Percent FOCs Related to xDSL Capable Loops Returned within
    "x" Hours -- EDI"), at 271-No. 5c (missed the benchmark in August by
    3.1 percent and in September by 2.9 percent); SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 94-15, Texas, ("Percent FOCs
    Received Within 'X' Hours -- Manual"), at 271-No. 94e (missing two
    of the last four benchmarks by 0.8 percent in August and 4.7 percent
    in September); and SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No.
    94-16, Texas, ("Percent FOCs Received Within 'X' Hours -- Manual"),
    at 271-No. 94e (returning 100 percent of notices on-time in three of
    the last six months).

[^383]: McLeodUSA Comments at 30.

[^384]: Allegiance Comments at 25.

[^385]: *Id.* at 15.

[^386]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 13-18; SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at
    paras. 7, 8, 16, 19 and 29. Errors detected by mechanized edits
    automatically result in rejects that are returned electronically via
    LEX or EDI, while errors detected during manual processing result in
    manually generated rejection notices returned electronically via the
    "LASR GUI" interface. SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 193, 201.

[^387]: SWBT has satisfied the standard for timely returns of
    mechanically generated reject notices by returning more than 97
    percent of reject notices within one hour for the past 12 months
    over LEX and for 11 of the last 12 months over EDI. *See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 10 and 11, Kansas and
    Oklahoma, at 271-No. 10-11. WorldCom complains that SWBT improperly
    rejects competitors' UNE-P orders. WorldCom Comments at 13. SWBT,
    however, working with competing carriers, has taken steps to remedy
    this problem by (1) implementing an exception report listing for
    UNE-P conversions that require three different service orders but
    for which each of the three orders has not yet issued and (2)
    created a report that shows the UNE-P conversion orders that require
    three service orders and for which the dates on each of the three
    orders do not match. *See* SWBT Noland Reply Aff. at para. 42.

[^388]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 11.1,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, 271-No.10.1, 11.1. Specifically, from July
    through October 2000 in Kansas, SWBT returned manually generated
    rejection notices in an average of 3.69, 8.32, 8.69 and 3.22 hours
    respectively. In Oklahoma, SWBT returned manually generated
    rejection notices in an average of 3.05, 6.76, 10.72, and 3.61 hours
    over the same time period.

[^389]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18441-42, para. 175.

[^390]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 10.1-01,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271 No. 10.1-01, 11.1. SWBT has returned
    79.8, 86.1, and 96.5 percent of manual rejection notices within 6
    hours in August, September and October, respectively, in Kansas and
    82.5, 86.4, and 96.2 percent of manual rejection notices within 6
    hours in Oklahoma.

[^391]: Allegiance Comments at 28; McLeodUSA Comments at 27; Sprint
    Comments at 48; WorldCom Comments at 14.

[^392]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurements No. 10 and
    11, Texas, at 271-No. 10-11; SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 10.1-01, Texas, at 271-No.10.1, 11.1; and SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 11.1, Texas, at
    271-No.10.1, 11.1.

[^393]: Sprint Comments at 47.

[^394]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18442, para. 176; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para. 175; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20673-74, paras. 111-112.

[^395]: SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 47.

[^396]: In the *SWBT Texas Order*, we recognized that SWBT planned to
    implement a change to its ordering system that would eliminate the
    need for carriers to list an end user's address on orders involving
    the migration of an end user from retail or resale to UNE-P service.
    *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18443, para. 178. We discussed
    how SWBT's electronic processes for provisioning UNE-P faltered when
    it handled orders containing address-related discrepancies that were
    not resolved by SWBT's front-end edits. *Id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    18452-53, para. 194. On May 27, 2000, SWBT released EDI/LSR software
    that eliminated the requirement to populate the end-user's address
    on UNE-P conversion service requests. Under SWBT's new process, no
    address errors would be returned to the competing carrier, and the
    service address would be provided by SWBT from the CRIS database,
    even if the street number and name information provided by the CLEC
    is incorrect. Importantly, no commenter complained about this
    problem in this proceeding. SWBT's application demonstrates that
    this change was implemented on May 27, 2000 and allowed SWBT's
    system to process competitor's orders even when an order had an
    incorrect end user address. *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 58-60.

[^397]: Competing carriers' orders "flow-through" if they are submitted
    electronically and pass through SWBT's ordering OSS into its back
    office systems without manual intervention. The Commission
    traditionally uses order "flow-through" as a potential indicator of
    a wide range of problems that we consider in determining whether a
    BOC provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. *See* SWBT Ham
    Aff. at para. 205; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4033, n. 488. However, we have not considered flow-though rates as
    the sole indicium of parity and thus have not limited our analysis
    of a BOC's ordering processes to a review of its flow-through
    performance data. Instead, we have held that factors that are linked
    to order flow-through but are more directly indicative of a BOC's
    OSS performance, such as a BOC's overall ability to return timely
    order confirmation and rejection notices, accurately process
    manually handled orders, and scale its systems, are relevant and
    probative for analyzing a BOC's ability to provide access to its
    ordering functions in a nondiscriminatory manner.

[^398]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 13a.

[^399]: Sprint Comments at 47. *See also* Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 34.

[^400]: The first carrier flowed through 100 percent of a total of 133
    orders during the most recent four-month period. The second carrier
    achieved flow-through rates of 91 to 100 percent during the same
    time period (with the exception of one month in which SWBT failed to
    flow through 2 of 8 orders). SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 52.

[^401]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13,
    Texas, at 271-No. 13a.

[^402]: *See* Allegiance Comments at 29; McLeodUSA Comments at 28;
    Sprint Comments at 48.

[^403]: We have, in past section 271 applications, used flow-through as
    a potential indicator of a wide range of problems with a BOC's OSS.
    *See* SWBT *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18444, para. 179. We do not
    find that the flow-through rate in Oklahoma (between 70 and 80
    percent in recent months), in itself, warrants a finding of
    checklist non-compliance, nor does the record in this proceeding
    indicate that this level of flow-through is indicative of the types
    of problems identified in prior orders. We thus disagree with
    Sprint's assertion that the LEX flow-through rate, by itself, shows
    that SWBT's OSS is neither scaleable nor reliable and McLeodUSA's
    and Allegiance's assertion that SWBT has not shown that it flows
    through competitors orders in a nondiscriminatory fashion. *See*
    Sprint Comments at 48; McLeodUSA Comments at 28; Allegiance Comments
    at 29.

[^404]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 56.

[^405]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para.
    175.

[^406]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18444, para. 180, n.489.

[^407]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 70.

[^408]: This "no facilities available" jeopardy notice is the only type
    of jeopardy notification SWBT provides within its retail operations.
    *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 66.

[^409]: *Id.* at para. 70.

[^410]: *Id.* at paras. 66, 67, and 72.

[^411]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 10.2
    and 11.2, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 10.2, 11.2.

[^412]: We can place only limited weight on this performance data as it
    represents only one month of performance and because SWBT does not
    provide an explanation for this new measurement.

[^413]: *See* WorldCom Comments at 13; WorldCom Reply Comments at 31;
    WorldCom January 3, 2001 *Ex Parte* Letter at 8-10.

[^414]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 69.

[^415]: WorldCom claims that SWBT put into jeopardy status 8.7 percent
    of WorldCom's orders in August, 6.8 percent in September and 6.0
    percent in October.

[^416]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 13-18; SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at
    para. 7. An order completion notice informs a competing carrier that
    SWBT has completed the installation of the service requested by the
    particular order.

[^417]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18448-49, para. 187.

[^418]: Specifically, SWBT has returned 97 percent of these notices
    within a day of work completion over LEX in Kansas for the past
    eight months and in Oklahoma for the past two of the last four
    months. In two months where SWBT's Oklahoma LEX performance fell
    below the 97 percent benchmark, it did so by less than two
    percentage points, an amount that we find has little significant
    competitive impact. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 7.1, Oklahoma, at 271-No. 7.1, 9. Over EDI, SWBT
    satisfied the benchmark four of the last six months in Oklahoma and
    one of the last four months in Kansas. For EDI orders submitted in
    Kansas, SWBT's performance varied from 100.0 percent in July to 78.7
    percent in September. SWBT returned 100.0, 92.6, 78.7 and 88.6
    percent of order completion notices within a day of completion over
    EDI in Kansas. Considering the totality of the evidence, we find
    that SWBT's EDI performance is sufficient in light of the fact that
    SWBT satisfied the benchmark in Kansas seven of the last 11 month s.

[^419]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 7.1,
    Texas, at 271-No. 7.1, 9.

[^420]: WorldCom Comments at 10-11.

[^421]: *Id.; see also* WorldCom January 3, 2001 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    10.

[^422]: *See* SWBT Noland Reply Aff. at para. 35.

[^423]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 49.

[^424]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18411-12, para. 120.

[^425]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 50.

[^426]: WorldCom Comments at 12-13.

[^427]: SWBT Reply at 45.

[^428]: *See* SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 62-63. We are also not
    persuaded by WorldCom's contention that we should reject SWBT's
    application due to SWBT's failure to propose a permanent solution to
    this issue. *See* WorldCom January 3, 2001 *Ex Parte* Letter at 11.

[^429]: *See* McLeodUSA Comments at 31-33; WorldCom Comments at 15-17.

[^430]: *See* SWBT Noland Aff. at paras. 39-40.

[^431]: *See* WorldCom January 3, 2001 *Ex Parte* Letter at 12.

[^432]: *See* SWBT Noland Reply Aff. at para. 41.

[^433]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196.
    For provisioning timeliness, we look to missed due dates and average
    installation intervals and for provisioning quality, we look to
    service problems experienced at the provisioning stage.

[^434]: We discuss loop provisioning below. *See* section V.D., *infra*.

[^435]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18453, para. 195.

[^436]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 96.

[^437]: EASE is the pre-ordering and ordering interface service order
    negotiation system used by SWBT and available to competing carriers
    for resold residence and simple business orders. *See* SWBT Ham Aff.
    at para. 129.

[^438]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 33.

[^439]: SWBT's resale "specials" include orders for DDS, DS1, DS3, voice
    grade private line, ISDN-BRI, ISDN-PRI, DSL and any other available
    resold services. *See* SWBT Dysart Aff. at Attachment F, at 77.

[^440]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18452, para. 194.

[^441]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 27-01
    to 27-04, 29-01 to 29-04, 43-01 to 43-08, and 45-01 to 45-08, Kansas
    and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 27a, 271-No. 29-a, 271-No. 43a-b and
    271-No. 45a-b.

[^442]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 29-04,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates-No Field
    Work-Business-POTS -- Resale"), at 271-No. 29-a. In Oklahoma, the
    disparity was 0.01 percent in July, 0.65 percent in August, 0.43
    percent in September and 1.20 percent in October. In Kansas, the
    disparity was 0.09 percent in July, 1.17 percent in August, 0.78
    percent in September and 3.32 percent in October.

[^443]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 27-01
    to 27-04, 29-01 to 29-04, 43-01 to 43-08, and 45-01 to 45-08, Texas,
    at 271-No. 27a, 271-No. 29-a, 271-No. 43a-b and 271-No. 45a-b.
    SWBT's only disparities were in Measurement No. 29-02 (disparity of
    0.80 percent in August and 0.42 percent in September), Measurement
    No. 29-03 (disparity of 0.11 percent in October) and Measurement No.
    29-04 (disparity of 0.21 percent in September).

[^444]: *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 35-01 to
    35-08 and 46-01 to 46-08, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 35a-b and
    271-No. 46a-b.

[^445]: While some of the dozens of sub-measurements in this area
    reflected disparities, none suggest a level of poor performance that
    warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. For example, several
    performance measurements simply do not provide a meaningful
    indication of SWBT's performance because the volumes of orders are
    so low, such as SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement Nos.
    35-05 and 35-06, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 35b (in four
    months, competitors placed a total of 4 orders in Kansas for
    Measurement 35-05, and a total of 9 orders in Kansas and 4 in
    Oklahoma for Measurement 35-06). Other measurements have minimal
    disparities, such as SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement
    35-08, Kansas, at 271-No. 35b (in the last three months, the
    disparity was 1.37 percent in August, 1.01 percent in September and
    1.85 percent in October). Finally, other disparities were scattered
    and indicated no pattern of disparate performance, such as SWBT
    Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement 35-01, Kansas, at 271-No.
    35a (disparity of 0.83 percent in July and 1.03 percent in October
    but better than parity in the other months).

[^446]: *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 35-01 to
    35-08 and 46-01 to 46-08, Texas, at 271-No. 35a-b and 271-No. 46a-b.
    SWBT did not satisfy the parity standard in Texas the last four
    months for Measurement 35-05, which tracks one type of
    installation-related trouble report (i.e. for trouble requiring
    dispatch for residential orders). SWBT's performance was
    satisfactory for all other related measurements (i.e. installation
    related non-dispatch residential troubles and all troubles on
    business orders).

[^447]: *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 27 and
    29, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 27b and 271-No. 27b.

[^448]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 35c, at
    271-No. 35c.

[^449]: For timeliness, see SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement
    No. 27-05, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 27b (disparity of 1.05
    days in July and 0.12 day in August in Kansas and disparity of 0.51
    day in Oklahoma in August); Measurement No. 29-06, Oklahoma, at
    271-No. 29b (disparity of 4.54 percent in July, 0.6 percent in
    September and 0.63 percent in October.) For quality, see Measurement
    No. 35-12, Oklahoma, at 271-No. 35c (disparity of 0.73 percent in
    July and August; 1.1 percent in September, and 0.2 percent in
    October).

[^450]: *See* SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 27, 29, and
    35, Texas, at 271-No. 27b, 271-No. 29b, and 271-No. 35c.

[^451]: KMC Comments at 4; Sprint Comments at 64.

[^452]: KMC Comments at 4; *see also* Department of Justice Evaluation
    at 33.

[^453]: Sprint Comments at 64.

[^454]: *See supra* section IV.C.2.b.i (for further discussion regarding
    SWBT's hot cut provisioning); *see also* SWBT Reply at 94.

[^455]: Sprint Comments at 64-65.

[^456]: *Id.* at 64.

[^457]: SWBT Reply at 94; SWBT Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 108.

[^458]: Sprint Comments at 65.

[^459]: SWBT Reply at 94; SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 162.

[^460]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 256; SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras.
    99-100.

[^461]: SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 261, 266. The Toolbar interface enables
    carriers to perform the same functions as SWBT's retail operations,
    including: (1) issue trouble reports; (2) request and receive a
    mechanized loop test; (3) determine that status of an opened trouble
    report; (4) check history; (5) view a list of open trouble reports;
    and (6) view a list of trouble reports closed within the last 120
    days. *Id.* at para. 258. SWBT also offers requesting carriers
    non-electronic access to its maintenance and repair functions
    through the SWBT Local Operations Center (LOC), which handles all
    competing carrier repair and maintenance requests for UNEs, resale,
    and interconnection. *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras. 18, 99;
    SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 76, 256. The LOC is staffed by nearly 400
    employees and is available through a hotline number 24 hours a day,
    seven days a week. SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras. 18, 20.

[^462]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18457, para. 201.

[^463]: *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 4, 13; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at
    para. 5; *see also SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18459, para.
    205. We note that no carrier claimed that SWBT's Toolbar interface
    acts differently in Kansas or Oklahoma than in Texas, or otherwise
    complained that this interface fails to provide timely responses.

[^464]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 39 and
    52, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 39a-39c and 271-No. 52a (average
    time to repair reported troubles). SWBT took longer to repair one
    type of trouble for competing LECs' customers than for its own
    customers -- service-affecting troubles (as opposed to service
    outages) that do not require dispatch (as opposed to those that
    require a technician's visit). *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data, Measurement No. 39-03, Oklahoma, at 271-No. 39a. We note that
    performance on related measurements has been generally satisfactory
    in Oklahoma. Moreover, because the volume of observations is so low
    (between 10 and 20 troubles reported per month), we look to SWBT's
    performance in Texas where, under higher volumes, SWBT has
    consistently satisfied the parity standard. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measurement No. 39, Texas, at 271-No. 39a-39c.

[^465]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 38,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 38a-b. SWBT missed repair
    commitments for competing carriers for the last four months for one
    sub-measurement, missing 14.06 percent in July (as opposed to 8.52
    percent for itself), 11.69 percent in August (6.73 percent for
    itself), 12.68 percent in September (5.44 percent for itself), and
    7.87 percent in October (7.52 percent for itself). *See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 38-05, Kansas, at
    271-No. 38b. This performance, in and of itself, does not appear to
    be a basis for a finding of checklist noncompliance in light of the
    fact that SWBT's performance, as a whole, is acceptable and when no
    commenter has identified this as an issue. We also are encouraged by
    SWBT's improved performance.

[^466]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 37 and
    54, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 37 and 271-No. 54 (trouble
    report rate). SWBT's data indicate that its competitors experienced
    a slightly higher trouble rate for resold business service than
    SWBT's business customers experienced in September and October,
    2000. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 37-02,
    Kansas, at 271-No. 37. Because the discrepancy between these two
    rates was slight (0.14 percent in September and 0.21 percent in
    October) and because no commenter complained about this performance,
    this performance differential does not appear to be competitively
    significant.

[^467]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 41,
    Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 41. While SWBT's performance is
    satisfactory in the residential and business resale categories, the
    percentage of repeat trouble reports experienced by its competitors'
    UNE-P customers has climbed recently and has been out-of-parity for
    the last two months. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Measurement No. 41-03, Oklahoma, at 271-No. 41. We would be
    concerned were this trend to continue, but do not find that the two
    out-of-parity months, in light of the satisfactory performance on
    related measures and the absence of specific complaints from
    competitors, warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance.

[^468]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 37, 41
    and 54, Texas, at 271-No. 37, 271-No. 41 and 271-No. 54.

[^469]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order* at 15 FCC Rcd at 18461, para. 210.

[^470]: *See id*.

[^471]: *See* SWBT McLaughlin Aff. at para. 4; SWBT McLaughlin Reply
    Aff. at paras. 3-12. SWBT explains that bills for Kansas, Oklahoma
    and Texas are processed in the same service centers, using the same
    systems and overseen by the same personnel. While the systems may
    use different tables, containing state-specific product codes and
    state-specific prices, there is nothing in the record that the use
    of these tables would change the functionality or performance of
    these billing systems.

[^472]: *Id.* We note that Ernst & Young, in its review to determine
    whether certain SWBT systems are the same region-wide, did not
    consider SWBT\'s billing systems. *See* Ernst & Young Supplemental
    Report. While SWBT\'s showing that its billing functions are the
    same region-wide was sufficient to allow us to consider region-wide
    data in this instance, we note a similar showing may not always
    allow us to do so in future applications. An independent reviewer's
    report could prove to be critical in supporting the relevance
    another state's OSS, for example, if there were evidence in the
    record that appeared to undermine this type of assertion (such as
    evidence suggesting that the billing systems function differently in
    different states, or competing carriers' assertions that they
    receive different treatment in different states).

[^473]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement Nos. 14, 16
    and 19, Kansas and Oklahoma, at 271-No. 14 and 271-No. 16/17/19.

[^474]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 18, Kansas and
    Oklahoma, at 271-No. 15, 18 (demonstrating that, for the period of
    July to October, 2000, SWBT has returned 100% of bills returned via
    EDI on-time, in both Kansas and Oklahoma).

[^475]: *See* SWBT McLaughlin Aff. at para. 30 (explaining that bills
    are mailed or transmitted by the sixth workday associated with the
    bill date).

[^476]: *See e.g., SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403, para. 106;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 3999, para. 102.

[^477]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403, para. 106; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 3999, para. 102.

[^478]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403, para. 106; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 4000, para. 102. A change
    management process refers to the methods and procedures that the BOC
    employs to communicate with competing carriers regarding the
    performance of, and changes in, the BOC's OSS system. *See SWBT
    Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403-04, para. 107; *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 4000, para. 103.

[^479]: *See SWBT Texas Order* in which we concluded that SWBT's change
    management plan was adequate based on, *inter alia*, the "go/no go"
    vote process (15 FCC Rcd at 18409, para. 116), adequate
    documentation (15 FCC Rcd at 18411, para. 119), compliance with
    documented procedures (15 FCC Rcd at 18415-16, para. 127), and the
    testing environment (15 FCC Rcd at 18420, para. 134).

[^480]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18406-07, para. 112.

[^481]: SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 72-73; *see also,* SWBT Ham Aff.,
    Attach. G. at 8, § 3.4, (Change Agreement) (providing that the most
    recent prior release will be maintained in service after a new
    release).

[^482]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 65.

[^483]: As SWBT explains, many of these "late" notices were letters sent
    to correct or update existing final requirements for new releases.
    *See* Letter from Jan Price, Associate Director-Federal Regulatory,
    SBC Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission (Dec. 19, 2000) at 2 (SWBT Dec. 19, 2000 *Ex Parte*
    Letter). In October, SWBT sent four letters that were not "on time."
    Of the four, two were exception requests about which no competing
    carrier complained. We find this disparity is not competitively
    significant. No competing carrier claimed to have been harmed by the
    "late" notices (*see* SWBT Dec. 19, 2000 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3) and
    competing carriers are further protected under SWBT's change
    management process by their ability to version SWBT software. SWBT
    Dysart Aff., Attach. F at 179-180. Moreover, the fact that SWBT is
    sending these notifications and reporting them in its performance
    reports also is an indication that it is following its agreed-upon
    procedures.

[^484]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 18424, para. 144.

[^485]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 11. SWBT has a Local Service
    Center staffed with approximately 1,338 employees that provides
    competing LECs with a single point of contact for issues regarding
    ordering, billing, and collections related to interconnection
    facilities, resold services and UNEs. *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at para.
    76. SWBT's LSC employees and facilities serve all five states in the
    SWBT region, including Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma. SWBT Noland/Smith
    Aff. at paras. 14-17. In addition, SWBT's Local Operations Center,
    with 391 employees, supports the provisioning of UNEs,
    interconnection with SWBT's local network, and resold services as
    well as any maintenance and repair functions requested by competing
    carriers. The LOC serves as the single point of contact for
    maintenance and repair and is available to competing carriers in the
    entire five-state SWBT region 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. SWBT
    Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 18, 20; SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 76.

[^486]: In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a
    BOC must show that it is offering "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to
    network elements in accordance with the requirements of section
    251(c)(3) . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii). Section 251(c)(3)
    requires an incumbent LEC to "provide, to any requesting
    telecommunications carrier . . . nondiscriminatory access to network
    elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on
    rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). Section 251(c)(3)
    of the Act also requires incumbent LECs to provide unbundled network
    elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such
    elements in order to provide a telecommunications service.

[^487]: In previous section 271 orders, the Commission has emphasized
    that the ability of requesting carriers to use unbundled network
    elements, as well as combinations of unbundled network elements, is
    integral to achieving Congress' objective of promoting competition
    in local telecommunications markets. *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18463-64, paras. 213-215; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 20718-19. Combining the incumbent's unbundled network elements
    with their own facilities encourages facilities-based competition
    and allows competing providers to provide a wide array of
    competitive choices. *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18464, at para.
    215.

[^488]: *See* SWBT Application at 45; Kansas Commission Comments at
    19-20; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order at 167-68.

[^489]: *See* SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 109.

[^490]: SWBT Application at 45; SWBT Sparks Aff. at paras. 108-120;
    Kansas 271 Agreement, Attach. 6, §§14.2 - 14.4, 14.7; Oklahoma 271
    Agreement, Attach. 6, §§14.2 - 14.4, 14.7. In addition, under the
    terms of the Kansas and Oklahoma 271 Agreements, SWBT will combine
    unbundled local loops with unbundled local switch ports for
    competitive LECs to provide service to business customers until at
    least October 2002. SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 115; Kansas 271
    Agreement, Attach. 6, §§ 2.4, 14.3, 14.7; Oklahoma 271 Agreement,
    Attach. 6, §§ 2.4, 14.3, 14.7. After that date, in those SWBT
    central offices where there are four or more competitive LECs
    collocated and where SWBT has provided unbundled network elements,
    SWBT may elect not to combine unbundled network elements for a
    competitive LEC's business customers when the same UNEs are not
    already combined in that central office. *See* SWBT Sparks Aff. at
    para. 115. If SWBT makes such an election, it will provide the
    requesting carrier with access to a secured frame where the
    competitive LEC can perform its own combining of those elements.
    *Id*. SWBT will provide new combinations of unbundled local loop and
    switching not currently interconnected and functional in SWBT's
    network for the competitive LEC to provide service to residential
    customers through the full term of the K2A and O2A. *Id*. at para.
    116.

[^491]: *See* Kansas Commission Comments at 19-20; Oklahoma Commission
    Sec. 271 Order at 167-69.

[^492]: SWBT Application at 46.

[^493]: SWBT Application at 46; SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 173-87; SWBT
    Sparks Aff. at para. 111; Kansas 271 Agreement, Attach. 6; Oklahoma
    271 Agreement, Attach 6; *see also* section IV.D.2, *infra*,
    (discussing the terms and conditions for access to unbundled network
    elements through physical and virtual collocation arrangements).

[^494]: SWBT Application at 47; SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 58.

[^495]: SWBT Application at 47; SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 111; Kansas
    271 Agreement Attach. 6, § 2.22; Oklahoma 271 Agreement Attach. 6, §
    2.22.

[^496]: SWBT Sparks Aff. at paras. 121-23. Collocation is not required
    in order to use this option for combining network elements. *Id.*
    Furthermore, when competitors order UNEs for combining at the
    secured frame or cabinet, SWBT is required to cross-connect those
    elements to the frame or cabinet at no additional charge. *See*
    Kansas Commission Comments at 20; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order
    at 169.

[^497]: *See* Z-Tel Reply at 13-14.

[^498]: *See id.*, Attachment B. We note that Z-Tel raises this argument
    for the first time in its reply comments.

[^499]: *See* Letter from Edwardo Rodriguez, Director-Federal
    Regulatory, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed December 22, 2000) (SWBT
    December 22 *Ex Parte* Letter); *see also* Z-Tel Reply at 14, n. 32.
    Because Z-Tel raised this issue for the first time in its reply
    comments, we find it appropriate to consider SWBT's ex parte
    response to Z-Tel's allegation.

[^500]: *See* SWBT December 22 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^501]: E.spire Comments at 3; Focal Comments at 2; *see also SWBT Texas
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18468-70, paras. 224-228 (discussing the
    Commission's reasoning for restricting the use of EELs to provide
    exchange access services).

[^502]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Supplemental
    Order, FCC 99-370 at paras. 4-5 (rel. Nov. 24, 1999) (*UNE Remand*
    *Supplemental Order*); *see Competitive Telecommunications
    Association v. FCC,* 117 F.3d 1068, 1073-75 (8^th^ Cir. 1997) and
    *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,* 750 F.2d 135, 140 (D.C. Cir.
    1984)). The *Supplemental Order* extended the terms of the temporary
    constraint imposed in the *UNE Remand Order* beyond merely the
    "entrance facility" portion of special access because we had
    originally underestimated the extent of the policy implications
    associated with temporarily constraining interexchange carriers only
    from substituting entrance facilities for incumbent LECs' special
    access service. *Supplemental Order* at para. 4 & n.5 (extending
    temporary constraint to include combinations of unbundled loops and
    dedicated interoffice transport network elements).

[^503]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Supplemental
    Order Clarification, FCC 00-183 at paras. 1, 21-23 (rel. June 2,
    2000) (*Supplemental Order Clarification*).

[^504]: *Id.* at paras. 29-30.

[^505]: *Id.* at para. 30.

[^506]: *Id*.

[^507]: *See* e.spire Comments at 6; *see also* Focal Comments *passim*;
    ALTS Reply at 10.

[^508]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.730(b).

[^509]: *See* e.spire comments at 7, n. 15 (citing Letter from Steven
    Augustino, Counsel to e.spire, to Frank Lamancusa, Deputy Division
    Chief, Market Disputes Resolution Division, Federal Communications
    Commission (filed Nov. 3, 2000)).

[^510]: As we have found in past section 271 proceedings, the section
    271 process simply could not function if we were required to resolve
    every interpretive dispute about the precise content of an incumbent
    LEC's obligations to its competitors, including fact-intensive
    interpretive disputes. *See* *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    18366-67, paras. 22-27.

[^511]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv).

[^512]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691,
    para. 380; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras.
    166-167, n.301 (retaining definition of the local loop from the
    *Local Competition First Report and Order*, but replacing the phrase
    "network interconnection device" with "demarcation point," and
    making explicit that dark fiber and loop conditioning are among the
    features, functions and capabilities of the loop).

[^513]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18481-81, para. 248; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20637, para. 185.

[^514]: Where no retail analogue exists to compare SWBT's performance
    towards competing carriers to SWBT's performance to its retail
    operations, we evaluate SWBT's showing to ascertain whether SWBT
    affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. As a
    result, we sometimes rely on performance measurements that use a
    benchmark instead of a parity standard.

[^515]: Letter from Jared Craighead, Associate Director-Federal
    Regulatory, SBC Telecommunications, Inc., to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket no 00-217
    (Nov. 29, 2000) (SWBT November 29 EX Parte Letter); Letter from
    Edwardo Rodriguez, Executive Director-Federal Regulatory, SBC
    Telecommunications Inc., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (Nov. 7, 2000); SWBT
    Chapman Aff. at paras. 17-51, 71-101; SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at
    paras. 14-26, 29, 96-148; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at paras. 23-37; SWBT
    Noland Reply Aff. at paras. 3-19.

[^516]: Specifically, we examine percent FOCs returned within "x" hours,
    average installation interval, missed installation due dates,
    percentage of trouble reports within 30 days of installation, mean
    time to restore, trouble report rate, and repeat trouble report
    rate. We examine SWBT's performance for 8.0 dB loops, 5.0 dB loops,
    DS-1 loops, BRI loops, and DSL loops. Both BRI loops and DSL loops
    are "xDSL-capable loops."

[^517]: In addition, we note that SWBT's separate affiliate has not been
    purchasing the same inputs used to provide advanced services as
    unaffiliated competing carriers. SWBT's separate affiliate purchases
    either line sharing to provide ADSL service or intrastate special
    access, while competing carriers in Kansas and Oklahoma are
    purchasing stand-alone DSL loops, BRI loops, and DS-1 loops to
    provide advanced services. As a result, SWBT's advanced services
    separate affiliate is not useful in making a presumption of
    nondiscriminatory performance. Pursuant to the *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order* and the *SWBT Texas Order*, a BOC may submit evidence of
    a fully operational separate affiliate to demonstrate compliance
    with this checklist item, but only if its affiliate is purchasing
    the same inputs and using the same processes as unaffiliated
    carriers. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4122-4123, paras. 331-32.

[^518]: SWBT provides two types of xDSL-capable loops: (1) DSL loops,
    which are further disaggregated in SWBT's performance measurements
    to show line shared loops and stand-alone DSL loops; and (2) BRI
    loops, which are often used to provide IDSL service. *See, e.g.*,
    SWBT Deere Aff. at para. 110.

[^519]: *Id.* at paras. 90-127; SWBT Jones Aff., Attach. A at 180.
    Kansas 271 Agreement, Attach. 25; Oklahoma 271 Agreement, Attach.
    25.

[^520]: Since June 2000, SWBT has been provisioning at least 70 DSL loop
    orders per month in Kansas and at least 115 such orders per month in
    Oklahoma. In October 2000, the volume of orders exceeded 220 in
    Kansas and 300 in Oklahoma*. See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Kansas and Oklahoma), Measure No. 58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused
    Missed Due Dates -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^521]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL --
    No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^522]: We also evaluate a BOC's provisioning of loop qualification
    capability to competing carriers. For the instant application, we
    evaluate SWBT's performance for loop pre-qualification and loop
    qualification under checklist item 2, access to unbundled network
    elements.

[^523]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 5.1-01 ("Percent Firm Order Confirmations (FOCs)
    Relating to xDSL-capable Loops Returned within x Hours"), at 271-No.
    5.1a.

[^524]: Since June 2000, SWBT has returned at least 98 percent of FOCs
    within 24 hours. Except for July 2000, SWBT has processed at least
    3,900 FOCs per month in Texas; in July 2000, SWBT processed 2,990
    FOCs in Texas. By contrast, SWBT processed an average of 125 FOCs
    per month in Kansas and 184 FOCs per month in Oklahoma between July
    and October 2000. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas,
    Kansas, Oklahoma), Measure No. 5.1-01 ("Percent Firm Order
    Confirmations (FOCs) Relating to xDSL-capable Loops Returned within
    x Hours"), at 271-No. 5.1a.

[^525]: Adelphia Lippold Decl. at para. 4 (alleging an average 5.27 day
    delay in FOCs provided to Adelphia between March 3, 1999 and July 1,
    2000); McLeodUSA Comments at 10.

[^526]: SWBT Cleek Aff., Attach. A at 75-78 (presenting Kansas
    Commission staff recommendations); SWBT Jones Aff., Attach. A at 180
    (presenting Oklahoma Commission conclusion that SWBT meets checklist
    item 4), 181 (presenting Oklahoma Commission conclusion regarding
    SWBT's provisioning processes for xDSL loops); Kansas Commission
    Comments at 17, 25, 26; Oklahoma Commission Comments at 1, Attach.
    A; *but see* IP Comments, Attach. 4 at 16 (noting local and regional
    differences in provisioning performance); IP Reply at 7-9.

[^527]: SWBT Application at 50; SWBT Chapman Aff. at 3; SWBT
    Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 29. *See* SWBT November 29, 2000 *ex
    parte* at 2-5.

[^528]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at para. 37.

[^529]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras. 18-22, 96-98; SWBT Chapman Aff.
    at paras. 35-45.

[^530]: *See* SWBT November 29, 2000 *Ex Parte*; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at
    para. 24. SWBT has a total of four MLACs located in Kansas City,
    Kansas; St. Louis, Missouri; Dallas, Texas, and Houston, Texas. More
    precisely, the provisioning process starts when SOAC, the system
    used to route orders, receives an order from the service order
    system, SORD. *See* SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 163-66; SWBT Mah Reply
    Aff. at para. 24. SWBT employees in the MLAC assign the facilities
    required to provision the service with LFACs. The MLAC employees use
    LFACs to manage outside plant facilities and SWITCH to manage and
    assign central office facilities. SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at para. 24.
    SWITCH is an operations system designed to inventory and assign
    central office equipment and related facilities. *See id.* at para.
    20.

[^531]: SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at para. 25. SWBT's has a total of four CPCs
    located in Topeka, Kansas; St. Louis, Missouri; Dallas, Texas; and
    Houston, Texas. Employees in the CPC use TIRKS to perform their work
    functions. SWBT's downstream work units, i.e., Central Office
    Operations and Installation & Maintenance forces, use the work
    document created in TIRKS by the CPC employees to install the
    service. *See id.*

[^532]: SWBT's advanced services retail operations are currently
    organized into a separate affiliate, ASI. Because SWBT's affiliate
    does not purchase stand-alone unbundled xDSL loops, there is no
    direct retail analogue for comparing xDSL performance. We therefore
    evaluate SWBT's performance to ensure SWBT affords competing
    carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

[^533]: In Kansas, SWBT installed DSL loops (no line sharing and no
    conditioning required) in 7.44 days in August, 6.87 days in
    September, and 6.02 days in October. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No. 55.1-01 ("Average
    Installation Interval -- DSL -- No Line Sharing -- Requires No
    Conditioning"), at 271-No. 55.1.

[^534]: In Oklahoma, SWBT installed DSL loops (no line sharing and no
    conditioning required) in 6.46 days in August, 7.24 days in
    September, and 6.09 days in October. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Oklahoma), Measure No. 55.1-01 ("Average
    Installation Interval -- DSL -- No Line Sharing -- Requires No
    Conditioning"), at 271-No. 55.1.

[^535]: Volumes of orders for DSL loops nearly tripled in both states
    between August and October 2000. In Kansas, SWBT received 72 orders
    for DSL loops in August and 224 orders in October 2000. In Oklahoma,
    SWBT received 134 orders for DSL loops in August and 305 such orders
    in October 2000.

[^536]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    55.1-01 ("Average Installation Interval -- DSL -- No Line Sharing --
    Requires No Conditioning"), at 271-No. 55.1. In the *SWBT Texas
    Order*, we accepted installation intervals for stand-alone xDSL
    loops ranging from 4.98 days to 6.65 days. *See SWBT Texas Order* at
    15 FCC Rcd at 18502, n.817, para. 292.

[^537]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL --
    No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c. In Kansas, SWBT missed 20.8
    percent of the installation due dates for DSL loops in August and
    9.4 percent in October. Volumes increased from 72 orders in August
    to 224 orders in October. In Oklahoma, SWBT missed 17.2 percent of
    the installation due dates for DSL loops in August and 9.8 percent
    in October. Volumes likewise increased in Oklahoma, from 134 orders
    in August to 305 orders in October. *Id.*

[^538]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL -- No Line
    Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^539]: *See* Adelphia Comments at 2, 4; Allegiance Comments at 11-31;
    KMC Comments at 4-9; McLeodUSA Comments at 7-22; Sprint Comments at
    57-64.

[^540]: Allegiance Comments at 20-23; McLeodUSA Comments at 9-12; Sprint
    Comments at 58, 60-61.

[^541]: *See* Adelphia Comments at 4. Adelphia explains that missed
    installation due dates irritate customers and often affect
    Adelphia's internal operations. We have not reviewed any evidence
    indicating specific instances in which customers cancelled
    installation service or otherwise changed service providers because
    of missed installation due dates.

[^542]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20718,
    para. 200.

[^543]: *See* Allegiance Comments at 25.

[^544]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No.
    58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- BRI Loop"), at
    271-No. 58a.

[^545]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Oklahoma), Measure No.
    58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- BRI Loop"), at
    271-No. 58a.

[^546]: In Texas, SWBT missed 15.5 percent, 17.8 percent, and 17.3
    percent of the due dates for BRI loops in August, September, and
    October respectively. By contrast, SWBT missed 30 percent, 24.8
    percent, and 27 percent of the due dates for BRI loops installed for
    its own retail operations. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Texas), Measure No. 58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates --
    BRI Loop"), at 271-No. 58a.

[^547]: See *supra* paras. 30-33.

[^548]: *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18504-05, para. 299; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4073-74, para. 222, n.711.

[^549]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 59-08
    ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 days -- DSL --
    No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 59c.

[^550]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Oklahoma), Measure No.
    59-08 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 days --
    DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 59c.

[^551]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    59-08 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 days --
    DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 59c.

[^552]: In Texas, SWBT processed 2,646 circuits in July, 3,343 circuits
    in August, 3,720 circuits in September, and 3,592 circuits in
    October 2000. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas),
    Measure No. 59-08 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N, T,C Orders within
    30 days -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 59c. By contrast,
    SWBT processed orders for between 70 and 305 circuits in Kansas and
    Oklahoma during the same period. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance
    Data (Kansas and Oklahoma), Measure No. 59-08 ("Percent Trouble
    Reports on N, T,C Orders within 30 days -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"),
    at 271-No. 59c.

[^553]: *See* Allegiance Comments at 25 (asserting that performance
    issues exist with BRI loops).

[^554]: See *supra* paras. 30-33.

[^555]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No.
    59-03 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N,T, C Orders within 30 days --
    BRI Loop"), at 271-No. 59a.

[^556]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Oklahoma), Measure No.
    59-03 ("Percent Trouble Reports on N,T, C Orders within 30 days --
    BRI Loop"), at 271-No. 59a.

[^557]: In Texas, competing carriers experienced a 25 percent trouble
    report rate within 30 days after installing BRI loops in January
    2000; by September 2000, SWBT's performance improved so that
    competing carriers experienced 10.4 percent trouble report rate
    within 30 days of installing a BRI loop. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Texas), Measure No. 59-03 ("Percent Trouble
    Reports on N,T, C Orders within 30 days -- BRI Loop"), at 271-No.
    59a.

[^558]: Competitive carriers submit trouble reports through Toolbar
    Trouble Administration (TBTA) or the application-to-application
    Electronic Bonding Trouble Administration interface. SWBT
    Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 99-105; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at para. 28.

[^559]: *Id*. at para. 28 and Attach. A (providing training course
    examples).

[^560]: *Id* at para. 29.

[^561]: *See* SWBT November 6, 2000 *Ex Parte*; SWBT November 29, 2000
    *Ex Parte*; SWBT May Reply Aff. at paras. 28-30; SWBT Noland/Smith
    Aff. at paras. 99-105.

[^562]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 67-08 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours) -- Dispatch -- DSL
    -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 67c.

[^563]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    67-08 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours) -- Dispatch -- DSL -- No Line
    Sharing"), at 271-No. 67c.

[^564]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No.
    69-08 ("Repeat Reports -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 69c.
    SWBT's performance for repeat trouble reports on BRI loops shows
    comparable performance provided to competing carriers and to SWBT's
    retail operations. Since May 2000, SWBT has generally met the
    statistical parity standard for repeat troubles in Kansas. Although
    SWBT missed the parity standard in August 2000, we note that this
    month involved a low volume of only four repeat trouble reports.
    *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 69-03 ("Repeat Reports -- BRI Loop"), at 271-No. 69a.

[^565]: SWBT's Oklahoma performance is reported as 14.3 percent, which
    is just above the 12 percent benchmark. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No. 69-08 ("Repeat Reports -- DSL
    -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 69c.

[^566]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    69-08 ("Repeat Reports -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 69c.
    In the area of BRI loop repair performance, SWBT provides competing
    carriers comparable repair service for BRI loops in Texas. For
    example, competing carriers experienced 17.5 percent, 11.5 percent,
    and 13.5 percent repeat trouble report rates in Texas for the months
    of August, September, and October respectively. By comparison,
    SWBT's retail operations experienced repeat trouble report rates of
    15.3 percent, 15.9 percent, and 17 percent for the same period.
    SWBT's Oklahoma performance is reported as 14.3 percent, which is
    just above the 12 percent benchmark. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No. 69-03 ("Repeat Reports -- BRI
    Loop"), at 271-No. 69a.

[^567]: SWBT's trouble report rates for DSL loops provided to competing
    carriers were 4.2 percent, 1.7 percent, 2.0 percent, and 3.1 percent
    for the months of July, August, September, and October 2000
    respectively. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas),
    Measure No. 65-08 ("Trouble Report Rate -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"),
    at 271-No. 65c; *see also* SWBT Reply at 64.

[^568]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Oklahoma), Measure No.
    65-08 ("Trouble Report Rate -- DSL -- No Line Sharing"), at 271-No.
    65c.

[^569]: In Texas, SWBT has consistently maintained a trouble report rate
    for DSL loops below the 3 percent benchmark since April 2000. Since
    July, SWBT's Texas average has been 2.4 percent for DSL loops
    without line sharing. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Texas), Measure No. 65-08 ("Trouble Report Rate -- DSL -- No Line
    Sharing"), at 271-No. 65c.

[^570]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at 3; SWBT Mah Reply Aff. at 23-27; SWBT
    November 29, 2000 *Ex Parte* at 2-3.

[^571]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 4104, para. 291.

[^572]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 114.

[^573]: *Id.*; *see also SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18492-93, paras.
    271-72.

[^574]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 114 n.14.

[^575]: SWBT Application at 96; SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 114

[^576]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 119 (stating that during July
    through September, "SWBT has received orders to provision only 2
    loops via the FDT process in Oklahoma, and 8 loops in Kansas").

[^577]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18487, paras. 260-61.

[^578]: *See id.*

[^579]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4114-15, para. 309 (finding that Bell Atlantic was able to complete
    at least 90 percent of competing carrier hot cut orders of fewer
    than 10 lines within a one-hour interval).

[^580]: SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 118. We relied on similar data
    in our Texas 271 proceeding. We recognize, however, that PM 114.1
    has been revised to track conversions with loop on a one-hour
    completion basis for orders of less than 10 lines, rather than
    orders of less than 11 lines. This change does not affect our
    analysis. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Kansas and
    Oklahoma, Measurement No. 114.1 ("CHC/FDT LNP with Loop Provisioning
    Interval") ("Coordinated Hot Cut, Frame Due Time") at 271-No.
    114.1-01- 114.01-05.

[^581]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff., Attachment C (providing July data
    for CHC loops for orders with less than 11 lines); SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Kansas, Measurement No. 114.1-01 at 271-No.
    114.1-01 (providing August through October data for CHC loops from
    orders with less than 10 lines). We also note that from July through
    October, SWBT completed 100 percent of FDT hot cut loops from orders
    with less than 10 lines within 1 hour. *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff.,
    Attachment C (providing July data for FDT loops completed within 1
    hour); SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Kansas, Measurement No.
    114.1-03 at 271-No. 114.1-03 (providing August through October data
    for FDT loops from orders with less than 10 lines).

[^582]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff., Attachment C (providing July data
    for CHC loops for orders with less than 11 lines); SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Oklahoma, Measurement No. 114.1-01 at 271-No.
    114.1-01 (providing August through October data for CHC loops from
    orders with less than 10 lines). We also note that from July through
    October, SWBT completed 100 percent of FDT hot cut loops from orders
    with less than 10 lines within 1 hour. *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff.,
    Attachment C (providing July data for FDT loops completed within 1
    hour); SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Oklahoma, Measurement No.
    114.1-03 at 271-No. 114.1-03 (providing August through October data
    for FDT loops from orders with less than 10 lines).

[^583]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Texas, Measurement No.
    114.1-01 at 271-No. 114.1-01 (providing August through October data
    for CHC loops from orders with less than 10 lines).

[^584]: As part of the Texas six-month performance measurement review,
    the Texas Commission adopted new PM 115.1 to measure the percent of
    CHC/FDT circuits for which the CLECs submits a trouble report on the
    day of the conversion, or before noon the next business day. *See*
    SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 131. SWBT's October data for PM
    115.1 show no trouble reports in either Kansas or Oklahoma. *See*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Kansas and Oklahoma, Measurement
    No. 115.1 at 271-No.-115.1 (providing August through October data).

[^585]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras. 120-28 (discussing the
    PPIG reconciliation process); *see also SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 18488-92, paras. 263, 269-71 (describing the PPIG process in
    Texas). No Oklahoma CLEC requested reconciliation of outage data.
    *See* SWBT Noland Smith/Aff. at para. 120.

[^586]: Because Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri are in the
    same LATA, and are served off a single AT&T switch, the results for
    both cities have been combined pursuant to AT&T's request. *Id.* at
    para. 122.

[^587]: SWBT Application at 97.

[^588]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras. 124-25.

[^589]: *Id*. at para. 129.

[^590]: *See* SWBT Application at 99.

[^591]: *See id.* at para. 129.

[^592]: Several commenters assert that SWBT has failed to meet the
    Commission's minimum standards for hot cut performance based on a
    one-month anomaly in June 2000 in the Oklahoma data for PM 114-01
    concerning premature disconnects involving the provisioning of local
    number portability *without* the loop. *See* Allegiance Comments at
    30-32; McLeodUSA Comments at 22-23. We reject this assertion because
    these commenters rely on a measurement that does not capture
    premature disconnects involving loop conversions. PM 114-01 measures
    premature disconnects for LNP conversions without loops. *See* SWBT
    Smith Reply Aff. at para. 10.

[^593]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff., Attachment G. SWBT includes
    trouble reports received on the day of conversion in this data.
    *Id.* at para. 133.

[^594]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 18493, para. 274 (finding
    that a 1.5 percent trouble rate for CHC in Texas complied with
    checklist item 4).

[^595]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 134.

[^596]: *See generally SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd. at 18493, para.
    274.

[^597]: *See* Adelphia Lippold Decl. para. 7; KMC Comments at 4; Sprint
    Comments at 62-63.

[^598]: KMC Comments at 5-6.

[^599]: *See* Adelphia Lippold Decl. para. 7; Sprint Comments at 62-63.

[^600]: *See* Letter from Andrew Klein, Counsel to KMC, to Magalie
    Salas, Secretary of the Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 00-217 (Dec. 7, 2000).

[^601]: *See* SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at para. 116 (stating that the CHC
    and FDT processes and procedures in Kansas and Oklahoma are the same
    that SWBT uses in Texas).

[^602]: Sprint Comments 62-64; Sprint Supp. Comments 5-7.

[^603]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 55-01 ("Average Installation Interval -- 8.0 dB Loop"),
    at 271-No. 55a (indicating that SWBT met the 3-day benchmark between
    July and October 2000); SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and
    Oklahoma), Measure No. 55-01 ("Average Installation Interval -- 5.0
    dB Loop"), at 271-No. 55a; SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas
    and Oklahoma), Measure No. 56-01 ("Percent Installed Within X Days
    -- 8.0 dB Loop"), at 271-No. 56a (showing that SWBT generally
    installed 100 percent of the loops in the requested 3-day interval).
    We recognize that, in Oklahoma, SWBT installed only 83.3 percent of
    8.0 dB loops in the 3-day interval for the month of October 2000. We
    conclude, however, that SWBT's performance is masked in large part
    due to the low volume of orders for that month. *See id.*
    (indicating that SWBT received only 6 orders for 8.0 dB loops during
    October 2000).

[^604]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    55-01 ("Average Installation Interval -- 8.0 dB Loop"), at 271-No.
    55a (indicating that SWBT met the benchmarks for loop orders of all
    quantities between July and October 2000); SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Texas), Measure No. 55-01 ("Average Installation
    Interval -- 5.0 dB Loop"), at 271-No. 55a.

[^605]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No.
    65-08 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- 8.0 dB Loop -- Field
    Work"), at 271-No. 58a. Although SWBT missed 33.3 percent of its
    installation due dates for competing carriers in September, there
    were only three orders in that month and SWBT missed only one of
    them. In light of the extremely low volume in Kansas for September,
    we conclude that SWBT's performance measurement does not reflect its
    true capabilities and provisioning quality. Furthermore, we note
    that most 8.0 dB loops do not require field work, and that SWBT's
    performance towards competing carriers has surpassed SWBT's
    performance for its retail operations in such instances in Kansas.
    *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas), Measure No. 58-02
    ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- 8.0 dB Loop -- No Field
    Work"), at 271-No. 58a.

[^606]: SWBT Reply at 59; SWBT Dysart Aff. at paras. 79-81; SWBT Dysart
    Reply Aff. at para. 48. SWBT explains that it often assigns changes
    to a customer's service features (e.g., adding voice mail, call
    waiting, or caller identification) to the performance measurement
    "8.0 dB loop without field work." Because changing a customer's
    service features is not labor-intensive work, SWBT rarely fails to
    meet an assigned due date. By contrast, installing an 8.0 dB loop
    for a competing carrier requires more labor-intensive work and
    frequently takes longer than SWBT Application at 95; SWBT Reply at
    59-60. After accounting for the discrepancies, SWBT met the parity
    standard for six months in the period January through August 2000.
    SWBT Reply at 59-60.

[^607]: In Texas, SWBT has provisioned at least 2,200 unbundled 8.0 dB
    loops per month since February 2000 and generally misses less than
    two dozen due dates per month. SWBT has generally missed a
    comparable percentage of due dates for its own retail operations
    during the same time period. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Texas), Measure No. 58-02 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates --
    8.0 dB Loop -- No Field Work"), at 271-No. 58a.

[^608]: Allegiance Comments at 20-23; KMC Comments at 7-8; McLeodUSA
    Comments at 9-15.

[^609]: SWBT's maintenance and repair process for voice grade loops is
    identical to the process described for xDSL-capable loops.

[^610]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 66-01
    ("Missed Repair Commitments -- 2 Wire Analog 8.0 dB Loop"), at
    271-No. 65d-66a.

[^611]: Since June 2000, competing carriers have experienced a far lower
    repeat trouble report rate than SWBT's retail operations for 8.0 dB
    loops. In Kansas, competing carriers experienced repeat trouble
    report rates of 5.9 percent, 0 percent, and 5.9 percent for the
    months of August, September, and October respectively; by
    comparison, SWBT's retail operations experienced 12.5 percent, 11.8
    percent, and 10.2 percent repeat troubles for the same months. In
    Oklahoma, competing carriers experienced 0 percent, 2.9 percent, and
    5.6 percent for the months of August, September, and October
    respectively; by comparison, SWBT's retail operations experienced
    repeat trouble report rates of 13.4 percent, 11.8 percent, and 11.2
    percent for the same months. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Kansas and Oklahoma), Measure No. 69-01 ("Repeat Reports -- 8.0 dB
    Loop with Test Access"), at 271-No. 69a. SWBT's performance for 5.0
    dB loops has been comparable. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Kansas and Oklahoma), Measure No. 69-02 ("Repeat Reports -- 5.0 dB
    Loop with Test Access"), at 271-No. 69a. Finally, SWBT's performance
    in Texas, where SWBT has generally met its established parity
    standards while handling larger volumes, shows that competing
    carriers generally receive fewer repeat troubles than SWBT's retail
    operations. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure
    No. 69-01 ("Repeat Reports -- 8.0 dB Loop with Test Access"), at
    271-No. 69a.

[^612]: SWBT Reply at 60, 63.

[^613]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 67-01 ("Mean Time to Restore (Hours) -- Dispatch -- 8.0
    dB Loop with Test Access"), at 271-No. 67c.

[^614]: *See id.* In Kansas, SWBT restored 8.0 dB loops for competing
    carriers in 4.34 hours in July, 13.77 hours in August, 1.97 hours in
    September, and 3.62 hours in October. By comparison, SWBT restored
    its own 8.0 dB loops in 20.67 hours in July, 17.88 hours in August,
    17.43 hours in September, and 9.42 hours in October. SWBT's Kansas
    data for July and September show statistically significant results
    in favor of competing carriers. In Oklahoma, SWBT restored 8.0 dB
    loops for competing carriers in 3.37 hours in July, 3.14 hours in
    August, 3.59 hours in September, and 1.66 hours in October. By
    comparison, SWBT restored its own 8.0 dB loops in 29.95 hours in
    July, 18.24 hours in August, 17.24 hours in September, and 13.08
    hours in October. SWBT's Oklahoma data for July through October show
    statistically significant results in favor of competing carriers.

[^615]: *See* SWBT Reply at 62. SWBT missed on average 47.8 percent of
    its installation commitments in Oklahoma between July and October
    2000, and 33.1 percent on average in Kansas during the same period.
    *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 58-06 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DS1
    Loop"), at 271-No. 58b; *see* Adelphia Comments at 4 (asserting that
    SWBT failed to meet due dates for installing DS-1 loops); *but see*
    SWBT D. Smith Reply Aff. at paras. 40-48. SWBT's performance in
    Texas has been equally poor. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data
    (Texas), Measure No. 58-06 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates --
    DS1 Loop"), at 271-No. 58b.

[^616]: High-capacity loops comprise only 9.6 percent of the recent loop
    volume in Oklahoma and 15.7 percent of the recent loop volume in
    Kansas. From July through October, SWBT received 123 orders for DS-1
    loops in Kansas (out of 1270 total for all loop types) and 210
    orders (out of 1334 total) in Oklahoma. By contrast, SWBT received
    1003 orders for DS-1 loops in Texas during the same period. *See*
    SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 58-06 ("Percent SWBT
    Caused Missed Due Dates -- DS1 Loop"), at 271-No. 58b.

[^617]: *See* SWBT November 29, 2000 *Ex Parte* at 2,4.

[^618]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 58-06 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DS1
    Loop"), at 271-No. 58b.

[^619]: Adelphia Comments at 4; Allegiance Comments at 15, 17, 18; IP
    Comments at 4-5; KMC Comments at 8; McLeodUSA Comments at 11, 13.

[^620]: See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capabilities and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third
    Report and Order, CC Docket No. 98-147, Fourth Report and Order, CC
    Docket No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999) (*Line Sharing Order*),
    *recon. pending*.

[^621]: SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 104, Attach. C-KS and C-OK.

[^622]: SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 121-25; SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras.
    57-101; SWBT Sparks Aff. at paras. 104-07. In October 2000, SWBT
    provisioned a single line shared loop to competing carriers in
    Oklahoma and none to carriers in Kansas. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma), Measure No. 58-10 ("Percent
    SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL --Line Sharing"), at 271-No.
    58c.

[^623]: See n. 327, *supra* (discussing recent court decision relating
    to this affiliate).

[^624]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 3, 57-58, 71-97; SWBT Cullen Aff. at
    para. 8*;* SWBT November 29, 2000 *Ex Parte* at 3, 5.

[^625]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at para. 80; SWBT Noland/Smith Aff. at paras.
    15 and 29.

[^626]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 81-84.

[^627]: One competing carrier ordered one line shared loop in October
    2000. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Kansas and Oklahoma),
    Measure No. 58-10 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL
    --Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^628]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas), Measure No.
    55.1-03 ("Average Installation Interval -- DSL -- Line Sharing --
    Requires No Conditioning"), at 271-No. 55.1. Although SWBT made
    available line sharing within its region as of June 1, 2000, SWBT
    did not having line sharing performance data available until
    September 2000. As a result, we only have two months of performance
    data to examine for this application.

[^629]: SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 59-09 ("Percent
    Trouble on N, T, C Orders within 30 Day -- DSL -- Line Sharing"), at
    271-No. 59c.

[^630]: In Texas, competing carriers experienced a trouble report rate
    for line shared loops of 18.4 percent and 11 percent in September
    and October respectively. During the same time period, SWBT's
    separate affiliate experienced a trouble report rate of 22.2 percent
    and 8 percent. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data (Texas),
    Measure No. 58-10 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates -- DSL
    --Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^631]: SWBT restored service for competing carriers in 0.12 hours in
    September and in 37.88 hours in October. By comparison, SWBT
    restored service for its separate affiliate in 31.19 hours in
    September and 42.98 hours in October. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data (Texas), Measure No. 67-23 ("Mean Time to Restore
    -- No Dispatch -- DSL -- Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 67g.

[^632]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure No. 55.1-03
    ("Average Installation Interval -- DSL -- Line Sharing -- Requires
    No Conditioning"), at 271-No. 55.1. In September 2000, SWBT
    provisioned over 1,700 line shared loops to its separate affiliate
    in Kansas and over 2,000 line shared loops to its separate affiliate
    in Oklahoma. *See* SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para. 18.

[^633]: In Oklahoma, SWBT missed 0.5 percent and 0.3 percent of its
    installation due dates for line shared DSL loops provided to its
    affiliate in the months of September and October 2000 respectively.
    During the same period in Kansas, SWBT missed 0.2 percent and 1.2
    percent of its installation due dates. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Measure No. 58-09 ("Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due
    Dates -- DSL -- Line Sharing"), at 271-No. 58c.

[^634]: We note that SWBT's performance towards its separate affiliate
    is subject to an annual independent audit pursuant to the
    *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*. *See* Applications of Ameritech Corp.,
    Transferor, and SBC Communications, Inc., Transferee, For Consent to
    Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and
    Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act
    and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95, and 101 of the Commission's
    Rules, CC Docket 98-141, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd
    14,712 at Appendix C, para. 66 (1999) (*SBC/Ameritech Merger
    Order*).

[^635]: *See generally* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18515-17,
    paras. 323-329 (describing line splitting); 47 C.F.R. §51.703(c)
    (requiring that incumbent LECs provide competing carriers with
    access to unbundled loops in a manner that allows competing carriers
    "to provide any telecommunications service that can be offered by
    means of that network element.").

[^636]: *See* SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 29-40. In its reply,
    SWBT states that it will modify the language of its interconnection
    agreements to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the ability of a
    competing carrier to purchase line splitting. Specifically, SWBT
    offers an amendment that states that a competing carrier "may
    provide voice and data services over the same loop by engaging in
    'line splitting' . . . ." SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at para. 40
    (addressing Section 4.7.5 of the K2A Optional Line Sharing
    Appendix).

[^637]: *See* WorldCom Comments at 19-20.

[^638]: *See, id.* (citing to SWBT Sparks Decl. Attach. C-KS, at 8 (K2A
    Optional Line Sharing Amendment § 4.7.5).

[^639]: *See* SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 31-39.

[^640]: *See, id.* We rely on SWBT's commitment to eliminate the
    restrictive language quoted above. Moreover, we accept SWBT's
    explanation that the commitments outlined in its Chapman Reply
    Affidavit, rather than the language in the K2A quoted above,
    represents its position on line splitting.

[^641]: Sprint Comments at 27-37; Department of Justice Evaluation at
    24-25, 27-28.

[^642]: *See* Section IV.D.4, *infra*.

[^643]: Sprint Comments at 32-33.

[^644]: Kansas Commission Reply at 4; Oklahoma Commission Reply at 17.

[^645]: *See* Section IV.B.1, *supra*.

[^646]: *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18475, para. 237.

[^647]: *Id.* at 14875-76, para. 237.

[^648]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 258.

[^649]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18379-81, paras. 61-64;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640.

[^650]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18380*,* paras. 62-63*;
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20648-50, paras.
    65, 74-77.

[^651]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18390, para. 79.

[^652]: *See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, Order on Reconsideration and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 98-147, FCC
    00-297 (rel. August 10, 2000), *recon. pending* (*Advanced Services
    Reconsideration Order*).

[^653]: Kansas Commission Comments at 7-8; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271
    Order at 160.

[^654]: In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the
    Commission identified trunk group blockage and transmission
    standards as indicators of an incumbent LEC's technical criteria and
    service standards. *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 15614-15, paras. 224-25. In prior section 271
    applications, the Commission concluded that disparities in trunk
    group blockage may indicate a failure to provide interconnection to
    competing carriers equal-in-quality to the interconnection the BOC
    provided to its own retail operations. *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15
    FCC Rcd at 18380*,* para. 62. As discussed below, for certain
    interconnection performance metrics, the Oklahoma and Kansas
    Commissions relied on a benchmark standard for evaluating SWBT's
    performance (*e.g*., percent of trunk blockage and average
    interconnection trunk installation intervals). For other
    interconnection measurements, such as percent missed due dates for
    installation, a parity standard is applied. *See* SWBT Dysart Aff.
    at paras. 10-11.

[^655]: SWBT Application App. B (providing interconnection agreements
    between SWBT and competing carriers in both Kansas and Oklahoma).

[^656]: SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 173.

[^657]: *See* SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 50 and Attachs. A and B,
    Measurements 70-78 (Performance Measurement Business Rules) (Version
    1.6). SWBT has implemented ten performance measures relating to
    interconnection, including measures that compare trunk blockage
    between SWBT and competitive LECs (PM 70), measures that capture
    missed due dates for trunk installations (PM 73), and measures that
    provide data on average installation intervals (PM 78). *Id*.

[^658]: Trunk group blockage indicates that end users are experiencing
    difficulty completing or receiving calls, which may have a direct
    impact on the customer's perception of a competitive LEC's service
    quality. *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18382-83, paras. 66-68;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20649-50, para.
    76; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20669-74, paras.
    236-245.

[^659]: In Kansas, for SWBT end office and SWBT tandem to competitive
    LEC end office, SWBT's data indicate 0% blockage for both measures
    from July through October. *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data,
    Kansas, No. 70-01 and 70-02 at 271-No. 70-71. In Oklahoma, for SWBT
    tandem to competitive LEC end office, SWBT's data indicate
    performance well below the benchmark, 0% blockage from July through
    September, and 0.1% blockage for October. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Data, Oklahoma, No. 70-01 and 70-02 at 271-No. 70-71.

[^660]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Texas, No. 70-01 and
    70-02 at 271-No. 70-71; SWBT Deere Aff. at para. 14.

[^661]: The Commission's rules interpret this obligation to include,
    among other things, the incumbent LEC's installation time for
    interconnection service, 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5), and its
    provisioning of two-way trunking arrangements. Our rules require an
    incumbent LEC to provide two-way trunking upon request, wherever
    two-way trunking arrangements are technically feasible. 47 C.F.R. §
    51.305(f); *see also SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18380-81,
    para. 63*; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642,
    para. 65; *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd
    15612-13, paras. 219-220.

[^662]: SWBT\'s percentage of missed due dates in Kansas:

    **PM 73: Missed Due Dates JulyAug.Sept.Oct.**

    CLEC 0% 0% 0%11.3%SWBT 2.9% 18.5% 10.5% 99.6%*See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Measurement Data, Kansas, PM 73 at 271-No.73-76 (showing
    performance measurement data for July 2000 through October 2000).

[^663]: *See* Letter from Jared Craighead, Associate Director-Federal
    Regulatory, SBC Telecommunications, to Magalie Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-217 (filed Dec.
    14, 2000). SWBT\'s percentage of missed due dates in Oklahoma:

    **PM 73: Missed Due Dates JulyAug.Sept.Oct.**

    CLEC 20.7% 0% 15.8% 49.9%SWBT 0% 78.4% 23.2% 16.2%*See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Measurement Data, Oklahoma, PM 73 at
    271-No.73-76 (showing performance measurement data for July 2000
    through October 2000).

[^664]: We also note that over the twelve-month period concluding
    October 31, 2000, SWBT has provided competitive LECs more timely
    interconnection trunk installations than SWBT has provided its own
    retail operations by a factor of almost three. *See* SWBT Dysart
    Reply Aff. at para. 111.

[^665]: SWBT percentage of missed due dates in Texas:

    **PM 73: Missed Due Dates JulyAug.Sept.Oct.**

    CLEC 0% 2.5% 7.2%% 8.7%SWBT 25.1% 26.1% 28.8% 41.3%*See* SWBT
    Aggregated Performance Measurement Data, Texas, PM 73 at
    271-No.73-76 (showing performance measurement data for July 2000
    through October 2000). We attribute these month-to-month
    fluctuations, at least in part, to the very low sample sizes
    involved, and thus find the 4-month aggregate number to be more
    probative of SWBT's performance in this instance.

[^666]: We also are encouraged by SWBT's commitment to continue to
    improve trunk provisioning performance in Oklahoma. *See* SWBT Mah
    Reply Aff. at para. 44.

[^667]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data, Kansas and
    Oklahoma, No. 78 at 271-No-78 (showing performance measurement data
    for average interconnection trunk installation interval).

[^668]: The average installation interval for the months in which SWBT
    missed the benchmark were 22.8 days for December 1999, 25.94 for
    January 2000, and 29.06 for October 2000. *See* SWBT Aggregated
    Performance Measurement Data, Texas, No. 78 at 271-No-78 (showing
    performance measurement data for average interconnection trunk
    installation interval).

[^669]: The Kansas Commission approved SWBT's physical collocation
    tariff on June 14, 2000. SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 34. The Kansas
    Commission approved SWBT's virtual collocation tariff on April 12,
    2000. *Id.* On May 9, 2000, the Oklahoma Commission adopted the
    terms and conditions of SWBT's Texas physical and virtual
    collocation tariffs on an interim basis, subject to true-up, while
    it reviews SWBT's Oklahoma physical and virtual collocation tariffs.
    *See id.*; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order at 20.

[^670]: SWBT Application at 80; *see also* Kansas Commission Staff
    Report at 8-10; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order at 160-61.

[^671]: SWBT Application at 79-85; *see also* Kansas Commission Staff
    Report at 10-11; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order at 161. On
    October 10, 2000, SWBT amended its collocation procedures to
    implement the rules adopted in the *Advanced Services
    Reconsideration Order*. SWBT Application App. E, Vol. 8, Revision to
    Notification of Compliance with FCC 00-297.

[^672]: Because the Kansas and Oklahoma Commissions have set their own
    application processing and provisioning standards for physical
    collocation, SWBT's operations in those states are not subject to
    the national standards. *See* *Advanced Services Reconsideration
    Order,* paras. 21-23; *see also* SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 38.

[^673]: SWBT Application at 80; SWBT Smith/Johnson Aff., Attach. A.

[^674]: SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 40; Kansas Commission Comments at 9.

[^675]: *See* SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data, Kansas and
    Oklahoma, PMs 107-109 at 271-No. 107a --109b. Although a few data
    points fall marginally short of the benchmarks, we do not believe
    that these misses rise to the level of non-compliance with this
    checklist item, absent evidence of more systemic failure or evidence
    from competitors demonstrating how this performance denied them a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.

[^676]: We are aware that the Enforcement Bureau recently has issued a
    *Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture* for violations of the
    Commission's rule requiring incumbent local exchange carriers
    promptly to post notices of premises that have run out of
    collocation space. *See* *SBC Communications, Inc., Apparent
    Liability for Forfeiture*, File No. EB-00-IH-0326a, DA-01-128 (rel.
    Jan. 18, 2001). This issue first came to light on August 7, 2000
    through an independent auditor's public report concerning SBC's
    compliance with the Commission's collocation rules. *See* August 7,
    2000 Report of Independent Accountants, Ernst & Young LLP. SBC had
    agreed to such an audit as part of the Commission's approval of the
    merger application of Ameritech Corporation and SBC. Although we are
    concerned about SWBT's apparent violation of our collocation rules,
    we believe that this issue will be appropriately addressed in the
    Enforcement Bureau's review of the pending *Notice of Apparent
    Liability* (*NAL*). Based on the information that we have to date,
    we are not persuaded that the evidence supporting the NAL warrants a
    finding of checklist non-compliance. Moreover, no commenter has
    raised SWBT's posting of collocation space exhaustion as an issue in
    this proceeding.

[^677]: *See, e.g.,* MFNS Comments at 3.

[^678]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).

[^679]: *GTE Services Corp. v. FCC*, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (*GTE
    v. FCC*).

[^680]: *Advanced Services Reconsideration Order*, paras. 71-92; *see*
    *also* MFNS Comments in CC Docket 98-147 at 10-15 (filed Oct. 12,
    2000) (arguing that incumbent LECs must permit requesting carriers
    to collocate fiber distribution frames).

[^681]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18366-67, paras. 22-27.

[^682]: Sprint Comments at 65-66 (referring to concerns expressed before
    the Oklahoma and Kansas Commissions regarding collocation for
    advanced services).

[^683]: *See* Kansas Commission Comments at 8-9; Oklahoma Commission
    Sec. 271 Order at 165.

[^684]: Kansas Staff Recommendation at 9.

[^685]: We also note that SWBT indicates that it has reached agreement
    with Sprint on language to be added to a new Sprint interconnection
    agreement to resolve Sprint's issues concerning collocation in
    remote terminals. *See* SWBT Reply at 88 n. 57.

[^686]: SWBT Application at 76; SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 15; 21-22.
    SWBT will provide other technically feasible alternatives using the
    Special Request Procedure set forth in the K2A and O2A. *Id*. at 15;
    84-88.

[^687]: SWBT Application at 76. SWBT's state-approved K2A and O2A
    require SWBT to provide other collocation arrangements that have
    been demonstrated to be technically feasible and in compliance with
    the *Advanced Services Order*.

[^688]: In compliance with our *SWBT* *Texas Order*, SWBT modified the
    language of its K2A and O2A to allow a carrier to choose a single
    point of interconnection in a LATA. *See* *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd 18390, para. 78; *see also* SWBT Application at 76; SWBT
    Deere Aff. at para. 5, 14, 66.

[^689]: AT&T Comments at 24; *see also* Cox Comments at 10; WorldCom
    Reply at 38.

[^690]: *See* AT&T Comments, Attachment 2 at 14-20.

[^691]: *See* SWBT Reply at 77-87.

[^692]: *Id.* at 86. SWBT relies on the following language from its
    Texas interconnection agreement with WorldCom: "MCI(WorldCom) and
    SWBT agree that MCI(WorldCom) may designate, at its option, a
    minimum of one point of interconnection within a single SWBT
    exchange where SWBT facilities are available, or multiple points of
    interconnection within the exchange, for the exchange of all traffic
    within that exchange. If WorldCom desires a single point for
    interconnection within a LATA, SWBT agrees to provide dedicated or
    common transport to any other exchange within a LATA requested by
    WorldCom, or WorldCom may self-provision, or use a third party\'s
    facilities." *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18390, para. 78 n.
    174.

[^693]: *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18367, para. 27.

[^694]: *See* Oklahoma Commission Reply at 16. We also note that in its
    Reply, SWBT makes certain concessions regarding future
    interpretation of certain language in the O2A and K2A that is at
    issue. For example, in response to AT&T's argument that SWBT
    requires a CLEC collocated in a SWBT end office to interconnect
    there by provisioning direct trunks, AT&T Comments at 28, SWBT
    concedes that the proper reading of the O2A and K2A is that direct
    trunking from the CLEC's collocation facility is an option, not a
    requirement. *See* SWBT Reply at 81.

[^695]: *See* SWBT Reply at 86-87.

[^696]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18390, para. 78 n. 174.

[^697]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.701 *et seq*.

[^698]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b); *see also TSR Wireless, LLC et al. v.
    U.S. West*, File Nos. E-98-13, E-98-15, E-98-16, E-98-17, E-98-18,
    FCC No. 00-194 (rel. June 21, 2000), *pet. for review docketed sub
    nom.*, Qwest v. FCC, No. 00-1376 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2000).

[^699]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(c).

[^700]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(d).

[^701]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(e).

[^702]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i).

[^703]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2).

[^704]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^705]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-07, 51.509(g); *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812-16, 15844-61, 15874-76,
    15912, paras. 618-29, 674-712, 743-51, 826.

[^706]: Kansas Commission Comments at 9; SWBT Application App.
    C-Oklahoma, Vol. 25a-c, Tab 275 (Order Regarding Recommendation On
    271 Application Pursuant to Telecommunications Act of 1996, Cause
    No. PUD 970000560 (Sept. 28, 2000)) at 161-62 (Oklahoma Commission
    Final 271 Order).

[^707]: Sprint Comments at 34-36.

[^708]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 24-25, 27-28.

[^709]: *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; *see also
    Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 258.

[^710]: ConnectSouth Comments at 2-6.

[^711]: *Id*.

[^712]: SWBT Application App. G, Vol. 3, Tab 36 (Order Denying Appeals
    From The April 20, 2000, Oral Recommendation of the Administrative
    Law Judge, Cause No. PUD 200000169 (May 2, 2000)) at 10 (Oklahoma
    Commission Collocation Order).

[^713]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18395, para. 89.

[^714]: SWBT Application App. D-Kansas, Vol. 2, Tab 52 (Order Granting
    in Part, Denying in Part Motion to Integrate Texas Collocation Rates
    into the SWBT-Kansas Collocation Tariff, Pending a Kansas-Specific
    Cost Proceeding and Subject to True Up, Docket No. 00-SWBT-733-TAR
    (Apr. 21, 2000)) at 4, 6-7, Att. 2 (Kansas Commission Collocation
    Order).

[^715]: *Id*. at 3.

[^716]: Kansas Commission Reply at 4; Oklahoma Commission Final 271
    Order at 162.

[^717]: Kansas Commission Collocation Order at 7; Oklahoma Commission
    Collocation Order at 10.

[^718]: Kansas Commission Collocation Order at 3-4; Oklahoma Commission
    Collocation Order at 9-10.

[^719]: *See* Kansas Commission Reply at 4; Oklahoma Commission Comments
    at 2.

[^720]: *See* section IV.B.1, *supra*.

[^721]: *See* Department of Justice Comments at 24 (Oklahoma), 27-28
    (Kansas).

[^722]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi); *see also SWBT Texas Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 18520, para. 336; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13
    FCC Rcd at 20722.

[^723]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18520-22, paras. 336-38;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722, para. 207.

[^724]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3822-32, paras. 276-299
    (limiting an incumbent LEC's general duty to unbundle circuit
    switching when a requesting telecommunications carrier serves end
    users in the top 50 MSAs, in Density Zone 1, with four or more voice
    grade lines, provided that such LEC provides access to EELs).

[^725]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3838-3919.

[^726]: SWBT Application at 103 (SWBT furnishes more than 17,000
    unbundled switch ports in Kansas, and more than 6,000 in Oklahoma,
    mostly in combination with unbundled local loops); SWBT
    Smith/Johnson Aff., Attachment A.

[^727]: Line-side facilities include, but are not limited to, the
    connection between a loop termination at a main distribution frame,
    and a switch line card. Trunk-side facilities include, but are not
    limited to, the connection between trunk termination at a trunk-side
    cross-connect panel and a switch trunk card. *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20724 nn.679-680. *See* SWBT Deere
    Aff. at paras. 152-153.

[^728]: The basic switching function includes, but is not limited to:
    connecting lines to lines, lines to trunks, trunks to lines, trunks
    to trunks, as well as the same basic capabilities that are available
    to the BOC's customers, such as a telephone number, directory
    listing, dial tone, signaling, and access to 911, operator services,
    and directory assistance. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20726 n.690. *See also* SWBT Deere Aff. at para. 154.

[^729]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20726.
    Vertical features provide end-users with various services such as
    custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and
    Centrex. *Id;* *see also* SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 154, 161.

[^730]: An incumbent LEC must provide customized routing as part of the
    local switching element, unless it can prove to the state commission
    that customized routing in a particular switch is not technically
    feasible. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20728
    n.705. Customized routing permits requesting carriers to designate
    the particular outgoing trunks associated with unbundled switching
    provided by the incumbent, which will carry certain classes of
    traffic originating from requesting carriers' customers. *See Id.*
    at 20728-29, para. 221; SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 134-137.
    Customized routing is also referred to as selective routing. *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 20728 n.704.

[^731]: *Local Competition Third Reconsideration Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    12475-79*; Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20716-17; *see
    also* *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20732, para.
    228; SWBT Deere at para. 157.

[^732]: The requirement to provide unbundled tandem switching includes:
    (i) trunk-connect facilities, including but not limited to the
    connection between trunk termination at a cross-connect panel and a
    switch trunk card; (ii) the base switching function of connecting
    trunks to trunks; and, (iii) the functions that are centralized in
    tandem switches (as distinguished from separate end-office
    switches), including but not limited to call recording, the routing
    of calls to operator services, and signaling conversion features.
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20733 n. 732.
    *See* SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 165-169.

[^733]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20733-35,
    paras. 230-31; SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 133.

[^734]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20735-37,
    paras. 232-34; SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 134.

[^735]: Kansas Commission Comments at 28-29; Oklahoma Commission Sec.
    271 Order at 184-85.

[^736]: As an amendment to its K2A and O2A, SWBT offers CLECs an
    optional amendment which implements the rules adopted in the
    Commission's *UNE Remand Order* that became effective on February
    17, 2000. *See* SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 90. These amendments
    include language which eliminates unbundled switching as a UNE in
    certain high density areas when EELs are available. *Id.*,
    Attachment B.

[^737]: SWBT Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 70-71.

[^738]: *See* SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 150, 188; SWBT Sparks Aff.,
    Attach. B at KS-9, OK-8-9.

[^739]: Allegiance Comments at 5-6; IP Comments at 21-27; McLeodUSA
    Comments at 36-37.

[^740]: *See* SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras, 109, 127; *see also* SWBT
    Reply at 91-92.

[^741]: For example, SWBT argues that unbundling criteria established in
    the *UNE Remand Order* will never be met because its Project Pronto
    architecture involves a fiber overlay, and thus copper subloops will
    always be available to a requesting carrier. SWBT Chapman Reply Aff.
    at paras. 74-75. This conclusion ignores the requirement in our
    unbundling rules that a competitor be able to provide over the spare
    copper the same level of quality advanced services to its customer
    as the incumbent LEC. *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3838-39.

[^742]: *Ameritech Corp. Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc.,
    Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control, CC Docket No. 98-141,
    Second Memorandum Opinion and Order*, FCC 00-336 paras, 2, 9, 30
    (rel. Sept. 8, 2000) (*Pronto Modification Order*).

[^743]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^744]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3). In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* the Commission concluded that, "consistent with the
    Commission's interpretation of 'directory listing' as used in
    section 251(b)(3), the term 'white pages' in section
    271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local alphabetical directory that
    includes the residential and business listings of the customers of
    the local exchange provider." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20748, para. 255. We further concluded, "the term
    'directory listing,' as used in this section, includes, at a
    minimum, the subscriber's name, address, telephone number, or any
    combination thereof." *Id.*

[^745]: *Id.*

[^746]: SWBT Application at 108-09; SWBT Rogers Aff. at paras. 6, 51-65.
    SWBT demonstrates that it is providing white pages directory
    listings for customers of competitive LECs that are
    nondiscriminatory in appearance and integration, and have the same
    accuracy and reliability that SWBT provides for its own customers.
    SWBT Rogers Aff. at paras. 53, 62 (nondiscriminatory appearance,
    *e.g.*, same size, font, and typeface), and paras. 62-65 (comparable
    accuracy and reliability).

[^747]: Kansas Commission Comments at 30; Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271
    Order at 187.

[^748]: McLeodUSA Comments at 24-25; KMC Comments at 12; KMC Moseley
    Aff. at para. 18.

[^749]: McLeodUSA Comments at 24.

[^750]: *See* SWBT *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18528, para. 351; *see
    also* SWBT Reply at 93.

[^751]: KMC Comments at 12. Specifically, KMC asserts that during a
    recent directory printing, at least 15 of its customers did not have
    white pages directory listings in the telephone directory. *Id.*
    SWBT explains that it ensures that all listings remain intact when
    customers transfer their local telephone service and, thus far, KMC
    has failed to take advantage of SWBT's white pages directory
    listings verification reports. SWBT Reply at 93; SWBT Rogers Reply
    Aff. at paras. 5-6, 9. SWBT maintains that it will continue to work
    with KMC to resolve all outstanding issues it may have regarding
    dropped directory listings. SWBT Reply at 93.

[^752]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^753]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A).

[^754]: SWBT provides reciprocal compensation to competing carriers for
    the termination of local calls from SWBT customers under approved
    interconnection agreements in both Kansas and Oklahoma. SWBT
    Application at 115.

[^755]: SWBT Application at 116.

[^756]: SWBT Application at 115.

[^757]: Kansas Commission Comments at 33; SWBT Application App.
    C---Oklahoma, Vol. 25a-c, Tab 275 (Oklahoma Commission's Final Order
    No. 445180 with Attachment 02A) (Sept. 28, 2000)) at 2.

[^758]: SWBT Application at 116.

[^759]: *See* AT&T Comments at 30; e.spire Comments at 10; WorldCom
    Comments at 22-25.

[^760]: E-spire Comments at 11-13. E-spire asks the Commission to
    require a BOC litigating ISP-bound traffic to pay the disputed
    amount or to refrain from filing section 271 applications while the
    BOC litigates. *Id.*

[^761]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for
    ISP-Bound Traffic; Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68, 14 FCC Rcd 3689, 3706 at
    para. 27 (1999) (*Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling*).

[^762]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4142, para. 377.

[^763]: *See Bell Atl. Tel. Companies v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
    2000); *Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal
    Compensation Declaratory Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    D.C. Circuit*, CC Docket. Nos. 96-98, 99-68, Public Notice, 15 FCC
    Rcd 11311 (2000).

[^764]: *Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    3703, para. 22.

[^765]: SWBT Application at 117. On May 19, 2000, the Kansas Commission
    opened Docket No. 00-GIMT-1054-GIT to investigate whether reciprocal
    compensation should be paid for ISP-bound traffic. Kansas Commission
    Comments at 33.

[^766]: *Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Brooks Fiber Commun. of
    Oklahoma*, No. 99-5222, 2000 WL 1827576 (10^th^ Cir. Dec. 13, 2000).

[^767]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).

[^768]: We note that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    has recently issued a decision overturning the Commission\'s
    determination, in conjunction with the Ameritech-SBC merger, that
    the merged company could avoid the resale obligation of section
    251(c)(4) for the sale of advanced services if it provided those
    services through a subsidiary. *Association of Communications
    Enterprises v. Federal Communications Commission*, 2001 WL 20519
    (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2001). At the time SWBT filed this application,
    it was obligated to comply with the Commission's rules regarding the
    provision of advanced services through affiliates. In its review of
    the Commission's decision on the New York 271 application, the D.C.
    Circuit affirmed the Commission\'s view that \"compliance with
    Commission orders cannot serve as a basis for rejecting an
    application.\" *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 630. We believe
    that, consistent with this ruling, SWBT should not be faulted for
    its efforts to comply with a Commission order in effect at the time
    of the application, even though the order was subsequently vacated.
    At the same time, we expect SWBT to act promptly to come into
    compliance with section 251(c)(4) in accordance with the terms of
    the court's decision. We anticipate issuing an order in the very
    near future to address this issue.

[^769]: SWBT Application at 117-120.

[^770]: Kansas Commission Comments at 34-35; Oklahoma Commission
    Comments Attach. A at 190-191.

[^771]: SWBT Application at 117.

[^772]: *Id.* at 117-118.

[^773]: Allegiance Comments at 43-45; McLeodUSA Comments at 49-51.

[^774]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4147-48, para.
    390; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18547, para. 392.

[^775]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4147-48, para.
    390.

[^776]: SWBT Sparks Aff. at paras. 160-161.

[^777]: *See In re* *Establishment of Rules to Prohibit the Imposition
    of Unjust, Onerous Termination Penalties on Customers Choosing to
    Partake of the Benefits of Local Exchange Telecommunications
    Competition*, Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CC Docket No. 99-142
    (filed Apr. 26, 1999) (requesting that the Commission declare
    unlawful termination penalties imposed by incumbent LECs, to
    prohibit enforcement of incumbent LEC termination penalties, and to
    require the removal of incumbent LEC termination penalties from
    state tariffs until more competition develops).

[^778]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4148*,* para. 391;
    S*WBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18547-48, para. 392.

[^779]: *See* section IV.B.2, *supra.*

[^780]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii); *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    18478-79, paras. 243-44. We discuss the statutory requirements of
    checklist item 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in more detail in Appendix
    B of this Order.

[^781]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    18518-19, para. 331.

[^782]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18524-27, paras. 343, 345-48.

[^783]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18530-31, paras. 359-60.

[^784]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    18531-32, paras. 362-63.

[^785]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18534-35, paras. 369-70.

[^786]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii); *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18536-37, paras. 373-74.

[^787]: SWBT Application at 88-91 (checklist item 3), 100-03 (checklist
    item 5), 104-08 (checklist item 7), 109-10 (checklist item 9),
    110-11 (checklist item 10), 111-14 (checklist item 11), and 114-15
    (checklist item 12); *see also* SWBT Adair Aff. (checklist item 9);
    SWBT Deere Aff. at paras. 128-48 (checklist item 5), paras. 189-209
    (checklist item 7), paras. 210-50 (checklist item 10), paras.
    251-260 (checklist item 11) and paras. 261-64 (checklist item 12);
    SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 74 (checklist item 3), paras. 150-54
    (checklist item 5), paras. 155-56 (checklist item 7), paras. 157-162
    (checklist item 11); SWBT Hearst Aff. at para. 5 (checklist item 3);
    SWBT Orozco Aff. (checklist item 11); SWBT Rogers Aff. at paras.
    70-86 (checklist item 10);

[^788]: Kansas Commission Comments at 22 (checklist item 3), 64
    (checklist item 5), 29 (checklist item 7), 30 (checklist item 9), 31
    (checklist items 10-11), and 32 (checklist item 12); Oklahoma
    Commission Sec. 271 Order at 179 (checklist item 3), 184 (checklist
    item 5), 185-86 (checklist item 7), 187 (checklist item 9), 188
    (checklist item 10), 189 (checklist item 11), and 189 (checklist
    item 12).

[^789]: Focal contends that SWBT fails to satisfy checklist item 5
    because the ordering process that SWBT has implemented for the
    conversion of existing circuits to EELs is so burdensome as to
    violate SWBT's obligation to provide EELs to requesting carriers.
    Focal Comments at 5. We discuss the provisioning of EELs, and
    address Focal's comments, in section IV.B.3, *supra*. Additionally,
    several CLECs allege that SWBT does not make available loop make-up
    information in a manner consistent with the *UNE Remand Order*.
    Allegiance Comments at 34; McLeodUSA Comments at 35; IP Comments at
    12, 14. We address these concerns in section IV.B.2.c.i, *supra*.
    KMC and Sprint allege that SWBT fails to satisfy checklist item 11
    because it has problems coordinating number portability with loop
    cutovers. KMC Comments at 4; Sprint Comments at 64. We address these
    issues in section IV.B.2.e.iii, *supra*. MFNS states that SWBT's
    denial of its requests for collocation and access to UNEs
    demonstrates unquestionable bad faith on SWBT's part, in
    contravention of checklist item 5 and of the public interest,
    convenience, and necessity. MFNS Comments at 13. We address these
    issues in section VII, *infra* where we discuss the public interest
    standard that is part of section 271 of the 1996 Act.

[^790]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^791]: *See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-150, Report and
    Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (*Accounting Safeguards Order*),
    Second Order On Reconsideration, FCC 00-9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000);
    *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and
    272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No.
    96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*); First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997)
    (*First Order on Reconsideration*), Second Order on Reconsideration,
    12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (*Second Order on Reconsideration*), *aff'd
    sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC*, 131 F.3d 1044
    (D.C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel.
    Oct. 4, 1999) (*Third Order on Reconsideration*).

[^792]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^793]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^794]: *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18549, para. 396.

[^795]: SWBT Application at 69.

[^796]: Section 272(a) states that a BOC may not provide certain
    services except through one or more affiliates that meet the
    requirements of section 272(b). *See* 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(1)(B).

[^797]: For the purposes of its application to provide in-region
    interLATA services in Kansas and Oklahoma, we only address SWBT's
    section 272 showing with respect to one affiliate, SBCS. We note
    that SWBT has several other section 272 affiliates as a result of
    various mergers: Southern New England Telephone Enhanced Services,
    Inc. (SNET Enhanced Services); Ameritech Communications, Inc. (ACI);
    Ameritech Communications, Inc. of Illinois (ACoI); and Ameritech
    Communications, Inc. of Wisconsin (ACoW). On October 8, 1999, the
    merger of SBC and Ameritech was consummated. For a discussion of
    Ameritech's Section 272 affiliates, s*ee* SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at
    paras. 9-12. Our findings do not apply to Advanced Services, Inc.
    (ASI) because ASI is not a section 272 affiliate. These other
    affiliates do not provide service in Kansas or Oklahoma. *See* SWBT
    Ramsey Aff. at paras 3-4.

[^798]: SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at para. 24.

[^799]: *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18549-54, paras. 397-407.

[^800]: SWBT Application at 69 (citing SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at paras.
    18-26; SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 11-17).

[^801]: SWBT Application at 69 (citing SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at paras.
    27-36; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 9-11, 36-42. In addition, SWBT
    describes the security measures and other internal controls to show
    restricted access to the books, records, and accounts of its section
    272 affiliate. *See* SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 10-11.

[^802]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(c); *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20730-31, para. 360; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20789-90, paras. 329-30;
    SWBT Application at 69-70; SWBT Carrisalez at paras. 37- 46,
    Attachs. D-K (submitting names of corporate officers and directors);
    Attach. L (submitting corporate policy prohibiting loans of
    employees); SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 18-19.

[^803]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(d); *Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 21995, paras. 189-90; *see* SWBT
    Application at 70; SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at paras. 47-49; SWBT Yohe
    Aff. at paras. at 20-21.

[^804]: SWBT Application at 70; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 13-36; SWBT
    Carrisalez Aff. at 50-78; *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at
    18551-54, paras. 403-407.

[^805]: *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18553, para. 406.

[^806]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(2); SWBT Larkin Aff. at para. 7.

[^807]: SWBT has a "shared services affiliate" that provides services to
    members of the corporate family. *See* *SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC
    Rcd at 18554, para. 408. The Commission's accounting safeguards
    allow certain accounting treatment for services provided by a shared
    services affiliate to members of the corporate family, so long as
    the shared services affiliate only conducts business with members of
    the corporate family. *See Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd
    at 17607-608, para. 148.

[^808]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(d); 47 C.F.R. § 53.209-213; *see* SWBT
    Application at 70-71; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 37-42; SWBT
    Carrisalez Aff. at paras. 79-81.

[^809]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(d)(1).

[^810]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17629, para. 198.

[^811]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17631, para. 203;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794, para. 338;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4158-57, para. 416.

[^812]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 21997-17, para. 195; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd 20796-800, paras. 341-50. The Commission found that the
    nondiscrimination safeguards extend to any good, service, facility,
    or information that a BOC provides to its section 272 affiliate,
    including administrative services and other non-telecommunications
    goods and services. *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    22003-04, para. 210. The Commission interprets the section 272(c)
    nondiscrimination safeguards broadly. *See id*. at 22003, 22007,
    22012, 22015-016; SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 22-32.

[^813]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22000-01, para.
    202.

[^814]: SWBT Application at 81-83; SWBT Sparks Aff. at para. 79 (noting
    collocation space reservation policies applicable to SWBT
    affiliates).

[^815]: *See* discussion *supra* Section IV.B.2; *SWBT Texas Order,* 15
    FCC Rcd at 18555-56, para. 410 ; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd 20799, para. 346.

[^816]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 22018-22, paras. 239-45*; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20800-01, paras. 348-50; *see* SWBT Application at
    71-72. SWBT demonstrates that it will provide accurate data
    regarding actual service intervals so that unaffiliated parties can
    evaluate the performance SWBT provides itself and its affiliates and
    compare such performance to the service quality SWBT provides to
    competing carriers. SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 33-39, Attach. C
    (submitting report format for section 272(e)(1) reporting
    requirements).

[^817]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(2).

[^818]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(3), (e)(4); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20802-03, paras. 353-55; *see* SWBT
    Application at 71; SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 40-43.

[^819]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(g)(1); *see* SWBT Application at 72; SWBT
    Carrisalez Aff. at paras. 82-90; SWBT Yohe Aff. at paras. 48-50.

[^820]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(g)(2); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20804, para. 357; *see* SWBT Application at 72; SWBT Yohe
    Aff. at para. 50; SWBT Carrisalez Aff. at para. 88.

[^821]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^822]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06,
    para. 360 (the public interest analysis may include consideration of
    "whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant
    telecommunications markets").

[^823]: *See, e.g.*, AT&T Comments at 21-24; Sprint Comments at 68.

[^824]: Sprint Comment at 68.

[^825]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77.

[^826]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18558-59, para. 419.

[^827]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806;
    *see Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747.

[^828]: These mechanisms are generally administered by state commissions
    and derive from authority the states have under state law or under
    the federal Act. As such, these mechanisms can serve as critical
    complements to the Commission's authority to preserve checklist
    compliance pursuant to section 271(d)(6). Moreover, in this
    instance, we find that the collaborative process by which these
    mechanisms were developed in Texas and then adapted and modified in
    both Kansas and Oklahoma for particular circumstances in each of
    these states, has itself helped to bring SWBT into checklist
    compliance.

[^829]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806.

[^830]: SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 25-42.

[^831]: SWBT Application at 66.

[^832]: SWBT Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 146.

[^833]: Allegiance Comments at 39; McLeodUSA Comments at 45. It appears
    that many of the differences identified may result from the fact
    that the Texas plan has been recently modified and those
    modifications were incorporated in the Kansas and Oklahoma Plans.

[^834]: *See Ameritech Michigan* Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20741-51, para.
    393.

[^835]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18560, para. 421; *also
    see* *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para.
    433. This prediction was based on five characteristics: (1)
    potential liability that provides a meaningful and significant
    incentive to comply with the designated performance standards; (2)
    clearly-articulated, pre-determined measures and standards, which
    encompass a comprehensive range of carrier-to-carrier performance;
    (3) a reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction
    poor performance when it occurs; (4) a self-executing mechanism that
    does not leave the door open unreasonably to litigation and appeal;
    and (5) reasonable assurances that the reported data is accurate.

[^836]: Oklahoma Commission Sec. 271 Order at 193; Kansas Commission
    Comments at 40-42.

[^837]: SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 32. The cap is based on 36% of SWBT's
    net return, and will be recalculated annually, but will never exceed
    \$45 million or go below \$35 million for Kansas or exceed \$44
    million or go below \$34.25 million for Oklahoma. The cap represents
    a comparable proportion of the applicant's "net return" as we deemed
    adequate for Bell Atlantic in New York (s*ee Bell Atlantic New York*
    *Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4168*,* para. 436 n.1332) and for SWBT in
    Texas (*see SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18561-62, para. 424).

[^838]: Allegiance Comments at 37-38; McLeodUSA Comments at 43-45;
    Sprint Comments at 70-73. *See also Bell Atlantic* *New York Order,*
    15 FCC Rcd at 4168-69, para. 437 ("\[A\]n overall liability amount
    would be meaningless if there is no likelihood that payments would
    approach this amount, even in instances of widespread performance
    failure.").

[^839]: Kansas Commission Comments at 43. The Commission states its
    intention to remain diligent to complaints even if the test results
    show compliance and further states that "if SWBT's behavior is
    habitually noncompliant ... the Commission retains the authority to
    address the level of penalties." *Also see* Oklahoma Commission
    Reply at 27 ("In the event of 'backsliding' ... the OCC will not
    hesitate to take such action as may be available to the OCC to
    correct the performance of SWBT").

[^840]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18562-63, para. 425; *see
    also Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4169*,* para. 438.

[^841]: SWBT Dysart Aff. at para. 25-26. The Kansas and Oklahoma Plans
    start with the Texas Plan after the modifications incorporated from
    the first six-month review. For instance, the Version 1.7 metrics
    are currently used in the Texas as well as the Kansas and Oklahoma
    Plans. We note that Version 1.7 of the performance metrics evolved
    from the previously approved Version 1.6 as a result of the expected
    periodic review as originally envisioned when the Texas Plan was
    approved.

[^842]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4169, para.
    438.

[^843]: SWBT Dysart Reply at para. 137.

[^844]: Allegiance Comments at 42-43 (including penalties for
    performance failure for three out of five months, increased monthly
    caps, removal of "CLEC" caps and a "several tiered" approach to
    remedies). A*lso see* McLeodUSA Comments at 40-43.

[^845]: Sprint Comments at 69-70 (suggesting neither state adequately
    considered the Plans).

[^846]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para.
    441; *also see SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18563-64, para. 427.

[^847]: SWBT Dysart Reply at para. 153.

[^848]: Allegiance Comments at 39 (asserting that the Texas Plan
    "appears to be somewhat more self-executing or more likely to become
    effective" than the Kansas or Oklahoma Plans) *see also* McLeodUSA
    Comments at 43.

[^849]: SWBT Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 164-165 (plans were first
    approved on October 23, 2000 for Kansas and December 7, 2000 for
    Oklahoma).

[^850]: SWBT Dysart Aff. at paras. 165-168.

[^851]: SWBT Dysart Reply at para. 124.

[^852]: Sprint Comments at 76.

[^853]: SWBT Dysart Aff. paras. 170-172.

[^854]: *SBC Merger Audit NAL.* See n. 377, *supra.*

[^855]: *See* discussion of order confirmation notices for faxed orders
    in section IV.B.2.d.i., *supra*.

[^856]: *See Accounting for Judgments and Other Costs Associated with
    Litigation*, 12 FCC Rcd 5112 (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 7370(d). As a
    general matter, a carrier's operating expenses recovered through its
    rates must be legitimate costs of providing adequate service to
    ratepayers. *See, e.g.,* *West Ohio Gas Co. v. PUC*, 294 U.S. 63, 74
    (1935); *Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 939 F.2d 1035,
    1044 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In the *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order*, the
    Commission held that bill credits provided under the performance
    assurance plan arising from that order "shall not be reflected in
    the revenue requirement of an SBC/Ameritech incumbent LEC."
    *SBC/Ameritech Merger Order* App. C at para. 34.

[^857]: *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18565, 430; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4172-73, para. 443.

[^858]: AT&T Lieberman Decl. (presenting analysis related to prices,
    addressed in the pricing section above); MFNS's Comments at 13
    (regarding fiber distribution interconnection issues has been
    addressed above under collocation); EMI Comments at 1-3 (suggesting
    SWBT provides inadequate service quality in Oklahoma. It should be
    noted that EMI did not make this argument before the Oklahoma
    Commission 271 proceedings; however, EMI had previously filed a
    complaint with that Commission regarding an accidental cable cut
    (the basis of its service quality argument)). Finally, two
    commenters argue that a "fresh look" policy (to provide an
    opportunity for retail and wholesale customers to exit without
    penalty long term contracts that the carriers have voluntarily
    entered into with SWBT) should be implemented in Kansas and
    Oklahoma. *See* Allegiance Comments at 43-45; McLeodUSA Comments at
    49-51. We find, as we have in prior orders, that this issue is best
    addressed in the context of a pending Petition for Declaratory
    Ruling regarding our \"fresh look\" policy, and we decline to
    resolve the issue here. *See SWBT Texas Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 18566,
    para. 433.

[^859]: Allegiance Comments at 45-46; McLeodUSA Comments at 51-53.

[^860]: Allegiance Comments at 2-10; IP Comments at 18-27; McLeodUSA
    Comments at 2-6.

[^861]: SWBT Chapman Aff. at paras. 111-29.

[^862]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^863]: This substantial enforcement authority augments the agency's
    pre-existing enforcement powers, including its authority under
    sections 206-209 of the Communications Act. *Implementation of the
    Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No. 96-149, First
    Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC
    Rcd 21905, 22066 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*).

[^864]: *See generally U S WEST Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 177 F.3d
    1057, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that a central purpose of
    section 271 is to create incentives for BOCs to open local markets
    to competition), *cert. denied*, 120 S.Ct. 1240 (2000); *AT&T Corp
    v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 612 (same).

[^865]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174, para. 446.

[^866]: *Id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174-77, paras. 446-453.

[^867]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(B). These complaints may include requests
    for damages. *See* *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    22066.

[^868]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^869]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4176, para.
    450. Furthermore, we envision exercising our section
    271(d)(6)(A)(iii) suspension power, when appropriate, through a
    "standstill" order that could prohibit a non-compliant BOC from
    enrolling additional subscribers and from marketing and promoting
    interLATA service -- in essence, freezing the BOC's subscriber base
    as of the date of the order. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A)(iii);
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4175-76, paras.
    448-451.

[^870]: For example, the New York Public Service Commission and the
    Commission coordinated a two-pronged enforcement response when Bell
    Atlantic developed performance problems associated with lost or
    mishandled orders for unbundled network elements submitted
    electronically by its local service competitors. *See Order
    Directing Market Adjustments and Amending Performance Assurance,*
    Case OO-C-0008/9 and Case 99-C-0949 (New York PSC, Mar. 23, 2000);
    *Bell Atlantic-New York, Authorization Under Section 271 of the
    Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the
    State of New York*, File No. EB-00-IH-0085, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413
    (2000) (adopting consent decree between Commission and Bell Atlantic
    that included provisions for Bell Atlantic to make a voluntary
    payment of \$3,000,000 to the United States Treasury, additional
    payments if Bell Atlantic failed to meet specified performance
    standards, and weekly reporting requirements to gauge Bell
    Atlantic's performance in correcting the problems associated with
    its electronic ordering systems); Letter from David H. Solomon,
    Chief, FCC Enforcement Bureau to Edward D. Young, III, Senior Vice
    President -- Regulatory, Bell Atlantic, dated June 20, 2000
    (advising Bell Atlantic that it appears to the Commission to have
    met the requisite performance standards and that, in the absence of
    new information indicating that Bell Atlantic's performance reports
    are materially inaccurate, Bell Atlantic's obligations under the
    Consent Decree have terminated).

[^871]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). As originally enacted, section
    224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators
    encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended
    section 224 in several important respects to ensure that
    telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access
    to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by
    utility companies, including LECs. *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n.574.

[^872]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). Section 224(a)(1) defines "utility" to
    include any entity, including a LEC, that controls "poles, ducts,
    conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire
    communications." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1).

[^873]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order,* the Commission concluded that, although the statutory
    exception enunciated in section 224(f)(2) appears to be limited to
    utilities providing electrical service, LECs should also be
    permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way because of insufficient capacity and for reasons of
    safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes,
    provided the assessment of such factors is done in a
    nondiscriminatory manner. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 16080-81, paras. 1175-77.

[^874]: Section 224(a)(4) defines "pole attachment" as "any attachment
    by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
    service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
    controlled by a utility." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4).

[^875]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).

[^876]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1). The 1996 Act extended the Commission's
    authority to include not just rates, terms, and conditions, but also
    the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts,
    conduits, and rights-of-way. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Absent
    state regulation of terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory
    attachment access, the Commission retains jurisdiction. *Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para.
    1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1); *see also Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264*.*

[^877]: *See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole
    Attachments,* Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); 47 U.S.C. §
    224(f).

[^878]: SWBT Hearst Aff. at para. 36.

[^879]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v).

[^880]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719, para.
    201.

[^881]: *Id.* A BOC has the following obligations with respect to
    dedicated transport: (a) provide unbundled access to dedicated
    transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such
    offices and serving wire centers (SWCs); between SWCs and
    interexchange carriers points of presence (POPs); between tandem
    switches and SWCs, end offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire
    centers of BOCs and requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically
    feasible transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical
    Carrier levels that the competing carrier could use to provide
    telecommunications; (c) not limit the facilities to which dedicated
    interoffice transport facilities are connected, provided such
    interconnections are technically feasible, or restrict the use of
    unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to the extent technically
    feasible, provide requesting carriers with access to digital
    cross-connect system functionality in the same manner that the BOC
    offers such capabilities to interexchange carriers that purchase
    transport services. *Id.* at 20719*.*

[^882]: *Id.* at 20719, n. 650. The Commission also found that a BOC has
    the following obligations with respect to shared transport: (a)
    provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of
    requesting carriers to be carried on the same transport facilities
    that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport
    transmission facilities between end office switches, between its end
    office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its
    network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled
    shared transport and unbundled switching to use the same routing
    table that is resident in the BOC's switch; and (d) permit
    requesting carriers to use shared (or dedicated) transport as an
    unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and
    terminating traffic to, customers to whom the requesting carrier is
    also providing local exchange service. *Id.* at 20720, n. 652*.*

[^883]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^884]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256.

[^885]: *Id.*

[^886]: *Id.*

[^887]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).

[^888]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3). The Commission implemented section
    251(b)(3) in the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*. 47
    C.F.R. § 51.217; *In re Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Second Report and
    Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996)
    (*Local Competition Second Report and Order*) *vacated in part,
    People of the State of California v. FCC,* 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
    1997), *overruled in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,* 119 S.Ct.
    721 (1999)*; see also Implementation of the Telecommunications Act
    of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings Information under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1934*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14
    FCC Rcd 15550 (1999) (*Directory Listings Information NPRM*).

[^889]: While both sections 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to
    nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance," section
    251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to "operator services,"
    while section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory
    access to "operator call completion services." 47 U.S.C. §§
    251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III). The term "operator call
    completion services" is not defined in the Act, nor has the
    Commission previously defined the term. However, for section
    251(b)(3) purposes, the term "operator services" was defined as
    meaning "any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange
    for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call." *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para.
    110. In the same order the Commission concluded that busy line
    verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory
    assistance are forms of "operator services," because they assist
    customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a
    telephone call. *Id.* at 19449, para. 111. All of these services may
    be needed or used to place a call. For example, if a customer tries
    to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy
    signal, the customer may contact the operator to attempt to complete
    the call. Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and
    busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted
    directory assistance can all be used when an operator completes a
    call, we concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* that
    for checklist compliance purposes, "operator call completion
    services" is a subset of or equivalent to "operator service."
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20740, n.763. As a
    result, we use the nondiscriminatory standards established for
    operator services to determine whether nondiscriminatory access is
    provided.

[^890]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19456-58, paras. 130-35. The *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order's* interpretation of section
    251(b)(3) is limited "to access to each LEC's directory assistance
    service." *Id.* at 19456, para. 135. However, section
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited to the LEC's systems but requires
    "nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the
    other carrier's customers to obtain telephone numbers." 47 U.S.C. §
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii). Combined with the Commission's conclusion that
    "incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities
    providing operator services and directory assistance from resold
    services and other unbundled network elements to the extent
    technically feasible," *Local Competition First Report and Order,*
    11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, paras. 535-37, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)'s
    requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance service
    provider selected by the customer's local service provider,
    regardless of whether the competitor; provides such services itself;
    selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party
    to provide such services. *See Directory Listings Information NPRM*.

[^891]: *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19464, para. 151.

[^892]: *Id*. at para. 112.

[^893]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148. For example, when customers
    call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically
    hear a message, such as "thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company."
    Competing carriers may use the BOC's brand, request the BOC to brand
    the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC
    not brand the call at all. 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d).

[^894]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(C)(3)(ii); *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61, paras. 141-44.

[^895]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3891-92, paras. 441-42.

[^896]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at para. 470. *See
    generally* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52; *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring UNE rates to be "based on the cost
    (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other
    rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element").

[^897]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at paras. 470-73;
    *see also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).

[^898]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^899]: *Id.*

[^900]: *See Second Bell South Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20752*;
    see also* *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 7574 (2000);
    *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Second Report and Order, Order on
    Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 99-200 and Second Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-200, CC Docket Nos. 96-98;
    99-200 (rel. Dec. 29, 2000).

[^901]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^902]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para.
    267.

[^903]: *Id.* at 20755-56, para. 272.

[^904]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741,
    n.1126; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^905]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15741-42, para. 484.

[^906]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^907]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^908]: *Id.* at § 251(b)(2).

[^909]: *Id.* at § 153(30).

[^910]: *Id.* at § 251(e)(2); *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; *In the Matter of Telephone
    Number Portability*, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701,
    11702-04 (1998) (*Third Number Portability Order*); *In the Matter
    of Telephone Number Portability*, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and
    Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 95-116, at paras. 1, 6-9
    (Jun. 23, 1999) (*Fourth Number Portability Order*).

[^911]: *Fourth Number Portability Order* at para. 10; *In re Telephone
    Number Portability*, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12, paras. 110-116 (1996)
    (*First Number Portability Order*); *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    251(b)(2).

[^912]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.3(b)-(f); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355 and 8399-8404, paras. 3 and 91; *Third
    Number Portability Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11708-12, paras. 12-16.

[^913]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.29; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 8417-24, paras. 127-140.

[^914]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.32, 52.33; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *Third Number Portability
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706-07, para. 8; *Fourth Number Portability
    Order* at para. 9.

[^915]: Based on the Commission's view that section 251(b)(3) does not
    limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of
    dialing parity (*i.e*., international, interstate, intrastate, or
    local), the Commission adopted rules in August 1996 to implement
    broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing
    parity. *Local Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at
    19407; *Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
    Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers*, CC Docket No. 95-185,
    Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).

[^916]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^917]: *Id.* at § 153(15).

[^918]: 47 C.F.R §§ 51.205, 51.207.

[^919]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be
    dialed); *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19400, 19403.

[^920]: *See, e.g.,* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 20543,
    20570-76 (1997); *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 539,
    560-61 (1997); *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 3953,
    3968-69 (1999); *SBC Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 18354, 18370-72
    (2000).