[A White Paper]{.underline}

[The "Perfect Voting System"]{.underline}

A patent pending business process called the "Perfect Voting System" is
designed to make elections completely transparent to the citizens,
media, political parties and candidates. Voters would be able to confirm
that his or her vote was counted exactly as intended. Voter intent would
be indisputable. Residual votes would be eliminated. Vote tabulation
transparency and a computer printed paper ballot audit trail would
minimize or eliminate the need for certification, testing and security
laws, rules and procedures. The secrecy of the ballot would be protected
and no voter would be able to prove how he or she voted to an
unauthorized third party.

Recounts would be largely unnecessary and state laws requiring them
would likely be relaxed over time. State laws would have to be changed
to allow voters the option of proving to elections officials, but not
third parties, how they voted. State laws would also have to be changed
to require "voter affirmation of intent to under vote" in every contest
by checking a final box for, say, "No Opinion -- No Vote." Hand printed
or marked documents used to input voter selections at precincts would be
destroyed. Only computer printed ballot summaries reviewed and approved
by the voters would be available for auditing the vote tabulation.

Voters would have the sole responsibility of ensuring that his or her
vote was recorded electronically exactly as they intended. Voters would
also have the primary responsibility of verifying that his or her vote
was accurately counted in the vote tabulation. The entire vote
tabulation would be open to public inspection and audit by any voter who
could prove to election officials that he or she had voted in the
election.

The vote tabulation software would be open source, peer reviewed,
independent of the software used to "set up" the election, deposited at
NIST and available to any election jurisdiction licensing the business
process. Election jurisdictions and the public would be able to verify
the authenticity of the vote tabulation software through its digital
signature.

The Perfect Voting System (PVS) can be implemented on any electronic
voting device that can print an accessible voter verified paper ballot
and "stub." The PVS would not apply to ballots prepared without the
assistance of an electronic voting device such as mail-in ballots. The
printed ballot and stub would include a bar code, such as PDF 417, so
that their contents could be both viewed and "heard" via a bar code
scanner and audio device.

[Description of "The Perfect Voting System"]{.underline}

The heart of the PVS is a computer-printed voter-verified paper ballot
and "stub" that includes a 19 digit random alpha-numeric character
string. The first step is for the voter to make his or her selections on
the electronic voting device and then print out the ballot summary and
"stub." The voter would be required to vote in every contest even if it
is for "No Vote -- No Opinion." This requirement would make it possible
to eliminate all residual votes. If the voter finds a mistake or even
changes his or her mind, the 19 digit random character string could be
used to amend the ballot and print a new one. Once the voter is
satisfied the computer printed ballot summary is accurate, he/she would
be required by precinct security to deposit it in a locked container,
sign and retain the "stub."

   

The ballot summary and "stub" include: a 19 digit random alpha-numeric
character string, a date and time stamp, precinct number and machine
number. To maintain the secrecy of the ballot, the stub does not
indicate how he/she voted and the ballot does not contain the voter's
name. The size of the random alpha-numeric character string has been
mathematically designed to reduce the odds of two independent computers
producing the same character string in a ten million vote election to
less than one in a hundred billion. The voting device would not allow a
ballot to be amended after 15 minutes from when it was cast.

At the end of voting, each precinct would download from each voting
device a ballot summary image file in xml format. The file would be
forwarded to the jurisdiction's vote tabulation headquarters. In
addition, the "poll book" (i.e. list of registered voters who cast a
ballot) summary data and a detailed list of voters casting ballots would
be forwarded to headquarters. The xml ballot images and "poll book" data
would be imported into the PVS vote tabulation database. The
authenticity of the PVS vote tabulation database should be confirmed on
Election Day by publicly reviewing the digital signatures between the
NIST standard and the resident software code. The PVS vote tabulation
database should only be hosted on a computer that is independent of the
internet.

The PVS would produce an error report if:

-   The number of votes cast in a precinct was significantly more or
    less than the number of voters who "signed in",

-   A previously entered machine number did not "report" any votes cast,

-   A previously entered precinct number did not "report" any votes
    cast,

-   A ballot was cast without recording a selection on one or more
    items,

-   Voting machine election results are materially different than the
    precinct,

-   Precinct election results are materially different than the election
    jurisdiction or

-   Any single voting machine reported an "excessive" number of votes
    cast.

Once the PVS tabulation database is complete, every voter using a PVS
enabled system would have the right to audit his/her vote using the 19
digit random character string printed on the ballot stub. To eliminate
"vote selling," the voter would be required to have his/her identity and
ballot stub signature verified by an election official before privately
auditing the PVS tabulation database housed on a secure intranet
independent of the internet.

Once the voter is qualified by election officials to access the PVS
tabulation database, they would enter their 19 digit random character
string printed on the stub. The first screen is an image of his or her
ballot summary. The voter can then select any contest and see how his or
her vote was counted. He or she can view all the ballots cast but cannot
see any of the 19 digit random character strings except his or her own.
A spread sheet of any portion or the entire jurisdiction may be viewed
but not printed. The names of all the voters who cast a ballot would
also be accessible. The voter, for example, could see how his or her
vote was counted by machine, precinct or for the entire election
jurisdiction. Sub totals and totals could be checked. The names of
neighbors who voted could be checked for accuracy. Media
representatives, candidates, party official, campaign workers, and
political scientists who voted and retained their stub would be able to
audit the PVS vote tabulation database.

If the voter believes his/her vote is missing or altered, he/she would
have the right to require an official examination. The election official
would retrieve the ballot summary lock box from the precinct indicated
on the stub. Then, wearing gloves, the election official would retrieve
the ballot summary containing the matching 19 digit random character
string. In the highly unlikely event that the PVS tabulation database is
found to be in error, the computer-printed voter-verified paper ballot
summary would be used as the official record for any recount.

If the voter disputes that the ballot summary with the matching 19 digit
random character string was his or hers, forensic research could be used
to prove or disprove that the ballot summary was only handled by the
protesting voter.

The Perfect Voting System is a patent pending transparent voting process
that:

-   Protects the secrecy of the ballot,

-   Eliminates all residual votes,

-   Requires the production of an accessible voter verified paper
    ballot,

-   Minimizes or eliminates the need for recounts,

-   Minimizes or eliminates the need for software and hardware
    certification and security measures,

-   Allows the voter to confirm that his or her vote is accurately
    recorded,

-   Empowers the voter with a method of confirming that his or her vote
    was accurately tabulated, and

-   Prevents the voter from "selling" his or her vote.