***Media Assistance: Best Practices and Priorities***

Report on the USAID Dialogue

July 31, 2002

Rapporteur: Ellen Hume

8/27/02 DRAFT

**1. Introduction**

Much of USAID's thinking about media development has been influenced by
a decade of such work in Eastern Europe, where providing alternative
media in conflict areas and developing non-governmental, professional
media in post-Communist and post-conflict settings were a major focus.
Obscure countries now are the front lines for America, and offer new
challenges. It is time to assess the lessons learned from past efforts
and think "afresh," perhaps adding some new models, including approaches
for Africa and Asia, where the cultural preconditions and economic
prospects are quite different from Europe's.

Dr. Krishna Kumar of USAID convened a discussion July 31 to begin this
process. The group of about 30 USAID and public diplomacy officials,
congressional aides, journalists and ngo media development practitioners
attempted to assess what worked and didn't work in the past, and what
might be tried differently in the future. This discussion launched what
will be a year-long USAID evaluation and review of their media
assistance programs. The goal will be to come out with a set of learning
tools and to promote a more aggressive media development agenda. A
number of country studies and other papers are being commissioned as
part of this review.

"Media" were not defined formally during the meeting, but the term was
used generally to refer to: newspapers, television, radio, and Internet
which ideally provide discussions and access to information, and give
voice to citizens. The term also was used to refer to journalists in all
of these media. Film and music were not discussed as such, but
theoretically they could be included as "media." Much of the discussion
focused on creating professional, independent, media who will give voice
to different sectors of the society, provide useful information, and
generate accountability by powerful institutions and individuals.

### The candid discussion acknowledged areas of tension among media development practitioners: first, the sometimes incompatible goals of public diplomacy work versus the development of independent, indigenous media, and secondly, the competing priorities and methods of media work in conflict zones versus long-term media development in more stable developing democracies.

##  **2. The Relationship between Media Development, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs**

When there were no opportunities in Communist countries for indigenous
or foreign voices to be heard, broadcasts from Radio Free Europe and
Voice of America were a lifeline for dissidents. Getting U.S. views out,
and explaining our culture, has been the work of traditional public
diplomacy and public affairs. They seek to win positive international
attitudes and reactions to U.S. policy aims.

Media development is not about selling specific American policies, but
about creating internal debate and information within other countries.
It is about training and supporting indigenous, professional media whose
first loyalty is to their own citizens, rather than to their patrons in
the U.S. or at home. The benefits to the U.S. are less direct, but more
fundamental and perhaps, long-lasting. The theory is that as countries
become more democratic and economically stable, with independent media
as an enabling factor, they become less problematic to the United
States.

To be sure, public diplomacy efforts, including the work of the former
United States Information Service, have always included some media
training and development. The State Department's Bureau of Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs has training programs in all 44 African
countries, for example. They provide radio vacuum tubes, VCRs, and other
small things needed by indigenous journalists "until the big supply ship
can come in." U.S. Embassies bring in journalists to help inspire and
train local media, and there are diverse U.S. government visitor
programs for foreign journalists to the U.S. Sometimes the U.S. will
lobby governments on behalf of a free press or individual journalists
who may have been persecuted. USAID-sponsored media training, focusing
at first on election coverage, became a standard feature of
post-Communist development aid.

While USAID media development has been going on for decades, modern
media capacity-building necessitates a fundamentally different role from
traditional diplomacy and public affairs. When one participant suggested
that media development aid might be coordinated by the new White House
Office of Global Communications, others cautioned that this would
confuse two different, sometimes incompatible, mandates.

Media development seeks to enable effective journalism capacity within
developing democracies. Such development does not necessarily need to be
tied even to such other USAID goals as elections, health and trafficking
issues. A vibrant, independent media sector is now considered worth
developing as an end in itself.

This difference in approach to media was illuminated when participants
discussed the current efforts to improve the U.S. image in the Muslim
world. Trying to address the question "Why do they hate us" with public
relations efforts about America was criticized by some participants as
possibly counterproductive: People in other societies can "smell
propaganda much better than we can." "Our good intentions to control the
messages that go out may work against us." "The U.S. is the net
beneficiary of the free flow of ideas. The more we try to control the
more people will resent us." "Societies ultimately change from within.
We need to help them open the information environment."

The terrorism of 9/11 grew in isolated societies whose closed,
officially sanctioned media chose to target America instead of
tolerating internal dissent for their own policy failures. The answer to
terrorism is multi-faceted, but one of the answers is to "create in
those societies moderate voices that have been kept out, in other words,
pluralistic media." If we support the growth of independent media, "we
will find that there will be a reduction of terrorism because these
countries will begin to build civil societies which give different ways
of solving problems," a participant said.

Central to media development is its editorial independence, not only
from its own government's meddling but from U.S. government control. The
credibility of the assisted media outlet or journalism community is
undermined if it reports only favorably on U.S. policy. These media
would be seen as being foreign propagandists spouting the message of
their backers, rather than being legitimate local voices. Thus U.S.
government program designers have to expect---even hope\--that the media
they help will be critical at times rather than universally supportive
of U.S. policies, participants said.

That is not to say that all foreign media should be supported. "We
should not be funding Hezbollah TV in Lebanon. We should have
transparent standards for what constitutes reliable media
organizations," one participant said. "The goal should be the injection
of support early, to build an organization that doesn't need us."

A strongly contrarian view was expressed by a government official with
senior public diplomacy experience. Skeptical that media development
could "reach U.S. objectives without getting into content," he noted
that in Pakistan, some of the most virulent anti-American discourse is
generated by the relatively free Urdu press. "There are lots and lots of
print outlets in Urdu media. The editorial views are hostile. Opening up
Pakistan's media is not going to change that," he said. He suggested
that as the Pakistan government reforms its broadcast licensing
procedures, "it will open up opportunities for ngos to have their own
radio broadcasting opportunities. Perhaps even television. Will we have
a better situation for U.S. interests? That is not clear." He said that
while freedom of the press was good "in an abstract sense," it was more
important to work closely with governments in countries like India and
Pakistan to reduce the anti-American media there. "I was appalled by the
low priority our (Pakistan) mission had on pressing governments about
their public relations about the U.S.," he concluded. "Opening up and
aiding the media through the mechanisms you're talking about here are
relatively less important." A journalist said his view was "the exact
opposite," because "If you're not practicing what you're preaching
(about press freedom) it's not going to ring true." Another participant
noted that public diplomacy had received far more USG money than media
development, which he said deserves more support. "Nobody is saying
either/or. We need to be involved in both," he concluded.

> **3. Rationale: Why is Media Assistance Worthwhile?**

Why should the U.S. taxpayers support the development of
independent-minded journalists around the world? They may even turn
around and criticize America. Why not just stick with traditional public
diplomacy, coordinating the U.S. government's message and focusing on
business investment and elections?

Most of the participants in the room had a clear view: building capacity
for independent, professional media is important because media are an
engine for social change, and a determinative factor in economic and
political progress. Today development is a much higher priority for
national security than it used to be. In order for societies to be
self-correcting, they need to engage in public dialogue through media.
"You can't develop as a country in Africa or wherever it is if you don't
have basic institutions providing transparent, good government," one
participant said.

Media are essential to a society's transparency, accountability,
information flow, and plurality of voices. U.S. business and foreign
policy interests are vulnerable in countries that don't have these
elements of civil society. "We found in some areas that people have been
starving much more for news and information than elections," said one
USAID official. "Elections and the rule of law are important, but media
are an essential element in making those things participatory."

Amartya Sen's book [Development as Freedom]{.underline} and The World
Bank's [World Development Report 2002]{.underline} were cited as
reinforcing these views. The World Bank's report includes Chapter 10 on
the media, which argues that a vibrant independent professional media
sector is an important factor in a country's economic health, because
media affect the incentives of market participants and influence the
demand for institutional change.

Media development also was seen as an important---and underused\--tool
to prevent conflicts. "We have a wealth of experience in Russia, Asia,
and Africa, and in how vital media is in conflict settings. They need to
find ways to report on both sides in balanced ways, to have town meeting
inputs, etc.," a USAID official said. Media don't get proper attention
in foreign policy and development work, a media expert said. "Only a
small number of foundations include media in their work. But what is the
force that has the greatest impact on social change in the world? Media.
It's ubiquitous. But it's not like the weather. It is something we can
create, shape, and produce."

The challenges of successful media development, including training and
selection of local partners, warrant much greater coordination,
collaboration and creativity among media assistance practitioners.

The case needs to be made in America and the world for the goal of
long-range media development, which was described by one USAID
participant as: "an indigenous corps of independent reporters who want
to do objective work---a professional field."

> **4. How does Media Assistance Relate to Peace-Building?**

The skeptical public diplomacy advocate concluded that the discussion
about promoting civil society with independent media development was
"naïve" because the real reason for such aid is political. The real
reason for B-92's support was not to create independent media as a
sustained sector, but rather to support the U.S. policy goal of
overthrowing a political regime (Milosevic's) that was fomenting
genocide, he said. Even governments that are more U.S.-friendly may
object to "democracy-building" that erodes their governmental authority,
he noted.

His critique illustrated the need to distinguish between short-term
media aid in a conflict setting (such as the former Yugoslavia, where
alternative media in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere were supported
on a crisis basis) and long-term media development in other types of
situations: a vulnerable region with smoldering ethnic tensions (such as
Pakistan), and a post-conflict society (Bosnia today) or developing
democracy (such as South Africa). In these latter cases, efforts to
foster civil society, including free speech and information access,
require a long-term media development strategy with sustainability as a
goal.

There is no "one-size fits all" approach to media development. It has to
be tailored to each situation:

-   In vulnerable countries, where conflict may be imminent, media
    assistance may focus on supporting a plurality of voices, and
    journalist training may stress de-emphasizing inflammatory coverage.

-   In areas of active conflict, alternative media may be supported with
    short-term grants to provide information and ideas that otherwise
    would be suppressed. The difficulty of creating credible new media
    was discussed. Radio B-92 in Serbia, supported by a coalition of
    international donors, was cited as an example of a successful new
    alternative media outlet which established local credibility.

-   In post-conflict and developing countries, the goal is developing a
    self-sustaining media sector over time that is part of the culture
    of democracy, and which provides accountability for other centers of
    power. This involves various kinds of training, support, and an
    "enabling environment" of legal and economic systems. It should be
    approached with a long-range plan.

There is a tension between conflict prevention and the development of
independent-minded, pluralistic media. The idea of shutting down hate
media in Rwanda and Bosnia was defended by some but vigorously opposed
by the American journalists at the meeting.

The different media needs according to the stage of conflict in the
society were discussed as follows:

[A. Vulnerable countries]{.smallcaps}

The importance of building local and regional journalism capacity in
vulnerable countries, in order to offset the power of such targeted hate
messages, was emphasized. "One lesson is, get in before the conflict.
Concentrate on finding the best partners within an ethnic community.
They're not going to have integrated media. Acknowledge you have to find
partners in the most hard-line areas. They will emerge." Aim training
and support at independent media that will think beyond ethnic lines and
include divergent viewpoints. Such efforts have been tried in Rwanda,
Burundi, Bosnia and Sierra Leone.

Some conflicts "are caused by preventing an ethnic minority access to
media." Is it a good idea or not to create stations that are just for an
ethnic minority in their own language? When Armenians in Ngorno Karabakh
had their access cut off, "violence became necessary. Television has
become a new locus of sovereignty. If you are cut off from it; you are
cut off from security."

One technique for preventing such violence is allowing all minorities
media access. "IREX's and Internews's work in developing pluralistic
media is itself a way to prevent conflict." Ashutosh Varshney's recent
book, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, was
cited as an excellent study about why some cities in India had racial
riots, and others did not. The cities that avoided violence had
integrated institutions, which played a key prevention role. Drawing
from this, one participant observed that it was good to "create
integrated media institutions." Sometimes this is impossible, others
noted. Trying to find pluralistic media in Bosnia after Croats, Serbs
and Bosnians had been ethnically 'cleansed" was extremely difficult.

[B. Countries At War]{.smallcaps}

Societies already in conflict need news and special programs,
particularly in broadcast, that support peace building. They also need
mechanisms for dialogue and information about the types of humanitarian
assistance that are available.

In Rwanda, Aceh, East Timor and elsewhere, one project aimed at reducing
the violence took journalists from both sides during the active
conflict, took them out of their region to Bali, and trained them to
report factually "in a way that can lower the temperature" of the
coverage. In another program, Armenians and Azaris engaged in 27 weekly
satellite dialogues in both countries. That was the highest rated
broadcast program in the region, but there was no money in the grant for
the project to be evaluated. "We did the whole thing and I can't tell
you whether it had any effect or not. It's a shame."

[C. Post-Conflict Media Development]{.smallcaps}

It is unreasonable to expect media in a conflict zone to be
self-sustaining or fully independent. In a post-conflict society,
however, media should be weaned off dependence on donors as the
appropriate "enabling environment" emerges. It can take a decade or
longer to accomplish this, one practitioner cautioned; "Even in the
United States, a startup cable company doesn't expect to turn a profit
for at least ten years."

The hostilities may be over, and a peace agreement signed, but ethnic or
partisan groups are likely still to control the indigenous media. To be
sustainable, "a media organization has to reach the average person. What
if the average person is interested in hearing their enemies
excoriated?" a development expert noted. Forcing a media outlet to be
multiethnic may not be realistic, and may even be counterproductive.

Supporting a large number of independent media outlets, such as the
effort in Bosnia, was one attempt to bridge this ethnic divide.
Peacekeepers may impose a central, monopolistic media system, talking
about the danger of land mines, where to get assistance, etc. Eventually
media program designers will try to loosen that and free up the
independent, local media. "In Kosovo, we funded lots of independent
media, decreased the enforcement. As we made the system freer, we had
more and more journalists say, 'Do you realize the dangerous thing
you're doing? We hate each other.' They didn't understand the conflict
of ideas."

USAID generally spends no more than 5-7 years in a post-conflict
country. A study by New York University found that nearly 50% of the
pledges made in peace accords are never fulfilled. At the same time, 50%
of civil wars that are halted go back to war within 5-7 years. Many
countries go back and forth, in and out of war. "Countries like Nigeria
are equally vulnerable even though democratized...We maybe need to think
of this kind of (post-war) assistance in a pre-conflict way so there is
a pressure valve in allowing these conflicts to be aired," one
participant suggested.

Crisis intervention is difficult to sustain. The discussion built a case
for more effective pre-conflict work, including long-term media
development that addresses plurality, professionalism and media
independence. For example, USAID's Office of Transition Assistance has
thought of itself as working on a two-year time-line, in and out of a
country. But now they find themselves returning to countries as
conflicts wax and wane, such as Congo, Angola, and possibly Venezuela.

The international community, including USAID, needs to be prepared to
cooperate more effectively in media development. In Serbia,
international coordination was the key. It provided continuity as the
situation changed. "It's not as if U.S. policy didn't gyrate. We went
from dancing with Milosevic to indicting him! " "We need to find some
kind of platform for continual discussion, even when there is not a
hotspot. We need to talk about donor dependence, etc." one international
media practitioner said. Periodic meetings to share best practices, form
coalitions and address common regional or thematic media development
issues would be useful.

Independent media capacity could be supported diplomatically by U.S.
policymakers, in head-to-head discussions with foreign leaders.
"Conditionality within the World Bank would be more effective than what
ngos could do," one ngo executive said.

"It is the failure of the preceding peace that causes the next war," a
media development expert concluded. "The solution to war is to fix
peace. Building up civil societies. Healthy civil societies don't have
ethnic conflict. When Dennis Ross was asked if he made a mistake, he
said 'We made one mistake. We didn't deal with the local media.'"

**5. Media Assistance Issues**

A.  [Donor Coordination]{.smallcaps}

The importance of better donor coordination was stressed. More
communication, planning and collaboration among USAID and other media
assistance organizations, including foreign counterparts to USAID, and
private ngos, would help everyone. For example in Serbia, international
donors effectively worked together on media which challenged Milosevic's
restrictions.

Joint operations not only help reduce redundancies and capture valuable
experience, but they protect the credibility of the individuals and
organizations being helped. "Policy coordination and
co-funding...actually gave the serious media development people allies,
cover, and helped mightily to answer the problem of whether Soros or the
Germans are 'buying the media.' When Milosevic wanted to shut down the
independent media center, he had to go against the whole international
community." Once the Milosevic regime changed, however, the various
media development institutions began pursuing different policies, and
coordination suffered.

A collaborative approach was deemed particularly important now in the
Middle East**,** where Americans are targets of decades of anti-American
propaganda. These populations need real information, not more
propaganda, some participants said. "You cannot begin doing media
assistance in the Muslim world without an (international) consortium.
The U.S. government cannot do it alone."

Regional organizations may offer an opportunity for more strategic use
of various donor contributions. Examples cited included CELAP, which
emerged from a USAID journalism training project in Latin America, and
the Media Institute of Southern Africa, which serves many southern
African countries, with help from multiple donors.

Several problems confront USAID when attempting better donor
coordination: 1) limited funding by other international donors, 2) a
small number of organizations with pertinent expertise 3) rigid donor
management structures and assessment requirements 4) the lack of a
political constituency in the U.S. for such media assistance.

Better coordination within the U.S. government and its media development
grantees also is needed. It was suggested that the U.S. government
create one "go-to" office for long-term media aid and immediate
journalist crisis assistance. One participant suggested placing it at
the Department of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, but there was no
consensus on that point. Another suggestion that won wide support at the
meeting was the proposal to train ambassadors about supporting work of
USAID, including independent media. The training should clarify the
difference between traditional public diplomacy and public relations,
and the development of independent, indigenous professional journalism
practices.

[B. Building Local Partnerships]{.smallcaps}

Selecting the local partners, which needs to happen at the outset of a
media project, is perhaps the most important step in the process of
media development. "What development means is change. It does have to
come from within," one media development expert emphasized.

These indigenous partners should take the lead. The role of the
international community is to help enlarge the space in which these
media outlets operate. Thus, the needs of the local partners should
dictate the nature of the assistance. If they need transmitters or
presses, the international community should make them available.

It is an "art form" to find the local partners, evaluating who will
fight for professional standards that serve the public's interest versus
who will be corrupt and inept. The levels of conflict in a society will
influence who the appropriate local partners are.

Suggestions for selecting the appropriate local partners included:

-   Forming a consortium of media development organizations, including
    legal defense groups, and getting their short list of which
    organizations and outlets to support in a given country or region

-   Bringing together distinguished journalists from across borders and
    America to evaluate applications

-   Investing in journalism communities rather than individual media
    outlets, which was the suggestion of a European media trainer, "We
    work with observatories, as a way to form communities of
    journalists, so that the media polices itself. This avoids the issue
    of unbalancing newspaper and radio stations one over the other."

-   Being sure that the local partners are respected professionally.

-   Getting the "technocrats" involved to avoid having the development
    practitioners targeted as political activists or partisans.

The idea of funding programming rather than media outlets also was
debated. This is what Voice of America and Radio Free Europe offer.
Common Ground productions, Internews and other USG grantees create
programming with local media. Creating the programming with indigenous
partners can be part of the training exercise. But when the grant money
is spent, and the programs have been run, you also want to leave behind
outlets that will carry this kind of programming in the future.

B.  Sustainability

A central goal of media assistance is for the media to become
self-sustaining. Otherwise it is difficult for them to be editorially
independent. However, establishing self-sustaining, independent media
outlets is not something that is ever fully achieved, but rather is a
never-ending process, one participant noted. The viability of the
enterprise always has to be nurtured, developed and promoted. This is
why a long-term development commitment by USAID and others is more
effective than one-shot grants and training programs.

Economic strength is at the heart of the challenge of media development;
without it an independent news organization can't fight back against
improper political or economic pressures, and "all the watchdogs in the
world can't help." Sustainability depends not only on economic
independence, but on a number of factors, including legal support and
the transparency of the political system. Because of this, it is helpful
to coordinate media development with other elements of
democracy-building. It was suggested that funding for media assistance
could come from economic development budgets, as well as from
democracy-building funds.

Greater flexibility in defining sustainability was urged by many
participants in the discussion. Advertising and business investment in
media have not developed as needed to support independent media in many
post-Communist and economically vulnerable societies. Donor dependency
remains a big problem. The emphasis on creating independent media
outlets remains vitally important, but it may not be realistic or
productive in many places.

There was a lively discussion about what it means for a media outlet to
be "independent." The participants agreed that the "reformed" government
media in Eastern Europe are generally not successful yet at serving the
public's interest with editorially-independent news and information.
Advertising revenue does not ensure independence in a country where ads
are a form of political patronage, one participant noted. Even the
purely commercial "independents" may not offer an ideal model because
some drop news entirely, as Radio Plus did in Kosovo.

Even having a media sector that is politically "independent" of the
government and economically self-sustaining may not fulfill the mission
of media development. The professional mission of serving the public
with news and information, bringing in diverse opinions and voices, must
be present as well. In Mongolia, some independent media undermined the
democracy, one participant observed. In some cases, quasi-governmental
media may be preferable if they are editorially independent of their
governments (as in U.S. public television and radio, the BBC and others)
and if they play a better role than the commercial media in giving space
to professional news and a plurality of voices.

The market distortion that comes from U.S. investment in some media over
others also was discussed. "We cannot be seen as bringing Wal-Mart to
these countries and rolling over the indigenous boutique media, which
will go out of business," observed one participant. "We will be seen
merely as a program to introduce large U.S. and European media into
those markets." To address this, some media development experts said
they focus on training and supporting a "community of journalists" and
"culture" of professional journalism. This offers greater fairness, and
also more useful results in some settings, particularly if
owners/managers or the political environment are hostile to professional
journalism. The decision on whether to support a media outlet or a
journalism "community" clearly differs from situation to situation.

[D. Training]{.smallcaps}

Media development generally includes training journalists inside or
outside the country, about professional norms and practices. Although
his/her media outlet might thwart efforts to offer professional,
independent content, the trained journalist may eventually move to
another job or may work within the existing one to moderate partisan
messages. "Building institutions is never as important as training
people," one U.S. official said. But another participant disagreed.
"Everybody loves training because it is politically very easy to do, but
it ignores the structural issues." Bringing foreign journalists to the
U.S. for training has its virtues, but it is difficult to establish
because it costs \$80,000 to \$90,000 to train one person for a few
years, he said. Another problem is that the better-educated trainees may
be reluctant to return home. The trend now is for U.S. media development
programs to use fewer Americans and more indigenous trainers, who work
within the target country.

The discussion provided some suggestions for effective journalism
training:

-   Training needs to include both professional values and ethics and
    practical, technical advice

-   There should be strings attached to the training. People who attend
    seminars should be required to take part in follow-up surveys,
    seminars and reunions, and to transmit their knowledge to others.

-   It isn't a good idea to force training on a reluctant organization
    or individual.

-   Cross-platform training (including Internet, broadcasting and print)
    offers a real opportunity to lure reluctant managers and governments
    to accept broader training in professionalism, ethics, and
    journalism practice.

-   Legal support and training are critical. Most journalists don't know
    the local or international media laws.

-   It is most effective to use indigenous and cross-border trainers
    when appropriate.

-   It is important to have different types of training in your toolbox:
    short workshops, long immersion training, practical advice, grants,
    traveling to the U.S. or other regions, opportunities to produce
    cooperative stories.

-   More up-to-date training materials and books are needed virtually
    everywhere, particularly in Africa.

Training at an organization whose managers are not committed to the same
values may be a waste of time and money, several participants said. One
way to address this problem is to try to involve the managers and, where
feasible, the owners, in the training. This has helped in some Latin
America settings. Getting "buy-in" from the managers also helps when
trying to extend the training of individuals to others. Where this seems
impossible, using the lure of technical Internet training may still open
some doors. This is true in China, for example, where media training
might otherwise be forbidden.

Concern was expressed that training might be wasted when autocratic
governments or corrupt media owners made it impossible to practice what
had been preached. Most participants argued that training of journalists
even in inhospitable settings was worth the investment, over the long
term. Journalists might not be allowed to practice their new
professional standards and ethics in their current jobs or political
environments. But training in post-conflict societies should be the
beginning of a long-term relationship. The importance of creating
journalist networks and a "community" of journalists with similar
professional values was stressed. This is part of creating civil
society, even if it is incremental and slow. Professionalized
journalists may look for opportunities to inform the public in creative
ways. In Russia for example, the trained journalists who now must work
for oligarchs are a 'fifth column" who look for opportunities to bend
the rules and report important stories. In the Czech Republic, if local
journalists can't break a story because their managers won't let them,
they leak it to foreign journalists and then quote the foreign report in
their own newspapers and broadcasts.

The training may be especially useful in societies where media are
relatively free, but remain unprofessional and divisive. "How to get an
Urdu language journalist to put out a message that is balanced and
informative is a matter of training," one participant concluded. "That
local voice is going to transform countries that are not democracies,
that are closed, into open societies."

[E. Plurality of Voices]{.smallcaps}

Supporting the development of indigenous media that offer a variety of
opinions and draw on a cross-section of the region's peoples is one of
the most important goals of media assistance. Such pluralistic media
tend to have a moderating influence on the political scene. They can
help prevent local conflicts from developing into major internal wars.

It is vital to support in those societies "moderate voices that have
been kept out," and media are a relatively efficient and low-cost way to
do this. In many cases, these populations and opinions have been
suppressed by the government, and as a result their resentment has grown
into civil instability. Providing the checks and balances of competing
views, as well as the legitimacy of a public platform, also can reduce
the influence of unchecked hate media, such as Rwanda's Radio Milles
Collines.

Some donor flexibility may be needed, therefore, to emphasize plurality
of views rather than "objectivity," which is an alien tradition in many
European countries and their former colonies. "People who want to impose
American standards may expect too much, considering conditions in some
of these countries." Instead of finding a neutral official voice for
news, which has been the U.S. tradition, these media may be effective in
engaging the public if they respectfully reflect a full range of local
opinions, including moderate views. These media not only can provide
opportunities for women, minorities and others to be heard, but they
improve the opportunities for public debate.

What if the media development merely prepares the way for foreign
investors to take over the indigenous newspaper or broadcaster? This may
not necessarily bad, a participant said, since "foreign investment
doesn't necessarily snuff out indigenous voices."

[F. Promoting Media in Poor Countries]{.smallcaps}

The present measures of success in media development---quantity of
journalists trained, number of media outlets equipped and set up,
"independent" media in continuing operation, etc.---don't necessarily
work for the poorest countries. In Africa, for example, there is little
private investment money for media. In places like Sierra Leone, a
charismatic, energetic individual can sustain a community radio news
operation "with wire and string" by selling birth announcements, death
announcements, birthdays, and other service-fee charges. But only the
government-run radio station reaches the whole country. This is where
economic grants for media development might be especially appropriate.

Some participants talked about being open to a "third way," a mixture of
public-private funding like America's public radio and television
systems. If quasi-governmental media are tending now to fall back under
autocratic government control in Eastern Europe, as one participant
asserted, elsewhere they may become a vibrant part of civil society,
with editorial independence, others said.

Perhaps corporations that are doing extractive business in African
countries could contribute to a pool of money, along with other donors,
to fund community radio and other media, one program designer suggested.
This model could operate like the U.S. Corporation for Public
Broadcasting. This "third way" model is particularly appealing for
countries that are very poor and unlikely to attract media investment
money.

**6. Assessment and other challenges**

The field of media assistance needs some way of assessing media
development that is meaningful, beyond just "numbers trained." One
problem is that empowering journalists may not be as easily measured as
other competing programs, such as the more traditional USAID health,
population and agriculture programs. It will be difficult to win funding
unless clearer assessment benchmarks are devised. Evaluation money is
the first to be cut from a grant, some participants noted.

Other challenges included:

-   USAID management structure is not as nimble as it needs to be. The
    Office of Transition Assistance has helped cut through the
    bureaucracy, but the timeline is still a problem.

-   There is no domestic constituency for developing democracy,
    including the independent media sector. "We need a constituency in
    the U.S. that understands the work we are doing." This may be
    complicated by the fact that Americans take a free press for
    granted, and are accustomed to sunshine laws, the freedom of
    information act, and other means of getting information about
    government actions.

-   U.S. policy may change every few years, making it difficult to
    commit to long-term programs and goals.

##### 7. Hallmarks of Effective Media Assistance

The participants shared their ideas about the hallmarks of effective
media assistance. These included: flexibility, credibility, creating a
culture of professional journalism, developing capacity rather than
dependency, building from the bottom up rather than the top down,
supporting diverse media voices and formats, addressing donor
corruption, and establishing a long-term development commitment to the
media in the region. They described the rationale for each of these
goals:

A.  [Flexibility]{.smallcaps}

Conditions differ from country to country, and from time to time, so no
precise criteria for media assistance can be identified in advance, the
participants emphasized. The countries with little or no independent
media may need the media assistance the most, participants said.

Since media sometimes work as a wedge, opening up society, openness
should not be a precondition to aid, one development expert noted. Under
the right circumstances, ngo aid can help to build debate,
accountability and change from within that country. Therefore, the
international community should respond to local initiatives, judging
each case on its own merits. "There are situations where we should be
helping dissident voices, and the governments may not be ready for
reform. We have to be careful about setting up standards ahead of time.
The ngos and dissidents need support before it reaches the government
level."

The American model of "objective" professional media is more viable in
some countries than in others. Plurality of voices represented may be a
better hallmark for judging development success. We forget our own
history when we insist on neutral media independent of all political
partisanship, one participant noted. "So-called independent media simply
meant independent from government. It was controlled by political
parties and other interests in this country for over 200 years."

Good programs also offer a flexible toolbox of media assistance (such as
in-country training, international visits, professional associations,
co-development of programming, legal aid, etc.), in order to respond to
changes that occur in the media and cultural environment as the program
evolves.

B. [Credibility]{.smallcaps}

It is essential to protect the credibility of the indigenous media being
assisted. This means that the editorial independence of the media
content must be respected. "If you're not practicing what you're
preaching, it's not going to ring true." We are exporting our values,
not our messages, a participant noted. It will compromise the program if
the media being assisted are seen as the pawns of the U.S. government.

It is important for U.S. government motives for the support to be
understood. A large transfer of money "could be the kiss of death." To
help ensure credibility both for the media assisted and those providing
the help, the standards for winning support for delivery of aid/training
also must be transparent.

C.  [Creating a culture]{.smallcaps}

The best programs create a culture and community of independent
professional journalism, linking journalists to each other. This also
prevents the problem of "king-maker" programs which may be criticized
for favoring one media outlet over a competitor.

To create the culture, trainers adjust to lessons learned over time, and
to local conditions. "The trained need to become trainers. Follow-up
linkages need to be made." In Latin America, one program did not do
enough to track the journalists and see what they produced following the
training, a participant said. The first generation of training was not
very successful, because they " looked only at the American model," but
the second was better because it "shaped the training to their own
perceived needs."

The enabling environment for independent, professional, public-spirited
media is a critical part of media development. "If we are not working
for changes in media laws, other technical assistance, not working for
civil society, then mere training may satisfy ourselves that we are
doing good work, but it is not enough," one media development veteran
concluded.

D.  [Developing Capacity, not Dependency]{.smallcaps}

The best aid promotes indigenous capacity rather than dependency. "The
goal should be injection of support early, to build an organization that
doesn't need us." While this is difficult in conflict settings, in more
conducive environments this goal builds local respect for both the media
and for the assistance organization.

E.  [Building from the bottom up]{.smallcaps}

The best assistance is generated by the local partners, who take the
lead in defining their needs and invite the assistance organization to
come in. The role of the international community is to help enlarge the
space in which these media outlets operate. "We don't run the show; they
run the show. We are in the background, helping in the form of grants
and training," one media assistance practitioner said.

It is important to work, from the beginning, with local people or
institutions that are respected by their peers. Arriving with a
transparent set of best practices principles ("fairness, accuracy,
truth, context, devotion to the reader, independence") helps to generate
appropriate partners in the field, one ngo participant said.

F.  [Diverse Media Voices and Formats]{.smallcaps}

The best programs include not only a plurality of media outlets, but
also a plurality of voices within each media outlet (women, minorities).
This helps prevent conflicts that are generated by those who previously
have been marginalized. It also fosters a variety of perspectives, and a
genuine debate in the society. "Hate" media and propaganda are less
powerful if there are other credible perspectives in play.

It is important to include rural as well as urban media strategies in
the program. In some countries it may be smart to offer cross-training
for multiple media formats: print, television, radio, Internet, rather
than segregating programs by print, broadcast and Internet media.
Professional journalism values and ethics are consistent across all
different media technologies.

G.  [Addressing Media Corruption]{.smallcaps}

The best programs address the issue of corruption within the media.
Sometimes professional media standards are thwarted by the low pay
provided to reporters, who then resort openly to bribes. Building the
journalism culture through journalism associations and more professional
training, can help upgrade the entire profession over time. One of the
successes of USAID's CELAP project (Center for Latin American
Journalism) in Panama in the 1990s, for example, was removing the "bribe
board" in each newsroom, which showed who owed journalists what for each
story.

H.  [Long term donor commitment]{.smallcaps}

One of the key lessons from media assistance so far is that it takes a
long time. Most media development\--in vulnerable, developing and
post-conflict societies---is effective only over many years. To be sure,
assistance to media in conflict zones may need to be initiated quickly
and to be limited in scope. But the participants agreed that sustained
commitments are necessary to achieve lasting results. One grantee said
he would rather have less money, committed over a longer time, than the
larger lump sums that commonly are granted now for shorter periods.

One USAID veteran said it is unrealistic to expect the U.S. donors to
have a sustained commitment to developing a professional independent
media sector. "We (in the U.S. government) are susceptible to reductions
in funding and changes in priority." For this reason, media assistance
practitioners need to have a plan from the outset, a strategy that is
designed for the country in question, for creating the independent media
sector, he emphasized.

But another media development expert contended that this wasn't
feasible. "We have to get real about this," he said. "If you go into a
country with its economy in collapse, no advertising, to put in a plan
for an exit strategy makes no sense. You have to admit that it is a ten
year plus process to get this on its feet. Let's at least all recognize
that it takes that long and there are no miracle ways to do this."

Committing to long-term aid does not necessarily mean sustaining
dependent media outlets that could otherwise be developing their own
independent economic base. But long term assistance can be effective in
areas where such economic independence is not yet possible, with
flexible grants, training, legal support, development of journalism
associations, and other enabling factors for creating a culture of
professional, open and independent media. The assistance should evolve
over time in response to the changing situation, with a variety of tools
and methods.