# summary

GE Americom has no *per se* objection to Commission licensing of
satellites to be transferred from INTELSAT to Intelsat LLC. However, the
Applications here are defective in two fundamental respects. First, the
Commission cannot consider granting Intelsat LLC access to the U.S.
market until steps have been taken to establish the company's
independence. Second, the Commission cannot license Intelsat LLC on
terms that differ substantially from the requirements that apply to
other U.S. licensees.

As a threshold matter, the Commission cannot now determine whether entry
by Intelsat LLC into the U.S. market is consistent with the Commission's
competition standards or its broader public interest concerns.
Commission policies with respect to IGO affiliates focus on whether the
affiliate is sufficiently independent from the IGO to minimize the risk
of collusion or other anti-competitive behavior. These policies provide
the framework for determining Intelsat LLC's eligibility to serve the
U.S., whether or not the company ultimately receives U.S. licenses.
Here, Intelsat LLC is completely owned and controlled by INTELSAT, and
critical decisions regarding the privatization of Intelsat LLC's
ownership and management structure have not yet been made, much less
implemented. As a result, no decision can be made regarding Intelsat LLC
entry into the U.S. market at this time.

The Commission must also deny Intelsat LLC's request for authority for
five new orbital positions. The request is a clear attempt by Intelsat
LLC to leverage INTELSAT's preferential access to orbital positions.
Furthermore, Intelsat LLC seeks award of the slots outside a processing
round, which would prejudice other prospective applicants and violate
well-established Commission policies. The request also conflicts with
the expansion rule, which was intended to prevent warehousing of orbital
locations and promote new entry. Here, four of the slots were registered
with the ITU in 1993, so INTELSAT has already managed to warehouse them
for seven years. The Commission should not permit Intelsat LLC to
benefit from INTELSAT's hoarding of slots at the expense of other
operators.

Intelsat LLC's attempt to avoid the Commission's two degree spacing
requirements must also be rejected. Intelsat LLC provides no reason why
it should not have to adhere to the same standards that have been
applied to other non-compliant systems seeking access to the U.S.
market. Like New Skies, Intelsat LLC should be required to operate on a
non-interference basis to two-degree compliant satellites, and future
Intelsat LLC spacecraft should be required to meet Commission standards
for operation at two-degree spacing.

Similarly, any other waivers of the Commission's technical rules should
be strictly time-limited. GE Americom does not object to grandfathering
of spacecraft that are operational or being built that do not comply
with FCC rules for linear polarization at C-band or operation of TT&C
carriers at the band edge. However, all future satellites should be
required to adhere to these rules. Finally, Intelsat LLC must also be
required to comply with the Commission's prohibition on exclusive
arrangements.

**Before the\
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION\
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of )

)

INTELSAT LLC ) File Nos. SAT-A/O-20000119-0002/18;

) SAT-AMD-20000119-00029/41;

Applications for Authority to Operate, ) SAT-LOA-20000119-00019/28

and to Construct, Launch and Operate )

C- and Ku-Band Geostationary Satellites )

in the Fixed-Satellite Service )

**PETITION TO DENY OR DEFER\
OF GE AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS, INC.**

GE American Communications, Inc. ("GE Americom"), by its attorneys and
pursuant to Section 25.154 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. §
25.154, hereby petitions to deny or defer the above-captioned
Applications of Intelsat LLC "Intelsat LLC" or the "Applicant") for
authority to operate and to construct, launch and operate C- and Ku-band
geostationary orbit satellites.[^1] The Applications seek Federal
Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") licensing of
existing and proposed satellites in the system currently operated by the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT").

GE Americom does not object to FCC licensing of the INTELSAT system *per
se*. To the contrary, we support U.S. licensing of the system provided
that the Commission requires that the system be operated consistently
with well-established U.S. policies. Unfortunately that is not what the
Applications propose. Although the Applications appear to support the
idea of a level playing field (Vol. 1 at 7), in fact Intelsat LLC seeks
authority under terms that would give it substantial competitive
advantages.

Grant of these Applications on the terms requested would undermine
bedrock Commission satellite policies and seriously harm competition in
the U.S. satellite services market. Accordingly, GE Americom
respectfully requests that the Commission deny the Applications or defer
them until INTELSAT has demonstrated that it will comply with the legal
standards for pro-competitive privatization.

# introduction

As the Commission has recognized, these Applications raise "broad policy
and unique issues associated with licensing an intergovernmental
organization, currently in the process of privatizing its operations."
Public Notice at 8. GE Americom has a strong interest in these issues.
As a provider of domestic and international satellite services, GE
Americom directly competes with INTELSAT service offerings. GE Americom
has experienced first-hand the competitive obstacles that result from
INTELSAT's privileged status and the technical difficulties associated
with attempting to reach reasonable coordination agreements with
INTELSAT. INTELSAT's fleet of geostationary satellites is the largest in
the world, and INTELSAT benefits from a host of advantages due to its
status as an intergovernmental organization ("IGO"), including
preferential access to orbital locations, immunity from lawsuits and
from tax obligations, and market access advantages.

The Applications describe INTELSAT's plan to privatize its C- and
Ku-band satellite operations by transferring them to Intelsat LLC.
Intelsat LLC requests FCC licensing for 17 operational C- and Ku-band
satellites and for its proposed use of 5 additional orbital locations.

GE Americom supports in principle both INTELSAT privatization and U.S.
licensing of INTELSAT operations. We have long been a vocal supporter of
efforts by the Administration and the Congress to encourage
privatization under terms that would enhance competition in the global
satellite services market. Most recently, we endorsed the compromise
legislation that was passed by the Senate last week and is now before
the House.[^2] We believe that the circumstances that led to the
creation of a satellite system operated by a consortium of governments
have long since ceased to exist, and that reform of the IGOs is overdue.

Similarly, licensing of INTELSAT spacecraft by the Commission would have
substantial benefits. The Commission has adopted a number of regulatory
policies and technical standards designed to enhance efficient use of
the orbital arc and promote competition in the delivery of satellite
services. These requirements impose costs on Commission licensees, but
have led to the development of a robust market for domestic and
international satellite services in the U.S. Application of these rules
to the INTELSAT system would allow GE Americom and others to compete
with INTELSAT on equal terms.

The Applications demonstrate, however, that any optimism regarding
privatization of INTELSAT is premature. Intelsat LLC is currently wholly
owned and controlled by INTELSAT, and none of the critical decisions
regarding the scope and timetable of actions to increase Intelsat LLC's
independence have yet been made. Essentially, Intelsat LLC is asking the
Commission to approve in advance a spin-off structure that has not even
been agreed to, much less implemented. Because the details of the
relationship between Intelsat LLC and INTELSAT are critical to any
decision regarding Intelsat LLC's ability to serve the U.S. market --
whether or not Intelsat LLC is licensed by the Commission -- the
Commission must deny or defer these Applications pending concrete
actions to make Intelsat LLC independent from INTELSAT.

Similarly, the Applications request U.S. licenses but seek to avoid
application of many of the Commission's basic policies. For example,
Intelsat LLC's request for new orbital locations conflicts with the
expansion rule and with Commission processing round requirements.
Intelsat LLC also asks for open-ended waivers of Commission technical
rules. Grant of these waivers would permit the INTELSAT system to be
operated in a way that imposes interference burdens on other
U.S.-licensed (and non-U.S.-licensed) providers and would perpetuate
INTELSAT's competitive advantages.

The Commission has an obligation to ensure that any action it takes in
this proceeding is consistent with its long-standing policies. Based on
the record here, the Commission cannot determine that permitting
Intelsat LLC to serve the U.S. market under the terms proposed in the
Applications would be in the public interest.

# before determining whether to grant intelsat llc access to the u.s. market, the commission must conduct the competition review required under *DISCO II*

As a threshold matter, the Applications do not provide a basis for the
Commission to conclude that permitting Intelsat LLC to serve the U.S.
market would be consistent with the Commission's competition policies.
The Commission detailed at length in the *DISCO II* decision,[^3] the
factors that would control any evaluation of the competitive risks of
U.S. market participation by an INTELSAT affiliate. The Applications,
however, fail to address the Commission's analysis.

Based on the information before it, the Commission cannot make a finding
that Intelsat LLC's entry into the U.S. market would be pro-competitive.
To date, no steps have been taken to separate Intelsat LLC from INTELSAT
or address the Commission's concerns regarding the competitive
advantages enjoyed by INTELSAT. As a result, Intelsat LLC is clearly not
eligible to enter the U.S. market at this time. The Commission must
accordingly deny the Applications to the extent they seek authority to
provide services in the U.S. or defer them until INTELSAT has complied
with the requirements for pro-competitive privatization.

## A. Commission Precedent Requires Consideration of Competitive Issues Raised by the Relationship Between INTELSAT and Intelsat LLC

In the *DISCO II* proceeding, the Commission undertook a comprehensive
review of competitive issues raised by the provision of services in the
U.S. by IGOs or IGO affiliates. The Commission determined that IGOs have
"unique characteristics as treaty-based organizations that could enable
them to distort competition." *DISCO II*, 12 FCC Rcd at 24148.
Furthermore, the Commission recognized the risk that IGO affiliates
could also distort competition by leveraging the benefits enjoyed by
IGOs. *Id*. at 24150.

The Commission held that IGO affiliates licensed by WTO members would be
entitled to a presumption in favor of entry. However, it expressly
reserved the right to deny an application or attach conditions if the
application presented a very high risk to competition in the U.S.
satellite market. *Id*. at 24154.

The Commission concluded that it was necessary to evaluate "any
potential anticompetitive or market distorting consequences of continued
relationships or connections between an IGO and its affiliate." *Id*.
Specifically, the Commission stated that:

we will look at whether the affiliate is structured to prevent practices
such as collusive behavior or cross-subsidization, the degree of
affiliation between the IGO and its affiliate, and whether the affiliate
can directly or indirectly benefit from IGO privileges and immunities.
We will also consider the ownership structure of the affiliate, the
effect of IGO and other Signatory ownership, and the existence of
clearly defined arms-length conditions governing the affiliate-IGO
relationship. We anticipate that arms-length conditions would include
separate officers, directors, employees, and accounting systems, and
fair market valuing for permissible business transactions between an IGO
and its affiliate that is verifiable by an independent audit and
consistent with normal commercial practice. There should be no common
marketing or recourse to IGO assets for credit or capital. It is also
essential that an IGO not register or coordinate spectrum or orbital
locations on behalf of its affiliate. *Id*. at 24154-155.

The Commission applied this standard in evaluating requests by U.S.
earth stations to communicate with the satellites that were transferred
from INTELSAT to New Skies.[^4] The Commission examined in detail all
aspects of New Skies' ownership structure and management and considered
whether New Skies could take advantage of INTELSAT's privileges and
immunities. The Commission also reviewed the steps that had been taken
to insulate New Skies from INTELSAT and to ensure that ongoing business
relationships between INTELSAT and New Skies did not create a
significant risk of harm to competition. *Id*. at 117-128.

Under the legislation being considered in Congress, similar standards
apply to consideration of U.S. market access by an INTELSAT
spin-off.[^5] If enacted, the legislation would require the Commission
to evaluate whether separated entities of INTELSAT are sufficiently
independent from the IGO. *Id*., § 621(2). The legislation requires any
entity separated from INTELSAT to conduct a public offering of stock to
dilute the ownership of IGO signatories. *Id*., § 621(5). In addition,
the board of directors and officers of the separated entity must not
serve as directors or officers of INTELSAT. *Id*. Transactions between
the separated entity and INTELSAT must be on an arm's length basis.
*Id*.

In accordance with clear Commission precedent as well as the language
currently before Congress, a thorough review of Intelsat LLC's
relationship with INTELSAT is required. Under existing law, the
Commission cannot grant Intelsat LLC access to the U.S. market without
first determining that Intelsat LLC is independent from INTELSAT,
minimizing the risk of collusion or other anti-competitive behavior. If
the legislation is enacted, Intelsat LLC will need to supplement its
Applications to address the statutory requirements, and the Commission
will need to solicit comments on the further information provided by
Intelsat LLC.

## B. The Commission Must Assess Intelsat LLC's Independence from INTELSAT Whether or Not Intelsat LLC Becomes a Commission Licensee

Inexplicably, Intelsat LLC completely ignores the Commission's framework
for considering the competitive issues raised by its relationship with
INTELSAT. Intelsat LLC seems to suggest that the *DISCO II* framework
does not apply because it deals only with non-U.S.-licensed systems. In
fact, however, Commission precedent makes clear that the affiliation
between Intelsat LLC and INTELSAT must be considered in order to
determine whether Intelsat LLC is eligible to provide services in the
U.S., whether or not Intelsat LLC becomes a U.S. licensee.

As discussed above, the Commission in the *DISCO II* proceeding
considered in detail the competitive issues raised by participation in
the U.S. market by IGOs and their affiliates and set standards for
determining whether IGO affiliate entry posed a very high risk to
competition. These standards will clearly apply to Intelsat LLC if it is
not granted U.S. licenses or otherwise chooses to pursue licensing in
another jurisdiction. Similarly, if the ORBIT Act becomes law, the
Commission will be obligated to evaluate the independence of Intelsat
LLC to determine its eligibility to serve the U.S. market, regardless of
where the company is licensed. *See* ORBIT Act at § 601(b)(1)(D).

Intelsat LLC, however, argues that *DISCO II* analysis is not applicable
to the instant Applications because Intelsat LLC is not licensed outside
the U.S. Vol. 1 at 35 n.75. But Intelsat LLC's decision to seek U.S.
licensing does not permit the company to avoid application of the *DISCO
II* framework.

First, there is no indication in the *DISCO II* decision itself that the
Commission intended to exempt IGO affiliates from its competitive entry
analysis if they sought U.S. licensing. Instead, the order simply states
that it will review any application to serve the U.S. market by an IGO
affiliate to determine whether it raises the potential for competitive
harm. *DISCO II*, 12 FCC Rcd at 24154. Although the primary focus of the
*DISCO II* proceeding was on non-U.S. licensed satellites, the
Commission clearly considered IGOs and their affiliates to be a special
case subject to competitive review.

In any event, however, Intelsat LLC concedes that its Applications are
subject to the policies adopted in the *Foreign Participation Order*,
which sets forth the standards for considering license applications by
entities that have greater than 25 percent indirect foreign
ownership.[^6] In that decision, the Commission noted that it has a
statutory obligation to determine that grant of an application to exceed
the 25 percent alien ownership benchmark is consistent with the public
interest. *Id* at 23910. The *Foreign Participation Order* and *DISCO
II* are companion orders, adopting parallel requirements for entry into
the U.S. by foreign entities. Thus, like *DISCO II*, the *Foreign
Participation Order* includes a presumption in favor of entry for
applicants from WTO member countries. *Id*. at 23913. But as in *DISCO
II*, the presumption can be rebutted if entry poses a very high risk to
competition in the U.S. market. *Id*. at 23913-914.

As a result, the standard for entry is the same for foreign-owned
carriers seeking U.S. licenses as it is for foreign-licensed satellites
seeking U.S. market access. Under either framework, the Commission must
address the competitive risks associated with Intelsat LLC's prospective
entry into the U.S. market. To do so it must consider in detail Intelsat
LLC's relationship with INTELSAT.

The Commission has previously determined that U.S. market access by IGO
affiliates raises special public interest concerns. Whether or not
Intelsat LLC becomes a U.S. licensee, the Commission must consider these
concerns before deciding whether to grant Intelsat LLC U.S. market
access. Either in this proceeding or in a separate subsequent
proceeding, the Commission must evaluate the relationship between
Intelsat LLC and INTELSAT before deciding what steps will be necessary
to protect competition in the U.S. satellite services market.

## C. The Commission Cannot Authorize Intelsat LLC to Provide U.S. Services Based on the Record Here

As noted above, there is no attempt in the Applications to demonstrate
that Intelsat LLC is entitled to U.S. market access under Commission
precedent. This is not surprising, because Intelsat LLC is currently
wholly owned and controlled by INTELSAT. No steps have been taken to
separate Intelsat LLC from its IGO roots or address the competitive
concerns outlined by the Commission in *DISCO II*. Thus, Intelsat LLC,
as it exists today, clearly cannot satisfy the Commission requirements
concerning independence from INTELSAT and is therefore ineligible to
provide services in the U.S.

Nevertheless, Intelsat LLC seeks assurances from the Commission --
*before* the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties makes further critical
decisions regarding the privatization process -- that Intelsat LLC will
receive U.S. licenses and be able to provide services in competition
with other U.S. and foreign commercial satellite operators. *See* Vol. 1
at 7-8. It is impossible for the Commission to provide such assurances.
The Commission simply cannot guarantee that Intelsat LLC will be
authorized to serve the U.S. market unless and until the relationship
between Intelsat LLC and INTELSAT is clarified and the necessary steps
have been taken to separate Intelsat LLC from INTELSAT's ownership and
control. Nor can the Commission make the required finding that grant of
Intelsat LLC's Applications would be in the public interest without more
concrete information regarding what the Applicant's ultimate ownership
and control structure will be.

Until privatization is accomplished, the most the Commission can do is
to set forth the conditions that Intelsat LLC would have to meet in
order to satisfy the Commission's competition analysis. But that would
constitute no more than a restatement of the framework adopted in *DISCO
II*. The legal standard is clear: it is up to INTELSAT's Assembly of
Parties to determine whether it will take the steps necessary to satisfy
the Commission's test for U.S. market access and its public interest
standards.

The Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of a privatization process
that is far from complete. Until the Commission has sufficient facts
before it to conclude that Intelsat LLC's entry into the U.S. market
would be consistent with the Commission's competition policies as set
forth in *DISCO II* and with the public interest, the Commission cannot
take any action that would allow such entry.

# ii. intelsat llc's request to license new orbital positions must be denied

Intelsat LLC requests Commission licenses not only for its existing
constellation of satellites and a number of planned replacements, but
also for five new orbital locations. *See* Vol. 1 at 12. This request
represents a blatant attempt by Intelsat LLC to leverage the competitive
advantages enjoyed by INTELSAT with respect to access to orbital
positions. Furthermore, the request is contrary to the Commission's
orbital assignment policies. Accordingly, the Commission must deny
Intelsat LLC's request.

## A. Intelsat LLC Cannot Be Permitted to Leverage INTELSAT's Preferential Access to Orbital Locations

The Commission has recognized that INTELSAT has a significant
competitive advantage in obtaining spectrum and orbital locations.[^7]
The Commission forwards INTELSAT's filings with the International
Telecommunications Union (\"ITU\") for orbital locations without
conducting any substantive review of them or exercising any regulatory
authority over INTELSAT's decisions. *Id*. at 14131. Thus, INTELSAT has
complete freedom to select orbital locations and make filings at the
ITU. In contrast, private systems seeking U.S. licenses must file
applications with the Commission for consideration in a satellite
processing round, and their orbital assignments are determined by the
Commission taking into account the competing requests of other
applicants.

Furthermore, INTELSAT has not been subject to any meaningful regulatory
constraints to prevent warehousing of orbital locations, unlike
Commission licensees who must meet strict milestone schedules for
implementation of new assignments. As a result, INTELSAT has been able
to acquire and retain a significant number of orbital positions without
ever bringing them into use.

By requesting licensing for five new orbital positions, Intelsat LLC
seeks to reap the benefits of the competitive advantages INTELSAT has
long enjoyed. The Commission made clear in *DISCO II* that it would not
permit an IGO to register or coordinate spectrum on behalf of its
affiliate. *DISCO II*, 12 FCC Rcd at 24155. Here, INTELSAT has already
registered and at least partially coordinated the spectrum without ever
making use of it and now seeks to assign the locations to Intelsat LLC
to augment what is already the largest international satellite system.
The request directly conflicts with Commission policies regarding
efficient use of the orbital arc and would provide Intelsat LLC a unique
advantage over competing providers. For these reasons alone, Intelsat
LLC's request for FCC licensing of new orbital positions must be denied.

## B. Intelsat LLC's Request for New Orbital Assignments Cannot Be Considered Until the Commission Opens the Next Processing Round

In any event, Intelsat LLC's request for new C- and Ku-band orbital
locations must be considered in the context of a processing round. The
Commission's policy of considering C- and Ku-band FSS applications in
processing rounds is well established.[^8] In the *DISCO I Order* the
Commission reaffirmed this policy and made clear that it extends to
applications for domestic or international service.[^9]

Intelsat LLC's application for five new C- and Ku-band orbital locations
falls squarely within the processing round requirement. Consideration of
these requests outside a round would adversely affect the interests of
other potential applicants for new frequency assignments and would
directly conflict with Commission policies.

Intelsat LLC does not explicitly request a waiver of the processing
round requirement,[^10] and is not entitled to such a waiver. The
processing round requirement protects the rights of qualified parties
who file timely applications to have those applications considered
simultaneously. Granting a waiver here would directly contravene that
policy. Until the Commission begins a new processing round, the
Commission cannot determine whether there will be enough orbital
locations to satisfy all qualified applicants. Nor can the Commission
weigh Intelsat LLC's request for new assignments against other C- and
Ku-band applications. Waivers are not appropriate where the grant of the
waiver would conflict with the purpose of the rule.[^11] The Commission
should deny the request or at a minimum defer it pending initiation of
the next GSO FSS processing round. To permit Intelsat to license five
additional slots outside a processing round would irretrievably
prejudice other operators and potential operators.

## C. Intelsat LLC's Application for Five New Orbital Assignments Violates the Expansion Rule

The expansion rule independently bars grant of the Intelsat LLC
applications. That rule, codified in Section 25.140, provides that an
incumbent satellite service provider is entitled to one additional
orbital location in each frequency band in which it is authorized to
operate, provided that its existing in-orbit spacecraft are essentially
filled and that it holds no more than two authorizations for spacecraft
that have not been launched. 47 C.F.R. § 25.140(f). As Intelsat LLC
acknowledges, the rule was intended to promote new entry by preventing
the warehousing of orbital slots or the assignment of an excessive
number of slots to one operator. Vol. 1 at 59 (citations omitted).

Intelsat LLC requests a waiver of the expansion rule. But contrary to
Intelsat LLC's assertions, the relief it seeks would directly contravene
the purpose of the expansion rule. As a result, Intelsat LLC's request
for a waiver must be denied.

Intelsat LLC claims that a waiver is appropriate because Intelsat LLC is
not proposing to warehouse spectrum. Vol. 1 at 60. It argues that the
new slots are intended to handle near-term demand, and notes that it
will be subject to implementation deadlines imposed under ITU
procedures. *Id*. In addition, Intelsat LLC claims that the Commission's
"one at a time" approach would undercut Intelsat LLC's ability "to
launch redeployment and replacement satellites and to grow its system in
a manner that is similar to its competitors." *Id*.

These arguments fly in the face of the facts. The ITU filings for four
of the five new orbital locations Intelsat LLC is requesting date back
to [1993]{.underline}.[^12] Thus, these are slots that INTELSAT has
already succeeded in warehousing for seven years, notwithstanding ITU
implementation deadlines. Intelsat LLC's suggestion that after all that
time the locations are now needed to meet near-term demand is simply not
credible. Furthermore, Intelsat LLC's claim that application of the
expansion rule would put it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors
is meritless. Intelsat LLC's U.S.-licensed competitors are all subject
to the expansion rule, so application of the rule here to Intelsat LLC
is necessary to ensure that it faces the same regulatory limitations as
its rivals.

Intelsat LLC also relies on a decision in which the Commission waived
the expansion rule to permit PanAmSat to add a second spacecraft in the
Pacific Ocean Region.[^13] In that decision the Bureau noted that
PanAmSat was seeking to create a global system and that satellites
deployed for one ocean region could not serve another. In these
circumstances the Bureau concluded that Commission policy permitted the
licensing of "two orbital locations in each ocean region in the same
frequency band." *Id*., 14 FCC Rcd at 2723. Intelsat LLC, however, is
seeking to acquire an existing seventeen-satellite constellation with 10
satellites serving the Atlantic Ocean Region, 4 serving the Indian Ocean
Region, and 3 serving the Pacific Ocean Region. Thus, the PanAmSat
decision is clearly distinguishable on its facts and does not support
Intelsat LLC's request for a waiver.

Grant of an expansion rule waiver to Intelsat LLC here would prejudice
future applicants and result in the assignment of an excessive number of
slots to one entity, violating the purpose served by the rule. As a
result, Intelsat LLC's request for waiver of the expansion rule to
permit the assignment of new orbital locations must be denied.

# iii. INTELSAT LLC should be required to operate subject to the commission's two degree spacing requirements

The Commission must reject Intelsat LLC's argument that Commission
requirements relating to satellite spacing and interference protection
should not be applied to the INTELSAT system. These requirements are
critical to protect U.S.-licensed systems from interference and ensure
efficient use of the orbital arc. The Commission has not barred
operational systems that were not designed to meet the Commission's
two-degree spacing standards from serving the U.S. market.[^14] However,
it has made clear that non-compliant spacecraft could not interfere with
or claim interference protection from U.S. services offered by
two-degree compliant satellites at orbital spacings of two degrees or
more. *Id*. The same standards must be applied to Intelsat LLC.

The Commission has described two-degree spacing as the "cornerstone" of
its orbital assignment plan for satellites in geostationary satellite
orbits providing fixed-satellite services.[^15] By implementing
two-degree spacing, the Commission has achieved a substantial increase
in the available orbital capacity. Contrary to Intelsat LLC's
suggestion, the Commission has clearly applied the requirement to
satellites providing both domestic and international services. For
example, the Commission has granted Columbia Communications Corporation
a license at 172˚ E.L., two degrees away from an INTELSAT spacecraft
operating at 174˚ E.L. *Id*.

As non-U.S. licensed systems have sought entry to the U.S. market, the
Commission has made clear that it continues to view compatibility with
two-degree spacing requirements as critical. The Commission outlined its
policy when addressing requests by U.S. earth station operators to
communicate with INTELSAT system satellites that had been transferred to
New Skies:

Applicants must demonstrate that they comply with the Commission's
technical requirements designed to permit two-degree spacing before they
are authorized to provide service in the United States. We license
non-compliant satellites as well as earth stations only when the
applicants can demonstrate that their operations cause no harmful
interference to existing satellite operations. Further, we condition any
non-conforming operations upon a licensee accommodating future satellite
networks serving the United States that are two-degree compliant.\
*New Skies Order,* 17 CR at 128 (footnotes omitted).

The Commission acknowledged that the INTELSAT spacecraft assigned to New
Skies "do not meet the Commission's two-degree-spacing requirements."
*Id*. However, the Commission nevertheless allowed New Skies to serve
the U.S. market:

Consistent with our treatment of U.S. licensed systems, we permit New
Skies to provide service in the United States, on a non-interference
basis to two-degree compliant operations. *Id*.

Intelsat LLC sets forth a laundry list of objections to enforcement of
the Commission's two-degree spacing rules (Vol. 1 at 48-59), but
presents no valid reason why it should not be required to adhere to the
same requirements that were applied to New Skies. In fact, Intelsat
LLC's own statements indicate that its satellites can tolerate operation
in a two-degree spacing environment.

For example, Intelsat LLC states that "the achievement of two degree
spacing is dependent on the use of orthogonal linear polarization."
*Id*. at 51. Yet this statement is contradicted by Intelsat LLC's own
orbital plan, which includes two degree spacing of satellites at 18 and
20 degrees W.L. and 27.5, 29.5 and 31.5 degrees W.L. in the Atlantic
Ocean Region, at 60, 62, 64 and 66 degrees E.L. in the Indian Ocean
Region and at 174, 176, 178, and 180 degrees E.L. in the Pacific Ocean
Region. *See* Vol. II at Table 3.1-1. Thus, achievement of two-degree
spacing is obviously feasible among the INTELSAT system's circularly
polarized satellites and is in fact used for most of INTELSAT\'s fleet.

Furthermore, Intelsat LLC demonstrates that coordination between an
INTELSAT spacecraft and a U.S.-licensed satellite may actually be easier
than coordination between two INTELSAT satellites. Specifically,
coordination may be facilitated by the different C-band polarization
schemes currently used. The isolation between the circularly polarized
signal and the linearly polarized signal provides an additional margin
that is not present when coordinating between two circularly polarized
spacecraft. *See* Vol. 1 at 52-53.

In fact, Intelsat LLC admits that "nothing inherent in the design of the
INTELSAT satellites" results in increased adjacent satellite
interference compared to two-degree compliant spacecraft. *Id*. at 53.
Thus, operation of INTELSAT spacecraft in a two-degree spacing
environment is not a matter of technical feasibility but a matter of
Intelsat LLC's willingness to accept the burdens that result from such
spacing -- burdens that other operators, both U.S.-licensed and
non-U.S.-licensed, are required to bear as a condition of serving the
U.S. market.

Intelsat LLC also claims that the Commission's decision to waive the
two-degree spacing requirement in a decision involving PanAmSat supports
Intelsat LLC's request for relief from the requirement here. *Id*. at
54-55. In that case, PanAmSat was granted authority to operate PAS-5 at
194˚ W.L., three degrees away from PAS-4 at 191˚ W.L.[^16] But Intelsat
LLC conveniently omits to mention the Bureau's rationale for allowing
non-standard spacing of the PanAmSat satellites. Specifically, the
Bureau allowed the increased spacing to facilitate coordination with a
proposed PacStar satellite planned for 192.55˚ W.L.,
[between]{.underline} the two orbital locations assigned to PanAmSat.
*Id*.

Intelsat LLC has failed to present a persuasive policy or technical
justification for its attempt to evade the Commission's two-degree
spacing requirements. Consistent with its treatment of other
U.S.-licensed and non-U.S.-licensed systems, the Commission must require
Intelsat LLC to operate the existing INTELSAT satellites on a
non-interference basis to two-degree compliant satellites. Future
satellites must be required to meet the Commission's technical
requirements for two-degree operation.

# iv. future intelsat llc spacecraft must be required to comply with Commission requirements regarding polarization and TT&C

Intelsat LLC also requests waivers of Section 25.210(a), which requires
C-band transponders to employ linear polarization, and Section
25.202(g), which specifies the location of TT&C functions. GE Americom
does not object to grandfathering of existing INTELSAT spacecraft that
do not comply with these rules. However, any waiver must be strictly
limited, and future spacecraft should be required to meet the
Commission's technical standards.

Requiring future satellites to use linear C-band polarization is
necessary to promote competition in the international satellite services
market. Linear polarization is used by U.S.-licensed systems as well as
most non-U.S.-licensed systems around the globe. Its almost unique use
of circular polarization allows the INTELSAT system to lock-in C-band
customers, insulating INTELSAT from competitive pressures. It is very
difficult for INTELSAT users to switch to a competing provider, even one
that offers substantially superior services and rates.

Consistency in C-band polarization among satellites will benefit all
users who rely on satellite services by facilitating their ability to
use competing providers. By requiring phased-in implementation of linear
polarization on new satellites, the Commission can minimize the costs of
the transition. All INTELSAT customers will derive long-term benefits
from standardization of the polarization and the ability to freely
choose among providers based on service quality and price.

Intelsat LLC should also be required to place TT&C carriers at the band
edges on future satellites. Operation of TT&C transmissions in the
center of the band places burdens on operators of adjacent satellites by
making coordination much more difficult. Intelsat LLC provides no reason
why future satellites should not have to adhere to Commission
requirements with respect to the location of TT&C carriers.

# Intelsat llc must be required to comply with the commission's prohibition on exclusive arrangements

Finally, Intelsat should be required to comply in other respects with
Commission requirements. For example, the Commission prohibits U.S.
licensees from entering into exclusive arrangements for satellite
services to or from any given country. In *DISCO II*, the Commission
explained that:

An exclusive arrangement generally would take the form of an agreement
between a space station operator or service provider that establishes a
particular satellite as the only permissible facility by which to offer
a particular satellite service between the United States and the foreign
country.\
*DISCO II*, 12 FCC Rcd at 24163.

The Commission has applied the prohibition to non-U.S. licensed systems
as well, including New Skies and EUTELSAT.[^17] Intelsat LLC must
similarly be subject to this obligation.

# conclusion

As discussed above, the Intelsat LLC Applications conflict with
well-established Commission competition and technical policies. Intelsat
LLC can be granted Commission licenses only if and when it has achieved
independence from INTELSAT and only under terms consistent with the
Commission's treatment of other U.S.-licensed providers.

Respectfully submitted,

GE AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| Philip V. Otero                 | By:                                |
|                                 | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_             |
| Senior Vice President and       | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
|                                 |                                    |
| General Counsel                 | > Peter A. Rohrbach\               |
|                                 | > Karis A. Hastings\               |
| GE American Communications,     | > Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.\          |
| Inc.                            | > 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.\     |
|                                 | > Washington, D.C. 20004\          |
| Four Research Way               | > (202) 637-5600                   |
|                                 |                                    |
| Princeton, NJ 08540             |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

March 6, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[Page]{.underline}

summary i

introduction [2](#introduction)

I. before determining whether to grant intelsat llc access to the u.s.
market, the commission must conduct the competition review required
under *DISCO II*
[5](#before-determining-whether-to-grant-intelsat-llc-access-to-the-u.s.-market-the-commission-must-conduct-the-competition-review-required-under-disco-ii)

A. Commission Precedent Requires Consideration of Competitive Issues
Raised by the Relationship Between INTELSAT and Intelsat LLC
[6](#a.-commission-precedent-requires-consideration-of-competitive-issues-raised-by-the-relationship-between-intelsat-and-intelsat-llc)

B. The Commission Must Assess Intelsat LLC's Independence from INTELSAT
Whether or Not Intelsat LLC Becomes a Commission Licensee
[8](#b.-the-commission-must-assess-intelsat-llcs-independence-from-intelsat-whether-or-not-intelsat-llc-becomes-a-commission-licensee)

C. The Commission Cannot Authorize Intelsat LLC to Provide U.S. Services
Based on the Record Here
[11](#c.-the-commission-cannot-authorize-intelsat-llc-to-provide-u.s.-services-based-on-the-record-here)

ii\. intelsat llc's request to license new orbital positions must be
denied
[12](#ii.-intelsat-llcs-request-to-license-new-orbital-positions-must-be-denied)

A. Intelsat LLC Cannot Be Permitted to Leverage INTELSAT's Preferential
Access to Orbital Locations
[13](#a.-intelsat-llc-cannot-be-permitted-to-leverage-intelsats-preferential-access-to-orbital-locations)

B. Intelsat LLC's Request for New Orbital Assignments Cannot Be
Considered Until the Commission Opens the Next Processing Round
[14](#b.-intelsat-llcs-request-for-new-orbital-assignments-cannot-be-considered-until-the-commission-opens-the-next-processing-round)

C. Intelsat LLC's Application for Five New Orbital Assignments Violates
the Expansion Rule
[16](#c.-intelsat-llcs-application-for-five-new-orbital-assignments-violates-the-expansion-rule)

iii\. INTELSAT LLC should be required to operate subject to the
commission's two degree spacing requirements
[18](#iii.-intelsat-llc-should-be-required-to-operate-subject-to-the-commissions-two-degree-spacing-requirements)

iv\. future intelsat llc spacecraft must be required to comply with
Commission requirements regarding polarization and TT&C
[22](#iv.-future-intelsat-llc-spacecraft-must-be-required-to-comply-with-commission-requirements-regarding-polarization-and-ttc)

V. Intelsat llc must be required to comply with the commission's
prohibition on exclusive arrangements
[23](#intelsat-llc-must-be-required-to-comply-with-the-commissions-prohibition-on-exclusive-arrangements)

conclusion [24](#conclusion)

**Before the\
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION\
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of )

)

INTELSAT LLC ) File Nos. SAT-A/O-20000119-0002/18;

) SAT-AMD-20000119-00029/41;

Applications for Authority to Operate, ) SAT-LOA-20000119-00019/28

and to Construct, Launch and Operate )

C- and Ku-Band Geostationary Satellites )

in the Fixed-Satellite Service )

**PETITION TO DENY OR DEFER\
OF GE AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS, INC.**

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| Philip V. Otero                 | > Peter A. Rohrbach\               |
|                                 | > Karis A. Hastings\               |
| Senior Vice President and       | > Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.\          |
|                                 | > 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.\     |
| General Counsel                 | > Washington, D.C. 20004\          |
|                                 | > (202) 637-5600                   |
| GE American Communications,     |                                    |
| Inc.                            |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| Four Research Way               |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| Princeton, NJ 08540             |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

March 6, 2000

[^1]: The Commission announced that the Applications had been accepted
    for filing in a Public Notice dated February 2, 2000. *See*
    Satellite Policy Branch Information, Report No. SAT-00035, DA No.
    00-192 ("Public Notice").

[^2]: *See* Letter from General Electric Company *et al.* to the
    Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, dated Feb. 28, 2000.

[^3]: *Amendment of the Commission\'s Regulatory Policies to Allow
    Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and
    International Satellite Service in the United States*, 12 FCC Rcd
    24094 (1997) (\"*DISCO II*\").

[^4]: *See New Skies Satellites, N.V*., FCC 99-210, 17 CR 109, 117
    (1999) ("*New Skies Order*") ("As an IGO affiliate, New Skies's
    entry into the U.S. market must be analyzed in accordance with the
    IGO affiliate standard adopted in the *DISCO II Order*.").

[^5]: *See* Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of
    International Telecommunications Act (\"ORBIT Act\").

[^6]: Vol. 1 at 20, *citing Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation
    in the U.S. Telecommunications Market and Market Entry and
    Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities*, 12 FCC Rcd 23891 (1997).

[^7]: *See* *Comsat Corporation*, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, 14130 (1998).

[^8]: *See, e.g., Processing of pending space station applications in
    the domestic Fixed Satellite Service,* 77 FCC2d 956 (1980).

[^9]: *Amendment to the Commission's Regulatory Policies Governing
    Domestic Fixed Satellites and Separate International Satellite
    Systems,* 11 FCC Rcd 2429, 2436 (1996) ("Any applications filed
    after the adoption date of this order will be considered in future
    'consolidated' FSS rounds.").

[^10]: Intelsat LLC simply asserts in a footnote that "starting a
    processing round here is clearly not in the public interest" because
    it would "threaten privatization efforts." Vol. 1 at 2 n.3. However,
    INTELSAT was clearly on notice regarding Commission processing round
    policies when it decided to seek U.S. licensing of these locations.

[^11]: *See, e.g., Denver and Ephrata Telephone and Telegraph Company,*
    9 FCC Rcd 1792 (Com. Car. Bur. 1994) ("a waiver is justified if
    application of a rule would frustrate its underlying purpose")
    (citing cases).

[^12]: *See* December 1998 Space Network List. For several of these
    locations, there are also expired INTELSAT filings dating back to
    1983.

[^13]: Vol. 1 at 60-61, *citing PanAmSat Licensee Corp*., 14 FCC Rcd
    2719 (Int'l Bur. 1998).

[^14]: *See, e.g., New Skies Order*, 17 CR at 129.

[^15]: *See, e.g.,* *Columbia Communications Corporation*, DA 99-134,
    1999 FCC LEXIS 109 (Int\'l Bur. rel. Jan. 11, 1999) at ¶ 29.

[^16]: *PanAmSat Licensee Corp*., 14 FCC Rcd 2719, 2722 (Int'l Bur.
    1998).

[^17]: *See New Skies Order*, at 17 CR at 128; *Applications of BT North
    America and CBS Broadcasting, Inc.*, DA 00-162 (Int'l Bur. rel. Feb.
    1, 2000) at ¶ 16.