**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | * | CC Docket No. 99-295         |
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| Application by Bell Atlantic New | ) |                              |
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| Section 271 of the               | * |                              |
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**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

**Adopted:** December 21, 1999 **Released:** December 22, 1999

By the Commission: Chairman Kennard and Commissioners Ness and Powell
issuing separate statements; Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring and
issuing a statement.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Paragraph

I. Introduction and Overview 1

II\. Background 17

A. Statutory Framework 17

B. History of this Application 21

C. New York Commission and Department of Justice Evaluations 23

III\. Analytical Framework 29

A. Absence of Unbundling Rules 29

B. Scope of Evidence in the Record 32

1\. Procedural Framework 32

2\. Motions To Strike 38

3\. Ex Parte Submissions 41

C. Framework for Analyzing Compliance with Statutory Requirements 43

1\. Legal Standard 44

2\. Evidentiary Case 47

IV\. Compliance with Section 271 (c)(1)(a) 61

A. Background 61

B. Discussion 62

V. Compliance with Checklist 63

A. Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection 63

1\. Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection 63

2\. Pricing of Collocation 77

B. Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements 81

1\. Operations Support Systems 82

2\. Combinations of Unbundled Network Elements 229

3\. Pricing of Network Elements 237

C. Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits, and Rights-of-Way 263

1\. Background 263

2\. Discussion 265

D. Checklist Item 4---Unbundled Local Loops 268

1\. Background 268

2\. Discussion 273

E. Checklist Item 5 \-- Unbundled Local Transport 337

1\. Background 337

2\. Discussion 338

F. Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching 343

1\. Background 343

2\. Discussion 346

G. Checklist Item 7 349

1\. 911 and E911 Access 349

2\. Directory Assistance/Operator Services 351

H. Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings 357

1\. Background 357

2\. Discussion 360

I. Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration 362

1\. Background 362

2\. Discussion 364

J. Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling 365

1\. Background 365

2\. Discussion 366

K. Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability 367

1\. Background 367

2\. Discussion 369

L. Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity 372

1\. Background 372

2\. Discussion 374

M. Checklist Item 13 \-- Reciprocal Compensation. 375

1\. Background 375

2\. Discussion. 376

N. Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 378

1\. Background 378

2\. Discussion 381

3\. Provisioning 400

VI\. Section 272 Compliance 401

A. Background 401

B. Discussion 403

1\. Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section
272 404

2\. Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272 417

3\. Joint Marketing Requirements of Section 272 419

VII\. Public Interest Analysis 422

A. Overview 422

B. Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets 425

1\. Impact on Local Competition 426

2\. Impact on Long Distance Competition 428

C. Assurance of Future Compliance 429

1\. Summary of Performance Reporting and Enforcement Mechanisms 431

2\. Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan 433

D. Other Arguments 444

VIII\. Section 271(d)(6) Enforcement Authority 446

IX\. CONCLUSION 454

X. ORDERING CLAUSES 455

Appendix A: List of Commenters

Appendix B: Statistical Methodology

Appendix C: Analysis of Average Completed Intervals for Non-dispatch
Orders Using Carrier to Carrier and Gertner/Bamberger Study Data

#  {#section .unnumbered}

# Introduction and Overview

1.  In this Order, we grant Bell Atlantic's application to enter the
    interLATA long distance market in New York State based on our
    conclusion that Bell Atlantic has taken the statutorily required
    steps to open its local exchange and exchange access markets to
    competition. The market opening actions by the New York Commission
    and Bell Atlantic underlying our decision bring the
    telecommunications industry one step closer to realization of the
    full pro-competitive goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,[^1]
    and promise substantial benefits for consumers in the form of lower
    rates and innovative service packages. Bell Atlantic filed the
    application addressed in this Order with the Commission on September
    29, 1999. Fifty-seven parties filed comments on the application on
    October 18, 1999. Of these, more than twenty parties supported grant
    of the application. Twenty-five parties filed reply comments on
    November 8, 1999.[^2]

2.  Our decision today approving Bell Atlantic's application represents
    the culmination of extensive federal and state efforts implementing
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This action builds on the
    experience that this Commission has gained from reviewing prior
    section 271 applications and developing rules to implement section
    251 of the Communications Act. Significantly, it also builds on the
    tireless efforts of the New York Commission, which has worked long
    and hard with Bell Atlantic and competitive local exchange companies
    (LECs) to ensure that local markets in New York are open to
    competition.

3.  In enacting the telephony provisions of the 1996 Act, Congress
    envisioned fundamental pro-competitive changes in the then-existing
    telecommunications environment. To this end, Congress took the
    momentous step of requiring that the incumbent LECs open the
    traditionally non-competitive local exchange and exchange access
    markets to competition in order to foster the entry of alternative
    service providers. Once the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) have
    opened their local markets to competition, the 1996 Act permits them
    to enter the in-region, interLATA toll market, thereby increasing
    competition in the long distance telecommunications market.

4.  Unfortunately, implementation of this congressional vision of
    increased telecommunications competition has, in many instances, not
    proceeded swiftly or smoothly. For example, some of the section 271
    applications that we have reviewed to date have fallen far short of
    the statutory requirements*.* Moreover, some carriers attacked
    sections 271-275 of the Act on constitutional grounds arguing that
    each constitutes an impermissible bill of attainder.[^3] The court
    roundly rejected this challenge, stating that these provisions "are
    constitutionally sound."[^4] We believe that the instant application
    represents a turning point in the process of implementing the 1996
    Act, with a new focus by the BOCs on taking the steps necessary to
    open the local exchange and exchange access markets to competition.

5.  While this is the first section 271 application to receive
    Commission approval, our decision here reflects the fundamental
    principles adopted in our prior section 271 orders. Thus, we apply
    the general standards developed in prior orders in evaluating
    section 271 compliance -- whether the BOC is providing service to
    competitors at parity with its retail offerings or, when there is no
    analogous retail activity, whether the BOC's performance would allow
    an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. Based
    on our growing experience in addressing issues involving the
    development of local exchange competition, we also apply these
    standards in a pragmatic fashion, thus building on our prior
    decisions. For example, we consider the overall picture presented by
    the record, rather than focusing on any one aspect of performance.

6.  It is no coincidence that this historic first is recorded in New
    York, a state that has been a leader in opening local markets to
    competition for over fifteen years,[^5] and a state with one of the
    most rigorous, expert commissions in the nation. Without the
    dedicated work and unfailing persistence of the New York Commission
    over the past several years, it is unlikely that this application
    would have reached a point at which it merits approval.[^6] It is
    also noteworthy that New York State has some of the most intensely
    competitive local exchange and exchange access markets in the
    nation. This track record of successful competition places the
    present application in a different context from prior filings. For
    the first time, we can evaluate compliance with the requirements of
    section 271 in a market context, rather than relying solely on
    predictive judgment.

7.  We applaud the dedicated efforts of the New York Commission,
    beginning shortly after passage of the 1996 Act, to work with Bell
    Atlantic and competitive LECs to ensure that Bell Atlantic would
    achieve compliance with section 271.[^7] A number of the parties to
    this proceeding also praise the work of the New York Commission.[^8]
    Even AT&T, which strongly opposes the application, agrees that the
    New York Commission has significantly advanced Bell Atlantic's
    progress toward compliance with section 271.[^9] MCI states that
    "\[a\]t the insistence of the New York State Public Service
    Commission . . . BA-NY has done much to open its local markets . . .
    "[^10] Nextlink, one of the competitors supporting the application,
    also cites with approval the "open, collaborative process that
    included independent third party testing, numerous industry
    workshops, and staff solicitation and review of detailed public
    comments."[^11]

8.  The section 271 process in New York exemplifies the way in which
    rigorous state proceedings can contribute to the success of a
    section 271 application. There are a number of elements that were
    particularly important to the success of this process in opening
    local markets to competition consistent with the terms of the 1996
    Act. These include: (1) full and open participation by all
    interested parties; (2) extensive independent third party testing of
    Bell Atlantic's operations support systems (OSS)[^12] offering; (3)
    development of clearly defined performance measures and standards;
    and (4) adoption of performance assurance measures that create a
    strong financial incentive for post-entry compliance with the
    section 271checklist by Bell Atlantic. While we accord applicants
    flexibility in demonstrating compliance with section 271, these
    elements played a vital role in the success of this application.

9.  First, under the auspices of the New York Commission, both
    competitive LECs and Bell Atlantic participated fully in
    collaborative sessions and technical workshops to clarify or resolve
    issues. This ensured broad-based industry participation throughout
    the proceeding.

10. Second, extensive third party testing of Bell Atlantic's OSS in New
    York was also critical to the success of these proceedings. The OSS
    testing was conducted in two phases. Phase I consisted of
    development of a detailed and comprehensive plan to evaluate and
    test the OSS interfaces and the adequacy of Bell Atlantic's
    processes, procedures, and documentation to allow competitive LECs
    to access and use these systems.[^13] Phase II of the test
    involved: (1) building the interface and assessing the ease or
    complexity of developing interface software; and (2) executing the
    test plan using a pseudo-competitive LEC.[^14] The rigorous,
    comprehensive third party testing in New York identified numerous
    shortcomings in Bell Atlantic's OSS performance that were
    subsequently corrected and re-tested. KPMG released its final report
    on August 6, 1999, concluding that Bell Atlantic's OSS was
    commercially available and sufficient to handle reasonable,
    anticipated commercial volumes.[^15]

11. Third, the New York Commission developed, and continues to refine,
    inter-carrier performance measures and service quality standards in
    its Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding.[^16] For example, the New York
    Commission has instituted collaborative proceedings to address xDSL
    issues and is developing xDSL specific performance measures and
    standards.[^17] This effort represents an ongoing process as a
    number of additional standards remain under development. To ensure
    that the company's performance data or "metrics" are reported
    reliably in accordance with the New York Commission's definitions,
    New York staff and KPMG reviewed the adequacy of internal controls
    surrounding the data collection process. In addition, the New York
    Commission's staff verifies on a monthly basis that Bell Atlantic's
    reported results conform to the definitions developed in the
    Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding.[^18] The definitions and standards
    developed in that proceeding have done much to foster the
    development of consistent and meaningful data concerning Bell
    Atlantic's performance. This gives us greater confidence that our
    decision is based on performance data that accurately measures Bell
    Atlantic's actual performance.

12. Fourth, the New York Commission has adopted Bell Atlantic's proposal
    for self-effectuating performance assurance plans that will provide
    significant financial incentives for Bell Atlantic to maintain an
    open market and prevent "backsliding" in the future provision of
    service by Bell Atlantic to competitive LECs. It is important that
    these plans are designed to function automatically without imposing
    administrative and regulatory burdens on competitors. It is also
    significant that the New York Commission is committed to supervising
    the implementation of these plans.

13. The well established pro-competitive regulatory environment in New
    York in conjunction with recent measures to achieve section 271
    compliance has, in general, created a thriving market for the
    provision of local exchange and exchange access service. Competitors
    in New York are able to enter the local market using all three entry
    paths provided under the Act.[^19] These new entrants are serving
    both residential and business customers in geographic areas
    throughout the state, although competition is most intense for
    business customers in urban areas, especially in New York City.[^20]
    As a result, the extent of competition in New York greatly exceeds
    that in the other states for which BOCs have filed section 271
    applications.[^21]

14. Bell Atlantic estimates that competitors serve at least 1,118,180
    lines in New York. [^22] According to Bell Atlantic, competitors
    serve at least 651,793 lines using their own facilities, 152,055
    lines using the UNE platform,[^23] and 314,332 lines through resale.
    Bell Atlantic states that competitive LECs serve both residential
    and business customers.[^24] Bell Atlantic estimates that
    competitors in New York serve at least 35,753 residential lines over
    their own facilities.[^25] In addition, Bell Atlantic estimates that
    competitive LECs in New York provide service to 137,342 residential
    customers using the UNE platform and resell another 63,547
    residential lines.[^26] Similarly, Bell Atlantic estimates that
    competitive LECs in New York serve at least 612,000 business
    customers over their own facilities.[^27] Competitive LECs serve an
    additional 14,713 business lines using the UNE platform and resell
    another 250,785 business lines.[^28]

15. Our action today clearly demonstrates that when a BOC takes the
    steps required to open its local markets to full competition, the
    company will be rewarded with section 271 authority to enter the
    long distance market. The market opening requirements of the 1996
    Act demand substantial changes in the way the BOCs have historically
    done business, and opening the New York market to full local
    competition has not been an easy process for Bell Atlantic or the
    New York Commission. We commend their hard work in reaching this
    historic achievement.

16. Finally, we wish to emphasize that grant of this application may
    close this chapter of the proceeding, but it is not the end of the
    story. Bell Atlantic must continue to comply with the checklist
    requirements, and with the requirements of section 272 of the Act.
    Section 271(d)(6) provides specific tools that augment our
    preexisting enforcement authority, to be used if Bell Atlantic falls
    out of compliance with the conditions required for grant of its
    application. Most notably, section 271(d)(6) authorizes the
    Commission to suspend or revoke the authorization granted here. This
    is a powerful enforcement tool, which should create a strong
    incentive for Bell Atlantic to ensure that its performance does not
    diminish. We expect that Bell Atlantic will not risk facing the
    severe remedy of having its authority to market service suspended,
    but stress that we are prepared to use this remedy if Bell
    Atlantic's performance in implementing the checklist deteriorates.

# Background

## Statutory Framework

17. In the 1996 Act, Congress conditioned BOC provision of in-region,
    interLATA service on compliance with certain provisions of section
    271.[^29] Pursuant to section 271, BOCs must apply to this
    Commission for authorization to provide interLATA services
    originating in any in-region state.[^30] Congress has directed the
    Commission to issue a written determination on each application no
    later than 90 days after the application is filed.[^31]

18. To obtain authorization to provide in-region, interLATA services
    under section 271, the BOC must show that: (1) it satisfies the
    requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A), known as "Track A" or
    271(c)(1)(B), known as "Track B"; (2) it has "fully implemented the
    competitive checklist" or that the statements approved by the state
    under section 252 satisfy the competitive checklist contained in
    section 271(c)(2)(B);[^32] (3) the requested authorization will be
    carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272;[^33]
    and (4) the BOC's entry into in-region, interLATA market is
    "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
    necessity."[^34] The statute specifies that unless the Commission
    finds that these four criteria have been satisfied, the Commission
    "shall not approve" the requested authorization.[^35]

19. Section 271(d)(2)(A) requires the Commission to consult with the
    Attorney General before making any determination approving or
    denying a section 271 application. The Attorney General is entitled
    to evaluate the application "using any standard the Attorney General
    considers appropriate," and the Commission is required to "give
    substantial weight to the Attorney General's evaluation."[^36]
    Section 271(d)(2)(A) specifically provides, however, that "such
    evaluation shall not have any preclusive effect on any Commission
    decision."[^37] Thus, Congress clearly contemplated that, in some
    circumstances, the Commission could reach a different conclusion
    from the Department, even after giving "substantial weight" to the
    Department's views.

20. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state
    commission to verify that the BOC has one or more state approved
    interconnection agreements with a facilities-based competitor, or a
    statement of generally available terms and conditions (SGAT), and
    that either the agreement(s) or general statement satisfy the
    "competitive checklist."[^38] In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the
    Commission determined that, because the Act does not prescribe any
    standard for Commission consideration of a state commission's
    verification under section 271(d)(2)(B), it has discretion in each
    section 271 proceeding to determine the amount of weight to accord
    to the state commission's verification.[^39] The Commission has held
    that, although it will consider carefully state determinations of
    fact that are supported by a detailed and extensive record, it is
    the Commission's role to determine whether the factual record
    supports the conclusion that particular requirements of section 271
    have been met.[^40] In the instant proceeding, we accord the New
    York Commission's evaluation substantial weight, for the reasons set
    forth above.[^41] In particular, we note that the New York
    Commission has directed a rigorous collaborative process that has
    included: an extensive independent third-party test of Bell
    Atlantic's OSS interfaces, processes and procedures; active
    participation by New York Commission staff, Bell Atlantic, and
    competitive LECs in numerous technical conferences that helped to
    identify and resolve problems; and the development of a
    comprehensive performance monitoring and enforcement mechanism.
    Throughout these proceedings, the New York Commission has ensured
    that the process was open to participation by all interested parties
    and, as a result, received and reviewed a massive record of public
    comments. We thus place substantial weight on the New York
    Commission's conclusions, as they reflect its role not only as a
    driving force behind these proceedings, but also as an active
    participant in bringing local competition to the state's markets.

## History of this Application

21. On February 13, 1997, Bell Atlantic, filed a draft application under
    section 271, along with a Statement of Generally Applicable Terms
    and Conditions with the New York Commission.[^42] On July 8, 1997,
    after a number of technical conferences and collaborative meetings
    and technical and legal analyses,[^43] a New York Commission
    Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bell Atlantic had made a
    *prima facie* case regarding certain offerings, but had not met its
    burden of proof regarding commercial availability, procedure
    standardization, timeliness, and measuring parity.[^44]
    Subsequently, the New York Commission held additional collaborative
    sessions to work out technical details associated with development
    of a working Operations Support System (OSS).[^45] Specifically,
    these sessions resolved numerous OSS issues, including an agreement
    on business rules that would govern the development by competitors
    of systems to interface with those of Bell Atlantic.[^46] Following
    approval of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, Bell Atlantic filed a
    supplemental section 271 application with the New York Commission,
    which was followed by additional filings and technical
    conferences.[^47] After completion of this process, Bell Atlantic
    agreed to make additional commitments in connection with its
    application for section 271 approval.[^48]

22. On April 6, 1998, Bell Atlantic filed a Pre-Filing Statement with
    the New York Commission, which contained a number of commitments,
    including: 1) to provide combinations of elements (including UNE-P
    as a minimum service offering); 2) to engage a third-party to test
    Bell Atlantic's OSS; and 3) to establish a self-effectuating system
    to prevent backsliding.[^49] Pursuant to these commitments, Bell
    Atlantic obtained a comprehensive independent third-party test of
    its wholesale support systems and developed a plan to ensure
    adequate continuing wholesale performance.[^50] As described above,
    this test was conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick and Hewlett Packard
    under the supervision of the New York Commission. Together, the New
    York Commission and KPMG created an open testing environment in
    which they consulted with interested parties, issued draft plans and
    reports, and reported in detail on issues of serious concern.[^51]
    The problems identified through the test were addressed by Bell
    Atlantic through process improvements during the test period. The
    third-party test was completed with the release of KPMG's final
    report on August 6, 1999.[^52] As noted above, Bell Atlantic filed
    its application with this Commission on September 29, 1999.

## New York Commission and Department of Justice Evaluations

23. On October 18, 1999, the New York Commission submitted to this
    Commission its evaluation of Bell Atlantic's application. The New
    York Commission advised the Commission that, following two and half
    years of review, testing, and process improvements, Bell Atlantic-NY
    had met the checklist requirements of section 271(c). Specifically,
    New York stated that Bell Atlantic had met its obligation under
    section 271(c)(1)(A) by entering into more than 75 interconnection
    agreements approved by the New York Commission, and that competitive
    LECs are providing local exchange service in New York using their
    own facilities and those of Bell Atlantic. In addition, the New York
    Commission stated that the record developed in the New York
    proceeding establishes that Bell Atlantic has a legal obligation,
    under its interconnection agreements and state-approved tariffs, to
    provide the 14 items required under section 271's checklist, and
    that Bell Atlantic is meeting its legal obligation to provide those
    14 items.[^53]

24. On November 1, 1999, the Department of Justice filed its evaluation.
    Consistent with its approach in past applications, the Department
    stated that it considers whether all three entry paths contemplated
    by the 1996 Act -- facilities-based entry involving construction of
    new networks, the use of unbundled elements of the BOC's network,
    and resale of the BOC's services -- are fully and irreversibly open
    to competitive entry to serve both business and residential
    customers. [^54] The Department of Justice found that "Bell Atlantic
    has completed most -- but not all -- of the actions needed to
    achieve a fully and irreversibly open market in New York."[^55] The
    Department concluded that it did not have substantial concerns about
    the ability of facilities-based carriers and firms that wish to
    resell Bell Atlantic's retail services to enter the local
    telecommunications markets in New York. It also concluded that Bell
    Atlantic has made "great progress in opening the market to
    competition through the use of unbundled network elements," but two
    major areas of deficiency---OSS and access to local loops -- remain
    as important obstacles to local competition.[^56] The Department of
    Justice also concluded, however, that Bell Atlantic has not yet
    demonstrated that it can adequately provide access to unbundled
    local loops, either for traditional voice services or for digital
    subscriber line (DSL) technology used to provide a variety of
    advanced services.[^57] Moreover, the Department expressed concern
    that Bell Atlantic's systems for handling orders for the unbundled
    network platform rely on manual processes that are prone to error
    and delay.[^58] The Department expressly reserved judgment, however,
    on whether the facts in the record established compliance with the
    legal requirements of the competitive checklist or the Commission's
    rules.[^59]

25. The Department of Justice stated its belief that its assessment of
    the facts regarding Bell Atlantic's wholesale performance was
    substantially consistent with the New York's assessment. The
    Department of Justice noted that, to the extent there is a
    difference between its evaluation and that of the New York
    Commission, "it arises largely from the Department's conclusion that
    needed improvements should be achieved before Bell Atlantic is
    authorized to provide interLATA services in New York, rather than
    relying on post-271 approval mechanisms to attempt to ensure such
    improvements."[^60]

26. The Department urged us not to permit Bell Atlantic to offer
    interLATA services until "it demonstrates that it has solved the
    existing problems in its provision of access to unbundled network
    elements." It noted, however, that it "is possible that information
    from Reply Comments and *ex parte* submissions will provide
    additional support for Bell Atlantic's claims and justify a
    conclusion different from that reached by the Department on the
    basis of the current record." [^61]

27. The Department of Justice stated that this Commission could properly
    deny this application. As an alternative, the Department suggested
    the Commission might be able to approve the application subject to
    carefully crafted conditions "under which Bell Atlantic would be
    permitted to offer interLATA services only after taking specified
    steps and demonstrating that its performance has met appropriate
    requirements."[^62] The Department of Justice thus concluded that
    "the Commission may be able to approve Bell Atlantic's application
    at the culmination of these proceedings."[^63]

28. On November 8, 1999, the New York Commission, and 23 other parties,
    filed reply comments in this proceeding. Both Bell Atlantic and the
    New York Commission contended that the arguments raised in
    opposition are insufficient grounds for denying the application.

# Analytical Framework

## Absence of Unbundling Rules

29. It is necessary to clarify, for the purpose of evaluating this
    application, which network elements we expect Bell Atlantic to
    demonstrate that it provides on an unbundled basis, pursuant to
    section 251(c)(3) and checklist item 2. In the *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, the Commission established a list of seven
    UNEs which incumbent LECs were obliged to provide: (1) local
    loops; (2) network interface devices; (3) local and tandem
    switching; (4) interoffice transmission facilities; (5) signaling
    networks and call-related databases; (6) operations support systems;
    and (7) operator services and directory assistance.[^64] This
    obligation was codified in section 51.319 of the Commission's rules
    ("rule 319").[^65] In January 1999, the Supreme Court vacated rule
    319 and instructed the Commission to revise the standards under
    which the unbundling obligation is determined and to reevaluate the
    network elements subject to the unbundling requirement.[^66]

30. Although the former rule 319 was not in force at the time Bell
    Atlantic filed its application in this proceeding, Bell Atlantic has
    sought to demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to
    these network elements.[^67] Indeed, Bell Atlantic has stated that
    it believes it would be "reasonable" for the Commission to use the
    original seven network elements identified in former rule 319 in
    evaluating this application.[^68] In assessing Bell Atlantic's
    argument, we begin from the premise that compliance with the
    competitive checklist requires that Bell Atlantic provide
    nondiscriminatory access to network elements, as contemplated by,
    and in accordance with, the requirements of sections 251(c)(3) and
    251(d)(2). We believe that using the network elements identified in
    former rule 319 as a standard in evaluating Bell Atlantic's
    application, during the interim period between its vacation by the
    Supreme Court and the effective date of the new rules, is a
    reasonable way to ensure that the application complies with the
    checklist requirements. We find it significant that no commenter has
    taken the position in this proceeding that Bell Atlantic *should
    not* be required to demonstrate that it provides these network
    elements. Accordingly, for the purposes of this application, we will
    evaluate whether Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory access to
    the seven network elements identified under former rule 319.

31. We disagree with commenters that contend that Bell Atlantic must
    demonstrate, for the purposes of this application, compliance with
    the rules governing unbundled network elements recently established
    in the *UNE Remand* proceeding.[^69] These new rules, among other
    things, specify which network elements an incumbent LEC is obliged
    to unbundle, and establish several new obligations that were not
    present under the former rule 319.[^70] We recognize, however, that
    these new rules will not take effect until some time after release
    of this order.[^71] Therefore, we will not require Bell Atlantic to
    prove that it currently complies with rules that have yet to take
    effect.[^72] Moreover, we believe it would be inequitable to require
    Bell Atlantic to comply with these rules, particularly when no other
    incumbent LEC must comply before the effective date, just because
    Bell Atlantic has a section 271 application pending before the
    Commission. Of course, the Commission expects that Bell Atlantic
    will comply with the new *UNE Remand* rules once they take effect.

## Scope of Evidence in the Record

### Procedural Framework

32. Section 271 proceedings are, at their core, adjudications that the
    Act requires the Commission to complete within ninety days of the
    application filing. The statute also requires us to consult with the
    Department of Justice and the relevant state commission in reviewing
    the application.

33. In the context of this statutory framework, the Commission has
    established procedural rules governing BOC section 271
    applications.[^73] Among other things, these rules provide an
    opportunity for parties other than the Department of Justice and the
    relevant state commission to comment on section 271 applications.

34. Under our procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications,
    we expect that a section 271 application, as originally filed, will
    include all of the factual evidence on which the applicant would
    have the Commission rely in making its findings.[^74] An applicant
    may not, at any time during the pendency of its application,
    supplement its application by submitting new factual evidence that
    is not directly responsive to arguments raised by parties commenting
    on its application.[^75] This includes the submission, on reply, of
    factual evidence gathered after the initial filing. In an effort to
    meet its burden of proof, however, a BOC may submit new factual
    information after the application is filed, if the sole purpose of
    that evidence is to rebut arguments or facts submitted by other
    commenters.[^76] The new evidence, however, must cover only the
    period placed in dispute by commenters and may, in no event,
    post-date the filing of the comments (*i.e.*, day 20).[^77] In the
    event that the applicant submits new or post-dated evidence in
    replies or *ex parte* filings, we retain the discretion to start the
    90-day review process anew or to accord such evidence no
    weight.[^78]

35. This precedent has served the Commission well, by deterring
    incomplete filings from the BOCs. In particular, the rule is
    designed to prevent applicants from presenting part of their initial
    *prima facie* showing for the first time in reply comments.[^79] The
    rule has enabled us properly to manage our own internal
    consideration of the application and ensures that commenters are not
    faced with a "moving target" in the BOC's section 271 application.
    We continue to believe, as a general matter, that it is highly
    disruptive to our processes to have a record that is constantly
    evolving. We emphasize, however, that our precedent makes clear that
    this rule is a discretionary one.[^80]

36. We do not expect that a BOC, in its initial application, will
    anticipate and address every foreseeable argument its opponents
    might make in their subsequent reply comments, but we have
    previously stated that a BOC must address in its initial application
    all facts that the BOC can reasonably anticipate will be at issue.
    Through state proceedings, BOCs should be able reasonably to
    identify and anticipate certain arguments and allegations that
    parties will make in their filings before the Commission.[^81]

37. In addition, the Commission has found that a BOC's promises of
    *future* performance to address particular concerns raised by
    commenters have no probative value in demonstrating its *present*
    compliance with the requirements of section 271.[^82] In order to
    gain in-region, interLATA entry, a BOC must support its application
    with actual evidence demonstrating its present compliance with the
    statutory conditions for entry, instead of prospective evidence that
    is contingent on future behavior. Thus, we must be able to make a
    determination based on the evidence in the record that a BOC has
    actually demonstrated compliance with the requirements of section
    271.

### Motions To Strike

38. On November 22, 1999, AT&T filed a motion to strike or to disregard
    portions of the reply submissions of Bell Atlantic and the New York
    Commission filed in this proceeding.[^83] AT&T argues that reply
    submissions of both Bell Atlantic and the New York Commission
    contain material that must be stricken or accorded no weight under
    the Commission's rules because they post-date Bell Atlantic's
    application and the due date for comments.[^84] In addition, AT&T
    argues that Bell Atlantic's reply submission contains numerous new
    promises of future performance.[^85]

39. We deny AT&T\'s motion because we do not rely, as a basis for our
    decision, on: (1) evidence submitted by Bell Atlantic after filing
    its application, unless such evidence both relates to events that
    occurred prior to the comment filing date (October 19, 1999) and is
    directly responsive to allegations in the record; (2) evidence
    submitted by the New York Commission that post-dates the comment due
    date; or (3) Bell Atlantic\'s promises of future compliance.

40. On December 17, 1999, Covad filed a motion to strike an *ex parte*
    submission filed by Bell Atlantic on December 10, 1999.[^86] We deny
    Covad\'s motion because we do not rely on Bell Atlantic\'s *ex
    parte* submission as a basis for our decision.

### *Ex Parte* Submissions

41. Under the procedural rules governing section 271 applications, we
    strongly encourage parties to set forth their views comprehensively
    in their formal submissions (i.e*.,* Brief in Support, oppositions,
    supporting comments, etc.), and not to rely on subsequent *ex parte*
    presentations. At the same time, the Commission expressly provided
    that parties may file *ex partes.* Our procedural Public Notice thus
    clearly contemplates that parties may file written *ex partes*, when
    appropriate, to clarify the record.[^87] We take this opportunity to
    clarify that like reply comments, *ex partes* must be directly
    responsive to arguments raised by parties commenting on the
    application. Such *ex partes* may, however, elaborate on, or provide
    additional explanation or detail in response to requests from
    Commission staff or in direct response to post-reply *ex parte*
    filings.[^88]

42. Nothing in our procedural rules or past precedent precludes the
    Commission and the staff from requesting clarification or an
    explanation about information or data contained in the filings
    specified above. Indeed, our procedural Public Notice expressly
    recognizes that the Commission may request additional information
    from the applicant, as the page limit for *ex partes* does not apply
    to written material filed in response to direct requests from
    Commission staff.[^89] It is critical to the agency's deliberative
    process that the Commission and staff fully understand the evidence
    and arguments presented in the BOC's section 271 application,
    arguments raised in opposition, and responses made by parties on
    reply. Accordingly, the Commission retains the discretion to request
    additional information from the applicant or other parties that
    elaborates on positions set forth in the original application,
    comments, or reply comments.[^90] We emphasize that we are not
    departing from our view that the applicant should set forth its
    position in a clear and concise manner in its formal filings.
    However, it is imperative that, as part of the Commission's
    deliberative process, we have the ability to engage in an ongoing
    dialogue with parties to ensure that we have a clear and accurate
    understanding of the information contained in all formal
    submissions.

## Framework for Analyzing Compliance with Statutory Requirements

43. In this section, we discuss two aspects of the framework for
    analyzing compliance with the statutory requirements of section 271.
    First, we discuss the legal standards we have enunciated in past
    orders for determining whether a BOC is meeting the statutory
    nondiscrimination requirements. Second, we discuss the evidentiary
    requirements of a BOC's section 271 application and, in particular,
    the types of showings we will find probative in deciding whether a
    BOC has met the statutory standards.

### Legal Standard

44. In order to comply with the requirements of section 271's
    competitive checklist, a BOC must demonstrate that it has "fully
    implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)(2)(B)."[^91]
    In particular, the BOC must demonstrate that it is offering
    interconnection and access to network elements on a
    nondiscriminatory basis.[^92] Previous Commission orders addressing
    section 271 applications have elaborated on this statutory standard.
    First, for those functions the BOC provides to competing carriers
    that are analogous to the functions a BOC provides to itself in
    connection with its own retail service offerings, the BOC must
    provide access to competing carriers in "substantially the same time
    and manner" as it provides to itself. Thus, where a retail analogue
    exists, a BOC must provide access that is equal to (*i.e.,*
    substantially the same as) the level of access that the BOC provides
    itself, its customers, or its affiliates, in terms of quality,
    accuracy, and timeliness.[^93] For those functions that have no
    retail analogue, the BOC must demonstrate that the access it
    provides to competing carriers would offer an efficient carrier a
    "meaningful opportunity to compete."[^94] As we stated in the
    *Ameritech Michigan Order,* there may be situations in which a BOC
    contends that, although equivalent access has not been achieved for
    an analogous function, the access that it provides is still
    nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the statute.[^95]

45. We do not view the "meaningful opportunity to compete" standard to
    be a weaker test than the "substantially the same time and manner"
    standard. Where the BOC provides functions to its competitors that
    it also provides for itself in connection with its retail service,
    its actual performance can be measured to determine whether it is
    providing access to its competitors in "substantially the same time
    and manner" as it does to itself. Where the BOC, however, does not
    provide a retail service that is similar to its wholesale service,
    its actual performance with respect to competitors cannot be
    measured against how it performs for itself because the BOC does not
    perform analogous activities for itself. In those situations, our
    examination of whether the quality of access provided to competitors
    offers competitors "a meaningful opportunity to compete" is intended
    to be a proxy for whether access is being provided in substantially
    the same time and manner and, thus, nondiscriminatory.

46. Finally, we note that a determination of whether the statutory
    standard is met is ultimately a judgment we must make based on our
    expertise in promoting competition in local markets and in
    telecommunications regulation generally. We have not established,
    nor do we believe it appropriate to establish, specific objective
    criteria for what constitutes "substantially the same time and
    manner" or a "meaningful opportunity to compete." We look at each
    application on a case-by-case basis and consider the totality of the
    circumstances, including the origin and quality of the information
    before us, to determine whether the nondiscrimination requirements
    of the Act are met. Whether this legal standard is met can only be
    decided based on an analysis of specific facts and circumstances.

### Evidentiary Case

47. We previously have set forth the analytical framework that we use in
    assessing whether a BOC has demonstrated compliance with the
    statutory requirements of section 271.[^96] At the outset, we
    reemphasize that the BOC applicant retains at all times the ultimate
    burden of proof that its application satisfies all of the
    requirements of section 271, even if no party files comments
    challenging its compliance with a particular requirement.[^97]

48. The evidentiary standards governing our review of section 271
    applications are intended to balance our need for reliable evidence
    against our recognition that, in such a complex endeavor as a
    section 271 proceeding, no finder of fact can expect proof to an
    absolute certainty. While we expect the BOC to demonstrate as
    thoroughly as possible that it satisfies each checklist item, the
    public interest standard, and the other statutory requirements, we
    reiterate that the BOC needs only to prove each element by "a
    preponderance of the evidence," which generally means "the greater
    weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing that the
    evidence which is offered in opposition to it."[^98]

49. As we held in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, we first
    determine whether the BOC has made a *prima facie* case that it
    meets the requirements of a particular checklist item. The BOC must
    plead, with appropriate supporting evidence, facts which, if true,
    are sufficient to establish that the requirements of section 271
    have been met. Once the BOC has made such a showing, opponents must
    produce evidence and arguments to show that the application does not
    satisfy the requirements of section 271, or risk a ruling in the
    BOC's favor.[^99]

50. When considering commenters' filings in opposition to the BOC's
    application, we look for evidence that the BOC's policies,
    procedures, or capabilities preclude it from satisfying the
    requirements of the checklist item. Mere unsupported evidence in
    opposition will not suffice.[^100] Although anecdotal evidence may
    be indicative of systemic failures, isolated incidents may not be
    sufficient for a commenter to overcome the BOC's *prima facie* case.
    Moreover, a BOC may overcome such anecdotal evidence by, for
    example, providing objective performance data that demonstrate that
    it satisfies the statutory nondiscrimination requirement.

51. We will look to the state to resolve factual disputes wherever
    possible. Indeed, we view the state's and the Department of
    Justice's role to be one similar to that of an "expert witness."
    Given the 90-day statutory deadline to reach a decision on a section
    271 application, the Commission does not have the time or the
    resources to resolve the enormous number of factual disputes that
    inevitably arise from the technical details and data involved in
    such a complex endeavor. Accordingly, as discussed above,[^101]
    where the state has conducted an exhaustive and rigorous
    investigation into the BOC's compliance with the checklist, we may
    give evidence submitted by the state substantial weight in making
    our decision. Although we are statutorily required to accord
    substantial weight to the Department of Justice's evaluation, in
    appropriate circumstances, we may conclude that the evidence
    submitted by a state commission is more persuasive than that
    submitted by the Department of Justice, particularly if the state
    has conducted a rigorous analysis of the evidence.

52. To make a *prima facie* case that the BOC is meeting the
    requirements of a particular checklist item under section
    271(c)(1)(A), the BOC must demonstrate that it is providing access
    or interconnection pursuant to the terms of that checklist item. In
    particular, a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and
    specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant
    to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices
    and other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it
    is currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist item
    in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an
    acceptable level of quality.[^102]

53. The particular showing required to demonstrate compliance will vary
    depending on the individual checklist item and the circumstances of
    the application. We have given BOCs substantial leeway with respect
    to the evidence they present to satisfy the checklist. Although our
    orders have provided guidance on which types of evidence we find
    more persuasive, "we reiterate that we remain open to approving an
    application based on other types of evidence if a BOC can persuade
    us that such evidence demonstrates nondiscriminatory treatment and
    other aspects of the statutory requirements."[^103] In past orders
    we have encouraged BOCs to provide performance data in their section
    271 applications to demonstrate that they are providing
    nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements to requesting
    carriers.[^104] We have concluded that the most probative evidence
    that a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access is evidence of
    actual commercial usage.[^105] Performance measurements are an
    especially effective means of providing us with evidence of the
    quality and timeliness of the access provided by a BOC to requesting
    carriers.

54. A number of state commissions, including New York, have established
    a collaborative process through which they have developed, in
    conjunction with the incumbent and competing carriers, a set of
    measures, or metrics, for reporting of performance in various
    areas.[^106] Through such collaborative processes, New York has also
    adopted performance standards for certain functions, typically where
    there can be no comparable measure based on the incumbent LEC's
    retail performance. We strongly encourage this type of process,
    because it allows the technical details that determine how the
    metrics are defined and measured to be worked out with the
    participation of all concerned parties. We also strongly support the
    efforts of state commissions to build and oversee a process that
    ensures the development of local competition that Congress intended.
    An extensive and rigorous evaluation of the BOC's performance by the
    states provides greater certainty that barriers to competition have
    been eliminated and the local markets in a state are open to
    competition.

55. We caution, however, that adoption by a state of a particular
    performance standard pursuant to its state regulatory authority is
    not determinative of what is necessary to establish checklist
    compliance under section 271. We recognize that metric definitions
    and incumbent LEC operating systems will likely vary among states,
    and that individual states may set standards at a particular level
    that would not apply in other states and that may constitute more or
    less than the checklist requires. Therefore, it is unlikely that we
    will see uniform standards that measure precisely the same BOC
    conduct across states. At the same time, for functions for which
    there are no retail analogues, and for which performance benchmarks
    have been developed with the ongoing participation of affected
    competitors and the BOC, those standards may well reflect what
    competitors in the marketplace feel they need in order to have a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^107]

56. We emphasize that, because the Commission is statutorily required to
    determine checklist compliance, we must independently evaluate
    whether a BOC is fulfilling the nondiscrimination requirements of
    section 271. Nevertheless, in making our evaluation we will examine
    whether the state commission has adopted a retail analogue or a
    benchmark to measure BOC performance and then review the particular
    level of performance the state has required. If the state commission
    has made these determinations in the type of rigorous collaborative
    proceeding described above, we are much more likely to find that
    they are reasonable and appropriate measures of parity. Accordingly,
    we are inclined to rely on such standards and measurements in our
    own analysis but may reach a different conclusion where justified.

57. In the instant proceeding, for example, the New York Commission has
    determined, through a collaborative process with input from Bell
    Atlantic and competing carriers, that there are retail analogues for
    certain functions and performance benchmarks for others. We find
    this to be a reasonable basis for us to begin our analysis. [^108]
    Under the framework adopted by the New York Commission, Bell
    Atlantic determines whether any difference in its performance
    compared to its retail operations is statistically significant, and
    provides a figure indicating the degree of statistical
    significance.[^109] For measures where the New York Commission has
    set a performance benchmark, the New York Commission has required
    Bell Atlantic to provide the metrics for its performance to
    competing carriers, which can then be compared to the benchmark.

58. In this case, we conclude that to the extent there is no
    statistically significant difference between Bell Atlantic's
    provision of service to competitive LECs and its own retail
    customers, we need not look any further.[^110] Similarly, if there
    is no difference between the Bell Atlantic provision of service to
    competitive LECs and the performance benchmark, our analysis is
    done.

59. To the extent there is any statistically significant difference
    between Bell Atlantic's provision of service to competitive LECs and
    retail customers or an apparent difference between its provision of
    service to competitive carriers and the performance benchmarks set
    by the New York Commission, we will examine the evidence further to
    make a determination whether the statutory nondiscrimination
    requirements are met. Thus, we will examine the explanation that
    Bell Atlantic and other commenters provide about whether these
    differences provide an accurate depiction of the quality of Bell
    Atlantic's performance. For instance, we may examine the data on a
    more disaggregated level, in order to evaluate arguments made by
    Bell Atlantic that competitive LEC error, or differences in the
    composition of competitive LEC orders, or sudden changes in the
    quantity or timing of orders made by competitive LECs, are
    responsible for the apparent poor performance. We also may examine
    how many months a variation in performance has existed and what the
    trend has been in recent months. A steady improvement in performance
    over time may provide us with an indication that problems are being
    resolved. It may also provide us with evidence as to whether Bell
    Atlantic's systems are scaleable and can handle large volumes of
    orders for services. Finally, in some instances, we may find that
    statistically significant differences in measured performance may
    exist, but that such differences have little or no competitive
    significance in the marketplace. As such, we may deem such
    differences non-cognizable under the statutory standard.

60. The determination of whether a BOC's performance meets the statutory
    requirements necessarily is a contextual decision based on the
    totality of the circumstances and information before us. There may
    be multiple performance measures associated with a particular
    checklist item, and an apparent disparity in performance for one
    measure, by itself, may not provide a basis for finding
    noncompliance with the checklist. Other measures may tell a
    different story, and provide us with a more complete picture of the
    quality of service being provided. Thus, whether we are applying the
    "substantially same time and manner" standard or the "meaningful
    opportunity to compete" standard, we will examine whether the
    differences in the measured performance are large enough to be
    deemed discriminatory under the statute.

# Compliance with Section 271 (c)(1)(a)

## Background

61. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate
    that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A)
    (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^111] To qualify for Track A, a
    BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing
    providers of "telephone exchange service . . . to residential and
    business subscribers."[^112] The Act states that "such telephone
    service may be offered . . . either exclusively over \[the
    competitor's\] own telephone exchange service facilities or
    predominantly over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange
    facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications
    services of another carrier."[^113] The Commission concluded in the
    *Ameritech Michigan Order* that, when a BOC relies upon more than
    one competing provider to satisfy section 271(c)(1)(A), each carrier
    need not provide service to both residential and business
    customers.[^114]

## Discussion

62. We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it satisfies the
    requirements of Track A based on the interconnection agreements it
    has implemented with competing carriers in New York. Specifically,
    we find that AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Cablevision Lightpath provide
    telephone exchange service either exclusively or predominantly over
    their own facilities to residential subscribers and to business
    subscribers. [^115] The New York Commission also concludes that Bell
    Atlantic has met the requirements of section 271(c)(1)(A).[^116]
    None of the commenting parties, including the competitors cited by
    Bell Atlantic in support of its showing, challenge Bell Atlantic's
    assertion in this regard. Thus, Bell Atlantic meets the requirements
    of section 271(c)(1)(A).

# Compliance with Checklist

## Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection

###  Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection

#### Background

63. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act requires a section 271 applicant
    to provide "\[i\]nterconnection in accordance with the requirements
    of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)."[^117] Section 251(c)(2)
    imposes a duty on incumbent LECs "to provide, for the facilities and
    equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier,
    interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network . . . for
    the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and
    exchange access."[^118] In the *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, the Commission concluded that interconnection referred "only
    to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of
    traffic."[^119] Section 251 contains three requirements for the
    provision of interconnection. First, an incumbent LEC must provide
    interconnection "at any technically feasible point within the
    carrier's network."[^120] Second, an incumbent LEC must provide
    interconnection that is "at least equal in quality to that provided
    by the local exchange carrier to itself."[^121] Finally, the
    incumbent LEC must provide interconnection "on rates, terms, and
    conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in
    accordance with the terms of the agreement and the requirements of
    \[section 251\] and section 252."[^122]

64. To implement the equal-in-quality requirement in section 251, the
    Commission's rules require an incumbent LEC to design and operate
    its interconnection facilities to meet "the same technical criteria
    and service standards" that are used for the interoffice trunks
    within the incumbent LEC's network.[^123] In the *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, the Commission identified trunk group
    blockage and transmission standards as indicators of an incumbent
    LEC's technical criteria and service standards.[^124] In prior
    section 271 applications, the Commission concluded that disparities
    in trunk group blockage indicated a failure to provide
    interconnection to competing carriers equal-in-quality to the
    interconnection the BOC provided to its own retail operations.[^125]

65. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
    concluded that the requirement to provide interconnection on terms
    and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"
    means that an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection to a
    competitor in a manner no less efficient than the way in which the
    incumbent LEC provides the comparable function to its own retail
    operations.[^126] The Commission's rules interpret this obligation
    to include, among other things, the incumbent LEC's installation
    time for interconnection service[^127] and its provisioning of
    two-way trunking arrangements.[^128] Similarly, repair time for
    troubles affecting interconnection trunks is useful for determining
    whether a BOC provides interconnection service under "terms and
    conditions that are no less favorable than the terms and conditions"
    the BOC provides to its own retail operations.[^129]

66. Competing carriers may also choose any method of technically
    feasible interconnection at a particular point on the incumbent
    LEC's network.[^130] Incumbent LEC provision of interconnection
    trunking is one common means of interconnection. Technically
    feasible methods also include, but are not limited to, physical and
    virtual collocation and meet point arrangements.[^131] In the
    *Advanced Services First Report and Order*, the Commission revised
    its collocation rules to require incumbent LECs to include shared
    cage and cageless collocation arrangements as part of their physical
    collocation offerings. The provision of collocation is an essential
    prerequisite to demonstrating compliance with item 1 of the
    competitive checklist.[^132] To show compliance with its collocation
    obligations, a BOC must have processes and procedures in place to
    ensure that all applicable collocation arrangements are available on
    terms and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and
    nondiscriminatory" in accordance with section 251(c)(6) and our
    implementing rules.[^133] Data showing the quality of procedures for
    processing applications for collocation space, as well as the
    timeliness and efficiency of provisioning collocation space, helps
    the Commission evaluate a BOC's compliance with its collocation
    obligations.[^134]

#### Discussion

67. We are persuaded, for the reasons discussed below, that Bell
    Atlantic demonstrates that, in New York, it provides
    equal-in-quality interconnection on terms and conditions that are
    just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the
    requirements of section 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1), as specified in
    section 271. We further find that Bell Atlantic meets its burden of
    proof that it designs its interconnection facilities to meet "the
    same technical criteria and service standards" that are used for the
    interoffice trunks within its own network, and that Bell Atlantic
    makes interconnection available at any technically feasible point.
    Finally, we find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is
    providing collocation in New York in accordance with the
    Commission's rules.

##### Interconnection Trunking 

68. Based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that Bell
    Atlantic provides competing carriers with interconnection trunking
    in New York that is equal-in-quality to the interconnection Bell
    Atlantic provides to its own retail operations, and on terms and
    conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.[^135]
    Bell Atlantic makes interconnection available in New York through
    interconnection agreements and through a state approved
    tariff.[^136] Bell Atlantic receives orders for interconnection
    trunks through the Access Service Request (ASR) process, and accepts
    ASRs through an electronic application-to-application interface, its
    Internet Web Graphical User Interface (GUI), and manual
    orders.[^137] In addition, Bell Atlantic provides performance data
    to measure the quality of interconnection service provided to
    competing carriers.[^138]

69. In prior section 271 applications, we relied heavily on trunk group
    blockage data to evaluate a BOC's interconnection quality.[^139]
    Bell Atlantic's performance data show that, in the months leading up
    to its application, Bell Atlantic provided interconnection using the
    level of service that is received in its own network. Specifically,
    Bell Atlantic's performance data show that, for the three months
    immediately preceding its section 271 application, interconnection
    trunk groups provided to competing carriers experienced blockage
    less frequently than Bell Atlantic's own retail trunk groups.[^140]
    The comments of the New York Commission, Intermedia, and Nextlink
    corroborate Bell Atlantic's performance data, and further indicate
    that Bell Atlantic provides interconnection equal-in-quality to the
    interconnection provided to Bell Atlantic's own retail
    operations.[^141] As a final matter, we note that the failure of any
    commenter to raise trunk group blockage as an issue further supports
    our conclusion that Bell Atlantic adequately designs its
    interconnection facilities to ensure calls are completed.

70. We find that other aspects of Bell Atlantic's data further indicate
    that Bell Atlantic is providing nondiscriminatory interconnection
    trunking in New York. Bell Atlantic's performance data show that,
    for July and August 1999, Bell Atlantic rarely missed installation
    appointments for provisioning interconnection trunks for
    competitors. In fact, Bell Atlantic missed installation appointments
    for local exchange competitors less often than it did for
    interexchange carriers in July and August, and we note that Bell
    Atlantic's data show that Bell Atlantic provided comparable
    installation quality through September.[^142]

71. We have examined the issues pointed out by the Department of
    Justice, Teligent, e.spire, Allegiance, and others regarding Bell
    Atlantic's provisioning of new and large orders of interconnection
    trunks.[^143] These parties generally argue that requesting carriers
    have experienced unreasonable delays in Bell Atlantic provisioning
    of new and large orders of interconnection trunks. In its
    application, Bell Atlantic submitted performance data that showed a
    statistically significant difference between the provisioning of
    trunks for competitive LECs and for interexchange carriers as
    reflected in some performance measurements related to provisioning
    large orders of interconnection trunks.[^144] After further analysis
    and discussion with the Commission, Bell Atlantic identified
    significant errors in its New York Carrier-to-Carrier Performance
    Reports, and submitted revised data.[^145] In addition, Bell
    Atlantic submitted supplementary data to show its provisioning
    performance for interconnection trunks provided to both competitive
    LECs and interexchange carriers.[^146] Our review of Bell Atlantic's
    supplementary data shows that, although its provisioning performance
    has deteriorated since January 1999, Bell Atlantic's provisioning of
    interconnection trunks for competitive LECs is comparable to its
    performance for interexchange carriers, which indicates that Bell
    Atlantic is meeting its equal-in-quality obligations.[^147] We
    therefore conclude that, while the claims of e.spire and others may
    very well be true, evidence of such provisioning delays does not
    preclude a showing of compliance for section 271 purposes, so long
    as the equal-in-quality requirement is met.

72. We conclude that our decision that Bell Atlantic meets checklist
    item 1 rests upon its demonstration that trunk group blockage for
    competitors is lower than for Bell Atlantic's retail operations,
    Bell Atlantic's rate of missed installation appointments is lower
    for service to local competitors than for service to interexchange
    carriers, and there is no significant difference between its
    provisioning of interconnection trunks to local competitors and to
    interexchange carriers. For the benefit of future section 271
    applications, and for purposes of evaluating Bell Atlantic's
    continued compliance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(I), we emphasize that
    our conclusion is based on a weighing of the various factors
    discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. A different combination of
    factors in another case might well lead us to conclude that, on the
    whole, competitive LECs do not receive equal-in-quality
    interconnection on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and
    conditions.

##### Collocation

73. Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that its collocation offering in New
    York satisfies the requirements of sections 271 and 251 of the Act.
    Bell Atlantic provides physical and virtual collocation through a
    state-approved tariff.[^148] In its application, Bell Atlantic
    indicates that shared, cageless, and adjacent collocation options
    are available in New York, and that it has taken other steps to
    implement the collocation requirements contained in the *Advanced
    Services First Report and Order*.[^149] In addition, Bell Atlantic
    demonstrates that it has deployed methods and procedures designed to
    ensure that its business units implement the Commission's
    collocation rules, including the designation of employees dedicated
    to providing collocation to competitive LECs, standard operating
    procedures related to collocation, and its [CLEC
    Handbook,]{.smallcaps} which informs collocators of their rights and
    responsibilities.[^150] A number of commenters, including the New
    York Commission and several competitive LECs, agree with Bell
    Atlantic that its collocation offerings have been revised to reflect
    the requirements specified in the *Advanced Services First Report
    and Order*.[^151]

74. We disagree with the contentions of ALTS that the New York state
    tariff, and the New York Commission tariff review process, do not
    adequately ensure that Bell Atlantic's collocation offerings are
    consistent with section 251 and the Commission's rules.[^152]
    Specifically, ALTS contends that terms in the New York state tariff
    delay the provisioning of collocation space and impose restrictions
    on methods of interconnection and access to collocation.[^153] In
    addition, ALTS argues that the New York tariff does not clarify Bell
    Atlantic's allocation of collocation costs.[^154] After reviewing
    the record, we are persuaded by the New York Commission that Bell
    Atlantic is meeting its collocation obligations.[^155] Bell Atlantic
    revised its tariffed collocation offering to make it consistent with
    our *Advanced Services First Report and Order*.[^156] Bell
    Atlantic's collocation tariff underwent an active and thorough
    review at the state level. The New York Commission addressed the
    provisioning of collocation space and established standard
    provisioning intervals for caged, cageless, and virtual
    collocation.[^157]

75. Our review of Bell Atlantic's collocation performance data indicates
    that Bell Atlantic responds to applications for collocation space in
    a timely manner. Between May 1999 and August 1999, Bell Atlantic
    processed 667 requests for collocation space and almost always
    responded to such requests within the 8-day standard set by the New
    York Commission.[^158] Although we are concerned that Bell
    Atlantic's performance data shows recent failures to meet the 76-day
    provisioning interval established by the New York Commission for
    physical collocation, our finding of checklist compliance is
    predicated on Bell Atlantic's demonstration that 95% of the time it
    provisions collocation within the 76-day provisioning interval
    established by the New York Commission.[^159] Should these recent
    failures lead to a more widespread deterioration in provisioning
    collocation, however, enforcement action pursuant to section
    271(d)(6) may be appropriate.

##### Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection

76. We conclude that Bell Atlantic provides interconnection at all
    technically feasible points, as required by our rules, and therefore
    demonstrates checklist compliance. Bell Atlantic asserts that it
    makes interconnection available at all technically feasible points,
    including trunk-side at Bell Atlantic end offices and access tandems
    and line-side at Bell Atlantic end offices.[^160] Bell Atlantic
    demonstrates that it has an approved state tariff that spells out
    readily available points of interconnection, and provides a process
    for requesting interconnection at additional, technically-feasible
    points.[^161] We disagree with Sprint that its experience
    negotiating interconnection agreements with Bell Atlantic
    conclusively demonstrates that Bell Atlantic has violated its
    obligation to permit competing carriers to select interconnection
    points.[^162] Sprint's experience does not constitute evidence of
    systematic failures by Bell Atlantic to provide interconnection at
    all technically feasible points. Bell Atlantic points out that a
    state-approved process enables competitive LECs to obtain
    interconnection at technically feasible points not specified in the
    tariff, and the comments of the New York Commission support this
    statement.[^163] We agree with the New York Commission that the
    pending arbitration between Sprint and Bell Atlantic is the
    appropriate forum for addressing this issue.[^164] As a final
    matter, we conclude that Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that it
    provides two-way trunking in accordance with our rules,[^165] and no
    commenter presents credible information to show otherwise.[^166]

### Pricing of Collocation 

#### Background 

77. In order to comply with its collocation obligations, a BOC must make
    physical and virtual collocation arrangements available at rates
    that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" in accordance
    with section 251(c)(6) of the Act and our rules implementing that
    section.[^167] Although the Commission's pricing rules were stayed
    by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1996,[^168]
    pricing authority was restored by the Supreme Court on January 25,
    1999.[^169] In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that
    section 201(b) "explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules
    governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies."[^170] Furthermore,
    the Court determined that section 251(d) also provides evidence of
    an express jurisdictional grant by requiring that "the Commission
    \[shall\] complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to
    implement the requirements of this section."[^171] The Court also
    held that the pricing provisions implemented under the Commission's
    rulemaking authority do not inhibit the establishment of rates by
    the States.[^172] The Court concluded that the Commission has
    jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local
    competition under the 1996 Act, including pricing for
    interconnection and unbundled access, as "it is the States that will
    apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining
    the concrete result."[^173]

#### Discussion

78. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
    offers cageless physical collocation to those LECs that request it
    at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory prices, in compliance
    with checklist item 1.[^174] Commenters raised only two issues
    related to collocation prices, and, as discussed below, we find that
    these commenters misinterpreted Bell Atlantic's tariffs and their
    concerns are unfounded. Bell Atlantic asserts that its collocation
    prices are consistent with the Act and Commission rules.[^175] The
    New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic currently provides
    collocation under approved interconnection agreements and tariffs,
    consistent with FCC and New York Commission orders.[^176] We agree
    with the New York Commission that the issues raised by commenters
    with respect to checklist item 1 "do not preclude a finding that
    Bell Atlantic-NY is in compliance with this checklist item."[^177]
    The Department of Justice did not comment on Bell Atlantic's
    collocation prices.

79. We disagree with TRA's assertion that Bell Atlantic's collocation
    prices are discriminatory because they burden competing carriers
    with "unnecessary security measures and costs."[^178] These rates
    are not discriminatory because Bell Atlantic does not impose the
    costs of security measures. In Phase Three of its network elements
    rate case, the New York Commission held that Bell Atlantic may not
    recover any costs for cageless collocation security measures.[^179]
    Rather, it held that Bell Atlantic must bear such costs
    itself.[^180] Bell Atlantic later filed cageless security rates with
    the New York Commission, but these rates have not yet been approved
    and are not in effect.[^181] Despite the fact that competitors
    complained about the lack of set rates for cageless collocation
    security measures, the New York Commission did not impose temporary
    rates for cageless collocation security measures, holding instead
    that this cost and Bell Atlantic's associated cost justification
    will be considered in Phase Four of the New York Commission's
    unbundled network elements rate case.[^182] In its reply comments to
    Bell Atlantic's 271 application proceeding, the New York Commission
    noted that Bell Atlantic had a "placeholder" in its cageless
    collocation tariff for its security rate but that no rates are being
    imposed.[^183] We therefore find that TRA has misinterpreted Bell
    Atlantic's tariff and that its claim that Bell Atlantic's security
    rates are discriminatory is unfounded.

80. We also disagree with ALTS' claim[^184] that Bell Atlantic does not
    meet the Commission's requirements that it allocate its space
    preparation and related up-front costs among competing carriers on a
    pro-rata basis.[^185] In order to fulfill its obligation to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to interconnection, an incumbent LEC must
    "allocate space preparation, security measures, and other
    collocation charges on a pro-rated basis so the first collocator in
    a particular incumbent premises will not be responsible for the
    entire cost of site preparation."[^186] The New York Commission
    reviewed Bell Atlantic's interconnection tariff and rejected Bell
    Atlantic's initial proposal that it be allowed to charge the initial
    collocator the entire cost of space preparation.[^187] The New York
    Commission held that "it seems unreasonable to require the initial
    collocator to bear, up-front, the entire cost of protecting \[Bell
    Atlantic\] against the possibility that its costs may go
    unrecovered."[^188] The New York Commission further held that no
    reason existed to single out these costs for up-front
    recovery.[^189] The New York Commission instead estimated room
    construction costs and other up-front payments on a TELRIC basis and
    provided for their recovery through recurring charges.[^190] The New
    York Commission calculated on the basis of reasonable estimates of
    the likely number of users, thereby "obviating any possibility that
    the full cost would be imposed on the first \[competing
    carrier\]."[^191] Bell Atlantic has complied with this requirement
    in its tariff.[^192] Based on the record presented to us, we find
    that the New York Commission has set prices for a competing
    carriers' up-front site preparation costs at TELRIC-based costs, and
    ensured that the initial competitor to collocate will not bear the
    complete up-front collocation costs. Therefore, we conclude that
    this claim is without merit.

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

81. The nondiscriminatory provision of operations support systems (OSS)
    and the ability of competing carriers to combine unbundled network
    elements are integral aspects of the BOC's obligation to provide
    access to unbundled network elements as required by checklist
    item 2. In this section, we first outline section 271's
    nondiscrimination standard and our general approach to analyzing the
    adequacy of Bell Atlantic's OSS. We then briefly describe the
    critically important independent third-party testing conducted by
    KPMG and Hewlett Packard under the supervision of the New York
    Commission. Next, we describe briefly the systems, databases, and
    personnel on which Bell Atlantic relies in support of its claim that
    it provides access to OSS on a nondiscriminatory basis. We then
    address Bell Atlantic's change management process and the technical
    assistance that Bell Atlantic offers to competing carriers seeking
    to use its OSS. We also analyze Bell Atlantic's provision of access
    to the critical OSS functions of pre-ordering, ordering,
    provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing. Finally, we
    analyze in this section whether Bell Atlantic provides access to
    unbundled network elements in a manner that allows competing
    carriers to combine such elements.

### Operations Support Systems 

82. As discussed below, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that
    it provides requesting carriers nondiscriminatory access to OSS
    functions. Specifically, we find that Bell Atlantic provides a
    change management process and technical assistance that affords
    competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. We also find
    that Bell Atlantic offers nondiscriminatory access to its
    pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and
    billing OSS functions.[^193] In reaching these conclusions, we
    acknowledge that we differ from the evaluation of the Department of
    Justice in certain material respects. Although we have accorded
    substantial weight to the Department's views as required by section
    271, the statute prohibits us from giving the Department's views
    preclusive weight.[^194] With respect to access to OSS functions, we
    differ from the Department primarily in instances where we assess
    the totality of the evidence differently or where we have a greater
    amount of information available to inform our conclusions.

#### Background

83. Incumbent LECs use a variety of systems, databases, and personnel
    (collectively referred to as OSS) to provide service to their
    customers.[^195] The Commission consistently has found that
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development
    of meaningful local competition.[^196] For example, new entrants
    must have access to the functions performed by the incumbent's OSS
    in order to formulate and place orders for network elements or
    resale services, to install service to their customers, to maintain
    and repair network facilities, and to bill customers.[^197] The
    Commission has determined that without nondiscriminatory access to
    the BOC's OSS, a competing carrier "will be severely disadvantaged,
    if not precluded altogether, from fairly competing" in the local
    exchange market.[^198]

84. Section 271 requires the Commission to determine whether a BOC
    offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Section
    271(c)(2)(B)(ii) requires a BOC to provide "nondiscriminatory access
    to network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections
    251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)."[^199] The Commission has determined that
    access to OSS functions falls squarely within an incumbent LEC's
    duty under section 251(c)(3) to provide unbundled network elements
    under terms and conditions that are nondiscriminatory and just and
    reasonable, and its duty under section 251(c)(4) to offer resale
    services without imposing any limitations or conditions that are
    discriminatory or unreasonable.[^200] The Commission must therefore
    examine a BOC's OSS performance to evaluate compliance with section
    271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and (xiv).[^201] In addition, the Commission has
    also concluded that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
    OSS functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive
    checklist as well.[^202] Consistent with prior orders, we examine
    Bell Atlantic's OSS performance directly under checklist items 2 and
    14, as well as other checklist terms.[^203]

85. As part of its statutory obligation to provide nondiscriminatory
    access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide access that sufficiently
    supports each of the three modes of competitive entry envisioned by
    the 1996 Act -- competitor-owned facilities, unbundled network
    elements, and resale.[^204] For OSS functions that are analogous to
    those that a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its
    affiliates, the nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer
    requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality,
    accuracy, and timeliness.[^205] The BOC must provide access that
    permits competing carriers to perform these functions in
    "substantially the same time and manner" as the BOC.[^206] The
    Commission has recognized in prior orders that there may be
    situations in which a BOC contends that, although equivalent access
    has not been achieved for an analogous function, the access that it
    provides is nonetheless nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the
    statute.[^207]

86. For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must offer
    access "sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
    opportunity to compete."[^208] In assessing whether the quality of
    access affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
    compete, we will examine, in the first instance, whether specific
    performance standards exist for those functions.[^209] In
    particular, we will consider whether appropriate standards for
    measuring OSS performance have been adopted by the relevant state
    commission or agreed upon by the BOC in an interconnection agreement
    or during the implementation of such an agreement.[^210] If such
    performance standards exist, we will evaluate whether the BOC's
    performance is sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^211]

87. We analyze whether Bell Atlantic has met the nondiscrimination
    standard for each OSS function using the two-step approach outlined
    in prior orders. First, we determine "whether the BOC has deployed
    the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
    each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is
    adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to
    implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them."[^212]
    We next assess "whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed
    are operationally ready, as a practical matter."[^213]

88. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has
    developed sufficient electronic (for functions that the BOC accesses
    electronically) and manual interfaces to allow competing carriers
    equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS functions.[^214] For
    example, a BOC must provide competing carriers with the
    specifications necessary for carriers to design or modify their
    systems in a manner that will enable them to communicate with the
    BOC's systems and any relevant interfaces.[^215] In addition, a BOC
    must disclose to competing carriers any internal business
    rules[^216] and other formatting information necessary to ensure
    that a carrier's requests and orders are processed
    efficiently.[^217] Finally, a BOC must demonstrate that its OSS is
    designed to accommodate both current demand and projected demand for
    competing carriers' access to OSS functions.[^218] Although not a
    prerequisite, the Commission continues to encourage the use of
    industry standards as an appropriate means of meeting the needs of a
    competitive local exchange market.[^219]

89. Under the second inquiry, we examine performance measurements and
    other evidence of commercial readiness to ascertain whether the
    BOC's OSS is handling current demand and will be able to handle
    reasonably foreseeable demand volumes.[^220] The most probative
    evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready is actual
    commercial usage.[^221] Absent data on commercial usage, the
    Commission will consider the results of carrier-to-carrier testing,
    independent third-party testing, and internal testing in assessing
    the commercial readiness of a BOC's OSS.[^222] We reiterate,
    however, that the persuasiveness of a third-party review is
    dependent upon the qualifications, experience and independence of
    the third party and the conditions and scope of the review
    itself.[^223]

#### Overview of OSS Operations

90. Bell Atlantic utilizes a number of systems and processes to support
    the entry of competing carriers into the local services market in
    New York. As an initial matter, a new entrant seeking to compete in
    the New York local services market must establish some form of
    connectivity with Bell Atlantic to submit service requests and
    receive responses. Bell Atlantic provides requesting carriers an
    application-to-application interface based on the Electronic Data
    Interchange (EDI) protocol for pre-ordering and ordering functions,
    as well as a Web-based Graphical User Interface (Web GUI or GUI) for
    pre-ordering, ordering and maintenance and repair functions.[^224]
    In addition, Bell Atlantic provides requesting carriers with
    training and reference guides for the use of each interface.[^225] A
    new entrant seeking to use the EDI interface must undergo a
    certification test with Bell Atlantic to verify that the carrier's
    operations support systems are capable of submitting valid service
    orders and receiving responses.[^226]

91. Before placing an actual order for service, a competing carrier can
    obtain pre-ordering information by sending a request over the Web
    GUI or EDI pre-ordering interface.[^227] Such pre-ordering
    information, which is often accessed while the customer is on the
    line, typically includes a customer's address and service history
    and the services and features available to that customer, as well as
    telephone numbers and delivery dates available from Bell
    Atlantic.[^228] Bell Atlantic returns the requested information over
    the same interface used by the carrier to submit the inquiry. The
    EDI interface enables competing carriers to populate an order form
    with information received from pre-ordering inquiries.[^229]

92. Using the information obtained in the pre-ordering process, the
    competing carrier submits an order for service using the EDI or Web
    GUI interface.[^230] An order sent by a competing carrier enters the
    Direct Customer Access System (DCAS) gateway system, which performs
    an initial check of the validity of the order. If the order is
    missing information or is determined not to be a valid transaction,
    Bell Atlantic will stop processing the order and send a Local
    Service Request Rejection (order rejection) notice to the
    carrier.[^231] An order that is not rejected will either flow
    automatically from DCAS to the Direct Order Entry (DOE) system or
    drop out for manual processing at a Telecom Industry Services
    Ordering Center (TISOC).[^232] At the TISOC, a Bell Atlantic
    representative will input the order into the Service Order Processor
    (SOP) directly.[^233] If the order flowed through to DOE, the order
    will pass through another series of checks and edits before it is
    passed to SOP for processing in the appropriate back end
    system.[^234] If the order does not pass the DOE screening, it is
    manually input into SOP by a Bell Atlantic representative.[^235]
    Once an order reaches SOP, it is mixed in and processed along with
    Bell Atlantic retail orders,[^236] and Bell Atlantic returns a Local
    Services Request Confirmation (order confirmation) to the
    carrier.[^237] The order confirmation provides, at minimum, the
    scheduled due date, service order identification, and account
    telephone number.[^238] At times, a carrier may need to "supplement"
    the order to reflect a subsequent change or to respond to an error
    message.

93. After an order is successfully entered into SOP, Bell Atlantic
    begins the process of provisioning the order, or activating the
    requested service or feature, which may involve assigning
    facilities, updating translations in a switch, and dispatching
    technicians. Specifically, an order flows from SOP to the Service
    Order Analysis and Control (SOAC) system. SOAC controls the progress
    of service orders through the provisioning process by distributing
    the service order to other necessary provisioning systems and then
    updating SOP.[^239] From SOAC, most orders flow automatically
    through the assignment systems, including the Loop Facility
    Assignment and Control System (LFACS), where the appropriate
    facilities are assigned or reserved for the order.[^240] After
    assignment, the next stage in the provisioning process for most
    orders is the loading of the translations into the switch, which is
    performed by the Recent Change Memory Administration Center
    (RCMAC).[^241] In addition, technicians at the central office
    perform any wiring work associated with the order. Orders that
    require work performed outside the central office are sent to the
    Work Force Administration (WFA) system for dispatch of a field
    technician. The Regional CLEC Coordination Center (RCCC) facilitates
    and coordinates the provisioning of wholesale orders.[^242]
    Competing carriers can monitor the provisioning process by viewing
    Bell Atlantic's regular posting of orders that are in jeopardy of
    missing an installation due date and by querying the order's status
    in SOP.[^243] Upon completion of the work involved in activating
    service, Bell Atlantic sends a notice of "work completion" to the
    carrier. In addition, after the order moves from SOP into Bell
    Atlantic's billing systems and is recorded as complete in the
    billing systems, Bell Atlantic sends a notice of "billing
    completion" to the carrier.[^244]

94. If a competing carrier's customer experiences service disruptions,
    the carrier can create and monitor trouble tickets, access trouble
    history for that line, and request a test of the customer's circuit
    by submitting inquiries over the Web GUI.[^245] A carrier's
    maintenance and repair inquiry is sent to the Repair Trouble
    Administration System (RETAS) gateway system, which routes requests
    to the appropriate back end systems and returns electronic
    responses.[^246] Most trouble reports are processed through the Loop
    Maintenance Operating System, handling overall maintenance, tracking
    and dispatch activities, and the StarMem system, which allows
    automatic feature updates to switches.[^247] To test for and analyze
    faults on a circuit, Bell Atlantic uses the Mechanized Loop Testing
    (MLT), Switched Access Remote Testing System (SARTS), and Delphi
    systems.[^248] Bell Atlantic's Regional CLEC Maintenance Center
    (RCMC) supports wholesale trouble reporting and repair issues.[^249]
    Bell Atlantic returns responses to trouble ticket inquiries over the
    same interface used by the carrier to submit the inquiry.

95. In order for competing carriers to bill their customers, Bell
    Atlantic provides carriers with usage billing information and a
    process for adjusting or correcting invalid or incorrect data.[^250]
    Bell Atlantic also provides requesting carriers documentation on its
    billing procedures, bill content and related interactions.[^251]
    Specifically, Bell Atlantic delivers a record of daily usage to
    competing carriers. Bell Atlantic also produces periodic bills (up
    to ten monthly) for wholesale carriers using the Customer Record
    Information System (CRIS), which provides billing for resale and
    unbundled loops, and the Customer Access Billing System (CABS),
    which provides billing for access services and other unbundled
    network elements.[^252] Competing carriers receive aggregated bills
    for the charges incurred by all their customers in a particular
    area, as well as charges for products and services ordered by the
    carrier itself. If a competing carrier believes that an individual
    usage item contains errors, it initiates a billing usage claim, and
    may be required to transmit the erroneous usage back to Bell
    Atlantic.[^253] Incorrect usage data may be either reprocessed or
    corrected with a billing adjustment. The competing carrier is
    responsible for billing the end user.

#### Independent Third-Party Testing

96. The New York Commission retained KPMG to conduct an independent,
    third-party test of the readiness of Bell Atlantic's OSS,
    interfaces, documentation and processes.[^254] Over the course of
    fifteen months, KPMG evaluated 855 separate items relating to
    pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair,
    billing, and relationship management and infrastructure, by
    performing both transaction and operational tests.[^255] KPMG
    combined efforts with Hewlett Packard to accomplish the
    transaction-driven tests.[^256] In doing so, KPMG acted much like a
    "pseudo-competing carrier" operations department, working with Bell
    Atlantic business rules, creating and tracking orders, monitoring
    Bell Atlantic performance, logging trouble tickets, and evaluating
    carrier-to-carrier bills.[^257] At the same time, Hewlett Packard
    acted as a competing carrier information technology department,
    establishing electronic bonding with Bell Atlantic, translating back
    and forth between business and EDI rule formats, and resolving
    problems with missing orders and responses.[^258] By building and
    submitting transactions using Bell Atlantic's electronic interfaces
    with test accounts in central offices spread across New York, KPMG
    was able to live the experience of a competing carrier.[^259] In
    addition, KPMG used operational tests to evaluate the results of
    Bell Atlantic day-to-day operational management and change
    management processes to determine if they functioned in accordance
    with Bell Atlantic documentation and expectations.[^260]

97. KPMG's test was broad in scope. All stages of the relationship
    between Bell Atlantic and competing carriers were considered, from
    establishing the initial relationship, to performing daily
    operations, to maintaining the relationship.[^261] Resale,
    UNE-loops, UNE-platform, and combinations were all included in the
    test.[^262] In addition, both the application-to-application
    electronic data interchange (EDI) and the terminal-type web-based
    graphical user interface (GUI) were tested.[^263] KPMG performed
    pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair,
    billing, and relationship management and infrastructure tests to
    evaluate functional capabilities and determine whether competing
    carriers receive a level of service comparable to Bell Atlantic
    retail service.[^264] To fully test these systems, orders were
    submitted with known error conditions, canceled, and
    supplemented.[^265] Documentation was evaluated for usefulness,
    correctness, and completeness.[^266] KPMG also performed stress
    volume tests of Bell Atlantic systems and identified specific
    bottlenecks for wholesale customers.[^267]

98. In performing these tests, KPMG adopted a military-style test
    philosophy, or a mindset of "test until you pass."[^268] Thus, when
    situations arose where testing revealed that a Bell Atlantic
    process, document, or system did not meet expectations, Bell
    Atlantic would generally implement a fix and KPMG would retest the
    process, document, or system until satisfied.[^269] As a result,
    KPMG believes that competing carriers now have a "baseline set of
    working components" that a one-time diagnostic evaluation of Bell
    Atlantic's OSS would not have provided.[^270]

99. To the greatest extent possible, the KPMG test was both independent
    and blind. Neither KPMG nor Hewlett Packard had a reporting
    relationship to Bell Atlantic.[^271] Although it was virtually
    impossible for the KPMG transactions to be truly blind, KPMG
    instituted certain procedures to ensure that both KPMG and Hewlett
    Packard would not receive preferential treatment.[^272] For example,
    KPMG required that all documents provided to them were generally
    available to all competing carriers.[^273] The New York Commission
    monitored phone calls between KPMG and Hewlett Packard and Bell
    Atlantic, and competing carriers were invited to attend conference
    calls.[^274] In addition, KPMG made concurrent observations of the
    service quality delivered to other competing carriers during the
    course of its test.[^275]

100. The scope and depth of KPMG's review, and the conditions
     surrounding it, including KPMG's independence, military-style test
     philosophy, efforts to place themselves in the position of an
     actual market entrant, and efforts to maintain blindness when
     possible, lead us to treat the conclusions in the KPMG Final Report
     as persuasive evidence of Bell Atlantic's OSS readiness. As we have
     said before, the persuasiveness of a third-party review is
     dependent on the conditions and scope of the review.[^276] Because
     we recognize that various third-party tests may be adequate to
     demonstrate the operational readiness of a BOC's OSS, we emphasize
     that we do not foreclose the possibility that a third-party test
     designed differently than the KPMG review may also be persuasive.
     Nonetheless, were a third-party test less comprehensive, less
     independent, less blind, and, therefore, less useful in assessing
     the real world impact of a BOC's OSS on competing carriers, we
     would not necessarily find it persuasive and may accord it less
     weight than we do the KPMG Final Report.

#### Change Management and Technical Assistance

##### Change Management

101. We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides the
     documentation and support necessary to give competing carriers
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Bell Atlantic makes this
     demonstration by showing that it has an adequate change management
     process in place in New York. The record also reflects that Bell
     Atlantic has adhered to its change management process over time. As
     a result, we find that Bell Atlantic provides access to its OSS in
     a manner that allows an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

###### Background

102. Competing carriers need information about and specifications for an
     incumbent's systems and interfaces in order to develop and modify
     their systems and procedures to access the incumbent's OSS
     functions.[^277] Thus, in the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the
     Commission determined that in order to provide nondiscriminatory
     access to OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate that it "has deployed
     the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
     each of the necessary OSS functions and . . . is adequately
     assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use
     all of the OSS functions available to them."[^278] By showing that
     it adequately assists competing carriers to use available OSS
     functions, a BOC provides evidence that it offers an efficient
     competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^279] As part of
     this demonstration, the Commission will give substantial
     consideration to the existence of an adequate change management
     process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to this process over
     time.[^280]

103. The change management process refers to the methods and procedures
     that the BOC employs to communicate with competing carriers
     regarding the performance of and changes in the BOC's OSS
     system.[^281] Such changes may include operations updates to
     existing functions that impact competing carrier interface(s) upon
     a BOC's release of new interface software; technology changes that
     require competing carriers to meet new technical requirements upon
     a BOC's software release date; additional functionality changes
     that may be used at the competing carrier's option, on or after a
     BOC's release date for new interface software; and changes that may
     be mandated by regulatory authorities.[^282] Without a change
     management process in place, a BOC can impose substantial costs on
     competing carriers simply by making changes to its systems and
     interfaces without providing adequate testing opportunities and
     accurate and timely notice and documentation of the changes.[^283]
     As Allegiance suggests, change management problems can impair a
     competing carrier's ability to obtain nondiscriminatory access to
     UNEs, and hence a BOC's compliance with section
     271(c)(2)(B)(ii).[^284]

104. Competing carriers have had a substantial role in the development
     of Bell Atlantic's change management process in New York. As part
     of a collaborative process dating back to October 1997 and
     conducted under the auspices of the New York Commission, Bell
     Atlantic and competing carriers developed a detailed process of
     managing changes to the Bell Atlantic systems and interfaces that
     affect competing carriers.[^285] This process resulted in the May
     1998 document entitled "Telecom Industry Services---Change
     Management Process" (Change Agreement).[^286] Although there have
     been subsequent modifications to the Change Agreement, the basic
     process and timelines set out in this document are still
     applicable.[^287]

105. The Change Agreement sets forth detailed procedures for introducing
     changes in Bell Atlantic's systems and documentation. It divides
     all changes into five different categories and provides specific
     time lines and intervals for each category. Thus, the process is
     designed to accommodate emergency changes, regulatory changes,
     changes in industry standards, changes requested by Bell Atlantic,
     and changes requested by competing carriers.[^288]

106. Regardless of the type of change, the Change Agreement expressly
     provides for feedback from competing carriers on the proposed
     changes.[^289] In addition, the Change Agreement calls for Bell
     Atlantic and the competing carriers to develop jointly a schedule
     for the distribution of draft specifications or business
     rules,[^290] receipt of competing carrier comments on the
     documentation, and distribution of final documentation.[^291] Bell
     Atlantic has established a forum where representatives from Bell
     Atlantic and competing carriers meet---often more than once a
     month---to discuss upcoming system and interface changes as well as
     the change management procedures themselves.[^292] Moreover, in
     September 1999, representatives of Bell Atlantic and competing
     carriers began to prioritize changes based on merit, rather than
     the sponsor of the change.[^293] Thus, competing carriers had a
     substantial role in the development of methods and procedures for
     the change management process in New York and continue to have
     opportunities for meaningful input in the change management process
     today.[^294]

107. Bell Atlantic's basic change management process is memorialized and
     set forth in a single document, the Change Agreement. As a result,
     Bell Atlantic's change management process documentation is clearly
     organized and readily accessible to competing carriers. Competing
     carriers can readily access the Change Agreement on Bell Atlantic's
     Telecommunications Industry Services (TIS) web page.[^295]
     Modifications to this document are also available on the TIS web
     page.[^296] Moreover, in response to KPMG findings, Bell Atlantic
     has improved its procedures for competing carriers to
     cross-reference and track information regarding the change
     management process.[^297] Thus, Bell Atlantic now updates and
     maintains a database that tracks the progress of each specified
     change, reports changes systematically using change request numbers
     and uses these same numbers in communications with competing
     carriers to identify specific changes.[^298]

108. Bell Atlantic's change management process includes a method for
     dispute resolution that is separate and apart from any process that
     is set forth in interconnection agreements. As a result, competing
     carriers now have a forum specifically designed to address any
     change management disputes. In response to concerns raised by
     competing carriers, Bell Atlantic, in consultation with competing
     carriers and the New York Commission staff, established an
     escalation process for resolving change control disputes.[^299]
     This process allows competing carriers to appeal to upper level
     management at Bell Atlantic on change management issues and also
     allows competing carriers to raise these issues before the New York
     Commission staff.[^300]

109. Bell Atlantic's change management process provides for a stable
     testing environment.[^301] Competing carriers need access to a
     stable testing environment to certify that their OSS will be
     capable of interacting smoothly and effectively with Bell
     Atlantic's OSS, as modified. In addition, prior to issuing a new
     software release or upgrade, the BOC must provide a testing
     environment that mirrors the production environment in order for
     competing carriers to test the new release. If competing carriers
     are not given the opportunity to test new releases in a stable
     environment prior to implementation, they may be unable to process
     orders accurately and unable to provision new customer services
     without delays.[^302] KPMG originally found Bell Atlantic's testing
     environment "Not Satisfied," specifically noting that the testing
     environment "did not adequately mirror production
     capabilities."[^303] As the New York Commission suggests, this can
     result in competing carriers' transactions succeeding in the
     testing environment but failing in production.[^304]

110. In response to KPMG's initial finding, Bell Atlantic worked with
     New York Commission staff and competing carriers to establish a new
     testing environment and new testing procedures.[^305] Some of these
     changes were introduced in April 1999 as part of an interim Quality
     Assurance (QA) environment for carrier-to-carrier testing of new
     versions of OSS interfaces.[^306] KPMG reviewed the interim QA
     testing environment for pre-ordering and ordering and determined
     that the interim environment mirrored the production
     environment.[^307] At the same time, KPMG determined the
     availability of the testing environment under Bell Atlantic's
     interim procedures presented problems for competing carriers.[^308]
     As AT&T and MCI WorldCom note, the interim QA testing environment
     was only made available to competing carriers during business hours
     and for a maximum period of five business days.[^309] On September
     20, 1999 Bell Atlantic introduced its permanent QA testing
     environment. Bell Atlantic represents that the permanent QA testing
     environment mirrors production and provides a physically separate
     environment for competing carrier testing.[^310] In addition, Bell
     Atlantic plans to maintain this testing environment for all but
     emergency changes for at least a month, including extended daily
     hours. [^311] Moreover, in order to ensure that competing carriers
     are not forced to test and cut over to a new industry standard
     release prematurely, Bell Atlantic maintains a pre-existing version
     after issuing a major new release rather than switching directly
     from one version to the next.[^312] Finally, Bell Atlantic, in
     response to a separate KPMG "Not Satisfied" finding, has introduced
     new procedures to certify that a competing carrier may move from
     the testing environment to the production environment.[^313]

###### Discussion

111. Based on the above record evidence, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it has a change management process in place in
     New York that provides an efficient competitor with a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. Specifically, we find that Bell Atlantic
     makes this showing with: (1) evidence of competing carrier input in
     the design and continued operation of the change management
     process; (2) the memorialization of the change management process
     in a basic document; (3) the availability of a separate forum for
     change management disputes; (4) and the availability of a stable
     testing environment that mirrors production. We note that even
     competing carriers have acknowledged in their comments that the
     processes in the Change Agreement are satisfactory as
     written.[^314] Because we recognize that various change management
     plans may be adequate to meet the needs of competing carriers, we
     emphasize that the individual factors described above are
     indicative, but not dispositive, of an adequate process. Although
     we will look for evidence of these same factors in evaluating a
     future applicant's change management process, we do not foreclose
     the possibility that a different plan may be sufficient.

112. We also find that the record demonstrates that Bell Atlantic has
     adhered to its change management process over time. Commenters,
     however, express concern that problems remain with respect to Bell
     Atlantic's ability to adhere to notification and documentation
     timelines in its Change Agreement and Bell Atlantic's ability to
     show that the permanent QA testing environment meets the needs of
     competing carriers. In addition, commenters allege that Bell
     Atlantic issues too many emergency changes and fails to consider
     competing carrier input in the change management process.

####### Notification and Documentation Timeliness

113. We conclude that Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers with
     change management notification and documentation for upcoming
     change releases in a manner sufficiently timely to allow an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. As TRA
     suggests, the failure of a BOC to provide timely, complete, and
     accurate notice of alterations to its systems and processes hinders
     the ability of competitive providers to serve their customers
     adequately.[^315] Without timely notification and documentation,
     competing carriers are unable to modify their existing systems and
     procedures or develop new systems to maintain access to a BOC's OSS
     functions. As a preliminary matter, we find that the Change
     Agreement establishes reasonable intervals for the distribution of
     change management notification and documentation because they
     provide competing carriers with sufficient time to prepare for Bell
     Atlantic system changes.[^316] In addition, we commend Bell
     Atlantic and the New York Commission for developing metrics that
     report its compliance with these intervals.[^317]

114. We find that Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers with timely
     change management notification and documentation for changes made
     at the request of regulatory authorities (Type 2 changes), industry
     standard organizations (Type 3 changes), and competing carriers
     (Type 5 changes) in a manner sufficiently timely to allow an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. For these
     types of changes, the data are extremely limited because they occur
     infrequently. Nonetheless, the data provided on these changes in
     both the Carrier-to-Carrier metrics and the KPMG Final Report
     demonstrate that Bell Atlantic has already established a pattern of
     compliance with the relevant notification and documentation
     intervals in its Change Agreement.[^318]

115. We also find that Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers with
     notification and documentation for Bell Atlantic-initiated changes
     (Type 4 changes) in a manner sufficiently timely to allow an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^319] In
     its Final Report, KPMG found that Bell Atlantic was unable to meet
     documentation intervals set in the Change Agreement for Type 4
     changes, and characterized this problem as "Not Satisfied."[^320]
     KPMG found that Bell Atlantic provided timely documentation in only
     three of nineteen instances for Type 4 changes from January to June
     1999.[^321] During the same period, Bell Atlantic was able to
     provide timely notification of upcoming Type 4 changes in sixteen
     of twenty instances.[^322] Bell Atlantic contends, however, that it
     has now addressed the documentation timeliness problem identified
     by KPMG.[^323] With respect to initial notification timeliness,
     during the period from July to October 1999, the record shows that
     Bell Atlantic provided timely notification for eleven of twelve
     Type 4 changes.[^324] With respect to final documentation
     timeliness, during the period from August to October 1999, the
     record shows that Bell Atlantic provided timely documentation for
     eight of ten Type 4 changes.[^325] Thus, Bell Atlantic has
     demonstrated considerable improvement since the KPMG review. In
     particular, Bell Atlantic was able to provide both timely
     notification and documentation to competing carriers for two of two
     Type 4 changes that occurred in October 1999.[^326] We find that
     these improvements, coupled with the opportunities competing
     carriers have to participate in the prioritization of changes and
     the month long testing opportunities provided for Type 4 changes,
     indicate that an efficient competitor has a meaningful opportunity
     to compete.[^327]

116. In addition, we conclude that Bell Atlantic provides notification
     for emergency changes (Type 1 changes) in a manner sufficiently
     timely to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. Under the Change Agreement, timely emergency notification
     simply requires notification prior to implementation.[^328] As the
     KPMG Final Report suggests, timely emergency notification can range
     from several hours to several days advance notice.[^329] Although
     we understand advance notification is preferable for competing
     carriers, we also must acknowledge that given the nature of
     emergency changes, it will not always be possible for Bell Atlantic
     to notify competing carriers prior to implementation. Some
     commenters question Bell Atlantic's ability to provide competing
     carriers with timely notification of Type 1 emergency
     changes.[^330] MCI WorldCom, for instance, complains that the
     timeliness of Bell Atlantic's emergency notification fell
     considerably in September 1999, when Bell Atlantic was timely for
     only seven of twelve Type 1 changes.[^331] We note, however, that
     Bell Atlantic's Type 1 change notification was timely for
     twenty-five of twenty-six changes in July 1999 and six of six
     changes that occurred between October 1 and October 19, 1999.[^332]
     Because we believe that as a matter of course emergency changes
     will occur in situations where Bell Atlantic may be unable to
     notify competing carriers prior to implementation, we do not find
     that Bell Atlantic's September 1999 performance prevents us from
     concluding that Bell Atlantic provides emergency change
     notification to competing carriers in a manner sufficiently timely
     to allow an efficient competitor to compete.[^333]

117. Our conclusion that Bell Atlantic provides timely change management
     notification and documentation to competing carriers seeking to use
     its OSS differs from that reached by the Department of
     Justice.[^334] We reach this conclusion, however, by separately
     assessing the underlying issues associated with each of the Bell
     Atlantic change types identified in the Change Agreement. First,
     with respect to the limited number of changes made at the request
     of regulatory authorities, industry standard organizations, and
     competing carriers themselves, Bell Atlantic has established a
     pattern of general compliance with the notification and
     documentation intervals in its Change Agreement. Second, we find
     the recent improvement in Bell Atlantic's timely distribution of
     Type 4 notification and documentation demonstrates its ability to
     adhere to its change management process. Finally, while we
     acknowledge notification prior to implementation of an emergency
     change will not always be possible, we still find that Bell
     Atlantic provides sufficiently timely notification to competing
     carriers.

118. Although we reach the same conclusion as the New York Commission
     with respect to Bell Atlantic's change management notification and
     documentation timeliness, we do not rely on Bell Atlantic's
     willingness to have its future change management notification and
     documentation timeliness enforced through the Change Control
     Assurance Plan.[^335] In addition, we acknowledge that the
     timeliness of Bell Atlantic's performance falls short of the
     monthly standards for change management notification and
     documentation set out in the Carrier-to-Carrier metrics and used in
     the Change Control Assurance Plan.[^336] Nonetheless, when we view
     Bell Atlantic's overall performance over the course of recent
     months, we find that Bell Atlantic's notification and documentation
     timeliness is sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. We will, however, be prepared to
     take appropriate enforcement action if there is evidence of
     deteriorating performance in the future. Finally, although our
     conclusion is based on the specific categories of changes
     identified in the Bell Atlantic Change Agreement in place in New
     York, we do not foreclose the possibility that a different plan
     with a less disaggregated structure and different intervals for
     notification and documentation may also be sufficient.

####### Testing Environment 

119. We conclude that Bell Atlantic's permanent QA testing environment
     provides competing carriers with a stable environment and an
     adequate opportunity to test Bell Atlantic OSS changes prior to
     implementation. Specifically, we find the record demonstrates that
     Bell Atlantic's new testing environment adequately mirrors the
     production environment and offers the extended testing periods that
     competing carriers need for new entrant certification and new
     release testing. MCI WorldCom and AT&T note that as of the date of
     Bell Atlantic's application, no competing carriers had been given
     the opportunity to use the permanent QA testing environment and
     determine that it works in the manner Bell Atlantic represents in
     its application.[^337] We conclude there is sufficient evidence to
     demonstrate that Bell Atlantic's permanent QA testing environment
     provides a stable testing environment for competing carriers.

120. We base this conclusion on the experience of the competing carriers
     that used the permanent QA testing environment without difficulty
     for an October 16, 1999 software release.[^338] Thus, we find that
     the recent evidence from commercial usage suggests that Bell
     Atlantic's permanent QA environment works in the manner represented
     in its application. As the New York Commission attests, with only
     one minor exception, the results of the production run matched the
     results of the run in the permanent QA testing environment.[^339]
     The one exception, the absence of a billing telephone number for a
     directory listing, has been corrected.[^340]

121. Our conclusion is buttressed by the similarity between the interim
     and permanent QA testing environment and KPMG's finding that the
     interim testing environment adequately mirrored the production
     environment.[^341] Both environments mirror production and offer
     test decks of representative pre-ordering and ordering
     transactions.[^342] The basic processes for new release and new
     entrant testing distributed in April 1999 apply to both the interim
     and permanent environments.[^343] The only differences between the
     two environments are that the permanent QA testing environment is
     physically separate and expands the test period to one month, thus
     remedying the major problems identified by KPMG and competing
     carriers with the interim QA testing environment.[^344]

122. We find that the record demonstrates that Bell Atlantic's permanent
     QA testing environment provides competing carriers with a stable
     environment and adequate opportunity to test Bell Atlantic OSS
     changes prior to implementation. Although we reach the same
     conclusion as the New York Commission, we differ somewhat from that
     reached by the Department of Justice.[^345] The Department of
     Justice found that while it was hopeful that the permanent QA
     testing environment would meet competing carrier needs, the results
     of recent Bell Atlantic improvements did not appear in the record
     before them.[^346] Comments filed subsequent to the evaluation of
     the Department of Justice, however, demonstrate that the October
     16, 1999 software release using the new QA testing environment was
     successful.[^347] As a result, we find that the record now
     demonstrates that Bell Atlantic provides a testing environment for
     OSS changes sufficient to enable an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

####### Other Issues

123. AT&T and Sprint assert that Bell Atlantic improperly categorizes a
     substantial number of changes as Type 1 emergency changes in order
     to evade the longer notification requirements associated with other
     types of changes under the Change Agreement. [^348] We conclude
     these claims do not warrant a finding that Bell Atlantic fails to
     adhere to its change management procedures in a manner sufficient
     to provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. Type 1 emergency changes are specifically defined and
     provided for in the Change Agreement that was developed in a
     collaborative proceeding involving Bell Atlantic, competing
     carriers, and the New York Commission.[^349] Furthermore, as AT&T
     itself acknowledges, on June 30, 1999, Bell Atlantic and competing
     carriers began a series of workshops that resulted in a more narrow
     definition of Type 1 changes.[^350] This provides evidence of
     competing carriers' continuing opportunity to provide meaningful
     input in the change management process in New York. Since these
     workshops began, Bell Atlantic has reduced the number of Type 1
     changes from twenty-six in July 1999 to ten in August, twelve in
     September and six in the first half of October.[^351] Because
     emergency changes are specifically provided for in the Change
     Agreement and Bell Atlantic's use of them has decreased in recent
     months, we find AT&T and Sprint's claims unpersuasive.

124. AT&T and MCI WorldCom allege that Bell Atlantic fails to give
     competing carriers opportunities to provide input on new releases
     as it is obligated to do under the Change Agreement.[^352] We find
     that the record simply does not support this claim. For instance,
     representatives of competing carriers and Bell Atlantic jointly
     prioritize upcoming changes.[^353] In addition, Bell Atlantic and
     competing carriers meet regularly to discuss upcoming changes and
     the change management process itself.[^354] As part of these
     meetings, Bell Atlantic and the competing carriers develop a
     detailed chart of competing carrier requests for action on specific
     change management issues, track the status of these problems, and
     note Bell Atlantic actions taken to address the problem. For
     example, when MCI WorldCom expressed a preference regarding how
     customer service record addresses be made available to competing
     carriers, Bell Atlantic agreed to add this functionality within the
     remaining weeks before the related change release.[^355] At the
     same time, Bell Atlantic devised a special software approach to
     defer implementation of this functionality for AT&T, the sole
     competing carrier that objected to this change.[^356] Although we
     would be concerned about the impact of a BOC disregarding input
     from competing carriers on change management issues, we do not
     believe the record indicates that this is a problem for carriers
     working with Bell Atlantic in New York.

125. We also conclude that problems with specific OSS changes described
     by MCI WorldCom, Allegiance, and Sprint do not warrant a conclusion
     that Bell Atlantic fails to adequately assist competing carriers
     seeking to use its OSS.[^357] Because Bell Atlantic must
     accommodate a variety of interests with any given change release,
     we reasonably expect some competing carriers to be less than
     satisfied with any given change.[^358] We do not, however, find
     that these complaints evidence a systemic problem.

##### Technical Assistance and Help Desk Support

126. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission determined that
     in order to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS, a BOC must
     first demonstrate that it "has deployed the necessary systems and
     personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS
     functions and . . . is adequately assisting competing carriers to
     understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions
     available to them."[^359] By showing that it adequately assists
     competing carriers to use available OSS functions, a BOC provides
     evidence that it offers an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^360] As part of this demonstration, the
     Commission will give substantial consideration to evidence showing
     that the BOC provides adequate technical assistance and help desk
     support to competing carriers seeking to use its OSS.[^361]

127. We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides the
     technical assistance and help desk support necessary to give
     competing carriers nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Bell
     Atlantic has produced a separate three volume handbook for
     resellers and purchasers of UNEs, both available on CD-ROM with
     word search capability.[^362] Documentation is updated for each
     release and also is made available on Bell Atlantic's web
     site.[^363] Thus, competing carriers have access to complete,
     up-to-date business rules and ordering codes.[^364] Bell Atlantic
     also conducts regular training courses for competing carriers in
     key areas.[^365] In addition, Bell Atlantic's "Systems Support Help
     Desk" provides a single point of contact for competing carrier
     reports of system outages and software defects and provides help to
     ensure that any problems are resolved as quickly as possible.[^366]
     We are further encouraged by Bell Atlantic's practice of evaluating
     the performance of its help desk call agents and, when necessary,
     replacing the tools available to them for analyzing information and
     resolving problems.[^367] Although KPMG reported confusion
     regarding contact lists and help desk numbers, we find that Bell
     Atlantic has since fixed this problem.[^368] Specifically, we note
     that in September 1999, Bell Atlantic posted on its web site a
     comprehensive and descriptive list of the different support
     features available to competing carriers, including the time of day
     these support functions are available.[^369] Accordingly, we find
     that Bell Atlantic provides efficient competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete by enabling them to understand how to
     implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them. Thus,
     we reject commenters' allegations that Bell Atlantic's technical
     assistance and help desk support is inadequate.[^370]

#### Pre-Ordering

128. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS
     pre-ordering functions. Bell Atlantic offers requesting carriers an
     industry standard application-to-application pre-ordering interface
     that enables carriers to integrate pre-ordering and ordering
     functions. Through this and other pre-ordering interfaces, Bell
     Atlantic makes available to requesting carriers all the
     functionality that it provides to itself. Bell Atlantic also shows,
     through response times and interface availability performance data
     and third-party testing, that its pre-ordering interfaces and
     systems are operationally ready and capable of sustaining
     reasonably foreseeable demand volumes.

##### Background

129. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities
     that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information
     necessary to place an order.[^371] Given that pre-ordering
     represents the first exposure that a prospective customer has to a
     competing carrier, it is critical that inferior access to the
     incumbent's OSS does not render the carrier a less efficient or
     responsive service provider than the incumbent.[^372] Because most
     pre-ordering functions that support resale services, as well as
     many of the functions that support service through unbundled
     network elements, are analogous to the pre-ordering of a BOC's
     retail services, Bell Atlantic must demonstrate that it provides
     requesting carriers access that enables them to perform these
     functions in substantially the same time and manner as Bell
     Atlantic's retail operations.[^373] For those pre-ordering
     functions that lack a retail analogue, Bell Atlantic must provide
     access that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

##### Discussion

130. *Application-to-Application Functionality*. We find that Bell
     Atlantic offers requesting carriers access to an
     application-to-application interface for all pre-ordering
     functionality that Bell Atlantic provides to itself. In prior
     orders, the Commission has emphasized that providing pre-ordering
     functionality through an application-to-application interface is
     essential in enabling carriers to conduct real-time processing and
     to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions in the same manner
     as the BOC.[^374] Bell Atlantic demonstrates through actual
     commercial usage and the results of third-party testing that it
     makes application-to-application functionality available for the
     pre-ordering functions that it provides to itself.

131. Bell Atlantic offers competing carriers pre-ordering OSS
     functionality through two electronic interfaces: a proprietary
     Web-based Graphical User Interface (Web GUI);[^375] and an
     application-to-application interface based on the industry standard
     EDI Issue 9 protocol.[^376] Bell Atlantic implemented EDI-9 in July
     1998, along with the associated industry standard transaction
     formats.[^377] Requesting carriers have several options for
     connecting with the EDI interface, and Bell Atlantic documentation
     provides the specifications for and benefits of each option.[^378]
     Competing carriers therefore have access to complete, up-to-date
     business rules for pre-ordering functionality. As of the
     application filing date, approximately 100 carriers were using the
     Web GUI for pre-ordering, and three carriers were using the EDI
     interface.[^379] Furthermore, Bell Atlantic recently made available
     a second application-to-application pre-ordering interface, Common
     Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), which it was testing
     with one carrier when it filed its application.[^380]

132. Bell Atlantic represents that these interfaces allow competing
     carriers "to obtain the same information from the same underlying
     OSS as Bell Atlantic's own retail service representatives."[^381]
     Specifically, carriers are able to perform the following
     pre-ordering functions: (1) retrieve CSRs;[^382] (2) validate
     addresses; (3) select and reserve telephone numbers;[^383] (4)
     determine services and features available to a customer; (5) obtain
     due date availability; (6) access loop qualification information;
     and (7) view a customer's directory listing.[^384] Competing
     carriers also can check the status of pending orders.

133. With respect to actual commercial usage, Bell Atlantic demonstrates
     that competing carriers successfully have built and are
     commercially using application-to-application interfaces (EDI-9 and
     CORBA)[^385] to retrieve CSR information and validate addresses,
     two of the seven pre-ordering functions.[^386] MCI WorldCom, for
     example, implemented EDI access for parsed CSR retrieval on
     September 3, 1999, followed by address validation for migrating
     customers on November 1, 1999.[^387] Similarly, AT&T acknowledges
     that it has commercially deployed CORBA for the same two
     pre-ordering functions.[^388] In addition, CTC Communications, a
     reseller, successfully implemented EDI for parsed CSR retrieval in
     June 1999.[^389]

134. Along with commercial usage, we also base our conclusion on the
     demonstrated ability of the third-party testers to construct and
     extensively test the EDI interface for all pre-ordering functions.
     As part of the third-party testing, Hewlett Packard used
     documentation provided by Bell Atlantic to build an EDI interface
     capable of performing each pre-ordering function, including parsed
     CSR retrieval.[^390] KPMG then conducted a functional evaluation
     and volume and stress tests of the EDI interface, which verified
     Bell Atlantic's ability to provide the requisite pre-ordering
     functionality.[^391] Although MCI WorldCom alleges that KPMG's
     testing interface was not as robust as one required in an actual
     production environment,[^392] we find that KPMG's testing interface
     was able to handle numerous pre-order transactions and extensive
     scenarios, using common security and transport (*i.e.*, File
     Transfer Protocol with Public Key Encryption).[^393] We therefore
     accord substantial weight to the demonstrated ability of the
     third-party testers in this case to build an
     application-to-application interface for all pre-ordering
     functions.

135. In this regard, we are not persuaded by commenters' claims that we
     should discount the ability of third-party testers to construct an
     EDI interface for all pre-ordering functions because the testers
     received favorable treatment from Bell Atlantic.[^394] The testing
     interface was constructed using publicly available Bell Atlantic
     documentation.[^395] Although KPMG acknowledges that at times it
     received better treatment from Bell Atlantic than that of an
     ordinary carrier,[^396] there is no evidence to suggest that such
     treatment skewed the test results.[^397] Indeed, the record shows
     that the New York Commission closely supervised the design and
     operation of the test.[^398] KPMG also specifically reviewed
     pre-order functionality experienced by actual carriers during its
     Live CLEC Functional Evaluation "in an effort to assess potential
     bias in the transaction tests."[^399] We find no evidence that the
     Live CLEC Functional Evaluation revealed that Bell Atlantic
     provided inferior documentation or technical support to competing
     carriers.[^400]

136. We further find that the fact that no carrier has chosen to access
     all seven pre-ordering functions using an
     application-to-application interface does not disprove Bell
     Atlantic's showing that it makes such functionality available. As
     we have previously stated, Bell Atlantic is not required to
     actually furnish a particular item to satisfy its obligations under
     the checklist; rather, it must show that it has a concrete and
     specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request and is
     "presently ready" to furnish the item.[^401] The record in this
     case shows that factors internal to carriers have affected their
     decision not to develop and commercially deploy an
     application-to-application interface for all pre-ordering
     functions. For instance, carriers acknowledge that they place a
     higher priority on accessing certain functions (*i.e.*, CSR
     retrieval and address validation) through an
     application-to-application interface than other functions that are
     not as critical to the carrier's business plan.[^402] Indeed, AT&T
     acknowledges that, with access to CSR retrieval and address
     validation, it can "ramp up commercial volumes using CORBA's
     present capabilities."[^403] It would therefore be inappropriate to
     penalize Bell Atlantic simply because carriers are not actively
     seeking to implement the remaining application-to-application
     functions at this time.[^404] In any event, we expect that the
     experience carriers gained in implementing parsed CSR retrieval and
     address validation will facilitate their efforts to deploy the
     remaining application-to-application functions.

137. *Integration*. We find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that its
     application-to-application interfaces allow competing carriers to
     integrate pre-ordering information into Bell Atlantic's ordering
     interface and the carriers' back office systems, a finding that is
     fundamental to a BOC's showing of nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS.[^405] The Commission has explained previously that a BOC with
     integrated pre-ordering and ordering functions must provide
     competing carriers with access to the same capability.[^406] In
     this regard, the BOC must enable competing carriers to transfer
     pre-ordering information electronically to the BOC's ordering
     interface or to the carriers' own back office systems, which may
     require "parsing" pre-ordering information into identifiable
     fields.[^407] Without an integrated system, a competing carrier
     would be forced to re-enter pre-ordering information manually into
     an ordering interface, which leads to additional costs and delays,
     as well as a greater risk of error.[^408] This lack of integration
     would place competitors at a competitive disadvantage and
     significantly impact a carrier's ability to serve its customers in
     a timely and efficient manner.[^409]

138. Our finding that Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering and ordering
     interfaces are readily integratable is based on evidence of
     successful commercial integration and KPMG's findings. In terms of
     commercial usage, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that CTC
     Communications was able to develop an integrated EDI pre-ordering
     and ordering system for parsed CSR information.[^410] Similarly, we
     find that MCI WorldCom and AT&T have integrated parsed CSR
     retrieval and limited address validation functionality into their
     back office systems.[^411] This successful integration of two
     pre-ordering functions in a commercial setting is probative
     evidence that carriers are capable of integrating the remaining
     pre-ordering functions.[^412] This evidence is also consistent with
     KPMG's finding that Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering and ordering
     interfaces are integratable.[^413] Although KPMG did not build a
     back office system to automatically populate the pre-ordering data
     into the ordering interface, it did evaluate the compatibility of
     the pre-ordering and ordering field names and formats and found
     that carriers would be able to integrate the information into their
     back office systems.[^414]

139. We are not persuaded by commenters' claims that full integration is
     not presently possible because Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering and
     ordering field names and formats are not entirely uniform.[^415]
     Based on the record evidence of successful commercial integration,
     it does not appear that incompatible fields are significantly
     increasing carriers' costs or impeding their ability to integrate
     pre-ordering and ordering functionality. In fact, MCI WorldCom
     indicates that it resolved problems with field incompatibility for
     the two functions that it has integrated successfully.[^416] Of
     course, to the extent that Bell Atlantic becomes aware of any
     inconsistencies in field names or formats that would impede a
     carrier's ability to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions,
     we expect that Bell Atlantic promptly will design and deploy a
     software correction or provide the necessary technical assistance
     to competing carriers in the interface integration.[^417]

140. *Access to Loop Qualification Information*.[^418] We find that Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that it offers nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a
     loop is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies.[^419] As
     an initial matter, we recognize that the Commission's recently
     enunciated *UNE Remand* rules, which further defined an incumbent
     LEC's obligations regarding nondiscriminatory access to loop
     qualification information, are not in effect. We do not consider,
     therefore, whether Bell Atlantic complies with the requirements
     that resulted from that proceeding in the context of this section
     271 application. Rather, for purposes of this application, in
     determining whether Bell Atlantic is providing nondiscriminatory
     access to its OSS in accordance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and
     (xiv), we evaluate only whether Bell Atlantic provides requesting
     carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification functionality
     that it provides to itself.[^420]

141. As the Department of Justice observes, "\[a\]ccess to pre-ordering
     information is particularly important in connection with DSL
     services because of the special loop requirements for such
     services."[^421] Whether a prospective customer can be provided a
     particular advanced service often depends upon the carrier having
     access to detailed information about available loops, including the
     actual loop length and the presence of bridged taps, load coils,
     and digital loop carrier equipment. As the Commission previously
     has explained, a BOC's duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS extends beyond the interface component to encompass all of the
     processes and databases used by the BOC in providing service to
     itself and its customers.[^422] In the *Advanced Services Order and
     NPRM*, the Commission explained that "\[i\]f new entrants are to
     have a meaningful opportunity to compete, they must be able to
     determine during the pre-ordering process as quickly and
     efficiently as can the incumbent, whether or not a loop is capable
     of supporting xDSL-based services."[^423] A BOC therefore must
     provide requesting carriers nondiscriminatory access to the systems
     and processes for identifying loop characteristics that it provides
     to its retail representatives.

142. Bell Atlantic provides three avenues for competing carriers to
     obtain information regarding its loops. First, for a limited number
     of central offices, Bell Atlantic provides a mechanized loop
     qualification process that indicates a theoretical loop length and
     whether a loop is qualified for ADSL service.[^424] Bell Atlantic
     is currently surveying its entire loop inventory to identify loops
     that are ADSL-capable, and expects to have "93 percent of Bell
     Atlantic's central offices in New York with completed or pending
     collocation orders" pre-qualified by the end of 1999.[^425] Second,
     for central offices that are not included within the mechanized
     loop qualification database, Bell Atlantic will conduct a "Manual
     Loop Qualification" to provide carriers with the same information
     that is ordinarily available through the mechanized loop
     qualification process (*i.e.*, theoretical loop length and ADSL
     capability).[^426] Third, in order to access more detailed
     information about the makeup of a particular loop, carriers can
     request a manual "Engineering Query" that can provide the physical
     loop length, the number and location of load coils, the length and
     location of bridged taps, the gauge of the wire at specific
     locations, and the locations of digital loop carrier
     equipment.[^427] Bell Atlantic states that almost all of this
     information must be obtained and verified using paper loop plant
     records, or "plats."[^428]

143. We find that these mechanized and manual processes enable
     requesting carriers to access loop qualification information in
     substantially the same time and manner as Bell Atlantic's retail
     operations.[^429] The record shows that competing carriers have
     access to the same database that Bell Atlantic makes available to
     its retail representatives, and therefore the same information for
     the same central offices.[^430] We disagree with commenters' claims
     that the mechanized process is discriminatory because, in
     populating the database, Bell Atlantic filtered its back office
     information in such a manner that it is useful only for Bell
     Atlantic's particular advanced services offering.[^431] Indeed, we
     find that competing carriers have access to the same underlying
     information that Bell Atlantic used to populate the mechanized loop
     qualification database.[^432] Although carriers seek real-time
     electronic access to other back office databases,[^433] we do not
     find convincing evidence on this record that the information that
     carriers seek in electronic form is currently contained in any
     existing Bell Atlantic database that carriers cannot already
     access.[^434]

144. *Response Times*. We find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it
     provides requesting carriers access to pre-ordering functionality
     in substantially the same time that it provides access to its
     retail operations. With respect to parsed CSR retrieval, which has
     no retail analogue, we conclude that Bell Atlantic provides access
     sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

145. To compete effectively in the local exchange market, competing
     carriers must be able to perform pre-ordering functions and
     interact with their customers as quickly and efficiently as the
     incumbent.[^435] The Commission previously has determined that a
     slower, less efficient process would have a significant impact on a
     competing carrier's ability to compete.[^436] For example,
     competing carriers must be able to retrieve a prospective
     customer's service record and other pre-order information in
     substantially the same time that it takes a BOC's retail
     representative to access the same information. A slower process can
     lead to delay while a prospective customer is on the line, causing
     the customer to view the competing carrier as a less efficient
     competitor than the BOC.[^437] Such a delay would also increase a
     carrier's operating costs and impede its ability to engage in
     aggressive marketing campaigns.[^438]

146. Our finding that Bell Atlantic processes pre-order inquiries from
     competing carriers in substantially the same time that it takes to
     process analogous retail transactions is based on Bell Atlantic's
     performance data.[^439] Bell Atlantic reports pre-order response
     times[^440] according to a performance standard of "parity plus
     four seconds" established by the New York Commission based on a
     consensus reached in the Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative
     proceeding.[^441] Given the additional security measures and
     computer translations needed to process pre-order transactions from
     competing carriers,[^442] we find that the "parity plus four
     seconds" standard is a reasonable and appropriate measure of
     whether Bell Atlantic processes pre-order transactions for
     competing carriers in substantially the same time that it processes
     its own pre-order transactions.

147. Performance data from August through September 1999 show that Bell
     Atlantic responds to pre-order inquiries from competing carriers in
     substantially the same time that it responds to analogous pre-order
     inquiries from retail representatives.[^443] Where Bell Atlantic
     deviated from the parity standard, it did so by only a fraction of
     a second for some pre-order functions, and less than two seconds
     for all others.[^444] Although a few commenters claim that these
     disparities are significant,[^445] we disagree and find that the
     slight variations in response times are not likely to impair the
     ability of a competing carrier to negotiate a service order while a
     customer is on the line. We also find no evidence in the record
     that these slight deviations have impacted a competing carrier's
     ability to conduct an aggressive marketing campaign or to compete
     effectively in the local exchange market. We therefore do not find
     that the slight deviations warrant a finding that Bell Atlantic
     does not return pre-order transactions for competing carriers in
     substantially the same time that it does for itself. We are
     nonetheless prepared to take appropriate enforcement action should
     the deviations in response times become more commercially
     significant or widespread.

148. We reject commenters' assertions that Bell Atlantic's performance
     measurements do not accurately reflect pre-order response times
     experienced by carriers,[^446] given the measures that Bell
     Atlantic implemented prior to filing its application that capture
     pre-order response time more accurately.[^447] Specifically, as
     agreed to in the New York Commission's Carrier-to-Carrier
     collaborative proceeding, Bell Atlantic generates pre-order
     response time measurements using the EnView system (formerly called
     Sentinel).[^448] Instead of timing actual pre-order transactions,
     EnView simulates pre-ordering transactions for both competing
     carriers and Bell Atlantic's retail operations using
     "robots."[^449] These robots send periodic pre-order inquiries, at
     least ten transactions per hour for each transaction type, into
     Bell Atlantic's back office pre-ordering systems 24 hours a day,
     seven days a week. The response times reported in the metrics are
     monthly averages of the average daily transactions captured from
     8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.[^450] Prior to
     August, the EnView system reported response times only for Bell
     Atlantic's older Electronic Interface Format (EIF) interface. In
     August, at the request of the New York Commission staff, Bell
     Atlantic began separately measuring and reporting response times
     for the EDI interface and, for both interfaces, began measuring
     transaction time from receipt of the request at the Bell Atlantic
     firewall to return of the response through the Bell Atlantic
     firewall.[^451]

149. We find that the changes implemented in August significantly
     improved the accuracy of the EnView system as a measure of
     pre-order response time.[^452] Specifically, we find that the
     EnView system simulates pre-order transactions for all active
     pre-ordering interfaces;[^453] mirrors the type of transactions
     performed by Bell Atlantic retail representatives during retail
     service hours; and captures the entire time that the transaction
     passes through Bell Atlantic systems, including the firewall. Even
     though evidence of actual pre-order response time would also be
     useful for our analysis, we conclude that the EnView system is a
     suitable measure of the time that a carrier or retail
     representative's pre-order request traverses Bell Atlantic's
     systems. As more carriers access Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering
     systems through EDI and CORBA, however, we encourage the New York
     Commission to continue to work with Bell Atlantic and competing
     carriers to ensure that the EnView simulation system continues to
     accurately reflect Bell Atlantic's retail operations (in terms of
     variability of transactions and service hours) and capture response
     times properly.

150. We further find that, in addition to accommodating current demand,
     Bell Atlantic demonstrates that its pre-ordering systems and
     interfaces are scalable to handle reasonably foreseeable demand
     volumes.[^454] We base our conclusion on Bell Atlantic's current
     performance and KPMG's findings. We find that Bell Atlantic
     processed more than 1.3 million pre-ordering transactions from
     January through July 1999, with more than 200,000 processed in July
     alone.[^455] In addition, KPMG found that Bell Atlantic's
     pre-ordering interfaces and systems are capable of handling
     projected year-end 1999 volumes.[^456] KPMG also evaluated Bell
     Atlantic's network architecture and found that its systems have
     sufficient capacity to meet expected future usage volumes.[^457]

151. We also reject assertions by AT&T and MCI WorldCom that Bell
     Atlantic is not providing parsed CSR responses in competitive
     timeframes.[^458] As discussed above, parsed CSR functionality is
     necessary for carriers to integrate CSR data into their own back
     office systems. Because Bell Atlantic's retail representatives do
     not retrieve parsed CSRs, Bell Atlantic must provide access to
     parsed CSR functionality that affords an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

152. As an initial matter, we recognize that, for parsed CSR retrieval,
     unlike other pre-ordering transactions, Bell Atlantic must perform
     the additional step of parsing CSR information into identifiable
     fields prior to sending the information to the carrier. In light of
     this extra processing step, Bell Atlantic and competing carriers
     agreed in the Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative that the performance
     standard applicable to other pre-ordering response times should be
     modified for parsed CSR retrieval.[^459] Specifically, in late
     September, Bell Atlantic agreed to measure the timeliness of parsed
     CSR information according to a standard of "parity with retail
     unparsed CSR plus ten seconds," based on simulated
     transactions.[^460] Moreover, in the present proceeding, MCI
     WorldCom supports a similar ten-second standard for parsed CSR
     retrieval.[^461] Accordingly, we find that, for purposes of our
     analysis, a performance standard of parity with unparsed CSR retail
     response time plus ten seconds is a reasonable and appropriate
     measure of whether Bell Atlantic processes parsed CSR inquiries in
     a manner that allows an efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity
     to compete.

153. Performance data indicates that Bell Atlantic provides timely
     access to parsed CSRs. In response to commenters' claims regarding
     parsed CSR timeliness, Bell Atlantic submitted data on reply
     showing that in early October Bell Atlantic took, on average, 7.42
     seconds to respond to parsed CSR inquiries.[^462] Although AT&T and
     MCI WorldCom assert that it takes much longer to receive parsed CSR
     responses,[^463] in view of the general and conclusory nature of
     their assertions, we have no confidence that the claimed longer
     response times are attributable to Bell Atlantic and not to delay
     in AT&T's or MCI WorldCom's own systems.[^464] Accordingly, we find
     these allegations insufficient to refute Bell Atlantic's
     performance data. We therefore conclude that the record evidence
     demonstrates that Bell Atlantic is processing parsed CSRs in a
     manner that affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.

154. *Interface Availability*. We conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that its interfaces[^465] are available in a manner
     that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^466] A stable, reliable pre-ordering interface is
     necessary for competing carriers to market their services and serve
     their customers as efficiently and at the same level of quality
     that Bell Atlantic provides to itself. The Commission previously
     has found that the unavailability of an interface could directly
     and negatively affect a carrier's interaction with its
     customers.[^467]

155. Bell Atlantic measures EDI interface availability 24 hours a day
     using the EnView emulation system.[^468] Based on the
     Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative proceeding, the New York
     Commission established a performance standard requiring that Bell
     Atlantic's interfaces be available at least 99.5 percent of their
     scheduled availability during prime-time hours, using simulated
     responses.[^469] As an initial matter, we find that the designation
     of prime time hours from 6:00 a.m. to 12:00 a.m., Monday through
     Saturday, appropriately captures critical hours in which competing
     carriers access the interfaces. Given the broad designation of
     prime time, we find the 99.5-percent standard a reasonable and
     appropriate measure of whether Bell Atlantic's interfaces are
     sufficiently available to afford an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete. Although competing carriers may
     also input pre-order transactions outside of these hours, we find
     it unlikely that they will have a customer on the line during those
     hours. For this reason, minor interface downtime during non-prime
     time hours is not as likely to deprive an efficient competitor of a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^470] We therefore find that
     Bell Atlantic's interface availability during non-prime time hours
     is a less important indicator of its ability to provide
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS functions.[^471]

156. We base our conclusion that Bell Atlantic's interfaces are
     sufficiently available on performance data from July through
     September 1999 showing that Bell Atlantic's interfaces were
     generally available as scheduled.[^472] For prime time hours, the
     EDI interface was available 100 percent of its scheduled time in
     July and August 1999, and 99.94 percent in September.[^473] During
     non-prime time, the EDI interface was available 99.9 percent of its
     scheduled time in June and 100 percent in July and August.[^474]
     Although the availability dropped to 97.01 percent in
     September,[^475] because we place less emphasis on this metric, we
     do not consider unavailability for three percent of non-prime time
     hours to present a barrier to an efficient competitor's ability to
     meaningfully compete by completing transactions in a timely manner.

157. We also base our conclusion on KPMG's verification that Bell
     Atlantic's interfaces are consistently available during scheduled
     hours of operation. Despite noting some instances of connectivity
     interruption or system unavailable error messages, KPMG found that
     Bell Atlantic's EDI and Web GUI interfaces for pre-ordering and
     ordering were "consistently available."[^476] Furthermore, in its
     limited test of parsed CSR functionality, KPMG did not experience
     any outages or system unavailable errors.[^477] We also note that,
     following the KMPG test results, Bell Atlantic improved its File
     Transfer Protocol (FTP) process to resend files automatically and
     to alarm Bell Atlantic support staff if FTP transmissions are not
     successful.[^478] Given the evidence in the record, we reject
     claims by AT&T and MCI WorldCom that Bell Atlantic's interfaces are
     not available sufficiently to afford competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^479]

#### Ordering

158. In this section we address Bell Atlantic's ability to provide
     access to its OSS ordering functions to competing carriers.[^480]
     We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to its ordering systems in accordance with
     the requirements of section 271. In addition, we find that Bell
     Atlantic shows that its systems will be able to meet reasonably
     foreseeable commercial volumes in the future. We note that the New
     York Commission also concludes that Bell Atlantic is able to
     satisfactorily process orders and that its ordering systems are
     scalable.[^481] We also conclude that Bell Atlantic satisfies its
     obligation to provide access to order status and jeopardy
     information, to the extent it is available, in a nondiscriminatory
     manner. Finally, we conclude that Bell Atlantic provides
     nondiscriminatory access to order completion notification.

##### Background

159. Bell Atlantic's interfaces provide competing carriers with
     electronic access for a full range of ordering functionality.[^482]
     Competing carriers may place service orders with Bell Atlantic over
     either an EDI interface or a Web GUI. As of the filing date of this
     application, six carriers were using EDI for ordering and three
     were in the certification process, which is a precursor to the use
     of EDI.[^483] In addition, over 100 competing carriers were using
     the Web GUI at the time of filing.[^484] Once an order is received,
     Bell Atlantic responds with either a "Local Service Request
     Confirmation" (order confirmation) notice or a "Local Service
     Request Rejection" (order rejection) notice.[^485] These notices
     are important because they provide information to a competing
     carrier about whether its order has been accepted, or whether it
     has been rejected and requires resubmission.[^486]

160. Bell Atlantic generates order confirmation and rejection notices as
     a result of either mechanized or manual processing of orders, and
     returns them electronically over the GUI or EDI interface
     regardless of how they were processed.[^487] Bell Atlantic's
     operations support systems generate a mechanized order confirmation
     or rejection notice automatically (*i.e.*, without human
     intervention) if the order is able to "flow-through."[^488] For
     orders that do not flow-through, Bell Atlantic generates order
     confirmation and rejection notices after the order is manually
     processed by Bell Atlantic wholesale representatives. The
     Carrier-to-Carrier guidelines, which were established by the New
     York Commission in conjunction with Bell Atlantic and the competing
     carriers, require the return of 95 percent of *mechanized* order
     confirmation and rejection notices within two hours of submission
     to Bell Atlantic, and 95 percent of *manually* processed order
     confirmation and rejection notices under ten lines within 24 hours
     of submission.[^489] We find that this standard, developed as a
     result of a collaborative proceeding including Bell Atlantic and
     competing carriers, is generally a reasonable measure of whether
     Bell Atlantic processes orders in a manner that provides an
     efficient competing carrier with a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^490] As demonstrated below, Bell Atlantic generally meets
     these standards, and where Bell Atlantic has fallen short of the
     standards, the shortfall has not been significant.

##### Discussion

161. As an initial matter, we find that, unlike prior section 271 orders
     where the Commission began its analysis of access to ordering
     functions with a discussion of order "flow-through rates," a number
     of factors present in this application weigh against doing so
     here.[^491] Specifically, in prior orders the Commission asserted
     that the "substantial disparity between the flow-through rates of
     the \[applicant\] and those of competing carriers, on its face,
     demonstrate\[d\] a lack of parity."[^492] To the extent that these
     prior statements could be read to suggest that flow-through rates
     standing alone are a conclusive measure of nondiscriminatory access
     to ordering functions, we now clarify that when presented with
     circumstances like those in the instant record it is unnecessary to
     focus on order flow-through rates to the same degree we have in
     past orders.[^493] As explained below, the record in this
     proceeding indicates that Bell Atlantic's provision of access to
     its ordering functions is substantially better than in any other
     prior application. When considered in the context of such
     performance, we find that it would be inappropriate to consider
     order flow-through rates as the sole indicia of parity.

162. The Commission has, in part, used order flow-through as a potential
     indicator of a wide range of problems that underlie a determination
     of whether a BOC provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.
     Where, as in this application, other evidence shows that such
     problems do not exist, however, it is unnecessary to center our
     analysis on flow-through rates.[^494] For example, in the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana* order, the Commission expressly found that the
     low order flow-through in the record was indicative of deficiencies
     in a BOC's systems for which the Commission also had other
     independent record evidence, including: (1) the failure to
     provision orders in a timely manner, (2) the failure to provide
     competing carriers with complete, up-to-date, business rules and
     ordering codes; (3) the lack of integration between pre-ordering
     and ordering functions; and (4) the failure to provide order status
     notices electronically.[^495] We have also used flow-through rates
     as an indicator of a BOC's ability to process competing carriers'
     orders, at reasonably foreseeable commercial volumes, in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^496] Flow-through rates, therefore, are
     not so much an end in themselves, but rather are a tool used to
     indicate a wide range of possible deficiencies in a BOC's OSS that
     may deny an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete in the local market.

163. Unlike the BOC systems we examined in prior orders, none of the
     specific deficiencies that we have previously associated with low
     flow-through rates is present in Bell Atlantic's systems. As
     discussed above, Bell Atlantic provides virtually all order status
     notices electronically,[^497] provides complete, up-to-date,
     business rules and ordering codes,[^498] makes integrated
     pre-ordering and ordering interfaces available through EDI,[^499]
     and, as discussed below, provisions orders in a timely
     fashion.[^500] Moreover, as discussed more fully below, we find
     that Bell Atlantic scales its system as volumes increase, and
     demonstrates its ability to continue to do so at reasonably
     foreseeable volumes. As a result, in this application flow-through
     has significantly less value as an indicator of deficiencies of
     Bell Atlantic's OSS. Thus, a different analysis is warranted.
     Specifically, in light of the facts and circumstances of this
     application, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's overall ability to
     return timely order confirmation and rejection notices, accurately
     process manually handled orders, and scale its systems is more
     relevant and probative for analyzing Bell Atlantic's ability to
     provide access to its ordering functions than a simple flow-through
     analysis. We note that this approach is consistent with the New
     York Commission's view that Bell Atlantic's order flow-through is
     not the only indicator of Bell Atlantic's ability to process orders
     in a nondiscriminatory fashion or to meet significant increases in
     order volumes.[^501]

###### Unbundled Network Element Orders

164. We find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is providing
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions for
     unbundled network elements (*i.e.*, UNE-loop and UNE-platform). We
     note that Bell Atlantic supports its application with
     Carrier-to-Carrier performance data, which aggregates UNE-loop and
     UNE-platform data, and the New York Commission based its initial
     comments on this aggregated data.[^502] Although we analyze Bell
     Atlantic's provision of ordering access using primarily aggregated
     UNE data, we conclude that our analysis would yield the same
     results were we to examine disaggregated data.[^503] In recent
     months Bell Atlantic has met, or has come very close to meeting,
     the strict benchmark standards for on-time processing of unbundled
     network element orders established in the Carrier-to-Carrier
     proceeding.[^504] According to the New York Commission's own
     calculations, Bell Atlantic's performance in providing on-time
     order confirmation and rejection notices, whether manually
     processed or mechanized, was about 94 percent for August and
     September and has been trending upwards.[^505] Similarly, in recent
     months Bell Atlantic's average time for returning an order
     confirmation or rejection notice, whether manual or mechanized, was
     between six and eight hours and has also been improving.[^506] We
     note that even when orders are manually processed by Bell Atlantic,
     competing carriers are still receiving their order status notices
     electronically and, for nearly all of their orders, within
     twenty-four hours of placing the order. Notably, Bell Atlantic has
     improved its on-time performance despite the fact that monthly
     volumes of UNE orders have increased from over 8,600 orders in
     January to almost 70,000 orders in September.[^507] Accordingly, we
     find that Bell Atlantic's ability to process nearly all competing
     carrier UNE orders in under 24 hours, and a majority of such orders
     within two hours of submission, provides an efficient competing
     carrier with a meaningful opportunity to compete. Should Bell
     Atlantic's performance deteriorate, however, we will be prepared to
     take appropriate enforcement action.

165. We note that Bell Atlantic's ability to process such large order
     volumes in a timely fashion is in stark contrast to any BOC's
     performance the Commission has considered in previous section 271
     proceedings.[^508] The record indicates that Bell Atlantic is able
     to process orders more quickly than other BOCs in prior section 271
     proceedings. For example, in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana*
     *Order* the Commission noted that BellSouth only returned order
     confirmation notices, on average, over 18 to 19 hours after it
     received an order, and over 21 to 27 percent of such notices were
     returned beyond a 24 hour interval.[^509] In contrast, in recent
     months Bell Atlantic has returned order confirmation notices, on
     average, within about five to eight hours and, as discussed above,
     returns nearly all order confirmation and rejection notices within
     24 hours.[^510]

166. Even considering Bell Atlantic's flow-through,[^511] however, we
     conclude that the Carrier-to-Carrier flow-through rate is not
     reflective of the actual flow-through capabilities of Bell
     Atlantic's systems.[^512] The record shows that Bell Atlantic's
     systems are *capable* of providing high levels of order
     flow-through, but are dependent, in part, on the performance of
     competing carriers to achieve high rates. We first examine
     commercial usage data because it is the most probative evidence
     that Bell Atlantic's ordering systems are operationally
     ready.[^513] To obtain the most accurate picture of a competing
     carrier's ability to access Bell Atlantic's ordering functions we
     look to the actual flow-through rates of individual carriers.
     Flow-through rates disaggregated by carrier show that the rates for
     competing carriers submitting UNE-platform orders in September
     range from about 1 to 83 percent.[^514] Similarly, the rates for
     carriers submitting UNE-loop orders range from about 1 to74 percent
     in September.[^515] Because all competing carriers interface with
     the same Bell Atlantic system, this wide range of results strongly
     implies that the competitors, rather than Bell Atlantic, are
     largely responsible for any "poor" UNE flow-through performance.
     For example, one such cause is competing carrier error. Bell
     Atlantic manually corrects certain types of errors in competing
     carrier orders, rather than rejecting such orders. [^516] The New
     York Commission found that over 30 percent of the orders that fail
     to flow-through are caused by such errors.[^517] In its evaluation,
     the New York Commission attributes the "bulk" of the competing
     carrier errors to typographical errors and notes that such errors
     should be eliminated with the implementation of integrated
     pre-order and order interfaces.[^518]

167. In prior orders the Commission has noted that a BOC is not
     accountable for flow-through problems that are attributable to
     competing carriers' errors.[^519] The Commission has previously
     rejected BOCs' claims that competing carrier "error" caused orders
     to be rejected or to fail to flow-through because we could not make
     a judgment regarding how many of the errors the BOC attributed to
     the competing carriers should have been assigned to the BOC for
     failure to provide clear business rules or integrated pre-ordering
     and ordering interfaces.[^520] We find that the record in this
     application demonstrates that Bell Atlantic's integration of its
     interfaces and timely and up-to-date business rules supports Bell
     Atlantic and the New York Commission's contention that such
     competing carrier errors are attributable to the actions of
     competing carriers. Based upon this evidence, we find that the bulk
     of these "errors" can be properly attributed to competing carriers
     that, for example, choose not to integrate their interfaces, do not
     adequately train and manage their employees, or do not invest in
     the necessary systems.

168. Second, KPMG's test also supports our conclusion that Bell
     Atlantic's systems are capable of achieving high rates of order
     flow-through. KPMG tested the ability of EDI and GUI orders to flow
     from competing carriers through the interface into the Bell
     Atlantic ordering system without human intervention.[^521] KPMG's
     test shows that Bell Atlantic's systems can achieve UNE-platform
     flow-through rates of over 99 percent and UNE-loop flow-through of
     over 85 percent for orders designed to flow-through.[^522] KPMG
     also found that over 99 percent of all UNE orders designed to
     flow-through did so at stress volume levels.[^523] Although higher
     than the rates reflecting commercial usage, we conclude that KPMG's
     test indicates that Bell Atlantic's systems are capable of
     achieving high levels of flow-through.[^524]

169. Although we recognize that the Department of Justice and commenters
     assert that the level of manual processing in Bell Atlantic's
     system suggests that Bell Atlantic's systems are not scalable, we
     believe that the totality of the evidence demonstrates Bell
     Atlantic's systems are scalable.[^525] In addition to showing its
     systems are handling current volumes of UNE orders in a
     nondiscriminatory manner, we find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates
     that its ordering systems will be able to handle reasonably
     foreseeable commercial volumes of such orders in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. We base our conclusion on Bell Atlantic's
     performance and the KPMG Final Report. As discussed above, Bell
     Atlantic has shown its ability to manually process orders in a
     timely and accurate fashion. As the New York Commission points out,
     Bell Atlantic has a track record of commercial performance that
     shows its ability to process orders in a timely fashion while
     demand increases.[^526] For example, as noted above, despite
     tremendous increases in monthly UNE order volumes from over 8,600
     orders in January to almost 70,000 orders in September, Bell
     Atlantic has consistently increased its overall UNE on-time
     performance for the processing of order status notices.[^527]
     Moreover, as discussed above, actual carrier data and KPMG's test
     shows that Bell Atlantic's systems are *capable* of achieving high
     levels of UNE order flow-through.[^528] Thus, contrary to the
     Department of Justice's assertions, we conclude that the evidence
     discussed above supports a finding that Bell Atlantic's ordering
     systems will be able to handle reasonably foreseeable commercial
     volumes of competing carrier orders in a nondiscriminatory manner
     and, as such, provides competing carriers a meaningful opportunity
     to compete. Finally, we note that Bell Atlantic's recent commitment
     to implement improvements to its OSS demonstrates that Bell
     Atlantic will continue to scale its systems to accommodate the
     expected increase in competing carrier UNE-platform order
     volumes.[^529]

170. Moreover, Bell Atlantic has shown its commitment to maintain, and
     even improve upon, its current level of performance. Although not
     determinative of this issue, our confidence that Bell Atlantic\'s
     systems are scalable also stems, in part, from Bell Atlantic's
     commitment to working with competing carriers to increase their
     individual order flow-through performance and reduce the number of
     rejection notices they receive. For example, Bell Atlantic has
     committed to initiate monthly workshops to address order
     quality.[^530] At these workshops, Bell Atlantic will provide
     generic examples of orders that failed to meet flow-through
     criteria and suggested steps for improving orders.[^531] Bell
     Atlantic believes this will "serve to improve \[competing carrier\]
     order quality, reduce \[order\] rejects, and improve the overall
     flow-through rate."[^532] In addition, Bell Atlantic has committed
     to work with competing carriers on an individual basis to address
     their specific and unique order quality concerns.[^533] We are
     encouraged by these proposed refinements as they indicate an
     intention on the part of Bell Atlantic to further enhance the
     scalability of its OSS systems, thereby ensuring that it will
     continue to process orders in a timely and accurate manner.

171. We also come to a different conclusion than the Department of
     Justice and commenters with regard to Bell Atlantic's accuracy for
     manually processed orders.[^534] Although we recognize that
     manually processed orders are more prone to error than orders that
     are processed automatically, there is no reliable evidence that
     this is the case in the instant application or that Bell Atlantic's
     manual processing of orders injects a level of error that prevents
     efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. Bell
     Atlantic measures the accuracy of its manual processes in at least
     two ways: (1) accuracy of order confirmation notices (order
     confirmation accuracy); and (2) overall accuracy of competing
     carrier orders entered into its service order processor (service
     order accuracy).

172. Bell Atlantic's order confirmation accuracy metric is obtained by
     comparing certain fields in an order submitted by a competing
     carrier with the order confirmation notice issued by a Bell
     Atlantic representative.[^535] In recent months, Bell Atlantic's
     performance metrics range between 95 and 99 percent accuracy for
     UNE order confirmation notices.[^536] AT&T and the Department of
     Justice, however, claim that Bell Atlantic's order confirmation
     accuracy for loop orders is not accurately reflected in this
     metric.[^537] Specifically, the Department of Justice notes that
     during a July Technical Conference before the New York Commission,
     Bell Atlantic stated that its rate of returning accurate order
     confirmation notices for loop orders at the time was between 60 and
     70 percent.[^538] AT&T alleges that data AT&T compiled shows that
     between June 21 and August 31 Bell Atlantic returned inaccurate
     order confirmation notices for more than 50 percent of hot cut loop
     orders.[^539] In the face of this discrepancy, we rely upon the New
     York Commission's conclusion that the disparity results in part
     from disagreement regarding the information that should be included
     in the order confirmation notices because the New York Commission
     has had greater opportunity to analyze this issue in the context of
     the collaborative process.[^540] Moreover, in its reply comments,
     Bell Atlantic states that subsequent improvements to its process
     for returning order confirmation notices caused it to reach levels
     of order confirmation accuracy for loop orders of more than 95
     percent since the July Technical Conference.[^541] We are also
     satisfied that AT&T's claims have been largely remedied by the
     parties' agreement to include specific information in order
     confirmation notices for loop orders.[^542] Contrary to the
     Department of Justice, we therefore find that, based upon all the
     relevant record evidence, AT&T's claims do not warrant a finding
     that Bell Atlantic's order confirmation accuracy rate for loop
     orders is commercially significant.

173. The Department of Justice and commenters also assert that Bell
     Atlantic's "service order accuracy" metric shows that Bell Atlantic
     is unable to accurately process manual orders.[^543] This metric
     compares the order submitted by a competing carrier with the
     completed Bell Atlantic service order.[^544] The metric is compiled
     each business day by Bell Atlantic from an audit of a random sample
     of orders.[^545] Bell Atlantic contends the metric is flawed
     because it attributes to Bell Atlantic as errors all differences
     between the original competing carrier order and the order
     information entered in its service order processor.[^546] Thus,
     according to Bell Atlantic, this metric actually counts as Bell
     Atlantic errors those cases where Bell Atlantic has fixed an error
     in a competing carrier order.[^547]

174. In support of its contention that this metric is flawed, on reply,
     Bell Atlantic submitted an analysis of a random sample of
     orders.[^548] We are persuaded by Bell Atlantic's analysis that its
     service order accuracy metric is flawed and that its actual level
     of service order accuracy is significantly higher than reflected in
     its performance data. We believe that Bell Atlantic's position is
     further buttressed by its performance on the installation quality
     performance metrics, which measure, among other things, whether the
     services requested by the end user were accurately installed.[^549]
     These metrics show that Bell Atlantic has consistently provided
     service with very low levels of reported installation troubles, as
     compared to the service it provides its own customers.[^550] Given
     the totality of the evidence described above, including Bell
     Atlantic's analysis and its performance on the installation quality
     metrics, we find that Bell Atlantic's accuracy in processing manual
     orders is sufficient to provide competing carriers with a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

175. Moreover, we do not share the Department of Justice's concern about
     the rate of competing carrier orders rejected by Bell
     Atlantic.[^551] Bell Atlantic has reported that on average it
     rejected between about 27 and 34 percent of the UNE orders that it
     received during June through September.[^552] Although the
     Department of Justice recognized that Bell Atlantic is not
     responsible for orders that are rejected because of competing
     carrier error, it expressed concern that some of the rejections may
     occur for reasons within Bell Atlantic's control.[^553] Ultimately,
     the Department of Justice concluded that it did not have sufficient
     information to determine the extent to which Bell Atlantic is, if
     at all, responsible for the level of rejected orders.[^554] We
     note, however, that in reaching its conclusion the Department of
     Justice did not discuss the evidence submitted by Bell Atlantic
     revealing that order rejections greatly vary on an individual
     carrier basis from 3 percent to greater than 70 percent.[^555] We
     agree with Bell Atlantic that this wide variation in the individual
     rates strongly implies that the care a competing carrier takes in
     submitting its orders makes a significant difference in the rate at
     which its orders are rejected.[^556] Accordingly, because we
     conclude the average rejection rate is overstated, we do not accord
     it as significant weight in this application as the other factors
     discussed in this section, such as Bell Atlantic's overall ability
     to return order confirmation and rejection notices, accurately
     process manually handled orders, and scale its systems.

176. We also conclude that AT&T and MCI's assertions that they have not
     received order confirmation or rejection notices for all of their
     orders are insufficient to rebut Bell Atlantic's evidence showing
     compliance with the requirements of this checklist item.[^557]
     Although we do not discount the importance of receiving an order
     confirmation or rejection notice for every order, the present
     record, including AT&T and MCI's claims, does not indicate that, to
     the extent any lapses exist, such failures are a systemic
     problem.[^558] Rather, they appear to be isolated problems
     attributable to either Bell Atlantic or the commenters. We note
     that we do not hold Bell Atlantic to a standard of perfection. If
     it were a systemic problem occurring for a significant number of
     orders, however, it would warrant a finding of noncompliance.

177. Thus after careful consideration of the evaluations of the
     Department of Justice and the New York Commission, as well as of
     the commenters, we find that the record demonstrates that Bell
     Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory access to its ordering
     functions for UNEs. Although our conclusion differs from that
     reached by the Department of Justice, we reach it by focusing, in
     part, on the timely return of order confirmation and rejection
     notices. Unlike the Department of Justice and various commenters,
     we place less importance on flow-through rates than in past orders
     because the deficiencies that we have previously associated with
     low flow-through rates are not present in Bell Atlantic's
     systems.[^559] Moreover, as explained above, we agree with the New
     York Commission that Bell Atlantic has shown that it is able to
     handle significant increases in order volumes and will be able to
     continue to do so at reasonably foreseeable order volumes. We also
     find that Bell Atlantic is able to manually process orders in an
     accurate manner.[^560] Finally, as noted above, the Department of
     Justice explicitly did not analyze Bell Atlantic's application
     under the competitive checklist of section 271(c)(2)(B) as we are
     required to do. Accordingly, we find that Bell Atlantic's overall
     ability to return timely order confirmation and rejection notices,
     accurately process manually handled orders, and scale its systems
     supports a finding that Bell Atlantic offers competing carriers a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

###### Resale Ordering

178. We also find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is providing
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions for resale
     services and, therefore, provides efficient competitors a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^561] As an initial matter, we
     note that there are virtually no objections from commenters to Bell
     Atlantic's provision of access to its ordering functions for resale
     services. Moreover, neither the Department of Justice nor the New
     York Commission found problems with Bell Atlantic's provision of
     access to its resale service ordering functions.[^562]

179. Although we recognize that the rate of flow-through of resale
     orders was an area of major concern in prior orders, as we explain
     above, it is of less concern here given the absence of the
     deficiencies that we have previously found to be associated with
     low order flow-through rates and Bell Atlantic's significantly
     better performance than seen in prior section 271 applications.
     Rather, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's overall ability, in light
     of the facts and circumstances of this application, to return
     timely confirmation and rejection notices accurately process
     manually handled orders, and process reasonably foreseeable
     commercial volumes in a nondiscriminatory manner is more relevant
     and probative for analyzing Bell Atlantic's provision of access to
     its ordering functions for resale services than a simple
     flow-through analysis. Thus, given these circumstances and evidence
     of other performance measures indicating that the access Bell
     Atlantic provides to its ordering functions offers efficient
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete, we place less
     emphasis on flow-through rates in this order than we have in prior
     orders.

180. In recent months Bell Atlantic has met, or has come very close to
     meeting, the strict benchmark standards set in the New York
     Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding. As discussed above, the
     Carrier-to-Carrier guidelines require the return of 95 percent of
     *mechanized* order confirmation and rejection notices within two
     hours of submission to Bell Atlantic, and 95 percent of *manually*
     processed order confirmation and rejection notices under ten lines
     within 24 hours of submission.[^563] Bell Atlantic has met, or has
     come close to meeting, these standards in recent months.[^564]
     According to the New York Commission's own calculations, this means
     that Bell Atlantic returned between 93 and 97 percent of all order
     confirmation and rejection notices on time for the months of June
     through September.[^565] We note that Bell Atlantic's average
     performance for returning an order confirmation or rejection
     notice, whether manual or mechanized, in recent months was between
     approximately four and seven hours.[^566] Bell Atlantic has
     achieved this reliable performance while resale order volumes have
     ranged from 14,000 orders to 23,000 orders monthly from January
     through September.[^567] Finally, we note that Bell Atlantic's
     ability to process relatively large volumes of orders in a timely
     and wholly electronic fashion is significantly better than the
     performance of the other BOCs in prior applications.[^568]
     Accordingly, we find that Bell Atlantic's ability to process nearly
     all competing carrier resale orders in under 24 hours, and nearly
     half of such orders within two hours of submission, provides a
     competing carrier with a meaningful opportunity to compete. Should
     Bell Atlantic's performance deteriorate, however, we will be
     prepared to take appropriate enforcement action.

181. Even considering Bell Atlantic's flow-through performance, [^569]
     however, we find that Bell Atlantic is providing an efficient
     competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. As we concluded in
     our discussion of UNE ordering, the record shows that the average
     flow-through rate provided in the Carrier-to-Carrier reports do not
     reflect the actual flow-through capabilities of Bell Atlantic's
     systems. An examination of flow-through rates of individual
     competing carriers ordering resale services from Bell Atlantic show
     flow-through rates in September ranging from about one to 82
     percent.[^570] Because all carriers ordering resale services from
     Bell Atlantic interface with the same Bell Atlantic systems, we
     conclude that this wide range of results for competitors strongly
     implies that competitors are likely more responsible for low
     average flow-through performance than Bell Atlantic.[^571]
     Moreover, the KPMG Final Report supports a finding that Bell
     Atlantic's systems are capable of high flow-through for resale
     orders, as KPMG found that over 99 percent of all resale orders
     designed to flow-through did so at normal and stress levels.[^572]

182. We also find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is capable of
     providing nondiscriminatory access to its resale ordering functions
     at reasonably foreseeable volumes. Although, as mentioned above,
     Bell Atlantic processes significant volumes of resale orders, the
     record does not indicate an upward trend in those monthly
     volumes.[^573] We do not believe that the volumes of resale orders
     are likely to grow to the same degree as we expect volumes of UNE
     orders to increase in the foreseeable future. As the Department of
     Justice recognized, resale service in New York is principally used
     as a "transitional tool on the way to facilities based
     competition."[^574] Thus, because we do not expect monthly volumes
     of resale orders to increase substantially above the volumes that
     Bell Atlantic has shown it is currently capable of processing in a
     manner that provides competitors with a meaningful opportunity to
     compete, we are satisfied that Bell Atlantic will meet future
     demand for reasonably foreseeable volumes of resale orders.
     Moreover, we note that Bell Atlantic has shown its willingness and
     ability to accommodate the needs of its wholesale customers as
     their needs grow increasingly complex.[^575] Should our predictive
     judgment concerning future volumes of resale orders prove
     inaccurate, and should Bell Atlantic's performance in processing
     such orders deteriorate, we fully expect to take appropriate
     enforcement action.

183. Finally, as we concluded in our discussion of UNE ordering, we find
     that Bell Atlantic demonstrates adequate performance with respect
     to order accuracy and order rejection for resale services. First,
     the Carrier-to-Carrier data indicate that Bell Atlantic has
     consistently provided service with very low levels of reported
     installation troubles, as compared to the service it provides its
     own customers,[^576] and accurate order confirmation notices.[^577]
     Moreover, for the reasons discussed above with regard to UNE
     ordering, we disregard Bell Atlantic's low reported performance for
     service order accuracy.[^578] Second, we find that Bell Atlantic's
     overall rejection rate for resale orders more accurately reflects
     the particular capabilities of individual competing carriers,
     rather than deficiencies in Bell Atlantic's systems. The
     Carrier-to-Carrier rejection rates for resale orders in recent
     months indicate that, on average, Bell Atlantic rejects between
     about 23 and 31 percent of resale orders submitted by competing
     carriers.[^579] When examined on an individual carrier basis,
     however, rejection rates vary from three to 73 percent.[^580] As we
     concluded for UNE rejection rates, we find that this wide variation
     in individual rates strongly implies that the ability of a
     competing carrier to submit accurate orders significantly affects
     the rate at which its orders are rejected. Because we conclude the
     average rejection rate is overstated, we do not accord it as
     significant weight in this application as the other factors
     discussed in this section. Rather, it is Bell Atlantic's overall
     ability to return timely order confirmation and rejection notices,
     accurately process manually handled orders, and scale its systems
     that supports our finding that Bell Atlantic affords competitors a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.

###### Jeopardies

184. We conclude that Bell Atlantic makes order status and "jeopardy"
     information (*i.e.,* notice that a service installation due date
     will be missed) available to competing carriers in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. Bell Atlantic explains that it makes this
     information available to competing carriers in several ways. First,
     it provides electronic access to jeopardy notices contained in Open
     Query System reports, which are generated three times daily from
     its Work Force Administration (WFA) system.[^581] The WFA system is
     updated by field technicians and reflects whether an order is
     pending, has been completed, or has been (or will be) missed.[^582]
     Competitors thus can retrieve this information and "determine
     whether there is a problem on a given order."[^583] Bell Atlantic
     also indicates that competing carriers may check on the status of
     an order in WFA or in the Service Order Processor (SOP) through the
     pre-ordering interfaces, or by calling one of Bell Atlantic's
     dispatch centers.[^584] Like their counterparts at competing
     carriers, Bell Atlantic's retail representatives also must take
     steps to determine whether there is any indication that an
     appointment will be missed, or has been missed. Specifically, Bell
     Atlantic states that its retail representatives may check the
     status of an order by querying the WFA system, by querying SOP, or
     by calling a dispatch center.[^585]

185. We conclude that the order status and jeopardy information system
     created by Bell Atlantic for wholesale orders is nondiscriminatory
     because it allows competing carriers to access order status and
     "jeopardy" information, to the extent that it is available, in
     substantially the same time and manner as Bell Atlantic's retail
     operations can access such information.[^586] We thus disagree with
     AT&T's suggestion that Bell Atlantic's inability to *actively*
     provide electronic jeopardy notices, instead of merely providing
     access to such information, reflects discriminatory access to its
     ordering functionality.[^587] We also disagree with NorthPoint's
     suggestion that Bell Atlantic must create a process for providing
     "notice *before* the due date that it is going to miss the due
     date."[^588] Although we recognize that a system designed to
     deliver jeopardy notification well in advance of missed
     appointments would lessen the impact of such misses, we reiterate
     that the standard sought in this instance is *nondiscriminatory
     access* to Bell Atlantic's OSS. Accordingly, we do not require Bell
     Atlantic to establish a system for creating and delivering jeopardy
     notifications to competing carriers that is superior to the system
     Bell Atlantic has for its own retail representatives or customers.

186. Although Bell Atlantic does not actually deliver jeopardy notices
     to competing carriers with respect to provisioning resale services,
     individual UNEs and UNE-P, we note that it has established a
     mechanism for actively providing such notices in connection with
     its hot cut process. Under the "due date minus two" procedure, Bell
     Atlantic is required to check for a competing carrier's dial tone
     two days before a hot cut due date and promptly to notify the
     carrier if there is a problem.[^589] The New York Commission
     recognizes that this "allows the \[competitive LEC\] the
     opportunity to notify its customer of potential delay and, if
     necessary, postpone the due date."[^590] We commend Bell Atlantic
     for developing this "due date minus two" jeopardy process, and find
     that it appears to be critical to the proper functioning of the hot
     cut process.

###### Completion Notices

187. We conclude that Bell Atlantic provides order completion
     notification in a manner that affords an efficient competitor a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^591] An order completion notice
     informs a competing carrier that Bell Atlantic completed the
     installation of the service requested by the particular order,
     which provides notice to the carrier that it has responsibility for
     the customer's care and may begin billing the customer for
     service.[^592] Until the competing carrier receives a completion
     notice, the carrier does not know that the customer is in service,
     and cannot begin billing the customer for service or addressing any
     maintenance problems experienced by the customer.[^593] Thus,
     untimely receipt of order completion notices directly impacts a
     competing carrier's ability to serve its customers at the same
     level of quality that Bell Atlantic provides to its retail
     customers.[^594] Accordingly, the Commission has instructed a
     section 271 applicant to demonstrate that it provides competing
     carriers with order completion notices in a timely and accurate
     manner.[^595] The BOC must minimize any delay between the actual
     installation of service and the competing carrier's receipt of an
     order completion notice.[^596]

188. We base our finding that Bell Atlantic provides sufficient order
     completion notification on Bell Atlantic's provision of both
     "billing completion" and "work completion" notices to competing
     carriers. Bell Atlantic sends billing completion notices when an
     order is recorded as completed in Bell Atlantic's billing
     systems.[^597] Specifically, after Bell Atlantic's Service Order
     Processor (SOP) passes order completion information to Bell
     Atlantic's billing systems (CRIS), the billing records are updated
     overnight and billing completion notices are sent the following
     day.[^598] In August 1999, Bell Atlantic began providing "work
     completion" notices (also referred to as a "provisioning
     completion" or "field completion" notice) to inform carriers of the
     completion of the work associated with an order.[^599] For orders
     requiring physical work, when the technician reports order
     completion to Bell Atlantic's Work Force Administration (WFA), it
     generates a completion in SOP, which automatically notifies the
     competing carrier of the work completion.[^600] For orders not
     requiring physical work, SOP is automatically updated during
     overnight processing and generates a work completion notice the
     following morning. Both types of completion notices are sent to the
     carrier over the same interface used to submit the order.[^601]

189. With respect to performance data, Bell Atlantic measures billing
     completion notification timeliness, or the time that elapses from
     when an order is recorded as completed in Bell Atlantic's billing
     systems until the time Bell Atlantic distributes a billing
     completion notice to the carrier.[^602] The New York Commission,
     based on the Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative proceeding,
     established a performance standard requiring Bell Atlantic to
     return 95 percent of billing completion notices by noon the day
     following order completion in its billing system.[^603] We find
     this standard to be a reasonable and appropriate measure of whether
     Bell Atlantic provides timely notification that a service order has
     been recorded as complete in Bell Atlantic's billing systems. For
     both resale and unbundled network elements, Bell Atlantic reports
     timely return of billing completion notices for 100 percent of
     carriers' orders from June through September 1999.[^604] In
     addition, KPMG verified that Bell Atlantic returned 99 percent of
     the billing completion notices for its test orders on time.[^605]
     KPMG also found that less than one percent of the 3,000 completion
     notices lacked complete information.[^606] In light of recent Bell
     Atlantic performance and KPMG's findings, we reject AT&T's
     allegation that Bell Atlantic does not deliver timely completion
     notices.[^607]

190. We note with approval that the New York Commission recently
     required Bell Atlantic to augment its reporting of the timeliness
     of billing completion notification by also reporting the timeliness
     of work completion notification.[^608] Specifically, Bell Atlantic
     must report work completion notification timeliness and the average
     time that elapses between work completion and billing completion,
     as well as the percentage of orders where this interval exceeds one
     and five days.[^609] For the timeliness of work completion
     notification, based on the Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative, the
     New York Commission established a performance standard requiring
     Bell Atlantic to deliver 95 percent of work completion notices by
     noon the day following completion of the work associated with the
     order.[^610] We find this standard a reasonable and appropriate
     measure of work completion notification timeliness. Although Bell
     Atlantic has not begun reporting these intervals, in this case we
     do not find that the lack of this performance data warrants a
     finding of noncompliance with this checklist item.[^611]
     Nonetheless, we expect that Bell Atlantic will promptly comply with
     the standard established by the New York Commission.

191. Based on the record evidence, we reject commenters' allegations
     that Bell Atlantic frequently fails to provide completion notices
     at all, and that the missing notices are not captured in the
     performance reporting.[^612] Although we do not discount the
     importance of receiving an order completion notice for every order,
     commenters do not demonstrate that the missing notices are
     attributable to Bell Atlantic's systems. Rather, based on the
     present record, we find that the failure to receive a notice may be
     attributable to either Bell Atlantic or the interfaces and systems
     of competing carriers. As such, we find that the commenters'
     allegations are insufficient to rebut Bell Atlantic's evidentiary
     showing. If in the future we find evidence of a systematic and
     widespread failure of Bell Atlantic to deliver completion notices
     to competing carriers, we are prepared to take appropriate
     enforcement action.

192. Furthermore, we are encouraged that Bell Atlantic will provide
     fielded complex completion notifications in April 2000.[^613] This
     functionality will enable competing carriers to detect and correct
     provisioning errors early.[^614] Although Bell Atlantic has yet to
     complete implementation of this functionality, AT&T admits that the
     decision to defer implementation until April 2000 came about by an
     August 1999 vote of Bell Atlantic and competing carriers in a
     change management collaborative meeting, with AT&T
     dissenting.[^615] Accordingly, we note that the delay in
     implementing this functionality is attributable in part to
     competing carriers.

#### Provisioning

193. In this section we conclude that Bell Atlantic provisions competing
     LEC customers\' orders for UNE-P and resale POTS in substantially
     the same time and manner as it is provisioning its own retail
     customers.[^616] Our conclusion is based on the totality of the
     evidence before us. First, we find that Bell Atlantic\'s systems
     are set up to provide parity of service for provisioning wholesale
     and retail orders. Second, we conclude that evidence from the
     Carrier to Carrier metrics shows that Bell Atlantic is missing
     fewer competitive LEC customer appointments and providing equal or
     better quality installations, compared to appointments for its own
     retail customers. Third, we consider evidence concerning Average
     Completed Intervals but conclude that, due to flaws in this data,
     as evidenced by the Gertner/Bamberger study[^617] and other
     evidence, such data should be accorded less weight.

##### Background 

194. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission first addressed
     nondiscriminatory access to OSS provisioning functions in the
     context of a BOC\'s showing of compliance with checklist item
     2.[^618] The Commission concluded that Average Installation
     Interval[^619] data are critical to determining whether a BOC
     provides equivalent access to OSS because such data are \"direct
     evidence of whether \[a BOC\] takes the same time to complete
     installations for competing carriers as it does for \[itself\],
     which is integral to the concept of equivalent access.\"[^620] The
     Commission also recognized, however, that data showing average
     installation intervals, on its face, may erroneously suggest
     discriminatory conduct by a BOC because of underlying flaws in the
     manner in which the data is calculated.[^621] Such flaws may result
     in average installation intervals that appear to be longer for
     competing carriers than for a BOC, even though the BOC may be
     provisioning services for competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory
     manner. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, therefore, the
     Commission asked Ameritech to explain any underlying flaws in its
     average installation data by, for instance: (1) excluding
     transactions for customers that requested due dates beyond the
     first available due date; and (2) disaggregating by service types
     to account for the impact that different types of services may have
     on the average installation interval.[^622] At the same time, the
     Commission found that data on Missed Appointments (Due Dates Not
     Met) could be helpful \"to explain any inconsistencies between the
     average installation intervals for \[a BOC\] and other
     carriers.\"[^623] The Commission explained that evidence that due
     dates are offered to a BOC\'s retail units and to competing
     carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis has probative value, although
     it found that Ameritech had not sufficiently explained its proposal
     for submitting such evidence for the Commission to determine
     whether it would be an adequate substitute for actual installation
     interval data.[^624]

195. In the *OSS Performance Measures NPRM*, the Commission tentatively
     concluded that the Average Completion Interval and Percentage of
     Due Dates Missed metrics are most probative in assessing whether an
     incumbent LEC processes and completes orders from competing
     carriers in the same time frame in which it processes and completes
     its own retail orders.[^625] The Commission tentatively concluded
     that both of these measurements are necessary to ensure that the
     incumbent LECs are not able to mask discrimination and, therefore,
     are necessary to provide a complete picture of an incumbent LEC\'s
     ability to complete orders for competing carriers in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^626]

##### Discussion

196. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     provisions UNE-P and resale orders to competitors in substantially
     the same time and manner that it provisions these orders to itself.
     To demonstrate parity in the provision of UNE-P and resale service
     orders, Bell Atlantic provides two performance measurements, the
     Average Completed Interval and Percentage of Missed Appointments,
     and the retail analogues for these measurements.[^627]

197. *Provisioning Processes*. Based on the evidence in the record, we
     conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning processes.
     Specifically, we find that Bell Atlantic provides competitive LECs
     and its retail operations with equivalent access to information on
     available service installation dates. For non-dispatch
     orders,[^628] Bell Atlantic asserts that it makes available the
     same set of standard intervals for competing carriers and its
     retail representatives.[^629] A competitive LEC\'s customer
     representative can, for instance, offer a customer \"same day\"
     service for services such as Call Waiting, just as a Bell Atlantic
     retail representative can.[^630] For orders requiring dispatch of a
     Bell Atlantic service technician, competitive LECs have access to
     the same Smarts Clock system as do Bell Atlantic retail
     representatives.[^631]

198. Our conclusion is buttressed by KPMG\'s finding that overall, Bell
     Atlantic's provisioning processes for competing carriers are
     provided at parity with its retail operations.[^632] As part of its
     independent test of Bell Atlantic's OSS, KPMG conducted a thorough
     assessment of Bell Atlantic\'s provisioning systems.[^633] KPMG
     examined the performance of these systems in analyzing and routing
     orders, handling problems with orders, coordinating the work of
     different centers, loading translations into the switch for
     non-designed services (e.g., POTS, ISDN), and scheduling the work
     needed for dispatch and designed services. KPMG interviewed Bell
     Atlantic personnel, reviewed documentation, observed daily
     operations, and reviewed sample order files, in twelve centers
     involved in provisioning.[^634] KPMG concluded that Bell Atlantic
     satisfied all test criteria for the provisioning function.[^635]

199. We also find that Bell Atlantic provides requesting carriers with
     the same level of confidence as its own retail operations that the
     due date promised to customers will be the actual due date that the
     BOC assigns to the order when it is processed.[^636] Some
     commenters nevertheless argue that Bell Atlantic does not provide
     nondiscriminatory treatment in its provision of confirmed due
     dates.[^637] We acknowledge that there is evidence that some orders
     receive confirmed due dates later than was requested. For example,
     KPMG found that 9.7 percent of its test orders submitted through
     the EDI interface received confirmed due dates later than was
     requested.[^638] In addition, as discussed more fully below,
     evidence submitted by Bell Atlantic suggests that the average
     confirmed due date for UNE-P orders was later than the average
     requested due date by an average of 0.18 days, or 4.3 hours, for
     June-August 1999.[^639] We do not find, however, that this warrants
     a finding of checklist noncompliance. We find that the 4.3-hour
     average disparity between requested and confirmed due dates is not
     large enough to be competitively significant. We believe consumers
     are much more sensitive to whether their service is being installed
     on the arranged appointment date, as opposed to whether their
     appointment is set a little later after the originally requested
     time.[^640] We note that because 90 percent of KPMG\'s EDI UNE-P
     orders received confirmed due dates no later than requested, KPMG
     determined that it was satisfied that Bell Atlantic provisions
     confirmed due dates consistent with KPMG\'s requested due dates on
     its test orders.[^641] Thus, we agree with the New York Commission
     that Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers with confirmed
     service installation dates in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^642]

200. *Due Dates Met*. The record evidence also demonstrates that Bell
     Atlantic is meeting the service installation dates for competitive
     LEC customers at higher rates than for its own retail customers.
     The Percent Missed Appointment metric measures the percentage of
     confirmed appointments that Bell Atlantic has missed due to its own
     fault. Specifically, the data demonstrate that, over a four month
     period, Bell Atlantic has consistently met a higher percentage of
     installation appointments for competing carriers than for
     itself.[^643]

201. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that Bell Atlantic performs
     service installations for competitive LEC customers at a higher
     level of quality than for its own retail customers. The metrics
     "Percent Installation Troubles Reported Within 7 Days" and "Percent
     Installation Troubles Reported Within 30 Days" show the quality of
     Bell Atlantic's service installations by measuring customer
     troubles reported within 7 and 30 days, respectively. According to
     these metrics, a much smaller percentage of competitive LEC
     customers experiences difficulties after installation, than retail
     customers.[^644]

202. *Average Completed Interval*. In concluding that Bell Atlantic
     provisions resale and UNE-P orders for competing carriers on a
     nondiscriminatory basis, we accord little weight to data evidencing
     the average intervals in which resale and UNE-P installations are
     completed. The record contains performance data that, standing
     alone, shows that competing carriers experience longer average
     completed intervals than do Bell Atlantic retail customers.
     Although these disparities are statistically significant,[^645] we
     conclude that Bell Atlantic has presented sufficient evidence to
     demonstrate that the disparity between wholesale and retail average
     completed intervals is not the result of discriminatory conduct,
     but rather is the result of factors outside of its control and
     unrelated to the timeliness and quality of Bell Atlantic's
     provisioning of resale and UNE-P to competing carriers. As such, we
     agree with Bell Atlantic that the Average Completed Interval data
     is flawed and therefore, should be accorded little weight in our
     analysis here.

203. According to Bell Atlantic, the disparity between Average Completed
     Intervals for competitive LECs and Bell Atlantic is substantially
     caused by three factors unrelated to the timeliness of its service
     installations: (1) competitive LECs are choosing installation dates
     beyond the first installation date made available by Bell
     Atlantic's systems (the "W-coding" problem);[^646] (2) for
     non-dispatch orders, competitive LECs are ordering a relatively
     larger share of services and UNEs that have long standard intervals
     (the "order mix" problem);[^647] and (3) for dispatch orders,
     competitive LECs are ordering a relatively larger share of services
     in geographic areas that are served by busier garages and, as a
     result, reflect later available due dates (the "geographic mix"
     problem).[^648] In conjunction with its Average Completed Interval
     data, Bell Atlantic submits a study by Dr. Gertner and Dr.
     Bamberger (Gertner/Bamberger study) to support its claim that its
     Average Completed Interval data is flawed for these reasons.[^649]
     We note that although AT&T criticized some aspects of the
     Gertner/Bamberger study, no commenter disagrees with Bell
     Atlantic\'s assertions that its Average Completed Interval data is
     flawed.[^650] By submitting a study to substantiate its claims that
     the Average Completed Interval data is flawed, we note that Bell
     Atlantic\'s application is quite different from BellSouth\'s
     *Louisiana II* application. In that application, although
     BellSouth's data on its face consistently supported a general
     conclusion that BellSouth provided services to competing carriers\'
     customers in twice the amount of time that it provided services to
     its retail customers, BellSouth offered no analysis or other
     evidence that purported to explain why these data might be flawed
     or to supplement BellSouth's showing on OSS provisioning.[^651]

204. First, we find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that its average
     completed interval data for competing carriers reflects a
     disproportionate share of orders with installation dates beyond the
     first available date offered by Bell Atlantic (the "W-coding"
     problem). If competing carriers request later installation dates
     more often than Bell Atlantic, then installation intervals for
     those competing carriers will be, on average, longer than those for
     Bell Atlantic customers. Although Bell Atlantic relies upon
     competing carriers to "code" orders that include requests for
     longer-than-average provisioning intervals so that they can be
     excluded from the average completed interval measures,[^652] the
     Gertner/Bamberger study establishes that competing carriers
     "miscode" a significant percentage of non-dispatch orders, causing
     those requests to be erroneously included in the performance
     data.[^653] Although the Gertner/Bamberger study does not address
     dispatched orders, we agree with Bell Atlantic that it is likely
     that competing carriers similarly miscode dispatched orders for
     which an appointment date after the first available date is
     sought,[^654] which would result in longer average provisioning
     intervals.[^655] Furthermore, no commenter seriously challenges
     Bell Atlantic's claim that competing carriers frequently request
     installation dates beyond the first available date. Indeed, AT&T
     and MCI claim that they normally request longer intervals than the
     standard interval.[^656]

205. Second, we also find persuasive Bell Atlantic's argument that its
     average completed interval data for competing carriers'
     non-dispatch orders reflects a disproportionate share of order
     types with longer-than-average standard intervals (the "order mix"
     problem). The Gertner/Bamberger study shows that competing carriers
     order a relatively larger share of non-dispatch orders with
     longer-than-average standard intervals, which would result in
     longer average completed intervals. The study compared the average
     standard intervals for resale, UNE-P, and Bell Atlantic retail
     orders, for all orders and for orders within the standard interval
     (correctly \"W\" coded orders). The study found that for some
     months, the average standard interval was longer for wholesale
     customers than for retail customers.[^657] A difference in average
     standard intervals could cause the average completed intervals to
     be different, even if Bell Atlantic was provisioning orders in a
     nondiscriminatory fashion, and only properly coded orders were
     included in the Average Completed Interval metric. The observed
     difference in standard intervals supports the argument that there
     are differences in order mixes between wholesale and retail orders
     that will affect the average standard intervals and, therefore, the
     Average Completed Intervals for wholesale and retail orders.[^658]

206. With respect to dispatch orders, we are also persuaded by Bell
     Atlantic's argument that competing carriers experience longer
     completed intervals than its retail customers because the automatic
     appointment clock used to schedule available appointments offers
     longer average appointment intervals in some geographic areas than
     in others (the "geographic mix" problem). As a result, reported
     average completed intervals will vary depending upon where
     competitive carriers are ordering service.[^659] Average completed
     intervals for dispatch resale services and UNE-P would be longer if
     a high proportion of those competing carriers provide service to
     geographic areas with busy garages.

207. We disagree with the Department of Justice and AT&T that the gap
     between requested and completed intervals that Gertner and
     Bamberger\'s study found for wholesale UNE-P orders is evidence of
     discrimination.[^660] Specifically, the study found that the
     average requested interval was 1.39 days while the average
     completed interval was 1.57 days for orders in which competitors
     requested the standard interval over a three month period. Thus,
     the study finds a difference of 0.18 days longer in the
     provisioning intervals of wholesale orders.[^661] AT&T argues that
     this difference in the provisioning of UNE-P orders is likely to be
     statistically significant and, therefore, is evidence of
     discrimination.[^662] Both the Department of Justice and AT&T
     express concern about the even larger difference of 0.52 days,
     reported in August for UNE-P orders.[^663]

208. Gertner and Bamberger note, however, that \"requested\" due dates
     are not the same as \"confirmed\" due dates.[^664] Because Bell
     Atlantic is missing very few appointments,[^665] almost all orders
     should have completion dates that are the same as their confirmed
     due dates. Therefore the reported gap between requested and
     completed intervals is very likely caused by some orders being
     given later confirmed due dates than was requested. As discussed
     above, we do not believe that a delay of 0.18 days, or 4.3 hours,
     in the appointment date impairs the ability of a competing carrier
     to meaningfully compete. We therefore agree with Bell Atlantic that
     even though the difference may be statistically significant, it has
     no practical competitive significance.[^666]

209. In view of the conclusions of the Gertner/Bamberger study and other
     evidence submitted by Bell Atlantic that its average completed
     interval data for competing carriers is flawed, we find
     unpersuasive the claims of competing carriers that this data
     demonstrates that Bell Atlantic provisions resale services and
     UNE-P in a discriminatory manner. Although we continue to believe
     that average completed intervals can be probative in determining
     whether Bell Atlantic provisions resale services and UNE-P in a
     nondiscriminatory manner, where, as here, a BOC has made an
     adequate showing that the data on average completed intervals is
     flawed, we must consider other evidence in making our parity
     determination.[^667] Specifically, as described above, we find that
     Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers with equivalent access to
     its process for selecting service installation dates as well as its
     provisioning processes overall and with timely confirmed service
     installation dates. In addition, we find that Bell Atlantic
     consistently meets a higher percentage of installation appointments
     for competitors than for itself. Accordingly, based on the totality
     of the evidence submitted by Bell Atlantic, we conclude that Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that it is provisioning resale services and
     UNE-P to competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner as for its retail operations.

210. Our conclusion is not undermined by KPMG\'s examination of Average
     Completed Interval data, which found an unexplained half day
     difference between the Average Completed Interval for its own test
     non-dispatch UNE-P orders and Bell Atlantic\'s own retail orders,
     and for which KPMG found it was Not Satisfied.[^668] Indeed, our
     own analysis of the average completed interval data for
     non-dispatch orders for the months of June-August 1999 for
     competing carriers and Bell Atlantic using the results of the
     Gertner/Bamberger study revealed an unexplained half day difference
     as well.[^669] Like the New York Commission, however, we do not
     believe that a half day difference in provisioning intervals is
     competitively significant.[^670] Rather, we find that given that
     there will always be some limited manual processing of
     competitors\' orders, even where, as discussed below, such
     processing is considered \"timely\" as measured by performance
     metrics,[^671] such manual intervention will inevitably affect
     provisioning intervals. Under the circumstances of this
     application, where Bell Atlantic has shown that it is meeting the
     rest of the relevant provisioning performance metrics, we decline
     to find that Bell Atlantic is provisioning resale and UNE-P orders
     in a discriminatory fashion.

#### Maintenance & Repair

211. We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to maintenance and repair OSS
     functions.[^672] First, we find that Bell Atlantic has deployed the
     necessary interfaces, systems, and personnel to enable requesting
     carriers to access the same maintenance and repair functions that
     Bell Atlantic provides to itself. We then conclude that Bell
     Atlantic's systems allow carriers to access those functions in
     substantially the same time and manner as Bell Atlantic's retail
     operations. We further find that Bell Atlantic restores service to
     customers of competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner that it restores service to its own customers. Finally, we
     conclude that Bell Atlantic performs maintenance and repair work
     for customers of competing carriers at substantially the same level
     of quality that it provides to its own customers.

##### Background 

212. As part of its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS functions, Bell Atlantic must provide requesting carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair
     systems.[^673] A competing carrier that provides service through
     resale or unbundled network elements remains dependent upon the
     incumbent LEC for maintenance and repair. Because Bell Atlantic
     performs analogous maintenance and repair functions for its retail
     operations, it must provide competing carriers access that enables
     them to perform maintenance and repair functions "in substantially
     the same time and manner" as Bell Atlantic.[^674] Equivalent access
     ensures that competing carriers can assist customers experiencing
     service disruptions using the same network information and
     diagnostic tools that are available to Bell Atlantic
     personnel.[^675] Without equivalent access, a competing carrier
     would be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage, as its
     customer would perceive a problem with Bell Atlantic's network as a
     problem with the competing carrier's own network.[^676]

##### Discussion

213. *Functionality*. We conclude that Bell Atlantic offers maintenance
     and repair interfaces and systems that enable a requesting carrier
     to access all the same functions that are available to Bell
     Atlantic's retail representatives.[^677] Specifically, Bell
     Atlantic offers requesting carriers access to its maintenance and
     repair systems through a Web-based GUI electronic interface.[^678]
     Inquiries submitted over the Web GUI feed into the Repair Trouble
     Administration System (RETAS),[^679] which automatically directs
     the transaction to Bell Atlantic's back office maintenance and
     repair systems.[^680] The Web GUI enables carriers to perform the
     same functions that Bell Atlantic's retail operations perform,
     including: (i) conduct a mechanized loop test (for resale and the
     UNE platform but not for unbundled loops),[^681] (ii) create a
     trouble ticket, (iii) determine the status of a trouble
     ticket, (iv) modify a trouble ticket, (v) request cancellation of a
     trouble ticket, and (vi) request a trouble report history.[^682]
     The interface can be used for all local exchange services.[^683]
     Bell Atlantic also staffs a "Regional CLEC Maintenance Center" to
     support wholesale maintenance and repair services.

214. Commercial usage and extensive testing by KPMG show that Bell
     Atlantic provides requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access
     to maintenance and repair functionality. Thus, we find that Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that its maintenance and repair interface is
     operationally ready and capable of handling reasonably foreseeable
     demand levels. In terms of commercial usage, carriers perform more
     than 40,000 maintenance transactions per month.[^684] Furthermore,
     after evaluating Bell Atlantic's systems, performance, processes,
     documentation, network surveillance, work center operations and
     work coordination for the delivery of competing carriers'
     maintenance and repair services, KPMG verified the functionality of
     Bell Atlantic's maintenance and repair systems for competing
     carriers and found them at parity with Bell Atlantic's retail
     systems and processes.[^685] KPMG also verified that Bell
     Atlantic's retail systems were capable of handling 500 transactions
     per hour (or 4,000 in an eight-hour day).[^686]

215. We disagree with AT&T's assertion that Bell Atlantic must
     demonstrate that it provides an integratable,
     application-to-application interface for maintenance and
     repair.[^687] Bell Atlantic is obligated to provide maintenance and
     repair functionality in substantially the same time and manner that
     it provides the functionality to itself.[^688] Although the
     Commission has indicated that a BOC would afford carriers a more
     complete opportunity to compete by offering an integratable,
     application-to-application maintenance and repair interface, we
     also found that the lack of integration does not necessarily
     constitute discriminatory access, provided that the BOC otherwise
     demonstrates that it provides equivalent access to its maintenance
     and repair functions.[^689] Accordingly, although it presently does
     not offer an application-to-application interface,[^690] we find
     that Bell Atlantic satisfies its checklist obligation by
     demonstrating that it offers competitors substantially the same
     means of accessing maintenance and repair functions as Bell
     Atlantic's retail operations.

216. We also find that Bell Atlantic permits competing carriers to open
     trouble tickets immediately on recently-completed service
     orders.[^691] In light of an early exception noted by KPMG, Bell
     Atlantic implemented a function in RETAS in April that permits
     competing carriers to enter a trouble ticket immediately after
     completion of a service order.[^692] KPMG verified that the
     enhancement would resolve its concerns about a lag time in creating
     trouble tickets.[^693] As a result, Bell Atlantic claims that
     competing carriers can enter a trouble ticket electronically at an
     earlier point than its retail representatives.[^694] Although Covad
     asserts generally that it cannot open trouble tickets on new loops
     for 24 hours,[^695] we are unable to determine whether their
     allegation post-dates Bell Atlantic's system enhancement. In any
     event, we find that the record evidence does not support Covad's
     allegation.

217. *Response Times*. We further conclude that Bell Atlantic's
     maintenance and repair interface and systems process trouble
     inquiries from competing carriers in substantially the same time
     and manner as Bell Atlantic processes inquiries concerning its own
     retail customers.[^696] To compete effectively in the local
     exchange market, competing carriers must be able to diagnose and
     process customer trouble complaints with the same speed and
     accuracy that Bell Atlantic diagnoses and processes complaints from
     its retail customers. A slower process can lead to customer
     perception that the competing carrier is a less efficient service
     provider than the BOC.

218. We base our finding of nondiscriminatory OSS processing time on
     Bell Atlantic's performance data. Although it had previously
     reported maintenance and repair response times according to
     absolute benchmark standards, Bell Atlantic started reporting
     response times according to a performance standard of "parity plus
     four seconds" in its September Carrier-to-Carrier report.[^697]
     Given the additional security measures required for competing
     carriers' access to Bell Atlantic's maintenance and repair
     systems,[^698] we find that this "parity plus four seconds"
     standard is a reasonable and appropriate measure of whether Bell
     Atlantic processes maintenance and repair requests for competing
     carriers in substantially the same time that it processes those
     requests for its own retail operations.

219. Performance data from June through September 1999 indicates that
     Bell Atlantic met the parity standard each month for modifying
     trouble tickets, failed to meet the standard for creating trouble
     tickets, and had mixed results for canceling a trouble ticket and
     conducting a POTs test.[^699] With respect to conducting a POTS
     trouble test, which is the most common maintenance and repair
     function, Bell Atlantic processed requests from competing carriers
     faster than requests from its retail operations in June, July and
     September, with a slight deviation from the standard in
     August.[^700] For creating a trouble ticket, although Bell Atlantic
     deviated from the standard each month,[^701] we find that the
     deviations were slight and do not warrant a finding that Bell
     Atlantic fails to process requests to create trouble tickets in
     substantially the same time for competing carriers as it does for
     its retail operations.[^702] Likewise, Bell Atlantic did not
     consistently meet the standard for canceling trouble tickets, but
     failed by only a fraction of a second each time.[^703] Accordingly,
     in light of the slight deviations in response times and the lack of
     evidence that such deviations are impeding carriers' access to
     maintenance and repair OSS functions, we conclude that competing
     carriers are able to process maintenance and repair requests in
     substantially the same time as Bell Atlantic's retail operations.
     We are nonetheless prepared to take appropriate enforcement action
     should the deviations in response times become more commercially
     significant or widespread.

220. *Time to Restore*. We conclude that Bell Atlantic repairs trouble
     complaints for competing carriers in substantially the same time
     and manner that it repairs complaints from its own customers. The
     Commission has stressed that a BOC is obligated to repair trouble
     for a customer of a requesting carrier in substantially the same
     time that it takes to repair problems experienced by its own
     customers.[^704] For example, because a reliable telephone line may
     be crucial for a business customer to conduct its business, the
     Commission has emphasized the importance of timely resolution of
     trouble reports from a competing carrier's business
     customers.[^705]

221. We base our finding of nondiscriminatory restoration time on Bell
     Atlantic's performance data. From June through September 1999, for
     both resale and unbundled network elements, Bell Atlantic generally
     repaired trouble reported by customers of competing carriers faster
     than it repaired trouble reported by its own retail
     customers.[^706] In fact, during this period Bell Atlantic
     consistently cleared a higher percentage of trouble reports within
     24 hours for competitors than for itself.[^707] In addition,
     customers of competing carriers were out of service for
     substantially the same amount of time that Bell Atlantic's retail
     customers were out of service.[^708] This level of performance is
     substantial evidence that Bell Atlantic responds to trouble reports
     and restores service in substantially the same time and manner for
     competing carriers as for itself. Although some commenters assert
     generally, without evidentiary support, that Bell Atlantic fails to
     address competitors' trouble tickets in a timely and efficient
     manner,[^709] they do not dispute the performance data submitted by
     Bell Atlantic and verified by the New York Commission. Given this,
     we find that the performance measurements provide compelling
     evidence that Bell Atlantic responds to competitors' trouble
     complaints in substantially the same time and manner that it
     responds to its own customers' complaints.

222. *Quality of Work Performed*. We also find that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it performs maintenance and repair work for
     customers of competing carriers at the same level of quality that
     it performs repair work for its retail customers. In order to
     compete effectively in the local exchange market, competing
     carriers must be able to access maintenance and repair functions in
     a manner that enables them to provide service to their customers at
     a level of quality that matches the quality of service that Bell
     Atlantic provides its own customers.[^710] A competing carrier's
     customer may become dissatisfied if the customer experiences
     frequent service problems, especially repeated troubles. In
     determining the quality of maintenance and repair work performed by
     Bell Atlantic for competing carriers, we examine the rate of
     trouble reported by customers of competing carriers as compared
     with Bell Atlantic's own retail customers, as well as the rate of
     repeat reports of trouble.[^711]

223. Bell Atlantic's performance data reveals that customers of
     competing carriers reported a lower rate of network trouble than
     Bell Atlantic's retail customers. From June through September 1999,
     for both resale and unbundled network elements, the rate of loop
     trouble reported was lower for competing carriers than for Bell
     Atlantic's retail operations.[^712] Similarly, during the same
     period, the rate of central office trouble reported for carriers'
     resale customers was lower than, or equal to, Bell Atlantic's, and
     the rate for customers served through unbundled network elements
     was just slightly higher for competing carriers than for Bell
     Atlantic's retail operations.[^713] This level of performance,
     coupled with the lack of any conflicting data or claims of inferior
     maintenance in the record, indicates that Bell Atlantic is not
     discriminating against competing carriers in routine network
     maintenance and repair functions.

224. Similarly, performance data on the rate of repeat trouble reports
     indicates that Bell Atlantic repairs trouble for competitors at the
     same level of quality that it provides to itself, or better.
     Consistently from June through September 1999, for both resale and
     unbundled network elements, a lower percentage of competitors'
     customers reported repeat trouble within 30 days than Bell
     Atlantic's retail customers.[^714] Given the lack of conflicting
     data, we find that Bell Atlantic's performance on this measurement
     provides compelling evidence that the company is not discriminating
     in the quality of the repair work that it performs for competing
     carriers.

225. We further find that Bell Atlantic has implemented processes to
     safeguard against premature closing of trouble tickets. KPMG
     initially found that some Bell Atlantic technicians were closing
     out loop trouble tickets even if the customer was not back in
     service if they found no trouble at the specific dispatch location
     (*e.g.*, the outside plant or the central office) without checking
     other locations.[^715] For these misdirected dispatch situations,
     carriers would need to open a second trouble ticket to resolve the
     problem. In response to KPMG's finding, Bell Atlantic implemented a
     new process under which Bell Atlantic's Regional CLEC Maintenance
     Center will open a second trouble ticket, either automatically (if
     the technician finds a problem on the line) or after it obtains the
     carrier's permission to issue a second ticket (if the technician
     finds no problem on the circuit). Although commenters allege that
     Bell Atlantic generally closes out trouble tickets without
     resolving the problem,[^716] we are unable to conclude, based on
     this record, that the process provided to competing carriers
     differs from Bell Atlantic retail operations or that Bell Atlantic
     is failing to adhere to the new procedures.[^717] Rather, the fact
     that competing carriers are reporting a lower rate of repeat
     trouble than Bell Atlantic's retail customers strongly signifies
     that Bell Atlantic is not closing out trouble tickets in a
     discriminatory manner.

#### Billing

226. We find that Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     billing functions. Competing carriers need access to billing
     information to provide accurate and timely bills to their
     customers.[^718] Bell Atlantic is obligated to provide competing
     carriers with complete and accurate reports on the service usage of
     competing carriers' customers in substantially the same time and
     manner that Bell Atlantic provides such information to
     itself.[^719] To do so, Bell Atlantic provides competing carriers
     with billing information through Daily Usage Files (DUFs) and
     carrier bills.[^720] DUFs itemize daily usage records for competing
     carrier customers, while carrier bills serve as a monthly invoice
     that incorporates charges for all of the products and services
     provided to a competing carrier by Bell Atlantic.[^721] These are
     the same mechanisms that Bell Atlantic uses to provide billing
     information to its retail operations.[^722]

227. Like the New York Commission, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its
     billing functions on the basis of the available Carrier-to-Carrier
     metrics and the KPMG Final Report.[^723] We find that the
     performance standards set by the New York Commission and developed
     in conjunction with Bell Atlantic and competing carriers are
     appropriate measures of Bell Atlantic's ability to provide
     competing carriers with DUFs and carrier bills in substantially the
     same time and manner that Bell Atlantic provides such information
     to itself.[^724] The Carrier-to-Carrier metrics indicate that,
     during the period from July to September 1999, Bell Atlantic's
     actual commercial performance consistently exceeds these
     standards.[^725] In addition, KPMG found Bell Atlantic's wholesale
     billing systems, processes, and operational support
     satisfactory.[^726] After testing seven bill types in eight billing
     cycles and making over 2,100 test calls to generate records, KPMG
     found that Bell Atlantic properly reported daily usage and applied
     correct rates and discounts to bill elements.[^727]

228. Although several commenters allege problems with Bell Atlantic's
     billing systems, we conclude that these allegations do not warrant
     a finding that Bell Atlantic fails to provide nondiscriminatory
     access to its billing functions. AT&T alleges that Bell Atlantic
     does not provide competing carriers with complete billing
     information on a consistent basis.[^728] The specific problems AT&T
     cites to support this argument, including difficulties with local
     usage file names and obtaining and processing local usage data, are
     not cited by any other commenter and are not supported by the
     Carrier-to-Carrier metrics or findings in the KPMG Final Report.
     Both CCA and Z-Tel argue that Bell Atlantic should alter its
     billing system to better meet their needs as competing
     carriers.[^729] Although we require a BOC to demonstrate that it is
     providing equivalent access to billing information, we do not
     mandate the use of a particular billing system.[^730] Accordingly,
     we reject CCA and Z-Tel's arguments. We also reject Adelphia, NALA,
     and TRA's allegations of double billing.[^731] Although we believe
     that evidence of a double billing problem demonstrates that a BOC
     is not providing nondiscriminatory access to its billing functions,
     we find that there is no evidence in the record to support these
     commenters' assertions.[^732] Similarly, we reject Z-Tel's
     allegation that Bell Atlantic refuses to provision service to
     residential customers that have outstanding balances on their Bell
     Atlantic retail accounts.[^733] Because Z-Tel offers no data to
     support this position and no other commenters raise this issue, we
     find that the record does not support Z-Tel's allegation.

### Combinations of Unbundled Network Elements

#### Background

229. In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a BOC
     must show that it is offering "nondiscriminatory access to network
     elements in accordance with the requirements of sections
     251(c)(3)\[.\]"[^734] Section 251(c)(3) requires an incumbent LEC
     to "provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . .
     nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
     at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^735] Section
     251(c)(3) of the Act also requires incumbent LECs to offer
     unbundled network elements to requesting carriers in a manner that
     allows them to combine them to provide a telecommunications
     service.[^736]

230. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission emphasized that
     the ability of requesting carriers to use unbundled network
     elements, as well as combinations of unbundled network elements, is
     integral to achieving Congress' objective of promoting competition
     in the local telecommunications markets.[^737] Using combinations
     of unbundled network elements provides a competitor with the
     incentive and ability to package and market services in ways that
     differ from the BOCs' existing service offerings in order to
     compete in the local telecommunications market.[^738] Moreover,
     combining the incumbent's unbundled network elements with their own
     facilities encourages facilities-based competition and allows
     competing providers to provide a wide array of competitive choices.
     Because the use of combinations of unbundled network elements is an
     important strategy for entry into the local telecommunications
     market, as well as an obligation under the requirements of section
     271, we examine section 271 applications to determine whether
     competitive carriers are able to combine network elements as
     required by the Act and the Commission's regulations.

#### Discussion

231. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it provides to competitors combinations of
     network elements that are already preassembled in their network, as
     well as nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements, in
     a manner that allows competing carriers to combine those elements
     themselves.[^739] We base our conclusion on evidence of actual
     commercial usage and the results of KPMG's third party test.[^740]
     We note that the New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic
     has provided nondiscriminatory access to combinations of unbundled
     network elements.[^741]

232. The record indicates that Bell Atlantic, as required by the New
     York Commission, provides a variety of methods that allow
     competitive carriers to combine unbundled network elements with
     their own facilities. For example, in addition to the standard
     physical and virtual collocation arrangements, Bell Atlantic
     provides alternative collocation arrangements such as smaller
     physical collocation cages, shared collocation cages, and cageless
     collocation arrangements.[^742] The record also indicates that Bell
     Atlantic has provided eleven "Assembly Room" and "Assembly Point"
     arrangements which do not require conditioned space and take less
     time to implement than caged collocation arrangements.[^743]

233. The record also indicates that Bell Atlantic, as required by the
     New York Commission, provides access to preassembled combinations
     of network elements. For example, Bell Atlantic has provided to
     competitors more than 152,000 preassembled platforms of network
     elements, including the loop switch combination (UNE-P) out of
     certain central offices, as well as local switching elements in
     combination with other shared elements, such as shared transport,
     shared tandem switching, operator services, directory assistance,
     and SS7 signaling.[^744] In addition, Bell Atlantic provides
     Enhanced Extended Loops (EELs), a combination of loops and
     transport.[^745] All of these combinations are offered in
     accordance with the New York Commission's requirements.[^746]

234. We disagree with arguments that Bell Atlantic's collocation
     offerings are deficient.[^747] ALTS and several other carriers
     argue that BA's collocation arrangements involve delays that
     diminish the ability of the competitive LECs to provide the
     services they seek to offer. [^748] As discussed above, we conclude
     that Bell Atlantic's collocation offerings meet the Act's
     nondiscrimination requirements.[^749]

235. We are not persuaded by arguments that the restrictions Bell
     Atlantic places on the use of its loop-switch (UNE-P) and
     loop-transport (EEL) offerings warrant a finding of checklist
     noncompliance. Several parties argue that Bell Atlantic cannot
     limit the central offices from which the UNE-P is offered.[^750]
     They also assert that the sunset provision that allows Bell
     Atlantic's UNE-P offering to sunset 4-6 years is unlawful.[^751]
     With regard to Bell Atlantic's EEL offerings, several parties
     contend that Bell Atlantic also unlawfully restricts the
     availability of extended loops by refusing to allow competing LECs
     to use them to provide solely exchange access service.[^752]

236. In the wake of the Supreme Court's January 25, 1999 decision
     vacating the Commission's Rule 51.319 that identified the network
     elements incumbent LECs are required to provide on an unbundled
     basis, and prior to adoption of our order reinstating that rule,
     the incumbents' obligations with regard to offering unbundled
     network elements or combinations thereof has been unclear.[^753]
     Given this vacuum, we find it would be inequitable to penalize Bell
     Atlantic for complying with the rules established by the New York
     Commission. Although we have adopted new rules identifying the
     incumbent LECs' unbundling obligations,[^754] these rules are not
     in effect yet. Moreover, even under our new rules, the extent to
     which requesting carriers may place restrictions on their
     loop-transport combinations remains the subject of a further
     notice.[^755] We therefore find that the restrictions Bell Atlantic
     places on its loop-transport combinations and its UNE-P
     combinations do not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance.
     Once our new rules identifying the unbundling obligations of
     network elements become effective, Bell Atlantic must fully comply
     with those rules.[^756]

### Pricing of Network Elements 

#### Background

237. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with
     sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)" of the Act.[^757] Section
     251(c)(3) requires local incumbent LECs to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
     at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. . . ."[^758]
     Pursuant to section 252(d)(1), determinations by a state commission
     of just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be "based
     on the cost . . . of providing . . . the network element . . . and
     nondiscriminatory \[ \] and may include a reasonable profit."[^759]
     Based on this statutory mandate, the Commission has determined that
     prices for interconnection and unbundled network elements (or UNEs)
     must be based on an incumbent LEC's forward-looking, long-run
     incremental costs for each network element.[^760] It adopted a
     pricing methodology that encompasses these concepts called TELRIC,
     or Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost.[^761] In order to prove
     compliance with these statutory provisions, a BOC must show that
     its prices for interconnection and unbundled network elements are
     based on forward-looking, long-run incremental costs.

#### Discussion

238. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that its pricing of unbundled network elements
     complies with the requirements of checklist item 2.[^762] We agree
     with Bell Atlantic's assertion that it has worked with the New York
     Commission to establish prices for unbundled network elements and
     that these proceedings "have resulted in a full suite of TELRIC
     rates."[^763] Specifically, as discussed below, we agree with the
     New York Commission that Bell Atlantic's prices for switches and
     loops offered as unbundled network elements are priced pursuant to
     a forward-looking, long-run incremental cost methodology. The New
     York Commission further asserts that "prices conforming to the
     FCC's requirements are in effect for resale, interconnection, and
     unbundled network elements provided by Bell Atlantic-NY."[^764] The
     Department of Justice did not comment on Bell Atlantic's prices for
     unbundled network elements. We stress that we place great weight on
     the New York Commission's active review and modification of Bell
     Atlantic's proposed unbundled network element prices, its
     commitment to TELRIC-based rates, and its detailed supporting
     comments concerning its extensive, multi-phased network elements
     rate case, as discussed below.

239. Despite the fact that the Eighth Circuit stayed the Commission's
     pricing authority after the New York Commission had begun its
     network elements rate case, the New York Commission determined that
     it would proceed in the rate case on a TELRIC basis.[^765] In Phase
     One of its rate case, the New York Commission considered two
     different TELRIC-based cost models, one submitted by Bell Atlantic
     and another, the Hatfield model, submitted by AT&T and MCI.[^766]
     The New York Commission noted that Bell Atlantic objected to TELRIC
     "in principle"[^767] but that "the parties continued to rely on the
     TELRIC standard.\"[^768] The New York Commission held that it "need
     not evaluate the various costing methods on theoretical grounds"
     because

> The case was litigated on a TELRIC basis; all parties contemplate its
> being decided on that basis; TELRIC is certainly a reasonable approach
> to use, though just as certainly not the only one; and, as \[Bell
> Atlantic\][^769] recognizes, as a practical matter there is no
> alternative other than the very unattractive one of temporary rates
> while a lengthy new case is litigated.[^770]

240. The New York Commission considered each of the cost elements to
     Bell Atlantic's TELRIC-based cost model. It approved, without
     modification, some of Bell Atlantic's proposed cost inputs, but
     substituted what it deemed "more reasonable inputs" to both Bell
     Atlantic's cost model and the Hatfield model.[^771] The New York
     Commission noted that, when it compared the modified results from
     the two cost models, the resulting costs converged and sometimes
     even crossed each other which, the New York Commission determined,
     defined a "sharply narrowed range of reasonable results that may be
     reached on the record here."[^772] The New York Commission
     determined that each cost model had its own advantages and
     disadvantages, and held that "in the absence of factors clearly
     tending one way or the other, prices will be set at the mid-point
     of that narrowed range."[^773]

241. *Burden of Proof*. We reject AT&T's assertion that Bell Atlantic
     has not provided sufficient detail in its section 271 application
     to demonstrate that its prices for unbundled network elements
     comply with the Act.[^774] In its section 271 application, Bell
     Atlantic asserts that the outcome of the New York Commission rate
     proceedings on network elements resulted in rates "fully consistent
     with this Commission's pricing rules, including the TELRIC
     methodology."[^775] While Bell Atlantic did not discuss in detail
     its pricing methodology in its section 271 application, it did
     provide sufficient documentation in its supporting affidavits and
     attachments for us to evaluate the pricing of each network
     element.[^776] Additionally, Bell Atlantic provided extensive
     records of the New York Commission's network elements rate case.

242. *Switch Prices*. We conclude that Bell Atlantic provides sufficient
     evidence to demonstrate that its switch costs are based on
     forward-looking, long-run incremental costs.[^777] We reject AT&T's
     allegation that Bell Atlantic's switching prices violate TELRIC
     principles because they fail to account for any cost savings from
     the steep switch discounts that an efficient carrier operating in
     the long run would unquestionably receive.[^778] AT&T previously
     raised this issue with the New York Commission, which considered
     AT&T's assertion and made significant modifications to Bell
     Atlantic's proposed switch prices. Using its TELRIC-based model,
     Bell Atlantic calculated an average total installed switch
     investment of \$586 per line.[^779] This switch cost was
     significantly higher than those calculated by AT&T under the
     Hatfield model, which calculated a per-line switch investment of
     \$125.[^780] The New York Commission held that the wide disparity
     between the two TELRIC models' inputs called both figures into
     question, and that the record before it suggested that neither
     figure was reliable.[^781] The New York Commission then conducted
     its own examination into switching costs, after which it estimated
     a per-line switch cost of \$303, which it reduced to \$192 to
     account for declining switch prices within the industry.[^782] The
     New York Commission contends that the resultant switch prices are
     TELRIC-based.[^783] Based on the evidence in the record, we find
     that the New York Commission has already considered AT&T's
     allegation that Bell Atlantic's proposed switch costs were too high
     and responded appropriately. Bell Atlantic may only recover \$192
     per switch per line, a significant reduction from its original
     proposal of \$586 per line and an amount much closer to AT&T's
     estimation. We have no basis to disagree with the New York
     Commission that its calculation of switching costs is a "reasonable
     calculation of pertinent costs, arrived at by the New York
     Commission Staff's application of forward-looking TELRIC
     analysis."[^784]

243. We also disagree with AT&T's further assertions that: (1) the
     Commission has concluded in the context of the Universal Service
     Fund that TELRIC does not permit recovery of the cost of "augmented
     switches," which are existing switches with capacity upgrades, and
     Bell Atlantic's proposal to recover such costs here violates
     TELRIC; [^785] (2) the New York Commission admitted in its reply
     comments that it did not apply a TELRIC methodology to switch
     prices and set switch prices based on speculative claims, not
     facts;[^786] and (3) Bell Atlantic's switch rates are merely
     interim in nature, pending a new pricing rulemaking.[^787]

244. First, we note that in the *Local Competition First Report and
     Order*, the Commission held that, while TELRIC consists of
     "methodological principles" for setting prices,[^788] states retain
     flexibility to consider "local technological, environmental,
     regulatory, and economic conditions."[^789] In reviewing state
     pricing decisions in the context of section 271 applications, we
     will not reject an application because isolated factual findings by
     a commission might be different from what we might have found if we
     were arbitrating the matter under section 252(e)(5). Rather, we
     will reject the application only if basic TELRIC principles are
     violated or the state commission makes clear errors in factual
     findings on matters so substantial that the end result falls
     outside the range that the reasonable application of TELRIC
     principles would produce.

245. Here, in response to AT&T's allegations regarding switch discounts,
     the New York Commission asserts that it "appropriately exercised
     its power to take account of conditions in New York" when it
     determined switching costs pursuant to TELRIC.[^790] We agree with
     New York that it has appropriately exercised its flexibility to set
     prices within a range of TELRIC-based rates. We also agree with the
     New York Commission that its determination of allowable switch
     costs was the result of a complex analysis that does not lend
     itself to simple arithmetic correction through the adjustment of a
     single input.[^791] AT&T has presented no evidence to persuade us
     that New York did not conform to TELRIC principles simply because
     it failed to modify one input into its cost model. We are not
     persuaded by AT&T's assertion that in our Universal Service
     proceeding, we disallowed the cost recovery of "augmented
     switches," and that Bell Atlantic's recovery includes such cost
     recovery, which violates our rules.[^792] As we stated in the
     *Universal Service Tenth Report and Order*, that federal cost model
     "was developed for the purpose of determining federal universal
     service support, and it may not be appropriate to use nationwide
     values for other purposes, such as determining prices for unbundled
     network elements."[^793] We specifically cautioned parties from
     making any claims in any other proceedings based on the inputs
     adopted in the *Universal Service* *Tenth Report and Order*. [^794]

246. Second, contrary to AT&T's assertion, we see no admission in the
     record by the New York Commission that it did not use a
     TELRIC-based cost methodology for switch prices. We find no basis
     to disagree with the New York Commission's assertion that it
     calculated pertinent costs "arrived at by the NYPSC Staff's
     application of forward-looking TELRIC analysis."[^795] Moreover, we
     are not persuaded that Bell Atlantic's switching costs are based on
     speculation, simply because AT&T believes the New York Commission
     did not adequately reflect switching discounts. As discussed above,
     the New York Commission engaged in extensive fact-finding in its
     rate case, and specifically considered AT&T's assertions about
     switching discounts. As a result, Bell Atlantic's switching prices
     were greatly reduced, with a final result that is very close to
     AT&T's estimated switching prices, further undermining AT&T's
     claims that Bell Atlantic's switch prices are double or even triple
     what they should be.[^796]

247. Third, we see no reason to disagree with the New York Commission
     that Bell Atlantic's switch costs are not "interim" merely because
     they may be adjusted in the future to account for newly adduced
     evidence.[^797] The New York Commission held that, while it had
     initially been persuaded by Bell Atlantic that it did not receive
     large switch discounts from its vendors, AT&T later presented new
     evidence on such discounts, which the New York Commission will
     examine in its second network elements rate case.[^798] AT&T has
     presented no evidence that the New York Commission's "ongoing
     examination of the \[switch discount\] issue betokens a failure to
     set TELRIC-compliant rates," nor does it refute the New York
     Commission's claim that these rates may be refined in the future,
     "but they are no less TELRIC-compliant on that account."[^799]

248. *Loops - Copper Feeder*. We also reject AT&T's allegation[^800]
     that Bell Atlantic's unbundled element prices are not TELRIC-based
     because Bell Atlantic uses fiber in the feeder portion of its loop
     plant, which can be more expensive than copper in longer loop
     lengths.[^801] AT&T raised identical arguments before the New York
     Commission. [^802] There, AT&T asserted that copper feeder is
     cheaper than fiber for loops shorter than 9,000--12,000 feet, and
     that Bell Atlantic should not be allowed to recover the higher
     capital costs of fiber feeder.[^803] AT&T also asserted that Bell
     Atlantic installed all-fiber feeder in order to subsidize its own
     broadband network for the provision of future services, and that
     competitors should not be required to subsidize such costs.[^804]
     AT&T also asserts that loops that may be efficient for shorter loop
     lengths such as those in Manhattan may not be efficient in other
     parts of New York state.[^805] In response, the New York Commission
     notes that it analyzed the difference between fiber and copper
     feeder, but found that the higher cost of fiber feeder was "more
     than offset" by the lower provisioning and maintenance costs of
     fiber.[^806] Additionally, the New York Commission was not
     persuaded by assertions that Bell Atlantic had inflated its loop
     costs in order to subsidize its own broadband ventures.[^807] The
     New York Commission found that the economics of copper versus fiber
     depend "not only on loop length but on capacity."[^808] The New
     York Commission held that New York's population per square mile
     supports "the economies afforded by fiber's greater capacity . . .
     even where distances are short."[^809] AT&T also alleges that Bell
     Atlantic's prices for unbundled loops include the costs of
     terminating DLC circuits at the switch using antiquated
     terminations rather than the modern GR-303 technology used for the
     loop feeder.[^810] AT&T contends that Bell Atlantic's use of older
     DLC terminations does not reflect an efficient, forward-looking
     network and thus violates TELRIC principles.[^811] AT&T again
     raised an identical argument before the New York Commission.[^812]
     The New York Commission found no evidence to support AT&T's
     allegations regarding either fiber feeder or DLC
     terminations.[^813] The New York Commission also noted that, in the
     future, competitors may wish to purchase elements to provide
     enhanced services to their own customers, and that fiber may prove
     useful for these purposes.[^814] AT&T also asserts that the New
     York Commission improperly relied on a 1991 Bell Atlantic cost
     study that was never placed into the record of the New York
     Commission's rate case when it considered the costs of fiber
     feeder.[^815] The New York Commission responds that its reliance on
     the 1991 cost study was both limited and proper.[^816]

249. We find that AT&T has not presented sufficient evidence to prove
     that the New York Commission erred in its determination or that it
     neglected to consider any relevant facts relating to fiber feeder
     or DLC termination technology. We have no reason to disagree with
     the New York Commission's conclusion that Bell Atlantic's use of
     fiber and DLC termination technology in this case does not make its
     rates inconsistent with a TELRIC methodology.[^817]

250. *Conditioning of xDSL-Capable Loops*. We find that Bell Atlantic's
     interim rates for xDSL provisioning and conditioning, which are
     subject to refund or true-up when the New York Commission completes
     its xDSL cost study, are not a basis for rejecting the section 271
     application. DSL describes a "family of transmission technologies
     that use specialized electronics at the customer's premises and at
     a telephone company's central office . . . to transmit high-speed
     data signals over copper cables."[^818] Bell Atlantic offers
     unbundled loops for use by competing carriers to provide
     Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) and High Bit-Rate
     Digital Subscriber Line (HDSL).[^819] Bell Atlantic offers
     "ADSL-qualified links" to loops of less than 18,000 feet, and
     "HDSL-qualified links" to loops of less than 12,000 feet.[^820]
     Bell Atlantic asserts, however, that "certain technical
     difficulties arise when ADSL or HDSL signals are transmitted over
     loops that exceed a certain length."[^821] Bell Atlantic asserts
     that, if a competitive carrier desires ADSL- or HDSL-level
     transmission over loops exceeding these lengths, loop
     "conditioning" may be required.[^822] Bell Atlantic's tariff
     regarding these services also includes a variety of "ancillary"
     charges, all but one of which are non-recurring charges.[^823]

251. Bell Atlantic's ancillary charges generally fall into one of two
     categories: 1) charges related to loop qualification, or 2) charges
     related to conditioning unqualified loops.[^824] In the first
     category of ancillary charges, Bell Atlantic operates a loop
     qualification database, which competitors must access to find
     necessary information about the loop they wish to use.[^825] Bell
     Atlantic imposes a "Mechanized Loop Qualification Charge" to
     recover the costs associated with the creation and maintenance of
     this database. [^826] If a loop is not included in the loop
     database, or if a competitive provider requires additional
     information about a loop, a manual loop qualification occurs, and
     additional charges may accrue.[^827]

252. In the second category of ancillary charges, Bell Atlantic charges
     competing carriers to remove load coils[^828] and bridge taps[^829]
     from its ADSL- and HDSL-qualified loops. Bell Atlantic asserts that
     load coils make loops generally unsuitable for xDSL
     transmission.[^830] Therefore, it charges these carriers to remove
     these load coils, as well as some bridge taps. Bell Atlantic
     asserts that, because the number of load coils on a loop depends on
     its length, its charge to remove load coils on loops longer than
     18,000 feet is loop-length-sensitive.[^831] Bell Atlantic does not
     charge for the removal of load coils on loops of less than 18,000
     feet.[^832] On loops of less than 18,000 feet, Bell Atlantic will
     not charge to remove bridge taps between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in
     order to accommodate xDSL technology. Bell Atlantic will remove
     these shorter bridge taps on its shorter loops, but will charge
     competing providers for this service.[^833]

253. Bell Atlantic asserts that its proposed rates for these ancillary
     services are "equal to their costs"[^834] and are forward-looking
     because they reflect the most efficient technology currently
     available for the services requested.[^835] Bell Atlantic also
     asserts that the charges for these ancillary services, most of
     which are non-recurring charges, are essentially determined as the
     product of an estimated worktime and a relevant labor rate.[^836]

254. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
     found that, in some instances, incumbent LECs would be required to
     "take affirmative steps to condition existing loop facilities" to
     enable competitors to provide services not currently provided over
     the facilities, such as xDSL.[^837] The Commission stated that
     "such loop conditioning may involve removing load coils or bridge
     taps that interfere with the transmission of digital
     signals,"[^838] and that the carrier requesting the loop
     conditioning would be required to "bear the cost of compensating
     the incumbent LECs for such conditioning."[^839] Pursuant to
     Commission rules, "nonrecurring charges . . . shall not permit an
     incumbent LEC to recover more than the total forward-looking
     economic cost of providing the applicable element."[^840] The costs
     incumbents impose on competitors for line conditioning, which are
     nonrecurring charges, must be in compliance with these pricing
     rules.

255. A number of carriers assert that Bell Atlantic does not demonstrate
     that its proposed prices for its xDSL-capable loops comport with
     TELRIC.[^841] These carriers assert that Bell Atlantic's xDSL loop
     provisioning policies are discriminatory, unjust, and unreasonable
     because they fail to give an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^842] ALTS contends that Bell Atlantic's
     charge for loop qualification fails to comply with the TELRIC
     standard.[^843]

256. Bell Atlantic urges us to refrain from evaluating Bell Atlantic's
     xDSL charges because its xDSL rates, which are interim and subject
     to refund, are still being reviewed by the New York Commission, and
     "there is no warrant for additional review here."[^844] In its
     evaluation of Bell Atlantic's section 271 application, the New York
     Commission notes that it is currently considering the issue of
     permanent rates pertaining to recurring and nonrecurring charges
     related to xDSL-capable loops, including conditioning and database
     charges.[^845] Noting that commenters have asserted that such
     charges may be so high that they are prohibitive, the New York
     Commission stated that a separate, accelerated track is underway to
     address these issues in its network element rate proceeding.[^846]
     Additionally, the New York Commission asserts that, in the interim,
     both recurring and non-recurring xDSL charges proposed by Bell
     Atlantic are temporary and subject to refund or true-up.[^847] In
     its reply brief, the New York Commission states that, consistent
     with its commitment to TELRIC principles and "to setting prices
     that satisfy the requirements of the 1996 Act and the Commission,
     we can safely say that \[xDSL\] rates meeting those requirements
     will have been set before the end of the year."[^848] Bell Atlantic
     contends that any concerns regarding its xDSL rates "will be
     resolved by the New York Public Service Commission in accordance
     with TELRIC standards in less than two months."[^849]

257. We note that Bell Atlantic currently has interim rates in effect
     for its conditioning of xDSL-capable loops, pending completion by
     the New York Commission of its xDSL rate case.[^850] The Commission
     has not previously addressed the question of whether a section 271
     applicant's reliance on interim rates should constitute grounds for
     rejection.

258. Although we recognize that interim rates create uncertainty, we are
     also aware that establishing permanent recurring and nonrecurring
     rates relating to unbundled network elements, resale, and transport
     and termination offerings is a complex and ongoing process. It was
     for that reason in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*
     that the Commission proposed interim proxy rates that states could
     use until they completed their permanent cost proceedings.[^851] We
     conclude that a BOC's application for in-region interLATA authority
     should not be rejected solely because permanent rates may not yet
     have been established for each and every element or nonrecurring
     cost of provisioning an element. We believe that this question
     should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. If the uncertainty
     caused by the use of interim rates can be minimized, then it may be
     appropriate, at least for the time being, to approve an application
     based on the interim rates contained in the relevant tariff.
     Uncertainty will be minimized if the interim rates are for a few
     isolated ancillary items, permanent rates that have been
     established are in compliance with our rules, and the state has
     made reasonable efforts to set interim rates in accordance with the
     Act and the Commission's rules.

259. We accept Bell Atlantic's proposal that we allow its interim rates
     until the New York Commission reviews its cost support and, if
     necessary, adjusts its rates to conform to a TELRIC-based cost
     methodology. The conditioning of xDSL loops is a relatively new
     issue, and because new issues are constantly arising, we believe
     that it is reasonable to allow a limited use of interim rates when
     reviewing a section 271 application where the state has not yet
     completed its permanent rate case for a new service. Additionally,
     the New York Commission, as discussed above, has a substantial
     track record of setting other applicable prices at TELRIC
     rates.[^852] Bell Atlantic's interim rates are subject to refund or
     true-up if the New York Commission determines that they exceed
     applicable TELRIC-based costs.[^853] Additionally, the Commission
     has clearly stated that incumbent LECs, if required to condition
     loops, may recover their costs of such conditioning.[^854] If any
     of these factors were absent, however, we would not be inclined to
     approve a section 271 application that contains interim rates
     because we would lack confidence that the permanent rates would be
     set in accordance with the Act.

260. Finally, although we would be willing, at this time, to grant a
     section 271 application with a limited number of interim rates
     where the confidence-building factors identified above are present,
     we emphasize that it is clearly preferable to analyze a section 271
     application on the basis of rates derived from a permanent rate
     proceeding. At some point, states will have had sufficient time to
     complete these proceedings. We will, therefore, become more
     reluctant to continue approving section 271 applications containing
     interim rates. It would not be sound policy for interim rates to
     become a substitute for completing these significant proceedings.

261. In the instant case, Bell Atlantic is only charging for removal of
     load coils and bridge taps that impede xDSL service but are
     otherwise appropriate for providing voice-grade service. In these
     circumstances, the cost of removing load coils and bridge taps can
     only be done on a loop-by-loop basis and may be expensive. We are
     not in a position to judge whether Bell Atlantic's interim rates
     are too high until the New York Commission has completed its
     review. Given the limited scope of Bell Atlantic's interim rates,
     the refund mechanism and the New York Commission's track record in
     reviewing Bell Atlantic's rates, we find that Bell Atlantic's
     interim rates for xDSL-capable loops meet the checklist requirement
     at this time. We note, however, that any significant time delay in
     permanent rates could be a basis for finding noncompliance with
     section 271 requirements.

262. *Glue Charges*. We also reject Cable & Wireless' assertion that
     Bell Atlantic acts in a discriminatory fashion by imposing an
     additional "glue charge" on business customers when it sells them
     unbundled network elements. Cable & Wireless contends that this
     charge is unlawful and will hinder the development of broad-based
     local competition.[^855] The New York Commission has defined "glue
     charges" as "charges that competitors will pay Bell Atlantic (in
     some cases) to compensate it for combining together all of the
     network elements into the 'platform.'"[^856] In its state UNE
     tariff revision with an effective date of February 15, 1999, Bell
     Atlantic proposed a "glue charge," which it stated would apply "to
     each Existing and New UNE Platform used to provide business POTS
     service."[^857] The New York Commission approved this glue
     charge.[^858] In a tariff revision that took effect September 24,
     1999, however, Bell Atlantic removed the glue charges.[^859] As a
     general rule, we are skeptical of glue charges, and note with
     approval that these glue charges were removed from Bell Atlantic's
     tariff before Bell Atlantic filed its section 271 application.
     Thus, the issue of glue charges is moot, and we need not further
     consider it here.

## Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits, and Rights-of-Way

### Background

263. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way owned or controlled by the \[BOC\] at just and
     reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section
     224."[^860] In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the
     Commission interpreted section 251(b)(4) as requiring
     nondiscriminatory access to LEC poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way for competing providers of telecommunications
     services in accordance with the requirements of section 224.[^861]
     In addition, we interpreted the revised requirements of section 224
     governing rates, terms, and conditions for telecommunications
     carriers' attachments to utility poles in the *Pole Attachment
     Telecommunications Rate Order.*[^862] Section 224(f)(1) states that
     "\[a\] utility shall provide a cable television system or any
     telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any
     pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by
     it."[^863] Notwithstanding this requirement, section 224(f)(2)
     permits a utility providing electric service to deny access to its
     poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory
     basis, "where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of
     safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering
     purposes."[^864]

264. Section 224 also contains two separate provisions governing the
     maximum rates that a utility may charge for "pole
     attachments."[^865] Section 224(b)(1) states that the Commission
     shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions governing pole
     attachments to ensure that they are "just and reasonable."[^866]
     Notwithstanding this general grant of authority, section 224(c)(1)
     states that "\[n\]othing in \[section 224\] shall be construed to
     apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to
     the rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts,
     conduits and rights-of-way as provided in \[section 224(f)\], for
     pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a
     State." As of 1992, nineteen states, including New York, had
     certified to the Commission that they regulated the rates, terms,
     and conditions for pole attachments.[^867]

### Discussion 

265. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to its
     poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way at just and reasonable
     rates, terms, and conditions in accordance with the requirements of
     section 224, and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist item
     3.[^868] The New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic
     provides nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits and
     rights-of-way in compliance with this checklist item.[^869]

266. Although ALTS argues that Bell Atlantic does not provide
     nondiscriminatory access to conduits, and rights-of-way within
     multiple tenant environments,[^870] Bell Atlantic responds that it
     does not control the conduits and rights-of-way within the multiple
     tenant environments cited by ALTS.[^871] Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii)
     is limited to the requirements set forth in section 224 and thus
     does not require the incumbent LEC to provide access to wiring it
     does not control inside buildings. Given that ALTS does not cite
     specific instances where Bell Atlantic has denied access to any
     conduits or rights-of-way that it does own or control within
     multiple tenant environments, we do not find sufficient evidence in
     the record to refute Bell Atlantic's assertion.

267. RCN raises concerns regarding access to conduits and ducts provided
     by Bell Atlantic's wholly owned subsidiary Empire City
     Subway.[^872] RCN does not argue, however, that Empire City Subway
     is not providing competitive LECs with equivalent access to
     conduits, but instead argues that any delay in accessing conduits
     is more detrimental to competitors than to Bell Atlantic. Because
     RCN does not assert that Bell Atlantic is providing access to
     conduits in a discriminatory manner, we have no basis for finding
     noncompliance with this checklist item. We note that no other
     commenter challenges Bell Atlantic's compliance with this checklist
     item.

## Checklist Item 4---Unbundled Local Loops

### Background

268. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive
     checklist, requires that Bell Atlantic provide "\[l\]ocal loop
     transmission from the central office to the customer's premises,
     unbundled from local switching or other services."[^873] The
     Commission has defined the loop as "a transmission facility between
     a distribution frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC
     central office, and the network interface device at the customer
     premises."[^874] This definition includes different types of loops,
     including "two-wire and four-wire analog voice-grade loops, and
     two-wire and four-wire loops that are conditioned to transmit the
     digital signals needed to provide services such as ISDN, ADSL,
     HDSL, and DS1-level signals."[^875]

269. In order to establish that it is "providing" unbundled local loops
     in compliance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv), Bell Atlantic must
     demonstrate that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to
     furnish loops and that it is currently doing so in the quantities
     that competitors reasonably demand and at an acceptable level of
     quality.[^876] Bell Atlantic must also demonstrate that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to unbundled loops.[^877] In previous
     section 271 orders, the Commission has generally indicated that the
     ordering and provisioning of network elements has no retail
     analogue, and we therefore look to whether the BOC's performance
     offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^878]

270. As the Commission stated in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
     one way that a BOC can demonstrate compliance with checklist item 4
     is to submit performance data evidencing the time interval for
     providing unbundled loops and whether due dates are met.[^879] As
     described in the discussion of checklist item 2, competing carriers
     must also have nondiscriminatory access to the various functions of
     Bell Atlantic's OSS in order to obtain unbundled loops in a timely
     and efficient manner.[^880] Thus, we look to performance data
     measuring whether competing carriers are informed of the status of
     their order and how responsive the BOC is in providing access to
     necessary support functions, including maintenance and repair.

271. Bell Atlantic must also provide access to any functionality of the
     loop requested by a competing carrier unless it is not technically
     feasible to condition the loop facility to support the particular
     functionality requested.[^881] In order to provide the requested
     loop functionality, such as the ability to deliver ISDN or xDSL
     services, the BOC may be required to take affirmative steps to
     condition existing loop facilities to enable competing carriers to
     provide services not currently provided over the facilities, with
     the competing carrier bearing the cost of such conditioning. The
     BOC must provide competitors with access to unbundled loops
     regardless of whether the BOC uses integrated digital loop carrier
     (IDLC) technology[^882] or similar remote concentration devices for
     the particular loop sought by the competitor. Again, the costs
     associated with providing access to such facilities may be
     recovered from competing carriers.[^883]

272. As part of allowing a competitor to combine its own facilities with
     an incumbent LEC's loops, a BOC must provide cross-connect
     facilities between an unbundled loop and a competing carrier's
     collocated equipment at prices consistent with section 252(d)(1)
     and on terms and conditions that are reasonable and
     nondiscriminatory under section 251(c)(3).[^884] Incumbent LECs
     must also provide access to unbundled network interface devices so
     that requesting carriers can connect their own loop facilities at
     that point.[^885]

### Discussion

273. We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     unbundled local loops in accordance with the requirements of
     section 271. As detailed below, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it
     has a concrete and specific legal obligation to provide unbundled
     local loops to competing carriers in accordance with these
     requirements. In addition, Bell Atlantic provides sufficient
     evidence that it provides unbundled local loop transmission, for
     the provision of both traditional voice services and various
     advanced services, in a nondiscriminatory manner.

274. In reaching these conclusions, we acknowledge that we differ from
     the evaluation of the Department of Justice in certain material
     respects. Although we have accorded substantial weight to the
     Department\'s views as required by section 271, the statute
     prohibits us from giving the Department's views preclusive
     weight.[^886] With respect to Bell Atlantic's provision of
     unbundled loops, we reach conclusions that vary from those of the
     Department in instances where we assess the totality of the
     evidence differently or where we take an analytical approach
     distinct from that taken by the Department.

275. Bell Atlantic makes local loop transmission available on an
     unbundled basis in compliance with the 1996 Act through its NYPSC
     No. 916 Tariff and through various interconnection
     agreements.[^887] Specifically, Bell Atlantic provisions a full
     range of unbundled loops, including analog and digital 2-wire and
     4-wire loops, that competing carriers can use to offer a full range
     of services such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, 1.544 Mbps digital (DS1)
     transmission, and 45 Mbps digital (DS3) transmission.[^888] Bell
     Atlantic provides access to stand-alone loops through
     cross-connects that run from the Bell Atlantic distribution frame
     to competing carriers' collocation space.[^889]

276. Bell Atlantic provisions these unbundled local loops to competing
     carriers in three distinct forms. First, when Bell Atlantic does
     not presently serve the customer on the lines in question, a
     competing carrier may obtain a "new" loop from Bell Atlantic. In
     this case, the customer would be provided service on the second
     line from a competitive carrier and not from Bell Atlantic, while
     retaining Bell Atlantic as the provider on the original line.
     Second, Bell Atlantic also provisions stand-alone loops to
     competing carriers through coordinated conversions of active loops
     to the carriers' collocation space. These coordinated loop
     cutovers, or "hot cuts," make it possible to transfer an active
     Bell Atlantic customer's service to a competing carrier. For both
     new loops and conversions of existing customers, when loops are
     provisioned on a stand-alone basis, the competing carrier obtains
     only the transmission facility between Bell Atlantic's central
     office and the customer's premises. Third, Bell Atlantic provisions
     loops as part of a platform of network elements. When Bell Atlantic
     provisions a loop as part of a platform, the competitor receives
     the local loop, shared transport, and switching capability.[^890]

277. Through September 1999, Bell Atlantic has provisioned to competing
     carriers 200,000 loops, including approximately 50,000 stand-alone
     loops and 150,000 loops provided as part of platforms of network
     elements.[^891] Nearly 150,000 of these loops, including
     approximately 15,000 stand-alone loops and 130,000 platform loops,
     were delivered to competing carriers during the period from May
     through September, 1999.[^892] Bell Atlantic represents that it can
     easily meet the current commercial demand for unbundled local loops
     and that it will, as needed, add personnel and resources to meet
     any further increases in commercial demand.[^893] Additionally,
     through September 1999, Bell Atlantic has provisioned to competing
     carriers more than 3,300 premium digital loops,[^894] which may be
     appropriate for the provision of advanced services, and
     approximately 1,100 xDSL-specific loops,[^895] which are
     specifically designed for the provision of advanced services.

278. To demonstrate that it provides unbundled loops in compliance with
     its checklist obligations, Bell Atlantic submitted performance data
     for various metrics relating to loop provisioning, including data
     on the length of provisioning intervals, missed appointment rates,
     "on-time" hot cut performance, and new loop and hot cut
     installation troubles. In addition, Bell Atlantic submitted
     performance data addressing both voice-grade loops and loops
     capable of transmitting the digital signals necessary to support
     high-speed data services. In view of the variety of these measures,
     we conclude that our analysis of this checklist item cannot focus
     on Bell Atlantic's performance with respect to any single metric or
     any single type of loop. Rather, we examine the performance data
     for all of the various loop metrics, as well as the factors
     surrounding those metrics, in order to obtain a comprehensive
     picture of whether Bell Atlantic is providing unbundled local loops
     in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.

279. As noted above, in the past we have evaluated whether a BOC is
     meeting its nondiscrimination obligation with respect to loops by
     examining whether loops are provided in a fashion that provides an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^896] In
     this application, however, we note that the New York Commission
     adopted a retail analogue for new unbundled loops, and Bell
     Atlantic submitted accompanying data with which we can conduct a
     direct parity comparison.[^897] Because this retail analogue was
     developed as a result of the rigorous collaborative process
     described above, we find this means of comparison to be reasonable
     in this instance. We therefore conclude that Bell Atlantic must
     satisfy its duty of nondiscrimination by demonstrating that it
     provisions new unbundled local loops to competing carriers in
     substantially the same time and manner as it does to its retail
     customers.[^898] Because the New York Commission did not identify a
     retail analogue to the coordinated cutover of an active loop,
     *i.e.*, a "hot cut," however, we will examine Bell Atlantic's
     provision of hot cuts in terms of whether its performance affords
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^899] We also
     discuss separately Bell Atlantic's evidence regarding its
     performance with respect to xDSL loops, describing how we will
     consider such evidence in evaluating future applications filed
     under section 271.

#### Provisioning of Unbundled Local Loops

280. We conclude that Bell Atlantic presented sufficient evidence to
     demonstrate that it provisions loops in the quantities that
     competitors reasonably demand, at an acceptable level of quality,
     and within a reasonable timeframe. With respect to unbundled loops
     provisioned both on a stand-alone basis and as part of a network
     platform, we find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     new unbundled local loops to competing carriers in substantially
     the same time and manner as it provides new loops to its retail
     customers.

281. *Stand-Alone Loops*. We find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that
     it provides new stand-alone loops to competing carriers in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. Specifically, as discussed below, we
     conclude that Bell Atlantic's processes for offering and meeting
     confirmed appointment dates for installing new loops to competing
     carriers are substantially the same as the processes for offering
     and meeting Bell Atlantic retail appointments. Additionally, we
     find that the new, stand-alone loops Bell Atlantic provisions to
     competing carriers are of the same quality as the loops it provides
     to its retail customers.

282. First, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's systems afford competing
     carriers access to appointment dates that is equivalent to the
     access provided to Bell Atlantic representatives serving retail
     customers. Orders for new loops are referred to as "dispatch"
     orders because they require that a technician be dispatched to the
     customer's premises in order to complete the installation.[^900]
     With respect to these orders, competing carriers have access to the
     same "SMARTS" clock, which sets available dispatch loop
     appointments through an automated system, as do Bell Atlantic
     retail representatives.[^901] Accordingly, competing carriers and
     Bell Atlantic customer representatives have equivalent access to
     loop installation appointments.

283. We similarly conclude that Bell Atlantic's process for meeting
     confirmed appointment dates is nondiscriminatory. Specifically, we
     find that Bell Atlantic meets the confirmed due dates of the
     customers of competitive carriers in the same time and manner as it
     meets the confirmed due dates of its retail customers. Performance
     data indicate that Bell Atlantic is completing loop installations
     within the interval requested by competitors.[^902] Indeed, the
     Carrier-to-Carrier performance measures evidence consistently lower
     missed appointment rates for the customers of competing carriers
     than for Bell Atlantic customers. In June 1999, Bell Atlantic
     missed approximately 2 percent of new loop installation
     appointments for competing carriers and 9 percent of appointments
     for Bell Atlantic retail customers.[^903] In addition, for the
     period from July through September 1999, Bell Atlantic missed less
     than one percent of installation appointments for new loops
     provisioned to competing carriers.[^904] By contrast, during the
     same period, Bell Atlantic missed between 10 and 15 percent of new
     loop installation appointments for its retail customers.[^905] As
     these performance data demonstrate, Bell Atlantic provisions new
     loops to competing carriers on a more reliable basis than it does
     for its own customers. We find that this level of performance
     demonstrates that Bell Atlantic is provisioning new loops to
     competitors on a timely basis in accordance with the requirements
     of checklist item 4.

284. In addition, we conclude that Bell Atlantic is provisioning
     unbundled loops, both on a stand-alone basis and as part of a
     platform of network elements, to competing carriers at an
     acceptable level of quality.[^906] Bell Atlantic's performance data
     indicate that from June through September 1999, less than 2 percent
     of the new loops provisioned to competing carriers were the subject
     of a trouble report within 7 days of installation, whereas
     approximately 3 percent of Bell Atlantic retail customers reported
     loop troubles within the same period.[^907] Similarly, from June
     through September, competing carriers reported far less loop
     troubles within 30 days of installation than did Bell Atlantic
     retail customers.[^908] We find this to be substantial evidence
     that Bell Atlantic is provisioning new loops to competing carriers
     that are equivalent in quality to those it provisions to its retail
     customers. Furthermore, the record lacks evidence of conflicting
     data, nor do competing carriers raise serious disputes regarding
     the quality of the new voice-grade loops provisioned by Bell
     Atlantic.[^909]

285. In concluding that Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory access
     to new unbundled loops, we note that, although data related to
     average installation intervals remain important in our framework
     for evaluating section 271 applications, in this instance Bell
     Atlantic provided information that convinces us that other factors
     more accurately reflect its compliance with this checklist item.
     Accordingly, under these facts, we accord little weight to data
     evidencing the average intervals in which loop installations are
     completed.[^910] The record contains performance data evidencing
     that, on average, competing carriers experience longer average loop
     installation intervals than do Bell Atlantic retail
     customers.[^911] These differences are statistically significant
     under the framework adopted by the New York Commission. As detailed
     below, however, we conclude that Bell Atlantic presented sufficient
     evidence to demonstrate that the disparity between wholesale and
     retail average installation intervals is not the result of
     discriminatory conduct, but rather is the result of factors outside
     of its control.

286. First, we find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that competitive
     carriers frequently request later due dates than those offered by
     Bell Atlantic's automatic appointment clock. If competing carriers
     request later due dates for loop installations more often than Bell
     Atlantic customers, then installation intervals for those competing
     carriers will be, on average, longer than those for Bell Atlantic
     customers. Although Bell Atlantic relies upon competing carriers to
     specifically "code" orders that include requests for
     longer-than-average provisioning intervals so they can be excluded
     from the installation interval measures,[^912] a statistical study
     submitted by Bell Atlantic establishes that competing carriers
     "miscode" a significant percentage of non-dispatch orders, causing
     those requests to be erroneously included in the performance
     data.[^913] Although the statistical analysis does not address
     dispatched orders, such as orders for new unbundled loops, we agree
     with Bell Atlantic that it is likely that competing carriers
     similarly miscode dispatched orders for which an appointment date
     after the first available date is sought,[^914] which would result
     in longer requested and actual provisioning intervals. Indeed, AT&T
     states that it typically requests 5 days for non-dispatch orders
     with standard intervals of 2 days,[^915] and we find it likely that
     it similarly requests longer intervals for dispatch orders.
     Additionally, with the exception of AT&T, commenters have not taken
     serious issue with Bell Atlantic's provisioning of new, stand-alone
     unbundled loops.[^916]

287. We are also persuaded by Bell Atlantic's argument that competing
     carriers experience longer completion intervals than its retail
     customers because the automatic appointment clock used to schedule
     available appointments contains longer average appointment
     intervals in some geographic areas than in others. As a result,
     reported average installation intervals will vary depending upon
     where competitive carriers are ordering service.[^917] Average
     completion intervals for unbundled loops provisioned to competing
     carriers would be longer if a high proportion of those competing
     carriers provide service to geographic areas with busy service
     centers. This factor, however, is not accounted for in the
     performance data measuring average loop installation
     intervals.[^918] No commenter disputes that this factor affects
     average completion intervals, and we are persuaded by Bell
     Atlantic's arguments that it does.

288. In view of these factors, which are outside of Bell Atlantic's
     control and which can cause distortion to the average installation
     intervals, we find unpersuasive the claims of competing carriers
     that the average completion intervals on their face demonstrate
     that Bell Atlantic provisions new loops in a discriminatory manner,
     citing the Commission's previous statements that average
     installation intervals are a "critical measure of parity."[^919]
     Although we continue to believe that average installation intervals
     are important in determining whether loops are being provided in a
     nondiscriminatory manner, we look to other available data as
     well.[^920] Where, as here, the BOC makes a reasonable showing that
     the evidence on average installation intervals is distorted by
     other factors, it is reasonable to accord more weight to this other
     evidence and less weight to average installation intervals. Here,
     we find the missed rate of installation appointments to be the most
     accurate indicator of Bell Atlantic's ability to provision
     unbundled loops. In this regard, as discussed above, Bell
     Atlantic's performance in meeting loop installation appointments
     demonstrates that it is providing new loops to competing carriers
     within the intervals they are requesting. Accordingly, we conclude
     that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is providing new,
     stand-alone loops to competing carriers in a timely manner.

289. We similarly conclude that the same analysis is applicable to Bell
     Atlantic's provisioning of high capacity loops. As with standard,
     voice-grade loops, the average completion interval for the
     installation of DS1 loops ordered by competing carriers is longer
     than the completion interval experienced by Bell Atlantic retail
     customers.[^921] Bell Atlantic demonstrates, however, that it
     misses fewer appointments for installations of high capacity loops
     to competing carriers than it does for its retail customers.[^922]
     Further, although commenters allege that Bell Atlantic is unable to
     provision high capacity loops such as DS1s in a timely
     manner,[^923] none of these claims is documented with specific
     evidence or contained in a sworn affidavit.[^924] Accordingly, we
     conclude that Bell Atlantic is meeting its installation due dates
     for high capacity loops provided to competitors on a more reliable
     basis than it does for loops provided to its own customers and
     therefore establishes that it provisions these loops in accordance
     with its checklist obligations.

290. *Loops Provisioned as Part of a Platform*. We similarly find, based
     on the evidence in the record, that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that
     it is providing unbundled loops in combination with other network
     elements in a nondiscriminatory manner. As detailed above in our
     discussion of checklist item 2, Bell Atlantic establishes that it
     provisions platforms of network elements, including unbundled
     loops, within the intervals in which they are requested and that it
     misses fewer competing carriers' due dates for platforms of network
     elements than it does for its retail customers. Further, as
     discussed above, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provisions
     unbundled loops as part of platforms of network elements that are
     of substantially the same quality as the loops provisioned to its
     own customers. We therefore conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it is provisioning unbundled loops as part of
     platforms in a nondiscriminatory manner.

#### Hot Cuts

291. We further conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is
     provisioning unbundled loops through the use of coordinated
     conversions of active customers from Bell Atlantic to competing
     carriers, a process known as "hot cuts,"[^925] in accordance with
     the requirements of checklist item 4. Because there is no retail
     equivalent to a hot cut, Bell Atlantic must demonstrate that it
     provides unbundled loops through hot cuts "in a manner that offers
     an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete."[^926]
     As detailed below, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that
     it provisions hot cuts in sufficient quantities, at an acceptable
     level of quality, and with a minimum of service disruption, thereby
     offering competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete in the
     local exchange market.

292. *On-Time Hot Cut Performance.* Under the performance standards
     developed by the New York Commission, with input from Bell Atlantic
     and several competitive carriers, hot cut performance is measured
     according to the percent of coordinated conversions completed
     within a specified time window.[^927] The window, which establishes
     the time within which the entire hot cut must be completed, is a
     fixed period of time ranging from one hour to eight hours,
     depending upon the number of lines involved.[^928] For orders with
     fewer than ten lines, Bell Atlantic has one hour in which to
     complete the coordinated cutover and report the completion of the
     hot cut to the competing carrier.[^929] Because there is no retail
     analogue for a hot cut, the New York Commission adopted a benchmark
     performance metric to measure Bell Atlantic's on-time hot cut
     performance. In order to meet the New York Commission's adopted
     standard, Bell Atlantic must provision 95 percent of hot cuts
     within the window applicable to the particular order.[^930] The New
     York Commission also established a secondary on-time hot cut target
     of 90 percent for inclusion in the Performance Assurance
     Plan.[^931]

293. In its application, Bell Atlantic asserts that it completed 94
     percent of hot cuts on-time in August and July 1999.[^932] The
     record also indicates that Bell Atlantic reported 94 percent
     on-time hot cut performance for September 1999.[^933] These
     figures, which are self-reported by Bell Atlantic, have been
     vigorously disputed by several competing carriers in the New York
     section 271 proceeding. In particular, AT&T submitted affidavits
     and its own performance data that challenged Bell Atlantic's
     on-time hot cut performance and raised serious concerns regarding
     the actual marketplace provisioning of hot cut loops.[^934] AT&T
     also argued that many of the hot cuts provisioned by Bell Atlantic
     resulted in non-functioning loops and extended service disruptions
     for its customers.[^935]

294. In response to these challenges to Bell Atlantic's data, the New
     York Commission conducted a reconciliation of the conflicting data.
     New York Commission staff reviewed all AT&T hot cut orders for both
     July and August.[^936] With respect to July, for which Bell
     Atlantic had reported 94 percent on-time performance, AT&T
     submitted data indicating that Bell Atlantic completed only 76
     percent of its ordered hot cuts within the established
     window.[^937] After reviewing the disputed data and its supporting
     documentation, New York Commission staff concluded that Bell
     Atlantic had completed 88 percent of AT&T's orders on-time in July
     and 90.55 percent of AT&T's orders on-time in August.[^938] The
     staff then adjusted Bell Atlantic's self-reported performance to
     reflect the revised AT&T-specific data. The staff thus factored
     into the 94 percent July and August figures those AT&T orders that
     Bell Atlantic had reported as "on-time," but that staff determined
     through the reconciliation to have been provisioned outside the
     established window.[^939] This process resulted in the New York
     Commission staff's conclusion that Bell Atlantic's on-time hot cut
     performance for all competing carriers was 90.79 percent for July
     and 91.54 percent for August.[^940]

295. We find the most reliable evidence of Bell Atlantic's on-time hot
     cut performance for July and August 1999 to be the figures that
     resulted from the New York Commission staff's reconciliation of
     coordinated loop cutovers provisioned to AT&T. The staff did not
     conduct a review of non-AT&T orders during this period, however,
     and we therefore recognize that the staff's calculations of overall
     hot cut performance could, in fact, include missed or late hot cuts
     that were reported inaccurately as being on-time.[^941] Indeed, the
     Department of Justice notes that the New York Commission's estimate
     that 90.79 percent of all hot cuts in July were provisioned on-time
     would be accurate only if Bell Atlantic had reported every non-AT&T
     order correctly.[^942] With the exception of AT&T, however, no
     competing carrier submitted data directly challenging Bell
     Atlantic's self-reported performance. Rather, the allegations of
     competing carriers are conclusory and anecdotal,[^943] and none is
     included in a sworn affidavit.[^944] We therefore do not accord
     them a great deal of probative value[^945] and instead are
     persuaded by and give significant weight to the New York Commission
     staff's exhaustive review of Bell Atlantic's hot cut performance.
     While criticizing the New York Commission's conclusion that hot
     cuts are performed on-time roughly 90 percent of the time, the
     Department of Justice undertook no analysis to proffer an
     alternative figure in the record.

296. Although we could arrive at a different conclusion if presented
     with another set of facts, we find that the record in this
     proceeding provides a reasonable basis for us to conclude that, at
     a minimum, Bell Atlantic performed hot cuts within the prescribed
     time interval at least 88 percent of the time in July and 90
     percent of the time in August, and Bell Atlantic's performance may
     have been closer to 90.79 percent and 91.54 percent in July and
     August, as the New York Commission found.[^946] There is also
     evidence in the record that Bell Atlantic performed hot cuts
     on-time 94 percent of the time in September 1999.[^947]
     Furthermore, Bell Atlantic provided this level of on-time
     performance each month in the face of increasing volumes.[^948]
     Moreover, in addition to maintaining this level of on-time
     performance, as detailed below, Bell Atlantic provisioned quality
     loops through hot cuts with a minimum of service disruption. We
     underscore, however, that the weight we accord to conflicting
     pieces of evidence here flows directly from our assessment of the
     probative value of each of those pieces of evidence. As such, we
     note that we could arrive at a different weighting if presented
     with another set of facts and circumstances.

297. The Department of Justice cites the failure to complete
     approximately 10 percent of hot cuts within the prescribed window
     as one of four problems that, collectively, evidence the need for
     Bell Atlantic to improve its hot cut performance.[^949] In addition
     to the level of on-time performance, the Department takes issue
     with Bell Atlantic's ability to return timely confirmations and
     rejections of hot cut orders, to return accurate order
     confirmations, and to ensure that customers' directory listings are
     not dropped during the provision of a hot cut.[^950] The Department
     of Justice, however, did not conclude that on-time hot cut
     performance of 90 percent, either alone or in combination with
     other factors, evidences Bell Atlantic's failure to comply with
     this checklist item. Although it found that the collective weight
     of these deficiencies imposes constraints upon competition,[^951]
     the Department did not specify in what manner and to what extent
     the New York local exchange market is affected adversely by these
     problems. Nor did the Department provide any indication as to what
     level of hot cut performance or what types of improvements Bell
     Atlantic should be required to demonstrate in order to satisfy
     section 271.

298. As discussed in our analyses of checklist items 2 and 7, we do not
     consider the factors identified by the Department of Justice,
     either alone or in combination, to have significant effects upon
     Bell Atlantic's overall hot cut loop performance. Thus, after
     careful consideration of the evaluations of the Department of
     Justice and the New York Commission, as well as the comments of
     competing carriers, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's demonstrated
     level of on-time hot cut performance is sufficient to offer
     efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. Although
     we recognize that this performance falls slightly short of the New
     York Commission's adopted standard, we make the independent
     judgment that on-time hot cut performance at a level of 90 percent
     or greater is sufficient to permit carriers to enter and compete in
     a meaningful way in the New York local exchange market.[^952] We
     conclude based upon the record before us that Bell Atlantic
     establishes that it attained this level of performance in August
     and September 1999. Furthermore, we are confident that the
     penalties attached to this performance measure in the New York
     Performance Assurance Plan are sufficient to ensure that Bell
     Atlantic maintains at least this 90 percent level of on-time
     performance, while also providing incentives to improve performance
     above this 90 percent level.[^953] We are prepared to take
     appropriate enforcement action in the event of a deterioration in
     Bell Atlantic's on-time performance below 90 percent.

299. *Quality of Loops Provisioned Through Hot Cuts.* We further
     conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provisions hot
     cuts at a level of quality that offers competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. The ability of a BOC to provision working,
     trouble-free loops through hot cuts is of critical importance in
     view of the substantial risk that a defective cut will result in
     end-user customers experiencing service disruptions that continue
     for more than a brief period.[^954] Upon review of the evidence in
     the record regarding hot cut installation quality, as well as
     service outages and disruptions, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     provisions hot cuts to competitors in a manner sufficient to meet
     the requirements of the checklist.

300. Bell Atlantic submitted performance data that evidence extremely
     low rates of installation troubles reported on the lines
     provisioned through hot cuts.[^955] From July through September
     1999, competitors reported installation troubles on less than two
     percent of the lines provisioned through hot cut loops.[^956] This
     level of performance is well below the two percent standard for hot
     cut installation troubles that was recently adopted by the New York
     Commission.[^957]

301. We find this evidence to be sufficient to overcome the claims of
     competing carriers that Bell Atlantic's hot cut provisioning
     results in a level of service disruptions that significantly
     affects their end-user customers and their ability to obtain and
     retain customers. Allegiance alleges that Bell Atlantic's hot cut
     provisioning results in outages for nearly 20 percent of its
     customers,[^958] although this claim is neither documented with
     specific facts nor contained in a sworn affidavit. AT&T makes the
     most serious challenge to the quality of Bell Atlantic's hot cut
     provisioning, asserting that between June 21 and August 31, 1999,
     Bell Atlantic provisioning errors placed nearly 12 percent of its
     customers out of service.[^959]

302. A comprehensive reconciliation of AT&T's outage data that was
     conducted by the New York Commission, however, largely refutes
     AT&T's allegations.[^960] The data reviewed by the New York
     Commission reveal that, in fact, less than 5 percent of the hot
     cuts that Bell Atlantic provisioned to AT&T between June 21 and
     August 31, 1999 resulted in end-user service outages as a result of
     a Bell Atlantic provisioning failure.[^961] The New York Commission
     further notes that many of the outages claimed by AT&T were not the
     result of Bell Atlantic failures and that many others had causes
     that could not be determined.[^962] Although the reconciliation
     demonstrates that approximately five percent of AT&T customers
     suffered service outages as a result of Bell Atlantic errors, we
     consider this to be sufficient for checklist compliance,[^963]
     particularly in view of the extremely low rates of installation
     troubles reported on the hot cut loops provisioned by Bell
     Atlantic.

303. Additionally, AT&T's reports of extended outages are called into
     question by Bell Atlantic's claims that AT&T fails to report
     installation troubles within a reasonable period of time. The New
     York Commission concluded that in many cases of service
     disruptions, "AT&T took longer to identify and report the problem
     to Bell Atlantic than Bell Atlantic took to fix it."[^964] In these
     circumstances, as the New York Commission notes, it is difficult to
     determine the cause for the duration of many service outages.[^965]
     Furthermore, performance data indicate that a percentage of Bell
     Atlantic's own customers suffer service disruptions at any given
     time.[^966] Based upon these factors, as well as the small
     percentage of AT&T service outages caused by Bell Atlantic and the
     lack of corroborating evidence of outages, we conclude that AT&T's
     claims of service disruptions are insufficient to overcome the
     performance data evidencing extremely low levels of installation
     troubles associated with the hot cut loops provisioned by Bell
     Atlantic.

304. *Hot Cut Provisioning Process.* We also dismiss claims by AT&T and
     other carriers that additional hot cut provisioning deficiencies,
     which are not reflected in performance data, impose significant
     costs and delays upon competing carriers and their customers,
     thereby impairing new entrants' ability to compete. After several
     parties in the New York proceeding challenged Bell Atlantic's hot
     cut performance and data, Bell Atlantic, the New York Commission,
     and several competing carriers collaborated to develop and adopt a
     standardized hot cut process that details operating methods and
     procedures to facilitate coordinated cutovers.[^967] In addition to
     identifying the steps to a hot cut, the procedure requires Bell
     Atlantic technicians to complete a checklist and report when each
     intermediate step has been completed.[^968] Although there are
     numerous steps in the hot cut process, the New York Commission and
     commenters identify four particular steps that have proven to be
     critical to on-time hot cut performance: the return of accurate
     order confirmations; the due date minus 2 days dial tone check; the
     due date minus one hour confirmation call from Bell Atlantic to the
     competing carrier; and the Bell Atlantic post-completion
     confirmation call.[^969]

305. Since the hot cut procedures have been in effect, competing
     carriers have continued to assert that Bell Atlantic fails to
     follow the agreed-to hot cut provisioning process.[^970] Compliance
     with the procedure's steps is currently not captured in any
     performance standard or measure,[^971] although competitors contend
     that Bell Atlantic's failure to comply with the process forces them
     to supplement and postpone many loop orders and to escalate
     problems throughout various levels of Bell Atlantic's wholesale
     organization, imposing costs and delays upon those carriers and
     their customers.[^972] AT&T asserts, for instance, that a high
     percentage of order confirmations received from Bell Atlantic are
     inaccurate,[^973] and that Bell Atlantic often fails to conduct the
     due date minus two days dial tone check and the due date minus one
     hour confirmation call.[^974] AT&T further states that it has
     devoted specific staff functions to escalating hot cut problems
     with Bell Atlantic and quantifies the resultant additional costs
     for each order.[^975]

306. By contrast, as Bell Atlantic argues, KPMG found that Bell Atlantic
     technicians followed the hot cut procedures 97 percent of the
     time.[^976] KPMG had previously taken exception with Bell
     Atlantic's ability to follow the established hot cut procedures,
     but, following a June 1999 two-week observation of hot cut
     provisioning, subsequently concluded that the problems had been
     resolved.[^977] Bell Atlantic indicates that it has undertaken
     extensive training of central office technicians and supervisors to
     ensure that the hot cut procedures are followed.[^978] As a result,
     the New York Commission confirms that hot cut checklists are
     completed by Bell Atlantic technicians for every order.[^979]

307. The Department of Justice notes that KPMG's observation of hot cut
     provisioning did not confirm whether Bell Atlantic performed any of
     the required steps prior to the due date, such as the due date
     minus two days dial tone check.[^980] Additionally, AT&T argues
     that Bell Atlantic's consistent failure to adhere to the hot cut
     procedures is evidenced by a letter from New York Commission staff
     in October 1999 stating that "\[a\]pplication of the due date minus
     2 days check has not been rigorously adhered to at the operations
     level and it appears that technicians have been using different
     practices to effectuate coordination."[^981] Bell Atlantic responds
     that this statement refers to Bell Atlantic's practice of agreeing
     with competing carriers regarding the manner in which the dial tone
     check will be completed and is not an indication that Bell Atlantic
     is not following the hot cut procedures.[^982] Considering each of
     these factors, we conclude that the evidence weighs in favor of
     finding that Bell Atlantic adheres to the hot cut provisioning
     process. Bell Atlantic demonstrates, and KPMG and the New York
     Commission have confirmed, that the hot cut procedures are being
     followed, and we believe contrary allegations in the record are
     insufficient to refute this showing. Although we take seriously
     AT&T's claims regarding additional costs it incurs as a result of
     Bell Atlantic's hot cut provisioning failures,[^983] we nonetheless
     conclude that the record does not indicate that any alleged failure
     to comply with the procedures results in adverse hot cut
     provisioning that denies efficient competitors a meaningful
     opportunity to compete. Rather, Bell Atlantic's high rate of
     on-time hot cuts bolsters the evidence in the record that it is
     adhering to the hot cut procedures.[^984]

308. Additionally, although we concur with the Department of Justice's
     conclusion that the economic significance of competition through
     unbundled loops is greater than would be suggested by assessing the
     percentage of stand-alone unbundled loops currently being
     provisioned,[^985] we nonetheless conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it is capable of continuing its performance in
     provisioning quality hot cuts in a timely manner. In this regard,
     we further find that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that its ability to
     provision hot cuts is scalable such that the company can expand its
     capacity to perform hot cuts in response to increases in commercial
     demand. KPMG verified that Bell Atlantic's capacity to provision
     hot cuts is scalable, citing Bell Atlantic's intention to open a
     second service center for processing hot cut orders.[^986]
     Commenters argue that the hot cut provisioning problems and delays
     they are currently experiencing demonstrate that Bell Atlantic does
     not have the capacity to process increased commercial
     volumes.[^987] As discussed herein, however, we find that competing
     carriers' claims of provisioning deficiencies are insufficient to
     refute Bell Atlantic's demonstrated hot cut performance.
     Accordingly, we similarly find those claims to be insufficient to
     refute Bell Atlantic's showing that it is capable of expanding hot
     cut volumes to meet growing demand. Additionally, as discussed in
     our analysis of checklist item 2, we conclude that Bell Atlantic is
     providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions
     for unbundled network elements, including unbundled local loops,
     and is capable of processing large volumes of orders in a timely
     fashion. Thus, although we have accorded them substantial weight,
     we do not agree with the concerns raised by the Department of
     Justice regarding the effects of manual loop order processing upon
     Bell Atlantic's ability to process increased volumes of loop and
     hot cut orders.[^988]

309. Finally, we emphasize that although we consider Bell Atlantic's
     demonstrated on-time hot cut performance at rates at or above 90
     percent, in combination with the evidence indicating that fewer
     than five percent of hot cuts resulted in service outages and that
     fewer than two percent of hot cut lines had reported installation
     troubles, to be sufficient to establish compliance with the
     competitive checklist, we view this as a minimally acceptable
     showing. We would thus have serious concerns if the level of
     performance in any one of these three measures were to decline and
     would be prepared, in that event, to take whatever enforcement
     action is warranted.[^989] We are especially concerned with hot cut
     performance because of the substantial risk that an untimely or
     defective cutover will result in an end-user customer's loss of
     service for more than a brief period, as well as the effect of such
     disruptions upon competitors. We also would be particularly
     concerned if there were any evidence that Bell Atlantic is
     competing in the marketplace in part by suggesting to consumers
     that there is a possibility of service disruptions when customers
     switch their service from Bell Atlantic to competing carriers.

#### Maintenance and Repair of Unbundled Local Loops 

310. We further conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is
     providing maintenance and repair functions for unbundled local
     loops in substantially the same time and manner in which it
     provides those functions to its retail customers. Although Bell
     Atlantic does not perform some loop maintenance and repair
     functions for competitors as quickly as it performs them for Bell
     Atlantic retail customers, we do not consider these slight
     differences to be competitively significant. Rather, we find that
     Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory maintenance and repair
     services for the unbundled loops it provides to competing carriers.

311. The New York Carrier-to-Carrier performance data demonstrate that
     Bell Atlantic performs maintenance and repair functions with
     respect to loops provisioned to competitors in substantially the
     same time and manner as it does with respect to loops provided to
     its retail customers.[^990] In July 1999, Bell Atlantic missed
     approximately 16 percent of loop repair appointments for competing
     carriers and 12 percent of repair appointments for its retail
     customers.[^991] In August, Bell Atlantic missed 14 percent of loop
     repair appointments for competitors and 10 percent for Bell
     Atlantic customers.[^992] Significantly, Bell Atlantic improved its
     performance substantially in September, missing approximately 12
     percent of competitors' loop repair appointments and 11 percent of
     Bell Atlantic retail appointments.[^993] This demonstrates that
     Bell Atlantic is responding to competitors' trouble complaints in
     substantially the same manner as it responds to its own customers'
     complaints.

312. Additional data indicate that the average time to repair loops
     provisioned to competing carriers is comparable to the average time
     to repair loops provisioned to Bell Atlantic customers. In July,
     for instance, data demonstrate that repairs were made to loops
     provisioned to competitors in, on average, 28 hours and to loops
     provisioned to retail customers in, on average, 29 hours.[^994]
     Similarly, in August, repairs were made in an average of 26 hours
     for competitors and 25 hours for Bell Atlantic customers[^995] and
     in September, in 25 hours for competitors and 27 hours for Bell
     Atlantic customers.[^996]

313. We conclude that this level of performance demonstrates that Bell
     Atlantic is providing loop maintenance and repair functions in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. We do not consider the slight differences
     between the percentage of missed repair appointments to be
     indicative of discriminatory access to these functions,
     particularly in view of the improvements made by Bell Atlantic in
     September. Furthermore, data addressing the duration of loop
     maintenance and repair activities demonstrate that Bell Atlantic is
     repairing competitors' loop troubles in substantially the same time
     period as it is repairing its own customers' loops. We consider
     this to be persuasive evidence of nondiscriminatory access to loop
     maintenance and repair functions.

314. Furthermore, KPMG verified Bell Atlantic's performance in this
     regard through an extensive test of maintenance and repair services
     offered to both competing carriers and retail customers, as well as
     Bell Atlantic's ability to scale its maintenance and repair
     capabilities to meet future volumes and increased demand.[^997]
     Finally, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it has addressed and
     resolved the situations in which it was not meeting performance
     standards governing maintenance and repair of unbundled
     loops.[^998]

315. Moreover, we do not find the concerns raised by commenters to be
     sufficient to overcome Bell Atlantic's evidence that it performs
     loop maintenance and repair functions in a nondiscriminatory
     manner. The few commenters that raise objections to Bell Atlantic's
     loop maintenance and repair performance do not raise specific
     allegations supported by documented facts. Rather, competing
     carriers claim generally that Bell Atlantic's performance of loop
     maintenance and repair functions are discriminatory.[^999]
     Accordingly, we find these allegations insufficient to rebut Bell
     Atlantic's showing that it provides access to loop maintenance and
     repair functions in a nondiscriminatory manner.

#### xDSL-Capable Loops

316. Based upon its overall performance in providing unbundled access to
     local loops, we conclude that Bell Atlantic satisfies its
     obligations under item 4 of the competitive checklist. We note at
     the outset that our previous section 271 orders have not addressed
     the ordering or provisioning of xDSL-capable loops[^1000] and that
     no previous applicant has made a separate showing on the provision
     of xDSL loops. Thus, although the obligation to provide access to
     unbundled loops capable of supporting xDSL technologies was adopted
     in 1996,[^1001] we have not previously provided guidance to the
     BOCs as to the type and level of proof necessary in this area to
     establish compliance with section 271.

317. States are just now developing and adopting performance standards
     and measures for xDSL loop ordering and provisioning, and incumbent
     and competitive carriers themselves are in the process of defining
     the relevant criteria for adequate xDSL performance and developing
     operational provisioning procedures. The New York Commission did
     not begin to address xDSL-specific issues until August 1999. In
     response to early concerns raised by competing carriers in the New
     York section 271 proceeding regarding the timeliness and quality of
     Bell Atlantic's provisioning of xDSL loops, the New York Commission
     in August initiated a collaborative proceeding to address the
     issues raised by competitors.[^1002] The collaborative proceeding
     is intended to focus on defining provisioning methods for xDSL
     loops to ensure the timely installation of functioning loops. In
     addition to conducting its xDSL collaborative proceeding, the New
     York Commission, in conjunction with Bell Atlantic and several
     competing carriers, is in the process of developing xDSL-specific
     performance standards and measures. The New York Commission expects
     to receive recommendations for xDSL-specific measures in December,
     in which case Bell Atlantic should begin officially reporting its
     performance to the New York Commission and competing carriers in
     January 2000.[^1003]

318. Parties are thus actively working in New York to address issues
     associated with xDSL loops, and have already undertaken a number of
     process improvements. The New York xDSL collaborative is designed
     to improve communication among carriers and to develop agreed-upon
     common practices for xDSL loop provisioning.[^1004] The New York
     Commission, for instance, instituted a process change to simplify
     xDSL central office cross-connections and is working to remedy
     customer contact problems that have led to a significant portion of
     installations in which Bell Atlantic cannot access the customers'
     premises.[^1005] The collaborative proceeding is also addressing
     problems relating to the timing of loop installations by ensuring
     that carriers engage in close operational coordination so that loop
     installations are accurate and less likely to be the subject of
     trouble reports.[^1006]

319. In addition, through the New York collaborative, Bell Atlantic and
     competing carriers have agreed to joint testing and provisioning
     procedures for xDSL loops. Provisioning xDSL loops to competitors
     involves processes that are more complex than those involved with
     the provision of a voice-grade loop.[^1007] As a result,
     participants in the New York collaborative proceeding have agreed
     to a provisioning process for xDSL loops that involves
     collaborative testing between Bell Atlantic and the requesting
     carrier. The process, which has been in place since September 15,
     1999, involves individual and joint testing of loops, sharing of
     test results, joint review of order status, and procedures for
     establishing a dialogue between Bell Atlantic and the requesting
     carrier on orders in jeopardy.[^1008] These procedures ensure, for
     instance, that the parties test loops during the installation
     process and that competitors receive demarcation information at the
     time of installation.[^1009] The New York Commission confirms that,
     where cooperative testing is conducted, xDSL loop installation
     problems are reduced.[^1010] We are highly supportive of these
     initiatives and fully expect that the New York Commission will
     provide needed clarity in this area, both in terms of defining
     operational procedures and adopting performance standards.

320. In New York, competitors have been ordering xDSL-capable loops for
     a relatively limited period of time. According to Bell Atlantic, it
     provisioned 7 xDSL-specific loops in June, 56 xDSL-specific loops
     in July, 449 xDSL-specific loops in August, and 653 xDSL-specific
     loops in September.[^1011] In addition, Bell Atlantic indicates
     that it provisioned more than 3,300 premium digital loops since
     January 1999, although not all of those loops have been used by
     competitors to provide xDSL services.[^1012] Covad indicates that
     it submitted more than 2,300 orders for xDSL-capable loops in New
     York during the period from June through September 1999.[^1013]
     Indeed, regardless of the data on which we rely, the record
     indicates that demand for xDSL-capable loops has grown dramatically
     in recent months.

321. Moreover, the xDSL-capable loops provisioned to competing carriers
     by Bell Atlantic to date represent only a small fraction of the
     entirety of unbundled loops provisioned in New York. Specifically,
     through September 1999, Bell Atlantic provisioned more than 50,000
     unbundled, voice-grade loops in New York, compared to only 1,100
     xDSL-specific loops.[^1014]

322. This application presents unique factual circumstances with regard
     to xDSL loops in New York. Specifically, competitors have been
     ordering xDSL-capable loops in New York for a relatively short
     period of time; there has been a recent surge in demand; and
     xDSL-capable loops remain a small percentage of overall loop
     orders. Given these circumstances it is difficult to reach
     conclusive judgments about Bell Atlantic's provisioning performance
     for xDSL loops. We believe we could benefit from New York's input
     with regard to xDSL-capable loop provisioning but note that its
     review is still underway. In the absence of definitive state
     standards, we could look at Bell Atlantic's performance by
     examining whether the loops are delivered in a timely fashion and
     whether those loops actually are working.

323. In its application, Bell Atlantic submitted performance data that
     it asserts demonstrate that it provisions quality premium digital
     loops and xDSL-specific loops in a timely manner. Opponents of the
     application, however, heavily contest much of that data. The data
     submitted by Bell Atlantic indicate, for instance, that it missed
     between .70 percent and 4.60 percent of installation appointments
     for premium digital loops provisioned to competing carriers between
     January and September 1999.[^1015] Bell Atlantic's data further
     indicate that it missed approximately 7 percent of xDSL-specific
     loop installation appointments for competitors in August
     1999[^1016] and approximately 3 percent of xDSL-specific loop
     appointments in September 1999.[^1017] By contrast, competitors
     contend that Bell Atlantic misses far more installation
     appointments. Covad, for instance, submits data indicating that
     between May and August, 1999, it received premium digital and
     xDSL-capable loops by the due date to which Bell Atlantic committed
     for only 29 percent of the loops it ordered.[^1018]

324. Bell Atlantic also asserts that in August and September 1999, it
     provisioned xDSL loops in approximately 7 days, on average.[^1019]
     Covad asserts that in its experience, the average interval for Bell
     Atlantic's installation of these loops has been approximately 40
     days.[^1020] Other competing advanced services providers argue that
     Bell Atlantic's performance data should be disregarded because the
     installation interval measure does not consider whether the loop
     installed by Bell Atlantic is functioning.[^1021]

325. There are also sharp disparities in the record regarding the
     quality of Bell Atlantic's xDSL loop provisioning. Bell Atlantic
     reports, for instance, that during the first month since the
     September 15, 1999 implementation of joint installation and testing
     procedures, it received trouble reports on approximately three
     percent of the xDSL loops it installed.[^1022] By contrast, Covad
     contends that only 39 percent of the loops it received in the first
     two weeks of the joint procedures were installed correctly.[^1023]
     Similarly, NorthPoint argues that a substantial number of the xDSL
     loops provisioned by Bell Atlantic are defective or
     impaired.[^1024]

326. The absence of a New York performance benchmark or Commission
     reconciliation of conflicting data claims makes it difficult for
     this Commission to decide between the competing statistics. A
     number of factors complicate our efforts to analyze the data. The
     record indicates, for instance, that Covad begins measuring its
     installation intervals on the date that it first sends an order for
     an xDSL loop to Bell Atlantic, whereas Bell Atlantic does not begin
     measuring the installation interval until it receives an error-free
     order from the requesting carrier.[^1025] According to Bell
     Atlantic, twenty-five percent of Covad's orders have had two or
     more corrections associated with them,[^1026] a result that could
     cause large disparities in installation intervals based solely upon
     the conflicting measurement techniques.[^1027] With respect to the
     missed appointment data, Bell Atlantic contends, and competing
     carriers do not seriously dispute, that in many instances it is
     unable to gain access to the customers' premises to complete the
     installation and that many orders are cancelled by the customer
     when Bell Atlantic arrives to complete the installation.[^1028] In
     such circumstances, Bell Atlantic does not score the appointment as
     having been missed, although it appears that at least some
     competing carriers do. We do not believe it appropriate to include
     legitimate "no access" situations in a measure of missed
     appointments.

327. We thus are faced with a situation in which competitors have been
     ordering xDSL-capable loops in New York for a relatively short
     period of time; there has been a recent surge in demand; and
     xDSL-capable loops remain a small percentage of loop orders.
     Although the ongoing New York proceeding is expected to resolve
     many key issues in the near future, the underlying performance data
     in this record are not reported in accordance with a common set of
     definitions and have not been validated by the New York Commission.
     Moreover, we have never before provided direction to the BOCs
     regarding the application of section 271 to the provision of xDSL
     loops. In light of these unique circumstances, we conclude that we
     should rely upon Bell Atlantic's overall showing of loop
     performance in evaluating whether Bell Atlantic has met its burden
     of demonstrating that it provides unbundled local loops in
     accordance with checklist item 4.

328. In reaching this conclusion, we take a different approach than the
     Department of Justice, which found that it could not conclude on
     the current record that Bell Atlantic demonstrates an acceptable
     level of performance in provisioning xDSL loops.[^1029] Like this
     Commission, the Department had difficulty evaluating the evidence
     presented by Bell Atlantic in light of the contrary data submitted
     by competing carriers. The Department, however, concluded that the
     Commission should await completion of the New York Commission's
     ongoing xDSL collaborative proceeding and review Bell Atlantic's
     provisioning performance at that time.[^1030] We have given
     substantial weight to the Department of Justice's views, but
     nonetheless, based upon our review of the record on loops as a
     whole, find that Bell Atlantic establishes that it provisions
     unbundled local loops at a level of performance sufficient for
     checklist compliance.

329. As detailed above, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's overall
     performance in providing access to unbundled local loops is
     sufficient to satisfy the competitive checklist. Bell Atlantic
     establishes that it meets the vast majority of installation
     appointments for standard and high-capacity voice grade loops and,
     in fact, misses fewer new loop installation appointments for
     competing carriers than it does for its retail customers. In
     addition, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that the loops it installs are
     of substantially the same quality as the loops it provides to its
     retail customers. Similarly, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it
     provides coordinated cutovers of loops, *i.e.*, hot cuts, to
     competing carriers within the prescribed time interval at least 90
     percent of the time and that in no more than five percent of cases
     did the hot cut result in a service disruption. Finally, Bell
     Atlantic establishes that it provides loop maintenance and repair
     functions to competitors in substantially the same time and manner
     as it provides them to its retail customers.[^1031] If xDSL
     services continue to grow rapidly, however, the aggregate loop
     results will be more heavily influenced by Bell Atlantic's
     performance in provisioning xDSL-specific loops. If the future
     aggregate performance declines from current levels, we will take
     appropriate enforcement action.

330. We choose to look at Bell Atlantic's overall performance due to the
     unique circumstances present in this application. Given our
     expectation that the unique circumstances present in this case will
     evolve over time or will otherwise not be present in future
     applications, we do not expect to rely solely on a BOC's overall
     loop performance in reaching a decision on this checklist item in
     future applications.[^1032] Rather, we will find it most persuasive
     if future applicants under section 271, unlike this applicant, make
     a separate and comprehensive evidentiary showing with respect to
     the provision of xDSL-capable loops, either through proof of a
     fully operational separate advanced services affiliate as described
     below, which may also include appropriate performance measures, or
     through a showing of nondiscrimination in accordance with the
     guidance provided herein. Given our statutory obligation to
     encourage deployment of advanced services[^1033] and the critical
     importance of the provisioning of xDSL loops to the development of
     the advanced service marketplace, we emphasize our intention to
     examine this issue closely in the future.

331. We believe that the creation of a separate affiliate for the
     provision of retail services may provide significant evidence that
     a BOC complies with the nondiscrimination requirements of the
     competitive checklist.[^1034] A separate affiliate may be
     particularly appropriate for new offerings where it is difficult to
     demonstrate nondiscrimination through statistical evidence.[^1035]
     In this case, we have further assurance that competing carriers in
     New York will have nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops
     in the future as a result of Bell Atlantic's commitment to
     establish a separate affiliate through which it will offer retail
     advanced services.[^1036]

332. Providing advanced services through a separate affiliate would
     reduce the ability of a BOC to discriminate against competing
     carriers with respect to xDSL services. Significantly, under this
     structure, the BOC would be required to treat rival providers of
     advanced services the same way that it treats its own separate
     affiliate. Because the BOC's advanced services affiliate would use
     the same processes as competitors to conduct such activities as
     ordering loops, and pay an equivalent price for facilities and
     services, the creation of the affiliate should ensure a level
     playing field between the BOC and its advanced services
     competitors.[^1037] We also believe that this structure would have
     the additional benefit of increasing the availability of and
     broadening the choices for advanced services for all Americans. A
     separate advanced services affiliate helps to attain the goal of
     encouraging entry into the provision of advanced services by
     numerous firms, in addition to the BOCs, while protecting against
     the risk that the BOCs could cripple these services in their
     infancy by discriminating against competing advanced services
     providers.

333. In the absence of a separate affiliate, a BOC seeking approval
     under section 271 in the future could demonstrate that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to xDSL loops in accordance with checklist
     item four by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
     it provides xDSL-capable loops to competitors in a
     nondiscriminatory manner. If an applicant chose to make its case by
     submitting performance data, we would examine carefully the
     performance standards adopted by the relevant state commission.

334. In this regard, we emphasize our strong preference for a record
     that contains data measuring a BOC's performance pursuant to
     state-adopted standards that were developed with input from the
     relevant carriers and that include clearly-defined guidelines and
     methodology. The need for unambiguous performance standards and
     measures has been reinforced by the disputes in this record
     regarding, for instance, what performance is being measured and
     whether it is properly captured by particular measures.
     Accordingly, we encourage state commissions to adopt specific xDSL
     loop performance standards measuring, for instance, the average
     completion interval, the percent of installation appointments
     missed as a result of the BOC's provisioning error, the timeliness
     of order processing, the installation quality of xDSL loops
     provisioned, and the timeliness and quality of the BOC's xDSL
     maintenance and repair functions. We believe information on these
     dimensions of performance is critical to ensuring our joint federal
     and state commitment to the development of a vibrant advanced
     services marketplace. We also urge states to consider adoption of
     self-enforcing mechanisms to ensure compliance with any
     state-adopted standards.

335. Specifically, depending upon whether there is an appropriate retail
     analogue, we would expect a BOC to demonstrate, preferably through
     the use of state or third-party verified performance data, that it
     provides xDSL-capable loops to competitors either in substantially
     the same average interval in which it provides xDSL service to its
     retail customers or in an interval that offers competing carriers a
     meaningful opportunity to compete.[^1038] The BOC would also be
     expected to establish, again through defined performance measures,
     that it meets substantially the same number of installation
     appointments for the customers of competing carriers that it meets
     for its retail customers or that the level of missed appointments
     is sufficiently low to offer competitors a meaningful opportunity
     to compete. Additionally, we would expect a showing that the
     quality of the loops provisioned to competing carriers is
     substantially the same as the quality of the lines used for the
     BOC's provision of retail advanced services or that the level of
     quality is sufficiently high to permit competitors to compete
     meaningfully. We would also look for evidence establishing that the
     BOC performs maintenance and repair functions for competitors' xDSL
     loops in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its
     retail lines. Finally, we would expect the BOC to demonstrate that
     it provides competing carriers with nondiscriminatory access to the
     pre-ordering and ordering OSS functions associated with the
     provision of xDSL loops, including access to loop qualification
     information and databases. In this regard, the BOC could make such
     a showing through evidence of either extensive commercial
     experience or third-party testing.

336. In conclusion, we reiterate that we do not expect the special
     circumstances that are present in this application to exist in
     future applications. Competitors are increasingly ordering xDSL
     loops, and, as the states begin to develop performance standards in
     this area, there will be a framework for future examination of
     performance data. Most importantly, in setting forth our views on
     the two avenues of proof that we would find persuasive in future
     applications, we have now provided direction to the BOCs regarding
     their obligation to provide xDSL-capable loops in accordance with
     the requirements of the competitive checklist.

## Checklist Item 5 \-- Unbundled Local Transport

### Background

337. Section 271(d)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC
     to provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
     local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
     services."[^1039] The Commission has required that BOCs provide
     both dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers.[^1040]
     Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities
     dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide
     telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting
     telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or
     requesting telecommunications carriers. [^1041] Shared transport
     consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one
     carrier, including the BOC, between end office switches, between
     end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem
     switches, in the BOC's network. [^1042]

### Discussion

338. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     provides both shared and dedicated transport in compliance with the
     requirements of this checklist item.[^1043] The New York Commission
     also finds that Bell Atlantic is in compliance with this checklist
     item.[^1044]

339. Bell Atlantic's August and September 1999 data concerning missed
     appointments for interoffice facilities show that its provisioning
     of transport to competitive LECs is nondiscriminatory.[^1045]
     Moreover, none of the commenting parties challenge Bell Atlantic's
     showing concerning the provision of shared transport, except
     insofar as the commenters address OSS issues and matters concerning
     the provisioning of the UNE platform, which we address
     elsewhere.[^1046]

340. We are not persuaded by the assertions of some commenters that Bell
     Atlantic fails to provide dedicated local transport in a timely
     manner.[^1047] Bell Atlantic states that, with the exception of
     Choice One discussed below, these commenters have not ordered
     unbundled local transport from Bell Atlantic, but rather have
     requested special access services from Bell Atlantic's
     interexchange access tariffs.[^1048] We cannot accept the assertion
     by a number of these parties that the provision of special access
     should be considered for purposes of determining checklist
     compliance in this proceeding.[^1049] Although dedicated local
     transport and the interoffice portion of special access are
     generally provided over the same facilities, they differ in certain
     other respects.[^1050] A number of these parties, however, assert
     that the checklist requirements focus on the provision of physical
     facilities, not the regulatory classifications that apply. We do
     not believe that checklist compliance is intended to encompass the
     provision of tariffed interstate access services simply because
     these services use some of the same physical facilities as a
     checklist item. We have never considered the provision of
     interstate access services in the context of checklist compliance
     before.[^1051] The fact that competitive LECs can use interstate
     special access service in lieu of the EEL, a combination of
     unbundled loops and transport, and can convert special access
     service to EELs does not persuade us that we should alter our
     approach and consider the provision of special access for purposes
     of checklist compliance.[^1052] This is especially true when Bell
     Atlantic is not required to demonstrate that it provides EELs for
     purposes of checklist compliance in this application because the
     application was filed before the effective date of the *UNE Remand
     Order* clearly establishing Bell Atlantic's federal obligation to
     provide EELs.[^1053]

341. Nevertheless, to the extent that parties are experiencing delays in
     the provisioning of special access services ordered from Bell
     Atlantic's federal tariffs, we note that these issues are
     appropriately addressed in the Commission's section 208 complaint
     process.

342. In addition, we find that Bell Atlantic satisfactorily responds to
     Choice One's complaint that Bell Atlantic's provisioning interval
     for unbundled local transport reflects unacceptable delays.
     According to Bell Atlantic, Choice One failed to follow the
     recommended procedures and ordered entrance facilities after it
     ordered collocation.[^1054] Bell Atlantic asserts that if Choice
     One had followed repeatedly suggested procedures and ordered
     collocation and entrance facilities simultaneously, both would have
     been ready at the same time.[^1055] Based on the present record,
     this appears to be an isolated problem for which Bell Atlantic
     should not be held responsible.[^1056]

## Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching

### Background

343. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[l\]ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop
     transmission, or other services."[^1057] In the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order,* the Commission required BellSouth to provide
     unbundled local switching that included line-side and trunk-side
     facilities, plus the features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch.[^1058] The features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch include the basic switching function as well as the same
     basic capabilities that are available to the incumbent LEC's
     customers.[^1059] Additionally, local switching includes all
     vertical features that the switch is capable of providing, as well
     as any technically feasible customized routing functions.[^1060]

344. Moreover, in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission
     required BellSouth to permit competing carriers to purchase
     unbundled network elements, including unbundled switching, in a
     manner that permits a competing carrier to offer, and bill for,
     exchange access and the termination of local traffic.[^1061] The
     Commission also stated that measuring daily customer usage for
     billing purposes requires essentially the same OSS functions for
     both competing carriers and incumbent LECs, and that a BOC must
     demonstrate that it is providing equivalent access to billing
     information.[^1062] Therefore, the ability of a BOC to provide
     billing information necessary for a competitive LEC to bill for
     exchange access and termination of local traffic is an aspect of
     unbundled local switching.[^1063] Thus, there is an overlap between
     the provision of unbundled local switching and the provision of the
     OSS billing function.[^1064]

345. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission stated
     that to comply with the requirements of unbundled local switching,
     a BOC must also make available trunk ports on a shared basis and
     routing tables resident in the BOC's switch, as necessary to
     provide access to shared transport functionality.[^1065] The
     Commission also stated that a BOC may not limit the ability of
     competitors to use unbundled local switching to provide exchange
     access by requiring competing carriers to purchase a dedicated
     trunk from an interexchange carrier's point of presence to a
     dedicated trunk port on the local switch.[^1066]

### Discussion

346. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it complies with checklist item 6.[^1067]
     Specifically, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides: (1)
     line-side and trunk side facilities; [^1068] (2) basic switching
     functions;[^1069] (3) vertical features;[^1070] (4) customized
     routing; [^1071] (5) shared trunk ports; [^1072] (6) unbundled
     tandem switching;[^1073] (7) usage information for billing exchange
     access, [^1074] and (8) usage information for billing for
     reciprocal compensation.[^1075] The New York Commission concludes
     that Bell Atlantic is in compliance with this checklist
     item.[^1076]

347. We are not persuaded by Z-Tel that Bell Atlantic fails to meet the
     requirements for this checklist item. Z-Tel claims that Bell
     Atlantic has used the Network Design Request (NDR) process to delay
     implementation of Z-Tel's custom dialing plans in selected New York
     markets.[^1077] We find that this claim does not warrant a
     conclusion that Bell Atlantic has failed to comply with this
     checklist item. We recognize that Z-Tel is better able to serve its
     customers if it is able to obtain a consistent level of service
     from Bell Atlantic statewide. We note, however, that the time
     frames for delivery of custom dialing plans are subject to
     negotiation between Bell Atlantic and competitive LECs under the
     terms of Bell Atlantic's interconnection agreements, and Z-Tel has
     not shown that Bell Atlantic's explanation for offering longer
     implementation time frames due to year 2000 system concerns is
     unreasonable.[^1078] Moreover, Bell Atlantic states that, in the
     interim, it has offered, and Z-Tel is now pursuing, an option of
     obtaining a generic NDR instead of a customized NDR, until a
     conversion to a customized NDR can take place.[^1079] Insofar as
     the commenters raise OSS issues and matters concerning the
     provisioning of the UNE platform, the primary vehicle used by
     competitive LECs to obtain unbundled local switching,[^1080] we
     address these issues elsewhere.[^1081]

348. We note that Z-Tel filed an *ex parte* letter on November 2, 1999,
     alleging that, after the comment date, Bell Atlantic ceased
     providing a vertical feature of the switch \-- pre-programming
     speed dial capability.[^1082] Bell Atlantic, in response, claims
     that this feature is designed to be initiated and controlled by the
     end user and, as such, it is not a feature that Bell Atlantic
     provides to its own retail users or to competing carriers.[^1083]
     We find that, in view of the compelling evidence in the record that
     Bell Atlantic complies with this checklist item, Z-Tel\'s claim
     does not present a sufficient basis upon which to find that Bell
     Atlantic has fallen out of compliance in the course of the instant
     proceeding. If, however, future evidence reveals this to be the
     case, we will take appropriate enforcement action against Bell
     Atlantic.

## Checklist Item 7

### 911 and E911 Access

#### Background

349. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to -- (I) 911 and E911
     services."[^1084] In the *Ameritech Michigan Order,* the Commission
     found that "section 271 requires a BOC to provide competitors
     access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that a BOC
     obtains such access, *i.e.,* at parity."[^1085] Specifically, the
     Commission found that a BOC "must maintain the 911 database entries
     for competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it
     maintains the database entries for its own customers."[^1086] For
     facilities-based carriers, the BOC must provide "unbundled access
     to \[its\] 911 database and 911 interconnection, including the
     provision of dedicated trunks from the requesting carrier's
     switching facilities to the 911 control office at parity with what
     \[the BOC\] provides to itself."[^1087]

#### Discussion

350. Based on the evidence submitted in the record, we conclude that
     Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it is providing nondiscriminatory
     access to 911/E911 services, and thus satisfies the requirements of
     checklist item (vii)(I).[^1088] We note that no commenter disputes
     Bell Atlantic's compliance with this portion of checklist item 7,
     and the New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic is
     providing nondiscriminatory access to 911/E911.[^1089]

### Directory Assistance/Operator Services

#### Background

351. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III)
     require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to "directory
     assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to
     obtain telephone numbers" and "operator call completion services,"
     respectively.[^1090] Section 251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act imposes on
     each LEC "the duty to permit all \[competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service\] to have
     nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory
     assistance, and directory listing with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^1091] The Commission implemented section 251(b)(3) in the
     *Local Competition Second Report and Order*.[^1092]

352. We concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* that a BOC
     must be in compliance with the regulations implementing section
     251(b)(3) to satisfy the requirements of sections
     271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).[^1093] In the
     *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, the Commission held
     that the phrase "nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance
     and directory listings" means that "the customers of all
     telecommunications service providers should be able to access each
     LEC's directory assistance service and obtain a directory listing
     on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding : (1) the identity of
     a requesting customer's local telephone service provider; or (2)
     the identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose
     directory listing is requested."[^1094] The Commission concluded
     that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and
     5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory assistance were technically
     feasible, and would continue.[^1095] The Commission specifically
     held that the phrase \"nondiscriminatory access to operator
     services\" means that ". . . a telephone service customer,
     regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service
     provider, must be able to connect to a local operator by dialing
     '0,' or '0 plus' the desired telephone number."[^1096]

353. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory
     assistance by either reselling the BOC's services or by using their
     own personnel and facilities to provide these services. The
     Commission's rules require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing
     to resell the BOC's operator services and directory assistance to
     request the BOC to brand their calls.[^1097] Competing carriers
     wishing to provide operator services or directory assistance using
     their own facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory
     listings either by obtaining directory information on a "read only"
     or "per dip" basis from the BOC's directory assistance database, or
     by creating its own directory assistance database by obtaining the
     subscriber listing information in the BOC's database.[^1098]

#### Discussion

354. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it provides directory assistance services in
     accordance with the requirements of checklist item 7.[^1099] The
     New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic has satisfied this
     checklist item.[^1100]

355. We are not persuaded by commenters' arguments that Bell Atlantic
     fails to comply with checklist item 7. AT&T submits studies to show
     that Bell Atlantic's systems drop more than 10 percent of the
     directory listings associated with unbundled loop orders from Bell
     Atlantic's directory assistance database.[^1101] In response, Bell
     Atlantic asserts that AT&T's studies are flawed and do not properly
     reflect improvements Bell Atlantic has made to its systems.[^1102]
     We find that Bell Atlantic has taken adequate measures to detect
     any dropped listings and restore them to the directory assistance
     database promptly.[^1103] No other commenter raises this objection,
     suggesting the difficulty is of limited competitive consequence. In
     fact, several parties support Bell Atlantic's assertion of
     compliance with this checklist item.[^1104] Accordingly, we
     conclude that these objections are not sufficient to conclude that
     Bell Atlantic has failed to comply with the requirements of
     checklist item 7.

356. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that we differ somewhat
     from the Department of Justice.[^1105] The Department of Justice,
     relying on evidence submitted by AT&T, however, did not have the
     benefit of Bell Atlantic's Reply, which we believe sufficiently
     rebuts AT&T's claims. Moreover, we note that the Department of
     Justice does not argue that Bell Atlantic fails to comply with
     checklist item 7 but rather simply cites Bell Atlantic's
     difficulties in this area as evidence that its hot cut performance
     needs improvement.

## Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings

### Background

357. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to
     provide "\[w\]hite pages directory listings for customers of the
     other carrier's telephone exchange service."[^1106] Section
     251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive
     providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service
     to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listings.[^1107]

358. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission concluded
     that "consistent with the Commission's interpretation of 'directory
     listing' as used in section 251(b)(3), the term 'white pages' in
     section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local alphabetical
     directory that includes the residential and business listings of
     the customers of the local exchange provider."[^1108] We further
     concluded, "the term 'directory listing,' as used in this section,
     includes, at a minimum, the subscriber's name, address, telephone
     number, or any combination thereof."[^1109]

359. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* the Commission found
     that a BOC satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by
     demonstrating that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance
     and integration of white page directory listings to competitive
     LECs' customers; and (2) provided white page listings for
     competitors' customers with the same accuracy and reliability that
     it provides its own customers.[^1110]

### Discussion

360. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
     satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8.[^1111] Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that it is providing white pages directory
     listings for customers of competitive LECs that are
     nondiscriminatory in appearance and integration,[^1112] and have
     the same accuracy and reliability that Bell Atlantic provides for
     its own customers.[^1113] The New York Commission concludes that
     Bell Atlantic complies with this checklist item.[^1114]

361. We are not persuaded by AT&T and Choice One's assertions that Bell
     Atlantic fails to provide white pages directory listings in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^1115] Although AT&T claims that Bell
     Atlantic's OSS consistently drop directory listing orders
     associated with UNE loop orders,[^1116] AT&T provides no evidence
     of problems with the white pages directory listings themselves as a
     result.[^1117] Moreover, although Choice One provides evidence of
     one dropped white pages directory listing,[^1118] we do not find
     that this isolated incident is reflective of a systemic problem
     with Bell Atlantic's provisioning of their listings.

## Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration

### Background

362. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to
     the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers," until
     "the date by which telecommunications numbering administration,
     guidelines, plan, or rules are established."[^1119] The checklist
     mandates compliance with "such guidelines, plan, or rules" after
     they have been established.[^1120]

363. Bell Atlantic does not assign telephone numbers to itself or
     competitive LECs. The Commission has designated NeuStar, Inc.
     ("NeuStar") as the North American Numbering Plan
     Administrator.[^1121] NeuStar is responsible for assigning blocks
     of 10,000 telephone numbers (NXX Codes) to carriers within each
     area code, and for coordinating area code relief planning efforts
     with state commissions.[^1122] Bell Atlantic must demonstrate that
     it adheres to industry numbering administration guidelines and
     Commission rules, including provisions requiring the accurate
     reporting of data to the code administrator.[^1123]

### Discussion

364. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
     satisfies the requirements of checklist item 9.[^1124] No
     commenters allege that Bell Atlantic has failed to meet the
     requirements for this checklist item. The New York Commission
     states that Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that it complies with
     the Commission's number assignment rules and Industry Numbering
     Committee Central Office Code Guidelines, and that it accurately
     reports data to the Central Office Code Administrator.[^1125]

## Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling

### Background

365. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling
     necessary for call routing and completion."[^1126] In the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana Order,* we required BellSouth to demonstrate
     that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access
     to: "(1) signaling networks, including signaling links and
     signaling transfer points; (2) certain call-related databases
     necessary for call routing and completion, or in the alternative, a
     means of physical access to the signaling transfer point linked to
     the unbundled database; and (3) Service Management Systems (SMS);"
     [^1127] and to design, create, test, and deploy Advanced
     Intelligent Network (AIN) based services at the SMS through a
     Service Creation Environment (SCE).[^1128]

### Discussion

366. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
     satisfies the requirements of checklist item 10.[^1129] No
     commenters allege that Bell Atlantic has failed to meet the
     requirements for this section. The New York Commission concludes
     that Bell Atlantic meets this checklist item.[^1130] Although Z-Tel
     states "it is impossible to verify whether Bell Atlantic actually
     can provision AIN related services, because no carrier presently
     purchases these services from Bell Atlantic,"[^1131] we note that
     Bell Atlantic is not required to actually furnish a particular item
     in order to satisfy its obligations under the checklist. Rather, as
     we have previously stated, if no competitor is actually using a
     checklist item, a BOC must show that it has a concrete and specific
     legal obligation to furnish the item upon request and be "presently
     ready to furnish each item in the quantities that competitors may
     reasonably demand and at an acceptable level of quality."[^1132] We
     find that Bell Atlantic has met this burden.[^1133]

## Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability

### Background

367. Section 271 (c)(2)(B)(xi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to be in
     compliance with the number portability regulations the Commission
     has adopted pursuant to section 251 of the 1996 Act.[^1134] Section
     251(b)(2) of the 1996 Act requires all LECs "to provide, to the
     extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with
     requirements prescribed by the Commission."[^1135] The 1996 Act
     defines number portability as "the ability of users of
     telecommunications services to retain, at the same location,
     existing telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality,
     reliability, or convenience when switching from one
     telecommunications carrier to another."[^1136] The Commission has
     incorporated this definition into its rules.[^1137] Moreover, to
     prevent the cost of number portability from thwarting local
     competition, Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which requires
     that "\[t\]he cost of establishing telecommunications numbering
     administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne
     by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis
     as determined by the Commission."[^1138]

368. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the Commission requires
     LECs to offer interim number portability "to the extent technically
     feasible."[^1139] The Commission also requires LECs to gradually
     replace interim number portability with permanent number
     portability.[^1140] The Commission has established guidelines for
     states to follow in mandating a competitively neutral cost-recovery
     mechanism for interim number portability,[^1141] and created a
     competitively neutral cost-recovery mechanism for long-term number
     portability.[^1142]

### Discussion

369. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     complies with the requirements of checklist item 11.[^1143] The New
     York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic has satisfied this
     checklist item.[^1144]

370. RCN states that Bell Atlantic will not provide number portability
     to customers with RCN-issued telephone numbers.[^1145] For example,
     RCN asserts that, in the last few months, Bell Atlantic has refused
     to allow RCN's customers that switch to Bell Atlantic to keep a
     RCN-issued telephone number.[^1146] Bell Atlantic denies this
     allegation.[^1147] We do not find that RCN's unsupported assertions
     are indicative of a systemic failure in Bell Atlantic's provision
     of number portability.

371. Adelphia and AT&T allege that Bell Atlantic has problems
     coordinating number portability with loop cutovers. Specifically,
     Adelphia maintains that "Bell Atlantic frequently activates number
     portability prematurely,"[^1148] resulting in customers being
     unable to receive telephone calls.[^1149] AT&T implies that Bell
     Atlantic's problems with hot cuts have "adversely affected" number
     portability.[^1150] Like RCN's claim, we find both Adelphia and
     AT&T's claims to be unsupported, conclusory allegations that do not
     warrant a finding of noncompliance with this checklist item.[^1151]

## Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity

### Background

372. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to such services or information as
     are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local
     dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section
     251(b)(3)."[^1152] Section 251(b)(3) imposes upon all LECs "\[t\]he
     duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service with no unreasonable
     dialing delays."[^1153] Section 153(15) of the Act defines "dialing
     parity" to mean that:

. . . a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of
any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications
services provider of the customer's designation . . .[^1154]

373. Customers of competing carriers must be able to dial the same
     number of digits the BOC's customers dial to complete a local
     telephone call.[^1155] Moreover, customers of competing carriers
     must not otherwise suffer inferior quality service, such as
     unreasonable dialing delays, compared to the BOC's
     customers.[^1156]

### Discussion

374. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it provides local dialing parity in accordance
     with the requirements of section 251(b)(3) and thus satisfies the
     requirements of this checklist item.[^1157] No commenter challenges
     Bell Atlantic's assertion that it provides local dialing parity.
     The New York Commission concludes that Bell Atlantic meets the
     requirements of this checklist obligation.[^1158]

## Checklist Item 13 \-- Reciprocal Compensation**.**

### Background

375. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC\'s access
     and interconnection includes \"\[r\]eciprocal compensation
     arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section
     252(d)(2)."[^1159] In turn, section 252(d)(2)(A) states that \"a
     State commission shall not consider the terms and conditions for
     reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unless (i) such
     terms and conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery
     by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and
     termination on each carrier\'s network facilities of calls that
     originate on the network facilities of the other carrier; and (ii)
     such terms and conditions determine such costs on the basis of a
     reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating
     such calls."[^1160]

### Discussion.

376. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that its access and interconnection include reciprocal
     compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of
     section 252(d)(2), and thus, satisfies the requirements of
     checklist item 13.[^1161] Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it (1)
     has reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with section
     252(d)(2) in place,[^1162] and (2) is making all required payments
     in a timely fashion.[^1163] The New York Commission concludes that
     Bell Atlantic is in compliance with checklist item 13.[^1164]

377. We are not persuaded by Global NAPs' claim that Bell Atlantic fails
     to meet this checklist item. Global NAPS argues that Bell Atlantic
     acts in an anticompetitive manner with respect to payments for
     traffic terminated by competitive LECs to ISPs by, among other
     things, failing to pay compensation in a timely manner under the
     parties' interconnection agreement, and disputing the amount of
     per-minute compensation payment which is owed pursuant to the
     *NYPSC Reciprocal Compensation Order*.[^1165] Global NAPs also
     disputes Bell Atlantic's assertion that it is complying with the
     *NYPSC Reciprocal Compensation Order* requiring compensation for
     ISP-bound calls.[^1166] In light of our prior ruling that
     "ISP-bound traffic is non-local interstate traffic" and that "the
     reciprocal compensation requirements of section 251(b)(5) of the
     Act . . . do\[es\] not govern inter-carrier compensation for this
     traffic," we conclude that Global NAPs' arguments are irrelevant to
     checklist item 13.[^1167] We recognize that Bell Atlantic has an
     obligation to comply with New York Commission orders concerning
     inter-carrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic, pursuant to our
     *Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic Order* and
     pending completion of our rulemaking on this issue.[^1168]
     Inter-carrier compensation for ISP bound traffic, however, is not
     governed by section 251(b)(5), and, therefore, is not a checklist
     item. In addition, we deny e.spire's request that we condition any
     Bell Atlantic 271 authority on Bell Atlantic's promise to pay any
     reciprocal compensation amounts currently due.[^1169] The statute
     requires Bell Atlantic to make reciprocal compensation in a timely
     manner and as stated above, we find that Bell Atlantic complies
     with this provision.

## Checklist Item 14 -- Resale

### Background

378. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make
     \"telecommunications services . . . available for resale in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and
     252(d)(3).\"[^1170] Section 251(c)(4)(A) requires incumbent LECs
     \"to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications
     service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are
     not telecommunications carriers.\"[^1171] Section 251(c)(4)(B)
     prohibits \"unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or
     limitations\" on resale, with the exception that \"a State
     commission may, consistent with regulations prescribed by the
     Commission under this section, prohibit a reseller that obtains at
     wholesale rates a telecommunications service that is available at
     retail only to a category of subscribers from offering such service
     to a different category of subscribers.\"[^1172] Section 252(d)(3)
     sets forth the basis for determining \"wholesale rates\" as the
     \"retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications
     service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to
     any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be
     avoided by the local exchange carrier."[^1173]

379. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
     promulgated several rules regarding the scope of the resale
     requirement and permissible restrictions on resale that a LEC may
     impose.[^1174] Most significantly, resale restrictions are presumed
     to be unreasonable unless the LEC \"proves to the state commission
     that the restriction is reasonable and non-discriminatory.\"[^1175]

380. Finally, in accordance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and section
     271(c)(2)(B)(xiv), a BOC must demonstrate that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to operations support systems for the
     resale of its retail telecommunications services.

### Discussion

381. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it makes telecommunications services available
     for resale in accordance with sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3) and
     thus, satisfies the requirements of checklist item 14.[^1176] Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that it: (1) offers for resale at wholesale
     rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at
     retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications
     carriers,[^1177] and (2) offers such telecommunications services
     for resale without unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or
     limitations.[^1178] Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to operations support systems for the
     resale of its retail telecommunications services. The New York
     Commission states that Bell Atlantic is in compliance with this
     checklist item.[^1179]

382. We are unpersuaded by CCA's arguments that Bell Atlantic does not
     comply with checklist item 14 because the difference between Bell
     Atlantic's wholesale rates and retail rates is so narrow that it
     precludes a profit and hinders competition.[^1180] CCA asserts that
     in New York, for example, one of Bell Atlantic's regional toll
     plans is priced below a reseller's cost to buy end-to-end wholesale
     switched access service.[^1181] In addition, CCA contends that Bell
     Atlantic offers discriminatory pricing by offering resold services
     at an across the board discount off standard end user "tariff"
     prices even though each local product, service or vertical feature
     carries a different retail profit margin above its cost.[^1182] CCA
     maintains that "the unitary discount forces the reseller to pay
     end-user retail profit margins instead of carrier based profit
     margins and that the margins above costs that Bell Atlantic
     collects from resellers should be no different than those collected
     from facilities-based carriers." [^1183] CCA argues that because of
     this pricing structure, Bell Atlantic forces a reseller to overpay
     for products and services.[^1184]

383. Section 252(d)(3) provides that "a State commission shall determine
     the wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to
     subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding
     the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing,
     collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local
     exchange carrier."[^1185] Bell Atlantic maintains that it provides
     services at wholesale discounts set by the New York Commission:
     19.1 percent for lines with Bell Atlantic's Operator Services and
     Directory Assistance, and 21.7 percent for lines without these
     features.[^1186] In addition, the New York Commission states that
     it set non-recurring charges for resellers in a manner consistent
     with the Commission's pricing regulations, and they are subject to
     further examination in a pending proceeding.[^1187] CCA provides no
     evidence that the New York Commission failed to adhere to the
     statutory requirements in setting the wholesale rates with respect
     to marketing, billing, collection and other avoided costs.
     Furthermore, in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the
     Commission recognized "that a uniform rate is simple to apply, and
     avoids the need to allocate avoided costs among services."[^1188]
     Although the Commission observed that avoided costs may, in fact,
     vary among services, it neither prohibited nor required use of a
     single, uniform discount rate for all of an incumbent LEC's
     services.[^1189] Thus, we find that Bell Atlantic makes available
     telecommunications services at wholesale rates established by the
     New York Commission as required by the statute.

384. *Termination liabilities*. Bell Atlantic maintains that it \"does
     not impose any unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or
     limitations on the resale of its telecommunications
     services.\"[^1190] As discussed below, we are not persuaded by
     commenters that Bell Atlantic imposes unreasonable or
     discriminatory conditions or limitations on the resale of its
     services. Thus, we find sufficient evidence that Bell Atlantic is
     satisfying the requirement in checklist item 14 that it offers its
     telecommunications services for resale in accordance with section
     251(c)(4)(B) of the Act.

385. Resellers may resell any of Bell Atlantic's CSAs to any customer
     that meets the terms and conditions of that particular arrangement,
     and customers may aggregate traffic from multiple customers to
     satisfy any volume requirement.[^1191] In addition, if a customer
     elects to terminate its service with Bell Atlantic, it may be
     subject to termination liabilities to the extent it was part of the
     CSA agreed to by the customer.[^1192] For example, Bell Atlantic
     explains that, if a customer terminates a five-year CSA for Centrex
     after two years, the termination liability will be the difference
     between what the customer would have paid under a two-year CSA and
     what the customer actually paid under the five-year CSA. According
     to Bell Atlantic, the Commission has previously recognized that
     these types of termination liabilities are both permissible and
     pro-competitive.[^1193]

386. ALTS, e.spire/Net2000, and TRA argue that the termination liability
     provisions contained in Bell Atlantic's contracts are
     anti-competitive, unjust, unreasonable, excessive or unfair. Except
     for TRA, they contend that the Commission should adopt a "fresh
     look" requirement in which customers would be able to terminate
     long-term contracts without incurring any penalty before or upon
     any Bell Atlantic section 271 relief.[^1194] The commenters contend
     that such a requirement is consistent with prior Commission
     decisions that adopted a "fresh look" policy because of changed
     circumstances, such as when a monopoly marketplace opens to
     competition, or where a regulatory area was subject to
     significantly altered circumstances.[^1195] Bell Atlantic responds
     that its termination liabilities are pro-competitive, reasonable,
     and have not inhibited competing carriers from obtaining
     customers.[^1196]

387. It appears that termination liability is not calculated in the same
     manner for all contracts. For example, Bell Atlantic's termination
     liability for Centrex customers is limited to the difference
     between what the customer would have paid under the shorter term
     and what the customer actually paid under the long-term
     contract.[^1197] This method for calculating liability comports
     with the method that we recognized in the *Expanded Interconnection
     Order*.[^1198]

388. e.spire/Net2000 contend that Bell Atlantic's termination liability
     constitutes a "take or pay" contract with respect to Flex Path T-1
     service.[^1199] Based on their understanding of Bell Atlantic's
     pricing structure for Flex Path T-1 services, e.spire/Net2000
     maintain that customers are not entitled to any additional
     discounts based on the duration of the contract. Therefore, they
     assert that Flex Path T-1 service customers cannot realistically
     terminate their contract to move to a competitor since they will
     still be charged for the service.[^1200]

389. In the *BellSouth South Carolina*[^1201] section 271 proceeding,
     the Commission expressed concern with the application of
     termination liabilities to situations where a new entrant sought to
     assume an existing CSA contract. The Commission stated that
     "\[b\]ecause, depending, on the nature of these \[termination\]
     fees, their imposition creates additional costs for a CSA customer
     that seeks service from a reseller, they may have the effect of
     insulating portions of the market from competition through
     resale."[^1202] Thus, under these circumstances, termination
     liability could constitute an unreasonable restriction on resale.

390. We do not have the same concerns here. Although the Commission has
     adopted "fresh look" requirements in prior proceedings,[^1203] the
     Commission has not adopted such a policy for the CSAs at issue
     here, which are generally regulated by the states. The New York
     Commission has already addressed Bell Atlantic's policy of imposing
     termination charges specified in an original CSA, when a reseller
     wishes to resell the services covered by an existing CSA and the
     reseller accepts the terms and conditions set forth in the original
     contract. The New York Commission has held "that termination
     penalties may not be assessed in instances where the transaction
     involves an assignment of the customer's contract with Bell
     Atlantic-NY, and that Bell Atlantic-NY may not unreasonably bar
     such an assignment."[^1204] Therefore, pursuant to the New York
     Commission *CTC Order*, the termination liabilities complained of
     here would not be triggered by an assignment of the contract.
     Rather, the termination liability is only triggered by a complete
     termination of the contract. Accordingly, the termination
     liabilities do not constitute a restriction on resale under
     checklist 14. Although termination liabilities that apply when a
     customer terminates a contact to take service from another provider
     could, in certain circumstances, be unreasonable or
     anticompetitive,[^1205] they may not on their face put a carrier
     out of compliance with checklist item 14.[^1206] Therefore, the
     absence of a "fresh look" requirement is not a basis for rejecting
     a section 271 application. In addition, as the New York Commission
     points out, parties may file a complaint about a termination
     liability provision at the New York Commission,[^1207] or initiate
     a proceeding under section 253 of the 1996 Telecommunications
     Act.[^1208] We find that the record does not support a finding that
     termination liability provisions contained in Bell Atlantic's CSAs
     constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory condition or
     limitation on the resale of its telecommunications services.

391. Several commenters also suggest that the Commission should impose a
     "fresh look" requirement in this proceeding on public interest
     grounds, that is, as part of our analysis under section
     271(d)(3)(C).[^1209] We note that a similar issue has been raised
     by KMC Telecom in a Petition for Declaratory Rulemaking, which is
     now pending before the Commission.[^1210] We conclude that issues
     raised by parties in this proceeding relating to contract
     termination liability are more appropriately resolved in the
     context of that pending petition, and we thus decline to resolve
     the issue in this proceeding.

392. *Resale of xDSL-based services*. We are not persuaded by TRA's
     argument that Bell Atlantic is restricting resale in violation of
     section 251(c)(xiv) because it does not make volume and term
     offerings of xDSL-based services available for resale. According to
     TRA, in the *BellSouth Louisiana Order* the Commission stated that
     "any service sold to end users is a retail services and thus is
     subject to the wholesale discount requirement, even if it is
     already priced at a discount of another retail service."[^1211] TRA
     contends that, by declining to make volume and term offerings of
     xDSL-based services available for resale, Bell Atlantic is creating
     a general exemption from the wholesale requirement. TRA further
     argues that in the *Local Competition Order* we stated that section
     251(c)(4) "makes no exceptions for promotional or discounted
     offerings."[^1212] Bell Atlantic responds that it is making all of
     its ADSL telecommunications services available for resale at the
     tariff rates pursuant to section 251(c)(4), and it is making its
     ADSL telecommunications service that it offers to its own end user
     customers available for resale pursuant to section
     251(c)(4).[^1213] Bell Atlantic argues that its "wholesale ADSL
     offering is not a retail service, and therefore is not subject to
     section 251(c)(4)'s requirement to provide retail services at an
     avoided cost discount."[^1214]

393. We have recently addressed this issue in *Deployment of Wireline
     Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability*.[^1215]
     In that proceeding, we found that, although DSL services designed
     for and sold to residential and business end-users are subject to
     the discounted resale obligations of section 251(c)(4), where the
     incumbent LEC offers DSL services as an input component to ISPs who
     combine the DSL service with their own Internet service, the
     discount resale obligations of section 251(c)(4) do not apply.
     [^1216] Therefore, we agree with Bell Atlantic that it is not
     required to provide an avoided-cost discount on its wholesale ADSL
     offering because it is not a retail service subject to the discount
     obligations of section 251(c)(4).

394. *Other resale conditions and limitations*. We are also not
     persuaded by NALA's argument that Bell Atlantic has imposed an
     unreasonable condition on resale because it does not provide a
     flat-rate local service option for resale in New York City.[^1217]
     According to NALA, Bell Atlantic offers only message-rate service
     in New York City.[^1218] Thus, NALA maintains that prepaid local
     providers must block all services that could result in per-call or
     per-minute charges, including toll, operator services, information
     services, directory assistance, and directory assistance call
     completion, and this constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the
     services which NALA members can resell.[^1219] We find NALA does
     not make a persuasive argument. As Bell Atlantic points out, it
     does not offer a flat-rate telephone service in New York City at
     retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications
     carriers,[^1220] and therefore Bell Atlantic is under no obligation
     to provide such services for resale under the statute.[^1221]

395. In addition, we reject CCA's argument that Bell Atlantic violates
     checklist item 14 because Bell Atlantic's resale tariff is highly
     restrictive, bundles services and prices, only allows resale of
     tariffed end-user services that have been designated by Bell
     Atlantic's retail marketing department, and does not offer some
     vertical products[^1222] for resale.[^1223] CCA argues that these
     limitations make it virtually impossible for a reseller to
     differentiate its service offering, since Bell Atlantic already has
     defined the retail products and services.[^1224] CCA further argues
     that, as a result of Bell Atlantic's actions, resellers cannot meet
     the needs of the local telephone consumer and compete with Bell
     Atlantic.[^1225]

396. As stated above, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it offers for
     resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications services that it
     offers at retail to subscribers and pursuant to the discounts set
     by the New York Commission. Therefore, we are not persuaded by
     CCA's argument that Bell Atlantic violates checklist item 14
     because its resale tariff is highly restrictive, bundles services
     and prices, and only allows resale of tariffed end-user services
     that have been designated by Bell Atlantic's retail marketing
     department.

397. In addition, based on the evidence in the record, we are unable to
     conclude that Bell Atlantic fails to make some vertical products
     available to resellers in violation of checklist item 14.[^1226]
     Sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3) of the Act and the Commission's
     rules do not require Bell Atlantic to provide its retail customers
     with all of the vertical products that Bell Atlantic is capable of
     providing. This does not mean, however, that Bell Atlantic may
     limit the vertical products that it makes available to competitive
     LECs. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission
     required Bell South to provide unbundled local switching that
     included line-side and truck-side facilities, plus the features,
     functions, and capabilities of the switch.[^1227] The features,
     functions, and capabilities of the switch include the basic
     switching function as well as the same basic capabilities that are
     available to the incumbent LEC's customers.[^1228] Additionally,
     local switching includes all vertical features that the switch is
     capable of providing, as well as any technically feasible
     customized routing functions.[^1229] Bell Atlantic provides local
     and tandem switching unbundled from loops and other network
     components.[^1230] Unbundled local switching is available as a
     line-side or a trunk-side port (shared and dedicated) and includes
     all of the vertical features available to Bell Atlantic's retail
     customers on a line-by-line basis.[^1231] Bell Atlantic states that
     it is prepared upon request to provide competitive LECs with access
     to other features resident in its switches that Bell Atlantic does
     not offer its retail customers.[^1232] In situations where a
     competitive LEC seeks to resell vertical products that Bell
     Atlantic does not offer at retail to its subscribers, we find that
     Bell Atlantic complies with the resale obligations contained in
     checklist item 14 by providing competitive LECs with access to
     unbundled switching. We clarify that under these circumstances, the
     avoided cost discount under section 251(c)(4) does not apply
     because Bell Atlantic is not offering the vertical products at
     retail to its customers.

398. We also reject the claim of Destek, that Bell Atlantic Network
     Integration (BANI) and Bell Atlantic Digital Services (BADS) have
     associated themselves with state owned and operated universities in
     joint ventures through exclusive and anticompetitive, special
     contract interconnection agreements in New Hampshire.[^1233] We
     find that Destek's argument does not pertain to Bell Atlantic's
     resale practices in New York and thus is not relevant to a
     determination of whether it meets checklist item 14 in this
     proceeding. Moreover, although Destek alleges that Bell Atlantic
     employs the same practices through out its service territories, it
     presents no evidence to support this claim with respect to Bell
     Atlantic's resale practices in New York.[^1234]

399. Similarly, Ntegrity's argument that Bell Atlantic engages in
     anticompetitive practices in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey
     is not relevant to a determination of whether Bell Atlantic meets
     checklist item 14 in New York.[^1235]

### Provisioning

400. *Provisioning*[.]{.underline} Based on the evidence in the record,
     we find that Bell Atlantic satisfies the provisioning requirements
     of checklist item 14.[^1236] As discussed *supra* Section V.B, Bell
     Atlantic is provisioning competitive LECs' orders for resale in
     substantially the same time and manner as for its retail customers.
     We are not persuaded by various claims that Bell Atlantic fails to
     provision resale services in a nondiscriminatory manner. Commenters
     assert that occasionally Bell Atlantic: (a) continues to bill its
     former customers following their switch to a competing provider,
     resulting in the customer being double billed;[^1237] (b) fails to
     activate toll blocks on competitors' orders;[^1238] (c) misses
     appointments to connect service to new customers;[^1239] (d)
     changes the phone number preassigned to a reseller's customer
     without any notification;[^1240] and (e) does not process the
     requests by resale customers to change their Presubscribed
     Interexchange Carrier ("PIC") seamlessly, as it does for the
     requests of Bell Atlantic's own retail customers.[^1241] Although
     we do not discount the effect of such occasional incidents on
     affected customers, the present record does not indicate that these
     are systemic problems. Were these widespread problems, they would
     appear to warrant a finding of noncompliance. We conclude, however,
     that these problems are insufficient to overcome Bell Atlantic's
     showing that it is in compliance with the provisioning requirements
     of this checklist item.

# Section 272 Compliance

## Background

401. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^1242] The
     Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the
     *Accounting Safeguards Order* and the *Non-Accounting Safeguards
     Order*.[^1243] Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate
     the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization
     between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate.[^1244] In addition,
     these safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of
     their section 272 affiliates.[^1245]

402. As we stated in the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, compliance with
     section 272 is "of crucial importance" because the structural,
     transactional, and nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272 seek
     to ensure that BOCs compete on a level playing field.[^1246] The
     Commission's findings regarding section 272 compliance constitute
     independent grounds for denying an application.[^1247] Past and
     present behavior of the BOC applicant provides "the best indicator
     of whether \[the applicant\] will carry out the requested
     authorization in compliance with section 272."[^1248]

## Discussion

403. Based on the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic has
     demonstrated that it will comply with the requirements of
     section 272. We note that neither the New York Commission nor the
     Department of Justice addressed Bell Atlantic's showing of section
     272 compliance. We address each section 272 requirement below.

### Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section 272

404. *Section 272(a) -- Separate Affiliate*. Section 272(a) requires
     BOCs and their local exchange carrier affiliates that are subject
     to section 251(c) to provide certain competitive services through
     structurally separate affiliates.[^1249] For the reasons described
     in the section below, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates
     that it will operate in accordance with section 272(a).

405. Bell Atlantic has established three section 272 affiliates to
     provide in-region interLATA services upon gaining section 271
     approval: Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc. (BACI), NYNEX Long
     Distance (NLD), and Bell Atlantic Global Networks, Inc.
     (BAGNI).[^1250] Each affiliate is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bell
     Atlantic Corporation, and each is incorporated in Delaware.[^1251]
     Bell Atlantic plans to offer interLATA services to residential
     consumers through BACI, and to serve business customers through
     NLD. Both BACI and NLD will conduct business under the trade name
     "Bell Atlantic Long Distance."[^1252] One affiliate, BAGNI, will
     build a telecommunications network and serve BACI and NLD. Bell
     Atlantic demonstrates that each affiliate has implemented internal
     control mechanisms to prevent, as well as detect and correct, any
     noncompliance with section 272.[^1253]

406. *Section 272(b)(1) -- Operate Independently*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that it will comply
     with section 272(b)(1), which requires a section 272 affiliate to
     "operate independently from the Bell operating company."[^1254] The
     Commission has interpreted the "operate independently" requirement
     to impose four important restrictions on the ownership and
     operations of a BOC and its section 272 affiliate: (1) no joint
     ownership of switching and transmission facilities; (2) no joint
     ownership of the land and buildings on which switching and
     transmission facilities are located; (3) no provision by the BOC
     (or other non-section 272 affiliate) of operation, installation,
     and maintenance services (OI&M) with respect to the section 272
     affiliate's facilities; and (4) no provision of OI&M by the section
     272 affiliate with respect to the BOC's facilities.[^1255]

407. We disagree with AT&T's contentions that the disclosures Bell
     Atlantic makes on the Internet pursuant to section 272(b)(5) reveal
     the provisioning of proscribed OI&M services by a Bell Atlantic BOC
     to a section 272 affiliate.[^1256] Bell Atlantic explains that the
     services noted by AT&T were construction services that do not
     involve installation or servicing telecommunications
     equipment.[^1257] Our review of Bell Atlantic's Internet postings,
     its cost allocation manual (CAM), and its independent auditor's
     reports support Bell Atlantic's explanation.[^1258] The Internet
     disclosures referenced by AT&T refer to certain types of employees
     and the rates at which such employees were billed to Bell
     Atlantic's section 272 affiliates. Reading this information in
     context, it is clear that the employees referenced in the Internet
     disclosures are not telecommunications technicians and engineers
     performing OI&M services.[^1259]

408. *Section 272(b)(2) -- Books, Records, and Accounts*. Based on the
     evidence in the record, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it will
     comply with the requirement that its section 272 affiliates "shall
     maintain books, records, and accounts in a manner prescribed by the
     Commission which shall be separate from the books, records, and
     accounts maintained by the \[BOCs\]."[^1260] We note that no party
     challenges Bell Atlantic's showing.

409. *Section 272(b)(3) -- Separate Officers, Directors, and Employees*.
     Based on the evidence in the record, Bell Atlantic has demonstrated
     that it will comply with the "separate officers, directors, and
     employees" requirement of section 272(b)(3).[^1261] We note that no
     party challenges Bell Atlantic's showing.

410. *Section 272(b)(4) -- Credit Arrangements*. Based on the evidence
     in the record, Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that it will comply
     with section 272(b)(4), which prevents a section 272 affiliate from
     obtaining "credit under any arrangement that would permit a
     creditor, upon default, to have recourse to the assets of \[any
     Bell Atlantic BOC\]."[^1262] We note that no party challenges Bell
     Atlantic's showing.

411. *Section 272(b)(5) -- Affiliate Transactions*. Based on our review
     of its application, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates
     that it will comply with the public disclosure requirements of
     section 272(b)(5) for transactions between its BOCs and its section
     272 affiliates.[^1263] Section 272(b)(5) requires that a section
     272 affiliate conduct all transactions with its affiliated BOCs on
     an arm's length basis.[^1264] In addition, the statute requires
     section 272 affiliates to reduce all such transactions to writing
     and make them available for public inspection.[^1265] Consistent
     with the Commission's *Accounting Safeguards Order*, Bell Atlantic
     must ensure that all transactions between its section 272
     affiliates (i.e., BACI, NLD, and BAGNI) and any affiliated BOC are
     posted on the company's Internet homepage within 10 days of the
     transaction.[^1266] To ensure that all affiliate transactions occur
     at arm's length, Bell Atlantic must abide by the Commission's
     affiliate transactions rules.[^1267] The Commission evaluates the
     sufficiency of a BOC's Internet disclosures by referring to its
     ARMIS filings, its cost allocation manuals, and the CAM audit
     workpapers.[^1268]

412. AT&T argues that Bell Atlantic failed to post all transactions
     between its BOCs and its section 272 affiliates on the Internet,
     and that Bell Atlantic fails to provide sufficient detail of such
     transactions.[^1269] Although we are concerned about the issues
     raised by AT&T, Bell Atlantic persuades us that it will comply with
     section 272(b)(5)'s public disclosure requirement.[^1270] To the
     extent that AT&T's comments and our review of the record revealed
     minor discrepancies between Bell Atlantic's Internet postings and
     its regular accounting submissions,[^1271] we find that Bell
     Atlantic has submitted satisfactory evidence to explain the
     inconsistencies.[^1272] As Bell Atlantic points out, a variety of
     circumstances may result in minor differences between ARMIS and CAM
     disclosures and the section 272(b)(5) Internet postings.[^1273]
     Furthermore, we find that the value of the posting discrepancies is
     small, totaling less than the amount of the discrepancies at issue
     in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order.*[^1274] Given these
     factors, we conclude that these isolated instances are not
     sufficient to show systemic flaws in Bell Atlantic's ability to
     comply with section 272(b)(5). Finally, we note that Bell
     Atlantic's Internet postings will undergo a thorough and systematic
     review in the section 272(d) biennial audit, which will ensure that
     any failures to post are identified in time for appropriate
     remedial action.

413. We likewise reject AT&T's assertion that Bell Atlantic's Internet
     postings do not contain sufficient detail to show that Bell
     Atlantic will comply with section 272(b)(5).[^1275] As required by
     the Commission's section 272(b)(5) rules, Bell Atlantic discloses
     "the number and type of personnel assigned to the project, the
     level of expertise of such personnel, any special equipment used to
     provide the service, and the length of time required to complete
     the transaction." [^1276] Although we are concerned that some
     descriptions of affiliate transactions may contain ambiguous
     descriptions of services, we are persuaded that, on balance, Bell
     Atlantic's descriptions are sufficiently detailed to facilitate the
     purchasing decisions of unaffiliated third parties.[^1277] In
     addition, we find that Bell Atlantic has implemented the internal
     controls and processes needed to identify and correct potential
     problem areas with its Internet disclosures.[^1278] We note that
     the section 272(d) biennial audit will ensure that Bell Atlantic
     continues to provide adequate descriptions of its posted
     transactions because inadequate descriptions will be identified by
     the Federal-State audit team, and disclosed in the subsequent audit
     report.[^1279]

414. Based on the record evidence, we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     demonstrates that it will comply with the affiliate transactions
     rules, which is necessary to ensure that all transactions between a
     BOC and its section 272 affiliate occur at arm's length.[^1280] We
     note that no party challenges Bell Atlantic's showing that it
     values transactions between its BOCs and its section 272 affiliates
     in accordance with our affiliate transactions rules.

415. *Section 272(c)(2) -- Accounting Principles.* Based on the evidence
     in the record, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that its BOCs account for
     all transactions with its section 272 affiliates in accordance with
     the accounting principles designated or approved by the
     Commission.[^1281] In the *Accounting Safeguards Order*, we
     concluded that complying with the Part 32 affiliate transactions
     rules satisfies the accounting requirements of section 272(c),
     which pertain to the BOC's "dealings" with its separate
     affiliate.[^1282] We note that no party challenges Bell Atlantic's
     showing.

416. *Section 272(d) -- Biennial Audit.* Based on the evidence in the
     record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it will
     comply with section 272(d), which requires an independent audit of
     a BOC's compliance with section 272 after receiving interLATA
     authorization.[^1283] Because the audit process involves a thorough
     and systematic evaluation into a BOC's compliance with section 272
     and its affiliate relationships, we expect that the section 272(d)
     biennial audit will address the concerns raised by AARP, Closecall,
     and others for stringent post-entry oversight of section 272
     compliance.[^1284]

### Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272

417. *Section 272(c)(1) -- Nondiscrimination Safeguards.* Based on the
     evidence in the record, we conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates
     it will comply with section 272(c)(1), which prohibits a BOC from
     discriminating in favor of its section 272 affiliate in the
     "provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and
     information, or in the establishment of standards."[^1285] The
     Commission's nondiscrimination safeguards require a BOC to, among
     other things, "provide to unaffiliated entities the same goods,
     services, facilities, and information that it provides to its
     section 272 affiliate at the same rates, terms, and
     conditions."[^1286] Although we agree with AT&T, CERB, and others
     regarding the broad nature of the nondiscrimination safeguards, we
     reject their contentions that Bell Atlantic fails to demonstrate
     compliance with the section 272(c)(1) nondiscrimination safeguards.
     [^1287] As we noted with respect to section 272(b)(5) above, Bell
     Atlantic posts information about transactions between the BOC and
     its section 272 affiliates, and thereby provides unaffiliated
     entities with notice of opportunities to obtain the same goods,
     services, and facilities at the same rates, terms, and conditions
     available to the section 272 affiliate. We reject AT&T's assertion
     that Bell Atlantic failed to show compliance with section 272(c)(1)
     because Bell Atlantic failed to provide unaffiliated third parties
     equal opportunities to lease real estate space.[^1288] Bell
     Atlantic persuades us that, with respect to the leases for real
     estate raised by AT&T, it regularly advertises its real estate
     listings, and thereby provides unaffiliated third parties with
     opportunities to lease space provided to its section 272
     affiliates.[^1289]

418. *Section 272(e) -- Fulfillment of Certain Requests.* Based on the
     evidence in the record, Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it will
     comply with section 272(e), which requires Bell Atlantic to fulfill
     requests for, among other things, telephone exchange and exchange
     access services from unaffiliated entities within the same time
     period Bell Atlantic fulfills such requests for its own retail
     operations.[^1290] In addition, section 272(e) also provides that a
     BOC "shall not provide any facilities, services, or information
     concerning its provision of exchange access to the \[section 272
     affiliate\] unless such facilities, services, or information are
     made available to other providers of interLATA services in that
     market on the same terms and conditions."[^1291] Finally, section
     272(e) places certain accounting and nondiscrimination requirements
     on BOCs with respect to exchange access and facilities or services
     provided to its interLATA affiliate.[^1292] We note that no party
     challenges Bell Atlantic's showing that it will comply with section
     272(e).

### Joint Marketing Requirements of Section 272

419. *Section 272(g)(1) -- Affiliate Sales of Telephone Exchange Access
     Services.* Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that
     Bell Atlantic has demonstrated that it will comply with the joint
     marketing provisions of section 272(g)(1).[^1293] We reject as
     inconsistent with Commission precedent AT&T's contention that Bell
     Atlantic must submit proposed marketing scripts in order to
     demonstrate compliance with section 272(g).[^1294] Although Bell
     Atlantic makes no assertions regarding the plans of one section 272
     affiliate, BAGNI, to market or sell Bell Atlantic telephone
     exchange services, we conclude that BAGNI's evidence of a corporate
     compliance program[^1295] and BAGNI's assertions that it plans to
     provide service only to BACI and NLD[^1296] adequately persuade us
     that Bell Atlantic will operate in accordance with section
     272(g)(1) for BAGNI.

420. We decline to adopt the suggestion of Excel to impose conditions on
     Bell Atlantic that would limit the ability of its section 272
     affiliates to resell Bell Atlantic's local exchange service.[^1297]
     Specifically, Excel requests that the Commission require Bell
     Atlantic either to forego the use of total service resale or to
     provide a greater discount for total service resale packages
     provided to competing carriers in New York.[^1298] As we recently
     noted in the *Non-Accounting Safeguards* proceeding, section 272
     does not prohibit a section 272 affiliate from providing both local
     exchange and interLATA services.[^1299] We conclude that the need
     for restrictions on the ability of Bell Atlantic's section 272
     affiliate to provide local service is unnecessary at this time, and
     that the existing section 272 safeguards adequately address the
     concerns raised by Excel.

421. *Section 272(g)(2) -- Bell Operating Company Sales of Affiliate
     Services.* We conclude that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it will
     comply with section 272(g)(2), which prevents a BOC from marketing
     or selling within its region any interLATA service provided by a
     section 272 affiliate absent authorization obtained pursuant to
     section 271(d).[^1300] We note that no party challenges Bell
     Atlantic's assertions or provides evidence to rebut Bell Atlantic's
     showing.

# Public Interest Analysis

## Overview

422. In addition to determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^1301] We conclude that approval of this application is
     consistent with the public interest. In reaching this
     determination, we find that compliance with the competitive
     checklist is, itself, a strong indicator that long distance entry
     is consistent with the public interest. This approach reflects the
     Commission's many years of experience with the consumer benefits
     which flow from competition in telecommunications markets.

423. Nonetheless, the public interest analysis is an independent element
     of the statutory checklist and, under normal canons of statutory
     construction, requires an independent determination.[^1302] Thus,
     we view the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review
     the circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no
     other relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional
     intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive
     checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest
     as Congress expected. Among other things, we may review the local
     and long distance markets to ensure that there are not unusual
     circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest
     under the particular circumstances of this application.[^1303]
     Another factor that could be relevant to our analysis is whether we
     have sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant
     of the application. While no one factor is dispositive in this
     analysis, our overriding goal is to ensure that nothing undermines
     our conclusion, based on our analysis of checklist compliance, that
     markets are open to competition. As discussed below, we conclude
     that the public interest would be met by grant of this application.

424. Finally, we note that a strong public interest showing can not
     overcome a failure to demonstrate compliance with one or more
     checklist items. The Commission is specifically barred from
     "limit\[ing\] . . . the terms used in the competitive
     checklist,"[^1304] or forbearing from requiring compliance with all
     statutory conditions under section 271.[^1305]

## Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets

425. As set forth below, we conclude that approval of this application
     is consistent with promoting competition in the local and long
     distance telecommunications markets.

### Impact on Local Competition

426. Consistent with our extensive review of the competitive checklist,
     which embodies the critical elements of market entry under the Act,
     we find that barriers to competitive entry in the local market have
     been removed and the local exchange market today is open to
     competition. We disagree with commenters' arguments that the public
     interest would be disserved by granting Bell Atlantic's application
     because the local market in New York has not yet truly been opened
     to competition.[^1306] Commenters cite an array of evidence which,
     they argue, demonstrates that the local telecommunications market
     is not open and that competition has not sufficiently taken hold in
     New York. For example, commenters point to: the low percentage of
     total access lines served by competitive LECs;[^1307] the
     concentration of competition in New York City and other urban
     areas;[^1308] minimal competition for residential services;[^1309]
     modest facilities-based investment;[^1310] and prices for local
     exchange service at the maximum permissible levels under the price
     caps.[^1311]

427. Congress specifically declined to adopt a market share or other
     similar test for BOC entry into long distance, and we have no
     intention of establishing one here.[^1312] Moreover, pursuant to
     section 271(c)(2)(B), the Act provides for long distance entry even
     where there is no facilities-based competition satisfying section
     271(c)(1)(A). This underscores Congress' desire to condition
     approval solely on whether the applicant has opened the door for
     local entry through full checklist compliance, not on whether
     competing LECs actually take advantage of the opportunity to enter
     the market. Although evidence of the type cited by commenters could
     result from checklist non-compliance or continuing barriers to
     entry in some circumstances, we have not found this to be the case
     here. Indeed, commenters do not link these market facts to any sin
     of omission or commission by Bell Atlantic. We have found nothing
     in the record to indicate, for example, that the limited
     competition outside of Manhattan is attributable to a refusal to
     provide collocation requests outside of Manhattan, or the provision
     of inferior OSS to competitive carriers upstate. Moreover, while
     competition for residential end users has proceeded less rapidly
     than competition for high-volume business end users, we have found
     that Bell Atlantic has satisfied its statutory obligations and made
     competitive entry possible in this market sector. Accordingly, we
     conclude that these indicators do not undermine Bell Atlantic's
     showing that it has complied with the competitive checklist.

### Impact on Long Distance Competition

428. We find that the record confirms our view that BOC entry into the
     long distance market will benefit consumers and competition if the
     relevant local exchange market is open to competition consistent
     with the competitive checklist. As a general matter, we believe
     that additional competition in telecommunications markets will
     enhance the public interest. Absent checklist compliance, grant of
     section 271 authority could potentially harm the long distance
     market because the BOC would have a unique ability to introduce
     vertical service packages (*i.e.,* long distance and other
     telecommunications services bundled with local exchange service).
     This is not the case here -- we find that the local market is open
     and determine that reasonable assurances exist that the market will
     remain open. We will not require Bell Atlantic to make a
     substantial *additional* showing that its participation in the long
     distance market will produce public interest benefits. We thus
     decline to address directly the comments and economic studies
     submitted by Bell Atlantic and by parties opposing Bell Atlantic's
     application, which seek to demonstrate alternately that Bell
     Atlantic's entry will have a positive, or a negative, impact on
     competition in the long distance market.[^1313]

## Assurance of Future Compliance

429. As set forth below, we find that the performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms in place in New York, in combination with
     other factors, provide strong assurance that the local market will
     remain open after Bell Atlantic receives section 271 authorization.
     The Commission previously has explained that one factor it may
     consider as part of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC
     would continue to satisfy the requirements of section 271 after
     entering the long distance market.[^1314] The standard of review
     employed by the Department of Justice in evaluating Bell Atlantic's
     application -- whether the local market is fully and *irreversibly*
     open -- also supports this approach.[^1315] Although the Commission
     strongly encourages state performance monitoring and post-entry
     enforcement, we have never required BOC applicants to demonstrate
     that they are subject to such mechanisms as a condition of section
     271 approval.[^1316] The Commission has, however, stated that the
     fact that a BOC will be subject to performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms would constitute probative evidence that the
     BOC will continue to meet its section 271 obligations and that its
     entry would be consistent with the public interest.[^1317]

430. We also believe that it is important to evaluate the benefits of
     these reporting and enforcement mechanisms in the context of other
     regulatory and legal processes that provide additional positive
     incentives to Bell Atlantic. It is not necessary that the state
     mechanisms alone provide full protection against potential
     anti-competitive behavior by the incumbent. Most significantly, we
     recognize that the Commission's enforcement authority under section
     271(d)(6) already provides incentives for Bell Atlantic to ensure
     continuing compliance with its section 271 obligations.[^1318] We
     also recognize that Bell Atlantic may be subject to payment of
     liquidated damages through many of its individual interconnection
     agreements with competitive carriers.[^1319] Furthermore, Bell
     Atlantic risks liability through antitrust and other private causes
     of action if it performs in an unlawfully discriminatory
     manner.[^1320]

### Summary of Performance Reporting and Enforcement Mechanisms

431. The New York Commission has ordered Bell Atlantic to report
     performance data, on a monthly basis, pursuant to a series of 152
     measurements or metrics.[^1321] These measurements were developed
     through the "Carrier-to-Carrier Service Quality" proceeding before
     the New York Commission, and cover Bell Atlantic's performance on
     key functions essential to an open, competitive local market:
     pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair,
     network performance (interconnection trunks), collocation, billing
     and operator services. Associated with most of these measurements
     are standards -- either benchmarks or retail analogs -- also
     developed through the Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding.[^1322]

432. The New York Commission also has required Bell Atlantic to submit
     to a comprehensive performance enforcement mechanism upon receiving
     authorization to provide interLATA services under section
     271.[^1323] The Amended Performance Assurance Plan ("APAP"), along
     with the Amended Change Control Assurance Plan ("ACCAP")
     (collectively, the "enforcement mechanism" or the "enforcement
     plan"), establish an automatic process under which affected
     competitors receive bill credits in the event Bell Atlantic fails
     to satisfy pre-determined performance standards on a set of 122
     performance measures -- essentially a sub-set of the
     Carrier-to-Carrier reporting metrics. The procedures and
     requirements of the Plan are described generally in Bell Atlantic's
     application and in detail in submissions made to the New York
     Commission.[^1324]

### Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan

433. Where, as here, a BOC relies on performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms to provide assurance that it will continue
     to maintain market-opening performance after receiving section 271
     authorization, we will review the mechanisms involved to ensure
     that they are likely to perform as promised.[^1325] While the
     details of such mechanisms developed at the state level may vary
     widely, we believe that we should examine certain key aspects of
     these plans to determine whether they fall within a zone of
     reasonableness, and are likely to provide incentives that are
     sufficient to foster post-entry checklist compliance. In this
     instance, we believe that the enforcement mechanisms developed in
     New York will be effective in practice.[^1326] We base this
     predictive judgment on the fact that the plan has the following
     important characteristics:

-   potential liability that provides a meaningful and significant
    incentive to comply with the designated performance standards;

-   clearly-articulated, pre-determined measures and standards, which
    encompass a comprehensive range of carrier-to-carrier performance;

-   a reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction poor
    performance when it occurs;

-   a self-executing mechanism that does not leave the door open
    unreasonably to litigation and appeal;

-   and reasonable assurances that the reported data is accurate.

434. Parties to this proceeding have identified numerous criticisms
     relating to the structure and methodologies of these monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms, and suggest a long list of possible
     improvements. None of these criticisms, however, are sufficient to
     cause us to conclude that the plan will fail to foster post-entry
     compliance with the checklist requirements.[^1327] We address each
     of the major challenges to these plans briefly below.

435. *Total Liability At Risk.* We conclude that the total of \$269
     million in potential bill credits placed at risk, on an annual
     basis, under all components of the performance plans represents a
     meaningful incentive for Bell Atlantic to maintain a high level of
     performance.[^1328] We thus disagree with commenters who suggest
     that \$269 million is insufficient and fails to provide adequate
     assurance of Bell Atlantic's compliance in the future.[^1329] Most
     fundamentally, we disagree with a basic assumption made by several
     commenters: that liability under the Plan must be sufficient,
     *standing alone*, to completely counterbalance Bell Atlantic's
     incentive to discriminate.[^1330] The performance plans adopted by
     the New York Commission do not represent the only means of ensuring
     that Bell Atlantic continues to provide nondiscriminatory service
     to competing carriers. In addition to the \$269 million at stake
     under this Plan, as noted above, Bell Atlantic faces other
     consequences if it fails to sustain a high level of service to
     competing carriers, including: federal enforcement action pursuant
     to section 271(d)(6); liquidated damages under 32 interconnection
     agreements; and remedies associated with antitrust and other legal
     actions.

436. Nonetheless, we recognize that the level of potential liability
     under a performance enforcement plan matters, as a plan with
     relatively low potential liability would be unlikely to provide
     meaningful incentives to maintain service quality levels. We
     believe it is useful to compare the maximum liability level to Bell
     Atlantic's net revenues derived from local exchange service --
     after all, it is primarily its local service profits that Bell
     Atlantic would have a theoretical incentive to "protect" by
     discriminating against competing local carriers.[^1331] A "Net
     Return" figure developed using ARMIS data, which represents total
     operating revenue less operating expenses and operating taxes, is a
     reasonable approximation of total profits derived from local
     exchange service.[^1332] In 1998, Bell Atlantic reported a Net
     Return of \$743 million in New York: \$269 million would represent
     36% of this amount. On the basis of this comparison, we conclude
     that \$269 million represents a substantial percentage of Bell
     Atlantic's profits, and agree with the New York Commission that
     "the dollars at risk in the \[APAP\] are substantial and should
     deter \[Bell Atlantic's\] incentive to provide discriminatory
     service."[^1333]

437. We disagree with commenters who suggest that, because the Plan is
     divided into multiple sub-categories with the overall liability
     divided into corresponding "sub-caps," Bell Atlantic will never
     face sizable penalties.[^1334] We agree that it is important to
     assess whether liability under an enforcement mechanism such as the
     APAP would actually accrue at meaningful and significant levels
     when performance standards are missed. Indeed, an overall liability
     amount would be meaningless if there is no likelihood that payments
     would approach this amount, even in instances of widespread
     performance failure. We do not believe, however, that the Plan
     suffers from this flaw. The New York Commission has sought to place
     sizable penalties on the most critical performance areas, thereby
     ensuring that Bell Atlantic will incur fixed, certain sanctions if
     its performance slips in these critical areas. In addition, the New
     York Commission has retained the authority to re-allocate money
     within the sub-categories, thereby, in its own words, "dramatically
     increasing \[Bell Atlantic's\] incentives to maintain or improve
     service in particular areas."[^1335]

438. *Performance Measurements and Standards.* Each performance metric
     developed through the Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding in New York has
     a clearly-articulated definition, or "business rule," which sets
     forth the manner in which the data is to be collected by Bell
     Atlantic, lists any relevant exclusions, and states the applicable
     performance standards. The clarity provided by these business rules
     will help to ensure that the reporting mechanism provides a
     "benchmark against which new entrants and regulators can measure
     performance over time to detect and correct any degradation of
     service rendered to new entrants."[^1336] While commenters raise
     concerns about the details of a handful of specific metrics,[^1337]
     we note that many of these issues are currently being considered in
     the ongoing Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding in New York.[^1338] We
     applaud the role played by the New York Commission in providing a
     forum for ongoing modification and improvement of the performance
     metrics.[^1339] This is an important feature because it ensures
     that the Plan can evolve to reflect changes in the
     telecommunications industry and in the New York market.

439. We also believe that the scope of performance covered by the
     Carrier-to-Carrier metrics is sufficiently comprehensive,[^1340]
     and that the New York Commission reasonably selected key
     competition-affecting metrics from this list for inclusion in the
     enforcement plan.[^1341] We disagree with commenters who suggest
     that additional metrics must be added to the plan in order to
     ensure its effectiveness,[^1342] and note that the New York
     Commission has considered and rejected similar arguments.[^1343]
     Moreover, we note that the New York Commission has indicated that
     it will consider adding new metrics, if necessary, in the
     future.[^1344] Indeed, in light of the ongoing development of
     xDSL-related measurements related to xDSL-capable loops in New
     York, we are not concerned that the APAP does not contain such
     measurements at present.[^1345] The New York Commission has stated
     that it expects to adopt measurements addressing xDSL-capable loops
     once their development is complete.[^1346] Accordingly, we expect
     Bell Atlantic to work with the New York Commission in developing
     performance measurements for xDSL-capable loops, and to incorporate
     these measurements into its \"Carrier-to-Carrier\" reports and the
     APAP.

440. *Structural Elements of the Plan.* We believe that the structural
     elements of the Plan appear reasonably designed to detect and
     sanction poor performance when it occurs. The APAP and the ACCAP
     set forth, in great detail, the processes by which Bell Atlantic's
     performance is measured and evaluated, the method for determining
     compliance and non-compliance with respect to individual metrics,
     and the manner in which noncompliance with individual metrics will
     translate into bill credits.[^1347] Commenters have set forth a
     long list of specific criticisms, arguing that the Plan: unduly
     forgives discriminatory conduct;[^1348] fails to deter targeted
     discrimination directed against individual competing
     carriers;[^1349] excessively aggregates performance data and
     combines metrics, thereby masking unsatisfactory results;[^1350]
     and does not include penalties that escalate with the severity of
     the performance shortfall.[^1351] These criticisms, however, do not
     undermine our overall confidence that the Plan will detect and
     sanction poor performance when it occurs. We also find it
     significant that the New York Commission considered and rejected
     most of these arguments.[^1352]

441. *Self-executing mechanism.* We conclude that the performance
     monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are reasonably
     self-executing.[^1353] We recognize, however, that several
     commenters, as well as the Department of Justice, expressed
     considerable concern that the "exceptions" or "waiver" process
     built into the Plan could effectively destroy the self-executing
     aspect of the plan and open the door to extensive delay and
     litigation.[^1354] We agree that a waiver process, if not narrowly
     limited to a discrete set of circumstances and subject to time
     constraints, could have such an impact. In this instance, however,
     we conclude that the waiver process is designed so as to alleviate
     the concerns noted above. First, the three grounds on which Bell
     Atlantic may seek a waiver review appear to be reasonable and --
     with one exception[^1355] -- are defined narrowly under the Plan.
     The New York Commission has explained that it will consider waiver
     requests only in "limited, extraordinary circumstances."[^1356]
     Second, the New York Commission placed time limits on the
     resolution of waiver requests, which will help to ensure that the
     Plan functions in a timely and predictable manner.[^1357]

442. *Data Validation and Audit Procedures.* We note with approval that
     the performance data used in the enforcement mechanism in New York
     appears to be subject to regular scrutiny. The New York Commission
     has independently replicated Bell Atlantic's performance reports
     from raw data submitted by Bell Atlantic, in order to identify and
     investigate any discrepancies, and will continue to do so for the
     next six months, and possibly longer.[^1358] The New York
     Commission also will perform an annual review of Bell Atlantic's
     data and performance measures.[^1359] These review and monitoring
     mechanisms provide reasonable assurance that the data will be
     reported in a consistent and reliable manner.[^1360]

443. *Accounting Requirements*. Consistent with our accounting rules
     with respect to antitrust damages[^1361] and certain other
     penalties paid by carriers,[^1362] we conclude that Bell Atlantic
     should not be permitted to reflect any portion of market
     adjustments as expenses under the revenue requirement for
     interstate services of the Bell Atlantic incumbent LEC. Such
     accounting treatment ensures that ratepayers do not bear, in the
     form of increased rates, the cost of market adjustments under the
     APAP and ACCAP in the event Bell Atlantic fails to provide adequate
     service quality to competitive LECs. We agree with CPI that any
     other approach would seriously undermine the incentives meant to be
     created by the Plan.[^1363] We note that the New York Commission
     has adopted a similar approach at the state level.[^1364]

## Other Arguments

444. We recognize that commenters raise several other concerns which,
     they contend, support a finding that grant of this application is
     not in the public interest. These arguments do not convince us that
     grant of this application would be inconsistent with the public
     interest. Several commenters offer specific allegations that Bell
     Atlantic has engaged in anti-competitive behavior.[^1365] We have
     previously stated that we will not withhold section 271
     authorization on the basis of isolated instances of allegedly
     unfair dealing or discrimination under the Act.[^1366] In this
     instance, we do not find that the various incidents cited by
     commenters constitute a pattern of discriminatory conduct that
     undermines our confidence that Bell Atlantic's local market is open
     to competition and will remain so after Bell Atlantic receives
     interLATA authority.[^1367] In addition, the City of New York
     argues that Bell Atlantic's exemption from payment of City
     franchise fees gives the company an unfair competitive advantage,
     and thus asks the Commission to require Bell Atlantic to submit to
     a City franchise arrangement, as a condition of section 271
     approval.[^1368] We conclude that this franchise arrangement is a
     matter for initial determination between the City of New York and
     Bell Atlantic and, therefore, we decline to address this issue in
     the context of this Order.

445. Finally, AT&T asserts that Bell Atlantic's provision of National
     Directory Assistance (NDA) service violates section 272 and
     "appears to violate" section 271(a).[^1369] We note that the Common
     Carrier Bureau adopted an order finding that Bell Atlantic's
     provision of NDA service falls within the exception for incidental,
     interLATA services under section 271(g)(4).[^1370] As such, Bell
     Atlantic may provide this service without prior Commission
     authorization pursuant to section 271. In addition, the Bureau
     forbore from applying the separate affiliate requirements of
     section 272, with the exception of the nondiscrimination
     requirements of section 272(c)(1), to Bell Atlantic's provision of
     NDA service. Although it is not clear from the record whether Bell
     Atlantic was in compliance with the requirements of section
     271(g)(4) at the time it filed its section 271 application with the
     Commission, we find that a temporary period of noncompliance does
     not warrant a finding that granting this application would not be
     in the public interest.[^1371] We note that the Commission released
     an order (*U S WEST Forbearance Order*),[^1372] which placed the
     BOCs on notice that their NDA services could be considered
     in-region, interLATA services, on September 27^th^, only two days
     before Bell Atlantic filed its 271 application. Moreover, since the
     issuance of the *U S WEST Forbearance Order*, we find that Bell
     Atlantic has taken prompt action to restructure its NDA service
     offering to comply with the Act. Given the particular circumstances
     present in the instant application, therefore, we find that AT&T's
     assertions do not provide a sufficient basis for rejecting Bell
     Atlantic's application.

# Section 271(d)(6) Enforcement Authority

446. Through section 271, Congress withheld from the BOCs, including
     Bell Atlantic, authority to provide in-region interLATA service
     until they satisfy various conditions related to competition in
     local markets. In this manner, Congress sought to create incentives
     for BOCs to cooperate with competitors and to accelerate acts
     facilitating the development of local competition.[^1373] Those
     incentives may diminish with respect to a given state once a BOC
     receives authorization to provide interLATA service in that state.
     The record in this proceeding, for example, evidences considerable
     concern regarding so-called "backsliding" by Bell Atlantic once it
     obtains section 271 approval and begins providing in-region
     interLATA service in New York.[^1374] Swift and effective
     post-approval enforcement of section 271's requirements thus is
     essential to achieve Congress's goal of maintaining conditions
     conducive to achieving durable competition in local markets. We
     describe below the post-entry enforcement framework that will
     govern now that Bell Atlantic has received authorization to provide
     interLATA service in New York.[^1375]

447. *The Commission's Section 271(d)(6)(A) Powers.* Congress included
     provisions in section 271 to ensure that a BOC continues to comply
     with the statutory requirements after the Commission approves an
     application to provide in-region interLATA service. Section
     271(d)(6)(A) discusses several actions the Commission is authorized
     to take should it determine that a BOC "has ceased to meet any of
     the conditions required for such approval."[^1376] After "notice
     and an opportunity for hearing," the Commission "may":

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(i) issue an order to such company to correct the deficiency;

(ii) impose a penalty on such company pursuant to title V;[^1377] or

(iii) suspend or revoke such approval.[^1378]

As the Commission previously has determined, these substantial powers
augment the agency's pre-existing enforcement powers, including its
authority under sections 206-209 of the Communications Act.[^1379]

448. *Suspension of Approval to Provide InterLATA Service.* Section
     271(d)(6)(A)(iii) authorizes the Commission to suspend approval to
     provide interLATA service in the event we determine that a BOC has
     ceased to meet any of the conditions required for approval. This
     critically important power underscores Congress's concern that BOCs
     continue to comply with the statute post-entry. Given this evident
     congressional concern, we will not hesitate to use this power --
     and employ it quickly -- in appropriate circumstances.

449. We take this opportunity to elaborate on how we intend to implement
     the "suspension" power under section 271(d)(6)(A)(iii).
     Specifically, we envision issuing an order similar in effect to the
     "stand-still" order the Commission issued recently in another
     context involving section 271.[^1380] Such a stand-still order
     would not only prohibit a non-compliant BOC from enrolling
     additional subscribers for interLATA service, but also could
     prohibit the BOC from all marketing and promotion of interLATA
     service. This status would continue until the record is clear that
     the specified deficiency has been corrected for a sufficient length
     of time and the stand-still order is dissolved. Such an action
     involving Bell Atlantic in New York would thus freeze Bell
     Atlantic's interLATA subscriber base as of the date of the
     order.[^1381]

450. Swift action in this area will further Congress's goal to ensure
     that markets remain open post-entry. Section 271(d)(6)(A)
     authorizes the Commission to suspend interLATA approval "after
     notice and an opportunity for hearing." The Commission previously
     has determined that this language does not require formal,
     trial-type evidentiary proceedings before an administrative law
     judge.[^1382] Section 271(d)(6)(A) does not contain the requisite
     "*on the record* after opportunity for an agency hearing" language
     which triggers trial-type evidentiary hearings under sections 553
     and 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[^1383] Nor is
     there any reason to believe that Congress intended section
     271(d)(6) to require trial-type hearings independently of the
     APA.[^1384] We thus conclude that generally we may exercise the
     suspension power of section 271(d)(6)(A)(iii) without holding
     time-consuming formal, trial-type evidentiary hearings. Rather, we
     envision expeditious paper proceedings.

451. With respect to this application, any diminution in performance
     below levels deemed sufficient in this order may expose Bell
     Atlantic to possible enforcement action under section 271(d)(6),
     including suspension of authorization to provide service. For
     instance, our finding of checklist compliance with respect to
     collocation is predicated on Bell Atlantic's demonstration that it
     provisions collocation within the 76-day provisioning interval
     established by the New York Commission 95 percent of the time. We
     are prepared to institute suspension proceedings in the event of a
     decrease in this on-time provisioning rate that we believe
     demonstrates that Bell Atlantic is no longer in compliance with
     that checklist item. Although we do not attempt to catalogue here
     all possible ways in which Bell Atlantic may come out of
     compliance, we emphasize that we view suspension as a potential
     remedy in any instance where other disincentives have failed to
     deter decreased performance by Bell Atlantic.

452. *Complaints.* In addition to FCC-initiated enforcement actions
     (such as forfeitures, suspensions, and revocations), Congress
     provided for the expeditious review of complaints concerning
     failure by a BOC to meet the conditions required for section 271
     approval.[^1385] Such complaints may include requests for
     damages.[^1386] The Commission will consider and resolve those
     complaints alleging violations of section 271 as well as the
     Commission's rules and orders implementing the statute. Complaints
     involving a BOC's alleged noncompliance with specific commitments
     the BOC may have made to a state commission, or specific
     performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms imposed by a
     state commission, should be directed to that state commission
     rather than the FCC.[^1387]

453. *Conclusion.* As these statutory provisions demonstrate, obtaining
     section 271 authorization is not the end of the road for Bell
     Atlantic in New York. Congress deemed satisfaction of section 271's
     requirements at a single moment in time insufficient to ensure
     continuing competition in local markets. In order to ensure that
     conditions conducive to local competition in New York are not
     ephemeral, the statute mandates that Bell Atlantic continue to meet
     "the conditions required for . . . approval" of its application.
     Working in concert with the New York Commission, we intend to
     monitor closely Bell Atlantic's post-entry compliance and to
     enforce vigorously the provisions of section 271 using the various
     enforcement tools Congress provided us in the Communications Act.
     We require that Bell Atlantic provide us with the monthly
     Carrier-to-Carrier performance data reports that it provides to the
     New York Commission for at least one year from the date of the
     release of this order, so that we can review Bell Atlantic's
     performance to ensure continued compliance with the statutory
     requirements.

# CONCLUSION

454. For the reasons discussed above, we grant Bell Atlantic's
     application for authorization under section 271 of the Act to
     provide in-region, interLATA services in the state of New York.

# ORDERING CLAUSES

455. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
     and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
     154(i), 154(j), 271, Bell Atlantic New York's application to
     provide in-region interLATA service in the State of New York filed
     on September 29, 1999, IS GRANTED.

456. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by AT&T Corp.
     on November 22, 1999, IS DENIED.

457. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by Covad
     Communications Company on December 17, 1999, IS DENIED.

458. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE
     January 3, 2000.

     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

     Magalie Roman Salas

     Secretary

# Appendix A: List of Commenters {#appendix-a-list-of-commenters .Appendix-Heading}

**Commenter Abbreviation**

1.  \@Link Networks (@Link)

2.  American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)

3.  AT&T Corporation (AT&T)

4.  Adelphia Business Solutions (Adelphia)

5.  Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (Allegiance)

6.  Alliance for Public Technology (APT)

7.  American Council of the Blind, American (ACB)

Foundation for the Blind, National Association of the Deaf,

Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc., and World Institute

on Disability

8.  Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

9.  Cable and Wireless, Inc. (C&W USA)

10. Cablevision Lightpath, Inc. (Lightpath)

11. Choice One Communications, Inc. (Choice One)

12. City of New York

13. Closecall America, Inc. (Closecall)

14. Coalition to Ensure Responsible Billing (CERB)

15. Competition Policy Institute (CPI)

16. Competitive Telecommunications Association (CompTel)

17. Consortium for School Networking (CoSN)

18. Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

19. CoreComm Limited and CoreComm New York, Inc. (CoreComm)

20. Covad Communications Company (Covad)

21. Destek Networking Group, Inc. (Destek)

22. DSL.net, Inc. (DSL.net)

23. E.Spire Communications, Inc. & (E.Spire)

Net 2000 Communications Services, Inc.

24. Excel Communications, Inc. (Excel)

25. Focal Communications Corporation of New York (Focal-NY)

26. General Services Administration (GSA)

27. Global NAPS, Inc.

28. ICG Telecom Group, Inc. (ICG)

29. Intermedia Communications, Inc. (Intermedia)

30. Keefe, Barbara, MainePOINT Project Director

University of Maine System

31. Keep America Connected et. al

32. KMC Telecom, Inc. (KMC)

33. League of United Latin American Citizens, Brent Wilkes (LULAC)

34. MCI WorldCom, Inc. (MCI)

35. National ALEC Association (NALA)

36. National Association of Partners in Education (NAPE)

37. National Black Chamber of Commerce (NBCC)

38. National Consumers League (NCL)

39. National Small Business United (NSBU)

40. Nextlink New York, Inc. (NEXTLINK)

41. Network Access Solutions (NAS)

42. New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners (NECPUC)

43. NorthPoint Communications, Inc. (NorthPoint)

44. Ntegrity Telecontent Services, Inc. (Ntegrity)

45. Omnipoint Communications, Inc. (Omnipoint)

46. Organization of Chinese Americans, Inc. (OCA)

47. Organizations Concerned about Rural Education (OCRE)

48. Prism Communication Services, Inc. (Prism)

49. RCN Telecom Services, Inc. (RCN)

50. Rhythms Netconnections, Inc. (Rhythms)

51. Santo, Virginia

52. Sprint Communications Company, L.P. (Sprint)

53. State of New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer

54. New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)

55. Telecommunications Resellers Association (TRA)

56. Teligent, Inc. (Teligent)

57. United Seniors Health Cooperative (USHC)

58. Z-Tel Communications, Inc. (Z-Tel)

    **REPLY COMMENTS**

**Commenter Abbreviation**

1.  AT&T Corporation (AT&T)

2.  Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (Allegiance)

3.  Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

4.  BellSouth

5.  Communications Workers of America (CWA)

6.  Competition Policy Institute (CPI)

7.  Conversent Communications, LLC (Conversent)

8.  Covad Communications Company (Covad)

9.  DSL.net, Inc. (DSL.net)

10. Focal Communications Corporation of New York (Focal)

11. Keep America Connected et. al

12. Level 3 Communications, LLC (Level 3)

13. MCI WorldCom, Inc. (MCI)

14. MediaOne Group, Inc. (MediaOne)

15. National Association of Partners in Education (NAPG)

16. National Council on the Aging (NCOA)

17. National Education Association of New York (NEA/NY)

18. Network Access Solutions (NAS)

19. New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)

20. NorthPoint Communications, Inc. (NorthPoint)

21. OmniPoint Communications, Inc. (OmniPoint)

22. Prism Communication Services, Inc. (Prism)

23. RCN Telecom Services, Inc. (RCN)

24. Rhythms Netconnections, Inc. (Rhythms)

25. State of New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer

26. Teligent, Inc. (Teligent)

27. U S WEST Communications, Inc. (US WEST)

# Appendix B: Statistical Methodology {#appendix-b-statistical-methodology .Appendix-Heading}

1.  In this appendix, we discuss the statistical methodology and test
    statistics that Bell Atlantic employed in its application. We find
    that the modified z-test that Bell Atlantic uses for measurements
    with large sample sizes is an appropriate test. We also find that
    the tests that Bell Atlantic uses for measurements with small sample
    sizes, the binomial and t-tests, and the permutation tests, are also
    appropriate tests. We note that, in so concluding, we do not
    preclude the use of other statistical tests that have been developed
    in collaborative proceedings in other states. Finally, we discuss
    how we will use the z-scores provided in the Carrier to Carrier
    reports to determine if a difference in performance is statistically
    significant. We conclude that a 95 percent confidence level is the
    appropriate threshold to use for a determination of statistical
    significance.

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459. When making a parity comparison, statistical analysis is a useful
     tool to take into account random variation in the metrics.[^1388]
     We note that random variation is inherent in the incumbent LEC\'s
     process of providing interconnection and access to unbundled
     network elements. Our concern is primarily that the process that
     the incumbent LEC employs be nondiscriminatory. Thus, the incumbent
     LEC could have a provisioning process that is identical in its
     ability to provide the same function to retail customers and to
     competitive LECs, but because of random factors outside the control
     of the BOC, the average completed interval could vary for retail
     customers and competitive LECs from month to month, such that for
     one particular month, the metric for competitors would show a
     longer average interval than would the metric for Bell Atlantic\'s
     retail customers. Thus, metric results showing weaker performance
     to competitors could be due to random variation in the measures,
     even though the process is inherently nondiscriminatory. Therefore,
     the use of statistical analysis to take into account random
     variation in the metrics is desirable.[^1389]

460. Statistical tests can be used as a tool in determining whether a
     difference in the measured values of two metrics means that the
     metrics probably measure two different processes, or instead that
     the two measurements are likely to have been produced by the same
     process. This can be done using traditional hypothesis
     testing.[^1390] Hypothesis testing involves testing to determine
     which of two hypotheses, usually called the null and the
     alternative hypotheses, is likely to be correct.[^1391] Usually
     this means devising a statistical test to determine whether the
     null hypothesis can be rejected, given the data available.[^1392]
     If the data is not consistent with the null hypothesis, then we
     reject the null hypothesis, and accept the alternative
     hypothesis.[^1393] The null hypothesis here would be the hypothesis
     that the two processes are the same, so that the measurements
     reflect different observations taken from the same (or identically
     performing) processes.[^1394] The alternative hypothesis asserts
     that the two processes are different.

461. In *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* we encouraged BOCs to submit
     data allowing us to determine if any detected differences in
     performance are caused by random variation in the data.[^1395] In
     its application, Bell Atlantic has presented us with performance
     data, as well as a statistical test and its corresponding test
     statistic (called z-scores) that can be used to determine whether a
     detected difference between the wholesale and retail metrics is
     statistically significant. Bell Atlantic has been required to
     utilize this statistical methodology in reporting its performance
     to New York as part of the Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding.[^1396]

462. The statistical test that is used depends on the kind of metric
     being tested, and the number of observations or \"sample size\" for
     that metric. The Carrier to Carrier guidelines specify that there
     are two kinds of metrics, \"measured\" and \"counted.\"[^1397]
     Measured metrics are averages or means of observations (for
     example, Average Completed Interval).[^1398] Proportionate
     (counted) metrics measure the proportion or percentage of a group
     of observations that meet some criterion (for example, Percentage
     of Appointments Missed).[^1399]

463. The statistical tests used by Bell Atlantic were initially proposed
     by Local Competition Users Group (LCUG), a group of competitive
     LECs.[^1400] The test LCUG advocated for large sample sizes is
     commonly known as the \"modified z-test\", which uses the
     \"modified z statistic.\"[^1401] The modified z-test uses only the
     incumbent LEC\'s standard deviation, and not the competitive LECs\'
     standard deviation, in calculating the z statistic.[^1402] It is a
     variation of the standard textbook z-test, which uses the standard
     deviations for both the incumbent LEC\'s and competitive LECs\'
     observations.[^1403] In its application Bell Atlantic presents us
     with z-scores, which are the test statistic used to perform the
     z-test.

464. The modified z-test for a difference in means between two
     populations, assuming the means are normally distributed, used for
     measured metrics, is:[^1404]\
     \
     **z** = (m~C~-m~I~) / (s~I~ \* SQRT \[1/N~C~+1/N~I~\])\
     \
     where m~C~ = competitive LEC sample mean, m~I~ = incumbent LEC
     sample mean, s~I~ = incumbent LEC\'s standard deviation, N~C~ =
     number of competitive LEC observations, and N~I~ = number of
     incumbent LEC observations. z is the test statistic (\"z-score\")
     that results from this calculation.

465. The modified z-test for a difference in proportions between two
     populations, used for proportionate metrics, is:[^1405]\
     \
     **z** = (P~C~-P~I~) / SQRT \[P~I~(1-P~I~) (1/N~C~+1/N~I~)\]\
     \
     where P~C~ = competitive LEC sample proportion, P~I~ = incumbent
     LEC sample proportion, N~C~ = number of competitive LEC
     observations, N~I~ = number of incumbent LEC observations, and z is
     the resulting z-score.

466. The z-test involves comparing the z-score for a particular metric
     with a critical value (call it z~C~) to determine if we can reject
     the (null) hypothesis that the same process generated the Bell
     Atlantic and competing carrier means. The critical value z~C~ is
     chosen based on a particular desired confidence level (call the
     confidence level C).[^1406] If the z-score is less than this
     critical value (z \< z~C~), we reject the null hypothesis, and
     accept the alternative hypothesis that the processes for serving
     retail and competing carriers\' customers are different. We would
     then say that the test indicates the measured difference in metric
     values is statistically significant.[^1407] If the confidence level
     is C, then the probability of mistakenly rejecting the null
     hypothesis when it is true would be 1‑C (call this α).[^1408]
     Statisticians call α, the probability of mistakenly rejecting the
     null hypothesis, the probability of a Type I error.[^1409] The
     confidence level can be interpreted as our confidence that we have
     not mistakenly rejected the null hypothesis (i.e., found a
     difference to be statistically significant when it is not).[^1410]
     Thus if we use the 95 percent confidence level for a one-tailed
     test,[^1411] the critical value (taken from tables) is ‑1.645, and
     there is a 5 percent probability that a statistically significant
     difference will be detected when the process in fact is the
     same.[^1412]

467. Z-tests, including the modified z-test and the standard z-test, are
     only appropriate if the distribution of the mean (or of the
     proportion, for proportionate measures) is normal.[^1413] Even for
     metrics whose observations are not normally distributed, the mean
     should be normally distributed if the sample size is large enough,
     according to the Central Limit Theorem.[^1414] Usually it is
     assumed that a sample size of 30 or more is sufficient for it to be
     appropriate to use the z-test for measured metrics.[^1415] For
     proportionate metrics, it is generally assumed that a z-test can be
     used if the sample size is large enough such that N \* P ≥ 5 or
     N \* (1‑P) ≥ 5.[^1416]

468. For metrics with small sample sizes, Bell Atlantic is using the
     binomial test, t-test, and the permutation test. For proportionate
     measures with small sample sizes, defined as N \* P \* (1−P) \< 5,
     where N is the number of observations and P is the proportion, Bell
     Atlantic will use a binomial test to test whether the difference in
     proportions is statistically significant.[^1417] For measured
     metrics with small sample sizes (less than 30 observations), Bell
     Atlantic is temporarily using a t-test, which assumes the
     population is normally distributed, or close to a normal
     distribution.[^1418] However, a non-parametric test should be used
     if the population is not normally distributed. Non-parametric tests
     do not assume the data or the mean have a particular distribution.
     Bell Atlantic is committed to using a permutation test, which is
     one kind of non-parametric test, to determine if differences in
     performance between Bell Atlantic retail customers and competitive
     LECs are statistically significant, once it is able to implement it
     for all metrics.[^1419]

469. Unlike standard z-tests, the modified z-test assumes that the
     incumbent LEC and competitive LEC variances are the same under
     parity (the null hypothesis), but not necessarily so under the
     alternative hypothesis.[^1420] With this test, unlike a standard
     z-test, z-scores will not fall if competitive LECs\' standard
     deviations rise.[^1421] While it is a test of a difference of
     means, it will also be more likely to show a statistically
     significant difference if the competitive LEC variance is
     larger.[^1422] This means this will also serve as a weak test for a
     difference of variances.

470. We find the modified z-test, the binomial test, the t-test, and the
     permutation test to be reasonable tests for statistical
     significance, for measured and proportionate measures. All parties
     in the New York Commission collaborative hearings have agreed to
     the use of these tests, and these tests have been adopted for use
     in the Carrier-to-Carrier measures and the Performance Assurance
     Plan.[^1423] Moreover, no commenters in this proceeding have
     objected to the use of the modified z-test, the t-test, the
     binomial test, or the permutation test. These tests are efficient
     in their ability to detect differences in means or proportions that
     are not caused by random fluctuation, while minimizing the
     likelihood of falsely concluding the variation may be due to
     underlying discrimination. They appear to be relatively powerful
     tests.[^1424] We find the modified z-test (t-test for small sample
     sizes) to be a reasonably efficient test to determine whether a
     difference in means or proportions is statistically significant. We
     further find that the two nonparametric tests proposed, the
     binomial and the permutation tests, are both fairly standard tests
     to use when the samples are small. The permutation test is a
     standard nonparametric test used to test for a difference in means
     for small samples.[^1425] We note that the binomial test is
     considered to be an exact test for proportionate metrics, such that
     it is the most powerful test possible.[^1426]

471. We will rely on the results of the tests and their associated test
     statistics that Bell Atlantic has presented to us with this
     application. However, we do not rule out the use in other section
     271 applications of alternative statistical tests that are of
     similar power and efficiency. For measures where the New York
     Commission has identified retail analogues, we will use the
     modified z-scores presented by Bell Atlantic to determine if a
     difference in performance provided to competitive LECs\' and Bell
     Atlantic\'s retail customers is statistically significant. As
     discussed below, we will employ a 95 percent confidence level
     one-tailed test, which yields a critical value (or minimum
     threshold z-score) of −1.645.[^1427] We note that the New York
     Commission has adopted this confidence level and critical value for
     its determination of performance scores of --2 for the Performance
     Assurance Plan.[^1428]

472. Therefore we will treat all z-scores that are positive, or are
     larger than ­1.645, as evidence of nondiscrimination.[^1429]
     Positive z-scores indicate that competitive LEC customers received
     better performance than Bell Atlantic retail customers. Z-scores
     between zero and ­1.645, such as a score of ­1, indicate that
     competitive LECs received on average poorer service than Bell
     Atlantic retail customers, but that there is a significant
     likelihood that Bell Atlantic\'s process of serving both sets of
     customers was identical, and the negative score was due to random
     chance. In these cases the difference would not be considered
     statistically significant, and we would conclude that Bell Atlantic
     has met its burden of demonstrating nondiscrimination. Z-scores of
     less than ­1.645, such as a score of ­2 or of ­3, would be viewed as
     statistically significant. Only in the last case would we then
     conduct a further inquiry into whether the difference is large
     enough to be deemed discriminatory.

473. The Carrier-to-Carrier guidelines have set no minimum sample size,
     so that statistical tests are reported even if the sample size is
     just one observation.[^1430] We make no determination here as to
     whether it is reasonable to have a minimum sample size for
     statistical testing. We believe, however, that the data should be
     reported for all sample sizes, so that we will have some
     information about performance for all services provided.[^1431] We
     note that for some kinds of orders, such as those for collocations
     or for high capacity lines like DS3s, small numbers of observations
     are possible for a given month. The importance and large revenues
     involved for each observation makes it important for us to have
     information about these orders.

474. When we look at the differences in metric values, we will assume
     that parity exists unless the competitive LEC scores are worse than
     those for the BOC, and the difference is statistically significant
     at the 95 percent confidence level for a one-tailed test.[^1432] We
     use the 95 percent confidence level because it is a commonly used
     standard, and because it gives us a reasonable likelihood of
     detecting variations in performance not due to random chance, with
     few false conclusions that variations are not due to random
     chance.[^1433] At the 95 percent confidence level, even under
     parity an average of 5 percent of the tests should fail (this is
     the probability of a Type I error).[^1434] At higher confidence
     levels this probability would be lower, but then the probability of
     not detecting unexplained variations in performance if they do
     exist (the probability of a Type II error) would increase. The 95
     percent confidence level appears to be a fair compromise. We do not
     comment here on AT&T\'s proposal to choose a confidence level of 85
     percent, which it says will balance the probability of Type I and
     Type II errors.[^1435] We find that AT&T has not put sufficient
     evidence on the record for us to determine that setting the
     confidence level at 85 percent[^1436] will in fact balance the
     probability of Type I and Type II errors.[^1437]

475. We accept Bell Atlantic\'s use of a one-tailed statistical test. We
     find a one-tailed test appropriate because we are only concerned
     with *inferior* performance provided by the incumbent LEC to the
     competitive LEC. Therefore we are only testing to determine whether
     inferior performance that is being provided by the incumbent LEC to
     a competitive LEC is statistically significant.[^1438] We note that
     the New York Commission has approved the use of a one-tailed test,
     and no commenters object to its use.[^1439]

476. For metrics that have no retail analogue, Bell Atlantic presents us
     with a benchmark level adopted by the New York Commission, and no
     statistical comparison is employed. According to the Carrier to
     Carrier guidelines, Bell Atlantic would fail a benchmark test if
     performance to competing carriers falls below the benchmark
     level.[^1440] We accept Bell Atlantic\'s use of benchmarks without
     a statistical test being employed. We make no determination here
     whether it would be better to employ a statistical test or a
     straight comparison. We accept, however, the use of a direct
     comparison, which we are presented with here.

#   {#section-1 .Appendix-Heading .unnumbered}

# Appendix C: Analysis of Average Completed Intervals for Non-dispatch Orders Using Carrier to Carrier and Gertner/Bamberger Study Data {#appendix-c-analysis-of-average-completed-intervals-for-non-dispatch-orders-using-carrier-to-carrier-and-gertnerbamberger-study-data .Appendix-Heading}

#  {#section-2 .unnumbered}

1.  In this appendix we adjust the reported Average Completed Interval
    data for competing carriers\' orders to correct for the factors Bell
    Atlantic cites. In this manner, we can make a proper comparison of
    the Bell Atlantic retail and competing carrier intervals. According
    to Bell Atlantic, the disparity between retail and wholesale Average
    Completed Intervals for non-dispatch orders is due to two
    factors: (1) the improper coding by competing carriers of some \"W\"
    coded orders, when they request longer intervals than the standard
    interval; and (2), competing carriers\' customers requesting a mix
    of services that have longer standard intervals associated with
    them, compared to the mix of services requested by Bell Atlantic\'s
    retail customers.[^1441] Using the Gertner/Bamberger study\'s
    results, it is possible to see whether correcting for these factors
    would explain the evident difference between Bell Atlantic retail
    and wholesale Average Completed Intervals in the reported Carrier to
    Carrier metrics for non-dispatch orders.[^1442] As set forth below,
    we find that, after accounting for those factors, a half day
    difference between wholesale and retail Average Completed Intervals
    remains for UNE-P orders, and for resale orders, a quarter day
    difference remains for July and August, while the intervals are
    about equal in June.

#### Analysis of UNE-P Orders

477. We make the following calculations. The data in the
     Gertner/Bamberger study allows us to estimate the Average Completed
     Interval for competing carriers\' properly coded \"W\" orders, and
     make an adjustment for the differences in order mix. The
     calculations we make, and the resulting differences that we find
     for non-dispatch UNE-P orders (measured in days), are summarized in
     the Table below.

#### Estimated Difference in Average Completed Intervals for Non-dispatch UNE-P Orders[^1443] {#estimated-difference-in-average-completed-intervals-for-non-dispatch-une-p-orders .unnumbered}

  ----------------- ------ ------- --------- ------ ------- --------- -------- ------- ---------
                    June                     July                     August           

                    BA     CLEC    Diff      BA     CLEC    Diff      BA       CLEC    Diff

  Carrier to        1.25   3.20    -1.95\*   0.99   2.55    -1.56\*   1.07     1.91    -0.84\*
  carrier metrics                                                                      
  data                                                                                 

  Using properly    1.25   1.13    0.12      0.99   1.31    -0.32     1.07     2.36    -1.29
  \"W\" coded CLEC                                                                     
  orders                                                                               

  Adjustment to            +0.53                    +0.04                      -0.62   
  CLEC data for                                                                        
  difference in                                                                        
  standard                                                                             
  intervals                                                                            

  CLEC data revised 1.25   1.68    -0.43\*   0.99   1.35    -0.36\*   1.07     1.74    -0.67\*
  for alleged                                                                          
  biases                                                                               
  ----------------- ------ ------- --------- ------ ------- --------- -------- ------- ---------

478. The top line in the table is the Average Completed Interval data
     reported in the Carrier to Carrier report for both Bell Atlantic
     retail orders and competing carriers\' (\"CLEC\") orders, which
     Bell Atlantic claims is flawed because of improper \"W\" coding and
     the order mix problem. The second line compares the Bell Atlantic
     retail interval from the Carrier to Carrier report with the Average
     Completed Interval data from the study for properly \"W\" coded
     competing carriers\' orders. The third line shows the adjustment
     made to the competing carriers\' measured intervals to account for
     differences in the average standard intervals, caused by the order
     mix problem. The bottom line compares the adjusted competing
     carriers\' data, which has been corrected for the \"W\" coding and
     order mix problems, with the Bell Atlantic retail data. The table
     shows that the Average Completed Interval for competing carriers is
     much smaller after these corrections are made for the \"W\" coding
     and order mix problems. Specifically, the difference between Bell
     Atlantic retail and competing carriers\' orders is about half a
     day, and is statistically significant.[^1444]

#### Analysis of Resale Orders

479. Although the Carrier to Carrier data is disaggregated between
     business and residential orders, the Gertner/Bamberger study data
     is not. In order to perform our analysis, we aggregated the
     business and residential Carrier to Carrier data. We then used the
     data from the Gertner/Bamberger study to estimate the Average
     Completed Interval for competing carriers\' properly coded \"W\"
     orders, and make an adjustment for the differences in order mix, as
     we did above for UNE-P orders. The calculations we make to the
     competing carriers data, and the resulting differences that we find
     for non-dispatch resale orders (measured in days), are summarized
     in the Table below.

#### Estimated Difference in Average Completed Intervals for Non-dispatch Resale Orders[^1445] {#estimated-difference-in-average-completed-intervals-for-non-dispatch-resale-orders .unnumbered}

  ----------------- ------ ------- --------- ------ ------- --------- -------- ------- ---------
                    June                     July                     August           

                    BA     CLEC    Diff      BA     CLEC    Diff      BA       CLEC    Diff

  Carrier to        0.96   1.90    -0.94\*   1.01   1.59    -0.58\*   1.06     1.58    -0.52\*
  carrier metrics                                                                      
  data[^1446]                                                                          

  Using properly    0.96   0.86    0.10      1.01   1.10    -0.09     1.06     1.15    -0.09
  \"W\" coded CLEC                                                                     
  orders                                                                               

  Adjustment to            +0.07                    +0.19                      +0.10   
  CLEC data for                                                                        
  difference in                                                                        
  standard                                                                             
  intervals                                                                            

  CLEC data revised 0.96   0.93    0.03      1.01   1.29    -0.28\*   1.06     1.25    -0.19\*
  for alleged                                                                          
  biases                                                                               
  ----------------- ------ ------- --------- ------ ------- --------- -------- ------- ---------

480. As evidenced by the bottom line of this table, the differences in
     Average Completed Intervals for resale orders between competing
     carriers and Bell Atlantic\'s retail customers are much smaller
     than before the correction. In fact, the Average Completed
     Intervals are about equal in June for wholesale and retail
     orders.[^1447] In July and August, the differences are about a
     quarter day, but are, nevertheless, statistically
     significant.[^1448]

[^1]: The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
    56 (1996). We refer to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
    as "the Communications Act" or "the Act." We refer to the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996 as "the 1996 Act."

[^2]: A list of the parties filing comments, replies and/or *ex partes*
    in this proceeding is contained in Appendix A.

[^3]: *SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 154 F.3d 226 (5^th^ Cir. 1998).

[^4]: *Id.* at 244.

[^5]: The New York Commission has pioneered measures to open the local
    exchange market to competition, beginning with its decision in 1985
    authorizing Teleport Communications (Teleport) to compete with the
    New York Telephone Company (the predecessor of Bell Atlantic in New
    York) in providing local exchange private line services. For
    example, in 1989, the New York Commission was the first to require
    an incumbent LEC to provide competitors with a form of central
    office interconnection (later known as virtual collocation) for the
    provision of private line services. *Opinion and Order Adopting
    Regulations Concerning Common Carriage,* Case 89-C-099 (NYPSC Feb.
    20, 1989). In 1991, the New York Commission was also the first to
    provide for "physical collocation" for the provision of private line
    services. Cases 29469 and 88-C-004, *Order Regarding OTIS II
    Compliance Filing*, Issued and effective May 1991. The New York
    Commission subsequently expanded its physical and virtual
    collocation requirements to include switched services. *Opinion and
    Order on Pooling, Collocation and Access Rate Design,* Opinion No.
    92-13, Case 28425 (NYPSC May 29, 1992). *See also Expanded
    Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities,* Report and
    Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd 7369, 7374-75
    (1991). In addition, the New York Commission ordered loop unbundling
    for centrex and private branch exchange (PBX) services. *Opinion and
    Order Concerning Comparably Efficient Interconnection Arrangements
    and Instituting Proceeding*, Opinion No. 91-24, Cases 88-C-004,
    88-C-063 and 91-C-1174 (NYPSC Nov. 25, 1991). In 1993, the New York
    Commission also became the first to authorize local exchange service
    competition, providing for the negotiation of carrier-to-carrier
    interconnection agreements between Bell Atlantic and competitive
    LECs, with mediation and arbitration if necessary. *Proceeding on
    Motion of the Commission to Investigate Performance-Based Incentive
    Regulatory Plans for New York Telephone Company,* Case 92-C-0665
    (NYPSC 1993). This decision resulted in Bell Atlantic issuing NXX
    codes to competitors (Teleport and Metropolitan Fiber Systems), a
    vital step in the development of local competition. The New York
    Commission has continued to encourage and strengthen the competitive
    marketplace for local service. *See, e.g., Order Considering Loop
    Resale and Ports Pricing,* Case 95-C-0657, *et al,* (NYPSC Nov. 1,
    1995) (requiring NYNEX to offer discount to resellers for
    residential service); *Opinion and Order Adopting Regulatory
    Framework,* Opinion No. 96-13, Case 94-C-0095 (NYPSC May 22, 1996)
    (adopting broad framework to encourage rapid transition to
    competition for local service).

[^6]: Once this Commission has approved the first section 271
    application, other applicants will have a model to follow in
    preparing their applications, making the proceedings at the state
    level less difficult.

[^7]: At the time, New York Telephone was a subsidiary of NYNEX
    Corporation. NYNEX was subsequently acquired by Bell Atlantic. For
    convenience and clarity we will refer to the entity as Bell Atlantic
    throughout this Order.

[^8]: *See, e.g.,* AT&T Comments at 1-2; CoreComm Comments at 1; Excel
    Comments at 1-2; Nextlink Comments at 2. *See also* MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 1.

[^9]: AT&T Comments at 1-2.

[^10]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 1.

[^11]: Nextlink Comments at 2.

[^12]: OSS refers collectively to the systems, databases, and personnel
    used by incumbent LECs to provide services to customers in an
    accurate and timely manner as well as to ensure the quality of those
    services. Nondiscriminatory access to OSS is essential if
    competetive LECs are to be able to compete effectively with
    incumbent LECs. *See infra* Section V.B.

[^13]: New York Commission Comments at 9-11.

[^14]: *Id.* KPMG Peat Marwick (KPMG) was selected as the
    pseudo-competitive LEC, and Hewlett Packard was hired to build the
    interface between KPMG and Bell Atlantic. *Id. See also* New York
    Commission Comments at 33.

[^15]: Bell Atlantic Application App. C, Tab 916, Bell Atlantic OSS
    Evaluation Project Final Report submitted by KPMG (Aug. 6, 1999)
    (KPMG Final Report).

[^16]: *Order Adopting Inter-Carrier Service Quality Guidelines*, Case
    97-C-0139 (NYPSC Feb. 16, 1999) (Bell Atlantic Application App. E,
    Tab 61) (*NYPSC Guidelines Order*); *Order Estabilshing Permanent
    Rule*, Case 97-C-0139 (NYPSC Jun. 30, 1999) (Bell Atlantic
    Application App. E, Tab 83) (*NYPSC Permanent Rule Order*).

[^17]: See New York Commission Comments at 92-95; New York Commission
    Reply at 31-35.

[^18]: New York Commission Comments at 12, App. A.

[^19]: Bell Atlantic Application Taylor Decl. Attach. A at paras. 1, 27.

[^20]: *Id.* at para 1.

[^21]: For example, in its second section 271 application for Louisiana,
    BellSouth stated that it had provisioned 107 UNE loops in Louisiana
    whereas Bell Atlantic had provided nearly 200,000 UNE loops as of
    July 1999. *Application of BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth
    Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for
    Provision of In-Region, Inter-LATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket
    No. 98-121. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599, at 20715
    (1998) (*Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*; Bell Atlantic
    Application at 15, Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 66.
    Moreover, BellSouth was not providing the UNE platform while Bell
    Atlantic has provided more than 150,000 loops as part of the
    UNE-platform as of August 1999. Bell Atlantic Application at 15;
    Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 66.

[^22]: Bell Atlantic Taylor Decl. Attach A at para.1. Because
    competitive LECs are not required to report this information,
    complete counts of the number of lines served by competitors are not
    available. We note, however, that no commenters disputed Bell
    Atlantic's estimates suggesting that these figures are well within
    the zone of reasonableness.

[^23]: The UNE-platform is a combination of unbundled elements composed
    of loops, switching, and transport.

[^24]: Bell Atlantic Taylor Decl. Attach. A at para. 1. According to
    Bell Atlantic, this has been the case in New York for some time.
    Bell Atlantic asserts that, by October 1997, competitive LECs were
    serving at least 19,357 residential customers (3,438
    facilities-based, 15,919 resale) and 216,637 business customers
    (151,135 facilities based, 65,502 resale). *Id.* at 2 n.2.

[^25]: *Id.* at para. 1. This estimate is based on the number of E911
    listings competitors have obtained. *Id.* at para. 2.

[^26]: *Id.*

[^27]: *Id.*.

[^28]: *Id.* at para 1.

[^29]: We note here that, for the provision of international services, a
    U.S. carrier must separately receive section 214 authorization from
    the Commission. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 214; *see also* *Streamlining the
    International Section 214 Authorization Process and Tariff
    Requirements,* Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 12884 (1996); *Rules and
    Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
    Market,* Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd
    23891 (1997), recon. pending. This requirement applies
    notwithstanding a BOC's approval under section 271 for the provision
    of in-region, interLATA service originating in a particular state.

[^30]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271.

[^31]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3).

[^32]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3)(A). The critical, market-opening provisions of
    section 251 are incorporated into the competitive checklist found in
    section 271. See 47 U.S.C. § 251; *see also Implementation of the
    Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,
    CC Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (*Local Competition
    First Report and Order*), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub
    nom., *Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC*, 117 F.3d 1068
    (8th Cir. 1997) and *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
    1997), aff'd in part and remanded, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 119 S.
    Ct. 721 (1999).

[^33]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^34]: *Id.* § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^35]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3). *See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 138
    F.3d 410, 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^36]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A).

[^37]: *Id.*

[^38]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(B).

[^39]: *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services In Michigan*, CC Docket No. 97-137, 12 FCC Rcd
    20543, 20559-60 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan Order*). As the Court of
    Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held, "\[A\]lthough the Commission
    must consult with the state commissions, the statute does not
    require the Commission to give State Commissions' views any
    particular weight." *SBC Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416.

[^40]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; *SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416-17.

[^41]: *See supra* at paras. 6-13.

[^42]: Petition of New York Telephone Company for Approval of Its
    Statement of Generally Applicable Terms and Conditions Pursuant to
    Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Case 97-C-0271
    (NYPSC Feb. 13, 1997) (Bell Atlantic Application App. C, Vol. 1, Tab
    1).

[^43]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application App. C, Vol. 1, Tabs 1-110.

[^44]: New York Commission Comments at 9.

[^45]: *Id.*

[^46]: *Id.* at 10.

[^47]: *Id.* at 10.

[^48]: *Id*. at 10-11.

[^49]: *Id.* at 10-11

[^50]: *Id.* at 10.

[^51]: *See, e.g.,* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 1-8;
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 4-5.

[^52]: New York Commission Comments at 11-12.

[^53]: *See* *id.* at 1. The New York Commission states that Bell
    Atlantic is providing a quality of wholesale service to competitors
    that is nondiscriminatory. *Id.* at 7.

[^54]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 7.

[^55]: *Id.* at 1.

[^56]: *Id.* at 2.

[^57]: *Id.*

[^58]: *Id*. at 1-2.

[^59]: *Id*. at 13 n.25.

[^60]: *Id.* at 13-14.

[^61]: *Id*. at 41.

[^62]: *Id*. at 42-43.

[^63]: *Id*. at 43.

[^64]: *See* *Implementation of the Local Competition Prrovisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report
    and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15683 (1996) (*Local Competition First
    Report and Order*).

[^65]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.319.

[^66]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). In
    reaching this conclusion, the Court held that the Commission had not
    adequately considered the "necessary" and "impair" standards of
    section 251(d)(2) in establishing the list of seven network
    elements. *Id.* at 734-36.

[^67]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 15-26.

[^68]: *See* Letter from Susanne Guyer, Assistant Vice President, Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Dec. 6, 1999).

[^69]: *See* Cable & Wireless Comments at 10-11; Comptel Comments at
    10-16; RCN Comments at 8; *see also In the Matter of Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC
    Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice
    of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-238 (rel. Nov. 5, 1999) (*Third
    Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice* or *UNE Remand Order*).

[^70]: For example, under the new rules, incumbent LECs will be required
    to provide unbundled access to certain network functionalities and
    elements that were not explicitly listed under the former rule 319,
    including dark fiber, subloops, inside wire, packet switching (in
    limited circumstances), certain databases and loop qualification
    information. *See Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice*
    at para. 526; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319. For similar reasons, we do not
    require Bell Atlantic to demonstrate that it complies with the new
    rules relating to unbundled network elements established in the
    Commission's recent advanced services order requiring "line
    sharing." *See* *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket Nos. 98-147 and 96-98,
    *Third Report and Order and Fourth Report and Order*, FCC 99-355
    (rel. Dec. 9, 1999).

[^71]: Some of these rules will take effect 30 days after publication in
    the federal register, while others will take effect 120 days after
    federal register publication. *See Third Report and Order and Fourth
    Further Notice* at para. 526.

[^72]: In particular, we disagree with Comptel's argument that Bell
    Atlantic should be required to demonstrate compliance with the *UNE
    Remand* rules, even before they become effective, because these
    rules reflect and embody statutory requirements with which Bell
    Atlantic is required to comply under the terms of the competitive
    checklist. *See* Comptel Comments at 10-11 (arguing that the
    competitive checklist requires compliance with "the 1996 Act's
    obligations, separate and apart from the Commission's rules
    implementing the statute"); Letter from Robert J. Aamoth, Kelley
    Drye & Warren (on behalf of CompTel), to Magalie R. Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295
    at 4 (filed Dec. 10, 1999) (CompTel Dec. 10 *Ex Parte* Letter). Our
    review will ensure that Bell Atlantic meets the statutory
    requirements of section 271, including the competitive checklist.
    Moreover, as explained above, we believe that Bell Atlantic's
    approach of framing its application with reference to the unbundled
    network elements identified in the former rule 319 is a reasonable
    one.

[^73]: *See, e.g., Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications
    Under New Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 11
    FCC Rcd 19708, 19711 (Dec. 6, 1996) (Dec. 6 Public Notice); *Revised
    Comment Schedule for Ameritech Michigan Application, as amended, for
    Authorization under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Michigan*, Public
    Notice, DA 97-127 (Jan. 17, 1997) (Jan. 17, 1997 Public Notice);
    *Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd
    17457 (Sept. 19, 1997) (Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice ).

[^74]: Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B.

[^75]: *Id.; Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20570-71.

[^76]: *Id.*

[^77]: Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B; *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20570-71.

[^78]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20570 (citing Jan. 17,
    1997 Public Notice). The Commission subsequently released a
    procedural public notice incorporating this policy for future 271
    applications; s*ee* Sept. 19 Public Notice at Section B. *See also
    Comments Requested on Application by Bell Atlantic for Authorization
    under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA service in the State of New Yor*k, Public Notice, DA
    99-2014 (rel. Sept. 29, 1999) (Sept. 29 Public Notice).

[^79]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20573.

[^80]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20570 ("\[I\]f a
    BOC chooses to submit such evidence . . . we reserve the discretion
    . . . to accord the new evidence no weight in making our
    determination."); *id.*at para. 54 ("\[W\]e find that using our
    discretion to accord BOC submissions of new factual evidence no
    weight will ensure that our proceedings are conducted in 'such
    manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and
    to the ends of justice."); *id.*at para. 57 ("By retaining the
    discretion to accord new evidence no weight . . . "); *id.* at para.
    59 ("Because we will exercise our discretion in determining whether
    to accord new factual evidence any weight, we deny \[the motion to
    strike."\]; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20674
    ("Given the complexity of this data and the fact that interested
    parties have not had an opportunity to address it, we exercise our
    discretion to accord the information minimal weight."); Dec. 10
    Public Notice at 1 ("\[I\]f parties choose to submit new evidence,
    \[the Commission\] retains the discretion to accord new evidence no
    weight.").

[^81]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20575.

[^82]: *Id.* at 20573-74.

[^83]: *See* Motion of AT&T Corp. to Strike or to Disregard Portions of
    the Reply Submissions of Bell Atlantic and of the New York Public
    Service Commission (filed Nov. 22, 1999) (*AT&T Motion to Strike*).

[^84]: *Id.* at 1-7.

[^85]: *Id*. at 7.

[^86]: Comments of Covad and Motion to Strike, CC Docket No. 99-295
    (filed Dec. 17, 1999); Letter from Thomas J. Tauke, Senior Vice
    President -- Government Relations, Bell Atlantic, to William E.
    Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    99-295 (filed Dec. 10, 1999) (Bell Atlantic Dec. 10 *Ex Parte*
    Letter).

[^87]: Sept.19 Public Notice at Section H. Section H of the Public
    Notice establishes page limitations for *ex partes*, subject to
    certain exceptions.

[^88]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Group,
    Bell Atlantic to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission*,* CC Docket No. 99-295 at 2 (filed Dec.
    16, 1999).

[^89]: *Id.*

[^90]: Consistent with section 1.1204(a)(b), responses to Commission
    inquiries will generally be placed in the record. 47 C.F.R §
    1.204(a)(b).

[^91]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20599.

[^92]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)(i), (ii).

[^93]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^94]: *Id.*

[^95]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619 n.345.

[^96]: *See* *supra* paras. 44-46.

[^97]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20567-68; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20635-36.

[^98]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20568-69; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39.

[^99]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39.

[^100]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20569
    (concluding that greater weight will be attached to comments and
    pleadings supported by an affidavit or sworn statement than to an
    unsupported contrary pleading).

[^101]: *See* *supra* paras. 43-46.

[^102]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20601-02.

[^103]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20638-39.

[^104]: *See, e.g., Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20658-59; *Application by BellSouth Corp. et al. Pursuant to Section
    271 of the Communications Avt of 1934, as amended, to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket No. 97-231,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd 6245, 6258-81 (1998) (*First BellSouth Louisiana Order*);
    *Application by BellSouth et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide InterLATA
    Services in South Carolina*, CC Docket No. 97-208, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order,13 FCC Rcd 539, 597-634 (BellSouth *South Carolina
    Order*); *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20627-52.

[^105]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618.

[^106]: In our *Performance Measurements NPRM* we proposed a model set
    of reporting requirements that states could adopt to measure whether
    an incumbent LEC is providing interconnection, resale, and unbundled
    network elements on nondiscriminatory terms. *Performance
    Measurements and Reporting Requirements for Operaions Support
    Systems, Interconnection, and Operator Services and Directory
    Assistance,* CC Docket No. 98-56, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
    FCC Rcd 12817 (rel. Apr. 17, 1998) (*Performance Measurements
    NPRM*). This Commission has not, however, adopted, as a federal
    requirement, a particular set of metrics or performance standards.

[^107]: We also recognize that states may choose to set their
    performance benchmarks at levels higher than what is necessary to
    meet the statutory nondiscrimination standard.

[^108]: We do not suggest that these New York standards represent
    absolute maximum or minimum levels of performance necessary to
    satisfy the competitive checklist. Rather, we conclude that, in the
    context of this proceeding, they fall within a zone of
    reasonableness.

[^109]: *See infra* Appendix B for further discussion of the statistical
    methodology used by Bell Atlantic.

[^110]: We would have a high level of confidence that any differences in
    performance are the result of random chance.

[^111]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^112]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A)*.*

[^113]: *Id.*

[^114]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20589. *See also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 20633-35.

[^115]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 4-8. The figures cited by
    Bell Atlantic in support of this assertion are subject to the
    confidentiality provisions set forth as part of the Public Notice
    seeking comments in this proceeding. *Comments Requested on
    Apllication by Bell Atlantic For Authorization Under Section 271 of
    the Communications Act to Provide In-Region InterLATA Service in the
    State of New York*, Public Notice (Sept. 29, 1999). Parties wishing
    to review these figures should comply with the confidentiality
    provisions of the Public Notice.

[^116]: New York Commission Comments at 13-14. Although the Department
    of Justice does not address business and residential subscribers
    separately, it states that 59 percent of all competitive LEC access
    lines in New York are served on a facilities basis. *See also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 9; CWA Reply at 4-6.

[^117]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i); *see Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-20642; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12
    FCC Rcd at 20662-63.

[^118]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(A).

[^119]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15590.
    Transport and termination of traffic is therefore excluded from the
    Commission's definition of interconnection. *See id.*

[^120]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order*, the Commission identified a minimum set of technically
    feasible points of interconnection. *See Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15607-09.

[^121]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(C).

[^122]: *Id.*§ 251(c)(2)(D).

[^123]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15613-15; *see Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20641-42.

[^124]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15614-15; *see* Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory
    Affairs, Bell Atlantic Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 99-295 (filed Nov. 2,
    1999) (describing Bell Atlantic's interconnection arrangements).

[^125]: The Commission has relied on trunk blockage data to evaluate a
    BOC's interconnection performance in previous section 271
    applications. *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20648-51; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20671-74. Trunk
    group blockage indicates that end users are experiencing difficulty
    completing or receiving calls, and may have a direct impact on the
    customer's perception of a competitive LEC's service quality.

[^126]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612;
    *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642.

[^127]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^128]: Our rules require an incumbent LEC to provide two-way trunking
    upon request, wherever two-way trunking arrangements are technically
    feasible. 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(f); *see also Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642; *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 15612-13.

[^129]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^130]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779;
    *see Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41.

[^131]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.321(b); *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-82; *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41.

[^132]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (requiring incumbent LECs to provide
    physical collocation); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20640-41; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    649-50.

[^133]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41;
    *BellSouth Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 649-51.

[^134]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41.

[^135]: For some interconnection performance metrics, the New York
    Commission established as a parity standard the quality of
    interconnection Bell Atlantic provides to interexchange carriers.
    *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 56 (stating that
    "the provisioning of \[competitive LEC\] trunks is most like the
    provisioning of trunks for interexchange carriers"). Other
    performance metrics use Bell Atlantic's retail operations as the
    standard by which to judge Bell Atlantic's service quality. *See*
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at para. 60 (stating the
    Bell Atlantic's common trunk groups are used to measure the quality
    of interconnection provided to competitive LECs).

[^136]: Bell Atlantic Application App. F (providing interconnection
    agreements between Bell Atlantic and competing carriers); New York
    Commission Tariff No. 914 (Bell Atlantic Application App. H, Tab 1).

[^137]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 37; *see also* Bell
    Atlantic, [CLEC Handbook]{.smallcaps}, Vol. II, § 4.4, 23-27. Bell
    Atlantic refers to paper orders received by facsimile and mail as
    "manual" orders.

[^138]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 10-96 and Attach. D
    (providing performance data for October 1998 to August 1999); *see
    also* *Order Adopting Inter-Carrier Service Quality Guidelines*,
    Case 97-C-0139 (NYPSC Feb. 16, 1999) (Bell Atlantic Application App.
    E, Tab 61) (*NYPSC Guidelines Order*). Bell Atlantic provides two
    types of data to show its interconnection performance. First, Bell
    Atlantic submits its New York "Carrier-to-Carrier" performance data.
    The New York Carrier-to-Carrier performance data measures the
    quality of ordering and provisioning interconnection trunks,
    maintaining interconnection trunks, and the performance of
    interconnection trunks after installation (*i.e.*, trunk group
    blockage). *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl., Attach. D. The
    New York Carrier-to-Carrier Reports also contain information about
    provisioning of collocation space.

    Second, Bell Atlantic submits additional data, referred to as its
    "Part M" data, to show the quality of its provisioning for
    interconnection trunks. Bell Atlantic's Part M data disaggregates
    its interconnection provisioning performance into five distinct
    categories: (1) forecasted augmentations of up to 192 trunks to
    existing trunk groups; (2) forecasted augmentations of 192 to 384
    trunks to existing trunk groups; (3) forecasted projects, new
    orders, and augmentations of more than 384 trunks; (4) unforecasted
    orders for instances in which Bell Atlantic has facilities
    available; and (5) unforecasted orders for situations in which Bell
    Atlantic does not have facilities available. These five categories
    contain additional information about "customer not ready"
    situations, i.e., when a competitive LEC is unable to receive an
    interconnection trunk at the time Bell Atlantic is ready to deliver
    the circuit. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 18 &
    Attach. E.

[^139]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20649-20650;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20669-74.

[^140]: In its application, Bell Atlantic provides data concerning the
    performance of "dedicated final trunk groups," which are
    interconnection trunks connecting competitive LECs with Bell
    Atlantic's network. Final trunk groups provide the last available
    path for overflow traffic and may also receive first-route traffic
    for which there is no alternate route. Bell Atlantic also provides
    data concerning the performance of "common trunk groups," which are
    trunk groups that carry both local traffic from Bell Atlantic and
    traffic for interexchange carriers between Bell Atlantic end offices
    and access tandems. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl., Attach.
    D at 60. Bell Atlantic's performance reports show that, in June
    1999, competitive LECs experienced blockage on 1.72 percent of their
    dedicated final trunk groups, while Bell Atlantic experienced
    blockage on 2.55 percent of its common trunk groups; in July 1999,
    competitive LECs experienced blockage on 1.70 percent of their
    dedicated final trunk groups, while Bell Atlantic experienced
    blockage on 2.04 percent of its common trunk groups; in August 1999,
    competitive LECs experienced blockage on 1.13 percent of their
    dedicated final trunk groups, while Bell Atlantic experienced
    blockage on 1.53 percent of its common trunk groups. *See* Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 83, 95, 107 (metric
    NP-1-01). Statistical analysis conducted on Bell Atlantic's trunk
    blockage performance data for June, July, and August 1999 shows that
    any differences in performance between dedicated final trunk groups,
    i.e., interconnection trunks provided to competitive LECs, and
    common trunk groups, i.e., trunk groups connecting Bell Atlantic end
    offices with its access tandems, are not statistically significant.

[^141]: New York Commission Comments at 19; Intermedia Comments at 5;
    Nextlink Comments at 2-3; Cablevision Comments at 2; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 8; New York Commission Reply at
    5-7.

[^142]: Bell Atlantic defines "missed appointments" as "the percent of
    orders completed after the commitment date." *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl., Attach. B at 40. Pursuant to the New York
    Commission's regulations, Bell Atlantic's performance for
    competitive LECs is measured against its performance for
    interexchange carriers. *Id.* Bell Atlantic's performance reports
    show that, in July 1999, Bell Atlantic missed 1.05 percent of its
    installation appointments for competitive LECs, while Bell Atlantic
    missed 2.57 percent of its installation appointments for
    interexchange carriers; in August 1999, Bell Atlantic missed 2.01
    percent of its installation appointments for competitive LECs, while
    Bell Atlantic missed 2.20 percent of its installation appointments
    for interexchange carriers; in September 1999, Bell Atlantic missed
    1.71 percent of its installation appointments for competitive LECs,
    while Bell Atlantic missed 1.59 percent of its installation
    appointments for interexchange carriers. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 95, 107 (metric PR-4-01); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 12 (metric PR-4-01).
    We note that the superior performance to competitors is
    statistically significant for the months of July and August.

[^143]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 10-11 n.20; *see* Teligent
    Comments at 10-13; Teligent Sullivan Decl. at paras. 2-9; Teligent
    Lissemore Decl. at paras. 2-9; e.spire Comments at 16-20; Allegiance
    Comments at 10-12; ALTS Comments at 40-42; OmniPoint Comments at
    7-13; Prism Comments at 20; ICG Comments at 2-7 (describing delays
    in the negotiation process); Focal Comments at 3-9; *see also*
    Letter from Ross A. Buntrock, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for
    e.spire, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 3, 1999); Letter from
    Ross A. Buntrock, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for e.spire, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 9, 1999); Letter from Ross A.
    Buntrock, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for e.spire, to Magalie
    Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 22, 1999); Letter from Edward B. Krachmer,
    Regulatory Counsel, Teligent, Inc., to Anthony Dale, Attorney,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov.
    19, 1999). By "large orders," we mean orders for 193 or more
    interconnection trunks. Bell Atlantic treats orders for new
    installations of interconnection trunks, regardless of the size, in
    the same manner it treats large orders. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. E.

[^144]: The New York Carrier-to-Carrier Performance Standards and
    Reports submitted in Bell Atlantic's application showed that, for
    August and September, Bell Atlantic had problems with some aspects
    of its provisioning process for new and large orders of
    interconnection trunks. In addition, the statistical test used to
    evaluate Bell Atlantic's data showed that the different results were
    statistically significant. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 107 (metric PR-1-09); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 12 (metric PR-1-09).

[^145]: Letter from Dee May, Directory, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell
    Atlantic Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 at 1 (filed Dec. 7,
    1999) (Bell Atlantic Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter) (submitting revised
    performance data). Bell Atlantic erroneously reported provisioning
    of large orders of interconnection trunks provided to interexchange
    carriers, which is the standard established by the New York
    Commission for assessing the quality of provisioning interconnection
    trunks to competitive LECs in New York. The effect of Bell
    Atlantic's error was to show large statistically significant
    differences between the provisioning quality received by competitive
    LECs and by interexchange carriers.

[^146]: The New York Commission evaluates Bell Atlantic's provisioning
    performance by comparing Bell Atlantic's provisioning of
    interconnection trunks for interexchange carriers to its
    provisioning of interconnection trunks for competitive LECs. Section
    251(c) requires incumbent LECs to provide interconnetion "that is at
    least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange
    carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other
    party to which the carrier provides interconnection." 47 U.S.C. §
    251(c)(2)(C).

[^147]: Bell Atlantic's provisioning time for "projects" increased 81
    percent, from 23.38 days in January to 42.33 days in September. For
    customer-not-ready situations (CNR), Bell Atlantic's provisioning
    time increased 69.8 percent, from 27.81 days in January to 47.24
    days in September. Together, these two categories comprise more than
    90 percent of all large orders for interconnection trunks. *See*
    Letter from Dee May, Directory, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell
    Atlantic Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Dec. 1, 1999)
    (Bell Atlantic Dec. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter) (providing supplementary
    Part M data for September 1999).

    Despite the increased delays in provisioning interconnection trunks,
    Bell Atlantic's supplementary data show comparable provisioning
    quality provided to both competitive LECs and to interexchange
    carriers. Specifically, Bell Atlantic's supplementary Part M data
    show that, in June 1999, Bell Atlantic installed large orders of
    interconnection trunks in 27 days for competitive LECs and in 43.6
    days for interexchange carriers; in July 1999, Bell Atlantic
    installed large orders of interconnection trunks in 29.8 days for
    competitive LECs and in 43.7 days for interexchange carriers; in
    August 1999, Bell Atlantic installed large orders of interconnection
    trunks in 30.3 days for competitive LECs and in 43.6 days for
    interexchange carriers; in September 1999, Bell Atlantic installed
    large orders of interconnection trunks in 42.3 days for competitive
    LECs and in 57.5 days for interexchange carriers. *See* Bell
    Atlantic Dec. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter; Bell Atlantic Dec. 7 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at Enclosures 1 & 2.

[^148]: Bell Atlantic Application at 13-14; *see* NYPSC Tariff No. 914
    at § 5 (Bell Atlantic Application App. H., Tab 1) (*NYPSC
    Interconnection Tariff*) (addressing collocation).

[^149]: Bell Atlantic Application at 13-14; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at paras. 35-43; New York Commission Comments at 24-25.

[^150]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 31 (noting that Bell
    Atlantic assigned over 80 employees to manage the collocation
    process); *see* Bell Atlantic Corp., [CLEC Handbook]{.smallcaps},
    Vol. IIII, § 4.

[^151]: New York Commission Comments at 24 (citing *Order Directing
    Tariff Revisions*, Cases 99-C-0715 *et al.* (NYPSC Aug. 31, 1999)
    (directing Bell Atlantic to revise its collocation offerings in a
    manner consistent with the *Advanced Services First Report and
    Order*) (Bell Atlantic Application App. I, Tab 19)); Intermedia
    Comments at 3; Allegiance Comments at 9.

[^152]: ALTS Comments at 49-64. *But see* Bell Atlantic Reply at 23-24.

[^153]: ALTS Comments at 50-57, 59-62.

[^154]: *Id.* at 62-64.

[^155]: New York Commission Comments at 20-25; New York Commission Reply
    at 8-9. For our evaluation of collocation pricing, *see* *infra*
    Section V.A.2.

[^156]: Bell Atlantic Application at 13-14 (citing Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 27-28, 31-32, 41-50); *see also*
    *Order Directing Tariff Revisions*, Cases 99-C-0715 & 95-C-0657
    (NYPSC Aug. 31, 1999) (located in Bell Atlantic Application at App.
    I, Tab 19).

[^157]: New York Commission Comments at 24-25; *see* Bell Atlantic,
    [CLEC Handbook]{.smallcaps}, Vol. III, § 4, 40 (Mar. 1999)
    (discussing collocation provisioning intervals). Bell Atlantic
    provides a standard installation interval of 76 days for physical
    and cageless collocation in New York, and 105 days for virtual
    collocation. *See* *Order Directing Tariff Revisions,* Cases
    99-C-0715 & 95-C-0657 (NYPSC Aug. 31, 1999) (Bell Atlantic
    Application App. I, Tab 19).

[^158]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 71, 83, 95,
    107 (metric NP-2-01) (listing June, July, and August 1999
    performance for metric NP-2-01 as 92 percent, 100 percent, 99
    percent respectively); *see also* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 12 (listing September 1999 performance for metric
    NP-2-01 as 99 percent).

[^159]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at (metric
    NP-2-05); Department of Justice Evaluation at Exhibit 6, 12; New
    York Commission Comments at 24-25; Allegiance Comments at 9.

[^160]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 7.

[^161]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 7; Bell Atlantic
    Application App. H, Tab 1 (submitting New York state tariff); *see
    also NYPSC Interceonnection Tariff* § 4.1.2-4.1.3 (specifying points
    of interconnection on BA-NY network).

[^162]: Sprint Comments at 7.

[^163]: New York Commission Comments at 18-20; Bell Atlantic Reply at
    22-23; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at paras. 30-33.

[^164]: New York Commission Reply at 7; Bell Atlantic Reply at 23; *see*
    Petition of Sprint Communications Co., *Arbitration of
    Interconnection Rates, Terms, Conditions, and Related Arrangements
    With Bell Atlantic-New York*, Case 99-C-1389 (filed with NYPSC Oct.
    11, 1999).

[^165]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 9 (stating that Bell
    Atlantic is providing roughly 65,000 two-way trunks to competing
    carriers); *see* New York Commission Comments at 17, 19; *see* Bell
    Atlantic Application App. C, Vol. 28, Tab 403 at 12-13 (Bell
    Atlantic's Pre-Filing Statement addressing two-way trunking); *see
    also* Intermedia Comments at 4-5; Cablevision Comments at 2 (citing
    the Bell Atlantic's Pre-Filing Statement).

[^166]: *See e.g.*, ALTS Comments at 44.

[^167]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).

[^168]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (8^th^
    Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and remanded, *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
    Bd*., 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999).

[^169]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd*., 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999).

[^170]: *Id.* at 730.

[^171]: *Id.* at 732.

[^172]: *Id.*

[^173]: *Id*.

[^174]: *See* *NYPSC Interconnection Tariff* at § 5.1.17(A)(B) and
    10.5.1(A)(B); *see also* New York Commission Comments at 24; New
    York Commission Reply at 9; Bell Atlantic Reply at 24, n.25. In the
    New York Commission rate case, Bell Atlantic filed under the name of
    "New York Telephone d/b/a/ Bell Atlantic-New York." *See, e.g*.,
    *Phase 3 Opinion and Order*, Case Nos. 95-C-0657, 94-C-0095,
    91-C-1174, and 96-C-0036 (NYPSC Feb. 22, 1999) (Bell Atlantic
    Application App. H, Tab 1) (*NYPSC Phase 3 Order*) at 1.

[^175]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 23-24.

[^176]: New York Commission Comments at 24.

[^177]: New York Commission Reply at 9.

[^178]: TRA Comments at 21.

[^179]: *NYPSC Phase 3 Order* at 73.

[^180]: *Id*.

[^181]: *Order Directing Tariff Revisions*, Case Nos. 99-C-0715 and
    95-C-0657 (NYPSC Aug. 31, 1999) (Bell Atlantic Application App. I,
    Vol. 3, Tab 19) (*NYPSC Collocation Order*) at 7.

[^182]: *Id*. at 7-8

[^183]: New York Commission Reply at 8-9.

[^184]: ALTS Comments at 63.

[^185]: *See* *NYPSC Interconnection Tariff* at §§ 5.1.17(A)(B) &
    10.5.1.(A)(B); *see also* Bell Atlantic Reply at 24 n.25.

[^186]: *Advanced Services First Report and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 4789.

[^187]: *NYPSC Phase 3 Order* at 72.

[^188]: *Id*.

[^189]: *Id*.

[^190]: New York Commission Reply at 49-50; *see also* *NYPSC Phase 3
    Order* at 72.

[^191]: *Id*.

[^192]: *See* *NYPSC Interconnection Tariff* at §§ 5.1.17(A)(B) &
    10.5.1.(A)(B); *see also* Bell Atlantic Reply at 24 n.25.

[^193]: We note, however, that certain OSS issues that relate to
    specific checklist items, such as the OSS associated with
    provisioning unbundled loops, are addressed in the sections that
    pertain to the individual checklist items.

[^194]: *See supra* Section II.A.

[^195]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 585;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613.

[^196]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613-14.

[^197]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 548;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613.

[^198]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20652;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 585; *First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6258.

[^199]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^200]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653-54;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 586; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613.

[^201]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 586; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20614.

[^202]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 586; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20614. As part of a BOC's
    demonstration that it is "providing" a checklist item (*e.g.*,
    unbundled loops, unbundled local switching, resale services), it
    must demonstrate that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to
    the systems, information, and personnel that support that element or
    service. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20614. An
    examination of a BOC's OSS performance is therefore integral to our
    determination of whether a BOC is offering all of the items
    contained in the competitive checklist. *Id*.

[^203]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20614.

[^204]: *See* *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 616;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20615, 20627.

[^205]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^206]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655. *See
    also BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593-94. For
    example, we would not deem an incumbent LEC to be providing
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS if limitations on the processing of
    information between the interface and the back office systems
    prevented a competitor from performing a specific function in
    substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent performs
    that function for itself. *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 20616.

[^207]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 594 n.292;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619 n.345.

[^208]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655. *See
    also BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 594; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619.

[^209]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619.

[^210]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619. As a general
    proposition, specific performance standards adopted by a state
    commission in an arbitration decision would be more persuasive
    evidence of commercial reasonableness than a standard unilaterally
    adopted by the BOC outside of its interconnection agreement. *Id*.
    at 20619-20.

[^211]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20620.

[^212]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616. *See also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 592-93. In making this
    determination, we "consider all of the automated and manual
    processes a BOC has undertaken to provide access to OSS functions,"
    including the interface (or gateway) that connects the competing
    carrier's own operations support systems to the BOC; any electronic
    or manual processing link between that interface and the BOC's OSS
    (including all necessary back office systems and personnel); and all
    of the OSS that a BOC uses in providing network elements and resale
    services to a competing carrier. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20615. *See also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20654 n.241.

[^213]: *See also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20654; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616.

[^214]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616-17.

[^215]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20662 n.294;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 628; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617.

[^216]: Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure
    uniformity in the format of orders and include information
    concerning ordering codes such as universal service ordering codes
    (USOCs) and field identifiers (FIDs). *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12
    FCC Rcd at 20617 n.335.

[^217]: *Id.* at 20617.

[^218]: *Id.* at 20617-18.

[^219]: *See id.* at 20659.

[^220]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618.

[^221]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618.

[^222]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20601-02, 20618.

[^223]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659 (emphasizing
    that a third-party review should encompass the entire obligation of
    the incumbent LEC to provide nondiscriminatory access, and, where
    applicable, should consider the ability of actual competing carriers
    in the market to operate using the incumbent's OSS access).

[^224]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 7.

[^225]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 87-89, 92-93.

[^226]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP1 IV-3.

[^227]: In addition, Bell Atlantic worked with AT&T to develop, and
    recently made available to other carriers, a second
    application-to-application pre-ordering interface based on Common
    Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA). *See* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 20; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini
    Reply Decl. at para. 23.

[^228]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 17 (describing
    pre-ordering information available to competing carriers).

[^229]: *See infra* Section V.B.1.e.

[^230]: Most local services are ordered through a Local Service Request
    (LSR), although carriers must order interconnection trunks and some
    complex services using an Access Service Request (ASR). *See* Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 37; KPMG Final Report at POP2
    IV-20. Carriers can submit ASRs electronically or by facsimile.

[^231]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 34, 41.

[^232]: Based on a complex algorithm, an order is classified as a
    potential candidate for flow through (Level 5), a non-flow through
    order that requires manual handling (Level 2), or a non-flow through
    order that requires only minimal manual handling (Level 4). Before a
    Level 4 order is sent to the TISOC, a shell of the order is
    established in the Service Order Processor. *See* KPMG Final Report
    at POP4 IV-66.

[^233]: Bell Atlantic uses two centers, which collectively employ 300
    full time representatives, to support wholesale orders in New York,
    as well as an outsourcing company for overflow of certain orders.
    Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 43. The Manhattan TISOC
    handles primarily resale and unbundled loop orders and the Boston
    TISOC handles primarily orders for the UNE platform, as well as
    complex services and high-capacity services. In addition, the TISOCs
    handle any non-platform unbundled loop order or ASR received via
    facsimile. If the TISOC representative finds errors on a faxed
    order, it will contact the carrier directly to resolve the error.
    *See* KPMG Final Report at POP4 IV-65-67. The TISOCs are staffed
    from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 8:00 a.m. to
    6:00 p.m. on Saturday. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 29.

[^234]: Specifically, in addition to ensuring that orders are complete
    and formatted properly, DOE checks the validity of certain
    information, such as whether the city and state match the requested
    area code and exchange. *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at
    para. 40.

[^235]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 42. If the Bell
    Atlantic representative is unable to correct the errors using the
    customer's pre-ordering information, the representative will send an
    electronic error message to the carrier for resubmission of the
    order with the corrected information. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 42.

[^236]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 41; KPMG Final
    Report at POP IV-271 ("SOP does not have separate ordering and
    distribution interfaces differentiating between wholesale and
    retail.").

[^237]: *See infra* Section V.B.1.f.(i); Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 41. For interconnection trunk orders, the order
    confirmation is called a Firm Order Confirmation (FOC).

[^238]: KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-112.

[^239]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 64; KPMG Final
    Report at POP11 IV-259.

[^240]: KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-259. Those orders that do not flow
    automatically through assignment are designated as Requests for
    Manual Assignment and are distributed to the appropriate work center
    -- the Mechanized Loop Assignment Center, Design Build Team, or the
    Network Administration Center. *Id*. Bell Atlantic uses a different
    provisioning process for complex orders that involve design work.
    *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 39.

[^241]: KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-260-63.

[^242]: KPMG Final Report at POP12 IV-285.

[^243]: *See infra* Section V.B.1.f.(ii).(c).

[^244]: *See infra* Section V.B.1.f.(ii).(d).

[^245]: In addition to the Web GUI, one carriers uses an older
    Electronic Interface Format (EIF) interface to submit trouble ticket
    inquiries. *See infra* Section V.B.1.h.

[^246]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 68; KPMG Final
    Report at M&R1 V-3.

[^247]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 69; KPMG Final
    Report at M&R1 V-8. For trouble with specials, the WFA system
    handles the maintenance, tracking and dispatch functions. *Id*.

[^248]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 69.

[^249]: KPMG Final Report at M&R1 V-9.

[^250]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 80.

[^251]: KPMG Final Report at BLG2 VI-16.

[^252]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 81; KPMG Final
    Report at BLG3 VI-28; BLG7 VI-81.

[^253]: KPMG Final Report at BLG5 VI-45.

[^254]: New York Commission Comments at 11; Bell Atlantic Application at
    9-10.

[^255]: Bell Atlantic Application at 9-10; KPMG Final Report at
    II-3-II-4.

[^256]: KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-3.

[^257]: *Id*.

[^258]: *Id*.

[^259]: *Id.* at Executive Summary II-3 and II-6-II-7.

[^260]: *Id.* at Executive Summary II-4.

[^261]: *Id.* at Executive Summary II-2.

[^262]: *Id.*

[^263]: *Id.*

[^264]: The KPMG pre-ordering, ordering, and provisioning tests
    evaluated Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering process, ordering process,
    provisioning process, order flow-through, metrics, documentation,
    work center/help desk support, provisioning parity, provisioning
    coordination, and scalability. KPMG Final Report at POP1 IV-1. The
    KPMG maintenance and repair tests evaluated Bell Atlantic's Repair
    Trouble Administration System, performance measures, wholesale
    processes, documentation, wholesale work center support, network
    surveillance support, and coordination. *Id.* at M&R1 V-1. The KPMG
    billing tests evaluated Bell Atlantic's metrics, documentation, work
    center/help desk support, daily usage feed, and carrier bills. *Id.*
    at BLG1 VI-1. The KPMG relationship management and infrastructure
    tests evaluated Bell Atlantic's change management, interface
    development, account establishment and mangement, network design
    planning, collocation planning, interconnection planning, system
    administration help desk, competing carrier training, and
    forecasting. *Id.* at RMI1 VII-1.

[^265]: *See, e.g.*, *id.* at Domain Summary-POP III-2.

[^266]: *See, e.g.*, *id* at POP9 IV-205-IV-229, M&R6 V-85-V-110, BLG2
    VI-16-VI-27.

[^267]: *See, e.g.*, *id.* at POP6 IV-138 (testing the EDI interface at
    150 percent of Bell Atlantic's highest reported hourly order
    volume).

[^268]: *Id.* at Executive Summary II-4-II-5.

[^269]: *Id.*

[^270]: *Id.*

[^271]: New York Commission Comments at 33. *See also* Department of
    Justice Evaluation at 4-5.

[^272]: For example, blindness was impossible because transactions
    arrive on dedicated circuits, the owners of which are known by Bell
    Atlantic. KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-5.

[^273]: *Id.*

[^274]: *Id.*

[^275]: *Id.*

[^276]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659.

[^277]: *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6279 n.197;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 625 n.467;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n. 334; *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19742.

[^278]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654.

[^279]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655 (citing
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619; *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15660; *Local Competition
    Second Reconsideration Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19742).

[^280]: Demonstration of an adequate change management process to which
    the BOC has adhered over time is also part of the BOC's "obligation
    'to provide competing carriers with the specifications necessary to
    instruct competing carriers on how to modify or design their systems
    in a manner that will enable them to communicate with the BOC's
    legacy systems and any interfaces utilized by the BOC for such
    access.'" *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 628;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617.

[^281]: *See generally* Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Chief,
    Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to Nancy
    E. Lubamersky, Executive Director, Regulatory Planning, U S WEST
    (Sept. 27, 1999) at 2-3 (U S WEST Sept. 27 Letter).

[^282]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 55 (change management
    "addresses the development of, and adherence to, stable business
    functions and system operations for scheduling, communicating, and
    managing changes that affect OSS interfaces"); *Applications of
    Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc.,
    Transferee*, CC Docket No. 98-141, FCC 99-279, App. C at para. 32
    (adopting an agreement defining the change management process as a
    "documented process that . . . \[a BOC and its competing carriers\]
    . . . follow to facilitate communication about OSS changes, new
    interfaces and retirement of old interfaces, as well as the
    implementation time frames; which includes such provisions as . . .
    release announcements, comments and reply cycles, joint testing
    processes and regularly scheduled change management meetings").

[^283]: MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 125. *See also*
    NY Attorney General Comments at 17.

[^284]: Allegiance Comments at 8.

[^285]: Bell Atlantic Application at 48; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 94; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 194.

[^286]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 94; AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 194; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori
    Decl. at para. 127. *See generally* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at Attach. G (May 22, 1998 document, Telecom Industry
    Services---Change Management Process).

[^287]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 97.

[^288]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 6-8 (change
    management process description of Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, Type 4,
    and Type 5 changes); AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 196.

[^289]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 15-20 (periods
    for feedback from competing carriers listed in timelines for typical
    change types); AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 196.

[^290]: Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure
    uniformity in the format of orders. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12
    FCC Rcd at 20617 n.335.

[^291]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 100.

[^292]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G, App. B (describing
    change management working groups); MCI WorldCom Comments at 19; MCI
    WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 127.

[^293]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 100; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 135.

[^294]: *See generally* KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-8 (Test R1-4,
    expressing satisfaction that the change management process "includes
    procedures for allowing input from all interested parties").

[^295]: New York Commission Comments at 62 n.4 (Bell Atlantic's "TIS web
    page
    ([www.bellatlantic.com/tis/resources.htm](http://www.bellatlantic.com/tis/resources.htm))
    provides resources and contacts for \[competing carriers\] at Bell
    Atlantic North and Bell Atlantic South").

[^296]: *See* \< www.bellatlantic.com/tis/resources.htm \>.

[^297]: *See* KPMG Final Report RMI1 VII-9 (Test R1-7); New York
    Commission Comments at 56.

[^298]: KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-9 (Test R1-7); Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 101; New York Commission Comments at
    56. Draft specifications, for instance, are shared by electronic
    mail with approximately 290 individual competing carriers that
    participate in the change management process. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 98.

[^299]: New York Commission Comments at 62.

[^300]: New York Commission Comments at 62.

[^301]: A stable testing environment means that no changes by the BOC
    are permitted after the testing period commences. *See generally* U
    S WEST Sept. 27 Letter; NY Attorney General Comments at 17
    (describing the importance of testing opportunities for competing
    carriers).

[^302]: *See generally* Department of Justice Evaluation at 35 ("testing
    is necessary to prevent major service disruptions when Bell Atlantic
    makes changes in its side of the interface").

[^303]: KPMG Final Report P1-2 at IV-17 (Test P1-2); New York Commission
    Comments at 59.

[^304]: New York Commission Comments at 59.

[^305]: New York Commission Comments at 60; Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 36. The test procedures developed provide for the
    availability of a test environment that mirrors production, a
    baseline validation test deck (a compilation of transactions
    designed to test whether a new release produces expected results)
    with test account data so competing carriers can test transactions
    of their choice, and protocols for identifying and resolving issues
    during testing. Both the baseline validation test deck and a
    progression test deck are made available to competing carriers on
    the Bell Atlantic TIS web page. New York Commission Comments at 60.

[^306]: *Id.*

[^307]: KPMG Exception Closure Report 21 at 3 (as referenced in KPMG
    Final Report at POP1 IV-18 (Test P1-2)).

[^308]: *Id.*

[^309]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 232; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 148 (interim QA test environment
    allotted only 30 hours over a 5-day period for competing carrier
    testing and a maximum of 3 hours of technical support). Commenters
    also claim that the interim QA testing environment was inadequate
    because orders submitted in production that had previously proved
    successful in testing were rejected and that Bell Atlantic failed to
    provide sufficient resources for competing carriers to conduct
    thorough carrier-to-carrier testing. Allegiance Comments at 8-9;
    AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 234; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 148.

[^310]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 106; Department of
    Justice Evaluation at 36; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 235.

[^311]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 106.

[^312]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 89-91 (describing
    versioning under the Change Agreement).

[^313]: Certification testing is a process conducted jointly by Bell
    Atlantic and competing carriers to determine whether or not a
    competing carrier's OSS are capable of submitting valid service
    orders and receiving responses using Bell Atlantic's EDI interface.
    KPMG Final Report at POP1 IV-3. KPMG determined that Bell Atlantic
    failed to offer a repeatable process for planning and coordinating
    certification testing activities and that Bell Atlantic lacked
    clearly defined entrance and exit criteria designed to certify that
    a competing carrier can move from the testing environment to the
    production environment. KPMG Final Report at POP1 IV-17 (Test P1-1);
    *see also* KPMG Exception Report 22 (as referenced in KPMG Final
    Report at POP1 IV-17 (Test P1-1)). Based on KPMG's findings,
    industry comment, and competing carrier input, Bell Atlantic issued
    new procedures in May 1999. KPMG reviewed and validated these
    procedures. New York Commission Comments at 61-62; KPMG Exception
    Closure Report 22 (as referenced in KPMG Final Report at POP1 IV-17
    (Test P1-1)).

[^314]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 19; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori
    Decl. at para. 127; *see also* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para.
    195.

[^315]: TRA Comments at 11 n.38. *See also* MCI WorldCom Comments at
    20-21; NY Attorney General Comments at 17.

[^316]: Under the Change Agreement, Bell Atlantic must provide competing
    carriers initial notification of most upcoming changes at least 66
    days prior to the implementation of the change. For these changes,
    Bell Atlantic must also distribute final documentation describing
    the change in detail 45 days prior to implementation. For emergency
    changes, however, the Change Agreement only requires that Bell
    Atlantic notify competing carriers at any time prior to
    implementation. For regulatory changes, notification and
    documentation intervals may be set by the New York Commission or
    other regulatory authority. Changes in industry standards may also
    proceed on a different schedule. *See generally* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 15-20.

[^317]: *See Order Adopting Inter-Carrier Service Quality Guidelines*,
    Case 97-C-0139 (NYPSC Feb. 16, 1999) (Bell Atlantic Application,
    App. E, Tab 61) (*NYPSC Guidelines Order*); *Order Establishing
    Permanent Rule*, Case 97-C-0139 (NYPSC Jun. 30, 1999) (Bell Atlantic
    Application, App. E, Tab 83) (*NYPSC Permanent Rule Order*).

[^318]: *See generally* KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-10 (Table
    VII-1.9); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 84-85, 96-97
    (metrics PO-4-01, PO-4-02, PO-4-03); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 1-2 (metrics PO-4-01, PO-4-O2, and
    PO-4-03).

[^319]: Type 4 changes are those that Bell Atlantic seeks to implement
    on its own accord, rather than at the request of regulatory
    authorities, industry standard organizations, or competing carriers
    themselves. *See generally* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl.
    Attach. G at 6.

[^320]: KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-8.

[^321]: KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-10.

[^322]: *Id.*

[^323]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 102. Bell Atlantic
    asserts that the deficiencies identified by KPMG resulted from Bell
    Atlantic missing several dates for the distribution of documentation
    in February 1999, and excluding updates to RETAS documentation from
    the change management process. According to Bell Atlantic, it now
    includes RETAS documentation in the change management process. Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 102; New York Commission
    Comments at 57. In addition, we note that billing changes also are
    now a part of the change management process in New York. Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 81.

[^324]: Because the sample sizes in any given month for Type 4 changes
    are so small, we prefer to review Bell Atlantic performance over the
    course of several recent months rather than in any one individual
    month. This also provides us with a better comparison to the data
    provided in the KPMG Final Report. KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-10
    (Table VII-1.9); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 84,
    96; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 1
    (observations listed for metric PO-4-01). In response to commenters'
    claims regarding untimely change notification and documentation,
    Bell Atlantic submitted data showing its Type 4 notification was
    timely in two of two Type 4 changes that occurred in October through
    October 19, 1999. Letter from Penny Rubin, Managing Attorney, New
    York Commission, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 96-98 Attach. at 1 (filed
    Nov. 30, 1999) (New York Commission Nov. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter);
    Letter from Dolores A. May, Director, Federal Regulatory, to Magalie
    Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 99-295 (filed Dec. 14, 1999) at 1 (Bell Atlantic Dec. 24 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^325]: The timeliness of Bell Atlantic documentation for Type 4 changes
    is still listed as under development in July 1999. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 85, 97; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2. In response to commenters' claims
    regarding untimely change notification and documentation, Bell
    Atlantic submitted data showing its Type 4 change documentation was
    timely for two of two changes that occurred in October through
    October 19, 1999. New York Commission Nov. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter,
    Attach. at 2; Bell Atlantic Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1.

[^326]: In response to commenters' claims regarding untimely change
    notification and documentation, Bell Atlantic submitted data showing
    its Type 4 change documentation was timely for two of two changes
    that occurred in October through October 19, 1999. New York
    Commission Nov. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 2; Bell Atlantic
    Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1.

[^327]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 100, 106; MCI
    WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 135.

[^328]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 19-20. *See,
    e.g*, Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 84, 96 (listing
    the standard for timely notification of emergency changes as
    "Notification before implementation").

[^329]: KPMG Final Report at RMI1 VII-10 (Table VII-1.9).

[^330]: AT&T Comments at 32-33; MCI WorldCom Comments at 23; MCI
    WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at paras. 62-63. Documentation
    timeliness for Type 1 changes is not reported in the
    Carrier-to-Carrier metrics, because it is not applicable. Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 12 n.5.

[^331]: MCI WorldCom Reply at 12; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 1.

[^332]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 84 (metric
    PO-4-01). In response to commenters' claims regarding untimely
    change notification and documentation, Bell Atlantic submitted data
    showing that its Type 1 change notification was timely for six of
    six changes that occurred between October 1-19, 1999. New York
    Commission Nov. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter Attach. at 1; Bell Atlantic
    Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter (listing October 1-19, 1999 observations
    for metric PO-4-01).

[^333]: In addition, not all emergency releases result in system
    changes, thus limiting the inconvenience imposed on competing
    carriers by Type 1 changes. *See, e.g.*, Bell Atlantic Nov. 24 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 4-5 (describing September 1999 Type 1 changes).
    Moreover, we expect Bell Atlantic's new practice to notify by pager
    key individuals at competing carriers when an emergency change
    occurs, and to conduct a conference call whenever there is an
    immediate software change, will minimize the impact of Type 1 change
    notification difficulties on competing carriers. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at paras. 69-71; MCI WorldCom Dec.
    14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 10.

[^334]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 34 (expressing concern that
    Bell Atlantic has not yet demonstrated that it is able to provide
    competing carriers with "relatively stable and predictable
    documentation"). *See also* AT&T Comments at 28; MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 20-21; NY Attorney General Comments at 17; Sprint
    Comments at 22; TRA Comments at 11; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at
    paras. 119-121, 124-132; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at
    paras. 57-60.

[^335]: New York Commission Comments at 57.

[^336]: The standard adopted by the New York Commission for both the
    Carrier-to-Carrier metrics and the Change Control Assurance Plan is
    95 percent change management notification and documentation sent on
    time with no delays greater than 8 days. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. B at 11 (listing metric PO-4 performance standard);
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, Ex. 2 (Appendix A to
    Amended Change Control Assurance Plan).

[^337]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 24-25; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at
    para. 235; AT&T Reply at 25; MCI WorldCom Reply at 11-12; AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at para. 24 n.14.

[^338]: In response to commenters' claims regarding lack of evidence
    that the permanent QA testing environment actually works as
    represented in the Bell Atlantic Application, the New York
    Commission submitted information regarding successful competing
    carrier use of the permanent QA testing environment for the October
    16, 1999 software release. New York Commission Reply at 19.

[^339]: *Id.* at 19 n.2.

[^340]: *Id*.

[^341]: *See generally* KPMG Exception Closure Report 21 (as referenced
    in KPMG Final Report at POP IV-18 (Test P1-2)) (evaluating and
    finding generally satisfactory improved interim QA testing
    environment).

[^342]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 93. A
    test deck is a compilation of transactions designed to test whether
    a new release produces expected results. New York Commission
    Comments at 60.

[^343]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para.
    93.

[^344]: *Id*.

[^345]: New York Commission Comments at 59-60.

[^346]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 36.

[^347]: In response to commenters' claims regarding lack of evidence
    that the permanent QA testing environment actually works as
    represented in the Bell Atlantic Application, the New York
    Commission submitted information regarding successful competing
    carrier use of the permanent QA testing environment for the October
    16, 1999 software release. New York Commission Reply at 19. In
    addition, unlike the Department of Justice, we consider the
    similarity of the interim QA testing environment to the permanent QA
    testing environment.

[^348]: *See* Sprint Comments at 20-21; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at
    para. 199.

[^349]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at 7-8, 19-20,
    40-45, 80-88.

[^350]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 201. *See generally* AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff., Attach. 8. Based on feedback from competing
    carriers, Bell Atlantic also agreed to add a pager notification
    system to ensure that key individuals at competing carriers receive
    notice of emergency changes as soon as possible. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 69.

[^351]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 84, 96; Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 1. In response to
    commenters' claims regarding Type 1 change frequency, Bell Atlantic
    submitted data showing that only six Type 1 changes occurred in
    October through October 19, 1999. New York Commission Nov. 30 *Ex
    Parte* Letter Attach. at 1; Bell Atlantic Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter
    at 1 (observations listed for metric PO-4-01).

[^352]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 20-21; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at
    paras. 207-212.

[^353]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 100; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 135. Further, as described above,
    Bell Atlantic and competing carriers participated in a series of
    workshops to come up with a more narrow definition of Type 1
    emergency changes. AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 201. *See
    generally* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. Attach. 8.

[^354]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 19; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori
    Decl. at para. 127; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. G at
    4.

[^355]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 86.

[^356]: *Id*.

[^357]: Allegiance Comments at 8-9; Sprint Comments at 18-20 (describing
    difficulties with Bell Atlantic's decision to skip LSOG 3); MCI
    WorldCom Reply Comments at 15-17, 20 (alleging problems with
    implementation of the GUI III interface, parsed CSR); MCI WorldCom
    Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 11 (criticizing Bell Atlantic change
    management notification proposal involving closing trouble tickets
    without root cause analysis).

[^358]: *See, e.g.,* Bell Atlantic Reply at 39 n.43 (noting that Sprint
    complaints regarding LSOG 3 must be viewed in light of a general
    consensus reached by competing carriers in the change management
    process).

[^359]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654.

[^360]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655 (citing
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619; *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15660; *Local Competition
    Second Reconsideration Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19742).

[^361]: Demonstration of adequate technical assistance and help desk
    support is also part of the BOC's "obligation 'to provide competing
    carriers with the specifications necessary to instruct competing
    carriers on how to modify or design their systems in a manner that
    will enable them to communicate with the BOC's legacy systems and
    any interfaces utilized by the BOC for such access.'" *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 628; *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617.

[^362]: Volume I provides basic information competing carriers need to
    know about doing business with Bell Atlantic, Volume II addresses
    the interfaces available to competing carriers for obtaining access
    to Bell Atlantic's OSS and provides information on how to obtain the
    technical specifications for them, and Volume III provides business
    rules for ordering Bell Atlantic products. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 87-89.

[^363]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at 87-88.

[^364]: Moreover, Bell Atlantic has addressed many of the problems with
    its business rules and EDI specification documentation identified
    during the KPMG review, resulting in more accurate documentation for
    competing carriers seeking to access Bell Atlantic's OSS. *See
    generally* KPMG Final Report at POP9 IV-227-228 (Tests P9-12, P9-14,
    P9-17-23).

[^365]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 92.

[^366]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 97.

[^367]: *Id*.

[^368]: The KPMG Final Report found that Bell Atlantic documents for
    competing carriers failed to provide useful contact lists and help
    desk numbers. KPMG characterized this problem as "Not Satisfied."
    KPMG Final Report at POP9 IV-220 (Test P9-16).

[^369]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. Attach. U
    (listing from web site of help desk and assistance information for
    competing carriers).

[^370]: Adelphia Comments at 3 (alleging difficulties reaching the
    appropriate contact person at Bell Atlantic when problems arise that
    require technical assistance); AT&T Comments at 29 (alleging
    problems with help desk errors); MCI WorldCom Comments at 23-24
    (citing KPMG Final Report); TRA Comments at 12-13 (citing KPMG Final
    Report); Z-Tel Comments at 14-16 (alleging inadequate wholesale
    account support); AT&T Reply at 26 (citing KPMG Final Report); MCI
    Dec. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 12 (criticizing Bell Atlantic help desk
    attendants).

[^371]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 589; s*ee also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20660 (referring to
    "pre-ordering and ordering" collectively as "the exchange of
    information between telecommunications carriers about current or
    proposed customer products and services or unbundled network
    elements or some combination thereof."). Pre-ordering consists of
    several functions and, in prior orders, the Commission has
    identified the following five functions: (1) customer service record
    (CSR) information; (2) address validation; (3) telephone number
    information; (4) due date information; and (5) services and feature
    information. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20660; *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6274;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 619.

[^372]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20669.

[^373]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 619; *see also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^374]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 623-29 (concluding
    that failure to deploy an application-to-application interface
    denies competing carriers equivalent access to pre-ordering OSS
    functions). Moreover, the Commission also found that, without access
    to an application-to-application interface, a competing carrier
    would be unable to develop its own customized interface that its
    staff could use nationwide, and would be required to train its staff
    on a BOC's proprietary system. *See Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20662 n.291; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 624-25.

[^375]: Bell Atlantic describes the Web GUI as "a graphical interface
    that a \[competing carrier\] can access from a personal computer via
    a dedicated/private line or a secure dial-up line, using either
    Netscape Communicator 4.0 or higher, or Microsoft IE Version 4.0 or
    higher." Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 23. Although
    Z-Tel complains that the Secure ID system for carrier access to the
    Web GUI is inefficient and costly, Bell Atlantic recently eliminated
    the need for Secure IDs by enabling carriers to access the Web GUI
    via the Internet using a URL address and password. *See* Z-Tel
    Comments at 16-17; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl.
    at para. 55. Bell Atlantic states that it provided Z-Tel with
    passwords on September 20, 1999. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini
    Reply Decl. at para. 55.

[^376]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 21.

[^377]: Bell Atlantic implemented the transaction formats specified in
    Local Service Ordering Guidelines (LSOG) version 3 (address
    validation, appointment scheduling, feature/service availability and
    telephone number reservation/selection), and worked with MCI
    WorldCom to develop EDI specifications and business rules for
    additional functionality (CSR retrieval, loop qualification
    information, directory listing information, and service order
    inquiry and installation status). Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl.
    at para. 21.

[^378]: Carriers' options for connecting with Bell Atlantic's EDI
    interface are: direct connection (dial-up or dedicated); Value Added
    Networks (VANs); public network (Internet) connectivity; and
    Interactive Agent connectivity using Secure Socket Layer 3 (SSL3)
    technology. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 27.

[^379]: Bell Atlantic Application at 37.

[^380]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 20 (indicating CORBA
    testing in progress with AT&T); Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini
    Reply Decl. at para. 23 (stating that CORBA is available to any
    requesting carrier). AT&T claims that CORBA is superior to EDI in
    that it "provides faster transmission responses to queries, and it
    is a more flexible standard that permits fine-tuning to improve data
    transmission." AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 86.

[^381]: Bell Atlantic Application at 37 n.36. Bell Atlantic's back
    office pre-ordering systems include: LiveWire (formerly PREMIS) for
    address validation and telephone number selection and reservation;
    Work Force Administration (WFA) for service installation status;
    Customer Record Information System (CRIS) or Carrier Access Billing
    System (CABS) for customer service records; Direct Order Entry
    system (DOE) for service and feature availability; SOP for due date
    availability and service order inquiry; Automated Telephone Listing
    and Address System (ATLAS) for directory listing information; and
    PHOENIX for ISDN and ADSL loop qualification. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. B. In August 1999, Bell Atlantic began
    replacing the PREMIS system with LiveWire, which, among other
    things, enhances Bell Atlantic's address validation capabilities.

[^382]: CSRs depict the end user's account with Bell Atlantic, including
    billing name and address, billing and working telephone numbers, a
    list of services provided to the end user, and the end user's
    presubscribed interexchange carrier and local presubscribed
    interexchange carrier. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para.
    17. Bell Atlantic implemented "parsed" CSR functionality in May
    1999. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 18.
    With parsed CSRs, pre-order customer information is separated into
    identifiable fields (*e.g.,* street number, street name) can
    automatically populate an order form. *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at
    27 n.36; MCI WorldCom Reply at 17.

[^383]: This function allows competing carriers to select a telephone
    number from up to five available numbers. The selected number is
    then removed from the pool of available numbers and, if the carrier
    subsequently submits an order, assigned to the carrier. Letter from
    Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell Atlantic, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 99-295, at 3-4 (filed Nov. 24, 1999) (Bell Atlantic
    Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter) (indicating that Bell Atlantic retail
    representatives obtain a telephone number using the same process and
    that, with the implementation of LiveWire, residential numbers are
    removed from the pool for three months and business numbers for
    twelve months).

[^384]: Bell Atlantic Application at 37 n.36. We note that the seven
    pre-ordering functions that Bell Atlantic provides to itself go
    beyond the five functions previously identified by the Commission.
    *See supra* n. 371.

[^385]: We do not consider the Web GUI's functionality in this section
    because Bell Atlantic does not represent that the Web GUI is an
    application-to-application interface. We note, however, that the Web
    GUI provides an economically efficient pre-ordering interface for
    low-volume carriers and new entrants. *See Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20661; *see also* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff.
    at para. 73; Department of Justice Evaluation at 34 n.92; New York
    Commission Comments at 37; Z-Tel Comments at 16 (noting the Web
    GUI's suitability for use by small carriers). KPMG conducted a
    comprehensive functional evaluation and verified that the Web GUI
    pre-ordering interface enables carriers to perform the seven
    pre-ordering functions. *See* KPMG Final Report at POP2 IV-20-41.

[^386]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 22. We do not rely on
    Bell Atlantic's unsubstantiated claims that carriers are also using
    the EDI pre-ordering interface for telephone number reservation and
    selection and due date availability. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 14.

[^387]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 27, 31; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori
    Reply Decl. at paras. 10, 13. Although MCI WorldCom recently
    discovered that its parsed CSR functionality does not cover all
    order types, it does not assert that it is incapable of adding such
    functionality or that the exclusion of ISDN orders will impede its
    ability to compete in the local services market.

[^388]: AT&T Comments at 26; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 87
    (indicating that AT&T deployed CORBA for commercial production for
    address validation in September 1999, and for parsed CSR retrieval
    during the first week of October 1999).

[^389]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. A at 2
    (Donnellan Affidavit).

[^390]: *See* KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-3; Bell Atlantic
    Application App. C, Tab 654, Hewlett Packard Consulting, "CTTG
    Project Final Report," Final Version (Apr. 20, 1999) (HP CTTG Final
    Report).

[^391]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-75-137 (EDI Functional
    Evaluation and Normal Volume Test); POP6 IV138-149 (EDI Stress
    Test); *see also* New York Commission Comments at 37-38. In
    particular, KPMG tested the following pre-order functions: address
    validation; telephone number selection and reservation; directory
    listing inquiry; service scheduling and due date availability;
    feature and service availability; customer service record retrieval;
    carrier access billing retrieval; installation status request; loop
    qualification and reservation channel facility inquiry; and service
    order inquiry. KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-77-78. KPMG also
    retrieved a limited number of parsed CSRs, and confirmed Bell
    Atlantic's ability to provide parsed CSR functionality. KPMG Final
    Report at POP5 IV-135.

[^392]: MCI WorldCom Comments at 28. For instance, MCI WorldCom claims
    that KPMG did not attempt to design the transport and security
    necessary for the interface in actual production. *Id*.

[^393]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 33-34, 38; KPMG Final
    Report at POP5 IV-102 (Table IV-5.10) (indicating that KPMG sent
    3,400 transactions over the pre-ordering interfaces during its
    functional evaluation, and more than 23,000 during the volume
    tests).

[^394]: *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at 28 (claiming that, because Bell
    Atlantic "showed favoritism" to the testers, KPMG's ability to
    construct an EDI interface for all pre-ordering functions does not
    demonstrate that Bell Atlantic provides the documentation and
    support necessary for other carriers to build all functionality for
    use in a production environment).

[^395]: *See* KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-3; HP CTTG Final
    Report, Overview § 1.4 at 3.

[^396]: *See* KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-8 ("For the most
    part we believe that the quality of service we received during the
    test was comparable to that generally received by CLECs. However, on
    several occasions we believe that we received better treatment than
    a normal CLEC. For example, BA-NY resources assigned to handle many
    of our problem escalations were very senior BA-NY resources.").

[^397]: Rather, to the extent that Bell Atlantic incorporated the
    testers' suggestions for enhancing its documentation, we find that
    competing carriers benefited significantly from the third-party
    testers' construction and testing of the interface. *See* Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 12 (indicating
    that Bell Atlantic incorporated Hewlett Packard's suggestions into
    its EDI documentation).

[^398]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 31-34.

[^399]: KPMG Final Report at POP3 IV-42 (noting that the Live CLEC
    Functional Evaluation "allowed for an element of blind testing and
    tracking performance in a 'real world' environment.").

[^400]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP3 IV-42-64.

[^401]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20601-02, 20614
    (explaining that a BOC's duty to "provide" a checklist item where no
    competitor is actually using the item requires that it demonstrate
    that it makes the item available as both a legal and practical
    matter); *id*. at 20618 (recognizing that a BOC need not ensure that
    competing carriers are currently using every OSS function as long as
    the BOC can demonstrate that the lack of use is a result of
    carriers' business decisions).

[^402]: MCI WorldCom, for example, claims that retrieving parsed CSRs is
    the most important pre-ordering function, and that lack of
    application-to-application access to service and feature information
    is "not nearly as problematic" and "has not proven to be a
    commercial necessity." MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Reply Decl.
    at para. 6. *See also* MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at
    para. 69.

[^403]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 88.

[^404]: MCI WorldCom further notes that its deployment schedule has been
    affected by a self-imposed "Y2K moratorium" on software changes that
    began on October 1, 1999, although it was able to secure an
    exception to implement EDI address validation on November 1, 1999.
    MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 96. Nevertheless, MCI
    WorldCom implies that application-to-application access to telephone
    number selection, due date availability, and address validation for
    new customers could be implemented as early as the first quarter of
    2000, and the other pre-ordering functions later that year. *Id*.;
    MCI WorldCom Reply at 20-21. *See also* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 16 (indicating that MCI
    WorldCom has completed EDI testing for telephone number reservation
    and selection, due date availability and directory listing
    information).

[^405]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 48.

[^406]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67;
    *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6275-79; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 602, 620-29.

[^407]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 620.

[^408]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661,
    20666, 20676-77; *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    6276-77; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 602,
    623-24, 629 (finding that, in addition to increased costs and
    delays, manual retyping of information can contribute to a high
    error rate); *see also* AT&T Comments at 26; AT&T Crafton/Connolly
    Aff. at paras. 70, 73, 81 (noting that, absent integration, a
    carrier would incur substantial costs, delays, and risks of error by
    entering data twice -- once into Bell Atlantic's OSS and again into
    the carrier's own systems); MCI WorldCom Comments at 26; MCI
    WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at paras. 9-10, 21 (claiming that
    manual re-entry of pre-ordering information hinders a carrier's
    ability to reach commercial volumes of orders).

[^409]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 623.

[^410]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 22. Bell
    Atlantic submitted the testimony of Michael H. Donnellan, Vice
    President of Operations for CTC Communications, describing CTC's
    development of an EDI pre-ordering interface through which "Bell
    Atlantic data is seamlessly inserted into CTC systems." Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. A at 3. Specifically, Donnellan
    asserts that "the information requested through a CSR flows in a
    file from Bell Atlantic's pre-order systems into CTC's information
    systems," where it is "reviewed on line and then an EDI order is
    created." *Id*. Donnellan also cites "Bell Atlantic's demonstrated
    effort" in assisting CTC through the development and testing stages.
    *Id*. We expect that Bell Atlantic will provide all necessary
    documentation and technical assistance to other carriers that seek
    to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions.

[^411]: *See, e.g.*, Letter from Lori Wright, Senior Manager, Regulatory
    Affairs, MCI WorldCom, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 24,
    1999) (MCI WorldCom Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter) (indicating that MCI
    WorldCom has successfully integrated parsed CSR retrieval and
    address validation using EDI); AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at
    para. 32 (indicating that AT&T has successfully integrated parsed
    CSR retrieval and address validation using CORBA).

[^412]: *See* *supra* at para. 136 (discussing carriers' internal
    business decisions to delay deployment of other
    application-to-application functionality, some of which MCI WorldCom
    has completed testing).

[^413]: For example, KPMG stated:

    > For \[competing carriers\] attempting to integrate the EDI
    > pre-order and order processes, efficiencies can be achieved by
    > automating the population of order input fields with information
    > returned in the pre-order response forms. \[Bell Atlantic\] has
    > published a guide that identifies the transport format of an EDI
    > transaction. \[Bell Atlantic\] has also published business rules
    > documents that specify how \[competing carriers'\] pre-orders and
    > orders should be structured.

    KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-76 (footnotes omitted).

[^414]: As KPMG reported:

    > \[A\] limited number of integrated pre-order/order transactions
    > were conducted. In these cases, the information returned in the
    > pre-order response was manually copied, without modifications,
    > into the Local Service Request (LSR). This test was conducted to
    > highlight any inconsistencies in field name and format between
    > pre-order and order forms.

    KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-79; *see also id.* at POP5 IV-90
    (identifying the integrated pre-order/order scenarios tested). KPMG
    identified certain field name and format inconsistencies, but found
    that the problems could be addressed by building a logical interface
    between pre-order responses and orders. *Id*. at POP5 IV-119-121;
    POP5 IV-128-130 (Table IV-5.20).

[^415]: *See* AT&T Comments at 13, 22, 26 (claiming that CORBA cannot be
    "fully" integrated with the EDI ordering interface); AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 82-83, 88, 91 n.51 (claiming that
    inconsistencies in the data elements for pre-ordering and ordering
    preclude full integration). Without uniformity, the pre-ordering
    data cannot automatically populate an order form but instead must be
    translated into the proper field characteristics for ordering. *See*
    AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 79-85. AT&T nonetheless admits
    that it has not yet tested whether it can integrate the remaining
    pre-ordering functions using CORBA. *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly
    Reply Aff. at para. 32.

[^416]: *See* MCI WorldCom Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter ("MCI WorldCom has
    resolved the problems with the differences in the pre-order and
    order field sizes for the two functions (CSR and address validation)
    that currently are up-and-running.").

[^417]: We note that Bell Atlantic plans to minimize inconsistencies in
    fields and formats and simplify the use of pre-ordering and ordering
    interfaces with the rollout of LiveWire, the implementation of LSOG
    4 in February 2000 and in ongoing collaborative discussions with
    competing carriers "which will result in still further commonality
    in mid-2000." Bell Atlantic Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^418]: Aside from access to loop qualification information and due date
    information, which is discussed in Section V.B.1.f below, commenters
    do not dispute that the functionality provided by Bell Atlantic for
    the other pre-ordering functions is nondiscriminatory.

[^419]: Because characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the
    presence of various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder
    certain advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to
    "pre-qualify" a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that
    will assist carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with
    or without the removal of the impediments, can support a particular
    advanced service. *See* Covad Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at para. 39;
    Rhythms Geis/Williams Aff. at paras. 13, 38-39, 49-51; *see also
    Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
    Capability, et al.*, CC Docket Nos. 98-147 *et al*., Memorandum
    Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd
    24012, 24037 (1998) (*Advanced Services Order and NPRM*), *recon.
    pending*.

[^420]: We note that, after the effective date of the *UNE Remand*
    rules, Bell Atlantic and all other incumbent LECs must comply with
    these rules, and future section 271 applicants must demonstrate
    compliance with the new requirements.

[^421]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 25.

[^422]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616; *see also
    id*., 12 FCC Rcd at 20615 (considering "all of the automated and
    manual processes that a BOC has undertaken to provide access to OSS
    functions.").

[^423]: *Advanced Services Order and NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 24038. The
    Commission explained that "\[a\]n incumbent LEC does not meet the
    nondiscrimination requirement if it has the capability
    electronically to identify xDSL-capable loops, either on an
    individual basis or for an entire central office, while competing
    providers are relegated to a slower and more cumbersome process to
    obtain that information." *Id*. As these statements demonstrate,
    there can be no doubt that Bell Atlantic and other BOCs have had
    sufficient notice that their section 271 obligation to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS extends to loop qualification
    information.

[^424]: Specifically, the mechanized loop qualification database
    identifies unloaded copper loops that are 18,000 feet or less in
    length, all of which were designed with less than 6,000 feet of
    bridged taps. *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 21; Bell Atlantic
    -- New York's Joint Affidavit in Support of Proposed Rates for
    ADSL-Qualified, HDSL-Qualified, and Digital-Designed Links, Case
    98-C-1357 (Sept. 13, 1999) at para. 24; Letter to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, FCC, to Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory
    Affairs, Bell Atlantic, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 22, 1999)
    (Bell Atlantic Nov. 22 *Ex Parte* Letter). In contrast to competing
    carriers, Bell Atlantic's retail representatives can "prequalify" a
    loop only through the mechanized loop qualification process. If a
    customer's line is not shown as qualified for ADSL service through
    the mechanized database, Bell Atlantic's sales representatives will
    not sell ADSL services to that customer. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 17; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para.
    99.

[^425]: Bell Atlantic Application at 21; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 84. According to Bell Atlantic, central offices with
    collocation represent 90 percent of the company's access lines in
    New York. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 84. Bell
    Atlantic populates the mechanized loop qualification database for a
    particular central office by conducting a mechanized loop test of a
    sample of the loops in each terminal served by that office and
    determining whether the individual loop is served by copper or by
    fiber technology. *See* Bell Atlantic -- New York's Joint Affidavit
    in Support of Proposed Rates for ADSL-Qualified, HDSL-Qualified, and
    Digital-Designed Links, Case 98-C-1357 (Sept. 13, 1999) at para. 23.

[^426]: Specifically, the Manual Loop Qualification process provides the
    total metallic loop length, the presence of load coils and digital
    loop carrier equipment and the capability of the loop to support
    ADSL. *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 21; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 85; Bell Atlantic -- New York's Joint
    Affidavit in Support of Proposed Rates for ADSL-Qualified,
    HDSL-Qualified, and Digital-Designed Links, Case 98-C-1357 (Sept.
    13, 1999) at para. 29.

[^427]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 21; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 102; Bell Atlantic Nov. 22 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 2.

[^428]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 102.

[^429]: Given the mechanized and manual processes described above, we
    differ with the Department of Justice's belief that the record is
    not sufficiently developed to conclude that Bell Atlantic is
    providing nondiscriminatory access to loop qualification
    information. *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 26.

[^430]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 85. Although Bell
    Atlantic is still in the process of surveying loops, the company
    claims that, as the loop information is gathered, it is made
    available simultaneously to competitors and its retail operations.
    We therefore disagree with carriers that argue that the mere fact
    that the mechanized loop qualification tool is not yet available in
    every central office renders it discriminatory. *See* CompTel
    Comments at 26; CoreComm Comments at 7; Covad Comments at 28;
    Northpoint Comments at 6, 8-9; Rhythms Comments at 14-20.

[^431]: *See* Covad Comments at 28-29; MCI WorldCom Comments at 34-35;
    MCI WorldCom Kinard Decl. at paras. 7-11; Network Access Comments at
    9-10; New York State Attorney General's Comments at 16; Northpoint
    Comments at 7, 11-12; Rhythms Comments at 15-17; Sprint Comments at
    11-14. MCI WorldCom, for example, claims that the mechanized loop
    qualification tool fails to provide carriers with loop length for
    loops over 18,000 feet, the length of the loop without bridged taps,
    the location and number of bridged taps, the loop wire gauge,
    spectrum management information, and the presence of load coils,
    digital loop carriers, repeaters, Digital Added Main Lines and pair
    gain devices, which could be used to assess the loop's compatibility
    with xDSL services other than ADSL. MCI WorldCom Comments at 35.

[^432]: Although commenters note that manual loop qualification
    processes (the Manual Loop Qualification and the Engineering Query)
    are time consuming and costly, they do not dispute that the manual
    processes provide access to all the loop makeup information that
    they need to make an independent assessment about a loop's
    suitability for a particular advanced service. *See* CompTel
    Comments at 27; Covad Comments at 29; Covad Conley/Poulicakos Aff.
    at para. 48; MCI WorldCom Comments at 32-36; Network Access Comments
    at 9-10; NorthPoint Comments at 7; Prism Comments at 21; Rhythms
    Comments at 15. We recognize that, pursuant to its tariff
    investigation, the New York Commission is in the process of
    reviewing the costs, as well as terms and conditions, of the access
    to loop makeup information that Bell Atlantic provides to competing
    carriers. *See infra* Section V.B.3.

[^433]: *See* CompTel Comments at 26-27; Covad Reply at 14-15; MCI
    WorldCom Comments at 35 n.48; MCI WorldCom Kinard Decl. at para. 15
    n.18; Northpoint at 5, 11-12; Rhythms at 17-20; Rhythms
    Geis/Williams Aff. at paras. 36-37, 43. Specifically, commenters
    seek access to the Loop Facility Assignment and Control System
    (LFACS), which inventories, maintains and assigns outside plant
    local loop facilities, and the Trunk Inventory Record Keeping System
    (TIRKS), which inventories, maintains and assigns facilities for
    interoffice transmission, trunking and other special services. Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 64.

[^434]: In response to commenters' assertions, Bell Atlantic claims that
    it "does not itself use or maintain" loop makeup information in a
    mechanized database, and that competing carriers seek "information
    that is not mechanized in \[Bell Atlantic's\] systems." Bell
    Atlantic Reply at 15; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at
    para. 102. *See also* Bell Atlantic Nov. 22 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3
    (representing that LFACs does not contain loop makeup information
    "\[i\]n well over 90 percent of the cases."). We find no conflicting
    evidence on the present record.

[^435]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 625, 634-36
    (expressing concern that significantly greater time is required for
    competitors to access and review pre-ordering information);
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616 (finding that limits
    on the processing of information between an interface and legacy
    systems that prevent a competitor from performing a transaction in
    substantially the same time and manner as the BOC would be
    discriminatory).

[^436]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 636.

[^437]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 588; *see
    also* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 85 n.47 ("AT&T
    representatives perform the CSR retrieval while the customer is on
    the line.").

[^438]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 636.

[^439]: We also note that KPMG reported response times for pre-order
    transactions, but given the significant improvement in the recent
    commercial usage data, we place less weight on KPMG's response
    times. *See* KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-131, 136.

[^440]: Response time is the time that elapses between the submission of
    a query and the receipt of a response by the requesting carrier.
    *See* KPMG Final Report at POP8 IV-166; *see also* *Performance
    Measurements NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12837 (discussing the average
    interval for providing access to pre-ordering information).

[^441]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 5-7; New
    York Commission Comments at 38-39. Most pre-order transactions,
    except for retrieval of parsed CSRs, have a retail analogue and are
    subject to a performance standard of "parity plus four seconds." We
    discuss the response times for parsed CSRs below. *See infra* paras.
    151-53.

[^442]: The four-second differential accounts for additional security
    requirements and computer translations that Bell Atlantic systems
    undertake to provide access to competing carriers. *See* Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 23, Attach. B at 6; New York
    Commission Comments at 38-39.

[^443]: Although Bell Atlantic reported pre-order response times in June
    and July that met the "parity plus four seconds" standard for all
    pre-order functions reported, we rely on data starting in August
    because, as discussed below, Bell Atlantic made changes in the way
    that it calculates response times in August that more accurately
    capture response times experienced by competing carriers.

[^444]: For EDI unparsed CSR retrieval, Bell Atlantic failed to meet the
    standard by .95 of a second in August and 1.52 seconds in September.
    For EDI due date availability, Bell Atlantic met the standard each
    month. For EDI address validation, Bell Atlantic met the standard in
    August and deviated by 1.87 seconds in September. For EDI product
    and service availability, Bell Atlantic met the standard in August
    and deviated by .16 of a second in September. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 96 (metrics PO-1-01; PO-1-02;
    PO-1-03; PO-1-04 for August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 1 (metrics PO-1-01; PO-1-02; PO-1-03; PO-1-04 for
    September 1999).

[^445]: *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 85 n.47; AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at paras. 37-40.

[^446]: *See* AT&T Comments at 48; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para.
    78 n.44, 85 n.47; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at para. 36; MCI
    WorldCom Kinard Decl. at paras. 7-8.

[^447]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20656 (requiring
    Commission satisfaction that performance measures submitted by the
    BOC actually measure performance in a manner that shows whether the
    BOC provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions).

[^448]: EnView was initially developed to monitor the internal TISOC
    systems response and availability times. *See* KPMG Final Report at
    POP8 IV-164. Bell Atlantic describes EnView as a "performance
    evaluation software tool that measures and records the actual
    response time of transactions through emulation by logging into
    applications and executing individual transactions." Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 6. In response to AT&T's criticism
    of the EnView system, Bell Atlantic notes that AT&T agreed in its
    interconnection agreement with Bell Atlantic to use the EnView
    system to measure pre-ordering response times. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 12.

[^449]: The EnView system consists of two emulation programs, or
    "robots," one operating out of Manchester, New Hampshire and the
    other out of Andover, Massachusetts. The robots run pre-defined
    scripts requesting information as if the information were being
    requested from a competing carrier (which would be processed through
    the DCAS system) or from a Bell Atlantic retail representative
    (which would flow directly to back office systems). *See* KPMG Final
    Report at POP8 IV-164-165 (describing EnView system).

[^450]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 5.

[^451]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 24; Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 21; New York
    Commission Comments at 39; *see also* *NYPSC Permanent Rule Order*,
    App. at 3-4 (ordering Bell Atlantic to measure separately response
    times for each type of interface, and to begin reporting EDI
    interface response times immediately).

[^452]: The New York Commission agrees that Bell Atlantic's August data
    more accurately capture pre-order response time because Bell
    Atlantic started measuring the EDI interface and implemented other
    changes. The New York Commission also notes that additional
    refinements to the EnView pre-order measurement system are currently
    being considered in the Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding. New York
    Commission Comments at 39.

[^453]: Although Bell Atlantic does not yet report CORBA pre-order
    response times, in light of the nascency of that interface and Bell
    Atlantic's reporting of the alternative EDI-9 interface, failure to
    report CORBA performance data does not preclude a finding that Bell
    Atlantic is meeting its pre-order OSS checklist requirements.

[^454]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 40.

[^455]: Bell Atlantic Application at 38. Furthermore, in response to
    commenters' claims that the pre-ordering interfaces are deficient,
    Bell Atlantic notes that the interfaces handled more than 283,000
    pre-order transactions in September. Bell Atlantic Reply at 32; Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 5.

[^456]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-102 (showing daily pre-order
    submission volume of 3,400 for the EDI functional evaluation; 10,500
    for the EDI normal volume tests; and 13,200 for the EDI peak volume
    test); *see also id*., at POP6 IV-139, 145 (showing submission of
    15,269 pre-order requests in a 4-hour period during EDI stress
    test). During the stress test, KPMG found that Bell Atlantic's
    pre-order systems were able to maintain operability at levels up to
    119 percent above the baseline established for peak volume testing,
    which represents a 50-percent increase over normal daily volume.
    KPMG Final Report at POP6 IV-149.

[^457]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP13 IV-300-314 (scalability review
    of interfaces and architecture).

[^458]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at paras. 37-38; MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 29; MCI WorldCom Reply at 19.

[^459]: *See* Bell Atlantic Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^460]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 13. The
    New York Commission recently adopted "parity with retail unparsed
    CSR plus tens seconds" as a performance standard for parsed CSR
    retrieval. *NYPSC Additional Guidelines Order* at 15; *see also* New
    York Commission Reply at 17. Although this standard was not formally
    adopted by the New York Commission until November 5, 1999, given
    that Bell Atlantic committed to the standard in collaborative
    meetings in late September and that we find the measure to be
    reasonable, we do not believe that we are precluded from
    independently relying on this standard for purposes of our analysis.

[^461]: *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at 29; MCI WorldCom Reply at 18
    (indicating that MCI WorldCom can presently operate in a competitive
    market if Bell Atlantic meets a 10-second standard for parsed CSR
    retrieval).

[^462]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 21,
    Attach. A (listing daily average parsed CSR response time for
    October 5 through October 14, 1999).

[^463]: MCI WorldCom asserts generally that it takes between 10 to 15
    seconds during the day (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) and 20 to 40 seconds
    in the evening (6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.) to receive responses for its
    parsed CSR inquiries. MCI WorldCom Reply at 19. *See also* MCI
    WorldCom Comments at 29; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at
    para. 62 (claiming that it experiences intervals of between 15 and
    20 seconds for parsed CSRs). AT&T claims that "response times on
    CORBA have been as long as 45 seconds in some instances," but notes
    that "CORBA has been in commercial production for too short a time
    for AT&T to provide comprehensive data." AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply
    Aff. at para. 38.

[^464]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para.
    21 (noting that Bell Atlantic has no ability to measure what happens
    on MCI WorldCom's side of the firewall, and that MCI WorldCom
    personnel have informed Bell Atlantic that they have experienced
    problems on MCI WorldCom's side of the firewall).

[^465]: In this section we evaluate the availability of Bell Atlantic's
    interfaces for all functionality, including the EDI, Web GUI and
    CORBA for pre-ordering, ordering, and maintenance and repair
    functions.

[^466]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 41 (concluding that Bell
    Atlantic is providing satisfactory interface availability). With
    respect to its back office pre-ordering systems, Bell Atlantic
    states that it periodically takes these systems out of service for
    routine maintenance, during which time they are equally unavailable
    to competing carriers as well as Bell Atlantic's retail
    representatives. We find no evidence on the record that Bell
    Atlantic discriminates in the availability of its back office
    pre-ordering systems.

[^467]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 637-38.

[^468]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 25-27, Attach. A at
    8-9.

[^469]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 8. We are
    further encouraged by, but our decision does not rely on, the New
    York Commission's recent modifications to the methodology used to
    calculate interface availability. *See* *NYPSC Additional Guidelines
    Order*, at 15-16 (reporting that Bell Atlantic will include actual
    outages reported by carriers as well as outages captured by the
    EnView simulations, change the EnView system to send transactions on
    average every six minutes rather than fifteen, and make available
    for inspection by carriers its logs of carrier-reported outages).

[^470]: We also note that Bell Atlantic performs necessary maintenance
    on the interfaces during non-prime time. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 26.

[^471]: We note that the New York Commission did not establish a
    performance standard for non-prime time. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 8-9.

[^472]: Because Bell Atlantic began reporting availability for the EDI
    interface in July, we do not rely on earlier data in this section.

[^473]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 73, 84, 96 (metric
    PO-2-02 for June, July and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 1 (metric PO-2-02 for September 1999). In
    June, Bell Atantic reported interface availability only for the EIF
    interface.

[^474]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 73, 84, 96 (metric
    PO-2-03 for July and August 1999).

[^475]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 1 (metric
    PO-2-03 for September 1999).

[^476]: *See* KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-106, 110-111 (noting some
    "sporadic and not routinely experienced" disconnections of the EDI
    ordering interface). During its functional evaluation of the Web
    GUI, KPMG did not experience any outages or down time for
    pre-ordering capability, although it did experience some temporary
    outages for ordering capability. *See* KPMG Final Report at POP2
    IV-34; POP2 IV-37.

[^477]: KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-135.

[^478]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 28.

[^479]: Although commenters report periodic interface outages, they fail
    to assert that the reported outages are not captured in the relevant
    performance measurements. For example, MCI WorldCom states that it
    has experienced "periodic failures" of the EDI pre-ordering
    interface. MCI WorldCom Comments at 28; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at paras. 61, 139-40; MCI WorldCom Reply at
    19-20 (indicating that the EDI pre-ordering interface was down 11
    times from September 3 through October 19); MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Reply Decl. at para. 10, Attach. 1. In addition,
    AT&T claims that since it began using CORBA for commercial
    production in October, the interface has failed on a number of
    occasions. When CORBA was down, AT&T used the Web GUI to conduct
    pre-order transactions. AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at paras.
    34, 89-94.

[^480]: Ordering functions for DSL capable loops are addressed in the
    DSL discussion of Checklist Item 4, *infra*, at section V.D.2.c.

[^481]: New York Commission Comments at 16 (concluding that Bell
    Atlantic has demonstrated its ability to "satisfactorily process
    orders" and that its "automated and manual processes are
    scalable.\").

[^482]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 40. KPMG Final Report at POP5
    IV-111 (Test P5-8) ("BA-NY system or representative provides
    required order transaction functionality").

[^483]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 35. Of the six
    competing carriers using EDI for ordering functions, multiple
    carriers are using it to order UNEs and resale services. *See id.*;
    Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket 99-295 (filed December 17, 1999) (listing
    carriers using EDI for UNE and resale service ordering).

[^484]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 35.

[^485]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 34; New York
    Commission Comments at 41. An order is confirmed when it is accepted
    into Bell Atlantic's Service Order Processor and rejected when it
    contains certain kinds of errors. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl.
    at para. 41.

[^486]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20678, 20680;
    *see* Bell Atlantic Application at 40.

[^487]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 38-43. Bell Atlantic
    will accept resale and UNE POTS orders only over either EDI or the
    Web GUI. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 17, 20. In
    contrast, for non-POTS UNE orders and interconnection trunk orders,
    Bell Atlantic will accept facsimile and mail orders in addition to
    accepting orders over EDI or the Web GUI. *Id.*

[^488]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 41; *see* Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. D at 1. A competing carrier's
    orders "flow-through" if they are transmitted electronically through
    the gateway and accepted into Bell Atlantic's back office ordering
    systems without manual intervention. *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20671; *see also* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. B at 79 (defining "mechanized flow-through" as
    "\[o\]rders received electronically through the ordering interface
    (DCAS) and requiring no manual intervention to be entered into the
    SOP"). Although under this definition a "rejected" order does not
    "flow-through," some commenters in this proceeding refer generally
    to orders that are mechanically processed by Bell Atlantic's systems
    without human intervention as "flowing-through." Bell Atlantic has
    designed its system to flow-through certain order types. Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 38. Order types that are not
    designed to flow-through will drop out of Bell Atlantic's systems
    for manual processing. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para.
    42. Moreover, for orders containing certain types of errors, such as
    mis-typed address information, Bell Atlantic has designed the system
    to direct the order for manual correction by Bell Atlantic
    representatives, rather than rejecting the order. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 41.

[^489]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 17, 21. These
    standards apply only for UNE and resale POTS orders under ten lines
    and certain "pre-qualified" complex orders under ten lines. Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 17, 21. The New York
    Commission established a 48 hour standard for manually processed
    resale and UNE special services orders under 10 lines, and a 72 hour
    standard for all manually processed resale and UNE orders of greater
    than or equal to ten lines. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach.
    B at 17, 21. We do not analyze Bell Atlantic's performance for such
    orders because the relative volumes of orders in these categories
    are too low to make a meaningful judgment.

[^490]: In prior orders the Commission concluded that ordering functions
    for unbundled network elements have no retail analogue. *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619. In contrast, the Commission
    has previously found that resale ordering functions have a retail
    analogue and, as such, BOCs must provide resale ordering functions
    to competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner as
    the incumbent performs that function for itself. *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616. In this application, the New York
    Commission has established benchmark standards to measure Bell
    Atlantic's ability to provide order status notices to competitors in
    a timely fashion, as it concluded that there are no retail analogues
    for ordering in Bell Atlantic's system. New York Commission Comments
    at 42. These benchmarks apply to both UNEs and resale. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 17, 21. We find that the New York
    Commission's benchmarks, which were established in a collaborative
    proceeding, provide a reasonable means of comparison for purposes of
    the instant proceeding.

[^491]: *See*, *e.g.*, Second *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20670-71; *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6263;
    *BellSouth South Carolina* Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 599.

[^492]: Second *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20670; *First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6263; *BellSouth South
    Carolina* Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 599.

[^493]: Second *BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20670-71;
    *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6263; *BellSouth
    South Carolina* Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 599.

[^494]: Commenters argue that Bell Atlantic's flow-through rates are
    insufficient and therefore fail to satisfy section 271. AT&T
    Comments at 16-17; Choice One Comments at 11; MCI WorldCom Comments
    at 10; NY Attorney General Comments at 12-13; NorthPoint Comments at
    14; *see* Covad Comments at 29-30. Because we conclude that, under
    the facts of this application, we need not focus on flow-through
    rates, we find that such arguments are not dispositive of our
    analysis.

[^495]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20671; *First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6259-70, 77; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 597-611.

[^496]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20671; *see*
    *Performance Measurements NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12850 (flow-through
    rate "serves as a yardstick to evaluate whether an incumbent LEC's
    OSS is capable of handling reasonably foreseeable commercial volumes
    of orders").

[^497]: *See* discussion *supra* paras 160.

[^498]: *See* discussion *supra* paras. 127, 131. *See* also Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras. 87-91.

[^499]: *See* discussion *supra* paras. 137-39.

[^500]: *See* discussion *infra* paras. 173-210; *see also* paras.
    287-88, 292-98.

[^501]: New York Commission Reply at 11. We note that the New York
    Commission focused its analysis of Bell Atlantic's ordering
    functions on on-time order processing. New York Commission Comments
    at 44; New York Commission Reply at 11.

[^502]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 78, 90, 102
    (metrics OR-1 and OR-2); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 7; New York Commission Comments at 43. In contrast, the
    Department of Justice submitted data disaggregated by UNE-loop and
    UNE-platform for the first time in its evaluation. Department of
    Justice Evaluation at 15 n.28 (noting that Bell Atlantic provided
    Department of Justice with "supplemental data disaggregating its
    UNE-L and UNE-P performance" after filing its section 271
    application and that "\[t\]o the Department's knowledge, these data
    have not been provided to the Commission, the NYPSC or the CLEC
    community for review.") On reply and in subsequent *Ex Partes*, the
    New York Commission submitted analyses of the Carrier-to-Carrier
    data in aggregated and disaggregated form. New York Commission Reply
    at 13; *id.* at Exh. 1; Letter from Penny Rubin, Managing Attorney,
    New York Department of Public Service, to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 99-295
    (filed December 7, 1999) (New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte*
    Letter) (resale data and aggregated UNE data); Letter from Penny
    Rubin, Managing Attorney, New York Department of Public Service, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket 99-295 (filed Dec. 2, 1999) (New York Dec. 2 *Ex Parte*
    Letter) (disaggregated UNE-loop and UNE-platform data).

[^503]: For example, as the New York Commission has shown, Bell Atlantic
    is able to provide order confirmation and rejection notices for
    UNE-loop and UNE-platform in a manner that provides efficient
    competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete even when
    disaggregated data is considered. New York Commission Reply
    Evaluation, Exh. 1 (showing, for example, that in September Bell
    Atlantic delivered order confirmation and rejection notices on time
    89% of the time for UNE-loop and 94% for UNE-platform). In contrast,
    the Department of Justice concluded that Bell Atlantic has not met
    its obligation to provide order confirmation and rejection notices
    in a timely manner for UNE-loops and UNE-platform. Department of
    Justice Evaluation at 15, 31-32. After careful consideration of the
    Department of Justice's evaluation we conclude, however, that the
    evidence demonstrates that Bell Atlantic is providing
    nondiscriminatory access to its ordering functions for both
    UNE-loops (including hot cuts) and UNE-platform. In addition to the
    reasons discussed more fully in this section, we note that our
    conclusions are based, in part, upon September performance data
    submitted by both Bell Atlantic and the New York Commission that the
    Department of Justice did not discuss in its evaluation. *See*,
    *e.g.*, Department of Justice Evaluation at 16 & n.29, 31-32 & n.86.
    Thus, although we recognize that there may be circumstances in which
    we find it appropriate to examine disaggregated data in the context
    of analyzing the ordering access a BOC provides to competing
    carriers, those circumstances do not present themselves in this
    application.

[^504]: In June, July, August and September respectively, Bell Atlantic
    returned 98, 97, 99,and 89 percent, of mechanized order confirmation
    notices within two hours, and 80, 80, 88, and 89 percent of manually
    processed order confirmation notices within 24 hours. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 78, 90, 102 (metrics OR-1-02 and
    1-04); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same);
    Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Group; Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295, Attach. at 2 (filed Dec. 17, 1999)
    (Bell Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter correcting September
    data). For those same months, respectively, Bell Atlantic returned
    86, 87, 94 and 93 percent of mechanized order rejection notices
    within two hours, and 71, 71, 83 and 91 percent of manually
    processed order rejection notices within 24 hours. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 78, 90, 102 (metrics OR-2-02, 2-04);
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same); Bell
    Atlantic December 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter correcting September
    data, Attach. at 2. On December 17, 1999, Bell Atlantic filed an *ex
    parte* letter correcting data for September that it filed as part of
    the Carrier-to-Carrier reports, which Bell Atlantic submitted on
    reply. Bell Atlantic explains that it did not properly conform to a
    change, first instituted in September, in the way the New York
    Commission required Bell Atlantic to classify certain orders
    (affecting metrics OR-1-01 through 1-04 and OR-2-01 through 2-04).
    *Id.* at 1. This reclassification caused Bell Atlantic's performance
    in September to show an anomalous dip that does not reflect a change
    in Bell Atlantic's actual performance when compared to prior months.
    Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Group; Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 at 1-2 (filed December 17, 1999)
    (Letter explaining September correction).

[^505]: New York Commission Reply, Exh. 1, page 1; New York Commission
    Reply at 11; New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter (88, 88,
    94, and 94 percent of all UNE orders received confirmation or
    rejection notices on time during June, July, August and September,
    respectively). AT&T also asserts that Bell Atlantic's performance in
    providing "order acknowledgments" for orders placed over the EDI
    interface declined in September. AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para.
    257. We note, however, that we have never required the provision of
    acknowledgements for the purposes of satisfying section 271.

[^506]: On average, for June, July, August, and September Bell Atlantic
    returned order confirmation notices in 8.48, 8.84, 6.16, and 6.46
    hours, respectively, and order rejection notices in 16.28, 12.63,
    8.12, and 6.20 hours, respectively. These averages were calculated
    by Commission staff from the Carrier-to-Carrier data provided by
    Bell Atlantic. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 78, 90,
    102 (metrics OR-1 and OR-2); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 7 (same); Bell Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter
    correcting September data, Attach at 2.

[^507]: New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter (Total UNE order
    volumes: January (8,612), February (15,442), March (19,796), April
    (39,427), May (45,136), June (72,121), July (58,575), August
    (64,350), September (69,791)).

[^508]: For example, in the *Ameritech Michigan Order* the Commission
    observed, over the course of the first *four* months of 1997, that
    Ameritech received almost 20,000 resale orders over its EDI
    interface for the state of Michigan. 12 FCC Rcd at 20629-30
    (Ameritech represented that it received 19,671 orders over EDI and
    accepted, and processed, 17,789 of those orders). In the *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order* we noted that BellSouth received, on a
    region-wide basis for one month, 6,715 resale orders through its EDI
    interface. 13 FCC Rcd at 596. In contrast, in the month of September
    in the state of New York alone Bell Atlantic processed almost 20,000
    resale orders, over half of which were received over EDI, and 70,000
    UNE orders, almost 50,000 of which were received over EDI. Letter
    from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell Atlantic,
    to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket 99-295 at 2 (filed November 17, 1999) (listing
    volumes by individual carriers over EDI and GUI interfaces); *see*
    New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter. Virtually all of the
    orders not received over EDI are received over the GUI.

[^509]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20681, para.
    122 & n.420. Bell Atlantic's performance is also significantly
    better than the BOC performance described in other section 271
    orders. We note that this is the first time the Commission has done
    a full analysis of UNE ordering in a section 271 order. We conclude,
    however, that our precedent regarding resale ordering is generally
    applicable to UNE ordering. For example, in the *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, between 14 and 45 percent of order confirmation notices were
    not returned to competing carriers within three days and, based upon
    monthly averages, it took as many as six days to return rejection
    notices to competing carriers. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20643. Evidence in the record in the *South Carolina Order*
    indicated that carriers did not receive 38 to 90 percent of their
    order confirmation notices in 24 hours, and for one carrier it took
    on average took up to 7 days from submission to receive such
    notices. *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 608. The
    evidence in the *First BellSouth Louisiana Order* showed that
    BellSouth only returned between 20 to 62 percent of competing
    carrier orders confirmation notices within 24 hours, and for one
    carrier it took an average of 3.5 workdays to receive an order
    confirmation. *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    6268-69. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, for
    *electronically* submitted orders for resale residential service,
    BellSouth returned a reject notice on average somewhere between 2
    and 8 days after it received an order, depending on the month.
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20679-80. Further,
    over 37 percent of such notices were returned beyond a 24 hour
    interval. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20679-80. For *manually* submitted orders for resale residential
    service, the average reject notice inteval was 1.61 days, and over
    63 percent of such notices were returned beyond a 24 hour interval.
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20679-80.

[^510]: We also note that, unlike Bell Atlantic, which returns rejection
    and order confirmation notices over electronic interfaces, in prior
    applications BellSouth returned some notices by facsimile. *First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6262; *BellSouth South
    Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 598-99. Electronic notifications are
    superior to faxed notifications because they are quicker and do not
    require competing carriers to manually reenter information from the
    notice into their OSS.

[^511]: Bell Atlantic has asserted that retail flow-through is a
    "misnomer" for its systems. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at
    para. 57; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para.
    37. Specifically, Bell Atlantic claims it is a misnomer because
    "every retail order must be typed by a BA-NY representative in order
    to enter it into the service order processor." Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 57; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini
    Reply Decl. at para. 37. Moreover, the New York Commission has
    agreed that there is not a retail analogue for Bell Atlantic's
    systems. New York Commission Comments at 42 ("Since there is no
    retail analogue in Bell Atlantic-NY's retail system, ordering
    metrics are 'absolute standard' metrics."). In the alternative, Bell
    Atlantic argues on Reply that an evaluation of all its October
    retail orders shows that 61.5% of its retail orders "flow-through."
    Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 39; *see
    also id.* Attach. E. Because this number is derived from an
    evaluation of data from the entire month of October, and therefore
    post-dates the comment filing date, we accord it no weight. Given
    New York and Bell Atlantic's conclusion that a retail analogue does
    not exist, and in absence of a credible retail analogue in the
    record, we find that for purposes of this application Bell Atlantic
    must demonstrate that the access it provides to its ordering
    functions offers an efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity to
    compete.

[^512]: The Carrier-to-Carrier reports indicate that overall UNE orders
    flowed-through 59.28 percent and 62.81 percent of the time for
    August and September, 1999, respectively. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. D at 102 (metric OR-5-01); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same).

[^513]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 593; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618.

[^514]: Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket 99-295, Attach 1 (filed November 19, 1999)
    (Bell Atlantic Nov. 19 *Ex Parte* Letter) (listing volumes and
    flow-through rates by individual carriers for UNE-platform and
    UNE-loop). Indeed, we note that those carriers submitting among the
    largest volumes of orders have achieved high flow-through rates.

[^515]: Bell Atlantic Nov. 19 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^516]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 60; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Reply Decl. at para. 36. The Commission has recognized
    in previous orders that there are limited circumstances in which
    manual intervention is appropriate. *BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 599, 107. We find that manually correcting and
    processing orders containing errors instead of rejecting them is one
    such circumstance. Bell Atlantic notes that if it were to reject
    such orders instead of correcting them, its flow-through rates would
    be much higher than currently reported. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Reply Decl. at para. 36 (projected 75% flow-through for UNEs).

[^517]: New York Commission Comments at 46; *see also* Bell Atlantic
    Application at 43 n.37.

[^518]: New York Commission Comments at 46 n.2. The New York Commission
    also concludes that flow-through suffers as competing carriers enter
    the market, and hire and train new employees. New York Commission
    Reply at 13.

[^519]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20674.*First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6263.

[^520]: *See BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 601-02.

[^521]: KPMG Final Report POP7 IV-150.

[^522]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 61 (citing KPMG
    Report POP7 IV-160 (Test P7-2)). Certain types of orders are not
    designed to flow-through, such as complex orders that require manual
    handling.

[^523]: KPMG Final Report POP IV-160 (Test P7-2); *see also* New York
    Commission Reply at 12; Bell Atlantic Reply at 16.

[^524]: The New York Commission noted that although the KPMG's results
    show a higher level of flow-through performance than Bell Atlantic's
    metrics, the difference "was anticipated and is easily explained."
    New York Commission Reply at 12. As the New York Commission
    explained, flow-through in the real commercial environment "is
    affected by such factors as ordering errors, pending orders,
    features not intended to flow-through, and the market entry learning
    curve; and one therefore would expect it to be lower." New York
    Commission Reply at 12.

[^525]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 32; AT&T Comments at 20; MCI
    WorldCom Comments at 16; *see* Choice One Comments at 11.

[^526]: *See* New York Commission Reply at 11-12.

[^527]: *See*, *e.g.*, New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter
    (Total UNE order volumes: January (8,612), February (15,442), March
    (19,796), April (39,427), May (45,136), June (72,121), July
    (58,575), August (64,350), September (69,791)).

[^528]: KPMG Final Report POP IV-160 (Test P7-2); *see also* New York
    Commission Reply at 12; Bell Atlantic Reply at 16.

[^529]: Specifically, Bell Atlantic proposed a series of enhancements to
    further reduce the manual processing of UNE-platform orders. In its
    proposal, Bell Atlantic presented the New York Commission with a
    three-phase plan to increase the percentage of electronically
    processed UNE-platform orders. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. B at 36. As we have stated previously, "the
    development of OSS functions is not a static process, and we
    encourage and expect \[a BOC\] to make improvements to its
    operations support systems, even after it has filed a section 271
    application." *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20624. We
    recognize, of course, that there is a fundamental difference between
    making improvements to OSS access that, at the time of the filing of
    the application, meets the nondiscriminatory requirement, and taking
    or proposing post-filing remedial measures to try to bring the OSS
    access into compliance during the pendency of the application. *Id.*
    We find that Bell Atlantic's proposed improvements are the former,
    not the latter.

[^530]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. B at 39
    (Affidavit submitted on behalf of Bell Atlantic to New York
    Commission on October 8, 1999).

[^531]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. B at 39
    (Affidavit submitted on behalf of Bell Atlantic to New York
    Commission on October 8, 1999)

[^532]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. B at 39
    (Affidavit submitted on behalf of Bell Atlantic to New York
    Commission on October 8, 1999)

[^533]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. B at 39
    (Affidavit submitted on behalf of Bell Atlantic to New York
    Commission on October 8, 1999)

[^534]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 31-32; AT&T Comments at 19;
    NorthPoint Comments at 13.

[^535]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 53.

[^536]: Bell Atlantic reported order confirmation accuracy of 99.54,
    July 97.97, August 98.39, and September 95.08 percent for June, July
    August, and September, respectively. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. D at 79, 91, 102 (metric OR 6-03); Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same).

[^537]: AT&T makes extensive claims regarding LSRC accuracy with respect
    to UNE loop orders. AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 35-41. The Department
    of Justice similarly raises concerns in this regard, arguing that
    the high level of inaccurate confirmations returned by Bell Atlantic
    imposes significant costs and delays upon competing carriers.
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 17.

[^538]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 16; s*ee* Bell Atlantic
    Application, App. C, Vol. 59, Tab. 890 at 3956.

[^539]: AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 95.

[^540]: New York Commission Comments at 81 n.3.

[^541]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 8; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    at para. 35.

[^542]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 81 n.3.

[^543]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 102 (metric OR
    6-01) (August (59.28%)); Bell Atlantic Reply Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. C at 7 (metric OR 6-01) (September (41.52%)).

[^544]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 37.

[^545]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 37. Members of Bell
    Atlantic's "Quality Management Team" examine the selected orders and
    compare twelve specified field identifiers in the service orders
    with corresponding information in the orders placed by competing
    carriers. *Id*. Bell Atlantic then reports the percent of orders
    that match completely. *Id.* Bell Atlantic also reports the percent
    of the *fields* with errors (i.e., "percent opportunities"). *Id.*
    Bell Atlantic's performance for the percent opportunities metric has
    been significantly better than for order accuracy. For example, Bell
    Atlantic reported performance in August and September of 93.18
    percent and 90.58 percent, respectively. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. D at 102 (metric OR 6-02); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same). We find that this performance
    further supports Bell Atlantic's assertion that it manually
    processes orders accurately.

[^546]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para 38*.* Bell
    Atlantic notes that some orders are handled manually because there
    is an error in the order submitted by the competing carrier. *Id.*
    When this happens, the Bell Atlantic wholesale representative
    corrects the error manually. *Id.* Bell Atlantic claims that the
    resulting differences between the original order and the corrected
    order are attributed to Bell Atlantic as errors merely because the
    order submitted by the competing carrier and the order entered by
    Bell Atlantic into its service order processor do not match. *Id.*
    Moreover, Bell Atlantic asserts that the process of translating
    competing carrier orders into the service order processor may result
    in "a literal mis-match of information" between the order submitted
    by the competing carrier and the order entered in the service order
    processor even when the end result is that the order is provisioned
    as requested. *Id.* For example, as Bell Atlantic explains, a single
    package ordering code on an order placed by a competing carrier may
    require translation into multiple ordering codes for entry into Bell
    Atlantic's service order processor. *Id.* Bell Atlantic further
    claims that the low rate is due, in part, to the fact that members
    of its "Quality Management Team" who compile the data have not yet
    "mastered the intricacies of the order process and, as such, are not
    properly attributing errors." *Id. at* para. 39. Bell Atlantic began
    reporting data for this metric in August 1999. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 53.

[^547]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para 38.

[^548]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para 38; *id.* Attach. G.
    The analysis consisted of a random sample of August orders
    identified as containing errors. Bell Atlantic Reply Dowell/Canny
    Aff., para 40-41; Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory
    Affairs, Bell Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket 99-295 at 1 (filed December 13,
    1999). Each order was listed with the original error identified.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para 38; *id.* Attach. G. Based
    upon this analysis, Bell Atlantic should have received a score of 87
    percent for service order accuracy. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    at para. 41.

[^549]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para 74 (Installation
    quality metrics are "additional measures of service order accuracy,
    since an end user will report a trouble if a service is not
    installed accurately.").

[^550]: *See*, *e.g.*, Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 80,
    92, 104 (metrics PR-6-01, 6-02, 6-03); Bell Atlantic Reply
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C at 9 (same); *but see* AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 112 (speculating that "errors alone
    *could* result in provisioning inaccuracies . . . for more than 15
    percent of all CLEC UNE orders").

[^551]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 30. *See also* AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 103-04 (Bell Atlantic's rejection
    rates are "commercially unreasonable").

[^552]: For June, July, August, and September , respectively, Bell
    Atlantic rejected 28.69, 34.01, 33.65, and 32.14 percent of
    competing carrier orders. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach D
    at 79, 91, 102 (metric OR-3-01); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 7 (same).

[^553]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 30 ("Many of these orders
    are undoubtedly rejected because of errors committed by \[competing
    carriers\], for which Bell Atlantic should not be held
    responsible.").

[^554]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 30.

[^555]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 42; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Reply Decl. at para. 33; *id.* Attach. C at 7-12
    (showing monthly rejection rates and order volumes by carrier for
    June through August 1999). We note that many carriers placing among
    the highest order volumes have been able to achieve rejection rates
    well below the average rate reported by Bell Atlantic in the
    Carrier-to-Carrier metrics. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 7-12. This is in contrast to the circumstances in prior
    section 271 applications where we concluded that a BOC had not shown
    that order rejections were attributable to competing carrier error.
    For example, in the *BellSouth South Carolina Order* we concluded
    that BellSouth had not shown that the level of order rejections for
    carriers using the EDI interface was attributable to competing
    carrier error, in part, because every competing carrier attempting
    to use the interface was experiencing high order rejection rates,
    Bell South was not providing competing carriers with adequate
    business rules, and BellSouth failed to provide integrated
    pre-ordering and ordering interfaces. *BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 600-01. None of these factors is present in
    this application.

[^556]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Reply Decl. at para. 33. Both AT&T
    and Z-Tel assert that Bell Atlantic issues spurious rejection
    notices. AT&T Crafton/Connolly Decl. Attach. 18; Z-Tel Comments at
    19. Bell Atlantic asserts that "the vast majority" of the rejections
    were not spurious, but resulted from the submission of incorrect
    orders. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 47.
    No other commenters have raised this issue. Moreover, neither AT&T
    nor Z-Tel has provided specific evidentiary support for their
    claims. As such, we are unable to find, based upon these claims,
    that Bell Atlantic has failed to comply with the requirements of
    this checklist item.

[^557]: AT&T Connolly/Crafton Aff. at para. 258 (asserting that AT&T did
    not receive order confirmation or rejection notices for 1% of its
    orders in August and 9% in September); MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Savori Reply Decl. at para. 19 (contending that MCI
    WorldCom did not receive order confirmations for 28 and 374 orders
    in August and September, respectively). No other commenters have
    raised this issue.

[^558]: There is no evidence in the record that shows, or even
    indicates, that Bell Atlantic's systems and interfaces, and not the
    competing carriers', are responsible for the failure of competing
    carriers to receive order confirmations.

[^559]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 29-30 (expressing concern
    that Bell Atlantic's "heavy reliance" on manual processing increases
    competing carrier costs and creates significant risk of
    customer-affecting service problems when order volumes increase);
    AT&T Comments at 15-22; Choice One Comments at 11; MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 9-19; NY Attorney General Comments at 11-13; NorthPoint
    Comments at 13-16; *see* Covad Comments at 29-30.

[^560]: The Department of Justice also asserts that manual processing of
    orders increases the costs of competing carriers, and that such cost
    "may impair the competitive vitality of competing carriers."
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 32. We conclude, however, that
    the record does not support a finding that such an impairment would
    occur. Although AT&T has asserted specific costs associated with
    various potential Bell Atlantic failures, we are unable to conclude
    that such costs are accurate and that an efficient competitor would
    be subjected to them. AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff Attach. 2. Although
    significant costs associated with a BOC's manual processing of
    competing carrier orders might prevent an efficient competitor a
    meaningful opportunity to compete, the evidence in the record does
    not support such a conlusion.

[^561]: Although we have previously analyzed resale flow-through
    performance under the "substantially same time and manner" standard,
    we are unable to do so in this application. *See*, *e.g.*, *First
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6259 (finding that
    BellSouth "failed to demonstrate that it is offering competing
    carriers the ability to order services for resale on a
    nondiscriminatory basis, *i.e.*, within substantially the same time
    and manner as the BOC provides the service to itself"). As discussed
    above, unlike other BOCs that provided retail flow-through data in
    prior applications, Bell Atlantic has asserted that retail
    flow-through is a "misnomer" for its systems. Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 57; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini
    Reply Decl. at para. 37. Moreover, the New York Commission has
    agreed that there is not a retail analogue in Bell Atlantic's
    systems. New York Commission Comments at 42 ("Since there is no
    retail analogue in Bell Atlantic-NY's retail system, ordering
    metrics are 'absolute standard' metrics."). Thus, given New York and
    Bell Atlantic's conclusion that a retail analogue does not exist,
    and in absence of a credible retail analogue in the record, we find
    that for purposes of this application Bell Atlantic must demonstrate
    that the access it provides to its ordering functions offers an
    efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity to compete.

[^562]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 12 ("While Bell Atlantic's
    wholesale performance to resellers has not been perfect, the
    Department does not believe that there are performance deficiencies
    that are significantly impeding entry by resellers."); New York
    Commission Comments at 16 (concluding that Bell Atlantic has
    demonstrated its ability to "satisfactorily process orders" and that
    its "automated and manual processes are scalable.\"). We also note
    that although we have previously recognized the continuing need for
    all three of the competitive modes of entry, we also stated that we
    "continue to believe, however, that the ability of unbundled network
    elements, including various combinations of unbundled network
    elements, is integral to achieving Congress' objective of promoting
    rapid competition . . .." *See* *also* *UNE Remand Order* at para.
    5.

[^563]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach B at 17, 21.

[^564]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach D at 74, 86, 98 (metrics
    OR-1 and OR-2); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at
    3 (same); Bell Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter correcting
    September data, Attach at 2. In June, July, August, and September,
    Bell Atlantic returned 98, 97, 99, and 99 percent, respectively, of
    mechanized order confirmation notices within two hours and 94, 93,
    95, and 85 percent, respectively, of manually processed order
    confirmation notices within 24 hours. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach D at 74, 86, 98 (metrics OR-1-02 and 1-04); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 3 (same); Bell
    Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter correcting September data,
    Attach at 2. Moreover, for mechanized rejection notices for those
    same months, Bell Atlantic returned 98, 98, 100, and 99 percent
    within two hours, respectively, and 96, 92, 93, and 91 percent,
    respectively, of manual rejection notices within 24 hours. Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach D at 74, 86, 98 (metrics OR-2-02
    and 2-04); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 3
    (same); Bell Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter correcting
    September data, Attach at 2. Although the September data in this
    footnote was also affected by the correction described in the UNE
    section above its effect was only marginal.

[^565]: New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter (Bell Atlantic
    returned 97, 95, 97 and 93 percent of its order confirmation and
    rejection notices on time for June, July, August, and September,
    respectively).

[^566]: On average for June, July, August, and September Bell Atlantic
    returned order confirmation notices in 5.27, 6.53, 6.27, and 7.25
    hours, respectively, and order rejection notices in 4.20, 5.98,
    5.31, and 6.25 hours, respectively. These averages were calculated
    by Commission staff from the Carrier-to-Carrier data provided by
    Bell Atlantic. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 74, 86,
    98 (metrics OR-1 and OR-2); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 3 (same); Bell Atlantic Dec. 17, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter
    correcting September data.

[^567]: New York Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter (stating resale
    service volumes as follows: January (14,206), February (14,457),
    March (21,833), April (20,974), May (20,702), June (17,787), July
    (16,885), August (17,549), September (22,856)).

[^568]: *See* *supra* para. 165*.*

[^569]: The Carrier-to-Carrier reports indicate that on average resale
    orders flowed-through 53.77, 54.02, 45.97, and 51.60 percent of the
    time for June, July, August, and September, 1999, respectively. Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 74, 86, 98 (metric
    OR-5-01); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 3
    (same).

[^570]: Bell Atlantic Nov. 23 *Ex Parte* Letter (listing volumes and
    flow-through rates by individual carriers for resellers).

[^571]: We note that factors under competing carrier control, such as
    failing to integrate pre-ordering and ordering interfaces,
    adequately train and manage their employees, or invest in the
    necessary systems, will have significant impacts on competing
    carrier flow-through rates.

[^572]: KPMG Final Report at POP7 IV-150 (Test P7-1).

[^573]: *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 11-12; New York
    Commission Dec. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter (listing total volumes by month
    for resale services).

[^574]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 11 (quoting Bell Atlantic
    Application Taylor Decl. at para. 43). The Department of Justice
    further described the resale entry strategy as follows:

    > \[s\]pecifically resale allows CLECs---especially those that serve
    > the more lucrative business market---to build a customer base with
    > minimal investment while they construct their own network
    > facilities. Resale allows those CLECs that cannot justify the cost
    > of investing in their own network facilities, such as those
    > serving the less lucrative residential market, the ability to
    > offer local exchange service as part of a bundled package of
    > telecommunications services that "one-stop shopping" customers
    > demand. Thus, although resale alone is not likely to be a major
    > avenue for competitive entry, particularly for serving the
    > residential market, the number of resale line in service continues
    > to grow in New York.

    Department of Justice Evaluation at 11-12.

[^575]: *See*, *e.g.*, Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory
    Affairs, Bell Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket 99-295, Attach 1 (filed
    December 7, 1999) ("To handle the increase in complex \[resale\]
    orders, Bell Atlantic is modifying its staffing needs to meet the
    new work requirements.").

[^576]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 75, 87, 99 (metric
    OR-6-03); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 3
    (same).

[^577]: For June, July, August, and September, respectively, Bell
    Atlantic's order confirmation accuracy performance was 95.10, 91.04,
    95.11, and 96.30 percent. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D
    at 74, 86, 98 (metric OR-6-03); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 3 (same).

[^578]: *See supra* paras. 173-74. For August and September, Bell
    Atlantic reported service order accuracy performance of 70.37 and
    56.90 percent, respectively. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. D at 98 (metric OR-6-01); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 3 (same). Bell Atlantic began reporting this
    metric in August.

[^579]: Specifically, on average Bell Atlantic rejected 30.59, 30.43,
    29.39, and 23.50 percent of competing carrier orders in June, July,
    August, and September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at
    74, 86, 98 (metric OR-3-01); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 3 (same).

[^580]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Aff. at para. 42; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Reply Decl at para. 33; *id.* Attach. C at 1-7
    (showing monthly rejection rates and order volumes by carrier for
    June through August 1999).

[^581]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 44; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 67; *see also* Letter from Robert W.
    Quinn, Director, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    99-295 at 57 (filed Dec. 15, 1999) (AT&T Dec. 15 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^582]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para.
    50; Bell Atlantic Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter at 6-7.

[^583]: Bell Atlantic Application at 44.

[^584]: *See* Bell Atlantic's Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 18; Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 50.

[^585]: *See* Bell Atlantic Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter at 6. Bell
    Atlantic also states that its dispatch centers receive Open Query
    System reports on a daily basis and, based on information contained
    in these reports, call customers to reschedule appointments when an
    appointment has been missed. *See id.* Because competing carriers
    also have access to these reports, they would be able to reschedule
    missed appointments in the same manner.

[^586]: In particular, we find that the regular access to Open Query
    System reports, in addition to real-time access to order status
    information through SOP and WFA, allows competing LECs access to
    obtain information about pending orders in substantially the same
    time as Bell Atlantic's retail operations.

[^587]: *See* AT&T Comments at 22; AT&T Reply at 28; AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 152-158; *see also* AT&T Dec. 15 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 57.

[^588]: *See* NorthPoint Comments at 16-17; *see also* Prism Comments at
    12; Z-Tel Comments at 15.

[^589]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 88; Bell Atlantic
    Application at 70; Bell Atlantic Reply at 10.

[^590]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 88.

[^591]: The Commission has indicated in prior section 271 orders that a
    BOC should provide order completion notification in substantially
    the same time and manner as it provides such information to its
    retail operations. *See First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 6264-65; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 603.
    *See also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20685-86
    (instructing BOCs to provide competing carriers with order
    completion notices "in a timely and accurate manner."). In this
    case, however, Bell Atlantic represents that it does not provide any
    completion notification to its own retail representatives, and the
    New York Commission similarly concluded that order completion
    notification lacks a retail analogue. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 52 (explaining that if a
    retail representative "has some need to check on a particular
    feature, he or she would pull up the customer's CSR or the service
    order."); New York Commission Comments at 42 (indicating that
    ordering metrics have no retail analogue). Given the New York
    Commission and Bell Atlantic's conclusions that a retail analogue
    does not exist, and in absence of a credible retail analogue in the
    record, we find for purposes of this application that Bell Atlantic
    must demonstrate that it provides completion notification sufficient
    to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
    compete.

[^592]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20685;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 615; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20650 n.512. *See also Performance
    Measurements NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12847.

[^593]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20685-86.

[^594]: *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6265
    (indicating that "order status notices have a direct impact on a new
    entrant's ability to serve its customers, because they allow
    competing carriers to monitor the status of their resale orders and
    to track the orders both for their customers and their own
    records.").

[^595]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20686. *See
    also First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6265;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 615.

[^596]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20685-86;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 615.

[^597]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 50; Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 46 ("For every order completed
    in the Billing system, a completion notice has been sent.").

[^598]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 46.

[^599]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 48; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 51; *see also* New York Commission
    Comments at 49; *NYPSC Additional Guidelines Order* at 16 (noting
    that in Carrier Working Group meetings during August and September
    Bell Atlantic offered to notify competing carriers when the work
    completion has been entered into its service order processing
    system).

[^600]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 48.

[^601]: *Id*. at para. 47; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at paras.
    50, 51. Although Z-Tel complains that it does not receive
    affirmative notification from Bell Atlantic over the Web GUI
    interface, we find that this functionality is available using the
    EDI interface. *See* Z-Tel Comments at 16, 19-20.

[^602]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 46; Attach. B. at
    26-27 (describing metrics OR-4-01, OR-4-02, OR-4-03).

[^603]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 47; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 50; *see also* *NYPSC Guidelines Order*
    at 2 (adopting, after input from Bell Atlantic and competing
    carriers in the Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative, a general
    performance standard of 95 percent as a reasonable and achievable
    level that will permit competing carriers to enter the local
    exchange market).

[^604]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 74, 79, 86, 91,
    98, 102 (metric OR-4-02 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 3, 7 (metric OR-4-02
    for September 1999).

[^605]: KMPG Final Report at POP5 IV-114-15 (excluding approximately ten
    percent of orders where KPMG did not receive a completion notice due
    to a problem occurring primarily in January 1999 that Bell Atlantic
    later resolved). *See* New York Commission Comments at 49.

[^606]: KPMG Final Report at POP5 IV-116. *See also* New York Commission
    Comments at 49.

[^607]: *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 260 (claiming that
    AT&T received only 79 percent of billing completion notices on time
    for AT&T orders that were eligible to receive such notices in
    September); AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at para. 83; AT&T
    Pfau/Kalb Reply Decl. at para. 56 (indicating that AT&T received
    only 72 percent of billing completion notices on time for eligible
    October orders). AT&T does not demonstrate that the delay is
    attributable to Bell Atlantic's systems.

[^608]: *See NYPSC Additional Guidelines Order* at 16-17; *Performance
    Measurements NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12845, 12847 (tentatively
    concluding that incumbent LECs must measure the average completion
    notice interval, or "the amount of time it takes an incumbent LEC to
    send a competing carrier notice that work on an order has been
    completed" by "subtracting the date and time that it completed the
    work from the date and time a valid completion notice leaves its OSS
    interface."). *See also NYPSC Permanent Rule Order* App. at 21-22;
    *NYPSC Guidelines Order*, App. 3 at 1 (directing parties in the
    Carrier-to-Carrier collaborative to consider measuring the time of
    completion of the physical work).

[^609]: *NYPSC Additional Guidelines Order* at 17.

[^610]: *Id*.

[^611]: We note that Bell Atlantic's pre-ordering interfaces enable
    carriers to view a pending order's installation status to determine
    whether the physical work on an order has been completed. *See
    infra* at Section V.B.1.c. *See also* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. at para. 48; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 21.
    Moreover, Bell Atlantic notifies competing carriers by phone when
    hot cut and trunk orders are completed. We therefore do not consider
    AT&T's and MCI WorldCom's allegations that Bell Atlantic does not
    deliver timely work completion notices particularly probative to
    approval of this application. *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at
    para. 259 (claiming that AT&T received only 66 percent of work
    completion notices on time for AT&T orders that were eligible to
    receive such notices in September); MCI WorldCom Kinard Decl. at
    paras. 16-17 (indicating that notification of provisioning
    completions "still takes too long.").

[^612]: *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 259, 260 (claiming
    that AT&T did not receive a work completion notice for 23 percent,
    nor a billing completion notice for 17 percent, of eligible
    September orders); AT&T Pfau/Kalb Reply Decl. at paras. 55, 56
    (indicating that AT&T did not receive work completion notices for 19
    percent of orders submitted in the first half of October and failed
    to receive billing completion notices for 24 percent of such
    orders); MCI WorldCom Kinard Decl. at para. 18 (claiming that MCI
    WorldCom failed to receive billing completion notices, but
    speculating that the addition of provisioning completion notices may
    improve the situation); MCI WorldCom Reply at 9-11; MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Reply Decl. at 9-12 (indicating that MCI WorldCom
    failed to receive completion notices for a number of August,
    September and October orders). MCI WorldCom admits that for half of
    the August and September orders that are missing billing
    completions, it did receive a work completion notice. MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Reply Decl. at 10.

[^613]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 52
    (indicating that Bell Atlantic "is prepared to implement this
    functionality in April"). A fielded complex completion notification
    takes information about a completed order and assigns it to specific
    fields. AT&T Comments at 22.

[^614]: AT&T states that it can use fielded completion notices to
    confirm that Bell Atlantic provisioned the order accurately and that
    the customer received the correct services and features. AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 159, 162.

[^615]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 165 n.87. According to AT&T,
    carriers agreed to the postponement because of concerns "about the
    effects of the implementation on the Y2K moratorium." *Id*.

[^616]: We discuss loop provisioning below. *See infra* Section V.D.2.a.

[^617]: The Gertner/Bamberger study was submitted to us by Bell
    Atlantic. It examines the reasons for the differences in the
    observed Average Completed Intervals for competing carriers orders
    as compared to orders for Bell Atlantic\'s retail customers. For a
    discussion of the study, *see* *infra* paras. 203-210.

[^618]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20612-58.

[^619]: We will use \"Average Installation Interval,\" \"Average
    Completed Interval,\" and \"Average Completion Interval\"
    interchangeably for purposes of this discussion.

[^620]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20633-34..

[^621]: *Id.* at 20632-33.

[^622]: *Id.* at 20633.

[^623]: *Id.*.

[^624]: *Id*. The Commission also stated that data on the percentage of
    installations completed within a certain number of days may be
    useful, even though such data could mask discriminatory conduct.
    *See id.* at 20631-32.

[^625]: *Performance Measurements NPRM*, 12 FCC Rcd 12842-43. The
    Average Completion Interval compares the average length of time it
    takes an incumbent LEC to complete orders for competing carriers
    with the average length of time it takes to complete comparable
    incumbent LEC retail orders. The Percentage of Due Dates Missed
    seeks to determine whether the agreed-upon due dates for order
    completion are equally reliable for orders placed by competing
    carriers and orders placed by an incumbent LEC\'s end user
    customers. *Id.*

[^626]: *Id.* at 12844.

[^627]: Bell Atlantic also provides other performance measurements,
    including Percent Completed within \"X\" Days, Percent Missed
    Appointments, Average Delay Days, and Percent Installation Troubles
    reported within \"X\" Days.

[^628]: Non-dispatch refers to orders for which no field work was needed
    for provisioning by a Bell Atlantic technician. Dispatch orders
    require a technician to be dispatched in order to fulfill the order.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 59; *see also*
    *Performance Measurements NPRM*, 12 FCC Rcd 12841 n.71.

[^629]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 63. Standard intervals
    are the minimum number of days that Bell Atlantic offers for the
    provision of service for orders not requiring dispatch. They vary
    according to the type of products and services being ordered. For
    example, the product Remote Call Forwarding has a standard interval
    of two days, while Call Waiting can receive same day service (if
    ordered before 3:00), and Caller ID has a standard interval of four
    days. Therefore, if a customer orders Caller ID, Bell Atlantic says
    that the earliest it can provision the customer is four days later.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 63 & Attach. B, App. L at
    143.

[^630]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Dec. at para. 63.

[^631]: Smarts Clock is a calendar of available appointment dates for
    orders requiring dispatch. On the calendar a red mark indicates that
    Bell Atlantic has reached its capacity for that day; a yellow mark
    indicates that Bell Atlantic is close to reaching capacity, but is
    still accepting due date requests; a green mark indicates that Bell
    Atlantic has sufficient capacity that the carrier's due date request
    for that day will likely be accepted. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. at para. 63; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para
    53.

[^632]: The only test criterion to receive a \"Satisfied with
    Qualifications\" concerned the assignment of skilled personnel to
    the Regional CLEC Coordination Center (RCCC). It received this
    qualification because \"Bell Atlantic did not replicate the retail
    processes at the RCCC. However, KPMG determined that equal
    functionality existed.\" KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-282 to
    IV-284.

[^633]: According to KPMG, \"\[t\]he focus of the evaluation \[was\] on
    the activities downstream from order entry through service
    activation. The objective of this test \[was\] to evaluate the
    degree to which the provisioning environment supporting wholesale
    orders is on parity with provisioning for Bell Atlantic New York
    retail orders.\" KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-258.

[^634]: KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-258 to IV-269.

[^635]: KPMG Final Report at POP11 IV-284.

[^636]: *BellSouth First Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6280-81
    (concluding that BOCs must provide equivalent access to due dates);
    *see also* *BellSouth Second Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20667;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 629-30; *Ameritech
    Michigan* *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20639-41.

[^637]: AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras. 74-5; Covad
    Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at para. 24; MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori
    Decl. at para. 68; CoreComm Comments at 13-14; Prism Comments at 9
    n.16. Both AT&T and MCI WorldCom claim that they normally request
    longer intervals than the standard interval because of the problem
    of getting the due date they request. MCI WorldCom
    Lichtenberg/Sivori Decl. at para. 68; AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at para.
    143.

[^638]: KPMG also found that 2.4 percent of its test orders received
    confirmed due dates earlier than requested. KPMG Final Report at
    POP5 IV-113 & Table IV-5.16.

[^639]: Bell Atlantic provides a study that examined the reasons why
    Average Completed Intervals for competing carriers might be longer.
    This study demonstrates that the average completed interval is
    longer than the average requested interval, for UNE-P orders. Bell
    Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at Table 2. As we discuss below, we
    assume that the confirmed due dates are the same as the completed
    dates. Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at 1 n.1.

[^640]: As the Commission has stated before, we would be concerned if we
    saw that confirmed due dates were set significantly later than was
    requested. *See BellSouth Second Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20667; *Ameritech Michigan* *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20639-41;
    *BellSouth First Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6280-81; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 629-30.

[^641]: KPMG was \"Satisfied\" with orders submitted through the GUI,
    and \"Satisfied with Qualifications\" for orders submitted through
    the EDI interface. KPMG Final Report at POP2 IV-38-9, POP5 IV-113.
    No reason for the qualification designation for EDI orders was
    given, although KPMG indicated in its comments that the 88 percent
    of orders having confirmed due dates the same as the due date
    requested was a key factor in its analysis. KPMG Final Report at
    POP5 IV-113.

[^642]: The New York Commission states that \"\[t\]he record before
    \[them\] does not suggest that \[competing LECs\] have been having
    problems receiving intervals for platform orders as requested or
    within the standard intervals set forth in the Carrier-to-Carrier
    guidelines. MCI WorldCom acknowledged that because it requested
    longer intervals for certain UNE-P products, \[Bell Atlantic\'s\]
    overall average interval offered and completed metrics may be longer
    than they otherwise would be. Moreover, \[Bell Atlantic\'s\] good
    missed appointment performance demonstrates that it is meeting
    requested intervals.\" New York Commission Comments at 69 n.1.

[^643]: For example, in September Bell Atlantic missed appointments for
    0.03 percent of competing carriers\' non-dispatch UNE-P orders,
    versus 0.79 percent of its own corresponding retail orders. For
    dispatch orders, it missed 8.9 percent of competing carriers\'
    appointments and 12.1 percent of its own retail appointments. The
    four month average (June through September) missed appointment rate
    for resale non-dispatch orders is 0.04 percent for competing
    carriers, versus 0.70 percent for Bell Atlantic customers; and for
    resale dispatch orders it is 7.26 percent for competing carriers
    versus 10.32 percent for its own retail customers. For UNE platform
    non-dispatch orders it is 0.04 percent for competing carriers versus
    0.70 percent for its retail customers; and for dispatch orders it is
    6.85 percent for competing carriers versus 10.32 percent for its
    retail customers. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D; Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C.

[^644]: For example, for resale POTS orders, in September only 0.74
    percent of competitive LEC customers reported difficulties within
    the first seven days of installation, compared to 3.15 percent of
    Bell Atlantic customers. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D;
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C.

[^645]: For June through September, resale POTS orders, dispatch and
    non-dispatch, business and residential, generally showed a monthly
    difference of a half day to a full day longer to fulfill for
    competitive LEC customers, and the monthly differences were usually
    statistically significant, with the exception of July for
    residential dispatch orders, for which the difference was not
    statistically significant. The four month average (June-September)
    difference for resale POTS orders is 1.18 days for dispatch
    business, 0.80 days for dispatch residential, 0.51 days for
    non-dispatch business, and 0.87 days for non-dispatch residential.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C. The difference in times was
    greater for UNE platform orders, for the same time period, and were
    always statistically significant. Competitive LEC UNE platform
    non-dispatch orders took from 0.8 to 2.0 days longer for June
    through August, averaging more than four months (June-September
    1999) 2.43 days for competing carrier orders versus 1.09 days for
    Bell Atlantic orders, for a difference of 1.34 days. Meanwhile, UNE
    platform dispatch orders took from 2.6 to 3.6 days longer, averaging
    over the four months 6.49 days for competing carriers orders versus
    3.26 days for Bell Atlantic orders, for a difference of 3.23 days.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C. The Carrier to Carrier report
    also contains data about how many orders were completed within \"X\"
    number of days for Bell Atlantic and competitive LEC customers, with
    metrics provided for \"X\" ranging from one to six days (the
    \"Percent Completed within \'X\' Days\" metrics). Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 61. These metrics paint a similar
    picture to the average completed intervals data, of competitive LEC
    orders having longer completion times than Bell Atlantic retail
    orders. The differences for this measure for UNE platform orders
    were statistically significant, for the months of June through
    September. Another interval metric, which measures the time it takes
    for Bell Atlantic to provide service to customers, is average delay
    days for missed appointments. This metric, which measures how long
    it takes to complete service to a customer if the appointment has
    been missed, generally shows large and statistically significant
    differences in performance in favor of Bell Atlantic retail
    customers, for both UNE and resale orders. For example, the average
    delay days for UNE platform orders for September for Bell Atlantic
    retail customers was 4.76 days, while for competitive LEC customers
    it was 6.66 days.

[^646]: Although Carrier to Carrier metrics are intended to exclude
    orders placed by competitive LECs that request due dates later than
    they are offered, this is not happening due to a coding error on the
    part of competing carriers. For example, if the requested due date
    (by the competitive LEC or by a retail customer) is later than the
    offered due date, then the order is supposed to be coded with an
    \"X\". If the customer accepts the offered due date, then the order
    should be coded with a \"W." All orders coded with an \"X\" are
    excluded from the interval metrics. However, if a competitive LEC
    fails to mark orders that request later due dates with an \"X\",
    they will be counted in the metrics, and are likely to increase the
    reported completion intervals because of their longer intervals.
    Bell Atlantic has found that in some categories large numbers of
    competitive LEC orders are incorrectly coded as \"W." Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 65-66. We note that in March 2000, Bell
    Atlantic\'s systems will begin to automatically code orders
    requesting later due dates with an \"X," thus eliminating this bias
    to the data. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 67.

[^647]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 62. For non-dispatch
    orders, the offered intervals a competitive LEC may choose depend on
    the service order. As described above, both Bell Atlantic
    representatives and competitive LECs are given the same list of
    standard intervals. The standard interval varies by service
    requested. So, for example, if a customer (competitive LEC or Bell
    Atlantic retail) asks for Call Waiting on an existing line, Bell
    Atlantic offers same day service if the order is placed before 3:00
    pm. If the customer wants Caller ID, the standard interval offered
    is 4 days. Therefore if a large proportion of competitive LEC
    customers order Caller ID, while most Bell Atlantic retail customers
    are only ordering Call Waiting, completion intervals will be much
    longer for competitive LEC customers than for Bell Atlantic retail
    customers.

[^648]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 64-65; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 53. For installations of service
    requiring dispatch of a Bell Atlantic service technician, Bell
    Atlantic argues that the average completed interval data for
    competitive LECs is skewed because it includes a larger share of
    orders in areas that are served by busier garages and, as a result,
    reflect later due dates available from Smarts Clock. Bell Atlantic
    argues that the dates received from Smarts Clock can vary by garage
    location, since busier garages tend to offer later dates. Therefore,
    geographic location of the customer can affect the completion
    intervals for dispatch orders. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. at para. 53.

[^649]: Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl.

[^650]: AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at paras. 140-50.

[^651]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20683.

[^652]: Bell Atlantic Application, App. A, Dowell/Canny Decl. at para.
    66.

[^653]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 66; Bell
    Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply at paras. 3-4 & Table 1. The
    Gertner/Bamberger study used a randomly chosen sample of \"W\" coded
    non-dispatch 1-5 line resale POTS and UNE platform orders to examine
    the impact of incorrect \"W\" coding on the completion intervals for
    non-dispatch orders. The study examined 300 orders for June, 800 for
    July, and 800 for August. Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at 1
    n.2. For each order in the sample, the study compared the requested
    interval with the standard interval appropriate to that order based
    on the service requested, to determine if the order was improperly
    coded as \"W.\" The study then examined the impact of the improperly
    coded orders on the average requested interval. In addition the
    study compared the average requested intervals with the average
    completed intervals, to see if, on average, Bell Atlantic was
    filling the orders within the time requested. Bell Atlantic
    Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at paras. 7-12 & n.2.

[^654]: *See* Bell Atlantic Bamberger/Gertner Decl. at para. 12.

[^655]: We note that the findings of the Gertner/Bamberger study are
    applicable to the Average Completed Interval data for dispatch
    orders, even though the Gertner/Bamberger study examined only
    non-dispatch orders for resale services and UNE-P. Just as the
    differences between wholesale and retail Average Completed Interval
    times for non-dispatch orders are likely to be inflated by these
    factors, so will dispatch orders, and average completed intervals
    for other types of dispatch orders, such as UNE loops. We note that
    other metrics, such as Percent Completed in \"X\" Days, and Average
    Delay Days, will also be affected in a similar manner by the factors
    identified in the study.

[^656]: MCI WorldCom says it sets a default due date of four days for
    migrations, and seven days for new orders for UNE platform orders.
    MCI WorldCom Lichtenberg/Sivori Declaration at para. 68. AT&T states
    that it requests five day intervals for UNE platform orders, even if
    the standard interval is only two days. AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at para.
    143.

[^657]: For example, in August the average standard interval for UNE-P
    orders that were within the standard interval was 1.84 days, while
    the average standard interval for retail orders was only 1.22 days,
    a difference of 0.62 days. Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply
    Decl. at paras. 5-6 & Table 2.

[^658]: Gertner and Bamberger also point out that customer-caused delays
    in completing orders that missed the due date can also lengthen the
    Average Completed Interval for wholesale orders. They analyzed the
    data looking for orders more than three days late, which they
    considered to be \"outliers.\" They found that for August customer
    delays increased the Average Completed Intervals for platform and
    resale orders. Meanwhile there was little or no impact on June or
    July\'s intervals. Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at
    paras. 7-9 & Table 3.

[^659]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Rep. Decl. at para. 53.

[^660]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 33 n.89; AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff.
    at para. 143.

[^661]: Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at paras. 12-14 & Table 2.
    For resale orders within the standard interval, Gertner and
    Bamberger found that the average completed interval of 0.99 days was
    less than the average requested interval of 1.09 days. Bell Atlantic
    Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at Table 2. Gertner and Bamberger conclude
    that Bell Atlantic generally met the Standard Intervals if
    competitive LECs request service within the Standard Interval. Bell
    Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at paras. 12-14.

[^662]: AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at paras. 140-43.

[^663]: The average completed interval for UNE-P orders requesting the
    standard interval was 2.36 days, while the average requested
    interval was 1.84 days, for a difference of 0.52 days. Bell Atlantic
    Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at Table 4; Department of Justice Evaluation
    at 33 n.89; AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at para. 143.

[^664]: Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at 1 n.1.

[^665]: Only 0.03 percent in September according to the Carrier to
    Carrier metrics. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C.

[^666]: Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at paras. 10-11;
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 54. We also note
    that the New York Commission reports that competing LECs have not
    been having difficulty getting the intervals they request. New York
    Commission Comments at 69 n.1.

[^667]: We said in the *Ameritech Michigan Order* that information about
    missed appointments can explain inconsistencies in the Average
    Completed Intervals. *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    20633.

[^668]: KPMG did some analysis of the data for January for non-dispatch
    Average Completed Intervals, and after accounting for geography,
    number of lines, type of order, and date of completion, still found
    an unexplained difference of 0.56 days. It found a similar
    difference in the closely related Average Offered Interval metric.
    KPMG Final Report at POP8 IV-193 to IV-194. KPMG determined that
    with respect to its analysis of the metrics, it was \"Not
    Satisfied,\" because of these detected differences. KPMG Final
    Report at POP8 IV-202. Bell Atlantic argues that the KPMG analysis
    did not fully account for the impact of differing order types,
    because KPMG\'s correction for \"order types\" only took into
    account whether orders were \"N\" (new), \"T\" (to another address),
    and \"C\" (change existing features), and not the various services
    ordered, with their differing standard intervals. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 51.

[^669]: The adjusted differences were calculated as follows. The Bell
    Atlantic retail Average Completed Interval was taken from the
    Carrier to Carrier metrics. To obtain the competing carrier\'s
    adjusted intervals for June, July and August, the study\'s reported
    Average Completed Interval for only orders within the standard
    interval (which corrects for the \"X\" coding problem) were used
    (top line of Table 4 in the Gertner/Bamberger Decl.), and then
    adjusted for the order mix problem by taking the difference between
    the wholesale and retail average standard intervals provided in
    Gertner/Bamberger\'s Reply (right column of Table 2). We found that
    the adjusted differences in Average Completed Intervals for
    non-dispatch UNE-P orders is 0.43 days for June, 0.36 days for July,
    and 0.67 days for August. These differences should all be
    statistically significant, with z-scores less than -7. The
    differences for resale are more difficult to determine, because the
    Carrier to Carrier data is broken down by business and residential,
    while the study aggregates the two together. However, the Carrier to
    Carrier data for business and residential can be combined to yield
    aggregate results. If this is done, and the competing carrier data
    is then adjusted for the factors discussed above, the differences
    come out to less than a third of a day for both business and
    residential orders for July and August, and competing LECs have
    shorter intervals for June. For the details of our analysis, *see*
    *infra* Appendix C. In future applications, we expect applicants to
    correct their Average Completed Interval data for factors outside
    the BOC\'s control, as the Commission recommended in *Ameritech
    Michigan Order* and as we have done here using data from the study.
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20633.

[^670]: The New York Commission states \"the remaining unexplained
    difference of a half day does not warrant a conclusion that Bell
    Atlantic is offering discriminatory service.\" New York Commission
    Comments at 50.

[^671]: The Carrier-to-Carrier guidelines require the return of 95
    percent of mechanized order confirmation and rejection notices
    within two hours of submission to Bell Atlantic, and 95 percent of
    manually processed order confirmation and rejection notices for
    orders under ten lines within 24 hours of submission. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at paras. 17, 20.

[^672]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 53 (finding that competing
    carriers have nondiscriminatory access to Bell Atlantic's
    maintenance and repair systems). Maintenance and repair issues
    specific to unbundled local loops are discussed in checklist item 4
    below.

[^673]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613, 20660-61.

[^674]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692-93.

[^675]: *Id.* at 20692.

[^676]: *See id.*

[^677]: *See id.* at 20693; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 593-94; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617. The
    Commission has previously indicated that, without electronic access
    for competing carriers, the BOC's ability to correct trouble reports
    while on line with the customer would be a "crucial competitive
    advantage." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20698.

[^678]: *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 68. In the
    past, Bell Atlantic also offered carriers access to an Electronic
    Interface Format (EIF) application-to-application interface, and one
    carrier presently is using that interface to access maintenance and
    repair functions.

[^679]: The main RETAS application is a routing tool that accepts
    trouble administration messages, routes requests to the appropriate
    back end systems and returns electronic responses. KPMG Final Report
    at M&R1 V-7. The New York Commission describes RETAS as a "web-based
    interactive system that allows a \[competing carrier\], upon
    receiving a report of trouble from a customer, to test the line and,
    if appropriate, arrange for a Bell Atlantic-NY technician to repair
    the problem," as well as to monitor progress on the trouble report
    and learn when the problem was corrected. New York Commission
    Comments at 50-51.

[^680]: Bell Atlantic's back office maintenance and repair systems
    include: StarMEM for memory feature fixes; Work Force Administrator
    (WFA) for processing special services trouble tickets and trouble
    history inquiries; Loop Maintenance Operating System (LMOS) for
    processing POTS trouble tickets and trouble history; Mechanized Loop
    Test (MLT) for conducting a POTS mechanized loop test; and Switched
    Access Remote Test System (SARTS) for conducting a special services
    test. *See* Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. Attach. E.

[^681]: Bell Atlantic submits that competing carriers have more
    automatic functionality than Bell Atlantic's retail representatives.
    For example, in conducting a mechanized loop test, a Bell Atlantic
    retail representative must assess the circuit type, geographic
    region and destination, and manually submit the test to the proper
    back end system, whereas RETAS automatically sends a competing
    carrier's test to the proper system. Similarly, a Bell Atlantic
    representative must interpret the highly technical test results, but
    the system automatically analyzes the test results and issues a
    recommendation for competing carriers. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at para. 72.

[^682]: Bell Atlantic Application at 45 n.40; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 68. In response to a KPMG finding that
    competing carriers did not have the same access as Bell Atlantic's
    retail representatives to extended trouble history for a given line,
    Bell Atlantic added that functionality to RETAS in June 1999. Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 72. Since June, competing
    carriers can access the three most recently reported trouble tickets
    on any given line. *Id*.

[^683]: Although the Web GUI can be used to report trouble associated
    with unbundled loops, carriers can also submit unbundled loop
    trouble tickets manually. Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para.
    75. We reject as unsupported by the record evidence Prism's mere
    assertion that it must manually submit trouble tickets because RETAS
    cannot be used for unbundled network elements. *See* Prism Comments
    at 13.

[^684]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 45; Bell Atlantic
    Miller/Jordan Decl. at 74 (indicating 47,000 transactions in July).

[^685]: *See* KPMG Final Report at M&R1 V-13-23 (RETAS functional and
    parity evaluation); M&R5 V-75-77 (parity evaluation).

[^686]: Although Bell Atlantic submitted average volume per month on a
    region-wide rather than state-wide basis, KPMG determined that Bell
    Atlantic could handle approximately 500 transactions per hour with
    acceptable response time performance. *See* KPMG Final Report at
    M&R2 V-36-37, 38-43. *See also* KPMG Final Report at M&R3 V-47-55
    (scalability review of system infrastructure, gateways and
    resources).

[^687]: AT&T Comments at 26-27; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras.
    169-71. Although one carrier is accessing maintenance and repair
    functions through the application-to-application EIF interface, we
    find that Bell Atlantic does not make that interface available
    generally to any requesting carrier, and therefore do not rely on it
    for purposes of our analysis.

[^688]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20695-96.

[^689]: *Id.*

[^690]: In conjunction with AT&T and MCI WorldCom, Bell Atlantic is
    developing an application-to-application interface for local service
    maintenance and repair functions that employs electronic bonding.
    Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 73. *See also* Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 56 (expressing
    willingness to work with other interested carriers in developing
    electronic bonding). Aside from one function (mechanized loop
    testing for local POTS, which Bell Atlantic is in the process of
    implementing), Bell Atlantic represents that there are no
    application-to-application industry standards for local services
    maintenance and repair. Bell Atlantic Application at 45; Bell
    Atlantic Miller/Jordan Decl. at para. 73; Bell Atlantic Reply at 36;
    Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 56. Without
    citing any specific standard, AT&T asserts generally that industry
    standards for reporting maintenance and repair troubles using
    electronic bonding have been in effect since 1992 and that Bell
    Atlantic is required to implement them pursuant to its commitments
    in the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX merger proceeding. AT&T Crafton/Connolly
    Aff. at para. 171 n.90. Without reference to any specific standard,
    the record is insufficient for us to verify AT&T's claim. Moreover,
    AT&T does not represent that the unspecified 1992 industry standard
    is for local exchange services.

[^691]: New York Commission Comments at 51; Bell Atlantic Reply at 37
    n.41. We note that RCN complains that Bell Atlantic does not permit
    competing carriers to submit a single trouble ticket when a
    loop-transport combination experiences service disruption. *See* RCN
    Comments at 2, 9-10. We do not find that this practice warrants a
    finding that Bell Atlantic fails to comply with this checklist item.

[^692]: New York Commission Comments at 51; Bell Atlantic Reply at 37
    n.41; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 59.
    The new functionality enables RETAS to check SOP to validate the
    presence of recently-completed service order.

[^693]: *See* KPMG Final Report M&R5 V75-76.

[^694]: Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan/Zanfini Reply Decl. at para. 59.

[^695]: Covad Comments at 31-32. Covad claims that it is unable to open
    a trouble ticket for at least 24 hours after the due date because
    neither the Regional CLEC Coordination Center nor the Regional CLEC
    Maintenance Center will take responsibility for an improperly
    provisioned loop.

[^696]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 53.

[^697]: Response time, or the number of seconds from the issuance of a
    query to the receipt of a response by the requesting carrier, is
    measured for competing carriers using actual response times reported
    by the RETAS gateway and for Bell Atlantic retail using actual
    response times reported by its Caseworker retail trouble report
    system. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 50. The
    New York Commission formerly required Bell Atlantic to report
    maintenance and repair response times using absolute standards
    derived from the KPMG test results. *See* New York Commission
    Comments at 52-53; *NYPSC Permanent Rule Order* App. at 49
    (recommending the temporary use of KPMG response times as the
    performance standards while Bell Atlantic investigates response
    times experienced by KPMG, competing carriers and its retail
    operations). In July and August 1999, with the exception of one
    measurement, Bell Atlantic failed to meet these absolute standards
    either for itself or for competing carriers. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 85, 97 (metrics MR-1-01, MR-1-03,
    MR-1-04, MR-1-06 for July and August 1999). Upon further review, the
    New York Commission found that the KPMG-based absolute standards did
    not measure each transaction processing step and were not
    "representative of real world" experience. New York Commission
    Comments at 52-53. Accordingly, based on a consensus reached by Bell
    Atlantic and competing carriers in the Carrier-to-Carrier
    collaborative, the New York Commission adopted a modified
    performance standard of "parity plus not more than four seconds."
    *NYPSC Additional Guidelines Order* at 10-11. Under this modified
    standard, Bell Atlantic will report maintenance and repair OSS
    response times according to the same performance standard that
    applies to its reporting of pre-ordering OSS response times. In
    light of Bell Atlantic's retail operations, we agree that the parity
    standard is a more appropriate measure of maintenance and repair
    response time than the absolute benchmarks.

[^698]: *See* *supra* para. 146; KPMG Final Report at M&R1 V-7-8
    (describing the layers of security for RETAS to limit unauthorized
    use and to preserve data confidentiality).

[^699]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 73, 85, 97
    (metrics MR-1-01, MR-1-03, MR-1-04 for June, July, and August 1999);
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (metrics
    MR-1-01, MR-1-03, MR-1-04 for September 1999). Bell Atlantic does
    not submit statistical analyses for response times, therefore we
    review any deviation from the performance standard.

[^700]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 73, 85, 97 (metric
    MR-1-06 for June, July, August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (metric MR-1-06 for September 1999).
    Although, using the "parity plus four seconds" standard, Bell
    Atlantic processed test requests 24.32 seconds faster for its retail
    operations in August (82.40 seconds for retail compared with 110.72
    seconds for competing carriers), Bell Atlantic achieved parity in
    September (83.63 seconds for retail; 83.17 seconds for competing
    carriers).

[^701]: Bell Atlantic deviated from the standard by 3.84 seconds in
    June, 5.38 seconds in July, 8.05 seconds in August, and 7.69 seconds
    in September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 73, 85,
    97 (metric MR-1-01 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (metric MR-1-01 for
    September 1999).

[^702]: We therefore reject AT&T's contention that these response times
    are "far longer" than Bell Atlantic's retail operations. AT&T
    Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 172.

[^703]: Although it met the standard in June and August, Bell Atlantic
    deviated from the standard by .96 of a second for July and .34 of a
    second for September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at
    73, 85, 97 (metric MR-1-04 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (metric MR-1-04 for
    September 1999).

[^704]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20693.

[^705]: *Id*.

[^706]: Bell Atlantic submits performance measurements that calculate
    the "mean time to repair," or average duration from receipt of a
    trouble report through its clearance. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. B at 57-59. *See also Performance Measurements NPRM*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 12854 (discussing measurement of the average time to
    restore). For resale, Bell Atlantic took less time to repair
    reported loop and central office trouble from its competitors'
    customers than its own retail customers in each month in June
    through September 1999. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. D at 77, 89, 101 (metrics MR-4-01, MR-4-02, MR-4-03 for
    June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 6 (metrics MR-4-01, MR-4-02, MR-4-03 for September
    1999). Similarly, for the mean time to repair unbundled network
    elements, Bell Atlantic performed better for its competitors'
    customers than for its own retail customers in June, July, and
    September 1999. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at
    82, 94 (metric MR-4-01 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 11 (metric MR-4-01
    for September 1999). Although Bell Atlantic's performance deviated
    slightly for the mean time to repair loops in August (26.22 hours
    for competing carriers versus 25.32 hours for Bell Atlantic retail),
    given that the difference is slight and did not cause a
    statistically significant difference in the total mean time to
    repair, we find that Bell Atlantic repaired unbundled network
    element troubles in substantially the same time for itself and for
    competing carriers. With respect to special services, Bell Atlantic
    met the standard each month from June through September 1999, for
    both resale and unbundled network elements. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 77, 82, 89, 94, 101, 106 (metric
    MR-4-01 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6, 11 (metric MR-4-01 for September 1999).

[^707]: For both resale and unbundled network elements, Bell Atlantic
    cleared a higher percentage of trouble reports within 24 hours for
    competing carriers than for itself in each month from June through
    September 1999. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at
    77, 82, 89, 94, 101, 106 (metric MR-4-04 for June, July, and August
    1999 for POTS and Special Services); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6, 11 (metric MR-4-04 for September 1999
    for POTS and Special Services).

[^708]: For resale POTS services, from June through September 1999, a
    smaller percentage of competing carriers' customers were out of
    service at the 4-hour, 12-hour and 24-hour measured intervals than
    Bell Atlantic's retail customers. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. D at 77, 89, 101, (metrics MR-4-06, MR-4-07, MR-4-08
    for June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 6 (metrics MR-4-06, MR-4-07, MR-4-08 for
    September 1999). For POTS service through unbundled network
    elements, the results were more varied. From June through September,
    although a smaller percentage of competing carriers' customers were
    out of service after 4 hours and after 24 hours compared with Bell
    Atlantic's retail customers, a higher percentage were out of service
    at the 12-hour interval. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. D at 82, 94, 106, (metrics MR-4-06, MR-4-07, MR-4-08 for
    June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 11 (metrics MR-4-06, MR-4-07, MR-4-08 for September
    1999). Considering the performance data for the 4-hour, 12-hour and
    24-hour intervals collectively, we do not consider the slight
    deviations in percent of troubles out of service at the 12-hour
    interval indicative that Bell Atlantic takes longer to repair
    trouble for customers of its competitors than for its own retail
    customers. Similarly, with respect to specials, a statistically
    significant percent of Bell Atlantic's competitors' resale customers
    were out of service after four hours, but not after 24 hours. *See*
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 77, 82, 89, 94, 101,
    106, (metrics MR-4-06, MR-4-08 for June, July, and August 1999);
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6, 11 (metrics
    MR-4-06, MR-4-08 for September 1999).

[^709]: *See* Covad Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at para. 10; Prism Comments
    at 4, 13.

[^710]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20694.

[^711]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 53, 60. In
    prior orders the Commission specifically instructed BOCs to provide
    performance data showing repeat trouble reports. *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20694 (using the repeat trouble
    report rate as an indicator of a BOC's performance in the initial
    resolution of trouble reports); *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20657. *See also* *Performance Measurements NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 12854 (indicating that the percentage of access lines that
    receive trouble tickets in a thirty-day period is indicative of the
    quality of network components supplied by the incumbent LEC, and the
    frequency of repeat troubles in a thirty-day period reflects the
    quality of the incumbent LEC's initial resolution of troubles).

[^712]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 77, 82, 89,
    94, 101, 106 (metric MR-2-02 for June, July and August 1999); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6, 11 (metric MR-2-02
    for September 1999). For specials, although the rate of trouble
    reported was higher for for competing carriers' resale customers
    than for Bell Atlantic each month, we do not consider the
    disparities indicative that Bell Atlantic overall is providing
    competing carriers with access to resale services at a level of
    quality inferior to its own.

[^713]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 77, 82, 89,
    94, 101, 106 (metric MR-2-03 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6, 11 (metric MR-2-03
    for September 1999). With respect to the rate for central office
    trouble reported, the June rate for competing carriers (0.19
    percent) exceeded Bell Atlantic's retail rate (0.16 percent) only
    slightly, followed by similar performance in July, August and
    September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 82, 94, 106
    (metric MR-2-03 for June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 11 (metric MR-2-03 for
    September 1999). We do not find these disparities dispositive of
    inferior quality of access provided by Bell Atlantic.

[^714]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 77, 82, 89,
    94, 101, 106 (metric MR-5-01 for June, July, and August 1999 for
    POTS and Special Services); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 6, 11 (metric MR-5-01 for September 1999 for POTS and
    Special Services).

[^715]: KPMG Final Report at M&R5 V-76-77. *See* New York Commission
    Comments at 52; TRA Comments at 11 n.37 (noting KPMG's findings).

[^716]: *See* AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at para. 177; Prism Comments at
    13-14; Covad Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at paras. 86-87 (contending
    that Bell Atlantic's technicians often improperly close trouble
    tickets).

[^717]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 52 (noting Bell Atlantic's
    claim that it also took longer to clear trouble tickets when its own
    technicians were dispatched in error).

[^718]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20698.

[^719]: *Id*.

[^720]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 102.

[^721]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 102.

[^722]: Bell Atlantic Application at 46; Bell Atlantic Miller/Jordan
    Decl. at paras. 80-81.

[^723]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 53-54.

[^724]: Specifically, the standard adopted by the New York Commission
    for the Carrier-to-Carrier metrics requires that Bell Atlantic
    transmit 95 percent of its DUFs for resale and UNEs to competing
    carriers within four business days after creation and send 98
    percent of its carrier bills to competing carriers within ten
    business days of the bill date. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. B at 66, 70 (Carrier-to-Carrier Guidelines listing
    performance standards); *NYPSC Guidelines Order* App. 2 at 5
    (describing the development of billing performance standards).

[^725]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 85, 97; Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (listing Bell
    Atlantic performance for metric BI-1-02 in July, August, and
    September 1999 as 98.78, 99.60, and 99.59 percent, respectively;
    listing Bell Atlantic performance for metric BI-2-01 in July,
    August, and September 1999 performance as 99.84, 99.54, and 98.71
    percent, respectively). The New York Commission has yet to adopt a
    standard for billing accuracy. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. B at 71; New York Commission Comments at 54. Nonetheless, we
    note that Bell Atlantic's billing accuracy performance, measured as
    the dollars adjusted for billing errors out of the total dollars
    billed, is comparable with Bell Atlantic retail in recent months.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 85,97; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 2 (listing Bell Atlantic
    retail/competing carrier performance for metric BI-3-01 in July,
    August, and September 1999 as 98.67/96.66, 98.17/98.33, and
    98.23/99.14 percent, respectively); *see also* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 71 (describing the measurement of
    metric BI-3-01).

[^726]: New York Commission Comments at 53-54 (noting that 81 percent of
    287 test points were satisfied and 19 percent were satisfied after
    exceptions were resolved). *See generally* KPMG Final Report at BLG
    IV-1-126.

[^727]: KPMG Final Report at Executive Summary II-10.

[^728]: AT&T Comments at 27; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Aff. at paras.
    178-187; AT&T Crafton/Connolly Reply Aff. at paras. 100-102; AT&T
    Dec. 15 *Ex Parte* Letter at 58-61. *See generally* Bell Atlantic
    Nov. 24 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4 (refuting AT&T allegations
    regarding usage for originating toll free calls, provision of
    classification codes for UNE records, and provision of billing
    records for operator-assisted, collect, third-party, and directory
    assistance calls).

[^729]: CCA Comments at 6-7 (arguing that reseller accounts should be
    moved to Bell Atlantic's wholesale billing systems); Z-Tel Comments
    at 22 (arguing that a "read-only" CD-ROM format is inadequate).

[^730]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20723.

[^731]: NALA Comments at 4; TRA Comments at 15-16 (alleging problems
    with service orders that are provisioned but not accounted for in
    Bell Atlantic's filing system, resulting in double billing of
    customers by Bell Atlantic and competing carriers); Adelphia
    Livengood Decl. at para. 18.

[^732]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20651.

[^733]: Z-Tel Comments at 22.

[^734]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)(ii).

[^735]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^736]: *Id.*

[^737]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20718-19;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646.

[^738]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646; *see also
    Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15666-68.

[^739]: *See* Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 117-25. Pursuant to NY
    P.S.C. 914 Tariff, Bell Atlantic offers standard physical and
    virtual collocation arrangements as well as a variety of alternative
    collocation arrangements that competing carriers can use to combine
    individual network elements. Pursuant to NY P.S.C. 916 Tariff, Bell
    Atlantic provides access to preassembled combinations of network
    elements.

[^740]: Through August 1999, Bell Atlantic had provided over 152,000
    network element platforms in service. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 122. KPMG has verified that Bell Atlantic can process
    more than 570,130 platform orders a year. *Id.* (citing KPMG Final
    report at Appendix C (App. C, Tab 916)).

[^741]: *See* Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 115 (stating
    that "the New York Public Service Commission has agreed that \[Bell
    Atlantic\] is providing \[competing carriers\] with 'every
    technically feasible method available today for competitive LECs to
    access network elements combinations to provide service.").

[^742]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 118; NY P.S.C. 914
    Tariff.

[^743]: Bell Atlantic Application at 26; Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para.
    118 (citing NY P.S.C. 914 Tariff). Bell Atlantic's Assembly Rooms
    are rooms within Bell Atlantic's central offices where competitive
    carriers can combine loops and switching ports, and Assembly Points
    are cabinets adjacent to Bell Atlantic's central offices where
    competitive carriers can combine loops and switching ports. *Id.*

[^744]: Bell Atlantic Application at 24; Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras.
    122-24.

[^745]: *Id.* at 125.

[^746]: *Id*. at paras. 115, 122, 125.

[^747]: TRA Comments at 21; ALTS Comments at 11.

[^748]: *See, e.g.,* ALTS Comments at 49-64; DSL.net Comments. at 7-8.

[^749]: *See* discussion of checklist item 1 above.

[^750]: *See, e.g.,* Sprint Comments at 16-17; TRA Comments at 19; AT&T
    Comments at 49-50; AT&T Reply at 44; CompTel Dec. 10 *Ex Parte*
    Letter. Bell Atlantic does not provide the full loop-switch platform
    for business services in New York City wire center in which there
    are two or more competing carriers already collocated and tariffed
    to provide local service. *See* *Pre-Filing Statement of Bell
    Atlantic New York* at 9, Case 97-C-0271 (PSC filed Apr. 6, 1998).

[^751]: Bell Atlantic's residence and business platform offerings have
    duration periods of either 4 or 6 years, depending on whether the
    central office is located in Zone 1 or Zone 2. *See* *Pre-Filing
    Statement of Bell Atlantic New York* at 9-10, Case 97-C-0271 (PSC
    filed Apr. 6, 1998).

[^752]: *See, e.g.,* AT&T Comments at 50-51; TRA Comments at 19-20; RCN
    Comments at 6-8.

[^753]: The Supreme Court also reinstated the Commission's Rule 51.315
    (b) (prohibiting incumbents from separating preassembled
    combinations of network elements) which, along with rules
    51315(c)-(f) (requiring incumbents' to combine non-preassembled
    combinations of elements for requesting carriers), had been
    overturned by the Eighth Circuit. *AT&T Corp v. Iowa Utilities Bd.*,
    119 S.Ct. 721 (1999).

    ^?^ In light of the reasoning set forth in that decision, the
    Commission has asked the Eighth Circuit to reinstate rules
    51.315(c)-(f). That matter is still pending.

[^754]: *See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report
    and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC
    99-238 (rel. Nov. 5, 1999) (*Third Report and Order and Fourth
    FNPRM*).

[^755]: In the *Fourth FNPRM*, we stated that it is not clear that the
    1996 Act permits any restrictions to be placed on the use of
    unbundled network elements. We concluded, however, that under
    existing law, a requesting carrier is entitled to obtain existing
    combinations of loop and transport between the end user and the
    incumbent LEC's serving wire center on an unrestricted basis at
    unbundled network element prices. *Third Report and Order and Fourth
    FNPRM* at para. 484. In a *Supplemental Order*, we modified those
    conclusions with respect to the use of unbundled network elements to
    provide exchange access services. *Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,* CC
    Docket No. 96-98 (adopted Nov. 24, 1999) (*Supplemental Order*).
    Specifically, we stated that in order to preserve the issue in the
    *Fourth FNPRM* as we intended, we would "allow incumbent LECs to
    constrain the use of combinations of unbundled loops and transport
    network elements as a substitute for special access service subject
    to the requirements of \[*the Supplemental Order"*\]. *Id.* at para
    2. We also concluded that this constraint does not apply if an
    interexchange carrier uses combinations of unbundled loop and
    transport network elements to provide a significant amount of local
    exchange service, in addition to exchange access service, to a
    particular customer. *Id.* at para. 5.

[^756]: We note that Bell Atlantic states that it will comply with the
    Commission's unbundling rules once they become effective. Bell
    Atlantic Application at 25.

[^757]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(B)(ii).

[^758]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

[^759]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^760]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15845.

[^761]: *Id.* at 15844-46.

[^762]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 66; *NYPSC Collocation Order*
    at 7; *NYPSC Interconnection Tariff* at 5.1.17(A)(B) and
    10.5.1(A)(B); NYPSC Tariff No. 916 (Bell Atlantic Application App.
    H, Tab 3*) (NYPSC UNE Tariff*) at 5.12.9.5; *Opinion and Order
    Concerning Methods for Network Element Recombination*, Case Nos.
    98-C-0690 and 95-C-0657 (NYPSC Nov. 23, 1998 (Bell Atlantic
    Application App. D, Vol. 6, Tab 121) (*NYPSC UNE Recombination
    Order); Opinion and Order Setting Rates for First Group of Network
    Elements*, Case Nos. 95-C-0657, 94-C-0095, 91-C-1174 (NYPSC April 1,
    1997) (Bell Atlantc Application App. G, Vol. 1, Tab 9) (*NYPSC Phase
    I Order*); New York Commission Comments at 152-62; New York
    Commission Reply at 49-50.

[^763]: Bell Atlantic Application at 65-66.

[^764]: New York Commission Comments at 162; *see also* New York
    Commission Reply at 42.

[^765]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 4.

[^766]: *Id*. at 14.

[^767]: *Id.*

[^768]: *Id*. at 13.

[^769]: In the New York Commission rate case, Bell Atlantic filed under
    the name of "New York Telephone d/b/a/ Bell Atlantic-New York."
    *See, e.g*., *NYPSC Phase 3 Order* at 1.

[^770]: *NYPSC Phase 1 Order* at 14.

[^771]: *Id*. at 48-64.

[^772]: *Id*. at 99.

[^773]: *Id*. at 120. We note that Phase Four of the New York
    Commission's network elements rate case has not been completed, and
    several important network element issues remain outstanding. New
    York Commission Comments at 154-55.

[^774]: AT&T Comments at 54.

[^775]: Bell Atlantic Application at 66.

[^776]: *See, e.g.,* *NYPSC Phase I Order*; *NYPSC Phase 3 Order*; Bell
    Atlantic Pre-Filing Statement; Bell Atlantic-New York Joint
    Affidavit in Support of Proposed Rates for ADSL-Qualified,
    HDSL-Qualified, and Digital-Designed Links, Case 98-C-1357 (NYPSC
    Sept. 13, 1999) (Rhythms Comments, Attach. EHG-RW-3) (Bell Atlantic
    Affidavit in Support of DSL Links); *NYPSC Collocation Order*.

[^777]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 84.

[^778]: AT&T Comments at 60.

[^779]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 83-84.

[^780]: *Id*. at 83-84.

[^781]: *Id.* at 84.

[^782]: Id. at 84-85; see also Order Denying Motion to Reopen Phase I
    and Instituting New Proceeding (NYPSC Sept. 30, 1998) (Bell Atlantic
    Application App. G, Vol. 1, Tab 18) (NYPSC Order Denying Motion to
    Reopen Phase I).

[^783]: New York Commission Reply at 47-48.

[^784]: *Id*. at 48.

[^785]: AT&T Comments at 60.

[^786]: Letter from Mark C. Rosenblum, Vice President-Law, AT&T, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission
    (filed Nov. 23, 1999) *(AT&T Nov. 23 Ex Parte* Letter) at 6.

[^787]: AT&T Comments at 62-63.

[^788]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812.

[^789]: *Id*. at 15559.

[^790]: New York Commission Reply at 46.

[^791]: *See* *id.* at 48.

[^792]: *See* AT&T Comments at 60.

[^793]: *In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC
    Docket No. 96-45, Tenth Report and Order, FCC 99-304 (rel. Nov. 2,
    1999) (*Universal Service Tenth Report and Order*) at para. 32.

[^794]: *Id.*

[^795]: New York Commission Reply at 48.

[^796]: AT&T Comments at 61; *see also* AT&T Nov. 23 *Ex Parte* Letter
    at 4-5.

[^797]: New York Commission Reply at 47-48.

[^798]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 85, n.1; see also New York Commission
    Reply at 47-48; *NYPSC Order Denying Motion to Reopen Phase I*.

[^799]: New York Commission Reply at 47.

[^800]: AT&T Comments at 58-60.

[^801]: New York Commission Reply at 45-46.

[^802]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 70.

[^803]: *Id.*

[^804]: *Id.*

[^805]: AT&T Nov. 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4-5.

[^806]: *NYPSC Phase I Order* at 83-84.

[^807]: *Id*.

[^808]: New York Commission Reply at 45-46.

[^809]: *Id*. at 46 and n.4.

[^810]: AT&T Clarke/Petzinger Aff. at paras. 5-24.

[^811]: Id. at paras. 5-24; see also AT&T Nov. 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    4.

[^812]: NYPSC Phase I Order at 71-72.

[^813]: *Id.* at 83-84.

[^814]: *Id*.

[^815]: AT&T Nov. 23 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^816]: New York Commission Reply at 46 n.2.

[^817]: We note, however, that in other states it may be acceptable, and
    even preferable, to assume the use of copper in certain parts of a
    LEC's network.

[^818]: *Bell Atlantic Affidavit in Support of DSL Links* at 4. A small
    "x" before the letters "DSL" signifies the use of the term as a
    generic transmission technology. *See infra* Section V.D.

[^819]: Bell Atlantic-New York's Joint Affidavit in Support of Proposed
    Rates for ADSL-Qualified, HDSL-Qualified, and Digital-Designed
    Links, Case 98-C-1357 (Sept. 13, 1999) at 4-5.

[^820]: *Id.* at 6.

[^821]: *Id*. at 6.

[^822]: *Id.*

[^823]: *Id*.

[^824]: *Id*. at 8.

[^825]: *Id*. at 8-9.

[^826]: *Id*. at 6. Bell Atlantic states that it would be willing to
    recover these charges through a non-recurring, loop based charge.
    *Id.*

[^827]: *Id*. at 9-10. In addition to a manual loop qualification
    charge, Bell Atlantic may impose an engineering query charge, an
    engineering work order charge, and a pair swap charge. *Id.* at
    10-13.

[^828]: A load coil is an inductor that is connected into a loop in
    order to improve its voice transmission characteristics. *Id*. at
    14.

[^829]: Bridge taps are a branching of a copper loop that permit the
    appearance of the loop at a number of alternative servicing terminal
    locations, which give the telephone company greater flexibility in
    reassigning a telephone number to a different address without
    rearranging existing facilities. *Id*. at 14-16.

[^830]: *Id*. at 14.

[^831]: *Id.* at 16. Additional charges may accrue when a competitive
    provider orders a two-wire digital link that is longer than 18,000
    feet. *Id.*

[^832]: *NYPSC UNE Tariff* at 5.5.1.1(D)(2)(b).

[^833]: *Id.*

[^834]: Bell Atlantic-New York's Joint Affidavit in Support of Proposed
    Rates for ADSL-Qualified, HDSL-Qualified, and Digital-Designed
    Links, Case 98-C-1357 (Sept. 13, 1999) at 16.

[^835]: *Id*.

[^836]: *Id*. at 17.

[^837]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692.

[^838]: *Id.*

[^839]: *Id*.

[^840]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.509(e).

[^841]: ALTS Comments at 36-37; CoreComm Comments at 6; Covad Comments
    at 6; Intermedia Comments at 8; MCI WorldCom Comments at 21.

    ^?^ ALTS Comments at 36-37.

[^842]: ALTS Comments at 36-37; CoreComm Comments at 6; Covad Comments
    at 6; Intermedia Comments at 8; MCI WorldCom Comments at 21.

    ^?^ ALTS Comments at 36-37.

[^843]: *Id*. at 36.

[^844]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 53-55.

[^845]: New York Commission Comments at 79-80.

[^846]: *Id*.

[^847]: *Id*.

[^848]: New York Commission Reply at 49.

[^849]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 195.

[^850]: New York Commission Reply at 49.

[^851]: Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812.

[^852]: We note that the New York Commission has committed to review
    Bell Atlantic's cost studies in support of its DSL prices and to
    conform such prices to TELRIC before the end of 1999. New York
    Commission Reply at 49-50.

[^853]: We note that New York Commission is taking reasonable steps to
    complete its permanent rate-setting proceeding within a short
    time-frame, and the New York Commission and Bell Atlantic have both
    committed to the use of forward-looking economic costs for
    determining unbundled network elements rates. *NYPSC Collocation
    Order* at 7; Bell Atlantic Reply at 55.

[^854]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692.

[^855]: Cable & Wireless Comments at 6.

[^856]: Bell Atlantic Pre-Filing Statement at 1.

[^857]: *NYPSC UNE Tariff* at 5.12.8.5.

[^858]: *Bell Atlantic Pre-Filing Statement*, Attach. Letter from John
    F. O'Mara, Chairman, New York State Public Service Commission, to
    Hon. Maureen O. Helmer, Deputy Chairman, New York State Public
    Service Commission (filed April 6, 1998) at 4.

[^859]: *NYPSC UNE Tariff* at 5.12.9.5.

[^860]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). As originally enacted, section
    224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators
    encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended
    section 224 in several important respects to ensure that
    telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access
    to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by
    utility companies, including LECs. *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n.574.

[^861]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16073.

[^862]: Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act
    of 1996, Amendment of the Commission's Rules and Policies Governing
    Pole Attachments, CS Docket No. 97-151, 13 FCC Rcd 6777 (1998) (Pole
    Attachment Telecommunications Rate Order).

[^863]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). Section 224(a)(1) defines "utility" to
    include any entity, including a LEC, that controls, "poles, ducts,
    conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire
    communications." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1).

[^864]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order,* the Commission concluded that, although the statutory
    exception enunciated in section 224(f)(2) appears to be limited to
    utilities providing electrical service, LECs should also be
    permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way, because of insufficient capacity and for reasons of
    safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes,
    provided the assessment of such factors is done in a
    nondiscriminatory manner. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 16080-81.

[^865]: Section 224(a)(4) defines "pole attachment" as "any attachment
    by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
    service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
    controlled by a utility." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4).

[^866]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).

[^867]: *See* *States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole
    Attachments*, Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992). The 1996 Act
    extended the Commission's authority to include not just rates,
    terms, and conditions, but also the authority to regulate
    nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way. *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 16104; 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Absent state regulation of terms
    and conditions of nondiscriminatory attachment access, the
    Commission retains jurisdiction. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1)*.*

[^868]: Bell Atlantic Application at 26-27; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at paras. 128-139.

[^869]: New York Commission Comments at 70-75. *See also* Intermedia
    Comments at 6 (stating that in Intermedia's experience, Bell
    Atlantic has complied with the requirements of this checklist item).

[^870]: ALTS Comments at 48-49. RCN raises similar issues regarding
    house and riser cables under checklist items 2 and 4. RCN Comments
    at 3-5.

[^871]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para.144.

[^872]: Letter from Patrick J. Donovan, Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman,
    LLP, Counsel for RCN, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (Filed November 3,
    1999) (*RCN Ex Parte* Letter). RCN claims that access to conduits
    and ducts requires 90 to 120 days and these delays are especially
    burdensome to competitive LECs with more limited infrastructure than
    Bell Atlantic. *See also* RCN Reply at 4-5.

[^873]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv).

[^874]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15691*.*

[^875]: *Id.*

[^876]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20637*.*

[^877]: *Id.* at 20712-13.

[^878]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 10619.

[^879]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20713*.*

[^880]: *Id.*; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20614.

[^881]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20713*; Local
    Competition First Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 15691*.*

[^882]: IDLC technology permits a carrier to aggregate and multiplex
    loop traffic at a remote concentration point and to deliver that
    multiplexed traffic directly into the switch without first
    demultiplexing the individual loops. *Local* *Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692.

[^883]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15692-93*.*

[^884]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20713*.*

[^885]: *Id.* at 15693. The network interface device is a cross-connect
    device used to connect the loop facilities to inside wiring. *See
    id.*

[^886]: *See supra* Section II.A.

[^887]: *See* Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 64.

[^888]: *Id.*

[^889]: *Id.*

[^890]: *See id.* at para. 66.

[^891]: *See id.* at para. 66; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl.
    at para. 34.

[^892]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 66; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Repy Decl. at para. 34.

[^893]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 67.

[^894]: *Id.* at para. 78; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at
    para. 73.

[^895]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 81 & Attach. K; Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 73.

[^896]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619.

[^897]: In particular, Bell Atlantic provides data regarding its
    performance in provisioning second lines and other new loops to its
    retail customers to its retail customers.

[^898]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20655*; Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15763-64.

[^899]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619.

[^900]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 59.

[^901]: *Id.* at para. 63; *see supra* Section V.B.1.g.

[^902]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 76**.**

[^903]: In June, Bell Atlantic missed 1.96 percent of installation
    appointments for competing carriers and 9.02 percent of appointments
    for Bell Atlantic customers. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. D at 90 (metric PR-4-04 -- Loop New for June 1999).

[^904]: In July, Bell Atlantic missed .33 percent of dispatched new loop
    installations for competing carriers and in August, .12 percent.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach., D at 92, 104 (metric
    PR-4-04 -- Loop New for July and August 1999). Similarly, Bell
    Atlantic missed .41 percent of loop installation appointments for
    competing carriers in September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric PR-4-04 -- Loop New for September
    1999).

[^905]: Bell Atlantic missed 10.69 percent of retail loop installation
    appointments in July and 9.41 percent of appointments in August.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 92, 104 (metric
    PR-4-04 -- Loop New for July and August 1999). Finally, Bell
    Atlantic missed 12.14 percent of retail loop installation
    appointments in September. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. C at 9 (metric PR-4-04 -- Loop New for September 1999).

[^906]: Installation quality performance data measure both new,
    stand-alone loops and loops provisioned as part of a platform.
    Accordingly, the only types of loops provisioned by Bell Atlantic
    that are not included in these reports are those provisioned as hot
    cuts. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. B at 47.

[^907]: In June, competing carriers reported troubles within 7 days for
    1.28 percent of the loops installed by Bell Atlantic, and retail
    customers reported troubles with 2.85 percent of installed loops.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 80 (metric PR-6-02 --
    Loop for June 1999). July data indicate that 1.65 percent of loops
    installed for competing carriers received trouble reports, and 2.90
    percent of Bell Atlantic retail loops had reported troubles. *Id.*
    at 92 (metric PR-6-02 -- Loop for July 1999). In August, competing
    carriers reported troubles within 7 days for 1.57 percent of the
    loops installed by Bell Atlantic, and retail customers reported
    troubles with 2.92 percent of installed loops. *Id.* at 104 (metric
    PR-6-02 -- Loop for August 1999). In September, 1.06 percent of
    loops provisioned to competitors had troubles reported within 7 days
    of installation, while 3.15 percent of Bell Atlantic retail
    customers reported loop troubles within 7 days. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric PR-6-02 -- Loop for
    September 1999).

[^908]: In June, competing carriers reported troubles within 30 days for
    3.31 percent of the loops installed by Bell Atlantic, and retail
    customers reported troubles with 4.85 percent of installed loops.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 80 (metric PR-6-01 --
    Loop for June 1999). July data indicate that 4.05 percent of loops
    installed for competing carriers received trouble reports within 30
    days and 5.22 percent of Bell Atlantic retail loops had reported
    troubles. *Id.* at 92 (metric PR-6-01 -- Loop for July 1999). In
    August, competing carriers reported troubles within 30 days for 3.50
    percent of the loops installed by Bell Atlantic, and retail
    customers reported troubles with 5.02 percent of installed loops.
    *Id.* at 104 (metric PR-6-01 -- Loop for August 1999). In September,
    2.65 percent of loops provisioned to competitors had troubles
    reported within 30 days of installation, while 5.74 percent of Bell
    Atlantic retail customers reported loop troubles within 30 days.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric
    PR-6-01 -- Loop for September 1999).

[^909]: We note that Prism alleges that Bell Atlantic often fails to
    provision functioning unbundled loops. Prism Comments at 9-11.
    Although we have considered these claims, Prism has not asserted
    that any installation problems it has experienced are not reflected
    or captured in the relevant performance measures. Moreover, we find
    Prism's general allegations to be insufficient to overcome the
    substantial evidence in the record of the quality of new, unbundled
    loops provisioned by Bell Atlantic.

    As discussed in our analysis of checklist item 2, we also rely
    heavily upon KPMG's comprehensive evaluation of Bell Atlantic's
    provisioning systems for both wholesale and resale services. KPMG
    examined the degree to which Bell Atlantic's provisioning
    environment for wholesale orders is "on parity" with provisioning
    for Bell Atlantic retail customers and concluded that Bell Atlantic
    had satisfied each of its testing criteria. *See generally* KPMG
    Final Report at POP11 IV-258-84 (Provisioning Parity Process
    Evaluation). *See also supra* Section V.B.1.g.

[^910]: Bell Atlantic's data measure the "average completed interval,"
    which is the average number of business days between the order
    application date and the work completion date. Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 35. For purposes of this discussion,
    we use the terms "average completed interval" and "average
    installation interval" interchangeably.

[^911]: With respect to customers of competing carriers, the average
    competed interval in June 1999 for loops with one to five lines was
    6.55 days, while the average completion interval for Bell Atlantic
    retail customers was 3.27 days. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl.
    Attach. D at 80 (metric PR-2-03 -- Loop for June 1999). In July
    1999, the average installation interval for loop orders of one to
    five lines was 5.39 days for competing carriers and 3.08 days for
    Bell Atlantic customers. *Id.* at 92 (metric PR-2-03 -- Loop for
    July 1999). In September 1999, the average installation interval for
    customers of competing carriers for loop orders of one to five lines
    was 5.88 days, and the Bell Atlantic retail average interval was
    3.52 days. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9
    (metric PR-2-03 -- Loop for September 1999). The data further reveal
    similar trends for loop orders involving more than five lines,
    although the number of such loops ordered by competitors has
    consistently been very small. *See id.* (metric PR-2-04 and 2-05 --
    Loop for June, July, August, and September 1999).

[^912]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 39.

[^913]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 17; Bell Atlantic
    Bamberger/Gertner Decl.

[^914]: *See* Bell Atlantic Bamberger/Gertner Decl. at para. 12.

[^915]: AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at para. 143. We note, however, that AT&T
    states that it does so because it lacks confidence in Bell
    Atlantic's ability to complete orders on-time. *Id.*

[^916]: We note that Prism alleges a low rate of successful loop
    installations performed by Bell Atlantic, although it does not
    dispute directly Bell Atlantic's data. *See* Prism Comments at
    10-11. Although we take seriously Prism's claims, we nonetheless
    find them to be insufficient to overcome the record evidence that
    Bell Atlantic provisions quality unbundled loops in a
    nondiscriminatory manner. In addition, although it mentions the
    disparity between Bell Atlantic's loop provisioning intervals, the
    Department of Justice does not address the provisioning of new
    unbundled loops in its evaluation. *See* Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 19 n.42.

[^917]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. at para. 53.

[^918]: Bell Atlantic also contends that, generally, average
    provisioning intervals are longer for competing carriers because
    those carriers order proportionately more products with longer
    standard provisioning intervals than Bell Atlantic customers. Bell
    Atlantic Bamberger/Gertner Decl. at para. 12. We note first that
    Bell Atlantic makes no specific reference to this claim with respect
    to loop orders, and we are therefore unable to determine if such a
    claim would be applicable to those orders. We are unpersuaded,
    however, that this "order mix" argument is applicable to stand-alone
    new loop orders because the feature mixes that Bell Atlantic alleges
    result in longer provisioning intervals do not come into play when
    Bell Atlantic provisions a stand-alone loop. A competing carrier,
    for instance, would not order any feature such as Caller ID or Call
    Answering from Bell Atlantic when it provides service over an
    unbundled loop that is cross-connected to its own switch, as is the
    case with a stand-alone loop, for such features are provided through
    the competitive carrier's switch and not the loop. *See* Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 64; *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15706.

[^919]: AT&T Comments, Exhibit K, para. 134. *See* Prism Comments at
    7-10.

[^920]: In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, for example, the Commission
    stated that the BOC "is free to use data on due dates not met to
    explain any inconsistencies between the average installation
    intervals for itself and other carriers. For example, if a
    particular competing carrier consistently requests a standard,
    longer interval for completion of all of its orders, rather than the
    first available installation date, such data may explain that any
    differences in the average installation intervals between \[the
    BOC\] and the other carrier are not due to discriminatory conduct on
    the part of \[the BOC\]." *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20633.

[^921]: The average completed interval for competing carriers in July
    was 15.00 days, and the interval for Bell Atlantic customers was
    11.34 days. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 93
    (metric PR-2-07 -- DS1 for July 1999). For August, DS1 loops were
    provisioned to competing carriers in, on average, 24.13 days and to
    Bell Atlantic customers in 8.07 days. Id. at 105 (metric PR-2-07 --
    DS1 for August 1999).

[^922]: In June, Bell Atlantic missed 2.94 percent of installation
    appointments for high capacity services delivered to competing
    carriers and 3.71 percent of appointments for its retail customers.
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 81 (metric PR-4-01 --
    Total for June 1999). In July, Bell Atlantic missed 22.22 percent of
    installation appointments for high capacity loops delivered to
    competing carriers and 5.44 percent of appointments for its retail
    customers. *Id.* at 93 (metric PR-4-01 -- Total for July 1999). In
    August, however, Bell Atlantic's performance towards competitors
    improved substantially, and it missed 15.79 percent of appointments
    for competing carriers and 18.03 percent of installations for its
    own customers. *Id.* at 105 (metric PR-4-01 -- Total for August
    1999). In September, Bell Atlantic missed only 4 percent of
    installation appointments for high capacity loops provided to
    competing carriers and 18.58 percent of appointments for
    installations to its retail customers. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 10 (metric PR-4-01 -- Total for September
    1999).

[^923]: Allegiance indicates that 46 percent of the DS1 loops it ordered
    from Bell Atlantic were delivered after the confirmed due date.
    Allegiance Comments at 12. *See also* Omnipoint Comments at 10;
    Focal Comments at 5-6.

[^924]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20569 ("\[W\]e
    will attach greater weight to comments and pleadings supported by a
    sworn statement than we will to an unsupported contrary pleading.").

[^925]: A hot cut entails manually disconnecting the customer's loop in
    the Bell Atlantic central office and reconnecting the loop at the
    competing carrier's collocation space. It also involves coordinated
    switch software changes at both Bell Atlantic's switch and the
    competing carrier's switch and the implementation of local number
    portability. The customer is taken out of service while the hot cut
    is in progress, thereby making the cut "hot," although if the cut is
    successful, the service disruption will last no more than five
    minutes. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 69. Ensuring
    that a hot cut is provisioned correctly with coordination between
    Bell Atlantic and the competing carrier is therefore critical
    because problems with the cutover could result in an extended
    service disruption for the customer.

[^926]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20714.

[^927]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 73.

[^928]: *Id.*

[^929]: Bell Atlantic Application, App. C, *Order Establishing Final
    Rule*, C2C Record, Tab 83.

[^930]: New York Commission Comments at 82.

[^931]: *Id.*

[^932]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 80, 92, 103
    (metric PR-4-06 -- Hot Cut for July and August 1999).

[^933]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric
    PR-4-06 -- Hot Cut for September 1999).

[^934]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 83; Bell Atlantic
    Application, App. C, Vol. 61, Tab 941. In the face of these and
    other challenges to its data, Bell Atlantic was forced to withdraw
    all of the hot cut data it had submitted prior to June 18, 1999.
    *See* Bell Atlantic Application, App. C, Vol. 51, Tab 789 (Letter
    from Randal Milch, Associate General Counsel, Bell Atlantic-State
    Regulatory North, to Andrew Klein, Assistant Counsel, New York
    Public Service Commission, June 18, 1999).

[^935]: New York Commission Comments at 85.

[^936]: A portion of AT&T's Motion to Strike is directed to the New York
    Commission's submission with its reply comments of the results of
    its data reconciliation for August 1999. See AT&T Motion to Strike
    at 4. Specifically, AT&T argues that our rules prohibit us from
    relying on the material submitted by the New York Commission because
    it post-dates this application's comment period. The New York
    Commission's hot cut reconciliation, however, responds directly to
    arguments made in the comments filed by AT&T regarding Bell
    Atlantic's on-time hot cut performance. Additionally, the
    reconciliation addresses data for the month of August 1999, which is
    prior to the filing of Bell Atlantic's application. Accordingly, as
    discussed *supra* Section III, we deny AT&T's Motion to Strike with
    respect to the New York Commission's August hot cut reconciliation.

[^937]: *See* New York Commission Rubino Reply Aff. at para. 6. AT&T
    Meek Aff. at para. 118.

[^938]: New York Commission Rubino Reply Aff. at paras. 9-11.

[^939]: *Id.* at para. 10.

[^940]: New York Commission Rubino Reply Aff. at paras. 9-10. The
    staff's reconciliation is ongoing, although its conclusions
    regarding September performance are not yet complete.

[^941]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19 & n.41. *See* AT&T
    Comments at 39; AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 132-35.

[^942]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19 & n.41. *See* AT&T
    Comments at 39; AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 132-35.

[^943]: *See* Allegiance Comments at 11 (hot cut process caused hot cut
    failures attributable to Bell Atlantic to drop from more than 70
    percent to 20 percent in recent months); ChoiceOne Comments at 4
    (Bell Atlantic failed to provision properly 21 of 43 loop orders).

[^944]: In addition, Bell Atlantic on reply addresses the specific
    allegations made by Allegiance and ChoiceOne regarding its hot cut
    performance. Specifically, Bell Atlantic states that between June 21
    and August 31, 1999, it completed 91.3 percent of Allegiance's hot
    cut orders within the prescribed window and 95.40 percent of
    ChoiceOne's orders within the prescribed window. Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at paras. 41, 42.

[^945]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20569 ("\[W\]e
    will attach greater weight to comments and pleadings supported by an
    affidavit or sworn statement than we will to an unsupported contrary
    pleading.").

[^946]: We also find that this level of on-time performance would not be
    significantly affected if it were to capture hot cuts that are
    delayed as a result of Bell Atlantic provisioning deficiencies, as
    commenters argue it should. *See* Department of Justice Evaluation
    at 19 (citing AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 127-30). Under the on-time
    performance standard, a hot cut that is not completed at the
    initially-scheduled time, but rather is completed in a
    subsequently-rescheduled time, is considered "on-time," even where a
    Bell Atlantic provisioning error causes the rescheduling. *See*
    *id.* at 19. The Department of Justice determined that this aspect
    of the metric causes the on-time performance measure to "overstate"
    Bell Atlantic's hot cut performance. *Id.* at 19. KPMG, however,
    found that the majority of rescheduled hot cuts are attributable to
    competing carriers, and Bell Atlantic argues that it causes only 11
    percent of delayed or postponed hot cuts. Bell Atlantic Application
    at 19 & Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 73. Commenters allege that the
    percentage of hot cut delays attributable to Bell Atlantic is much
    higher. See Allegiance Comments at 11; AT&T Comments at 38. AT&T
    argues that KPMG acknowledged in the New York proceeding that 40
    percent of supplements were attributable to Bell Atlantic. AT&T Meek
    Aff. at para. 102 (citing New York Technical Conference Transcript
    at 3936-37). As Bell Atlantic responds, however, this statement
    predated the final report, which represents KPMG's comprehensive
    analysis of Bell Atlantic's performance in New York. We therefore
    rely upon the KPMG final report, which found that approximately 11
    percent of postponed orders were attributable to Bell Atlantic, and
    conclude that the failure of the on-time performance measure to
    include hot cut delays attributable to Bell Atlantic does not
    overstate overall performance. *See* KPMG Final Report at POP12
    IV-294-95 (Table IV-12.6: POP12, P12-3). We find that the number of
    hot cut delays not included in the metric and attributable to Bell
    Atlantic is sufficiently small that it would not effect a change in
    Bell Atlantic's on-time hot cut performance.

    We also note that, although commenters argue that "early" cuts,
    i.e., those made prior to the Frame Due Time, are not reflected in
    the On-Time Hot Cut Performance Measure, a review of the
    Carrier-to-Carrier performance standards indicates that early cuts
    are, in fact, reported as missed hot cuts. See Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 43. *See also* New York Commission
    Reply at 27.

[^947]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric
    PR-4-06 -- Hot Cut for September 1999).

[^948]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 80, 92, 104;
    Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9. Moreover,
    even reviewing the data in a light most favorable to the opponents
    of the application indicates that in only one month was performance
    slightly below 90 percent, namely 88 percent.

[^949]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 18.

[^950]: *Id.* at 15-16, 19.

[^951]: *Id.* at 20.

[^952]: *See* New York Commission Reply at 28. We note that the
    Department of Justice recognized that deviation from a New York
    Commission performance standard should not be dispositive in a
    determination of checklist compliance. Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 20.

[^953]: Under the New York Performance Assurance Plan, the Percent
    On-Time Performance Measure is considered to be a "Critical
    Measure," requiring the payment of \$787,037 for every month that
    Bell Atlantic fails to meet the 90 percent on-time performance
    standard and a smaller portion of that amount if Bell Atlantic's
    performance is between 90 and 95 percent for more than two
    consecutive months. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, App.
    B at 1. In addition, recent amendments to the Plan placed an
    additional \$24 million per year at risk for poor on-time hot cut
    performance. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, App. H at
    2.

[^954]: *See* CPI Reply at 7. Indeed, KPMG recognized during its test of
    hot cut provisioning that hot cut failures have the potential to
    affect customers detrimentally, causing service disruptions ranging
    from hours to days. KPMG Final Report at POP3, POPIV-60P3-33, Table
    IV-3.33.

[^955]: Installation troubles for hot cut loops are reported in terms of
    the number of lines, not hot cuts, that are the subject of trouble
    reports. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 47.

[^956]: For July 1999, Bell Atlantic reports that it received trouble
    reports within seven days of installation on .34 percent of the
    lines provisioned through hot cut loops. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. D at 92 (metric PR-6-02 -- Hot Cut Loop for July
    1999). In August, it received 1.26 percent of troubles reported
    within seven days. Id. at 103 (metric PR-6-02 -- Hot Cut Loop for
    August 1999). September data reveal that .51 percent of lines
    provisioned by Bell Atlantic through hot cuts received trouble
    reports within seven days of the cutover. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. C at 9 (metric PR-6-02 -- Hot Cut Loop for
    September 1999).

[^957]: Beginning September 1999, the New York Commission adopted a
    standard of 2 percent for the Percent Hot Cut Installation Troubles
    Reported within 7 Days Measure. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Reply Decl. Attach. D at 9 (metric PR-6-02 -- Hot Cut Loop for
    September 1999).

[^958]: Allegiance Reply at 3.

[^959]: AT&T Meek Aff. at para. 86. Specifically, AT&T alleges that Bell
    Atlantic's failures caused service disruptions to 170 out of 1438
    customers. *Id.* AT&T also contends that 61 percent of these service
    outages endured for more than twenty-four hours. *Id.* at para. 87.

    Although the Carrier-to-Carrier performance measures do not address
    them directly, service disruptions or outages can occur in two
    situations. First, an early cut occurs when a customer's loop is
    moved to a competitor's collocation space prior to the Frame Due
    Time and the switch translations are removed from the Bell Atlantic
    switch prior to such time. AT&T Meek Aff. at para. 84. In that case,
    the customer would lose service because the competing carrier is
    unaware that the customer's line is being cut and does not take the
    steps necessary to port the customer's telephone number. Id. Such an
    occurrence would be scored as a "miss" under the Percent On-Time Hot
    Cut Performance Measure and would also result in an outage. A second
    type of outage involves a defective cut, in which the customer would
    lose service because of a failure that occurs during the cutover.
    Id. at para. 85. In this case, if the cutover occurred during the
    one hour window, the hot cut would be scored as having been on-time,
    although the customer suffered a disruption of service.

    In this regard, AT&T raises several arguments with respect to the
    allegedly misleading nature of the "On-Time Hot Cut Performance"
    metric. *See* AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 112-17. AT&T argues, for
    instance, that Bell Atlantic is able to manipulate its reported
    on-time hot cut performance data because it can score as "on-time"
    hot cuts that result in outages. AT&T Meek Aff. at para. 112.
    Although this is the case, such an occurrence would nonetheless be
    reflected in the "Percent Installation Troubles" metric for hot
    cuts. AT&T further argues that it is inappropriate to score an
    outage as a "trouble" and not as a "provisioning problem." *Id.* at
    para. 114. The "Percent Installation Troubles" measure, however, is
    a provisioning metric that measures provisioning quality and
    therefore appropriately captures installation troubles that are not
    reflected in the on-time measure.

[^960]: A portion of AT&T's Motion to Strike is directed to the New York
    Commission's submission with its reply comments of the results of
    its data reconciliation of AT&T's claims of outages. *See* AT&T
    Motion to Strike at 4. Specifically, AT&T argues that our rules
    prohibit us from relying upon the material submitted by the New York
    Commission because it post-dates this application's comment period.
    The New York Commission's reconciliation, however, responds directly
    to arguments made in the comments filed by AT&T regarding outages
    caused by Bell Atlantic's hot cut provisioning failures.
    Additionally, the reconciliation addresses data for the period from
    June 21 through August 1999, which is prior to the filing of Bell
    Atlantic's application. Accordingly, as discussed supra Section III,
    we deny AT&T's Motion to Strike with respect to the New York
    Commission's outage data reconciliation.

[^961]: New York Commission Rubino Reply Aff. at para. 13 & Ex. 5. The
    New York Commission staff's reconciliation demonstrates that
    approximately 4.5 percent of AT&T's customers suffered outages
    between June 21 and August 31, 1999 as a result of a Bell Atlantic
    provisioning error. Id.

[^962]: *Id.*, Ex. 5. The New York staff's reconciliation indicates
    that, of the 167 alleged outages reviewed, 66 were attributable to
    Bell Atlantic provisioning errors, 75 were not attributable to Bell
    Atlantic, and 26 had causes that could not be determined. *Id.*

[^963]: In this regard, we note that the Department of Justice did not
    raise the issue of service disruptions in its evaluation.

[^964]: New York Commission Reply at 29-30 (citing NYDPS Staff Analysis
    of AT&T Reported Service Outages---June 21-August 31, 1999, Ex. 5).
    The New York staff also observed that, unlike other carriers, AT&T
    does not perform mechanized loop tests when it accepts a hot cut.
    Rather, AT&T attempts to call the customer and, in the absence of a
    completed call, waits until the customer calls AT&T. *Id.*

[^965]: New York Commission Reply at 29. We also note, although we do
    not rely upon them as a basis for our decision, that
    recently-adopted performance measures in New York will monitor the
    percentage of defective, early, and late hot cuts, as well as the
    duration of customer service disruptions. *See* NYPSC Additional
    Guidelines Order at 28-29.

[^966]: *See e.g.*, Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 94
    (metric MR-2-02 -- Loop for July 1999). In July, for instance, Bell
    Atlantic reported loop troubles on 1.56 percent of its network. Id.
    We also note that in each month from June through September, the
    network trouble report rate for loops was higher for Bell Atlantic's
    network than for those of competing carriers. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D at 82, 94, 106 (metric MR-2-02 -- Loop
    for June, July, and August 1999); Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply
    Decl. Attach. C at 10 (metric MR-2-02 -- Loop for September 1999).

[^967]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 18; New York Commission
    Comments at 83. For a description of the entire hot cut provisioning
    process, see Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 70.

[^968]: New York Commission Comments at 84.

[^969]: *Id.* at 83. See also AT&T Comments at 34; AT&T Meek Aff. at
    paras. 25-29. The process and tracking checklist were adopted in New
    York on June 21, 1999. Bell Atlantic Application, App. C, Vol. 61,
    Tab 941 at 17.

[^970]: *See* AT&T Comments at 34; ALTS Comments at 29-30; Choice One
    Comments at 5; Allegiance Comments at 11.

[^971]: We note, however, that Bell Atlantic has agreed that, upon a
    grant of interLATA relief, it will include in the on-time hot cut
    performance measure whether it has completed the due date minus 2
    days dial tone check. *See* New York Commission Comments at 88.

[^972]: *See* AT&T Comments at 34; AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 49, 51,
    90-91; Choice One Comments at 4.

[^973]: AT&T Comments at 35-36; AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 35-40, 95-98.
    As discussed in our analysis of checklist item 2, we find that
    AT&T's claims of LSRC inaccuracy are largely overstated. *See supra*
    Section V.B.1.f.(ii).(a).

[^974]: AT&T Comments at 35; AT&T Meek Aff at paras. 46-52.

[^975]: AT&T Comments at 37; AT&T Mulligan Aff. at para. 38.

[^976]: Bell Atlantic Application at 19; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 73. KPMG Final Report at POP3, IV-60-62 (Test Cross
    Reference P3-22).

[^977]: KPMG opened an "Exception" regarding compliance with the hot cut
    procedures. *See* New York Commission Comments at 89. The Exception
    was closed following a two week test during which KPMG observed
    technicians performing the due date hot cut procedures. KPMG Final
    Report at POP3, IV-60-62 (Test Cross Reference P3-24). *See also*
    Bell Atlantic Application at 19; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl.
    at para. 73.

[^978]: Bell AtlanticLacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 71.

[^979]: New York Commission Comments at 88.

[^980]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 18 n.40. The Department also
    notes that KPMG did not test whether the hot cut resulted in a
    working loop. *Id.* With regard to this argument, we refer to our
    previous discussion and finding that Bell Atlantic demonstrates that
    it provides hot cut loops at an acceptable level of quality and with
    a minimum of service disruption.

[^981]: AT&T Meek Aff. Attach. 6 at 3 (Letter from Peter McGowan,
    Associate Counsel, New York PSC, to Randal Milch, Associate General
    Counsel, Bell Atlantic, and Bob Mulvee, Associated General Counsel,
    AT&T, dated October 12, 1999).

[^982]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 60.

[^983]: *See* AT&T Mulligan Aff. at para. 38.

[^984]: We similarly reject AT&T's argument that Bell Atlantic is not
    able to perform accurate migrations of loops that are served over
    IDLC facilities. *See* AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 132-35. Rather, we
    accord significant weight to KPMG's finding that the methods and
    procedures adopted by Bell Atlantic permit effective migrations of
    these loops. After reaching this conclusion, KPMG closed the
    exception regarding Bell Atlantic's performance in providing
    cutovers of ILDC loops. *See* KPMG Exception No. 44. *See also* KPMG
    Final Report at POP3 IV-61-62 (Test Cross Reference P3-24); New York
    Commission Comments at 91-92.

[^985]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 21. As the Department noted,
    customers served by unbundled local loops tend to be heavy
    telecommunications users and, therefore, also tend to be extremely
    profitable customers for both Bell Atlantic and competing carriers.
    *See* AT&T Mulligan Aff. at paras. 6-7; Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 21.

[^986]: KPMG Final Report at § IV.L.3.1, Table IV12.6, P12-4. KPMG
    stated that it "confirmed that BA-NY as stated taken actions \[sic\]
    to address \[increased volumes\] of LNP Hot Cut orders.
    Specifically, BA-NY is opening a second RCCC to handled coordinated
    orders within Bell Atlantic North, including New York. This new RCCC
    currently has a staff of 20 coordinators and an ultimate staffing
    goal of 128 non-management personnel." *Id.* We also note, however,
    that we expect Bell Atlantic to expand its manual hot cut capacity
    further as it experiences increases in demand.

[^987]: AT&T Comments at 37; AT&T Mulligan Aff. at para. 38; Department
    of Justice Evaluation at 21.

[^988]: *See also supra* Section V.B.1.f.(ii).(a).

[^989]: *See infra* Section VII.

[^990]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 87.

[^991]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D (metric MR-3-01 --
    Loop for July 1999). In July, Bell Atlantic missed 16.57 percent of
    loop repair appointments for competitors and 12.28 appointments for
    its own customers. *Id.*

[^992]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D (metric MR-3-01 --
    Loop for August 1999). In August, Bell Atlantic missed 14.00 percent
    of loop repair appointments for competing carriers and 10.47 percent
    of appointments for repairs to its own customers' loops. *Id.*

[^993]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, Ex. C at 6 (metric
    MR-3-01 -- Loop for September 1999). September data demonstrate that
    Bell Atlantic missed 12.27 percent of repair appointments for
    competitors and 11.23 percent of appointments for its own customers.
    *Id.*

[^994]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D (metric MR-4-02 --
    Loop Trouble for July 1999). In July, loop repairs were completed
    in, on average, 28.33 hours for competitors and 29.60 hours for Bell
    Atlantic customers. *Id.*

[^995]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D (metric MR-4-02 --
    Loop Trouble for August 1999). Specifically, in August, loop repairs
    were completed in, on average, 26.22 hours for competitors and 25.32
    hours for Bell Atlantic customers. *Id.*

[^996]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C at 6 (metric
    MR-4-02 -- Loop Trouble for August 1999). In September, loop repairs
    were completed in, on average, 25.08 hours for competitors and 27.12
    hours for Bell Atlantic customers. *Id.*

[^997]: KPMG Final Report at M&R1 V-13-23 (RETAS functional and parity
    evaluation) & M&R5 V-75-77 (parity evaluation).

[^998]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 89.

[^999]: Omnipoint Comments at 11; Prism Comments at 13.

[^1000]: With xDSL technology, two modems are attached to the local
    loop: one at the subscriber's premises and one at the telephone
    company's central office. The use of xDSL modems allows transmission
    of data over the copper loops at vastly higher speeds than can be
    achieved with analog data transmission. An ordinary voice channel in
    the United States, for instance, generally allows transmission of
    digital information at the rate of up to 56,000 bits per second. By
    contrast, xDSL services permits data to be transmitted to the end
    user at up to several million bits per second, depending upon loop
    length, loop design, and the technology deployed. *Advanced Services
    Order and NPRM*, 13 FCC Rcd at 24026-27.

[^1001]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15691*.*

[^1002]: New York Commission Comments at 92-93.

[^1003]: *Id.* at 94-95.

[^1004]: New York Commission Reply at 34.

[^1005]: *Id.*

[^1006]: *Id.*

[^1007]: *Id.* at 31-32.

[^1008]: New York Commission Comments at 94.

[^1009]: *Id.* at 94; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para
    97.

[^1010]: New York Commission Comments at 94; New York Commission Reply
    at 35.

[^1011]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 81; Department of
    Justice Ex. 8 at 2.

[^1012]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 77-78; Department
    of Justice Ex. 8 at 2. Bell Atlantic provides two types of loops
    over which competitors may provide advanced services: premium
    digital loops and loops that are specifically intended for use in
    the provision of xDSL services. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl.
    at paras. 77, 80. Premium digital loops are used for the provision
    of Bell Atlantic's retail ISDN services and, on occasion, can be
    utilized for the provision of xDSL services. We are unable to
    determine from the record what portion of Bell Atlantic's premium
    digital loops has been used by competitors for the provision of
    advanced services.

[^1013]: Covad Cutcher/McChesney/Clancy Decl. at para. 37.

[^1014]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 66, 81; Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 34; Department of
    Justice Ex. 8 at 2.

[^1015]: Bell Atlantic missed 4.60 percent of digital loop installation
    appointments in January 1999, and then demonstrated significantly
    improved performance through July 1999. See Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 79 & Attach. J. In August 1999, Bell
    Atlantic again missed 4.00 percent of installation appointments for
    premium digital loops provisioned to competing carriers. *Id.*

[^1016]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. Attach. F.

[^1017]: *Id.*

[^1018]: Covad Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at para. 28.

[^1019]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. Attach. K; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. Attach. F.

[^1020]: Covad Conley/Poulicakos Decl. at para. 28.

[^1021]: NorthPoint Comments at 18-19; NAS Comments at 8.

[^1022]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 82.
    Specifically, Bell Atlantic states that it received 21 repair orders
    on the 824 xDSL loops it installed between September 15 and October
    15, 1999. *Id.*

[^1023]: Covad Cutcher/McChesney/Clancy Decl. at para. 62.

[^1024]: NorthPoint Comments at 18.

[^1025]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 85.

[^1026]: *Id.*

[^1027]: This is similarly the case with respect to the timely return of
    Firm Order Commitments (FOCs). Although Covad claims that from June
    through August 1999, Bell Atlantic was, on average, two days late in
    providing it with FOCs for xDSL orders, Covad begins measuring the
    FOC interval the first time it submits an order, whereas Bell
    Atlantic calculates the interval from the time it receives an
    error-free order. See Covad Cutcher/McChesney/Clancy Decl. at para.
    34. We believe that it would be appropriate to measure FOC intervals
    from the time a valid order is placed.

[^1028]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 86.

[^1029]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 27-28.

[^1030]: *Id.* at 28.

[^1031]: *See supra* paras. 283, 284, 291-302.

[^1032]: Future applicants, for instance, may have the benefit of
    clearly-defined performance standards and verified performance data
    with respect to xDSL-capable loop provisioning. In addition, future
    applicants will have a clear picture of the evidentiary showing we
    would expect for a showing of checklist compliance with respect to
    xDSL-capable loops.

[^1033]: The principal section of the 1996 Act concerning advanced
    telecommunications services is Section 706, Pub. L. 104-104, Title
    VII, § 706, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 153, reproduced in the notes
    under 47 U.S.C. § 157.

[^1034]: Pursuant to the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, a
    BOC must offer access to loops capable of transmitting the digital
    signals necessary to provide the full range of xDSL-based services.
    *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692-93.

[^1035]: Separate affiliates can also be utilized to demonstrate
    checklist compliance for conventional services.

[^1036]: Specifically, Bell Atlantic on December 10, 1999 committed to
    establish a separate advanced services affiliate that will be
    distinct from its local exchange company and will operate largely in
    accordance with the structural, transactional, and nondiscrimination
    requirements of sections 272. *See* Letter from Thomas J. Tauke,
    Senior Vice President -- Government Relations, Bell Atlantic, to The
    Honorable William E. Kennard, CC Docket No. 99-295, Attach. 1 at 1-2
    (filed December 10, 1999). Under Bell Atlantic's commitment to
    establish this affiliate, which conforms to the conditions to our
    approval of the SBC/Ameritech merger, Bell Atlantic will transfer to
    the separate affiliate specified advanced services equipment on an
    exclusive basis during a limited grace period, to end on July 1,
    2000. After February 1, 2000, all new advanced services equipment
    will be purchased and owned by the separate affiliate. After July 1,
    2000, the responsibility of providing retail advanced services would
    rest with the separate affiliate. The particular activities in which
    the separate affiliate and the incumbent LEC may engage are set
    forth in the SBC/Ameritech merger conditions. *See In re Ameritech
    Corp. and SBC Communications Inc. For Consent to Transfer Control of
    Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to
    Section 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22,
    24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and 101 of the Commission's Rules*, CC Docket No.
    98-141, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14859-67,
    14969-99 (1999).

[^1037]: We view it as critical that a BOC provide all forms of advanced
    services through a separate affiliate, and not just ADSL, so the
    affiliate would need to obtain stand-alone loops from the BOC in
    order to provide all varieties of advanced services.

[^1038]: As discussed *supra* in Section III, where a retail analogue
    exists, a BOC must provide access to competing carriers in
    "substantially the same time and manner" as it provides access to
    itself. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20118-19. If there
    is no appropriate retail analogue, the BOC must demonstrate that the
    access it provides to competing carriers would afford an efficient
    carrier a "meaningful opportunity to compete." *Id.*

[^1039]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v).

[^1040]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719.

[^1041]: *Id.* A BOC has the following obligations with respect to
    dedicated transport: (a) provide unbundled access to dedicated
    transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such
    offices and serving wire centers (SWCs), SWCs and interexchange
    carriers points of presence (POPs), tandem switches and SWCs, end
    offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire centers of BOCs and
    requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically feasible
    transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical Carrier
    levels (*e.g.,* OC-3/12/48/96) that the competing carrier could use
    to provide telecommunications; (c) not limit the facilities to which
    dedicated interoffice transport facilities are connected, provided
    such interconnections are technically feasible, or restrict the use
    of unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to the extent technically
    feasible, provide requesting carriers with access to digital
    cross-connect system functionality in the same manner that the BOC
    offers such capabilities to interexchange carriers that purchase
    transport services. *Id.* at 20719*.*

[^1042]: *Id.* at 20719 n.650. The Commission also found that a BOC has
    the following obligations with respect to shared transport: (a)
    provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of
    requesting carriers to be carried on the same transport facilities
    that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport
    transmission facilities between end office switches, between its end
    office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its
    network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled
    shared transport and unbundled switching to use the same routing
    table that is resident in the BOC's switch; and (d) permit
    requesting carriers to use shared (or dedicated) transport as an
    unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and
    terminating traffic to, customers to whom the requesting carrier is
    also providing local exchange service. *Id.* at 20762, n.652*.*

[^1043]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture /Troy Decl. at para. 106; NY PSC 916
    Tariff § 5.3 (Appendix H, Tab 3 of Bell Atlantic's 271 Application).

[^1044]: New York Commission Comments at 100-04. *See also* Intermedia
    Comments at 8-9.

[^1045]: Bell Atlantic's August 1999 data shows a missed appointment
    rate of 12.03 percent for interoffice facilities provided to
    competitive LECs and a missed appointment rate of 18.03 percent for
    Bell Atlantic retail special services. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. G at 15 (metric PR-4-01). In September 1999, Bell
    Atlantic had a missed appointment rate of 18.75 percent for
    interoffice facilities provided to competitive LECs and a missed
    appointment rate of 18.58 percent for Bell Atlantic retail special
    services. Bell Atlantic Comments Dowell/Canny Reply Decl. Attach. C
    at 10. The New York Commission uses a retail analogue to measure
    parity New York Commission Comments at 103.

[^1046]: *See supra* Section V.B.

[^1047]: *See* Allegiance Comments at 12; Choice One Comments at 9;
    Focal Comments at 3-6; OmniPoint Comments at 7-8,12-13; Teligent
    Comments at 16.

[^1048]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 114.

[^1049]: *See, e.g.*, Letter from Jonathan Askin, Vice President -- Law,
    The Association for Local Telecommunications Services, Carol Ann
    Bischoff, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Competitive
    Telecommunications Association, James Falvey, Vice President,
    Regulatory Affairs, e.spire Communications, Inc., Richard J.
    Metzger, Vice President, Regulatory and Public Policy, Focal
    Communications Corporation, Douglas G. Bonner, Arent Fox Kintner
    Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC, Counsel to Omnipoint Communications, Inc., and
    David S. Turetsky, Senior Vice President, Law and Regulatory,
    Teligent, Inc. to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed December 16,
    1999) (ALTS Dec. 16 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^1050]: For example, local transport is provided between BOC and/or
    competitive LEC wire centers or switches while in the case of
    special access at least one end of the transmission facility is
    located at a customer premise. Letter from Dee May, Director,
    Regulatory Affairs, Bell Atlantic to Claudia Pabo, Common Carrier
    Bureau, FCC, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 19, 1999). These
    parties do not challenge the assertion that special access is a
    service offering while unbundled transport is not, although they
    argue that this should not remove it from consideration in the
    context of checklist compliance.

[^1051]: We note that a number of checklist items in addition to
    unbundled transport have interstate access tariff analogs, including
    the local loop and local switching.

[^1052]: Our reasoning here applies equally to the consideration of the
    local loop component of special access in the context of the
    unbundled local loop checklist requirement. For the reasons
    addressed in this section, we also conclude that there is no need to
    consider the provision of special access in the context of the
    public interest requirement.

[^1053]: See, *supra*, Section V.B.2. The fact that Bell Atlantic
    provides EELs pursuant to state requirements is not dispositive of
    section 271 checklist obligations.

[^1054]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 115.

[^1055]: *Id.*

[^1056]: In reaching this conclusion, we note that Choice One is the
    only competitive LEC which reports experiencing this problem with
    the provisioning of dedicated transport in this proceeding.

[^1057]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi); *see also Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20722.

[^1058]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722-24.

[^1059]: *Id.* at 20722.

[^1060]: *Id.* at 20722-23.

[^1061]: *Id.* at 20723, 20733-34.

[^1062]: *Id.* at 20723 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20619, 20717-18).

[^1063]: *Id.* at 20723.

[^1064]: *Id.* at 20723.

[^1065]: *Id.* at 20723 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20705).

[^1066]: *Id.* at 20723 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20714-15).

[^1067]: Bell Atlantic provides unbundled local switching under its
    tariffs and approved interconnection agreements. Bell Atlantic
    Application at 22, n.25; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para.
    90. *See also* Bell Atlantic Application at 23 (citing KPMG Report);
    Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 90, 91, 95, 105; Letter
    from Joseph J. Mulieri, Director, Government Relations, Bell
    Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed November 18, 1999).

[^1068]: Line-side facilities include, but are not limited to, the
    connection between a loop termination at a main distribution frame,
    and a switch line card. Trunk-side facilities include, but are not
    limited to, the connection between trunk termination at a trunk-side
    cross-connect panel and a switch trunk card. *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20724 nn.679-680.

[^1069]: The basic switching function includes, but is not limited to:
    connecting lines to lines, lines to trunks, trunks to lines, trunks
    to trunks, as well as the same basic capabilities that are available
    to the BOC's customers, such as a telephone number, directory
    listing, dial tone, signaling, and access to 911, operator services,
    and directory assistance. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20726 n.690.

[^1070]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20726.
    Vertical features provide end-users with various services such as
    custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and
    Centrex. *Id.* at 20726.

[^1071]: An incumbent LEC must provide customized routing as part of the
    local switching element, unless it can prove to the state commission
    that customized routing in a particular switch is not technically
    feasible. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* at 13 FCC Rcd at 20728
    n. 705. Customized routing permits requesting carriers to designate
    the particular outgoing trunks associated with unbundled switching
    provided by the incumbent, which will carry certain classes of
    traffic originating from requesting carriers' customers. *See id.*
    at 20728-29. Customized routing is also referred to as selective
    routing. *Id.* at 20728 n.704.

[^1072]: *Local Competition Third Reconsideration Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    12475-79; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20716-17; *see
    also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20732.

[^1073]: The requirement to provide unbundled tandem switching includes:
    (i) trunk-connect facilities, including but not limited to the
    connection between trunk termination at a cross-connect panel and a
    switch trunk card; (ii) the base switching function of connecting
    trunks to trunks; and, (iii) the functions that are centralized in
    tandem switches (as distinguished from separate end-office
    switches), including but not limited to call recording, the routing
    of calls to operator services, and signaling conversion features.
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20733 n.732.

[^1074]: *See id.* at 20733-35.

[^1075]: *See id.* at 20735-37.

[^1076]: New York Commission Comments at 110. *See also* ALTS Comments
    at 14-15; Intermedia Comments at 9.

[^1077]: Z-Tel Comments at 10-13.

[^1078]: *See id.* at 13.

[^1079]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 27-28.

[^1080]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 91.

[^1081]: *See supra* Section V.B. We note that none of Bell Atlantic's
    metrics applies expressly to the provisioning of unbundled local
    switching separate from provisioning this element as part of the UNE
    platform.

[^1082]: Letter from Michael B. Hazzard, Lawler, Metzger & Milkman, LLC,
    Counsel to Z-Tel, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 2, 1999)
    (Z-Tel Nov. 2, 1999 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^1083]: Letter from Dee May, Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Bell
    Atlantic, to Sanford Williams, Policy & Program Planning Division,
    Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 99-295 at 1 (filed November 23, 1999).

[^1084]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^1085]: *Ameritech Michigan Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 20679.

[^1086]: *Id.*

[^1087]: *Id.*

[^1088]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. paras 161-170. *See* KPMG
    Final Report at § VIIE.3.1, Table VII5.5, R5.2-1-7 (App. C, Tab 916)
    (verifying that Bell Atlantic's process for E911 access for
    competitive LECs using Bell Atlantic's switches are satisfactory);
    KPMG Final Report at § VII5.4, R5.1-4 (App. C, Tab 916) (verifying
    Bell Atlantic's ability to provide E911 functionality).

[^1089]: New York Commission Comments at 116. *See also* ALTS Comments
    at 15-16 (asserting that Bell Atlantic has provided
    nondiscriminatory access to 911/E911); Intermedia Comments at 9-10
    (stating that in Intermedia's experience, Bell Atlantic complies
    with this element of checklist item 7).

[^1090]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).

[^1091]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^1092]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217; *Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket 96-91,
    *Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd 19392 (1996) (*Local Competition Second Report and Order*)
    *aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom, People of the State of
    California v. FCC,* 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1997), *overruled in
    part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils Bd.,* 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999);
    *Provision of Directory Listings Information under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1934, as amended,* CC Docket No. 99-273,
    FCC 99-227, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (rel. Sep. 9, 1999).

[^1093]: While both section 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to
    nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance," section
    251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to "operator services"
    while section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory
    access to "operator call completion services." 47 U.S.C.
    §§251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III). The term "operator call
    completion services" is not defined in the Act, nor has the
    Commission previously defined the term. However, for section
    251(b)(3) purposes, the term "operator services" was defined as
    meaning "any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange
    for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call." *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19448. In the
    same order the Commission concluded that busy line verification,
    emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory assistance are
    forms of "operator services," because they assist customers in
    arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a telephone
    call. *Id.* at 19449. All of these services may be needed or used to
    place a call. For example, if a customer tries to direct dial a
    telephone number and constantly receives a busy signal, the customer
    may contact the operator to attempt to complete the call. Since
    billing is a necessary part of call completion, and busy line
    verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory
    assistance can all be used when an operator completes a call, we
    concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* that for
    checklist compliance purposes "operator call completion services" is
    a subset of or equivalent to "operator services." *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd 20740 n.763. As a result, we use the
    nondiscriminatory standards established for operator services to
    determine whether nondiscriminatory access is provided.

[^1094]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19456, 19457. The *Local Competition Second
    Report and Order's* interpretation of section 251(b)(3) is limited
    "to access to each LEC's directory assistance service." *Id.* at
    19456. However, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited to the
    LEC's systems but requires "Nondiscriminatory access to . . .
    directory assistance to allow the other carrier's customers to
    obtain telephone numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii). Combined
    with the Commission's conclusion that incumbent LECs must unbundle
    the facilities and functionalities providing operator services and
    directory assistance from resold services and other unbundled
    network elements to the extent technically feasible, *Local
    Competition First Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, section
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii)'s requirement should be understood to require the
    BOCs to provide nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance
    service provider selected by the customer's local service provider,
    regardless of whether the competitor provides such services itself;
    selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party
    to provide such services. *Provision of Directory Listings
    Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, as amended,*
    CC Docket No. 99-273, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (rel. Sep. 9,
    1999).

[^1095]: *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19464.

[^1096]: *Id.* at 19449, 19450

[^1097]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19455, 19463. For example, when customers call
    the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically hear
    a message such as "Thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company."
    Competing carriers may use the BOC's brand, request the BOC to brand
    the call with the competitive carrier's name or request that the BOC
    not brand the call at all. 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d).

[^1098]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3)(ii); *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61.

[^1099]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. 172-192. *See* KPMG Final
    Report at § VII5.5, R5.2-1-7 (App. C, Tab 916) (concluding that Bell
    Atlantic's processes for Directory Assistance are satisfactory).

[^1100]: New York Commission Comments at 116-117. *See also* ALTS
    Comments at 15-16; Intermedia Comments at 9-10.

[^1101]: AT&T Comments at 41-44. *See also* Choice One Comments at 7-8
    (citing a single customer whose directory listing was dropped from
    the database); Department of Justice Evaluation at 19-20 (citing
    AT&T's studies).

[^1102]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 152.
    According to Bell Atlantic, AT&T's studies are misleading in that
    they address an unrepresentative subset of the total competitive LEC
    local service orders that are added to Bell Atlantic's directory
    listing database on a monthly basis. Bell Atlantic asserts that
    AT&T's studies do not address directory listings which are
    established for competitive LEC resale or UNE-Platform orders.
    According to Bell Atlantic, these types of orders account for nearly
    80 percent of all competitive LEC orders and enjoy a 0 percent error
    rate. *Id*. at para. 154. Bell Atlantic further argues that
    "\[f\]ully 60 percent of the orders AT&T claimed were missing were,
    in fact, in the database by the end of the second business day in
    accordance with the Carrier to Carrier Guidelines." *Id.* at para.
    155.

[^1103]: For example, beginning in September 1999, Bell Atlantic
    increased the personnel dedicated to monitoring and correcting
    database entries. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para.
    157.

[^1104]: *See* ALTS Comments at 15-16; Intermedia Comments at 9-10; New
    York Commission Comments at 116-17.

[^1105]: The Department of Justice stated that evidence in the record
    subsequent to KPMG's review of Bell Atlantic's process improvement
    plan "suggests that the process changes have not provided a
    sufficient solution" to the problem of dropped directory listings
    associated with provisioning of hot cuts. Department of Justice
    Evaluation at 19-20.

[^1106]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^1107]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^1108]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20748.

[^1109]: *Id.* at 20748. We note that in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* we stated that the definition of "directory listing" was
    synonymous with the definition of "subscriber list information."
    *Id.* at 20747 (citing the *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 19458-59). However, the Commission's decision
    in a recent proceeding obviates this comparison, and supports the
    definition of directory listing delineated above. *See
    Implementation of the Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer
    Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,* CC
    Docket No. 96-115, Third Report and Order; *Implementation of the
    Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,*
    CC Docket No. 96-98, Second Order on Reconsideration; *Provision of
    Directory Listing Information under the Telecommunications Act of
    1934, as amended,* CC Docket No. 99-273, FCC 99-227, Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, para. 160 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999).

[^1110]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20747-48.

[^1111]: Bell Atlantic provides competitive LECs with basic white page
    directory listings under interconnection agreements and tariffs.
    Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 194. Additional white
    page listings and other white page listing services are provided
    under tariff on the same terms and conditions as those provided to
    Bell Atlantic customers. *Id.* *See also* Bell Atlantic App. C, Tab
    535 (KPMG Closure Report for Exception 56, 7/22/99).

[^1112]: Bell Atlantic Application at 30; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 195. *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20748-49; *see also* New York PSC Comments at 122-23; ALTS
    Comments at 17-18; Intermedia Comments at 10.

[^1113]: Bell Atlantic Application at 30; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 196. *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20749-50.

[^1114]: New York Commission Comments at 123.

[^1115]: AT&T Comments at 41-44; Choice One Comments at 7-8.

[^1116]: *See supra* Section V.B.

[^1117]: AT&T Comments at 41-44; AT&T Callahan/Connolly Aff. KPMG
    similarly found little evidence of actual dropped listings in its
    discussion of problems with Bell Atlantic's OSS for white pages
    directory listings orders. Bell Atlantic Application App. C, Tab 535
    (KPMG Closure Report for Exception 56, 7/22/99). *See also* Bell
    Atlantic Application at 31; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at
    para. 210.

[^1118]: Choice One Comments at 7-8.

[^1119]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^1120]: Id.

[^1121]: In the Matter of Request of Lockheed Martin Corporation and
    Warburg, Pincus & Co. for Review of the Transfer of the Lockheed
    Martin Communications Industry Services Business, CC Docket No.
    92-237, Order, FCC 99-346 (rel. Nov. 17, 1999). See generally 47
    C.F.R. Part 52 -- Numbering, Subpart B -- Administration, §§
    52.7-52.19.

[^1122]: *See Administration of the North American Numbering Plan,*
    Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 2588, 2615; *NANP Third Report and
    Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 23042-46; *see also* Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 211.

[^1123]: *See Second Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20752. *See also*
    Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 213. *See, e.g.,*
    Central Office Code (NXX) Assignment Guidelines (INC 95-0407-008)
    (revised August 1999).

[^1124]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 213. *See also*
    Bell Atlantic Application App. C, Tab 535 (KPMG Closure Report for
    Exception 46, 7/22/99).

[^1125]: New York Commission Comments at 127. Bell Atlantic's compliance
    is also supported by KPMG's findings. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 216.

[^1126]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^1127]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20753.

[^1128]: *Id.* at 20755-56.

[^1129]: Bell Atlantic Application at 31-33; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 218-247. Bell Atlantic provides
    access to signaling, call-related databases, SCE, and the SMS
    databases under interconnection agreements and tariffs. Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 220, 226, 229, 232, 234,
    238, 242, 245.

[^1130]: New York Commission Comments at 133.

[^1131]: Z-Tel Comments at 23.

[^1132]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20602; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 582.

[^1133]: *See also* Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras.
    243-247.

[^1134]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).

[^1135]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).

[^1136]: 47 U.S.C. § 153(30).

[^1137]: 47 C.F.R. § 52.21(k).

[^1138]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20757 (citing
    47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2) and *In the Matter of Telephone Number
    Portability,* Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701, 11702-11704,
    para. 4 & nn.4, 7, 9, 12 (1998) (*Third Number Portability Order*)).
    *See also In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability,* Fourth
    Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No.
    95-116, RM 8535 at paras. 1, 6-9 (June 23, 1999)(*Fourth Number
    Portability Order*).

[^1139]: Fourth Number Portability Order at para. 10 (citing In re
    Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12 (1996)(First
    Number Portability Order). See also 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).

[^1140]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§52.23(b)-(f); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20758; *First Number Portability Order,* 11
    FCC Rcd at 8355-56, 8399-8404; *Third Number Portability Order,* 13
    FCC Rcd at 11708-12.

[^1141]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.29; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20758; First Number Portability Order, 11 FCC Rcd at
    8417-24.

[^1142]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.32-52.33; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20578; *Third Number Portability Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 11706-07; *Fourth Number Portability Order* at para. 9*;
    see generally* *Fourth Number Portability Order*.

[^1143]: Bell Atlantic Application at 33-34; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 248-256. Bell Atlantic provides
    number portability to requesting carriers under interconnection
    agreements and tariffs. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras.
    249, 255.

[^1144]: New York Commission Comments at 136.

[^1145]: RCN Comments at 10-11.

[^1146]: *Id.* at 10.

[^1147]: Bell Atlantic Reply Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 117-118.

[^1148]: Adelphia Livengood Aff. at para.17.

[^1149]: *See* *id*.

[^1150]: *See* AT&T Meek Aff. at paras. 42-43.

[^1151]: *See supra* Section V.D (for further discussion regarding Bell
    Atlantic's hot cut provisioning).

[^1152]: Based on the Commission's view that section 251(b)(3) does not
    limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of
    dialing parity (i.e., international, interstate, intrastate, or
    local), the Commission in August 1996 adopted rules to implement
    broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing
    parity. *Local Competition Second Report and Order,* 11 FCC Rcd
    19392 at 19407; *Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
    Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers*, CC Docket No. 9-98,
    *Further Order On Reconsideration*, FCC 99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).

[^1153]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^1154]: *Id.* at § 153(15).

[^1155]: 47 C.F.R §§ 51.205, 51.207.

[^1156]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be
    dialed); *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19400, 19403.

[^1157]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 257-261, Att. A.

[^1158]: New York Commission Comments at 137-139. *See also* ALTS
    Comments at 21 (Bell Atlantic appears to provide local dialing
    parity); Intermedia Comments at 12-13 (Bell Atlantic appears to be
    providing local dialing parity throughout New York).

[^1159]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^1160]: *Id.* § 252(d)(2)(A).

[^1161]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 262.

[^1162]: Bell Atlantic provides reciprocal compensation to competing
    carriers for the termination of local calls from Bell Atlantic
    customers under approved interconnection agreements and tariffs.
    (*See, e.g.,* AT&T Interconnection Agreement). During the first
    seven months of 1999, Bell Atlantic exchanged an average of 2.5
    billion minutes of traffic each month with 27 local wireline
    carriers in New York. During this period, Bell Atlantic paid more
    than 98.4 million dollars to competitive LECs as reciprocal
    compensation. Bell Atlantic asserts that it is paying reciprocal
    compensation payments consistent with the New York Commission's
    order, which governs Internet Service Provider (ISP) bound traffic.
    *See* Opinion and Order Concerning Reciprocal Compensation, Case
    99-C-0529 (NYPSC Aug. 26, 1999) (*NYPSC Reciprocal Compensation
    Order)*. *See also* Bell Atlantic Brief at 34; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at paras. 262-264; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Reply Decl. at paras. 119-124.

[^1163]: With regard to the second requirement, we note that section
    271(c)(2)(A)(i) requires a showing that a BOC \"*is* providing
    access and interconnection pursuant to one or more agreements . . .
    or . . . *is* generally offering access and interconnection pursuant
    to \[an SGAT\].\" 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

[^1164]: New York Commission Comments at 144.

[^1165]: Global NAPS Comments at 2-4.

[^1166]: *Id*. at 2.

[^1167]: Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for
    ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 at n.87 (1999) (Inter-Carrier
    Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic Order).

[^1168]: *Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic Order*, 14
    FCC Rcd at 3707-3710.

[^1169]: *See* Letter and Attachment from Ross A. Buntrock, Attorney,
    Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for e.spire, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    99-295 (filed Nov. 3, 1999) (e.spire Nov. 3 E*x Parte* Letter).

[^1170]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).

[^1171]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A).

[^1172]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B).

[^1173]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3).

[^1174]: *See*, *e.g*., 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.613-51.617. The Eighth Circuit
    acknowledged the Commission's authority to promulgate such rules,
    and specifically upheld the sections of the Commission's rules
    concerning resale of promotions and discounts in *Iowa Utilities
    Board*. *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d at 818-19, *aff'd in part
    and remanded on other grounds*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 119 S.Ct.
    721 (1999).

[^1175]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(b).

[^1176]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 265.

[^1177]: The telecommunications services that Bell Atlantic provides at
    retail to subscribers that are not telecommunications carriers are
    available at the following discount levels ordered by the New York
    Commission: 19.1 percent for lines with Bell Atlantic's Operator
    Services and Directory Assistance, and 21.7 percent for lines
    without these features. Bell Atlantic Application at 35, Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 265, *Opinion and Order
    Determining Wholesale Discount,* Case No. 95-C-0657 (NYPSC Nov. 27,
    1996) (Bell Atlantic Application App.G, Tab 7) (*NYSPSC Wholesale
    Discount Order*). Bell Atlantic's retail telecommunications services
    are available for resale under interconnection agreements and its
    tariffs. Bell Atlantic Application at 35, Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 266. Through July 1999, Bell Atlantic
    has provided 314,000 resold lines to more than 65 competing carrier
    including more that 250,000 business lines and more than 63,000
    residential lines. Also, as of September 1999, Bell Atlantic has
    provided 319,000 resold lines to more than 65 competing carriers. In
    addition, forty companies resell more than 100 lines, 22 companies
    resell more than 1,000 lines, and five companies resell more than
    10,000 lines. Of the 522 Bell Atlantic wire centers in New York, 90
    percent have at least one resold listing, and 64 have at least 10.
    Bell Atlantic Application at 35, Bell Atlantic Reply at 30, Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 267, Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 159, Bell Atlantic Taylor Decl.
    at para. 42.

[^1178]: Bell Atlantic's customer-specific arrangements (CSAs),
    grandfathered services and promotional offerings in effect more than
    90 days are also provided at wholesale discounts set by the New York
    Commission. Bell Atlantic Application at 35, Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Del. at para. 268. Customer-specific arrangements or
    contract service arrangements are contractual agreements made
    between a carrier and a specific customer, tailored to that
    customer's individual needs. The customer is typically a high-volume
    user of telecommunications services. Contract service arrangements
    may include volume and term arrangements, special service
    arrangements, customized telecommunications service arrangements and
    master service agreements. e.Spire/Net2000 Comments at 7 (citing
    *Order Granting Petition*, Case No. 98-C-426 (NYPSC Sept. 14, 1998)
    (*NYPSC CTC Order*)). We note that promotional offerings for a
    period greater than 90 days must be offered for resale at wholesale
    rates pursuant to section 251(c)(4)(A). *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15970. If Bell Atlantic's
    promotional offering is limited to 90 days or less, the CLEC may
    elect to have Bell Atlantic apply the wholesale discount to the
    retail price of telecommunications services included in the
    promotional offering, or pay the promotional offering price. Bell
    Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 268. We note that there is a
    presumption that promotional offerings for a period of 90 days or
    less need not be offered at a discount to resellers. *Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15970.

[^1179]: New York Commission Comments at 150-151.

[^1180]: CCA Comments at 2, 4-5. *See also* ALTS Reply at 15.

[^1181]: CCA Comments at 4.

[^1182]: CCA Comments at 6.

[^1183]: *Id*.

[^1184]: *Id*.

[^1185]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3).

[^1186]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 265. *See also*
    NYPSC *Wholesale Discount Order* at 79.

[^1187]: New York Commission Comments at 148 (citing Second Network
    Proceeding, Case 98-C-1357).

[^1188]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15957-58.

[^1189]: *Id.*

[^1190]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 266.

[^1191]: Bell Atlantic Application at 36; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at para. 268-270.

[^1192]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 270.

[^1193]: Bell Atlantic Brief at 36 (citing Expanded Interconnection
    First Reconsideration Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 7341). *See also BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 539.

[^1194]: ALTS Comments at 65-67; e.spire/Net2000 Comments at 3-10; TRA
    Comments at 23-28; ALTS Reply at 14; Letter from Ross A. Buntrock,
    Attorney, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for ALTS, to Magalie
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    99-295 (filed Nov. 3, 1999) (ALTS Nov. 3 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter
    from Ross A. Buntrock, Attorney, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel
    for e.spire, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Nov. 3, 1999) (e.spire Nov.
    3 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Ross A. Buntrock, Attorney, Kelley
    Drye & Warren, LLP, Counsel for Net.2000, to Magalie Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295
    (filed Nov. 3, 1999) (Net.2000 Nov. 3 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter
    from Ross A. Buntrock, Attorney, Kelley Drye & Warren, Counsel for
    Net2000, to Claudia Pabo, Federal Communications Commission, CC
    Docket No. 99-295 (filed Dec. 3, 1999) (Net.2000 Dec. 3 *Ex Parte*
    Letter).

[^1195]: ALTS Comments at 87-88; e.spire/Net2000 at 8-9.

[^1196]: Bell Atlantic Reply Application at 30-31; Bell Atlantic
    Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at paras. 163-167.

[^1197]: Bell Atlantic Application at 36; Bell Atlantic Reply at 30-31;
    Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply Decl. at para. 166.

[^1198]: *Expanded Interconnection Order*, 7 FCC Rcd at 7464-7465 n.466.

[^1199]: e.spire/Net2000 Comments at 5; Net.2000 Dec. 3 *Ex Parte*
    Letter. According to Net.2000, Flexpath is essentially a T-1 line
    service for those customers who utilize PBX systems. Net2000 Dec. 3
    *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^1200]: e.spire/Net2000, Net.2000 Dec. 3 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^1201]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 539, 662.

[^1202]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 662.

[^1203]: *See, e.g., Expanded Interconnection Order*, 7 FCC Rcd at
    7463-64; *Interexchange Marketplace Order*, 6 FCC Rcd 5880, 5906
    (1991); *Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relative to Allocation
    of the 849-851/894-896 MHz Bands*, 6 FCC Rcd 4582, 4583-84 (1991).
    *See also* 47 U.S.C. § 253.

[^1204]: New York Commission Reply at 40 (citing *NYPSC CTC Order)*. We
    note that the New York Commission expressed concern about Bell
    Atlantic's use of termination liability, but did not find that Bell
    Atlantic's past actions constituted a violation of 47 U.S.C. §
    251(b)(1) or section 251(c)(4). New York Commission Reply at 40
    (citing *Order Denying Motion to Compel and for Sanctions and
    Clarifying the Order Granting Petition* *Complaint of CTC
    Communications Inc.*, Case No. 98-C-426 (NYPSC Feb. 1, 1999)
    (*NYPSC* *Order Denying Motions and Clarification Order*)).

[^1205]: *See* New York Commission Reply at 41.

[^1206]: Thus, we need not evaluate Bell Atlantic's liability provisions
    for termination of Flex Path T-1 service contracts in this
    proceeding because the termination liability does not on its fact
    constitute a violation of checklist item 14.

[^1207]: New York Commission Reply at 41.

[^1208]: 47 U.S.C. § 253.

[^1209]: *See* KMC Comments at 13; *see also* Allegiance Comments at 17;
    Allegiance Reply at 7-8.

[^1210]: e.spire/Net.2000 Comments at 9 n.12 (citing In re Establishment
    of Rules to Prohibit the Imposition of Unjust, Onerous Termination
    Penalties on Customers Choosing to Partake of the Benefits of Local
    Exchange Telecommunications Competition, Petition for Declaratory
    Ruling, CC Docket No. 99-142 (filed Apr. 26, 1999) (requesting that
    the Commission declare unlawful termination penalties imposed by
    ILECs, to prohibit enforcement of ILEC termination penalties, and to
    require the removal of ILEC termination penalties from state tariffs
    until more competition develops)).

[^1211]: TRA Comments at 27 (citing *Bell South Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd at 6245).

[^1212]: TRA Comments at 27; *see also Local Competition First Report
    and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15499.

[^1213]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Joint Decl. at para. 169.

[^1214]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 31; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply
    Decl. at para. 170 (citing *Federal Communications Commission Adopts
    Rules Applicable to the Sale of High-Speed Internet Services*, News
    Release, CC Docket No. 98-147 (rel. Nov. 2, 1999)).

[^1215]: *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket No. 98-147, Second Report
    and Order, FCC 99-330 (rel. Nov. 9, 1999) (*Advanced Services Second
    Report and Order*).

[^1216]: *Advanced Services Second Report and Order* at para. 19.

[^1217]: NALA Comments at 2. *See also* ALTS Reply at 15-16.

[^1218]: NALA Comments at 3.

[^1219]: *Id.* at 2-3.

[^1220]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 31, Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply
    Decl. at para. 172.

[^1221]: Similarly, Bell Atlantic states that if it offers flat-rate
    local telecommunications service in the future, Bell Atlantic will
    make it available for resale. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Reply
    Decl. at para. 172.

[^1222]: Vertical features provide end-users with various services such
    as custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and
    Centrex. *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20726.

[^1223]: CCA Comments at 5-6. *See also* ALTS Reply at 14.

[^1224]: CCA Comments at 5.

[^1225]: *Id.* at 5-6.

[^1226]: *See also* *supra* Section V.F.

[^1227]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722-24.

[^1228]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722.

[^1229]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722-23.

[^1230]: Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. at para. 90.

[^1231]: *Id*.

[^1232]: *Id*.

[^1233]: Destek Comments at 2-3, App. A. According to Destek, the
    interconnection agreements provides for the deployment of
    Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Cell Relay services that allow Bell
    Atlantic and the state owned institutions to provide information,
    data, real-time voice and video conferencing, voice communications,
    internet access, local and wide area networking and
    telecommunications services initially to K-12 schools, states and
    federal agencies, nonprofit organizations and ultimately to
    businesses throughout the service area.

[^1234]: Destek Comments at 3.

[^1235]: Ntegrity Comments at 1-3.

[^1236]: Bell Atlantic provides competitive LECs with retail
    telecommunications services available for resale under
    interconnection agreements and tariffs. Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy
    Decl. at paras. 84, 266. *See also* Bell Atlantic Application at
    35-36; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl. At paras. 84-88, 265-279.
    Bell Atlantic's compliance is also supported by KPMG's findings.
    Bell Atlantic Application at 35; Bell Atlantic Lacouture/Troy Decl.
    at paras. 84, 267

[^1237]: Adelphia Comments, Aff. at para. 18; TRA Comments at 16-17.

[^1238]: NALA Comments at 5.

[^1239]: *Id*.

[^1240]: *Id*.

[^1241]: RCN Reply at 9. *See also* NALA Comments at 4; TRA Comments at
    15.

[^1242]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^1243]: *See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-150, Report and
    Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (*Accounting Safeguards Order*),
    recon. pending. *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of
    Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*,
    CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (*Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order*), petition for review pending sub nom. *SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, No. 97-1118 (filed D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997)
    (held in abeyance May 7, 1997), First Order on Reconsideration, 12
    FCC Rcd 2297 (1997) (*First Order on Reconsideration*), Second Order
    on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (*Second Order on
    Reconsideration*), aff'd sub nom. *Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies
    v. FCC*, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on
    Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel. Oct. 4, 1999) (*Third Order on
    Reconsideration*).

[^1244]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^1245]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^1246]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725; *see* AT&T
    Comments at 64; ALTS Comments at 69; CERB Comments at 5-6; CloseCall
    Comments at 8.

[^1247]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20785-86.

[^1248]: *Id.*

[^1249]: Section 272(a) states that a BOC may not provide certain
    services except through one or more affiliates that meet the
    requirements of section 272(b). *See* 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(1)(B).

[^1250]: Bell Atlantic Application App. A, Vol. 1, Tab 5, Declaration of
    Maureen C. Breen at paras. 1-3 (Bell Atlantic Breen Decl.); Bell
    Atlantic Application App. A, Vol. 1, Tab 6, Declaration of Stewart
    Verge at paras. 2-3 (Bell Atlantic Verge Decl.); Bell Atlantic
    Application App. A, Vol. 1, Tab 7, Declaration of Susan C. Browning
    at paras. 4-6 (Bell Atlantic Browning Decl.). For an organizational
    chart, see Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. Attach. P at 12 (showing
    Bell Atlantic section 272 affiliates, operating telephone companies,
    and service organizations).

[^1251]: Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at para. 4, Attach. A (submitting
    articles of incorporation for BACI and NLD); Bell Atlantic Verge
    Decl. at para. 4, Attach. A (submitting articles of incorporation
    for BAGNI).

[^1252]: Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. Attach. E & P.

[^1253]: Bell Atlantic Application at 54 (citing Bell Atlantic Browning
    Decl. at paras. 30-34; Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at paras. 18-24;
    Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras. 20-26). Among its internal
    control mechanisms are a corporate compliance program,
    corporate-wide supervision of affiliate relationships, and periodic
    employee training. *See* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. Attach. E.

[^1254]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(1); *see also Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21981-87; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20787-88; *see* Bell Atlantic Application at 49-50,
    54-55 (describing internal control structure); Bell Atlantic
    Browning Decl. at para. 8(b)-8(c); Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at
    paras. 11 (stating that BACI and NLD own neither domestic
    telecommunications facilities nor related land and buildings), 13
    (stating that BACI and NLD do not jointly own switching and
    transmission facilities or related land and buildings); Bell
    Atlantic Verge Decl. at para. 10 (stating that BAGNI will operate,
    install, and maintain its own network either directly or by
    contracting with unaffiliated third parties).

[^1255]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 53.203(a)-203(c); *see Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21981-82; *see also* *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20787.

[^1256]: AT&T Comments at 67-68; AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 24-26
    (submitting Bell Atlantic Internet disclosures).

[^1257]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 43-44.

[^1258]: *See* Letter from Gerald Asch, Director, Federal Regulatory
    Affairs, Bell Atlantic Corp., to Anthony Dale, Attorney, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 99-295 (filed Oct. 19,
    1999) (Bell Atlantic Oct.19 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^1259]: *See* AT&T Kargoll Aff. Attach. 2; Bell Atlantic Reply Decl. at
    paras. 5-7.

[^1260]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(2); 47 C.F.R. §53.203(b); *Accounting
    Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17617-18; *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20786-89; *see* Bell Atlantic Breen
    Decl. at para. 6 & Attach. E (submitting corporate accounting
    policy); Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at para. 6 & Attach. D.

[^1261]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(c); *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20730-31*; Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20789-90; *see* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl.
    at paras. 3(a), 3(b) (stating that Bell Atlantic compared payroll
    registers of the section 272 affiliates to the records for the
    operating telephone companies); Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at para.
    5, Attach. B (presenting list of corporate directors), C (presenting
    list of corporate officers); Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at para. 5,
    Attach. B & C.

[^1262]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(d); *Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order* at paras. 189-90; *see* Bell Atlantic Application
    at 50; Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at para. 11; Bell Atlantic Breen
    Decl. at paras. 7-8, Attach. F (submitting support agreement between
    holding company and nonregulated lending affiliate), G (submitting
    promissory note for BACI), H (submitting promissory note for NLD);
    Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at 7, Attach. E (submitting promissory
    note for BAGNI).

[^1263]: The Commission has rejected section 271 applications in part
    because BOCs failed to disclose fully all transactions in a manner
    consistent with section 272(b)(5) and the Commission's rules. *See
    Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20734-37; *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 20791-92.

[^1264]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 53.203(e).

[^1265]: Section 272(b)(5) states that the section 272 affiliate "shall
    conduct *all* transactions with the \[BOC\] of which it is an
    affiliate on an arm's length basis with *any such* transactions
    reduced to writing and available for public inspection." 47 U.S.C. §
    272(b)(5) (emphasis added).

[^1266]: *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20734-37; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95.

[^1267]: 47 C.F.R. § 32.27; *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    17582-17; *see Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20790-95. The Commission's affiliate transactions rules require BOCs
    to report transactions between regulated and nonregulated
    affiliates, and to value the cost of affiliate transactions in
    accordance with a hierarchy of valuation techniques.

[^1268]: Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. Attach. L; *see Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20791-92. In their Automated
    Reporting Management Information System ("ARMIS") reports, the BOCs
    provide summary information about their transactions with
    nonregulated affiliates. *See* ARMIS 43-02 USOA Report, Tables I-2,
    B-4. In their CAMs, the BOCs disclose the nature, terms, and
    frequency of their anticipated affiliate transactions. *See* 47
    C.F.R. § 64.903; *see also* Bell Atlantic Corp., [Cost Allocation
    Manual]{.smallcaps} § V (Dec. 1998). Pursuant to the Commission's
    Part 64 rules, all the BOCs receive annual audits of their ARMIS
    data conducted by an independent auditor. 47 C.F.R. § 64.904. In
    addition, the Commission regularly reviews the CAMs and the audit
    materials related to the independent audits, which show the actual
    amount of affiliate transactions that occurred in the audited
    period.

[^1269]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 32-51; AT&T Nov. 8 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 1-4.

[^1270]: *See* AT&T Comments at 69-70; AT&T Reply at 47-48. *But see*
    Bell Atlantic Reply at 44.

[^1271]: *See* Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at para. 14 (citing
    \<http://[www.callbell.com/regreqs2](http://www.callbell.com/regreqs2)\>
    and
    [www.callbell.com/regreqs2/index.htm](http://www.callbell.com/regreqs2/index.htm)),
    Attach. I; Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras 14-15 (citing
    \<<http://www.bagn.com/regrequirements.html>\>). The working papers
    of Bell Atlantic's independent auditors show that, in 1998, two Bell
    Atlantic BOCs provided approximately \$96,000 worth of data services
    and \$37,790 in voice messaging services to BACI; approximately
    \$69,000 in property management services to BAGNI; and approximately
    \$18,000 in real estate services to NLD. *See, e.g.*, Bell Atlantic
    Corp., [Cost Allocation Manual]{.smallcaps} at App. V-1 (Dec. 1998)
    (identifying services provided by a Bell Atlantic BOC to its section
    272 affiliates).

[^1272]: *See* Bell Atlantic Oct. 19 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^1273]: *See* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. Attach. L (explaining
    potential differences in dollar values of posted transactions);
    Browning Reply Decl. at 8-12, 14; *see also* Bell Atlantic Oct. 19
    *Ex Parte* Letter. *But see*AT&T Reply at 47-48 (criticizing Bell
    Atlantic's explanations); Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Director --
    Federal Government Affairs, AT&T Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (filed Nov. 8, 1999)
    (AT&T Nov. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^1274]: The total value of the discrepancies between Bell Atlantic's
    Internet disclosures and its other accounting information amounts to
    approximately \$220,000. When compared to the total volume of
    affiliate transactions for all three affiliates combined, the
    discrepancies amount to less than one percent of the total dollar
    value. By comparison, in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, we
    found approximately \$610,000 worth of discrepancies between the
    BOC's Internet postings and its ARMIS data, which amounted to 7.3
    percent of the total dollar value of transactions. *Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20792 n.1046. In the *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, BellSouth failed to provide explanations
    regarding its discrepancies, while Bell Atlantic presented
    explanations in the instant proceeding. *See* Bell Atlantic October
    19 *Ex Parte* Letter at 1-2 & Attach.

[^1275]: AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 34-40.

[^1276]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20793-94;
    *see Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20735. According to its
    Internet postings, its CAM, and its ARMIS data, Bell Atlantic did
    not transfer any assets from a BOC to its section 272 affiliates in
    1998.

[^1277]: *See, e.g.*, BACI Technical Services Agreement -- New York ,
    which is located on BACI's Internet site at:
    \<<http://www.callbell.com/regreqs2/detail.cfm?ContractID=19>\>.

[^1278]: *See* Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. Attach. I; Bell Atlantic Verge
    Decl. Attach. F; *see also* Bell Atlantic Browning Reply Decl. at
    paras. 8-12, 16.

[^1279]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 272(d) (requiring a joint Federal-State audit
    of section 272 compliance conducted by an independent auditor).

[^1280]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794-95;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17592; 47 C.F.R. §
    32.27; *see* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at paras. 22-25 & Attach.
    K-S (presenting various corporate policies and standard operating
    procedures pertaining to affiliate transactions compliance); Bell
    Atlantic Breen Decl. at paras. 14-17; Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at
    paras. 14-19.

[^1281]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(2); *see* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at
    paras. 22-26 & Attach. K (submitting reports of independent
    auditors), P (presenting employee training materials related to
    affiliate transaction compliance).

[^1282]: 47 C.F.R. § 32.27; *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    17586-87; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20785-86.

[^1283]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(d); *see* 47 C.F.R. §§ 53.209-213; *see also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794; *see* Bell
    Atlantic Application at 52; Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at para. 27
    & Attach. P at 36-40 (describing internal controls related to the
    biennial audit).

[^1284]: AARP Comments at 1; Closecall Comments at 8 (raising concerns
    about affiliate structure); ALTS Comments at 72; *see also* AT&T
    Reply at 47 (arguing that Bell Atlantic cannot evade its section 272
    obligations by chaining transactions through its affiliates); AT&T
    Nov. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2 (addressing risk of chain
    transactions).

[^1285]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 21997-17; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    20796-800. The Commission found that the nondiscrimination
    safeguards extend to any good, service, facility, or information
    that a BOC provides to its section 272 affiliate, including
    administrative services and other non-telecommunications goods and
    services. *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22003-04.

[^1286]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22000-01.

[^1287]: ALTS Comments at 69-72; AT&T at 71-73; CERB at 2, 10; Letter
    from Kristine DeBry, Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman, LLP, Counsel
    for CERB, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket 99-295 (filed Nov. 8, 1999) (CERB Nov. 8 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^1288]: AT&T Comments at 71-72.

[^1289]: Bell Atlantic Reply at 45; *see* AT&T Comments at 71-73.

[^1290]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 22018-22; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 20800-01; *see* Bell Atlantic Application at 52-53; Bell Atlantic
    Browning Decl. at para. 17(d) (citing Bell Atlantic FCC Tariff No.
    1, Bell Atlantic FCC Tariff No. 11, NYPSC Tariff No. 918, NYPSC
    Tariff No. 900). Bell Atlantic demonstrates that it will provide
    accurate data regarding actual service intervals so that
    unaffiliated parties can evaluate the performance Bell Atlantic
    provides itself and its affiliates and compare such performance to
    the service quality Bell Atlantic provides to competing carriers.
    Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at para. 17(e), Attach J; *see id.* at
    para. 18(a) (showing data that can be used to evaluate whether Bell
    Atlantic meets its nondiscrimination obligations). Bell Atlantic
    likewise addresses the accounting requirements of section 272(e) in
    its application. *See* Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at para. 19(a)
    (addressing accounting for amounts charged for access to telephone
    exchange and exchange access); Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at paras.
    14, 16; Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras. 17-18.

[^1291]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(2).

[^1292]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 272(e)(3), (e)(4); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20802-03; *see* Bell Atlantic Application at
    53; Bell Atlantic Application at 53; Bell Atlantic Browning Decl. at
    paras. 19(a), 20; Bell Atlantic Breen Decl. at paras. 14-16; Bell
    Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras. 17-18.

[^1293]: Bell Atlantic Application at 54; Bell Atlantic Browning Decl.
    at para. 21, Attachment P, 21, 27 (submitting portions of employee
    training materials); *see also* Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras.
    20-26 (describing corporate compliance program); Bell Atlantic Breen
    Decl. at para. 15; Bell Atlantic Reply at 46-47.

[^1294]: AT&T Comments at 73-77; AT&T Reply at 48-49; *BellSouth South
    Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 668.

[^1295]: Bell Atlantic Verge Decl. at paras. 21-26.

[^1296]: *See id.* at para. 2.

[^1297]: Excel Comments at 6-13.

[^1298]: *Id.* at 7.

[^1299]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Third Order on Reconsideration*, FCC
    99-242, paras. 22-24; *see also Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 22055-56.

[^1300]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(g)(2); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20804; Bell Atlantic Application at 54; Bell Atlantic
    Browning Decl. at para. 21 & Attach. P at 21, 27 (submitting
    portions of employee training materials); *see also* Verge Decl. at
    paras. 20-26 (describing corporate compliance program); Bell
    Atlantic Breen Decl. at para. 15; Bell Atlantic Reply at 46-47.

[^1301]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C). The Commission has offered direction
    for the benefit of section 271 applicants relating to the meaning
    and scope of the public interest inquiry. *See generally Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-08; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20741-51.

[^1302]: In addition, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that
    would have stipulated that full implementation of the checklist
    necessarily satisfies the public interest criterion. *See Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747; *see also* 141 Cong. Rec.
    S7971, S8043 (Jun. 8, 1995).

[^1303]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06
    (the public interest analysis may include consideration of "whether
    approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant
    telecommunications markets").

[^1304]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).

[^1305]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(d).

[^1306]: *See, e.g.*, AT&T Comments at 78-84, 94-100; MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 43-45; CPI Comments at 5-19.

[^1307]: *See* AT&T Comments at 79-80; AT&T Kelley Aff. at paras. 2-3,
    14-33; AT&T Hubbard/Lehr Aff. at para 54 and Attach. 13; CPI
    Comments at 10-16; KMC Comments at 11; MCI WorldCom Comments at 44;
    NY Attorney General Comments at 8.

[^1308]: While Bell Atlantic has offered evidence that it has lost large
    numbers of access lines to competitors, we recognize that
    competition may be slender as a percentage of access lines
    controlled by Bell Atlantic, particularly outside of urban areas.
    *See* AT&T Comments at 79-80; KMC Comments at 10; MCI WorldCom
    Comments at 44; MCI WorldCom Beard/Mayo Decl. at paras. 35-41.

[^1309]: *See* ALTS Comments at 68; CPI Comments at 3-5, 10-20; CPI
    Reply at 2-3; KMC Comments at 11; NY Attorney General Comments at
    7-9; TRA Comments at 28-29.

[^1310]: *See* AT&T Kelley Decl. at paras. 24-32; MCI WorldCom Comments
    at 44; MCI WorldCom Beard/Mayo Decl. at para. 37; *see also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 10 ("\[g\]iven the extent of
    facilities-based entry in metropolitan New York and other cities in
    upstate New York, we have no substantial concerns about the ability
    of facilities-based carriers to enter the market").

[^1311]: *See* AT&T Comments at 80-81; AT&T Bernheim/Ordover/Willig Aff.
    at paras. 35-36; AT&T Hubbard/Lehr Aff. at paras. 57-64.

[^1312]: This is consistent with the Commission's approach in prior
    section 271 orders. *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20585; *see also* BellSouth Reply at 19. For similar reasons, we
    decline to require Bell Atlantic to demonstrate, as urged by CPI,
    that all end users in New York have a "realistic choice" between
    facilities-based local carriers. *See* CPI Comments at 10-20.

[^1313]: *See generally* AT&T Hubbard/Lehr Aff. at paras. 28-136; AT&T
    Bernheim/Ordover/Willig Aff. at paras. 99-171; AT&T Selwyn Aff. at
    paras. 4-35; MCI WorldCom Beard/Mayo Decl., Attach. 3; Bell Atlantic
    Taylor Decl. at paras. 1-78; Bell Atlantic MacAvoy Decl. at paras.
    1-122.

[^1314]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806;
    *see Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747.

[^1315]: *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 7, Schwartz Aff. at
    paras. 149-192.

[^1316]: These mechanisms are generally administered by state
    commissions and derive from authority the states have under state
    law or under the federal Act. As such, these mechanisms can serve as
    critical complements to the Commission's authority to preserve
    checklist compliance pursuant to section 271(d)(6). Moreover, in
    this instance, we find that the extensive collaborative process by
    which these mechanisms were developed and modified in New York has,
    itself, helped to bring Bell Atlantic into checklist compliance.

[^1317]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806.

[^1318]: *See infra* Section VIII.

[^1319]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 71; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 8, 125, and Attach. A; AT&T Comments at
    94 (recognizing that 32 of Bell Atlantic's 85 interconnection
    agreements contain liquidated damages provisions).

[^1320]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 71 (recognizing that
    competitive carriers could seek "private remedies under generally
    applicable statutes, including the treble-damages remedy of the
    federal antitrust laws").

[^1321]: *See NYPSC Guidelines Order*; see also *NYPSC Permanent Rule
    Order*.

[^1322]: The New York Commission explained that, wherever possible, it
    established "parity" standards (a performance level which is the
    same for competitors as it is for Bell Atlantic's retail
    operations). *See* *NYPSC Guidelines Order* at 2. For wholesale
    functions that do not have retail analogues, the New York Commission
    established absolute standards, usually a fixed percentage or a
    fixed period of time. *Id.*

[^1323]: Although the enforcement plans were formally adopted by the New
    York Commission on November 3, 1999, *see* *Order Adopting the
    Amended Performance Assurance Plan and Amended Change Control Plan*,
    Case Nos. 97-C-0271 and 99-C-0949 at 32 (NYPSC Nov. 3, 1999) (Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Reply Decl., Att. A) (*NYPSC Enforcement Plan
    Order*), we disagree with commenters who suggest that, consistent
    with our policy of requiring that applications be final when filed,
    we may not consider these plans in our public interest analysis.
    *See, e.g.,* CoreComm Comments at 10; Sprint Comments at 24; AT&T
    Motion to Strike at 7; *see also* NY Attorney General Comments at
    36. These plans were developed through a 16 month process in New
    York and were submitted to the New York Commission for adoption on
    September 24, 1999. We take administrative notice of the fact that
    the plans were adopted virtually unchanged by the New York
    Commission. *See* AT&T Reply Comments at 38. What is critical to our
    analysis is that the plans were described in detail in Bell
    Atlantic's initial application, and have been subject to extensive
    comment in this proceeding. Because this aspect of our public
    interest inquiry necessarily is forward-looking and requires a
    predictive judgment, this is a situation where it is appropriate to
    consider commitments made by the applicant to be subject to a
    framework in the future. Accordingly, this is different from our
    checklist analysis in which we assess present or past compliance by
    an applicant.

[^1324]: *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 67-71; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl., App. A, Vol. 3, Attach. C (Petition for Approval
    of the Amended Performance Assurance Plan and Amended Change Control
    Assurance Plan for Bell Atlantic-New York, NYPSC Cases 97-C-0271 and
    99-C-0949 (Sept. 24, 1999)); *see also* *NYPSC Enforcement Plan
    Order* at 3-6; New York Commission Comments at 164-172.

[^1325]: As is clear from our discussion of the checklist requirements,
    we do not base our decision that the checklist has been satisfied on
    the existence of the New York performance plans. We thus approach
    our analysis of the New York performance monitoring and enforcement
    mechanisms from a different angle than the Department of Justice.
    While we conclude that the checklist has been met, and assess the
    predicted impact of these monitoring and enforcement mechanisms on
    Bell Atlantic's ability to *maintain* compliance with section 271,
    the Department of Justice has assessed whether these mechanisms will
    be sufficient to "ensure the rapid *completion* of necessary
    market-opening measures." Department of Justice Evaluation at 37
    (emphasis added), and Schwartz Aff. at paras. 137-140.

[^1326]: Our examination of the New York performance monitoring and
    enforcement mechanisms is solely for the purpose of determining
    whether the risk of post-approval non-compliance is sufficiently
    great that approval of its section 271 application would not be in
    the public interest. Our analysis has no bearing on the separate
    question of how the Commission would view and respond to any
    particular conduct by Bell Atlantic in the *federal* enforcement
    context.

[^1327]: Several parties also urge us to adopt, in the context of this
    section 271 application, automatic "federal" remedies, in addition
    to those developed in New York. *See* Allegiance Comments at 14-17;
    ALTS Comments at 79; AT&T Reply at 39; Comptel Comments at 47-57;
    e.spire/Net2000 Comments at 24-25; MCI WorldCom Reply at 30;
    MediaOne Reply at 17. As discussed more fully below, *see infra*
    Section VIII, we fully intend to enforce the provisions of section
    271 using the enforcement tools set forth in the Communications Act.

[^1328]: *See* *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 2, 17; Bell Atlantic
    Application at 69. We reach this number by adding the following
    components: \$75 million (MOE); \$75 million (MOE "doubling"
    provisions); \$75 million (Critical Measures); \$34 million (Special
    Provisions); and \$10 million (ACCAP).

[^1329]: *See* AT&T Comments at 87-88; ALTS Comments at 79; ChoiceOne
    Comments at 12; CoreComm Comments at 10-11; CPI Comments at 22-23;
    Focal Comments at 8; KMC Comments at 12-13; MCI WorldCom Comments at
    39-40; NY Attorney General Comments at 30-32. Several parties also
    argue that *any* cap or total limit on liability unnecessarily
    weakens an enforcement mechanism. *See, e.g.,* ALTS Reply at 26-27;
    e.spire/Net2000 Comments at 23; Intermedia Comments at 15.

[^1330]: *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at 39-40; MCI WorldCom Ford/Jackson
    Decl. at 14 (arguing that the APAP must entail liability "equal to
    or greater than the benefits that BA-NY would receive over time from
    providing such poor performance," which MCI WorldCom claims would
    exceed \$600 million per year); NY Attorney General Comments at 31
    ("in order to effectively deter certain conduct, sanctions should be
    much larger than the cost to comply," which it calculates at \$495
    million per year); Cable & Wireless Comments at 16. MCI WorldCom
    submits a detailed economic study, in which it seeks to calculate
    with precision the hypothetical benefits Bell Atlantic would derive
    from certain levels of discrimination, with the purpose of
    identifying a corresponding "optimal" penalty amount. The New York
    Commission concluded that a similar study submitted by MCI WorldCom
    in New York was "flawed" (*NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 18) and,
    in this proceeding, Bell Atlantic challenges MCI WorldCom's
    assumptions and methodology. *See* Bell Atlantic Duncan Reply Decl.,
    Attach. A. Because we do not find it necessary to determine the
    "optimal" penalty amount for a stand-alone enforcement mechanism, we
    will not specifically address the details of MCI WorldCom's study,
    the "flaws" identified by the New York Commission, or Bell
    Atlantic's counterarguments.

[^1331]: *See* MCI WorldCom Ford/Jackson Decl. at paras 22, 49
    (suggesting that local service profits represents a meaningful frame
    of reference in this analysis); *see also* CPI Comments at 22-23; NY
    Attorney General Comments at 30-31. While we are using net local
    revenue as a reference point or yardstick for comparison purposes,
    we do not suggest that local revenues constitute the *only* relevant
    figure. We recognize that Bell Atlantic may also derive benefits in
    other markets (such as long distance) from retaining local market
    share. *See* New York Commission Reply, Ex. 7 at 2, n.1.

[^1332]: To arrive at a total "Net Return" figure that reflects both
    interstate and intrastate portions of revenue derived from local
    exchange service, we combined line 1915 (the interstate "Net Return"
    line) with a computed net intrastate return number (total intrastate
    operating revenues and other operating income, less operating
    expenses, nonoperating items and all taxes). *See* ARMIS 43-01
    Annual Summary Report, Table 1, Cost and Revenue Table (1998).

[^1333]: *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 18, 32. The New York
    Commission, in its Evaluation, also expressed its "confiden\[ce\]
    that Bell Atlantic-NY, once having earned section 271 approval, has
    the proper incentive to continue to meet its commitments." New York
    Commission Comments at 172.

[^1334]: *See* AT&T Comments at 89; Cable & Wireless Comments at 16;
    CoreComm Comments at 11; MCI WorldCom Comments at 40-42; Sprint
    Comments at 26. We also disagree with Sprint and find that the
    amount at stake under the ACCAP (\$10 million, plus up to \$15
    million in penalties "unused" by the APAP) provides reasonably
    sizable incentive for Bell Atlantic to adhere to change management
    procedures developed in New York. *See* Sprint Comments at 31.

[^1335]: New York Commission Comments at 166; *see also* *NYPSC
    Enforcement Plan Order* at 32 (commenting that this reallocation
    power "allows the Commission flexibility to ensure that potential
    loopholes may be closed rapidly and pointedly").

[^1336]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806.

[^1337]: *See* AT&T Comments at 47-48; Choice One Comments at 5; AT&T
    Pfau/Kalb Decl. at paras 53-62; AT&T Reply at 31; CPI Reply at 13.

[^1338]: The New York Commission has explained that questions have
    arisen about certain performance measurements, and that several of
    these are currently under further review in the Carrier-to-Carrier
    proceeding. *See* New York Commission Comments at 7 n.2 and 46 n.1;
    *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 25-26, 30 and 39 n.4. *See also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 6 (recognizing that the New York
    Commission "is continuing its efforts to refine \[certain\]
    performance measures").

[^1339]: The New York Commission adopted interim guidelines for
    inter-carrier service quality on March 16, 1998 and, in conjunction
    with a collaborative process involving working groups and
    subject-area sub-groups, has reviewed and modified these guidelines
    on an ongoing basis since that time. *See* *NYPSC Guidelines Order*
    at 1-2; *NYPSC Permanent Rule Order* at 1-4; *NYPSC Additional
    Guidelines Order* at 1-2. Moreover, the New York Commission has
    stated that it "fully expect\[s\] that metrics will continue to be
    developed and refined." *See* New York Commission Reply at 4.

[^1340]: The New York Commission concluded that the reporting
    requirements "are comprehensive and will help fulfill our goal of
    achieving expeditiously an open, competitive local exchange market."
    *NYPSC Permanent Rule Order* at 3.

[^1341]: See *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 14-15. In particular, we
    applaud the New York Commission and Bell Atlantic for addressing the
    very important issue of change management by designing metrics that
    measure Bell Atlantic's compliance with its change management
    processes and give the company incentives to satisfy performance
    standards in this area.

[^1342]: AT&T Comments at 91; MCI WorldCom Comments at 43; AT&T
    Kalb/Pfau Aff. at paras. 205-206 (arguing that *every*
    Carrier-to-Carrier metric must have a penalty attached); *see also*
    Focal Comments at 7 (the mechanisms fail to address metrics relating
    to special access services); Sprint Comments at 30-31 (additional
    metrics should be added to the change control plan).

[^1343]: *See* *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 14-15; *see also* New
    York Commission Comments at 165.

[^1344]: *See* *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 15 (explaining that
    "\[o\]nce the \[Performance Assurance Plan\] is in effect, market
    conditions will be examined to determine whether metrics should be
    added or deleted"). The New York Commission also may add metrics to
    the ACCAP. *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl., Attach. C, Ex. 2
    at 3 (Amended Change Control Assurance Plan, September 1999).

[^1345]: *See* ALTS Comments at 37-38; AT&T Reply at 31; \@link Comments
    at 6; Covad Comments at 33-34.

[^1346]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 94-95
    ("\[r\]ecommendations to the NYPSC are expected in December for the
    adoption of DSL-specific metrics to ensure that \[DSL services\] can
    be separately monitored to ensure provisioning at a commercially
    reasonable level of quality and timeliness"); *see also* New York
    Commission Reply Comments, Ex. 7 at 4, n.2.

[^1347]: *See* Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 122-157 and
    Attach. C (Petition for Approval of Amended Performance Assurance
    Plan); *see also* New York Commission Comments, Appendix 1.

[^1348]: *See* ALTS Comments at 78 (arguing that the "forgiveness"
    provision of the Plan would allow Bell Atlantic to "hide
    discriminatory practices"); AT&T Comments at 92-93; Intermedia
    Comments at 16; KMC Comments at 12; AT&T Kalb/Pfau Aff. at para.
    214.

[^1349]: *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at 40; Intermedia Comments at 16;
    AT&T Pfau/Kalb Decl. at para 209.

[^1350]: *See* ALTS Comments at 78 (suggesting that aggregating measures
    together would result in "offset\[ting\] poor performance in one
    performance category with good performance in another category");
    AT&T Comments at 92; KMC Comments at 12; MCI WorldCom Comments at
    41-42.

[^1351]: *See* MCI WorldCom Comments at 42; MCI WorldCom Ford/Jackson
    Aff. at para. 67; AT&T Kalb/Pfau Aff. at para. 217.

[^1352]: *See NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 12-14; *see also* New
    York Commission Reply, Ex. 7 at 3-6.

[^1353]: *See NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 11-12. We also note with
    approval that the APAP "will be enforceable as a New York Commission
    order," and that failure by Bell Atlantic to comply with the terms
    of these mechanisms could subject the company to penalties in the
    amount of \$100,000 per day. *See* New York Commission Comments at
    165, n.1. Complaints alleging that Bell Atlantic is not complying
    with these state-crafted mechanisms thus would be directed to the
    New York Commission rather than the FCC.

[^1354]: *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 39-40; Sprint
    Comments at 30; NY Attorney General Comments at 33-34;
    e.spire/Net2000 Comments at 23.

[^1355]: The Plan allows Bell Atlantic to seek a waiver on grounds of
    "unusual" or "inappropriate" CLEC behavior, listing a handful of
    examples. We find this category to be vague, and note that it could
    be used to challenge a very wide range of data. We note, however,
    that the New York Commission has stated that "waiver relief is
    intended for limited, extraordinary circumstances," *see* *NYPSC
    Enforcement Plan Order* at 24, and thus we expect that this
    exception will not be applied expansively.

[^1356]: NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order at 24.

[^1357]: In its order adopting the APAP, the New York Commission
    explained that "resolution of a waiver exception request must occur
    prior to the scheduled payment period." *NYPSC Enforcement Plan
    Order* at 24. We understand this to mean that waiver petitions will
    be resolved expeditiously, such that bill credits due for poor
    performance in a given month will never be "stayed" by a waiver
    petition. This interpretation is consistent with the sample waiver
    processing timeline contained in Bell Atlantic's petition requesting
    NYPSC approval of the APAP. *See* Bell Atlantic 271 Application,
    Attach. C, Ex. 1 (Amended Performance Assurance Plan, Appendix D at
    5) (showing a hypothetical waiver petition being resolved before
    bill credits for a given month are due).

[^1358]: *See* New York Commission Comments at 12, 169 n.1.

[^1359]: *See id*; Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl., Attach. C, Ex. 1 at
    17-19. Bell Atlantic has also committed to implement a Quality
    Assurance Program (more accurately, an "Accuracy Assurance Program")
    under which it will document and verify its data in an open,
    reviewable manner and provide an internal mechanism for
    investigating and resolving CLEC disputes about the accuracy of
    reported data. *See id.* at 15.

[^1360]: MCI WorldCom has commented that this replication commitment is
    "extremely valuable in enabling CLECs to ensure that metrics are
    being reported as intended . . . after long distance entry by \[Bell
    Atlantic\]." MCI WorldCom Kinard Decl. at 3. AT&T, however, argues
    that this replication is incomplete. *See* AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at
    para. 184.

[^1361]: *See* *Accounting for Judgments and Other Costs Associated with
    Litigation*, 12 FCC Rcd 5112 (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 32.7370(d). As a
    general matter, a carrier's operating expenses recovered through its
    rates must be legitimate costs of providing adequate service to
    ratepayers. *See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. V. PUC*, 294 U.S. 63, 74
    (1935); *Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 939 F.2d 1035,
    1044 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

[^1362]: Under the SBC/Ameritech merger, the Commission held that bill
    credits "shall not be reflected in the revenue requirement of an
    SBC/Ameritech incumbent LEC." *See Applications of Ameritech Corp.
    and SBC Communications Inc*., CC Docket No. 98-141, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, Appendix C at para. 34 (rel. Oct. 8, 1999).

[^1363]: *See* CPI Comments at 24.

[^1364]: *NYPSC Enforcement Plan Order* at 31 ("\[Bell Atlantic\] will
    be specifically prohibited from recovering revenue losses
    attributable to the remedial performance credits given in connection
    with the \[penalty plans\]").

[^1365]: For example, several commenters suggest that Bell Atlantic has
    engaged in unfair and dilatory tactics in interconnection
    negotiations. *See* ICG Comments at 2-7; Ntegrity Comments at 2;
    Z-Tel Comments at 22. *See also* Global NAPS Comments at 2-5
    (asserting that Bell Atlantic's conduct in resolving ongoing
    disputes concerning inter-carrier compensation for ISP-bound calls
    is anticompetitive); *but see* *Complaint of Bell Atlantic-Delaware,
    et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc.*, File No. E-99-22, Memorandum Opinion
    and Order, FCC 99-381(rel. Dec. 2, 1999) (concluding that challenged
    sections of a Global NAPs tariff in Massachusetts are unlawful,
    based on the fact that the Massachusetts Department of
    Telecommunications and Energy has yet to resolve whether and how the
    parties' existing interconnection agreement provides for
    inter-carrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic).

[^1366]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20749.

[^1367]: We emphasize that grant of this application *does not* reflect
    any conclusion that Bell Atlantic's conduct in the individual
    instances cited by commenters is nondiscriminatory and complies with
    the company's obligations under the Communications Act.

[^1368]: *See* City of New York Comments at 2-4.

[^1369]: AT&T Comments at 65-67.

[^1370]: *See Petition of Bell Atlantic for Forbearance from Section 272
    Requirements in Connection with National Directory Assistance
    Services*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 97-172, DA
    99-2990 (rel. Dec. 22, 1999).

[^1371]: This determination does not remove the possibility of future
    enforcement action to the extent that Bell Atlantic may have failed
    to comply with the Act.

[^1372]: Petition of U S WEST Communications, Inc. for a Declaratory
    Ruling Regarding the Provision of National Directory Assistance, CC
    Docket No. 97-172, Memorandum Opinion & Order, FCC 99-133 (rel.
    Sept. 27, 1999), *recon. pending* (U S WEST Forbearance Order).

[^1373]: *U S WEST v. FCC*, 177 F.3d 1057, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As the
    Department of Justice has observed, section 271 serves a critical
    market-opening role by "ensuring the BOC has powerful incentives
    (*i.e.*, the ability to enter the long distance market) to cooperate
    to open its markets." Department of Justice Evaluation at 38.

[^1374]: *See, e.g.,* ALTS Comments at 74-79; AT&T Comments at 81-94;
    Cable & Wireless Comments at 12-14; CPI Comments at 20-23; CompTel
    Comments at 27-34; MCI WorldCom Comments at 36-37; Sprint Comments
    at 23-31; NY Attorney General Comments at 27-36. *See also*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 36-40.

[^1375]: Of course, this statutory framework would apply whenever a BOC
    receives section 271 authorization for a particular state.

[^1376]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^1377]: Specifically, the Commission may impose monetary forfeitures
    pursuant to Title V by issuing a written notice of apparent
    liability for forfeiture and providing the subject an opportunity to
    respond in writing. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).

[^1378]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^1379]: *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections
    271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC
    Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905, 22066 (1996) (*Non-Accounting
    Safeguards Order*). *See* Bell Atlantic Application at 71 ("Any
    anticompetitive conduct is unthinkable in light of this Commission's
    powers under section 271(d)(6)(A). That provision allows the
    Commission to enforce the requirements of section 271 with
    penalties, up to and including possible revocation of long distance
    authority."); *see also* Bell Atlantic Reply at 60.

[^1380]: *See AT&T Corp. v. Ameritech Corp*., File No. E-98-41,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14508 (1998) (*Ameritech
    Stand-Still Order*) (stand-still order issued pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
    § 154(i) temporarily preventing Ameritech from enrolling additional
    customers in, and marketing and promoting, a "teaming" arrangement
    with Qwest Corporation pending a decision concerning the lawfulness
    of the program); *see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co*.,
    392 U.S. 157 (1968) (affirming Commission's authority to impose a
    stand-still order pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)).

[^1381]: Service to existing interLATA subscribers would not be
    interrupted*. See Ameritech Standstill Order*.

[^1382]: See *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22077.

[^1383]: 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 554 (emphasis added). *See AT&T v. FCC*,
    572 F.2d 17, 22-23 (2^nd^ Cir.) (where statute does not require
    hearing "on the record," APA does not require trial-type evidentiary
    hearing), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); *United States v.
    Florida East Coast Railway Co.*, 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973).

[^1384]: For example, the 90-day deadline in section 271(d)(6)(B) for
    resolving complaints concerning failures by a BOC to meet conditions
    required for approval suggests that Congress did not intend to
    afford BOCs trial-type hearings in all post-approval enforcement
    proceedings*. See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    22077.

[^1385]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(B ); 47 C.F.R. § 1.736; *Implementation
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment of Rules Governing
    Procedures to Be Followed When Formal Complaints Are Filed Against
    Common Carriers*, CC Docket No. 96-238, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd
    22497, 22610-12 (1997).

[^1386]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22066.

[^1387]: *See supra* para 441.

[^1388]: Statistical testing can be used, but is not necessary, for
    metrics using benchmarks.

[^1389]: It would be unreasonable to expect a particular performance
    metric to always show *ex post* equal or better performance for
    service to a requesting carrier, compared to that provided to the
    incumbent LEC\'s customers. Such a requirement, if implemented,
    would demand that the incumbent LEC provide *ex ante* superior
    service to a requesting carrier, in order to ensure that random
    variation does not cause performance to the requesting carrier to
    drop accidently below the level needed for a determination of
    parity.

[^1390]: Other methods of testing are possible, such as the use of
    Bayesian estimation techniques. We will not discuss those methods
    here. *See* John Neter, William Wasserman, and G.A. Whitmore,
    *Applied Statistics* at ch. 27-28 (4^th^ ed., 1993).

[^1391]: Researchers usually call the hypothesis they are trying to
    prove the alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis is the
    hypothesis which they are trying to determine whether to reject.
    Ramakant Khazanie, *Statistics in a World of Applications* 495
    (4^th^ ed., 1997).

[^1392]: Devising a statistical test usually involves creating a test
    statistic and then comparing it to some critical value.

[^1393]: *See* Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at ch. 9.

[^1394]: Statisticians would say that the observations are a sample
    taken from the population. The population is the theoretical set of
    values obtained if an infinite number of observations were taken of
    the underlying process. Therefore the population mean is the
    theoretical mean produced by the process, while the sample mean is
    the measured mean. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 5-6; Neter, Wasserman,
    and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 235-36, 248-49; Alexander Mood,
    Franklin Graybill and Duane Boes, *Introduction to the Theory of
    Statistics* 219-31 (3^rd^ ed., 1974).

[^1395]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 20659 and
    n.274.

[^1396]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 112, and Attach. B,
    App. K.

[^1397]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. The use of
    different formulas for statistical testing for measured and
    proportionate (counted) metrics is recommended in statistical
    textbooks. *See* Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 538-48; Neter, Wasserman,
    and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at ch. 14. To be consistent with textbook
    usage, we will refer to \"counted\" metrics as \"proportionate.\"

[^1398]: Any metric measuring average times is a measured metric. The
    sample mean, also called the average or the arithmetic mean, is
    defined as the sum of the observations, divided by the number of
    observations. Mathematically it is m = Σ X~i~ / N, where X~i~ are
    the observations, and N is the number of observations. Khazanie,
    *supra* n.4 at 77-79, 234-35; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore,
    *supra* n.3 at 71, 248-49.

[^1399]: Proportionate metrics are generally said to have a binomial
    distribution. Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 363-65.
    Competitive LECs have suggested that there is a third kind of metric
    involved called rates. Rates are measures that involve the division
    of two numbers (for example, the trouble rate). Letter from Robert
    Quinn, Director-Federal Government Affairs, AT&T, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    99-295 Attach. at 13 (Local Competition Users Group, Statistical
    Tests for Local Service Parity, version 1.0) (filed December 17,
    1999) (LCUG Statistical Tests for Local Service Parity). In theory
    rates can exceed 1, unlike proportions. For example, more than one
    trouble could be reported for each line, so the trouble rate (which
    is the number of troubles divided by the number of lines) could be
    greater than one. Rates are classified as proportionate (counted)
    metrics by Bell Atlantic, and there are no special formulas for
    rates used in this application, so we will not discuss formulas for
    rates here.

[^1400]: The z and t tests to be used for measured and proportionate
    variables were agreed upon by the Carrier-to-Carrier Group. They
    were proposed by LCUG and agreed to by Bell Atlantic. LCUG
    Statistical Tests for Local Service Parity; Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 112, and Attach. B, App. K.

[^1401]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. It is also
    sometimes known as the \"LCUG modified z-test.\" The only known
    published discussion of the modified z-test is in Cavell Brownie,
    Dennis D. Boos, and Jacqueline Hughes-Oliver, \"Modifying the *t*
    and ANOVA *F* Tests When Treatment Is Expected to Increase
    Variability Relative to Controls,\" *Biometrics* 46, 259-66 (1990).
    AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff., Attach. 2, \"AT&T\'s Responses to FCC\'s
    Questions Dated April 12, 1999\", at 3.

[^1402]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. The
    standard deviation is the square root of the variance. The sample
    variance is the sum of the squares of the differences between the
    mean and the observations, divided by the number of observations
    minus one. For measured metrics the sample variance is:
    s^2 ^= Σ (m­X~i~)^2 ^/ (N‑1), where s^2^ is the sample variance, m is
    the sample mean, X~i~ are the observations, and N is the number of
    observations. For proportionate metrics the sample variance is: s^2^
    = N \* P \* (1-P), where P is the proportion. Khazanie, *supra* n.4
    at 257; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 82-83,
    363-71; Mood, Graybill, and Boes, *supra* n.7 at 229.

[^1403]: Assuming the means have *identical* but unknown variances, and
    the sample size is large, the standard z-test for a difference in
    means between two populations, stated in terms of competitive LEC
    and incumbent LEC means, is z = (m~C~−m~I~) / (s~p~ \* SQRT
    \[1/N~C~+1/N~I~\]), where m~C~ = competitive LEC sample mean, m~I~ =
    incumbent LEC sample mean, s~p~ = pooled standard deviation (either
    uses the observations of both populations, or combines the standard
    deviations of the two populations), N~C~ = number of competitive LEC
    observations, and N~I~ = number of incumbent LEC observations. The
    test statistic is normally distributed, so the critical value is
    obtained from the standard normal distribution. If the sample size
    is small and the populations are normal, then the standard test is a
    t-test, using the same test statistic, but the test statistic has a
    t distribution with N~I~+N~C~-2 degrees of freedom. Khazanie,
    *supra* n.4 at 540-41, 563; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra*
    n.3 at 397-402. The normal and standard normal distributions,
    t-statistics, and critical values are discussed below at *infra*
    para. 9 and n.Error: Reference source not found, Error: Reference
    source not found, Error: Reference source not found.

    If the variances are assumed to be unknown and *different*, and the
    sample size is large, then the standard z-test uses the test
    statistic z = (m~C~−m~I~) / SQRT \[s~C~^2^/N~C~+s~I~^2^/N~I~\]),
    where s~C~ = competitive LECs\' standard deviation and s~I~ =
    incumbent LEC\'s standard deviation. The test statistic is normally
    distributed, and the standard normal distribution is used to
    determine the critical value. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 538-40, 563.
    If the sample size is small and the populations are normal, however,
    then the problem is known as the Behrens-Fisher problem (or the
    Behrens problem or the Fisher-Behrens problem), which is
    considerably more complicated to solve. Hamparsum Bozdogan and
    Donald E. Ramirez, \"An Adjusted Likelihood-Ratio Approach to the
    Behrens-Fisher Problem,\" *Communications in Statistics: Theory and
    Methods*, 15 (8) at 2405 (1986); Brownie, Boos, and Hughes-Oliver,
    *supra* n.14 at 259-60. One solution is to use the Aspin-Welch test,
    using the same test statistic as for the large sample size test, but
    here the test statistic has a t distribution, with a complicated
    calculation of the degrees of freedom. Acheson J. Duncan, *Quality
    Control and Industrial Statistics* 616-617 (5^th^ ed., 1986);
    William H. Beyer, *CRC Standard Mathematical Tables* 525 (26^th^
    ed., 1987).

[^1404]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. Bell
    Atlantic calls this a t-test. The t-test uses Student\'s t
    distribution to determine the critical value. For large sample
    sizes, this is approximately equivalent to doing a z-test, because
    for sample sizes of greater than 30 observations, the t distribution
    has approximately the same distribution as the standard normal
    distribution. With a t-test, the critical value varies according to
    the degrees of freedom, which depend on the sample size. Since Bell
    Atlantic is using a fixed critical value, it is effectively using a
    z-test. The formula for calculating the test statistic is
    effectively the same for both kinds of tests. Khazanie, *supra* n.4
    at 410-413, 521; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 913;
    *see infra* n.Error: Reference source not found. The formula for the
    test statistic can be more simply described as the difference in
    means divided by the standard error (Bell Atlantic calls the
    standard error the \"sampling error\" in the Carrier to Carrier
    metric reports), or (m~C~‑m~I~) / S.E. Neter, Wasserman, and
    Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 266, 290-91; LCUG Statistical Tests for
    Local Service Parity at 7-8.

[^1405]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. We note
    that the standard z-test for a difference in proportions is z =
    (P~C~-P~I~) / SQRT \[P~p~(1-P~p~) (1/N~C~+1/N~I~)\], where P~C~ =
    competitive LEC sample proportion, P~I~ = incumbent LEC sample
    proportion, P~P~ = pooled sample proportion, N~C~=number of
    competitive LEC observations, and N~I~=number of incumbent LEC
    observations. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 546-47, 563; Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 408-12.

[^1406]: As noted above, the critical value for a z-test is taken from
    tables based on the standard normal distribution. *See* *supra*
    n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^1407]: In New York the tests have been set up so that z-scores that
    indicate worse performance for competing carriers are negative. Thus
    if the critical value is --1.645, only z-scores that are less, such
    as --2 or --3, would yield statistically significant results.

[^1408]: For example, if the confidence level C is 95 percent (0.95),
    then α is 5 percent (0.05).

[^1409]: While falsely rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., falsely
    finding that the BOC\'s processes of serving retail and
    competitors\' customers are different) is called a Type I error,
    falsely accepting the null hypothesis when it is not true (i.e.,
    falsely finding that the BOC\'s processes are identical) is called a
    Type II error. The probabilities of a Type I error and a Type II
    error are commonly referred to by the Greek letters α (alpha) and β
    (beta), respectively. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 498; Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 319-20. Usually
    statisticians choose one hypothesis to be the null hypothesis
    because falsely rejecting it (Type I error) is considered more
    serious than falsely accepting it (Type II error), so controlling α
    is more important than controlling β. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 499,
    506; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 320; Mood,
    Graybill, and Boes, *supra* n.7 at 411.

[^1410]: Statistical tests virtually never determine anything with
    certainty. There is always a certain probability of being wrong and
    choosing the incorrect hypothesis. Statistical tests are devised to
    minimize this probability of being wrong, i.e., to keep the
    probabilities of Type I and Type II errors at a minimum.

[^1411]: The rationale for using a one-tailed test is described below.
    *See infra* para. 18.

[^1412]: This means that, if a 95 percent confidence level is used for a
    statistical test, when the null hypothesis is true, 95 percent of
    the time we will correctly choose the null hypothesis. Meanwhile
    there will be a 5 percent chance that a statistical test will show a
    statistically significant difference. This is caused by random
    variation in the data. One way to interpret this is that out of
    every 100 measurements, on average five should show statistically
    significant differences, even with identical processes serving
    retail and competing LECs\' customers.

[^1413]: A normal distribution is sometimes referred to as a Gaussian
    distribution. It is often described as having a \"bell-shaped\"
    curve. A standard normal distribution is a normal distribution that
    has been transformed such that its mean is zero and standard
    deviation is one. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 281, 294-96.

[^1414]: The Central Limit Theorem is a powerful theorem in statistics.
    It says that under most circumstances, the distribution of the mean
    will approach a normal distribution for a large enough sample size,
    even if the distribution of the population from which the mean is
    drawn is not normal. Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 344-45; Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 267-68; Mood, Graybill, and
    Boes, *supra* n.7 at 233-36.

[^1415]: Textbooks are vague about what the minimum sample size should
    be to use a large sample test like the z-test on measured metrics,
    but 30 is often cited as appropriate. Textbooks generally agree,
    however, that at 30 observations and greater, the t-test can be
    replaced by the z-test, for distributions that are approximately
    normal. *See, e.g.,* Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 413, 521, 539; Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 913; Duncan, *supra* n.16 at
    150. *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found. Doubts about
    whether a sample size of 30 is sufficient for measured metrics have
    been raised by AT&T in other proceedings. AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff.
    Attach. 3, at 4-5. We note that KPMG used 100 as the threshold for
    using permutation testing in their test analysis of Bell Atlantic\'s
    metrics. KPMG Final Report at POP8 IV-176-77. The parties in this
    proceeding have agreed to use 30 as the minimum sample size for use
    of a z-test, and there is insufficient evidence in the record for us
    to reject this choice. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B,
    App. K. The minimum sample size needed before a z-test should be
    used generally depends on the distribution of the underlying
    observations, and, in particular, how skewed it is. Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 296.

[^1416]: Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 262-64; Neter, Wasserman, and
    Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 368-69.

[^1417]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. KPMG used a
    hypergeometric test (also known as Fisher\'s Exact Test) for its
    analysis when the number of observations is less than 10,000, for
    comparing two proportions. KPMG Final Report at POP8 IV-177. For a
    discussion of the binomial and hypergeometric distributions and
    tests, which are similar, *see* Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 246-64;
    Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at ch. 7.

[^1418]: The t-test is similar to a z-test. Unlike a z-test, it is used
    for small sample sizes, when the population is assumed to be normal,
    and the variance is not known. The t-test uses the same formula for
    the test statistic as the z-test (*see supra* para. 7), but instead
    of obtaining the appropriate critical value from a table of the
    standard normal distribution, the critical value has to be taken
    from the tables for the t distribution, taking into account the
    appropriate degrees of freedom (i.e., number of observations). Note
    that the t-test yields about the same result as a z-test for sample
    sizes of 30 or more. Since z-tests are easier to do, they are
    usually used for large sample sizes. *See supra* n.Error: Reference
    source not found; Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 410-413, 521; Neter,
    Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 335-36, 402-03, 913.

[^1419]: Bell Atlantic says it will initially use a t-test until it is
    able to run a permutation test in \"an automated fashion.\" Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K.

[^1420]: In other words, it assumes: H~0~: μ~I~ = μ~C~ and
    σ~I~^2^=σ~C~^2^, and H~A~: μ~I~ ≠ μ~C~ or σ~I~^2^≠σ~C~^2^, where μ
    is the population (theoretical) mean for the incumbent I and
    competitive LEC C, σ^2^ is the variance, and H~0~ and H~A~ are the
    null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. Brownie, Boos, and
    Hughes-Oliver, *supra* n.14 at 260; LCUG Statistical Tests for Local
    Service Parity at 8-9. There are no standard textbook z-tests for
    these hypotheses. There are standard z-tests for a test of
    difference of means which assume that the incumbent and competitive
    LEC variances are always the same, or that the variances are always
    different. *See* Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 563; Neter, Wasserman, and
    Whitmore, *supra* n.3 at 538-42, 563; *supra* n.Error: Reference
    source not found.

[^1421]: In a standard z-test, if the competitive LECs\' standard
    deviation rises, so will the standard error (the denominator in the
    z statistic), causing the z statistic to fall, even if the
    difference in the means stays constant. This will not happen with
    the modified z, since its standard error does not directly depend on
    the competitive LECs\' standard deviation.

[^1422]: If the competitive LEC variance (and standard deviation) is
    large, then the competitive LEC means m~C~ will be much more
    variable. Since the standard error for the modified z does not
    depend on the competitive LEC standard deviation, unlike the
    standard z, the modified z will be more likely to find that a
    difference in means is statistically significant. AT&T Pfau/Kalb
    Aff., Attach. 2, \"AT&T\'s Responses to FCC\'s Questions Dated April
    12, 1999\" at 3-4.

[^1423]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at para. 112, and Attach. B,
    App. K, and Attach. C, Ex. 1, App. D; AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at para.
    54.

[^1424]: Statisticians define the power of a test as its ability to
    correctly determine when the alternative hypothesis is true, while
    keeping fixed the probability of falsely rejecting the null
    hypothesis, for every possible alternative hypothesis (or Power=1‑β
    while α is fixed, for all H~A~). A more powerful test has a lower β,
    for the same α and H~A~. Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, *supra* n.3
    at 339-47; Mood, Graybill, and Boes, *supra* n.7 at 406-11; William
    H. Greene, *Econometric Analysis* 156-57 (3^rd^ ed., 1997).
    Therefore, these tests are more powerful if they are better able to
    detect differences in means when the processes serving retail
    customers and competitors are truly different, while maintaining the
    same probability of falsely finding a difference when the processes
    are, in fact, the same. The modified z has been shown to be a more
    powerful test than a standard z under the hypotheses outlined above
    (*supra* n.Error: Reference source not found), using power curves.
    Brownie, Boos, and Hughes-Oliver, *supra* n.14 at 261-63.

[^1425]: Permutation tests are classified as a bootstrap method.
    Bootstrap methods involve repeated resampling of the original data
    to generate the statistical results of interest. A.C. Davison and
    D.V. Hinkley, *Bootstrap Methods and Their Applications* at chs. 1,
    4 (1997); H. Scheffe, *The Analysis of Variance* 313-18 (1959).

[^1426]: Duncan, *supra* n.16 at 608, 973-75.

[^1427]: *See infra* para. 17. The Carrier-to-Carrier metrics are set up
    in such a way that negative scores indicate that competitive LECs
    are receiving worse performance than Bell Atlantic customers, while
    positive scores indicate the opposite. *See* Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, App. D at 1.

[^1428]: The plan also provides for performance scores of --1, which
    represent a confidence level of 79 percent. The adjustment used in
    the plan of erasing a --1 if followed by zeros in two following
    months effectively raises the confidence level to 90 percent for
    --1\'s that are not erased. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at
    paras. 128-29, and Attach. C, App. E at 1.

[^1429]: Note that a \"larger\" negative score is actually closer to
    zero, so --1 is larger than --2.

[^1430]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K.

[^1431]: For metrics with observations excluded from their measurement,
    the number of observations excluded should also be reported, to
    improve our ability to determine how accurately the metric measures
    the universe of orders or customers.

[^1432]: A difference in metric values that is statistically
    significant, however, does not necessarily mean that the BOC\'s
    service is discriminatory. We will examine the totality of the
    evidence before making a determination whether the BOC is providing
    parity.

[^1433]: Khazanie, *supra* n.4 at 506; Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore,
    *supra* n.3 at 298. We note that Bell Atlantic argues that the 95
    percent confidence level is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny
    Decl. Attach. B, App. K; Bell Atlantic Duncan Reply at para.
    36-38**.**

[^1434]: Type I and Type II errors are described above. *See* *supra*
    para. 9.

[^1435]: AT&T argues that choosing a critical value to balance the
    probabilities of Type I and Type II errors is desirable, because it
    balances the interests of BOC and competitive LECs by setting equal
    the chances of falsely finding discrimination and of falsely missing
    discrimination. While acknowledging that the critical value to
    achieve this balancing (\"balancing critical value\") will depend on
    the number of BOC and competitive LEC observations, they argue that
    using a fixed critical value based on an 85 percent confidence level
    is a reasonable approximation of the balancing critical value, given
    typical competitive LEC sample sizes. AT&T Pfau/Kalb Aff. at paras.
    88-93 and n.97 and Attach. 2 at 27-30.

[^1436]: This would mean using a critical value for the z-test of 1.04.

[^1437]: AT&T\'s proposal to balance the Type I and Type II error
    probabilities does appear to have the attractive feature that the
    interests of the incumbent LEC and the competitive LECs are given
    equal weight, so that the probabilities of falsely concluding the
    incumbent LEC may be discriminating and of missing existing
    discrimination are balanced (so α=β). Such an approach could be used
    in future section 271 applications. We would be more likely to
    accept use of such an approach if the state commission and parties
    have agreed on its use, particularly since there are details that
    need to be worked out before it is used. For example, the relevant
    alternative hypothesis must be agreed upon. We note that the New
    York Commission has not accepted AT&T\'s proposal. Bell Atlantic
    argues that AT&T\'s proposal is not standard and is difficult to
    implement. Bell Atlantic Duncan Reply at paras. 36-38**.**

[^1438]: The alternative is to use a two-tailed test to determine
    whether an incumbent LEC\'s performance to competitive LECs is
    either inferior *or superior* to the performance that it provides
    itself. Our analysis does not take into account whether superior
    performance is being provided. We are unable to determine how much
    superior performance in one metric or for one month could offset
    inferior performance in another metric or for another month.

[^1439]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. B, App. K. The use of
    passing scores in some months to offset negative scores in other
    months is used in the Performance Assurance Plan to lower the
    probability of Bell Atlantic making payments under parity. Bell
    Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 128-29. *See supra* n.Error:
    Reference source not found. This is one reasonable method of
    reducing the probability of a Type I error.

[^1440]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. C, Ex. 1 at 4 and App.
    C. *See supra* Section III.C.2.

[^1441]: Bell Atlantic Dowell/Canny Decl. at paras. 62, 65-66; Bell
    Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl. at paras. 7-12.

[^1442]: The Gertner/Bamberger study provides us with no information
    about the impact of the factors they discuss on dispatch orders, so
    we are unable to make the same adjustments for Average Completed
    Intervals for dispatch orders.

[^1443]: Sources are Carrier to Carrier metrics, Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D; Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl.
    at Table 4; Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at Table 2.
    The Bell Atlantic retail numbers used for comparison with the study
    data for CLECs were taken from the carrier to carrier metrics. The
    bottom row includes an adjustment to the CLEC average completed
    interval to take into account the different lengths of the average
    standard intervals (listed in the third row). The calculation of the
    CLEC intervals in the bottom row involved taking the study\'s
    estimate of the interval for only properly coded orders from Table 4
    (2.36 days in August) and adding the difference in average standard
    intervals between retail and CLEC orders caused by the different
    order mixes, taken from Table 2 of the Reply (1.84−1.22=0.62 days in
    August), to get the revised CLEC interval (2.36−0.62=1.74). The
    column \"Diff\" contains the differences between Bell Atlantic and
    CLEC intervals. Results that appear to be statistically significant
    are marked with an asterisk. *See infra* n.8.

[^1444]: Statistical significance is determined by calculating a
    z-score, which is the difference in the means divided by the
    standard error (called "sampling error" by Bell Atlantic), and then
    examining whether the z-score is less than --1.645. In order to
    determine whether our estimated differences in Average Completed
    Intervals are statistically significant, the standard error must be
    recalculated. The standard error used here differs from the value
    published in the Carrier to Carrier report because the number of
    CLEC orders in that report was used in its calculation, and that
    number was inflated because of the number of miscoded orders
    included in it. The standard error is: SE = s~I~ SQRT
    \[1/N~C~+1/N~I~\], where s~I~ is the standard deviation for Bell
    Atlantic, N~C~ is the number of CLEC observations, and N~I~ is the
    number of observations for Bell Atlantic. For our calculations s~I~
    and N~I~ are the same as in the Carrier to Carrier report. We adjust
    the published N~C~ to remove miscoded orders from the count. This
    was done using the percentage of orders that were miscoded, which
    was provided in the right column of Table 1, in Bell Atlantic
    Gertner/Bamberger Reply. So, for example, in August for UNE-P there
    were 25,270 Bell Atlantic orders (N~I~) and Bell Atlantic\'s
    standard deviation was 2.35 (s~I~). There were 10,642 CLEC orders,
    of which 45.9 percent were miscoded, leaving 5,757 orders correctly
    coded (N~C~). The result is a standard error of 0.034. The
    calculated standard error for July was 0.034, and for June was
    0.043. The resulting z-scores are --10.1, --10.7 and --19.5, for
    June, July, and August, all of which are statistically significant.

[^1445]: Sources are Carrier to Carrier metrics, Bell Atlantic
    Dowell/Canny Decl. Attach. D; Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Decl.
    at Table 4; Bell Atlantic Gertner/Bamberger Reply Decl. at Table 2.
    The Bell Atlantic retail numbers were aggregated from the Carrier to
    Carrier metric data on business and residential orders, to allow
    comparison with the study\'s numbers for CLECs. For the calculations
    of the adjusted CLEC numbers. *See supra* n. 4. Results that appear
    to be statistically significant are marked with an asterisk. *See
    infra* n.8.

[^1446]: Both retail and CLEC data are aggregated for both business and
    residential orders.

[^1447]: The measured difference of 0.03 days is not likely to be
    statistically significantly different from zero. *See infra* n.8.

[^1448]: Calculations of statistical significance were made using the
    same formulas as in n.Error: Reference source not found, except that
    calculating an aggregate standard error was more difficult for
    resale orders because the standard deviations are provided only in
    disaggregated form, for business and residential orders. The
    business and residential numbers of observations were added to yield
    the total numbers of observations for Bell Atlantic (N~I~) and CLECs
    (N~C~). The aggregate Bell Atlantic standard deviation was
    approximated by taking the weighted average of the business and
    residential standard deviations, weighted by the number of
    observations. This should yield a standard deviation close to the
    true standard deviation for the pooled set of observations, if the
    means for business and residential customers are close together. The
    means are close for August (1.07 for business versus 1.06 for
    residential) and for July (0.99 for business versus 1.01 for
    residential), and the calculated standard error for August is 0.049,
    and for July is 0.044. The means are not close for June (1.25 for
    business versus 0.94 for residential), but the Average Completed
    Intervals show that competing carriers received better service than
    retail customers in June. The calculated z-scores are --3.9 for
    August, and --6.3 for July, both of which are statistically
    significant. If we use July or August\'s standard errors, it is
    apparent the June difference of +0.03 days is not statistically
    significantly different from zero.