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**Mars Advance Planning Group 2006 (MAPG)**

**[Co-chairs]{.underline}**: David Beaty (Mars Program Office,
JPL/Caltech) and Michael Meyer (SMD, NASA HQ)

**[Science Sub-Team]{.underline}**: Ray Arvidson (Washington Univ.),
Bruce Banerdt (JPL/Caltech), Joy Crisp (JPL/Caltech), David Des Marais
(NASA-Ames), Bruce Jakosky (Univ. Colorado), Dan McCleese (JPL/Caltech),
Scott McLennan (SUNY), Mark Richardson (Caltech), Glenn McPherson
(Smithsonian Institution)

**[Engineering Sub-Team]{.underline}**: Mark Adler (JPL/Caltech), Karen
Buxbaum (JPL/Caltech), Bobby Braun (Georgia Tech), Chad Edwards
(JPL/Caltech), Samad Hayati (JPL/Caltech), Frank Jordan (JPL/Caltech),
Rob Manning (JPL/Caltech), Richard Mattingly (JPL/Caltech), Sylvia
Miller (JPL/Caltech), Greg Wilson (JPL/Caltech)

# 

#   {#section-1 .unnumbered}

# **[INTRODUCTION]{.underline}**

In July 2005, NASA initiated a Mars program strategic planning process
through the formation of a strategic planning team, which became known
as the Mars Advance Planning Group 2006 (MAPG), under the leadership of
Daniel McCleese and Michael Meyer. On the basis of a series of
discussions regarding science/programmatic priorities, scientific lines
of inquiry, and engineering implementation options, the MAPG prepared a
draft white paper summarizing planning options through the middle of the
next decade. This report was updated after iteration with the Mars
Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) in late 2005, and was updated
again after the release of the U.S. Federal budget in February 2006. The
March 2006 version of this planning document (McCleese et al., 2006) was
then presented to the NRC for its formal review. The NRC carried this
out by forming the Mars Architecture Assessment Committee (MAAC), which
responded in July 2006 with a detailed set of review comments, including
12 specific recommendations to NASA (NRC, 2006a; summarized in Appendix
1 of this report). Five of those are sufficiently addressed in a letter
from Mary Cleave (Associate Administrator for NASA's Science Mission
Directorate, Appendix 2) to Dr. Reta Beebe (Chair, MAAC) dated July
2006, and require no further comment from MAPG. The other seven
recommendations were referred to MAPG for its consideration. The purpose
of this report is to document those discussions and findings.

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*[Figure 1.]{.underline} Timeline illustrating the 2005-2006 Mars
Program planning process. The two planning documents highlighted in pink
represent the original MAPG report (March 2006), and the "update report"
(this document).*

# 

This report is structured as an addendum to the March 2006 MAPG document
(McCleese et al., 2006), rather than as a replacement. Although the MAAC
raised some questions, it did not find that the March 2006 document has
substantial omissions or errors. In addition, the programmatic context
of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP) has evolved since March 2006.
Although some changes to the March 2006 report would therefore be
appropriate to bring it up to date, MAPG also recognizes that Mars
strategic planning is a dynamic process. As of this writing, there are
four orbiters and two rovers at/on Mars actively returning data, so
there is a steady progression of scientific discovery and evolution of
scientific priority. \[MGS operational status was uncertain as this
report went to print.\] *All* Mars planning documents slowly drift out
of currency as exploration proceeds and circumstances change. Thus,
rather than rewrite the March 2006 document, MAPG prefers to retain that
as a snapshot in time of our state of strategic thinking.

# **[PLANNING QUESTIONS POSED BY THE NRC MARS ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (MAAC)]{.underline}**

The seven MAAC recommendations considered by MAPG (see Appendix 1) can
be organized around five general topics:

1.  The architecture analysis and trade-off process

2.  Network science options

3.  Astrobiology Field Laboratory timing relative to the 2009 Mars
    Science Laboratory

4.  Mars Sample Return technology investment

5.  The decision strategy for 2016

**[1. The Architecture Analysis and Trade-off Process (Recommendation
#6)]{.underline}**

> [Clarify how trade-offs involving mission costs versus science were
> made for the various launch opportunities to justify the rationale
> behind the proposed sequence of specific missions and the exclusion of
> others.]{.underline}

In general, planning trade-offs for future Mars missions involve four
kinds of inputs: science priorities; NASA strategies and priorities;
programmatic goals; and cost, technical, and policy considerations.

[Science priorities.]{.underline} The MAPG (and similar past planning
groups) had access to science priorities for Mars exploration from two
sources. The NASAAdvisory Council and the National Research Council
recommend priorities related to both missions and scientific approaches
to NASA at irregular intervals. Much of the advice of the National
Research Council comes from the Space Studies Board (SSB; one of 14
operating units of the Engineering and Physical Sciences Division of the
NRC; provides independent, authoritative advice on all aspects of space
science and applications), or the Committee on Planetary and Lunar
Exploration (COMPLEX; one of seven standing committees of the SSB;
advises the Space Studies Board on the entire range of planetary system
studies that can be conducted from space as well as on ground-based
activities in support of space-based efforts). The primary, relatively
recent reports that contain Mars recommendations are listed below:

-   Strategy for Planetary Exploration of the Inner Planets (COMPLEX,
    1978)

-   Space Science in the 21st Century (SSB, 1988)

-   Update to Strategy for Planetary Exploration of the Inner Planets
    (COMPLEX, 1990)

-   An Integrated Strategy for the Planetary Sciences: 1995-2010
    (COMPLEX, 1994)

-   Review of NASA's Planned Mars Program (COMPLEX, 1996)

-   On NASA Mars Sample-Return Mission Options (COMPLEX, 1996)

-   On NASA's Office of Space Science Draft Strategic Plan (SSB, 1997)

-   On Assessment of NASA's 2000 Solar System Roadmap (COMPLEX, 2000)

-   Assessment of Mars Science and Mission Priorities (COMPLEX, 2003)

-   New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration
    Strategy (NRC, 2003)

-   Review of Goals and Plans for NASA\'s Space and Earth Sciences (SSB,
    2005)

Much of the advice relating to Mars from the NASA Advisory Council (NAC)
is based on analysis work conducted by the Mars Exploration Program
Analysis Group (MEPAG), which has recently been reorganized as a part of
the NAC structure. NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) has a
standing request for MEPAG to maintain an up-to-date analysis of the
scientific investigations and measurements, in priority order, that
would contribute to achieving four high-level programmatic scientific
goals of MEP. This is done through a multi-disciplinary "bottoms-up"
process involving the Mars scientific exploration community and an
annual reassessment of the Goals and Objectives document, first prepared
in 2001 (for the current version, see MEPAG, 2006).

[The NASA-SMD Strategic Plan.]{.underline} The NASA Science Mission
Directorate and its organizational predecessors maintain strategic plans
that have benefited from formal advice from the National Research
Council and the NASA Advisory Council. Examples of these plans include
NASA (2003a), NASA (2003b), and NASA (in prep.).

[Programmatic Goals.]{.underline} The Mars Exploration Program has six
programmatic goals of relevance to planning future missions (Section
1.4.3 of the MEP Program Plan). It is important to note that these are
explicitly stated as goals, not requirements.

I.  Maintain a continuous operational presence at Mars

-   Ensure that operating orbiters or landers are able to provide
    continuous and long-term observations of the changing Mars natural
    environment.

-   Provide uninterrupted telecommunications relay capability for US,
    and international partners as appropriate.

I.  Launch at least one mission to Mars at each 26-month opportunity

-   Maintain a capability to assure that there is at least one mission
    ready to launch at every Mars launch opportunity. These
    opportunities will include Scout-class, competitively selected
    PI-led missions as well as strategic, facility-class missions
    carrying competitively selected instruments.

II. Provide continuing improvements in technical capabilities of Mars
    missions by investments in technology development

-   Conduct a technology investment program to develop, mature and test
    technology advances that enable future Mars Missions with a
    recommended investment goal of 5-10% of the overall MEP budget.

III. Capitalize on measurement opportunities that contribute to the
     advancement of knowledge for future human exploration of Mars, in
     collaboration with ESMD.

-   Ensure scientific measurements and technologies that can enable
    human exploration of Mars are considered for flight, that data is
    exploited to support the Vision, and opportunities to fly
    instruments of opportunity from ESMD are exercised on a mutually
    agreed-to basis.

IV. Ensure that Mars exploration activities are publicly engaging and
    incorporate current Mars mission science and technological
    achievements into a long-term portfolio of formal and informal
    education and public outreach activities.

-   Increase the number of participants and the depth of their
    experience through progressive learning, in alignment with SMD/MEP
    guidance and complementing NASA Strategic Communications efforts.

-   Strategically and systemically engage participants, especially
    students, who are traditionally under-represented in the fields of
    science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.

[Cost, Technical and Policy Considerations.]{.underline} In carrying out
the exploration of Mars, the Mars Exploration Program considers
financial constraints, engineering heritage, the possible or planned
state of future technology readiness, infrastructure needs, policy
constraints (e.g., planetary protection), and the logical consequences
of precedent relationships in designing future mission sequences.

During the time period under consideration, the most important
infrastructure need is for telecommunications, especially orbital assets
that can be used for data relay locally at Mars (for additional detail,
see Section 5.3 of McCleese et al., 2006).  Our experience with the
Spirit and Opportunity rovers has shown that it is very effective to
relay data from the Martian surface through science orbiters back to
Earth.  However, since such orbiters have limited lifetime, we need to
plan for their replenishment.  In addition to relaying the data to
Martian orbit, the data from missions on the surface of Mars need to be
transmitted to Earth where they can be received by the Deep Space
Network.  The current DSN infrastructure imposes limitations on the
maximum rate that data can be transmitted from Mars to Earth, in turn
limiting the science return from high performance instruments (e.g.,
multispectral imagers) both in orbit and on the surface.  The optimal
functioning of the DSN is not a uniquely Mars issue, but it is certainly
one that is relevant to Mars planning.  These issues were represented
within MAPG's discussions through the Mars Program Chief
Telecommunications Engineer.

Technical concepts for mission design, spacecraft, flight operations and
required technology developments were derived from the MEP Advanced
Studies Office, which made use of JPL Team-X for cost estimation.
Conceptual payload characteristics were derived from MEPAG Science
Analysis Groups or the Advanced Studies Office (note: in order to
generate a cost estimate, it is typically necessary to specify the
payload and how it will be used. This information is used for scoping
purposes only, and does not imply instrument selection). Cost estimates
for mission development, flight operations, and needed technology
development (if any) were developed and profiled over multiple fiscal
years. Launch vehicle cost estimates were obtained from KSC. Data from
past mission experience were used as analogy for estimating both the
budgets and mission schedules.

The costs of candidate sequences of missions were estimated and compared
to an assumed future budget. Mission sequences were judged to be
financially acceptable if the cumulative cost was within about \$100
million of the revenue model through 2013, and within about \$200
million through 2018. Although there is an imperfect ability to forecast
the budget of the Mars Exploration Program 12 years in the future, in
order to avoid unrealistic expectations, MAPG did not consider mission
sequences that are significantly discordant with this financial model.

The MAPG was configured with a mixture of personnel who could provide
expertise in each of the above areas. Not surprisingly, given the
diverse nature of the scientific questions and the diverse nature of the
constraints, the MAPG team had divided opinions on certain planning
options. In order to preserve the possibility for additional input from
future advisory bodies, mission results, and technology development,
multiple options were built into the proposed architecture. Where
decisions were needed on non-consensus issues, the Lead Scientist and
the Chief Scientist for MEP made them. As the MAPG Co-chairs, they were
responsible for appropriate balancing of the above inputs.

**[2. Network Science Options (Recommendations #1, #10,
#11)]{.underline}**

> [(1 & 10) Include the Mars Long-Lived Lander Network in the mix of
> options for the 2016 launch opportunity. (11) If the Mars Long-Lived
> Lander Network cannot be implemented in the period under
> consideration, provide for an effort to make some of the
> highest-priority measurements on the landed missions that are included
> in the proposed Mars architecture.]{.underline}

A planning premise used within the Mars Exploration Program for the past
several years has been to make progress towards each of the four MEPAG
goals, and to treat the Life goal, as "first among equals." This simple
statement of priority is based on the integrated advice the Mars
Exploration Program has received from its various advisory bodies over
most of the past decade. Within the presently planned Mars flight
architecture, each of the next three missions (2005-MRO, 2007-Phoenix,
2009-MSL) have scientific objectives that are related to the Life goal.
Specifically, these investigations will give us critically important new
insight into the habitability potential of Mars in both space and time,
and in the case of MSL, in a detailed and quantitative way for one site.
If strongly encouraging life-related data were to be delivered by one of
these three missions, our most effective response would be the
Astrobiology Field Lab (AFL) in 2016 or 2018. The emphasis on the Life
goal, coupled with financial constraints, has delayed plans to implement
network science. Since the Mars Long-Lived Lander Network (ML^3^N) would
have minimal direct value as a follow-up to a habitability discovery by
MRO, Phoenix, or MSL, it would be inconsistent with the overall priority
structure to move the network mission ahead of AFL if the consequence
would be to delay the possibility of AFL beyond 2018. While we do not
know in advance that AFL will be the mission of choice in 2016-2018, it
is necessary that we protect that option.

MAAC recommended that MAPG expand its consideration of options for
network science within the proposed Mars Architecture. In response to
this recommendation MAPG identified four basic options to conduct
network science, or some of its component investigations, early in the
mission queue.

> [Option A: ML^3^N as an option for 2016]{.underline}. MAPG looked at
> the implications of including the Mars Long-Lived Lander Network
> (ML^3^N) in the mix of options for the 2016 launch opportunity. MAPG
> agrees with the MAAC that this mission has very attractive science,
> and that it will contribute an entirely new type of knowledge to our
> understanding of Mars as a system. MAPG was asked to base its planning
> on a financial model where future funding is the inflation-adjusted
> equivalent of about \$600M per year (in FY06 dollars). Based on
> current cost estimates, flying the ML^3^N mission in 2016 would
> preclude all but the simplest versions of AFL until the 2020 launch
> opportunity, and in addition would require a descoped version of MSO.
> This one to two opportunity slip of AFL from its earliest possible
> launch must be weighed against the two-opportunity promotion of
> ML^3^N. However, if a modest increase in the program budget (perhaps
> 10-15%) were possible in the future, the mission sequence 2013-MSO,
> 2016- ML^3^N, 2018-AFL would represent an extremely attractive balance
> between direct life-related measurements and broader characterization
> of Mars as a system.
>
> [Option B: Augmentation of MSO]{.underline}. A new technical option
> was presented to the MAPG in which multiple (two to four) network
> landers could be launched in 2013 using MSO as the cruise carrier and
> communication relay. Preliminary analysis shows that the 4-node option
> provides considerable overall savings compared to the stand-alone
> ML^3^N mission and might allow this high-priority science to be
> addressed earlier in the program than would otherwise be possible.
> However, with the current financial constraint of \$600M/yr, this
> large 2013 investment would preclude the financial capability to
> follow-up with missions in both 2016 and 2018, and would therefore
> affect the possible timing of AFL.
>
> [Option C: Single geophysical lander augmentation of MSO]{.underline}.
> A single geophysical lander could be flown on MSO. A case can be made
> that a geophysical pathfinder would generate some valuable science
> (although not nearly as valuable as a 4-node geophysical network).
> From a single station, it would be possible to determine the level of
> seismicity on Mars, which would give a measure of the current level of
> tectonic and volcanic activity; this is fundamental information about
> the dynamics of Mars. Doing this geophysical pathfinder in 2013 would
> provide the potential of additional landers in subsequent years,
> perhaps by our international partners, and set things up for the full
> ML^3^N mission three opportunities later (in 2020) to achieve the full
> complement of geophysical science. However, with this scenario and AFL
> in 2018, a mission launching in 2016 would be precluded without a
> budget augmentation. Alternatively, AFL and subsequent missions would
> incur a further delay.
>
> [Option D: Augmentation of a 2016-2018 rover mission]{.underline}. A
> stand-alone geophysical package could be included on a landed mission
> in 2016-2018 (e.g., either AFL or Mid-Rovers). However, our present
> concepts for rovers in the 2016-2018 time period are such that there
> is likely to be a shortage of spacecraft resources for completing the
> mission's primary objectives, rendering it unlikely that additional
> resources could be spared for a geophysical package.

**[3. Astrobiology Field Laboratory timing relative to the 2009 Mars
Science Laboratory (Recommendation #2)]{.underline}**

> [(2) Consider delaying the launch of the Astrobiology Field Laboratory
> until 2018 to permit an informed decision of its merits and the
> selection of an appropriate instrument complement in the context of a
> mature consideration of the results from the Mars Science Laboratory
> and other prior missions.]{.underline}

[]{.mark}

For the past decade, scientific results from the Mars Exploration
Program have been progressively more encouraging regarding the
possibility of life (either past or present) on Mars. If this trend
continues, by the middle of the next decade the life-related part of the
Mars program will have built towards the Astrobiology Field Laboratory
(AFL), Mars Sample Return (MSR), or both. The principal scientific
objective of the Mars Science Laboratory is specifically focused on
habitability, and it is very possible that MSL could generate a
compelling discovery to which there would be a strong desire to respond
with AFL. However, it is also possible that important life-related
discoveries could be made by MRO or Phoenix, for which an AFL response
would be warranted. Thus, AFL should not be considered to be uniquely
dependent on MSL discoveries. In fact, some scientists argue that
sufficient discoveries have *already* been made (by MGS, ODY, and/or
MER), and that no further justification is needed to commit to planning
for AFL. Although the MAAC is correct that there is probably not enough
time to design a 2016 AFL mission as a specific response to a discovery
by 2009 MSL, there may be sufficient justification to fly AFL in 2016
independent of MSL.

[**What is "AFL"**?]{.underline}

Part of the difficulty in discussing AFL is that the term "Astrobiology
Field Laboratory" is not well defined, and it means different things to
different people.

For the purpose of this report, the term "AFL" is used to refer to a
substantial landed mission with a payload designed to test life-related
scientific hypotheses. This mission was initially scoped by MEPAG
(Steele et al., 2004). Although some of Steele et al.'s concepts require
mobility and some do not, for current planning and costing purposes AFL
is assumed by MAPG to include a large rover, based closely on MSL
engineering heritage. Although MSL heritage is assumed to be a part of
AFL, for the purpose of cost estimation and strategic planning, MAPG
limited the use of the term "AFL" to missions with the following
characteristics:

> 1\. A substantial roving mission
>
> 2\. A payload designed to test life-related scientific hypotheses
>
> 3\. At least one of the following:
>
>         a. Precision sample handling (to allow sub-sampling from
> rocks, cores, etc)
>
>         b. Multiple life-detection instruments (for corroborative
> data)
>
>         c. A sampling drill with capability of at least 2 m
>
> 4\. System sterilization (to allow the mission to be sent to a special
> region) if needed

Depending on which of these four characteristics are assumed to be
present, the "Astrobiology Field Laboratory" could encompass a diverse
set of conceptual variants, with different costs, landing site needs,
and operational requirements. Cost, complexity, and rationale differ for
the many possible combinations of these attributes, and planning for the
full suite of possibilities will require significant technology
development.

**[AFL and discovery response]{.underline}**

As implied above, the scientific objective of AFL is far from final.
MEPAG (2006) proposed that the basic logic to determine if life ever
arose on Mars is to first determine the past and present habitability of
Mars, then to test for life (either past or present) within an
environment of high habitability potential. This suggests that life
detection should be at least one primary scientific objective of AFL,
and this general logic implies that AFL would be used to respond to a
habitability-related discovery made by a prior mission.

As discussed above, there are strongly held divergent opinions within
the Mars science community about the minimum threshold for such an
AFL-triggering discovery. MSL is NASA's first mission whose primary
scientific objective is to quantitatively assess habitability potential.
Although a positive MSL result could clearly be the foundation of an AFL
mission, the argument has been made that one of our past missions has
already delivered sufficiently compelling results, or one of our
immediately upcoming missions will do so. Because a decision on what to
fly in 2016 is not required for another one to two years, it is not
necessary that this question be answered now. Instead, MAPG recommends
that the Mars community and the Mars advisory structure engage in
discussion of the complexities of this issue for at least the next year
and reconsider in 2008. One study that will constitute an important
input to this discussion---the "Astrobiology Strategy for the
Exploration of Mars"---is currently being carried out by the Space
Studies Board of the National Research Council. Until broad-based
discussions take place, planning for the Astrobiology Field Lab should
retain options for discovery response even as late as surface operations
of MSL in 2010.

**[Can AFL be effectively planned and implemented as early as
2016?]{.underline}**

There are three aspects to this question: 1) Can a sufficient scientific
justification for AFL be established in time to implement AFL for the
2016 opportunity, 2) Can the competitive instrument procurement
processes be carried out in time to support mission engineering, and 3)
Will the program be technically and financially able to implement AFL in
2016 given expected constraints?

-   Regarding scientific justification, two points are important. First,
    if the MSL investigations are completed as planned, they
    [will]{.underline} have a relevance to the scientific objectives of
    AFL. Second, there is a school of thought within the Mars community
    that scientific results compelling enough to justify AFL will have
    been obtained by missions to Mars before MSL. Clearly more
    discussion is needed. Is it possible to build a consensus that AFL
    either is or is not scientifically contingent on MSL? How strong are
    the pro and con arguments? If AFL is justified independent of MSL,
    is it possible to set a baseline design, and then adjust it based on
    MSL results (e.g., by selection among previously-developed
    instruments)? Is adjusting the AFL landing site based on MSL results
    sufficient?

-   As pointed out by the MAAC (NRC 2006a), the timing is tight for a
    significant discovery by MSL to influence the specific language in
    the Announcement of Opportunity for a 2016 AFL instrument
    competition. MAPG considered this and found that there are different
    ways to construct the AFL development timeline, depending in part on
    what AFL turns out to be. Although the problem is real, it is
    probably premature to conclude that a solution is not possible.
    These timelines are best evaluated in detail by the study team that
    assesses the AFL science-engineering trade space.

> However, it is important to note that in order to achieve 2016 AFL
> instrument selections with some degree of responsiveness to MSL
> discoveries, it would definitely be necessary to have a robust
> instrument development program during the period 2007-2010. This would
> increase the likelihood that several candidate instruments would have
> been developed to at least an intermediate TRL level by the time of
> the AO. There will not be nearly enough time to use MSL discoveries in
> the early-stage instrument engineering decisions. Having enough
> instruments to generate a credible response to an instrument
> competition is an important mechanism for reacting to discoveries and
> other major developments in the Mars Exploration Program.

-   Although it is possible that some variants of AFL could credibly be
    scheduled as early as 2016, the more capable mission concepts might
    necessitate a move to the 2018 opportunity or would require
    resources beyond the assumptions made by MAPG. In addition to the
    obvious financial benefits, a delay to 2018 would permit valuable
    feedback on the performance of the MSL engineering system to be used
    as input to the AFL design. However, since it is clearly possible
    that the scientific justification for AFL may be established before
    MSL results become available, it is important to retain the 2016
    option for AFL if it is financially possible to do so.

**[Extant vs. fossil life, and the relationship to planetary
protection]{.underline}**

Some of the most important recent discoveries by the Mars Program's
missions are leading to specific hypotheses relating to fossil, rather
than extant, indigenous life. Examples include the evidence of ancient
standing water discovered by the MER Opportunity rover, evidence of
groundwater found by the Spirit rover, and the Eberswalde delta
discovered by MGS. MRO, which has recently begun its primary science
mission, is also more likely to make discoveries of relevance to the
questions around fossil rather than extant life because of the nature of
its instrument complement.

One discovery that would trigger the development of testable hypotheses
related to extant life would be the identification of what is referred
to in planetary protection policy as a "special region" (see NRC, 2006b;
Beaty et. al., 2006). In this context, a special region is one in which
Martian organisms might live or in which terrestrial organisms delivered
by spacecraft could propagate. To avoid irreversible contamination by
live organisms, planetary protection policy requires the use of
sterilized spacecraft for the exploration of a special region. As
discussed in detail by the MEPAG Special Regions Science Analysis Group
(Beaty et. al., 2006), there are no currently known places on Mars that
demonstrably fit the special region definition; however, there are
incompletely characterized places for which this potential exists, and
which need protection until this uncertainty is resolved. Gully regions
are examples of such regions, and it is possible that future missions
will identify others.

In order to preserve the option to use AFL to test hypotheses related to
[either]{.underline} extant or fossil life on Mars and retain the option
to explore a part of Mars protected as a "special region," it will be
necessary to factor in planetary protection considerations. Since direct
investigation of a special region would require sterilization under
current planetary protection policy, MAPG would endorse a strategy that
includes system sterilization in the baseline design for AFL. The
sterilization requirement could be dropped in the future if it was
unnecessary, but it would be impossible to add in the opposite scenario.

A program strategy to plan for system level sterilization of AFL would
impact near-term planning in the areas of technology development,
planetary protection implementation, and advance mission design. MAPG
recommends that these impacts be considered as part of any future AFL
science and engineering studies.

**["MSL-copy" or "MSL with new payload"]{.underline}**

A possible mission that could be flown in 2016-2018 is a system similar
to, or perhaps even identical to, MSL, but to a different location. For
planning purposes, it is convenient to think of these conceptually as
either an exact copy of MSL, or a mission that is identical to MSL in
all respects except that the payload is re-competed. These options could
be described as cost-driven missions that deliver a
geology/geochemistry/mineralogy payload with the same rover, sample
acquisition system, planetary protection and organic cleanliness
requirements as for MSL. Such a mission could be quite valuable in
evaluating habitability in a different location, and possibly with more
advanced instrumentation than MSL. It is possible that in a re-competed
payload scenario, a life-detection instrument could be selected
(however, unless sterilization is also added, the mission would be
restricted to investigations related to fossil life). The MAPG considers
this MSL-like mission to be a valuable planning option, but it should
not be considered a substitute for AFL.

[**4. MSR Technology Investment (Recommendation #4)**]{.underline}

> [(4) Devise a strategy to implement the Mars Sample Return mission,
> and ensure that a program is started at the earliest possible
> opportunity to develop the technology necessary to enable this
> mission.]{.underline}

Under the current program funding levels and priority of missions, the
mission queue does not include MSR before the 2020's for an
orbiter/landers/return sequence nor a focused technology development
starting before 2014. Nevertheless, the program could further consider
the potential of moving MSR earlier if circumstances were to change the
nature of the program.  Such changes could include increase of funding
for Mars exploration; unexpected and compelling results from MRO,
Phoenix or MSL; increased emphasis on preparation for humans to Mars; or
substantial international participation.  Within the current budget, if
modified priorities were to displace the entire post-MSO program with
MSR, it could be implemented in a split mission of lander then orbiter,
or vice versa, possibly as early as 2018/2020.   For a 2018/2020 MSR, it
is thought that focused technology development would need to start in
FY08, but that it could be funded at a relatively modest level (e.g.,
\$25M) for the first two years. (The technology program is ready to
restart based on a detailed plan that was "tabled" in FY05.)  A
commitment to that first two years of technology development would be
necessary to preserve MSR as an option in the second decade and
demonstrate NASA\'s commitment to MSR sufficiently to re-invigorate
international discussions.   \
\
For an MSR mission scheduled early in the third decade, there are
certain things that could be done with the intervening missions that
could increase the scientific value of MSR, but there is not much that
can be done to reduce the cost. One obvious example is that caching of
samples by AFL 2016 or 2018 could potentially improve the quality of the
sample collection returned by MSR by allowing more information to go
into sample selection decisions. This option would keep MSR planning
active and enable potential sample selection with the most sophisticated
suite of instruments to date, at minor incremental cost to AFL. 
Development of comprehensive planetary protection solutions for AFL
would also contribute to MSR needs.  

**[5. Decision Strategy for 2016 (Recommendations #5a,
#5b)]{.underline}**

> [(5a) Develop and articulate criteria for distinguishing between the
> three options for missions to launch in 2016. (5b) Similarly, define a
> strategy that addresses the short lead time between science results
> obtained from the Mars Science Laboratory and selection of the mission
> to fly in 2016.]{.underline}

There are multiple mission options to be considered for launches in 2016
and 2018, but the decisions about which missions to launch, and in which
sequence, depend on information that is not yet available. The outcome
of the competition for the 2011 Scout mission may be a factor, since
there will be a need to avoid duplication of science accomplished by the
subsequent missions. In addition, the decisions will require further
detail on the cost-performance tradeoffs for the 2016-2018 candidate
missions. Finally, it will be necessary to incorporate scientific
results from the on-going Mars missions, most importantly, from the Mars
Reconnaissance Orbiter, which has just entered its science mapping phase
in early November 2006. Rather than undertaking an effort to map out the
various planning contingencies at this time, the MAPG recommendation is
to consider 2016-2018 in light of results from the three considerations
above, along with updated program context. A component of the analysis
will be the development of decision criteria, including the feasibility
and timing associated with feed forward of science results.

**[Updated Mars Program Architecture]{.underline}**

Based on an analysis of the Mars Program's significant recent
discoveries and its main strategies and priorities for moving forward,
McCleese et al. (2006) established a primary flow of major scientific
investigations for the exploration of Mars. This scientific flow was
consistent with an assumed overall programmatic financial constraint and
assumptions of future technology readiness to derive a set of next
decade architecture options (Figure 3a of McCleese et al., 2006). Since
then, the following changes have occurred:

-   NASA HQ has decided that the 2011 launch opportunity will be a Scout
    mission. The Announcement of Opportunity was released in mid-2006,
    and as of this writing, the proposals received in response to the AO
    are in review.

-   The NRC has provided formal feedback on the McCleese et al. (2006)
    report.

-   The financial model for MEP has been modified slightly.

-   The MEP has improved its understanding of the engineering trade
    space for the Mars Science Orbiter and the Astrobiology Field Lab
    mission concepts.

Using these refinements, MAPG proposes the updated architecture shown in
Figure 2.

-   [2013 Mars Science Orbiter (MSO).]{.underline} Two compelling
    classes of atmospheric science investigations have been described by
    the MEPAG Science Analysis Group report on MSTO (Farmer et
    al., 2006) and will be considered for MSO. In addition, two classes
    of geophysical investigations are thought to be possible for MSO,
    neither of which have yet been completely studied: orbital radar, in
    follow-up to the MARSIS and SHARAD experiments on MEX and MRO,
    respectively; and one or more small landed elements for network
    science. The mission selection through the Mars Scout competition
    for launch in 2011 will be a major factor in mission content
    decisions for MSO.

-   [2016-2018.]{.underline} The second decision point determines
    content for the 2016 and 2018 opportunities. Figure 2 shows four
    main options, consideration of which is dependent both on scientific
    results and early programmatic decision-making. The options include
    the Astrobiology Field Lab (or MSL-copy or MSL with new payload),
    twin Mid-Rovers, a network mission, and a Scout. There are several
    attractive combinations involving these missions for the two
    launches, however, it is important to recognize that current
    financial assumptions will permit no more than two of the four
    missions shown in 2016-2018, and not all combinations of two
    missions fit within financial guidelines.

Given present financial assumptions, it is not possible to fly all of
the missions recommended by the NRC during the period 2013-2018. For
example, a very attractive mission sequence from the point of view of
science would be 2013-MSO, 2016-Network, 2018-AFL, but this architecture
would require a significant budget augmentation. In the absence of such
an augmentation, financial constraints will force us to reduce our
expectations.

The notional placement of MSR in the "2020 or later" time frame
indicates the program's intent to get MSR into the mission sequence
after the in-situ missions in 2016-2018 and to restart technology
development in the second decade. Placement of MSR in the flight
architecture of the following \[or third\] decade may be useful to
encourage technological development, support international partnership
discussions, and ensure continuing dialog about MSR options for the
future.

![](media/image4.jpeg){width="6.497916666666667in"
height="3.988888888888889in"}

*[Figure 2.]{.underline} Proposed next decade Mars Program flight
architecture. It is assumed that ESA's ExoMars mission will fly in 2013.
For the 2016 and 2018 launch opportunities, there are several possible
mission options, and multiple ways to sequence these options. The Mars
Exploration Program plans further definition of these options during
FY07. Mars Sample Return is shown in the 2020+ period. Although the
specific timing cannot be planned this far in advance, this mission is
an intrinsic part of the program's scientific logic.*

# 

# **REFERENCES**

Beaty, D.W., K.A. Buxbaum, M.A. Meyer and the MEPAG Special Regions
Science Analysis Group (2006), Findings of the Mars Special Regions
Science Analysis Group, *Astrobiology* 6, 677-732. The document can also
be accessed at <http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/index.html>.

COMPLEX, 1978, Strategy for Planetary Exploration of the Inner Planets:
1977-1987, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 1990, 1990 Update to Strategy for Planetary Exploration of the
Inner Planets, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 1994, An Integrated Strategy for the Planetary Sciences:
1995-2010, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 1996, On NASA Mars Sample-Return Mission Options, National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 1996, Review of NASA's Planned Mars Program, National Academy
Press, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 2000, On Assessment of NASA's 2000 Solar System Roadmap,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

COMPLEX, 2003, Assessment of Mars Science and Mission Priorities,
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Farmer, B., et al., 2006, Mars Science Orbiter (MSO): Report of the
Science Analysis Group, Unpublished white paper, 48 p, posted April 2006
by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) at
<http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/index.html>.

McCleese, D.J. and the Mars Advance Planning Group, *Mars Exploration
Strategy 2007-2016*, NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif.,
2006. A copy may be accessed at the following web site:
<http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/index.html>.

MEPAG (2006), Mars Scientific Goals, Objectives, Investigations, and
Priorities: 2006, J. Grant, ed., 31 p. white paper posted February, 2006
by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) at
<http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/index.html>.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2003a, Solar System
Exploration Roadmap 2003, NASA Document JPL-400-1077, 65 p.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2003b, Space Science
Enterprise Strategy, NASA Document NP-2003-10-317-HQ, 81 p., can be
accessed on the web at
<http://science.hq.nasa.gov/strategy/spsci2003.pdf>.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in prep., NASA SCIENCE
PLAN for 2007-2016.

National Research Council, 2003, New Frontiers in the Solar System: An
Integrated Exploration Strategy, National Academy Press, Washington,
D.C.

National Research Council, 2006a, Assessment of NASA's Mars Architecture
2007-2016, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC,
<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11690.html>.

National Research Council, 2006b, Preventing the Forward Contamination
of Mars, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Space Studies Board, 1988, Space Science in the 21st Century, National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

Space Studies Board, 1997, On NASA's Office of Space Science Draft
Strategic Plan, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

Space Studies Board, 2005, Review of Goals and Plans for NASA\'s Space
and Earth Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

Steele, Andrew and the AFL SSG, 2004, Findings of the Astrobiology Field
Lab Science Steering Group (AFLSSG), unpublished analysis 54 p, posted
2004 by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) at
<http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/index.html>

**[APPENDIX 1.]{.underline}** SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY NRC
(2006a).

![](media/image5.wmf)

**[APPENDIX 2]{.underline}. NASA LETTER RESPONSE (DATED JULY 10, 2006)
TO NRC.**

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