Introduction and Summary: Democracy and Governance Sector Assessment

This Introduction includes the Assessment Purpose and Scope of Work
(SOW), Assessment Approach and Methodology (B), a brief summary of the
Assessment Framework (C), and Report Structure and Contents (D).

**A. Assessment Purpose and Scope of Work**

-   This scope of work called for the completion of two interrelated
    tasks: An assessment of political change and democratization in
    Nigeria; and

-   Recommendations for a USAID strategy to address major problems of
    democratic transition and consolidation in Nigeria.

The purpose of the assessment is to provide USAID/Nigeria with an
analysis of needs and opportunities in assisting a process of
democratization in Nigeria. This analysis is intended to be
comprehensive, so as to furnish necessary information to guide the
mission's strategic choices and programmatic approaches. The assessment
team draws upon substantial empirical material in the form of
interviews, group discussions, primary and secondary published material
on Nigerian developments, documentation of USAID programming, survey
data and other relevant documentation.

**B. Organization and Fieldwork**

A team of five ARD consultants (three Americans and two Nigerians) and
one senior officer from USAID's Democracy Center undertook the
assessment over the course of three months, from November 2002 through
January 2003. Fieldwork took place over three weeks during November
2002. The American consultants met with representatives from
USAID/Washington (the Africa Bureau and Democracy Center) prior to their
departure, as the Nigerian consultants arranged principal interviews
with individuals and organizations. The full team held a day-long team
building exercise that reviewed the SOW, arranged a division of labor,
detailed a work plan, and summarized the analytical methodology.

The work program for the assessment was: 1) collecting data in-country
using interviews, group discussion, field visits and a review of
relevant documents (November 2002); 2) analyzing the data individually
and synthesizing it as a team (November 2002-January 2003); and, 3)
preparation and peer review of report components, as well as
presentations to USAID/Nigeria staff and members of the American
Embassy. This was an iterative process over the entire three-month
period.

Some 144 individuals from about 106 organizations were interviewed
during the assessment (see Annex 2). Respondents came from a
cross-section of Nigerian political life including major institutions
and branches of the federal government, state and local governments,
civil society, traditional authorities and the business community.
Members of different USAID/Nigeria Strategic Objective (SO) teams and
senior management, American Embassy officers including the DCM,
international donors and NGOs were also interviewed. A broad review of
the extensive literature on Nigerian politics was undertaken including a
large number of documents collected by the team during the Nigerian
field visit. (See Annex 3 for a list of reference documents utilized)

The principal methodology used by the team was the application of an
analytic framework developed by USAID/Washington. The team adapted the
framework to the local context and applied it (see Part C, below) in all
interviews conducted. In this regard, all team members used the DG
assessment guidelines (see Annex 4) in their interviews, thus providing
a consistent set of questions to collect data thus ensuring that the
methodology was followed as designed.

**C. The Assessment Methodology**

The assessment draws upon the framework employed by USAID to guide
country D/G assessments and shape assistance strategies. Through a
series of analytic steps, the framework addresses the question: *what
political changes or reforms should a USAID mission support, in a given
environment, in order to bring about significant deepening of
democratization?* This approach helps to structure data collection and
calls for application of the methodology in the course of analysis.

The following analysis draws on the central features of the assessment
methodology. In the first instance, the report provides an overview, or
diagnosis, of the principal challenges to democratization in Nigeria. We
begin with Step 1, a consideration of five key variable of democratic
performance: consensus, inclusion, competition, rule of law, and
governance. This section addresses critical challenges in major areas of
democratic development.

The next chapter applies Step 2, providing a diagnostic of the Nigerian
political process, with special attention to actors, social forces and
institutional factors that enable or impede democratic consolidation.
The analysis considers the political context, the nature of the regime,
and central trends within the political system. It furnishes a summary
of Nigeria's political landscape, highlighting the catalysts and
hindrances to democratic development.

The next element \[Step 3\] in the assessment framework call for
analysis of the principal institutional *arenas* in which political
interactions occur (e.g. the legislature, courts, presidency, public
service, state governments, etc.), and the central *actors* that are
relevant to key dimensions of politics (e.g. leadership, elite factions,
officials, social groups, organizations, etc.)

For this assessment, the analysis of institutional arenas and political
actors is structured around six core issues that are deemed to be
critical in Nigeria's democratic development over the medium term. The
application of these steps in the analysis therefore suggests the most
important problems to be addressed, institutional arenas pertinent to
central problems in political reform, and the possibilities for creating
alliances with domestic partners in support of change. By narrowing
programmatic choices, the assessment seeks to identify areas where USAID
investments might have the greatest impact.

The final step in the assessment framework calls for recommendations on
a D/G Strategy. The recommended strategy -- in this case, a series of
options -- is formulated as one or more 'first-order' results or
outcomes (linked to the problems identified in Step 1), with some notion
of the 'second-order' changes required to reach those outcomes.

**D. Assessment Report Structure and Contents**

The following chapters follow the general assessment framework as
discussed above. Chapter II provides a background and context for the
current political situation. In Chapter III, we discuss central aspects
of democratic performance in light of the central dimensions in the
assessment framework: consensus; rule of law; competition; inclusion;
and governance. Chapter IV then summarizes key problems of
democratization and governance in the wake of the 1999 political
transition, and presents the core diagnostic elements of the analysis.
Chapter V takes up core issues of political change, and considers the
principal institutional arenas and actors that influence democratic
reform. Finally, Chapter VI recommends a strategy for USAID/Nigeria in
supporting reforms that consolidate a system of democratic governance.

**II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND**

**THE SETTING OF TRANSITION**

A.  **Nigeria's Political Travails**

Since independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has experienced
repeated cycles of civilian and military rule. Two previous democratic
regimes collapsed amidst crises of public order and legitimacy, giving
way to extended periods of authoritarian government, and subsequent
efforts to restore civilian rule. Despite strong expressions of public
commitment to democracy, and repeated pledges by military leaders to
restore democratic rule, Nigeria in fact witnessed a discouraging trend
of authoritarianism, corruption and misrule from the early 1980s through
the end of the century. The transition to civilian rule in 1999 capped
sixteen years of uninterrupted military dominance, by a series of
increasingly autocratic leaders. During this period, central
institutions declined, social polarization grew, and the economy
declined markedly.

The failure of civilian regimes, and the adverse trend in military rule,
can be traced to diverse causes. Three factors can be highlighted: 1)
the structure of communal competition, 2) the evolving nature of the
political economy, and 3) the declining quality and efficacy of core
institutions. These factors are emphasized in the following analysis.

Nigeria's First Republic was a Westminsterian parliamentary system
inherited from the colonial power. A central dilemma quickly emerged as
ethnic contention aggravated institutional flaws in the regime.
Nigeria's three principal ethnic groups -- the northern Hausa-Fulani,
southwestern Yoruba, and southeastern Igbo -- gravitated to sectional
political parties which captured power in each of the three regions then
in Nigeria's federal structure. When northern elites attained control of
the central government, the resulting strains gave rise to communal
polarization and growing political abuses. An invidious "winner take
all" ethos of politics formed, in which ethno-regional groups used
patronage, electoral manipulation, and violence in their struggle to
preserve regional power and gain control of the federal center. The
civilian regime quickly lost legitimacy, and the military stepped in
(twice) in 1966 as a response to rising political disarray and violence.
Following the change of regime, communal tensions unleashed in this
period fomented civil war from 1967-70.

Thirteen years of military rule followed the initial 1966 coup, a period
in which Nigeria underwent the cataclysmic civil conflict (in which at
least 1 million people died), and then a profound economic and social
transformation. Immediately following the civil war, crude oil
production increased sharply, and the OPEC-inspired price rises of 1973
changed Nigeria virtually overnight from an agricultural-export economy
to a petroleum-based economy. Nigeria in short order became a *rentier*
state, reliant on rents from a foreign-dominated resource enclave for
the bulk of government revenues and hard currency. This greatly
increased the fiscal discretion and authority of the central government,
as it accentuated the importance of state patronage, and focused
political contention on gaining access to (or control of) the federal
government and its agencies. The expanding scope and resources of the
state allowed military rulers to preserve social peace as they moved
haltingly toward a promised transition to civilian rule.

A process of constitutional revision and electoral preparation,
supervised largely by the military ruler, General Olusegun Obasanjo,
paved the way for political transition. The Second Republic, under
President Shehu Shagari, took office in 1979. The decline and fall of
the Second Republic was even more rapid than its predecessor, though for
substantially different reasons. While the communal competition
underlying Nigerian political life was quite apparent during the second
civilian regime, its forms and dynamics changed. The ruling National
Party of Nigeria, though dominated by elites from the Muslim north,
constructed a multi-ethnic, cross-regional patronage machine, taking
advantage of a more decentralized federal system based on nineteen
states.

The principal factors that undermined the regime, however, were a
widespread, flagrant disregard for basic democratic rules, and a
precipitous decline in the oil revenues that fueled the rentier state.
Policy drift, a passive legislature, and corrosive factionalism
paralyzed government operations, while the political class indulged in
epic corruption, electoral fraud, and growing recourse to violence.
Declining revenues and rising debt soon bankrupted the government, with
immediate consequences for government services and institutions. The
1983 elections were a fiasco, as rigging, violence, and the collapse of
public functions delegitimized the regime. The Second Republic scarcely
survived its first term, being ousted by the military three months after
the elections.

The period from 1984-1999 was unlike previous episodes of authoritarian
rule in Nigeria. First, it was more repressive in character. From the
stern "corrective" regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (1984-85), to the
autocratic drift under General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and the
draconian control of General Sani Abacha (1993-98), the country
witnessed unprecedented abuses of human rights and civil liberties,
including restrictions on association and the media, indiscriminate
arrests, and political assassinations. Second, military rule became
increasingly personalized. The regimes of the 1960s and 1970s reflected
a collegial style of leadership and decisionmaking, but the Babangida
and Abacha regimes were marked by a growing concentration of power in
the person of the ruler. This contributed to a third tendency, the
rising levels of corruption evident among military leaders. Military
regimes were increasingly dominated by factional elements that focused
mainly on personal aggrandizement; Sani Abacha accumulated an estimated
\$6 billion in less than five years in office. Finally, the most recent
phase of military rule yielded a deterioration of public institutions,
including the economic bureaucracy, the civil service, the health and
education systems, and even the armed forces themselves. These adverse
trends in ruling regimes were reflected in a stagnant economy and a
palpable rise in ethnic, regional, and religious dissension.

The central event of this period was General Babangida's annulment of
the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, and the cancellation of his
regime's political transition. Babangida initially slated a handover to
democratic government for 1990, but repeatedly extended the transition
schedule and postponed elections. When finally convened in 1993, the
presidential elections were surprisingly smooth and transparent,
yielding an apparent victory for Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim.
The country was thrown into turmoil following the annulment, as an
aggrieved Yoruba community and pro-democracy activists agitated for
recognition the election results. Babangida resigned in august of 1993,
leaving behind an ineffectual civilian caretaker committee that was
quickly ousted by General Abacha. Chief Abiola was jailed, and his
closest supporters in the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the
petroleum unions were variously jailed, persecuted, or murdered by the
regime.

Abacha proceeded with his own transition agenda, which emulated the
general features of Babangida's program. Following a carefully managed
constitutional convention and a selective process of party registration,
the five political parties announced a common presidential slate
featuring General Abacha, "by acclamation." These steps toward the
General's "self-succession" as a civilian ruler ended abruptly with
Abacha's unexpected death in June 1998. The ruling military council
appointed General Abdulsalami Abubakar as successor to Abacha. General
Abubakar quickly relaxed restrictions on political activity, opened
dialogue with opposition elements, and announced a transition to
democracy to conclude within a year.

**B. Recent Political Transition**

The pent-up desire for an end to military rule was widely felt after
Abacha's death. The 1998-99 political transition was hastily arranged by
the military, with limited input from civil society or the political
class. General Abubakar's regime established the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC), which in turn elaborated the electoral
schedule, regulations for party registration, and other central
guidelines. The INEC's restrictive criteria on qualifying political
parties led to the certification of only three -- the People's
Democratic Party (PDP), All People's Party (APP) and Alliance for
Democracy (AD). The PDP, the most extensively organized and best funded
of the three, was a diverse assemblage of veteran politicians, retired
military officers and political newcomers, with a multi-ethnic profile.
The leadership of the APP were less prominent or experienced figures,
many of whom from the far north, who had been closely associated with
the previous Abacha-certified parties. The core of the Alliance for
Democracy came from the supporters of the late Chief Abiola (who
suffered a fatal heart attack in July 1998), with a strong base in the
Yoruba heartland.

The elections were convened on schedule, and held in an atmosphere that
was generally peaceful and without overt provocation. Nonetheless, the
polls were marked by general administrative problems and serious
malpractices. Domestic and international observers saw widespread
evidence of rigging and fraud by various parties. Nonetheless, the
public mood in Nigeria (as well as in much of the international arena)
was strongly desirous of an end to military rule, and there was general
acceptance of the election results. President Olusegun Obasanjo of the
PDP was inaugurated in May. Just a week before the inauguration, the
Abubakar regime promulgated a constitution for the Fourth Republic (the
"Third" being the abortive democratic regime under Babangida). Public
hopes ran high for improvements in governance, stability and public
welfare -- a 'democracy dividend.'

**C. Expectations and Disappointments**

In the first months of the Obasanjo administration, high popular
expectations were met by a number of reforms and pronouncements that
appeared to promise a new direction in governance, along with decisive
steps to tackle Nigeria's most pressing policy problems. The new
government forced the retirement of "political" military officers;
rescinded grants of oil parcels and land made by the previous regime;
embarked on a review of government contract procedures; and declared a
new anti-corruption initiative. Discussions with the IMF and the World
Bank suggested renewed efforts to revive the economy, while a new
federal revenue allocation formula and the creation of the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) spoke to important minority grievances.
The administration's honeymoon period carried promise.

Soon, however, a pattern of policy drift and political stalemate was
apparent. Most of the government's early initiatives stalled as a result
of legislative opposition, contention from various interest groups, and
lack of sustained attention from the administration. Problems of
representation and accountability emerged as the legislature appeared
more concerned with perks and infighting than addressing important
public concerns, while the executive appeared to many as aloof,
arrogant, and ineffectual. Many of the least desirable characteristics
of civilian politics were on display, including crude appeals to
communalism, widespread use of patronage politics, corruption among the
parties and the political class, and factional disputes among key
personalities and their allies.

In consequence, most Nigerians have come to feel that the promised
"democracy dividend" has eluded them. The economy remains stagnant, a
victim contention among the president and the National Assembly,
inadequate government policies, weak institutions, and pervasive
corruption that undermines investment and production. Personal security
and national stability are threatened by rampant social conflict among
ethnic, religious, partisan and criminal groups in various parts of the
country. The rising tide of violence reflects the stubborn problems of
identity and national unity, as Nigerians seek a common ground for
governance and social accord. Democracy, national unity and economic
growth all rest upon the development of a rule of law, and the assorted
legal and institutional challenges in these areas present major
obstacles to better governance.