TESTIMONY OF

ROGER F. NORIEGA,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS (WHA)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

MARCH 2, 2004

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Administration's foreign
assistance priorities for the Western Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere
has a unique place in our foreign policy and assistance programs. Not
only is it our home, but we also share with the other countries certain
defining events and values that have given form to our political
institutions and culture. Our own destiny is uniquely bound to that of
our neighbors to the north and south \-- through the constant movement
of goods and people across our long borders seeking markets, education,
jobs, or simply new experiences. Our open societies, however, are
vulnerable to both internal and external threats -- crime of all kinds
and dimensions, internal conflict and, as September 11^th^ made clear,
dangerous new forms of terrorism.

The most encouraging development in the hemisphere over the last two
decades has been the decisive shift to democratic governance. In 1980,
fewer than half the countries in the hemisphere had freely elected
leaders. Although some democracies in our hemisphere are troubled --
Haiti comes immediately to mind -- today thirty-four of our thirty-five
countries have freely-elected governments. Only one -- Cuba -- does not.
Beginning at the 1994 Summit of the Americas, thirty-four Heads of State
and Government have repeatedly endorsed democracy and free trade as
guiding principles. They have also approved ambitious work plans to
achieve these and related goals. The Summit action plans -- which both
orient and reflect major components of our foreign assistance program --
describe the broad spectrum of activities still needed to ensure that
democracy's promise of freedom and prosperity reaches all who reside in
the Western Hemisphere.

We recognize that the path towards true democracy for all nations of the
hemisphere has not been smooth. But we must continue to invest in the
Hemisphere's future. Democratic, prosperous nations make the best
neighbors. They are likely to maintain peaceful relations with others in
the region and safeguard the rights of Americans living within their
borders. They are likely to foster favorable investment climates for
U.S. firms and open their markets to U.S. products. They are likely to
work with us to combat trans-national threats and to advance views
similar to our own in multilateral fora such as the UN, the OAS, and the
international financial institutions. We must continue to strengthen
this Inter-American community.

## Democracy

To take root, democracy must provide much more than free elections. As
we have seen in country after country, the return to democracy -- in
some cases at the end of long internal conflicts \-- has raised
expectations that have not been fulfilled. While some gap in performance
is unavoidable, in many countries the gap remains dangerously wide or is
growing. The institutions of government are simply not organized to be
able to respond effectively to the reasonable demands of the people. The
avenues for participation that we take for granted in the United States
-- an active civil society, established political parties, and a free
market economy that encourages entrepreneurship, among other things --
still are not fully developed in many countries in the region. These
structural impediments are compounded by world economic trends and
national fiscal problems, as well as crime and other threats to
security, all of which have placed further demands on elected leaders.

Our foreign assistance program addresses these interconnected problems.
We aim to encourage continued progress throughout the hemisphere toward
effective democracy with broad-based economic growth, human development
and both personal and national security. Let me give you some examples.

# 

Haiti most dramatically illustrates the perils of democratic government.
The country is in the midst of yet another crisis despite the dedicated
efforts of the international community, including the OAS and the United
States. After years of undemocratic governance, President Aristide
became the victim of his own repressive and autocratic rule. President
Aristide voluntarily resigned when he realized that he could no longer
depend on armed gangs to maintain him in power. And in the end, those
were the only elements of possible support left to him. He alienated the
democratic opposition in 2000 when he refused to remedy fraudulent
legislative elections, despite requests from opposition leaders and the
international community. Violent suppression of peaceful protest
demonstrations, sometimes with the complicity of the Haitian National
Police, further polarized the political landscape, as did intimidation
of journalists and the credibly alleged participation of local officials
in extra-judicial killings.

While the manifestations of Haiti's ills are poverty and misery, the
root causes are political. President Aristide's government failed its
people in every way. Now we can make a new beginning in helping Haiti to
build a democracy that respects the rule of law and protects the human
rights of its citizens. The U.S. and its partners in the international
community will work intensively with Haiti's interim government to
restore order and democracy. We are participating in the multinational
force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1529, and will also
work with our international partners in efforts to reform the Haitian
National police. Restoring democracy and the rule of law in Haiti will
require lots of work for us and the international community, but we are
committed to the task.

Just a few months ago, Bolivia was in the headlines. When Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada was elected president of Bolivia in August 2002, we
looked forward to working with him to implement, among other things,
market-oriented economic reforms he had previously developed. However,
he was forced to resign this past December by popular demonstrations
against some of those very policies. While there was a constitutional
transfer of power to Vice President Mesa, Bolivia's indigenous majority
remains underrepresented in the government and deeply suspicious of
institutions which provide little of benefit to the poor. A principal
objective of our democracy program in Bolivia is to draw the
long-marginalized indigenous population into political life. We are also
assisting the Government's anti-corruption campaign, continuing to
support improvements in the administration of justice, and helping to
increase the Government's responsiveness to citizen needs through
support for decentralization as well as for the national legislature.
The consolidation of democracy in Bolivia is our top performance goal
for the country. We believe that a stable democracy is a necessary
condition for success in the fight against illegal drugs.

Venezuela remains a cause for considerable concern. The crisis of
governance -- brought on by President Chavez' increasingly
anti-democratic actions and the strong opposition of the traditional
elites -- is now entering its third year. The National Electoral Council
will announce soon whether sufficient signatures have been verified to
convoke Presidential and National Assembly recall elections. The United
States has a major interest in preserving and regenerating democracy in
Venezuela and facilitating a peaceful, constitutional solution to the
ongoing political crisis. Foreign assistance resources will be used to
improve the functioning of institutions that underpin democracy, in
particular stronger, more democratic political parties and
democracy-related NGOs. The absence of such dependable actors has
greatly increased the distance between Chavez and his detractors and
prolonged the crisis, with devastating effects on the national economy
as well. We will also be dedicating resources to help Venezuela reverse
this long-term economic decline and promote sound growth-oriented
macroeconomic policies.

Other examples of assistance to strengthen democratic institutions
include a five-year project in Peru focused on the national legislature,
judicial reform, and decentralization and activities in the Dominican
Republic to support civil society advocacy for political reform and
training for the media. In Ecuador, a decade has passed since a
president has completed his term of office. Our challenge there is to
work at all levels -- both within and outside the government -- to
reinforce the message that politics must stay within constitutional
bounds. Assistance will include training on civil-military relations,
exchange programs on constitutional democracy, and support for selected
civil society groups to demand effective democratic government. In
Paraguay, where more orderly constitutional processes are the goal, we
will promote consensus between the executive and legislative branches on
issues of rule of law, state reform, and protection of human rights.
Mexican democracy too is at a critical stage in its transition toward
more open and participatory government. Assistance there will strengthen
the rule of law through judicial reform and support greater transparency
and accountability in government.

In Cuba, the one country in the region that does not have a freely
elected government, our policy is to encourage a rapid, peaceful
transition to democracy characterized by strong support for human rights
and an open market economy. With increased ESF resources, we will
augment our support for Cuba's embattled civil society and increase our
efforts to break the information blockade Castro has imposed on the
island. We will provide a voice to Cuba's independent journalists and
human rights activists. In this way, we will help Cuba's strongly
motivated civil society to work for freedom in political, economic and
other fields. We intend to help create the conditions that will bring to
an end the hemisphere's only totalitarian government and reintegrate the
Cuban people as members of the community of the Americas.

## Prosperity

At the Special Summit of the Americas held in Monterrey, Mexico, this
past January, the democratically elected Heads of State and Government
declared their commitment to economic growth to reduce poverty. Called
in response to problems that have arisen since the Third Summit in April
2001, the Special Summit focused on private sector-led growth to reduce
poverty and fighting corruption. There was much discussion in the lead
up to the Summit and at the Summit itself around social issues and
economic equality for all members of society. Hemispheric leaders agreed
on a host of concrete actions to fight corruption and promote
transparency, invest in health and education, and promote growth through
trade and economic reforms.

Among these specific commitments, leaders agreed to reduce the time and
cost of starting a business and to strengthen property rights by the
next summit in 2005. Leaders agreed to triple lending by the
Inter-American Development Bank through private sector banks to micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises by 2007. They also agreed to create
conditions for reducing by at least half the average cost of remittance
transfers by 2008. All these steps are intended to facilitate
entrepreneurship and increase access to capital. The Summit declaration
welcomed the progress achieved to date toward the establishment of a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and reaffirmed the commitment to
complete the FTAA on schedule, that is, by the January 2005 deadline.
The declaration contained numerous other statements of support for sound
macroeconomic policies, prudent fiscal management, and public policies
that stimulate domestic savings, meet the need for creation of
productive jobs, and contribute to greater social inclusion.

As with democracy as a form of government, there is broad agreement
throughout the hemisphere on objectives, on the principles that
determine overall economic success and prosperity. The problem is once
again a performance gap, the gap between political declarations and
reality. After decades of government control of basic industries and
other mercantilistic policies, the structure of the economy in many
countries cannot readily be reoriented to a free market system, which
also needs regulatory and other support mechanisms to ensure a level
playing field. Our assistance programs will help support legal and
regulatory reforms to help small- and medium-sized businesses and
property owners and to bring informal businesses into the formal sector.
We will also help countries develop the capacity to provide business
services, including access to credit and markets, to enable them to
compete in the global economy. As international standards increasingly
require attention to the environment, we will promote the use of the
best environmental management practices, including access to financing
for their implementation.

An overriding issue in the quest for equitable growth is corruption.
Corruption undermines the rule of law and distorts economies and the
allocation of resources for development. In Monterrey, the leaders
pledged to intensify efforts to combat corruption and other unethical
practices in both the public and private sectors. They pledged to
strengthen a culture of transparency and deny safe haven to corrupt
officials and those that corrupt them. They called for promoting
transparency in public financial management. They called for robust
implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and
its follow-up mechanism, and committed to develop specific measures to
strengthen international cooperation toward this end. In addition,
Leaders pledged to hold consultations if adherence to their transparency
and anti-corruption objectives is compromised to a serious degree in any
Summit country.

In support of the transparency commitment, U.S. assistance programs will
promote transparency and accountability in government institutions. In
Bolivia, we will provide technical assistance to support civil service
reform and anti-corruption training for police, military, prosecutors
and judges. In the Dominican Republic, we will help mobilize a civil
society coalition for transparency in government and support the
development and implementation of a national anti-corruption plan. In
Nicaragua, we will support reform of the law governing the operation of
the Office of the Comptroller General and continue to provide assistance
to the Attorney General and National Police to support prosecution of
public corruption cases. These examples illustrate the different
approaches being taken by individual countries toward the same objective
of greater transparency in government.

We remain firmly convinced that trade is the most effective means of
increasing prosperity in the hemisphere. The United States already
imports from Latin America and the Caribbean goods valued at more than
120 times the total amount of its assistance to the region. We will work
to expand trade -- and the prosperity it brings \-- through the FTAA,
the Central America Free Trade Area, and bilateral agreements as
appropriate. We will call upon the United States Senate to help us make
this vision a reality by providing advice and consent to ratification of
these agreements at the appropriate time. Trade related assistance, such
as that just alluded to, is an integral part of our trade strategy. My
colleague Adolfo Franco of USAID will discuss in greater detail our
current efforts to build trade capacity throughout the hemisphere.

[Investing in People]{.underline}

While I have been talking about political and economic structure and
processes, people are the intended beneficiaries of all our programs. We
aim to facilitate the development of open political and economic systems
that serve the needs of the people and enable them to prosper and pursue
their own individual objectives within the framework of a rule of law.
At present, too many in the hemisphere are trapped in poverty and suffer
from malnutrition. Without attention to their basic human needs -- food,
basic sanitation and quality education and healthcare, they will never
be able to participate in the gains generated by economic growth and
expanded trade. Consequently, we are continuing to dedicate significant
resources to improve nutrition and healthcare in selected countries and
regions.

In the poorest country in the hemisphere, Haiti, two-thirds of the
population lives below the absolute poverty line, unable to meet minimum
daily caloric requirements. This fact alone is enough to launch
thousands of undocumented migrants toward our shores each year in
unseaworthy vessels. Haiti is also the country most severely affected by
HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence rate of between 4.5 and 6%. U.S. assistance
to Haiti, channeled largely through nongovernmental organizations,
focuses on the most vulnerable -- those suffering from chronic
malnutrition, communicable disease and illiteracy. The U.S. is the
largest bilateral donor for HIV/AIDS prevention and care in Haiti, using
a public/private partnership to provide a comprehensive set of
prevention and education activities to reduce the rate of new
infections, as well as programs to provide care and support for those
already infected or affected by the disease.

In Nicaragua, the second poorest country in our hemisphere, our programs
address fundamental obstacles to development, including food aid to
ameliorate the impact of rural unemployment. We are also providing
assistance to diversify agricultural production and link agricultural
products to local, regional and global markets, giving small farmers a
stake in the national economy. We are working with the Nicaraguan
Government to expand access to primary education and improve the
infrastructure and quality of schools, to reform public policy and
management of health issues, and increase access to sustainable health
care for low- and middle-income families through the private sector
health market. All these activities aimed at helping individuals meet
immediate needs bring those people into the economic and political life
of the country, expanding prosperity and participation in democratic
governance.

Examples of other programs we ask you to fund include assistance in
Bolivia and Peru, particularly in high poverty coca-growing regions, to
improve nutrition and enhance the capacity of public and private sector
organizations to meet the population's health, nutrition and education
needs. In the Dominican Republic, programs focus on health sector
reform, improving reproductive health services, and controlling the
spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In Honduras, we are supporting
President Maduro's Poverty Reduction Strategy, developed as part of the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and designed to improve access
and opportunities for low-income Hondurans via an improved investment
climate, better social services and more effective municipal
governments. As the center of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Central America,
Honduras will also receive assistance to improve prevention and care for
people contracting the disease. A regional program for the Eastern
Caribbean works with NGOs, community-based organizations, and
governments toward the same ends.

We look forward to the initiation of programs through the Millennium
Challenge Account, which represents a major departure from past
practices in distributing U.S. economic assistance. The MCA will provide
an important new source of financing for lower income countries that
establish sound economic policies, invest in their people and
demonstrate the political will to establish transparency in government
and conform to the rule of law. This month the Millennium Challenge
Corporation will propose eligibility criteria for nations to
participate, and in May the MCC will select a final list of countries to
receive assistance. We hope that several countries in the Western
Hemisphere will qualify in the first year, and that additional nations
will become eligible in the future. We will be working to ensure that
the initial funding provided by Congress delivers the promised results:
reducing poverty by significantly increasing economic growth. As the
President has stated, the MCA will provide people in developing nations
the tools they need to seize the opportunities of the global economy .

[Security]{.underline}

While the hemisphere is making progress in the development of effective
democratic institutions and open economies, this progress is threatened
by the inability of governments to control crime and demonstrate to all
citizens the value of a rule of law. Indeed, the lack of personal
security is now recognized in many countries as a primary threat to the
stability of the democratically elected government. The goals of
democracy and security are thus two sides of the same coin. We cannot
pursue one without the other, and both are critical to our own security
here at home.

For many people in the region, the immediate perceived threat is common
crime -- theft of property, assaults, kidnapping, and murder -- and is a
direct reflection of some governments' inability to provide adequate
police services. However, this is the tip of the iceberg. Intermingled
with these same local criminals -- and taking advantage of the same gaps
in the criminal justice systems -- are those engaged in international
organized crime. The drug traffickers, alien smugglers, and traffickers
in persons, among others, all thrive in the same fertile ground of
inadequate laws, often untrained and inexperienced personnel throughout
the justice system, and a long history of not enforcing the laws on the
books. While there are certainly variations among countries, in too many
countries only the poor are incarcerated, generally for long periods of
time without trial and without access to counsel. To reverse this
situation and establish criminal justice systems capable of prosecuting
high visibility crimes against prominent defendants on a regular basis
is a monumental task. The countries of the Americas must meet it to
secure the rule of law and sustain democratic governance.

Much of our assistance to the region focuses on strengthening criminal
justice institutions and processes. ESF and INCLE are the primary source
of funds for such programs. Assistance ranges from training and
equipping of counternarcotics and other specialized units to sector-wide
efforts aimed at implementation of new criminal procedure codes. The
latter reach out at a policy level to all elements of the criminal
justice system \-- police, prosecutors, judges and public defense
services. In many countries, such efforts are proceeding in parallel and
are coordinated by the Country Team. We feel that it is critical to look
at justice systems as a whole to identify the weak points in
coordination between agencies. These are the critical gaps that need to
be filled for successful prosecutions. Both the lack of competence in
investigative techniques and competition among police, prosecutors and
judges over investigative responsibilities are serious obstacles to the
effective prosecution of crimes in the region today. Many countries also
need to give greater attention to crime prevention and victim
assistance.

Notwithstanding Haiti, Colombia continues to present the most urgent
case for law enforcement and other assistance in the region.
Counternarcotics remains at the center of U.S. relations with Colombia,
which supplies 90% of the cocaine consumed in the United States.
However, as Colombia's three terrorist organizations -- the FARC, ELN,
and AUC -- fund their activities with the proceeds of drug trafficking,
a unified response is necessary. We appreciate the expanded authority
that Congress has provided to allow our assistance program to support
Colombia's unified campaign against drugtrafficking and terrorism. Our
FY 2005 request for funding builds upon the successes of programs begun
in FY 2000 with the Plan Colombia Supplemental and sustained by
subsequent Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) appropriations. Our ACI
request for FY 2005 would provide \$150 million for programs to address
underlying social and institutional issues and \$313 million for
narcotics interdiction and eradication. The alternative development and
institution building programs include emergency and longer-term
assistance to vulnerable groups and displaced persons, as well as
programs promoting the rule of law, local governance, and human rights.

The total ACI request for FY 2005 (including Colombia) is \$731 million.
These funds are needed to support a unified Andean regional campaign
against the drug trade and narco-terrorism. In Peru, coca cultivation
has already been reduced by 70%. Our FY 2005 request (\$112 million)
will support the further eradication of illicit coca and opium poppy
cultivation, interdiction, maintenance of USG-owned air assets, and the
development of rural infrastructure to prevent the spread of illicit
economic activities linked to narcotics trafficking. We will pursue
similar activities in Bolivia at a somewhat lower level (\$91 million).
We are seeking \$26 million for Ecuador, where programs will aim
primarily to stop spillover from Colombia and the transit of drugs
destined for the United States, and \$9 million for Brazil, to support
an interagency operation to fortify the northern border through riverine
control. We also request \$6 million and \$3 million for Panama and
Venezuela, respectively, for interdiction and other law enforcement
activities. Given Panama's strategic location and its well-developed
banking sector, our goal is to help Panama develop its own capabilities
to protect itself from criminal exploitation of all kinds. We also
propose to increase support for port, canal, and maritime security.

Mexico is the major transit country for cocaine entering the United
States. Mexican opium and marijuana cultivation is also a serious
threat, and Mexican traffickers figure prominently in the distribution
of illegal drugs in this country. Over the last few years, we have built
trust and an unprecedented track record of law enforcement cooperation
with the Mexican Government. Successes have come by targeting
individuals involved in criminal activity, the goods they are
trafficking, and the assets they accrue. With INCLE funds, we intend to
sustain the progress made since 2001 in interdiction capacity while
supporting eradication, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities. We
will develop a comprehensive Law Enforcement Training Plan with Mexican
counterparts to enhance police and prosecutorial capabilities to combat
serious crimes affecting citizens of both countries. We will support
initiatives, such as the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership, to improve
security along our southern border. We will also continue to work with
Mexican authorities as they reevaluate their domestic legislation,
including the proposed introduction of oral proceedings in criminal
cases. Complementary administration of justice activities will be funded
with ESF.

In other countries, INCLE funds are used to help governments build
strong law enforcement and related institutions that can stop the
threats of international drug trafficking and transnational organized
crime before they reach U.S. soil. In the wake of September 11, 2001, we
have refocused many anti-crime programs to emphasize and sharpen their
counter-terrorism impact. For example, we are stepping up cooperation
with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay with a view toward decreasing use of
the tri-border area as a hub for terrorist financing. Administration of
justice programs throughout the region, including ESF-funded law
enforcement development activities, generally address problems in the
criminal justice system. Programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua all seek to develop good working relationships between
police investigators and prosecutors, to improve the quality of criminal
cases presented to judges and the possibility of conviction on the
merits. Because of the serious street crime problems in Central America,
including violent gangs, we are also looking for ways to enhance crime
prevention efforts -- through the work of enforcement agencies and
community organizations. Projects in Central America, Mexico and the
Caribbean address the need for better management systems and training
for all participants in the judicial process. A new international
organization has been established in Santiago, Chile, with a mandate
from the Summit of the Americas to support judicial reform throughout
the hemisphere. The ESF account is the source for U.S. financial
contributions to the Justice Studies Center of the Americas.

On the military side, our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request for
FY 2005 will provide professional training and equipment to meet three
distinct requirements. Most of the requested assistance will support
efforts in the Andean region to establish or strengthen national
authority over remote areas that shelter terrorists and illegal
narcotics activity. Despite impressive improvements, Colombian security
forces will still require significant U.S. assistance in the key areas
of mobility, intelligence, sustainment and training. Our FMF request for
FY 2005 would provide \$108 million for such programs, including the
provision of interdiction boats, infrastructure improvements and support
for Colombia's C-130 transportation fleet. FMF support is also critical
to Colombia's neighbors to preclude spillover of narcotics and terrorism
into their territories.

A second objective of the FY 2005 FMF request is to reinforce homeland
security by controlling approaches to the United States. We will provide
countries of the Caribbean and Central America communications equipment,
training, spare parts, port security enhancements and logistical support
to complement U.S. interdiction efforts. Our intention is to reinforce
each country's own sovereign ability to address the continuing terrorist
threat, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration into the United
States.

The third objective for FMF financing is to improve the capability of
certain security forces in the region to participate in coalition and
peacekeeping operations. Chile, Uruguay and Argentina are committed and
well-trained to participate in international peacekeeping operations but
lack support in aviation logistics, specialized individual equipment and
infrastructure. Providing this support through FMF will enable their
continued participation in peacekeeping efforts, reducing the possible
requirement for U.S. forces in such operations. Similarly, when El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic volunteered
troops for stability operations in Iraq, they demonstrated the political
will to support U.S. objectives. However, deficiencies in equipment and
training remain, which we propose to address through FMF to allow
continued participation in peacekeeping operations.

Training provided under the IMET program will expose foreign students to
U.S. professional military organizations and procedures and the manner
in which military organizations function under civilian control. In the
Western Hemisphere, such training focuses on junior and mid-grade
officers, who still have a significant military career ahead of them and
whose development can be positively influenced by exposure to U.S.
practices. The largest programs are in Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico,
Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. Our total FY 2005
request is \$14,390,000. Continuation of these programs is intended to
enhance regional security by consolidating gains Latin American
militaries have made in subordinating themselves to civilian control.

[Gaps and Authorities]{.underline}

Your letter of invitation asked specifically whether, in my opinion,
there were any critical gaps in the Administration's foreign assistance
request for the Western Hemisphere. Needless to say, there are always
choices that must be made in putting together a budget of this kind. Our
request level is sufficient to address the highest priority needs in our
hemisphere. As is the custom, however, we expect to make some
adjustments in individual country or program levels to meet actual
requirements when FY 2005 appropriations are made available.

You also asked whether we needed any new authorities. Last year on this
occasion, Acting Assistant Secretary Struble identified aspects of
existing legislation that hampered programming in the region. The areas
identified -- the need for year-to-year extension of special authorities
for Colombia and administration of justice programs, and the confusing
array of exceptions to section 660 to authorize police assistance --
remain issues of concern to us today. We would like to have permanent
authorization language to support the unified campaign in Colombia
against narcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated
as terrorist organizations. We would welcome elimination of the sunset
and other revisions in FAA section 534 to bring it into line with the
annual appropriations language. However, more fundamentally, we continue
to believe that police assistance authorities should be reevaluated with
a view toward developing new affirmative legislation to replace section
660 and its numerous exceptions. The limitations of our authority to
work with law enforcement personnel under section 534 have become
particularly apparent in connection with the need for general crime
prevention activities in Central America. We are discussing these issues
internally and look forward to sharing an Administration position with
the Committee in the near future.

[Conclusion]{.underline}

In conclusion, our objectives in the Western Hemisphere are clear -- to
strengthen democratic institutions, to improve conditions for
broad-based economic growth, to provide for basic human needs in the
most urgent situations, and to protect people from both internal and
external threats. Our foreign assistance program and specifically our FY
2005 budget request provide an accurate overview of the many challenges
still before us. While there have been many positive developments -- and
I would call your attention once again to the strong consensus
demonstrated through successive Summits of the Americas on diverse
issues of longstanding importance to the United States \-- there are
very real problems that require our ongoing attention. The institutions
of government, social services, and the free market economy we enjoy in
the United States were not created overnight. We cannot expect that
other countries in this hemisphere, most of which have a much shorter or
inconsistent experience with democratic governance, will achieve a
similar institutionalization of rights and freedoms in a few short
years. We are engaged intensely with them across a wide spectrum of
issues through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. We must also offer
them concrete assistance as they work toward our common objectives.
Their success will not only benefit their own citizens but also redound
to our benefit. As they become more stable partners in international
endeavors and more open markets for our goods and services, we will
become better friends in the broadest sense of the word. That is the
overall objective we seek through our assistance program. I ask your
support for full funding of the Administration's FY 2005 budget.

Thank you for your attention.

Drafted:

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