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CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND HARDWARE

17\. STATE OF THE ART. Concern for the physical aspects of

residential security has traditionally centered on familiar

types of protective hardware,e.g., locks, lighting,and window

grilles. In recent years, growing attention has been given to

new technologies for electronic alarm and surveillance systems.

In addition, the enhancement of security through architectural

design has become the subject of research and development. All

of these trends represent significant advances in the state of

the art, and even greater advances are probable for the future.

However, the burgeoning development of new products and

techniques confronts Management with a bewildering array of

design and hardware options. This discussion is intended as a

brief overview of these complex options, so as to provide

guidance on choices incident to the planning approach described

in Chapter 3.

18\. DESIGN AND HARDWARE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE

SECURITY PROGRAM. Design and hardware measures are among the

most important components of residential security. Some degree

of physical protection is always essential, even in the small

project with relatively minor security problems. However, design

and hardware are not panaceas. To achieve maximum effectiveness,

economy and resident satisfaction, they must be integral to a

comprehensive security program which also takes maximum advantage

of \"software\" measures. In this context, the following

preliminary considerations are applicable to planning design and

hardware improvements:

a\. Potential for Different Types of Security Objectives.

Security-related design and hardware measures offer an

enormous variety of options for all three types of security

actions described in Chapter 2, subparagraph 5c above (i.e.,

\"Check\", \"Treat\" and \"Cure\" actions). Since this Handbook

emphasizes \"Check\" actions, aimed at direct defense against

crime and vandalism, most of this Chapter is devoted to

design and hardware measures whose potential is primarily of

that type. However, some of those measures, as well as more

sophisticated design and hardware measures, have great

potential as \"Treat\" and \"Cure\" actions. See paragraph 19

below.

b\. Phased Planning and Action. Decisions on design and

hardware, like those on other elements of the project\'s

security program, should largely be made only after the goals

and priorities of the total security program are set. See

Chapter 3, subparagraph 12d and paragraph 14 above. Since

additions or alterations to existing projects are apt to be

expensive, and once made, even more expensive to change,

great caution should be exercised in implementing them on a

short-term basis. Normally, the relatively simple types of

protective hardware are most appropriate to short-term

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action in existing projects, while basic changes in the

design of buildings and grounds or installation of electronic

surveillance and alarm systems require thorough advance

planning. As accomplishment of \"Check\" prerequisites

permits the security program to proceed on to \"Treat\"

and \"Cure\" objectives, orderly progression can be made

toward more sophisticated design measures.

19\. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN. Although full exposition of sophisticated

concepts of the relationship between security and architectural

design is a complex subject which is beyond the scope of this

Handbook, some further mention of this subject is merited before

turning to discussion of the more familiar types of design and

hardware features for residential security. While recent

research in this field has produced much of practical value, it

has by no means arrived at a fixed set of design standards, and

Management should therefore realize that this is a changing,

though highly pertinent, technical field. A useful introduction

to one major concept is provided by a publication entitled

Architectural Design for Crime Prevention (1973), National

Institute of Law Enforecemnt and Criminal Justice, Law

Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA), U. S. Department of Justice

(Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402, Stock No.

2700-00161, Price: \$2.60). That publication describes the

\"defensible space\" hypotheses developed by Professor Oscar Newman

of New York University. This concept includes the following four

ingredients of physical design (as quoted from Chapter 1,

paragraph B (page 2) of the referenced publication) which,

independently and in concert, can contribute to residential

security:

a\. Territoriality. Design ingredients \"which serve to define

spheres of territorial influence by dividing the residential

environment into subzones within which occupants can easily

adopt proprietary attitudes.\"

b\. Surveillance. Design ingredients \"which improve the natural

capability of residents and their agents to visually survey

the exterior and interior public areas of their residential

environment.\"

c\. Common Facilities. Design ingredients \"which enhance the

safety of adjoining areas through the strategic geographic

location of intensively used communal facilities.\"

d\. Perceptions of the Project. Design ingredients \"which

through judicious use of building materials, the tools of

architectural composition and site planning are able to

reduce the perception

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of peculiarity\--the vulnerability, isolation . . . . of

housing projects and their residents.\"

20\. ANALYZING SPECIFIC DESIGN AND HARDWARE OPTIONS. Since there is

virtually no specific type of security measure which is

necessarily appropriate for every multifamily housing project,

design and hardware must be analyzed in terms of choice among a

multitude of options, always taking into account the possibility

that a \"software\" alternative might be even better, and the fact

that the effectiveness of design and hardware measures may

depend upon ancillary \"software\" measures, e.g. surveillance,

reporting, and police response. A useful method of analysis is

to look at the project on an area-by-area basis. This permits

evaluation of specific options in the context of their function.

Paragraphs 21 through 23 below follow this method, providing a

checklist of major design and hardware options which tend to be

in the nature of direct protective measures designed to withstand

criminal attack (or by evidence of their strength to dissuade the

would-be offender from attempting attack), rather than to affect

deeper levels of human motivation. Thus, these tend to be

\"Check\" actions.

21\. PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL DWELLING UNIT. Normally, the first

priority for security in multifamily housing is the protection of

the individual dwelling unit against burglary. The focus here is

on doors and windows, although the existence of other portals

(e.g., skylights and attic openings) calls for similar attention

to those additional points of vulnerability. In any event,

doors, windows, and other means of possible access should be

analyzed as total systems, comprised of their frames, locks, and

other accessories, as well as their basic components.

a\. Exterior Doors. All exterior doors (including the back

door, if any) should be sufficiently secure to withstand the

degree of attack anticipated.

\(1\) The basic door component should be of sufficiently

heavy construction to withstand the degree of force

anticipated. Where security problems are serious,

doors with glass panels should be avoided. It is

strongly recommended that all exterior wooden doors be

of solid-core construction with a minimum thickness of

1-3/4 inches. Both hollow wood doors and thin panel

doors are inadequate where serious security problems

exist. Although flush doors provide better security, if

panel doors are desired, their panels should have a

minimum thickness of 1/2 inch. Heavier-duty options are

doors with solid wood cores and metal coverings and

doors of hollow steel or aluminum construction.

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\(2\) Door hinges must also be of heavy-duty construction,

and mounted on the inside of the door so that burglars

cannot remove the entire door from its hinges. Spring

hinges, which close the door automatically, are

recommended.

\(3\) Door locks are the one element in the entire security

picture about which a standard recommendation can most

validly be made for every multifamily housing project:

Every exterior dwelling unit door should be equipped

with a deadbolt mortise lock with a \"throw\" of at least

one inch, constructed of case-hardened steel, brass,

zinc alloy, or bronze. This, if no other, security

design feature should be incorporated into every new and

existing project. Locks equipped with spring latches

only (but not deadbolts) are unsatisfactory, because an

intruder can easily push back a spring latch with a

celluloid strip. \"Key-in-the-knob\" locks should not be

relied upon for primary exterior lock protection, since

a determined burglar can break them with relative ease.

The cylinder is a critical element of any lock and must

be sufficient to withstand expert lock-picking efforts;

it is desirable for a lock cylinder to have at least six

pins. Protruding cylinders should be avoided, or

protected by a spinner ring, a bevelled ring cylinder

guard or escutcheon plate. There is, however, no such

thing as a \"burglar-proof\" lock, which can withstand the

attack of a skilled burglar with ample time and

equipment to practice his skills. The value of a good

lock is that it can withstand attack by the relatively

unskilled burglar, or delay the skilled burglar until he

is driven away or apprehended, or deter either from

attempting to break in.

\(4\) The door frame is often overlooked as a component of the

security of a complete door system. All frames should

be of heavy-duty construction. Metal-covered wood

frames provide optimum cost effectiveness when used in

combination with doors of similar construction, but are

recommended for use with wooden doors as well. Wooden

frames should be at least two inches thick. If hollow

steel frames are used, the air space behind the frame

should be filled with crush-resistant material,

especially in the area of the strike. For in-swinging

doors, rabbeted jambs should be used to prevent

tampering in the area of the strike; addition of an L-

shaped metal plate in the area of the strike affords

extra protection to the lock. For doors opening out, an

escutcheon plate, extending beyond the edge of the door

and fitting flush with the jamb when the door is closed,

will provide similar protection to the

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lock. All plates mounted on the outsides of doors should be

attached with tamper-resistant connectors, such as round-

headed carriage bolts or one-way screws.

\(5\) Interviewers are devices installed on opaque doors to allow

persons inside the unit to see and hear who is outside

without having to unsecure the door. A wide-angle optical

interviewer (peep-hole) should be installed on each exterior

door (including the back door, if any). This is a relatively

inexpensive measure and should be standard for all

multifamily housing projects. The opening of an optical

interviewer should be no more than 1/4 inch in diameter, and

a double glass should be used for safety. Slide-chain

interviewers (chain locks) should not be relied upon; they

are easily defeated and impart a false sense of security.

\(6\) Doors with glass panels, though highly undesirable for

exterior use where security problems are serious, must be

given special attention wherever they are used. Sliding

doors should have break-resistant glass and should be

equipped with a sturdy lock designed specifically for this

type of door. For other types of doors with glass panels

(e.g., French doors),the deadbolt mortise lock should be key-

operated from the inside as well as the outside, in order to

prevent the burglar from simply removing a portion of the

glass and reaching inside to operate the latch by hand.

b\. Windows. The dwelling unit windows which are most vulnerable to

attack are those situated on the first floor (or otherwise

accessible from the ground) and those leading to fire escapes.

Also vulnerable, but to lesser degree, are windows located over a

canopy (e .g., above a lobby entrance), adjacent stairwell

windows or on the top floor. Cornices, ledges or other

architectural features can create further vulnerability. In some

instances, the threat of determined and resourceful burglars has

even extended several stories above the ground or below the roof.

Since windows are a prime target for vandalism, that threat, as

well as the threat of burglary, should be considered in planning

measures for the protection of windows. Careful analysis of

experience, trends and building design will enable Management to

identify degrees of window vulnerability.

\(1\) Window glass can be protected by the use of \"unbreakable

glass\" made of polycarbonate materials, though at relatively

high initial purchase cost. Other options which are

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superior to ordinary window glass include plate glass,

tempered glass, and bonded safety glass.

\(2\) Window locks are an important element to which little

thought is usually given. The only reliable window locks

are those of the key-operated variety. However, such

locks present problems of fire safety and inconvenience

to residents. The standard crescent sash lock, the slide

bolt latch, and various friction or pressure devices can

easily be overcome, especially if the intruder is willing

a break a small section of the glass.

\(3\) Grilles, bars, and gates afford reliable protection for

vulnerable windows where security problems are great.

Such fixtures should be of heavy-duty construction, and

should be securely attached to the window frame with

machine or roundheaded bolts which cannot be easily

removed from the outside. Fire safety requirements must

be checked before window grilles, bars,or gates are

installed.

c\. Electronic Alarm Systems. The measures described in

subparagraphs 21a and 2lb above for the protection of exterior

doors, windows,and other possible points of access to the

dwelling unit can be reinforced by electronic alarm systems,

although such systems should be used only where necessary and

practicable.

\(1\) Types of Alarm Systems. There are scores of electronic

alarm products on the market, varying greatly in price,

quality,and complexity. Some are very difficult to

install; others need only be plugged into an existing

electric outlet. Alarm devices fall roughly into two

categories: contact devices and motion detection

devices. In the simplest terms, contact devices are

mechanical switches which detect the movement of a door

or window. Foil strips are a related mechanism used to

detect breakage of glass in windows and doors. The

second type of alarm system detects the motion of an

intruder as he moves about the protected space. Motion

detection technologies include seismographic devices,

photo-electric cells,and ultrasonic detectors. Great

caution should be exercised in selecting alarm equipment.

The advice of an independent expert is strongly advised.

\(2\) Alarm Reporting Systems. Either a contact or motion

detection system may be linked to a local alarm (bell,

buzzer, lights on the immediate premises) or to a central

alarm (via wires to a security force which is prepared to

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react when so alerted). Local alarms aim at driving

off the burglar or aiding in his apprehension, and at

alerting residents and neighbors that a break-in is

being attempted. The effectiveness of any alarm system

depends to a great extent upon the ability to secure a

prompt response from the police or other security

personnel. False alarms are a major problem, because

they diminish the credibility of the system and tend to

slow or stop effective response from police, security

personnel, and neighbors.

22\. PROTECTING COMMON AREAS WITHIN MULTIFAMILY BUILDINGS. With

regard to protection of common areas within multifamily

buildings, a basic choice is the degree to which a \"fortress\"

strategy can and should be adopted. For a project inhabited by

families with children, such a strategy may be patently

inconsistent with the normal pattern of residents, daily lives.

An extreme \"fortress\" strategy is apt to be most workable in a

high-rise building exclusively for the elderly. Acceptability to

residents is always a commanding consideration, though it may be

possible to obtain resident acceptance through careful

educational efforts.

a\. Lobbies are a first line of building defense. The degree and

methods of controlling access must depend upon residents\'

attitudes and life styles and the availability of policing

services. Nevertheless, in all instances, the lobby itself

and the area immediately outside its doors should be brightly

lighted and free of places of concealment. The following

additional elements of lobby design merit special attention:

\(1\) Lobby doors should have large glass panels, to

facilitate two-way surveillance. Where security

problems are great and policing services inadequate to

control access, serious consideration must be given to

keeping lobby doors locked, especially during evening

hours. Where this is done, lobby doors should be

equipped with heavy-duty metal frames, a good deadbolt

mortise lock set,and a sturdy door closer.

\(2\) Intercom (annunciator) devices permit residents

conveniently to admit callers when lobby doors are

locked. The familiar \"buzzer reply\" system is

satisfactory, but should be installed during initial

construction, because costs of wiring installation are

very high in existing buildings. A functionally similar

alternative is an intercom system utilizing regular

telephone wires, instead of separate wiring, so that

installation costs are relatively modest. However, a

monthly service charge is made for each dwelling unit.

If there is a telephone connection in the unit, this

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system can be used even if the resident does not have a

regular telephone. This type of system is available

through some local telephone companies. A much less

expensive, though also much less satisfactory, method is

simply to have the telephone company install a public

telephone outside the lobby entrance, so that callers

can telephone residents, who can then come to the lobby

to open the door. One potential problem with any of

these systems is vandalization of intercom panels or

telephones located outside the building\'s entrance.

Difficulties with resident acceptance and vandalism tend

to be greatest in buildings with many small children in

residence.

b\. Secondary doors (e.g., emergency exits, delivery doors) each

require analysis in terms of ordinary function as well as

threat of criminal access. It is sometimes difficult to

reconcile these two factors. Fire regulations require that

occupants of the building be readily able to open emergency

doors from the inside; the best solution here is a vertical-

bolt latch or crash bar on the inside, keeping the door

locked from the outside at all times. Exit alarms can be

installed to alert security personnel upon the opening of

emergency doors. All secondary doors should have automatic

door closer devices. Glass panels should never be used in

such doors, and the construction of the door and its frame

should be sufficiently heavy to withstand the degree of

attack anticipated. Where secondary doors are continuously

used for resident ingress and egress (e.g., doors to garages

or parking lots), they should be treated in much the same way

as lobby doors.

c\. Garage access should be controlled, even if doors leading

from the garage to other areas of the building are monitored

and/or kept locked.

d\. Elevators are among the most problematical elements of high-

rise multifamily buildings, from the standpoint of vandalism

as well as crimes against persons.

\(1\) Surveillance is a prime factor in elevator security.

Buildings should be designed so that the elevator area

is fully visible throughout the lobby, and preferably

from the area immediately outside the lobby and the

street beyond. On levels other than the lobby floor,

elevators should open directly on hallways, without

recesses or blind corners to restrict two-way

visibility. A common and inexpensive device to increase

a person\'s ability to survey the interior of an elevator

before entry is a

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convex mirror placed in the upper back corner of the

elevator cab.

\(2\) Audio-intercom systems permit persons within the elevator to

communicate with persons in elevator waiting areas or with

security personnel. A continuous audio device is preferable

to one which must be activated by pushing a button.

\(3\) Closed-circuit television is particularly adaptable to

elevator security (see paragraph 24 below).

\(4\) Vandalism to elevators can be limited by a variety of

measures, including use of stainless steel mushroom buttons,

protecting indicator lights with a heavy-duty plastic shield

and use of automatic sliding doors (rather than swinging

doors). Door glass, though an element in surveillance, is so

susceptible to breakage as to merit avoidance where vandalism

is a problem. Where existing elevators have such glass, a

piece of metal can be simply welded or bolted over the

opening.

e\. Mailboxes and mail rooms should be located so as to permit

maximum surveillance \--preferably in or adjacent to the main

lobby of the building. The mailboxes themselves should be

constructed of heavy metal, with tightly-fitted doors. Locks

should be of the cylinder type with at least five pins. Sizes of

mailbox doors should be kept at a minimum. A locked mailbox room

provides additional security, although it should be subject to

full surveillance from the lobby by means of large windows and

good lighting. Where back-loading mailboxes are used, a separate

mail loading room is often provided. Doors to all such rooms

should be of sturdy construction, should be kept locked on a 24-

hour basis,and should be equipped with automatic door closers.

f\. Laundry rooms commonly invite attack on residents or pilferage

of coins from laundry machines. A first consideration here is

location. Laundry rooms are usually located in basement

recesses, and Management should carefully consider whether that

is the best choice. If acceptable to residents, the laundry room

might better be situated in a more active area of the building,

adjacent to social rooms or even the main lobby, and fitted with

large glass windows to facilitate surveillance. This may accord

well with social patterns, and there is no reason why laundry

rooms cannot be made attractive. In any event, laundry rooms

should be kept locked on a 24-hour basis, with tenants being

provided Keys. Laundry rooms may be further protected by audio

intercom or closed-circuit television devices.

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g\. Social rooms should provide protection for both people and

such valuables as may be kept there. Proximity to other

heavily-used areas (e.g., the main lobby) can facilitate

mutual surveillance by residents in the ordinary course of

their activities.

h\. Storage rooms for residents\' and Management\'s property, merit

heavy protective measures. Use of windowless rooms (e.g., in

basements) is advisable, and door systems (including their

locks and frames) should be of particularly strong

construction. Deadbolt locks should always be used. For

residents\' storage, the additional use of locked bins is

recommended.

i\. Management offices should be protected to the degree they make

attractive targets for burglary or robbery, with particularly

strong measures where money, office equipment,or other

valuable movables are kept in such areas. Measures similar to

those employed for dwelling units are recommended (see

paragraph 21 above). Where significant sums in money or

checks are kept in the Management office, a strong safe

(preferably bolted into the floor) should be used. Collection

windows may be further protected by heavy metal grilles or

bars and alarms which can be readily activated in the event of

robbery. However, one of the best precautions is to avoid

keeping large sums in cash or checks on the premises at any

time.

j\. Hallways and stairs should be susceptible of easy

surveillance. Open design is generally desirable, and all

such areas should be well-lighted at all times. As in the

case of elevators, convex mirrors can be used to permit an

approaching view of possible places of concealment. Doors

between fire stairwells and other common areas should be kept

locked from the outside, with hardware to permit emergency

egress only. Vertical-bolt latches or crash bars on the

inside of such doors and automatic door closers are

recommended. Exit alarms provide a local alert upon the

opening of a fire exit door, but have the same weakness as all

local alarms \-- the necessity for prompt response and the

problem of nuisance and credibility.

k\. Roofs merit attention, because of their potential as avenues

of escape or access and as isolated areas which may be used

for such offenses as drug abuse, assault, and rape. In

addition, easy access to the roof presents a safety hazard to

children. At the same time, fire safety requirements may

demand that access to the roof be available from fire stairs.

Where this is the case, doors to the roof should nevertheless

be kept locked from the outside, with vertical-bolt latches or

crash bar on the inside to permit emergency egress. However,

if fire

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safety codes permit, such doors should also be kept locked

from the inside. In either event, but especially where ready

egress must be allowed, consideration should be given to

installing exit alarms on these doors, and means for regular

surveillance of roof areas. Rooftop lighting, closed circuit

television,and (to the extent possible) avoidance of

structural elements which provide opportunities for

concealment on the roof are possible options to promote

surveillance.

l\. Interior lighting for common areas within the building

has already been mentioned in connection with several of the

specific types of areas discussed above. However, the

generally applicable principle merits additional emphasis:

all common interior areas should be brightly lighted at all

evening hours when they are subject to ordinary use. For

lobbies, elevators, hallways,and stairwells, this means 24-

hour lighting. Where vandalism is a problem (as is most

likely in lobbies, elevators, hallways,and stairwells),

vandal-resistant lighting fixtures should be installed.

Residents should be requested to make prompt report of

inoperative lights, and maintenance staff should be required

to make frequent lighting inspections and speedy repairs or

replacements. Good lighting for interior common areas is one

of the least expensive of security measures, and missing or

burned-out bulbs are always a mark of poor management.

(Energy conservation measures may impose constraints on

lighting.)

23\. PROTECTING EXTERIOR AREAS OF THE PROJECT. Normally, at

least in housing for families with children, it is infeasible or

undesirable to restrict access to the project\'s grounds to the

same degree as with respect to interior common areas. On the

other hand, in some instances (e.g., all-elderly projects),it may

be both feasible and desirable to extend some degree of a

\"fortress\" strategy to the exterior boundaries of the property.

Again, the choice must depend upon a realistic appraisal of all

the relevant facts. The following options merit consideration in

this connection:

a\. Exterior lighting should be amply provided for all heavily-

used areas, such as walkways, entry areas,and parking lots.

Lighting levels in projects for the elderly should be well in

excess of conventional standards, because light perception

declines with advancing age. High placement of lighting

fixtures results in wider coverage as well as less

susceptibility to vandalism. High intensity lights are well-

suited to large areas, such as parking lots. A variety of

vandal-resistant lighting equipment is now being marketed.

The assistance of lighting engineers or consultants is

recommended. (Energy conservation measures may impose

constraints on lighting.)

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b\. Recreational areas for children and adults merit

individualized treatment, taking account of the particular

use to be made of each, the particular group of users,and

the social patterns of the project and the wider

neighborhood. Generally, areas designed for use by

different age groups (preschool, elementary school,

teenagers, adults) should be sufficiently separated by

space or other barriers to minimize conflicts. However,

all recreational areas should be susceptible to intensive

surveillance from streets and sidewalks, and, if possible,

from the windows of dwellings. In addition, benches on

the perimeter of playgrounds and areas for athletics can

encourage adults to exercise casual surveillance. While

vandalism to playground equipment is a matter of

legitimate concern, hard use of such equipment should be

no cause for discomfort. Particularly, where their

number is high, children \"use up\" playground equipment

during the ordinary course of play, and this is even

desirable as a means of diverting normal youthful energies

from damage to other elements of the property.

c\. Fences and walls may be utilized to channel or restrain

movement, so as to facilitate surveillance and policing.

However, it is seldom feasible to erect complete physical

barriers around the property. More widely appropriate is

the creation of limited exterior zones for use by elderly

residents or small children, with access only by way of an

adjacent building. Fences and walls may be objectionable

to residents. However, if they are well-designed in both

their security and esthetic aspects, it is much easier to

gain resident acceptability.

d\. Approaches to building entrances are particularly prone to

crime, and primary entrances should be near the street.

Routes from parking lots to building entrances should also

be kept short and direct. Dense shrubbery or other

possible places of concealment should be avoided in these

areas. Every opportunity for casual surveillance should

be exploited.

e\. Closed-circuit television can provide effective

surveillance of exterior areas. (See paragraph 24 below.)

24\. CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS. Where other

means of surveillance are inadequate, the potential and

feasibility of closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems should

be explored. While initially costly, CCTV may be more

economical than such alternatives as design modifications or

security patrols, particularly in large projects. However,

Management should exercise great care in deciding whether CCTV

is suitable, workable, and cost-effective for the particular

project. The following points are pertinent in this

connection:

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a\. CCTV equipment of great variety in quality and cost is now on the

market, and choice of equipment as well as the manner of its use

should be carefully studied. Expert independent advice is

essential before any purchase is made. All equipment should meet

the standards of the Electronic Industries Association for CCTV.

b\. Monitoring and response components are critical to the

effectiveness of CCTV systems. Accordingly, a well-planned,

well-trained and well-supervised personnel adjunct is essential.

Regular police or project security personnel, or both, might be

relied upon for dispatch to the scene of an offense, but there

should always be a Management intermediary to monitor the system

on a continuous basis and obtain prompt dispatch.

c\. Repairs of CCTV equipment must be given emergency priority.

Breakdowns do worse than producing lapses in surveillance. They

can also create a false sense of security or undermine the

credibility of the system.

d\. Camera locations should concentrate on particularly vulnerable

areas within buildings and grounds. Lobbies and elevators are

prime locations. Remote pan and tilt mechanisms enable one

camera to scan a large area. Protection against vandalism is an

important consideration.

e\. Available lighting virtually dictates the type, and therefore

the cost, of the camera needed to produce an image of adequate

quality, and the cost of additional lighting must be balanced

against the higher cost of more light-sensitive cameras.

f\. In-apartment monitoring by residents, by means of their own

television sets, is possible by connecting CCTV equipment to a

master antenna system within a building. Residents can be given

the option of tuning into unused television channels to monitor

the lobby, elevator, playground,and parking lot. While this

does not assure continuous monitoring, in large buildings it can

provide considerable back-up to the Management monitor. A

microphone system can be added, permitting communication between

the apartment and children at the playground or callers at the

lobby entrance. The residents\' organization might organize a

voluntary monitoring program, with certain residents taking

responsibilities for watching the CCTV image in their homes

during specific hours.

g\. Widespread knowledge of how a CCTV system operates is desirable,

provided the system is genuinely effective. If the potential

offender knows of such features as in-apartment monitoring, the

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SECURITY PLANNING FOR

CHAPTER 4 HUD-ASSISTED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING

deterrent effect will be strengthened. Therefore,

Management should make every effort to brief residents and

community groups on the system, and encourage people to

spread the information as widely as possible. Notices posted

outside buildings and in the lobby may help to get the

message across.

25\. MAINTENANCE. Strong physical security depends to an important

degree upon good maintenance. Management\'s maintenance staff

must be thoroughly trained in maintenance of security hardware

and equipment, and repairs must be effected promptly.

Continuous serviceability of all security hardware and design

elements is essential to build and maintain resident confidence,

to enhance their subjective sense of security, to prevent a

false sense of security and, of course, to present a credible

deterrent to would-be offenders. Both residents and maintenance

staff must be instructed to report maintenance needs in both

common areas and individual units. Regular maintenance

inspections should cover all security features. Even with

respect to special equipment beyond the repair capabilities of

regular maintenance personnel (e.g., electronic alarm or CCTV

equipment), such personnel should be trained to identify and

report deficiencies.

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