Transcript of

Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns

Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton

Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt

Regarding Federal Preparedness for Avian Flu

Washington D.C.

March 20, 2006

SEC. MIKE JOHANNS: Well, good afternoon, everyone. I\'ll go ahead and
get us started here. I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation
to Secretaries Norton and to Leavitt for joining me today to talk about
avian influenza or "bird flu" as it is commonly referred to. We are
prepared today to discuss our expectations, our preparedness, and what
we are doing to enhance our early warning system.\
\
We wanted to address you together because we have been planning
together, and we each have an important role to play in our country\'s
preparedness.\
\
With the aggressive spread of bird flu overseas, we believe it is
important for us to update the American people on our efforts to prepare
and to protect the United States.\
\
First I\'d like to discuss just for a moment the role of the media as we
talk about the likelihood of a detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus
in the United States. Reporters covering the story of course have
enormous power, the power to choose between words that would cause panic
or words that inspire very calm preparations.\
\
With that power, of course, comes responsibility. Never before has it
been more important for you to help the American people understand a
very complex but vitally important animal health and public health
issue.\
\
Clear and comprehensive reporting of this story will make the difference
between informing and alarming the public. We stand before you today
confident that there is no need to alarm the public, but there is a need
to inform the public.\
\
The American people deserve the facts. They need accurate information
about where the threat exists and where it does not exist. The fact is
that a detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus in birds in the United
States would not constitute a reason for panic. That\'s an important
message that we leave with you today.\
\
The nation depends on you to tell the story with the highest possible
levels of accuracy and precision.\
\
I want to thank all of the reporters covering this story in advance for
taking very seriously the tremendous responsibility that you have. Your
reporting much more than our words will determine whether we are
successful in preparing the public without causing panic.\
\
How can we be so confident there is no need for panic? We\'ll answer
that question today and explain how we are strengthening our early
warning system.\
\
We are closely monitoring the rapid spread of the H5N1 virus overseas,
and we now believe it is likely that we will detect it within our
borders in the United States. It is critically important for the
American public to understand that a detection of this virus in birds
does not signal the start of a pandemic among people.\
\
We feel very strongly about delivering that message now to the American
people to prevent unnecessary panic if and when H5N1 virus is detected.
Allow me to repeat that if I could. A detection of the highly pathogenic
H5N1 virus in birds does not signal the start of a human pandemic. The
rapid spread of the virus does signal that the time is now to expand our
early warning system, and that\'s what we are doing together.\
\
In recent weeks we have discussed our plan to expand the monitoring and
testing of migratory birds. I\'m pleased to report that earlier today
the plan was finalized, clearing the way for its implementation.\
\
For those of you who might not know, I\'ll take just a moment to explain
our departments' respective roles. The Department of the Interior
monitors wild bird populations through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the U.S. Geological Survey and the National Park Service.
USDA also has a connection to wild birds through our Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service as well as our Agricultural Research Service.\
\
The Department of Health and Human Services is a part of this effort
because we all recognize a line exists between protecting animal health
and protecting human health. We work together. If I were to boil it down
to its most simple terms, I would say that Interior is heavily involved
with wild birds. USDA\'s main focus is domestic flocks and HHS zeros in
on human health.\
\
So to provide an overview of the wild bird surveillance plan, it is my
pleasure to introduce Secretary Gale Norton of the Department of
Interior. Gale?\
\
SEC. GALE NORTON: Good afternoon. First I want to reiterate what
Secretary Johanns said. We are working together to expand our early
warning system, but the arrival of the H5N1 strain of highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus in birds is an eventuality that should be viewed
in context.\
\
It is increasingly likely that we will detect the highly pathogenic H5N1
strain of avian flu in birds within the U.S. borders possibly as early
as this year. The Department of the Interior has been detecting avian
influenza strains in wildlife for many years. We know that there are
many strains of bird flu routinely circulating in migratory birds. Most
of those viruses are at the low pathogenic variety that pose minimal
risk to poultry and none to people.\
\
However, when a virus mutates or mixes with another avian influenza
virus it occasionally can become highly pathogenic, causing higher
fatality rates in birds. Highly pathogenic avian influenzas have been
detected in domestic poultry three times in this country, most recently
in 2004 when the outbreak was quickly confined to a single flock.\
\
No wild bird infections were reported in connection with the 2004
outbreak. There are a number of ways that avian influenza virus can be
carried from one place to another \-- by people, by commercial birds, by
smuggled wildlife, by equipment, and by wild migratory birds. And they
may also play a role in the virus transmission.\
\
We are uncertain of the extent of wild birds\' role in the spread of the
current lethal virus, but we do know that wild birds are often victims
of the virus. In Europe unusual deaths of swans and other wild birds
were an early indication of the arrival of the highly pathogenic strain
of H5N1.\
\
The wild migratory birds can provide both a possible pathway through
which highly pathogenic H5N1 strain can be brought to North America and
an indicator of its arrival here. Therefore the nation needs a robust
system to monitor and detect the virus in wild birds as part of an
effective early warning system.\
\
The Interagency Strategic Plan we are unveiling today does that by
providing a unified national framework of survey priorities, methods,
and data management. In developing this plan the Department of the
Interior and the Department of Agriculture worked with the Department of
Health and Human Services, the International Association of Fish and
Wildlife Agencies, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and
representatives of other state wildlife, animal health, and public
health agencies.\
\
Effective early warning will involve the coordinated work of many
agencies and cooperators across the country, especially federal and
state wildlife agencies.\
\
Migratory birds carry the highly pathogenic H5N1 or a similarly
dangerous virus to the United States. It\'s most likely to arrive first
via the Pacific Islands or Alaska. I\'d like to take a moment to
describe this map of migratory bird flyways.\
\
As we see here, there are species of migratory birds that spend the
wintertime in Asia and in these areas, and then in the spring they
travel to Alaska and nest in that area. So this is a pathway for birds
that is flown by a number of species.\
\
We also see a pathway that comes from Europe and goes into North America
through Canada. There are many, many fewer birds that fly on the Europe
route, and so it is much more likely that birds reaching the United
States would be coming through this route from Asia.\
\
Birds would nest in the spring and summer in Alaska and would mingle
with birds that might be coming from the United States through our
pathways and flyways here.\
\
And so it is during that mixing that we would most likely see birds that
would then go into the Lower 48 United States.\
\
The early detection plan prioritizes our efforts to focus on Alaska,
elsewhere in the Pacific flyways, and in the Pacific Islands. We are
also working and we also, as you can see from this map, will be sampling
birds throughout Alaska in a number of locations. And those are chosen
in part to coincide with the places that are used by nesting by those
species that are most likely also found in Asia.\
\
We are working with wildlife leaders in the Central flyway, the
Mississippi flyway, and the Atlantic flyway of the Lower 48.\
\
These areas will have plans in place, and their activities might be
increased depending on the circumstances.\
\
The Interagency Strategic Plan establishes a comprehensive framework for
early detection of the highly pathogenic strain of H5N1 in wild birds.
The plan uses five major strategies\-- testing wild birds that are sick
or have died; sample testing of live wild birds; sample testing of
hunter-killed birds; monitoring and testing of sentinel animals; and
testing of environmental samples.\
\
Interior and its partners including state Fish and Game agencies
routinely investigate when groups of wild birds become sick or die. This
happens quite frequently. There are many instances every year when
groups of birds become sick or die for a variety of different causes.
The systematic investigation of sick or dead wild birds offers the
highest and earliest probability of detecting the high path H5N1 strain.
The strategy expands existing programs conducted by Interior and its
partners to investigate disease outbreaks.\
\
Testing of live, apparently healthy, wild birds will target those
species that represent the highest risk of being exposed to or infected
with high pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza. We would first focus on the
species that migrate to Alaska from Asia. This strategy uses capture and
sampling to detect the presence of the virus. Birds are not killed in
this process. A sample is taken by swabbing. The strategy also
capitalizes on current research activities of Interior, USDA, and other
partners.\
\
To supplement the samples from live wild birds, we will do targeted
sampling of hunter- killed birds at check stations operated by the Fish
and Wildlife Service and state natural resource agencies. Samples from
these species will be collected at hunter check stations in Alaska and
the Lower 48 during hunting seasons in areas where these birds gather
during migration or over-wintering.\
\
Samples will also be collected from wild birds taken by Alaska natives
during the spring subsistence hunt. Monitoring and testing of sentinel
animals includes poultry flocks reared in backyards. They can be
monitored for diseases of interest in nearby commercial poultry
operators. Also waterfowl can be placed in wetland environments where
they can commingle with wild birds. The ducks are then monitored and
tested for avian influenza viruses.\
\
Environmental sampling monitors water and/or fecal samples from
waterfowl habitat. They can provide evidence of avian influenza type
circulating in wild bird habitats, specific subtypes, and the levels of
pathogenicity.\
\
Using these strategies and techniques, field specialists and wildlife
biologists from several federal and state agencies, universities, and
nongovernmental organizations plan to collect between 75,000 and 100,000
samples from live and dead wild birds in 2006.\
\
Coordinated collaborative efforts are critically important to
effectively carrying out this work.\
\
The USGS, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and USDA are now working with
the four migratory bird Flyway Councils to translate the interagency
strategic plan into flyway and state-specific sampling plans. These
flyway plans and state plans will identify what bird species or
populations should be targeted, what survey methods would be most
appropriate to employ, and what geographic areas should be surveyed.
This will enable us to focus the collective efforts of federal, state,
and other cooperators in the most effective manner.\
\
Testing of all the collected samples will be carried out by a number of
federal, state, and university veterinary laboratories that are licensed
to test for this virus. Testing will follow a strict protocol to ensure
that timely, accurate, and consistent information is disseminated to
appropriate officials and to the public.\
\
Under federal laboratory testing programs, initial tests may indicate
the presence of a strain of avian influenza of concern that these
initial tests are considered presumptive, not definitive. Identical
samples from the presumptive tests are sent to the USDA National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, for additional testing and
official confirmation.\
\
A presumptive test indicates H5N1. These results will be shared with the
appropriate federal, state, and local officials and the public. Each
government agency can initiate its appropriate response based on the
circumstances in the particular situations. In many cases this response
may simply be further monitoring.\
\
We anticipate that presumptive H5N1 results may be announced 20 to 100
times this year. Those initial tests do not tell us whether it is highly
pathogenic or whether it is of the low pathogen variety. We will not
know that information until tests are completed that take another five
to ten days to perform.\
\
During this wait, the press and the public will need to realize two
things\-- first, that this is a disease of birds and not humans at this
point; finding a bird with the disease does not signal a pandemic.\
\
It is quite possible that we could have dozens of H5N1 reports with none
turning out to be the highly pathogenic variety. These low pathogenic
viruses do not even cause particular problems for birds and are not
relevant to human influenza concerns. If the Ames Lab confirms the
occurrence of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, those initial
response actions will either be sustained, expanded, or
modified---again, in cooperation with affected federal, state and local
officials.\
\
We must avoid handling preliminary information in a way that would cause
undue concern, while striving for timely, transparent results getting
into the hands of responsible people, officials, and the public.\
\
If at some future point the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza is
detected in wild migratory birds in North America, we will also consult
with state Fish and Wildlife agency partners, the agricultural health
community, and the public health community to determine whether and how
that might affect the sport hunting of waterfowl.\
\
How we respond will be determined by the facts of the particular
situation. That being said, I want to emphasize the current scientific
consensus that the primary risk to human health is not from human
interaction with wild birds. Experts currently believe that limiting
opportunities for domestic poultry to come in contact with wild birds is
a more effective disease management strategy in closing waterfowl
seasons or otherwise restricting human contact with wild birds.\
\
Hunters should always practice common sense sanitary practices in
handling, cleaning, and preparing wild fowl. Cooking kills the virus.
USGS, National Wildlife Health Center issued guidelines for proper
handling of wild birds to provide good common-sense guidance. Thus far
there have been no cases reported of humans contacting the disease from
contact with wild birds.\
\
It\'s also important to note that the World Health Organization and
Animal Health authorities throughout the world do not currently believe
that culling wild birds is an effective means to control avian
influenza. Interior is working with its state and federal partners to
coordinate contingency plans so that we can rapidly gather the relevant
facts, test the situation with the appropriate parties, and reach a
decision on these issues should a disease outbreak occur in North
America.\
\
In conclusion, let me return to Secretary Johanns\' message. Discovery
of the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus in migratory birds in Alaska or in
other parts of North America will not be a reason for panic. It will not
signal the beginnings of a pandemic. Based on the spread of this virus
in Asia, Europe and into Africa we expect it to show up in North America
at some point possibly this year.\
\
The Interagency Surveillance Strategy is designed to help us find the
disease as soon as possible after it enters North America and then take
the appropriate steps to protect the public health. Thank you.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Thank you, Gale. I do want to, if I might, acknowledge
your recent announcement that you\'ll be leaving your Department. And I
wanted to take this moment to just say thank you for your service to our
country. We are especially grateful for Gale\'s leadership in the
assistance in the development of this plan and we\'re very proud at USDA
to be a partner with the Department of Interior in this effort.\
\
We have actually been testing wild migratory birds for more than 15
years at the USDA. That dates back to 1998 \[not 1988\], and we\'ve been
doing that in partnership with the universities. In fact, we\'ve tested
more than 12,000 migratory birds in the Alaska Flyway and nearly 4,000
in the Atlantic Flyway.\
\
As our researchers can tell you, we frequently find the common strains
of avian influenza in the birds we test, especially in the wild bird
populations, which brings us to a very important point. There are two
very different types of avian influenza.\
\
To understand the potential threat related to an outbreak of AI it is
important to know that the two types are really very different from each
other. Low path AI is as common as the human flu, and sometimes it
isn\'t even noticeable in birds. Now high path strains of AI like H5N1
circulating in Asia and Europe are easily transmitted between birds and
typically they are fatal to birds.\
\
This distinction must be understood because there is also a low path
variety of H5N1.\
\
So we could find a bird with H5N1 and it could be a harmless strain of
the virus. This low path H5N1 has been detected both in Canada and in
the United States, and it\'s referred to as the North American H5N1.
Again, the low path North American H5N1 is not a cause for broad
concern.\
\
There\'s another important distinction to make. A detection of the more
dangerous high path H5N1 in wild birds would not mean that commercial
poultry\-- that is, birds raised for consumption \-- would be affected.
The U.S. poultry industry is much better positioned to deal with bird
flu than many countries currently affected by the high path H5N1 virus.\
\
There are two reasons why I can confidently make this statement. One,
our industry is very consolidated. In many of the countries struggling
with the virus, chickens are commonly raised in yards and even inside
houses. In the United States, chickens, turkeys, and eggs produced for
human consumption are typically raised in very controlled environments.\
\
Secondly, biosecurity practices have been a part of the business of
raising poultry in the United States for decades, literally decades. The
vast majority of our commercial poultry producers raise their chickens
and turkeys in covered structures with controlled access.\
\
Having said that, if the virus did reach a commercial poultry flock, we
do have experience dealing with it, even the more dangerous strains of
it. Some people are surprised to learn that we have responded to high
path AI three times in domestic poultry in the United States\-- during
the 1920s, the 1980s and again just two years ago. In the most recent
case, USDA teamed up with state experts and confined the virus to one
flock.\
\
Another reason the United States is well positioned in terms of response
capabilities is the cooperation that we have with the industry. U.S.
poultry producers understand the importance of wiping out this virus the
moment that it is detected. This is a \$29 billion industry in the U.S.
and our producers are as eager as we are to protect the safety of our
poultry.\
\
An important point. Producers know they will be compensated for
destroyed birds. Our producers have demonstrated that they will call us
at the first sign of sick birds knowing that with high path strains of
bird flu we reimburse them for the birds that we destroy.\
\
So unlike what we have seen in some countries where producers are
reluctant to report the virus because of economic loss, our producers
know their loss will be covered if they call us. If the virus does reach
a commercial flock, we would quickly take action to eliminate the virus
following a very, very detailed response plan.\
\
If I were to reduce our response to a few simple steps they would be
this. One, we would immediately establish a quarantine area around the
infected birds and restrict movement into and out of that area to
prevent the further spread of the virus.\
\
Two, we would humanely destroy the birds and disinfect the area.\
\
Three, we would step up testing throughout the region to ensure that the
virus does not spread.\
\
And fourth, the quarantine would be lifted only when tests confirm that
the area is free of the virus.\
\
A close relationship with state and local experts ensures that we can
rapidly dispatch experts to the scene. We have 400 USDA veterinarians in
a network of nearly 3,000 animal health workers across the country who
are prepared to respond if needed. We have the capability to run as many
as 18,000 tests per day, the combined capacity of our Ames, Iowa, lab
with an established network of 39 laboratories across the United States.
We are also prepared to protect healthy birds outside the quarantine
area with 40 million bird vaccines stockpiled and additional 70 million
in production.\
\
As we talk about preparing for the high path H5N1 to be detected here, I
don\'t want anyone to assume that we are backing away from our efforts
overseas. In fact we\'re stepping up assistance to countries that have
been impacted by the virus. We have sent our scientists to the scene of
outbreaks in countries to lend their expertise.\
\
They are assisting with everything from education to eradication. We are
working as a part of an international team delivering assistance to
those countries in hopes of limiting the spread.\
\
Here at home we also protect our borders. We have talked about the
potential for wild birds to bring high path H5N1 to the U.S., but there
are other possible sources of introduction, and we have protections in
place to address them. We prohibit the importation of poultry from
countries where the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus has been detected in
the commercial poultry.\
\
USDA quarantines and tests all live birds imported from other countries
other than Canada, except returning U.S. origin pet birds, which are
examined and then allowed to undergo home quarantine.\
\
We also have a smuggling interdiction team that works with the
Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection to
prevent illegal entry of birds from other countries.\
\
If you leave here today remembering nothing else that I tell you, I hope
you\'ll remember two points. One, a detection of the high path H5N1
virus does not signal the start of a pandemic. The virus is not easily
transmitted person to person. People who have become ill in other
countries have had direct contact with infected birds.\
\
Two, properly prepared poultry is safe to eat. A detection of H5N1
should not cause a loss of confidence in the safety of poultry. It is
highly unlikely that an infected bird would enter the food supply, but
even if it did proper cooking kills the AI virus just as it does other
viruses and bacteria, so there\'s no reason to be concerned about eating
chicken or turkey if you\'ve properly prepared it. As always, we have
guidelines on our website.\
\
With that, I\'d like to introduce someone who has really worked
tirelessly to encourage preparedness, Secretary Mike Leavitt has
traveled the country conducting state summits, always careful to point
out that this virus might or might not evolve into a form that can be
passed from person to person.\
\
I recently joined him at a summit; I was very impressed. So I\'m pleased
to invite to the podium the Secretary of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Mike Leavitt.\
\
SEC. MIKE LEAVITT: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. May I just say much has
been said already about the potential of H5N1 in birds. Our theme today
I think could well be expressed in two words, planning and in
perspective.\
\
At this point if you are a bird it\'s a pandemic. If you\'re a human
being, it\'s not. Simple as that.\
\
However, we are not excused from concern. While there\'s no evidence
that the virus is passing from person to person, we do see this virus
circulating in birds all over the world. It is a highly lethal virus
when it gets into human beings, and there is no human immunity. The
virus is constantly changing, like other viruses. We know that it can
affect people who come in close contact with birds or who handle
infected poultry. It has killed thus far 98 people in the world, and it
has a mortality rate of about 50 percent.\
\
Scientists are rightly concerned that this H5N1 virus looks very similar
genetically to the virus of the Spanish Flu of 1918, not just
genetically but it presents itself clinically in a way that\'s very
similar to that virus.\
\
The truth is, pandemics happen. We have had ten pandemics in the last
300 years. We have had three pandemics in the last 100 years. That\'s
the reason that the President has called on the nation to prepare. He\'s
laid out the national strategy that\'s been discussed already, and he
has asked Congress for \$7.1 billion emergency supplemental
appropriation, half of which has been granted, and we look forward to
discussions in Congress about the next half.\
\
My colleagues have mentioned the precautions that are being taken for
birds and wild birds and domestic flocks. I would like also to mention
to you the five major areas of preparation that we have with respect to
humans. The first is monitoring the disease, developing vaccines,
stockpiling countermeasures, coordinating state and local preparedness,
and working on ways to talk about this effectively to give people a
sense of perspective and planning.\
\
First let me mention the disease monitoring. Think of the world if you
will as a vast forest that is susceptible to fire. A spark if allowed to
burn will emerge as an uncontainable fire. That\'s a pandemic. If we are
there when the spark happens, it can be squelched. But if allowed to
burn for a time it begins to spread uncontrollably.\
\
So we are building a network of monitoring all over the world. We\'re
working to cooperate with nations in vigilance so that we can determine
when and if this virus should spread.\
\
Second objective I mentioned is vaccines. We need vaccines. I say
vaccines in the plural because the H5N1 virus is in fact evolving. Our
scientists are working to develop vaccines. In addition to vaccines,
we\'ll obviously need a way to manufacture them and distribute them. Our
objective is to have the capacity to generate 300 million courses of a
vaccine within a period of six months after the virus has been isolated.
We do not have that capacity today. We anticipate within three to five
years we will.\
\
The third objective is stockpiling antiviral medications. This month
earlier we announced contracts totaling \$275 million for additional
purchases of antivirals such as Tamiflu. Tamiflu is one antiviral
medicine that in some situations has a positive impact after a person
becomes ill. We are on track to meet our nation\'s goal of having 25
percent of our population or Tamiflu for up to that number. We will
reach 26 million courses by the end of 2006.\
\
In addition, we\'re stockpiling other assets such as masks and
ventilators and so forth.\
\
A pandemic involves much more than just public health officials. This is
a matter that requires the attention of elected political leaders, of
employers, of school leaders, of healthcare leaders, of the media \--
all need to be engaged and actively involved.\
\
Local preparedness is the foundation of pandemic readiness. Any
community that fails to prepare with the expectation that the federal
government will at the last moment be able to come to the rescue will be
tragically wrong, not because the federal government lacks will, not
because we lack wallet, but because there is no way in which 5,000
different communities can be responded to simultaneously, which is a
unique characteristic of a human pandemic.\
\
We have begun to hold pandemic planning summits. We have held them in
half of the states, and in the next two months we will hold the balance.
We are also creating checklists. Checklists have been issued thus far
for businesses, for state and local governments, for schools, for health
organizations, for faith organizations, for community organizations, for
individuals and for families. They can be found on pandemicflu.gov,
which is a comprehensive website for the U.S. government.\
\
Now it has been mentioned before, but let me emphasize it \--
preparedness starts with good communication. We must learn to speak
about this in ways that will inform but not

We need to speak openly and candidly and honestly about this. One of the
dilemmas of dealing with a pandemic is: anything that\'s said before a
pandemic happens seems alarmist. Anything we have done after it starts
seems inadequate. Therefor, talking about it early, preparing, but
keeping perspective is the important objective.\
\
Preparation is a continuum; every day we need to get better prepared.
We\'re better prepared today than we were a day ago; and we\'ll be
better prepared tomorrow than we are today. A continuum of preparation.
We must learn to speak about this in ways that will inform but not
inflame. In a fashion that inspires us to prepare not to panic.

SEC. JOHANNS: With that, we would be happy to take your questions. If I
could just offer a few thoughts of instruction, I would ask that you
step to one of the microphones. There\'s one in each aisle. If you do
have a question you might indicate who you want the question directed
to.\
\
I should mention also that we will first answer any questions posed by
those joining us physically here in the auditorium. Then we\'ll move to
the USDA Broadcast Center to respond to questions from reporters that
have joined us on the telephone. So we\'ll take questions here, and then
after a short delay just to change locations we will follow that up with
a second question and answer period for those who are on the telephone.\
\
So with that, the first question.\
\
REPORTER: Good afternoon. I\'m Carl Roshell, Global National. And a
Canadian question, if you will, since many of these birds either fly
through Canada coming south or come from Canada, is the U.S. talking
with Canada about the bird flu, the potential bird flu epidemic? And
what sort of discussions have you had? What sort of plans are you
working out with the Canadians?\
\
Probably to Secretary Norton, but perhaps all three of you would chip
in.\
\
SEC. NORTON: Yes, we are talking with them. They would obviously be the
ones who would have the first monitoring responsibility for any birds
that might be coming from Europe through the usual pathways there. We
would be working with them, and we do routinely coordinate with them on
migratory birds issues and would continue to do so. We will be
coordinating with them as we further move through our planning effort as
well as coordinating with them on our monitoring as we find results.\
\
REPORTER: Their surveillance plan does start about a month later than
the U.S. plan. Does that concern you at all?\
\
SEC. NORTON: They routinely do monitoring as we do. They may not be
stepping things up quite as quickly. All of these decisions are made on
a scientific basis, depending on particular species of birds and when
they do their ordinary migrations.\
\
REPORTER: But you\'re satisfied with the Canadian plans?\
\
SEC. NORTON: To the extent that I know about it, they have been very
responsible partners in working with us on so many migratory bird
issues. And we anticipate continuing that working relationship.\
\
REPORTER: Thank you.\
\
REPORTER: Hi. I\'m Jeff Young. I work for an NPR program called "Living
On Earth." You\'ve all stressed the importance of openly and candidly
communicating as this progresses. But of course the administration does
not have the best reputation when it comes to openly and candidly
communicating science, so in other matters\--for example climate change
and ignoring the advice of science Advisory Committees on clean air
issues for example. There\'s a long list I\'m sure you\'re aware of. Are
you concerned at all that you have undermined public trust in your
ability to openly and candidly communicate science?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: I\'ll offer a thought on that. No, I am not. I appreciate
your statement there, but I will tell you that in my experience in
working with consumers, and we deal with food health issues on an
ongoing basis, I find consumers rely upon our information. They access
our information. They make buying decisions based upon the information
we have out there.\
\
I can tell you and I think I speak for all of the departments here, when
it comes to human health issues they are at the forefront of what we do.
In terms of information we put out, I think you can see in how we\'ve
handled other issues that we are very transparent. Oftentimes I\'ll
receive information on testing, and 10 minutes later it will be out
there in the media\'s hands with our explanation as to what the testing
indicated.\
\
So again, I appreciate your statement. You\'ve had an opportunity here
to make it, but quite honestly I think at the USDA we handle that much
differently than what your statement would indicate.\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: I would also mention that we have been working
internationally with nations all over the world to create a network of
transparency and cooperation. Over 90 countries have responded to the
President\'s call to work on an international basis in developing the
network of monitoring that I\'ve spoken of earlier. It\'s clear that
working with the World Health Organization that\'s an essential part of
being able to identify at the earliest possible moment when such an
event would occur.\
\
SEC. NORTON: From the Interior perspective, we are working very closely
with scientists who are in state organizations as well as federal
organizations. We will be meeting with biologists and Fish and Wildlife
Agency officials from all of the states in the coming week and
anticipate that they will be very actively involved in our process as we
go along.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Next question.\
\
REPORTER: Yes. I\'m Sally Schuff. I\'m with Feedstuffs. My question is
for Secretary Johanns. In the event of a high path H5N1 outbreak in the
United States, do we have a vaccination plan for poultry? And if so, do
we have a stockpile of vaccines readily available to answer that need?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: If we experience a case of high path H5N1 in the United
States, you will see us handle it very aggressively. We believe that the
best approach is to deal with\--that instant\--with the four steps that
I outlined. We will cordon off the area, movements in and out will be
prohibited and monitored. The other thing we will do is, we will destroy
the poultry. We will then test in that area to make sure that we\'ve
gotten rid of the virus and we will disinfect.\
\
There are instances where we might use the vaccine to, in effect, to
build a rim around an infected area, but our preference is to be much
more aggressive and just simply eradicate the birds, eliminate the
virus, do the disinfectant, and literally end it right there.\
\
So we believe that\'s a much more aggressive and much more direct way of
dealing with the virus.\
\
REPORTER: This can be directed to Secretary Leavitt. The most recent
disaster that hit this country that required the coordination of state,
local and federal governments was Hurricane Katrina. And can we expect
if a pandemic should hit this country, can we expect the response to be
similar to that of Katrina or a better response?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: Well, let me describe some of the lessons that I believe
were learned from Katrina about pandemics. The first is that what
happens before a disaster is a prominent importance in being able to
assure that damage is minimized.\
\
The second is, you have to think about the unthinkable, because often it
occurs.\
\
The third lesson I would point to is, how much different a pandemic is
from any other natural disaster.\
\
nI Katrina we saw major portions of Louisiana, big pieces of Mississippi
and some of Alabama, but at least it was constrained to those three
states.\
\
I walked through medical shelter after medical shelter for weeks after
and saw people who came from all over America to help them. That could
not and would not happen in a pandemic. Why? Because they would be in
their homes either handling the same dilemma or preparing to handle the
same dilemma. In other words, a pandemic is different than anything we
have dealt with before in terms of natural disasters. And consequently
local preparedness will be of paramount importance. The national
government clearly has a role. I laid them out\-- vaccines, antivirals,
working to develop stockpiles, and assisting state and local
governments.\
\
We\'re working through a whole series of actions that we\'ve at least
highlighted today: preparation.\
\
Now I will tell you straight out, no one in the world is well prepared
for a pandemic. We\'re better prepared now than we were before, and
we\'ll be better prepared in the future than we are now. But it\'s a
continuum of preparation.\
\
REPORTER: Mr. Secretary, Bill Tomson with Dow Jones. Secretary Johanns,
officials at USDA have been saying for quite some time that the best way
to head this disease off is to fight it at its source. Is it too late to
fight at its source, where it has become endemic in countries such as
Asia, especially with much of the lion's share of the funding has gone
to the human side rather than the poultry side?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Well, we\'re doing all of what you suggest. As you know
we\'re partnering with foreign groups. FAO would be a good example. If
we\'re asked for assistance we go to where the virus has been found, we
assist countries that are seeking our help, and we reach out to them.\
\
The one thing about this virus though that we have to be mindful of, and
it\'s what we spoke about today, this virus can be spread by migratory
birds. And it\'s like I said a few weeks ago, there\'s none of us that
can build a cage around the United States. These migratory birds have
been flying this pathway for a long time, and they\'re going to continue
to do that.\
\
So we have to be prepared to deal with the virus here. We\'re preparing
like it\'s going to be here. We can have a great debate about whether it
will or it won\'t, but quite honestly that\'s a debate that I don\'t
believe would be helpful at this point. I think we just have to be
prepared.\
\
We have dealt with it in the past. As you know it has been in the United
States on three occasions. We do have experience with it.\
\
So we\'re doing what you\'re suggesting, but we\'re also recognizing
that we have to be prepared here too.\
\
REPORTER: But is it too late to fight H5N1 there so we don\'t have to
fight it here?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Well there at the moment is in a lot of countries. Bill,
that\'s the issue. And there at the moment is wherever migratory birds
may fly that might have H5N1. I rest my case. I think we need to be
prepared here.\
\
REPORTER: Philip Brasher with the Des Moines Register. A couple of
questions. I understood you said you could contract as many as 20 to 100
presumptive positives this year. If that\'s correct do you plan to
release those, news about those, prior to the confirmatory tests? If you
could go over what your procedure\'s going to be on that?\
\
Number two, I wondered if you, for Secretary Johanns, if you plan any,
do you have any authority to plan any restrictions on flocks that have
access to the outdoors or outdoors? You think, is that something that
you\'ve given any consideration to?\
\
SEC. NORTON: Our current plan is to release that information at the
point we do get presumptive results that indicate H5N1. At that point we
had to make some careful decisions about the right point to release
information. That allows people to begin preparation because at that
point we would not know whether it is high path or low path. We want to
make it clear to people that just by saying that does not indicate that
we have the strain of virus that is causing so much concern in Asia at
this time.\
\
So we want to place in context what release of that information would
mean. And then we would work with people as we get additional
confirmation of that and additional characterization of the disease.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: In reference to your question to me, I can tell you today
there is nothing under consideration that would indicate that we would
somehow bring all the poultry in that may be outside.\
\
Another opportunity though to reinforce a point that I made in my
comments, and that is keep in mind that the arrival of H5N1 in migratory
birds in the United States doesn\'t necessarily mean that it will get in
the domestic flock. It\'s a pretty integrated industry here. The
majority of the birds that we raise here in the United States are in
very large operations that are covered and they\'re housed in that
operation. There are some exceptions to that. We still have some flocks,
kind of the back yard variety if you will, but nothing like what you see
in other countries.\
\
So today that idea is not under consideration.\
\
REPORTER: Hi. Libby Quaid with AP. Question for Secretary Johanns. Would
you please talk about the special concerns, following up on your last
answer facing the organic natural cage-free industry and what
specifically is being done to prepare that segment of the industry?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: They are an excellent industry as you know, Libby. They
are very mindful of what we\'re dealing with, and they just do an
outstanding job with their poultry. The arrival of H5N1 in migratory
birds, again, does not indicate that those birds would be infected or
anything like that. So we work with them on an ongoing basis. Our
relationship with the industry is excellent, and they\'ll make the
preparations that they feel are necessary.\
\
The other thing I would say, compared to our very large poultry
enterprises in many states in the United States, these tend to be on the
smaller side. And again the biosecurity that they put in place really
is\-- they do a good job.\
\
REPORTER: Following up on that, do they have the capability to bring the
birds inside if they need to?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: You know, you have a lot of birds outside. I\'m not sure
how you would even catch them. You know, anybody who grew up on a farm
if you think about catching all those birds that in itself would be a
pretty gigantic task.\
\
REPORTER: Secretary Leavitt, in regards to stockpiling masks and
ventilators, are you aware of the sharp increase of silicosis lawsuits?
And can you comment on how this is expected to negatively impact the
availability of respirator masks in the event of a pandemic outbreak?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: I am aware. We have recently made orders for 100 million
masks; however, we do not anticipate that would be adequate in and of
itself. That\'s another reason that we are dealing with the states and
suggesting to them that a hospital at a time, a clinic at a time, a
school at a time \-- they need to have a plan.\
\
And there are many conditions in the market that could affect that.\
\
REPORTER: Todd Zwilig (sp) with UPI, Public Radio International. I have
a two-part question. Secretary Johanns, you mentioned the federal
government has a reimbursement program so that if poultry producers have
to cull their poultry they get reimbursed, and you mentioned that\'s an
incentive for them to report to you immediately. But that doesn\'t seem
like a significant cost they would confront. The cost of birds is low
compared to the fear and concern that would be spread among the public
so they wouldn\'t buy poultry in the future.\
\
That being the case, what are you doing to guarantee or can you
guarantee that private companies, poultry producers, will report to you
as soon as they know they have a positive bird if they have a positive
bird?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: I\'d probably debate with you the premise of your
question. The premise of your question is that somehow that cost is low
and \--\
\
REPORTER: Not that it\'s low but that the other cost is higher.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Yeah. Here\'s what\'s going to happen. If they have H5N1
their birds are going to die. If they have high path H5N1, I mean that
spreads very aggressively in poultry. We\'ve seen that over and over
again; we\'ve seen it around the world. And they are literally going to
be there with a chicken house full of dead chickens. And it\'s that
straightforward.\
\
They will contact us because we will assure them that we will pay for
the work to be done to destroy those birds. We will compensate them for
the destruction of the birds. So I really strongly debate the premise of
your question.\
\
The other thing I would tell you is, it is a very sophisticated industry
in the United States. They are very concerned about the industry and
making sure that if the virus does land in the commercial flock that it
is eradicated. And we have the way to eradicate it but it does require
destroying the birds.\
\
REPORTER: Secretary Leavitt, one of your priorities throughout this
preparation has been vaccines, and part of that priority has been
security liability protection for vaccine makers. A lot of people on the
Hill, mostly Democrats, have been very upset about the way that
liability protection was achieved. Nobody on the Hill has said there
shouldn\'t be special protection for vaccine makers, but that the
provisions that are now in law were in effect rammed through, and
they\'re much broader than they have to be. Putting the debate aside,
why wasn\'t this done in a way that brought everyone to the table and
has left so many people, so many decision makers at odds with the
administration over how to prepare?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: Vaccine and liability is always a controversial subject. I
met personally with vaccine makers as did the President. For the purpose
of being able to ask what do we have to do in order to ratchet up our
production to meet this objective of having 300 million courses within a
six-month period, they told us there were three things that were
barriers. One was liability. The second was the need for FDA
streamlining the regulatory process. And the third was to assure there
was someone there to buy the vaccine should it be produced.\
\
With respect to the first, Congress did act. We could not begin the
development of vaccines without it. And without respect to our comment
on what the process was, it was a critical part to unlocking the barrier
to solving that problem.\
\
Obviously we\'re working with the FDA on the third problem, but it was a
necessity if we were to have vaccines ready should a pandemic occur.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Yes, sir.\
\
REPORTER: FDA Today announced that they\'re banning extra label use of
some antiviral flu vaccines for birds. I think it\'s Tamiflu mainly that
they\'re talking about. Is this used actually all that often? I mean,
how big a deal is this? Is this something that the poultry producers
even use that often?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: I\'m not actually sure what you\'re referencing. My
technical advisers have any insight into that? That may be something
we\'ll need to get back to you on if it\'s late-breaking news.\
\
REPORTER: Stephanie Deal with Nightly Business Report. You mentioned
that the poultry industry is\-- you seemed to indicate they\'re very
well prepared. Is there anything they still need to do? And more
broadly, how prepared are businesses and what do they still need to do
if there were to be a pandemic?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Like you said biosafety measures for poultry have been in
place a long time, not just related to avian influenza. The industry
started consolidating literally when I was growing up on a farm in the
\'50s and \'60s. We pretty much started to leave the 500-bird flocks to
the very larger flocks and now you go to many parts of the country and
you see the very long houses and a lot of birds are raised there \--
turkey and chickens. So it is an industry that has consolidated over
time, and that\'s what makes it quite a bit different than other parts
of the world.\
\
The rest of the industry, you know we\'ve been working with them for a
long time whether it\'s retail or wholesale or the producers. We\'ve
worked with them on the issues that they faced, and so I just see a
level of preparation there. They are doing testing. So for me it\'s
comforting to see. They are reaching out to us, trying to figure out how
best to be prepared. And so it\'s been a pretty good working
relationship.\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: Can I comment on that?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Yeah.\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: Earlier I indicated there were lessons we learned from
Katrina that can be applied. Some of them pointing out the differences
in a pandemic and other natural disasters. I indicated one of the
differences was that it was constrained to an area.\
\
Second difference is that a pandemic does not occur in two or three days
and then move into recovery like most natural disasters. It goes for a
period of between 12 and 18 months and will happen in waves of between 6
and 8 weeks, twice and sometimes three times.\
\
What that means is, that life has to go on during that entire period of
time, and people have to eat, to make a living, and therefore businesses
are dependent upon to deliver goods and services during that period. It
isn\'t just poultry businesses that need to be planning and preparing.
It\'s every business. They need to ask themselves the question\-- how
would we continue to operate, to serve our customers and the public in
general, if 40 percent of our workforce could not come to work for a two
to four-week period?\
\
That\'s the reason that this planning has to be so deep. It has to go
well beyond public health. It has to be local elected officials,
business leaders, colleges, schools, faith leaders. Everyone needs to be
involved in pandemic planning, not just those who have domestic flocks,
not just those who are hospitals and clinics, but those who are involved
in business in any way serving the public.

SEC. JOHANNS: Yes, sir.\
\
REPORTER: Hi. Seth Lindon at BC Alaska. As you know Alaska is the most
likely point of entry if you will for migratory birds that would be
spreading this disease. And so that said, and based on the fact that you
have a population there that is a subsistence population that
essentially relies on the land for its food and hunts and fishes,
etcetera, it seems inevitable that you\'re going to have some sort of
human contact with this disease at some point.\
\
Why am I perhaps wrong on that? And what reassurances would you offer
particularly to residents in that state who are going to face this it
seems almost inevitably?\
\
SEC. NORTON: If I can start with that, we\'ve worked very closely with
Alaska Fish and Game and have gotten a word out to hunters including
subsistence hunters over the last several months about this process,
about what kinds of precautions they ought to be taking.\
\
Again I reiterate this is a disease of birds at this point. There is not
a recorded case of someone contracting the disease from a wild bird. And
so hunters that take appropriate precautions against this disease as
they would against a variety of other bird diseases should be just fine.
And we\'ve put out information about that.\
\
We do want to do the testing so we can make people aware of anything
that we find. And as we see circumstances develop we can pass that
information along.\
\
At this point we have not yet seen the virus occur in Alaska, and it may
or may not arrive there this spring.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: How about one more here and then one more there and we\'ll
wrap it up?\
\
REPORTER: Carrie Young, Bloomberg News. I just wanted to check. The
Department of Interior will be the agency to announce that there\'s a
case in wild birds, but who would announce if it\'s in a commercial
flock, and who would announce if it\'s in man?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: When it comes to commercial flocks, we would announce
that, and we would follow the same transparent process. As soon as we
had test results we would get them out to the public via the media.\
\
SEC. NORTON: It may or may not be the Department of the Interior that
would be making that first report. We would work with other agencies and
that information would be coming in from a variety of sources.\
\
REPORTER: Which other agencies would be involved?\
\
SEC. NORTON: USDA would be quite involved as well as working with a
variety of state agencies, universities and so forth. But we would work
closely with them as we\'re making our announcements.\
\
REPORTER: And if it\'s in humans?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: It would undoubtedly be the Department of Health and Human
Services and likely through the Centers for Disease Control. But I
should point, make one observation. It is likely that incidents would
first be discovered in a state. And therefore our coordination with
state and local officials is paramount. There are protocols in place but
it is likely we would see a confirmatory announcement made by the
Department of Health and Human Services.\
\
REPORTER: Fran Quisimmis, MSNBC. Are there things that consumers should
know now just to have the sense of protection for themselves so if they
were to come in contact with a dead bird they would highly unlikely that
it was H5N1. Just to have some sense of power over the situation who
they would call, what they would do, how they\'d protect themselves, not
to create a sense of panic but just to have some sense that you would
leave it alone, you would call your local city. Just useful information
that gives people some sense of empowerment.\
\
SEC. NORTON: If someone finds a dead bird first of all, an individual
dead bird is no cause for concern. That happens all the time. If people
want to call someone, they could call a state Fish and Game agency or a
local public health agency. People should not touch the bird. If they
want to handle it, wearing gloves and putting it into a plastic bag
might be the best way to deal with it.\
\
If there are large numbers of birds or a significant number of birds
that are dead, that can be caused by a variety of different things as
well. We have cases of botulism or of parasites or of other types of
avian diseases that can cause the death of birds. We investigate those
routinely, and that would be a situation where we would be working with
local Fish and Wildlife agencies.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Okay, everyone. Thank you very, very much for being here
today. We appreciate it.\
\
MODERATOR: Good afternoon and welcome to the continuation of the media
briefing on avian influenza. I\'m Larry Quinn speaking to you from the
Broadcast Center at the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Washington. As
we continue our question period this afternoon we remind reporters that
if you\'d like to ask a question you should press \*1 on your telephone
touchpad. That will alert us that you have a question.\
\
Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, Interior Secretary Gale Norton, and
Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt are here in the studio
to receive your questions. Now we\'re ready to begin. And our first
question comes from Miriam Falco of CNN. Miriam, go ahead, please. Not
hearing from Miriam, we\'ll go on to Jeremy Grant of Financial Times.
Barry Sleckter from Ft. Worth Star Telegram. Barry?\
\
REPORTER: When would be the earliest any infected migratory birds would
arrive on U.S. flyways? Would it be this fall or this winter or this
summer?\
\
MODERATOR: Barry, could you repeat that question one more time, please?\
\
REPORTER: Yes, can you hear me?\
\
MODERATOR: Yes. Go ahead, Barry.\
\
REPORTER: This is for Secretary Norton. Could she give us an idea when
possibly the earliest any infected migratory birds would arrive via U.S.
flyways? And for Secretary Johanns, is there any greater concern for the
free range poultry facilities? And are there any different protocols for
handling them differently from the large commercial chicken houses?\
\
SEC. NORTON: The migratory birds would be coming from Asia and arriving
in Alaska starting some time in April, and so we might begin picking up
positive test results in Alaska at that point in time. It\'s important
to note that those birds, the birds that are coming from Asia go back to
Asia. And so it would only be if they would then infect birds that are
from the Lower 48 who would then be going to the Lower 48 later in the
summer and fall.\
\
And so that is the most likely timeframe. If it did not happen this
year, next year would be the time we\'d be looking at those similar
schedules as the most likely timeframes for migratory waterfowl.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: In reference to your question about free range birds, just
a couple of points I would make. As you know and as I mentioned a couple
of times during our media briefing, this is a very consolidated
industry, so large majority of our birds are now raised under cover. We
do have, we still do have some free range birds that are raised outside
if you will, or they have access to a building but also can get
outside.\
\
We have a program that\'s called biosecurity for birds, and this
industry has worked very, very hard in making sure that they have
biosecurity items in place. The industry is very attentive. We\'ve seen
them work very hard. And then the other thing I would mention in terms
of just the human health issue, as we\'ve mentioned so many times,
properly prepared and cooked poultry kills the virus.\
\
So whether it was raised free range, whether it was raised in a
building, the message is still the same\-- properly prepare and cook
your poultry and you\'re not going to get sick. It is safe to eat
poultry because the virus is destroyed by cooking.\
\
MODERATOR: Our next question comes from Daniel Goldstein from Bloomberg
News. Dan?\
\
REPORTER: Yes. Hi. Thanks very much for taking my call. This question I
guess is for the Secretary of Agriculture. Mr. Secretary, Secretary
Norton did say that she expected about 25 to 100 presumptive positives.
Am I to presume that the USDA\'s APHIS agency that\'s going to be
announcing those presumptive positives?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: We will work with the Department of Interior and for that
matter with the Department of Health and Human Services to get that
information out there. But again I think if there\'s one message we can
deliver today it\'s we intend to do this in a very transparent way. We
want folks to have the information when we have the information. So
whether it\'s a joint announcement or an announcement by one of our
departments, our goal is the same. We want information to get out to the
public.\
\
MODERATOR: Our next question comes from John Rashard of Congressional
Quarterly. John?\
\
REPORTER: Yes. Thank you. I had a question. I just wanted to make sure I
was hearing this properly. Did you say that there have been no cases of
low path as well as high path H5N1 in the U.S?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: No. I don\'t know where you got that from. We have had
high path avian influenza in domestic poultry in commercial flocks on
three occasions. 2004, 1980s, and then one that dates back some period
of time.\
\
In reference to low path avian influenza, let me just again remind you
that birds go through a flu season much like humans go through a flu
season, and oftentimes you won\'t even notice it unless you were trained
to notice it. They recover, they\'re fine, there really isn\'t much
consequence to that.\
\
And so low path avian influenza has actually been in the United States
in poultry probably 100 years. I mean it\'s not uncommon, it\'s not
unusual, it\'s not dangerous, it\'s not even dangerous to the bird.
It\'s when you get into the high path avian influenza that you really
have fatalities in birds, and that\'s when we move very aggressively.\
\
REPORTER: What I meant was low path H5N1 \--\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Maybe that answers your question because we don\'t want to
imply that we\'ve never had low path here or even high path for that
matter. That\'s been here on three occasions.\
\
REPORTER: No. What I meant to ask was, low path H5N1. Has that been in
the United States or not?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Let me clear something up. We have not had H5N1 high path
in the United States, and that might be the confusion that you\'re
having.\
\
REPORTER: Right. But have we had low path H5N1?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Yes.\
\
REPORTER: And when was that first reported?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Dr. DeHaven might be able to answer that. Doctor?\
\
DR. RON DEHAVEN: We\'ve had a number of incursions of low path H5
viruses most recently a H5N1 virus. We can only assume that there\'s
H5N1 low pathogenic virus in migratory birds, and that we have found an
H5N1, for example, in Canadian birds and we would assume that the same
bird population that is transversing Canada could come to North America.
So it wouldn\'t be a surprise to find a low pathogenic H5N1 virus in
migratory birds in the United States. But again as the Secretary has
pointed out, that\'s a far different virus than the highly pathogenic
H5N1 virus.\
\
REPORTER: So the low path H5N1 has been found in migratory birds in
Canada but not in the United States?\
\
DR. DEHAVEN: Not yet in the United States, but we certainly would not be
surprised to find it as part of our migratory bird surveillance
program.\
\
REPORTER: And when was it first detected in Canada?\
\
DR. DEHAVEN: I can\'t tell you the exact time, but within the last 12 to
18 months when the Canadians made an announcement to that effect based
on some migratory surveillance that they had been doing.\
\
REPORTER: All right. Thank you.\
\
MODERATOR: Secretary Norton, did you have an additional comment?\
\
SEC. NORTON: I\'m not sure whether there might have been some found in
Alaska or other parts of the United States.\
\
MS. SUE HASSELTOWN: I think what we can say about low path \-- I\'m
sorry. I\'m Sue Hasseltown with the U.S. Geological Survey.\
\
I think that we can say that, we over the years, since we\'ve been
monitoring for avian influenza in wildlife in this country that we will
have found some low path H5N1 in this country. We have not found it in
samples in the last couple of years as the Canadians have. But we assume
that it is here; it\'s just a matter of sampling.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: That gets your information to you?\
\
MODERATOR: Okay. Going on to our next question from Cookson Beecher of
Capitol Press. And standing by should be Miriam Falco of CNN. Cookson,
please?\
\
REPORTER: Yes, thank you. This is for USDA. I live in Northwest
Washington, and so therefore I\'m part of the Pacific Flyway. All around
me are backyard flocks. Most of these people have had no contact about
avian flu preparedness. They\'re not part of the organic industry.
They\'re just chicken farms all around. I eat eggs from my neighbor\'s
farm. But we also have two large commercial operations in the same area.
So I\'m wondering, let\'s say a high path form does show up in either a
backyard flock or a wild bird, what would happen with those quarantine
process for these commercial operations?\
\
And then further down the road, when British Columbia announced it\'s
low path form recently, great big trade doors closed shut for awhile.
And so if we\'re announcing low path, what\'s going to happen to trade?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: Okay. That\'s a lot of questions, but let me do my best to
answer it. If we identified a high path avian influenza in a flock,
backyard domestic flock, we would follow the same sort of practice. We
move in there, we in effect put a barrier around that area. We don\'t
want people coming and going at random. We would, if it\'s high path we
would destroy those birds. That is our practice. We would disinfect. We
would test in the surrounding area so we could ascertain whether that
high path had been spread, and so we would follow the same sort of
aggressive practice with high path and backyard poultry that we would
with a more commercialized flock.\
\
In reference to trade, there are some very, very complex trade issues,
but I can offer kind of a general approach that countries seem to be
adopting. If it is a migratory bird, trade stays open. In other words,
if we happen to find a duck or swan or something that flew in here and
it\'s got high path avian influenza and it\'s a wild migratory bird, we
don\'t have it in our domestic poultry, then I think I can safely say
that trade would stay open.\
\
In the event we identified a high path avian influenza in a commercial
flock, then the practice has been to impact trade. Now our approach to
that has been, we will regionalize. What do I mean by that? If we find a
case of that in the southeast part of Canada for example, we will work
with the Canadian government to put a very regional approach to that,
and that would not necessarily bar trade in poultry in other parts of
Canada.\
\
International guidelines are the key here. We always endeavor here in
the United States to follow those guidelines. We support those
guidelines, and that\'s what we encourage other countries to do, and
that\'s where the idea of the regional approach comes from is the
international guidelines.\
\
Complicated question, and you can get a lot of variations, especially
when it comes to trade. But those are the general rules of thumb.\
\
MODERATOR: Our next question comes from Miriam Falco of CNN, and
standing by should be Margaret Haskell from Bangor Daily News.\
\
REPORTER: Hi. It\'s Miriam. The press conference started out urging
journalists to get the story right and rightfully so because the need to
prevent panic is definitely there. One thing that\'s confusing is
you\'ve got USDA, Interior, HHS all talking about stuff, and then
you\'ve got the Homeland Security Secretary making comments saying bird
flu can be here in a few months, which is really not news since it\'s
been talked about especially by HHS and CDC for awhile.\
\
So who takes the lead on this when it does come? How are you going to
get a streamlined message across because it could be a local health
department or veterinarian who makes the announcement. But it\'s all
very confusing. Is this going to be a DHS or an HHS, or how\'s this
going to be clear to both the public as well as journalists so we know
which way to go? That\'s my first question. Then I have two small ones.\
\
One is, when we had the fear of foot and mouth over in Britain, specific
measures were taken at airports to prevent people from coming into the
country with any kind of diseased shoes or whatever. Is anything like
that going to be done?\
\
Finally, you talked about vaccinating birds. Can you give us any more
details how would the vaccine be administered?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: This is Mike Leavitt. I\'m going to respond to your first
question. Inherent in your question is the answer. If this is a wild
bird you\'ll hear from Interior, and if it is a domestic flock you\'ll
hear from Agriculture, and if it involves humans you will hear it from,
and it goes to HHS for information. If, in fact, it becomes an incident
that involves multiple departments at the same time because let\'s say
it was a human to human to transmission, you would begin to see many
different departments of federal government begin to move into action.
At that point the Department of Homeland Security would play its
coordinating role.\
\
You made the point, it\'s a good one, that under most circumstances
these will manifest themselves in the states. That\'s the reason we\'re
holding the pandemic summits, and we\'re including agriculture officials
and officials from various wildlife divisions under the auspices of the
governor. It\'s quite clear that those messages do need to be
coordinated, and we\'re working actually exercising among the
departments and within states how we will respond in those
circumstances.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: In reference to your question about borders and how we
deal with that, if a high path avian influenza is found in a country
then we have trade restrictions that we impose. Again we will work with
that country and it\'s possible we can work those restrictions to a
point where they\'re regional versus a whole country sort of ban. And we
would work in that effort if you will.\
\
But if you find high path in another country, you\'re going to likely
find there\'s a ban in place in terms of live poultry and that\'s just
the way we work \-- and meat products also.\
\
Now in reference to the vaccine, I will ask Dr. DeHaven to offer a
thought about vaccine. But one thing I would offer about poultry
vaccine, in the United States you have at any given time millions and
millions of birds. I don\'t even know if I know the count; it\'s a very,
very large number. Now most of them are grown in commercial enterprises,
but you do have birds out there in more of a backyard sort of setting,
an open sort of setting.\
\
The other thing I will tell you about the United States is that our
broilers aren\'t with us long. They are fed out and processed very, very
quickly. And so the notion that you could somehow vaccinate every bird
in the United States is not, humanly it would not be possible.\
\
But Dr. DeHaven, talk about when we\'d use vaccination as an approach.\
\
DR. DEHAVEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As you pointed out earlier, we do
have a bank of vaccines available to us, and we\'ve done some challenge
studies and shown this vaccine does provide protection against the virus
that is currently circulating in parts of Asia and Europe. But in fact
the numbers in the U.S. are staggering. At any given time we have 1.5 to
2 billion broilers on the ground in our annual production in broilers is
about 8 billion. So from a logistical, economics standpoint, that would
be overwhelming.\
\
Secondly, if you vaccinate for a disease such as this you\'re accepting
the fact that you may live with a small load of virus that you\'re
expecting some small amount of virus to be circulating, and that some
birds may be vaccinated and protected from showing clinical signs but
they can still harbor the virus. So again, our primary strategy is going
to depopulate, humanely destroy flocks that are affected, and only using
vaccination in ring strategy. If it\'s spreading faster than we can
contain it then much as you use similar strategy in ring fires around a
forest fire, we would vaccinate poultry around an infected area.\
\
The only other likely scenario is, sometimes there is extremely valuable
breeding stock; we might use that vaccine to protect valuable breeding
birds who would be in an area potentially exposed to the virus.\
\
MODERATOR: Our next question comes from Margaret Haskell who is with the
Bangor Daily News. Margaret?\
\
REPORTER: Hi. Thank you. A clarification I need and also a question.\
\
For clarification, I know you\'ve addressed this a couple times so I
apologize \-- I though I heard somebody say there\'d been several
instances of high path influenza in commercial flocks in the U.S. one as
recently as 2004. Was that just not H5N1?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: That\'s correct.\
\
REPORTER: So it was a high path influenza but not H5N1?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: It was high path H5N2.\
\
REPORTER: N2.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: For accuracy, but it was a high path avian influenza, and
so in 2004 we followed the approach that we literally contained it to
that flock.\
\
REPORTER: And where was that?\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: That was in Texas, the state of Texas.\
\
REPORTER: Okay, thank you. You\'ve all said several times how important
transparency is to managing the situation. I\'m seeing a lot of
potential for some blurring of lines with public information regulations
and guidelines. I\'m thinking specifically here in Maine we also have a
lot of backyard chicken flocks and so forth.\
\
I\'m wondering about a situation where if there were a die-off of a
flock or extermination of an infected flock or if this pathogen does
enter the human population if there was a household or a community that
was quarantined, how specific can we expect the information that we as
journalists get from the authorities to be? Will we be naming names and
towns and places?\
\
SEC. LEAVITT: This is Mike Leavitt. As respect to humans, we will be as
specific as possible recognizing the restrictions of HIPA (sp) and the
privacy of the patients and those involved.\
\
SEC. JOHANNS: In terms of the USDA, we have different guidelines if you
will. We\'re talking about poultry here, so if we identify that we have
a flock and we test and that test comes out as a positive indicating
that the virus is there, high pathogenic, then we\'re going to put that
information out there.\
\
Now again, very important thing to recognize here because the last part
of your question concerned me a little bit. Proper preparation of
poultry in cooking kills this virus. You\'re not going to get sick. And
we have always put out information that, prepare your poultry properly,
cook it properly, because that kills bacteria, kills virus, and so again
let me just remind people that we\'ve always said prepare and cook
poultry properly. And that continues to be our message because it\'s
important. It kills the virus and it kills bacteria.\
\
MODERATOR: Our final question today comes from Jeremy Grant of Financial
Times. Jeremy?\
\
REPORTER: Yes, hi. Thank you. A question for Secretary Leavitt or indeed
anyone else. Could you just be clear on exactly what this new program
\-- what\'s different between this new program and what you\'ve been
doing before? Because looking at the press release you\'ve clearly been
testing some birds in Alaska and various places already. Is this simply
an enhanced testing program over on top of what you\'re doing already?
And if you just boil down for me what\'s the difference between the
before and the after if you\'d like?\
\
SEC. NORTON: This is Gale Norton. I can answer that. We have a much more
extensive testing program than we have had in the past, and our
coordination is much more comprehensive.\
\
Birds are tested all the time for various scientific purposes, but
we\'re now working with all of the various states and research
organizations, federal agencies, to get that information put together to
do testing in a comprehensive way and to have procedures so that we know
if we get the positive H5N1 results that will immediately go to the USDA
Ames Laboratory so that they can do the confirmation and high path/low
path testing.\
\
So we have a system that today is targeted toward detecting H5N1 and
targeted toward getting that information to the right people at the
right time.\
\
MODERATOR: Thank you, Reporters, for your questions, and thank you,
Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns; Secretary of the Interior Gale
Norton; and Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt. I\'m
Larry Quinn bidding you a good day from Washington.