CHAPTER 500 -- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

(500)-150 [Security]{.underline}

## Introduction.

Security guidance is binding for all TIGTA employees and this section
serves as the reference for all TIGTA security policy, procedures, and
guidelines. These guidelines are offered to supplement and assist in the
implementation of sound security procedures tailored to TIGTA\'s
requirements. TIGTA\'s security policy and requirements are guided by
national policy and standards. This section clarifies national issuances
and adopts them to TIGTA\'s specific circumstances, and imposes
additional requirements, when necessary.

### Purpose. 

This section establishes general policy and procedures for the personnel
security program and the physical security program of TIGTA, pursuant to
Executive Order (E.O.) 10450, "Security Requirements for Government
Employment," as implemented by Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), parts 731, 732, and 736; E.O. 12968, "Access to Classified
Information," Treasury Order (TO) 102-17m "Delegation of Authority
Concerning the Personnel Security Program;" and Treasury Directive (TD)
12-32, "Delegation of Authority Concerning Personnel Security."

### Responsibilities. 

TIGTA shall ensure that consistent, timely, and equitable personnel
security and suitability determinations are made in all cases. The TIGTA
Security Management Office, in accordance with the Treasury Security
Manual, shall:

-   Refer all allegations of disloyalty or subversion to the Director,
    Treasury Office of Security, who will notify the appropriate senior
    departmental officials and/or refer the allegations to the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation when appropriate.

-   Consult with the Director, Treasury Office of Security, when
    significant suitability information is developed concerning TIGTA
    executives.

-   Consult with the Director, Treasury Office of Security, when
    significant adverse information is developed that could result in
    the denial or revocation of a security clearance.

-   Inform the Director, Treasury Office of Security, within one
    business day when significant behavioral issues are reported on
    those TIGTA employees who have been granted access to Sensitive
    Compartmented Information.

-   Perform the operating functions relating to personnel security as
    defined in Chapter (500) of this manual.

-   Managers and employees with TIGTA are responsible for assisting in
    implementing the Federal government's personnel security program by
    ensuring that only authorized individuals are granted access to
    classified information under their control, and by promptly
    informing TIGTA's Security Management Office of conduct by any
    person, which may raise security issues.

### Role of Outside Agencies. 

Pursuant to [E.O.
10450](http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/executive_orders/1953_eisenhower.html),
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has oversight of federal agency
personnel security programs. OPM Investigative Services conducts
periodic reviews or inspections of agency personnel security and
investigative programs to evaluate compliance with its standards.

The Security Policy Board (SPB), established by Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 29, has been charged with oversight of agency
implementation of [E.O.
12968](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1995_register&docid=fr07au95-150.pdf).

In the interest of Departmental consistency, program and procedural
questions concerning personnel security should first be discussed with
the Treasury Office of Security before consultation is initiated with
outside agencies.

### Authorities.

-   *Security Requirements for Government Employment,* E.O. 10450, April
    27, 1953, as amended.

-   *Access to Classified Information*, E.O. 12968, August 2, 1995.

-   *Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to
    Classified Information,* SPB Issuance 1-97, March 24, 1997.

-   *Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
    Classified Information*, SPB Issuance 2-97, March 24, 1997.

-   *Investigative Standards for Temporary Eligibility for Access*, SPB
    Issuance 3-97, March 24, 1997.

-   *Reinstatement or Restoration; Individuals Suspended or Removed for
    National Security*, *Employment and Clearance; Individuals Removed
    for National Security*, and *Suspension and Removal (National
    Security),* 5 U.S.C. 3571, 7312, and 7532 respectively.

-   *Delegation of Authority Concerning the Personnel Security Program*,
    TO 102-17, May 2, 1996.

-   *Delegation of Authority Concerning Personnel Security*, TD 12-32,
    November 3, 2000.

-   *Suitability, National Security Positions, and Personnel
    Investigations,* 5 CFR Parts 731, 732 and 736, respectively.

### References.

-   *Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility
    for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information*, Director of
    Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4.

-   *National Industrial Security Program*, E.O. 12829, January 6, 1993.

-   *Classified National Security Information*, E.O. 12598, October 17,
    1995, as amended.

-   *United States Intelligence Activities*, E.O. 12333, December 4,
    1981.

-   *National Security Decision Directive No. 84*, March 11, 1983.

-   *Security Policy Coordination*, PDD 29, September 16, 1994.

-   *The Privacy Act* (5 U.S.C. 552a).

-   *Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), E-Government
    Act of 2002,* Public Law 107-347*,* December 17, 2002.

-   *Management of Federal Information Resources*, Office of Management
    and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Appendix III, revised February 8,
    1996.

-   *Standards of Conduct, Disclosure of Records, National Security
    Information*, 31 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 2 respectively.

-   *Post Security Functions*, Volume 12, State Department Foreign
    Affairs Manual (FAM), Subchapter 440, (includes Overseas Security
    Policy Board investigative Requirements for Permanent Change of
    Station Assignment Overseas).

-   *Employee Marriage, Equivalent Bonds, and Cohabitation*, Volume 3,
    State Department FAM, Section 629.

## Personnel Security.

### Position Sensitivity. {Reserved}

### Granting Access. {Reserved}

### Adjudicative Guidelines.

#### Purpose. 

This section implements E.0. 12968, "Access to Classified Information,\"
and SPB Issuance 2‑97, \"[Adjudicative
Guidelines](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc)\".

#### Scope. 

These provisions apply to the TIGTA. This section does not affect
authorities reserved to the Special Assistant to the Secretary (National
Security).

#### Policy. 

This section shall be used in adjudicating background investigations of
all TIGTA applicants, employees, consultants, and other persons who
require access to classified information pursuant to [E.O.
12968](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1995_register&docid=fr07au95-150.pdf),
and for determining eligibility for employment in a sensitive position
pursuant to [E.O.
10450](http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/executive_orders/1953_eisenhower.html),
\"Security Requirements for Government Employment.\" Additionally, these
guidelines may be used in determining eligibility for (1) access to
sensitive but unclassified information or TIGTA automated information
systems, or (2) access to TIGTA occupied facilities.

#### Responsibilities. 

The Inspector General for Tax Administration, shall:

-   Direct appropriately trained adjudicative personnel to make access
    eligibility determinations;

-   Provide appropriate review proceedings, as set forth in Chapter
    (500), Section (150.2.5.5) of this manual, for any individual who is
    determined not to be eligible for access to classified information
    pursuant to E.O. 12968, and

-   Seek the advice of the Director, Treasury Office of Security, on any
    case, which involves complex, unique or precedent‑setting factors.

With respect to TIGTA, the functions above shall be performed by the
Security Management Office or the designee of the Security Management
Office. If TIGTA does not have its own appropriately trained
adjudicative personnel, TIGTA may obtain adjudication services from
another organization within the Department which has such adjudicative
personnel, and may delegate the necessary authority to make
determinations to those personnel, with the concurrence of the Director
of Security Management.

The Director of Security Management, shall:

-   Assume jurisdiction through the Treasury Security Board after TIGTA
    has rendered its decision over all cases involving a potential
    determination that an employee in TIGTA should be suspended,
    reassigned, or terminated in the interest of the national security
    pursuant to E.O. 10450 and [5 U.S.C.
    7532](http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/5/7532.html) \"Suspension
    and Removal (National Security)\"; and

-   Make access eligibility determinations according to the guidelines
    in Attachment 1 for the following positions, pursuant to the
    requirements of [Treasury Directive
    12‑32](http://www.ustreas.gov/regs/td12-32.htm), \"Delegation of
    Authority Concerning Personnel Security";

-   All presidential appointees in the Department requiring confirmation
    by the Senate, including the Inspector General for Tax
    Administration;

-   TIGTA's Security Management Office and any official with delegated
    authority to grant security clearances.

#### Adjudicative Process. 

After a thorough review, analysis, and evaluation of all available
investigative information, an appropriately trained adjudicator shall
determine an individual\'s eligibility for access to classified
information under E.O. 12968, or to occupy a sensitive position pursuant
to E.O. 10450, using the guidelines in Attachment 1.

ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES

-   If a security determination under E.O. 12968 or E.O. 10450 is made
    subsequent to a favorable initial suitability determination, the
    security determination shall resolve any questions of the
    suitability of an applicant for or an appointee to a sensitive
    position. (See Section 150.2.4 of this Manual for a full discussion
    of security determination record requirements.)

-   The Security Management Office or designee may also determine
    eligibility for access to sensitive but unclassified information
    and/or TIGTA automated information systems using the guidelines in
    "[Security
    Guidelines](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc)".

#### Adjudicating Suitability. 

Employment suitability should be adjudicated according to the standards,
criteria, and procedures found in [Title 5, CFR, Part
731](http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_03/5cfr731_03.html).

[Introduction]{.underline}. The following adjudicative guidelines are
established for all United States Government civilian and military
personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors,
licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other
individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to
persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access
to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented
Information and Special Access Programs and are to be used by government
departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

[The Adjudicative Process]{.underline}. The adjudicative process is an
examination of a sufficient period of a person\'s life to make an
affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is
predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security
guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number
of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In
evaluating the relevance of an individual\'s conduct, the adjudicator
should consider the following factors:

-   The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;

-   The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
    participation;

-   The frequency and dates of the conduct;

-   The individual\'s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;

-   Whether the individual's participation was voluntary;

-   The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
    behavioral changes;

-   The motivation for the conduct;

-   The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and

-   The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination
remains the responsibility of TIGTA's Director of Security Management.
Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly
consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of national
security.

The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of
eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the
interests of national security must be an overall common sense
determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of
which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as
explained further below:

[GUIDELINE
A](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideA):
Allegiance to the United States

[GUIDELINE
B](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideB):
Foreign Influence

[GUIDELINE
C](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideC):
Foreign Preference

[GUIDELINE
D](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideD): Sexual
Behavior

[GUIDELINE
E](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideE):
Personal Conduct

[GUIDELINE
F](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideF):
Financial Considerations

[GUIDELINE
G](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideG):
Alcohol Consumption

[GUIDELINE
H](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideH): Drug
Involvement

[GUIDELINE
I](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideI):
Emotional, mental, and personality disorders

[GUIDELINE
J](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideJ):
Criminal Conduct

[GUIDELINE
K](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideK):
Security Violations

[GUIDELINE
L](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideL):
Outside Activities

[GUIDELINE
M](../../500-exhibits/adjudicative-guidelines-athrum.doc#GuideM): Misuse
of Information Technology Systems

Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be
sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be
disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring
pattern or questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally
unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole person concept, pursuit of
further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative
agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse
information.

When information of security concern becomes known about an individual
who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the
adjudicator should consider whether the person:

-   Voluntarily reported the information;

-   Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;

-   Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
    appropriate;

-   Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
    concern;

-   Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment; and

-   Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final
    adjudication of the information.

If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator
decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a
recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance,
it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future
incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

### Personnel Security Operations.

#### Purpose. 

Specific procedures have been established in this section to ensure
compatibility and consistency in the use and maintenance of personnel
security investigations and records.

#### Scope. 

The provisions set forth herein apply to the Office of the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration.

#### Personnel Security Files. 

TIGTA shall establish and maintain a personnel security file for each
employee in the following positions: (1) all national security
positions, (2) all moderate and high-risk public trust positions, and
(3) all those in low risk/nonsensitive positions on whom favorable or
derogatory information has been developed or received. With regard to
favorable investigations on employees in low or moderate risk positions,
TIGTA may, at their discretion, retain either the entire report or
pertinent investigative data only. The TIGTA Security Management Office
or designee shall maintain personnel security files.

Personnel security files shall include documentation of investigative
coverage and results, results of security and suitability
adjudication/determinations, security clearance decisions, and any
significant personnel security or suitability information, which is
developed during employment

Personnel security files should be retained for the duration of an
individual's employment or contractual relation with the Department, and
shall be maintained in accordance with [TD
25‑02,](http://www.ustreas.gov/regs/td00-03.htm) "Records Disposition
and Removal of Papers Management Program,\" and National Archives and
Records Administration [General Records Schedule
18](http://ardor.nara.gov/grs/grs18.html) (items 21-25 relating to
personnel security files).

[Use of OPM Investigative Reports]{.underline}. TIGTA may choose to
retain copies of OPM investigative reports for the duration of the
retention schedule; however, the OPM case transmittal must be retained
in the case file as the record of adjudicative action for a minimum of
two years from the date of the final decision. Reports of investigation
of cases conducted by other Federal agencies but transmitted through OPM
must be handled in the manner prescribed by the originating agency\'s
Privacy Act system security notice or stamped caveats, which may appear
on those documents.

[Disposition of Investigative Reports]{.underline}. Personnel security
case files and related indices shall be destroyed or transferred to a
Federal Records Center upon notification of an employee\'s death or not
later than five years after separation or transfer, or expiration of the
contract relationship. TIGTA shall ensure that the Privacy Act notice of
routine uses for that system of records accurately describes their
practice in this area. Investigative reports and related documents
obtained from other agencies for making security/ suitability
determinations shall be destroyed in accordance with the investigating
agency\'s instructions.

#### Security Clearance Records.

[Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination]{.underline}.
Treasury Department Form (TD F) 67‑32.4 or TIGTA equivalent shall be
signed by the Director of Security Management or other authorized
official as designated by the Inspector General. This information will
be provided to the operating personnel office. The notification shall
document the date and basis of the determination, but shall not reflect
any adverse information recorded in the personnel security file or on
the Security Evaluation Sheet. When access to classified information has
been granted, the form should include the level of access granted, and
whether granted on an interim or final basis. For employees who do not
require security clearances, the form will contain the same biographical
and investigative information, but the level of security clearance shall
be reflected as "None" or "None Required." The original TD F 67‑32 .4
shall be filed on the right side of the Official Personnel Folder (OPF),
while a copy shall be filed as the uppermost document in the personnel
security file.

[Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF‑312)]{.underline}.
As a condition of being granted access to classified information, the
individual must first undergo a security briefing by appropriate
security officials wherein he or she is informed of the obligations and
responsibilities attendant upon being granted such access, and must
execute the SF-312, which shall be appropriately witnessed.

For employees, the original SF-312 shall be placed on the right side of
the OPF along with the original copy of the TD F 67-32.4. A copy of the
SF-312 may be retained in the employee\'s personnel security file.

For individuals not having an OPF, TIGTA must maintain the SF-312 in an
appropriate system of records that meet the information Security
Oversight Office 5-year retention requirement.

[Written Consent Form for Access to Financial Records]{.underline}.
Every employee granted access to classified information shall provide
TIGTA with a written consent form developed by the Security Policy Board
allowing an authorized investigative agency access to financial and
other records as defined in Section 1 2(e) of Executive Order (E.O.)
12968, \"Access to Classified Information\", during the period of
his/her access to classified information and for a period of three years
thereafter. Such records may be requested by an authorized investigative
agency only when: (1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
employee or former employee is, or may be, disclosing classified
information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power; (2) TIGTA has received credible information that an
employee or former employee has incurred excessive indebtedness or has
acquired a level of affluence that cannot be explained by other
information; or (3) circumstances indicate that the employee or former
employee had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified
information that is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.

#### Transfer of Personnel Security Records and Clearances between Bureaus.

When an employee transfers from TIGTA to another bureau, the complete
personnel security file or a copy thereof shall be transferred from the
TIGTA Security Management Office to the personnel security office of the
gaining bureau. Exception: where the file on an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) employee contains tax information, the tax information shall not
be transferred outside the IRS. A discussion of investigative and
security requirements for detailees is found in 150.2.4.8 of this
section.

Pursuant to Section 2.4 of E.O. 12968, a current security clearance is
transferable between bureaus and agencies without readjudication of the
investigation upon which it is based, provided a review of the current
SF-86 discloses no adverse information and provided the existing
investigation satisfies the investigative requirements for the new
position in the gaining bureau. Further investigation will then be
conducted only to meet required reinvestigation or security clearance
revalidation requirements.

#### Protection of Personnel Security Records. 

Information in personnel security investigations, records, and
operations shall be carefully safeguarded to protect the interests of
both the individual and TIGTA, pursuant to requirements of the Privacy
Act. Unless classified at a higher level, personnel security information
must be afforded the same degree of protection as material classified
Confidential and must be used only for authorized official purposes.
When not in use, personnel security information must be stored in a
GSA‑approved security container or in an equally secure area.

Personnel security investigation information requested by subjects of
investigations shall be processed according to procedures established by
TIGTA under provisions of the Privacy Act or the Freedom of Information
Act, as appropriate. Requests for the release of the results of any
personnel investigation should be referred to TIGTA or the non-Treasury
agency that conducted it.

Medical information developed during personnel security investigations
may require interpretation by medical authorities in order to be
meaningful to personnel security and operating officials, and its
privileged nature shall be carefully respected.

Investigative information and the identity of confidential sources must
be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act.

Reports containing classified information shall be protected in
accordance with E.O. 12958, \"Classified National Security
Information,\" and appropriate Treasury regulations (TD P 71-10).

When investigative information is made available to authorized personnel
outside of TIGTA for suitability and/or security purposes, a disclosure
record, TD F 67‑32.7, \"Security File Review,\" or similar form shall be
prepared. The form shall be signed and dated by those, granted access to
review background investigation files.

#### Monitoring Personnel and Security Clearance Changes. 

An effective personnel security program requires that TIGTA Security
Management Office be promptly informed of all personnel changes; in
order to assure that requisite investigations are obtained. Current data
must be maintained on those who have been cleared to occupy sensitive
positions or be granted an effective personnel security program requires
that TIGTA Security Management Office access to classified information.
Action should be taken to administratively withdraw or reduce the level
of classified access as appropriate and to close out security files on
separated employees.

[Security Entry Tracking System (SETS)]{.underline}. TIGTA shall notify
the Director, Treasury Office of Security, of all security
determinations and security clearances granted, revoked, suspended, or
administratively withdrawn within TIGTA. This requirement applies to
those individuals occupying National Security Sensitive Positions, and
includes all individuals in positions of Moderate or High Risk public
trust positions. The above information shall be entered into the
Department\'s tracking system, SETS, by the security office. The
availability of that information will facilitate granting access to
classified information pursuant to E.O. 12968. SETS also serves as an
Office of Security locator file and provides preliminary security
clearance information for special access programs.

Name changes and changes in marital status must be reported promptly to
the TIGTA Security Management Office.

#### Clearance Verification.

TIGTA Employees Assigned or on Temporary Duty (TDY) Outside the U.S.

-   TIGTA employees assigned overseas must comply with minimum-security
    clearance and investigative requirements established by the Overseas
    Security Policy Board. (See Foreign Affairs Manual for applicable
    requirements.) Additional requirements for access to individual
    Embassies and other restricted facilities will be determined by the
    post.

-   TIGTA employees on TDY outside the U.S. must meet the security
    clearance requirements established by the individual post(s) to be
    visited.

Security clearances should be verified to posts as follows: The TIGTA
office preparing travel orders and notifying the post of the employee\'s
arrival should obtain the level of the employee's clearance from the
TIGTA security office, and include this information in a cable to the
post. (Example: "Mr. Jones holds a Top Secret clearance.") The security
clearance information can be passed telephonically to the office
preparing the cable, but the security office should be included for
clearance on the cable, which will ensure that the security office is
subsequently provided with a copy of the outgoing cable for inclusion in
the individual\'s security file.

[TIGTA Employees Visiting Classified Facilities]{.underline}. When an
employee\'s official duties require access to classified information at
another governmental agency or access to facilities or areas which are
restricted for security reasons, bureau officials arranging such access
or visit shall request the TIGTA security office to certify to the host
or receiving agency security office the necessary security clearance
status and other required visit data on TIGTA employees. Details
regarding the proposed visit/access, including the date(s) of the visit,
the purpose, the level of the required clearance, date and type of
investigation, and name and telephone number of a point of contact at
the receiving site, shall be provided to bureau personnel security
offices sufficiently in advance of the intended activity to permit
timely processing of each request. Acceptance of temporary or interim
security clearances is at the discretion of the agency whose facility is
to be visited.

[Detailees]{.underline}. When a TIGTA employee is detailed to another
bureau, it is TIGTA's responsibility to ensure that the employee meets
all investigative requirements for the position into which the employee
is detailed and to grant any security clearance required for access to
classified information.

[Cleared Visitor Access to TIGTA Facilities]{.underline}. For employees
of other Federal agencies or cleared contractor facilities whose
official duties require access to classified information at TIGTA
facilities, the sponsoring TIGTA office shall request TIGTA's Security
Management Office to obtain the pertinent security clearance
verification data (see above) directly from the visitor\'s agency. For
contractors, verification should be obtained from the parent company or
the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.

### Suspension, Denial and Revocation of Access to Classified Information.

#### Purpose. 

E.O 12968, \"Access to Classified Information,\" sets forth the
requirements for proceedings for denial or revocation of access to
classified information. These are described in 150.2.5.5 and 150.2.5.6.
Procedures to be followed when suspending access to classified
information are described in section 150.2.5.4. The procedures described
herein do not apply to termination of access when the individual no
longer has a need‑to‑know.

#### Scope. 

The provisions set forth herein apply to all employees of the Office of
Inspector General for Tax Administration.

#### Notices and Due Dates. 

The Assistant Inspector General for Management Services has the
responsibility for notification of employees regarding suspensions,
denials, or revocations of access to classified information.
Notification sent to an employee regarding suspension, denial or
revocation of access to classified information may be delivered by
personal delivery, government or commercial overnight courier, or
certified mail. It must be delivered in a timely manner and an
acknowledgment of receipt shall be requested. A copy shall be maintained
in the individual\'s personnel security file, and a copy shall be
provided to the Security Management Office. Unless explicitly stated
otherwise, the time period for a reply or other filing by an applicant
or employee begins upon delivery of notification to the individual.
Where delivery cannot be made or the individual refuse's delivery the
time period begins five calendar days after issuance of notification to
the individual. The due date specified for a reply or other filing by an
individual indicates the date the reply or other filing must be received
by the appropriate office. The reply or other filing can be made by
personal delivery, by facsimile, by mail, or by commercial overnight
delivery.

#### Access Suspension. 

The TIGTA Assistant Inspector General for Management Services may
suspend access to classified information temporarily. A suspension is an
administrative procedure, not an adverse security action, and does not
require the review procedures described in 150.2.5.5 and 150.2.5.6.
Suspension of a security clearance may be appropriate in, but is not
limited to, the following situations:

-   Preparations are being made to revoke an individual\'s existing
    access to classified information and access is suspended while the
    review of the determination to revoke takes place;

-   Additional time is needed to resolve adverse information which may
    require additional investigation or the individual must complete
    certain requirements to maintain his/her clearance;

-   Pending removal and termination of employment resulting from adverse
    personnel actions under Title 5 of USC, Chapter 75; or

-   Failure by an individual to submit required security forms or
    releases in a timely manner.

In all cases where access is suspended, the individual shall be notified
in writing that his/her access to classified information has been
suspended. The notice shall include a Statement of Reasons (SOR) for the
suspension action consistent with the interests of the national
security. The SOR will be coordinated through TIGTA's Office of Counsel
who will review the SOR before it is forwarded to the individual. The
notification shall state the duration of the suspension of access. The
TIGTA Assistant Inspector General for Management Services shall also
notify the individual\'s supervisor(s) of the suspension, who shall be
responsible for ensuring that the individual does not receive access to
classified or sensitive information while the clearance is suspended.
Temporary suspension may include administrative leave with pay or
reassignment to another TIGTA function that does not require access to
sensitive information.

Temporary suspension of access to classified information should not be
used as a means to avoid the review procedures for revocation of access
described below.

#### Access Denial or Revocation. 

When the TIGTA Assistant Inspector General for Management Services
determines that (1) an individual who has been nominated for or
currently has access to classified information fails to meet applicable
security criteria and (2) there are not sufficient mitigating factors
which would indicate that access may be granted in the future, TIGTA
should proceed with access denial or revocation, as appropriate. The
individual shall be provided with the review proceedings set forth in
section 5.2 of E.O. 12968, as follows:

-   The applicant or employee shall be provided with a written [Notice
    of Determination]{.underline} that he or she does not meet
    applicable eligibility standards for access to classified
    information. The written Notice of Determination shall include as
    comprehensive and detailed an explanation of the basis for the
    determination as the national security interests and other
    applicable laws permit.

-   The Notice of Determination shall state the name and address of the
    official to whom the individual should direct any reply, request or
    other filing. A copy of this Chapter 150.2.5, (\"Suspension, Denial
    and Revocation of Access to Classified Information\") of the TIGTA
    Operations Manual and a copy of E.O. 12968 shall be enclosed with
    the Notice of Determination. The Notice of Determination shall
    direct the individual to this Chapter 150.2.5, for a description of
    the review proceedings available to the individual.

An individual to whom a Notice of Determination is issued may:

-   Be represented by counsel or other representative at their own
    expense.

-   Request in writing, no later than 15 (fifteen) days after receipt of
    the Notice of Determination any documents, records, and reports upon
    which a denial or revocation is based, as defined in section
    5.2(a)(2) of E.O. 12968, and the entire investigative file, as
    permitted by the national security and other applicable law.

Reply in writing to, and request a review of, the determination:

-   No later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice of
    Determination, if no timely request has been made under 5.c (2) of
    E.O. 12968 has been made, or

-   No later than thirty (30) days after receipt of a notice from the
    TIGTA to the individual that TIGTA has made the final release of
    material requested, where a timely request under 5.c (2) above has
    been made; and

-   Request to appear personally before the Deciding Authority (Deputy
    Inspector General for Audit who is designated to review any reply to
    the Notice of Determination), and to present relevant documents,
    materials, and information at that time. A request to appear
    personally shall be made no later than the time at which a written
    reply to a Notice of Determination would be timely made.

[Production of Documents]{.underline}. If the applicant or employee
requests any documents, records, and reports upon which a denial or
revocation is based, the documents shall be provided to the individual
within thirty (30) days of receipt of the request by the bureau, and
shall be provided to the extent they would be provided if requested
under the Freedom of Information Act or the Privacy Act, as applicable.

If the applicant or employee requests the entire investigative file,
such documents shall be provided promptly prior to the time set for a
written reply, as permitted by the national security and other
applicable law. TIGTA shall notify the individual when final release of
documents or the file is made, so that the due date for a written reply
may be set.

[Review of the Determination]{.underline}. TIGTA officials who have been
delegated authority for performing the operating functions relating to
personnel security shall designate an official review any reply by the
individual to the Notice of Determination. For TIGTA the deciding
authority is the Deputy Inspector General for Audit.

[Opportunity to Appear Personally]{.underline}. If the applicant or
employee timely requests an opportunity to appear personally, the
Deciding Authority shall comply with the provisions of section 5.2(a)(7)
of E.0.12968, shall be present at the personal appearance, and shall
make a written summary or recording, at TIGTA's discretion, of the
personal appearance. The Deciding Authority shall make any necessary
rulings for the conduct of the personal appearance and shall regulate
the proceeding as may be necessary.

A confrontation interview conducted as part of the investigation does
not constitute an opportunity to appear personally.

[Notice of Review]{.underline}*.* Upon completion of the review of the
case, the Deciding Authority shall notify the individual in writing (the
[Notice of Review]{.underline}) of the Deciding Authority\'s decision,
the reasons for the decision, and the identity of the Deciding
Authority.

If the decision of the Deciding Authority is to affirm the determination
to deny or revoke access, the Notice of Review shall also inform the
individual of the right to appeal the decision to the Treasury\'s
Security Appeals Panel, as described in section 5.2(a)(6) of E.O. 12968.
To file an appeal, the individual must submit a written appeal to the
Security Appeals Panel within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Notice
of Review. The address for the appeal shall be included in the Notice of
Review.

[Appeal of the Determination]{.underline}. Appeals shall be decided by
the Treasury's Security Appeals Panel, which shall be appointed by the
Treasury Assistant Secretary (Management) and Chief Financial Officer,
and shall include at least two persons from outside the security field.
The Director of Security Management shall serve as member of, and chair,
the Security Appeals Panel. Upon request of the Security Appeals Panel,
all relevant case materials shall be provided to the panel by the
Deciding Authority, including the written summary or recording of any
personal appearance.

If the panel determines that additional information or investigation is
necessary to render a decision, the Chair of the panel may request such
information or investigation from TIGTA, which shall ensure that the
request is fulfilled.

The decision of the Security Appeals Panel shall be in writing and shall
be final, unless the Secretary personally exercises appeal authority
based upon recommendations from the panel. In such case, the decision of
the Secretary shall be final.

#### Final Action. 

When an applicant or employee timely requests a review of a Notice of
Determination, or, after such review, appeals to the Security Appeals
Panel, the denial or revocation of eligibility for access to classified
information shall be implemented only when any or all such proceedings
(requested by the applicant or employee within applicable time limits)
have been completed.

Failure of the applicant or employee to request review of the
determination, or to appeal to the Security Appeals Panel, or to meet
any applicable time limit for these actions normally will result in a
termination of any further proceedings. The denial or revocation of
access shall be implemented at that time. These requirements do not
affect any temporary suspension of access, which may have occurred.

#### Applicability. 

These procedures are applicable except where the Secretary or, where
permitted, the Deputy Secretary invokes the provisions set forth in
section 5.2 (d) or (e) of E.O. 12968.

#### No Rights Created. 

These provisions, consistent with section 5.2 (c) of E.O. 12968, create
no procedural or substantive rights.

### Hiring Guidelines.

#### Personnel. 

When the selecting/hiring official makes a decision, the official needs
to notify the Personnel Office in writing. The applicant is not to be
contacted. TIGTA's Personnel Office will contact the applicant and make
a tentative job offer, explaining that a final offer is contingent upon
a favorable background investigation.

Once the applicant has tentatively accepted the job offer, the Security
Management Office will review the background investigation package and
notify management and personnel of the preliminary suitability
determination. Once the Security Management Office has notified
Personnel that a favorable preliminary suitability determination has
been granted, Personnel will contact the applicant to make a final job
offer and coordinate a starting date.

Upon receipt of the completed background investigation TIGTA's Security
Management Office will make the final suitability decision. If the
decision is for unsuitability and the employee has reported to TIGTA the
clearance denial will be handled in accordance with Section 150.2.5. The
Security Management Office will initiate the personnel security
investigation by reviewing all of the required forms and fingerprint
cards. The completed package will be sent to OPM. The Security
Management Office will determine the type of investigation needed based
on the position sensitivity as set by position classification.

As part of the ongoing security background program the Security
Management Office will also provide OPM with the required forms to
initiate 5-year updates for those positions that require them.

Whenever a new employee is hired and they have a Personnel Security
Investigation (PSI) that is current, TIGTA will accept the investigation
in accordance with EO 12968. If the investigation is less than one year
old a review of the PSI will be accomplished and no new SF86/SF85 will
be required. The new employee will rectify the information contained in
the security file by re-signing and dating the Questionnaire for
National Security Positions (SF86) or the Questionnaire for Public Trust
Positions (SF85). The rectification by the employee is an indication
that the information contained in the SF86/SF85 is correct.

Any new employee that has a PSI over one (1) year old will be required
to submit a new SF86/SF85 that will be used for comparison with the old
PSI. No new investigation will be initiated unless the PSI is outdated
or the level of clearance is being upgraded.

The decision to initiate a new investigation is left to the discretion
of the Security Management Office.

Upon receipt of each investigation from OPM, the TIGTA Security
Management Office will prepare the appropriate memorandum to notify the
respective Head of Office of the investigative results as determined by
the TIGTA's Security Management Office.

The Security Management Office will issue an initial suitability
determination sufficient to allow the individual to be employed by
TIGTA. The initial determination for suitability will only be issued
upon a favorable review of the OPF, the security package and an
interview with the individual. The individual will still be required to
complete a favorable background investigation at the level of position
sensitivity required.

**In all cases, employment will be contingent upon a favorable
background investigation.**

#### Office of Personnel Management. 

OPM processes all TIGTA requests for personnel security investigations.
Once completed, the investigative package is forwarded to the Security
Management Office for review and final determination.

#### Security Management Office. 

Upon completion of the review of the completed personnel security
investigation, the Security Management Office will notify Personnel of a
favorable determination. If an unfavorable determination is made, the
Security Management Office will advise the Assistant Inspector General
for Management Services as to the facts that lead to an unfavorable
determination. In all cases where an unfavorable determination is made
the Deputy Inspector General for Audit will be the final deciding
authority, in accordance with TIGTA's Operations Manual (500) 150.2.5.

The Security Management Office is TIGTA's contact point for all
inquiries regarding the status of ongoing investigations or pending
adjudication action.

The Security Management Office will provide to the Chief, Financial
Management Section, a monthly report that will be used to track all
personnel security investigation requests, cost per investigation and
total cumulative costs to date.

#### Assistant Director, Financial Management. 

Based on the monthly report from the Security Management Office, the
Assistant Director, Financial Management Section, will ensure sufficient
funds have been transferred to OPM, to cover all completed and pending
personnel security investigations.

#### Detailees Assigned to TIGTA. 

Detailees assigned to TIGTA fall into one of two categories:

If an individual is assigned to TIGTA for 120 days or less, the
following procedure will take place:

-   The Security Management Office will inquire of the detailee's
    organization to ascertain if the individual has a security clearance
    or a current Background Investigation (BI). If the individual has a
    security file (clearance or BI) review of the file will be
    performed.

-   Review the OPF. If there is a favorable review of the security file
    and OPF, the security office will grant a waiver to bring the
    individual on board.

If an individual is assigned to TIGTA for 120 days or more, the same
steps will be taken as above.

If the individual does not have a current security clearance or BI the
following procedure will take place:

-   The individual will be required to fill out security forms for a
    Background Investigation; this investigation will be conducted at
    the National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) level.

-   Review of the OPF.

-   An interview with the individuals' current supervisor.

If the review of the OPF and interview with the individual's supervisor
are favorable, a waiver will be granted, pending the final outcome of
the NACLC.

### Employee Notification of Personnel Security Investigation.

#### Favorable Adjudication. 

Applicants/Employees: After the PSI is completed and adjudicated
favorably by the Security Management Office; the applicant/employee is
notified through a TD F67-32.4 "Certificate of Clearance and/or Security
Determination." The original form is forwarded to the Personnel Office
to be placed in the applicant/employee's OPF. A copy of the form is
placed in the applicant/employee's security folder that is kept in the
Security Management Office. A copy is also sent to the
applicant/employee for their record.

#### Unfavorable Adjudication. 

When the Security Management Office has determined that an applicant is
unsuitable for employment with TIGTA, the Personnel Office is
responsible for notifying the applicant of the adjudicative decision.
The Security Management Office drafts a letter (proposal letter) for the
Personnel Office to forward to the applicant. This letter will explain
the reasons for the preliminary decision that the applicant is
considered unsuitable for employment. The letter will also contain the
applicant's response procedures. The Security Management Office will
consider the applicant's response, if any, and prepare a final decision
letter for the Personnel Office. If the decision is for
disqualification, appeal rights will be included.

## Physical Security. {Reserved}

### Occupant Emergency Plan. 

This handbook is intended to provide policy and guidance on the
development, implementation and testing of occupant emergency plans for
all Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) facilities
offices and posts of duty.

#### Establishment of Occupant Emergency Plan Responsibility.

1.  The Designated Official is responsible for the development and
    maintenance of the occupant emergency plan. TIGTA Designated
    Officials are established by Delegation Order 28.

2.  In facilities where TIGTA is the Primary Occupant Agency, or it has
    been agreed that an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) official will be
    the Designated Official, the responsible TIGTA or IRS official will
    serve as the Designated Official.

3.  In facilities where the Designated Official has been determined to
    be other than an TIGTA employee, the senior resident TIGTA official
    will work with the Designated Official to develop and maintain an
    effective occupant emergency plan.

#### Awareness and Training.

1.  All employees must know that a plan has been developed for their
    protection and the protection of other assets. The employees should
    also know that an organization has been established to provide
    direction and assistance to them in the event an emergency does
    occur and that following the directions of the various monitors will
    enhance their protection. The unprotected portions of the plan (text
    150.3.1.3) should be available to all employees.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
4.  All members of the Occupant Emergency Organization (text 150.3.1.10)
    must be trained in their duties to be effective and must have access
    to the plan including protected portions that pertain to their
    duties.

#### Protection of the Plan. 

1.  The degree of protection required for each plan will depend on its
    content. Text 150.3.1.7 describes the components of the plan and
    provides for an introduction followed by several appendixes.
    Normally the introduction will not contain any information that must
    be protected, however, some of the various appendixes may. This is
    one of the purposes of arranging the plan in this fashion since
    using appendixes allows appropriate parts to be separated and
    protected leaving the remainder of the plan available for wider
    distribution.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
5.  Appendixes that contain information that would be detrimental to the
    protection of the facility if known by unauthorized personnel should
    be marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

6.  The local Physical Security function will provide guidance on proper
    marking and protection of the plan.

#### Reports Requirement. 

1.  A copy of the annual occupant emergency plan review will be
    forwarded to the Local Physical Security Officer and Headquarters
    Security Management Office.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
7.  An incident report will be filed as it relates to bombs and bomb
    threats; fire; severe weather; demonstrations; hostage situations;
    and earthquake, within the scope of the occupancy emergency plan.
    This report will be sent to the Local Physical Security Officer and
    Headquarters Security Management Office.

#### General. 

1.  An effective plan includes all anticipated emergencies, but is
    simple to follow and implement. Complex plans are more difficult to
    operate and often cause confusion. The plan should be designed to
    eliminate confusion and provide an orderly procedure for the
    protection of personnel, documents, property and facilities. Life
    safety is the primary concern.

    Refer to [Exhibit (500)-150,1, Occupant Emergency Plan Check
    List](../../500-exhibits/exhibit500-150-1.doc), for developing/
    updating your Occupant Emergency Plan.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
8.  A properly developed plan will require coordination with the various
    agencies and departments, both federal and state that provides
    assistance during emergencies. For example, knowledge of procedures
    and techniques used by local fire and police departments and the
    General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Protective Service is
    necessary to develop an effective plan to deal with fires, building
    evacuations, demonstrations, etc. Contacts with local Civil Defense
    organizations can develop awareness of local conditions for which
    special planning is needed such as flood, earthquake, and local
    severe weather hazards.

9.  It is important that all occupant agencies and activities be
    involved in all aspects of planning and staffing of the occupant
    emergency plan.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  If there are non-government activities in the building or facility,
    these activities will be invited to participate. It should be
    explained that the plan is designed to protect the life and property
    of all occupants and their participation will permit their special
    interests and needs to be considered and incorporated into the plan.

b.  If the non-government activities do not desire to participate in the
    plan, the plan should be developed without their participation.
    Provisions will be made in the plan that if an emergency does occur,
    where there is possible danger to other tenants, such as a fire,
    water leak, chemical or biological threat, explosion or the
    discovery of an explosive device, other tenants or the building
    management will be notified. Whether notification is made for each
    bomb threat or pending demonstration will depend on the tenants or
    building management.

c.  The Designated Official and a Physical Security Officer/Analyst
    should work with the director of a childcare center in the facility
    to develop and post emergency response procedures.

-   Childcare center staff should know whom to contact in the event of a
    medical emergency, how the childcare center will be notified of a
    fire or other danger that may require evacuation, the location of
    fire alarm boxes and fire extinguishers, the primary and secondary
    evacuation routes, and the locations of safe areas.

-   Each staff member should be assigned a specific group of children
    for whom he or she is to be responsible during an emergency.
    Childcare center staff should conduct practice drills over the
    prescribed evacuation routes so children won\'t be unprepared or
    unduly alarmed should a real emergency occur.

-   The plan should be developed to provide procedures, which will
    reduce the effect of the emergency to the greatest extent practical.

-   The plan will identify the responsible individual for each action
    specified in the plan.

#### Advisory Committee. 

An Advisory Committee consisting of the Building Manager, GSA Federal
Protective Service personnel, technical experts and local authorities
should be formed to help develop the plan and organization. The
committee should remain available for consultation after the plan has
been completed.

#### Components of the Plan. 

1.  The plan for each facility will be different because of the varied
    functions and sizes of offices and facilities within the TIGTA, but
    as a minimum, the plan for each regional office, district office,
    service center, large post of duty and the Headquarters Office, will
    consist of an introduction describing the purpose, scope and general
    content of the plan and an appendix each for:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  The Emergency Organization

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Emergency Services

b.  Evacuation Procedures

c.  Fire and Explosion

d.  Bombs and Bomb Threats

e.  Chemical and Biological Threats

f.  Hostage Situation

g.  Demonstrations and Civil Disorders

h.  Natural Disasters and Severe Weather

i.  Emergency Communication System

j.  Public Affairs

k.  Other appendixes as required by local needs

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
2.  The Headquarters Security Management Office will determine the level
    of occupant emergency planning required for smaller posts of duty
    based on local conditions. At a minimum each office will have a
    basic plan consisting of an introduction describing the purpose,
    scope and general contents of the plan and emergency procedures.

3.  The plan will designate a command center, which is staffed by the
    Command Center Team (TIGTA Operations Manual 150.3.1.11). The
    command center is the center of all emergency communications. An
    alternate command center should also be considered off-site to be
    used in the event the emergency situation denies use of the primary.

#### Plan Development Where the Designated Official is not a TIGTA Employee. 

1.   Each office or facility occupied by TIGTA personnel will have an
    occupant emergency plan whether or not a TIGTA employee is the
    designated official.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
10. In facilities where the designated official is not a TIGTA employee
    the responsible TIGTA official will cooperate with the designated
    official to develop and maintain an effective occupant emergency
    plan. Cooperation will include:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Advising the designated official of the TIGTA\'s needs and
    requirements.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
d.  Participating in training, drills, and tests.

e.  Providing proportionate staffing for the plan.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
11. The responsible TIGTA official, with assistance from local Security
    personnel, will evaluate the plan developed by the designated
    official to insure that it is adequate to meet the TIGTA\'s needs.
    The plan will be evaluated per guidelines in this Handbook. If the
    plan is determined to be inadequate and the designated official will
    not make the necessary adjustments, the responsible TIGTA official
    will supplement the plan as necessary. Any supplements determined to
    be necessary will be prepared as appendixes to the occupant
    emergency plan and will be distributed to TIGTA employees as
    appropriate.

#### Review of Occupant Emergency Plans.

Each occupant emergency plan will be reviewed annually by local security
personnel. The review will be conducted to determine if the plan is
current, adequately staffed and meets the other requirements outlined in
this Handbook. The review will be prepared in narrative form and will
include training efforts and dates of drills and tests of the plan. In
those cases where the designated official is not a TIGTA official the
review will also include coordination efforts with the designated
official and whether additional coordination is necessary. A copy of the
review will be provided to the TIGTA official responsible for the office
involved and a copy will be maintained in the files of the Local
Security function that conducted the review and an information copy will
be sent to the TIGTA headquarters security office.

#### General.

The Occupant Emergency Organization is established to provide a small,
organized group of knowledgeable employees to implement the occupant
emergency plan. The size of the Occupant Emergency Organization will
depend on the size and complexity of the office or facility. To avoid
communication problems the organization should be only as large as
necessary to effectively control any emergency situation. All members of
the organization will not have duties in all emergencies. For example,
in the event of a fire, the Bomb Search Team or Hostage Negotiator will
not have functions. The Occupant Emergency Organization appendix will
show the individuals name, position title in the plan, and telephone
number. The appendix will also contain an organization chart and a
synopsis of the duties of each position.

#### Staffing. 

1.  The staffing for the plan should, whenever possible, be individuals
    who serve in leadership positions in their day-to-day duties. This
    will enhance the effectiveness and authority of the plan. Minimum
    staffing for any plan will be the Designated Official and the
    Occupant Emergency Coordinator which will normally only be
    considered for very small facilities or very small local offices
    where other occupant agencies are not involved. In some offices it
    may be appropriate to assign a person to more than one position.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
12. In multiple occupant buildings the Occupant Emergency Organization
    should include members from each agency as appropriate. If there are
    nongovernmental activities in the building the organization should
    include members from each activity as appropriate.

13. Considerations for staffing the Command Center Team are: Designated
    Official, Occupant Emergency Coordinator, Floor Team Coordinator,
    Damage Control Coordinator, Medical Coordinator, Public Affairs
    Officer, Administrative Officer, and technical advisors.

14. Considerations for other members of the Occupant Emergency
    Organization include: Floor Monitors, Area Monitors, Stairwell
    Monitors, Handicapped Monitors, Elevator Monitors, Bomb Search
    Officer, Bomb Search Team members, Hostage Negotiator(s), Damage
    Control Officer, Damage Control Team members, and messengers.

#### General. 

The orderly removal of individuals from an area of danger is a necessary
part of any emergency plan. The larger the building the more complicated
the evacuation tends to be. The evacuation procedures should provide for
the fastest route(s) out of the building for all occupants. Alternate
routes are specified to be used in the event the primary route is not
accessible. The primary goal is to move individuals from the danger area
as safely and rapidly as possible.

#### Evacuation Authorization. 

1.  The official(s), with appropriate alternate(s), authorized to order
    an evacuation must be specified in the plan. The decision of whether
    to evacuate depends on the type of threat, the circumstances of the
    threat and where the danger is or is suspected to be.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
15. Evacuation for a fire, bomb threat, explosion, inclement weather,
    utility failure or some other hazardous condition may or may not be
    prudent. To assist the authorizing official(s) in making a
    determination, the following should be considered:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  There will be situations where the evacuation will be automatic,
    such as the pulling of a fire alarm in a building that does not have
    a presignal system.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
f.  Evacuation of the entire building or area may not always be
    advisable or practical. In many cases partial evacuation will be
    more advisable, such as when an explosive device is found in a large
    building or an explosion occurs in one area of a large building.

g.  Care must be taken not to move individuals from a relatively safe
    area through a danger area in the process of evacuation. Good
    communications and well-trained monitors are necessary to prevent
    such situations.

h.  Text 150.3.1.30 contains factors to be considered in the event of a
    bomb threat.

#### Evacuation Signals. 

1.  The method of notifying occupants to evacuate will vary depending on
    the building layout and alarm system installed, but must be
    specified in the plan. The general alarm can and should normally be
    used for complete evacuation.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
16. Different types of emergencies, such as fire, bomb threat, bomb,
    suspicious package, explosion, gas leak, power failure, etc., may
    require different procedures. Evacuation may also be advisable prior
    to a severe weather condition. Depending on the facility some of
    these situations may require a method of notification other than the
    general alarm.

17. Good communications are necessary to get the proper word to the
    proper people to avoid confusion. The monitors must know which
    procedure is to be used so that the occupants can be efficiently
    notified and directed to the proper location.

18. To ensure that alarms, signals, and other methods of communication
    are in working order and effective, periodic tests of the system may
    be conducted without an evacuation. All occupants should be advised
    prior to such tests so that they will become familiar with the
    methods of notification.

#### Evacuation Procedures. 

1.  Keeping in mind that the first consideration is life safety, the
    evacuation should be orderly and rapid, but running should not be
    permitted. Personnel should take purses and coats (inclement
    weather) with them but should not stop to take other personal
    belongings. Doors and windows should be closed but not locked to
    provide effective smoke and fire containment if the evacuation is
    for a fire. If conditions permit, cash, documents, and small office
    equipment should be secured in locked containers prior to
    evacuation.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
19. The workstation of each handicapped employee must be identified. A
    handicapped monitor will be assigned to each handicapped employee to
    assist him/her evacuate the area. After the employee has been
    assisted to a safe place the monitor will notify the Occupant
    Emergency Coordinator through the Occupant Emergency Organization.

20. Monitors will ensure that persons do not re-enter the area(s)
    evacuated until the area(s) have been determined safe and the
    Designated Official authorizes re-entry. It is quite possible for
    visitors to be unaware that an area or building has been evacuated
    unless someone at the entry point so advises them.

#### Specification of Evacuation Sites. 

When a building or area is evacuated the evacuees must know where to go.
The choices of where the evacuees will go are varied but will be
restricted by the configuration of the building, location of the
building, facilities in the area and the reason for evacuation.

1.  For general building evacuation, a nearby park, an auditorium in a
    nearby building, etc., may be specified.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
21. For partial evacuation instructions may specify to go up or down one
    floor or leave the building and assemble at a specified alternate
    location.

22. For severe weather warning instructions may specify to proceed to an
    inner core of the building, to the basement, to a nearby shelter, or
    to\
    return home.

#### Building Re-entry. 

Employees that have evacuated a building must know how they will be
notified that they may re-enter the building. The method of recalling
employees will often depend on where they have assembled. It may be
appropriate to provide controls for re-entry to the building especially
if the emergency situation resulted in damage or obstructions.

#### Drill Schedules. 

1.  To be effective, a plan must be tested. Evacuation drills test the
    evacuation procedures, help the monitors become familiar with their
    duties and familiarize occupants with the procedures. The following
    are recommendations and requirements for the conduct of drills.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  A drill will be conducted at least annually either as part of or in
    addition to the plan review required in text 150.3.1.9. Although
    actual evacuation drills are recommended for effective emergency
    planning, an effective drill can be conducted without a total
    evacuation of a facility and may consist of a discussion about
    evacuation routes, duties and responsibilities of various employees,
    and the use of fire extinguishers. These discussions will be
    followed by a \"walk-through\" of the evacuation routes. Drills of
    this nature can be conducted by groups or sections of employees.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
i.  Facilities that experience a high rate of employee turnover should
    consider semi-annual drills.

j.  Procedures will be established to provide for the notification of
    the appropriate Security function when drills are conducted. The
    notification will include comments about any plan weaknesses or
    training needs determined by the drill.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
23. The local Security function will maintain records of the date of the
    last drill and the scheduled frequency of drills for each facility
    within its jurisdiction. The Chief, Security function, will advise
    the designated official when the drill for a facility is due.

#### General. 

1.  The availability and response of emergency services are vital to an
    emergency plan. The right help obtained rapidly will greatly
    minimize the effect of the emergency. The plan must identify, with
    phone numbers, the services required for each emergency as well as
    the capabilities, limitations and response times of each service.
    The Advisory Committee in (text 150.3.1.6) may be of assistance in
    the development of this part of the plan.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
24. In relatively small offices these requirements will be greatly
    scaled down to meet the needs of the particular office.

#### Unlawful Acts. 

All occupants must know whom to notify if they observe a theft or other
unlawful act or suspicious incident. In addition to local procedures for
reporting incidents to Inspection and Security, sources of immediate
response should be known which include GSA Federal Protective Officers,
contract guards, and local, state and federal law enforcement
authorities. Jurisdictional limitations must be determined when
developing the notification list. Additional reporting requirements are
under development.

#### Medical Assistance. 

1.  Medical assistance will not be required in all emergencies, however,
    the availability of medical assistance must be known in the event
    the emergency does result in injuries. In large facilities planning
    must include provisions for getting medical assistance for events
    that result in large scale injuries. If injuries do occur,
    professional medical assistance must be called immediately. After
    actions are taken to prevent further injuries, the first priority
    becomes aiding the injured utilizing persons trained in first aid
    until professional medical assistance arrives. Sources of aid to the
    injured are:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Employees trained in first aid

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
k.  Federal Protective Officers (all are trained in first aid)

l.  Health units

m.  Emergency medical service (volunteers, police and fire departments,\
    hospitals, rescue squads)

n.  Local doctors

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
25. The quicker the response the better the results. For this reason
    employees trained in first aid are an excellent source of immediate
    aid. First aid should not be relied upon as final treatment but
    rendered only until professional medical assistance arrives. The
    area surrounding the facility should be surveyed to identify other
    sources of medical assistance as close as possible to reduce the
    response time as much as possible.

#### Rescue. 

1.  Each occupant emergency plan will provide provisions for performing
    rescue operations. Preplanning will enhance the safety and
    survivability of those individuals who may become injured and/or
    trapped in a building or area. The larger the complex the greater
    the possibility exists that an emergency will result in a situation
    that will require an organized rescue operation. Sources of
    assistance are the Federal Protective Officers, local rescue squads,
    fire departments, police departments, and civil defense
    organizations.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
26. In those offices where tornadoes and earthquakes may occur, a rescue
    pack could aid in the rescue of employees. Suggested items to be
    considered for inclusion in a rescue pack:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  A three-ton hydraulic jack

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
o.  8-lb sledgehammer

p.  8:1 ratio block and tackle

q.  Nylon/cotton rope

r.  Wrecking bars

s.  Bolt cutter

t.  First aid kit

u.  Helmets with protective visors

v.  Lanterns

w.  Heavy-duty flashlights

x.  Walkie-talkie radios

y.  Voice guns

#### Fire Control. 

Employees must know where local fire alarm boxes are and under what
conditions they should be used. The plan should take into consideration
the response time and type of local fire emergency equipment. Further
guidance on fire is in Section 150.3.1.25

#### Toxins and Toxic Fumes. 

Toxins and toxic fumes may come from hazardous chemicals, gas leak or
other sources. Although the Federal Protective Officers can provide
assistance in the event of Toxins and toxic fumes, the best local source
of assistance will usually be the fire department.

#### General.

1.  Fire is the most likely threat to life and property that may be
    faced by an emergency organization. Although TIGTA facilities have
    been fortunate in recent years, industrial experience shows that
    fire continues to be a major cause of death, injury, property damage
    and operational disruption.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
27. A major portion of the TIGTA\'s efforts to deal with the threat of
    fire must be in fire prevention. When developing fire prevention
    measures it is essential that security personnel work closely with
    safety personnel to create a comprehensive and coordinated effort to
    deal with the threat of fire. It is also important to coordinate
    with local fire officials represented on the Advisory Committee
    recommended in text 150.3.1.6.

##### General.

1.  All TIGTA facilities will have written plans to deal with fire
    emergencies.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
28. Plans to deal with fire emergencies should avoid unnecessary detail
    and complexity and should emphasize life safety and quick action.
    Completed plans must accomplish the following objectives:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Notifying the fire department.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
z.  Evacuating personnel from any area of danger.

a.  Keeping in mind that the first consideration is life safety,
    firefighting operations may be initiated, continuing as long as
    conditions are tenable, reasonably safe and within the capabilities
    of the personnel involved and the protective equipment provided.

b.  Directing the fire department to the scene of the fire and providing
    aid and information as necessary.

c.  Removing portable equipment and records endangered by the fire, as
    long as there is no danger to personnel.

d.  Informing management of the incident and extent of loss and damage.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
29. The fire appendix will include, at a minimum, the following
    information:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Telephone numbers for the fire department and the appropriate
    individuals in the Occupant Emergency Organization.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
e.  Location and use of fire extinguishers.

f.  Evacuation procedures and routes (reference to evacuation appendix).

g.  Location and use of fire alarms.

h.  Any special plans necessary for handicapped employees.

##### Additional Planning for ADP Facilities. 

1.  TIGTA operations are highly dependent on automatic data processing
    (ADP) equipment and it is imperative that special care be taken to
    protect that equipment from fire and consequent smoke and water
    damage. Enhanced emergency response procedures for computer room
    personnel will be developed, included in the plan and prominently
    posted.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Minimum procedures to be included in the plan:

-   Evacuation routes.

-   The location, and criteria for, use, of emergency power cut-off\
    switches.

-   The location, and instructions for use of fire extinguishers or
    other protective devices designed for use in the computer
    environment.

i.  Consideration will also be given to providing waterproof covers for
    the protection of ADP equipment. The waterproof covers can vary from
    fitted covers of light canvas, nylon, or plastic to plastic sheeting
    or like material.

-   Waterproof covers are useful to protect ADP equipment from
    contaminants in the event:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   A leak develops in the roof of the building.

-   A leak develops in over-head water lines.

-   A leak develops in the sprinkler system or a sprinkler head
    malfunctions.

-   A fire develops in the floor above a computer room and water will be
    used to fight the fire.

-   There is going to be construction in the area that will produce
    dust.

-   Smoke or soot is likely to filter into the area.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   When waterproof covers are used the following precautions must be
    observed:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Ensure that the equipment has been powered down.

-   Do not place covers on equipment where heat build-up within the
    equipment will cause internal damage.

-   If covers are used priorities should be placed on the most vital\
    equipment.

-   Store waterproof material where it will be readily available.

-   Do not use the covers if there is danger of fire in the immediate
    area (melted plastic will cause more damage than the water).

-   Do not place the covers on the equipment at the risk of injury to
    personnel.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Discussion: When electronic equipment has been doused with water,
    fire fighting chemicals, smoke or soot, it is imperative that action
    be taken to clean and dry the equipment as soon as possible. If
    clean water has been the contaminant, drying is all that is
    necessary and little, if any damage should result. A supply of water
    displacing compound may be available so that emergency treatment can
    begin as soon as possible. Caution should be used in using the
    water-displacing compound, which may be flammable. Immediate action
    is to be taken if the equipment is contaminated with dirty water,
    fire fighting chemicals or smoke would consist of spraying the
    equipment with clean water to wash away the contaminant. This should
    then be followed with the latest salvage procedures as recommended
    by the manufacturer.

30. Computer room emergency response procedures will define what actions
    must be taken, assign responsibilities for each action and provide
    necessary material and equipment in handy locations. In some cases,
    there will be ample time to initiate loss control measures but in
    extreme emergencies, life safety will dictate immediate evacuation.
    For this reason, emergency response procedures will designate one or
    more individuals in each computer room who, in the event of an
    emergency, shall determine what can be done to protect equipment and
    records without endangering life, and direct computer room personnel
    accordingly.

31. The plan will also require that each employee regularly assigned to
    work in a computer environment receive instructions concerning the
    provisions of the plan.

#### Liaison with Local Fire Departments. 

Contact with the local fire department, who should be represented on the
Advisory Committee (text 150.3.1.6), is essential to the fire emergency
planning process. The occupant emergency plan should be reviewed with
the fire department that would respond in case of fire. These reviews
will help avoid a conflict between the techniques and practices of the
fire department and the provisions of the plan.

#### General. 

1.  Although most bomb threats do not result in an explosion or
    discovery of an explosive device, it is very important that threats
    are thoroughly evaluated and that effective procedures exist for
    reacting to threats.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
32. Aside from explosion, the two significant dangers that exist with
    bomb threats are the sense of complacency that can develop from
    repeated hoax threats and the panic that can result from the lack of
    appropriate action when a threat is perceived to be real. Both
    dangers can be partially overcome by instructing personnel about the
    organization and procedures involved in bomb threat reaction, and by
    establishing uniform bomb threat reporting procedures throughout the
    facility. Properly established reporting procedures will avoid
    having information delayed or stopped on its way to the official
    with responsibility for evaluating threats.

33. Analysis of bomb threat data indicates that most threats are made to
    create a sense of fear in the employees and disrupt the facility at
    which the threat is directed. The objective can be denied, to a
    great extent, by effective planning and organization.

#### Bomb Threat Planning. 

1.  All TIGTA facilities will have written plans to deal with bomb
    threats and explosions.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
34. A position entitled Bomb Search Officer will be included in the
    organization of every plan. The Bomb Search Officer should be an
    individual with a good general knowledge of the physical layout of
    the entire facility as well as the type of work that is done in each
    area. This knowledge will help determine the areas most susceptible
    to the introduction of an explosive device and will facilitate
    quick, effective searches. Bomb Search Officer should only be
    assisted by local law enforcement specifically trained in this area.

35. The plan will provide for all bomb threat information to be relayed
    to the Bomb Search Officer as quickly as possible. The Bomb Search
    Officer will be responsible for analyzing the threat, presenting the
    analysis of the threat to the Designated Official, initiating any
    search of evacuation (as directed by the Designated Official) that
    is considered to be appropriate, and notifying the appropriate
    federal and local authorities.

36. The Bomb Search Officer will be responsible for arranging bomb
    threat plan training and drills and for conducting liaison with
    local and federal offices that provide assistance with the
    implementation of the bomb threat plan. In addition to the local
    police and GSA Federal Protective Service, assistance can be
    obtained from U.S. Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments.

37. The Bomb Search Officer is responsible for the development of a
    local form to be used to record the receipt of bomb threat
    information. The form will include a requirement that any employee
    receiving bomb threat information immediately notify his/her
    supervisor; that the supervisor immediately notify the Bomb Search
    Officer; and the Bomb Search Officer notify the appropriate local
    authorities. The priority or order in which the notifications are
    made may be changed to meet local requirements or the desires of
    management.

38. The plan should include procedures to implement more stringent than
    normal security procedures in the event that bomb threats become a
    recurring problem. These procedures include access controls, package
    searches and screening of mail.

39. The Bomb Search Officer will conduct an analysis of the facility to
    identify the areas most susceptible to placement of an explosive
    device. Potential concealment areas around outer walls, restrooms,
    trash containers, public access areas, etc., will be evaluated in
    the analysis. A properly conducted analysis will be helpful in the
    event a search is necessary.

#### Bomb Search. 

1.  All TIGTA employees involved in bomb searches will be advised not to
    touch strange or suspicious objects or packages. Under no
    circumstances will a TIGTA employee attempt to move or examine a
    suspected explosive device.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
40. Searches involving TIGTA employees will be limited to the
    identification of a suspected explosive device. Examination and
    removal will be left to local or federal authorities trained in the
    disposal of explosives.

41. Searches are most effectively conducted by individuals familiar with
    the area to be searched. When a bomb threat is considered to be
    serious, local and/or federal authorities trained in bomb search and
    disposal techniques will be called immediately to assist with the
    search. Searches should begin in the area previously identified as
    most susceptible to concealing an explosive device unless a location
    was provided with the threat.

42. If it is determined that in-depth searches will be conducted by
    TIGTA employees, the search team members will be provided with
    training in search methods and techniques. The local or federal
    agency that would be called to provide bomb disposal should be
    contacted for assistance with the training.

43. If a suspected explosive device is located the Bomb Search Team will
    notify the Bomb Search Officer and open all windows and doors in the
    area. They will not touch or move the device. The Bomb Search
    Officer will recommend to the Designated Official how much area
    should be evacuated and notify the appropriate local or federal
    disposal unit if they have not already been notified.

#### Bomb Threat Evacuations.

1.  Whether to evacuate or not when a bomb threat is received is a
    decision that only the Designated Official can make. Even though
    general experience indicates that most bomb threats are hoaxes, all
    factors must be considered. The safest course of action may appear
    to be evacuation. On the other hand, continued bomb threats,
    followed by automatic evacuation of the facility, could cripple our
    operation and encourage still more threats. Some of the factors the
    Designated Official should consider in making the decision are:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Current trends involving bomb threats and explosions\--the local
    police department may be a good source of information.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
j.  The character and consequences of recent threats in the
    area\--percentage of threats that results in an explosion or an
    explosive device being found.

k.  Whether recent activity of dissident groups has been directed
    against government agencies, or against TIGTA and or the IRS
    specifically.

l.  Characteristics of recent threats toward local TIGTA offices if any.

m.  Content of threat\--whether caller specified a location or time the
    bomb is to explode.

n.  Whether evacuation will put personnel in greater danger of injury
    than remaining in place.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
44. When there is doubt whether to evacuate it is generally better to
    err on the side of evacuation since life safety is of prime
    importance.

45. If evacuation is directed, the evacuation will be conducted as
    specified in text 150.3.1.12.

#### Bomb Detonations. 

If an explosion occurs in or immediately adjacent to a TIGTA facility,
the local police will be contacted immediately advising them of the need
for medical aid. The nearest Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
office will also be notified as soon as possible. The area surrounding
the explosion will be evacuated and kept clear to prevent destruction of
evidence and to minimize the dangers of secondary explosions caused by
leaking gas lines, falling debris, and explosions from other explosive
devices. If there are any injured personnel they will be given first-aid
while waiting for further medical assistance.

#### Severe Weather. 

Severe weather conditions can affect all TIGTA facilities. The affects
range from minor disruption of operations to life threatening events
capable of destroying entire facilities.

##### General. 

1.  All TIGTA facilities will have written plans to deal with local
    severe weather threats.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
46. Severe weather plans are to be developed based on the type(s) of
    weather most likely to cause life threatening conditions or
    disruption of operations. The types of weather conditions that
    should be considered are:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Tornado

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
o.  Hurricane and windstorm

p.  Winter storm

q.  Severe thunderstorm

r.  Flooding

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
47. Local Civil Defense offices should be contacted to obtain
    information about the conditions most likely to occur in the area of
    a particular facility.

##### Office Closings. 

1.  Severe weather plans should have provisions for advising employees
    of an office closing in the event that adverse conditions develop
    before working hours. In large offices the use of local radio
    stations should be considered as a notification medium. In smaller
    offices the cascade call system may be the most effective means of
    making the notification.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
48. In the event that local radio stations are used as a notification
    medium, the radio station call signs and frequencies will be
    included in the severe weather appendix.

#### Demonstrations. 

All TIGTA facilities are subject to the disruption that can result from
demonstrations. Disruption can result when a demonstration is directed
at TIGTA or when directed at other tenants of a facility occupied by or
near the offices.

##### General. 

1.  All TIGTA facilities will have written plans to deal with
    demonstrations.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
49. In recent years demonstrations have tended to be non-violent. With
    this in mind, the emphasis on planning for demonstration reaction
    must be on minimizing the potential for confrontation that can
    develop into violence and for avoiding the involvement of TIGTA
    employees with demonstrators in all but the most unusual cases.

50. TIGTA employees should be instructed to continue working and to stay
    away from windows and doors to the extent possible during
    demonstrations.

51. Local law enforcement agencies and the GSA Federal Protective
    Service should be contacted in order to develop coordinated plans to
    deal with demonstrations.

##### Distribution of Handbills. 

Federal Property Management Regulations 101-20.309 authorizes persons or
organizations, with a permit from the building manager, to distribute
handbills in public areas of GSA controlled property. If the persons
distributing the handbills enter areas not authorized by the permit or
cause a disturbance action will be taken to notify the building manager,
Investigations SIID or local police as necessary. Interaction between
employees and demonstrators will be avoided.

##### Use of TIGTA Investigations Personnel. 

1.  TIGTA Investigations personnel will be utilized in demonstration
    control only when one or both of the following conditions exist:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  There is a clear and present danger to federal employees and
    property in federally owned or leased space and other local or
    federal law enforcement officers are not available to provide
    adequate protection.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
s.  There is a request from local or other federal law enforcement
    agencies for the use of TIGTA Investigations personnel to assist
    with control of a demonstration at a TIGTA or IRS occupied facility.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
52. If time permits TIGTA Investigations personnel should be deputized
    by the local U.S. Attorney or U.S. Marshal prior to being utilized
    in demonstration control.

53. This Handbook is not meant to suggest any limitation on normal
    enforcement functions and does not pertain to instances where TIGTA
    Investigations personnel are to be used as part of a federal force.

#### Employee Job Actions. 

1.  Personnel Division develops plans for TIGTA employee job actions.
    Planning for demonstrations that result from TIGTA employee job
    actions requires coordination with the Personnel Officer for the
    TIGTA facility involved.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
54. Most employee job actions will not require the use of emergency
    action plans. However in the unlikely event that an employee job
    action becomes a threat to life and property, the demonstration
    plans will be utilized to control the incident.

#### General Hostage Incidents.

1.  In recent years the use of hostages to gain negotiating advantage
    has increased. The TIGTA susceptibility to this threat is low
    because of limited public access to employees and managers.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
55. When dealing with hostage incidents in an ideal setting, properly
    trained and equipped law enforcement agencies will be available to
    control the situation. However, because of the wide range of TIGTA
    locations ideal conditions are not always attainable, especially in
    the early development of an incident.

##### General. 

1.  All TIGTA facilities will have written plans to deal with hostage
    situations. Coordinated with Investigations SIID or the local police
    department as appropriate.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
56. The plans will include, at a minimum, the following information:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Telephone numbers for the law enforcement agencies that will provide
    support in the event of a hostage incident.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
t.  Designation of the TIGTA officials responsible for conducting
    negotiations or assisting law enforcement agencies with
    negotiations, (the designation will include name, position title and
    telephone number).

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
57. All TIGTA prepared hostage situation plans must emphasize the use of
    properly trained law enforcement agencies except in unavoidable
    circumstances.

##### Guidelines for Hostage Situation Control.

The following guidelines are provided as general background information
on the control of hostage situations and will be used until the
appropriate law enforcement agency takes control of the incident:

1.  Isolate the area involved by evacuating employees and visitors.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
58. Cordon off the area to prevent entry by unauthorized persons.

59. Maintain communications with hostage captor(s). Communications will
    be conducted in such a way as to avoid provocation of the captors or
    escalation of the incident. Any communication that allows time for
    the arrival of the appropriate law enforcement agency is usually
    worthwhile.

#### Contacts for Hostage Planning Assistance. 

1.  Local police departments will be contacted to determine the
    resources available for handling hostage incidents. Assistance with
    specific planning needs and training for the employees designated in
    the plan should also be pursued.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
60. The GSA Federal Protective Service should be contacted to determine
    the level of assistance available from that function.

#### General Earthquake Threat Planning.

The most important time for earthquake threat planning is during
facility site selection and determination of construction standards.
Planning from the ground up is, however, rarely an option available to
facility managers. This, coupled with the current inability to prevent
or accurately predict earthquakes, leaves emergency planners with the
task of providing effective reaction to a threat with rapid onset and an
intensity that cannot be mitigated once underway.

##### General. 

1.  Earthquake emergency plans will be prepared for all TIGTA facilities
    which are in seismic risk zone 3 as defined by the U.S. Geological
    Survey. For facilities in seismic risk zone 1 and 2, a review of
    historical data and advice from local Civil Defense authorities will
    be helpful in making a determination on the need for earthquake
    emergency plans.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
61. Local Civil Defense authorities should be contacted to obtain
    training and guidelines for earthquake emergency response.

##### Guidelines for Earthquake Reaction. 

The following are general guidelines for behavior during and after an
earthquake.

1.  During the earthquake:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Stay indoors if already there.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
u.  Take cover under sturdy furniture such as desks or worktables.

v.  Stay near the center of the building.

w.  Stay away from glass windows and doors.

x.  Do not walk through or near buildings where there is a danger of
    falling debris.

y.  If outside, stay away from buildings and utility wires.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
62. After the earthquake:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  Stay out of damaged buildings.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
z.  Have building maintenance check the building for damaged water or
    gas lines and broken or shorted electrical lines.

#### General Communications.

Emergency plans require rapid communication in order to be effective. A
pyramid or cascade system is an effective means of alerting an emergency
organization without tying up the communications system.

##### Cascade Call Concept. 

1.  The concept of the cascade call system is simple. One individual
    initiates the system by calling one set of individuals who then call
    other sets of individuals. The number of calls each individual is
    responsible for will vary with the size of the organization but the
    number should be as small as possible.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
63. For occupant emergency planning purposes the individual responsible
    for initiating the cascade call systems should be the Designated
    Official or other TIGTA official responsible for initiating
    emergency action.

64. In addition to initiating emergency action plans, the cascade call
    system should be considered as a means of providing notification of
    office closings to all employees of small facilities.

##### Maintenance of Cascade Call Systems. 

1.  A cascade call system that contains incorrect names and telephone
    numbers is useless; therefore, reviews are necessary to validate the
    system.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
65. In facilities where a cascade call system is used to initiate
    emergency action plans, the system will be validated quarterly. This
    will be accomplished by routing a copy of the call list to the
    participants in the system or through existing automated system
    designed and designated for this purpose. Each individual will then
    enter any corrections needed and initial next to his/her name. A
    copy of the validated list will be forwarded to the appropriate,
    local security function and Headquarters Security Management Office,
    for review.

66. In addition to the quarterly validation, participants in the call
    system will be instructed to immediately advise the designated
    official whenever telephone numbers or other information needs
    revision.

##### Limitations of Cascade Call Systems. 

1.  Total reliance on the telephone, cell, landline or other systems
    that do not have back-up or self-contained power sources, as the
    sole means of communication should be avoided during emergencies.
    Since the results of a serious emergency condition frequently
    include downed power and telephone lines, alternate communication
    systems should be devised.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
67. Alternate communication systems that should be considered range from
    radios using batteries or back-up power sources, to messengers.

#### Emergency Situation Perceptions.

A potential danger in any emergency situation is the perceptions of what
employees and/or the public think happened as opposed to what really
happened. Misinformation received by employees or the public may be as
damaging as the emergency. There must be a plan for disseminating
information to those who have need and or a right to know.

##### Public Affairs Emergency Plans.

1.  All TIGTA offices will have written public affairs emergency plans.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
68. To ensure that accurate information is disseminated and the office
    speaks with one voice a spokesman must be appointed to the Occupant
    Emergency Team. In headquarter offices; the public affairs officer
    will be the spokesperson. In smaller offices an individual able to
    deal with people should be appointed and to the degree possible
    information disseminated should be coordinated with the headquarters
    public affairs officer.

69. The individual appointed as the public affairs officer on the
    Occupant Emergency Team must be kept fully advised of the entire
    emergency plan and should attend as many planning sessions as
    possible.

70. The public affairs officer must also be advised what can and cannot
    be released.

71. During the emergency the public affairs officer must be kept advised
    of all occurrences and actions taken so that proper and accurate
    information may be disseminated.

72. There must be procedures for keeping employees informed of the
    situation as well as the public. Good liaison with the news media
    will keep the public informed. Employees may be kept informed
    through managers, public address systems or other methods that will
    effectively get the word out.

##### Guidelines for Public Affairs Emergency Planning. 

The following guidelines will assist in planning a successful public
affairs emergency response:

1.  Release only verified information.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
73. Promptly alert the press of relief and recovery efforts.

74. Escort the press.

75. Keep accurate records and logs of all inquiries and news coverage.

76. Try to find out and meet press deadlines.

77. Have a clear idea of what can and cannot be released.

78. Carefully coordinate planning and implementation of public affairs
    emergency plans with security and operations personnel.

79. Do not speculate on causes of the emergency.

80. Do not speculate on the resumption of normal operations.

81. Do not speculate on the outside effects of the emergency.

82. Do not speculate on the dollar value of losses.

83. Do not interfere with the legitimate duties of newsperson(s).

84. Do not permit unauthorized persons to comment to the press.

85. Do not cover up events or purposely mislead the press.

86. Do not place blame for the emergency.

### Building Pass Program.

#### Identification Card/Building Passes. 

All employees of TIGTA will be issued an Identification Card/Building
Pass that identifies the user as a TIGTA employee. The Identification
Card/Building Pass will be in addition to any TIGTA credentials issued.
Each pass will include the following:

FRONT

-   A color photo of the employee with the appropriate colored
    background

-   The name of the employee

-   The signature of the employee

-   An ID card number to include the suffix letter "T"

-   The date of issue

-   The word "TIGTA" in the lower right corner

-   The Treasury Seal

REVERSE

-   The following warning, "Issued for identification of holder.
    Improper use, possession, alteration, reproduction or counterfeiting
    of this card will make the offender liable to criminal penalties."

-   Property of U.S. Government. If found drop in any U.S. mailbox.
    Postmaster: Postage Guaranteed.

-   Return to: M:S:RE:FP, 1111 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC
    20224

IRS has agreed to produce the Identification Card/Building Pass for
TIGTA. All lost Identification Card/Building passes will be returned to
IRS, Washington DC. TIGTA's Security Management Office will be notified
by IRS in the event that a lost pass is returned to IRS.

#### ID Card/Building Pass Production. 

These passes will be produced by the IRS, Washington, DC. IRS will issue
TIGTA Identification Card/Building Pass numbers and keep a record of
each pass issued. IRS will maintain any required personal information
and a color photo of each employee.

#### TIGTA Property. 

Identification Card/Building Passes are the property of TIGTA and are
issued for official TIGTA business and can be used to gain entry into
Treasury buildings. The use of the TIGTA ID/Building Pass does not
preclude any bureau within Treasury from issuing a temporary pass while
visiting their facility. In addition, some bureaus may establish
turnstiles or other card reader passes to enter particular facilities.
TIGTA will not customarily request that such cards be issued unless a
TIGTA employee is an occupant.

#### Lost Identification Card/Building Pass. 

Lost ID/Building Passes shall be reported to the Security Management
Office as soon as possible.

#### Separating Employees. 

When a TIGTA employee separates from TIGTA, the ID/Building Pass will be
turned into or sent to the Security Management Office by the employee's
immediate manager.

#### Headquarters Employees. 

New TIGTA employees in headquarters will obtain a request for a TIGTA
ID/Building Pass from the TIGTA Personnel Office who will prepare the
request for a ID/Building Pass. The employee will present the request in
person to the IRS Security and Safety Operations Section, at 1111
Constitution Avenue, Washington DC, where a photo will be taken and an
ID/Building Pass issued.

#### Contractors. 

Contractors assigned to TIGTA are required to have a background
clearance and to obtain an ID/Building Pass. Any TIGTA function hiring a
contractor is required to contact the Security Management Office prior
to allowing access to TIGTA facilities.

#### Field Employees. 

TIGTA field employees will follow the instructions, as set forth in
[TIGTA Memorandum #01-10, dated Feb 7,
2001](../../../tigta-numbered-memos/fy2001/tigta0110.htm) from the
Assistant Inspector General Management Services.

## Badges and Credentials.

150.4.1 [Purpose]{.underline}

This section establishes policy and requirements regarding the issuance,
use, control and accountability of official credentials and Special
Agent/Investigative Specialist badges utilized by TIGTA.

2.  Definitions

  ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------
  Special Agent/         These are distinctive metallic emblems, which
  Investigative          convey the instant authority of the bearer and
  Specialist Badges      serve as an outward sign and representative
                         symbol of specific authority.

  Bureau                 For purposes of this section the term "bureau"
                         refers to TIGTA.

  Credentials            These are recognized forms of identification,
                         which describe the authority of the bearer and
                         identify that individual's right to exercise
                         specific authority for expressed official and
                         legal purposes.

  Credentials without a  These are issued to authorized employees, as
  badge                  warranted. Such person(s) may not have specific
                         statutory authority of the types listed below,
                         but do conduct official inquiries, which
                         include, but are not necessarily limited to:
                         accessing facilities, property, files or
                         records; and requesting or requiring assistance
                         in compliance with official duties. Positions
                         may include, but are not necessarily limited to,
                         Security Management Office; Security Analyst;
                         Security Specialist; General Investigator;
                         Auditor or Attorney.

  Credentials with a     These connote that the bearer performs specific
  Special                official functions as authorized by law, statute
  Agent/Investigative    or Treasury/TIGTA regulation. Examples include,
  Specialist Badge       but are not necessarily limited to, carrying
                         firearms, making seizures of property subject to
                         forfeiture, making arrests, executing or serving
                         warrants, and fulfilling protective, inspection
                         or investigatory functions of the United States
                         on behalf of TIGTA. Positions are limited to
                         Criminal Investigators (Special Agents) and
                         Investigative Specialists. Positions where the
                         duties are limited to auditing, general
                         investigating, legal or security work shall not
                         be authorized Special Agent/Investigative
                         Specialist badges unless the Treasury Inspector
                         General for Tax Administration approves the
                         issuance.
  ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------

3.  [Policy.]{.underline}

It is the policy of TIGTA that credentials and Special
Agent/Investigative Specialist badges shall be issued only to
specifically authorized personnel as evidence of their authority when
having contact with the public and in official dealings with Federal,
State, local or foreign officials under purposes authorized by law,
statute, or Treasury regulation.

### Requirements.

Credentials will usually be issued only to permanent TIGTA employees by
the Security Management Office. As determined by the Inspector General,
either on a case-by-case basis or by category of employee position and
upon positive determination of need, credentials and Special
Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields may be issued to temporary
personnel. Examples may include temporary hires or a Federal employee of
another agency who possesses unique skills and is engaged to conduct
special investigations or inquiries on behalf of TIGTA. Requests for the
issuance of credentials (with or without a badge) to designated security
or other issuing authority for personnel in positions not previously
identified as requiring same shall be in writing and approved by the
bureau head. This shall be based upon the incumbents' official position
and the degree to which they engage in activities, which support the
need for credentials and badges in fulfillment of specific official
responsibilities.

-   [Contents]{.underline}. Credentials shall consist of two separate
    laminated cards, which may be permanently affixed, in a protective
    case or folder to protect them and inhibit removal or tampering. The
    upper portion normally displays the printed legal name and title of
    the bearer; the bottom portion describes the authority conferred and
    provides evidence of the bearer's signature and photograph.
    Credentials shall describe the designated scope of authority and
    duties of the bearer, and, at a minimum, include:

a.  A full-face, color photograph showing a true likeness of the bearer
    in the attire in which the employee serves while on duty. If
    prescription glasses are worn full-time, such glasses will be worn
    when credentials photographs are taken;

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  The bearer's printed legal name, title and signature;

b.  The term "Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration";

c.  The Seal of TIGTA;

d.  The signature of the Inspector General;

e.  A serial or control number; and

f.  Description of the bearer's legal statutory, regulatory or other
    specific authority.

-   [Security Clearance]{.underline}. Credentials shall not indicate
    that the bearer has a security clearance or is otherwise eligible
    for access to classified national security information.
    Certification of clearance shall be handled by established personnel
    security verification procedures and be obtained in advance of all
    instances involving access to classified information. For internal
    purposes, credentials may be coded by use of bureau unique
    alphanumeric identifiers or by varying the color of the background
    of the bearer's photograph to reflect the security clearance of the
    bearer so long as such indication is not otherwise apparent to the
    casual observer.

-   [Case or Folder]{.underline}. The credential carrying case or folder
    shall be approximately 3.5 inches in width and 5.5 inches in length
    when closed. Cases or folders will normally fold in half and contain
    two carrying pockets; one for the upper portion and one for the
    bottom portion of the credential, as described above. When opened,
    both portions of the credential must be subject to unobstructed
    viewing. Cases or folders shall not be used as wallets or contain
    other materials unrelated to official use. Cases or folders may have
    a carrying clip and badge-carrying surface at the discretion of the
    bureau head.

-   [Controls]{.underline}. All credentials and Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges are property of the U.S.
    Government and TIGTA. Credentials and Special Agent/Investigative
    Specialist badges will be returned to the supervisor of the special
    agent upon termination of employment, need or upon request of
    issuing authority and forwarded to the TIGTA Security Management
    Office. Credentials and Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges are not transferable and are subject to inventory and
    inspection at the discretion of the Inspector General. Each employee
    shall be required to sign a receipt when issued a credential and/or
    Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badge.

-   [Transmittal]{.underline}. When credentials and/or Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges are transmitted between TIGTA
    facilities, they will be packaged in double envelopes together with
    their transmittal letter or memorandum. Within the U.S., including
    the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and U.S. territories or possessions,
    credentials and/or Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges
    will be sent via U.S. Postal Service registered mail or, at TIGTA's
    discretion, via the current carrier authorized by the General
    Services Administration contract for U.S. Government express
    mailings. Credentials and/or Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges will be mailed to, from, and within overseas areas, or
    courier via diplomatic pouch, as may be necessary.

-   [Serial or Control Numbers]{.underline}. Serial or control numbers
    shall be used for accountability purposes such that credentials and
    Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges shall normally be
    issued in consecutive order as individual recipients are authorized
    to receive them. Once assigned by the Security Management Office,
    the numbers shall not be reused except to ensure compliance with
    Federal Property Management Regulations relating to reusable
    Government property or as authorized by TIGTA.

-   [Safeguarding]{.underline}. Individuals authorized credentials and
    Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields are personally
    responsible for safeguarding these items from loss, theft or
    possible misappropriation by any means while minimizing personal
    risk. Credentials and Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges
    should be carried on the bearer's person and not left or stored in a
    manner, which allows access, by unauthorized persons. When not being
    used for a given period of time, or when the bearer is on extended
    leave, credentials should be safeguarded, e.g., secured in an office
    security container or locked file cabinet.

-   [Reporting Loss or Theft]{.underline}. In all instances, loss or
    theft of credentials and Special Agent badges/shields must be
    reported to TIGTA security officials as soon as possible, but not
    later than 72 hours. A signed report of loss or theft must be
    submitted which identifies the bearer's name, credential, Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badge/shield number, date and place
    where the incident occurred and other relevant facts. Recovered
    credentials and Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges/shields are to be reported to the Security Management Office
    or the Special Agent in Charge or Office Head of the bearer's area
    without reasonable delay, and accountability records shall be
    adjusted to reflect the recovery. Recovered credentials may be
    either destroyed or reissued to the bearer, as appropriate. Under no
    circumstance, however, are individuals to retain more than one
    credential at a time.

-   [Updating of Credentials]{.underline}. Credentials remain valid for
    the duration of employment and once issued, are not to be reissued
    merely because of a change in the name or title of the
    authenticating official(s). Credentials may be updated and reissued
    to the bearer when a change takes place under the following
    conditions;

a.  Upon legal name change;

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
g.  Official reassignment to a different position to reflect a change in
    title or authority;

h.  Significant change in the bearer's appearance over a period of time;
    or

i.  Mutilation of the credential, excessive wear, or lapse of sufficient
    time to indicate that a lost or stolen credential will not be
    recovered or otherwise returned.

-   [Disposition]{.underline}. Records shall be maintained by the TIGTA
    Security Management Office to indicate the disposition of all
    credentials and Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges/shields. Employees terminating employment shall return their
    credentials to the Security Management Office and Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields to their immediate
    supervisor prior to being granted final clearance and departing
    employment. The TIGTA Security Management Office shall take
    appropriate action to ensure that credentials and Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields are returned, or
    otherwise accounted for, prior to separating an employee from
    Federal Service. Credentials of persons who retire or separate from
    TIGTA may be held for a period of time at the discretion of TIGTA
    and then destroyed unless approved for special disposition as part
    of a TIGTA award program as outlined below. Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges shall also be returned to
    inventory unless approved for special disposition as part of an
    award program as outlined below.

-   [Credentials]{.underline}. Credentials may be canceled and awarded
    to retirees when such awards are established through a TIGTA
    employee incentive award program. Canceled credentials shall be
    either perforated or permanently stamped to reflect that the
    individual is "retired" or otherwise indicate that the credential is
    awarded "for honorable service". The canceled credential must be
    marked in a manner to ensure distinction from active credentials,
    e.g., encased in Lucite, or other display-type manner at the
    discretion of TIGTA, to limit use to exhibition purposes only.
    Issuance of new credentials to retirees or persons previously
    separated is not authorized.

-   [Special Agent/Investigative]{.underline}. Specialist badges/shields
    Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields may be awarded
    when such awards are established through TIGTA's employee incentive
    program. For example, awarded Special Agent badges/shields may be
    encased in Lucite, or other display-type material, and/or fitted
    with a "retired" or "honorable service" plate in a manner to ensure
    distinction from active Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges/shields and to limit such use to exhibition purposes only.
    Issuance of new replacement Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badges/shields to retirees or persons previously separated from
    TIGTA or as awards is not authorized.

-   [Cost Considerations]{.underline}. TIGTA shall minimize costs
    associated with the manufacture, safeguarding, issuance and
    accountability of credentials and Special Agent/Investigative
    Specialist badges/shields.

-   [Recognition]{.underline}. Credentials shall generally be honored
    for entry of the bearer during normal working hours into Treasury
    owned, leased or operated facilities for the conduct of official
    business. Possession of credentials does not relieve the bearer from
    complying with established access control requirements.
    Circumstances, which cast a reasonable doubt on authenticity or
    validity of the credentials or the matching identity or authority of
    the bearer, shall be reported to TIGTA's Security Management Office.

-   [Use of Pseudonyms]{.underline}. It is Treasury policy to require
    the use of the individual's legal name on a credential, except when
    deviation from this policy is in accordance with applicable law.
    Whenever use of pseudonyms is permitted, TIGTA will develop
    appropriate control procedures for issuing and monitoring the use of
    such credentials. All such control procedures shall be submitted to
    the Security Management Office for review.

### Authentication. 

Individuals are not authorized under any circumstances to authenticate
or otherwise validate their own credentials. Such authentication shall
be executed according to the procedures set forth below:

-   The Inspector General (IG) for Tax Administration shall authenticate
    credentials for TIGTA personnel.

-   With respect to any credentials and Special Agent/Investigative
    Specialist badges/shields issued to employees, the responsibilities
    of the IG for Tax Administration that are listed in section 150.5.6,
    below or elsewhere in this section shall be performed by the
    Security Management Office which issued the credentials and/or
    Special Agent badges/shields.

### Penalties. 

The careless handling, abuse, misuse or intentional misrepresentation of
official credentials and Special Agent badges/shields shall be cause for
possible administrative or disciplinary action which may include
temporary suspension, reassignment, revocation of official duties and
responsibilities, or other penalties. Instances involving senior
officials shall be reported concurrently to the IG for Tax
Administration, U. S. Treasury Office of the Inspector General, and
TIGTA's Security Management Office. The IG for Tax Administration shall
decide if an investigation is warranted.

Credentials and Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields
shall never be issued for transacting non-official or personal business.
Penalties may be imposed pursuant to law for improper use of official
identification, including:

-   18 U.S.C. 499 which states that "Whoever falsely makes, forges,
    counterfeits, alters, or tampers with any naval, military, or
    official pass or permit, issued by or under the authority of the
    United States, or with intent to defraud uses or possesses any such
    pass or permit, or impersonates or falsely represents himself to be
    or not to be a person to whom such pass or permit has been duly
    issued or willfully allows any other person to have or use any such
    pass or permit, issued for his use alone, shall be fined not more
    than \$2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

-   18 U.S.C. 701 which states that "Whoever manufactures, sells, or
    possesses any badge, identification card, or other insignia, of the
    design prescribed by the head of any department or agency of the
    United States for use by any officer or employee thereof, or any
    colorable imitation thereof, or photographs, prints, or in any other
    manner makes or executes any engraving, photograph, print, or
    impression in the likeness of any such badge, identification card,
    or other insignia, or any colorable imitation thereof, except as
    authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined
    not more than \$250 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
    both."

-   18 U.S.C. 1028, which establishes penalties for fraud and related
    activity in connection with identification documents.

### Requirements of the Inspector General and Security Management Office. 

The Inspector General for Tax Administration and the Security Management
Office, shall ensure that:

-   Credentials, with or without Special Agent/Investigative Specialist
    badge/shields, are issued only to authorized person.

-   Records are properly maintained with respect to credentials and
    Special Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields that are
    issued, returned, lost, stolen, canceled and destroyed.

-   The loss or theft of credentials and Special Agent /Investigative
    Specialist badges/shields is reported to the designated security
    and/or issuing authority for appropriate action. This may also
    include notification to the National Crime Information Center and
    notification of the facts related to the loss or theft, to State and
    local police.

-   If credentials with pseudonyms are issued pursuant to section 5.m.,
    appropriate control procedures are maintained and such procedures
    must be forwarded to the Security Management Office for review.

-   Review samples of each type of credential to ensure conformance with
    this section.

-   Designate security or other issuing authorities to safeguard
    supplies, process and maintain related records and control the
    issuance of official credentials and Special Agent/Investigative
    Specialist badges/shields.

-   Conduct periodic inventories of existing stock of blank credentials,
    Special Agent Investigative Specialist badges/shields and credential
    case/folders to ensure that sufficient supply is procured and
    available for use. Inventories shall also be conducted prior to the
    transfer of responsibility from one designated security or issuing
    authority to a successor; and

-   Ensure that personnel who are issued credentials and Special
    Agent/Investigative Specialist badges/shields are properly informed
    as to the requirements and obligations governing such use under
    prescribed professional standards of conduct.

### References.

-   5 U.S.C. 301

-   18 U.S.C. 499, 701, and 1028

-   31 U.S.C. 321

-   TDP 71-10; Chap III, Section 6