# Session No. 20

### Course Title: Disaster Response Operations and Management

### 

### Session Title: Damage Assessment and Disaster Declaration

## Time: 50 minutes

**Objectives:**

1.  Explain why damage assessment is important for disaster response and
    recovery operations.

2.  Identify the numerous actors involved in damage assessment
    functions.

3.  Recognize the different types of damage assessments as well as the
    distinct methods for conducting them.

4.  Be aware of the unique challenges confronting those that perform
    damage assessment.

5.  Discuss the process of successfully completing damage assessment.

6.  Illustrate how disasters are declared at the federal level.

7.  Underscore the political realities of damage assessment and disaster
    declarations.

**Scope:**

In the following session, the nature of both damage assessment and
disaster declaration is discussed. The importance of damage assessment
is explained, followed by an identification of the many participants
involved in this post-disaster operation. The professor conveys the
different types of damage assessments in addition to the diverse means
of performing them. Typical problems in damage assessments and ways to
perform them in an effective manner are acknowledged. The session
concludes with an overview of the declaration process and a discussion
about the politics involved in seeking federal disaster assistance.

**Session Requirements:**

1.  Instructor Reading:

> Bates, Frederick L. and Walter Gillis Peacock. 1992. "Measuring
> Disaster Impact on Household Living Conditions: The Domestic Assets
> Approach." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*
> 10 (1): 133-160.
>
> Brooks, E.R. 1964. "Post Attack Damage Assessment for Civil Defense."
> *Operations Research Division Research Memorandum, 25 May*. Research
> Triangle Institute: Durham, North Carolina.
>
> Cochrane, Hal. 1991. "The Principles of Damage Assessment Applied to
> the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Hugo." Paper presented at the
> International Conference on the Impact of Disasters. University of
> California, Los Angeles, July 10-12.
>
> Cochrane, Hal. 1990. "The Damage Assessment Process: An Overview." Pp.
> 24-32 in ed. Bolin, Robert. *The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Studies of
> Short-Term Impacts*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph
> #50, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: Boulder,
> Colorado.
>
> Donaldson, Milford Wayne. 1998. "The First Ten Days: Emergency
> Response and Protection Strategies for the Preservation of Historic
> Structures." In *Disasters Management Programs for Historic Sites*,
> eds. Dirk H.R. Spennemann and David W. Look. Association for
> Preservation Technology and the Johnstone Centre, Charles Stuart
> University: San Francisco and Albury.
>
> Federal Emergency Management Agency. EMI Workshop E270, "Workshop in
> Emergency Management: Asking for Help."
>
> French, Steven P. 1990. "The Damage Assessment Process: An Overview."
> Pp. 17-24 in ed. Bolin, Robert. *The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Studies
> of Short-Term Impacts*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph
> #50, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: Boulder,
> Colorado.
>
> Hamada, Masanori. 1991. "Damage Assessment of Lifeline Systems in
> Japan." Proceedings of the 3^rd^ United States/Japan Workshop on Urban
> Earthquake Hazard Reduction. Honolulu, Hawaii, November 13-15.
> Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (U.S.) and Institute of
> Social Safety Science (Japan).
>
> Iwai, S. and H. Kameda. 1998. "Post-Earthquake Reconnaissance and
> Disaster Information Management Methodologies." Proceedings, 11^th^
> European Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Paris, September 6-11.
>
> Massell, B.F. and S.G. Winter, Jr. 1961. "Post Attack Damage
> Assessment: A Conceptual Analysis." *Memorandum RM-2844-PR*. Rand
> Corporation: Santa Monica, California.
>
> May, Peter J. 1988. "Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction." PP.
> 236-251 in Louise Comfort, *Managing Disasters: Strategies and Policy
> Perspectives*. Duke University Press: Durham.
>
> May, Peter. 1985. "Political Influence, Electoral Benefits and
> Disaster Relief." Pp. 104-128 in *Recovery from Catastrophe: Federal
> Disaster Relief Policy and Politics*. Contributions in Political
> Science 128. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut.
>
> McEntire, David A. and Jill Cope. 2004. "Damage Assessment After the
> Paso Robles (San Simeon, California) Earthquake: Lessons for Emergency
> Management." *Quick Response Report 166*, Natural Hazards Center,
> University of Colorado at Boulder.
> <http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/qr/qr166/qr166.html>.
>
> McEntire, David A. 2002a. "Understanding and Improving Damage
> Assessment." *IAEM Bulletin* (May): 9, 12.
>
> McEntire, David. A. 2002b. "Coordinating Multi-organizational
> Responses to Disaster: Lessons from the March 28, 200, Fort Worth
> Tornado." *Disaster Prevention and Management* 11 (5): 369-379.
>
> Oaks, Sherry D. 1990. "The Damage Assessment Process: An Overview."
> Pp. 6-16 in ed. Bolin, Robert. *The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Studies of
> Short-Term Impacts*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph
> #50, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: Boulder,
> Colorado.
>
> Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records
> Administration. 2001. *Code of Federal Regulations 44, Emergency
> Management and Assistance*. (as of October 1, 2001). U.S. Government
> Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
>
> Schneider, Saundra K. 1985. *Flirting with Disaster: Public Management
> in Crisis Situations*. M.E. Sharpe: New York.
>
> State/Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team. 1990. "Description of the
> Disaster." Pp. 5-27 in *State and Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey
> Team Report for the October 17, 1989, Loma Prieta Earthquake,
> California*. January.
>
> Suarez-Villa, Luis and Wallace Walrod. 1999. "Losses from the
> Northridge Earthquake: Disruption to High-Technology Industries in the
> Los Angeles Basin." *Disasters* 23 (1): 19-44.
>
> Sylves, Richard. 1996. "The Politics and Administration of
> Presidential Disaster Declarations: The California Floods of Winter
> 1995." *Quick Response Report 86*, Natural Hazards Center, University
> of Colorado at Boulder.
> <http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/qr/qr86.html>.
>
> Texas Division of Emergency Management. 2001. Disaster Recovery
> Manual.
> [ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/recovery/recoverymanual.pdf](ftp://ftp.txdps.state.ts.us/dem/recovery/recoverymanual.pdf).
>
> Tracey, Brian. 2004. "The Politics of Disaster." *Harvard Magazine*
> (March-April).
>
> World Bank, Turkey Country Office. 1999. *Turkey Marmara Earthquake
> Assessment*. September 14. World Bank: Turkey.

2.  Student Readings:

> Oaks, Sherry D. 1990. "The Damage Assessment Process: An Overview."
> Pp. 6-16 in ed. Bolin, Robert. *The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Studies of
> Short-Term Impacts*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph
> #50, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: Boulder,
> Colorado.
>
> or
>
> McEntire, David A. and Jill Cope. 2004. "Damage Assessment After the
> Paso Robles (San Simeon, California) Earthquake: Lessons for Emergency
> Management." *Quick Response Report 166*, Natural Hazards Center,
> University of Colorado at Boulder.
> <http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/qr/qr166/qr166.html>.
>
> and
>
> May, Peter. 1985. "Political Influence, Electoral Benefits and
> Disaster Relief." Pp. 104-128 in *Recovery from Catastrophe: Federal
> Disaster Relief Policy and Politics*. Contributions in Political
> Science 128. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut.

3\. Handouts:

> Importance of Damage Assessment
>
> Actors Involved in Damage Assessment
>
> Types and Methods of Damage Assessment
>
> Challenges in Damage Assessment
>
> Damage Assessment Processes
>
> Factors Influencing Declarations
>
> 44 CFR §206.36 - §206.39
>
> Prescribed Roles in Providing Federal Disaster Relief

**Remarks:**

1.  A novel way to introduce the subject of damage assessment is to ask
    the students how first responders, emergency managers and relief
    workers know what to do after disaster strikes. The answer should
    logically lead to a discussion about the nature and purpose of
    damage assessment.

2.  It is extremely vital that students understand that damage
    assessment is both a response and recovery function. This is to say
    that damage assessment helps to guide emergency activities and also
    facilitates the acquisition of outside disaster assistance.

3.  Students should be told that damage assessment is related to other
    types of post-disaster evaluations (e.g., impact assessment, needs
    assessment, etc.). However, students should also recognize
    variations in terminology and meaning.

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4.  The professor should make an extra effort to reiterate the complex,
    repetitive and drawn-out damage assessment process. Students will
    naturally desire a simple explanation of this function, but damage
    assessment should not be taught as a linear or rational process.

5.  Useful documents on damage assessment can be acquired from the
    Applied Technology Council at
    <http://www.atcouncil.org/reports.shtml#ATC-20>[.]{.underline}

6.  It is necessary to make an explicit comment about the interdependent
    relationship between damage assessment and disaster declarations.

7\. The professor should reiterate during the session that the disaster
declaration process follows a routine pattern, which is sometimes
influenced by politics.

8\. Possible guest speakers for this session include building
inspectors, architects, and structural engineers. Claim adjusters for
insurance companies may also provide novel insight about damage
assessment. Representatives of the American Red Cross may also visit the
class and present information about damage assessment (note: the Red
Cross has a training class and video devoted to residential damage
assessment; the Red Cross video is entitled "Disaster Damage
Assessment," 1990, Stock No. A3067-1V). It might also be useful to
invite to the class a local, state or federal employee that has had some
experience in assessing damages and requesting a Presidential Disaster
Declaration.

9\. It may be beneficial to provide a handout of 44 CFR §206.36 -
§206.39 to each student to help them understand the disaster declaration
process.

10\. A good review of the history of Federal disaster declarations and
relief policies can be found in May 1985 and May 1988.

**Objective 20.1 Explain why damage assessment is important for disaster
response and recovery operations.**

**Present the following information as a lecture:**

I. When a disaster strikes, **one of the most important functions** **is
damage assessment**. According to research, **Damage assessment**:

> A. Helps to **identify the immediate needs** **of disaster victims**
> (e.g., emergency medical care, sheltering, etc.) (McEntire 2002, 9).
>
> B. Enables first responders and emergency managers to **recognize
> required material and human resources** (McEntire 2002, 9).
>
> C. **Is necessary before a disaster can receive a federal
> declaration**, thereby opening up the possibility of outside recovery
> assistance (Office of the Federal Register 2001, 399).
>
> D. Determines if a **structure is habitable** (i.e., safe, sanitary
> and secure) (McEntire and Cope 2004, 5-6).
>
> E. May assist in the **designation of hazardous areas and factors that
> augment disaster vulnerability** (McEntire and Cope 2004, 5-6).
>
> F. In short, **"After disasters, the damage assessment process is
> fundamental to relief and reconstruction as it triggers the beginning
> of formalized disaster relief and recovery aid, beginning with
> governmental disaster declarations"** (Oaks 1990, 6).

**Objective 20.2 Identify the numerous actors involved in damage
assessment functions.**

**Present the following information as a lecture:**

I. Damage assessment is **performed by a multitude of organizations**.

> A. In the past, **the military was heavily involved** in damage
> assessment planning **due to the possibility of a nuclear attack**
> (Massell and Winter 1961; Brooks 1964).

II\. However, according to the Texas Disaster Recovery Manual
(<ftp://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/recovery/recoverymanual.pdf>), (note:
instructors may wish to refer to documents in their own state) **those
assessing damages may also include:**

> A. **City/county engineers** -- for public buildings.
>
> B. **Council members/Commissioners** -- to determine response and
> recovery priorities (as they relate to damages).
>
> C. **Department heads** such as public works, utilities, etc. -- for
> evaluation of debris clearance, road and street closures, and public
> health.
>
> D. **Building inspectors** -- for public buildings and business
> structures.
>
> E. **Tax assessors** -- to determine the value of damage losses.
>
> F. **Lending institutions** -- to determine the value of the damage
> losses.
>
> G. **Insurance companies** -- to determine the value of damage losses
> for policy holders.
>
> H. **Red Cross representatives** -- to determine the immediate needs
> of victims and evaluate damages to residential areas.
>
> I. **Hospital administrators** -- for hospitals and clinics.
>
> J. **School district superintendents or school principals** -- for
> educational facilities.
>
> K. **County agricultural agents** -- for farming and ranch damage
> information.
>
> L. **State agencies and river authorities** -- for state highways,
> electric cooperatives, levees, drainage systems, etc.

III\. There are **others that participate** in damage assessment as well
(McEntire and Cope 2004):

> A. **Architects** -- for an understanding of damages as they relate to
> structural design.
>
> B. **Chamber of commerce** -- to assist with evaluation of business
> losses.
>
> C. **Volunteers** -- typically engineers and architects offering their
> services.
>
> D. **Preservationists** --to protect historic buildings (see Donaldson
> 1998).
>
> E. **FEMA officials** -- to determine federal assistance needs and
> reimbursement amounts.
>
> F. **Politicians** -- to bring visibility to damages and disaster
> assistance needs.

IV\. In accordance with **Code of Federal Regulations guidelines**,
various individuals and agencies will work together to assess damages.
These **damage assessment teams include**:

> A. **"at least one representative of the Federal Government and one
> representative of the State. A local government representative,
> familiar with the extent and location of damage in his/her community,
> should also be included, if possible. Other State and Federal
> agencies, and voluntary relief organizations may also be asked to
> participate, as needed"** (Office of the Federal Register 2001, 400).
>
> B. **"The bulk of duties associated with damage assessment, however,
> falls to local municipal governments who have the jurisdictional
> responsibility and authority to undertake the postevent surveys"**
> (Oaks 1990, 6).

V. A good example of the many actors involved in damage assessment is
from the 2003 Paso Robles (San Simeon, California) earthquake. Field
research illustrated: "**There is an incredible convergence of personnel
at the scene of a disaster for the purpose of evaluating the disaster's
impacts**.

> A. Aside from **emergency workers and curious onlookers**, there were
> a number of people and agencies that were involved in examining the
> impact of the disaster.
>
> B. The **American Red Cross** had at least 10 people (five groups
> consisting of two inspectors each) conducting damage assessments on
> residential structures.
>
> C. The **Building Department** played the lead role in conducting
> damage assessments for city facilities and downtown businesses.
> Because this department only has a few staff members, its efforts were
> supported by many **volunteer architects and engineers** who came to
> Paso Robles from different parts of California.
>
> D. The **Chamber of Commerce and Main Street Association** worked with
> local businesses to determine lost income, the number of employees
> laid off, and other liabilities associated with the disaster.
>
> E. **Public Works** contracted with several **consulting firms such as
> Boyle, Floyd and Butterfield, and GSI** to assess water storage tanks,
> the sewage treatment facility, and the hot spring that percolated to
> the surface in the City Hall parking lot.
>
> F. **Officials from county, state and federal emergency management
> agencies** traveled to Paso Robles and worked with the County Office
> of Emergency Services to verify destroyed property.
>
> G. The **State Department of Transportation (CalTrans)** spent time
> inspecting state bridges and highways.
>
> H. **Insurance companies** also assessed damages to settle claims with
> their clients.
>
> I. Although there were a number of organizations involved in damage
> assessment, **the most important in this disaster were the American
> Red Cross (for residential structures), the Building Department (for
> city facilities), Public Works (for the infrastructure), and the
> County Office of Emergency Services** (which compiled the damage
> assessment numbers and relayed them to FEMA)" (McEntire and Cope 2004,
> 6).

**Objective 20.3 Recognize the different types of damage assessments as
well as the distinct methods of conducting them.**

**Present the following information as a lecture:**

I. Not all **damage assessments are the same** (McEntire and Cope 2004;
McEntire 2002a; Texas Disaster Recovery Manual 2000; Oaks 1990). There
are basically **three types** of damage assessments:

> A. **Rapid/Initial Evaluation**
>
> 1\. Is **conducted immediately** when a disaster occurs.
>
> 2\. Purpose is to gain **quick comprehension of deaths, injuries,
> victim needs, and overall scope of the disaster**.
>
> 3\. **Plays a vital role in marshaling additional resources** (e.g.,
> mutual aid or more damage evaluators).
>
> B. **Preliminary/Detailed Evaluation**

1.  Is **performed within days or weeks** after the disaster.

2.  Goal is to convincingly **illustrate the extent of the disaster and
    need for outside assistance**.

3.  Is **required** before a disaster can be **Presidentially declared**
    and **federal disaster assistance** can be made available.

> C. **Technical/Engineering Evaluation**
>
> 1\. Is **performed days, weeks or months after the disaster**.
>
> 2\. Objective is to **determine exact value of losses**.
>
> 3\. Is **necessary before disaster assistance funds can be provided**.
>
> D. In other words, **"A rapid or initial damage assessment is
> undertaken to quickly comprehend the scope of the devastation. This
> usually involves the collection of data regarding deaths and injuries
> as well as the number of buildings destroyed or partially damaged. A
> preliminary damage assessment (PDA) is completed with state and
> federal emergency management officials for the purpose of obtaining a
> presidential disaster declaration. This assessment examines the extent
> of losses and determines the status of property in terms of safety,
> sanitation and security concerns. A technical damage assessment is
> performed on structures and infrastructure to view engineering in an
> in-depth manner. It is conducted to estimate or verify the costs of
> the disaster and recommend the best approach for repairs, demolition
> and reconstruction"** (McEntire 2002a, 9).

II\. Damage assessments are **conducted in different ways** (McEntire
and Cope 2004; McEntire 2002a). The **most common means of assessing
damages are** by:

> A. **Windshield/Drive Through**
>
> 1\. Performed **in a vehicle**.
>
> 2\. **Allows visual of damages** on ground and from a distance.
>
> 3\. **Common to most organizations** after a disaster occurs **to
> determine response priorities and needs**.
>
> B. **Aerial**

1.  Conducted in **helicopters or planes**.

2.  Especially **useful when roads are blocked** or **for widespread
    disasters** (e.g., floods).

3.  **Popular among politicians** and key decision makers.

> C. **Walkthrough/Site Visit**
>
> 1\. **Personal** **tour of damaged building**.
>
> 2\. **Determines amount of disaster assistance to be given**.
>
> 3\. **Typically conducted by architects and engineers**.
>
> D. Put differently, **"The rapid or initial assessment is often
> performed in a vehicle. Known as a windshield assessment, this method
> enables one to see damages on the ground from a distance. At other
> times, the assessment of damages is viewed from above with the use of
> an airplane or helicopter. This strategy allows political figures and
> agency leaders to view a large geographic area to facilitate decision
> making about response and recovery priorities and obligations. In
> contrast, the PDA and the technical assessment may include a site
> visit to the affected home, business, road, school or other public
> building. It is used to verify damage and fill out extensive reports
> about losses and/or needed repairs"** (McEntire 2002a, 9).

**Objective 20.4 Be aware of the unique challenges confronting those
that perform damage assessment.**

**Present the following information as a lecture:**

I. There are several **problems or difficulties** facing those involved
**in damage assessment (McEntire and Cope 2004)**:

> A. **Accuracy**
>
> 1\. Damage assessment **is performed repeatedly by many
> organizations**.

a\. **"In San Francisco \[after Loma Prieta\], most red and
yellow-tagged structures received an average of four reinspections
during the first week after the earthquake"** (Oaks 1990, 11).

> b\. Oak has illustrated after the Loma Prieta earthquake: **"Buildings
> were reassessed and re-evaluated as changing geologic processes and
> weather affected the damaged structures, and as city officials tried
> to balance people's needs for food, fuel, and shelter with safety.
> Significant factors affecting the damage assessment process included
> aftershocks, continued ground failure, and secondary hazards, such as
> the exposure of asbestos in earthquake damage buildings. Significant
> social, economic and legal concerns also influenced the building
> evaluation process (e.g., liability, landlord-tenant disputes,
> language barriers)"** (1990, 10).
>
> 2\. Some of the **damages may not be reported immediately or may not
> be readily visible**.
>
> a\. After the 2003 San Simeon earthquake, **"many people were out of
> town and were only able to report damages when they returned after the
> holidays. There were also a significant number of vacation homes in
> rural areas that could not be assessed until the owners came back to
> inspect them"** (McEntire and Cope 2004, 8).
>
> b\. **"In San Luis Obispo County, there were a number of reasons for
> this repetition. First, all earthquakes (including the one that
> occurred in San Simeon) produce hidden damage that is often difficult
> to detect in the initial damage assessments"** (McEntire and Cope
> 2004, 7).
>
> 3\. Damages may be **missed or double counted** due to human error.
>
> a\. **"Assessing the damage from earthquakes is much more time
> consuming than other types of disasters. In comparison to the visible
> destruction of floods and fires, earthquake damage is sometimes
> difficult to detect. The integrity of a structure may only be seen
> upon careful examination and inspection from within the edifice"**
> (McEntire and Cope 2004, 8).
>
> B. **Communications** and **coordination**
>
> 1\. It is **difficult to maintain constant communication** with
> everyone involved in damage assessment **due to the vast number of
> organizations** participating in this function.
>
> 2\. The **large number of people doing damage assessment** also
> **hinders** the ability of city officials and emergency managers from
> **orchestrating the function** in an effective manner.
>
> 3\. **" . . . the difficulty of communicating with each of the parties
> involved in damage assessment, or compiling the numbers from different
> organizations \[was present after a disaster in California\]. Although
> organizations generally had communications equipment, the sheer number
> of people and agencies involved made the relaying of information
> difficult at times"** (McEntire and Cope 2004, 9-10).
>
> C. **Divergent** **purposes and forms**
>
> 1\. **Each organization has its own objective** for doing damage
> assessment. For instance,
>
> a\. The **Red Cross** is involved in assessing **residential
> damages**.
>
> b\. The **building department** is interested in evaluating the
> integrity of **public structures** (e.g., the county courthouse).
>
> 2\. **Each organization has distinct forms** which may not always
> allow quick or easy integration or summary of damages.
>
> a\. A county emergency management official stated that **this created
> problems when he was compiling the preliminary damage assessment
> numbers** after the 2003 Paso Robles, California earthquake (McEntire
> and Cope 2004, 10).
>
> D. **Parcel number vs. addresses**
>
> 1\. Those evaluating damages may also **rely on different coding
> techniques** for the assessment.
>
> 2\. After the earthquake in Paso Robles, **some assessors utilized lot
> numbers while others noted the complete street address** of the
> damaged structure (McEntire and Cope 2004, 10).
>
> 3\. **This creates additional confusion** when trying to compile data
> or visit the site again.
>
> E. **Safety**
>
> 1\. Because of the **potential for building collapses and fires**,
> damage assessment **can be very dangerous**.
>
> 2\. **"The larger aftershocks pose added risk to the damage assessment
> teams engaged in the safety evaluation of structures. Additional
> building collapse is common with aftershocks, and was experienced in
> San Francisco after this earthquake"** (Oak 1990, 10).
>
> 3\. Oaks' study (1990, 13) of damage assessment in the Loma Prieta
> earthquake reveals that **"damage assessment and safety evaluation are
> most always at odds, just as the rush to reconstruct after an event
> seems to disregard hazard and risk."**
>
> 4\. Nevertheless, McEntire and Cope have illustrated: **"Although
> damage assessment is a dangerous activity, it does promote a safer
> environment for the public and those involved with repairs, demolition
> and reconstruction. When the fire department arrived at the area in
> Paso Robles with the greatest concentration of damages, the dangerous
> situation of many buildings was taken into consideration. Roofs and
> upper floors had collapsed to the ground level. Eves and awnings above
> the sidewalks had fully or partially separated from numerous edifices.
> Walls had crumbled, and bricks and concrete were hanging precariously
> from building facades. Fire fighters therefore used yellow tape to
> cordon off the areas that were regarded to be the most dangerous. The
> goal was to keep the public out of harms way. Over the next few days,
> the fire and police chiefs met with other city leaders to discuss
> post-disaster policies. Safety became the number one priority. Anyone
> entering the area had to have proper safety equipment and had to be
> accompanied by a fire fighter. Fences were brought in and a perimeter
> was placed around the damaged buildings in the downtown district.
> Police officers were stationed in the area to prevent people from
> entering unsafe areas and buildings (and as a symbolic gesture to
> discourage possible - but improbable -looting). As the inspections
> continued, those offices deemed safe were opened to building owners
> and merchant tenants. Other buildings had to have debris removed,
> receive shoring, and then be assessed again before access could be
> granted. Condemned buildings remained closed to the public, although
> there was at least one report of a building occupant disregarding the
> fences and entering a damaged structure to gather personal belongings.
> Nonetheless, damage assessment did play a role in limiting the number
> of injuries and deaths associated with this disaster"** (2004, 5-6).
>
> F. **Access**
>
> 1\. **Floods, debris and missing streets signs** may make **travel**
> to the damaged area difficult or **impossible**.
>
> 2\. **"The earthquake's adverse effects were spread over the entire
> county, which made traveling to each site for verification
> problematic"** (McEntire and Cope 2004, 8).
>
> G. **Counting techniques**
>
> 1\. It is difficult to know whether to **count damages** based on
> **purchase price, replacement value or going market rate** (McEntire
> and Cope 2004, 10).
>
> 2\. There are **many types of damages** **and losses** that may get
> **overlooked**:
>
> a\. **"direct physical and economic damage to the \[road, water,
> sewer, gas, electric\] systems themselves;**
>
> b\. **diminished activity to carry out emergency response
> activities;**
>
> c\. **inconvenience due to temporary service interruption;**
>
> d\. **longer term economic losses due to limits on recovery**" (French
> 1990, 18
>
> e\. **Economic impact is often neglected, as are loss of life,
> historic assets and environmental damages** (see also Cochrane 1990;
> Cochrane 1991; Suarez-Villa and Walrod 1999).
>
> f\. For this reason, it might be wise to **consider not only damages,
> but anticipated losses and needs as well**.
>
> H. **Other**
>
> 1\. People may need to **retrieve personal belongings** (e.g., keys,
> wallets, purses, computers, merchandise) from damaged structures
> (McEntire and Cope 2004, 9).
>
> 2\. Some **tenants, merchants, business owners and landlords may be
> disgruntled with damage assessment results** (e.g., condemned
> buildings).
>
> a\. After the Paso Robles 2003 earthquake, **"Some business operators
> were frustrated that they could not retrieve retail stock, display
> cases, and other equipment for operations (e.g., machines and
> computers) in a timely fashion. They were losing money and saw no way
> to resume business in other locations until these articles could be
> obtained. The city wanted to err on the side of caution, however,
> since the possibility of sizable aftershocks could easily bring down
> previously damaged structures"** (McEntire and Cope 2004, 9).

**Objective 20.5 Discuss the process of successfully completing damage
assessment.**

**Present the following information as a lecture:**

I. A number of **steps must be taken** to conduct an **effective
assessment** of damages (McEntire 2002a; McEntire and Cope 2004):

> A. **Plan.**
>
> 1\. Before disaster strikes, each jurisdiction and/or department
> should **create a damage assessment annex and develop needed
> capabilities** (e.g., identify assessment methods, produce needed
> forms, etc.).
>
> B. **Train.**

1\. **Each individual** involved in damage assessment **must understand
the plan** and **be able to implement it**.

2\. **All departments** should **train independently** and **with each
other**.

> C. **Exercise.**
>
> 1\. **Simulations** can be an effective way to **test the plan and
> level of training**.
>
> D. **Hold a preliminary meeting.**

1\. After a disaster occurs, **all of those involved** in damage
assessment **should meet to discuss various issues**:

> a\. The **process** for conducting the assessment **should be
> identified**.
>
> b\. **Participants must be made aware of the forms** to be utilized
> and **how to fill them out** completely.
>
> c\. The **dangers of the job** should be made explicit and **safety
> should be the number one priority** (it might be advisable to have a
> fire fighter assist with damage assessment in case someone is or may
> become injured).

-   After Loma Prieta, **"The damage assessment teams were briefed on
    aftershocks as part of the in-field training provided by the City
    and County of San Francisco. ATC 20 guidelines point out the
    hazardous nature of entering previously tagged unsafe structures
    during aftershock activity, and inspection teams were careful to
    exercise caution near building with collapse potential"** (Oak 1990,
    11).

> d\. **Geographic areas should be divided up and clearly assigned to
> individuals/teams** (so as to **avoid gaps or duplication in
> counting**). **Maps** **may be useful** for this purpose.
>
> e\. **Key distribution and access routes** to the areas of
> responsibilities **should be discussed**.
>
> f\. **Individuals and teams should know who they should report to and
> how to communicate concerns or questions** (equipment may need to be
> provided).
>
> g\. The **deadline and location** for turning in the assessment
> **should be announced**.
>
> E. **Conduct assessment.**
>
> 1\. Be sure to **follow all instructions and assessment
> methodologies** in order create as accurate a picture of the damages
> as possible.
>
> 2\. **Note damages on forms, post results on buildings, cordon off
> dangerous areas, and educate the public about assessment codes** (see
> McEntire and Cope 2004).
>
> 3\. Be aware that some **jurisdictions have the following**
> **designations based on the Applied Technology Council guidelines
> (Procedure for Post-earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings) (see
> Oaks 1990)**.
>
> a\. **Major** damage (**red** code for no access)
>
> b\. **Moderate** damage (**yellow** code for limited access)
>
> c\. **Minor/No** damage (**green** code for unlimited access)
>
> F. **Rely on experts and technology.**
>
> 1\. **Utilize the right person** for each job.
>
> a\. **Structural engineers** for **public buildings and businesses**.
>
> b\. **Civil engineers** for **roads**.
>
> c\. **Red Cross representatives** for **residential areas**.
>
> d\. **Specialists for utilities, water treatment plants**, etc.

-   **"Part of the reason it worked so well in San Francisco \[after
    Loma Prieta\] was due to the availability of large numbers of highly
    trained building inspectors and engineers in the community"** (Oaks
    1990, 14).

> 2\. **Employ technology** as dictated by the disaster.
>
> a\. **Remote sensing** for flooded areas.
>
> b\. **Cameras** for water systems.
>
> b\. **Geographic information systems** to track damage totals and
> locations.
>
> G. **Gather and review data.**
>
> 1\. **Collect and ensure accuracy** **and** **completeness** **of**
> damage assessment **forms**.
>
> 2\. **Keep** city/county **leadership involved and informed**.
>
> H. **Relay and act on information as needed.**
>
> 1\. **Give information** as required **to county, state and federal
> officials (in order to justify a Presidential Disaster Declaration).**
>
> 2\. **Shore up, repair, demolish, and/or rebuild structures** in
> accordance with codes and permits.
>
> 3\. **Reassess buildings** (if needed) to verify safe condition.
>
> I. A fairly successful example of damage assessment took place after
> an earthquake in 2003: **"Some interviewees at the county level
> believe that their prior planning, training and experience in damage
> assessment made the function easier to perform. In contrast, officials
> in Paso Robles asserted that their creativity and flexibility helped
> them complete their damage assessments in spite of their small staff
> in the building department. In particular, as volunteer engineers and
> architects arrived in Paso Robles, they were told to check in at the
> gazebo at the park in front of City Hall. These experts were then
> divided into teams (comprised of at least one fire fighter, an
> architect and an engineer), were assigned geographic areas, were given
> keys to the buildings that were collected from local businesses, and
> were briefed about dangerous conditions and the goals and methods of
> the assessment. Many people commented about how individuals worked
> together harmoniously to assess the damages. Another major strength
> made evident during damage assessment was the widespread knowledge of
> standard operating procedures. Fire fighters spray painted symbols
> common to the search and rescue community on buildings to denote who
> evaluated the safety of the structures, when this was done and what
> the results were. The Building Department also utilized California's
> damage codes (e.g., red -- condemned, yellow -- potentially dangerous,
> and green -- safe) to track destroyed areas and educate building
> owners and occupants about their meaning and status. The shift
> rotation of the Emergency Operations Center appears to have been very
> smooth, with periodic briefings about the damage assessment function
> when leadership duties changed. Modern technology such as specialized
> cameras were utilized to detect damages to the city's water treatment
> facilities, and Geographic Information Systems helped to track the
> extent of all types of damages throughout the county"** (McEntire and
> Cope 2004, 10-11).

**Objective 20.7 Illustrate how disasters are declared at the federal
level.**

Present the following as a lecture.

I. Once damages have been assessed, the **findings** are then **shared
with state and federal officials** in the hopes of obtaining a
**Presidential disaster declaration** (in the hopes of obtaining outside
disaster assistance). The **process** **takes place in the following
manner** (see Robert T. Stafford Act at
<http://www.fema.gov/library/stafact.shtm>):

A. **The disaster occurs**.

B. **City and county initiates response operations, including an
assessment of damages**.

C. If the municipal and county governments determine that the **disaster
is beyond their capabilities** (e.g., there are insufficient resources
to deal with the magnitude of the event), then a **disaster is declared
at the local level**.

D. If a disaster is **declared by city and county officials**, the
**state sends personnel** to the scene to evaluate the impact. The
**state** also **begins** its **response** to the disaster.

E. Should state personnel determine that the impact is so severe that
**additional outside help will be needed**, the **governor will declare
an emergency or disaster** and will **request help from the FEMA
region** responsible for that state.

F. At this point, **FEMA personnel will be deployed** for the
preliminary damage assessment.

G**. If damages warrant a declaration, a request will be made** (through
the FEMA regional office, FEMA headquarters and the Department of
Homeland Security) for a Presidential Disaster Declaration. **The
President will declare a federal disaster and resources will be
dedicated to the jurisdiction(s) in question**.

H. **If damages do not warrant a declaration**, **officials at FEMA
and/or the Department of Homeland Security will deny the declaration
request**. The **President does not decline the disaster** **request**
(probably for political reasons).

I. Note: In some states (e.g., Texas and California), **a State Disaster
or Regional Liaison Officer will act as a go between for the local and
state government**. That is to say, the declaration will proceed from
the city/county through the DLO/RLO to the state.

> J. **Local and state governments must assure that they know how to
> conduct a damage assessment and then relay information to FEMA**.
>
> 1\. After **Hurricane Andrew** in 1992 (see Schneider 1995, chapter
> 8), **local and state governments responded to the event on their
> own** (e.g., opening shelters, providing food and water, etc.).
>
> 2\. **"The day after Andrew hit, President Bush had promised storm
> victims that 'help was on the way.' But local and state officials
> claimed that the federal government was not responding. Governor
> Chiles complained that urgent requests for federal assistance had been
> delayed or hopelessly lost because of bureaucratic red tape and
> confusion. Kate Hale, director of Dade County's Emergency Office,
> states 'we have appealed through the state to the federal government.
> We've had a lot of people down here for press conferences. But \[in
> the end\] it is Dade County on its own . . . . Where the hell is the
> cavalry on this one?'"** (Schneider 1995, 95).
>
> 3\. **FEMA** actually **deployed personnel and resources** to South
> Florida, but **this federal agency could not provide assistance until
> the damage assessment numbers and formal request for aid came from the
> state** (thus following standard operating procedures).
>
> 4\. It is believed that **local governments asked for everything**,
> but **failed to follow protocol** for damage assessment and the
> disaster declaration.
>
> 5\. It was this mistake of **not being specific about local and state
> needs** that **resulted in delays** by the Federal Emergency
> Management Agency.

II\. There are numerous objective **factors** that **determine** whether
a **disaster is declared or not**. According to the Texas Division of
Emergency Management
<ftp://ftp.txdps.state.ts.us/dem/recovery/recoverymanual.pdf>., these
include, among other things:

> A. The number of **homes destroyed or sustaining major damage**.
>
> B. The number of **homes sustaining minor damage**.
>
> C. The extent to which the **damage is concentrated or dispersed**.
>
> D. The **estimated costs of repairing the damage**.
>
> E. The **demographics** of the affected areas (e.g., income levels,
> unemployment, and concentrations of the elderly).
>
> F. The extent to which the **damage is covered by insurance**.
>
> G. The extent to which the **disaster area is traumatized**.
>
> H. The extent of **disaster-related unemployment**.
>
> I. The level of **assistance** available **from other federal
> agencies** (e.g., SBA's home and business loans).
>
> J. The **state and local governments' capabilities** for dealing with
> the disaster.
>
> K. The level of **assistance** available **from voluntary
> organizations** (e.g., the American Red Cross).
>
> L. The **availability of rental housing**.
>
> M. The **extent of health and safety problems**.
>
> N. The extent of **damage to facilities providing essential services**
> (e.g., medical, utilities, police, etc.).

III\. There are many **other important facts about disaster
declarations** to be aware of.

> A. Requests for **declarations typically include letters** (see Texas
> Recovery Manual at
> <ftp://ftp.txdps.state.ts.us/dem/recovery/recoverymanual.pdf> for
> examples) **and other supporting documents** (e.g., damage assessment
> numbers).
>
> 1\. In some cases, **phone calls may initiate the declaration
> process** (due to the large size and readily apparent magnitude of
> some disasters).
>
> 2\. FCR 44 clarifies when this type of exception may occur: **"The
> requirement for a joint PDA may be waived for those incidents of
> unusual severity and magnitude that do not require field damage
> assessment to determine the need for supplemental federal assistance
> under the Act, or in such other instances determined by the Regional
> Director upon consultation with the State"** (Office of the Federal
> Registrar 2001, 400).
>
> B. Declarations are **almost always given after a disaster has
> occurred**.
>
> 1\. However, **some declarations** **can be made before occurrence**
> if it appears that the **incident will occur** and **steps can be
> taken to mitigate damages.**
>
> 2\. **For instance,** with an advanced declaration FEMA can mobilize
> staff and resources **before a hurricane** makes landfall in Florida.
>
> C. There are **different types of Presidential/Federal declarations**.
>
> 1\. An "**Emergency Declaration**" may be issued by the President **at
> any time** to mobilize federal resources.
>
> a\. This **does not require local, state or FEMA involvement**.
>
> b\. This is most often **used for national security purposes** (e.g.,
> 9/11 terrorist attack) **or** when an **incident does not qualify
> under the definition of a major disaster in the Stafford Act**.
>
> c\. It may entail **"more limited assistance aimed at saving lives and
> protecting property, public health, and safety"** (May 1985, 110).
>
> 2\. A "**Disaster Declaration**" may be issued by the President
> **under more stringent guidelines**.
>
> a\. This always **requires local, state and FEMA requests and
> involvement**.
>
> b\. This may be **given for many different types of natural,
> technological and civil disasters**.
>
> c\. It also **"makes available, as necessary, federal grant and loan
> programs for individuals and public entities"** (May 1985, 110).
>
> D. If a disaster declaration request is denied, **an appeal can be
> made** with additional supporting evidence.
>
> 1\. **Some** initial disaster declaration **requests will be
> incomplete and will require additional evidence** to warrant federal
> disaster assistance.

**Objective 20.8 Underscore the political realities of damage assessment
and disaster declarations.**

Present the following as a lecture.

I. The **disaster declaration process** can be a very **politically
contentious and salient activity**.

> A. This is especially the case in **borderline** disaster events that
> **do not clearly illustrate sufficient damages** for a Presidential
> Declaration.
>
> 1\. Andrew Reeves states **"The best predictor of a presidential
> disaster declaration, bar none, is actual need. The question \[of
> politics\] arises in these marginal cases, when it's unclear whether
> to give or not"** (in Tarcey 2004).
>
> B. The **tendency** of **the affected jurisdiction** is to **present
> the worst case scenario.**
>
> 1\. **Local and state governments** will **do all they can** to
> **present compelling evidence** in order to receive a Presidential
> Disaster Declaration. This is because:
>
> a\. **" Presidential disaster declarations provide immense benefits to
> localities able to qualify for them"** (Sylves 1996, 7).
>
> b\. **"Clearly, federal relief dollars are welcomed and appreciated at
> the local level"** (Sylves 1996, 8).
>
> c\. **"Governors stand to gain much and to lose little in requesting
> declarations. Erosion of conventional federal budgetary support to the
> states makes federal resources obtained through declarations that much
> more valuable to governors"** (Sylves 1996, 7).
>
> d\. There is a **recognition** that the **expense** of emergency
> protective measures, debris management, and rebuilding **will be the
> responsibility of the local and state governments** if this does not
> occur.
>
> 2\. Local and state efforts may therefore include **actively
> publicizing the possibility for a federal declaration** and
> **requesting** that all government agencies, businesses and citizens
> submit **information** **about** **damages**.
>
> a\. In Paso Robles, California, the **local government established a
> website** that acknowledged the **urgent need to compile damage
> reports** for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (McEntire and
> Cope 2004).
>
> b\. This community also **worked with the Chamber of Commerce to
> collect information** about losses and the impact on businesses
> (McEntire and Cope 2004).
>
> c\. The **Chamber of Commerce** also **encouraged people to write
> state officials, congressional representatives and the President of
> the United States** and stress the need for a disaster declaration
> (McEntire and Cope 2004).
>
> C. However, **FEMA** is very careful to **verify damages** to ensure
> that the numbers are correct and **determine if the disaster does** in
> fact **meet needed threshold requirements**.
>
> D. It is not uncommon for there to be **disagreement about the scope
> of damages, value of destroyed structures, financial loss numbers,
> cost for replacement, extent of disaster-related unemployment**, etc.
>
> E. All of this will be **discussed, illustrated with persuasion, and
> debated** in the hope that all parties find **agreement** and the
> **paperwork can be submitted and approved (or rejected)**.
>
> 1\. The FCR 44 states: **"At the close of the PDA, FEMA will consult
> with State officials to discuss findings and reconcile any
> differences"** (Office of the Federal Registrar 2001, 400).
>
> 2\. **After a Fort Worth, Texas Tornado, there was disagreement about
> the extent of damages. A meeting on the matter revealed that some
> duplexes were not counted by all parties involved** (McEntire 2002,
> 73).

II\. The President and others may **utilize his/her/their power to
declare a disaster for political purposes**.

> A. The President may **reward those communities** that are closely
> **affiliated with the President's party** (i.e., favoritism).
>
> 1\. **"At least in marginal disasters, the size of the state (in terms
> of electoral votes) and whether the political parties view it as
> 'competitive' matters quite a bit. In 1994, for example, Bill Clinton
> turned down a request by Illinois governor James Edgar for help with
> floods on Chicago's South Side that caused \$6.7 million in damage.
> The 1992 Clinton campaign had declared Illinois a Republican
> territory. A year later, Clinton did declare a disaster in response to
> New Orleans floods that caused \$10 million in damage; Clinton's
> strategists considered Louisiana a pivotal state"** (Tarcey 2004).
>
> B. Or, the President may **declare disasters** as a way to **obtain
> votes during campaigning and election years**.
>
> 1\. **"During his four years in office, President George H.W. Bush
> averaged 39 disaster declarations annually. The seven years of the
> Clinton presidency that Reeves studies averaged 72 disasters per year.
> When he focused on the presidential election years of 1992 and 1996,
> Reeves found that President Clinton was about 60 percent more likely
> than President Bush to declare a disaster in a pivotal, electorally
> important state"** (Tarcey 2004).
>
> C. Some **Presidents have even bypassed the typical disaster
> declaration process** in order to award funds for political purposes.
>
> 1\. **"The study \[of several 1995 flooding episodes in California\]
> provided convincing evidence that the declaration process in #1044 and
> #1046 did not flow from the 'bottom up' in a data driven manner.
> Instead, the President, benefiting from early advanced information
> distributed through White House officials working the Northridge
> earthquake recovery and apprised of California's needs through CNN and
> other national news television network news coverage, issued
> declaration #1044 before the official request flowed through the
> established declaration process from the bottom up" (Sylves 1996,
> 6).**
>
> 2\. **"The President, in conjunction with FEMA leadership, agreed to
> back-date the incident period of the second presidential declaration
> to encompass damage which began in the days after closing of the first
> incident period. In other words, the President issued a second
> declaration of major disaster for California in early March but in his
> statement indicated that it encompassed damage which began in
> mid-February" (Sylves 1996, 4).**
>
> 3\. **"The President actually waived the requirement that local
> officials prepare preliminary damage assessments to prove deservedness
> for a declaration. According to one OES official, 'In the last couple
> of years the declaration process has not gone by the book as it
> probably has in the past'" (Sylves 1996, 4).**
>
> D. The **politics** of declarations have thus been **illustrated in
> convincing manner by Sylves (1996)**.
>
> 1\. **"Political forces seem paramount at the presidential-FEMA
> executive level in these declarations" (Sylves 1996, 8).**
>
> 2\. **"Many officials mentioned California's political importance,
> especially its 54 electoral votes in presidential elections" (Sylves
> 1996, 7).**
>
> E. **May** has also shown that **politics is a factor in many, but not
> all disaster declarations**.

1\. **"Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota commented in the aftermath
of the Rapid City floods in 1972 that George McGovern's presidential bid
seemed to help in that instance: 'We were lucky here in Rapid City, in
no small part I suspect, because South Dakota had a Presidential
candidate, the bureaucracy was more responsive to Rapid City's
requests"** (May 1985, 104).

2\. Regarding this same disaster, **"President Nixon kept a higher
profile \[than Senator McGovern who was also running for President\] by
sending a top-level aide to the site, by having Mrs. Nixon attend a
memorial service for disaster victims, and by expediting federal relief
and reconstruction funding. This involvement helps explain Nixon's gain
in electoral support in disaster-affected counties relative to changes
in nonaffected counties"** (May 1985, 121).

3\. Congressman Latta issued charges of favoritism after a disaster
struck Ohio: **"What is it that the State of Massachusetts has that the
State of Ohio does not have except the speakership? How does it happen
that several counties in Massachusetts can get a disaster declaration by
the President of the United States practically within hours after it
occurs when it takes others weeks if they get it then? It has been about
3 weeks since we suffered a statewide disaster in Ohio and requested
such declaration from the President of the United States. What did we
get? A request to compile an impossible list of damages from every
individual, township, municipality, and county in the State of Ohio. If
such statistics are necessary before a disaster declaration is declared,
how did Massachusetts get theirs collected so fast? Obviously they were
not required to do so in Massachusetts"** (in May 1985, 111).

4\. **"A common thesis of nonelected officials who were involved in
providing relief assistance in the aftermath of Mount St. Helens was
that election-year politics played a dominant role in shaping relief
activities. Those who adopted this view pointed to the visible role of
elected officials in securing federal aid, noting President Carter's
visit to the disaster area, Senator Magnuson's orchestration of the
passage of supplemental funding, and Governor Ray's high press profile
in pushing for added federal assistance"** (May 1985, 104).

5\. Even congressmen become involved in disaster declarations.
**"Congressmen have strong incentives to become involved in relief
activities because they believe it is a primary constituent service"**
(May 1985, 124).

a\. **After Hurricane Agnes in 1972, "George McGovern visited the
disaster scene in August 1972 in a campaign stop for which newspaper
accounts describe McGovern as 'riding a wave of resentment there against
delays in Nixon Administration disaster relief.' During that visit
McGovern contrasted what he labeled inadequate disaster assistance for
Wilkes-Barre with the millions of dollars of aid going to fund the
Vietnam war. He proposed the creation of a national catastrophic
insurance fund. Three weeks later President Nixon flew to the same area,
making what the *New York Times* described as 'a surprise visit to the
flood damaged community with a \$4-million check for a local college, an
offer of free picnic hot dogs and a promise that Wilkes-Barre would
'come back better than ever.' The next day about 1,500 residents ate
'White house hamburgers' and played games as 6 members of the White
House mess crew served 100 cases of soda and 2,000 hamburgers and hot
dogs"** (May 1985, 115).

b\. In regards to the same event, **"\[Representative Daniel\] Flood was
working in his one-bedroom apartment next to the Capital at 2:00 A.M.
when he learned that the Susquehanna was starting to rise over its
banks. For sixteen years he had served on two subcommittees, with
Republican Congressman Melvin Laird. Laird, now Secretary of Defense,
was fast asleep at 3:00 A.M. when his phone rang: 'Stand by!' Flood
shouted into the phone after telling Laird that he was on his way to
take command of the rescue effort, and that he expected full-scale
assistance from his old friend . . . .That night on the television news,
Flood, dressed in fatigues, was shown standing on a hill overlooking his
flooded district. 'Today,' he said, 'I have ordered the Army Corps of
Engineers not to permit the Susquehanna to rise one more inch'"** (May
1985, 116).

6\. One member of a Senate Appropriations Committee declared **"Even
though there are some safeguards -- the president has to declare a
disaster -- there are still some open pipelines to the Treasury. In a
political year, that can be abused"** (May 1985, 104).

7\. However, **there are checks on abuse** (show handout "Prescribed
Roles in Providing Federal Disaster Relief").

> a\. **"Congress and the administration can take credit for holding the
> line on total budget increases"** (May 1985, 109).
>
> b\. **Congressional representatives may also deride the President if
> disaster assistance disregards laws and regulations**.
>
> 8\. And, it would be **incorrect** to assert that **politics
> determines all disaster declarations**.

a\. **"Evidence for, or against, election-year politics influencing the
process of budgeting for disaster relief is difficult to find. The
pattern of supplemental appropriations clearly reflects the fact that in
some years disasters were more frequent and of greater magnitude than in
other years, but that is independent of election-year cycles"** (May
1985, 109).

b\. **"The existing empirical research about such election effects is
rather limited in scope and inconclusive in its findings. One study of
citizen expectations about local officials' behaviors in the aftermath
of disasters concludes that citizens do expect elected officials to take
active roles in providing for relief assistance. Yet the few studies of
elections that closely followed disasters suggest that local officials
are not punished for failing to be active, nor are they rewarded for
securing additional assistance. A study of the local Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, election that followed Hurricane Agnes shows that local
elected officials did not fulfill citizen expectations, but there was no
retribution at the ballot box. A similar study of a local New Orleans
election that followed Hurricane Betsy in 1965 concluded that the mayor
was neither punished for inadequate preparations nor rewarded for his
visible efforts to secure federal assistance"** (May 1985, 117).

c\. **" . . . politicians who had highly visible involvement . . .
generally benefit more at the ballot box than those with moderately
visible . . . or less visible . . . involvement. Note, however, that a
positive electoral change does not necessarily indicate that the
candidate won the election. Nor does a negative one mean the candidate
lost"** (May 1985, 119).

d\. **"Political influence \[on disaster declarations\] has both
positive and negative effects: The politics of budgeting for disaster
relief has negative consequences, the election-year influence upon
presidential declarations of disasters has little effect, and the
involvement of congressmen at the scene of a disaster has largely
positive effects"** (May 1985, 122).

**Questions to be asked:**

1\. Why is damage assessment important?

2\. Who participates in damage assessment?

3\. What types of damage assessments are there?

4\. What methods are utilized for damage assessment?

5\. What is the relationship between damage assessment types and
methods? (Do some assessors prefer to use certain means to assess
damages?)

7\. What challenges confront those involved in damage assessment?

8\. How can damage assessment be performed successfully?

9\. Is damage assessment a simple, singular, or easy process?

10\. What is the disaster declaration process?

11\. On what bases may a disaster be declared?

12\. Why is disaster declaration a political process?

13\. Why do local and state governments want a disaster declared?

14\. Why does the President declare disasters in some locations and not
in others?

15\. What limits a President from abusing his/her power to declare a
disaster?

**Importance of Damage Assessment**

-   Identify victim needs

-   Recognize resource requirements

-   Obtain a disaster declaration

-   Determines if a structure is habitable

-   Estimate future risk

**Actors Involved in Damage Assessment**

-   Military personnel

-   City/County engineers

-   Council members/commissioners

-   Department heads

-   Building inspectors

-   Tax assessors

-   Lending institutions

-   Insurance companies

-   Red Cross representatives

-   Hospital administrators

-   School district superintendents/school principals

-   Agricultural agents

-   State agencies and river authorities

-   Architects

-   Chamber of Commerce

-   Volunteers

-   Preservationists

-   FEMA officials

-   Politicians

**Types and Methods of Damage Assessment**

-   Rapid/Initial

-   Preliminary

-   Technical

-   Windshield/Drive Through

-   Aerial

-   Technical/Walk through/Site Visit

**Challenges in Damage Assessment**

-   Accuracy

```{=html}
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```
-   Communications/coordination

-   Divergent purposes and forms

-   Parcel number vs. street address

-   Safety

-   Access

-   Counting techniques

-   Other

**Damage Assessment Processes**

-   **Plan**

-   **Train**

-   **Exercise**

-   **Hold a preliminary meeting**

-   **Conduct damage assessment**

-   **Rely on experts and technology**

-   **Gather and review data**

-   **Relay and act on information**

**Factors Influencing Declarations**

-   **The number of homes destroyed or sustaining major damage.**

-   **The number of homes sustaining minor damage.**

-   **The extent to which the damage is concentrated or dispersed.**

-   **The estimated costs of repairing the damage.**

-   **The demographics of the affected areas (e.g., income levels,
    unemployment, and concentrations of the elderly).**

-   **The extent to which the damage is covered by insurance.**

-   **The extent to which the disaster area is traumatized.**

-   **The extent of disaster-related unemployment.**

-   **The level of assistance available from other federal agencies
    (e.g., SBA's home and business loans).**

-   **The state and local governments' capabilities for dealing with the
    disaster.**

-   **The level of assistance available from voluntary organizations
    (e.g., the American Red Cross).**

-   **The availability of rental housing.**

-   **The extent of health and safety problems.**

-   **The extent of damage to facilities providing essential services
    (e.g., medical, utilities, police, etc.)**

-   **Politics**

**44 CFR §206.36 - §206.39**

**§206.36 Requests for major disaster declarations.**

\(b\) When a catastrophe occurs in a State, the Governor of a State, or
the Acting Governor in his/her absence, may request a major disaster
declaration. The Governor should submit the request to the President
through the appropriate Regional Director to ensure prompt
acknowledgement and processing. The request must be submitted within 30
days of the occurrence of the incident period in order to be considered.
The 30-day period may be extended by the Associate Director, provided
that a written request for an extension is submitted by the Governor, or
Acting Governor, during this 30-day period. The extension request will
stipulate reasons for the delay.

\(c\) The basis for the request shall be a finding that:

\(1\) The situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective
response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local
governments; and

\(2\) Federal assistance under the Act is necessary to supplement the
efforts and available resources of the State, local governments,
disaster relief organizations, and compensation by insurance for
disaster-related losses.

\(d\) In addition to the above findings, the complete request shall
include:

\(1\) Confirmation that the Governor has taken appropriate action under
State law and directed the execution of the State emergency plan;

\(2\) An estimate of the amount and severity of damages and losses
stating the impact of the disaster on the public and private sector;

\(3\) Information describing the nature and amount of State and local
resources which have been or will be committed to alleviate the results
of the disaster;

\(4\) Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of supplementary
Federal disaster assistance needed under the Stafford Act; and

\(5\) Certification by the Governor that State and local obligations and
expenditures for the current disaster will comply with all applicable
cost sharing requirements of the Stafford Act.

\(e\) For those catastrophes of unusual severity and magnitude when
field damage assessments are not necessary to determine the requirement
for supplemental Federal assistance, the Governor or Acting Governor may
send an abbreviated written request through the Regional Director for a
declaration of a major disaster. This may be transmitted in the most
expeditious manner available. In the event the FEMA Regional Office is
severely impact by the catastrophe, the request may be addressed to the
Director of FEMA. The request must indicate a finding in accordance with
§206.36(b), and must include as a minimum the information requested by
§206.36 (c)(1), (c)(3), and (c)(5). Upon receipt of the request, FEMA
shall expedite the processing of reports and recommendations to the
President. Notification to the Governor of the Presidential declaration
shall be in accordance with 44 CFR 206.39. The Associate Director shall
assure that documentation of the declaration is later assembled to
comply fully with these regulations.

**§206.37** **Processing requests for declarations of a major disaster
or emergency.**

> \(a\) *Acknowledgement*. The Regional Director shall provide written
> acknowledgement of the Governor's request.

\(b\) *Regional summary*. Based on information obtained by FEMA/State
preliminary damage assessments of the affected area(s) and consultations
with appropriate State and Federal officials and other interested
parties, the Regional Director shall promptly prepare a summary of the
PDA findings. The data will be analyzed and submitted with a
recommendation to the Associate Director. The Regional Analysis shall
include a discussion of State and local resources and capabilities, and
other assistance available to meet the major disaster or
emergency-related needs.

\(c\) *FEMA recommendation*. Based on all available information, the
Director shall formulate a recommendation which shall be forwarded to
the President with the Governor's request.

\(1\) *Major disaster recommendation*. The recommendation will be based
on a finding that the situation is or is not of such severity and
magnitude as to be beyond the capabilities of the State and its local
governments. It will also contain a determination of whether or not
supplemental Federal assistance under the Stafford Act is necessary and
appropriate. In developing a recommendation, FEMA will consider such
factors as the amount and type of damages; the impact of damages on
affected individuals, the State and local governments; the available
resources of the State and local governments, and other disaster relief
organizations; the extent and type of insurance in effect to cover
losses; assistance available from other Federal programs and other
sources; imminent threats to public health and safety; recent disaster
history in the State; hazard mitigation measures taken by the State or
local governments, especially implementation of measures required as a
result of previous major disaster declarations; and other factors
pertinent to a given incident.

\(2\) *Emergency recommendation*. The recommendation will be based on a
report which will indicate whether or not Federal emergency assistance
under section 502 of the Stafford Act is necessary to supplement State
and local efforts to save lives, protect property and public health and
safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. Only after it
has been determined that all other resources and authorities available
to meet the crisis are inadequate, and that assistance provided in
section 502 of the Stafford Act would be appropriate, will FEMA
recommend an emergency declaration to the President.

> \(d\) *Modified Federal emergency recommendation*. The recommendation
> will be based on a report which will indicate that an emergency does
> or does not exist for which assistance under section 502 of the
> Stafford Act would be appropriate. An emergency declaration will not
> be recommended in situations where the authority to respond or
> coordinate is within the jurisdiction of one or more Federal agencies
> without a Presidential declaration. However, where there are
> significant unmet needs of sufficient severity and magnitude, not
> addressed by other assistance, which could appropriately be addressed
> under the Stafford Act, the involvement of other Federal agencies
> would not preclude a declaration of an emergency under the Act.

**§206.38 Presidential determination.**

\(a\) The Governor's request for a major disaster declaration may result
in either a President declaration of a major disaster or an emergency,
or denial of the Governor's request.

\(b\) The Governor's request for an emergency declaration may result
only in a Presidential declaration of an emergency, or denial of the
Governor's request.

**§206.39 Notification.**

> \(a\) The Governor will be promptly be notified by the Director or
> his/her designee of a declaration by the President that an emergency
> or a major disaster exists. FEMA also will notify other Federal
> agencies and other interested parties.
>
> \(b\) The Governor will be promptly notified by the Director or
> his/her designee of a determination that the Governor's request does
> not justify the use of the authorities of the Stafford Act.
>
> \(c\) Following a major disaster or emergency declaration, the
> Regional Director or Associate Director will promptly notify the
> Governor of the designations of assistance and areas eligible for such
> assistance.

**Prescribed Roles in Providing**

**Federal Disaster Relief**

(May 1985, 105)

+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Role of         | Prescribed      | Range of        | Check on Abuse  |
|                 | Actions         | Discretion      |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| *President*     | Disaster        | Broad           | Congressional   |
|                 | declaration:    | guidelines set  | outcry from     |
|                 | Decides whether | by              | inappropriate   |
|                 | di              | congressional   | decisions       |
|                 | saster-impacted | intent,         |                 |
|                 | areas eligible  | precedence      |                 |
|                 | for federal     |                 |                 |
|                 | assistance,     |                 |                 |
|                 | upon governor's |                 |                 |
|                 | request         |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| *Congress*      | Budgetary       | Funds subject   | Disasters must  |
|                 | actions:        | to limits       | be declared     |
|                 |                 | specified in    | eligible for    |
|                 | Makes           | authorizing     | federal aid;    |
|                 | appropriations  | legislation     | agency          |
|                 | to disaster     |                 | regulations     |
|                 | funding pools   |                 | control         |
|                 | that agencies   |                 | specific        |
|                 | use to fund     |                 | expenditures    |
|                 | disaster        |                 |                 |
|                 | assistance      |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| *Governor*      | Disaster        | Can make        | Risks creating  |
|                 | declaration:    | request any     | sour state and  |
|                 |                 | time state and  | federal agency  |
|                 | Makes request   | local ability   | relations if    |
|                 | to the          | to respond is   | 'cries wolf'    |
|                 | president for   | insufficient    | too often       |
|                 | disaster        |                 |                 |
|                 | declaration     |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| *Federal        | Rendering       | Federal         | Executive       |
| Agencies*       | assistance:     | regulations     | branch controls |
|                 |                 | guide funding   | plus            |
|                 | Agencies        | for specific    | congressional   |
|                 | determine for   | activities      | oversight       |
|                 | declared        |                 |                 |
|                 | disaster which  |                 |                 |
|                 | specific relief |                 |                 |
|                 | activities      |                 |                 |
|                 | eligible for    |                 |                 |
|                 | federal funds   |                 |                 |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+