APHIS -Veterinary Services

June 13-15, 2001

Team members:

Lisa Ferguson, APHIS-VS

Cristobal Zepeda, APHIS-VS

Anne Goodman, APHIS-VS

Jere Dick, APHIS-VS

Sylvie Farez, CFIA, Ottawa, Canada

Mike Hanley, FAS/Dublin

**Overview**

On the morning of June 14, Mr. Hanley met the review team at the hotel
and we traveled to the Headquarters Office for the Department of
Agriculture, Food & Rural Development (DAFRD), Kildaire Street, Dublin
2, Republic of Ireland. DAFRD was primarily represented by Dr. Albert
Costelloe, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, who apologized for the
absence of Colm Gaynor, Chief Veterinary Officer, due to prior
commitments. Also representing DAFRD were Dr. Sally Gaynor; Dr. Billy
McAteer; and Dr. John Melville. Others employees giving presentations
rotated through the conference room during the day.

A well organized program was closely followed throughout the day. These
presentations gave an excellent overview of key activity areas
surrounding Ireland's response to FMD cases in Northern Ireland, as well
as their response to FMD in their own country. The following paragraphs
address the highlights of various presentations. More detail on each
subject area is available as necessary.

**Veterinary situation in Ireland**

The day started with an initial presentation on the overall agricultural
economy and function in the Republic of Ireland (Attachment 1). The June
2000 census for major agricultural animal species was as follows: 7.2
million cattle; 7.6 million sheep; and 1.7 million pigs. This also
included a brief overview on the DAFRD Veterinary Headquarters Staff and
normal "peace time" field infrastructure, including geographical
distribution for employees and information on supporting laboratories
located throughout the country (Attachment 2). There are 26 counties in
Ireland, each with a district office and district Superintending
Veterinary Inspector (SVI). The National Veterinary Reference Laboratory
is located in Abbotstown, Ireland. There are five additional regional
laboratories which assist in regular animal disease control and
eradication activities.

**Animal identification systems**

A summary of current and future plans for sheep identification was
presented next. Sheep identification has been mandated by the EU for the
past 5-6 years. However, this is a flock-based system, and does not
include individual animal identification. A new National Sheep
Identification System (NSIS) is now being implemented. The NSIS will
give greater uniformity, and better allow the department to conduct
disease monitoring, surveillance, and disease control programs for
sheep. Unfortunately, NSIS had not yet been implemented during the FMD
outbreak, thus leading to some difficulties in tracebacks. The new NSIS
carries with it a significant new legal structure through the amended
Disease of Animals Act (March 2001). It specifically requires individual
identification of [all]{.underline} sheep; shifts the onus on to flock
owners to prove ownership; significantly increases penalties (upto 5 yr
prison sentences); provides uniform eartags through 8 national tag
suppliers; and provides for a new "Dispatch Document" that will
accompany the animal throughout life. Legislation provides that all
sheep in Ireland will be identified with this new system by December 15,
2001.

A presentation was made on the cattle identification system. There are
three main elements to this system: (1) Physical ID, ie. Alphanumeric
Ear Tags, (2) Documentation, ie. Animal Passports, and (3) a
Computerized Database System, ie. The CMMS. Complete data has now been
captured on all bovine animals since January 1, 2000. This system proved
quite valuable for tracing bovine animals and products during the FMD
outbreak.

**Overview of response to outbreak**

Discussions then moved into more specifics about the actual FMD
outbreaks, beginning with an "Overview of Measures Taken in Ireland to
FMD" (Attachment 3) . This included a chronology of events in relation
to outbreaks of FMD in other EU countries; a review of Ireland's
response organizations and activities; specific actions and dates those
actions were taken; the formation of an Expert Advisory Group
(Attachment 4); and the evolutionary process into their current FMD
disease status. It was evident that Ireland had expended vast monetary
resources to prevent the spread of disease.

The remaining presentations were very detailed about the outbreaks in
both Northern Ireland and Ireland, and the responses taken due to each
of these. Initially, discussions focused on describing Ireland's
activities and legislative response to Northern Ireland's notification
of suspicion of FMD on February 28, 2001. This was required because the
3 km control zone for the first Northern Ireland case extended into the
Republic. Subsequently, an extensive summary was given of Ireland's
laboratory and field response to notification of FMD in Broughattin,
County Louth, Ireland, on March 23, 2001. Also discussed were EU
Commission Decisions 2001/234 and 2001/295, and how they affected the
Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) in Ballymascanlon, and the National
Disease Control Centre (NDCC) in Dublin.

**Laboratory resources and testing**

A brief presentation was given on laboratory support. The primary
laboratory in Ireland is the Abbotstown National Veterinary Reference
Laboratory. The Central Veterinary Laboratory in Pirbright, England was
the reference laboratory and was used to confirm suspicious tests run in
Ireland's laboratory.

Testing of field samples basically fell into two categories: (1)
Serology - which consisted of either liquid phase blocking ELISA or
virus neutralization testing (VNT). VNT is done at Pirbright because
Irish officials did not want live virus at Abbotstown. (2) Viral antigen
detection - which consisted of either ELISA (a 4-6 hr test) or virus
isolation (a 4 day test) consisting of double passage in cell culture.
The laboratory had 158 suspects referred to their FMD experts during the
February-June period. Out of those, 115 were ruled out
epidemiologically. The remaining 43 were sampled by laboratory
investigators, following a strict protocol, which involved collection of
epithelium, serum, and blood. For confirmation, samples were sent to
Pirbright, England. The lone isolate from Ireland's single outbreak was
Type O, Panasian Strain, FMD Virus.

**Outbreak effects on milk production**

The next presentation addressed the issue of milk production in the
restricted zones. Thirty-two milk suppliers (producers) were eventually
affected within the FMD control zones created by the Northern Ireland
and Irish outbreaks. No movement of animals or product was allowed in
this zone. On-farm acidification, and dumping of milk, accounted for
28,290 gallons of milk being destroyed. Strict measures were also taken
in the collection, treatment, and movement of milk product within the 10
km surveillance zone. Only double-pasturized whole milk powder was
allowed out of this zone. A total of 1.5 million gallons of milk were
processed in this manner.

**Tracing imported and exported animals**

Details were provided about tracing of imported animals. European
Commission Decisions 223/2001, 208/2001, and 172/2001, relating to
infection in the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom,
respectively, were discussed. A detailed summary of all traces from
these countries was provided. Some specific examples of problem traces,
and their use of the police (Irish Garda) and the Departmental Special
Investigations Unit (SIU), pointed out the urgent measures taken to
provide timely data on all tracebacks.

Extensive details were then presented concerning tracing work done on
various import and export issues. The source of Northern Ireland's
initial outbreak was sheep received from Great Britain. Tracing work was
done by Ireland for sheep received in a "common" consignment with
Northern Ireland. Hundreds of sheep were traced, tested, and destroyed
in an efficient and timely manner by the Irish LDCC in Ballymascanlon.
Consequently, no FMD was ever detected in Ireland originating from these
shipments.

Discussions were also held concerning shipments of animals to the
Netherlands and France. Investigations, epidemiology, and tracing proved
that the source of infection in the Netherlands was most likely Irish
calves that had become infected while on the infected premises in
Mayenne, France. In addition, extensive Irish, English, and French
investigations all pointed to the source of FMD infection for France as
sheep imported from England.

**National Disease Control Centre activities**

An overview of operations for the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)
located at Headquarters in Dublin, Ireland was given. This focused on
general Organizational Structure and the various functions of Centre
units. The role of the Centre was to provide coordination for all field
activities; general direction for the LDCC; liaison with the Ministry,
media, industry, and other government entities; provide for ongoing
review; and to provide logistical support. A review of general staffing
was provided, and a second look at all field investigations conducted by
26/27 Districts was provided.

**National surveillance activities**

Nationwide surveillance had been initiated to confirm the freedom from
FMD and both a description of the survey and interim results were
discussed. The primary objective of the survey was to declare the
country free of FMD. OIE guidelines were followed in developing the
survey - i.e., the samples were random, and were obtained at a rate to
demonstrate 95% confidence that prevalence of seropositive flocks is no
more than 1%. The survey was divided into two phases with the first
phase targeting high risk counties and premises. Specifically, this
focused on the eastern half of the country where the sheep population is
more unstable. The plan is to examine 3,636 flocks from a target
population of 18,579 flocks. At the time of the visit, approximately
3,000 samples had been received as part of phase 1, and all tests had
been negative to date. The samples are tested using the ELISA test at
the Abbotstown laboratory, with any positives being sent to Pirbright
for confirmation. The second phase was scheduled for completion toward
the end of June and was planned to extend into the remainder of the
country.

**Border controls**

Import and border controls were discussed, "FMD Controls at Ports,
Airports, and Border Crossings" (Attachment 5). There are 4 major ocean
ports for human travel and 8 major ocean ports for cargo movement. In
addition, there are 8 international airports, 144 land border crossing
with Northern Ireland, and hundreds of smaller harbors navigable from
the sea. Extensive border activities have been undertaken including:
disinfection of vehicles, passenger footware, and equipment;
dissemination of written materials & verbal announcements; certification
checks; confiscation of high risk materials; and collection/destruction
of high risk waste.

**Local disease control activities**

An overview of the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) was presented.
The LDCC was located at the Ballaymascanlon Hotel/Golf Club inside the
Control Zone on the Cooley Peninsula. It operated 24 hours/day, 7
days/week. It was supervised by the Garda (Police) and the Technical
Staff of the Department. This Centre supervised the limited movement of
animals within the zone and all eradication activities carried out
there. Only animals and/or equipment permitted by the Garda were allowed
to move out of the zone. A total of 2,753 permits were issued up to
April 30, 2001. Also included was a brief review of the various tasks
for each group located at the LDCC. It was notable that 18,000
disposable suits, and 40,000 disposable gloves were used by Department
employees during the 14 weeks of the outbreak!

Further details were provided in a chronology of the Louth County
outbreak. The Meigh, Northern Ireland case was confirmed on February 28,
2001 and the control zone extended into northern Louth County, Ireland.
The LDCC was activated immediately in the District Veterinary Office,
and then moved and became fully operational at Ballymascanlan on March
2, 2001. Between February 28 and March 22, 736 clinical visits were
carried out in the extended Meigh control zone and no suspect cases
noted. Similar clinical visits were carried out in the surveillance
zone.

Suspicion of disease in County Louth was reported on March 20. The
farmer reported this suspicion to the veterinary inspector on routine
surveillance as required in the control zones. This premise was
approximately 8 km from Meigh, in the extended protection zone. On
clinical examination, these sheep were strongly suspicious and they were
slaughtered the same day. Samples were submitted to Pirbright on March
21, and on March 22, preliminary confirmation of infected sheep was
received in Ireland. The control zones were immediately established as
required by Community legislation (85/511/EEC). All animals within 1 km
of the infected premises were culled, and all sheep within 3 km were
culled. The premise where the infected sheep were confirmed had a total
of 7 land parcels, located in both the protection and surveillance
zones. All cattle and sheep on all of these land parcels were sampled
and slaughtered, a total of 113 cattle and 447 sheep. In addition, sheep
contiguous to different premises owned by the same producer were also
culled.

Samples were taken from animals included in the culls described above.
One of the premises owned by the original producer, located in the
surveillance zone, had a positive serology result (positive antibody
ELISA, negative virus neutralization). In response to this, a decision
was made to cull all cattle within a 1 km zone around this premise - all
sheep had already been culled. There were 3 additional sites that had
positive serology as a result of samples taken during the cull. One of
these was positive samples in wild goats taken in the wildlife cull. As
a result of these, a decision was made to cull all the sheep in the
entire Cooley peninsula. In all, greater than 50,000 animals were
destroyed and either buried on-site or rendered.

Clinical surveillance visits were done in both the protection and
surveillance zones as prescribed in Community legislation. In the
protection zone, visits were made to all herds within the protection
zone between 9 and 11 April, and a total of 795 bovine blood samples
were obtained. All of these samples were negative. From 19 to 24 April,
the final round of clinical visits were completed within the controlled
area. In this area, a total of 7,062 blood samples were taken, all with
negative results. All movement restrictions were released as of
midnight, April 30, 2001.

The discussion of LDCC activities was continued with a presentation on
specific work procedures in the centre. An overview of training and
biosecurity for all employees was detailed. Daily briefings were held
and each crew received a packet with instructions for their daily work
allocation. The protocol for completion of forms, submission of samples,
and reporting of suspected cases was summarized, and a review was given
of the work description and final zone clearance dictated by EC Decision
2001/295 regarding each species of farm animals.

An overview of the epidemiology of the outbreak was presented. Irish
officials have yet to definitively identify the source of infection, but
believe it is highly likely that it will prove to be via illegal
transport of sheep from England. Full disclosure of the epidemiology
will be provided once criminal cases are prosecuted and the final data
are received.

**Wild animal cull on the Cooley Peninsula**

A specific presentation was made describing the cull of wild animal
species on the Cooley peninsula. The objective was to eliminate wild
susceptible species in the "common" grazing areas of the Cooley
Peninsula mountains. Wild goats, sheep and several species of deer
roamed the mountains and Irish Army Rangers were used to hunt these
target species. Helicopters were used where necessary to gain access to
rugged terrain. All carcasses were sampled, double bagged, and
transported off the mountain for burial. Over 300 animals were removed,
with 2 goats showing positive serology for FMD. Local officials believe
all wild susceptible species have now been removed from the entire area.

**Restocking**

The final discussion was on restocking options for Cooley peninsula. The
restocking of the Cooley Peninsula will take place on a phased basis.
The highest areas of risk will be left free of livestock for the longest
period, with the lowest risk areas restocked first. The restocking will
be managed in such a way to allow appropriate monitoring and testing of
replacement animals. Four risk category groups were identified and
strategies developed to deal with each category were delineated in the
presentation.

**Details of the local situation**

On the morning of June 15, the team traveled by coach to the Cooley
Peninsula. The team arrived at the former LDCC at Ballymascanlon
Hotel/Golf Course and received a quick tour of the facilities. The Hotel
facility appeared to be ideally suited as an operational centre, housing
facility, and restaurant - all wrapped into one very isolated group of
buildings. Every thing employees required was at one site.

A representative of the Garda Siochana (Guardians of the Peace or Irish
Police) gave a presentation on the role of the Garda in the outbreak.
All police functions in Ireland are carried out solely by the Garda.
When notification of infection in Northern Ireland was received by the
government, they sealed the 250 mile common border, which included 206
different roads. During the outbreak, the Garda employed 1,571 police
officers along the border, having to call an additional 388 from other
remote locations within the country. It took 685 officers to work each
24 hour period. Each time a control zone changed, it would require new
check points and extra manpower. A full-time veterinarian worked with
the Garda at the LDCC to coordinate training and answer technical
questions from designated entry points. Today over 400 Garda are still
working the border, and during the 14 weeks since the outbreak began,
the police support alone has cost about \$25 million U.S. dollars.

Brendan Smith, Superintending Veterinary Inspector (SVI) and director of
the LDCC, then accompanied the group to the Cooley Kichams Disinfection
Centre. This site was a football/recreation center taken over from a
nearby small town, and was ideally suited for rigorous disinfection
procedures, as it was heavily tiled and cemented. Walls were specially
coated to facilitate cleaning and disinfection. It was used by task
force personnel after farms visits, to complete sample submissions and
for conducting thorough personal and equipment disinfection. We received
a tour of the facility and were briefed on its operation by Dr. Jim
Thorton, SVI and director of the Centre during its operation.

The team then drove by one of the eight sites held by the owner of the
infected premises. It was still heavily posted and "taped" to prevent
outside visitors. There were no animals in sight, and no one exited the
bus. The team continued to travel around the peninsula. As the team left
the control zone, its bus crossed through a border control point. The
vehicle was disinfected by an automatic spray unit located in the middle
of the highway. Garda and Department employees were present. Traffic
delays were still significant, as this was a major thoroughfare with
Belfast, Northern Ireland.

The team returned to Dublin for a final meeting with DAFRD officials. A
final short presentation was given on all the legislative activity which
has occurred in Ireland since the first of this year. Copies of all
legislation were provided.

The team thanked Irish Department Officials for their candid and
thorough review of all FMD related activities. We also thanked them for
their warm hospitality and congratulated them on their successful
eradication of disease.

**General comments**

The team came away with a thorough understanding of the response to the
outbreak. It appears that all involved did an exceptional job of
responding to incursion of a foreign animal disease in an efficient,
effective, and timely manner. Irish veterinary officials continue to
take every precaution and have implemented several extensive targeted
surveillance projects. They have a well-thought-out, conservative, plan
for restocking of the Cooley Peninsula.