**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS**

No. 01-1322

[Theodore L. Bissonnette, Jr., Appellant]{.smallcaps},

v\.

[Anthony J. Principi,]{.smallcaps}

[Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee]{.smallcaps}

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans\' Appeals

(Decided June 15, 2004 )

*Kenneth M. Carpenter*, of Topeka, Kansas, was on the brief for the
appellant.

*Tim S. McClain*, General Counsel; *R. Randall Campbell*, Assistant
General Counsel; *Carolyn F. Washington*, Deputy Assistant General
Counsel; and *Robert W. Legg*, all of Washington, D.C., were on the
brief for the appellee.

Before IVERS, STEINBERG, and GREENE, *Judges*.

STEINBERG, *Judge*: The appellant, through counsel, seeks review of an
April 6, 2001, Board of Veterans\' Appeals (Board or BVA) decision that
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the doctrine of res judicata
his claim for an effective date earlier than May 27, 1993, for an award
of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service connection for a seizure
disorder; that claim included the issue whether a Notice of Disagreement
(NOD) was filed as to a January 1968 VA regional office (RO) decision
denying service connection for a seizure disorder. Record (R.) at 1. The
appellant and the Secretary each filed a brief, and the appellant filed
a reply brief. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). For the reasons that
follow, the Court will affirm the Board decision.

**I. Relevant Background**

> The veteran served honorably on active duty in the U.S. Army from
> September 1964 until

November 1967, including service in Vietnam. R. at 11. Upon his entry
into service, he had no history of epilepsy. R. at 15-16. Beginning in
December 1965, his service medical records indicate that on several
occasions he experienced blackout spells and reported seizures. *See*,
*e.g.*, R. at 24, 28, 49, 37, 40, 46, 52, 60. Two days before the
veteran\'s discharge, a VA examining physician completed a physical
profile record on the veteran and listed as a defect the veteran\'s
\"\[s\]eizure disorder (\[e\]pilepsy)\". R. at 52.

In November 1967, the veteran filed with a VARO a claim for service
connection for epilepsy, which, he stated, had \"\[s\]tarted during the
middle of 1966 while in Vietnam.\" R. at 90. In January 1968, the VARO
sent a letter to the veteran stating that because he had failed to
report for a scheduled examination, the RO had denied his claim; the
letter also stated:

> No further action will be taken unless you inform us of your
> willingness to report for examination by signing the statement below
> and returning this letter to us. Upon receipt of such notification, an
> examination will be re\[\]scheduled and your claim will be
> reconsidered when the examination is complete.

R. at 93. On January 23, 1968, the RO received from the veteran a
letter, which stated: \"I received your letter today telling me my claim
has been denied. I really don\'t think you have the right to do so.\" R.
at 95. The veteran then explained why he did not report for examinations
and asked: \"So Sir if it is possible could it be arrange\[d\] for me to
reopen my claim \[and\] take the physical exam here at Fort Riley.\" R.
at 96. Also in January 1968, the RO replied that there were no
facilities at Fort Riley for an examination and informed the veteran
that he should notify the RO if he was able to report \"to the VA for an
examination at some future date\" (R. at 99); in July 1968, the veteran
submitted a statement that he was \"willing to report for examination
for compensation purposes at any time\" (R. at 101). In a September 1968
VA examination report, the examining physician during a \"special
neurologic examination\" recorded as a diagnosis \"\[c\]onvulsive
disorder, grand mal type\", and the examining physician for the
\"general medical examination\" recorded that \"\[d\]iagnoses are
pending laboratory work\" and listed as his diagnosis
\"**\[*h*\]*istory* *of*** convulsive disorder, grand mal type\". R. at
106-07 (emphasis added). In December 1968, the RO sent to the veteran a
letter stating that he had been scheduled for \"a period of hospital
observation and examination to determine the extent of \[his\]
disability\" but because he did not report for that examination, the RO
would \"tak\[e\] no further action in \[his\] claim . . . until such
time \[as he was\] willing to report for the hospital observation and
examination.\" R. at 114.

In May 1971, the veteran filed, through a representative, \"an informal
claim for reconsideration of compensation benefits.\" R. at 116. A
partially illegible copy of a VA hospital summary reveals that the
veteran was admitted for four days for observation and tests in
August 1971, but that he had left the hospital apparently before the VA
physicians finished a diagnosis; it also appears from the record that he
stated that he would prefer to undergo further tests as an outpatient so
that he could return to his business at his home. R. at 119. In October
1971, the RO sent to the veteran a letter (1) stating that he had \"left
the hospital before \[his\] tests and evaluations could be competed in
August 1971\", (2) advising him that in order for the RO to process his
application, he needed to undergo \"an observation and evaluation
examination\", and (3) requesting that he respond to them within 60 days
regarding whether he was \"ready, willing, and able to report and remain
in the hospital until such examination can be performed.\" R. at 122.
There is no evidence in the record that the appellant ever responded to
this letter. *See* R. at 1-398.

In May 1993, the veteran filed, through a representative, an
\"informal\" claim for service connection for his seizure disorder (R.
at 124); he filed a formal claim in May 1994 (R. at 127-28). In October
1994, the RO, inter alia, granted service connection for his \"seizure
disorder\" and awarded a rating of 80% for that disability, effective
from May 27, 1993, the date of his informal claim. R. at 195-97. The
veteran submitted to the RO a \"Request for Readjudication\", stating
that the RO erroneously had failed to adjudicate his claim in 1967 and
that, thus, that claim was still pending. R. at 205-06. The RO responded
in December 1994 that, in January 1968, it had administratively denied
his November 1967 claim because he had failed to report for an
examination. R. at 209. On appeal to the Board for an earlier effective
date (EED) for his 80% seizure-disorder rating (R. at 230 (Substantive
Appeal), 274 (Certification of Appeal), 282-83 (written submission in
support of appeal requesting effective date as of date of discharge),
the Board in November 1996 denied an effective date before May 27, 1993,
because it determined that the veteran had abandoned his November 1967
and October 1971 claims by his failure to report for examinations,
within the one-year period following the RO\'s requests, and that there
was thus no prior claim upon which he could be awarded an EED (R. at
292-95). The veteran then appealed to this Court; in a March 1998
single-judge memorandum decision, the Court, inter alia, held as to the
November 1967 and May 1971 seizure-disorder claims that (1) pursuant to
38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a) there was \"a plausible basis for the Board\'s
finding that the appellant had abandoned those earlier claims by not
reporting for his examinations\" and (2) there was \"a plausible basis
for the Board\'s conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to an
effective date earlier than May 27, 1993,\" for his service-connected
seizure disorder. *Bissonnette v. West*, No. 96-1751, 1998 WL 136888, at
\*4 (Vet. App. Mar. 20, 1998) (*Bissonnette I*).

> In September 1998, the veteran filed, inter alia, with the RO a
> \"claim that the \[RO\] failed to submit a Statement of the Case
> \[(SOC) as\] to his \[NOD\]\" filed in January 1968. R. at 309-10. In
> a June 1999 SOC, the RO stated that no timely NOD was filed as to the
> January 1968 letter denying the veteran\'s original claim for service
> connection. R. at 334-35. Specifically, the RO determined: The
> veteran\'s letter, received January 23, 1968, did express some
> disagreement with the VA decision to deny his claim. The disagreement
> was specific as to the requirement for an examination. This
> requirement was explained to the veteran and he agreed to report for
> the examination. The portion of the decision with \[sic\] which the
> veteran questioned was addressed and the veteran was apparently
> satisfied as he agreed to report for the VA examination. Although the
> letter did express some disagreement with the prior decision, it can
> not be reasonabl\[y\] construed, based on the letter and subsequent
> events, that the veteran desired appellate review.

R. at 335. Following the veteran\'s August 1999 submission of a
Substantive Appeal (R. at 338-55), the RO issued another decision in
September 1999; the RO found that the veteran\'s claim \"for service
connection for a seizure disorder, initially received \[on November 9,
1967,\] and reopened \[on\] July 16, 1968, is considered to be
abandoned\" because he failed to report for the required examination
within one year after notice of the request (R. at 357-58). In making
that determination, the RO stated that any argument that the veteran\'s
January 1968 letter constituted a claim to reopen that must now be
adjudicated is moot because \"the veteran\'s claim was considered by VA
to be formally reopened by his written statement, received in July of
1968, when he reported he was willing to report for VA examination.\" R.
at 358.

In March 2000, after submitting to the Board a memo of additional
argument in support of his claim (R. at 371-79), the veteran also
submitted, inter alia, to the RO a \"formal claim\" regarding the RO\'s
\"failure to adjudicate a claim for service\[-\]connected disability\"
from November 1967 (R. at 382-85). A few days later, also in March 2000,
the appellant then submitted to the RO a document, entitled \"Notice of
Disagreement\", which asserted that, although the RO conceded in its
September 1999 decision that his July 1968 letter served as a claim to
reopen his abandoned 1967 claim, the RO never issued a \"\[d\]ecision
with an appropriate notice of his appellate rights\" as to that July
1968 claim, and it thus remained open. R. at 388-91. In the Board
decision here on appeal, the Board summarized as follows the veteran\'s
four arguments in support of his assertion that his November 1967 claim
was unadjudicated: (1) The veteran\'s January 1968 letter to the RO was
an NOD and the RO never issued an SOC in response; (2) the RO failed to
inform the veteran in its January 1968 letter denying his
service-connection claim that he had one year to report for the exam;
(3) the RO erroneously denied the veteran\'s claim in January 1968,
rather than simply \"\'labeling it as potentially abandoned\'\"; and (4)
the RO\'s January 1968 letter denying his claim did not advise the
veteran of his appellate rights. R. at 6. The Board also noted that the
veteran had asserted that his September 1968 examination constituted an
informal claim to reopen. *Ibid*. The Board declined to reach those
arguments because it determined that they were \"foreclosed under the
doctrine of *res judicata*\"; the Board reasoned:

> In its March 1998 decision, the Court found that the claim \[for\]
> service connection for a seizure disorder was adjudicated by the RO in
> January 1968, and that the claim was denied based on the veteran\'s
> failure to report for scheduled VA examinations. The Court also found
> that the veteran\'s claim for entitlement to service connection for a
> seizure disorder was abandoned based on his repeated failure to report
> for scheduled examinations. . . .
>
> Accordingly, the Court decision dated in March 1998\[\] found that the
> veteran\'s claim \[for\] service connection received in 1967 was
> adjudicated and abandoned. In so finding, the argument . . . that the
> veteran\'s claim . . . was never finally adjudicated is barred by the
> doctrine of *res judicata*. Hence, the Board is without jurisdiction
> to find otherwise.

R. at 6-7 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104 and *Morris v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App.
260 (1991)). The Board then dismissed the veteran\'s claim for an EED,
to include the issue whether an NOD as to the January 1968 RO decision
was timely filed. R. at 7.

**II. Contentions on Appeal**

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, as the appellant
concedes, he expressly withdrew (in his August 1999 Substantive Appeal
(R. at 341)) his claim of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the
January 1968 RO decision denying his original claim for service
connection. Dec. 2002 Response at 3-5 (noting \"error\" by counsel for
appellant and apologizing for characterizing, in response to
Secretary\'s motion to dismiss, claim as CUE claim); *see Bissonnette v.
Principi*, No. 01-1322, 2002 WL 31513330, at \*2 (Vet. App. Nov. 12,
2002) (ordering, inter alia, appellant to show cause why Board decision
concluding that it had no jurisdiction over CUE claim should not be
affirmed). Thus, the now-withdrawn CUE claim is not part of the instant
appeal.

In his principal brief, the appellant first argues that the Board
incorrectly applied the doctrine of res judicata. Brief (Br.) 7-11. He
asserts that the \"theory of entitlement to an \[EED\]\" before the
Court in March 1998 was solely that he had not abandoned his claim, and
that the Court\'s holding was only that \"the original claim of November
1967 **was final** due to the **abandonment** of that claim by the
\[a\]ppellant.\" Br. at 8-9. On that basis, the appellant concludes that
res judicata applies only to the legal determination regarding
abandonment but not to the question of law whether the appellant\'s
January 1968 letter was an NOD. Br. at 9. The appellant cites the four
elements identified in *Neves v. Brown*, 6 Vet.App. 177, 179 (1993),
that render a claim barred under res judicata and concedes that all
requirements are met except that the instant case does not involve the
same claim as the first; instead, he contends that whether his January
1968 letter is an NOD \"**does not involve** the same claim.\" Br. at
10-11 (citing *Andre v. Principi*, 301 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for
proposition that \"the \[a\]ppellant can present alternative theories of
CUE at any time under 38 U.S.C. § 5109A\"). Having asserted that his
current claim is not precluded on the basis of res judicata, the
appellant then argues (1) that his January 1968 letter was, in fact, an
NOD, as to which the RO issued no SOC (Br. at 11-15) and (2) that the
BVA violated 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) by not remanding the claims to the RO
for the issuance of an SOC in response to his March 2000 NOD as to the
September 1999 RO decision (Br. at 15-18).

In response, the Secretary counters that the April 2001 BVA decision
dismissing the appellant\'s claim \"reflected a solid appreciation of
the facts and applicable law and should be affirmed.\" Br. at 5 (citing
*Trilles v. West*, 13 Vet.App. 314, 321 (2000) (en banc)). With respect
to res judicata, the Secretary criticizes the appellant\'s citation to
*Andre*, *supra*, and argues that that case is distinguishable from the
instant case because (1) *Andre* involved a CUE claim; (2) *Andre* dealt
with whether the issue there had been adjudicated by the Board, whereas
the instant case deals with whether the claim has already been decided
by this Court, a higher tribunal; and (3) in *Andre*, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that each specific allegation of
CUE is a new claim, whereas here the appellant is raising \"the same
claim, albeit with a different twist to his already adjudicated argument
as to the finality of the 1968 RO decision, using evidence previously
considered by the Court in 1998.\" Br. at 8. The Secretary also asserts
that the appellant \"had a fair opportunity to raise this specific
argument to the Board and Court in his appeal for an \[EED\] at \[the
time of his prior appeal\]\" that resulted in the Court\'s March 1998
decision. Br. at 9 (citing *McDowell v. Brown*, 5 Vet.App. 401, 405
(1993)). The Secretary contends that whether the veteran\'s January 1968
letter was an NOD is precluded as res judicata in light of the Court\'s
prior ruling regarding the finality of the January 1968 RO decision, and
he thus declines to address the merits of that argument. Br. at 9-10.
Regarding the appellant\'s argument that the Board failed to require the
RO to issue an SOC as to the appellant\'s March 2000 NOD, the Secretary
asserts that the appellant\'s \"\'claim\' for adjudication of an
informal claim in 1999 was not a separate claim, but rather a separate
theory of entitlement to an \[EED\].\" Br. at 11 (citing *Andre*, 301
F.3d at 1361).

In his reply brief, the appellant agrees with the Secretary that his
current claim for an EED is the same ***claim*** as the claim denied by
the Board in November 1996, but argues that the \"theory of
entitlement\" to the EED claim he is currently pursuing is different
from the prior theory; he contests the Secretary\'s interpretation of
*Andre*, *supra*, a case that he claims supports his interpretation and
entitles him to an adjudication on the current theory. Reply at 2-5. As
to the Secretary\'s assertion that the appellant had a prior opportunity
to raise this argument to the Board and the Court, the appellant states
that \"\[t\]here does not exist any compulsory joinder of **all**
theories of entitlement . . . in VA law\" and that \"\[t\]here is no bar
to a claimant, after being unsuccessful in one theory, to thereafter
present to the Secretary an alternative theory of non\[\]finality, not
previously presented and considered by the Secretary.\" Reply at 5-6.
The appellant has also filed a notice of supplemental authority
notifying the Court of a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, *Littlejohn v. United States*, 321 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
2003), after briefing was complete here.

**III. Analysis**

Res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that determines the effect
of prior judgments on parties in subsequent adjudications. [Gene R.
Shreve & Peter Raven-Hansen, Understanding Civil Procedure]{.smallcaps}
§ 106 (2d ed. 1994). The doctrine has long included two subdoctrines,
one of which was historically called \"res judicata\" and more recently
has been termed \"claim preclusion\", and the other which was
historically called \"collateral estoppel\" and more recently has been
termed \"issue preclusion\"; res judicata deals with \"how a judgment
can foreclose subsequent opportunities to bring a claim or cause of
action\" and collateral estoppel deals with \"how a judgment can prevent
relitigation of an issue of fact or law.\" *Ibid*.; *see also* *Strott
v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App. 114, 117 (1991). In *Neves*, this Court
outlined the four requisite elements for a claim to be barred by claim
preclusion:

> \(1\) \[T\]he Court\'s prior decision must be a valid and final
> judgment; (2) the latter suit must involve the same claim or cause of
> action litigated in the first suit; (3) the decision in the original
> action must have been on the merits; and (4) the same parties must be
> involved in both cases.

*Neves*, *supra*.

The parties each assert that elements (1), (3), and (4) are met in the
instant case, and the Court agrees. *Ibid*. Specifically, *Bissonnette
I*, *supra*, was a valid and final judgment involving Mr. Bissonnette
and the Secretary, and it was rendered \"on the merits\" -- that is,
\"on the substance of the claim advanced\", because the EED claim was
denied, *Semtek Int\'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, 531 U.S. 497,
501-02 (2001) (quoting **[Restatement (Second) of Judgments]{.smallcaps}
§ 19, cmt. a (1980)), and** stating that **in every jurisdiction \"on
the merits\" denotes decision \"that actually \'passes directly on the
substance of \[a particular\] claim\'\" and is \"the meaning intended in
those many statements to the effect that a judgment \'on the merits\'
triggers the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion\")**. *See
Neves*, *supra*. The parties appear to disagree, however, over whether
the instant appeal \"involve\[s\] the same claim\" as *Bissonnette I*;
the appellant asserts both (1) that whether his January 1968 letter is
an NOD \"**does not involve** the same claim\" as did the March 1998
decision (Br. at 10‑11) and (2) that the Secretary\'s \"assertion that
these claims are the same . . . is correct \[but that\] it is
**incorrect** that the theory of entitlement to an \[EED\] is the same
theory previously made \[sic\] by the \[a\]ppellant\" (Reply at 2). We
reject the appellant\'s first argument because both the claim before the
Court in March 1998 and the claim now on appeal were for an \"effective
date earlier than May 27, 1993, for the grant of service connection for
a seizure disorder.\" *Compare* *Bissonnette* *I*, 2002 WL 31513330, at
\*1, *and* R. at 286, *with* R. at 1. Moreover, the appellant\'s
reliance on *Andre* for his assertion is not persuasive; *Andre* stated
that \"each \'specific\' assertion of CUE constitutes a \[separate\]
claim\", and, as the Secretary contends, now that the appellant has
withdrawn his CUE claim, that statement has no bearing on the instant
appeal. *Andre*, 301 F. 3d at 1361 (stating that \"\[o\]ur decision
turns on the fact that Mr. Andre\'s case involves CUE claims\").

As to the appellant\'s second argument, he asserts that he is not barred
\"in VA law\" from presenting an additional theory with respect to a
previously litigated claim. Reply at 5-6. That contention is directly
refuted by this Court\'s caselaw; specifically, in *McDowell*, this
Court held that claim preclusion applies to \"further claims by the
parties or their privies based on the same cause of action, including
the issues actually litigated and determined in that suit, ***as well as
those which might have been litigated or adjudicated therein***.\"
*McDowell*, 5 Vet.App. at 405 (emphasis added) (citing *Lawlor v. Nat\'l
Screen Serv. Corp*., 349 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1955)); *see also Federated
Dep\'t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie*, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (\"\[a\] final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were ***or could have been***
raised in that action\" (emphasis added)); *Comm\'r v. Sunnen*, 333 U.S.
591 (1948); *cf. Smith (Barbara) v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App. 267, 277
(1991) (quoting *Williams v. North Carolina*, 325 U.S. 226, 233-34
(1945), for proposition that res judicata includes issues in a claim
that claimant \"permitted . . . to pass without objection\"). The Court
also stated in *Hamilton (Stanley) v. Brown*:

> \"The remaining question is simply whether respondents having failed
> to raise the question in the proceeding to which they were parties and
> in which they could have raised it and had it finally determined, were
> privileged to remain quiet and raise it in a subsequent suit. Such a
> view is contrary to the well‑settled principle that res judicata may
> be pleaded as a bar, not only as respects matters actually presented
> to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding,
> \'***but also as respects any other available matter which might have
> been presented to that end***\'.\"

*Hamilton*, 4 Vet.App. 528, 539 (1993) (en banc) (emphasis added in
*Hamilton*) (quoting *Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank*, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940)).

In essence, the res judicata precedent ensures that a litigant may have
his or her day in Court, but not two or three. The appellant previously
had his day in this Court to argue that he is entitled to an effective
date earlier than May 27, 1993; his original EED claim was denied by the
Board in November 1996 in the context of the Board\'s finding that he
had abandoned November 1967 and May 1971 claims by failing to report for
examination (R. at 292-95), and he cannot now assert an EED based on a
contention that he filed an NOD as to the RO\'s denial of that November
1967 claim. *See Federated Dep\'t Stores*, *McDowell*, and *Hamilton*,
all *supra*; *cf. Costantino v. West,* 12 Vet.App. 517, 521 (1999)
(refusing to hear arguments raised for first time in appellant\'s reply
brief); *Henderson v. West,* 12 Vet.App. 11, 18-19 (1998) (same);
*Carbino v. Gober,* 10 Vet.App. 507, 511 (1997) (same), *aff\'d,* 168
F.3d 32, 34 (Fed. Cir.1999) (stating that \"cogent reasons for not
permitting an appellant to raise issues or arguments in a reply brief\"
include \"unfairness to the appellee who does not have an opportunity to
respond and the added burden on the court that a contrary practice would
entail\"). The latter argument should have been raised in the prior
litigation, and the Court, having heard and decided that claim, cannot
reopen its doors to hear an argument that could have been raised the
first time. Again, the appellant\'s *Andre* arguments are unavailing in
this regard both (1) because *Andre* dealt with CUE claims, which
require specific pleadings by a claimant, *see Fugo v. Brown*, 6
Vet.App. 40, 44 (1993), and (2) because the instant case involves the
preclusive effect of a prior judicial decision, whereas *Andre* involved
specific issues not raised before the department in an underlying CUE
adjudication. *See Andre*, *supra*. Finally, because the appellant had a
\"\'full and fair opportunity\'\" to litigate his claim, there are no
due-process concerns that would render inapplicable res judicata to the
instant claim*. Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp.*, 456 U.S. 461, 480-81
(1982) (citations omitted). The Court has considered the appellant\'s
supplemental notice with regard to *Littlejohn*, *supra*, and does not
find that that case persuasively undercuts the res-judicata authority
addressed above.

**IV. Conclusion**

On the basis of the above analysis, the record on appeal, and the
parties\' pleadings, the Court holds that the appellant has not
demonstrated that the Board committed error in dismissing based on res
judicata the appellant\'s claim for an EED for the award of service
connection for his seizure disorder. Accordingly, the April 6, 2001,
Board decision is affirmed.

> AFFIRMED.