TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HORTICULTURE & ORGANIC AGRICULTURE

JOEL NELSEN, PRESIDENT

CALIFORNIA CITRUS MUTUAL

OCTOBER 3, 2007

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee; as noted my
name is Joel Nelsen and I am president of California Citrus Mutual
(CCM), a citrus producers' trade association in California. Our
membership is statewide and consists of 2,200 farm families producing
citrus on almost 300,000 acres, with an economic value exceeding \$1.3
billion. CCM greatly appreciates the opportunity to share our views and
concerns on an issue that is extremely important to the California
citrus industry.

Today I want to provide a justification for why CCM and other industry
organizations strongly support legislation to transfer the Agriculture
Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) functions from the Department of
Homeland Security back to the Department of Agriculture (H.R. 2629 and
S. 887). We want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for including this
legislation in the House Agriculture Committee-approved version of the
2007 Farm Bill, and we also want to commend Congressman Putnam and
Senator Feinstein for their leadership on this issue in the House and
the Senate. CCM strongly believes that this legislation is necessary to
ensure the protection of U.S. agriculture from the threat of invasive
pests and diseases.

As an industry totally reliant upon fresh fruit sales for economic
viability, we have always been sensitive to issues surrounding invasive
pests and diseases. We have suffered through quarantines in the San
Diego and Riverside areas. We have lost lemon sales in Ventura County as
a result a of Medfly outbreak. Fruit flies in Fresno County have limited
our ability to export to China.

These quarantines adversely impact sales, require specific cultural
practices that destroy integrated pest management programs, cost jobs
and are a public relations nightmare. They have a tremendous negative
cost impact on state and local government not withstanding the hundreds
of millions of dollars allocated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The ripple effects are countless, ranging from transportation, ports,
and local businesses.

Our state and our industry was the first to partner with USDA and
utilize a sterile fly approach to eradication programs. Our industry has
always been at the forefront of efforts to maximize budget support for
pest exclusion activities at the state and federal level. The challenges
in this area have been increasing, with the most notable at the federal
level now being a mandate that the Office of Management and Budget agree
to eradication dollars before they are spent by USDA. I submit that's
synonymous with a fire chief calling a mayor and needing to receive
permission to race to a site in order to put out a fire.

The cost and frequency of these programs have now reached a level that
has triggered action by state and local government to seek financial
support to help underwrite eradication programs from impacted
stakeholders. Going back to my fire chief metaphor that's synonymous
with a home owner being forced to write a check to the fire captain
before the water is released. Specialty crop growers are the primary
victims in this alarming scenario.

In 1994, our organization, along with a sister group in California, led
the effort to change the funding methodology for agricultural inspection
at ports of entry. We led the charge for authorization and then helped
the Agricultural Committee in the floor fight with appropriators. The
existing method for funding port of entry inspections was achieved
during that fight.

I make mention of all this to emphasize the fact that we are an integral
part of and supporter for the ag inspection program. Staff members of
APHIS are very tired of me as I constantly participate and advocate in
their budget, policy, education and implementation components of this
valuable program. The Department of Homeland Security is now becoming
well aware of us also.

We have a passion for the program, we understand it and no other
agricultural entity has a greater working knowledge of this program.
This passion was first presented to DHS in 2003 when a small group of
CEO's from agricultural organizations across the country met with
Commissioner Bonner and senior assistant Jay Ahern. At that meeting we
were assured of the following: *that the program would be better than
ever; that* *one face at the border would work; that there are more
inspectors working to protect agriculture with the merger of Customs &
Border Protection; that CBP is sensitive to our concerns and remains
open to stakeholder communications; that training and education will be
cornerstones of the program; and that we have an* *excellent working
relationship with USDA*. These statements were elements of that
discussion.

Unfortunately, this situation did not materialize. Since then I have had
no less than six meetings at DHS headquarters in which I was assured
identified problems were being corrected. Identified problems ranged
from the slowness of the training program, adequate utilization of AQI
dollars, the reduction in interceptions, interagency battles, a major
deterioration of the beagle brigade program, and high staff turnover,
just to name a few.

In 2004, I took a copy of a California Department of Food & Agriculture
report entitled *Protecting California from Biological Pollution* which
dealt with invasive species, thereby emphasizing the need to "get the
DHS act together" so to speak. My colleagues and I became alarmed at the
attrition rate as new management styles and new priorities encumbered
the mission of USDA transfers. We soon asked respective members of
Congress to initiate their own studies.

Below is a brief listing of what was collectively developed:

-   May, 2004, a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on
    Border Security and Agriculture

-   March, 2005, GAO report determines that defenses against
    agro-terrorism needs bolstering

-   May, 2006, GAO report states that Management & Coordination Problems
    Increase Agriculture Vulnerability

-   November, 2006, GAO report to House Agriculture Committee regarding
    Agricultural Specialists Views of Program Efficacy after the
    transfer

-   February, 2007 OIG report by DHS and USDA reviewing their joint
    activity and program efficacy.

The DHS response basically was recruiting an APHIS employee to run the
program at DHS. The position was filled, but he had no staff nor budget
for too long a period of time. Meanwhile, institutional knowledge left
in droves, position vacancies remained and the quality of the program
suffered. That's the opinion of the industry which was subsequently
confirmed by the plethora of reports listed above. After the November,
2006, GAO report was published members of the specialty crop industry
requested and received a meeting with the report authors. Our
understanding of the report was confirmed. Our fears of quality and
quantity reductions were being realized. The people were over-extended,
management was not focused and our risk was magnified.

Thus, our industry came to the conclusion that enough was enough; the
program must be transferred back to where it belongs, at the Department
of Agriculture. The transfer was a well-intended effort that just didn't
work. Good ideas don't always work, but the real failure is not
recognizing that an effort is failing and doing nothing to correct it.
We mounted an effort to accomplish the only solution visible, transfer
of the functions back to the agency which believed this inspection
program was a priority. Transfer it back to managers that understood the
importance and the nuances of this inspection effort. Transfer it back
to a home where the productivity and quality of the program blooms
rather deteriorates.

That is why we encouraged members of Congress to introduce legislation
to transfer the AQI program back to USDA's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service. The response by DHS to the introduction of this
legislation in Congress has been amazing. Rather than simple verbal
responses we received a game plan in writing. There was a joint session
with stakeholders and the two agencies (albeit with only a two week
notice). Outreach exploded and a road map developed. Communications were
forwarded to members of Congress as to how and why the program is and
will be improved. There's a massive effort, now, to revitalize,
reenergize and rebuild the program.

There's a greater appreciation of the mission, more enlightenment as to
how best to carry it out. It's almost as if a rebirth is occurring and
we should allow the status quo to mature. I've heard it before and now
it's in writing. We heard it in 2003. I heard it in a meeting on
December 9, 2004; July 19, 2005, and then again February 3, 2006. I have
heard it in industry meetings and private discussions for the past four
years.

Well, we're through with second chances, done with third chances, and
tired of fourth chances. It's not as if a path for improvement had never
been identified. I read the reports, you read the reports but nobody of
consequence acted as a result of the reports. And now the agencies and
certain members of Congress ask us for one more chance with the status
quo?

That fact remains that DHS has failed to properly implement this
component of their mission. But who pays the price? Stakeholders are
quarantined, USDA and states are responsible for the eradication
project, but from DHS all we get is another pledge. A close examination
of the training regime speaks to the fact that almost an entire team of
1,800 transfers has been hired and trained to replace original
employees. The diverse dynamics of the existing CBP mission may not be
compatible.

I do not believe that a transfer back to USDA would lead to another
degradation of the program or another "cultural shock" which was one
excuse after the original transfer. The employees would be working for
the management team that trained them, established the benchmarks for
improvement, established the operational guidelines and that have the
passion for the mission. That's defined as one team on the same page at
all times. That's defined as a management team that is singularly
focused and creates a climate of responsibility for optimum job
performance, satisfaction, reward, recognition and ultimately success.
It's now a management issue, not a line or personnel problem.

A tremendous amount of rhetoric is being disseminated regarding the
efforts and efficacy of the new personnel and new and improved program.
But the reality is that we have heard it all before. Sure, we all want
to believe in the new energy, but it's a management problem. [The
framework does not exist at the Department of Homeland Security to
achieve the desired results]{.underline}. Four years worth of history
proves that point. Adoptions are a great thing but in most cases there
is no place like home.

CCM strongly urges Congress to enact legislation to transfer the AQI
program from DHS back to USDA's APHIS (H.R. 2629 and S. 887). We believe
this will greatly improve the AQI function and is necessary to
adequately protect U.S. agricultural producers and other stakeholders
from the threat and highly adverse impacts of invasive pests and
diseases.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to express CCM's views in an
effort to improve the efficiency of an important government program.